“Managing Diversity” in U.S. Popular Culture, Politics, and Education in the 1990s

Lisa Renee Schubert

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2020

Reading Committee:

Eva Cherniavsky, Chair

Anis Bawarshi

Wendy Swyt

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Department of English

University of Washington

Abstract

"Managing Diversity"
in U.S. Popular Culture, Politics, and Education in the 1990s

Lisa Renee Schubert

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

Eva Cherniavsky

English

This dissertation examines how multinational corporations influenced U.S. popular culture, politics, and education in the 1990s. In contrast to the Reagan years--in which white women and people of color were frequently positioned as the cause of both a historically high unemployment rate and an erosion of U.S. public education--the 1990s were marked by a discursive shift as corporations sought to profit in an increasingly globalized and diversified marketplace. This shift is evidenced in popular culture through films such as *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves* (1991) in which the Medieval folk legend heroized for robbing from the rich to give to the poor is re-imagined as a multicultural manager who regains his own lands by harnessing the talents of a white woman and a Black Muslim. It is evidenced by President Clinton's 1992 pledge "to bring our people together as never before so that our diversity can be a source of strength in a world that is ever smaller." And it is evidenced in education, both in K-12 education, pressured into producing flexibly specialized entrepreneurs who could market their "differences" to corporations looking to hire people with the best "differences" for the job, and academia, where white women and people of color finally gained cultural capital only to position it as the rarefied possession of the few. This new strategy of managing diversity, however, also meant managing adversity, not only as a growing number of white women and people of color asserted themselves in civic, corporate, and political life but because it relied on exploiting the full diversity of people in the US and across the globe, including poorly paid service and production workers and a previously more empowered group, white working class men. Finally, as an introduction to this dissertation, I explain why it took me 26 years to come back to finish it, originally slated to be completed in 1994, as I myself was part of the diversity managed in the 1990s as the result of my original PhD supervisor's sexual harassment and the University's then response.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1:	Introduction	1
Chapter 2:	Managing a Multicultural Workforce in Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves	35
Chapter 3:	The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 1990s	65
Chapter 4:	For the ‘Public Good’: Contradictions in Contemporary Literary Theory	98

Chapter 1: Introduction

1

Afterwards, there is often silence. This is in part due to the high prevalence of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder that survivors of sexual harassment and assault experience. Silence, as survivors blame themselves, wondering if they couldn't have done something differently, embarrassed that they didn't see it coming, bereft that they had no power to stop it. Silence, as survivors realize what they had envisioned for their future will no longer be, and they struggle to explain to themselves and to others what happened. Silence, as the institution's walls go up to protect its assets, and in many cases as in mine, silence, because a non-disclosure agreement demands it.

In 1993, I was a twenty-seven year old PhD candidate in English at the University of Washington. In that year, I had received the University's award for best writing instructor as nominated by the students and voted on by the faculty and a PEW Foundation award as one of 200 promising graduate student instructors across the nation. For the 1993-1994 academic year, I had received an appointment as the first graduate student fellow at the University's new Center for the Humanities, a think tank on the liberal arts that invites scholars from around the country to think and write, and to present what they have been thinking and writing about for a year.

But as that year unfolded, instead of thinking and writing, I was sitting outside the University's Office of the Ombud, waiting for my second appointment. At the first appointment, after many months of trying to handle the problem myself, I had revealed that my dissertation director, who was also the Director of Graduate Studies in the English Department at the University--a very powerful man in the department, at the University, and in my field of American cultural studies nationally, and whose recommendation letter and connections would largely determine my first job out of graduate school--was making unwanted sexual advances. He had been my faculty adviser since the end of my first year in graduate school, 1989. Twenty years my senior, he was, to me, a father figure. He was the smartest person I had ever met in my life, the professor I trusted to guide both my master's and doctoral degrees, the human being I most wanted to fashion my research, teaching, and career after. I loved him in the sense that a student loves her favorite teacher.

So I didn't really make much of it, the first time he brushed his fingers up my arm when we were talking about a chapter in a book he was writing. Since I had passed my doctoral exams in 1992, I had been an editor of his work. He shaped the direction of mine, and we also co-authored articles for publication. Weekly we were huddled together over one piece of writing or another. When he touched me that time, I just thought he didn't have enough space at the table, and I moved my chair a bit to give him more room.

It wasn't until his advances became more flagrant just a short while later that I recognized what he was doing was intentional. As he pulled me onto his lap or pinned me to a desk, I remember at first being simply confused. His behavior was so completely unexpected, like your best friend turning around one day and stabbing you with a knife. I didn't know how to process it. Here was my most trusted academic adviser, who knew I had married my high school sweetheart just a couple years prior, expecting me to kiss him back, expecting to end our editing sessions together with sex. *What?*

That first time I could hardly speak. I remember shaking my head; I remember sidestepping him; I remember moving out from under him and out the door. When I could process what he wanted, I came back to him in a calm moment and explained this type of relationship was not what I wanted. I told him--I remember these words--I wanted “a teacher-student relationship.” I was gentle, not confrontational. I missed him, the person I thought he was. I wanted my teacher back.

And for a while, he complied. Our work together resumed a state of tenuous normalcy. I write “tenuous” because already my doctoral work was being affected. The purpose of academic writing is twofold: to establish the author as well-read in the field, and therefore a credible source of information, and to assert something new. As such, it is a performance intended to impress its audience with a display of knowledge and cause its audience to re-think prior conceptions. As my master’s and doctoral director, my teacher had been the intended audience of all of my academic writing, a representative of the larger intellectual community that would read my work. Prior to his advances, I loved to dazzle him. After his advances, I found it increasingly difficult to perform.

Meanwhile, a month would pass, and he would be right back to kissing me, caressing my hair, or placing his hand on my thigh. I remember meeting him on a bench in a park one day to talk this out, far from the ears of anyone else. I remember telling him to stop several times in his office or mine. Each time, he would resolve to stop but never did. Finally, months into his advances, I remember shouting at him to stop so loudly that it seemed to register in his brain, and he went across the hall to the men’s restroom. I could hear him retching, as if finally aware and disgusted with his own behavior. But instead of coming out and apologizing to me, and promising to me that he would never touch me again, he did just the reverse. Standing in the hall on the 4th floor of Padelford, the building that houses the English Department at the University of Washington, its Director of Graduate Studies told me, “If you can’t love me the way I love you, I can no longer grant your PhD.”

2

My studies in graduate school had taken a turn from what I originally thought I would pursue after I graduated from the University of Minnesota with a bachelor’s degree in English. There, my professors Roberta Trooien, Lillian Bridwell-Bowles, Toni McNaron, and Shirley Garner had opened my thinking to the ways in which women’s perspectives had been left out of psychology, history, literature, philosophy, and language. It was Roberta who in first year composition placed Anne Wilson Schaef’s *Women’s Reality* (1981) on my desk before the start of class one day and suggested I might like to read it. In Lillian’s course, Dale Spender’s *Man Made Language* (1980) caused me to consider not just how texts but words and sentences are reflective of relationships of power. The sole content of Toni and Shirley’s 16-credit seminar for advanced undergraduates was women’s autobiography, such was their belief that the diversity of women’s experiences should be valued as much as the traditional canon of white male authors. We read Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua’s *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1981), Audre Lorde’s *Zami: A New Spelling of My Name* (1982), Adrienne Rich’s *On Lies, Secrets,and Silence* (1979), Maya Angelou’s *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings* (1969), and Tillie Olsen’s “I Stand Here Ironing” (1961), among many others. And then we wrote our own autobiographies, as if even our lives--which were just beginning--mattered. To graduate with a bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota in 1988, I submitted a thesis on women's ways of writing. Influenced by French feminist literary theorists Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, I argued that women could embrace a more diffuse mode of discourse distinct from the singular assertion of a thesis that dominated rhetoric and composition all the way back to Aristotle.

It was with the nurturing of what felt like a women's collective at the University of Minnesota and the expectation that I would become the kind of English professor who had mentored, valued, and liberated me--liberated in the sense of empowering me, the granddaughter of tenant farmers in Southwest Minnesota, to consider that I could make a living by thinking, writing, and teaching, and liberated in the sense of recognizing that what might be perceived as mundane and ordinary at the moment--ironing, for example, or raising children--was, in fact, extraordinarily significant and worth studying--that I pursued a PhD at the University of Washington.

But as I entered graduate school in the fall of 1988, my expectations shifted. The voices of "ordinary" women that had been valued at the University of Minnesota didn't appear on the reading lists of my graduate school seminars. Certainly there were women writers represented, but they tended to be the classics of the traditionally understood canon, such as Emily Dickinson. And there was no discernable women's collective at the University of Washington. The discussions around a table in a graduate school seminar were marked more by competition than collaboration, each student trying to out talk the last in effort to impress the professor. It was even rumored that professors shared a secret "black book" in which they passed notes between them about the intellectual potential of each graduate student, noting which ones of us belonged in academia and, derisively and dismissively, which ones did not.

I found myself now surrounded by something perhaps ignorantly I did not anticipate: the elitism of academia. The comments of my relatives in Minnesota heightened my awareness of the distance between us. On one of my visits home, my Aunt Lavonne, a dairy farmer, wondered why a college graduate had to go to "graduate" school. "I bet you think you're going to be smarter than me," she chuckled, her eyes disapproving. My Uncle Gary, a short-haul trucker who in a fit of depression and a spat with his wife would later shoot himself to death in a barn, confessed to me that he always wanted to be a writer. He wanted to know if helping people become writers was what I was doing in Seattle. "The kind," he said, "that wrote Hallmark cards and brightened people's days."

Because I wanted to better understand "what I was doing in Seattle" and what separated me in the world of "ideas" from my relatives in the world of "work," class analysis became just as prominent in my studies as feminist theory. *Writing and Sexual Difference* (edited by Elizabeth Abel,1982) made way for Harry Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (1974). I read Marx's *Das Capital* and theorists who considered themselves Marxist. Of these, I remember being particularly struck by Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich's work "The Professional-Managerial Class" (1979). The PMC, these authors theorize, is a new class that arose in monopoly capitalism, neither capitalist nor proletariat but situated between the two. These teachers and social workers, middle managers and government policymakers were "salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations" (13). The PMC--the thinkers--and the working class--the doers--were both situated opposite the capitalists but were set up to be antagonists, with the former controlling the work of the latter and the latter resenting the former. If the progressive left was to be successful in bringing about a more just and humane order, according to the Ehrenreichs, these two classes, rather than pitched against each other, would have to work together.

Recognizing that as a university professor I would be a member of the PMC, I set out to understand the capitalist culture and capitalist class relations I was in training to reproduce. I studied the history of the discipline of English in the United States. What I knew from my experiences at the University of Minnesota is that the feminist and civil rights movements, bursting with activity in the 1960s, had a great influence on the discipline, but I thought there might be more reasons to explain this intellectual competition--everywhere present in the UW's Department of English--so antithetical to the feminist and civil rights movements themselves. To understand the historical context, I began to read in various academic fields but most notably in the discipline of education, no doubt in part because I saw myself as primarily becoming an educator, and in part because, like the discipline of English, the discipline of education changed dramatically starting in the 1960s. The changes made in public education as explained by the "new sociology of education theorists," such as Michael Apple in *Teachers and Texts: A Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education* (1986), were a watershed for my exploration as they suggested a closer look at two intertwined external pressures: corporate interests and national identity.

This exploration resulted in my first publication. In "For the 'Public Good': Contradictions in Contemporary Literary Theory," I contrast the New Critics who started out the 20th century examining poems as if under a microscope, deliberately eschewing the cultural contexts of their objects of study, with the new literary theorists who emerged after the civil rights and feminist movements on the 1960s: the French feminists, Derridian deconstructionists, Lacanian psychoanalysists, and postcolonial theorists. Although these pre- and post-1960s English faculty seem to be antithetical to one another, or even that the latter arose in reaction to the former, I argue that both the New Critics and the "new theorists" were influenced by the corporate and national interests prevalent at their respective times. Thus, while the establishment of literary theory as an institution in the 1970s and 80s developed a new cultural capital for white women and people of color, it inadvertently mirrored the exclusionary economic practices and organization of capitalist American society. Although now espousing ideas to empower white women and people of color, these new theorists did so within the confines of an institution that valued hierarchy and competition. The winners in this race for new technologies and new discourses were the new theorists. But like the New Critics, the new theorists positioned cultural capital as the rarified possession of the few, in this case those who have the time and money to struggle through graduate seminars on Derridian deconstruction. Indeed, by reifying rather than disrupting the exclusionary practices of an institution built to maintain the social order, the new theorists reinforced what the Ehrenreichs feared. Rather than bringing the PMC and the working classes together, the new theorists reinscribed the distance between the two, furthering the resentment of academia by people who cannot see themselves in ideas they do not participate in creating, and blunting the possibility for transformative social change.

In addition to “The Professional-Managerial Class,” another text that greatly informed my thinking was Alan Trachtenberg’s *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age* (1982). His concern is the emergence of corporations in the post-Civil War era that rapidly overtook smaller scale, often family-centered modes of production and that concentrated wealth and ownership into fewer and fewer hands. Trachtenberg is careful to claim that this concentration of power wasn’t without resistance or contradiction. The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 was one example of resistance, as the railroad workers struck en masse over wage cuts caused by the panic of 1893. But Trachtenberg shows that time and time again corporations overcame these conflicts by positioning their interests, which in reality were the interests of stockholders, as the interests of the American populace. For example, Trachtenberg explains that mining, timber, and railroad companies supported the Homestead Act of 1862 because, while promising 160 acres to every farmer who could put down $10, Congress granted millions of acres free-of-charge to corporations. Thus, during the post-Civil War period, Trachtenberg evidences, far more land was purchased by farmers from these mining, timber, and railroad corporations than they received from the Homestead Act itself (22).

Trachtenberg’s greatest gift to me as a young graduate student was his analysis not of those who benefitted from that concentration of wealth but of ordinary Americans. Department stores, according to Trachtenberg, taught people how to be “middle class,” with even the growing numbers of clerks and assembly line workers able to escape being “working class” while in them. Another aspect of Trachtenberg’s writing I admired is that although he led with class analysis, he recognized the intersectionality of race and gender. To justify to predominantly white Christians in the East the murderous extermination of the Native American population in the West, for example, he demonstrates that Westward expansion was portrayed as white "civilization" advancing against Native American "savagery." Dime store novels and roadshow characters such as Buffalo Bill, for other examples, enabled Eastcoast city dwellers, whose working lives were increasingly demasculinized by the mechanisms of scientific management, to imagine a more rugged, more autonomous life in the West. His central question, "How did changing forms and methods in industry and business affect the culture of American society in the Gilded Age, the shape and texture of daily life, and the thinking of Americans?" (4) became a model for my dissertation in a different time period. Through Trachtenberg's writing, I saw the tracks laid in the 1860s and 1870s for what would later appear as Lee Iaccocas's call to "Make America Great Again" in the 1980s. It provided a model for the central question I took for my dissertation: How did the interests of now multinational corporations in the 1960s - 1990s influence U.S. national identity and the lives of everyday Americans?

In 1992, I wrote my dissertation proposal like this:

In *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Frederic Jameson proffers that there have been three dominant cultural movements that concur with what economist Ernst Mandel has labelled the three stages of capitalism in the West. With the beginnings of industrial capitalism, Jameson pairs realism; with monopoly capitalism at the turn of the 20th century, he links modernism; and with the current stage of capitalism, what has variously been called late or multinational capitalism, he positions postmodernism. More than merely co-existing at the same time, however, these cultural movements represent stages in what Jameson sees as a history of capitalism increasingly colonizing everything that had previously existed "outside" of it, as yet unassimilated. Similar to E.P. Thompson arguing that our sense of “time” shifted as industrial capitalism developed--from agricultural, seasonal, and solar time to the much more precise, clocked, factory time--Jameson argues that during monopoly capitalism “commodity culture” became so pervasive that the only refuge left was manifested in the work of the high modernists. The modernist was always in the process of “making it new” to resist succumbing to the rapid encroachment of a commodity culture that threatened to make everything the same.

In late capitalism, then, according to this model, the cultural struggle is over. We are not only surrounded by but born into the commodified culture of television, advertisement, Hollywood movies, roadside billboards--a veritable Mall of America. Thus, from Jameson’s Marxian view of “history” as propelled by a dialectics of dominance and opposition, we are all caught, stuck in the perpetual present. If, as orthodox Marxism proposes, resistance stems from a worker’s relations to the means of production, resistance dissipates where no real relationship of a subject to his or her material conditions, unmediated by the media, is possible.

My dissertation is also an attempt to characterize the period that falls roughly between the 1960s and the 1990s. But whereas for Jameson history is stuck in a perpetual present because there no longer exists a class-based resistance that has been able to maintain its integrity, I argue that history cannot be described in terms of an “outside” that was increasingly cannibalized by an always expanding “inside” of omnivorous capitalism. Rather, I work toward a theoretical understanding of history as possibility, where dominance and opposition emanate from an interaction of discourses representing various positions in a heterogeneous social formation. For while it is true, as for example Georg Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness* posits, that the commodity “obfuscates social relations,” social relations *never* existed in some sterile or purified form. As the more recent work of theorists such as Stuart Hall in cultural studies, Teresa de Lauretis in film and literary theory, Michel Foucault in philosophy, and Pierre Bourdieu in sociology has convincingly demonstrated, social relations are constituted by competing and conflicting discourses. What the proliferation of commodity culture does register, however, is a shift in the sites of the most visible and therefore most powerful discursive constructs, from the site of production to the site of consumption. The underlying premise of my dissertation is that popular culture is a site of struggle and strategy for position, rather than, as in postmodern constructions, just a site of surrender.

The discourses that constitute popular culture, no less than in other fields of a social formation, are imbued with relationships of power. Since I am most interested in understanding how resistances appear differently as capitalism shifts, develops, and itself changes in response to oppositional politics located in the intersections of class with race and gender, the theoretical task of my project is to demonstrate that discourses about "class" are also discourses about race and gender. For in popular culture of the 1960s through the 1990s, representations of class have as much to do with the gradual empowerment of white women and people of color in the U.S. as they do with economic narratives of the deindustrialization of America.

3

In the early 1990s, I finished and published two more chapters of my dissertation. In "Managing a Multicultural Workforce in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*," I contrast the rhetoric of national identity in the Reagan years--in which white women and people of color were frequently positioned as the cause of both a historically high unemployment rate and an erosion of U.S. public education --with a discursive shift in the 1990s as corporations sought to profit in an increasingly globalized and diversified marketplace. No longer disparaging diversity, the white male hero in the 1991 version of *Robin Hood* "manages diversity," with Maid Marian now portrayed as a feminist and Hood's sidekick, Azim, a Black Muslim. The film makes clear that neither Azim nor Marian consider themselves subordinate to Robin, so if he wants to achieve his corporate ends--which interestingly are not to rob the rich and give to the poor but to reclaim his own land--he must manage them prudently. Similarly, President Clinton, who took office in 1992, pledged to make his cabinet "look like the face of America" and "to bring our people together as never before so that our diversity can be a source of strength in a world." But as I argue in this essay, by "managing diversity" to benefit from the increasingly segmented marketplace, both Robin Hood and President Clinton must also manage adversity at home, as the tensions between national sovereignty and multinational corporate interests are exacerbated.

I had picked up this shift in corporate discourse--a shift from dismissing or disparaging diversity to "managing" it--from the business management books my husband Jeff was bringing home from work. At the time, he was the business, scientific, and technical book buyer for Elliott Bay Book Company, and I couldn't help but notice these publisher galleys increasingly contained the words "diversity," "multicultural," and "manage": John Fernandez' *Managing a Diverse Workforce: Regaining a Competitive Edge* (1991); Sondra Thiederman's *Bridging Cultural Barriers for Success: How to Manage the Multicultural Work Force* (1991) and her *Profiting in America's Multicultural Marketplace: How to Do Business Across Cultural Lines* (1991); and Roosevelt Thomas' *Beyond Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Workforce by Managing Diversity* (1992), among others.

It was this shift in corporate strategy and its implications for public education that was the focus of the essay Evan Watkins and I co-authored called "The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 1990s" published in *After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s*. Although one dominant reaction in the 1980s to the rise of feminist, postcolonial, and Marxist theories in the humanities was a call to return to "cultural literacy," a canon of work that every American child must read to instill common values and unite the nation, in this essay we argue that a new discourse arose during that time to position corporations to profit from the increasingly global and segmented marketplace. This new corporate strategy did not seek to "return" to some sterilized vision of culture without diversity, but it did not embrace affirmative action or even a valuing differences approach, either. As written into the title of Roosevelt Thomas' book, it was *Beyond Race and Gender*. This new corporate strategy sought to "manage diversity" and to influence public education to produce the "best person for the job," while eliding the continuing deprivations of those left behind.

What would have been the fourth chapter of my dissertation was at least drafted but now lost with the prevailing technology of the day, a floppy disk. In it, I argue that another narrative developed in response to white women and people of color asserting themselves in civic, corporate, and political life. The white working class men portrayed as the heroic figures of such popular movies as *Rocky* and *Saturday Night Fever* in the 1970s were by the early 1990s cast in an entirely different light. Their presence in popular culture was no longer as the sympathetic character--the Rocky Balboa or Tony Manero-- but as a repository of a racism and sexism so egregiously and obviously "dated" that a new type of white male leader could ascend in contrast.

This new white male hero would acknowledge the equality of white women and people of color while at the same time seeking to save them from those who have treated them unfairly, often now white working class men.

Thelma & Louise, the 1991 feminist film classic, is a prototype of this depiction. After Louise shoots Thelma's would-be rapist in the parking lot of a bar, Thelma's first thought is that they should go to the police. "We should tell them he was raping me," she pleads. But Louise retorts, "Who's going to believe that? We don't live in that kind of world." The kind of world they live in is dominated by men like Thelma's husband Darryl, a carpet salesman who runs around with other women while controlling Thelma's every move; a salacious semi-truck driver who wags his tongue when the women pass him on the road and hollers, "You ready for a big dick?"; a sweet talking drifter who sleeps with Thelma and then steals all of their money; and the Arkansas state detectives who call the women "girls" and coach Darryl to tell Thelma that he loves her because "women love that shit." In this kind of world where sexual harassment, gender harassment, and sexual violence dominate, Thelma and Louise don't stand a chance of seeing justice, so they take justice into their own hands: They shoot the rapist, rob a convenience store, and blow up the truck of the semi-truck driver after he refuses to apologize.

In many respects this film continues the feminist saga started in the 1980 film *9 to 5*. The same type of male characters are present: In *9 to 5,* when Judy Bernley's husband cheats on her and runs off with a secretary, she is forced to go to work and finds an office job at Consolidated Companies. Her new boss sexually harasses her co-worker Doralee Rhodes while taking the best ideas of his office manager, Violet Newstead, without giving her any credit. Like Thelma and

Louise ten years later, the three women take justice into their own hands, tying up their boss in his home while gathering evidence that he has been embezzling from their company.

But while both movies play as fantasies of what women would like to do to men who diminish their accomplishments, relegate them to subordinate positions, and sexually harass them, the movies are different in how they represent class. In the 1980 movie, the white male perpetrator is portrayed as a corporate executive. In the 1991 film, it is white working class men--a carpet salesman, a bar lizard, a drifter, a semi-truck driver--who are the purveyors of sexism, sexual assault, and harassment while the white male executive is cast in a positive light. Indeed, the man in the suit and tie in *Thelma & Louise*-- the Arkansas state investigator Hal--is the only man portrayed as if he's attended some sort of sensitivity training. He tells Louise that he understands why they're running, he knows what happened to Louise in Texas (the inference is she was raped there), and if they turn themselves in, he will try to get the best deal possible for them. Most notably, while the other police officers draw their guns on the women trapped on the edge of the Grand Canyon, Hal runs--in slow motion--to save them.

Hal is the archetype of the new white male manager that emerged in the 1990s. He doesn't represent the gross caricatures of sexism now embodied in the white working class male characters, but he doesn't represent justice, either. His attempt to "save" the women appears as much an attempt to save the authoritative position of the white middle class male manager, now increasingly threatened by competent, assertive, fed-up women like Thelma and Louise.

But what makes *Thelma & Louise* such an iconic feminist film is that the two women reject Hal's attempts to save them. Given the choice of surrendering to him or certain death, the two women kiss each other and drive off a cliff.

4

I didn't know where to get help in those days before there was anything like an Office for Sexual Harassment. I started by revealing what by then had been months of sexual advances to two close friends in graduate school. Surprisingly and sadly, they also had been approached sexually by male professors in the department. One had complied, engaging in a sexual act with her professor; the other had successfully escaped. Although they could have joined me in pursuing charges, it was too risky for them to do so. Just a couple of years prior, Clarence Thomas had been confirmed by the Senate as a Supreme Court justice, despite the explicit testimony of Anita Hill. In a "he-said, she-said" case, there was more evidence to suggest that what "she-said" didn't matter. And both of my friends had women as their dissertation directors, and thus ultimately did not have fates that rested on the approval of these men.

They escorted me to my first appointment with the Ombud and sat outside the door. The Ombud explained to me that what the University did in circumstances like this is arrange for a panel of professors to speak to the offending professor about how his behavior must change. She asked me to sign an agreement to what she called "mediation"--this process she had explained--and I signed it, still in a state of shock. I took my copy and went home.

That night was the first time I revealed any of this was happening to my husband. I know that must sound strange; it was certainly alienating to my partner of now (in 2020) 38 years. What I wanted in the months I struggled with my professor is to get my teacher back. I saw "getting my teacher back" as inextricably related to getting my PhD, and I knew I would never “get my teacher back” and therefore would not finish my PhD if I had told Jeff. Jeff would have rightly and immediately reported my professor’s behavior to any authority he could find.

We looked at the statement the Ombud had me sign. How could this “panel of professors” succeed in changing what I could not? Even if they could, how could our “teacher-student” relationship ever return to a state of normalcy? How could I resume the dissertation that bore his imprint or immediately establish an intellectual relationship with another professor interested in the same topics?

It wasn’t enough.

The next day, I returned to the Ombud’s Office thinking that her job was to advocate for my interests. I explained my reservations about the mediation process and asked her if there weren’t charges I could pursue, criminal or civil. The Ombud, who in later years prided herself on establishing one of the first sexual harassment centers at a public university, may have been trying to protect me. But to a graduate student asking for help, her words sounded like a threat: “If you pursue charges against the Director of Graduate Studies,” she said, “you will be throwing your academic career away.” She paused and added, “Lisa, you will never see a tenure-track faculty position anywhere.”

In many ways, the Ombud was right. Not one of the three other members on my doctoral committee came forward to support me as I sued the Director of Graduate Studies for sexual discrimination, harassment, assault, and battery--not even the Director of Women’s Studies on whose promotion committee my teacher sat. Tragically, in the midst of writing a dissertation about the shift in corporate and institutional strategy towards “managing diversity,” I myself became “managed” out. Rather than spending that year thinking and writing as a fellow at the Center for the Humanities, with the above chapters of my dissertation published or in process, I left the University without a reference.

5

People often ask why survivors sign these non-disclosure agreements that condemn them to sentences of silence in return for a payment. Simply put, it is because we know no other act of justice will be taken. It was difficult in 1994 to even find an attorney to take my case. The first two I interviewed were men who kept their doors open and asked assistants to join us lest I level an accusation at them. When I did find an attorney willing to take my case, she told me we wouldn’t win if it went to court. The perpetrator would claim either that we had had a consensual relationship or that I had pursued *him*. In 1997, Jennifer Freyd, a professor of psychology, created a term for how perpetrators of sexual abuse often rewrite the narrative to put themselves in the position of the victim. It is called DARVO, which stands for Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and Offender.

It is startling to see how pervasive DARVO is at work in the non-disclosure agreement I signed in 1994. Substituting “Perpetrator” for his name, the purpose of the NDA is stated as the following: “to preserve Perpetrator’s ability to teach and work in his established areas of concentration; to protect Perpetrator’s personal and professional reputation; to prevent further strain to Perpetrator’s marriage; to prevent further personal distress to Perpetrator and his family; to preserve the personal and professional relationships Perpetrator has established; to preserve Perpetrator’s employability as a tenured college professor; to offset the loss of Perpetrator’s ability to defend himself from the Discrimination Claims after execution of this agreement; and to provide Perpetrator with a measure of security that the Discrimination Claims and the issues surrounding them are behind him."

There was no similar language in the NDA to preserve Survivor's ability to teach and work in her areas of concentration; no promise to protect Survivor's personal and professional reputation; no commitment to prevent further strain and distress in Survivor's life; not a word about what measure of security would be provided to Survivor. Nothing to offset the very real and tangible loss of Survivor's ability to defend herself.

A "fact," according to Merriam-Webster's dictionary, is "something that has actual existence." A non-disclosure agreement is a deliberate attempt to rewrite facts out of existence. In return for the resignation of the perpetrator from the position of Director of Graduate Studies in English and $117,000, half of which went to my attorney for taking a "risky" case we were not expected to win, I committed "not to disclose or cause to be disclosed to any third party after the date of this agreement any fact or allegation pertaining to, or incidental to, or raised in or which could have been raised in Schubert's Discrimination Claims." I committed to not disclose "any fact" from that date forward. But facts have "actual existence." They can only be covered over, buried over, like a coffin with a live person in it.

For nearly 25 years I stayed silent. As the perpetrator moved on to another prestigious university, supported by the recommendation letters of University of Washington administrators and faculty colleagues, I walked into a community-based adult literacy center and started my career over as a volunteer tutor. I owe a debt of gratitude to the woman who mentored me in the field of adult literacy, Anne Helmholz, and the students I tutored and taught at Literacy Source, for they taught me how to survive. I stayed silent as I learned how to survive from African American seniors who came back for a high school diploma at age 70. As children in the Jim Crow South, they had gone to school every other day so that they could help support their families picking fruit or loading trucks. I stayed silent as I learned how to survive from Cambodian and Iraqi, Guatemalan and Eritrean refugees in Talk Time and US Citizenship classes whose trauma far exceeded anything I suffered. I stayed silent as I paid for a second master's degree in education to have the credentials to teach high school English and English as a Second Language. Silent again as I rebuilt my career as the director of an adult high school diploma program, of a community college basic skills program, of a statewide adult literacy professional development and advocacy network. When I was the executive director of Wisconsin Literacy, I spoke regularly to the governor's staff and state legislators about the need to increase funding for adult education. Twice per year on Wisconsin Public Radio, I answered callers' questions about the state of adult literacy and its impact on Wisconsin's workforce and communities. But I stayed silent about the sexual harassment that had caused me to change my career. I stayed silent even though, if only for a moment, I thought about the perpetrator's abuse every single day.

In 2018, as the 25th year of my silence approached, I decided I couldn't be silent anymore. The #MeToo movement started by Tarana Burke in 2006 took off in 2017 as one survivor after another stepped forward to accuse Harvey Weinstein of sexual harassment and assault. How powerful it was to hear these women's voices tell the truth--how powerful for these women to talk publicly about his abuse that disrupted their careers and might have influenced their choices of whether or not to have children, frustrated their ability to trust others, impacted their sexual relationships, and visited them time and time again in the dark of night. But also, how powerful for *each other*. One of the most debilitating aspects of the silence survivors suffer is that we can't talk to each other. In fact, the non-disclosure agreements we sign ensure we don't even know about each other.

I knew at the time of my lawsuit in 1994 that there were at least two other graduate students--my friends I had confided in--who had been propositioned for sex by professors at the University of Washington. How many more were there? And what had the University done to protect those who came after me? After *us*? Incredibly, at the time of my lawsuit, the University denied culpability, stating that it did not know what its Director of Graduate Studies in English was doing so could not be held liable. What the University did offer, in a letter to my attorney, was a commitment to improve its sexual harassment polices and procedures. In return for the withdrawal of my claims, the University promised to "restructur[e] its entire complaint process" including "the protection of a complainant when the respondent has a hierarchical position over the complainant. This would include both staff/supervisor and student/faculty relationships." Although the University wouldn't accept responsibility for the behavior of the professor who not only had a hierarchical position over me but all graduate students in the Department of English, I consoled myself at the time and years later that the University had committed to better protect those who came after me. After us.

In April 2018, as I started to think about what I could do to contribute to the movement, I read in the *Seattle Times* that the UW graduate students were refusing to sign their contracts as research and teaching assistants with the University. Incredibly, they were holding out for two things: better pay and better sexual harassment protections. As quoted in the *Times*, Andrea

Canini, vice president of UAW 4121 and an anthropology graduate student, remarked on the prevalence of sexual harassment graduate students suffer: “We know that women, nonbinary people and people of color are constantly harassed and discriminated against in the lab, in the field and in the classroom.” Sam Sumpter, a philosophy graduate student, noted the lack of University procedures in place to protect those graduate students who spoke out against the abuse. “If you’re being harassed by someone who’s writing your letters of recommendation,” she said, “it’s very unlikely you can report harassment — you don’t have a lot of options. You can just suck it up and deal with it, or some leave academia entirely.” A third graduate student, Shua Sanchez, a PhD student in physics, stated that there was no university mechanism to discipline and fire known harassers, claiming that “bad actors can stay in positions of power for literally decades.”

Clearly, 24 years after the University had promised that it would restructure its sexual harassment procedures and preventions to better protect complainants--to better protect *graduate students*--whatever it had done in the decades since wasn’t enough. My first thought was that I could sue the University for breach of contract, except that I had no contract with the University; I had a letter stating its commitment. And my contract with the perpetrator--the non-disclosure agreement I had signed--stipulated that I could neither name him nor the University of Washington for fear that by date and a search of academic employees his identity could be inferred.

The final event that happened in early 2018 that caused me to break my silence seemingly had nothing to do with sexual harassment: Stormy Daniels sued to invalidate her non-disclosure agreement with Donald Trump. Just before the 2016 presidential election, in return for $130,000, she had signed an NDA that kept her silent about their sexual liaison that could have damaged his election prospects. In 2018, she claimed that Trump did not sign the NDA and therefore it was not valid. He could not prevent her from telling the truth. Although hers was not a case of sexual harassment or assault, her lawsuit to reclaim her voice made me realize that non-disclosure agreements could be flawed and maybe even invalid.

In the summer of 2018, I hired Sara Amies, a renowned sexual harassment attorney, to review my 1994 non-disclosure agreement. Was it valid? Could it be breached? And what could I do to learn what the University had actually done to improve protections for graduate students and hold the University accountable for its commitment? Sara advised me that I still could not name the perpetrator. The immediate financial penalties I would suffer if I did so--$30,000 for the first infraction, $50,000 for the second--were no longer in force, written into the NDA as expiring when the perpetrator turned 65 and presumably retired--but he could still say I breached the contract. He would have to show he suffered some financial harm, though, which would be difficult if he was retired. And he would be foolish, she said, to draw attention to himself if I did not.

While she advised me not to name the perpetrator, she said she was surprised that he himself paid me and not the University. The University had given me nothing of monetary value so I certainly did not owe it my silence. To answer the question about what the University had done in the intervening years to improve its sexual harassment procedures and protections for graduate students, she recommended that I write Valery Richardson, the Title IX Coordinator at the University.

Packaged up with copies of my 1994 lawsuit, the letter from the University with its commitment, and the 2018 *Seattle Times* article quoting the voices of graduate students desperate for better protections from sexual harassment, twenty-five years of silence erupted like this:

April 13, 2019

Valery Richardson
Title IX Coordinator
University of Washington
Roosevelt Commons East, Box 354996
4311 11th Avenue NE, Suite 505
Seattle, WA 98105

Dear Ms. Richardson:

Twenty-five years ago, I refused to have sex with my PhD dissertation director at the University of Washington and, as a result of his sexual harassment, did not complete my PhD program.

I write to you now to request information to help me understand what UW has done to ensure students are protected from sexual harassment by their professors. Further, I request information on what processes UW has implemented to ensure that vulnerable students can seek redress for professorial abuse without damage to their academic careers.

After attempting to stop my professor's sexual aggression for several months on my own, I sought help from the University's then ombudsman, Lois Price-Spratlen, who offered me a process of mediation with the offending professor. I declined and sought legal counsel, resulting in a complaint filed with the University on June 8, 1994 (enclosed).

In return for the withdrawal of my claim and the promise of my silence, the University made a commitment to "restructur[e] its entire harassment complaint process" to protect "a complainant when the respondent has a hierarchical position over the complainant," including "student/faculty relationships" (enclosed letter dated October 10, 1994, from Kelly Williams, Liability Claims Manager, Office of Risk Management, UW).

I am writing today to request evidence:

1. That such a restructuring of the University of Washington's sexual harassment complaint process took place. Please describe what changes have been put in place since 1994 to investigate sexual harassment complaints, particularly those complaints by graduate students against their supervising professors.

2. That such a restructuring included new policies and procedures to protect complainants.

3. That the restructuring promised to me is effective at the "protection of a complainant when the respondent has a hierarchical position over the complainant." Such effectiveness could be measured by an increasing number and percent of graduate students, particularly PhD students, who have filed sexual harassment complaints at the University of Washington, and subsequently have succeeded in completing their intended degree. There may be other metrics for success being used by UW about which you could educate me.

I have lived for 25 years with the knowledge that I was sexually exploited when I was in an exceptionally vulnerable position. I was a young woman seeking to obtain the credentials necessary for me to pursue my career, and I knew my professor had the power to end my ability to pursue my chosen field of study. He was able to successfully complete his career after my complaint, and I often wonder whether my agreement to keep my story confidential in fact allowed him to continue his proclivity to exploit young women under his influence.

I was disheartened to learn from an article in the *Seattle Times* (enclosed) that the sexual harassment of UW graduate students by their supervising professors is still such a pervasive problem that it was one of two issues the graduate student union placed at the top of their priorities in contract negotiations with the University last year.

In the wake of the #MeToo movement, I feel a heightened sense of urgency to understand whether the University of Washington took meaningful steps in response to my complaint to ensure that other students who came after me benefitted from the process the University promised to implement.

Thank you for your time and attention to my request. I would be happy to speak with you if you have any questions, and I look forward to reviewing any information you can provide to me that demonstrates how UW responded to my complaint. I request the courtesy of a response before May 15, 2019.

Sincerely,

Lisa Schubert

To be honest, I wasn't sure I would get a response. To a faceless institution with three major campuses that enrolls nearly 60,000 students and employs tens of thousands of staff and faculty, I was screaming. Roaring. In a way, I was replaying *Thelma & Louise* all over again. Only instead of driving off that cliff, taking control of the only thing that I could in the 1990s, I was standing my ground and demanding to be heard. What were my chances someone would listen?

Valery Richardson listened, and I think that how she responded could be such a model for restorative justice that I proposed we deliver a presentation together at the Second Annual Public Summit on Sexual Harassment in Higher Education in October 2020. She responded in four ways.

First, she apologized to me. "I am so very sorry," she wrote, "about what you experienced while at the University and the subsequent impacts of that experience." Even if it were a courtesy placed at the beginning of every response she wrote, like *Dear So and So*, it was the first time any University representative had apologized to me. I cannot overstate its importance. When I sued my professor, I told my then attorney that I didn't want any money; I wanted an apology, an acknowledgement from the perpetrator and the University that what he did was wrong. What was so difficult then seemed simple now. Valery apologized again a few months later when we met in person.

The second thing she did is acknowledge that despite a list of new procedures and offices the University had established in the intervening years, including her own position, clearly there was more work to do. At a meeting in July 2019 with my attorney Sara and the assistant attorney general Rolf Johnson present, she listed out some of the work the University was currently engaged in to improve sexual harassment protections and prevention:

- The University was looking into how to require candidates for faculty positions to disclose if they have had sexual misconduct findings against them and, conversely, how the University could with immunity reveal findings of sexual harassment against UW professors seeking employment elsewhere.
- The UW graduate student union in its 2018 contract had won in-person training for all new graduate students to raise awareness about sexual harassment. The University was working to expand that training to faculty and staff.
- The University was reconsidering past practices of requiring non-disclosure agreements in sexual harassment settlements.

Sara urged that the University consider maintaining records of sexual harassment investigations longer than the standard seven years required for most documentation, given that harassers tend to be serial. Valery added it to the list.

Third, Valery invited me to participate in improving the University's sexual harassment policies and practices. In 2018, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine had published a report that found the prevalence of sexual harassment in higher education to be second only to that found in the military. In response, the UW had joined a collaboration of universities and colleges across the country to work together on efforts that no one university could accomplish alone. It would take institutions of higher education working together, Valery said, to disrupt the long held practice of a doctoral student being mentored by a sole professor who controls their future career prospects. She asked me if I would be interested in working with

Elizabeth Umphress, a professor in the Foster School of Business, who was appointed to chair a committee of administrators, faculty, and graduate students across the three campuses to contribute and respond to the work of the national collaborative.

With the support of Elizabeth and the committee, I would later testify before a state legislature committee in favor of a bill to stop “passing the harasser,” the rough outline of which Valery had presented to me in her office at our first meeting. The bill--House Bill 2327: Addressing sexual misconduct at postsecondary educational institutions-- was signed into law in April 2020. Each time I told the truth about what happened to me—either to new members of the UW committee or in testimony to the state legislature committee—I healed a little bit. I was healing because I was stating the facts out loud--and not against the will of the institution but with the institution’s support.

Finally, it was Valery who called me in December 2019 and asked if I would be interested in a path, if one could be established, to finish my PhD—this very path I am on right now. The poet Patricia Hampl writes, “Beyond us--all of us--something is happening. We haven’t the slightest idea.” I don't want this story to end with the granting of my doctorate. I hope what I am doing--what we are doing together—is creating a pathway and precedent for other survivors to come forward. I imagine listening sessions the UW could hold so that other survivors can be heard. There is a chapter at the end of *She Said*, a book by the *New York Times* reporters Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey who broke the Harvey Weinstein case, in which sexual harassment and assault survivors--from Hollywood celebrities to a McDonald's worker-- come together in Gwyneth Paltrow's house to share their experiences and what impact the harassment or assault has had on their lives. I imagine the UW holding something similar.

I think publicizing instances of sexual harassment is one of the most effective ways both to prevent it and to heal other survivors who recognize and reclaim in every story a bit of themselves. I thank the University of Washington for supporting me to come forward to finish my PhD and to publish my story. Perhaps the women's collective I had wanted graduate school to be all those years ago is starting to appear, one where people support and collaborate with each other rather than compete with and denigrate one another.

It took several people to make this moment possible. For this opportunity to complete my PhD 26 years after originally planned, I want to thank Valery Richardson, Title IX Coordinator at the University of Washington; Bill Mahoney, Associate Dean for the Graduate School who worked with Valery to make this pathway possible; Ana Mari Cauce, the President of the University of Washington who, when I introduced myself at the First Annual Summit on Sexual Harassment in Higher Education in 2019, thanked me for my service to the University; Eva Cherniavsky, Andrew R. Hilen Professor of American Literature and Culture and the Director of Graduate Studies in English, who recognized the value of my 1990s published work and agreed to grant my PhD based on it; Anis Bawarshi, Chair of the Department of English who concurred with Eva and graciously offered to serve on my PhD committee; Elizabeth Umphress, Professor & Evert McCabe Endowed Fellow in the Foster School of Business, who welcomed me onto the University's committee to improve sexual harassment preventions and protections and has supported me ever since; my graduate school colleagues Wendy Swyt, the Divisional Chair for the Humanities at Highline College, and Kari Tupper, Strategic Advisor for the City of Seattle, who supported me then and support me now, conferring with me throughout this process of coming forward to tell my story; the UW graduate students who cried out for better protection from sexual harassment in 2018, winning important new training and creating awareness of sexual harassment among their graduate student colleagues; Sara Amies, the sexual harassment attorney who helped me figure out what to do when I decided I must do something in 2018; my children, Mai Li and Kai, who have heard this story more times than they are years old; my parents, Joyce and Clayton, who even at 83 serve as a model of resilience in the face of adversity; and most importantly, Jeff Jorgensen, my partner, the one who shares this life with me, both when the sun sets and when it rises.

Scripted over the faces of various survivors on the landing page of Tarana Burke's #MeToo website are the words, "You are not alone." They are, perhaps, the most important words we can hear.

Works Cited

9 to 5. Directed by Colin Higgins, performances by Jane Fonda, Dolly Parton, and Lily Tomlin, IPC Films, 1980.

Abel, Elizabeth. *Writing and Sexual Difference*. University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Apple, Michael. *Teachers and Texts: A Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education.* Routledge, 1986.

Angelou, Maya. *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings*. Random House, 1969.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard University Press, 1984.

Braverman, Harry. *Labor and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. Monthly Review, 1974.

De Lauretis, Teresa. *Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction*. Indiana University Press, 1987.

Ehrenreich, Barbara and John Ehrenreich. "The Professional-Managerial Class." *Between Labor and Capital,* edited by Pat Walker, South End Press, 1979, pp. 5-45.

Fernandez, John. *Managing a Diverse Workforce: Regaining a Competitive Edge.* Jossey-Bass, 1991.

Freyd, Jennifer J. "II. Violations of Power, Adaptive Blindness and Betrayal Trauma Theory." *Feminism & Psychology*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1997, pp. 22–32.

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. Vintage, 1990.

Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. Harvard

University Press, 1982.

Hall, Stuart. "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms." *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 2, no. 1, Jan. 1980, pp. 57–72.

Hampl, Patricia. "Beach, Beach House, and Sky." *Resort and Other Poems*. Houghton Mifflin, 1983.

Jameson, Fredric. *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Duke University Press, 1991.

Kantor, Jodi and Megan Twohey. *She Said*. Penguin, 2019.

Long, Katherine. "Pay, Sexual-Harassment Issues at Stake as UW Grad Students Vote to Authorize Strike." *The Seattle Times*, The Seattle Times Company, 27 Apr. 2018, www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/pay-sexual-harassment-issues-at-stake-as-uw-grad-students-vote-to-authorize-strike/.

Lorde, Audre. *Zami: A New Spelling of My Name*. Persephone Press, 1982.

Lukács, Georg. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. MIT Press, 1972.

Marx, Karl, and Serge L. Levitsky. *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Washington: H. Regnery, 1965.

Moraga Cherríe, and Anzaldúa Gloria. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. Persephone Press, 1981.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. *Sexual Harassment of Women: Climate, Culture, and Consequences in Academic Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine*. The National Academies Press, 2018.

Olsen, Tillie. “I Stand Here Ironing.” *Tell Me a Riddle: a Collection*. J.B. Lippincott Co., 1961.

Schaef, Anne Wilson. *Women’s Reality*. HarperCollins, 1981.

Schubert, Lisa. “For the ‘Public Good’: Contradictions in Contemporary Literary Theory,” Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 121-136.

--. “Managing a Multicultural Workforce in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*,” *The Centennial Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 571-592.

Spender, Dale. *Man Made Language*. Pandora Press, 1980.

Thelma & Louise. Directed by Ridley Scott, performances by Geena Davis, Susan Sarandon, and Harvey Keitel, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1991.

Thiederman, Sondra. *Bridging Cultural Barriers for Success: How to Manage the Multicultural Work Force*. Jossey-Bass, 1991.

--. *Profiting in America’s Multicultural Marketplace: How to Do Business Across Cultural Lines*. Lexington Books, 1991.

Thomas, R. Roosevelt, Jr. *Beyond Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Workforce by Managing Diversity.* Amacom, 1992.

Trachtenberg, Alan. *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age*. Hill and Wang, 1982.

Watkins, Evan and Lisa Schubert. “The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 1990s.” *After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s*. 1995. Routledge, 2018. pp. 90-108.

Chapter 2: Managing a Multicultural Workforce in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*

I thank *The Centennial Review* for permission to re-publish this article with the citation:

Schubert, Lisa. "Managing a Multicultural Workforce in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*," *The Centennial Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 571-592.

"Managing diversity is an idea whose time has come," writes John Preston, CEO of Avon Products, Inc. "More and more, corporations and organizations of all kinds are awakening to the fact that a diverse work force is not a burden, but their greatest potential strength—when managed properly." Preston's statements, excerpted from the foreword to R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr. 's Beyond *Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Work Force by Managing Diversity*, suggest a new direction in American corporate strategy corroborated by many recently published business titles.

In addition to *Beyond Race and Gender* (1991), *Managing a Diverse WorkForce* (1991), *Managing Cultural Differences* (1991), *Bridging Cultural Barriers for Corporate Success* (1991), and *Profiting in America's Multicultural Marketplace (*1991)—all with a focus on "cultural diversity" and its management—have taken prominent positions on the shelves of professional-technical bookstores. These publications denounce discrimination in the workplace, claiming that racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination inhibit employee contributions to

American corporate success. They argue that US companies must change their managerial practices to accommodate diversity rather than suppress it, not only to ease conflicts among employees that could hinder productivity but, more importantly, to maximize the productive potential of the cultural resources offered by a diverse workforce. "Companies that are willing to accommodate diversity will reap rewards in dollars-and-cents terms," one business author writes, "because they will fully utilize their most valuable resource: people" (Fernandez 1-2).

This strategy for corporate competitiveness stands in stark contrast to, and with a much different multicultural message than, the one promulgated by government officials and other public figures ten years ago. At that time, as the United States struggled to define a new "national identity" in the face of a diminishing Soviet threat,[1] cultural diversity was positioned as part of the "problem," part of the reason why the US economy and the US school system were deteriorating. In 1982 for example, President Ronald Reagan blamed the nation's unemployment rate—at a then postwar high of nine percent—on women workers. "Part of the unemployment is not as much recession as it is the great increase in people going into the job market," he explained, "and, ladies, I'm not picking on anyone, but because of the increase in women who are working today and two-worker families and so forth" (qtd. in Milkman 111).

At about the same time, William Bennett, Allan Bloom, Lynne Cheney, and E. D. Hirsch, among others, claimed in varying degrees that the repercussions of the feminist and civil rights movements have eroded the US education system, denying the possibility of instilling in students a sense of national pride. As Bloom surmised, "The very idea of majority—now understood to be selfish interest—is done away with in order to protect the minorities" (31). According to Bloom the only curricular success "cultural diversity" has enjoyed is in "destroying] the West's universal or intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another culture" (39).

Throughout the 1980s, within many different kinds of organizations from universities to corporations, affirmative action and other legislation meant to even the social playing field were met with charges of "reverse discrimination." The message emanating from various sources was that "America," meaning white males, must defend itself against encroachments by white women and people of color, and that the only way "American" economic prosperity could be restored is through an ethnically cleansed public education and an emboldened, remasculinized leadership, ready to "kick" Third World leaders' "asses" if necessary to protect US interests.[2] Stripped of the "enemy" that for so long had mobilized a diverse population, US federal officials and other public figures sought to unite the nation, however paradoxically, by dividing it.

But if the outcome of the most recent presidential election is any indication, divisiveness is no longer an effective strategy to "unify" the nation. I want to suggest in this paper that our national identity is in the process of being refashioned, not because of some "liberal elite" monopolizing the media, as Dan Quayle would envision, but to a large extent because of the way US corporate strategies are shifting to compete in an increasingly diverse and globalized marketplace. As any number of recently published books like Sondra Thiederman's *Profiting in America's Multicultural Marketplace* testify, a culturally diverse work force can only help to secure a diversifying market for corporate products and services. Not only do women know better than men what women "need," for example, but they know best how to play on their insecurities to sell it to them. And with the aggregate spending power of African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos estimated at $424 billion in 1990, and projected to soar to $650 billion by 2000 (Copeland qtd. in Morrison 16), corporations have every incentive to invest in such previously disparaged "efficiency drags" like diversity training seminars.

If this new corporate strategy is to be successful, however, diversity, as Preston reminds us, must be "managed properly." For unlike affirmative action or valuing differences programs,[3] managing cultural diversity isn't simply "about" employing more white women and people of color in executive positions. As R. Roosevelt Thomas—the consultant Preston credits with having successfully restructured Avon in the mid eighties—explains, it's about finding a managerial strategy that will solicit and utilize the resources offered by people with culturally diverse backgrounds to the greatest company benefit. "True, all groups will benefit," he writes, "whether they are different in terms of age, lifestyle, gender or race. But their benefit is not the driving motivation. Managing diversity presumes the driving force is the manager's, and the company's, self-interest" (168).

In this paper I explore the contradictory relationship between the self-interest of corporations and the varied interests of a population ostensibly represented by US national identity. This relationship has had a long history in the United States, of course, at least since the turn of the twentieth century. Asked whether or not he saw a conflict of interest in being appointed Eisenhower's defense secretary, "Engine Charlie," the CEO of General Motors in the 1950s, responded, "What's good for GM is good for the country, and vice versa." Much more recently, Lee Iacocca—an icon of the American dream—was put in the awkward position of distinguishing the kind of government involvement necessary to bail out Chrysler from the kind of government planning implemented by V. I. Lenin. In the chapter in his autobiography entitled, "Making America Great Again," this former champion of the free market wrote: "We're not going to make any progress until we give up the ridiculous idea that any planning on a national level represents an attack on the capitalist system" (346). "Without a strong industrial base," he argued, "we can kiss our national security good-bye" (344).[4]

Like Iacocca, corporations in the 1990s continue to associate their success with the imperatives of "national security," albeit with a fresh image. Rather than suppress cultural diversity, corporations now "accommodate" it in the name of the "public good." As John Fernandez, author of *Managing a Diverse Work Force*, explains, US businesses need to implement managing diversity programs for their country's as well as their own profit. In striking contrast to the divisive claims of the previous decade, Fernandez contends that "the key to the United States' successful competition in the new global marketplace will be the diversity of its people" (ix).

The contradictions inherent in conflating corporate interests with national identity are already visible in popular culture, where white men are increasingly depicted as "cultural managers" who employ white women and people of color to achieve "company" objectives. This shift—from suppressing to "managing" diversity—is evident in everything from the simple substitution of Johnny Carson and Ed McMahon with Jay Leno and Branford Marsalis to the replacement of Captain Kirk's Star Trek, in which Kirk weekly seduced an alien woman while battling her male comrades, with Jean-Luc Picard's *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, in which the white, well-educated Picard delegates responsibility to a multicultural, multigalactic work force. In this context, Kevin Costner's 1991 *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves* offers no exception to the emphasis on white men managing cultural diversity already at work in other TV shows and movies. The most visible difference between this version of the tale and the one that preceded it is, after all, that Robin comes back from the Crusades with a black man by his side, whose difference is further accentuated by a frequent mention of his Muslim faith.

What distinguishes this film from other contemporary pop cultural portrayals is that Robin Hood is a story of political leadership and corporate strategy. As the traditional legend goes, Robin steals from the rich and gives to the poor to defend English sovereignty from the wicked Sheriff of Nottingham. But in this version of the tale, Robin's own economic assets are also threatened. Thus both Robin of Locksley and the Sheriff of Nottingham become "managers" who attempt to recruit a group of "employees" to work together toward "company" objectives. In fact, the Sheriff defeated in this version of the story is clearly positioned to represent a now "obsolete," no longer desirable managerial strategy, so that a new managerial strategy, more in line with the imperatives of a diversified marketplace, can be portrayed in heroic light. In this context, *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves* provides a particularly good indication of the politics of management implicit in such a shift in corporate strategy, as well as a glimpse of how that politics, which purports to "unite" the "nation," has much in common with a politics intent on dividing it.

Admittedly, *Robin Hood*, a folk tale based in Medieval England, seems a strange site for refiguring American national identity. But a shift in venues for the opening scene from Sherwood Forest (as in the 1938 version of the film) to a Jerusalem dungeon—coupled with the film's debut just months after the Persian Gulf War—suggests the movie is playing more on the conventions of an American military movie than an English morality play. After the triumphant, brassy music of the opening credit sequence comes to a close, the screen fades to black as the narrative is established in script: "800 years ago Richard 'the Lionheart,' King of England, led the third Great Crusade to reclaim the Holy Land from the Turks." This sentence is gradually displaced by another, which firmly, even before we see them, positions the viewer to sympathize with Kevin Costner's Robin and his fellow Englishmen, who, of course, never pretend to be anything but American:[5] "Most of the young English noblemen who flocked to his banner never returned home." This identification with Robin and "our boys" is further solidified as the audio once filled with Medieval music now emits Middle Eastern music, a juxtaposition that shows just how "foreign" the land "our boys" have traveled to is. A scream of agony from a white man further emphasizes the pain of alienation, as the camera cuts, stitching together the "Ahh" of the chant-like music with the "Ahhh!" of the man being tortured. The "foreign" man even chuckles slightly after he chops off the hand of the white man, who is here, as a guard reminds the white American spectator, the "infidel."

When the confusion of the opening shot clears, the camera focuses on Robin, who is chained with several other captured "Englishmen" to the wall of a Jerusalem dungeon. In the darkness only Robin's eyes are clearly visible, staring at a black man strapped to the wall opposite him. This inquisitive stare is soon disrupted, however, when Robin's boyhood friend and fellow patriot, Peter, is accused of stealing bread, the punishment for which is his hand on the chopping block. Since Peter is weak and could possibly die from this infliction, Robin resolutely volunteers to take his place. But as the hatchet falls, Robin yanks the guard's hand under the blade, after which he successively knocks the executioner's head on the cutting block and throws another guard into a nearby fire.

Up to this point, the film plays like any other Hollywood production in which an "American" (e.g., Sylvester Stallone in *Rambo: First Blood Part II* or Robert DeNiro in *The*

Deer Hunter, or even Steve McQueen in *The Great Escape*) is imprisoned overseas. The camera carefully establishes identification with "our hero" and "our boys" and contrasts that identification with the alien surroundings. Robin stares at a "foreigner," but when allegiance to "our boys" must be demonstrated, he displays patriotic courage, single-handedly disposing of three or four "enemies" in a classically heroic gesture.

It is after this event, as Robin frantically begins to hack away at the chains of a fellow (white) "Englishman," that the film diverges from other Hollywood war movies. For unlike those films in which a clear distinction is maintained between "patriot" and "enemy," Robin Hood blurs that distinction when the black man, whom we later find out is named Azim, speaks: "You cannot save those people, Christian. But you can save me!" Azim confounds conventional categorization by refusing to be reduced to an essentialist position that equates "difference" with "enemy." Although the film has already established that he is not one of "us," as Robin stares at him in the darkness before his release, his plea for freedom suggests he is not one of "them," either. Like the "enemy," Azim is a Muslim, which he himself foregrounds by calling Robin a Christian, but unlike the other Muslims in the opening scene he is black. He's "different," the movie seems to be saying, but there is difference within difference.

Because Azim is difficult to categorize, what would be unthinkable in other war movies becomes a matter of negotiation. Instead of immediately dismissing the cries of the Moor—who is, as a Muslim, the very sort of "foreigner" he was sent to the Holy Land to defeat—Robin inquires, "Why should I?" Azim offers a reason meant to position him "like us": "For pity's sake. Mine was a sentence of death." Which is immediately countered by Peter who positions Azim "like them": "No, Robin, he is a Moor, don't listen to him." Ironically, in the circumstances

Robin really has no choice. Azim is the only one who can show him the way out, and further, Azim is the only one whose chains are relatively easy to break since he is strapped in by leather rather than the iron that encases the wrists of the Englishmen.

But the film plays up this scene as one of choice so that it can position Robin as the chooser: only Robin can reconcile Azim's uncategorability because only Robin, as the agent of decision making, can recast what counts as "us" and "them" altogether. Thus the film blurs the distinction between "patriot" and "enemy" so that those categories can be redefined, not on the basis of king or religion, race or ethnicity, as they are in other war movies, but on the basis of who will be functionally valuable to Robin. Robin chooses "the black man" over his own white countrymen because he offers something to Robin that the white men cannot. "Set me free," Azim implores. "I will show you the way out."

Azim *is* different from the Englishmen. Throughout the movie, the viewer is frequently reminded of Azim's Muslim faith as, for example, he searches for an Easterly view from which to meditate or refuses the alcoholic beverage shared by the serfs. His "difference" is significant, moreover, because it often yields valuable knowledge not available in a white male network. In addition to showing Robin the way out of the dungeon (and the city of Jerusalem itself), Azim provides Robin with the technology—the telescope and gunpowder—that eventually makes it possible for him to defeat the Sheriff and win back his lands.

Since Azim is not an Englishmen, however, he will not assimilate like one, which means that for as much as Azim's "difference" is useful to Robin, it is also a potential liability. Although he is faithfully indentured to Robin because he saved his life in the Jerusalem dungeon, he by no means considers himself the Lord of Locksley's servant. "No man controls my destiny," he announces upon reaching English shores. A few minutes later when Robin is besieged by a pack of Sir Guy of Gisbourne's men, the Moor ignores the scuffle, praying in a meditative state fifty yards away. When Robin reproaches him, attempting to lay down company policy like a foreman to a wayward employee, Azim simply responds, "I fulfill my vows when I choose."

It should be easy to recognize that when she appears on screen, Marian functions similarly to Azim. Just as Azim's "difference" offers Robin potential resources for information and technology, as King Richard's niece, Marian offers Robin a potential network of communication inaccessible by other means. It is Marian, for example, whom Robin asks to get word to the King detailing the Sheriff's intended forced "acquisition" of English lands. Like Azim, however, Marian does not consider herself subordinate to Robin, nor will she tolerate him patronizing her. Indeed, in contrast to the demure Olivia De Havilland who swooned over Errol Flynn in the 1938 screen adaptation of *Robin Hood*, the 1991 Marian is played by what *Premiere* magazine has called "a smart woman in a man's world," Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio. When Robin comes calling in this version of the story he is met by a brash, independent "maid," who initially calls his attempts at seduction "boyish pranks."

The film makes it clear that Azim and Marian have much to contribute to Robin's effort, but it is Robin who must be re-educated before those potential contributions can be realized. He must learn to value the "differences" they have to offer while at the same time managing them in the best interests of his "corporation." As Preston points out, this retraining of the managerial staff is an integral part of "managing diversity." Before Preston himself had been re-educated, he had attempted to employ cultural diversity at Avon with little company advantage. The contributions of white women and people of color seemed minimal, and few made significant progress on the corporate ladder. And then, one day, Preston had the insight:

> We weren't really valuing diversity, much less managing it. We were merely trying to "do the right thing." We were inviting minorities and women to join and blend into our corporate culture. But most people, no matter what their background, don't want to blend into anything. They want to be themselves—preserve their own culture, heritage, and customs.

After conferring with his chief executives and consultants, Preston realized "that it was the culture of the *company* that had to change, not the culture of the *people*" (Preston's italics).

It is "the culture of the company"—what business writers call "corporate culture"—that must change if diversity is to be "managed properly." Since a corporate culture that pits "foreigners" against "Americans" isn't exactly going to encourage white women and people of color to contribute their knowledge and skills, a new "corporate culture" must be established that can itself "manage" the much more tenuous line between appearing to value cultural diversity for what it is and valuing cultural diversity insofar as it contributes to corporate success. The "culture of the company" must change, as Preston suggests, because it is this "culture"—the root assumptions of an organization—that implicitly dictates operations and justifies decisions. Thus, multinational corporations in the information age have had to reconfigure culturally as well as structurally, implementing a re-education process that will teach company executives a whole new politics of management. As Richard Crawford in *In The Era of Human Capital* writes, "Managers in the new knowledge economy are teachers and facilitators who don't control workers but liberate them. . . . Because this is so contrary to traditional military-style management thinking, the big challenge of the 1990s is not to retrain workers but to retrain managers" (126). Although *Robin Hood* may have begun like a traditional "military-style" movie—with "our boys" captured in a foreign land—it gradually becomes an instruction manual for management re-education.

Managers must be retrained in the new knowledge economy not only because they will have to shift managerial strategies—from suppressing to "accommodating" diversity—but because they will have to shift managerial styles. For if managing diversity is to be profitable, corporate executives must become what consultant R. Roosevelt Thomas identifies as "enablers." In contrast to the "doer" model—or what he calls "the old top-down, directive style"—in which managers concentrate on performing the "tasks" of the corporation while relegating employee concerns about diversity to human resources departments, this new managerial style must be based on an "empowerment model." "In this model," Thomas writes, "the duality between 'business issues' and 'people issues' is absent. Instead, the empowerment of employees is linked directly to or integrated with business objectives" (47). Since in an information-based service economy a company's most valuable assets are the insights and knowledge provided by its work force, "enabling" employees is much more lucrative than "directing" them, provided that they utilize their relative independence to pursue corporate objectives.

The movie demonstrates this shift in managerial styles by initially placing the Lord of Locksley in a subordinate position to Azim. Besides depicting Robin's dependence on the Moor in the Jerusalem dungeon, the film reverses expectations of Azim's assimilation upon reaching English shores. Instead of Azim questioning Robin about his new surroundings, it is Robin who appears curious about the world Azim comes from. "You know for an infidel," Robin begins the conversation, "you have uncommon clarity of thinking. But you tell me nothing of yourself. For instance, your name—Azim—what does it mean?" Likewise, it is Robin not Azim who initially appears physically and intellectually inept. In one scene, Robin beseeches Azim for advice on how to defeat John Little ("Move faster"). In another, Azim corrects Robin as he fumbles with his telescope, stabbing the air as if the objects in the lens were close enough to touch.

When the emphasis of Robin's "education" falls on Azim's combat knowledge and technical expertise, however, the true motive behind Azim's "empowerment" becomes clear. As Robin's chief military adviser, Azim teaches the serfs how to sword fight and how to use gunpowder. Most importantly, after Robin has exhausted Azim's cultural resources, their roles of dependence reverse. The viewer watches as the Moor shifts from a position of defiant independence to one of subdued servitude. In contrast to the beginning of the narrative, when he entreated Azim's advice, in the middle of the film Robin roundly puts him in his place. Azim asks Robin to show the serfs some respect, and the Lord of Locksley replies: "You forget yourself, Azim. I do not ask for your company or your counsel."

As his culturally resourceful servant, Azim also becomes valuable to Robin as a means to persuade the serfs to see him as their leader. That is, several times in the film Azim's "differences" are presented as a potential threat to the serfs. In each case, however, the film reconciles the tension by placing Robin in the role of arbitrating which "differences" will be accepted and which will not. When John Little's pregnant wife goes into labor, for instance, Azim suggests a Caesarean section because the baby's body has not yet turned. The serfs do not trust this procedure which they have never witnessed and initially refuse Azim's suggestion. It is only when Robin steps in and gives his approval that they reluctantly agree. Hence when both the baby and mother survive, Robin gets much of the credit. In scenes like this, the film makes it abundantly clear that although Azim is the bearer of multiple subject positions, it is Robin who assigns those positions value. As Thomas reminds us, some white women and people of color may benefit from managing diversity. "But their benefit is not the driving motivation. Managing diversity presumes that the driving force is the manager's, and the company's, self-interest" (168).

Since this new corporate strategy prioritizes the same old "manager's and company's self-interest"—all the while purporting to "put people first"—it must sell itself as "new and improved" by creating a "past" that can be made to seem worse. Just as managing diversity textbooks must denounce the overt racism and sexism fostered by the "old, top down" management style, managing diversity heroes, like Robin Hood, must defeat "old, top-down" racist and sexist villains. In the movie, that villainy is luridly displayed in the Sheriff of Nottingham.

Thus, while Robin is off in Jerusalem displaying a managerial strategy that "accommodates diversity" (i.e., freeing Azim to free himself), the Sheriff is back at the castle, attempting to coerce Robin's father to conspire with him against King Richard. As twenty or more of the Sheriff's henchmen gather outside the castle walls, the Lord of Locksley is summoned by a serf who says his son has been killed and his daughter been taken by "men on horses in masks." Failing to heed his servant Duncan's words that "there is an evil moon tonight," Robin's father rides out to discover that his trust has been betrayed. Indeed, those "men in masks" look a great deal like a technicolor version of D. W. Griffith's Ku Klux Klan in *The Birth of a Nation*. Dressed in hooded white robes, each one of the Sheriff's men holds a torch to light the midnight sky. As the Sheriff removes his mask, he reveals his managerial strategy as well: "Join us," he commands. When Robin's father resists, declaring, "Never," the Sheriff simply raises an eyebrow and says, "Join us or die."

The Lord, we later find out, was lynched, providing corroborating evidence that the Sheriff dominates his work force with one, black or white, choice: assimilate or be nullified. As such, the Sheriff epitomizes Thomas's category of "doer" managers, which "define 'managing' as being a model, showing how the work should get done. Their 'best' employees are those who come closest to being clones of the boss" (46). If Robin's father refuses to become a "clone"—in this case significantly represented by the hooded cloaks—he cannot be useful to the Sheriff. In contrast to Robin's active attempt to "enable" his "different" employees, from the Sheriff's perspective differences are not assets but threats.

While this midnight encounter implicitly suggests that the Sheriff's "old-style" management is racist in its practices, the film much more directly represents the Sheriff's sexism. When Sir Guy of Gisbourne barges in to tell him that Robin is back from the Crusades, for instance, the Sheriff is on the verge of raping a young peasant woman. Unlike Robin, who profits from the differences women have to offer even while seducing them, the Sheriff objectifies women strictly as entertainment, a leisure activity, divorced from the "real world" of men's work. Because he employs women, Robin himself is not a "real man" to the Sheriff: "He's a whelp," as the Sheriff tells Sir Guy. From his perspective, Robin's enabling strategies are emasculating, to such an extent that, as the Sheriff continues, "this girl can best him."

Although he is ridiculing Robin, the Sheriff's statements are obviously not intended to raise the ire of "our hero" (who can't hear him) but of the nineties, socially aware spectator.

Rather than anger the audience, however, the Sheriff provides comic relief. His presumptuous orders appear so "dated" that they are funny, as when he commands one woman to meet him in his quarters at 10:30, the woman next to her at 10:45 ("and bring a friend"). These antics are understood as comic because the audience knows that no king, no president, no corporate executive would manage a work force like that *anymore*. Like Gordon Gekko in Oliver Stone's 1987 *Wall Street* declaring "greed is good, greed is right," the Sheriff is positioned as an embodiment of everything that *retrospectively* can be made wrong with the "greed-power-sexist-racist is good" management excesses of the eighties. By creating the immediate past as excess and displacing that excess onto the villain, the film carefully slides away from implicating the audience in that villainy. Although this "old" managerial style was oppressive, the film seems to be saying, corporate executives like Robin confronted with a new priority to "accommodate diversity" can relax. *That*, after all, wasn't really "us," anyway.

Perhaps most troubling, by implicating racism and sexism only in the "old" managerial style, the movie seems to be depicting the solution to these social problems as a matter of updating management techniques. Like power suits, racism and sexism have simply gone out of fashion. While the Sheriff is portrayed as a chauvinistic dinosaur, a racist and sexist relic of the "past," corporate executives who stay abreast of the most current managerial procedures need not worry. If only they successfully learn and adopt the "new and improved" management techniques—like Robin—they, too, will be portrayed in heroic light.

In fact, the film never directly blames even the Sheriff for his racism and sexism but seemingly displaces that blame onto some mystical, magical, superhuman power, beyond his control. Indeed, in contrast to Azim, the most visibly different employee of Robin's work force, the Sheriff's most striking employee is the witch. As the narrative unfolds, however, it becomes apparent that she is not an employee of the Sheriff at all, but his employer. "You called," the Sheriff says to Mortiana the first time we see her. Just as Lord Robin represents an upper level of management but not the chief executive officer (who is King Richard), the Sheriff serves the witch in deference to the magical powers that she possesses. Although the Sheriff often appears to be in control, it is Mortiana who, for example, orders him to rape Marian. "She's ripe," the witch says. "She will give us a son. You must take her now." Ultra white, Albino-like, with fish belly white hair, skin, and eyes, Mortiana also appears to be the force behind the Sheriff's fear of the "Other," whose hooded cloaks we saw in the earlier scene. "The painted man," cries Mortiana in reference to Azim, "he haunts my dreams." The film positions the witch as an embodiment of the "old white boy network" and in the process surreptitiously displaces blame for the racism and sexism imbedded in that network onto an hysterically wicked, and immensely powerful, woman.

It would seem logical that the witch and the Moor would be pitted against one another in the penultimate scene of the film, since they, as the only new additions to the standard cast of characters in Robin Hood productions, represent the tension of the film between opposing ideological interests. But when Azim busts in the Sheriff's door, hurtling his scimitar end over end into the body of Mortiana, it is a triumph for the new managerial strategy rather than equitable race relations. "The painted man" does not kill the witch out of anger or revenge or justice because she represents the fears and bigotry of the Aryan nation: the black man kills the white woman to save his master's life. "I have fulfilled my vows," Azim tells Robin. As King Richard rides in to give the bride away at Robin and Marian's wedding in the final scene of the film, it becomes clear that Azim has fulfilled John Fernandez's prophecy as well: "Companies that are willing to accommodate diversity will reap rewards in dollars and cents terms." While the serfs— who are, after all, despite Robin's victory, still serfs—look on, the King of England commends Robin for his new managerial strategy. "Thanks to you," the white patriarch says, "I still have a throne."

***

"On this day, with high hopes and brave hearts, ... the American people have voted to make a new beginning." When Bill Clinton was elected President on November 3, 1992, it indeed seemed like the American people were asking to make a new beginning. Much like Robin Hood employing Azim and Maid Marian to defeat the racist and sexist villain of the "past," Clinton was elected on a campaign pledge "to bring our people together as never before so that our diversity can be a source of strength in a world that is ever smaller, where everyone counts and everyone is a part of America's family." Vowing to make his administration "look like the face of America," he promised to create a "re-United States," as he said in his victory speech: "a united country with a new sense of patriotism."

In shaping that new patriotism, Clinton seems to have learned much from the "managing diversity" strategies of corporate consultants like Fernandez and Thomas. In contrast to the Reagan and Bush administrations, which attempted to forge a remasculinized national identity by pitting the economy (the domain of hard-working, tax-paying white men) against social issues (the domain of black welfare mothers, abortion rights activists, Willie Hortons, and Columbian drug-traffickers), Clinton promises to address economic and social concerns together. As if emulating Thomas's "empowerment model," he pledges to elide the difference between "business issues" and "people issues" by linking the empowerment of the people directly to the success of the nation. "I remind you again tonight my fellow Americans," Clinton said the night he was elected, "that this victory was more than a victory of a party, it was a victory for the people who work hard and play by the rules, a victory for the people who feel left out and left behind but want to do better, a victory for the people who want to compete and win in the global economy. . . ." Just as John Fernandez urges that "the key to the United States' successful competition in the new global marketplace will be the diversity of its people," Clinton seems committed, as is already evident in his nominations for Cabinet positions, to put diversity to work for America.

Unlike corporations "managing diversity" to profit in the global marketplace, however, as the political leader of an entire nation, Clinton must recognize the difference elided in his victory speech between "those who want to compete and win in the global economy" and "those who feel left out and left behind." That is, he must recognize that the multinational interests of corporations do not immediately translate into a vision of an equitable multicultural society in the United States, where no one is "left out and left behind." Indeed, competing and winning in the global marketplace often requires corporations to think past the terms of national identity altogether. This point is not lost on Clinton's Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, who argues that "the very idea of an American economy is becoming meaningless, as are the notions of an American corporation, American capital, American products, and American technology" (8). At a time when "almost every factor of production—money, technology, factories, and equipment—moves effortlessly across borders" (8), the concept of "national identity" matters little to multinational corporations who employ engineers in Germany, computer programmers in Japan, and assemblers in Mexico. But it matters a great deal to a president whose very agenda, much less job, depends upon preserving a sense of national cohesion among a diverse group of people rooted to a specific geographic space. Whatever exigencies multinational corporations face in a multicultural marketplace, Clinton faces the task of securing the allegiance of a multicultural population to a notion of "national identity" that itself threatens to become obsolete. For Clinton, much more than for corporations, managing diversity in the executive ranks will mean managing diversity in the general American populace, for two reasons.

As the "Zoe Baird problem" inadvertently indicates, it's not that this new corporate strategy values all white women and people of color equally. At the same time people with culturally diverse backgrounds are being offered lucrative salaries for their time and knowledge (Baird makes over $500,000), other people with diverse backgrounds are being offered the lowest paying routine production and in-person service jobs (her Peruvian employees, in contrast, had an annual salary of $12,000 apiece). While it is commonly understood that many companies' profits depend upon the pennies they pay wage laborers in Third World countries,[6] the exploitation of Third World peoples—particularly women of color—is no longer reserved for export-processing zones in Third World countries. As Robert Reich argues, despite a public perception that immigration control in the United States is a high federal priority, American-owned corporations avidly encourage the influx of skilled and semi-skilled workers from Latin America and South East Asia. In *The Work of Nations*, Reich quotes from the *Wall Street Journal*'s editorial staff: "Our own view remains that the problem is not too many immigrants, but too few. ... As long as we don't train enough [Americans] ourselves, immigration is a saving grace" (Reich, n. 287 88). Immigration is a "saving grace," as these journalists write, because increased quotas from impoverished Third World nations can only help to keep wages down in the kind of in-person service jobs and routine production jobs these groups typically are allowed to hold.

Relatedly, the very movement of routine production jobs overseas has left large numbers of displaced workers—native to the United States— vulnerable to the development of export-processing zones here. Like their counterparts in Third World countries, these "enterprise zones"— embraced by presidents across the political spectrum from Reagan to Clinton as a solution to US poverty—provide "[a] whole range of incentives, including exemption from rates and property taxes, ... to attract private investment and create employment" (Mitter 81). The result is essentially the establishment of "colonies" within the "motherland." As economist Swasti Mitter explains, "The concepts of core and periphery are no longer used simply to describe the differentiation between the metropolis and the ex-colonies, but also to describe an emerging dichotomy between the core (elite) workers and the peripheral (casual) workers within a national boundary. In this new division, as in the case of the global division of labor, race and gender provide the most effective grounds for the stratification of labor" (105). Clearly, we are not *Beyond Race and Gender*, as the title of Thomas's book states. Racism and sexism are not obliterated by "managing diversity"—they're just conveniently moved to other sites, away from the highly visible positions of corporate executives.

Second, and correlatively, this shift in the sites of the most blatant racism and sexism will make it all the more difficult for white men, especially white, working class men without a college education, to value the diversity their managers are now employing. Bombarded in the 1980s by rhetoric suggesting that the national economic security depends upon protecting "our boys" from white women and people of color, working class white men will find it all the more difficult to see "managing diversity" as "the key to the United States' successful competition in the new global marketplace" (to reiterate Fernandez) when their own livelihoods are gradually being displaced by lower paid white women and people of color.

The tensions generated by this situation are played out across a wide range of popular culture representations but perhaps most interestingly in the 1991 version of *Robin Hood*. For despite all its emphasis on race and gender, the film is, after all, supposed to be a story about class conflict. The traditional legend, as everyone knows, is about an English Lord who restores the dignity of the "average white man" by stealing from the rich to give to the poor. In this version of the tale, however, so much attention is paid to empowering and enabling Azim and Maid Marian that the serfs appear relatively insignificant. In fact, in an ironic twist of plot, in order to "accommodate diversity" the film must portray the serfs as having little incentive to cooperate in their own "saving." As John Little says the first time Robin entreats him to join his staff, "This here's all we simple men can expect. Here we are safe. Here we are kings."

Paradoxically then, the most formidable obstacle Robin faces in attempting to win back his land is not represented by Azim or Maid Marian (who are of course "empowered" by his new managerial strategy) or even the Sheriff of Nottingham himself, but by the serfs. When the Sheriff pillages the serfs in retaliation for Robin slashing his face, for example, Will Scarlet (who in the traditional tale is Robin's partner in adventure) confronts Robin and blames him for the subsequent devastation of the serfs' villages: "You brought this misery on us, Locksley." Will correctly points out that the Sheriff is Robin's problem, not the serfs': while he took Robin's lands, he didn't interfere much with the serfs until Robin came along.

Robin initially tries to deny responsibility for this destruction by deflecting the blame for it onto the Sheriff: "It's Nottingham trying to divide us." But Will only strengthens his resolve. "We are divided, rich boy," he says. "You're still trying to be Lord of the manor." As a self designated spokesperson for the serfs, Will challenges Robin by invoking class "difference," the one difference that the movie ironically is supposed to be "about" and yet the one difference that cannot even ostensibly be recognized if this new managerial strategy is to work. For in the new knowledge economy where corporations purport to value cultural differences, economic differences—like those between Robin and the serfs—must be veiled.

Since blaming the Sheriff for the "difference" between the serfs and Robin fails to enlist their support, Robin must convince them that only he knows which differences are valuable and which differences threaten "national security." Just as he secures their trust in earlier scenes by telling them which differences to value—they should not call Azim a "savage" and they should accept John Little's wife as a viable member of their ad hoc battalion about to attack the Sheriff's fortress—he now decides which differences will not be valued. Robin dismisses Will's accusation as an inessential difference (that he is "just trying to be Lord of the manor") by identifying the Sheriff's difference as a more dangerous threat. "The Sheriff calls us outlaws," he says, positioning himself with the serfs. "But I say we are free. And one free man defending his home is more powerful than ten hired soldiers." To secure the serfs' loyalty, Robin creates what appears to be a greater "difference"—a national difference—than the economic difference between him and the serfs.

Robin's construction of national identity must obscure economic differences, of course, because it's never really clear what the serfs get out of even a "new and improved" nationalism.

While it may be true that "one free man defending his home is more powerful than ten hired soldiers," as Robin tells them, serfs, after all, do not "own" homes. Their lord owns their home and all the land surrounding it. Although both Robin and Azim tell them they must fight if they want to be "free," the freedom they gain under Robin's rule isn't all that much different than under the Sheriff's. In fact it may be no better.

Throughout the movie Robin demonstrates that he neither respects their ideas nor their leadership any more than the Sheriff does. He lies to the serfs, for example, when Friar Tuck and his group approach the forest, telling them that there are only five intruders coming rather than the actual twenty. When Azim disapproves, as if negotiating labor relations between the shop floor and the board room, Robin explains, "They can't count, anyway." This lack of respect for the serfs is most evident when Robin returns from slashing the Sheriff's face, an open declaration of war. John Little, who had claimed himself the leader of the woodsmen when Robin originally entered the forest, asks him what he means by this act: "You planning to join us, Matey?" "No," Robin replies, very much the Lord of Locksley, "to lead you."

Just how precarious that leadership is, however, is evident just after the serfs release their brothers and sisters taken by the Sheriff in response to Robin's declaration of war. When all the nooses that had threatened the lives of the woodsmen are cut loose, the serfs run for Sherwood Forest, crowding through the castle gate. It is only when Azim, Robin's newly empowered executive, reminds them of their "national identity" that they hesitate, as if remembering some distant campaign pledge. "If you will be a free man then you must fight!" Azim shouts. Then, to further convince them to fight for objectives which are not their own, he adds, "I am not one of you, but I fight. Join us now. Join Robin Hood." Just as Robin had in the beginning of the film, Azim—himself a symbol of the new national identity—invokes the "us" versus "them" nationalistic paradigm, where what is in the best interest of Robin becomes the best interest of the "nation."

All of this talk of "regaining" one's integrity or "freedom" is of course familiar to anyone who has followed US presidential politics in the past twelve years. Even before Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, he began to exhort US citizens to become "Americans again." After the embroilment of Vietnam and the scandal of Watergate, which had tarnished not only the ethical reputation but the virility of the US government, Reagan appealed to the American consciousness by suggesting that there was a time when being a citizen of this country meant something to the world. The phrase to be "Americans again" offered, as one Reagan aide stated, "some way, after Vietnam, and Watergate, and Angola, of reasserting the glory of the country. People once more see a chance for Americans to stand up as Americans" (qtd. in Black, 132).

After twelve years of Reaganism in which the campaign to be "Americans again" was exposed to serve the interests of the nation's wealthiest, Bill Clinton used the same phrase to get elected, but now to mean something else. Much like Robin Hood's plea to the serfs ("If you will be free men . . ."), Clinton used the phrase "to be Americans again" to suggest that something had been lost with the past two presidential administrations that would now be found with him: "I accept tonight the responsibility that you have given me to be the leader of this, the greatest country in human history. . . . But I ask you to be Americans again, too, to be interested not just in getting, but in giving; not just in placing blame, but now in assuming responsibility; not just in looking out for yourselves, but in looking out for others, too." Clinton, like Reagan, like Robin Hood, must constantly remind his subjects of their national identity, however "new and improved," however refashioned. Because as the tension between serving multinational corporate interests and preserving a national identity exacerbates, "to be Americans again" will increasingly become an empty signifier, devoid of any association with national leadership. Clinton must constantly remind his subjects of their national identity for fear of them not hearing, not feeling responsible, not turning back to fight for objectives which are not their own—like the serfs—but crowding through the castle gate.

Notes

[1]In the decade preceding the collapse of its Communist government, the (former) Soviet Union was increasingly preoccupied with domestic crises and the escalating war in Afghanistan (its own "Vietnam"). Nevertheless, President Reagan's reaction to the diminishing Communist "threat" across the ocean was to suggest that Communism was cropping up in our very own backyard. Following the embarrassment of Vietnam and the scandal of Watergate which had tarnished the integrity and virility of the federal government, Reagan made a highly publicized effort to purge Central America of a red menace that he insisted was itself a direct threat to US national security. For further reading on Reagan's politics in Nicaragua and Grenada, and US relations with Central America in general, see George Black, *The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean*.

[2]Susan Jeffords's book, *The Remasculinization of America*, discusses this remasculinization during the 1980s in terms of popular culture representations of the Vietnam war. The words in quotes ("kick" "asses") were the words President Bush used at several news conferences in reference to Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.

[3]From Thomas's perspective, the goals of affirmative action and valuing differences approaches are extrinsic to the corporation, whether by legal mandate or ethical obligation. Only managing diversity, according to Thomas, requires no extrinsic guidelines or imperatives. It is intrinsic to the "natural" operating assumptions of a corporation in the pursuit of profit. Thus by "natural creation of a diverse workforce" and "natural upward mobility for minorities and women" (28), Thomas doesn't mean that this new picture of the corporation now conforms to some universalized norms of "human nature." He means, precisely, that hiring and promotion practices appear fully congruent with the "nature" of the corporation—which of course involves making money. For a fuller discussion of what distinguishes affirmative action and valuing differences programs from the managing diversity programs presented by business consultants like Thomas, see Watkins and Schubert, "The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 90s."

[4]It should come as little surprise that Iacocca's six-point plan for recovery in the name of the "national interest" included "restructuring and revitalizing our so called sunset industries" (346)—such as the manufacturing of automobiles—at the expense of federal entitlement programs. Although he vehemently denied it, he was in effect advocating the replacement of social welfare for displaced workers with a kind of "corporate welfare" for displaced industries (349-50).

[5]Indeed, the film never really tried to present itself as a British production, with actors trained in the Shakespearean tradition. Although the original intent was to do so, the English accent was giving its star player a headache. As James Robinson, the Morgan Creek chief executive officer who produced the film, explained: "Kevin could not focus on the English

accent and act. . . . [H]e was trying to do the English accent, and it was ruining his performance." So Robinson suggested, "Have Kevin play Kevin Costner. . . . Enough of this" (Griffin 47).

[6]While Michael Jordan may be one of the highest paid black men, recognized all over the world in his advertisements for Nike, the vast number of Nike employees in Malaysia are compensated twelve cents per shoe. As Jeffrey Ballinger reports in "The New Free Trade Heel," at that wage a Malay worker laboring ten hours a day, six days a week still lives malnourished in a shanty without electricity or running water.

Works Cited

Ballinger, Jeffrey. "The New Free Trade Heel." *Harper's* (August 1992): 46-7.

Black, George. *The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean.* New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Bloom, Allan. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Copeland, Lennie. "Valuing Workplace Diversity: Ten Reasons Employers Recognize the Benefits of a Mixed Work Force." *Personnel Administrator* (Nov. 1988): 38-40.

Crawford, Richard. *In the Era of Human Capital: The Emergence of Talent, Intelligence, and Knowledge as the Worldwide Economic Force and What It Means to Investors*. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Fernandez, John. *Managing a Diverse Work Force: Regaining the Competitive Edge*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991.

Griffin, Nancy. "A Star is Torn." *Premiere: The Movie Magazine* (June 1991): 42-50.

Harris, Philip and Robert Moran. *Managing Cultural Differences.* 3rd ed. Houston: Gulf, 1991.

Iacocca, Lee. Iacocca: *An Autobiography*. New York: Bantam, 1984.

Jeffords, Susan. *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War.* Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989.

Milkman, Ruth. "Women Workers and the Labor Movement in Hard Times: Comparing the 1930s with the 1980s." *Women, Households, and the Economy*. Eds. Lourdes Beneria and Catharine Stimpson. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1987: 111-31.

Mitter, Swasti. *Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy*. London: Pluto P, 1986.

Morrison, Ann. *The New Leaders: Guidelines on Leadership Diversity in America*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992.

Preston, John. “Foreword.” *Beyond Race and Gender*. By R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr. New York: AMACOM, 1991. ix-xi.

Reich, Robert. *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-century Capitalism*. New York: Knopf, 1991.

Thiederman, Sondra. *Bridging Cultural Barriers for Corporate Success: How to Manage the Multicultural Work Force*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991.

--. *Profiting in America's Multicultural Marketplace: How to Do Business Across Cultural Lines*. New York: Lexington, 1991.

Thomas, R. Roosevelt, Jr. *Beyond Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Work Force by Managing Diversity*. New York: AMACOM, 1991.

Watkins, Evan and Lisa Schubert. "The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 90s." *After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s*, edited by Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland, Westview Press,1995, pp. 90 - 108. Routledge, 2018.

Chapter 3: The Entrepreneurship of the New: Corporate Direction and Educational Issues in the 1990s

I thank Routledge/CRC Press for permission to re-publish this Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter co-authored with Evan Watkins in *After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s* first published in 1995 and reprinted 2018. It is available online at the following link: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429502477.

The educational rhetoric of the eighties seemed full of a vocabulary of "return." Schools were encouraged to "return" to the standards of assessment and accountability, to go back to the basics, to rediscover the heritage of Western culture and tradition, and so on. What exactly the country was to return from included among other things the "excesses" of political correctness and multiculturalism, as if some invisible pendulum had swung "too far" and was overdue for a compensatory trajectory. Working as we do in a university English department, in the midst of a now immense range of instruments for cultural critique, such discourse looked almost constructed for the purposes of laboratory experiment in critical analysis, made to order for the instruments at hand, with of course the bonus that its very pervasiveness ensured the political relevance of critique. What might have seemed even in the immediate past a relatively local intra-departmental quarrel over hiring decisions or curricular change, say, could now assume the larger dimensions of engagement with already mobilized political forces across any number of sectors in the social field.

We have no intention of denying the political relevance--or the larger implications--of ostensibly local debates in this newly drawn social landscape. But we are convinced that politically useful critique also has to question the notion of a “return” itself rather than focusing exclusively on the frequent distortions of what political correctness and multiculturalism are really about, or decoding the race/gender/class significations masked by “return” appeals. For while it’s true enough that “return” rhetoric has simplified and distorted the issues that arose in public debates about political correctness and multiculturalism, and unquestionably true that “return” is a coded assault on already politically disenfranchised groups, it seems to us a mistake to assume that “dominant politics” is then unequivocally invested in restoring the power balances that existed somewhere in “the past,” before p.c. and multiculturalism. It’s an all too easy assumption to make, since it conforms to the familiar claims of oppositional politics as dedicated to social change, to creating new and alternative possibilities against all the pressures for preserving existing configurations of social relations. That is, as we suggested, a rhetoric of return appears tailor made for oppositional political critique, playing to oppositional self-perceptions of being in the vanguard of change. To that extent, return rhetoric becomes an agreed upon designation of ideological positions, however much its values and exact meanings are debated.

Yet it’s worth remembering that despite such visible and familiar arguments as William Bennett’s in *To Reclaim a Legacy*, public discussion of education initiated within the terms of Reaganite hegemony has by no means always been oriented around a rhetoric of return. The "business community," in publications like *The Wall Street Journal*, *Fortune, Forbes*, and *Business Week*, has argued long and hard that a public education system in the U.S. requires a drastic overhaul if it is to train the *new* worker skills necessary in a rapidly changing and increasingly competitive climate of global business. It is particularly important for those of us who teach within the disciplines of the humanities to attend carefully to these arguments and their agendas. For unlike Bennett's claims, or those advanced by Allan Bloom or Roger Kimball and others, which very often find expression in some version or other within humanities departments, these business oriented proposals are much less likely to have any faculty representatives as it were within the humanities. That is, not only the self-perceptions of radical political critique, but also the internal structure of humanities departments works to emphasize the political weight of return rhetoric, at the expense of minimizing the challenges represented by among other things business community interests in educational reform.

Educational policy in any case is located in the midst of what has been historically the field of greatest tension within Reaganism: on the one hand, economic imperatives that have emphasized corporate "restructuring" and diversification, technological innovation, participation in a global marketplace, and so on; and on the other, so-called "social issues" imperatives that have emphasized the importance of the family, the authority of moral guidance and religious belief, and correspondingly the rampant dangers represented by homosexuals, feminists, militant blacks--the familiar gallery of Reaganism's social villains. Educational policy marks a territory where these divergent concerns must meet, if often conflictually, since implementation of both economic imperatives and "social issues" requires educating children for a desired *future*. (Thus in a sense, even the most insistent rhetoric of return might be understood more accurately in educational terms as a kind of “back to the future” program.) Insofar as intra-academic debates about multiculturalism and political correctness look first to issues that are explicitly social, political and cultural, they play in the same field as it were as “social issues” Reaganism. In contrast, multiculturalism--or “diversity” as it usually referred to in discussions of corporate management--appeared first to “economic” Reaganism as, precisely, an economic issue. As a result, corporate interests in educational reform enter educational territory, including the debates about multiculturalism and political correctness, from a rather different angle indeed.

Yet educational policy is obviously a matter of social, political and cultural issues no less than economics. Further, and while the initial excitement over “supply-side” and the like seemed to identify a “pragmatic,” profit-oriented side of Reaganism often remote from the fundamentalism of the Moral Majority, there any number of early indications of the imperatives that would drive corporate change as also involving a new priority to explicitly political and cultural concerns, if initially couched in negative terms. Affirmative action was identified as unwarranted government “political” interference in business practices, for example, while the pressures toward “sensitivity training” and “diversity workshops” were viewed as a time wasting drag on corporate efficiency.

At the same time, however, globalization meant the necessity of doing business with people from other cultures. The relocation of production plants outside U.S. borders created “problems” of dealing with a “native” workforce. Domestically, the increasing reliance on contracting work outside of the corporation and a “leased” workforce within created similar “problems” with “nonnative” workers in the U.S. And the enormous numbers of mergers, acquisitions and leveraged buyouts posed the difficulty of also “merging” what often turned out to be surprisingly different "corporate cultures." All of which functioned during the eighties to make *cultural* issues, no less than economic concerns, very high indeed on the agenda of how to prepare "corporate America" for the rapidly approaching 21st century. Diversity could not be viewed as just a "problem" imposed by government interference that might be "solved" by cosmetic attention in sensitivity workshops as part of a regrettably necessary exoskeleton of affirmative action hiring procedures. Managing diversity profitably would require wholesale changes in the very assumptions that shaped "corporate culture."

In the face of these changes in the interest and organization of major corporations, it seems to us no longer very useful to image a simple division between "economic" and "social issues" Reaganism, or even to construct elaborate ways of marking out what was a certain ideological congruity. For "economic" Reaganism has mutated into its own version of *linked* programs for economic and cultural change, which are not a matter of "return" in any sense. What these programs involve, and how they legitimize their images of the future, should be a matter of considerable concern in trying to anticipate the directions of educational reform.

In what follows, we want to focus on the emergent process of restructuring "corporate culture" in terms suggested by human resources analysis and the thematics of "managing diversity," and then if briefly connect these directions to what is often referred to as school culture reform, likewise already visible in such things as Bush's *America 2000* agenda and Clinton's notion of educational "choices."[1] The premise is a simple one: to whatever extent a public educational system in the U.S. was both created for and modelled on industrial corporate organization, changes in that organization toward a postindustrial, "service" economy will be a powerful force shaping future changes in education. To see the actual historical development of public education in these terms is not the whole story by any means. And as a result, to project the future of educational institutions by way of looking to corporate reorganization will hardly yield an infallible guide. At best, it will only help identify pressures and potential directions of reform. Thus we don't intend by this emphasis our own form of "return" to any version of economic determinism, which in any case was always just bad philosophy with little relation to economics. In part, the rationale is simply some sense that when corporate interests pay this much attention to "culture," it's perhaps time for the rest of us to pay some attention to economics, without resort to the metaphysical gloss of "the last instance." For it's "the next instance" that has to occasion the most concern. We think that focusing on emergent changes in corporate organization will help to locate issues that should engage educators considerably more than a continual and often virtually hypnotized stare at return rhetoric.

I

In 1987-88, John Fernandez (a former manager with AT&T and currently president of Advanced Research Management Consultants) conducted a massive survey of employee attitudes toward "diversity" in the workplace, involving over 30,0000 respondents and including often quite lengthy discussions among the some 2,000 employees who had attended Fernandez's workshops in managing diversity. In an article summarizing some of the results, he and co-author Jacqueline Dubois report that racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism are still very much in evidence on shop floors and in boardrooms. Consequently, their argument is that U.S. companies must make every effort to change their managerial practices to accommodate diversity rather than suppress it or pretend that the "problems" of employing white women and people of color have already been resolved. For active accommodation, they claim, will ease conflicts among employees that potentially could hinder productivity and, more importantly , maximize the productive potential of the cultural resources offered by a diverse workforce. “We must emphasize,” they write, “that companies that are willing to accommodate diversity will reap rewards in traditional dollars-and-cents terms as they listen to their most valuable resource: people. We predict that those corporations that refuse to attend to pressing employee concerns will be split by conflict as they find potential workers more difficult to find and much more apt to work in organizations where they are fully appreciated” (206).

A national study published in 1987 by the Hudson Institute entitled *Workforce 2000* lends demographic support to many of Fernandez and Dubois’ suggestions. By the year 2000, the report claims, native white males will account for only 15 percent of the “net new” employees in the U.S. Native white women (42%), native nonwhite women (13%) and men (7%), and immigrant men (13%) and women (9%) are expected to fill the vast majority of the new jobs created in the U.S. And of the already existing employee positions, white males will soon account for less than one-third (qtd in Morrison 14). With potential workers coming from so many culturally diverse backgrounds, corporations that refuse to accommodate diversity not only will find it more difficult to reduce the kind of employee conflicts Fernandez found prevalent in his survey. They may find it difficult to hire a workforce at all.

Thus companies willing to accommodate diversity will “reap rewards in dollars-and-cents terms,” as Fernandez and Dubois contend, because they will save themselves the cost of frequent employee turnovers, reduce the risk of conflicts that deflect attention from the pursuit of corporate objectives, and in general improve employee morale and investment in the company.

But this new emphasis on diversity claims more to offer than a sort of “loss prevention” cost reduction safeguard. A diverse workforce has clear competitive advantages as well, since white women and people of color can offer insights and ideas that would not be tapped in “the old boy” network. As any number of recently published books such as Sondra Thiederman’s *Profiting in America’s Multicultural Marketplace* testify, a culturally diverse workforce can help secure an increasingly diverse market for corporate products and services. Not only do women know better than men what women “need,” for example, but they know best how to play on their insecurities to sell it to them. And with the aggregate spending power of African Americans, Asian Americans and Hispanics estimated at $424 billion in 1990, and projected to soar to $650 billion by 2000 (Copeland, qtd. in Morrison, 16), corporations have every incentive to invest in such previously disparaged “efficiency drags” like diversity training seminars to pursue the potential marketing edge offered by a diverse workforce.

Corporate attention to demographic trends, to the increasingly intense competition for market presence among diverse cultural groups, and to the competition for highly qualified “non-traditional” workers all indicate that corporate management has recognized the importance of “accommodating diversity.” What’s as yet not clear, however, and currently a subject of debate, is the kind of corporate change and retraining this new emphasis necessitates. Since the entrance of white women and people of color into the labor force in large numbers creates new and intense pressures, as Fernandez’s survey documents, the success of “cultural diversity” in the corporate environment will depend upon “managing” these pressures adequately. Hence John Preston, the CEO of Avon Corporation, adds one caveat to his otherwise upbeat assessment: “More and more, corporations and organizations of all kinds are awaking to the fact that a diverse work force is not a burden but their greatest potential strength--*when managed properly*" (ix, our italics).

By now a vast array of recently published books, including Fernandez's own *Managing a Diverse Work Force: Regaining the Competitive Edge*, have attempted to define what "managing diversity" entails. Yet there's little if any consensus understanding of the concept within the field. In Ann Morrison's *The New Leaders: Guidelines on Leadership Diversity in America*, for example, what Fernandez calls "managing diversity" appears rather differently, and for her less patronizingly, as "the multicultural approach." As typical in situations requiring new definitional constructs, it often has proven easier to identify what "managing diversity" is *not* than agree on what it is. A recent course offering for faculty, professional and classified staff at the University of Washington, "Developing an Organization Diversity Plan," thus begins by distinguishing "the differences among affirmative action, valuing differences, and managing diversity" (16) as corporate strategies for integrating white women and people of color.

These particular distinctions derive from the work of R. Roosevelt Thomas Jr., the founder of the American Institute for Managing Diversity and the consultant James Preston credits with having successfully restructured Avon in the mid-eighties. In his recently published *Beyond Race and Gender*, Thomas argues that affirmative action is implemented primarily for legal and ethical reasons. The assumption is that white males constitute the majority of employees in any given workplace and that "others"--categorized collectively by gender and race--are employed either because the company must conform to government regulations or because management feels a moral obligation to provide "equal opportunity" to white women and people of color. For Thomas, affirmative action is then a reactive strategy "imported" from outside the corporation to solve internal problems. As such, it leads to what he calls an "affirmative action cycle," which is "frustrating and virtually avoidable….[a] cycle of crisis, problem recognition, action, great expectations, disappointment, dormancy, and renewed crisis" (21). A company may "react" to the symptoms of crisis--for example, when morale is low, or there has been a high turnover of "minority" employees--by setting off a frantic search to find the "right" categorically identified person who can ensure the firm's image as an equitable place to work. But because the "action" has simply assumed the feasibility of assimilating collectively defined "others" into an already existent "corporate culture," the solution only leads into a renewed "cycle of crisis."

In contrast to affirmative action, a "valuing differences" approach responds to the felt needs and values of individual employees: "Valuing difference programs are geared to the individual and interpersonal levels. The objective is to enhance interpersonal relationships among individuals and to minimize blatant expressions of racism and sexism" (24-5). According to Thomas, the intent of such an approach is to be the perfect complement to an affirmative action emphasis on collective, group identifications that categorically distinguish white women and people of color from white males. For while affirmative action imposes legal and ethical obligations from outside to incorporate culturally diverse "groups" into the company, valuing differences attempts to break the "cycle of crisis" with programs that raise awareness of the culturally unique contributions each individual has to offer.

For Thomas, however, valuing differences remains like affirmative action a reactive strategy, simply a complementary way of addressing what is nonetheless perceived as "the problem" of incorporating white women and people of color into the company. Whether by legal mandate or ethical obligation, the goals of affirmative action are extrinsic to the corporation, which isn't in the business of writing legal codes or devising ethical systems. And while employees are obviously important to corporate business, their individual qualities as revealed through a program of valuing differences workshops are not exactly what the company exists for either. With both approaches, severally or in combination, the company merely "reacts" to what is perceived as a human resources "problem" whose correction at best can only set the company back on course.

Through this process of defining affirmative action and valuing differences, Thomas arrives at a kind of double negative as it were to identify managing diversity as a positive program. For managing diversity "doesn't seek to give relief to a system's negative consequences by adding supplementary efforts" (26). Rather, it "is a holistic approach to creating a corporate environment that allows all kinds of people to reach their full potential in pursuit of corporate objectives" (167). That is, unlike either affirmative action or valuing differences, managing diversity requires no extrinsic guidelines or imperatives. It is intrinsic to the "natural" operating assumptions of a corporation in the pursuit of profit. Thus by "natural creation of a diverse work force" and "natural upward mobility for minorities and women" (28), Thomas doesn't mean that this new picture of the corporation now conforms to some universalized norms of "human nature" or whatever. He means, precisely, that hiring and promotion practices appear fully congruent with the "nature" of the corporation, which of course involves making money. "True, all groups will benefit," he argues, "whether they are different in terms of age, lifestyle, gender or race. But their benefit is not the driving motivation. Managing diversity presumes that the driving force is the manager's, and the company's, self-interest" (168).

In order for hiring and promotion practices to appear fully congruent with the "nature" of the corporation, however, the definition of diversity must expand--"beyond race and gender," as Thomas' title implies--to include difference "with respect to age, functional and educational backgrounds, lifestyle preferences, tenure with the organization, personality traits, and ways of thinking" (170). White men are also constituted as "different" in this new approach and included with everyone else rather than segregated, as often happens in diversity workshops. In *The New Leaders*, Ann Morrison makes a similar point with respect to what she calls the "multicultural approach": "In this approach, diversity has a broad meaning that encompasses sex and ethnic groups along with groups based on such attributes as nationality, professional discipline, or cognitive style. In contrast to the assimilation model, this approach assumes that the organization must change and the norms must accommodate a wide range of workers. The explicit goal is to strengthen the organization by leveraging a host of significant differences" (7). By revamping the corporate culture to recognize all differences that employees have to offer, while selectively valuing only those differences that contribute to corporate success, managing diversity claims to offer the possibility of acquiring and promoting a diverse workforce "naturally," as an intrinsic part of corporate objectives.

Lest Thomas himself be understood as a version of economic determinism pointing invariably to "the last instance" of profit, however, his understanding of managing diversity is as thoroughly cultural as it is economic. The point for Thomas is that managing diversity *integrates* economic and cultural priorities, realizes their mutual dependence from within, and thereby maximizes the productive potential of the company. The collectively based categories of affirmative action and the individual attention of valuing differences thus reemerge within the “nature” of the diverse corporation as an expression of its human resource potential. Indeed, in contrast to what Thomas calls “the old top-down, directive style” of management, in which managers concentrated on performing the “tasks” of the corporation while relegating employee concerns about diversity to human resources departments, this new managerial strategy is based on an “empowerment model.” As Thomas explains, “In this model, the duality between ‘business issues’ and ‘people issues’ is absent. Instead, the empowerment of employees is linked directly to or integrated with business objectives” (47). By means of a “radically” altered corporate environment in which employees are “empowered” to pursue corporate ends, managing diversity locates people rather than raw materials or capital or technologies as a company’s most powerful “leveraged” resource.

To “sophisticated” cultural critique a management strategy that claims to privilege human resources may itself seem little more than a disguised “return” rhetoric doing its usual job of legitimizing invidious practices under the banner of “the human.” Yet to a certain extent, in ways necessary to understand for the purposes of effective critique, human resources thinking is closer to academic postmodernism than to any lamely residual nod toward “humanistic” discourse. For in trying to move beyond the categorial, group-based identifications embodied in affirmative action guidelines and the individualizing programs of valuing differences, this new conception of “human resources” addresses what might usefully be recognized as a kind of collective multiplicity. That is, Thomas’ simultaneous critique of affirmative action and valuing differences suggests that the “subject” of human resources analysis is no more a vestige of the metaphysically “human” than the “decentered subject” now so familiar in poststructuralist theorizing. Each one of the people in Thomas’ new corporate environment is understood to occupy what such a poststructuralist terminology might identify as “multiple subject positions,” involving determinations of race, gender, age, lifestyle, and so on.

The analogy can’t be pushed too far, however, since despite the similarities that permit the use of terminology borrowed from our own academic field, these positionalities locate finally a collective *resource* rather than the experientially based, “decentered” multiplicity of poststructuralist theorizing. Thus while not transcendently “human,” they are positions Thomas would image as “beyond race and gender” because immanently corporate; each position in its shifting, contingent, flexible adaptation to continually changing circumstances contributes to the collective goal of “leveraging a host of significant differences,” in Morrison’s phrase, “that strengthen the organization.” That is, differences *as diversity* matter in relation to the maximizing of resources. Not all differences count equally on all occasions. What constitutes “significant differences” involves a politics of selection that is neither some damped down, “co-opted” version of the postmodern nor a return to “traditional” humanism.

Neither is it merely a deceptive expansion of those familiar corporate attempts in the early eighties to circumvent affirmative action guidelines and minimize the importance of diversity workshops. Indeed, the theorizing of diversity expresses the commitments of an emergent corporate culture to include white women and people of color as an invaluable resource. Unlike affirmative action or valuing differences, however, managing diversity is not *about* white women and people of color. It is about managing. “Managing diversity,” Thomas reminds us, “presumes the driving force is the manager’s, and the company’s, self-interest” (168). Thus the practices that regulate the process of inclusion nevertheless don’t begin with the question of how to deal with white women and people of color, but with what Thomas’ attention to diversity has already "presumed," with a politics of management selection that defines company "self-interests" and the resources that might contribute to the realization that interest. We want to turn, then, from the theorizing of diversity by management consultants like Thomas and Fernandez to the work of human resources analysis in a "case study" of a corporate merger that describes in some considerable detail how the principles that guide management selection are being altered. As an integral part of a much larger process of change over the last decade, it is the new corporate politics of selection evident in the merger that is likely to include educational proposals for the future, and hence what oppoetunites actually become available to white women and people of color to "participate" in a diverse workforce.

II

One of the more familiar and visible business changes in the eighties was the enormous increase of mergers and acquisitions, nearly doubling by the middle of the decade and involving triple digit billions of dollars. The financing of these "events" has attracted the most attention, especially as they often depended on leveraged buyouts and the virtually complete transformation of the so-called junk bond market (with now, as one of the delayed effects, the burgeoning of a whole new sector of financial specialists to engage in "unleveraging" staggering debt burdens, and a new legal sector of specialists to rewrite the permissible itineraries of junk bond movement). Much of the merger/acquisition activity involved unrelated (in terms of product-identification) corporations, reinforcing a perception of an increasingly "decentralized" and global business network, and the unencumbered movement of legal/management/finance specialists across both corporate and national borders.

It is necessary to recognize, however, that in a number of cases mergers occurred between firms offering directly competing products and services, where the financing--while obviously crucial--produced nothing by the way of the dramatic action narratives of "corporate raiders" and little of the speculative possibilities of junk bond float. Financing was largely secondary to the immense and immediate problems of how to reorganize the new corporate structure quickly to main market presence. These problems were not "financial" but "people" problems: who would do what? who would stay, and where? who would go and under what severance conditions? They were, in sum, problems involving the principles of selection for the collective multiplicity of a new corporate workforce. Cultural diversity in the sense of profoundly different racial, ethnic, gender and age groups was not an explicit issue in most of these mergers, nor was it in the example we want to focus for attention: the Baxter Travenol and American Hospital Supply merger in 1985 to form the Baxter Healthcare Corporation. Corporate culture was the central concern, yet in circumstances that like the incorporation of diversity require a revised politics of selection intrinsic to the objectives of the new corporate entity. That is, the Baxter-American merger offers a compact model of change in the politics of selection, and a model whose principles are already being extended by human resources analysis to define not only new management objectives, but more importantly the larger process of education and training necessary for diversity to be mobilized as a corporate resource.

Anthony Rucci, the senior vice president of human resources for Baxter Healthcare; Frank LaFasto, manager of human resources for Baxter; and David Ulrich, management professor at the University of Michigan, provided a lengthy summary discussion of the transition process in "Managing Organizational Change: A Merger Case Study." For our purposes, the most revealing aspect of the merger involved an early key point established by the transition teams with respect to “people selection”: that selection would be guided by a principle to “select the best person regardless of the company” (148). Although the idea seems unexceptional, it in fact was not at all common practice in merger reorganization. More typically, the acquiring firm--in this case Baxter--would fit specific individuals into its existent organization if their expertise seemed valuable, or sometimes simply dismiss wholesale much of the acquired firm’s personnel. If “practical” enough in circumstances of a generally shrinking market and the correspondingly necessary “downsizing” of the corporation, in a rapidly growing field of healthcare supplies such policies made little sense.

How to determine “the best person” in the new circumstances of the merger, however, was by no means clear. For while providing similar products to the health care industry, Baxter and American had operated very differently: “American Hospital Supply Corporation was characterized by a decentralized operating structure that included multiple operating units with a fully integrated operating philosophy. By contrast, the pre-merger Baxter organization was a much more centralized and functional operating style with few autonomous operating units and functional responsibilities such as human resources and finance reporting directly to the corporate headquarters” (146). A person skilled in the team organization of one of American’s autonomous units might not be skilled at all in guiding a project through the levels of a pre-merger Baxter hierarchy, and might not in any case be willing to work in circumstances that could seem a constraint on decision-making authority.

Thus as important as it was to establish initially, the principle of “selecting the best person” could not yield an answer or take a stand as it were on whether decisions should be made on “a strictly individual basis” or on considerations of whatever “group” identifications or values. Nor would an affirmative action assumption of group identities or a valuing differences assumption of individual uniqueness supply useful corrective guidelines because in the circumstances, *both* key terms--”individual” and “group”--were the very terms necessarily up for definitional grabs. Every “individual” interviewee and every “individual” interviewer in the selection process were already and from the beginning also a *Baxter* individual or an *American* individual, who then had to occupy at least the double “subject position” of pre-merger American or Baxter and post-merger Baxter during the negotiations. Further, the interviewers on the selection teams had no guarantees themselves that they would eventually become part of the new organization. Even “fit” with the post-merger Baxter collective couldn’t simply be assumed as a criterion, since post-merger Baxter had yet to be defined, and in its details could only be defined through the very process of setting up employee screening processes and interpreting their results. “Selecting the best person” likewise yielded no available guidelines for understanding the relation between past performance and projected future performance. What might constitute optimum performance had, precisely, a “functional”--as yet to be determined--and not an “intrinsic” content.

Before “selecting the best person” could be implemented, it was necessary to identify in some detail the corporate “philosophy” of the new Baxter as a “hybrid” organization that involved “decentralizing,” on the American model, “those decisions that had a substantive impact on the customer,” but for “those areas not seen as critical to customer interface” moving closer to a Baxter-like centralization of authority (146). It was necessary to determine the composition of screening teams for selection at each level of the new structure, no easy task in itself, since Baxter and American had been often bitter competitors for 45 years, and part of the corporate "lore" of each company included many tales of "sinister" behavior on the part of the other. And finally, it was necessary to devise considerably more elaborate "interview" procedures for selection that could generate reasonably accurate predictions of how interviewees would function in the new organization. At the level of concrete detail, in other words, looking at such a process helps explain what exactly is involved in one of Thomas' key principles distinguishing the education for a managing diversity perspective: change begins with the very "roots" of corporate culture and always requires a continual and explicitly constructed definition of what it's all for.

How "the best person" was selected in the merger transition is important to understand, because it is a process that has a rather direct equivalent within educational institutions. "Selecting the best person" also expresses a primary educational task of transforming a multiple, diverse student population within the schools into a workforce trained and sorted out "appropriately" to the job tasks available. As both feminist and Marxist critique have amply demonstrated, it is a selection process that has operated in all kinds of skewed and discriminatory ways behind the facade of "merit." The Baxter-American merger model, however, profoundly alters the rationale of selection. The politics of selection is no longer based, like merit, in a claim to determine intrinsic qualities of the person. Instead, it becomes a function of the identification of what "significant differences" would best serve the emergent corporate entity. Further, and while the corporate culture differences addressed by the model are by no means the same as racial-ethnic or gender or sexual preference or age differences, preserving a rhetoric or selecting the best person nevertheless permits the model to be extended by human resources analysis to *any* form of "diversity" and "difference." Like merit, "the best person" exhaustively codes the available field in the selection process. But in contrast to the rationales for merit decisions, "the best person" is contingently defined for the occasion by the merger process.

For all that it thereby unanchors determination of "the best person" from familiar, stable ideological codings of "merit," a text like "Managing Organizational Change: A Merger Case Study" admittedly lacks the visceral excitement of the postmodern novel for academic literary theorists. And it offers little obvious scope for the political delights of attacking Roger Kimball, et. al. with their Marshall amplified "return" noises about the imminent collapse of Western civilization. But in many ways it's a lot more important, because it and the number of texts like it will have a lot to do with where, under what conditions and to whom you might in future be teaching postmodern novels, and what kind of jobs if any those students who have benefitted from your careful instruction will get. For as the Fernandez and Dubois article--if perhaps melodramatically--expresses, educational commitments and educational reform must be very high indeed on the agenda of implementing managing diversity: "if we start investing in education from every source (private donations of various types and funding from all levels of government), we can truly have a literate country and a labor pool of qualified candidates. If we ignore the statistics about workforce composition and education, we will have a severe shortage of qualified workers and a country that continues to have large pockets of extremely disadvantaged people of color" (208).

Fernandez and Dubois conveniently manage to ignore, however, the way in which this "reformed" vision of larger educational purpose nevertheless continues to embody a politics of selection in terms that by no means guarantee expectations of "advantageous" social change for “large pockets of extremely disadvantaged people of color.” Although managing diversity would rewrite the conditions of what constitutes social “advantage” and “disadvantage” through educational training, curricular structure, institutional organization and selection processes, it nonetheless remains a politics of power, of control over “human resources,” and to some very great extent of social disenfranchisement, now increasingly finding expression in and through a process of educational reform policies.

III.

“Flexible specialization” is a complex concept that describes the difference between mass production of standardized goods with predominantly unskilled labor, and the manufacture of specialized goods for segmented buying publics, employing relatively much fewer and very highly skilled workers. This flexibly specialized form of production might be implemented by small businesses or the autonomous operating units of large corporations. In either case, however, it is very much “rooted” in and dependent on the resources available in a particular region. Thus the literature of flexible specialization, such as Michael Piore and Charles Sabel’s influential inaugural text, *The Second Industrial Divide*, describes in some considerable detail the links between corporations and their regional locations, emphasizing the interconnected ensemble of social relations and institutional resources that identify the specificity of a region. Resources, they argue, typically will involve not only the presence of one or more major research universities, but the whole complex tributary web of educational suppliers to the university.

For our purposes, the concept of flexible specialization permits a kind of double exposure image of projected directions of educational reform. On the one hand, it widens the lens significantly beyond the parameters of "radical" corporate culture change Thomas emphasizes in his managing diversity programs for re-educating corporate management. Although Thomas understands well enough that implementing a managing diversity approach takes more time than a day long "diversity" seminar, he neglects to consider its dependence on resources beyond the corporation.[2] Even as reorganized in Thomas' terms, a company after all can "naturally" acquire a diverse workforce only if it has well established connections to educational institutions who "naturally" make such a workforce available. Thus, Fernandez and Bubois argue, corporations have every incentive "to invest in the communities from which they hope to draw workers" (238).

On the other hand, however, flexible specialization also frames a close-up shot of how the characteristics of educational institutions may vary considerably from one region to another, as the forms of specialized manufacture vary across different regions. "Universal" education, general standards of skills and training, institutional uniformity of educational opportunity--such concepts have relatively little long term use in generating limited pools of highly skilled workers. In order to gain the kind of corporate support for education that consultants like Fernandez recommend, educational institutions themselves, no less than corporations, would have every reason to "flexibly specialize." A corporate politics of selection, that is, becomes in larger terms an educational policy of training different people differently.

In his reconceptualizing of Labor Department classificatory indices of the workforce in *The Work of Nations*, Robert Reich, chief economic advisor to Bill Clinton, argues that a system developed in the industrial economy of mass production in the thirties which still distinguishes between hand labor and machine operatives is completely inadequate to describe current workforce divisions. The select, highly skilled employees envisioned by the literature of flexible specialization, for example, would be identified by Reich under the general term "symbolic analysts." Rather than trained to perform specific tasks, symbolic analysts are trained in the conceptual operations of "problem-finding" and "problem-solving." That is, their skills are themselves "flexible," capable of being turned to *whatever* new and continually shifting occasions appear. Reich argues that symbolic analysts are in fact the primary "resource" of "human capital" filling the pages of human resources analysis hymns to corporate progress.

Even very successful regional sectors, however, will have a population composed not only of such symbolic analysts, but also of what Reich calls "routine producers" and "in-person servers," the two other large, general divisions of the workforce in Reich's revised classificatory scheme. Routine producers are engaged in specific and repetitive tasks, whether in the corporate office, the warehouse, or in the "home-shop" subcontracting firms who supply much of the labor for specific product runs for large corporations such as Baxter Healthcare itself. While as Reich admits routine producers continue to decline as a relative percentage of the total workforce, in absolute terms their numbers remain enormous. And to whatever diminished extent, their work remains indispensable to corporate productivity. In-person servers, in contrast, are a rapidly growing percentage of the workforce, as necessary as routine producers and no less tied to the regional location. For it is of course their "services" which exempt symbolic analysts from much of the tedium of their working lives.

Reich is then by no means sanguine that the high priority of education--as a key to changing corporate culture, as the "tools" in effect for realizing the potential of "human resources," and institutionally as a vital element in the regional web--automatically implies anything like a higher level of education for everybody, linked to a highly rewarding and well paid job awaiting the person with that higher education.[3] A great many "people skills" may in fact be necessary to an "in-person server" who rushes McDonald's hamburgers from one office complex to another, and even more such skills if the product is taco sushi delivered to the office instead of hamburgers on the run. It's possible the "server" could speak two languages with some remarkable fluency--three including "street" or "'hood." But it's not real likely that person will be eagerly recruited by the local research university (or local community college for that matter), the local autonomous operating unit of the now flexibly specialized, downsized and flattened management hierarchy of recently acquired corporation X, or even the firm supplying a leased workforce to that operating unit.[4] For that is not the person who leaps immediately to mind to fill what human resources environmental scans project as a growing number of soon-to-be-empty "skill positions."[5] Such "diversity" is not attractive, or indeed even *noticeable* in the landscape of the scan. Skilled though the person may be, s/he has a long ways to go in the entrepreneurship of self-marketing.

Entrepreneurship was a term made famous during the early years of Reaganism, signifying an emphasis on individual economic initiative, the encouragement of "small business" enterprise, and so on. But like a great many other terms it has itself changed, and it has generated offspring such as the currently fashionable "intrepreneurship" used to designate managerial in-house innovations in employee relations, including treating employees as if they were customers. Marquette Bank, for example, like a number of corporations, has extended a classic bank sales tactic of gifts to attract new customer savings accounts, by giving first and savings bonuses to employees who generate new ideas that translate into a greater clientele base. The example is a particularly telling one, for even in its earlier and more directly economic usages, "the entrepreneurial spirit" was typically imaged as a matter of recognizing possibilities for new product and service niches in the market. That is, it was already *consumer* oriented, grounded in a combination of market research analysis and "intuitive flair" for realizing the occasion. "Successful entrepreneurs," Richard Crawford argues in *In the Era of Human Capital*, "are not risk takers but rather opportunity takers who are constantly looking to shift resources--both human and financial--to areas of higher return" (128). As a result, Crawford adds, any "good entrepreneurial strategy has to be market based and driven" (129).

Thus as its meanings have evolved, entrepreneurship has more and more come to identify the flip side as it were of human resources attention to people resources and selection: what is good human resources management when directed within the corporation, translates into entrepreneurial success when directed toward the corporation's clientele, its customers. Correspondingly, what human resources analysis focuses from a management perspective as a matter of interpreneurshp with respect to managing a workforce, might well be understood from a workforce perspective as the skills of entrepreneurial self-marketing in *getting* a good job. You must learn to treat your potential employer as a customer, a consumer of the services you have to offer. It doesn't then take a great leap of logic to see one driving force behind projected directions of educational reform as a training in precisely such skills. For that training would teach you how to be the kind of employee who would benefit the most and yield the greatest productivity under the new conditions of corporate organization.

All of this has of course a familiar right to anyone aware of the reciprocal interest in job training between educational institutions and corporations that has existed throughout the history of public education in the U.S. As Wakins has argued in *Throwaways*, however, to the extent the reciprocity is familiar, it should be a reminder that as corporations change, what is expected in terms of educational training will change as well. And the changes we have been describing in corporate practices and organization are considerable. In one sense to be sure, schools have always been expected to provide the "service" of job training and its corresponding cultural conditioning. Thus in Marxist critique, for example, an educational system is often understood, crudely, as an "apparatus" for ideological (re)production. These new circumstances, however, permit not only an image of educational reform as training new and different workforce skills, but more importantly a redefinition of education itself as a service marketer and distributor, making available a student "service" where and when it is needed for the regional consumers of the schools' services.

Recent proposals for educational reform tuned to business interests, such as those collected under a school culture emphasis, are then not open even to very sophisticated versions of Marxist "reproduction" critique in quite the same way. For schools aren't understood as a factory processing student "raw material" into the finished product of good, docile workers who know their place. They are entrepreneurial service firms, ever sensitive to indices of marketability that locat new sectors of consumer "needs" and "demands," and dedicated to educating students accordingly. Students , again, are the product-services marketed by the schools. Thus "selecting the best person" in the schools would become less and less a matter of fine-tuned instruments to detect the precious metal of inherent student potential encased in the slag ore of each individual sample of student work. (Or, in Marxist terms, "reproducing" what's already defined as precious). What's "precious" and "the best" would become openly and admittedly functional, as in the Baxter-American merger model. It would be defined in and through the interactive and continually changing consumer context of who contracts for the schools' services, and managed by the educator as entrepreneurial strategist. As we have argued, educational institutions in these circumstances would have every incentive to "downsize" and "flexibly specialize." (The Edison Project and Channel One are only two of many recent examples.) For their institutional structure and market presence, too, would depend on seizing the occasion of possible new market niches. "A good entrepreneurial strategy," Crawford reminds us, "has to be market based and driven."

This large redefinition of educational organization and function isn't really a return to anything, as familiar as certain aspects of it certainly are. It's a vision of a postindustrial education for a postindustrial economy. It doesn't set out to combatively "return from" multiculturalism or even political correctness, nor simply to incorporate and isolate their thematics procedurally in order to get on with business. It's part of a vision that offers itself instead as a larger and more comprehensive way of organizing a desirable and "diverse" social world. As Piore and Sabel's work on flexible specialization emphasizes, corporate innovation in this vision is not necessarily at odds with relatively very convservatiove and even "traditional" social values of a regional center. Nor is it necessarily inconsistent with a region of rapidly changing social values. Thus school culture reform as it appears in Bush's *America 2000* agenda may appear relatively "conservative," in Clinton's education for choices, as relatively more "progressive," for neither managing diversity nor school culture reform can afford to be incompatible with whatever specific and powerful clientele inhabit the region.

But as Watkins has argued at length in *Throwaways*, they are altogether incompatible with the hopes and expectations of huge groups of the population--with Reich's "routine producers" and "in-person servers" no less than the populations of "urban ghettos" -- who are designated as obsolete, products of a now dysfunctional internal culture, the throwaway waste of change. The proposed educational reforms won't after all target these groups for reform but for disposal and recycling, like some urban core landfill site for future real estate speculation. Waste management is also a service the schools will be expected to supply, while at the other end supplying the bright new human resources capital of the diverse workforce of the future. That's the situation that must be changed, not the mind of our collegial William Bennett clones.

Terms like multiculturalism and political correctness identify now familiar contested territories, but as we have argued territories beginning to be occupied by groups with little interest in a "return." It's true enough that the relative freedom of an academic position permits flight to as yet unnamed open spaces at the first signs of an approaching squall line of "co-optation," let alone the massive redefinitional powers of "managing diversity." But not everybody has that luxury available to academics; not everybody can afford to see the "co-optation" of terms and territories as a cue to exit stage (further) left rather than as a necessary struggle just underway. And from the perspective of those who can't afford it, such freedom of academic movement is just another name for that no less familiar educational pattern of the eighties, white flight to the 'burbs.

Notes

[1]"School culture" (or "student culture") is one of a number of terms for an assumption that the assessment of student knowledges and skills affords a direct index of the "learning environment" available in the school. Thus if it could be documented--as both Bennett's 1984 and Cheney's 1998 reports claim to do--that students were deficient in knowledge areas generally recognized as crucial, the primary reason would be found in an inadequate school environment. The answer to those deficiencies is then a thoroughgoing reform of "school culture" rather than changes in educational funding or in the political and economic conditions of the larger social world students inhabit. (Bush's recommendation for standardized skill testing in his *American 2000* agenda, for example drew on school culture reasoning by claiming that such tests simply accumulate the necessary data on which to base decisions about education reform policies.) Like the concept of "corporate culture" in human resources analysis, school culture too locates a specific ensemble of interconnected relations between economic and social priorities. (For a further discussion of the terms and its implications, see Watkins, *Throwaways*.)

[2]As Schubert argues in "Managing a Multicultural Work Force in *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*," the corporate restructuring of the last 20 years and the new managerial strategies that ensued have necessitated a re-education process that will teach not only company executives but the general populace a whole new set of priorities and assumptions associated with the new "corporate culture." This re-education process is already visible in popular culture, where white men are increasingly depicted as "cultural managers," employing white women and people of color from around the world to achieve "company" objectives.

[3]Indeed, in the last section of his book, Reich implores the symbolic analysts as the top fifth of income earners to in effect “pay their fair share” for benefitting from the labor and services of routine producers and in-person servers. Since the symbolic analysts have the money, education, and political leverage to understand and influence the public policies that have resulted in the widening divergence in incomes between the top one-fifth and the lower four-fifths--“the growing difference in their working conditions, the regressive shift of the tax burden, the growing difference in the quality of primary and secondary education available to their children, the growing disparity in their access to higher education, [and] the increasing difference in recreational facilities, roads, security, and other local amenities available to them” (282)--they must vote to increase their own rate of taxation.

Reich’s tone in this section, however, is one of desperation verging on futility, as he has just outlined in the preceding pages of his book how symbolic analysts spend their weekdays “problem-finding” and “problem-solving” with people all over the world, while spending their weekends in suburban enclaves sheltered from the public policies that continue to distance the lower four-fifths from any hope of a financially secure future.

[4]Flattened management hierarchy identifies both the elimination of a number of “middle management” positions and the streamline decentralization of decision making authority. Thus as an index of relative “progressiveness” in Dennis Kravetz’s 1988 study, for example, it signals corporate willingness to alter organization structure in response to changing market conditions. And in *The Human Resources Revolution*, Kravetz claims an impressive statistical correlation between such indices of progressiveness and annualized company profits in a comparative analysis of some 150 firms--most of which were in the Forbes 500 list--between 1984 and 1988.

[5]"Environmental scan" is a term introduced by human resources analysis to describe a multi-layered profile that combines an attention to demographic trends, "lifestyle" changes and accommodations, educational directions and resources, technological innovation, market shifts, and so on, in so far as they might affect the composition, availability, skills, expectations and commitment of a potential workforce.

Works Cited

Bennett, William. *To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education*. Washington D.C., 1984.

Cheney, Lynn. *Humanities in America: A Report to the President, the Congress, and the American People*. Washington D.C., 1988.

Copeland, Lennie. "Valuing Workplace Diversity: Ten Reasons Employers Recognize the Benefits of a Mixed Work Force." *Personnel Administrator*, Nov. 1988, 38-40.

Crawford, Richard. *In the Era of Human Capital: The Emergence of Talent, Intelligence, and Knowledge as the Worldwide Economic Force and What It Means to Managers and Investors*. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Fernandez, John P. *Managing a Diverse Work Force: Regaining the Competitive Edge*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991.

Fernandez, John P., and Jacqueline A. Dubois. "Managing a Diverse Workforce in the 1990s." London et al. 205-45.

Hudson Institute. *Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the Twenty-first Century*. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1987.

Kravetz, Dennis J. *The Human Resources Revolution: Implementing Progressive Management Practices for Bottom-Line Success*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.

London, Manuel, Emily Bassman and John Fernandez, eds. *Human Resource Forecasting and Strategy Development: Guidelines for Analyzing and Fulfilling Organizational Needs*. New York: Quorum, 1990.

Morrison, Ann. *The New Leaders: Guidelines on Leadership Diversity in America*. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992.

Piore, Michael, and Charles Sabel. *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Preston, James P. Foreword. *Beyond Race and Gender*. By R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr. New York: AMACOM, 1991, ix- xi.

Reich, Robert. *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism*. New York: Knopf, 1991.

Rucci, Anthony J., Frank M.J. LaFasto, and David Ulrich. "Managing Organizational Change: A Merger Case Study." London et al. 141-54.

Schubert, Lisa. "Managing a Multicultural Work Force in Robin Prince of Thieves." *The Centennial Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 571-592.

Thiederman, Sondra. *Profiting in America's Multicultural Marketplace: How to Do Business Across Cultural Lines*. Lexington Books, 1991.

Thomas, R. Roosevelt, Jr. *Beyond Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Workforce by Managing Diversity.* Amacom, 1992.

University of Washington, "Training and Development: Autumn Catalog, 1992." Seattle, 1992.

Watkins, Evan. *Throwaways*. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1993.

Chapter 4: For the 'Public Good': Contradictions in Contemporary Literary Theory

This article originally appeared in *Mosaic, an interdisciplinary critical journal*, Volume 25, issue 3 (1992): 121-36. I thank *Mosaic* for permitting me to reproduce it here.

"The first problem with which the critic of literature is confronted is to find a mode of living which will enable him to develop his mind, practice his art, and support his family. The universities offer the obvious solution, but the matter is worth at least brief discussion" (Winters 11). While much has changed since Yvor Winters discussed the subject, the first problem with which a literary critic is confronted is still finding a job to support his/*her* family. The job secured for literary critics in academia today, however, is much different than for the New Critics, like Winters, writing in the first half of the century, and the difference has much to do with the way the notion of literary criticism has changed as a result of pressures from outside the university.

When the New Critics were writing, the job of the literary critic seemed to embrace the duties of an architect and a linguist. Almost mathematical in his approach, the New Critic spent most of his work time designing theories of structure, locating points of tension and, in the case of I.A. Richards, sketching blueprints of the brain. Partly due to a need to establish literary criticism as an academic discipline, the New Critics tended to treat the study of literature as if it were a science. Thus, John Crowe Ransom, seemingly equipped with lab coat and microscope, set out to "examine and define the poem with respect to its structure and texture" ("Criticism" 887). Meanwhile, his student, Cleanth Brooks, tinkered with the poem as if it were a physics project, the solution dependent upon "the working out of the various tensions" (1038), and Richards, by far the most pseudo-scientific of the New Critics, explicated the step-by-step neurological spasms provoked, "from the surface inwards," when a poem is read. "The surface," he wrote, "is the impression of the printed words on the retina. This sets up an agitation which we must follow as it goes deeper and deeper" (*Poetries* 23).

To imagine the New Critics treating the "object of poetry" as an object for the petri dish, however, is an incomplete portrayal. As much as they were establishing literary criticism like a science, they were at the same time positioning their field against science, antithetical to science. That is, many of the New Critics felt impelled to demonstrate how their field was at once progressing like the sciences, with similar technical methodologies and terminologies, and yet offering something different, contributing an area of understanding to society that science simply could not. Therefore critics like Richards rigorously differentiated "referential language" from "emotive language," relegating the former to the realm of science, while savoring the latter exclusively in literature. "Emotive language," he wrote, the language of poetry, does not rely on reason and logical thought but rather upon a "happy condition of real intellectual disconnection" ("Criticism" 853). Ransom similarly contrasted science and poetry, suggesting that the former required thought and the latter resisted thought. "Science gratifies a rational or practical impulse and exhibits the minimum of perception," he wrote, while poetry "gratifies a perceptual impulse and exhibits a minimum of reason" ("Poetry" 877). Thus while other sciences in the university depended upon reason and logical thought, the experience of reading a poem was uniquely indescribable in these terms.

Furthermore, the New Critics opposed their discipline not only to the sciences but also to their neighboring fields in the humanities. Indeed, in defining the discipline of literary criticism, the New Critics spent a great proportion of time simply defining what it was not. To Brooks, for example, the "heresy of the paraphrase" was that the paraphrase, unlike the intact structure of the poem, could be "conveyed into an unreal competition with science or philosophy or theology" (1036). Like many of his colleagues, Brooks refused to dispute a poem's ideological center, philosophical meaning, or theological tract, because that would make the field of literary criticism a subset of something else, of another field already well-established in the university. It is, after all, the business of the philosopher to discuss philosophy, the business of the theologian to discuss theology. The "business of the literary critic is," therefore, according to Ransom, "exclusively with aesthetic criticism. The business of the moralist will naturally, and properly, be with something else" ("Criticism" 884).

In carving out a distinct niche for the study of literature, then, the New Critics fled from presenting any ideology which they believed might confuse their function with philosophical, theological or scientific pursuits. Instead, they proffered an ostensibly apolitical stance. As Richards wrote, "The point is that many, if not most, of the statements in poetry are there as a means to the manipulation and expression of feeling and attitudes, not as contributions to any body of doctrine of any type" ("Criticism" 850-51). In fact, the movement away from politically charged criticism was so rigorous that if the experience of reading a poem became anything but an emotional catharsis, or a "happy disconnection" from the socioeconomic, cultural and historical events of the day, it ceased to be poetry. According to Ransom, "the poetic experience would have to stop for the poet who is developing it, or for the reader who is following it, if the situation which is being poetically treated should turn back into a situation to be morally determined" ("Criticism" 884).

***

In sharp contrast to the position of the literary critic of the 1920s, 30s and 40s, which depended upon a clear distinction between the esthetic and the moral, the job of the contemporary critic relies heavily on the erasure of such distinctions. As much as the New Critics established literary criticism as a circumscribed, clearly defined discipline, contemporary literary theorists work in effect to elide boundaries, to create a heterogeneous, seemingly borderless body of work. Since the late 1960s, and undoubtedly greatly influenced by the civil rights and feminist movements of that decade, literary theorists have deliberately crossed discipline boundaries to align their work politically. Speaking of the changes in literary theory initiated by the women's movement, Carolyn Allen cites historical, materialist, reader-response and psychoanalytical positions, explaining that "[s]tudies such as these, radically different from each other in methodology but cross disciplinary in practice and feminist in perspective, signal a move away from disciplinary boundaries which threaten to keep the most informed textual readings from their fullest cultural contexts" (296).

Indeed, it was soon after another discipline appeared on university campuses—women's studies—that feminist literary criticism firmly took root in English departments. These first feminist literary critics (at least the first ones formally acknowledged as such) began to recognize that the great works of literature traditionally taught in English classrooms excluded some perspectives, while privileging others. As Susan Koppelman Cornillon, editor of one of the first collections of feminist essays on literature, wrote in 1972: "Those of us who have looked to literature...for answers, for models, for clues to the universal questions of who we are or might become are beginning to understand why the things we sought have not been there. We are now beginning to understand how we have been alienated from ourselves and from the literature that we loved...by the bias of what we have been taught and the biases incorporated in the works" (ix). Realizing the hegemony propagated by the ostensibly apolitical stance of the New Critics, feminist literary critics, as well as black literary critics and black feminist literary critics, called for a re-examination of the canon and the theoretical practices which had previously purported to be "objective." They worked either to reinstate or to discover marginalized authors who had not received the recognition that they deserved. Zora Neale Hurston, for example, and Rebecca Harding Davis, as well as Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, circulated in academic discussions more than ever before. Furthermore, some feminist literary critics began to analyze the images of women in fiction (as the title of Cornillon's volume would suggest), while black literary critics examined the stereotypes of African-Americans.

As the 1970s progressed into the 1980s, literary critics (by this time a no longer sufficiently defined, free-standing category, but always preceded by a further denomination: feminist, black, black feminist, lesbian, Marxist, etc.) questioned not just the literature of the canon and the images therein but the very ideologies masked behind these works, the predominantly Western white male values, assumptions and ways of thinking imbued in the texts. Empowering the marginalized groups that they represented, some critics began to reject anything that resembled a "traditional" (read: white male) theoretical approach to literature. Indeed, battle lines were drawn, as critics like Barbara Smith in "Towards A Black Feminist Criticism" effectively told white male critics to keep their theoretical hands off black women's art. She wrote that the "use of Black women's language and cultural experiences by Black women about Black women results in a miraculously rich coalescing of form and content and also takes their writing far beyond the confines of white/male literary structures" (174). Similarly, Hélène Cixous, powerfully exhorting women to unleash the resources of the unconscious by "writing the body," declared that "[t]here have to be ways of relating that are completely different from the tradition ordained by the masculine economy" (78).

Cixous, moreover, is just one of the many French literary theorists to have an impact on American academics in the last two decades. In fact, her work is largely informed by Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose work reinterprets Freud in conjunction with linguistics, and Jacques Derrida, whose work deconstructs the binary oppositions with which Western thought is imbued. It is his deconstruction of "logocentrism" (i.e., the system of binaries that make up the foundation of Western thought, e.g., speech/ writing, rational/emotional, positive/negative, culture/nature) that Cixous most explicitly draws upon, as she demonstrates that the "feminine" in these pairs is always, inexorably debased.

As French theorists gained recognition within literary circles, however, the limitations of their theories increasingly came under attack. Cixous, for instance, effectively utilizes Derridean deconstruction to reject the binaries imbedded in Western culture, but a closer look finds her work limited by a strictly gender-based theory in which class and ethnicity do not play a part.

Broadening the perspective, recent theorists have begun to study such critics as Trinh Minh-ha who pushes Derrida's attack on logocentrism a step further to apply it to "identity." Rather than privileging sexual difference (and therefore a "feminine essence"), Trinh, a critic of post-colonial discourse, not only recognizes difference, but difference within difference. That is, she resists the notion of a feminine essence because that presupposes the relegation of an other, that which is not feminine, to an inferior position. Proposing a strategy which considers specific cultural contexts, Trinh and other post-colonial critics demonstrate that identity consists of many particular traits and characteristics, including race, religion, sexual preference and class.

In short, literary theory today has come to embrace a large and heterogeneous body of work, and is much concerned with the politics of equitable representation. Thus, while the "chief theoretical concern of the New Criticism was to define the nature of the literary object" (Bruss 11), the chief theoretical concern of contemporary literary theory is to define the political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts in which the literary object is imbedded.

Yet, even as many literary theorists work to deconstruct the exclusionary tower of the New Critics, there does seem to be a way in which the two groups are similar. Like their predecessors, contemporary theorists are located in the university; their work therefore is vulnerable to societal pressures made on educational institutions in the name of the "public good." As the New Critics were writing during the Cold War era, they had to prove that they were progressing "scientifically" not only to the established disciplines in the university but to an increasingly fearful American public as well. Since the "freedom of democracy" depended upon an ever progressing military/industrial complex, those specifically working in education and research, in whatever capacity and whatever discipline, were compelled to demonstrate their "technologically" innovative contributions.

In the 1980s, when the rhetoric of the "Cold War" greatly diminished, a new "threat" emerged, once again allowing corporate America to dictate the "public good." Instead of the nuclear arms build-up in the Soviet Union, the technological advances of Japanese industries put "our nation at risk" and perpetuated the pressures put on literary theorists, however indirectly, to fashion their field like a science but different than science. It is this impact of technology on literary theory that I wish to explore, but before doing so, it may be helpful to embark on a discussion of a larger scholastic field, much less autonomous, where the influence of high-tech industry is more readily apparent: public education.

***

Similar to the movement that was beginning to take place in literary theory, in the late 1960s there also arose a movement in educational theory. Like their colleagues in English departments, these theorists were reacting in part against the isolated, exclusive tradition established by white, male, middle-class intellectuals in the first half of the century. As one of their members, Madan Sarup, explained, their criticisms were "basically directed against a certain tradition (that includes Leavis, Eliot, Bantock, Cox and others), which propagates a concept of culture which is elitist" (6). Primarily a group of Marxist critics, they called their project the "new sociology of education" and endeavored to provide "an alternative tradition of education and culture...a tradition which attempts to show the historical situatedness of knowledge, and its social character" (Sarup 7).

In much the same way that literary theorists were beginning to recognize the political ideologies imbedded in the traditional study of literature, educational theorists began to report the political mechanisms at work within the public school. These reports criticized the public's passive acceptance of an educational methodology which "disciplin[es] children in the interest of producing a properly subordinate adult population" (Bowles & Gintis 37). Particularly frightening for these theorists was the forced compliance to the dominant political ideology imbedded within the educational system, in which only those students who accept that ideology matriculate. As Sarup explains, "it is generally accepted that only those who have been schooled into compliance on a lower grade are admitted to the higher reaches. Despite the claim that teaching is non-political, schools indoctrinate the child into the acceptance of the political system" (137-38).

In 1968, attempting to locate the crux of this indoctrination, Paulo Freire published a book which attacked the predominantly authoritative position of the teacher in the classroom. In *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, he denounces what he calls the "banking concept of education," in which the teacher "knows everything and the students know nothing" (59). Practicing this kind of pedagogy, the teacher deposits the "gift" of knowledge into the "savings accounts" of the students, who are expected to accept it passively. Not surprisingly, this "gift" tends to reflect the ideological interests of only the hegemonic group. As Freire writes, the teacher "expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students. His task is to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration—contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance" (57).

Much like the new literary theorists of the late 1960s, Freire worked to expose the exclusions of the dominant ideology by affirming the significance of the socioeconomic, cultural and historical situation. In fact, in opposition to the banking concept of education, Freire proffered a pedagogical methodology he called *conscientizacao*, a term which "refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality" (19n).

While some educational theorists, like Freire, concentrated their efforts on deconstructing the overtly authoritative position of teachers and the dominant ideologies espoused by them, still others debunked more subtle, but no less powerful, hegemonic practices operating within the industrial networks of high technology. That is, in the late 1960s the United States entered what sociologists term the fifth stage in the evolution of industry. Partly due to its declining share of the automobile and steel markets as a result of Japanese competition in these industries, corporate America invested its capital in the rising high-tech electronic and computer fields. Suddenly the language of disk drives and spread sheets, IBM and Apple, database and dot matrix overtook the country. Telecommunication satellites were sent into space and Apollo 11 was sent to the moon. High technology flourished in the fields of aeronautics, medicine, agriculture, communications and manufacturing. No longer were the loudest complaints heard from manual laborers, slogging through steel in factories, but from red-eyed data processors, fixedly staring at computer screens.

As the United States began to win back its competitive edge over foreign contenders, however, it nonetheless felt perpetually threatened. Even as reports proliferated on the financial success of some American corporations, leading economists were already predicting that it would not last. As Edwin Mansfield reported in 1980, "Productivity has been increasing less rapidly in the United States than in other major countries since 1960" (595).

Furthermore, the outlook for college graduates began to look bleak, since "there was a substantial downgrading in the types of jobs held by graduates, with fewer holding professional and technical positions and more in blue collar and lower level white-collar jobs" (Freeman 363-64). Indeed, the number of men holding professional and technical positions in the years between 1968 and 1978 dropped 8.5%, while the number of blue-collar, clerical and service jobs held by men increased 4.7%. These statistics appear even more stark in light of the changing positions of women, whose numbers decreased 16.1% in professional and technical fields, while increasing 8.7% in blue-collar, clerical and service positions (Freeman 364).

Troubled over foreign competition and an apparently under-skilled, college-educated work force, government and corporate attention turned toward the schools in hopes of technologizing children at a younger age, acculturating them in the languages of COBOL and FORTRAN as much as German and French. Most notably, in 1981 the U.S. Department of Education commissioned a task force to investigate the quality of education in America. Their report, ominously entitled, "A Nation at Risk," pleaded with the American public: "If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system for the benefit of all....Learning is the indispensable investment required for success in the 'information age' we are entering" (7). As

Michael Apple reports, "The last time that so much attention was paid to education as a national issue was at the very height of the Cold War" (128). Much like the current "Japanese scare," education was then "seen by the federal government and business as part of a larger battle with the Soviet Union and its allies over the production of technical expertise and knowledge, defense, 'manpower' planning, and industrial might" (Apple 128). Teaching technical and computer skills in the schools, then, was seen as fulfilling not only the needs of private industry but more significantly, as Apple points out, the needs of the "public good." If the United States wished to remain a superpower in a world of ever-progressing competition, public education would have to accommodate the needs of high-tech industry.

As the U.S. government and business sectors pressured schools to adopt a more technical curriculum in the name of the "public good," however, educational theorists began to examine who, exactly, this "public" constituted. Losing much of the autonomy to choose their own pedagogical practices and materials, they at least wanted to know what they were advocating—and for whom. As corporate America advertised technology as the way of the future, educational theorists investigated whose futures, in particular, would benefit.

They were shocked by what they found out. While students from kindergarten through graduate school are instructed to believe job security lies in a strong foundation of technical know-how, statistics collected by Russell Rumberger and Henry Levine suggest that between now and 1995 only 17% (3 to 8% according to less generous forecasts) of new jobs will be created in high-tech industries (qtd. in Apple 156). It is the service sector, as the U.S. Department of Labor reports, that is the fastest growing occupational field. Retail jobs alone are expected to employ 22.9 million (out of a total projected workforce of 141 million) by the year

2000. In comparison, computer services, although the fastest growing sub-field, is expected to provide only 1.2 million jobs, according to a report by the U.S. Department of Labor (*Outlook* 26-29). Furthermore, even given the expected expansion of the electronic and computer fields, the large majority of jobs held in those industries are minimum wage secretarial, custodial or assembly line positions. In 1989, for instance, according to another report by the U.S. Department of Labor, the electronics industry employed 1.7 million workers, 15% of whom were engineers, computer programmers or related technicians; clerical and administrative support positions constituted another 15%, while nearly 60% worked in production (*Employment* 88-93).

Clearly, despite portentous reports like "A Nation at Risk," it is not that American students are poorly educated, or even less educated than in the past, but that the combination of high-technology and corporate capitalism has created fewer and fewer positions which require that education to be utilized. In other words, college graduates filled fewer white-collar positions between the years 1968 and 1978, not because they lacked the education or technical know-how to do so, but because there were fewer white-collar positions to fill. Students are instructed to believe that technology secures them a prestigious position on the cutting edge of industry, but industry, priding itself on production standards and electronic efficiency, is only "cutting" away at the opportunity to exercise their intellect. In the last two decades alone, there has been a significant decrease in jobs with a high level of autonomy, while there has been a similar increase in jobs with little control over the labor process (Apple 31). In Marxist terms, the end result is that workers are alienated further and further from the product of their work. While the rhetoric of the "public good" promises positions in which the workers will control and conceptualize the product—their occupations ever enriched by the advancements of technology—in reality, the majority of workers, college-educated or not, merely execute the conceptualizations of a few corporate heads.

***

If less threatened by a loss of autonomy than some other positions in the labor force, the jobs of literary theorists are nonetheless affected by high tech industry. If the "public good," dictated by corporate America, is to teach hands-on technical applications, the fundamental lessons of the humanities—creative and critical thinking—seem far less significant in comparison. Even given the fact that many businesses cry out for students with better writing skills, better writing skills are taught in classrooms of composition, not literary theory. Technology, in other words, has threatened the very significance of the work that academics in the English department do. In the 1920s, 30s and 40s, criticizing books was of high import in society because books were of high import. Thus, literary theorists were writing works such as *The Responsibilities of the Critic* (F.O. Matthiessen) or *The Function of Criticism* (Yvor Winters), as if the critic and the criticism espoused had a function in, and responsibility to, society.

But now? Today few people read much more than the daily news. With TV (and MTV), video games and VCRs, Americans are more likely to spend a Saturday afternoon with the remote control than with the *Leaves of Grass*. In an age witnessing the decline of reading, English departments no longer hold a central position, as they once did, in educating the public in mainstream cultural ideologies. "Other sites of cultural production, such as advertising, circulate such things far more widely and far more quickly" (Watkins 25). The question that remains, then, is where these advancements in high-tech industry leave literary studies. That is, if the "public good" of today rests in technology, how is the literary critic, to reiterate Winters, "to find a mode of living which will enable him to develop his mind, practice his art, and support his family"?

I think there are at least two reactions the discipline of English has had in response to the technological advancements of industry. One is an increase in the recruitment of women and other marginalized groups. While the civil rights and feminist movements of the 60s opened the doors of schooling to more women and non-whites than ever before, their increased level of education did not necessarily better their chances in the business world. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis note that "despite the important contribution of education to an individual's economic chances, the substantial equalization of educational attainments over the years has not led measurably to an equalization in income among individuals" (8). Put in terms of numbers collected by the Bureau of the Census, in 1988 black women held 4% of all managerial positions in the U.S., and black men half that number. White men, in comparison, occupied 51% of all managerial positions and white women 39%. These numbers, already indicative of the disparity between blacks and whites in terms of economic opportunity, only begin to note the disparity between white men and women. For while a cursory glance at these percentages suggests that the sexes are approaching equality in terms of the number of managerial positions held, they indicate very little about the level of those positions in terms of corporate hierarchy.

More specifically, it may come as no surprise to learn that an overwhelming majority of Fortune 500 companies are headed by male CEOs. A recent report published in the *Washington*

Post, moreover, suggests that reserving the upper-most executive positions for men is not an uncommon practice. Entitled "Benefits may stymie women," the report states indeed that "almost three quarters of the more than 200 CEOs surveyed said there were identifiable barriers to women climbing the corporate ladder." Surprisingly, the obstacles mentioned were not pregnancy and childrearing, which traditionally have kept women out of the upper echelons. Instead, the CEOs surveyed said that stereotypes and preconceptions, a reluctance to take risks with women in line, and a lack of careful career planning and planned job assignments were keeping women in lower level management. Even if they choose to remain childless, these obstacles, for the most part, are not within the power of women to change.

Contrary to the relatively low numbers of women and non-whites in upper-level managerial positions, the shifting demography of those who attain doctoral degrees, specifically in English, would suggest that the avenues of opportunity for traditionally marginalized groups are far more open in higher education. Obtaining a statistical breakdown by sex of PhDs awarded in the first half of the century is difficult, but in 1950, as reported by the National Center for Educational Statistics, only 49 women attained doctoral degrees in English, less than one third of their male counterparts who totaled 181. By 1987, however, the number of women had surpassed men by 25%: 509 women earned PhDs in English that year and 387 men. To give some indication of the relative proportions found in the other disciplines, in 1987 men still dominated doctoral studies in engineering (3,557 PhDs awarded to men, as opposed to 263 to women), computer science (322 to men, 52 to women), and business, where male doctorates outnumbered those of female colleagues by a ratio of three to one (839 men to 259 women).

A comprehensive statistical breakdown of PhDs by race is even more difficult to find, a situation complicated by the large number of foreign students who come to the United States for the sole purpose of graduate school; however, a 1987 report in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* cited that approximately 50% of all PhDs awarded to blacks are in education, rather than business or engineering or computer science (qtd. in Scott 120). Furthermore, according to Ralph Scott in *Education and Ethnicity*, education is "a preferred professional field for blacks" (120).

Facilitating this trend toward increased numbers of women and/or people of color obtaining doctorates in English or related fields is the vacancy left in English departments after many of the white, middle-class men, who dominated the field in the first half of the century, moved on to more "publicly prestigious" and financially lucrative positions in technical industries. English departments, in other words, are seeking an alternative source of people. As Evan Watkins writes, "English as a university discipline always foregrounds theory in one way or another, under whatever name, because it is always in the business of recruiting" (9). Thus, as the New Critics espoused the ideologies of the dominant group, they recruited members of that dominant group into their field. These members obviously tended to be white, middle-class men, as only they could fully participate in Richards's "happy disconnection" from the social realities of financial distress, racial or sexual discrimination, or religious persecution. Current critical theory, in contrast, attracts a diverse group of people, as feminist literary theory recruits women, black critical theory recruits blacks, post colonial theory recruits ethnically diverse, third world people of color, and so on.

In short, it seems that in the wake of the technical revolution, both literary theorists and oppressed or marginalized groups seek to establish an alternative tradition, a source of power not dependent on the financial venues closed off to them by high-tech industry. Rather than continuing to chase after a corporate capitalism that privileges the few at the expense of the majority, new literary theorists seek to foster an ethnically diverse cultural capitalism, where the needs of both marginalized peoples and marginalized disciplines converge.

Since the "public good" rests in technology, however, a second response of the discipline of English to such advancements in industry has been to technologize the language of literary study. "Hence, the distinctly synthetic cast to this new theoretical writing, its penchant for the chemical and the mechanical, for terms derived from cybernetics, economics, or topology rather than from the homelier idioms of horticulture and handicraft" (Bruss 4). Similar to the terminology used by the New Critics, the language employed by current literary theorists seems strangely scientific.

The difference, however, is that the New Critics described the "tension" within the structure of a single poem. The New Theorists, in an age when poems are no longer significant to the vast majority of people, describe the "tension" within whole political movements, or history or culture. As used by the New Critic Allen Tate, tension "include[s] the meanings of its two derivatives: extension and intension. Extension means denotation; intension means connotation. The ideal tension in a poem would be a maximum content of both" (Winters 18). As employed by Jacques Derrida, however, "tension" takes on a significantly different meaning. "Besides the tension of freeplay with history," he writes, "there is also the tension of freeplay with presence....Freeplay is always an interplay of absence and presence, but if it is to be radically conceived, freeplay must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence; being must be conceived of as presence or absence beginning with the possibility of freeplay and not the other way around" (263-64).

In short, for the New Critics the literary object was their little all, the sole subject of their exploration. It was the golden nugget of truth that established for them a unique position in the university. For new theorists, however, in light of technological advances, "literary" and the object it defines have become almost insignificant signifiers; literature—books—are often completely dropped from the discourse to encompass larger issues. Thus, the "crisis" of current theory, according to Frank Lentricchia "is generated...by, on the one hand, a continuing urge to essentialize literary discourse by making it a unique kind of language—a vast, enclosed textual and semantic preserve—and, on the other hand, by an urge to make literary language 'relevant' by locating it in larger contexts of discourse and history" (xiii). In the contexts of a "Japanese scare," literary theorists have made their discourse "relevant" by abandoning the discussion of books to embrace the larger, more socially responsible issues of cultural reproduction, historical situatedness and hegemonic practices.

***

Still, literary theorists seem to be attempting a bit more than just making their discourse relevant. By emphasizing language—terminology—to the exclusion of literature, they seem to be attempting to establish a new ideology to oppose that of corporate capital. So much of recent theoretical work, drawing from the essays of Ferdinand de Saussure, "recognize[s] language as the infrastructure of ideology—as the institution par excellence of social order, of relations of power in general" (Goodson 40). In her *Critical Practice*, to cite just one example, Catherine Belsey argues that language is imbued with ideology. "If signifieds are not pre-existing, given concepts," she argues, "but changeable and contingent concepts, and if changes in the signifying practice are related to social formation, the notion of a language as a neutral nomenclature functioning as an instrument of communication of meaning which exists independently of it is clearly untenable" (44). Giving several examples of how ideology is inscribed in a language (e.g., the patriarchal inscription in the sign for married woman: "Mrs."), Belsey claims that since we cannot have thought without the segmentation of that "vague, shapeless mass" into language by different sound patterns, "subjectivity itself is inconceivable outside of language"(47; Saussure 155). More clearly, Belsey (and others) is suggesting that since ideology is inscribed in language and, consequently, since we cannot think about ourselves as beings, as "subjects," without language, then this ideology is inscribed in us, in the construction of ourselves, and without conscious effort. In order to change that construction, therefore, it becomes necessary to change the language.

In changing the language to encourage the articulation of a variety of oppositional discourses, however, literary theorists seem to be caught in limbo, at once claiming to represent the needs of marginalized groups and, then again, inadvertently reproducing the same sort of exclusionary practices found in corporate capitalism. That is, taken separately the two reactions I have outlined above would seem to provide a source of power for, on the one hand, women and people of color, and on the other hand, the discipline of English, as a new kind of cultural capitalism would give fresh blood to a dying field of literary studies.

Taken together, however, the two seem mutually exclusive. How is this cultural capitalism to benefit marginalized groups when it is written in a terminology that "would convince readers they did not know their words, much less their minds" (Goodson 36)? Relatedly, after listing several of the literary journals that were established in the last two decades (e.g., *Critical Inquiry*, *Diacritics*, *Boundary 2*, *Glyph*), Elizabeth Bruss reports: "But as significant as the sheer quantity was the quality of these new journals— self-consciously interdisciplinary, often deliberately blurring the boundaries of the political and the aesthetic, and...almost aggressively extraordinary in their language. The breadth of reference might suggest the rebirth of the encyclopedist or the man of letters, but these new letters were obdurately, forbiddenly opaque" (4). The contradiction in current theoretical approaches, it seems, is that while they attempt to blur "the boundaries of the political and aesthetic" in order to empower those marginalized groups not represented in mainstream, ostensibly apolitical, discourses, they do so in a language that is simply inaccessible ("obdurately, forbiddenly opaque") to the vast majority of those whom they supposedly empower.

Significant in this respect is the similarity between the kind of terminology used in literary theory and the kind of terminology used to keep traditionally disadvantaged groups out of the most prestigious economic opportunities in business. Educational theorists note how teaching the needs of high-tech industry in schools perpetuates a system which grooms minorities for low-income jobs. In *Marxism and Education*, Sarup discusses the work of several of these theorists, including Michael F.D. Young, who "reports that high-status knowledge is taught to the 'ablest' children, usually in homogeneous ability groups...." Thus, students coming from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are often immediately channeled into lower ability groups from which they rarely, throughout their scholastic careers, escape. Furthermore, according to Sarup, Young suggests that high-status knowledge, much like current literary theory, "tends to have 'abstractness', a high level of literacy, minimum relatedness to non-school activities, and a stress on individual performance" (16).

In view of the similarities between current literary theory and the kind of high-status knowledge taught only to the "ablest" of students, it is little wonder that critics such as Edward Said seem skeptical of the potential good literary theorists attempt to do. "My position is that texts are worldly," he writes, "they are...a part of the social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are located and interpreted. Literary theory, whether of the Left or of the Right, has turned its back on these things....A precious jargon has grown up, and its formidable complexities obscure the social realities that...encourage a scholarship of 'modes of excellence' very far from daily life in the age of declining American power" (4). This "precious jargon," as Said calls it, not only "obscure[s] the social realities" but the possibility for any kind of social effectiveness. The mainstream ideologies espoused by TV and advertising are much more readily accessible to the public and therefore are much more likely to be taken up and proliferated. While just about anyone can understand the barrage of values (wealth! status! a beautiful [white!] body!) taught to them through advertising, only those who have struggled through graduate seminars in deconstruction can understand the technical terminology—however consciousness-raising it is—flying about the pages of Derrida's work. Despite the fact that literary theory may empower a few marginalized intellectuals, it tends to leave the everyday working man and woman behind.

***

It seems, then, that the relative autonomy of literary theorists in universities is both an asset and a liability; on the one hand, their autonomy enables them to proffer oppositional ideologies, but on the other hand it disconnects them from the realities of those working lives whose jobs do not permit the same investment and indulgence in cultural knowledge and theory. A gap is created, in other words, between those who create and control cultural capitalism and those for whom its value lies in improving their social condition. Perhaps most disturbing is the similarity between this gap and the disjuncture in high-tech industries—between those few corporate heads who control and conceptualize the labor process and those who ultimately execute it. It seems, finally, that the establishment of literary theory as an institution in the 1970s and 80s has inadvertently mirrored the exclusionary economic practices and organization of capitalist American society. Even more unsettling, unlike corporate America, literary theorists currently have no avenue for execution; their theoretical terminology both divorces them from the marginalized groups they could empower and encapsulates them in a world divorced from everyday practical realities.

Let me emphasize, however, that what I mean to submit here is not just a request for simplification, since implicit in such a request would again be an exclusionary notion of knowledge as something that must be made available to a dumbfounded populace by an educated elite. Nor do I wish to be perceived as suffering from theoreo-phobia, as Michael Riffaterre has recently diagnosed those who are paralyzed by the "Fear of Theory." My concern is to suggest that literary theorists, in the last twenty to thirty years, have concentrated their efforts too exclusively on a continuing escalation of polemical refinements, in which each new theory professes to go "beyond" the "limitations" of the last theory. Although their ultimate purpose is to delineate further the historical, political or socioeconomic conditions in which the literary object is imbedded, such theorists neglect to consider the way in which literary theory itself is a product of an historical, political and socioeconomic context, whose limitations will not disappear with further conceptual refinement.

Thus, while much of recent theory's claims are situated on the political left, the institution of literary theory remains steeped in the political organization of the right. The production of knowledge, with all of its theoretical (re)fineries, is right where it was in the first half of the century, entrenched in the corporate competition for ever more "advanced" technologies, an advancement that, curiously enough, depends on leaving the disadvantaged behind.

Works Cited

Adams, Hazard, ed. *Critical Theory Since Plato*. New York: Harcourt, 1971.

Allen, Carolyn J. "Feminist Criticism and Postmodernism." *Tracing Literary Theory*. Ed. Joseph Natoli. Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1987. 278-305.

Apple, Michael W. *Teachers and Texts: A Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education*. New York: Routledge, 1986.

Belsey, Catherine. *Critical Practice*. New York: Methuen, 1980.

"Benefits may stymie women." *Washington Post*. Rpt. in *The Seattle Times* 20 Feb. 1990: Bl.

Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*. New York: Basic, 1976.

Brooks, Cleanth. "The Heresy of the Paraphrase." 1947. Adams 1033-41.

Bruss, Elizabeth W. *Beautiful Theories: The Spectacle of Discourse in Contemporary Criticism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982.

Cixous, Hélène. "Sorties." *The Newly Born Woman*. 1975. Trans. Betsy Wing. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.

Cornillon, Susan Koppelman, ed. *Images of Women in Fiction: Feminist Perspectives*. Bowling Green: Bowling Green UP, 1972.

Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." *The Structuralist Controversy*. Ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1970. 247-65.

Freeman, Richard B. "The Evolution of the American Labor Market, 1948-80." *The American*

Economy in Transition. Ed. Martin Feldstein. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980. 349-96.

Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. 1968. Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Continuum, 1970.

Goodson, A.C. "Structuralism and Critical History in the Moment of Bakhtin." *Tracing Literary Theory*. Ed. Joseph Natoli. Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1987. 27-53.

Lentricchia, Frank. *After the New Criticism*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980.

Loury, Glenn C. "Why Preferential Admission is Not Enough for Blacks." *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 25 Mar. 1987: 100.

Mansfield, Edwin. "Technology and Productivity in the United States." *The American Economy in Transition*. Ed. Martin Feldstein. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980. 563-96.

Matthiessen, F.O. *The Responsibilities of the Critic*. New York: Oxford UP, 1952.

National Center for Education Statistics. "Degrees and Other Formal Awards Conferred." *Digest of Education Statistics*. Washington: U.S. Department of Education, 1989.

National Commission on Excellence in Education. "A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1983.

Ransom, John Crowe. "Criticism as Pure Speculation." 1941. Adams 881-90.

--. "Poetry: A Note in Ontology." 1934. Adams 871-81.

Richards, I.A. *Poetries and Sciences*. 1926. London: Routledge, 1970.

--. "Practical Criticism." 1929. Adams 848-59.

Riffaterre, Michael. "Fear of Theory." *New Literary History* 21 (1990): 921-38.

Rumberger, Russell W., and Henry M. Levine. "Forecasting the Impact of New Technologies on the Future Job Market." Project Report No. 84-A4. Institute for Research on Educational

Finance and Government, School of Education, Stanford University, February 1984.

Said, Edward. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983.

Sarup, Madan. *Marxism and Education*. London: Routledge, 1978.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. 1972. Trans. Roy Harris. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986.

Scott, Ralph. *Education and Ethnicity: The U.S. Experiment in School Integration*. Washington, D.C.: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1987.

Smith, Barbara. "Toward a Black Feminist Criticism." *The New Feminist Criticism*. Ed. Elaine Showalter. New York: Pantheon, 1985. 168-85.

Trinh, Minh-ha. *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Post-Coloniality and Feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Statistical Abstract of the United States:* 1990. Washington, D.C., 1990.

U.S. Department of Labor. *Occupational Employment in Manufacturing Industries*. Washington, D.C., March 1991.

--. *Outlook 2000*. Washington, D.C., April 1990.

Watkins, Evan. *Worktime: English Departments and the Circulation of Cultural Value*. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1989.

Winters, Yvor. *The Function of Criticism*. Denver: Swallow, 1957.

Wright, Erik Olin. "The American Class Structure." *American Sociological Review* 47 (1982): 709-26.

Young, Michael F.D., ed. *Knowledge and Control*. London: Collier, 1971.