

The Mestizo State: Violence and State Formation in Peru (1980 – 2000)

Fernando Turin Sanchez

A thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in International Studies

University of Washington

2016

Committee:

Jose Antonio Lucero

Maria Elena Garcia

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

©Copyrighth 2016

Fernando Turin Sanchez

University of Washington

Abstract

The Mestizo State: Violence and State Formation in Peru (1980 – 2000)

Fernando Turin Sanchez

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Dr. Jose Antonio Lucero
International Studies

The research I present in this thesis will analyze Peru's statecraft process in the late 20th century (1980–2000). Scholars agree that the Peruvian state was about to fail due to the internal conflict that deepened the deterioration of the state capacity. The idea of failure was also associated with the explosive slum growth in the capital. Ironically the Peruvian state at a moment of ostensible weakness gained strength, and the negative attitudes toward the slums changed within that context. This paradox is what my research aims to address.

This research builds on previous empirical studies and explores archival records from the Peruvian government regarding Lima's slums growth, and the civil war. I also make the case for an alternative approach to state formation that can articulate both elite-centered and popular approaches. I argue that the Peruvian state approach toward the slums changed during the 1980s, because the slums of Lima had already acquired political agency. The long frictional urban progression of the slums of Lima changed the conversation of power and percolated social

pressures in a time when “informality” had been incorporated into the neoliberal agenda and international developments trends. The change of attitude was due to a combination of these trends. Domestically the slum growth changed social practices and power dynamics that became visible during the internal conflict between the Peruvian government and Shining Path. These dynamics came at the time in which international narratives had incorporated “informality” into their global discourse.

Table of Contents

1. Abstract.....	2
2. An Introduction to War and Statecraft in Peru	5
The War	10
The Race Issue	13
Theoretical Framework.....	15
Top-Down Approaches.....	15
Bottom-Up Approaches	17
Research Design.....	18
3. Mestizo State.....	20
Mestizo Statecraft	23
4. The Slum Process: A Stream from Below	31
Urban Progression.....	31
Modernity vs. Barriadas: Building Perceptions	45
5. The Crisis: Villa El Salvador	50
The Origins	51
The Invasion.....	53
6. Shining Path: The Common Threat	61
Villa El Salvador Incorporation	64
Villa El Salvador Official Recognition	66
The Juncture.....	68
7. Legacies	73
The Rise of Alberto Fujimori.....	73
COFOPRI.....	78
8. Conclusion	86
9. Bibliography	94

Chapter 1

An Introduction to War and Statecraft in Peru

In 1996 after finishing architectural school in Lima, I started working for a Catholic organization in the district of Rimac (*municipalidad del Rimac*), which is part of the Historic Center of Lima and holds 40% of its historical heritage. I met Benito Huauya and his five sons when they were part of the group of construction workers I supervised. Benito was a *Quechua* speaker; he understood Spanish but was not able to speak it very well, and I communicated with him through his sons. Benito was the first Quechua speaker that I personally met and with whom I had a relationship.

He and his family fled from Ayacucho escaping the violence of Shining Path and the Peruvian Army. “*Arqui* (diminutive for architect) we did not know who was going to kill us,” he said to me. He and his family were part of the thousands of indigenous people that suffered the most during the conflict. My experience with Benito made me aware that colonial times were not something from the past. I could feel it in the way in which Benito addressed me, using my title rather than my name and the fact that there is a large Quechua-speaking population in Peru, but personally I did not know any of them.

Benito came from the Andes to work in the historic center of Lima to preserve the Spanish heritage. The city of Lima was founded in 1535. Paradoxically, almost 450 years later Benito was working to preserve the colonial heritage left by the same power the subjugated indigenous people to build that heritage. Indigenous hands were used to build it, and indigenous hands were used to preserve it. My experience with Benito helped me see that the system of domination and production of inequality was an ongoing process, and I was part of it.

The research I present in this thesis will analyze Peru's statecraft process in the late 20th century (1980–2000). In this period, the seemingly imminent failure of the Peruvian state was the starting point of any intellectual inquiry about Peru's political direction (Matos Mar, 2004; Stern, 1998; Koonings, 1999). Scholars agree that the Peruvian state was about to fail due to the internal conflict that deepened the deterioration of the state capacity. The idea of failure was also associated with the explosive slum growth in the capital. Ironically the Peruvian state at a moment of ostensible weakness gained strength, and the negative attitudes toward the slums changed within that context. This paradox is what my research aims to address. I will ask why the Peruvian government changed its approach toward the slums and urban informality during the 1980s and 1990s.

The spread of slums around Lima has been seen historically as the failure of the Peruvian state. Urban planning literature situates this slum growth as the result of inadequate housing policies of consecutive Peruvian administrations (Riofrio, 1978; Ludeña, 2006; Driant, 1991). These policies failed to accommodate the city to the immigration flows coming from the countryside. In that regard, the slum growth was racialized because predominantly indigenous populations inhabited them. This new urban reality, alongside the historical disdain of the Peruvian establishment toward indigenous populations, generated the slum reification in which racial prejudices and class ideas were combined with ideas of modernity and progress. This vision triggered the stigmatization of the slum growth and their settlers; they became the urban other, and in consequence, they were rejected and discriminated against. But the official discourse changed in the 1980s, and that is what this research is seeking to understand.

The new gigantic “informal”¹ urban fabric reveals the poverty and extreme income inequality of the rest of the country (Dietz, 1998, p. 65). By the early 1980s, the Peruvian government started to see the social reality of the country differently and changed its attitude. To understand what could have occurred, I propose to seeing the slum growth within a theoretical framework of state formation, placing it as a process of statecraft from below. While the slum growth followed different settlement patterns, in this research I am not considering their individual urban morphology.

This research focuses on the transformative power of the process as a whole.² I see the slum growth as a macro-level force coming from below that eventually intersected with Peruvian government power, creating frictions that in turn made possible new forms of social and political interactions. Methodologically, I will employ a “critical junctures” approach to understand how certain configurations came to be and what legacies they produced (Collier and Collier, 1992). This way of understanding Peru’s slum growth will allow visibility of its frictional nature and how this generated mutual recognitions long before the conflict, as well as having a point of inflection in 1971 with the land invasion that created Villa El Salvador (VES). This frictional relationship between the slums and the Peruvian government is manifested in the 1980s during the internal conflict when a terrorist organization pursuing a Maoist political project violently challenged the Peruvian government.

The country’s urban population went from 30% in 1940 to 75% in 2007, and now Lima represents 44% of Peru’s urban population (INEI, 2011, p. 32). This demographic shift changed

¹ “El crecimiento de una economía popular contestataria a la que la opinión pública ha dado en llamar como “informal”. La importancia de los grupos populares, especialmente de la población migrante, en la manifestación

² “Lima está profundamente marcada por sus barriadas. Un observador extranjero que recorriera la ciudad de norte a sur pasando por el centro no dejaría de sorprenderse por la gran heterogeneidad del tejido urbano, por su extensión y por la impresión de visitar una inmensa obra en construcción”(Driant, 1991)

the city. The slums spread rapidly while the government was promoting multifamily housing projects. I will contrast these different urban trajectories to show the social and political tensions of above and below forces. Viewing the slum growth through statecraft from “below” and “above” lenses allows one to see the transformative magnitude of the process not just in urban planning terms but also as an engine that modified the sociopolitical scenario. The VES eruption—or “invasion”—in the 1970s can help us understand these fluctuations.

VES will also let us see how these changes took shape during the country-wide internal conflict with the Peruvian Communist Party, known as *Sendero Luminoso* (Shinning Path). The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) highlights the struggle in the Andes, indicating that nearly half a million were displaced during 1980–2000 and 75% of these were indigenous people. Many of them were concentrated in the slums of Lima, and “they became the lowest social class, they were discriminated socially and culturally” (CVR, 2001, Tomo VI p. 653). This new influx of immigrants added more complexity to the slum growth. Slum settlers had already developed practices, meanings, and ways to interact within Lima. Recognizing the slum growth as a transformative social force, rather than a marginalized endeavor as the classic literature does will provide better insights.

Alongside literature about the transformation, the causes and outcomes of the internal conflict have been studied extensively. The emergence of Shining Path was the result of years of abusive treatment against native Peruvians along with unsuitable agricultural land reform (Gorriti, 1999; Kooning, 1999). The violent rebel movement also gained followers through misleading rhetoric that overestimated its own discourse and capacity to gain support from the urban poor of Lima and rural Andean populations (Stern, 1998; Taylor, 2006; Burt, 2006). The urban poor of Lima and their organizations played a fundamental role in containing Shining Path

strategy to take the city. I use the VES experience to illustrate the slums' struggle during the internal conflict.

The war against Shining Path characterized this period and created new outcomes and conditions for indigenous populations and slum organizations. The historical Peruvian approach to the Indian population has been guided by the assumption that there is something invariably wrong in these populations and that they have to be fixed. Similar to the Indian issue, urban informality was addressed as a pernicious manifestation that collided with dominant elite notions of law and order. By 1980 when the internal conflict started, the Peruvian state narrative had already linked slums as urban advancements of indigenous populations. (Matos Mar, 1968). The slums of Lima and their indigenous inhabitants were a visual stigma for the state elite; the settlements were out of place in the aesthetics of modern urban planning. The urban informality was perceived as a threat to the state. In the 1980s, however, this issue changed in valence for state actors and new narratives of modernity.

The changes in this period generated legacies that changed the political landscape and the legal urban framework. The rising of Alberto Fujimori as a national political figure and the implementation of urban land reform characterized these legacies. The civil war of the 1980s and 1990s generated conditions that enabled the Peruvian state to see these issues with different lenses. I argue that the Peruvian state changed its perception, and saw that threat as the opportunity to build a survival strategy during the war against Shining Path. The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts: Context, Theoretical Framework, and Research Design.

The War

In 1980 in the highlands of the Peruvian Andes, Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Shining Path, unleashed the horrors of his violent ideology stating that, “blood would flow in rivers and the only way to triumph would be by crossing the rivers of blood... We have made the irrevocable decision to cross the river of blood and to conquer the far shore” (as cited in Gorriti, 1999, p. 104). The response of the Belaunde administration was far from adequate, causing heavy casualties among the most vulnerable groups such as the Quechua-speaking population.

President Belaunde was reluctant to involve the armed forces due to the fragile situation of the new Peruvian democracy. Instead, he commissioned the police to deal with Shining Path. The result was a catastrophic development of events; the police took heavy casualties and lost terrain and morale. “Untrained and unfit for guerrilla fighting [the police force] was mobilized” (Koonings, 1999, p. 37). Public infrastructure was destroyed. State representation was eliminated; the weak response of the Belaunde administration boosted Shining Path’s image and power. Shining Path intensified its violence in the Andes, and by 1982, the government decided to deploy the army. Shining Path’s strategy to make the government deploy the army finally became reality. Koonings explains, “[Abimael] Guzman welcomed the entry of the army because he felt that massive repression would provoke an uprising throughout the country... the strategy was to provoke bloody reprisals against the population as the best way to rally support for the revolt against the government” (1999, p. 77). The army took control of the region, civil liberties were suspended, and both sides committed massive human right violations. In this context, scholars estimated that the Peruvian state was compromised.

This approach to the Peruvian reality was embedded in the Weberian concept of nation-state that assumes the Peruvian state was in control of the entire territory with an effective

institutional system of governance and uncontested legitimacy³—which was not the case. This reductionist view neglected an assessment of other manifestations of state formation such as slum growth, another feature consistently associated with Peru’s deterioration of state capacity.

The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates that around 70,000 Peruvians were killed between 1980 and 2002, and that more than 500,000 people were displaced because of the conflict. During this period the capital of Peru, Lima, experienced an explosive population growth from 3.5 million in 1981 to almost 8.1 million in 2007 (CVR, Vol. I, Chapter 2, 2003). The Peruvian National Institute of Statistics (INEI) estimates that “more than 40 percent of the urban growth in the period 1983-1993 was concentrated in this city, in a country in which 73 percent of the population lives in cities. As it can be imagined, 33 percent of the country’s urban poverty is also to be found in Lima” (as cited in Riofrio, 2002, p. 2). Shining Path’s asymmetric urban warfare certainly did not defeat the Peruvian government, but it broke Lima’s historic reticence to accept that a significant percentage of the country’s population was indigenous.

According to the Peruvian national censuses of 1981 and 1993, the population within the slums went from 1 million in 1981 to 3.5 million in 1993. Lima’s population was 6.5 million, comprising 35% of Peru’s total population (Peru, 1984-1994). While it’s true that there was a steady migration trend from the Andes to Lima since the 1940s, the political violence of the

³ The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission mentions that lack of state capacity long before the conflict: “La vigencia del Estado de Derecho era también cuestionada por una larga tradición de pronunciamientos militares. En las cinco décadas previas al estallido del conflicto armado interno, el país tuvo sólo 14 años de gobiernos democráticos....Pues si el desarrollo ciudadano era débil, la tradición de administración de justicia imparcial y universal era casi inexistente”. (CVR, 2003, Volume I, Chapter 2, p. 25-26)

1980s and 1990s profoundly changed the demographic character of the city; Lima became predominantly a city of immigrants. Shining Path had been terrorizing Lima since the beginning of the conflict. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates “Lima, since the start of the conflict was permanently under siege because it was the center of the economy. It concentrated the greater number of [Shining Path] attacks due to its national and international visibility. But, it was also the place where nationwide attacks were planned. The slums were the target of Shining Path proselytism and agitation” (CVR, Vol. I, Chapter 2, 2003, p. 80). Shining Path started to realize that the slums were involved in a different social dialogue with the government, and by cracking the articulations between the slums and the government, they would undermine the government war efforts. The figure below shows the incremental attacks on the slums of Lima.




Figure 1 Source: DESCO, taken from CVR 2003.

From 1980 to 2000 Peru faced dramatic social events due to internal war with Shining Path and the increasing indigenous populations in the outskirts of Lima. The city had to deal with two major structural events: the war with Shining Path and the explosive urban growth with the subsequent urban land reform. Shining Path hung dogs and used car bomb attacks across the city to generate a general sense of fear and hopelessness.

There is an extensive literature covering the dramatic changes in the urban fabric of Lima during this period of frequent attacks. The explosive growth of urban slums around Lima is seen as the “deterioration” of Peruvian institutions that could not fulfill their state responsibilities (De Soto, 1989, 2000; Dietz, 1990; Maxwell, 1997; Matos Mar, 1984, 2014). The Peruvian state was not able to maintain control of its land assets in the capital, and Shinning Path compromised the accessibility to its resources in the countryside. However, the Peruvian state continued functioning. Along with internal conflict, race and discrimination continued shaping the social and power dynamics.



Figure 2: Source: Caretas, 1980, dogs hung in Lima.
Diario Correo, 1989, attack on the Presidential Guard.

The Race Issue

Racial categories have been a terrain of constant dispute in the Peruvian statecraft experience. The issue of the indigeneity, famously called by Jose Carlos Mariategui, “el problema del Indio”, has been a central issue in the construction of citizenship narratives. In this research, I use the term *Criollo* as conceptualized by Maria Elena Garcia, “to designate the Hispanic elite of Lima” (2005, p. 29), which refers to middle and upper-class urban *Limeños*. In

the dominant political class conceptualization of the Peruvian state, race has been a historical problem. For Indigenous populations, race has been the engine that propelled narratives of subjugation and stigmatization.

Race and racism have been the hallmark of colonial and postcolonial Peruvians' troubling existence. These narratives of subjugation and racial disregard are present in the different appraisals of the Peruvian social transformation from an agrarian society into urban society and in the comprehension of the Peruvian struggle with Shining Path. The context of internal war generated opportunities that the Criollo government was willing—or desperate—to take, articulating certain populations or popular sectors into the state. The Indian problem played a key role in the construction of knowledge about the process of informality and the understanding of poverty. The internal conflict revealed how the production of concepts about race and disparity shaped the official view of the war and how these conceptual narratives enabled Criollo elites to recognize who was actually paying the social price of the war. The final conclusions of the Comisión de la Verdad (CVR), present overwhelming data:

75 percent of the victims who died in the internal armed conflict spoke Quechua or other native languages as their mother tongue. This figure contrasts tellingly with the fact that, according to the 1993 census, on a national level only 16 percent of the Peruvian population shares that characteristic (CVR, Vol VIII, Chapter 2, 2003, p. 316).

The Criollo government did not care much about indigenous populations. Carlos Tapia asserts, “Efectivos militares que no comprendían el Quechua y menos la cultura e idiosincracia de los pobladores de la zona no eran los más idóneos para ganarse el apoyo de la población. Las FFAA aparecieron casi como una fuerza de ocupación externa y se comportaron en muchos

casos como tal” (1997, p. 31). After a brutal and ineffective initial strategy to deal with Shining Path, the Criollo government slowly changed its tactics to neutralize and defeat Shining Path. But the view about the war did not change, “Debido al racismo y la subestimación como ciudadanos de aquellas personas de origen indígena, rural y pobre, la muerte de miles de quechua hablantes fue inadvertida en la opinión pública nacional” (CVR, Vol VIII, Chapter 2, 2003, p.103). The historic disregard of indigenous people was a fundamental component in the perception of the conflict; it showed the disconnection between the establishment and the rest of the country.

Theoretical Framework

To unpack what happened in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s we have to understand the literature on state formation. For the purpose of this study, I review two approaches to state-building: a top-down approach relying on the works of Charles Tilly (1990) and James Scott (1998), and a bottom-up view of the state using Roxanne Lyn Doty (2001, 2003) and David Nugent (1997). The tensions in each school, as we will see, indicate that there is a more interactive way to understand how forces from above and below produce new political forms. I call this form the “Mestizo state.” Below I discuss these perspectives.

The Top-Down Approach

Charles Tilly’s state formation approach is rooted in the Weberian tradition of the monopoly of force; the right to use violence is based on the “legitimization of domination”(Weber, 1946, p. 78). According to Tilly “war drives state formation and transformation” (1990, p. 20). Premodern states needed to acquire the means to support successful war efforts. Therefore, extraction of resources was the cornerstone of state formation in Europe. Eliminating or neutralizing potential competitors would not have been possible

without securing those resources. But securing those resources, according to Tilly, requires that a ruler develop not only a system of violence and coercion but also of taxation and representation, which are the seeds of state making. “The very activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord’s local rivals; thus, it led to state making. As a by-product, it created an organization in the form of tax collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus, it again led to state making” (1985, p. 183). In return the ruler provides some benefits, such as protection, that is to say that this interaction created a “clientship” relation with the ruler. “The omnivorous state of our time took shape” (1990, p. 25). Clients became citizens.

Scott’s examination of the intersections between knowledge, technology, and governance reveals how states are shaped or constructed under fixed categorizations of institutional relationships, ideology, and politics. He argues that a “high modernist” state is produced by the necessity to make everything “legible.” To establish control of society, the state has to standardized realities focusing on key elements such as the administrative ordering of nature and society and a strong belief in scientific, technological, and human progress schemes. This requires a certain amount of authoritarianism, according to Scott, as this means a state committed to a high modernist ideology and willing to implement it by using the full scope of its power.

In opposition to those top-down forces, Scott argues that *metis* or “practical knowledge, informal processes and improvisation in the face of unpredictability,” has allowed an important role establishing a formal order that could not be possible without taking into account “the local knowledge and know-how” to serve as countervailing force, to some extent (1998, p.6). In this way, Scott bridges top-down and bottom-up approaches.

The Bottom-Up Approach

Building on Scott and others, Roxanne Lyn Doty approaches statecraft as a dynamic register in constant production of “meanings and identities.” She reflects on the flexibility of the state notion of power that coexists with the uncertainty of social change. “I would argue that everyday on-the-ground practices...are a necessary component of statecraft, and that in the absence of this statecraft from below the more familiar acts of statecraft by government officials would lack the legitimacy and constitutive force they generally have” (2001, p. 528). That is to say that common practices produced out of the framework of the modern state are relevant elements that constitute statecraft formation.

I consider this approach of “statecraft from below” particularly relevant in understanding the Peruvian state approach toward informality during the 1980s and 1990s. It proposes that our understanding of how sovereignty and power interact should be reconfigured in order to visualize the scope of forces from below. Urban informality, in the words of Roy, “is a heuristic device that uncovers the ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized. This relationship is both arbitrary and fickle and yet is the site of considerable state power and violence” (2011, p. 233). In turn, it provides a more comprehensive view of the Peruvian statecraft experience.

In the city of Chachapoyas, David Nugent observed that the central state is not necessarily perceived as an alien force but rather as an opportunity to challenge regional aristocracies. “These subaltern groups looked toward identification with the nation precisely because of the distinctive kind of local community they understood themselves to be” (1997, p. 12). Nugent suggests that processes of state formation are not affairs solely associated with the state. States are also pushed and shaped “from below” by local endeavors. The enlightenment

values of popular sovereignty and equality under the rule of law set the stage for marginalized communities in Chachapoyas to embrace the central state. This was not a process of imposition; the concept of popular sovereignty was invited, and it came in the shape of the modern state.

Research Design

To explore these articulations, I will conduct a historical analysis relying on two case studies: VES as an expression of the so-called informality in Lima, and the Commission for Formalizing Informal Property (COFOPRI) as a policy designed to address urban informality. Certainly VES and COFOPRI, while on different levels, were possible due to the state involvement in full capacity of its power. Understanding the length of state authority should not prevent us from seeing the conditions that push the state to change its posture to recognize VES and to enact a policy like COFOPRI. This analysis includes race and racism as the hallmark of colonial and postcolonial troubled Peruvian existence. These narratives of subjugation and racial disregard are present in the different appraisals of the Peruvian social transformation from an agrarian society into an urban society and in the comprehension of the Peruvian struggle with Shining Path.

I explore these case studies seeking to understand the changing attitudes of the state toward urban unregulated settlements using Collier and Collier's critical juncture framework: conditions, crisis, critical juncture, and the legacy (1991, p. 30). The aim of this research is to see how the informal urban process—land invasions—was the expression of forces from below that began a long process of friction with the Peruvian state that led to the 1971 crisis. The clash between the Peruvian government and forces below—VES “invaders”—created the convergence of new political arrangements and actors during the 1980s as the face of the internal conflict. The

articulation of below and above forces during this critical juncture resonated internally and externally and left various legacies in the form of new legitimacies of power and new polices.

This research builds on previous empirical studies and explores archival records from the Peruvian government regarding Lima's urban process, VES, COFOPRI, and the civil war. In addition, it includes news, presidential speeches, community leader speeches, and scholarly work about Peru. I also make the case for an alternative approach to state formation that can articulate both elite-centered and popular approaches. My writing on these topics is organized into the following chapters. In chapter 2, *The Mestizo State*, I explore the exclusionary features of Lima's urban planning as the cultural lenses to visualize an alternative theoretical framework to understand Peru's state formation. In chapter 3, I explain the urban progression of Lima and how it was seen as a threat to the establishment while shaping the conditions of the VES crisis. In chapter 4, I explore the crisis of VES with the Criollo and the emergence of new legitimacies. In chapter 5, I explore how these new legitimacies found support in each other in the face of the challenge posed by Shining Path. In chapter 6, I describe the legacies of this experience through COFOPRI. Finally, in chapter 7, I provide my conclusions.

Chapter 2

Mestizo State

In this chapter, I explain my conceptualization of the Mestizo state departing from historical racial categories that were on the one hand a continuation of colonial practices, and on the other, the same practices that formed the foundational values in which the new republic set its power dynamics and cemented its trajectory.

Race has been a distinctive feature of the Latin American experience. At the dawn of the emancipation from Spain, the question of who or what we are has been one of the quintessential features of the Spanish postcolonial statecraft saga. The process of independence was not an inclusive effort to build a multicultural state, it was a racial struggle “The threat poised by Tupac Amaru...[was] built upon an image of new social order in which the downtrodden would ultimately become the rulers, this was something that criollos fear far more than the officers of the Spanish crown” (Canny and Pagden, 1987, p. 78). The idea of a unified national category to generate or replicate schemes of national identities based on homogeneity is one of the core features of the Latin American postcolonial nationalistic discourse. Carlos Fuentes clearly expresses this epic vision:

Tardamos tres siglos en ganar nuestro nombre, nuestra estirpe y en reivindicar, al mismo tiempo con la independencia mestiza, a nuestra madre. A fin de reencontrar a España, México debió, primero, reencontrarse a sí mismo a través de las luchas por la independencia política y en seguida por la independencia económica (1984, p. 9).

Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, writing a century before Fuentes, went further; he drew a line between urban settlers and peasants linking those to “*Civilization and Barbarism*”:

The man of the city wears European dress, lives a civilized life as we know it everywhere: in the city, there are laws, ideas of progress, means of instruction, some municipal organization, a regular government, etc.... the man of the country [indigenous population in the Peruvian case], far from aspiring to resemble the man of the city, rejects with scorn his luxuries and his polite manners; and the clothing of the city dweller, his tailcoat, his cape, his saddle—no such sign of Europe can appear in the countryside with impunity (1998, p. 53).

In this research the racial connotation of the Mestizo State is not attached to the nationalist discourse but is rather a critique of the reductionist state use of it to construct the national Peruvian identity. I am using the term Mestizo as a positional category, one of double reading as Garcia conceptualizes, “among many people...mestizo implies a distance from indigenous spaces. This distance is seen as positive by those who see Indianness as a sign of backwardness and as negative by those who seek to revalorize indigenous identities and cultures” (2005, p. 29). I should add that in the context of the slums of Lima this frictional space has been incorporated in the evolving dynamics of the new urban fabric of the city.

The migration to the city generated a racialization process attached to the urban development of the city. It created new divisions and reinforced racial prejudices, at the same time forcing new avenues to renegotiate power and meanings of citizenship, i.e., VES. Mestizo is a rhetorical space in which the criollos feel confident to navigate because for them it only means a hook to make the “invisible other” believe that they belong to the same space i.e., the state, but with no material outcomes that compromised their historical privileges. For the slums of Lima this ambiguous and reductionist space provided avenues to advance their presence and political

power, “they command infrastructure.”⁴ In the words of Roseberry, “The dominated know they are dominated, they know by whom and how, far from consenting to the domination, they initiate all sorts of subtle ways of living with, talking about, resisting, undermining, and confronting the unequal and power-laden worlds in which they live” (1994, p. 357). For good or for bad, this space has allowed the construction of new social practices and meanings that enable the later convergence of above and below forces during the internal conflict. The gradual incorporation of the slums into the urban fabric was also the incorporation of the continuous influx of immigrants into the city.

⁴ “[slums] They are expressions of class power and can therefore command infrastructure, services and legitimacy. Most importantly, they come to be designated as ‘formal’ by the state” (Roy, 2011, p. 233).

Mestizo Statecraft

I see the Peruvian experience as two statecraft trajectories in constant friction. My conceptualization of a Mestizo state is an overarching regime that articulates top-down and bottom-up elements, in the words of Matos Mar, “The official Peru...and the real Peru” (2004 p. 97). The Criollo government, its institutions, and formal practices personify the official Peru. The real Peru is the bottom-up stream, composed of “marginalized” multiracial populations, peasants, and slum settlers. They develop parallel “informal” practices, social norms, and codes to make its contextual reality functional.

The real Peru became incarnate in the slums of Lima but at the same time detached from itself to be a new component of the official Peru. It is valid to say at this point that the slums did not fully represent the entire countryside, but I argue that at least they were the urban part of the real Peru. It is true that in their long process for recognition their practices changed. New practices were developed, but more importantly, the slums changed Lima, its culture, and the meanings of citizenship, i.e., Dietz’s “cholo culture” (1998, p. 108). The 1980s “cholo culture” became the 1990s Gargurevich’s “la cultura chicha” (as cited in Tremblay, 2003, p. 150). Degregori understood this new cultural dynamic, “La chicha permitió la cohesión grupal de esa inmensa masa de migrantes andinos, articulados cada vez mas estrechamente a aquellos que no migraron o regresaron o se aprestan recién a migrar”(1984, p. 22). In that sense “la cultura chicha” reflects the changes brought from the slums and their inhabitants. This process also changed the entire country since the countryside shifted its view of Lima; the old center of European power now had more things in common with the rest of the country, its demographics representing 75% of the population. With that big percentage of the population living in urban areas, it is safe to say that a significant portion of the countryside moved to the city. The Mestizo

sate encloses these trajectories and the resulting formal and informal practices —lo chicha—that are the actual rules, norms, and codes that allow the country to continue functioning.

The Mestizo state took form when the deep Peru—el Peru profundo—described by Basadre in 1947, reached the surface and seized the outskirts of Lima. The previously distant “otherness” materialized in the city. The Mestizo label, as I am using it, describes this new form of state formation based on the articulation of convergent forces; it is at the same time a project of domination and governance. It is a project of incorporation and control of new social groups. The Mestizo state emerges out of an expanded demographic base, new rearrangements of power that created new political demands while maintaining exclusionary and discriminatory features. It became more visible during the 1980s when the slums played an important role in the internal conflict, and acquired another dimension during the 1990s following urban land reform.

The Mestizo state was a platform to articulate coexisting forces and practices from above and below that registered the same sense of crisis and urgency carried by Shining Path. The Mestizo State is not a fixed category or a point where two streams naturally converge, it is rather a dynamic friction of elements that coexist and interact in continuous tension, a terrain in constant reaccommodation in which power is a currency in permanent negotiation. As in any bargain, it can be perceived as good or bad, but it is the core principle of the changing nature of the Mestizo state. It is not a revolution; it is rather a project of appropriation. It is not a history of triumph from below, nor a history in which subordinated movements overcome the power of the Criollo government. The Mestizo state is the articulation and incorporation of legitimacies that converge and have to unequally rely on each other to live and survive.

What best exemplified these tensions was the construction of the walls of Lima in 1684. Richard L. Kagan mentions that the purpose of building the walls was to secure the city from

possible “English attacks” (2000, p. 171). In the process, a plan of Lima was crafted emphasizing Spanish urban guidelines. “[It] rendered the city in orthogonal perspective and gave it appearance of a series of neat, geometrically shaped blocks emanating from the plaza mayor” (Kagan, 2000, p.171). But what is more relevant is that the “rest of the urban fabric was left blank” with the aim to highlight the perception of the walls (Kagan, 2000, p. 171). This rendering of the city became official and later modified to bolster the “idealized image that reflected the Creole conception of Lima as the western paradise” (Kagan, 2000, p. 172). This view did not include the real urban progression of the city; it rather showed how exclusion became a common manifestation to accommodate paradigms of the elite.

Peruvian scholar Reinhard Augustin points out that the best attribute of the walls was precisely its exclusionary feature, because it prevented the city from following the external urban fabric. “Es decir, a partir de los antiguos ejes prehispánicos y que sin duda hubieran continuado generándose de no haberse levantado las murallas, repercutiendo negativamente casi a perpetuidad sobre el urbanismo Limeño” (2014, p. 199). This account did not include those that were outside of the walls. The five gates of the original design indicate that there was a dynamic urban life outside the walls, but it was seen as pernicious and contrary to the accepted urban norms of the Criollo government. The walls would give the city its necessary urban protection for almost two centuries; such precolonial patterns that would contaminate the metropolis would have to wait until 1868 when the walls were torn down.




Figure 3 Source: Taken from Kagan 172: Municipalidad de Lima. Lima 1688 published version of the Koninick plan.

The walls were a physical division that fulfilled the elite desire to resemble European urban schemes, but it provided just the appearance of protection. According to Lohmann Vilena, these walls were not a real defensive fortification; they were ornamental (1964, p. 125). The construction of the walls of Lima shed light on the inability of the Peruvian elites to come to

terms with the reality of a multicultural city and the desires to fulfill a Western fate. The walls of Lima are the visual manifestation of what I call the percolating exclusionary feature of the Peruvian statecraft experience. It enforces societal divisions by filtering fluid interactions that allow an unequal beneficial coexistence while reinforcing differences by normalizing this relationship.

The Criollo government was able to develop this capacity of reinterpretation, which in theory emulates Weberian guidelines with its institutions and thin legal framework, to establish its “domination by virtue of ‘legality,’ by virtue of belief in the validity of legal statute and functional [juridical] competence based on rationally created rules” (Weber, 1946, p. 79). In reality, the government operates a porous system that allows it to interact with informal practices and alternative legalities. My theoretical framework will be one of viewing state formation as the intersection of the real Peru, expressed in the urban slums, with the Criollo government in a time of extreme pressure. They were two streams in constant interaction, each one with their own constituencies and agendas. I will borrow ideas from the bottom-up approach heading toward a platform of encounter with above forces. A statecraft-from-below force that is not necessarily opposing the Weberian state itself, the friction of this encounter is a form of state formation.

In order to overcome the civil war the Criollo government had to elongate its Weberian posture and display an alternative side. I conceptualize the Mestizo state as an entity that gathers heterogeneous social and cultural trajectories and percolates different legibilities of the same reality, similar to the notion of “sociedad abigarrada” developed by Zavaleta Mercado in *Lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia* (2013, p. 17). Zavaleta’s notion of “sociedad abigarrada” refers to a heterogenous society that hosts different layers of knowledge. Wanderley explains Zavalet’s concept saying “is a motley society in which coexists different production, social and legal

relations that are linked to diverse political structures and cultural matrices” (2010, p. 5). The Mestizo state is something variegated, therefore, exhibits various uncombined shades of understanding of common economic, cultural, and social experiences.

The Criollo government embodies the Peruvian version of the modern state, Weberian in discourse but flexible and baroque enough to deal with its social realities. It remains exclusive and discriminatory but canny enough to know its limitations and continuously recognize and incorporate certain sectors of the population. This juxtaposition of exclusion, flexibility, and incorporation has been the driving force of Peru statecraft, “tensions between emergent popular cultures and processes of state formation” (Joseph, 1994, p. 4). I consider that peripheral forms of organization have been inadequately addressed as part of the statecraft process and rather shadowed by the Weberian statecraft discourse.

The Peruvian statecraft process provides an opportunity to understand Tilly’s and Scott’s approaches of state formation, but also Doty’s and Nugent’s ideas. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of internal war that reshaped formal and informal Peruvian state institutions and created others, but at the same time, it was a period of intersection of power and social boundaries. Tilly’s “war making and state making” intersects Scott’s “statecraft legibility” approach. Tilly’s approach fell short in the Peruvian case. Although Peru officially maintains an institutional state in Weberian terms; it plays its own repertoire of it. Peru’s Criollo government fit the core features of Scott’s theory of states on the verge of collapse associating failure to the authoritarian simplification of the reality, but the outcome was different. Peru is economically and socially in better shape than before.

Tilly and Scott provide the classical and dominant vision of the state, imposing order from above. But viewing the Peruvian case through Doty’s concept of “statecraft from below”

would help to understand how the Peruvian state notion of statecraft was a fictional quest that collided with communities living in the margins of the official state that developed their own organizations and ways to survive to deal with the hegemonic shadow of the Criollo government. “Statecraft is characterized by a double-writing, which both produces the givenness of the nation-state and those who belong on the inside, but simultaneously produces the strangers, the excluded, which destabilize the inside” (Doty, 2001, p. 28). Nugent also provides a different view of state-building from below, where practices of power provide the opportunity for those below to eliminate the middleman and embrace the state. Marginalized populations invited the Criollo government to confront their most urgent threats.

This research builds on the work of Doty, Nugent, and Scott on state formation from below and local knowledge. I argue that different state projects from above and below are intersecting, and the articulation of these projects has resulted in the emergence of another view for understanding state formation. The syncretism of the Peruvian culture depicted in the walls of Lima is an example of the complexity and the frictional features of the Peruvian statecraft, a physical boundary with large gates. The threshold of the gates allowed the “double writing,” the percolation to occur. The exclusionary vision surrounding the construction of the walls of Lima give us the vision of a European descendant ruling class pursuing—or attempting to replicate—Tilly’s top-down state approach. In that effort, it was able to suppress its contextual reality in order to fulfill its dreams of modernity and progress. The articulation of these tensions is an unaddressed aspect of state formation. The particular political progression of Peru, and for that matter of a postcolonial state, has divergent statecraft trajectories precisely because of these twofold realities. It demanded the production of particular forms of state—formal and informal—institutions, political associations, and social knowledge.

The urban development (slum growth) of Lima as a centripetal statecraft-from-below force can shed light on how different state trajectories (Criollo and real Peru) intersect and articulate new forms of state formation that shaped the social fabric of Lima and new power arrangements due to evolving demographics and political dynamics.

Chapter 3

The Slum Process: Statecraft from Below

“Important attributes of the legacy may, in fact, involve considerable continuity and/or direct causal links with the preexisting system (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 30)

En el inconsciente colectivo limeño...la barriada se asume como un hecho emplazado “fuera” de la ciudad, que no tiene “ni agua ni desagüe ni luz” y donde viven “puros serranos”. Allí no existen áreas verdes y las calles son de tierra, “no son rectas” y no hay carros. Las casas son de esteras y tienen problemas legales (Ludeña, 2006, p. 89)

Urban Progression

In this chapter, I will explore the urban process of Lima as a pattern of constant friction between the Criollo government and the real Peru. The urban progression of Lima is the empirical evidence of how —Tilly’s Western state vision from above—in the Peruvian case— along with racial prejudices and below forces of historically disregarded populations developed separate trajectories contributing to the same outcome. It set the conditions for the clash of the 1970s and the rise of VES. The increasing official recognition of the slums running parallel with the housing policies implemented by the government demonstrates the dissonant dynamics between the official state project and the empirical evidence spreading around the city. In other words, between the urban paradigms and the urban reality, which translates in multihousing projects vs. unregulated settlements as the actual urban pattern.

Lima started a rapid expansion with the demolition of the walls in 1868 (Augustin, 2014). According to the Peruvian urban planner Luis Ortiz de Zevallos, the urban evolution of Lima is divided into three periods: from its foundation in 1535 to 1684 with the construction of the walls;

from 1684 to 1870 with the demolition of the walls, and from 1870 to 1941 (as cited in Aguilar, 1989, p. 237). It is in this last period when the city starts a rapid horizontal expansion and faces significant migration waves from the Andes. From 1940 to 1993, Peru's population tripled. The demographic shift put pressure on a city historically enclosed and reluctant to expand. Therefore, the integration patterns to the city of the influx of migrant from the countryside were seen as a failure of the state, and a threat to the system. The occupation of hills and land came with the visual recognition that the city was changing rapidly. Peruvian Urban Planner Shariff Kahhat, who wrote one of the few studies about Peruvian modern urbanism, explains this failure as a tension tensions between modernity and chaos:

Las migraciones y la aparición de las barriadas se dieron hacia 1946 en Lima con la misma potencia que la modernización de la ciudad y la vivienda moderna, creando el fenómeno de barriadas y unidades vecinales en centro y periferia de la ciudad. De este modo, se ha generado una extraña simbiosis entre modernidad e informalidad de la ciudad, en donde sus actores, con distintos roles, confluyen en este proceso de hibridación cultural y socio-espacial que va del orden al caos (Kahatt, 2014, 46).

Kahatt's linking of migration and slums running in parallel with modernity reinforces the idea that they belong to different dimension. Degregori understand this differently, "the mere fact of migration is already in most cases...an act of modernity. Usually those who migrate are not resigned to their fate, they are rather rebelling against it, seeking changes in the outside world" (1986, p. 22). The Lima slum growth was seen as chaos confronted by Criollo governments' modern urban efforts. Therefore, popular self-developments were conceptualized

out of modern times; they were stigmatized and confined to primitive and illegitimate manifestations that needed to be fixed.

Population of Peru vs. Population of Lima			
Year	National Population	Lima's Population	Lima's %
1940	7,023,111	661,508	9.4
1961	10,420,357	1,901,927	18.3
1972	14,121,564	3,418,452	24.2
1981	17,762,231	4,835,793	27.2
1993	22,639,443	6,434,323	28.4

Figure 4 Source: Peruvian National Census, 1940, 1961, 1972, 1981, 1993, INEI - www.inei.gob.pe

From 1940 to 1993 Lima increased its population from having almost 10% of Peru's total population to accommodate 30% of Peru's population. This growth in urban population had a direct impact on the social fabric of Lima and changed the political dynamics of the entire country. It also reinvigorated the divisions between the city and the countryside.

City of Lima 1940–93: Evolution of Slums' Population			
Years	City of Lima	Slums Population	% Lima
1956	1,397,000	119,886	8.6
1961	1,845,910	316,829	17.2
1970	2,972,787	761,755	25.5
1981	4,608,010	1,171,800	25.5
1993	6,434,323	3,500,000	35

Figure 5 Source: Lima Metropolitana Perfil Sociodemografico, 1996. INEI - www.inei.gob.pe
Taken from Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003.

By 1993, the population of Lima living in slums was 35% of the total population of the city. But this explosive growth was not an event unique to the Peruvian experience. The urban theorist Mike Davis indicates, “most of the today’s megacities of the South share a common trajectory: a regime of relatively slow, event retarded growth, then abrupt acceleration to fast growth in the 1950’s and 1960’s... Earlier in the twentieth century, the massive transfer of rural poverty to cities was prevented by economic and political equivalents of city walls” (2007, p. 51). What happened in Peru was part of a global scale phenomenon initiated by the “import substitution industrialization policy” and international development paradigms. (Davis, 2007, p. 54). In an attempt to catch up with “modernity” and close the development gap with global north nations, the Peruvian government initiated a process of industrialization that triggered internal changes. This process pushed people from the countryside toward urban areas. As it happened with the walls of Lima, modernity concerns were the fundamentals of this policy.

The 1950s Criollo government modernity quest came with a human wave that compromised what the criollos of the previous century wanted to preserve. Lima was unprotected. It is important to notice how the Criollo government consistently followed Western thinking and international trends; this will come again in the 1990s with the execution of the urban land reform promoted by Hernando De Soto and the World Bank. De Soto will be a crucial figure in the global promotion of the neoliberal agenda and the implementation of the Peruvian urban formalization reform. The table below shows the progression of international policies promoted by the World Bank since 1950.

International Developments Trends - World Bank			
Chronology	Development Paradigm	Advocates	Approach
1950s–early 1970s	Modernization	Replicated for developed-country context	Slum clearance combined with public sector social housing construction
1970s	Basic need, growth with equity	John F Turner	Self-help housing, sites, and services, squatter upgrading; “Freedom to build”
1980s–ongoing	Neoliberalism, SAPs	International finance institutions; Hernando De Soto	Private sector housing, mortgages provided by commerce banks; Community enablement combined with market enablement; Formal and informal sectors; “Urban productivity”; Land titling/property rights; COFOPRI

Figure 6 Source: Compiled from Zanetta; Payer 1982; UN Fact Sheet. Taken from Tilley, 2007.

According to Aguilar, by 1935 Lima was already economically divided, rich to the south and poor to the north, (1989, p. 241). The slums of Lima were labeled as an anomaly; the Corporacion Nacional de la Vivienda, National Housing Corporation (CNV) created in 1946 labeled the slums as, “urban cancer, insalubrious, mushrooming or fungal neighborhoods” (Gyger, 2013, p. 8). The elimination, of this form of settlements, was the cornerstone to of the newly created CNV. By the time that this new urban approach was taking place in Lima, the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) delivered their core principles about urban development. At the head of this, French Architect Le Corbusier in the architectural treaty, the Athens Charter, “demanded that housing districts should occupy the best sites, and a minimum amount of solar exposure should be required in all dwellings. For hygienic reasons,

buildings should not be built along transportation routes, and modern techniques should be used to construct high apartment building spaces widely apart, to free the soil for large green parks” (Mumford, 2000, p.85). The slums of Lima did not precisely fit these requirements. Kahatt explains how Western ideas shaped Peruvian policies. The National Housing Corporation and the National Bureau of Urban Planning (ONPU), created in 1946, followed Le Corbusier guidelines of the Athens Charter of 1942. “since the late 1940s modern principles in urban planning having applied nationwide through ONPU and CNV, plans such as city zoning schemes, transportation plans, and mass housing developments, as well as commercial and civic centers” (Kahatt, 2011, p. 95). It is clear that the Peruvian government housing policy was an example of Scott’s high-modernity approach, extrapolating international urban conventions to build its modern state project, undermining the Peruvian context. Peruvian laws needed to be upgraded to make possible these new urban guidelines. At the head of these changes was an influential Peruvian architect Fernando Belaunde—later elected president, twice. Kahhat states, “[The] ‘Horizontal Property Law’ provided the basis for the capitalistic and fast development of high-rise buildings with share ownership” (2011, p. 88). The law allowed the subdivision of buildings, and each section could have a different owner. By 1947, the path for multihousing projects, the so-called Unidades Vecinales Peruvian neighborhood units was paved. Certainly the Peruvian top-down statecraft project adjusted its institutions to pursue Western ideas that were not necessarily related to Peruvian social needs.


The influx of new immigrants to Lima was primarily seen regarding housing issues. The CNV main mission was the application of modern architecture principles to fix the new urban reality of Lima. The new settlement urban process was not the target of the CNV; it rather was an opportunity, an enabler mechanism to bring believed urban progress and modernity to the

city. Kahhat states, “unidades vecinales were probably the most distinctive component of Plan Piloto de Lima...the most important product of the Peruvian encounter with modern architecture and urbanism...They had the aim to provide not only housing facilities but the sense of community in the modern city” (2011, p. 96). As it happened centuries ago, when the Criollo government decided to build the walls of Lima, its leitmotiv was the fulfillment of Western urban paradigms. The Criollo government was again pursuing another international paradigm to make the city comply with the organized visual schemes of a contemporary Western metropolis delivering housing projects: Unidad Vecinal 3 in 1948, Unidad Vecinal Mirones in 1954, Unidad Vecinal de Matute in 1963. The real Peru continued its own trajectory creating more slums around the city, changing the urban morphology of Lima. “Invading” land became a social practice and the urban development pattern of Lima. The real Peru continued advancing over the city while the Criollo government was developing disjointed housing policies. The Criollo government rather than focus its efforts in the root causes of internal migration and the settlement patterns, pursued a housing policy to assert itself as a modern state. The auto-construction trend, the collective effort required to set a settlement in the sands of Lima were not part of the Peruvian urban modern narrative. Helen Elizabeth Gyger’s dissertation, “The Informal as a Project: Self-Help Housing in Peru, 1954–1986,” provides an alternative narrative focused on self-help housing. She indicates, “Writers have presented unplanned urban development as a challenge to Peru’s investment in achieving a certain modernity (its “modern project”) and have not considered the pragmatic work of aided self-help housing an appropriate object of study” (2013, p. 6). The CNV legal framework and policies can be seen as the manifestation of Tilly’s top-down Peruvian statecraft but does not necessarily depict the

relationship between the government and the “real Peru” that generated political processes of mutual recognition due to historical and cultural intersections.

While it is true that the Criollo government wanted to be modern at any cost, it was also able to deal with its day-to-day pressures and did not assertively interfere with the slums growth. The slums were understood as a housing issue, rather than a social force looking for a city, not just a house. The Criollo government policymaking and the slums growth took different trajectories.

Horizontal Law



Unidad Vecinal 3



Figure 7 Source: Gobierno del Peru, Ministerio de Justicia.
Source: El Arquitecto Peruano, N 146, Sep. 1946. Taken from Kahhat

The Criollo government delivered a series of urban policies aiming to channel urban pressures and committed to doing so within the new modern architectural trends. However, these

policies overlooked the social, economic, and demographic components of its urban reconfiguration. Lima became an urban lab to apply avant-garde urban concepts to push the country into “modernity” and the Criollo government endorsed those urban concepts. Kahatt states:

It is within this context of cultural overlap and transformation in the mid-twentieth century that the Peruvian “Modern Project” emerged and consolidated as a national project in the country and endured for several decades. It should be understood as a national political and cultural project, in which the government, nation, and state worked together on new strategies for the progress of the country (2011, p. 85).

Kahatt understanding of “modern project” however, is hardly called a “national project.” It is more a desire to see the Peruvian statecraft project considering what most resembles the Western experience, a “desire” for modernity, as Doty would say. Kahatt expresses the Criollo government view, in which the achievements of popular organizations are not considering part of modernity, nor part of progress, nor part of the state, because it is a top-down view that is centered on the Criollo government as the only player. At the same time, popular organizations continued pushing their own agendas, gradually surrounding Lima with new settlements, always gaining greater political relevance. These trajectories met each other contested each other and negotiated with each other; the Criollo government was flexible enough—or had no choice—to balance its quest for modernity with internal social forces pursuing their goals. We can see this in the chronological correlation and social dissociation between housing policies and slums growth encouraging the development of new power interactions that led to the gradual recognition of the slums as districts: San Martin de Porres in 1950, Villa Maria del Triunfo in 1961, Comas in 1961

Independencia in 1964, San Juan de Miraflores in 1965, El Agustino in 1965, San Juan de Lurigancho in 1967 (Dietz, 1998, p. 69). This process led to the Villa El Salvador take over in 1971 and its recognition in 1983.

According to several studies, (Aguilar, 1989; Lloyd, 1980; Mattos Mar, 1956). The earthquake of 1940 triggered the slum growth in Lima; the real Peru of Mattos Mar became visible to the Criollo government and came under measures for containment. Lima became a zone of friction and reaccommodation, the real Peru in the form of slums surrounded the Criollo government. The housing policies and slum recognitions occurring at the same time is the physical display of this frictional urban dialogue. The visual manifestation of how two seemingly disconnected streams are occupying the city show the competing nature of above and below forces. Below I briefly describe a few of the slum and housing projects to explain the slum growth - housing policy dynamics.

Cerro San Cosme Invasion, 1946

San Cosme is a hill close to the city center. It is labeled as the first violent invasion (Cueto 2015). In 1946, Cerro San Cosme became the first so-called “asentamiento humano”. Presidente Bustamante described the slums, “[they have] deplorable housing conditions that belong to remote Andean villages. We do not have to be surprised of such primitivism when even in Lima we have a popular housing regime that has the same features, no water, no sanitation, no paved roads” (1947, p. 31). But previous to this “invasion” in the 1945 creation of the new city market, “La Parada,” close to the city center was itself a signal of new demographic needs. Dietz conceptualized La Parada as the epicenter of new urban attitudes (1998, p. 95).

By 1946, the social dynamics of the country had change the urban structure of Lima and its economy. “the presence of the market generated a whole range of secondary industries,

garages, stores, restaurants...At the same time...[it] created a need for cheap housing which led to squatting and trespassing in nearby land” (Burt, 2007, p. 95) The creation of La Parada that triggered the take over of Cerro San Cosme is the manifestations of these changes resembling the dynamics of Doty’s bottom-up approach. San Cosme represents the switch in demands and practices. Settlers were not pursuing just shelter but the capitalist approach; settlers needed a place close to work.

The response of the Criollo government to the new reality was to accept the fact that Lima had new food demands legitimizing the newcomers and their practices. But at the same time, the Peruvian government was balancing these setbacks by replicating U.S. urban experiences. Kahatt mentions “appropriation and transformation of American modernization were already taking place in the same way in which the new *Urbanistic Legislation* was established by young Lima’s deputy Fernando Belaúnde” (2011, p. 94). The invasion of Cerro San Cosme was the cornerstone to the creation of El Agustino district in 1965. After the invasion, the government started to provide basic services as part of its “urban improvement” efforts. “The dialogue with neighborhood organizations and the confidence in the process of urban improvement provided a partial citizenship to a vast sector of the urban poor” (Ramirez and Riofrio, 2006, 14). This established the dynamic between the slums and the government, invasions first, services later.

Unidad Vecinal 3, 1945-1949

Unidad Vecinal 3 was a multihousing state-funded project close to center of the city. Paradoxically, 1945 is mentioned by Kahatt as “crucial for the process of introducing and consolidating modern architecture in Lima, and the EAP [El Arquitecto Peruano] journal gave good indications of this transformation.” He also mentions the distinctness of the neighborhood

units as a symbol of international urban trends, “unidades vecinales were probably the most distinctive component of Plan Piloto de Lima...the most important product of the Peruvian encounter with modern architecture and urbanism...They had the aim to provide not only housing facilities but the sense of community in the modern city” (2011, p. 96). The Unidad Vecinal 3 was a CNV project; it was the first of its type. Its vertical block aesthetics contrast the organic verticality of the slums growing in the surrounding hills of Lima.

President Odria assessed the slums growth in terms of lack of housing. “The housing shortage that our lower class population is experiencing has inspired a keen interest in the government...After hard work the construction of Unidad Vecinal No. 3, has been completed. It will provide hygienic housing at moderate cost for 1,112 families” (1949, p. 45) What is exceptional in this account is that the lower class was not able—or willing—to assume “moderate” cost. Cerro San Cosme by 1955 had more than 13,000 settlers that did not pay for the land. The Unidad Vecinal 3 was a housing project, a top-down measure that skipped that fact that the slum growth was more than a housing issue.

San Martin de Porres 1945-1950

This was the first slum to officially become a district of Lima. The first settlers strategically name it 27 de Octubre—the date in which General Odria overthrew President Bustamante—to gain the favor of the Odria administration. Slum settlers started to maneuver in the political realm; taking names related to current administrations became a common practice and persists until today. Sponsored by the Odria administration the “Distrito Obrero Industrial 27 de Octubre” [was] created in 1950⁵, in 1962 was renamed San Martin de Porres. This new district consolidated various slums that grew in the north part of the city since 1945, people

⁵ El nuevo gobierno trató de encuadrar la oleada migratoria dentro de los cauces del paternalismo promoviendo la “Asociación de Pobladores 27 de octubre.” (Degregori, 1986, p. 42).

started to move close to industrial areas. Degregori, using Matos Mar research and the national census of 1961 mentions the explosive growth of San Martin, from 29,512 settlers in 1957 to 97,040 in 1961(1986, p. 43). San Martin represents a step forward in the consolidation of the slum growth in the city; the slums started its long process of recognition. But while the government recognized the slums, it was also involved in a wide “modernizing” effort. The Harvard Review of Latin America mentions “in 1948, Lima started its first Pilot Plan, heavily influenced by Josep Lluís Sert, urban designer and later dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design, during his visits that year to the country” (Malaspina 2014). The plan proposed Unidades Vecinales as the solution to the slums growth⁶, and became the official posture of the Peruvian government. San Martin in 1961 had almost 100,000 inhabitants and growing while Unidad Vecinal 3 housed 1112 families, no more than 5000 thousand people. The government was proposing limited urban interventions while the slums were creating a new city.

Experimental Housing Project, PREVI

It was a multihousing project promoted by the Belaunde administration in 1968 and sponsored by the United Nations. The Criollo’s government most advanced attempt to deal with the slum growth of Lima. The slums self-construction system had gained traction in international circles due to the field research of British architect John C Turner. PREVI’s concept was based on self-construction as an integral part of the design; the owners of the units would have to finish the construction according to their needs.

Originally the idea was 1500 units for 10,000 people, by the time of its completion in 1977 the project was downgraded to 500 units, reducing the impact of the project. PREVI was not designed by the urban poor because the slum settlers did not have “incomes that allow,

⁶ Unidades vecinales were proposed in Lima as a solution for the housing crisis that affected thousands of people living in slums and blighted areas. (Kahatt, 2011, p. 96)

through a monthly saving, the acquisition of a dwelling with long-term financing” (Gyger, 2013, p. 212). Regardless of the fact the PREVI was not targeting the urban poor, Kahatt indicates that “[n]evertheless, PREVI’s houses embody the hybridization of the Peruvian Modern Project and also embrace the physical overlapping and rich negotiation of the complexities of local urban culture” (2011, p. 25). Kahatt’s carries the establishment’s paternalistic view of slum growth, in which reinterpretation by Western modernity was mandatory. He states, “[t]his overlapping of Anglo-Saxon modernization and traditional patterns endured for several decades...PREVI was the most significant effort to overcome the housing and urbanization crisis in a third world country in those years, and its strategies are still relevant today” (2011, p. 23). The project’s attempt to connect Western and “traditional patterns” exposes the state top-down lenses used to measure the needs of the government and the outcomes of its policies. The Criollo government rendering of Lima’s slum growth revolves in the intersection of Doty’s concept of state as a “desire” and Scott’s “high modernism” state feature. This intersection produced and reproduced top-down policies centered in the appropriation and concealment of the slum growth.

PREVI shows how the Criollo government attempted to refashion the slum growth to meet the aesthetics of modern urbanism. The idea of self-construction was dematerialized in order to move from the slums to the formal city. Sarmiento’s Eurocentric vision was vivid in the 1960s and 1970s housing policy of the Criollo government; the slums’ self-construction was outfitted in the ways of the West, reinforcing the idea that marginality, backwardness, and race were an intrinsically part of the slums.

These different approaches to deal with urban pressures are rooted in historical patterns. The Criollo government had developed a keen approach to managing social pressures in its terms; that is to say without renouncing its “modern” project. State housing schemes such as

Unidad Vecinal 3 and PREVI were made to enhance the Criollo government's limited modern state project. The legal recognition of the slums of Lima, i.e., Cerro San Cosme, that led to the later creation of El Agustino and San Martin de Porres was reluctantly accepted. Lima from that point on would share with the real Peru. This coexistence became more visible in later years as the slums spread around the city; the Criollo government policies toward "invasions" accommodated the social pressures of the slums of Lima. By accepting land "invasions" the Criollo government was able to filter social demands, and its posture was seen as a path for future claims and a flexible mechanism to respond to them.

The Criollo government, in all its spheres, was immersed in a Western response to the Peruvian experience; adapting international ideas and producing knowledge to make the Western experience a viable theoretical framework, aiming to provide policies to deal with the Peruvian reality. The Criollo government was focused on the application of Western modernity not much in the empirical evidence of the slum growth.

Modernity vs Barriadas: Building Perceptions

Western urban development narratives shaped the Criollo government perception about the new settlements and settlers of the city. These international urban principles reinforced stigmatization and prejudice. Both the settlers and the settlements were labeled as outlaws, the urban others that needed to be fixed or upgraded to a much superior system. The sum of all Limeño's fears became reality and materializes in Lima without knocking its doors.

This perception came from different sectors of the establishment, intellectuals, and political leaders. Susan Lobo explains that wealthy sectors of the society share a negative view about the slums, "[a]mong middle-class and upper-class Limeño, squatter settlements are often stereotyped as harboring criminals and social degenerates. It is believed that anyone from the

outside, who dares to walk through a squatter settlement, would be lucky to escape with his life” (1980, 4). The attitudes to the slums and housing policies are well documented, as I describe below.

- In 1960, *Caretas*, a weekly Peruvian magazine published an article, *Infierno in Lima*, ” “La barriada lo ofende todo. Ofende la vista, ofende el olfalso y ofende el corazon. es un inmundo lupanar en donde la vida humana se prostituye cada dia y es, en verdad, la viga en el ojo de todos los Limeños” (qtd. in Riofrio).

- Lobo cites Peruvian Historian Jose Varallanos who wrote:

Today Lima is a city of cholos, that is, it has been cholified... thousands of indigenous peasants live in the so-called “barriadas,” or marginal neighborhoods. In effect, in these districts which, like mushrooms have arisen in the outskirts of Lima as if to enclose it in a ring of misery and social promiscuity, live close to a half million cholos who each day give Lima a more Peruvian profile. It is this invasion of the capital by the highlanders from the forgotten provinces that is the revolution that humbly arrives at the gates of Lima without agitation or political demagogues... and continues to transform the republican and mestizo capital. (as cited in Lobo, 1983, xxii)

- Matos Mar in his book, *Urbanizacion y Barriadas en America del Sur*, wrote:

Es necesario destacar que esta poblacion que viene de la zona rural al ciudad trae a ella sus formas de vida, correspondientes a grupos poco desarrollados con una mentalidad campesina y que mantiene patronos culturales de la cultura llamada indigena... Es asi como los inmigrantes que llegan a Lima, a vivir preferentemente en estas barriadas, aportan su forma de vida tradicional y se

enfrentan a la vida urbana que tiene otro ritmo de acción, produciéndose en este enfrentamiento una serie de conflictos de gran importancia que se traducen en desajustes mentales, sociales, y económicos que atentan contra su buena adaptación (1968, p.18).

Paradoxically Matos Mar was also one of the pioneers in changing the perception of the slums. These misleading perceptions about the slums growth were based on historical racial stigmatization of poverty, as opposed to modernity and progress. Also, policies that were never designed to cope with the changing nature of its urban fabric shaped the Limeño's attitude toward the slums as a threat, a constant menace waiting to take the city. It was until the late 1950s that the unregulated settlements of Lima were approached differently with the works of Peruvian architect Adolfo Cordova, sociologist Matos Mar in 1957, anthropologist William Mangin in 1967, and the United Nations "Manual on Self-Help Housing of 1964," based on John F.C. Turner's work. In 1960s, Turner's assessment of self-construction as an efficient housing method challenged modern urbanism. "The procedures followed by these self-selecting occupant builder communities, free to act in accordance with their own needs, enable them to synchronize investment in buildings and community facilities with the rhythm of social and economic change" (1967, p. 167).

It is from here that studies about the informal urbanization shifts. The new approach targets "self-construction and collective efforts" as positive social endeavors (Turner, 1963). In political terms, the new narrative was the preamble of *La ley de Barriadas*, law 13517, signed on February 14, 1961. Dietz states, "It not only gave the state a major role in the squatter communities of Lima, it was also de facto recognition by the state that these communities had to be officially recognized and dealt with" (1998, p. 146). By 1961, it was clear that slums of Lima

had gained enough power and leverage to be part of the political game. “This policy also gave the Peruvian state a justification to allocate fewer resources to the poor, and a means to defuse poblador mobilization by other political groups” (Dietz, 1998, p. 146). In 1963, the study conducted by Austin and Lewis, *Urban Government for Metropolitan Lima*, concluded that “No functioning body is presently capable of authoritative control over planning and plan implementation in the urban area. The idea of area wide coordination is popular, and both the National Office of Urban Planning and the Lima Provincial Council have promoted it as the very essences of modern metropolitan government” (1970, p. 170). While the Criollo government attempted to have some control and promoted modern approaches to address the spread of slums around the city, its capacities were not just limited, its view of the issue was distorted.

The proliferation of slums was not an attack on the Criollo government but rather a conquest of citizenship from below. Doty explains the challenge to the central authority, “These human beings may not be engaging in political practice as traditionally understood. They are just trying to survive, hoping their hopes, dreaming their dreams, in a world that feeds off those hopes and dreams, then grinds them up and spits them out across spaces of unprecedented wealth and crushing poverty” (527). At this point, I have to add that initially settlers were not politically engaged. However, social practices are not static, and the slums were progressively involved in political activities because they gradually articulated a collective voice. The slums’ creation became a standard practice, and their incorporation to the urban dynamics of Lima was a manifestation of the bottom-up forces and practices of Doty’s “statecraft from below”. The trajectories of the real Peru and the Criollo government were set to collide.

The district of Villa El Salvador was the offspring of this new statecraft dynamics. VES, the major exponent of Lima’s slums growth, did not happen due to a failure of the Criollo

government, they were an achievement of the real Peru. In the 1980s and 1990s, the political posture of its leaders, e.g., Maria Elena Moyano, toward Shining Path offers a clear view of how the trajectories of the Criollo government and the real Peru started to intertwine in a different dimension integrating—unequally—the new slum districts into the urban legal framework.

Chapter 4

The Crisis: Villa El Salvador

In this chapter, I explore the crisis originated by the invasion that led to the creation of VES as a point of inflection in the Peruvian statecraft experience. VES signified a major change in the understanding of legitimate power and created a direct clash between the Criollo government and real Peru. De Soto states, “between 1968 and 1970 the police evicted 79 percent of the new invaders. This harsh repression ended in suddenly in 1971, when a violent invasion overthrew the government physically and politically, triggered a ministerial crisis, and led to the adoption of a new state policy” (1989, p. 45). But this crisis did something more; it changed how the government and the real Peru saw each other.

The self-proclaimed revolutionary military administration of General Velasco Alvarado has been being labeled a socialist regime, a top-down effort to separate from the criollos. Nevertheless, the army was a long partner of the Criollo government and its oldest republican institution. Hinojosa describes the position of the military in that ideological context, “according to a strict class analysis, the armed forces constituted a part and a pillar of the bourgeoisie, and could not be expected to foment a revolution against their own class. What the military proposed rather, was essentially a corporatist project of class conciliation...in other words, the negation of Marxism” (1999, p. 84).

It that sense, I see the military Junta still representing the Criollo top-down statecraft process. The crisis of VES was not a rhetorical confrontation; it was a change in the configuration of power from above, and the most tangible indicator of bottom-up capacities. It was a conflict with physical consequences; VES land takeover became a symbol of the forces

coming from below that open new forms of power intertwined and new forms of distance and division.

The Origins

In 1961, the Prado administration enacted the *Ley de Barrios Marginal* (Law 13517), created to facilitate the regularization of the slums on Lima. The law declared, “de necesidad y utilidad pública e interés nacional la remodelación, saneamiento y legalización de los barrios marginales o barriadas” (Congreso de la Republica 1961). The law implied that the city had official or formal physical and legal boundaries. In asking for the regularization of neighborhoods at the margins of the city. The law assumed that the city had real boundaries, following the walls of Lima mentality that classified who was in or out of the city based on Western urban categories, which in turn defined who was citizen and who was not. The slum growth of Lima made evident that boundaries were provisional and porous.

The Criollo government used the same fictional logic of the advocators of the walls of Lima three hundred years earlier, which did not consider the settlements outside the wall as an integral part of the city. Law 13157 inherited this vision and called the slums of Lima marginal neighborhoods outside the borders established by the Criollo government. But at the same time, it was a policy that recognized the emergence of a new urban regime. By 1961, the slums were already a physical part of the city. The government discourse started to acknowledge the empirical reality of the real Peru that had already modified the urban fabric of Lima.

While it expressly prohibited the creation of more slums, it provided a legal framework for them and created a path for land recognition. A Peruvian researcher from the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos explain the implications of this law:

[E]n ella predominó una visión moderna que entendió las barriadas como proceso inevitable del crecimiento explosivo de la ciudad, por lo cual planteaba su reconocimiento... Sin embargo los acontecimientos siguieron un rumbo muy distinto al planteado en la ley de barriadas: el estado no asumió la construcción de la vivienda popular, se limitó a reconocer, y en otros casos crear barriadas oficiales sin preocuparse por la posterior edificación (Remy Simatovic, 2015).

Remy Simatovic suggests that the Criollo government assumed a “modern” approach by recognizing the obvious. The Criollo government was modern because it realized that the slums of Lima were already part of the city. It failed logistically, but what seems to be relevant was its “modern” intentions. By highlighting the government’s “modern” effort, slum endeavors were stigmatized as illegitimate efforts of modern times. It confined the slum growth as the failure of the Criollo government rather than an achievement of the real Peru. Mar, in his study *Las Barriadas de Lima*, estimated that 10% of Lima’s population, 119,140 inhabitants, were living in slums (1955, p. 17). By the time that the law was enacted in 1961, the slum growth of Lima had long passed the benchmark of inevitability.

Law 13517 bolstered the slum growth, as people realized that they would eventually be landowners. Gyger’s research offers a view of the outcome of the law: “3,000 titles were granted in the seven years from the passage of Law 13517 in early 1961 to October 1968; following the simplified titling process instituted at the very end of the Belaúnde administration” (2013, p. 276). The Belaunde administration issued an insignificant amount of property titles, and the Velasco administration was not very proactive either, “10,000 titles were granted between October 1968 and October 1972” (Gyger, 2013, p. 276). However, the law sent an unequivocal signal to the real Peru. Villa El Salvador was a product of this; it was the resulting outcome of

regulatory policymaking and the social understanding of it. Remy Simatovic explains how the law ended the land speculation and “The state became the sole operator in recognition of slums or promoting urbanize slums, delimiting the plots but no basic infrastructure was developed” (2015). President Velasco in his 1969 national address said, “Nuestra preocupación central se dirigirá a resolver los problemas de los pueblos jóvenes y las áreas tugurizadas de las ciudades y a eliminar la especulación con las tierras aledañas a los centros urbanos”(Juan Velasco). But things would turn sour for the Criollo government; in Scott’s words: “We must never assume that local practice conforms with state theory” (1998, p. 49). The Velasco administration will be challenged by statecraft from below forces.

The Invasion

On April 27th of 1971, a singular invasion occurred, 80 families occupied private land in Pamplona Alta, an area close to urbanized districts; paradoxically that area is currently one of the wealthiest residential areas. The day after, the police attempted to remove them, but the settlement dwellers did not leave. At the same time, the media was spreading information about this new invasion, and more people wanted to be part of it. Five days later 9,000 families were already on the ground. In 2005, La Republica, a Peruvian newspaper recalled this moment as the largest human displacement in Peruvian history “35,000 invasores se hicieron presentes en el llamado Pamplonazo” (Mairata, 2005). But VES was not only an effort of the poor dwellers of Lima; it has deep roots in the Peruvian Andean struggle with the Criollo government. Poole and Rénique state, “[VES] was created in the 1970s by survivors of an earthquake that devastated the Callejon de Huaylas in 1970” (1992, p. 88). There were displaced peasants coming from the Andes, and the urban poor of Lima, those peoples who channeled the visibility of the real Peru.



Figure 8 Source: Municipalidad de Villa El Salvador, Pamplona Invasion April 1971



Figure 9 Source: Municipalidad de Villa El Salvador: Relocation to Villa El Slalvador, May 1971

The way in which VES made its entrance hit the establishment at its core. Peruvian historian, Antonio Zapata, mentions how the military government of Velasco has had a rigid posture against new settlements:

Velasco prohibió enérgicamente la invasión de terrenos urbanos propiedad del Estado, proceso que había sido moneda corriente durante las dos décadas anteriores. Por ello, pasados dos años de gobierno militar y, habiéndose concentrado una gran presión humana en los antiguos barrios populares de Lima, que alojaban a los recién llegados y estaban reventando por exceso de población (2015).

The real Peru showed its strength, defying the power of an authoritarian government. The interior minister, General Armando Artola ordered a complete removal of the invaders, resulting in dozens injured and one death. VES created frictions between political actors of the Criollo establishment, the Catholic Church sent Bishop Bambaren, but his presence was not well taken by government officials. Collier stated, “Bambaren... went to the invasion site and held a mass. Artola then had Bambaren arrested for disturbing the peace. The church vigorously protested the arrest... Bambaren was released after thirteen hours, and Artola was forced to resign on May 17” (Lowenthal, 1975, p. 154). The Criollo government had to accept the de facto land takeover. Tilly’s core top-down feature of securing land resources was challenged but not eliminated. Collier relates this with the creation of the National Social Mobilization Support System (SINAMOS) “It made clear that the government needed to increase its ability to deal with sectors of society capable of mass political action” (Lowenthal, 1975, p. 155). The mobilization strength made the government realize that they were facing a new social reality that would eventually threaten its power. Therefore, the appropriation of this effort from below became a state policy.

De Soto explains the magnitude of power that was on display, “For the first time, the residents of an informal settlement had been able to bring down a minister of the interior— moreover, one who wielded considerable power and had a reputation as a strongman.” (1989, p.

46). The events unfolding by VES ignited a new power relationship between the Criollo government and the real Peru. While the Velasco administration was already taking measures to change the structure of the country, “Velasco reform’s, constituted an effort to dramatically alter state-society relations by redefining the role of the state vis-à-vis the economy; its capacity to influence and integrate society, and to modernize the country” (Burt, 2007, p. 27). The top-down policies promoted by Velasco were intersected by VES. It was a power stream coming from below, claiming visibility, and taking its place in the Peruvian political game. VES did not represent a call to revolutionize the country but to negotiate new power arrangements.

By the time that the events of VES were unfolding, Lima was hosting the annual Meeting of the board of governors of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The organizers of the invasion were aware of this. The date of the invasion was not a coincidence; they knew about the efforts and necessity of the military government to gain international recognition. The government was not in the position to deliver a harsh response (Blondet, 1991; De Soto, 1989). VES irruption occurred as a result of the confluence of three regimes of governance: a global regime represented by the IDB, a Criollo government, and the real Peru. De Soto explains, “The incident attracted international attention and earned the invader considerable publicity.” (1989, p. 46). VES organizers took their claim in a new dimension and twisted the hand of the Criollo government. Two months later in his annual address on July 28th President Velasco stated “[La] Revolución Peruana se basa en la posición fidedignamente revolucionaria de aspirar a que el poder de decisión política y económica en el Perú del futuro resida sin intermediación en las organizaciones sociales básicas que los propios hombres y mujeres de nuestro pueblo creen para regir su destino” (Juan Velasco 1971).

The new dynamics were visible immediately; the government became an active enabler of the occupation. Its response, aimed to ease criollos, was preoccupied with the invasion of private land and to regaining control of events. Its solution was to relocate the settlers into an area further south. 9,000 people were relocated from Pamplona to what is now VES, The army assisted with the relocation and provided trucks to the massive mobilization. The Criollo government became part of the occupation effort and the foundation of VES.

The wall that the Limeño citizens of the 17th century asked for protection against the pirates was not there to contain the incoming menace. Burt states “The long-held fear of Limeño elites—that the poor, Indian, and cholo masses would descend upon them and take over the city—seemed to be coming true” (2006, p. 227). As it happened with the unjustified fears to build the walls of Lima three centuries earlier, the Criollo government was not able to clearly read the actual dynamics surrounding it. “The ineligibility of local measurements practices was more than an administrative headache for the monarchy. It compromised the most vital and sensitive aspects of state security” (Scott, 1998, p. 29). While Scott used this approach regarding units of measurement, I think it is valid also to use it in term of policymaking designed to fit a top-down state approach, oversimplifying the reality and failing to foresee its long lasting consequences.

The making of VES represented a defeat for the government, “a political victory of the informal in their first massive confrontation with the state” (De Soto, 1989, p. 44). It altered the slum growth; “Villa El Salvador is atypical of newer lower-class districts in that it was formed all at once, in singles well-organized land invasion”(Stokes, 1995, p. 13). It changed the significance of power for both sides. The new dynamics of authority force the Criollo government to update its view of the Peruvian social landscape and developed new approaches to

exercise its power. To regain control in Tilly's terms, the Velasco administration had to coerce and control these new popular organizations.

SINAMOS was created to "concentrate under its authority all the state's relations with the settlements" (De Soto, 1989, p. 47). SINAMOS represented the government appropriation of the mobilization capacity showed in VES. A new legal urban framework was designed, la Comunidad Urbana Autogestionaria de Villa El Salvador (CUAVES). De Soto states, "Villa El Salvador was chosen as a pilot experiment... because the political impact to be gained from taking the offensive in the very place where invaders had brought down the minister of the interior. An the first Self-Managed Urban Community (CUAVES) was established there" (1989, p. 47). The forces from below that created VES were balanced by the CUAVES top-down policy.

The relocation of the settlers and the subsequent creation of the CUAVES are manifestations of the exclusionary feature of the Peruvian statecraft experience. VES is a striking example of the transformative power of the friction between the real Peru and the Criollo government. Its capacity to twist the Criollo state top-down statecraft reflects how the urban development of Lima is a cultural process intrinsically connected with the Peruvian state formation experience, and it should be seen as such, not just as unlinked new urban manifestation or as a failure of the Criollo government. VES was the materialization of that cultural process, the first point of engagement that would eventually bolster VES political role and would generate possibilities of mutual collaboration to face the Shining Path danger. VES was not the result of a fight against the Criollo government. It was not a revolution crafted by middle-class university theorists to overcome oppression; it rather was the product of a long process of mutual empirical observation of behaviors and practices that shaped a popular culture

in constant motion. “Popular and dominant culture are produced in relation to each other through a “dialectic of cultural struggle” (Hall 198) “that takes place in contexts of unequal power and entails reciprocal appropriations, expropriations, and transformations” (Nugent and Alonso as cited in Joseph 17). The Criollo government and the real Peru—expressed through VES—started a period of interaction. The military regime developed mechanisms to handle the friction of the new political landscape attempting to regain political control.

The military government delivered SINAMOS, attempting to assert itself in this new form of political mobilization. While also seeking to monopolized popular mobilizations, and politically profit from them, the government became an active sponsor of grassroots organizations. Dietz notes, “attempting to Create an institutionalize and multilevel organizational apparatus whose avowed aims are simultaneously the encouragement and the control of local autonomous decision making” (as cited in Malloy, p. 414). The Peruvian government’s seemingly inconsistent position might reflect its anxieties about the new reality and the unknown roadmap opened by the strengths of the real Peru.

The capacity of the settlers of VES was visible from the beginning, and its incorporation into Lima’s economy came in the form of auto construction. Zapata describes the transformation of VES and its process of integration into the city:

[En 1971] Los fundadores de VES recibieron del gobierno un lote por familia, por el que no tuvieron que pagar nada... los agentes censales de 1972 decidieron considerar a casi todas las casas de VES como viviendas precarias, ya que de 18 mil viviendas existentes sólo 500 fueron consideradas por el censo en buenas condiciones. Pero, aunque rudimentarias, estas viviendas eran propias, lo que motivó un tremendo impulso a la autoconstrucción. La mayoría de los vecinos

ahorraban en materiales de construcción y el visitante del primer año se sorprendía al encontrar delante de las chozas de esteras las primeras pilas de ladrillos y bolsas de cemento que anunciaban que ya estaban empezando a construir sus viviendas con materiales más sólidos (2015).

The integration to the economy of the Lima along and the sense of property changed the way in which the settlers of VES, and for that matter the settlers of the slums of Lima, felt about their membership as citizens of Lima. VES became the path of *el Peru real*; Tuner states:

Official housing policies and projects...attempt to telescope the development process by requiring minimum modern standard structures and installations prior to settlement. Such “instant development” procedures aggravate the housing problem by disregarding the economic and social needs of the mass of urban settlers in modernizing countries (Tuner, 1967, p. 167).

VES settlers galvanized the “practical knowledge” described by Scott. By 1971 when they confronted the Criollo government, they knew what they were doing. And from that encounter they modified their sense of belonging, they were still part of *invasiones*, settlers of *pueblos jovenes* or inhabitants of *asentamientos humanos*. “La organización vecinal tenía el papel de único representante del barrio y era por su intermedio que se canalizaban las demandas y gestiones. En muchos casos, la organización de pobladores preexistía a las municipalidades en su papel de autoridad urbana” (Ramirez and Riofrio, 2006, p.14). The slums and their organizations had the sense of ownership and authority on their side. That new modified sense of citizenship would come up later, during the Shining Path struggle.

Chapter 5

Shining Path: The Common Threat

“A critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways... and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 30).

1980 started a period of internal conflict; Shining Path, a direct enemy that wanted to take control of the country, challenged the Criollo government. In this period of extreme pressure, the real Peru was the most vulnerable. Government military forces and Shining Path forces targeted these peoples indiscriminately. The demographic structure of the country had changed and almost 30% of the country was living in Lima, The CVR reports that almost one-third of Lima’s population was living in—los pueblos juvenes—the slums of Lima by 1981 (CVR, 2003, Vol IV, Chapter 1). The most representative of them was VES. I will use the case of VES as the leading organized settlement that found points of encounter with the Criollo government to face the Shining Path threat.

In 1980, after twelve years of dictatorship, Peru returned to democracy when the day before Peruvians elected Fernando Belaunde Terry as the new democratic president; Shining Path started its operation in Ayacucho, a symbolic city in the central Andes of the country. Hellman explains the historical racial abuses in the Andes, particularly in Ayacucho where “anti-Indianism” was rampant and made this city a key target for Shining Path. He states, “For anti-Indianism, I mean two entwined systems: a system of beliefs that cast indigenous peoples as broadly inferior to nonindigenous mestizos and whites and system of practices that exploited indigenous labor and land to bolster nonindigenous wealth” (2010, p. 198). Shining Path strategy was to exploit the historical racial abuses, build a strong base in the Andes, start armed

operations terrorizing the highlands of Peru, and finally take the armed struggle to Lima. Gorriti states, “Shinning Path is preparing a Guerrilla war from the countryside to the city and a war from the urban periphery [shanty towns] to the urban center” (1999, p. 53). But the slums were already engaged in a process of articulation with the central state initiated through agencies such as SINAMOS. Zapata describes this articulation “SINAMOS was successful in the organization of popular sectors, especially new groups. However, these entities detached from its control and pursued their own agenda joining old labor unions. A typical case of this process corresponds to Villa El Salvador” (2015). VES was already institutionally connected by the time conflict began.

Shining Path escalated the hostilities and started targeting critical infrastructure across the country, particularly in Lima where the electrical grid was compromised severely. The Peruvian army response included more repressive actions against the population. The Belaunde administration had to deal with the economic crisis left by the military government. The emergence of Shining Path occurred in a time of widespread economic unrest. The estimates of the CVR provided a view of that period, “En 1980 se llevaron a cabo 739 huelgas que involucraron a 481 mil trabajadores. En, 1981 hubo 871 huelgas acatadas por 857 mil trabajadores. En 1982, el número de huelgas fue 809 y los trabajadores adheridos a ella fueron 572 mil” (CVR, 2003, Vol III, Chapter 2, p. 14). On top of this situation, the internal conflict took shape, while the Criollo government was still assessing the nature of the conflict, Shining Path pursued a strategy to bolster its image of effectiveness; it was not a large movement, Manwaring states, “[this] is not an organization of the masses. At the start of the “people’s war” in Peru, in 1980, Shining Path was estimated to be numbered at only 189 militants. Even by the time Guzman was captured in 1992, the numbers of Shining Path fighters was estimated well below 10,000” (2012, p. 34). The indigenous population faced madness, leaving their

communities was their only way to survive. Shining Path could not achieve its goal to create a general uprising as a response to the army brutal repression, but it achieved its goal to generate a nationwide sense of inevitability. In Lima, with a few militants, Shining Path was able to create enough terror to make the Peruvian government crumble. Gorriti explains why creating such massive dislocation was key for this terrorist organization, “[t]he growth curve of the Shinning Path insurrection would exceed that of its vulnerability once strategic equilibrium was achieved” (1999, p. 58).

Guzman’s strategy to win the war relied on the capacity to take control of urban areas; his ideology prevented him from seeing the extent to which the slums were already integrated into the social fabric of Lima. In an interview in 1988 he explained his plans.

We think that our activity in the cities is indispensable and it must be pushed forward more and more, because that is where the proletariat is concentrated and we cannot leave it in the hands of revisionism or opportunism. The *barriadas* are in the cities, the shantytowns with their vast masses. Since 1976 we’ve had guidelines for work in the cities. Take *barrios* and *barriadas* as the foundation and the proletariat as the leading force. This is our policy and we will continue to apply it, now, under conditions of people’s war. What masses do we direct our work at? This you can see. From what’s already been said, it’s clear that the vast masses of the *barrios* and *barriadas* are a belt of steel that is going to encircle the enemy and hold back the reactionary forces (Abimael Guzman, 1988).

Shining Path strategy saw the slums of Lima as potential antagonizers of the central state. Therefore, exacerbating the exclusionary and discriminatory practices of the Criollo government toward the slums was key to taking control of them, and from there defeating the

government. The outcome of the war would prove that the Shining Path reading of the Peruvian reality as a class struggle was discontinued or diffused in the slums of Lima. Because the real Peru and the Criollo government dichotomy did not fit the static class-struggle rhetoric in which Shining Path based its ideology.

VES incorporation to Lima

By 1980, VES had developed its own trajectory within city, national, and international politics. Internally VES evolved fast, and its improvements were notable. But prejudice against the slums had also increased. Lloyd described these attitudes in the 1980s, “[c]ultural marginality is now discredited in most academic circles...however, still alive in much popular middle-class thinking...The objectively different behavior observed by the middle-class person contrasts to the strong desire to share and participate in a middle-class way of life which is felt within the [slum] community” (1980, p. 122). But VES perceived itself as part of the city. Researcher Pablo Galaso Reca compares the developments of Silicon Valley and Villa El Salvador as successful models of social capital and economic growth (2005). He noticed important changes between 1973 and 1984. Illiteracy decreased substantially, and there was a substantial increase in the percentage of the population with secondary and higher education in VES. By the time that the internal conflict started, VES was already immersed in an evolving process of economic and social engagement with the city, ergo with the Criollo government.

Villa El Salvador 1973 - 1984			
Education Level	1973	1984	Increasing %
Illiteracy	8.5	4.0	-112.5%
Elementary	65.0	48	-35.4%
Middle and high school	25.0	40	37.5%

Technical or higher education	1.5	9	83.3%
-------------------------------	-----	---	-------

Figure 10 Source: CUAVES and National Census.
 Taken from Sociedad y Poder Local: La Comunidad de Villa El Salvador.

This research is not arguing that the slums of Lima did not resent the crisis of the Belaunde administration and then the catastrophic economic recession of the Garcia period. Their population was composed for those in extreme poverty, and they were the most affected. Imaging outcomes based on ideological premises implied logic of schematic inevitability in words of Scott “Designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order” (1998, p. 6). The real Peru had already navigated through the politics of the Criollo government; it was not waiting for Shining Path for any liberation. They were still oppressed and poor, but even in that harsh situation, the alternative to revolt against the government was hard to sell. For the urban poor, those who made the slums of Lima their new home and built the new districts of the city, joining a political project that could destroy or compromise what they had already achieved did not offer an appealing solution to overcoming poverty.

The slums of Lima had long before started a confrontation with the Criollo government; the long process for recognition and political participation was in a different stage. They had some victories and many setbacks, but overall they had gained enough leverage to deal with the government without an open war, in which of course they would have been the most vulnerable. Stokes describes Lima’s slum experience:

[It] changes in consciousness can explain new movements from below. Some lower-class actors came to hold new goals (e.g. they imaged new kinds of social orders and strove to make them actual); new beliefs...new identities (e.g. they

behaved in conformity with a new image of themselves as poor people who fully participated in community affairs (1995, P. 124)

The new empowering awareness of the slums relational position within the city made the slums an active actor in the national struggle brought by Shining Path.

Official Recognition as a District of Lima

The recognition of VES as an integral part of the city of Lima came after an internal confrontation that defined the future character of the district. Ten years after the invasion, VES settlers did not have the same view of their position within greater Lima and how to deal with it. Testimony given to the CVR sheds light on the internal refashioning of meanings from invaders to settlers of the city and how the VES experience was also dealing with hegemonic citizenship forces:

Nosotros en la CUAVES nos opusimos a la distritalización de Villa, los cuavistas nunca estuvieron de acuerdo a que Villa El Salvador fuera un distrito... por que no queríamos que parte de la estructura del estado estuviera en nuestras propias casas, porque irrumpía y entorpecía el proceso de desarrollo político. ...Nosotros el temor que teníamos [al formarse el gobierno municipal] es que nos vaya a sobrepasar, que nos vaya a imponer, que nos vaya dominar (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 511).

With the end of the military government, the state assistance to VES ended. The operational capacity of the CUAVES compromised its political direction, “many of its projects faltered, generating mistrust among the population. Municipal neglect fed a growing movement to establish Villa El Salvador as an independent municipality” (Stern, 1998, p. 277). Political parties furthered these demands, seeking to take VES as a political stronghold.

In 1983, the Belaunde administration officially recognized VES, (Ley 23606). But the CUAVES remained a strong organization within the VES. By this time, Shining Path was clearly a threat to the Criollo government and the slums of Lima. Shining Path challenged them both; the irruption of a third party seeking its own political project was a threat to the fragile equilibrium they had built. VES elected its first major Michel Azcueta, a left-wing (Izquierda Unida) teacher. VES leadership now was part of the political stablishments, but the power in VES was still contested, as was reported in the CVR:

En la medida que el poder de la IU se iba consolidando en el distrito desde el municipio, la brecha entre los dos grupos políticos —los izquierdistas independientes agrupados en la CUAVES y los izquierdistas de la IU— así como entre las dos instituciones —la CUAVES y el municipio— se fue acrecentando. Utilizando esa brecha, los grupos alzados en armas buscaron establecer alianzas con los sectores radicalizados de la CUAVES, para formar un frente común contra la IU y el municipio (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 512).

Burt 1996, 1997, 1998 and the CVR have extensively documented the penetration of CUAVES by Shining Path. I will not devote this research to the details and progression of this. What is important in this research is to indicate the significance of the CUAVES political dynamics and its response to Shining Path. The real Peru that took Lima's outskirts through a long process of land takeovers, represented by its most symbolic and influential slum, decided to take part in the Criollo government political framework. That is not to say that VES did not have to deal with Peruvian security forces, "Para las fuerzas del orden, VES fue tempranamente designado como «zona roja». Como consecuencia de esto, los pobladores soportaron operativos

de rastrillaje que frecuentemente significaban la detención arbitraria de decenas, sino cientos de personas” (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 485).

The Juncture

By the late 1980s, CUAVES had shown sympathies for the Shining Path predicament. These internal frictions reflect VES settlers’ shifting layers of understanding their relationship with the Criollo government. And more importantly, during this process of difficult coexistence with the Criollo government and generalized internal conflict, VES decided which legitimacies to navigate. From the disagreement about the nature of VES, and its role within the state and the Peruvian society as a whole, a group of VES leaders saw in Shining Path a reason to align with the Criollo government. “Azcueta, Rodríguez, and Moyano all belonged to the United Mariateguista Party (PUM)...The party’s division was due in part to growing discrepancies over conceptions of armed struggle and the role of the left in supporting Peru’s fledgling democracy” (Burt, 1998, 287). Shining Path ideological conceptualization of Peru’s struggle did not match VES leaders’ vision.

Shining Path saw the reality of slum life through its ideological dichotomies based on fixed collective identities, skipping any discernment about the construction of those identities in relation to space, time, and the practices that arise from it. Zavaleta Mercado explains these dynamics:

[las clases] aprenden las dimensiones de su poder y la eficiencia de su poder no desde los análisis previos, que son todos incompletos o presuntivos o totalmente inexistentes, como consecuencia de aquellos límites cognoscitivos de este tipo de sociedades en el momento de su quietud, sino a partir de su práctica; aquello que pueden y aquello que no pueden es lo que son (Zavaleta Mercado, 693).

Shining Path's idea of urban and rural societies as struggling worlds was contradicted by the slums' gradual incorporation into Lima; Shining Path's predicament was not able to flourish. Instead, other participation practices took place. De la Cadena cites Shining Path ideologist Diaz Martinez, "[t]he connection between two such different societies in Peru, the rural and the urban, bring with them the decomposition of many of the autonomous institutions, makes integration difficult, and the much-heralded communal development will be difficult to achieve under present conditions" (as cited in De la Cadena, 1999, p. 50). "The connection" stated by Diaz Martinez, rather than decomposing institutions, created innovative communal institutions such as the Federacion Popular de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador (FEPOMUDES). Scott rightly advises the relevance of "practical knowledge" in the progressive construction of formal orders. The Shining Path was unable to see how social practices were acquired or modified during the slum growth and the generation of a flexible social knowledge that shaped slum settlers' perceptions. The VES experience was the bridge between Tilly's top-down Criollo government approach and Doty's "statecraft from below." This new social knowledge enabled VES to be part of both the real Peru and the Criollo government, a contact zone recognized nationally and internationally. FEPOMUDES played a major, role articulating womens' organizations across the slums of Lima and confronting Shining Path. Moyano was elected FEPOMUDES president twice and later became VES deputy mayor. Moyano symbolizes the syncretism emanated from this junction.

The improvements made by VES in less than ten years disputed Shining Path narratives of rural as naturally and inevitably opposed to the urban experience. "Dentro de sus difícil entorno ha conseguido resultados muy positivos para la población en ámbitos como la educación, la cultura, la salud y los servicios públicos" (Galaso, 2005, 162).

Lima vs. Villa El Salvador 1973–81				
Education Level	VES 1973	Lima 1984	VES 1984	Lima 1981
Illiteracy	8.5	6	4	3
Elementary education	65	45	48	29
Middle and high school education	25	41	40	48
Technical or higher education	1.5	8	9	18

Figure 11 Source: CUAVES 1973 and National Census.
Taken from: Sociedad Y Poder Local: La Comunidad de Villa El Salvador

In 1987 VES received a major international recognition, “[the] Villa El Salvador experiment is influencing different Peruvian districts. The great prestige this community has acquired over the years led to its being chosen by different national organizations from all over Peru to host the First National People’s Congress in June 1987” (Prince of Asturias Foundation). The Spanish Crown did not award any of the Limeño residential districts but showed the change in attitudes and the appropriation capacity of the Criollo government. The award became a symbol of national pride, as VES became a Peruvian national effort.⁷

In 1991, Shining Path understood that the articulation of a VES-Criollo government represented an emergent front against its political interest. Shining Path started a more aggressive posture in VES, attacked FEPOMUDES, and targeted local authorities. The CVR reports “El primer acto en ese sentido se registra el 23 de junio de 1991, cuando asesinaron a Alejandro

⁷ Mayor Michel Azcueta interview “Me acuerdo que Alan García me llamaba y decía: ‘Ya vamos un voto más’. Era toda una alegría, luego yo comunicaba a la población: ‘Teníamos cinco, ahora tenemos seis’” (El Comercio, 2012).

Magno Gómez, prefecto del distrito y miembro de Cambio 90, el partido de gobierno” (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 492). Asked about the Shining Path attack, Moyano said:

Hasta hace un tiempo yo pensaba que el PCP-SL era un grupo equivocado y que, de alguna manera, intentaba luchar por alguna justicia. Pero cuando mataron al dirigente obrero [Enrique] Castillo [en octubre de 1989], tuvieron todo mi repudio, sin embargo yo no me atrevía a condenar esta actitud terrorista de el PCP-SL. Ahora han tocado las organizaciones de base, donde están los más pobres... Pretenden socavar este tipo de organizaciones... [Y]o ya no considero a el PCP-SL un grupo revolucionario, es solamente un grupo terrorista (as cited in CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 495).

The position took by Moyano as the most prominent leader of popular organizations, signified the most confrontational message to Shining Path. VES, the most visible popular organization of the Peruvian “sociedad abigarrada,” was siding with the Criollo government, confirming Zavalata’s suggestion that different social bodies can find clarity in times of crisis. Shining Path strategy to take the slums of Lima failed to see how the real Peru and the Criollo government were gravitating to a new political conversation. Moyano’s posture against Shining Path expresses the sense of “clarity” mentioned by Zavaleta Mercado, “Ademas digo los politicos, los parlamentarios deben dedicarse a bajar a las bases, a trabajar y no a hacer comisiones ni tanto escandalo” (1992). Moyano’s speech reflects the reacomodation of power, the arising of “the statecraft from below.” Moyano is working in ways that Doty might expect, but also reflecting Nugent, as she is inviting the government, the official Peru to work together with real Peru. Shining Path was not a viable alternative for the slums of Lima. This convergence set the path to the reaccommodation of the slums into a new political project. In words of

Nugent, “hegemony emerges out of struggle” (1997, p. 11). The “clarity” of the critical juncture led to a new “hegemony” in the 1990s.

The legacies of this period of violence will be visible at the beginning of 1990: The election of Alberto Fujimori, the embracement of neoliberal policies, the collapse of Shinning Path, are the features of the 1990s.

Chapter 6

Legacies

The Criollo government realized that popular forces from below could articulate powerful mobilizations and undermine its power. Alberto Fujimori understood this situation and used this new reality. Fujimori took office in July 1990 and implemented a hard neoliberal agenda, but his popularity did not fall. Interestingly, he gained more steam and was reelected in 1995. In his second term, President Fujimori passed a decree creating the Commission for the Formalization of Informal Property. This policy was promoted by Hernando and sponsored by the World Bank as the ultimate neoliberal solution to deal with informal settlements.

The Rise of Alberto Fujimori

I consider that the political emergence of Fujimori and his election as President in 1990 is a legacy of the critical juncture that occurred in the 1980s. The ascendance of Fujimori also marked the increasing electoral relevance of slum populations in national politics. The Mestizo state took another dimension. In a moment in which Shining Path and its Maoist ideology were the major threat to the nation, the electorate did not embrace a candidate with capitalist or free market platforms, e.g., Vargas Llosa, as a response to it. The radical Washington consensus measures proposed by Vargas Llosa were rejected for a population that did not want structural adjustments. The population living in the slums came from a long process of frictions, achievements, and setbacks; radical changes were not an appealing proposal. According to Grompone “Los votantes de Cambio 90 [Fujimori] son en su mayoría los campesinos de las provincias más pobres de los Andes, los migrantes que hicieron crecer a los barrios periféricos de la ciudad de Lima” (1991, p. 37). They choose Fujimori, not only because they were poor but because Fujimori shared a crucial feature; he was an emergent figure challenging the Criollo

establishment. The political dimension of the slums made the Mestizo state more visible than before. Its summary of social bargains and accepted informal practices created new interpretations and expectations about the institutions and the state itself. The modernity offered by Vargas Llosa was contrary to their trajectory because they were the peasants that took Lima

Indians peasants live in such primitive way that communication is practically impossible. It is only when they move to the cities that they have the opportunity to mingle with the other Peru. The price they must pay for integration is high-renunciation of their culture, their language, their beliefs, their traditions, and customs, and the adoption of the culture of their ancient masters (1992).

They were the Indian peasants that took Lima and forced the “other Peru” to mingle with them. They impregnate the city with their practices; they made Lima “informal”, or they formalize the informal reality. It was not a passive mass of people without agency as Vargas Llosa pictured them. It might be that the price of “integration” was that they decided that Llosa did not suit their political expectations. Degregori uses Jose Maria Arguedas idea of modernity to describe the cultural and racial tensions, “Arguedas no sólo decía que teníamos un país antiguo...en el discurso de agradecimiento por el premio “Inca Garcilaso de la Vega”, sintomáticamente titulado “No soy un aculturado” (1968), se define como un “individuo quechua moderno”, sujeto que en el esquema de MVLl resulta un imposible” (1991, p. 115). The Mestizo state was an ongoing process with forces seeking accommodation; Fujimori was the offspring of that precise moment. The Criollo government embodied in Vargas Llosa failed to recognize the real dimension of the statecraft from below forces. “Los

resultados finales fueron del 57% de los votos emitidos para Alberto Fujimori y del 33.5% apoyando a Vargas Llosa. Las elites resultaron otra vez tomadas por sorpresa.” (Grompone, 1991, p. 22) The real Peru did not want significant top-down structural changes; they were accustomed to small gains in gradual and continuous subtle accommodations. The Mestizo state with its new demands, practices, and meanings found in Fujimori someone as malleable as them.



Figure 12, Source: Caretas 1990
Source: El Comercio 1990

The presidency of Fujimori could be seen as the triumph of the real Peru—at least electorally—seeing in Fujimori exactly what his campaign slogan said, “un president como tu” (Roldan, 219). Fujimori’s credentials as a Japanese descendant was dissociated from the Criollo establishment and made him closer to real Peru than any of the other candidates. Connaghan indicates, “[h]is Appeal was based on his lack of association with what Peruvians perceived as a bankrupt party system and the resonance of racial-class appeal” (1994, p. 227). While the critical juncture geared top-down and bottom-up streams, these forces were always in friction. Fujimori arose out of the internal conflict and integrated the slums in his political discourse.

Peruvian scholars explain the rise of Fujimori mainly as the collapse of the political party system (Pease, 2003; Tuesta, 2005). It is noticeable that besides the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the other parties—Accion Popular, Partido Popular Cristiano, and IU—were recent political ventures. They still held political power, but by the time of Fujimori’s emergence their relevance shrunk. Rather than a deterioration of the system, the critical juncture forced by Shining Path changed the supply and demand political dynamics. I agree at a certain point with Pease and Tuesta about the decline of the political parties, but I can hardly see that as a deterioration of a political system because it was an embryonic system. To be deteriorated, first they had to be consolidated. Connecting this with Doty’s thought, this view is just “a desire for order” (2003, p. 12). In that regard, I agree with Martin Tanaka’s suggestion that the party system was only able to see mirages of democracy, “Los partidos privilegiaron los gremios y las organizaciones constituidas y entonces llegaron a los espejismos de la democracia: con esa lógica de funcionamiento los partidos no llegaban a la sociedad o—mas precisamente—no alcanzaban a una gran parte de esta” (as cited in Pease, 2003, p. 71). The real Peru that was already living in the slums of Lima and had their own demands elected Fujimori with 62.4% of the national vote and 53.3% in Lima (Dietz 1998).

By the 1990 election, political parties were enclosed in their particular narrowed views, unable to see how forces from below were gravitating toward a different spectrum of power. Using the lenses of the deterioration of political parties to explain the emergence of Fujimori is a method of understanding the real scope of forces from below that took the outskirts of Lima. Fujimori was a peripheral candidate, an outsider; he was running a campaign out of the traditional political establishment. He was doing “informal” politics and his audience was out of the “walls of Lima” The political establishment was static, conducting business as usual.

The dynamics of the slums' growth and the internal war took the realpolitik out of the scope of traditional parties. New organizations such as the FEPOMUDES and its leadership were gaining more leverage. Blondet explains this new construction of power, “[I]a lucidez de estas nuevas dirigentas se plasmó en entender los engranajes políticos con los que funcionaba los partidos...reconocieron y mantuvieron las diferencias entre la organización funcional y la política...Esta constituyó una nueva manera de articular el vínculo entre la organización y los partidos” (Blodent, 1991, p. 132). Those who had the capacity to see this pragmatism politically took the most out of the slums. In fact, Remy Simatovic describes how the left-wing party consolidated its presence in the slums. “Sendero Luminoso se enfrentaba allí a un fenómeno nuevo el de las expectativas que generaba la izquierda Izquierda Unida, la izquierda legal, asumiendo en las elecciones de 1980, 1983 y 1986 las alcaldías de los barrios populares” (2015). IU, the left-wing party was part of the political establishment.

The slums gravitated toward this political option “Michel Azcueta IU elected mayor in 1983 and 1986, led the campaign to establish VES as an independent district in 1983” (CVR p. 441). In 1989, Moyano was part of his platform and became VES deputy mayor. What was happening was a change in the political composition; Azcueta and Moyano were part of that rearrangement of power. Shining Path understood that this political integration was a threat to its cause and targeted slum leaders, killing 27 of them in 1992 alone (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 139). The new political dynamics came at a high price for slum leaders and transformed the political landscape of the 1990s.

In the first round of the 1990 presidential elections FREDEMO (Vargas Llosa) attained 28.2% of the vote; Cambio 90 (Fujimori), 24.3%; APRA, 19.6%; and IU, 7.1% (Peru, JNE, 1990). These percentages show that the parties were functioning and still had significant

constituencies. However, in the second round Fujimori attained 56.5% of the vote and Llosa 33.9% (Peru, JNE, 1990). The electoral results did not reflect the deterioration of traditional parties. Rather than deteriorating, the political parties were facing “growing disaffection” in an evolving political realm. As Grompone mentions above, Fujimori’s constituency was the immigrant urban poor living in the outskirts of the city (1991, p. 37). Fujimori targeted these populations with specific policies that enhanced his popularity.

Commission for the Formalization of Informal Property

President Fujimori won the 1990 election by campaigning heavily in Lima’s slums. He understood the electoral importance of the outskirts of the city. Hernando de Soto, his economic advisor at the time was the world champion of economic development. He argues that the slum growth originated new social and economic practices outside of the legal system, “the migrants became informal” (1989, p.11). De Soto sustain that the “informals” are “entrepreneurs” and the state should incorporate them i.e. formalize them. De Soto argued that in developing countries like Peru capitalism did not work because the lack of strong property rights institutions. “Western nations have made the transition from dispersed, informal arrangements to an integrated legal property system” (2007, 106). Developing countries should replicate that experience. Therefore, property rights had to be secured to create a new landowner class able to access credit. In turn, the process of trading properties would enhance the Peruvian economy. Fujimori was reelected in 1995 attaining 64% of the popular vote (Peru, JNE 1995). Former interior minister Fernando Rospigliosi points out that the capture of Guzman in 1992 was key to Fujimori’s reelection. In 1990 he defeated Llosa and in 1995 he defeated Javier Perez de Cuellar, former UN secretary general, and the emblematic icon of the Criollo establishment.

In March 1996, the Peruvian Government passed a law to create an agency to formalize property land, Commission for the Formalization of the Informal Property targeting major urban areas. By the time that the law was enacted Lima's population was close to seven million people. A World Bank report on the Slum growth in Lima describes the scope of the new agency, "COFOPRI assumed the functions of about 14 separate agencies that previously regulated the titling... a National Formalization Plan was launched" (Imparato, 2003, p.250). By 2003 COFOPRI had titled 1,313,795 plots.⁸

COFOPRI is a policy that operated in different dimensions. It articulated the slum growth into the state institutional framework, and ideologically promoted informality as a positive economic force, the informal becoming an "entrepreneur" of the Peruvian popular economy. The neoliberal agenda appropriated the collective efforts of slum growth and framed it as a policy designed to boost the market. But COFOPRI is also a policy that reinforced divisions. It is based on de Soto's view of informality as something cause by the migration from the countryside. "If [migrants] were to live, trade, manufacture, transport, or even consume, the cities' new inhabitants had to so illegally" (De Soto, 1989, p.11). In that sense, while COFOPRI articulated statecraft forces from below with the institutional framework, it was a policy based on exclusionary meanings of citizenship: urban citizens and the rest.

The creation of COFOPRI in policy terms was the final step to recognize slum settlers as part of the formal city. In that sense, COFOPRI was the articulation between the statecraft from below and the top-down institutional framework. The understanding of the trade-offs, of *de facto* and *de jure* land property patterns, are important elements to understand the real dimension of COFOPRI as a policy that was able to articulate two seemingly opposed forms of legitimacy.

⁸ Data from the World Bank Shanghai Poverty Conference, 2003.

COFOPRI broke with the long pattern—50 years—to face the slum growth with housing policies and containment laws. It instead included the slums in “a neoliberal agenda that effectively relieve[d] governments of the duty to address the housing problem at all” (McGuirk, 2014, p. 70). COFOPRI’s mission was to capitalize slum growth by issuing property titles to slum settlers in line with De Soto’s neoliberal guidelines. “Without formal property, no matter how many assets they accumulate or how hard they work, most people will not be able to prosper in a capitalist society” (2007, 159).

Pág. 138322	El Peruano NORMAS LEGALES	Lima, viernes 22 de marzo de 1996
<p>registral con el fin de garantizar los derechos de todos los ciudadanos a la propiedad y al ejercicio de la iniciativa privada en una economía social de mercado, establecidos por el inciso 16) del Artículo 2° y los Artículos 58° y 70° de la Constitución Política.</p>	<p>Artículo 5°.- COFOPRI contará con una Gerencia General cuyas principales funciones serán:</p>	
<p>Artículo 2°.- Créase la Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI), como organismo rector máximo encargado de diseñar y ejecutar de manera integral, comprehensiva y rápida un Programa de Formalización de la Propiedad y de su mantenimiento dentro de la formalidad, a nivel nacional, centralizando las competencias y toma de decisiones a este respecto.</p>	<p>a) Ejecutar los acuerdos de COFOPRI y reportar su cumplimiento directamente a ella; b) Supervisar, dirigir y coordinar las actividades de COFOPRI y las instituciones privadas especializadas contratadas; c) Representar a COFOPRI; y d) Las demás que le asigne COFOPRI y el Reglamento de la presente ley.</p>	
<p>La inscripción de los títulos de propiedad formalizados por COFOPRI se realizará en el Registro Predial Urbano a que se refiere el Artículo 10° de la presente Ley.</p>	<p>El Gerente General será designado mediante Resolución Suprema, a propuesta del Ministro que preside COFOPRI.</p>	
<p>COFOPRI constituye un pliego presupuestal con autonomía técnica, funcional, administrativa, económica y financiera. Sus integrantes son designados mediante Resolución Suprema y reportarán directamente al Presidente de la República. Será presidida por un Ministro de Estado, que ejercerá la titularidad del pliego presupuestal.</p>	<p>Artículo 6°.- Son recursos de COFOPRI los siguientes:</p>	
<p>La presente ley crea un nuevo mecanismo institucional que permitirá que la propiedad predial de los sectores informales de menores recursos se pueda convertir en activos líquidos que puedan integrarse al mercado y ser objeto de transacciones; incrementando el valor de las</p>	<p>a) Los que le otorgue la Ley Anual de Presupuesto y sus modificatorias; y b) Otros recursos asignados de otras fuentes y fondos.</p>	
	<p>Artículo 7°.- Créase el Fondo de Promoción del Acceso a la Propiedad Formal (FOPROP), cuyos recursos serán destinados a financiar las actividades a que se refiere esta ley. La dirección del FOPROP corresponde a COFOPRI. Son recursos del FOPROP:</p>	

Figure 13 Source: Official publication COFOPRI law El Peruano, March 1996.

An assessment of the effectiveness of this policy indicates, “The result predictable for those who understand the poor’s finances is that the access to property registration does not imply a significant access to credit. The mortgage credit of the shantytowns registered in Lima represents 0.7 percent of the registered plots, in many cases, they are not even mortgage credits”

(Riofrio 2002). So the economic goals of this policy were not achieved. Instead, COFOPRI became a mechanism to further Fujimori's political project.

COFOPRI se convirtió en una de las herramientas de movilización de respaldo al oficialismo. La entrega masiva de certificados de propiedad por parte de la COFOPRI fue un recurso muy utilizado —especialmente por los ministros de la Presidencia, Edgardo Mosqueira, y de Transportes, Comunicaciones, Vivienda y Construcción, Alberto Pandolfi— en los meses anteriores a las elecciones de abril del 2000 (Fowks, 2000, p. 26).

COFOPRI was Peru's official acknowledgment of the new urban reality. It was the legacy of a long process of social pressures that led to recognitions, encounters, and frictions in the face of a brutal internal conflict articulated within a political project. De Soto labeled his formalization idea as “the economic answer to terrorism” (1989). In that sense, formalization was *the* solution to Peru's problems. Therefore, COFOPRI was a matter of state but also became a political a tool for Fujimori's power ambitions. The Criollo establishment after the 1992 self-coup (*autogolpe*) realigned with Fujimori due to his neoliberal agenda—which was the same proposed by Vargas Llosa—and the influence of World Bank and De Soto as supporters of the administration. COFOPRI was the policy manifestation of this new form of incorporation and articulation of apparently conflicting forces from above and below. It was a top-down land reform policy targeting years of unregulated urban settlements. De Soto's view of the slums did not care about Western and Criollo aesthetics; it was about making the slum growth a profitable experience, not just in market terms but in political and most importantly—at least for Fujimori—in electoral terms. In August 1996, six months after COFOPRI was enacted, the

government “passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation, which declared that because Fujimori’s first term began under the old constitution, it did not count under the new one, leaving him free to seek reelection in 2000” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 166). The strategy for a third reelection was unfolded. In words of Julio Cotler, Fujimori started his plot of “reelection at any cost” (as cited in Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 166). COFOPRI became part of Fujimori’s electoral repertoire.

INEI estimates that “More than 40 percent of the urban growth in the period 1983–1993 was concentrated in this city, in a country in which 73 percent of the population lives in cities. As it can be imagined, 33 percent of the country’s urban poverty is also to be found in Lima” (as cited in Riofrio, p. 2). This demographic landscape made COFOPRI a tool to articulate a big portion of the Peru’s population with official Peru. It reconfigured the social power structure of Peru, as Dietz states, “Lima in the mid-1990s contains about the 30 percent of Peru’s total population and about one-third of its voters” (1998, p. 200). The above and below articulation took another dimension because of COFOPRI. The real Peru that reached the outskirts of Lima started a process of incorporation in the official Peru and in this process the official Peru also became incorporated in the real Peru. Still, the official Peru remains exclusionary and discriminatory. COFOPRI restored the official Peru power legitimacy over urban land; it was the government that issued titles, and the slum settlers recognized its authority. It summarized the long trajectory of the slum growth to acquire a physical and political place. But it also was a project of domination and control. “Many Lima organizations found that once land titles have been acquired, attendance at community meetings and protest marches plummeted, as settlers no longer feel insecure, despite a continued lack of basic services like pipe water” (Dosh, 2010, p. 47). The Mestizo state took a different shape with this new demographic base, and became more

visible. It first percolates the slums through its walls when they were officially recognized as districts of Lima; then expanded its walls to incorporate slum settlers through COFOPRI.

In the year 2000, the Fujimori administration took a step further, promoting invasions as an electoral tactic, “thousands of people invaded the outskirts of Lima” (Carrion, 2006, p. 143). Two months before the election “on February 13, 2000, Fujimori announced the creation of an ambitious program...Family Lot Program (PROFAM)...that would provide the urban squatters with state-owned land. Less than two weeks after the announcement, more than a quarter of million people had applied to obtain a free lot” (Carrion, 2006, p. 143). Fujimori commoditized the long process of collective efforts of slum growth and turned it into what Carrion calls a “vote-buying measure...[PROFAM was supported by] 86 percent of the poorest residents” (2006, p. 144). COFOPRI can be seen as a process of formalization but also as a moment when the informal became formal, the illegal became legal, and the invader became an owner. That is to say the supposedly official city became lawfully informal. COFOPRI is a constant topic in Peru’s politics because it helped to consolidate Fujimori’s political movement, which still has a strong presence today. The government used agencies such as COFOPRI to articulate the slums growth into the institutional framework, but at the same time COFOPRI was used to promote Fujimori’s long-term political project, which was part of a global project of economic and social reaccommodations dictated for international institutions, e.g., World Bank, IMF, and NGOs associated with them such as the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), Mitchell explains the domestic and international dynamics:

Backed from Washington, De Soto became chief advisor to the Fujimori government in the 1990s and was able to install the metrology that made the later findings possible. The connections among these interlocking networks created the

narrow world in which economic facts could be produced—and also ensured their recirculation, as the “findings” were published by the think tanks, by de Soto, and by the World Bank. (2008, p. 1120).

The “findings”—*The Other Path*—were used as a component of the ideological foundations of Fujimori’s political project. He forced the third reelection in 2000; he later fled to Japan. Accused of corruption and human rights violations he was extradited in 2007 and is currently imprisoned. However, his political project is still alive. His daughter Keiko Fujimori capitalized the legacies of his administration and ran for President in 2011 attaining 48 percent of the votes. She narrowly lost the election, but she consolidated the political presence in the parliament with 37 seats⁹. De Soto was part of the 2011 campaign and is also her economic advisor in the 2016 campaign.



Figure 14 Source: Institute for Liberty and Democracy: De Soto with Alberto Fujimori in 1990, Source: Andina Agencia Peruana de Noticias: De Soto with Keiko Fujimori 2016

Fujimori’s daughter is facing the run off of the 2016 election with strong possibilities to win the election. Keiko Fujimori promotes her campaign using the same arguments used by her

⁹ Elecciones generales y Parlamento Andino

father, “informals” and “terrorism”, she is offering the formalization of illegal miners, regardless of the environmental risks that such a measure involves since a significant portion of them are polluting the Peruvian Amazon, “Vamos a trabajar por una verdadera formalización. Tenemos que empezar de cero y tenemos que hacer esa formalización desde acá, trabajando con la gente, con sus dirigentes, para poder lograr el proceso de formalización” (Keiko Fujimori, 2016). While she calls for mining formalization De Soto has labeled ecological activists as the “Green Shining Path” implying that they are a new form of terrorism, “vamos a darle un nombre, ‘sendero verde’: son ex terroristas que ya han cumplido sus penas. No tienen armas. Todos son ecologistas. Se han dado cuenta de que no pueden ganar. Lo que han hecho es organizar movimientos ecológicos, que son los que han parado Conga y Tía María” (De Soto, 2016).

The political project created by Fujimori in the 1990s was possible due to the reconfiguration generated by the slums growth, “the informality” associated with a global neoliberal agenda incarnated in Hernando De Soto. Keiko Fujimori is a legacy of Fujimori’s opportunistic and corrupt form to do politics. De Soto with his global economic pedigree validates Fujimori’s dynastic political project domestically and internationally.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

The Peruvian state approach toward the slums changed during the 1980s, but it was not a unilateral decision as the initial question of this research had inferred—of why the Peruvian state changed its approach toward popular organizations and urban informality during the 1980s and 1990s—In fact the change of attitude occurred from both sides. The slums of Lima had already acquired political agency. The long frictional urban progression of the slums of Lima changed the conversation of power and percolated social pressures in a time when “informality” had been incorporated into the neoliberal agenda and international developments trends. The change of attitude was due to a combination of these trends. Domestically the slum growth changed social practices and power dynamics that became visible during the internal conflict. These dynamics came at the time in which international narratives had incorporated “informality” into their global discourse.

By the 1980s, in the context of the slums of Lima, the real Peru and the Criollo government were already engaged in a new conversation of power; “formalization” was the new “modern” narrative sponsored by international organizations. These new power dynamics pushed both of them to see Shining Path as a common threat in order to maintain their evolving equilibrium while the new slums’ narratives became part of the international modernity discourse. The change of attitude toward urban informality lays not only in the power acquired for the slums and the Criollo government acceptance of it in the face of Shining Path’s violent project but also in the formalization that already was an international accepted modern approach toward urban informality. Maria Elena Moyano articulated this new dynamic of power. By

openly opposing Shining Path, she demonstrated the agency acquired by slums' organizations and leaders and their place in the new urban power dynamics.

The revolution is an affirmation of life and of individual and collective dignity. It is our ethic. Revolution is not death, nor imposition, nor submission, nor fanaticism. Revolution is new life—the belief in and struggle for a just and dignified society—in support of the organization that people have created, respecting their internal democracies, sowing new seeds of power in a new Peru” (Moyano, 2000, p. 66).

Moyano was talking about the power already acquired. She was not representing only VES; she was the voice of the statecraft from below telling Shining Path, that they were pursuing a different project. Moyano's “new Peru” was closer to government formalization promise than the “rivers of blood” offered by Abimael Guzman. Also formalization—of the “asentamientos informales”—as a modern response came from Hernando De Soto stating, “informality has ultimately succeeded in establishing a new system of property rights to land” (1989, p. 19), and that was a positive thing for the economy. Therefore, the government should create legal mechanism to promote this “incipient market economy generated by [urban poor] Peru's people” (de Soto, 1989, p. 56). De Soto's research became part—or influenced—the international neoliberal agenda of the 1990s, and became the ten rule of the Washington Consensus¹⁰. The economist who coined the term describes the relevance of De Soto, “[m]y view is in fact that the Washington Consensus is the outcome of worldwide intellectual trends to which Latin America contributed principally through the work of Hernando De Soto” (Williamson, 1993). Through De

¹⁰ The legal system should provide secure property rights without excessive cost and make these available to the informal sector (Williamson, 2004).

Soto’s research the Peruvian slum growth experience became part of a new international approach to urban informality.

De Soto’s research became one of the pillars of the Washington Consensus. Williamson stated, “[t]his was the one institutional reform that got included in the original version of the Washington Consensus. The initial impetus to its inclusion came from Hernando de Soto (1989), who had made the case for granting secure property rights cheaply to Peruvian informal enterprises” (2004, p. 11). Once disregarded by urban planners and Presidents, as “mushrooms” (CNV, 1996), “primitive and insalubrious” (Bustamante, 1947; Odria 1949), the neoliberal narrative reshaped them as “entrepreneurs” (De Soto, 2007). They became the symbol of the emergent popular market economy. This critical juncture came at a high price, with legacies that resonate until today, but it was the result of a long process of frictions, intersections, and crisis. The graphic below describes the critical juncture framework process.




Figure 15 Source: Matos Mar, 1956; SINAMOS, 1973; La Republica, 1992; Caretas, 1996

The change of dynamics during the 1980s and 1990s was part of a process that started in the 1940s with the internal migration from the Andes to the Lima. Indigenous populations seeking accommodation in the city began a process of popular self-adjudication of urban land that became the urban development pattern of Lima. Doty's "desire" concept is reflected in the influential presence of Fernando Belaunde as the main advocator of urban policies to control the slum growth. "Belaúnde aimed to demonstrate that architects could meet the challenge of creating an "economical system" of minimum standard modern housing even (or especially) within the constraints of a developing economy" (Gyger, 2013 p.32). Belaunde's view as an architect favored housing policies and set the posture of the Peruvian state toward the slums. Belaunde's participation in politics for more than 40 years was crucial to assess the slum growth as a housing issue. Starting in the 1940s as deputy of Lima, he promoted and succeed in passing the horizontal property law and then as head of CNV proposed large-scale multihousing projects. As a President for two terms he again heavily promoted these developments. The slum growth was an excuse to make Lima an urban lab to build the city of the future.

The slum growth was generated by marginalized sectors of the population who were left outside the walls of Criollo power. The real Peru emerged; the statecraft from below became visible and decidedly pursued its place in the city. The Criollo government reacted passively with disdain and disbelief. These different attitudes—one pushing from below to reach the surface and the other disgusted and confused—produced new practices and rules of coexistence. This coexistence set the conditions that led to the collision between the real Peru and the Criollo government in 1971.

In less than a week, VES was able to congregate 35,000 people—an entire district worth—in Lima. While the real Peru was able to deploy an impressive popular mobilization

capacity, producing in five days an urban settlement on its own terms; the Peruvian government was engaged in Western trends of urban development. PREVI, with its experimental self-housing approach, took seven years. It was designed by a pool of renowned Western architects that reconceptualized the slums' self-construction feature and delivered a project that became an urban planning anecdote, a project of 500 units that did not have significance relevance to the city. PREVI and VES illustrate the disconnection between the real Peru and the official Peru, showing how mechanisms of appropriation and mestizaje from above do not always have the desired outcome. While the government was delivering housing projects in the slums of Lima, a new form of citizenship emerged.

VES's five-day ascension changed the system. It pulled apart the government high-modernist approach and turned down the power capacity of the Criollo government. The crisis generated new interactions and created agencies such as SINAMOS. It was the top-down response to the emerging statecraft from below. SINAMOS was an attempt to bridge Scott's "practical knowledge" with the institutional framework. The Criollo government saw this mobilization power and wanted to use and control it.

The link created after VES was crucial during the 1980s to generate the critical juncture between the slums and the government. VES leaders such as Moyano emerged from organized-from-below forces described in the SINAMOS report but transitioned to traditional political platforms. VES and the slums of Lima were incorporated in the political arena because of their political gravity. Shining Path was unable to find support for its cause in the slums of Lima. Its discourse of class struggle and government oppression did not find a fertile environment. The statecraft from below embodied in VES became to be part of a mutual metabolism with the city.

The slums and the government were engaged in a different social language. The slums became official districts; they were still stigmatized, but they became an integral part of the urban fabric. In this landscape, Shining Path's violent discourse was seen as a pernicious project that would destroy what the slums had already achieved. And for the government, the possibility of the slums embracing Shining Path could undermine its capacity to defeat it. VES became a district in 1983; it was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986 and won the Asturias Prize in 1987. VES represented the slums' capacity to create something from nothing and to make the illegal legal. For that reason, the slums were not as Shining Path assumed; they were not the best place to find supporters. On the contrary, the slums were able to subvert the order without bombs. They were the proof that Shining Path's ideology was disconnected from the social reality, its violent message was in direct opposition to the slum growth itself.

Shining Path violently replied the junction between the government and the slums. Moyano was assassinated in 1992 and Pascuala Rosado in 1996, to mention two of the most popular leaders in Lima's slums. Moyano was "accused [By Shining Path] of cooperating with the authorities and the democratic left, and for representing a hindrance to the recruitment of new members to Sendero in new urban [slums]" (Castañeda, as cited in Odegard, 161). By the time of her execution, she was already a leader of the civil society beyond VES, according to CVR:

La prensa escrita la señaló como un modelo ejemplar de una dirigente popular que combatía al PCP-SL; a finales de 1991, el periódico La República la nombró «Personaje del año», mientras la revista semanal, Caretas, la declaró «Madre Coraje» en el número de fin de año. Pero María Elena Moyano estaba peligrosamente sólo frente a la fuerza de un grupo armado obsesionado por aparentar una situación de «equilibrio

estratégico» en su lucha contra el Estado, y de imponer su control sobre las organizaciones sociales de VES. (CVR, 2003, Vol V, Chapter 2, p. 500).

Moyano became a symbol of the civil society. The Fujimori administration used her image to highlight Shining Path's brutality and to further its own political agenda. Burt explains the necessity to include Moyano's death in Fujimori's official discourse: "[it] was carried out just six weeks after Moyano's murder, and she would become an important symbol in the regime's efforts to construct an image of unity between the state, the armed forces and the pueblo...and thereby justify its authoritarian appropriation of power" (Bilbija, 2011, p. 72). Moyano's death became a symbol of the juncture—if not the juncture itself—the Criollo government used her assassination to produce a nationalistic narrative of collective effort against Shining Path. The Criollo government was quick to weigh the political possibilities of Moyano's legacy. Abrams states, "The state is, then in every sense of the term a triumph of concealment. It conceals the real history and relations of subjections behind an a-historical mask of legitimizing illusion. In sum, the state is not the reality, which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask" (as cited in Joseph and Nugent, 1994, p. 19). Fujimori incorporated Moyano's fight against Shining Path into its political discourse, strengthening his legitimacy in the outskirts of the city. With the capture of Guzman in 1992, he built a political discourse around antiterrorism, race, and inclusion but also neoliberalism and nationalism:

Trabajo en el arenal de los asentamientos humanos o en una aldea selvática o en el villorrio andino. De allí, cada vez que voy de visita, la propia población que quiere un presidente como ellos, me pone chullo y un poncho. A algunos les parece huachafo, un chino con poncho! Pero

ése es mi estilo. El nuevo nacionalismo del Perú, es el nacionalismo de la paz reconquistada, de la integración y la oportunidad para todos y el reconocimiento de uno de los ejes de la nacionalidad, por siempre olvidado: lo andino. Es decir, el nacionalismo de la no exclusion (Fujimori 1995, p. 3).

Fujimori political discourse is the summary of what happened in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s, a “new Peru” with visible contradictions and tensions. He mentions the slums as comparable to the Andes or the Amazonia. Fujimori unifies those regions by using “chullo y un poncho”, a recognition of “lo andino” within “inclusive nationalism.” Fujimori is “imaging a community.” He claims that he represents all the dimensions in this community and that he embodies the entire struggle, “la paz reconquistada.” Fujimori was revolving in Tilly’s “war making, state making” approach to cement his legitimacy. Fujimori’s discourse represents the hegemonic appropriation of everything to create a new legitimacy from above. The intersection of statecraft forces from above and below was not a story of victory from below; it rather represents a project of governance and domination.

Bibliography

- Adrianzén, A. (2011). *Apogeo y crisis de la izquierda peruana: Hablan sus protagonistas* (1. ed.). Lima: IDEA Internacional
- Aguilar, H. C. (1989). La Ciudad de Lima: su Evolución y Desarrollo Metropolitano. *Revista Geográfica*, (110), 231–265.
- Augustin, R. (2014). *Las murallas coloniales de Lima y el Callao*. Lima, Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma.
- Austin, A. & Lewis, S. (1970). *Urban government for metropolitan Lima* (International urban studies of the Institute of Public Administration ; no. 6). New York: Praeger.
- Azcueta, M. & El Comercio. (2012, May 14). Cuando Villa El Salvador recibió su Príncipe. Retrieved May 27, 2016,
- Bilbija, K., & Payne, Leigh A. (2011). *Accounting for violence : Marketing memory in Latin America* (Cultures and practice of violence series). Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press.
- Blondet, C. (1991). *Las mujeres y el poder: Una historia de Villa El Salvador* (1ra. ed.). (Serie Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 10; Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 10). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Burt, J. (1997). Political Violence and the Grassroots in Lima, Peru. In *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America* (p. The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America, Chapter 12). Oxford University Press.

- Burt, J. (1998). Shining Path and the Decisive Battle in Lima's Barriadas: The Case of Villa El Salvador. In *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*. Duke University Press.
- Burt, J. (2006). *Contesting the Terrain of Politics State Society Relations in Urban Peru*. In. *State and society in conflict: Comparative perspectives on Andean crises* (Pitt Latin American series). Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Burt, J.-M. (2007). *Political violence and the authoritarian state in Peru: silencing civil society*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bustamante y Rivero, J. L. (1947). *Mensaje al País del presidente de la República del Perú José Luis Bustamante y Rivero*. Lima: C.I.P.
- Canny, N., Pagden, Anthony, & Institute for Advanced Study. (1987). *Colonial identity in the Atlantic world, 1500-1800*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Carrión, J. (2006). *The Fujimori legacy: The rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Collier, R., & Collier, David. (1991). *Shaping the political arena : Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Conaghan, C. M., & Malloy, J. M. (1994). *Unsettling statecraft: democracy and neoliberalism in the central Andes*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Congreso De La Republica Del Peru. (1961). *Ley 13517: LEY ORGANICA DE BARRIOS MARGINALES Y AUMENTO DEL CAPITAL DE LA CORPORACION NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA*. Archivo Digital De La Legislación Del Perú. Congreso De La Republica Del Peru, n.d. Retrieved April 19, 2016.

- Congreso De La Republica Del Peru. (1983). *Ley 23605 CREAM EL DISTRITO “VILLA EL SALVADOR”, EN EL DEPARTAMENTO Y PROVINCIA DE LIMA.*” Archivo Digital De La Legislación Del Perú. Congreso De La Republica Del Peru. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- Contreras Carranza, C., & Cueto, M. (2015). *Perú: Mirando hacia dentro. Tomo 4, 1930-1960* (América Latina en la historia contemporánea; América Latina en la historia contemporánea). Madrid: Fundación Mapfre.
- Cordova V, A., & Peru. (1958). *La vivienda en el Peru: Estado actual y evaluacion de las necesidades*. Lima: Comisora la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda.
- Corporación Nacional de la Vivienda (Peru). (1956). *Esfuerzos para la solución del problema de la vivienda en el Perú*. May 1950. CDI-MVCS. *Planteamientos generales sobre el problema de la vivienda social*. Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin.
- CVR Perú, Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación. (2003). *Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación: Informe Final*. Miami: El Cid Editor / apuntes
- Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación. *Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación: Informe Final: El despliegue regional*. Tomo I, capítulo 2 . Miami: El Cid Editor / apuntes.
- Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación: *La violencia en las regiones*. Tomo IV, capítulo 1 . Miami: El Cid Editor / apuntes.
- Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación: *Historias representativas de la violencia*. Tomo V, capítulo 2. Miami: El Cid Editor / apuntes.

- Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación : *Conclusiones y recomendaciones*. Miami: El Cid Editor / apuntes.
- Davis, M. (2007). *Planet of slums* (Paperback ed.). London ; New York: Verso.
- Degregori, C. I. (1984). *Huayno, Chicha: el nuevo rostro de la música peruana*. En *Cultura Popular, Nros. 13/14*. Celadec. Lima.
- Degregori, C. I., Blondet, C., & Lynch, N. (1986). *Conquistadores de un Nuevo Mundo : De invasores a ciudadanos en San Martín de Porres* (1a ed.). (Serie Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 8; Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 8). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
- Degregori, C.I. (1991). *El Aprendiz de Drujo y el Curandero Chino* In *Elecciones 1990: Demonios y redentores en el nuevo Perú, una tragedia en dos vueltas* (1ra. ed.). (Colección mínima, 22). Lima: IEP Ediciones.
- De la Cadena, M. d. I. (1999). *De raza a clase : La insurgencia intelectual provinciana en el Perú (1910-1970)*. In *Los senderos insólitos del Perú: guerra y sociedad, 1980-1995* /. Lima : IEP : UNSCH , 1999.
- De Soto, H. (1989). *The other path : The economic answer to terrorism*. New York: Basic Books.
- De Soto, H. (2000). *The mystery of capital : Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else* (1st pbk. ed.). New York: Basic Books.
- De Soto, H. (2016, May 11). Hernando de Soto: “Hay diversos tipos de ex terroristas”. *El Comercio*. Retrieved May 25, 2016.
- Díaz Martínez, A. (1969). *Ayacucho: hambre y esperanza*. Ayacucho, Peru: Ediciones Wamama.
- Dietz, H., & Shidlo, Gil. (1998). *Urban elections in democratic Latin America* (Latin American

- silhouettes). Wilmington, Del.: SR Books.
- Dietz, H. (1998a). *Urban Poverty, Political Participation, and the State: Lima, 1970–1990*. University of Pittsburgh Pre.
- Dosh, P. G. J. (2010). *Demanding the land : Urban popular movements in Peru and Ecuador, 1990-2005*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Doty, R. (1996). The Double-Writing of Statecraft: Exploring State Responses to Illegal Immigration. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 21(2), 171-189.
- Doty, R. (2001). Desert Tracts: Statecraft in Remote Places. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 26(4), 523-543.
- Doty, R. L. (2003). *Anti-immigrantism in western democracies : Statecraft, desire and the politics of exclusion* (Routledge/RIPE studies in global political economy, 9; Routledge/RIPE studies in global political economy, 9). London: Routledge.
- Driant, J.-C. (1991). *Las barriadas de Lima : Historia e interpretacion* (Travaux de l'Institut français d'études andines). Lima: IFEA Instituto Frances de Estudios Andinos.
- Fowks, J. (2000). *Suma y resta de la realidad : Medios de comunicaciñ y elecciones generales 2000 en el Peru*. Lima: Fundaciñ Friedrich Ebert.
- Fuentes, C. (1994). *Cervantes, o, La crítica de la lectura* (Biblioteca de estudios cervantinos; 1). Alcalá de Henares: Centro de Estudios Cervantinos.
- Fundación Príncipe De Asturias (1987). *Prince of Asturias Award for Concord 1987, Villa El Salvador - Laureates - Princess of Asturias Awards - The Princess of Asturias Foundation*. The Princess of Asturias Foundation. Retrieved May 02, 2016.
- Fujimori, A., & Perú. (1995). *Mensaje del Presidente de la República del Perú presentado al Congreso de la republica. 1995, Mensaje a la nación y memoria anual*. Lima.

- Fujimori, A., & Perú. (1995). *Mensaje del Presidente de la República del Perú presentado al Congreso de la república . 1996, Mensaje a la nación y memoria anual .* Lima
- Fujimori, K. (2016, March 21). Keiko plantea empezar de cero proceso para formalizar mineros. *El Comercio*. Retrieved May 27, 2016.
- Fujimori, K. (2016, May, 12). Keiko Fujimori en Ayacucho: "Kuczynski representa la continuidad de este gobierno" (VIDEO). Retrieved June 02, 2016, from <http://diariocorreo.pe/politica/keiko-fujimori-en-ayacucho-kuczynski-representa-la-continuidad-de-este-gobierno-672141/>
- Galaso Reca, P. (2005). *Capital social y desarrollo económico. Los casos de Silicon Valley y Villa El Salvador*. Nóesis. Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades.
- García, M. E. (2005). *Making indigenous citizens : Identities, education, and multicultural development in Peru*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Gargurevich J. (1995). *La Chicha Cultura que Resiste*. In *cultural industries and dialogue between civilizations in the Americas*. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1999). *The Shining Path : A history of the millenarian war in Peru* (Latin America in translation/en traducción/em tradução; Latin America in translation/en traducción/em tradução). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Grompone, R. (1991). *Fujimori Razones y Descnciertos* In *Elecciones 1990: Demonios y redentores en el nuevo Perú, una tragedia en dos vueltas* (1ra. ed.). (Colección mínima, 22). Lima: IEP Ediciones. <http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/043030750.pdf>
- Guzmán Reynoso, A., & Partido Comunista Peruano. (1991). *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo: Interview with the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru*. Berkeley, CA: Committee to Support the Revolution iru.

- Gyger, H. (2013). *The Informal as a Project : Self-Help Housing in Peru, 1954-1986*. New York, N.Y. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.
- Heilman, J. (2010). *Before the Shining Path : Politics in rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Hinojosa, I. (1999). *Sobre Parientes Pobres Y Nuevos Ricos: Las Relaciones Entre Sendero Luminoso Y La Izquierda Radical Peruana*. In *Los Senderos Insólitos Del Perú: Guerra Y Sociedad, 1980-1995*. 1. ed., 1999. Serie Ideología y política, 11. Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
- Imparato, I, & Ruster, J. (2003). *Slum Upgrading and Participation: Lessons from Latin America*. World Bank Publications.
- INEI. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (Peru). (2011). *Perú : Migración interna reciente y el sistema de ciudades, 2002-2007*. Lima: INEI, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática.
- Joseph, G., & Nugent, Daniel. (1994). *Everyday forms of state formation : Revolution and the negotiation of rule in modern Mexico*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kagan, R., & Marías, Fernando. (2000). *Urban images of the Hispanic world, 1493-1793*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kahatt, S. S. (2011). Agrupación Espacio and the CIAM Peru Group: architecture and the city in the Peruvian modern project. *Third World Modernism*, S.85-110.
- (2011). PREVI-Lima's time : Positioning Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda in Peru's modern project. *Latin America At The Crossroads /*.

- (2014). Lima: Cinco siglos de orden y caos. Breve recuento de ... Retrieved June 8, 2016, from <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4853272.pdf> N° 2, 2014, págs. 38-43
- Koonings, K., & Kruijt, D. (1999). *Societies of fear : The legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War* (Problems of international politics; Problems of international politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lloyd, P. (1980). *The “young Towns” of Lima: Aspects of Urbanization in Peru*. CUP Archive.
- Lobo, Susan. *A House of My Own : Social Organization in the Squatter Settlements of Lima, Peru*. Tucson, Ariz.: U of Arizona, 1982. Web.
- Lowenthal, A. F., & Center for Inter-American Relations. (1975). *The Peruvian experiment : Continuity and change under military rule* (Center for Inter-American Relations publication). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Ludeña Urquiza Wiley; Universidad Ricardo Palma de Lima. (2011). *Barrio y ciudad Historiografía urbanística y la cuestión del dominio de referencia. El caso de Lima*. In *Bitácora urbano-territorial; vol 1, no 10 (2006): vivienda; 82-105*. Instituto de Investigaciones Hábitat, Ciudad y Territorio.
- Mairata, S. (2005). *Un Día Como Hoy, Hace 34 Años, Nació Villa El Salvador*. Larepublica.pe. La Republica. Apr. 25, 2016.
- Malaspina, O. (2014, Fall). *Reverse Urbanism*. ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America. Harvard University. Retrieved April 14, 2016.

- Malloy, J. (1977). *Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America* (Pitt Latin American series). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Mangin, W. (1967). Latin American squatter settlements : A problem and a solution. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 1967).
- Manwaring, M. (2012). *The complexity of modern asymmetric warfare* (International security affairs ; v. 8). Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Matos Mar, J. (1957). *Las barriadas de Lima*, (Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 1; Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, 1). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Matos Mar, J. (1968). *Urbanización y barriadas en América del Sur: (recopilación de estudios realizados entre 1956 y 1966)* (Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, publicación, no. 2; Urbanización, migraciones y cambios en la sociedad peruana, no. 2). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Matos Mar, J. (1984). *Desborde popular y crisis del estado : El nuevo rostro del Perú en la década de 1980* (1a ed.). (Perú problema, 21; Perú problema, 21). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Matos Mar, J. (2004). *Desborde popular y crisis del estado: Veinte años despues*. Lima: Fondo Editorial de Congreso del Perú.
- Matos Mar, J. (2015, April 25). Una barriada nueva cada día, por José Matos Mar. Retrieved May 26, 2016, retrieved from <http://elcomercio.pe/opinion/columnistas/barriada-nueva-cada-dia-jose-matos-mar-noticia-1806617>
- McGuirk, J. (2014). *Radical cities : Across Latin America in search of a new architecture*. London ; New York: Verso.

- Moyano, M., Miloslavich Túpac, Diana, Edmisten, Patricia Taylor, & Gift in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Peace Corps. (2000). *The autobiography of María Elena Moyano: The life and death of a Peruvian activist*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida..
- Mumford, E. P. (2000). *The CIAM discourse on urbanism, 1928-1960*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Myers, D. J., & Dietz, H. A. (2002). *Capital city politics in Latin America : Democratization and empowerment*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
- Nugent, D. (1997). *Modernity at the edge of empire : State, individual, and nation in the northern Peruvian Andes, 1885-1935*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Odría, M. A., & Perú. (1949). *Discurso-Programa : Leído ante el Congreso por el señor general de brigada Don Manuel A. Odría, presidente constitucional de la república del Perú*. Lima.
- Odegaard, C. V. (2010). *Mobility, markets, and indigenous socialities: Contemporary migration in the Peruvian Andes* (Vitality of indigenous religions; Vitality of indigenous religions). Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate.
- Pease García, H. (2003). *La autocracia fujimorista : Del estado intervencionista al estado mafioso* (1. ed.). Lima Peru: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial.
- Peru. (Lima). (1984). *Censos nacionales : VIII de poblacion, III de vivienda, 12 de Julio de 1981: resultados definitivos*. Lima: Instituto nacional de estadística.
- Peru. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). (1990). *Elecciones generales 1990: Resultados presidenciales y de congreso*. Lima: Peru. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones.
- Peru. (1994). *Censos nacionales 1993, IX de población, IV de vivienda: Resultados definitivos - Peru*. Lima: INEI.

- Peru. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). (1995). *Elecciones generales 1995: Resultados presidenciales y de congreso*. Lima: Peru. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones.
- Poole, D., & Rénique, G. (1992). *Peru : Time of fear*. London: Latin American Bureau
- Ramírez Corzo, D., Riofrío, G., & Program urbano Desco (Peru). (2006). *Formalización de la propiedad y mejoramiento de barrios : Bien legal, bien marginal* (Estudios urbanos, no. 1). Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo.
- Remy Simatovic, M. (2015). *Población Y Sociedad*. In *Perú: La búsqueda de la democracia. Tomo 5, 1960-2010* (América Latina en la historia contemporánea; América Latina en la historia contemporánea). Madrid: Fundación Mapfre.
- Renner, A., & Ballon, Hilary. (2011). *Housing Diplomacy: US Housing Aid to Latin America, 1949--1973*, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.
- Riofrío, G. (1978). *Se busca terreno para próxima barriada: espacios disponibles en Lima, 1940-1978-1990*. DESCO.
- Riofrío, G. (2002). *The case of Lima, Peru*. Lima: DESCO. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Lima.pdf
- Roldán, J. (2000). *Vargas Llosa entre el mito y la realidad : Posibilidades y límites de un escritor latinoamericano comprometido* (2., leicht verb. Aufl.). Marburg: Tectum Verlag.
- Roseberry, W. (1994). *Hegemony and the Language of Contention*. In *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico*. Durham: Duke UP.
- Rospigliosi, F. (1998). *Perú: elecciones entre 1992 y 1996*. In *Elecciones y democracia en América Latina, 1992-1996: Urnas y desencanto político*. San José, Costa Rica:

Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral.

Roy, A. (2011). Slumdog cities: Rethinking subaltern urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional*

Sarmiento, D., Mann, Mary Tyler Peabody, & Stavans, Ilan. (1998). *Facundo, or, civilization and barbarism* (Penguin classics). New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books.

Scott, J. (1998). *Seeing like a state : how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

SINAMOS (Agency : Peru). (1973). *Informe sobre Villa El Salvador* (Serie Movilización social, no. 4; Capacitación ONAMS; Serie Movilización social, no. 4; Capacitación ONAMS). Peru: SINAMOS.

Stepan, A. C. (2015). *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton University Press.

Stern, S. J. (1998). *Shining and other paths: War and society in Peru, 1980-1995* (Latin America otherwise; Latin America otherwise). Durham: Duke University Press.

Stokes, S. C. (1995). *Cultures in conflict: social movements and the state in Peru*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tanaka, M. (1998). *Los espejismos de la Democracia: El colapso del sistemas de partidos en el Peru, 1980-19905, en perspectiva comparada*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Jo

Tapia, C. (1997). *Las fuerzas armadas y Sendero Luminoso: dos estrategias y un final* (1. ed.). Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Tilly, C. (1985). *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*. In *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Tilly, C. (1990). *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge, Mass, USA: Blackwell.
- Tremblay, G. (2003). *Panam : Industries culturelles et dialogue des civilisations dans les Amériques = Panam : cultural industries and dialogue between civilizations* (EPC, Ethique et philosophie de la communication; EPC, Ethique et philosophie de la communication). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- Tuesta, F. (2003). : *El liderazgo político en el Perú*. Lima, Peru: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales.
- Turner, J. (1967). Barriers and Channels for Housing Development in Modernizing Countries. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 33(3), 167–181.
- Turner, J. (1972). *Freedom to build; dweller control of the housing process*. New York, Macmillan.
- United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (1964). *Manual on self-help housing*. New York: United Nations.
- Varallanos, J. (1962). *El cholo y el Perú; introducción al estudio sociológico de un hombre y un pueblo mestizos y su destino cultural*. (Biblioteca Andes, t. 2). Buenos Aires: Impr. López.
- Vargas Llosa, Mario. (1992). Questions of Conquest: What Columbus Wrought and What He Did Not. *American Educator: The Professional Journal of the American Federation of Teachers*, 16(1), 25-27.
- Velasco Alvarado, J. (1969). *Mensaje a la nación del Presidente de la República General de División Juan Velasco Alvarado, 28 julio 1969*. Lima: Oficina Nacional de Información.

- Velasco Alvarado, J. (1971). *Mensaje a la nación del Señor General de División Presidente de la Republica, con motivo del sesquicentenario de la independencia nacional*. Lima: Oficina Nacional de Información.
- Wanderley, Fernanda. (2010). La construcción de ciudadanía económica: el desafío del nuevo modelo de desarrollo. *Tinkazos*, 13(Supl. 1), 203-219. Retrieve May 27, 2016.
- Weber, M., Gerth, Hans, & Mills, C. Wright. (1946). *From Max Weber : Essays in sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, John. (1993). Democracy and the “Washington Consensus.”. *World Development*, 21(8), 1329.
- World Bank. (2004). SHANGHAI POVERTY CONFERENCE: CASE STUDY SUMMARY: Peru’s Urban Land Titling Program. Retrieved May 30, 2016, from http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-36.PDF
- Zanetta, C. (2004). *The Influence of the World Bank on National Housing and Urban Policies: The Case of Mexico and Argentina During the 1990s*. Ashgate.
- Zapata Velasco, A. (2015). *La vida politica*. In *Perú: La búsqueda de la democracia. Tomo 5, 1960-2010* (América Latina en la historia contemporánea; América Latina en la historia contemporánea). Madrid: Fundación Mapfre.
- Zavaleta Mercado, R. (2008). *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia* (2.nd ed.). La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.