

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies  
University of Washington

# Redefining Security



*NATO's Role in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

Task Force 2011



The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

University of Washington

**Task Force Policy Report on  
NATO and the New Strategic Concept**

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## Acronyms

ABM Treaty – Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty  
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense  
CANWFZ – Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone  
CCDCOE - Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence  
CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy  
CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies  
DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service  
ECT – Energy Charter Treaty  
EDA – European Defense Agency  
EGF – European Gendarmie Force  
EPAA – Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan  
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy  
EU – European Union  
FOC – Full Operational Capability  
FOIA – Freedom of Information Act  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
HNT – Host Nation Trucking  
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICBM – Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile  
IED – Improvised Explosive Device  
IFOR – Implementation Force  
INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty  
IPAP – Individual Partnership Action Plan  
IPP – Individual Partnership Program  
ISAF- International Security Assistance Force  
JDEC – Joint Data Exchange Center  
LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas  
MAP – Membership Action Plan  
MDAA – Mutual Defense Assistance Act  
NAC – North Atlantic Council  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NCIRC - NATO Computer Incident Response Capability  
New START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
NRC-MR - NATO-Russia Council at Military Representatives' Level  
NSA – NATO Standardization Agency  
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom  
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PfP – Partnership for Peace  
PMC – Private Military Company  
PMSC – Private Military and Security Company  
RAMOS – Russian- American Observational Satellite System  
RNC – Russia-NATO Council  
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
SFOR – Stabilization Force  
TMD – Theater Missile Defense  
UK – United Kingdom  
UN – United Nations  
UNHCR – United Nations Refugee Agency  
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force  
UNSC – United Nations Security Council  
US – United States  
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



## **Executive Summary**

**Ryan Braun**

### **Background**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now an alliance without a purpose. Formed by the Western Allies after the end of World War II its original objective was to defend Europe against Communism and the Soviet threat. Communism has now been discredited and the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. NATO has always viewed itself as having three primary responsibilities, collective defense, crisis management, and collective security. Of these collective defense, as personified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, has been the most important. However, in recent history NATO has begun to take on more crisis management responsibilities, mainly in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Since the end of the Cold War there has also been a shift in the total defense spending of the various NATO members, with the United States increasingly being the only country able to respond to distant threats. NATO has also begun to have trouble thanks to the rise in power of non-state actors thanks to the fact that it has kept its focus on collective defense despite the lack of a nation-state threat to the Alliance. The Asia-Pacific region has also seen a gain in power and influence, which NATO is not well positioned to interact with.

### **Critical Issues**

NATO must adapt to the new global system or cease to be relevant. NATO can no longer respond in a timely manner to the kinds of threats that can emerge, where small groups can move incredibly quickly and cause large amounts of damage. The Alliance as it is currently designed is not likely to live on for an extended period of time, as imbalances are beginning to become too large. There is no authority to hold the various treaty members to their obligations and agreements. While the North Atlantic Council is theoretically the executive body for the Alliance it has no real power. There are too many

member states with too many differing opinions on crises to respond properly. NATO is in the position of requiring either major structural changes, or in being left by the wayside.

## **Recommendations**

NATO must begin a process of centralization, forming new agencies and strengthening existing ones.

- Form a NATO Intelligence Agency headquartered in Brussels.
- Grant greater authority to the North Atlantic Council, form a powerful chairman position that can make binding decisions.
- Create a budget drawn from member governments determined by GDP
- Facilitate greater technology sharing between the United States and the rest of the Treaty members.
- Authority given to a central body focused upon cyber security threats.

The Alliance must place greater priority on its relationships with non-member states, facilitating closer ties.

- Begin bilateral discussion and partnerships with like minded democracies in the Pacific, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.
- Pay closer attention to developments with the European Union, work remove overlap between the two organizations.
- Form closer ties with China.
- Engage Russia in a joint missile shield.

Shift focus away from collective defense and a large land war in Europe, and more towards crisis management and collective security where new threats are actually arising.

- Terrorism has indelibly marked the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and NATO needs to spend more resources combating it.
- Regulate Private Military Companies.
- Begin greater diversification of energy sources to allow for less dependency upon too few pipelines to allow for increased security.

Re-orient towards smart power instead of just military power.

- Increased priority towards international human rights.
- Human development in addition to military development.

## Introduction

Ryan Braun

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization presides over the greatest collection of military resources in human history. NATO contains three of five recognized nuclear powers under the NPT, three of five permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), six of the G8 countries, and over half of the world's GDP. It is the institution that carried the United States and Europe through the Cold War without violence, brought stability to the Balkans, and was the first to pledge aid to the United States following the tragedy of 9/11.

Unfortunately, this admirable string of successes has left NATO without a clear purpose. Throughout most of NATO's history its primary goal was defending against an invasion by the Warsaw Pact nations, led by the armies of the Soviet Union. But now almost all of the former Warsaw Pact countries are now NATO members, and in the Baltic we even see former Soviet republics joining the alliance. While Russia cannot be completely written off, it is by no means the arch-enemy of decades past.

The two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have seen the rise of new challenges to the wellbeing of the NATO member states. While a land battle between superpowers is currently out of the question, other, more subtle threats have arisen. The state has become de-emphasized in the present world, as actors increasingly transcend national boundaries. As our world becomes more interconnected, NATO is forced to engage non-state actors in a variety of contexts. As companies become increasingly international, terrorist networks span continents, and states begin to subordinate their sovereignty to multilateral organizations like the EU, NATO's challenge will come more from transnational actors than national ones.

Indeed, NATO lacks relevance in its present state, and was not designed to tackle any of these challenges. However, its membership places it directly at the intersection of groups most invested in solving these issues. As a collection of Western democracies,

NATO is composed of precisely the group that would benefit most from increasing security around the globe.

During the Cold War NATO stood for security and freedom against dictatorship, but always in a European context. NATO must defend these values in a global context. It should use its resources and economic power to insure stability. With its economic and political influence it can create and enforce global standards of conduct. Where democratic values exist, NATO should be there protecting them.

At this point, the reader may become understandably wary. America's own efforts at introducing democracy to the rest of the world in the last decade have gone disastrously awry. Iraq has yet to hold a convincingly democratic election, and Afghanistan continues to be plagued by insurrection. Indeed, the last paragraph, read in isolation, appears to exhibit the sort of neoconservative exuberance that led to these predicaments in the first place.

In order to prevent future catastrophes, NATO must dust off an old but time-honored strategy: containment. Containment was the strategy that guided America through the Cold War. By permitting communism to exist where it was already established, and aggressively opposing it where it was not, NATO was able to outlast the Soviet Union. Containment walks a fine line between unnecessary aggression and unconscionable passivity that is both elegantly simple and demonstrably effective.

NATO must adapt this policy of containment to tackle today's security challenges. But what is NATO to contain? As previously pointed out, individual states are no longer the biggest threat to NATO's members. The answer, it seems, is lawlessness. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the transnational security threats that NATO faces today are all bred from acts against the established global order. Dictatorial regimes provide funds to terrorist organization, which participate in human rights violations, which breeds additional regional insecurity. We cannot view the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in a vacuum. Rather, NATO must solve them each by containing them all.

A perfect example of how such a containment strategy might function is enshrined in the First Gulf War. In what is arguably America's first (and last) successful foray into the Middle East, a coalition of states, including Syria and Egypt, worked to

protect the sovereignty of a hapless third party. As a happy coincidence, America was able to stop a nuclear proliferation program in its tracks, which would have otherwise ruined security in the region for the years to come. Unlike the current Iraq War, America ended the first Gulf War with the adulation of many across the globe, including many countries in the Middle East.

For proof that containment will work, we need look no further than North Africa. Over the two months, as the world watched, citizens rose up against dictators, demanding rights and freedoms unheard of in that region. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, dictators are slowly being displaced, pushed aside in favor of democracy and human rights. If protected and nurtured, democracies can easily flourish from authoritarian states, as seen with Japan and South Korea. So long as NATO acts to protect nascent democracies around the world,

Unfortunately, NATO is not set up to engage these issues. After years of the Soviet threat, it is currently better suited for a land battle in Germany than intervention across the globe. While it is absolutely the correct choice as the world's only democratic military alliance, it lacks the mechanisms to do so. The following Task Force is dedicated to equipping NATO with the tools necessary to realize this dream.

NATO's New Strategic Concept provides a vigorous defense of its strengths as an organization. In one of the very first points, it asserts that "the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world."<sup>1</sup> However, it does nothing about what to do with the Alliance with regards to this point. It discusses burden sharing, and yet the United States overwhelmingly has to carry more weight than the rest of the treaty members combined. Collective defense is listed as the most important function of NATO, despite the fact that NATO lacks a threat warranting such importance. What the Strategic Concept lists as lower priorities, crisis management and collective security, should become the new main missions of NATO.

These are very real challenges, such as the oncoming conclusion of the mission in Afghanistan and the continuing stewardship of ethno-nationalist tensions in the Balkans. There is also the danger of the fluctuating tensions between NATO and Russia over missile defense in Europe. But the rise of new non-state threats is the greatest challenge

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<sup>1</sup> NATO Strategic Concept.

facing NATO, from piracy to the ever-increasing number of assaults upon cyber security. While the Strategic Concept mentions the previous challenges, it completely leaves out other new ones that must also be focused upon. The rise of Asia is changing the geopolitical rules that once governed the world, China is now the second largest economy in the world and still growing, but is still a one-party state with little to no ability for the average citizen to gain redress for abuses. But Asia's rise has also seen a democratic wave, Indonesia and India; both growing dynamic economies are staunch democracies. Australia and Japan already have a long history of cooperation with NATO members. These are the relationships and partnerships that must be cultivated.

NATO has been a body focused upon the threat of a land war in Europe for most of its existence, and is now making the jump to something new. But to make this jump NATO must discard, remodel, or add new structures so that it can compete and remain relevant in this new ever more connected world. The Lisbon Declaration shows that NATO and its members are aware that a shift needs to occur, but they do not go far enough to really change the overarching direction that NATO is currently following. NATO needs to become more than just a simple alliance of nation-states. It needs to begin to change into something that will help secure the wellbeing and human rights of not just its own members, but the world, as thanks to the shrinking effect caused by modern technology security issues are no longer only limited to a single country.

However, this is not an easy task, NATO must be transformed from an organization simply concerned with defense security, and into one that has a larger constabulary role for the entire world. The United States Navy already acts as the arbitrator of the seas, having NATO step up to assist the United States in that regard and beyond is well within its possibilities. But one of the main changes this will require is a more centralized NATO, wherein the members of the treaty willingly cede some degree of sovereignty to the organization. This is a larger challenge for the Anglo sphere members, as they have more fiercely guarded their national sovereignty. The United States has refused to sign onto the International Criminal Court for fear of this sovereignty loss, and even in the United Kingdom despite their membership in the European Union. Some of the other NATO countries in the EU have shown a greater

willingness to give up a portion of their national decision making to a larger body, and they should make a greater effort showing the benefits of this approach.

The United Nations both provides an example of what we want to happen and what we want to avoid at all costs. There was a great deal of hope placed in the UN after its initial formation, hope that it would provide truly global governance. This has not come to pass, and the UN is quite often a distressingly ineffective body that has trouble responding quickly to any kind of crisis. In order for NATO to take on a greater constabulary role we have to insure that whatever executive body is created can actually respond with speed, as new threats will often not give us as obvious a sign that trouble is about to occur as the Warsaw Pact moving tanks into East Germany would. Threats pop up and must be dealt with quickly, if terrorists seize an important oil refinery there needs to be requires an immediate response.

But at present NATO does not have a body tasked with looking for these kinds of threats, and one of the most important and earliest reforms that would need to be made is a powerful centralized intelligence agency headquartered in Brussels. There already exists within NATO an Intelligence Division of the International Military Staff underneath the Military Committee. This provides a good framework for expanded intelligence cooperation, as NATO has already gotten used to a degree of intelligence sharing and working with foreign intelligence agents. This more centralized agency would be staffed by people forwarded from their various national governments, and who would need to be given a mission to find information useful to NATO as a whole rather than a particular national interest. However, they would also need to keep access to their national databases as many NATO countries already have very skilled and large networks throughout the world.

The executive body of the UN, the Security Council, has many qualities that are worth copying for a similar NATO executive body with one exception, the veto. Fortunately there is already a similar body to this which exists within NATO, the North Atlantic Council. It would simply need to be strengthened and given greater authority, the ability to make security decisions binding upon its members, but must not have countries with the veto. The veto slows down decisions and often destroys flexibility until the concerns of that single country are met, if ever. Now, this is not to say that it should be

simple majority rule as these would be important security decisions that could have far reaching consequences, but there are ways to do that without giving one country the ability to completely stop everything. Even this empowered North Atlantic Council cannot respond quickly enough to all threats however, so the Council needs an authority that can make key on the spot decisions. This authority would be able to make the key decisions in the event of a matter pressed for time, such as a bomb threat or terrorist seizure of important infrastructure without having to call the full Council together. This authority could be invested in a chairmanship that rotates amongst the representatives of the different members in the Council.

One of the topics we will spend time discussing is the evolution of the United States' relationship with NATO. This is particularly important; the United States has historically been hesitant to give up any degree of sovereignty. This is problematic because without the resources of the United States NATO lacks the ability to really project influence and respond to threats beyond the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The United Kingdom has also shown that it is very careful about giving up any control, but its EU membership has shown that it is willing to do so, despite their very public repudiation of the euro. These are issues that NATO needs to begin solving immediately. This it is not an impossible task. After all, this stronger NATO should allow the United States to reduce expenditures on defense and security, as that burden would be more equally shared with their fellow NATO members. .

Of course, another key issue is the problem of actually paying for any of these new changes. NATO does already have a small budget given to it by the treaty members but this amount would not be enough for the expanded and strengthened structures that would need to be put into place. A more centralized NATO is would require more employees, and would also need to be able to pay for its own fast reaction missions. All of this requires an increase in the existing NATO budget, at current each NATO nation is supposed to spend two percent of GDP on defense, something which almost none of them do. If even a small fraction of this amount were given directly to NATO, rather than on purely national concerns, NATO would have a greatly increased budget allowing it to perform the new mission being given to it. It would also provide a good compromise for those countries not making the existing two percent commitment, if we assume that each

member should give 0.5 percent of their GDP to the communal NATO budget that is still more than enough to make NATO the single greatest military and security power in the world while eliminating duplication.

This Task Force identifies pressing concerns and considerations for an organization committed to understanding and tackling the challenges of an ever-evolving security landscape. The recommendations provided within may require a surplus of political will but nothing we have suggested is beyond NATO's capabilities. The strength of an organization lie in its values, and the values that bind NATO members provide the clarity of purpose needed to address security threats, no matter their form. Change is never easy, but sometimes it is necessary. We have brought together information, and have provided the best advice and recommendations that we could with what we know. While our recommendations may go beyond what is actually viable with the existing political solution, this does not mean that they are not still good goals. And while many times our recommendations may be a simple statement that more attention needs to be paid to a topic, this does not mean that we are not serious about our belief that NATO needs to change. If more people start thinking about what is wrong and what needs more attention, then maybe the change we wish to witness will actually occur.



**Part I**

**The Balkans, Afghanistan and Private Military Contractors:  
Out of Area Security Challenges and how they Affect NATO**

**Paige Irwin, Gabrielle Gurian, and Kelli Wells**



## **Part I: Introduction**

### **The Balkans, Afghanistan and Private Military Contractors: Out of Area Security Challenges and how they Affect NATO**

**Paige Irwin, Gabrielle Gurian, and Kelli Wells**

#### **Executive Summary**

NATO's recent involvement in out of area operations such as the Balkans and Afghanistan has led to the continual growth and development of NATO's international role. The Balkan campaign and the security challenges posed by the region effectively catalyzed the Alliance's internal adaptation towards crisis management and peacekeeping. Today, the operations in Afghanistan are proving to be the latest challenge for the Alliance. Since Private Military Companies were used in both Afghanistan and the Balkans, and are one of many new development mechanisms that could play a pivotal role in the future out of area campaigns, they too will be analyzed below along with NATO's role in the Balkans and Afghanistan. From looking at the Alliance's history of adaptation, it is clear that NATO will continue to redefine its purpose and usefulness by learning from these operations. The Alliance will move forward with these lessons in mind and continue to adapt according to the external security concerns it faces.

In order to demonstrate the role out-of-area operations have played in defining NATO's international character, three case studies will be evaluated below. We will begin with the campaign in the Balkans and then move on to the challenges faced in Afghanistan. Afterwards, we will compare the two operations to better understand the different challenges faced and how the Alliance has responded. Lastly, we will investigate the role of PMC's and address NATO's need to recognize the emerging role of these Private Military Contract groups in these and future operations.

#### **Case 1: The Balkans**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was the only country that posed an immediate security challenge to the West, due to the history of hyper-nationalism, intense ethnic division, violence, and political instability throughout the region. After a long

process of internal policy debates, NATO took on the role of crisis manager in the area. The Bosnian campaign, being NATO's first out of area operation, essentially became the key driver of NATO development. It redefined the contours of its transatlantic relationship and its core function as "collective defense." NATO then applied the same principal instruments of intervention and peacekeeping when the issue of Kosovo's independence arose. The progress made within the region over the last 15 years, is testament to the benefits that outside engagement is able to produce in motivating political reform. To continue to improve the situation in the Balkans and overcome the challenges presented by the region, NATO must continue partaking in crisis management, the end goal being the creation of cooperative partnerships and the full integration of all Balkan states.

### **Case 2: Afghanistan**

NATO's presence and experiences in Afghanistan have highlighted places for improvement within NATO's strategy for entering and sustaining success with development and combat operations. The war in Afghanistan is an extremely complex operation that has been a NATO priority for many years. This particular operation is challenging because of the poor development statistics, lack of basic security and extensive insurgency operations in Afghanistan. The solutions to these problems are hard to define and hard to solve. Afghanistan is receiving support from numerous different countries, organizations and agencies. The presence of so many stakeholders and actors has complicated the formulation of a coherent strategy and a common enforcement and command system. Afghanistan has highlighted the importance for strong US-NATO relations, the importance of NATO being reliable, the need to socially and economically stabilize states in order to ensure security, how crucial the development of an overall strategy is and the importance of efficient and clear communication about operations. These lessons will lead to the continual development and growth of NATO as an influential and powerful organization.

### **Case 3: Comparative Study**

NATO's campaigns in Afghanistan and the Balkans have both had enormous effects on the Alliance's international role. Both pose significant challenges for the Alliance, but also provide further experience in peacekeeping, development, dealing with

ethnic division and working with other influential governments and organizations. Differing agendas and approaches have been used in the two campaigns, which have given rise to varying outcomes and sometimes criticism, especially in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been a unique and difficult endeavor for the Alliance, with a new type of cultural situation, and differing power dynamics and strategic goals. Some argue that if the Alliance is to fail in Afghanistan, its legitimacy and usefulness could be questioned. On the other hand, the Balkan experience of the 1990's, and the success seen there through peacekeeping and democratic development demonstrates that when challenged, the Alliance is effective. At the same time, there are many lessons that can be taken from the Alliances history in the Balkans and its present involvement in Afghanistan, in order to optimize future out of area and peacekeeping operations.

#### **Case 4: Private Military Industry**

Having taken into account the two different outcomes of the NATO operations in the Balkan region as well as in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize the need for NATO to address the emerging industry of Private Military Companies. The policy recommendation suggested in accordance with the practices of the Private Military Industry is the suggestion for NATO to create a NATO approved and applied NATO Standard of Private Military Company Activities, which will be reinforced by NATO members operation alongside these deployed PMCs. The contracts of those PMCs that fall below standard will immediately become defunct and their reputation tainted. This policy recommendation will be a self-reinforcing combination of NATO members and PMCs.



## **Chapter One**

### **NATO Security Considerations in the Balkans**

**Gabrielle Gurian**

The Western Balkans, a region surrounded by NATO members, is still proving to be a potential source of insecurity and instability throughout Europe. The history of nationalism, intense ethnic division and political instability throughout the area has been one of the single greatest security challenges that NATO has faced since the end of the Cold War. The integration and stabilization of the Balkans is considered crucial for Europe's future and security. For this reason, since the Bosnian War and the collapse of Yugoslavia, NATO has been extensively involved in stabilizing and integrating the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions, in order to ensure a democratic, unified Europe. The most current NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 acknowledges a continuation of the NATO management agenda in the area, the end goal being the creation of cooperative partnerships and the full integration of the Balkans into the EU and NATO.

NATO's involvement in the region has produced significant progress politically, economically and socially. But, that being said, a focus of attention in the region cannot waiver now, division between different ethnic groups and political party members is still troublesome, especially within Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. These political divisions block political and social reform, allowing the rule of law and the state structure to remain weak. The Balkan region also remains a major exception to the growth and success that many European, especially Western, nations have witnessed. For these reasons the full integration of the Balkan states into European institutions remains a priority for full development of a democratic, peaceful and prosperous region.

To best portray this, I will begin by outlining NATO's involvement in the area and its transformation into a regional "crisis manager," specifically through the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo campaigns. I will then explain why the integration of the Balkans into Europe as a whole is a priority by outlining the progress made in the area and describing the challenges posed by the region. Then I will investigate the lessons that

can be taken from the 15-year commitment NATO has already made in the region, and give recommendations on future involvement. I will maintain throughout each section of this paper that NATO's involvement has been greatly beneficial to all the Balkan states, and will continue to be for the overall security of the region and Europe alike. NATO cannot back out now, after so much has been invested and achieved.

### **NATO's Involvement and Projection of Order in the Balkans**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was the only country that posed an immediate policy challenge for the West<sup>2</sup>. The Yugoslav War that began in 1991 came as a shock to the whole of the international community because it marked the return of the ethno-nationalist sentiment that had ravaged Europe throughout the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Alliance and Europe were not prepared for such a crisis,<sup>3</sup> but with the break out of war, human devastation, ethnic cleansing and violence in Yugoslavia, it was clear that the Balkans posed a preminent security threat for the West.

The turmoil that consumed the area posed many difficult dilemmas for NATO. Could the conflict be classified as an internal sovereignty issue or was it one country infringing on another's sovereignty? The latter case warranted international support, while the former did not. In legal terms, the issue was nowhere near simple. Milosevic's nationalist tactics alarmed Slovenia and Croatia, both asked for independence, and Slovenia was actually attacked by the JNA (Yugoslav Army) two days after its declared independence. During this time, neither Croatia nor Slovenia were regarded internationally as sovereign states or part of the UN. They were still part of an internationally recognized sovereign Yugoslavia, thus making it difficult for external bodies, including NATO to act.

Initially, NATO was also prevented from participating due to its own rule on "out of area conflict."<sup>4</sup> But, institutional adaption within the Alliance had already begun to take place. After the Cold War, NATO had to begin debating its own future role and legitimacy. What would its purpose be, if not defense against the Soviets? The New Strategic Concept of November 1991 recognized a "new strategic environment" of

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<sup>2</sup> Cviic, Christopher and Sanfey, Peter. "In Search of the Balkan Recovery: Political and Economic Reemergence of South Eastern Europe." (Columbia University Press, New York. 2010) p.49-131.

<sup>3</sup> Yost, David S. *NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Roles in International Security* (Washington D.C. 1998) p.74.

<sup>4</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.49-131.

“diverse multidirectional risks.”<sup>5</sup> This posed a consequent need for NATO to shift its role away from the traditional preoccupation with self-defense and adapt more towards crisis management and conflict prevention. As stated by Douglas Stuart, “After four decades of intense disagreement (during the Cold War), NATO governments came to accept the proposition that the alliance needed to monitor, discuss and respond to issues beyond the established treaty borders.”<sup>6</sup>

However, there was little consensus among members on how to go down the route of dealing with these types of issues. Many Alliance members were still preoccupied with the possibility of out of area disputes jeopardizing the central mission of the Alliance. During this adaption period, it was extremely difficult for NATO to negotiate “the out of area operations” issue. The then Secretary-General publicly admitted this to the internal opposition taking place, saying in a February 1991 interview that, “member nations want to deal with out of area questions in a way that does not involve NATO as such.”<sup>7</sup>

The unfolding of the crisis in Bosnia, though, reframed thinking on the issue. In 1991, war broke out. Yugoslavia became the epicenter of a powerful internal ethnic earthquake that shook the whole region and Europe as well. Milosevic, the Serbian President, had radicalized Serbian nationalist sentiments to crack down on Bosnia’s Muslim minority population, imposing oppressive and authoritative policy.<sup>8</sup> The Serbian population was convinced there was a threat of fundamentalist Muslim Bosnian rule and possible genocide. In order to protect Bosnian Serbs, JNA (The Yugoslav Military) massacred the Muslim town Bijeljina and continued to attack other Muslim areas in the region.<sup>9</sup> The Serb offensive took 70% of Bosnian territory, displaced over 2 million people, raped Muslim women and murdered up to 100,000 non-Serbs.<sup>10</sup>

Due to the enormous amount of violence, ethnic cleansing, material devastation and human suffering within Yugoslavia, it became difficult for Europe to ignore its first

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<sup>5</sup> Sperling and Webber, “NATO from Kosovo to Kabul,” *International Affairs Journal* 85:3 (2000) p.493.

<sup>6</sup> Yost. p.72-89.

<sup>7</sup> Smith, Martin A. Afghanistan in Context: NATO out of Area Debates of the 1990s. (UNISCI Discussion Papers No 22 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Boduszynski, Mieczyslaw, Regime Change in the Yugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths Toward a New Europe. (Baltimore 2010) p.172-200.

<sup>9</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.49-131.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p.49-131.

real war since 1945. International pressure and outrage increased and it became crucial for NATO to become involved. It was the UN though, who first intervened, beginning with the War in Croatia in 1992. The UN consolidated a cease-fire and sent in a body called the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in areas under Serb control. But, the UN also began to pressure NATO to become involved in the Balkans. The Secretary General had made it clear that regional security institutions, such as NATO, should assume more of the burden of conflict management.<sup>11</sup>

However, NATO members were still not able to come to a consensus on what exactly to do, since in order to take on the new roles affirmed in the New Strategic Concept of 1991 a long and complex process of internal adaption was in order. NATO lacked a doctrine of operations and experience for this type of operation and its force structure reforms could not keep up with the requirements of the task of conflict management that would be needed in Yugoslavia.<sup>12</sup> Also, the political and ethnic divisions within Yugoslavia ran deep, and NATO had little experience in these types of operations, making it even more difficult for the Alliance to come to an agreed view on what interests were at stake and how to go about achieving them.

There was a difference in opinion varying from country to country. The United States policy maintained that sovereignty should be upheld in the region, not allowing the break up of the country, while France and Germany disagreed and supported sending in forces to establish conditions of peace. The UK on the other hand argued it would be irresponsible<sup>13</sup>. Given the conceptual, political and operational barriers posed, it was inevitable that NATO's involvement in the area was initially absent and hindered and thus began to be criticized more heavily for its hesitance and ineffectiveness.

As the situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate, the question of NATO's usefulness emerged. In 1992, the UN Secretary General communicated with NATO requesting support for UN humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia, and NATO finally stepped in.<sup>14</sup> Although the Alliance's initial response to the situation in the Balkans was somewhat belated, NATO became the key actor in the conflict, moving up a scale of

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<sup>11</sup> Boduszynski. p.172-200.

<sup>12</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.493.

<sup>13</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.49-131.

<sup>14</sup>Drew, Nelson S. *NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition*. Washington D.C. National Defense University 1995) p.9.

commitment from sanctions, air strikes, and military targeting. NATO deployed a large-scale peacekeeping operation and though it was never used, had plans in place for an extraction force to assist in the safe withdrawal of the UNPROFOR.<sup>15</sup>

By these measures, NATO had a decisive impact on the outcome in Bosnia, first, by creating conditions of peace, and lastly, by persuading the Serbian President Milosevic to enter in to peace talks that led to the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Agreement acted as a general framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) agreed to fully respect the sovereignty of each state and resolve disputes by peaceful means, signifying an enormous advance in ethnic relations in the region<sup>16</sup>. NATO also shaped the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in policing it<sup>17</sup>.

In this sense, NATO's campaign in Bosnia became a key driver of its own political development. Not only did it define the basis of its transatlantic relationship, but it also catalyzed its internal transformation. The Bosnian War became NATO's first out of area operation (Operation Maritime Monitor), first authorized use of armed force (Operation Maritime Guard), and first combat operation (Operation Deny Flight). And, not only was it NATO's first performance in peacekeeping and deployment of NATO led land forces, but it was also the first major instance where NATO coordinated involvement with partner countries, Russia included.<sup>18</sup> It was based on this Bosnian experience that at Berlin in 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers came to a consensus and adopted a new formal commitment to "peace-support operations" beyond treaty area. Thus, NATO took on the new role of "regional and conflict manager."<sup>19</sup>

The influence of the Bosnian outcome on NATO's international role, redefining its core function as "collective defense," played a pivotal role when the Kosovo issue emerged. Although Bosnian and Serbian peace had been more or less established through the Dayton Accords, the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating drastically in 1999, where oppressive policy was still being enacted upon the ethnic minorities by Milosevic's party.

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<sup>15</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.494.

<sup>16</sup>Department of State Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement. Bureau of Public Affairs, December 11, 1995. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html>

<sup>17</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.495.

<sup>18</sup> Boduszynski. p.172-200.

<sup>19</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.498.

“The minorities in Kosovo were being denied access to both their basic human rights and any effective redress for violations and abuses of these rights.”<sup>20</sup> Milosevic had revoked ethnic Albanian autonomy and replaced all Albanian party officials with Serbs. The tensions between the Muslim Albanian and the Serbs were high, the two societies lived separately and were in constant competition for scarce resources and jobs, pitting the two groups against each other. When the Kosovar Albanians attempted to boycott state institutions, the Milosevic regime sent in the army and other paramilitary groups.<sup>21</sup> The Serb police began to attack UCK activists and civilian sympathizers and violence escalated. Milosevic succeeded in establishing apartheid and military rule in the province for the next several years by exploiting the social divisions and frustrations.<sup>22</sup> Kosovo had the potential to look very similar to the Bosnian War, fully of human devastation and suffering.

Not only did the conflict arising in Kosovo signify a test of NATO’s transformation, it also required the Alliance to approach some fundamental questions about its role as crisis manager; whether to take sides; how to place force in the service of democracy; how to justify its intervention and how to produce internal consensus.<sup>23</sup> Intervention was necessary from a political standpoint in order to avoid a repeat of the “carnage” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “We would have been judged very harshly if we had allowed something like this to happen again,” stated the then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.<sup>24</sup>

In this case, NATO was seen as the principal instrument of intervention, and applied the lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina to avoid extensive human casualties in Kosovo. NATO members efficiently intervened militarily, granted independence to the country and established a democratic political framework in Kosovo.<sup>25</sup> NATO provided security of and support to humanitarian agencies, peace enforcement (developed in Bosnia) ensuring Serbian compliance with appropriate

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<sup>20</sup> Bardos, Gordon N, *Containing Kosovo*. (Mediterranean Quarterly Vol. 16. No. 3 2005) p.17-43.

<sup>21</sup> Boduszynski. p.182.

<sup>22</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.49-131.

<sup>23</sup> D. Allin *NATO’s Balkan Interventions*, (Adelphi Paper 347, 2002) p.49.

<sup>24</sup> Albright, Madeline. Interviewed in Public Broadcasting Service. War in Europe. Part 1. Feb. 2000.

<sup>25</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.493-497.

standards of behavior and lastly, preventative enforcement,<sup>26</sup> which signaled the rationale of the New Strategic Concept. The Alliance was ready to maintain a framework of expected behavior among states through NATO's provision of military forces.

While NATO had taken on immediate security measures, internal distress throughout the region had become extremely apparent to members. In order to improve and maintain security for the whole of Europe, a mechanism needed to be established to commit the Balkan nations to progressive development while providing security throughout Europe. The "mechanism" or solution that Alliance members began to focus on was a common foreign policy initiative, which is essentially an EU policy. Since key members of NATO are also EU members, many foreign policy initiatives overlap. It was promulgated in the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, and re-stated in the 2010 Concept, that the common policy initiative would be enacted in the Balkans, first through crisis management, since the countries were in need of continued support to manage ongoing hostilities, and secondly, through economic and political stabilization, in which NATO would assist in implementing a democratic framework. After ongoing hostilities had been stabilized and a democratic system set in place, a system of partnerships and cooperation was to be enacted through an "open door" dialogue policy.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the initial problematic campaign, the alliance showed a collective decisiveness through much of the Bosnia and Kosovo issues. The Alliance has taken on a very difficult deep-rooted political and ethnic problem. And although, the Balkan countries have shown great capacity to advance and develop towards democratization and economic stabilization, NATO still maintains an open-ended commitment to keeping peace in the Balkans and promoting stability to this day. The area is still security priority for NATO, the EU, and for the region itself

### **The Euro-Atlantic Interest in Balkan Stability: Why is it a Priority?**

For the last 15 years, since the Bosnian War, NATO has been bound with the historic work of building a democratic, prosperous, unified and secure Europe. The NATO belief is still that the path to achieving this vision relies on the integration of the

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<sup>26</sup> Kavalski, Emilian *Extending The European Security Community: Constructing Peace in the Balkans.* (Tauris Academic Studies. London 2008) p.18.

<sup>27</sup> Seroka, Jim. *Security Consideration in the Western Balkans; NATOS Evolution and Expansion.* (European Quarterly, XLI, No.1 March 2007) p.25-40.

Balkan states into Europe's political and economic institutions. As the NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 states, "crises and conflicts beyond NATO's border can pose a direct threat the security of Alliance territory and populations. Lessons learned from the Western Balkans make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is effective for appropriate crisis management."<sup>28</sup>

European security relies on a common foreign policy campaign, as is stated above. Since joint policy initiatives are always reduced to their lowest common denominator, the Balkan region is an immediate security priority. By examining the troubled history of the region during the 1990s, a region racked by ethnic rivalry, hyper nationalism and violence, the conflicts demonstrate the stakes of politics in the region, not only for the citizens who live there, but also for the outside powers who are inevitably drawn down<sup>29</sup>. Therefore, NATO's involvement in Balkan integration is both about promotion of norms, as well as strategy. It is of strategic importance to the Alliance because there is always the possibility of the importation of regional tensions and instability into neighboring states. As stated by Madeline Albright in 1999: "Southeastern Europe is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains divided and wracked by conflict."<sup>30</sup>

The fundamental problem faced by this region of Europe is the history of conflict between geopolitical and ethnic boundaries, matched with an absent political mechanism to deal with the differences between the geopolitical realm and the ethnic boundaries. This problem is not entirely new. Other parts of Europe have experienced similar conflicts and challenges. For example, the histories of Western Europe after World War II and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. Both instances demonstrate how beneficial the path of political and economic integration through international cooperation is. Thus, for more than a decade NATO has played an essential role in engaging the area in a strategic manner to promote economic freedom and ethnic minority rights, while providing a

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<sup>28</sup> NATO Strategic Concept Active Engagement Modern Defense: Security Through Crisis Management (November 2010).

<sup>29</sup> Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Western Balkans. (Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. April 12, 2010) p.4-21.

<sup>30</sup> Kavalski. p.18.

reliable forum for peaceful resolution of conflict.<sup>31</sup> The progress made throughout the region due to NATO involvement is striking and will be further analyzed below.

### **Political, Economic, and Social Progress in the Balkan Region**

The progress of the last decade in the Western Balkans is testament to the benefits of outside engagement in motivating reform. Each country has undergone dramatic political, economic and social transformations and nearly every country has taken a step towards EU and NATO integration.<sup>32</sup> Despite the political upheavals and the break up of Yugoslavia between 2000-2008 there was a sustained economic recovery throughout the region.<sup>33</sup>

The positive adjustments made by each country are arguably due to NATO's expansion and enlargement process, which actually began in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic regarding security concerns with Russia. NATO supported democratic change and market economies in the three countries for the sake of stability throughout Europe. In fact, Slovenia, part of former Yugoslavia was already pursuing EU and NATO membership to protect itself from the violence and turmoil that racked the countries around it. Expansion/enlargement policies began to appear as a possible solution both for creating reform within the Balkan countries and for creating a mechanism that would motivate the countries to continue with their reforms.

NATO's enlargement process in the Balkans began in 1997, while the MAP (Membership Action Plan), the most important initial step towards integration, was launched in 1999.<sup>34</sup> Every prospective country is required to take part in MAP as a preliminary step in becoming a member of NATO. The program is divided into five distinct chapters outlining the necessary reforms each country must implement to obtain membership status.

The first chapter of MAP outlines the need to restructure military defense and establish armed forces. Prospective members are to use forces available and make them compatible with the alliance's future tasks. The second chapter involves political and

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<sup>31</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe. p.4-21.

<sup>32</sup> Cascone, Gabriele. Edited by Aybet, Gulnur and Moore, Rebecca R., NATO in Search of a Vision: NATO Enlargement and the Western Balkans (Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C. 2010) p.175-197.

<sup>33</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.123.

<sup>34</sup> Cascone. p.175-194.

economic reform. Traditional values and a functioning democracy must be in place, as well as an established market economy. And most importantly, there must be peaceful settlement of internal and external disputes. This seems to be the most difficult of the challenges posed in the region and will be addressed in the following section. The last chapters address issues dealing with trade, resources and legal reform, as well as the amount of GDP of each country that must go to security expenditures<sup>35</sup>.

Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were first included in the MAP of 1999. Initially, both countries were economically, militarily and politically very fragile. Albania had avoided a civil war in 1997, but the state had collapsed. Both countries were in dire need of political reform and a placing of more power in state authorities.<sup>36</sup> There were also many issues involving organized crime and corruption in both countries, which posed a challenge for economic and political stability<sup>37</sup>. “By 1999, many of the countries had nothing to offer other than their enthusiasm and desire to join.”<sup>38</sup> Croatia joined the MAP process in 2002, with a much stronger economy, but also was unstable democratically and had an unaccountable intelligence.

Each country faced complex politico-military challenges, but each was encouraged to move towards a framework of cooperation. This was due to international attention from the member states and the strengthening theme of NATO membership as an “element of long-term stabilization.”<sup>39</sup> In other words, enacting the reforms expected by NATO meant increased security and foreign AID for the prospective member country. This motivated the countries to move forward with NATO’s assistance more efficiently and effectively.

Through the structural reform policies, expected by NATO and the EU (the EU policies are usually parallel to those of NATO) for full membership, Albania’s Democratic Party and Socialist party were able to come to agreement on policy reforms<sup>40</sup>. This is a colossal improvement. Due to ethnic divisions in almost all the Balkan

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<sup>35</sup> Cascone. p.175-194.

<sup>36</sup> Seroka. p.25-40.

<sup>37</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans. p.4-21.

<sup>38</sup> Cascone. p.179-194.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p.175-194.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p.175-194.

countries, compliance between parties before was almost impossible<sup>41</sup>. Croatia and Macedonia also exhibited substantial social and political advances. Croatia allowed the return of Serb refugees and improved minority rights throughout the country, while Macedonia was able to implement a more decentralized and ethnically balanced police force<sup>42</sup>. Albania and Croatia both fully complied with the MAP procedures, and have now achieved full integration. Both joined the Alliance in 2009. The only issue remaining for Macedonia is the ongoing name dispute with Greece, which will be further discussed in the next section, as it poses a security risk for the Alliance.

The other half of the Western Balkans--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia--took a widely different course towards European assimilation with regards to NATO. Nonetheless, each country has made astonishing political, economic and social advances. The opportunity for integration was immediately seized by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, who requested open dialogue with NATO and quickly attempted to implement the necessary policies for reform to become effective members.<sup>43</sup> Both began to establish defense-planning programs and started the IPAP (Individual Partnership and Action Plan), which involves a series of goals motivated towards security sector and domestic reform. Serbia, on the other hand, the largest country and arguably a crucial element for stability in the region, took a more reserved position.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, now fifteen years after the genocide, has a single military, is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and has taken major steps towards EU membership by signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement. "Bosnia and Herzegovina has also made significant progress addressing the problems and challenges that are the legacy of war," declared Philip H. Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.<sup>44</sup> Montenegro, since its peaceful separation from Serbia in 2006, has also taken concrete steps toward integration and has successfully entered MAP.

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<sup>41</sup> The Balkans after Independence of Kosovo on the Eve of NATO Enlargement. (Hearing before Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Second Session, March 12, 2008) p.3-25.

<sup>42</sup> Cascone. p.175-194

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p.175-194

<sup>44</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans. p.3-25.

Both countries experienced broad based economic recovery and consumer spending rose.<sup>45</sup>

Serbia initially welcomed the opportunity of membership, but refrained from declaring an interest in joining it. This could have partly been due to the fact that following the Kosovo Air Campaign of 1999, any reference to NATO within the country still was able to cause emotional public reaction and raise nationalist feelings. The break-up of Kosovo from Serbia has created additional fuel for Serbia's already prominent anti-NATO sentiment<sup>46</sup>, but the elections of a Democratic Party led government in Serbia in 2008 showed a new commitment towards NATO cooperation. The Serbian government is now pro-European, democratic and is moving to institute rule of law, market reforms, and is even pursuing cooperative relations with neighboring states such as Kosovo<sup>47</sup>. Another astonishing movement towards cooperation on behalf of the Serbians was the resolution passed by the Serbian National Assembly that condemned the crimes committed at Srebrenic and requested a capture of war crime fugitives<sup>48</sup>. Because of these immense advances, the EU has recently decided to extend visa free travel to Serbian citizens<sup>49</sup>.

The last and most astonishing case of political and economic transformation can be seen within Kosovo. Ten years ago, violence and ethnic cleansing consumed the country, but the year 2009, only one year after its declared independence, proved to be a year of growth and consolidation for Kosovo. The Constitutional Court was born and the first ever successful, democratic elections, managed by Kosovo's Central Elections Commission took place. There was a significant turnout of Kosovo Serbs for the established Serb majority municipalities, and four new Serb mayors were elected.<sup>50</sup>

Montenegro and Kosovo opened borders in agreement to establish full diplomatic relations between the two countries. On the EU front, Kosovo is working for visa liberalizations and an interim trade agreement. To portray the enormous reform that

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<sup>45</sup> Cviic and Sanfey. p.123.

<sup>46</sup> Cascone. p.175-194.

<sup>47</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans. p.3-25.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p.3-25.

<sup>49</sup> Hearing: The Balkans after Independence of Kosovo on the Eve of NATO Enlargement. p.4-21.

<sup>50</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans: *Statement Phillip H. Gordon*. p.7.

has taken place, NATO has begun to phase down its forces in the area because of advances in establishing peace and stability.

Each country has gone to great lengths to establish ties with NATO and the EU, leading to a more secure and prosperous Europe. Economically the region has seen significant growth, almost all countries have progressed in the area of minority rights and ethnic cooperation, and every country has taken at least the initial steps towards integration. The progress made demonstrates how far the Western Balkans has come, but there still remains a substantial amount of work to be done before the region is fully integrated into the “fabric of Euro-Atlantic institutions,<sup>51</sup>” and many challenges remain unresolved.

### **Remaining Challenges in the Balkan Region**

There are three main issues of great concern regarding the integration of the Balkans that will be mentioned below. First, for the last four years, Bosnia has exhibited a lack of political will necessary for effective reform. Narrow ethnic division and shortsighted political interests have hindered the countries ability to move forward. Second, Kosovo is still very recently independent, and still has a great deal of work to do regarding its governance and rule of law. Lastly, the name issue regarding Macedonia and Greece impedes not only Macedonian integration, but also the stability of the whole region.

*Bosnia and Herzegovina:* Bosnia and Herzegovina pose many political challenges regarding integration. Due to ethnic group and party divisions, politicians become reluctant to compromise and political leaders become stuck in a vicious cycle where divisions among parties/ethnic groups trump long-term political goals.<sup>52</sup> This leaves a great deal of room for political instability and crisis. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been home to inflamed nationalist rhetoric and uneasy relations between the state and entities for decades.<sup>53</sup> This became most apparent after the War. The two main ethnic groups (the Serbs and the Croats), felt more allegiance to Croatia and to Serbia than to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the minority Muslim population felt that the Dayton

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<sup>51</sup> Hearing: Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans: Statement Phillip H. Gordon. p.7.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p.8.

<sup>53</sup> Boduszynski. p.184.

Accords did not go far enough in establishing a state structure and a rights system.<sup>54</sup> The speech given by Vice President Biden in 2009 illustrated this very issue by emphasizing the need for authorities to work together across ethnic and party lines in order to function as a single sovereign state.<sup>55</sup> The state is in need of institutional reforms in order to develop state structures and improve overall stability.

*Kosovo:* Though, Kosovo has improved greatly since its independence, the country still has several political and legal hurdles it must jump through before obtaining full integration. The first of these is the status of its international sovereignty. A substantial number of EU members still have not recognized the country as sovereign and independent, which has been damaging to the country's progress. This lack of recognition has hindered Kosovo's movement forward significantly by complicating economic development and inhibiting certain aspects of EU involvement. Some observers argue that it has also signaled to Serbia that it has a chance to reverse the independence, which could prove dangerous for cross border relations.<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, there remain many unfinished political reforms. Kosovo still needs to decentralize the government and work to protect ethnic minorities. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a great deal of internal division between ethnic groups, especially in Northern Kosovo, where the situation remains tense. For cooperation to take place, Kosovo must first reach out to the Serb minority.

The country also has a weak system of law and needs to pass and implement the necessary legislation to strengthen currently weak institutions. Kosovo must in turn modernize the judicial system and update legal codes with the democratic standards set by NATO.<sup>57</sup> Strengthening the rule of law is argued to be the key to success in Kosovo and will allow for a more dynamic political approach to internal issues, while also hopefully combating the corruption and organized crime, which still has a large presence in the area<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> Cascone. p.175-192.

<sup>55</sup> Hearing Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans: Statement by Kurt Volker. p.30.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p.30.

<sup>57</sup> Situation in the Balkans Statement by Alexander Vershbow, FDCH Congressional Testimony. April 14, 2010.

<sup>58</sup> Hearing: The Balkans after Independence of Kosovo on the Eve of NATO Enlargement. p.4-21.

Economically, the government must also implement reforms to allow for the growth of the private market. High unemployment, low investment rates and a relatively small economic base challenge the country. Kosovo must work closely with the private sector to create an attractive investment climate.<sup>59</sup> The resistance to interact with Serbia could be perpetuating this problem. If Kosovo could create dialogue with its neighbor and address day-to-day issues such as electricity supply, customs and courts, some economic burdens could be lifted.

*Macedonia:* The last critical issue regarding the Balkans integration remains the ongoing name dispute between Greece and Macedonia. The resolution of this conflict is in the interest of stability of the entire region. As demonstrated by the progress made in each country, the credible prospect of membership is the most powerful incentive that the Balkan countries have for continuing reform.<sup>60</sup> Not allowing Macedonia to enter even though the country has taken all necessary steps towards membership, simply because of a title disagreement, raises great concern of “NATO/EU enlargement fatigue.”<sup>61</sup> It worries prospective countries that there is no viable way to obtain membership and thus could undermine their reform agenda and the success already made.

Over the past decade and a half, Balkan countries have made a tremendous transformation and have all taken huge steps towards becoming NATO and EU members. Though, there remain many challenges, the progress made far outweighs them. Other than ethnic disagreement and political squabbles, there has been no armed conflict and no ethnic violence. Each country has established a democratic system and though there is some need of refinement in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the advances are astonishing. At the same time, the work is far from over, and there are many lessons to be taken from the political, social and economic processes made by each country regarding the future of the Balkans.

### **Lessons and Recommendations**

After focusing on the progress made by the Western Balkans it is hard to imagine the violent and bloody history that engulfed most of the region only 15 years ago, and in

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p.4-21.

<sup>60</sup> Statement by Alexander Vershbow, *Situation in the Balkans* (2010).

<sup>61</sup> Hearing Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Balkans. p.4-21.

Kosovo only ten. Overall, this proves that two of the main lessons NATO can take from the 1990's in Yugoslavia are: 1) common values and cooperation do lead to a more secure and prosperous Europe, and 2) NATO and EU membership are strong magnets for reform and cooperation. NATO's involvement in the area has allowed for better cooperation, extended peace, regional policy coordination and compliance. The humanitarian and peacekeeping missions have allowed for ethnic groups to begin to see each other as non-threatening while economic and political reforms have created more transparency, better rule of law and cooperation within the region, and externally.

Since the Bosnian War, the break up of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War, NATO has adapted and advanced drastically from only taking on within border missions, to becoming a regional crisis manager. The advances made by NATO all translate to better security throughout Europe. Now the question is: how should NATO continue? As seen above, the Balkan region still has many challenges to face and could still potentially pose a security threat in the future if all states are not integrated into the EU/NATO framework. For this reason, it is essential that NATO does not back out now. NATO must continue to give attention and support to the region.

NATO's commitment in the area, based on the NATO Strategic Concept 2010, demonstrates a resolve in protecting human rights and promoting democratization as well as economic and institutional reconstruction. It is clear that the Alliance has made significant progress in assisting reform in the Balkan countries in these areas, but ultimately prosperity lies with the people and the steps they are willing to take towards regional cooperation and ethnic reconciliation. Therefore, it is essential that NATO/EU membership maintain its attraction, not allowing prospective members to become discouraged by disturbances such as the Macedonian name issue. For the Balkans to carry forward with reforms, there needs to be a prospect of stability and credibility of achievement. NATO must also continue giving AID and resources to the countries that still need it, such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia to jumpstart their economies and build up stable public and military infrastructure. Many countries still lack the resources necessary to carry through with the necessary reform. If a country has an instable economy, it will be difficult to build up; this lack of development could discourage the people and hinder progressive reform.

Also, very importantly, ethnic rights need to be addressed more clearly. Of course, countries should be able to establish their own sovereign infrastructure, but looking at the recent history of ethnic division, ethnic minority rights need to be monitored and upheld by NATO. Since several states remain economically and, for the most part socially, unstable, NATO needs to continue to act as an overseeing body. A way to promote internal multi-ethnic prosperity should be investigated, discovered, and implemented into policy within each state. This would mean creating institutional means of cooperation established by NATO, and a delegation of human rights responsibilities within the Balkan region.

In order to better integrate the different countries and societies, NATO would also benefit by approaching the issue of ethnic division from a different angle. Along with promoting peacekeeping operations and cooperative measures between different groups, NATO should attempt to link them together. Since all the Balkan states are attempting NATO and EU integration, the two organizations could deem the countries “European” by culture, history and geo-strategic coordination. This would emphasize that becoming a member of Europe is more than simply an enlarged EU or NATO, allowing the broader concept of integration into Europe to be made a reality. This could foster a common identity or link between the different ethnicities and countries and possibly better cooperation.

In conclusion, it has become clear that a sustained growth economically and socially correlates directly to a sustained commitment to reforms. Albania, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia have all advanced furthest in reform, have entered in either NATO or the EU (Macedonia close behind) and have also grown the fastest. The NATO and EU perspective for the region is crucial in keeping those countries that are not yet members focused on reform and moving forward. NATO’s involvement has produced significant progress within each country, and although there remain challenges within the region, overall, the political, social and economic situation in each country has greatly improved, along with the prosperity and overall security of Europe.



## Chapter Two

### NATO in Afghanistan

Paige Irwin

NATO involvement in Afghanistan for the past fifteen years has been extraordinarily significant in defining the role of NATO in potential future combat and high risk security operations around the globe. NATO has been engaged in Afghanistan since Article 5 was enacted after 9/11 by the United States, in response to the al Qaeda attack. Afghanistan is one of NATO's top priorities. In the Lisbon Summit Declaration, NATO stated that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance's key priority<sup>62</sup>. The United States initially led the war in Afghanistan but has relied heavily on other countries, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations for support. NATO is in charge of the ISAF which was founded by the UN Security Council on December 20, 2001, to serve as a multinational force constituting primarily of European states committed to the provision of security in and around Kabul for the Afghans<sup>63</sup>. NATO countries have been contributing troops and financial support to operations in Afghanistan for years, and as support for the war deteriorates as does support from the participating countries. As the war in Afghanistan continues to be problematic in terms of strategy, cooperation and achievements, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan has had serious effects on the reputation of the effectiveness current NATO structure, goals and strategies.

Many have speculated that Afghanistan will determine the future of NATO. The war in Afghanistan is the largest and most complex operation in NATO's history. Winning a war is not a free-standing goal, development and nation-building are crucial to the success of the operation. While NATO's mission is to ensure security, social and economic development is also extremely necessary to reinforce security measures.

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<sup>62</sup> Lisbon Summit Declaration. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 20 Nov 2010. < [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease)>

<sup>63</sup> Richard E. Rupp *Nato After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print.) p.155.

Former NATO chief, General James Jones stated that “in committing the alliance to sustained ground combat in Afghanistan... NATO bet its future. If NATO were to fail, alliance cohesion will be at grave risk. A moribund or unraveled NATO would have a profoundly negative geostrategic impact<sup>64</sup>. The consequences of not getting involved in Afghanistan could have been absolutely detrimental to global security. However, NATO will need to fight for their future reputation and success as an organization because “NATO’s status and prospects are inextricably linked to the successful execution of the Afghanistan operation”<sup>65</sup>. Afghanistan is a chance for NATO to prove that the alliance can perform in an active combat operation combined with the development of a stable state. Success or failure in this arena could drastically change the role of NATO in the world.

Afghanistan has presented significant problems with NATO’s structural policies. There is no one commonly accepted strategic plan of operation in Afghanistan. Not at the NATO level, not at the US level or at the level of informed observers and other participating organizations. This has led to disjointed actions and policies in Afghanistan. Non-US NATO members and the United States must work cohesively with each other as well as with host governments and influential organizations such as President Karzai, all our twenty-one partners in ISAF, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and Japan, who have all reaffirmed their long-term commitment to Afghanistan<sup>66</sup>. I will identify key problems in Afghanistan and use them to analyze weaknesses in NATO’s current structure.

### **NATO-US Relations**

The relationships between the forces in Afghanistan have never very been clearly defined and there have been continuous debates about what the role of NATO should be and how each side feels about their role. The US and NATO need to work well together in order to succeed. Directly after 9/11, The United States, and more specifically the Bush Administration, did not want NATO involved in their war in Afghanistan because they did not want to coordinate with another organization that could have conflicting or

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<sup>64</sup> Ahmed Rashid. *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009.) Print. p.373.

<sup>65</sup> Rupp. p.153.

<sup>66</sup> Lisbon Summit Declaration.

alternative goals. “President George W Bush did not view NATO as a central component in the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy.”<sup>67</sup> This caused tension between the United States and NATO. “The Bush Administration developed and undertook a military campaign in Afghanistan that relied primarily on American forces and assets and that was under the direction of an American command and control structure”<sup>68</sup>. They did not choose to actively involve NATO in the planning and strategizing of the operation. However, The United States later relied heavily upon an ill-equipped NATO led ISAF to maintain progress in Afghanistan while the Bush Administration directed their attention to invading Iraq. While the Bush Administration should have treated NATO with more respect, NATO could have also acted in a more productive manner. Throughout the Afghanistan operation the United States has been frustrated with the lack of enthusiasm and reliability of NATO contributions.

If non-US NATO members are to be considered partners in future combat operations, they need to be legitimated as a reliable partner in combat operations by responding quickly and appropriately to Article 5 enactments. This was not the case after 9/11. “Instead of unifying and responding effectively to the new dangers in the system, the member states of NATO experienced their greatest sustained internal conflict since the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949”<sup>69</sup>. Goals and strategies surrounding the war in Afghanistan differed, and trust was wary on both sides. However, as the United States ramped up their operation in Afghanistan they needed NATO’s full support in order to be successful. The country was in such disarray, and it needed a troop and civilian surge in order to continue moving towards a stable state in Afghanistan. However, there was not enough manpower. In “January 2004, the United States criticized NATO for the slow progress”<sup>70</sup> and “the entirety of 2007 was spent with the US demanding more troops and equipment from NATO countries and NATO continuing to

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<sup>67</sup> Rupp. p.100.

<sup>68</sup> Tom Lansford. All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002.) Print. p.180.

<sup>69</sup> Rupp. p.93.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p.161.

stall”<sup>71</sup>. Even if there are disagreements on the active strategy, it is difficult to achieve any goals if the players involved are not complying with each other’s requests.

These same sentiments are still present in 2010 when, “U.S. officials said they are increasingly frustrated by the unwillingness of European countries to provide more trainers to build up the Afghan army and national police, NATO allies have provided only about 10 percent of the trainers promised for Afghan security forces”<sup>72</sup>. NATO did not provide what was asked of them. There was no trust between the United States and non-US NATO members because they were hesitant to support rapid action. A “fundamental problem lies not in the unique assets that it still possesses but in the lack of trust that many Allies feel about whether it will meet their security needs and expectations”<sup>73</sup>. NATO did not respond effectively to the Article 5 enactment, but the United States did not include NATO in the planning and strategizing of the war.

### **An Equal Partner**

In order to be involved in future large scale-combat and nation-building operations, NATO needs to be treated as an equal partner. When war was declared on Afghanistan, “the United States made it clear that they were going to make their own decision regarding the conduct of the war and would consult with neither its NATO allies”<sup>74</sup>. These decisions challenged the purpose of NATO. Article 5 had been enacted, calling for the support of all NATO countries, but the United States did not seem to consider NATO a particularly important or reliable partner in the operation in Afghanistan. “President George W Bush did not view NATO as a central component in the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of Defense for the Bush Administration, Donald Rumsfeld stated that ‘the mission needs to define the coalition, and we ought not think that a coalition should define the mission’ ”<sup>75</sup>. It was clear that the Bush Administration did not want NATO as a partner, they just wanted their support. The opinions expressed by the U.S. government were not positive about NATO.

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<sup>71</sup> Rashid. p.394.

<sup>72</sup> Craig Whitlock. "Nato Hits Snags on Troop Pledges; German Vow to Boost Numbers in Afghanistan Falls Short of U.S. Hopes." (Washington Post. 2010). Print. p.2

<sup>73</sup> Gülnur Aybet, and Rebecca R. Moore. NATO in Search of a Vision. (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010.) Print. p.20.

<sup>74</sup> Rashid. p.79.

<sup>75</sup> Rupp. p.100.

“Washington’s decision to limit and marginalize NATO’s involvement was a serious blow to the alliance”<sup>76</sup>. NATO is a defense organization but were not asked to participate in planning the defense and security operation with would be involving NATO troops. This is particularly problematic because in order for the war in Afghanistan to be successful is would take enormous amounts of resources from not only the United States, but all NATO countries, as well as support from other nongovernmental organizations and other international institutions.

### **A Reliable Partner**

NATO and the US have had difficulties working together in Afghanistan because the US sees many NATO member states as unreliable partners. In order for NATO to be treated with respect, European NATO members must be reliable by providing the agreed upon amounts of troop and physical military support and fiscal support. There is a consistent shortage of troops and resources that were promised by non-US NATO members. NATO’s operations with ISAF did not start off well. “In the first day of ISAF’s training program, only 69 out of 630 recruits were present”<sup>77</sup>. Success or failure in a combat operation is obviously contingent in having enough people to handle to operation. There were many disputes of Europe’s inability to supply enough troops. “Though more than half of NATO’s members had forces in Afghanistan, the number of countries contributing troops did not equate to large numbers of troops on the ground. Indeed, with over 2 million personnel in European military establishments, only 5,000 were on duty with ISAF in 2002”<sup>78</sup>. The numbers were not corresponding with the previously agreed upon commitments and there were still not enough troops on the ground. This led to more frustration and distrust between the United States and non-US NATO members.

Fiscal responsibilities were also not being fulfilled by NATO. “In 2005, NATO countries were expected to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense, but only six out of the 26 members met that goal”<sup>79</sup>. It is impossible to plan anything without using accurate information; NATO has been providing inaccurate information surround what they are able and willing to provide for the war in Afghanistan. It is important to note

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<sup>76</sup> Rupp. p.94.

<sup>77</sup> Rashid. p.202.

<sup>78</sup> Rupp. p.156.

<sup>79</sup> Rashid. p.351.

that, “the total military budget of the twenty-six NATO member states was just \$265 million, compared with the U.S. defense budget of \$472 million”<sup>80</sup>. It is acknowledgeable that non-US NATO members purely do not have as much financial power as the United States. This being said, non-US NATO members should only pledge what they are positive they can supply, even if their contributions are smaller than planned, at least they will be reliable. With reliable troop numbers, budgets and supply figures, planning the next steps of reconstruction will be smoother, more efficient and more productive.

Non-US NATO members should also agree only to maintain areas of peace in Afghanistan that they are sure they can remain in control of. There have been many instances in Afghanistan where NATO was responsible for regions that they could not maintain, the conditions in the area deteriorated and other organizations had to adjust their resources in order to step in and help alleviate building pressures. In “August 2003, NATO had only managed to sustain one of the five Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to which it had committed”<sup>81</sup>. This left four PRTs inactive and ineffective. In 2004 “NATO failed to man the five PRTs in the north on time, which then delayed completion of phase two”<sup>82</sup>. Not only were these areas not receiving security support but the overall operation was stalled. Failing to maintain a province not only hurts NATO’s reputation but has detrimental effects to the entire operation.

The use of caveats has also contributed to NATO’s ineffectiveness as a reliable partner in Afghanistan. Because European countries have placed restrictions on how and where their troops can be used, NATO’s overall strategy is negatively restricted. “Every European country set down caveats that have paralyzed the entire NATO effort”<sup>83</sup>. If NATO is going to be a conducive part of a military operation they need to go where they are needed. Caveats “include geographical restrictions on locations of units’ deployments as well as nature of missions units are allowed to participate”<sup>84</sup>. These restrictions are meant to protect the soldiers in these units but they restrict strategy and development

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<sup>80</sup> Rashid. p.351.

<sup>81</sup> Rupp. p.164.

<sup>82</sup> Rashid. p.352.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. p.351.

<sup>84</sup> V Krishnappa, Shanthie M. D'Souza, and Priyanka Singh. Saving Afghanistan. (New Delhi: Academic Foundation in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009.) Print. p.12.

progress. Caveats will need to be removed if non-US NATO members wish to be considered as reliable partners in future combat operations.

### **The Importance of Basic Security and Strong Governance in Afghanistan**

Achieving basic security was NATO's primary assignment in Afghanistan and remains a constant concern. In January 2010, it was stated that "the security situation in much of Afghanistan was still dire"<sup>85</sup>. Basic security is crucial for national stability. If the people are not safe, security and social programs will not succeed. Stability is necessary for success in Afghanistan. There has not been sustained basic security in many parts of Afghanistan. "Providing basic security has largely been left to an under-resourced ISAF, The Afghan capital, Kabul, is reasonably safe but most of the country is anything but"<sup>86</sup>. Kabul has received the most security support and has remained relatively stable, but the majority of the country has not seen significant improvement. While Kabul has achieved a relatively high level of security and stability but the rest of the country is still very unstable and vulnerable to losing any progress that has been made during the current operations in Afghanistan.

It is very difficult to achieve basic security without strong governance and system of law. "Additional troops and fire power will not help in Afghanistan without good governance, sustainable security and the establishment of the rule of law"<sup>87</sup>. When the United States invaded Afghanistan the state was very weak, corruption was rampant, there was not a fair and effective judicial system. It has been speculated that "the root cause of most insurgencies has been the collapse of government"<sup>88</sup>. The presence of extreme insurgency in Afghanistan is having detrimental effects on security. In order for Afghanistan to develop into a strong state that can provide basic security for all citizens, strong governance is necessary. ISAF's mission goals include the "hopes of establishing the rule of law, governing political institutions, economic and social infrastructures a domestic police force, and a national military establishment"<sup>89</sup>. If all engaged parties can

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<sup>85</sup> Whitlock. p.2.

<sup>86</sup> "Afghanistan: NATO Fails a Test." (The Economist. 371 2004: 12-13.) Print.

<sup>87</sup> Krishnappa. p.28-29.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. p.72.

<sup>89</sup> Rupp. p.156.

work together to increase strong governance in Afghanistan, other security-related goals will be more attainable.

### **Afghanistan Strategy**

NATO has been in combat operations before and has learned valuable lessons from these experiences. For example, NATO's "lessons learned from the Western Balkans make it clear that comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is effective for appropriate crisis management"<sup>90</sup>. However, in Afghanistan, NATO's latest crisis to be managed, a comprehensive plan was not formulated. This is particularly crucial in Afghanistan because of the complications presented by insurgency actors. "The most serious problem in fighting insurgency is the absence of a coordinated strategy based on a shared vision and carried out through and integrated military, political and developmental effort"<sup>91</sup>. NATO does not just need to improve Afghanistan's institutions, it needs to rid the country of insurgency and terrorist organization first. If there are several powerful and competing power systems and ideologies in the country, none will prevail. NATO has states that it is "committed to a better future for the Afghan people"<sup>92</sup>, but the components of this better future are not articulated. NATO had acknowledged the need for a comprehensive strategy for crisis management and there is not one in place in Afghanistan.

An overall strategy needs to be formulated with the U.S. Coalitions Forces, ISAF-NATO and Afghan military about how to stabilize Afghanistan. If these institutions cannot come to an agreement over goals and strategies, neither side's goals will be accomplished. Formulating this plan is extremely complicated because so many actors are involved in Afghanistan operations. There have been several significant conflicting strategies between stakeholders in Afghanistan. "ISAFs mandate was to support the Afghan government in every way possible. The U.S. led coalitions mandate was to fight terrorism"<sup>93</sup>. While their reasons for being in country were different, so were the ways

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<sup>90</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence: "Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. 19th November 2010. <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

<sup>91</sup> Krishnappa. p.28.

<sup>92</sup> Lisbon Summit Declaration.

<sup>93</sup> Rupp. p.173.

they wanted to be perceived. “Most NATO governments would prefer Afghans to view the Alliance positively- as an institution promoting peaceful stability, not as a western military alliance employing lethal force”<sup>94</sup>. This is a typical problem in coalition warfare. Different countries join wars for different reasons, with different incentives and with different belief systems, however, none of them had a plan. “The US didn’t have a plan, NATO didn’t have a plan, a number of NATO countries had a different philosophy about how to operate in Afghanistan and how to conduct counterinsurgency operations”<sup>95</sup>. Nobody had a plan, it would of course be optimal for every involved organization to agree on a plan but any plan would have been beneficial.

The overarching plan needs to map out the projected steps needed to progress from one phase of the operation to the next. Each step from invasion, to combat, to development and state building and the transitions in between need to be planned with all stakeholders onboard. In Afghanistan, “NATO had no overarching strategy for winning or for transforming military victories into development, reconstruction, good governance and political strategies. Nobody had yet come up with a solution to the major problem of how to reconstruct a nation in the midst of an insurgency”<sup>96</sup>. The war in Afghanistan is not just a war, it is an extensive development project and there was no strategy in place to transition between these two operations. They are both highly dependent on each other for success. NATO appeared to be much more open to work on basic security and development issues over combat operations. “NATO Allies would help train and teach the Afghan police and army, but the impression was that many of the European armies station in Afghanistan had not expected to be in combat”<sup>97</sup>. While the United States wanted to launch a larger combat operation, they would need NATO’s cooperation. “President George W Bush once stated that we had only just begun in Afghanistan, while alliance countries were not ‘seeking a broader war to include ‘rogue’ states in pursuits of

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<sup>94</sup> Rupp. p.174.

<sup>95</sup> Krishnappa. p.70.

<sup>96</sup> Rashid. p.399.

<sup>97</sup> Bob Woodward. Obama's Wars. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.) Print. p.152.

weapons of mass destruction”<sup>98</sup>. These differences in strategy need to be resolved. For success, NATO needs to have a clear role to fill that all parties are willing to support.

### **Efficient Communication**

While NATO and the United States are the largest military presences in Afghanistan, there are many other organizations to consider. A large component of the overall strategy needs to incorporate NGOs and other agencies in country. The Afghan government, as well as the United Nations need to be heavily incorporated into the planning of strategies in Afghanistan. In the past, “the problems in Kabul were compounded by the sheer number of actors there. Thirty-nine countries were now involved in contributing troops to ISAF in Kabul. More than sixty large donor institutions and dozens of NGOs were supposed to be coordinating with the Afghan government, but frequently were not”<sup>99</sup>. Although it is extremely difficult, communication is crucial in between all of these entities. Communications between forces in Afghanistan has been a problem in the past, this cannot continue. There needs to adequate support in all parts of the country, covering all of the stability reducing factors and they need to be coordinated with an effective plan.

The lack of communication and in Afghanistan has led to a disjointed operation. Mission effectiveness has deteriorated as a result. Security support was greatly needed in Southern Afghanistan, but “when the first NATO troops were deployed in the south in late 2005, they discovered that the Americans had not monitored Taliban activity in four southern provinces.”<sup>100</sup> This slowed down NATO missions in the area, because they had to do this work as well as their assigned mission. These miscommunications in strategy and the reality of the situation are necessary for the success of both NATO and the United States in Afghanistan. One of the main difficulties in communication is that there is no single entity in charge of the entire operation. “There were two separate command structures for foreign forces in Afghanistan- the NATO-ISAF command was responsible for peacekeeping in Kabul and the provinces; while the hunt for terrorists would continue

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<sup>98</sup> Rupp. p.94.

<sup>99</sup> Rashid. p.397.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. p.223, 351.

to be carried out by the U.S.-led Coalition under Operation Enduring Freedom”<sup>101</sup>. The two missions would intertwine and overlap at points, but were under different command structures with different goals and strategies for achieving those goals. There was a communication breakdown which led to unequal military and civilian support around the country.

### **Consistent and Even Support**

If NATO is going to be a partner in future large-scale combat operations like the current one in Afghanistan, there will need to be changes to NATO’s structure and potential caveats or guarantees about what NATO troops will be asked to manage. In order for NATO itself to be a stronger organization, many changes will need to be implemented. “Advancements in military capabilities and the evolution of NATO’s command structure”<sup>102</sup> are necessary. NATO needs to be structured in such a way that members are reliable for their commitments. There needs to be an enforcement system that will ensure equitable contributions from all members.

Unequal military support across Afghanistan has led to increased frustrations among NATO members. NATO was primarily based only in Kabul and Kabul had achieved acceptable levels of basic security, but the rest of the country was still very dangerous. Southern Afghanistan, especially in the regions around Kandahar, is particularly unstable. The countries that have been responsible for these areas in the past have not had enough logistical support to be successful. “The Canadians had lost fifty-four soldiers [in Kandahar], a quarter of all foreign troops killed in Afghanistan. Canada demanded that unless another country sent one thousand troops. When this demand was not met, in February 2008, Canada announced that they would withdraw their troops from Kandahar by 2011”<sup>103</sup>. In other parts of the country the lack of security lead to missions being deferred from reconstruction back to basic security. “The sixteen hundred Dutch troops based in the southern province of Uruzgan were prepared to fight, but their mission was defined by the Dutch government as limited to peacekeeping and reconstruction.”<sup>104</sup> The Dutch troops were not able to achieve their objectives because

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<sup>101</sup> Rashid. p.353.

<sup>102</sup> Lansford. p.163.

<sup>103</sup> Rashid. p.395, 413.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p.395.

they did not have enough basic security support. This deterred progress and did not encourage a positive relationship with the Dutch.

There needs to be a plan in place in case NATO country populations stop supporting an operation. A Pew Research Study showed that in few NATO countries supported additional troops in Afghanistan. In August 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal announced that a new strategy was necessary in order to fight the Taliban, the request for more troops has highly anticipated. A Pew Research Center showed, “significant opposition to troop increases was found in all NATO countries polled; at least half of those surveyed in Germany (63%), France (62%), Poland (57%), Canada (55%), Britain (51%) and Spain (50%) disapproved of sending more troops to Afghanistan”<sup>105</sup>. Because such significant portions of the population in many NATO countries do not support the war, these countries have become even more resistant to sending the necessary troops. NATO needs to have a strategy to deal with problems like these for when they may occur in the future because NATO needs to provide the support they promise.

### **Poppy Production Dependence as a Case Study**

Poppy production in Afghanistan exemplifies how root problems in Afghanistan are not being alleviated and are contributing to security threats. In order for security strategies to be realistically implemented the human development statistics need to be improved. In 2010, Afghanistan had the 155<sup>th</sup> worst human development index ranking, life expectancy was 44.6 years, mean years of schooling was 3.3 years and income GDP per capita in 2008 was \$1,419.<sup>106</sup> In order to earn money, many Afghans rely on poppy production. Poppies are harvested and processed into opium products such as heroin. Farmers can make a large profit from growing poppies, but the real profit ends up in the pockets of warlords or insurgency organizations which contribute to national instability. “No one can contest that Afghanistan needs a civilian surge to help with governance, police reform, alternative livelihoods to poppy production, and the like”<sup>107</sup>. Once citizens have access to stable incomes from other means, the production of poppies can shift into

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<sup>105</sup> Auxier, Richard Few in NATO Support Call For Additional Forces in Afghanistan. Pew Research Center. 31 Aug 2009. 10 Feb 2011. <<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1325/little-support-in-nato-for-afghanistan-troop-increases>>.

<sup>106</sup> “Afghanistan”. *International Human Development Indicators*. 2010 Report. 20 February 2011. <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html>>.

<sup>107</sup> Aybet. p.23.

the agricultural production of food to increase quality of life, decrease hunger and decrease the amount of money that will be put into the hands of insurgents.

The differences between the United States and Non-US NATO member are exemplified in the case of poppy production dependence in Afghanistan. “The United States favors spraying poppy fields with pesticides from the air, but the Afghan government has concerns that spraying might estrange poor farmers and drive them into the arms of the Taliban. The United Nations and NATO oppose spraying, with NATO refusing to get involved in fighting traffickers or destroying drug labs and marketers”<sup>108</sup>. Because NATO did not want to tackle the poppy problem, “the arrival of NATO forces in the south in 2006 made little difference”<sup>109</sup>. This case perfectly exemplifies the lack of a clear ultimate leader, the lack of a common policy and enforcement structure. The United States, NATO, the UN and Afghan government all had different goals in relation to poppy production and the underlying problems that encourage it and the problems that are perpetuated as a result.

### **Lessons from Afghanistan**

Afghanistan has presented new obstacles that will influence NATO’s future operations. The most prevalent and complicated is the need for a collective, comprehensive plan operation plan. Henry Kissinger, former United States Secretary of State, said that “the military effort in Afghanistan should be conducted substantially on a provincial basis rather than in pursuit of a Western-style central government. We need a regional diplomatic framework for the next stage of Afghan strategy”<sup>110</sup>. The military operations are crucial to solve many problems, but alleviating civilian poverty and social structures is needed at the same time. Ultimate success, as elsewhere, will depend on military focus on peace building progressively giving way to civilian reconstruction and Afghan ownership of residual security tasks.”<sup>111</sup> Operations similar to Afghanistan will always be extremely complicated, but have a common goal structure and strategy outline formulated with all involved parties will strengthen collective relationships and increase the affectivity of the overall operation.

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<sup>108</sup> Krishnappa. p.26.

<sup>109</sup> Rashid. p.330.

<sup>110</sup> Henry Kissinger. "America needs an Afghan Strategy, not an Alibi." (Washington Post. 2010). Print.

<sup>111</sup> Aybet. p.23.

A clear leader and command structure should be utilized in future combat operations. This leader should be present at the very least to coordinate strategy and communication between stakeholders. “If the Allies have not been collectively involved in the elaboration of a policy or decision, it will be increasingly difficult for them to implement it with their military forces”<sup>112</sup>. This way goals and strategies can be formulated, and can be worked on collectively in an effective manner. “There is an urgent need for consensus among the domestic and international partners on a unified strategy and campaign plan. Implementation may require bringing the NATO-ISAF and US-Led Operation Enduring Freedom forces under a unified command with full capacity for both combat operations and stabilization-peacekeeping efforts”<sup>113</sup> This leader could organize troop and equipment from all involved organizations to ensure that support is distributed as necessary and no single actor is carrying too much of the burden. This leader could also act as an ultimate enforcer to ensure that all agreed contributions are followed through on.

NATO needs to be reliable. Adequate troop numbers should be available and equipped with the necessary equipment. Fiscal responsibilities need to be respected. It would be helpful for NATO to develop a standing army, ready-to-go equipment and a central budget if they are to be involved with any more combat operations. When NATO entered Afghanistan there was “no standing army or ready-to-go equipment and aircraft. It had no central budget; deployments were paid for by individual countries. Troops, air craft, helicopters and artillery had to be extracted from each country after endless meeting and then matched up with other donations”<sup>114</sup>. NATO still lacks is an organized, deployable civilian and military capacity that is specially designed to address stabilization and reconstruction operations<sup>115</sup>. By having unified budgets and equipment, NATO would be able to react faster in times of urgent action. This will be extremely useful for operating quickly and efficiently in future crisis relief situations. NATO’s operations in Afghanistan have highlighted the ways in which NATO can grow and

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<sup>112</sup> Aybet. p.20.

<sup>113</sup> Krishnappa. p.31.

<sup>114</sup> Rashid. p.351.

<sup>115</sup> Aybet. p.90.

develop. NATO will continue to redefine its structure and purpose as future conflicts and operations present clear lessons, in the same fashion that Afghanistan has.

### **Policy Recommendations**

- Create a central budget, standing army and ready to go equipment and aircrafts for effective NATO use in future combat operations.
- Develop a strong US-NATO relationship. The United States and NATO should plan to work together to formulate a clear, comprehensive plan for combat in the future.
- Formulate an analysis structure for the development and state building necessary in a country before starting operations in country.
- Advocate extensive communication, coordination and collaboration with the international community about combat and development operations.
- Identify a clear command structure and leader in future operations.
- Develop an ultimate enforcer to ensure that NATO members produce the fiscal and military support that is needed of them.
- NATO members need to agree upon manageable amounts of troops, monetary fund and equipment that will be provided when necessary. These should then be produced quickly when requested.
- NATO members should remove caveats on troops to improve cooperation, collective relationships and efficiency.



## **Chapter Three**

### **Lessons from NATO's Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan: A Comparison**

**Gabrielle Gurian and Paige Irwin**

The active military operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have both been extremely influential in defining NATO's internationally. Both the Balkans and Afghanistan have presented many challenges and have taught NATO unique lessons about how future out of area conflict should be handled. The operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans have many similar aspects but also many very differing ones; NATO has learned many lessons for the future from their involvement with these countries. It has become clear that it is necessary to have clear goals and objectives, along with clear development indicators and understandings of regional cultural tensions. Both challenges, in the Balkans and Afghanistan have played and continue to play significant roles in the future success of NATO operations.

#### **NATO Motives for Entering Afghanistan vs. Balkans**

After the invocation of Article 5 and in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the question of NATO's legitimacy and usefulness was no less dire than in the 1990s during the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns. After the U.S. became involved in Afghanistan, NATO again went through internal divisions similar to those experienced before entering Bosnia. Continuous debates took place on what the role of NATO should be in Afghanistan, whether they should enter (since they were initially not asked to participate) and what the goals and strategies should be. This slowed NATO's involvement, as it did before entering Bosnia. The international community again began questioning NATO's legitimacy and criticizing its hesitance, thus the Alliance stepped in and in August 2003. It took over and assumed control of UN mandated ISAF in Kabul.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.511.

The Alliance committed to remain in Afghanistan until security and armed forces were sufficiently “constituted and operational.”<sup>117</sup>

NATO was slow to respond, once again, because of internal division, but reasonably so. In the Balkans, NATO had an advantage. The Balkan region shares a very similar history to the rest of Europe. Also, the Balkan states, before 1990, were already surrounded by NATO members and part of the European continent. NATO had immediate security reasons for entering Bosnia and Kosovo because of the fear of the spread of ethno-nationalism to other countries. As a result, the Balkans posed a local threat, while Afghanistan, on the other hand, only posed an immediate threat to the United States. Afghanistan is nowhere near Europe, is not surrounded by NATO members or part of any regional cooperative force and also has a very distinct and different history and ethno-cultural situation, which will be further discussed below. These issues only add to the difficulties and challenges faced by NATO in Afghanistan. Essentially, because the members do not have the collective determination nor need to pursue the case in Afghanistan other than the enactment of Article 5 by the United States and the desire to live up to their new international “crisis manager” identity.

### **Defining Clear Goals and Objectives**

The outcomes in both the Balkans and Afghanistan are equally important in defining the role of NATO. However, the success in their operations has been very different. This was in large part due to the planning of the operation. One of the most noticeable differences between the operation in the Balkans and the operation in Afghanistan is a lack of clear objective the latter. NATO’s operation in the Balkans had a clear goal; EU and NATO integration after stabilization. The full integration of the Balkan states into European institutions still remains a priority for full development of a democratic, peaceful and prosperous region. Integrating the Balkans into the EU and NATO political and ideological structures will encourage long-terms stability and a lasting strong state. NATO’s operation in Afghanistan never had a clear final objective.

Being able to define and execute objectives and goals in combat and development operations is crucial. However, when there are multiple powerful actors, it becomes very difficult to organize around common goals. Every institution and county has their own

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<sup>117</sup> Sperling and Webber. p.510.

reason for being involved in Afghanistan and, they all want to work towards their own goals and objectives. In Afghanistan NATO is not the sole major actor, they are working in collaboration with US led coalition forces as well as other institutions, organizations and governments. Neither the United States nor NATO formulated a clear set of long term goals beyond achieving stability. NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration stated that, "In meeting with President Karzai, all our 21 partners in ISAF, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and Japan, we reaffirm our long-term commitment to Afghanistan"<sup>118</sup> In the Lisbon Summit Declaration it is reaffirmed that NATO has a "long-term commitment to a better future for the Afghan people" but this is not defined, it is a vague and broad goal that can be interpreted differently by every actor in Afghanistan.

The involvement of NATO in the Balkans has contributed to a more efficient and goal oriented operation. There was coordination between NATO and the Balkan states in order to stabilize the Balkans and develop them enough to integrate them into the EU. In the Balkans, NATO established defense-planning programs and started the IPAP (Individual Partnership and Action Plan), which involves a series of goals motivated towards security and domestic reform. These clearly defined goals have led to increased stability in the Balkans and in the immediate region. The Balkan States have undergone very extensive dramatic political, economic and social transformations and nearly every country has taken steps towards EU and NATO integration. Afghanistan has also undergone immense political, economic and social transformations as a result of NATO and US operations, however there is not a long-term support system to ensure that these developments do not collapse.

Afghanistan is not speculated to be a long-term partnership by NATO, since the 2010 Strategic Concept only outlines their commitment to partnerships with the UN, Russia, the EU and the Balkans<sup>119</sup>. Afghanistan has never been considered a future member of a NATO, and by geographic proximity cannot join the EU. Being a part of these larger governing bodies, lends enormous amounts of support to a recently stabilized

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<sup>118</sup> Lisbon Summit Declaration. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 20 Nov 2010. < [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease)>.

<sup>119</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence: "Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. 19th November 2010. <<http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>>

country. However, in Afghanistan, once NATO forces are removed, there will not be the same kinds of institutional support that is still present in the Balkans.

### **Factors Influencing Development in the Balkans and Afghanistan**

Both the Balkans and Afghanistan were in need of development strategies in order to decrease internal conflict, improve the economy and stabilize the state. Institutions needed to be developed and strengthened in both the Balkans and Afghanistan. Kosovo has a weak system of law and needs to modernize their judicial system in order to combat corruption and organized crime; Bosnia and Herzegovina need to overcome ethnic and party lines in order to develop a strong and functional state structure in order to improve overall stability. Afghanistan was in a similar position when the United States invaded. The state was very weak, corruption was rampant and there was not a fair and effective judicial system. However, Afghanistan also required counterinsurgency operations and continues to need constant peace keeping efforts.

The counterinsurgency operations have caused a number of debates in Afghanistan over how the operation should be run. The large number of actors in Afghanistan has complicated the formulation of a collective and comprehensive strategy. “The US didn’t have a plan, NATO didn’t have a plan and a number of NATO countries had a different philosophy about how to operate in Afghanistan and how to conduct counterinsurgency operations”<sup>120</sup>. How to organize counter insurgency operations was one large overarching problem in Afghanistan that was not a concern in the Balkans. Insurgency problems will continue to stall Afghanistan’s progress and if international support wanes it is possible that Afghanistan could lose stability. It has been speculated that “the root cause of most insurgencies has been the collapse of government”<sup>121</sup>. If the state collapses, insurgent organizations could take over again.

The differences between NATO countries and the countries in which they are operating within have had significant impacts on the amount of success achieved in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. The Balkans is much more similar to its potential European partners than Afghanistan is. Not only is lifestyle, state structure and political ideologies

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<sup>120</sup> Krishnappa, V, Shanthie M. D'Souza, and Priyanka Singh. *Saving Afghanistan*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009. Print.

<sup>121</sup> Krishnappa. p.72.

more similar but the quality of life in the Balkans is much better than that in Afghanistan. Lack of education, poverty, refugees and poor health are large contributors to the breakdown of a stable state. The Human Development Index highlights many of the differences between the populations in Afghanistan versus Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example when comparing Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is easy to see how

<b>Table I: Development Indicators</b>	<b>Afghanistan<sup>122</sup></b>	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>123</sup></b>
<b>Life Expectancy (years)</b>	44.6	75.5
<b>Mean years of schooling (years)</b>	3.3	8.7
<b>Income GDP per capita (2008)</b>	1,419	7,964
<b>Human Development Index Ranking</b>	115 <sup>th</sup>	68 <sup>th</sup>

much less developed Afghanistan is. (See Table I below).

Social and economic factors need to be considered when running any kind of development organization in another country. They have enormous effects on stability. The population in Afghanistan is very poor, have limited education and poor health. If the state cannot provide what the people need they will turn to illegal operations such as poppy production, which fund warlords and insurgency movements. In order to form a stable Afghan state, social problem need to be remedied first.

### **Different Cultural Dynamics**

Once NATO entered in Afghanistan, inevitably the Alliance drew on their experiences in the Balkans. NATO did not take into account that, although the Alliance had extensive experience in peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan posed a completely new challenge for the Alliance, with a different socio-cultural dynamic, history and minority situation. As seen above, within the Balkans there were sharp ethnic divisions that led to bloody violence and ethnic cleansing. So intense were the divisions that they caused secession of states from the Former Yugoslavia. In Afghanistan, although the War against the Soviet Union (1978-89) and the Civil War (1989-01)

<sup>122</sup> “Afghanistan”. *International Human Development Indicators*. 2010 Report. 20 February 2011. <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html>>.

<sup>123</sup> “Bosnia and Herzegovina”. *International Human Development Indicators*. 2010 Report. 20 February 2011. <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BIH.html>>.

empowered ethnic groups and ethnic lines to become more defined, no party ever threatened to secede or even expressed interest in leaving the state.<sup>124</sup>

The nature of ethnicity within Afghanistan is vastly different than that of the Balkans. Although, “ethnicity is often assumed to be the natural partner of nationalism and the nation state,”<sup>125</sup> in Afghanistan ethnicity did not play this role. There is such a range of diversity at the local level that social organization is based on local kinship groups and regional communities. Major national ethnic labels acted only for political purposes and analysis. Thomas Barfield states that, “although it (Afghan nationalism) explained the outlines of Afghan politics to external entities, it did not mobilize the Afghans themselves.”<sup>126</sup>

This could have possibly been due to the fact that after the Soviet War, old ethnic hierarchies were broken down in which Pashtuns were most favored, the Turks were ignored, and the Shia Hazaras were discriminated against. After the fall of the communist regime, each controlled its own region. Then in 1995, the Taliban regimes movement spread across the country and many ethnicities saw it as a vehicle to restore their own dominance, especially the Pashtuns, but when the U.S. intervened after the 9/11 attacks, the support of the Taliban broke down and ethnic-based regional leadership returned. This left a vacuum at the national level and there was no move by any ethnic group to fight over the establishment of a new government.

The Afghans saw their multi-ethnic state as the norm, not something to fight over like in the Balkans. They knew that all factions were so closely engaged in negotiations to control their own region at the local level that they did not fear being displaced by a new government. And when the different groups fight, it is not for their specific ethnic group, it is for their regional faction and usually over resources.

A very different ethnic atmosphere and struggle occurred in the Balkans. As we witnessed above, in the Balkan region a new central government was extremely threatening to the minorities of the country, which gave rise to ethno-nationalism. The differences could possibly be due to both different histories and cultural beliefs, but there

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<sup>124</sup> Kamp, Marianne. Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan is not the Balkans: Ethnicity and Its Political Consequences from a Central Eurasian Perspective*. Central Eurasian Studies Review. Vol. 4 No. 1 Winter 2005.

<sup>125</sup> Kamp and Thomas. p.5.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. p.7.

was definitely not the same ethnic nationalism that ravaged the Balkans, in Afghanistan. Yet, the Balkan model seems to pervade most analysis of the region. This is an obstacle in understanding the politics within Afghanistan and how to go about approaching the challenges posed by the country<sup>127</sup>. NATO is not accustomed to this type of conflict and though the Alliance has a great deal of experience in peace-keeping and state-building from the Balkans, it does not have much experience with dealing with this type of ethnic atmosphere. NATO will need to use empirical cases and historical examples that better capture the current situation in Afghanistan.

### **Conclusion**

Although the initial response on the part of NATO in Afghanistan was slow and the prospect of success is unclear due to divisions within NATO and with the United States, regarding goals, strategies, effectiveness and contributions, positive lessons have been produced for NATO. Just like Bosnia and Kosovo before it, Afghanistan is but the latest episode of NATO's fight to prove its legitimacy and usefulness. It is difficult to assume or estimate NATO's success in Afghanistan in the future, but we must be cautious in claiming that the campaign is a complete failure. The Balkan experience of the 1990s suggests that the alliance is effective when challenged, especially in regards to ethnic division. Although the cultural situations do differ, we must remember that NATO before the Balkans had absolutely no experience in peacekeeping or development. Although, Afghanistan is a unique and difficult operation for NATO, it cannot be said that it is the crisis that will finally bring NATO down. Both the Balkans and Afghanistan have had and continue to have significant impacts of the development of NATO strategies. These lessons can hopefully be used in the future to optimize peacekeeping operations.

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<sup>127</sup> Kamp. p.9.



## Chapter Four

### The Rise of Private Military Companies

Kelli Wells

Private Military Companies are a phenomenon in need of NATO's attention. It has not been since at least the fourteenth century that private military forces have been used in warfare.<sup>128</sup> These private forces were initially known as mercenaries and have now evolved into corporations as private security firms. Yet there lie many differences between the private military companies (PMCs) and their predecessor mercenaries. Throughout history, mercenaries were for-profit entities that were loyal to no one government but to their payments. The state's control over monopoly of violence has indeed been more of an exception rather than the rule in the history of security.<sup>129</sup> The nation-state itself is a relatively new body only coming into existence 400 years ago.<sup>130</sup> It was the "common interest in building state power vis-à-vis society [that] produced an international norm against mercenarism." Initially, mercenaries were hired by the state to wage war against other states, yet most often these mercenaries would plunder and pillage villages, thus violating any treaties made between two states. This issue of accountability of mercenary action essentially eliminated the order, giving way to the creation of nation-states.<sup>131</sup>

Yet, there are a number of differences that characterize the modern day mercenary. A mercenary in the 18<sup>th</sup> century was often a foreigner serving and fighting in battles of other states, yet now they may come from a foreign nation but are sponsored by governments as well as multinational corporations. Secondly, while mercenaries were not bound long-term to any entity and only to its personal rewards, now PMCs are driven by

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<sup>128</sup> William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power : Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

<sup>129</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) p.154.

<sup>130</sup> Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, & Sovereigns*, (Princeton, NJ: The Princeton University Press, 1994) p.26- 29.

<sup>131</sup> Thomson. p.85-87.

large sums of business profit and reputation, whether it be good or bad. While mercenaries of the past were free-lance, short-term workers with no national boundaries, a PMC functions in a legal and public market. And while earlier mercenaries lacked in organizational capabilities, they primarily focused on combat. On the other hand, the modern-day mercenaries have a corporate structure, with highly skilled professionals, operating in not only warfare but consulting and training, and with a varied clientele. It appears that the modern day mercenary has re-emerged, more powerful, driven and wider in scope. The question is not whether these firms are ‘more advanced’ entities of human organization than the conventional military, but rather does their ability to surpass state capability pose more of a problem than it solves?

It was only after the vacuum that was presented after the Cold War, the end of the strategic patronage of superpowers around the globe, which allowed the re-emergence of mercenaries. With the end of the Soviet Union came the orderly downsizing of military personnel, which left a surplus of ex-military officials up for grabs for the privatized security industry, thus the birth of the modern private military companies.<sup>132</sup> This was the beginning of the gradual breakdown of the Weberian notion of monopoly of violence; where the ability to control this ‘violence’ was dissembled and distributed to private entities within the state. Throughout the decades following until today, PMCs have been used globally.

Much discussion on PMCs has been negative in the mind of the public, as well as governments and international communities. The notorious case of Blackwater operations in Iraq contracted by the US government comes to mind, where “preliminary report of findings by the Interior Ministry, the National Security Ministry and the Defense Ministry stated that ‘the murder of citizens in cold blood in the Nisour area by Blackwater is considered a terrorist action against civilians just like any other terrorist operation.’”<sup>133</sup> Given the negative press that PMCs have received, such as the Blackwater

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<sup>132</sup> Rouba Al-Fattal, “The Privatization of Peace: Private Military Firms, Conflict Resolution and the Future of NATO,” *Central European Journal of International & Security Studies*, Vo.1 Issue 1., June 2007, [http://www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol1-1/CEJISS\\_Vol1\\_Issue1\\_full\\_version.pdf](http://www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol1-1/CEJISS_Vol1_Issue1_full_version.pdf). 52. (accessed January 28, 2011).

<sup>133</sup> James Glanz and Sabrina Tavernise, “Security Firms Faces Criminal Charges in Iraq,” *The New York Times* (23 Sept 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/world/middleeast/23blackwater.html> (accessed February 16, 2011).

scandal, it is important to note that these PMCs, while receiving massive criticism, still have an undeniable impact on the outcomes of combat, as will be exemplified later.

The emergence of Private Military Companies (PMCs) is a phenomenon that NATO must address. Through NATO oversight, PMCs will be put to effective use as they have in the Kosovo and Bosnian War in the past. While it is important to note that PMCs have served alongside NATO and its member forces in the past, the eruption of unregulated PMCs has led to further chaos in certain regions. NATO is an organization with social capital, reputation of trust, and historically unprecedented institutions that have dealt with new problems. It is important to call NATO's attention to the benefits that result from incorporating PMCs into their agenda. NATO should construct a mechanism of control and regulation that monitors the activities of PMCs as well as procedures that qualify them.

### **Definitions**

Before proceeding to the core argument, there is a need to explain the different definitions of Private Military Companies. According to P.W. Singer of *Corporate Warriors*, among the private security industry, different companies are assigned to different locations within the battlefield, just as the stage on the military theater, in regards of level of impact, training, supplies, etc.<sup>134</sup> Accordingly, the three different fields in the industry are (a) military provider firms, (b) military consulting firms, and (c) military support firms.

The type (a) military provider firm refers to the combatants who stand on the forefront of conflict. They engage in "direct command and control of field units" and often are allowed to act as leadership in the battalion by those who employ them. Clients whom employ type (a) have poor military capacity and/or are in a situation of imminent danger. These firms would include Sandline, Airscan, and Blackwater.

The type (b) military consulting firm refers to those firms that provide recommendation and advice to military operations. Most often their recommendations are "strategic, operational, and organizational analysis that is...integral to the function or restructuring of armed forces," thus the burden of combat lies in the restructured client

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<sup>134</sup> P.W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security," *International Security*, Vol. 26. No.3, Dec. 2001, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092094> (accessed January 24, 2011) p.201.

and not those employed.<sup>135</sup> The type (b) firms are favored due to their expertise and quality. Often these firms hire ex-military officers that are well trained and equipped to handle the demands of their clients. Clients of this firm are most likely not in any immediate danger and thus these firms are more lucrative and longer in term. Type (b) firms include Levdan, Vinnell, MPRI, McKinsey, Accenture and SAIC.

Finally, the third type (c) military support firms refer to companies that provide maintenance and management services that are often supplementary to the actual military forces. Although they may not engage, direct or organize combat, they give aid through things such as technical support or transportation. These firms are often used in imminent danger and hazardous situations, but are also long lasting in its ventures. Firms under this category include Ronco, Brown & Root services and Watan Risk Management.<sup>136</sup>

### **The Problems**

Having understood the different types of private military forces there are, it is essential to understand how each one poses different problems. Although there has been wide and mainly negative discussion on PMCs and how they operate, little attention has been given to how these PMCs could be used in a more effective and less detrimental manner. First, it is important to understand the problems they pose and how NATO regulation efforts will resolve each one.

#### *Contractual Dilemma*

As Singer phrases it, the “contractual dilemma” is a significant problem where the incentives and goals of the client often conflict with the profit seeking PMC. In cases of companies who employ type (b) firms, the power of decision-making shifts from the client to the PMC, enabling the PMC to operate in its favor.

#### *Checks and Balances*

Another problem when hiring PMCs is the lack of supervision over the PMCs’ activities. Furthermore, PMCs often function in extraterritorial fields, creating difficulties of national oversight. Thus, since PMCs are profit making entities, they are more likely to try and prolong their contracts for their own means or “avoid taking undue risks that

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid. p.201.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p.202.

might endanger their own corporate assets,” which would only result in a conflict that is long overdue as has occurred previously in some cases.<sup>137</sup>

### *Dependency*

In worse situations, a client may become overly reliant on these PMCs, in which case, the client may be left without defense, creating the issue of dependency. Or in some cases, the PMC may override its client, as was the case in Sierra Leone in 1996, where a PMC aided the coup of the very leader that hired them due to a better “working relationship” with the local general.<sup>138</sup> Due to the fact that PMCs face little penalties from international law and often operate on foreign soil, the PMC has little incentive to remain loyal to their contract if things turn sour. Thus, there is no guarantee of security when dealing with a PMC. As Singer claims, “in game-theoretic terms, each interaction with a private actor is *sui generis*... exchanges in the international security market may take the form of one-shot games rather than guaranteed repeated plays.”<sup>139</sup>

### *Hidden Motives*

Furthermore, there are cases where the PMCs’ incentives to fight may differ from those of the clients’. There have been cases in nations such as Angola, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone, where weak and poor regimes offer, not cash as compensation for PMC services but, rights to mineral lands and oil. Valuable resources of a single nation are then lost to change short-term outcomes having long-term consequences on the nation’s wealth. Thus it is in the interest of the international community that these PMCs create further disruption to a nation’s future.

### *Entrance into the Market*

The challenge presented, with the entrance of PMCs into the commercial market, not only detract from the power of the state, but can also seek to threaten it. With multinational corporations and drug cartels growing in size and wealth, the dichotomy of state as the sole operator of military capabilities is gradually diminishing. More importantly, the threat of weak states employing PMCs and becoming subdued to their military counterpart only adds to the security threat of NATO. With military weapons and deployment on sale in the market, it could add to a new balance of power among nations,

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p.205. PMCs have prolonged their contracts in the Biafra conflict of the 1970s and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 1997-99.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid. p.206.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p.206.

where politics are altered and relations adjusted.

#### *White and Black Market*

Another concern regards PMCs being hired by non-state actors, which often poses a threat to national security. There have been instances in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Congo where rebel groups have hired PMCs of type (a) military capabilities. A firm known as Hod Hahanit, was hired by Colombian militants who were involved in “the assassination of two Colombian presidential candidates and the bombing of a civilian airliner.”<sup>140</sup> However, in some cases, non-hostile non-state actors such as the United Nations (UN) also hire PMCs. The UN hires mostly type (c) firms to help with logistics, transportation, consultations and more.<sup>141</sup>

#### *Human Rights Violations*

Finally, PMCs are notorious for their violations in many human rights issues. While it is in their long-term interest to maintain good publicity, this often conflicts with a business that sells violence for a living. This is not to say that PMCs are entirely barbaric, however, often human rights are only secondary in priorities after monetary interests. Another dilemma in dealing with PMCs is that they are often operating on foreign land and are not subject to international law. With the lack of supervision over PMC activities, as stated earlier, it makes it very difficult to prosecute them.

The problems stated above are very pressing concerns for the international community. Yet as an international constabulary entity interested in peacekeeping, NATO is capable and responsible to limit the harm that PMCs could cause and oversee regulation in order to provide a positive impact as will be exemplified below.

#### **NATO Relations with PMCs in the Yugoslav War**

The private military industry still remains in its infancy and it is in the way that we nurture these companies that will determine its outcome. As noted previously, these modern day mercenaries are a re-emerging occurrence ever since the end of the Cold War. Here we will examine two cases in which PMCs have helped to aid and maintain peace.

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid. p.213.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. p.213.

The Yugoslav wars of 1991 to 1995 erupted after the declaration of war by the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and ethnic genocide of the Croats and Bosnian minority. Initially, what began as a war of the oppressor against the oppressed soon turned into a civil war between all three fractions of the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats.<sup>142</sup> It was not until 1995 that NATO led forces alongside the United States (US) to intervene as a peacekeeping force. Here, private military forces fought alongside NATO troops, although not hired by them. Although these PMCs were of type (c), they often found themselves in hazardous situations, giving them reason to bear arms in certain instances. In the Bosnian War of 1995, Defense Systems Limited (DSL), a U.K. based PMC, was hired to “provide transport, maintenance, communications, and engineering services for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),” furthermore, “the United States hired the Virginia based DynCorp to supply ceasefire monitors for Kosovo in 1998 [and] although the DynCorp employees were unarmed, they were deployed into a potential combat environment instead of regular soldiers.”<sup>143</sup>

When the Kosovo War broke out, most non-governmental organizations, such as the Red Cross, were not prepared for “the mass exodus that occurred...and potential human disaster that loomed if these refugees could not be fed and housed immediately.” These NGOs lack the very structure to be able to facilitate these functions, thus they turned to NATO for aid and “the military in turn, contracted the job out to [Brown & Roots Services, yet] NATO spokesmen would take credit for the good publicity that this last aspect of the operation generated.”<sup>144</sup> Brown & Roots Services had provided for 100 percent of the soldiers’ food, maintenance of vehicles, hazardous material management, water, 80 percent of fuel and 75 percent of construction and transportation.<sup>145</sup> Thus much of the US troops, roughly a fifth of the NATO Kosovo Forces, were essentially dependant on PMCs.

As stated previously, NATO relations in the Balkans have proved to be positive and effective politically, economically and socially. Much of NATO’s success in bringing Milosevic to the peace talks and eventually the Dayton Peace Agreement could

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<sup>142</sup> Al-Fattal, p.58.

<sup>143</sup> James K. Wither, “European Security and Private Military Companies: The Prospects for Privatized ‘Battlegroups,’” *The Quarterly Journal* 66, no. 9 (2005). p.115.

<sup>144</sup> P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2003). p.145.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.* p.145.

be attributed to not only NATO forces that were deployed in the Bosnian War but also to the private military firms that fought alongside them. NATO effort in the Kosovo War that led to the independence of the region and democratic development alike is attributed to peacekeeping forces as well as PMCs that provided material assistance. Thus, while PMCs foster a negative image and present many difficulties, in some cases they demonstrate valuable and potential for progress.

### **PMC Problems in Afghanistan**

Yet while some types of PMCs may be useful in combat servicing, there are cases where PMCs do more harm than they do good. In a report headed by Chairman John Tierney and the Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, they assert the questionable outsourcing in the security supply chain in Afghanistan, which allegedly supplies warlords and the very insurgents that the military is trying to combat. As a part of the Afghanistan peacekeeping operation, it is in NATO's interests to eliminate these types of threats to security that PMCs may induce.

The report entitled *Warlord Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan*, begins with an investigation into the Department of Defense's Afghan Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract. Evidence indicates that the US military involvement in Afghanistan has created a supply chain that results in the empowering of oligarchies led by warlords across the nation. By granting the rights to transport military equipment to private contractors, they in turn provide payments to, not only the Taliban, but a corrupt Afghani government as well. With rampant corruption at bay and enabling of warlords, violence is further perpetuated while also supplying illicit markets. It seems that without revision of the current situation of PMCs, specifically in Afghanistan, the situation may only become worse. As the NATO goal towards creating a NATO international intelligence agency, it is in NATO's interest to prevent cultivating Taliban insurgents, PMC oligarchies and a corrupt government in Afghanistan.

Similar to the Kosovo case, with supplies by Brown & Roots Services, it is in the supply and aiding of troops handled by PMCs where the problem has erupted. As Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton stated in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when "offload[ing] a ship in Karachi and by the time whatever it is – muffins for our soldiers' breakfasts or anti-IED equipment – gets to where [they're]

headed [in Afghanistan], it goes through a lot of hands... [a]nd one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money.”<sup>146</sup> The primary contractor for supplying the goods is the HNT, who then subcontracts out to different security providers who will transport the supplies ‘safely’ with armed protection. Thus, the US pays roughly 2.16 billion dollars to the HNT, which then hires eight different PMCs of Afghan, American and Middle Eastern origin. This would include “typical convoy[s] of 300 supply trucks going from Kabul to Kandahar... [that] will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.”<sup>147</sup> It is claimed by these PMCs that over the course of these transports the company has lost hundreds of men in a year and there is frequent combat with insurgents, rival companies and other criminal entities, yet the validity of these statements are still in question due to the concealed nature of PMCs. “Business is done in the ebb and flow of il/legalites.”<sup>148</sup> The strategic method of carrying military equipment on trucks accompanied by private security contractors funded by Defense Department creates a situation of “zero visibility” and also perpetuates the strength of warlords, corrupt officials and insurgents.

The chain begins with the deals that are made between the HNT and different PMCs to create warlords. These Afghan Private Military Contractors are formally hired under the Afghan Ministry of Interior, however, in reality they seek to undermine the Afghan government. These contractors merely use this title as a PMC to obtain wealth, legal status and empower their private armies; in essence the emergence of warlords. A prominent PMC in use is the Watan Risk Management firm headed by Commander Ruhullah whom receives over ten million dollars each year.<sup>149</sup> The response is that many “Afghans fear the Americans [and with it the NATO alliance] will leave behind an Afghan government too weak to do its work, and strongmen without any popular support [warlords].”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> John F. Tierney, Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, (Washington: Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 2010) p.1.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. p.2.


<sup>148</sup> Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). p.89.

<sup>149</sup> Tierney, p.23.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p.54.

Furthermore, with the development of these new oligarchies controlled by warlords, the line between legal markets and illicit markets begin to blur. The money that is supplied by the US flows into the pockets of the private security contractors who pay off insurgents. In some cases, these insurgents illicitly tax these contractors. In addition, not only is there money pumped into the illicit markets of the Taliban, but also Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of President Karzai, who is accused of having paid these insurgents. It appears that “to attack certain fronts of unregulated trade would be to attack some of the fronts of the economy in general – and the business leaders who control them.”<sup>151</sup>

**Figure 1: Department of Defense Hierarchy of Military Command.**<sup>152</sup>



<sup>151</sup> Nordstrom. p.89.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p.14.

In addition, there is a limited amount of visibility by the US government over these interactions with these PMCs. (See Figure 1). Within the US Defense Department alone there is a complex hierarchy that enables the functioning of these PMCs, causing a lack of oversight and transparency. It is due to this structure of military command that causes this protection racket funded by the United States. Furthermore, the majority of PMCs hired in Afghanistan are primarily local PMCs. The approximate total of PMC personnel is 14,439, of which 114 are US citizens, 409 are third country nationals and 13,916 are local nationals. This contributes to the enabling and empowering of warlords equipped with a massive number of weapons.<sup>153</sup>

It is in the interest of both the US Government and NATO command to secure the Afghan region. While there is an immediate need for the US to revise its convoluted structure within the department of defense, it is also in the interest of NATO as a constabulary body to consider that NATO/US operations in Afghanistan, as well as any future conflict, are most likely to require the use of PMCs. Therefore, it should be the mission of NATO as a peacekeeping force to regulate PMCs.

### **Proposition of NATO Enforcement and Incorporating the Regulation of PMCs**

In the NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, the lack of any reference to the posed threats by PMCs is alarming. It is through NATO oversight that will allow for PMCs to be put to effective use as they have in the Kosovo and Bosnian War in the past. While it is important to note that PMCs have served alongside NATO and its member forces in the past, the eruption of unregulated PMCs has led to further chaos in certain regions. NATO is an organization with social capital, trust and flexible ability for crisis management. Thus, NATO should construct a mechanism of control and regulation that monitors the activities of PMCs as well as procedures that qualify them.

This Task Force proposes that NATO develop a policy document, signed on by all NATO members, that establishes a NATO Standard on PMC activities. NATO members

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<sup>153</sup> Tierney. p.15.

signing on to this document will abide by NATO set guidelines. Thus any PMC, employed by any government in NATO, that falls below or violates the NATO Standard is obligated to immediate termination of the contract made between the PMC and said government. This treaty will signify that any PMC that is hired by NATO member states are enforceable by law and are subject to court decisions. Any NATO member country will be allowed to indict any other member state or their PMC for falling below standard. In this way the NATO Standard will be maintained through mutual correction.

The NATO Standard structure will look to the guidelines set by the Montreux Document. The Montreux Document is an initiative launched by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Montreux Document is an international document to describe international law as it applies to the activities of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the context of an armed conflict. This is a document concerning the dialogue that 17 states have signed on to, including: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States of America.<sup>154</sup> It contains around 70 recommendations to states employing PMSCs and the international law that applies accordingly. However, this document is legally non-binding, and is thus more of a general guideline about PMSCs. Hence, NATO will implement a similar version to the Montreux Document to allow the policy document to be legally binding to every NATO member, which will ensure the prevention of PMCs from violating human rights as well as intervening with military activity and security concerns.

The UN has already established a document on the regulation of mercenaries.<sup>155</sup> Yet, the *UN's International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries*, strongly discourages states from the employment of PMCs. However the UN recommendation is an elusive concept. It is undeniable that the impact of PMCs cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing

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<sup>154</sup> Paul Seger and Philip Spoerri, "The Montreux Document." International Committee of the Red Cross, (17 September 2008) [http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc\\_002\\_0996.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf) (accessed January 20, 2011).

<sup>155</sup> "International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries," (New York: United Nations, 1989) <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm> (accessed February 13, 2011).

the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. Thus while the original North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, Article 1 states:

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.<sup>156</sup>

It is also important for NATO to understand that it is not realistic to eliminate the use of PMCs, and that there exists a limit to the scope and jurisdiction of the United Nation Conventions. As noted previously, PMCs can shape the outcome of NATO operations in favor of its goal when applied appropriately. In addition, NATO should not fall back in addressing the issue of PMCs as the UN, and should follow suit to resolve the matter in its own method.

As a long-term goal, it is also in NATO's interest to include PMC regulations in its Partnership for Peace Programs. By including it in a previously designed structure, it will be less costly. It will bring the issue to the table of not only NATO members but other important players as well. Moreover, often the employment of PMCs are by nations that are highly unstable and frequent in regime change. Hence, by including NATO partners in its long-term goal of PMC oversight, this will allow the gradual solidification of international security and the objective of NATO as a constabulary body.

### **The Consequences of a NATO Regulatory Body**

NATO is best fit for the regulation of PMCs for its flexibility and ability to adapt in crisis situations as epitomized by the Kosovo and Bosnian incident. With the implementation of a NATO Standard on the Private Military Industry, the problems stated above would be either eliminated or restrained in the least. The issue of transparency giving way to the contractual dilemma, problem of checks and balances, dependency and hidden motives will be resolved. With NATO as a constabulary force, such issues empowering the PMCs will be kept under control. With the issuing of a NATO Standard, many PMCs are less likely to cause problems due to the trustworthy reputation NATO upholds, and with a NATO seal of approval, PMCs are more inclined

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<sup>156</sup> "The North Atlantic Treaty," (Washington: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949) [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed February 18, 2011).

to function within the open market where their good name is upheld and not the illicit ones. In addition, by working in the ‘white’ market, PMCs have more incentive to abide by human rights laws due to not only public scrutiny under NATO guard but also their threat of contract termination.

NATO will act as a filter of PMCs, as an international body with the political, economical and societal trust and reputation, by establishing its legitimacy as an internationally recognized body of security through its standard to prevent PMC operations from taking the wrong turn and doing more harm than it does good. This would be beneficial to nations such as the US whom employ many PMCs.

### **Conclusion**

It is clear that PMCs are a force that NATO members and other nations alike find increasingly difficult to ignore. The two incidences where PMCs were used alongside NATO forces and how they affected by either adding to or detracting from NATO military capabilities are quintessential examples. With the breakdown of Yugoslavia, many PMCs proved vital to operations conducted by not only the US military but those by NATO alike and cannot be denied. Recent events in Afghanistan have uncovered that these PMCs that provide a supply route for military aid not only contribute to the creation of warlords in Afghanistan but also grant funding to the insurgents for guaranteed safe passage. It is such issues that are outside of the NATO realm that NATO fails to consider is important to address. Not only is it important but also as an international institution reputed for its adaptable qualities in crisis management, conflict prevention and peace keeping, it is the duty of NATO to regulate these PMCs.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote in *War and Anti-War*, that there is a trend that suggests a gradual process of ‘demassification,’ where the society is gearing towards fragmentation, individualism and lone successful entities integrating within this dissembled society to achieve success while maintaining its general stability.<sup>157</sup> While their novel suggests the ‘third wave,’ which is an eruption of non-lethal warfare in terms of hackers, scientific weaponry and war over knowledge, the current discourse of the private military industry could suggest a different path of warfare through commodified

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<sup>157</sup> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

violence. In Allison Stanger's *One Nation Under Contract* she claims that a nation's foreign policy is not just for diplomats and politicians anymore. While Walmart is advocating for energy efficiency, Angelina Jolie is the representative of UNHCR, Google's combating issues of neutrality on the internet and Facebook having a population reaching 500 million, third after China and India, the dated definition of a nation's power is slowly disintegrating and with it such institutions like the PMCs are increasingly becoming prominent.<sup>158</sup> In the US, PMCs have not only overpowered the field of foreign policy, but in Homeland Security, intelligence sectors but also in US AID programs.<sup>159</sup> The Yugoslav War and Afghanistan War are two very distinct conflicts, and thus while PMCs worked in the prior it failed in the latter. Yet NATO, as an internationally recognized body that wields the ability to adapt to emerging threats, as it has in the past, has the capability to administer these PMCs that nation-states are ill equipped to control. It should be a priority of NATO to recognize PMCs as an imminent security threat and seek to resolve these issues immediately. The conventional idea of warfare is slowly disintegrating and the notion of security is becoming redefined. NATO should take this moment as an opportunity to improve their role as a diplomatic body and contribute to peacemaking efforts through its regulatory policy on PMCs. With this, it will ensure NATO's position as an international constabulary.

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<sup>158</sup> "Social Networks and Statehood: The Future is Another Country," *The Economist*, (22, July 2010) <http://www.economist.com/node/16646000> (accessed February 19, 2011).

<sup>159</sup> Allison Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).



**Part II**

**NATO and Armaments**

**Lisa Bergstrom and Chloe Jackson**



## Chapter Five

### Under the Shield of Damocles: Missile Defense and the Future of NATO-Russian Relations

Lisa Bergstrom

For centuries Russia has been, to a greater or lesser extent, on the margins of the West, geographically, economically, culturally, and militarily. It is this long history of semi-isolation that makes Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's call for a common European home resonate far beyond the issue of German unification, at least for this author. Over two decades later, a common European home surely exists, but while the United States is a member, Russia largely is not. The fundamental obstacle to Atlantic-Russian integration is almost entirely one of perception: a deeply embedded attitude of mutual distrust, which is sustained by the continuing existence of nuclear deterrence, an inherently adversarial relationship. As Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin write:

[The] inexorable dynamics of mutual nuclear deterrence have acquired a growing and negative "feedback effect" on political relations between former opponents, sustaining a muted though multifarious fear: of the supposed evil intentions of the "strategic partner"; of inadvertent or accidental nuclear attack; of possible loss of control over nuclear weapons leading to their acquisition by rebel groups or terrorists; of the one's plans to gain control over the other's nuclear weapons or to deliver a disarming strike against nuclear sites—all this in the absence of any real political basis for suspecting such horrific scenarios or actions....Although it would be presumptuous to claim that Russian democratic development and economic reform directly depend on doing away with nuclear deterrence, transforming deterrence as part of a process of forging closer security relations with the West would certainly advance Russia's progress toward democracy and economic integration with the West.<sup>160</sup>

Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has proven that "doing away with deterrence" requires more than just declaring that the Cold War is over and pretending deterrence no longer exists. Instead, Arbatov and Dvorkin propose that Russia and the US can eliminate the deterrence relationship with "full-scale collaboration...in developing and deploying [ballistic missile defense] systems. Indeed, the powers that deploy and maintain a joint BMD system cannot, by definition, be opponents who deter each other with nuclear

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<sup>160</sup> Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006): p.6, 10.

weapons. They must be full-scale military allies....”<sup>161</sup> The authors envision this as the final step in a long and incremental process of confidence-building measures. However, a surprising new development has pushed it to the top of the agenda: potential NATO-Russian cooperation on a European missile shield.

In the words of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, missile defense cooperation is “a true turning point” in Atlantic-Russian relations, but in which direction remains to be seen.<sup>162</sup> When in 2007 President George W. Bush announced a plan to build BMD facilities in Eastern Europe to counter possible Iranian missiles, Moscow protested vociferously that the shield was actually intended to undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.<sup>163</sup> The controversy helped bring US-Russian relations to their lowest point since the Cold War. Following President Barack Obama’s 2009 “reset” of relations, his reconfiguration of the Bush missile defense plan to focus on short- and medium-range missiles, and the plan’s incorporation into NATO, Russian participation in European BMD has become a topic of serious consideration. The obstacles to cooperation, whether technological, political, or cultural, are great, but the consequences of failure may be greater. As Russian President Dmitri Medvedev warned recently, repeating a familiar theme, “We are facing the following alternative in the next ten years: either we reach an agreement on missile defense and create a fully-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation, or if we fail to do so, a new round of arms race will start, and we will have to adopt decisions on the deployment of new strategic weapons.”<sup>164</sup> Thus, BMD cooperation holds the potential either to eliminate an outdated security relationship and smooth the path to Russian-Western integration, or to undermine the relationship and push Russia and the West further apart.

This chapter argues that close NATO-Russian cooperation on European missile defense is, for all its problems, the only feasible way to prevent relations between Russia and the West from deteriorating, let alone to strengthen such relations. Russia opposes US-led missile defense in Europe because it challenges Russia’s self-identity as a great

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<sup>161</sup> Arbatov and Dvorkin. p.152.

<sup>162</sup> *BBC News*, “Russia ‘to work with NATO on missile defence shield,’” 20 Nov. 2010, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11803931>>.

<sup>163</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *Shield of Dreams: Missile Defense and U.S.-Russian Nuclear Strategy*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2008): p.13-14.

<sup>164</sup> *RIA Novosti*, “Russia, West have 10 years for full accord on missile defense – Medvedev,” 30 Nov. 2010. Web.

power with a sphere of privileged interests, and because Russia rationally fears that the open-ended plan could threaten its nuclear deterrent within the next decade or so. However, giving in to Russian demands by canceling or severely curtailing European missile defense is not an option, as support for missile defense and suspicion or outright hostility toward Russia is a powerful factor in US (and to some extent European) politics, not to mention that this would leave Europe unprotected from a missile strike. Cooperation, therefore, represents a narrow path between the Scylla and Charybdis of Russian national security fears on the one hand, and US domestic politics on the other.

Beginning with a claim for the necessity of engaging Russia on serious and mutually beneficial terms, this essay analyzes the obstacles to and opportunity in NATO-Russian BMD cooperation. After providing a history of NATO-Russian relations and missile defense issues, the essay examines the reasons for Russian opposition to American BMD plans and the factors influencing potential Russian cooperation. The essay then discusses political opinion toward BMD and Russia in the United States and among its NATO allies. After this the essay explores what form BMD cooperation might take, followed by recommendations for US and NATO policy.

### **Why NATO Must Engage Russia**

Considering the enormous difficulties in potential BMD cooperation with Russia, how far should NATO be willing to go to accommodate Russian demands before deciding to go it alone? While Russian facilities and technology might be useful, NATO is capable of building a missile shield without Russian help. Moscow's response to the BMD plans has been less than constructive, including threatening to place nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave, accusing the US of making a hegemonic power grab and threatening to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As mentioned above, Russia is also engaging in a sort of nuclear blackmail by warning that failure to reach agreement, presumably on Russian terms, will result in a new arms race. It is possible Russia has agreed to cooperate only to sabotage the shield and spread discord within NATO, leaving Europe vulnerable to missile attacks and Russian manipulation. Russia's insistence on a combined sectoral system, rather than separate coordinated systems, may be an attempt to do just that, as such a bold step may be almost impossible to negotiate. One analyst has concluded that, under such conditions,

“taking Russia ‘seriously’...would be both a moral and strategic disaster for the United States and Europe, not to mention former Soviet republics.”<sup>165</sup>

Despite these legitimate concerns, BMD cooperation with Russia is both possible and desirable. Russia has been moving toward agreement with the US threat assessment of Iran, as demonstrated by its recent support of US-backed sanctions, and it possesses technology, facilities, and land that would increase the range and effectiveness of a European or Eurasian missile shield.<sup>166</sup> Yet the need for NATO-Russian collaboration goes far beyond missile defense. The problems facing the West today, be they Afghanistan, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy, or climate change, require Russian assistance. Russia is a nuclear and energy superpower surrounded by the world’s most troubled regions. Cooperation may be hard, but ignoring Russian interests will bring misfortune to both Russia and the West. Meaningful BMD cooperation, since it would, in effect, make NATO and Russia military allies, would finally surmount each side’s deep-seated tendency to view the other as an adversary. Conflicts over NATO’s enlargement to post-Soviet countries could give way to discussions on Russian membership. If cooperation proves impossible, however, then the chances of Russia moving closer to the West, and thus to democracy, will greatly suffer.

### **NATO-Russian Relations after the Cold War: A History of Missed Opportunities**

Despite their ongoing conflicts, NATO and Russia have clearly done much to overcome their long legacy of mutual hostility. NATO, an organization founded to protect America’s Western European allies from a Soviet invasion, states in its latest Strategic Concept: “NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia...Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined....”<sup>167</sup> Although still indicative of the radical post-Cold War shift in relations, Russian statements are more ambiguous, ranging from the 2010 Military Doctrine, which lists NATO enlargement as Russia’s main military danger, to a recent

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<sup>165</sup> Stephen Blank, "The Real Reset: Moscow Refights the Cold War," *World Affairs* (Sep./Oct. 2010): p.81-82.

<sup>166</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "Missile Defence: Towards Practical Cooperation with Russia," *Survival* 52 (Aug.-Sept. 2010): p.121-130.

<sup>167</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, Nov. 2010.

Moscow Times article by a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, stating, “Of course, Russia will never knock on the alliance’s door, but if NATO invites Russia to join, it will be difficult to decline.”<sup>168</sup> Unfortunately, this fitful twenty-year trudge toward partnership, with much progress but many setbacks, represents a failure of historic proportions to fulfill the promise created by the fall of the Soviet Union of an all-encompassing common European home.

The years 1991-3 are sometimes called the “honeymoon” in relations between Russia and the West. In December of 1991, even before the official dissolution of the USSR, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the heads of NATO governments, raising the possibility of “Russia’s membership in NATO” as a “long-term political aim.”<sup>169</sup> However, NATO, at that time uninterested in enlargement and worried about the uncertainties of Russia’s future foreign policy, dismissed the proposal as a mere hypothetical, and Russia did not raise the issue again. While the seriousness of the Russian proposal can be debated, in hindsight, NATO’s silence was the first major missed opportunity in NATO-Russian relations.

The honeymoon was troubled by the entrenched suspicion toward NATO of Russian government officials, many of whom had worked in the Soviet government and feared a potential eastward expansion of NATO. The Yeltsin government consistently made clear its opposition to NATO enlargement, except during an August 1993 trip to Poland, when President Yeltsin supported a declaration stating that Polish membership in NATO “in the interests of overall European integration does not go against...the interests of Russia.”<sup>170</sup> Although Russia tried to retract this position, Yeltsin had inadvertently put enlargement on the NATO agenda, eventually culminating in the 1999 admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and the 2004 admission of the Baltic states. Russians felt humiliated and betrayed: according to US Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker had personally promised Gorbachev that NATO would expand “not one inch” into former

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<sup>168</sup> President of Russia, *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation]*, Kremlin.ru, 5 Feb. 2010. Alexander Kramarenko, “5 Reasons Why Russia Could Join NATO,” *Moscow Times*, 9 Dec. 2010. Web.

<sup>169</sup> Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: from Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?* (London: Routledge, 2006) p.51.

<sup>170</sup> Smith. p.52-54.

Warsaw Pact states if the USSR would support a united Germany in NATO.<sup>171</sup> The decision to expand NATO eastward marked a critical juncture in Russian-Atlantic relations, when Russia turned away from the West and back towards a centuries-old Great Power ideology.<sup>172</sup> In the mid-1990s, George F. Kennan called this decision potentially one of the most disastrous in US foreign policy.<sup>173</sup> However, the real mistake was not inviting former Soviet states into the Atlantic security community, but in doing so before creating a strong and stable NATO-Russian partnership, thereby leading Russia to fear re-marginalization and closing a window of opportunity that must somehow be forced back open. The question is, can BMD cooperation re-open this window?

### **Missile Defense in NATO-Russian and US-Russian Relations**

There is some precedent for missile defense cooperation, and it suggests that the main determinant of success or failure is politics. On the one hand, political will can overcome the ubiquitous technological, economic, and legal problems; on the other, cooperation is always at the mercy of fickle political relations. Attempts at BMD cooperation began in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan tried to convince the USSR of the defensive nature of his Strategic Defense Initiative by offering to share the technology that he hoped it would someday produce, despite the fact that several years earlier the administration had tried to prevent the USSR from acquiring even a turbine generator.<sup>174</sup> Needless to say, Moscow rejected the offer. Since the Cold War, the record of achievement has been ambiguous: while the Russian-American Observational Satellite system (RAMOS) and the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), two bilateral Russian-American ventures, never got off the ground, theater missile defense (TMD) cooperation between NATO and Russia has been quietly progressing for several years.

RAMOS was intended to increase trust and transparency between the US and Russia, improves Russia's poor early-warning satellite system, and prevents an accidental

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<sup>171</sup> William Pfaff, "Broken Promise: the Price of Expanding NATO," *Commonweal* 135.19 (2008): p.7.

<sup>172</sup> Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: the Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010) p.161-82.

<sup>173</sup> Pfaff. p.7.

<sup>174</sup> Robert C. Hughes, *SDI: A View from Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 1990): p.164.

nuclear war through cooperation on national technical means.<sup>175</sup> The plan, signed in 1997, originally called for the two former Cold War adversaries to collaboratively develop and launch two satellites to share warnings on missile attacks. From the beginning RAMOS faced political and ideological obstacles, including Republican attacks on suspected Russian ballistic missile cooperation with Iran and reluctance to transfer sensitive technology.<sup>176</sup> Both countries feared the other was trying to steal military technology, a problem that will also arise in any effort to build a NATO-Russian missile shield. However, the burden of failure for RAMOS rests on the US; the Pentagon twice unilaterally restructured the agreement, claiming the technical benefits were insufficient and downplaying RAMOS's confidence-building function.<sup>177</sup> In 2004, the Department of Defense pulled its request for RAMOS funding, issuing a press release which stated, "Given the uncertainty associated with the future of the RAMOS program, this funding could be used for more beneficial missile defense cooperation projects with Russia."<sup>178</sup> It did not say what those projects might be.

The JDEC was another missile defense-related initiative whose purpose was to increase transparency and prevent an accidental nuclear launch. In 2000, the US and Russia signed a Memorandum of Agreement to build a center in Moscow for the exchange of "near real time" information on Russian and American ballistic missile launches and on potentially dangerous third-party launches, meaning Russia could share information on missile launches from Iran, China, and other countries.<sup>179</sup> In principle, the JDEC could have become the command and control center of an international missile shield, since the agreement allowed for the eventual involvement of other states and for sending data from national early-warning systems directly to interceptors.<sup>180</sup> Instead, the center became mired in politics and mistrust. Ostensibly, the reason for suspending the project was liability and tax disputes, but behind this was Russian concern over US

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<sup>175</sup> Victoria Samson, "Prospects for Russian-American Missile Defence Cooperation: Lessons from RAMOS and JDEC," *Contemporary Security Policy* 28.3 (Dec. 2007). p.497.

<sup>176</sup> Samson. p.498.

<sup>177</sup> Samson. p.499-500.

<sup>178</sup> Missile Defense Agency. *Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates Press Release*, 18 Feb. 2004, Web.

<sup>179</sup> Samson. p.502-506.

<sup>180</sup> Sokov. p.123.

missile defense plans.<sup>181</sup> Russia, claiming US BMD was intended to undermine its nuclear deterrent, was unwilling to provide the US information on its own launches. Recently, there has been some interest in resurrecting the JDEC.<sup>182</sup> Its fate will depend on the future of missile defense cooperation in general.

NATO-Russian TMD cooperation began in 2001 with a Russian proposal for a collaborative system to protect deployed troops from short- and medium-range missiles.<sup>183</sup> In part, Russia hoped that NATO members would buy its TMD systems, arguing that Russian products were cheaper than American ones and lacked the restrictive technology transfer policies, but few members were interested.<sup>184</sup> From 2004 to 2008, Russia participated in several command-post exercises with computer-simulated attacks. Since the August 2008 Russo-Georgia War and the suspension of the Russia-NATO Council (RNC), however, there have been no joint exercises. One can argue whether curtailing military-to-military relations is a helpful response to a crisis fueled by Russian security fears and deep suspicion of the West. Either way, the RNC has resumed, and according to Russia's NATO envoy Dmitri Rogozin, Russia will join NATO in a computer TMD test to be held soon in Germany.<sup>185</sup> Although NATO-Russian cooperation in TMD has been limited, it provides an encouraging foundation for cooperation in regional missile defense.

#### *The "Third Site" Controversy*

When the Bush Administration gave notice in 2001 that the US would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Russia reacted with surprising resignation. The US soon began building a global Ballistic Missile Defense System, which included missile interceptors in Alaska and California to protect against an attack from North Korea. However, a crisis erupted in early 2007 when the Bush Administration formally announced plans for a "third site": ten missile interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar station in the Czech Republic to counter Iranian missiles. A second radar was to be built somewhere closer to Iran, and thus likely close to

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<sup>181</sup> Sokov. p.123-5.

<sup>182</sup> Tom Z. Collina, "Russia, U.S. Working on Joint Launch Notification," *Arms Control Today* (July/Aug. 2010), Web.

<sup>183</sup> Richard Weitz, "Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence," *Survival* 52.4 (2010). p.102.

<sup>184</sup> Weitz. p.103.

<sup>185</sup> "Germany: Russia To Participate In NATO Exercise," *STRATFOR*. 26 Jan. 2011. Web.

Russia.<sup>186</sup> Given that this plan had been publicly discussed for several years, Russia's response was unexpectedly strident. Dismissing the US claim of a looming Iranian missile threat, Russian officials argued that the missile shield was aimed at negating Russia's nuclear deterrent, the only check on US hegemony. Russian military officials acknowledged that ten interceptors were not a threat to Russia's enormous nuclear arsenal, but they worried that the Polish and Czech sites were only a first step in a larger system. As then-President Vladimir Putin stated at the Munich Security Conference in 2007:

[T]he United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defense system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective...So hypothetically we recognize that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralized. Russia's present nuclear capabilities, that is. The balance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security. This means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts.<sup>187</sup>

The Bush Administration attempted to assuage Russian fears with briefings on the planned shield and offers to negotiate Russian inspections of European and US BMD sites.<sup>188</sup> However, Russia remained impervious to US reassurances. Part of the problem may have been the difficulty for Americans, protected by two oceans, to understand the sensitivity of Russians, who spent the Cold War "contained" by a circle of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

Russia tried to derail the US plan with a number of sticks and carrots (or, to use the Russian term, whips and gingerbread). Russian officials claimed the missile shield would force Russia to upgrade its nuclear arsenal, thereby triggering an arms race.<sup>189</sup> They threatened to aim missiles at Poland and the Czech Republic and to annul the INF Treaty. In 2007, Russia suspended participation in the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (which NATO had never ratified). Russia's strategy, which had limited success, was probably to induce America's European allies to pressure the US into

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<sup>186</sup> Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long-range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe*, RL34051, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2008). p.8.

<sup>187</sup> Vladimir Putin, "Vladimir Putin's Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," delivered Feb. 10, 2007, <<http://natomission.ru/en/cooperation/document/14/>>.

<sup>188</sup> Weitz. p.105, 108.

<sup>189</sup> Hildreth and Ek. p.19.

canceling or modifying the missile shield in the interest of European harmony.<sup>190</sup> Russia also held out the possibility of cooperation. At a G-8 meeting in June 2007, Putin offered the US use of the Russian Gambala radar in Azerbaijan as an alternative.<sup>191</sup> The next month, he proposed developing a coordinated NATO-Russian system and offered use of a new radar near Armavir in southern Russia. US officials expressed interest in the Russian proposals, but only as additions to the original US plan. Atlantic-Russian relations continued to deteriorate up to Russia's war with US-ally and NATO-prospect Georgia, bringing relations to a post-Cold War low.

*Obama's Phased Adaptive Approach and the Russian Response*

The Russo-Georgia War brought a kind of catharsis. Worried about the dangerous tenor of US-Russian relations, President Barack Obama made the "reset" of bilateral relations one of his first foreign policy initiatives, and the atmospherics of the relationship, at least, improved dramatically. Thus, it is no surprise that when Obama scrapped the Bush-proposed missile defense plan in September 2009 in favor of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), Republican critics quickly accused him of bowing to Russian pressure and abandoning America's close Czech and Polish allies. Russian officials cautiously welcomed the announcement and the improved prospects for cooperation, but they did not publicly portray it as a Russian diplomatic victory.<sup>192</sup> For its part, the Obama Administration argued that the EPAA is a strategic, technical, and financial improvement over the Bush-proposed system, based on recent intelligence that Iran's short- and medium-range missile program is progressing faster than its ICBM program.<sup>193</sup> According to Obama, "if the by-product of it is that the Russians feel a little less paranoid then that's a bonus."<sup>194</sup> The Phased Adaptive Approach includes land- and sea-based SM-3 interceptors and is scheduled to be completed in four phases between 2011 and 2020, with the eventual capability to intercept ICBMs, although officials

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<sup>190</sup> Weitz. p.106.

<sup>191</sup> Hildreth and Ek. p.20.

<sup>192</sup> Thomas Young, "Issue Brief: The Reconfiguration of European Missile Defense, Russia's Response and the Likely Implications," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 9 Oct. 2009. <[http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/e3\\_missile\\_defense.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_missile_defense.html)>.

<sup>193</sup> Young.

<sup>194</sup> Young.

emphasize the flexible system will “respond to evolving threats.”<sup>195</sup> The ship-based interceptors will be stationed in the Mediterranean, and maybe the Black Sea, starting in 2011, with radar stations in Turkey or the Caucasus. The land-based interceptors are planned for Romania and Poland later in the decade. Moscow remains extremely concerned about the final two phases and the uncertainty of future deployments. Obama’s reconfiguration has not removed the ostensible threat to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, but it has bought precious time to reach agreement on cooperation.

At the November 2010 summit in Lisbon, NATO officially endorsed incorporating the US plan into its own missile defense system and invited Russia to participate.<sup>196</sup> The RNC released a joint statement reporting that the two sides had agreed to discuss cooperation and “to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation,” to be reviewed at an RNC meeting in June 2011.<sup>197</sup> However, the extent of cooperation remains highly contentious. While Russia insists on being an “equal partner,” NATO refuses to give the Kremlin a veto over missile defense deployments. Russia has suggested a joint, sectoral missile shield, with each party responsible for defending a specific geographic area. NATO, however, wants two separate but coordinated systems. Rogozin, in typically colorful fashion, said NATO’s plan “could not be called cooperation. It’s not even a marriage of convenience. It’s like living separately in different apartments.”<sup>198</sup> Clearly, agreement on a cooperative European missile defense shield will be a monumental task; nevertheless NATO and Russia must not let this opportunity pass.

### **Why Russia Objects to US-led Missile Defense in Europe**

#### *Domestic Politics*

While the ultimate danger of the missile shield may be its long-term potential to threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the immediate concern is politics. Political opposition to missile defense and NATO has several dimensions. First, Russia’s strategic nuclear

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<sup>195</sup> Missile Defense Agency, “The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe,” 17 Sept. 2009. Web.

<sup>196</sup> Robert Golan-Vilella, “NATO Approves Expanded Missile Defense,” *Arms Control Today* (Dec. 2010). p.32-33.

<sup>197</sup> NATO-Russia Council, “NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council held in Lisbon on 20 November 2010,” Web.

<sup>198</sup> “Russia, NATO Remain at Odds Over Missile Shield,” *Global Security Newswire*. 27 Jan. 2011. Web.

arsenal is an enormous source of pride and legitimacy, “the basis and guarantee of our sovereignty and independence,” in the words of Rogozin.<sup>199</sup> During the chaos and financial crises of the 1990s, Russia’s once fearsome military declined substantially both in size and scope. The nuclear weapons complex also suffered, yet it has remained Russia’s strongest claim to great power status.<sup>200</sup> The prestige of Russia’s arsenal comes not only from its size, the second largest in the world, but also from its perceived parity with US forces, enshrined in documents such as New START. Whether the missile shield is an actual threat to Russia’s arsenal, its presence in Europe is a threat to the perception of US-Russian nuclear equality and thus a challenge for Russia’s global standing. Although the Russian military is undergoing a major modernization, the credibility of Russia’s military prowess and great power status will likely continue to rest on nuclear weapons for a long time.

Second, the Russian ruling elite and general public share a desire for revenge against NATO for its enlargement to former Communist bloc countries during Russia’s period of weakness.<sup>201</sup> In this context, the decision to place military facilities in these states is seen as another humiliating dismissal of Russian interests and betrayal of American assurances at the end the Cold War.

Third, there are the byzantine power-struggles of the Russian political elite. Beneath the iron grip of now-Prime Minister Putin is a cutthroat battle among the *siloviki*<sup>202</sup> and industrial and financial leaders, the winners of the transition from communism. Mikhail Tsypkin of the US Naval Postgraduate School argues, “The president’s job is to manage this competition lest it get out of control and the country, lacking much of the apparatus of a genuine democracy...descend into semi-chaos, which might swallow him and his court. This is a complicated job: to keep the system operating smoothly, lucrative government appointments need to be apportioned among various clans, and public opinion needs to be manipulated to avoid surprises during elections.”<sup>203</sup> It is no coincidence that the strongest Russian criticism corresponded with the 2008

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<sup>199</sup> “Russia to Prepare Missile Defense Proposals For NATO,” *Global Security Newswire* 22 Feb. 2011. Web.

<sup>200</sup> Cimballa, *Shield of Dreams*. p.39.

<sup>201</sup> Mikhail Tsypkin, "Russian Politics, Policy-making and American Missile Defense," *International Affairs* 84.5 (2009). p.793.

<sup>202</sup> *Siloviki* are powerful politicians from the security services or military.

<sup>203</sup> Tsypkin. p.782.

presidential election that initiated the Kremlin's ruling tandem. It was elaborate political theater performed to convince the ruling elite that Putin remains firmly in command.<sup>204</sup> By bringing a Western military alliance to Russia's borders, NATO presents an immediate threat to the current political system, making cooperation with NATO and the US, or even benign indifference, difficult for the Kremlin. On the other hand, a stronger democracy and closer European integration is the only effective replacement for Russia's precarious and unsustainable political system. Ultimately, Russia's best hope for the future may be the creation of a Russian political landscape that can be managed without Putin or any other strongman. To the extent that the West can influence this process, any attempts to integrate Russia into the European community that do not undermine the Kremlin's domestic authority, such as a truly equal partnership on missile defense, could pay large dividends.

### *Regional Relations*

Another cause of Russian opposition is that the missile shield, especially the Bush version, violates Russia's self-proclaimed "sphere of privileged interests" in its "near abroad," the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.<sup>205</sup> This is not only a matter of pride and politics: Russia has suffered devastating invasions from the West and has long considered control of Eastern Europe necessary for its security.<sup>206</sup> Russia's anxiety is compounded by the fact that some Polish and US leaders publicly portrayed the presence of BMD facilities, and NATO membership, as protection from Russian manipulation.<sup>207</sup> Of course, Moscow does not seem to realize that its own actions contribute to the anti-Russian sentiments of former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states. The Russo-Georgia War may have put Georgia's NATO membership on hold, but it also reinforced the Western orientation of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. For its part, NATO refuses to recognize a sphere of influence, which contravenes its "goal of a Europe whole and free," particularly when this sphere includes its own members.<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Tsyarkin. p.782.

<sup>205</sup> Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia Claims its Sphere of Influence in the World," *New York Times*, 31 August 2008. Web.

<sup>206</sup> Cimbalá, *Shield of Dreams*. p.41.

<sup>207</sup> Hildreth and Ek. p.11.

<sup>208</sup> *Strategic Concept*, Nov. 2010.

Furthermore, Russia wishes to maintain good relations with Iran and is thus reluctant to support an explicitly anti-Iranian missile shield. Russia certainly does not want a nuclear-armed Iran, and Iran's refusal to allow Russia to enrich its uranium has severely strained ties.<sup>209</sup> However, Russia has more immediate concerns in Iran. Iran is a major buyer of Russian weapons and nuclear technology, and Moscow is grateful that Iran has not supported Muslim separatists in the North Caucasus.<sup>210</sup> Russia is trapped in a catch-22: it needs Western assistance on many problems, but the West, particularly the United States, demands Russia take a hard line on Iran, which in turn could lead Iran to foment Islamist rebellion in the former Soviet Union or aim its missiles at Russia. The US should accept that Russia will only push Iran so far and view Russian-Iranian cooperation not as a threat, but as an asset to be leveraged in negotiations.

#### *National Security*

U.S. and European officials have dismissed Russian claims that European missile defense is a threat to the country's nuclear deterrent, with then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice calling such concerns "ludicrous."<sup>211</sup> The chief of the Czech general staff, speaking of the "third site," said, "by simple arithmetic, Russian generals can see that U.S. missile defenses cannot imperil Moscow's arsenal."<sup>212</sup> Nevertheless, Russian protests, while strident, have some basis in fact. Moscow repeatedly made clear that the initial Polish and Czech deployments were no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. Instead, Russian officials worried that the US could achieve a technological breakthrough and deploy a larger and more effective missile shield, since the US abrogation of the ABM Treaty has freed it from all restraints on missile defense.<sup>213</sup> Although the Bush Administration had no definite plans for further BMD deployments in Europe, its pronouncements made clear it intended to improve and expand missile defense systems across the globe.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Mark N. Katz, "Russia's Greater Middle East Policy: Securing Economic Interests, Courting Islam," *Russie.Nei.Visions*, No. 49, Apr. 2010, p.17.

<sup>210</sup> Katz, p.16.

<sup>211</sup> George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns," *Arms Control Today*, (Oct. 2007). Web.

<sup>212</sup> Hildreth and Ek, p.19.

<sup>213</sup> "Russia unconvinced by US reassurances on missile defense plans," *RIA Novosti*, 27 Feb. 2007. Web.

<sup>214</sup> Lewis and Postol.

Obama's Phased Adaptive Approach may have cooled Russian criticism, but it is clearly a greater threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent than ten interceptors in Poland. Though Moscow welcomed the change as brightening the prospects for US-Russian cooperation, it contends that the third and fourth phases will threaten Russia's nuclear arsenal.<sup>215</sup> Is this assessment true? Analyst Stephen J. Cimbala has calculated that, even with missile defenses 80% effective and 1500 deployed nuclear weapons, 93 Russian warheads would survive a US first strike and be able to retaliate.<sup>216</sup> Of course, no one knows how successful a missile shield would be against an actual attack, and missile defenses may well never reach 80% effectiveness. On the other hand, given the uncertain current and potential efficacy of missile defense, the open-ended nature of the EPAA, the volatility of Atlantic-Russian relations, and the declining condition of Russia's nuclear forces, the future of US and NATO missile defenses should give Moscow cause for genuine concern. While the EPAA will not give the US a hypothetical first-strike ability at New-START levels, it will present a serious impediment to the deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and the limitations on tactical nuclear weapons envisioned by President Obama if NATO and Russia cannot agree to cooperate.

## **Determinants of Russian Cooperation**

### *Cultural Factors*

A key question is whether Moscow could bring itself to become partners with NATO. Many Russian officials at various levels of government are veterans of the Soviet and post-Soviet security and intelligence services. While they are not a homogenous group, they tend to share certain characteristics, including an overriding desire to restore Russia to its "rightful place" and a strong suspicion of the West. The political and military bureaucracies are inclined toward worst-case thinking that sometimes seems to border on paranoia.<sup>217</sup> Western commentators and Atlantic-leaning Russians routinely (if rather intemperately) declare that the Kremlin's mindset requires an enemy and that enemy is America.<sup>218</sup> But the problem is not just a knee-jerk anti-Americanism. After the

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<sup>215</sup> "Lavrov says missile defense projects should not 'upset parity,'" *RIA Novosti* 5 Feb. 2011. Web.

<sup>216</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, "Smashing Atoms: Post-START Rationality and Cold War Hangover," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 23 (2010): p.24.

<sup>217</sup> Tsyarkin. p.788-93.

<sup>218</sup> Tsyarkin, p.793. Blank.

fall from superpower to weakling in the 1990s, Russia refuses to let others decide its fate.<sup>219</sup> In this Russia shares the same reluctance to subjugate itself to collective authority as does the United States. Of course, Russians must conquer their own cultural demons, but a joint NATO-Russian missile shield would do much to stamp out lingering Cold War distrust, both in Russia and the West.

Another impediment to cooperation is Russian military secretiveness. Moscow has long closely guarded its state secrets and military technology and is prone to accusations of spying. Washington, too, is highly averse to sharing sensitive technology, as the failure of RAMOS shows. US technology transfer policies are so restrictive they sometimes hinder cooperation with its NATO allies. The obstacles to Russian cooperation would be much greater, requiring a major change in US mentality.<sup>220</sup> In fact, the cultural and legal challenges on both sides to technology and information sharing may turn out to be the biggest hurdle to missile defense cooperation.

### *Strategic Factors*

The clearest reason for Russia to cooperate with NATO on a European missile shield is to ensure that the shield cannot threaten Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, following the logic of "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em." This logic can be extended to NATO-Russian relations in general: while NATO today has no intention of attacking Russia, its conventional military superiority and borders reaching Russia's give it a strong *capability* against Russia. Thus, it behooves Russia to seek partnership with NATO rather than be seen as a potential adversary. Russia and NATO share many areas of concern and potential cooperation, including proliferation, piracy, drug trafficking, and Islamic extremism. Politics aside, the existence of NATO is a benefit to Russia, even when the two do not work together, because NATO has largely pacified Europe, allowing Russia to focus on the many problems to its south and east.<sup>221</sup>

It should also be noted that both Moscow and Brussels are concerned about whether Beijing will perceive stronger NATO-Russian collaboration as a threat. The closeness of Russia's ties to the West and to the East has generally been in an inverse relationship, and a military alliance with NATO may come at the expense of Chinese-

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<sup>219</sup> Cimbala, *Shield of Dreams*. p.41.

<sup>220</sup> Weitz. p.101.

<sup>221</sup> Cimbala. *Shield of Dreams*. p.40.

Russian relations.<sup>222</sup> On the other hand, Moscow might find NATO a safer, more reliable partner than the rising giant to its southeast. The best recourse is for NATO to improve its dialogue with China, preferably involving Russia in the process. Yu Tong's essay provides an analysis of the role of Russia in NATO-Chinese relations.

### *Economic Factors*

The global economic crisis has proven that Russia's petro-based economy is unsustainable. Despite occasional autarkic rhetoric, Russia recognizes that its economic prosperity is tied to the West, as its quests for WTO membership and Western investment demonstrate. The concurrence of the economic crisis with the missile defense talks is fortuitous because the crisis has opened a window of opportunity for the West to bring Russia deeper into the international community, while the fall in oil prices has temporarily tamed the hubris of Moscow's foreign policy.<sup>223</sup> Strengthening the Atlantic-Russian security relationship may be one of the most effective paths to economic and political integration. As Stephen Cimbala writes, "Russia seeks larger economic and political integration with the European Union, and NATO provides a military glacis behind which EU members can feel a sense of security in reaching out to Russia."<sup>224</sup> Thus, Moscow has a powerful economic incentive to increase its cooperation with NATO.

A further economic enticement to NATO-Russian cooperation is that a joint missile shield, while expensive, would remove the risk of Russia dragging itself into a new arms race. Russian leaders have declared that, if cooperation fails, Moscow will counter the missile shield with more and better strategic weapons, but they have also pledged not to bankrupt the country in the process.<sup>225</sup> Given that Russia can scarcely maintain its current levels of nuclear deployments, a major arms build-up would be an enormous burden on the Russian economy, not to mention a colossal waste of money desperately needed for military and economic modernization. The Russian economy simply cannot afford a one-sided arms race, lest it suffer the same debilitating expenditures as the Soviet economy.

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<sup>222</sup> Sokov. p.123.

<sup>223</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff. *The Russian Economic Crisis*. Council Special Report No. 53. (*Council on Foreign Relations*, April 2010). p.3-4.

<sup>224</sup> Cimbala. *Shield of Dreams*. p.40.

<sup>225</sup> "Russia to give 'intellectual' response to U.S. missile shield," *RIA Novosti*. 9 Feb. 2007. Web.

## Will the West Cooperate? Political Opinion in the United States and Europe

Although missile defense has not been a major issue in American public opinion since the Cold War, it is the darling of many *Reaganite* Republicans. The raucous debate over the ratification of the New START Treaty illustrates the political power of missile defense. Mindful of the need to secure Republican support, the Obama Administration rebuffed Russian attempts to include limitations on future BMD deployments. New START holds no restrictions on missile defense except for a ban on converting existing missile silos to use for missile interceptors, which the US military had no plans to do. In spite of this, Republicans assailed the treaty on the grounds that Russia interpreted it as limiting missile defense: the preamble, at Russian insistence, included the obvious statement that offensive weapons and defenses against them are linked, and Russia issued a unilateral, non-binding signing statement declaring their right to withdraw in response to “a qualitative or quantitative build-up” in US BMD that could threaten Russia’s nuclear forces.<sup>226</sup> Mitt Romney’s *Washington Post* opinion piece provides the gist of the Republican argument: “[T]o preserve the treaty's restrictions on Russia, America must effectively get Russia's permission for any missile defense expansion. Moscow's vehemence over our modest plans in Eastern Europe demonstrates that such permission would be extremely unlikely...New START does something the American public would never countenance and the Senate should never permit: It jeopardizes our missile defense system.”<sup>227</sup> The criticism may have been mostly an attempt to deny Obama a policy victory, but portraying the treaty as a threat to missile defense almost prevented ratification.

The Republican Party also contains a strong strain of *Russophobia*. A number of prominent Republicans such as Senators Jim DeMint (R-SC) and James Inhofe (R-OK) have gone so far as to publically call for “a missile defense system that renders [Russia’s nuclear] threat useless.”<sup>228</sup> While they do not represent the majority, they are highly influential on arms issues. If a Democratic administration pursues anything perceived as limiting US freedom to develop missile defenses, particularly in deference to Russia, a

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<sup>226</sup> Greg Thielmann. “Strategic Missile Defense: A Threat to Future Nuclear Arms Reductions?,” Threat Assessment Brief, *Arms Control Association*, 26 Jan. 2011. p.5.

<sup>227</sup> Mitt Romney. “Obama’s Worst Foreign Policy Mistake,” *Washington Post*. 6 July 2010. Web.

<sup>228</sup> Peter Baker. “A Defender for a Defense the US Doesn’t Want,” *New York Times*. 19 May 2010. Web.

large fraction of Republicans will fight it tooth and claw. The exact composition of Congress is irrelevant, as even a minority party stands a good chance of blocking almost any single piece of legislation. A Republican administration might have more room to negotiate, but it probably would not bother. With neoconservatives and their allies dominating Republican foreign policy, it appears that the long era of Republican advocacy for arms control is over.

European NATO members, who share their continent with Russia and tend to prefer multilateral, cooperative decision making, are naturally more sensitive to Russian concerns. NATO endorsed the original Bush missile defense plan at the April 2008 summit in Bucharest, but some European leaders criticized the plan for creating, in the words of former French President Jacques Chirac, “new divisions in Europe,” and they sought greater Russian involvement.<sup>229</sup> Eastern Europe, which will host part of the shield, has been the most conflicted. While some support hosting missile defenses as a way to strengthen ties with the US and remain out of Russia’s orbit, a substantial and active majority of Poles and Czechs opposed the “third-site” deployments, in part over fears of Russian retaliation.<sup>230</sup> Yet collaboration with Russia also troubles Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, who worry Moscow could gain a veto over BMD deployments and compromise their security, a situation the US has promised will not occur.<sup>231</sup> In general, however, the participation of Russia in the missile shield will probably make missile defense more attractive to European member states, who will not have to worry about being targeted by Russian missiles or the victims of Russian energy manipulation.

### **The Scope of Cooperation**

Agreeing to cooperate on missile defense was a small, but important first step. Now Moscow and Brussels must decide what form such cooperation will take. Russia wants to ensure that the shield will not threaten its nuclear arsenal. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, a collaborative NATO-Russian missile shield “must be a joint system with shared responsibilities, information exchange and decision-making in order to make us an equal and responsible member. If two separate networks

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<sup>229</sup> Hildreth and Ek. p.17.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid. p.15-18.

<sup>231</sup> *Reuters*. “U.S. reassures Poles on Russia missile defense role”. 11 Feb. 2011. Web.

are built, things won't change for us and we will see a situation when the NATO system could potentially be used against Russia's security interests. Cooperating on such a system would mean hurting ourselves."<sup>232</sup> To prevent such a scenario, the Kremlin has purposed a shared, sectoral system in which each side would defend a specific area. The details are not yet available.

NATO, however, staunchly opposes giving Russia defense of its members' territory or requiring Russian authorization to launch the interceptors. Instead, NATO is advocating for two independent, but coordinated systems that would exchange information. Each side would protect its own territory and maintain control over its own defenses. This, of course, falls short of Moscow's demand for an equal partnership. Russia's bold proposal may just be its opening bid for negotiations, rather than its final offer.<sup>233</sup> The RNC Joint Analysis due in June should clarify the prospects and parameters of cooperative missile defense.

The other option to resolve the dispute with Russia without abandoning the missile shield would be to negotiate politically or legally binding limits on future BMD deployments.<sup>234</sup> This would be easier to reach agreement on with Russia than a joint shield, but the chance of it surviving Republican opposition in Congress is virtually zero. Now that the link between strategic offense weapons and defenses enshrined in the ABM Treaty has been severed, it will not be resurrected. Binding limitations on missile defense would present a similar level of political difficulty as building a collaborative missile shield would but without the considerable benefits of true cooperation. Non-binding limitations would not satisfy Moscow: after NATO's post-Cold War eastern expansion, Russia will not stake its security on another "tacit promise."

### **Recommendations for the Future of NATO-Russian Relations**

Speaking to reporters at a January meeting of Russian and NATO military leaders, a NATO official said Moscow's surprising call for a joint shield is "too big a jump."<sup>235</sup> Twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, but Russia remains

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<sup>232</sup> *Global Security Newswire*. "U.S. Ready to Work With Russia on Missile Shield, Clinton Says," 7 Feb. 2011. Web.

<sup>233</sup> *Global Security Newswire*. "Russia, U.S. Still Disagree on Missile Shield, Envoy Says". 18 Feb. 2011. Web.

<sup>234</sup> Thielmann. p.8.

<sup>235</sup> "Russia, NATO Remain at Odds Over Missile Shield."

on the margins of the Western world. It is clear that overcoming the legacy of the Cold War will require a very big jump, indeed. Missile defense could vault Russia and the West across their gulf of distrust, but only if the degree of cooperation is extensive enough to bury deterrence in the eyes of both Moscow and Washington once and for all. NATO should pursue the highest level of cooperation on which both parties can agree. A combined NATO-Russian shield need not be ineffective or a risk to NATO members' security. The US should not let overheated fears of incoming Iranian missiles blind it to the more real problem of Russia's alienation from the West.

In parallel with missile defense cooperation, the West should strive to enmesh Russia in as many mature international institutions as possible. This would have the combined benefits of sharing Russia's substantial scientific, economic, and cultural resources with the world; tempering Russian policy; and impressing on Russia international norms of responsible behavior. To this end, the West should seek, *inter alia*, a stronger RNC and greater Russian presence in NATO's day-to-day operations, Russian membership in the World Trade Organization, and increased bilateral trade, especially between Russia and the United States. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Moscow felt it had nothing to lose from Western censure. The West must give Russia relations worth protecting.

Finally, NATO should begin a dialogue with Russia on eventual membership in the alliance. This conversation must occur simultaneously between Russia and NATO and within Russia and NATO states. Due to the domestic politics and mindset of Russia, NATO will have to take the initiative in convincing Moscow and its own members that Russian membership would be realistic and mutually beneficial. The US and its European allies, ensconced in a web of strong cooperative security institutions, do not understand that Russia has been largely shut out of the Atlantic security community. The OSCE is moribund, and Russia's proposals for a new European security architecture are dismissed as self-serving propaganda. If a common European home is ever to exist, then NATO must open its door to Russia. Russia's entry into NATO would transform both NATO and Russia, but it is a transformation that ought to be welcomed. As the Russians say, it's easy to get used to a good thing.



## Chapter Six

### Smart Defense and Standardization

Chloe Jackson

#### Introduction

Currently there is no collective action towards a NATO standardization policy of military technology and weaponry; as a result, there is a growing disparity between European and United States' military capabilities. This disparity leaves western nations in a vulnerable position, particularly the European states. The current military gap between European NATO members and the US had been addressed in the 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative. But in fact, little has been done to create a collective action policy for NATO in regards to creating a NATO alliance that has a flexible, collaborative, advanced, and manageable defense system. This paper asserts that NATO needs to develop a policy that promotes collaborative defense development between all member states. A new policy will focus on NATO overseeing and incentivizing European countries to focus their defense research and development on multinational programs rather than just national, a new policy will also promote the creation of comprehensive multinational collective defense based on the needs of the twenty-first century. Such a policy will help to close the military capabilities gap between Europe and the United States, alleviate the costs of adopting new military capabilities, and most importantly secure NATO's role as a powerful and legitimate trans-Atlantic military alliance in the twenty-first century.

This paper will focus on NATO enacting a "Smart Defense" Policy. Smart Defense, as defined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his keynote speech at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, ensures greater security for less money by requiring NATO members to work together with more flexibility.<sup>236</sup> Smart Defense focuses on intelligence gathering rather than arms production, and it is the necessary defense system of the twenty-first century. The first section, background, demonstrates

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<sup>236</sup> Rasmussen. "Building Security in an Age of Austerity."

why the military capabilities gap between Europe and the US is a problem for the US, Europe and NATO. The second section, significant past solutions, details how NATO and Europe have attempted to solve the military capabilities problem. The last section, recommendations, states new attempts that could help to end the gap.

## **Background**

### **Europe**

At the end of the Cold War it was the popular belief that the United States would slow down its military development and weapons production. This was not the case because even today the US defense budget is characterized by its complexity and enormous size.<sup>237</sup> The projected defense spending by the US congress for 2011 is \$701 billion, and this is in fact 4.5% of the U.S. GDP; in terms of GDP allotted to defense. The United Kingdom is the closest country in comparison, 2.5% of its GDP is in its defense budget.<sup>238</sup> The United States did not slow down the modernization of its military, in fact it focused on low-range, high-tech evolving capabilities to deal with potential threats, and Europe focused on maintaining regional peace.<sup>239</sup> As a result, the United States current total share in NATO members' defense spending is 75%, while just ten years ago it was under half.<sup>240</sup> There is no doubt about the dangers of the perpetual shrinking of European defense capabilities. This is not just a security threat for Europe, but also one for the United States and the future of NATO.

The twenty-seven member states of the European Union control the second largest military force in the world.<sup>241</sup> Nevertheless, the EU is still struggling to sustain less than five percent of its overall military manpower on vital peace support tasks.<sup>242</sup> European leaders have been cautious of adopting the same strategies as the United States in regards to increase in funding of research and development for defense sector; in fact: "Over the past two years, defense spending by NATO's European member nations has shrunk by some 45 billion dollars"<sup>243</sup> This reflects the reality of European defense procurement budgets. Most European countries are still developing their militaries out of

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<sup>237</sup> Gansler, Jacques. "Defense Conversion." p.19.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Liddy, James. p.70.

<sup>240</sup> Rasmussen, "Building Security in an Age of Austerity."

<sup>241</sup> Flournoy. p.11

<sup>242</sup> Flournoy. p.11

<sup>243</sup> Rasmussen. "Building Security in an Age of Austerity."

the Cold War posture, and they are struggling to fund for strategic air lift, C4ISR, and the other equipment necessary for war fighting and peace keeping missions.<sup>244</sup> Essentially, Europe is unable to “stand on their own” and is doing little to change the situation.

Some European leaders do not find this an issue. In fact, some say that the new NATO strategy should be more pragmatic and require that the US provide the war fighting power while Europe provides peacekeeping power. This suggestion is dangerous and naïve. A more global world is emerging and Europe will lose its power if it does not begin to increase defense spending. China, one of the fastest growing powers, is currently in its second phase of its defense development strategy, its ambitious goal is to catch up with the world’s current second tier of regional military powers: Japan, Russia, and Western Europe.<sup>245</sup> Additionally China understands the transforming nature of warfare and the principal focus is on research and development of information based operations.<sup>246</sup> China’s efforts are not without an increase in spending, “according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China has tripled its defense expenditure over the past decade. And India [another emerging power] has increased its defense spending by almost 60 per cent in the same period.”<sup>247</sup> It is foolish for Europe to decrease its allotted spending on security and rely on the US when a new global framework is developing. Most importantly, Europe needs to be able to contribute to collaborative NATO defense appropriately because the US might begin to look elsewhere for reliable defense partners. With China and India becoming increasingly more powerful, they are also become a more attractive security ally.

### **U.S. and NATO**

The military capabilities gap between Europe and the United States is not just a problem for Europe; it is a problem for the US as well. A weak Europe is a huge loss for the US. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, recently stated: “the demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20<sup>th</sup> century

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<sup>244</sup> James. p.8.

<sup>245</sup> Cheung. p.32-33.

<sup>246</sup> Cheung. p.33.

<sup>247</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21<sup>st</sup>.”<sup>248</sup> There should be little surprise for the current US disappointment in the alliance.

The core of the NATO alliance is Article V, which states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on the rest of the alliance and all must react in defense.<sup>249</sup> After the terrorist attacks of 9.11, the United States enacted Article V. The current war in Afghanistan is the first NATO ally effort of collaborative combat, and the funding and equipment shortfalls have complicated NATO’s effectiveness. Secretary Gates stated:

For many years, for example, we have been aware that NATO needs more cargo aircraft and more helicopters of all types – and yet we still don’t have these capabilities...The shortage of helicopter and cargo planes was directly impacting operations in Afghanistan...NATO also needs more aerial refueling tankers and unmanned aircraft for surveillance and intelligence... this is a natural consequence of having underinvested in collective defense for more than a decade.<sup>250</sup>

The capabilities gap between Europe and the United States has directly impacted US military efforts in Afghanistan. It is in US interest to invest in collective defense in order to be able to rely on its European partner.

The capabilities gap is an obvious problem for the legitimacy and strength of NATO itself. The NATO-EU relationship is already plagued with mistrust that block the development of necessary components of collaborative defense, including an unhealthy competition of defense development and information sharing blockages.<sup>251</sup> NATO is weak because it does not have an open dialogue with the EU’s Political and Security Committee.<sup>252</sup> In order for NATO to become a constabulary in the twenty-first century then it needs to have a collective defense system that is managed executively and all members contribute appropriately.

### **A Final Thought on the Critical Importance of Solving the Military Capabilities Gap**

Some question whether defense integration can occur among states that value their sovereignty and right to develop their own defense system. However, collective defense does not require ceding decisions making; what it does requires is a “more

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<sup>248</sup> De Luce. p.170.

<sup>249</sup> James Goldgeier. p.48.

<sup>250</sup> De Luce. p.170.

<sup>251</sup> Flournoy. p.12-13.

<sup>252</sup> Flournoy. p.12.

explicit discussion and accounting of national interests, perspectives, strengths, and constraints.”<sup>253</sup> Each NATO member can make a distinct contribution based on comparative advantage. A second worry of Allies when it comes to multinational cooperation is the bureaucracy that is usually involved: delayed delivery schedules, inflated overhead costs, and slow decision making. Yet, as stated by Secretary General Rasmussen: “cooperation between nations is no longer a choice. It is a necessity.”<sup>254</sup>

As demonstrated in the previous section, no European Ally is able to develop the full range of responses to meet all security challenges.<sup>255</sup> The current collaborative defense system is also very inadequate because of both hardware and software limitations. NATO is facing new powerful global players that are attempting to develop rival security forces. The time for NATO members to act is now, both Europe and the United States need to support closing the capabilities gap and working towards a collective defense. The next section will detail past attempts at solving the military gap, and demonstrate how each attempt was lacking the critical idea of Smart Defense.

### **Significant Past Solutions**

#### *Defense Capabilities Initiative*

In 1999 NATO addressed the growing gap between the US and European military defense and passed the Defense Capabilities Initiative. The goal of the initiative was to make the alliance stronger, in case there was an attack, by improving the interoperability among Alliance forces. The initiative stated that improvements were needed in certain countries because “many Allies have only relatively limited capabilities for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases.”<sup>256</sup> The initiative was meant to promote collective security, but aside from minor improvements it has unfortunately not done enough.

The initiative did not necessarily outline suggestions for how closing the capabilities gap would be accomplished. The four goals of the initiative were more

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<sup>253</sup> Flournoy. p.15.

<sup>254</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

<sup>255</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

<sup>256</sup> NATO Summit Press Release. Article 4.

focused on certain areas that needed improvement, not on how these improvements would be made.

The four goals of the 1999 Initiative were:

- *“Mobility and deploy ability:* the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory.
- *Sustainability:* the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations.
- *Effective Engagement:* the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity.
- *Survivability:* the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats.
- *Interoperable Communications:* Command, control, and information systems that are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.<sup>257</sup>

The first three goals essentially outline the necessary components that are needed in any effective modern military; the final goal of interoperable communications is what is essential to make a collective military campaign work. Each goal is needed and should still be goals that are actively sought after. The major flaw of the initiative is that it never outlined how collective security should be achieved or what was preventing collective security- it just stated what collective security should look like.

#### *European Defense Agency (EDA)*

Europe’s procurement of industrial military technology throughout the beginning of the twenty-first century has been slow. The European Defense Agency (EDA) was founded on July 12, 2004 by the European Defense Council:

With the aim of developing defense capabilities, promoting and enhancing European armaments co-operation, strengthening the European defense industrial base and creating a competitive European defense equipment market as well as promoting research efforts.' Such a reform of the demand side is important and long overdue because it holds out the possibility of procurement of more cost-effective, technologically advanced and timely defense equipment.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Isenberg, Alan L. "Last Chance: a Roadmap for Nato Revitalization". p.646.

<sup>258</sup> James, Andrew. p.6.

The EDA has uniformed European efforts in closing the military gap. The EDA is a top-down approach; it promotes coordination and pressures EU member states to make necessary capabilities improvements.<sup>259</sup>

The EDA focuses on four main domains: defense capabilities development, armaments cooperation, the European defense technological and industrial base and defense equipment market, and research and technology.<sup>260</sup> The EDA has very ambitious goals, but unfortunately fewer than eighty people on staff. Also, it deals with the difficult challenge of coordinating several European defense planning cycles. Nevertheless, the EDA is a good first step towards collective defense and improving European capabilities. It has the opportunity to represent the international body of Europe, which for NATO and the United State is logistically far simpler than dealing with multiple bodies. It also gives private members of the defense industry and stronger voice due to the fact that one international body can speed up the contracting.<sup>261</sup> The EDA works toward uniting Europe but it needs to be given more funding and decision-making power in order to efficiently close the gap and achieve the collective defense NATO needs.

### **Final Thoughts on 1999 Defense Initiative and the EDA**

The 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative still serves as an excellent framework for what collective security should look like. The four goals should set the standard for NATO countries. In order to expand on the Capabilities Initiative this report will focus more on how these goals could be accomplished within the specific circumstances of today's world: fiscal austerity, a politically peaceful Europe, and the advanced war-fighting capabilities of the United States. The next section will expand on recommendations for accomplish collective security and the theoretical approach on which these recommendations are based. The EDA is the EU response to the lack of security cohesiveness among its member nations. It offers to opportunity for Europe to come together in a much more cost efficient and effective manner. Additionally have one defense body represent multiple European nations is easier for other EU members. Overall, the Defense Capabilities Initiative and the EDA both work towards a more strategic and effective global defense and lay a strong foundation for the future.

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<sup>259</sup> Flournoy. p.59.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. p.58.

## Recommendations

### Smart Defense and Adoption Capacity Theory

A colloquial understanding of smart defense is that governments no longer ask defense industries to build mass amounts of “dumb weapons-” conventional fire arms for example. Rather, defense industries are given the task to integrate a few powerful and complex systems in order to make “smart weapons.”<sup>262</sup> Smart weapons gather intelligence and assist with battlefield awareness: sensors that sniff, sensors that hear, sensor that produce images. Thus, as stated earlier, smart defense results in stronger, integrated, more efficient, and less costly weapons system. There is no longer a need to welders and machinists, but a need for engineers and software designers. This shift from hardware to software reflects the new security threat. These new security threats are outlined in this report: piracy, terrorism, and cyber warfare. Modern government are very aware that it is not always obvious who the enemy is, how the enemy operates, and what the enemy is planning; so it is necessary to develop systems that can gather intelligence that would be answer those questions.

Fortunately, even though a Smart Defense system requires rapid European technological advancements, an integrated NATO Smart Defense system is much s more cost effective and realistic approach to closing the military capabilities gap and achieving effect collective security based on the four goals of the 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative: mobility and deploy ability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications.<sup>263</sup> The eara of one-size-fits-all defense cooperation is over, what matters are creating a defense system that all NATO members can operate equally.<sup>264</sup> The current capabilities gap is a huge problem for an effective NATO and effective collective security, but European nations have been hesitant act because of fears of losing sovereignty, war mongering, and high costs- especially after a financial crisis. However, if NATO members work toward an integrated Smart Defense system then the previously mentioned worries will not be exasperated.

According to the Adoption Capacity Theory: “for any given innovation, it is the interaction of the resource mobilization challenges and organization changes required to

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<sup>262</sup> Coffman. p.171.

<sup>263</sup> Isenberg, Alan L. "Last Chance: a Roadmap for Nato Revitalization". p.646.

<sup>264</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

adopt the new innovation, and the capacity of states to absorb these demands, that explains both the system-level distribution of responses and the choices of individual states.”<sup>265</sup> Essentially, this means that because the financial intensity of adopting new innovations is so high for individual countries. Additionally, the organizational capital, recruitment and training for example, is also high. these countries are faced with two options. The first option is not adopting any new innovations of adopting innovations very selectively. The second option is sharing the cost burden by forming alliances.<sup>266</sup>

The Adoption capacity theory provides another frame of support for all NATO members funding and participating in collective security. It is essential that collective security focus more on Smart Defense because current security threats demand that the Alliance have a strong intelligence system that is incomparable to any potential threat. Even though there is no doubt that military hardware does need to be a focus, it is important that more funding and direction go to building up the collective security essentials of NATO. In order to determine what hardware and organizational essential are needed, it is important that NATO set up a committee to examine and determine the comparative advantages of each member nation’s current military hardware.

### **Recommendation One: Utilize Comparative Advantage in NATO**

“Dumb Defense” is still a necessary part of security, but if NATO’s looking for effective system and military integration then it is not necessary for Europe to double its hardware.<sup>267</sup> What is necessary is to examine the various comparative advantages within NATO. The NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) should setup a committee further research in order to best determine what each individual country has to offer the alliance. This would help keep the budgets lower and alleviate the risks of unnecessary programs or changes be implemented. However, this paper recommends that the constabulary force of Europe be utilized and the current American capabilities of both military software and hardware.

The European Union has some of the world’s largest constabulary forces- the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).<sup>268</sup> These forces, which only have participation from

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<sup>265</sup> Horowitz. p.3.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid. p.3.

<sup>267</sup> Coffman. p.171.

<sup>268</sup> Flournoy. p.58.

France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Romania, are a mixture of light infantry and police force; they are also specially trained for police activities. They are more heavily armed when compared to other police forces and can easily be placed into a military chain of command.<sup>269</sup> The exceptional past performances of the constabulary, Kosovo, makes them a viable option for forces that are needed to bridge the gap between major military operation and reconstruction.<sup>270</sup> NATO should examine the advantage of such an already existing force. It should encourage and provide guidance for more European countries to support and join.

The United States has already strong military capabilities to offer NATO. Most importantly, the US has several private industries that NATO needs to create stronger ties with in order to help create a trans-Atlantic Smart Defense system. Industry reflect another comparative advantage that NATO committee need to take into serious consideration. Industry has expertise and is on the cutting edge of defense, including areas such as cyber defense, fuel cell energy, and light logistics.<sup>271</sup> It is important that the advantage of public-private partnerships be researched and encouraged.

The key to this recommendation is that the committee that is formed to research and assess comparative advantage in military capabilities considers each country, trans-Atlantic international body, and trans-Atlantic major industry. Only through such action will the most cost effective means of improving collective security be accomplished with the best technology, organizational capacity, and new military hardware.

**Recommendation Two: Begin system integration of European and American military technology, assembly capabilities, intelligence technology, and surveillance technology.**

This recommendation is to solve the “how” question of standardization and systems integration. The goal is to begin to earlier stages of developing a collective security force with an advanced Smart Defense system. This task will be allotted to the Policy and Coordination branch of the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). As of January 1, 2011 NSA defined standardization as: *“the development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the*

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<sup>269</sup> Selden. p.92.

<sup>270</sup> Flournoy. p.59.

<sup>271</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

*compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability, or to optimize the use of resources, in the fields of operations, materiel and administration.*”<sup>272</sup> The aim of NSA is to increase communications and active interchangeability between the resources of NATO members, which is why they will focus on developing ideas and means that make it easier for NATO members to acquire and participate in an integrated Smart Defense system.

Military practices that the NSA is currently allowed to manage are: “doctrines, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, reporting, maps and charts.”<sup>273</sup> This chapter recommends adding systems integration management. This is to ensure that this task only be allotted to one management area of NATO. The goal of an effective collective security is efficiency; therefore, only the NSA will be in charge of developing systems integration. This report also recommends that the NSA develop a concrete executive manager and overseeing committee of standardization. This will optimize the procedural process.

Currently, once a standardization initiative has been approved, the Director of the NSA is responsible for the promulgation of the agreed NATO standardization documents. We recommend that this continues to be in effect. After the promulgation NATO member countries ratify the document and indicate their own levels of standardization, and NATO members are also allowed to take on implementation individually or with NSA oversight<sup>274</sup>. This current procedure hinders the effectiveness of the NSA. This report recommends that each document make certain articles requirements, and only allow countries to ratify under certain circumstances that are to be decided based on the demands and the ability of the individual country. Lastly, all standardization procedures must be implemented and overseen by NATO officials.

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<sup>272</sup> <http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/>, “Production, Maintenance, and Management of NATO Standardization Documents,” Article 1.4.1.2.

<sup>273</sup> <http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/>, “Production, Maintenance, and Management of NATO Standardization Documents,” Article, 1.4.5.1.

<sup>274</sup> <http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/>, “Production, Maintenance, and Management of NATO Standardization Documents,” Article 1.4.4.

**Recommendation Three: Each NATO member country Allots .17 percent of its GDP to defense development.**

We have already determined that each country allot .5 percent of its GDP to help fund NATO changes. A change of funding is needed because the “costs lay as they fall” system has proven to be inadequate. The United State funding 75 percent of the NATO defense budget, as stated earlier, which demonstrates the unequal framework. The goal of this new budget system is “to reimburse states that absorb front-end costs and ensure that the financial burden is shared equitably between those who contribute forces and those who do not.”<sup>275</sup> This chapter suggests that the new financial requirements do reflect equity rather than equality. It is essential that these changes are made so that everyone is contributing equally to collective security.

**Conclusion**

The goal of Smart Defense is not to impose anything on nations. It is to promote nations work together in a strategic direction. NATO’s role is to begin that direction, identify comparative advantage within countries or regions, and identify additional possible areas of cooperation.<sup>276</sup> Up until this point, Europe has been unable to acquire the necessary capabilities needed to defend itself, and it is NATO’s job to make it easier for Europe to acquire capabilities. Once Europe has accomplished NATO and every country that partners with it will be stronger and safer.

This chapter has outlined ways NATO can work pragmatically. The most important goal is developing a Smart Defense system that can help NATO members know its potential threats and enemies and finally closing the capabilities gap between the United States and Europe. Each country should actively participate in this development and move beyond intelligence gathering within its borders. NATO has always worked towards protecting its trans-Atlantic members, and the security it can offer is needed now more than ever.

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<sup>275</sup> Fournoy. p.11.

<sup>276</sup> Rasmussen. “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

## **Part III**

### **Emerging Threats: Energy Security, Terrorism, and Cyber Security**

**Jessica Dawn Puckett, Evan Wyse, and Aiden Duffy**



### **Part III: Introduction**

## **Emerging Threats: Energy Security, Terrorism, and Cyber Security**

**Evan Wyse**

Each decade in the United States' history has brought new challenges to our foreign policy. The 70s saw the emergence of oil security as an issue. The 80s witnessed the emergence of new enemies in the Middle East, and the 90s saw an administration embattled with a newly liberated Eastern Europe and failed states in Africa. Emerging issues of the past have been integrated into our foreign policy. Through careful consideration and policy-making, American and NATO have moved through countless changes in the global order, and can do so again.

In this sense, we should not view these latest challenges as earth-shattering game changers, but as the latest set of developments in an ever-changing world. While it is important to break out of a 20<sup>th</sup> state-centric mentality, we should not delude ourselves by forgetting the lessons of the past. These new issues should be viewed as additions, not centerpieces, of NATO policy.

The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has added several new items to the global agenda. While the issues presented here are not a complete list of the developments, they cover some important highlights of changes to the global order.

If one might venture to find a connecting theme between these new challenges, it is their transnational nature. Cyber security is naturally a transnational issue, given the ease with which actors can attack from around the globe. International terrorism, also, involves terrorist networks that span across the globe. Energy security and climate change, by their nature, affect the whole world in different but connected ways. While states still play an important role in engaging these issues, it seems that their influence has been greatly diminished. It is therefore completely fitting that NATO, a powerful multilateral alliance in its own right, be the agency to engage these issues as America sets out into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.



## Chapter Seven

### Energy Security

Jessica Dawn Puckett

Energy security was one of the emerging threats identified in the new Strategic Concept. The destabilizing nature of climate change was also acknowledged as a likely source of future insecurity and instability; one that would require NATO to develop new capabilities in order to address the evolving security landscape. There is growing awareness about the interconnected relationship between energy, climate, and the geopolitical stability. There is also growing anxiety around energy security and climate change. The following passage is from Michael Ruhle, who is the Head of the *Energy Security Section* in the new *Emerging Security Challenges Division* recently established by NATO. Mr. Ruhle correctly identifies several of the factors responsible for growing concern around the energy dimension of security.

Over the past years, energy security has turned into a major theme of the international security debate. Several developments account for this: Europe's growing dependency on oil and gas; the growing energy needs of rising powers such as China and India; the depletion of fossil fuels expected to set in after the middle of this century; an intensifying debate on climate change; and a renewed interest of many nations in civilian nuclear energy.<sup>277</sup>

Agreeing with Mr. Ruhle, this report argues that NATO has a legitimate role to play in energy policy because energy is not separable from security. NATO—like other historically contingent international institutions—is in the process of transitioning from conceptualizing itself as a provider of territorial security to one of human security. As a collective institution, this is a natural step, but an uncomfortable one in the context of energy, because energy is so vital to national security. The larger countries in NATO, as well as the EU, have been reluctant to cede any sovereignty in the realm of energy policy. Without energy, there is no defense or security. This simple fact demonstrates that energy sovereignty should be ceded: if energy is so crucial, then institutions whose legitimacy is

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<sup>277</sup>“NATO and energy security,” [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy\\_security/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy_security/EN/index.htm).

bound by collective defense must engage energy policy. The new Strategic Concept acknowledges how energy fits into the security equation. NATO is however, aware that there are several obstacles to achieving energy security.

The largest obstacle is the unwillingness to cede autonomy in the realm of energy decision-making which is contributing to the perception (reality?) of “diverging national interests”<sup>278</sup> within NATO. This isn’t just a NATO problem; the European Union suffers the same dysfunction. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas has encouraged competition between European countries for Russian resources. “Despite the European Commission’s efforts at drafting a forward-looking energy policy, member states continue to make individual deals with energy suppliers... Nations look after themselves.”<sup>279</sup> This is also true for the United States, who maintains full sovereignty across the board, including on issues related to energy policy and especially evident in political debate about climate change.

Efforts to address climate change are even more plagued by politics than energy security. Energy security, in a minimal sense, has been institutionalized within NATO in the form of protecting and maintaining pipeline systems and protecting oil tankers; climate change remains elusive in the policy world, despite wide-spread public awareness of some of the more apocalyptic predictions. The failure of the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 to produce a legally binding international agreement capping carbon emissions, combined with the current political climate and the economic recession, have all but guaranteed policies of “adaptation” and abandoned any hope of capping emissions in the short term (sometimes addressed as “mitigation” policies). A significant shift is evident in the policy world regarding climate change, reflecting short-term priorities and political-economic constraints. This report reflects that shift, focusing on issues usually classified as “energy security” and bracketing much of the climate change conversation for a later day.

*What’s the difference between “energy security” and “climate security”?*

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<sup>278</sup>NATO and energy security,” [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy\\_security/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy_security/EN/index.htm).

<sup>279</sup>NATO and energy security,” [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy\\_security/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/climate-action/energy_security/EN/index.htm) (Accessed 11th February 2011).

There are a series of terms that refer to energy, resource, or climate related security threats. The differences between them are best understood with reflection on political realities and priorities. “Energy security” concerns generally focus on instability, such as disruption, affecting energy sources or supplies (including prices). These threats include sabotage of energy production facilities or transport modes including sabotage of pipelines or tankers. However, “energy security” is an umbrella term and also includes the destabilizing effects of purchasing energy from “petro dictators” or “natural gas oligarchs,” as well as the considerable insecurity non-state actors like terrorists and pirates can inflict. Fierce competition for energy supplies due to rising demand in China and India is another emerging energy security issue, but there are other sources of insecurity not mentioned here.

The long term path to energy security includes achieving some degree of “energy independence,” or reducing national dependence on single sources or suppliers of energy through diversification, as well as developing any native or indigenous energy supplies, including renewable energy resources. It has therefore also come to be associated with “clean energy” and state-subsidized “green” economic incentives, which are sometimes not so green at all (e.g. the disproportional investment in inefficient first-generation biofuel crops such as corn ethanol). The take-away here is that energy security, energy independence, and “clean” energy—whether or not it is clean—have recently coalesced around national security in a new way. The U.S. military has recently sought to connect the instability caused from enriching hostile regimes to carbon emissions to global climate change, and finally to human security. NATO, in the new Strategic Concept represents a shift from emphasis on territorial security to providing human security.

Climate security engages issues like droughts, floods, and changing global wind patterns and temperatures which could affect national and global stability by reducing food and fresh water supply. In reality, it is very difficult to separate some energy security challenges from climate change-related security issues; our energy system is the source of the carbon emissions after all. Climate change and energy security are complicated issues that straddle development and conventional territorial security concerns. As such, the institutions addressing these issues will likely duplicate one another’s efforts, which is obviously less efficient than a coordinated effort. This is one

of the challenges that NATO faces while trying to find its role in energy and climate security.

*Energy is Government Business...Literally*

Energy is government business. Over 80 percent of oil and natural gas supplies are controlled not by “big oil” or by natural gas multinational companies, but by national monopolies—by governments. For this reason alone, it is impossible to separate energy from national security issues. Energy is, furthermore, wielded as a weapon. Never mind that without reliable sources of energy, there is no capability to provide any type of security. “Economic vitality, military readiness, and national security all depend on energy realities.”<sup>280</sup> Getting energy policy right is incredibly important. Coordination and cooperation between allies is crucial for achieving long-term energy security. Despite the crucial role of energy in national and collective security, there is no uniform energy policy for NATO, or for the European Union.

First, we must acknowledge that whether we like it or not, NATO members purchase most of their energy from national monopolies or cartels, and not in an efficient or competitive marketplace. The prices are distorted and differential, depending on political relationships between buyers and sellers, which is a potential source of resentment among allies. The prices are wrong—something that has serious implications for all analysis, including comparisons between the efficiency of different energy sources. The estimates of oil and natural gas reserves are definitely wrong. No external experts have independent access to evaluate reserve levels, but the released estimates are so unlikely that it is difficult to find any credibility in the claims. There is a lot of uncertainty around remaining reserves of oil and gas, despite “peak oil” claims. The prices are wrong for another reason: because they do not include the cost of negative externalities, especially greenhouse gases.

The last point to make about who supplies our energy is that much of our hydrocarbons originate in countries or with regimes that are either politically unstable or hostile toward NATO members. Most of Europe’s energy comes from Russia, the Middle East and North Africa. While the U.S. doesn’t import much Russian natural gas, the Middle East has long been a staple of the American energy diet. The recent revolutions in

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<sup>280</sup> Montgomery. *The Powers that Be*. p.30.

the Egypt, Tunisia, and now Libya have the potential to significantly disrupt production and transportation of energy supplies. Those results are yet to be seen, though prices are responding to the instability already. Although many countries have sufficient reserves to deal with any short-term major shock, the energy landscape is constantly evolving.

## **Background**

*“The European Union still lacks an effective common energy policy or even a common energy market. The divisions between the interests of the older and newer EU members persist.”*<sup>281</sup>

There is no common energy policy in the European Union. There are instead, many national energy policies, sometimes competing with one another. “Although the European Union’s 27 member states have ceded some national sovereignty (or competency) to EU institutions in a variety of areas, including economic and trade policy, energy policy remains primarily the responsibility of the member states.”<sup>282</sup> Although membership between NATO and the EU is not perfectly comparable, any common energy policy supported by NATO would need the support of the EU. What is Europe’s energy profile?

Although the sources of energy consumed by individual member states vary within the EU, an overall profile can be gleaned. Europe remains overwhelming dependent on conventional sources of energy. “Today, oil, natural gas, and coal account for 80 percent of the energy consumed in the EU.”<sup>283</sup> (See Figure 1 below). Other sources of power are making negligible inroads. These include renewable and civilian nuclear energy. Although nuclear power is a prominent source of energy in states like France and the UK, it is met with resistance in other European countries, sometimes banned altogether.


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<sup>281</sup> Kevin Smith. “Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. (April 2010): 1, accessed 3 February 2011. Web.

<sup>282</sup> Belkin, “The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges,” *Congressional Research Service*, (January 2008): p.1.

<sup>283</sup> Belkin, “The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges,” *Congressional Research Service*, (January 2008): p.2.

**Figure 1: European Union, 2005**



Source: European Commission, “Energy and Transport in Figures, *Statistical Pocket Book 2007*.”

\*Solid fuels refer to coal, but not biomass, which is classified as “renewable” showing some data classification weaknesses. This data compilation includes EU members as of 2005.

Today, the European Union imports around half of its energy, with foreign dependence expected to increase. The European Commission anticipates the proportion of imported energy will rise by 15 percent (to around 65 percent) over the next two decades. Most of this energy is imported from Russia, with the Middle East also a significant contributor to Europe’s energy portfolio. About half of the EU’s natural gas imports and 30% of its imported oil come from Russia.”<sup>284</sup> This is increasingly bothersome in the context of energy independence goals. Europe has been looking to expand natural gas options, to diversify its supply source, as well as to lower emissions, as natural gas burns clean. However, despite these broadly agreed upon goals, there have been serious political barriers to energy supply diversification, particularly natural gas.

### **Energy Security in East Central Europe**

East Central Europe<sup>285</sup> is a region home to several younger NATO and EU member states. The energy insecurities of Central and Southeastern Europe (CSEE)

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<sup>284</sup> Paul Belkin, “The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges,” *Congressional Research Service*, (January 2008): xi.

<sup>285</sup> Mission and History, from the “About Us” section, East Central European Center <<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/about/mission.html>> (Accessed 20<sup>th</sup> February 2011). In using “East Central Europe” as my geographic category, I am accepting the classification set forth by Columbia University’s East Central European Center, which aims to “promote the study of the countries lying

countries are not new, but have gained more attention recently. Russia has long been a well-endowed “energy bully” in the region, utilizing every resource at the state’s disposal to pursue national objectives. However, several analysts writing between 2005 and 2010, believed we had reached a “turning point” in Russian-European energy policy and relations, especially after the extended natural gas cut-offs during winter in 2009.

Natural gas and oil supply disruptions by Russia have occurred on a fairly regular basis since 1990, but they did not elicit sufficient concern and an effective response until recently by the leadership of the European Union or by the larger member states. As long as Russian gas cutoffs did not affect Western Europe, there was an unwillingness by the older member states to acknowledge that Russia had for the past 20 years been using its energy resources to coerce neighboring states into adopting “acceptable” political and economic policies.<sup>286</sup>

In the months leading up to the Lisbon Summit, there were reports that energy security and energy supply reliability would top the agenda. Russia’s behavior was increasingly drawing attention for gas cut-offs. The disputes between Russia and Ukraine over energy prices resulted in “energy withholding” (during winter) on the part of Russian national monopolies. It became clear that energy would be a prevailing geopolitical tool of Russian politics and one with serious implications for NATO members. The following passage was reported to Congress in March 2008 concerning the expected agenda of the NATO Summit at Bucharest around energy security.

Energy security is an issue of growing importance in the alliance. Some allies averse to placing Georgia and Ukraine in the MAP say that the alliance must first resolve issues in energy security. How, for example, would the allies come to the assistance of Georgia and Ukraine if Russia were to cut off the two countries’ gas supplies? At the same time, this is already an issue for countries now in the alliance, as a gas cut-off could affect a number of allied states.<sup>287</sup>

However, by the time of this Congressional Report, Russian energy cut-offs had already *recently* affected members of the alliance, in 2005 and again 2007. The situation became even more complex when Georgia entered the discussion because of Russia’s resistance to Georgian entry into NATO. Russia’s occupation and apparent violation of Georgian sovereignty began just a couple of weeks before this report was issued to Congress. Although Russia has used energy as a coercive political and economic tool for decades, it was not until the oil and natural gas disruptions of January 2009 that this

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between Germany and Russia and between the Baltic and Aegean Seas.” This is a commonly accepted classification, although the UN uses a different one.

<sup>286</sup> Smith, “Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe,” p.2.

<sup>287</sup> Gallis. p.6.

“energy bullying” solicited the attention of larger EU member states and their leadership.<sup>288</sup> Several European Union members and the European Commission have called for states “to increase foreign policy coordination to secure and diversify energy supply” in response to these events.<sup>289</sup>

Still, there has been little action taken to mitigate Russia’s growing influence in European energy markets. Attempts have been made to diversify supply, such as the planning of the Nabucco Pipeline, but Russian monopolies pushed forward with competing pipelines—namely the Nord and South Stream Pipelines. Some bigger EU and NATO member states have supported the competing pipeline projects, to the dismay of other NATO members and allies.

### **The Pipelines: Nord and South Stream and Nabucco**

The growing natural gas demands of Europe have fostered the desire to build new pipelines. Unfortunately, two of the three pipelines under construction do not advance the goal of “energy diversification” as they are (largely) Russian owned and operated ventures, with significant backing from larger EU members, such as Italy (South Stream) and Germany (Nord Stream). In fact, the Nord and South Stream Pipelines are competitors to Nabucco (the US and EU favorite). But there is only room for so many pipelines. Despite the growing demand for Russian natural gas, the three proposed pipelines represent at least one too many. The fate of the Nabucco pipeline is unclear, but not promising.

Beyond Nabucco, the proposed new pipelines have other negative ramifications for European and thus NATO energy security. Both of the proposed Gazprom pipelines are planned to be laid on the sea floor, in addition to their land routes. Nord Stream in particular may limit the ability of Poland to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), part of the Polish effort at expanding energy independence. Seabed pipelines prevent certain transportation vessels—specifically LNG tankers—from berthing depending on water depth. There are also security concerns about a growing Russian military presence, something that Russian officials dismiss as ridiculous. Figure 2 is a map that highlights

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<sup>288</sup> Smith. “Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe”. p.2.

<sup>289</sup> Belkin. p.8.

the dependence of Europe on Russian natural gas. There are few pipelines that do not lead back to Russian gas fields, although there are other natural gas fields to be exploited.

**Figure 2: Major Russian Gas Pipelines to Europe**



Source: Samuel Bailey, Wikipedia Commons, November 15, 2009, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Major\\_russian\\_gas\\_pipelines\\_to\\_europe.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png).

### *Nord Stream*

Nord Stream<sup>290</sup> is a natural gas pipeline currently under construction, which will deliver Russian natural gas to Germany, with the first delivery expected at the end of 2011. When it begins delivering gas, Nord Stream will have been in the making for over a decade, having overcome significant political and environmental hurdles along the way. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas monopoly owns and operates the pipeline in Russian territory and maintains 51 percent of shares of *Nord Stream AG*, the official company name for the project.

<sup>290</sup> Originally called the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), Nord Stream has gone by a variety of names, including the North Stream Pipeline, the Russo-German Pipeline, and the Baltic Sea Pipeline, among other names.

Before the gas cut-offs of 2009, Nord Stream was identified as promoting further dependence on Russian natural gas. This was a source of consternation among members of the EU, particularly Poland and Lithuania,<sup>291</sup> who openly objected to the project.<sup>292</sup> Germany pushed the project forward, arguing that construction of the pipeline “will significantly enhance German and therefore European energy supply and security.”<sup>293</sup> However, this argument is complicated by a series of factors. Nord Stream runs under the Baltic Sea, effectively bypassing Poland and Lithuania. These countries argued that “by running the pipeline under sea so it bypasses both countries, and that by failing to coordinate with EU neighbors when negotiating with Russian, Germany’s actions pose a threat to their and broader European energy security.”<sup>294</sup> Poland and Lithuania were not the only countries to object to the project on energy security grounds.

There are significant environmental concerns regarding Nord Stream as well. As an undersea pipeline, the sea floor must be disrupted for installation. Baltic States and environmental analysts have raised questions about old toxic and chemical waste, including old (and perhaps active) WWII naval mines.<sup>295</sup> Others have emphasized the unique ecology of the Baltic Sea, and the potential for harm and destabilization. However, these objections aside, Nord Stream seems to be proceeding as planned. Sweden, Finland, and others signed off on environmental impact analysis paving the way for Nord Stream to move forward.

### *South Stream*

In December 2008, a deal was reached that secured the future of the South Stream pipeline, which will be jointly owned by the Italian multinational Eni and the Russian monopoly Gazprom. South Stream is seen as a direct challenge to the Nabucco pipeline.

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<sup>291</sup> Poland and Lithuania are also both NATO members.

<sup>292</sup> Belkin. p.4.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid.


<sup>295</sup> See “Final Report of the ad hoc working group on dumped chemical munition (HELCOM CHEMU) to the 16<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Helsinki Commission. *HELCOM*. March 1995. <<http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/Publications/OtherPublications/CHEMUFinalReport1995.pdf>> (Accessed 20<sup>th</sup> February 2011). See also, “Tons of mercury found in the Baltic Sea. Europe’s underwater chemical dump” *Spiegel International*, (August 2, 2007) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,434329,00.html> (Accessed 20<sup>th</sup> February 2011).

## *Nabucco*

The Nabucco Pipeline was born out of growing frustration and increasing dependence on Russian natural gas. If built, the pipeline would carry Central Asian natural gas from Turkey to Austria. The long term prospects of the project are unclear: investment capital is still needed. Political support from some European allies has waned despite strong US endorsement of the project and general EU support. However, some EU members are supporting competing pipelines as a way of ensuring national supply, while undermining a potential source of natural gas diversification for Europe.

Nabucco has its own set of challenges. Nabucco is planned to carry natural gas from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, and even Iran. Iraq is not ready to transport gas, and the political landscape in the Middle East is rapidly developing in unpredictable ways that may limit production capacity and supply, if only in the short term. In addition, as mentioned, the Nord and South Stream Pipelines reduce the needed cubic volume of natural gas threatening the viability of Nabucco, which will not be operational until 2015, if everything goes well. By that time, both of the competing projects will be operational. Figure 3 below shows the proposed designation of the Nabucco pipeline.

**Figure 3: Nabucco Pipeline**



Source: Simon Sanett, Wikipedia Commons,  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2010Nabuccopipelinemap.jpg>.

## Russia's "Divide and Conquer" Policy?

*"Moscow's pursuit of a "divide-and-conquer" policy toward Europe has not diminished."<sup>296</sup>*

Russia is an "energy thug." Rather than hope for Russian good will, the EU should engage energy policy as a united front. The disparities--developmental, political, economic, and even social--allow tiered decision-making authority to occur within the institution. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and others who pursue bilateral agreements with Russia must be confronted, especially when these agreement risks the integrity of the union as a whole.

For obvious reasons, NATO must begin to address EU energy security issues. Germany is believed to have limited any discussion of energy security at the Lisbon Summit, in an effort to appease the Russians, ensuring natural gas delivery to Germany. For Baltic member states this is disconcerting. The integrity of NATO here too is at stake. The smaller and newer member states feel that their biggest security threat--Russia--is being granted a pass. These member states, notably the Baltic States and Poland, recently met to discuss the implications of energy security threats originating from Russia, as well as the possibility that their security was not being duly considered in negotiations. They invited larger member states as well as representatives from the United States to observe.

While the Russian government claims that competitors to the Nabucco project and actions of Gazprom and Transneft more generally, are no threat to European energy security or independence, the actions of our Eastern European allies, including some NATO member states indicate these nations do indeed feel threatened by Russia. Several analysts believed a "turning point" had been reached in January 2009, not because it was the first time Russia cut off gas in the dead of winter, but because this time the ripples extended to the longer established and more influential NATO (and EU) member states, such as Germany who saw pressure in their pipelines drop.

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<sup>296</sup> Smith. "Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe". p.1.

## Responses and Reactions to Energy Security Concerns

### *The Energy Charter Treaty*

In 1998, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) came into legal force, after nearly a decade in the making. The predecessor to the ECT was the Energy Charter Declaration, which was initiated in 1991 by the European Union “to promote energy cooperation and diversify Europe’s energy supply.”<sup>297</sup> The “fundamental aim” of the Energy Charter Treaty, according to the Energy Charter Organization is to:

“Strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy related investment and trade.”<sup>298</sup>

Today, fifty-one countries are signatories to the ECT. There are two glaring exceptions: Russia and the United States. The United States signed the 1991 Declaration, but cited a “preference to pursue energy-related matters on a bilateral basis.”<sup>299</sup> Today, the United States is an “observer” but not a member to the ECT. Russia, on the other hand, signed the ECT and was “applying it provisionally”<sup>300</sup> until October 2009 when Prime Minister Vladimir Putin formally withdrew from the treaty altogether. Russia also formally withdrew from the World Trade Organization at the same time, making “it more difficult to draw Russia into a rules-based system regarding energy sales and distribution.”<sup>301</sup> Figure 4 is a map of members to the ECT.

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<sup>297</sup> Gallis. p.3.

<sup>298</sup> The Energy Charter Organization, About Us page, <http://www.encharter.org> (Accessed 20<sup>th</sup> February 2011).

<sup>299</sup> Gallis. p.3.

<sup>300</sup> Energy Charter Organization, <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61>.

<sup>301</sup> Smith. “Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe”. p.6.

**Figure 4: Members and Observers to the Energy Charter Treaty (prior to 2009)**



© European Energy Charter [1991 – 1994]  
© Energy Charter Secretariat [1995 - 2007]

\*Countries marked in green are signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty, and members of the Energy Charter Conference.

\*Countries marked in blue are observers (blue vertical stripes denote the countries of ASEAN).

\*\*Note that this map does not show the new status of the Russian Federation. It should now be white, along with other non-members and non-observers.

### *A New Energy Security Center for NATO?*

Recently, High-Level NATO officials attended the opening ceremony of Lithuania's new Energy Security Center in Vilnius. The center, with funding from various Lithuanian government and educational institutions, is seeking to "clarify and evaluate what is going on in the energy sector" as well as "how we can avoid conflicts by using energy resources management and supply systems."<sup>302</sup>

According to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Audronius Azubalis, the establishment of the Energy Security Centre in Vilnius is a response to the major contemporary global challenges in the field of energy security. The new Energy Security Centre will aim to gain the status of a NATO Centre of Excellence contributing to the Alliance's capability in the field of energy security.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Energy Security Centre in Vilnius Wants to Become NATO Agency, interview," *The Lithuania Tribune*, (26<sup>th</sup> January 2011), <http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2011/01/26/energy-security-centre-in-vilnius-wants-to-become-nato-agency-interview/print/>.

<sup>303</sup> "NATO High-Level Officials attend the opening ceremony of the Energy Security Centre in Vilnius, Lithuania," (14<sup>th</sup> January 2011), [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_69826.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_69826.htm).

Mr. Azubalis believes that the new center will be eligible to gain the status of a “Center of Excellence” in around five years. When asked if NATO is moving in the right direction on energy security issues, Mr. Azubalis believes the organization is:

Absolutely. The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit mentions the necessity to evaluate energy security challenges. This is the basis for our hope that the Energy Security Centre will become a NATO centre in the future.<sup>304</sup>

NATO is still in the early stages of conceptualizing its role in providing energy security. This will require working with member countries as well as institutions like the European Union.

### **Conclusion**

Energy security, as with other forms of security is best achieved cooperatively and collectively. However, even in the case of collective institutions like the European Union and NATO, uniform energy policy has been difficult to come by. Nations prefer to maintain control over so vital a policy area. This is especially problematic given that emerging energy security threats are transnational in nature, reflecting the reality of an interconnected world. From pipelines to transportation systems or electricity grids, national boundaries are traversed with increasing ease to deliver energy. Global climate change, perhaps the most transnational of all phenomenon, will require international governance and cooperation the likes of which have never been seen.

The twenty-first century will without a doubt be one of energy transition and transformation. Although individual members within NATO may be relatively better equipped for this transition, the strength of the organization depends on strong independent member states with robust and diverse energy packages. It also depends on strong partnerships between allies who trust that their security concerns—particularly those energy security concerns of younger and newer NATO and EU members—are being addressed. This report has focused on the disparities between the concerns of younger, newer EU (and NATO) members around energy security and the older more established nations. To ensure the strength of the alliance to address and tackle energy security issues, this report makes the following recommendations:

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<sup>304</sup> Energy Security Centre in Vilnius Wants to Become NATO Agency, interview,” *The Lithuania Tribune* (26<sup>th</sup> January 2011), <http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2011/01/26/energy-security-centre-in-vilnius-wants-to-become-nato-agency-interview/print/>.

1.           **Diversification of Energy Source and Supply.** Russia is increasingly gaining additional leverage in the European energy market. Attempts to diversify supply, such as the Nabucco Pipeline have been met with competing projects supported by alliance members. Neither Nord Stream nor South Stream could have moved forward without EU members (and non EU member) support. NATO should encourage the development of a commission that reviews
2.           **Greater Transparency in Energy Contracts.** Currently, the European Commission has the authority to enforce greater transparency, especially when dealing with nonmember states.<sup>305</sup> NATO should encourage the Commission to take these steps. However, in the mean time, NATO could establish procedures for promoting transparency around its own energy dealings.
3.           **Developing human capital within NATO.** The Energy Security Center in Lithuania, as well as the new Emerging Security Challenges Division (in particular the Energy Security section) have the potential to be invaluable resources for NATO and beyond on issues of energy security. However, both of these centers are very limited in resources, with the Lithuanian center fully funded by the national government.

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<sup>305</sup> Smith. "Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe". p.5.

## Chapter Eight

### NATO's Response to Terrorism

Evan Wyse

#### Introduction

9/11 and other acts of terror have vaulted terrorism to the top of NATO's list of priorities. NATO's latest Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as a key issue moving into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The text of the strategic concept reads,

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks.<sup>306</sup>

Unfortunately, terrorism is poorly understood as a policy issue in the Western world. While some countries like Israel have been grappling with such problems for decades, it is only recently that the Western world has had to face the threat of international terrorism. Despite intense fascination with words like "terrorism," "jihad," or "extremist," little time has been given to produce a long-term policy that will curtail the threat of terrorism. Edgar Buckley, the Chairman of NATO's Policy Coordination Group, wrote of the hours following 9/11, "There was little to guide us. There had been hardly any discussion of terrorism in NATO up to that point. There was no clear policy, as far as I know, on the use of NATO assets in response to terrorist attacks."<sup>307</sup> While many documents have been written since then, this Task Force offers a unique opportunity to step back from the overwhelmingly popular issue of 9/11 and determine where terrorism fits in to NATO's policy as a whole.

This paper will recommend a policy in two areas. First, it will enumerate ways that future acts of terror might be stopped or prevented. Second, in the event of a major act of terror, it will prescribe a suggested course of action for NATO in the future.

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<sup>306</sup> NSC.

<sup>307</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html>.

## **Background**

Terrorism is a problem specific to democracies. Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush commented that, “they hate us...for our freedom.” While this statement has been dismissed by most scholars as an inaccurate characterization of al-Qaeda’s goals, it may contain a grain of truth. Terrorists do not waste their time targeting the populations of autocratic states. Democracies are the only viable target for a terrorist, because they are the only venue in which their ideas may be heard. Chechen terrorists only began to target Russians following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of *Laskar jihad* in Indonesia coincides directly with improved political freedoms.

Thus, it seems fitting that NATO, a body of Western democracies, be the agency to tackle terrorism. Indeed, NATO is uniquely equipped to handle terrorism. Unlike any other multilateral organization in the world, NATO is populated primarily by military officers. Unlike civilians, NATO’s officers are well accustomed to working together to protect their mutual security. The following report will characterize the terrorist threat, and discuss some promising avenues for engaging the issue within NATO’s framework.

## **Characterizing the Threat**

The scourge of terrorism is not the actual damage caused, or lives lost. While such events are indeed a tragic loss of life, 3,000 lives is not a huge number in the national context. Considering that over 10,000 equally innocent people are killed per *year* in drunken driving accidents, it seems that our concern lies not with the actual deaths, but with the act.

Given the immense power that terrorist attacks wield over the public’s imagination, the real danger is the intense political attention that is given to such violence. Psychologist Nehemia Friedland writes that, “public perception of threat and danger seems to be disproportionate to the terrorists’ actual capabilities...terrorism bears primarily on individuals’ perception, on the ‘public mind.’”<sup>308</sup> The real problem of terrorism lies in its ability to instill fear in a population. The results of this fear can be traumatic to a society, as citizens lose confidence in their safety.

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<sup>308</sup> Friedland. p.592.

Following 9/11, the airline industry crashed, tourism plummeted, and America experienced a minor recession due to fears of future attacks. In the end, the 9/11 attacks caused \$500 million in damage to the US's economy.<sup>309</sup> However, terrorism is clearly not just an economic issue. The 2009 Federal Budget requested \$145 billion for use in the Global War on Terror – far more than any terrorist attack has ever cost the United States.

Terrorism appears to provoke an aggressive response among the attacked. Indeed, in his address following the attacks, President Bush promised to, “make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”<sup>310</sup> As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have shown us, gratifying such urges can be extremely expensive.

### **Terrorism, Domestic and Foreign**

Terrorism can be neatly divided into two categories: domestic, and international. The distinction is self-explanatory: domestic terrorists strike targets within their country of origin, usually in attempt to overthrow the government. International terrorists travel abroad, or form networks, to influence the politics of foreign countries. While this may seem to be a fairly arbitrary distinction, further analysis demonstrates domestic terrorists and international terrorists to be rather distinct from one another, with completely different profiles and *modus operandi*.

Domestic terrorist networks frequently resemble a group of friends. They operate in small groups, and rarely travel far to their target. For example, Timothy McVeigh chose to bomb the federal building in Oklahoma City. Surely there were more ambitious targets for the aspiring terrorist, but Mr. McVeigh picked a target both convenient and close to home. Domestic terrorists rarely recruit members outside their personal circle, which makes them difficult to monitor with informants. Most fund operations with their personal finances, which makes financial tracking impossible.

Some domestic terror cells operate within larger organizations, like the Ku Klux Klan or Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. While large numbers of the movement may support such violence, only a small percentage is sufficiently radicalized to go through

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<sup>309</sup> Bergen. p.22.

<sup>310</sup> Bergen. p.53.

with it. However, radical organizations such as these frequently form an excellent support base for recruitment and aid. Many are part time terrorists, with day jobs and families.

International terrorism, by contrast, is strictly a business. International terrorist rings frequently have budgets, recruitment goals, and salaries. The size of the organization generally determines the quality of their particular institutions. Al-Qaeda, for example, paid most of its Afghani members, allowed them sick leave, and offered disability compensation for anyone who was injured in the line of duty.<sup>311</sup>

International terrorists frequently collaborate with other extra legal groups to achieve their goals. In 1981, for example, a team of Palestinian jihadis, German Marxists, and Carlos the Jackal, an infamous Venezuelan revolutionary, participated in a raid on a German bank. While cooperation on actual offensive operations is rare, international terrorist networks frequently work together or with other lawbreakers to achieve their ends. In Africa, for example, al-Qaeda and its affiliates provide protection for local warlords, facilitate smuggling operations, and use slave labor to extract blood diamonds from Nigeria.<sup>312</sup> Al-Qaeda also generates funds through ownership of legitimate businesses. Until recently, al-Qaeda held a large stake in the world's largest producer of gum Arabic, which is used in many soft drinks and sweets. Other ventures have included boating and fishing businesses in Nairobi, mines in Tanzania, and cattle ranches in the Sudan.<sup>313</sup> These businesses also serve as a way to launder money received from other operations.

International terrorist networks also generate funds on a local level. Al-Qaeda, for example, uses a highly structured framework to move into a new area. Members are trained in camps in Somalia, the Sudan, or Afghanistan. Then, they are given a certain amount of seed money, much like any other business, to set up operations in a new area. After a certain time period, generally 12 months, the new cell is expected to be completely financially independent.<sup>314</sup> This is generally accomplished by shaking down local businesses or community centers like mosques. Much like the Italian Mafia in

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<sup>311</sup> Bergen. p.34.

<sup>312</sup> Kepel. p.90.

<sup>313</sup> Corbin. p.311.

<sup>314</sup> Bergen. p.241.

Chicago, al-Qaeda and its affiliates across the globe frequently run security rackets as a means of generating income and participating in the local community.<sup>315</sup>

Indeed, many terrorists are not the ideological freedom fighters we portray them as. While deranged and violent, traditional perceptions see him as a strict idealist, willing to fight and die for his cause. Popular television shows like *24* depict terrorists as misguided but self-sacrificing individuals. While a terrorist is understood as hostile, there is a certain amount of respect afforded to those willing to risk their lives – a certain tendency to romanticize terrorists as passionate, brave, and misunderstood.

The reality of international terrorist groups is that they are criminals, nothing more. One of the participants in the 9/11 attacks spent his final night on earth sleeping with a prostitute – hardly a religious man. Several purportedly Muslim terrorist groups have engaged in human trafficking, and several elements of the Taliban are funded via drug trafficking.

As an organization, al-Qaeda has an estimated income of \$15 million per year.<sup>316</sup> While this seems like an unimpressive sum compared to the annual budgets of other organizations, it is more than enough to conduct terrorist operations. 9/11, by far al-Qaeda's most successful operation to date, was executed at a total cost of \$500,000. Indeed, according to researcher Peter Bergen, "[Osama] bin Laden was successful not because he was an inspiring or seasoned combat leader, but because he was excellent at bringing in donations."<sup>317</sup> Thus, we must view terrorist networks as a small part of criminal networks abroad. They provide security to illegal operations, are financed by a number of illegal activities, cooperate with criminals and terrorists with different political affiliation than their own. Like an evil security company, they work alongside other enemies of peace and security for personal gain and notoriety. They can be viewed in this light – not as politically motivated actors, but as thugs.

### **Potential Responses to Terrorism**

The most basic response to a terrorist attack is an invasion, in an effort to completely wipe out the perpetrators of such an attack. This has been the classic response of victim of terrorism for many years, and was the strategy that President Bush employed

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<sup>315</sup> Kiser. p.88.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid. p.42.

<sup>317</sup> Bergen. p.24

following 9/11. There are certainly advantages to this response. Acting aggressively sends a message to future terrorists, and has demonstrably weakened al-Qaeda's hold over Afghanistan.

However, these invasions can come at a huge cost. Following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia, and was subsequently embroiled in a catastrophic war. The Russo-Chechen conflict continues to produce casualties despite the Russian occupation. France occupied Algiers with paratroopers following a wave of violence. We shall let history be the judge of how these endeavors ultimately fared.

Another option is a limited, targeted response. Rather than wage a large land battle in a war, such a response would target the specific perpetrators of the incident rather than the area as a whole. This response was employed by the Clinton Administration following the embassy bombings in Africa and the bombing of the USS Cole. President Clinton ordered Tomahawk missile strikes on al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. While it allows the state to avoid a protracted conflict, it also fails to address the root of the problem. As Israel's repeated strikes into Palestine and the surrounding area show, calculated strikes often prove to be temporary, rather than permanent, solutions.

## **Recommendations**

### **Treat Terrorism as a Crime**

Following 9/11, NATO invoked Article V, and declared its commitment to overthrow the Taliban. In retrospect, this was a poor decision, if the objective was to prevent future terrorism. Indeed, an insurgency continues, hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent, and we have yet to capture Osama bin Laden. Even if we are successful in bringing peace to the region, it is likely that terrorists will migrate to other regions and begin anew. Given the liquidity of such groups, it seems unlikely that we will ever be able to pin them down in such a fashion.

Furthermore, there were powerful precedents in NATO's history for avoiding multilateral intervention as a response to international terrorism. During the troubles in Britain, NATO chose not to intervene. Despite over 3000 casualties and repeated bombings of locations within the United Kingdom, NATO did not feel the need to intervene. According to Edgar Buckley, NATO decided to invoke Article V in a

statement on September 12<sup>th</sup>, less than 24 hours after the events of 9/11. He writes that, “The scene was one of confusion...As for distinguishing such an attack from ‘normal’ terrorism, we selected two criteria – the scale and external direction.”<sup>318</sup>

This seems to be rather nonsensical. While the scale of the 9/11 attacks was certainly unique, it was definitely not the first time that a NATO member had been the victim of externally directed terrorism. From the Libyan-directed Lockerbie bombing in 1988 to the assassination of British MPs by the IRA, there are numerous examples of international terror being directed against NATO members. Without faulting NATO’s leadership too much, it seems like the decision that 9/11 was unique was made in the heat of the moment, rather than thought out carefully with insights into its potential implications.

Now that we have the opportunity to do so, NATO must create specific policy to prevent 9/11 from setting a dangerous precedent that will define its response to terrorism in the future. Terrorist acts should not be covered by collective defense. While it is an egregious offense against a nation’s sovereignty, it does not require offensive action by all of NATO’s members.

This is not to say that NATO should remain inactive, however. There is definitely a middle ground between complete non-response and NATO’s response to 9/11. Indeed, following the bombing of the *USS Cole*, President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on several targets in Afghanistan, which succeeded in killing several important al-Qaeda leaders. The main point, however, is that NATO members should remain free to pursue more nimble policy solutions such as air strikes, foreign aid, covert action, or diplomacy to respond to terrorist networks. We must prevent our reaction to 9/11 from becoming the knee jerk reaction to terrorist events in the future, lest NATO find itself dragged into a number of conflicts around the globe.

**Formulate an intelligence agency to analyze intelligence on terrorism:**

The most effective way to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring is to gain knowledge of them before they occur. Part of the nature of asymmetric attacks like terrorism is that they rely on surprise. Effective intelligence allows the state to anticipate such attacks, arrest the would-be perpetrators, and begin dismantling the network.

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<sup>318</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html>

Effective intelligence after a terrorist incident is equally useful, as it allows nations to respond precisely to the perpetrators of an attack.

However, gathering such intelligence in a national context is quite difficult. Since many terrorist attacks are planned abroad, domestic law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to effectively detect terrorist networks. Further, in the context of the European Union, citizens can travel between countries without going through customs, making persons of interest difficult to track. As a result, foreign intelligence agencies – the CIA, MI6, BND – have a far better capability to engage international terrorism.

A further advantage of foreign intelligence agencies is their non-reliance on probable cause. In America and other democracies, reasonable suspicion must be demonstrated before belongings can be searched, or phones can be wiretapped. However, foreign agents are not subject to such restrictions when operating in other countries. This would allow for far more aggressive collection of intelligence to take place without infringing on the rights of citizens in NATO member states.

In order to take advantage of these benefits, countries within NATO must establish a multilateral intelligence organization under NATO command. Its responsibilities will include the analysis and appropriate dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence. However, it will not be involved in the direct collection of intelligence. States would be required to turn over all terrorism-related intelligence gathered, as part of the agreement. Just as citizens of the United States can request the release of redacted documents through FOIA, this organization would have the right to view any and all intelligence pertaining to terrorism after it had been scrubbed of other sensitive information.

Such an organization would fill out our knowledge of terrorist networks. Much in the same way that various United States intelligence organizations share intelligence, Western democracies would benefit immensely from the additional knowledge of their peers. While it is difficult to quantify how this benefit would be realized, it is certain that there would be no drawback to colluding with other nations. Among NATO members, terrorism is an uncontroversial issue – every single nation stands opposed to it. Thus, we can expect that every nation would willingly benefit from the ability to help their peers and receive their help in turn.

Engaging intelligence in a multilateral fashion also provides an excellent way of vetting it for bias. National intelligence agencies frequently fall victim to political pressure from elected leaders. In an infamous example, the United States' intelligence services provided a ludicrous account of nuclear weapon proliferation prior to the invasion of 2003. Multilateral organizations do not seem prone to such a bias. The IAEA, for example, has a superb track record as an investigator of potential nuclear safeguards violations and proliferation. Unlike the United States, the IAEA has correctly assessed Iraq's WMD capacity and North Korea's nuclear capability.

### **Why NATO?**

While the importance of having an intelligence community is well demonstrated, one might question whether NATO is the ideal agency to be its host. Indeed, several other international organization. The United Nations, for example, already handles several international counter-terrorism forums.

However, there are several countries that are not necessarily opposed to some forms of terror. Syria, Iran, or Libya, for example, might misuse the information provided, by passing it along to terrorist networks, or using it to improve the terrorist networks that they sponsor. Whether or not this would actually occur is fairly irrelevant – even the possibility of potential misuse of national security information might be sufficient to deter nations from sharing information as necessary. By contrast, NATO members have only ever been the *victims* of terrorist attacks. They would have no incentive to misuse intelligence, and remain committed to stopping terrorism wherever they are able.



## Chapter Nine

### NATO and Cyber Defense

Aiden Duffy

#### **Introduction**

The challenge that cyberspace presents as a defense issue lies in its unique characteristics. These characteristics present both negative and positive effects on the policy making process. For example, threats that emerge in cyberspace are inherently global and therefore require the highest level of efficient communication and strategically disseminated plans to address. At the same time, the fact that all systems can be replicated exactly allows for the advancement of applied knowledge in a ‘test’ zone to prepare for such threats.

The demand for international cooperation to address cyber security is irrefutable, but the actions being taken to meet this demand remain undefined. This paper outlines the current state of cyber defense measures within the international community and recommends that NATO take the lead as an efforts coordinator by expanding its operations and innovating to stay in front of cyber threats.

NATO’s position as an international military-political organization and experience aligning member states to tackle global defense issues provides the ideal environment for creating and enforcing cyber defense measures at the international level. Increased autonomy and decision-making abilities should be extended to the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) for the speedy and effective combat of cyber threats.

#### **Defining ‘cyber-warfare,’ ‘cyber defense,’ and ‘cyber security’**

‘Cyber-warfare,’ in this case, is defined as “any warfare waged by states and significant non-state actors in cyberspace. It can include defending information and communications systems, critical infrastructure, weapons systems or military command centres from

attack, as well as conducting equivalent offensive operations against an adversary.”<sup>319</sup> ‘Cyber defense’ refers to the strategies devised and policies put in place to defend against cyber-warfare, while ‘cyber security’ refers more broadly to the general security of all global information infrastructure.

### **Background Information**

The World Wide Web has been in the public domain since 1990 and cyber attacks directed at states date back to the Kosovo War, but it was only in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit that NATO established its first tangible cyber defense policy. The establishment of this policy was a reactionary measure after the 2007 attacks on Estonia. During heightened political tensions between the Estonian and Russian governments, distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS)<sup>320</sup> attacks occurred in which both government and private sector servers were compromised. Russian sympathizers were later charged with responsibility for these attacks<sup>321</sup>.

Interestingly, the CCDCOE was actually developed in Estonia in 2004, with the mission to “be the main source of expertise in the field of cooperative cyber defense by accumulating, creating, and disseminating knowledge in related matters within NATO, NATO Nations and Partners.”<sup>322</sup> The disparity is years between the creation of a knowledge-sharing center and the implementation of policies proved to be disastrous. Suleyman Anil, a Turkish IT expert from the NATO Security Office is the man driving much of that policy. "Estonia was the first time, in a large scale, [that we saw] possible involvement of state agencies; that the cyber attack can bring down a complete national service, banking, media... the other particular trait everyone is struggling to deal with... is lots of cyber espionage going on".<sup>323</sup>

The previous example of Russian sympathizers attempting to take down Estonia’s information infrastructure could be an example of state-to-state action, but the world of

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<sup>319</sup> Hughes. 2010.

<sup>320</sup> “Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), a particularly noxious attack in which computer criminals mimic legitimate client behavior by sending proper-looking requests, often via compromised and commandeered hosts known as bots.” Shenker. 2010.

<sup>321</sup> Tikk. 2010.

<sup>322</sup> From the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence mission statement, found here: <http://www.ccdcoe.org/12.html>.

<sup>323</sup> Quote is from an interview Anil did with the BBC that was printed in February 2009 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7851292.stm>>.

cyber-warfare is not limited to this realm. In 2009, major US firms reported attacks said to be originating from China<sup>324</sup>. There was evidence that the target was information pertaining to the activities of Chinese human rights activists. While there is not enough evidence for a finite conclusion, it is accepted by the general public that these attacks were politically motivated and instigated by the Chinese government, becoming the largest example of attacks by a state directed at foreign firms.

In 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, cyber security rose to the list of critical capabilities and a two-year plan was agreed upon by member states. This is a necessary step in the progression towards aligned policy around cyber defense, but the lack of details in execution is not proportional to the magnitude of impending threats in cyberspace.

### **The State of Cyber security on the Global Landscape**

There is currently no international body with the directive to coordinate cyber security initiatives globally. Part of the reason for this is the fact that various issues under the umbrella of cyberspace effect different segments of society and different levels of government. Issues of cyber security can be broken out into overarching categories in which policies fall: internet governance, cyber crime, cyber terrorism, cyber warfare. A look at the current efforts related to cyber security that other international organizations are taking on reveals the distinct defensive function that NATO could adapt into. The following table shows the divisions in scope:

	<b>OSCE</b>	<b>UN</b>	<b>OECD</b>	<b>CoE</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>G8</b>	<b>NATO</b>
<b>Internet Governance</b>		•	•	•	•		
<b>Cyber Crime</b>	•	•	•	•	•	•	
<b>Cyber Terrorism</b>	•	•				•	•
<b>Cyber Warfare</b>		•					•

*Table created by Eneken Tikk, legal adviser of the Cooperative Defense Centre of Excellence, for her paper "Global Security – Thinking About the Niche for NATO" in the Summer-Fall 2010 issue of SAIS Review of International Affairs.*

According to Eneken Tikk's<sup>325</sup> academic study of the current landscape of cyber security, there is a tendency among international organizations to focus on either the regulatory aspects of the internet or cybersecurity aspects. The UN and NATO are the sole

<sup>324</sup> Vascellaro, Jessica E. "Google Warns of China Exit Over Hacking - WSJ.com." The Wall Street Journal. 12 Jan. 2010. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126333757451026659.html>>.

<sup>325</sup> Eneken Tikk is the legal adviser of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).

organizations with the ability to impact policy at the national and international level in the areas of cyber terrorism and cyber warfare.

While the UN is an important generalist body and a forum for discussion and awareness, its lack of focus or success in coordinating strategic defense efforts places it in the position to approve and promote NATO's efforts rather than lead the way itself. NATO, on the other hand, has a proven track record of carrying out member-sanctioned initiatives.

### **Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)**

As mentioned above, the CCDCOE was formed in 2004 in Taillin, Estonia. It operates as an International Military Organization (IMO), fully accredited by NATO's North Atlantic Council in October 2008. "CCD COE vision is to be the main source of expertise in the field of cooperative cyber defence by accumulating, creating, and disseminating knowledge in related matters within NATO, NATO nations and Partners."<sup>326</sup> The body is essentially a research and knowledge sharing institution meant to inform action and policies for member states. At the moment, its directive is limited to the collection and provision of information to NATO members, but an expansion of its role could prove to be an agile move for curbing cyber threats.

### **Existing Plans**

Although the recommendations provided by the Group of Experts addressed cyber security several times with some degree of detail, the New Strategic Concept mentions only a timeline for creating policies and ensuring capabilities.

The timeline laid out in the Lisbon Summit Declaration includes the two-step process of establishing a plan and executing said plan. "We have tasked the Council to develop...a NATO in-depth cyber defense policy by June 2011 and to prepare an action plan for its implementation" (Section 40). The ultimate goal being "to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection" (Section 40).

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<sup>326</sup> "Mission and Vision." *Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence*. NATO, n.d. Web. 2 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.ccdcoe.org/11.html>>.

One unmentioned disparity in the timeline is the varying stages of current information security capabilities among member countries. While the United States has a well-developed strategy for addressing issues of information security, other member states with fewer resources will have a steeper learning curve and higher barrier to implementation. At present, less developed member states rely on stronger member states for support, as exemplified in the cyber attacks on Estonian government agencies in 2007.

The Group of Experts' report makes recommendations on the provision of training to member states, the expansion of early capabilities, the preparation of an expert team to address member states in emergency situations, and the creation of both passive and active cyber defense capabilities.<sup>327</sup> Adjusting the New Strategic Concept to factor in more of these recommendations from the Group of Experts report, as well as additional more forward-thinking efforts, could make for a more robust directive in which to NATO would emerge as the global leader in cyber defense strategy.

**Recommendation: NATO members should embrace its role as a global policymaker to address cyber security**

In reviewing the array of international organizations that could take on the task of addressing cyber defense, NATO is uniquely positioned as the most successful traditional military alliance still in existence. Leveraging its existing legitimacy in the defense arena to address cyber defense could provide a smooth transition to adopting policies around cyber defense and the strategies to uphold it.

As time is an issue, the speed with which policies can be put in place is a relevant factor in the decision of an international organization to take on cyber defense. NATO's experience in the establishment of security protocols for all member states would effectively translate to the establishment of comparable information security protocols.

As threats such as cyber security come into NATO's purview, it becomes imperative to pre-delegate authority over certain threats to NATO military leaders. As the Group of Experts recommended in its report, *Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, NATO leadership could pre-delegate

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<sup>327</sup> Albright, Madeleine K. "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement". May 17, 2010. [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf). p.45.

authority based on rules of engagement to address emergency situations.<sup>328</sup> The Group of Experts report states that unconventional threats (including cyber warfare) will be evaluated on a case by case basis by the NAC to determine if Article 5 is to be invoked. Delegating authority to a CCDCOE leader (currently within or appointed at a later date) could decrease response time to and reduce the impact of a cyber attack on any given nation.

**Recommendation: Create NATO-specific ‘Black Hat Briefings’ to regularly challenge the security infrastructure**

While many of the traditional threats that NATO has addressed in the past and continues to address in the future are limited in their ability for realistic test scenarios, cyberspace is quite the opposite. The immaterial nature of cyberspace allows for extensive systemic testing without the risk of harmful aftermath. Unlike an arms race with physical weapons, full-scale real world exercises in cyber defense are possible. For example, the Cyber Coalition exercise practiced by NATO member states annually for the past three years presents a scenario of multiple simultaneous cyber attacks<sup>329</sup>. Existing defense teams are tasked with identifying and addressing the issue, after which the results can be reviewed to learn points for improvement. This type of training is an innovative method of preparation that provides invaluable experience to those tasked with cyber defense.

Beyond the Cyber Coalition exercises, there is very little organized opportunity for member states with fewer resources to practice techniques. Additional innovative techniques are necessary to keep up with the quickly evolving field of cyber defense. One tactic that could be easily transferred from the private sector and applied to international organizations like NATO is the sponsorship of a series similar to the ‘Black Hat Briefings’<sup>330</sup>, currently run in the United States. ‘Black Hat Briefings’ are conferences in which information security experts from all walks of life, from the CIO to the elite hacker, present and review issues in the field and reveal weaknesses in information security systems.

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<sup>328</sup> Albright, Madeleine K. “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” May 17, 2010, [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf). p.20.

<sup>329</sup> “Cyber Coalition 2010” to exercise collaboration in cyber defense.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, 16 Nov. 2010. Web. 2 Feb. 2011. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_68205.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68205.htm?selectedLocale=en)>.

<sup>330</sup> Black Hat Technical Security Conference [<http://www.blackhat.com/>]

**Recommendation: Centralized body with member trust could more effectively address cyber defense tactics**

Earlier, it was suggested that an autonomous committee be created with decision-making power necessary to quickly evaluate threats on a case-by-case basis in order to determine NATO involvement. In this vein, it makes logical sense that autonomy and decision-making abilities be extended to the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) for the speedy and effective combat of such cyber threats.

The CCDCOE has proved to be a valuable asset to many NATO members, especially those not able to develop and maintain a state-run cyber defense organization. Without CCDCOE involvement, member-state Georgia may have suffered far worse in the DDOS attacks it experienced in 2008.<sup>331</sup> Even if Georgia had a state run organization to address cyber threats, it is unlikely that any such organization would be comparable in capabilities to that of an international organization spanning the North Atlantic. Access to the skill levels and high technology currently existing at the CCDCOE is a value to any member state, but a necessity to smaller states in the midst of political feuds. Sharing the resources of the CCDCOE could balance out the inherently asymmetrical nature of cyber warfare.

The CCDCOE, working in conjunction with the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), could effectively address and perpetuate a collective cyber defense strategy for all member states. The Group of Experts specifically recommends that the “ Alliance should be prepared to send an expert team to any member experiencing or threatened by a major cyber attack.”<sup>332</sup> Granting this additional responsibility to the CCDCOE could make for a natural transition, as this body is a NATO accredited COE and member-formed institution<sup>333</sup> and therefore member state endorsement would be attained more easily because of its existing legitimacy and

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<sup>331</sup> Tikk, Eneken, Kadri Kaska, and Kristel Rünneri. "Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified." Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (). Web. 5 Feb. 2011.

<sup>332</sup> Albright, Madeleine K. "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement," May 17, 2010, [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/NATO2020-Experts-Report.pdf). p.20.

<sup>333</sup> "Centres of Excellence (COEs) are educational institutions used to train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner countries. Their primary purpose is to assist with transformation within the Alliance, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and capabilities already present within the NATO command structure." *NATO - Topic: Centres of Excellence*. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Feb. 2011. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_68372.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm)>.

approval. Creating a response team from scratch could be a contested issue and further delay the implementation cyber defense policies in member states.

### **Conclusion**

NATO's goal of collective security is continuously challenged with the emergence of new threats. Cyberspace poses a unique threat in that a new battleground is established, forcing the adaptation of members' definition of security. Challenges in addressing the issue of information security lie in cyberspaces' low barrier to entry, tackling disparities in technological capabilities between member states, and creating innovative approaches to defending member states in this emerging battlefield. As Melissa Hathaway<sup>334</sup> postulates in *Toward a Closer Digital Alliance*<sup>335</sup>, "The Internet has connected every nation and nearly all essential services, and has blurred the line between sovereign assets and commercial space. This digital entanglement of private and public infrastructure also makes it difficult to draw a distinction between military and civilian systems and property." If NATO could carve out its distinct sphere of responsibility within cyber defense as it has with traditional military operations, some order could be made of the current chaos that is the international approach to cyber security.

Up to this point, NATO's cyber security efforts have been developed reactively. In order for NATO members to fully protect themselves against a cyber attack, policies and practices must be developed proactively. The swift establishment of security protocol across all member states is crucial to NATO's collective security. While information security may not impress the immediate fear that weapons security does, the potential impacts of leaving cyberspace vulnerabilities exposed include the loss of both arms control and economic stability for member states.

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<sup>334</sup> Hathaway led President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review and previously led the development of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) for President George W. Bush.

<sup>335</sup> *SAIS Review* 30.2 (2010). p.21-31.

**Part IV**

**Human Rights and Development**

**Kelsey Bourn, Bianca Smoker, and Lindsay Jackson**



## Chapter Ten

### The Future Role of the United States and NATO

Kelsey Bourn

#### Introduction

As the new strategic concept for NATO describes, the Alliance was first founded in 1949 in order to forge a strong political and military bond across the Atlantic between North America and Europe. Although its efforts have continuously been to ensure international peace and security, the need for a strong solidarity among the Alliance has grown with the modern threats in an increasingly unpredictable world. The United States plays a significant role in the future success of NATO, as one of the most powerful countries within the Alliance pursuing international security.

From its founding, NATO established an international forum for Atlantic nations to organize an alliance that shared a common commitment to promote international defense and security. “While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values.”<sup>336</sup> In the past, conventional military threats challenged the international community into war. During the Cold War, the polarity between Western states and the USSR divided the world into two military enterprises forcing NATO to become an alliance defined by war fighting policies. However, with the end of the Cold War, the purpose of NATO has transformed into a global organization that promotes multilateral cooperation to ensure international order with the constant evolution of the new world era.

This chapter will discuss the role that the United States should play in NATO. In particular, it engages the United States’ interest in acting through an alliance like NATO

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<sup>336</sup> NATO Strategic Concept. 19 November 2010. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*. p.1.

rather than on its own. Using a concept termed by policy analysts as “smart power,” it will explore the advantages and drawbacks that a multilateral system holds. Overall, it recommends that the United States create a foreign policy that puts greater emphasis on alternative policy tools, like foreign aid and diplomacy, instead of acting with unilateral force.

#### Current Environment

Today, the United States plays an important role in the NATO Alliance as one of the largest nations with nuclear capabilities and incomparable military power. As the Strategic Concept states, the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States.”<sup>337</sup> Similarly, General Klaus Naumann, Former NATO Military Chair, like many critics recognize, “there is no security for Europe without the United States.”<sup>338</sup> However, as the operational experience has established:

Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to [international] security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments.<sup>339</sup>

As the statement suggests, NATO depends on the shared beliefs and the spectrum of powers of all members to contribute to the overall effort of the Alliance, not just military power. Although the United States acts as a predominant nation in the world today, the challenges that face the modern era today are transnational problems that threaten the security of the entire international community, making it a mutual concern for all states and societies. From less imperative challenges such as finding alternative energy resources to the possibility of mass destruction from violent nonstate actors, these transnational challenges concern all states and will force countries to reevaluate their foreign policies to effectively address the future. Ultimately, the best way to ensure national interests and safety in the modern era will be through close state associations

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<sup>337</sup> NATO Strategic Concept. 19 November 2010. Article 18.

<sup>338</sup>Naumann, Klaus. *What's changed since 1999*. NATO Video Online. <[http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO\\_Change/Klaus\\_Naumann/EN/](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/Klaus_Naumann/EN/)>.

<sup>339</sup> Lisbon Statement. 20 November 2010. *Lisbon Summit Declaration*. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. p.2.

with NATO addressing international security issues through a multilateral network. Unfortunately, it is important to note that when U.S. foreign policy advances solely American interests diverging from NATO efforts, the U.S. can greatly hinder the effectiveness of the multilateral cooperation. As political theorist Reinhold Niebuhr emphasizes in his book, *The Irony of American History*, American “preoccupation with [its] own interests must lead to an illegitimate indifference toward the interests of others.”<sup>340</sup>

After the terrorist attack on September 11<sup>th</sup>, the United States invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter for the first time in history, arguing that an attack on one member should be considered an attack on all. When deciding to fight terrorism in the Middle East, President Bush argued that that the U.S. would “not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise [its] right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm”.<sup>341</sup> Although America claimed to be assuming its international responsibility to maintain global order, when the U.S. invaded a sovereign country without waiting for a “permission slip” from NATO, the international community raised concerns about the legitimacy and sincerity of U.S. foreign policy.

Since the Cold War ended, the United States, like NATO, has been struggling to form clear and effective foreign policy to address the future concerns of the international community. The U.S. serves as one of the largest members in NATO with one of the most powerful militaries in the world, but since the end of the Cold War the future role of both entities in world affairs appears uncertain. To understand the future of the international system it is important to explore traditional American perceptions regarding U.S. involvement with the international community that will ultimately influence its relationship with NATO and the future efforts of the Alliance.

#### American Foreign Policy

In general, foreign policy serves as an extension of domestic politics and a strategic political tool to pursue national interests abroad. The encyclopedia states, foreign policies are the “objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state

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<sup>340</sup> Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1952. *The Irony of American History*. Charles Scribner’s Sons. p.148.

<sup>341</sup> Gaddis, John Lewis. 2004. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Harvard. p.87.

in its interactions with other states...influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs.”<sup>342</sup> America, like most nations, uses international relations as an extension of domestic politics to further national interests. The United States typically has the most national consensus in pursuing foreign policy when the exchange appeals to traditional American themes involving economic prosperity, national security or civilizing missions reaffirming American exceptionalism. However, qualifying “exceptional” becomes a subjective concept often debated between the two major American political parties.

Since revolutionary ideology, U.S. foreign policy has commonly been an extension of national interests and religious beliefs that serve to reaffirm American supremacy in the world. The basic principles established during the birth of the American Republic began with the commitment to independence and liberty in which Americans were certain “they were a chosen people creating a new form of government and setting higher standards of behavior among nations”.<sup>343</sup> Americans believed it was their “obligation to spread the blessings of their superior institutions to less fortunate people across the world.”<sup>344</sup> By combining American exceptionalism with the idea of a spiritual destiny, the foundation was established to spread liberal democracy worldwide as the American way to pursue foreign policy. Although deviating at times from the founding fathers, U.S. politics were eventually successful in turning America into the international superpower it is today. However, even as the United States currently operates as the world hegemony, the power of the state and the global role it will have in the future remains uncertain. Without the fight against communism uniting Europe and the United States in honor of protecting “the West” from the Soviet Union, the purpose of NATO in the future is concerning.

As a result, American constituencies have entered one of the greatest political divides since the end of the Cold War. The two major schools of thought disagree not only on politics but also their moral and cultural ideals outlining the debate today. National politics can no longer unite in order to defeat a single overarching cause like

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<sup>342</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011. *Foreign Policy*. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Web. <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213380/foreign-policy>>.

<sup>343</sup> Herring, George C. 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford Press. p.44.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.* p.304.

communism but must now address transnational threats that are not so easily defined nor constrained by state boundaries. These international security concerns just simply did not equate to anything during the late 1980s as they do today, these challenges include maritime piracy, nuclear proliferation, international crime, transnational terrorism, and natural disasters.<sup>345</sup> In the past twenty years, Americans have not been able to reconcile their political differences in order to agree on the best strategy to guide U.S. foreign policy. However, after exploring the literature from either side of the debate, it is clear Americans do share some beliefs about the future of the United States. Many Americans generally believe in the value of international partners, diplomacy, and the spread of American ideals. Additionally, the academic literature suggests that U.S. interests could be ultimately served by working with NATO rather than threatening to break apart from the Alliance, meanwhile NATO interests too could best be pursued with the contribution of the United States. The course in which America decides to pursue its foreign policy will in turn guide the future role of the United States in the world as well as the future international role of NATO.

### I. The American Political Debate

For years Americans have debated whether the United States should focus its attention and priorities on international or domestic affairs. As a nation currently divided between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, the divide will continue to threaten U.S. foreign policy and national interests until the United States can reconcile domestic differences. The division often gets interpreted as two political parties separated by the religious zealots striving for American superiority as an “empire of liberty” and those that believe the U.S. should lead by an example with the appeal of democratic principles. Similar to the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, U.S. foreign policy remains subject to debate “by a public whose understanding of the issues and mechanisms [is] neither sophisticated nor nuanced”<sup>346</sup> so that today, “every question, from basic constitutional rights to the fight against terrorism, has become grist for the exceedingly fine grind of the partisan mill.”<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 39.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.* p.78.

<sup>347</sup> Shrum, Robert. November 2010. *Take it to the People*. National Affairs, Inc. Foreign Policy. No.177-182. p.73.

For conservatives and liberals, the spread of universal rights to make a peaceful world order, whether to ensure national security or spread freedom and democracy, has been a crucial aspect of U.S. foreign policy. However, although the United States should be confident in the value of its principles that does not necessarily imply the primary purpose of foreign policy should be to project its belief system and institutions onto reluctant nations. When deciding how to pursue international efforts through the use of hard military power or the soft power of diplomacy, the nation becomes divided. In general, using hard military power to ensure national interests abroad is often associated with conservative politicians whereas those on the left are more apt to support the idea of soft power and avoid strong military intervention, although even these distinctions are not infallible. In “The Future of Power”, Joseph S. Nye represents the more left-leaning Democrats that tend to support the role of soft power and progressive liberalism through international cooperatives. After comparing the conservative perspective of Robert Kagan from his book, “Of Paradise and Power”, which examines the diverging interests of Europe and America based primarily on the hard military power of the U.S., and the liberal view of Joseph Nye in his book advocating for a smarter strategic use of power, the conclusion clearly suggests that the United States should consider itself part of a larger community rather than a self-contained entity, pursuing distinctly national interests.

## II. Robert Kagan and Conservatives on the Right

Although the objectives of conservatives is admirable in their attempts to see a stable world order that offers everyone the values of democracy and freedom as experienced in America, using military force in world politics to enforce those opportunities only undercuts their value and legitimacy. In “Of Paradise and Power”, Robert Kagan often refers to a more generalized American perspective that the United States realizes more power through its military strength than negotiation and diplomacy. On the other side of the Atlantic however, Kagan argues that Europeans hold a very Kantian perspective on international affairs believing that the world is moving towards a “paradise of peace and relative prosperity”<sup>348</sup> without the use of military force. Thus

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<sup>348</sup> Kagan, Robert. 2003. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. Alfred A. Knopf. New York: Random House, Inc. p.3.

suggesting, “when it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defensive policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.”<sup>349</sup> As Kagan states, Europeans believe the U.S. resorts too quickly to the use of force and intervention outside of established international institutions like NATO in order to address security threats. For conservatives like Kagan, military power is the only means necessary to get the desired ends. They understand that in particular circumstances military power sends the strongest message and has the quickest results, at least in the short term.

#### Hard Power:

For neoconservatives, America leads the world based on its own exceptionalism, mainly its lucrative economy and military power that serves as proof of the blessings of democracy. From its origins, America has used its moral authority through its military power, to ensure that the “city on the hill” would become an “inspirational example”<sup>350</sup> for the world by spreading the gift of liberty and democracy. However, it is questionable whether American conservative politicians base foreign policy on the “goal of sustaining America’s global dominance”<sup>351</sup> or truly believe in a moral urgency to save the world from security threats. Even before the culmination of this course of American politics, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, recognized the irony of a country based on “Messianic consciousness” with a focus on global dominion rather than diplomatic practices that strive to balance both national and international interests. As some critics argue, “a superpower that demands absolute security for itself makes all other nations insecure”.<sup>352</sup>

As a result, American military interventions that address primarily American interests, have made U.S. foreign policy appears less inspirational than imperialistic. Unfortunately, the use of coercion to impose American beliefs on reluctant nations and the reinforcing conservative ideals about American exceptionalism often result in an international criticism that, “Americans asked everything and offered nothing.”<sup>353</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> Ibid. p.4.

<sup>350</sup> Gunn, Jeremy T. 2009. *Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion*. Westport, CT: Praeger. p.42.

<sup>351</sup> Dorrien, Gary. 2004. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. Routledge. p.17.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid. p.256.

<sup>353</sup> Herring, George C. 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford Press. p.89.

Although during his presidency George W. Bush Jr. returned to a traditional American theme of the U.S. as an “empire of liberty” which appealed to his political party, the founding fathers were aware of the risk involved in making the U.S. the “dictatress of the world” rather than “securing liberty throughout the world”.<sup>354</sup> Bush, like most conservatives, believed that the world was becoming far less hospitable and America needed to act strongly and quickly in order to minimize threats to U.S. power and security. Rather than seeing international states as partners for collective peace, Bush now determined the U.S. as the world hyper-power against all terrorists that threaten democracy and international security with or without partner consent.

#### Unilateralism

As Kagan suggests in his discussion, the expanded Alliance objectives to include more crisis management and humanitarian efforts, threaten American exceptionalism and political power by appearing weak in the collective effort to fight transnational challenges such as the War on Terror. He argues that the United States remains one of the strongest and most powerful countries in the world that should act on its own in order to best address international concerns and protect its own empire in the face of an unknown future. Although Kagan understands Europe’s attraction of the Kantian perspective for a future peaceful world, he believes that Europeans can only exercise those beliefs thanks to U.S. military protection included in NATO membership, including that, “the European unwillingness to spend as much on their military as American administrations believed necessary was a constant source of transatlantic tension.”<sup>355</sup>

Ultimately, after the war in Kosovo, Kagan argues, “for all Europe's great economic power and for all its success at achieving political union, Europe’s military weakness had produced diplomatic weakness and sharply diminished its political influence”.<sup>356</sup> While Europeans were upset that America fought according to American doctrine because it was American equipment, Americans didn’t like how the war in Kosovo was fought either. Kagan claims Americans argued that, “we paid a price in operational effectiveness by having to constrain the nature of the operation to fit within

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<sup>354</sup> Gaddis, John Lewis. 2004. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Harvard. p.110.

<sup>355</sup> Kagan, Robert. 2003. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. Alfred A. Knopf. New York: Random House, Inc. p.18.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.* p.48.

the political and legal concerns of NATO member nations.”<sup>357</sup> Kagan argues that now free of Cold War fears and constraints, Americans have begun turning “away from the common solidarity with Europe that had been the central theme of the Cold War and back towards a more traditional American policy of independence, toward that uniquely American form of universalistic nationalism.”<sup>358</sup>

Although conservatives have good intentions by reluctantly claiming it the American duty, as the empire of liberty, to make the world “safe for democracy”,<sup>359</sup> and recognize the U.S. military and foreign policy as tools to support a “crusade to shape the world’s destiny”.<sup>360</sup> This thinking gives way to a false idea of American perfectibility so that foreign policy becomes a more prideful United States that measures its power and influence “by what it [does], not just by what it [is]”.<sup>361</sup> Although traditional conservatives believe the role of international alliances are important, they put a bigger emphasis on maintaining the American balance of power, particularly hard power, making the North Atlantic Treaty Organization somewhat of a constraint to U.S. success. Kagan concludes that:

When Americans sought legitimacy for their actions abroad, they sought it not from supranational institutions but from their own principles. That is why it was always so easy for so many Americans to believe, as so many still believe today, that by advancing their own interests they advance the interests of humanity. As Benjamin Franklin put it, America’s ‘cause is the cause of all mankind.’<sup>362</sup>

Like most conservatives, Kagan truly believes that American power is not only unconstrained but the U.S. must act unilaterally when addressing international concerns, “not out of passion for unilateralism but only because, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice *but* to act unilaterally.”<sup>363</sup> Moreover, in their beliefs that the U.S. should act alone in order to best pursue its own

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid. p.49.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid. p.76.

<sup>359</sup> Gaddis, John Lewis. 2004. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Harvard. p.90.

<sup>360</sup> Dorrien, Gary. 2004. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. Routledge. p.79.

<sup>361</sup> McDougall, Walter. 1998. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*. Mariner Books. p.121.

<sup>362</sup> Kagan, Robert. 2003. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. Alfred A. Knopf. New York: Random House, Inc. p.88. Here Kagan quotes a line from Edward Handler, *America and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams* (Cambridge, MA, 1964), p.102.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid. p.99.

interests that would ultimately benefit the international community, conservatives would argue that close association with NATO does not serve American interests.

### III. Joseph S. Nye and Liberals on the Left

On the other side of the debate, rather than focusing primarily on American exceptionalism, hard military power, and unilateralism, Joseph Nye explores the concept of power and expands military power to include both economic and soft power. More specifically, in “The Future of Power”, Joseph S. Nye introduces a new term which he coins “smart power”. Ultimately he combines both terms. “Soft power” with the conservative emphasis on “hard power” to create “an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.”<sup>364</sup>

Just as Woodrow Wilson first promoted, those on the left side of the American political debate, believe that foreign policy should “serve broad human concerns rather than narrow selfish interests”<sup>365</sup> and that an international peace program would better reflect American ideals. Like many Americans, Nye believes that there is a mutual desire from all NATO members for international peace and that U.S. military interventions only cause greater concerns for security. Although conservatives argue that certain tradeoffs need to be made as the most effective way to ensure American interests, liberals often recognize the American dilemma between imposing U.S. theories and the actual implementation of its practices.

#### Smart Power

In his book, Nye does not deny the benefit of a strong U.S. military yet he refrains from defining state power based exclusively on hard or soft power but recognizes the opportunities when the two ideas are combined. As power is no longer traditionally defined by the state “capable of prevailing in war”, unconventional threats continue to make state power dependent upon “human relationships that vary in different contexts”.<sup>366</sup> Nye would refute the conservatives’ idea that power is based merely on military strength, revealing that “the utility of military force is declining in the twenty-

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<sup>364</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Armitage. 2007. *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, more secure America*. Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press. Center for Strategic and International Studies. p.7.

<sup>365</sup> Herring, George C. 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford Press. p.380.

<sup>366</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: PublicAffairs. p.5.

first century<sup>367</sup> due to the variety of tools now necessary to do address modern security issues. Nye does not dismiss the importance of military resources as it provides security, shapes world politics, and influences the political calculations of actors thereby producing both hard and soft power. However, Nye does argue that power depends upon the cost and context arguing, “a carrot is more effective than a stick if you wish to lead a mule to water, but a gun may be more useful if your aim is to deprive an opponent of his mule.”<sup>368</sup>

Similarly, soft power alone could be wielded for both good and bad purposes and needs the attributes of both hard and economic power in order to make it a smart strategic option. Although soft power may be less risky to utilize than hard or economic power, “it is often hard to use, easy to lose, and costly to reestablish” as the desired results often take a long time to materialize.<sup>369</sup> For example, Nye points out that although the initial American invasion of Iraq may have produced admiration at its military efficiency, the soft power was “undercut by the subsequent inefficiency of the occupation”.<sup>370</sup> While both military and economic resources could undercut a state’s soft power, they can also benefit a nation’s international position in addition to its public diplomacy. In order to better address transnational concerns that threaten the international community today, governments will need to expand their public diplomacy to include relationship-building with civil society actors and non-governmental parties at home and abroad which means to succeed at public diplomacy, states will have to relinquish control and risk that “nongovernmental civil society actors are often not aligned in their goals with government policies or even objectives.”<sup>371</sup> However, Nye recognizes the paradox of using public diplomacy to generate soft power in a global information age that by working through multilateral organizations or international institutions that diminish exclusive state control may be central to the creation of soft power.

### Multilateralism

In order to succeed at addressing international challenges that affect all nation states, including the U.S., liberals suggest the future leads to a diffusion of power that

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid. p.29.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid. p.52.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid. p.83.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid. p.86.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid. p.108.

conservatives interpret as a power transition from the United States to another nation. However, in an information-based world, constantly transforming from globalization mechanisms, America will have to prepare for the inevitable that is to relinquish some of its power. As Nye argues, “America’s position as the lone global power is unlikely to last forever, and the United States must find ways of transforming its power into a moral consensus that ensures the willing acceptance if not active promotion of our values over time.”<sup>372</sup>

Conservatives fear that America would appear weak if it were to give up some of its military or economic resources in order to have a closer association with NATO and its international efforts for peace and security. However, as Nye suggests, a smart power narrative for the twenty-first century “is not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony.” As Martin Luther King, Jr. announced during the Vietnam War, “Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them is not just.”<sup>373</sup> Former President Woodrow Wilson too understood that America needed to broaden the rights of liberty and security from America to the entire world creating “not a balance of power but a community of power.”<sup>374</sup> Nye believes the United States could use foreign policy to focus on the shared desire for peace and independence inspired by universal human rights. By combining all the military, economic, and soft power resources available to form a smart and strategic approach to foreign policy, more alliances will flourish. These alliances in turn will “multiply a nation’s power through everything basing rights, intelligence sharing, weapons system collaborations and purchases, and shared military trade benefits and mutual security guarantees.”<sup>375</sup> In this way, without alienating other nations or compromising its values because of its dependence on military force, the U.S. could succeed in a multilateral approach to create a stable world order addressing world problems.

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<sup>372</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Armitage. 2007. *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, more secure America*. Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press. Center for Strategic and International Studies. p.12.

<sup>373</sup> King, Martin Luther Jr. Delivered 4 April 1967 *Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence*. Delivered at Riverside Church, New York City. The Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. Atlanta, Georgia. p.9.

<sup>374</sup> Herring, George C. 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford Press. p.412.

<sup>375</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: PublicAffairs. p.217.

#### IV. The Big Picture

After exploring the positions of Robert Kagan and Joseph Nye from either side of the current political debate in America, authors Binnendijk and Kugler compose a useful overview to compare the general U.S. political perspectives. In their book, “Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security”, the authors establish the driving aspects that influence U.S. foreign policy. In a generalized method, Binnendijk and Kugler divide Americans into either a Kantian or Hobbesian category. While most conservatives align with Hobbes over major concerns for a future of chaos and danger, they associate most liberals with Kant anticipating a more peaceful future and stable world order, although these are not perfectly distinguished according to party lines. For example, progressive multilateralists associated with the Democratic Party and assertive interventionists from the Republican Party both favor building democratic institutions that fall under Kantian theory while traditional conservatives and liberal offshore balancers look to power relationships as the dominant factor in their policies.<sup>376</sup>

Moreover, Robert Kagan falls under the Hobbesian interpretation of the future while Joseph Nye believes in the Kantian approach to understanding the future peace and prosperity of the world. As a result, Kagan is more apt to emphasize the importance of hard military power, less likely to recognize limits on American power, and consider international alliances less important than maintaining a strong balance of power in favor of the United States. On the contrary, Nye supports U.S. relationships abroad because he does in fact recognize the limits of American power to effectively address modern security issues, ultimately allowing Nye to promote the multilateral approach to foreign policy to create a greater community of power. Henry Kissinger, like most Americans, would agree that due to an increase in globalization and modern technology, there is a strong need for “wise U.S. diplomacy” as the current leader guiding international affairs.<sup>377</sup> This wise diplomacy exemplifies Nye’s concept of smart power in that it would balance realism and idealism to find a workable synthesis of hard and soft power tools in order to think pragmatically about vital U.S. national interests.<sup>378</sup> However, as Binnendijk

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<sup>376</sup> Binnendijk, Hans and Kugler, Richard L. 2006. *Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security*. Washington, D.C. Potomac Books, Inc. p.5.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.* p.171.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.* p.168.

and Kugler conclude, the world is being driven by powerful dynamics of both progress and peril in which American politicians should take attempt to solve the problems recognized by the neo-Hobbesian while also taking advantage of the opportunities outlined by neo-Kantian perceptions.<sup>379</sup>

#### V. NATO and U.S. Interests

Although the end of the Cold War left both NATO and the United States uncertain about their efforts and approach to international policy, it is clear that the two entities would be more effective in pursuit of their interests by working together. During the Cold War, both NATO and the U.S. wanted to present a united Western front that promoted democracy and universal rights. Ultimately, although modern technology and transnational threats continue to transform the world, the interests of both NATO and America remain essentially the same. For NATO it is “to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values”<sup>380</sup> while the United States places its own similar values as an intrinsic part of American foreign policy. While traditional realists often separate a foreign policy based on values and a foreign policy based on interests, Nye argues that “values are simply an intangible national interest” especially for the United States. Arguing that, “if the American people think that our interests include certain values and their promotion abroad, then they become part of the national interests.”<sup>381</sup> That is, if Americans see it in their interests to spread democracy, ensure international and national security, and protect human rights, then having a close association with NATO actually in turn serves U.S. interests.

Conclusion:

As a member of the NATO Alliance and advocate for international security, the United States will need to examine American foreign policy and ensure that national interests are relative to international security concerns represented in NATO. The new Strategic Concept will “guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.” The Lisbon Document states, that NATO partnerships can “enhance Euro-

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<sup>379</sup> Ibid. p.282.

<sup>380</sup> NATO Strategic Concept. 19 November 2010. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*. p.1.

<sup>381</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: PublicAffairs. p.219.

Atlantic and wider international security and stability; can provide frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation in the field of security and defence; contribute to strengthening our common values; and are essential to the success of many of our operations and missions.”<sup>382</sup>

Moreover, the future of NATO will depend on the relationships in the Alliance that are based on “reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.”<sup>383</sup> In order for NATO to have a successful future, the members will have to work together to fight emerging attacks based on an international community with shared interests and values. Therefore, the resources of the Alliance must seek to “preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together”<sup>384</sup> not guided by states on an individual level with a predominant United States. Ultimately, NATO thrives as “a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.”<sup>385</sup>

Focusing on national interests while attempting to serve the world should not mean Americans are “willing to become citizens of the world, but only if the world becomes an extension of the United States.”<sup>386</sup> The United States will need to be more willing to adhere to NATO decisions for international security without putting national concerns and political agendas first. By recognizing differences and accepting cultural diversity, American politics should attempt a multilateral approach within NATO in order to address world problems without alienating other nations or compromising NATO efforts for international peace and stability. At a minimum, U.S. foreign policy should follow a path consistent with U.S. interests that the America public can understand and

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<sup>382</sup> Lisbon Statement. 20 November 2010. *Lisbon Summit Declaration*. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. p.5.

<sup>383</sup> NATO Strategic Concept. 19 November 2010. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*. Article 29.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.* Article 37.4.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.* Article 38.

<sup>386</sup> McDougall, Walter. 1998. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*. Mariner Books. p.164.

support. To the extent possible, this policy should also support our growing interdependence with other nations by advancing globally the basic goals of democratic politics.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Kissinger, Henry. 2001. *Foreign Policy into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The U.S. Leadership Challenge*. New York: Simon and Schuster. p.3.

## Chapter Eleven

### Rethinking the World System

Bianca Smoker

#### I. Introduction

The preservation of international peace, security, and defense have been central tenets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its inception in 1949. While it has also established a commitment to political means of defense, NATO's operations have often been centered around arms and weapons control and proliferation, military training and defense, and strategic information sharing related to these two divisions of defense. Moving into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO has reaffirmed these commitments, but has recognized that a complex set of emerging challenges is presenting themselves. These new challenges require an assessment of the efficiency of NATO policies, including openly acknowledging where these policies may have fallen short and how they may be improved upon, as well as fully understanding the intricacies of the completely new issues presenting themselves. This essay will seek to begin that assessment, analyzing what "security" means in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and how the meaning of this concept has changed over the approximately 60 years of the existence of NATO.

The Strategic Concept Document and the Lisbon Statement of 2010 reestablish NATO's commitments to political and militaristic attempts to protect member countries and ensure their security. Among the most emphasized in these two documents are:

- sustaining the military campaigns in the Balkans and Afghanistan
- continued information sharing and diplomacy between member states, as well as the maintenance of ties between NATO members, non-NATO members, and other international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union;
- the ability to "deter and defend," by whatever means are necessary, against direct threats to member states or threats to the secure environment that NATO seeks to maintain (even if these occur in non-member states, as NATO recognizes the ability of an external threat to impinge upon the security of members and their citizens);
- the special need to defend against terrorism, both militarily and through intelligence specialization, as it is a particular form of a threat to the peace and security of member states which targets innocent civilian populations;
- defending against cyber attacks;

- Cooperating to address environmental and resource constraints facing the world as a whole.

NATO members have been resilient in their commitment to these policies and efforts, which have manifested themselves in military campaigns in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

There are a number of areas in which NATO's policies have fallen short. In order to more comprehensively address the challenges facing the members of NATO, they must: (1) remain committed to interactive, diplomatic, peaceful efforts at security, as the ability to avoid a military conflict is always preferable; (2) include in their information-sharing the research and understanding of the cultural factors at play in the situations they are involved in – the failure to do so before taking action in places like Afghanistan has led to residual issues that may have been avoided had more care been placed in appreciating the existing cultural tensions at hand. (3) The member states must also understand the full extent of the capabilities of technology in the modern-day world, where many non-state actors have access to communication and information-sharing that can be harmful to the security of member states. Also, more efficient communication allows for such activity as illegal weapons trading taking place more easily. NATO must address these concerns, along with protecting against cyber attacks, as they all fall under a new technological threat to the world, while maintaining a respect for the right of individuals to have access to the Internet and other technology.

## **II. The End of the Cold War**

Where conflict before 1989 was between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their satellites, the fall of the Iron Curtain brought about a shift in security concerns. No longer centered on the capitalist-communist dichotomy, the world system now had to focus on other security threats. Therefore, both the nature of the threats present in the world and the manner of addressing them have changed, which NATO needs to take into consideration as it seeks to protect its member nations.

The purpose of NATO's existence is to present a united front against threats to the security of its members, which it has managed to do in some cases, and at other times has been unable to do because of a failure to come together to act. Philip Cuccia argues that the most pressing matter facing NATO currently is the inability of all members to come to a consensus regarding what threats are the most important to be dealt with, and how to

go about dealing with them<sup>2</sup>. In the face of the new types of security concerns facing NATO and the world as a whole, this aspect of the “united front” is the first, and often times most important, step in the success or failure of the strategy. The majority of the threats manifesting themselves today are from non-state actors – non-state actors have always brought about security concerns, but have taken on a greater role as a threat in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. After the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in New York City, such groups as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have come to the forefront of security efforts. There is a markedly different way of addressing non-state threats, which must be taken into account in this new world system.

While the end of the Cold War has largely been seen as “the West winning,” this has forced the United States to take on an uneven amount of responsibility when issues have arisen in the global sphere. Charles Kupchan discusses the events that led up to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, and the difference between these events and the close of the Second World War.

There was no wake-up call...to drive home the point that something bold had to be done to interrupt the recurring cycles of great-power rivalry and war. On the contrary, the West’s bloodless victory was a vindication of its values and institutions. The United States therefore plodded ahead with little change of course....America was left with too much strength for its own good.<sup>3</sup>

For instance, the United States bore a large majority of the defense of Kuwait against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. Other countries followed, but it was nothing like the multilateral alliances of World War I and II.

After World War II, there were great efforts at peacekeeping between countries, with true cooperation and interactive efforts. Kupchan argues that because of the nature of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the reaction of the United States and the rest of the world was to assume that this was completely as a result of United States action. Therefore, proper analysis was not done in regards to the different types of threats presenting themselves to the global community and how to respond to them collectively. Kupchan continues on to show how after the end of the Cold War, the United States “opted out of multilateral efforts,” acting unilaterally or remaining isolationist, both under President Bush and President Clinton<sup>4</sup>. This has put the United States in a problematic position in relation to NATO, as the entire existence of NATO depends upon the collective response of the member countries, both intellectually *and* militarily.

NATO has managed to endure as a legitimate international body through the rise and fall of the Cold War, and now needs to take on the necessary steps of analysis and reform in order to face the different types of challenges it will see in this new world order. One aspect of this has to do with the role that the United States played during the Cold War – the conflict and the responses to the threat of nuclear war were defined by the United States, as it was one of the two key actors involved. With the global world order shifting, the United States too needs to shift the nature of its involvement, resorting less to unilateral action and moving to work interactively with the rest of the members of NATO. The other aspect of this new world order is the significance that non-state actors have begun to play. While they have long been present, the world system has now entered a stage where it cannot ignore non-state actors or dismiss them as insignificant.

### **III. Redefining Security, Reassessing NATO**

In broadening the definition of security, the member states of NATO must recognize that protection and defense include more than military means. I will use the assumption that happy, provided-for populaces present less of a security threat than those who lack basic necessities. As we have seen in places around the world like Cuba, Iran and now Egypt, when the basic human needs of a populace are not met, the people may rise up against their governing bodies and demand change. Often times, this can lead to violent and bloody uprisings that can pose security risks internally and externally. It is in this way that it becomes the interest of NATO and each of its member states to ensure the welfare of developing nations. Now, the difficulties of underdevelopment and human rights challenges come from a number of sources, and this author in no way intends to suggest that NATO, by itself, could bring about the elimination of these sources and alleviate all such problems. These are issues that must be tackled by a number of supporting sectors, including development, NGOs, individual governing bodies, and the like. But NATO, as a security-oriented body, could play a crucial role in assisting the process of such an important endeavor, and maintaining its efforts as progress is made. Throughout this section, I will explore the damaging effects of non-state actors, addressing the manner in which these become more than a domestic issue and transcend the capabilities of individual governments in controlling them. Using narcotics trafficking as a case study, I will demonstrate how an individual threat to international security

creates instability and further issues in other areas. I will also discuss the importance of upholding human rights both domestically and in the international sphere, drawing heavily from the writings and experience of Admiral James Stavridis, who is the current Supreme Allied Commander to NATO and served as the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, to analyze both of these issues.

Whereas the majority of significant conflicts in the world used to be country to country, today we find that most threats to domestic and international peace often involve non-state actors. These actors have less formal goals and less formal means of accomplishing these goals. For instance, rather than invading a country in the interest of acquisition of territory (and thereby involving only the invaded party and the invading party), many non-state actors have little affiliation with a state government and have goals that are not directly tied to traditional political efforts. Many security problems presenting themselves today are primarily criminal in nature, operating across national borders and affecting people who are not involved in their endeavors.

#### *Narcotics Trafficking*

A perfect example of such non-state threats is the organized groups of drug traffickers around the world, which exist on every continent, albeit with varied political affiliations (from none to primarily operating with political goals in mind) from place to place. An analysis of narcotics trafficking, narcoterrorism, and the affiliated threats that present themselves, such as human trafficking and the stockpiling of weapons, we can see a chain of problematic issues that are multifaceted. I find it important to here define narcoterrorism – it is the involvement of narcotics with an organized group, either by selling and trafficking narcotics to fund other illegal operations, or by engaging in criminal activity in order to facilitate narcotics trafficking, like maintaining open trafficking routes. Such pursuits are inherently transnational in nature, as they involve the transport of narcotics from producers to consumers, which are rarely in the same location, and threaten a broad range of formal sectors, from economic to political and societal.

The scourges of illegal drugs, poverty, and violent criminal gangs are transnational and thus cannot be countered by any one nation alone. Their eradication requires cooperative solutions; it requires security forces, international agencies, and humanitarian assistance groups throughout the region<sup>5</sup>.

As Stavridis mentions, the ability to counteract such “scourges” is one that depends on cooperation across borders and across sectors. As such, this activity should be of great concern to an organization like NATO, which is transnational and is dedicated to the maintenance of global safety, regardless of the specific targeted sector involved.

It is important also to explore what types of circumstances breed such a unique type of security threat, as this is very much tied to NATO’s central tenets of good governance within a country. In this discussion of international criminality, it is worthwhile to note that illicit trade takes place in areas where the people have few other options, which Carolyn Nordstrom studied in great depth in West Africa<sup>6</sup>. From Colombia to Angola to Thailand, throughout the world, desperate situations produce desperate actions. In many places, such desperate situations involve weak economies in weak governments that do not provide substantial income, job security, or employment. As Nordstrom discusses in her book, when governments have poor regulation of the market and improper provisions for the people of their nation, they will turn to other means of supporting themselves, which are often illicit and not a part of the formal framework of employment that is viewed as “legal.” Whether this be illicit and non-violent, like selling untaxed and unregulated fruit, or illicit and possibly violent, like trafficking dangerous weapons or narcotics, people will find a way to support themselves if they have no other recourse in the context of “formal” employment. This illegal activity is important to address because it is resultant of the political, economic, and societal environments of a populace, and in turn affects each of these sectors when it comes back around. Formal markets are affected by the trafficking of goods in an informal market, and a state government that is both unable to provide for or defend its people from groups like the violent Mexican drug cartels that have so much power is undermined and therefore commands less respect from its people.

Admiral Stavridis wrote during his command of the US Southern Command, and therefore was writing of his experience in Latin America. While no Latin American countries are member states of NATO, the illicit activities in these countries affect NATO countries, and Admiral Stavridis’ experience can be used as a case study for other areas of the world. It is also important to take Admiral Stavridis’ writings into account because he now serves as Supreme Allied Commander, a significant office in which his

experience and opinions could beneficially affect the goals of NATO. As I have been describing, Admiral Stavridis found that societal problems that should fall under the influence of domestic governments often create situations that breed activities that can be considered as international security concerns:

[T]he cumulative effects of poverty and income inequality in this region provide a fertile field for the seeds of social and political insecurity and attendant instability to sprout, take root, and grow into the weeds of drugs, crime, gangs, illegal immigration, and trafficking, among others<sup>7</sup>.

Therefore, it would do society well if a country or group of countries focused on improving such contributing factors as income inequality and the external demand for drugs that drives supply networks in order to address problems like narcotics trafficking, rather than responding only with military and police force. Military responses to an issue like drug trafficking merely a topical response; they may eliminate the visible individuals and tools of the trade, but they fail to deal with the underlying societal causes, including the people who remain without a means of formal employment and the aforementioned drive to supply consumers of narcotics.

### *Human Rights*

Since the end of World War II, we have seen human rights emerge as an important issue that, whether recognized fully by all countries at all times or not, factors into the development, well-being, and progress of a peoples. Human rights encompasses a vast range of topics, from health provision to education to civil rights and liberties to work protections, that, when upheld by a government or governments, allows the populace to actively and positively participate in civil society, thereby allowing for a better overall functioning of governments and the state. While ensuring the maintenance of human rights has often been seen as a task of international organizations like the UN, which has difficulties in enforcing its missions on a domestic level, we are seeing a shift in this typical expectation. Admiral Stavridis writes about the manner in which the U.S. Southern Command, as a branch of the Department of Defense, began incorporating human rights into its efforts in Latin America, in something he eventually describes as the “Human Rights Initiative:”

In unequivocal terms, the new directive stated that “one of our most important and universal foreign policy objectives is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.” This memorandum established the requirement for all U.S. military personnel to immediately record

and report through the chain of command any instance of suspected human rights violation<sup>8</sup>.

Admiral Stavridis goes on to explain how human rights education and maintenance became a regular part of training and operations for U.S. Southern Command personnel, as well as a part of dialogue and cooperation with local governments. This was important as a step for human rights, but also for interaction with the local culture and governments of countries, which have not always been taken into account in military operations and international joint efforts.

Even when blatant security threats are not visible (like narcoterrorism or illegal weapons trafficking), it would do a society well to maintain human rights efforts as a preventative, rather than solely reactionary, means of ensuring the safety of a population. As Admiral Stavridis explains, the success of military efforts in a region, whether current or in the future, is tied to the interaction and support of those people. If the local populace does not feel that they can trust the government or armed forces claiming to work in their name, these bodies will have no legitimacy in carrying out their goals. Part of trusting the government is feeling secure in its desire and ability to protect the population's basic human rights.

The command was acutely aware that failure to improve respect for human rights in the region would ultimately jeopardize the success of its missions and undermine public and congressional support for essential military-to-military programs<sup>9</sup>.

When seen in this light, the quality of human rights in an area can help to support or weaken military efforts. Since NATO has been mainly militaristic in nature, this directly ties to NATO, and the evidenced connection that it has human rights places such efforts in the interest of NATO operations.

NATO cannot be expected to take on these problems by itself without outside collaboration. Yet as an organization interested in the security of sovereign nations and the well-being of its members (who are affected by a number of threats originating in non-member states), NATO would do well to take into account the new types of security threats that have come to the forefront in the world, even though they do not fall into the typical military realm. One of the best ways for NATO to do this would be to work closely with similar international organizations like the UN and the EU on matters like

human rights, which the UN and NATO have already collaborated in doing<sup>10</sup>. By encouraging its members to uphold the tenets of such agreements as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, NATO could improve the environment of its members, as well as those non-members with whom NATO works, thereby ensuring greater capabilities in the military field. If institutions like NATO, which promote strong democracies, were to support a government that can provide for its people and attend to the needs of those turning to such “desperate measures” as drug and human trafficking, they could help to fight some of the sources that fuel the negative and often potentially risky environments that we see.

#### **IV. Analyzing NATO Efforts**

The majority of NATO’s efforts and rhetoric have been largely centered around military efforts, military operations, military concerns – the military aspect of peacekeeping. For so long, this has been the focus of most of the world’s peace-keeping efforts, and these efforts have been lacking. In this section I will show an example of this military centric approach to foreign policy, and then discuss what such an approach leaves out.

Robert Art’s *A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy After the Cold War* provides a perfect example of how the United States’ (and by extension, NATO’s) approaches to defense and peacekeeping were so narrow, and left out so many other important factors of security. Writing in the near aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, Art seems to open up to a hint of analysis and consideration of multiple factors in defense, but this is quickly shifted right back to military methods and concerns:

The proper way to...set forth America's grand strategy after the Cold War is to answer four questions: (1) What interests does the United States have, now that its major adversary is defeated? (2) What threats to those interests can we now foresee? (3) What military strategies are best suited to counter the foreseeable threats? and (4) What military forces are required to execute these strategies?<sup>11</sup>

There is no discussion of diplomacy or the creation of linkages to other nations, no approach outside of this militaristic one, no taking into account a multilateral effort at addressing the challenges presenting themselves to the United States (and the rest of the world, though he fails to mention other countries). The unilateral and militaristic approach—with its narrow vision of U.S. interests—leaves out the diplomatic approaches

and societal concerns that have been discussed throughout this paper. In his table of “Interests, Threats, and a U.S. Presence Overseas,” the responses that Art presents in the face of threats to U.S. include one economic response, three military responses, and only one diplomatic response:

Diplomacy is a last, almost less important thought, but still involves a strong military perspective (“intervention” through “overseas force”). With an approach like this, there is no true consideration for humanitarian, cultural, societal, and local concerns; it is mainly interested in how the United States is threatened or might benefit, and responds only with this in mind.

Another error that Art commits in his analysis of protection and defense is to take

	<b>U.S. Interest</b>	<b>Prime Threat to U.S. Interest</b>	<b>Major Purpose of Overseas Force</b>	<b>Nature of the Argument for Overseas Force</b>
<b>1.</b>	Protect U.S. homeland from destruction	Spread of nuclear weapons	Selectively extend deterrence to retard spread	Based on high cost of low-probability events
<b>2.</b>	Preserve prosperity based on international economic openness	Economic nationalism	Reduce others’ relative gains worries to preserve stability	Hedge bets because of indeterminate arguments about today’s interdependence
<b>3.</b>	Assure access to Persian gulf oil	Near-monopoly control by regional hegemon	Deter attack and/or conquest of others	Simple deterrence
<b>4.</b>	Prevent certain wars	Great-power wars in Europe and Far East; conquest of Israel and South Korea	Deter attack and/or conquest of others	Added insurance for low-probability events
<b>5.</b>	Where feasible, promote democratic institutions and certain humanitarian values abroad	Other governments mass-murdering their citizens	Intervention in other states’ internal affairs	Humanitarian motives

a rather paternalistic and somewhat disrespectful tone towards “Third World countries,” placing them below the United States and other ‘reasonable’ nations:

Third, many would-be Third World nuclear states do not have governments as stable as those of the more mature nuclear powers....Fourth, many Third World would-be nuclear states are involved in implacable regional confrontations in which reason and restraint have been far less prevalent than they have in U.S.-Soviet relations. Consequently, the politically restraining effects that nuclear ownership has imposed on the superpowers might not be strong enough to offset the ambitions, insecurities, hatreds, and fanaticisms that characterize many Third World conflicts<sup>13</sup>.

This air of arrogance does nothing for ensuring safety between countries, as it provides little respect for the people or governments of these countries, who could be valuable allies if given the chance. Rather, one would do well to analyze a situation as Phillip Wilkinson did in his study of NATO's efforts in Afghanistan, recognizing what can be improved upon in an attempt to better the military operations, while also taking into consideration the humanitarian needs of an operation. Wilkinson argues that in order to improve the operations in Afghanistan (and Iraq), the member countries of NATO must pull together as to collectively tackle the security risks at hand in the region, and must reassess their approach to stabilizing the region. With a myriad of cultural differences from NATO member countries, Afghanistan and Iraq present more than the clearly difficult military task at hand; as Wilkinson states, it will be an issue of balancing military operations with "operations designed to win hearts and minds"<sup>14</sup>. There are many different factors that play into the success of a mission, and as NATO analyzes its current efforts around the world and the ones it will face in the future, it would be best for the member states to use an approach more like Wilkinson's rather than Art's.

## **V. Conclusion/Recommendations**

For sixty years, NATO has been committed to the security and well being of its member nations, including its interactions with other non-member nations and international organizations. As time has gone on it has had to adapt to the new challenges that have presented themselves, which will continue to be necessary for NATO and its members to do. There are a number of goals that it has committed itself to, and several others that it should include in its commitments to ensure the greater security of its members and the world as a whole.

- All the members of NATO must assess their involvement, including whether they have participated enough, or if they have perhaps taken on too much responsibility, and reaffirm their commitment to true interactive cooperation in tackling security threats;
- The members of NATO must understand the new and difficult security challenges at play in this modern 21<sup>st</sup> century, realizing that they are very different from Cold War-era challenges both in their nature and in the manner in which they need to be dealt with – combating organized crime is not the same as combating an aggressive state;
- The role of NATO in the world does not need to be as a belligerent, but should act as a defense organization, preparing and protecting

against security threats, rather than merely responding to them after they have struck;

- The threats that NATO should address should not be only military concerns, but should include humanitarian concerns as well, as a healthy humanitarian situation can help to either prevent or lessen the need for military action, which is always preferable.

I will close with the words of Admiral Stavridis, who spoke in the name of the US Southern Command at the time, but whose words are applicable to both NATO's efforts and to our collective global efforts at preventing hostilities and aggression: "the message is that all participants are stakeholders working toward common goals based on shared values, and that all have valuable insights to share."

#### End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of Tolerance*. New York: The Penguin Press. 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Phillip R. Cuccia, *Implications of a Changing NATO* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010) 13.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2002) 22.

<sup>4</sup> Kupchan, 14-15.

<sup>5</sup> James G. Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010) xviii.

<sup>6</sup> Carolyn Nordstrom, *Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Stavridis (2010), 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> James G. Stavridis, "Partnership for the Americas: the Human Rights Initiative." *Military Review* (May-June 2007) 2.

<sup>9</sup> Stavridis (2007), 3.

<sup>10</sup> NATO website.

<sup>11</sup> Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War." *International Security* (Spring 1991) 7.

<sup>12</sup> Art (1991), 8.

<sup>13</sup> Art (1991), 24.

<sup>14</sup> Philip Wilkinson, "NATO in Afghanistan: Too Little..." *The World Today* (Nov. 2006): 10.

## **Chapter Twelve**

### **Security and Human Rights**

**Lindsay Jackson**

#### **Introduction**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has brought many new transformations and challenges that must be confronted. The world has transitioned into an interconnected global system that has exposed NATO to both new emerging threats and opportunities which it must adapt to in this changing world. In order to achieve security for its members, NATO must help take the initiative to redefine security with a focus beyond the military. In particular, NATO must put greater emphasis on development and diplomacy in order to highlight the importance of human rights in security. This paper will examine the significance of collective and individual human rights to global security by analyzing the relationship between failed states and insecure societies. NATO, by adding these “softer” forms of security to its agenda, can help achieve global peace and security.

NATO’s 2010 New Strategic Concept reaffirms its commitments to traditional militaristic methods of ensuring the security of its members. The documents emphasize continued information sharing and cooperation between member states, defense by whatever means necessary, and emphasize the growing threat of terrorism in the current global framework.

NATO indeed must remain committed to interactive, diplomatic, and peaceful forms of security and it must also preference non-violent solutions to a conflict. Doing otherwise contradicts the value of peaceful efforts. NATO must also place human rights as a priority in their policies, because human rights allow individuals to pursue the ends in which define them. Improved access to human rights will help eliminate hostility to America around the world – according to one sociologist, “the more people are free, the

better off all are.”<sup>388</sup> If NATO seeks to achieve a peaceful and secure world, human rights must be used as part of the framework.

The United States was founded upon the values of freewill and self-determination to promote prosperity, security, and the universal values of democracy, human rights and cooperation. In the midst of chaos resulting from the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush Administration lost those original values and relied on destructive and aggressive military force to achieve its goals. The United States must help set the standard for the rest of the world by transmitting these values, with the guidance of NATO, to promote peace throughout the world. By viewing peaceful means of resolving conflicts as equally viable, international security can be achieved in a more holistic and long-lasting fashion. Weak governments and failing states create safe havens for terrorists, insurgencies, and criminal syndicates.<sup>389</sup> By providing access to human security and development, NATO can create opportunities for people by providing an alternative for a more prosperous future for everyone. Development and diplomacy stand together as a shared strategic and moral imperative to help America and NATO avoid conflict in the future.

### **Insecure Societies as International Security Threats**

In many parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, today’s youth are referred to as the ‘lost generation’, who never had to the opportunity to see anything positive in their lives. These young people in various parts of the world whose countries are embroiled in conflict are in the most radical, despairing, and violent generations for centuries. They have grown up in a territory cut off from the rest of the world, consumed by fighting and seared by violence, accustomed to seeing guns and tanks rather than schools or cars. They, the oppressed, become agents of oppression where in their sense of hopelessness they feel undeserving of peace, inadequate and useless. Protectionist trade barriers have further shrunken globalist by taking away interactions with outsiders and depriving them of mobility for employment, education and resources.

Faith has been lost in peaceful, democratic solutions. Instead, people resort to violence, because they have no other alternative but to give up or fight. Families are unable to provide their children with security or safety causing them to lose their

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<sup>388</sup> Burke-White.

<sup>389</sup> QDDR.

childhood without hope for a normal life. When a child realizes that they cannot be provided with security, safety or livelihood at all, they resort to violence or become involved in terrorist groups.<sup>390</sup> People in the world are left hopeless and become global threats by not having access to human security and or human rights.

### **Human Rights as a Strategic Objective for Security**

Human rights are seen as a form of agency. In order to possess such agency people must have access to freedom, giving them the ability to choose the life that they see fit to lead.<sup>391</sup> States have a duty to protect all those under their jurisdiction, meaning; individuals, groups and states have the obligation to respect the human rights of others. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks there have been worldwide repercussions. It has undermined the rule of law and international standards, especially American values, which poses great challenges to the protection of human rights across the globe. NATO has the opportunity to play an important role for security by promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights which constitute the basis for the common fight against security threats.<sup>392</sup> Security is a condition or feeling of safety, of being protected. International human rights norms define the meaning of human security including access to freedom, dignity, and equality. Human rights are the foundation for security and peace.

However, there is a gap between the human rights ideology and the reality of human rights - there is much more to be done in order to successfully mainstream human rights as a security priority. While many states pay lip service to the importance of human rights, some of its greatest advocates are ironically some of its most notorious violators. States must still demonstrate the political will to translate their stated human rights commitments into action. States have a responsibility to promote human rights, including the right to life and the duty to protect civilians from attacks by taking effective measures to prevent threats to civilians. The right to life as a human should include access to opportunities for a prosperous life which many poverty stricken people and inhabitants of unstable states are not provided with.

Extreme poverty, the struggle against HIV/AIDS, and political violence are all current issues that threaten human security around the world. The common thread

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<sup>390</sup> Erlanger NYT.

<sup>391</sup> Ignatieff.

<sup>392</sup> Amnesty International.

connecting all of these issues is the need to respect fundamental human rights.<sup>393</sup> Without the respect for human rights and freedom, the accomplishment of lasting peace would be impossible and human security would remain illusory.

Respect for human rights has strategic importance by acting as a link between individual, national, and international security. Individual security is the basis for national security, and national security is grounded in individual security this must be the basis for international security.<sup>394</sup> National and international security cannot be achieved without individual security in the form of human rights and fundamental freedom. There are many places throughout the world where oppression has led to violations of human rights causing conflict, displacement, and human suffering, which explains why so many societies are consumed in poverty and conflict because human rights are nonexistent. Human rights enable security by preventing conflict, supporting development strategies for humans, and providing effective government and resources. A human rights based approach to security would need to address the discrimination, powerlessness and weakness in systems of accountability that are found in the root of poverty and other development issues by applying the standards and values of human rights throughout development policies and activities. NATO can help to implement this with the collaboration of other leading global actors.

The linkage between development and human security are significant. The lack of security hinders the creative capacity of people resulting in impoverishment. Global conflict arises from the ground rules in society that do not provide people with decent or equitable life chances, but where people have access to human rights they are inspired to create and produce and able to be more efficient. Where there is oppression or corruption, development cannot take place. Therefore the best conflict prevention strategy is a strategy of respecting human rights. NATO cannot achieve Security by sacrificing human rights. Human rights are not an obstacle to security and peace; human rights are the key to achieving them. Security and protection of human rights are not conflicting goals but are in fact complementary and mutually reinforcing. In a recent speech, President Obama noted that, “The more we see repression, the more there are no outlets for how people can

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<sup>393</sup> Ramcharan. p.39.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid. p.40.

express themselves and their aspirations, the worse off we're going to be, and the more anti-American sentiment there is going to be in the Middle East. We keep making this mistake."<sup>395</sup> National security and human rights must stop being in competition with each other or thought to be at the expense of one another- instead they must effectively work together as equal priorities. The correlation between security and human rights introduce three basic hypotheses:

- (1) States that systematically abuse human rights at home are most likely to engage in international aggression
- (2) States with average or good human rights records are unlikely to engage in international aggression
- (3) Human rights respecting states may still engage in international interventions (usually in conformity with international law) at least in part to protect the human rights of citizens in a state that seriously and systematically abuses the rights of its own citizens.<sup>396</sup>

Considering this correlation between human rights and security, a foreign policy initiated with the help of NATO, that actively advances human rights around the world can enhance national and global security by decreasing the number of states likely to engage in international aggression.<sup>397</sup>

### **Global Health as a Strategic Objective for Security**

In the emergence of the global health agenda its focus excluded the influence of the social environment to an individual's health whereas the health of the individual is determined by a wider social context such as social, economic and political factors- all shaping security. Protecting the wellbeing of citizens is the key indicator for security. International relations in the past have primarily been concerned with relations between states and protection of war, this ideology has continued ever since and is seen predominantly within NATO. Although that only achieves security to an extent, the search for security and peace requires broader spectrum for international relations to include global health. Poor health and disease acts as a verifiable threat to international security and state power by having the capability to threaten a country's economic and political stability and causing instability as a result of a pathogen wiping out the core population base. Increasing levels of disease correlate with a decline in state capacity and

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<sup>395</sup> Obama.

<sup>396</sup> Burke White. p.254.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid. p.254.

state failure in which then leads to chaos and security dilemmas.<sup>398</sup> There are two main approaches to international politics of health; the *statist* approach and the *globalist* approach.<sup>399</sup> The *statist* health approach is security focused with an inside/outside dynamic where there is an inside (of the state) to protect and an outside to protect against based on the traditional understandings of what is a threat. But what the *statist* approach doesn't take into account is that disease and health doesn't distinguish between borders. Especially today, where there is no longer an outside, now the community is the entire world. Security needs to be less focused on containment and more focused on the root causes of inadequate health (Davies, p. 1180) such as poverty, lack of access to human rights and the need for cooperation. The health of individuals requires effective state structures as a central premise.

In contrast, the *globalist* approach to the politics of international relations of health is more focused on the wellbeing and rights of individuals. The *globalist* approach is based on two main ideas: individuals, and the promotion of health equity.<sup>400</sup> The focus of security for health should be on the threats that endanger the individual not the state, where many times the state itself can be the threat. The real root in poor health can only be reduced by collective action grounded in human rights. Human rights should be the framework for security.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed a global health policy that should be taken into account by NATO. Their policy is to create a strategy for United States engagement on global health by bridging the foreign policy and public health communities (CSIS). The CSIS Commission on Smart Global Health Policy aims to include global health policy into smart power. Smart power, is the ability to combine hard and soft power into a single strategy, where there is an engagement of both the military force and all forms of diplomacy. Sustainable global health is extremely valuable in terms of international security by enhancing lives and building constructive new partnerships. This in turn motivates people to do more and establishes lasting collaborations that could save and lift the world in many ways. The CSIS Commission on Smart Global Health Policy emphasizes five goals;

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<sup>398</sup> Davies, p.1173.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid. p.1173.

<sup>400</sup> Ibid. p.1181.

- (1) Maintain commitment to fight against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB
- (2) Prioritize women and children
- (3) Strengthen prevention of and develop capabilities to manage emergencies
- (4) Ensure the US has capability to match global health ambitions, and
- (5) Make smart investments in multilateral institutions (CSIS). The CSIS Commission on Global Health Policy should act as a reference for the emphasis for global health to achieve security.

### **Security through Civilian Power**

Civilian power is the combined force of people across the world who are practicing diplomacy, implementing development projects, and strengthening alliances and partnerships, preventing and responding to crises and conflict, and advancing core interests (QDDR). They are the people who negotiate peace treaties, stand up for human rights, and strengthen our economic cooperation and development. The civilian side should work as one just as military forces work together as a unified force. Civilian power must be placed alongside military power as equals in foreign policy integrated with smart power in order to achieve international security and solve global problems.<sup>401</sup> By leading through civilian power it empowers the people and allows us to view the world and think on different levels- on the individual, regional and global levels. This enables everyone to have participate and have a voice in their place in which better secures the world and strengthens regional and global cooperation overall. When the world functions through government-to government, power usually only ends up in the pockets of the wealthy or corrupt, therefore there needs to be a new method such as people-to-people contact in which will really reach people and development sustainable and more personal relationships by showing that we care.

### **Diplomacy and Cooperation as a Strategic Objective for Security**

Diplomacy and cooperation is what ties together the respect for human rights, global health, and civilian power for human security in which are all contributing factors and part of the foundation in accomplishing the ending goal of global security. In order to establish lasting partnerships and diplomacy that lead to global security, NATO must increase and further develop its collaboration efforts with the United Nations, work through smart power, and take advantage of the United States global position by using them as world model based on moral authority. Power in the international system, once

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<sup>401</sup> Clinton.

distributed among a few great powers, is now shared among an array of states, institutions, and non-state actors. Since more states are capable of acting on their own diplomatic agendas, international diplomacy must be reshaped to adapt to our current system with global partnerships and alliances through a multilateral approach. NATO has the capability to help work to instigate partnerships to work towards successful international security. Power is best expressed when it is shared.<sup>402</sup>

### *I. Smart Power Strategy*

Since the world has become so integrated, smart power has taken the place of hard power. Smart power is neither hard nor soft power, but is a combination of both in means of developing an integrated strategy to achieve global objectives drawing on both types of power. Smart power underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels. Providing the global good is central to this effort because it helps the United States in particular, reconcile its dominating power with the rest of the world's interests and values (CSIS, Commission on Smart Power). Smart Power focuses on five critical issues in relevance to achieving security; (1) Alliances, partnerships, and institutions must serve interests to help conquer the 21<sup>st</sup> c. challenges (2) Global development- elevate the role of development in foreign policy to help align the interests of people around the world (3) Public diplomacy- build long term people-to-people relationships (4) Economic integration- continue engagement with the global economy is necessary for growth and prosperity, but the benefits of free trade must be expanded to include those left behind (CSIS, Commission on Smart Power). By NATO investing in the global good of smart power, it will provide people throughout the world with what they want that they cannot attain on their own in which will over all conquer the global challenges of security.

### *II. NATO & the United Nations*

NATO on its own is not the right organization to take on the responsibility to redefine security beyond the military to include human security, but NATO does have the opportunity to help promote human security by aligning their policies accordingly in collaboration with the United Nations. Both NATO and the United Nations have similar interests and goals, but in the past they have not taken advantage of each other by

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<sup>402</sup> Suskind. p.121.

working together to achieve their shared commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organizations would be able to address global threats and challenges more effectively by collaborating and fulfilling each other's gaps. As partners, the United Nations acts as the agent for peace, in which would enforce human security, while NATO can act as the provider for military power while promoting security and peace while stressing human security, aligning each organization's policies together. In 2008, the two organizations made progress by establishing a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation between one another (United Nations). The framework includes regular reports to each other between secretary general, frequent meetings, and a consistent exchange and dialogue on political and operational issues. Further cooperation development between NATO and the United Nations on common interests include communication and information sharing, capacity building, training and exercises, lessons learned, planning, and support for contingencies, and operational coordination and support. This relationship is still in the process of developing and is in need of a deeper more structured connection. The United Nations can help to fill in the missing components of NATO to achieve human security and respect for human rights by applying a smart power strategy focusing on peacekeeping and peace building, counter terrorism, global health and energy and climate. NATO, in response can contribute to the United Nations, making them stronger by improving management accountability.

### *III. The United States as a Global Model for Security*

The United States' image and influence are currently in decline around the world. To maintain a leading role in global affairs, the United States must move from ongoing fear and anger to inspiring optimism and hope (CSIS, Commission on Smart Power). The United States has the potential to become a smarter power by investing in the global good to stand up for their core values of democracy and human rights that they have strayed away from, while at the same time defend their own security. The United States foreign policy in the recent past has tended to over rely on hard power because it is the most direct and visible source for American strength, but the use of hard and destructive power contradicts the United States' moral authority and their values of peace and respect for human rights. According to Suskind, "States objective, is a losing game in this era."<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> Suskind. p.146.

Considering the United States' current global leadership position, they have the opportunity to act as a global model as an agent for good for diplomacy and peace to achieve universal security.

*The United States should be a beacon for the rest of the world-not out of step and out of favor.*

Richard L. Armitage, *Center for Strategic & International Studies*

In order for the United States to become a smart power, it will require strategic reassessment of how the US government is organized, coordinated and budgeted which will determine its relations and influence on the rest of the world. NATO and the United Nations can help to work the United States to mold them into the ideal model for international security and peace that can be transmitted to the rest of the world. The United States will need to renew its commitment to the current global order and accommodate to other rising power that hold different principles and values. NATO and the United Nations can use United States as an example to implement the smart power strategy, but first the United States must rekindle its relationship with the United States and be willing to collaborate with both NATO and the United Nations. The US must look beyond hard power and take on a 'do the right thing' mentality for foreign policy based on moral values for the greater global good.<sup>404</sup> People believe and support the American values of free will, but the United States must follow through and trust their own values for them to be able to be seen by everyone else.<sup>405</sup>

*There's no pause. People-to-people. Great waves of us-just regular people, young people, building clinics or digging wells, laying electrical wires, carrying computers. Something, something big. America's good at building things. Let's do that, something we're good at...And ask nothing in return.*

-Ron Suskind, *The Way of the World*

## **Policy Recommendations & Conclusions**

In order to have a more effective and sustainable foreign policy, NATO needs to restructure their foreign policy to align with the current and emerging global challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> c. making development and diplomacy the foundation with a focus on human rights so that they become complementary forces with security. This will provide policy makers with a powerful tool to enhance security through the promotion of human rights.

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<sup>404</sup> Suskind. p.149.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid. p.148.

By using human rights and security as a strategic link requires a number of vital policy modifications.

## **I. Diplomacy**

- A. *Establish a Strong Partnership Between NATO & United Nations:* The United Nations acting as the agent for peacekeeping and NATO acting as the provider for military power, together shaping global security.
- B. *Implement Global Civilian Power:* by establishing partnerships with other agencies such as the United Nations. Empower, while holding accountable ‘chiefs of security’ to act as representatives for civilians to report back to policy makers to contribute to human security (QDDR).
- C. *Make Diplomacy a Core Diplomatic Mission:* by creating hubs of skilled communicators to ensure global participation and expand people-to-people relationships (QDDR).
- D. *Adapt Diplomacy to Meet New & Current Challenges:* Think regionally and globally to be able to see connections of interests between countries that will help to eliminate the gaps and overlaps (QDDR).
- E. *Build Relations with Emerging Powers and Existing Allies:* develop strategic dialogues and strengthen regional cooperation through multilateral meetings (QDDR).

## **II. Human Rights**

- A. *Human Rights Violations as Predictor:* Human Rights violations should act as an indication for aggression. If states systematically violate their own citizen’s human rights they are more likely to engage in aggression that will endanger international stability, peace and security. Therefore NATO’s priorities of countries to be of highest concern must change accordingly, and alter policy prescriptions to such states.
- B. *Institutionalize Human Rights:* to prevent international aggression through human rights policy. Human rights informed foreign policy for NATO would include an active advocacy for improvement in states’ human rights records for human dignity and to enhance national and global security by preventing future aggression. Also, a more active advocacy of human rights improvement in NATO’s multilateral relations, such as linking foreign aid, trade ties and other benefits as an incentive to the improvement of human rights.
- C. *Establish Peace-makers & Peace-building Built on Human Rights Foundations:* develop tools and train peace-maker representatives, build peace building offices around the world to use as an instrument to support and collaborate with country teams and agencies that will help to develop programs to address the root cause of conflicts (UN).

## **III. Development**

- A. *Focus on Development Investments:* A shift from aid to investment, delivery to systematic change that will create opportunities for people by using development to lift people out of poverty and secure lives. Such investments would include global health, food security, gender equality, education, economic growth and governance through civilian power (QDDR).
- B. *Build the 21<sup>st</sup> c. Workforce:* Smart power requires smart people, NATO in cooperation with the United Nations must promote innovation, provide resources, and create a more balance workforce consisting of a mix of representatives (QDDR).
- C. *Strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation:* create NATO performance evaluations to help take into account all contrasting values and principles through civilian feedback, in which will also attract and keep current members by being socially conscious.

By NATO making these policy modifications then diplomacy, development and the respect for human rights will be achieved in which will result in overall global peace and security. Security and human rights as complementary forces working together is what will confront the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> c and make a secure and peaceful world while bettering the lives of people through the accomplishment of human security.

**Part V**

**NATO Partnerships for Peace**

**Julia Rundberg, Yu Ling Tong, and Ken Li**



## **Part V: Introduction**

### **NATO Partnerships for Peace**

**Julia Rundberg, Yu Ling Tong, and Ken Li**

Since the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, an unprecedented number of events have redefined our previous understandings of security. Terrorist attacks by non-state actors like the ones that blinded-sided the United States on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 reminds us of the new threats and breaches to security in the existing international order. In order for history's longest standing and successful military alliance to tackle these new security threats, revisions must be made to its current partnership policies between countries outside the trans-Atlantic region. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces new threats that can only be resolved by establishing better bi-lateral relations with other non-NATO nations.

The first paper will use Sweden as a case study in order to highlight the inadequacies of NATO's current relationship with nations outside the alliance. As an EU member but not a member of NATO, Sweden cooperates with NATO through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework and with the EU through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Sweden's commitments to two different security frameworks weaken each of the respective partnerships. NATO needs to reconsider its relationship with both the EU and with non-members in order to guarantee more committed partnerships in the future and reduce unnecessary duplication between the EU's and NATO's defense systems.

The second paper is to initiate long-term thinking about NATO's relations with China. The fact that China is already engaged in bilateral and multilateral relationships which overlap with security organizations that link NATO to Central Asia, to the Russia Federation, and to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suggests that NATO should build up a better relationship with China. The recommendations are also based on the Sino-Russia relationship, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO's interest in building the nuclear weapons free zones in the Far East, China's border

sharing with Afghanistan and engagement in the Central Asia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issues.

The last paper examines the shift in NATO defense strategies during and after the Cold War era. This shift can be recognized in changes to the definition of NATO's original mission of preserving collective defense, Article 5 mission, to a more expeditionary operation or crisis response, non-Article 5 mission, approach. Also, this paper will examine NATO's future possibility of extended their partnership roles with countries that share similar core values and security interests to that of NATO. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations to build better relations with current non-NATO countries and multi-lateral organizations.

## Chapter Thirteen

### **NATO's Expanding Role: Sweden as a Case Study For How Increased Cooperation Via the EU and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Can Build a Stronger NATO Alliance**

**Julia Rundberg**

During the Cold War Sweden avoided military engagement by refusing to join the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliance. Swedish neutrality during the Cold War was seen as a 'third way' between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but the extent to which Sweden actually remained non-aligned was different in practice than it was on paper. As a relatively small European nation Sweden can pursue its own defense options outside of NATO (especially within the framework of the EU) but it cannot afford to completely ignore or fail to cooperate with the alliance.

Today Sweden's nonalignment policy still forms the foundation of the country's defense strategy. However, Sweden's close ties with NATO were strengthened after joining the EU in 1995 due to the high degree of overlap between EU and NATO members. The fact that Sweden (as a non-NATO member and neutral nation) cooperates with the alliance shows how far NATO's influence extends beyond its 28 member nations. Even though Sweden presently refuses to pursue official NATO membership, its extensive *partnerships* with the military alliance complicate and reduce Sweden's defense commitments to the EU and its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Sweden has become an integral part of two different frameworks for collective security. As a nation with active links to both the EU's defense system and to NATO, the case of Sweden shows the importance of collective security is in today's European zone. Small European nations like Sweden cannot afford to act unilaterally, especially against more modern threats like terrorism. As a result, these less powerful nations are forced to accept collective security frameworks to varying degrees. Whether or not the frameworks for collective security and defense will continue to exist is not the question. The future form and success of these frameworks (NATO and CSDP in particular) is extremely

uncertain though. The way NATO and CSDP will develop is highly dependent upon their level of coordination.

Sweden's ties to both NATO and the CSDP of the EU are problematic because the Swedish government's defense resources are spread thinly between two powers rather than consolidated in one. Since the EU and NATO have overlapping security priorities and share many of the same members, it is in their best interest to create a more unified body for collective defense purposes under the guidance of NATO. As Europe's primary security provider it will be important for NATO to both establish and maintain partnerships with non-members, like Sweden. Partnerships build trust between NATO and non-member nations and with ongoing cooperation strong partnerships can lead to membership. In this paper I use Sweden as a case study in order to demonstrate the importance of NATO's relations with non-members. Additionally, I examine Sweden's dual obligation to both NATO and the EU in order to make the argument for a unified European defense force that would be subordinate to NATO. A single cooperative security provider will guarantee the EU and NATO do not duplicate already existing defense structures and will ensure the defense budgets of member nations are used effectively.

### **Sweden's Historical Background with NATO**

Historically Sweden has professed to be a nonaligned nation but in actuality the Swedes have been in contact with NATO since the 1940s.<sup>406</sup> Sweden solidified its position as a NATO partner and ally by tacitly lending support to NATO during the Cold War, while still refusing to join the military alliance. Swedish politicians were careful to avoid sounding aligned with NATO in public speeches but Sweden's cooperation with the organization during the Cold War is indisputable. By working alongside but not within NATO during the Cold War, however, the Swedes were able to maintain their official neutrality and still benefit from NATO protection. Although it was not publically discussed or acknowledged, NATO agreed to support Sweden in the event of a Soviet attack during the Cold War and, in a clear breach of neutrality, Swedish highways were

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<sup>406</sup> Dahl, A.-S. "Not If but How: Sweden's Future Relations with Nato." *Nato Review*. 45.3 (1997): 19. Print.

specifically constructed in order to act as potential runways for NATO planes<sup>407</sup> (Miles 19). Additionally, landing strips on Swedish military bases were modified in order to accommodate large American bombers and the Swedes began using NATO standard aircraft fuel and fuel nozzles.<sup>408</sup>

With its minimal military resources the Swedes greatly relied on NATO for protection, but the relationship between Sweden and NATO was not one-sided. NATO also benefited from its Swedish ally through the use of Amber Nine, a secret flight path over the southwest part of Sweden.<sup>409</sup> Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Swedish government permitted NATO air traffic over Sweden while still insisting neither Cold War power block had Swedish backing.<sup>410</sup> Swedish airspace was a valuable commodity for NATO, considering Sweden's strategic position in relation to Russia. Many of the central targets in the Soviet Union could be reached most directly through Swedish airspace, making cooperation with the Swedes vital to NATO.<sup>411</sup> Amber Nine had the potential to discredit Sweden's neutrality though. Consequently, Swedish government officials publically vowed to fire indiscriminately at any planes that entered Swedish airspace in order to appear nonaligned.<sup>412</sup> Swedish diplomats were telling a different story in Washington though, assuring the Americans only Soviet planes would be shot down if caught traveling over Sweden.<sup>413</sup> The Swedes then went one step farther in order to preserve their façade of neutrality by issuing formal complaints whenever American planes entered Swedish airspace.<sup>414</sup> Each complaint was met by an empty promise from the American side to respect Sweden's neutral airspace. The complaints were merely issued to provide the Swedes with the documentation necessary for an alibi if a Soviet plane was shot down over Sweden. In the event the Soviets found out NATO and American planes were being allowed into neutral Swedish airspace the Swedes could

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<sup>407</sup> Miles, Lee. *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*. London: Continuum, 2000. 19. Print.

<sup>408</sup> Nilsson, Mikael. "Amber Nine: Nato's Secret Use of a Flight Path Over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in Nato's Infrastructure." *Journal of Contemporary History*. 44.2 (2009). p.288. Print.

<sup>409</sup> Nilsson p.287.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.* p.287.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.* p.289.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.* p.290.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*

demonstrate their ‘efforts’ to restrict such departures from neutrality. However, Sweden was not willing to compromise its neutrality without compensation from NATO.

In order to guarantee Swedish/NATO cooperation Sweden was granted the right to purchase armaments from the United States in 1952, making Sweden an official member of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA).<sup>415</sup> Sweden’s membership in the MDAA in combination with NATO’s implicit military support secured the future of the Swedish/NATO partnership. Already in 1952 NATO’s strategic guidance document stressed the necessity of protecting Scandinavia as a whole, and by the 1960s the United States and Britain, “saw Sweden as the first line of defense on NATO’s northern flank.”<sup>416</sup> Sweden’s close but veiled relationship with NATO during the Cold War is demonstrative of NATO’s reach and influence. Additionally, NATO’s ability to penetrate a neutral nation during wartime proves how valued NATO is as a partner. Sweden’s alliance with NATO will arguably endure in the future based on the level of cooperation seen during the Cold War. During this period both parties involved came to recognize the other’s value, bringing Sweden increasingly closer to the military alliance and farther from its nonalignment strategy.

### **Implications of Sweden’s Membership in the EU**

Taking into consideration that 21 out of NATO’s 28 members are also members of the EU Sweden can no longer pass judgment on NATO in the same way it could prior to joining the EU in 1995.<sup>417</sup> Upon entering the European Union in 1995, Sweden was all at once drawn closer to the NATO alliance while at the same time presented with a new potential security framework via the EU. The collective defense policy shift that came as a result of Sweden’s EU membership is apparent in then Foreign minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen’s 1996 speech,

The development towards a new European security order, of which NATO is one part, is hopeful in many ways. The states of Europe already in many respects have a common agenda of security policy. It is this common agenda that forms the basis for cooperation between NATO and the states outside the organization, both in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and in concrete missions, such as that in Bosnia. In Bosnia, as in other contexts, Sweden has contributed

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<sup>415</sup> Nilsson. p.290.

<sup>416</sup> Nilsson. p.290, 288

<sup>417</sup> Miles, Lee. Sweden and the European Union Evaluated. London: Continuum, 2000. 25. Print.

to the building of a European security order. We intend to continue to do so. Military non-alignment does not mean passivity.<sup>418</sup>

As the former foreign minister explains, EU membership translated to the acceptance of a new structure for security and defense policy. Since collective security is one of the EU's main priorities, Sweden again was faced with a threat to its neutrality. While initially apprehensive about the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the Swedes soon accepted the ESDP as an avenue to pursue common defense while still being able to maintain their nonaligned status.<sup>419</sup>

### **The ESDP vs. NATO as Sweden's Security Framework**

What set the ESDP apart from NATO's collective security system was the degree of influence Sweden had in its development during the late 1990s. Sweden accepted the ESDP's common defense framework since the Swedish government was able to push for a greater civilian dimension within the ESDP and a reduced military dimension.<sup>420</sup> Due to the level of Swedish involvement, the Swedes transitioned from a position of great reluctance toward the creation of the ESDP to a position of active support.<sup>421</sup> In 2003, Sweden and France were the only two EU members to deploy troops to the ESDP's Operation Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRP).<sup>422</sup> Sweden's active role in Operation Artemis demonstrated a distinct shift in Swedish neutrality policy and proved that Sweden's nonalignment would not impede the nation from securing a prominent place within the EU, as many critics presumed it would.<sup>423</sup> Additionally, the highly successful Operation Artemis mission arguably halted a potential genocide within DRC, increasing Swedish public support for the ESDP.<sup>424</sup>

The Swedish government also used its commitment to the ESDP as a way to mitigate potential public backlash when implementing national defense reforms. The implications of Swedish ESDP membership went well beyond just the Swedish public though. The success of Operation Artemis gave the Swedes greater influence within the

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<sup>418</sup> Miles. p.22.

<sup>419</sup> Lee-Ohlsson, Fredrick. "Sweden and Development of the European Security and Defence Policy." *Cooperation and Conflict*. 44.2 (2009): 123-142. Print.

<sup>420</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.128.

<sup>421</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.124.

<sup>422</sup> Ibid.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.130.

ESDP and demonstrated that Sweden's military nonalignment does not necessarily correspond to an unwillingness to engage militarily. The ESDP rewarded the Swedes for their strong commitment; proving smaller nations can wield power disproportionate to their size when they are willing to contribute ideas and manpower.<sup>425</sup>

The mutually advantageous relationship between Sweden and the ESDP secured the EU as Sweden's preferred route for conducting foreign policy and further cemented Sweden's interest in the EU for collective defense purposes. As the Swedish government became more deeply intertwined with the EU's defense system it did not, however, pull its support away from NATO. Instead, Swedish cooperation with NATO actually increased. In a 1999 press statement, then Prime Minister Göran Persson commented on NATO's decision to bomb Yugoslavia in March of 1999,

NATO's decision to start the bombings were obviously taken with the intention to prevent a humanitarian disaster and to re-establish peace in the area...But bombings in themselves cannot solve the Kosovo conflict. It must be solved politically.<sup>426</sup>

While Persson does not outright praise NATO for its decision to begin bombing without an explicit mandate by the UN Security Council, he does subtly express Sweden's support. The fact that the Swedish government supported NATO bombing a sovereign nation without a UN mandate shows how much EU membership has begun to color Swedish foreign policy.<sup>427</sup> Based on statements like Persson's, Sweden's nonalignment policy has rightfully come to be considered a "national myth" by many in the Social Democratic Party.<sup>428</sup>

### **Official Swedish cooperation with NATO**

While Sweden is not an official NATO member and has yet to express an interest in gaining member status, the Swedes still actively participate in NATO-led missions. What separates Sweden from actual NATO members is the voluntary status of Swedish participation, made possible by Sweden's membership in the Partnership for Peace initiative (PfP). The PfP was set up in order to foster relationships between NATO and non-NATO countries like Sweden. NATO explains the partnership as a way to, "increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between

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<sup>425</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.134.

<sup>426</sup> Miles. p.26.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid.

<sup>428</sup> Miles. p.28.

individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries.<sup>429</sup> In regard to the PfP, NATO works on a case-by-case basis with non-NATO members. The PfP framework resultantly allows each partner nation to establish a unique and customized relationship with NATO, “according to their ambitions and abilities.”<sup>430</sup> Each of the 22 nations currently in the PfP program takes part in a 2-year Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which is based on activities between the particular nation and NATO.<sup>431</sup> Nations that wish to have an even greater partnership with NATO can choose to create an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).<sup>432</sup> Also on a 2-year schedule, IPAPs enhance cooperation by honing in more specifically on a nation’s activities in order to, “better support their domestic reform efforts.”<sup>433</sup>

The PfP has not only been a way for non-NATO members to build a relationship with NATO but it has also been a vehicle for non-members to join NATO. Since its inception in 1994 the PfP has had 10 members leave the PfP in order to become full NATO members.<sup>434</sup> As one scholar argues, “Although initially some saw the partnership as an alternative to NATO membership, it soon became a means to joining NATO... Broadening membership is preferable to creating ad hoc coalitions.”<sup>435</sup> In this way the PfP became a way for NATO to expand and build trust with new partners while moving toward a more global role.

After becoming a PfP member in 1994 Sweden has been able to “select areas of cooperation with NATO that match joint objectives.”<sup>436</sup> As a PfP participant, Sweden dedicated troops to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 and again in 1999 to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.<sup>437</sup> Sweden then deepened its partnership with NATO in 1997 upon joining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a 50-nation multilateral forum designed to bring NATO and its non-

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<sup>429</sup> "NATO - Topic: Partnership for Peace Programme, The." *NATO - Homepage*. Web. 24 Feb. 2011. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50349.html](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.html)>.

<sup>430</sup> NATO Partnership for Peace.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid.

<sup>435</sup> Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. "Global Nato." *Foreign Affairs*. 85.5 (2006): 110. Print.

<sup>436</sup> "NATO Topics: NATO’s Relations with Sweden." *NATO - Homepage*. Web. 11 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-sweden/index.html>>.

<sup>437</sup> NATO’s Relations with Sweden.

member partners closer.<sup>438</sup> Continuing its commitment to NATO the Swedes contributed forces to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan in 2000.<sup>439</sup> NATO has even gone so far as to establish Sweden's military training center in Kungsängen as an official PfP Training Center.<sup>440</sup> Through the PfP framework, Sweden is also working with Estonia, Finland and Norway in the development of the EU Battle Ground Concept in order to create a, "multinational rapid reaction force for EU-led peace-support operations."<sup>441</sup> The Swedes have also generously contributed funding to the PfP Trust Funds, further establishing the nation's close connection to NATO. However, Sweden's steady partnerships with NATO have not come at the cost of a reduced Swedish responsibility to the EU. The Swedish government is still deeply committed to the EU and its security framework, which complicates Sweden's participation in NATO.

### **The EU's Push for Greater Defense Capability**

In the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP was renamed The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). For EU members like Sweden this meant the implementation of a "common defense policy," which "will lead to a common defense, when the European Council acting unanimously, so decides."<sup>442</sup> The 2007 Lisbon Treaty does not formally establish any sort of mutual assistance defense policy and the unanimous support of the EU's 27 members is still needed in order to take military action.<sup>443</sup> The treaty does, however, push for "permanent structures of cooperation" which would pull more militarily robust nations into, "more binding commitments."<sup>444</sup> States drawn into such commitments would contribute to crisis management endeavors.<sup>445</sup> The CSDP's establishment of 'permanent structures of cooperation' is demonstrative of the EU's changing role. The EU has begun to take on a more active role concerning foreign and security policy, signaling its desire for increased power and influence. For small EU nations like Sweden that lack the power or resources to act alone, a stronger EU defense

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<sup>438</sup> "NATO - Topic: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), The." *NATO - Homepage*. Web. 11 Feb. 2011. <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49276.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm)>.

<sup>439</sup> NATO's Relations with Sweden.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid.

<sup>442</sup> Walter, Robert. "Future Directions for the Security and Defence of Europe." *Military Technology*. 34.1 (2010): 104. Print.

<sup>443</sup> Walter. p.104.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

capacity is appealing, especially considering the CSDP's lack of mutual defense guarantees. The success of the EU as a security provider is dependent on member contributions though, making its efficacy uncertain.

The EU's reliance on member nations for funding, personnel, and equipment is troubling considering EU nations are reducing their national defense budgets at present.<sup>446</sup> In 2010 most EU nations implemented significant cuts in defense spending for equipment and only a handful of the members actually allocated more than 2% of their GDP for defense purposes.<sup>447</sup> The EU's military capability pale in comparison to NATO's much better equipped defense forces. Only about 5% of the EU's 2 million troops are actually capable of being deployed in out-of-area operations.<sup>448</sup> As a security provider NATO dwarfs the EU because the EU's budget simply cannot compare to the funding available within NATO. All European defense spending combined does not even add up to half of American defense spending.<sup>449</sup>

The EU's 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, which anticipated an army of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft that could all be deployed within a 60-day window and remain in action for one year would never be realized.<sup>450</sup> The EU recognized the impossibility of its ambitious Helsinki Headline Goal and replaced it with the battle groups initiative.<sup>451</sup> The new, more modest, target aims for 1,500 troops deployable within 15 days to act as first responders in a conflict situation.<sup>452</sup> The reduction of the Helsinki Headline Goal was an admission on behalf of the EU that it fell short in terms of the funding and resources needed to adequately fill a defense role and yet the CSDP continues to exist in its limited capacity.

The EU's inadequacies as a security provider extend beyond budget constraints. Missions conducted on behalf of the EU currently rely on the dedication and interest of

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<sup>446</sup> Walter. p.106.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid.

<sup>448</sup> Koenig, Nicole. *The EU and NATO: Toward a Joint Future in Crisis Management?*

Thesis. Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, 2010. Bruges: EU Diplomacy Papers. Print. Lee-Ohlsson, Fredrick. "Sweden and Development of the European Security and Defence Policy." *Cooperation and Conflict*. 44.2 (2009): 9. Print.

<sup>449</sup> Koenig. p.9.

<sup>450</sup> Bickerton, Chris J, Bastien Irondele, and Anand Menon. "Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State: the Eu's Common Security and Defence Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 5. (2011). Print.

<sup>451</sup> Koenig. p.5.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid.

leading EU members.<sup>453</sup> At any point in time principal EU nations can decide not to commit their resources and capabilities to missions within the EU structure, leaving the EU without a reliable military.<sup>454</sup> The very framework of the CSDP is precariously based on the changing political, militaristic and financial pressures of its members. As a military force unable to stand alone, the EU greatly relies on NATO support in more involved missions like the conflict in Yugoslavia.<sup>455</sup> In the case of Yugoslavia, “the EU had to rely on its Alliance partners in order to resolve a crisis in its own backyard.”<sup>456</sup>

EU members must consider whether the CSDP is in fact the most effective way to channel the EU’s collective resources, considering the organization’s shaky infrastructure. The bilateral summit in 1998 was essentially the starting point for the CSDP, at which point France and the UK used the events in the Balkans to necessitate the creation of a European defense force.<sup>457</sup> The St. Malo declaration of 1998 stated, “the Union must have the capacity of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”<sup>458</sup> From its roots in the St. Malo declaration the CSDP was a welcomed concept not only for Europeans but also for Americans. With values that closely aligned with American objectives, the CSDP was a way for the US government to secure US interests in Europe without expending additional resources of its own. In a 2008 statement, Victoria Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, noted, “...we agree with France – Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs – a stronger, more capable European defense capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough.”<sup>459</sup> The St. Malo declaration failed to outline the terms of autonomy between NATO and the ESDP though, leading to confusion as to where the first ended and the latter began. Furthermore, the declaration was wrought with disagreements amongst its architects, “as to its ultimate nature and purpose.”<sup>460</sup> The

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<sup>453</sup> Missiroli, A. "The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 8.4 (2003): 501. Print.

<sup>454</sup> Missiroli. p.501.

<sup>455</sup> Koenig. p.9.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid.

<sup>459</sup> Thulstrup, Morten Thaning. “The Eu and Nato in Crisis Management - Towards Intensified Rivalry or Partnership?” 2010. Internet resource.

<sup>460</sup> Bickerton. p.3.

CSDP was seen as the best way to secure European autonomy but its creation was haphazard in nature and its founders failed to consider the extent to which the CSDP would duplicate frameworks already present in NATO.

In its current state the CSDP is not viable as an organization because it operates without a guaranteed support base. As the former chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs argues, “[if the EU needs troops, the] question is posed to all around the table: the country that does not raise its hand will count as a lightweight – even in other political issues.”<sup>461</sup> There are obvious flaws in a system that relies on what is essentially a “peer pressure” mechanism in order to call troops to action.<sup>462</sup> In a time of crisis the EU cannot rely on member nations to lend their support. The foundation of the EU’s security framework is weak and the CSDP needs to recognize its members’ inadequacies.

### **NATO and CSDP Enhanced Cooperation**

When proposing solutions to the CSDP’s shortcomings it is vital that EU members do not overlook the fact that 21 of the EU’s members are simultaneously full NATO members and an additional 4 EU members, including Sweden, are part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. When the degree of overlap between EU and NATO members is taken into consideration the CSDP’s expansion can be seen as a threat to NATO. Not only does the CSDP have the potential to weaken NATO’s role in the region, but because NATO and the CSDP rely on a nearly identical membership body the CSDP also diverts resources away from NATO.<sup>463</sup> Furthermore the EU’s CSDP is unfit to fill a collective defense role in Europe because it lacks its own headquarters, making it difficult to autonomously deploy military operations at the scale that is needed.<sup>464</sup> The future of the CSDP is unlikely simply because as an organization it is ill equipped to fill a collective defense role. Furthermore, the existence of NATO, an organization far superior to the EU in terms of defense capabilities, will pose the greatest threat to the continued existence of the CSDP.

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<sup>461</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.139.

<sup>462</sup> Lee-Ohlsson. p.138.

<sup>463</sup> Walter. p.106.

<sup>464</sup> Koenig. p.24.

NATO's present relationship with the EU needs to be reconsidered in order to more effectively make use of the defense resources available between the two organizations. If the EU and NATO cooperate to a greater extent they will avoid unnecessary duplication between their defense systems, guaranteeing the national defense budgets of both NATO and EU member states are used most effectively. NATO and the EU face similar security threats, which give both parties an incentive to pursue a closer partnership with enhanced communication. In 2007 Former Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, argued NATO and the EU are in a "frozen conflict."<sup>465</sup> The Secretary General is alluding to the fact that NATO and the EU are failing to take any significant steps toward a closer partnership at present. In order to progress toward a more mutually beneficial relationship the EU and NATO must recognize they possess different skill sets, which are valuable in separate contexts. Once the EU and NATO can recognize their differing capabilities, the two organizations can specialize in order to produce a more resourceful and expert defense framework. This framework will also allow nations like Sweden that are currently caught between two defense systems to fully commit to only one.

### **NATO and the EU: Potential for Cooperation**

In the post Cold War world the EU and NATO each developed independently of one another but, "parallel transformation as well as subsequent enlargement rounds resulted in an institutional and functional overlap."<sup>466</sup> The product of this autonomous development was two organizations with differing capabilities. The EU and NATO are currently at a crossroads, leading many critics to question whether the two organizations will compete or compliment one another in the future.<sup>467</sup> The EU's civilian dimension is its strong suit, whereas NATO relies on the strength of its military alone and lacks adequate civilian capabilities.<sup>468</sup> The differing capabilities of the EU's CSDP and NATO relate to the greater security frameworks driving the organizations: the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the American National Security Strategy (NSS), respectively.<sup>469</sup> As an organization still greatly based on US interests, NATO closely aligns with the NSS

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<sup>465</sup> Koenig. p.4.

<sup>466</sup> Koenig. p.6.

<sup>467</sup> Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> Koenig. p.11

<sup>469</sup> Thulstrup. p.50

‘hard power’ strategy, which relies on a strong military component and unilateral security solutions.<sup>470</sup> Alternatively, the CSDP is more of a ‘soft power’ guided by the principle of multilateralism, urging for “diplomacy, economic incentives and military power” over militaristic solutions.<sup>471</sup> NATO and the CSDP have diverged in terms of military involvement based on the vastly different way the two organizations choose to involve themselves in crisis situations.

NATO does have the potential to act as Europe’s sole security provider but as the conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate NATO needs to rely less on its military force to mitigate crises. The 2010 Report of the Group of Experts on NATO's New Strategic Concept stated, "NATO efforts to operate with civilian partners remain disjointed."<sup>472</sup> The EU simply does not have the resources or competency to fill the same role as NATO in terms of security and defense; however, it does possess a strong civilian dimension, which would greatly benefit NATO. NATO is in need of increased civilian instruments like police forces in order to guarantee the long-term efficacy of its missions.<sup>473</sup> In Afghanistan NATO troops were forced to take on civilian jobs because of NATO’s relative weakness in its civilian dimension, which is, “problematic since it can lead to a perceived militarization of civilian instruments.”<sup>474</sup> A strong civilian dimension should be a priority for NATO as an organization because it would compliment NATO’s present framework, which almost solely relies on a robust military component. In order to be perceived as a comprehensive organization NATO should bolster its civilian instruments by working with the EU.

While the EU lacks NATO’s power in terms of military might, it does have an edge over NATO in terms of a sound civilian response. The CSDP is engaged in 13 missions, almost all of which are civilian based.<sup>475</sup> The CSDP has transitioned from its more European roots to an international force, with its missions taking place across three different continents and in nations varying from Somalia to Afghanistan.<sup>476</sup> All of the CSDP’s 22 missions to date have been relatively successful, but limited in scope and

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<sup>470</sup> Thulstrup. p.50.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> Koenig. p.8.

<sup>473</sup> Koenig. p.7.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid.

<sup>475</sup> Bickerton. p.4.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid.

scale.<sup>477</sup> Lacking any large-scale failures in its past operations, it is easy to perceive the CSDP as a well-run organization. While the CSDP may be relatively good at what it does, it is necessary to recognize what the organization does *not* do, for example the CSDP chose not to intervene in Darfur in 2008.<sup>478</sup> The EU's decision to intervene in some but not all crises makes the CSDP's actions appear to be 'cosmetic' at times and undertaken, "more in order to highlight the role of CSDP than to solve problems on the ground."<sup>479</sup> When the CSDP's inaction is recognized, the inadequacies of the organization are revealed. The CSDP is not suited to fill a collective defense role in the European zone considering the organization does not fill its role as a security provider with any level of consistency.

### **Efforts at a NATO/CSDP Partnership to Date**

An enhanced partnership between NATO and the EU seems to be likely in the future based on statements from the two defense providers. However, despite the fact that the two organizations have recognized their shared objectives, little has been done to move farther in the direction of cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty intentionally makes note of NATO's importance to the EU:

The common security and defense policy of the Union respects the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty of those Member States which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members, and is compatible with the common security and defense policy...<sup>480</sup>

NATO has also recognized the need for cooperation. In September 2009 the secretary-general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted,

There is enormous potential for cooperation between NATO and the EU. If we could actually coordinate the military power and transatlantic engagement of NATO, with the civilian and financial resources of the EU, think of how much positive change we could achieve. Unfortunately, the reality falls far short of that potential. We can't even have security arrangements between the two organizations on the ground in Afghanistan, where we both have personnel. This is a waste of resources. It makes our missions less effective – and therefore longer. And it potentially puts personnel at risk.<sup>481</sup>

Statements from both the EU and NATO push for greater cooperation and recognize the shortcomings of the EU NATO partnership as it currently stands. However, the lack of a

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<sup>477</sup> Bickerton. p.5.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

<sup>480</sup> Thulstrup. p.9.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

more concrete means for teamwork makes these statements appear to be little more than lip service to critics.

The Berlin Plus Agreement was the greatest step the EU and NATO have taken toward actually formalizing a partnership, “signaling NATO’s increasing acceptance of the EU as a potential partner.”<sup>482</sup> The agreement, which outlines the degree to which NATO and the EU can cooperate in terms of defense, was concluded in March of 2003.<sup>483</sup> The agreement allows the EU to pull from NATO’s “assets, capabilities and planning facilities” in crisis management situations only when NATO has already refused to intervene in a given crisis.<sup>484</sup> The agreement can be seen as a step toward future cooperation but it can also be interpreted as a way for the CSDP to maintain its autonomy from NATO to the greatest extent possible while still using NATO as a temporary support system. Via The Berlin Plus Agreement the EU is, “gradually trying to diminish its resource dependency of NATO by the evolution of its own capability, while taking advantage of NATO resources in the interim phase.”<sup>485</sup> Through The Berlin Plus agreement the CSDP was pulled closer to NATO but it still retains its autonomy. If NATO is going to cooperate with the CSDP by sharing its resources it also needs to limit the CSDP’s autonomy. NATO will be more effective as an organization when the CSDP is working within its own framework.

### **Impediments to a NATO/CSDP Partnership**

NATO and the EU have thus far failed to build a closer relationship in part because NATO and the CSDP were created with very different objectives and opposing interests. NATO was a product of the Cold War, established in order to create a bridge between the US and Europe and to curtail the spread of Soviet influence within Europe.<sup>486</sup> US interests still largely guide NATO and the continued autonomy of the CSDP saves the US money and defense resources, “US policymakers see the CSDP as a vehicle for strengthening European military capabilities eventually leading to enhanced transatlantic burden sharing.”<sup>487</sup> The degree to which NATO and the EU can cooperate is

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<sup>482</sup> Thulstrup. p.59.

<sup>483</sup> Koenig. p.12.

<sup>484</sup> Koenig. p.17.

<sup>485</sup> Thulstrup. p.60.

<sup>486</sup> Thulstrup. p.48.

<sup>487</sup> Koenig. p.20.

also influenced by individual member states. When NATO and the EU do engage in formal discussions they take place at meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).<sup>488</sup> Initially most issues were open for discussion at the meetings. Non-allied EU nations like Finland, Austria, Ireland and Sweden were not seen as a threat to NATO's information sharing because they have well-established connections to NATO via the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP).<sup>489</sup> However, when Malta and Cyprus were granted EU membership in 2004 their attendance at the meetings became an issue seeing as they are not PfP members.<sup>490</sup> The tension between Cyprus and Turkey thus prevented the sharing of information between NATO and the two new EU member states.<sup>491</sup> Furthermore, cooperation between the CSDP and NATO has been halted because certain EU members fear a closer union between with NATO would translate to greater American influence within the CSDP. France in particular is weary of the CSDP becoming a 'toolbox' for American foreign policy, fearing the CSDP would be demoted to a "junior partner."<sup>492</sup>

### **Recommendations**

In order to reduce duplication between the CSDP of the EU and NATO, I recommend NATO become Europe's main security provider. The unification of the CSDP and NATO will reduce defense spending because nations with commitments to the EU and to NATO, like Sweden, will no longer be pulled between the two agreements. Additionally, since NATO almost entirely draws on the same pool of forces as the CSDP, NATO will benefit from an enhanced European military capability.<sup>493</sup> It is necessary that the EU recognize NATO has a comparative advantage over the CSDP in terms of defense both because of its expertise and its resource pool. Since the EU will likely not be willing to surrender all of its power to NATO, an agreement should be reached wherein the CSDP will maintain its authority concerning the civilian dimension of defense but NATO will act as the final authority in terms of collective security in the region. Uninhibited information sharing between the two organizations will also be a necessary component,

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<sup>488</sup> Koenig. p.13.

<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid.

<sup>492</sup> Koenig. p.20.

<sup>493</sup> Koenig. p.27.

but the CSDP will need to remain subordinate to NATO concerning crisis management issues. The unification of NATO and the CSDP cannot translate to a US take over of all responsibility for European security. The US government is neither willing to nor should it bear the entire burden when it comes to defending Europe. As president Barack Obama explained in a press conference at NATO's Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in 2009, the US government supports a stronger European defense capability and is not willing to be Europe's "patron" but rather is looking for a partner in Europe.<sup>494</sup> The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack also solidified the commitment between the US and NATO and for the first time in NATO history article 5, which addresses mutual defense, was used.<sup>495</sup> NATO, along with the US, needs to bring the CSDP into the NATO framework, while still allowing the EU to share Europe's security burden. The US still maintains a technological advantage over its allies but, "the potential of US troops is maximized when they are involved in operations with other troops with whom they have trained on a regular basis," which makes the joining of forces with the CSDP a mutually advantageous arrangement.<sup>496</sup>

In order for NATO to become Europe's head security provider increased burden sharing is necessary. Through the already established PfP program NATO should expand its reach to other nations in order to build a stronger alliance with more partners. To accomplish this, Article 10 needs to be amended in order to expand the NATO alliance to non-European nations. The PfP is an effective means to increasing the strength and size of NATO because it allows nations to more gradually transition into NATO members. The fact that 10 PfP members have become NATO members shows how the PfP can act as an intermediary. While partnerships with nations like Sweden via the PfP can be productive for both parties, formal membership should be the eventual goal for nations that enter the PfP. Formal membership is preferable because it allows nations to work together more effectively in joint military operations and also creates guarantees of support. NATO is in need of strengthened partnerships because today's modern security issues increasingly threaten the future stability of the NATO alliance. In order to secure

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<sup>494</sup> Koenig. p.20.

<sup>495</sup> Thulstrup. p.63.

<sup>496</sup> Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. "Global Nato." *Foreign Affairs*. 85.5 (2006): 111. Print.

its place as a reputable defense alliance NATO needs to establish more partners through the PfP program and draw the CSDP into its framework. These changes will more effectively consolidate European defense spending in one provider and allow non-NATO members to use the PfP as a means to gaining NATO membership.

## Chapter Fourteen

### Toward a Better NATO-China Relationship

Yu Ling Tong

#### **Introduction**

China, as a key international player in 21<sup>st</sup> century, has always been targeted by global powers and international organizations as either a possible competitor or partner. China has actively participated in international institutions especially in these ten years while it has tried not to throw its weight around in every area. Engagement in international organizations is an important step of a nation's interest and prestige. Therefore, since 1971, People's Republic of China (PRC)'s first attendance in the United Nations (UN), China joined the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the International Olympic Committee, and several hundred international institutions.

However, PRC has been left out by the world's most important intergovernmental military organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the new strategic concept and the recent Lisbon Statement, NATO does not mention its current relationship or any potential partnership with China. But the Lisbon documents do note that the NATO-Russia cooperation which is of "strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security." In addition, Afghanistan remains an important object of NATO and becomes the core issue of the 2011 Lisbon summit. NATO promises the control of security of Afghanistan would be returned to Afghan government by 2014 after meeting with President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai. However, NATO will continue its commitment to Afghan security, training the Afghan National Army.

This chapter will discuss in order to fulfill its mission of "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" in the model world and switch from its role of an anti-communist organization to an anti-criminal organization, NATO has to rethink its long-term relationship with China, considering China's relationship with Russia as a "strategic

partner”, and China’s position in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Central Asia. Therefore, in the new strategic concept, NATO failed to include the possible partnership with China. In order to transform into a constabulary, NATO has to build up a better relationship with China, and includes China as an important partner.

## **History**

In principle, the North Atlantic Treaty was set up as a military alliance in 1949 for defending against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the Western portions, rather than the Eastern portions which bordered in China and North Korea. However, in case of a NATO-Warsaw Pact War, US forces based in East Asia would have engaged target in the Far East of the Soviet Union. Later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1950 as in part a response of US and Europe to the outbreak of the Korean War<sup>497</sup> that turned China into the major battlefield opponent of the United States in the Korean War because of the fighting between the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) Forces and the PRC--People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces. The Korean War implicated the beginning of the NATO-China connection.

Scrolling through history, the relationship between NATO and China has not been very good because of the different ideologies. For example, during the Cold War, China opposed NATO as the military tools for sphere its influence. The relationship between them even got worse in 1999 because of U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. On May 1999, five US JDAM bombs hit the People's Republic of China Embassy in the district of New Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists wounding dozens of people, and causing serious damage to embassy buildings. Later, the Chinese side claimed that it was an intentional bombing as a revenge on China’s opposed to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. There were strong protests from the China’s government to the U.S. government and NATO. NATO explained it was only an accident. Later, the victims of the incident got economic compensation from NATO. The former U.S. President Bill Clinton also personally apologized for this incident. Therefore, the Sino-US relations began to recover in late 1999.

Although the relationship between NATO and China got better because of the diplomatic efforts, the image of NATO has grown even more negative in the mind of

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<sup>497</sup> Halperin, Morton. *Limited War In the Nuclear Age*.

Chinese people and government which made the further interaction even more problematic. It was not until 2002 the NATO and China started a normal interaction because Chinese Ambassador in Brussels met NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to discuss the potential for building a closer relationship between China and the NATO. China and NATO has remained a low profile contact since then.

After 9/11, although NATO has expressed its willingness of establishing a partnership with China because of China's important role as a neighboring country to Central Asia, Chinese government still responded NATO in its usual manner. Moreover, China always opposed the action NATO took in the Afghan War and called for the NATO to withdraw from the wars.

The fact is that China is concerned about an expanded NATO presence in Central Asia. Currently, NATO has already had Japan and South Korea as contact countries and some former Warsaw Pacts members as new members. Its sphere of influence has been greatly expanded to the Asia, alarming China.

### **Defense Budget Cuts in NATO**

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General, makes a few good points at the 2011 Munich Security Conference. First, the NATO continues to face the effects of the financial crisis. The NATO's European member states have been cutting their defence spending by some 45 billion dollars over the past two years.<sup>498</sup> And nowadays, the United States has accounted for almost 75 percent of the NATO members' total defence spending which has increased 25 percent comparing to 10 years ago.

Second, Europe has always believed in its consolidation "as one of the world's top providers of humanitarian and development aid." "And they suggest a division of labor within NATO – with the United States providing hard power, while its European Allies increasingly turn to soft power assignments like training and institution-building."<sup>499</sup>

However, on the other hand, "According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China has tripled its defense expenditure over the past decade. And

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<sup>498</sup> "Building security in an age of austerity" - Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference.

<sup>499</sup> "Building security in an age of austerity" - Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference.

India has increased its defense spending by almost 60 per cent in the same period,” and “fast-moving events are unfolding in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The outcome of this turmoil remains unclear, its long-term consequences unpredictable.”<sup>500</sup> The fact is that the security environment in the world has been even more complex than Europe is risking its security.

Rasmussen emphasizes the new approach of NATO: “Smart Defence – ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility”. “Smart Defence is about making it easier for nations to develop and acquire capabilities – alone, together as Allies, or even involving non-NATO countries, in NATO or in the EU.”<sup>501</sup> “To pool and share capabilities, to set the right priorities, and to better coordinate our efforts”<sup>502</sup> so NATO can get more security for resources. Basically, it means that NATO has to set up a security partnership network and share capabilities such as “such as the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability based in Hungary.” To do so, not only can they save money, but also they can ensure their security. To get more security resources and to invest less in defense, NATO wants to share.

### **NATO-Russia Cooperation**

“NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.”<sup>503</sup> As seen that, Russia is a very important object of the 2010 Lisbon summit. NATO enlargement which includes new capabilities and new partnerships is critical for the NATO’s future development, according to the new strategic concept. NATO expresses its highly interest in developing a partnership with NATO despite the fact that they were enemy during the Cold War period. The establishment of a strategic partnership with Russia would help to reconstruct the NATO-Russia relations. The Cold War is over and new threats and new challenges exist. Both Russia and NATO are facing the same security problems. Therefore, they are determined to

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<sup>500</sup> “Building security in an age of austerity” - Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference.

<sup>501</sup> Secretary General’s Monthly Press Conference - 7 February 2011.

<sup>502</sup> “Building security in an age of austerity” - Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference.

<sup>503</sup> “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”.

1. Enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defense, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
2. Use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.<sup>504</sup>

The cooperation with Russia would redefine the position of NATO and its development in the future as an international safeguarding security. The cooperation can also ensure and provide useful solution of the security of both Russia and NATO's member nations.

On 26 January 2011, the 29 Chiefs of Defense of the NATO-Russia Council Military Representatives (NRC-MR) met in Brussels, and the Russian Parliament of the new START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation is ratified. The NRC-MR Work Plan for 2011 was approved during the meeting.

*This Work Plan builds on the success of the 2010 Work Plan, and seeks to deepen and broaden NATO-Russia military cooperation. The plan covers six agreed areas of cooperation, Logistics, Combating Terrorism, Search and Rescue at Sea, Counter Piracy and two new areas of cooperation, Theatre Missile Defense and Military Academic Exchanges.*<sup>505</sup>

### **NATO, China, and Russia**

Yet to make sure a stable NATO-Russia relationship, NATO needs to consider the Sino-Russian relationship. The Sino-Russian relationship has been long perceived as a "strategic partnership." It is viewed by the Washington as "an anti-American alliance in all but name."<sup>506</sup> Historically Russia allied with China, sharing the common goal against the American hegemony.

But, there are few things that cause the change of Russia's foreign policy:

First, China is considered as an emerging threat to Russia. The transformation of China from a backward country into influential global actor that also shifted the Russia from an "older brother" to an "equal partnership." This change created anxiety for Russia

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<sup>504</sup> "Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation".

<sup>505</sup> NATO-Russia Council Chiefs of Defence approve the Work Plan for 2011, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_70086.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70086.htm).

<sup>506</sup> Lo, Bobo, p.1, Axis of Convenience

and reinforced “a long time mutual ambivalence”. Russia has always wanted to maintain its first priority in Central Asia, and it is now afraid that China would take over its position. The Sino-Russian relationship is ambivalence.

Second, after NATO’s expanding to Northern and Eastern Europe, Russia senses the problem that NATO is coming into its front door.

In addition, after the president Dmitry Medvedev came to the power, the foreign policy of Russia has been changed. Medvedev is unlike Putin who has always opposed the NATO expansion. Medvedev appears to be a president who is friendlier to the US. So when the NATO suggests in the new strategic concept that NATO should cooperate with Russia for further expansion, Russia shows its interest.

Apparently, the NATO-Russia relationship is sound. But the cooperation still leaves much open for discussion.

1. What would China do to stop the NATO-Russia cooperation?
2. Would Russia risk its Sino-Russian relationship and give up its old ideology for allying with the West?

For China, the threat that NATO member states are becoming more global has already created an anxiety. If Russia joins the NATO, China would be the only global power that is left out by NATO. This is a direct threat to China, it means that NATO will deploy anti-missile system directly connected to the Chinese border.

After the Lisbon summit, Wen Jiabao, the Premier of PRC, visited Russia and Tajikistan. Although China claims that they are just routine diplomatic action, China's official Xinhua News Agency at the same time focuses on the Wen Jiabao's visit to Russia and Tajikistan, and promotes Sino-Russian relations by allotting a series of articles. In the discussion column, there is the so-called civil discussion that claims that China should attach importance to the NATO Russia relationship, especially in the anti-missile systems approach.

Although the Sino-Russian relationship is ambivalence, “For Moscow, partnership with Beijing is crucial to its ability to conduct an “independent” foreign policy and to secure Russia’s return as a global great power.”<sup>507</sup> Moreover, regarding of the relationship among Russia, China and the US,

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<sup>507</sup> Lo, Bobo. *Axis of Convenience*. p.47.

*Relations with a rising China served several purposes for Moscow in the triangular context. First, they offered the prospect of greater strategic flexibility by diluting its reliance on the United States. Second, rapprochement might persuade Washington to be more responsive to Russian interests. A “turn to the east” would stoke extant fears of “Russia going bad,” of becoming undemocratic and confrontational. Third, closer ties with a strong China could boost Russia’s chances of becoming a “bridge between civilizations” or “guarantor” of European security against a possible, if distant, threat from the East. Finally, the spectacle of Moscow and Beijing working toward a common purpose—the “multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order”—enhanced Russia’s credentials as an “indispensable” global power, without which no international issue could be resolved.*<sup>508</sup>

Apparently, the NATO-Russia relationship is sound. But the cooperation on the missile defence leaves much open for discussion: the sources of missile threats and how to deal with them. NATO proposes that both sides should build up an independent missile defense system while Russia suggested the missile defense systems should partly be consolidated. Additionally, China might try to interfere the NATO-Russia based on their “strategic partnership” and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

### **Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

NATO should take account of the membership of China and Russia in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) before cooperates with Russia. Although there are many uncertainty of the Sino-Russian relationship, the linkage between them should not be neglected

*The main goals of the SCO are strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order. Proceeding from the Spirit of Shanghai the SCO pursues its internal policy based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal rights, consultations,*

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<sup>508</sup> Lo, Bobo. Axis of Convenience. p.47.

*respect for the diversity of cultures and aspiration towards common development, its external policy is conducted in accordance with the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting anyone and openness.*<sup>509</sup>

Although China and Russia have different perception of the bilateral relationship, they still have to cooperate in the future based on the SCO principles which makes China a very important object of the NATO-Russia relationship. Considering of the external policy of SCO, “the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting anyone and openness,” the NATO-Russia Cooperation is against the principle because NATO is considered as an alignment. In addition, China’s own stand of nonalignment on security is also counter to NATO’s ideology of allying together. So the cooperation between Russia and NATO would not be easy without the cooperation of China. For China, NATO is a threat.

### **Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ)**

NATO also has a strong interest in the development and strengthening of the nuclear weapons free zones in the Far East. The most important of the thesis is the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ), which contains five members: Russia, the US, Britain, France and China have unresolved issues in regard to the functions of CANWFZ. The Mongolian nuclear weapons free zone has engaged Russia, China and the US on security issues in that region.

### **What Does China Think?**

On 22 November 2010, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (right) accepts an exclusive interview with Xinhua in the Belgian capital Brussels, at NATO headquarters. Rasmussen said that while NATO's new strategy does not explicitly mention China, but he is looking forward to strengthening relations with China.<sup>510</sup>

Although NATO has been willing to improve the relationship with China, there are a few reasons that China only maintained low-profile contact with NATO. According to Dr. Cui Hongjian, a Chinese scholar of international studies,

1. *It will take more time for China to make judgment on the nature and strategy of NATO in a “post-post-cold war period,” a “U.S.A-led aggressive military bloc” or a transforming security mechanism towards open and cooperative direction keeping up with the times. The manner and extend of China contacting with NATO is decided by this judgment.*

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<sup>509</sup> Brief introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, <http://www.sectsc.org/EN/brief.asp>.

<sup>510</sup> [http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-11/25/c\\_12814064.htm](http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-11/25/c_12814064.htm).

2. *China recognized that it is just because of “China’s growing international profile combined with NATO’s presence at China’s borders with Afghanistan and Central Asia,” NATO is ready to enhance the communications with China as a pressing need. This goodwill is a more pragmatic and tactical consideration than a strategic one.*
3. *To avoid stimulating Chinese people’s emotion, because the memory does not disappear as time goes by. A survey by a Chinese website shows, when Mr. Rasmussen appealed, at Munich Conference on Security Policy of this year, to China and some other countries for building a “Global Security Coalition” with more representativeness to resolve Afghan and other critical security problem, 72.5% of Chinese respondents think that China should “observe calmly and no reaction,” 14.0% think “ignore” is a right way and only 13.6% agree that “we should go with NATO.”<sup>511</sup>*

Although China seems to be passive about the NATO-China issues, China would be willing to develop a better relationship with NATO after the NATO-Russia partnership. China does not want to put itself in danger and out of NATO.

### **Proposal**

NATO should build up a better relationship with China because of its strong defense system, significant position in Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Six Party Talks. First, China has the strong defense system, and it is one of the most major nuclear powers. The title of “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” represents the general framework of the new NATO strategic concept. The member states would actively engage and cooperate with each other in order to ensure the security of the member nations, so there are three essential core tasks – collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Generally, the new strategic concept is more like a transparent action plan. Both partnership and enlargement is very significant for NATO. Leaving out China as a possible partner in the new strategic concept contradicts the idea of the new strategic concept of expanding its partnership and defending capability. Developing partnership with China can help with NATO’s anti-terrorist mission in Central Asia and enhance the security in Asia, and hence preventing security threats in the US and Europe from Asia.

Second, in order to ensure the cooperation with Russia regarding of SCO, NATO should build up a better relationship with China. Under the treaty of SCO, China and Russia should work together based on “the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting anyone and openness.” The membership of Russia in SCO may hinder the cooperation

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<sup>511</sup> NATO’s New Concept and Its Existence in Asia: Relevance for China.

between Russia and NATO. As an important member in SCO and strategic partner, China would not be happy to see the cooperation between Russia and NATO because it is too dangerous to China's security. Only if China become the partner of NATO, the cooperation between Russia and NATO would be more possible.

Third, being the most important partner of North Korea, China's significant role may help to alleviate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. North Korea as one of the major threats in Asia creates one of the major security problems for NATO; therefore NATO should cooperate with China in order to erase this security threat. In the Lisbon Statement, it mentions, "We are also deeply concerned by the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to comply." As we all know that the Chinese government is a very important object in the issue of North Korea. The North Korean government has always remained a good relationship with the Chinese government. The world has relied on the Chinese government to keep North Korea from doing anything harmful.

However, before cooperation with China, NATO has to narrow the political gap with China. According to Kissinger,

North Korea provides a good example of differences in perspective. America is focused on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China, which in the long run has more to fear from nuclear weapons there than we, in addition emphasizes propinquity. It is concerned about the turmoil that might follow if pressures on nonproliferation lead to the disintegration of the North Korean regime. America seeks a concrete solution to a specific problem. China views any such outcome as a midpoint in a series of interrelated challenges, with no finite end, about the future of Northeast Asia. For real progress, diplomacy with Korea needs a broader base.<sup>512</sup>

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, the new strategic concept and the recent Lisbon Statement, NATO does not mention about its relationship and any potential partnership with China but the NATO-Russia cooperation. Moreover, Afghanistan remains an important object of NATO and become the core issue of the 2011 Lisbon summit. The physical existence of NATO in Afghanistan since the anti-terrorist mission and the Afghan War has opened the door of Central Asia to NATO where Central Asia is in China's sphere of influence. Therefore, the involvement of NATO with Central Asia and Russia has actually created

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<sup>512</sup> Kissinger, A. Henry. *Avoiding a U.S.-China Cold War*.

an indirect engagement with China because of Central Asia and Russia's engagement in the SCO. Hence, in the new strategic concept, NATO failed to include the possible partnership with China. Based on NATO's interests in enlargement by developing new capabilities and partnership, NATO should develop partnership with China due to the China's important role as a strategic partner of Russia and North Korea and membership in SCO.



## Chapter 15

### The Future of NATO: Building Global Partnerships

Ken Li

#### *Introduction*

The NATO Alliance is not new to operating outside of Europe. In the recent years, NATO has extended its security efforts to maintain peace in Afghanistan, trained local security forces in Iraq, provided logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur, airlifted 3,500 tons of humanitarian aid to the earthquake epicenter of Kashmir, Pakistan and responded with medical relief to victims of natural disasters such as the tsunami in Indonesia and Hurricane Katrina in the United States.<sup>513</sup> NATO's expanded efforts are a result of new global politics that emerged after the Cold War. Nowadays, terrorists born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and professionally trained in Kandahar, Afghanistan can direct U.S. commercial airplanes into buildings in New York. Physical distance and national borders are no longer recognized as safety barriers to prevent an attack. Such alarming threats to the meaning of security push NATO missions to operate at the source of the threat rather than only committing to the role of collective defense. Establishing such a full functioning global security network would require a range of defensive measures; such as helicopters to deliver supplies to disaster zones and transportation of victims; increased participation of ground forces to maintain stability in peacekeeping missions, and experienced military officers to train local security forces.<sup>514</sup>

Additionally, adapting to a more globalized NATO effort does not come without great political and economic costs either. The tedious war in Iraq has U.S. military forces stretched thin. As U.S. defense spending continues to be focused in the efforts in the Middle East, the U.S. Department of Defense will be reluctant to mobilize any further military efforts to other foreign crises or approve missions that require heavy U.S. intervention that are not absolutely critical to the immediate U.S. national interests.

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<sup>513</sup> Daalder, I., and Goldgeier, J. "Global NATO."

<sup>514</sup> See "Reaching Out" section in Daalder, I., and Goldgeier, J. "Global NATO."

European states are also turning away from investing their own troops in missions far away from home. The current operations in Afghanistan led by the International Security Assistance Force, under the direction of NATO, is a clear example of the complex politics that are involved with determining the number of ground troops to be sent by each NATO member and appointing what type of dangerous mission each respective member states are responsible for. And, while the NATO Alliance finds great importance operating outside of Europe or the Trans-Atlantic region, requirements under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty continue to limit member states to be located only within the North American or European region.

It's very clear that NATO has evolved to meet the changing security demands over past the several decades. But has it really evolved enough to tackle the challenges of today's global threats? In order for the NATO Alliance to maintain collective security within the trans-Atlantic region, security efforts must also be directed toward extinguishing the spark before it sets fire. In other words, terrorist organizations like the Taliban or Al-Qaida located outside the NATO security network have, in the past, successfully organized and launched terror attacks within the security boundaries of the NATO member states because preemptive actions were not taken accordingly to prevent these attacks from occurring before they become a reality. The London suicide bombings in 2005, America embassy attack in Paris in 2001, and of course the attacks during September 11th in Washington D.C. and New York are only a few of multiple dozens of attacks since the start of 2000. These types of security breaches can be prevented if establishing better direct relations and non-NATO partnerships becomes one of NATO's top priorities. If the focus of the Alliance is no longer merely territorial defense in the Atlantic but rather aims to bring together countries with similar values and interests to create a global security network, then NATO will no longer need to be restricted to just a trans-Atlantic nature. Other democratic countries that share many common values and interests to those of NATO include Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Some countries like Australia have already contributed some 1000 troops in the South of Afghanistan engaged in combat missions to maintain security in that region<sup>515</sup>.

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<sup>515</sup> Tsuruoka, Michito. "The coming role of Asia: Asia, NATO and its partners: complicated relationships?"

And others like Japan, which recently announced greater economic assistance for Afghanistan, has also shown interest in missile defense and could contribute to the effort to protect the Alliance against proliferators<sup>516</sup>. However, a number of countries with questionable democracy and human rights, such as Belarus, are covered by the conditions under Article 10, while other reputable democracies like Australia and Japan are not.<sup>517</sup>

This paper argues the current nature of security threats and armed attacks in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has evolved greatly since the end of the Cold War. And, in order for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to maintain collective defense for its member states as well as preemptively eliminate threats outside their security network before they arise, NATO needs to extend its partnerships and establish better bi-lateral relations with non-NATO countries, especially with countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and other Asia Pacific nations. However, the current missions in Afghanistan, under the direction of NATO or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), have been a vital test for the Alliance's ability to operate against a security threat outside of their Euro-Atlantic region. The allocation of NATO assets and security forces under the conditions of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, collective defense, versus non-Article 5 operations, crisis response, has created enormous debate to which direction does the future of NATO defense strategies head toward. Moreover, despite many current non-NATO countries', like Australia and Japan, contributions to NATO-led missions in Afghanistan, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty still limits countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region to become full members and restricts them from be included into NATO's security network.

This paper will be constructed into three parts. The first part will examine the changes to NATO's defense strategies during and after the Cold War. The end of this section will provide us with a clear framework of the current NATO defense and security capabilities, and what are the necessary additions NATO needs to incorporate moving forward into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The second section will bring to our focus one of the most important debates regarding NATO's evolving purpose and future defense strategies, the distinction between Article 5 missions versus non-Article 5 missions, or missions geared

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<sup>516</sup> Goldgeier, James. "The Future of NATO."

<sup>517</sup> Daalder, I., and Goldgeier, J. "Global NATO."

toward collective defense versus missions of crisis response respectively. Our goal is to determine which definition of the Article 5 treaty best fits the goals and objectives outlined in the new 2010 Strategic Concept. And lastly, the final section will reevaluate the possible NATO enlargement limitations of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and then followed by recommendations that encompass all considerations and arguments made within this paper to identify the most ideal partnership strategy for the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

With the above mentioned, we now begin by analyzing the reasons for NATO's evolving purposing, starting with the events both during and post-Cold War period that transformed NATO's defense and security strategies to what they are today.

*Part One: Transformations During and After the Cold War*

The reason the United States fought two world wars and were so committed to resolving multiple political and military tensions in the duration of the Cold War is the very same reason why NATO exists today, to prevent any one single force from dominating the European continent. The aftermath of World War II brought many parts of Europe to shambles. With a rising Kremlin power to the east of Europe, the United States saw the importance of establishing a defensive security block in the west. Aside from forming a unified military defense for its member states, NATO also acted as a network of like-minded nations that collectively agreed on preventing the spread of communism by reaching out to countries that also sought peace and security in Europe. During the Cold War, the Alliance expanded from 12 to 16 members with Greece, Turkey, and West Germany joining in the 1950s and Spain in the 1982.<sup>518</sup>

During this period of time, the main objective of NATO was pretty clear; maintaining the peace and security in Europe. The first NATO Security General's, Lord Ismay, famous line describes the situation at the time quite well, "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."<sup>519</sup> NATO strategic policy was very unanimous during this time. Europeans states were far too battered to fight another war, which led to close partnership and reliance on the United States military and economic strength. However, NATO strategies shifted dramatically after the Cold War ended.

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<sup>518</sup> Daalder, I., and Goldgeier, J. "Global NATO."

<sup>519</sup> Reynolds, A. "The origins of the Cold War in Europe"

The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 reinforced the primary objective of NATO. The fall of the Berlin Wall unified Germany and opened the door to former members of the Soviet Union. On March 12, 1999 the Alliance grew to 19 members when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined as members. In addition, the result of NATO intervention in the Balkan Wars created an even larger network of collective defense by incorporating another seven eastern European countries in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009.<sup>520</sup> By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, one can arguably say NATO has accomplished its mission of defeating communism and maintaining peace throughout Europe. However, since the end of the Cold War, the allies not only retained the traditional purposes of the Washington treaty, but also have taken on additional roles outlined in the 1999 Strategic Concept, listed as face “fundamental security tasks.”<sup>521</sup>

- **Security:** To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.
- **Consultation:** To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty [the North Atlantic Treaty], as an essential transatlantic forum for allied consultation on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security , and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- **Deterrence and Defense:** To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Article 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.
- **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- **Partnership:** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing

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<sup>520</sup> Daalder, I., and Goldgeier, J. “Global NATO.”

<sup>521</sup> See “NATO’s purposes during the Cold War and after” section in Yost, David. “NATO’s evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept.”

transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the alliance.<sup>522</sup>

The “security” purpose, as defined above, is expected from the original of establishment of NATO, drafted in the Washington Treaty. The tasks “consultation” and “deterrence and defense” also reflect NATO’s responsibility for a collective defense and peaceful resolutions during the Cold War. The “crisis management” task, however, has constituted a significant departure from the Cold War assumptions as to NATO’s role. Although the 1991 strategic concept was written at the end of the post-Cold War era, the NATO Alliance declared that “none of its weapons will be used except in self-defense,” however, the allies did not foresee that in the next couple years NATO security forces would be engaged in what many considered non-Article 5 operations in the Balkans, especially NATO involvement in the 1999 Kosovo conflict.<sup>523</sup> Such operations of this nature have also been carried out in Afghanistan since 2003. These types of non-Article 5 operations take on a variety of names, including crisis management, crisis response, stabilization operations, and peace operations.<sup>524</sup>

Although, by almost any reasonable definition, the Balkans are “in Europe,” but for NATO to engage in military actions in both Bosnia and Kovoso, with no question violates Article 5’s “use of armed force” to “assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith” because former member states of the Warsaw Pact were not formally members of NATO at that time.<sup>525</sup> However, a counter argument can suggest that NATO actions had to be taken immediately in order to insure the stability in the Balkans and also prevent any possible future aggression between former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Regardless of the reasoning behind NATO involvement in the Balkans, NATO military force was exercised outside the conditions written under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. However, these types of operations, by all means, were not halted from NATO operations ten years later. As we will discuss later in the paper, operations in

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<sup>522</sup> North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 10, Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>523</sup> North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7-8 Nov. 1991, para. 35, Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm).

<sup>524</sup> Yost, David. “NATO’s evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept.”

<sup>525</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, para 5, Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm).

Afghanistan, Darfur conflict, and earthquake relief in Pakistan in 2005-2006 all were not motivated by geography but rather the in the nature of the threat of challenge.<sup>526</sup>

Looking back at NATO's strategic purposes during and after the Cold War, we find the Alliance's definition of security has shifted from a military force of collective defense, of which the security of member states a guaranteed through the commitment of Article 5, to incorporating non-Article 5 missions such as crisis management or crisis response. This new approach, which the allies have called "comprehensive approach," has involved in the increased activity of using NATO security forces to address a wider range of crisis management missions and including the partnerships of other international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the European Union, as well as wide spectrum of non-governmental organizations and partner countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.<sup>527</sup> The concept comprehensive approach has been promoted to a greater or lesser degree since the Riga NATO Summit in 2007.<sup>528</sup> There has been numerous debates to whether NATO should be involved with nonmilitary tasks or whether it should enlist the cooperation of other multi-lateral institutions or individual nations, but it is important for us to turn our attention to these critical debates, as the history of NATO's non-Article 5 operations can give us a potential lens of future NATO strategic policies. The following section will begin our analysis of Article 5 versus non-Article 5 missions and how each individual case supports or detracts from NATO's vision of maintaining long-term security and stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### *Part Two: Article-5 vs. Non-Article 5 Operations*

After the Cold War came to an end, NATO acquired three additional functions: (1) commitment towards preventing nuclear proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), (2) support EU-led crisis management operations, and (3) serve as a general "toolbox" for ad hoc security operations.<sup>529</sup> In addition, the Atlantic alliance gradually extended its partnership polices to former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region via the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

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<sup>526</sup> Comprehensive Political Guidance Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on November 29, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt.b061129e.htm>.

<sup>527</sup> See Yost, David. "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept." and Hunter, Robert. "NATO's Strategic Focus: Satisfying All of the Allies."

<sup>528</sup> Hunter, Robert. "NATO's Strategic Focus: Satisfying All of the Allies."

<sup>529</sup> Yost, David. "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept."

Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and other organizations in order to accomplish mutual political and security goals. The establishment of these various partnerships and bi-lateral agreements in relationship to NATO's newly added functions meant a greater support and reinforcement for NATO's future security agenda. In other words, by starting a dialogue with these Euro-Atlantic organizations, NATO was able to push its security and political agenda as well as develop critical relationships between many current non-NATO countries.

The three additional functions mentioned above reflect upon NATO's adjustments to the new changing security issues during the post-Cold War period. The Allies referred to WMD proliferation as a risk for "Alliance security interests" in the 1991 strategic Concept, and claimed in the 1999 Strategic Concept that "can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces."<sup>530</sup> Although these WMD proliferation threats were alarming for NATO's security agenda, the main institutional changes have only been the establishment of the WMD Centre and the committees at NATO Headquarters that serve to reduce WMD proliferation directly. But the Alliance has yet to coordinate their positions on nuclear non-proliferation with the United Nations (UN) or other non-proliferation committees<sup>531</sup>.

The latter two of NATO's post-Cold War functions arguably recognizes the Alliance's need to extend its security forces beyond the parameters of Article 5 in order to maintain their strong future security agenda. Since 2003, the allies have supported EU-led crisis management operations that were in accordance with the Berlin Plus cooperation agreements. Operation Concordia, an EU-led mission, sent approximately 350 military personnel from thirteen EU members and fourteen non-EU countries to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to participate in this operation.<sup>532</sup> Most importantly, NATO assets were deployed under the Berlin Plus arrangements to resolve conflicts between non-NATO member states, a clear non-Article 5 operation. Also in 2004, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina retained nearly 2,500 troops, part of which were provided by NATO assets, to reinforce the political presence of the EU in

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<sup>530</sup> North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7-8 Nov. 1991, para. 12 See also paras II and 49.

<sup>531</sup> Yost, David. "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept."

<sup>532</sup> Monaco, Annalisa. "Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock."

that region.<sup>533</sup> However, there still has been a number of operations outside of the Berlin Plus arrangements that fall under the non-Article 5 category such as NATO support of the African Union in Darfur in 2005-2007.<sup>534</sup>

The last one of the three new functions has incorporated an assortment of non-traditional security operations. The term “toolbox” suggests the use of the Alliances’ assets in ad hoc-like fashion. These services have ranged from providing security for the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 to transporting humanitarian relief to Pakistan and the US state of Louisiana following natural disasters. Also, more recent ad hoc counter piracy operations included operations off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden: Operation Allied Provider in October – December 2008, Operation Allied Protector in March – August 2009, and Operation Ocean Shield in August 2009.<sup>535</sup>

These types of counter-piracy operations have been pursued in support of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and in coordination with the support of European Union. David Yost argues the current Ocean Shield operation includes a “capacity building” dimension.<sup>536</sup> In other words, helping local governments build their own capacity and measures to counter against piracy will help benefit NATO’s security of that region as a whole. Recent capacity building strategies have been reinforced in many ad hoc operations, such that over the past few years, NATO has taken big steps in establishing relations with other multi-lateral organizations like the UN and EU.

As we can see, NATO assets and security forces have been deployed numerous times without strictly following the preconditions of an “armed attack” written under the Article 5 Treaty. So what about terrorism? Where do armed attacks from non-state actors fit into this complicated definition of collective defense versus crisis response? Collective defense and the conditions of Article 5 have often been bent and manipulated to meet the changing security demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. On September 11, 2001 the tables shifted in dramatic fashion when the terrorist attacks blind-sided the United States with organized attacks in New York and Washington. It was the first time in history for

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<sup>533</sup> Monaco, Annalisa. “Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock.”

<sup>534</sup> Yost, David. “NATO’s evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept.”

<sup>535</sup> Refer to the authors “toolbox” terminology written in Yost, David. “NATO’s evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept.”

<sup>536</sup> NATO, “Counter-piracy operations,” 22 Dec. 2009 available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D71E706D6CFC2B66/natolive/topics\\_48815.mth](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D71E706D6CFC2B66/natolive/topics_48815.mth).

members of NATO to officially invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. One of NATO's own member was attacked within its territorial boundaries by the means of an armed attack. Though the terrorist attacks by a non-state group was probably not what the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty had in mind as an "armed attack" in 1949, but an attack on one of its members, is an attack on all. And in 2003, NATO responded by taking over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in order bring stability to the Middle Eastern region and prevent the possibility of another future Article 5 attack on one of its own member states.

The year 2003 had many "firsts" for the Alliance. It was the first time in history Article 5 was put into action. And it was the Alliance's first time operating outside the Trans-Atlantic region. One can argue the new emerged threats of terrorism redefined the definition of security, and changed NATO's role in only operating towards a collective defense, whereas many current NATO operations can arguably take the role of crisis response or operating at the source of the threat. However, this very distinction between where to act and who to act upon has fostered many heated political tensions among existing NATO members. The next section explores the tensions that evolved out of operating between operations of collective defense and operations that allude to more of a crisis response approach. Also, we will look to last year's newly drafted 2010 Strategic Concept and how the changing definition of Article 5 operations affects NATO's future security strategies.

#### *Dichotomy between Collective Defense and Crisis Response Operations*

The lack of agreement on capabilities for collective or territorial defense, on one hand, and for crisis management or crisis response operations, on the other, has created two different perceptions and definitions toward NATO's current military operations. This type of dichotomy has been the source of increasing political tensions between observing NATO member states. For example, allied observers like Poland and the Baltic states have been critical towards the Alliance's operations in the recent years have focused too heavily on crisis response missions in Afghanistan, when they see Russia as a larger more existential threat than the Taleban or Al-Qaeda. At the same time, some allied observers in Italy, Spain, and other nations north of the Mediterranean have

suggested the advantages of expeditionary capabilities -- or crisis response missions -- could counter the possibility of asymmetric challenges in Africa or the Middle East.<sup>537</sup>

So why is there such a big debate to whether the Alliance's should focus primarily on expeditionary operations or sustaining the capabilities for a collective territorial defense? Well in actuality, NATO really needs both. In a recent report from Washington argues for this claim: "If NATO cannot protect, it cannot project".<sup>538</sup> During the Cold War, most of the allies were set on keeping the fight within Europe. And to a degree that was true. The conflicts of the Cold War never stretched past the European continent, but the Alliance has grown from 16 countries at the end of the Cold War to 28 nations today; and most importantly, some of these countries cannot defend itself from emerging 21<sup>st</sup> century threats unless their allies are prepared to project their own power. Simply, the NATO of today needs to invest more in expeditionary capacities not only for crisis response operations far away from the European community, but also for the collective defense itself.

In a speech given by the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said: "We must also realize that territorial defense very often starts far from our own borders, like in Afghanistan."<sup>539</sup> The Secretary General is implying that the numerous requirements needed to insure security on our home fronts, including strategic mobility, logistical assets, and command, control, and communications abilities, are often essential to the success of expeditionary operations far away from home. In other words, crisis response and collective defense capability requirements overlap to a considerable extent.

The 2010 Strategic Concept acknowledges NATO's role in expeditionary missions through the "crisis management" and "cooperative security" bullet points under their core tasks and principles. The new Strategic Concept claims that "NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage

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<sup>537</sup> Yost, David. "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept."

<sup>538</sup> Daniel Hamilton, with Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, and James Townsend, *Alliance reborn: an Atlantic compact for the 21 century* (Washington DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University; and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Feb. 2009). p.22.

<sup>539</sup> Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the "New challenges, better capabilities" conference, Bratislava, 22 Oct. 2009, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_58248.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm)

developing crises that have potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; and stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security”.<sup>540</sup> Also, NATO’s new strategy is not shy on operating in conflicts outside their territorial borders as listed under critical point number 20; “Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.”

The new crisis management implications in the new Strategic Concept reinforce many of NATO’s non-Article 5 expeditionary operations over the past two decades. Security through crisis management not only gives new meaning to a more globalized approach to resolving security conflicts, but also opens the door to other partnerships with relevant countries and international organizations such that NATO will “actively engage to enhance international security through partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations” as written under the “cooperative security” section in the new Strategic Concept. Security issues like preventing nuclear proliferation, identifying non-state terrorist organizations, and regulating cyber-attacks are no longer seen as a single nation’s responsibility. Instead, these emerging security threats capture the attention of the entire international community, as the decision-making and allocation of responsibility requires multiple international organizations like NATO, UN, and EU.

The remaining challenge for the Alliance is determine through experience the correct balance between the core function of collective defense and their numerous non-Article 5 operations. Although, it is clear that the conditions that provoke a NATO military response have not been entirely transparent, but Alliance’s operations in the Balkans and Middle East during the past twenty years and now with the written implications of the newly Strategic Concept show that maintaining the original core functions of collective defense also require incorporating expeditionary – or crisis response – operations in conflicts areas outside of the NATO borders.

On the other hand, the current financial and economic crisis has reminded us of the scarcity of military funds and limited security resources. In order for the allies to

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<sup>540</sup> See the “crisis management” and “cooperative security” bullet points in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Available at <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

accomplish their objectives in an effective manner, the pool of NATO assets cannot be used recklessly; and NATO's future role cannot be seen as a "global policeman," where obligations to resolve regional conflicts and tensions around the world falls into the hands of the allies. Future NATO operations must be prioritized, keeping in mind the core tasks and principles of the Washington Treaty. The following section will examine the allies' future capacity to tackle security crises like the one they are currently involved with in Afghanistan. Also, we look for alternative solutions that will benefit the Alliance's original goal of maintaining peace and security in Europe through developing better partnerships and future NATO membership enlargement policies.

*Part Three: Future NATO Enlargement*

During the summer of 2008, the events of the Georgia-Russia conflict reminded NATO and countries in Europe (or specifically Eurasia) that perhaps there still remains a dangling threat to the east. Russia saw its opportunity to "show-off" its muscles when the status and future of the Georgian region of South Ossetia came into conflict of interests between the two countries. Despite the provocative nature of the event, NATO allies were hesitant to engage in any military support for Georgia. But why should they? Georgia is not a full member of NATO and thus does not fall under the protection of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In contrast, however, Georgia is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and was previously encouraged by the United States to become a full member of NATO through the Membership Action Plan (along with Ukraine).<sup>541</sup> At the time, Georgia and Ukraine's possible membership plans had to be put aside because their inclusion would have resulted in the further alienation of Russia. And to this day, NATO still values Russia as an important role player in NATO's future strategy to build a connecting bridge across Eurasia, but Russian membership will only be offered under the Kremlin's agreement of the core NATO principles and values.

What does this Georgia-Russia conflict tell us? Would have the summer 2008 missile attacks on the Georgia-Russia border been preventable had Georgia and Ukraine signed as full members of the Alliance earlier that same year? This type of speculation is difficult to predict, however, it is for certain that developing better partnerships and direct relations with countries that support the core peace and security values of NATO, can

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<sup>541</sup> Hunter, Robert. "NATO's Strategic Focus: Satisfying All of the Allies."

only benefit the Alliance’s strategies down the road. Unfortunately, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty continues to limit the membership enrollment of nations outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Below, we will see why this is an issue for NATO’s ability to tackle the security challenges of today.

*Security outside the Euro-Atlantic region & Commitments in the Asia-Pacific*

In the previous sections, we’ve mentioned the precautionary steps NATO must consider prior to committing themselves in becoming a “global policeman,” intervening in all sorts of political conflicts and operations that require military intervention. This argument, indeed, does hold true if the necessary resources and personnel capabilities of pursuing these operations become limited. However, if NATO expeditionary operations were given additional support by countries or organizations that seek a similar goal, then the capacity for NATO to operate in distant regions around the world is no longer seen as heavy burden.

This was exactly the case for NATO operations in Afghanistan when non-NATO countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore contributed troops to the ISAF-led missions.<sup>542</sup> For others, like Japan and South Korea, who were making indirect contributions but were still very much in-support of the mission cause, are called “other partners across the globe.” New Zealand deployed troops to Afghanistan for the first time under the framework of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in close bilateral cooperation with the United States.<sup>543</sup> These additional partnerships have contributed a significant portion of military forces toward NATO-led missions. And, one could arguably say they played integral roles in the stabilizing peace in certain parts of Southern Afghanistan.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s current relationship with NATO have developed largely because of their troop contribution to the ISAF missions. Without their direct military involvement in the Middle East, there would be no NZ-NATO or Australia-NATO relations. The operational cooperation of NATO has enabled these countries to become active international contributors in that region. Moreover, their contributions has

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<sup>542</sup> Tsuruoka, Michito. “The coming role of Asia: Asia, NATO and its partners: complicated relationships?”

<sup>543</sup> See “NATO as means of cooperation with the US” section in Tsuruoka, Michito. “The coming role of Asia: Asia, NATO and its partners: complicated relationships?”

led to a more internationally recognized legitimacy, allowing the demand for more information-sharing, influences to policy-shaping, and eventual decision-making (see Tsuruoka). As an alternative point of view, the NATO Alliance also can request partnership countries to assist in tasks or objectives vital to NATO's future security missions. Although these partnership countries can refuse on the basis that they are not obliged to help NATO because they are not full members yet, however, once relations have been established, both NATO and partnership nations share a mutual agreement to deepen the relations, rather than break them apart.

Furthermore, the rise of China is shaping a new regional and global order. Beijing's political, economic and military buildup was widely perceived to significantly alter the balance of power – with serious consequences for the traditional US role as a “resident power” providing stability in the region with the greatest potential for great power conflict in the world.<sup>544</sup> Also, with the issue of cross-Straits relationship remains to be unresolved, and the potential for a North Korean nuclear threat (as we've seen from the shell bombings in just November of last year), East Asia seems to be slipping towards a much more unstable and dangerous balance of power system, involving the United States, Japan, China, Korea, as well as India and ASEAN countries.<sup>545</sup>

In the long term, the shift of balance of power in East Asia will directly affect European security and the responsibilities of the United States. Some authors have argued that the current politics of NATO's intervention in Afghanistan foretells the future of heavy U.S. involvement in foreign security operations.<sup>546</sup> It's no surprise that American troops and Marines have been invested at far greater amounts than that of their European allies. If this trend continues, U.S. forces will be stretched thin, limiting their future capacity to deal with other crises and threats around the globe. Thus, trans-Atlantic burden-sharing becomes one biggest issue for the future of balancing troop allocation in NATO operations. The uncertainty of China economic and military rise and North Korea's buildup of uranium only can mean less stability in East Asia. In order for the

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<sup>544</sup> Ikenberry, John. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1, Jan. – Feb. 2008.

<sup>545</sup> White, Hugh. “Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable.” *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 6, Dec. 2008 – Jan. 2009), p.85-104

<sup>546</sup> Frahling, Stephan & Schreer, Benjamin. “NATO's New Strategic Concept and US Commitments in the Asia-Pacific.” *The RUSI Journal*. Vol. 154, No. 5. Oct. 2009. p.98-103.

Alliance and the United States to “stay ahead of the race,” investing in better bi-lateral and direct partnerships with countries like Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea needs to be of critical priority. Otherwise the current nature of trans-Atlantic burden-sharing will only run the U.S. forces dry and leave a Europe defenseless against major future security threats.

For these reasons, contributions made from non-NATO countries that share similar values and principles to those of the Alliance are a critical addition to aiding NATO’s scarce resources and limited military personnel. However, for countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly other Asia-Pacific countries, their seat into NATO membership has been halted by the restrictions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Their admissions would require revision of Article 10 which would create huge opposition within Europe for the reason of global enlargement would essentially mean losing NATO’s trans-Atlantic focus.

So what options does the Atlantic alliance have in pursuing global issues far from the Euro-Atlantic region while simultaneously preserving their original principles of maintain peace and security in Europe? To what degree do these two responsibilities overlap? And what is at stake here? Charles A. Kupchan provides us with a valuable framework for considering the possible future direction for the allies. Although Kupchan’s article was written before last year’s new Strategic Concept, he argues that by keeping NATO resources in balance with its commitments, rather than tax the Alliance with responsibilities that risk compromising its credibility and coherence, NATO’s future functionality will be much more effective and coherent to its founding principles and values.<sup>547</sup> Or simply, NATO should continue to anchor the west while making good on their assurance and commitment to collective defense, particular countries in Central Europe. Also, since engaging in operations that would characterize NATO as a global alliance would mean stretching it past the breaking point, intervening in conflicts around the world should be engaged, but with “due modesty” (See Kupchan).

NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan has had its “ups and downs.” Operations in Afghanistan have shown the allies’ ability to invoke Article 5 and come to consensus on

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<sup>547</sup> Statement by Charles A. Kupchan during the NATO: A Strategic Concept for Transatlantic Security: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 111 Congress, first session, October 22, 2009. *United States G.P.O.* 2010.

responding to an armed attack on one of its own members. Thus, over 35,000 non-American troops from 41 different countries and multi-lateral organizations were sent to restore order in that region of the world (Kupchan). However, such operations also created great imbalance of military responsibility where the Americans, Canadians, British, Danes, Dutch, and Romanians have taken more demanding missions. Therefore, the seeking to globalize NATO would “saddle it with unsustainable burdens and insurmountable political divides,” similar to the ones we’ve seen in Afghanistan.<sup>548</sup>

#### *Recommendations*

Taking into consideration the preceding arguments and analysis of past NATO operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Africa, the Middle East, and other various regions of the world, the following recommendations suggest the most ideal NATO enlargement strategy that supports future NATO expeditionary missions or crisis response operations far from the Euro-Atlantic region, while, at the same time, preserving the coherence and effectiveness of maintaining peace and security throughout Europe and the West.

#### *Collective Defense:*

Through the Cold War and beyond, collective defense has proven the security and stability of European countries and opened the doors to numerous nations in the Balkans and former Warsaw Pact members. In order for NATO to function effectively as the world’s most powerful and versatile military alliance, collective defense must remain at the core principles of future NATO strategies.

#### *Continue Dialogue with Russia:*

The Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008 reminded the West of another possible military threat in Europe. However, of the course of the last couple years, the remilitarization of NATO forces at the eastern front would be both unnecessary and irrelevant due to the extremely low probability of an overt Russian aggression against any official NATO member or their respective territory. Looking ahead, NATO should pay closer attention to unconventional threats that emerged out of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, including cyber-attacks, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. Russia-NATO relationship is

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<sup>548</sup> See Global NATO section in Statement by Charles A. Kupchan during the NATO: A Strategic Concept for Transatlantic Security: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 111 Congress, first session, October 22, 2009. *United States G.P.O.* 2010.

important to building a bridge that connects the west to Eurasia and helps maintain the possibility of future security threat breaches.

*Security Beyond Europe, but with Due Caution:*

Many of the most crucial international tensions and conflicts arise from regions outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In order for the NATO Alliance to intervene between all of them would require an extensive financial budget and accumulation of resources that no current multi-lateral organization has. Thus, exercising NATO expeditionary operations far from home must consider all forms of costs and consequences prior allocating scarce resources. Lessons from Afghanistan have shown the limitations of the allies' ability to come to a consensus without clashing political interests. NATO cannot play the role of a "global policeman" in future operations.

*Developing Better Bi-Lateral Relations and Partnerships is First Priority:*

The establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) , Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs), and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – for Ukraine and Georgia – is a positive step forward for fostering better relations with these non-NATO countries, however, there is not enough current dialogue between nations located in the Asia-Pacific and NATO. NATO should start developing deeper relations with countries that value similar core principles of security and peace like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. These non-NATO countries can contribute – and have previously contributed to a great degree – to the future effectiveness of NATO operations far away from Europe.

*Revisions to the Definition of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty:*

The current Article 10 Treaty greatly restricts NATO membership to countries within Europe. However, by extending the Alliance's membership criteria to nations have share common values and interests rather than strict territorial dimensions can be beneficial to a more global approach. It is important to note, here, that revisions to Article 10 do not equal opening doors to anyone that share the Alliance's common interest, but rather begin seeking alternative methods to include countries that have relevant objectives to offer, without changing NATO's original purpose of security in Europe.



## Conclusion

Ryan Braun

NATO has been an organization dedicated to protecting democratic values for over 60 years. Its unique position as a values-based military alliance makes it a critical institution that must be preserved as a part of America's foreign security policy. With the reforms and changes advised here it can continue to do so for many to come.

The world has clearly changed since NATO's inception. The threat that states pose to international security has been significantly diminished – it is unlikely that the United States or NATO will find itself embroiled in a large scale conflict in the future. In a recent speech to West Point cadets, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that, “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the President to again send a big land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”<sup>549</sup> Land battles are no longer a viable strategy for the United States.

In order to maintain its value as an institution, NATO must make a similar shift away from large-scale land battles. As sovereign states become less important in the global framework, NATO has an opportunity to redirect its resources towards the emerging security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Terrorism has emerged as a major problem, and cyber security is starting to rise as well. NATO's multilateral setup makes it ideal for tackling the transnational issues endogenous to the globe's new framework.

NATO must shift away from a focus upon collective defense, and place additional efforts into crisis management and collective security. The on-going actions in the Balkans and Afghanistan prove that NATO has the means to do this. However there are still challenges to be overcome in making NATO effective in this objectives shift.

In order to meet these challenges, NATO should begin a process of centralization, to prepare for taking more responsibilities onto its shoulders and off of the nation-states who make up its membership. One of the first and comparatively simplest tasks that need

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<sup>549</sup><http://www.dennismansfield.com/business/2011/02/sec-robert-gates-address-to-west-point-today-february-25th-2011.html>.

to be done is creating a unified intelligence agency in Brussels. Thank to the existence already of a military intelligence sharing group this will not be entirely new territory to cross. But upon the heels of this change further centralizations are necessary to allow for the shift that needs to occur. PMCs are a new player in combat operations, and at present they lack international supervision. NATO is well placed to serve as the regulatory body for these companies, as its member states are already amongst the top military spenders in the world. But to be able to perform this regulatory role there needs to be a central authority in NATO, one which can make decisions which are binding throughout the organization. This new authority, on top of the experience of intelligence sharing from the new NATO agency, would also make it simpler to facilitate technology sharing between the United States and the other NATO members.

NATO must be able to adapt to changing circumstances. NATO can no longer slowly deliberate about events, as new technologies allow for sudden and vast shifts. The events in Libya show the current ineffectiveness within the organization. Even though the most powerful countries within the Alliance want to stop the violence Gaddafi is perpetrating against his own people in his desire to remain in power nothing is being done. It took a week for the UN Security Council to undertake simple sanctions. An empowered North Atlantic Council would be able to take action to protect the civilians who want a right to determine their own affairs.

NATO must also look abroad, and focus more upon its relations with other nations. Russia and its missile stockpile is still an issue, as are its growing control of energy to Europe. There are also the more distant Asia-Pacific democracies which are now rising in importance, and who can assist in providing world security. And while Russia is no longer the main competitor, the rise of China requires greater analysis.

The recent events in the Arab world demonstrate the swiftness with which the world can now change thanks to the advances of the information age. NATO must be able to respond to these events with the same swiftness, a unified response early in the timeline of the crisis. It cannot dither and debate to achieve consensus as the Security Council does. In the course of three months the entire Middle East has been thrown upside down, and yet there still isn't a unified policy between the US and its NATO allies. Even though there have been three months, which is still a very brief period of

time in international politics where treaties can take years, the different national governments have failed. NATO has the capability, and must create the will to form an organization that can act as the world policeman. By acting decisively and carefully to uphold the global order, it can protect the American values which are at the core of its being, and provide a point of stability to an increasingly tumultuous changing world.



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