?Copyright 2013 Prem Pahlajrai Ni?cald?s and his V?ttiprabh?kar: Advaita Ved?nta in the Vernacular Prem Pahlajrai A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2013 Reading Committee: Collett D. Cox, Chair Heidi R. M. Pauwels Richard G. Salomon Michael C. Shapiro Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Department of Asian Languages and Literature University of Washington Abstract Ni?cald?s and his V?ttiprabh?kar: Advaita Ved?nta in the Vernacular Prem Pahlajrai Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Collett D. Cox Asian Languages and Literature This dissertation is a study of Sw?m? Ni?cald?s (1791-1863 CE), a highly regarded Advaita Ved?ntin and D?d?panth?, who lived in what is now the state of Haryana in Northern India. Ni?cald?s is best known for his Vic?rs?gar and V?ttiprabh?kar, both written in Hindi. The dissertation examines Ni?cald?s?s motivations for writing in the vernacular, as opposed to Sanskrit, with which he was also well-versed, by presenting his life and works, particularly the V?ttiprabh?kar. In the process, the influence on Ni?cald?s?s stance on caste and religion of D?d? Day?l and his sect and possibly also of Ni?cald?s?s patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd?, as well as that of classical Ved?nta as presented in the works of ?a?kar?c?rya and others in the Advaita tradition, is explored. The latter half of this dissertation then presents an in-depth reading of his V?ttiprabh?kar in order to thoroughly understand Ni?cald?s's standpoint on the inter-related issues of caste, soteriology, philosophy, scripture, tradition and theology. There, Ni?cald?s uses the key Advaita concept of v?tti or ?mental modification by which cognition occurs? as a novel structuring device to present a wide-ranging survey of prevailing Ved?nta thought. In the process of answering three questions, namely, 1) ?what is a v?tti,? 2) ?what is the cause of a v?tti,? and 3) ?what is the purpose of a v?tti,? he presents his perspectives on the central issues of Advaita pertaining to the means of cognition (pram??a), the nature of valid (pram?) and indirect, erroneous cognitions (apram?), superimposition (adhy?sa) as the means of erroneous cognition, the nature of ignorance (avidy?), reality (satt?) vs. illusoriness (mithy?tva), and the means for, and the nature of, the cessation of ignorance (kalpita-niv?tti). Ni?cald?s?s presentation of differences in the standpoints of past Advaitins and his proposed reconciliations, his stance on the diversity of doctrinal interpretations, his relation to the Ved?nta literature and tradition, his acceptance of the theory that perception is creation (d???i-s???i-v?da), and his position on reason versus revelation are explored. These issues provide us with a deeper insight into Ni?cald?s?s understanding of Advaita Ved?nta and the influence it had on his radical choice to compose his works in the vernacular instead of Sanskrit. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ i LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. vii LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................... ix DEVAN?GAR? TRANSLITERATION ................................................................................... xi PREFACE ................................................................................................................................ xii 1 Introduction .........................................................................................................................1 2 Ni?cald?s?s Life and Patronage ............................................................................................9 2.1 Biographical Sources ..............................................................................................9 2.2 Early Life.............................................................................................................. 13 2.3 Advanced Studies ................................................................................................. 14 2.4 Post-Benares ......................................................................................................... 17 2.5 Patronage .............................................................................................................. 18 2.6 Death .................................................................................................................... 19 2.7 Successors in the Lineage ..................................................................................... 19 2.8 Works Written by Ni?cald?s.................................................................................. 22 2.9 Other Unpublished Works: .................................................................................... 24 2.10 Influence of Ni?cald?s and His Works ................................................................... 25 2.11 More on Ni?cald?s?s Patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd? ......................................... 28 2.12 Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 34 3 The D?d? Panth and Ni?cald?s ........................................................................................... 37 3.1 D?d? Day?l, the Founder of the D?d? Panth.......................................................... 37 3.2 D?d??s Patrons ...................................................................................................... 41 3.3 Hagiographic Tropes in D?d??s Life ..................................................................... 43 3.4 The D?d? V??? on Religion and Caste .................................................................. 45 3.4.1 D?d??s Familiarity with Islam .................................................................. 46 3.4.2 D?d? on Hindus and Muslims .................................................................. 49 3.4.3 D?d? on Caste (J?ti) ................................................................................ 53 3.5 D?d??s Disciples Rajjab and Sundard?s and Their Views ...................................... 55 3.6 An Evaluation of the Views of D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s on Religion and Caste ............................................................................................................................. 61 i 3.7 Comparisons Between the Hagiographies of D?d? and Ni?cald?s .......................... 63 3.8 Ni?cald?s within the D?d? Panth ........................................................................... 66 3.9 Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 73 4 Ni?cald?s and the Vernacular ............................................................................................. 76 4.1 Why Did Ni?cald?s Write in the Vernacular? ........................................................ 76 4.2 Ni?cald?s vis-?-vis Pollock?s Theories of Vernacularization .................................. 84 4.3 Ni?cald?s on Caste (J?ti) ....................................................................................... 91 4.4 More on ?a?kara and Caste: The Case of the Man???-pa?cakam ........................... 95 4.5 Caste in the Mah?bh?rata .................................................................................... 102 4.6 Ni?cald?s?s Stance on Caste Compared to the D?d? Panth .................................. 109 4.7 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 110 5 On V?tti and the Means of Cognition ................................................................................ 113 5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 113 5.1.1 The Internal Structure of the VP ............................................................. 114 5.1.2 The Structure of the Rendering of VP in This Dissertation ..................... 116 5.1.3 The Layout of the Remainder of Chapter 5 ............................................. 118 5.2 What is a V?tti? ................................................................................................... 119 5.3 Types of V?tti-cognition (V?tti-j??na) ................................................................. 121 5.4 The Means of Valid Cognition (Pram??a) in Advaita ......................................... 123 5.4.1 Perception (Pratyak?a) ........................................................................... 124 5.4.2 Inference (Anum?na).............................................................................. 127 5.4.3 Verbal Testimony (?abda) ..................................................................... 130 5.4.4 Analogy (Upam?na) .............................................................................. 138 5.4.5 Postulation (Arth?patti) .......................................................................... 140 5.4.6 Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi) ................................................................ 143 5.5 Causes of a V?tti ................................................................................................. 148 5.6 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 155 6 Superimposition (Adhy?sa) and Theories of Error (Khy?ti-v?da) ..................................... 161 6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 161 6.2 Superimposition (Adhy?sa) ................................................................................. 162 6.3 Theories of Error, Khy?ti-v?da ............................................................................ 168 6.3.1 Anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da, The Advaita Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Logically Indeterminate ..................................... 168 6.3.2 Sat-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Real .................................................................................................... 179 ii 6.3.3 Asat-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Unreal .................................................................................................... 181 6.3.4 ?tma-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is a Mental State Projected by the Self .......................................................... 184 6.3.5 Anyath?-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Real, but is Present Elsewhere ................................................................ 190 6.3.6 Akhy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Erroneous Cognition is the Failure to Distinguish between the Real Recollection and Real Substratum ............ 210 6.4 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 222 7 Validity (Pram?tva), Ignorance (Aj??na), J?va and ??vara ................................................ 225 7.1 Validity (Pram?tva) and Invalidity (Apram?tva) ................................................. 226 7.1.1 The Ny?ya Theory of Extrinsic (Parata?) Validity and Invalidity .......... 226 7.1.2 Other Non-Advaita Views on Validity ................................................... 229 7.1.3 The Advaita Theory of Intrinsic Validity (Svata?-pr?m??ya-v?da) ........ 230 7.2 The Removal of the Shortcoming Raised During the Akhy?ti Treatment ............. 232 7.3 The Nature of Ignorance ..................................................................................... 233 7.4 The Nature of J?va and ??vara ............................................................................. 237 7.4.1 Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) .............................. 239 7.4.2 The Vivara?a Theory of Reflection (Bimba-pratibimba-v?da) of Prak???tman ........................................................................................... 247 7.4.3 The Theory of Delimitation (Avaccheda-v?da)....................................... 249 7.4.4 The Theory of There Being Only One J?va (Eka-j?va-v?da, D???i-s???i- v?da)...................................................................................................... 252 7.4.5 The Theory of Reflection (Bimba-pratibimba-v?da) Compared to the Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) .................................................... 256 7.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 259 8 Ignorance (Aj??na) Revisited, Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) & Reality (Satt?) ......................... 263 8.1 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) in the Empirical Sphere................................................................................................................. 264 8.1.1 The Cause of Superimposition: Primordial Ignorance v. Secondary Ignorance ............................................................................................... 264 8.1.2 The Difference between Primordial and Secondary Ignorance ................ 266 8.1.3 The Nature of the Cessation of Empirical Superimposition .................... 267 8.1.4 Cessation of Superimpositions through Opposing Cognitions ................. 269 8.1.5 Refutation of Secondary Ignorance as the Material Cause of Reflection-superimposition .................................................................... 272 iii 8.2 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) in Dreams ...... 278 8.2.1 The Substratum of the Dream State ........................................................ 279 8.2.2 The Immediacy of the Dream Superimposition ...................................... 283 8.2.3 A Digression Unrelated to Dream State: The Perception of Space via V?tti285 8.2.4 The Self-immediacy of Dreams Confirmed by Scripture ........................ 286 8.3 Reality (Satt?) and Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) ........................................................ 288 8.3.1 The Theories of D???i-s???i (Perception is Creation) and S???i-d???i (Creation Precedes Perception) .............................................................. 288 8.3.2 The Illusoriness of the Unreal Creation .................................................. 289 8.3.3 Five Repudiations of the Reality of the Visible World (Prapa?ca) ......... 294 8.4 Utility of Acts (Karma) in Effecting Knowledge (J??na) .................................... 297 8.5 Utility of Renunciation (Sanny?sa) in Effecting Knowledge (J??na) .................. 302 8.5.1 Eligibility for Renunciation .................................................................... 304 8.6 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 305 9 Brahman-realization Through V?tti................................................................................... 312 9.1 The Removal of Ignorance by Brahman-realization (Tattva-j??na) ..................... 313 9.1.1 Traces of Ignorance (Avidy?-le?a) .......................................................... 314 9.1.2 Means (Kara?a) and Accessories (Sahak?r? s?dhana) for Brahman- realization .............................................................................................. 317 9.1.3 The Immediacy (Aparok?at?) of Knowledge and Its Object ................... 320 9.1.4 Understanding the Immediacy of the Knowledge of Brahman ................ 323 9.2 The Purpose of a V?tti ......................................................................................... 330 9.3 Cessation of the Conceived ................................................................................. 337 9.3.1 ?nandabodha?s View of the Cessation of the Conceived ........................ 337 9.3.2 Ni?cald?s Refutation of ?nandabodha .................................................... 341 9.4 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................... 347 10 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 353 10.1 Patronage ............................................................................................................ 353 10.2 Influence of the D?d? Panth ................................................................................ 355 10.3 Motives for Writing in the Vernacular ................................................................. 357 10.3.1 Ved?nta and Caste ................................................................................. 358 10.3.2 Ni?cald?s?s Position on Caste ................................................................. 360 10.4 Influence of Ni?cald?s?s Works ........................................................................... 361 iv 10.5 The VP, Illuminator of V?ttis ............................................................................... 362 10.5.1 The Six Means of Cognition................................................................... 363 10.5.2 The Cause and Types of V?ttis ............................................................... 366 10.5.3 Superimposition and Theories of Error ................................................... 367 10.5.4 Validity (Pram?tva) ............................................................................... 369 10.5.5 Ignorance ............................................................................................... 370 10.5.6 The Relation between J?va and ??vara .................................................... 371 10.5.7 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) .......... 371 10.5.8 The Cause of Dreams ............................................................................. 372 10.5.9 D???i-s???i-v?da (DSV), the Theory that Perception Precedes Creation ... 373 10.5.10 Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) ......................................................................... 374 10.5.11 Action (Karma) and Renunciation (Sanny?sa) ........................................ 375 10.5.12 The Cessation of Ignorance .................................................................... 376 10.5.13 The Use and Result of a V?tti ................................................................. 379 10.5.14 The Cessation of the Conceived (Kalpita k? Niv?tti) ............................... 380 10.6 The Completeness of the VP ............................................................................... 381 10.7 Resolution of Differences in Positions ................................................................ 382 10.7.1 The Prau?hi-v?da Strategy of Reconciling Conflicting Views ............... 389 10.8 Diversity of Doctrinal Interpretations .................................................................. 391 10.9 Ni?cald?s and D???i-s???i-v?da ............................................................................ 395 10.10 Reason versus Revelation.................................................................................... 397 10.10.1 Some Puzzling Exclusions ..................................................................... 402 10.11 Philosophy versus Theology ............................................................................... 403 10.12 A Final Summation ............................................................................................. 406 10.13 Future Directions ................................................................................................ 407 Appendix 1: Works and Authors Cited in VP .......................................................................... 409 A1.1 Works Cited by Name ......................................................................................... 409 A1.2 Authors Cited by Name ....................................................................................... 411 Appendix 2: Source Text Excerpts and Translation ................................................................. 413 A2.1 Some General Observations on the Different Versions ........................................ 413 A2.2 Manuscript Text .................................................................................................. 414 A2.3 KS Text .............................................................................................................. 415 A2.4 ?tm?nand Muni Text .......................................................................................... 416 A2.5 Literal Translation (of Manuscript Version) ........................................................ 418 v Appendix 3: Reproductions of Select Pages of the VP from the Versions Consulted ................ 421 Glossary .................................................................................................................................. 431 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 441 Index ....................................................................................................................................... 481 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Stemmatic Relationship of Sources for Ni?cald?s?s Biography ................................. 11 Figure 2: Ass? Gh?? in Benares (Sundard?s 1978, 55) ................................................................ 14 Figure 3: Representation of Ni?cald?s ....................................................................................... 16 Figure 4: R?m?nand and His Family, ca. 1950 .......................................................................... 21 Figure 5: Mrs. R?m?nand, 2008 ................................................................................................ 21 Figure 6: Sam?dhis of Ni?cald?s, Day?r?m and Man?r?m .......................................................... 21 Figure 7: R?j? R?msi?ha (Bautze 1985, 95) ............................................................................. 29 Figure 8: Types of v?tti-cognition (preliminary) ...................................................................... 122 Figure 9: Types of v?tti-cognition ............................................................................................ 154 Figure 10: Types of Superimposition ....................................................................................... 163 Figure 11: The opening page of the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 1.0). .... 422 Figure 12: The colophon to the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). ........ 423 Figure 13: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.2), (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.27-8). .................. 424 Figure 14: An example of the errors found in the KS edition, VP 8.57, 384. ............................ 425 Figure 15: An example of the errors found in the KS edition, VP 8.123-5, 418. ....................... 426 Figure 16: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.3), pt. 1 (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 411). ............................................................................................................................................... 427 Figure 17: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.3), pt. 2 (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 412). ............................................................................................................................................... 428 Figure 18: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.4), pt. 1 (Ni?cald?s 1957, 576-7). ................ 429 Figure 19: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.4), pt. 2 (Ni?cald?s 1969, 500-1). ................ 430 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Comparison of the hagiographies of D?d? Day?l and Ni?caldas ................................... 63 Table 2: Vernacularization vs. Independent Advaita Literature .................................................. 85 Table 3: Types of vy?v?tti, differentiation ................................................................................ 343 viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AiU Aitareya Upani?ad a.k.a. also known as AV Atharva Veda BhG Bhagavad G?t? Bh Bh??ya, commentary BHSD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Edgerton (1953) BS Brahma-s?tra BU B?had?ra?yaka Upani?ad c. century ca. circa, around ch., chs. chapter, chapters comm. commentary CU Ch?ndogya Upani?ad DJL Jangop?l?s D?d? Janma L?l? DJV dharmi-j??na-v?da, -v?d?, substantive cognition, a proponent thereof DSV d???i-s???i-v?da, the doctrine that perception is creation. DV D?d? V???, Callewaert ed. (1991). DVN D?d? V???, N?r?ya?d?s ed. (2004). ed. edition EIP Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (1981, 1995) fl. flourished Gau. Dh. S? Gautama Dharma S?tras H Hindi intro. introductory KCNB Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya KeU Kena Upani?ad KS Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s lit. literally M?U M????kya Upani?ad M?K? M????kya K?rik? MBh Mah?bh?rata MP Man???-pa?cakam, by ?a?kara MuU Mu??aka Upani?ad MW Monier-Williams? Sanskrit-English Dictionary (1899) n. (foot)note Nai? Nai?karmya-siddhi of Sure?vara N?UTU N?si?ha-uttara-t?pan?ya-upani?ad ix PPV Pa?cap?dik?-vivara?a of Prak???tman Pt. Pa??it r. reigned Raj. Rajasthan RH?K R?jasth?n? Hind? ?abda Ko?a (S?kariy? and S?kariy? 1977-84). RV ?g Veda SAR Sarv??g? of Rajjab, Callewaert ed. (1978) ?Bh ?a?kara-bh??ya, commentary by ?a?kara ?DV ?a?kara-dig-vijaya Skt. Sanskrit SLS Siddh?nta-le?a-sa?graha of Appayya D?k?ita S? Sa?k?epa-??r?raka of Sarvaj??tman s.v. sub verbo/voce, under the word/entry SV S?ma Veda ?vetU ?vet??vatara Upani?ad TS Tarka Sa?graha of Annambha??a (1963) TU Taittir?ya Upani?ad v., vv. verse, verses var. variant V?. Dh. S? V??i??ha Dharma S?tras VP n.x, m V?ttiprabh?kar, ch. n, section x, p. m (Ni?cald?s 1899) VS n.x, m Vic?rs?gar, ch. n, section x, p. m (Ni?cald?s 1917b) vv. verses YajV Yajur Veda YP Yuktiprak?? (Ni?cald?s 1914) YogV? Yoga V??i??ha x DEVAN?GAR? TRANSLITERATION ? a ? / ? ka ? pa ? ? ? / ? kha ? / ? pha / fa ? i ? / ? ga / ga ? ba ? ? ? gha ? bha ? u ? ?a ? ma ? ? ? ? ? ca ? ya ? ? ? cha ? ra ? e ? / ? ja / za ? la ? ai ? jha ? va ? o ? ?a ? ?a ? au ? ?a ? ?a ? sa ? ?ha ? ha ? / ? ?a / ?a ? / ? ?ha / ?ha ? ?a ? ?a ? ?(anusv?ra) ? 1 ? ta ? ?(candra-bind?) ? 1 ? tha ?? (visarga) ? ? da ? dha ? na 1. In stand-alone words or citations of prose passages, if the anusv?ra or candra-bind? is followed by a consonant, it is replaced by the homorganic class nasal for better readability. Thus, ?????? is rendered as s??khya, ???? as p??c, ???? ?as parantu, but ??????? as sa?sk?ra, ?? as hai?, ??? ?as tah??. For verse citations, the anusv?ra or candra-bind? is preserved as ?. 2. The inherent ?a? sound is preserved in transliteration of verse, but is dropped otherwise for transliterations of Hindi or Marathi prose, unless occurring in an unfamiliar word whose spelling might otherwise be uncertain, for example, Kad unk??, apne j?vank?l me??. However, if the stand-alone word denotes a term that occurs unchanged in meaning from the Sanskrit context, the inherent ?a? is preserved, for example, nirvikalpa sam?dhi, j??nagu??. 3. Where a source uses ja but intends za, I have transcribed as za. I do not take any liberties with kha vs. ?a, those are reproduced faithfully. xi PREFACE Some conventions followed throughout this dissertation: 1. Common Sanskrit/Hindi terms are not italicized: Brahman, ??vara, karma, guru 2. Common geographical names are not transliterated: Delhi, Rajasthan. Unfamiliar or less well-known places are transliterated: B?nd?, Ko??, Kiha?aul?. 3. Non-English terms when used are italicized, followed by the English translation in parentheses if used infrequently, for example, ?D?d? is described as a nadd?f (cotton carder) who ??. When the term occurs frequently, only the first instance is accompanied by the translation. 4. In matters of style and formatting, The Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS)1 has been followed. For example, plurals of non-English terms follow CMOS 7.12: ??stras, D?d?panth?s; possessives of names ending in ?s? follow CMOS 7.18: Ni?cald?s?s followers; abbreviated text names are italicized, per CMOS 15.8: VS. 5. All dates to be understood as Christian Era (CE), unless indicated otherwise. Dates originally given according to the Vikram Sa?vat calendar have been converted to CE equivalents by the simplified process of subtracting 57, with the acceptance that this can lead to the CE year being a year earlier for the last two and a half lunar months of the sa?vat. 6. ?Brahman? with an upper-case ?B? denotes the advaita brahman, ?the undifferentiated ground of all being,? whereas ?brahman? with a lower-case ?b? denotes the br?hma?a (H. br?hman) priestly caste. (According to Fowler?s (1996, 115, s.v.), the alternate spelling brahmin is reserved for ?highly cultured or intellectually aloof person[s]? such as originally from New England). By analogy, members of the other three castes are also referred to in unitalicized lower-case, as k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras. 7. Certain Sanskrit words will be used without translation: Brahman, ?tm?, ??vara, j?va, m?y?, karma, v?tti, up?dhi. These words are either complex concepts that defy satisfactory single- word equivalents and/or their conventional translations are opaque and not necessarily an improvement. Brahman can be rendered as ?the indivisible ground of all being,? among other things. ?tm? is usually rendered as ?self,? ??vara as ?creator,? j?va as ?individual? or ?living being,? m?y? as ?creative power, illusion,? karma as ?action,? v?tti as ?mental modification,? and up?dhi as ?limiting adjunct.? To avoid procrustean assignment of meaning to other key Sanskrit terms, while the English translations are provided in parentheses following the Sanskrit for the first few uses in a section, I revert to using the Sanskrit term subsequently. A Glossary of key terms has been provided. 1 The Chicago Manual of Style. 2003. 15th ed. University of Chicago Press xii 8. The terms Advaita and Ved?nta are often used independently, and both, in that case, are references to Advaita Ved?nta, and Advaitin and Ved?ntin, to the subscribers of the school of thought of non-dual Ved?nta, of which ?a?kara was one of the earliest proponents. When other schools of Ved?nta are referred to, they are qualified references, for example, Vi?i???dvaita, Dvaita, etc. 9. Any translations provided, unless stated otherwise, are my own. xiii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many to whom I owe my gratitude in completing this dissertation: Sv?m? Day?nanda Sarasvat?, ?r?a Vidy? P??ham, Rishikesh, for first suggesting I consider the VP as a dissertation topic, for introductions to teachers to study the text with, and much more; Sv?m? Praj??nanda T?rtha, Harihara T?rtha ??ram, Rishikesh, for reading the entire VP and the TS with me in under twelve weeks in the summer of 2006. For much that cannot even be begun to be expressed in words: Sv?m? ??rad?nanda Sarasvat?, Badrin?th and Haridwar; ?tm?r?m Sv?m? and Arjund?s Sv?m?, Baga?, Raj.; Mah?r?j ?y?md?s Guru R?md?s Ud?s?n, Pune; Sv?m? Satsvar?p?nanda Sarasvat?, Pune; Sv?min? Saral?nanda Sarasvat?, Usha Pahlajrai, Tim Malone, Thalia Stewart, Dannette Allen, Valerie Smith, Valerie Lesniak, Roberta Mackrill, Mary Lombard, Kate Blackney, Colleen J. Watkins, Donna Suwall, Carol Meyer, Sr. Barbara Raymond, Sr. Judy Bertolli. Over the summers of 2006 and 2008, I was able to visit some of the places connected with the D?d? Panth in Rajasthan, as well as the seat of Ni?cald?s in Kiha?aul?, Haryana. In locating and visiting these places, I give thanks for much help, hospitality and kindness that I received from: ?c?rya ?e??dri, Jaipur; Ved Prak?? Kum?vat, Phuler?, Raj.; Brahma Prak?? D?d?, Delhi; the families at D?d? Ko?h?, Narnaul; Arvind Sv?m?, mahant of the Kal?naur ?er? (dist. Bhiv?n?, Haryana); R?m Prak?? ??str?, mahant of the K?hnaur ?er? (dist. Rohtak, Haryana). My gratitude also to the UW Graduate School for the award of the 2006-07 Chester Fritz Grant which funded my travels and study in the summer of 2006, and to the untiring staff of the Suzallo Library and the Interlibrary Loan & Document Delivery Services. On the academic front, for their wisdom, guidance and support, my utmost gratitude to my dissertation committee members: Collett Cox, Heidi Pauwels, Richard Salomon, Michael Shapiro. All that is good in what follows is thanks to their guidance. Any errors are all mine. Also to Bill Boltz, Kyoko Tokuno, Karl Potter, Marty Jaffee, Romila Thapar and Monika Horstmann, and to my colleagues in the department, Tim Lenz, Jameel Ahmed and Jennifer Dubrow, and to Youngie Yoon, Abby Petty, Curtis Dye and Meredith Laver for their help and encouragement. My thanks also, for their help in keeping the vy?dhikara?a at bay, to: David Koelle, Jaime Friedman, Victor Erlich, James Bowen, Letitia Colston, David Fuselier, Valerie Warren, Christy Fisher, Suzette Birrell, Reed Johnston, Ted Brown, Susan Watters, Melissa Pei. To my widespread family, including the kh?nd?ns of Daryanani, Daswani, Chainani, Chandiramani, Kripalani, Huffman, Khemlani, Udeshi, Sehwani, Lord, Shetye, Kurup, Budhani, Hohman, Hicks, and Morr; the Ved?nta study groups of Portland, Dr. Ramanathan, and James Mackinlay; and to those of my tribe not mentioned yet who have been there through thick and thin: Sunil Mirchandani, Theresa Hohman, Thom Bianco, Barbara Malizia, Dan Wright, Gillian Kathleen, Anoop Chainani, Vijaylakshmi Menon, Sanjay Menon, Tammy Halstead, Yudhvir & Saroj Suri, Rajiv & Preeti Suri, Ramakrishna & Nalini Mayya, Niranjan & Rekha Mayya, Harpreet & Manpreet Baweja, John Major, Martie Skinner, Sharon Enger, Bill Curtis, Pat Emmons, Ben Green? & Christina Wienhold, Albert & Alex Shen, Richard Alishio, Minda Redburn, Ray Redburn, Sid & Helen Mirsky, Bob & Sandy Hanis, John & Joanne Bauer, John Caldbick, Gulshan Deboo, Peter Fabish, Nessa Elila, Jeanine Murrell, Pamelajean Meyers. Thank you. xv DEDICATION To all my teachers. veda udadhi bina guru lakhai, l?gai launa sam?na; b?dara guru-mukha dv?ra hvai, am?ta sai? adhik?na. The ocean of the Vedas, seems like salt[-water] To one who studies without a teacher; [The same, when received as rain] from clouds that are the teacher?s words, Is sweeter than nectar. ? Ni?cald?s, VS v. 3.8 xvi 1 Introduction This dissertation examines the life and works of Sw?m? Ni?cald?s, a relatively recent Advaita Ved?nta proponent who flourished in Haryana in the nineteenth century. Ni?cald?s deliberately chose to compose his independent treatises on Ved?nta in a vernacular language, Hindi, despite being well-versed in Sanskrit. What were his reasons for doing so? Through a close reading of and his magnum opus, the V?ttiprabh?kar, what more can we learn about his perspectives on caste, soteriology, philosophy, scripture, tradition and theology? How does he reconcile doctrinal differences in the Advaita tradition? The answers to these questions are inter-related and will provide us a more complete understanding of Ni?cald?s and his Advaita standpoint. To understand Ni?cald?s's reasons for composing his works in the vernacular, I examine what is known about his origins, history, and patronage. I also examine the broader context of the D?d? Panth to which he belonged and compare his views on caste to that of the founder, D?d? Day?l, and D?d??s earliest disciples, and also to the views of ?a?kara, one of the earliest Advaitins whose writings are available to us. I present what Ni?cald?s himself has to say on this subject in his writings, particularly his Vic?rs?gar and his V?ttiprabh?kar. The latter half of this dissertation then takes a detailed look at the VP and presents Ni?cald?s?s unique Advaita perspective and the influence it had on his decision to write in the vernacular. Sw?m? Ni?cald?s (1791-1863 CE) wrote three works, all in Hindi, on Advaita Ved?nta: the popular and widely available Vic?rs?gar (VS), ?The Ocean of Contemplation,? the philosophically erudite V?ttiprabh?kar (VP), ?The Illuminator of V?ttis,2? and the lesser-known Yuktiprak?? (YP), ?The Light of Analogical Reasoning.? These works are distinctive due to their originality and relative contemporaneity; the most recent, VP, being barely 150 years old.3 Ni?cald?s is highly regarded within indigenous Ved?nta circles but very little has been written in English-language scholarship about his life and works. To date, we have Lala Sreeram?s translation of the VS, titled The Metaphysics of the Upanishads: Vichar Sagar (Nischaladasa 1885), Surendra Kumar Shrivastava?s The Essential Advaitism (The Philosophy of Ni?calad?sa) (1980), and Kamal Shivkumar?s The Philosophy of Advaita: As Expounded by Ni?cald?s with Special Reference to his V?tti-Prabh?kar (2009). Even in Hindi, apart from translations or commentaries, there are only two independent works devoted to Ni?cald?s: Ra?j?t Si?ha?s Sant 2 The term v?tti is deliberately being left untranslated for now. It will be described thoroughly in Ch. 5. 3 It is believed that Ni?cald?s had not finalized the VP text by his untimely demise in 1863 CE. See section 10.6 on p. 369. 2 Ni?cald?s ? Vyaktitva aur K?titva, ?Saint Ni?cald?s: The Man and His Works? (1981), and Indu B?l? Kapil?s Sant Ni?cald?s aur unk? D?r?anik Cetan?, ?Saint Ni?cald?s and His Philosophical Thought? (2005); both of these are written over a century after Ni?cald?s?s death. I first encountered references to Ni?cald?s and his V?ttiprabh?kar (VP) in 2005 while researching the authorship of the Pa?cada??, a fourteenth-century Advaita Ved?nta text attributed to Vidy?ra?ya, for my MA thesis. Scholars such as S. N. Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophy as well as Thangaswami?s Bibliographical Survey of Advaita Ved?nta Literature (following Dasgupta) incorrectly list the V?ttiprabh?kar as a commentary on the Pa?cada?? (Pahlajrai 2005, 6).4 In Radhakrishnan?s Indian Philosophy, Ni?cald?s?s V?ttiprabh?kar is barely mentioned, and only then in a footnote in connection with Vidy?ra?ya (1923-27, 451n1). Thangaswami?s Survey does not mention the Vic?rs?gar at all. However, other scholars and thinkers, especially contemporaries of Ni?cald?s, consider his works to be highly significant. For example, Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902 CE) states: ?? the great Nishchalad?sa, the celebrated author of Vich?ra s?gara, which book has more influence in India than any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries?? (1972, 4:335). Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883 CE), founder of the ?rya Sam?j and staunch critic of Advaita Ved?nta, in his Saty?rthaprak??a, Light of Truth (1963, 393-4; 1915, 355-6), selects for attack the views of Ni?cald?s, specifically Ni?cald?s?s V?ttiprabh?kar, along with those of Vasi??ha and ?a?kara.5 In addition to Vivekananda and Dayananda Saraswati,6 other scholars and religious figures also held Ni?cald?s in high regard. For example, Ramana Maharshi (1879- 1950 CE) wrote the Vic?ra Ma?i M?l?, Jewel Garland of Enquiry, a ?compilation of the salient points? of the VS in Tamil, based on the Tamil translation of the VS (Ramana and Sankaracharya 2002, 98). The S?? B?b? (1836-1918 CE) of ?ir??, Maharashtra, who is regarded as a saint by Hindu and Muslim devotees alike, is also said to have given discourses on the VS and recommended its study (Dabholkar 2002, 111). 4 Ni?cald?s make numerous references to the various sections of the Pa?cada?? in VP, such as its Citra-d?pa (PD 6, VP 8.8, 348; 8.13-17, 350-2), Pa?cako?a-viveka (PD 3, VP 8.17, 353), Brahm?nanda (PD 11-15, VP 8.19, 355), [Mah?]Bh?taviveka (PD 2, VP 8.23, 359) and T?pti-d?pa (PD 7, VP 8.26, 360), and also to the views of Vidy?ra?ya throughout VP. 5 Dayananda Saraswati attacks Ni?cald?s for inferring the identity of j?va and Brahman on account of both being consciousness (j?vo brahm?bhinna?, cetanatv?t, VP 2.9, 44). 6 It may also be more than a coincidence that both Vivekananda and Dayananda had strong ties to Bengal. Ni?cald?s is known to have visited Nadiy?, Bengal to study Ny?ya (Si?ha 1981, 6). 3 Vernacular treatises on Advaita typically tend to be translations of or commentaries on existing Sanskrit works. It is noteworthy that Ni?cald?s chose to write his original and independent works in the vernacular instead of the more traditional (and prestigious) Sanskrit. The influence of Ni?cald?s?s published works, particularly the VS, is vast, at least in part a result of their having being written in, as Ni?cald?s himself terms it, bh??? (vernacular Hindi) as opposed to Sanskrit. The first part of this dissertation is therefore a study of Ni?cald?s?s deliberate choice to engage with the vernacular as opposed to the more cosmopolitan Sanskrit through an exploration of his origins and influences.The language of Ni?cald?s may be characterized as Braj-like, with influence of the Haryana dialect, B??gr? or Hary?nv?.7 Both the VS and the VP were composed in Kiha?aul?, Haryana and therefore it may be appropriate to consider Ni?cald?s?s language as Hary?nv?, though the Hindi language as well as of its dialects at the time of Ni?cald?s was still very much in flux, a blend of undefined dialects and not yet standardized. Chapter 2 begins with a review of all the sources from which Ni?cald?s?s biographical profile can be constructed, including prefatory matter to early published editions of his works. Throughout this biographical profile, attention is given to key events that might be considered to have influenced his decision to write in the vernacular. Chapter 2 also provides an overview of Ni?cald?s?s published works and mention his many unpublished works, which are no longer extant. The possible influence of Ni?cald?s?s patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd?, Rajasthan, on Ni?cald?s?s deliberate choice to write in the vernacular will also be discussed. Ni?cald?s was a member of the D?d? Panth (lit. the Way of D?d?), a group founded by D?d? Day?l (1544-1603 CE), comprising followers of D?d? Day?l?s message. In chapter 3, the life and teachings of D?d? Day?l are investigated to determine what, if any, influence the life experiences and teachings of D?d? might have had on Ni?cald?s, and whether or not there are any parallels between the lives of Ni?cald?s and D?d?, for example, in their attitudes towards patronage, religion and caste. As in the case of Ni?cald?s, biographical evidence regarding D?d? Day?l is largely based on hagiographic accounts, and hence a comparison of their biographies as hagiographies is undertaken to investigate commonalities between D?d? and Ni?cald?s. The utterances of D?d? were compiled by his followers into a collection known as the D?d? V??? 7 According to Ethnologue.com, the online version of Ethnologue: Languages of the World maintained by SIL International, B??gr?/Hary?nv? has a 92% lexical similarity with Braj Bh??? (http://www.ethnologue.com/language/bgc, accessed 08/26/2013). 4 (DV), and a small selection from the DV is examined to develop a sense of D?d??s stance regarding religion and caste. Some selections from the corpus of two of D?d??s most famous, immediate disciples, Rajjab (1567?-1689 CE), and Sundard?s (1596-1689~ CE) are also explored in order to determine whether the disciples? positions on these matters diverge from those of their teacher, D?d?. This chapter also explores the internal structure of the D?d? Panth, as well as Ni?cald?s?s place within it, in an effort to understand whether or not the strength or weakness of Ni?cald?s?s affiliation with the Panth may have had a bearing on Ni?cald?s?s decision to write in the vernacular. Chapters 2 and 3 thus set the stage for a closer look at what Ni?cald?s himself has to say regarding his writing in the vernacular. This is undertaken in chapter 4, where his VS and VP texts are closely examined to gain an understanding of Ni?cald?s?s position on the vernacular. Here, Ni?cald?s's position is compared with Sheldon Pollock?s theory of vernacularization, the historical process of deliberately producing literature in local languages (such as Hindi), in forms similar to those found in the dominant literary culture (for example, Sanskrit). In the process, the dates for the beginning of the vernacularization of literature in general are compared to those for independent Advaita literature in various Indian vernacular languages. This permits us to test whether or not the processes of vernacularization are concurrent in all forms of literature or whether they differ according to genre. This is followed by a detailed examination of Ni?cald?s?s stance on caste (j?ti). Ni?cald?s defends his stance by citing passages from the Mah?bh?rata epic, as well as ?a?kara?s commentary to the Brahma-s?tra, thus necessitating a deeper investigation into ?a?kara?s position on caste, as well as that of the Mah?bh?rata, in order to determine if Ni?cald?s is following tradition or breaking with it and presenting his own innovative interpretations. The rest of the dissertation, chapters 5 through 9, shifts its focus to Ni?cald?s's presentation of Advaita Ved?nta in his VP. For Ni?cald?s, the composition of his works was not a mere scholastic exercise but a direct expression of his values. Hence, we will gain further insight into Ni?cald?s's mindset and the influence it had on his choice to compose his works in the vernacular. In this text, Ni?cald?s raises three questions pertaining to the concept of a v?tti (?mental modification by which cognition takes place?): 1) What is a v?tti? 2) What is the cause of a v?tti? 3) What is its purpose? In the process of thoroughly answering these three questions, Ni?cald?s undertakes a detailed examination of issues regarding Ved?nta epistemology, 5 metaphysics and praxis. Ni?cald?s covers much ground in the VP, vigorously defending the Advaita perspective against proponents of various opposing schools (p?rva-pak?in), mostly Ny?ya, but on occasion also M?m??s? and Buddhism. At first glance, it may appear that he is not covering any new territory compared to his Advaita predecessors. After all, the non-dual Brahman had been written about by Ved?ntins for over a millennium prior to Ni?cald?s?s time. Even the organizational scheme, that of using the concept of a v?tti as a central element around which the precepts of Advaita can be presented, had been undertaken before, by Mah?dev?nanda (ca. 1600-1700 CE) in his Tattv?nusandh?na, although only in its second and third of four chapters and nowhere as exhaustively as in the VP. Nonetheless, considering how central the concept of v?tti is to Advaita, it is surprising that there are not more texts focused on it, and Ni?cald?s?s VP is an important contribution that helps one understand how, by means of a v?tti, one?s cognition relates to the objects about us and thereby constructs the ?reality? of one?s experience at any level. The same process of v?tti-cognition is also instrumental in realizing one?s identity with non-dual Brahman when it becomes a brahm?k?ra v?tti, a v?tti in the form of Brahman. Beyond just presenting this material in the vernacular, Ni?cald?s?s unique contribution is his clear-eyed and uncompromising focus on soteriology, i.e., attaining the knowledge of Brahman, or liberation. In order to facilitate this knowledge of Brahman for his readers, Ni?cald?s presents a reorganization of vast swaths of post-?a?kara Ved?nta tradition and serves as our guide through the Ved?nta landscape, pointing out the various different perspectives held by Ved?ntins and other schools on key issues along the way, explaining which views are sound and conducive to liberation, and steering us away from those he considers unproductive. The VP shows Ni?cald?s in dialogue with the Advaita tradition, evaluating, contrasting and, where possible, reconciling various standpoints. On several occasions, after exhaustively analyzing opposing views within the Advaita school, Ni?cald?s provides a resolution to the seeming contradictions and concludes that, where the knowledge of Brahman is concerned, while one viewpoint is more doctrinally sound, other viewpoints are also efficacious. While the text is often dense and one may easily get lost in the thickets of argument and counter-argument, Ni?cald?s never deviates from his central soteriological objective, namely, gaining knowledge of Brahman, and he steadily works towards that goal throughout the entire text. I suggest that this soteriological focus upon non-duality is ultimately behind Ni?cald?s?s decision to write in the vernacular, which will 6 ensure that anyone desirous of attaining the knowledge of Brahman may do so, not just those who know Sanskrit. A close reading of the VP will make this quite clear. In the process, other issues such as Ni?cald?s?s application of the philosophical method in the service of Brahman- realization and his understanding of scripture will also be revealed. What follows is a highly abridged overview of the VP text. The short answer to the first question, ?What is a v?tti?? is that v?ttis facilitate cognition. This leads to detailed discussion of the six accepted means of cognition (pram??a) in Ved?nta, which is presented in chapter 5. In answering the second question, ?What is the cause of a v?tti?? Ni?cald?s describes the two types of cognition, direct and valid (pram?) and indirect (apram?), and their further typology; this is also presented in chapter 5. Indirect cognitions can be false, and in chapter 6, we examine Ni?cald?s?s presentation of the Advaita view of superimposition (adhy?sa), which is held to be the cause of erroneous cognition. Chapter 6 also contains a discussion of the Advaita theory of erroneous cognition (anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da), namely, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), which is followed by the presentation and refutation of five other theories of erroneous cognition. In the course of refuting these theories, an objection is raised on behalf of the M?m??sakas that if one has doubts regarding the validity (pram?tva) of any given cognition, one will not engage in any definite activity (prav?tti). In effect, if one does not trust the validity of one?s own cognitions, one might be reluctant to commit to any action based on these cognitions. In chapter 7, Ni?cald?s addresses the inapplicability of this objection to Advaita, by analyzing the nature of validity and invalidity. With this, both the first question, concerning types of cognition, and the second question, concerning the cause of v?ttis begun at the end of chapter 5, are answered. Next, and still in chapter 7, we see Ni?cald?s begin his answer to the third question, ?What is the purpose of a v?tti?? In brief, although a v?tti can also result in false cognitions (as seen in chapter 5), the primary purpose of a v?tti is the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). The ignorance can be at the empirical level or it can be the ignorance of one?s self as Brahman. To thoroughly understand this, Ni?cald?s embarks on an examination of the locus of ignorance: is it the individual being (j?va), is it ??vara (the theistic creator) or is it elsewhere? Ni?cald?s presents the principal Advaita views on the locus of ignorance and the relation of consciousness to erroneous cognitions, the differences between these various views, and ways in which these views may be reconciled. In chapter 8, we take up Ni?cald?s?s continuing examination of 7 ignorance, as it manifests in the empirical sphere as well as in the dream state. Chapter 8 also contains a discussion of the nature of reality (satt?) versus illusoriness (mithy?tva) and a repudiation of the reality of the manifest world (prapa?ca). Next, Ni?cald?s takes up the means to dispel this illusoriness, discussing the utility of action (karma) and renunciation (sanny?sa) in effecting knowledge as proposed by various Advaita thinkers. He also discusses the eligibility of non-brahman castes for self-realization. Chapter 9 presents Ni?cald?s?s return to the third question, ?What is the purpose of a v?tti?? which he states is to bring about the cessation of ignorance through Brahman-realization (tattva-j??na). Ni?cald?s explores the nature of this v?tti, what happens once it occurs, the means for effecting Brahman-realization, and whether or not the realization is immediate. Ni?cald?s suggests that a v?tti is the cause of an individual?s (j?va) experience of the cycle of life-death-rebirth (sa?s?ra) by relating the individual to the three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep). A different v?tti is the cause of the attainment of liberation. Different arguments regarding the nature of the cessation of what was conceived (kalpita), namely, sa?s?ra, are considered before Ni?cald?s presents his view, and his conclusion. The final chapter of the dissertation, chapter 10, consolidates the findings of the preceding chapters and reviews the evidence from the VP that supports the assertion that Ni?cald?s?s uncompromising Advaita perspective and clear-eyed, primary focus on soteriological efficacy is behind his decision to write in the vernacular. Chapter 10 also explores whether the VP as we have it is a complete text or whether it was left unfinished by Ni?cald?s?s sudden death. Ni?cald?s holds the Advaita position that there is only one consciousness (ekam?tra) and, apart from it, the entire creation (prapa?ca) is false. I review examples of Ni?cald?s?s reconciliation of seemingly conflicting doctrinal interpretations and of his use of the stratagem of prau?hi-v?da, the temporary acceptance of the opponents? view in the process of refuting their objections to one?s own view. Ni?cald?s?s matter-of-fact acceptance of the theories that there is only one individual being (eka-j?va-v?da) and that perception is creation (d???i-s???i-v?da, DSV) is presented as further evidence of his clear and uncompromising Advaita perspective that dictates his decision to write in the vernacular. The implications of Ni?cald?s's novel contributions to the understanding of the Advaita problem of the nature of the cessation of ignorance and of the means for achieving Brahman-realization are also considered. In both cases he gives precedence to scripture and the experience of wise, liberated persons over reason, and deprecates the misuse 8 of reason when scripture and the Advaita tradition is disregarded. I also examine Ni?cald?s?s pragmatic stance that, since the goal of Advaita is the demonstration of the unreality of the created world (prapa?ca), even an incorrect view may help achieve the same end. Such pragmatism and Ni?cald?s's radical views on the eligibility for liberation are contrasted with his otherwise conservative stance elsewhere, such as his criticism of attempts to contort the purport of the divinely revealed Vedas (?ruti) through humanly contrived tools of logic (yukti- samud?ya). Ni?cald?s?s use of reason in the service of revelation, his view of revelation, and his relation to the overall Advaita tradition are examined, and it is stressed that, for Ni?cald?s and Advaita, philosophy is always in the service of theology mediated by scripture. Lastly, proposals for future exploration of Ni?cald?s?s ideas are presented. 2 Ni?cald?s?s Life and Patronage Sw?m? Ni?cald?s (1791-1863 CE) is highly regarded within indigenous Ved?nta circles. He wrote three works on Advaita Ved?nta: the popular and widely available Vic?rs?gar (VS), ?The Ocean of Contemplation,? the philosophically erudite V?ttiprabh?kar (VP), ?The Illuminator of V?ttis,8? and the lesser-known Yuktiprak?? (YP), ?The Light of Analogical Reasoning.? All are written in Hindi. These works are distinctive in their originality and relative contemporaneity, the most recent, VP, being barely 150 years old. To understand Ni?cald?s?s motivations to write in bh??? (vernacular) Hindi, we need to piece together his history and biography from all available sources, including prefatory matter to earlier published editions of his works. This chapter undertakes a review of these sources of Ni?cald?s?s biography and describes what is learned about his life and his surviving works, with particular attention to key events that might have influenced his choice to write in the vernacular. We also look at the historical background of R?j? R?msi?ha, of B?nd?, a patron of Ni?cald?s, to better understand what, if any, influence the R?j? had on Ni?cald?s?s choice to write in the vernacular. 2.1 Biographical Sources To separate fact from hypebole, let us review the sources regarding Ni?cald?s?s biography in chronological order. The oldest available source of biographical information about Ni?cald?s is Vi?h?hala??str??s S?dh? Ni?cald?sj? k? J?van-caritra, ?Biography of S?dh? Ni?cald?s,? which is found in the second edition of Ni?cald?s's Yuktiprak?? (1899). Vi?h?hala??str? acknowledges that this account itself is taken from another source, which is not available to me for consultation.9 This raises at the outset a recurring question faced in determining the facts about Ni?cald?s: What is the source of these accounts? The next oldest account of Ni?cald?s's life is given in Pt. P?t?mbar?s (1917) introduction10 to the first edition of Vic?rs?gar. The author states that he 8 The term v?tti is deliberately being left untranslated for now. It will be described more thoroughly in Ch. 5, p. 101. 9 Vi?h?hala??str? (11n1): ?yaha j?vancaritra r?? r?? mana?sukhr?m s?ryar?m trip??h? ke vic?rs?gar me? se liy? hai. This biography is taken from R?. R?. Mana?sukhr?m S?ryar?m Trip??h??s Vic?rs?gar.? The Cambridge University Library lists an 1874 edition of Vic?rs?gar by Manasukharama Suryarama Tripathi [sic] in Marathi. Based on the year of publication being only eleven years after Ni?cald?s's death, one may suspect that this is actually a Hindi edition which has been miscataloged, though I have not had an opportunity to view this volume. Kapil (2005, 246-47n?a) also indicates that Trip??h??s work is in Hindi. 10 The introduction is signed prasiddhakart?, ?publisher? (lit. ?one who makes famous?), and there is an internal reference to a mah?puru?, ?learned man? which is glossed as Pt. P?t?mbar (9n1). From this it would appear that the author of this introduction is someone other than Pt. P?t?mbar. But it is more likely that the footnote was a later addition. The author also makes reference to the anukrama?ik?, table of contents, created by him(self) and also the ??k?, commentary, which he provides to the mangal?cara?a doh?s, invocatory couplets. These ??k?s are attributed to Pt. P?t?mbar by others, e.g., D?d? (1994, 1-7). Therefore, I too have attributed this introduction to Pt. P?t?mbar. 10 intended to write the complete biography of Ni?cald?s but because he could not obtain the means (s?dhana) to do so, he has presented whatever he has heard.11 Once again, the sources for ?whatever he has heard? are not given. We then face a gap of almost forty years before the third account of Ni?cald?s's life, provided by Sv?m? Mangald?s (1955) in Nigam?nand?s edition of Vic?rs?gar (Ni?cald?s 1967). Sv?m? Mangald?s was the director of the D?d? Mah?vidy?laya, Jaipur, at that time, and thus, it is to be expected that his account will have a sectarian perspective since Ni?cald?s was a notable member of the D?d? Panth. But he too does not mention any sources for the events he narrates. Another account from the same period, that of Lak?min?r?ya? Cop?? (1956) in the introductory sections of his edition of Ni?cald?s's Yuktiprak??, is cited by two subsequent authors, Si?ha (1981) and Kapil (2005), but I have not been able to locate it. The first non-sectarian account on Ni?cald?s is found in Para?ur?m Caturved??s Uttar? Bh?rat K? Sant-para?par?, ?The Saint Tradition of North India?(1964, 514-16); it also lacks any citation of sources regarding Ni?cald?s's biographical details. In 1978-79, the D?d?panth? Sv?m? N?r?ya?d?s provides the most detailed account regarding Ni?cald?s in his D?d? Panth Paricay, ?Information about the D?d? Panth? (N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:834-56, 3:759-64). Vol. 2 includes a section that provides exhaustive details about Ni?cald?s's life, and more briefly, about his written works, while vol. 3 discusses his written works at greater length. This account has a decidedly hagiographic nature. N?r?ya?d?s acknowledges elsewhere that he ?relied on lore he was able to remember personally or draw out from his wide circle of Dadu-panth? acquaintances? (Gold 1994, 260n3), presumably including Sv?m? Mangald?s. One has to keep in mind that these recollections come over a century after Ni?cald?s?s death. The first full-length study of Ni?cald?s was a ninety-nine page monograph by Ra?j?t Si?ha (1981). Sources for some of the details are mentioned, including Caturved?, with accompanying evaluations of disparate accounts to determine which are most probable. But more often, Si?ha presents the details as accepted fact without any mention of their provenance. Over a decade later, S?ratr?m D?d? (1994) edited a version of Vic?rs?gar in which he presents details about Ni?cald?s gathered from various 11 is gra?th ke kartt? ?r? ni?cald?sj? k? sa?p?rn? janma-caritra iske s?thi likhanaik? mer? vic?r th?, para?tu ai?sai s?dhan k? apr?pti honaitai? jo kachuka mere ?rava?amai? ?y? hai, so ih?? likh?? h?? (P?t?mbar 1917, 6). 11 sources, including Caturved?,12 N?r?ya?d?s, and Ra?j?t S??ha mentioned earlier. S?ratr?m D?d? is much more meticulous at citing his sources and makes every attempt to present differing views from various sources and to determine which version is most likely. The final independent work on Ni?cald?s by Indu B?l? Kapil (2005) is also a full length work providing references to most of these sources discussed thus far, excluding the works of N?r?ya?d?s and S?ratr?m D?d?. These temporal and factual relationships are represented stemmatically in Figure 1 below, with the temporal dimension represented vertically with the oldest sources at the top. The dashed arrows in the figure denote inferred dependencies on sources which do not cite their sources, and the solid arrows represent dependencies that are cited. Any schematic representation is necessarily a simplification, since each author undoubtedly relied on sources that are not represented here. This figure attempts to capture the major recurring sources. From the nineteen- 12 D?d? refers to an article by Caturved? published in a periodical called Sant-v???, Sept. 1989 issue (1994, 23n). The details presented from this article do not seem different from the section in Caturved? (1964) and for our purpose the 1964 version can be considered as D?d??s source. Mangald?s? prefatory piece Granthk?r k? Paricay (1955, 17- 20), in Nigam?nand?s Standard Hindi translation of Vic?rs?gar (Ni?cald?s, 1967). Sv?m? N?raya?d?s?s sections on Ni?cald?s in ?r? D?d? Panth Paricay (1978-9, 2:834-856, 3:759-764). Para?ur?m Caturved??s brief account of Ni?cald?s in Uttar? Bh?rat k? Sant-parampar?, (1964, 514-16) Prefatory matter in S?ratr?m D?d??s ?r? Vic?rs?gar, (1994, 1-61) Ra?j?t Si?ha?s Sant Ni?cald?s ? Vyaktitva aur K?titva (1981) Indu B?l? Kapil?s (2005) Sant Ni?cald?s aur unk? D?r?anik Cetan? Pt. P?t?mbar?s introduction to the first edition of Vic?rs?gar (1917, 3-9). inferred Figure 1: Stemmatic Relationship of Sources for Ni?cald?s?s Biography Vi?h?hala??str??s S?dh? Ni?cald?sj? k? J?van- caritra (1899, 6-11) in Yuktiprak?? (Ni?cald?s, 1914) ?? Lak?m?n?r?ya? Cop???s (1956) introduction to Yuktiprak?? (I have been unable to locate this text). inferred 12 sixties onwards, several other texts13 refer to Ni?cald?s but do not offer any new or verifiable evidence. Since many of these works were written over a century after the death of Ni?cald?s in 1863, many of the facts presented are not verifiable. Although they may be ultimately based on hearsay, there is no other data available. Only the three most recent accounts, those by Si?ha (1981), S?ratr?m D?d? (1994) and Kapil (2005) cite their sources, but even these do not do so rigorously. To their credit, all three are aware that their sources may be based on hearsay, and they attempt to corroborate details through multiple sources; for example, when S?ratr?m D?d? cites information from Nar?ya?d?s?s D?d? Panth Paricay, he attempts to corroborate it with other sources. Some works not included in the stemma in Figure 1 were less rigorous. For example, the foreword to a Modern Hindi translation of Vic?rs?gar, by Camanl?l Gautam, boldly states that Ni?cald?s (1791-1863) and Tuls?d?s (1532-1623), the author of the R?mcaritm?nas, were coterminous, ignoring the intervening two and a half centuries (Ni?cald?s 2001, 4).14 This author may have taken D?d? Day?l (1544-1603), whom Ni?cald?s repeatedly invokes in his works, as Ni?cald?s?s direct guru. Si?ha judiciously clarifies that there was another Sant Tuls?d?s (ca. 1788-1843), a resident of H?thras.13F 15 S?ratr?m D?d? traces Ni?cald?s?s teaching lineage (guru parampar?) back to D?d? Day?l. He relies upon the D?d? Panth Paricay, which states that Ni?cald?s was a ninth-generation disciple.16 Allowing 25 years per generation, one falls short of accounting for the intervening two hundred years between D?d??s death in 1603 and Ni?cald?s?s initiation (d?k??) in 1805, as there are only seven generations between D?d? and Ni?cald?s, getting us to 1778.17 13 For example, Ram Sarup Joon (1967), Dharm Pal (1968), Shashi Bhushan Singhal (1971), Ram Kumar Bhardwaj (1983), Nonica Datta (1999). 14 ?s?dhu ni?cald?sj? r?mcarit m?nas ke racayit? mah?tm? tuls?d?s ke samak?l?n the.? Vi?h?hala??str? may be the source of this ?fact?: ?us? samaya ved?nta??stra p?ra?gata ?r?mad-r?mabhakta tuls?d?sj? bh? k??? me? rahate the. At the same time, Tuls?d?s, the devotee of R?ma, who was unexcelled in Ved?nta, also was living in Benares? (1899, 8-9). 15 Even Pt. P?t?mbar was aware of this difference: ??r?-k???-j?-mai? bh???-r?m?ya?-ke kartt?-sai? vilak?a? mah?tm? ?r?- tulas?d?s-j??, a sage named Tuls?d?s in Benares, different from the author of the vernacular R?m?ya?a?? (1917, 7). 16 According to N?r?ya?d?s, the lineage is 1) D?d? Day?l, 2) Banv?r? D?s, 3) Chab?l D?s, 4) ?y?m D?s, 5) N?r?ya? D?s, 6) Har Bhakta, 7) Alakhr?m, 8) Amard?s, 9) Ni?cald?s. (1978-9, 2:823,833-4). 17 From D?d? Day?l?s death in 1603, eight more generations at twenty-five years each (on average) brings us to 1803 when Ni?cald?s would be twelve years old, and he is said to have got his d?k?? at the age of fourteen. The only problem with this scenario is that Ni?cald?s is the eighth generation after D?d?. Perhaps there were some long-reigning intervening mahants, as S?ratr?m D?d? (1994, 27-28) suggests. The D?d? Panth Paricay doesn?t consistently, or chronologically, give such details. Alternatively, one must posit an average of twenty-nine years per generation, to make the numbers work out, which is not unreasonable, considering D?d? himself lived for fifty-nine years, and Ni?cald?s for seventy-two. 13 2.2 Early Life Although Ni?cald?s?s exact year of birth is not known, he is reported to have been born in either Sa?vat 1848 or 49 (1791 or 92 CE) in Dhan???, Dist. His?r in Haryana, in a J?? family of the Dahiy? sub-caste (gotra).16 18 He was an only child, and his birth name was Aga?? (Kapil 2005, 23) or Angari (Datta 1999, 40). His mother passed away when Ni?cald?s was young. In 1805, when a drought struck the area, Ni?cald?s?s father, Mukta/Mukt? took the thirteen- or fourteen- year-old Ni?cald?s to Delhi, where the father searched for work. They stayed at the D?d?panth? center (akh???) near the Bhav?n? Shankar Chatt? in the Kh?r? B?v?? bazaar, where Ni?cald?s learned how to read and write (Mangald?s 1955, 17; Si?ha 1981, 4-5). (At present, there is a Kh?ri B?v?? Road near Jama Masjid and Chandn? Chowk). The D?d?panth? head, either Swami Alakhr?m (Mangald?s 1955, 17), or Amard?s (Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 17; Si?ha 1981, 5), was impressed by Ni?cald?s?s intelligence and convinced his father to turn him over to their care. 19 At this time, he was given his initiatory (d?k??) name, Ni?cald?s, which follows Sanskrit phonology, instead of the vernacular (bh???) Nih?cal/Neh?cald?s, but was nonetheless preserved by Ni?cald?s throughout his works.20 According to N?r?ya?d?s, Ni?cald?s?s father also took initiation (d?k??) some time later and eventually became an ascetic (s?dh?). 21 18 Si?ha (1981, 2) cites Lak?min?r?ya?a Cop?? as the source for the Sa?vat 1849 date (1792 CE). N?r?ya?d?s also gives the same year, specifically ?r?va?a K???a 8 (1978-9, 2:833). Si?ha cites the VS edition published by Ud?s?na Sa?sk?ta Vidy?laya as the source for the Sa?vat 1848 date (1791 CE). S?ratr?m D?d? (1994, 26-7) also explores the possibility of Sa?vat 1847 proposed by Sv?m? Dv?rak?d?s of K???, but rejects it for lack of evidence. See also Datta (1999, 40), Kapil (2005, 21, 23-4), Ma?gald?s (1955, 17). Si?ha (2-3) also reports three other places reported as Ni?cald?s?s birthplace: 1) Kiha?hauli, dist. Sonipat, 2) K??ga?, Dist. Hisar per Caturved? (1964, 514), and 3) Delhi, and provides reasons why they are not likely. 19 According to N?r?ya?d?s (1978-9, 2:434), Ni?cald?s received his initiation (d?k??) from Amard?s. This practice of initiating young children prevails even in the present. When I visited D?d? P?lk? in Naren? in 2006, I was told by R?m J?van Kum?vat?s grandfather that his grandson, age perhaps nine, had been turned over to the order by his family. Orr (1947, 221-2), too, mentions that adoption was a common means for the D?d? Panth to add to its ranks. 20 S?ratr?m D?d? (1994, 25-6) concludes that this meant Ni?cald?s liked his given name, but it just as well could be the stylistic flourish of poets mentioning their own name in their works as a ch?p (signature). 21 N?r?ya?d?s: Muktaj? bh? sth?n me? rahkar sth?n k? sev? karne lage aur kuch samay pa?c?t ve bh? guru d?k?? lekar s?dh? ho gaye the (1978-9, 834). 14 2.3 Advanced Studies Ni?cald?s was sent to Jalandhar, Punjab for studies, and possibly also to Kap?rthal?, Lahore and Amritsar and then eventually in 1806-7 to Benares (Kapil 2005, 24; Si?ha 1981, 6).22 Because Ni?cald?s was of the J?? k?atriya caste, pandits were not prepared to teach him Sanskrit, so when he arrived in Benares he passed himself off as a brahman (Caturved? 1964, 514-5). The experience of caste discrimination in the pursuit of knowledge, and of having to lie to circumvent it would have profound consequences for him. He stayed at the D?d? Ma?h at Ass? Gh?? (see Figure 2) 23 where he studied the Vedas, Sanskrit grammar (vy?kara?a), Ny?ya and Ved?nta. At Vi?uddh?nanda?s ashram (Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 7), he studied meter (chanda-??stra) with Dasapu?jaj? (Si?ha 1981, 6) and/or Rasapu?jaj? (Caturved? 1964, 515; Kapil 2005, 25), grammar and philosophy (?a?-??stra) with the ?tmapur??a commentator (??k?k?r) ?r? K?k?r?m, and 22 Datta mentions that he was accompanied by a friend, Swarupanand, but it is not clear if only up to Punjab or also to Benares (1999, 40). Handa writes: ?Impressed by his prodigal [sic] intelligence, the head priest arranged for Nischal Das?s higher Sanskrit education first at Jullundur and then at Kashi? (1978, 107). 23 A D?d?panth? predecessor, Sundard?s, also stayed at the Ass? Gh??, ca. 1606-25 CE (Sundard?s 1978, 2:55). Hastings (2002, 26n30) mentions that this ma?h had been ?long abandoned? but was ?currently being renovated by the Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha.? Figure 2: Ass? Gh?? in Benares (Sundard?s 1978, 55) 15 Ny?ya with D?modar ??str? (Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 8; N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:834-6; Si?ha 1981, 5-6; Kapil 2005, 25),24 and also in Nadiy?, Bengal (Caturved? 1964, 515; Si?ha 1981, 6). He is said to have had total recall of everything he heard (N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:834),25 and a good command of vy?kara?a (Si?ha 1981, 5-6). At the conclusion of Vic?rs?gar, he writes: s??khya ny?ya me? ?rama kiyo, pa?hi vy?kara?a ase?a, pa?hai grantha advaita ke, rahyo na ekahu se?a; ka?hina ju aura nibandha hai?, jiname? mata ke bheda, ?rama tai avag?hana kiye, ni?calad?sa saveda (VS vv. 7.111-2). I toiled in the study of S??khya, Ny?ya and learned grammar completely, [I] studied Advaita texts, not even one is left [unstudied]. Other difficult compendia, which have differences of opinion, [I,] Ni?cald?s have sweated and laboriously immersed myself in them all. By various accounts, Ni?cald?s was an intelligent, eloquent and good-looking man, medium- complexioned, tall and thin (Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 11; Mangald?s 1955, 18; Si?ha 1981, 9; Kapil 2005, 27).26 Si?ha verified that this description of his build was consistent with his clothes preserved at his residence (gurudv?ra) in Kiha?aul?. He also is said to have a tobacco and hookah habit, 27 crooked, protruding teeth, and a serious, thoughtful appearance (Mangald?s 1955, 18; N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:850).28 S?ratr?m D?d? (1994 iv, 21) includes a representation of Ni?cald?s, courtesy of Mah?ma??ale?var Sv?m? ???nand of Haridwar (Figure 4). 24 N?r?ya?d?s (1978-9, 2:834-36) (1978-9, 2:834-36) only mentions K?k?r?m. 25 N?r?ya?d?s: Ni?cald?sj? k? smara? ?akti bahut acch? th?. ek b?r sunkar do b?r ucc?ra? karne se p??h unko ka??hastha ho j?t? th?. 26 Vi?h?hala??str?: Ni?cald?sj? k? ?ar?r k?? th?, pa?ca ke? (spread locks/tresses?) dh?ra? kiye the, mukh k? ?k?r lamba va gol th??. Mangald?s: Ni?cald?s j? k? var?a pakk? th?, ve na to gaurva[r]?a the na ?y?m. Kad unk? la?b? th?. ?ar?r ikhar? th?. Si?ha: ra?g-r?p khar?b na hokar acch? h? th? ? vah [sic] kad me? lambe tath? ?ar?r se duble-patle the. Kapil: ek pratibh???l? vyaktitva, vilak?a?a v?k-?akti, gaur-var?a, su?aul eva? ??r?rik d???i se sudar?an the. 27 Apparently, the last mahant, R?m?nand, had in his possession a silver hookah (rajatnal?) but the prevailing belief by then was that Ni?cald?s didn?t smoke (Kapil 2005, 31). 28 Mangald?s: D?nt kuch ba?e the aur mu?h khulne par ho?ho? se b?har dikh?? dete the. unko tamb?k? p?ne k? abhy?s th?, isliye ve nayd?r hukk? p?y? [sic] karte the. N?r?ya?d?s: ?pk? mukh-ma??al ga?bh?r vic?r mudr? yukt raht? th?. D?nt kuch nikle huye the. P?c ke? (spread locks/tresses?) rakhte the. 16 It is standard hagiographic practise to describe the subject?s appearance favorably, but the authors may also provide these details about his appearance to explain why one of Ni?cald?s?s teachers (Pt. K?k?r?m, according to N?r?ya?d?s) wished to give his daughter in marriage to Ni?cald?s. When Ni?cald?s revealed his true j?ti and moreover, that he was a D?d?panth?, his guru is said to have cursed him. All other sources consulted, except Pt. P?t?mbar and Vi?h?hala??str?, mention this episode, with some variations. 29 According to Caturved?, he was cursed that he?d have to marry twice (1964, 515). According to Si?ha?s research, however, there is no evidence that Ni?cald?s ever married (1981, 7-9). Two other accounts mention that Ni?cald?s was cursed by his teacher that he would henceforth remain tormented by fever, and Ni?cald?s duly suffered an hour or two daily (Mangald?s 1955, 18; N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:837).30 Si?ha suggests that this stimulated Ni?cald?s?s interest in Ayurveda in search of an antidote. Ni?cald?s is held to have written a work on Ayurveda and ?gained fame by curing the diseased? 29 Vi?h?hala??str? only mentions that Ni?cald?s was afflicted by fever, ?ar?r me? jvar k? p??? th? (1899, 11). 30 Mangald?s: j?o tum janmabhar santapta rahoge. N?r?ya?d?s: is mithy? bh??a? ke phal r?p me? tum ko prati din ek gha??? jvar ?y? kareg?. The Mangald?s account subsequently has Ni?cald?s suffering a fever daily for two hours. Si?ha (1981, 8-9) and Kapil (2005, 27) reproduce these per Mangald?s (uncredited by Si?ha). Figure 3: Representation of Ni?cald?s 17 (Datta 1999, 40). To this day, many D?d?panth?s engage in Ayurveda practices. Si?ha also narrates a second curse, based on hearsay (jana?ruti), stating that Ni?cald?s?s learning would only bear fruit when engaged in religio-philosophical debate (??str?rtha), and that none of the successors from his lineage would ever become learned (vidv?n). We must keep this in mind when we consider Ni?cald?s's lineage in section 2.7. According to the hagiographic account in D?d? Panth Paricay, Ni?cald?s was visited later in his life by a D?d?panth? sant (holy man), who was very pleased with Ni?cald?s?s knowledge of Ved?nta. Seeing Ni?cald?s suffering from the fever and learning the cause of it, he told Ni?cald?s that if he recited the D?d? V??? daily this fever would stop afflicting him within a few days. Ni?cald?s is said to have started doing so immediately and was freed from his affliction. As a result his faith in the D?d? V??? increased greatly (N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:837). 2.4 Post-Benares After 20 to 25 years, sometime between 1826-32, Ni?cald?s left Benares (Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 9; Mangald?s 1955, 17; N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:836; Si?ha 1981, 8-9; D?d? 1994, 34; Kapil 2005, 28).31 He is said to have collected (and perhaps even memorized) 2.7 million Sanskrit ?lokas while studying there (P?t?mbar 1917, 7).32 The depth of his knowledge and mastery had been recognized in Benares, and Kapil suggests that this raised feelings of jealousy and hatred towards him, causing him eventually to return to the D?d? Panth center (akh???) in Delhi. However, its then head, who was less learned than Ni?cald?s, was threatened by his learning and worried that he would lose his students to him. He treated Ni?cald?s with arrogance (Kapil 2005, 28), 33 and eventually Ni?cald?s left to settle in Kiha?aul? (present day Ki?haul?, Dist. Rohtak, Haryana) (Nischaladasa 1885, 404; Orr 1947, 215; Singhal 1971, 33).34 He was given twenty b?gh?-s 35 of land for his ashram by his followers and established a teaching residence (gurudv?ra), a school (p??h??l?) and a library there (Kapil 2005, 28). Datta claims that the 31 Mangald?s: 20 years; Si?ha and Vi?h?hala??str?: duration not provided; D?d?: 25 years, after N?r?ya?d?s; Kapil: 20-22 years. 32 ?r?-k???j? mai? rahike ?r?-ni?cald?sj?nai vidy? ke 27 lak?a sa?sk?ta-?lokan k? sa?graha kiy? th?. 33 adhik?r? mah?tm? ne inke s?th udda??at? k? vyavah?r ?ur? kar diy?. 34 Lala Sreeram gives the name as Kehrowli (Nischaladasa 1885, 404). Orr (1947, 215) calls it Kirdoli, Singhal (1971, 33), Kindoli, Datta, Kehrauli (1999, 40). It is also known as Ki?haul?. (D?d? 1995, 18). As of Nov. 2012, the village shows up on Google Maps as Pehl?dpur-Kirholi, Haryana. In October 2008, I had the good fortune to locate and visit Kiha?aul? with the help of three mahants of the D?d? community: Arvind Sv?m?, mahant of the Kal?naur ?er?, (dist. Bhiv?n?, Haryana), R?m Prak?? ??str?, mahant of the K?hnaur ?er? (dist. Rohtak, Haryana), and Arjun D?s Sv?m?, mahant of the Baga? ?er?, (dist. Jhunjhun??, Rajasthan). 35 A b?gh? is is anywhere from a quarter to five-eights of an acre, depending on whether it is kacc?, provisional or sark?r?, official. 18 p??h??l? was opened ?as an alternative to brahminical institutions? (1999, 41). The present day government high school is situated on the site of this original p??h??l?. In Pt. P?t?mbar?s time (early twentieth century), Ni?cald?s?s lineage was still prevalent, and a collection of his texts was preserved there (Ni?cald?s 1917b, 328n553). 36 These sites continued to be active at least through 1964 (Caturved? 1964, 516),37 and it appears that Ra?j?t Si?ha met R?m?nand, who was the religious head (mahant) there prior to 1981 (17). However, by S?ratr?m D?d??s visit in 1991, no one was living there, and everyone was said to have moved to R?mpur? near Delhi (1994, 18; Kapil 2005, 31).38 Ni?cald?s is said to have taught Ved?nta, Ny?ya and vy?kara?a and to have received many scholars who wished to study with him. Pt. Pit?mbar mentions that Ni?cald?s would teach Ny?ya and non-Ved?nta texts at times other than in the morning, saying that he refused to teach texts that propagate something other than ?tm? (an?tm?) early in the day (1917, 6).39 In the final verses of his work Vic?rs?gar, which was written in Kiha?aul?, he writes: Dill? tai? pa?cima di??, kosa a?h?raha g?ma; T?mai? yaha p?ro bhayau, Kiha?aul? tihi n?ma. (VS v. 7.115) Eighteen kos [approximately 36 miles] east of Delhi, There is a village named Kiha?aul?, this [text] was completed there. 2.5 Patronage By 1843, Ni?cald?s?s fame had spread, and in that year he received an invitation from King R?msi?ha to visit him in B?nd?, Rajasthan, but was unable to go (Si?ha 1981, 10). After receiving a second invitation, written in Sanskrit and unambiguously dated to 1856 CE, Ni?cald?s went to B?nd? (Si?ha 1981, 10). The traditionalist royal pandits in R?msi?ha?s court were hostile to Ni?cald?s since he was not a brahman, and they tried to turn the king against him. However, R?msi?ha, who wanted to learn Ved?nta from Ni?cald?s, was not swayed. The r?j? kept Ni?cald?s with him for quite a while (Mangald?s 1955, 19), and adjudicated a religio- 36 tah?? ady?pi unk? ?i?ya??kh? b? hai. unho?nai jo gra?th sa?graha kiye the ve b? tah?? vidyam?n hai?. 37 ? ink? ?i?ya-parampar? tath? p??ha??l? ?j bh? cal rah? hai. 38 Kapil reports: vartam?n (Janvar?, 2005) sthiti me? kiha?aul? sthit gurudv?r?, gurugadd?, ??ram aur pustak?lay n?m k? ko? vastu nah?? hai. R?mpur? is a suburb of Delhi, approx. 10 km. northwest of New Delhi. I was able to confirm this when I visited Mrs. R?m?nand in Kiha?aul? in 2010, and I also spoke over the phone with her son who resides in R?mpur?. 39 ko? prabh?tmai? ny?y?di pa?hne ?vai tisk?? nah?? pa?h?vte the au kahte the jo prabh?tmai? an?tm? (dvait) ke pratip?daka- granthank? ?ham nah?? pa?h?vai?ge. The earlier part of the day is held to have more of the sattva attribute, and as the day progresses, the tamas attribute starts to increase. Hence it is considered more effective to study important topics earlier in the day, when the mind is more receptive, and to consign study of lesser matters to later in the day. 19 philosophical debate (??str?rtha) between all the pandits in his court with Ni?cald?s. Ni?cald?s was able to meet their challenges and was victorious (Si?ha 1981, 10-11).40 R?msi?ha, his wife and family became Ni?cald?s?s disciples (Mangald?s 1955, 19; P?t?mbar 1917, 12; Vi?h?hala??str? 1899, 10).41 Although they invited him back to B?nd? after this initial visit, Ni?cald?s apparently was never able to return. R?msi?ha did meet with Ni?cald?s again in 1862 in Delhi, as is once again corroborated by a letter written in Sanskrit by the king to Ni?cald?s and reproduced by Si?ha (1981, 11) and N?r?ya?d?s (1978-9, 2:847-50). 2.6 Death A year after R?j? R?msi?ha?s visit, Ni?cald?s planned a pilgrimage to the Ganga, but suddenly fell ill and passed away in 1863, after being unable to move for fifteen days or not being able to consume any food for a further ten days. His last rites were performed at the Nigambodh Gh?? in Delhi, on the banks of the Yamuna river. The ceremonies lasted for seven days and were attended by thousands and accompanied by great fanfare (Si?ha 1981, 12).42 A month later, a festival (mel?) was held in Kiha?aul?. In a letter reporting Ni?cald?s?s last days, written in bh??? Hindi by Ni?cald?s?s successor Day?r?m, R?j? R?msi?ha was asked to fund another bigger ceremony commemorating Ni?cald?s (Si?ha 1981, 12-13). 2.7 Successors in the Lineage Since Ni?cald?s was unmarried, upon his death he was succeeded by the seniormost of his two disciples, Day?r?m. He is said to be of simple nature (saral svabh?v), and have written a Hindi text on Ayurveda. By 1896, Day?r?m was succeeded by Ni?cald?s?s other disciple, Man?r?m, who was a famous physician (vaidya). Both Day?r?m and Man?r?m were J??s. N?r?ya?d?s reports that Man?r?m would charge the wealthy (?r?m?n) for his medical services, but then would spend the money in feeding ascetics (s?dh?) and holy men (sant), distributing clothes to the needy and feeding the poor and hungry, including monkeys and pigeons. When a British tax assessor, hearing of Man?r?m?s wealth, paid him a visit, he found a long line of poor 40 Si?ha reports that the topic of the debate was the repudiation of the cakr??kita samprad?ya (followers of the dvaita-ved?ntin Madhva and vi?i???dvaitin R?m?nuja, according to Dayananda Saraswati (1963, 512-3)) and their foolish practice of being announced in broad daylight by preceding ma??l-dh?r?s, torch-bearers (Ibid., 512-13). 41 Pt. P?t?mbar: r?j?r?n? don? ?tino?mai? gurubh?v rakhte the. ?r?ni?cald?sj?k? sa?gatisai? so r?j? pa??itk? padav?k?? pr?pt bhay?. Mangald?s: ? sab r?j-ku?umb ni?cald?s vi?e gur?bh?v rakhkar unk? ?j??-anus?r vartane lag?, aur ni?cald?s ke kathananus?r r?msi?ha ne satk?rya kiy?. 42 Ni?cald?s?s successor Day?r?m wrote R?j? R?msi?ha: ? s?huk?r sa?g h?th? do bakhare k? nish?n k? 1 ballam 13 pa?khe 15 gho?e ko??v?l 15 ma??al? b?j? baj?va? v?l? th? ? 20 receiving food. Upon inspecting Man?r?m?s accounts and stores, the tax assessor found no wealth and asked Man?r?m, ?Although you have little wealth, you give away so much. What will you do when you run out?? Man?r?m replied, ?When it runs out, I too will go join the line of these poor.? Hearing this, the tax man was very impressed and returned without assessing him any taxes (1978-9, 2:856-7). Man?r?m passed away in 1921 and was succeeded by R?m?nand, an Ah?r J?? (Si?ha 1981, 17-18; N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:856-8), who was the first in Ni?cald?s?s lineage to become a householder (Si?ha 1981, 8).43 Figure 4 shows him with his wife, son and an unidentified man. (On my visit to Kiha?auli, I took a photograph of this picture hanging on the wall inside Mrs. R?m?nand?s house). He passed away in 1973 (N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:858) and is survived by his wife, whom I was fortunate to meet on my visit to Kiha?aul? (Figure 5). By the time S?ratr?m D?d? visited Kiha?aul? in 1991, no center (gadd?, lit. ?seat?) remained (1994, 19). The family now lives in R?mpur?, a suburb of Delhi, and only Mrs. R?m?nand visits the property periodically. Kapil provides a photo of the cremation memorials (sam?dhi) of Ni?cald?s, Day?r?m and Man?r?m in the school (p??h??l?) in Kiha?aul? located on the grounds of the Pahl?dpur-Ki?haul? Government High School (r?jak?ya ucca vidy?lay) at the entrance to the village (2005, 31 and dust jacket). During my visit to Kiha?aul? in 2008, I was informed by R?m?nand?s wife that they are just memorials, there are no ashes in them ? which may account for their general neglect (Figure 6, photographed by me). 43 Si?ha: inke kathan?nus?r sant ni?cald?s j? k? gadd?-parampar? me?, mai? sarvapratham ais? mahant h?? jisne vaiv?hik j?van sv?k?r kiy? hai. 21 R?m?nand had four sons, of whom two are doctors, one a police official, and the youngest a detached mendicant (virakta s?dh?), but not connected with this center (gadd?).44 The eldest son, Dr. Jagd??var?nand, is of the Y?dav (Ahir) j?ti and practices Ayurveda in the R?mpur? district of Delhi (D?d? 1994, 19, 24, 60).45 When I contacted him by phone in 2008, Jagd??var?nand was not interested in talking about his father, Ni?cald?s or the D?d? Panth. 44 Kapil, p. 31: cauth? jo sabse cho??, vah apn? g?hasth? se du?kh? hokar virakt s?dh? ho gay? hai? 45 S?ratr?m D?d? incorrectly indicates that Jagd??var?nand is Manir?m?s son, but based on the other evidence presented above, and corroborated by my visit to Kiha?aul?, he is R?m?nand?s son. Figure 4: R?m?nand and His Family, ca. 1950 Figure 5: Mrs. R?m?nand, 2008 Figure 6: Sam?dhis of Ni?cald?s, Day?r?m and Man?r?m 22 2.8 Works Written by Ni?cald?s Ni?cald?s has two well-known works, Vic?rs?gar (VS) and V?ttiprabh?kar (VP). His third work, Yuktiprak?? (YP) is less known. All three were written in a Braj-like medieval Hindi dialect, B??gr?/Hary?nv? (see n. 7, p. 3). These works are rather unusual in their originality and relative contemporaneity. Ved?nta works of the era written in the vernacular typically tend to be translations of existing Sanskrit works and despite the breadth of the Advaita canon, there have been relatively few original works of similar scope written in the past two hundred years. Vic?rs?gar was composed no later than 1848; several manuscripts with Ni?cald?s's own revisions were also in circulation (D?d? 1994, 37-8, 69-77; Si?ha 1981, 19). 46 This work is a comprehensive exposition of Advaita Vedanta covering various topics essential for the realization of the true nature of ?tm?, intended to leave no doubts in the reader?s mind. He makes the bold claim: kavi-jana-k?ta bh??? bahuta, grantha jagata vikhy?ta; bina vic?ras?gara lakhai, nahi? sandeha nas?ta (VS v. 1.8). Although there are many world-famous vernacular texts written by wise persons, Without reading Vic?rs?gar, doubts will not be destroyed. While relatively unknown nowadays, the Vic?rs?gar, ?The Ocean of Contemplation,? was considered a significant work during its time. According to Sw?m? Vivekananda ?[this] book has more influence in India than any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries? (Vivekananda 1972, 335).47 The VS has been translated into several other languages, Indian and Western, and there have been commentaries written on it, for example, by S?ratr?m D?d? (Ni?cald?s 1994) and by Nigam?nand (Ni?cald?s 1967). As further evidence of its lasting popularity, Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950) wrote a ?compilation of the salient points? of the VS in Tamil, entitled the Vic?ra Ma?i M?l?, ?Jewel Garland of Enquiry,? which is based on the Tamil translation of the VS (Ramana and Sankaracharya 2002, 98).48 To avoid burdening the reader with technical Sanskrit vocabulary, the VS is written in simple language and does not 46 D?d? (37): ek prati sa?? 1905 [1848 CE] k? sv?m? dv?rik? d?sj?, k??? v?lo?, ke p?s bh? hai. Caturved? however gives its approximate date as 1857: racan?-k?l lagbhag sa?? 1914 (515). 47 One Swami Anand, while enumerating saints all over India in his monograph, Path of Saints as the Fulfilment [sic] of Vedanta, lists ?Nischaldas, whose Vicharsagar is second only to the Brahmasutras, in the North [of India]? (Anand 1977, 84). 48 In his introduction to the English translation of Vic?ra Ma?i M?l?, Arthur Osborne writes that ?on being appealed to by a devotee, Arun?chala Mudaliar, who complained that the volume in Tamil was too difficult to read and understand, Sri Bhagavan graciously made the following extracts? (98). 23 advocate any specific sectarian way (not even the D?d? Panth), nor does it engage in any argumentation and excessive refutation of other viewpoints. It reveals intimate command of diverse metrical forms and is broad in its coverage, describing the three varieties of truth-seekers and the nature of liberation (mok?a). Since the VS was directed at an elementary audience, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd? requested that Ni?cald?s write something for more erudite readers (P?t?mbar 1917, 7). In the (unattributed) introduction to the printed edition of V?ttiprabh?kar published by Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s, we learn that the VS was aimed at average persons (manda-buddhi-v?le), and hence was written in simple language (Ni?cald?s 1899, n.p.). But since the VS only briefly explained the means of knowledge (pram??a), doubts would remain in the minds of many readers. In order to dispel these doubts completely and explain both the means of knowledge and the various kinds of error, the writing of the V?ttiprabh?kar, ?The Illuminator of V?ttis, 49? was undertaken. The text is almost entirely in prose, with the exception of three doh?s. Its authorship is not in doubt, since Ni?cald?s frequently refers to ideas already explained in his VS. Compared to the VS, the VP is far more complex. For each pram??a, (means of knowledge), the Ny?ya standpoint is presented first, then the differences between Old (pr?c?na) and New (navya) Ny?ya, and differences between the Ny?ya and M?m??saka viewpoints are also considered. Finally, these viewpoints are evaluated from the perspective of Advaita Ved?nta. Without intimate familiarity with these other views and their specialized terminology, it is often a challenge to follow the argument. The language here is geared towards learned readers unlike the VS and the YP, which were written for the average person. Ni?cald?s?s erudition is clearly showcased in this work through his familiarity with in the fields of vy?kara?a, Ny?ya, M?m??s?, as well as all the Advaita secondary literature. Ni?cald?s compares the standpoints presented by various Ved?nta sub-schools, without any particular preference for one over the rest. Ni?cald?s also wrote a third, briefer work, Yuktiprak?? (YP), 50 ?The Light of Analogical Reasoning,? which also fits the pattern of the VS and the VP ? an independent treatise whose appeal lies in the reorganization of a traditional body of knowledge. It is a short text in which 49 The term v?tti refers to what is often translated as ?mental mode,? ?conception,? or the ill-advised ?psychosis.? It pertains to the means by which knowledge takes place and will be described more thoroughly in Ch. 5. 50 Caturved? incorrectly gives this text as Mukti-prak?? (515). 24 Ved?nta axioms are explained through illustrations (d????nta) and principles deduced from those illustrations (d?r???nta), and then reinforced with testimony from ?ruti and sm?ti. This is done in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and student, through the course of thirty-nine arguments presented by means of analogies (yukti). According to Si?ha, this text was composed after the VS and the VP, since it refers to topics covered in each, whereas the author of the preface to the 1914 edition of the YP believes it was composed before the other two (Ni?cald?s 1914, 4). I am inclined to agree with the view that the YP predates the VS and the VP, since there are no references to VS or VP in YP. At the same time, however, there is no reference to YP in the VS or VP, but that is easily explained by the difference in their approaches: while VS and VP are sweeping, systematic overviews of Ved?nta, YP is more of a supporting text aimed at clarifying specific issues of Ved?nta for a seeker. 2.9 Other Unpublished Works: When Si?ha visited the Kiha?aul? library, he saw manuscripts for glosses (?ippa??) by Ni?cald?s on the ??? and Ka?ha Upani?ads. The colophons of these manuscripts indicated that they were written at the behest of R?j? R?msi?ha (1981, 28-9). 51 N?r?ya?d?s also saw a manuscript for the Kena Up. (1978-9, 2:850). 52 Ni?cald?s is also said to have written a gloss (?ippa??) on the Mah?bh?rata, but Si?ha was unable to verify this (29). Si?ha also believes that a bh??? text on Ayurveda is alluded to by VS v. 3.10, a discussion of the efficacy of vernacular Advaita texts in delivering knowledge of ?tm? (29). Although a complete manuscript of this Ayurveda text has never been located, Ni?cald?s was also a good physician (vaidya) and the Kiha?aul? library used to have handwritten pages on Ayurveda, though it is unclear who wrote these. Si?ha thinks that perhaps an Ayurveda text ascribed to Man?r?m may have been based on these (29). Sadly, very few manuscripts of Ni?cald?s?s works have been located. The Kiha?aul? library is no longer in existence, and its collection seems to be untraceable. S?ratr?m D?d? wrote that many manuscripts were turned over to the ?r? D?d? Day?l Mah?vidy?laya, Jaipur. When I contacted the principal of the institute, Swami Bajrang D?s, in the summer of 2006, he said the catalogs listed a V?ttiprabh?kar manuscript, but after weeks of searching, his staff were unable to 51 ? B?nd??ek?itodbh?te??v?sasya ?ippa??. For Ka?ha: ? b?nd??en?po rama? sar?mo bhavat?tpara? [sic]. 52 ? ?r?d?d?mah?vidy?lay mot? ???gar? me?? 25 locate it. Both S?ratr?m D?d? in the early 1990s and Kapil in 2005 reported little success finding manuscripts mentioned by earlier scholars. I even contacted descendants of S?ratr?m D?d? in Delhi and Narnaul, Haryana, who told me that their families no longer possessed any manuscripts. Apparently the manuscripts of Ni?cald?s's works were under threat even during the time of his immediate successor, Day?r?m. N?r?ya?d?s mentions a pandit opposed to Ved?nta who borrowed from Day?r?m a manuscript of one of Ni?cald?s's works, a commentary (??k?) on the Mah?bh?rata commentary N?laka??h?, which dealt with two profound sections on Ved?nta. The pandit returned the manuscripts with their pages glued together, but this was not detected for some time (1978-9, 2:850-51). 53 Mangald?s also mentions hearsay that, in the time of Mahant R?m?nand, Ni?calad?s? last successor, many members of the ?rya Sam?j ?borrowed? books from the library, purportedly for their own libraries (20).54 I later procured a microfilm of a manuscript of the V?ttiprabh?kar from the British Library, which could possibly have been one such ?borrowed? manuscript (Ni?chalad?sa 1868). 2.10 Influence of Ni?cald?s and His Works I have already mentioned the Vic?ra Ma?i M?l? written by Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950) in Tamil based on the VS, and also the high regard that Vivekananda (1863-1902) had for the VS. Banerjee suggests that Ni?cald?s?s treatises were ?studied [by Vivekananda] with great attention and recommended studied as a great text to all,? and that Ni?cald?s had significant influence on Vivekananda?s stance regarding knowledge and action (2007, 140-5). As another measure of its influence, Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883), founder of the ?rya Sam?j and staunch critic of Advaita Ved?nta, in his Saty?rthaprak??a (light of truth) singled out for attack Ni?cald?s, specifically his V?ttiprabh?kar, alongside Vasi??ha and ?a?kara (1915, 355-6; 1963, 393-4). Since Ni?cald?s himself passed away in 1863, Dayananda Saraswati was his contemporary, while Vivekananda and Ramana came into their prime one to three decades after his death. Hence their comments give us some sense of how widely known he must have been in their time.55 53 See also Si?ha (1981, 29). 54 vartam?n mahant j? ke samay ved?di k? bahut s? pustake? pustakalayo? ke liye m??g kar aneko? ?rya-sam?j? mah?nubhav le gaye, ais? sunte hai?! 55 Both Darda (1971, 2) and Tank (1984, 140) list Ni?cald?s among the religious and social reformers that had an influence on Rajasthan. Others in the list are Vivekananda, Dayananda Saraswati, Sanyasi Atma Ram, and Swami Govind Giri. 26 A measure of the influence of a philosophical text is the secondary literature that stems from it. For the VS, we have Pt. P?t?mbar?s gloss (?ippa??) written in 1917. P?t?mbar also wrote an abridgment of the VP, called V?ttiratn?val?, published in the same volume (Ni?cald?s 1917b), which has been reprinted many times since. There is also an abridgement of the VS by Lak??nanda, the Ved?nta-prad?pik? (Si?ha 1981, 92), a Marathi commentary, Vic?r-s?gar Rahasya, by ?S?khare? Kisan Mah?r?j (Kapil 2005, 247), not to mention the translations into numerous languages. VS has been translated into modern Hindi, Sanskrit, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu and English, 56 and has been available in various versions since at least 1917, if not earlier (Kapil 2005, 245).57 The Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s (KS) Hindi edition has been available since at least 190658 and is regularly studied by Advaita Ved?nta monks in Benares, Rishikesh and Haridwar. The V?rkar? sect of Maharashtra, 59 which worships Vi?hob? as a form of K???a, employs the VS as one of its primary training texts in its educational institutions (Anonymous 2006; Pal 1968, 91). 60 The VS is held in sufficiently high regard that portions from it were read out to a dying man for comfort (Kopardekar 1985, 69).61 There is mention of the ?ir??v?le S?? B?b? (1836-1918) giving discourses on the VS and recommending its study in his biography, Shri Sai Satcharita (Dabholkar 2002, 111). The VP too has been in print continuously since 1899, published virtually unchanged by Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s and the Venka?e?var Steam Press in Mumbai for at least 50 years. This is the only version readily available, and it is plagued by many typographical and other errors.62 ?tm?nand Muni undertook a painstaking revision of the text in 1957 without the benefit of any 56 There may be versions in other language, e.g., N?r?ya?d?s also mentions Urdu and Gurmukhi versions (1978-9, 2:852). Shiv Brat Lal (1860-1939) of the Radha Swami Satsang movement may also have authored one or more Urdu works based on VS, though its fidelity is suspect, since, according to Ansarullah (1998, 64), ?Swami Nischal Das Ji of the Daood Panth [sic] has based his Vichar Sagar on this book [Vidy?ra?ya?s Pa?cada??, referred to as Vidya Raina?s Panjadashi]. Shiv Brat writes in the preface: ?I found that people hardly follow Vichar Sagar in Hindi, this is the reason why on its basis Vichar Kalapdrum [sic] in Urdu is written? (64-65). Shiv Brat Lal goes on to state (regarding his version of Pa?cada??), ?Since my primary interest is to arouse interest and remove doubts from the minds of the people, the inadequacies in the translation are excusable? (65). 57 The 1917 Hindi edition by Brajballabh Haripras?d of Gu?g?on was the fifth edition, pa?cam?v?tti. 58 The 1906 edition (sa?vat 1963) does not include Pt. P?t?mbar?s ?ippa?a (Ni?cald?s 1906). 59 The word v?rkar? is derived from v?r?, ?[multiple] times? and kar?, ?one who does.? A V?rkar? is one who makes the pilgrimage to Pandharpur twice a year regularly, on foot if possible. An alternate ?self-definition? of v?r?, attributed to S. K. Neurgavkar, is ?coming and going,? and a v?rkar? is ?one who comes and goes? (Mokashi 1987, 23). 60 From the website of the Shri Gajanan Maharaj Warkari Shikshan Sanstha, regarding the education at its school in Shegaon, Maharashtra: ?This Sanstha is started in 1964. Learning Adhyatmic knowledge and the teaching of the Great Santas and to spread it was the main objective. A syllabus of 4 years is specially prepared. Sanskrit language, and Dhynaneshwari, Bhagwat, Bhagwat- Geeta, Tukaram Gatha, Eknathi Bhagwat, Vichar Sagar, etc. Granthas are taught.? (Anonymous 2006). 61 Gulabrao Maharaj (1881-1915), a Maharashtrian Advaitin did so to comfort a man dying of tuberculosis in Madhan, ca. 1911. 62 Muni (1957, 62): a?uddhiyo? k? to ko? p?r h? nah??, ?there is no end to the errors?? See Muni (62-64) for a discussion of the nature of errors, and also Appendices 2 and 3. 27 handwritten manuscripts (Ni?cald?s 1957). There were two editions of ?tm?nand?s version, and though it is vastly superior, its original print run was undoubtedly quite small, and it has been out of print for nearly 40 years. 63 Certainly the VP would have become much better known if this version been more widely distributed. A Telugu translation of the VP by Vadapalli Pattabhirama Sarma (Niscaladas 1912) is available only at the British Library. The Tamil version by Kuppuswamy that I encountered in Rishikesh (n. 178, p. 71) is also available as microform (Ni?caladasa 1901). Conversely, the YP has virtually dropped out of sight ? I was only able to locate a single copy of it in the Library of Congress collection (Ni?cald?s 1914). A Kannada version translated by Swami ?iv?nanda Bh?rat? also exists, but held only in a German library (Ni?cald?s 1911). The most recent Hindi edition of the YP on record dates to 1959 (Kapil 2005, 247). A relatively recent Malayalam translation of the YP is also available (Ni?cald?s 1966). Within the D?d? Panth, Ni?cald?s is included among D?d? Day?l?s illustrious followers. As W. G. Orr stated (1947), ?the most famous Dadu Panthi writer of modern times is Nischal Das? His books are by no means easy reading, and few, with the exception of some able Hindu scholars, have attempted to master them? (Orr 1947, 215). As Monika Thiel-Horstmann observed almost half a century later (1989), not much had changed: Ni?cald?s was ?a highly thought of but hardly read D?d?panth? Ved?ntist? (1992, 146). During my visits to D?d?panth? areas in Rajasthan and Haryana in 2006 and 2008, I frequently encountered expressions of pride from D?d?panth?s that Ni?cald?s was a great scholar respected all over India, and now the world, since I had come all the way from USA to study him. Yet when I asked about locating manuscripts and printed versions of his less common texts like the VP and the YP, most were not even familiar with these titles. When we located Ni?cald?s?s center (gadd?) in Kiha?aul? and were fortunate to meet with the wife of the last member of Ni?cald?s?s lineage, the three D?d?panth? religious leaders (mahant) who were helping me expressed gratitude to me for providing them with a viewing (dar?an) of the great scholar?s center and wooden sandals (p?duk?) and expressed wonder that it required someone like me to come from overseas and motivate them to look for a place that was practically in their backyard.64 They all were familiar with Ni?cald?s, but had never even read the VS, although they could quote select verses from it verbatim. During 63 The second edition was published in 1969 and does not give the number of copies printed. The first edition (1957) had a print run of a thousand copies. 64 Arjund?s Sv?m? remarked, ?kitne acraj k? b?t hai ki aise mah?n puru? ke ?j ham?re dar?an hue hai? aur vah bh? ?p ko amr?k? se ?kar hame? yah?? l?n? pa??!? 28 my stay in Rishikesh in 2006, when seeking a teacher with whom to study the VP, I found that many monks considered themselves unfit to teach it, and a few told me that they would like to study the text themselves, since they had heard it was a formidable (praca??a) text. A major reason for the popularity of Ni?cald?s?s works is his decision to make them accessible to average people by writing them in the vernacular (bh???).65 At the conclusion of the VS, Ni?cald?s states: tin yaha bh???grantha kiya, ra?ca na upaj? l?ja; t?mai? yaha ika hetu hai, day?dharma sirt?j. (VS v. 7.113) From them, 66 I?ve written this work in the vernacular, without embarrassment. Compassion and dharma are its crown. In writing this, I have only this one goal: bina vy?karana na pa?hi sakai, grantha sa?sk?ta manda; pa?hai y?hi anay?sa h??, lahai su param?nanda (VS v. 7.114) Without knowledge of grammar, Sanskrit works cannot be read by the average folk, They can read this (VS) with ease, and attain the highest bliss. Ni?cald?s?s reasons for writing in the vernacular will be examined in great detail in section 4.1, beginning on p. 70. 2.11 More on Ni?cald?s?s Patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd? R?j? R?msi?ha 67 of B?nd?, who reigned from 1821 to 1889 CE, is an embodiment of seemingly contradictory impulses. On the one hand, he was very traditional and conservative. But he was also closely allied with the British. He supported the Indian rebel cause yet turned his cannons on the rebel soldiers when they came to his gates. He had family members and opponents killed and yet tried to stop the practices of female infanticide, the killing of old women accused of witchcraft, and animal sacrifices. 65 Si?ha notes the presence of words from the local B??gr? dialect (89). This is the another name for the Hary?nv? dialect, considered to have a 92% lexical similarity with Braj Bh???. See n. 7, p. 3. 66 The works he has studied. See VS v. 7.111-12 quoted earlier on p. 16. 67 At least one author was confused by the profusion of contemporaneous R?j? R?msi?ha-s in Rajasthan, with Orr (1947, 215) reporting that Ni?cald?s conducted ?many learned discussions? in Jaipur under the reign of Sawai R?m Singh II (r. 1835-80). There is also R?j? R?m Singh of neighboring Ko?? (r.1827-66). 29 R?msi?ha had studied Sanskrit in childhood and was deeply interested in Ved?nta and religious texts. Gahlot mentions that it was a matter of honor to R?msi?ha to act as an old-style noble, pur?ne ?ha?g k? R?jp?t ra?s, and he adopted traditional practices in all government matters (1960, 99-100).68 Tod calls him ?the most conservative prince in conservative R?jput?na, and a grand specimen of a true R?jput gentleman? (1920, 3:1520n2). He would bathe and have his clothes washed after even a moment?s meeting with Englishmen and Muslims (Gahlot 1960, 99)! 69 Art and literature flourished under him (Datta and Narain 1985, 283), and B?nd? was renowned as the second K??? with forty schools for teaching Sanskrit (Gahlot 1960, 100). He honored poets and writers with gifts of land and money, and had many well-known personages at his court in addition to Ni?cald?s. These included the Sanskrit scholar Pt. Gang?r?m and the poet S?ryamalla (var. S?rajmalla or S?rajmal) Mi?ra? (1815-1868 CE), who composed the Va??a Bh?skar, a poem in Hindi, Braj, Prakrit, Sanskrit and the regional poetic languages Pi?gal and 68 R?jya pra??l? me? pratyek b?t pur?ne ?ha?g k? rakhne k? ise ?auk th? aur apne ?pko pur?ne ?ha?g k? ek r?jp?t ra?s m?nane me? ye apn? gaurav samajhte the. 69 Ye a?grez va musalm?no? se chane par mul?k?t karne ke b?d nah?te aur kapa?e bh? dhulv?te the. I?m taking chane par as k?a? bhar, but have been unable to verify this usage. Figure 7: R?j? R?msi?ha (Bautze 1985, 95) 30 ?i?gal 70 about the history from earliest times of R?msi?ha?s lineage, the H???-s of the Cauh?n dynasty (S?ryamalla 2007). The medicines of the court physician Vaidyar?j B?b? ?tm?r?m Sany?s? were very famous. Other notable scholars of the court were ?s?nand J?vanl?l, Pa?h?n Ham??kh?? 71 and J?van L?l Nagar, the king?s prime minister and poet (Datta and Narain 1985, 283; Dhoundiyal 1964, 243; Gahlot 1960, 99-100; Khan 1992; Mishra 1987, 101; S?ryamalla and Devala 2007). The case of S?ryamalla Mi?ra??s Va??a Bh?skar itself provides further insight into R?msi?ha. S?ryamalla, like his father, Ca???d?n (1791-1835 CE) before him and his adopted son Mur?r?d?n after him, was a court poet for R?msi?ha. He earned the title Mi?ra? by showing proficiency in six languages (Sharma 1976, 7). Once, when R?msi?ha was listening to Pt. ???nand narrate the Mah?bh?rata in his court, a desire awoke in him to have a similar narrative of his Cauh?n lineage commissioned by S?ryamalla. However, as Sanskrit was not widely understood at this time, why not have it written in the vernacular (Khan 1973, 17)? S?ryamalla is said to have accepted the commission on the condition that he would be allowed to write the truth. As the work progressed and R?msi?ha saw both the good qualities and the flaws of his ancestors captured in verse, he demanded that S?ryamalla leave his defects out of the work or not write anything. The poet is said to have promptly quit work on the piece and the work was eventually completed posthumously by S?ryamalla?s adopted son Mur?r?d?n, who complied with R?msi?ha?s bowdlerizing desires (Khan 1992, 54; 1973, 24-5; Sharma 1976, 9-10). Alam Shah Khan believes that the actual unflattering events that S?ryamalla would have incorporated in his work include: 1) R?msi?ha treacherously had his own eldest son Bh?msi?ha killed for being disrespectful (avaj??k?r?) and for roaming in the company of [European] foreigners (yavana); 2) R?msi?ha had his brother Gop?lsi?ha placed under house-arrest (nazar-qaid) on allegations of depravity (du?caritrat?), and he died under arrest; 3) R?msi?ha?s intimate connections with the 70 Pi?gal is said to be a synthesis of Braj and Kha?? Bol?, while ?i?gal is a mix of Rajasthani and Peshachi (Dhoundiyal 1964, 242). According to Prabhakar, who draws on Tessitori?s Bardic & Historical Survey of Rajputana, and Grierson?s Linguistic Survey of India, Pi?gal/Pinga?a is ?Braj Bh??? more or less adulterated and vitiated by the introduction of local words and idioms, while [Di?gal/Dinga?a] is the literary form of old M?rw???, one of the principal R?jasth?n? dialects. ? The standardized old M?rw??? characterized by its elaborateness of diction and currency of poetical and obsolete words different from the colloquial ones was, however, known as Dinga?a only in the context of versified compsositions? (Prabhakar 1976, 46; Grierson 1967, 3-4). [I was unable to verify Prabhakar?s reference to Tessitori (1917, 1:iv). Tessitori (1917) contains two sections of two parts each, and none of these has a ?p. iv?]. 71 Only Gahlot mentions Pa?h?n Ham??kh?? (100), and I am unable to find any further details as to his claim to notability, or that of Pts. Gang?r?m and ?s?nand/???nand. 31 British (see below) would not have been reported favorably by S?ryamalla who was anti-British and sympathized with the mutineers in the 1857 Revolt (Khan 1973, 26-31). The kingdom of B?nd? was indeed closely linked with the British, and was the first of the R?jp?t?n? kingdoms to ally itself with the East India Company (Mishra 1987, 184-5). When R?msi?ha?s father and predecessor to the throne Bi?ansi?ha died in 1821, he specifically requested that James Tod, the then Agent to the Governor General (AGG) for the Rajasthan? princely states (riy?sat), be the guardian of his son R?msi?ha, who was only ten years old at the time (Tod and Crooke 1920, 3:1733). Tod was present at the coronation of R?msi?ha not just as guardian, 72 but also as the authority who would ratify his ascension to the throne (Gahlot 1960, 97n*; Tod and Crooke 1920, 3:1740-44). The kingdom of B?nd? paid the British government an annual ?rent? of Rs. 80,000 to include two-thirds of the district (pargan?) of Ke?or?y P??a? in its kingdom (Aitchison 1929, 217-8; Gahlot 1960, 98), which amounted to over a tenth of the estimated revenue of B?nd?, reported to be Rs. 75,55,323 as of 1897 (Hendley 1897, 29). In 1877, R?msi?ha was appointed Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India (GCSI) by Queen Victoria and given the title of Advisor to the Queen. In 1878 he was awarded the Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire (CIE) (Chisholm 1910, 798; Gahlot 1960, 99; Anonymous 1877). From 1886 onwards, he had rupee coins minted with ?Queen Victoria? engraved on one side and his name on the other (Gahlot 1960, 101). He also signed treaties with the British for the mutual extradition of ?persons charged with certain specific offences? (Aitchison 1929, 218, 232-4), and for prohibiting the manufacturing of salt in B?nd? and permitting only salt on which ?duty had been levied by the British government.? For the latter treaty, R?msi?ha was paid Rs. 8,000 per year by the British government (Aitchison 1929, 219, 234-6). Aitchison grumbled that ?R?m Singh?s attitude towards the British Government during the mutiny of 1857 was one of apathy which, in the case of the rising of the Raj troops at Kotah, almost amounted to open support of the rebel cause,? but this act was more likely a result of his ill-will towards Ko?? (218; Gahlot 1960, 98-9). However, in 1858, he closed his gates and turned the B?nd? fort?s cannons on the Indian rebel soldiers and did not grant them sanctuary. In the same year, when the M?n? tribe of Khar?? rebelled, he had the uprising squelched, presumably by 72 R?msi?ha was Tod?s ?nephew by courtesy and adoption.? (Tod and Crooke 1920, 3:1520n2) and Tod was a r?kh?-brother to R?msi?ha?s mother (Khan 1973, 30-31). 32 force (Gahlot 1960, 100; Vashishtha 1993, 10-11; Sharma 1996, 90-91).73 When Bhomasim?a H???, an estate-holder (j?g?rd?r) of Gotha??, transgressed government orders and spread revolt through the kingdom, his estate was confiscated and he was expelled from B?nd?. Later, the transgressor was killed along with his brother and sons (Gahlot 1960, 100).74 Clearly, R?msi?ha governed with an iron fist. On the other hand, Gahlot also tells us that R?msi?ha used to care deeply for the welfare of his subjects (99). He banned the R?jp?t practice of female infanticide in 1936 CE, eight years before the British instituted a similar law in B?nd? (98 n. ?). During that time, it was customary, particularly among the aboriginal tribes, to accuse old women of being witches (d??n) eating children and humans. These women would be mistreated and abused, and sometimes even drowned alive. R?msi?ha abolished this practice in B?nd? in 1829 (100). To counter the blind belief of his subjects in ghosts, he announced that anyone who arranged for a direct encounter with a ghost would be awarded 50 b?gh?-s of land;75 nobody was able to collect. (100). In the severe droughts of 1833 and 1838 he looked after the well-being of his citizens (99). He stopped ?traditional? practices such as buffalo and goat sacrifices during the Caitra (Mar-Apr) and A?vin (Sep-Oct) Navar?tr? Dev? p?j?s, nine- to ten-day long festivals of goddess worship (98). In addition to his interest in the arts and literature and his administrative actions, R?msi?ha is described by Gahlot as having a great desire to contemplate and discuss Ved?nta (100),76 perhaps implying that this was the reason behind R?msi?ha?s good works (satk?rya). Vi?h?hala??str? is more direct. After relating that Ni?cald?s was adopted by R?msi?ha and his family as their guru, he writes that R?msi?ha performed good works in accordance with Ni?cald?s?s request (1899, 10).77 Since Ni?cald?s did not visit B?nd? until 1856 (Si?ha 1981, 10), the good works described above occurred prior to Ni?cald?s?s visit, and there is no record of any other communication between Ni?cald?s and R?msi?ha prior to Ni?cald?s?s visit, one must conservatively assume that the motives for R?msi?ha?s good works were something other than his beloved guru?s wishes. There is, however, written record of correspondence between 73 ? jab khar?? ke m?no? ne balv? kiy? to mah?r?v r?msi?ha ne unko dab? diy? (Gahlot 1960, 100). 74 Go?ha?? ke j?g?rd?r ? ne r?jya k? ?j??o? k? ula?ghan kiy? aur r?j vidroh fail?y?, isse usk? j?g?r jabta karke use rajya se nik?l diy? gay?. Pa?c?t vah may apne bh?i ? va putra ? ke m?r? gay?. 75 Approximately 30 acres, assuming these were sark?r? b?gh?-s. See n. 35 on p. 7. 76 Mah?r?v r?msi?ha ko ved?nt par vic?r vimar?a karne k? ba?? c?v th?. 77 ? Ni?cald?sj? b?nd? me? ? gaye. pher s?dh? ke sam?gam se r?msi?haj? k? bhaktibh?v v?ddhi?gata hu?. Aur sab r?jku?umb ni?cald?s vi?e gurubh?v rakhkar unk? ?j??nus?r vartane lag?. Aur ni?cald?s ke kathan?ns?r r?msi?hane satk?rya kiy?. 33 Ni?cald?s and R?msi?ha, and also correspondence from Ni?cald?s?s disciple Day?r?m to R?msi?ha upon Ni?cald?s?s death (Si?ha 1981, 10-13).78 Further, in the colophon to the earliest version of the V?ttiprabh?kar, dated barely five years after Ni?cald?s?s death, it is stated that ?this text has been disseminated (prasiddha kiy? hai?) by the servants of holy men, N?r?ya?a Trikam and L?l?dhar Odhav. They researched the text over at the esteemed (nirmala) Lord R?msi?ha?s [place], at the request of Sw?m? Trilokr?m, and published it in Mumbai at Har? Li?g? Kadam?s printing press? (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41).79 Hence there is strong evidence of the relationship between R?msi?ha and Ni?cald?s, in the connection of Ved?nta. R?msi?ha passed away in 1889 at the age of seventy-eight, having ruled his kingdom for sixty-eight years. He was survived by five legitimate sons as well as three illegitimate sons borne by his concubines (Gahlot 1960, 101).80 The myriad contradictions in R?msi?ha?s actions may be best explained by borrowing from Tod?s assessment of the character of R?msi?ha?s father, the Mah?r?o Bi?ansi?ha: ?He was an honest man, and every inch a Rajput. Under an unpolished exterior, he concealed an excellent heart and an energetic soul; he was by no means deficient in understanding, and possessed a thorough knowledge of his own interests [emphasis mine]. ? He was somewhat despotic in his own little empire, knowing that fear is a necessary incentive to respect in the governed?? (1920, 3:1518-9, emphasis mine). In light of what has been said about R?msi?ha, it is unlikely that he had any intention to contribute to the formation of a nationalist identity when he commissioned Ni?cald?s to write the VP. He was more likely motivated by a desire to show his respect for tradition and his guru, to earn merit (pu?ya) as a patron of spiritual teachers, and also possibly to reform the orthodoxy, particularly the pandits in his court who did not think highly of Ni?cald?s prior to his victory over them in religio-philosophical debate (??str?rtha). R?msi?ha always acted in his self-interest, doing what he thought was best for him and his kingdom, in keeping with his pride in being a traditional, conservative, honorable R?jp?t. He would make deals with the British when it suited his purposes, and break them when it didn?t. He looked after his subjects as long as they followed his wishes. Yet he was not completely bound by tradition and showed willingness to make some changes for the wellbeing of his 78 See also n. 617, p. 379. 79 so? granth sv?mi trilokr?m-ji ki ?j?? sai? santana ke d?s n?r?ya?-ji trikam-ji au l?l?dhar odhav-j? don?? milke nirmale sv?mi r?msi?g-ji ki p?s sodh?yke mumb?? mai? har? li?g? kadam ke ch?p-kh?nai? mai? chap?yke prasiddha kiy? hai?. 80 iske ? p??c r?jkum?r tath? ? t?n anauras putra upa-patniyo? (pa?ad?yato?) se the (Gahlot 101). A pa?ad?yat f. (var. parad?yat) is a woman who was a d?s? of the king married by the king to someone else but staying in the king?s palace as a upa- patni, co-wife or rakhail, concubine, with the right to remain in pard? similar to a queen RH?K (2:716 s.v.; Kumar 2003). 34 subjects, perhaps even to the extent of requesting his guru to write a text in the vernacular. We do have record of his awareness of the wider accessibility of vernacular languages over Sanskrit, since he specifically requested that his court poet, S?ryamalla Mi?ra?, compose an epic narrative of his rule in the vernacular (Khan 1973, 17). We also have evidence of his role in helping get Ni?cald?s?s VP published after Ni?cald?s?s untimely death. 2.12 Chapter Summary Our review of Ni?cald?s?s biographical sources presents him as a learned yet simple, unworldly man, a staunch Advaita Ved?ntin without any interest in fame or fortune. After his mother passed away when he was thirteen or fourteen, he was raised among the D?d? Panth, and was most certainly influenced by their ideas of religious tolerance and disregard of caste. From the age of fourteen or fifteen he devoted himself to the pursuit of knowledge, and went to study Sanskrit in Benares. Due to earlier experiences of caste discrimination, he is said to have kept his J?? caste secret from his teachers, who would otherwise not have taught him Sanskrit, Ny?ya and Ved?nta. Hagiographic accounts state that when he confessed his true caste to his teacher, Pt. K?k?r?m, who had offered Ni?cald?s his daughter?s hand in marriage, K?k?r?m cursed Ni?cald?s to suffer, every day, from a fever. Even if one discounts these accounts as fanciful, it is plausible that Ni?cald?s encountered caste-discrimination, which, if true, would most certainly have influenced his stance against caste in his writings, and possibly also his choice to write in the vernacular. There is no proof that Ni?cald?s?s writings were influenced by his patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd?, Rajasthan. There is documentary evidence that R?msi?ha was indeed a patron of Ni?cald?s, 81 but non-hagiographic sources such as the historian of Rajasthan, Gahlot (1960), do not directly mention the connection. 82 The R?j? was reputed to be a Sanskrit scholar, and a staunch traditionalist. Yet this scholar-king was ruthless and iron-fisted, an opportunist who formed close relationships with the ruling British colonial regime. However, as mentioned earlier, he was certainly aware of the wider accessibility of vernacular languages over Sanskrit, and specifically requested his court poet, S?ryamalla Mi?ra?, to compose an epic narrative of his 81 As evinced by several letters from the R?j? to Ni?cald?s, whose content was presented by Ra?j?t Si?ha (1981, 10-13) 82 Gahlot only mentions that Ni?cald?s, the author of VS, was coterminous: ?d?d?panth? s?dhu ni?cald?s vic?rs?gar n?mak ved?nt granth ke racayit? ins? ke samay me? hu? th?.? (1960, 100). Due to the ambiguous wording, it is unclear if Gahlot is implying that R?msi?ha commissioned VS. Patronage is implied, since this sentence follows one which mentions Suryamal Mi?ra as dependent on the king for patronage. 35 rule in the vernacular. It is quite likely not a hagiographic exaggeration that R?msi?ha and his family considered Ni?cald?s as their Ved?nta teacher. It is very possible that R?msi?ha requested him to write works in the vernacular for the benefit of the common person, and just as likely that the king also requested him to write a text that would be equally appreciated by a learned, Sanskrit-speaking audience. But it is not the least bit surprising that Ni?cald?s totally neglected to acknowledge his patron in any of his extant three bh??? Ved?nta works. As he states in the invocatory verses (ma?gala doh?) at the start of VS: Being pure, boundless Brahman, in which all of creation occurs, to whom should he prayerfully bow down (VS vv. 1.1-5)?83 One has the impression that Ni?cald?s was being true to his uncompromising understanding of non- duality, and everything he wrote appears to consistently stem from that. The patronage of the king must have been welcome, but its absence would have not bothered Ni?cald?s in the least. One is reminded of the anecdote about Ni?cald?s?s successor, Man?r?m, and the British tax assessor, recounted in section 2.7 above. When the assessor asked Man?r?m what he would do if his meager wealth was exhausted by his charity, Man?r?m is said to have replied that he too would then go stand in line with the poor who queued at his door for charity. 83 The essence of these verses have been presented here. See section 3.8, p. 67 for the full context. 3 The D?d? Panth and Ni?cald?s In this chapter, I present the life and thought of D?d? Day?l, the founder of the D?d? Panth to which Ni?cald?s belonged, through an examination of D?d??s hagiographies, of D?d??s teachings as recorded in the D?d? V???, and of the writings of some early followers in D?d??s lineage, namely Rajjab and Sundard?s. I do so to determine if there are any parallels between the lives and hagiographies of these early D?d?panth?s and Ni?cald?s, and to ascertain their attitudes towards patronage, religion and caste. I explore whether the experiences and/or teachings of D?d? and his followers may have influenced Ni?cald?s?s stance on caste and writing in the vernacular, and whether there are any parallels between the lives of Ni?cald?s and D?d?, and their attitudes towards patronage, religion and caste. I also examine the internal structure of the D?d? Panth, Ni?cald?s's place within this structure, and the actual relationship between the Panth and Ni?cald?s. 3.1 D?d? Day?l, the Founder of the D?d? Panth The D?d? Panth84 is named after its founder, D?d? Day?l (1544-1603). Definite biographical detail about D?d? Day?l is scarce; most sources are based on sectarian accounts of his life, primarily the D?d? Janma L?l?, DJL (ca. 1620) by Jangop?l who was one of D?d??s disciples, the Sarv??g? (ca. 1620) of Rajjab, another first-generation disciple of D?d?, and the Bhaktam?l (ca. 1713) by R?ghavd?s, a fifth generation disciple (1988, 11-14; Caturved? 1964, 488-9; Orr 1947, 26, 210). These accounts are largely hagiographic in nature. 85 According to these sources, D?d? was raised in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, by a merchant named Lod?r?m, who found him as a baby in the Sabarmati river. In some versions of DJL, the baby was of divine origin (Jangopal 1988, 19, 34).86 Later versions state that Lod?r?m was a N?gar or Gaur brahman, but Orr and Caturved? discuss the possibility that he was Muslim since the name D?d? was actually derived from the common Muslim name D??d and his parents Lod?87 and Bas? or Bas?ran, sons Gar?bd?s and Misk?nd?s, daughters Abb? and 84 Panth literally means ?way, road or path.? In the present context it means ?sect.? Hence a D?d?panth? is one who belongs to the D?d? Panth, a follower of the sect. 85 Callewaert writes rather tactlessly that the sectarian historians ?indulged in laudatory embellishments to the point of most fanciful ?miracle mongering?? (Jangopal 1988, 12). 86 In DJL 1.6.3 D?d? is described as ?b?lak adhar, a child from heaven.? In 1.6.4 ?pala?? k?y? b?la k? r?pa hvai, He transformed His body into the shape of a child.? In 1.6.5 ?l?n? avat?r?, he became an avat?r, incarnation of the divine.? These are common hagiographic tropes of descent (Smith 2000, 22-26, 29-34). 87 Caturved? also mentions that D?d??s father may have been named Sulem?n and his mother, Habb? (1964, 490). 38 Sabb?, 88 and grandson Faq?rd?s all had Muslim names (Caturved? 1964, 490; Orr 1947, 50- 51).89 D?d? was a cotton carder by profession, likely an inherited family trade. This is confirmed by a Persian account, the Dabist?n-i-Maz?hib (The School of Religions), ?a kind of encyclop?dia of religions? (Orr 1947, 47),90 where he is described as a cotton carder (nadd?f), that is, one who prepares the cotton fibers for spinning into yarn. Also, in Marathi works by Ekn?th (ca. 1533-1599), Tuk?r?m (1598-1650) and the Bhaktivijaya by Mahipati (1715-1790), D?d? is referred to as a cotton-carder (pi?j?r?), possibly an inherited family trade (Orr 1947, 47; Jangopal 1988, 15; Abbott and Godbole 1982, 2:384; Callewaert 1978, 30-31). Thus, it is possible that, like Kabir (1398-1448),91 D?d? also came from a lower caste family which converted to Islam (Vaudeville 1974, 83-89). At the age of eleven, D?d? met his guru, whose identity also is a subject of controversy. Sundard?s, D?d??s direct disciple, gives his name as V?ddh?nand in his Guru Samprad?ya, ?Teacher Lineage? (Sundard?s 1978, 271).92 In Jangop?l?s DJL, he is identified as B?b? B??h?, with a variant referring to him only as an old man (b??h?). It is also implied that this teacher is none other than the Supreme Lord (parmesura). 93 Orr suggests that he was Shaikh Buddhan (var. Bu?han), a Sufi saint in Sambhar, of the Q?dir? order, and presents what he considers irrefutable historical evidence of D?d??s connection to this Buddhan and of relations between Buddhan?s descendants and the Narain? seat (gadd?), that continued 88 The daughters are given as Hav? and B?? by Jangop?l in v 9.6 (1988, 60) and as Haww? and Shabbo by Orr (1947, 30). 89 Callewaert is unusually silent on the matter of these Muslim names. 90 For more recent scholarship on the Dabist?n-i-Maz?hib, see Behl (2011). Behl describes the mid-seventeenth-century Dabist?n accounts of the various religion as biased and reported through the lens of the narrator, M?bad Sh?h?s Zoroastrian sect, the ?zar Kaiv?n?, and its politics. Behl does not discuss the Dabist?n?s account of D?d?, though he suggests that the author ?finds monistic philosophical systems most sympathetic to his own view of religion? (226). The longer version of this article (Behl 2010) also does not refer to D?d?. 91 Vaudeville (1974, 39). 92 Sundard?s? Guru Samprad?ya vv. 8-9: D?d?j? k? guru aba suniye; bahuta bh?nti tinike guna guniye. D?d?j? kau? darasana d?nhau; akasm?ta k?h? nah?? c?nhau?. B?ddh?nanda n?ma hai j?kau; ?haura ?hik?nau kah?? na t?kau. Sahaja r?pa bicarai bh? m??h??. Icch? parai tah?? so j??h??. ?Now listen, who was D?d??s guru, who was very virtuous. He gave D?d? his dar?an suddenly, no one [else] recognized him [at that time]. V?ddh?nand is his name, he has no fixed place. He wanders the earth in his unqualified (sahaja) form, going where[ever] he desires.? Sundar then proceeds for nearly another 40 verses to trace back the lineage culminating in Guru Brahm?nanda (v. 46) (Sundard?s 1978, 270-71, 78). 93 DJL 1.7:?B?b? B??hai d?nau? daras??. ?B?b? B??h? gave him his dar?an.? Variant: b??hai r?pa diyau hari daras?. ?Hari, God gave him his dar?an in the form of an old man.? 1.8, about the glories of parama puri?a paramesura, the Supreme Lord, occurring after the mention appearance of B?b? B??h?, implies a direct association between the two (Jangopal 1988, 35, 91). 39 through Orr?s time (1947, 54-56).94 Callewaert quotes H. H. Wilson?s ?important account? based on verbal information from Kabirpanthias of Benares, that D?d? was ?a pupil of one of the Kabir-panthi teachers, ? fifth in descent from Ramananda, namely 1) Kabir; 2) Kamal; 3) Jamal; 4) Bimal; 5) Buddhan; 6) Dadu? (Jangopal 1988, 15-16; Callewaert 1987, 188-89). Thus Callewaert appears to accept this linking of D?d? to Kabir via Buddhan, while side- stepping the question of whether he was Muslim. Orr is more outspoken, calling Sundard?s?s Guru Samprad?ya lineage a ?roll of imaginary saints,? an ?imaginative flight? which was concocted to put the new sect on the same footing as the Vaishnava Samprad?yas. Orr suggests that since Sundard?s?s Samprad?ya never became part of the established tradition, it only proves the point. He speculates that D?d? must have split from his Muslim teacher early in his career since there is no mention of his name in any of D?d??s works (1947, 53-54). It seems likely that within fifty years95 of D?d??s death there was already a trend among D?d??s followers to downplay his lower-caste origins and distance him from his Muslim teacher, that is, to portray him not as an illiterate householder sant but a detached, saintly scholar (Gold 1994, 244). D?d? appears to refer to himself in DV as a pinjara96 and a dhuniy?, 97 both terms for a cotton-carder. The earlier manuscripts of DJL seem untroubled by these terms. However, Callewaert?s study (Jangopal 1988) of the various manuscripts of DJL shows that in those sources, references to his family?s cotton-carding profession are either dropped98 or modified99 (18-19). The DJL retains numerous references to D?d? carding cotton while discoursing. 100 Eventually, a voice from heaven is said to have ordered D?d? to stop carding cotton, because people who did not know his secret would go to hell for despising him, presumably for being a low-caste cotton-carder (DJL 4.5.1-2). 94 Caturved? writes that Orr has established this convincingly, nirviv?d r?p se (1964, 492). For more on Shaikh Buddhan, see Pandey (1992, 180-1), Behl (2007, 178-9). 95 Callewaert consulted seven manuscripts, A through G, which he treated as two groups: ACDG form the ?earliest version,? even though the dates vary from 1653 (A) through 1711 (G); BEF constitute the ?revised version,? with dates ranging from 1654 (B) to 1700 (F). Thus the earliest of the DJL manuscripts with the interpolations, B, is dated 1654, and D?d? passed away in 1603 (Jangop?l 1988, 17-18). 96 ?ek (refrain) to DV pad 316 (21.3), a first-person lament: kau??a ?da?m?? ka?m??a bic?r?, kisa kau? p?jai gar?ba pi?j?r?. ?Who is the lowly, wretched man; whom should the poor cotton-carder worship?? (Callewaert 1991, 1:249; Caturved? 1966, 455 ). N?r?ya?d?s?s version has piy?r? instead of pi?j?r? (2004, 664). 97 ?ek to DV pad 375 (24.23): ko sv??m? ko se?a kahai, isa dhu?niye k? mara?ma na ko? lahai. ?Who is called a [Hindu] sv?m?, who, a [Sufi] Shaikh? No one gets the essence of this cotton-carder.? (Callewaert 1991, 1:259; Caturved? 1966, 477). 98 ?There was great joy at the house of the cotton-carder (dhuniy? ke ghari) [at his birth]? becomes ?All, saba sa?tani, were overjoyed.? (DJL.1.6). 99 ?When [the thief] found only threads [of cotton] (p?yau suta) and started to take them away?? gets changed to ?When [the thief] started to take away the books and pages (poth? p?n?)?? (DJL 3.9). 100 E.g., DJL 1.16 ?He carded cotton,? DJL 4.3 ?he worked as a cotton-carder,? DJL 4.5 ?He never stopped carding cotton, when ordinary people or even kings came to see him.? 40 In some versions D?d??s parents are not named, but in other versions there is an interpolation naming the father as Lod?r?m, a Brahman merchant (Jangopal 1988, 19). D?d??s Sufi teacher?s name, Bu??han, is initially B?b? B??h?, but becomes reinterpreted as the non-Muslim an old man (b??h?) (19-20), which in Sundard?s becomes further brahmanized to V?ddh?nanda. In R?ghavd?s?s Bhaktam?l (ca. 1720), biographies of D?d?panth? sants 101 occur alongside those of other sants and Vaishnava devotees. This trend continues to the present day; Daniel Gold reports, based on field interviews, that D?d?panth?s now identify themselves as Vaishnavas and are also recognized by others as belonging to a Vaishnava sect (1994, 258). 102 Thiel-Horstmann notes that in D?d?panth? sermons, too, there is an obvious tendency towards Sanskritization and hence brahmanization (Thiel-Horstmann and Chopra 1989, 179-180). This brahmanizing trend paradoxically coexists with a certain amount of pride evident among the D?d?panth?s even today have in the fact that D?d?, like Kabir, was respected by both Hindus and Muslims. Two of D?d??s earliest disciples, Rajjab and Bakhn?, were Muslim, as was V?zind Kh?n, a later disciple who did not establish a lineage. 103 There are many verses in the D?d? V??? which display Persian and Arabic linguistic features, and even refer to Allah. 104 But this present-day pride of the D?d?panth?s does not extend to an acceptance of D?d??s Muslim birth, even though D?d??s Muslim parentage was not as much of an issue for at least some of his earlier disciples. Sundard?s praises his guru with a verse that begins eka pi?j?r? ais? ?y??, ?Such a cotton carder came?? (Callewaert and de Beeck 1991, 1:563, pad 95.0; Thiel-Horstmann 1983, 5n8). When Rajjab?s Sarv??g? describes the birth of D?d? by the phrase dhuniy? grahe utpanno D?d? mah?muni, the term dhuniy? can 101 The term sant is difficult to translate. According to Schomer (1987, 2-3) it means ?one who knows the truth? or ?one who has experienced Ultimate Reality? and is extended to also refer to all who seek enlightenment. It goes on to take the generalized senses of ?a good person,? ?a holy man,? a religious teacher. But it also is the historical designation given to the Hindi-speaking and mostly Punjabi and Rajasthani groups of believers in a nirgu?a god, a god beyond qualifications. The English ?saint? is a false cognate. For my purposes, I will henceforth leave this term untranslated. 102 See also Bahuguna?s insightful article where he describes Vaishnavization (my term) pressures faced by sects such as the D?d?panth?s, from sources such as hagiographers, caste hegemony, and ?reformer? rulers such as Sawai Jai Singh (r. 1700- 1743) who had the sects commit to following Vaishnava dharma and forswear caste subversion and contact with Muslims (2009). 103 ?W?zind Kh?n? in Sen (1936, 111). His name does not occur in the lists of D?d??s 52 disciples, e.g. Orr (1947, 234-5) or N?r?ya?d?s (1975, 2:1061-64). But N?r?ya?d?s does have a few sections describing Disciple V?j?nd, a Pathan from Uttar Pradesh and his meeting with D?d? (1975, 2:655-60), and states that the 52 disciples of D?d? were th?m?yat?, those who established sub-lineages, while V?j?nd (V?zind) was among the 100 virakta, detached disciples. Caturved? also includes him a section on other disciples of D?d? (1964, 512-3), as does a collection Ham?re Muslim Sant Kavi [Our Muslim Sant-poets] (V?nkha?e 2002, 66-67). 104 More on this shortly, in section 3.4.1, ?D?d??s familiarity with Islam?. 41 be interpreted as either ?woman of the cotton-carder caste (dhuni),? or ?river,? yielding either the translation ?D?d? was born from the womb of a dhuni woman,? or ?D?d? was found in a river? (Callewaert 1987, 185; 1978, 99; Jangopal 1988, 13).105 Not surprisingly, the sectarian biographer Sv?m? N?r?ya?d?s opts for the latter interpretation, and even argues that a sage can be considered a brahman even if not born from the womb of a brahman, as in the case of Vy?sa and Par??ara (1975, 41). But when a second- or third-generation disciple of D?d?, B?l?kr?m, writes asurakul praka?e d?d?, rather than the straightforward interpretation, ?D?d? was born in the family of asuras, i.e., Muslims,? Sw?m? N?r?ya?d?s gives the strained interpretation, ?D?d? became famous due to quarrels with Muslims,? by interpreting prakan??, ?to appear? as ?to become famous? (Callewaert 1978, 25n11; N?r?ya?d?s 1975, 1:48-9). Orr reports that the Panth started to emphasize the Hindu elements in D?d??s thought soon after D?d??s death, with a trend ?in the direction of a return to the fold of Hindu orthodoxy. The enrollment of Muslim adherents ceased with Dadu?s death.? By 1693, the Panth was ?to all intent a new Hindu sect? (1947, 196).106 3.2 D?d??s Patrons W. L. Smith, in his book Patterns in North Indian Hagiography, writes that ?Accounts of meetings between sages and kings seem obligatory in hagiographic literature? (2000, 159). D?d??s account is no exception, and the sectarian accounts make much of his meeting with the Mughal emperor, Akbar (r. 1556-1605) at Fatehpur Sikri in 1585. 107 In Jangop?l?s DJL, three chapters (out of a total of sixteen) describe this meeting (Jangopal 1988, 46-55, 98- 104). D?d? had moved to S?mbhar, which was then ruled by R?j? Bhagv?n D?s (r. 1574-90), whose sister Jodh B?? was Akbar?s R?jp?t queen. The R?j? is said to have arranged D?d??s visit to Akbar at the latter?s request. A preliminary visit was held with R?j? B?rbal and 105 In Iraqi?s edition of the Sarv??g?, the verse reads dariy? madhye utpa?no d?d? jogyandro mah?mun??. (Iraqi 1985, 174, v. 14). But in the preceding verse, it mentions Kabir being born in the womb of a weaver, jul?h? grabhe, and the following verse, Raid?s being born in the womb of a leather-worker, cam?ra grabhe. 106 My use of Orr (1947) as a source for D?d? Day?l?s biography might appear outdated. However, as Hastings (2002, 26-7) notes, ?Since Orr?s publication, only two western scholars have dealt at any length with Dadu and the Dadu Panth,? these being Winand Callewaert and Monika Thiel-Horstmann, and that ?neither has dealt with more than limited portions of Dadupanthi history. The work of both these scholars have been consulted for additional details in this chapter. Callewaert in particular is cited here frequently as Jangopal (1988) and his earlier work on D?d? (1978, 21-56) has also been availed of. Thiel-Horstmann?s focus, as Hastings observes, has been ?primarily literary? and also on the social organization of present day Dadupanthi sadhus; her work too has been widely consulted for the present chapter (Thiel-Horstmann 1983; 1986; 1991; 1992; 1997) as well as Thiel-Horstmann and Tilak Raj Chopra (1989). Other sources, of course, have also been consulted where relevant. 107 DJL 16.27 bay?l?, 1642 V.S. (Jangop?l 1988, 88, 125). 42 Shaikh Abdul Fazl (var. Abu-l-Fazl), who tested D?d??s wisdom and reported back to Akbar, duly impressed. When D?d? met with Akbar, Akbar too was moved by the exchange with D?d? and requested that D?d? visit him daily for further discussions. But D?d? is said to have curtly refused. B?rbal and Abdul Fazl suggested that D?d? stay with them and continue the conversations, which lasted either four or forty days.108 On B?rbal?s intercession, D?d? visited Akbar one more time. Akbar presented D?d? with gifts, which D?d? did not accept. DJL reports that Akbar was greatly influenced by his meeting with D?d? and thereafter ?stopped hurting living beings? (54, 103, v. 5.25.1). According to Kshitimohan Sen, Akbar subsequently removed his own name from his coins and instead had them issued with Jalla jal?luhu, ?resplendent is His splendor? on one side, and All?hu Akbar, ?God is great? on the other (1936, 111-12). According to D?d?panth? hagiographies, B?rbal became D?d??s disciple; 109 he entreated D?d? to stay, and offered him many gifts, as did Bhagv?n D?s, but D?d? refused them all and returned to Amber (a.k.a. ?mer). Orr examined the record of Akbar?s life during that period and concluded that ?there is ? no difficulty about the supposed date of Dadu?s visit. ? It harmonises not only with the outward course of events, but also with what we know of the development of Akbar?s religious views? (1947, 57). But he doubts that the event made much of a lasting impression on Akbar and he surmises from D?d??s insistence on returning to Amber, that D?d? too ?cherished no such illusion. It may well be that the deepest impression ? was that left on the mind of the faithful Jangop?l? (58). While the lack of supporting evidence from other sources permits no definite conclusion, Orr concludes that the account ?has an air of veracity which it is difficult to escape? (58). 110 After R?j? Bhagv?n D?s?s death in 1590, the nephew he had adopted as his son, M?n Singh, became the R?j? of the kingdom of ?hun?hahar or Amber (later Jaipur). In DJL, M?n Singh (r. 1590-1615), having received complaints about D?d? from brahmans, went to meet D?d? himself. The R?j? was impressed by the meeting but did not want to spoil his relations with the brahmans. When D?d? perceived that M?n Singh wished him to leave his kingdom 108 Callewaert notes that ?if c?r?s? [forty] is only to rhyme with b?s?, it should be understood as c?r?, ?four?? (Jangop?l 1988, 51n69). 109 DJL 6. 26: ?If that is unreal, I?ll give it all up and become your disciple;? DJL 7.12.2 ?he took off his turban and put it at Sv?m?j??s feet;? DJL 8.5 ?B?rbal ? had asked for total protection? (Jangop?l 1988, 51, 56, 59). N?r?ya?d?s includes him in his accounting of D?d??s disciples (1975, 2:1065). 110 There is also no mention of Akbar?s meeting with D?d? in Abu-l-Fazl (1897) 43 and began preparing to do so, the R?j? was fearful that he had offended D?d?. However, D?d? showed the R?j? compassion, and according to an interpolated section (11.8.7, 67),111 made M?n Singh his disciple (Jangopal 1988, 67, 112). According to Orr, D?d? later revisited ?mer during his ten-year pilgrimage at the request of the ?Rathorani Queen of Amber? who Orr thinks was the wife of either M?n Singh or Bhagv?n D?s (1947, 41n1).112 However, in DJL 14.7, she is described only as Kanak?vati, queen of R??hor (Jangopal 1988, 76,117). She too gave D?d? many fine gifts, which he did not keep for himself. DJL also mentions a lesser king, the R?j? of Bhura?iya (vv. 12.1-4, 9-17) and some other noblemen who wished to bestow favors on D?d?, but in all cases D?d? refused to accept them. Thus, the sovereigns Akbar, B?rbal, Bhagv?n D?s, M?n Singh and others were all potential patrons. According to DJL, D?d? visited with them and impressed them with his understanding of the divine nature, but turned away their gifts of wealth and offers of property. The tradition claims that they accepted D?d? as their guru,113 or would have done so, but their discipleship is not corroborated by non-sectarian sources. D?d? is portrayed as indifferent to patronage, preferring to not be beholden to anyone but the indweller (antary?m?) Ram (Jangopal 1988, vv. 16,17.1). Monika Thiel-Horstmann mentions N?r?ya? Singh, a rich official (mansabd?r) from Jobner, who gave land at Narain? to D?d? and his followers, where D?d? is said to have spent his last days (1983, 7). This is the same N?r?in D?s mentioned in DJL, who was ?ordered by Hari? to take D?d? to Narain? (Jangopal 1988, 80, 120, v.15.9.1-15.11). However, N?r?in D?s is not considered a patron, but rather a devotee who wished to serve D?d?. N?r?ya? Singh is listed among the 152 additional disciples of D?d? by Sv?m? N?r?ya?d?s (N?r?ya?d?s 1975, 2:1067). 3.3 Hagiographic Tropes in D?d??s Life In his book Patterns in North Indian Hagiography, W. L. Smith enumerates common tropes that tend to occur in hagiographical works: 1) descent; 2) childhood exploits (b?lya l?l?); 3) marriage; 4) renouncing the world; 5) appearance, personality, and powers; 6) visitation (dar?an); 7) virtuous company (satsa?g); 8) widespread fame (digvijaya); 111 DJL 11.8.7. 112 Orr does not cite specific sections of the Janma L?l? and may have misconstrued the identity of this queen. 113 N?r?ya?d?s, in his ?r? D?d? Carit?m?ta, after listing the canonical 52 disciples of D?d?, goes on to enumerate 213 additional ?i?yas, disciples. Some items in the list are comprised of multiple persons whose names and numbers are not known. R?j? Bhagv?nd?s, Akbar, B?rbal, Abdul Fazl, R?j? M?n Singh and virtually everyone that D?d? is reported to have come in contact with are included in the list (1975, 2:1064-67). 44 9) meeting the emperor; 10) enemies; 11) brahman opposition; 12) temptation, sin and salvation; 13) ?hard,? i.e., strong devotion (bhakti); and 14) ascent to heaven (svarg?roha?a) (2000, iii). All but one of these tropes play a prominent role in DJL. 114 I have already mentioned that D?d? was considered an incarnation of God (avat?r) at birth (section 3.1), as well as his meetings with royalty (section 3.2). D?d??s remarkable childhood is implied in the account of his meeting at the age of eleven with his teacher, B?b? B??h? (who Jangop?l suggests is none other than the Supreme Lord (parmesura), see n. 88 above): while all the other children ran away, only D?d? approached him, and gave him a gift. Jangop?l, suggesting that D?d? was destined for greatness, comments, ?if a child shows such intelligence, what love will he be capable of later?? (DJL 1.8). When D?d? was eighteen, Hari (God) appeared again to him, completing the transformation initiated at their meeting seven years earlier. As an illustration of the trope of renunciation, D?d? ?was turned out of the house? for giving everything away, ?he became indifferent to the world ? detached from wealth and sexuality, he spent all his time in merciful acts? (DJL 1.12.2-15). There is no explicit mention of his marriage, other than references to his wife and mother-in-law (DJL 3.10), and to his four children, two sons and two daughters (DJL 9.1-7). An interpolation states that his children were born miraculously, ?as Kam?l was born to Kabir,? 115 from two cloves and two peppercorns which he gave to his wife (DJL 9.1.1-2). When asked by R?j? M?n Singh about his views on sex and marriage, D?d? replied, ?I do not impose or forbid marriage; each individual should choose the nectar or the poison? (DJL 10.19). Because he ?ignored all Muslim customs and abandoned Hindu practices,? D?d? drew the ire of both Hindus and Muslims (2.5,7). Several events illustrate D?d??s powers. D?d? warned a Q?z? who had hit him that his ?hand will go on aching,? and the Q?z? ?died in great suffering, but full of repentance? three months later (2.14-17). The house of another Q?z? who wished to harm D?d? burned down (3.1-5). On multiple occasions, D?d? fed his followers by miraculously providing food (8.17.1-3, 9.12.1-3, 14.18.2), even posthumously during the month-long commemoration events after his death (16.14). The following incidents may be 114 For a tabular representation of which hagiographic tropes are present/absent in the case of D?d? Day?l, see section 3.7 where his hagiographic representation is compared to that of Ni?cald?s. 115 While there are stories about the birth of Kam?l, e.g., (Caturved? 1964, 166-7; Abbott and Godbole 1982, 1:93-95; Lorenzen 1991, 50-52), I have been unable to locate a corroboration of his miraculous birth in a manner similar to that of D?d??s children. 45 viewed as illustrations of D?d??s powers as well as examples of the trope of dar?an: When D?d? was beaten and locked up, he appeared both inside and outside the prison (3.12-17). Later, he was present simultaneously at seven celebrations in his honor (3.18,21). His subtle body travelled to ?an infinite variety of worlds? (8.23.6). An example of brahman opposition: When D?d? was staying in ?mer, the brahmans were afraid that he would win over R?j? M?n Singh and so they complained. M?n Singh, in order to retain the brahmans? favor, hinted that D?d? had stayed there too long, so D?d? decided to leave. But M?n Singh feared that he would suffer the wrath of the Almighty as a consequence, so to appease M?n Singh?s fears, D?d? made him his disciple and then left (11.2-8). D?d??s ?conquest of the four quarters? (digvijaya) was mostly restricted to Rajasthan. A year before his death, D?d? received a sign foretelling his end (15.7) and moved to Nar?in? (present day Naren? / Narain?) in preparation. On his passing, when his body was moved to Bharain? (present day Bhair?n?), it miraculously disappeared ?like camphor? (15.31.2). There are numerous references to D?d??s ?hard bhakti,? forsaking everything for devotion and service to holy men (DJL 1.12, 1.12.1-3, 1.14-16), but no instances of D?d? ever having personally faced temptation or sin. 3.4 The D?d? V??? on Religion and Caste Tradition relates that D?d? did not write anything himself; his utterances were either memorized (magaziy?) or recorded (k?gaziy?), and were collected as the D?d? V??? (DV) by some of his disciples, mainly Mohan Daftar?, Rajjab, ??l?, Jagann?th and Sant D?s (Orr 1947, 80-81; N?r?ya?d?s 1975, 2:1012; Caturved? 1966, 17). The language of the DV predominantly comprises Braj, M?rw??? and Jaipur?, but Gujarati, Kha?? Bol?, Sanskrit, Persian and Rekht?, Arabic, Marathi, Punjabi, Sindhi and Sar??116 word and phrases are also found (N?r?ya?d?s 1975, 2:1051-54). The text is divided into two sections, the s?kh?, ?religious didactic distich? portion consisting of 37 chapters (a?ga) with a total of 2453 116 N?r?ya?d?s parenthetically explains Sar?? as the language of the region between Sindh and Punj?b, sindh aur pa?j?b ke b?c k? [bh???] (1975, 2:1051), but does not provide any examples, whereas he does for Gujarati, tadbhav Hindi, mi?rit bh???, Marathi, Punjabi and Farsi instances (2:1052-3). Sar?? may be the same as ?ar?ik?, considered a dialect of Sindhi, and also of Punjabi. Sar??k? or Sh?hmukh? is is ?a member of the Lahnda branch of Indo-Aryan languages and spoken by about 14 million people mainly in the central Pakistan provinces of Sindh and Punjab, and also in India, mainly in the state of Punjab, and in parts of Afghanistan,? according to Omniglot.com. It is also known as Multani or Lahndi. 46 verses (s?kh?),117 and the religious song (pada)118 portion organized in 28 chapters, 27 of which are organized by musical structures (r?ga), and the final chapter consisting of songs of praise (?rati), with a total of 443 padas (Thiel-Horstmann 1983, 8-10; Callewaert and de Beeck 1991, 1:13-14). In this section, I present a small selection to provide a sense of D?d??s views on religion and caste. All the DV verse references are to the critical edition by Callewaert (1991). The corresponding verse numbering and location from N?r?ya?d?s?s edition will be provided with the notation DVN when available (2004). All translations are mine unless stated otherwise. 3.4.1 D?d??s Familiarity with Islam D?d??s works reveal great familiarity with Muslim and Sufi concepts. For instance, the much quoted DV s?kh? 3.137: ?sika m?s?ka hvai gay?, isaka kah?vai so?; D?d? usa m?s?ka k?, alaha ?sika ho?. When the lover has become the beloved, then alone is it called love; O D?d?, God becomes the lover of that beloved. Or the first part of the ?ek, refrain of DV pad 84 (2.14): ba?de h?zir? haz?ri ve, alaha ?le n?r ve. O Slave, He is the highest present, He is God, the highest light? (Callewaert 1991, 1:143,213; Caturved? 1966, 41, 344). The following selections, from parac? k? a?ga, the section on proof/knowledge (paricaya), is another example of D?d??s familiarity with Islam and the way he mixes Arabic and Persian with occasional Sanskrit words (1963, 184-5):119 D?d? hauda haz?r?, dila hi bh?tari gusala ham?r? s?ra?; Oj? s?ji alaha ke ?gai?, tah?? niv?za guz?ra? (DV 4.211, p. 148; DVN 4.226. p. 134). D?d?, the reservoir of His presence is within [my] heart, I perform my complete 117 A s?kh? is the term often used to describe doh?s of Kabir and other sant poets, two lines of 13+11 syllables each (Greene et al. 2012, 689). 118 A pada is a devotional poem or song of ?from four to eight lines (but often extended to several more), all having the same metrical structure and frequently the same rhyme. Often the lyrics begin with a shorter line that in performance serves as a refrain? (Greene et al. 2012, 689). 119 For alternate translations of these verses, see Orr (1947, 99) and Chand (1963, 184-5). Chand bases his translation on Sudh?kar Dvivedi?s edition of DV (Day?l 1906), and there are subtle variations besides the verse numbering. 47 ablutions there; After washing my hands and feet, I say the prayers there before Allah. D?d? k?y? mas?ti kari, pa?ca jam?t? mana h? mul? im?ma?; ?pa ale?a il?h? ?gai?, tah?? sijad? karai sal?ma? (DV 4.212). D?d? makes his body His mosque, he finds in [his own] mind the five members of the congregation (jam??at) and the leader of the prayers (mull??im?m); He bows and greets the indescribable God, who Himself is before him. D?d? saba tana tasab? kahai, kar?ma? ais? kari le j?pa?; Roz? eka d?ri kari d?j?, kalam? ?pai ?pa? (DV 4.213). D?d? regards the whole body as the rosary (tasb??) on which the name of the Generous One (kar?m) is repeated; There is but one fast (roz?), shun any other. He himself is the profession of faith (kalam?). D?d? a?he pahara alaha ke ?gai?, ika ?aga rahiv? dhy?na?; ?pai ?pa arasa ke ?pari, jah?? rahai rahim?na? (DV 4.214). Thus D?d? remains ever before Allah with one-pointed concentration, And himself goes beyond the heavens (ar?) to the place where Rahm?n (the Merciful) lives. A?he pahara iv?vat?, j?va?a mara?a niv?hi; S?hiba dari sevai ?a??, d?d? ch??i na j?i (DV 4.215). D?d? the worshipper (ib?dat?) continues thus twenty-four hours a day till his death, And then he will stand before the gates of the Master and never leave him. These verses are replete with Islamic terms and conventions such as the Persian supplication, entreaty or prayer (niv?z, ni?z),120 ritual worship and adoration (?ib?dat), ritual ablutions (gusala) in a bathing tank or reservoir (haud, hauz), a prayer congregation (jam??at) led by a priest (mull?, maul?) or minister of a mosque (im?m), prostration in prayerful adoration (sijd?, s?jid, sajj?d), praying the rosary (tasab?, tasb??), the Muslim confession of faith, ?There is no god but God, l? il?ha illa?l-l?h,? (kalam?, kalma. kalimat), keeping the fast during the month of Ramazan (roz?), and Arabic words for God, such as Supreme Being (alaha, all?h, al il?h), the Divine (il?h?), the Generous (kar?m), the Merciful (rahm?n), and for heaven (?ar?). 120 N?r?ya?d?s, in his edition (2004, 134, v. 4.223), gives nam?za in place of niv?za and Dvivedi, nim?ja (Day?l 1906, 55, v. 4.221). 48 Rather tellingly, D?d? does not consider the Muslim as ?the Other.? In s?c k? a?ga, the section on truth, he describes the attributes of a Muslim: 121 D?d? musalm???a ju r??ai m??a, s??? k? m?nai jhuram????; S?rau? kau? su?ad?? hoi, musalam?na kari j???au? soi (DV 13.25, p. 167; DVN 13.28. p. 264). D?d?, the Muslim who shows respect and accepts the Lord?s penalty, who gives happiness to all, he alone I consider a Muslim. D?d? musalam?na mihiri gahi rahai, saba k?? su?a kisah? nah?? dahe; M?v? na ??i j?va nah?? m?re karai, bandag? r?ha sa?v?rai (DV 13.26). A Muslim displays compassion, gives happiness to all and doesn?t distress anyone, He does not eat the dead, does not kill living beings, and follows the path of devotion. D?d? so momina mana mai? kari j??i, sata sab?ri vaise ???i; C?lai s?ca sa?v?rai v??a, tinak? ?ule bhista ke p??a (DV 13.27). That (Muslim) believer brings truth and patience into his heart and knows; He acts truthfully and prepares the path; for him the doors of paradise (bahi?t) open. D?d? so momina moma dila hoi, s??? k?? pahic?nai soi; Zora na karai har?ma na ??i, so momina bhirita mai? j?i (DV 13.28). That believer is compassionate, he alone recognizes the Lord; He is not violent, he does not accept what is ill-begotten; that believer goes to paradise. There is nothing in these attributes that is specific to practitioners of the Muslim faith. The list reads like any enumeration of virtues to be aspired to in any faith. 122 D?d? is thus implying that though he is intimately familiar with Muslim practices, for him the label ?Muslim? as conventionally understood to mean a person who follows certain beliefs and practices is not significant compared to cultivating the attributes such as compassion, kindness, non-violence, etc. This would also suggest that for one who possesses these attributes, whether she be called Muslim or Hindu is unimportant. 121 For alternative translations see Thiel-Horstmann (1983, 94). 122 For example, compare this with enumeration of Divine Virtues (daiv?-sampad?) in BhG 16.1-3, listed in Ch. 8, n. 572 on p. 258 (VP 8.109). 49 3.4.2 D?d? on Hindus and Muslims When it comes to Hindus and Muslims, D?d? suggests that such categorization is contrived and irrelevant from the standpoint of non-duality: D?d? ekai alaha r?ma hai, sa?mratha s??? soi; Maide ke pakav??na saba, kh?t?? hoi sa hoi (DV 2.18, p. 136; DVN 2.20, p. 37). Oh D?d?! Ram, Allah, Emperor, Lord, [these names] are one and the same; All fried bread is made of finely ground flour, the result of eating [their products] is the same. D?d? saba hama de?y? sodhi, saba ?usara n??h? ??na; Saba gha?i ekai ?tam??, ky? h?nd? ky? musalam??na (DV 29.4, p. 191; DVN 29.5, p. 428). D?d?, investigating everything, I have seen [that] there is no second; There is only one ?tm? in all bodies; what is a Hindu, what is a Muslim? Alaha r?ma ch??i gay? bhra?ma mor?; H?nd? turaka bheda kach? n??h??; de??? darasa?na tor? (DV 56.0, p. 209; DVN 1.65.0, p. 508). My false notion [that] Allah and Ram [are different] has disappeared; There is no difference between a Hindu and a Muslim, I see [only] your image. Another selection, titled 123 hind? musalm?no? k? bhram, ?Erroneous distinctions between Hindus and Muslims? in DVN, makes the point directly: D?d? h?nd? m?raga kahe? ham?r?, turaka kahai? raha mer?; Kau?a? pantha hai kaho ala?a k?, tuma to ais? her? (DV 13.43, p. 167; DVN 13.48, p. 268). D?d?, the Hindus say, ?ours is the way,? the Muslims say ?ours [is];? Tell me which is the way of the Ultimate? You however have sought such [quarrels]. D?d? du? daroga loga kau? bh?vai, s??? s?ca piy?r?; Kau?a pantha hama calai kaho dhau?, s?dho karau vic?r? (DV 13.44; DVN 13.49). People cultivate duality and falsehood, [but] the Lord is the true Beloved; In truth (dhau?), O sages, reflect and tell me which way should I follow. ?a??a ?a??a kari brahmak??, pa?i pa?i l?y? v???i; D?d? p?ra?a brahma taji, bandhe bhra?ma k? g???hi (DV 13.45; DVN 13.50). Breaking Brahman into pieces, and distributing them (the pieces) among the factions, Forsaking the complete Brahman, they have tied the knots of false ideas. 124 123 These sub-section titles are considered a later addition and are not included in the DV edition. 124 For an alternate translation of this verse, see Orr (1947, 161). 50 D?d? does not think highly of either Hindu or Muslim religious teachers, as this couplet shows: D?d? jihi variy?? yahu sabkach? bhay?, so?kachu karau vic?ra; K?z? pa??ita b?vare, ky? li?i bandhe bh?ra (DV 18.36, p. 177; DVN 18.37, p. 342). Contemplate a bit on the time when all this [creation] came into being, O crazy qazis and pandits, what a burden you have imposed by [your] writing. In fact, D?d? is critical of all religious groups, not just Hindus and Muslims: Jog? ja?gama seva?e, bodha sa?ny?s? se?a; ?a? darasana d?d? r??ma vina, sabai kapa?a ke bhe?a (DV 14.31, p. 170; DVN 14.33, p. 296). Yogis, wandering ?aivas, Jains (seva?e), Buddhists, renunciates, Sufis (sheikhs), The six Hindu systems of philosophy, all are hypocrisy without Ram. 125 D?d? describes his affiliation as being beyond Hindu and Muslim. According to the D?d?panth? scholar and hagiographer N?r?ya?d?s, the following verses are D?d??s response to Akbar?s inquiry about whether he allied himself with the Hindus or the Muslims or one of the six systems of philosophy: D?d? h?nd? turaka na hoiv?, s?hiva set? k?ma; ?a?a darasana kai sa?gi na j?iv?, n?pa?a kahiv? r??ma (DV 16.42, p. 175; DVN 16.36, p. 326). D?d? is neither Hindu nor Muslim, he works with the Lord; He doesn?t affiliate with the six systems; Ram is impartial. ?a?a darasana d?ny?? nah??, nir?la?ba nija v??a; D?d? yekai ?sirai, la?ghe ogha?a gh??a (DV 16.43; DVN 16.37). D?d? is neither of the six systems nor both [Hindu and Muslim]; taking refuge in the one and only independent, true way, he crosses the difficult mountain pass. D?d? n?? hama h?nd? h??hi?ge, n?? hama musalam?na; ?a?a darasana me? hama nah??, hama rate rahim??na (DV 16.44; DVN 16.38). D?d? will be neither Hindu nor Muslim, He is not of the six systems, he is in love with the Merciful [God]. Na tah?? h?nd? dehur?, na tah?? turaka mas?ti; D?d? ?pai ?pa hai, nah?? tah?? raha r?ti (DV 16.45; DVN 16.44126). 125 For an alternate translation of this verse, see Upadhyaya (1979, 210, v. 462). 51 There is no Hindu temple or Muslim mosque there, D?d? says [Ram is self-existent], 127 there are no rites [where He dwells]. 128 D?d? alaha r??ma k? dvai pa?a tai? ny?r?; Rahit? gu?a ?k?ra k?, so gur? ham?r? (DV 16.46; DVN 16.39). That which is distinct from the two factions of Allah and Ram, Devoid of attributes and form, that is my guru. D?d? is equally critical of both Hindu and Muslim practices and does not value the study of scripture, which he considers empty of praxis: 129, 130 D?d? r?n? gha?a sodh? nah??, pa??ita brahm?p?ta; 131 ?gama n?gama saba kathai, ghara me? n?cai bh?ta132 (DV 13.84, p. 168; DVN 13.87, p. 275). Oh D?d?! Sound133 is not found in the vessel; pandits, sons of Brahm? Recite all the sacred texts, [while] ghosts dance in [their] houses. Pa?he? na p?vai parma gati, pa?he na la?ghe p?ra; Pa?he na pahu?cai pr??iy??, d?d? p??i puk?ra (DV 13.85; DVN 13.88). They recite but don?t attain the highest state, they don?t cross over [worldly existence]; Reciting, the beings don?t arrive, calling out in grief. D?d? pa??ita nibare n??va vina, jh??he kathai giy?na; Bai?he sira ??l?? karai?, pa??ita veda pur??na (DV 13.86; DVN 13.89). Oh D?d?, the pandits are empty without the Name, they speak of false knowledge; Sitting with empty heads, the pandits recite the Vedas and pur??as. D?d? kete pustaka pa?hi mue, pa??ita veda pur??na; Kete brahm? 134kathi gae, n??hina r??ma sam??na (DV 13.87; DVN 13.90). 126 This verse occurs out of sequence in DVN. 127 My thanks to Dr. M. Shapiro for drawing my attention to the sense of ?pa indicating God, the Lord, Brahman, Ram similar to its usage in the Sikh Guru Granth S?hib, e.g., ?th?pi? na j?ik?t?na hoi; ?pe ?pa nira?janu soi. The Lord cannot be installed, nor created, He is pure by Himself? (Jap j?, 5.1). 128 For an alternate translation of this verse, see Upadhyaya (1979, 216, v. 482). 129 DVN has one more verse, 13.95, which appears later in DV as 13.94 ? I have not included it here. The selection 13.87-95 is titled ?kara?? bin? kathan?, Saying Without Doing? in DVN. 130 There is another delightful pada that I am not including in this section for reasons of brevity, but it bears mentioning: avigati k? gati ko na lahai?, ?No one gets the nature of the Ultimate Being,? DV 228, pp. 235-6; DVN 9.31(244), p. 610. 131 Callewaert (1991, 168) has brahy?p?ta which is quite obviously a Devan?gar? typo for brahm?p?ta, ? instead of ? (Caturved? 1966, 157). 132 Callewaert (op. cit) has bhata; I am following Caturved? instead. 133 I take r?n? as r??a, meaning ?abda, ?v?z, ?sound? according to the RH?K (2:1171 s.v). The etymology of this word, however, is not provided. DVN has s?n?, ?empty, unoccupied? instead. 52 Reciting [from] so many books, Vedas and pur??as, the pandits died; So many Brahm?s (wise sages) [also] have said and gone: there is nothing comparable to Ram. D?d? saba hama de?y? sodhi kari, veda pura?au? m??hi; Jah?? nira?jana p??e, so desa d?ri ita n?hi? (DV 13.88; DVN 13.91). I have investigated in all the Vedas and pur??as, The place where one shall find the Faultless is not distant from here. D?d? k?z? kaz? na j????h??, k?gada h?thi kateva; Pa?hat?? pa?hat?? dina gae, bh?tari n?h? bheda (DV 13.89; DVN 13.92). The qazi does not know the divine decree (qaz?), [even though] he keeps papers and scripture at hand; Days have passed in reading incessantly, yet no change occurs within [the qazi]. Masi k?gada kai ?sirai, ky?? ch??ai sa?s?ra; R??ma bin? s?jhai nah??, d?d? bharama vik?ra (DV 13.90; DVN 13.93). How will one be released from worldly life on the basis of ink and paper? O D?d?, without Ram, one will not understand the erroneous notions and distortions. K?gada k?le kare mue, kete veda pur??na; Ekai a?ira p?va k?, d?d? pa?hai suj?na (DV 13.91; DVN 13.94). So many have died, blackening paper with the Vedas and pur??as; The wise read just one letter of the Beloved[?s name], O D?d?! For D?d?, scripture cannot do justice to the nirgu?a, that which is beyond words: Je kachu veda kur???a thai?, agama agocara b?ta; So anabhai s?c? kahai, yahu d?d? akaha kah?ta (DV 4.189 p. 148; DVN 4.203, p. 129). Whatever topic from the Vedas and Quran that is impenetrable and imperceptible, It is known to be true by experience; this, D?d?, is called the ineffable. And yet again: D?d? so? m?raga mana gahy?, jihi m?raga milie j??; Beda kur?nau n? kahy?, so gura d?y? di??i (DV 1.79 p. 134; DVN 1.80, p. 15). The mind has caught hold of the way, by which one finds [Ram]. The guru has shown that which the Vedas and Quran did not tell [of]. 134 Callewaert again has brahya, see n. 131 above. 53 Thus, for D?d?, not only is there only one God ? the Beloved (piy?ra, p?va), the complete Brahman, Ram ? and there is no other, a vision of uncompromising non-duality. Hindus and Muslims, or for that matter any religious groups or even systems of philosophy (dar?ana) are all wrong. Therefore, it is meaningless to speak of differences between any of them. All priests and sacred texts of any religious tradition are empty of knowledge of the non-dual Brahman which is without attributes (nirgu?a) and is beyond words. 3.4.3 D?d? on Caste (J?ti) Concerning caste (j?ti), D?d? states, in a section titled (in DVN) ?the removal of erroneous notions on caste and status? (j?ti p??ti bhram vidhva?sana): Apa?? apan? j?ti sau?, sabako? vesai p??ti; D?d? sevaga r??ma k?, t?kai nah?? bha?r?ti (DV 13.107 p. 169; DVN 13.110, p. 279). Each is enamored with one?s own caste, all [of the same caste] sit in a line [together]; D?d?, a servant of Ram does not have [such an] erroneous notion. 135 D?d?l?l? r?j? r??ma k?, ?elai? sabah? sa?ta; ?p? para yekai bhae, ch??? sabai bhara?ta (DV 13.108).136 O D?d?, all the sages play the l?l?, divine play of King Ram; The highest self is only one, all the erroneous notions have disappeared. S?pa gay? sahin???a ko?, saba mili m?rai? loka; D?d? aise de?ie, kula k? ?agar? phoka (DV 13.109; DVN 13.113). The snake is gone, [yet] the people gather and beat the tracks [left behind by the snake], The way (?agara) of caste by birth should similarly be seen as worthless (phoka), D?d?. D?d? s?pa baj?y?? ky?? ?alai, ghara mai? ba?? bal?i; K?la jh?la isa j?va k?, b?tani h?? ky?? j?i (DV 13.110; DVN 13.112). O D?d?, how can one avert a great calamity in the house by fanning a winnowing basket (s?p baj?n?)? Death is the flame for this living being, why should it go [away] merely from talking? 135 Orr translates this as ?Each sits in the company of his caste-fellows; The servant of Rama knows no such distinctions? (1947, 161, v 13:123). [Orr?s verse citations are to the 1907 Ajmer text of the D?d? V??? edited by Candrik? Pras?d Trip?th?, which I was unable to locate ]. 136 DVN has a different verse here. 54 D?d? d?ny?? bhara?ma hai?, h?nd? turaka ga?v?ra; Je duhuv??tai? rahata hai?, so gahi tata vic?ra (DV 13.111; DVN 13.114). O D?d?, the concepts of ?Hindu? and ?Muslim? both are foolish erroneous notions. Catch hold of the truth which is without both [notions] and contemplate it. Apa?? apa?? kari l?y?, bha?jana m??hai? b?hi; D?d? ekai k?pajala, mana k? bhara?ma u?h?i (DV 13.112; DVN 13.115). Each has made the erroneous mental notion his own, O D?d?, Like taking the water from the same well and filling it into [different] vessels. 137 D?d? p???? ke vahu n??va dhari, n?n? vidhi k? j?ti; Vola?ah?r? ko??a hai, kahau dhau? kah? sam?ti (DV 13.113; DVN 13.116). D?d?, the different kinds of castes are like giving many [different] names to water; But who speaks [these names], indeed, where does It reside?138 Jaba p?ra?a brahma vic?riye, taba sakala ?tam? eka; K?y? ke gu?a dekhiye, to n?n? vara?a aneka (DVN 13.117).139 When Brahman is considered as a whole, then all the ?tm?s are one; If the gu?as140 of the body are seen, then there are endless different classes. 141 Clearly, for D?d?, caste (j?ti) is an erroneous notion. D?d? repeats the one water/many forms analogy (DV 13.113) that we saw in the section 3.4.1 in connection with the irrelevance of Hindu/Muslim distinctions (DV 29.4). In the s?ragr?h? a?ga, ?the chapter on getting hold of the essence,? D?d? suggests that if one must think in terms of caste, it ought to be considered as follows: D?d? kara?? ?pari j?ti hai, d?j? soca niv?ri; Mail? madhima hvai, ujala ??ca vic?ri (DV 17.12, p. 176; DVN 17.13, p. 333). 137 Orr: ?Each has filled his vessel with water and called it his own; The water of the One Well dispels error form the mind?(1947, 161, v 13:128?). [Orr provides four verses but only cites three, so the verse number here is tentative]. 138 Orr: ?They have given the water many names, they have formed many different castes; Say, who is the Speaker, and where is He contained?? (1947, 161, v 13:129?). [This verse citation is also tentative, see n. 137]. 139 This verse is not included in DV, but I have included it here from DVN because I think it reinforces the point made thus far. 140 These are the sattva, rajas, and tamas attributes. Cf. BhG 18.41, br?hma?a-k?atriya-vi??? ??dr????? karm??i pravibhakt?ni svabh?va-prabhavair gu?ai?. 141 Orr: ?When thou considerest the complete Brahma[n], then are all spirits one; When thou lookest on bodily attributes, there are castes many and diverse?(1947, 161, v 13:130). 55 D?d?, caste depends on deeds, let go of any other thinking [on this matter]; Consider [those who perform] foul deeds to be [of] mediocre [caste], [and those who perform] pure deeds, high caste. Ujala kara?? r??ma hai, d?d? d?j? dha?dha; K? kahie samajhai nah??, c?ry?? locana a?dha (DV 17.13; DVN 17.14). The deed beyond reproach is [contemplating & worshipping] Ram, all else is worldly activity. What can I say, folks don?t understand ? all [their] four eyes142 are blind. Rather than considering caste in terms of birth and family lineage, D?d? suggests that it be based on one?s deeds alone. It is what is within oneself that matters: D?d? b?hara k? saba de?ie, bh?tari la?y? na j?i; B?hari di??v? loka k?, bh?tari r??ma di??i (DV 14.36, p. 170; DVN 14.38, p. 296). Everyone sees what?s on the outside, the inside is not seen; The outside show is for the world, show what?s inside to Ram. 143 We see that for D?d?, in the light of non-duality, similar to religious identity, caste- consciousness too is an erroneous notion (bhrama), akin to seeing a non-existent snake in a rope. From the standpoint of indivisible Brahman (p?ra?a=p?r?a brahma), there is only one ?tm?; to think in terms of caste (j?ti) and class (var?a), shows that one does not see the true nature of reality. Rather than considering conventional markers of caste such as heredity, the true measure of a human being is revealed by how she acts. When one further sees the true nature of creation, that all is nothing but Brahman, any distinction based on religion or caste is meaningless. 3.5 D?d??s Disciples Rajjab and Sundard?s and Their Views According to Thiel-Horstmann, ?D?d? was not destined to enrich or revive Sant poetry. His merit it [?] was, however, to have instigated some of the most brilliant of his disciples to activities by which the sect gained fame, such as the compilatory activities of Rajjab, the rich philosophical works of Sundard?s, ?? (1983, 10). Regarding caste, however, the views of Sundard?s and Rajjab were not dissimilar from D?d??s, and in what follows in this section, I provide a brief summation of their views based upon a sampling of their works. 142 N?r?ya?d?s explains ?four eyes? as vivek, discrimination, vic?r, contemplation, and dono? b?hya netra, both external eyes (2004, 333). 143 For an alternate translation, see Upadhyaya (1979, 210, v. 463). 56 Rajjab (1567?-1689 CE) is said to have been born to a Muslim Pa?h?n family and is considered to have influenced Sundard?s. According to Orr, D?d? ?is said to have treated him [Rajjab] more as an equal than as a disciple? (1947, 209). He is also considered to be one of the compilers and arrangers of the D?d? V??? (80). In Callewaert?s critical edition of a selection of 848 distichs (s?kh?) written by Rajjab in his Sarv??g? (1978), there are very few s?kh?s that deal with the issues of religion and caste. I reproduce these here, with Callewaert?s translations. In verses from the chapter on remembrance, sumiran k? a?g, we see themes similar to those evident in D?d??s work, such as the irrelevance of being Hindu or Muslim, the one water/many drops analogy, and God transcending names: N??i l?gi nara nisatarai, hi?d? musalam??na; Ubhai ?haura ekai kah?, rajaba beda kur?na. SAR 17.40, p. 129. Both the Vedas and the Quran proclaim the same principle: Whether Hindu or Muslim, a person will cross the ocean [of rebirth] if he clings to the Name (203). N??va anekahu eka guna, jy?? bahu b??dahu? b?ri; Jana rajaba j??ni ra kah?, nara nira?au su nih?ri. SAR 17.41. Listen and reflect upon what I tell you from my true knowledge: although we give Him many Names, His reality is one, as there are many drops in one and the same water. Jy?? ?tama arav?ha ika ty?? h? r??ma rah?ma; Udika ?ba kach? dvai nah?? rajaba samajhi phah?ma. SAR 17.42. ?tam and arav?h are just two synonyms for soul, and udik and ?b both mean water; Rajab has understood this: Ram and Rah?m are two names for one God. In verses from bhajan prat?p k? a?g, the chapter on the glory of prayer, Rajjab, like D?d?, speaks of the insignificance of family origin, i.e., caste:144 J?ti p??ti kula saba gaye, r??ma n??ma kai ra?ga; Rajaba l?gai loha jy??, p?rasa k? parasa?ga. SAR 22.8, p. 134. All the evil effects of a [low] birth and bad company can be erased by the color of the Name of God (r?m), as all the 145 of iron are changed when it is touched by the philosophers? stone (215). 144 Again, the translations are primarily Callewaert?s, my modifications are enclosed in < >. 57 D?ragha kula su ater?, b??ai laghu kula t?rika t?rai; So rajaba guna kaisai metai, j?sau jalanidhi p?rai. SAR 22.9. A man of a noble family gets drowned if he cannot swim, but a swimmer of low origin gets across; nothing can diminish the quality [of the Name] by which one gets across the ocean [of rebirth]. Ka?av? m??h? tu?bik?, ??ba n?ba k? n?va; Rajaba tiriye cah?? ca?hi, tau kula k? ora na ?va. SAR 22.10. Does it matter whether a boat is made of the wood of a sweet or of a sour gourd plant, of the mango tree or of a lemon tree? You may climb in each of them and get across: honour is not given to the origin (216). N??ba dhaturai ?ka vi?a, madhu nikasai una m??hi; Rajaba vi?a am?ta bhay?, tau kula k?rana ko? n??hi. SAR 22.11 There is poison in the neem tree, the thorn-apple tree and the swallow-wort plant, yet their flowers produce honey; we can [in analogy] conclude that holiness has nothing to do with family origin. Kula parabata nah?? p?jiye, suta pratam? k? m??ni; Ty?? rajaba r??mahi bhajy??, ga? sakala kula k??ni. SAR 22.12, p. 135. Nobody thinks of the rocky hill when worshipping its offspring, the carved image [of the deity]; when one worships God (r?m) all dishonour of family-origin is ignored. In this verse from the chapter on nectar,146 ras k? a?g, the same message, namely that one should aspire to a state of blindness to caste, is echoed in a more direct and succinct form: Rajaba duniy? hada mai?, s?dh? jana behada; J?ti p??ti de?ai nah??, p?y? hari rasa mada. SAR 60.21, p. 151. Worldly people are tied up whereas saints are totally free; drunken with the nectar of God (hari), the saint no longer cares for caste or class (247). Sundard?s (1596-1689~ CE) was D?d??s youngest disciple, being only eight at the time of D?d??s death. He wrote extensively and his work is highly regarded both for its poetic mastery and its depth. According to Orr, ?no one did more to turn the thoughts of the [D?d?] Panth in the direction of Hindu philosophy than ? Sundar Das? (1947, 195). He does not 145 Callewaert has instead ?relations,? and tenuously argues that ?Iron is related to weapons and tools which perform dirty work. When it is changed to gold, it is used for jewels etc.? (1978, 215n3). 146 For ras, Callewaert reminds us that besides nectar, it also refers to ?God, who is the source of the nectar of mystical experience? (1978, 246, a). 58 seem to concern himself as much with the issue of Hindus, Muslims and/or caste, but his attribute-less (nirgu??) view of the divine as well as his writings on Ved?nta clearly indicate that his views resemble those of D?d? on these issues.147 A representative religious song (pad) from his pad?val? text, #82 (Callewaert and de Beeck 1991, 561; Sundard?s and Mi?ra 1992, 2:1018) presents the familiar tropes we have seen with D?d? such as the water/drops analogy, and the disregard for the classification as Hindu or Muslim, and for caste (the translations that follow are mine): Ais? sataguru k?jiye karan? k? p?r?; Unamani dhy?na? tah?? dharai jah?? canda na s?r?. (?ek) O guru! May [my] deeds be completed [such that] [My] totally absorbed state of meditation be on the place where there is no sun nor moon (refrain). Tana mana i?dr? basi karai phiri ula?i sam?vai; Kanaka k?min? de?ikai? kahu? citta na cal?vai. 1. May my mind, body and senses reverse [themselves] and come to rest inwards; On seeing wealth or attractive women, may they not make my mind wander. Dvai pa?a hind? turaka k? bici ?pa sa?bh?lai; Gy?na ?a?aga gahi jh?jhat? madhi m?raga c?lai. 2. May you take care of my mind, that between the two factions, Hindu and Muslim, It walk the path amidst the fighting (jh?jhat?), 148 holding the aloft the sword of wisdom. J?nai sabakau? ekah? p?n? k? b??d?; N?ca ??ca de?ai nah?? ko? b?bha?a s?d?. 3. May [my mind/deeds] know everyone to be drops of the same water; May it not consider any brahman or ??dra as high or low. Saba sa?tani k? mata gahai sumirai karat?r?; Sundara aisai guru bin? nahi? hvai nist?r?. 4. Holding the tenets of all the sages, may [my mind/deeds] remember the Creator; O Sundar! Without such a guru, there is no salvation. 147 There is however a pad (201), that is unequivocally critical of Muslim practices such as hal?l and meat consumption (Callewaert and de Beeck 1991, 1:582; Sundard?s 1992, 2:1087-8); while it is criticizing a so-called musalm?n vs. one who truly understands Mohammad?s teaching, it could be perceived as bordering on intolerant. 148 jh?jha = yuddha, battle, fight; RH?K (1:474). 59 Sahaj?nand (?Unqualified Joy?), a short independent work by Sundard?s comprising four doh?s149 and twenty caupa?s,150 speaks of the futility of religious observances, whether Hindu or Muslim, for gaining unqualified joy. The first six verses are of particular interest (Sundard?s and Mi?ra 1992, 1:269-70): Caupa?: Prathamahi? nir?k?ra nija banda?; guru pras?da sahajai ?nanda?. P?ra?a brahma akala abin???; pa?ca tatva k? s???i prak???. 1. First, the formless, real, praised, unqualified joy [that is] the gift of the teacher, The indivisible whole indestructible Brahman manifested the creation of the five elements. Cinha bin? saba ko? ?ye; ih?? bhaye do? pantha cal?ye. Hind? turaka u?hyau yaha bharm?; hama do? k? ch??y? dharm?. 2. Everyone arrived without any distinguishing marks, [but] upon arriving, we created two paths. The erroneous notion arose that one is Hindu or Muslim; I have given up both these faiths. N?? mai? k?ttama karma ba??nau?; n?? ras?la k? kalam? j?nau?. N?? mai? t?na t?ga gali n???; n?? mai? sunata kari baur???. 3. I don?t praise false acts, nor do I know the prophet?s profession of faith (kalam?). I don?t wear the [Hindu] three-strand sacred thread, nor do I undergo circumcision and go crazy(?). M?l? japau? na tasab? ferau?; t?ratha j??? na makk? herau?. Nh?i dhoi nahi? kar?? ac?r?; uj? tai? puni h?v? ny?r?. 4. I pray neither the Hindu nor Muslim rosaries, I don?t go on Hindu pilgrimage nor to Mecca. I don?t perform [Hindu] rites after bathing, moreover, I am free from [Muslim] ritual ablutions. Ek?das? na bratahi? bic?rau?; roj? dharau? na ba?ga puk?rau?. Deva pitara nahi? p?ra man???; dhart? ga?au? na deha jal???. 5. 149 A doh? is ?a rhyming couplet commonly used for aphorisms, as well as for longer narratives and didactic poetry. The first foot of each line has 13 morae and the second 11? (Greene et al. 2012, 689). 150 caupa? = caup??, a verse of four sections of fifteen or sixteen syllables (McGregor 1984, 22-3; Snell 1991, 21-2). 60 I don?t observe the eleventh-day [Hindu] fast, nor the Ramazan fast, nor make the call to prayer. I don?t observe the rites of Hindu gods, ancestors or Muslim saints, I neither cremate nor bury the dead. Doh?: Hind? k? hadi ch??i kai taj? turaka k? r?ha; Sundara sahajai c?nhiy?? ekai r?ma al?ha. 6. I have left the limits of the Hindus, I have renounced the way of the Muslim. Sundar has intuitively recognized that Ram and Allah are one and the same. Sundard?s not only shows his familiarity with both Hindu and Muslim culture, he advocates transcending the erroneous distinctions of Hindu and Muslim altogether to attain the unqualified joy that is innate to the realization of non-duality, of indivisible, whole Brahman (p?rana = p?r?a Brahman). The final selection from Sundard?s, five s?kh?s,151 distich verses, from his S?kh? Grantha, the Section on the Knower (j??n? k? a?ga), vv. 30.53-7 (Sundard?s and Mi?ra 1992, 1:534), presents his stance regarding caste: A?tyaja br?hma?a ?di dai d?ra mathai jo ko?;; Sundara bheda kach? nah?? praga?a hut?sana hoi. 53. Whether an outcaste or a brahman churns two sticks [to start a fire], O Sundar, there is no difference in the fire that is produced. D?paga joyau bipra ghara puni joyau ca???la; Sundara do? sadan kau timira gayau tatk?la. 54. If a lamp is lit in a brahman?s house or in an outcaste?s, O Sundar, the darkness is immediately dispelled in both their houses. A?tyaja kai jala kumbha mai? br?hmana kalasa ma?jh?ra; Sundara s?ra prak??iy? duhu?vani mai? ikas?ra. 55. In the water within the earthen pot of an outcaste and in the metal pitcher of a brahman, The sun, O Sundar, is reflected identically in both. A?tyaja br?hma?a ?di dai ki?v? ra?ka ki bh?pa; Sundara darpana h?tha lai so de?ai nija r?pa. 56. 151 See n. 117 on p. 45 for an explanation of s?kh?. 61 Whether a brahman or an outcaste, a king or a pauper, When one takes a mirror in hand, one sees one?s own form. Sundara saba kau? j??na k? b?tai? kahai aneka; jyau? darpana bahu bh??ti kai agni parai kahu? eka. 57. Sundar tells everyone many words of wisdom: Just as mirrors are of many types, but when they fall in the fire, they become one.152 Sundard?s pointedly suggests that distinctions based on caste or other status are artificial and, when examined closely, indicative of no real difference; whether it is fire, light, the reflection of the sun in water, or the reflection of one?s face in the mirror, they function the same for both an outcaste and a brahman, or for a pauper and a king. In fact, verse 54 on the sun?s reflection in the water within a brahman or outcaste?s vessel echoes sentiments raised in a Sanskrit poem, the Man???-pa?cakam ?Five Verses of Wisdom,?153 attributed to ?a?kara in the eighth century, one of the earliest exponents of Advaita Ved?nta. We shall look at this poem closely in the next chapter, when we explore Ni?cald?s?s position on caste vis-?-vis the Advaita tradition, in section 4.4. The selections presented in this section clearly show us that D?d??s direct disciples, Rajjab and Sundard?s, echoed D?d??s position on the matters of religion and caste, namely, that these are not important or relevant in light of the realization of non-duality, i.e., Brahman or Ram. The next section explores this in greater detail. 3.6 An Evaluation of the Views of D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s on Religion and Caste The verses quoted above are by no means comprehensive or complete, but these verses do represent the views of D?d? as well as his two most notable direct disciples regarding religion and caste. D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s are consistent in their message regarding religion and caste. Some scholars have suggested that D?d? preached ?Hindu-Muslim unity? (Chand 1963, 185; Sen 1936, 109), but this is an over-simplification. In the sampling provided above, we see that he and his followers are not suggesting unity, but rather the 152 Here Mi?ra explains that mirrors in the time of Sundard?s were made of steel, faul?d (Sundard?s and Mi?ra 1992, 1:534). 153 See p. 96. 62 transcendence of categories such as Hindu and Muslim, high caste and low. This is not at all surprising or novel. Kabir (1398-1448) presented the same radical message over a century and a half earlier, as did N?nak (1469-1539) half a century prior to D?d?, and D?d? was not unfamiliar with their message. In fact, the compositions of Kabir constitute one of the five books of the D?d? Panth?s Pa?ca V???, Five Sacred Books.154 In the D?d? V??? too, D?d? himself invokes Kabir occasionally. 155 Regarding the influence of Kabir, Jules Bloch rather extravagantly remarked that ?by boldly bringing the two religions [Hinduism and Islam] on the same plane, Kabir has contributed not only to purifying Hinduism by insisting that it was the most abstract and at the same time the most humane of religions, but has also furnished a justification for the presence of Islam on Indian soil.? But it is the following sentence that is of greater relevance to us: ?It is on account of him [Kabir], his disciples, and other like- minded people that the two religions have managed to live side by side without harming each other. His attitude is not exceptional; we find it in Dharamdas, Raedas [sic], Mirabai, and Dadu, who came after him? (2003, 93).156 The call to transcend categories is also logical, given D?d??s philosophical stance: to a nirgu?? sant, a devotee of the unqualified, attribute-less God, any duality is evidence of rootedness in the unreal. An attachment to attributes and forms is tantamount to a forsaking of the divine. From a set theory perspective, the indivisible Brahman (p?r?a brahma) is the universal set, and any categorization on the basis of religion or caste can only result in subsets, which, by their very nature as a part of the whole, are incomplete and unreal since they exclude other parts of the part-less Brahman. But this insight regarding the insignificance of religious and caste distinctions obviously did not take hold among the D?d? Panth, as is indicated by the tradition?s discomfort with D?d??s potential Muslim origins and its attempts to ignore or reinterpret them, and also by its Vaishnava self-identification in the present times. ?A worthy successor of Kabir in terms of castelessness and protest against both Hindu and Muslim ritualism, D?d? in the end seems to have created only one more Hindu sect? (Zelliot 1976, 160). Section 4.6, on Ni?cald?s?s 154 The other four V???s are those of D?d?, N?mdev, Raid?s and Hard?s. 155 For example, DV 7.9: sira para r??i kab?ra kau?, nira?jana lyau l?i; d?d? m?raga jugau? k?, eka palaka me? j?i. Keeping [the teachings of] Kabir on one?s head, i.e., in one?s mind, bringing forth an attachment to God (nira?jana), the path of eons [of rebirth] will pass in the blink of one?s eye. 156 Bloch essay (in French, English tr. by M. Waseem) also cites numerous verses of Kabir?s, similar to those I have provided for D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s, regarding religion and caste. 63 stance on religion and caste compared to that of the D?d? Panth, will revisit the question of whether or not D?d??s teachings had any influence on Ni?cald?s. 3.7 Comparisons Between the Hagiographies of D?d? and Ni?cald?s In chapter 2, sections 2.2 through 2.6, the available biographical accounts of Ni?cald?s were evaluated to determine whether they conform to hagiographic styles. In the preceding sections (3.1 through 3.3), the biographies of D?d? Day?l were similarly evaluated for presence or absence of standard hagiographic tropes. Using the list of common tropes provided by W. L. Smith (2000, iii), Table 1 compares the two hagiographies. ? indicates the presence of a trope, and ? its absence; ?~ indicates its presence in a milder form, for example, D?d??s ?widespread fame? not extending far beyond Rajasthan, and ?? signifies that the trope may be considered only faintly present, as in the case of Ni?cald?s?s ?fame.? Hagiographic Trope D?d? Ni?cald?s 1. Descent ? ? 2. Childhood exploits, b?lya l?l? ? ?~ 3. Marriage ? ? 4. Renouncing the world ? ?~ 5. Appearance, personality, powers ? ?~ 6. Visitation, dar?an ? ? 7. Virtuous company, satsa?g ? ?~ 8. Widespread fame, digvijaya ?~ ?? 9. Meeting the emperor ? ?~ 10. Enemies ? ?~ 11. Brahman opposition ? ?~ 12. Temptation, sin and salvation ? ?~ 13. Hard bhakti ? ?~ 14. Ascent to heaven, svarg?roha?a ? ? Table 1: Comparison of the hagiographies of D?d? Day?l and Ni?cald?s While it is not required that all these tropes be present in a hagiography, D?d? Day?l?s biography by Jangop?l contains virtually all the hagiographic tropes. D?d??s fame (digvijaya) was mostly restricted to Rajasthan. It is not all that surprising that there are no accounts of D?d? ever having personally faced temptation or sin. By comparison, three of the common hagiographic tropes are absent in Ni?cald?s's biographical accounts (descent, dar?an, and svarg?roha?a), and there is only one that can be undoubtedly considered present: that of marriage. All the remaining tropes occur in milder forms that some may not considered all that impressive; Ni?cald?s's fame (digvijaya) is even more limited than that of D?d??s. While 64 it is not required that a hagiography must have all these tropes, this comparison makes the point that accounts of Ni?cald?s?s biography available to us, though not necessarily completely objective, are only mildly hagiographic, in the true sense of the term. As stated earlier in chapter 2, section 2.12, this can be attributed to two related factors: 1) Ni?cald?s's profound identification with non-dual Brahman did not, in all probability, invite the attention and adulation of potential followers and hagiographers in the manner in which an eloquent and charismatic devotee (bhakta) like D?d? Day?l might have; 2) the admiration and respect that Ni?cald?s's biographers have for his scholarship and knowledge of Ved?nta and his Brahman-realization might occasionally manifest itself in the presence of these hagiographic tropes, albeit in milder form. Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote157 that ?[g]reat geniuses have the shortest biographies? (1906, 37); the hagiographers as though step up to redress the brevity. The purpose of hagiography is usually to 1) present notable events of the teacher?s life as testimony to the doctrine he taught, 2) demonstrate the superiority of the teacher?s teachings and/or sect, and 3) to present ?selected, manipulated or invented? events of the teacher?s life as illustrations of devotion in action and as a model for the faithful to emulate (Smith 2000, 16-18). D?d? in his time can be viewed as an instigator for change, advocating a direct relationship with the divine, independent of religion, teachers, scripture or caste. His message was at odds with the established orthodoxies, both Hindu and Islamic, and this likely caused his followers to look for means to propagate his message in order to reach a wider audience; hagiography was but one means to do so. In contrast, Ni?cald?s did not challenge orthodoxy to the same degree as D?d?; he made the uncompromising doctrine of Advaita Ved?nta accessible in the vernacular, and while doing so, presented a cogent viewpoint that evaluated centuries of viewpoints about the doctrine, both for and against, and provided a clear statement of which thinkers were consistent with the doctrine and which were not. In other words, Ni?cald?s cut through the thicket of argument and counter-argument that had grown around Advaita Ved?nta through centuries of tradition, both within Ved?nta and in debates with other schools of Indian thought. Ni?cald?s presented the core of Advaita in such a way that one did not have to know Sanskrit and be immersed in the tradition to understand and assimilate. For this 157 In the context of discussing Plato. 65 impressive feat, Ni?cald?s was highly respected and sought after as a teacher; but his life and acts did not quite lend themselves to hagiographic purposes for the following reasons: 158 1) Ni?cald?s did not offer a new doctrine but instead presented interpretations already been offered by ?a?kar?c?rya in the seventh century, and even earlier, by the scripture (?ruti) itself; 2) the superiority of Advaita Ved?nta had also been asserted by numerous Advaitins prior to Ni?cald?s, who was merely clarifying their arguments, sorting through seemingly conflicting views and determining the most effective and relevant standpoints; and 3) while Ni?cald?s is certainly reported to have lived a life that demonstrated his identity with Brahman, emulating such an identity, according to Ved?nta, requires the seeker to engage in ?rava?a, 159 listening to canonical texts expounded by a teacher, manana, reflection on the content of these texts,160 and nididhy?sana, profound and continuous meditation on the same.161 It would seem that a teacher such as Ni?cald?s who presents the way of knowledge (j??na m?rga) is not as amenable a subject for hagiographers as teachers like D?d? Day?l who present the way of devotion (bhakti m?rga), even if such devotion leads to Brahman without attributes (nirgu?a brahman). Therefore, we have rich hagiographies of D?d?, but in the case of Ni?cald?s, the biographers work milder versions of the typical tropes into their accounts, but do not produce a full hagiography. Another interpretation for the absence of hagiographies of Ni?cald?s is also possible. Huston Smith, in the context of Christianity, has suggested that if no institution forms around 158 Emerson goes on to write, explaining the paucity of biographical detail on Plato: ?As a good chimney burns its smoke, so a philosopher converts the value of all his fortunes into his intellectual performances? (1906, 37). Ni?cald?s, with his focus on Advaita Brahman, gave not just his biographers, but even his hagiographers little to work with! 159 ?a?kara considers ?rava?a as ?listening, first from a teacher, and to scripture. ?rotavya p?rvam ?c?ryata ?gama? ca. BU 2.4.5 ?Bh? (1986, 193). Sad?nanda defines ?rava?a as ?the ascertainment, by means of the six characteristics (see p. 124), that the goal of all of Ved?nta is the non-dual essence [i.e., Brahman]. ?rava?a? n?ma ?a?-vidha-li?gair a?e?a-ved?nt?n?m advit?ya-vastuni t?tpary?vadh?ranam. Ved?nta-s?ra 182? (1974, 104). 160 ?a?kara explains manana as ?reflecting [on that which has been heard] by means of reasoning. pa?c?t mantavyas tarkata?? (1986, 193). Sad?nanda defines manana as ?the incessant reflection on the non-dual essence [i.e., Brahman] that has been heard [from the teacher], by means of proofs that are in accordance with Ved?nta. manana? tu ?rutasy?dvit?ya- vastuno ved?nt?nugu?a-yuktibhir anavaratam anucintanam. Ved?nta-s?ra 191? (1974, 108). 161 For ?a?kara, nididhy?sana means ?subsequently [after ?rava?a and manana], meditation with resolve, tato nididhy?sitavyo ni?cayena dhy?tavya? (1986, 193). But this does not convey the full sense of the word. BU 2.4.5 uses vij??na instead of nididhy?sana when restating its case: ??tm? v? are d???avya? ?rotavyo mantavo nididhy?sitavyo maitreyy ?tmano v? are dar?anena ?rava?ena maty? vij??nena ida? sarva? viditam.? This suggests that knowing (vij??na) is also an aspect of nididhy?sana. Sure?vara in his BU V?rtika, states: ?In restating what was already stated about ?dar?ana, etc.,? why is nididhy?sana referred to by vij????? In order to forestall the doubt that nididhy?sana implies meditation. anuv?de yathokt?n?? prakr?nte dar?an?di?u; vijy?nenety atha katha? nididhy?sanam ucyate. dhy?n??a?k?-niv?tty-artha? vij??neneti bha?yate? (1982, 695 v. 232-33ab). Sure?vara also states that ?nididhy?sana is knowing, dependent on [?rava?a and manana], apar?yatta-bodho ?tra nididhy?sanam ucyate? (693 v. 217ab). According to Sad?nanda, nididhy?sana is defined as ?the stream of conceptions (pratyaya-prav?ha) that are similar to the non-dual essence [i.e., Brahman], and are free from dissimilar conceptions such as the body, etc. vij?t?ya-deh?di-pratyaya-rahit?dvit?ya-vastu-saj?t?ya-pratyaya- prav?ho nididhy?sanam. Ved?nta-s?ra 192? (1974, 108). See also Hino (1982, 22-5). 66 the message of religious teachers, their message of spirituality ?gets no traction on history? (quoted in Horgan 2003, 19-20). In the case of D?d? Day?l, there arose the D?d? Panth, which preserved his message through the systematization of his utterances in the D?d? V???, as well as through various hagiographies about him. The fact that no institution nor even small group of individuals arose around Ni?cald?s for the purpose of preserving and propagating his message can be attributed to the fact that Ni?cald?s, rather than being a potential founder of a new institution, can be considered a member not just of the D?d? Panth but also of the larger Advaita Ved?nta community. This reverses the roles; instead of hagiographers propagating the glories of Ni?cald?s's life and teachings, Ni?cald?s himself is the author of works aimed at presenting the message of Advaita Ved?nta, and, in the process, also of the D?d? Panth, to a larger audience by writing in the vernacular rather than in Sanskrit. Whereas a hagiography uses the tropes discussed above to draw attention to the teacher and his teachings, Ni?cald?s draws upon his deep understanding of the Ved?nta corpus to make its central message of non-duality accessible to common folk, through both logic as well as parable. 3.8 Ni?cald?s within the D?d? Panth One last issue concerning the D?d? Panth remains unexamined: the internal structure of the Panth and Ni?cald?s?s place within it. Caturved? writes that by 1732 CE, five sub-factions had arisen within the D?d? Panth: Kh?ls?, N?g?, Uttar??h?, Virakta, and Kh?k? (1964, 534).162 I shall briefly describe each of these groups: 1) Kh?ls?, pure: This term is applied to the members attached to the original D?d?-dv?ra in Narain?, or to any of the branches (th?mb?) founded by D?d??s original disciples (Orr 1947, 217). They primarily engage in meditation (dhy?na), study (adhyayana), teaching (adhy?pana), and worship (bhajana- ?r?dhana); they are typically celibate, though a small number of these are householders (Caturved? 1964, 534). 2) N?g?:163 The armed wing of the panth is probably the most studied 162 Caturved? does not cite any source for this view. 163 Historically, the word n?g? is held to derive from the term, nagna, ?naked,? and used to describe the fighting ascetics, though this is not always agreed upon. The D?d?panth? faction is clothed. See Orr (1940), Caturved? (1964, 534) and Lorenzen (1978, 69). Edgerton, in the BHSD, provides ?great man, mighty man, champion? as the meaning for nagna, and cites the description of mah?-nagn? in the Pali D?gha-Nik?ya i.51.10 ?in a list of kinds of fighting men which include ugga r?japutt? [fierce princes]? s?r? cammayodhino [shield-bearing warriors] etc.? (289, 423 s.v.). 67 faction of the D?d?panth?s, possibly because of the paradox presented by militant sants. 164 In the early-to-mid-eighteenth century, they worked as mercenaries and tax collectors. From 1797 onwards, five thousand or more D?d?panth? N?g?s were in the service of Jaipur state, an arrangement that only came to an end in 1938. Their allegiance to the Jaipur state was so strong that during the 1857 uprising against the British, when the kingdom of Jaipur aligned itself with the British, the N?g?s ?rendered good service in the Mutiny,? that is, to the British (Orr 1940, 95-96; 1947, 205-6). With the decline of the kingdom of Jaipur, the numbers of the N?g?s also subsequently declined, and today they are mostly householders (Thiel- Horstmann 1991, 255-6). 3) Uttar??h?, Northerners: This group consists mainly of the rich and respected (dhan?-m?n?) members from Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. Many are involved in business, often as Ayurveda physicians or trade (len-den). They are often described as possessors of/dwellers in houses (mak?n-v?le), though it need not follow from this that they are married (Orr 1947, 218; Thiel-Horstmann 1997, 234). 4) Virakta, unattached:165 Members of this group support themselves through alms (bhik??), and giving discourses at the homes of householders who invite them. They never stay more than a few days in one place and primarily engage themselves in the study of the D?d? V??? and Sanskrit texts (Caturved? 1964, 536). 5) Kh?k?, ash-smeared: These are considered a marginal group by the other groups; they remain apart from and observing rules different from those of the other D?d?panth?s (Thiel-Horstmann 1997, 240-41; Orr 1947, 219). Kapil (2005, 26) gives a slightly modified version of these sub-groups. Instead of five, she mentions six groups: ascetic (tapas?), instead of ash-smeared (kh?kh?); the northern holders of a place or residence (uttar?dh? [sic] sth?ndh?r?s,), instead of the uttar??h?s, and as a sixth group, the dakhan??h? sth?ndh?r?s, analogous to the uttar??h?s, but located in the south of Rajasthan. Among these five factions, Ni?cald?s is held to belong to the Uttar??h? group, based on his original residence in Haryana. He is also considered to have practiced Ayurveda medicine, and Ra?j?t Si?ha reports inspecting old letters and account ledgers (bah?-kh?ta) 164 See, for examples, Thiel-Horstmann (1991), Gold (1994), Orr (1940), Mi?ra (1997). 165 Orr (1947, 218) calls them ?devotees? while Thiel-Horstmann (1997, 234) calls them ?monks,? though neither term reflects the innate sense of virakta. 68 attesting to Ni?cald?s?s engagement in trade (len-den) (1981, 15).166 However, this detail of Ni?cald?s?s Uttar??h? affiliation appears to be a mere afterthought. In almost all accounts, it is not even mentioned, and the three that do mention it do so towards the end, as they are concluding the relevant section. Ra?j?t Si?ha refers to it towards the end of the chapter on Ni?cald?s?s life, and after enumerating and briefly describing the five sub-groups of the D?d? Panth (1981, 15). Caturved?, followed by Si?ha, does not mention the Uttar??h? affiliation at all in the section on Ni?cald?s (1964, 514-16), which is itself included in another section titled ?Other disciples and grand-disciples (pra-?i?ya) of D?d?.? We only learn of Ni?cald?s?s Uttar??h? affiliation when Caturved? is describing the sub-groups of the D?d? Panth and listing notable members of the group (536). Kapil mentions Ni?cald?s?s Uttar??h? affiliation in a similar context and manner as Si?ha (2005, 26). She is certainly aware of both Si?ha and Caturved??s writings on Ni?cald?s, but she cites the sub-group details from the work ?r? D?d? Caritra ? Citraval? by Sukhday?l D?d?, which I have been unable to locate to verify its sources. In the sectarian accounts by Sw?m? N?r?ya?d?s, Ni?cald?s's Uttar??h? connection is mentioned to indicate his geographical location (1978-9, 839, 1026- 28). In the account of Ni?cald?s by S?ratr?m D?d? (1994) (Sukhday?l D?d??s younger brother), there is no mention of the Uttar??h? affiliation. These accounts suggest that Ni?cald?s's group affiliation was considered an incidental detail, not highly significant in the overall picture of his life. However, none of these authors doubt Ni?cald?s?s affiliation with the D?d? Panth itself, 167 although, as we shall see shortly, others have even questioned the strength of this affiliation. As evidence for Ni?cald?s?s being a D?d?panth?, Si?ha points out that Ni?cald?s himself proclaims his affiliation in the concluding verse(s)168 of each of the seven sections (tara?ga), in his VS. These verses are also enumerated by the hagiographers and biographers 166 There is some ambiguity in the sense of the term len-den, literally ?giving and taking.? While it typically means ?trade? or ?business,? it can also mean ?dealings.? Thus it is not clear if Si?ha means to say that Ni?cald?s engaged in trade, or he had dealings that extended as far as Bhivan?. He writes, ?N?scald?s ne apne j?vank?l me? bahut len-den kiy?. yah?? tak ki ink? len-den hariy??a k? prasiddha vy?p?rik [sic] nagar? bhiv?n? tak phail? hu? th?. is b?t k? pu??? lekhak ne kiha?haul? j?kar pr?c?n patra aur bah? kh?ta dekhakar k? hai. Ni?cald?s did much len-den in his lifetime, to the extent that his len-den was spread as far as Bhiv?n?, the famous business city of Haryana. This matter was verified by the author himself by going to Kiha?haul? and inspecting old letters and account ledgers? (15). But the author is silent on the nature of Ni?cald?s?s len-den. 167 To quote Ra?j?t Si?ha, ?Ni?cald?s d?d?pa?th ke anuy?y? the, is vi?ay me? ra?ca-m?tra bh? sa?deh nah?? hai. Regarding the matter that Ni?cald?s was a follower of the D?d? Panth, there is not even the slightest doubt (14). 168 The last tara?ga has two verses that invoke D?d?. 69 as justification for Ni?cald?s's commitment to the D?d? Panth. I present the doh?s from VS here, with my translations: 169 Jo jana prathama-tara?ga yaha, pa?hai t?hi tatk?la; Karahu mukta gurum?rti hvai, d?d? d?naday?la (VS v. 1.29). Those who would read this first chapter, liberate them immediately, O D?d? the compassionate, [who] is the embodiment of [my] teacher. D?d? d?na day?la j?, sata sukha paramaprak??a; 170 J?mai? mati k? gati nah??, so? ni?calad?sa (VS v. 2.15). D?d?, the compassionate, who is being, happiness and the highest light; Whose mind is unmoving, is not at all different from Ni?cald?s.171 Tana mana dhana b?n? arapi, jihi? sevata cita l?ya; Sakalar?pa so ?pa hai, d?d? sad? sah?ya (VS v. 3.23). D?d? is the self in entirety, [he is] always [of] help Who served attentively, 172 offering one?s body, mind, wealth and speech. ?Aha? brahma? y? v?ttimai?, nir?varana hvai bh?na; D?d? ?d?r?pa so, y?? hama liyo pich?na (VS v. 4.120). In the v?tti, ?I am Brahman,? the concealment is removed; I have recognized D?d? as that primeval form. O?k?rako artha lakhi, bhayo k?t?rtha ad??ti; Pa?hai ju y?hi tara?ga tihi, d?d? karahu sud???i (VS v. 5.170) Understanding the meaning of Om, Ad???i 173 achieved his goal; May D?d? clear the vision of the one who reads just this chapter. Bandha-harana sukha-karana ?r?, d?d? d?naday?la; Pa?hai sunai jo grantha yaha, t?ke harahu ja?j?la (VS v. 6.2.5).174 169 All citations from VS are from the Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s edition, Ni?cald?s (1917). I have verified that none of these doh?s are quotations or even partial quotations from DV. 170 The attributes sata, paramaprak??a, sukha are synonyms for sat, cit, ?nanda ? existence, consciousness, and joy. This compound, saccid?nanda is the very nature of Brahman in Advaita Ved?nta. This verse also contains a clever pun on Ni?cald?s?s name: ni?cala = unmoving. 171 N?r?ya?d?s gives an alternate, literal interpretation for this second half by providing the following context for the verse: A dim-witted but faithful seeker asked Ni?cald?s why his form was different from that of D?d? as opposed to what is stated in VS v. 2.15. Ni?cald?s asked the seeker to look at him with a one-pointed, concentrated mind and when the seeker did so he saw Ni?cald?s as D?d?. (N?r?ya?d?s 1978-9, 2:844). 172 cita l?ya/l??, (Thiel-Horstmann 1983, 164, s.v.) 173 Name of the second prince in the VS frame story, who represents a madhyam?dhik?r?, middling aspirants. See n. 580 on p. 315. 70 D?d? Day?l, the compassionate, is the remover of bondage, causing happiness, auspicious; Whoever reads or hears this text, free him from this snare of birth and death. Lacchya artha lakhi v?kyako, hvai jij??su nih?la; Nir?varana so ?pa hai, d?d? d?naday?la (VS v. 6.2.60).175 Understanding the deeper sense of the sentence, the seeker becomes happy; The unconcealed is the self, [which is] D?d?, the compassionate. J??n? mukti videha mai?, j?sau? hoya abheda; D?d? ?d?r?pa so, j?hi bakh?nata veda (VS v. 7.116). The knower [reaches] liberation after death, and therefore becomes non-different [from Brahman]; D?d? is that primeval form which alone expounds the Vedas. N?ma-r?pa vyabhic?ri mai?, anugata eka an?pa; D?d?pada ko lacchya hai, asti-bh?ti-priya-r?pa (VS v. 7.117) Name and form are used fallaciously, they follow the incomparable One. The deeper meaning of the term D?d? is [that which has] the nature of being, manifestation and dearness (i.e., Brahman).176 These verses comprise all of Ni?cald?s?s references to D?d? in VS, and the term D?d? has a double meaning throughout, as both the founder of the D?d? Panth, and as Brahman. 177 But there is no mention of D?d? in the beginning of the text in the mangal?cara?a verse, the invocation of a blessing, where an author traditionally invokes one?s guru. At least one writer, Kuppuswamy Raju, in his introduction to his Tamil translation of V?ttiprabh?kar (Ni?cald?s 1901), felt that since Ni?calad?s did not explicitly present D?d? Day?l?s teachings, his conviction in them must have been weak. Yet Kuppuswamy acknowledges 174 In VS 6, the verses pertaining to the story of Ag?dhadeva?s dream restart the numbering from 1 onwards. To avoid confusion with earlier verses (1-12) in the same chapter, the new verses are indicated as VS v. 6.2.nn. 175 See n. 174 for verse numbering convention. 176 This is a reference to D?g-d??ya-viveka 20 by Vidy?ra?ya/Bh?rat?t?rtha: asti bh?ti priya? r?pa? n?ma cetya??apa?cakam; ?dyatrayam brahmar?pam jagadr?pa? tato dvayam. ?Being, manifestation, dearness, form and name are five [attributes]. The first three are the nature of Brahman, the remaining two are the nature of creation.? Thus one who is termed as having the r?pa of asti-bh?ti-priya is essentially being called brahma-r?pa, i.e., Brahman. 177 In my translations of these VS verses, I have stayed with the literal meaning of D?d?, i.e. as referring to the founder of the D?d? Panth. 71 Ni?calad?s as a strong brahma-ni??ha, one who is steadfast in Brahman. 178 Moreover, in the VP 179 and YP, there is no mention of D?d? anywhere at all. This understandably raises the question of the strength of Ni?cald?s?s commitment to the D?d? Panth. An explanation for the absence of references to the founder of his lineage in Ni?cald?s?s other works can be found in the opening invocatory verses (ma?gala doh?) of VS: Jo sukha nitya prak?sa vibhu, n?ma r?pa ?dh?ra; Mati na lakhai jihi? mati lakhai, so mai? ?uddha ap?ra (VS v. 1.1). That which is joy, eternal, manifest, all-pervasive, the basis for name and form; Which the intellect does not understand [but] which understands the intellect ? I am that pure, boundless [Brahman]. Abdhi ap?ra svar?pa mama, lahar? vi??u mahesa; Vidhi ravi ca?d? varuna yama, sakti dhanesa ganesa (VS v. 1.2). My nature is [like a] boundless ocean [whose] waves are Vi??u, ?iva, Brahm? (vidhi), the sun, moon, Varuna, Yama, [the goddess] ?akti, Kubera (dhanesa) and Gane?a. J? k?p?lu sarvaj?ako, hiya dh?rata muni dhy?na; T?ko hota up?dhitai?, momai? mithy? bh?na (VS v. 1.3). The compassionate knower of all, whom sages hold in the heart in contemplation, Appears in ?me? falsely through [its] up?dhi (limiting adjunct)180 [which is m?y?]. Hvai jihi? j?nai bina jagata, manahu? jevar? s??pa; Nasai bhujaga jaga jihi? lahai, so?ha? ?pai ?pa (VS v. 1.4). Without knowing [Brahman], the world appears like a snake [perceived] on a rope; Just as the snake disappears for one who sees [the rope], so does the creation [for a knowledge of Brahman]; I myself am [that Brahman]. Bodha c?hi j?ko? suk?ti, bhajata r?ma ni?k?ma; So mero hai ?tam?, k?k?? kar?? pran?ma (VS v. 1.5). People do good acts and selflessly worship God (r?m) in order to know that Which is my self, [so] to whom should I prayerfully bow down? 178 Ni?cald?s (1901, 4-7). My thanks to Ms. Hamsav??? Kuppuswamy (no relation) and Mr. Ma?ika??an for translating the Tamil for me in Rishikesh, July 2006. 179 VP has only three doh?s. (Ni?cald?s 1899, 1, 275, 361). 180 This is the usual, yet unsatisfactory, translation for up?dhi. See p. 171 for a discussion of its sense. 72 Ni?cald?s clearly indicates that he is beyond identification with name and form (n?ma-r?pa) and sees Brahman as the ground of his own self, the boundless Brahman that encompasses all including the various deities. Brahman is the basis of all creation and is only perceived by name and form due to the up?dhi (?limiting adjunct?)181 that is caused by m?y?, the veiling aspect of ??vara. In just these five verses at the very beginning of the text, Ni?cald?s very directly and uncompromisingly presents the core tenets of Advaita Ved?nta and shifts the reader?s frame of reference from the conventional reality (vy?vah?rika satt?), to the absolute or highest reality (p?ram?rthika satt?). From the standpoint of absolute reality, there is no deity or guru, there is nothing but the self, so whom should he invoke?182 He seems to imply that it is irrelevant whether D?d? or any other guru or deity is supplicated once one has clearly seen that one?s self is none other than Brahman. This is affirmed by Pt. P?t?mbar?s commentary (??k?) to these verses. Introducing VS v. 1.5, the ??k? implies the doubt, that Ni?cald?s ought to invoke at least Ram in his invocatory verses (ma?gala), as Ram signifies attribute-less (nirgu?a) Brahman in the D?d? Panth. But it is explained that since Ram is indeed the nature of his (Ni?cald?s's) ?tm?, and nothing other than him exists, it is not possible to supplicate anyone else (Ni?cald?s 1994, 6-7; 1967, 8-9). Indirectly, through these ma?gala verses, Ni?cald?s is also establishing his eligibility (adhik?ra) for writing this text (VS) which will make this very insight accessible to the reader. There is no reason to doubt Ni?cald?s?s place in the D?d? Panth, since all the accounts, sectarian and non-sectarian, mention Ni?cald?s as belonging to this Panth, and he has not been affiliated with any other Panth. Ni?cald?s's scholarship is highly esteemed by the D?d?panth?s, even though they are not really familiar with the content of his works.183 S?ratr?m D?d? explains the difference between Ni?cald?s and D?d? thus: ?Ni?cald?s's path was that of knowledge, not devotion. ? Ni?cald?s's highest teacher (parama-guru), D?d? Day?l used to consider all three ? devotion, knowledge and detachment ? as means for 181 See n. 180. 182 This may appear an unseemly grandiose and unbowing perspective, but it has sound precedent. See, for example, ?a?kara in his bh??ya on BhG 12.13, where he states that ?Nobody who comes to know ??vara as the Self through proper means, desires to subordinate (gu?abh?va? jigami?ati) himself to anybody else, because it would be contradictory. Na ca ?tm?nam ??varam pram??ata? buddhv? kasyacid gun?bh?va? jigami?ati ka?cid, virodh?t.? This has even greater significance when one considers that it occurs in what is considered the BhG chapter on bhakti-yoga, the way of worship. 183 To Thiel-Horstmann, Ni?cald?s is ?a highly thought of but hardly read D?d?panth? Ved?ntist? (1989, 146). She means hardly read by the D?d?panth?s themselves, and this was borne out by my conversations with them in the field. 73 attaining the highest joy. ? Ni?cald?s had meditated on D?d? as his teacher in the beginning. ? D?d? advanced Ni?cald?s on the path of knowledge and Ni?cald?s thoroughly mastered that path and experienced that ?The implied meaning (lacchya=lak?ya) of the term D?d? is Brahman (VS v. 7.117)?? (D?d? 1994, 56-7).184 All that matters to the D?d? Panth, it seems, is that one of their own order has written works that are highly regarded far beyond their domain, and this, they feel only adds to the glory of the Panth. 3.9 Chapter Summary This section attempted to clarify the relationship of Ni?cald?s to the D?d? Panth. First, both historical and hagiographical accounts about the founder of the Panth, D?d? Day?l, were examined. The evidence is inconclusive as to D?d??s lower caste and Muslim origins as well as his possibly Muslim teacher(s), but there seems to be a discomfort with these matters from the time of his direct disciples onward, and there is evidence of attempts to either downplay such uncomfortable references or to ?brahmanize? outright D?d? and his panth. The D?d? Panth reads much into D?d??s meeting with Akbar, though there is no historical record on the Mughal side corroborating the event. It is likely that the meeting did occur, but its impression, as Orr suggests, might have been greatest on his hagiographer, Jangop?l. On analysis, all but one of the fourteen hagiographic tropes enumerated by W. L. Smith are found to be present in Jangop?l?s DJL, with an unsurprising exception: the loyal hagiographer recorded no instance of D?d? ever facing temptation, sinning, or requiring salvation. An investigation of D?d??s writings as recorded in the D?d? V??? showed his familiarity with Muslim and Sufi ideas, and his usage of relevant Arabic and Persian terms and conventions. Rather than the Muslim being demonized as ?the Other,? his writings suggest that whether one is called Muslim or Hindu is unimportant; what matters is that one cultivate the non-denominational and universal attributes such as compassion, kindness, non-violence, etc. D?d??s writings suggest that categorization on the basis of one?s religion is contrived and irrelevant from the standpoint of his vision of uncompromising non-duality. Scriptures and leaders of any religious tradition are empty of knowledge of the non-dual ground of all being 184 Sv?m? ni?cald?s j? k? j??n m?rg th?, bhakti m?rg nah?? th?. ? Ni?cald?s j? ke param-guru ?r? d?d? day?lj? bhakti, jy?n, aur vair?gya (ni?k?m karma) t?no? m?rgo? ko param?nand pr?pti ke s?dhan m?nte the. ? Ni?cald?sne d?d? j? k? guru r?p me? h? ?ra?bh se up?san? k? th?. ? D?d? j? ne ni?cald?s j? ko j??n m?rg par ?ge ba?h?y? aur ni?cald?s j? jy?n m?rg me? p?ra?gat ho gaye, aur unho?ne a?t me yah anubhav kiy? ?D?d? pada ko lak?ya hai, asti-bh?ti-priya-r?pa.? 74 (Brahman) which is without attributes (nirgu?a) and is beyond words. He considers caste (j?ti), too, to be an erroneous notion. It is not birth and family lineage that matters, but what is within oneself. The true measure of a human being is revealed by how one acts. On the matters of religion and caste, selections from two of his immediate disciples, Rajjab, a Muslim, and Sundard?s, a Hindu, showed that they too had views similar to those of D?d?. The writings of all three teach transcendence of categories such as religion and caste. This will provide the context from which Ni?cald?s's views on similar matters can be investigated in the next chapter, and we shall examine (in section 4.6) whether any direct influence can be detected on his choice to write in the vernacular. On comparing the hagiographies of D?d? and Ni?cald?s (Table 1, p. 63), we saw that in Ni?cald?s's biographical accounts three of the common hagiographic tropes (of descent, visitation (dar?an), and ascent to heaven) are absent. There is only one trope that can be undoubtedly considered present: that of marriage. All the remaining tropes occur in milder forms as compared to D?d??s hagiography. This can be considered a direct result of Ni?cald?s's profound identification with non-dual Brahman which would not prove as attractive to potential hagiographers as D?d??s charismatic devotion (bhakti). The respect that Ni?cald?s's biographers have for his scholarship and knowledge of Ved?nta and his Brahman-realization may explain the milder form of the hagiographic tropes that are present. Ni?cald?s's uncompromising vision and embodiment of non-duality did not challenge orthodoxy to the same extent as D?d??s message to cultivate a direct relationship with the divine. Ni?cald?s?s teachings did not gain any ?traction on history? within the D?d? Panth; his teaching lineage did not even survive three generations. Conversely, Ni?cald?s?s writings themselves serve the function of hagiographies and help propagate the message of Advaita Ved?nta to the broader Advaita Ved?nta community, making its central message of non- duality accessible to common folk who have no knowledge of Sanskrit. Finally, the sub-groups within the D?d? Panth and Ni?cald?s's place among these were discussed, and Ni?cald?s's relationship to the D?d? Panth as a whole was also examined. The mention of Ni?cald?s?s affiliation to the Northern sub-group, the Uttar??h?s, appears to be a mere afterthought, suggesting that this be considered an incidental detail, not highly significant in the overall picture of his life. But his affiliation to the D?d? Panth as a whole was important to consider, as some have questioned the strength of his commitment to the 75 group, given that he does not mention D?d? in the beginning of his texts in the invocatory verses (mangal?cara?a) where one typically invokes one?s guru. Even though the concluding verse(s) of each of the seven sections of his VS contain the word ?D?d?,? the term has a double meaning throughout, signifying both the founder of the D?d? Panth, and as Brahman. In his VP and YP, there is no mention of D?d? whatsoever. This is explained by Ni?cald?s himself via his opening invocatory verses (ma?gala doh?) to the VS, where he openly states that he is beyond identification with name and form (n?ma-r?pa) and sees Brahman as the ground of his own self, the boundless Brahman that encompasses all including the various deities. Given this, to whom should he prayerfully bow down? From the standpoint of absolute reality, there is no deity or guru, there is nothing but the self, so whom should he invoke? To Ni?cald?s, it is irrelevant whether D?d? or any other guru or deity is supplicated once one has clearly seen that one?s self is none other than Brahman. 4 Ni?cald?s and the Vernacular As defined by Sheldon Pollock, vernacularization is ?the historical process of choosing to create a written literature, along with its complement, a political discourse, in local languages, according to models supplied by a superordinate, usually cosmopolitan, literary culture? (2006, 23).185 Such a process signals ?the protohistory of the nation? and we are witnessing a decision by the authors ?to make texts in languages that did not travel?and that they knew did not travel?as far as Sanskrit?? Pollock suggests that to make such a decision ?to produce a regional alternative to [Sanskrit] and to elect to remain within a limited world was ? to effect a break ? in cultural communications and self-understanding.? In choosing the language in which a text will be produced, a choice is also being made regarding cultural identity formation, which has potential political significance, particularly if the text is commissioned by a royal court (1998, 43-6). This chapter explores whether the concept of vernacularization applies to Ni?cald?s. It also takes a closer look at Ni?cald?s?s position on caste, particularly as viewed in the light of his decision to write in the vernacular instead of in Sanskrit. Ni?cald?s?s stance is compared with that of the Advaitin ?a?kara, and also of the Mah?bh?rata, to determine if Ni?cald?s is making a break with tradition and society, and whether his motives are political. The attitude of D?d? and his disciples Rajjab and Sundard?s towards religion and caste is also revisited in order to evaluate whether, and to what degree, Ni?cald?s concurs with them (in section 4.6). 4.1 Why Did Ni?cald?s Write in the Vernacular? Ni?cald?s?s motive for writing in the vernacular is glimpsed in the opening verses of VS, where he states: sutra bh??ya v?rtika prabh?ti, grantha bahuta surab?ni; tath?pi mai? bh??? kar??, lakhi mati-manda aj?ni. (VS v. 1.7) There are many Sanskrit texts [such as the Brahma-]s?tra, [?a?kara?s] commentaries, [Sure?vara?s] V?rtika, 186 etc., Yet I write in the vernacular, taking into account the average person who is ignorant [of Sanskrit]. 185 The cosmopolitan language, for Pollock?s arguments, is Sanskrit. At other locales and periods of India?s history, Persian is another contender for status as ?cosmopolitan.? 186 According to Pt. P?t?mbar?s gloss, a v?rttika (var. v?rtika) is a secondary, supplementary metrical commentary which explains stated, unstated and opposing opinions regarding the core text (Ni?cald?s 1917b, 2n7). 77 kavijanak?ta bh??? bahuta, grantha jagata vikhy?ta; bina vic?ras?gara lakhai, nahi? sandeha nas?ta. (VS v. 1.8) Although there are many famous vernacular texts written by wise persons, Without reading Vic?rs?gar, doubts will not be destroyed. This verse attests to Ni?cald?s?s awareness of the unsuitability of Sanskrit for dispelling doubts many might have regarding Ved?nta. The (unattributed) introduction to the printed edition of VP published by Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s states that VS was aimed at average folk (manda-buddhiv?le) in simple language (Ni?cald?s 1899, np). According to Sw?m? Vivekananda, ?[this] book has more influence in India than any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries? (335). This is hardly the ?limited world? to which Pollock is alluding in the quote above. VS has been translated into modern Hindi, Sanskrit, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu and English, 187 and has been the subject of many commentaries, 188 all of which attest to its widespread appeal. VS describes three kinds of truth-seekers and the nature of mok?a, liberation. It is written in simple language to avoid burdening the reader with technical Sanskrit vocabulary, without advocating any specific sectarian way (not even D?d?panth?), or engaging in any argumentation and excessive refutation of other viewpoints. In his auto-commentary to VS v. 1.8, Ni?cald?s elaborates on the ?other famous vernacular texts? of the time. There are the pa?ca-bh???, the five vernacular texts written, according to Pt. P?t?mbar, by Manohard?s. These are titled ?a?-pra?n? (Six Questions), ?ata- pra?n? (Hundred Questions), J??na-ma?jar? (Knowledge-blossoms), J??na-c?r?a (Knowledge Simplified) and Ved?nta-s?ra (The Essence of Ved?nta). Ni?cald?s considers all these incorrect in some portions, and hence they are incapable of providing the reader with a doubt-free understanding. The vernacular ?tma-bodha (self-knowledge) by M??akd?s is also considered to be incapable of producing understanding, since it is incomplete in Ved?nta methodology. 189 Only VS contains the entire methodology and conforms fully to 187 There may be other language versions, e.g., N?r?ya?d?s (1978-9, 2:852), also mentions Urdu and Gurmukhi versions. 188 D?d? (1994) and Ni?cald?s (1967) are two such examples. 189 Sadly these texts, or others by these authors, are not to be found. 78 Ved?nta, without any contradictions. Hence, Ni?cald?s proclaims his text superior to these other vernacular texts (3). 190 The introduction to VS states that because it was targeted toward an elementary audience, the general populace, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd? requested Ni?cald?s to write something for more erudite readers (P?t?mbar 1917, 7). As VS only briefly explained the pram??as, means of knowledge, there might be many doubts remaining in the minds of the readers. Thus VP, a much more complex text, was created in order to fully dispel any doubts, and explain the pram??as as well as the various kinds of perceptual errors (khy?ti). This work is highly regarded, as one of the introductory verses191 proclaims: s?rad?sa tuls?d?sa ke?avd?sa ?di bhale, chandanake racabe me? bhaye kavibh?pahi; y?hike sam?na bh??? granthana me? artha n?hi?, j?suke mananakare mi?ai bhavak?pah?. (VP intro. v. 1) Let S?rd?s, Tuls?d?s, Keshavd?s and others be poet-kings in composing poetry. There is no purpose in [their vernacular] language books comparable to what is found here, contemplating which, the pit of existence is destroyed. For each pram??a (means of knowledge), first the Ny?ya standpoint is presented, then differences between pr?c?na and navya Ny?ya, if any, are taken up. Differences from the M?m??saka viewpoints are also considered, and then finally the refutation of, or agreement with these viewpoints from the perspective of Advaita Ved?nta is presented. Without an intimate familiarity with these other views and their specialized terminology, it is often a challenge to follow the argument. The language here is geared towards learned readers as compared to the VS and YP, which, as already noted, were written for average, unlearned folk. Ni?cald?s?s erudition is clearly showcased in the VP, in the scope of literature with which he exhibits intimate familiarity: Grammar (vy?kara?a), Ny?ya (pr?c?na and navya), M?m??s? (Bh???a and Pr?bh?kara), as well as all the Advaita secondary literature.192 Ni?cald?s compares the standpoints presented by various sub-schools of Advaita, without any particular preference for one over the rest, though he deems certain standpoints in V?caspati 190 It is both sad and ironic that none of these ?famous vernacular texts? referred to by Ni?cald?s are available today in print, not even in the WorldCat library catalog which claims to be ?the world's largest network of library-based content and services.? They may survive in manuscript collections; I have not explored this avenue. 191 In kavitta meter, most likely not by Ni?cald?s. 192 By my analysis, in addition to ?ruti and sm?ti texts, Ni?cald?s refers to over fifty texts and forty authors by name connected with Vy?kara?a, Ny?ya, Advaita and other fields. See Appendix 1: Works and Authors Cited in VP, p. 407ff. 79 Mi?ra?s Bh?mat? (ninth century), Sarvaj??tman?s Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (eleventh century), Vidy?ra?ya?s Pa?cada?? (fourteenth century), ?nandabodha?s Ny?ya-makaranda (eleventh/twelfth century) inconsistent with core Advaita positions. According to Pandit P?t?mbar, several Sanskrit-knowing pandits read VP in hiding, because they were embarrassed to have to seek help from a bh??? or vernacular text (P?t?mbar 1917, 7). Certainly, one reason for the influence of Ni?cald?s?s works is his decision to make them accessible to ?average folk? in bh???, the vernacular.193 At the conclusion of VS, we have: tina yaha bh???grantha kiya, ra?ca na upaj? l?ja; t?mai? yaha ika hetu hai, day?dharma sirt?ja. (VS v. 7.113) From them, 194 I?ve written this work in the vernacular, without embarrassment. Compassion and dharma are its crown. In writing this, I have only this one goal: bina vy?karana na pa?hi sakai, grantha sa?sk?ta manda; pa?hai y?hi anay?sa h??, lahai su param?nanda (VS v. 7.114) Without knowledge of grammar, Sanskrit works cannot be read by the average folk. They can read this (VS) with ease, and attain the highest bliss. Some insight may be gained into why Ni?cald?s chose to compose his works in the vernacular by recalling the account of his earlier years (chapter. 2). By the age of fourteen, he had already experienced caste discrimination at the hands of the pandits ? because he was a J?? k?atriya, they refused to teach him Sanskrit. Thus, when he arrived in Benares in 1806-07 (Si?ha 1981, 5; Kapil 2005, 24), he lied and passed himself off as a brahman (Caturved? 1964, 514-15). According to hagiographic accounts, this act of lying would have profound consequences for him. As recounted in chapter 2, when Ni?cald?s confessed his lie and revealed his true caste, his teacher is said to have cursed him, saying that he would from then on be regularly troubled by fever, and that his lineage would not prosper. It would be quite reasonable to assume that Ni?cald?s?s experience of discrimination may also have motivated him to make his works accessible to a wider audience who do not know Sanskrit and should not be required to resort to deceitful means to gain such knowledge. This will be explored in greater depth shortly in section 4.2 below. 193 Si?ha (1981, 89) notes the presence of words from the local B??gr?/Hary?nv? dialect. 194 The works he has studied. See VS vv. 7.111-12 quoted on p. 15Error! Bookmark not defined.. 80 In VS 3.99, 59, Ni?cald?s notes that, if ailments can be cured by means of knowledge gained from Ayurveda texts written in Hindi or Farsi, one can also arrive at knowledge of the identity of ?tm? and param?tm? through Ved?nta texts written in Hindi. He writes: brahmar?pa ahi brahmavita,195 t?k? v??? veda; bh??? athav? sa?sk?ta, karata bheda bhrama cheda (VS v. 3.10). A knower of Brahman is Brahman incarnate, and his speech is the Veda. Whether in the vernacular or in Sanskrit, it destroys the error of duality. To Ni?cald?s, what really matters is that the teachings help to deliver the knowledge of Brahman to a seeker (mumuk?u) and that they remove all doubts and confusion, regardless of the language in which the teachings are given. One can get a sense of how radical this notion was for his era from an argument presented by the seventeenth century grammarian, Kau??a Bha??a. Traditionally, it was held that only grammatical Sanskrit had the efficacy to cause verbal knowledge (?abda j??na), which in Advaita Ved?nta is the only means for knowing Brahman, i.e. gaining ultimate knowledge. The navya naiy?yikas suggested that vernacular language can also induce verbal knowledge through invoking the corresponding Sanskrit word indirectly. But Kau??a (and also Ni?cald?s) suggest that vernacular language can signify directly, just like Sanskrit. To a traditional m?m??saka, this is tantamount to heresy as it diminishes the divinely conferred exclusive power of the Vedas. 196 Ni?cald?s is clearly aware of how radical his decision to write in the vernacular may appear to be to the pro-Sanskrit establishment, and he defends his choice in multiple places in the VS. For example, in the second chapter of the VS, where he defends the four requirements (anubandha) of the text, he first raises a series of objections that the text cannot be efficacious because the text cannot possibly have an eligible audience (adhik?r?) (VS 2.33- 38).197 Ni?cald?s refutes these objections systematically (VS 2.61-71). In VS 1 5-23), an adhik?r? is defined as one whose anta?-kara?a (lit. inner organ, more on this term in section 5.2, on p. 120) is free from impurities (mala) and distractions (vik?epa) but still has ignorance (aj??na or ?vara?a), and who is endowed with the four-fold means (s?dhana-catu??aya) of 195 Cf. sa yo ha vai tatparama? brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, MuU 3.2.9; brahmavid ?pnoti param. TU 2.1.1. 196 See Pollock (2001b, 28-30) for a more detailed description of Kau??a Bha??a?s argument. 197 VS section references refer to Ni?cald?s (1917). 81 discrimination (viveka), detachment (vair?gya), the six ?wealths? (?a?-sampatti),198 and the desire for liberation (mumuk?ut?). Regarding the objection that everyone desires objects and no one desires liberation (VS 2.38), Ni?cald?s writes199 (VS 2.65): ?Do you say that a) no one seeks liberation (mok?a), or b) there are seekers of liberation, but they do not use texts? If (a), that does not hold, since everyone desires an end to sorrow and eternal joy, which is the nature of liberation. It is not that one only desires happiness derived from objects (vi?aya-janya); all desire everlasting happiness alone, which is mok?a. So one is left with objection (b), that all are desirous of liberation (mumuk?u), but this text is not efficacious. In this regard, we ask (VS 2.66): c) Is this text not a means of liberation, and thus not effective? d) Or is there a means other than this text, due to whose efficacy one does not engage with this text? e) Or is there no one with the eligibility for this text?? Ni?cald?s deals with (e) at length (VS 2.68-71), describing a person who is desirous of knowledge (jij??su) and establishing that this text is efficacious for such a person. Of greater interest to us, in the context of the present discussion concerning his choice to write in the vernacular, is how Ni?cald?s addresses (c) and (d). Regarding (c), he states: ?The Vedas establish that liberation occurs through knowledge. Knowledge takes place when the ears connect with the utterances of Ved?nta (ved?nta-v?kya). Direct knowledge (aparok?a-j??na) takes places through the contact of the ears with the mah?-v?kyas (?great utterances?) while indirect knowledge results from contact with the subsidiary statements of Ved?nta (av?ntara- v?kya). 200 Ved?nta here refers to the Upani?ads. Although this text (VS) is different from the Upani?ads, sentences in colloquial language with the same meaning are in this text, and, by listening to these, knowledge will occur? (VS 2.66, 36, emphasis mine). 198 The ?a?-sampatti, according to VS 1.9-13, 5-6 are 1) restraint of the mind from sense objects (?ama), 2) restraint of the senses (dama), 3) the conviction that the teacher and the Vedas are true (?raddh?), 4) the end of the mind?s distraction (sam?dh?na), 5) forsaking all acts along with means, objects, and women (upar?ma), 6) forbearance/tolerance (titik??) 199 What follows is my abridged and edited rendering of Ni?cald?s?s writing, not a literal translation. 200 With these comments, Ni?cald?s opposes Vidy?ra?ya and others who hold that ?rava?a, manana and nididhy?sana all are required to gain aparok?a-j??na. See VS 1.21-23 for greater details. Ni?cald?s does not name Vidy?ra?ya specifically, but refers to an ekade??. Pt. P?t?mbar further elaborates that an ekade?? is one who holds to a portion of the established Ved?nta doctrine (siddh?nta) but independently reads more into it. Pt. P?t?mbar pointedly states that this refers to Vidy?ra?ya and not Bhart?prapa?ca (Ni?cald?s 1917b, 13n42). For a brief overview of Bhart?prapa?ca vs. ?a?kara, see Malkovsky (2001, 103-106). 82 Ni?cald?s also offers a response regarding objection (d), the argument that there are many other Sanskrit texts such as the Upani?ads, Brahma-s?tra, and commentaries that explain the unity of j?va and Brahman, and are hence means of liberation, having the same prerequisites (adhik?ra) as for the VS, thereby rendering VS superfluous. Ni?cald?s states: ?Although this is true, for those whose intellect is not capable of understanding the content [of texts in Sanskrit], such seekers will not derive knowledge from these texts. For such persons of duller intellect (manda-buddhi), this text [in the vernacular] will be effective? (36). This statement very clearly states Ni?cald?s's intent to make liberation accessible to those unable to access Sanskrit texts. Ni?cald?s returns to the issue of the efficaciousness of vernacular languages in VS 3.99. We have already encountered the doh?, VS v. 3.10 (on page 80), where Ni?cald?s proclaims that one who knows Brahman is Brahman itself, and the utterances of such a person, be they in Sanskrit or the vernacular, remove the erroneous notions of duality. In his commentary, he elaborates: ?It is not the rule that ?knowledge does not occur without the Vedic statements? (emphasis mine). The knowledge of the causes of illnesses and their medicine recorded in the Ayurveda can also be gained from other Sanskrit texts, as well as from Farsi and vernacular texts. Similarly, the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ?tm? can also occur through vernacular texts. If knowledge could not occur without the Vedas, then the entire sm?ti [humanly conceived secondary scriptures], pur??a [sacred texts containing stories, legends, hymns and instructions of various deities, sages and kings] and itih?sa texts [historical texts, including the R?m?ya?a and MBh] propounding the knowledge of Brahman would become futile. Hence it is established that knowledge can also occur through vernacular texts? (VS 3.99, 59-60). Ni?cald?s is directly and plainly refuting those who hold that only the Sanskrit language can signify knowledge of Brahman. Despite being so bold and outspoken regarding the efficacy of the vernacular to effect liberation, Ni?cald?s provides a glimpse into how deep-seated the pro-Sanskrit tendencies were in the nineteenth century, even within himself. In VS 6, Ni?cald?s accepts d???i-s???i- v?da, the theory that perception is creation. Prince Tarkad???i (lit. ?he whose perspective is argumentative?), one of the three princes in the broader VS frame story, and who is symbolic 83 of the lowest grade of spiritual seeker,201 raises the objection that if existence (sa?s?ra) were like a dream, then there would be no beginning-less ignorance, and thus, all the means for the removal of ignorance would be futile. In response, Ni?cald?s narrates the tale of (fictional) King Ag?dhadeva (lit. ?lord without desire?) who has a dream wherein he sees himself as an outcaste (c????la) trapped in an endless forest (VS 6.330-452, 203-83). In the dream, Ag?dhadeva approaches a guru and requests the teacher to free him from the forest and from his outcaste status. Before commencing the narration of the dream-guru, Ni?cald?s remarks that the guru?s teachings to Ag?dhadeva were in Sanskrit, which Ni?cald?s then presents in the vernacular (VS 6.333, 206)! Since this tale is Ni?cald?s?s creation, the guru could just as easily have directly instructed Ag?dhadeva in the vernacular instead of Sanskrit. This would be even more justifiable, since in the dream Ag?dhadeva is an outcaste who does not know Sanskrit. But the dominant mindset still prevails even for Ni?cald?s, that gurus instruct kings in Sanskrit (even one dreaming that he is an outcaste), and, even in vernacular tales, one must hold to that convention. In concluding the section that knowledge is the cause for liberation (VS 6.375-406, 233- 50), having stated the essence (s?ra) of the Vedas that knowledge alone effects liberation, and not karma, Ni?cald?s provides a seemingly apologetic section (VS 6.401, 245-6) on the conventions (samprad?ya) of the vernacular: laghu guru guru laghu hota hai, v?tti hetu ucc?ra; r? hvai aru k? ?haura me?, ava k? ?haura vak?ra. (VS 6.401, 245-6 v. 1) For metrical purposes, a long vowel is pronounced short and vice versa, [The syllable] r? occurs in place of aru, and va in place of ava. sa?yog? k?a cha ru ?a kha hota hai,202 nah?? ?a-varga ?ak?ra; bh??? me? ? ? hu nah??, aru t?lavya ?ak?ra. (VS 6.401, 246 v. 2) k?a occurs as cha and ?a as kha, the retroflex consonants [including] ?a do not occur, In the vernacular, ? and ? do not occur, nor the palatal ?a. 201 See n. 580 on p. 314 for an explanation of the three types of spiritual seekers. 202 The first pada of this line seems corrupt. Ni?cald?s (1917,246) has: sa?yogau k?a na ka para kha na. Ni?cald?s (1967, 330) has: sa?yogo k?a na ka para kha na. To be metrically consistent with the prior verse, I have followed a slightly modified version of the pada given Ni?cald?s (1994, 280): sa?yog? k?a cha ru ?a kha na. All three versions are metrically problematic. In fact, neither verse follows the standard 6+4+3, 6+4+1 doh? arrangement; instead we have 4+4+3, 5+3; 8,5+3. I also assume that v?tti in the first verse is pronounced as three syllables, viriti, metri causa. 84 Ni?cald?s appears to be addressing potential criticism from m?m??sakas when he states in the commentary that ?so many letters do not occur in the vernacular; were they to be used, the learned (kavi) would say they were improper (a?uddha) ? (VS 6.401, 246). 4.2 Ni?cald?s vis-?-vis Pollock?s Theories of Vernacularization Pollock believes that ?breaks in cultural communication? began to take effect during 1000-1500 (1998, 45). According to his findings, the dates for the start of vernacularization in various languages are as follows: Kannada, ninth-tenth century; Tamil, 1000-1200; Sinhala, ca. 1250; Gujarati, by the end of the twelfth century; Assamese, by the fourteenth century; Oriya and Malayalam, by the fifteenth century (49-54). It is instructive to compare these dates with what is known regarding the creation of independent Advaita Ved?nta literature in the vernacular in Table 2 below. 203 It is interesting to note that Pollock does not consider Hindi in this context. Elsewhere, he notes a Braj prose ?work in metaphysics,? Siddh?ntabodha by Jasvant Si?ha, the king of Jodhpur, dating to ca. 1650 CE (2001b, 26n39). However, its content is far too sparse to be considered a significant independent philosophical work.204 Fortunately, we have McGregor?s survey, Hindi Literature from its Beginnings to the Nineteenth Century (1984), according to which the Hindi literature tradition begins between 1200-1450. All works connected with Ved?nta that are listed by McGregor are either translations of Sanskrit texts, for example, the Braj translation of the Prabodhacandrodaya in 1544 (103),205 or works in verse with Ved?ntic viewpoints, such as D?d?panth? Sundard?s?s J??nasamudra (1653), Ak?ar-Ananya?s (b. 1653) ?eclectic adaptation of Ved?nta?, Gokulpras?d Brij?s ?ok-vin?? (1877) ?on Ved?nta topics and the frailty of the world? expressed through ?a father?s bereavement and the consolation of faith? (137, 142, 202). We find no mention of Ni?cald?s 203 Dates for earliest independent Advaita Ved?nta literature in languages other than Hindi are from the section ?Advaita in Vernaculars? in Balasubramanian (2000, 443-665). The authors for the sections on each language considered take into account both metrical and non-metrical works that are not translations of pre-existing works. 204 The Siddh?ntabodha (Si?ha 1972) is a discourse between teacher and student on Brahman from an Advaita standpoint. The printed version is 19 pages and concludes with a two-page, 12-verse metrical summary. If one subtracts the footnotes providing the critical apparatus, the actual body of the discourse is barely nine pages (including the metrical summary). This gives one a clear indication of the depth at which matters are expounded in this work, particularly when compared with typical Advaita works, whether metrical or in prose. 205 Prabodhacandrodaya is a theistic Vaishnava Ved?nta allegorical drama by K??nami?ra, eleventh century. 85 in this volume. 206 If we consider these metrical works to be Advaita literature, then the earliest date for Hindi would be the mid-seventeenth century, but according to Shrivastava (2000), other Hindi works on Advaita, prior to Ni?cald?s?s, have been in the sant tradition and are mostly devotional poems, even if they deal with nirgu?a (attribute-less) Brahman. Quite clearly, although Ni?cald?s is not the first to compose works in the vernacular, 207 he is the first author to write an Advaita Ved?nta prakara?a-grantha (independent treatise) in Hindi, be it verse or prose, whose philosophical rigor is comparable to those in Sanskrit. In doing so, Ni?cald?s was possibly influenced by the D?d?panth? tradition of making their works widely accessible to the average person. Start of Vernacularization208 Earliest Known Vernacular Independent Advaita Literature Time Lag (centuries) Kannada 9th-10th c. 15th c. 5-6 Tamil 11th-12th c. late 14th-early 15th c. 2-4 Telugu 11th c.209 15th c. 4 Sinhala ca. 1250 no data - Gujarati by end of 12th c. 17th c. 5 Assamese by the 14th c. no data - Malayalam by the 15th c. 19th c. 4 Oriya by the 15th c. no data - Marathi 11th-12th c. 210 12th c. 0-1 Hindi 1200-1450211 19th c. 4.5-7 Table 2: Vernacularization vs. Independent Advaita Literature There is an average time lag of four or five centuries between the start of literary vernacularization and the appearance of independent Advaita texts in the vernacular. 212 Halbfass writes that in Indian thought, ?the present lags the past? and that there is a 206 McGregor?s earlier survey in the same series, Hindi literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1974) also has no mention of Ni?cald?s, nor for that matter, of any philosophical literature. 207 Among the D?d?panth?s, others, most notably the founder D?d? Day?l (sixteenth c.) and Sundard?s (seventeenth c.) also composed vernacular philosophical/metaphysical works. We have also seen earlier, in connection with VS v. 1.8, mention, by Ni?cald?s himself, of vernacular works by Manohard?s and M??akbodh, (on p. 77). Shrivastava also includes Kabir (1398-1448), N?nak (1469-1539), Ravid?s (fifteenth c.), Tuls?d?s (1532-1623) and others in the sant category (2000, 590). 208 Unless specifically mentioned, the dates are from Pollock (49-54). 209 Rao (2003, 390-93). 210 According to Tulpule (1979, 313-15). 211 McGregor (1984, 10-12). Also McGregor (2003, 912-15). 212 Marathi philosophical literature appears to be the one exception to this pattern, as the earliest Marathi literature itself is philosophical in nature: the Viveka-darpa?a, ?a philosophical treatise written in rhythmic prose and narrating the theory and practice of yoga as propounded by the N?thas? (Tulpule 1979, 314). 86 ?tendency to dispense with all claims to new discoveries and ideas and to project all insights back into the basic texts and into the most ancient past? (1988b, 364). I suggest instead that the lag in the case of vernacular Advaita texts has to do with the nature of the body of literature here, i.e., philosophical texts. Until the creation of works in the vernacular, these philosophical texts were exclusively in Sanskrit, and it is unthinkable to advance a serious study of this material without knowledge of Sanskrit, since ?understanding anything later, ? always presupposes understanding everything earlier? (Pollock 2001b, 3). As Pollock suggests, the fact that some intellectuals in the seventeenth century ?began to identify themselves or their opponents as navya or ?new? scholars ? appears to signify not just a different relationship with the past but a different way of thinking. ? [A] new conception of the development of knowledge itself had come into being? (2001b, 5-7). Earlier, ?all intellectual generations, disembedded from any spatio-temporal framework, were thought of as coexistent: the past was a very present conversation partner. ? a superior partner, the master who made the primary statements in a discussion upon which later participants could only comment. In the face of the grandeur of the past, intellectuals typically assumed an attitude of inferiority?. By the seventeenth century, however, there was a shift in thinking such that ??new? has ceased to connote ?worse?, and instead effectively serves to signify the furthest point of advancement in a discourse? (7). Pollock suggests that in the seventeenth century, ?historicist periodisation [sic, this article uses British spelling conventions] for the first time becomes the very modality of understanding how knowledge is to be organized, and, more important, how new knowledge can actually be produced? (10). ?The production of independent treatises (prakara?a- grantha) and of works that directly comment on s?tra texts while summarising the entire earlier history of interpretation,? and ?the concomitant decrease in ever more deeply nested commentaries on canonical works that had been a hallmark of the earlier schoolmen [sic]? signals an appearance of this new historicist perspective that had not been present earlier. What is apparent in such independent treatises is an utterly new ?modality of understanding how knowledge is to be organised, and ? how new knowledge can actually be produced? (10). While the shift to the vernacular language might have been slower in the case of philosophical literature, other shifts that marked this ?new intellectual? in Pollock?s 87 comments, such as development of a philological and text-critical approach, occurred earlier. In the case of Ny?ya commentarial literature in Sanskrit, Karin Preisendanz observes this taking place as early as the fifteenth century (2005, 70-72, 80-81). These fifteenth-century Sanskrit Naiy?yikas were precursors to those that made their way into the vernacular as ?focused independent treatises ? unburdened or unimpeded by the task of S?tra exegesis and apologetics,? concerned with a ?historicist search for originality and authenticity? and ?cultural self-assertion and legitimization? (2005, 85-86). I suggest that in the area of philosophical literature, these new modalities of understanding and structuring knowledge were first perfected in Sanskrit before the final shift took place for the production of texts in the vernacular. Owing to the already large volume of Sanskrit philosophical literature and its continued production, it was going to take some time to structure these writings in the new ways that reflected an awareness of a historicist periodization. This may explain the time lag of a few centuries as evident in Table 2 above. And it is this time lag that may account for the fact that, during the seventeenth century, ?many domains of systematic thought?logic-epistemology-ontology (ny?ya), text? hermeneutics (m?m??s?), moral philosophy (dharma??stra)?had been wholly impervious to vernacular penetration? (Pollock 2001b, 26). It may also explain the ?continuing vitality of [Sanskrit in] the tradition of logic, for example, where a work like Vi?van?tha Tarkapa?c?nana's Siddh?nta-mukt?val? (Compendium of Principles) from the mid- seventeenth century could undertake to reorganize received wisdom (though not overturn it) and quickly find a place in the philosophical syllabus213 over much of the Indian subcontinent. The distribution of scholarly works demonstrates unequivocally that even up to the early eighteenth century, in the disciplines where Sanskrit intellectuals continued to maintain control, old networks of vast circulation and readership were as yet intact? (Pollock 2001a, 413). In the case of Ni?cald?s?s vernacular VP in the nineteenth century, the awareness of the historicist periodization of Ny?ya and Advaita thought greatly influences the structuring of his arguments. Thus, in the seventeenth century, new ?knowledge production? within philosophical literature continues to take place in Sanskrit, and, in the 213 The Siddh?nta-mukt?val? is Vi?van?tha Pa?c?nana?s auto-commentary on the Bh???-pariccheda or K?rik?vali, comprising 166 stanzas, and is considered an elementary textbook on the terms of logic (ny?ya) of the Navadv?pa school. These ?were known by heart by thousands of pa??its? (Matilal 1977b, 110). It is part of the traditional elementary curriculum of study for Ny?ya to this day (Vi?van?tha 1940, iii). 88 nineteenth century, Ni?cald?s may have been the first to carry this new modality into the vernacular. Both VS and VP are independent treatises that reorganize vast swaths of Advaita thought, and in doing so seem to bring out a freshness and relevance of the subject that was in danger of being suffocated by the centuries of commentarial argumentation and counter- refutation carried out in Sanskrit. However, there are limits to the innovation carried out. Pollock suggests that ?[the] new historicity and the awareness it seems to imply of the possibility of new truths are clearly in evidence, but remain securely anchored in a very old practice of thought, on an invariant set of questions? and that these questions remained ?without exception, questions inherited from tradition? (2001b, 14, 16). He sees this as indicative of ?a serious tension in a newness that could not achieve innovation: a newness of the intellect constrained by an oldness of the will? (2001b, 19). The primary question that Ni?cald?s is addressing in VP ? ?what is a v?tti and what is its role in knowing Brahman?? ? is certainly inherited from the Advaita tradition. However, answering that question and remaining consistent with the tradition leaves little room for innovation. The originality comes, as Pollock himself suggests, in the organization of prior knowledge, and, in this process, the sorting out and comparison of various prior standpoints results in the presentation of what Ni?cald?s holds as valid and consistent with Advaita doctrine, and the refutation of other conflicting views where relevant. And although this activity might not count as the production of ?new? knowledge, per se, it helps produce greater clarity in the understanding of existing knowledge, thus contributing to the high regard of VP. Were there larger motives behind Ni?cald?s?s decision to compose works exclusively in the vernacular, namely, those of ?culture and power outside of a national narrative,? as Pollock suggests (1998, 65)?214 Both Vasudha Dalmia, with her study of Bh?ratendu Hari?candra in Benares (1997), and Brian Hatcher, in his study of Bengali pandits (2005), posit that vernacularity is closely linked with colonization and nationalization. Pollock believes that it is not necessarily so, even though he is aware that ?no unified theory may account for the manifold relations to the social and political domains in which this transformation took place? (1998, 69). Based on my reading of the limited historical data 214 Emphasis mine. 89 available regarding Ni?cald?s, there appear to be no colonizing and nationalizing factors in his decision to write in the vernacular. His patron, R?j? R?msi?ha is closely connected to, and even supported by colonial power but at the same time is an old-fashioned traditionalist who considers himself to be a patron of the intellectuals and a lover of Sanskrit culture (as we learned in section 2.11). Nevertheless, cultural and power issues are certainly at play, as can be seen from the caste (j?ti) discrimination that Ni?cald?s is said to have encountered as a student, as well as from R?j? R?msi?ha?s patronage for his production of VP, since he wished for a text, even if in the vernacular, that could hold its own among the learned pandits in his court. According to Pollock, ?Sanskrit intellectuals never directly confronted colonialism, whether as a political or an epistemological order; virtually without exception they simply ignored it? (2001b, 31). But Dalmia and Hatcher?s accounts certainly contradict this assertion. They provide many significant examples of pandits trying to work either with or against the colonizing forces or attempting to manipulate these forces for self-serving purposes, albeit with very short-sighted perspectives. During Ni?cald?s?s time, there were certainly colonizing and nationalizing forces at play in other parts of the country, yet even if these were occurring in Ni?cald?s?s region, it is highly unlikely that Ni?cald?s, as a D?d?panth? and a Ved?ntin, would have done anything about them. I am reminded of an anecdote about Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950), a Ved?ntin who was familiar with Ni?cald?s?s VS. When asked to aid India?s independence struggle, Ramana is said to have responded, ?If you see a fire on the cinema screen, do you rush to put it out with water? This struggle for independence is like a fire on the movie screen.?215 This anecdotal stance of Ramana?s is corroborated by Ramana?s answer to the question ?Should I try to help the suffering in the world?? Ramana replies, ?The Power that created you created the world as well. If God created the world it is His business to look after it, not yours? (Osborne 1971, 87). 216 A Ved?ntin would say that such a stance constitutes ?ignoring? colonialism (in Pollock?s terms) only from the conventional (vy?vah?rika) standpoint. When one has 215 As narrated by Sw?m? Satsvar?p?nanda Sarasvat? in a public Ved?nta discourse, ca. 1986, in Pune. A similar analogy of fire on a cinema screen is also present in Ramana?s Talk 316, without any reference to the independence movement (Maharshi 2006, 290) 216 Osborne clarifies further that Ramana did not condone ?callousness to human suffering. ? What was forbidden was only the self-importance in trying to act the part of providence? (87). 90 realized one?s identity with Brahman, then from that ultimate (p?ram?rthika) standpoint, Ramana Maharshi?s response is perfectly consistent. Ni?cald?s also, as noted earlier, 217 uncompromisingly identifies with the ultimate standpoint: he proclaims in VS v. 3.10 that ?a knower of Brahman is Brahman incarnate, and his speech is the Veda.? Vernacularization of knowledge also has an effect on its distribution. Both Ulrike Stark and Vasudha Dalmia point out that ?widely disseminated printed texts contributed substantially to the ?democratization of religious knowledge? in the modern vernacular.?218 Thus, one measure of the influence of a text in Ved?nta is the secondary literature that stems from it. For the VS, we have Pandit P?t?mbar?s ?ippa?? (gloss), written in 1917. P?t?mbar also wrote an abridgment of VP, called V?ttiratn?val?, published in the same volume. 219 In similar vein are the Ved?nta-prad?pik? by Lak??nanda, an abridgement of the VS (Si?ha 1981, 92), a Marathi commentary by ?S?khare? Kisan Mah?r?j (Kapil 2005, 247), as well as the translations into numerous languages. The Hindi VS has been available in various versions since at least 1917, if not earlier (Kapil 2005, 245).220 A Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s (KS) edition has been available since at least 1906.221 It is regularly studied by Advaita Ved?ntin monks in Benares, Rishikesh and Haridwar and has even been translated into Sanskrit (Ni?cald?s 1964). The VP too has been in print continuously since 1899, published virtually unchanged by Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s and the Venka?e?var Steam Press in Mumbai. It is the only version readily available, in a form that has remained virtually unchanged for at least 50 years even though it is plagued by many typographical errors, and other incongruities. 222 ?tm?nand 217 In this chapter, on page 79. 218 Stark (2004, 266), quoting Dalmia (1997, 225). 219 VS with V?ttiratn?vali has been reprinted multiple times and is cited here as Ni?cald?s (1917). 220 The 1917 edition by Brajballabh Haripras?d (Ni?cald?s 1917a) was the fifth edition (pa?cam?v?tti) 221 The 1917 Gurgaon edition (Ni?cald?s 1917a), as well as the 2005 KS edition of VS (Ni?cald?s 1917b), both interestingly carry a picture of one ?ar?f S?lemahammad (the name is given both as ?s?lemahammad? and ?s?le mahammad? on facing pages) and on the facing page a declaration that ?we have received all the rights including registry to this book from ?ar?f S?le Mahammad?s sons D??d Bh?? and All?d?nbh??.? [is pustak-ko ?ar?f s?le mahammad inh??-ke putra d??d bh?? aur all?d?n-bh?? inke p?s se sab rajis?ar?-hak-sahit le liy? hai.]. There is also the further declaration: ?This edition has been printed based on the edition publicized by the well-known S?le Mahammad ? Yah ?v?tti suj?a s?le-mahammad-k? prasiddha k? hu? ?v?tti parse chap? hai.? These references persist in the 2005 KS edition. The presence of these preserved references, virtually unchanged since 1917, to a clearly Muslim man by publishers of Hindu texts is very intriguing. Could he have been a publisher from some other part of the country? ?ar?f S?le[h] Muhammad?s picture is also preserved in the 1917 Brajballabh Haripras?d edition from Bombay (Ni?cald?s 1917a) with similar text in the inside title page regarding transfer of rights from his sons. On the title page, the publisher states that ?all rights have been retained by registry of this book according to the 25th rule of the [Vikram Sa?vat] year 1967 (1910 CE).? [[v]i.sa.1967 ke 25 v?? k?yade anus?r yah gra?th prak?t-kartt? nai rejistar karike sarva hak sv?dh?n rakhe hai?.] 222 Muni (1969, 53): a?uddhiyo?k? to ko? p?r h? nah??? A detailed discussion of the nature of errors found in the various versions is provided (54-55). Also see Appendix 2, p. 411. 91 Muni undertook a painstaking edit of the text in 1969 without the benefit of any handwritten manuscripts, and his edition, though superior, was probably published in a small run and has been out of print for nearly 40 years. (See Appendices 2 and 3). One can only conjecture as to the impact on the VP?s renown had this version been more widely published and distributed. Conversely, the YP has virtually dropped out of sight.223 Meanwhile, the high regard of the VS and VP confirms Pollock?s observation that ?vernacular writings themselves became new scriptures (1998, 63)? and fits in well with Ni?cald?s?s own stance on scripture, which we shall examine in section 10.10. Ironically, Pollock suggests that this ?age of vernacularity? is coming to a close and ?an epoch of ?postliteracy? has begun where national languages take on the status of dead languages? (1998, 69-70). While studying VP in Rishikesh in 2006, I encountered passages whose B??gr?/Hary?nv? dialect stumped even the swami with whom I was studying. 4.3 Ni?cald?s on Caste (J?ti) If indeed Ni?cald?s's experience of caste discrimination was a significant factor in his decision to write in the vernacular, it will be helpful to explore what he has to say on the matter of caste. In the final chapter of VP (8.110, 412), Ni?cald?s expresses his opinions in no uncertain terms: ?If, due to residual traces (sa?sk?ra) from prior lives, even persons of the lowest caste get the desire to know [Brahman] (jij??s?), then by hearing spiritual discourse they too will get knowledge [of Brahman] and will get liberated through the cessation of ignorance and also of its effects. Like the gods and demons, all humans have the right to knowledge of [the highest] truth [i.e., Brahman].?224 This passage occurs at the conclusion of a section considering the eligibility of k?atriyas and vai?yas for renunciation (sanny?sa), and whether only renunciates are qualified for listening (?rava?a) to Ved?nta (VP 8.100-110, 407-12). Ni?cald?s presents various opinions before arriving at his pronouncement. For example, he presents the view of some (unnamed) author that ??dras are ineligible for ?rava?a (VP 8.108, 411) because as per Manu-sm?ti 4.80a, ?na ??dr?ya mati? dady?t, ??dras should not be given knowledge,? followed by that of another (unnamed) 223 The most recent edition of YP dates to 1959 in Kapil (2005, 247). 224 janm?ntara sa?sk?ra tai antyaj?dikan k?? bh? jij??s? hoy j?ve to paur??eya vacana tai tinko bh? j??na hoy ke k?rya sahita avidy? k? niv?ttir?pa mok?a hovai hai?. y?te deva asuran k? n?? sakala manu?yan k?? tattvaj??na k? adhik?ra hai. Also Si?ha (1981, 4). See VP 8.102-9, 408-412 for other opinions on j?tis and their adhik?ra for sanny?sa and brahma- ?rava?a considered and refuted. The text of VP 8.109-10 is considered in entirety in Appendix 2. 92 author (VP 8.109) that, although ??dras are ineligible for listening to the Vedas since they are not enjoined to have the sacred-thread ceremony (upanayana), they are eligible for listening to itih?sa and pur??as, etc., because it is said, ??r?vayec caturo var??n, all four castes (var?a) ought to be taught [MBh ??nti-parvan 12.314.45c]. ?225 He resolves the conflict as follows: all good karma is useful for knowledge, and even ??dras are eligible to perform good karma. By performing good karma, they purify their anta?-kara?a and thereby can attain knowledge. In support of this view, he cites ?a?kara: ?The eligibility for studying Vedas is only after the upanayana, but although a ??dra is ineligible for study of the Vedas due to lack of the upanayana, if one should arrive at knowledge through listening to the pur??as and the like, at the very instant of knowing, the ??dra too can attain liberation without any obstacles.?226 This is a loose and selective paraphrase by Ni?cald?s; the section in the BS where this occurs, BS 1.3.34-38 (adhikara?a 9) is even titled ?The ineligibility of the ??dra (apa??dr?dhikara?am 227)!? ?a?kara does not appear to be consistent in his statements about ??dras. He states, ?the ??dra is ineligible, because he has not studied the Vedas. ? He cannot study the Vedas, since the study requires upanayana, and only the three [higher] castes are eligible for that? (BS ?Bh 1.3.34).228 However, he also concedes that ?It is not possible to withhold the attainment of the result [of knowledge, i.e., liberation] from those in whom knowledge arises as a result of [positive] tendencies (sa?sk?ra) developed in past lives, such as for Vidura, Dharmavy?dha229 and others, because the sm?ti texts do state the eligibility of all four castes (var?a) to study the itih?sa and pur??as [in MBh ??nti-parvan 12.314.45c,230 225 More on the full context of this verse when I look at the MBh in section 4.5 (on page 103). 226 upanayana-p?rvak veda k? adhyayan kahy? hai; au ??drak?? upanayana ke abh?va tai? yadyapi veda mai? adhik?ra nah??, tath?pi pur?n?dik ?rava?a tai? ??dra k?? bh? j??n hoy j?vai tau j??n-samak?l h? ??dra k? bh? pratibadha-rahita mok?a hovai hai. 227 The translation I provide for apa-??dra reflects the negating aspect of the apa- prefix and also ?a?kara?s overall tone on this matter. Gambhirananda titles this section ?pseudo-??dra? (?a?kar?c?rya, B?dar?ya?a, and Gambhirananda 1965, 229), while Vajpeyi takes a more neutral stance with ?subsection about making an exception of the ??dra? (2011, 339). 228 na ??drasy?dhik?ra?, ved?dhyayan?bh?v?t. ? naca ??drasya ved?dhyayanam asti, upanayana-p?rvakatv?d ved?dhyayanasya. upanayanasya ca var?atrayavi?ayatv?t. 229 Dharmavy?dha, ?the righteous butcher/fowler,? is the central character of the Vy?dha-g?t?, MBh 3.197-202. Though a butcher and thus of low caste, he is enlightened, and he instructs the brahman who seeks him out. The narrative is summarized in Kinsley (1993, 159) and by Agarwal (2002). The entire narrative is translated by van Buitenen (1975, 614- 20). 230 Also see the detailed discussion on the full context of MBh 12.314.45 to follow (on page 18). 93 cited earlier]? (BS ?Bh 1.3.38).231 However, ?a?kara concludes the section (adhikara?a) with the statement ?It is established (sthitam) that ??dras do not have the eligibility to Vedic knowledge,? 232 while only a few sentences earlier 233 he has cited or alluded to choice selections from the dharma??stras such as ?should [a ??dra] happen to hear the Vedas, [the expiation consists of] filling his ears with lead and lac [i.e., shellac or sealing wax]. If he should utter [the Vedas], his tongue should be cut. If he should commit it to memory, his body should be chopped to pieces,?234 ?a ??dra is indeed a walking crematorium; therefore, one should not study in the vicinity of a ??dra.?235 Setting aside briefly the internal contradiction236 between ?a?kara?s dominant stance on ??dras in this BS adhikara?a and his concessive statement (I will shortly return to this, in section 4.4 below), it is quite evident that Ni?cald?s considers ??dras to be as eligible for liberation as the three other castes, even though he conforms with tradition in agreeing that the knowledge in their case will occur through non-Vedic texts, to which class his vernacular writings also belong. As Ananya Vajpeyi puts it, ?[t]he ??dra, mostly shut out altogether, is, at best, the designated eavesdropper? (2010, 159). Here we have Ni?cald?s trying to modify the situation, at least as regards their access to knowledge of liberation. In the conclusion of the section regarding who is eligible for Brahman-realization (tattva- j??na), VP 8.110-11, 412-3, Ni?cald?s writes: ?Only humans have the ability (s?marthya) for Brahman-realization; only a body without a self can be considered ineligible for knowledge. Brahman-realization is attained only by a body in which the Divine Properties (daiv?- sampad?)237 are in residence. All beings have compassion (day?); it is only possible for brahmans to have forbearance (k?am?), truth (satya), honesty/uprightness (?rjava), and 231 ye??? puna? p?rva-k?ta-sa?sk?ra-va??d vidura-dharmavy?dha-prabh?t?n?? j??notpattis te??? na ?akyate phala- pr?pti? prati?eddhu?, j??nasyaik?ntika-phalatv?t. ??r?vayec caturo var??n? iti cetih?sa-pur???dhigame c?turvar?yasy?dhik?ra smara??t. 232 veda-p?rvakas tu n?sty adhik?ra? ??dr???m iti sthitam. 233 Still in BS ?Bh 1.3.38. 234 ath?sya vedam upa???vatas trapu-jatubhy?? ?rotra-pratip?ra?am. ud?hara?e jihv?cchedo. dh?ra?e ?ar?ra-bheda?. Gau. Dh. S?. 12.4-6 235 pady u ha v? etac chma??na? yac ch?dras tasm?c ch?dra-sam?pe n?dhyetavyam. V?. Dh. S? 18.11-12 [as occurs in ?a?kar?c?rya (1965, 233n53). Var. replaces pady u h? with eke (F?hrer 1914?, 54)] 236 Appayya D?k?ita (1520-1593), in the third chapter of his SLS, suggests that the apa??dr?dhikara?am merely indicates the ineligibility of the ??dra for sagu?a contemplation of Brahman, but cannot possibly make the ??dra ineligible for the means to know nirgu?a Brahman, since the desire for that topic of knowledge is prompted by its attractiveness, nirgu?a-vidy?y?? ??drasy?pi vi?aya-saundarya-prayuktasy?rthitvasya ni?eddhum a?akyatv?d. But since the ??dra cannot study the Vedas, according to the SLS he only has recourse to studying the itih?sa and pur??as, and to performing karma that will lead to birth in another body of a higher caste, and thereby to liberation (D?k?ita, T?rtha, and ??str? 1890, 90). 237 For an enumeration of the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?) per BhG 16.1-3, see n. 572, p. 295. 94 contentment (santo?a), etc. Since k?atriyas possess the quality of being active (prav?tti- dharma) for the sake of protecting their subjects (praj?), they have fewer Divine Properties than brahmans. However, since their violence towards wicked beings for the protection of the subjects arises from a sense of duty, it is actually non-violence, and, as a result, it is not impossible for a k?atriya to have the Divine Properties. Vai?yas perform even more physical activity such as agriculture and trade, and it is not possible for them to have occasion for contemplation of ?tm?. Nevertheless, many fortunate vai?yas succeed (nirv?ha) in activities without physical functioning and thereby can gain the Divine Properties. Some teachers hold the view that k?atriyas and vai?yas are eligible for renunciation, and consider the Divine Properties easily attainable by them as well. Although it is hard for ??dras and the lowest caste (antya-j?ti) to attain the Divine Properties, the results of action are of infinite kinds. Therefore, if they too should acquire the Divine Properties due to actions of prior lives, then a ??dra, by listening to the pur??as and such, and the lowest caste, by listening to vernacular commentaries (bh???-prabandha) and the like, can also attain liberation without obstruction by means of devotion to God, and thereby attain Brahman-realization. Thus, humans alone [as opposed to gods and demons] are eligible for devotion to God and Brahman-realization ? this is the conclusion (nirdh?ra) of all scripture (??stra).? In VS 2.83, Ni?cald?s states that caste as a property does not reside in the ?tm? and the subtle body (s?k?ma-?ar?ra) but only in the gross body (sth?la-?ar?ra). The caste (j?ti) of the gross body is mistakenly attributed to the ?tm?, just like a snake is superimposed (adhy?sa) on a rope. In fact, ?tm? and caste are very dissimilar: ?tm? is pervasive, caste is limited; ?tm? is internal (pratyak) and caste is external (par?k); ?tm? is the subject (vi?ay?) while caste is the object (vi?aya) (47). Here, Ni?cald?s is being very inclusive in stating that all humans are eligible for Brahman-realization, and claiming that all ??stras teach this. Identifying with one?s caste is a case of mistaken identity because, from the Advaita standpoint, caste is a delusion and is not real. But curiously, in the VS, Ni?cald?s appears to accept implicitly the restrictions imposed on ??dras and lower castes, namely that they are not permitted to read or study the Vedas but can only listen to the sm?ti texts such as the itih?sa, pur??as and vernacular texts. This suggests that at least one motive for composing his works in the vernacular was to make them accessible to the widest audience, particularly those members who have no recourse to Sanskrit. 95 4.4 More on ?a?kara and Caste: The Case of the Man???-pa?cakam How does one reconcile the contradiction between ?a?kara?s hardline stance against ??dras as seen earlier in his BS ?Bh on Adhikara?a 1.3.9 with his concessive statement granting ??dras the eligibility to gain Brahman-knowledge through study of itih?sa and pur??as? ?a?kara?s commentary on the BS is considered his magnum opus and it is believed that this work was addressed to the M?m??saka orthodoxy. Hence, he is ?very careful not to depart from tradition (Ingalls 1954, 295)? and to ?suppress his originality by attempting to prove that his ideas are those of B?dar?ya?a and the Upani?ads? (Eliot 1921, 2:312). ?Although ?a?kara understood his teaching to be accessible to all castes, for sociohistorical and/or strategical [sic] reasons, in practice, he may have taught mainly to brahmans, who were probably the most qualified to understand the subtle argumentation of his revival, the most concerned about it, and the most competent to spread it throughout society once converted to his doctrine? (Marcaurelle 2000, 39).238 His vehemence against ??dras would thus be in keeping with the times, and it is altogether more remarkable that ?a?kara saw fit to include mention of any possibility of ??dras attaining liberation. 239 Given the weighty burden of tradition borne by commentaries on the prasth?na-tray?, 240 it is much harder to determine from these works what ?a?kara?s position on any given issue really was. ?a?kara?s Upade?a-s?hasr? is ?the only independent, non-commentary work that can be safely ascribed to him? (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 1:xi). One would hope to gain a clearer assessment of ?a?kara?s position regarding ??dras from this text. In a passage describing the qualifications of a seeker (mumuk?u), he states: ?The means to final release is knowledge [of Brahman]. It should be repeatedly related to the pupil until it is firmly grasped, if he is ? a brahman who is pure ?, if his caste, profession, behavior, knowledge [of the Veda], family 238 Others have also made similar observations to explain ?a?kara?s position regarding the ineligibility of ??dras for studying the Vedas: ?It must also be remembered that in commenting on the classical texts ?a?kara is necessarily bound by their plain views and the Sm?tis by his time clearly expressed discriminatory views as far as the rights of the ??dras to Vedic study and ritual were concerned? (Pande 1994, 249). Also, ?[?a?kara and R?m?nuja] reflect the circumstances of their own times, and they ought not be condemned as discriminatory from the vantage point of our times ? We should bear in mind that equality, whether in Sankara's time, or now, is subject to restriction, though in each age we define the restrictions differently, based upon our current moral presuppositions? (Comans 2000, 317). 239 Rambachan, however, rightly considers such explanations ?mild? and points out that it is ?a matter of concern that the greatest historical exponent of this teaching remained untroubled by social inequality, a contradiction that is still not uncommon? (2006, 28). 240 According to Up?dhy?ya, the conventional meaning of prasth?na is ?going? (gamana), but in this context, it means the path (m?rga), by which one may approach Brahman. The three-fold way comprises of 1) s?tra, i.e., BS; 2) ?ruti, i.e., Upani?ads; and 3) sm?ti, i.e., BhG (1950, 126). 96 have been examined.?241 These are the only two of the seven requirements enumerated that have to do with caste. 242 Thus this text, too, shows ?a?kara?s conservatism, and excludes the ??dra (and other non-brahmans) from the knowledge of Brahman.243 Belvalkar suggests ?some minor short works ? if admitted as genuine, reveal to us the real psychology of ?a?kara the man more correctly than some of the ?c?rya?s longer and more erudite works? (1929, 217). Fortunately, we have just such a work, a short stotra (hymn), Man???-pa?cakam (MP) ?Five Verses of Wisdom,? and we have evidence that Ni?cald?s also was familiar with this work. This stotra is held to have been spontaneously uttered by ?a?kara in response to a particular event. In the words of T. M. P. Mahadevan: ?One day, in V?r??as?, the ?c?rya was walking towards the sacred river Ga?g?, accompanied by his disciples. At a distance he espied an untouchable coming towards him, followed by four ferocious dogs. Addressing the untouchable, the ?c?rya said, ?Go away; go away!? ? (?a?kar?c?rya and Mahadevan 1967, 1). The untouchable?s reply was in two verses: annamay?d-annamayam athav? caitanyam eva caitany?t, yativara d?r?kartu? v??chasi kim br?hi gaccha gaccheti. Tell me, O best of ascetics, by saying ?go away, go away,? what do you wish to distance? Is it a body made from grains, from [another] body made from grains, or consciousness from consciousness? pratyag-vastuni nistara?ga-sahaj?nand?vabodh?mbudhau vipro?ya? ?vapaco ?yam ityapi mah?n ko?ya? vibheda-bhrama?. ki? ga?g?mbuni bimbite ?mbarama?au c???ala-v?th?paya? pure v??ntaram asti ka?cana-gha??-m?t-kumbhayor v??mbare. In the inner essence that is the still ocean of natural happiness, What is this grand delusion of difference: ?this one is a brahman,? ?this one, an eater of dog-meat?? Is there any difference in the sun?s reflection, be it in the waters of the Ganges or 241 Upade?a-s?hasr? 2.1.2: ?tad ida? mok?a-s?dhana? j??nam. ? ?ucaye br?hma??ya ? br?y?t puna? punar y?vad graha?a? d??h?-bhavati? (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 1:191, 2:211). 242 The other five qualifications are that the pupil must have: 1) dispassion towards everything other than knowledge; 2) abandoned the desires for sons, wealth, etc., and become an ascetic; 3) tranquility, self-control, etc.; 4) the qualities required of a student by scripture; and. 5) he must approach the teacher in the prescribed manner (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 2:90). 243 However, in Upade?a-s?hasr? 1.5.1, ?a?kara makes a passing reference to the MBh 14.54 episode of the sage Utta?ka (var. Uda?ka), where the sage has been granted a boon by K???a that he will receive water whenever he thinks of K??na. Travelling throught the desert and thirsty, Utta?ka draws upon this boon, but does not accept water offered in the form of urine by Indra who is in the guise of a c????la hunter (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 1:79, 2:114-5n1). K???a goes on to explain that he and Indra were testing Utta?ka. It is notable that this MBh incident is inverting the conventional notions of purity and caste in a test of the brahman caste, which, presumably, fails. 97 [in] the puddles of water in the streets of the outcastes,244 Or in interior space, be it enclosed by a gold vessel or an earthen pot?245 The canonical collections of ?a?kara?s works246 typically do not include these opening verses spoken by an untouchable (c????la).247 However, Ni?cald?s quotes the second verse of this prologue,248 as pram??a (proof), in YP 10 on the determination of a knower and non-knower [of the self], as support for his statement that one?s nature is Brahman-consciousness and unattached (brahma-caitanya aur asa?ga). Moreover, Ni?cald?s states that the pram??a is offered by none other than Lord ?iva as a challenge to ?a?kara (?a?kara-sv?m?-j? ?par ?k?epa) (1914, 55-57). Hearing these words from the c????la, ?a?kara is said to have immediately recognized that the outcaste was none other than Lord ?iva in disguise, and the four dogs, the four Vedas. ?a?kara then humbly prostrates himself at the c????la?s feet and states: jagrat-svapna-su?upti?u sphu?atara y? sa?vid-ujj?mbhate y? brahm?di-pipilik?nta-tanu?u prot? jagat-s?k?i??, saivaha? na ca drsya-vastv-iti d??ha-praj??pi yasy?sti cec c????lo ?stu sa tu dvijo ?stu gurur ity e?? mani?? mama. (MP1) The consciousness which is clearly visible in the waking, sleeping and deep sleep states, Which is the witness of creation that pervades all beings, from Brahm? down to an ant, I am that alone and not the seen object?the one who firmly has such knowledge Is my guru, be he an outcaste or a twice-born. This is my conclusion. The same encounter is also described at greater length in the ?a?kara hagiographies, such as the ?a?kara-dig-vijaya (SDV) 6.25-38 (M?dhava and Up?dhy?ya 1967, 188-192; M?dhava 1978, 59-61).249 Without going into the remainder of the MP verses or the alternate versions in the various ?a?kara hagiographies, we can clearly see from the excerpts cited that ?a?kara 244 Recall the similar sentiment expressed by Sundard?s in the s?kh? 30.55 seen earlier in section 3.5, on p. 60. 245 ?a?kar?c?rya and Mahadevan (1967, 1-3), my translations. 246 For example, the Samata Books reprint of the Vani Vilas collected works (?a?kar?c?rya 1981a, 2:52-53) or The Minor works of ?r? ?a?kar?c?rya (?a?kar?c?rya and Bhagavat 1952, 364-5) only give the five verses uttered by ?a?kara, without the c????la?s preamble. Pantulu, in his translation of MP ?with the gloss of Patanjali? does mention these verses. However, he does not mention what the source document is and his translation does not distinguish between the commentary and the core text (1905). 247 A c????la (var. ca???la) is considered to be an outcaste, born of a ??dra father and a brahman mother. 248 In the text, the first and second halves of the verse appear to be swapped. 249 The ?DV account of the encounter appears to be faithful to the events as described in MP, including its preamble. However, the MP version is more eloquent and concise. 98 in the MP is advocating transcending caste. According to Bader, ?this episode has become one of the best known stories on ?a?kara?s life. Nowadays in India, the tale is repeatedly cited to demonstrate that ?a?kara, in bowing down to one of lowly birth, was above ?casteism?? (2000, 49-50). This naturally raises the question: can the MP be considered an authentic work of ?a?kara? He is credited by tradition with having written some 400 works (Belvalkar 1929, 217; Pande 1994, 104), all in just a short 32-year lifespan. These works fall into three categories: commentaries; stotras (hymns of praise); and prakara?a-granthas (explicatory treatises). Considering the authorship issue of MP, Belvalkar states that ?the authorship of ?a?kar?c?rya is plausible, but not altogether certain? (1929, 223). H. R. Bhagavat, the editor of Minor Works of ?a?kar?c?rya (?a?kar?c?rya and Bhagavat 1952) considered MP an authentic work and included it in his compilation. Paul Hacker, in his analysis of authorship based on attestations to ?a?kara as ?c?rya, Bhagavat, Bhagavat-p?da or Bhagavat-p?jya- p?da in manuscript colophons, neglects to list the MP among the texts he enumerates (1995, 45-48). Gussner (1976) attempts a ?stylometric study? of fourteen hymns attributed to ?a?kara, including the MP. On the basis of the occurrence of just one word, h?daya, in MP 4 used to indicate ?mind?, which is different from ?a?kara?s usage in the metrical Upade?a- s?hasr? (15.53, 17.31) where h?daya occurs in the compound h?daya-granthi?, Gussner concludes that ?a?kara is most likely not the author of the MP. But the latter two instances are quoting MuU 2.2.8250 and do not quite reveal how ?a?kara would otherwise use the term, so Gussner?s argument is weak, at least concerning the authorship of the MP. 251 Potter does not draw any definite conclusions as to ?a?kara?s authorship of the MP, but he does list it as one of the 66 works of ?a?kara in his Bibliography of the EIP (1995, 284-5). Baldev Up?dhy?ya, in his Hindi work ?r? ?a?kar?c?rya, considers 64 hymns (stotra) attributed to ?a?kara that are included in the V??? Vil?s collection of ?a?kara?s works. These stotras are classified as hymns to Gane?a, ?iva, goddesses (dev?), Vi??u, deity pairs (yugal- devat?), rivers and pilgrimage sites, and miscellaneous (s?dh?ra?a). He writes that there are over 240 hymns (stotra), in either manuscript or printed form, associated with ?a?kara, of 250 MuU 2.2.8: ?bhidyate h?daya-granthi? chidyante sarva-sa??ay??, k??yante c?sya karm??i tasmin d???e pr?vare. When it (Brahman) is seen in the high and the low, the knot of one?s heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled and one?s karmas are exhausted.? 251 For a more general critique of Gussner?s methodology, see Pande (1994, 123-9) 99 which most are contrived (k?trima) and have no associated commentaries (vy?khy?) by ancient teachers (pr?c?na ?c?rya). Thus, they should be considered the works of other ?a?kar?c?ryas (1950, 133-37). On the basis of a ??k? by Sad??ivendra 252 and the Madh?ma?jar?-vy?khy? of Gop?lab?la, 253 Up?dhy?ya considers the MP to be a genuine work (137). However, according to the dates for these commentators given in Thangaswami (1980) (fifteenth-sixteenth century for Gop?lab?la and eighteenth century for Sad??ivendra), 254 they are not as ancient (pr?c?na) as Up?dhy?ya would like. Nevertheless, there is sufficient scholarly consensus among Belvalkar (1929), Up?dhy?ya (1950), Bhagavat (1952), Mahadevan (1967) and G. C. Pande (1994) 255 to accept that the MP is a genuine work of ?a?kara. As a result, the representation of caste transcendence that it contains can be considered a clearer reflection of ?a?kara?s true position, unencumbered by extraneous concerns of attempting not to alienate the brahmanical orthodoxy. Such a stance is perfectly in keeping with what has been referred to as ?a?kara?s ?social innovations, his intransigent stand against the necessity of ritual and social duty, his insistence on complete sanny?sa, on giving up all marks of caste or distinction, this despite the fact that he was a brahman by birth and his pupils were brahmins? (Ingalls 1952, 13). The case for the MP being a genuine work of ?a?kara can be further strengthened by similar appeals for caste transcendence from other works universally acknowledged to be genuine works of ?a?kara. These are his bh??yas on the prasth?na-tray?, namely the BS, BhG,256 and the ten principal Upani?ads (???, Kena, Ka?ha, Pra?na, Mu??aka, M????kya, Taittir?ya, Aitareya, Ch?ndogya and B?had?ra?yaka) (Pande 1994, 107; Hacker 1995, 50; Belvalkar 1929, 218). I will present excerpts from ?a?kara?s bh??yas on the BhG, BU and 252 Thangaswami (1980, 132, 218, 301) lists a Man???pa?caka-t?tparyad?pik? by Sad??ivabrahma or Sad??ivabrahmendra Sarasvat? (1700-1800 CE). 253 Mahadevan also refers to the Madhuma?jar?, which he ascribes to B?lagop?lendramuni (?a?kar?c?rya and Mahadevan 1967, 9). Thangaswami (1980, 335-6, 366) gives the Madhuma?jar? author?s name as Gop?lab?layati (1500-1600 CE) and also B?lagop?lendrayati (1475-1575 CE). 254 See nn. 252, 253 above for specific references in Thangaswami. 255 Regarding MP, Pande doesn?t add any new information to what has already been presented, but he appears to implicitly concur with the inclusion of MP to the ?a?kara corpus (122-29), and he mention the text in the context of discussing ?a?kara?s attitude towards caste discrimination as an example of ?a?kara?s changed attitude while wondering if the story is ?history or mere legend.? Yet, for him, ?[t]he very fact that [this episode of ?a?kara?s meeting a c????la] was accepted even as part of the ?a?kara legend is not without significance? (250). 256 There is some controversy over ascription of the BhG bh??ya to ?a?kara (Potter 1981, 294-5). I follow W. R. Antarkar who concludes that ??a?kar?c?rya's authorship of the [BhG bh??ya], therefore, stands proved and the proof rests on very strong evidence? (1962, 26), and also Mayeda who has ?found no strong evidence, internal or external, to deny the authenticity of the [BhG bh??ya] as ?[a?kara]?s production? (1965, 197). 100 TU, whose ascription to ?a?kara is not in any doubt whatsoever. ?nandagiri (1260-1320 CE) wrote ??k?s on all three works (as well as other works of ?a?kara) and there also exist v?rtik?s on the latter two by Sure?vara, his immediate disciple. 257 In BhG 9.32, K???a states, ?Even those of low births (p?pa-yonaya?), be they women, vai?yas, and even ??dras, whoever take refuge in Me, O P?rtha, they also attain the highest goal.?258 Here ??dras are clearly and unambiguously enumerated among those who are not excluded from the ?highest goal,? and, if ?a?kara truly subscribed to the anti-??dra rhetoric he espoused in the context of BS 1.3.34-38, his commentary to this BhG verse would give him an opportunity to restate his position and engage in fancy footwork to explain why K???a is not excluding them here. Instead we see ?a?kara simply restating the content of the verse without any protest whatsoever: ?those low births, women, vai?yas and ??dras, they too attain the highest goal.?259 With regard to the BU ?Bh, Potter writes, ?there is no reason to doubt ?a?kara?s authorship of this commentary? (1981, 180). More importantly, for our purposes, ??a?kara's Brhad?ra?yakopani?ad-bh??ya is a far more original piece of writing than his Brahma-s?tra- bh??ya and might be expected to contain views at odds with tradition. In commenting on the Brahma-s?tra ?a?kara is very careful not to depart from tradition. On the other hand, in commenting on the B?had?ra?yaka it appears to be his intention to break with tradition? (Ingalls 1954, 295). In the very second sentence of the introduction to his bh??ya to BU, ?a?kara plainly states, ?This little commentary [on the BU] is being commenced for those desirous of turning away from sa?s?ra, in order to explain the knowledge of the identity of ?tm? with Brahman as a means for removing the cause of sa?s?ra.?260 There is no mention 257 I thus stay clear of works where the authorship is debated. ?a?kara?s authorship of the bh??yas on Kenopani?ad and the M????kya K?rik?s is not without controversy. For Kena, see Mayeda (1967), Pande (1994, 107), for the M????kya K?rik?s, see Mayeda (1967-68). 258 m?? hi p?rtha vyap??ritya ye ?pi syu? p?payonaya?, striyo vai?y?s tath? ??dr?s te ?pi y?nti par?? gatim. 259 BhG ?Bh 9.32: ? p?pa-yonaya? p?p? yonir ye??? te p?pa-yonaya? p?pa-janm?na?. ke te ? ity ?ha -striyo vai?y?s tath? ??dr?s te 'pi y?nti gacchanti par?? prak????? gatim. We do see evidence of ?a?kara?s conservatism in BhG ?Bh 18.41. The BhG ?loka is ?br?hma?a-k?atriya-vi??? ??dr???? ca parantapa, karm??i pravibhakt?ni svabh?va-prabhavair gun?i?. O Arjuna, the acts of the brahmans, k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras have been distributed according to the strength of their nature and gu?as.? Here, ?a?kara comments that the ??dras are not included in the compound with the other three castes on account of their ineligibility to study the Vedas: ?udr?n?? asam?sa-kara?a? eka-jatitve sati ved?nadhikara??t. It is telling that ?a?kara chose to explicitly draw attention to this, he could just as easily have explained it as metri causa, for the sake of the meter. 260 tasy? iyam alpa-granth? v?ttir ?rabhyate sa?s?ra-vy?viv?tsubhya? sa?s?ra-hetu-niv?tti-s?dhana-brahm?tmaikatva- vidy?-pratipattaye. (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 1) 101 whatsoever of caste eligibility of the seeker. 261 Commenting on BU 1.4.16, ?a?kara suggests that the performance of Vedic rituals puts one in a relationship with the gods similar to that of the livestock to their owner. He goes on to ask, ?if, on knowing Brahman, one is freed from the duties that are bondage, [duties] that make one [act] like an animal, on what account is one made to take on the privileges (adhik?ra) of the bondage of action, as though powerless, and not instead [take up] the claim (adhik?ra) to knowledge which is the means to freedom from that [bondage of action]??262 ?a?kara is clearly de-emphasizing and devaluing the karma-k???a (ritualistic) portions of the Vedas and, by implication, the attendant preoccupation with caste. Elsewhere, while commenting on BU 4.4.8, ?a?kara alludes to the portion of BU 1.4.10 beginning with, ?And whoever among the gods realized It [Brahman], they alone became That [Brahman]; Likewise among the seers and among humans.?263 He then adds, ?because ?ruti states that [the knowledge of Brahman is for everyone? (emphasis mine). 264 Once again, caste is no bar. His definitive statement occurs in the bh??ya summation of BU 2.4.5 and the preamble to 2.4.6: ?The different castes such as brahman, k?atriya, etc., that are caused by one?s karma, and the stages of life (??rama) and other attributes that are objects of notions superimposed on the ?tm? due to ignorance, like the notion of the snake on the rope, in order to destroy these notions [of caste, etc.], it is stated ?All this indeed becomes known, dear Maitreyi, when the ?tm? is seen, heard, and reflected [upon].??265 Knowledge of ?tm? and Brahman destroys the false notions of caste, says ?a?kara here. In the bh??ya on TU 1.12.1, in response to the objection that knowledge occurs only through karma and that listening to the Upani?ads is futile, ?a?kara says, ?No, there is no 261 Sure?vara?s Sambandha-v?rtika, his metrical introduction to BU ?Bh also echoes the same sentiment in vv. 292-93: ?[Rites such as] the Agnihotra, etc., even when performed by a ??dra, who is ineligible, are fruitless. Therefore, it [eligibility] is carefully defined. But here nothing more is required from the ??stras than the human goal, which is the destruction of ignorance dependent only on the arising of knowledge. k?min??py adnihotr?di ??dre??nadhik?ri??; k?tam apy aphala? tena yatn?t tatra nir?pyate. avidy?-gha-smara-j??na-janma-m?tr?valambina?; pum-arthasy?dhika? ??str?t ki?cid atra tu n?rthyate? (Sure?vara and Venkataramana Aiyar 1905, 46; Sure?vara and Mahadevan 1972, 147-8). Liberation in simply a human goal, and is not proscribed by one?s caste. 262 brahma vidv??? cet tasm?t pa?u-bh?v?t kartavyat?-bandhana-r?p?t pratimucyate. ken?ya? k?rit?? karma- bandhan?dhik?re?va?a iva pravartate, na punas tad vimok?a?op?ye vidy?dhik?ra iti? (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 112) 263 tad yo dev?n?? pratyabudhata sa eva tad abhavat. tathar????m. tath? manu?y???m. (BU 1.4.10). 264 ?tad yo dev?n?m? iti sarv?rth?rute? (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 363) 265 yad brahma-k?atr?di-karma-nimitta? varn??ram?di-lak?a?am ?tmany avidy?dhy?ropita-pratyaya-vi?aya? rajjv?m iva sarpa-pratyayas tad upamardan?rtham ?ha, ??tmani khalv are maitreyi d???e ?rute vij??ta ida? sarva? vidita? bhavati? (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 193). 102 such rule [that knowledge occurs through karma alone]. Nor does knowledge arise only through the removal of obstacles and not 266 through the grace of ??vara, the practices of austerity, meditation, etc. Because non-violence, celibacy, etc., facilitate knowledge and listening, reflection and meditation are the direct causes [of knowledge]. Thus, it is established that there are other ??ramas, that everyone has a right (adhik?ra) to knowledge, and that the highest good is only by way of knowledge.?267 Here too, ?a?kara refutes Vedic karma as a means to knowledge, ignores caste, and proclaims that everyone has a right to the knowledge of liberation. Thus, we can conclude that Ni?cald?s, when he cited ?a?kara in defense of his views on the eligibility of ??dras to liberation, was being faithful to ?a?kara?s broader intent, and was not trying to misrepresent his stance to further his own caste transcendence agenda. 4.5 Caste in the Mah?bh?rata ?a?kara?s position certainly appears radical in the context of the P?rva-M?m??s? view of his times, but that does not appear to present an obstacle for him. His views, however, are not without precedent: in the Anu??sana-parvan (MBh 13.131), in the dialog between Um? and Mahe?vara (?iva) on the four castes (var?a), ?iva says: etai? karma-phalair devi ny?na-j?ti-kulodbhava? ??dro ?py ?gama-sa?panno dvijo bhavati sa?sk?ta? (v. 45). By the result of these actions, 268 O goddess, a person born to a family of a low caste, even a ??dra, becomes a sanctified twice-born (dvija) endowed with [Vedic] knowledge (?gama). br?hma?o v?py asad-v?tta? sarva-sa?kara-bhojana? br?hma?ya? pu?yam uts?jya ??dro bhavati t?d??a? (v. 46). Whereas even a br?hma?a who is of vile conduct and observes no distinction with regard to food, Such a person gives up the merit of br?hma?a-hood and becomes a ??dra. 266 Yes, this is an awkward double negative, faithful to how ?a?kara renders it in Sanskrit. 267 na, niyam?bh?v?t. na hi pratibandha-k?ay?d eva vidyotpadyate na tv ??vara-pras?da-tapo-dhy?n?dy-anu??h?n?d iti niyamo ?sti. ahi?s?-brahmacary?d?n?? ca vidy?? pratyupk?rakatv?t s?k??d eva ca k?ra?atv?c chrava?a-manana- nididhy?san?n?m. ata? siddh?ny ??ram?ntr??i sarve??? c?dhik?ro vidy?y?? para? ca ?reya? keval?y? vidy?y? eveti siddham (?a?kara and ?nandagiri 1979, 438). 268 Enumerated in vv. 27-44 of this section (MBh Anu??sana-parvan, Ch. 131). These actions are said to result in upward mobility from one var?a to the next, but only in the subsequent birth. 103 karmabhi? ?ucibhir devi ?uddh?tm? vijitendriya? ??dro ?pi dvijavat sevya iti brahm?brav?t svayam (v. 47). Even a ??dra, O goddess, who has purified his ?tm? by pure deeds and has conquered all his senses, Is to be honored like a twice-born; so said Brahm? himself. Svabh?va-karma ca ?ubha? yatra ??dre ?pi ti??hati vi?uddha? sa dvij?tir vai vij?eya iti me mati? (v. 48). Where natural deeds and virtue are present in even a ??dra, He should indeed be considered a pure twice-born; this is my opinion. na yonir n?pi sa?sk?ro na ?ruta? na ca sa?nati? k?ra??ni dvijatvasya v?ttam eva tu k?ra?am (v. 49). Neither birth, nor the purificatory rites, nor learning, nor humility Are reasons for [conferring] the twice-born status. Conduct alone is the reason. sarvo ?ya? br?hma?o loke v?ttena tu vidh?yate v?tte sthita? ca su?ro?i br?hma?atva? nigacchati (v. 50). All br?hma?as in this world are accounted for by conduct. One who is established in good conduct, O one with beautiful hips, attains the status of a br?hma?a. br?hma? svabh?va? kaly??i sama? sarvatra me mati? nirgu?a? nirmala? brahma yatra ti??hati sa dvija? (v. 51). The nature of Brahman, O auspicious one, is equal everywhere, in my opinion. The one in whom the attribute-less, unsullied Brahman resides, is a twice-born. According to none other than Lord ?iva, in the MBh, anyone with pure deeds, good conduct and virtue, even a ??dra, is to be considered a twice-born, not just those belonging to brahman, k?atriya or vai?ya castes. In fact, a brahman is determined, not by birth, but by conduct. Though Ni?cald?s is thought to have written a gloss (?ippa??) on the MBh, it is no longer extant (Si?ha 1981, 28), thus we do not know if he was aware of the above dialog between ?iva and P?rvati. But this is not an isolated instance in the MBh where caste is not considered 104 to be hereditary269. Both ?a?kara and Ni?cald?s are aware270 of MBh 12.314.45 from the ??nti-parvan (Book of Peace), where Vy?sa, the author of the MBh blesses his five students Sumantu, Vai?amp?yana, Jaimini, Paila, and his own son, ?uka, saying: sarvas taratu durg??i sarvo bhadr??i pa?yatu ?r?vayec caturo var??n k?tv? br?hma?am agrata? (v. 45). May all overcome difficulties, may all experience good fortune; One should teach [the Vedas to]271 all four castes, putting a brahman first. Let us take a closer look at the context of this verse. In MBh 12.313, ?uka receives final teachings on liberation from King Janaka. In 12.314, he returns to his father Vy?sa?s ??rama, situated ten yojanas272 from where ?iva had undergone the most austere penance (tapo?tapyata durdhar?as) for a thousand heavenly years (divya? var?a-sahasra?). Vy?sa continued to teach the Vedas to his disciples and his son. One day, his disciples asked Vy?sa for a boon: ?a??ha? ?i?yo na te khy?ti? gacched atra pras?da na? (v. 37cd). catv?ras te vaya? ?i?y? guruputra? ca pa?cama? iha ved?? prati??herann e?a na? k??k?ito vara? (v. 38). If you might favor us here, may no sixth disciple of yours attain fame. We four are your disciples, and [your] son is the fifth; May the [five] Vedas273 prosper here ? this is our desired boon. 269 In the Vana/?ra?ya[ka]-parvan (MBh 3.177), in the dialog between the serpent Nahu?a and Yudhi??hira, Yudhi??hira unequivocally states that even a ??dra, if possessed of the virtues of truth, charity, freedom from anger, compassion (?n??a?sya), non-violence, tenderness (gh???), is not a ??dra, and a brahman without these virtues is not a brahman (3.177.20). The sages consider one?s moral conduct (??la) as primary (28), etc. In the same parvan, there also occurs the Vy?dha-g?t?, MBh 3.197-202 (Calcutta ed. 3.205-16), where a ??dra hunter/butcher named Dharmavy?dha instructs an arrogant brahman named Kau?ika regarding dharma. [For more on the Vy?dha-g?t?, see n. 229, p. 106]. E. W. Hopkins (1895, 425n3) also refers to a MBh verse 12.319.87 (??nti-parvan) "Let him get instruction even from a ??dra if he can thereby attain to salvation, pr?pya j??nam ? ??dr?d api,? but this is not found in the Pune Critical Edition, not even in the Supplementary Passages. It is unclear which MBh edition Hopkins was referring to, but it could be the (problematic) Calcutta Edition, since he lists Pratap Chandra Roy?s translation as one of his sources for the epic (500). Then there also is the case of the sage Utta?ka, who is offered water in the form of urine by a c????la (MBh 14.54), mentioned earlier in n. 243, p. 96. 270 As we have seen earlier (Ni?cald?s on page 97, and ?a?kara on page 98). 271 This parenthetical edit will be justified shortly. 272 A yojana is a unit of measure considered to be either 4, 5, 8 or 9 miles long, with no consensus among scholars. The astronomer ?ryabha??a (500 CE) & the S?rya Siddh?nta considered it equivalent to 5 miles, while the astronomer Parame?vara (fifteenth c.) took it to be more than one and a half times larger (Thompson 1997, 195; Parame?vara 1916, 4, v. 30). 273 The MBh is referred to as the ?fifth Veda,? which is supported by CU 7.1.4: ?itih?sa-pur??a? pa?camo ved?n?m veda??.? For more details specific to the MBh, see Fitzgerald (1985). 105 In response Vy?sa said: br?hma??ya sad? deya? brahma ?u?r??ave bhavet brahmaloke niv?sa? yo dhruva? samabhik??k?ati (v. 40). The Vedas should always be given to a brahman, to one who is desirous of learning the Vedas, Who desires a secure dwelling in the world of Brahm?. bhavanto bahul?? santu vedo vist?ryat?m ayam n??i?ye sa?prad?tavyo n?vrate n?k?t?tmani (v. 41). May you all multiply, may this Veda spread [through your efforts]. The Vedas are not to be imparted to one who has not formally become a disciple, nor to one who is not observant of religious rites, nor to one who is not identified with the ?tm?. ete ?i?ya-gu??? sarve vij??tavy? yath?rthata? n?par?k?ita-c?ritre vidy? dey? katha? cana (v. 42). These are to be known as the proper qualifications for discipleship, Knowledge should be not imparted to anyone without testing their character. yath? hi kanaka? ?uddha? t?pa-cchedani-ghar?a?ai? par?k?eta tath? ?i?y?n ?k?et kula-gu??dibhi? (v. 43). Just as pure gold is tested by heat, cutting and rubbing, Similarly disciples should be viewed by their family, attributes, etc. na niyojy?? ca va? ?i?y? aniyoge mah?bhaye yath?mati yath?p??ha? tath? vidy? phali?yati (v. 44). Never set your disciples to tasks to which are unfit, or are fraught with danger. One's knowledge will bear fruit commensurate with one's understanding and study. The rules for selecting a disciple contain no mention of caste, unless one reads the reference to family (kula) in v. 43 as an indirect allusion. In fact, v. 40 seems to make the study of the Vedas eligible for anyone ?who is desirous of learning the Vedas (brahma ?u?r??ave bhavet).? This would be consistent with ?iva?s words in the Anu??sana-parvan, MBh 13.131.45-51, that anyone with good conduct (v?tte sthitha?) is to be considered equal to a 106 brahman. 274 In the context of the topic of this section (MBh 13.314.40-44), namely, the eligibility of one to become a disciple and study the Vedas, it becomes clear that the much cited p?da 13.314.45c, ?One should teach all four castes, ?r?vayec caturo var??n,? is referring to the teaching of the Vedas, including the Mah?bh?rata, to all four castes. The narrowing of the materials suitable for study by women and ??dras to just the itih?sa and pur??as, as suggested by ?a?kara in BS ?Bh 1.3.38 and also by Ni?cald?s, is not apparent here. After enjoining his five disciples to teach the four var?as, Vy?sa concludes this chapter with the following verses, leaving no doubt that the Vedas are intended as suitable material for teaching: vedasy?dhyayana? h?da? tac ca k?rya? mahat sm?tam stutyartham iha dev?n?? ved?? s????? svaya?bhuv? (v. 46). This is the study of the Vedas, and it is considered an important task. The Vedas were created by the self-born [Brahm?] for the purpose of praising the deities here. yo nirvadeta sa?moh?d br?hma?a? vedap?ragam so ?padhy?n?d br?hma?asya par?bh?y?d asa??ayam (v. 47). One who, due to confusion, may speaks ill of a brahman who has mastered the Vedas, Shall doubtless perish due to [his] jealousy of the brahman. ya? c?dharme?a vibr?y?d ya? c?dharme?a p?cchati tayor anyatara? praiti vidve?a? v?dhigacchati (v. 48). One who unjustly teaches and one who unjustly questions, Either of them dies or attracts hatred. etad va? sarvam ?khy?ta? sv?dhy?yasya vidhi? prati upakury?c ca ?i?y???m etac ca h?di vo bhavet (v. 49). You all have been told everything regarding the way of studying [the Vedas]. May you bear [all] this in mind and help your disciples succeed. These selections from the MBh illustrate what Matilal calls ?internal criticism? ?within the tradition about the prevalence of the heredity-based caste hierarchy? (2002, 142). Even in 274 A similar view is also expressed by Yudhi??hira in the ?ra?yaka-parvan, MBh 3.177, see n. 269 above. 107 the Bhagavad G?t?, there is no explicit mention of heredity in connection with the var?a, caste system. In BhG 4.13ab, K???a only states that the four var?as were created by him in accordance with the distribution of karma and the gu?as, 275 a point which is further elaborated in BhG 18.41-45. It is ?a?kara who ties this to heredity via his commentary to BhG 18.47, by quoting Gau. Dh. S?. 11.29, ?[Members of] the castes and stages of life (??rama), who always live according to their karma, enjoy the rewards of their works after death, and by virtue of the remnant (of their karma) they are born again in specific places, castes, and families, (endowed) with dharma, long life, learning in the Vedas, virtuous conduct, wealth, happiness, and wisdom.?276 As discussed in the context of BS ?Bh 1.3.34-38 in section 4.4 above, this may have been motivated by ?a?kara?s calculated, political attempt to not alienate the orthodoxy. Also, K???a himself in BhG 9.32 allows that even women and ??dras can attain the ?highest goal,? a statement that demands an explanation. However, as mentioned in section 4.4 of this chapter, ?a?kara?s views elsewhere are considerably more radical and advocate the irreconcilability of caste with the Advaita stance, and it is plausible that he was not only aware of the MBh criticism of caste heredity but also sympathetic to it. In other works such as his bh??ya to the BU and TU, as well as the MP, he makes the case that everyone, regardless of caste, is eligible for knowledge of liberation. Similar caste- leveling sentiments appear in the work of Sure?vara, one of his four immediate disciples. In his Nai?karmya-siddhi, Sure?vara states, ?The very witness of the intellect of a ca???la (an outcaste) is the witness of Brahm??s intellect; the one [consciousness] illumines both, but appears as though many because of the difference among what is illumined? (2.88).277 In his introduction to his commentary on the BU, the Sambandha-v?rtika, Sure?vara again maintains that a ??dra is eligible for liberation even if he is ineligible for heaven as a result of his ineligibility to perform Vedic rites such as the agnihotra. 278 Ni?cald?s too, as was evident 275 BhG 4.13ab: c?tur-var?yam may? s???a? gu?a-karma-vibh?ga?a?. 276 Gau. Dh. S?. 11.29 (=2.2.29): var?? ??ram?? ca sva-karma-ni??h?? pretya karma-phalam anubh?ya tata? ?e?e?a vi?i??a- de?a-j?ti-kula-dharm?y??-?ruta-v?tta-vitta-sukha-medhasa? janma pratipadyante (Krishna Warrier 1983, 589). Var. (in boldface): var?? ??ram?? sva-sva-dharma-ni??h?? pretya karma-phalam anubh?ya tata? ?e?e?a vi?i??a-de?a-j?ti-kula- r?p?y??-?ruta-citra-(v?tta)-vitta-sukha-medhaso janma pratipadyante (Gautama, Haradatta, and ?p?e 1931, 87-8; Gautama, Haradatta, and Pa??eya 1966, 115-6) 277 Nai? 2.88: ca???la-buddher yad dra??? tad eva brahma-buddhi-d?k, eka? tad ubbhayor jyotir bhasya-bhed?d anekavat (Raghavachar 1965, 77; Balasubramanian 1988, 187-8). 278 Sambandha-v?rtika 292-3: ?k?min??py agnihotr?di ??dre??nadhik?ri??, k?tam apy aphala? tena yatn?t tatra nir?pyate. avidy?ghas-mara-j??na-janma-m?tr?valambina?, pumarthasy?dhika? ??str?t ki?cid atra tu n?rthyate. The agnihotra and other rites do not bear fruit when performed by a ??dra, who is ineligible [to perform such rites], even though he is desirous 108 in connection with VP 8.111, allows that any human being is eligible for Brahman- realization, but in connection with ??dras, he appears to follow ?a?kara?s compromising stance re. BhG 4.13ab and allows that their eligibility is ?due to actions of prior lives.? Thus, by choosing to write in the vernacular, Ni?cald?s is hardly unique; he is tapping into a long tradition of criticism of the hereditary caste stratification, which is never far from the surface, as the selections from the MBh in this section have shown. Such sentiments are also prevalent in Advaita Ved?nta, with its ultimate (p?ram?rthika) standpoint of absolute non-duality, and also in the nirgu?? sant tradition of Kabir, D?d? and others. Even in Ni?cald?s?s time, Hindu orthodoxy was being boldly challenged on many fronts. Raja Rammohun Roy (1772-1833) argued for a rationalist interpretation of the Vedas. He rejected idolatry, priests and their rituals, the custom of sat? (self-immolation of a Hindu widow on her husband?s funeral pyre), and the prohibition of access to education and scriptural knowledge on the basis of gender and caste. The Brahmo Sam?j started by Roy in 1828 went on to influence many other Indian reformers and movements of that century, most notably Vivekananda and the Ramakrishna Mission (Jones, K. W 1989, 30-33, 41-6; Pankratz 1981, 165-72; Lavan 1981). The rationalist, monotheistic Vedic Hinduism of Dayananda Saraswati (1824-83) also rejected the idolatry, deities, polytheism, priestly privilege, non-Vedic rituals, the Pur??as, and popular Hinduism in general. The ?rya Sam?j founded by him in 1875 grew to be a major pan-Indian force for social and political change (Jones, K. W. 1981). In Maharashtra, Jyotirao Phule (1827-90) rejected the brahmanical religion and caste structure altogether and strove to bring about a sociological and cultural revolution promoting egalitarianism, non-exploitation and non-Aryans (Omvedt 1971; O?Hanlon 1985). In Benares, from 1869 onwards, Bh?ratendu Hari?candra (1850-85), through his publications and the K??? Dharma Sabh? and the Tad?ya Sam?j, was working to define a nationalistic Hinduism, essentially a monotheistic and Vaishnava version in which bhakti and image- worship were central, replacing the Vedic canon, rituals and sacerdotal structure with the Bh?gavata Pur??a, the BhG, Brajbh??? devotional and hagiographical literature and the all- important guru. This religion was pitched as the one true dharma, almost about to disappear of the result (i.e., heaven) as such eligibility is carefully stated. But here nothing more is desired from the ??stra, scriptures, than the human goal which is only dependent on the arising of the knowledge which destroys ignorance? (Sure?vara, ?nandagiri, et al. 1937, 103; Sure?vara and Aiyar 1905, 46; Sure?vara and Mahadevan 1972, 147). 109 due to the pettiness of the brahmanical tradition but graciously rescued by monotheistic teachers; it attempted to include the Brahmo and ?rya Sam?j followers too (Dalmia 1997). Even among groups where the validity of the Vedas was accepted, questions were being raised as to their relationship to other sources of authority, textual as well as non-textual, such as the founders of the tradition and their lineages; an example of this occurs in the debates in the court of Mah?r?j? R?m Singh II of Jaipur (r. 1851-80) between the Vaishnava followers of Nimb?rka and Vallabha on the one side with the Sm?rta-?aivas on the other (Cl?mentin-Ojha 2001). Thus criticisms of and challenges to the orthodox views on caste were never entirely suppressed and continued to arise throughout the intervening millennia after the composition or compilation of the MBh. Challenges to the orthodoxy were certainly part of the zeitgeist around Ni?cald?s. While it is not possible to adduce from his works the direct or indirect influence on Ni?cald?s of such currents prevalent in the nation during his time, Ni?cald?s certainly did not hesitate to question the orthodoxy where it conflicted with his vision of Advaita. 4.6 Ni?cald?s?s Stance on Caste Compared to the D?d? Panth The previous chapter, particularly section 3.6, ?An Evaluation of the Views of D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s on Religion and Caste,? presented the manner in which the writings of D?d? and his immediate followers advocated the transcendence of religious categorization as Hindu, Muslim, etc., as well as of caste. This is not surprising when one considers that D?d?, Rajjab and Sundard?s were self-professed devotees of nirgu?a, p?r?a Brahman ? the unqualified, attribute-less, indivisible and non-dual God ? any attachment to categories and sub-divisions of humanity would be in conflict with their vision. Similar sentiments were expressed by Ni?cald?s with regard to caste; Ni?cald?s is highly critical of the orthodox practice of restricting access to teachings on liberation to only the three ?twice-born? castes, namely, brahmans, k?atriyas, and vai?yas. He holds the position that everyone, regardless of caste, is eligible for liberation. But he does not make a complete break with orthodoxy by advocating the eligibility of ??dras for studying Vedic texts too. Rather, he conforms to the orthodox view which permits the ??dras to study liberation as long as it is via listening to non-Vedic texts such as the itih?sa and pur??as. But Ni?cald?s subverts the orthodoxy by including vernacular texts such as the ones he is writing about Ved?nta, i.e., Upani?adic 110 (meaning Vedic) matters, among the texts that can provide ??dras liberation! He is unequivocal that any human being, even ??dras and the lowest caste (antya-j?ti), can attain Brahman-realization. There is, however, one significant difference between Ni?cald?s and the early D?d?panth?s: The message of D?d? and his early followers was rooted in the nirgu?? sant tradition that can be traced back to Kabir in the fifteenth century, and was subscribed to by both Hindus and Muslims. Ni?cald?s?s message is solidly grounded in the Advaita tradition. While one can justifiably argue that there is no conflict between the non-duality of the sant tradition and that of Advaita, the inescapable fact remains that Advaita is staunchly rooted in Hinduism. There is not one mention of Muslims in any of the three published books of Ni?cald?s, namely, YP, VS and VP. The trend of Hinduization of the D?d? Panth begun by Sundard?s which was alluded to by Orr earlier (1947, 195) is well and truly complete by Ni?cald?s?s time. It is as though, for Ni?cald?s, there is no world outside of the Hindu world. 4.7 Chapter Summary This chapter began with Pollock?s remarks on vernacularization, which he describes as a deliberate choice to create vernacular texts modeled on those of a ?superordinate literary culture? and a cosmopolitan language such as Sanskrit, in languages that ?do not travel,? electing instead to ?remain within a limited world.? Such a choice is influenced by cultural and political factors, and potentially by nationalizing and colonizing forces as well. In the case of Sw?m? Ni?cald?s, there are two superordinate literary cultures influencing his works: the Sanskrit philosophical tradition with its vast body of literature spanning millennia, and the D?d?panth? culture with its tradition of writing in vernacular Hindi since the sixteenth century. In contrast to Pollock?s characterization, rather than choosing to remain in a ?limited world,? Ni?cald?s chose to write in the vernacular for exactly the opposite purpose: to make his works more widely accessible than if they had been in Sanskrit. Instead of ?not traveling,? his VS is widely available and almost pan-Indian, with translations available in most of the major national languages, including Sanskrit. While it may appear that Ni?cald?s ignores colonialism and nationalism, he certainly engages with issues of culture and power, possibly motivated by his patron, the ruler of B?nd?, and also by his own experience of discrimination and hardships due to his j?ti when 111 attempting to acquire a Sanskrit education. His writings clearly reflect a deliberate decision to write in the vernacular in order to make the knowledge of liberation available to all, irrespective of caste. His decision to write in Hindi may have also been influenced by the then prevalent ?winds of vernacularization? and ?new intellectualism? and historicist perspectives that began to arise in literary works, starting in the sixteenth century. In the case of philosophical literature, vernacularization occurred after a time lag of as much as four to five centuries, partly due to the challenge of assimilating the colossal body of preceding knowledge in the field. As an agent of this process of vernacularization, Ni?cald?s is well aware of the ?internal criticism,? of heredity-based caste hierarchy within the earlier literature, as in portions of the MBh from almost two millennia prior, and he cites from these selections in support of the eligibility of anybody, irrespective of caste, to attain the knowledge of liberation. He is particularly selective in citing ?a?kara as also supporting this position, but as became evident in section 4.4 above, ?a?kara?s position on the eligibility of ??dras is more nuanced and politic. I have argued that, from an ultimate (p?ram?rthika) standpoint, ?a?kara too subscribes to the same position as Ni?cald?s and many others in the Advaita and nirgu?? sant traditions. In this context, Ni?cald?s is not proposing anything new; he is simply making the point in a clear and uncompromising fashion that all humans have the right to knowledge of the highest truth, of liberation. Ni?cald?s then actively embodies this point by writing in the vernacular. This can be viewed as a deliberately subversive act, essentially giving even the ??dras and lower castes access to Upani?adic, i.e., Vedic knowledge of liberation that the Hindu orthodoxy traditionally limits to just their listening to the itih?sa and pur??a texts. By presenting the teachings of Ved?nta in the vernacular, Ni?cald?s is not just giving the ??dras and lower castes access, he is giving them a chance to read and study these texts on their own. Ni?cald?s?s subversion is however restricted to just the Hindu sphere, the D?d?panth? trend towards Hinduization and the tacit exclusion of any mention of Muslims that began in the time of Sundard?s is well-entrenched by Ni?cald?s?s time to where there is no mention of Muslims at all in his works. 5 On V?tti and the Means of Cognition 5.1 Introduction The dissertation thus far has focused on the broader context of Ni?cald?s ? his D?d?panth? background, biography, and patronage. The previous chapter examined his choice to write in the vernacular, driven by his views on caste (j?ti). The remainder of the dissertation narrows its focus to his magnum opus, the V?ttiprabh?kar (VP), ?The Illuminator of V?ttis,?279 where he demonstrates great familiarity not just with the Advaita Ved?nta corpus but also with the Ny?ya, M?m??s? and grammatical (vy?kara?a) traditions. It is reputed to have been written at the request of his patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd?, for a text aimed at more erudite readers (P?t?mbar 1917, 7). Typically, Ved?nta texts are organized as either sub-commentaries to or abridgements of existing works. For example, Padmap?da?s Pa?cap?dik?, and Sarvaj??tman?s Sa?k?epa- ??r?raka are based on ?a?kara?s commentary on the BS. Other independent texts present their perspective of Ved?nta in the process of answering a specific question. For example, Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra?s Ved?nta-paribh??? establishes the Ved?nta epistemology by refuting Ny?ya in its first six chapters dedicated to the six means of cognition, and then its last two chapters take up the nature of Brahman and the goal of Ved?nta. Along similar lines, the VP is a novel structuring of the Ved?nta doctrinal issues around three questions pertaining to the concept of v?tti (provisionally translated as ?mental modification by which cognition occurs? till we discuss this further in section 5.2): what is it, what is its cause, and what is its purpose. Mah?dev?nanda (seventeenth c. CE) also uses the concept of v?tti as an organizational device in his Tattv?nusandh?na, but only in its second and third of four chapters, and not as the central device. The central topic of all Ved?nta texts is Brahman and the attainment of its knowledge, and it is important to understand v?ttis in this context, as the knowledge that one is Brahman is attained through a v?tti in the form of Brahman (brahm?k?ra v?tti). While one is not aware of one?s identity with Brahman, one relates to the objective world about us by means of v?ttis, and in effect creates one?s ?reality? by means of these v?ttis. The concept of v?ttis is implicit in all of Advaita but has never been treated in the depth that it is by Ni?cald?s in his VP. In providing answers to his three questions on v?tti, 279 The term v?tti will be explained shortly, in section 5.2, ?What is a v?tti?? on p. 117. 114 besides writing in the vernacular, Ni?cald?s?s unique contribution is his reorganization of over a millennium?s worth of post-?a?kara Advaita literature, by presenting and then comparing various prior standpoints, followed by his defense of what may be considered valid and in keeping with Advaita doctrine, the refutation of other conflicting views where relevant, or when possible, a presentation of the means to reconcile the apparent conflict. A sense of Ni?cald?s?s achievements is provided by Pandit P?t?mbar, the commentator to Ni?cald?s?s VS, who writes that several pandits who knew Sanskrit read the VP in secret because they did not wish to be seen taking help from a vernacular (bh???) text (1917, 7). A close reading of the VP will provide us with a deeper insight into his thought processes and the influence his Advaita perspective had on his radical choice to write in the vernacular instead of Sanskrit. But before we can delve deeper, it will be productive to look at: 1) the internal structure of the VP; 2) the structure of corresponding rendering in chapters 5 through 9 of this dissertation; and 3) the layout of the remainder of this chapter. 5.1.1 The Internal Structure of the VP The VP comprises eight chapters, prak??as. In the KS edition which has been available virtually unchanged since 1899 CE, these chapters are further subdivided into numbered and titled subsections, but when compared to the only manuscript version available to me which precedes the printed version by over thirty years (Ni?chalad?sa 1868), these subdivisions do not appear in the manuscript but appear to be the interpolation of a later editor.280 In this dissertation, for ease of location and access, all references to the VP source are to the KS printed edition (Ni?cald?s 1899), in the format ?VP n.x, m,? where ?n? is the chapter number, ?x? the subsection, and ?m? the page number(s). The manuscript is only organized into chapters, with virtually no punctuation or word breaks past the first twelve folios, and the chapter names only appear in the colophon at their end. The colophon chapter names for the first six chapters are preserved in the KS edition where they are used as the chapter titles. The first six chapters are named for the six means of cognition accepted by Advaita Ved?nta, presented in descending order of the number of orthodox systems281 which accept them, as 1) perception (pratyak?a), 2) inference 280 See Appendices 2 and 3 for a comparison of the VP across various versions. 281 These are essentially the classical ?ad-dar?anas, the six schools of Hindu philosophy. Differences between the Old (pr?c?na) and New (navya) Ny?ya schools are considered where relevant. For the most part, the Vai?e?ika school is treated 115 (anum?na), 3) verbal testimony (?abda), 4) analogy (upam?na), 5) postulation (arth?patti) and 6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). These first six chapters, VP 1-6, comprise a little under 45% of the total length of the VP. VP 7 accounts for another third of the total, while VP 8 is nearly a quarter of the text. 282 For the last two chapters however, there is a divergence between the manuscript colophon names and the KS chapter titles. For VP 7, the colophon name283 is ?The elaboration of the types of v?ttis, followed by a refutation of the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real (sat-khy?ti),284 etc., wherein the investigation of intrinsic validity for the sake of refuting the theory that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real recollection and the real substratum (akhy?ti).?285 By comparison, the title in the KS ed. reads, ?Types of v?ttis, elaboration of the [Advaita] theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya-khy?ti),286 refutation of [other] doctrines of perceptual error, and the investigation of the means of cognition via intrinsic validity.?287 For VP 8, the divergence is not as significant. The colophon name reads, ?The nature of j?va and ??vara, followed by the elaboration on the use of v?tti and the nature of the cessation of the conceived,?288 whereas the KS chapter title reads, ?The nature of j?va and ??vara, and the elaboration on the use of v?tti along with the nature of the cessation of the conceived.?289 [The terms, j?va and ??vara, are being left untranslated and shall be explained shortly]. The difference between the manuscript colophons and the KS chapter titles seem to suggest an editorial ?tightening? moving from the manuscript to the printed version. as part of the Ny?ya, the two are often referred to jointly as Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika. Differences within M?m??s?, such as the Bh???a and Pr?bh?kara sub-schools are considered. S??khya is considered a separate school but is unclear as to whether Ni?cald?s treats P?ta?jala-yoga as separate from S??khya. The only reference to Pata?jali is to the grammarian. 282 The distribution of pages per chapter (in the KS ed.) are as follows: VP 1: 7.5%, VP 2: 2%, VP 3: 10.5%, VP 4: 2%, VP 5: 2%, VP 6: 19.5%, VP 7: 33%, VP 8: 23.5%. 283 ? v?tti-bheda-nir?pa?a-prasa?ga-pr?pta-sat-khy?ty-?di-nir?kara??gat?khy?ti-nir?kara?a-prayojaka-svata?pram?tva- nir?pa?a?-n?ma saptama? prak??a? (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 7.65-6). 284 Sat-khy?ti will be explained in section 6.3.2. 285 Akhy?ti will be explained in section 6.3.6. 286 Anirvacan?ya-khy?ti will be explained in section 6.3.1. 287 atha v?tti-bheda anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-ma??ana khy?ti-kha??ana au svata? pram?tva-pram??a-nir?pa?a n?ma saptama- prak??a-pr?rambha (VP 7, 196). 288 ? j?ve?vara-svar?pa-nir?pa?a-p?rvaka v?tti-prayojana-nir?pa?a-sahita kalpita-niv?tti-svar?pa-nir?pa?a? n?ma a??ama? prak??a? (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). 289 atha j?ve?vara-svar?pa-v?tti-prayojana-sahita kalpita-niv?tti-svar?pa-nir?pa?a? n?m???ama-prak??a pr?rambha? (VP 8, 343). 116 Two things should be apparent from the above consideration of the VP chapter names: 1) VP 1-6 are the answer to the first question posed at the outset of the text, ?What is a v?tti?? VP 7 is the answer to the second question, ?What is the cause of a v?tti?? and VP 8 answers the third question, ?What is the purpose of a v?tti?? 2) The last two chapters, VP 7-8 are rather sprawling in scope, answering not just the questions pertaining to v?ttis, but also in the process raising several underlying issues that are dealt with exhaustively in order to do full justice to the original questions. Ni?cald?s?s successor Day?r?m wrote R?j? R?msi?ha that Ni?cald?s was unable to conclude the VP due to his unexpected death. The completeness of the VP as we presently have it is discussed in section 10.6 below, p. 381. 5.1.2 The Structure of the Rendering of VP in This Dissertation To make the underlying structure more apparent, this dissertation structures its treatment of VP differently, instead of mapping directly chapter for chapter. VP 1-6 are largely presented as a summary, as Advaita epistemology has been already been dealt with rather extensively by many.290 Only noteworthy sections are paraphrased in detail. However, VP 7-8 are presented in detail, as they contain Ni?cald?s?s distinctive interpretations. Where necessary, some systematization is introduced in the way of numbered lists, etc., to make the analyses easier to follow. While still a paraphrase, every attempt has been made to stay true to Ni?cald?s?s voice, and judicious editorial judgment has been exercised to keep the text readable in English without loss of meaning. I have made every attempt to allow Ni?cald?s speak for himself while confining my own remarks to the opening and closing portions of each section, to the footnotes, or delimited within square brackets. A brief overview of chapters 5 through 9291 as they map to the VP is provided next, and at the beginning of each chapter of the dissertation, a more detailed introduction will also be provided. In chapter 5, Ni?cald?s?s initial brief answer to the first question (what is a v?tti) in VP 1, namely, that v?ttis facilitate cognition, leads to a detailed discussion of the six accepted means of cognition (pram??a) in Ved?nta (VP 1-6), which are presented in summary form with some exceptions. While introducing the concept of v?tti, Ni?cald?s describes the two 290 Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra?s Ved?nta-paribh??? (1550-1650) and Vimukt?tman?s I??a-siddhi (850-976 CE) to name just a couple of treatments. 291 Whenever a reference is made to ?chapter n?, it is to a chapter in this dissertation, while chapters (prak??a) of the VP will be referred to as ?VP n,? ?n? being the chapter number in both instances. 117 types of cognition, direct (pram?) and indirect (apram?) (VP 1.1, 1-4). In answering the second question (what is the cause of a v?tti), Ni?cald?s further develops this v?tti typology (VP 7.3-6, 206-21). Indirect cognitions can be false, and chapter 6 examines Ni?cald?s?s presentation of the Advaita view of superimposition (adhy?sa), which is held to be the cause of erroneous cognition. A discussion and defense of the Advaita theory of erroneous cognition, (anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da), namely, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), is followed by the presentation and refutation of five other theories of erroneous cognition. In the course of refuting one of these theories, an objection is raised by the proponent of the theory that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real recollection and real substratum (akhy?ti), that if one has doubts regarding the validity (pram?tva) of any given cognition, one will not engage in any definite activity (prav?tti). Chapter 6 concludes with Ni?cald?s establishing that this objection is valid for akhy?ti too. Chapter 7 sees Ni?cald?s address the inapplicability of this objection to Advaita, by analyzing the nature of validity and invalidity. By answering the second question concerning v?ttis (what is their cause), this concludes the discussion of types of cognition which began towards the end of chapter 5, and also marks the end of VP 7. Next, Ni?cald?s begins his answer to the third question, ?what is the purpose of a v?tti?? In brief, the primary purpose of a v?tti is the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). To thoroughly understand this, Ni?cald?s embarks on an examination of the locus of ignorance: is it the individual being (j?va), is it ??vara (the theistic creator), or is it elsewhere? Ni?cald?s presents the principal Advaita views on the locus of ignorance and the relation of consciousness to the erroneous cognitions, the differences between these views, and a way in which these views may be reconciled. Chapter 8 takes up Ni?cald?s?s continuing examination of ignorance as it manifests in the empirical sphere as well as in the dream state. It also contains a discussion on the nature of reality (satt?) versus illusoriness (mithy?tva), where he repudiates the reality of the manifest world (prapa?ca). Next, Ni?cald?s takes up the means to dispel this illusoriness, discussing the utility of action (karma) and renunciation (sanny?sa) in effecting knowledge as proposed 118 by various Advaita thinkers, as well as the eligibility of non-brahman castes for self- realization. Chapter 9 presents Ni?cald?s?s return to the third question, namely, the purpose of a v?tti being to bring about the cessation of ignorance through Brahman-realization (tattva-j??na). Ni?cald?s explores the nature of this v?tti, what happens once it occurs, the means for effecting Brahman-realization, and whether the realization is immediate or not. Ni?cald?s suggests that a v?tti is the cause of an individual?s (j?va) experience of the cycle of life-death- rebirth (sa?s?ra) by relation to the three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep), and also the cause of the attainment of liberation. Different arguments regarding the nature of the cessation of what was conceived (kalpita), namely, sa?s?ra, are considered before Ni?cald?s presents his own view, and his conclusion. 5.1.3 The Layout of the Remainder of Chapter 5 Section 5.2 introduces the concept of v?tti the three questions pertaining to it, the term anta?-kara?a, and a provisional answer to first and easiest question, what is a v?tti? A v?tti is first defined as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a (provisionally translated as ?mind? for the moment, although it is more than just the mind) and ignorance (aj??na),? The definition is then further refined to exclude certain inapplicable modifications. A v?tti leads to cognition, which can be characterized as valid or invalid in section 5.3. Discussion of valid cognition leads Ni?cald?s to take up each of the six means of cognition (pram??a) which are accepted by Ved?nta: 1) perception (pratyak?a), 2) inference (anum?na), 3) verbal testimony (?abda), 4) analogy (upam?na), 5) postulation (arth?patti) and 6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Each pram??a is summarized in its subsection (5.4.1 through 5.4.6) and the flow of the argument will be presented at the start where required. The utility of each pram??a in attaining the knowledge of Brahman is also discussed. In connection with perception, Ni?cald?s explores whether or not to accept the mind as a sense organ for perception. In connection with inference, Ni?cald?s also considers whether or not par?mar?a, recollection of the perception of the probans qualified by invariable concomitance of the probandum, is the instrument (kara?a) or the intermediate cause (vy?p?ra) for inferential cognition, or if the memory (sm?ti) of the invariable concomitance constitutes an inference as an intermediate cause. Verbal testimony requires a detailed 119 discussion of a different sense of the word ?v?tti,? namely, as the ?significatory function? of individual words, whether this is direct (?akti) or indirect/implied (lak?a??), and of the various kinds of indirect signification. This issue is particularly important for Ved?nta in order to explain how the great Upani?adic statements (mah?-v?kya) can bring about the direct cognition of the identity between j?va and Brahman [The term j?va meaning ?individual? or ?living being? will be left untranslated henceforth]. In this context, the six characteristics (?a?-li?ga) that determine the intent (t?tparya) of Vedic statements are discussed, along with the four accessories to verbal cognition: expectancy (?k??k??), compatibility (yogyat?), intention (t?tparya), and proximity (?satti). The treatment of analogy (upam?na) and postulation (arth?patti) are rather straightforward, but that of non- cognition (anupalabdhi) is rather involved and requires a description and critique of the Ny?ya categories of non-existence (abh?va). Lastly, section 5.5 covers Ni?cald?s?s treatment of the causes of a v?tti, in order to facilitate a detailed discussion of the different types of v?ttis, i.e., as valid/direct (pram?), indirect (apram?), or recollection (sm?ti). The latter two are further categorized depending upon their being true (yath?rtha) or false (ayath?rtha). We now begin with the VP itself. 5.2 What is a V?tti? Ni?cald?s opens his V?ttiprabh?kar (VP) with a doh? (rhyming couplet)292: asti bh?ti priya sindhu me?, n?ma r?pa ja?j?la; lakhi tihi? ?tma-svar?pa nija, hvai tatk?la nih?la. In the ocean of being, manifestation, and dearness [i.e. Brahman], name and form are a trap.293 Upon seeing the nature of one?s own ?tm? there, one will immediately become happy. The doh? is followed by the statement, ?By the v?tti, ?I am Brahman,? ignorance and its results are removed, and the highest happiness (?nanda), is attained ? this is ultimate purpose (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. In this connection, there arises the desire to know: ?What is a v?tti, 292 This is one of the only three doh?s occurring in VP. The other two occur at VP 7.39 and VP 8.28. 293 This is a yet another reference to D?g-d??ya-viveka v. 20 by Vidy?ra?ya/Bh?rat?t?rtha; Ni?cald?s also alluded to this verse in VS v. 7.117. See n. 176 for the Sanskrit. verse. 120 who is the cause of a v?tti and what is its purpose?? This text, V?ttiprabh?kar, The Illuminator of V?ttis, has been written with these [questions in mind].?294 The term v?tti is complex and multivalent. For its meaning in the Advaita context, Grimes? Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy translates v?tti as ?mental mode? and explains it as: a modification of the mind whose function is to manifest objects. It is what makes knowledge possible according to Advaita. It serves as a connection link between the knowing subject and the known object. It is a transformation of either the internal organ or of nescience (avidy?). It goes out through the senses and pervades the object (1996, 403-4 s.v). V?tti has also been translated by others as ?mood of the mind (MW),? ?mental state,?295 ?cognition,?296 and the ill-chosen ?psychosis.?297 In VS, Pt. P?t?mbar provides four further meanings of v?tti that may be appropriate in in other contexts: 1) relation of a word to its meaning; 2) that which occurs, exists; 3) a feminine proper noun; 4) the activity of the breaths; 298 5) a section of a grammar (251n438). Yet another common sense of v?tti is a commentary or a gloss on a specific s?tra (aphorism). Here, the term v?tti, in the context of enabling knowledge, will be deliberately left untranslated to avoid providing an incomplete or misleading equivalent. According to Ni?cald?s, ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance (aj??na) is called a v?tti? (VP 1, 1). The term anta?-kara?a will also be left untranslated. Commonly it is rendered as the ?inner-organ? or ?inner sense/instrument,? which is what the Sanskrit means literally, except that, unlike the other five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch), the anta?-kara?a is not a physical organ or sense. In Ved?nta, the anta?-kara?a is defined as 294 aha? brahm?smi y? v?tti sai? k?rya-sahit aj??n k? niv?tti aur pram?nand k? pr?pti hovai ha, yah ved?nt k? siddh?nt hai. tah?? yah jij??s? hovai hai, v?tti kisk?? kahai hai? aur v?tti k? k?ra? kaun hai aur v?tti k? prayojan ky? hai, y?tai? v?ttiprabh?kar n?m granth likai? hai?. (VP 1.1, 1). This opening is very similar to, but not exactly the same as the opening of the section on v?tti in the Advaita-cint?-kaustubha, Mah?dev?nanda-sarasvat??s auto-commentary on the Tattv?nusandh?na, dvit?ya pariccheda? (1994, 127; 1922, 125-6). Mah?dev?nanda flourished ca. 1600-1700 CE (Thangaswami 1980, 371-2), but is dated to the latter half of the seventeenth c. by K. Srinivasan and T. V. Vasudeva (Mah?dev?nanda-sarasvati 2008, xvii-xviii). Also see n. 303. 295 By M?dhav?nanda (Adhvar?ndra 1972, 5,15) 296 By Comans (To?ak?carya 1996, 11) 297 By T. M. P. Mahadevan (2006, 11). As Bilimoria points out, ?[the term ?psychosis?] has strong psychological and not epistemic denotation (1980, 44n16)? and Mahadevan is well aware of it: ?The term psychosis is used by modern psychologists to indicate an abnormal state of mind. [But] here it is employed to mean a transformation either of the mind or of its cause, nescience? (51n11). 298 ?breaths,? pl., is a reference to the vital breaths (pr??a), usually five in number, and sometimes ten. Ni?cald?s provides a detailed description of the breaths in VS (5.255, 151-2). 121 consisting of four components: 299 mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), subconscious (citta), and ego (aha?k?ra).300 Ni?cald?s further refines his definition of v?tti as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance which reveals the object (vi?aya) in the form of cognition (j??na).?301 This refinement is necessary to exclude a) the modifications of the anta?-kara?a such as anger and happiness which do not reveal any object, and b) the modifications of ignorance alone, such as space [and the other elements] which do not reveal themselves. 302 Although the emotional modification of the anta?-kara?a (such as happiness, sorrow, desire, contentment, anger, forgiveness, fortitude and the lack thereof, embarrassment, fear, etc.) are often referred to as v?ttis in many places, Ni?cald?s defends his definition as representing the technical (p?ribh??ika) sense of v?tti for Advaita and conforming to the definition given in the Tattv?nusandh?na and [its auto-commentary] the Advaita-cint?-kaustubha.303 5.3 Types of V?tti-cognition (V?tti-j??na) V?tti-cognition, i.e., v?tti as cognition, is of two types, valid or direct (pram?) and indirect (apram?). 304 A valid cognition is that which is that which is produced by the means of valid 299 Tattvabodha 7.3.2.2: ? mano-buddhy-aha?k?ra-citt?nta?kara??ni sambh?t?ni (Vasudevendramuni 2011, 5; ?a?kar?c?rya 1981b, 36-39). [The authorship of Tattvabodha is usually ascribed to ?a?kara, but is most likely by Vasudevendramuni (1700-1765 CE) as per Thangaswami (1980, 396-7) and verified by the opening ma?gala ?loka where his guru Vasudevendrayog? is acknowledged]. Also Ved?nta-s?ra vv. 65-69 (Sad?nanda 1974, 46-7), Pa?c?kara?a-v?rtika vv. 33-4 (Sure?var?c?rya and Sarasvat? 1970, 19). 300 For a discussion on ?a?kara?s conception of anta?-kara?a, see Mayeda (1968/69, 225). 301 VP 1.1, 1: vi?aya k? prak??aka jo anta?-kara?a k? aur aj??na k? pari??ma so v?tti kahiye hai. ? j??na-r?pa pari??m te? prak??a hovai hai, t?h? ko v?tti kahai? ha??. 302 From the Advaita perspective, the five elements (mah?-bh?tas, space, air, fire, water, and earth) are modifications of ignorance; for them be perceived, the senses must be in contact with them. 303 Tattv?nusandh?na 2.1: ?A v?tti is a particular modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance that manifests the object- consciousness. Manifestation is the giving rise to direct knowledge or the removal of concealment. v?ttir n?ma vi?aya- caitany?bhivya?jako?nta?kara??j??nayo? pari??ma vi?e?a?. abhivya?jakatva? n?m?parok?a-vyavah?ra-janakatvam ?vara?a-nivartakatva? v?? (Mah?dev?nanda-sarasvat? 1994, 127). 304 The terms pram? and apram? are opposites of each other, yet I have chosen to translate them as ?valid? and ?indirect.? To render pram? as ?direct? to regain the opposition in English results in a weakening of the term pram?, whose primary sense is of validity (from the Skt. ?m?, ?to measure, conclude,? which, prefixed with pra- gives ?to know,? or nominally, ?true, correct knowledge.? Rendering apram? as ?invalid? however would lead to an undesired definitional contradiction that apram? cognitions are both invalid and true. Wherever necessary, I shall remind the reader that pram? means a cognition that is both ?valid? and ?direct? by translating it as ?valid or direct.? 122 cognition (pram??a); anything else is considered indirect. A valid cognition is true Figure 8: Types of v?tti-cognition (preliminary) (yath?rtha); an indirect cognition can be either true or erroneous (bhrama). Indirect cognitions produced by defects (do?a) are termed erroneous, whereas those produced by non- defective means (other than the means of cognition) are termed true. Examples of erroneous cognitions are the cognition of silver in mother-of-pearl resulting from the defect of similarity (s?d??ya) and the cognition of bitterness in sugar resulting from a defect in the liver system. 305 Examples of true, indirect cognitions are: 1) recollections (sm?ti), which are caused by impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior true experiences; 2) the experience of joy or sorrow, which is not caused by any means of cognition but is caused by a modification of the anta?-kara?a?s sattva (purity) and rajas (activity) attributes in conjunction with favorable or unfavorable objects, governed by one?s karma; and 3) ??vara?s cognition, desire and acts, which are caused by the collective karma of all beings and not by means of cognition. 306 This is graphically represented in Figure 8 above as a preliminary classification. Ni?cald?s elaborates on this scheme of valid and indirect cognitions in VP 7, to which we will return shortly (in section 5.5), after looking at the means of valid cognition (pram??a). 305 Technically, a defect in pitta, one of the three ayurvedic humors. 306 What I have translated as karma in two instances here is Ni?cald?s?s reference to dharma and adharma (?dharm?dika nimitta se ? VP 1.1, 2?) in the first instance, and ad???a in the second (VP 1.1, 4). Both instances are implicitly referring to the unseen merits (pu?ya) and demerits (p?pa) of a person. v?tti-cognition (v?tti-j??na ) Valid / Direct (pram?) Indirect (apram?) Pe rc ep tio n (p ra ty ak ?a ) In fe re nc e (a nu m ?n a) V er ba l T es tim on y (? ab da ) A na lo gy (u pa m ?n a) Po st ul at io n (a rt h? pa tti ) N on -c og ni tio n (a nu pa la bd hi ) True (yath?rtha) Erroneous (bhrama) Recollection (sm?ti) Joy & sorrow (sukha-du?kha) I?vara?s cognition (??vara-v?tti-j??na) 123 5.4 The Means of Valid Cognition (Pram??a) in Advaita The goal of VP is to lead the reader to the knowledge of Brahman through the understanding of v?ttis. As just discussed in the preceding section, v?tti-cognitions can be direct and valid (pram?) or indirect. To thoroughly understand v?ttis, one therefore must also understand valid cognitions and their means (pram??a). Ni?cald?s therefore presents the six means of cognition which are also accepted by the Bh???a M?m??sakas: 1) perception (pratyak?a), 2) inference (anum?na), 3) verbal testimony (?abda), 4) analogy (upam?na), 5) postulation (arth?patti) and 6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). He states that, although both the author of the Brahma-s?tra and ?a?kara did not enumerate the means of cognition, Advaita accepts the opinion of the Bh???a M?m??saka system wherever it does not contradict the accepted doctrine (siddh?nta). 307 In the VP, Ni?cald?s first presents the Ny?ya view for each means of cognition (pram??a) in detail and then the differences between the Ny?ya and Advaita perspectives. There is a long history of the various philosophical schools influencing the development of one another?s viewpoints. For example, the Ny?ya proponent Udayana (eleventh c. CE) criticized the Buddhist theories of momentariness and defended the existence of God in his works, Ny?y?-kusum??jali and ?tma-tattva-viveka (Matilal 1977b, 96).308 The Advaitin ?r?har?a (twelfth c.) criticized Udayana?s formulation of Ny?ya in his Kha??ana-kha??a-kh?dya. The Navya-Ny?ya response to ?r?har?a was presented by Ga?ge?a (ca. 1320 CE) in his Tattva-cint?ma?i, although his main focus was on the Pr?bh?kara M?m??s? tenets (King 1999a, 61). From the twelfth century onwards, there arose an ongoing tradition of philosophical disputes between the Naiy?yikas and the M?m??s? schools, and by extension, between the Naiy?yik?s and the Advaita Ved?ntins. The Advaita perspective on the means of cognition had already been treated by Ni?cald?s in VS 4.191- 196. Here each of these individual means of cognition will be described in brief from the Advaita perspective, as presented in VP, along with noteworthy and interesting issues that Ni?cald?s raises. They are presented ranked in descending order of the number of orthodox systems which accept them (VP 4.1, 92). 307 This echoes Bh?rat?t?rtha/Vidy?ra?ya in his Vivara?a-prameya-sa?graha: ?vyavah?re bha??a-naya[?], with regard to empirical matters, the Bha??a system [is adequate]? (Vidy?ra?ya and Taila?ga 1893, 16). On the authorship of this text, see Pahlajrai (2005, 17-35) 308 The Buddhist views were of the dialectician J??na?r? in his ??vara-bha?ga-k?rik? (Plott 1984, 477). 124 5.4.1 Perception (Pratyak?a) Following the Ny?ya system, Ni?cald?s first presents six sense organs (indriya): 1) ears; 2) skin; 3) eyes; 4) tongue; 5) nose; and 6) mind. The perceptual cognition (prayak?a pram?) takes place upon the contact of the appropriate sense organ with its object. Erroneous cognition is described in the Ny?ya fashion, namely the perception of a thing as something else (anyath?-khy?ti).309 When a rope is perceived as a snake, the perceived snake is real, but exists elsewhere; it appears as though before one due to an extraordinary process caused by the memory of a past perception of a real snake. For Ny?ya, ?tm? is the locus (??raya) of all cognition and erroneous cognition is produced by defective senses, but in Ved?nta, the erroneous cognition is not produced by the senses; the anta?-kara?a is both the locus as well its material cause (up?d?na k?ra?a). [The term ?tm?, for Advaita, signifies either the individual self or the absolute self. It can also mean ?the breath.? Often it is evident which sense is intended, but sometimes it may deliberately be ambiguous. Further, for Ny?ya and other philosophical systems, there are subtle differences in what ?tm? connotes. Hence I have chosen to leave this term untranslated]. In Ny?ya, knowledge, desire, effort, happiness, sorrow, hatred, merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are attributes of ?tm?,310 but for Ved?nta these are modifications of the anta?-kara?a and hence its (the anta?-kara?a?s) attributes. Erroneous cognition, for Ved?nta, is not a modification of the anta?-kara?a but of ignorance (avidy?). When a rope is erroneously cognized, the anta?-kara?a goes out the eyes and assumes the rope?s form as ?this?, but it doesn?t take on its rope-ness and other attributes due to defects (do?a). The ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the v?tti in the form of the rope?s ?this- ness? (idam-?k?ra-v?tti-upahita-cetana-stha-avidy?) 311 undergoes modification into snake-, or stick- or garland-form cognition, depending on the defect and impression (sa?sk?ra) in the perceiver. This erroneous cognition is the erroneous perception of an object as something 309 Described in greater detail in section 6.3.5 starting on p. 188. 310 See TS 4,73 (5,59,134-6) 311 The inter-element sandhi is not preserved in the original itself (VP 1.17, 29). 125 else that is neither real nor unreal (anirvacan?ya-khy?ti);312 it is not real like a snake, stick or garland, nor is it unreal, since there is something being seen as ?this? in both cases. 313 Regarding the status of the mind (manas) as a sense-organ, Ni?cald?s is quite catholic. The Ved?ntin V?caspati Mi?ra (900-980 CE314) considers the mind to be a sense-organ315 and happiness and sorrow to be valid cognitions of the mind. For Ved?ntins such as Padmap?da (750 CE) who do not accept the mind as a sense-organ, happiness and sorrow are revealed by the witness-consciousness (s?k??), whereas immediate cognition (aparok?a j??na) is not caused by the sense-organ but arises when there is identity between the v?tti-consciousness and the object-consciousness. This, Ni?cald?s reminds us, has been explained in VS (4.200, 110-11). First, Ni?cald?s raises a series of defects pertaining to V?caspati?s position that the mind is a sense-organ. 1) Unlike each of the other senses, the mind does not have a special object. 2) BhG 3.42 would be violated, where the mind is said to be ?superior to the senses, indriyebhya? para? mana?,? and not included among the senses. 3) All revelation (?ruti) and composed scripture (sm?ti) are in agreement that Brahman is not an object of mind- cognition, but, by accepting the mind as a sense, V?caspati suggests that the direct realization (s?k??tk?ra) of Brahman too is generated by the mind sense-organ, i.e., the realization is mental, which is opposed to scripture. Further, 4) the mind is a state of the anta?-kara?a. By being the locus of immediate cognition, the anta?-kara?a is the agent of cognition, and that which is the agent (kart?), cannot be the instrument (kara?a). [Here, Ni?cald?s is holding fast to the definition of the anta?-kara?a discussed earlier (on p. 120), that it consists of four components, the mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), subconscious (citta), and ego (aha?k?ra)]. Thus, Ni?cald?s concludes that the mind cannot be a sense-organ. 312 Described in greater detail in section 6.3.1, ?Anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da, the Advaita theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate,? starting on p. 138. 313 Usually the word anirvacan?ya is translated as ?indescribable? but it is used to describe that which is logically indeterminate, neither absolutely real nor empirically false. 314 Potter (1999, 632) 315 In his comm. Bh?mat? on BS 2.4.17, V?caspati states ?manasas tv indriyatve sm?ter avagate kvacid indriyebhyo bhedenop?d?na? go-bal?varda-ny?yena. athav? indriy???? vartam?na-m?tra-vi?ayatv?n manasas tu traik?lya-gocaratv?d bheden?bhidh?nam. But being that the sm?ti texts are understood to consider the mind as a sense-organ in places by the difference from the [other] senses, along the lines of the rule of the particular term ?bull? restricting the general term ?cows? [on being mentioned along with it]. Or, being [considered] present among the sense-organs, but being named separately because of the mind having its objects from the past, present and future? (?a?kar?c?rya and Sastri 1938, 647). 126 But Ni?cald?s next states that, on further reflection, these are not truly defects, and he resolves each in turn. 1) Happiness, sorrow, desire are the special (as?dh?ra?a) objects of the mind, and one who is characterized by an anta?-kara?a is called a j?va. 2) In BhG 3.42, indriyas denote external sense organs. Thus, there is no conflict to say that the mind is superior to the external sense organs. 3) Brahman is not an object of the mind. It is not an object of v?tti either, except for the v?tti that removes the concealment [by ignorance].316 Besides, TU 2.9.1317 indicates that Brahman is not an object of verbal testimony (?abda- pram??a) either. Brahman is only the object of the knowledge produced by the secondary signification (lak?a??-v?tti)318 of verbal testimony, and even in that case only in the form of removing the concealment (?vara?a).319 4) The anta?-kara?a can be the agent by virtue of being the locus (??raya) of cognition, and the mind as the modification of anta?-kara?a can be an instrument of valid cognition, and therefore, also a means of cognition (pram??a). Ni?cald?s says, in essence (s?ragr?h? d???i se, VP 1.19), it does not damage one?s understanding of Ved?nta, i.e., one?s knowledge of Brahman, to accept V?caspati?s view that the mind is a sense-organ. 320 Thus, we have the five sense-organs and the mind as the sixth means of perceptual cognition per V?caspati, whereas in Padmap?da?s system, verbal testimony (?abda) is the sixth means, which alone is responsible for direct perceptual knowledge of Brahman. Ni?cald?s seems to suggest that since neither view of the mind hinders a seeker?s attainment of Brahman, one is free to choose the view that personally resonates best. 316 Ni?cald?s provides more details on the role of v?tti in VS 4.211-12, 117-20 317 TU 2.9.1: ?yato v?co nivaratante apr?pya manas? sah, ?nanda? brahma?o vidv?n na bibheti kuta?cana. Words, along with the mind, turn back from Brahman, having failed to attain it; the one who knows the happiness of Brahman fears nothing.? 318 This will be treated in greater detail in section 5.4.3, ?Verbal testimony (?abda).? 319 Ni?cald?s expounds upon this defect at considerably greater length than presented above, considering how mental cognition and verbal testimony can each give rise to knowledge of Brahman, and whether only one pram??a or two are required for direct knowledge of Brahman (VP 1.19, 31-32). 320 This view is echoed over a century later by Athalye et al.: ?[The] controversy seems to be nothing more than a battle of words. So long as all are agreed in distinguishing the mind from the five external [sense] organs, and treating it as an entity by itself, it does not matter whether you call it an indriya or anta?-kara?a-v?tti or anything else. If the mind is an organ, it is an internal organ (antar-indriya) quite distinct from the external organs, while if it is not an organ it is so much akin to one that it shares many of its properties and functions? (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 150). Also see Mayeda?s summary of the issue (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 2:31-3). 127 5.4.2 Inference (Anum?na) From the Ny?ya perspective, the requirements for inferential cognition (anumiti) are: 1) the probandum, or the term to be proven (s?dhya), the object of the inferential cognition, for example, fire on the mountain; 2) the probans or sign (li?ga) by the perception of which the object of inference is cognized, which is also known as the reason (hetu), for example, smoke; and 3) invariable concomitance or co-existence (vy?pti) between the probans and probandum, for example, where there is smoke, there is fire. The sequence of inferential cognition per Ny?ya is as follows. First, the invariable concomitance of the probans (hetu) and probandum (s?dhya) is witnessed. From this the invariable concomitance of the probans and the probandum is ascertained. Next, the probans is perceived in a particular locus (pak?a), say on a mountain, and then the invariable concomitance is recalled. The recollection (par?mar?a) of the perception of the probans qualified by the invariable concomitance of the probandum then occurs. 321 This leads to the inferential cognition that the locus, the mountain, is fire-possessing. In Old (pr?c?na) Ny?ya, the recollection (par?mar?a) itself is inference. There is much variation within the Ny?ya school as to whether recollection is the instrument (kara?a) or the intermediate cause (vy?p?ra) for inferential cognition, but all agree that without recollection no inference (anumiti) occurs. The M?m??sakas, however, consider recollection to be dispensable (anyath?-siddha) and inessential to the cause of inferential cognition. Instead, some M?m??sakas hold that inferential cognition is the memory (sm?ti) of the invariable concomitance, others consider it to be the experience of the invariable concomitance as seen in the particular instance of the kitchen fire, and still others, the knowledge of the probans in the locus. As noted earlier (on p. 123),322 Advaita accepts M?m??s? wherever there is no disagreement. According to the Ved?nta-paribh???, the means (kara?a) is the experience of invariable concomitance (vy?pti), and the latent impressions (sa?sk?ra) that arise either from perceptual cognition or through memory are the intermediate cause (vy?p?ra). 323 But 321 TS 44: ?vy?pti-vi?i??a-pak?a-dharmat?-j??na? par?mar?a?, The knowledge of the locus possessing the property of being qualified by the [probans with the] invariable concomitance [of the probandum] is recollection (par?mar?a).? When the term ?recollection? is used for brevity in the context of inference in this section, this meaning is to be assumed. 322 See n. 307. 323 Ved?nta-paribh???: ?anumiti-kara?a? ca vy?pti-j??nam. tat sa?sk?ro?v?ntara-vy?p?ra?. The instrument of inferential cognition is the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The latent impression of that [knowledge] is the intermediate cause? (Adhvar?ndra 1972, 69). 128 Ni?cald?s holds that the argument is not affected even if one holds that memory is the intermediate cause instead of a latent impression. Even though this would be counter to Ved?nta-paribh??? and other Ved?nta texts, it does not contradict revealed or composed scriptures (?ruti-sm?ti) or the accepted doctrine (siddh?nta) since the scriptures and accepted doctrine are indifferent to whether a latent impression or memory is the intermediate cause or mediate activity (vy?p?ra). Nonetheless, Ni?cald?s suggests that it is actually more logical to accept memory of the invariable concomitance (vy?pti) as the intermediate cause. If the latent impressions of the invariable concomitance were held to be the instrument of inferential cognition, i.e., if inference were to occur due to unmanifest impressions, then even without seeing the smoke on the mountain, one should always infer fire there. Thus, one would be forced to state that manifest latent impressions are the cause of inferential cognition, but manifest latent impressions are nothing other than memory (VP 2.6, 40-1)!324 In Advaita, inference (anum?na) and inferential cognition (anumiti) are of two kinds: a) for oneself (sv?rtha); and b) for another (par?rtha). According to Ny?ya, in the case of inferential cognition for oneself, three cognitions have to occur: 1) perceptual cognition of smoke; 2) memory of its invariable concomitance (vy?pti) by fire; and finally 3) the recollection (par?mar?a) [in the form of the statement (v?kya)], ?the smoke which is pervaded by fire, the mountain possesses that (smoke).? But in Ved?nta, recollection is not accepted as an instrument (kara?a). Instead, without such a recollection that employs a statement, the inferential cognition for oneself (sv?rtha-anumiti) takes place directly from the cognition of invariable concomitance, and its instrument, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, is termed inference for oneself (sv?rth?num?na). Inference for another (par?rtha) occurs when one employs a statement to convince another person. According to Ved?nta, three components are required: 1) thesis (pratij??) as in ?the mountain is smoke-possessing;? 2) reason (hetu), ?because [it has] smoke;? and 3) example (ud?hara?a), ?whatever is smoke-possessing is also fire-possessing, as in a kitchen.? The minor term is the locus (pak?a), for example, mountain, and the object of inferential cognition is the probandum (s?dhya). The location or locus (adhikara?a) refers to 324 Ni?cald?s is somewhat sarcastic towards the author of the Ved?nta-paribh???, Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra (seventeenth c. CE) and its commentary (most likely by his son R?mak???a Adhvarin), with statements such as ?What knowledge one might get from maintaining both [sa?sk?ra and sm?ti] as causes of inference, one should ask Dharmar?ja? (VP 2.6, 41). 129 the place where the desire to know the probandum arises and is then ascertained inferentially to have the probandum. The words that yield cognition of the probans (li?ga) are the reason (hetu). If the opponent is not convinced, for example, he holds that the smoke is not concomitant (vyabhic?r?) with fire on the mountain, then that doubt is resolved via reasoning (tarka). The reasoning to overturn the opponent?s doubt in this example is as follows: there is a cause-effect relation between fire and smoke, and, if one holds smoke to exist without fire, this relation is violated. Hence, the perception of smoke on the mountain gives rise to the inferential cognition of fire on the mountain. In Advaita, inference for the sake of another has an additional function. The identity of the individual (j?va) and Brahman is ascertained through the great Upani?adic statements (mah?-v?kya), i.e., verbal testimony. It can also be proven via inference as follows: 1) j?va is identical to Brahman, 2) because of consciousness; 3) wherever there is consciousness, there is identity with Brahman, for example, as in the case of Brahman. Here the locus (pak?a) is j?va, the probandum (s?dhya) is identity with Brahman, and the probans (hetu) is the state of possessing consciousness (cetanatva). The reasoning (tarka) is as follows. If the consciousness of j?va were not accepted as the reason for the identity with Brahman, the scripture (?ruti) propounding the non-duality of consciousness would be contradicted, which is undesirable for the orthodox systems. Consider the syllogism: 1) The phenomenal world is unreal, 2) because it is negated by knowledge. 3) Whatever is negated by knowledge is unreal, as in the case of the silver perceived in mother-of-pearl. 325 The real cannot be negated by knowledge. If the opponent were to accept negation of the phenomenal world through knowledge but not its unreality, then the scriptural utterances propounding the negation of the entire world would be contradicted. Per Ved?nta, inference by itself is not the cause for self-realization of Brahman because the accepted doctrine (siddh?nta) maintains that, apart from the Ved?nta utterances (v?kya), no other means of knowledge takes up Brahman as its object. Therefore, inference merely serves to bring one closer (sa?bh?van?) to the knowledge of Brahman. 325 vy?vah?rika? prapa?co mithy?, j??na-nivartyatv?t. yatra yatra j??na-nivartyatva? tatra tatra mithy?tvam. yath? ?ukti- rajat?dau (VP 2.9, 44). 130 5.4.3 Verbal Testimony (?abda) As the preceding section suggests, verbal testimony, specifically in the form of the great Upani?adic statements (mah?-v?kya), is the most important means of cognition for Advaita as it alone can provide direct knowledge of Brahman. Ni?cald?s spends more pages on the means of verbal cognition (?abda pram??a ) than on perception and inference combined: 47 pages on ?abda pram??a (VP 3), vs. 29 pages on pratyak?a (VP 1.4-21) and 10 pages on anum?na, (VP 2). 326 In brief, this section comprises the following. After defining verbal cognition and describing the process of cognition via verbal testimony, Ni?cald?s undertakes an examination of the types of significatory function (v?tti) of a word. This is followed by a discussion of the types of implication (lak?a??) that are possible through words. Next, Ni?cald?s presents the two types of verbal cognition, empirical (vy?vah?rika), and absolute (p?ram?rthika), and their further typology, culminating in Ved?nta statements that are either subsidiary (av?ntara) or the ?great sayings? (mah?-v?kya), the purpose of both being the knowledge of Brahman. The form of implication by which the mah?-v?kyas are comprehended is discussed, as well as the six characteristics (?a?-li?ga) of the intent (t?tparya) of Vedic statements. The four accessories (sahak?r?) to verbal cognition are also presented. Ni?cald?s next discusses the method of resolution of potential conflicts between two means of cognition (pram??a) and asserts that the means for the more strongly desired object wins out. Lastly, the possibility for the Ved?nta statements to possess intent (t?tparya), given that the Vedas are not eternal, is examined. Let us look at verbal testimony in greater detail. Ni?cald?s defines verbal cognition (??bd? pram?) as knowledge of the relationships among the meanings of the words, or knowledge of the meanings and of the relationships among the words.327 The means of verbal cognition (?abda pram??a) is defined as the knowledge of all the words in a sentence qualified by their significatory function (v?tti). 328 Cognition through verbal testimony is said to function as follows. When one hears the words of a sentence, such as ?the pot is blue,? the individual words trigger latent impressions 326 The next two means of cognition (pram??a) also collectively get only 18 pages: 10 pages on analogy (upam?na, VP 4), and 8 pages on postulation (arth?patti, VP 5). Only non-cognition (anupalabdhi, VP 6) gets a significantly more detailed treatment, 87 pages. 327 VP 3.7, 54: ? pad?rthan ke sambandh k? j??n athav? sambandh-sahit pad?rthan k? j??n v?ky?rth-j??n kahiye hai au ??bd? pram? kahiye hai. 328 VP 3.7, 54: v?tti-vi?i?ta sakal padan k? j??n ?abda-pram??a hai. More on v?tti as ?significatory function? shortly. 131 that give rise to the memory of the meaning of the words, which in turn gives rise to the knowledge signified by each word independently. Then, the relationship between the individual words is known, providing the understanding of the sentence, for example, ?the pot has identity with the color blue.? The significatory function (v?tti) of a word is a special form of v?tti discussed earlier in this chapter. The significatory function, defined as the mutual relation between a word and its meaning, 329 is of two types: 1) a direct significatory relation (?akti-v?tti); and 2) an indirect or implied significatory relation (lak?a??-v?tti). The primary function of a word (?akti, also ?power?), according to Ny?ya, occurs as a result of ??vara?s will, while the M?m??sakas consider it a separate entity. According to Pata?jali (the grammarian) and the Ma?j??? text,330 the primary function of a word (?akti) is the identity-relation between a word and its meaning as signifier and signified. According to Advaita, ?akti is the capacity (s?marthya) of a word to evoke knowledge either directly or indirectly through the memory of its own meaning. 331 The meaning denoted by the word?s ?akti is called its literal meaning (?aky?rtha, or simply ?akya). The implied significatory relation (lak?a??-v?tti) is the relation of the word to an indirect (parampar?) meaning. Such a meaning is called the implied meaning or connotative sense (lak?y?rtha, or simply lak?ya). For example, in the sentence, ?the village of the cow herders is on the Ganga,? 332 the literal meaning (?akya) of the word ?Ganga? is the river, but in this context, the implied meaning (lak?ya) is better suited, i.e., the bank of the river since the village cannot literally be on the river. Essentially, where the literal meaning of the word is not suited to the intent of the speaker, it is appropriate to consider the implied meaning. In addition to the direct and indirect significatory relations (?akti- and lak?a??-v?tti respectively), some hold that there are two additional relations. 3) Attributive signification (gau??-v?tti) occurs when the word signifies the attribute or quality that is possessed by the meaning directly signified. In the sentence ?Devadatta is a lion,? the attributes of strength (??rat?), etc., possessed by a lion are ascribed to Devadatta. This can easily be subsumed under indirect signification. 4) Allusive or suggestive signification (vya?jan?-v?tti) occurs 329 VP 3.2, 46: pad artha k? jo ?pas me? sambandh t?k?? v?tti kahai? hai?. 330 The Ma?j??? is a commentary by K???a Bha??a on the ?aktiv?da by Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya (1927) who fl. ca. 1700 CE. 331 VP 3.3, 47: padan mai? apne artha ke j??na k? s?marthya h? ?akti hai. ? pada-j??na mai? pad?rtha k? sm?ti k? ?akti hai. jah?? pada k? dhva?sa huy? hai, tah?? bh? pada k? smara?a-r?pa j??na hai. jah?? vartam?na pada hai, tah?? pada k? ?rava?a-s?k??tk?ra j??na hai. 332 ga?g?y?? gho?a?, a stock example. 132 when there is an allusion to the implied meaning. For example, when a person tells his friend who is going for a meal to an enemy?s house, ?Eat poison!? 333 since poison as directly signified is not fit for consumption, the intended meaning is allusive: ?Do not eat [at an enemy?s house].? Ny?ya texts typically also subsume allusive implication under indirect signification. 334 On the basis of the relation between the literal (?akya) and implied (lak?ya) meanings, implication (lak?a??) is of two kinds. 1) Bare implication (kevala-lak?a??) occurs when the implied meaning is directly connected to the literal meaning, as in the case of ?bank? and ?river.? 2) Indirect or double implication (lak?ita-lak?a??) occurs when the implied meaning is indirectly connected to the literal meaning. Here, the example is ?dvirepho rauti, the two- repha-ed one buzzes.? Repha denotes the Sanskrit consonant ?ra? and ?two-repha? directly signifies two ?ra? consonants, but indirectly signifies the word ?bhramara,? Sanskrit for ?bee,? which in turn signifies the honey-making insect.335 Implication can also be classified into three types, depending upon the extent to which the literal meaning (?akya) of the word is retained or given up in the implied meaning (lak?ya). 1) Exclusive implication (jahal-lak?a??) occurs when the literal meaning is given up and the implied meaning is considered instead. This is the case in examples like ?The village is on the river,? and ?Eat poison.? 2) Inclusive implication (ajahal-lak?a??) occurs when the literal meaning as well as the implied meaning are intended, as in the example ?Protect the curds from the crows.?336 The speaker?s intent is the protection of the meal; hence, cats and other creatures that may ruin the curds are also implied by the term ?crows.? Or, in the sentence, ?The parasol-bearers come,?337 the term ?parasol-bearers? also implies the parasols that are being carried. 3) Both inclusive and exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga- lak?a??)338 occurs when a part of the literal meaning is preserved while the rest is given up. 333 vi?a? bhu?k?va. 334 VP 3.10, 61-2. Examples of allusive signification have been discussed by Mamma?a (2002), Govindabha??a (a.k.a. Govinda?hakkura) (1982) and others in texts on poetics. Discussion on whether it is appropriate to subsume allusive signification under indirect signification has been skipped here. Ni?cald?s merely presents an argument in favor since it does not impact the Advaita end (siddh?nta, 62). 335 Another stock example for lak?ita-lak?a?? is the one seen earlier as an example of attributive signification: ?si?ho devadatta?, Devadatta is [as brave as] a lion.? See VP 3.8, 55-61 for a more complex discussion on this issue. 336 k?kebhyo dadhi rak?yat?m. 337 chatri?o y?nti. 338 Another term for this is jahad-ajahal-lak?a??. 133 In the sentence, ?This is that Devadatta,?339 the word ?that? indicates a non-proximate entity, while ?this? indicates a proximate entity. Since they are in grammatical apposition and the identity of proximity and non-proximity is not possible, one has to give up the proximate meaning of ?this? and the non-proximate meaning of ?that? while preserving the ?entity? meaning, to get the intended identity, namely, that both words refer to the same person, Devadatta. Each of these three forms of implication can be further sub-divided. 1) Productive implication (prayojanavat? lak?a??) refers to cases in which the implied meaning (lak?ya) is more fruitful than the literal meaning. The sentence, ?The village is on the bank? lacks the sense of the bank being cool, holy, etc. conveyed by the sentence, ?The village is on the Ganga.? 2) Conventional implication (nir??ha-lak?a??) refers to cases in which the literal meaning is not used but a secondary meaning, which is known to all, is accepted.340 In the sentence, ?The pot is blue,? the literal meaning of ?blue,? is the color blue, but secondarily it also implies the substance possessing that color. The literal meaning is forsaken in favor of the implied meaning which is understood conventionally, i.e., the pot is blue-color- possessing. 341 There are two types of verbal cognition (??bd? pram?): 1) empirical (vy?vah?rika); and 2) absolute (p?ram?rthika). Empirical verbal cognition is further sub-divided into two types: 1a) produced by worldly sentences (laukika-v?kya-janya); and 1b) produced by Vedic sentences (vaidika-v?kya-janya) (VP 3.1, 45). Vedic sentences are also of two types: 1b.1) those teaching about empirical meanings; and 1b.2) those teaching about the absolute reality, Brahman (VP 3.5, 52). According to Ni?cald?s, all Ved?nta statements explain Brahman which is neither to be sought nor avoided, and do not explain meanings subordinate to Vedic prescriptions and prohibitions (VP 3.16, 78).342 Sentences that teach about Brahman 339 so?yam devadatta?. 340 ?nir??hatva? n?ma prayoga-pr?cury?n mukhyavad bh?nam, Conventionality is the perception [of a secondary sense of a word] as primary due to currency of usage.? Amal?nanda Sarasvat??s Kalpataru sub-comm. to BS Bh?mat? (?a?kar?c?rya and Sastri 1938, 13). 341 Ni?cald?s also mentions in passing Arbitrary Implication (aicchika lak?a??) where there is the use of a word according to the author?s desire, contrary to the literal or conventional meanings. Texts on poetics do not mention this form of implication but Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya and others have considered it. Their mention of arbitrary implication is only to state its possibility, but should not be interpreted as approval. Its use is frowned on by all. Mamma?a and others write about this and many other forms of implication, but these are not described in any Ved?nta texts as they are not considered useful to a seeker (jij??su) (VP 3.11, 65-6). 342 sakala ved?nta-v?kya aheya anup?deya brahma ke bodhaka hai?, vidhi?e?a artha ke bodhaka nah??. 134 are further subdivided into two categories: 1) ?great sayings? (mah?-v?kya) such as ?tat tvam asi, you are that (CU 6.8.7),? which explain the identity between the words ?you? and ?that;?343 and 2) subsidiary statements (av?ntara-v?kya), which pertain to the meaning of either the word ?that (tat)? [Brahman], or to the word ?you (tvam),? for example, ?satya? j??nam ananta? brahma, Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite (TU 2.1.1)? explains the word ?that? and ?ya e?a h?dy antarjyoti? puru?a?, the person is the inner light within the heart (BU 4.3.7)? explains the word ?you.? Ni?cald?s uses these various forms of implication to describe the comprehension of the great sayings (mah?-v?kya). For example, he holds that only the third type, both inclusive and exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a??) applies. He elaborates on this further in VS 6.433-8, 269-72: In the mah?-v?kya context, the literal meaning of ?that (tat)? is that which is all-powerful, all-knowing, pervasive, the inciter (preraka) of all, independent, indirect (parok?a), possessor of m?y? [the indeterminate and ultimately unreal creative power that manifests the empirical world, a term that will be left untranslated], free from bondage and liberation. The literal meaning of ?you (tvam)? is that which has the opposite of all the stated properties of ??vara, namely, j?va-consciousness with little power, little knowledge, delimited, not ??vara, dependent on karma, deluded by ignorance, having bondage and liberation, directly perceived. Since the literal meanings of tat and tvam are in direct opposition, the need arises for implication (lak?a??) to resolve their apposition. However, in understanding mah?-v?kyas, neither exclusive (jahat) nor inclusive (ajahat) implication alone is appropriate. The sole object of knowledge of all of Ved?nta is the witness- consciousness, i.e., Brahman-consciousness, which pervades the literal sense (v?cya), of tvam and tat respectively, and, if these are excluded through exclusive implication (jahal- lak?a??), what is other than consciousness is unreal, inert, etc., and will not establish liberation. Inclusive implication (ajahal-lak?a??) is also not applicable here because the literal meanings [of tat and tvam] are in opposition, and, if nothing is given up, the opposition remains. Hence, through both inclusive and exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga- lak?a??), the opposing qualities of j?va and ??vara are excluded, resulting in the identity of 343 There are four Great Sayings, mah?-v?kyas, one from each of the Vedas: 1) praj??na? brahma, Consciousness is Brahman (AiU 3.1.1, RV), 2) aha? brahm?smi, I am Brahman (BU 1.4.10, YajV), 3) tat tvam asi, You are that (CU 6.8.7, SV) and 4) ayam ?tm? brahma, This Self is Brahman (M?U 2, AV). All express the identity of ?tm? and Brahman. 135 the pure, unattached consciousness. Further, the verbal cognition of the mah?-v?kyas occurs through bare implication (kevala-lak?a??), as there is a direct relation between the literal meaning and the implied meaning, namely, consciousness. Such verbal cognition of the mah?-v?kyas is also conventional implication (nir??ha-lak?a??), because it is the eternal intent of ??vara that seekers get to know the impartite Brahman through the mah?-v?kyas344 (VP 3.13, 68). 345 The intent (t?tparya) of Vedic statements is determined in relation to six characteristics (?a?-li?ga): 1) the consistency of the introduction and conclusion (upakrama upasa?h?ra k? ekar?pat?); 2) repetition (abhy?sa); 3) originality (ap?rvat?); 4) result (phala); 5) praise (arthav?da); and 6) demonstration (upapatti).346 Ni?cald?s uses CU 6 as an example to further explain these characteristics. 1) The introduction (CU 6.2.1) states, ?In the beginning, son, there was only being, one alone, without a second,?347 and the conclusion states, ?All this has that as the self. That is truth. That is the self. You are that, ?vetaketu.?348 Both the introduction and the conclusion consistently state the same point regarding non-dual Brahman. 2) The CU 6 passage repeats ?You are that? nine times, to reinforce the non- duality of Brahman. 3) Originality is that which cannot be known by any other means, and Brahman is not the object of any means of cognition other than the verbal testimony of the Upani?ads. 4) The result is the cessation of sorrow and delusion along with the root knowledge of Brahman. 5) Praise of the knowledge of Brahman is clear in the Upani?ads. 349 6) Demonstration is the use of reasoning (yukti) to support the stated goal. CU 6 is full of many examples and analogies which demonstrate the identity of the cause and effect. Thus, the intent of Ved?nta statements is non-dual Brahman, and the knowledge of the meaning of these words is reached through verbal testimony (VP 3.17, 79-80). 344 It is typical of Advaita metaphysics to hold that the Vedas are without human authorship, that they are without beginning and infallible. If an author has to be ascribed, it is ??vara, the omniscient creator, who is just Brahman personified by the creative powers due to the collective ignorance of all beings. The Upani?ads are a part of the Vedas, literally the end of the Vedas or Ved?nta, and the mah?-v?kyas are from the Upani?ads. 345 VP 3.13-16, 68-79 deal with refutation of various challenges to the presented view of mah?-v?kya implication, including criticisms of the Ved?nta-paribh??? position, the M?m??s? & Ny?ya views, and of the ancient commentators (pr?c?na v?ttik?ra, traditionally understood to be Bhart?prapa?ca, Bh?skara and other pre-?a?kara commentators). 346 This is succinctly stated in a verse quoted in Ved?nta-s?ra 184: upakramopasa?h?r?v-abhy?so?p?rvat?-phalam; arthav?dopapatt? ca li?ga? t?tparyanir?aye (Sad?nanda 1974, 105). 347 CU 6.2.1: sad eva somyedam agra ?s?d ekam ev?dvit?yam. 348 CU 6.16.3: etad?tmyam ida? sarvam. tat satyam. sa ?tm?. tattvam asi ?vetaketo iti. 349 An example (not stated by Ni?cald?s) would be CU 6.1.3: ?uta tam ?de?am apr?k?yo yen??ruta? ?ruta? bhavaty amata? mata? avij??ta? vij??tam iti. Surely you must have asked about the teaching by which what was unheard of becomes heard, what was unthought of becomes thought of, what was unknown becomes known.? 136 There are four accessories (sahak?r?) to verbal cognition. 1) Expectancy (?k??k??) is the property of a word, when heard, to arouse the expectation of another word to follow it. In the sentence, ?ayam eti putro r?j?a? puru?o?pasaryat?m, literally: ?, once one hears the word ?r?j?a? (of the king)? follow ?son,? there is no longer an expectancy for any other word to follow, so one does not associate the genitive ?r?j?a? (of the king)? with the following word to subsequently form ?remove the king?s man,? but instead understands, ?remove the man.? 350 2) Compatibility (yogyat?) is relation between the meanings of two words so as to provide verbal cognition. In the sentence ?He sprinkles with fire, vahnin? si?cati) there is an incompatibility between the act of sprinkling and fire, and hence no verbal cognition arises. 3) Intention (t?tparya) is the intent of the utterer. The sentence ?saindhava ?naya, bring saindhava? is ambiguous, as the word saindhava can mean either ?salt,? that which is derived from the sea, sindhu, or ?horse,? a particular breed found in the Sindh region, and as a result the intent of the speaker cannot be divined. But, if the sentence were to be uttered at the time of a meal, it would be understood to mean ?salt,? and if uttered at the time of departure, then ?horse? would be intended. 351 4) Proximity (?satti) is typically defined by Ny?ya as the contiguity of the words, but Ni?cald?s provides a revised definition: proximity is the memory of the uninterrupted meanings of words in relation to the signification (v?tti) of the compatible (yogya) words. Thus, the cause of verbal cognition is the knowledge of the expectancy (?k??k??-j??na), compatibility (yogyat?-j??na), and intention (t?tparya-j??na) of the words, as well as their inherent proximity (?satti-svar?pa). The four are collectively called the apparatus for verbal cognition (?abda-s?magr?). Next, Ni?cald?s takes up the case of the potential conflict between two means of cognition, such as perception (pratyak?a) and verbal testimony (?abda). It is accepted that two cognitions pertaining to the same object or cognizer (sam?n?dhikara?a 352) cannot occur 350 The example that Ni?cald?s provides here is different from the typical one usually supplied in this context: When one hears the word ?bring (?naya)? the expectancy is aroused as to ?bring what??, which can be satisfied by the word ?cow (g?m).? 351 Ni?cald?s raises the doubts as to whether a parrot?s utterance can have intention, or the Vedas which are eternal and without author, particularly for the M?m??sakas whose metaphysics does not accept ??vara, or verses composed by a silent sage (maun?). He disagrees with the views of N?goj? Bha??a?s (1670-1750) [Vaiy?kara??-siddh?nta-laghu-]Ma?j???, (1925), Prak???tman?s (11th c.) Vivara?a (Padmap?d?c?rya et al. 1985), Dharmar?ja?s (1550-1650) Ved?nta-paribh??? (Adhvar?ndra 1972) and others on these matters. These discussions have not been presented here (VP 3.18, 81-84). 352 sam?n?dhikara?a is defined as [multiple] v?ttis in one adhikara?a, substratum (VP3.20, 89). 137 at the same instant. Where the eyes perceive a pot on the ground at the same time that the sentence ?the ground is pot-possessing, gha?avad bh?talam,? is heard, the stronger means of cognition will win out, which in this case is perception. But in the case where, just as the eyes are perceiving the pot on the ground, one hears the sentence, ?A son has been born to you, putras te j?ta?,? the pot is not cognized in that instance, but instead the knowledge of the son?s birth occurs since the verbal cognitive apparatus is dominant. The desire to know (jij??s?) is what sways the balance. Where there is the desire to know both objects, the cognitive apparatus for the object which is more greatly desired to be known (utka?a- jij??sita) will be dominant. The desire to know worldly things (laukika pad?rtha) and the apparatus for their cognition is always possible in the waking state, and such worldly things will be cognized, because, in the absence of a desire to know Brahman, the apparatus for the knowledge of Brahman will be obstructed. Therefore, to obstruct the apparatus of the cognition of worldly things, such as perception and the rest, one needs a greater desire to know Brahman. This indeed is the intent (t?tparya) of BS 1.1.1, ?ath?to brahma jij??s?, Thereafter, therefore, the desire to know Brahman.? Ni?cald?s suggests that although the implied sense (lak?a??) of the term ?desire to know (jij??s?)? suggests that the contemplation of the meaning of the Vedas is to be performed, the literal meaning (v?cy?rtha) of the term is that the desire to know Brahman is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman, and that is the preferred meaning (VP 3.19,86-7). 353 Ni?cald?s holds that the intent (t?tparya) of the Ved?nta statements is not injunctions for meditation or worship (up?san?-vidhi)354 but rather the knowledge of non-dual Brahman, as is conveyed by the six characteristics (?a?-li?ga) described earlier. 355 The M?m??sakas hold that the Vedas are eternal and without author; hence, they cannot function as the object of intent. The Naiy?yikas hold that the Vedas are authored by humans (pauru?eya) and therefore finite and transient (k?a?ika), being only a collection of syllables (var?a- 353 Ni?cald?s explains that the same word cannot convey the knowledge of both the literal and implied meanings in a sentence, as in the example, ?The fish and the village of the cow herders is on/in the Ganga, ga?g?y?? m?na-gho?au.? He further suggests that multiple meanings of an aphorism (s?tra) are its adornment (bh??a?a), and hence multiple authors have provided multiple interpretations. However, he elects to not examine whether the term jij??s? can alternately also imply the sense of an injunction (vidhi), to avoid further protractedness of this [VP] text (grantha k? v?ddhi, VP 3.19, 87-8). 354 The M?m??saka viewpoint is that all Vedic statements are either injunctions for acts (vidhi), statements further explaining the injunctions (artha-v?da), or declarative statements (mantra). Thus, they consider the Upani?ad statements as injunctions for meditation/contemplation/worship (up?san?). 355 To back this assertion, Ni?cald?s refers to BS ?Bh 1.1.4, the samanvaya-s?tra, which states that Brahman is the purport of the Upani?ads. 138 samud?ya), sounds which last for only two instants before perishing in the third. After presenting the Ny?ya position at considerable length (VP 3.20, 88-91), Ni?cald?s gives the Ved?nta view that the Vedas are not eternal, because revealed scripture (?ruti) itself has described its creation. 356 According to Ved?nta, everything other than consciousness (cetana) is not eternal (anitya), including the Vedas. But the Vedas are not transient, because they are created by ??vara via a mere intention (sa?kalpa) at the beginning of creation,357 as effortlessly as breathing. Similar to the Ny?ya view, the Vedas and the Mah?bh?rata, etc., can be considered humanly authored, however, in Ved?nta, Vy?sa [author of the Mah?bh?rata] and the others are omniscient. Further, ??vara recalls the Vedas and reproduces them faithfully from creation to creation, whereas Vy?sa and the other authors create their works according to their desire in each creation, and these created works are not necessarily identical to those of a prior creation. Thus, the Vedas, being a creation of ??vara, can have an intent, which is reproduced faithfully and eternally, from creation to creation, and this intent is the knowledge of Brahman (VP 3.20, 88-92). 5.4.4 Analogy (Upam?na) Typically, verbal cognition is treated after analogy, but Ni?cald?s presents the means of cognition in the order of their acceptance by the most systems. Since verbal cognition is accepted by S??khya, but analogy is not, analogy is given fourth place after verbal cognition in Ni?cald?s?s listing. According to Ny?ya, analogical cognition (upamiti) is the knowledge of the word?s literal meaning as denoted by a particular object.358 The typical example is: When one hears the word ?gavaya,?359 but does not know what it means and is told by another that a gavaya resembles a cow, at a later time on seeing an animal resembling a cow and recalling the earlier description, one concludes, ?This is a gavaya.? There are differences between the old (pr?c?na) and new (navya) Naiy?yikas, as to the means (kara?a) and 356 The origin of the Vedas is described in the puru?a-s?kta, Hymn to the Cosmic Person, RV 10.90.9: ?tasm?d yaj??t sarvahuta ?ca? s?m?ni jaj?ire; chand??si jaj?ire tasm?d yajus tasm?d aj?yata. From that [sacrifice of the Cosmic Person] arose the ?g and S?ma verses, the [Vedic] meters and Yajus [sacrificial] formulae.? John Muir gives other descriptions of the origin of the Vedas in the AV, the Br?hma?as and the Upani?ads (1967, 3-5). 357 The Hindu view is that creation (s???i) is cyclic, followed by a period of sustainment (sthiti) then dissolution (laya), only to repeat indefinitely. 358 sa?j?? me? sa?j?? k? v?cyat? k? j??na upamiti kahiye hai (VP 4.1, 92). Another way of describing this: ?sa?j??- sa?j?i-sambandha-j??nam upamiti, upamiti is the knowledge of the meaning relation between a word and the thing denoted by it? (TS 58). 359 A gavaya is a species of ox, bos gavaeus (MW, s.v.). It is a wild species, similar to a cow, but lacking a dewlap. 139 intermediate cause or mediate activity (vy?p?ra) of analogical cognition, which we will not go into here. Knowledge through analogy can also occur through knowledge of dissimilarity (vaidharmya). Analogy is understood differently in Ved?nta. When one sees a gavaya, the perceptual cognition arises, ?This animal is like a cow,? subsequent to which arises the cognition, ?My cow is similar to this animal.? The cognition of similarity in the cow to the gavaya, born of the cognition of similarly between the gavaya and the cow, is termed analogical cognition (upamiti). There is no mediate activity (vy?p?ra) involved here. Analogical cognition through the knowledge of dissimilarity is not traditionally accepted. In an earlier work (VS 4.194, 107), Ni?cald?s had presented analogical cognition along the lines of Ny?ya, because it does not conflict with the Ved?nta perspective. In fact, Ni?cald?s proposes that it provides examples that support the accepted doctrine (siddh?nta). When one asks, ?What is the meaning of the word ??tm??? after receiving the teacher?s answer, ??tm? is different from the body, etc. (deh?di-vaidharmyav?n ?tm?),? one subsequently reflects in solitude and arrives at the analogical cognition that the literal meaning (v?cya) of the word ??tm?? is that which is different from the transient, impure body that is suffering: it is eternal, pure, the nature of happiness. If one accepts the Ved?nta definition, a seeker (jij??su) will find no favorable examples, given that there is nothing similar to ?tm?. It might be argued that an analogy based on similarity which is helpful for a seeker is possible: ??tm? is similar to space (?k??a), unattached, etc.? However, the most advanced seeker (uttama jij??su) will eventually arrive at the firm conclusion that the entire creation, including space is like a mirage,360 momentarily seen and then it vanishes (d???a- na??a-svabh?va), and hence ?tm? is different from it all. Such a seeker will not find a favorable analogical example. Therefore, a better definition of analogical cognition is that which arises from the cognition of either similarity or dissimilarity. 361 Thus, analogy (upam?na) is the cognition of dissimilarity in the empirical world (prapa?ca) from Brahman, and its result is the analogical cognition (upamiti), that Brahman is dissimilar to the creation. 360 Lit. gandharva-nagara, an imaginary city in the sky. 361 Ni?cald?s goes on to defend his definition of analogical cognition and take the author of Ved?nta-paribh???, Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra (1550-1650 CE) and his son R?mak???a D?k?ita (1625-1700 CE, author of ?ikh?ma?i commentary on Ved?nta- paribh???) (Thangaswami 1980, 279, 380), respectively, to task for inconsistencies in their position in this regard (VP 4.5, 96-8). This is followed by a discussion on the technical differences (p?ribh??ika bheda) in the Ny?ya and Ved?nta definitions of analogical cognition, and further faults in the Ved?nta-paribh??? commentary (VP 4.6, 98-100). 140 5.4.5 Postulation (Arth?patti) Unlike the prior four means of cognition, Ny?ya does not accept postulation (arth?patti)362 as an independent means of cognition, but instead considers it an inference of the negative (vyatirekin) type. Ny?ya classifies inferences into three types. 1) An inference for which an example of concurrence of the probandum (s?dhya) and the probans (hetu) is not available; instead only negative examples of the concurrence of the absence of the probans and the absence of the probandum are available. Such an inference is called a purely negative (kevala-vyatirekin) inference; for example, ?Of the five elements, 363 none that is not different from the other elements has odor; earth has odor, and hence it is different from the other elements.?364 This inference has no positive example other than earth that satisfies it. 2) An inference for which a negative example of concurrence of the absence of the probandum and the absence of the probans is not available; instead only positive examples of the concurrence of the probans and the probandum are available. Such an inference is called a purely positive (keval?nvayin) inference; for example, ?Any object that is knowable has a name; a pot is knowable, hence it is nameable.?365 This inference has no negative example that is both unnamable and unknowable. 3) An inference where both positive and negative examples are available is called a positive and negative (anvaya-vyatireka) inference; for example, ?Where there is fire, there is smoke; there is smoke on the mountain, and hence the mountain has fire.?366 A positive example is a kitchen, while a negative example is a lake. Ved?nta accepts only the third, positive and negative (anvaya-vyatireka) type as inference proper. Purely positive (keval?nvayin) inferences are not possible in Ved?nta because there is an absence of everything in Brahman. Purely negative (kevala-vyatirekin) inferences based on the invariable concomitance of absences do not really qualify as inference; they form the separate means of cognition, namely, postulation (arth?patti). However, Ni?cald?s suggests that cognition can arise either by purely negative inference or through postulation, depending upon the manner in which the reflexive cognition 362 Also rendered as ?implication,? ?supposition,? or ?presumption.? 363 Space, air, fire, water, earth (?k??a, v?yu, agni, ?pa?, p?thiv?). 364 p?thiv? itara-bhedavat? gandhatv?t. 365 gha?a? pada-?aktim?n j?eyatv?t. 366 parvato vahnim?n dh?m?t. 141 (anuvyavas?ya) occurs.367 With regard to the above example regarding earth being different from the other elements because it possesses odor, the reflexive cognition can be either ?Due to the earth?s property of odor, I infer that earth is different from the other elements,?368 or ?Due to the inapplicability of the property of odor [to the other elements], I postulate that earth is different from these elements.?369 The term postulation (arth?patti) denotes both the means (pram??a) and the cognition (pram?). The means of postulation (arth?patti pram??a) is the cognition of that which is to be explained (upap?dya), it (the means of postulation) is the cause of the explaining hypothesis (upap?daka kalpan?); the cognition via postulation (arth?patti pram?) is the cognition of the explanation (upap?daka). 370 For example, in the case of a person who does not eat during the day, yet grows fatter, this condition is not possible unless he is eating at night. His fatness is the phenomenon to be explained (upap?dya), and that without which it (the upap?dya) would not exist is its explanation (upap?daka), namely, eating at night. Here Ni?cald?s raises a doubt that postulation as defined above is not different from inference. As presented, the probandum (vy?paka) has the property of being the explanation (upap?dakat?), and the probans (vy?pya) has the property of having to be explained (upap?dyat?). By the definition of the postulation as means, the cognition of the probans is the cause of the cognition of the probandum. This is precisely the definition of inference, and hence they would be identical. In reply, Ni?cald?s states that when the two cognitions, namely, 1) fatness is the probans (vy?pya) of eating at night, and 2) Devadatta possesses the property of fatness, occur together, when the cognition of eating at night occurs, this cognition is inferential: ?On account of fatness, I infer [the fact of] eating at night.?371 But when the cognition of eating at night occurs subsequent to the cognition that for a person who does not eat during the day, fatness is unproven (anupapatti) unless he eats at night, and it is a postulation cognition: ?Due to the lack of proof of fatness, I postulate eating at night.?372 Thus, the postulation of an explanation by the cognition of the lack of proof of that 367 Here, Ni?cald?s appears to be agreeing with the views of R?mak???a D?k?ita, the author of the Ved?nta-paribh??? commentary, ?ikh?ma?i (Dharmar?j?dhvari?ndra, R?mak?s?n??dhvarin, and Amarad?sa 2000, 342-3; Datta 1990, 187-8). 368 gandhena itara-bhedam p?thivy?m anuminomi (VP 5.2, 105). 369 gandh?nupapattya itara-bheda? p?thivy?m anuminomi (VP 5.2, 105). 370 Ni?cald?s provides that sa?p?daka and sa?p?dya are synonyms of upap?daka and upap?dya (VP 5.3, 105). 371 sthaulyena r?tri-bhojanam anuminomi (VP 5.3, 106). 372 sth?lat?nupatty? r?tri-bhojana? kalpay?mi (VP 5.3, 106). 142 which is to be explained is called the cognition via postulation, and its cause, the lack of proof of that which is to be explained, is called the means of postulation. 373 Postulation is of two types: 1) postulation from what is seen (d????rth?patti); and 2) postulation from what is heard (?rut?rth?patti). The cognition of eating at night for one who grows fatter yet does not eat during the day is postulation from the seen, since the fatness is perceived. When the explanation is conceived by the cognition of the lack of proof of that which is heard and needs to be explained, it is termed postulation from the heard. On hearing the sentence, ?Devadatta who is not at home is alive,?374 one conceives of Devadatta?s existence as being external to the house on the basis of the lack of proof of Devadatta?s being alive while not being at home. Postulation from the heard is further subdivided as 2a) lack of the verbal expression (abhidh?n?nupapatti), and 2b) lack of something implied (abhihit?n?nupapatti). On hearing the word ?[the] door? uttered, there is a lack of an additional word ?shut? which has to be supplied (adhy?h?ra) to the intent of the speaker by a logical connection (anvaya); this is termed ?lack of the verbal expression.? When the entire sentence being heard is without meaning unless additional meaning is supplied, this is termed ?lack of something implied.? When one hears the Vedic injunction, ?One who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice,? this phrase lacks meaning without conceiving of the concept of ?the unseen potency of one?s deeds? (ap?rva). Since the sacrifice cannot effect attainment of heaven immediately when it is performed, the unseen potency has to be postulated. Postulation is useful375 for understanding the meaning of Upani?adic statements such as ?tarati ?okam ?tmavit, one who knows the ?tm? transcends sorrow? (CU 7.1.3). The cessation of sorrow through knowledge is heard, but there is no implied ?illusoriness of sorrow? (?oka-mithy?tva). The illusoriness of sorrow is the explanation (upap?daka); the cessation of sorrow through knowledge is that which is to be explained (upap?dya). This is 373 The term arth?patti, in the case of arth?patti-pram? is explained as a genitive tatpuru?a compound, ?arthasya ?patti,? the ?patti=kalpan?, conception, of the artha=upap?daka, the explanation. In the case of arth?patti-pram??a, it is explained as a bahuvr?hi compound, ?arthasya ?pattir yasm?t,? that due to which the conception of the explanation [occurs], i.e., the cognition of the lack of proof of that which is to be explained. 374 g?he?sat devadatto j?vati (VP 5.3, 106). The text has been emended from asan to asat per Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 5.3). 375 Postulation (arth?patti) also is very useful in Advaita for explaining experienced events, and in supposing unperceived principles to explain the empirical world, such as the six things without beginning [1) j?va; 2) ??vara; 3) pure consciousness; 4) m?y?; 5) the difference between j?va and ??vara; and, 6) the relation between m?y? and pure consciousness], the power (?akti) possessed by objects that explains their efficacy, the law of karma and the existence of ??vara for apportioning the results of karma (Datta 1990, 206). 143 an explanation of postulation from what is heard. In the case of the identity of j?va and Brahman as found in the Great Sayings (mah?-v?kya), such identity would be possible only if the difference were at the level of conditioning by the ?limiting adjuncts?376 (aup?dhika bheda). Therefore, the cognition of the difference being at the level of conditioning by the limiting adjuncts caused by the lack of proof (anupapatti) of the identity of j?va and Brahman is produced by the means of postulation. The identity of j?va and Brahman is perceptible to a wise person but only heard of by all others, so in this case it is an example of both postulation from what is seen and from what is heard. In the case of mother-of-pearl mistaken as silver, the negation of silver is perceptible but is not possible without the illusoriness of silver. Thus, the illusoriness of silver is conceived of from the lack of a proof of the negation; this is an example of postulation from the seen. After the mind is stilled (vilaya) during non-conceptual one-pointedness (nirvikalpa sam?dhi), only non-dual Brahman remains, and there is the absence of all experience of non-?tm? objects. This absence is only possible if the non-?tm? objects are mental constructs which cease when the mind is stilled. Therefore, due to the lack of any proof for the absence of all duality upon the stilling of the mind, the conception arises that all duality is merely a mental construct. Here, the means of postulation is the cognition of what is to be explained (upap?dya), namely, that all duality ceases on the stilling of the mind. The cognition via postulation is the cognition of the explanation (upap?daka), namely, that all duality is a mental construct.377 5.4.6 Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi) Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) receives by far the most detailed treatment of all the means of cognition in VP, with much attention to presenting and refuting the Ny?ya perspective. The KS edition devotes 87 pages to non-cognition (VP 6) as compared to 47 pages to verbal testimony (VP 3) and 57 pages collectively to the remaining four means of cognition (VP 1-2, 5-6).378 In this section, first Ni?cald?s presents the Ny?ya view of non-existence, and then criticizes it. He next presents the six items that Ved?nta considers to be without beginning, all of which except consciousness are negatable by knowledge; he defends the position that 376 See the discussion of up?dhi on p. 164. 377 Here, although the means (arth?patti-pram??a) effect the cognition (arth?patti-pram?) without any intermediate activity (nirvy?p?ra), the instrumentality (kara?at?) of the cognition (pram?) is possible, as discussed under the section on the means of analogy (VP 4.6, 98-101, not reproduced in the current treatment of pram??a). 378 See also section 5.4.3, p. 114 and n. 326. 144 j?va and ??vara are without beginning. Non-cognition is required as a distinct means of cognition since otherwise absence is not perceptible by the senses; the sense can only perceive that which is present. Ni?cald?s refutes the immediacy of the knowledge of absence resulting from non-cognition, and defends non-cognition against the Ny?ya objection of lack of economy. Lastly, Ni?cald?s's view of the utility of non-cognition for a seeker of liberation is presented. Only the Bh???a M?m??sakas and the Ved?ntins accept non-cognition as a distinct means of cognizing non-existence (abh?va). The Naiy?yikas accept non-existence but hold that the non-existent object (pratiyogin) is cognized by perception of its locus (anuyogin), which is then qualified by the absence of the non-existent object. 379 In old Ny?ya, non-existence is defined as the object of non-apprehension, 380 whereas for Navya Ny?ya it is the object of apprehension dependent upon the apprehension of its non-existent object.381 In Ny?ya, non- existence is of two kinds. 1) Mutual or reciprocal non-existence (anyony?bh?va) is the negation of identity, namely, difference. Reciprocal non-existence is without beginning and end. 2) Relational non-existence (sa?sarg?bh?va) is the absence of a relation between two objects and is further classified into four sub-types: 2a) prior non-existence (pr?gabh?va), which has an end but no beginning; 2b) posterior or annihilative non-existence (pradhva?s?bh?va), which has a beginning but no end; 2c) temporal non-existence (s?mayik?bh?va), which has both a beginning and an end; and 2d) absolute non-existence (atyant?bh?va), which has neither a beginning nor an end, and is different from reciprocal non-existence (1, above). The statement ?the cloth does not have the quality of a pot (?pot- ness?), pa?e gha?atva? na,? conveys the absolute non-existence of the quality of a pot in the cloth, whereas ?the cloth is not the pot, pa?o gha?o na,? conveys the mutual non-identity of the pot and cloth. The first example has the non-existent object (pratiyogin), namely, quality of a pot, and the locus (anuyogin), namely, cloth, connected by an inherence relation 379 The term pratiyogin is traditionally translated as ?counter-correlate,? ?adjunct,? ?counterpositive,? or ?absentee,? and anuyogin as ?correlate?, ?subjunct? depending on whether the relation between the two objects is one of non-existence or of co-existence (Phillips 1995, 315, 319 s.v.; Ingalls 1951, 44, 55-6). I have chosen to leave these terms untranslated rather than substitute specialized and opaque equivalents. In the present context of non-cognition, when a pot is absent on the ground, the absent object (the pot) is the pratiyogin to the locus where it is absent, the anuyogin (the ground). 380 ni?edha-mukha prat?ti k? vi?aya (VP 6.1, 109). 381 pratiyog? s?pek?a prat?ti k? vi?aya (VP 6.1, 109). 145 (samav?ya sa?bandha) while the second example has the anuyogin (cloth) and pratiyogin (pot) connected by a negation of an identity relation (t?d?tmya sambandha). 382 The Ny?ya view is criticized by Ni?cald?s. It is not proper to consider prior non-existence (2a) of, say, a pot, as without beginning since its locus (anuyogin), which is the material cause (up?d?na k?ra?a), itself has a beginning and so does the absentee (pratiyogin), the pot. The Naiy?yikas may argue that m?y?, the material cause of creation, is without beginning, and hence the effects of m?y? possess prior non-existence. However, the Ved?nta view of creation does not require prior non-existence of the direct cause, and moreover m?y? is not the direct cause (s?k??t-k?ra?a) but only the general cause. In addition, m?y? is neither existent nor non-existent but logically indefinable (anirvacan?ya). It is also improper to consider annihilative non-existence (2b) as endless, since the locus of destruction can also be destroyed. For the pot, the potsherds are the locus of its destruction and when the potsherds are destroyed, the pot?s non-existence in them also has an end. Further, reciprocal non- existence (1) cannot be without both beginning and end because its locus has a beginning and an end. In the case of the reciprocal non-existence of the pot and cloth, the locus of the pot?s non-existence is the cloth, which has both beginning and end. Reciprocal non-existence can be without beginning if its locus is without beginning, but that locus will have an end. There is reciprocal non-existence of j?va and Brahman, which is without beginning, but this non- existence comes to an end when there is the cessation of ignorance through the knowledge of Brahman. Ved?nta considers only these six items to be without beginning: 1) pure consciousness (?uddha cetana); 2) the individual (j?va); 3) ??vara; 4) ignorance (avidy?); 5) the relation between ignorance and consciousness; and 6) the reciprocal difference of objects without beginning. Except for pure consciousness, all the rest are considered to be negated by knowledge. Thus, for Ved?nta, all non-existence is destructible and non-eternal (VP 6.19-21, 148-154). An opponent might raise the objection that, as per Ved?nta, j?va and ??vara are said to be caused by m?y?, namely, the indeterminate and ultimately unreal creative power that manifests the empirical world, and if they are effects of m?y?, they cannot be without beginning. Moreover, effects possess the same properties as the cause, and yet m?y?, claimed 382 VP 6.3-5, 112-6; VP 6.9, 124-36. I have considerably simplified the discussion. 146 by Ved?nta to have an appearance of existence (bh?va-r?pa), 383 would be the opposite of non-existence. Ni?cald?s responds that j?va and ??vara are not effects of m?y? but are dependent on m?y? for their existence. Though m?y? is said to have an appearance of existence and it is different from non-existence, yet it is the material cause for all non- existence by virtue of possessing the similar properties of logical indefiniteness (anirvacan?yatva), illusoriness (mithy?tva), being negatable through knowledge (j??na- nivartyatva), and not being ?tm?. For example, even though two pot halves (kap?la), as the material cause for the pot, differ from the effect, the pot, by virtue of having the property of being pot halves (kap?latva) and not having the pot property (gha?atva), yet the pot halves and the pot share the properties of ?clay-ness? (m?nmayatva), etc., and still can be cause and effect. Similarly, all non-existence, despite being an effect of m?y?, shares with m?y? its properties of logical indefiniteness, illusoriness, and being negatable through knowledge (VP 6.21, 154-5). 384 Whereas Ny?ya considers non-existence as directly perceptible by the senses, Ved?nta and the Bh???a M?m??sakas view absence as not perceptible by the senses; 385 instead, non- cognition (anupalabdhi) is a separate means for the cognition of non-existence. The means of cognition (pram??a) is the suitable non-apprehension (yogy?nupalambha or yogy?nupalabdhi) of the non-existent object (pratiyogin), namely, were the pratiyogin present, it would be directly perceptible. Non-cognition cannot grasp the non-existence of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) because these are not sense-perceptible. There is no intermediate activity (vy?p?ra) for the means, just as in the case of analogy (upam?na) and postulation (arth?patti). 383 See Kar (2003) for a discussion on bh?va-r?pa 384 Ni?cald?s also makes passing reference to an unnamed Ved?ntin author (ko? granthak?ra advaitav?d?) who accepts absolute non-existence only (2d above) and considers all other forms on non-existence improper (al?ka) and reducible to absolute non-existence (VP 6.21, 155). The unnamed personage is N?si?h??rama who puts forth this view in his Bheda- dhik-k?ra (1904, 90-91; Sastri and Mahadevan 1936, 33-4). Elsewhere (VP 6.34, 185-7), Ni?cald?s criticizes another aspect of the Bheda-dhik-k?ra, but while considering superimposition in Ved?nta, he appears to agree with N?si?h??rama?s position that all non-existence is absolute (VP 7.13, 229: sakala pad?rtha siddh?nta mai? kalpita hai?, tink? abh?va p?ram?rthika hai, so brahma-r?pa hai). 385 The perceptual cognition of existent objects takes place via the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti which goes out and assumes the form of the object, whereby the consciousness delimited by the v?tti becomes identical with the consciousness delimited by the object. In the case of non-existent objects, there is nothing for the v?tti to assume the form of, hence the need for a separate means of cognition. 147 The cognition of non-existence arising from the means of non-cognition is held by Ved?nta to be immediate (pratyak?a). 386 It is not necessary for a cognition to be sense- generated (i.e., via the means of cognition for perception, pratyak?a pram??a) for it to be immediate. When a person hears, ?You are the tenth,?387 the cognition that arises through verbal testimony is also immediate. The knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ?tm? arising from the mah?-v?kyas is also immediate. The knowledge of ??vara, though a v?tti of m?y? and hence not sense-produced, is also immediate. Similarly, the knowledge of non- existence born of non-cognition is immediate, because the locus of the non-existence is suitable for perception. When the senses do not function in the perception of the locus, the knowledge of non-example born of non-cognition is mediate. For example, the knowledge of the absence of size (mahattva) in atoms occurs without use of the eyes and is mediate. Ni?cald?s suggests that, where the authors of texts such as the Bheda-dhik-k?ra [N?si?h??rama, sixteenth century] and Ved?nta-paribh??? [Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra, 1550- 1650 CE] speak of the immediate (pratyak?a) cognition of non-existence, they are engaging in the (temporary) acceptance of their opponents? view while refuting their objections to one?s own view (prau?hi-v?da).388 When examined carefully, the knowledge of non- existence due to non-cognition is always mediate, according to Ni?cald?s. Even when the locus of the non-existence is sense-perceptible, as when the non-existence of the pot on the ground is cognized, the cognition of the ground is immediate, but the cognition of the non- existence is mediate. 389 The Naiy?yikas may object that there is a lack of economy (gaurava) in requiring another means for the cognition of non-existence, while their system preserves economy (l?ghava) by utilizing perception instead. The Advaitin would respond that it is the Ny?ya view that 386 Literally, the term pratyak?a means ?perceptual? but here Ni?cald?s means aparok?a, ?immediate? because he contrasts it with parok?a, ?mediate,? in the same sentence. (VP 6.30, 178: Ved?nta-mata mai? pram??a anupalabdhi hai au ved?nta- matamai? anupalabdhi pram??a janya abh?va k? j??na bh? naiy?yika mata k? n??? pratyak?a hai parok?a nah??). 387 This is a reference to an oft-used story of the tenth person used to illustrate the ignorance of one?s true nature: Ten boys go on an excursion. En route they have to swim across a river. On arriving at the opposite shore, when a count is taken, each forgets to count himself and comes up one short and thinks that one of the group has perished in the crossing. The grief that arises is only dispelled when a wise passer-by instructs the leader, ?You are the tenth.? ?a?kara draws upon this story in TU ?Bh 2.1 (1979, 442), BU ?Bh 1.4.7 (1986, 73), 1.4.15 (108), with a brief reference to ?sa?khy?-p?ra?a, completing the count,? and his Upade?a-s?hasr? 1.12.3, 1.18.170-4,187,190,199 (2006, 2:131n3). See PD 7.22-28, 247-250 for another example of how this story is used (Vidy?ra?ya and Swahananda 1967, 242-4, 327-8). For the occurrences of this story as folk tales, see Pahlajrai (2005, 73n49). 388 VP 6.35, 191: prativ?d? k? ukti m?nikai bh? svamata me? do?a k? parih?ra karai t?k?? prau?hi-v?da kahai hai?. 389 VP 6.31-34, 178-87. 148 lacks economy since it requires sense contact with the imagined attribute of absence in the locus, while also requiring the senses as the means and non-cognition as an auxiliary cause (sahak?r? k?ra?a). 390, 391 The scriptures speak of the non-existence of the empirical world (prapa?ca) in all three times, past, present and future, as in ?There is no diversity here at all, neha n?n?sti ki?cana? (BU 4.4.19). Non-cognition is useful to a seeker of liberation (jij??su) as a means of ascertaining the non-existence of the empirical world from the absolute (p?ram?rthika) standpoint. The nature of the empirical world is cognized, and, if it were absolute in nature, it would be cognized as absent in all three times. But it is not thus cognized; hence, there is the non-existence of the empirical world as absolute. Thus, non-cognition helps a seeker to arrive at the absence of diversity in the empirical world as well as the absolute difference of the empirical world from Brahman (VP 6.36, 195-6). 5.5 Causes of a V?tti After first defining v?tti and stating that v?tti-cognitions are of two types, valid (pram?) and indirect (apram?) (VP 1.1, 1), Ni?cald?s initiated the exploration of the means of valid cognition (pram??a), just concluded above (section 5.4), to facilitate the understanding of the valid, direct v?tti-cognitions. Ni?cald?s now turns to the investigation of indirect cognitions (the second half of Figure 8 on p. 122). The examination of both valid and indirect cognitions is for the purpose of answering the second question, ?What is the cause of a v?tti?? and is a step along the journey to ultimately attain the knowledge of Brahman, arrived at by means of a v?tti in the form of Brahman (brahm?k?ra v?tti). In this connection, Ni?cald?s first provides a discussion of types of causes. Ny?ya holds that there are three types of causes: 1) inherent cause (samav?y? k?ra?a) which is the same as the material cause (up?d?na k?ra?a); 2) non-inherent cause (asamav?y? k?ra?a); 392 and 3) efficient cause (nimitta k?ra?a). The Advaita view accepts only two types of causes, material 390 VP 6.29-30, 175-8; 6.34-5, 187-8, 194-5. 391 Ni?cald?s takes issue with the author of the ?ikh?ma?i commentary on Ved?nta-paribh???, Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra?s son R?mak???a D?k?ita, for suggesting, per the Naiy?yikas, that non-cognition is not a separate means of cognition and non- existence is perceived by the senses: tisak?? advaita-??stra ke sa?sk?ra ny?na huve hai? au ny?ya-??stra ke sa?sk?ra adhika rahe hai? ? ved?nta-paribh??? k? ??k? mai? naiy?yika mata k? ujj?vana sakala advaita granthana sai? viruddha likhy? hai (VP 6.35, 188-9). The passage in question is Dharmar?j?dhvar?ndra et al. (2000, 358). 392 Ni?cald?s defines the non-inherent cause (asamav?y? k?ra?a) as ?the producer of the effect, which is associated with the inherent cause of the effect. k?rya ke samav?yi-k?ra?a sai? sambandh? jo k?rya k? janaka.? The non-inherent cause for cloth is the contact between the threads, that for a pot is the contact between its two halves (kap?la) (VP 7.1.197). 149 and efficient. The remaining Ny?ya cause, the non-inherent cause, is held to be of no use for knowing non-duality, since it only differentiates between material causalities: for example, the pot is not different from clay. According to Ved?nta, the non-inherent cause is a part of the efficient cause. Causes can also be divided into the special cause (as?dh?ra?a k?ra?a) and the common cause (s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a). There are nine common causes that are present in all situations: 1) ??vara; 2) ??vara?s knowledge; 3) ??vara?s desire; 4) action; 5) place; 6) time; 7) unseen potentiality (ad???a); 393 8) prior non-existence (pr?gabh?va); and 9) absence of obstacles (pratibandhak?bh?va) (VP 7.2, 201-6, VP 1.3, 5). For a v?tti that is a cognition (j??na-r?pa), the material cause is the anta?-kara?a, and the efficient causes are the means of cognition (pram??a) as well as the functioning (vy?p?ra) of the contact between the sense organs and the objects, etc. For the v?tti that is ??vara?s knowledge, m?y? is the material cause, and the efficient cause is the unseen potency (ad???a) [of the collective j?vas]. For an error-producing v?tti, ignorance (avidy?) is the material cause, and defect (do?a) is the efficient cause. Earlier (in section 5.2), v?tti was defined as ?the cause for the illumination of the object, a modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance.? Other Ved?nta texts define v?tti as ?the modification that destroys ignorance,? but Ni?cald?s rejects this definition as being too wide, since it would include indirect knowledge as well. Further, in the case of a stream of v?ttis, the second definition would not include the v?ttis of the second and subsequent moments: if the first v?tti destroys the ignorance, then no ignorance remains for the subsequent v?ttis to destroy. However, the earlier definition is also too wide in that it includes the v?tti of pleasure, sorrow and other emotional states, ??vara?s v?tti, and erroneous cognitions such as silver in mother-of-pearl. Emotions and their cognitions arise simultaneously; therefore, pleasure, etc., are not available as objects for a v?tti to illumine. ??vara is omniscient; therefore, destruction of ??vara?s ignorance is meaningless. Illusory objects like mother-of- pearl mistaken for silver also arise at the same time as their cognitions, and an erroneous v?tti does not destroy ignorance. Ni?cald?s proposes a revised definition that does not suffer from these defects: ?A v?tti is a modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance that is the cause for practical usage (asti-vyavah?ra k? hetu).? Thus, consciousness delimited by an 393 Also can represent past good and bad karma (pu?ya and p?pa) bearing fruit in the present. 150 uncontradicted v?tti (ab?dhita-v?ttyavacchinna-cetana) is termed a valid cognition (pram?- j??na), whereas consciousness delimited by a contradicted v?tti is an indirect cognition (apram?-j??na). As seen earlier (section 5.3), a v?tti-cognition is of two types, valid (pram?) and indirect (apram?). Indirect cognitions are further classified as true (yath?rtha), and erroneous or false (ayath?rtha). [The typology which follows is represented graphically in Figure 9: Types of v?tti-cognition on p. 154]. ??vara?s knowledge, cognitions of emotions such as pleasure, etc. are true indirect cognitions, whereas erroneous perception of silver in mother-of-pearl is a false indirect cognition. True cognitions born of the means of cognition are valid cognition, and cognitions that are not the result of the means of cognition, but still true and defect-free are considered indirect cognitions. Valid v?ttis are of six kinds depending upon which of the six means of cognition (perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, postulation, non- cognition) is involved. 394 Immediate395 valid cognition (pratyak?a-pram?), is further of two types. 1) External (b?hya), which is sub-divided into six396 types: five in which the uncontradicted v?tti is produced through the five senses respectively (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) in external substances, and the sixth in which immediate (aparok?a) v?tti of the external object is generated through verbal testimony, as in ?You are the tenth (da?amas tvam asi);?397 2) Internal (?ntara) immediate valid cognition is further sub-divided into two types: 2a) cognition pertaining to the ?tm?; and 2b) cognition pertaining to that which is other that the ?tm? (an?tma-gocara). Cognition pertaining to the ?tm? is classified as 2a.i) cognition pertaining to the pure ?tm? (?uddh?tma-gocara); and 2a.ii) cognition pertaining to the qualified ?tm? (vi?i???tma-gocara). The former is again sub-divided into 2a.i.i) Cognition pertaining to Brahman (brahma-gocara), v?ttis generated by the mah?- v?kyas; and 2a.i.ii) Cognition not pertaining to Brahman (brahm?gocara), v?ttis generated by 394 Ni?cald?s also explores an alternate definition of pram? advocated by some authors that includes true memories (yath?rtha sm?ti) as valid but concludes that cognition via memory is inappropriate for inclusion within valid cognitions (VP 7.4, 208-10). 395 Pratyak?a is normally translated as ?perceptual.? Ni?cald?s, however, defines a pratyak?a cognition as ?that where the association of the object with the knower occurs either through a v?tti or directly (s?k??t), jah?? vi?aya k? pram?t? sai? v?tti dv?r? athav? s?k??t sambandha hovai, tis vi?aya k? j??na pratyak?a hai, so vi?aya bh? pratyak?a kahiye hai (VP 7.4, 211). I choose ?immediate? to reflect this sense. 396 Some others add the immediate v?tti generated by non-cognition (anupalabdhi-pram??a) as a seventh external valid means of cognition (b?hya-pratyak?a-pram?) but the v?tti in the sphere of absence is different from a perceptual v?tti, as has already been discussed in the section of non-cognition (5.4.6). 397 See n. 387 for the tenth-man story. 151 subsidiary Ved?nta statements (av?ntara-v?kya), such as ?I am pure illumination (?uddha? prak??o?ham).?398 External objects are connected to the cognizer (pram?t?) through v?ttis, while internal objects are connected to the cognizer directly (s?k??t). There are endless permutations of cognitions pertaining to the qualified ?tm? (2a.ii), such as ?I am ignorant, the doer, sad, happy, etc.? The object of immediate cognition (pratyak?a-vi?aya) is defined as a suitable (yogya) object related to the cognizer in the present. The qualifier ?suitable? is required to rule out merit/demerit (dharma/adharma) which are also attributes of ?tm?399 but are not directly perceptible. Also, immediate cognition (pratyak?a-j??na) is the cognition of a suitable object connected to the cognizer by means of a suitable means of cognition. This cognition cannot be generated by an unsuitable means of cognition (ayogya-pram??a- ajanyat?), thereby including emotions which can be cognized only by the self-revealing (s?k??-bh?sya) anta?-kara?a-qualified ?tm?, and not by any means of cognition (VP 7.4, 207-16).400 The anta?-kara?a?s v?tti in the form of memory or recollection (sm?ti) is not a direct cognition (pram?). Recollection, too, is of two kinds, and is dependent upon experience: 1) true (yath?rtha), born of true experiences, i.e., those which are in regard to uncontradicted objects, and termed valid cognitions (pram?); and 2) erroneous, born of erroneous experiences. True recollection is separated into two types: 1a) recollection of the ?tm?, produced by the experience of the mah?-v?kyas; and 1b) recollections of anything other than the ?tm?, caused by the impressions (sa?sk?ra) produced by the illusory experience of the empirical world. Erroneous recollection is also of two kinds: 2a) recollections pertaining to the ?tm?, such as ?the self is a doer;? and 2b) recollections pertaining to anything other than the ?tm?, such as ?the creation is real,? arising from impressions of erroneous reality in the creation. 398 This statement is not from the Upani?ads and I have been unable to locate which secondary Ved?nta text it might be from. 399 This is according to Ny?ya. ?The eight attributes beginning with intellect are the particular attributes of ?tm? alone. buddhy ?dayo?a???v ?tma-m?tra-vi?e?a-gu???? (TS 73). The eight attributes of ?tm? are 1) intellect (buddhi), 2) pleasure (sukha), 3) pain (du?kha), 4) desire (icch?), 5) aversion (dve?a), 6) effort (prayatna), 7) merit (dharma), and 8) demerit (adharma), a subset of the twenty four attributes enumerated in TS 4. 400 Ni?cald?s briefly presents the views of V?caspati Mi?ra (9th c. author of the Bh?mat? sub-commentary on BS ?Bh) that the brahma-gocara v?tti-j??na generated by the mah?-v?kyas such as ?I am Brahman, aham brahm?smi (BU 1.4.10) ? as well as the cognition of the emotions and the qualified ?tm? are generated by the mind. This view is rejected in favor of the view that the mind is not a sense-organ (indriya) and no cognition is mental, the emotions are illumined by the witness in the anta?-kara?a, and the view in the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (Sarvaj??tman?s metrical abridgement of BS ?Bh) that the knowledge from the mah?-v?kyas is always immediate (VP 7.4, 215-6). 152 False experience is also of two kinds: 1) doubtful or uncertain (sa??aya-r?pa); and 2) certain (ni?caya-r?pa). Both of these erroneous cognitions (bhrama) are the cause of harm (anartha) and are to be avoided by a seeker. Uncertainty is the cognition of two opposing qualifiers in a qualificand. Erroneous cognitions in the form of uncertainty are also of two types: 1) uncertainty regarding the means of cognition (pram??a-sa??aya); and 2) uncertainty regarding the object of cognition (prameya-sa??aya). Uncertainty regarding the means of cognition takes the form: ?Are the Ved?nta utterances (v?kya) the means for knowing non-dual Brahman or for something else?? This uncertainty is removed through the study (?rava?a) of the first section (adhy?ya) of the Brahma-s?tra, BS 1 [the samanvaya- adhy?ya, the chapter on harmony, which establishes Brahman as the subject matter of Ved?nta]. Uncertainty regarding the object of cognition is of two further types: 2a) uncertainty regarding the ?tm? (?tmasa??aya); and 2b) uncertainty regarding everything other than the ?tm? (an?tmasa??aya). The latter (2b) has many variations, but Ni?cald?s suggests there is no use in describing these. Uncertainty regarding the ?tm? (2a) is also manifold, concerning both the nature of tat (Brahman) and also tvam (?tm?). These are removed via contemplation (manana), which is effected by listening to and contemplation of (?rava?a-manana), and study (adhyayana) of BS 2 [also known as the avirodha adhy?ya, the chapter which puts forth possible objections to the Ved?nta view, and their refutations]. Uncertainty regarding the means of knowledge and liberation are included under uncertainty regarding the object of cognition (prameya-sa??aya (2)) and are resolved by ?rava?a- manana of BS 3 [the chapter on s?dhana, the means to attaining Brahman], and the initial section of BS 4. The uncertainty regarding the nature of liberation is resolved by ?rava?a- manana of the remainder of BS 4 [the chapter on phala, the result of liberation. BS 4.1 continues the discussion on means, and covers various meditations (up?san?) and rites (nitya-karma), and their effects on one?s karma, merit and demerit (pu?ya-p?pa)]. The erroneous cognition of an object that can be contradicted (b?dhita) and is different from uncertainty is certain or definite error, as in the cognition of silver in mother-of-pearl. Definite erroneous cognitions are also of two types. 1) The erroneous cognition that cannot be contradicted without knowledge of Brahman is called unsublatable or uncontradicted (ab?dhita); 2) The erroneous cognition that can be negated by knowledge of something other than Brahman is called contradicted. The erroneous cognition that is uncontradicted is of two 153 types: 1a) always uncontradicted; and 1b) empirically (vy?vah?rika) uncontradicted. Only consciousness (cetana) is always uncontradicted. Ignorance [of Brahman], the five elements (mah?bh?ta) and the elemental apparent world (prapa?ca) are empirically uncontradicted. Contradicted erroneous cognitions are comprised of two types: 2a) the apparent transformation (vivarta) of consciousness delimited by empirical substance (vy?vah?rika- pad?rth?vacchinna-cetana), for example, silver perceived in mother-of-pearl; and 2b) the apparent transformation of consciousness delimited by illusory substance (pr?tibh?sika- pad?rth?vacchinna-cetana), for example, silver perceived in mother-of-pearl in a dream. The different kinds of cognitions (v?tti-j??na) enumerated above, both true and false, can be represented schematically as in Figure 9, on p. 154. There are notable differences compared to the scheme of types of v?tti described in section 5.3 (see on p. Error! Bookmark not defined.), particularly in the placement of recollection; earlier it was treated as an indirect (apram?), true (yath?rtha) cognition, whereas now it is neither direct/valid (pram?) nor indirect and itself has true and false subdivisions. This is an outcome of the greater degree of detail and refinement in the current treatment, but we end up with subtly different characterizations of direct and indirect cognitions between VP 1 and VP 7. It is quite clear that Ni?cald?s intended the definitions in VP 7 to supersede those in VP 1. Though Ni?cald?s does not directly state this, this classification is to aid in understanding those v?ttis that are worth cultivating for the purpose of attaining liberation, namely, knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman. The implicit message is that cognitions not pertaining to the self (an?tma-gocara) are unproductive. False (ayath?rtha) cognitions pertaining to uncertainty regarding the means of cognition or the self can be resolved through the study and contemplation (?rava?a-manana) of the four chapters of the BS. Definite false cognitions that can be contradicted (b?dhita) by knowledge of something other than Brahman fall in either the empirical or illusory sphere, and can be thus resolved by a proper understanding of the nature of superimposition and erroneous cognition. The false cognitions that are empirically uncontradicted, namely, ignorance [of Brahman], the five elements (mah?bh?ta) and the elemental apparent world (prapa?ca), can only be resolved through the knowledge of Brahman. 154 Figure 9: Types of v?tti-cognition 5 mah?bh?tas, prapa?ca, Ignorance of Brahman v?tti-cognition (v?tti-j??na ) Valid / Direct (pram?) Recollection (sm?ti) Indirect (apram?) Pe rc ep tio n (p ra ty ak ?a ) In fe re nc e (a nu m ?n a) V er ba l T es tim on y (? ab da ) A na lo gy (u pa m ?n a) Po st ul at io n (a rt h? pa tti ) N on -c og ni tio n (a nu pa la bd hi ) External (b?hya) Internal (antara) (5) Sense produced (indriya-janya) Verbal Testimony (?abda-janya) Pertaining to ?tm? (?tma-gocara) Other (an?tma-gocara) Pure (?uddh?tma) Qualified (vi?i???tma) Re. Brahman (brahmagocara) Re. non-Brahman (brahm?gocara) True (yath?rtha) False (ayath?rtha) About ?tm? (?tma-sm?ti) Other (an?tma-sm?ti) Pertaining to ?tm? (?tma-gocara) Other (an?tma-gocara) True (yath?rtha) False (ayath?rtha) Uncertain (sa??aya-r?pa) Definite (ni?caya-r?pa) Uncontradicted (ab?dhita) Contradicted (b?dhita) Re. means of cognition (pram??a-sa??aya) Re. object of cognition (prameya-sa??aya) About ?tm? (?tma-sa??aya) Other (an?tma-sa??aya) About ?tm? (tva?) About Brahman (tat) About means of knowledge & liberation (j??na-mukti-s?dhana) Always (sad?) Empirical (vy?vah?rika) Empirical (vy?vah?rika) Illusory (pr?tibh?sika) Consciousness (cetana) 155 5.6 Chapter Summary Ni?cald?s presents the importance of a v?tti at the very outset: ?By the v?tti, ?I am Brahman,? ignorance and its results are removed and the highest happiness (?nanda) is attained ? this is the ultimate purpose (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. In this connection, the desire to know arises: ?What is a v?tti, what is the cause of a v?tti, and what is its purpose?? For that, this text V?ttiprabh?kar, The Illuminator of V?ttis, has been written.? Ni?cald?s uses the concept of v?tti as the central theme through which to explore Ved?nta epistemology, metaphysics, and praxis, as he answers the three questions he raised. His goal is to lead the reader to the knowledge of Brahman, which is attained through a v?tti in the form of Brahman (brahm?k?ra v?tti). A v?tti is defined as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance (aj??na).? A v?tti leads to cognition, and it is necessary to distinguish between valid and invalid cognitions. To understand valid cognition one must understand the six means (pram??a) which are accepted by Ved?nta: 1) perception (pratyak?a); 2) inference (anum?na); 3) verbal testimony (?abda); 4) analogy (upam?na); 5) postulation (arth?patti); and 6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Ni?cald?s systematically explains how each of these means of cognition help one attain the knowledge of Brahman. In the discussion of perception, we learn that for Ved?nta, erroneous cognition is not sense-produced but is a modification of ignorance (avidy?), whereas the anta?-kara?a is the locus as well as the material cause. Ni?cald?s presents the differing views as to whether the mind is a sense-organ (as held by V?caspati Mi?ra), or not. He first points out the flaws in V?caspati Mi?ra?s position, but then proceeds to show how these are not necessarily defects, and concludes that in essence, it does not hurt one?s understanding of Ved?nta, i.e., one?s knowledge of Brahman, to accept V?caspati?s view that the mind is a sense-organ. Regarding inference, traditionally the instrument (kara?a) of inference is the experience of the invariable concomitance (vy?pti) of the probans and the probandum; the latent impressions (sa?sk?ra) that arise either from perceptual cognition or through memory are considered the intermediate cause (vy?p?ra). However, Ni?cald?s proposes that even if one holds that memory is the intermediate cause instead of a latent impression, the argument is unaffected because it does not contradict revealed or composed scriptures (?ruti-sm?ti) or the accepted doctrine (siddh?nta). He considers it more logical to accept memory of the 156 invariable concomitance (vy?pti) as the intermediate cause. Of the two types of inference, inference for oneself (sv?rtha) and inference for others (par?rtha), the latter is useful for proving the identity of the individual (j?va) and Brahman, although inference alone cannot be the cause for self-realization of Brahman because the doctrine states that, apart from the Ved?nta utterances (v?kya), no other means of knowledge takes up Brahman as its object. Inference merely serves to bring one closer to the knowledge of Brahman. Verbal testimony is the most important means of cognition for Advaita, because it alone can bring about the realization of the identity of the j?va and Brahman. The means of verbal cognition (?abda pram??a) is the knowledge of all the words of a sentence qualified by their significatory function (v?tti, in a narrower, specialized sense). The significatory function is the mutual relation between a word and its meaning and can be either a direct significatory relation (?akti-v?tti) or an indirect or implied significatory relation (lak?a??-v?tti). On the basis of the relation between the literal and implied meanings (?akya and lak?ya), the implication (lak?a??) is either bare implication (kevala-lak?a??), where the implied meaning is directly connected to the literal meaning, or indirect or double implication (lak?ita- lak?a??), where the implied meaning is indirectly connected to the literal meaning. Implication can also be classified into three types, depending upon the extent to which the literal meaning (?akya) of the word is retained or given up in the implied meaning (lak?ya): 1) exclusive implication (jahal-lak?a??), wherein the literal meaning is given up and the implied meaning is considered instead; 2) inclusive implication (ajahal-lak?a??), wherein the literal meaning as well as the implied meaning are intended; 3) inclusive-and-exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a??),401 wherein a part of the literal meaning is preserved while the rest is given up. Further, verbal cognition (??bd? pram?) is either empirical (vy?vah?rika), or absolute (p?ram?rthika). Empirical verbal cognition is either produced by worldly sentences (laukika-v?kya-janya), or by Vedic sentences (vaidika-v?kya-janya). Vedic sentences teach either empirical meanings or the absolute reality, Brahman. All Ved?nta statements are for the knowledge of Brahman alone, and are of two classes: 1) subsidiary statements (av?ntara-v?kya), which specifically explain either Brahman or ?tm?; and 2) great sayings (mah?-v?kya) such as ?tat tvam asi, you are that (CU 6.8.7)? which 401 Also known as jahad-ajahal-lak?a??. 157 explain the identity between the words ?you? and ?that.? In comprehending the mah?-v?kyas, only inclusive and exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a??) applies. This is also bare implication (kevala-lak?a??), as there is a direct relation between the literal meaning and the implied meaning, namely, consciousness. When there is a potential conflict between two means of cognition, such as perception (pratyak?a) and verbal testimony (?abda), the cognitive apparatus for the object which is more greatly desired to be known (utka?a-jij??sita) will win out. The desire to know worldly things (laukika pad?rtha) and the apparatus for their cognition is always possible in the waking state, and these things will be cognized in the absence of a desire to know Brahman. To obstruct the apparatus of cognition of worldly things, such as perception et al., one therefore needs to develop a stronger desire to know Brahman as compared to worldly objects. Ni?cald?s holds that, rather than contemplation of the meaning of the Ved?nta, it is the desire to know Brahman itself that is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman. Ved?nta statements are not injunctions, as the M?m??sakas maintain, but have the knowledge of non- dual Brahman as their intent (t?tparya). According to Ni?cald?s, for Ved?nta, even the Vedas are not eternal, as everything other than consciousness (cetana) is not eternal (anitya). Ved?nta considers the Vedas and the Mah?bh?rata, etc., to be humanly authored, but ??vara, Vy?sa (the author of MBh) and the other authors of scripture are considered to be omniscient. ??vara reproduces the Vedas faithfully from creation to creation, whereas Vy?sa and the other authors create their works according to their desire in each creation, not necessarily identical to the prior creation. These created works have an intent, namely, the knowledge of Brahman, which is reproduced faithfully and eternally, from creation to creation. The traditional Ved?nta definition of analogy (upam?na) is the cognition of similarity. Ni?cald?s proposes a better definition of analogical cognition as that which arises from the cognition of either similarity or dissimilarity. This is motivated by the fact that, if dissimilarity is not accepted as part of the definition, then, given that there is nothing similar to Brahman, analogy would not be helpful to a seeker. With the revised definition, analogy (upam?na) becomes the cognition of dissimilarity of the empirical world (prapa?ca) to Brahman, and its result, the analogical cognition (upamiti), that Brahman is dissimilar to the creation. 158 Postulation (arth?patti) is accepted only by Ved?nta and M?m??s?. The postulation of an explanation (upap?daka) by the cognition of the lack of proof of that which is to be explained (upap?dya) is called the postulation cognition (pram?), and its cause, the lack of proof of that which is to be explained, is called the postulation means (pram??a). Postulation can be either from what is seen (d????rth?patti), or from what is heard (?rut?rth?patti). An example of postulation from the heard is the case of a seeker understanding the meaning of Upani?adic statements such as ?tarati ?okam ?tmavit, one who knows the ?tm? transcends sorrow? (CU 7.1.3). The cessation of sorrow through knowledge is heard, but there is no implied ?illusoriness of sorrow, ?oka-mithy?tva.? The illusoriness of sorrow is the explanation (upap?daka); the cessation of sorrow through knowledge is that which is to be explained (upap?dya). Ni?cald?s illustrates that postulation from what is seen helps one understand non-duality; after the mind is stilled during non-conceptual one-pointedness (nirvikalpa sam?dhi), only non-dual Brahman remains, and there is the absence of all experience of non-?tm? objects. This absence is possible only if the non-?tm? objects are mental constructs which cease when the mind is stilled. Due to the lack of a proof of the absence of all duality upon the stilling of the mind, the conception arises that all duality is merely a mental construct. Here, the means of postulation is the cognition of what is to be explained (upap?dya), namely, that all duality ceases on the stilling of the mind. The postulation cognition is the cognition of the explanation (upap?daka), that all duality is a mental construct. Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is accepted only by the Bh???a M?m??sakas and the Ved?ntins, as a distinct means of cognizing non-existence (abh?va), which they do not consider to be perceptible by the senses. The non-existence of only those objects whose existence is ordinarily perceptible by the other positive means of cognition is cognizable. The scriptures speak of the non-existence of the empirical world (prapa?ca) in the past, present and future times as in ?There is no diversity here at all, neha n?n?sti ki?cana? (BU 4.4.19). Non-cognition is useful to a seeker of liberation (jij??su) as a means of ascertaining the non- existence of the empirical world from the absolute (p?ram?rthika) standpoint. The nature of the empirical world is cognized, and if it were absolute in nature, that would also be cognized. But, it is not thus cognized; hence, there is the non-existence of the empirical 159 world as absolute. Non-cognition aids a seeker to arrive at the absence of diversity in the empirical world, as well as the absolute difference of the empirical world from Brahman. Once the means of valid cognition have been described, Ni?cald?s turns to the second question pertaining to v?ttis, namely, what is their cause. For Advaita, there are only two types of causes, material and efficient (up?d?na and nimitta k?ra?a), which can be also divided into the special cause (as?dh?ra?a k?ra?a) and the common cause (s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a). For a v?tti that is a cognition, the material cause is the anta?-kara?a, and the efficient causes are the means of cognition (pram??a) as well as the functioning (vy?p?ra) of the contact between the sense organs and the objects, etc. For the v?tti that is ??vara?s knowledge, m?y? is the material cause, and the efficient cause is the unseen potency (ad???a) [of the collective j?vas]. For an error-producing v?tti, ignorance (avidy?) is the material cause, and defect is the efficient cause. Ni?cald?s puts forth a more robust definition of a v?tti as a modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance, which is the cause for practical usage (asti- vyavah?ra k? hetu). Consciousness delimited by an uncontradicted v?tti (ab?dhita- v?ttyavacchinna-cetana) is termed a valid cognition (pram?-j??na), whereas consciousness delimited by a contradicted v?tti is an indirect cognition. The anta?-kara?a?s v?tti in the form of memory or recollection (sm?ti) is treated separately from direct and indirect cognitions. A detailed classification of the various kinds of v?ttis is presented (Figure 9, p. 143) for the purpose of understanding which are the v?ttis worth cultivating for the purpose of attaining liberation, namely, knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman, though Ni?cald?s does not explicitly state this. The implicit message is that cognitions not pertaining to the self (an?tma-gocara) are unproductive. False (ayath?rtha) cognitions pertaining to uncertainty, regarding the means of cognition or the self, can be resolved through the study and contemplation (?rava?a-manana) of the four chapter of the BS. Definite false cognitions that can be contradicted (b?dhita) by knowledge of something other than Brahman fall in either the empirical or illusory sphere, and can be thus resolved by a proper understanding of the nature of superimposition and erroneous cognition. The false cognitions which are empirically uncontradicted, namely, ignorance [of Brahman], the five elements (mah?bh?ta) and the elemental apparent world (prapa?ca), can be resolved only through the knowledge of Brahman. 160 In order to facilitate the proper understanding of the nature of superimposition and erroneous cognition so that the empirical and illusory definite false cognitions can be resolved, Ni?cald?s next enters into a lengthy treatment of superposition (adhy?sa) and various theories of error (khy?ti-v?da), which will be the focus of chapter 6. 6 Superimposition (Adhy?sa) and Theories of Error (Khy?ti-v?da) 6.1 Introduction This chapter continues the answer to the second question pertaining to v?ttis, namely, ?What is the cause of a v?tti?? Ni?cald?s's answer to this question began in the previous chapter, with a classification of v?tti-cognitions into two types, valid (pram?) and indirect (apram?). Chapter 5 dealt with the means of valid cognitions (pram??a) and initiated the exploration of indirect cognitions, which were subdivided into true (yath?rtha), and erroneous or false (ayath?rtha). False cognitions were said to be cause of harm (anartha), and hence they are to be recognized and resolved, freeing seekers to devote their attention to cognizing Brahman. Continuing the exploration of false cognitions, this chapter presents Ni?cald?s?s views concerning superimposition (adhy?sa) and various theories of error (khy?ti-v?da). Superimposition, by means of which the unreality of the created world is explained, is a central concept in Advaita, and Ni?cald?s provides multiple definitions of superimposition and two schemes for its categorization. These superimpositions are all immediate erroneous cognitions, and their difference from mediate erroneous cognitions is discussed. Ni?cald?s also raises various possible objections to the theory of superimposition and presents their refutations according to Ved?nta. The rest of the chapter is devoted to an examination of six theories of error (khy?ti-v?da). First, the Advaita theory of erroneous cognition (anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da), namely, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), is presented. After the soundness of the Advaita theory has been established and defended against objections, each of five non-Advaita theories is explained from the standpoint of their respective proponents and is then shown to be lacking, from the Advaita perspective. The five theories discussed are: 1) sat-khy?ti-v?da, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real; 2) asat-khy?ti-v?da, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is unreal, as subscribed to by the M?dhyamika Buddhists and some followers of Tantra; 3) ?tma-khy?ti-v?da, the Yog?c?ra Buddhist theory that the object of erroneous cognition is a mental state projected by the self; 4) anyath?-khy?ti-v?da, the Ny?ya theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real, but is present elsewhere; and 5) akhy?ti-v?da, the Pr?bh?kara M?m??saka theory that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real 162 recollection and real substratum. Of these five, Ni?cald?s devotes the greatest attention to anyath?-khy?ti, and in the process, refutes the Ny?ya perspective concerning the cause of extraordinary (alaukika) perceptual cognition, as well as Naiy?yika arguments against the Advaita anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. The Pr?bh?kara akhy?ti also gets a fairly detailed treatment here. Being complex technical terms, the names of these six theories of error (khy?ti-v?da) will be left untranslated henceforth in this chapter. 6.2 Superimposition (Adhy?sa) In Advaita, superimposition plays a central role in explaining the unreality of the created world which is erroneously perceived as real, i.e., superimposition is the mechanism by which erroneous cognition occurs. Ni?cald?s defines superimposition (adhy?sa) as an appearance (avabh?sa) in the substratum (adhi??h?na), which possesses a reality (satt?) different from that of the substratum, 402 such as the erroneous cognition of silver in mother- of-pearl. Superimposition is of two kinds: 1) superimposition of an object onto a substratum (arth?dhy?sa); and 2) superimposition of the knowledge of an object onto the knowledge of the substratum (j??n?dhy?sa). Superimposition of an object (1) is further sub-classified: 1a) superimposition of relation (sambandha) only; 1b) superimposition of the relation-qualified relatum (sambandha-vi?i??a sambandh?); 1c) superimposition of a property (dharma); 1d) superimposition of a property-qualified object (dharma-vi?i??a dharmin); 1e) reciprocal superimposition (anyony?dhy?sa); and 1f) other (anyatara). This last category, anyatar?dhy?sa, is itself of two kinds: 1f.i) superimposition of ?that which is not ?tm?? (an?tm?) on ?tm?; and 1f.ii) superimposition of ?tm? on an?tm?. From an ultimate (param?rtha) standpoint, the substratum [for all superimposition] is consciousness, while empirically (vy?vah?rika), it is consciousness delimited by an object, say a rope (VP 7.7, 402 ?a?kara in his adhy?sa-bh??ya intro to BS 1.1 defines superimposition even more compactly as ?the apprehension of something where it is not present, atasmi?s tad-buddhi?.? Ni?cald?s also presents this alternative definition: ?Superimposition is the manifestation [of an object] in the locus of its absence, apne abh?va ke adhikara?a mai? ?bh?sa k?? adhy?sa kahai? hai?? (VP 7.10, 226). Earlier in the adhy?sa-bh??ya, ?a?kara also defines superimposition as ?It is the apparent cognition, similar to recollection, of something seen earlier in something else. sm?ti-r?pa? paratra p?rva- d????vabh?sa?? (1980, 10-13). 163 221-3).403 This can be depicted graphically as Figure 10. Figure 10: Types of Superimposition Regarding the reciprocal superimposition (anyony?dhy?sa, 1e), one can raise the objection that, if one says ?the substratum of ?tm? is an?tm?,? then ?tm? is superimposed, i.e., it is imaginary. Hence, one cannot say ??tm? is superimposed on an?tm?.? In response to this, Ni?cald?s puts forward an alternative categorization of superimposition into two types: 1) superimposition of one?s nature or identity (svar?p?dhy?sa), wherein the nature of a substance arises as neither true nor false, but logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), for example, a snake superimposed on a rope; and 2) relational superimposition (sa?sarg?dhy?sa), wherein a logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya) relation arises in a substance whose nature is valid, whether absolutely (p?ram?rthika) or empirically (vy?vah?rika). Examples of empirical relational superimposition are [the reflection of] the face in the mirror, and the appearance of red color in cloth due to saffron dye (kusumbha dravya) or in a crystal due a red flower behind it. In the case of absolute relational 403 Examples of these various kinds of superimpositions are provided in VP 7.14, 231-4. Superimposition (adhy?sa ) 1) Object superimposition (arth?dhy?sa ) 2) Knowledge superimposition (j??n?dhy?sa ) 1a) Superimposition of relation (sambandh?dhy?sa ) 1b) Superimposition of relation-qualified relatum (sambandha-vi?i??a-sambandhy?dhy?sa ) 1c) Superimposition of property (dharm?dhy?sa ) 1d) Superimposition of property-qualified object (dharma-vi?i??a-dharmy?dhy?sa ) 1e) Reciprocal Superimposition (anyony?dhy?sa ) 1f) Other Superimpositions (anyatar?dhy?sa ) 1f.i) an?tm? on ?tm? 1f.ii) ?tm? on an?tm? Superimposition (adhy?sa ) Alternative Classification 1) Superimposition of identity (svar?p?dhy?sa ) 2) Relational superimposition (sa?sarg?dhy?sa ) Absolute relation, p?ram?rthika sa?sarga Empirical relation, vy?vah?rika sa?sarga 164 superimposition, although consciousness (cetana) cannot possibly be superimposed upon ego (aha?k?ra) [because, for Ved?nta, consciousness is the substratum of not just the ego, but of the entire empirical and illusory creation], the relation (sambandha) of consciousness can be superimposed. Consciousness is absolute and not imaginary, but the identity-relation (t?d?tmya-sambandha) between consciousness and ego is imagined. In such cases, one can accept anyath?-khy?ti here, although it actually is anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. 404 [Ved?nta texts often accept the Ny?ya theory of anyath?-khy?ti as a possible explanation of cases where reality is erroneously perceived in inert objects, and in the cases of mediate erroneous cognition. This will be revisited in detail in section 6.3.5, when Ni?cald?s?s evaluation of anyath?-khy?ti is presented]. In the case of ?tm? superimposed on an?tm?, if only the relation were superimposed, then both the substratum and the superimposed relation would have the same reality, namely, empirical (vy?vah?rika), and the definition of adhy?sa [that the substratum and the superimposed have different orders of reality] would not be satisfied. Therefore, the superimposition is considered to be the absolute ?tm? qualified by the relation. ?Reality? (satt?) [i.e., the substratum, an?tm?, empirically perceived as real] is different from ?reality as consciousness? (cetana-svar?pa-satt?) [i.e., the superimposition, which has absolute reality]. The former ?reality? has gradations (utkar?a-apakar?a, lit. increase & decrease, or superiority & inferiority); there are three orders of reality: absolute (p?ram?rthika); empirical (vy?vah?rika); and illusory (pr?tibh?sika). Objects perceived in a dream have illusory reality, but the substratum of the dream is the witness-consciousness (s?k??), which has absolute reality and is thus of a different order of reality, and therefore, the definition of superimposition holds for dream objects too. (VP 7.8-9, 223-6). Superimposition can alternatively be defined as ?the manifestation [of an object] in the locus (adhikara?a) of its absence.?405 For example, where silver is erroneously perceived in mother-of-pearl, there is both absolute and empirical absence of silver in the mother-of-pearl, and the silver is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya). This may give rise to a doubt regarding whether presence (bh?va) and absence can occur in the same substratum. However, 404 Both these terms, anyath?-khy?ti and anirvacan?ya-khy?ti refer to specific theories of error, and will be taken up in sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.1 respectively. 405 See n. 402 on p. 160. 165 presence and absence can coexist in the same locus, as borne out by experience: in the locus of a pot, the absence of a pot qualified by past time does not oppose the presence of the pot. There is no opposition between the absence and presence of differing realities. The imagined object has illusory reality; its absence has either empirical or absolute reality. Similarly, in the case of a superimposition, the erroneous cognition (bhrama-j??na) and its object arise as logically indeterminate, i.e., neither real nor non-existent (anirvacan?ya), but its absence has conventional reality (VP 7.10, 226-7). Erroneous cognition [i.e., the result of superimposition] is of two kinds: mediate (parok?a), and immediate (aparok?a). All the types of superimposition described thus far can be considered immediate erroneous cognition (aparok?a bhrama). An example of mediate erroneous cognition is a fire that is erroneously inferred in a location without fire. The same erroneous conclusion can also be reached through deceitful verbal testimony. Superimposition cannot be considered to be a mediate erroneous cognition [earlier, Ni?cald?s had defined superimposition as ?an appearance (avabh?sa) in the substratum, which possesses a reality different from that of the substratum?], because the term ?appearance? implies an object (vi?aya) and its immediate cognition (aparok?a j??na). For the cases of mediate erroneous cognition, the Ny?ya anyath?-khy?ti theory is adequate. Advaita only insists on a different theory in connection with superimposition regarding immediate erroneous cognition. The non-objective (anartha) erroneous cognitions such as agency, etc., are immediate erroneous cognitions, and Advaita describes the theory of superimposition only for the invalidation (nivartyat?) [of these erroneous immediate cognitions] by means of knowledge [of one?s true nature] (VP 7.14, 233-4). Ni?cald?s posits four further objections to his explanation of superimposition and offers their refutations. 406 Objection 1: It cannot be the case that ?the substratum of a dream is the witness- consciousness (s?k??) [as was stated when defending the definition of superimposition, that the superimposition and the substratum possess different orders of reality].? Whatever is projected is cognized in conjunction with its substratum. When superimposed silver is perceived as ?this is silver,? it is perceived along with the ?this-ness? of its substratum, 406 These are presented in some detail to give a sense of Ni?cald?s?s methodology and reasoning processes (VP 7.12-13, 227-31). 166 mother-of-pearl. When agency (kart?tva) is superimposed upon ?tm?, as ?I am the doer?, it is cognized in conjunction with the ?tm?, ?I?. In a dream, if an elephant were superimposed on the witness-consciousness, then it ought to be cognized as ?I am an elephant? or ?an elephant is in me,? but this does not occur. [The objector is trying to show that the definition of superimposition does not hold in the case of dreams]. Response: Superimposition (adhy?sa) always occurs due to latent impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior experiences. These impressions are the efficient cause of superimposition, whereas the material cause of all superimpositions is ignorance (avidy?). Dependent upon whether or not the prior experience had ?I-ness,? ?in-me-ness,? or ?this-ness,? the resulting superimposition will have the same form. Since the experience of elephants is always accompanied by ?this- ness,? in a dream too, the cognition will be ?this is an elephant.? (One never sees an elephant and experiences ?I am an elephant? [or ?the elephant is in me?]). The latent impressions are inferable in accordance with the effect. Since the prior experience, which is the generator of these latent impressions, is also a superimposition, the stream of impression-experience- impression is beginning-less, and one cannot argue that there is no cause for the first experience. Objection 2: It cannot be said that ?the absence of silver in mother-of-pearl is absolute,? [as was stated while presenting the alternative definition of superimposition as the manifestation of an object in the locus of its absence], since only consciousness is absolute according to Advaita. Response: According to Ved?nta, all substances are imagined, but their absence is indeed absolute, and their absence is Brahman. This is ?a?kara?s view, and the reasoning (yukti) behind this will be explained shortly [in VP 8.78-84 and section 8.3.2, ?The illusoriness of the unreal creation?]; this is not detrimental to the Advaita position. Objection 3: [The same alternative definition of superimposition, as in Objection 2, suggests that the illusory silver perceived in mother-of-pearl is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya). It also suggests that the Ny?ya anyath?-khy?ti theory is adequate for explaining mediate erroneous cognitions, but the Advaita theory of superimposition, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, is required to explain immediate erroneous cognitions. This is under attack here]. It cannot be said that ?anirvacan?ya silver is created and destroyed in mother-of-pearl,? since if this were 167 the case, its creation and destruction would be visible. Therefore, only anyath?-khy?ti is appropriate, and anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is not possible. 407 Response: The silver in mother-of-pearl and the mother-of-pearl?s ?this-ness? in the silver are both superimposed by a mutual identity relation. That is the reason why silver appears in mother-of-pearl as ?this is silver?. Similarly, the mother-of-pearl?s property of prior-presence (pr?k-siddhatva-dharma) is superimposed on silver; therefore, instead of ?Now silver is produced,? the cognition ?I see previously produced silver? occurs. To accept the arising of logically indeterminate prior-production (anirvacan?ya-pr?g-j?tatva) in silver would give rise to undue complexity (gaurava). It is possible to posit that the cognition of the mother-of- pearl?s prior-production in silver requires accepting anyath?-khy?ti, as some Advaitins do. However, it is proper (sam?c?na) in this situation to accept the fact that the indeterminate relation of the mother-of-pearl?s property of prior-existence arises in silver, which then opposes the cognition of the perception of the silver being produced in the present. As to the cognition of the silver?s destruction, when the substratum, mother-of-pearl, is cognized, the silver is destroyed via the ascertainment of its negation, i.e., that there is no silver in the mother-of-pearl in the past, present and future; silver is always absent in the mother-of-pearl. The destruction of the imagined silver takes place due to the cognition of the mother-of-pearl substratum, which alone remains. The cessation (niv?tti) of the material cause, ignorance, as well as of that which was imagined (kalpita), occurs through the cognition of the substratum. Objection 4: That which is not real is unreal, and that which is not unreal is real. It is improper to say that the erroneously cognized silver, etc., are neither real nor unreal but logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya). [In refuting this objection to the need for a third, logically indeterminate state, Ni?cald?s provides the Advaita definition of the term anirvacan?ya]. Response: This objection would be true if ?other than real or unreal (sad-asad-vilak?a?a)? meant something that was neither with nor without form (svar?pa). But here ?real (sat)? means that which cannot be negated (b?dhita) in the past, present and future, while ?other than real (sad-vilak?a?a)? is that which is negated. ?Unreal (asat)? means that which has no form, such as the ?hare of a horn? or ?son of a barren woman,? ?other than unreal (asad- 407 Anyath?-khy?ti and anirvacan?ya-khy?ti will be discussed in great detail shortly, in sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.1 respectively. 168 vilak?a?a)? is that which has form. Thus, ?other than real or unreal? is that which has a form and can be negated.408 6.3 Theories of Error, Khy?ti-v?da In describing and defending the Advaita theory of superimposition (adhy?sa) [the process whereby erroneous cognition occurs], Ni?cald?s cites the Advaita theory of erroneous cognition, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, as the only one capable of satisfactorily explaining immediate erroneous cognitions. He also cites the Ny?ya theory, anyath?-khy?ti, which he claims is adequate for explaining mediate erroneous cognitions. Therefore, Ni?cald?s now presents the various theories of error (khy?ti-v?da) subscribed to by different schools of thought, starting with his own, the Advaita anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. After the soundness of the Advaita theory is established and defended against objections from within the Advaita framework, each of the five non-Advaita theories is explained from the standpoint of its respective proponent and is then shown to be lacking from the Advaita perspective. 409 6.3.1 Anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da, The Advaita Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Logically Indeterminate For Advaita, only the anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-v?da theory, that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), provides a satisfactory explanation of immediate erroneous cognitions. All objects of erroneous cognition, including the apparent creation (sa?s?ra), are not unreal (asat) because they possess form and a relative reality until they are recognized as false. However, these objects are not real (sat) either, as they can be negated through knowledge. For something to be considered real in Advaita, it needs to be non-negatable (ab?dhita) in all three times ? past, present and future (trik?la). Since only Brahman satisfies this criterion, anything other than Brahman in unreal from the absolute (p?ram?rthika) perspective, even though it may possess empirical (vy?vah?rika) or illusory (pr?tibh?sika) reality. In order to gain the knowledge of Brahman, one must understand the process by which erroneous cognitions occur. This section presents Ni?cald?s's treatment of 408 As Potter states, ?falsity must have a status above negation but below reality. It is not real (sat) like Brahman, but it isn?t unreal (asat) like nonsense either? (1963, 221). 409 The objections and refutations presented are between Advaita and the respective systems, but from the Advaita perspective. For a good general treatment of khy?ti-v?da, including inter-system arguments, see Perceptual Error: The Indian Theories (Rao 1998). Also Sinha (1969, 74-120), Mohanty (2000, 32-5), Raju (1985, s.v. ?Doctrine of Error? for individual systems). 169 anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, which continues the discussion of superimposition begun in the previous section (section 6.2). First, the mechanics of an erroneous cognition by means of a v?tti is analyzed. In order to demonstrate the incorrectness of the view of an Advaitin named Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB), Ni?cald?s next (in section 6.3.1.1) undertakes the investigation of the agency (kara?at?) of superimposition, whether it is the general cognition of the substratum, the miscognition of the substratum?s particular portion, or simply the contact of the senses with the substratum. Without going into the detailed debate between KCNB and the proponent of substantive cognition (dharmi-j??na-v?din, DJV), the following section (6.3.1.2) then presents a summary of four views concerning the locus of the erroneous cognition, a discussion of their relative merits, and the determination of which view accords with the Advaita tradition. When an erroneous cognition of a snake occurs on a rope, the rope?s general characteristic (s?m?nya), ?this-ness,? is perceived by the eyes that have a defect. This gives rise to the anta?-kara?a?s ?this-ness? v?tti in the rope, which then becomes non-separate from the cognizer?s consciousness delimited by ?this-ness,? and the rope?s general ?this- ness? is thereby immediately cognized. To explain the process of perception by means of a v?tti, Ni?cald?s draws an analogy to the case of water in a reservoir that becomes indistinct from water in a [submerged] field when connected to the reservoir via a canal; as a result the water in the canal is also indistinct from the water in the field.410 Analogously, ?water in the reservoir? is the cognizer?s consciousness, the canal is the v?tti, ?water in the canal? is the v?tti?s consciousness [thought to go out of the eye or other appropriate sense-organ to the object being perceived and assume the object?s form], the field is the object, and ?water in the field? is consciousness manifesting as the object [abbreviated henceforth as ?object- consciousness?]. The object-delimited consciousness is the substratum for all objects. When the being (satt?) of cognizer-consciousness becomes the being (satt?) of the object via the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti, that object is perceptually cognized (pratyak?a). The cognizer- consciousness is the basis of the immediate v?tti?s object, and its being becomes indistinct from the object?s being; hence, the identity of the cognizer-consciousness with the object occurs. For this to happen, the v?tti is considered to extend to the object. The tradition holds 410 A similar analogy is made in Ved?nta-paribh??? in connection with perception (Adhvar?ndra 1972, 14-16). 170 that for an erroneous cognition (bhrama), the general attribute (?this-ness?) of the substratum is validly perceptually cognized (pratyak?a pram?), and subsequently the erroneous cognition of the snake arises (VP 7.15, 234-6). The objection can be raised that, since ignorance is removed by immediate cognition (aparok?a pram?), 411 the removal of ignorance occurs in the object-consciousness due to the immediate cognition of the ?this-ness? of rope, mother-of-pearl, etc. Now, since the material cause (ignorance) is no longer present, the snake and its erroneous cognition cannot arise. Ni?cald?s presents Sarvaj??tman?s refutation of this objection from the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka412 as follows: Although the ignorance in the ?this? portion of the object is removed by the v?tti, the ignorance of its particular portion (vi?e?a a??a) is not removed. This ignorance is the cause of the superimposition, and the superimposition is only removed by the knowledge of the particular portion. The ignorance of the general (s?m?nya) portion is not the cause for superimposition; rather the cognition of the general portion of the substratum is a cause for the superimposition, and the general portion causes a perturbation (k?obha) of the ignorance, which is the material cause for the superimposition (VP 7.16, 236-7). 6.3.1.1 The agency (kara?at?) of superimposition Ni?cald?s next takes up for consideration the viewpoint expressed by one Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB), that the contact of the eyes with the substratum alone is the cause for superimposition, so there is no need for two parts in any superimposition. Not much is known about this exponent beyond the fact that this view is attributed to KCNB and is presented at length by Appayya D?k?ita in his Siddh?nta-le?a- sa?graha (SLS).413 There (in the SLS), Appayya D?k?ita simply presents but does not render any judgment on KCNB?s views. In the K????la?k?ra commentary to SLS, however, the commentator Acyutak???a T?rtha refutes KCNB from the perspective of a dharmi-j??na-v?d? (DJV), i.e., one who accepts that the ?this-ness? v?tti of an object mistaken for something else is cognized and that it serves as the substratum for the superimposition. Dharmi-j??na can also be termed substantive cognition. Ni?cald?s is of the opinion that, although KCNB 411 This will be elaborated on in VP 8.126-44, discussed in section 9.1.3, ?The immediacy (aparok?at?) of knowledge and its object.? 412 S? 1.29-38 (Sarvaj??tman 1972, 14-18). 413 S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri places the date of KCNB in the vicinity of 1283 CE (1930, 52-3). 171 was an Advaitin, his views were against traditional views; 414 therefore, Ni?cald?s takes up KCNB?s arguments and the DJV counterarguments at length in order to refute the KCNB stance (VP 7.17, 237-8).415 KCNB does not accept that the general cognition (s?m?nya-j??na) of the substratum (adhi??h?na) is the cause of the superimposition. But when the general cognition of the substratum is held to be the cause of the superimposition [the traditional view], the superimposition does not require ignorance of the ?this-ness? portion. To make this clear, Sarvaj??tman, in his Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (S?), 416 takes up the difference between substratum (adhi??h?na) and locus (?dh?ra).417 The substratum is the object of ignorance, along with its effect (savil?sa); for example, the rope, as the object of ignorance, is the substratum, and the effect [of the ignorance of the rope] is the [misperceived] snake. The locus is that whose manifestation (sphura?a) occurs in the superimposed object without being differentiated from that object, for example, ?this is a snake.? In this [S?] view, we have: ?The general ?this? portion of the locus and the substratum are [jointly] the object of one cognition,? as in ?this is a snake.? If, as in the KCNB view, we have, ?The locus and the substratum are [jointly] the object of one cognition,? then the erroneous cognition would be of the form ?the rope is a snake?. Therefore, the ignorance of a particular portion alone is the cause of superimposition (VP 7.17, 238). Prak???tman (1000 CE), the author of the Pa?cap?dik? Vivara?a (PPV), explains the agency (kara?at?) of superposition differently. Ignorance has two powers, concealment (?vara?a) and projection (vik?epa). The concealment portion of the mother-of-pearl- delimited ignorance is removed by the cognition (j??na) [of the mother-of-pearl], but the projection portion of the mother-of-pearl-delimited ignorance is not opposed by cognition and hence is not removed. For example, the ?below? portion of a tree is erroneously cognized 414 VP 7.17, 238. 415 Without further careful analysis, I am presently unable to determine whether Ni?cald?s is merely reproducing Acyutak???a?s arguments here or providing his own independent critique, though they both arrive at the same conclusion, that only the DJV position is tenable. 416 The Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (S?) is a condensed metrical version of the BS ?Bh by Sarvaj??tman (1050 CE). Though some consider him a disciple of Sure?vara, this is not the case (Sarvaj??tman 1972, 1-5; Thangaswami 1980, 238-9). 417 S? 1.31-2: sa?siddh? savil?sa-moha-vi?aye vastuny ashi??h?na-g?r n?dh?re adhyasanasya vastuni ? adhi????nam ?dh?ra-m?tra? yadi sy?t prasajyeta tad? codyam etat; na caitat sakaryasya mohasya vastuny adhi??h?na-g?r-gocare loka- siddh?. ?The term ?substratum? is well established in the thing which is the object of ignorance along with its manifestation, and not in the thing that is the locus of the superimposed. ? If the locus alone were the substratum, then truly this objection [of mutual superimposition, also raised by KCNB] would hold, but it is not so. It is well known that the term ?substratum? is used in connection with the objects of ignorance and its effects.? 172 on seeing it reflected in water. When a person who is liberated while alive (j?van-mukta) has immediate perception of oneness with Brahman, the portion of ignorance delimited by its power of concealment is removed, but not the portion delimited by its power of projection (VP 7.18, 238-9). According to S?, the property of being the substratum (adhi??h?nat?) is in the particular portion of the object, and not in the general portion, whereas the property of being the locus (?dh?rat?) is in the general portion, not in the particular portion. The ?this-ness? of the rope, mother-of-pearl, etc., can be cognized via the means of cognition, but because their rope- ness, mother-of-pearl-ness is not available for cognition, and their particular form remains unknown; therefore, their particular form possesses the substratum-ness (adhi??h?nat?). According to PPV, the property of being a substratum (adhi??h?nat?) is in the general portion alone. The content (vi?ayat?) of valid cognition (pram?) is the object?s ?this-ness,? and although the ?this-ness? opposes the projection power, yet the content of the ignorance due to concealing power is possible even when [the ?this-ness? is] known. Therefore, the ?this-ness? alone is the substratum of silver. The subtlety [reconciling the S? and PPV views] lies in the fact that the concealing performed by ignorance occurs in consciousness alone.418 The content of cognition produced by its means (pram??a), i.e., the valid cognition (prameyat?) resulting from the overthrow of the concealment, also occurs in consciousness alone. Similarly, the substratum of all superimpositions is consciousness alone. 419 Since inert objects are themselves superimposed, how can they be the substratum of other superimpositions? The object of the primary ignorance (m?l?j??na)420 is undivided (niravayava), non-delimited (niravacchinna), all- pervasive (vibh?) consciousness, whereas the object of the secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na) is consciousness delimited by the object. 421 Thus, consciousness contains the inert objects that are the delimiters of the states of ignorance, knowledge, and superimposition. Ignorance, etc., are possible in these inert objects by the relationships of delimitation (avacchedakat?- 418 Ni?cald?s is careful to point out that the concealment due to ignorance is not accepted in inert objects that are naturally concealed, similar to being born blind, i.e., the concealment is with regards to empirical reality. VP 7.19, 240: svabh?va sai? ?v?ta-r?pa janm?ndha ke sam?na ja?a-pad?rthana mai? aj??na-k?ta ?vara?a k? a?g?k?ra nah??. 419 This is from the absolute (p?ram?rthika) standpoint. 420 Primary ignorance (m?l?j??na / m?l?vidy?) is the ignorance of Brahman. 421 Primary and secondary ignorance are discussed in greater detail in VP 8.38-47 and will be treated in sections 8.1 and 8.2. 173 sambandha). Therefore, the superimposition of a snake on a rope can be interpreted in two ways: S1. When the senses come into contact with the cause of the erroneous cognition of snake, namely the rope, the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a arises as a valid cognition of the general portion (s?m?nya-j??na-pram?), namely, the object?s ?this-ness?. The projecting (k?obha-vat? = vik?epa-vat?) ignorance gets transformed together with this cognition of the general portion, into a snake, etc. [This is the PPV view]. S2. The portion of ignorance in consciousness delimited by the object such as rope, etc., gets transformed into the object-form as snake, etc., and the portion of ignorance in consciousness delimited by the ?this? form (idam?k?ra) v?tti gets transformed into knowledge. The rope-delimited consciousness is the substratum of the snake; the ?this? v?tti-delimited consciousness is the substratum of the snake cognition. [This is the S? view] (VP 7.19, 239-41). The latter [S?] interpretation (S2) can be objected to422 as follows. It is inappropriate to describe the distinction between the object and its cognition with regard to their material cause and substratum, since the consciousness delimited by the object and the consciousness delimited by the v?tti are the same when there arises a perceptual v?tti of the ?this-ness?. 1) If the substratum of the [superimposed] snake-object is held to be different from the substratum of its cognition, then, by cognition of the substratum, the cognition of the snake will not be removed, since that which is superimposed is removed by cognition of the substratum. 2) If the removal of the superimposed object occurs by the cognition of the substratum of something else, then by the cognition of the rope substratum of the superimposed snake, the empirical creation (sa?s?ra) superimposed [on Brahman] should also be removed. Ni?cald?s responds to this by stating that where there is a distinction caused by an up?dhi (?limiting adjunct, condition?), and by the removal of the up?dhi, the distinction of the object is also removed. [The term up?dhi is typically rendered in English rather opaquely as ?limiting adjunct? or ?adventitious condition,? and I have chosen to leave it untranslated. An up?dhi indicates an entity that conditions something else, whereby the up?dhi?s attributes are perceived to belong to the other object. The typical example is a clear crystal, which appears 422 Presumably by KCNB. 174 red in color due to the proximity of a red flower behind it; the red flower is the up?dhi of the crystal, which is not really red but is conditioned to appear red by its up?dhi. An up?dhi may limit another entity instead of conditioning it: limitless space appears as pot-space due to the pot-up?dhi, and as hut-space due to the hut-up?dhi. Similarly, Brahman as consciousness appears in varied forms ? j?va, ??vara, knower, known, knowledge ? based on the associated up?dhis. The conditioning or limiting by the up?dhi is only apparent and not real]. Where there are two up?dhis in one location, there too, that which is limited or conditioned (upahita) remains the same, and in that location the two properties reside in the form of their up?dhi-ness (upahitatva-r?pa). For example, the same space (?k??a) can have two up?dhis, pot-formed and hut-formed, and can be differentiated accordingly, but when the up?dhis are destroyed, the space then becomes one and the same. In the rope-snake superimposition, when the v?tti goes out to the location of the rope-object, although the consciousness conditioned by the v?tti becomes the same as the consciousness conditioned by the object, on account of the existence of the two up?dhis, two qualities (dharma) reside in consciousness: 1) the state of being v?tti-conditioned (v?tti-upahitatva); and 2) the state of being rope-conditioned (rajju-upahitatva). The latter (2) is the delimiting (avacchedaka) quality of the substratum-ness (adhi??h?nat?) of the snake-object, and the former (1) is the delimiting quality of the substratum-ness of the snake-cognition. The material cause for each state?s substratum-ness is the respective portion of ignorance (aj??n???a). Although the consciousness is the same, and although the object and the v?tti are in the same place, it is not improper to talk of the difference between the material cause and the substratum because of the up?dhis. That is why, by knowing one substratum it is possible to end the superimposed object and its cognition (VP 7.20, 241-2). Regarding the former [PPV] interpretation of superimposition (S1), there are two ways in which the erroneous cognition can be explained relative to the valid cognition of ?this-ness? (ida?t?), defined as ?the relation to the present time and present location (purode?a).? 1) While the imagined object may seem empirically real due to the ?this-ness? residing in the substratum being perceived, the ?this-ness? does not reside in the imagined object. If the erroneous cognition were to reside entirely in the superimposed object, then the cognition would be of the type ?silver? as opposed to ?This is silver.? The cognition of the relation (sambandha) itself does not occur without the relatum (sambandh?); thus, the 175 immediate erroneous cognition of ?this-ness? in the realm of the superimposed cannot occur without the ?this-ness? residing in the substratum. The ?this-ness? is perceived in two ways: a) the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti in the form of a valid cognition of ?this? by the contact of the senses and the substratum; and b) a v?tti as an erroneous cognition of snake, silver, etc., which is the transformation of ignorance present in the consciousness conditioned by the v?tti in the form of ?this?. This [second] v?tti also is related to the ?this,? creating the identity of the ?this-ness? with the superimposed object its object. Thus in all cases, immediate erroneous cognitions having the form ?this? are in the form of the superimposed object. 2) According to many authors, the transformation of ignorance into an empirical substance is not possible; it can only be transformed into an illusory substance and an erroneous cognition. Thus, the object of an erroneous cognition can only be the superimposed object, and not the ?this? of the substratum. For the v?tti as a valid cognition of ?this? in the substratum, an indeterminate (anirvacan?ya) relation to its ?this-ness? arises in the ?this-ness?-devoid erroneous cognition and thus it is perceived as possessing ?this-ness?. Alternatively, in an erroneous cognition, an anirvacan?ya relation can be considered to arise with the object of the v?tti of ?this-ness?, which allows for the perception of ?this- ness? in the superimposition. Or, the consciousness delimited by the ?this-ness? v?tti is the substratum of erroneous cognition. At the location of the erroneous cognition, two cognitions occur in ?This is a snake.? The valid cognition v?tti has the form ?this,? the erroneous cognition v?tti has the snake-form. The ?this? v?tti is the substratum of the erroneous cognition v?tti by a delimiting relation (avacchedakat? sambandha), and the two have an identity relation (abheda sambandha). The ancient (pr?c?na) view that ?the superimposed and the substratum are both objects of one cognition (j??na)? may seem invalidated by the two-v?tti view stated here, but in this statement, the cognition does not imply that they are both objects of one v?tti, but rather they are objects of one witness (s?k??). 6.3.1.2 The KCNB-DJV debate on the locus of an erroneous cognition: a summary With the considerations presented in the prior section, Ni?cald?s has set the stage to go deeper into the debate between KCNB and the DJV (dharmi-j??na-v?din, the proponent of 176 substantive cognition), which he examines at considerable length (VP 7.22-37, 246-71), but I will not enter into the details here. KCNB?s position is also presented in SLS 1.5.153 (D?ks?ita and Suryanarayana Sastri 1935-37, 1:220-33, 2:52-60).423 The debate between KCNB and the DJV as presented by Acyutak???a T?rtha in his K????la?k?ra commentary to SLS, is also available in Revathy (1990, 239-84, notes: 75-90). 424 Ni?cald?s concludes the section on anirvacan?ya-khy?ti by summarizing four views on the locus of the erroneous cognition: 1) KCNB?s view, where just one cognition in the form of a transformation of the anta?- kara?a occurs by the connection of a defective sense and an object. This cognition is erroneous; it takes the general portion of the substratum and the superimposed object jointly as the object. This opinion does not accept the valid cognition of just the general portion of the substratum. 2) Immediately following the valid general cognition in the form of ?this,? the erroneous cognition ?this is a snake/silver? that occurs is but the transformation of ignorance (avidy?). Making the general portion of the substratum its object, the erroneous cognition creates the superimposed object. Thus, the resulting object is of the form of ?this? and the superimposed object. 3) The general cognition as ?this,? which is the cause of the superimposition is a valid cognition, and in the instant following it, the cognition, which is the transformation of ignorance in the realm of snake/silver, is erroneous. Therefore, it is not related to the substratum but only to the superimposed object. That erroneous cognition does not have the objectivity of the ?this?-substance (ida?-pad?ratha-vi?ayakatva), since cognition of its substratum does possess the objectivity of the ?this?-substance. However, an anirvacan?ya relation to ?this? arises in the erroneous cognition. Thus, that erroneous cognition is only of the form of the superimposed object. According to Ni?cald?s, (2) and (3) fall under DJV, substantive cognition. (3) alone is proper (sam?c?na). 4) Within DJV, there are some authors who hold a third alternative. Their view is that since the cause of superimposition is the general cognition of the substratum, there is 423 See also Sastri (1930) for an earlier translation and a little more context. 424 I intend to compare Ni?cald?s?s treatment of the KCNB-DJV debate to that rendered by Acyutak???a in greater detail in the near future. It is however outside the scope of this dissertation. 177 no need to consider a separate v?tti of ignorance pertaining to the snake, silver, etc. The ?this?-form v?tti of the anta?-kara?a pertaining to the substratum is accepted as the cause of superimposition, and the consciousness manifest in the v?tti itself illumines the snake/silver/etc. Thus, the snake, etc., as cognized (j?eya), are the transformations of ignorance, but ignorance is not transformed into cognition (j??na). Like the KCNB view (1), this last view (4) is only the superimposition of an object onto a substratum (arth?dhy?sa); there is no acceptance of superimposition of the knowledge of an object onto the knowledge of the substratum (j??n?dhy?sa) here. Like the KCNB view, it is also opposed to all the utterances of the teachers (?rya-vacana) and to reason (yukti), because it does not allow for erroneous cognition. Here, the ?this?-cognition that occurs is in the form of a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a due to the contact of the senses and substratum, and pertains to the substratum alone; thus it is a valid cognition (pram?). No other cognition is accepted by this view, thus erroneous cognition is not possible. 425 It is thus agreed that the v?tti-cognition is in the form of the transformation of ignorance as the superimposed, and it differs from the ?this?-form general cognition. There are two possibilities [for the cognition of the superimposition]. In the first, an anirvacan?ya cognition occurs, pertaining to the substratum and the superimposed. This is not proper, because if the false, anirvacan?ya cognition pertains to both, then the defect of the mixing of validity and error arises. Therefore, the second possibility alone is valid: in the instant after the ?this?- form general cognition, only the v?tti of ignorance pertaining to the superimposed object occurs, and just as the snake, silver, etc., are false, their cognition also is false, and therefore, as with the negation of the snake, etc., their cognitions too are negated. Further, the illumination of the superimposed cannot be due to the witness manifest in the ?this?-form valid cognition v?tti alone. If this were the case then, since the witness is always non-negatable, and the ?this?-form v?tti, being the transformation of the anta?-kara?a, is also not negatable in the conventional sense; then the negation of the cognition of the superimposed would not occur without the knowledge of Brahman. 425 Ni?cald?s provides a detailed refutation of the fourth view of superimposition in VP 7.38, 272-4. 178 Wrapping up the discussion on erroneous cognition in Ved?nta, Ni?cald?s sums up these four positions. Wherever erroneous cognition pertaining to snake, silver, etc., occurs, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti alone is accepted, and the four views may be summarized as follows. KCNB holds that the contact of a defective sense with the substratum alone is the cause of superimposition, and the general cognition of the substratum is not the cause (view 1 above). In the other teachers? views, the general cognition of the substratum alone is the cause of superimposition. General cognition is also called substantive cognition (dharmi-j??na). The remaining three views all are variants of this DJV (dharmi-j??na-v?da). Of these three DJV views, only one is proper, namely view 3: ?the erroneous cognition is of the form of a v?tti of ignorance (avidy?) in the shape of the superimposed object.? View 2, ?the v?tti is in the form of ?this? pertaining to the substratum as well as in the form of the superimposed as a transformation of avidy?,? and view 4, ?only the general cognition is required, which is of the form of a ?this?-v?tti and is the cause of the superimposition; there is no acceptance of the ignorance-v?tti pertaining to the superimposed,? are improper. Ni?cald?s concludes the discussion of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, saying ?We have clarified the merits and demerits according to the ancient authors themselves. If it be considered independently, all four views have similar merits and demerits. In truth, the intent of Advaita is only to demonstrate the unreality of empirical world, there is no purpose apart from this in propounding or refuting subdivisions (av?ntara bheda). Thus, even if some refuted view alone were established in a seeker?s intellect, there would be no harm. But here we have provided the reasoning only according to one view in order to prevent [a seeker] from going off on a wrong path, other than the way [shown by] the ancient teachers (pr?c?na ?c?rya).? 426 If an incorrect model of superimposition succeeds in delivering the knowledge of non- duality, then there is no harm done! Ni?cald?s then provides a closing verse (doh?):427 ni?cala-bina kinahu na likh?, bh??? mai? yaha r?ti; khy?ti anirvacan?ya k? pekahu sujana sapr?ti. 426 VP 7.39, 275: is r?ti sai? pr?c?na-granthak?ro? nai? jo likhy? hai, tiske anus?ra h? hamnai? d??a?a-bh??a?a likhe hai?. apane? buddhi ke bala sai? vic?ra kara?? tau in c?ro? matan mai? d??a?a-bh??a?a sam?na hai?. au prapa?ca ke mithy?tva s?dhana mai? advaita-v?da k? abhinive?a hai, av?ntara-mata-bheda ke pratip?dana mai? v? ka??ana mai? abhinive?a nah??, y?tai? kis? jij??s? k?? ka??ita pak?a h? buddhi mai? ?r??ha hovai tau kachu h?ni nah?? au ekah? mata ke anuk?la hamna?? yukti likh? hai? so pr?c?na ?c?ryana ke m?rga sai? utpatha-gamana ke nirodh?rtha likh? hai?. 427 In VP, there are only three doh?s. Besides this one, the other two occur at 1.1 and 8.28. 179 Apart from Ni?cald?s, no one has written in this manner in the vernacular On anirvacan?ya khy?ti. Look at [it] with favor, good people. We turn next to Ni?cald?s?s examination of five non-Advaita theories of erroneous cognition (khy?ti-v?da) and their inadequacies as compared to anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. 6.3.2 Sat-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Real The proponent of sat-khy?ti, 428 the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real, holds that, along with the components of mother-of-pearl, the components of silver also are ever present, and these too are real, not false. By the contact with defective eyes, real silver arises from the real silver components. By the cognition of mother-of-pearl, the destruction of the real silver into its components occurs. This view is to be refuted by Ved?nta because the aim of the mother-of-pearl-silver example is simply to allow inference of the unreality (mithy?tva) of the created world. But the silver in mother-of-pearl is real according to the theory of sat-khy?ti, and so, taking it up as an example, one would be unable to establish the unreality of the world. The defect of this theory is that after the proper cognition of mother- of-pearl, the non-existence of silver in mother-of-pearl is apprehended in all three times (past, present and future). According to Advaita, the anirvacan?ya silver is only present in the mother-of-pearl in the present, but the real (vy?vah?rika) silver is absent [in the mother-of- pearl] in all three times, which is why the real silver is not opposed by the illusory silver. But if, according to sat-khy?ti, real silver resides in mother-of-pearl, then, at that very moment [when the mother-of-pearl is cognized], the absence of real silver should not be possible. But the latter is true, so to say that real silver is present is incorrect. Further, in Advaita, there is no need for any apparatus to produce the anirvacan?ya silver, since its arising is possible merely due to defective senses and ignorance. But the production of real silver is not possible without the use of a well-known apparatus, and, since there is no such apparatus in mother- of-pearl, the production of silver in mother-of-pearl is false (VP 7.41-2, 276-7). The sat-khy?ti proponent claims that despite the silver in mother-of-pearl being illusory (pr?tibh?sika), it is empirically real. Either the silver disappears in the instant after the silver- cognition disappears, or else the silver disappears on account of the cognition of mother-of- 428 The proponents of sat-khy?ti-v?da are not named by Ni?cald?s, but include the Vi?i???dvaita followers of R?m?nuja. 180 pearl or some other object, this cognition being the cause of the disappearance of the silver- cognition. The silver-cognition and the silver disappear in the same instant. However, even if this is accepted, the sat-khy?ti-v?da is still defective. If, at the very instant when there is erroneous cognition of silver in mother-of-pearl, the mother-of-pearl comes in contact with fire and in the next instant is destroyed leaving behind only ashes, then there is no means for the cessation of silver-cognition and silver should be obtained, because the silver substance possesses luminosity (taijasa) and cannot be destroyed. 429 Thus, according to Ni?cald?s, the sat-khy?ti theory that ?in the location of erroneous cognition, empirically real silver is perceived? is always incorrect. Moreover, in the case where ten persons erroneously see diverse objects in one and the same rope, such as a stick, a garland, a snake, a stream of water, etc., the components of all these objects cannot possibly be present in the limited space of the rope, because material substances (m?rta dravya) occupy space. As the components of all these objects cannot remain in the small location of erroneous cognition, namely, the rope, how can they even be possible? In the [Advaita] doctrine (siddh?nta), since the stick, etc., are anirvacan?ya, they do not occupy any empirical space. If sat-khy?ti were also not to accept the space-constraint effects of the erroneous cognitions such as stick, etc., then it would be futile and contrary to consider them real. Thus, according to Ni?cald?s, only anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is resoundingly (bal?tk?ra se) proven because the stick, etc., are only apprehended and have no other demonstrable effect. If the arising of a real object in the location of erroneous cognition were indeed accepted, as a result, if the erroneous cognition of water were to occur in salty soil with heated coals, then the coals would be extinguished by the erroneous water. If fire were erroneously cognized in a mass of gu?j? berries430 held above cotton (t?la), the cotton would get burnt. If it is said that an object arising due to a defective cause is not apprehended by others, but only by the one whose defect caused the object, then the erroneously cognized water and fire in these instances lack wetness and burning capacity. Thus, Ni?cald?s suggests that to call the 429 Ni?cald?s appears to be using a Ny?ya argument here: tejas is a substance (dravya) in Ny?ya, and metals are a special category under it: gold, and presumably by extension, silver are non-earth-like minerals that cannot be destroyed. See TS 12 (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 8, 111-4) and EIP (6:145-6). 430 Abrus precatorius, commonly known as Indian Licorice, Rosary Pea, Crab?s Eyes, Precatory pea/bean, is bright red in color and is held to convey the illusion of the vine being on fire when seen at a distance. 181 erroneously cognized objects real is merely a cause for ridicule, since on one hand, the components do not have any spatial constraints, and on the other hand, the whole object is incapable of exerting any effect. Ni?cald?s concludes that sat-khy?ti-v?da is not possible in any manner, and is always unreasonable. He writes that he made no mention of sat-khy?ti in VS, because only a position that can somehow be explained and be fit for refutation by logic is worth describing. Although sat-khy?ti is completely untenable, however, if it were not described anywhere, the reader might conclude that the author was not aware of sat-khy?ti. Therefore, Ni?cald?s says he has written about sat-khy?ti here only to dispel this incorrect conclusion (VP 7.46, 280- 1).431 6.3.3 Asat-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Unreal Ni?cald?s considers the asat-khy?ti theory, that the object of erroneous cognition is unreal, also to be totally devoid of reason and counter to experience. Although he feels this view is not even worthy of denial, this theory is well known as a rival (prati-dvandvin) of the Vedas, and its refutation has also been explained in the Brahma-s?tra. Therefore, the refutation of asat-khy?ti is necessary here. There are two proponents of asat-khy?ti; one of them is the heterodox M?dhyamika Buddhists (n?stika-??nya-v?d?), 432 according to whom, all objects are unreal (asat); therefore, leave alone the silver in mother-of-pearl, even the mother-of-pearl itself is non-existent. There is false silver [projected] on a false substratum; therefore, all erroneous cognition is without basis (niradhi??h?na), and its knower, knowledge, etc., are all unreal. This view has been refuted at length in the BS 2.2, tarka-p?da section, 433 and is always contrary to experience. It posits that everything is nothing but void (??nya), and therefore, no empirical practice should be provable. If the void were empirical then fire could be used in place of 431 ?sat-khy?ti-v?da k? upap?dan nah?? sambhavai, y?tai? isa grantha mai? bh? lekhan?ya nah??, tath?pi sarvath? likhe vin? adhyet? k?? ais? bhram hoy j?vai [ki] grantha-kart? k?? sat-khy?ti-v?da k? j??n nah?? th?. tis bhrama k? niv?tti v?stai ih?? likhy? hai? (VP 7.46, 281). Arguments refuting the apparatus of real silver in mother-of-pearl (VP 7. 43-5, 277- 80) have not been presented here. 432 One must bear in mind that what follow is Ni?cald?s (and the Advaita school?s) view of Buddhism. As Srinivasa Rao states, ? many non-Buddhist philosophical works contain an account of Asat-khy?ti and ?tma-khy?ti as a p?rvapak?a [prima facie viewpoint] which they all subsequently refute; but none of these works contain any account of the answers given by the Buddhists in defence [sic] of their position. ? An important issue that emerges from the above is whether the Buddhists did actually hold these theories attributed to them by their rival schools? (1998, 48). 433 Specifically, BS 2.2, adhikara?a 5, vv. 28-32. 182 water, and vice versa, since water and fire are neither real nor false, but simply non-existent. There is only the void element (tattva) which is the same everywhere and has no particulars. If particularity were accepted in the void, then the posited view would be defective, since the particular itself would be different from the void. It may be argued that ?there is a particular in the void which is called variety (vilak?a?at?), by means of which empirical differences occur. But ultimately, that variety, the empirical practice derived from it, and the agent of the empirical act, all are void. Therefore, there is no defect.? This too is not possible because it is contradictory even to say that there is particularity in the void. By admitting to the void, particularity is relinquished, and then empirical differentiation is not possible. Thus, M?dhyamika is false (al?ka). The other proponents of asat-khy?ti are some followers of Tantra (tantrik). According to them, empirical objects are not unreal; only the objects of erroneous cognition which Advaita considers anirvacan?ya, such as silver, etc., are unreal. Therefore, even though empirical silver, etc., are in their own place, they have no relation with mother-of-pearl. Unlike [the Ny?ya theory of] anyath?-khy?ti, silver-ness is not apprehended in mother-of-pearl. Nor is anirvacan?ya silver produced in mother-of-pearl, nor do two cognitions arise (as in akhy?ti), nor are the mother-of-pearl, cognizer and cognition all unreal (as in M?dhyamika). Instead, mother-of-pearl, its cognizer, cognition, etc., are real; however, when defective eyes come in contact with mother-of-pearl, then the mother-of-pearl is not cognized, and therefore, only the apprehension of unreal silver takes place in the location of mother-of-pearl. In anyath?- khy?ti too, since the silver in the location of mother-of-pearl is held to be unreal, while the silver in a mine or market is considered real, these two views appear to be similar. But in anyath?-khy?ti, the silver-ness in real silver in another location is considered to appear in the mother-of-pearl, whereas in the [tantrik] asat-khy?ti, although real silver in another location has been accepted, the appearance of its silver-ness in the mother-of-pearl location is not accepted; instead, only an unreal cognition of silver is believed to occur. Wherever the contact of defective eyes occurs with mother-of-pearl and the erroneous cognition of silver arises, the object of that cognition is neither just mother-of-pearl, nor just silver. Moreover, as soon as mother-of-pearl is cognized, in the very next instant it is known that ?there is no silver here in all three times [past, present and future].? The erroneous cognition of silver, 183 lacking an object, is considered unreal, and this unreal cognition is called asat-khy?ti (VP 7.48, 282-3). There is also the asat-khy?ti theory, held by the author of the Ny?ya-v?caspatya. 434 Where erroneous cognition of silver occurs at the moment of eye contact with mother-of- pearl, the object of the erroneous cognition is mother-of-pearl, but, because of the defect [in the eye], both the mother-of-pearl-ness in mother-of-pearl, as well as the inherence of mother-of-pearl-ness in mother-of-pearl, are not visible. Instead, the inherence of silver-ness appears in mother-of-pearl, where it is not actually present. The inherence (samav?ya) between silver-ness as adjunct (rajatatva-pratiyogika) and mother-of-pearl as locus (?ukty- anuyogika) is always unknown and unreal; thus, its apprehension is termed asat-khy?ti. Although the inherence of silver-ness in silver, where silver-ness is the adjunct (pratiyogin), is well known, and the inherence of mother-of-pearl-ness as the adjunct in mother-of-pearl as the locus (anuyogin) is also well known, silver-ness as adjunct (rajatatva-pratiyogika) is only well known in the case of inherence in silver as the locus (anuyogin) and not in mother-of- pearl. Thus, since inherence where silver-ness is the pratiyogin and mother-of-pearl is the locus is not well known (aprasiddha), it is unreal and its apprehension is called asat-khy?ti. That of which mother-of-pearl is the locus, i.e., the property-possessor (dharmin), is called inherence where mother-of-pearl is the locus (?ukty-anuyogika samav?ya); that of which silver-ness is an adjunct, i.e., a property (dharma), is called inherence where silver-ness is the adjunct (rajatatva-pratiyogika samav?ya). Inherence is also known to have the property of inherence-ness (samav?yatva). Just as inherence is known to possess silver-ness-as-adjunct- ness (rajatatva-pratiyogikatva), it is also known to possess mother-of-pearl-as-subjunct-ness (?ukty-anuyogikatva). However, since both these properties are never established as occurring in one location and in one and the same inherence, it is unreal. Such an apprehension, according to the author of the Ny?ya-v?caspatya, is asat-khy?ti (VP 7.49, 283- 4). According to Ni?cald?s, even these two asat-khy?ti views presented above [the tantrik and the Ny?ya-v?caspatya versions] are improper. Those who accept asat-khy?ti must be asked, ?In the phrase ?asat-khy?ti,? does the word ?asat, unreal? mean 1) ?not non- 434 This appears to be a reference to the entry on asat-khy?ti in the Sanskrit lexicon, the V?caspatyam (1962, 1:531-9), by T?r?n?tha Tarkav?caspati Bha???c?rya (1812-1885 CE). 184 negatable,? or 2) ?without form (svar?pa)?? If the response is that the word ?asat? means ?without form? (2), then to accept asat-khy?ti would be the cause for shamelessness, similar to saying ?there is no tongue in my mouth.? Only that which is without being and manifestation is termed formless; therefore, the proponents of asat-khy?ti merely establish, ?That which is without being and manifestation can be apprehended.? Such a statement is always wrong, like ?the son of a barren woman.? If asat means ?not non-negatable? (1), that means ?negatable,? i.e., capable of being negated. This establishes that the apprehension of that which is capable of negation is termed asat-khy?ti, and that is exactly what Advaita doctrine (siddh?nta) accepts. The term anirvacan?ya means that which is capable of negation; thus, it cannot be said that asat-khy?ti is different from anirvacan?ya-khy?ti (VP 7.50, 284). 6.3.4 ?tma-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is a Mental State Projected by the Self Ni?cald?s writes that ?tma-khy?ti, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is a mental state projected by the self, is the view of the Vij??nav?dins, Yog?c?ra Buddhists who consider the transient consciousness (k?a?ika-vij??na) as ?tm?.435 In their view, the silver, etc., are not external. Instead, the transient consciousness (?tm?), is internal, and silver, etc., are its properties (dharma), which are seen as external on account of defects. Except for the M?dhyamikas (??nya-v?d?), no follower of the Buddhists disagrees with the internal reality of objects. Some Buddhists accept that objects are external and some do not; but, except for the M?dhyamikas, 436 none of the heterodox followers (n?stika) denies internal consciousness. The proponents? view [as presented by Ni?cald?s] is that, in ?tma-khy?ti, the ?tm?, in the form of consciousness (vij??na), is the substratum of the internal silver, and the internal silver is its property, but, due to defect (do?a), it is apprehended as external. Through cognition, the silver is not negated (b?dha) in essence (svar?pa), but only its externality is negated. In anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, one has to accept the negation of the property-possessor (dharmin), silver, as external, and also the negation of its external v?tti in the form of ?this- ness?; but in ?tma-khy?ti only the external ?this-ness? is negated since the internal reality of 435 Per Srinivasa Rao, ??tma-khy?ti appears to be one more attempt at crude deduction from the general position of the Vij??nav?dins which is made by the critics rather than it being a position actually evolved and advocated by Vij??nav?dins themselves? (1998, 53). Also see n. 432. 436 The M?dhyamikas are held to ascribe to asat-khy?ti, as just seen in the previous section. 185 silver is not disputed. So if anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is accepted, then from the standpoint of ?tma-khy?ti, there is the defect of lack of economy (gaurava) in the conceptualization of the negation of both the property-possessor (dharmin) and the property (dharma). ?tma-khy?ti has economy in that only the dharma of the external ?this-ness? needs to be negated. Internally, the silver is real; there is only erroneous cognition in apprehending it as external (VP 7.51, 284-5). Ni?cald?s considers this view to be incorrect, because no one experiences silver as internal. Also, the interiority of silver, etc., whether real or erroneous, cannot be established by any pram??a. Everyone experiences pleasure, etc., as internal, and silver, etc., as external. To accept silver as internal is against one?s experience, and there is no means of valid cognition nor reasoning to prove interiority; therefore, to accept silver as internal and its apprehension as external is totally improper (VP 7.52, 285). Ni?cald?s states that there are two schools of Buddhists (saugata); one is the Yog?c?ra, which holds to internal consciousness alone as real, and the other437 which accepts external objects as real. Among those who accept external objects, there are two views. 1) External objects are only inferable, and not perceptible; only their cognition is directly perceived (pratyak?a), and from the cognition the cognized object is inferred. External objects are only mediately perceived (parok?a). 2) The objects of defective perceptual cognition are external; they are immediate (aparok?a). In contrast to these two views, for Yog?c?ra, even the empirical silver is not external, regardless of whether it is mediately or immediately cognized. Ni?cald?s then provides a description of the defects in the view of the Buddhist proponent of immediate cognition of external objects, presented from the standpoint of the proponent of internal consciousness (vij??na). The two factions do not disagree about the internal reality of objects. For those who hold immediate cognition of real external objects (2), since the silver which is the object of the real (yath?rtha) cognition is external on account of defects, the flaw incurred by the proponents of internal consciousness (vij??na) of the internal silver being counter to experience is not an issue. However, there is no utility to their accepting the externality of silver in erroneous cognition since a bracelet or such cannot be made from that 437 Ni?cald?s does not name this other Buddhist school, so it is unclear whom he is referring to. 186 silver but can only be apprehended. However, since apprehension does not take place without an object, although the result (phala) of the erroneous cognition of that silver is the demonstration (siddhi) of its object-ness, even if the silver were considered internal, the object-ness of the erroneous cognition would be demonstrated. Therefore, if the object-ness of the erroneous cognition is considered to be demonstrated by considering the silver to be external on account of defect, then, by accepting the negation of both the property and property-possessor, as mentioned earlier, the proponent of external objects incurs the flaw of lack-of-economy (gaurava). If, according to the view of the proponents of internal consciousness (vij??na), the defect-caused external apprehension of the internal silver is accepted, there is economy due to accepting the negation of only the ?this-ness? property (dharma). There are also other defects that are incurred by the view of the proponent of external objects. 1) Silver, which is the object of true cognition tends to be before one?s eyes, but, if the silver of erroneous cognition also occurs before one?s eyes, then what possible difference can there be between the real and erroneous cognition? 2) If it be held that, on account of a defect, the silver that exists as a real object of cognition before one?s eyes appears internally as an object of erroneous cognition, then, due to the difference in interiority and exteriority of the object, there will arise the difference of reality and falseness between cognitions. 3) If the external arising of the object of erroneous cognition is agreed to, then the silver arisen in the mother-of-pearl should be visible to all. 4) Where ten persons have different erroneous cognitions on the same substratum, all persons should see all those objects there. Contrary to this, in the view of the proponent of internal consciousness (vij??na), only the person to whom the object arises internally can apprehend the object before his eyes, and therefore, another person can have no doubt regarding its apprehension (VP 7.53, 286-7). Then follows a refutation of ?tma-khy?ti from the Ved?nta perspective.438 The interiority of objects is only known in dreams, and not in the waking state. So to conceive of objects that are external in nature as internal objects is a defect of unknown conception (aprasiddha kalpan? do?a). If objects were internal, then one ought to perceive, ?the silver is in me,? or ?I am silver,? and the external perception of silver as ?this is silver? should not occur. 438 Compare Padmap?da & Prak???tman?s refutation of ?tma-khy?ti in the Pa?cap?dik? and Vivara?a respectively (Padmap?d?c?rya et al. 1992, 92-4). 187 The ?tma-khy?ti proponent may respond as follows. ?Although silver is internal and not external, the external arising of internal objects is seen due to the power of defects. Although the external ?this-ness? is in mother-of-pearl, due to the power of the defect, the ?this-ness? resident in mother-of-pearl appears in silver. The defect that causes internal silver to arise externally also causes the mother-of-pearl?s ?this-ness? to be seen in the externally arisen silver. Real silver is not possible externally and in an erroneous place; therefore, it will have to be considered anirvacan?ya. Such anirvacan?ya objects do not occur in the world, so the fallacy of unknown conception (aprasiddha kalpan? do?a) arises [in the anirvacan?ya-khy?ti position]. In our [?tma-khy?ti] opinion, the real silver is internal; therefore, its appropriation and relinquishing (h?na up?d?na) are impossible. Moreover, by considering it internally real, the absence of silver changing to bracelets etc., is still possible. ?tma-khy?ti has the advantage of economy (l?ghava) over anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, since one does not have to imagine anirvacan?ya objects.? Ni?cald?s rejects this argument. If one says that ?the ?this-ness? of mother-of-pearl is apprehended in silver,? one accepts anyath?-khy?ti. If anyath?-khy?ti is considered in the apprehension of the ?this-ness,? then, in the anyath?-khy?ti fashion, one should also accept the apprehension of that which possesses silver-ness (rajatatva-dharmi) in mother-of-pearl. [Anyath?-khy?ti considers the silver erroneously cognized in mother-of-pearl to be real but present elsewhere]. But then it is futile to accept the internal arising of silver. If it is argued that ?just as the silver is separate from mother-of-pearl, it is not possible for the qualities of silver to be apprehended in mother-of-pearl,? then, even in the ?tma-khy?ti view, the silver is separate from mother-of-pearl and internally located, so even in that internal silver, there is the similar defect of the impossibility of the apprehension of mother-of-pearl?s ?this-ness? property (VP 7.54, 287-8). In response, Ni?cald?s further clarifies the anirvacan?ya-khy?ti position. In Advaita, there arises an anirvacan?ya relation of the identity (t?d?tmya) of the mother-of-pearl v?tti with silver. This is called relational superimposition (sa?sarg?dhy?sa). Where the relation residing in the substratum is apprehended in the superimposed object, the relational superimposition of the entire substratum occurs. The properties (dharma) of one object cannot be apprehended in another without relational superimposition. Without superimposition, the apprehension of the ?this-ness? residing in mother-of-pearl in internally 188 occurring silver is not possible; hence, ?tma-khy?ti is improper. Further, the flaw of an unknown conception (aprasiddha kalpan? do?a) in connection with the anirvacan?ya object that was raised by the ?tma-khy?ti proponent is based in ignorance, because the primary view (mukhya siddh?nta) of Advaita is as follows. There is only one (ekam?tra) consciousness and it is real, the entire creation (prapa?ca) apart from consciousness is false. Anirvacan?ya is the same as illusory (mithy?); therefore, to call any object other than consciousness real incurs the defect of unknown conception (aprasiddha kalpan? do?a). Anirvacan?ya-ness is extremely well known in objects other than consciousness. If it be contemplated through logic (yukti), the nature (svar?pa) of any object other than ?tm? is not known; rather, the object is apprehended despite its nature being unknown. That is why all objects other than ?tm? are anirvacan?ya. In Advaita, any object other than ?tm? is not real, in fact the entire creation is of the nature of ?barely seen, then gone (d???a-na??a),? just like an imaginary city in the sky (gandharva-nagara). There is no difference at all between objects in a dream and those in the waking state. Even so, the silver in mother-of-pearl is illusory and that in a mineshaft, etc., is empirically real. This difference between non-?tm? objects as real and illusory is merely for the sake of facilitating entry into the knowledge of Advaita for those seekers whose intellect is dull (sth?la-buddhi),439 analogous to the manner in which the Arundhat? star is pointed out (arundhat?-ny?ya).440 If one whose intellect is dull is told the doctrine right at the outset, then the person who holds that non-?tm? objects are real, on hearing the remarkable meaning of the doctrine, might become averse to the scriptures (??stra) and stray from the goal of liberation (puru??rtha). Therefore, non-?tm? objects are said to have a two-fold reality, empirical and illusory, while consciousness has ultimate reality. When the lesser reality of the created world (prapa?ca) relative to consciousness has been established in one?s intellect by the example of the dream and by the negating statements (ni?edha-v?kya) of Ved?nta, then one learns that all non-?tm? objects are illusory and bereft of reality and manifestation (satt?-sph?rti-??nya). With this 439 Colloquially, sth?la-buddhi = dull-witted, dense. The English literal translation ?fat-head? could also stand in. 440 Arundhat? Ny?ya alludes to the method of leading one to a subtle object through easy and gradual steps. Arundhat? is faint star, situated just to the east of the Vasi??ha star in the Sapta??i constellation. In order to view Arundhat?, its location is first determined by looking at the brighter star Vasi??ha beside it, then if one looks carefully one can see Arundhat?, Vasi??ha?s wife, close by. In Western astronomy, the Sapta??i is the Big Dipper or Ursa Majoris, Vasi??ha is the star Mizar (apparent magnitude 2.23), the second star from the end of the Big Dipper's handle. Arundhat? is Alcor (apparent magnitude 3.99; the smaller the apparent magnitude, the brighter the star). 189 intent alone, the Advaita ??stra speaks of the different orders of reality, and not with the intent of distinguishing between non-?tm? objects as either empirical or illusory. Therefore, to state that ?anirvacan?ya objects are unknown in Advaita? is contrary, and, since the elucidation of non-duality (advaita) by any other means is not possible, to talk of economy or lack thereof (l?ghava-gaurava) in this context is based in error (bhrama-m?laka). If there were some means possible other than anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, then, in view of the flaw of lack of economy, this view could be renounced. But there is no other possible theory of error [starting with sat-khy?ti and including the others yet to be discussed]; hence, it is unproductive to talk of economy or lack thereof (VP 7.55, 288-9). ?Unproductive? as it may be, Ni?cald?s still refutes the ?lack of economy? flaw ascribed to anirvacan?ya-khy?ti by the ?tma-khy?ti proponent. ?If the external arising of silver be accepted, then there is lack of economy in accepting the negation (b?dha) of the property- possessor (dharmin), silver, and the property (dharma), ?this-ness;? whereas, if only the external apprehension of internal silver is accepted, then there is economy by the negation of only ?this-ness.?? Ni?cald?s dismisses this statement as insignificant (aki?citkara). Everyone is familiar with the experience of the negation of silver upon the cognition of mother-of-pearl as ?I had only apprehended false silver.? But according to ?tma-khy?ti, this ought to be ?I had only apprehended false externality in silver,? and no one has experienced such negation. If the negation of the property-possessor is dropped (lopa) merely from a desire for [logical] economy, that is as ridiculous as taking up only some single action from among the collective actions facilitating the result of cooking, etc., (p?k?di-phala-s?dhaka vy?p?ra-sam?ha), for economy sake (l?ghava-bala se), and renouncing all other actions. Moreover, when an authoritative person (?pta) instructs a deluded one, he negates the silver by its nature (svar?pa) itself, ?this is not silver; rather, this is mother-of-pearl.? But according to ?tma- khy?ti, only the external location of the silver should be negated, ?there is no silver here [externally], rather the silver is internal to you? (VP 7.56, 289-90). Ni?cald?s concludes that the ?tma-khy?ti view of the Buddhist who holds that objects are external, namely, ?the misperception (khy?ti) of silver arisen in the ?tm? has occurred externally,? is incorrect. This ?tma-khy?ti view belongs to the one who holds the internal consciousness (vij??na) alone, namely, ?apart from consciousness (vij??na), there is no object external or internal, instead all objects are solely forms of consciousness (vij??na-r?pa 190 ?tm?). Therefore, the [mis]perception (khy?ti) is of consciousness in the form of silver,? it too is improper, because silver is different from consciousness (vij??na) and is an object of cognition. It is not possible to state that silver is identical to consciousness as ?tm?. Further, upon accepting the view of the Vij??nav?dins that all objects are momentary forms of consciousness, endless defects (d??a?a) such as the impossibility of re-cognition (pratyabhij??), etc., are incurred. Thus, ?tma-khy?ti is not possible (VP 7.57, 290-91). 6.3.5 Anyath?-khy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Object of Erroneous Cognition is Real, but is Present Elsewhere Now Ni?cald?s takes up the Ny?ya anyath?-khy?ti theory, that the object of erroneous cognition is real, but is present elsewhere. In Ni?cald?s?s time, the Ny?ya school was the main rival of Advaita, and hence, compared to the three theories of error considered thus far, he spends considerably more time addressing the Ny?ya theory that the objects of erroneous perception are real. He provides a statement of the anyath?-khy?ti theory from the Ny?ya perspective (section 6.3.5.1), followed by a preliminary refutation from the Ved?nta perspective (section 6.3.5.2), which he elaborates on in great detail later, both from within the Ny?ya framework, and also from the Advaita standpoint (sections 6.3.5.5 and 6.3.5.6 respectively). Before doing so, however, Ni?cald?s first provides a thorough overview of the Ny?ya conception of relations, particularly extraordinary relations (alaukika sambandha) (section 6.3.5.3), followed by a detailed presentation of the Ny?ya arguments against anirvacan?ya-khy?ti (section 6.3.5.4). 6.3.5.1 Ni?cald?s?s presentation of anyath?-khy?ti-v?da According to anyath?-khy?ti-v?da, a person has impressions (sa?sk?ra) that are generated by the experience of real objects. When a person?s defective eyes come in contact with an object similar to that previously seen, the recollection (sm?ti) of the previously seen object arises due to the general cognition (s?m?nya j??na) of the similar object that is before one?s eyes. Alternatively, if one chooses not to accept recollection, the impressions of the previously seen object arise. The property (dharma) of that recollected object, or of the object whose impressions arise, is apprehended in the object before one. For example, when a person has previously had impressions generated by an experience with real silver and subsequently his defective eyes come in contact with mother-of-pearl, which resembles 191 silver, he recalls silver, and the silver-ness property then appears in the mother-of-pearl. Or, since there is no delay between the contact of defective eyes with mother-of-pearl and the erroneous cognition of silver, the recollection of silver does not arise in the time in between, but instead the impressions of the experience of silver arise and then, without any interruption (vyavadh?na) by a recollection, the silver-ness property is promptly perceived in mother-of-pearl. In the case of recollection, the impressions arise due to the cognition of similarity to that seen before. In a similar manner, in the case of an erroneous cognition, as soon as the senses contact with an object similar to that seen before, the impressions arise and the property (dharma) connected with the impressions appears in the object that is before one?s eyes. In reality, there is the mother-of-pearl-ness property in mother-of-pearl, not silver-ness, but, in the case of an erroneous cognition, the mother-of-pearl is apprehended with [the property of] silver-ness. An object is being apprehended here in another (anyath?) form, hence this is called anyath?-khy?ti (VP 7.57, 290-1). 6.3.5.2 Ni?cald?s?s preliminary refutation of anyath?-khy?ti Although many Naiy?yika authors have described anyath?-khy?ti as ?the apprehension of the silver-ness property in mother-of-pearl,? Ni?cald?s considers their view to be not worthy of belief because it is opposed to revealed and secondary scriptures (?ruti-sm?ti-viruddha). The Naiy?yikas call a dream-cognition a mental misapprehension (m?nasa-viparyaya), whereas anyath?-khy?ti is simply termed misapprehension. But, in ?ruti, the arising of dream objects has been described differently: ?There are no chariots or teams of horses or roads there, but he creates [for himself] chariots, team-horses and roads. na tatra rath? na rathayog? na panth?no bhavantyatha rath?n rathayog?n pantha? s?jate? (BU 4.3.10). Here, ?ruti negates empirical chariots, horses and roads and then mentions the creation of anirvacan?ya chariots, horses and roads. They have not been called mental errors. The creation of anirvacan?ya objects in a dream is similarly stated in the sm?ti: ?In the intermediate stage [between waking and deep sleep] there is [a real] creation; because [?ruti] says so, sandhye s???ir?ha hi? (BS 3.2.1). [The Naiy?yikas consider the silver misperceived in mother-of-pearl to be real, but present elsewhere]. But, by logic too, the cognition in mother-of-pearl of silver-ness of silver that is distant from the eyes is not possible. If the silver were close to the mother-of-pearl, 192 then perhaps after the eyes come in contact with both, the erroneous cognition of silver-ness residing in silver might possibly be produced in mother-of-pearl. But where there is no silver in proximity to mother-of-pearl, how can an erroneous cognition of silver be produced in mother-of-pearl by the eyes? [According to the Ny?ya view of perception,] first, the senses contact the qualifier (vi?e?a?a) and qualificand (vi?e?ya), and only then does the cognition of the qualified (vi?i??a) occur. Where there is real silver, the silver-ness is the qualifier, and the manifestation in the form of silver is the qualified. Then the eyes have a contact-relation (sa?yoga-sambandha) with the silver-manifestation, and with silver-ness it is ?a relation with the inherence in that which is in contact? (sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha). But when there is an erroneous cognition qualified by silver-ness with regards to the mother-of-pearl, although the eyes are in contact-relation with the qualified [that is] the mother-of-pearl manifestation, there is no sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha with the silver-ness qualification. If the eyes were in contact with the silver-manifestation, such a relation could arise, but here, due to the absence of contact with the silver-manifestation, the absence of the sa?yukta- samav?ya-sambandha with silver-ness is but natural; it is not possible to have cognition of mother-of-pearl qualified by silver-ness (VP 7.59, 292-3). Hence, the erroneous cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver cannot be possible in the manner of anyath?-khy?ti.441 6.3.5.3 Types of relations (sambandha), according to Ny?ya According to Ny?ya, the appearance of silver-ness, which is present in another location, in the mother-of-pearl before one occurs by means of an extraordinary relation. Hence Ni?cald?s presents a review of the Ny?ya perspective concerning the cause of perceptual cognition. Perceptual cognition is held to be of two kinds: 1) ordinary (laukika) [which was described earlier, in VP 1.14-15, 22-6],442 and 2) extraordinary (alaukika). Extraordinary relations are of three kinds of: 2a) Universal relations (s?m?nya-lak?a?a), 2b) J??na- lak?a?a, a relation to ?[the] here and now of the features of a thing which was known 441 The refutation of the Old Ny?ya view of anyath?-khy?ti (VP 7.58, 291-2) which was also described in VS 4.128,74 is not reproduced here. 442 The six kinds of ordinary relations were earlier described in the section on perception (VP 1.14-15, 22-6). They are: 1) Conjunction (sa?yoga) of the senses with the object; 2) Inherence in the conjoined (sa?yukta-samav?ya), e.g., the color blue in the pot; 3) Inherence in the one inhering in the conjoined (sa?yukta-samaveta-samav?ya), e.g., the blueness inhering in the blue color in the pot; 4) Inherence (samav?ya), e.g., ?abda, sound in ?k??a; 5) Inherence in the one inhering (samaveta-samav?ya), e.g., ?abdatva in ?k??a; 6) Adjectivality to the conjoined (sa?yukta-vi?e?a?at?), e.g., non-existence of an object in its locus. See also Six Ways of Knowing, Datta, D. M (1990, 89-90). 193 previously at another place and time? (EIP 6:61), and 2c) Yoga-janya-dharma-lak?a?a, relation to that which is learned of via supernatural faculties. 443 These are described in the following examples: 2a. Universal relations (s?m?nya-lak?a?a): Where the eyes are in contact with one pot, the direct cognition (s?k??tk?ra) of the one pot occurs, and, on the basis of its pot-ness, the direct cognition of all pots also occurs via the eye. There are two views on this matter divided among the Navya Naiy?yikas and the traditional. According to the Navyas, the direct cognition of the pot in contact with the eyes as well as pots in other locations occurs in the same instant. But according to the older view, the direct cognition of just the pot in contact with the senses occurs in the first instant, and then, in the next instant, pots in other locations are directly cognized. Though these two direct cognitions are born of the eyes, their relations are different. Of these two opinions, the older is easier to understand, so that is discussed here: When the contact of the eyes occurs with the pot in front of oneself, the direct cognition of the pot occurs as ?this is a pot.? The cause for this direct cognition is the relation of contact, sa?yoga- sambandha; therefore, this direct cognition is termed sa?yoga-sambandha-janya. In this cognition, the pot-ness qualifier (vi?e?a?a), i.e., class (prak?ra), resides in all pots. Due to this relation, in the next instant, the direct cognition, born of the eyes, of all pots occurs, and the pot in front of one?s eyes is also an object of this direct cognition. Thus, two cognitions arise regarding the pot in front of one?s eyes: in the first instant, it is an ordinary cognition, and in the next, an extraordinary one. In the first instant, although the pot-ness class resides in that cognition too, at the time of the ordinary cognition of the pot before one?s eyes, an extraordinary relation is not possible, which is why it is believed to occur in the instant following the ordinary cognition. This is termed the relation to the universal class (s?m?nya-lak?a?a sambandha). S?m?nya means class (j?ti), lak?a?a is inherent nature (svar?pa), so it is also the j?ti-svar?pa- sambandha (VP 7.60, 293-5). 2b. The nature of j??na-lak?a?a-sambandha, along with example(s): Where the sense is in contact with its appropriate object, and, at the time of sense-contact, the memory 443 J??na-lak?a?a and Yoga-janya-dharma-lak?a?a are a challenge to translate concisely. I will stay with the Sanskrit terms. 194 cognition of an object inappropriate for sense-cognition occurs, just one cognition occurs, of both the object in contact with the sense and the object of the recollection. The portion of the cognition which is due to sense-contact is ordinary cognition, and the portion due to recollection is extraordinary cognition. [The Naiy?yikas use the nature of this j??na-lak?a?a-sambandha to explain the perception of fragrance in sandalwood that is located too far away to for its fragrance to be directly perceived, though it can be seen]. For example, where the eye is in contact with sandalwood, if the recollection of the fragrance property also occurs, then the eye-generated perception ?the sandalwood is fragrant? arises. Here, the sandalwood qualified by sandalwood-ness is suitable for [perception by] the eyes, and although fragrance is a property of sandalwood and the eyes are also in a relation of inherence in the conjoined (sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha), the fragrance is not suitable for perception by the eyes, but by the nose. Therefore, the direct cognition of the sandalwood?s fragrance cannot occur via the eyes. Only the instance of sandalwood that is in contact with the eyes and its sandalwood-ness by its relation of inherence in the conjoined [sandalwood] can be directly perceived by the eyes. Although it is known that the sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha of the eye with the fragrance quality of the sandalwood is not productive (aki?citkara) [of cognition of fragrance], still, when the eye-cognition is in contact with the sandalwood, the cognition ?The sandalwood is fragrant? is known to one?s experience. Therefore, it is necessary to consider some relation that is the cause of the direct cognition by eye of the fragrance quality residing in the sandalwood. Since impressions arise from prior experience and give rise to subsequent recollections of objects similar to the experience, the experience, impressions, and recollection ? all three have the same basis (?dh?ra) and object. Thus, the direct cognition via the eye, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? has as its object all three ? sandalwood, sandalwood-ness, and fragrance. The relation with sandalwood and sandalwood-ness is ordinary, but recollection and impression being other than ordinary relations, are extraordinary. At the time of the eyes being in contact with sandalwood, where the recollection of fragrance is via experience, then it is an extraordinary recollection-relation, and, where there is no experience of recollection, it is an extraordinary impression-relation. This extraordinary relation is termed j??na- 195 lak?a??-sambandha. The use of the term j??na, cognition, relating to recollection (sm?ti) is well known, and because impressions are derived from cognition alone, and they give rise to subsequent cognition, they too are termed j??na (VP 7.60, 295-8). 2c. Yoga-janya-dharma-lak?a?a: In the case of a yog?, who possesses supernatural powers and directly cognizes objects distant from the senses in the manner of cognition via the senses, the senses possess such distinctive capacity through the practice of yoga. In this case, the property (dharma) produced by yoga itself is termed the sense-relation. But there are differences in opinion regarding this process: a) In Jagad??a Bha???c?rya?s444 view, the sense by which the object is suitably perceived alone provides the direct cognition. A yog? has direct cognition of non-proximate objects and also of the future and past via the senses, while non-yog?s only have direct cognition of the present via the senses. But the yog? does not have direct cognition of an object by a sense which is not suitable for its perception, for example, color is cognized via the eyes alone, not by the tongue, etc. b) Many authors hold that the power of a yog? is extraordinary, and the properties (dharma) produced via yoga are also different, according to the superiority or inferiority of the [yog??s] practice. By superior practice, some yog?s have such a dharma that all suitable and unsuitable objects are cognized by means of just one sense. [Thus, a superior yog? is able to ?see? a person?s past and future karma, and other ordinarily imperceptible objects]. But some, on account of their inferior practice, may only have the ability to cognize objects by the appropriate senses alone. Because all kinds of non-proximate objects are indeed cognized by dharma produced by yoga, yoga-janya-dharma too is deemed an extraordinary relation (VP 7.60, 298). According to Ny?ya, the appearance of silver-ness, which is present in another location, in the mother-of-pearl before one?s eyes, is by means of an extraordinary relation. When the defective eyes come into contact with mother-of-pearl, the mother-of-pearl instance is suitable for perception by the eyes, but the silver instance, which is the basis of the silver- ness, is not proximate to the eyes. Although the non-proximate silver-ness is not suitable for 444 Jagad??a Bha???c?rya, also known as Jagad??a Tark?lan?k?ra (ca. 1600 CE), wrote the Jagad??? (a sub-commentary on Raghun?tha's Anum?na-d?dhiti), M?yukha (a commentary on Ga?ge?a's Tattvacint?ma?i), S?kti (a commentary on Pra?astap?da?s Pad?rtha-dharma-sa?graha), a sub-commentary on Raghun?tha's L?l?vati-d?dhiti, and several original texts on Navya-ny?ya, such as the ?abda-?akti-prak??ik?, Tark?m?ta (a brief manual on Navya-ny?ya), and Ny?yadar?a (an independent short work) (Matilal 1977b, 111). 196 eye-perception, just as the fragrance portion of the sandalwood cognition is extraordinary, here also the silver-ness portion in the erroneous cognition ?this is silver? is extraordinary. The difference is that in the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? the fragrance residing in the sandalwood itself appears in the sandalwood, whereas in the cognition, ?this is silver,? the silver-ness, which does not reside in the ?this? object, appears in it. Further, in the [visual] cognition ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? the fragrance, which is typically unsuited for eye-perception, appears, and all the general qualifiers of sandalwood also appear. In contrast, in the cognition ?this is silver,? the appearance (bh?sa) of silver-ness, though being unsuited for visual perception on account of it being non-proximate, is similar to the appearance of the fragrance, but the particular, mother-of-pearl-ness, of mother-of-pearl does not appear, unlike the sandalwood-ness particular of sandalwood. In this manner, the two cognitions are different, and these differences cause the real versus false nature of the two cognitions (VP 7.61, 298-300). This is Ni?cald?s?s presentation of the Naiy?yika conception of extraordinary relations, which they use to explain the eye-perception of fragrance in sandalwood located at a distance, and also the erroneous sense-perception in mother-of-pearl of silver located elsewhere. 6.3.5.4 The Ny?ya arguments against anirvacan?ya-khy?ti Having presented the Ny?ya position on anyath?-khy?ti, Ni?cald?s next presents the Naiy?yika arguments against the Advaita anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya). Firstly, there is economy (l?ghava) [i.e., logical or methodological simplicity] in anyath?-khy?ti since the anyath?- khy?ti proponent has to only accept causality of the erroneous cognition in the defect, whereas the anirvacan?ya-khy?ti proponent has to accept the causality of both the anirvacan?ya objects, silver, etc., and also their cognition. Further, the anirvacan?ya-khy?ti proponent cannot succeed (nirv?ha hon?) without anyath?-khy?ti. Advaita accepts anyath?- khy?ti in some places and anirvacan?ya-khy?ti in others, but it is more appropriate to accept anyath?-khy?ti everywhere. If the proponent were to accept anirvacan?ya-khy?ti in all cases, then there would be opposition to his own [Advaita] texts [which accept anyath?-khy?ti in certain cases], and yet the proponent cannot succeed with only anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, because where anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is not possible, there the Advaita texts present anyath?-khy?ti 197 alone. For example, where non-negatable reality (satyatva) is apprehended in inert (an?tma) objects, if it is said that the anirvacan?ya arising of non-negatability (ab?dhyatva) occurs in inert objects, then this will be contradictory, similar to the statements such as ?birth of the unborn,? and ?destruction of the eternal.? Therefore, in this case, the apprehension of self- reality (?tma-satyat?) in an?tma, non-self, can only be possible via anyath?-khy?ti, and, in Advaita texts too, anyath?-khy?ti alone has been accepted in such cases. The Advaita texts [according to the Ny?ya proponent] have also accepted anyath?-khy?ti in the case of mediate erroneous cognition. Perceptual cognition (pratyak?a j??na) necessarily (niyama-p?rvaka) pertains to the present alone, because the immediate cognition (pratyak?a) can only be the cognition of an object that is in relation with the cognizer. An [immediate] relation of the silver-ness of non-proximate silver with the cognizer is not possible because the existence of silver before one?s eyes is necessary for immediate cognition. But mediate cognition of that which is in the past as well as the future can occur; therefore, an [immediate] relation of the object of mediate cognition to the cognizer is not required, nor is it even possible. In cases where the true cognition of an object located in another time and place occurs via either inference or verbal testimony, i.e., when there is no connection of the cognizer with the objects located in various times and places, then, in the case of erroneous mediate cognition, how can the cognizer possibly have a relation with the object? Therefore, in the case of mediate erroneous cognition, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is not possible by any means; only anyath?-khy?ti is possible in the form of apprehension of objects in a location devoid of objects. Advaita only accepts anirvacan?ya-khy?ti in the cases where the superimposed object is non-proximate to the substratum. But in reality, where the superimposed object may be in relation with the substratum that is before one?s eyes, there too anyath?-khy?ti alone occurs. When there might be a v?tti pertaining to the substratum, if the cognizer can be in relation with the superimposed object even by anyath?-khy?ti, then there is no use in accepting the arising of an anirvacan?ya object. Therefore, there is no utility in accepting anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, and it lacks economy (VP 7.62, 300-1). 198 6.3.5.5 Ni?cald?s?s refutation of the Ny?ya objections to anirvacan?ya-khy?ti from within the Ny?ya framework Ni?cald?s refutes these objections at length445 by establishing the invalidity of anyath?- khy?ti from within the Ny?ya framework. He shows the untenability of extraordinary relations from the standpoint of experience. He shows that the cognition of fragrance in sandalwood in the case considered earlier is not direct, but instead, it is inferred. The perception of fragrance cannot even be considered as the direct cognition of the extraordinary relation to the fragrance as a universal property. Even if one were to accept fragrance as an extraordinary relation, Ni?cald?s shows that the erroneous cognition of silver as a recollection in mother-of-pearl is still not possible within the Ny?ya framework. The perception of silver is also shown to not be caused by an inference of a past impression of silver seen elsewhere. The silver erroneously cognized as an immediate extraordinary relation, assuming this were possible, is shown to be indistinguishable from real silver. The cognition of extraordinary relations is also shown to conflict with inference as a means of cognition. Considering inference as weaker then perception and stronger than extraordinary perception to avoid this defect is also shown to not be feasible. Thus Ni?cald?s considers anyath?-khy?ti to be utterly impossible. Let us now take a look at his detailed arguments. First, Ni?cald?s suggests that the extraordinary relations such as universal relations (s?m?nya-lak?a?a), etc., which have been termed the cause of immediate cognition, are utterly improper and opposed to all experience. If one who has cognition of a single pot via the eyes is asked, ?how many pots have you directly cognized by eye,? the cognizer will answer, ?your question itself results from a lack of discrimination, because only one pot is in front of me.? Thus, the cognizer instead finds fault with the question. But according to the Naiy?yika view, since the apparatus for the perception of all pots is available, and there is the possibility of different ordinary/extraordinary relations, such fault-finding should not occur, and instead the viewer should simply answer, ?I see one pot with my eyes via ordinary relation, and all pots via extraordinary relation.? But this claim of the direct cognition of even non-proximate pots should cause astonishment in the hearts of all. The direct cognition by universal relation (s?m?nya-lak?a?a) asserted by the Naiy?yikas is opposed everywhere by 445 Compared to Padmap?da & Prak???tman?s refutation of anyath?-khy?ti in the Pa?cap?dik? and Vivara?a respectively (Padmap?d?c?rya et al. 1992, 89-92ff), Ni?cald?s?s treatment shares similar arguments but is more detailed. 199 all doctrines. Upon directly cognizing one pot, the recollection, etc., of other pots is possible due to similarity, but all pots are not experienced as an immediate cognition. Similarly, in the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? it is untenable to hold that the fragrance property residing (avag?hin) in the sandalwood is directly cognized by the eyes via the j??na-lak?a?a relation [a relation to the here and now of the features of a thing which was known previously at another place and time, (2b) in section 6.3.5.3, p. 193ff]. Because, if the person to whom the direct cognition of sandalwood is occurring is asked, ?what is seen by you?? then, even if the viewer responds, ?fragrant sandalwood is seen by me,? and is asked again by way of investigating, ?In what manner did you cognize that the sandalwood is fragrant?? the viewer would offer the following response, ?It is white sandalwood; therefore, it must certainly have fragrance. Red sandalwood does not have fragrance; only this kind of white sandalwood has fragrance.? Thus, the viewer?s answer indicates inference giving rise to the fragrance portion of the sandalwood cognition; he would never offer the response, ?I have directly cognized fragrance by eye.? Thus, it is clear that the cognition of fragrance is not immediate and via the eyes; rather, the cognition of the sandalwood portion is immediate, but the fragrance portion is inferred alone. Further, if the person viewing the sandalwood is asked, ?Does this sandalwood have much fragrance or little?? he might offer the following response. ?By the eye, it is apprehended as white sandalwood alone, by which the inference of the fragrance-universal occurs. When the fragrance is immediately cognized, then it can be known whether the fragrance is excessive or less. Only when it is smelled by the nose, can the cognition of the excess (utkar?a) or dearth (apakar?a) of fragrance be known. Visually, only the cognition of white sandalwood occurs and from it the fragrance universal alone is inferred.? By this kind of answer too, only the inferred cognition of the fragrance-universal is established, and not direct cognition, since it is the rule that by whichever sense sound, touch, color, taste and fragrance is cognized, by that sense alone is the excess or dearth of the sound, etc., cognized. If fragrance were cognized by the eyes, then the eyes should also cognize the excess or dearth of fragrance. The non-apprehension of the excess or dearth of any object via inference is well known through experience; for example, where fire is inferred via smoke, the largeness or smallness of the fire is not known (VP 7.63, 302-3). If the Naiy?yikas say, ?the excess or dearth of objects appears through direct cognition by means of ordinary relations; only the universal property of the object appears by means of an 200 extraordinary relation, not the particular,? this too is improper, because the appearance (prak??a) of a universal property of an object can be possible even by way of mediate cognition, and thus, it is futile to conceive of an uncommon (aprasiddha) direct cognition via an uncommon extraordinary relation. If the Naiy?yikas say, ?By extraordinary relation, fragrance is illumined only as a universal, not as a particular,? then again it will be established that, as soon as the white sandalwood is directly cognized by eye, only the universal cognition of fragrance takes place as an inference, and the cause (prayojaka) of that inference is the eye as the means of the cognition of sandalwood?s whiteness. Thus, the cognition of fragrance is not produced by the eyes, but instead is an inference. The Naiy?yikas may respond as follows. ?Although the eye-cognition of fragrance does not reveal its excess or dearth and is therefore similar to inference, yet it is not possible for that cognition to be similar to inference because the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? is one cognition and not two. If one cognition were to be termed ?direct? in the sandalwood portion and ?inference? in the fragrance portion, then there would be the concurrence of two opposing properties (dharma) in one cognition. Therefore, both portions should be considered immediate cognition.? This too is improper. Just as, in the Naiy?yika view, two opposing properties, in the form of ordinary and extraordinary cognition, are concurrent, in the Advaita view also, the immediate cognition and inference can be concurrent in one cognition. Further, the opposition of immediate cognition and inference is only perceived by followers of the Ny?ya ??stra. 446 In contrast, ordinariness and extraordinariness are mutually contradictory, like presence and absence; therefore, their opposition is known to all. Since it is well known that ?the absentee (pratiyogin) and absence (abh?va) mutually oppose each other,? and the concurrence of such well-known opposing properties is accepted by the Naiy?yikas themselves, it is astonishing for them to say [in objection] that ?there will be concurrence of opposing objects, perceptibility and inferability.? In the Ved?nta view, cognition, in the form of the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti, is a substance (dravya) and being composed of parts, the concurrence of two properties in separate parts is possible. Since the anta?-kara?a, which is the material cause of the cognition, has parts (s???a), two cognitions occur as transformations of the anta?-kara?a in the cognition ?the sandalwood is fragrant;? 446 Lit. ?those who have impressions, sa?sk?ras, of the Ny?ya ??stra, ny?ya-??stra ke sa?sk?ra-v?le k??? (VP 7.63, 304). 201 the portion ?the sandalwood? is immediate (pratyak?a), while the cognition ?is fragrant? is an inference (anumiti). Both transformations occur in the same instant; therefore, duality never appears in them. But in the Ny?ya view, cognition is considered an action, not a substance, therefore, it is without parts (nir???a), and therefore, in that part-less cognition the concurrence of two opposing properties, ordinariness and extraordinariness is negated. As the Naiy?yikas themselves agree, the fragrance portion of the cognition can never be via the eyes. (VP 7.63, 303-4). Even if one somehow accepted the Naiy?yika view, that the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant? is produced by an extraordinary relation, erroneous cognitions such as ?this is silver,? etc., are never possible according to the Ny?ya explanation. Those who hold the cause of this cognition to be contact of the eyes with mother-of-pearl and recollection of silver-ness must be asked these questions. ?After contact of the eyes with mother-of-pearl, after the general cognition of mother-of-pearl as ?this? qualified by the brightness which is the common quality of mother-of-pearl and silver, does the recollection of silver occur and then the erroneous cognition of silver (1)? Or before the general cognition of mother-of-pearl itself, when the eyes contact the mother-of-pearl, does the recollection of silver qualified by silver-ness and the erroneous cognition ?this is silver? occur in that same instant (2)?? Cognition per (1) is not possible, because the sequence of three cognitions ? first the general cognition of mother-of-pearl, then the recollection of silver qualified by silver-ness, and then the erroneous cognition of silver ? is negated by experience, where everyone has just one cognition, ?this is silver.? Cognition per (2) also is not possible, because all cognitions are self-illumined (sva-prak??a) consciousness by nature, and cognitions as v?tti are revealed by the witness-consciousness (s?k??-bh?sya). Therefore, no cognition is unknown at any time; this will be explained further on.447 Thus, at the very instant of the eyes? contact with mother- of-pearl, and right before the general cognition of mother-of-pearl, if the recollection of silver should occur, then it should be revealed, since the consciousness portion in the recollection is self-revealing and, since the v?tti portion relying on the witness-consciousness is always revealed, that recollection should be experienced. If the Naiy?yika is asked under oath, ?Have you experienced the recollection of silver prior to the erroneous cognition in 447 In VP 7.76, 335 (section 7.1.1 on the Ny?ya theory of extrinsic validity, parata? pr?m??ya) and further in VP 8.76, 393- 4 in connection with d???i-s???i-v?da (section 8.3.1). 202 mother-of-pearl, ?This is silver??,? and, if the Naiy?yika is truthful, he will have to attest to the absence of the experience of recollection. Thus, prior to the erroneous cognition, in the very instant of contact between the eyes and mother-of-pearl, the recollection of silver does not occur. The Naiy?yika may respond, ?The above defect does not apply, because, although the erroneous cognition of silver occurs due to contact with the eyes along with the impressions pertaining to silver, which are created by experience of silver, the impression-qualities are not suitable for perception but are inferable.? In that case, the question arises as to whether the erroneous cognition is created by the arisen or the unarisen impressions. If it is answered that the unarisen impressions are the creator of the erroneous cognition, this is not possible, because recollection, etc., never occurs from unarisen impressions. If a recollection were to occur from unarisen impressions, then the recollection should always persist. Therefore, one has to accept recollection and erroneous cognition from arisen impressions only. But this also is not possible in reality, because only the sight of similar objects, etc., are the arousers of impressions. Therefore, upon the contact of the eyes with mother-of-pearl, the impressions pertaining to silver arise only after the cognition of the mother-of-pearl qualified by shininess; the arising of the silver-impressions in the same instant as the contact of the eyes with mother-of-pearl is not possible. Therefore, the Naiy?yika will have to concede that in the first instant, the eyes contact mother-of-pearl; in the second, the cognition of mother-of- pearl qualified by shininess takes place; in the third, the impressions arise; and in the fourth instant, the erroneous cognition of silver occurs. But this is negated by experience, since, in the very next instant after eye-contact, everyone experiences erroneous cognition via the eye. Further, according to the Ny?ya process, two cognitions of mother-of-pearl are established: one is the general cognition that gives rise to the impressions, and the other is the erroneous cognition caused by the impressions. But two such cognitions also are counter to experience since the erroneous cognition, ?this is silver,? occurs immediately when the eyes come into contact with mother-of-pearl. Therefore, the Naiy?yika statement, ?the erroneous cognition ?this is silver? arises from mother-of-pearl conjoined with the eyes, accompanied by impressions born of the experience of silver,? is not possible (VP 7.63, 304-6). [The Naiy?yikas use the nature of j??na-lak?a?a-sambandha, discussed in section 6.3.5.3, under (2b), p. 193ff., to explain the perception of fragrance in sandalwood that is 203 located too far away to for its fragrance to be directly perceived, though it can be seen. Ni?cald?s now considers this view for refutation]. Even if the cognition ?the sandalwood is fragrant? is somehow accepted as immediate extraordinary cognition, still, the cognition ?this is silver? arising from a j??na-lak?a?a extraordinary relation is never possible. Since the doubt about the excess or dearth of fragrance still remains even after the cognition ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? it has to be accepted that the definite manifestation (pr?ka?ya) of excess or dearth of fragrance does not occur via the extraordinary relation. If the manifestation of an object were to occur even by an extraordinary relation, then there would be no doubt regarding the excess or dearth of fragrance. In the erroneous cognition, ?this is silver,? and the valid cognition from real silver, ?this is silver,? the manifestation of silver is identical because, if there were no manifestation of silver in the case of erroneous cognition, then there should be doubt regarding the size, etc., of silver, but, in fact, no such doubt occurs. From this it is clear that the manifestation of silver in erroneous cognition is the same as that in the cognition of real silver itself. But in a cognition caused by a j??na-lak?a?a relation, the manifestation of the object does not occur; therefore, the cause of the erroneous cognition, ?this is silver? cannot be a j??na-lak?a?a relation. If it is considered thoughtfully, a j??na-lak?a?a relation is never possible because the essence of the Naiy?yika position, ?extraordinary immediate cognition occurs by j??na-lak?a?a relation,? is that where one object has recollections or impressions produced by experience, and there occurs contact of the sense with another object, the object connected to the recollection or impressions is apprehended precisely there, in the object connected with the sense. In other words, the object conjoined with the sense is apprehended as a qualificand (vi?e?ya) and the object connected with the recollection or impressions is apprehended as a qualifier (vi?e?a?a). For example, in the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? the sandalwood connected with the eyes is the qualificand, and the fragrance connected with the recollection or impressions is the qualifier. Similarly, in the erroneous cognition ?this is silver,? the mother-of-pearl connected with the eyes is the qualificand and the silver-ness connected with the recollection or impressions is the qualifier, and so the cognition of both qualifier and qualificand is immediate. If this Naiy?yika position is accepted, then the status of inference as a means of cognition is undermined, because the inferential cognition, ?the mountain is fire-possessing,? can only occur through inference as the means of the means of cognition. In this case, the 204 recollection or the arisen impressions of the pervasion (vy?pti) of the probandum (s?dhya) in the probans (hetu), which is smoke, gives rise to inferential cognition. This has already been described in the section on inference (VP 2.1, section 5.4.2). When the recollection of the pervasion of the probandum occurs, the pervader or probandum is also recalled. In the Ny?ya manner, when the immediate cognition, ?the mountain is smoke- possessing,? occurs from the contact of the eyes with the smoke on the mountain and the recollection of the fire, then the acceptance of the inference as a means of cognition, the cause of inferential cognition of the certainty of the probandum, will be useless. But the s?tras of the all-knowing sages, Gotama, Ka??da, Kapila, etc.,448 all mention a separate inference pram??a, which they would have omitted if there were no need for it. Therefore, j??na-lak?a?a relation-caused extraordinary direct cognition is wrong (al?ka) (VP 7.63, 306-7). The proponent of anyath?-khy?ti might offer the following response: ?Because the object-ness (vi?ayat?) of perceptual cognition is different from that of inferential cognition, there is no doubt regarding the size, etc., of the object of perception, but these doubts definitely persist regarding the object of inference. The difference [in the cognition] of the object as mediate or immediate can only occur by the difference of whether it is perceptually or inferentially cognized. Therefore, the producer of mediate-ness (parok?at?) of the object cannot be perceptual cognition, but inferential cognition alone, and its cause is the means of cognition, inference.? This too is not possible because, although the Naiy?yikas consider the object-ness of ordinary perception (pratyak?a) to be different from inference, in cognitions like ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? where they allow extraordinary perception in the fragrance portion, the cognition of fragrance [in the extraordinary perception case] is similar to inference. Because just as excess or dearth remain undetermined in the object of inferential cognition, the excess, etc., of fragrance remain undetermined as well; therefore, there remains no difference whatsoever between the object-ness of extraordinary perception and that of inference. Where the object-ness of erroneous extraordinary perception is accepted in silver, etc., the difference of that object-ness from the object-ness of inference is known by experience, and so the doubt regarding the silver?s extent, etc., does not occur. However, there is no difference between the object-ness of extraordinary valid perception born of a 448 Ak?ap?da Gotama is considered the author of the Ny?ya-s?tra, Ka??da, of the Vai?e?ika-s?tra, and Kapila, of the S??khya-s?tra. 205 j??na-lak?a?a relation and that of inference. Just as there is non-manifestation (apr?ka?ya) in the object of inference, similarly there is non-manifestation even in the case of objects of extraordinary valid perception, fragrance, etc. Therefore, if the valid perceptual cognition of fire on the mountain is possible by means of extraordinary perception via a j??na-lak?a?a relation, inference as a means of cognition (anum?na pram??a) will be superfluous. But because inference as a means of cognition is established on the basis of the words of those who are all-knowing, that which causes the futility of inference as a means of cognition, namely, the extraordinary perception itself, is not established (aprasiddha) (VP 7.63, 306-8). Moreover, whenever inference occurs via its means of cognition, in all such cases the apparatus for extraordinary perception is also present. Just as, prior to the inference of fire on the mountain, the cognition of pervasion (vy?pti) in the form of smoke is the means (s?magr?) of inference, similarly the contact of the eyes with smoke and the recollection of fire are the means of extraordinary perception. The means of perception and inference both being present, the perceptual cognition of fire on the mountain ought to occur, not an inference, rendering inference futile. According to Ny?ya ??stra, where the means for the inference pertaining to one object and for the perception of another object are concurrent, the means of inference will win out; but where the means of perception and inference pertain to the same object, the means of perception win out. For example, when the eyes connect with smoke on the mountain, although both the means for perception of smoke and the inference of fire are concurrent, in this case, only the inference of fire occurs, and the perception of smoke is absorbed into the inference of fire itself. But where there is contact of the eyes with both smoke and fire, and there is also cognition of the pervasion of smoke by fire, in that case, only perception of fire occurs, and not its inference. Similarly, in the case under discussion, [namely, the instance prior to fire being inferred from smoke], despite the means of inference being present, the fire should be only perceptually cognized by the extraordinary means of perception as j??na-lak?a?a relation, and, if this is accepted, then there would be no need for inference as a means of cognition. The Naiy?yikas might respond as follows. ?As considered above, although where there are different objects, the means of inference are stronger than those of perception, and where the object is the same, the means of perception is stronger. Even so, only the means of ordinary perception have been accepted as being stronger, and not those of extraordinary 206 perception. The means of extraordinary perception are always weaker than the means of inference. So inference as a means of cognition does not become useless (ni?phala) in the case of the fire on the mountain because the means of inference overrides (b?dha) the means of extraordinary perception.? This too is improper, because where there is a doubt regarding a post, ?is this a post or not?? and then the erroneous cognition, ?this is something with hands, etc., which are invariable concomitants (vy?pya) of human-ness,? followed by erroneous perception, ?this is indeed a human,? in this case, according to the Naiy?yika process, only the inference of a human should occur, not perception. The perception of human-ness in a post creates an erroneous perception, and, according to the Ny?ya view, the means of erroneous cognition are extraordinary, and, are weaker than the means of inference. Thus, the erroneous cognition of human-ness in a post should be an inference, and not perception. If the erroneous cognition were accepted as inference, then in the next instant, the after-cognition (anuvyavas?ya), ?I see a human with my own eyes (s?k??t)? should not follow, but instead it ought to be, ?I infer a human.? Therefore, it should be accepted that, as in the case of ordinary perception, for extraordinary perception also, when perception and inference have the same object, the means of extraordinary perception are stronger, and the means of inference are weaker. Therefore, if the arising of perception via j??na-lak?a?a relation is accepted, then inference will be negated; only the perceptual cognition of fire, etc., will occur on the mountains, etc., and inference as a means of cognition will remain useless. If inference as a means of cognition is accepted, then the direct cognition (pratyak?a-j??na) of a non-proximate object via sense-contact accompanied by recollection or impressions will not be possible. Thus, the apprehension of mother-of-pearl as silver-ness via anyath?-khy?ti is utterly impossible (VP 7.63, 308-10). 6.3.5.6 Ni?cald?s?s defense of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti Having established the invalidity of anyath?-khy?ti from within the Ny?ya framework, Ni?cald?s concludes his treatment of anyath?-khy?ti by taking up the defense of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti against the flaws enumerated earlier, namely: 1) in anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, the causality of both the object and cognition have been accepted in the defect, but anyath?- khy?ti accepts the causality of cognition alone in defect only and not of the object; and 2) 207 anirvacan?ya-khy?ti has to accept anyath?-khy?ti as well, but anyath?-khy?ti has no need to accept anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, and so anyath?-khy?ti has economy over anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. Ni?cald?s holds that even the anyath?-khy?ti proponent should certainly accept anirvacan?ya-khy?ti in dreams, according to scripture (?ruti-sm?ti).449 For an orthodox person (?stika), it is not appropriate to distort (lit. anyath? bh?va-kalpana, to conceive as otherwise) the meaning stated in the Vedas (vedokta artha) by means of the tools of logic (yukti- samud?ya) invented by the human mind (puru?a-mati-kalpita). Moreover, the identity (t?d?tmya) of silver alone is apprehended in mother-of-pearl, i.e., the Naiy?yikas should accept the fact that, just as the inherence (samav?ya) of silver-ness is apprehended in ?this? object, similarly, ?this? object and the identity of silver are apprehended. Here, ?this? object is mother-of-pearl, and the identity of mother-of-pearl and silver is not known anywhere other than in erroneous cognition. Thus, it is proper to accept that the identity of mother-of- pearl and silver arises in an anirvacan?ya manner only in a location before one?s eyes. Immediate apprehension (aparok?a prat?ti) of something unknown does not tend to occur, but the identity of mother-of-pearl and silver is apprehended immediately; therefore, one has to resoundingly (bal?tk?ra se) accept the arising of anirvacan?ya identity. If the Naiy?yikas should stubbornly insist that ?the inherence of silver-ness appears in mother-of-pearl? means that silver-ness appears in mother-of-pearl by an inherence relation, and not that the identity (t?d?tmya) of silver appears in mother-of-pearl, then, in the instant after the cognition of mother-of-pearl, the negation (b?dha), ?this is not silver,? should not occur. But everyone experiences such negation as true (anubhava-siddha), and the object of this negation is the identity of silver alone in mother-of-pearl, not the inherence of silver- ness. If, at the time of erroneous cognition, the identity of silver were not to appear in mother-of-pearl, then this negation would be object-less. Or, if only the inherence of silver- ness should appear in mother-of-pearl and not the identity of silver, then the negation, ?there is no silver-ness here,? should occur. But this does not occur, and so one must accept the fact that, at the time and place of erroneous cognition, the identity of silver alone appears in mother-of-pearl, and not the inherence of silver-ness. Therefore, even in anyath?-khy?ti, it is 449 Ni?cald?s is referring to his preliminary arguments against anyath?-khy?ti in section 6.3.5.2, on page 189, where he cites BU 4.3.10 and BS 3.2.1 in support of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. 208 necessary to accept the arising of the stated anirvacan?ya identity because one cannot succeed (nirv?ha hon?) with anyath?-khy?ti alone (VP 7.64, 310-11). The Naiy?yika?s assertion, ?anirvacan?ya-khy?ti has to accept anyath?-khy?ti too, and even Advaita authors have accepted anyath?-khy?ti? (2), was made without knowing the intent of the Advaita texts. In Advaita, anyath?-khy?ti is not accepted anywhere at all, whereas anirvacan?ya-khy?ti alone is accepted everywhere. In reality, wherever valid cognition is discussed in the Advaita doctrine (siddh?nta), the object and its cognition are referred to as anirvacan?ya. In the few places where anyath?-khy?ti is discussed, the intent is only that anyath?-khy?ti is possible where there is contact between the substratum and the superimposed or where mediate erroneous cognition occurs, but anyath?-khy?ti is not possible everywhere. However, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is incontrovertible where the superimposed object is non-proximate and there is immediate erroneous cognition, and therefore, it is necessary to accept anirvacan?ya-khy?ti alone in all cases. Thus, Advaita mentions anyath?-khy?ti with the sole intent of referring to its possibility, and not to indicate its acceptance. In Advaita, even where the anyath?-khy?ti of the existence of ?tm? (?tma- satt?) in non-?tm? is mentioned, there, too, an anirvacan?ya relation of ?tma-satt? arises in an?tm?. Wherever the anirvacan?ya arising of the relatum (sambandhin) is not possible, there an anirvacan?ya relation is accepted. Thus, the Brahma-vidy?bhara?a refers to the arising of an anirvacan?ya subject even in cases of mediate erroneous cognition.450 But even if anyath?-khy?ti is accepted as a simplification (sarala-buddhi se) by Advaita in cases where mediate erroneous cognition might occur, it is no defect (VP 7.64, 311-12). The anyath?-khy?ti proponent also raised the defect of lack of economy. ?Where [both] the cause of anirvacan?ya silver, etc., and their cognition is considered a defect, if, instead, only the cognition is considered to be caused by defect, then there is economy. In anyath?- khy?ti, the silver from the other location is well known; therefore, only the cognition of its silver-ness property occurs in mother-of-pearl, there is no actual silver there. Thus, only the cognition is caused by defect, and so there is economy in anyath?-khy?ti.? This too is improper because, if, through an appeal to [logical] economy, even the experientially established (anubhava-siddha) object were to be omitted, and even the object of true 450 A sub-commentary on the BS ?Bh, by Advait?nandabodhendra, 1700 CE (Advait?nanda[bodhendra] 1894/5, 16-39), e.g.,. ?na kutr?py anyath?-khy?ti?? (23). 209 cognition were to be refused, then an even greater degree of economy would be achieved if consciousness (vij??na) alone is accepted, along the lines of Yog?c?ra (vij??na-v?da). Therefore, just as experientially established objects such as pots, etc., are apprehended and the extremely economical vij??na-v?da is abandoned, similarly anyath?-khy?ti also should be abandoned. If it is examined thoughtfully, even anyath?-khy?ti has lack of economy in the following ways. 1) In the immediate cognition (s?k??tk?ra) of silver, the causality of contact between eyes and silver is ascertained (nir??ta). If the cognition of silver located in another place is accepted in mother-of-pearl, then that ascertainment is abandoned. 2) The immediate cognition of silver is ascertained by contact between eyes and silver, but in anyath?-khy?ti the erroneous immediate cognition of silver occurs by contact between eyes and mother-of- pearl, i.e., the unascertained is accepted. 3) The j??na-lak?a?a relation is not established (aprasiddha); therefore, in the anyath?-khy?ti view, the uncommon is accepted. Even if the j??na-lak?a?a relation is accepted, manifestation (praka?at?) of an object whose perception is accepted via extraordinary relation does not occur at all. Therefore, in the cognition, ?the sandalwood is fragrant,? despite the extraordinary perception of fragrance having occurred, the after-cognition (anuvyavas?ya), ?I immediately perceive fragrance,? never occurs. But upon the erroneous cognition of silver caused by extraordinary relation, the silver is manifested, and that is why, in the instant following the erroneous cognition, the after- cognition occurs: ?I immediately perceive silver.? In this manner, when a true (yath?rtha) cognition caused by j??na-lak?a?a relation does not have the ability to effect manifestation (pr?ka?ya-janakat?) [of its object, fragrance, in the above example], then to accept such ability in the case of erroneous cognition alone is astonishing, and it becomes an uncommon conception (aprasiddha kalpan?). In this manner, anyath?-khy?ti itself, having several uncommon conceptions, is lacking in economy. But according to scripture (?ruti-sm?ti), the defect-caused anirvacan?ya objects and their ability to effect cognition is well known and not an unestablished conception (VP 7.64, 312-14).451 451 Ni?cald?s mentions that anyath?-khy?ti has been thoroughly (vi?e?a-r?pa se) refuted in the Anirvacan?ya-v?da by Brahm?nanda, but it is a challenging text, therefore, he has presented the rejection of anyath?-khy?ti here in the easily understood manner of Brahma-vidy?bhara?a (VP 7.64, 314). No reliable information is to be found linking the text Anirvacan?ya-v?da and Brahm?nanda. Anirvacan?ya-v?da may possibly be the anonymous incomplete work Anirvacan?ya- khy?ti-siddhi? mentioned by Thangaswami (1980, 161, #67). 210 With this strenuous defense of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti against the Ny?ya objections, culminating in a resounding refutation of anyath?-khy?ti both on scriptural and logical grounds, Ni?cald?s concludes his treatment of the Ny?ya theory of erroneous cognition, and next directs his attention to the M?m??s? theory. 6.3.6 Akhy?ti-v?da, The Theory that the Erroneous Cognition is the Failure to Distinguish between the Real Recollection and Real Substratum Advaita Ved?nta is also known as uttara-m?m??s?, ?enquiry (m?m??s?) in to the latter (uttara) section of the Vedas,? as contrasted with [p?rva-]m?m??s?, the school concerned with Vedic exegesis pertaining to the earlier (p?rva) sections of the Veda, which deal primarily with Vedic rituals and their efficacy. Pr?bh?kara M?m??s? is one of the primary schools of [P?rva] M?m??s? interpretation, named after Prabh?kara Mi?ra (600-700 CE); it does not accept liberation. (The other major [P?rva] M?m??s? school is founded by Kum?rila Bha??a, 600-700 CE, and does allow for liberation). 452 The Pr?bh?kara akhy?ti theory of erroneous cognition has historically served as the prima-facie view (p?rva-pak?a) for Ny?ya?s anyath?-khy?ti, 453 and also in Ved?nta expositions of anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. 454 Therefore, Ni?cald?s, too, treats the Pr?bh?kara theory at considerable length. 6.3.6.1 The Pr?bh?kara statement of akhy?ti-v?da The essence of the akhy?ti theory of Pr?bh?kara M?m??s?, according to Ni?cald?s, is as follows. Other scriptures (??stra) have accepted cognition as being of two kinds, true (yath?rtha) and untrue (ayath?rtha), leading to activity (prav?tti) and refraining from activity (niv?tti) respectively. The Pr?bh?kara view considers this improper because untrue cognitions are unestablished (aprasiddha), all cognitions are true alone. Even if false cognitions were to occur, as soon as the person had the cognition, upon seeing the cognition-ness (j??natva) general property, the doubt of falsity (ayath?rthatva) would arise with regard to the cognition, and there would be the absence of activity or refraining from activity towards the cognized object (prav?tti-niv?tti). [The words prav?tti and niv?tti have a broad range of meanings. Prav?tti can mean inclination, activity, effort towards some end, active 452 For the relation between p?rva- and uttara-m?m??s?, see (Bronkhorst 2007). 453 As in Jayanta Bha??a?s (seventh c. CE) Ny?ya-ma?jar? (EIP 2:368-70), and Apar?rkadeva or Apar?dityadeva?s (twelfth c.) Ny?ya-mukt?val? (EIP 2:605-6), to name a few. 454 For example, in Padmap?da?s Pa?cap?dik? (Padmap?d?c?rya 1948, 19-27). 211 involvement with the world. Niv?tti can mean negation, cessation, involution, turning away from action, withdrawal. In the present context, prav?tti shall be translated as ?activity (towards the cognized object)? and niv?tti as ?refraining from activity (towards the cognized object).? I shall provide the terms with their translation when there are is the potential for polysemy]. In the Pr?bh?kara view, only the certainty of truth and the absence of the doubt of falsity with regard to the cognition act as causes of a person?s activity or refraining from activity, and as long as there remains the doubt that the cognition is false, neither activity nor refraining from activity will be possible. When all cognitions are true, then how should there be the doubt of falsity in cognition? Thus, erroneous cognition is not known. When a person acts towards (prav?tti) mother-of-pearl due to greed, and moves away from (niv?tti) the rope due to fear, neither action is due to a direct cognition of silver or snake. If such actions were to occur, then these cognitions [of silver or snake] could not possibly be true cognition, but false cognition is not accepted (al?ka). Therefore, there is only the recollection of silver and snake, not direct cognition, and the general cognition of mother-of-pearl and rope is directly perceived. Since there is a connection (sambandha) of mother-of-pearl and rope with defective eyes, their particular form does not appear, only their general ?this-ness.? Thus, in the instant following the general cognition, on account of similarity, the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of silver and snake are evoked (udbuddha) and these cause the recollection of silver and snake. Although the that-ness (tatt?) of an object also appears in all recollections, when the impressions are evoked by a connection with defective eyes, on account of the power of the defect, the that-ness portion gets suppressed (pramo?a, lit. stolen). In the case of ?this is silver,? ?this is a snake,? two cognitions occur; the direct cognition in the form of the general cognition of the mother-of-pearl and rope as ?this? is true, and the recollection of silver and snake is also true. Although the direct cognition has omitted (ty?gikai) the particular portion of the mother-of-pearl/rope and the recollection too has omitted the that- ness portion, even so, a cognition does not become false by omitting one portion. Rather, the cognition of an object by another form alone is called false cognition. Therefore, the above cognition is not false, it is true. In this manner, erroneous cognition is not known in akhy?ti, according to Pr?bh?kara M?m??s? (VP 7.65, 314-5). 212 6.3.6.2 The Pr?bh?kara defense of akhy?ti An objection can be raised against the akhy?ti standpoint. ?The convention (niyama) is that there is activity towards that object in which the cognition of the means of obtaining that which is desired (i??a-s?dhanat?-j??na) resides, and there is the refraining from activity towards that object in which cognition of the means of obtaining that which is not desired (ani??a-s?dhanat?-j??na) resides. Now, if according to akhy?ti, the cognition of the means of obtaining that which is desired is accepted to reside in mother-of-pearl, then erroneous cognition will be accepted, and if it is said that the above cognition is absent, the activity of the person desirous of silver should not occur, but in fact it does. Similarly, in the rope, there is no property of being a means of obtaining that which is undesired (ani??a-s?dhanatva), but if such a cognition should be accepted in the rope, then erroneous cognition will be accepted; if it is said that such a cognition is absent, then refraining from activity [towards the rope], in the form of flight from it, ought not to occur, but in fact it does. Therefore, erroneous cognition is unavoidable? (VP 7.66, 315-6). This objection is refuted by the akhy?ti proponent in the following way. When a person acts (prav?tti) towards a cognized object, the following collocation (s?magr?) is the cause of prav?tti: 1) the general cognition; 2) the recollection of the desired object; 3) the absence of cognition of the difference (bheda-j??n?bh?va) of the object of recollection from the object in front of one; and 4) the absence of the cognition of difference of the recollection from cognition before one?s eyes. Thus, even without erroneous cognition, activity is possible. Now, if only the absence of cognition of the difference between the object and cognition is called the cause of activity, then activity should occur even in a neutral state (ud?s?na da??). Therefore, the direct general cognition of the object (1) and the recollection of that which is desired (i??a-sm?ti) (2) are also stated as the cause of activity. If just the direct general cognition of the object and the recollection of that which is desired (1 and 2) are stated as the cause of activity, then, with the cognition of mother-of-pearl as something and the recollection of silver that is connected to another location, only the cognition, ?that silver is in another location, this is something? should occur, and even in this case, the activity of a person desirous of silver should occur. Therefore, the absence of cognition of the lack of difference of the desired object and its cognition on one hand, and the object before oneself and its cognition on the other (3 and 4) have also been stated as the cause of activity. In the 213 case of the cognition, ?that silver is in another location, this is something,? because there is cognition of difference between silver and mother-of-pearl, activity does not occur. If only the absence of the cognition of difference of the desired object from the object before oneself (3) were added to the means of activity, and the absence of the cognition of difference between the two cognitions (4) were not included, then, on apprehending two cognitions (1 and 2) as ?this is silver,? i.e., I saw the this-object, and I have recalled silver, even after apprehending the difference between the two, activity should occur, but it does not. Therefore, the absence of the cognition of difference [of the recollection itself from the present cognition] (4) has also been included in the means for activity. In this manner, along with both kinds of absence of cognition of difference (3 and 4), and the recollection of the desired (2), the direct perceptual general cognition of the object in front of one (1) is the cause of activity. Where there is cognition of difference of silver from mother-of-pearl (3), there too, the activity of the person desirous of silver does not occur. Where the difference between the cognition of mother-of-pearl and the cognition of silver is apprehended (4), there too activity does not occur. Therefore, cognition of difference is the obstructer (pratibandhaka) of activity, and the absence of obstruction in the form of absence of cognition of difference is the cause of activity. Therefore, considering the causality of activity to reside in the absence of cognition of difference does not incur the defect of conception of the unestablished (aprasiddha k? kalpan?). Where fleeing occurs on account of fear in the vicinity of a rope, there, too, there is no erroneous cognition of a snake. Instead, the general cognition of the rope (1), recollection of the snake connected with dislike (2, 5), and the absence of the cognition of differences of the two objects and their recollection (3, 4), all are the cause of fleeing. Fleeing too is a particular activity, which never occurs towards the object, but only away from it. The difference is only that in activity directed away, the recollection is connected with aversion, and in the activity directed towards, recollection occurs in conjunction with desire. Whether the action of fleeing born of fear is called activity or refraining from activity, its cause is the recollection of an object connected with fear alone. In the case where the refraining from activity occurs in the form of the absence of the activity of the person desirous of silver, caused by the cognition of mother-of-pearl, since the cause is the cognition of mother-of-pearl alone, it is not an erroneous cognition. Where the activity of a person who is desirous of silver occurs 214 towards real silver, its cause is the cognition of silver qualified by silver-ness; therefore, in the case of silver in front of oneself, the cause of activity is not the absence of cognition of difference. Therefore, in no way does the loss (lopa) of causation (janakat?) of activity occur with regard to the cognition of the qualificand (vi?i??a), since, in the case of real silver too, it is not possible to state that the absence of the cognition of difference of silver with regards to the silver right in front of oneself alone is the cause of activity (VP 7.66, 316-7). The gist of this is that if the absentee (pratiyogin) is known, then its absence pertains to empirical utility (vyavah?ra-gocara), but an unknown absentee?s absence is not suitable for any empirical utility. For example, the absentee of the absence of a hare?s horn [namely, the horn of a hare] is unknown; therefore, even the absence of the hare?s horn is false (al?ka). There is no empirical utility in a false object, only its verbal use (?abda-prayoga) and imaginary cognition (vikalpa-r?pa j??na) occurs. There is no empirical utility in false objects in the form of being a cause or an effect, or of being eternal or non-eternal, etc. Only the absence of known objects tends to be suitable for empirical utility. When there is no difference whatsoever of silver from real silver, i.e., the difference is unknown, how can the cognition [of imaginary silver] be possible? If the cognition of difference is accepted, then the cognition of the difference of imaginary silver from real silver is possible, but cognition of difference is unknown (aprasiddha) in akhy?ti; therefore, even the cognition of difference of imaginary silver from real silver is not possible. In this manner, due to the non-existence (asambhava) in real silver of the absentee (pratiyogin) in the form of cognition of difference, the absence of the cognition of difference in real silver that is an absentee of silver is false, and the causation of activity in that cognition of difference is non-existent too. Therefore, for the Pr?bh?kara M?m??saka, in the case of real silver before one?s eyes, the particular cognition alone, that there is silver-ness-qualified silver, is the cause for the activity of the person desirous of silver (VP 7.66, 317-8). Even though there is no erroneous cognition in akhy?ti at all, and all cognition is true, sometimes activity is successful and sometimes not; therefore, the cause for this [from the Pr?bh?kara standpoint] needs to be explained as follows. Activity that is caused by cognition of particulars is successful, while that caused by absence of cognition of difference is unsuccessful. If, even in the location of real silver, the activity is said to be caused by absence of cognition of difference, then everywhere the same activity ought to occur, and 215 there will remain no difference of success or failure. Therefore, the cause of successful activity is considered to be cognition of particulars. Where there is no activity towards false silver by a person desirous of silver, there, refraining from activity is the absence of activity, and its cause is the absence of cognition of silver as qualified by silver-ness. But there too, there is no cognition of the absence of silver as an erroneous cognition. Since activity and refraining from activity are mutually absentee (pratiyogin) and absence, the cause of activity as an absentee is the cognition of silver qualified by silver-ness; the cause of refraining from activity as the absence of activity is the absence of cognition of silver qualified by silver- ness. Thus, in akhy?ti, where there is no object and yet there is activity of the person desirous of the object, the causes are the recollection of the desired [object], etc., and the absence of the cognition of difference, etc., and not cognition of the qualified. Where there is mother-of- pearl and the cognition ?this is silver,? there is not only one cognition, but the ?this? form of mother-of-pearl is the general cognition and the recollection of silver with suppressed that- ness (pramu??a-tatt?). Although activity occurs due to both of these cognitions, it occurs only when there is the absence of the cognition of difference between these two cognitions, and, upon the cognition of difference occurring, no activity occurs. Therefore, the absence of the cognition of difference, along with the two cognitions mentioned, is the cause of activity. Many akhy?ti authors have also accepted activity due to the absence of the apprehension of non-relation (asambandha-gr?h?bh?va). Their purport is that there is non-relation of silver-ness in mother-of-pearl, and also the identity-relation of silver is not in mother-of- pearl. The person who cognizes this will not engage in activity. The meaning here is similar to the absence of apprehension of difference (bheda-grah?bh?va = bheda-j??n?bh?va). But the activity that occurs in this fashion is unsuccessful. In contrast, where cognition of the particular is the cause of the activity of the person desirous of the object in the place where the object resides, the activity is always successful. In this manner, for the Pr?bh?kara M?m??saka, erroneous cognition is not established in akhy?ti; instead, all cognitions are true. Where unsuccessful activity occurs due to the lack of discrimination of the two cognitions, there, the lack of discrimination of the two cognitions itself is called ?erroneous cognition? by others. This absence of discrimination of the two cognitions, as well as the absence of discrimination between the two objects, is the technical (p?ribh??ika) meaning of Prabh?kara?s akhy?ti (VP 7.66, 318-9). 216 6.3.6.3 Ni?cald?s?s refutation of akhy?ti Ni?cald?s refutes akhy?ti-v?da in the following way.455 When a person who has acted towards (prav?tta) mother-of-pearl due to erroneous cognition of silver does not gain silver, he says, ?I engaged in activity unsuccessfully in a location lacking silver due to erroneous cognition of silver.? Such erroneous cognition which is known through experience cannot be omitted (lopa). When water is negated in a desert, then too it is said, ?I saw imaginary water in the desert.? The experience of false water and its apprehension are also known by this negation. But according to akhy?ti, the negation should be, ?I engaged in activity towards mother-of-pearl due to recollection of silver and the non-apprehension of the difference between mother-of-pearl and silver,? and ?the activity in the desert took place due to recollection of water and the absence of cognition of the difference between the desert and water.? Other examples of deficiency in akhy?ti include: 1) due to the power of defect, upon contact of the eyes with mother-of-pearl, the cognition of the particular of mother-of-pearl does not occur; 2) the recollection with that-ness suppressed, despite arising, is unsuccessful; 3) the two objects differ, but that difference does not manifest; and 4) both the cognitions differ, but the difference does not appear. According to akhy?ti, because the apprehension (graha) of the difference of silver in mother-of-pearl?s place obstructs activity, only the absence of apprehension of the difference of the recalled silver from the mother-of-pearl is accepted as the cause of the activity of the person desirous of silver. Similarly, in the case of real silver, the apprehension of the non- difference is the obstructer of the refraining from activity [of the person desirous of silver]. This is certainly experientially true, so in the case of real silver, the absence of the apprehension of non-difference will be the cause of the refraining from activity of the person desirous of silver. Thus, it should be accepted that the absence of the cognition of difference of perceived silver from real silver is the cause of the silver-seeker?s activity, and the absence of the cognition of non-difference is the cause of the same person?s refraining from activity. Hence, when two cognitions [one being the general cognition of the mother-of-pearl, and the other, the desired silver] arise in mother-of-pearl as ?this is silver,? then, according to 455 Once again, compared to Padmap?da & Prak???tman?s refutation of akhy?ti in the Pa?cap?dik? and Vivara?a respectively (Padmap?d?c?rya et al. 1992, 79-83), and to Vimukt?tman?s treatment in the I??a-siddhi (1933, 42-7), Ni?cald?s?s treatment shares similar arguments, but is more detailed. Vimukt?tman?s dates are uncertain and fall somewhere within 850-976 CE per Sundaram (1968, xviii-xix). 217 akhy?ti, both the cognitions for activity and refraining from activity are there in the mother- of-pearl. a) The mother-of-pearl possesses difference from silver, but on account of defect, the cognition of silver?s difference in mother-of-pearl does not occur. Therefore, the absence of cognition of difference of silver is the cause of the silver-seeker?s activity. b) Actually, since there is no identity of silver in mother-of-pearl, and akhy?ti does not accept erroneous cognition, cognition of the identity of silver in mother-of-pearl cannot ever be possible, and thus the cause of the silver-seeker?s refraining from activity is also present: namely, the absence of the cognition of identity of silver in mother-of-pearl. In this manner, although the means for both activity and refraining from activity of the silver-seeker are there in mother- of-pearl, the two are mutually opposed and cannot possible exist at the same time. Due to the impossibility (asambhava) of the means for both activity and refraining from activity occurring simultaneously, it is not possible to abandon both, since the absence of activity itself is refraining from activity, and giving up the refraining from activity is naturally equivalent to activity. In this fashion, the akhy?ti proponent, unable to undertake both or give up both, will become bewildered and give up his life on account of shame. Consequently, akhy?ti is the cause for death! There are many sides to this view, but these have not been presented here by Ni?cald?s, as he considers them obscure (kli??a) (VP 7.67, 319-20). Moreover, in akhy?ti, even without desire, the means of erroneous cognition is established forcefully. Where one sees a dust-cloud (dh?li-pa?ala) on a mountain that is without smoke but with fire and draws the conclusion (par?mar?a), ?the mountain is fire- pervaded smoke-possessing, vahni-vy?pya dh?mav?n parvata?,? the inference of fire is a valid cognition (pram?). Because the object of the inference, fire, is present on the mountain, this cognition is valid, even though the probans (vy?pya), in the form of smoke, is not present. Due to the absence of the probans (hetu) as smoke in the mountain, the cognition of the relation of smoke as pervaded by fire on the mountain cannot be possible in akhy?ti because, there is no actual relation to smoke in the mountain. If erroneous cognition is accepted, then the cognition of the relation to smoke in the mountain can occur in a mountain without smoke. But here, since erroneous cognition is not accepted, even if the cognition of the relation to smoke is not possible in that which is smoke-less, the absence of the cognition of the non-relation of smoke is certainly present, and that conclusion formed by the absence of the cognition of non-relation itself becomes the cause of the inference. Then one should 218 accept the absence of the cognition of the non-relation of the probans in the locus (pak?a) alone to be the cause of inference, because, where there is a relation of the probans in the locus, there is the absence of the cognition of non-relation of the probans in the locus, and there is also the cognition of the relation of the probans. But in the previous case, where there is no smoke in the mountain, yet inference occurs, there the cognition of the relation of the probans to the locus is not possible, but the absence of the cognition of non-relation of the probans is possible everywhere. Therefore, in akhy?ti, the absence of the cognition of non- relation of the probans to the locus itself is [erroneously] established as the cause of inference everywhere (VP 7.67, 320-21). Now the possibility of erroneous cognition via inference is established in akhy?ti by the grabbed-by-the-throat rule (gala-graha-ny?ya), i.e., by the akhy?ti proponent?s own logic. Just as smoke is the probans (vy?pya) of fire, the probans of being a means of obtaining that which is desired (i??a-s?dhanatva) is silver-ness, i.e., wherever there is silver-ness, there is the means of obtaining that which is desired, and in this way there is the pervasion of i??a- s?dhanatva in silver-ness. The essence is that if there is pervasion or invariable concomitance (vy?pti) of A in B, then B is the pervaded (vy?pya) of A. Thus, i??a-s?dhanatva is the pervader (vy?paka), silver-ness is the pervaded (vy?pya). The pervaded is the probans, and the pervader is the probandum (s?dhya). 456 The i??a-s?dhanatva as probandum is inferred by the silver-ness probans. This meaning is not refuted (nirviv?da) in all views (mata). But in views other than the akhy?ti, the inference of probandum as pervader is via the cognition of relation of the probans as pervaded, and in the akhy?ti view the inference of the probandum is established via the absence of cognition of non-relation of the probans as that which is pervaded in the locus, as has been explained. Now, in akhy?ti, where the cognition ?this is silver? occurs in mother-of-pearl, although the cognition of silver-ness is not present in the ?this?-object, mother-of-pearl, the cognition of the non-relation of silver-ness is also not there. Therefore, by virtue of the absence of the cognition of the non-relation of silver-ness in mother-of-pearl, by the absence of the cognition of non-relation of the probans as silver-ness in the locus as the ?this?-object, the inference of the probandum as i??a-s?dhanatva becomes self-evident without [the requirement of] desire and by the strength of the completeness [of 456 This has been dealt with earlier in the section on inference, VP 2 219 the logic] (s?magr?-bala-tai?). Then this inference of i??a-s?dhanatva in mother-of-pearl is indeed an erroneous cognition because mother-of-pearl does not possess i??a-s?dhanatva; instead, the inferential cognition of i??a-s?dhanatva in that which is without i??a-s?dhanatva will only be erroneous. Thus, by the grabbed-by-the-throat rule (gala-graha-ny?ya), erroneous cognition is established in the akhy?ti view (VP 7.67, 321). In the previously stated manner, where the conclusion of smoke was reached in regard to the mountain with a dust-cloud, if the cognition of the relation with smoke in the mountain were to be accepted, that cognition would have to be considered erroneous. But if the absence of the cognition of the non-relation of the smoke in the mountain is said to be the probans of inference, then the argument succeeds even by the non-acceptance of erroneous cognition. But if the absence of cognition of non-relation of the probans is considered the cause in all inferences, then the inference of i??a-s?dhanatva by the absence of the cognition of non-relation of silver-ness in mother-of-pearl will still be established as erroneous. In this manner, erroneous cognition is established in akhy?ti, in the manner of a rope with a noose on both ends (ubhayata? p???-rajju-ny?ya) [i.e., the proponent is trapped both ways and cannot escape] (VP 7.67, 321-2). According to Ni?cald?s, there are further defects in akhy?ti. Where tin and silver are held together and the cognition, ?[both] these are silver, ime rajate? occurs, according to the other views, this cognition is erroneous in the tin portion and valid in the silver portion.457 The cognition makes the silver-ness property an object in tin, and also in silver; the cognition in the tin portion is silver-ness qualified and is erroneous. But in the akhy?ti view, there is no erroneous cognition, and therefore, this cognition is true in all portions. In the silver portion, there is the apprehension of contact with silver-ness (rajatatva-sa?sarga-graha) 458 and the tin portion is cognized as ?this,? in which there is the non-apprehension of the non-relation of silver-ness. This type of conception of difference is against experience, since the tin and silver are described as an identity (eka-r?pa) in ?[both] these are silver,? but, according to the akhy?ti conception of difference, a different description ought to occur. The apprehension of the relation of silver-ness in the tin portion is not possible due to the non-acceptance of 457 A similar argument is made against the Pr?bh?karas by the fourteenth c. Naiy?yika Ga?ge?a (Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004, 273ff). 458 This is misprinted in the KS ed. as rajata-sa?graha (322) but occurs correctly as rajata-sa?sarga-graha in both Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 7.56b) and also in Ni?cald?s (1957, 448). 220 erroneous cognition [in akhy?ti]. In the silver portion, the non-apprehension (agraha) of the non-relation to silver-ness can be accepted, since the apprehension of the non-relation of silver-ness in silver is not possible. But even so, there still is an apprehension of a relation by means of which the description as identity in the silver portion is possible. But where the object of prav?tti is before oneself, the prav?tti would occur in that case only due to a cognition qualified by contact (sa?sarga-vi?i??a-j??na), such a rule has been described earlier, 459 and this rule will be forsaken [because no activity occurs by the non-apprehension of non-relation] (VP 7.67, 322). The akhy?ti proponent may offer the following. ?The cognition qualified by contact occurs only where the desired object which is the object of activity is before oneself, and not the undesired object, just as only the cognition of silver as ?this is silver? is qualified by silver-ness. But where the desired silver and undesired tin are both in front of one, and cognition of the undesired object also occurs as ?this,? similar to the desired object, in that case, even the desired silver does not have cognition qualified by silver-ness; only the absence of the cognition of non-relation of silver-ness is there. Upon accepting this, the identity description, ?both these are silver, ime rajate,? is possible. There, the ?this?-form of tin and silver is a general cognition, and, though tin has the non-relation of silver-ness, the cognition of that non-relation does not occur due to defect, therefore, since there is the absence of the cognition of non-relation of silver-ness in tin and that non-relation never occurs in silver, there too there is absence of cognition of non-relation, and therefore, the description as one object of desire (eka-rasa ullekha) is possible.? If it be so said, then even with regard to the silver portion, fruitless activity ought to occur, since the cognition of the silver-ness qualification which is the cause of activity was not accepted in the silver-portion. And if the cognition of the silver-ness qualification is accepted, then the description [of tin and silver] as one object of desire will not be possible. But since activity does occur in the stated case, it will have to be accepted that the cognition of the silver-ness qualification does occur in the silver portion and the description as one object of desire does not occur. Secondly, in the akhy?ti view, there is no erroneous cognition by which unsuccessful activity may occur; instead, the activity which occurs due to the cognition of difference of the desired 459 VP 7.66, 318 and on p. 203 here. 221 object is unsuccessful, while the activity which occurs due to the cognition of the particular is successful. Therefore, where tin and silver are before one and the cognition ?[both] these are silver? occurs, although the cognition of tin and silver is the same in the ?this?-form, there is the silver-ness qualified cognition in the ?this?-portion of silver and the non-apprehension of the relation of silver-ness or the non-apprehension of difference of silver in the ?this?-portion of tin. Where there is the non-relation of silver, there itself is the difference of silver, and therefore, there is no difference of meaning in saying the non-apprehension of difference of silver. In this way, in the case of ?[both] these are silver? according to akhy?ti, the identity description is not possible, and consequently, akhy?ti is improper (VP 7.67, 322-3). The akhy?ti proponent raised a defect against those who accept erroneous cognition: ?Even if erroneous cognition were well known, due to the doubt in all cognitions that they may be erroneous, no definite (ni?kampa) activity should occur.? This defect is also not possible, according to Ni?cald?s. In akhy?ti, although there is no erroneous cognition and all cognitions are true (yath?rtha), even according to their view, sometimes the prav?tti due to a cognition is successful and sometimes it is unsuccessful. Therefore, even akhy?ti has accepted the difference of cognitions effecting success or failure in activity. Wherever activity occurs on account of cognition qualified by contact (sa?sarga-vi?i??a-j??na), it is successful, and, where it occurs due to two cognitions of unapprehended difference, it is unsuccessful. Even the akhy?ti proponent accepts that the two cognitions that are the cause of unsuccessful activity are invalid (apram?). Thus, even if validity/invalidity of the cognitions due to truth/falsity of the object have not been accepted, still the validity/invalidity, which is the cause of the difference as success/failure of activity/refraining from activity, is desired by the akhy?ti proponent as well. Now if akhy?ti has an aversion only towards the term ?invalidity,? the difference between the qualified cognition causing successful activity and the two cognitions of unapprehended difference causing unsuccessful activity is experientially known [as true], and even akhy?ti has accepted it. Then, it only remains to use a different term for practical differentiation, in which case it is appropriate to conduct dealings (vyavah?ra) using the well-known term alone. Further, even upon not accepting erroneous cognition, and instead accepting as true cognitions both the unapprehended difference that leads to unsuccessful activity, and also the silver-ness qualified cognition in silver that leads to successful activity, on seeing the 222 common property of cognizability (j??tatva) in them both, a doubt is possible. Just as there are two cognitions of unapprehended difference present in mother-of-pearl, and their difference is not apprehended, is this cognition [of silver-ness in silver] in the form of two cognitions of unapprehended difference, or is it just one cognition without difference? If it is in the form of two cognitions of unapprehended difference, then the silver will not be gained through prav?tti. Due to such a doubt also, even in akhy?ti, definite activity is not possible. Thus both views [akhy?ti, and that which acknowledges erroneous cognition] share the same unfeasibility of doubt-free activity. Thus, Ni?cald?s concludes, akhy?ti-v?da also is improper (VP 7.68, 323-4). Only anirvacan?ya-khy?ti is free from fault (nirdo?a). 6.4 Chapter Summary This chapter began with Ni?cald?s?s explanation of erroneous cognitions via the Advaita theory of superimposition (adhy?sa) and two schemes of classification of its different types (Figure 10). The possible objections to the theory and their refutation were also presented. The Advaita theory of erroneous cognition, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya), was presented next. The mechanics of an erroneous cognition by means of a v?tti were analyzed, and the agency (kara?at?) of superimposition was investigated from the perspectives of: 1) an obscure thirteenth century Advaitin named Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB); 2) Sarvaj??tman (eleventh c.), author of the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (S?); and 3) Prak???tman (1000 CE), the author of the Pa?cap?dik? Vivara?a (PPV). The S? and PPV views were reconciled, but the debate between KCNB perspective and that of substantive cognition (dharmi-j??na-v?da, DJV) was further explored through a presentation of four possible views on the locus of the erroneous cognition. The only correct view was deemed to be that of DJV, namely, that the erroneous cognition is of the form of a v?tti of ignorance (avidy?) in the shape of the superimposed object. Then Ni?cald?s presented five non-Advaita theories of erroneous cognition (khy?ti-v?da) and their inadequacies as compared to Advaita?s anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. The first three opposing theories were presented and refuted in short order: namely, sat-khy?ti, which holds that the object of erroneous cognition is real; akhy?ti, which holds that the object of erroneous cognition is unreal; and ?tma-khy?ti, which holds that the object of erroneous 223 cognition is a mental state projected by the self. The Ny?ya theory of anyath?-khy?ti, which holds that the object of erroneous cognition is real but is present elsewhere, was presented at great length along with the Ny?ya arguments against the Advaita anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, followed by a systematic refutation from within the Ny?ya framework, and also from the Advaita standpoint. Finally, Ni?cald?s also presented in considerable detail the Pr?bh?kara akhy?ti theory, that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real recollection and real substratum, followed by its detailed refutation. In the process, Ni?cald?s, as the akhy?ti proponent, raised the objection regarding the defect in the view of those who acknowledge erroneous cognition, including Advaita, namely, the impossibility of definite activity due to doubt. In refuting the objection, although Ni?cald?s showed that the same defect existed in akhy?ti also, he has not yet refuted the defect in Advaita [lit. sva-mata, his own view]. In order to address this issue, Ni?cald?s goes on to examine the nature of validity (pram?tva) and invalidity (apram?tva), their arising and types of cognition. This will be taken up in the next chapter so that the issue of activity in the face of doubt can be resolved. This will be followed by a discussion on the nature of ignorance, as well as that of the j?va and ??vara, and their relation, also in the next chapter. 7 Validity (Pram?tva), Ignorance (Aj??na), J?va and ??vara In the previous chapter, in the course of his examination of the Pr?bh?kara theory of erroneous cognition, akhy?ti, Ni?cald?s presented the akhy?ti objection to those who acknowledge erroneous cognition, including Advaita, namely: the impossibility of definite activity (ni?kampa prav?tti) because one doubts the validity of the cognition. Although Ni?cald?s dismissed this objection by showing that akhy?ti also suffers from the same defect, the inapplicability to Advaita?s anirvacan?ya-khy?ti still needs to be demonstrated. Ni?cald?s addresses this next, by examining the nature of validity (pram?tva) and invalidity (apram?tva), their arising and the types of their cognitions. This is required because whether activity occurs or not is dependent on the ascertainment of validity. For Advaita, notions of activity and agency are only relevant in the empirical (vy?vah?rika) sphere, thus Ni?cald?s?s examination of validity is laying the groundwork for his showing that the empirical reality depends on the non-dual ultimate (p?ram?rthika) reality. Before presenting the Advaita theory of intrinsic validity (svata?-pr?m??ya-v?da), Ni?cald?s offers the Ny?ya theory of extrinsic (parata?) validity and invalidity, and the Advaita response to it. He then proceeds to other non-Advaita views concerning validity and invalidity, such as those of the Pr?bh?karas, Bh???as, and of a M?m??saka named Mur?ri Mi?ra, which he refutes as well. Then Ni?cald?s returns to resolve the issue of the impossibility of definite activity, which was raised during the discussion of akhy?ti. That brings to a close his answer to the second question pertaining to v?ttis, namely, ?what is the cause of a v?tti?? Chapter 7 then continues with Ni?cald?s?s preparations for his response to the final question regarding v?ttis, ?what is the purpose of a v?tti?? In short, the primary purpose of a v?tti is stated to be the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). This then necessitates an investigation of ignorance, its locus, and its object. Ignorance is presented as without beginning, and various doubts concerning the reality of ignorance are addressed. Within Advaita itself, there are differing opinions as to whether j?va (the individual) or ??vara (the theistic creator) is the locus of ignorance. Ni?cald?s presents these views and explores the merits and demerits of each: 1) Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da); 2) the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection (bimba-pratibimba-v?da of Prak???tman); 3) the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da); and 4) the theory of there being only one j?va (eka-j?va-v?da, 226 d???i-s???i-v?da). This chapter concludes with Ni?cald?s?s resolution of the differences primarily between the Theory of Appearance and The Theory of Reflection. 7.1 Validity (Pram?tva) and Invalidity (Apram?tva) According to Ni?cald?s, the nature of validity and invalidity of cognition, their arising, and the types of their cognition are important to consider, because, if a cognition is ascertained as invalid, then no activity (prav?tti) will arise from it; if there is doubt regarding validity, then the activity occurs with hesitation [lit. sakampa, tremblingly/with trepidation]; and if the validity is certain, then definite activity occurs. Earlier, (VP 1.1, 1-2; 7.3, 209), valid cognition (pram?) was defined thus: the cognition that is different from recollection, non-negated (ab?dhita), and pertaining to the object (artha-gocara), is a valid cognition (pram?), and an invalid cognition (apram?) is that which is different from valid cognition. From this, it is known that a valid cognition has the property (dharma) of validity (pram?tva); a cognition that is not valid has the property of invalidity (apram?tva); and recollection does not possess technical (p?ribh??ika) validity. But recollection should also be accepted as possessing validity that is applicable (upayog?) to activity. A person?s activity occurs even in a location where the recollection of a desired object occurs, and when the recollection is considered to possess validity, definite activity occurs. In such cases, the term ?validity? is used to refer to the property of truth (yath?rthatva-dharma). If the use of the term ?valid cognition (pram?)? for recollection is utterly unacceptable, then instead of the sentence ?definite activity occurs due to validity,? one should state, ?definite activity occurs due to cognition of truth (yath?rthatva-j??na).? (VP 7.69, 324-6). 7.1.1 The Ny?ya Theory of Extrinsic (Parata?) Validity and Invalidity According to Ny?ya, validity (pr?m??ya = pram?tva) is produced by something other than the means of effecting cognition, and it is cognized by something other than the means of cognizing (j??paka) cognition. If the means of cognition such as the senses, inference, etc., were to produce validity, then all cognition would be valid, and invalid cognition would not be possible. Validity is produced by an additional means, which is a quality (gu?a). Invalidity of cognition also is produced externally, since erroneous cognition is produced by external defect (VP 7.70, 326-7). Where the cognition of pots, etc., occurs through the eyes and other means, the cognition occurs in the form, ?this is a pot,? and, where the pot- 227 cognition is directly cognized (pratyak?a hon?) by the means of cognition in the form of the mind, it takes the form ?I know the pot.? The object of this [second] mental cognition is both the pot-cognition and the pot, since the pot-cognition is termed a determinate cognition (vyavas?ya), while the [second] cognition of the pot-cognition is called an after-cognition or reflexive cognition (anuvyavas?ya), i.e., that which follows (anus?rin) a cognition (vyavas?ya). The nature of an after-cognition is that without forsaking the object of the cognition, it illumines the object along with the cognition. The ?tm? is also the object of the reflexive cognition, since it is the rule that, when any one quality (gu?a) is apprehended from among the particular qualities (vi?e?a gu?a) of ?tm?, namely, cognition (j??na), desire, action, happiness, sorrow, and dislike, ?tm? is apprehended.460 Thus, the cognition, ?I know the pot,? illumines: 1) the pot; 2) the pot-cognition; and 3) the basis of cognition, ?tm?. The cognition pertaining to this triad (tripu??) is termed the after-cognition, and its means is the contact with the mind.461 Although the cognition of the cognition and of cognition-ness (j??natva) occurs through an after-cognition, the cognition of validity (pram?tva) does not occur until after the person?s successful activity occurs, in the following instant via the inferential cognition of validity in the activity-producing cognition. For example, when a person desirous of water obtains water after a perceptual cognition of a pool followed by activity towards the pool, the following inference occurs to the person. ?This water-cognition is valid, because of its resulting in a successful activity. Wherever successful activity results, validity resides there, for example, in an ascertained valid cognition.?462 The counter-example (vyatireka-d????nta) is as follows. ?Wherever the resulting of successful activity does not occur, validity does not reside there, for example, in the case of the silver-cognition in mother-of-pearl.? The Advaitin responds to this Ny?ya position as follows. There are two types of after- cognition: 1) ?I know [this is] water;? and 2) the after-cognition ?I infer water,? which occurs 460 Athalye?s explanation is that the ?tm? is the substratum for the qualities buddhi, sukha, du?kha, icch?, dve?a, prayatna, dharma, adharma, none of which can reside in inanimate substances (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 135) 461 The mind is said to have 1) a self-conjoined, ?tm?-inherence relation (sva-sa?yukta-?tma-samav?ya-sambandha) with the pot-cognition, 2) a self-conjoined, ?tm?-inhering-inherence relation (sva-sa?yukta-?tma-samaveta-samav?ya- sambandha) with the cognition-ness, 3) contact-relation (sa?yoga-sambandha) with ?tm?, 4) conjoined-inherence relation (sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha) with ?tmatva, ?tm?-ness and 5) an extra-ordinary (alaukika) j??na-lak?a?a relation with the pot (VP 7.71, 398). 462 ida? jala-j??na? pram?, saphala-prav?tti-janakatv?t. yatra yatra saphala-prav?tti-janakatva? tatra tatra pram?tva?. yath? nir??ta-pram?y?m (VP 7.71, 329). 228 following the ascertainment of validity. Thus, in (2), the cognition apprehending assemblage (j??na-gr?haka-s?magr?) ascertains the validity of the [inferential] cognition, which essentially supports the Advaita position, namely, the apprehension of intrinsic validity (svata?-pr?m??ya-gr?ha) (VP 7.71, 329-32)!463 Further, cognition never has uncognized- ness (aj??tat?), and so the statement ?Due to the absence of cognized-ness in cognition, an after-cognition in connection with the cognition occurs,? is totally improper. Nobody ever has such a doubt as to ask, ?did I cognize the pot or not?? which would be the case if the cognition of the pot remained uncognized. Advaita considers the statement ?The illuminator of cognition is an after-cognition? to be improper (VP 7.77, 336). The difference between the two cognitions, ?this is a pot,? and ?I know [this] pot? is explained in Advaita as follows. In the cognition ?this is a pot,? the pot?s cognized-ness (j??tat?) does not appear, and in the cognition ?I know [this] pot,? it does. The object of the second cognition, ?I know [this] pot,? is the cognized-ness resident in the pot, and not the pot-cognition (VP 7.77, 337). Moreover, the Naiy?yika view, that instead of the means to cognition, a quality (gu?a) is considered the cause of the production (utpatti) of validity, is also improper. The quality is said to be the contact (sa?yoga) of the sense organ with additional parts (adhika avayavo? se) in the place of perception (pratyak?a-sthala); such a quality is not possible in the impartite perception of form, etc. The quality [that causes the cognition of validity] in the case of inference, in the form of the cognition of the pervaded probans (vy?pya-hetu) in the locus (pak?a), is also not possible, because, contact [with additional parts] is impossible owing to the absence of parts in the impartite form, etc. Where fire is inferred by the erroneous cognition of smoke in a dust-cloud on the mountain with fire, although the said quality is not present, the valid inferential cognition of fire still occurs there. Hence, it is clear that it is not possible for a quality to produce validity, but instead, only the means of general cognition (j??na-s?m?nya k? s?magr?) produces validity (VP 7.82, 340). 463 Ny?ya escapes the flaw of infinite regress (anavasth?), that to illumine the first cognition, a second cognition is required, for the second, a third, and so on, by not requiring the illumination of an object?s cognition for the object?s illumination. The illumination is required only for its own activity. vi?aya ke prak??a mai? apane prak??a k? j??na apek?? karai? nah??, kintu savyavah?ra mai? prak??a k? apek?? hai (VP 7.71, 330-1). 229 7.1.2 Other Non-Advaita Views on Validity Ni?cald?s presents and refutes other rival views as well. According to the Pr?bh?kara M?m??s? view, all cognitions illumine the collective triad (tripu??) of the cognition, cognizer and the cognized. Thus, the cognition also has its own nature and its validity as its object (VP 7.73, 332). The Pr?bh?kara view conforms to (Advaita) doctrine (siddh?nta) on the following points: 1) the cognitions of pot, etc., do not require an anuvyavas?ya for their own illumination; 2) nothing other than the means of apprehending cognition is required for the apprehension of validity; 3) all cognitions have the triad [of cognition, cognizer, and cognized] as their object, and no cognition occurs pertaining only to the object; cognition pertaining to only the object is unknown (asiddha); 4) all cognitions pertain to the triad alone, in the manner of ?I cognize the pot.? Even in the cognition, ?this is a pot,? when the pot-cognition occurs after the sense-organ has contacted the pot, this cognition illuminates the pot, the nature of the cognition, and its basis, the ?tm?. Similarly, this cognition also illumines its own property (dharma), validity. Thus the pot-cognition does not require another cognition for its illumination. The Pr?bh?kara view is only contrary to the Advaita doctrine in holding that the cognition also illuminates itself while pertaining to the triad. The agent (kart?) of an action (kriy?) cannot also be the result (karma) of that action. Therefore, the agent of the illumination of cognition, namely, the cognition itself, cannot also be the result of the illumination, the cognition. In Advaita, cognition is itself illumination, so the contradiction does not apply (VP 7.80, 338-9). Mur?ri Mi?ra (a M?m??saka, ca. 1150-1220 CE)464 accepts the illumination of the cognition by the after-cognition (anuvyavas?ya) and also the fact that the validity of a cognition is illumined by the illumination of that cognition, i.e., the after-cognition or the inference. Therefore, the doubt of validity does not occur after the after-cognition (VP 7.74, 332-3). Ni?cald?s considers Mur?ri Mi?ra?s view to be equivalent to the Ny?ya view and therefore improper. Although Mur?ri Mi?ra?s view also accepts the illumination of validity by the cognition-illuminating after-cognition, this difference is not significant (aki?citkara) because Ni?cald?s thinks that accepting the illumination of a cognition by an after-cognition while still considering cognition to be non-luminous is a gross mistake (VP 7.78, 338). 464 Mur?ri Mi?ra is considered to be a ?minor M?m??saka? and the founder of a third school of M?m??s? (Verpoorten 1987, 44). 230 Kum?rila Bha??a?s465 view is that the cognition of the cognition of pots, etc., is not in the form of perception, because the cognition quality (gu?a) is not suitable for perception. Therefore, the cognition of cognition is only as an inference, and is not mentally perceived (m?nasa-pratyak?a) (VP 7.75, 333-4). Ni?cald?s considers this view to be even more improper than the Ny?ya view. A portion of this view, wherein ?inference, which is the illuminator of cognition, illuminates validity,? differs from the Ny?ya view, and is similar to the Advaita position. But Ni?cald?s considers accepting the illumination of this perceptual cognition, which immediately (aparok?a) cognizes objects such as pot, etc., as only in mediate form via inference to be quite ridiculous (h?sya k? ?spada) (VP 7.79, 338). 7.1.3 The Advaita Theory of Intrinsic Validity (Svata?-pr?m??ya-v?da) Advaita defines apprehension of intrinsic validity as ?the apprehension of validity by the means of apprehension of the cognition which is free from defect.?466 According to Ni?cald?s, the illuminator of the validity of cognition is the witness-consciousness (s?k??) accompanied by the absence of defect. However, the witness-consciousness does not apprehend invalidity, because the attribute of erroneous cognition is produced either by a defect, or by the causation of unsuccessful activity, or by the manifestation (avabh?sa) of that which has a different reality (vi?ama satt?) than the substratum. Thus, the attributes of erroneous cognition are connected with (gha?ita) a defect, unsuccessful activity, and a different reality. These are not the objects of the witness-consciousness, and so the definition of the apprehension of intrinsic validity (svata?-pr?m??ya-graha) does not over-pervade (ativy?pti) into this invalidity. Instead, as with the Naiy?yikas, invalidity is cognized on seeing unsuccessful activity. If it were accepted that invalidity, too, is produced by the same means of cognition, then the shortcoming could arise that ?all cognitions should be invalid.? But in the production of invalidity, the means that produces the cognition, i.e., the cause, is defective, and therefore, this shortcoming does not arise. Invalid cognition is produced by defective eyes, [defective] inference, etc. The production of invalidity-qualified erroneous cognition itself is considered the production of invalidity in this text [i.e., the VP], while the 465 Kum?rila Bha??a fl. eighth c. CE according to Dasgupta (1922, 1:129), or between 600-700 CE according to Verpoorten (1987, 22), and otherwise subscribes to the theory of intrinsic validity (Dasgupta 1922, 1:460; Verpoorten 1987, 23-4). 466 do??bh?va-sahita j??na-gr?haka s?magr? tai? pram?tva k? graha hovai t?k?? svata?-pr?m??ya-graha kahai? hai? (VP 7.81, 339). 231 production of validity is only through the general means of cognition (j??na k? s?m?nya s?magr? tai?) (VP 7.81, 339-40). The objection can be raised: ?If it is accepted that the means of general cognition produces validity, then even in the case of an erroneous cognition, the means of general cognition being present, a valid cognition should occur.? Ni?cald?s refutes this objection in the following manner. Where there is a defect, valid cognition does not occur; therefore, the defect is an obstacle in the production of validity. The absence of obstacles alone is the cause of the production of all effects (k?rya); therefore, validity can only be produced by means of cognition that are free from defect. Here, ?the production of validity? is intended to convey the meaning (t?tparya), ?the production of a cognition that is qualified by validity (pram?tva-vi?i??a-j??na k? utpatti).? Therefore, it is not improper to speak of ?the production of the property (dharma) of validity.? The production of validity occurs intrinsically (svata?), not extrinsically, because the valid cognition is produced by defect-free cognition-producing means such as eyes, etc. It may appear that external validity is being accepted because the senses, inference, etc., themselves, without the absence of defect, are said the means for general cognition; but it was also said above that the absence of defect, too, was a cause in the production of validity; therefore, validity is produced by something other than the means of general cognition. Still, the shortcoming (?patti) of extrinsic validity could occur only if the requirement of some positive (bh?va-r?pa) means in excess of the means for general cognition were accepted, but the apprehension of extrinsic validity is not established merely by the requirement of absence of defect, which is negative (abh?va-r?pa). The means of cognition is the witness-consciousness, i.e., the cognition of validity of cognition occurs by the witness-consciousness accompanied by absence of defect, and the production of invalidity occurs from the cognition-producing means such as sense organs, inference, etc., accompanied by defect. Since the sense organs, inference, etc. are the means of general cognition, and defect is external to them, invalidity is produced extrinsically. After an erroneous cognition, when activity (prav?tti) occurs and the result is not obtained, an inferential cognition of invalidity occurs. Since the means of apprehending inferential cognition is different from the witness-consciousness, the apprehension of invalidity also occurs extrinsically. In this manner, in the instant of the production of cognition itself, the 232 nature of the cognition is illumined by the witness-consciousness, and the validity residing in the cognition (j??na-v?tti pram?tva) is also illumined (VP 7.82, 340-1). 7.2 The Removal of the Shortcoming Raised During the Akhy?ti Treatment Having established intrinsic validity for Advaita, Ni?cald?s now returns to address the shortcoming raised during the earlier discussion of akhy?ti-v?da. ?When the conviction of validity occurs, no doubt occurs regarding its validity. Yet, when there is doubt regarding error (bhramatva-sandeha), even in the presence of the certainty of validity, there will be absence of definite activity (ni?kampa prav?tti).? Ni?cald?s considers this statement by the akhy?ti proponent to be untrue. Certainty of validity alone opposes doubt regarding validity. Certainty of validity does not oppose doubt regarding error because doubt and certainty are opposed only with regard to the same object. In the above [akhy?ti proponent?s] statement, the objects of the certainty of validity and the doubt regarding error are different, namely, validity and error respectively, so the akhy?ti statement above [that doubt regarding error is not opposed by the conviction of validity] is proper (sa?gata). However, where the certainty of validity occurs for a cognition, it is known by experience that neither certainty of error nor doubt regarding error occurs for that cognition; therefore, certainty of validity and doubt regarding error are also opposed. Upon further reflection, Ni?cald?s continues, there is no difference between doubt regarding validity and doubt regarding error; both are one and the same. Doubt regarding validity is of the form, ?is this cognition valid or not?? Here, the positive portion (vidhi ko?i) is validity, and the negative portion (ni?edha ko?i) is error (bhramatva), because, upon negating validity, only error remains. Similarly, doubt regarding error takes the form, ?is this cognition erroneous or not?? In this, the positive portion is error and the negative portion is validity, because, upon negating error in a cognition, only validity remains. Thus, both portions, error and validity, are the same in both doubts, and therefore, there is no difference between doubt regarding validity and doubt regarding error. That in which the positive portion is validity, is called doubt regarding validity, and that in which the positive portion is error, is called doubt regarding error. The two doubts thus being the same, when there is certainty of validity, just as doubt regarding validity no longer persists, similarly doubt regarding error also does not persist. Therefore, in Advaita, even on accepting erroneous 233 cognition, definite activity is possible. The certainty of that which is anirvacan?ya is called erroneous certainty (bhrama-ni?caya) (VP 7.83, 341-2). Erroneous cognition is of three kinds: 1) doubt; 2) certainty; and 3) cognition through contra-factual argument (tarka-j??na).467 Contra-factual argument (tarka) is the factitious supposition (?ropa) of the pervader (vy?paka) due to the factitious supposition of the pervaded (vy?pya). 468 For example, ?If there were no fire, then there would be no smoke either,? if such a cognition occurred in a location with smoke and fire, it is a contra-factual argument (tarka). Here, the absence of fire is the pervaded, and the absence of smoke is the pervader, and since the factitious supposition of the absence of smoke is made by the factitious supposition of the absence of fire, and despite the presence of fire and smoke, the cognition of absence of fire and absence of smoke occurs; therefore, it is erroneous. If an error occurs despite being negated (b?dha), it is called factitious supposition (?ropa). In this case, there is the existence of smoke and fire; hence, their absence is negated. Despite their being present, the erroneous cognition of the absence of fire and smoke occurs through a person?s desire, and therefore, it is called factitious supposition. Such contra-factual argument that is of the form of factitious supposition is also included within erroneous cognition (VP 7.84, 342-3). 7.3 The Nature of Ignorance Having concluded a detailed analysis of the types of v?ttis and their causes, including erroneous cognitions, in VP 7, Ni?cald?s now takes up the final question, ?What is the purpose of a v?tti?? in VP 8.469 He tells us in brief that the primary purpose of a v?tti is the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). The cessation of ignorance located in the consciousness (cetana) delimited (avacchinna) by a pot, etc., is brought about by the v?tti in the non-?tm? form of a pot, etc.; the cessation of ignorance located in the non-delimited consciousness is brought about by the impartite (akha??a) v?tti in the form of Brahman (VP 8.1, 343). 467 See TS 64: ?ayath?rth?nubhavas trividha? sa??aya-viparyaya-tarka-bhed?t. False experience is of three kinds: doubt, error, and contra-factual argument? (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 56). 468 See Chakrabarti (2010, 32-3) and also Athalye (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 356) where the definition of tarka is provided as vy?py?rope?a vy?pak?ropa?am. 469 The three questions were first introduced in Ch. 5 on p. 111: 1) What is a v?tti? 2) Who is the cause of a v?tti? and 3) What is its purpose? 234 Before Ni?cald?s can further elaborate on the purpose of a v?tti, he must undertake a thorough investigation of ignorance. According to V?caspati Mi?ra, 470 the individual (j?va) is the locus (??raya) of ignorance which is destroyed by v?tti, and Brahman is its object, i.e., ignorance resides in the j?va and conceals Brahman. According to Prak???tman, the author of the Vivara?a, and others, pure consciousness alone is the locus and object of ignorance. Just as the illumination of a pot, etc., caused by cognition is termed the object-ness (vi?ayat?) of cognition, similarly the covering up of one?s nature caused by ignorance is termed the object- ness of ignorance. Since being a j?va (j?va-bh?va) and being ??vara (??vara-bh?va) depends on ignorance, the j?va caused by ignorance cannot possibly be the locus of ignorance (VP 8.2, 343). To facilitate the understanding of this, Ni?cald?s next explores the nature of j?va and ??vara, but first, a closer look at ignorance. This one entity (pad?rtha), ignorance, has several names: aj??na, avidy?, prak?ti, m?y?, ?akti and pradh?na. Among these, the difference between m?y? and avidy? is merely a view held by some (eka-de??-v?da), and not an actual difference. The Naiy?yikas and others term the absence of cognition itself ignorance. For Advaita, the entity that has the power (?akti) to conceal (?vara?a) and project (vik?epa), which is beginning-less and has the appearance of existence (bh?va-r?pa), is named aj??na, ignorance. It is called avidy? due to its being destroyed by knowledge (vidy?); it is called prak?ti and pradh?na on account of being the material cause of the apparent creation (prapa?ca), m?y? on account of effecting difficulties (durgha?a), and ?akti due to absence of independence (svatantrat?) (VP 8.3, 344). Regarding the beginning-less reality of ignorance, Ni?cald?s lists a variety of possible doubts. 1) Advaita texts state either that ignorance is different from consciousness, or that it is not different ? both of these cannot be possible. By ?ruti statements such as ?neha n?n?sti ki?cana, there is no diversity here [in this creation] (BU 4.4.19),? that which is different from consciousness is negated, and the non-difference of inert consciousness is not possible. Along with this, there is mutual opposition between difference and non- difference, so it is not possible to say that ignorance is different and non-different (bhinn?bhinna) from consciousness. 470 Author of the Bh?mat? sub-commentary on BS ?Bh, 842 CE. 235 2) By being in opposition to the ?ruti teachings of non-duality, it is also improper to attribute reality to ignorance. However, by being the cause of creation (prapa?ca), it cannot be considered false or imaginary (tucchat?-svar?pa). Since mutually opposed properties (dharma) cannot reside in the same substratum (adhikara?a), it is also not possible for ignorance to be called both real and unreal (sat-asat). 3) If ignorance is considered to have parts (s?vayava), in Ny?ya the material cause (up?d?na) that initiates a substance (dravya) is called a part, and in S??khya, the transforming material cause (pari??m? up?d?na) is called a part. If only the material cause is called a part, then one will have to accept space, which is the material cause of sound, as a part of sound, and similarly the pot, etc., which are the material causes of their own qualities (gu?a) and action (kriy?), will be the parts of the qualities such as color, etc., and actions such as movement, etc. Therefore, only the material causes of a substance are termed parts, not the material causes of others. Only that which results from parts is said to have parts (s?vayava). Now if ignorance were a substance, it could have parts, but it is not possible for ignorance to have the property of being a substance (dravyat?) because substances are of two kinds, eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya). If ignorance were considered an eternal substance, it would be improper to consider it with parts, and its destruction by knowledge would not occur. If ignorance were considered a non-eternal substance, then being different from ?tm?, its parts would also be non-eternal, and if these parts were non-eternal, an infinite regress would result. If the final part were considered eternal as in the case of an atom or of primordial matter (pradh?na, same as prak?ti), the ?ruti teaching non-duality would be contradicted, so the acceptance of the eternal atom in Ny?ya, and of the eternal primordial matter in S??khya, is opposed to ?ruti. Thus, since ignorance cannot be a substance, it is not possible for it to be with parts. 4) To say that the material cause of the empirical world (prapa?ca), ignorance, is impartite is also not possible, since a material cause is always with parts. Although in Ny?ya, space, the material cause of sound, is considered impartite, this is opposed to the ?ruti, ?tasm?d v? etasm?d ?tmana ?k??a? sambh?ta?, space came into being from that which is this ?tm?? (TU 2.1.1). 236 5) Although in Ny?ya, the atom that is the material cause of the dyad is considered part-less, yet, due to the defects of the absence of contact of part-less atoms and then the arising of the dyads, etc., the author of the Brahma-s?tra has refuted the part-less atom in BS 2.2.471 Therefore, it is also not possible to maintain that the material cause of the empirical world is part-less. The fact that ignorance is the material cause of the empirical world is known through the ?ruti, ?m?y?? tu prak?ti? vidy?t, One should recognize m?y?, the illusory power, as prak?ti, primal matter (?vetU 4.10),? because m?y? and ignorance are identical. 6) Thus ignorance cannot possibly be with parts or part-less, nor can it be both part-less and with parts since the two attributes are mutually opposed. Thus, since ignorance cannot possibly be described by any property (dharma), several texts have described it as anirvacan?ya. To consider such an anirvacan?ya ignorance as without beginning and real is not possible. Its reality has already been negated. Ni?cald?s refutes all of these doubts: Just as ignorance is different from reality, it is also different from unreality. Therefore, ignorance does not have non-negatable reality, but it is acknowledged to have a reality that is different from the empty (tuccha-r?pa) unreality, and therefore, it has been called anirvacan?ya, other than real and unreal. An entity to which words never pertain is not the only thing that is anirvacan?ya; the technical sense of the word anirvacan?ya is that which is different from Brahman, ultimate reality, and also different from the unreal, as the unreal is always devoid of reality and manifestation (satt?-sph?rti- ??nya), such as the hare of a horn, etc. Thus, it is possible to call ignorance beginning-less and real. But in Advaita, the meaning is not as it is in Ny?ya, where ignorance is considered the negative version (ni?edha-mukha) of the object of apprehension, in the form of the absence of cognition. Instead, just as the snake in the rope, etc., are positive versions (vidhi- mukha) of objects of apprehension that are negated by cognition, in Advaita, ignorance is a positive object of apprehension that is to be negated (nivartan?ya) by cognition. The a- prefix in aj??na here does not imply negation, and so it is possible to speak of reality in ignorance. Further, the ancient (pr?c?na)472 teachers, such as the author of the [Pa?cap?dik?-]Vivara?a and others have forcefully illustrated the fact that ignorance, which is opposed to illumination, is real, just as darkness, which is opposed to illumination, is real. Therefore, 471 Specifically, BS 2.2.12-17. 472 ?Respected? might be a better translation for pr?c?na here. 237 those who hear that ignorance is real and become put-off (utkar?a 473), are not very learned (alpa-?ruta). Ignorance is real. Being without origin, it is beginning-less, but it is not with parts like a pot which is comprised of parts (avayava-samaveta); instead, it has portions (s???a), 474 like darkness (VP 8.5, 345-6). 7.4 The Nature of J?va and ??vara Ni?cald?s describes ??vara as the reflection (pratibimba) of consciousness in the primordial matter (m?la prak?ti) based in pure consciousness. Avidy? is the portion of primordial matter qualified by the concealing power (?vara?a-?akti). The innumerable j?vas are the innumerable reflections of consciousness residing in the innumerable portions of ignorance. Ni?cald?s describes the relation between j?va and ??vara in four ways: 1) In the Tattva-viveka, 475 the nature of j?va and ??vara has been described as follows. Matter (prak?ti), the source of the creation (jagat), is conceived of in two forms: ?m?y? c?vidy? ca svayam eva bhavati, It [primordial matter, m?la-prak?ti] itself is both m?y? and ignorance,? according to ?ruti. 476 M?y? has pure sattva477 as its primary matter (pradh?na), and ignorance has impure sattva as its primary matter. Sattva that is overcome (abhibh?ta) by rajas and tamas gu?as is called impure sattva, and that by which rajas and tamas are overcome is called pure sattva. The reflection [of consciousness] in m?y? is called ??vara; the reflection in ignorance is called j?va. The up?dhi (?limiting adjunct?)478 of ??vara is m?y?, and ??vara is omniscient as it is primordial matter (pradh?na) that is pure sattva. But because the up?dhi of the j?va is primordial matter that is impure sattva, the j?va has limited knowledge (alpa-j?a). 473 Var. utkar?a in Ni?cald?s (1957, 483 n) and also Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 8.1). ?tm?nand Muni explains it as ?to raise one?s ears, i.e., to listen with surprise. ??ce k?n karn?, arth?t ??carya ke s?th sunn?.? 474 Ni?cald?s is using a??a (portion) and avayava (part) in a specific, technical sense, even though both these terms are typically considered to be synonymous. An avayava is a part of measurable size which can be further subdivided, whereas a??a denotes a portion that is without size and indivisible. The precedent for such usage is BS 2.1.26, ?[Brahman transforming into creation] results in the entire [transformation] or the violation of scripture on [Brahman?s] being without parts. k?tsna-prasaktir niravayavatva-?abda-kopo v?,? and BS 2.3.45, ?[The j?va is] a portion [of Brahman] due to the mention of diversity, and also otherwise [i.e., non-different]? a??o n?n?-vyapade??d anyath? c?pi ?.? See also Nakamura (1983, 500-1) 475 Vidy?ra?ya?s Pa?cada??, Ch. 1. 476 N?UTU 9 (?a?kar?c?rya and Vidy?ra?ya 1896, 144). 477 Sattva (purity, light), rajas (activity, passion) and tamas (sloth, inertia, dullness) are the three qualities (gu?a) of matter (prak?ti). These are deliberately being left untranslated to leave it clear that these are references to the gu?as. 478 See discussion on meaning of up?dhi on p. 164. 238 2) According to some authors, 479 prak?ti is mentioned in the ?ruti to have two forms: it is called m?y? because of the primacy of its power to project (vik?epa-?akti), and it is called avidy?, ignorance, because of the primacy of its power to conceal (?vara?a-?akti). Since the up?dhi of ??vara, m?y?, has no power to conceal, ??vara as a reflection in m?y? is not without knowledge (aj?a) [??vara is held to be all-knowing]; only j?va is without knowledge, because it is the reflection in ignorance which is possessed of concealing power. 3) According to the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka [by Sarvaj??tman], ?ruti has stated the up?dhi of ??vara to be the cause, and the up?dhi of j?va to be the effect; therefore, the reflection in m?y? is ??vara, and the reflection in ignorance is j?va. In this context, the reflection may be called j?va or ??vara, but the j?va-ness or ??vara-ness is not warranted in only the reflection, but also in the consciousness qualified by the state of being a reflection (pratibimbatva). If the j?va-ness or ??vara-ness were only in the reflection, then implication by renouncing a portion of the meaning (bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a??, see section 5.4.3, p. 132) would not be possible in the words j?va and ??vara. 4) In reality, the highest truth (param?rtha) is that in all the positions stated so far there is the non-difference between the source (bimba) and its reflection. In this view, the reflection is not false (mithy?), but when the face located on the neck apprehends its reflection, although the apprehension is erroneous and the property of being a reflection is false, by nature the reflection is not false. This will be explained below [under the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection of Prak???tman, section 7.4.2]. In all four of these views, since j?va and ??vara have both been considered reflections, it is Brahman that is attained by liberated j?vas, and not ??vara. When one up?dhi is destroyed, the reflection of that up?dhi does not become non-different from other reflections; instead, it only becomes non-different from its source [object] (bimba). And since ??vara too is a reflection, it is not possible for the j?va to become identical with the ??vara-reflection when the j?va?s up?dhi in the form of a reflection is destroyed; it can only be identical with the 479 The most notable proponent of this view is Ma??ana Mi?ra, 660-720 CE (Thrasher 1993, 70-1, 127-8). 239 source, pure Brahman (VP 8.6-7, 346-7). Thus, the above four views all accept a three-fold consciousness: 1) j?va; 2) ??vara; and 3) pure Brahman. 480 Having provided a brief overview of differing views of the relation between j?va, ??vara and consciousness, Ni?cald?s now takes a detailed look at four primary views by which the differentiation of consciousness as j?va and ??vara is explained in the Advaita tradition: 1) Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da); 2) the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection (bimba-pratibimba-v?da) of Prak???tman; 3) the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da); and 4) the theory of there being only one j?va (eka-j?va-v?da, d???i-s???i-v?da). 7.4.1 Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) In the Citra-d?pa [prakara?a],481 Sw?m? Vidy?ra?ya mentions four types of consciousness, which are described by Ni?cald?s thus: Space can be differentiated in four ways as: 1) pot-space (gha??k??a), the pot-delimited space; 2) great-space (mah?k??a), un- delimited (niravacchinna) space; 3) water-space (jal?k??a), the reflection of the sky in the water in the pot; and 4) cloud-space (megh?k??a), the reflection of the sky in the subtle droplets of the cloud-water. Consciousness has similarly been differentiated in four ways as: 1) k??astha, the substratum consciousness of the gross and subtle bodies; 2) Brahman, un- delimited consciousness; 3) j?va, the reflection of consciousness in the water that is the intellect (buddhi) inside the pot that is the body; and 4) ??vara, the reflection of consciousness in the latent tendencies of the intellect (buddhi-v?san?), which are similar to the water droplets in the cloud that is m?y?. The subtle state of the intellect (buddhi) in deep sleep (su?upti) is called latent tendency (v?san?). If the reflection of consciousness in only the buddhi-v?san?s were called ??vara, then, since there are countless buddhi-v?san?s, there would also be countless ??varas. Instead, the reflection of consciousness in the ignorance qualified by the buddhi-v?san?s is called ??vara. The sheath of intellect (vij??namaya-ko?a) is called the j?va; the gross anta?-kara?a in the waking and dream states is called the intellect (vij??na), and the reflection in it is said to consist of intellect (vij??namaya). The one who possesses a particular intellect that maintains, ?I am the doer, experiencer, fat, weak, cross- 480 In the V?rtika, six substances (pad?rtha) have been accepted as beginning-less: 1) pure consciousness (?uddha cetana) 2) ??vara?s consciousness, 3) j?va?s consciousness, 4) ignorance, 5) the mutual relation (sambandha) between ignorance and consciousness, 6) the mutual difference among all these five. These six are devoid of creation and hence beginning-less (an?di), and the first three are the types of consciousness (VP 8.8, 348). 481 Pa?cada??, ch. 6, specifically PD 6.18. 240 eyed, deaf, etc.,? is the j?va. In the state of deep sleep, the sheath consisting of happiness (the ?nandamaya-ko?a), in the form of ignorance along with the buddhi-v?san?s, is ??vara. The state of being ??vara (??varat? = ??vara-ness) in the ?nandamaya-ko?a is also well known in the M????kya Upani?ad (M?U).482 In Vidy?ra?ya?s theory, the reflection is false, but in the four views [of j?va and ??vara] stated above, since the source and reflection are non-different, the reflection is also real. Because of the proximity (sannidh?na) of the up?dhi, there is the erroneous cognition of reflection and source in the same object, yet in reality the reflection is only of the nature of the source. In Vidy?ra?ya?s theory, by the proximity of the face as a source, the anirvacan?ya reflection arises in the mirror, etc. Therefore, the j?va and ??vara are false in nature (VP 8.9-10, 348-9).483 Ni?cald?s explains Vidy?ra?ya?s stance. According to [Vidy?ra?ya?s] Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da),484 in the mah?-v?kya statements that teach (pratip?dana) the identity of j?va and Brahman, only negated grammatical co-ordination (b?dha- sam?n?dhikara?ya) is present, as opposed to identity coordination (abheda- sam?n?dhikara?ya). For example, where an erroneous cognition of a post as a person occurs and then the cognition of the post occurs, the non-difference of the person from the post is stated as ?this person is a post.? The negation occurs as ?the post has the absence of a person,? or ?the absence of a person is a post.? In the view [lit. mata] that accepts absence as separate from the substratum (adhikara?a), the first version performs the negation; where the absence of the imagined is in the form of the substratum, it is the latter. Similarly, the statement ?J?va is Brahman? means ?Brahman is that which has the absence of a j?va,? or ?The absence of a j?va is Brahman.? Absence (abh?va) in all three times [past, present, and future] is called negation (b?dha). Where the identity of an imagined object with the real substratum is stated, negated coordination (b?dha-sam?n?dhikara?ya) alone is intended. Whereas, where the identity of the immutable (k??astha) with Brahman is stated, the identity- coordination (abheda-sam?n?dhikara?ya) alone is intended. For example, where the identity of space [reflected] in the water [of the pot] (jal?k??a) with the great space (mah?k??a) is 482 This will be taken up shortly, in VP 8.18. 483 This will be clarified in the following discussion on sam?n?dhikara?ya, grammatical coordination (VP 8.11-14). 484 Vidy?ra?ya cites ?a?kara?s Upade?a-s?hasr? as the source for his ?bh?sa-v?da, in PD 8.12cd: ?brahma-cit-phalayor bheda? s?hasry?? vi?ruto yata?, since the difference between Brahman-consciousness and the resultant consciousness has been noted in the [Upade?a] S?hasr?.? 241 stated, the negated coordination of the water-space with great-space occurs only through the negation of the water. But where the identity of the pot-space with the great-space is stated, there identity-coordination alone takes place, and this is also called principal coordination (mukhya-sam?n?dhikara?ya) (VP 8.11-12, 349-50). But in the Vivara?a text, in the [mah?-v?kya] statement ?aha? brahm?smi, I am Brahman,? the principal coordination of ?I,? meaning j?va, with Brahman, is intended, and negated-coordination is refuted in all the mah?-v?kyas. Vidy?ra?ya, in the Citra-d?pa [prakara?a], justifies his stance while demonstrating agreement with the Vivara?a standpoint in the following manner. The appearance of consciousness (cid?bh?sa) and the immutable (k??astha) are mutually superimposed (anyony?dhy?sa), because the substratum of the intellect (buddhi) qualified by cid?bh?sa is the k??astha, and so the mutual superimposition of the substratum and the superimposed is natural. The object of the I-apprehension (aha?- prat?ti) is the intellect (buddhi) qualified by cid?bh?sa, and the object of self-apprehension (svaya?-prat?ti) is the k??astha. ?I know myself,? ?you know yourself,? ?he/she knows himself/herself.? In all these apprehensions the meaning of the ?self? word is subsequent (anugata), but the meaning of the words ?I,? ?you,? ?he/she,? is changing. Here the meaning of the word ?self,? the k??astha, which is subsequent in every case, is the substratum, but the ?I,? ?you,? ?he,? words meaning j?va as the cid?bh?sa-qualified intellect, which is changing, are the superimposed. There is the superimposition of the nature or identity (svar?p?dhy?sa) of the j?va on k??astha, and relational superimposition (sambandh?dhy?sa) of the k??astha on the j?va.485 Since there is mutual superimposition, k??astha and j?va do not discern (viveka hon?) each other. Therefore, the principal coordination of the k??astha with Brahman operates (vyavah?ra) in the j?va, because, without superimposing the properties (dharma) of the k??astha in the false j?va, the j?va?s principal coordination with Brahman is not possible. In this manner, k??astha is the substratum of the anta?-kara?a, which is based in the j?va (sv??raya), and the principal coordination of j?va with Brahman is spoken of only with the intent to describe (vivak??) the properties of the k??astha. (VP 8.13, 350). But, according to Ni?cald?s, if the Vivara?a text is considered thoroughly (lit. p?rva-uttara, before and after), the manner of agreement stated by Vidy?ra?ya is not possible, since the reflection is 485 VP 7.8, 223-5, covered in Ch. 6.2 on Superimposition (adhy?sa). 242 considered to be of the nature of the source (bimba). Therefore, in the Vivara?a, although the state of being a j?va (j?vatva) as a reflection is false, the j?va?s nature (svar?pa) as a reflection is true, [i.e., the j?va?s true nature is that of the source], and thus the principal (grammatical) coordination (mukhya-sam?n?dhikara?ya) of the j?va with Brahman is possible. But the harmonizing intent (samanvaya-k?raka abhipr?ya) of the Vivara?a that Vidy?ra?ya posits is an extravagant assertion (prau?hi-v?da). 486 According to Vidy?ra?ya, ?even considering the reflection to be false, the principal coordination of the Vivara?a becomes possible by the mah?-v?kyas? intent of the reflection being of the nature of k??astha (k??asthatva). Therefore, it is futile to accept the reflection as real simply for the purpose of principal coordination.? By this extravagant assertion, Vidy?ra?ya has imposed (lit. s?cita, indicated) his opinion (abhipr?ya) on the Vivara?a text (VP 8.14, 350-1). In essence (lit. ??aya, meaning/intention), the fact that principal coordination in the mah?-v?kyas can be expounded, even considering the reflection as false, reveals Vidy?ra?ya?s over-reach (utkar?a). Ni?cald?s suggests that Vidy?ra?ya?s intent behind the four types of consciousness in the Citra-d?pa is as follows. The appearance (?bh?sa) in the anta?-kara?a is the j?va, and it is in the form of the sheath of intellect (vij??namaya ko?a). Also, the appearance in the ignorance qualified by [the collective] latent tendencies of the intellect (buddhi-v?san?) is ??vara, and it is in the form of the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a). The nature (svar?pa) of both is false, i.e., on the one hand there is mutual superimposition of the k??astha and j?va, and, on the other hand, there is mutual superimposition of Brahman and ??vara. In some places, j?va is said to be ultimate Brahman, by superimposing the properties of the k??astha on j?va, and in some places the presence of the attributes of being that which is to be known through Ved?nta (ved?nta-vedyatva), etc., in ??vara is stated with the intent of expressing the Brahman-ness underlying the superimposition (?dhy?sika brahmatva). But Ni?cald?s goes on to assert that what Vidy?ra?ya has stated above, namely, the reflection in the latent tendencies of the intellect is ??vara, or the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a) is ??vara, is not possible. Those who consider ??vara in the ignorance qualified by latent tendencies of the intellect should be asked: 1) is the up?dhi of the state of being ??vara 486 In VP 6.35, 191, Ni?cald?s defines prau?hi-v?da as ?the (temporary) acceptance of the opponents? view while refuting their objections in one?s own view, prativ?d? k? ukti m?nikai bh? svamata me? do?a k? parih?ra karai t?k?? prau?hi-v?da kahai hai?.? Here he defines it as ?that which is asserted extravagantly. prau?hi kahiye utkar?a sai? jo v?da kahiye kathana, t?k? prau?hi-v?da kahai? hai?? (VP 8.14, 351). 243 (??vara-bh?va) only ignorance; or, 2) is it [the up?dhi] ignorance accompanied by latent tendencies; or, 3) is it latent tendencies alone? The first option would contradict the reflection in ignorance qualified by latent tendencies of the intellect as ??vara. According to the second option, then only ignorance should be considered the up?dhi of ??vara-ness; it is fruitless to consider ignorance accompanied by latent tendencies of the intellect as the up?dhi of ??vara- ness. A follower of Vidy?ra?ya might say, ?if only ignorance be considered the up?dhi of ??vara-ness, then the omniscience of ??vara would not be established, and therefore, for this purpose, the latent tendencies of the intellect have also been accepted as an attribute of ignorance.? Such a statement is improper as well, because the apprehension (l?bha, lit. gain) of omniscience is only possible by the v?tti pertaining to the sattva-portion present in ignorance, and, in that case, it is fruitless to consider the latent tendencies of the intellect as an attribute of ignorance. Instead, one should claim that [the apprehension of] omniscience is only possible through the sattva portion of ignorance; omniscience is simply not established by the latent tendencies of the intellect. It is impossible for each latent tendency of the intellect to pertain to all objects (nikhila-pad?rtha-gocarat?); therefore, in order to apprehend omniscience, one will have to consider all latent tendencies as attributes of ignorance, although the existence of all latent tendencies at one instant is not possible except at the time of the dissolution [of the creation]. Therefore, one must accept that omniscience is just not established by latent tendencies (v?san?). Thus the second option, ?ignorance accompanied by latent tendencies of the intellect is the up?dhi of ??vara-ness,? is not possible either. According to the third option, that ?latent tendency alone is the up?dhi of ??vara-ness,? the question arises whether 3a) each reflection in each latent tendency is ??vara; or 3b) the one reflection in all the collective latent tendencies is ??vara. If it is (3a), since every j?va has endless latent tendencies, the ??varas as reflections in them will also be endless, and since each latent tendency only pertains to a finite entity (alpa-gocara), the endless, reflected ??varas in them will be of finite knowledge as well. If it is (3b), then all the latent tendencies cannot be simultaneously present (yugapat) except at the dissolution of creation (pralaya). Moreover, the reflections in multiple up?dhis can, likewise, only be multiple, and therefore, only one reflection in all latent tendencies is not possible. These considerations show that only ignorance can be the up?dhi of ??vara-ness, and so Vidy?ra?ya?s usage of latent tendency in Citra-d?pa is futile (VP 8.15-16, 351-2). 244 Similarly, Ni?cald?s writes that it is improper to attribute ??vara-ness to the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a), because, in the waking and dreaming states, the anta?-kara?a alone, qualified by the gross states along with the reflection, is described as consisting of intellect (vij??namaya), and in the deep sleep state, that j?va consisting of intellect itself, devoid of even the subtle form (l?na hu?), is considered to be consisting of happiness (?nandamaya). If the sheath consisting of happiness alone were considered ??vara, when there is absence of the [sheath] of happiness (?nandamaya [ko?a]) of the anta?-kara?a in the waking and dreaming states, in those states there should be absence of ??vara too, and there should also be countless ??varas of endless j?vas in countless states of deep sleep. Moreover, all authors have accepted the five sheaths (ko?a), including Vidy?ra?ya himself in his Pa?cako?a-viveka. 487 If only the sheath of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a) were considered ??vara, then all those writings would be improper, and thus, it is not possible to have ??vara- ness in the sheath of happiness (VP 8.17, 352-3). Returning to Vidy?ra?ya?s statement that M?U488 supports the presence of ??vara-ness in the sheath consisting of happiness (the ?nandamaya-ko?a), Ni?cald?s suggests that although the sheath consisting of happiness has been stated to be omniscient and the ??vara of all in M?U, this does not establish the ??vara-ness of the sheath consisting of happiness. Instead, the meaning of the M?U statements is that the j?va has three natures, vi?va, taijasa and pr?j?a, and ??vara has the three natures: vir??, hira?yagarbha and avy?k?ta. 489 The presence of j?va (j?va-r?pat?) in hira?yagarbha is well known in all the Upani?ads, and the meditation (up?san?) for the attainment of the form of hira?yagarbha is also well known, as well as the attainment of the status of hira?yagarbha in another time period (kalpa) by the j?va who performs the meditation. Similarly, the j?va who performs the meditation for the attainment of vir?? nature also attains it in another kalpa. The power (ai?varya) of vir?? is less than that of hira?yagarbha, and the power of ??vara is the greatest of all. Vir?? is the son of 487 Pa?cada??, Ch. 3 488 This refers to M?U 5-6, ?The third quarter is pr?j?a, where, asleep, one neither desires nor dreams of anything. That is deep sleep. In the state of deep sleep, becoming one, a mass of consciousness consisting of happiness (?nandamaya), one enjoys happiness, with consciousness as one?s face. This is the ??vara of all, the omniscient, the inner controller, the womb of all, the origin and dissolution of beings. yatra supto na ka?cana k?ma? k?mayate na ka?cana svapna? pa?yati tatsu?uptam; su?upta-sth?na ek?bh?ta? praj??naghana ev?nandamayo hy ?nandabhuk-cetomukha? pr?j?as t?t?ya? p?dah. e?a sarve?vara e?a sarvaj?a e?o 'ntary?my e?a yoni? sarvasya prabhav?pyayau hi bh?t?n?m.? 489 The terms vi?va, taijasa and pr?j?a refer to the form of the j?va in the waking, dream, and deep sleep states respectively, and vir??, hira?yagarbha and avy?k?ta are the corresponding states of the macrocosm in those three states. These terms, most being proper nouns, are not being translated here. 245 hira?yagarbha, and has the limitation of hunger and thirst. 490 It is not possible to consider ??vara-ness in hira?yagarbha and vir??; instead, the j?va who resides in satya-loka [or brahma-loka, the highest of the seven upper worlds, BU 6.2.15], who lays claim to collective subtle-ness (s?k?ma-sama??i k? abhim?n?), and is the experiencer of pleasure, is named hira?yagarbha, and the j?va who lays claim to collective matter (sth?la) is named vir??. Along with this, the meaning of the word hira?yagarbha is the dispatcher (preraka) of the subtle creation (s?k?ma prapa?ca) in the form of the inner regulator (antary?m?), and the meaning of the word vir?? is the dispatcher of the material creation as the inner regulator. Further, the unmanifest (avy?k?ta), in the form of ignorance contained in the reflection of consciousness alone, is that ??vara called hira?yagarbha when it is the dispatcher of the subtle in the time of its creation, and when it is the dispatcher of matter (sth?la) in the time of its creation, then it is that ??vara called vir??. Thus, there is agency (prav?tti) of the words hira?yagarbha and vir?? in the states of being j?va and ??vara. In the j?va, which is claimed to be the subtle and the material, the words have a direct significatory relation (?akti-v?tti); in ??vara which is claimed to be the dispatcher of the subtle and material creation, the words have a subsidiary significatory relation (gau??-v?tti). This is because, just as hira?yagarbha and vir?? in the form of j?va have an identity relation (sv?yat?-sambandha) with the subtle and material creation, similarly hira?yagarbha and vir?? as ??vara have a dispatcher (preryat?) relation with the subtle and material creation. Therefore, the word hira?yagarbha has a subsidiary significatory relation (gau??-v?tti) to ??vara by the connection (yoga) of the quality (gu?a) of relationship (sambandhitva) to subtle creation residing in hira?yagarbha, and the word vir?? has a subsidiary significatory relation to ??vara by connection of the quality (gu?a) of relationship to subtle creation residing in vir??. In this manner, the words hira?yagarbha and vir?? each have both senses, j?va and ??vara, and one should take the sense that is reasonable in each context. But those who read Ved?nta texts without the benefit of a teacher (guru) and tradition (samprad?ya) do not have knowledge of the usage (vyavas?ya) as stated above, and so they become deluded by the fact that the words 490 Ni?cald?s says that ?this verse [attesting to Vir?? being the son of Hira?yagarbha and subject to hunger and thirst] is also well known in the pur??as. yah g?th? pur??a mai? prasiddha hai? (VP 8.18, 353). The relation of Hira?yagarbha and Vir?? is attested to in RV 10.90.5a, ?tasm?d vir?? aj?yata, From [cosmic Puru?a] was born Vir??.? Also in BU 2.6.3 on the lineage: ?parme??h? brahma?a?, Parame??hin from Brahman,? where ?a?kara glosses Parame??hin as Vir?? and Brahman as Hira?yagarbha. I have been unable to locate the pur??a reference to Vir?? being subject to hunger and thirst. 246 hira?yagarbha and vir?? are used as j?va in some places and ??vara in others. In M?U, the manner of contemplation of the identity between the three-fold j?va and the three-fold ??vara is also given. Its intent is also the same. For the person of weak intellect (manda-buddhi) who cannot realize truth through the contemplation of the mah?-v?kyas, the method of contemplation on Om (pra?ava) is provided. 491 That contemplation focuses on the identity between vi?va-vir??, taijasa-hira?yagarbha and pr?j?a-??vara, and the qualities of ??vara such as omniscience, etc., in the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya) as pr?j?a are mentioned only for the contemplation of identity, and not to signify ??vara-ness in the sheath consisting of happiness. Ni?cald?s concludes that the ??vara-ness of the sheath consisting of happiness is not established by the M?U (VP 8.18, 353-5). Here, Ni?cald?s is not criticizing Vidy?ra?ya specifically but rather, he is finding fault with the misunderstanding of Vidy?ra?ya?s teachings. Ni?cald?s points out that in the Brahm?nanda text,492 Vidy?ra?ya speaks of that [sheath (ko?a)] which consists of happiness (?nandamaya) as a particular state of the j?va. In the waking and dream states, the compact form (ghan?-bh?va) of the anta?-kara?a is called that [sheath] which consists of the intellect (vij??namaya) because of the karmas causing experience (bhoga) [in those two states], and the same vij??namaya in the state of deep sleep is called ?nandamaya [sheath] of the absorbed (vil?na) state by its relation with the up?dhi in the form of [this] anta?-kara?a. 493 Thus, even Vidy?ra?ya would prefer that the ?nandamaya [sheath] is a particular state of the vij??namaya, and that the j?va-hood (j?va-bh?va) itself be in the ?nandamaya-ko?a. Ni?cald?s suggests that, although it might be traditionally understood from the different writings in the Pa?cada?? that the five viveka and five d?pa chapters494 are written by Vidy?ra?ya and the five ?nanda chapters495 by Bh?rat?t?rtha, 496 it is not possible to have contradictions between the former and latter portions of the same text. As a result, even the Pa?cada?? does not teach (vivak?ita) ??vara-ness in the ?nandamaya, and the ??vara-ness 491 Meditation (up?san?) of Om (pra?ava) is described in detail by Ni?cald?s in VS 5.281-303. 492 Pa?cada?? chs. 11-15. 493 Compare PD 11.62-3: yad aj??na? tatra l?nau tau vij??na-manomayau; tayor hi vilay?vasth? nidr??j??na? ca saiva hi. The ignorance is latent in the intellect and mind [sheaths, vij??namaya and manomaya]; deep sleep is the state of latency and also of ignorance. vil?na-gh?tavat pa?c?t sy?d vij??namayo ghana?; vil?n?vastha ?nandamaya-?abdena kathyate. As melted ghee later solidifies, [similarly] the intellect [and mind sheaths are manifest after deep sleep]; the state of latency [for the mind and intellect sheaths] is termed the happiness sheath (?nandamaya). 494 Pa?cada?? chs. 1-10. 495 Pa?cada?? chs. 11-15. 496 For a discussion of the authorship of the Pa?cada??, see Pahlajrai (2005, 23-36) 247 mentioned in the Citra-d?pa chapter by Vidy?ra?ya is for the purpose of contemplation of identity with ??vara alone, just like in the M?U (VP 8.19, 355). Further, Ni?cald?s suggests that although Vidy?ra?ya enumerated four types of consciousness in the Citra-d?pa chapter of Pa?cada??, in the D?g-d??ya-viveka text, 497 he has included the immutable (k??astha) in the j?va, and has provided three types of j?vas: 1) ultimate (p?ram?rthika); 2) empirical (vy?vah?rika); and 3) apparent (pr?tibh?sika).498 The k??astha consciousness delimited by the material and subtle bodies (sth?la-s?k?ma-deha- dvay?vacchinna) 499 is the ultimate j?va (1), and it has principal identity with Brahman. The appearance of consciousness (cid?bh?sa) is in the anta?-kara?a, conceived of (kalpita) in the k??astha concealed by m?y?. The conceiver of the ego-self (abhim?na-kart?) in the material and subtle bodies is the empirical j?va (2). It is not negated (b?dha) prior to knowledge of Brahman (brahma-j??na). The apparent j?va (3) is concealed by ignorance in the form of sleep and is conceived on the substratum of the empirical j?va (2), i.e., it is the one who conceives of ?I? and ?mine? in the apparent creation in the dream state. When the apparent creation is negated (niv?tti) upon the knowledge of the creation in the waking state, even without knowledge of Brahman, then by the awareness of the empirical j?va (2), the cessation of the apparent j?va (3) occurs. In this manner, k??astha is included in the j?va, and consciousness is of three kinds: j?va, ??vara and pure consciousness (?uddha-cetana). This view is agreed to by all and is in concord with the V?rtika (VP 8.20, 355-6). 7.4.2 The Vivara?a Theory of Reflection (Bimba-pratibimba-v?da) of Prak???tman Next, Ni?cald?s takes up the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection for a closer examination in order to harmonize a seeming inconsistency. According to the four views on the nature of j?va and ??vara, enumerated above (in section 7.4, p. 237), in the state of liberation, the j?va has identity with pure Brahman, but according to the Vivara?a view, the j?va has identity 497 Ni?cald?s is assuming that both the Pa?cada?? and the D?g-d??ya-viveka were written by Vidy?ra?ya. For a brief discussion of the possible authorship of the latter by Bh?rat?t?rtha, see Pahlajrai (2005, 34). 498 D?g-d??ya-viveka v. 32: ?avacchinna? cid?bh?sas t?t?ya? svapna-kalpita?; vij?eyas tri-vidho j?vas tatr?dya? p?ram?rthika?. The j?va should be known to be of three kinds: first is the ultimate (p?ram?rthika), [the second is] delimited appearance of consciousness, the third as imagined in a dream.? 499 The KS ed. reads sth?la- s?k?ma-bheda-dvay?vacchinna (VP 8.20, 355). I have followed the text as per Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 8.5). Tattvabodha, an Advaita primer states: sth?la-s?k?ma-k?ra?a-?ar?r?d vyatirikta? ? sac-cid-?nanda-svar?pa? san yasti??hati sa ?tm?. The ?tm? is that which abides apart from the material, subtle and causal bodies ? and is of the nature of existence, consciousness and happiness (Vasudevendramuni 2011, 2, v. 2). The k?ra?a-?ar?ra (causal body), the cause of the sth?la- and s?k?ma-?ar?ras, is ignorance (3, v. 3.3). 248 with ??vara. Since, according to all four views, ??vara too, just like the j?va, is only a reflection, the j?va does not have identity with ??vara in the state of liberation. When the up?dhi goes away (apasara?a), the identity of one reflection with other reflections is not experienced; instead, the identity of the reflection with the source alone is known by experience. Similarly, in the state of liberation, the j?va reflection gains identity with pure consciousness alone. But, in the view of the author of the Vivara?a [i.e., Prak???tman], ??vara is the source-consciousness (bimba-cetana); therefore, [on liberation] the j?va does become identical to ??vara (VP 8.21, 356). In the view of the author of the Vivara?a, the same ignorance is the up?dhi of both j?va and ??vara. The j?va is the reflection in ignorance, and ??vara is its source. Where the reflection of the face is visible in a mirror, there is neither the shadow of the face in the mirror, nor the arising of an anirvacan?ya reflection, nor the arising of an empirical reflection. Instead, the v?tti of the eye in the realm of the mirror, reflecting off the mirror, takes as its object its own face situated on the neck (gr?v?-stha-mukha). Thus, the face on the neck itself is apprehended as source and reflection, and the face on the neck alone is real. Similarly, since the essence (svar?pa, lit. ?own form?) of the source and reflection is the face on the neck alone, the essence of the source and the reflection is real, but the properties (dharma) of being source or reflection (bimbatva-pratibimbatva) are false for the face on the neck. The face is the substratum of the anirvacan?ya false states of being source or reflection. According to this example, like the source, the essence of the reflection is also real and of the form of the source, due to the proximity of the ignorance located in the mirror. Similarly, because of the ??vara located as the source in pure consciousness, the essence of the j?va located in the reflection is also pure consciousness alone. Although principal grammatical coordination (mukhya-sam?n?dhikara?ya) is possible in the mah?-v?kyas, the properties of both ??vara-ness as the state of being the source and j?va-ness as the state of being a reflection are false, and their substratum is pure consciousness alone. Further, since the up?dhi of j?va and ??vara is the one and the same ignorance, both j?va and ??vara should be either ignorant or omniscient. However, just as the superposition of the attributes of smallness, yellowness, etc., of the mirror as the up?dhi occur only in the reflection and not in the source, similarly the concealing nature (?vara?a-svabh?va) and the limitedness of knowledge (alpa-j??t?) caused by ignorance reside in the j?va-reflection alone, and, due to 249 ??vara?s self-luminosity (svar?pa-prak??a), only omniscience resides in ??vara. In this way, when there is the identity of the source and reflection, it is not possible to speak of the differences of their properties. However, the fact that the face on the neck is located in the mirror and [the face?s] being a reflection is only an erroneous cognition (bhrama). The erroneously established state of being a reflection empirically requires the face on the neck to have the state of being the source. Just as both properties, the states of being the source and the reflection, are superimposed on one and the same face, similarly the difference as source and reflection is also superimposed on the property-possessor (dharmin). The erroneous apprehension of difference between the source and reflection makes possible the arrangement [of ??vara as the omniscient source and j?va as a reflection with limited knowledge]. In this manner, according to the Vivara?a?s author, j?va is the reflection in ignorance, and ??vara is the source. Ignorance is anirvacan?ya, even when it exists, and, from the ultimate standpoint (param?rtha), ignorance does not exist. Thus, since consciousness in the form of source and reflection is ultimately pure consciousness alone, the attainment of ??vara-hood (??vara- bh?va) is also just the attainment of pure consciousness (VP 8.22, 356-7). 7.4.3 The Theory of Delimitation (Avaccheda-v?da) Some teachers (?c?rya) [proponents of the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da)] 500 raise an objection against the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection. They claim that the reflection of formless (n?r?pa) consciousness in the Vivara?a view is not possible; instead, consciousness delimited (avacchinna) by the anta?-kara?a is the j?va, and consciousness non-delimited (anavacchinna) by the anta?-kara?a is ??vara. The sky (?k??a) is apprehended as blue and vast when reflected in the water within a pool or well, despite the absence of blueness or vastness. Therefore, according to the apprehension, the sky, qualified by blueness superimposed on it and by vastness, should be considered a reflection, regardless of the fact that the sky does not actually have color. Although the reflection of the formless sky may be somehow possible, the sky is known to have the blue color superimposed on it through error (bhr?nti). Only substances possessing color/form (r?pa), whether superimposed or not, can have reflections. But the reflection of consciousness is not possible by any means, because of 500 The proponents of the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) include V?caspati Mi?ra, the ?founder? of the Bh?mat? school. 250 the absence of even superimposed color/form in consciousness. It is also improper to call an echo of formless sound in formless sky a reflection, because, if this were to be accepted, then, since a reflection is not possible in a formless up?dhi, the sky would not remain formless. Further, the echo that occurs in space/sky cannot be called the reflection of sound because, if an echo is accepted as a reflection of sound, then the absence of sound in the space will occur. The reality (v?stavikat?) of an echo can be explained as follows. By the contact of a stick with a drum, the first earthly (p?rthiva) sound is produced, and then in the location facing that earthly sound, the echo sound is produced in the space delimited by stone, etc. This sound is not a reflection. The earthly sound is the efficient cause (nimitta- k?ra?a) of the echo sound, and that is why the echo is similar to the original sound. Now, if the echo is accepted as a reflection of the earthly sound, in Vidy?ra?ya?s view, the reflection is considered to be anirvacan?ya, and, in the Vivara?a view the reflection is considered to be of the nature of the source. Then, according to both of these views, the echo will not remain an attribute (gu?a) of space. According to the anirvacan?ya reflection view, if the echo is considered to be an anirvacan?ya reflection of the earthly sound, the attribute of empirical (vy?vah?rika) space cannot be apparent (pr?tibh?sika); therefore, the echo will no longer be an attribute of space. According to the Vivara?a view of the identity of source and reflection, since the echo is a reflection of the earthly sound, and identical to its source, that echo will remain an attribute of earth alone. Further, earth, water, fire and wind have separate sounds, but space has no other type of sound apart from an echo. On accepting an echo to be a reflection, then the space will be left without sound, and no ??stra accepts this. Vidy?ra?ya, in his [Mah?]bh?ta-viveka,,, 501 states that the earth makes the sound ka?a-ka?a,502 the water cula-cula, 503 fire bhuka-bhuka, 504 wind, s?s?, 505 and space, an echo. Similarly, other authors also claim that echo is an attribute of space; therefore, an echo cannot be the reflection of sound; instead, the echo independently is the sound-attribute of space, its material cause is 501 Pa?cada?? Ch. 2. 502 PD 2.5: ka?a-ka??, a rattling sound, per Swami Swahananda?s tr. (Vidy?ra?ya and Swahananda 1967, 33). 503 PD 2.4: bulu-bulu, rippling. 504 PD 2.3: bhugu-bhugu, crackling. 505 PD 2.3: b?s?, rustling 251 space, and the earthly sound that occurs in a drum, etc., is the efficient cause of that echo. This establishes the fact that a formless reflection is not possible. A proponent of Theory of Reflection may respond as follows. ?The space in a well, etc., is apprehended as ?vast space,? but there is no vastness in the well?s space. Therefore, one will have to accept that the external, formless vast space alone is reflected in the well-water. The reflection of formless consciousness is similarly possible.? Even if this were to be accepted somehow, still, the reflection can only be possible in an up?dhi with form, so how can a reflection be possible in a formless up?dhi? Here, the well-water is the up?dhi of the reflection of space, and it has form. But ignorance, the anta?-kara?a, etc., are formless, so how can the reflection of formless consciousness be possible in them? Therefore, it will have to be accepted that consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a is the j?va, and consciousness non-delimited by the anta?-kara?a is ??vara. Or, consciousness delimited by avidy?, ignorance, is the j?va, and consciousness delimited by m?y? is ??vara (VP 8.23,357- 9). This theory is known as the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da). Ni?cald?s refutes the anta?-kara?a delimitation aspect of this theory. If consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a is accepted as j?va, and non-delimited, as ??vara, then ??vara-ness will only occur in the consciousness located outside of the universe (brahm???a), since there are endless pervaded (vy?pta) anta?-kara?as of endless j?vas in the universe, and therefore, it will not be possible to obtain consciousness non-delimited by the anta?-kara?a within the brahm???a. If the existence of ??vara is accepted only outside the universe, the statements of ?ruti propounding the inner controller (antary?m?) will be contradicted, such as ?yo vij??ne ti??han [?]506 vij??nam antaro yamayati, that which, residing within the intellect [?], controls it from within? (BU 3.7.22). In this statement, the existence of ??vara is affirmed to be located in the j?va, which is indicated by the term intellect (vij??na). Therefore, it should be accepted that ??vara is not ?consciousness non-delimited by anta?- kara?a? but instead is ?consciousness delimited by m?y?.? If consciousness non-delimited by anta?-kara?a is considered ??vara, then only the absence of a relation with the anta?-kara?a is established as the up?dhi of ??vara-ness. But, omniscience, etc., in ??vara are caused by the up?dhi, and an up?dhi in the form of absence does not establish properties (dharma) such as 506 The intervening words (?vij??n?d antaro ya? vij??na? na veda yasya vij??na? ?ar?ra? yo? are omitted by Ni?cald?s. Unclear if this is intentional or if he is citing a variant version or an altogether different source. 252 omniscience, etc. (VP 8.25, 359-60). Vidy?ra?ya states in the T?pti-d?pa507 that, just as the relation of the anta?-kara?a is an up?dhi, similarly the absence of the relation of the anta?- kara?a is also an up?dhi. Just as an iron chain restrains wandering, so does a gold chain. 508 Likewise, the j?va-nature is known by the existent up?dhi of the anta?-kara?a as a relation, and the ??vara-nature (param?tm?-svar?pa) is known by the absence of the same relation. Thus, even the absence (r?hitya) of the anta?-kara?a is an up?dhi for Vidy?ra?ya. His intent is that just as the knowledge of the j?va?s nature is known by its relation with the anta?- kara?a, similarly the knowledge of the nature of Brahman occurs by means of the absence of anta?-kara?a. Thus, even according to Vidy?ra?ya?s works, omniscience, etc., are not established in ??vara by an up?dhi in the form of absence (VP 8.26, 360). Only consciousness delimited by m?y? is ??vara, and, because m?y? is all-pervasive, it is possible for ??vara to be the inner controller (antary?m?) as well. If we accept consciousness delimited by the anta?- kara?a as the j?va, then consciousness as doer and enjoyer will have different locations, and consequently the [logical] defects of destruction of the achieved (k?ta k? n??a) and attainment of the unachieved (ak?ta k? pr?pti) will arise. 509 Therefore, consciousness delimited by ignorance alone is the j?va, and not consciousness delimited by the anta?- kara?a. Many authors thus accept the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) alone, and their texts clearly present the remedy (parih?ra) to the [seeming] contradiction by the ?ruti and sm?ti texts that propound the Theory of Reflection (VP 8.27, 360-1). 7.4.4 The Theory of There Being Only One J?va (Eka-j?va-v?da, D???i-s???i-v?da) The primary exponent of this theory is Prak???nanda in his Ved?nta-siddh?nta-mukt?val?. Ni?cald?s sums up this view with a verse (doh?):510 jy?? avik?ta kau?teya me? r?dh?-putra prat?ti; cid?nanda-ghana brahma me? j?va-bh?va tihi? r?ti. 507 PD 7. 508 PD 7.86: yath? vidhir up?dhi? sy?t prati?edhas tath? na kim, suvar?a-loha-bhedena ???khal?tva? na bhidyate. Just as something positive can be an up?dhi, why not something negative? The property of being a chain is not lost on account of the difference [of the chain being made] of iron or gold. 509 The essence is that, in the deep sleep state, there is always the absence of anta?-kara?a, and from the standpoint of siddh?nta, a different anta?-kara?a arises in the waking state. Therefore, it will not be possible to attain the enjoyment in the same location of the anta?-kara?a where karma was achieved, and therefore, the defects of destruction of the achieved and attainment of the unachieved arise. 510 This is one of the only three doh?s occurring in VP. The other two occur at VP 1.1 and VP 7.39. 253 Just as the son of R?dh? [i.e., Kar?a] is perceived in the unchanged son of Kunt?, The existence of j?va is similarly perceived in Brahman, the mass of consciousness and happiness. According to this view, it is not possible for the ever unattached, eternally liberated Brahman that is consciousness and happiness to be a reflection of, or to be delimited by, ignorance, etc. Reflection (pratibimbitat?) or delimitation (avacchinnat?) is not possible in the space filled with water from a mirage in a pot made with a stick created from the horn of a hare by a potter who is the son of a barren woman; it is only possible in space in a pot filled with water of the same reality (sam?na-satt?) as the space. Similarly, ignorance and its effects are not of the same reality as Brahman-consciousness; rather, they are devoid of their own reality (svasatt?-??nya) and they appear as though possessing reality (satt?) only due to the reality of Brahman. Therefore, it is not at all possible to speak of any relation between the extremely untrue (al?ka) ignorance, etc., like the horn of a hare, etc., with consciousness, and the relation of consciousness to a reflection, etc. is even more remote. Therefore, Brahman is ever unchanging (ekarasa), and it is not possible for a j?va to occur as a reflection or delimitation in it. But the non-existent j?va, etc., are apprehended in Brahman by an imagined relation of an imagined ignorance, without actually being present there [in Brahman]. Just as R?dh??s son [Kar?a] had been erroneously apprehended in the unchanged (avik?r?) son of Kunt?, 511 similarly there is only erroneous cognition of the j?va as a reflection, etc. in the changeless Brahman, without any modification as a reflection, etc. The attainment of any j?va-reality (bh?va) as a reflection or delimitation does not actually occur. Brahman alone, attaining j?va-hood due to its own ignorance, becomes the conceiver (kalpaka) of the creation (prapa?ca). ??vara too, endowed with omniscience and the other attributes, is conceived by the j?va itself, according to this view. Just as in a dream, the service of the king conceived of in the dream attains a result (phala), similarly, attainment of a result is also possible by the devotion (bhajana) to an ??vara conceived in the dream that is ignorance. Thus, there occurs the erroneous cognition of j?va-hood due to the strength of the beginning-less ignorance and the concealing of one?s own Brahman-nature. The immediate cognition of the truth produced by the mah?-v?kyas, such as ?tat tvam asi, You are that,? etc., removes the erroneous 511 In the MBh, Kar?a is the son given to Kunt? (who would later become the mother of the P???ava brothers) by the sun god, S?rya. As Kunt? was unmarried at the time, she gave up the baby, setting him adrift in a basket on a river. He was discovered by a childless charioteer, Adhiratha, and his wife, R?dh?, and came to be known as R?dheya, son of R?dh?. 254 cognition of j?va-hood. Even at the time of erroneous cognition, there is no j?va-hood; instead, there is only the unchanged (jy??-k?-ty??), ever-liberated Brahman whose nature is consciousness and happiness. According to Ni?cald?s, ?a?kara (bh??yak?ra) and Sure?vara (v?rtikak?ra) have propounded this very view in the commentary to the BU by the example of Kar?a. 512 Kunt??s son, Kar?a, who suffered from the delusion that he was inferior (nik???a) due to his relation with a low caste, kept on experiencing endless kinds of sorrow born of disgrace (tirask?ra). One day the sun god S?rya513 told him in private, ?you are not R?dh??s son, you are born out of my relation with Kunt?.? Due to these words of the sun god, Kar?a abandoned the delusion of himself as a low-caste and attained the self-evident glory effected by (nimittaka) being Kunt??s son. Similarly Brahman, which consists of consciousness and happiness (cid?nanda), has attained the delusion of j?va-hood and has forgotten its own self- evident Brahman-nature because of its relation with beginning-less ignorance, and it is thereby experiencing endless kinds of sorrow as a result. At some time, in a dream conceived by its ignorance, if Brahman were to hear the mah?-v?kya spoken by an imagined teacher, then the removal of ignorance would occur by knowledge (vidy?) about oneself, and Brahman would experience its nature of eternal highest happiness and consciousness. Just as the teacher and ??stra conceived by the ignorance of the j?va are the cause of the teaching (upade?a), similarly, like the dream-conceived king, the j?va-conceived ??vara also is a cause for results via devotion (bhajana). This view supports the position of eka-j?va-v?da, the theory is that there is only one j?va, and that there is one ??vara conceived by the one j?va, and therefore, the shortcoming (?patti) of multiple ??varas also does not arise. Here a doubt can present itself. If there is only one j?va, then the scriptures (??stra) expounding the liberation of ?uka, V?madeva and others must be false, since the creation (sa?s?ra) is real (vidyam?na), and therefore, that one j?va alone is real, and without that one 512 I have been unable to locate this exact account in the BU ?Bh. At BU 2.1.20, in the ?Bh, the parable of the abandoned prince brought up in the family of a hunter is narrated by ?a?kara (1986, 165-6), and Sure?vara in his V?rtika also uses the story in the Sambandha V?rtika and again later in the context of BU 2.1 (1982, 56, vv. 233-4; 630-1, vv. 506-23). The prince grows up thinking he is a hunter and performing the karma of a hunter. When told by some kind person that he was of royal stock, he abandons the duties of a hunter and takes on the royal tasks, now knowing himself to be a king. In citing this example, and also its affirmation by ?a?kara and Sure?vara, Ni?cald?s appears to be following Appayya?s SLS 1 (D?k?ita and T?rtha 1973, 104-5). 513 In the MBh, it is K???a who tells Kar?a of his birth to Kunt? (MBh 5.138.11), whereas the Sun withholds this secret from Kar?a when he visits Kar?a in a dream to warn him not to give away his breast-plate and earrings to Indra (MBh 3.285.9- 10). 255 j?va?s liberation, how can other j?vas be liberated?514 But in this [d???i-s???i-v?da] view, even by the texts that propound the liberation of ?uka, V?madeva and others, only multiple appearances (?bh?sa) of j?vas are established, similar to multiple persons being conceived in a dream by the dreamer. Just as in a dream, where one dreamer sees multiple persons, someone may go on a wrong road in a great forest and experience suffering due to tigers, etc., while another may travel the royal road and reach one?s own city, there the wandering in the forest and the arrival at one?s city does not happen to the dreamer, but only to the persons appearing to the dreamer. In the same manner, for the j?va, whose nature is Brahman, this j?va accompanied by ignorance does not actually attain bondage or liberation; instead, only the apparent (?bh?sa-r?pa) j?vas attain bondage or liberation, and, on the cessation of their imagined ignorance, they are freed from imagined bondage. In this context, the question may be asked, ?By whose knowledge will liberation in the form of cessation of ignorance occur?? One possible answer is as follows. ?By your own knowledge alone can the liberation in the form of cessation of ignorance be possible [because you alone have erected this bondage in the form of sa?s?ra by your own ignorance]. In reality there is the utter absence (atyant?bh?va) of bondage.? As a second possible answer, ?Liberation does not occur by means of anybody?s knowledge.? This is because, in this view, there is absolute non-existence (asadbh?va) of bondage in the ?tm?. Therefore, it is not possible even to say that the eternally free ?tm? will be liberated or has been liberated. With this very intent, in this view, the statements propounding liberation have been said to be subordinate statements, praising (artha-v?da) [mok?a]. But, those who hold the view that ?there is bondage, and, as a result, until now nobody has become liberated, and in future, liberation will happen by means of human effort (puru??rtha),? such persons [who hold that sa?s?ra and bondage are real] would lose the hope of liberation in the future when even ?uka, V?madeva and others did not get liberated, and then would cease to engage in listening to Ved?nta (?rava?a). Therefore, as a kindness to those people, the statements propounding the liberation of ?uka, V?madeva and others have not been termed subordinate statements of 514 ?uka is the son of the author of the Mah?bh?rata (and other works), K???a Dvaip?yana Vy?sa, who is held to have attained liberation while living. V?madeva is a Vedic sage (??i) considered to be the author of the fourth ma??ala of the RV, and also of the Aitareya Upani?ad. He claimed the knowledge of births of all the gods, while in his mother?s womb, and as a result, became immortal, in AiU 2 (4).5-6. V?madeva is also mentioned in BU 1.4.10 as knowing himself as Brahman: ?tadhaitat pa?yann ??ir v?madeva? pratipede?ha? manur abhava? s?rya? ceti. On seeing [that one who realizes oneself as Brahman becomes the All], the sage V?madeva affirmed, ?I was Manu, and also the sun.?? 256 praise (artha-v?da) [but are instead said to be injunctions (vidhi) for the pursuit of liberation]. Actually, the ?tm? is eternally liberated Brahman, so there is absolute non- existence of bondage in ?tm?. Such is the conclusion of wise persons who have ascended to the highest level (uttama-bh?mik?r??ha) (VP 8.28, 361-3). According to Ni?cald?s, the intent (t?tparya) of these different methods (prakriy?) and all the texts of Advaita is that only listening (?rava?a) to Ved?nta [texts] can provide the result of becoming free from suffering. This occurs by means of the knowledge of the nature of the ever-liberated ?tm?, and the attainment of happiness (sukha), by obtaining release from the endless kinds of afflictions (kle?a) produced by an attitude of agency (kartavya-buddhi- janya). Aside from this, the destruction of bondage in ?tm? or the attainment of liberation in the form of ultimate happiness can never result from listening to Ved?nta [texts], because, even before listening to Ved?nta, the ?tm? is ever-liberated, and it does not have the affliction of bondage. Nevertheless, since the endless false bondage is apprehended, one engages (prav?tti) in listening to Ved?nta only due to delusion (bhrama). One who is not deluded will not engage in such activity (VP 8.29, 363). In this manner, the authors have described the nature of j?va and ??vara in great detail. There is debate about oneness or multiplicity with regard to j?va?s nature, but ??vara is one, omniscient and ever-liberated in all views. No Advaita text accepts the concealment (?vara?a) of ??vara. Those who speak of ??vara?s concealment are external to the Vedanta tradition. In V?caspati?s opinion, there are diverse (n?n?) ignorances that reside in the j?vas and make Brahman an object; the ??varas and creations (prapa?ca) conceived by the ignorance(s) of the j?vas are also considered to be multiple, but these conceived ??varas are also considered to be omniscient and their concealment is not accepted (VP 8.30, 363). 7.4.5 The Theory of Reflection (Bimba-pratibimba-v?da) Compared to the Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) Of the four theories regarding the relation of j?va and ??vara, Ni?cald?s has given the least attention to the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) of the Bh?mat? tradition, possibly because he disagrees with its view of the j?va as being consciousness delimited by the anta?- kara?a, and also because the theory holds that formless consciousness cannot be reflected, its proponents have to work harder to address the contradiction of the ?ruti and sm?ti texts that 257 propound the reflection of consciousness. In the VS, Ni?cald?s declared that Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) is superior to the Theory of Delimitation, and that even ?a?kara presents the Theory of Appearance in his V?kya-v?tti and Upade?a-s?hasr? (VS 4.203, 113; 6.442, 275). He will return to the theory that there is only one j?va (Prak???nanda?s eka-j?va-v?da); 515 this eka-j?va-v?da view was also accepted by him in VS 6.328, 201-2. Now Ni?cald?s turns to a closer look at the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection (bimba-pratibimba-v?da) and its comparison to the Theory of Appearance, and presents the differences between the views of Vidy?ra?ya and Prak???tman. According to the author of the Vivara?a, the reflection is not different from the source. The ray of the eye itself, reflected off (pratihata) the mirror that serves as the up?dhi, makes the face situated on the neck its object. Although the immediate perception of the face on the neck alone occurs, the delusions of facing towards the east or west, being situated in the mirror, and different from oneself may occur, thereby causing the thought [lit. vyavah?ra, activity], ?the reflection is facing east in the mirror and is different from my face? (VP 8.31, 364-5). Vidy?ra?ya and others offer three kinds of j?vas based on the difference between ultimate (p?ram?rthika), empirical (vy?vah?rika), and illusory (pr?tibh?sika). The reflection in the empirical anta?-kara?a is called the empirical j?va, the reflection in the illusory anta?- kara?a of the dream state is called the illusory j?va. But according to the Vivara?a view, due to the absence of the reflection apart from the source, the three types of j?vas are not possible. Therefore, only the proponents of the three-fold j?va theory (tri-vidha-j?va-v?da) accept the difference between the source and reflection; in their view alone is there the arising of the anirvacan?ya reflection in the up?dhis such as a mirror, etc. According to their view, the mirror, etc., are the material cause as substratum for the reflection, and the proximity of the source is the efficient cause, which is present at the time of the effect of the superimposition of the reflection. When the source goes away, it becomes possible for the effect in the form of the reflection to be absent. However, in the Vivara?a view, the nature of the reflection is not different from the source, but rather the anirvacan?ya properties, such as being located in the mirror, facing the opposite direction, and being different from the source, arise in the 515 In VP 8.76-84, discussed in section 8.3.1. 258 face situated on the neck as a source alone. The face located on the neck is the material cause in the form of the substratum, and the proximate mirror, etc., are the efficient causes for these three properties. Thus, there are two views in the theory of the reflection of consciousness. In the Vivara?a view, which is called the Theory of Reflection (pratibimba-v?da), due to the identity between the source and the reflection, the nature of the reflection is real. In Vidy?ra?ya?s view, which is called the Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da), since there is the arising of an anirvacan?ya appearance of a face in the mirror, the nature of the reflection is false. The refutation and elaboration (kha??ana-ma??ana) of both views is clear in many texts, so Ni?cald?s does not present them here. However, he states that both views are acceptable; Advaita does not insist on the Theory of Reflection or the Theory of Appearance alone. Only for the sake of the understanding (bodha) of the meaning that ?the property of sa?s?ra is not possible in consciousness and there is no mutual difference between j?va and ??vara,? has the general survey (dig-dar?ana) of truth been carried in several ways. Then, by whichever view that the seeker comes to understand the unattached Brahman, that view alone is respectable. Nevertheless, Ni?cald?s considers it easier to understand the identity of unattached Brahman and ?tm? in the manner of the theory of the identity of source and reflection (i.e., the Vivara?a view), because, where there is a worldly reflection of the face, etc., in the mirror and the like, there too the nature of the source remains ever unchanging (eka-rasa), and the delusion of difference between the source and reflection occurs only by the proximity of the up?dhi. Similarly, Brahman-consciousness is ever unchanging, and only by a relation to the up?dhi of ignorance, etc., does the apprehension of j?va and ??vara?s nature in it occur as a delusion. In reality, there is the total absence of difference between j?va and ??vara in the unattached consciousness. Although in consciousness, the properties in the form of being j?va and ??vara are conceived of as mutually different, the possessor (dharmin) of the properties, as j?va or ??vara, is neither mutually different nor conceived. Therefore, the theory of identity between source and reflection is very favorable (anuk?la) to the Advaita view. In the Theory of Appearance, the reflection is anirvacan?ya and its substratum, namely, the mirror and such, are the up?dhi. In the Theory of Reflection of the Vivara?a, the properties of being located in the mirror, facing the opposite direction, etc., are anirvacan?ya, and their substratum, the face, etc., are the source. In both views, ignorance should be 259 considered the transforming material cause (pari??m? up?d?na)516 of the anirvacan?ya [entities]. Ni?cald?s concludes that, from the perspective of grasping the essence (s?ra- gr?h?), only these two positions, the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, are reasonable (yukti-sahita) (VP 8.32-5, 365-7; 8.38, 369).517 7.5 Chapter Summary In the previous chapter, a potential objection was raised during the discussion on akhy?ti, that accepting erroneous cognition leads to the impossibility of definite activity (prav?tti) due to doubts regarding the validity of the cognition. Since one?s engaging in any activity is dependent upon the ascertainment of validity, Ni?cald?s undertakes a discussion of the nature of validity (pram?tva) and invalidity (apram?tva), their arising, and the types of their cognitions in order to show that the impossibility of definite activity is not applicable to anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. He presents and refutes the Ny?ya theory of extrinsic validity (parata? pr?m??ya), as well as the differing views of M?m??s?. The Advaita theory of intrinsic validity (svata?-pr?m??ya) was presented as the apprehension of validity by the means of apprehension of cognition which is free from defect. The witness-consciousness (s?k??), accompanied by absence of defect, apprehends validity, whereas invalidity is cognized on experiencing unsuccessful activity and is not the object of the witness-consciousness. The production of invalidity occurs via the cognition-producing means such as sense organs, inference, etc., accompanied by defect, which is external to the means. Thus, invalidity is produced extrinsically: when activity (prav?tti) occurs after an erroneous cognition and the result is not obtained, an inferential cognition of invalidity occurs. Conversely, in the instant of the production of cognition itself, the nature of the cognition and the validity residing in the cognition are illumined by the witness-consciousness. The certainty of that which is anirvacan?ya is called erroneous certainty (bhrama-ni?caya). Ni?cald?s also includes cognition through contra-factual argument (tarka-j??na) under erroneous cognition, along with erroneous certainty and doubt. In the case of a cognition, the certainty of its validity alone opposes doubt regarding its validity, and it is known by experience that neither 516 According to R. Balasubramanian, ?Brahman-?tman is the vivartop?d?na-k?ra?a (transfigurative material cause), m?y? or avidy? is the pari??myup?d?na-k?ra?a (transformative material cause) of the world? (1988, 152). 517 Arguments on whether a shadow (ch?y?) is a reflection or not, and whether the reflection possesses actual substantive nature (vy?v?h?rika dravya-r?pat?) separate from the original are taken up in VP 8.36-7, 337-9, but have not been reproduced here for the sake of brevity. 260 certainty of error nor doubt regarding error occurs in that cognition. Doubt regarding validity is of the form, ?is this cognition valid or not?? Similarly, doubt regarding error takes the form ?Is this cognition erroneous or not?? These doubts are identical, being concerned with validity and error, albeit in inverse ways. When there is certainty of validity, just as doubt regarding validity no longer persists, similarly doubt regarding error also does not persist. Therefore, in Advaita, even upon accepting erroneous cognition, definite activity is possible. In this chapter, Ni?cald?s next begins his response to the final question on v?ttis, namely, ?what is the purpose of a v?tti?? In brief, the primary purpose of a v?tti is the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). The cessation of ignorance located in the consciousness (cetana) delimited (avacchinna) by a pot, etc., is brought about by the v?tti in the non-?tm? form of a pot, etc.; the cessation of ignorance located in the non-delimited consciousness is brought about by the impartite (akha??a) v?tti in the form of Brahman. That being the case, Ni?cald?s next embarks on an investigation of ignorance. According to V?caspati Mi?ra, the individual (j?va) is the locus (??raya) of ignorance which is destroyed by v?tti, and Brahman is its object, i.e., ignorance resides in the j?va and conceals Brahman. According to Prak???tman, the author of the Vivara?a, and others, pure consciousness alone is the locus and object of ignorance. Just as the illumination of a pot, etc., caused by cognition is termed the object-ness (vi?ayat?) of cognition, similarly the covering up of one?s nature caused by ignorance is termed the object-ness of ignorance. Because being a j?va (j?va-bh?va) and being ??vara (??vara-bh?va) depends upon ignorance, the j?va caused by ignorance cannot possibly be the locus of ignorance. Ni?cald?s considers the terms aj??na, avidy?, prak?ti, m?y?, ?akti and pradh?na to be synonymous with ignorance. For Advaita, the entity that has the power (?akti) to conceal (?vara?a) and project (vik?epa), which is beginning-less and the appearance of existence (bh?va-r?pa), is named ignorance (aj??na). It is called avidy? (lit. absence of knowledge) due to its being destroyed by knowledge (vidy?); it is called prak?ti and pradh?na (both terms for the primordial inert matter which constitutes creation) by being the material cause of the apparent creation (prapa?ca), m?y? (the illusory power to manifest the empirical creation) because of effecting difficulties (durgha?a), and ?akti (power) due to absence of independence (svatantrat?). Ignorance does not have non-negatable reality, but it is acknowledged to have a reality that is different from the empty (tuccha-r?pa) unreality, and therefore, it has been called anirvacan?ya, other than real and unreal. Anirvacan?ya is 261 different from Brahman, ultimate reality, and also different from the unreal, such as the horn of a hare, etc., which is always devoid of reality and manifestation (satt?-sph?rti-??nya). For Advaita, ignorance is a positive object of apprehension which is to be negated (nivartan?ya) by cognition. Ni?cald?s describes ??vara as the reflection (pratibimba) of consciousness in the primordial matter based in pure consciousness (m?la prak?ti). Avidy? is the portion of m?la prak?ti qualified by the concealing power (?vara?a-?akti). The innumerable j?vas are the innumerable reflections of consciousness residing in the innumerable portions of ignorance. The relation between j?va, the individual, and ??vara, the creator, is described diversely. All views accept a three-fold consciousness: 1) j?va, 2) ??vara, and 3) pure Brahman. Because j?va and ??vara have both been considered reflections, what is attained by liberated j?vas is Brahman, and not ??vara. Four theories regarding the relation of j?va and ??vara are considered in considerable detail: 1) Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance, ?bh?sa-v?da; 2) Prak???tman?s Vivara?a Theory of Reflection, bimba-pratibimba-v?da; 3) The Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da); and 4) the theory of there being only one j?va (eka-j?va-v?da, d???i-s???i-v?da). Of these four, Ni?cald?s gives the least attention to the theory of delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) of the Bh?mat? tradition, possibly because he disagrees with its considering the j?va as being consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a. In the VS, Ni?cald?s declares that Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) is superior to that of delimitation (VS 4.203, 113). The theory that there is only one j?va, Prak???nanda?s eka- j?va-v?da will be reconsidered in section 8.3.1; Ni?cald?s also accepts this eka-j?va-v?da or d???i-s???i view in VS 6.328, 201-2. Ni?cald?s presents the differences between the views of Vidy?ra?ya and Prak???tman and then states that both these views are acceptable; there is no insistence on just the Theory of Reflection or the Theory of Appearance. He states that the general survey (dig-dar?ana) of truth has been carried in several ways for the sake of effecting the understanding that ?the property (dharma) of sa?s?ra is not possible in consciousness, and that there is no mutual difference between j?va and ??vara.? Whichever view delivers the understanding of the unattached Brahman to the seeker, that view alone is respectable. Nevertheless, Ni?cald?s considers it easier to understand the identity of unattached Brahman and ?tm? in the manner of the theory of the identity of source and reflection (i.e., the Vivara?a view). From the perspective of extracting the essence (s?ra- 262 gr?h?), only the two positions, the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, are reasonable (yukti-sahita). Ni?cald?s states that the intent (t?tparya) of these different methods (prakriy?) and all the texts of Advaita is that only listening (?rava?a) to Ved?nta [texts] provides the result of becoming free from suffering. This is brought about by the knowledge of the nature of the ever-liberated ?tm?, and by the attainment of happiness (sukha) through obtaining release from the endless kinds of afflictions (kle?a) that are produced by an attitude of agency. Aside from this, results such as the destruction of bondage in ?tm? or the attainment of liberation in the form of ultimate happiness can never arise from listening to Ved?nta texts (ved?nta- ?rava?a), because even before listening to Ved?nta, the ?tm? is ever-liberated and it does not have the affliction of bondage either. Nevertheless, since one erroneously apprehends the endless, false bondage, one therefore engages (prav?tti) in listening to Ved?nta only due to delusion (bhrama). One who is not deluded will not engage in such activity. In the next chapter, we shall take a look at Ni?cald?s?s more detailed examination of ignorance, the illusoriness of the world, the utility of action and renunciation in gaining knowledge, and a few other issues, before again returning to the purpose of v?ttis. 8 Ignorance (Aj??na) Revisited, Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) & Reality (Satt?) In the previous chapter, we reviewed Ni?cald?s?s treatment of the nature of validity (pram?tva) and invalidity (apram?tva), an introductory treatment of the nature of ignorance, as well as of the j?va (individual) and ??vara (the theistic creator) and their relationship. Chapter 8 presents Ni?cald?s?s more detailed examination of ignorance, the illusoriness of the world, and whether or not action and renunciation are of utility in gaining knowledge. Ni?cald?s is laying the ground work for answering the final question on v?ttis, namely, ?What is their purpose?? The previous chapter considered the Theory of Appearance (Vidy?ra?ya?s ?bh?sa-v?da) and the Theory of Reflection (Prak???tman?s bimba-pratibimba-v?da). In both these theories, ignorance is considered to be the transforming material cause; as primordial ignorance (m?l?j??na), it conceals the nature of Brahman, and, as secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na or avasth?-aj??na), it conceals consciousness delimited by the up?dhi (?limiting adjunct?). 518 Ni?cald?s explores the difference between these two kinds of ignorance as well as the difference between their results in both the empirical and dream spheres. Taking up the perspectives of both the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, Ni?cald?s investigates and addresses objections to either of these kinds of ignorance as the cause for superimposition, and describes the nature of the cessation of such kinds of ignorance in the empirical sphere, even without the knowledge of Brahman. He explores in detail whether the Pa?cap?dik? considers primary or secondary ignorance as the material cause of reflection- superimposition, and whether primary or secondary ignorance is the material cause of dreams. In this context, questions concerning the substratum of the dream state and why dream-superimpositions recur even when negated by waking up are also considered. In this context, in order to understand how dreams are cognized even when the senses are inactive, Ni?cald?s examines whether a v?tti is required in dreams. Ni?cald?s will conclude that dreams are illumined by self (?tma-prak??a). Some thinkers extend the property of self-effulgence (?tma-prak??at?) beyond dreams to the empirical state as well. Therefore, chapter 8 continues with Ni?cald?s?s further investigation of the theory that perception is creation (d???i-s???i-v?da), which was presented earlier in section 7.4.4. This theory will be compared with the theory that creation is 518 See the discussion on up?dhi on p. 164. 264 perceived (s???i-d???i-v?da). In connection with both of these theories, the doubt may arise as to whether the property of being illusory (mithy?tva), which is possessed by unreal, i.e., non- ?tm?, objects, is itself real or unreal. Both options are contrary to the Advaita position, and Ni?cald?s provides the resolution of this problem as presented by different Advaita thinkers. He also provides five different ways in which the reality of the visible world (prapa?ca) is negated by its illusoriness (mithy?tva) and thus establishes the illusoriness of creation. Ni?cald?s next considers the means to dispel this illusoriness, discussing the utility of action (karma) in effecting knowledge as proposed by various Advaita thinkers. Similarly, the utility of renunciation (sanny?sa) is examined, and the eligibility of k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras for self-realization through the cultivation of the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?) is presented. This chapter thus prepares the ground for Ni?cald?s?s treatment of the removal of ignorance and, at long last, the purpose of v?ttis, in chapter 9. 8.1 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) in the Empirical Sphere Given that in both the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, ignorance is considered to be the transforming material cause (pari??m? up?d?na k?ra?a) of logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya) entities, Ni?cald?s takes a closer look at what this implies. The common cause (s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a) of the world (jagat) is primordial ignorance (m?l?j??na), the ignorance that conceals the nature of Brahman, whereas secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na or avasth?-aj??na) is the ignorance that conceals consciousness delimited by an up?dhi. 519 8.1.1 The Cause of Superimposition: Primordial Ignorance v. Secondary Ignorance If primordial ignorance itself is called the material cause of being a reflection and other such properties (dharma), or the material cause of the property-possessor (dharmin), then, like the effects of primordial ignorance, such as space, etc., the property of being a reflection, etc., or the property-possessor in the form of the reflection should also be empirically real. But these have been considered logically indeterminate, as stated earlier; therefore, an objection (O1) can be raised, that it is not possible for primordial ignorance to be the material cause of these anirvacan?ya entities. Further, according to the Vivara?a view [the Theory of 519 Whether the primordial and secondary ignorances are different or identical will be discussed shortly, at VP 8.42, 370-1, on p. 257 below. 265 Reflection], the material cause of the properties of being a reflection, etc., is considered to be the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the face, and, according to Vidy?ra?ya?s view [the Theory of Appearance], the material cause of the anirvacan?ya reflections is considered to be the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the mirror. When the effect (k?rya) of secondary ignorance (avasth?-aj??na) is considered to be anirvacan?ya, although the shortcoming (?patti) of reality is not present in those anirvacan?ya effects, nevertheless, the cessation of the anirvacan?ya [effect] occurs by the cognition of the substratum. In this case, the substratum of the reflection-superimposition (pratibimb?dhy?sa) is either the consciousness delimited by the face [per Theory of Reflection], or consciousness delimited by the mirror [per Theory of Appearance], and the cognition of the substratum is either the cognition of the face or the cognition of the mirror [correspondingly]. But [the alternative objection (O2) can be raised that] everyone experiences the apprehension of reflections even in the instants subsequent to the cognition of the face or the mirror, and therefore, it is also not possible that the secondary ignorance, which is the concealer of either the consciousness delimited by the face or the consciousness delimited by the mirror, can also be the material cause of the reflection-superimposition (VP 8.39, 369-70). Ni?cald?s provides two possible refutations (R1 and R2) to these objections (O1 and O2 respectively), without offering their specific attribution. R2: According to ?a certain [unidentified] author (ko?ka granthak?ra),? although in superimpositions, such as silver on mother-of-pearl, both the concealing and projecting portions of ignorance are removed by the particular cognition of the substratum, one?s experience is that, by the cognition of the substratum of the reflection-superimposition, only the concealing portion of ignorance is removed. Due to the persistence of the projection-causing portion of ignorance even subsequent to the cognition of the substratum, the reflections and their cognitions remain present. Thus, the position that reflection-superimpositions are the effects of secondary ignorance located in consciousness delimited by the up?dhi is possible. R1: According to ?other authors (anya granthak?r, pl.),? primordial ignorance is the material cause of the mirror and such, and also the material cause of the reflection-superimpositions. Therefore, even after the cognition of the mirror, etc., has occurred, the apprehension of the reflection persists. Although, with the knowledge of Brahman, there is the cessation of the ignorance 266 which conceals Brahman-consciousness, and of the effects of that ignorance, yet, with the cognition of the mirror, etc., even on the cessation of the ignorance that conceals the consciousness delimited by the mirror, etc., the cessation of the ignorance that conceals the nature of Brahman does not occur. Thus, by accepting primordial ignorance as the material cause of the reflection-superimpositions, even after the cognition of the mirror, etc., reflection-superimpositions are possible (VP 8.40-1, 370). 8.1.2 The Difference between Primordial and Secondary Ignorance What is the difference between primordial and secondary ignorance? When one accepts primordial ignorance as the material cause of reflection-superimposition in the above (R1) manner, the reflection, etc., should also remain empirical like the mirror, etc. Further, since the conception of falseness (mithy?tva-buddhi) occurs in the reflections and in the properties of being a reflection, etc., even without knowledge of Brahman, these [reflections] are considered to be illusory. But it is not possible for them to be illusory if primordial ignorance is considered the material cause of the superimposition. Nevertheless, the effects of the ignorance that are removed by the knowledge of Brahman are considered empirical, and the effects of ignorance that are removed without the knowledge of Brahman are considered illusory. [The effect of ignorance, the reflection in the mirror, should not persist once the ignorance is removed, but it continues to do so, hence it ought to be considered empirical]. Thus, the empirical and the illusory need to be distinguished differently. ?The effect that is produced by ignorance alone, and not by defects other than ignorance, is empirical; the effect that is produced by defects as well as ignorance is illusory.? When the relation of the face, etc., with the mirror, etc., arises, there occurs a transformation of either the property of being a reflection, etc., or the property-possessor as a reflection, etc., of primordial ignorance located in Brahman-consciousness, and in both cases the substratum remains Brahman- consciousness alone. In this manner, when the reflection-superimpositions are not produced by defects other than ignorance, then they can only be empirical (VP 8.42, 370-1). If secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na) is considered to be the material cause of the stated superimpositions, upon accepting the arising of a reflection according to Vidy?ra?ya?s [Theory of Appearance] view, the consciousness delimited by the mirror, etc., is the substratum, and the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the mirror, etc. is the 267 material cause. Upon accepting the arising of the properties of being a reflection, etc., according to the Vivara?a [Theory of Reflection] view, the consciousness delimited by the face is the substratum, and the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the face is the material cause. But when one considers primordial ignorance to be the material cause, the difference between these substrata is not possible; hence, Ni?cald?s suggests that primordial ignorance alone should be considered the material cause of both kinds of superimpositions (VP 8.43-6, 371-4).520 8.1.3 The Nature of the Cessation of Empirical Superimposition This begs the obvious question that, if only primordial ignorance located in the Brahman- consciousness be considered the material cause of reflection-superimposition, then surely the cessation of the reflection-superimposition should not occur without knowledge of Brahman? Ni?cald?s?s answer is as follows. Ignorance has two parts, the concealing power and the projection power. The total (a?e?a) cessation of ignorance occurs only by the cognition of the substratum devoid of obstructions. But as long as there remains the obstruction of pr?rabdha karmas (the accumulation of the karmic results of past actions), the cessation of the portion of ignorance that is the cause of projection does not occur, even on the cognition of the substratum as Brahman. Where the cognition pertaining to objects other than the ?tm? (an?tma pad?rtha) such as a pot, etc., occurs, the cessation of their ignorance does not occur as long as the manifestation (sphura?a) of the pot, etc., persists. But there is a reduction in the concealment caused by ignorance similar to the manner in which the illumination due to light in one location causes a reduction (sa?koca) in the darkness within a house enveloped by darkness. Similarly, although the cessation of primordial ignorance covering Brahman does not take place through the immediate perceptual cognition of the face, mirror, etc., even so, due to their cognition, a reduction in the material cause [of the reflection-superimposition projection produced by ignorance] takes place in the form of its dissolution (vilaya). This dissolution of the material cause is called the subtle state (s?k?ma avasth?) of the effect. Thus, although the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance in the form of the negation (b?dha) of the reflection-superimposition is not possible because of the absence of the cognition of the 520 The details of Ni?cald?s?s arguments for the validity of considering primordial ignorance as the material cause (VP 8.44) and the invalidity of considering secondary ignorance as the material cause of reflection-superimposition (VP 8.45-6) have not been presented here, for reasons of economy. 268 substratum [as Brahman], the cessation of the effect occurs in the form of the dissolution of the material cause due to the removal (lit. absence, abh?va) of the obstacle (pratibandhaka) that takes place by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc. (VP 8.48, 374-5). What is the nature of the negation (b?dha)? According to Ni?cald?s, some (ko? ekade??, pl.) 521 hold that in the state of worldly life (sa?s?ra), the negation of the reflection- superimposition does not occur as just described. In this view, the ascertainment (ni?caya) of absence is not considered to be a negation because the ascertainment of absence of the superimposition in the manner of ?the face does not possess [the property of ] being located in the mirror,? or ?there is no face in the mirror,? according to the Vivara?a [Theory of Reflection] or Vidy?ra?ya [Theory of Appearance] views respectively, is known through experience, even by all non-learned persons; yet in the state of worldly life it is not possible to speak of the negation of those superimpositions. Therefore, in the opinion where the negation of reflection-superimposition is not accepted without the knowledge of Brahman, the negation here is simply the remaining of the substratum (adhi??h?na-?e?a). Even if the ascertainment of the absence of the reflection-superimpositions takes place in the worldly state as just stated, due to the existence (satt?) of ignorance, the mere substratum does not remain; instead, the substratum qualified by ignorance remains. Thus, through the immediate perceptual cognition of the face, mirror, etc., without obstructions, and despite the absence of the cessation of ignorance in the form of negation [because the substratum has not been cognized as Brahman], the reduction (sa?koca) of the effect [the ignorance-caused projection of the reflection] occurs in the form of the dissolution in its own material cause. The persistence (sthiti) of the effect (k?rya) in the form of the material cause is called the subtle state (s?k?m?vasth?) (VP 8.49, 375). According to several [other unspecified] authors, the negation of the reflection- superimposition produced by primordial ignorance takes place without the knowledge of Brahman, and without the destruction of primordial ignorance. Their purport is that negation refers to the ascertainment of illusoriness (mithy?tva) or the ascertainment of absence itself. In many cases, where the ascertainment of either falsity or absence of an object occurs, there only the substratum remains, and ignorance does not remain. With precisely this intent, one 521 Again, it is difficult to identify whose view is being presented here. 269 [unspecified] author has described negation as the remaining of only the substratum, but this is not the definition of negation. If it were, then in the case where a crystal is erroneously cognized as having an up?dhi of redness, etc., even in the instant after the cognition of the substratum, the obstruction of the mutual relation of the jap? flower (China rose) and the crystal still remains, and hence the cessation of the superimposition of redness should not occur. Similarly, while the obstruction of the pr?rabdha karmas of a wise person persists, the cessation of the body, etc., does not occur. If only the remaining (?e?a) of the substratum were said to be the definition of negation, then the body of a wise person should cease to be. Therefore, in both these cases, owing to the effect-qualified (k?rya-vi?i??a) ignorance and the substratum both being in one place, and because the substratum does not remain by itself [post-cognition], the operation (vyavah?ra) of negation should not occur. But the negation of the superimposition of redness does occur by means of the immediate perception (s?k??tk?ra) of a clear crystal, and, for a wise person liberated while living (j?van-mukta), despite the body still remaining, sa?s?ra is negated by the immediate perception of Brahman. Thus, by means of the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., devoid of obstructions, the properties of being a reflection, etc., and the property-possessor reflection, etc., are ascertained to be false and absent in the face and mirror respectively. Therefore, it is improper (ayukta) to say that ?without knowledge of Brahman, the negation of reflection- superimpositions does not occur.? (VP 8.50, 375-6). 8.1.4 Cessation of Superimpositions through Opposing Cognitions Just as the cessation of the superimposition in the form of a negation occurs through the cognition of the substratum, similarly the cessation of the reflection-superimpositions by the immediate cognition of the face, mirror, etc., in a time devoid of obstructions is experientially known, and it can also be accepted as a cause for the cessation of superimposition. It is the rule that only a cognition that has the same object opposes ignorance, whereas a cognition of a different object does not. Therefore, the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., only opposes the secondary ignorance situated in the consciousness delimited by the face, mirror, etc. And no other cognition besides the knowledge of Brahman opposes primordial ignorance that obscures Brahman. Hence, the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., does not oppose primordial ignorance that opposes the knowledge of Brahman, 270 but although the cessation of the material cause of the reflection-superimposition, namely, primordial ignorance, does not occur, nevertheless, even without the cessation of the [primordial] ignorance, the cessation of an earlier [mis-]cognition by means of its opposing cognition is certainly experientially known (VP 8.51, 376-7). In the case where, due to ignorance of the rope, one erroneously cognizes a snake, and then subsequently erroneously cognizes a stick, in that case, the stick cognition does not bring about cessation of the secondary ignorance which is the material cause of the snake because the cessation of ignorance only takes place through the direct cognition (aparok?a- j??na) of the substratum. Therefore, without the cognition of the rope, the cessation of the ignorance located in the rope-consciousness is not possible because, even if were possible to bring about the cessation of the ignorance located in the rope-consciousness by erroneous cognition of the stick, subsequently, due to the absence of the material cause [namely, the ignorance of the rope], the stick-superimposition would not be established. Nevertheless, just as the snake-superimposition ceases due to the stick-cognition without the cessation of ignorance, similarly, the cognitions of the face and mirror of the type ?the face does not possess [the property of] being a reflection? or ?the face is not in the mirror,? being opposed to the reflection-superimposition, bring about the cessation of the reflection-superimposition without causing the cessation of primordial ignorance that is the material cause of the reflection-superimposition. If it were said that these cognitions also bring about the cessation of primordial ignorance, then empirical objects like face, mirror, etc., that are the effects (k?rya) of primordial ignorance should also be destroyed. Therefore, even without the cessation of primordial ignorance, the cognitions of the face, mirror, etc., being of opposing objects (virodh?-vi?ayaka), destroy the reflection-superimposition. Just as presence and absence are mutually opposed, their cognitions also are mutually opposed. Where the erroneous cognition of a person occurs in a post after the cognition of the post, there, the cessation of the prior valid cognition is brought about even by the opposing erroneous cognition ?there is no [property of] being a post (sth?nutvam).? In the case of the ground with a pot on it, after the erroneous cognition of the absence of the pot, when there is the contact of the senses with the pot, then the cessation of the prior erroneous cognition is brought about by the opposing valid cognition, ?the ground has a pot [on it].? Similarly, after the erroneous snake-cognition in the rope, the cessation of the erroneous snake-cognition is 271 brought about by the erroneous stick-cognition, despite the fact that both these cognitions are erroneous. In this manner, sometimes the cessation of a valid cognition is brought about by an opposing erroneous cognition, sometimes the cessation of an erroneous cognition is brought about by an opposing valid cognition, and sometimes the cessation of one erroneous cognition is brought about by another opposing erroneous cognition. Where the cessation of a valid cognition is brought about by an erroneous cognition, or the cessation of one erroneous cognition is brought about by another opposing erroneous cognition, the cessation of the prior cognitions is brought about just by the existence of the ignorance that is the material cause of the erroneous cognition. But where the cessation of an erroneous cognition is brought about by a valid cognition, due to the true cognition of the substratum being valid (pram?), it brings about the cessation of the erroneous cognition along with ignorance. Thus, the cessation of a reflection-superimposition is possible by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., without the cognition of the substratum and also without the cessation of primordial ignorance. In other words, it is a rule that the cessation of the prior cognition is brought about by another opposing cognition. But it is not a rule that the cessation of the prior erroneous cognition should be brought about only by the true cognition of the substratum; rather, it can also be brought about by another erroneous cognition. Yes, it is certainly the rule that the cessation of ignorance does not occur without the true cognition of the substratum, and this cessation occurs only by the particular valid cognition of the substratum. In this situation, according to the Vivara?a [Theory of Reflection] view, the superimposition is ?the face possesses [the properties of] being a reflection, which is located in the mirror, facing the opposite direction,? and its opposing cognition is ?the face does not possess [the properties of] being a reflection, etc.? In Vidy?ra?ya?s [Theory of Appearance] view, the superimposition is ?the face is in the mirror,? and its opposing cognition is ?the face is not in the mirror.? Even in the Ny?ya view, which accepts the mutual opposition of presence and absence, the opposition of the objects also implies the opposition of their cognition. Hence, even accepting primordial ignorance as the material cause of the reflection-superimpositions, at the time of the presence of the obstruction of the proximity of the source and up?dhi, even without the cessation of primordial ignorance, only by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., the cessation of the stated reflection-superimpositions is possible (VP 8.52, 377-8). 272 8.1.5 Refutation of Secondary Ignorance as the Material Cause of Reflection-superimposition Ni?cald?s now raises a prima-facie objection (p?rva-pak?a) on behalf of those who consider secondary ignorance as the material cause of reflection-superimposition: ?Padmap?da wrote the Pa?cap?dik? commentary (??k?) to the [?a?kara-]bh??ya on the Brahma-s?tra (??r?raka), and he attained enlightenment [lit. omniscience (sarvaj?at?)] through the teachings [lit. words (vacana)] of ?a?kara. In the enlightened Pa?cap?dik? commentary it is written: ?Where erroneous cognitions such as snake, silver, etc., occur, there the cessation of ignorance in the form of the material cause of the snake, silver, etc., is brought about by the cognition of the rope and mother-of-pearl, and, through the cessation of ignorance, the cessation of the superimposition of the snake, silver, etc., takes place. If the cognition of the rope, mother-of-pearl, etc., be considered the immediate (s?k??t) cause in the cessation of the snake, mother-of-pearl, etc., then the rule that ?a positive effect (bh?va- k?rya) is only destroyed by the destruction of the material cause? will be violated. But if it be considered that the destruction of ignorance occurs through the cognition of the substratum, and that, by the destruction of ignorance, the destruction of the superimposition occurs, then the stated rule is not violated. Although ignorance has an appearance of existence (bh?va- r?pa) like darkness, since it is beginning-less, it cannot be an effect. Therefore, the cessation of ignorance can only be possible through the cognition of the substratum, but the cessation of the positive effects like the superimpositions of snake, etc., is not possible without the destruction of the material cause, namely, ignorance. Although the cessation of the destruction of the pot (gha?a-dhva?sa) has been accepted in the Ved?nta view, there is no material cause of a non-existent object; therefore, although even without the destruction of the material cause, the effect is destroyed in the form of the destruction of the pot, but the destruction of the pot is not an actual (bh?va) effect. In this manner, in order to preserve the invariable causality (niyata hetut?) of the destruction of the material cause in the destruction of an positive effect, in the Pa?cap?dik?, the cognition of the substratum has been stated as a cause of the cessation of superimposition only via the cessation of ignorance, and it is prohibited (ni?edha) to forsake the cessation of ignorance and consider only the cognition of the substratum as the immediate cause of the cessation of superimposition. But upon accepting primordial ignorance as the material cause of the reflection-superimposition, one 273 must accept the cessation of the reflection-superimposition in the previously mentioned manner, without the cessation of ignorance, thereby opposing the Pa?cap?dik? statement. Instead, if secondary ignorance is considered the material cause of the stated superimposition, there is no opposition [to the Pa?cap?dik? statement] because in the opinion of those who follow the Vivara?a view, the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the face is established as the material cause of the property-superimposition (dharm?dhy?sa), and also in the opinion of those who follow Vidy?ra?ya, the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the mirror is established as the cause of the superimposition on the property-possessor (dharm? adhy?sa). During the time when there are no obstructions, the cessation of those ignorances is brought about by the cognition of the face or the mirror respectively, and then by the cessation of ignorance [in the form of the material cause], the cessation of the reflection-superimposition occurs. Therefore, considering secondary ignorance to be the material cause of the reflection-superimposition conforms with the Pa?cap?dik? view, and to consider primordial ignorance as the material cause goes against the Pa?cap?dik?? (VP 8.53, 378-80). Ni?cald?s addresses this objection by first demonstrating its inappropriateness. Even if, according to the section above, secondary ignorance were to be accepted as the material cause for reflection-superimposition, even then the contradiction of the Pa?cap?dik? statement would not be remedied (parih?ra): Where Yaj?adatta, without a relation to the mirror, has the immediate perception of either Devadatta?s face or the mirror without Devadatta?s face, and, in the following instant, the relation of Devadatta?s face with the mirror occurs, then reflection-superimposition takes place there. If primordial ignorance were considered the material cause, then by the cognition of the face and mirror, the cessation of primordial ignorance does not occur; instead, only the cessation of the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the face takes place through the cognition of the face, and, through the cognition of the mirror, the cessation of the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the mirror takes place. Even in the instant following the immediate cognition of the face and mirror, due to the proximity of the face and the mirror, the reflection-superimposition is again possible. Although the immediate cognition of the face and mirror destroys the portion of secondary ignorance qualified by its concealing power, nevertheless, the portion [of secondary ignorance] qualified by its projection power is 274 not destroyed, 522 and hence the superimposition can still be possible in the substratum that is particularly cognized (vi?e?a-r?pa se j??ta523). Nevertheless, what the proponent of secondary ignorance asserts is not possible in this case: namely, that upon the mutual separation of the face and the mirror, by means of the cognition of the substratum accompanied by the absence of obstructions, the cessation of superimposition has occurred by means of the cessation of ignorance. Here instead, one can only say that the cessation of the immediate (s?k??t) superimposition has occurred by means of cognition [without the cessation of ignorance]. This is so because the cognition of the rope does not destroy the ignorance of mother-of-pearl, and therefore, all ignorance (aj??na-m?tra) does not get destroyed by a cognition but only the ignorance that has same object (sam?na-vi?ayaka aj??na) gets destroyed by the [object?s] cognition. That which is illuminated by cognition is said to be the object (vi?aya) of cognition, and that which is concealed due to ignorance is said to be the object of ignorance. Here, in the time before the superimposition [of Devadatta?s face in the mirror], when Yaj?adatta has had the immediate perception of Devadatta?s face and the mirror, due to the resulting destruction of the concealment, the concealing ignorance is absent in both the face and mirror. Therefore, even the proponent of the secondary ignorance [as the material cause of the superimposition] has to accept that in the location having the same object, which causes the opposition of cognition and ignorance, the cessation of only the superimposition takes place without the cessation of ignorance. In this manner, despite taking secondary ignorance to be the material cause of reflection- superimposition, the contradiction of the Pa?cap?dik? statement is not remedied (VP 8.54, 380-1). Ni?cald?s explains that this contradiction occurs only if secondary ignorance is accepted as the cause of reflection-superimposition, but not if primordial ignorance is accepted as the cause. It is not the intent of the Pa?cap?dik? that, ?by cognition, only the cessation of ignorance is brought about, and, by the cessation of the material cause in the form of ignorance, the cessation of the effect of ignorance takes place.? The destruction of the material cause is the invariable (niyata) cause of the destruction of the positive effect (bh?va- 522 This phrase is left out in the KS ed. (VP 8.53, 380), shown here in bold, following Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 8.15): ? avasth? aj??na ke ?vara??-?akti-vi?i??a aj??n???a k? n??a huy?? b? vik?epa-?akti-vi?i??a aj??n???a k? n??a nah?? hone tai? ? 523 This is erroneously printed in the KS ed. (VP 8.53, 380) as vi?e?a-r?pa tai? j??n?di??h?na mai? ? I have emended it as j??t?dhi??h?na ? per Ni?chalad?sa (1868, 8.15). 275 k?rya), and thus the cessation of immediate superimposition is not possible by cognition. If the destruction of the positive effect does not occur without the destruction of the material cause, then the destruction of the material cause is the invariable (niyata) cause of the destruction of the positive effect; but, where the positive effect is a dyad (dvya?uka) and its material cause is the atom, the atom is eternal and its destruction is not at all possible. Although the destruction of the dyad does occur from the destruction of the contact between the atoms, this is a counter-example to the requirement that the destruction of the material cause is the cause of the destruction of the positive effect. Therefore, the Pa?cap?dik? statement cannot have the intention of the preservation of this requirement. If it were insisted that the Pa?cap?dik? statement indeed has the intent of the preservation of this rule, then the cessation of the [erroneous] snake-cognition [with regard to the rope] would not occur by the [erroneous] cognition of the stick. Although, even in the Ny?ya view, the destruction of the material cause has been considered the cause of the destruction of substances other than dyads, nevertheless, if the destruction of the material cause is said to be the cause of the destruction of all positive effects, then the atoms and the mind too are eternal substances [per Ny?ya], and therefore, since their destruction is impossible, none of their actions will ever be destroyed. Similarly, there will be no destruction of the attributes (gu?a) of the eternal ?tm?, such as cognition, etc., or of the attributes of eternal space, such as sound, etc. Therefore, it is improper (asa?gata) to state that the destruction of the material cause is the invariable cause in the destruction of the positive effect. If, in some cases, upon the destruction of the substratum (??raya), the effect does not remain, then the destruction of the material cause is the cause of the destruction of the effect. Still, the destruction of the material cause cannot be said to be the invariable cause because, even during the existence of the material cause, the destruction of the effect can occur due to other reasons as well. Thus, the Pa?cap?dik? statement was not made with the intent of the preservation of the above rule; instead, the meaning of this statement is that, where the cessation of the superimposition occurs through the cognition of the substratum, the cognition of the substratum is not the immediate cause of the cessation of the superimposition, but the cognition of the substratum is the cause of the cessation of ignorance, and that in turn is the cause of the cessation of superimposition. Just as the potter?s father, being a dispensable antecedent (anyath?-siddha), is not the cause of the pot, 276 similarly the cognition of the substratum, as a dispensable antecedent, is not the cause for the cessation of superimposition. Thus, where the cessation of a superimposition is spoken of by means of the cognition of the substratum, only the cessation of ignorance is brought about by the cognition of the substratum. Then, by the destruction of ignorance in the form of the material cause, the cessation of the superimposition occurs; this is the purport of the Pa?cap?dik?. If the purport of the Pa?cap?dik? were that ?the cessation of superimposition occurs in all cases through the cessation of ignorance,? then, without the cessation of ignorance, even the cessation of snake-cognition should not occur by the stick-cognition. Therefore, where the cessation of superimposition occurs by means of the true cognition of the substratum, there the cessation of superimposition occurs only through the cessation of ignorance ? this is the rule explained in the Pa?cap?dik?. For those who consider secondary ignorance to be the cause of reflection- superimposition, the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., itself is the cognition of the substratum, and to accept the cessation of superimposition through the cessation of ignorance by the cognition of the substratum is in accordance with the Pa?cap?dik?. But where the proximity of the up?dhi of Devadatta?s face occurs for Yaj?adatta in the place where the concealment [portion of ignorance] has been destroyed due to prior cognition, and through it the reflection-superimposition of Devadatta?s face occurs, and in the time of the removal (viyoga) of the up?dhi, the cessation of superimposition occurs through the cognition of the substratum, there it is not possible for the cessation of superimposition to occur through the cessation of ignorance, but instead the cessation of the immediate superimposition occurs through the cognition of the substratum. This is opposed to the Pa?cap?dik?. But if primordial ignorance is considered to be the material cause of reflection-superimposition, then, where the cessation of reflection-superimposition occurs through the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., there the face, mirror, etc., are not the substratum (adhi??h?nat?), and therefore, one cannot speak of the cessation of superimposition being caused by cognition of the substratum. Instead, the cessation of superimposition is caused by the cognition of an opposing object that is in opposition to the cognition of the face, mirror, etc. But in the Pa?cap?dik?, the cessation of superimposition caused by the cognition of the substratum is only spoken of through the cessation of ignorance, and, apart from the cognition of the substratum, other means (dv?rat?) for the cessation of superimposition are not spoken of 277 (vivak?ita). So, if primordial ignorance is considered the material cause of reflection- superimposition, then the cessation of superimposition caused by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., does not classify as being caused by the cognition of the substratum. If secondary ignorance is considered to be the material cause for the superimposition, then, although the cessation of superimposition caused by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., does qualify as being caused by the cognition of the substratum, it does not qualify as the cessation of ignorance. But according to the Pa?cap?dik?, where the cessation of superimposition occurs through the cognition of the substratum, it is only spoken of as occurring through the cessation of ignorance, and, where superimposition occurs in a previously cognized substratum and then ceases, there the cessation of superimposition is not possible by cessation of ignorance as just stated. Thus, if secondary ignorance is considered to be the material cause of reflection-superimposition, then the Pa?cap?dik? is contradicted; and, if primordial ignorance is considered to be the material cause of the said superimposition, there is no contradiction (VP 8.55, 381-3). As a summation of this discussion on the material cause of empirical reflection- superimposition, Ni?cald?s states that reflection-superimposition, similar to space and the rest of creation (prapa?ca), is caused by primordial ignorance. But in the manner of some (eka-de??), on account of its cessation in the form of negation not occurring without the knowledge of Brahman, although there is the conjecture [lit. doubt (?a?k?)]524 of reflection- superimposition possessing empiricality, nevertheless the relation of the source and the up?dhi [in the superimposition] is adventitious (?gantuka) and therefore, it is considered illusory. The superimposition of space and the rest of creation is caused by mere ignorance, and therefore, is empirical. But in reflection-superimposition, even without the cognition of the substratum in the manner already mentioned, its cessation is possible in the form of negation through an opposing cognition in the worldly state (sa?s?ra-da??) itself, and therefore, it becomes possible for the superimposition to possess illusoriness in the form of negatability (b?dhyatva) (VP 8.56, 383). 524 ?tm?nand Muni uses gum?na, ?conjecture, supposition, conceit? instead of ?a?k? (Ni?cald?s 1957, 536). 278 Just as primordial ignorance and secondary ignorance are considered material cause for reflection-superimposition through differing opinions, similarly, dream-superimposition is caused by primordial ignorance in some views, and by secondary ignorance in others. We shall examine these views next. 8.2 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) in Dreams Secondary ignorance is considered the material cause of dreams. Sleep is a particular state (avasth?-vi?e?a) of ignorance, since the definition of ignorance is that which possesses concealing and projection powers, 525 and, in the time of dream, the concealment of the waking seer526 (dra???) and seen (d??ya) is experientially known. For example, in the waking state, when a person named Devadatta, of brahman caste, possessing a son, wealth and other good fortune, after the death of his father and grandfather, having cremated them and performed the ?r?ddha 527 and other rituals for them, goes to sleep, he experiences himself as someone named Yaj?adatta of k?atriya caste, as a child suffering from hunger and cold due to the unavailability of food and clothing, and crying in the lap (a?ka) of his father or grandfather. In this case, if it were said that the empirical seer and seen of the waking state are concealed by primordial ignorance, then they should be concealed even in the waking state since there is no other concealer perceived in the waking state other than primordial ignorance. Therefore, it will have to be accepted that in the dream, sleep (nidr?) itself conceals, and sleep itself transforms into the forms of the dream objects. Therefore, sleep is qualified by the power to conceal and project, and, since the attribute of ignorance is connected (gha?ita) with sleep, sleep is a particular state of ignorance. But secondary ignorance has a beginning because, when primordial ignorance itself, qualified by adventitious (?gantuka) form conceals to some extent consciousness delimited by the up?dhi, then it is considered secondary ignorance (avasth?-aj??na or t?l?j??na). The cessation (upar?ma) of the actions that are the cause of experience (bhoga) in the waking state is the efficient cause of the arising of secondary ignorance. Also, since secondary ignorance is a particular form of primordial ignorance, primordial ignorance alone is the material cause of 525 VP 8.57, 384: ?vara?a-vik?epa-?akti-yuktat? aj??na k? lak?a?a hai. 526 ?Seer? here is being used in the sense of ?one who sees? (as opposed to ?sage?). 527 MW defines ?r?ddha as ?a ceremony in honour and for the benefit of dead relatives observed with great strictness at various fixed periods and on occasions of rejoicing as well as mourning by the surviving relatives ?? 279 secondary ignorance. In the illustration, the illusory seer (dra???) concealed by secondary ignorance in the form of sleep is superimposed on the empirical seer, and the illusory vision concealed by that sleep is superimposed on the empirical vision. Therefore, the substratum of the illusory seer is the empirical seer, and the substratum of the illusory vision is the empirical vision. But, when actions approach (abhimukha) the waking state experience (bhoga), then the waking state arises again, and, in that time, whatever cognition of the empirical seer-seen occurs to the persons devoid of knowledge of Brahman, that itself is the cognition of the substratum of the dream. This brings about the cessation of the material cause in the form of secondary ignorance from which the cessation of the illusory seer-seen takes place. The cessation of the illusory seer-seen occurs with the cognition of the empirical seer-seen (VP 8.57,383-4). Ni?cald?s raises a doubt in connection with the above view. In the manner just stated, there is the difference between the seer in the waking state and the seer in the dream state, and the experience of the dream state is recalled in the waking state. Now, if the experience of one seer should occur as a recollection (sm?ti) to another, then Devadatta?s experience should be recalled (sm?ti) by Yaj?adatta, [which is absurd]. Therefore, if the difference between the seers is accepted, then the recollection of the dream experience will not be possible. Ni?cald?s resolves this doubt as follows. Although the experience of one person is not recalled by another, nevertheless one?s own experience is recalled by oneself, and, in just this way, the experience, having identity with oneself (sva-t?d?tmya), is also recalled by oneself. There is no mutual identity (t?d?tmya) between Devadatta and Yaj?adatta, but the dream-state seer, being superimposed on the waking-state seer, has identity with the waking- state seer; the superimposed object always has identity with its own substratum. Thus, the waking-state seer can recall the dream-state seer?s experience, the two having mutual identity, and so the material cause of dream-superimposition is the secondary ignorance in the form of sleep (VP 8.58-9, 385). 8.2.1 The Substratum of the Dream State In the dream state, if only what is seen is accepted as produced by ignorance, then it is not possible for the empirical j?va of the waking state to be considered its seer because [in dream state] the nature of the empirical j?va remains concealed by ignorance in the form of 280 sleep. It is the rule that the immediate perception of an object occurs only when the object is in relation to an unconcealed j?va. Therefore, if the waking state j?va concealed by sleep is considered to be the seer of the dream, then the immediate cognition of the dream creation will not be possible. Therefore, Ni?cald?s accepts the fact that the dream-state seer is also superimposed on the empirical j?va and is unconcealed. The immediate cognition of the illusory vision is possible by its relation to the seer in the dream state. The authors who believe that the j?va is of three kinds ? ultimate, empirical, and illusory ? maintain that the substratum of the dream state is only the empirical j?va and the world (jagat). But this view is illogical (ayukta), because the empirical seer is also inert (ja?a), like the vision, on account of being non-?tm?. Therefore, it is not possible for the empirical seer to be the substratum imparting reality (satt?) and manifestation (sph?rti). Instead, Ni?cald?s considers consciousness alone as the substratum of the dream state. That is why, where the substratum of snake and silver is said to be the rope and mother-of-pearl, it means that the substratum is rope-delimited consciousness and mother-of-pearl-delimited consciousness alone. Consciousness itself has been posited as the substratum of the dream-state creation in many texts, too. Therefore, the substratum of the dream state is either 1) ego-delimited consciousness, or 2) consciousness not delimited by ego (aha?k?ra). Both of these views are authoritative (pr?m??ika). If ego-delimited consciousness (1) is considered the substratum, then it will not be possible to conceal consciousness by primordial ignorance. Therefore, only the secondary ignorance, which is the concealer of the ego-delimited consciousness, can possibly be the material cause of the dream, and its [the ignorance?s] cessation is possible when one awakes (j?grad-bodha) without cognition of Brahman. The consciousness reflected in ignorance, or the ??vara?s consciousness as the source (bimba), is called consciousness non-delimited by ego (2). If it is considered the substratum of the dream, then the material cause of the dream state will have to be primordial ignorance, which is the concealer of the consciousness. But then, instead of considering its cessation in the form of negation due to awaking, it will have to be considered in the form of dissolution in the material cause. Alternatively, just as was stated in the description of the reflection-superimposition, 528 if awaking is considered to be an 528 VP 8.51-52, discussed in section 8.1.4, on pp. 267-269. 281 opposing cognition, the cessation of the dream-superimposition can be considered to be caused by waking. But the cessation of the portion of ignorance that is the cause of concealment is not brought about by an opposing cognition; instead, there is the cessation only of the portion of ignorance that is the cause of projection. If the cessation of ignorance without remainder were said to be brought about by an opposing cognition, then in the case of the cessation of the snake-cognition by the stick-cognition, on account of the absence of the material cause, the erroneous cognition of the stick itself will not be possible, because, if in this case the cessation of the projection portion, too, were to occur without remainder, then the stick would also be only a projection, and therefore, its attainment (upalambha) should not occur. And so, it is appropriate to consider that in one instance of ignorance there is endless power that is the cause for endless projections, but only the power that is the cause of one projection is destroyed by an opposing cognition, and the power that is the cause of other projections remains. Thus at another time, superimposition again can reoccur in that very substratum. In this manner, even upon the negation of past dreams having been brought about by awaking, on account of the power that is the cause of projections in the form of future dreams being left remaining, dream-superimposition occurs again on another day. Therefore, it is also possible for consciousness non-delimited by ego (2) to be the substratum of dream. But even accepting consciousness non-delimited by ego as the substratum of dreams, only the consciousness located inside the body can possibly be the substratum. If consciousness located outside the body were also to be considered the substratum, then, just as every pot, etc., is visible to all, and there is the need for the functioning (vy?p?ra) of the senses in the immediate perception of the snake, silver, etc., in the same manner there also ought to be the need for the functioning of the senses in the immediate perception of a dream.529 But if the dream-superimposition is considered to occur in the consciousness located inside the body, then, on account of consciousness being related to the cognizer (pram?t?), just as happiness, etc., are immediately cognized without the functioning of the senses, similarly it is possible for the dream-superimposition to be immediately cognized without the functioning of the senses (VP 8.60-5, 385-7). 529 Ni?cald?s does not take up the argument that, if non-delimited consciousness were the substratum of dreams then the dreams of one person would be visible to all, presumably because his focus is to prove that the senses do not focus when dreaming. 282 In defense of the appropriateness of the substratum of dream being the consciousness that is located within the body and not delimited by the ego, Ni?cald?s suggests the following. If consciousness non-delimited by ego is said to be the substratum of dream, it is of two kinds. Both a) the j?va-consciousness as the reflection in ignorance, and b) ??vara-consciousness as the source in ignorance, are non-delimited by ego, and, on account of being pervasive (vy?paka), both can be said to be within the body. The difference between the source and reflection is not natural; it is not possible for just one consciousness located within the body to be the basis of two opposing properties. Thus, the state of being ??vara or j?va as the source or reflection is caused by an up?dhi, and, in just one consciousness, the fact of being a source or reflection by relation to ignorance is imagined. Hence, there occurs the two-fold functioning of being either a source or a reflection in one consciousness located within the body. If the anta?-kara?a is considered to be the delimiter (avacchedaka) of the state of being the substratum of dream-superimposition in the one consciousness located inside the body, then the state of being a substratum (adhi??h?nat?) is established in the ego-delimited consciousness (1). If the anta?-kara?a is not considered to be the delimiter of that state of being a substratum, then the state of being a substratum is established in the consciousness non-delimited by ego (2). With regard to one and the same Devadatta, if he is referred to from the standpoint of his son, he is called a father, and if he is referred to from the standpoint of Devadatta?s parents, then he is called a son. Similar to the operation of the opposed properties, ?father? and ?son,? in one and the same Devadatta, due to the difference in standpoints of reference (vivak??-bheda), it is possible for the opposed properties of ego- delimited-ness and ego-non-delimited-ness, as well as being a source or reflection to function in one and the same consciousness located in the body. Even so, it is proper to accept the substratum-ness of dreams only in inner consciousness located in the body (VP 8.66, 388). Moreover, if the substratum-ness of dream is said to be in consciousness located in an extraordinary location which is either inside or outside (b?hy?ntar-as?dh?ra?a-de?a-stha), then it will oppose the words of Gau?ap?da and ?a?kara. In the vaitathya-prakara?a of the M????kya-k?rik?, Gau?ap?da has said: ?On account of the absence of suitable place and time for the creation of the elephant, mountain, etc. in a dream, the dream objects are false 283 (mithy?).?530 Also, ?a?kara, in his commentary on Gau?ap?da?s statement, stated, ?the creation of an empirical elephant, mountain, etc., in an instant and within the subtle nerves (n???)531 is not possible;? 532 therefore, the dream objects are unreal (vitatha). Thus, they too have spoken of the arising of the dream within the body itself. If the substratum-ness is considered to be within ordinary consciousness, then their statements that the dream arises in the subtle location will be improper. Therefore, the dream-superimposition should be considered to occur in consciousness non-delimited by ego inside the body (VP 8.67,388-9). 8.2.2 The Immediacy of the Dream Superimposition Both the source (bimba) and reflection in ignorance (avidy?-pratibimba) are also consciousness non-delimited by ego. According to differing opinions, both can be the substratum of dream. Nevertheless, it is only proper to consider j?va-consciousness in the form of a reflection in ignorance as the substratum of dreams because immediate (aparok?a) superimposition can only occur in an immediate substratum. Like pure Brahman, the cognition of ??vara-consciousness also occurs only in mediate form by means of the ??stras alone. If ??vara-consciousness were considered to be the substratum of dream, then, on account of the absence of immediacy of the substratum, the immediacy of the superimposition would not be possible. The j?va-consciousness, in the form of a reflection in ignorance becoming delimited by ego, is the object of the v?tti in the form of ?I? (aham- ?k?ra v?tti). Although the j?va-consciousness, in the form of a reflection in ignorance non- delimited by ego, is not the object of the aham-?k?ra v?tti, nevertheless is not concealed, and therefore, because of it being immediate itself, immediate superimposition is possible on it (VP 8.68,389). In the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, a three-fold immediacy of the substratum has been accepted in order to provide for the immediacy of the superimposition: 1) the immediacy of the rope, mother-of-pearl, etc., which is useful to the immediacy of the snake, silver, etc., superimpositions, is produced by the senses;533 2) the immediacy of space, useful to the 530 This is an abridgement of M?K? 2.1-3 531 ?It is said in the Scriptures that the mind moves about during the time of sleep along some nerves and this produces the dream experience.? (Gau?ap?da and Sa?kar?c?rya 1955, 87n6) 532 M?K? 2.1 ?Bh: ?na hy anta? sa?v?te deh?ntar n????u parvata-hasty-?din?? sambhavo?sti? (?a?kara and ?nandagiri 1979, 253). The ?in an instant? has been inserted by Ni?cald?s here, the idea occurs in the ?Bh for the next verse, M?K? 2.2 533 S? 1.41, 2.52 284 immediacy of the superimposition of blueness, etc., occurs via the mind; 534 and 3) the immediacy of the substratum, useful to the immediacy of the dream-superimposition, is innate (svabh?va-siddha). Sarvaj??tman has spoken of dream-superimposition in the self that is immediate (svata? aparok?a) in this manner in the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka;535 therefore, the j?va-consciousness alone is the substratum of dream (VP 8.69,389-90). Ni?cald?s raises a potential shortcoming (?patti) with the above view. ?If the nature of the j?va-consciousness, on account of being unconcealed, is considered to be self-illumined (svata?-prak??a), then, due to ignorance being pervasive, the j?va-consciousness reflected in it will also be pervasive, and therefore, it should always be in relation with pots, etc. In such a state, the immediate cognition of the pots, etc., should occur without the need of a v?tti produced by the eyes. If the need of a v?tti is accepted even in the immediate cognition of that which is related to the j?va-consciousness, then it will be improper (asa?gata) to speak of the immediate cognition of dream-superimposition by means of the j?va-consciousness, which itself is immediate (svata? aparok?a).? Nevertheless, the substratum of the dream- superimposition is the j?va-consciousness alone, but the substratum of the pot, etc., is not j?va-consciousness, it is Brahman-consciousness. Therefore, the objects of the dream have an identity-relation with their own substratum, which is j?va-consciousness, whereas the substratum of the pots, etc., being Brahman-consciousness, their identity relation is with Brahman-consciousness, not with j?va-consciousness. A relation of the j?va-consciousness with the pots, etc., arises only through a v?tti produced by the eyes, etc., and therefore, in the time before the [production of the] v?tti, the relation that the j?va-consciousness has with the pots, etc., does not produce (samp?daka) immediacy. The immediate cognition only arises from the requirement of a v?tti, which causes the different relation of the j?va-consciousness with the pot, etc. But in the dream-superimposition, due to the constant relation of the j?va- consciousness as substratum, the related objects are illumined without a v?tti. It has been stated in this manner by the teacher (?c?rya) named Prak???tma-?r?cara?a. 536 (VP 8.70, 390). 534 S? 1.43 535 S? 1.42 536 Ni?cald?s is alluding to Prak???tman, the author of the Vivara?a, and his arguments in (Padmap?d?c?rya et al. 1985, 308-9). Elsewhere (VP 3.18, 81), Ni?cald?s explicitly associates Prak???tma-?r?cara?a with the Vivara?a. I am uncertain as to why Ni?cald?s specifically ascribes the view to prak???tma-?r?cara?a n?ma ?c?rya, since ?ricara?a can also be used as an honorific, lit. ?lotus feet,? particularly in the Vaishnava context, or ?honorable feet [of the king]? (Sircar 1966, 317). 285 8.2.3 A Digression Unrelated to Dream State: The Perception of Space via V?tti [In the process of arguing for the immediacy of dreams, Ni?cald?s stated that empirical objects have Brahman-consciousness as their substratum, and, in order to be perceived by the j?va-consciousness, a v?tti is required to go out through the senses to such empirical objects. The Sa?k?epa-??r?raka presented a three-fold immediacy of the superimposition, where the perception of space was said to occur via the mind. In connection with this, and unrelated to dreams, Ni?cald?s discusses a specific difference of opinion regarding the use of v?tti in the perception of space]. In the above context (prasa?ga), in connection with space, the v?tti is considered to be mental. In the Advaita-d?pik?, N?si?h??rama has stated, ?Although a v?tti related to the eyes is not possible in connection with the formless space, sight (?loka) spread over space is possessed of form (r?pa-v?l?), and the eye-v?tti has the form of ?loka. In the same manner that the cognizer (pram?t?) is identical with the consciousness delimited by ?loka by means of the eye-v?tti, the v?tti located in ?loka is identical with consciousness delimited by space. Thus, due to the object of the eye-v?tti being of the form of ?loka, the immediate cognition of space has also been said to be caused by the eye sense organ.? But the purport of the mental immediate cognition of the sky that is mentioned in the Sa?k?epa- ??r?raka is as follows: ?Space itself is formless; therefore, it is not possible for the eye-v?tti to be of the form of space, and if the perception of another object located in the same place is accepted to occur by means of a v?tti having a different form, then, by a v?tti having the form of a pot, the perception of the pot?s smallness, depth and size should likewise occur. Also, by means of the v?tti in the form of ?loka, wind that is in the same place as the ?loka should also be perceived by the eyes. Therefore, since the immediate cognition of space is not possible by means of the eye-v?tti, only mental immediate perception is possible in connection with space.? If it is thought about carefully, although the immediate cognition of one [object] by a v?tti in the form of another, in the manner of the Advaita-d?pik?, is not well known, and its acceptance is a defect [of N?si?h??rama?s position], nevertheless, by accepting the immediate cognition of one [object] by a v?tti in the form of another on the basis of the result (phala-bala-tai?) in some cases, the defect is removed. Similarly, the relation (gocarat?) of the anta?-kara?a to external objects, in the manner of the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, is not known, and its acceptance is a defect. Nevertheless, if the relation of the anta?-kara?a v?tti to external objects assisted by the eye-v?tti of another form (any?k?ra), is accepted in some 286 cases on the basis of the result, then the defect in the form of the violation of the rule, ?there is no relation of merely the anta?-kara?a to external objects,? does not arise. Thus, although both versions are possible, only the Advaita-d?pik? view is correct because, according to the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, by accepting the eye-v?tti in the form of ?loka as an assisting cause, the anta?-kara?a has to be additionally considered as an instrument (kara?a) of immediate cognition pertaining to external objects, whereas, according to the Advaita-d?pik?, it is not required to accept the anta?-kara?a as an instrument for the immediate cognition of external objects; therefore the view [by N?si?h??rama] has economy (l?ghava). Even if the eyes were not considered to assist, but only the anta?-kara?a were considered the cause of perception of space, then the mental perception of space ought to occur even with closed eyes. Moreover, since the anta?-kara?a is a material cause of cognition, to speak of its instrumentality is totally improper (ayukta). Thus, in speaking of the immediate cognition of space as mental, the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka makes a prau?hi-v?da, an extravagant assertion. It is only proper to say that the cause of the immediate cognition of superimposition, which is the immediate cognition of the substratum, occurs via the senses or via self-illumination. In other words, rather than considering the immediate cognition of the substratum as three-fold, as was said earlier, 537 it should be considered as only two-fold (VP 8.71-2, 390-2). 8.2.4 The Self-immediacy of Dreams Confirmed by Scripture Thus, given this difference of opinion, the material cause of a dream is said to be either secondary ignorance or primordial ignorance. But in all the views, the material cause of the superimpositions of snake, silver, etc., is considered to be secondary ignorance alone, and the cessation of the snake, etc., takes place through the cessation of ignorance by means of the cognition of the rope, etc. Here, the doubt may arise that once a rope has been cognized, due to the absence of the material cause, the erroneous cognition of a snake should not occur at another time. The resolution of this doubt is undertaken by Ni?cald?s under the description of the purpose of the v?tti in VP 8.145-161538 (VP 8.73, 392). The immediate cognition of a dream by means of the self-immediacy of its substratum was mentioned earlier. In the svaya?-jyotir br?hma?a [BU 4.3] also, in connection with 537 In VP 8.69, 389-90. 538 Discussed in section 9.2, ?The purpose of a v?tti,? p. 328. 287 dreams it is stated, ?atr?ya? puru?a? svaya?jyotir bhavati, here [in the dream] this person is self-illumined? (BU 4.3.9). Its purport is that although ?tm? is said to be self-illumined in all three states, that which is self-illumined is in its own illumination, independent of any other illumination, and illumines all. According to this definition, in the waking state, the ?tm? is not self-illumined, due to the presence of other illuminators such as the sun, eyes, etc. In the deep sleep state, the embodied seer (sth?la-dar??) does not perceive anything, and therefore, the Naiy?yikas consider general cognition (j??na-s?m?nya) to be absent in deep sleep. Therefore, here too, the self-effulgence of ?tm? is not ascertained (nirdh?ra). Since there is no other source of illumination to be found in the dream state apart from the self-effulgent ?tm?, which can be considered the illuminator of the dream creation, ?ruti (scripture) has termed the ?tm? as self-illumined only in the dream state. If the eyes and other senses were involved even in the dream state, then on account of the absence of the independence (nirapek?at?) from other illumination in dreams as well, it would not be possible to assign self-effulgence to ?tm?. But the ?tm? is self-illumined in a dream, without the functioning of the senses. Although in a dream one wanders about with a staff in hand, beating camels, buffalos, etc., and seeing mangoes, etc., with the eyes, the centers (golaka) for the hands, eyes, and feet appear still. Therefore, the empirical senses do not function in dreams, and illusory senses are not accepted either. If illusory senses were to be accepted in dreams then ?ruti, which posits that ?tm? is self-effulgent due to the absence of other sources of illumination, 539 would be negated. Although illusory senses in the dream have been spoken of in the VS, 540 that was an extravagant assertion (prau?hi-v?da) [i.e., accepting the opponent?s view in order to justify one?s own better teaching]. 541 Even if illusory senses are accepted in dreams, then on account of their arising at the same time as the cognition, it is not possible for them to be means of cognition. Also, the anta?-kara?a alone, without the functioning of the senses, cannot be a means of cognition. According to the Tattva-d?pik?,542 the anta?- kara?a in dream transforms into the form of elephant, etc., and thus, cannot possibly be a 539 BU 4.3.9, quoted above. 540 In VS 6.306, 186, Ni?cald?s writes: ?In the dream, the senses, like the elephant, etc., are also imagined. hasti ?dikan k? ny??? svapna mai? kalpita indriya b? hai?.? 541 The parenthetical explanation of prau?hi-v?da is provided by ?tm?nand Muni: arth?t p?rva-v?d? k? ukti m?nkar apn? utkar?a bodhan?rtha h? vah sam?dh?n hai (Ni?cald?s 1957, 550). 542 There are multiple texts by this name. Citsukh? is also known as Tattva-d?pik? or Tattva-prad?pik?, as is the commentary on Vidy?ra?ya?s PD by R?mak???a, among others. The reference here is to Citsukh? 1.3, which establishes the self- effulgence (svaprak??at?) of ?tm? (Citsukha, Pratyaksvar?pa, and Yog?ndr?nanda 1956, 38-46). 288 means of cognition of the dream; therefore, a dream is illumined by ?tm? (?tma-prak??a), without the functioning of the anta?-kara?a [or the senses]. Thus, the immediate cognition of the dream occurs by means of the self-immediate ?tm?. In the dream, the elephants, etc., being seen by the eyes (c?k?u?at?) that is perceived is also a superimposition, as are the elephants, etc. In the waking state, the perception of the pots, etc., being seen by the eyes is empirical, and the perception of snake, silver, etc., [being seen by the eyes] is illusory on account of being superimposed (VP 7.74-5, 392-3). 8.3 Reality (Satt?) and Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) Self-effulgence need not be restricted to the dream state alone, and some Advaita thinkers extend it to all objects perceived in the empirical state. To explore this, Ni?cald?s takes up the theory that perception is creation (d???i-s???i-v?da). 8.3.1 The Theories of D???i-s???i (Perception is Creation) and S???i-d???i (Creation Precedes Perception) In the d???i-s???i (perception is creation) view, non-?tm? objects have no reality when uncognized (aj??ta-satt?); they only have reality when cognized (j??ta-satt?). Therefore, like the snake [perceived] in a rope, as long as non-?tm? objects are only revealed by the witness consciousness (s?k??-bh?sya), their apprehension as objects of cognition produced by the senses is also superimposed. There are two types of d???i-s???i-v?da. 1) In the [Ved?nta-] Siddh?nta-mukt?val? and other texts it is said that perception (d???i), i.e., cognition itself (j??na-svar?pa) is creation (s???i) [d???ir eva s???i?]. There is no creation separate from cognition. 2) But in the primary source texts (?kara-grantha), it is said that the creation of a non-?tm? object takes place at the time of cognition of perception, and that prior to cognition there is no non-?tm? object [d???i-samak?l?n? s???i?]. Therefore, everything seen has reality when cognized (j??ta-satt?) alone, and not when uncognized (aj??ta-satt?). 543 These are two kinds of d???i-s???i-v?da which are accepted (abhimata) by all Advaita ??stras (VP 8.76, 393- 4).544 543 ?tm?nand Muni adds, ?To consider reality of an object prior to cognition is called aj??ta-satt?, reality when uncognized, or empirical reality. To not consider reality of an object prior to cognition but only to accept its reality at the same time as its cognition is called j??ta-satt?, reality when cognized, or illusory reality? (Ni?cald?s 1957, 551). 544 In VS (2.81, 45), Ni?cald?s states that d???i-s???i-v?da is the Ved?nta doctrine, siddh?nta, and describes it in great detail at VS 6.317-29, 193-203. In fact, VS 6.328 is titled ?The acceptance (a?g?k?ra) of d???i-s???i-v?da.? 289 Many authors have described s???i-d???i-v?da, the view that creation is perceived, in the manner of persons of unrefined vision (sth?la-dar??). First, creation occurs, and then subsequently, by relation with a means of cognition (pram??a), perception takes place. The meaning of s???i-d???i is that perception occurs after creation. In this view, non-?tm? objects have uncognized reality, and, unlike snake, silver, etc., the non-?tm? pot, etc., are held to have empirical reality. In d???i-s???i-v?da, no non-?tm? object is an object of a means of cognition. Only pure Brahman is the object of verbal means of cognition (?abda pram??a) in the form of Ved?nta. All inert objects are revealed by the witness-self. The apprehension of an object?s perception by eyes, etc., is erroneous because even the division of means of cognition and cognizer (pram??a-prameya-vibh?ga) are superimposed like [in] a dream. In contrast, in s???i-d???i-v?da, all pots and other non-?tm? objects are objects of the means of cognition, and even the teacher, ??stras, etc., are empirical, and different from the erroneously cognized snake, silver, etc. Although the use of empirical silver as a chain/bracelet, etc., is known, and such use of the illusory versions is not known, nevertheless the cessation of both through cognition of the substratum is similar, both are anirvacan?ya, different from real and unreal, and the absence of both in their own substratum (sv?dhikara?a) in all three times [past, present, future] is similar. Therefore, like illusory objects, empirical objects too are only unreal (mithy?). Thus, even in s???i-d???i-v?da, there is no damage (h?ni) to non-duality, Advaita (VP 8.77, 394). 8.3.2 The Illusoriness of the Unreal Creation Ni?cald?s raises a doubt on behalf of the dualists in connection with these two theories. ?In both d???i-s???i-v?da and s???i-d???i-v?da, all non-?tm? objects are unreal. There is no debate regarding this, but a question arises regarding the property of being illusory (mithy?tva) which is possessed by unreal objects. Is this property (of being unreal) 1) real; or 2) unreal? If it be said to be real (1), the Advaita position will be harmed since there is reality in a non-?tm? property that is different from consciousness. If it be said to be unreal (2), then, too, there will be harm to the Advaita position since an unreal object is not an opposer (pratik?epaka) to an object opposed to it, and therefore the reality of creation (prapa?ca) will 290 not be repudiated by the unreal (mithy?-bh?ta)545 property of being illusory (mithy?tva). The properties of being with manifestation (saprapa?catva) and being without manifestation (ni?prapa?catva) reside in Brahman; the property of being with manifestation is imaginary (kalpita), and that of being without manifestation is ultimate (p?ram?rthika). Thus, although Brahman possesses both of these properties, the property of being without manifestation is not repudiated by the unreal property of being with manifestation. Similarly, in the creation, the property of illusory is imaginary and the property of reality (satyatva) is ultimate; therefore, by the existence of the ultimate property of reality in the creation, the Advaita position will be harmed? (VP 7.78, 394-5). This objection is resolved by the Advaita-d?pik? as follows. The reality that is apprehended in a pot, etc., as in ?the pot is real,? is the reality of the substratum itself that appears in the pot, etc. Or, an anirvacan?ya relation arises between the pot, etc., and the reality of the substratum. The pot?s property of illusoriness (mithy?tva), which is different from real and unreal, is known through ?ruti (scripture). Illusoriness is different from real (sat); therefore, it is opposed to reality (satyatva), which is different from unreal (asat), and that reality is repudiated by this illusoriness. The dualists might argue, ?It is not possible to repudiate the reality of creation by the unreal* (mithy?-bh?ta) illusoriness without accepting reality in the property of illusoriness. If an unreal* property could bring about the repudiation of its opposing property, then even Brahman?s property of being without manifestation should be repudiated by the unreal* property of being with manifestation.? This [argument of the dualist] is also improper because it is a rule that a property repudiates an opposing property of a property-possessor (dharmin) of the same reality [as the property], but where the property-possessor has a different reality, its opposing property is not repudiated. The property of Brahman?s being with manifestation is empirical, and Brahman is ultimate; therefore, the property possessor, Brahman, is not of the same reality as the property of being with manifestation, and so that property cannot repudiate Brahman?s property of being without manifestation. But in the empirical creation, illusoriness is also empirical because the empirical creation free from adventitious (?gantuka) defects is only produced by ignorance, 545 The term mithy?-bh?ta is challenging to translate without causing further confusion. I choose to render it as ?unreal? and then either provide the Sanskrit original in parentheses as ?unreal (mithy?-bh?ta)? or, in the cases where this gets too cumbersome, as ?unreal*? so as to be able to distinguish it from ?unreal (asat).? 291 and is illusory (mithy?). Therefore, since creation and illusoriness are both empirical, and thus of the same reality, the reality of creation can readily be repudiated by illusoriness. If only a real property is accepted as capable of repudiating an opposing property, then for one who apprehends reality in the silver in mother-of-pearl as ?the silver is real,? the illusoriness of silver should not repudiate that reality because the property of illusoriness in the imagined silver is also only imagined and not real. Hence, the reality of the repudiating property is not required in the repudiation of an opposing property, but only that the property possessor of the opposing property be of the same order of reality as the repudiating property. Thus, the defect simply does not arise, that Brahman?s property of being without manifestation is repudiated by its property of being with manifestation; the repudiation of the [empirical] reality of creation by the empirical illusoriness of creation is possible (VP 7.79, 395-6). The dualists raise another type of objection. ?If the property of illusoriness (mithy?tva) in creation is considered illusory (mithy?), the ultimate reality of creation is still not repudiated since only properties at the same [level of] reality oppose one another; properties at different levels of reality do not oppose one another. If properties of different levels of reality could also be in opposition, then the identity (t?d?tmya) of the illusory (pr?tibh?sika) silver with mother-of-pearl should also repudiate the difference [of mother-of-pearl] from empirical real silver. Since the empirical illusoriness of creation is unable to repudiate the ultimate reality of creation, creation is real, and Advaita, non-duality, is not possible.? Ni?cald?s?s response is that even this doubt has the resolution stated before. The reality of snake, silver, etc., should not be repudiated by the illusoriness of the illusory snake, silver, etc. Therefore, a property that is ascertained by a means of valid cognition alone is the cause (prayojaka) for the repudiation of an opposing property. The illusoriness of silver in mother-of-pearl is ascertained by a means of valid cognition, and this illusoriness repudiates (pratik?epa) its opposing property of reality. Similarly, the illusoriness of creation is also ascertained by a means of cognition such as ?ruti (scripture), etc., and it repudiates the reality of creation. But in the mother-of-pearl, the identity of illusory silver is not ascertained by a means of cognition, rather, it is established by erroneous cognition, and therefore, it does not repudiate the difference from empirical silver. On the contrary, the difference of silver from mother-of- pearl is itself ascertained by a means of cognition, and it repudiates the identity of silver with mother-of-pearl. The dualist has accepted the illusoriness of creation as empirical, and 292 thereby the ascription of being ultimately real (p?ram?rthika) to its property-possessor (dharmin), the creation, is totally contrary (sarvath? viruddha) because the only possible substratum of an empirical property is an empirical property-possessor. Thus, even the second objection of the dualists is improper (VP 8.80-1, 396-7). When, in the manner of the Advaita-d?pik?, the property-possessor (dharmin) is of the same [level of] reality as the contradicting property (dharma), then the contradicting property repudiates its opposing property. On accepting this rule, the unreal* (mithy? bh?ta) illusoriness (mithy?tva) of creation repudiates the reality of creation, and Brahman?s being without manifestation is not repudiated by its being with manifestation. But the Advaita- d?pik? resolution can only be possible by accepting differences in reality (satt?-bheda). Against this, if only one reality is accepted, in the manner of ?there is only the reality as Brahman which appears in the pot, etc., and there is no [other] different reality in empirical or illusory objects,? then this resolution is not possible. Ni?cald?s presents his own solution to this objection. Although a property ascertained by a valid means of cognition repudiates an opposing property, yet, in the case where other properties are ascertained by a valid means of cognition, there the other property is not contradicted. For example, the illusoriness of creation is ascertained by a valid means of cognition such as ?ruti (scripture), etc., and there is no ?ruti as a means of cognition for the reality of creation. On the contrary, only the absence of reality is known through ?ruti. Therefore, the illusoriness of creation negates its own reality. Although reality is apprehended in creation by the perceptual means of cognition, such as in the assertion, ?the pot is real,? human perception is weaker than ?ruti statements which do not originate with humans (apauru?eya), and thus, the reality of creation cannot be said to be established by a means of cognition. Brahman?s being with manifestation and being without manifestation (saprapa?catva ni?prapa?catva) are both established by means of cognition; therefore, one property should not be negated by the other. But the highest human goal, i.e., liberation (parama puru??rtha), is attained only by the cognition of [Brahman?s] being without manifestation. Therefore, the goal (t?tparya) of ?ruti is the setting forth (pratip?dana) of being without manifestation. The description of Brahman?s being with manifestation is useful for the understanding (bodha) of non-dual Brahman without manifestation, but the actual goal of ?ruti is not to describe being with manifestation; hence, being with manifestation is not ultimate but is merely conceived. But it 293 is not illusory either, having been produced by ignorance free from adventitious defects; [therefore] it is empirical, and thus the negation of being with manifestation by being without manifestation is established. By stating that the intention of ?ruti statements promoting the being with manifestation is solely for empirical being with manifestation, being with manifestation is restricted. Also, Brahman?s being with manifestation is not eternal; it is only present in the time of ignorance prior to knowledge (vidy?), and therefore, the property of being with manifestation is negated by the property of being without manifestation, whereas the converse is not possible. Thus, the objection of the dualist is improper (VP 8.82-3, 397-8). Authors other than N?si?h??rama have resolved the above objection [against the Advaita-d?pik? view] in the following manner. Pertaining to its own substratum (sv??raya- gocara), the property that is not negated by the immediate perception of truth (tattva) repudiates its opposing property, but the property that, pertaining to its own substratum, is negated by the immediate perception of truth, cannot repudiate its opposing property. For example, creation (prapa?ca) is the substratum of illusoriness (mithy?tva). The illusoriness of creation is not negated by the immediate perception of the truth pertaining to Brahman, which is the substratum of the creation. Instead, the conviction of illusoriness (mithy?tva- buddhi) pertaining to creation becomes firmer by the immediate perception of Brahman. Hence, the opposing [property of creation?s] reality is repudiated by the illusoriness of creation. But Brahman is the substratum of the property of being with manifestation. The property of being with manifestation is negated by the immediate perception of Brahman; therefore, the property of being with manifestation does not cancel (tirask?ra) Brahman?s property of being without manifestation. Just as mother-of-pearl has its own identity (t?d?tmya), the imagined silver also has its identity in its substratum, mother-of-pearl. The mother-of-pearl-identity is not negated by the immediate perception of mother-of-pearl, but the difference from mother-of-pearl that opposes mother-of-pearl is repudiated by the mother-of-pearl-identity. Also, by the immediate perception of mother-of-pearl, the identity of silver in mother-of-pearl gets negated, but that identity of silver [in mother-of-pearl] does not repudiate the difference-from-silver that opposes the silver [which is falsely perceived in mother-of-pearl]. Similarly, the property of reality gets repudiated by the creation?s *unreal (mithy? bh?ta) property of illusoriness, but Brahman?s property of being without 294 manifestation does not get repudiated by its property of being with manifestation (VP 8.84, 398-9). Thus, there are several resolutions to the dualists? objections. Ni?cald?s suggests that the seeker of knowledge (jij??su) should stay away from the dualists? ideas.546 8.3.3 Five Repudiations of the Reality of the Visible World (Prapa?ca) Ni?cald?s provides five different ways in which the reality of the visible world is negated by its illusoriness (mithy?tva): According to the author of the Tattva-?uddhi,547 the object of the perceptual cognition ?the pot is real,? etc., is the substratum of the pot, etc., namely, consciousness, whose nature is real (sat-svar?pa cetana). The pot, etc., superimposed on the real-by-nature consciousness, become identical with their substratum and become the objects of a v?tti pertaining to an erroneous cognition (bhrama-v?tti). For example, the mother-of-pearl, rope, etc., are objects of the v?tti from the eyes (c?k?u?a-v?tti) in the form of ?this? (idam-?k?ra), but the snake, silver, etc., are not objects of any v?tti from the eyes but are the objects of a bhrama-v?tti. Similarly, the object of all cognitions produced by the means of cognition such as eyes, etc., is only the reality in the form of the substratum; the v?tti produced by the means of cognition does not pertain to the pot, etc. The means of cognition pertain only to that which is not cognized. [Therefore, the uncognized-ness can reside only in the substratum, which is consciousness, and the concealment caused by ignorance is possible in that consciousness alone]. 548 In contrast, the inert objects such as pot, etc., [are devoid of reality and,] because of the absence of uncognized-ness in them, and because of the impossibility of their being concealed by ignorance, the means of cognition cannot pertain to these inert objects. [There is just one real entity (vastu), and that is the object of concealment. A non-real entity, being devoid of its own reality, is itself the form of concealment, so how can it be the object of concealment?] Therefore, the pot, etc., like the snake, silver, etc., are the objects of erroneous cognition, and only their substratum, the real-by-nature consciousness, is the object of the 546 Lit. ?should remain turned away (vimukha) from the dualists? words (vacana). 547 J??naghana, 950-1050 CE. See also J??naghana-p?da (1941, ix). The illusoriness of creation is treated in two sections titled prapa?ca-mithy?tva-nir?pa?am and sa?s?ra-mithy?tvam, J??naghana-p?da (1941, 98-104, 192-8). Ni?cald?s?s arguments presented here are along the lines of the second section, though arguments similar to those presented in the first section have also been used by Ni?cald?s elsewhere. 548 This helpful comment, as well as others in this section that are provided in square-brackets are only in ?tm?nand Muni?s version, (Ni?cald?s 1957, 559-60). 295 v?tti produced by the eyes and the other means of cognition. In this manner, the object of all means of cognition is simply the real-by-nature consciousness, whereas the endless difference-qualified pot, etc., are apprehended as erroneous cognitions in that consciousness, and as such, the reality in pot, etc., is not the object of any means of cognition. Therefore, several ?ruti-sm?ti (scriptural texts) reiterate (anuv?da) the illusoriness (mithy?tva) of the pot, etc. The author of the Tattva-?uddhi has explained, in this manner, that the means of cognition such as the eyes, etc., pertain to the reality of the substratum alone, not the pot, etc., and has thus repudiated the reality of creation (VP 8.85, 399-400). 1) Some other authors write that, although the object of the apprehension ?the pot is,? etc., is the reality (sattva) of the pot, etc., nevertheless, according to ?ruti (scripture), reasoning (yukti) and the experience of those who know (j??n?), the pot, etc., possess illusoriness. There, illusoriness is opposed by non-negated (ab?dhita) reality, which means that the pot, etc., have reality in the form of a class (j?ti). Just as all pots have the consequent (anugata) property of pot-ness, similarly in the case of the object of the uniform (ek?k?ra) apprehension, ?the pot is, the cloth is,? this property (dharma) that is in all objects in the form of a consequent class, is itself the reality. Alternatively, the apprehension of pot, etc., does not occur without the relation of time and place; only the pot, etc., qualified by time and place are apprehended, i.e., the apprehension related to the pot, etc., takes place as ?there is a pot here, there is a pot now,? with just the time and place relations as the object, and these relations themselves are the reality in the pot, etc. Alternatively, the object of the apprehension, ?the pot is,? is just the form and nature of the pot, etc.; this apprehension does not make the reality of the pot, etc., a separate object. The object that is apprehended by a sentence without the word ?not? is negated (ni?edha) by the word ?not.? Therefore, the sentence ?the pot is not? only negates the form of the pot. Since this is consented to by all, it is best to accept just the knowing (bodha) of the pot by the sentence without the word ?not,? i.e., ?the pot is.? In this manner, since all objects like the pot, etc., have reality only in the nature (svar?pa) of the class, or qualified by time and place, or as form, due to the absence of reality separate from their nature, they are only illusory (mithy?) (VP 8.86, 400). 296 2) In the view of the author of the Ny?ya-sudh?, 549 the object of the apprehension ?the pot is? is only the pot, etc.?s relation of being (satt?) present in the substratum. According to the author of the Tattva-?uddhi, an apprehension produced by means of cognition does not pertain to non-?tm? pot, etc., but to the being of the substratum alone. The Ny?ya- sudh? view only has the difference that the pot, etc., qualified by the relation with the substratum?s being have been considered the objects of apprehension generated by means of cognition. Thus, reality is apprehended in the pot, etc., by the relation of the substratum?s being, but actually the reality is absent in the pot, etc. The acceptance of the apprehension of the substratum?s being in the pot, etc., is an acceptance of anyath?- khy?ti; therefore, it is best to consider that an anirvacan?ya relation to the substratum?s being arises in the pot, etc. (VP 8.87, 400-1). 3) Some teacher 550 asserts that the ?ruti states ?pr??? vai satya? te??m e?a? satyam, the breath [vital functions] is the real; he is the real underlying [lit. of] that? (BU 2.3.6). Its meaning is that breath, i.e., hira?yagarbha is real, and, by its connection (apek??), the param?tm? is the highest real. There is also another ?ruti, ?satyasya satyam, the real of the real? (BU 2.3.6, just preceding the previous phrase), which means that the reality of ?tm? is superior to the reality of non-?tm?. Just as with regards to another king (r?j?), the superior king is called the Mah?r?ja, similarly the superior real is called the real of the real. Thus, in ?ruti where the superiority-inferiority of the real has been stated, this is not possible in any other manner; the real can be superior or inferior only on the basis of being ever non-negated or being sometimes non-negated [respectively]. In non-?tm? objects, prior to cognition, there is reality in the form of being non-negated, and, in the ultimate entity, the reality is always present in the form of being non-negated; therefore, hira?yagarbha is the inferior real, and param?tm? is the superior real. In this manner the two-fold real is in concord with ?ruti. Of these realities, that which is of the form of being sometimes non-negated does not oppose illusoriness, but the reality that is always non- 549 Gau?e?vara J??nottama, also known as Saty?nanda, 1100-1200 CE per Thangaswami (1980, 347), and 1175 CE by Potter (2006, 583) was the teacher of Citsukha. I have been unable to locate this text. It is not to be confused with two other texts of the same name, one by Some?vara [twelfth c. CE, a M?m??saka work, an interpretation of Kum?rila?s thought (Verpoorten 1987, 38)] and the other by Jayat?rtha [1365-88 C?E, a dvaitin commentary on Madhva?s Anuvy?khy?na on the BS (Sharma 1986, xviii-xix)]. 550 ?ko? ?c?rya,? unnamed. 297 negated opposes illusoriness, and so it repudiates illusoriness of the creation (VP 8.88, 401). 4) In the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, it is stated that although the reality of pot, etc., is apprehended by the means of cognition such as perception, etc., only Brahman-revealing (lit. bodhaka) sentences are the means of cognition. The means of cognition such as perception, etc., that perceive (gr?haka) non-?tm? are not means of cognition but merely the appearance of a means of cognition (pram???bh?sa). A means of cognition is simply the producer of the understanding of [heretofore] unknown meaning, but it is not possible to have ignorance-caused concealment in inert objects [because inert objects are devoid of being and solely of the nature of concealment]. Therefore, it is not possible for perception, etc., that reveal inert objects, to be means of cognition because of the absence of unknowability (aj??tatva) in anything that is different from consciousness. [Ultimately, there is nothing that is different from consciousness, let alone knowable]. Thus, the reality is established in the pot, etc., by the appearance of a means of cognition, and their illusoriness is established by ?ruti as a means of cognition. Consequently, the reality of creation is repudiated by means of the negation of the appearance of means of cognition by the principal means of cognition, ?ruti (VP 8.89, 401-2). In this manner, the contradiction of creation by the endless non-negatable reality has been stated in five ways; therefore, creation is illusory. 8.4 Utility of Acts (Karma) in Effecting Knowledge (J??na) Given that the illusoriness of creation has been established, Ni?cald?s takes up the means to dispel illusoriness. Ni?cald?s states bluntly that there is no use for action in the cessation of an illusory (mithy?) entity. Therefore, it is not possible to effect the cessation of futility (anartha) by means of either action, or action along with knowledge. [Futility here refers to sa?s?ra 551]. The cessation of illusoriness can be brought about only by knowledge. This sense is very well known in Advaita texts and even in the vernacular. 552 In this regard, the Advaita doctrine (siddh?nta) is that, although several ?ruti and sm?ti texts speak of the 551 Sa?s?ra is yet another word I choose to not translate. A few of the senses provided by MW should suffice to reveal the richness of this term: ?course, passage, passing through a succession of states, circuit of mundane existence, transmigration, metempsychosis, the world, secular life, worldly illusion.? 552 Ni?cald?s refers to his own treatment of this topic in the sixth tara?ga of V?. See VS 6. 376-99, 234-45. 298 attainment of liberation through knowledge combined with action, ?a?kara has taught (pratip?dana) the denial (ni?edha) of the theory of knowledge and action combined [to effect liberation] in several places. There, it has been ascertained that the combining (samuccaya) [of knowledge and action] is of two kinds: 1) simultaneous combination (sama-samuccaya); and 2) sequential combination (krama-samuccaya). Considering both knowledge and action as the means of liberation, combining them and practicing (anu??h?na) both at the same time is termed simultaneous combination (1). For one and the same practitioner to first perform action only, and then later, through the renunciation of all action, to engage in listening (?rava?a) [to scripture], etc.,553 for the purpose of knowledge is termed sequential combination (2). Of these two, simultaneous combination has been denied, and, wherever the combination of knowledge and action is described in ?ruti and sm?ti texts, the purport is only the sequential combination stated above (VP 8.90, 402). ?a?kara?s position (siddh?nta) is that action is not the immediate (s?k??t) means for liberation; knowledge is the only means, and action is the means to effect knowledge. According to V?caspati, action is a means to bring about the desire of knowledge. In the Bh?mat?, V?caspati writes that karma is not an immediate means of knowledge, but it is a means for the desire to know (jij??s?). In the Kaivalya School (lit. kaivalya-??kh?),554 it has been clearly stated that all ??rama-karmas 555 are the means for desire to know (vividi??).556 But the author of the Brahma-s?tra has stated in the third chapter [BS 3.4] the requirement of all actions [as necessary] for [attaining] knowledge alone,. In his explanation of the s?tras, 557 ?a?kara says that control of the inner and outer senses (?ama-dama), etc., 558 are the means of knowledge, and therefore, they are close to knowledge. By contrast, other actions are a 553 See the discussion on p. 60 to review what ?listening (?rava?a), etc.? refer to. 554 It is unlikely that kaivalya-??kh? refers to the Kaivalyopani?ad of the AV, as the only reference there to ??rama occurs in v. 5, where it is clearly referring to the last ??rama, i.e., sanny?sa. (In fact, v. 2cd is against action: ?na karma?? na prajay? dhanena ty?genaike am?tatvam ?na?u?, Not through action, nor through offspring or wealth, [rather] some attained immortality through renunciation?). In the context of n. 565, Ni?cald?s refers to the BU as kaivalya-??kh?. If the BU is intended instead, then BU 4.4.22 is the verse. See also n. 585. 555 Actions done in all four ??ramas, stages of life, namely, 1) brahmac?r?, student, 2) g?hasta, householder, 3) v?naprasth?, forest-dweller, and 4) sanny?s?, renunciate. 556 Kaivalya Upani?ad 1.2 states: ?tasmai sa hov?ca pit?maha? ca ?raddh?-bhakti-dhy?na-yog?d avaihi; na karma?? na prajay? dhanena ty?genaike am?tatvam ?na?u?. [Parame??hin] said to him, know it by means of the practice of faith, devotion, and meditation. They [the wise] attained immortality neither by acts, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation.? 557 Specifically, in the par?mar??dhikara?am (BS 3.4.18-20) on whether ?ruti prescribes renunciation. 558 This refers to the ?a?-sampatti, the six-fold wealth: 1) ?ama, & 2) dama, self-control, 3) uparati, cessation of the senses, 4) titik??, forbearance, 5) sam?dh?na, contemplation, 6) ?raddh?, faith. This is introduced in BS ?Bh 1.1.1 (?an?kar?c?rya et al. 1980, 36-7). 299 means for the desire to know, and, due to the need for ?ama, dama, etc., these other actions are distant from knowledge. 559 Thus, through ?ruti and also the [?a?kara-] bh??ya, action is the immediate means for the desire to know, and through the desire to know, [actions] are the means for knowledge. If it were said that actions are the immediate means for knowledge, the performance of action will be required until the dawning of knowledge, and then there will be the loss of the [requirement for] sanny?sa in the form of renunciation of action, and also the [loss of consequent] knowledge. Therefore, according to V?caspati, action is only the means for the desire to know (VP 8.91-2, 403). According to Prak???tman, the author of the Vivara?a, action is a means for knowledge. Although ?ruti says, ?ved?nuvacanena [br?hma??] vividi?anti, [the brahmans] seek to know [Brahman] by Vedic recitation? (BU 4.4.22),? there, by the word-breaks (ak?ara-mary?d?) it appears that the study of Vedas and other actions are the means for the desire to know; nevertheless, the purport of ?ruti is that action is a means for the object of desire, i.e., knowledge alone, and not merely the means for the desire [to know]. Just as in the sentence, ?he wishes to go by means of a horse,? it is seen from the word-breaks that the horses are the means for the desire pertaining to going. Also in ?he wishes to kill by means of a weapon,? the means for the desire to kill is seen in the weapon. Just as for the object of the desire of going, its means is intended (abhipreta) to be the horse, and for the object of the desire of killing, its means is meant to be the weapon, similarly, for the object of desire for knowledge, its means is intended to be action. In this regard, V?caspati has raised the defect that ?if actions are considered the means of knowledge, due to the fault arising of the performance of action [being required] till the dawn of knowledge, there will be the loss of sanny?sa.? The [Vivara?a] resolution to this objection is that, just as the land is tilled (kar?a?a) prior to the scattering of the seed, and, in the time subsequent to the planting of the seed, it is re- ploughed (?kar?a?a) [to cover the seeds], and thus the establishing (siddhi) of rice, etc., is done by the plowing and re-plowing, similarly, knowledge is established by action and renunciation (sanny?sa). Action is to be done only as long as the detachment (vair?gya) and 559 BS ?Bh 3.4.20: ? ?ama-dam?dis tu tad?yo dharmo brahma-sa?sthat?y? upodbalako na virodh?. Control of the inner & outer senses (?ama-dama), etc., however, are [a renunciate?s] properties [and] strengthen one?s abiding in Brahman and are not in opposition. brahmani ??hatvam eva hi tasya ?ama-dam?dy upab??hita? sv??rama-vihita? karma yaj??d?ni cetare??? tad vyatikrame ca tasya pratyav?ya?. Just abiding in Brahman is the prescribed action for one?s ??rama [at the stage of renunciation], strengthened by ?ama, dama, etc., [whereas] acts and rituals [are the prescribed actions] for the other stages [and their performance] is improper (?an?kar?c?rya et al. 1980, 795). 300 strong desire to know the inner essence (pratyak tattva) have not arisen through the purification of the anta?-kara?a. But once detachment and strong desire to know have arisen, only renunciation is to be performed in the form of the giving up of action along with the means. Thus, although actions are the means of knowledge, in the time subsequent to the strong desire to know, only the sections (a?ga) of renunciation (sanny?sa), the control of the inner and outer senses (?ama and dama), etc., are to be performed, and not actions. Thus, the dependence on action does not oppose ?a?kara?s bh??ya on the third chapter of the BS, which teaches the essentiality of ?ama, etc. Thus, in the Vivara?a view, actions are a means to knowledge, and in V?caspati?s view, they are a means to the desire to know. But in both views there is the performance of actions prior to [the arising of] the desire to know, and subsequently there is only the performance of ?ama, dama, etc., followed by listening to scriptures, etc., along with renunciation. After the [arising of] the desire to know, in neither view is action required to be done (VP 8.93, 403-4). At this juncture a doubt may arise. If, in both the views, action is to be performed only prior to the desire to know, then stating the difference in the views is fruitless. But in V?caspati?s view, the result of actions is the desire to know, and in the Vivara?a view, the result is considered to be knowledge. Once the result has been achieved, then the means is renounced. Thus, if, in V?caspati?s view, it is accepted that the action is performed until the desire to know is established, and in the Vivara?a view, the action is performed even after the desire to know until knowledge is established, then a difference in the two views is possible. But according to what has been said, in both views, on accepting the renunciation of action after the desire to know, there is no difference between the two views (VP 8.94, 404- 5). Ni?cald?s provides the following resolution. Although, in both views, action is performed only until the desire to know, there is a difference in the result of the action. In V?caspati?s view, the result is only the desire to know, and, after producing the desire to know, the unseen consequences of actions (ap?rva) come to an end. Upon the desire to know occurring, if one has the benefit of the apparatus (s?magr?) of knowledge, such as the best teacher, ??stras, etc., then knowledge occurs, but, if there is the lack of some apparatus, then knowledge does not occur. Essentially, the function of action is only in the arising of the desire to know and not in the arising of knowledge. Therefore, the result of action is not 301 knowledge. Thus, according to V?caspati?s view, even on performing an action which is the cause of the desire to know, knowledge is not attained as a rule, but, if by the best of fortune, the complete apparatus should become established, then alone does knowledge occur. Therefore, the attainment of knowledge by means of action is uncertain (aniyata). In contrast, in the Vivara?a view, prior to the desire for knowledge, the result of performed action also is knowledge, which means that the unseen consequences of actions (ap?rva) do not get exhausted without producing knowledge. Instead, they remain until the arising of knowledge. Also, the apparatus without which the result of action, namely, knowledge, will not occur, all that entire apparatus is effected by action itself. In this version, on the performance of action having been carried out, knowledge will certainly occur in either the present body or in the future body; therefore, the arising of knowledge is certain. Thus, in V?caspati?s view, the desire to know occurs as a rule due to good (?ubha) actions, but the achievement of knowledge is uncertain. In the Vivara?a view, the same action causes knowledge as a rule. Therefore, the two views are mutually different and not inter-mixed. In essence, whether action is the cause of the desire to know or of knowledge, according to both, the utility of ??rama-karmas, such as the study of the Vedas, sacrificial rituals (yaj?a), charity, and rites such as the k?cchra-c?ndr?ya?a, 560 etc., is only for knowledge (vidy?). However, some teachers say that the duties (dharma) carried out only as prescribed by one?s caste (var?a), are of no use for knowledge (VP 8.95-6, 405-6). According to the author of the Kalpataru,561 all obligatory actions (nitya-karma) are useful for knowledge (vidy?) because both the author of the Brahma-s?tra and ?a?kara have stated the eligibility of people without an ??rama [the life stage] to perform actions for the purpose of knowledge, and also for engaging in listening [to Ved?nta texts] (?rava?a), etc. [i.e., reflection (manana) and profound and continuous meditation (nididhy?sana) on the content of these texts, also for the sake of knowledge]. Similarly, even ?ruti has spoken of the knowledge of Brahman in persons without an ??rama, such as Raikva [in CU:4.1-2, he is 560 K?cchra-c?ndr?ya?a is a difficult (k?cchra) fast where the amount of food consumed is in proportion to the phase of the moon. The food consumed is decreased by a fixed fourteenth every day of the waning fortnight, until one consumes nothing on the new moon day. The food is then increased in like manner during the waxing fortnight. 561 Amal?nanda, 1247-1347 CE, author of a commentary on the Bh?mat?. 302 described as a non-brahman ?with a cart, sayugvan?], 562 V?caknav?563 [a woman, BU 3.6, 3.8], etc. If the ??rama duties alone were useful for knowledge, then these persons should not have had knowledge because they lacked the actions that produce (samp?daka) knowledge. Therefore, it is the view of the Kalpataru author that all good actions, such as bathing in the Ganga, japa, meditations on gods (devat?-dhy?na), etc., are useful for knowledge. But only obligatory actions (nitya-karma) can be useful for knowledge because actions are not useful for knowledge in any way other than the removal of the p?pas564 that are obstacles to knowledge. The fruits of the optional actions [performed for attaining specific desires] (k?mya-karma) are only in the form of the attainment of heaven, sons, etc.; they do not have the capacity to remove p?pas. Since only obligatory actions remove p?pas, all obligatory actions are useful in knowledge (VP 8.97, 406). Sarvaj??tman, the author of the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka has said that all good deeds, optional as well as obligatory, are useful for knowledge because the kaivalya-??kh? 565 states, ?yaj?ena vividi?anti, they desire to know through yaj?a? (BU 4.4.22).566 Here, the word yaj?a is used for obligatory and optional ordinary actions. Also, by statements such as ?dharme?a p?pam apanudati, by dharma he removes p?pa,? 567 etc., the ability of all good actions to destroy p?pas is known. Therefore, even optional actions, just like obligatory actions, are useful in [attaining] knowledge by the removal of the p?pas, which are obstacles to knowledge (VP 8.98, 406-7). Thus, all good actions are to be performed until the strong desire for knowledge [arises]. 8.5 Utility of Renunciation (Sanny?sa) in Effecting Knowledge (J??na) Then, on the arising of the desire for knowledge, accompanied by strengthened dispassion (vair?gya), renunciation (sanny?sa), in the form of the giving up of actions along 562 I read, following Olivelle, against ?a?kara, CU 4.1.7 as ?yatr?re?br?hma?asy?nve?a?? ? ? (1998, 216, 548), as the more likely reading, as this seems in keeping with Ni?cald?s?s reading, but I stay with the traditional ?Bh interpretation of sayugvan as ?sah yugvan? gantry? varatata iti, one who stays with a small cart? (?a?kara et al. 1979, 130), over Olivelle?s ?gatherer? (215, 548). 563 Vacaknu?s daughter, G?rg?, is called V?caknav?. 564 P?pa is usually translated as ?sin? but that conflates religious doctrines. A better translation is ?negative potency of improper actions.? 565 It is not clear what Ni?cald?s is referring to as ?kaivalya-??kh?.? No such named Vedic ??kh?, theological sub-school, is known of. Here he cites from the BU, which is part of the ?ukla YajV and is associated with two ??kh?s (schools), the Madhyandina and K??va. See also n. 554 and n. 585. 566 BU 4.4.22 (K??va) actually reads: tam etam ?tm?na? ved?nuvacanena br?hma?? vividi?anti yaj?ena d?nena tapas??n??akena, brahmans seek to know this Self by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, charity, penance, fasting. 567 Mah?n?r?ya?opani?ad 22.1 (Jacob 1888, 23) 303 with their means, is to be undertaken. Just as the cessation of p?pas occurs by means of good actions, the cessation of p?pas that are obstacles to knowledge is also brought about through renunciation. Obstacles to knowledge are multifarious; the cessation of some obstacles occurs through action, and some through renunciation. Therefore, action and renunciation are both causes of knowledge through [effecting] the cessation of the knowledge-obstructing p?pas, and they are to be undertaken in sequence. It is the opinion of some [unnamed] teacher that renunciation is not a means of knowledge merely through effecting the cessation of p?pa, but that, along with the unseen potency (ap?rva) generated through renunciation, a person attains knowledge through listening (?rava?a) [to scripture], etc. 568 Therefore, since ?rava?a is a component of renunciation, even those totally free from p?pa have to undertake renunciation. It is the opinion of the author of the Vivara?a, however, that ?without renunciation, projection (vik?epa) [due to ignorance] does not cease, and therefore the visible result of renunciation is the cessation of the projection that is an obstacle to knowledge.? In contrast, to say that ?the cessation of p?pa that is an obstacle to knowledge, or the creation of pu?ya that is the cause of knowledge? alone is the invisible result of renunciation is improper. Where a visible result is not possible, there alone an invisible result is conceived of. But when this visible result of renunciation, ?the cessation of projection,? is possible, it is improper to speak of any unseen result. If a superior person in some different [non- renunciatory] stage of life (??rama), should experience a cessation of projection in the form of desire, anger, etc., and the contemplation of Ved?nta should become possible even in the intervals between (lit. chidra, crack, gap, break) [performance of] action, then although renunciation in the stated manner becomes useless, nevertheless, by the words of Gau?ap?da (gau?ap?d?ya vacana) ??supter ?m?te? k?la? nayed ved?nta-cintay?, one should spend the time until asleep, and until death, in the contemplation of Ved?nta;?569 and by the divine words (bhagavad-vacana), ?taccintana? tat kathanam anyonya? tat prabodhanam, 568 See the discussion on p. 60 to review what ?listening (?rava?a), etc.? refer to. 569 This verse does not occur in the M?K?. The full verse is cited as sm?ti (without mention of the source) in the SLS (D?k?ita, T?rtha, and ??str? 1890, 92), and also by Muktidananda (2010, 74), again without mention of the source, as ??supter ?m?te? k?la? nayed ved?nta-cintay?; dady?n n?vasara? ki?cit k?m?d?n?? man?gapi. One should spend time in contemplation of Ved?nta until one falls asleep, until the time of one?s death; one should not even give any time to desires and the like, however small [they may be].? A variant of p?da ab also appears in ?iva Pur??a 1.18.25 as ??supter ?m?te? k?la? nayed vai ?iva-ci?tay?.? 304 contemplation of it, speaking of it, and instructing it to one another,?570 and by the ?ruti, ?brahmasa?stho?m?tatvam eti, one who is established in Brahman arrives at immortality (CU 2.23.1),? only by the constant (nirantara) ?rava?a, etc., of Brahman, is knowledge attained. Sometimes, knowledge does not occur by ?rava?a, etc., that is performed in the times of breaks (chidra) in action, but renunciation is the cause of the practice (abhy?sa) of continual ?rava?a, etc. Therefore, renunciation is the cause of a visible result, and is not futile (VP 8.99-101,407-8). 8.5.1 Eligibility for Renunciation Given the utility of renunciation in effecting knowledge, Ni?cald?s next presents differing opinions as to whether or not k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras are eligible for renunciation, as well as for ?rava?a (VP 8.102-111, 408-12), and concludes that all humans are eligible for knowledge and devotion. Even the lowest caste humans are eligible for knowledge of the Brahman (lit. tattva-j??na, realization of the essence, i.e., Brahman). Due to the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior births, even those of the lowest caste can develop a desire to know (jij??s?), and then can get knowledge by human statements (pauru?eya vacana) [as opposed to the divinely revealed Vedas, ?ruti], thereby becoming liberated by the cessation of ignorance and its effects. If somebody (lit. ?ar?ra, body) were without ?tm?, then that entity could be considered ineligible for knowledge. Therefore, only humans are capable of self- knowledge (?tma-j??na) (VP 8.110, 412).571 To effect self-realization, one requires the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?). 572 According to Ni?cald?s, all beings have compassion (day?), but it is only possible for brahmans to have forbearance (k?am?), truth (satya), honesty (?rjava), and contentment (santo?a), etc. On account of k?atriyas having the active duty (prav?tti-dharma) for the sake of protecting their subjects (praj?), they have somewhat fewer Divine Properties than brahmans. However, even their violence towards wicked beings 570 YogV? 3.22.24: ?tac-cintana? tat-kathanam anyonya? tat-prabodhanam; etad eka-paratva? ca brahm?bhy?sa? vidur budh??. Know this as the study of Brahman: contemplation of it, speaking of it, instructing it to one another, and one- pointed meditation of it.? This verse also occurs in PD 7.106. 571 This has already been explored in greater detail in Ch. 4, particularly 4.3-4.5. 572 The Divine Properties are enumerated in BhG 16.1-3 as: 1) abhaya?, fearlessness; 2) sattva-sa??uddhi?, purity of disposition; 3) j??na-yoga-vyavasthiti, perseverance in the practice of knowledge; 4) d?na, charity; 5) dama, self-control; 6) yaj?a, [practice of] ritual; 7) sv?dhy?ya, study of scriptures; 8) tapas, austerity; 9) ?rjava, honesty; 10) ahi?s?, non- violence; 11) satya, truthfulness; 12) akrodha, absence of anger; 13) ty?ga, renunciation; 14) ??nti, peace; 15) apai?una, absence of wickedness; 16) bh?te?u day?, compassion towards [all] beings; 17) aloluptva, absence of greed; 18) m?rdava, gentleness; 19) hr?, modesty; 20) ac?pala, steadiness; 21) tejas, vitality; 22) k?am?, forbearance; 23) dh?ti, resolve; 24) ?auca, purity; 25) adroha, freedom from treachery; 26) n?tim?nit?, humility. 305 for the protection of the subjects from a sense of duty is only non-violence, and therefore, it is not impossible for a k?atriya to have the Divine Properties. Although a vai?ya has even more physical activity, such as agriculture and trade, making it impossible for a vai?ya to have occasion for contemplation of ?tm?, nevertheless many fortunate vai?yas manage (nirv?ha) in all affairs (vyavah?ra) without physical activity, and it is possible for them to gain the Divine Properties. In the view of those teachers for whom k?atriyas and vai?yas are eligible for renunciation, the Divine Properties are easily possible for vai?yas too. Although it is hard for ??dras and the lowest caste (antya-j?ti) to attain the Divine Properties, the result of action is of endless types. Therefore, if they too should acquire the Divine Properties due to actions of prior lives, then a ??dra, by listening to the pur??as and such, and the lowest caste by listening to vernacular commentaries (bh???-prabandha) and the like, can also, by means of devotion to God, attain liberation without obstruction and thus attain Brahman- realization. Hence, all humans are eligible for devotion to God and Brahman-realization ? this is the nirdh?ra, conclusion of all scripture (??stra) (VP 8.111, 413). 8.6 Chapter Summary A lot of ground was covered in this chapter. Ni?cald?s examined in considerable detail the nature of ignorance and the illusoriness of the world, and whether or not action and renunciation are of utility in gaining knowledge. In both the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, ignorance is considered to be the transforming material cause of the anirvacan?ya entities. The common cause of the world is primordial ignorance (m?l?j??na), the ignorance that conceals the nature of Brahman. Secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na or avasth?-aj??na) is the ignorance that conceals consciousness delimited by an up?dhi. Are perceived entities such as a reflection in the mirror empirically real, or are they illusory? The persistence of such reflections even past the cognition of the mirror and the source of the reflection is initially explained by considering whether they result from either primordial or secondary ignorance, and Ni?cald?s returns to this when considering the nature of the cessation of empirical superimpositions. He concludes that such entities are known to be false (mithy?) even without the knowledge of Brahman, so they ought to be considered illusory. But if primordial ignorance is considered their source, then it is not possible for them to be illusory because only the knowledge of Brahman removes the empirical effects of 306 primordial ignorance; instead, it is the effects of secondary ignorance that are illusory, as they can be removed without knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, Ni?cald?s revises the distinction between the empirical and the illusory: ?That which is not produced by defects other than ignorance, but is only produced by ignorance, is empirical; that which is also produced by defects other than ignorance, it is called illusory.? (However, at the conclusion of the discussions of the nature of ignorance in the empirical state, in VP 8.56, 383, section 8.1 on p. 277ff. in the present text, Ni?cald?s does concede that reflection-superimposition can be considered illusory in that they can be negated by opposing cognitions). The reflection in the mirror is a transformation of primordial ignorance located in Brahman-consciousness, and the substratum remains Brahman-consciousness alone; the reflection-superimposition is not produced by any defects other than ignorance, and hence it can only be empirical. Ni?cald?s suggests that primordial ignorance alone should be considered the material cause of such superimposition because then the substratum does not differ dependent on whether the Theory of Appearance or the Theory of Reflection is considered. Then, how can cessation of the reflection-superimposition occur without the knowledge of Brahman? The total cessation of ignorance occurs only by the cognition of the substratum devoid of obstructions. But as long as the obstruction of pr?rabdha karmas remains, the cessation of the portion of ignorance that is the cause of projection does not occur, even with the cognition of the substratum as Brahman. Where the cognition pertaining to objects other than the ?tm?, such as a pot, etc., occurs, the cessation of their ignorance does not occur as long as the manifestation of the pot, etc., persists; however, there is a reduction in the concealment caused by ignorance. The cessation of the reflection-superimpositions is also experientially known by the immediate cognition of the face, mirror, etc., in a time devoid of obstructions. Only a cognition having the same object opposes ignorance; a cognition with different objects does not. Therefore, the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., opposes only the secondary ignorance situated in the consciousness delimited by the face, mirror, etc., but does not oppose primordial ignorance that veils Brahman. Where the cessation of valid cognition is brought about by an erroneous cognition, or the cessation of one erroneous cognition is brought about by another opposing erroneous cognition, the cessation of the prior cognitions is brought about simply by the existence of the ignorance that is the material cause of the erroneous cognition. But where the cessation of 307 erroneous cognition is brought about by a valid cognition, the true cognition of the substratum also brings about the cessation of ignorance. Thus, the cessation of reflection- superimposition is possible without the cognition of the substratum, and also without the cessation of primordial ignorance, but merely by the cognition of the face, mirror, etc. The cognition of the substratum is a dispensable antecedent and is not a required cause in the cessation of superimposition. In a case where the cessation of superimposition occurs by means of the cognition of the substratum, only the cessation of ignorance is brought about by the substratum-cognition, and then, by the destruction of ignorance as the material cause, the superimposition ceases. Reflection-superimposition, similar to space and the rest of creation (prapa?ca), is caused by primordial ignorance. But the reflection-superimposition can be negated by an opposing cognition, even without cognition of the substratum. Ni?cald?s also refutes at length the view that the Pa?cap?dik? holds that secondary ignorance is the cause for reference-superimpositions. In the case of dreams, their material cause is considered to be secondary ignorance, but, because secondary ignorance is a particular form of primordial ignorance, primordial ignorance is the material cause of secondary ignorance. The substratum of the illusory dream seer is the empirical seer, and the substratum of the illusory vision is the empirical vision. Upon waking, the cognition of the empirical seer-seen itself is the cognition of the substratum of the dream, which brings about the cessation of the material cause in the form of secondary ignorance from which the cessation of the illusory seer-seen takes place. But since the empirical seer is also inert (ja?a) and non-?tm? like the seen, it is not the substratum that imparts reality (satt?) and manifestation (sph?rti) to the dream. Instead, consciousness alone, non-delimited by ego and located inside the body, is the substratum of the dream state, i.e., j?va-consciousness in the form of a reflection in ignorance. Since consciousness is related to the cognizer, the dream-superimposition is immediately cognized without the functioning of the senses; the dream is illumined by the self-illumined ?tm? without the functioning of the anta?-kara?a and the senses. Ni?cald?s also provides scriptural confirmation (BU 4.3.9) for the self-immediacy of dreams. In the course of defending the immediacy of dream-cognitions, Ni?cald?s shows that no v?tti is required for their cognition as their substratum is j?va-consciousness, unlike the perception of external objects, whose substratum is Brahman-consciousness. Ni?cald?s then 308 undertakes a brief digression, unrelated to the cognition of dreams, to discuss a difference of opinion between the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka and N?si?h??rama?s Advaita-d?pik? regarding the use of v?tti and the mind for the perception of space. Ni?cald?s explains that both positions have defects, and that the defects can be overcome in each case ?on the strength of the result (phala-bala-tai?),? but he concludes that the Advaita-d?pik? view is to be preferred as it does not require the improper acceptance of the anta?-kara?a as an instrument for the immediate cognition of external objects, and therefore has economy (l?ghava) over the Sa?k?epa- ??r?raka position. The saving grace for the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, according to Ni?cald?s, is that it is engaging in prau?hi-v?da, an extravagant assertion. Self-effulgence need not be restricted to the dream state alone, and some Advaita thinkers extend this to all objects perceived in the empirical state. Ni?cald?s presents the theory that perception is creation (d???i-s???i-v?da), wherein non-?tm? objects have no reality when uncognized (aj??ta-satt?), but only have reality when cognized (j??ta-satt?). As long as non- ?tm? objects are revealed by the witness consciousness (s?k??-bh?sya), their apprehension as objects of cognition produced by the senses is also superimposed. There are two types of d???i-s???i-v?da. 1) Perception (d???i), i.e., cognition itself, is creation (s???i), and there is no creation separate from cognition. 2) Creation of a non-?tm? object takes place at the time of cognition of perception; prior to cognition, there is no non-?tm? object; therefore, everything seen has reality only when cognized (j??ta-satt?) and not when uncognized. According to Ni?cald?s, these two kinds of d???i-s???i-v?da are accepted (abhimata) by all Advaita ??stras. He is less understated in his VS, where he unequivocally states that d???i-s???i-v?da is the Ved?nta siddh?nta. Accepting the fact that all non-?tm? objects are unreal, the question arises regarding the property of illusoriness (mithy?tva) which is possessed by unreal objects: is that property real or unreal? It cannot be real because that would violate non-duality. If it is unreal, it will be unable to repudiate the reality of creation (prapa?ca), and once again the Advaita position would be harmed. In response, Ni?cald?s provides the Advaita-d?pik? resolution that illusoriness possesses an anirvacan?ya empirical reality that is capable of repudiating the empirical reality of the creation, the two being of the same level of reality. If it be objected that the repudiation of the ultimate reality of creation is not possible by the empirical illusoriness of creation, Ni?cald?s responds that a property being ascertained by a means of 309 valid cognition itself is the cause for the repudiation of an opposing property. The illusoriness of creation is also ascertained by the means of valid cognition, such as ?ruti, etc., and it repudiates the reality of creation. However, if only one reality is accepted, in the manner of ?only the reality as Brahman appears in the pot, etc., and there is the absence of any further empirical or illusory difference in reality in these objects,? then the Advaita- d?pik? resolution is not possible. As a result, Ni?cald?s presents his own solution: a property ascertained by a valid means of cognition can repudiate an opposing property, but, where the other property is also ascertained by a valid means of cognition, there is no repudiation. But, although reality is apprehended in creation by the perceptual means of cognition, human perception is weaker than ?ruti statements, which state that the creation is unreal and do not originate with humans (apauru?eya). Brahman?s being with manifestation and being without manifestation (saprapa?catva and ni?prapa?catva) are both established by means of cognition. But the highest human goal, i.e., liberation, is attained only by the cognition of being without manifestation; hence, the purpose of ?ruti is to set forth the state of being without manifestation. The description of Brahman?s being with manifestation is useful in the understanding of non-dual Brahman without manifestation. However, since it is not the purpose of ?ruti to describe being with manifestation, the being with manifestation is not ultimate but is only conceived, and, having been produced by ignorance free from adventitious defects, it is empirical, and it is non-eternal since its producing cause, ignorance, can be ended knowledge (vidy?). Thus, being without manifestation negates being with manifestation, and the converse is not possible. Ni?cald?s proceeds to provide five different ways in which the reality of the visible world is negated by its illusoriness (mithy?tva), as put forth in Ved?nta texts such as the Tattva-?uddhi, the Ny?ya-sudh?, the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, and two other unnamed authors. Having thus established the illusoriness of creation, Ni?cald?s next takes up the means to dispel illusoriness. He starts off by bluntly stating that there is no use for action in bringing about the cessation of an illusory entity, and consequently it is futile to attempt to effect the cessation of sa?s?ra by means of either action or by action combined with knowledge. Such cessation can only be brought about by knowledge. Wherever the combination of knowledge and action is described in ?ruti and sm?ti texts, the purport is specifically the sequential combination (krama-samuccaya), where a practitioner first performs action only, and then 310 later, having renounced all action, engages in listening to scripture (?rava?a), etc., for the sake of knowledge. According to V?caspati, in the Bh?mat?, action is not an immediate means of knowledge but a means for the desire to know (jij??s?). V?caspati raised the defect that, ?if actions are considered the means of knowledge, due to the fault arising of the performance of action [being required] till the dawn of knowledge, there will be the loss of sanny?sa, renunciation.? The Vivara?a resolution to this is that knowledge is established by action and sanny?sa. An action is to be done only as long as the detachment (vair?gya) and strong desire to know the inner essence (pratyak tattva) have not arisen through the purification of the anta?-kara?a. But once the detachment and strong desire to know have arisen, only renunciation is to be performed in the form of the giving up of action along with the means. Thus, although actions alone are the means of knowledge, in the time subsequent to the strong desire to know, only the sections (a?ga) of renunciation (sanny?sa), the control of the inner and outer senses (?ama and dama), etc., are to be performed. All good deeds, optional (k?mya-karma) as well as obligatory (nitya-karma), are useful in attaining knowledge, by causing the removal of the p?pas that are obstacles to knowledge. Once the desire for knowledge, accompanied by strengthened dispassion (vair?gya), has arisen, renunciation, in the form of the giving up of actions along with the means, is to be undertaken. The cessation of p?pas that are obstacles to knowledge is brought about even through renunciation. Obstacles to knowledge are multifarious; the cessation of some obstacles occurs through action, and some through renunciation alone. Therefore, action and renunciation are both causes of knowledge, through effecting the cessation of the knowledge- obstructing p?pas, and are to be undertaken in sequence. Sometimes knowledge does not occur by ?rava?a, etc., performed in the times of breaks in action, but this will eventually lead to renunciation, the cause of the practice of continual ?rava?a, etc. Ni?cald?s next considers differing opinions as to whether or not k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras are eligible for renunciation as well as ?rava?a, and concludes that all humans are eligible for knowledge and devotion. Due to the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior births, even those of the lowest caste can develop a desire to know, and then through human statements (pauru?eya vacana) [as opposed to the divinely revealed Vedas, ?ruti], they can gain knowledge of Brahman and become liberated by the cessation of ignorance and its effects. Only humans are capable of self-knowledge (?tma-j??na). To effect self-realization, one 311 requires the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?). Ni?cald?s states that the conclusion (nirdh?ra) of all ??stras is that all humans are eligible for devotion to God and Brahman- realization. Having laid the groundwork regarding the nature of ignorance, illusoriness and reality, now Ni?cald?s can examine the removal of ignorance by Brahman-realization and, at long last, the purpose of v?ttis. We will look at this in the next chapter. 9 Brahman-realization Through V?tti Having laid the groundwork regarding the nature of ignorance, illusoriness and reality, Ni?cald?s is now ready to bring the VP to a finish, by examining the removal of ignorance through Brahman-realization and, at long last, the purpose of v?ttis. In essence, Brahman- realization is the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a in regard to the identity of j?va and Brahman. In connection with Brahman-realization, Ni?cald?s has to resolve the doubt that, since the anta?-kara?a is an effect of ignorance, the Brahman-realization in the form of the anta?- kara?a?s v?tti is also an effect of ignorance and cannot possibly oppose ignorance. Another possible doubt is whether, once ignorance is completely destroyed by Brahman-realization, the body of the wise person who becomes liberated while living (j?van-mukta) through Brahman-realization ceases to exist. Ni?cald?s explains that the persistence of the enlightened person?s body is due to the traces of ignorance (avidy?-le?a) that remain. Next, Ni?cald?s presents differing opinions concerning this trace ignorance. The only means (kara?a) for Brahman-realization, according to Ni?cald?s, is continued meditation (prasa?khy?na), i.e., a continuous stream of v?ttis. This is compared to the Bh?mat? view that the mind is the means for Brahman-realization whereas continued meditation assists the process. Ni?cald?s makes the case that only words (?abda), in the form of the Upani?ads, can be the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman. This then leads to a discussion of the immediacy of the knowledge of Brahman and the immediacy of any cognition and its object. The difference between the knowledge of Brahman produced by subsidiary Upani?adic statements (av?ntara-v?kyas) and that produced by the principal statements (mah?-v?kyas) is then considered. Ni?cald?s examines three views regarding the production of immediate cognition by ?abda, and considers several definitions of immediacy before presenting his own definition and demonstrating its soundness. Finally, Ni?cald?s answers the last of the three questions that are the focus of the VP, the question regarding the use and result of v?ttis. A v?tti is the cause of the j?va?s experience of sa?s?ra in relation to the three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep), and it is also the cause of the attainment of liberation. Ni?cald?s presents three views of the use of a v?tti in the waking state, and their differing conceptions of the j?va?s up?dhi. The role of a v?tti in the dreaming and deep sleep states is also discussed. Ni?cald?s suggests that the conception of these three states via v?ttis itself constitutes bondage, because the three states make up one?s 313 experience of sa?s?ra. But when the identity of j?va and Brahman is established by means of the Upani?adic statement that gives rise to the v?tti, ?I am Brahman,? liberation occurs. The last topic that Ni?cald?s examines constitutes the nature of the cessation of what was conceived (kalpita), viz., sa?s?ra. Ni?cald?s first presents at length the view of ?nandabodha?s Ny?ya-makaranda that the cessation of the conceived is different from the substratum and that it is neither 1) real (sat), nor 2) false (asat), nor 3) both real and false (sad-asat), nor 4) neither real nor false (sad-asad-vilak?a?a), but instead is of a fifth type. Ni?cald?s refutes the Ny?ya-makaranda position and establishes that the cessation of the conceived can only be in the form of Brahman. Ni?cald?s also refutes ?nandabodha?s objections against this view. Ni?cald?s explains cessation of the conceived as destruction in form of a momentary modification of being (bh?va-vik?ra). It persists for only one instant after knowledge takes place, after which, the absolute absence of the cessation of the conceived occurs, in the form of Brahman. Ni?cald?s concludes the VP with the assertion that ignorance, the visible creation in the form of existence and non-existence, and its cessation, all are anirvacan?ya, logically undefined; the negation of these elements itself is liberation. 9.1 The Removal of Ignorance by Brahman-realization (Tattva-j??na) The conclusion (siddh?nta) of Advaita texts is that the cessation of ignorance and its effects is brought about by Brahman-realization. A doubt is raised in this context: ?The v?tti of the anta?-kara?a in regard to the identity of j?va and Brahman is called Brahman- realization. Since the anta?-kara?a is an effect of ignorance, the Brahman-realization in the form of the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti is also an effect of ignorance. It is well known that the cause and effect do not mutually oppose one another; therefore, it is not possible to speak of the cessation of ignorance by means of Brahman-realization.? Ni?cald?s provides the resolution as follows. The rule that the cause and effect do not mutually oppose one another is a universal (s?m?nya) rule, and the rule that the cognition and ignorance that have the same object do mutually oppose each other is a particular (vi?e?a) rule; the universal rule is negated by the particular rule. For example, the cloth is destroyed by the contact of cloth and fire, i.e., where there is contact, there are two material causes of the contact, and the cloth is one of the material causes, but the contact of cloth and fire also is of the form of the destroyer-destroyed opposition, and so the rule that the cause and effect never oppose each 314 other is not possible. However, [it may be argued that] according to the Vai?e?ika ??stras, the cloth is not destroyed by contact with fire, but instead, the following sequence takes place: 1) the cloth comes in contact with fire; 2) action occurs in the threads that initiate the cloth; 3) the separation of the threads takes place by means of this action; 4) the non-inherent cause (asamav?y? k?ra?a) of the cloth, i.e., the contact between threads gets destroyed by their separation; and 5) the cloth is destroyed due to the destruction of the contact between threads. Thus, in the Vai?e?ika view, a substance (dravya) is destroyed only by the destruction of its non-inherent cause, and the cause of the destruction of cloth is the destruction of the contact between threads and not the contact between cloth and fire. Nevertheless, if the destruction of cloth occurs solely by the aforementioned sequence, then the destruction of the cloth should be possible only in the fifth instant after its contact with fire, but it is seen to occur in the immediate instant after contact with fire. Thus, the Vai?e?ika view is incorrect. Moreover, the components of the cloth that are reduced to ashes appear as coalesced (sa??li??a), and, similarly, a pot destroyed by a hammer appears only in pulverized form, without the destruction of the contact between the separate halves of the pot. Therefore, the destruction of the contact between the components (avayava) cannot possibly be a cause of the destruction of the whole (avayavin), and it is improper to consider the destruction of the contact between the threads of the cloth as the cause of the destruction of the cloth. But the contact between the cloth and fire can be a cause of the destruction of the cloth, and the cloth and the fire are the material cause of the cloth-fire contact. Thus, since the opposition of the cause and effect are also well known as the destroyer-destroyed, the rule that they never mutually oppose each other is not possible. In the same manner, the destruction of ignorance along with its effects is brought about by the ignorance-caused v?tti-cognition [which takes the form of Brahman-realization] (VP 8.112-3, 413-5). 9.1.1 Traces of Ignorance (Avidy?-le?a) Now a further doubt is possible. ?If ignorance is completely destroyed by Brahman- realization, then the body of the wise person who becomes liberated while living (j?van- mukta) through Brahman-realization should cease to exist because the persistence of the body, the effect, is not possible on the destruction of ignorance, the material cause.? A certain (unnamed) teacher offers this resolution. Even when an archer?s bow gets destroyed, 315 the momentum of the released arrow persists. Similarly, even on the destruction of the cause, ignorance, the persistence of the wise person?s body is possible [for as long as there remains the fruition (bhoga) of already commenced (pr?rabdha) karma].573 But according to Ni?cald?s, this resolution is not possible because the effect persists when the efficient cause is destroyed. But the persistence of the effect is not possible upon the material cause being destroyed. Here, the material cause of the speed of the arrow is the arrow, and its efficient cause is the bow; therefore, it is possible for the speed of the arrow to persist even after the bow has been destroyed. But on the destruction of the material cause, ignorance, the persistence of the effect, which is the wise person?s body, should be impossible. Therefore, some authors have written that even upon Brahman-realization, a trace (le?a) of ignorance remains (VP 8.114-6, 415). Due to differences of opinion, the nature of trace ignorance is explained in three ways: 1) just as the scent of garlic remains in a cleaned vessel, similarly the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of ignorance persist, and this persistence is called trace ignorance; or, 2) like a wooden board burned by fire, the ignorance which is negated by knowledge, but is incapable of causing its effect, is called trace ignorance; or, 3) ignorance has two portions, the power to conceal, and the power to project; through Brahman-realization, the portion of ignorance which is qualified by the concealing power is destroyed, but due to the obstacle remaining in the form of past accumulated actions [and their results] (pr?rabdha karma), the portion of ignorance qualified by the projection power is not destroyed. Therefore, even in the instant after Brahman-realization, the material cause of projections such as the body, etc., namely, the portion of ignorance qualified by concealing power remains left over, but it does not conceal one?s nature (svar?pa) (VP 8.117, 415-6). Sarvaj??tman presents the following view. ?In the instant following Brahman-realization, the body, etc., do not appear (pratibh?sa) to the one who knows (j??n?). Also, the ?ruti statements propounding the attainment of liberation while living (j?van-mukti) do not intend a literal meaning (sv?rtha). Rather, these statements are only praise for the ?rava?a method (vidhi): listening to [teachings about] ?tm? (?tma-?rava?a) is so exalted that by the glory (prat?pa) of ?rava?a, a person gets liberated even while alive. In this manner, the statements 573 Parenthetical explanation by ?tm?nand Muni (Ni?cald?s 1957, 581). 316 propounding j?van-mukti are certainly not intended to imply that the knower?s body persists or that the body appears to the knower after knowledge. In the immediate instant after Brahman-realization, liberation from the body (videha-mok?a) occurs.? In Sarvaj??tman?s view, there is no trace ignorance post-knowledge. 574 But this view contradicts the knower?s experience. 575 By means of Brahman-realization, the cessation of ignorance takes place, along with its effects. In the following instant, the Brahman-realization also ceases. But if Sarvaj??tman?s view that there is no trace ignorance left is accepted, then the cessation of Brahman-realization will not happen in this order, because, according to Sarvaj??tman?s view, as a result of Brahman-realization, no non-?tm? items remain. Then, since only non- attached (asa?ga) consciousness remains, its destruction is not possible. Brahman-realization destroying itself is also not possible, and thus the destruction of Brahman-realization will not occur. Therefore, the cessation of Brahman-realization takes place in the very instant of the cessation of ignorance in this manner. When the powder (raja) of the kataka nut576 is added (prak?epa) to water, the dirt in the water precipitates, and the kataka powder also precipitates along with the dirt; there is no need for another means for the precipitation of the kataka powder. Similarly, when [burning] charcoal is added to a grass heap, the grass heap is reduced to ashes, and the charcoal is also reduced to ashes along with the grass. In the same manner, when the cessation of ignorance along with its effects takes place, [since there is no other object left suitable for cessation], 577 the cessation of Brahman-realization also occurs. There is no other means required for the cessation of Brahman-realization (VP 8.118-20, 416-7). According to Padmap?da, the author of the Pa?cap?dik?, knowledge opposes ignorance alone, and not the effects of ignorance. Therefore, only the cessation of ignorance occurs from Brahman-realization; and then, in the instant following the cessation of ignorance, due 574 S? 4.38: ?samyag-j??na-vibh?vasu? sakalam ev?j??na-tat sambhava?, sadyo vastu-bala-pravartana-marud-vy?p?ra- sa?d?pita?; nirlepena hi dandah?ti na man?g apy asya r?p?ntara?, sa?s?rasya ?ina??i tena vidu?a? sadyo vimuktir dhruv?. The radiant fire of the true knowledge [of ?tm?], fanned by the gusting wind that is the power of Brahman (vastu), immediately and completely destroys ignorance and its products. Not even a trace of empirical existence (sa?s?ra) remains in any form. Therefore, it is certain that the liberation of one who knows [?tm?] (vidus) is immediate.? See also the next two verses (S? 4.39-40), where Sarvaj??tman suggests that j?van-mukti and trace ignorance hold in the case of aneka-j?va-v?da, the view that there are multiple j?vas, but from the standpoint of eka-j?va-v?da, the doctrine that there is only one j?va, these do not apply. 575 j??n? ke anubhava ke viruddha hai (VP 8.119, 416). This implies that Ni?cald?s himself is a j??n?, knower. 576 The clearing nut, strychnos potatorum, also known as nirmali (Oudhia 2004). 577 These words are not in the KS source, they are supplied by ?tm?nand Muni: niv?tta karane yogya ko? vastu ?e?a na rahne se (Ni?cald?s 1957, 583). 317 to the absence of the material cause, its effect ceases by itself. But pr?rabdha karma is the obstruction to the cessation of the effects such as the body, etc. Therefore, as long as trace ignorance remains, it is also possible for the one who is liberated while living (j?van-mukta) to see the body, etc. But when the pr?rabdha karma obstruction becomes absent, the body etc., and the Brahman-realization both cease. According to this view, the cessation of ignorance, along with the absence of pr?rabdha karma, is the cause of the cessation of Brahman-realization (VP 8.121, 417). 9.1.2 Means (Kara?a) and Accessories (Sahak?r? s?dhana) for Brahman-realization There are two means for Brahman-realization by which the cessation of ignorance takes place. According to all Advaita texts, 1) for the best aspirant (uttama adhik?r?), ?rava?a (listening to scriptures), etc.,578 alone are the means (s?dhana); and 2) for the middling aspirant (madhyama adhik?r?), the contemplation of the self as attribute-less (nirgu?a) Brahman (aha?-graha up?san?)579 is a means of Brahman-realization. 580 But, according to several authors, in both alternatives, continued meditation (prasa?khy?na) is the means (pram??a) as an instrument (kara?a) for Brahman-realization. A continuous, ceaseless (nirantara) stream of v?ttis is called prasa?khy?na. 581 Just as the middling aspirant is required to perform contemplation (up?san?) as ceaseless v?ttis in the form of attribute-less Brahman, and that alone is considered prasa?khy?na for that aspirant, similarly, for the best aspirant too, after contemplation (manana), prasa?khy?na in the form of nididhy?sana, ?profound and continuous meditation on ?ruti,? 582 is the means for immediate cognition of 578 For a refresher on ??rava?a, etc.,? see the discussion on p. 62. 579 aha?-graha up?san? is described in BS 3.3, and also in CU 3.14.1-4 (????ilya Vidy?), BU 3.7.2-23 (Antary?m? Vidy?, the dialog between Y?j?avalkya and Udd?laka ?ru?i). 580 Ni?cald?s describes the means for the best and middling aspirants at great length in VS 4.63-120 and VS 5.121-183 respectively. There, he also describes the means for kani??ha adhik?r?, the lowest aspirant ?who has many doubts, even though his intellect is sharp, j?k?? ?a?k? bahut upajai t?k? yadyapi buddhi t?vra hovai hai? (VS 6.304, 184). Rather pointedly, the names of these three aspirants, from highest to lowest, are Tattvad???i, ?seer of truth,? Ad???i ?non-seer,? Tarkad???i ?seer of doubts.? 581 Henceforth, the term prasa?khy?na will be left untranslated to enable us to distinguish it from nididhy?sana. See n. 582 and also Raja (1990) and Sundaresan (1998) for the historical context for the interpretation of prasa?khy?na as contrasted to parisa?khy?na. In the VP, Ni?cald?s appears to be using prasa?khy?na to mean parisa?khy?na, the form of meditation taught by ?a?kara in his Upade?a-s?hasr?, for seekers intent on destroying accumulated merit and demerits and preventing any further accumulation, mumuk??n?m up?tta-pu?y?pu?ya-k?apa?a-par???m ap?rv?nupacay?rthin?? parisa?khy?nam idam ucyate (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 1:216). 582 nididhy?sana is also often translated as ?continuous meditation.? To distinguish it from prasa?khy?na, it can be considered as ?profound and continuous meditation on the content of canonical Ved?nta texts, which one has listened to (?rava?a) and reflected on (manana), culminating in the knowledge of Brahman.? In his VS, Ni?cald?s does not mention prasa?khy?na at all, and defines nididhy?sana as ?the continued state of the v?tti in the form of Brahman, without any 318 Brahman. Although prasa?khy?na is not present in the six-fold means of cognition (pram??a), and so it cannot possibly be considered as a means [of cognition], nevertheless, is well known in all ?ruti and sm?ti texts that contemplation (up?san?) of Brahman with attributes (sagu?a Brahman) is the means for immediate cognition of sagu?a Brahman, and contemplation of Brahman without attributes (nirgu?a Brahman), the means for the immediate cognition of nirgu?a Brahman. Similarly, the prasa?khy?na of a distant lover is well known in worldly life583 as the cause for the immediate perception of the lover; hence, prasa?khy?na in the form of nididhy?sana is also possible as a means of immediate cognition of Brahman. As stated above, prasa?khy?na is not a means of cognition; therefore, knowledge of Brahman caused by prasa?khy?na cannot be said to be caused by a means of cognition, and thus, the [prasa?khy?na-caused] knowledge of Brahman cannot possibly be a valid cognition (pram?). Nevertheless, just as an erroneous cognition leads to the correct result (sa?v?d? bhrama),584 on account of the negation of objects not taking place without knowledge of Brahman, it is possible for the [prasa?khy?na-caused] knowledge of Brahman to be a valid cognition. Moreover, verbal testimony (?abda-pram??a) is the root cause of prasa?khy?na in the form of nididhy?sana [because ?rava?a and manana of ?ruti and sm?ti is also implied by nididhy?sana], and because of this too it is possible for knowledge of Brahman to be a valid cognition (VP 8.122-3, 417-8). It is the view of V?caspati [Mi?ra], author of the Bh?mat?, that prasa?khy?na assists the mind, and the mind is a means of Brahman-realization, whereas prasa?khy?na being a means for Brahman-realization is not commonly known (aprasiddha). Meditation (dhy?na) on Brahman with and without attributes also assists the mind, but meditation is not the means of their immediate cognition; the mind alone is. Similarly [for V?caspati], meditation on a distant lover is not the means of the immediate cognition of the lover, but, together with contemplation of the lover, the mind is the means of the immediate perception of the lover. In this manner, the mind alone is the instrument of knowledge of Brahman. However, the principal opinion of Advaita texts is that immediately after the knowledge caused by the intervention from the v?ttis of non-?tm? forms, an?tm?k?ra-v?tti k? vyavadh?na rahita brahm?k?ra-v?tti k? sthiti? (VS 1.18, 10-11). Also see the other definitions, n. 161, p. 65. 583 lit. loka me?. 584 For a discussion on, and examples of sa?v?d? bhrama, an erroneous cognition leading to the correct result, see PD 9.1- 13. 319 mah?-v?kyas, there is no need for prasa?khy?na, but that the immediate perception of non- dual Brahman occurs via the mah?-v?kyas themselves. The mind is an accessory in all cognitions; therefore, along with one-pointedness caused by nididhy?sana, the mind is also an accessory in the knowledge of Brahman. Nevertheless, the words in the form of the Ved?nta statements alone are the means for the knowledge of Brahman, and not the mind. This is because the anta?-kara?a, being the material cause of cognition in the form of a v?tti, is the locus (??raya) of this cognition, and therefore the mind can be the agent of cognition, but it cannot be a means. Even if somehow the mind as a means were accepted in a different cognition, even then it is absolutely contrary to consider the mind as a means for the knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman being the object of a mental cognition has been denied by ?ruti such as ?yan manas? na manute, that which cannot be contemplated by the mind (KeU 1.6),? and instead, Brahman has been said to be taught by the Upani?ads (aupani?adatva) alone. Therefore, verbal testimony (?abda) in the form of the Upani?ads alone can be the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman. Although in the kaivalya-??kh?, 585 where the mind has been denied as an instrument of the knowledge of Brahman, likewise, speech (v?k) has also been denied as the instrument. Therefore, [it would seem that] even ?abda as the instrument for the knowledge of Brahman is opposed to ?ruti. Nevertheless, if the intent of ?ruti were that ??abda is not an instrument of knowledge of Brahman,? then to state [elsewhere] 586 that Brahman to be taught by the Upani?ads (aupani?adatva, vedyatva) would be improper. Therefore, the intent of ?ruti is that knowledge pertaining to Brahman takes place by the implied significatory relation (lak?a??-v?tti) of ?abda alone, and not by the 585 Once again, I struggle to identify what Ni?cald?s refers to as the kaivalya-??kh?. Earlier, in one instance it was not so obvious (n. 554), and in another, it was clearly a reference to the BU (n. 565), which falls in the ?ukla YajV recension. Here, Ni?cald?s seems to be referring to TU 2.4.1, 2.9.1, ?yato v?co nivartante apr?pya manas? saha; ?nanda? brahma?o vidv?n na bibheti kad?cana. The one who knows the joy of Brahman, from which words, together with the mind, turn back without having attained it [the joy of Brahman], never fears [anything].? The TU is also part of the YajV, but from a different branch, the K???a YajV. There are traditionally said to be 101 ??kh?s, schools, of the YajV, but these were divided between the ?ukla (15) and K???a (86) branches, and so even if the kaivalya-??kh? is from among these schools, it is unlikely that would include both the BU and TU from opposing branches (Gonda 1975, 324). The detailed enumeration of 109 schools (82 ?ukla and 27 K???a) in the Yajur-v?k?a (Vira 1981) does not include the kaivalya-??kh?. [The numeric distribution of the ??kh?s between the K???a and ?ukla branches in Vira is the opposite of Gonda who cites Vira and others, possibly incorrectly]. Incidentally, ?a?kara is supposed to belong to the taittir?ya ??kh? of the K???a YajV (Pande 1994, 78), and Sure?vara to the k??va ??kh? (Hino 1982, 4). 586 For example, MuU:1.1.4-5: tasmai sa hov?ca dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma yad brahmavido vadanti par? caiv?par? ca. tatra ? par? yay? tad ak?aram adhigamyate. [A?giras] said to [?aunaka], ?There are indeed two types of knowledge that are to be learned, so say the knowers of Brahman. [These are] the higher and the lower. Of these, ? the higher knowledge is that by which the imperishable [Brahman] is attained.? MuU 2.2.3: dhanur g?h?tvaupani?ada? mah?stra? ? lak?ya? tad ev?k?ara? somya viddhi. Grasping the weapon of the Upani?ad as a bow, ?the target is the imperishable [Brahman] alone. Pierce it! 320 direct significatory relation (?akti-v?tti). 587 Thus, although the instrumentality of ?abda for knowledge of Brahman is denied by the direct significatory relation, nevertheless, by the implied significatory relation, ?abda is the instrument for knowledge of Brahman, and thus it is possible to say that Brahman is taught by the Upani?ads (aupani?adatva). For those who consider the immediate perception of Brahman to be mental, even in their view the mediate (parok?a) knowledge of Brahman is accepted [to occur] by means of ?abda alone; therefore, since the instrumentality of ?abda in attaining knowledge of Brahman is essential in both views, ?abda alone should be considered the instrument of the direct perception of Brahman, and not the mind (VP 8.124-5, 418-9).588 9.1.3 The Immediacy (Aparok?at?) of Knowledge and Its Object Although ?abda only has the capacity for producing mediate knowledge, and ?abda cannot produce immediate knowledge, yet, after performing ?rava?a as described in the ??stras, immediate knowledge pertaining to Brahman can arise via ?abda, qualified by the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of mediate knowledge and accompanied by one-pointed consciousness. For example, according to the theory of identity between the reflection and its source (bimba-pratibimba-abheda-v?da), the eyes have immediate perception of the sun, etc., when assisted by a vessel of water or a mirror, etc. In this case, the eyes by themselves do not have the capacity for the immediate perception of the sun, etc., and the eyes do not possess this capacity even with the proximity of a turbulent and dirty up?dhi. The eyes only possess the capacity for the immediate perception of the sun, etc., when assisted by a steady and clear up?dhi. Similarly, the immediate knowledge of Brahman is only possible through ?abda when assisted by a mirror in the form of a pure, steady mind which is qualified by the impressions of the knowledge of Brahman. As another example, the cause of heaven is not produced by making an oblation (homa) to the gods by casting butter into a conventional (laukika) fire, but the production of unseen potency (ap?rva) that yields heaven is certain when one makes such an oblation into a fire accompanied by Vedic purifying ceremonies (sa?sk?ra). Although ?ruti has described the oblation as a means for [attaining] heaven, an oblation that is destroyed in the following instant cannot possibly be a means for heaven 587 As discussed in VP 3.3, and in section 5.4.3, on p. 128. 588 Ni?cald?s?s arguments in this section parallel those of the SLS, chapter 3 (D?k?ita, T?rtha, and ??str? 1890, 96-7), but are not exactly the same. 321 [attained] at a different time; therefore, the [existence of] unseen potency is established by the postulation means of cognition (arth?patti pram??a) in the form of the inapplicability of the oblation as a [direct] means for heaven. Similarly, ?ruti speaks of the cessation, through the knowledge of Brahman, of all suffering that is in the form of superimposition. The cessation of immediate superimpositions such as agency (kart?tva), etc., cannot possibly occur through mediate knowledge of Brahman; it can only be brought about by immediate knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, due to the non-occurrence of the cessation of immediate superimposition, [and] the other means of cognition not pertaining to Brahman, the immediate knowledge of Brahman is proven [through postulation] to occur only through ?abda. Just as the unseen potency generated by oblations is established through postulation on the basis of what is heard (?rut?rth?patti), the immediate knowledge of Brahman caused by ?abda is also similarly established through ?rut?rth?patti. 589 In another text, 590 ?abda as the producer of immediate knowledge has been illustrated by an example: Although the mind alone is not capable of the immediate perception of external objects, the immediate perception of a deceased [lit. na??a, destroyed] beloved (vanit?) certainly takes place through the mind accompanied by imagination (bh?van?). Similarly, although ?abda alone is not capable of effecting immediate knowledge, nevertheless, the immediate knowledge of Brahman takes place through ?abda qualified by the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of mediate knowledge and accompanied by a mind conditioned as stated earlier [by prasa?khy?na] (VP 8.126, 419-20). Another author writes that the cognition and object both have immediacy, because, where the pot is cognized by the eyes, the immediate (pratyak?a) cognition of the pot occurs, and the pot is also immediate; hence, both functions (vyavah?ra) are known as such by experience. But in such a case, the immediacy of the cognition is not dependent upon the means of cognition, because, if cognition via the senses were immediate, and cognition via inference, etc., were mediate, then the immediacy or mediacy would be dependent upon the means of cognition. But authors have only refuted the immediacy of sense-produced cognitions. Therefore, cognition pertaining solely to immediate objects (artha) is called 589 Postulation on the basis of what is heard (?rut?rth?patti) as a means of cognition was explained in detail earlier, in VP 5 and in section 5.4.5, p. 133ff. 590 Ni?cald?s does not mention which text this is, though a parallel is found in SLS 3 (D?k?ita, T?rtha, and ??str? 1890, 98). 322 immediate, and, the cognition of an immediate object is immediate itself; there is no insistence (abhinive?a) on whether it occur via the senses or by other means of cognition. Thus, although the cognition of pleasure, etc., the cognition of ??vara, and dream-cognitions are not sense-generated, they are still immediate. Therefore, the immediacy of cognition is not sense-generated, but rather the cognition pertaining to an immediate object (aparok?a- artha-gocara) is called an immediate cognition (VP 8.127, 420). A doubt may arise. Although the object of an immediate cognition is considered immediate, if cognition pertaining to an immediate object is also called immediate, the fallacy of reciprocal dependence arises because in the description of the immediacy of the cognition, the cognition of the immediacy of the object is a cause, and, in the description of the immediacy of the object, the cognition of the immediacy of the cognition is the cause. The reciprocal-dependence fallacy can certainly arise if the immediacy of the object is considered to be the state of being an object (vi?ayat?) of the immediate cognition, but, in actuality, the immediacy of the object is the [object?s] identity with the cognizer- consciousness alone. Therefore, since the cognition of the immediacy of the cognition is not used in the description of the immediacy of the object, in spite of the requirement of the cognition of the object?s immediacy in the description of the immediacy of the cognition, the mutual-dependence fallacy is not incurred (VP 8.128-9, 420-1). [Ni?cald?s attributes this view to Advaita-vidy?c?rya at VP 8.139, 427; p. 327]. The pleasure, etc., properties (dharma) of the anta?-kara?a are superimposed on the witness-consciousness. That which is superimposed does not have its own reality (satt?) apart from the reality of the substratum. Therefore, pleasure, etc., have immediacy, due to this [pleasure, etc.,] always being identical to the cognizer-consciousness (pram?t?-cetana); then, the cognition pertaining to pleasure, etc., is also immediate. But since the external pot, etc., are superimposed on external consciousness, the cognizer-consciousness is not always identical with these objects. When the identity of the cognizer-consciousness with the external consciousness occurs by means of a v?tti, then the cognizer-consciousness alone is the substratum of the pot, etc. Therefore, only when there is a sense-generated v?tti pertaining to the pot, etc., the property of immediacy arises in the pot, etc.; thus, the cognition of the pot, etc., qualified by immediacy, is also considered to be immediate. When there is a v?tti of inference, etc., pertaining to the pot, etc., at that time, as the cognizer-consciousness is not 323 identical to the pot, etc., the immediacy property is not present in these objects; thus, an inferential or other cognition of them is not considered to be immediate. However, Brahman- consciousness (brahma-cetana) is always immediate, because the cognizer-consciousness is always identical to Brahman-consciousness. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman produced by verbal testimony (?abda pram??a) in the form of the mah?-v?kyas is considered to be immediate as well. Thus, the immediacy or mediacy of cognitions is not dependent on the means of cognition but solely on the immediacy or mediacy of the object. The identity or difference of the cognizer-consciousness with the object-consciousness is the producer of immediacy or mediacy in the object. Therefore, it is possible to state that the knowledge of Brahman generated by ?abda is also immediate (VP 8.130, 422). 9.1.4 Understanding the Immediacy of the Knowledge of Brahman Now a doubt may arise that the knowledge of Brahman generated by the subsidiary Upani?adic statements (av?ntara-v?kya) should also be immediate, in accordance with the above-stated view. Brahman, being the nature of the cognizer-consciousness in the above manner, has been considered to be ever-immediate, and the cognition pertaining to an immediate item is considered to be immediate. Thus, the mediate knowledge of the ever- immediate Brahman is not possible. But all authors have accepted only the mediate knowledge of Brahman through the subsidiary Upani?adic statements, similar to the mediate cognition of the tenth person that occurs by the statement, ?the tenth person exists.? Even in the Pa?cada?? 591 and other texts, only the mediate cognition of the tenth person is spoken of, although the tenth person is identical to the cognizer-consciousness. Therefore, due to immediacy being natural to entities such as Brahman and the tenth person, all their cognitions should always be immediate only. To avoid this defect, it should be considered that dharma and adharma 592 are superimposed on the cognizer-consciousness in the same manner as pleasure, etc., and therefore, like pleasure, etc., dharma and adharma also should be immediate due to their being identical to cognizer-consciousness. Nevertheless, only an object suitable for immediate perception (pratyak?a) is the producer of the immediacy in the object which is identical to the cognizer-consciousness. Dharma and adharma are not 591 For the tenth person story, see n. 387, p.140. 592 dharma here has a different sense than the earlier ?property;? it indicates religious merit, and adharma, the converse, religious demerit. 324 suitable for immediate perception; therefore, despite their being identical to the cognizer- consciousness, they lack immediacy. For an object to have immediacy, along with the requirement that the object be suitable for immediate perception, there is also the requirement that the means of cognition be suitable. The Upani?adic subsidiary statements and the statement, ?the tenth person exists,? do not have the capability of producing immediate cognition, but the mah?-v?kyas and the statement, ?you are the tenth person? do have the capability of producing immediate cognition. 593 The capability of an object is known through the activity (vyavah?ra) of perception, etc.; that is to say, the object in which the activity of perception takes place, while being identical with the cognizer, is a suitable object, and the object in which, despite being identical with the cognizer, the activity of perception does not take place, is considered an unsuitable object. Thus, just as pleasure, pain, etc., are suitable objects, and the impressions (sa?sk?ra) such as dharma and adharma are unsuitable objects, which are known by experience, similarly, like the object, the suitability of the means of cognition should also be known according to experience, that is to say, the external senses have the capability of generating immediate perception, inference has the capability of generating mediate cognition, and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) and verbal testimony (?abda) have the capability of generating both immediate and mediate cognition (VP 8.131-2, 422-3). But there is the distinction that, for an object which is not in relation (asambandh?) to the cognizer, only mediate cognition can take place through ?abda. For an object that has an identity relation with the cognizer, even if it also possesses suitability, only the mediate cognition of that object occurs via ?abda if there are no words revealing the identity with the cognizer. A listener gets only the mediate cognition of the tenth person, or of Brahman, who is not different from the hearer, in the sentences, ?the tenth person is/exists,? ?Brahman is,? since there are no words revealing the identity with the cognizer. But in Sarvaj??tman?s view, for an object that is suitable and identical to the cognizer, its immediate cognition alone occurs through the statement that also has the words revealing the identity with the cognizer. In this view, only ?abda is the cause for the immediate knowledge of Brahman. This immediate knowledge of Brahman occurs solely by means of ?abda that is qualified by the 593 ?tm?nand Muni adds here, ?Therefore, according to capability, the mediate knowledge of Brahman takes place by subsidiary statements, and immediate knowledge of Brahman occurs via the mah?-v?kyas. isliye yogyat?nus?r av?ntara- v?kyua se to brahma k? parok?a-j??na aur mah?-v?kya.se aparok?a-j??na hot? hai? (Ni?cald?s 1957, 592). 325 impressions (sa?sk?ra) of the mediate knowledge of Brahman and is accompanied by a one- pointed consciousness, as has already been stated earlier 594 (VP 8.133, 424). Thus, immediacy is possible for knowledge of Brahman by accepting immediacy in cognition pertaining to an immediate object (artha) ? this third view in between was stated. [The first view is that ?the immediate knowledge of Brahman is possible only through ?abda via postulation? (VP 8.126, 419-20; section 9.1.3, p. 320). The second view adds the qualification ?when accompanied by the sa?sk?ras of the knowledge of Brahman? (VP 8.127, 420; section 9.1.3, p. 321). The third view, presently under discussion, is ?the cognition pertaining to an immediate object (aparok?a-artha-gocara) is called an immediate cognition? (VP 8.128-9, section 9.1.3, p. 322)]. This [third] view results in the defective argument (d??a?a), ?since the subsidiary Upani?adic statements pertain to the ever- immediate Brahman, the knowledge of Brahman produced by these statements should also be immediate.? Advaita-vidy?c?rya 595 explained the immediacy connected with the object and cognition in a different manner, and, in this stated defective view, he has raised yet another defect, as follows. ?If, considering an object (artha) identical to the cognizer as immediate (aparok?a-svar?pa), the cognition pertaining to the immediate object is said to possess immediacy, then there will be non-pervasion (avy?pti) of the definition of this immediate cognition in the cognition as the self-revealing inherent pleasure (svaprak??a ?tmasukha). If the cognition whose object (vi?aya) is the immediate object (artha) should be called immediate, then there is a mutual difference-dependent (bheda-s?pek?a) subject-object relation between the object and the cognition, and in that place alone will the attribute of immediacy apply to the cognition. But, since the self-revealing pleasure is identical to the cognition, and the subject-object relation is not possible in this case, the stated definition is not possible. In the Pr?bh?kara [M?m??s?] view, cognition is said to be self-revealing, and cognition is considered to take the cognizer, its object, and its own nature as its objects, and so all cognitions are considered to pertain to the triad (tripu??) [of cognition, cognizer, cognized]. Despite there being identity between the subject and object, the subject-object nature has been accepted in this view. Consequently, for the Pr?bh?karas, the subject-object 594 In VP 8.126-7, 419-20, and at the beginning of section 9.1.3 on p. 360 above. 595 Advaita-vidy?c?rya is someone whose views are known only through references in Appayya D?k?ita?s SLS. The only academic study of his views is by Revathi (1990, 5-7, 159-237). 326 nature is not improper in pleasure, which is a self-revealing cognition wherein the meaning of self-revealing (sva-prak??a) is one?s own nature (sva-), and that of which [there is] the subject (prak??a, as vi?ayin). Thus, by this meaning, even in identity, the subject-object nature is possible. However, the difference between the revealing and the revealed is known by experience, and thus Prabh?kara?s subject-object nature in the absence of difference is improper. Also, the meaning of self-revealing (svaprak??a) as stated above is not proper. Instead, according to Advaita texts, the meaning should be that by virtue of one?s own reality (sva-), there is the absence of doubt, etc., (prak??a=sa??ay?di-r?hitya), i.e., that which is free from doubt, etc., by virtue its own reality, is self-revealing (svaprak??a). In this manner, since the subject-object nature is not possible in one?s own pleasure (svar?pa sukha), which is identical to self-revealing cognition, the Pr?bh?kara definition of immediacy is not possible? (VP 8.134-6, 424-5). In response [to the further defects pointed out by Advaita-vidy?c?rya ], Ni?cald?s offers a definition for an immediate object that is free from the above defect. ?The definition of an immediate object is the identity of the object with consciousness favorable (anuk?la) to its (sva-) function (vyavah?ra).? The anta?-kara?a and its properties, pleasure, etc., are superimposed on consciousness, and therefore, there is identity of the anta?-kara?a along with the properties such as pleasure, etc. Since these are revealed by the witness- consciousness, the witness-consciousness is favorable to their function. The identity of the anta?-kara?a along with pleasure, etc., with the witness-consciousness (sva-), which is favorable to the function of the anta?-kara?a along with pleasure, etc., is possible according to the definition. And merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) also have an identity with the witness-consciousness, but due to the absence of their suitability, the witness-consciousness is not favorable to their function. And since there is no identity between the merit, etc., and the consciousness favorable to their function, they do not have immediacy. Similarly, at the time of the v?tti pertaining to a pot, etc., 596 the consciousness delimited by the v?tti is identical with the substratum-consciousness of the pot; therefore, at that time, the pot- consciousness is favorable to the function of the pot, and the pot, which is identical to the consciousness, is considered immediate. At the time when the v?tti pertaining to the pot is 596 In what follows, the ?etc. (?di)? is dropped to avoid awkward expressions; ?pot? stands for any external object, ?pot, etc.? 327 absent, the pot remains identical to its substratum-consciousness, but the substratum- consciousness is not favorable to its function because only on becoming identical with the v?tti-delimited consciousness does the pot?s substratum-consciousness become favorable to its function. That is the reason why the pot is not immediate when the v?tti pertaining to the pot is absent. Similarly, only the witness-consciousness delimited by the v?tti pertaining to Brahman is favorable to the function of Brahman, and immediacy is possible for Brahman, which is identical to it [the witness-consciousness delimited Brahman-v?tti]. Just as the identity of the object with consciousness that is favorable to the function of the object facilitates the immediacy (pratyak?atva) in the object, similarly the identity of consciousness that is favorable to the function as a pot (gha??dika-vyavah?t?nuk?la caitanya) with the pot object facilitates the immediacy in the cognition (VP 8.137, 425-6). However, this definition of immediacy is inapplicable (avy?pti) to immediate perceptual cognition in the form of a v?tti. Although the pot, etc., are superimposed on consciousness, and, at the time of the v?tti in the form of the pot, since there is a unity (ekat?) between the pot-consciousness and the v?tti-consciousness, the pot, which is identical to its substratum, the pot-consciousness, also has identity with the v?tti-consciousness. Nevertheless, even at that time, it is not possible for the v?tti to be identical to the pot. Just as the snake, stick and garland, which are imagined in the rope, even while being identical to the rope, do not have identity but still have mutual differences among themselves, similarly, even while all the dualities conceived of in Brahman are identical to Brahman, they are not mutually identical. Although it is possible for the v?tti and the pot to each have identity with the v?tti- consciousness, nevertheless the mutual identity of the v?tti and the pot object is not possible (VP 8.138, 426). This shortcoming can be removed in the manner of Advaita-vidy?c?rya, according to whom, the property (dharma) of immediacy pertains to consciousness and not to the v?tti. The property of immediacy does not pertain to the v?tti in the same manner that the [properties of] being inferred, desired, etc. (anumititva, icch?tva) are properties of the anta?- kara?a v?tti. Instead, immediacy pertains only to the consciousness delimited by the v?tti in the form of the object; the v?tti is only the up?dhi of the immediacy of consciousness. Therefore, by superimposing immediacy on the v?tti, it functions [lit. vyavah?ra karai hai] as 328 ?the v?tti-cognition is immediate.? If the property of immediacy were desired in v?tti- cognition, and the definition of immediacy did not cover [lit. nah?? j?vai] v?tti-cognition, then non-pervasion (avy?pti) would occur; but v?tti-cognition is not even the indirect meaning (lak?ya). Therefore, the non-pervasion is not an issue, and instead, the indirect meaning of immediacy is the consciousness delimited by the v?tti. In the cognition of pleasure, etc., immediacy is only possible if immediacy is accepted as the property of consciousness. If immediacy were to be considered a property of the v?tti, then the view wherein the v?tti pertaining to pleasure, etc., is not accepted, there, due to the absence of the v?tti in the cognition of pleasure, etc., in the form of the witness, the experience [lit: vyavah?ra, function] of immediacy should not occur. Thus, immediacy is a property of consciousness, and not of the v?tti (VP 8.139, 427). Regarding this view, a doubt may arise: If immediacy is the property of consciousness alone, then everyone should experience [lit: vyavah?ra] that ?Brahman is immediate? because the identity of j?va with Brahman is ever-present, even in the state of sa?s?ra. The knowledge of Brahman caused by subsidiary Upani?adic statements should also be immediate, since the Brahman form of the witness-consciousness delimited by the v?tti produced by the subsidiary statements is always identical to the object. According to Ni?cald?s, this doubt is not possible. The definition of an immediate object is the identity of the unconcealed object with the consciousness suitable to its function. The definition of immediate cognition is the identity of consciousness suitable to its function with the unconcealed object. Here, even with the concealed Brahman that has identity with consciousness suitable to its function in the state of sa?s?ra, due to Brahman being concealed, there is no identity of the object as the unconcealed Brahman with consciousness suitable to its function, and so the immediacy of Brahman does not occur. Similarly, since the knowledge caused by the subsidiary Upani?adic statements is identical with the object in the form of concealed Brahman, immediacy does not apply to the knowledge (VP 8.140-1, 427-8). Ni?cald?s raises yet another doubt concerning the above position. If, as described above, immediacy is accepted as caused by the mutual identity between consciousness and the unconcealed object, then the fallacy of reciprocal dependence will arise. If only cognition that pertains to the same sphere (sam?na-gocara-j??na-m?tra) is accepted as having the 329 ability to end concealment, then even mediate cognition should cause the cessation of ignorance. Ved?nta (siddh?nta) accepts mediate cognition as bringing about the disappearance (tirodh?na) or the destruction of the power of ignorance that causes non- existence (asattv?p?daka), but the destruction of the particular power of ignorance that causes the non-manifestation (abh?n?p?daka) occurs only by means of immediate cognition. Thus, 1) the cessation of ignorance is dependent upon the proof of the immediacy of cognition; and, since the definition of the immediacy of cognition has been stated as ?the identity of an unconcealed object with consciousness suitable to its function,? 2) the proof of the immediacy of cognition is said to be dependent upon the cessation of ignorance (VP 8.142, 428). This doubt is resolved as follows. Although, as stated earlier, the cessation of ignorance is required for the immediacy of cognition, the immediacy of cognition is not required for the cessation of ignorance. In order to remove the defect, ?if cognition alone is accepted to cause the cessation of ignorance, then the cessation of ignorance should also occur by mediate cognition [discussed in VP 8.131, at the beginning of this section, 9.1.4, on p. 323],? immediate cognition was said to bring about the cessation of ignorance, and there, too, the reciprocal-dependence fallacy was incurred. Therefore, the cessation of ignorance is said to occur neither through cognition, nor through immediate cognition alone. Rather, it is accepted that the cessation of ignorance occurs by the very cognition that establishes the identity-relation (t?d?tmya sambandha) between the cognition and the object, through the power (mahim?) of the means of cognition. Hence, through the power of the means of cognition, sometimes the cognition of the pot, etc., produced by external senses is one of identity-relation with the pot and such objects, and sometimes the knowledge of Brahman, which is produced by ?abda in the form of the mah?-v?kyas, is one of identity-relation with the object in the form of Brahman, and the cessation of ignorance is brought about by both these cognitions. Since Brahman is the material cause of all, all cognitions have an identity- relation with Brahman; therefore, the cessation of the ignorance of Brahman should also be brought about both by the inferential knowledge of Brahman and by the mediate knowledge of Brahman caused by the subsidiary Upani?adic statements. However, the identity-relation that such inferential and mediate cognitions have with their object [namely, Brahman] occurs through the power of the object and not through the power of the means of cognition. In the 330 case of the cognition that occurs through the mah?-v?kyas pertaining to the identity (abheda) of the j?va and Brahman, that cognition?s identity-relation with its object [namely, Brahman] occurs through the power of the means of cognition. Since Brahman is pervasive and is the material cause of all, the identity-relations that other cognitions have with Brahman occurs through the power of the object. In this manner, the statement, ?the cessation of ignorance occurs through the cognition related to the object, produced by a distinctive (vilak?a?a) means of cognition,? on the one hand, does not have the fault (?patti) of the cessation of ignorance by mere cognition, and, on the other hand, due to the absence of the requirement of the immediacy of cognition, the reciprocal-dependence fault also does not arise. Thus, the definition of an immediate object is ?the identity of the object with the unconcealed consciousness favorable to its function,? and the definition of immediate cognition is ?the identity of the unconcealed consciousness with the object.? Therefore, immediacy is also possible in knowledge of Brahman produced by ?abda (VP 8.141, 428-9). Thus, three views597 have been stated regarding the production of immediate cognition by ?abda, and, among these, only the first is proper: ?The mediacy or immediacy of a cognition is dependent on the means of cognition, and ?abda qualified by assisting means also possesses the capability of producing immediate cognition.? The second view has the purport, ?The properties of cognition, such as immediacy, etc., are dependent on the object, and not on the means of cognition,? and the third view is that of Advaita-vidy?c?rya [p. 327]. If, according to both these [second and third] views, immediacy, etc., are considered to be dependent on only the object, then the immediate knowledge of Brahman should also occur through subsidiary statements. Therefore, the necessary dependency of the immediacy of cognition on the means of cognition needs to be stated, as per the first view [first stated in VP 8.126, 419-20; p. 320] (VP 8.144, 429). 9.2 The Purpose of a V?tti Ni?cald?s is now ready to address the final question concerning v?ttis. He reminds us that three questions were presented at the start of VP. 1) What is the nature of a v?tti? 2) What (lit. who, kaun) is the cause of a v?tti? 3) What is the use and result of a v?tti? A v?tti was generally defined as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance, in the form of 597 See p. 365 for a concise reiteration of the three views. 331 illumination,? and then its particular nature was described via its differences, based on truth (yath?rthatva), falsity (ayath?rthatva), etc. Through the description of the means of cognition, the nature of the cause of a v?tti was also stated. The succinct answer to the third question is as follows: the relation of the j?va with all three states, [waking, dreaming, and deep sleep], occurs by means of a v?tti, and the attainment of liberation [lit. puru??rtha] is also by means of a v?tti. In other words, a v?tti is the cause of the attainment of sa?s?ra, and also the cause of the attainment of liberation, since the j?va experiences sa?s?ra in relation to the three states (VP 8.145-6, 429-30). Of the three states, the waking state is provisionally defined as ?a particular state of the cognition caused by the senses.? Here, the word ?state (avasth?)? signifies time. Although the time of the cognition of pleasure, etc., and the time of indifference (ud?s?na-k?la) are also called the waking state, the cognition of pleasure, etc., is not caused by the senses. Similarly, at the time of cognition of pleasure, etc., the cognition of other objects is also not sense- caused. Nonetheless, ?the time that is the basis (?dh?ra) for sense-caused cognition and for the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of sense-caused cognition, different from the dream and deep sleep states,? should be called the waking state. Although there is no sense-caused cognition at the time of the cognition of or the indifference to pleasure, etc., their impressions persist, and therefore the definition contains [the qualifier] ?different from the dream and deep sleep states.? Thus, the waking-state function is dependent on sense-caused cognition, and that sense-caused cognition is in the form of a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a (VP 8.147, 430). Ni?cald?s presents three views on the purpose of a v?tti: 1) An [unnamed] author writes that the use of a v?tti is to overcome concealment (?vara?a- abhibh?va). There are diverse opinions in connection with the overcoming of concealment. Among them, some say that, just as the light of a firefly destroys deep darkness in one place, similarly, the destruction of ignorance in one place is the meaning of the term ?overcoming of concealment.? This is the traditional (s?mprad?yika) view. In the view of those who hold that ?collective ignorance is the up?dhi of j?va- consciousness,? consciousness is always in relation to objects such as a pot, etc.; therefore, the object?s relation with consciousness cannot possibly overcome concealment since the Brahman-consciousness assists concealment and does not prevent it. If ??vara?s consciousness is said to overcome concealment, then the j?va?s function (vyavah?ra) of 332 overcoming of concealment in the form, ?this is understood (avagatam) by me,? should not occur, but instead it should be ?[it] is understood by ??vara.? There is an empirical difference between j?va and ??vara; therefore, an item known by ??vara is not known by the j?va. Thus, if the overcoming of concealment is said to occur by the relation of j?va- consciousness, then in this view, the j?va-consciousness is always in relation with the pot, etc. The up?dhi of the j?va-consciousness is primordial ignorance (m?l?j??na), and the consciousness qualified by the reflection superimposed on it [primordial ignorance] is called the j?va. Primordial ignorance always has a relation with the pot, etc., and therefore, the j?va-consciousness also always has a relation with objects. Therefore, if the overcoming of concealment were to occur by means of the relation of consciousness, then the overcoming of concealment of the pot, etc., should always persist. Similarly, if the overcoming of concealment is said to occur by means of a v?tti, then it should also occur by means of a mediate v?tti. Hence, it should be accepted that either an immediate v?tti or the consciousness qualified by an immediate v?tti overcomes the concealment. Just as the great darkness is [briefly] destroyed in some place by the illumination of a firefly, and in the absence of the firefly, the great darkness spreads again, similarly, a portion of primordial ignorance is destroyed by either the relation of an immediate v?tti or by consciousness qualified by an immediate v?tti; but, in the absence of the v?tti, ignorance spreads again. This is the view according to tradition. Here, the purpose (prayojana) of an immediate v?tti is to destroy a portion of [primordial] ignorance, and that of a mediate v?tti is to destroy the portion of ignorance that causes non-existence (asattv?p?daka). In this manner, in this view (pak?a), the purpose of a v?tti is only to destroy concealment (VP 8.148-51,430-2). 2) According to another view, the purpose of a v?tti is the relation of the individual consciousness with the object. In the view, ?the j?va is the reflection of collective (sama??i) ignorance [namely, primordial ignorance],? although the j?va-consciousness always has a relation (sambandha) with the pot, etc., the object is not illumined by the general relation of the j?va-consciousness, but rather, the cause of the illumination of the object is the dissimilar (vij?t?ya), i.e., particular relation of the j?va-consciousness. Thus, the illumination-causing relation is dependent upon a v?tti and is of the form of manifesting, i.e., the ?manifester? (abhivya?jaka), and becoming manifest, i.e., the 333 ?manifested? (abhivya?gya). The object has the property of manifesting (abhivya?jakat?), and the j?va-consciousness has the property of becoming manifest (abhivya?gyat?). That in which the reflection occurs is called the manifester [that which manifests], and that which is reflected is called the manifested. For example, where the reflection of a face occurs in a mirror, the mirror is the manifester and the face is the manifested. Similarly, where the reflection of consciousness occurs in the objects such as pot, etc., the pot is the manifester and the consciousness is the manifested. Thus, the object, a pot, etc., has the property of manifesting (vya?jakat?) in the form of assuming (graha?a) the reflection, and the consciousness has the property of being manifested (vya?gyat?) in the form of presenting (samarpa?a) the reflection. Objects such as a pot, etc., do not naturally have the capability of assuming the reflection. They become fit for assuming the reflection of consciousness by the relation of the v?tti in their form, just as the reflection of the sun on the wall does not occur without the relation of the mirror; therefore, the wall has the capability of assuming the reflection of the sun only due to the relation of the mirror. In this example, the general relation of the sunlight with the wall is always present; nevertheless, the manifester-manifested relation is dependent upon the mirror. Similarly, although the relation of the j?va-consciousness with the object is always present, nevertheless the capability of the pot, etc., to assume the reflection of the j?va- consciousness only comes from the relation with a v?tti. Therefore, the manifester- manifested relation of the j?va-consciousness with the pot, etc., is dependent upon a v?tti. Thus, the v?tti is the cause of the differing relation of the j?va-consciousness with the pot, etc.; it occurs for the sake of the relation with the object, so the object is illumined by that relation. In the view that ?the j?va-consciousness is all-pervasive (vibhu),? the v?tti is the cause of the differing relation (VP 8.152, 432-3). 3) In the view, ?the nature of the j?va is consciousness qualified by the anta?-kara?a,? the j?va does not have any relation with the pot, etc., without the v?tti; but when, by the relation of the senses and the object, the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a goes towards the object, then the relation of the j?va-consciousness occurs with the pot, etc. Without the external venturing forth of the v?tti, there is no relation of the inner j?va with the external pot, etc. Thus, in the view that ?the j?va is consciousness delimited (paricchinna) and 334 distinguished (avacchinna) by the anta?-kara?a,? the v?tti is only for the sake of the relation with the object (VP 8.153, 433). In the views where ?the j?va is that which has ignorance as its up?dhi? (1 & 2), the j?va- consciousness is always in relation with the object, but the manifester-manifested relation does not occur all the time, and the v?tti functions to provide this relation. In the view that ?consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a is the j?va? (3), the j?va is not always in relation with the object, but the v?tti occurs for providing this relation. However, to speak of the difference in the relation of the v?tti on the basis of differing views is improper, because, where the anta?-kara?a has been accepted as the up?dhi of the j?va (3), even in that view it is certainly desired to have ignorance as the up?dhi of j?va-ness (j?va-bh?va); otherwise the j?va as pr?j?a [the form of the j?va in deep sleep] does not occur. Consequently, in everybody?s view, the up?dhi of j?va-bh?va is ignorance alone [as is held by (1)]. The erroneous conception (abhim?na) of doer-ship, etc., occurs in that which is qualified by the anta?- kara?a, and therefore, consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a alone has been called the j?va (3). In the case of the view where the j?va has been taken to be the reflection in ignorance (2), there too the cognizer has not been considered to be the consciousness qualified by ignorance, but instead, the cognizer has been considered to be the consciousness qualified by the anta?-kara?a alone. In this view (2), although the relation of the j?va to the object is considered ever-present, the cognizer-consciousness does not always have such a relation with the object. Nevertheless, the illumination of the object is considered to occur only by its relation with the cognizer-consciousness alone, and the illumination of the object does not occur via the relation of the j?va-consciousness with the object. Just as Brahman- consciousness and ??vara-consciousness are facilitators of ignorance, so also is the consciousness of the j?va, which has ignorance as its up?dhi. Even with the relation of that j?va-consciousness, any function (vyavah?ra) of being known (j??tat?), etc., does not occur in the object, and neither does the conception (abhim?na) of being known, etc., occur in the j?va-consciousness. Rather, the function of being known, etc., in the object, and also the cognizer?s conception of that function, occurs only by the relation of the cognizer to the object. Such a cognizer resides in a location different from the object, and therefore the cognizer does not always have a relation with the object, but instead the relation only occurs dependent upon the v?tti. Thus, whether the j?va?s up?dhi is considered to be pervasive or 335 delimited, in both views the relation of the cognizer with the object is the same and is dependent upon the v?tti alone. Ni?cald?s suggests that the stating of the difference between the two is solely for the revealing of the cleverness of one?s intellect (buddhi-prav??at?- khy?pana), but there is no relation between the cognizer and the object, and therefore, it only demonstrates the lack of cleverness of one?s intellect! (VP 8.154-5, 433-4). Since the cognizer is not always in relation with the object, four kinds of consciousness have been stated: 1) cognizer-consciousness (pram?t?-cetana), consciousness qualified by the anta?-kara?a; 2) means-of-cognition consciousness (pram??a-cetana), consciousness delimited by a v?tti; 3) object-consciousness (vi?aya-cetana), consciousness delimited by the pot, etc.; 4) result-consciousness (phala-cetana), the reflection of consciousness that occurs in the pot, etc., by the relation of the v?tti. If the cognizer were always in relation with the object then the partitioning of the cognizer- and object-consciousness (1 & 3) would be improper. Some say that, when just the pot-delimited consciousness is unknown, then it is the object-consciousness, and when it is known, then it is called both the result-consciousness and the consciousness of the cognized (prameya-cetana). But Vidy?ra?ya and the author of the V?rtika [Sure?vara] have named result-consciousness as the manifestation (?bh?sa) of consciousness that occurs in the pot, etc., in the instant following the v?tti of the means of cognition. In this manner, the cognizer-consciousness is circumscribed (paricchinna), and only by its relation is the object illumined. Even if the j?va-consciousness is considered to be all-pervasive (vibhu), the relation of the cognizer with the object is caused by a v?tti. Therefore, in both views, there is no difference in the relation with the object (VP 8.156, 434- 5). The v?tti of the anta?-kara?a caused by the senses, functioning as described above, occurs in the waking state. Contrary to this, the state of the immediate (aparok?a) v?tti of the anta?-kara?a pertaining to an object, which is not caused by the senses, is called the dream state. In the dream state, the cognition and the cognizer are the modifications of the anta?- kara?a. The state of the v?tti pertaining to pleasure and ignorance (avidy?) in the form of the immediate (s?k??t) modification of ignorance (aj??na) is called the deep sleep state, because in deep sleep only the v?ttis pertaining to pleasure and ignorance occur. Although v?ttis pertaining to ignorance, such as ?I do not know,? also occur in the waking state, the waking 336 state v?tti is of the anta?-kara?a and not of ignorance, and so there is no over-application (ativy?pti) of the definition of deep sleep to the waking state. Similarly, in the waking state, the v?tti in the form of apparent silver is a modification of ignorance, but it does not pertain to ignorance. In the same manner, the v?tti in the waking state pertaining to pleasure is not a modification of ignorance. In deep sleep, the witness seated in the v?tti of ignorance illuminates ignorance and also the pleasure that is its nature (svar?pa-sukha 598). The person?s anta?-kara?a becomes absorbed (l?na) in the portion of ignorance that has been modified into pleasure in deep sleep, and resides there. Then, at the time of waking, that portion of ignorance gets modified into the anta?-kara?a. Therefore, in the waking state, the pleasure experienced in deep sleep is recollected by means of a v?tti of ignorance. Because there is no difference between the material cause and the effect, there is also no case-relation (vyadhikara?at?) between the experience and the recollection (VP 8.157-9, 434-6). In this manner, there are three states of the j?va. Some include dying and fainting (m?rch?) within deep sleep while others consider them to be separate [states]. The difference between the three mentioned states is dependent upon the v?tti. In the waking and dream states, the v?tti is of the anta?-kara?a, and in deep sleep, the v?tti is of ignorance. In the waking state, the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a is caused by the senses, but, in the dream state, it is not generated by the senses. The erroneous conception (abhim?na) of the [waking, dream and deep sleep] states in this fashion [as distinct and real] itself is bondage. Erroneous cognition (bhrama-j??na) is called conception, which is just a particular v?tti. Therefore, sa?s?ra is nothing but bondage caused by v?tti. But when, by means of the Ved?nta statements, a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a occurs that ?aha? brahm?smi, I am Brahman? (BU 1.4.10), then the cessation of ignorance along with the worldly creation (prapa?ca) is brought about through this v?tti, and that itself is liberation. Consequently, in the sa?s?ra, the purpose of v?ttis is to establish empirical reality (vyavah?ra-siddhi), but the highest purpose of a v?tti is for liberation (VP 8.160-1, 436). 598 Sv?m? Praj??nanda explains svar?pa-sukha, ?natural pleasure? as ?tm? k? sukha, ?pleasure of the self, ?tm?? (personal communication). 337 9.3 Cessation of the Conceived The cessation of the conceived (kalpita k? niv?tti) occurs in the form of the substratum. To say that the cessation of sa?s?ra is liberation establishes the fact that Brahman is liberation. Ni?cald?s suggests that to consider the cessation of the conceived to be the destruction of the conceived, and then raise the defect (?patti) of duality in liberation [as the Ny?ya-makaranda599 does], is due to ignorance (aj??na-prayukta). Ni?cald?s argues that ?nandabodha (ca. 1050-1150 CE), the author of the Ny?ya-makaranda, has not accepted the cessation of the conceived as being in the form of the substratum, and has also justified (sam?dh?na) the defect of duality, but such a view is not according to experience. Hence, Ni?cald?s presents the Ny?ya-makaranda view at length here (VP 8.163-6, 437-41; section 9.3.1), before refuting it (VP 8.167-72, 441-5; section 9.3.2). 9.3.1 ?nandabodha?s View of the Cessation of the Conceived ?nandabodha writes that the cessation of the conceived is different from the substratum. If it were said that the cessation were of the form of the substratum, then this would establish that the substratum and the cessation of the conceived are one and the same thing. This raises the issue of whether 1) the disappearance (lopa) of the cessation of the conceived is desired after considering it to be included in (antar-bh?va) in the substratum or 2) is the disappearance of the substratum desired after considering it to be included in the cessation of the conceived. The inclusion of one within the other will have to be accepted, because any other way is not possible. Now (1) is not possible because the substratum of sa?s?ra is Brahman, and if the cessation of sa?s?ra is not different from Brahman, then there should be no activity (prav?tti) in the means of the cessation of sa?s?ra. This is because the cessation of sa?s?ra is not different from Brahman, and Brahman is established (siddha). Activity occurs for the sake of functional goals (vy?p?ra-s?dhya), and activity for the sake of knowing the self- established Brahman, such as ?rava?a, etc., will not be possible. Therefore, the inclusion of the cessation of sa?s?ra in the eternally established Brahman is not possible. Now if it is said, as in (2) above, that Brahman is included in the cessation of sa?s?ra, then again, due to the delusion of sa?s?ra [then] not being possible, activity such as ?rava?a, 599 ?nandabodha Bha???r?k?c?rya (1907). 338 etc., should not be possible as the means of its cessation, because it is experientially known that that the cessation of sa?s?ra occurs in the time subsequent to knowledge; prior to knowledge, the cessation of sa?s?ra does not occur. But when Brahman is not considered to be separate from the cessation of sa?s?ra, and Brahman is considered to be included in the cessation of sa?s?ra, then, prior to knowledge, due to the natural absence of the substratum in the form of Brahman, the delusion of sa?s?ra is not possible. Further [sa?s?ra is experientially known and so] sa?s?ra cannot be said to be absent; it will have to be considered as real, although cessation of a real through knowledge is not possible. Moreover, there is no cessation of sa?s?ra prior to knowledge, and by its occurring only after knowledge, it has a beginning. But Brahman is without beginning, and therefore, it is unreasonable (ayukta) to speak of the inclusion of a beginning-less substance in one that has a beginning. As the inclusion of one by the other is not possible, then the position ?the cessation of sa?s?ra is in the form of Brahman? is not possible. The following view might be offered. ?Although we do not speak of the mutual inclusion of anything, the cessation of the conceived is not separate from the substratum, but rather the cessation of the conceived is a particular state of the substratum. The substratum has two states, known and unknown. Prior to cognition, it is the unknown state, and after cognition, it is the known state. The cessation of the conceived is in the form of the known substratum, and, since the known substratum has a beginning, the means of knowledge such as ?rava?a, etc., are not fruitless; so the cessation of sa?s?ra is not separate from Brahman.? Even if the cessation of sa?s?ra is considered to be in the form of Brahman, this is still not possible, because the object of knowledge is called ?known,? and the object of ignorance is called ?unknown.? The concealment-caused ignorance alone is the state of being an object of ignorance, and when the absence of ignorance is brought about by knowledge, functioning as unknown (aj??ta vyavah?ra) does not remain. Similarly, in the state of being without a body (videha-da??) [i.e., after death, or post-liberation], 600 as a result of the absence of knowledge occurring due to the absence of the body, etc., the absence of being known (j??tat?) is also brought about. Therefore, in the state of being without a body, since there is the absence of the known state too, just like the unknown state, there should also be the absence of the 600 It is unclear if ?nandabodha views mok?a as videha-mukti, liberation after death, since this is part of his p?rva-pak?a, prima facie argument. 339 cessation of the conceived in the form of the known substratum in liberation. If absence is accepted in liberation, then, because of the absence of being without end (anantat?) in the cessation of the conceived, the highest human pursuit (puru??rtha), i.e., liberation, will not be possible (abh?va) similar to the impossibility of the cessation of an illness due to the lack of medicine. Therefore, it should be accepted that the cessation of the conceived is not of the form of the substratum, but is separate from it, and, although being different from the substratum, it is not a producer of duality because if there were something else real apart from the substratum, then there would be the defect of duality. And, if a substance other than real were to be a cause of duality, the sense that there is always non-duality in Ved?nta would be negated. Therefore, the difference from a real substance alone is the cause of duality, but the cessation of the conceived is different from the substratum and is not real, and so duality is not established by this position (VP 8.162-4, 436-8). For the ascertainment of the nature of the cessation of that which is conceived, the alternatives have been presented [in the Ny?ya-makaranda] in this manner. In considering the cessation of the conceived to be different from the substratum, it is asked whether it is 1) real (sat), or 2) false (asat), or 3) both real and false (sad-asat), or 4) neither real nor false (sad-asad-vilak?a?a)? Four alternatives thus arise. From among these, if it be said to be real (1), then is it 1a) empirically real, or 1b) ultimately real? If it is empirically real (1a), then due to the empirically real not being possible after knowledge of Brahman, there ought to be the absence of that cessation of the conceived after the cessation of the conceived, since the empirically real is not negated prior to knowledge of Brahman and its reality (satt?) and manifestation (sph?rti) do not remain after the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, if the cessation of the conceived is considered to be empirically real, it should not remain possible after knowledge. If it is said to be ultimately real (1b), then the fault of duality is incurred. Therefore, the cessation of the conceived different from the substratum cannot be said to be empirically real (1a) or ultimately real (1b). With regard to (2), if that cessation of the conceived different from the substratum is said to be false, then does the word ?false? mean anirvacan?ya or unreal (tuccha)? If it is anirvacan?ya, then the defects about to be raised in refutation of (4) [that the cessation of the 340 conceived is neither real nor false (sad-asad-vilak?a?a)] will be present here, and if it is unreal, then the cessation of the conceived will not be a human pursuit (puru??rtha). Thus, even the second option is not possible. For (3), if that cessation of the conceived is said to be both real and false, then truth and falsity are not possible in one and the same substance due to being in opposition. Even if it is accepted as both real and false, then the aforementioned defects of the true option (1) and of the false option (2) will apply; in the case of the true portion, the cessation of the conceived will have duality, and in the case of the false portion, the human pursuit [of liberation] will cease to be a possibility (apuru??rthat?). The meaning of sad-asat might be alternately stated as follows. ?Real (sat) is the basis of empirical reality, and false (asat) is other than ultimate reality. Then with these meanings, sat and asat do not oppose each other, because the pot, etc., are well known as the basis of empirical reality and other than ultimate reality. Thus, the formerly mentioned opposition no longer applies, and there is also no duality from opposing ultimate reality; although it has empirical reality, it is not unreal (tuccha), and consequently the apuru??rthat? does not arise either. In this manner, the cessation of the conceived as different from the substratum lacks ultimate reality and has empirical reality.? If the nature of sad-asat is stated thus, then the defect raised against accepting empirical reality in connection with the first option, namely, that ?subsequent to knowledge, an empirical substance becomes impossible,? does not make the above sense of sad-asat possible either. That being the case, (3) is also not possible. Now, if, as stated in (4), the cessation of the conceived as different from the substratum is said to be other than real or false (sad-asad-vilak?a?a), then by saying it is other than real, the defect of duality does not arise, and, by saying it is other than false, the defect of apuru??rthat? also does not arise. However, this option is also not possible because that which is other than real and false is anirvacan?ya, and so it will be established that ?the cessation of the conceived is anirvacan?ya.? But anirvacan?ya denotes m?y? and its effects. Now, if the cessation of sa?s?ra along with ignorance also is anirvacan?ya, then the cessation of the manifest creation (prapa?ca), along with ignorance will similarly have to be considered as m?y? or its effect, but this statement will be laughable (h?sy?spada) since it resembles the statement ?the cessation of the pot is like a pot.? Further, Ved?nta establishes (siddh?nta) that, when the cessation of the manifest creation along with [the cessation of] 341 ignorance occurs due to the knowledge of Brahman, no apparatus remains for the accomplishment of the puru??rthas. The result of the knowledge of Brahman, which is the cessation of the conceived, if it is of the form of m?y? or its effect, should leave nothing remaining to remove it. Then, in the state of liberation, due to the eternal relation with m?y? and its effect, there will be the absence of liberation in the form of attaining the unqualified Brahman. Hence, the fourth option is also not possible. Accordingly, ignorance and the cessation of its effect are different from Brahman, but they are not real, so there is no duality. The cessation of the conceived is not false; therefore, there is no apuru??rthat?. It is not both real and false; therefore, the defects of both alternatives are not incurred. It is also not ?neither real nor false, anirvacan?ya,? and so, in the state of liberation, ignorance and its effects do not remain. In this manner, the cessation of the conceived is separate from the substratum, but it is other than the four options above. Therefore, in the Ny?ya-makaranda, a fifth type of cessation of the conceived is described, which is different from the [previous] four. ?Just as the substance different from real and false has been defined as anirvacan?ya in Advaita, in our view the cessation of the conceived is different from all the four types: real, false, both real and false, neither real nor false, i.e., it is a fifth type which is different from the four options? (VP 8.165-6, 439-41). 9.3.2 Ni?cald?s Refutation of ?nandabodha According to Ni?cald?s, the Ny?ya-makaranda view is not correct, because substances (pad?rtha) that are empirically real are well known in the world, and anirvacan?ya substances caused by magic (indraj?la-k?ta) are also well known. Similarly, Brahman, the ultimate real substance, is well known in the ??stras and it is also experientially known by wise persons (vidv?n). But no entity different from all these is known, either in the world or in the ??stra; so, if the cessation of the conceived is considered to be extremely unknown, then the human pursuits (puru??rthat?) will not be possible (abh?va). The object of a person?s desire is called a human goal (puru??rtha), and nobody desires something that is completely unknown; everyone tends to desire the known. Therefore, the cessation of the conceived cannot be different from well-known substances. Although when the cessation of the conceived is considered in the form of the substratum, Brahman that is the substratum of sa?s?ra is not well known since it is not experienced by all; nevertheless, it is not the rule 342 that there should only be a desire for that which is previously experienced. One desires that which is similar to what has been experienced [and also has been heard from the teacher and scriptures that are trustworthy]. 601 Just as the cessation of the snake which is the meaningless cause of fear is the substratum in the form of the rope, similarly, the cessation of sa?s?ra which is the meaningless cause of birth, death, etc., is the substratum in the form of Brahman. The desire of a person for the cessation of sa?s?ra is possible because is similar to that which is experienced. But, in the view of the one who holds to the fifth type, that type is neither experienced nor is it similar to anything [well known]; therefore, it is not possible for it to be the object of any person?s desire. Along with this, if the cessation of the conceived is considered to be different from the substratum, then ?a?kara?s [bh??yak?ra] words will be opposed since he has stated that the cessation of the conceived is in the form of the substratum alone (VP 8.167, 441). The author of the Ny?ya-makaranda had raised the defect regarding acceptance of the cessation of the conceived as in the form of the known substratum, namely, that ?there will be the re-arising of the conceived due to the absence of the cessation of the conceived occurring in the state of liberation from the absence of known-ness (j??tatva) in the state of liberation.? Ni?cald?s provides the resolution of this defect as follows.602 At the time of liberation, Brahman is neither qualified (vi?i??a) nor limited by (upahita) known-ness. That which possesses the attribute of known-ness is called j??tatva-vi?i??a, and that which has the up?dhi of j??tatva is called j??tatva-upahita. That which is related to the effect and distinguishes the present (vartam?na vy?vartaka)603 is called an attribute/qualifier (vi?e?a?a). For example, in the case of ?the blue-colored pot is created,? the ?blue-colored? is the attribute of the pot, because the blue color is related to the pot effect (k?rya), and, since it is present in the pot, it distinguishes the pot from the yellow pot. That which is not related to the effect and excludes the present (vartam?na vy?vartaka) 604 is called the up?dhi. For 601 Parenthetical explanation by ?tm?nand Muni (Ni?cald?s 1957, 618): tath? ?raddheya guru-??stra ke dv?r? ?rava?a kiye hue me? bh? abhil??? hu? kart? hai. 602 I have chosen to leave many of the terms in this discussion untranslated past the first few times that they are explained. This is a highly terminology-laden explanation which loses its force and comprehensibility when presented fully in translation. 603 See n. 604. 604 vy?vartaka has both senses, of distinguishing and excluding. It seems more meaningful to translate the same phrase differently in the two cases. Possible senses of the term: separating, removing, excluding, excepting, distinguishing, distinctive, turning away from, encircling, encompassing (MW). 343 example, in the case of ?sound occurs in the space limited by the kettle-drum (bher?),? the kettle-drum is the up?dhi of space, because the drum is not related to the substratum of sound, and the kettle drum which is present excludes the space in it from the external space. That which is not related to the effect and excludes is called a mere designating expression (upalak?a?a). An upalak?a?a is not required to be present since it can also be past (at?ta), and, whereas an up?dhi is in all locations of the qualificand, the upalak?a?a occurs in only one location. For example, on hearing ?k?kavat g?he gaccha, go to the house with the crow [perched on it],? one goes to the house where the connection with a crow was seen, even if the crow [subsequently] flies away from the house. Here the crow is the upalak?a?a of the house since it is not related to the activity (k?rya) of going, but it indicates the house, and the present or past crow excludes that house from others. The difference between the three is best conveyed via a table: vi?e?a?a, attribute up?dhi, ?limiting adjunct? upalak?a?a, designator Part of the effect? ? ? ? Present with the effect at all times & places? ? ? ? Distinguishes or excludes the effect? ? ? ? vy?vartaka :: vy?v?tta, differentiator :: differentiated terminology vi?e?a?a :: vi?i??a, qualifier :: qualificand up?dhi :: upahita, conditioner :: conditioned upalak?a?a :: upalak?ita, designator :: designated vy?vartaka :: vy?v?tta example pot :: pot-color drum :: space enclosed crow :: house Table 3: Types of vy?v?tti, differentiation Thus, the attribute and the up?dhi are present, and they occur in all locations and times of the qualificand. In the place and time of the qualificand, when and where they do not occur, their qualifying and conditioning functions also do not occur. In the times and places from which they are excluded (vy?vartaka), their qualifying and conditioning functions occur only there and then. In the state of liberation there is no present relation with known-ness (j??tatva), but the attribute of known-ness (j??tatva) has occurred formerly. Therefore, although the substratum is not qualified (vi?i??a) or conditioned (upahita) by j??tatva, it is however designated (upalak?ita) by j??tatva. This is because an upalak?a?a is that which only excludes but is not required to be present, and thus, by having a relation with the qualificand in one place or at one time, that which excludes can still be called an upalak?a?a. 344 The cognition of difference from other substances is called differentiation (vy?v?tti). Thus, an attribute (vi?e?a?a), up?dhi, and designator (upalak?a?a), all three bring about differentiation (vy?v?tti). Of these, in all the times and places that the vi?e?a?a is present, it provides vy?v?tti of the qualificand along with itself, and that for which vy?v?tti occurs by means of a vi?e?a?a, is called a vi?i??a, qualified. In all the times and places where the vy?vartaka is present, when it provides vy?v?tti of that which is also present in those times and places while itself remaining external, it [the vy?vartaka] is called the up?dhi, and that for which vy?v?tti occurs by means of an up?dhi is called the upahita, conditioned. That which is present in one place at some time for the object to be excluded (vy?vartan?ya), and provides vy?v?tti of the object while remaining external like an up?dhi, is called an upalak?a?a, and the object of which vy?v?tti occurs by means of an upalak?a?a is called an upalak?ita, that which is designated. In summary, by combining both the vy?vartaka and the vy?vartan?ya, a qualifying (vi?i??a) function occurs. In all the places where the vy?vartaka is present, the upahita function occurs only in the vy?vartan?ya present in those places, but this function occurs only by forsaking the vy?vartaka in the time it is present (sadbh?va-k?la). Where the vy?vartaka is sometimes present in one location of the vy?vartan?ya, there the upalak?ita function occurs only in the vy?vartan?ya, and there is no requirement for the presence of the vy?vartaka. In this manner, the cognizer qualified (vi?i??a) by the anta?-kara?a, the individual witness (j?va-s?k??) conditioned (upahita) by the anta?-kara?a, and the ??vara as witness designated (upalak?ita) by the anta?-kara?a, occur with the difference(s) of these vi?e?a?a, etc. The connection here is that, although in the state of liberation, due to the absence of j??tatva, it is not possible for the substratum to be qualified by (vi?i??a) or conditioned by (upahita) j??tatva, nevertheless, it still remains j??tatva-upalak?ita, designated by known-ness in that state (VP 8.168, 442-3). The proponent of the cessation of the conceived being of the fifth kind might raise the following doubt. ?If an entity which may sometimes have known-ness (j??tatva) is considered to be designated by known-ness even when known-ness is absent, then, even in the time prior to known-ness, considering the imminent (bh?v?) known-ness in the entity, it should be considered to be designated by known-ness. Now if it is thus considered, then due to the cessation of sa?s?ra being present in the form of the substratum designated by known- 345 ness, even in the time of sa?s?ra, one will easily attain the puru??rtha. Therefore, it is not appropriate to speak of the cessation of the conceived in the form of the substratum designated by known-ness when known-ness is absent.? The resolution of this doubt is as follows. The function of designation [lit. designated function, upalak?ita vyavah?ra] only occurs subsequent to the relation with the differentiator (vy?vartaka), never in the time prior to it. Just as it is only in the time subsequent to the [house?s] relation with the crow that the function of being designated by the crow occurs, similarly the substratum cannot be said to be designated by known-ness in the state of sa?s?ra prior to the arising of known-ness. But subsequent to the known-ness, even in its absence, the substratum can be called designated by known-ness, and its nature is the cessation of sa?s?ra (VP 8.169-70, 444). If the view that ?the cessation of the conceived is different from the substratum? is insisted upon, then to accept the extremely unknown (aprasiddha) fifth type, as posited by the author of the Ny?ya-makaranda, is certainly fruitless since the cessation of the conceived, i.e., the anirvacan?ya, is also anirvacan?ya itself. Cessation is the name of destruction (dhva?sa). If that destruction is considered to be endless absence and also different from the substratum, then there will be duality in the state of liberation. But in actuality, that destruction is not endless absence; it is of the form of momentary modifications of being (bh?va-vik?ra). In Y?ska?s Nirukta portion [lit. limb, a?ga] of the Vedas, 605 six modifications of being have been stated: birth, existence, change (pari??ma), growth (vardhana), decay (apak?aya), and destruction. 606 Being (bh?va) means an anirvacan?ya entity; its modifications indicate particular states. All the states, beginning with birth through destruction, are anirvacan?ya, since they are particular states of an anirvacan?ya entity. For example, the state of birth is momentary, because the relation of an entity with its first instant is called birth. Therefore, only in the first instant does the function ?j?yate, it is born/created? occur, but, in the second and subsequent instants, the function ?j?ta?, it was born/created? occurs, and never ?it is born?. Similarly, when the pot gets crushed by a hammer, only in the first instant does the function ?gha?o na?yati, the pot is destroyed? occur; from the second instant onwards, only the function ?na??o gha?a?, the pot was destroyed? occurs, never ?the 605 Y?ska (600-500 BCE) is a Sanskrit grammarian prior to P??ini, the Nirukta is a work on etymology and semantics. 606 Nirukta 1.2: ??a?-bh?va-vik?r? bhavant?ti v?r?y?ya?i?. j?yate asti vipari?amate vardhate apak??yate vina?yat?ti. Per V?r?y?ya?i, there are six modifications of being: birth, existence, change, maturing, decay, destruction? (Sarup 1984, 3:29). 346 pot is destroyed.? In this manner, birth and destruction are momentary, meaning that, by the sentence, ?the pot is born,? the present birth of the pot is apprehended, and by the sentence, ?the pot was born,? its past birth is apprehended. Similarly, by the sentence, ?the pot is destroyed,? the present destruction of the pot, and by the sentence, ?the pot was destroyed,? the past destruction of the pot, are apprehended. If the destruction were endless, then destruction should have the function of past-ness (at?tatva). Therefore, destruction is not endless, but momentary and is a positive (bh?va-r?pa) modification. In the description of the means of non-cognition (anupalabdhi pram??a), the endless, non-existence (abh?va-r?pa) of destruction represents the Ny?ya view. For Ved?nta, however, there is only one non-existent substance, and that is absolute non-existence (atyant?bh?va). Thus, the cessation of the conceived is also momentary and anirvacan?ya alone. Just as the anirvacan?ya body, etc., of the wise person persist for some time after knowledge on the strength of already commenced (pr?rabdha) karma and is not a means of duality, similarly, the cessation of the conceived remains for only one instant after knowledge and is not a means of duality. After one instant, the absolute absence of the cessation of the conceived occurs, and it is in the form of Brahman (VP 8.171, 444-5). In this view, the cessation of sorrow cannot be called a human pursuit (puru??rtha), since [the cessation of sorrow] is existent only momentarily. Only happiness (sukha) can be a puru??rtha, because, by nature, all j?vas engage in the pleasures of sexual intercourse (gr?mya-dharma), etc., which are accompanied by endless sorrow. If only the absence of sorrow were the object of a person?s desire, then a person should not have desire for the pleasure that is totally eclipsed (grasita) by sorrow. Where there is a desire for the absence of sorrow, there too sorrow is considered the obstruction of the experience of natural happiness, and when it is absent, the natural happiness manifests. Consequently, the desire of a person for the absence of sorrow also occurs for the sake of natural happiness alone, and thus, the principal puru??rtha is not the absence of sorrow, but only happiness. Therefore, if even the absolute absence of sorrow is not considered to be the nature of Brahman and is only considered to be anirvacan?ya, then the negation [of absolute absence of sorrow] is also possible. But absence in the form of the negation of the anirvacan?ya is experientially known to be of the form of the substratum. Therefore, along with ignorance, the visible creation in the form of existence and non-existence as well as its cessation, all are anirvacan?ya, and the 347 negation of them all, in the form of the substratum, is liberation, which is of the nature of non-duality, ultimate happiness (param?nanda) and the highest puru??rtha (VP 8.172, 445- 6). With this, the VP concludes. 607 9.4 Chapter Summary According to Advaita doctrine, the cessation of ignorance and its effects is brought about by Brahman-realization (tattva-j??na). In this chapter, we examined the form that is taken by the removal of ignorance and attainment of Brahman-realization. Brahman-realization is the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a in regard to the identity of j?va and Brahman, and the anta?-kara?a is an effect of ignorance; therefore, Brahman-realization in the form of the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti is also an effect of ignorance. Since the cause and effect do not mutually oppose one another, how can one speak of the cessation of ignorance by means of Brahman-realization? Ni?cald?s reminds us that the universal (s?m?nya) rule that the cause and effect do not mutually oppose one another is negated by the particular (vi?e?a) rule that cognition and ignorance, having the same object, mutually oppose each other. Thus, the destruction of ignorance, along with its effects, can be brought about by the ignorance-caused v?tti- cognition, which takes the form of Brahman-realization. If ignorance is completely destroyed by Brahman-realization, then the body of the wise person, who becomes liberated while living (j?van-mukta) through Brahman-realization, should cease to exist, because the persistence of the body, the effect, is not possible on the destruction of ignorance, the material cause. However, even after Brahman-realization has occurred, the wise person?s body persists until the fruition of the commenced (pr?rabdha) karma, and therefore, even upon Brahman-realization, some authors hold that a trace (le?a) of ignorance still remains. Sarvaj??tman disagrees; for him, there is no trace ignorance post- knowledge, and the statements propounding j?van-mukti are not literal but instead praise the power of listening to teachings about ?tm? (?tma-?rava?a) and the fact that one gets liberated even while alive. Ni?cald?s disagrees with Sarvaj??tman?s view as it contradicts a knower?s 607 The text concludes with: ?iti ?r?man-ni?cald?sa-sa?j?aka-s?dhu-viracite v?ttiprabh?kare j?ve?vara-svar?pa-nir?pa?a- p?rvaka-v?tti-prayojana-nir?pa?a-sahita-kalpita-niv?tti-svar?pa-nir?pa?a? n?m???ama prak??a?. So concludes the eighth chapter of the V?ttiprabh?kar, named the description of the nature of the cessation of the conceived, along with the description of the use of v?tti, preceded by the description of the nature of j?va and ??vara, written by the s?dhu named Ni?cald?s. sam?pto ?ya? grantha?, This text is concluded? (VP 8, 446). The published colophon is identical to that found in the manuscript (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). 348 experience wherein, by means of Brahman-realization, first, the cessation of ignorance occurs along with its effects and, in the following instant, Brahman-realization also ceases. If, according to Sarvaj??tman, there is no trace ignorance left, then, after Brahman- realization, only non-attached consciousness will remain, and the cessation of Brahman- realization will no longer be possible. Ni?cald?s suggests that when the cessation of ignorance with its effects takes place, as there is no other object left suitable for cessation, the cessation of Brahman-realization also occurs without requiring any other means for its cessation. It is analogous to when adding burning charcoal to a grass heap; the grass heap is reduced to ashes, and the charcoal is also reduced to ashes along with the grass. According to Padmap?da, knowledge opposes only ignorance but not its effects. Thus, only the cessation of ignorance occurs from Brahman-realization, and, in the instant following the cessation of ignorance, due to the absence of the material cause, its effect ceases by itself. However, as long as trace ignorance remains in the form of pr?rabdha karma, the body persists; but when the pr?rabdha karma obstruction becomes absent, the body and Brahman-realization both cease. There are two means for the Brahman-realization by which the cessation of ignorance takes place. According to all Advaita texts, 1) for the best aspirant (uttama adhik?r?), ?rava?a, and the rest alone are the means; and 2) for the middling aspirant (madhyama adhik?r?) the contemplation of the self as attribute-less (nirgu?a) Brahman (aha?-graha up?san?) is a means of Brahman-realization. But several authors hold that in both alternatives, continued meditation (prasa?khy?na) is solely the means as an instrument for Brahman-realization. A continuous stream of v?ttis is called prasa?khy?na. Just as the middling aspirant is required to perform contemplation of a continuous v?tti in the form of attribute-less Brahman, and that in itself is considered prasa?khy?na for that aspirant, similarly for the best aspirant too, after reflection (manana), prasa?khy?na in the form of nididhy?sana is the means for immediate cognition of Brahman. Prasa?khy?na is not a means of cognition (pram??a), but verbal testimony (?abda-pram??a) is the source of continuous meditation in the form of nididhy?sana; therefore, the knowledge of Brahman is a valid cognition. But V?caspati Mi?ra, author of the Bh?mat?, holds that prasa?khy?na assists the mind, although prasa?khy?na as a means for Brahman-realization is not established. Meditation on Brahman with and without attributes also assists the mind, but the mind alone 349 is the means of their immediate cognition. However, the principal opinion of Advaita texts is that the immediate perception of non-dual Brahman occurs via the mah?-v?kyas themselves, and, immediately after this, there is no need for prasa?khy?na. The mind is an accessory in the knowledge of Brahman, together with one-pointedness caused by nididhy?sana; but the means for the knowledge of Brahman are the words in the form of the Ved?nta statements alone. Even those who consider the immediate perception of Brahman to be mental accept the fact that the mediate (parok?a) knowledge of Brahman occurs by ?abda alone. Therefore, in both views, the instrumentality of ?abda in knowledge of Brahman is essential, and ?abda alone, not the mind, is the instrument of the direct perception of Brahman. Since ?abda has the capacity for producing only mediate knowledge, the production of immediate knowledge through ?abda is not possible. Yet, after performing ?rava?a as described in the ??stras, immediate knowledge pertaining to Brahman can arise via ?abda qualified by the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of mediate knowledge and accompanied by one- pointed consciousness. The immediate knowledge of Brahman is possible only through ?abda, when assisted by a pure, steady mind qualified by the impressions of the knowledge of Brahman. ?ruti speaks of the cessation of all suffering in the form of superimposition, which occurs through the knowledge of Brahman. Because superimpositions such as agency (kart?tva), etc., are immediate, the cessation of these superimpositions can only be brought about by the immediate knowledge of Brahman. Since the immediate superimpositions do not cease without the knowledge of Brahman, and the other means of cognition do not pertain to Brahman, the immediate knowledge of Brahman is proven to occur only through ?abda, as a result of postulation on the basis of what is heard (?rut?rth?patti). Alternatively, immediacy is dependent on the object, and not on the means of cognition. Therefore, the cognition of an immediate object is immediate itself, whether it occurs via the senses or by other means of cognition. The producer of immediacy or mediacy in the object is the identity or difference between the cognizer-consciousness and the object consciousness. Brahman-consciousness is always immediate because the cognizer- consciousness is always identical to Brahman-consciousness, and so the knowledge of Brahman produced by the verbal testimony (?abda pram??a) in the form of the mah?-v?kyas is also considered to be immediate. The means of cognition is also required to be appropriate 350 for providing immediate. cognition. Upani?adic subsidiary statements do not have the capability of producing immediate cognition; only the mah?-v?kyas have this capability. Ni?cald?s offers a definition for an immediate object free from key defects based on that of Advaita-vidy?c?rya: an immediate object is the identity of the unconcealed object with consciousness favorable (anuk?la) to its function (vyavah?ra). The definition of immediate cognition is the identity of consciousness suitable to its function with the unconcealed object. Since the identity of j?va with Brahman is ever-present, even with the identity of concealed Brahman with consciousness suitable to its function in the state of sa?s?ra, since Brahman is concealed, there is no identity of the object as unconcealed Brahman with consciousness suitable to its function. Therefore, the immediacy of Brahman does not occur. Similarly, since knowledge caused by the subsidiary Upani?adic statements is identical with the object in the form of concealed Brahman, immediacy does not apply to this knowledge. Three questions were presented at the start of VP: 1) What is the nature of a v?tti? 2) What (lit. who, kaun) is the cause of a v?tti? 3) What is the use and result of a v?tti? A v?tti was generally defined as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance, in the form of illumination,? and then its particular nature was described via its differences, based on truth (yath?rthatva), falsity (ayath?rthatva), etc. Through the description of the means of cognition, the nature of the cause of a v?tti was also stated. Now Ni?cald?s answers the third question, pertaining to the purpose of a v?tti. The relation of the j?va with all three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep) occurs by means of a v?tti, and the attainment of liberation (lit. puru??rtha) is also by means of a v?tti. The waking state is defined as the basis (?dh?ra) for sense-caused cognition and the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of sense-caused cognition, and different from the dream and deep sleep states. Thus, the function of the waking state is dependent on sense-caused cognition, which is in the form of a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a. According to some, the use of a v?tti is to overcome concealment. By the relation of an immediate v?tti or by consciousness qualified by an immediate v?tti, a portion of primordial ignorance is destroyed, but, in the absence of the v?tti, ignorance spreads again. The purpose of an immediate v?tti is to destroy of a portion of ignorance, and that of the mediate v?tti is the destruction of the portion of ignorance causing non-existence (asattv?p?daka). In another view, the purpose of a v?tti is to relate the individual 351 consciousness with the object. Where the j?va is considered to be the reflection of collective, primordial ignorance, although the relation of the j?va-consciousness with the object is always present, nevertheless the capability of the pot, etc., to assume the reflection of the j?va-consciousness comes only from the relation with a v?tti. The v?tti is the cause of the differing relation of the j?va-consciousness with the pot, etc., and the object is illumined by that relation. Where the j?va is considered to be consciousness qualified by the anta?-kara?a, the j?va does not have any relation with the pot, etc., without the v?tti, but when, by the relation of the senses and the object, the v?tti of the anta?-kara?a goes towards the object, then the relation of the j?va-consciousness occurs with the pot, etc. Here, the v?tti is purely for the sake of the relation with the object. Whether the j?va?s up?dhi is considered pervasive or delimited, in both the views the relation of the cognizer with the object is the same, dependent on the v?tti alone. The state of the immediate (aparok?a) v?tti of the anta?-kara?a pertaining to an object, which is not caused by the senses, is called the dream state. In the dream, the cognition and the cognizer are the modifications of the anta?-kara?a. The state of the v?tti pertaining to pleasure and ignorance (avidy?) in the form of the immediate (s?k??t) modification of ignorance (aj??na) is called the deep sleep state because in deep sleep only the v?ttis pertaining to pleasure and ignorance occur. In deep sleep, the witness seated in the v?tti of ignorance illuminates the ignorance and the pleasure that is its nature (svar?pa-sukha). The person?s anta?-kara?a becomes absorbed (l?na) in the portion of ignorance that has been modified into pleasure in deep sleep and resides there. Then, at the time of waking, that portion of ignorance gets modified into the anta?-kara?a. Therefore, in the waking state, the pleasure experienced in deep sleep is recollected by means of a v?tti of ignorance. The conception (abhim?na) of the three states in this fashion itself is bondage. Erroneous cognition (bhrama-j??na) is called conception, which is just a particular v?tti. Therefore, sa?s?ra is nothing but bondage caused by v?tti. When, by means of the Ved?nta statements, a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a occurs that ?aha? brahm?smi, I am Brahman? (BU 1.4.10), then the cessation of ignorance along with the worldly creation (prapa?ca) is brought about through this v?tti, and that itself is liberation. Thus, in the sa?s?ra, the purpose of v?ttis is for 352 the establishing of empirical reality, whereas the highest purpose of a v?tti is for liberation, i.e., knowing absolute reality. The cessation of the conceived is in the form of the known substratum. To say that the cessation of sa?s?ra is liberation establishes that Brahman is liberation. At the time of liberation, Brahman is not qualified (vi?i??a) by or limited by (upahita) known-ness (j??tatva). In the state of liberation, there is no present relation with known-ness (j??tatva), but the attribute (j??tatva) has occurred previously, and therefore, although the substratum is not qualified (vi?i??a) or conditioned (upahita) by j??tatva, it is however designated (upalak?ita) by j??tatva. The substratum cannot be said to be designated by known-ness in the state of sa?s?ra, prior to the arising of known-ness. But subsequent to the known-ness, even in its absence, the substratum can be designated by known-ness, and its nature is the cessation of sa?s?ra. The cessation of the conceived, i.e., the anirvacan?ya, is also anirvacan?ya itself, and momentary. The cessation of the conceived remains for only one instant after knowledge, and is not a means of duality. After one instant, the absolute absence of that cessation of the conceived occurs, and that is in the form of Brahman. This cessation of the conceived, i.e., the cessation of sorrow, cannot be called a human pursuit (puru??rtha) since it exists only momentarily. If only the absence of sorrow were the object of a person?s desire, then a person would not have desire for pleasure that is totally eclipsed by sorrow. A person?s desire for the absence of sorrow also occurs only for the sake of attaining the happiness that is ones nature. Therefore, the principal puru??rtha is not the absence of sorrow but only happiness. Ignorance, the visible creation in the form of existence and non- existence, as well as their cessation, all are anirvacan?ya. The negation of them all is liberation in the form of the substratum, and that is of the nature of non-duality, ultimate happiness (param?nanda) and the highest puru??rtha. 10 Conclusion The biographical sources for Sw?m? Ni?cald?s suggest that he was a learned yet simple, unworldly man, a staunch Advaitin without any interest in fame or fortune. After his mother passed away when he was thirteen or fourteen, he was raised among the D?d? Panth, and, as discussed in sections 3.4.3, 3.5-3.6, 4.3, and 4.6, he was most certainly influenced by their ideas of religious tolerance and disregard of caste. From the age of fourteen or fifteen he devoted himself to the pursuit of knowledge and went to study Sanskrit in Benares. Due to earlier experiences of caste-discrimination, he is said to have kept his J?? caste secret from his teachers, who otherwise would have not taught him Sanskrit, Ny?ya and Ved?nta. Hagiographic accounts state that when he confessed his true caste to his teacher, Pt. K?k?r?m, who had offered Ni?cald?s his daughter?s hand in marriage, K?k?r?m cursed Ni?cald?s to suffer every day from a fever. According to the D?d? Panth Paricay, Ni?cald?s began to recite the D?d? V??? daily to gain relief from this affliction. Even if one discounts these accounts as fanciful, it is quite plausible that Ni?cald?s encountered caste-discrimination; if true, this would certainly have influenced his stance against caste as evident in his writings and possibly also his choice to write in the vernacular. 10.1 Patronage There is no proof that the content of Niscaldas?s writings was influenced by his patron, R?j? R?msi?ha of B?nd?, Rajasthan. However, there is documentary evidence, in the form of several letters from the R?j? to Ni?cald?s reproduced by Ra?j?t Si?ha (1981, 10-13), that R?msi?ha was indeed a patron of Ni?cald?s, but non-hagiographic sources, such as the historian of Rajasthan, Gahlot (1960), do not make direct mention of the connection. 608 The R?j? was reputed to be a Sanskrit scholar and a staunch traditionalist, and B?nd?, with more than forty Sanskrit schools, was well known as a second Benares under his reign. Yet this scholar-king was ruthless and iron- fisted, killing or imprisoning members of his own family to strengthen his own power. He was an opportunist who secured close relationships with the ruling British colonial regime, and yet he would promptly bathe after contact with them. Under his reign, the kingdom of B?nd? paid more than a tenth of its revenue to the British, and in return, Queen Victoria appointed him a Knight 608 Gahlot only mentions that Ni?cald?s, the author of VS, was coterminous: ?d?d?panth? s?dhu ni?cald?s vic?rs?gar n?mak ved?nt granth ke racayit? ins? ke samay me? hu? th?.? (1960, 100). Due to the ambiguous wording, it is unclear if Gahlot is implying that R?msi?ha commissioned VS, or is simply referring to Ni?cald?s as the author of VS. Patronage is implied, however, since this sentence follows one which mentions S?ryamalla Mi?ra as dependent on the king for patronage. 354 Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India (KGCSI) in 1878. But R?msi?ha instituted reforms in his kingdom, banning traditional animal sacrifices, female infanticide, and the mistreatment and abuse of aged women. He commissioned his court poet, S?ryamalla Mi?ra, to write an epic narrative of his Cauh?n lineage, similar to the Mah?bh?rata but specifically in the vernacular in order that it might be widely understood. It is not unlikely that R?msi?ha and his family considered Ni?cald?s as their Ved?nta teacher. It is quite possible that R?msi?ha requested that he write works in the vernacular for the benefit of the common person and just as likely that the king also requested that he write a text that would be equally appreciated by a learned, Sanskrit speaking audience, as is reported by Pt. P?t?mbar (1917, 7). Hagiographers often try to elevate the prestige of their subject by claiming royal patronage, and Pt. P?t?mbar is certainly biased in favor of Ni?cald?s. However, the association between Ni?cald?s and R?msi?ha, particularly regarding the VP, is strengthened by two facts. 1) In the correspondence from Day?r?m to the king on the event of Ni?cald?s?s death, Day?r?m responds to R?msi?ha?s query as to whether and s?dh?s (holy men) had heard the VP directly from Ni?cald?s. It is likely that R?msi?ha was inquiring as to the status of the text, as Day?r?m goes on to provide a report on the same and appears to ask for the king?s assistance in compiling the final version of the text.609 2) In the colophon to the last chapter of the VP in the only manuscript available to me, the scribes, N?r?ya?a Trikam and L?l?dhar Odhav report that they ?researched the text over at the esteemed (nirmala) Lord R?msi?ha?s [place], at the request of Sw?m? Trilokr?m? and had the text published in Mumbai (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). 610 But it is not the least bit surprising that Ni?cald?s totally neglected to acknowledge his patron in any of his extant three Ved?nta works. He states in the invocatory verses, ma?gala doh?s, at the start of VS, that since he [Ni?cald?s] is pure, boundless Brahman, in which all of creation occurs, whom should he prayerfully bow down to (VS vv. 1.1-5)?611 One gets the impression that Ni?cald?s was being true to his uncompromising understanding of non-duality, and everything he wrote appears to stem consistently from that. Patronage by the king must have been welcome, but its lack would not have bothered Ni?cald?s in the least. One is reminded of the anecdote about Ni?cald?s?s successor, Man?r?m, and the British tax assessor recounted in section 2.7 above. When the 609 See n. 617, p. 366. 610 See n. 79, p. 32, and also Appendix 3, Figure 13 on p. 421. 611 The verses have been presented in abridged form here. See section 3.8, p. 65. 355 assessor asked Man?r?m what he would do if his meager wealth were exhausted by his charity, Man?r?m is said to have replied that he, too, would then go stand in line with the poor who queued at his door for charity. 10.2 Influence of the D?d? Panth Evidence for a greater influence on Ni?cald?s and his decision to write in the vernacular is found in the non-sectarian teachings of D?d? Day?l, the founder of the D?d? Panth to which he belonged. As in the case of Ni?cald?s, much of what we know about D?d? is from hagiographic accounts. As section 3.7 showed, all but one of the fourteen commonly found hagiographic tropes enumerated by W. L. Smith (2000, iii) are present in D?d??s biographical account. In comparison, an additional three tropes are absent in Ni?cald?s?s account, one is only faintly present and the remaining nine of the fourteen common hagiographical tropes are only mildly present (see Table 1 on p. 63). This shows us that, as compared to D?d?, Ni?cald?s had a much lower profile among their respective followers. This is perfectly understandable when one takes into account the fact that Ni?cald?s's profound self-identification with the advaita Brahman is not as amenable to the attention and adulation of potential followers and hagiographers, especially when compared to the eloquent and charismatic devotee of nirgu?a Brahman, D?d? Day?l. The purpose of hagiographies is to present the teacher?s life as a testimony of his superior doctrine and as a role model to emulate. D?d? challenged the orthodoxies of his time, both Hindu and Islamic, by advocating a direct relationship with the divine, not dependent on religion, teachers, scripture or caste. In contrast, Ni?cald?s did not challenge orthodoxy to the same degree as D?d?; he made the uncompromising doctrine of Advaita Ved?nta accessible in the vernacular and, while doing so, presented a cogent assessment that evaluated centuries of viewpoints about the doctrine, both for and against, and provided a definitive version showing which thinkers were consistent with the doctrine, and which were not. He presented the core of Advaita in the vernacular so that one did not have to know Sanskrit and be immersed in the tradition in order to understand and assimilate it. While Ni?cald?s was highly respected and sought after as a teacher, his life and acts did not lend themselves to hagiographic purposes for three reasons. a) Ni?cald?s did not offer a new doctrine; what he presented in his works had already been stated by ?a?kar?c?rya in the seventh century, and even earlier, by the authors of ?ruti. b) The superiority of Advaita Ved?nta had also been argued by numerous Advaitins prior to Ni?cald?s, who was 356 merely clarifying their arguments, sorting through seemingly conflicting views, and determining the most effective and relevant standpoints. And, c) while Ni?cald?s is certainly reported to have lived a life that demonstrated his identity with Brahman, attaining such identity, according to Ved?nta, requires that the seeker not simply emulate a living teacher but engage in ?rava?a, listening to canonical texts expounded by a teacher, manana, reflection, on the content of these texts, and nididhy?sana, profound and continuous meditation on the same. From a review of D?d??s teachings, as recorded in the D?d? V??? and presented in chapter 3, it becomes clear that D?d? was intimately familiar with the teachings of Islam and that he did not consider Muslims as ?others.? For D?d?, a true Muslim is one who is honest, patient, compassionate, and considerate to all (DV 13.26-28). Moreover, D?d? suggests that categorizing humans as Hindus and Muslims is contrived and irrelevant from the standpoint of the highest, the non-dual. D?d? is critical of all religious groups, not just Hindus and Muslims; he considers himself to be beyond such trivial labels. He is equally critical of both Hindu and Muslim practices and does not value the study of scripture, which he considers to be empty of praxis. Brahman without attributes (nirgu?a) is beyond words. D?d? is also critical of j?ti, caste, considering it a bhrama, an erroneous notion. From the standpoint of the absolute, p?r?a brahma, there is only one ?tm?; to think in terms of j?ti and var?a, caste and class, is indicative of not seeing the true nature of reality, of ?beating the snake? even though it is not really there. Rather than considering a person in terms of his caste based on birth and lineage, D?d? believes that one?s deeds and what is within oneself are the things that matter. These views are also echoed in the works of D?d??s immediate disciples, Rajjab and Sundard?s, although hints of the ?brahmanization? of the D?d? Panth are already visible in Sundard?s?s writings. D?d? and his followers advocate the transcendence of categories such as Hindu and Muslim, high caste and low. They were not the first, since Kabir (1398-1448) and N?nak (1469-1539) had preached this radical message prior to D?d?, and D?d? was familiar with their works. This is altogether logical and unsurprising: for a nirgu?? sant, a devotee of the unqualified, attribute-less God, any duality is evidence of mistaken attachment to the unreal, and any attachment to attributes and forms is tantamount to forsaking the divine. Growing up within and maintaining a lifelong affiliation with the D?d? Panth, Ni?cald?s must have internalized this message, which would have a significant bearing, on both his preference for Advaita Ved?nta and on his decision to write in the vernacular. 357 10.3 Motives for Writing in the Vernacular We saw that in general there is an average time lag of four or five centuries between the start of literary vernacularization and the appearance of independent Advaita texts (Table 2, p. 85) due to the fact that the vast body of Sanskrit philosophical literature that continued to be generated through the eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries took longer to assimilate and structure. However, an independent work such as Ni?cald?s?s VP reflects the historicist periodization seen in Sanskrit works on Ny?ya and Advaita, and, in reorganizing vast swaths of Advaita thought, it brings out a freshness and relevancy of the subject that was in danger of being suffocated by the centuries of commentarial argumentation and counter-refutation carried out in Sanskrit. Sheldon Pollock describes vernacularization as a deliberate choice to create texts, which are modeled on those of a ?superordinate literary culture? and a cosmopolitan language such as Sanskrit, in languages that ?do not travel,? electing instead to ?remain within a limited world.? Such a choice is influenced by cultural and political factors and potentially by nationalizing and colonizing forces as well. In the case of Sw?m? Ni?cald?s, there are two superordinate literary cultures influencing his works: the Sanskrit philosophical tradition with its vast body of literature spanning millennia, and the D?d?panth? culture with its tradition of writing in vernacular Hindi since the sixteenth century. In contrast to Pollock?s characterization, rather than choosing to remain in a ?limited world,? Ni?cald?s chose to write in the vernacular for exactly the opposite purpose: to make his works more widely accessible than they would have been if they had been written in Sanskrit. Instead of ?not traveling,? his VS is widely available and almost pan-Indian with translations available in most of the major national languages including Sanskrit. Given what we have learned about R?j? R?msi?ha and Ni?cald?s in chapters 2 and 3, Ni?cald?s seems to completely ignore colonial and nationalist matters. But, in choosing to compose his works in the vernacular, he clearly engages with issues of culture and power, possibly motivated by his patron, the ruler of B?nd?, and also by his own experience of discrimination and hardships imposed by his j?ti in his attempts to acquire a Sanskrit education. Ni?cald?s?s decision to write in the vernacular may also have been influenced by R?msi?ha?s patronage and desire to have the works commissioned by him be in the vernacular, as had been the case for the Va??a Bh?skar about his Cauh?n lineage written by the poet S?ryamalla Mi?ra?. But nonetheless, Ni?cald?s?s writings clearly reflect a deliberate decision to write in the vernacular in order to make the knowledge of liberation available to all, irrespective of caste. His 358 decision to write in Hindi may have also been influenced by the then prevalent ?winds of vernacularization? and ?new intellectualism? and historicist perspectives that began to arise in literary works as early as the sixteenth century. In the sphere of philosophical literature, vernacularization occurred after as much as four to five centuries, partly due to the challenge of assimilating the colossal body of preceding knowledge in the field. But, as the next sections show, there is a deeper source to be found for Ni?cald?s?s motive to write in the vernacular. 10.3.1 Ved?nta and Caste As an agent of this process of vernacularization, Ni?cald?s is well aware of the ?internal criticism,? of heredity-based caste hierarchy within the earlier literature, such as the MBh from almost two millennia prior, which he cites in support of the eligibility of everyone, irrespective of caste, to attain the knowledge of liberation. He is particularly selective in citing ?a?kara as also supporting this position, but, as became evident in section 4.4 above, ?a?kara?s position on the eligibility of ??dras is more nuanced and politic. I have argued that, from an ultimate (p?ram?rthika) standpoint, ?a?kara subscribes to the same position as Ni?cald?s and many others in the Advaita and nirgu?? sant traditions. In the VP (8.108, 411), Ni?cald?s refutes the Manu-sm?ti injunction (4.80a) against teaching ??dras, ?na ??dr?ya mati? dady?t,? and in support, loosely and selectively paraphrases ?a?kara?s commentary to BS 1.3.34-38, which is typically titled ?The ineligibility of the ??dra (apa??dr?dhikara?am).? On closer scrutiny of the commentary, ?a?kara clearly states that the ??dra is ineligible for studying the Vedas (and thus, Ved?nta as well), giving only a passing concession to the fact that knowledge of liberation through the study of itih?sa and pur??a cannot be withheld from ??dras because knowledge of Brahman can arise as a result of [positive] tendencies (sa?sk?ra) developed in their past lives. To reconcile the contradiction between ?a?kara?s hardline stance against ??dras and his concessive statement permitting ??dras eligibility to gain Brahman-knowledge only through study of itih?sa and pur??as, we surveyed the broader corpus of ?a?kara?s works. It has been argued by scholars that, in his commentaries on the prasth?na-tray?, the BS, BhG and Upani?ads, ?a?kara was addressing the brahman orthodoxy and hence was rather conservative in order to win them over. In light of this, his vehemence against ??dras would be in keeping with the times, and it is altogether more 359 remarkable that ?a?kara saw fit to include mention of any possibility of ??dras attaining liberation. To get a better sense of ?a?kara?s true position, we looked at his independent works, particularly the short stotra (hymn), Man???-pa?cakam (MP) ?Five verses of Wisdom,? about an encounter between ?a?kara and a c????la, outcaste (section 4.4). Judging this work to be genuinely attributed to ?a?kara on the basis of a wide survey of scholarly opinions, we saw that ?a?kara advocates transcending caste altogether. We also get glimpses of this view in his commentaries to BU and TU and hence can conclude that Ni?cald?s was being true to ?a?kara?s broader intent and was not trying to misrepresent ?a?kara?s stance to further his own views. In support of their argument that ??dras are eligible for liberation, Ni?cald?s and ?a?kara both cited Mah?bh?rata ??nti-parvan 12.314.45c: ??r?vayec caturo var??n, all four var?as ought to be taught.? When the MBh was examined (section 4.5), we found that it too contains many statements that ??dras are eligible for the study of Brahman. In MBh 13.131, a dialog between Um? and ?iva, ?iva states that anyone with pure deeds, good conduct and virtue, even a ??dra, is to be considered a twice-born, not just those belonging to the brahman, k?atriya or vai?ya castes. In fact, a brahman is not determined by birth but by conduct. The verse cited by ?a?kara and Ni?cald?s occurs in a dialog where Vy?sa, the author of the MBh, blesses his five students, including his own son, ?uka. There, Vy?sa says that anyone ?who is desirous of learning the Vedas (brahma ?u?r??ave bhavet)? is eligible to study the Vedas (12.314.40b). While ?a?kara and Ni?cald?s cite ??r?vayec caturo var??n? to validate ??dras? eligibility to gain knowledge of Brahman through study of the itih?sa and pur??as, Vy?sa is actually referring to teaching the Vedas (including the Mah?bh?rata) to all four castes. There is no mention of the restrictive narrowing of the materials suitable for study by women and ??dras to just the itih?sa and pur??as. Thus, criticism of the heredity-based caste hierarchy goes all the way back to the time of the composition of the MBh. This is also evident in the BhG portion of the MBh, for example, BhG 4.13ab and 18.41, where K???a states that the four var?as were created by him in accordance with the distribution of karma and the gu?as. Moreover, in BhG 9.32, K???a himself allows that even women and ??dras can attain ?the highest goal.? Ni?cald?s himself mentions the argument of Amal?nanda (fourteenth c.), the author of the Kalpataru commentary on the Bh?mat?, that 360 even ?ruti speaks of non-brahmans such as Raikva (in CU 4.1-2) and women such as G?rg? V?caknav? (BU 3.6, 3.8) as possessing the knowledge of Brahman (VP 8.97, 406; section 8.4, p. 301). Back in the sixteenth century, Appayya D?k?ita, in his SLS, suggested that ??dras are only excluded from the study of sagu?a Brahman; everyone is eligible for the study nirgu?a Brahman. It is quite likely that Ni?cald?s was familiar with the SLS (see section 10.10.1 below). Appayya, however, falls short of giving ??dras complete access to liberation; through the study of the itih?sa and pur??as and the performance of good works, the ??dra will gain rebirth in a higher caste and then access liberation. 612 Thus, Ni?cald?s is not saying anything new vis-?-vis caste; he is simply yet again bringing to the foreground viewpoints that have been in the cultural consciousness for a long time but have been repeatedly disregarded for the sake of keeping the status quo favorable to the twice-born castes. Advaita Ved?nta, with its ultimate (p?ram?rthika) standpoint of absolute non-duality, and also the nirgu?? sant traditions of Kabir, D?d?, and others have continually spoken out against hereditary caste stratification. 613 Ni?cald?s is just one more voice in a chorus that extends through the millennia but this time in the vernacular. Whereas the nirgu?? sant traditions completely rejected the Vedic corpus, Ni?cald?s makes his case from within the Ved?nta tradition, drawing on ?ruti, sm?ti, and a vast lineage of illustrious teachers of Advaita. 10.3.2 Ni?cald?s?s Position on Caste Ni?cald?s simply makes the point, in a clear and uncompromising fashion, that all humans have the right to knowledge of the highest truth, of liberation. Ni?cald?s then actively embodies this point by writing in the vernacular. This can be viewed as a deliberately subversive act, essentially giving even the ??dras and those outside the caste system access to Upani?adic, i.e., Vedic knowledge of liberation that the Hindu orthodoxy traditionally limits only to listening to the itih?sa and pur??a texts.614 By presenting the teachings of Ved?nta in the vernacular, Ni?cald?s is not just giving access to the ??dras and those outside the caste system; he is giving them a chance to read and study these texts on their own. Ni?cald?s?s subversion is however 612 See n. 236, p. 87. 613 One might even speculate that Appayya D?k?ita?s acceptance of the eligibility of ??dras to study nirgu?a Brahman, in his sixteenth c. work, SLS, may have been somehow influenced by the nirgu?? sants such as Kabir, who preceded Appayya by a century. 614 Even the higher castes, who were perhaps losing their knowledge of Sanskrit by this time, benefited from Ni?cald?s?s vernacular works, as was attested by Pt. P?t?mbar (1917, 7) on p. 78. 361 restricted only to the Hindu sphere; the D?d?panth? trend towards Hinduization and the tacit exclusion of any mention of Muslims that began in the time of Sundard?s is well-entrenched by Ni?cald?s?s time to the extent that there is no mention of Muslims at all in his works. Nonetheless, Ni?cald?s considered Sanskrit unsuitable for dispelling any doubts an average person might have regarding Ved?nta (VS vv. 1.7-8).615 Therefore, without engaging in any doctrinal polemics, he composed VS in simple vernacular Hindi to avoid burdening the reader with technical Sanskrit vocabulary. The more erudite VP was taken on, possibly at the instigation of R?msi?ha, to dispel any doubts that may have remained for the readers of VS. Ni?cald?s?s own experience of caste discrimination encountered while on the quest for knowledge in his youth, coupled with his exposure to the non-sectarian, caste-disregarding teachings of D?d? Day?l and his disciples, was surely a factor. Ni?cald?s, from his Advaita perspective, claimed that the Ved?nta teachings of one who knows oneself as Brahman will remove all doubts and confusion, in any language, not just Sanskrit (VS vv. 3.10; VS 2.66, 36; VS 3.99, 59-60).616 A measure of the success of the VP may be gained from Pt. P?t?mbar who relates that several Sanskrit-knowing pandits read the text in hiding because they were embarrassed to have to seek help from a vernacular text (P?t?mbar 1917, 7). Yet, despite intentionally breaking with the Sanskrit tradition, when Ni?cald?s narrates the parable (in VS) of King Ag?dhadeva becoming enlightened through the teachings of a guru he had seen in a dream, the guru instructs the king in Sanskrit! Apparently the pro-Sanskrit tendencies in the nineteenth century were still rooted deeply enough in Ni?cald?s that, even in a Ved?nta text deliberately written in the vernacular, the dream-guru of a parable narrated in the vernacular must still impart teaching of liberation in Sanskrit rather than in the vernacular. 10.4 Influence of Ni?cald?s?s Works It is quite clear that his works have had great influence and popularity as a result of their use of the vernacular. VS has been translated into modern Hindi, Sanskrit, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu and English, and possibly Urdu and Gurmukhi. The VP and VS have also inspired considerable secondary literature. For VS, we have Pandit P?t?mbar?s ?ippa?? (gloss), written in 1917, and also his abridgment of the VP, called V?ttiratn?val?, published in the same volume. In similar vein are the Ved?nta-prad?pik? by Lak??nanda, an abridgement of VS (Si?ha 1981, 92), 615 Discussed in section 4.1, p. 70. 616 See section 4.1, pp. 70-77. 362 a Marathi commentary by ?S?khare? Kisan Mah?r?j (Kapil 2005, 247), as well as the translations into numerous languages. VS in Hindi has been available in various versions since at least 1917, if not earlier (Kapil 2005, 245). A Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s (KS) edition has been available since at least 1906, and is regularly studied by Advaita Ved?ntin monks in Benares, Rishikesh and Haridwar. The V?rkar? sect of Maharashtra, which worships Vi?hob? as a form of K???a, employs the VS as one of its primary training texts in its educational institutions. The VP too has been in print continuously since 1899, published virtually unchanged by Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s and the Venka?e?var Steam Press in Mumbai. It is the only version readily available, in a form that is has been virtually unchanged for over a century despite its many typographical errors and other incongruities. ?tm?nand Muni undertook a painstaking edit of the text in 1969 without the benefit of any handwritten manuscripts, but this edition, though vastly superior, has been out of print for nearly 40 years. 10.5 The VP, Illuminator of V?ttis The argument has been made that Ni?cald?s's deliberate choice to compose his works in the vernacular was a direct outcome of his being firmly rooted in his understanding of Advaita Ved?nta. The best way to fully understand his position is to look closely at his magnum opus on Ved?nta, the VP. This was undertaken in chapters 5 through 9, and here in the conclusion, a highly abridged version is provided in order to make Ni?cald?s?s emphasis on Brahman- realization more evident. Ni?cald?s is, for the most part, not saying anything new as compared to the traditional Advaita perspective. His brilliance lies in reorganizing vast swaths of over a millennium of post-?a?kara Advaita thought by using the concept of a v?tti as a central element around which the precepts of Advaita can be presented. Although the concept of v?tti is implicit in all of Advaita literature, it is never typically treated at length. By adopting this new structure, Ni?cald?s brings a clarity, freshness, and relevancy to the subject that was in danger of being suffocated by the centuries of commentarial argumentation and counter-refutation carried out in Sanskrit. At the very outset of the VP, Ni?cald?s states: ?Ignorance and its results are removed and the highest happiness, ?nanda, is attained by means of the v?tti, ?I am Brahman;? this is the ultimate purpose (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. In this connection, there arises the desire to know 1) what is a v?tti, 2) what is the cause of a v?tti, and 3) what is its purpose? For that, this text V?ttiprabh?kar, 363 The Illuminator of V?ttis, has been written.? A v?tti is defined as ?the modification of the anta?- kara?a and ignorance (aj??na).? One?s consciousness cognizes an object only when a v?tti ?goes out? through one?s senses and assumes the form of the object of perception. Ni?cald?s, in answering these three questions, uses the concept of v?tti as the central theme through which to explore Ved?nta epistemology, metaphysics and praxis. While one is not aware of one?s identity with Brahman, one relates to the objective world about us by means of various v?ttis, and in effect creates one?s ?reality? by means of these v?ttis. And, by means of the practices of listening (?rava?a) to Ved?nta texts and reflection (manana) and profound and continuous meditation (nididhy?sana) on their content, the seeker?s v?tti that takes the form of Brahman (brahm?k?ra v?tti), establishes the knowledge of oneself as Brahman, and effects liberation. Ni?cald?s?s goal is to lead the reader to an understanding of how to attain this knowledge of Brahman for oneself through the clarification of the process by means of which this occurs. 10.5.1 The Six Means of Cognition A v?tti leads to cognition, and it is necessary to distinguish between valid and invalid cognitions. To understand valid cognition, one must understand the six means (pram??a) that are accepted by Ved?nta: 1) perception (pratyak?a), 2) inference (anum?na), 3) verbal testimony (?abda), 4) analogy (upam?na), 5) postulation (arth?patti) and 6) non-cognition (anupalabdhi). These means of valid cognition, the topic of the first six chapters of the VP, were summarized in chapter 5 of this dissertation. In the discussion of perception, we learned that, for Ved?nta, erroneous cognition is not sense-produced but is a modification of ignorance (avidy?); thus, the anta?-kara?a is the locus as well as the material cause of the ignorance. Depending on whether the mind is considered a sense-organ or not, there are five or six kinds of sense-generated direct perception. Except through verbal testimony (?abda), which is treated as a separate means of cognition, sense perception cannot provide direct knowledge of Brahman. In presenting inference, Ni?cald?s maintains that there are two types: inference for oneself (sv?rtha), and inference for others (par?rtha). The latter is useful for proving the identity of the individual (j?va) and Brahman; however, inference alone cannot be the cause for self-realization of Brahman because the doctrine states that, apart from the Ved?nta utterances (v?kya), no other 364 means of knowledge takes up Brahman as its object. Inference merely serves to bring one closer to the knowledge of Brahman. Verbal testimony is the most important means of cognition for Advaita because it alone can bring about the realization of the identity of the j?va and Brahman. As a result, the different ways in which words bring about verbal cognition (?abda pram??a) is discussed in detail. Verbal cognition (??bd? pram?) can be either empirical (vy?vah?rika) or absolute (p?ram?rthika), and Vedic statements teach either empirical meanings or the absolute reality, Brahman. All Ved?nta statements are for the knowledge of Brahman alone, and are of two classes: 1) subsidiary statements (av?ntara-v?kya), which specifically explain either Brahman or the self; and 2) great sayings (mah?-v?kya) such as ?tat tvam asi, you are that? (CU 6.8.7), which explain the identity between the words ?you? and ?that.? The mah?-v?kyas bring about the knowledge of Brahman through inclusive and exclusive implication (bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a??), which is also bare implication (kevala-lak?a??), since there is a direct relation between the literal meaning and the implied meaning, namely, consciousness. When there is a potential conflict between two means of cognition, such as perception (pratyak?a) and verbal testimony (?abda), the cognitive apparatus for the object that is more greatly desired to be known (utka?a-jij??sita) will win out. The desire to know worldly things (laukika pad?rtha) and the apparatus for their cognition is always possible in the waking state, and such worldly things will be cognized in the absence of a desire to know Brahman. To obstruct the apparatus of cognition of worldly things, such as perception et al., one needs to develop a stronger desire to know Brahman as compared to worldly objects. Ni?cald?s holds that, rather than contemplation of the meaning of the Ved?nta, it is the desire to know Brahman itself that is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman. Ved?nta statements are not injunctions, as the M?m??sakas maintain, but have the knowledge of non-dual Brahman as their intent (t?tparya). For Ved?nta, even the Vedas are not eternal, as everything other than consciousness (cetana) is not eternal (anitya). Ved?nta considers the Vedas and the Mah?bh?rata, etc., to be humanly authored, but ??vara, Vy?sa (the author of the MBh), and the other authors are considered to be omniscient. ??vara reproduces the Vedas, i.e., ?ruti, faithfully from creation to creation, whereas Vy?sa and the other authors, according to their desire in each creation, create works that are considered sm?ti and are not necessarily identical to those of the prior creation. The goal of these 365 created works is the knowledge of Brahman, which is reproduced faithfully and eternally, from creation to creation. The traditional Ved?nta definition of analogy (upam?na) is the cognition of similarity. Ni?cald?s proposes a better definition of analogical cognition as that which arises from the cognition of either similarity or dissimilarity since, as there is nothing similar to Brahman, analogy would otherwise not be helpful to a seeker. Analogy (upam?na) thus becomes the cognition of the dissimilarity between the empirical world (prapa?ca) and Brahman, and its result is the analogical cognition (upamiti) that Brahman is dissimilar from the creation. Postulation (arth?patti) is accepted only by Ved?nta and M?m??s?. The postulation of an explanation (upap?daka) by the cognition of the lack of proof of that which is to be explained (upap?dya) is called the postulation cognition (pram?), and its cause, the lack of proof of that which is to be explained, is called the postulation means (pram??a). Postulation can arise either from what is seen (d????rth?patti) or from what is heard (?rut?rth?patti). An example of postulation from the heard is the case of a seeker understanding the meaning of Upani?adic statements such as ?tarati ?okam ?tmavit, one who knows the ?tm? transcends sorrow? (CU 7.1.3). On hearing of ?the cessation of sorrow through knowledge?, that which is to be explained (upap?dya), one has to postulate, by means of an explanation (upap?daka), the implied ?illusoriness of sorrow, ?oka-mithy?tva.? As an example of postulation from what is seen, after the mind is stilled during non-conceptual one-pointedness (nirvikalpa sam?dhi), only non-dual Brahman remains, and all experience of non-?tm? objects is absent. This absence is possible only if the non-?tm? objects are mental constructs that cease when the mind is stilled. Due to the perception of the lack of a proof of the absence of all duality upon the stilling of the mind, the conception arises that all duality is merely a mental construct. Here, the means of postulation is the cognition of what is to be explained (upap?dya), specifically, that all duality ceases on the stilling of the mind. The postulation cognition is the cognition of the explanation (upap?daka) that all duality is a mental construct. Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is only accepted by the Bh???a M?m??sakas and the Ved?ntins as a distinct means of cognizing non-existence (abh?va), which is not considered to be perceptible by the senses. Only the non-existence of those objects whose existence is ordinarily perceptible by the other positive means of cognition is cognizable. The scriptures speak of the non-existence of the empirical world (prapa?ca) in the past, present and future times as in 366 ?There is no diversity here at all, neha n?n?sti ki?cana? (BU 4.4.19). Non-cognition is useful to a seeker of liberation (jij??su) as a means of ascertaining the non-existence of the empirical world from the absolute (p?ram?rthika) standpoint. The nature of the empirical world is cognized, and, if it were absolute in nature, that would also be cognized. But it is not thus cognized; hence, the non-existence of the empirical world is absolute. Non-cognition aids a seeker in arriving at both the absence of diversity in the empirical world and the absolute difference of the empirical world from Brahman. In this brief review of the six means of cognition, much of the detailed analysis presented earlier has been omitted in order to draw attention to the fact that Ni?cald?s never loses sight of his main objective and the ultimate purpose (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta, namely, the knowledge that one is Brahman. He started the VP by telling us that a v?tti is the means for gaining this knowledge, and, therefore, he is going to tell us about v?ttis by answering the three questions he introduced. To explain how a v?tti leads to cognition, he takes up the different means of cognition at great length, but, at the conclusion of the presentation of each means, he discusses its direct or indirect utility in effecting the knowledge of Brahman. It is as if Ni?cald?s is aware that readers may lose sight of the goal as they try to keep up with the philosophical argumentation, as a result he reiterates that philosophical debate serves only to clarify one?s understanding of the means. This principal focus on soteriology will continue to be a noticeable pattern in the remainder of Ni?cald?s?s VP. 10.5.2 The Cause and Types of V?ttis Once the means of valid cognition have been described, Ni?cald?s turns to the second question pertaining to v?ttis, namely, what is their cause. For Advaita, there are only two types of causes, material and efficient (up?d?na and nimitta k?ra?a), which can also be divided into the special cause (as?dh?ra?a k?ra?a) and the common cause (s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a). For a v?tti that is a cognition, the material cause is the anta?-kara?a, and the efficient causes are the means of cognition (pram??a) as well as the functioning (vy?p?ra) of the contact between the sense organs and the objects, etc. For the v?tti that is ??vara?s knowledge, m?y? is the material cause, and the efficient cause is the unseen potency (ad???a) [of the collective j?vas]. For an error- producing v?tti, ignorance (avidy?) is the material cause, and defect is the efficient cause. Ni?cald?s puts forth a more robust definition of a v?tti as a modification of the anta?-kara?a and 367 ignorance, which is the cause for practical usage (asti-vyavah?ra k? hetu). Consciousness delimited by an uncontradicted v?tti (ab?dhita-v?ttyavacchinna-cetana) is termed a valid cognition (pram?-j??na), whereas consciousness delimited by a contradicted v?tti is an indirect cognition. The anta?-kara?a?s v?tti in the form of memory or recollection (sm?ti) is treated separately from direct and indirect cognitions. A detailed classification of the various kinds of v?ttis is presented next (chapter 5, Figure 9, p. 154) for the sake of understanding which v?ttis are worth cultivating for the purpose of attaining liberation, namely, knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman (though Ni?cald?s does not directly state this). The implicit message is that cognitions not pertaining to the self (an?tma- gocara) are unproductive. False (ayath?rtha) cognitions pertaining to uncertainty, regarding the means of cognition or the self, can be resolved through the study and contemplation (?rava?a- manana) of the four chapter of BS. Definite false cognitions that can be contradicted (b?dhita) by knowledge of something other than Brahman fall in either the empirical or illusory sphere and can be thus resolved by a proper understanding of the nature of superimposition and erroneous cognition. False cognitions that are empirically uncontradicted, namely, ignorance [of Brahman], cognition of the five elements (mah?bh?ta) and of the elemental apparent world (prapa?ca), can be resolved only through the knowledge of Brahman. 10.5.3 Superimposition and Theories of Error Thus, to understand and resolve false cognitions, in chapter 6, we looked at Ni?cald?s?s treatment of superimposition (adhy?sa). Superimposition is defined as either ?the appearance (avabh?sa) in the substratum (adhi??h?na), which possesses a different reality (satt?) from that of the substratum,? or ?the manifestation of an object in the locus of its absence.? Various classifications of superimposition were presented. The definition of superimposition does not extend to mediate erroneous cognitions (parok?a bhrama) because the term ?appearance (avabh?sa)? applies only to immediate cognition. Advaita is primarily concerned with addressing the immediate, non-objective (anartha), erroneous cognitions such as agency, etc. Understanding how these occur through superimposition leads to their removal and the knowledge of the nature of one?s self. Ni?cald?s presents a defense of superimposition against various objections and explains that, according to Ved?nta, all substances are imagined and their absence is absolute and hence Brahman. An entity is said to have anirvacan?ya status if it is 368 ?other than real or unreal (sad-asad-vilak?a?a).? That which is ?real (sat)? cannot be negated in the past, present and future; anything ?other than real (sad-vilak?a?a),? however, is that which is negated. ?Unreal (asat)? means that which has no form, such as the ?hare of a horn,? or ?son of a barren woman;? ?other than unreal (asad-vilak?a?a)? is that which has form. Thus, ?other than real or unreal? is that which has a form and can be negated. This leads us to the Advaita theory of error, anirvacan?ya-khy?ti. When an empirically real rope is erroneously cognized as an anirvacan?ya snake, the general attribute (?this-ness?) of the substratum, the rope, is validly cognized by the cognizer-consciousness that goes out to the rope in the form of a v?tti and becomes identical with the rope-delimited consciousness. Subsequently, the erroneous cognition of the snake arises due to ignorance of the particulars (vi?e?a) of the rope. Various views of the cause of this superimposition of a snake on a rope are considered, including those of one Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB), of a dharmi- j??na-v?d? (DJV), i.e., one who accepts substantive cognition, of Sarvaj??tman?s Sa?k?epa- ??r?raka, and of Prak???tman?s Pa?cap?dik?-vivara?a. An erroneous cognition is deemed to be of the form of a v?tti of ignorance (avidy?) in the shape of the superimposed object; that is to say, an anirvacan?ya relation of the superimposition object to the ?this-ness? of the substratum arises in the erroneous cognition. However, Ni?cald?s states that although the correctness of this view is in accordance with the ancient authors (pr?c?na-granthak?r), other views have similar merits and demerits. If any of these views effectively establishes the unreality of the empirical world and the knowledge of non-duality, the goal of Advaita is satisfied. After the soundness of the Advaita theory is established and defended against objections, Ni?cald?s presents five non-Advaita theories from the standpoint of their respective proponents and then shows each to be lacking, from the Advaita perspective: 1) sat-khy?ti-v?da, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real; 2) asat-khy?ti-v?da, the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is unreal, as subscribed to by the M?dhyamika Buddhists and some followers of Tantra; 3) ?tma-khy?ti-v?da, the Yog?c?ra Buddhist theory that the object of erroneous cognition is a mental state projected by the self; 4) anyath?-khy?ti-v?da, the Ny?ya theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real, but is present elsewhere; and 5) akhy?ti- v?da, the Pr?bh?kara M?m??saka theory that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real recollection and real substratum. Of these five, Ni?cald?s spends the most time refuting anyath?-khy?ti and, in the process, refutes the Ny?ya perspective on the cause of 369 extraordinary (alaukika) perceptual cognition. He also presents and refutes the Naiy?yika arguments against the Advaita anirvacan?ya-khy?ti and gives quite a detailed treatment of the Pr?bh?kara akhy?ti. In the process of refuting ?tma-khy?ti, Ni?cald?s restates the Advaita position: consciousness is only one (ekam?tra) and real; apart from it, the entire creation (prapa?ca) is false. Anirvacan?ya is the same as illusory (mithy?), and this property is well known in objects other than consciousness. Any object other than ?tm? is not real; in fact, the entire creation is of the nature of ?barely seen then gone (d???a-na??a),? just like an imaginary city in the sky (gandharva-nagara). There is no difference at all between objects observed in a dream or during the waking state. Even so, the silver in mother-of-pearl is illusory, and that in a mineshaft, etc., is empirically real. This difference between non-?tm? objects as real and illusory is merely for the sake of facilitating a seeker?s entry into the knowledge of Advaita. Non-?tm? objects are said to have a two-fold reality, empirical and illusory, while consciousness has ultimate reality. When the lesser reality of the created world (prapa?ca) relative to consciousness has been established in one?s intellect, through the example of the dream and through the negative sentences of Ved?nta, then one learns that all non-?tm? objects are illusory and bereft of both reality and manifestation (satt?-sph?rti-??nya). The elucidation of non-duality (advaita) by any other means is not possible. 10.5.4 Validity (Pram?tva) A potential objection is raised during the discussion of akhy?ti: since one engages in activity dependent upon the ascertainment of validity, accepting erroneous cognition leads to the impossibility of definite activity (prav?tti) as a result of doubts regarding the validity of the cognition. To show that this is not applicable to anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, Ni?cald?s embarks on a discussion of the nature of validity (pram?tva) and invalidity (apram?tva), their arising, and the types of their cognitions. He presents and refutes the Ny?ya theory of extrinsic validity (parata? pr?m??ya) as well as the differing views of M?m??s?. The Advaita theory of intrinsic validity (svata?-pr?m??ya) is presented as the apprehension of validity by the means of apprehension of cognition which is free from defect. The witness-consciousness (s?k??), accompanied by absence of defect, apprehends validity, whereas invalidity is cognized on experiencing unsuccessful activity and is not the object of the witness-consciousness. The production of invalidity occurs 370 via the cognition-producing means such as sense organs, inference, etc., accompanied by defect, which is external to the means. Thus, invalidity is produced extrinsically; when activity (prav?tti) occurs after an erroneous cognition, and the result is not obtained, an inferential cognition of invalidity occurs. Conversely, in the instant of the production of cognition itself, the nature of the cognition and the validity residing in the cognition are illumined by the witness-consciousness. Under erroneous cognition, Ni?cald?s includes cognition through contra-factual argument (tarka- j??na) along with erroneous certainty (bhrama-ni?caya), which is the certainty of that which is anirvacan?ya, and finally, doubt. In the case of a given cognition, the certainty of its validity alone opposes doubt regarding its validity, and it is known by experience that neither certainty of error nor doubt regarding error occurs in that cognition. Doubt regarding validity is of the form, ?Is this cognition valid or not?? Similarly, doubt regarding error takes the form, ?Is this cognition erroneous or not?? These doubts are identical, as they are concerned with validity and error, albeit in inverse ways. When there is certainty of validity, just as doubt regarding validity no longer persists, similarly doubt regarding error also does not persist. Therefore, in Advaita, even upon accepting erroneous cognition, definite activity is possible. 10.5.5 Ignorance Having concluded in VP 7a detailed analysis of the types of v?ttis and their causes, including erroneous cognitions, Ni?cald?s now takes up the final question, ?What is the purpose of a v?tti?? in VP 8. In chapter 7, we saw that, in brief, the primary purpose of a v?tti is the cessation (niv?tti) of ignorance (aj??na). The cessation of ignorance located in the consciousness (cetana) delimited (avacchinna) by a pot, etc., is brought about by the v?tti in the form of a pot, etc., in the form of non-?tm?; the cessation of ignorance located in the non-delimited consciousness is brought about by the impartite (akha??a) v?tti in the form of Brahman. That being the case, Ni?cald?s next embarks on an investigation of ignorance, its object, and its locus, and examines the views of V?caspati Mi?ra and Prak???tman. Ni?cald?s considers the terms aj??na, avidy?, prak?ti, m?y?, ?akti and pradh?na to be synonymous with ignorance. For Advaita, the entity that has the power (?akti) to conceal (?vara?a) and project (vik?epa), which is beginning-less and positive (bh?va-r?pa), is named aj??na, ignorance. It is called avidy? due to its being destroyed by knowledge (vidy?); it is called prak?ti and pradh?na, by being the material cause of the apparent creation (prapa?ca), m?y? because of effecting difficulties (durgha?a), and ?akti due to 371 its absence of independence (svatantrat?). Ignorance does not have non-negatable reality, but it is acknowledged to have a reality that is different from empty (tuccha-r?pa) unreality, and therefore it has been called anirvacan?ya, other than real and unreal. For Advaita, ignorance is a positive object of apprehension that is to be negated (nivartan?ya) by cognition. 10.5.6 The Relation between J?va and ??vara Ni?cald?s describes ??vara as the reflection (pratibimba) of consciousness in primordial matter based in pure consciousness, m?la prak?ti. Avidy? is the portion of m?la prak?ti qualified by the concealing power (?vara?a-?akti). The innumerable j?vas are the innumerable reflections of consciousness residing in the innumerable portions of ignorance. The relation between j?va and ??vara is described diversely. All views accept a three-fold consciousness: 1) j?va, 2) ??vara, and 3) pure Brahman. Since j?va and ??vara have both been considered reflections, what is attained by liberated j?vas is Brahman, and not ??vara. Four theories regarding the relation of j?va and ??vara are considered in considerable detail: 1) Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance, ?bh?sa- v?da; 2) Prak???tman?s Vivara?a Theory of Reflection, bimba-pratibimba-v?da; 3) the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da); and 4) the theory of there being only one j?va (eka-j?va-v?da, d???i-s???i-v?da). Of these four, Ni?cald?s gives the least attention to the theory of delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) of the Bh?mat? tradition. The theory that there is only one j?va (Prak???nanda?s eka-j?va-v?da) will be summarized in section 10.9. 10.5.7 Primordial and Secondary Ignorance (M?l?j??na and T?l?j??na) In chapter 8, Ni?cald?s undertakes a more detailed examination of ignorance. In both the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection, ignorance is considered to be the transforming material cause (pari??m? up?d?na) of the anirvacan?ya entities. The common cause (s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a) of the world (jagat) is primordial ignorance (m?l?j??na), the ignorance that conceals the nature of Brahman. Secondary ignorance (t?l?j??na or avasth?-aj??na) is the ignorance that conceals consciousness delimited by an up?dhi. Reflections in the mirror are known to be false (mithy?) even without the knowledge of Brahman, so they must be illusory, but the persistence of the reflection past the removal of ignorance suggests that the reflection ought to be considered empirical. To resolve this paradox, Ni?cald?s revises the distinction between the empirical and the illusory: ?That which is not produced by defects other than ignorance but is only produced by ignorance is empirical; that which is also produced by defects 372 other than ignorance is called illusory.? The reflection in the mirror is a transformation of primordial ignorance located in Brahman-consciousness; its substratum remains Brahman- consciousness alone. The reflection-superimpositions are not caused by defects other than ignorance; hence they can only be empirical. Primordial ignorance alone should be considered the material cause of either kind of superimposition, whether by the Theory of Appearance or by the Theory of Reflection. Also, the portion of ignorance with the power to project no longer remains after the cessation of the portion of ignorance in the form of its concealing power. The total cessation of ignorance occurs only by the cognition of the substratum devoid of obstructions. But as long as there remains the obstruction of pr?rabdha karmas, the cessation of the portion of ignorance that is the cause of projection does not occur even when the substratum is cognized as Brahman. Only a cognition having the same object is the opposer of ignorance; a cognition with different objects is not. Therefore, the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., opposes only the secondary ignorance situated in the consciousness delimited by the face, mirror, etc., and does not oppose primordial ignorance veiling Brahman. The cessation of reflection-superimposition is possible by means of the cognition of the face, mirror, etc., without requiring the cognition of the substratum and also without the cessation of primordial ignorance. The substratum-cognition, by being a dispensable antecedent (anyath?- siddha), is not a cause in the cessation of superimposition. When the cessation of superimposition is spoken of by means of substratum-cognition, it is to be understood that only the cessation of ignorance is brought about by the substratum-cognition, and then, the cessation of superimposition occurs by the destruction of ignorance as its material cause. Reflection- superimposition, similar to space and the rest of creation (prapa?ca), is caused by primordial ignorance. But because the reflection-superimposition can be negated by an opposing cognition, even without cognition of the substratum, it is considered to be illusory. 10.5.8 The Cause of Dreams Just as primordial and secondary ignorances are considered material cause for reflection- superimposition in the waking state, secondary ignorance is considered to be the material cause of dreams. Sleep is a particular state of ignorance, with the power to conceal and project. When primordial ignorance itself, qualified by adventitious (?gantuka) form, conceals consciousness delimited by the up?dhi, then it is considered to be secondary ignorance (avasth?-aj??na or 373 t?l?j??na). The efficient cause of the arising of secondary ignorance is the cessation (upar?ma) of the actions that are the cause of experience (bhoga) in the waking state. Because secondary ignorance is a particular form of primordial ignorance, primordial ignorance alone is its material cause. The substratum of the illusory seer is the empirical seer, and the substratum of the illusory vision is the empirical vision. Upon waking, the cognition of the empirical seer-seen itself is the cognition of the substratum of the dream, which brings about the cessation of the material cause in the form of secondary ignorance from which the cessation of the illusory seer-seen takes place. But the empirical seer is also inert like the seen due to its being non-?tm?. Therefore, consciousness alone is the substratum of the dream state, specifically, consciousness non- delimited by ego and located inside the body, i.e., j?va-consciousness in the form of a reflection in ignorance. Consciousness is related to the cognizer (pram?t?); therefore, just as happiness, etc., are immediately cognized without the functioning of the senses, it is similarly possible for the dream-superimposition to be immediately cognized without the functioning of the senses. The j?va-consciousness in the form of a reflection in ignorance, when delimited by ego, i.e., in the waking state, is the object of the v?tti in the form of ?I? (aham-?k?ra v?tti). When it is non- delimited by ego in the dream-state, the j?va-consciousness is not the object of the aham-?k?ra v?tti; nevertheless, it is not concealed, and, being immediate itself, immediate superimposition is possible on the j?va-consciousness. The dream is illumined by ?tm? without the functioning of the anta?-kara?a and the senses, and its immediate cognition occurs by means of the self- immediate ?tm?. In other words, dreams are illumined by self (?tma-prak??a) or self-effulgent. In a dream, the elephants, etc., being seen by the eyes (c?k?u?at?) that is perceived is also a superimposition, as are the elephants, etc. 10.5.9 D???i-s???i-v?da (DSV), the Theory that Perception Precedes Creation Self-effulgence need not be restricted to the dream state alone, and some thinkers extend this to all empirical states in accordance with the theory that perception precedes creation (d???i-s???i- v?da). Non-?tm? objects have no reality when uncognized (aj??ta-satt?); they all only have reality when cognized (j??ta-satt?). As long as the non-?tm? objects are revealed only by the witness (s?k??-bh?sya), their apprehension as objects of cognition produced by the senses is also superimposed. Ni?cald?s mentions two types of d???i-s???i-v?da. 1) Perception (d???i), as cognition (j??na-svar?pa), is creation (s???i); there is no creation separate from cognition. 374 2) Creation of the non-?tm? object takes place at the time of cognition of perception; prior to cognition, there is no non-?tm? object. Therefore, everything seen has reality when cognized (j??ta-satt?) alone, and not when uncognized (aj??ta-satt?). According to Ni?cald?s, these two kinds of d???i-s???i-v?da are accepted (abhimata) by all Advaita ??stras. He is less understated in his VS, where he unequivocally states that d???i-s???i-v?da is the correct view (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. The implications of this will be explored further in section 10.9. 10.5.10 Illusoriness (Mithy?tva) Accepting the fact that all non-?tm? objects are unreal, the question arises regarding the property of being unreal (mithy?tva) that is possessed by unreal objects: is that property real or unreal? It cannot be real, because that would violate non-duality. If it is unreal, it will be unable to contradict the reality of the creation (prapa?ca), and once again the Advaita position would be harmed. In response, Ni?cald?s provides the Advaita-d?pik? resolution that mithy?tva possesses an anirvacan?ya empirical reality which is capable of contradicting the empirical reality of creation since the two are of the same level of reality. The mithy?tva of creation is ascertained by a valid means of cognition, such as ?ruti, etc., and thus it contradicts the reality of creation. However, if only one reality is accepted, in the manner of ?Only reality as Brahman appears in the pot, etc., there is the absence of any further empirical or illusory difference in the reality of these objects.? In that case, the Advaita-d?pik? resolution is not possible, and so Ni?cald?s presents his own solution: A property ascertained by a valid means of cognition can contradict an opposing property; but, where the other property is also ascertained by a valid means of cognition, there is no contradiction. Although reality is apprehended in creation by the perceptual means of cognition, human perception is weaker than ?ruti statements that do not originate with humans (apauru?eya) and assert that the creation is unreal. Brahman?s being with manifestation (saprapa?catva) and being without manifestation (ni?prapa?catva) are both established by means of cognition; therefore, one property should not be negated by the other. But the highest human goal, i.e., liberation (parama puru??rtha), is attained only by the cognition of being without manifestation; hence, the goal of ?ruti is the setting forth of being without manifestation. The description of Brahman?s being with manifestation is useful in the understanding of non- dual Brahman without manifestation; but, since it is not the goal of ?ruti to describe being with manifestation, being with manifestation is not ultimate but is only conceived. But it is not 375 illusory either; since it is produced by ignorance free from adventitious defects, it is empirical. Thus, being without manifestation negates being with manifestation. Brahman?s being with manifestation is empirical and thus restricted, and it also is not eternal; it is present only in the time of ignorance prior to knowledge (vidy?) and is therefore negated by the property of being without manifestation. The converse is not possible. Ni?cald?s proceeds to provide five different ways in which the reality of the visible world is negated by its illusoriness (mithy?tva) as put forth in Ved?nta texts such as the Tattva-?uddhi, the Ny?ya-sudh?, the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, and the texts of two other unnamed authors. 10.5.11 Action (Karma) and Renunciation (Sanny?sa) Having thus established the illusoriness of creation, Ni?cald?s next takes up the means to dispel illusoriness, bluntly stating that there is no use for action in the cessation of an illusory (mithy?) entity, and consequently it is futile attempt to effect the cessation of sa?s?ra by means of either action or action along with knowledge. Cessation can be brought about only by knowledge. Wherever the combination of knowledge and action is described in ?ruti and sm?ti texts, the purport is specifically a sequential combination (krama-samuccaya) where a practitioner first performs action only and then later, having renounced all action, engages in listening to scripture (?rava?a), etc., for the sake of knowledge. Action is to be done only as long as detachment (vair?gya) and the strong desire to know the inner essence (pratyak tattva) have not arisen through the purification of the anta?-kara?a. But once detachment and strong desire to know have arisen, only renunciation is to be performed in the form of the giving up of action along with the means. Thus, although actions alone are the means of knowledge, in the time subsequent to the strong desire to know, only the sections (a?ga) of renunciation (sanny?sa), the ?ama, dama, etc., are to be performed and not actions. All good deeds, optional (k?mya-karma) as well as obligatory (nitya-karma), are useful in knowledge, since they cause the removal of the p?pas that are obstacles to knowledge. With the arising of the desire for knowledge accompanied by strengthened dispassion (vair?gya), renunciation, in the form of the giving up of actions along with the means, is to be undertaken. The cessation of p?pas that are obstacles to knowledge is brought about even through renunciation. The obstacles to knowledge are multifarious; the cessation of some obstacles occurs through action, and the cessation of others, through renunciation alone. 376 Therefore, action and renunciation are both causes of knowledge since they effect the cessation of the knowledge-obstructing p?pas and are to be undertaken in sequence. Sometimes knowledge does not occur by means of ?rava?a, etc., that are performed only during the times of breaks (chidra) in day-to-day worldly action; renunciation is thus the cause of the practice (abhy?sa) of continual ?rava?a, etc. Ni?cald?s considers differing opinions as to whether or not k?atriyas, vai?yas and ??dras are eligible for renunciation as well as ?rava?a and concludes that all humans are eligible for knowledge and devotion. Due to the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior births, even those of the lowest caste can develop a desire to know (jij??s?) and then, by means of human words, can get knowledge of Brahman and become liberated by the cessation of ignorance and its effects. Only humans are capable of self-knowledge (?tma-j??na). To effect self-realization, one must cultivate the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?), the twenty-six positive traits enumerated in BhG 16.1-3. Ni?cald?s states that the conclusion (nirdh?ra) of all ??stras is that all humans are eligible for devotion to God and Brahman-realization. 10.5.12 The Cessation of Ignorance The conclusion (siddh?nta) of Advaita texts is that the cessation of ignorance and its effects is brought about by Brahman-realization (tattva-j??na). Hence, Ni?cald?s examines the form that is taken by the removal of ignorance and attainment of Brahman-realization. The v?tti of the anta?-kara?a in regard to the identity of j?va and Brahman is called Brahman-realization, and the anta?-kara?a is an effect of ignorance; therefore, Brahman-realization in the form of the anta?- kara?a?s v?tti is also an effect of ignorance. The universal (s?m?nya) rule that the cause and effect do not oppose one another is negated by the particular (vi?e?a) rule that the cognition and ignorance having the same object mutually oppose each other. The ignorance-caused v?tti- cognition in the form of Brahman-realization brings about the destruction of ignorance along with its effects. If ignorance is completely destroyed by Brahman-realization, then the body of the wise person, who becomes liberated while living (j?van-mukta) through Brahman-realization, should cease to exist because the persistence of the body, or the effect, is not possible with the destruction of ignorance, or the material cause. However, even after Brahman-realization has occurred, the persistence of the wise person?s body is observed until the fruition of the commenced (pr?rabdha) karma, and, therefore, some authors hold that a trace (le?a) of 377 ignorance still remains even upon Brahman-realization. Ni?cald?s suggests that when the cessation of ignorance with its effects takes place, since there is no other object left suitable for cessation, the cessation of Brahman-realization also occurs without requiring any other means for its cessation. It occurs in a manner analogous to how, when burning charcoal is added to a grass heap, the grass heap is reduced to ashes, and the charcoal is also reduced to ashes along with the grass. According to Padmap?da, knowledge opposes only ignorance but not its effects. Thus, the cessation of ignorance alone occurs from Brahman-realization, and in the instant following the cessation of ignorance, its effect ceases by itself due to the absence of the material cause. However, as long as trace ignorance in the form of pr?rabdha karma remains, the body persists, but, when the pr?rabdha karma obstruction becomes absent, the body and the Brahman- realization both cease. There are two means for Brahman-realization by which the cessation of ignorance takes place. According to all Advaita texts, 1) for the best aspirant (uttama adhik?r?), ?rava?a and the rest alone are the means; and 2) for the middling aspirant (madhyama adhik?r?), the contemplation of the self as attribute-less (nirgu?a) Brahman (aha?-graha up?san?) is a means of Brahman-realization. But several authors hold that for both alternatives, continued meditation (prasa?khy?na), a continuous stream of v?ttis, is the sole instrument for Brahman-realization. Just as the middling aspirant is required to perform contemplation of a continuous v?tti in the form of attribute-less Brahman, and that in itself is considered prasa?khy?na for that aspirant, similarly, for the best aspirant too, after reflection (manana), prasa?khy?na in the form of nididhy?sana is the means for immediate cognition of Brahman. Because prasa?khy?na is not a means of cognition (pram??a), the knowledge of Brahman that it causes cannot possibly be a valid cognition (pram?). Nevertheless, like an erroneous cognition leading to the correct result (sa?v?d? bhrama), and since the negation of objects does not take place without knowledge of Brahman, it is possible for the knowledge of Brahman caused by prasa?khy?na to be a pram?. Moreover, the source of continuous meditation in the form of nididhy?sana is verbal testimony (?abda-pram??a); so from this too it is possible for knowledge of Brahman to be a pram?. However, the principal opinion of Advaita texts is that immediately after the knowledge caused by the mah?-v?kyas, there is no need for prasa?khy?na, but the immediate perception of non- dual Brahman occurs via the mah?-v?kyas themselves. Together with one-pointedness caused by nididhy?sana, the mind is an accessory in the knowledge of Brahman, but the words in the form 378 of the Ved?nta statements alone are the means of knowledge of Brahman; the mind is not the means. ?ruti (KeU 1.6) states that Brahman cannot be the object of a mental cognition; only verbal testimony (?abda) in the form of the Upani?ads can be the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, ?abda alone is the instrument of the direct perception of Brahman, and not the mind. Although ?abda has the capacity for producing only mediate knowledge, yet, after performing ?rava?a as described in the ??stras, immediate knowledge pertaining to Brahman can arise via ?abda qualified by the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of mediate knowledge and accompanied by one-pointed consciousness. The immediate knowledge of Brahman is possible only through ?abda, when assisted by a pure, steady mind qualified by the impressions of the mediate knowledge of Brahman. ?ruti speaks of the cessation of all suffering in the form of superimposition, which occurs through the knowledge of Brahman. Because the superimpositions such as agency (kart?tva), etc., are immediate, their cessation is not possible through mediate knowledge of Brahman; only by immediate knowledge of Brahman can the cessation of immediate superimposition be brought about. Since the other pram??as besides ?abda do not pertain to Brahman and since the cessation of immediate superimposition does not occur without immediate knowledge of Brahman, the immediate knowledge of Brahman is proven to occur only through ?abda. The immediate knowledge of Brahman caused by ?abda is established through the means of postulation on the basis of what is heard (?rut?rth?patti). Alternatively, immediacy is dependent on the object, and not on the means of cognition. Therefore, the cognition of an immediate object is immediate itself, whether it be via the senses or by other means of cognition. Brahman-consciousness is always immediate since the cognizer- consciousness is always identical to Brahman-consciousness, and therefore the knowledge of Brahman produced by verbal testimony (?abda pram??a) in the form of the mah?-v?kyas is also considered to be immediate. The Upani?adic subsidiary statements do not have the capability to produce immediate cognition; only the mah?-v?kyas have this capability. Ni?cald?s explains this through the definition of an immediate cognition. An immediate object is defined as the identity of the unconcealed object with consciousness favorable (anuk?la) to its function (vyavah?ra). Immediate cognition is defined as the identity of consciousness suitable to its function with the unconcealed object. Since the identity of j?va with Brahman is ever-present, even with the identity of concealed Brahman with consciousness suitable to its function in the state of sa?s?ra, 379 due to Brahman being concealed, there is no identity of the object as the unconcealed Brahman with consciousness suitable to its function. Therefore, the immediacy of Brahman does not occur. Similarly, since the knowledge caused by the subsidiary Upani?adic statements is identical with the object in the form of concealed Brahman, immediacy does not apply to the knowledge. 10.5.13 The Use and Result of a V?tti Three questions were presented at the start of the VP: 1) What is the nature of a v?tti? 2) What is the cause of a v?tti? 3) What is the use and result of a v?tti? A v?tti was generally defined as ?the modification of the anta?-kara?a and ignorance,? and it takes the form of illumination of the object of perception. Its particular nature was described via its differences, based on truth (yath?rthatva), falsity (ayath?rthatva), etc. Through the description of the means of cognition, the cause of a v?tti was also stated. Now Ni?cald?s can answer the third question pertaining to the purpose of a v?tti: the relation of the j?va with all three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep) occurs by means of a v?tti, and the attainment of liberation (puru??rtha) is also by means of a v?tti. The waking state is defined as the time that is the basis (?dh?ra) for sense-caused cognition and the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of sense-caused cognition, and that is different from the dream and deep sleep states. Thus, the waking state function is dependent on sense-caused cognition, which is in the form of a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a. The j?va is that which has ignorance as its up?dhi. Even when an object has a relation with that j?va-consciousness, the function of being known, etc., in the object as well as the cognizer?s conception (abhim?na) of that function only occurs by the relation of the cognizer to the object, and it is the function of the v?tti to effect this relation since the cognizer resides in a location different from the object and does not always have a relation with the object. The dream state is the state of the immediate (aparok?a) v?tti of the anta?-kara?a pertaining to an object, which is not caused by the senses. In the dream, both the cognition and the cognizer are the modifications of the anta?-kara?a. Deep sleep is the state of the v?tti pertaining to pleasure and ignorance (avidy?) in the form of the immediate (s?k??t) modification of ignorance (aj??na) because, in deep sleep, the witness seated in the v?tti of ignorance illuminates the ignorance and the pleasure that is its nature (svar?pa-sukha). In deep sleep, a person?s anta?-kara?a becomes absorbed (l?na) in the portion 380 of ignorance that has been modified into pleasure and resides there. Then, at the time of waking, that portion of ignorance is modified into the anta?-kara?a, and the pleasure experienced in deep sleep is recollected by means of a v?tti of ignorance. The conception (abhim?na) of the three states in this fashion is itself bondage. Erroneous cognition (bhrama-j??na) is called conception, which is just a particular v?tti. Therefore, sa?s?ra is nothing but bondage caused by v?tti. When a v?tti of the anta?-kara?a occurs by means of the Ved?nta statement that ?aha? brahm?smi, I am Brahman? (BU 1.4.10), then this v?tti causes the cessation of ignorance along with the material creation (prapa?ca), and that itself is liberation. Thus, in sa?s?ra, the purpose of v?ttis is to establish empirical reality, whereas the highest purpose of a v?tti is for liberation, i.e., knowing absolute reality, whereby sa?s?ra conceived in the empirical state is negated. 10.5.14 The Cessation of the Conceived (Kalpita k? Niv?tti) Liberation, or the cessation of the conceived, is in the form of the known substratum. In other words, Brahman, as the substratum of all superimpositions, is not something that is unknown. In making this argument, Ni?cald?s draws on the fact that the ??stras (scripture) and wise persons describe Brahman as the ultimate real substance. To say that ?the cessation of sa?s?ra is liberation? establishes that Brahman is liberation. At the time of liberation, Brahman is not qualified (vi?i??a) by, or limited by (upahita), known-ness (j??tatva). In the state of liberation, there is no present relation with known-ness (j??tatva), but the known-ness attribute has occurred previously, and therefore, although the substratum is not qualified (vi?i??a) or conditioned (upahita) by known-ness, it is however designated (upalak?ita) by known-ness. Prior to the arising of known-ness, in the state of sa?s?ra, the substratum is not designated by known-ness. But, subsequent to the known-ness arising, even in its absence, the substratum can be designated by known-ness, and its nature is the cessation of sa?s?ra. The cessation of the anirvacan?ya conceived is also anirvacan?ya itself and momentary. The cessation of the conceived remains for only one instant after knowledge, and does not cause duality. After one instant, the absolute absence of that cessation of the conceived occurs, and that is in the form of Brahman. This cessation of the conceived, i.e., the cessation of sorrow, is not the human pursuit (puru??rtha) as it exists only momentarily. If only the absence of sorrow were the object of a person?s desire, then a person would not have desire for the pleasure that is totally eclipsed by 381 sorrow. The desire of a person for the absence of sorrow also occurs for the sake of natural happiness alone. Therefore, the principal human pursuit is not the absence of sorrow, but only happiness. Ignorance, the visible creation in the form of existence and non-existence as well as their cessation all are anirvacan?ya. The negation of them all is liberation in the form of the substratum, and that is of the nature of non-duality, ultimate happiness (param?nanda), and the highest human pursuit. With this, the VP concludes. 10.6 The Completeness of the VP Though the progression of ideas in the VP is logical, the end might appear abrupt. Was the text completed? Ni?cald?s?s successor Day?r?m, in his letter reporting Ni?cald?s?s final days to R?j? R?msi?ha, mentions that seven chapters had been completed and the eighth was also complete; only the conclusion was lacking at the time of Ni?cald?s?s death. It is unclear who compiled the final version of the text.617 Concerning the apparent abruptness of the VP?s ending, let us compare it to other Ved?nta texts. Ni?cald?s devotes just ten pages to the nature of liberation, described as ?the cessation of the conceived? (VP 8.161-72, 436-46), the majority of which is taken up with presenting and refuting opposing views, particularly that of the Ny?ya- makaranda that the cessation of the conceived is of a fifth kind, other than the four possibilities of true, false, both-true-and-false, and neither-true-nor-false. Thus, the actual description of the cessation of the conceived amounts to being fewer than two pages (VP 8.171-2, 444-6) and constitutes the end of the text. Now, if we look at the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (1050 CE), there too, the nature of liberation is described in the last and by far the shortest of its four chapters, comprising only 63 verses (where the total text runs to 1240 verses). Approximately 30 of these verses describe the fruits of self-knowledge, the fact that liberation is identical to the ?tm?, and 617 Day?r?m writes: ?v?tti d?pik? likh? hai sau yah sam?c?r hai. saptaprak?? var?e the unm?tai kuch k??hai b? hai aur gh?le b? hai, aur ??hv?? prak?? ba??vai the so haz?r p??h ba?? itne mai? ?ar?r?nt ho gay?. iti ?r? to hu? nah?? aur pad?rth bahut se likhe gae aur haz?r ne yah p?ch? ki mah?r?j k? mukh?rvind dv?r? kisai s?dhu nai su?? hovai usk? n?m likhiyo cho n?m kisk? likhe, sutantra rahne v?le p??c s?t s?dhu to pahle the so mah?r?j k? ?ar?r p?r? hot?? kitnek to cale gaye aur kitnek s?dhu pustak likhte hai?? granth to p?r? ho gay? par iti ?r? ho?e k? kasar b?k? rah ga? likha? pa?ha? v?l? k? ih?? to aus?? nah?? ?vt? parantu sutantra hai? sau d?d?dv?re k? mel? kar?e ?ve?ge jad gha?as re uh?? ikase ?ye hove?ge jad dekh? j?veg?. The news regarding the V?tti D?pik? [possibly the ?working title? of the VP] is that seven chapters were written and edited[?, k???n? and gh?ln?]. And the eight chapter that was written was very long, when [Ni?cald?s] passed away before finalizing it. And Your Highness [R?j? R?msi?ha] had asked for the name of any s?dh? who might have heard the text directly from [Ni?cald?s]. What to say of those, there were five to seven earlier, most of whom left on [Ni?cald?s]?s death, and as it is, how many s?dh?s write books? The [VP] text was completed, it just fell short of being concluded. There is nobody literate here. But, when your [R?j? R??si?ha?s] esteemed self comes for the festival at D?d? Dv?r?, at that time many [s?dh?s?] will have gathered there, then we?ll see [what to do about compiling the final version of the text?]? (Si?ha 1981, 13). [The punctuation in the Hindi text above is my editorial judgment. The only punctuation in the source is a da??a after ??ar?r?nt ho gay?.?] 382 whether liberation is embodied (j?van-mukti) or immediate. The remaining verses deal with the disciple?s introductory question, refutations of the efficacy of karma for effecting liberation, whether the cessation of the ignorance is of the fifth kind, and closing dedicatory verses. As another point of comparison, 618 consider the I??a-siddhi by Vimukt?tman (850-976 CE), comprising 602 verses and eight chapters. The last chapter examines the removal of ignorance and has only 28 verses, just four of which (8.24-28) deal with the nature of liberation, while the earlier verses refute incorrect notions of the nature of the cessation of the conceived. From this rather brief comparison, it becomes clear that these authors were concerned primarily with refuting incorrect and unhelpful notions that hinder the understanding of one?s identity with Brahman and perhaps felt that, since the process of correcting these mistaken notions leads one to direct experience of one?s self and Brahman, there is no need to say much more on the topic. Hence, I would surmise that Ni?cald?s?s VP, rather than being brought to an abrupt end by his passing, is mostly complete in the form that we have it. It is likely that Ni?cald?s had already laid out the sections and may have intended to further flesh out the content of some portions and perhaps to add a concluding doh? or two as he did at the end of the major section dealing with anirvacan?ya-khy?ti (in section 6.3.1, p. 178). However, I am unable to identify any glaring absences and believe that the text as we have today forms a cohesive whole, despite Ni?cald?s?s untimely demise. 10.7 Resolution of Differences in Positions After working through the entire VP, one is left with the sense of Ni?cald?s as an extremely well-read Advaita scholar, intimately familiar with Ny?ya, M?m??s?, and Advaita texts up to his time (See Appendix: Works and Authors Cited in VP, p. 409). He is not just regurgitating the ideas of his predecessors but is presenting a careful, reasoned analysis of the relative merits and demerits of various views and occasionally advancing his own refinements and clarifications. What follows is an enumeration of instances where Ni?cald?s presents differences in the standpoints of past Advaitins, and a look at how Ni?cald?s resolves these in each case. 618 Advaita texts are legion. I have deliberately chosen Sarvaj??tman?s Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (S?) and Vimukt?tman?s I??a-siddhi for comparison of their length of treatment of the state of liberation, or the cessation of the conceived, because they both also consider whether the cessation of ignorance is of the fifth type, as ?nandabodha does. In fact, the I??a-siddhi is the source for ?nandabodha?s Ny?ya-makaranda conception of the cessation of ignorance being the fifth type as discussed in the VP by Ni?cald?s, and possibly also for Sarvaj??tman (Vimukt?tman 1933, xxxv-vi). 383 In describing the sense-organs, Ni?cald?s presents V?caspati Mi?ra?s view that the mind is a sense-organ that validly cognizes happiness, sorrow, etc., and contrasts it with Padmap?da?s view that the mind is not accepted as a sense-organ and, instead, happiness and sorrow are revealed by the witness-consciousness (s?k??). First, Ni?cald?s enumerates four defects pertaining to V?caspati?s position: 1) unlike the other five senses, the mind does not have a special object; 2) BhG 3.42, where the mind is said to be ?superior to the senses, indriyebhya? para? mana?,? does not include mind among the senses; 3) by accepting the mind as a separate sense-organ, V?caspati suggests that Brahman-realization is mental, which is opposed to scripture; 4) the mind is a state of the anta?-kara?a, which, being the locus of immediate cognition, is the agent of cognition, and that which is the agent (kart?), cannot be the instrument (kara?a). But then Ni?cald?s proceeds to show that these are not truly defects: 1) happiness, sorrow, desire, etc., are the special objects of the mind; 2) in BhG 3.42, indriyas denote external sense organs, and thus there is no conflict to say that the mind is superior to the external sense organs; 3) Brahman is neither an object of the mind, nor of a v?tti, except for the v?tti removes the ignorance which conceals Brahman; 4) the anta?-kara?a can be the agent by virtue of being the locus (??raya) of cognition, and the mind, as the modification of anta?-kara?a, can be an instrument of valid cognition, and therefore, also a means of cognition (pram??a). Ni?cald?s states that it does not damage one?s understanding of Ved?nta, i.e., one?s knowledge of Brahman, whether one accepts V?caspati?s view that the mind is a sense-organ, or not.619 Ni?cald?s seems to suggest that, since neither view of the mind hinders a seeker?s attainment of Brahman, one is free to choose the view that personally resonates best. He essentially shows through extensive use of logical analysis that neither position on this matter conflicts with scripture and thus has no adverse soteriological effect. Ni?cald?s does not hesitate to point out flaws in the Ved?nta-paribh??? and its commentary with regard to analogy (upamiti) (VP 4.5, 96-98). The author of the Ved?nta-paribh???, Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra (1550-1650 CE), defines the means of analogy (upam?na) as the cognition of similarity, 620 but Ni?cald?s holds that a better definition of analogical cognition is that which arises from the cognition of either similarity or dissimilarity; otherwise, there will be 619 Mayeda suggested the same for ?a?kara: ?It is not important at all to ?a?kara whether or not the manas [mind] is an indriya [sense-organ]: what he wishes to emphasize is that neither manas nor the indriyas are ?tman? (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 2:33). 620 s?d??ya-pram?-kara?am upam?nam (Dharmar?j?dhvari?ndra, R?mak?s?n??dhvarin, and Amarad?sa 2000, 245). 384 no favorable analogical example for ?tm?, since there is nothing similar to it. Ni?cald?s also takes to task Dharmar?ja?s son, R?mak???a D?k?ita (1625-1700 CE), the author of ?ikh?ma?i commentary on Ved?nta-paribh???), for suggesting that an analogical cognition is not caused by the cognition of dissimilarity. 621 When one states, ?your face is like [i.e., analogous to] the moon,? the similarity between the face and the moon is directly perceived, but the analogical cognition here is a rhetorical figure of speech (upam?la?k?ra). The face-moon analogy example is actually from the Ma?iprabh? sub-commentary to the Ved?nta-paribh??? (by Amarad?sa, nineteenth c.). However, Ni?cald?s concedes that to explain this further would be difficult and also unproductive [for Brahman-realization]. Even though it is explained in texts such as the Ala?k?ra-candrik? (a seventeenth century text on rhetoric by Gajapati V?ra N?r?ya?adeva) and others, he does not develop this further. This gives us an example of Ni?cald?s?s use of reason to clarify one?s understanding of analogy as a means of cognition and also of his thorough reading of the secondary literature, his refusal to let any misstatements pass unchecked, yet, at the same time, his constant focus on that which is necessary for explaining the knowledge of Brahman to his reader. Pointing out the defect in R?mak???a?s logic here serves to remind his readers that they are in the hands of a knowledgeable guide622 who will leave no stone unturned to deliver his reader to Brahman-realization, while at the same time saving the reader from having to deal with exploring unproductive approaches or from developing an improper understanding of the means which might delay one on the pursuit of the knowledge of Brahman. In explaining anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, Ni?cald?s presents two different descriptions of the agency of superimposition. According to Sarvaj??tman in the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka, the property of being the substratum (adhi??h?nat?) is in the particular portion of the object and not in the general portion, whereas the property of being the locus (?dh?rat?) is in the general portion. However, Prak???tman, the author of the Pa?cap?dik? Vivara?a (PPV), holds that the property of being a substratum is in the general portion alone, and the content of valid cognition is the 621 R?mak???a writes: ?na ca go-visad??a u??ra iti vaidharmya-j??na-jany?nena visad??? mad?y? g?ur ity upamit?v avy?pti? tatropam?na-pram??y?nabhyupagam?t. na hi ka?cid anuvyavasyati karabhena g?m upaminom?ti. Our definition [of analogical cognition] does not fall short of covering the case where the analogical cognition, ?my cow is different,? may result from the cognition of the difference, ?the camel is different from a cow,? because the means of analogical cognition do not apply there, and neither does anyone subsequently realize, ?I cognize a cow by analogy to a camel?? (Dharmar?j?dhvari?ndra, R?mak?s?n??dhvarin, and Amarad?sa 2000, 247). 622 Similarly, when presenting the competing theory of sat-khy?ti after having explained the Advaita view of anirvacan?ya- khy?ti, Ni?cald?s states that although sat-khy?ti is not fit to be written about, however, if it were not described anywhere, the reader might conclude that the author was not aware of sat-khy?ti, therefore, Ni?cald?s has written about sat-khy?ti only to dispel this incorrect conclusion (VP 7.46, 281). See n. 431, p. 207. 385 object?s ?this-ness,? which opposes the object?s projection power, but, even when the ?this-ness? is known, the content of the ignorance due to concealing power is still possible. Ni?cald?s reconciles these views, suggesting that both the ignorance-caused concealing, i.e., erroneous cognition, as well as the overthrow of concealment via a valid cognition occur in consciousness alone. The substratum of all superimpositions is also consciousness. Based on this, Ni?cald?s shows that the two views are simply different ways of conceiving erroneous cognition and that both these views are soundly defensible against objections. But once again, this reconciliation suggests that Ni?cald?s simply wants the reader to understand the Advaita siddh?nta that all is Brahman as consciousness, and, as long as one understands this, either viewpoint is efficacious. Once again, as in the issue regarding whether the mind is a sense-organ or not, neither viewpoint in this current case conflicts with scripture and thus has no adverse soteriological effect. Ni?cald?s also explores at great length both the view of an Advaitin named Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB) that the contact of the eyes with the substratum alone is the cause for superimposition and the debate between KCNB and the proponent of substantive cognition (dharmi-j??na-v?din, DJV). Although KCNB is also an Advaitin, Ni?cald?s considers KCNB?s view to be ?against traditional views (s?mprad?yika vacana tai? viruddha)? and hence unacceptable. However, at the conclusion of his presentation of the KCNB-DJV debates, Ni?cald?s states that the various views considered ?have similar merits and demerits. In truth, the intent of Advaita is only to demonstrate the unreality of empirical world; there is no purpose apart from this in propounding or refuting subdivisions (av?ntara bheda). Thus, even if some refuted, incorrect view helps a seeker understand this, there is no harm. But here we have provided the reasoning only according to one view in order to prevent [a seeker] from going off on a wrong path, other than the way [shown by] the ancient teachers (pr?c?na ?c?rya).?623 The only reason the ?correct? view is pointed out is to help the seeker follow the path of the ancient, enlightened teachers. Here again, Ni?cald?s demonstrates his ever-present focus on the soteriological goal desired of his undertaking to write the VP, namely, to aid the reader in achieving the knowledge of Brahman, the ultimate and only reality. However, at the same time we see his respect for the Advaita tradition. Similarly, in the VS, when Ni?cald?s disagrees with Vidy?ra?ya and others who hold that ?rava?a, manana and nididhy?sana all are 623 VP 7.39, 275. See n. 426, p. 204, for the Hindi text. 386 required to gain immediate cognition (aparok?a-j??na) of Brahman (VS 1.21-3; also n. 200, p. 200), he provides the means to reconcile their position with the correct view (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. Ni?cald?s reiterates the soteriological priority of Ved?nta when he refutes potential arguments from the ?tma-khy?ti standpoint, namely, that the Ved?nta presentation of superimposition incurs the fallacy of unknown conception (aprasiddha kalpan? do?a) due to its conception of a logically indeterminate (anirvacan?ya) silver appearing in place of the mother- of-pearl and that ?tma-khy?ti has economy over anirvacan?ya-khy?ti due to not requiring one to imagine anirvacan?ya objects. Ni?cald?s states that the primary view (mukhya siddh?nta) of Advaita is that there is only one consciousness and it is real; the entire creation (prapa?ca) apart from consciousness is false, or anirvacan?ya. Thus, for Advaita, the true fallacy of unknown conception is to consider any object other than consciousness to be real. Ni?cald?s holds that, other than anirvacan?ya-khy?ti, no other theory of error can elucidate non-duality. Thus, it is unproductive to talk of economy or lack thereof; nevertheless, he proceeds to demonstrate that it is the ?tma-khy?ti view that suffers a lack of economy instead. While describing the nature of the cessation of ignorance after Brahman-realization, Ni?cald?s refutes Sarvaj??tman?s view that there is no trace-ignorance left after the realization (VP 8.118-20, 416-7; section 9.1.1, p. 315ff.), saying that this view ?contradicts the knower?s experience (j??n? ke anubhava ke viruddha hai).? Since the reader of the VP is presumably reading the text in order to gain the knowledge of Brahman and lacks the ?knower?s experience,? this remark only serves to remind the reader, in a very understated yet direct way, that Ni?cald?s himself is speaking from experience. But this cannot also be construed as Ni?cald?s suggesting that Sarvaj??tman did not have the knowledge of Brahman, given the high, albeit not uncritical, regard displayed by Ni?cald?s for Sarvaj??tman; therefore, one gathers that once again Ni?cald?s is merely attempting to clarify the situation and forestall any misunderstanding on the seeker?s part. When Ni?cald?s is describing Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) (in VP 8.9- 18, 348-55; section 7.4.1, p. 239ff.), he demonstrates the impossibility of Vidy?ra?ya?s stance that ??vara is the appearance in the ignorance qualified by the collective latent tendencies of the intellect (buddhi-v?san?) in the form of the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a). However, he does not find fault with Vidy?ra?ya but rather with the understanding of 387 Vidy?ra?ya?s teachings resulting from study without benefit of a teacher or tradition. Ni?cald?s goes on to show that in other parts of the PD, Vidy?ra?ya?s understanding conforms with the teachings of the M?U, and indeed, Vidy?ra?ya holds that the ?nandamaya-ko?a is of the j?va alone. Further, the mention of ??vara-ness in the ?nandamaya-ko?a that occurs in the Citra-d?pa (PD 6) is for the purpose of contemplation of the j?va?s identity with ??vara alone, just as in the M?U (VP 8.19, 355; section 7.4.1, p. 246ff.). Of the four theories regarding the relation of j?va and ??vara, Ni?cald?s gives the least attention to the Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) of the Bh?mat? tradition, possibly because he disagrees with its view that the j?va is consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a, and because, since the theory holds that formless consciousness cannot be reflected, its proponents must work harder to address the contradiction of ?ruti and sm?ti texts that propound the reflection of consciousness. But Ni?cald?s nonetheless accepts this theory because ?many Advaita authors? have propounded it, and it is acceptable as long as one does not accept the version that holds the j?va to be consciousness delimited by the anta?-kara?a. In this context, in the VS, he again states that, even though ?a?kara has propounded the Theory of Appearance in his V?kya-v?tti and Upade?a-s?hasr?, ?all methods of Ved?nta are for the sake of causing the knowledge of the non-dual ?tm?; by whichever method the seeker gains this knowledge, that method alone is right for her.?624 Going on to contrast the Vivara?a?s Theory of Reflection and Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance, Ni?cald?s points out that in the former, the nature of the reflection is real, while in the latter, it is false. Nevertheless, he states that both views are acceptable since the purpose is only to show that consciousness cannot possibly have the property of sa?s?ra and that there is no mutual difference between j?va and ??vara. Thus, any view that leads the seeker to understand the unattached Brahman is respectable. However, Ni?cald?s does suggest that it is easier to understand the identity of unattached Brahman and ?tm? by the Vivara?a view, and, from the perspective of grasping the essence, only the Theory of Appearance and the Theory of Reflection are reasonable. Yet again, the Advaita tradition is respected, yet the different views are evaluated on the basis of soteriological efficacy. In discussing the feasibility of the perception of space by means of a v?tti, Ni?cald?s finds fault with both Sarvaj??tman?s conception in the S?, and N?si?h??rama?s conception in the 624 VS 6.442, 275: sarva h? ved?nt k? prakriy? advaita-?tm? ke jan?vanai k?? hai. y?tai? jauns? prakriy? tai? jij??su k?? bodha hovai, so? t?k?? sam?c?na hai. 388 Advaita-d?pik?. Sarvaj??tman?s immediate perception of space by means of the mind requires the acceptance, on the basis of the result (phala-bala-tai?), of the relation of the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti with external space, assisted by an eye-v?tti of another form (any?k?ra). For N?si?h??rama, the immediate cognition of space requires the acceptance of an eye-v?tti that has the form of sight (?loka) [of light] spread over space, once again on the basis of the result. Their explanations for their respective scenarios are somewhat unsatisfactory, as Ni?cald?s himself concedes, 625 but he allows for their feasibility ?on the basis of the result,? i.e., the pragmatic consideration that we do perceive space immediately. It is appropriate to allow for immediate perception either via the senses or via self-illumination, as opposed to via the mind. Hence, the Advaita-d?pik? conception, albeit flawed, is the ?better? explanation (VP 8.71-2, 390-2; section 8.2.3, p. 285ff.). Ni?cald?s?s explanation of why the S? would even suggest its ?more flawed? scheme will be deferred until the next section. Thus, the S? and Advaita-d?pik? views are evaluated through the use of reason, and, while their interpretations are not outright rejected due to an implicit respect for the tradition, they are also not uncritically accepted. The cases of divergences among Advaita texts pointed out by Ni?cald?s in the VP that have been described in this section thus show some notable patterns. In all of these cases, there is considerable display of the use of reason and logical analysis to evaluate conflicting positions, which constitute the practice of philosophy. Frequently, Ni?cald?s demonstrates that the different positions have equal soteriological efficacy and are not in conflict with scripture; thus, one?s attainment of the knowledge of Brahman is not harmed by adopting any particular position. This is his conclusion in the matter of whether or not the mind is a sense-organ. In the case of whether the property of being the substratum of the superimposition resides in the particular portion of the object, per Sarvaj??tman, or in the general portion, per Prak???tman, here too, Ni?cald?s demonstrates that both positions are valid. In summarizing the KCNB-DJV debate on the nature of superimposition, Ni?cald?s concedes that the various views considered have similar merits and demerits and that any of these views may help one understand the unreality of the empirical world, but it is important to follow the ?correct? way shown by enlightened teachers in the 625 ?The immediate cognition of one [object] by a v?tti in the form of another, in the manner of the Advaita-d?pik?, is not well known, and its acceptance is a defect, advaita-d?pik? k? r?ti sai? any?k?ra-v?tti-sai? anya k? aparok?at? aprasiddha hai, t?k? a?g?k?ra do?a hai?, and the relation (gocarat?) of the anta?-kara?a to external objects, in the manner of the Sa?k?epa- ??r?raka, is not known, and its acceptance is a defect, au sa?k?epa-??r?raka r?ti sai? b?hya-pad?rtha mai? anta?-kara?a- gocarat? aprasiddha hai, t?k? a?g?k?ra do?a hai?? (VP 8.72, 391). 389 tradition. In explaining Vidy?ra?ya?s apparent stance that ??vara is in the sheath consisting of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a), Ni?cald?s shows his respect for tradition by demonstrating that this is a misunderstanding of Vidy?ra?ya view and suggests that this can be avoided by studying with a teacher within the tradition. When presenting the four different theories regarding the relation of j?va and ??vara, he considers them all soteriologically efficacious. He accepts the Bh?mat? Theory of Delimitation (avaccheda-v?da) because others in the tradition have supported it, even though he does not spend much time discussing it. The Theory of Appearance has the added benefit of having been accepted by ?a?kara, and Ni?cald?s accepts it as well as the Vivara?a Theory of Reflection as helpful for the seeker to know Brahman, even though the latter is the easier of the two. But Ni?cald?s does not uncritically accept all traditional views. He revises the Ved?nta- paribh??? definition of analogical cognition and points out flaws in its ?ikh?ma?i commentary, as if to remind the readers that he is giving them the benefit of his knowledge by pointing out incorrect positions when needed. He is particularly vigorous when refuting views outside the Advaita system such as ?tma-khy?ti and the other theories of erroneous cognition, but his motive is purely to enable the seeker to attain the proper understanding of non-duality and to forestall any potential misunderstanding. He draws on the understanding and experience of a knower (j??n?) of Brahman to clarify issues, such as when he refutes Sarvaj??tman?s view that there is no trace-ignorance left after the realization, and implicitly reminds us that he himself is a knower of Brahman. He also finds fault with both Sarvaj??tman and N?si?h??rama?s views of the immediate perception of space, but, since they are both respected members of the Advaita tradition, presents a means to reconcile their interpretations. 10.7.1 The Prau?hi-v?da Strategy of Reconciling Conflicting Views In some cases where Ni?cald?s sees a disagreement between two views, he reconciles the incorrect view by suggesting that the originator was engaging in prau?hi-v?da, an extravagant argument. At the very least, it appears to be a gentle stratagem to explain the defect in the position of a proponent who is highly regarded in the tradition while alerting the reader that the particular position is not soteriologically productive. Ni?cald?s defines prau?hi-v?da as the temporary acceptance of the opponents? view in the process of refuting their objections to one?s own view (VP 6.35, 191). Thus, where the immediate (pratyak?a) cognition of non-existence is 390 claimed by the authors of texts such as the Bheda-dhik-k?ra and Ved?nta-paribh???, Ni?cald?s suggests these authors were engaged in prau?hi-v?da, and, in actuality, the knowledge of non- existence due to non-cognition is always mediate (VP 6.35, 191). However, Ni?cald?s does not leave it at that; he proceeds to show at length how these views are incomplete, and provides a tighter definition of non-cognition (VP 6.31-34, 178-87; section 5.4.6, p. 388). In discussing Vidy?ra?ya?s statement that principal (grammatical) coordination (mukhya- sam?n?dhikara?ya) of the j?va with Brahman is possible in the mah?-v?kyas even though the reflection is considered false in Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance, Ni?cald?s suggests that it may be reconciled with the Vivara?a view by understanding Vidy?ra?ya?s statement as prau?hi- v?da, an extravagant assertion. However, Ni?cald?s does state that, in this case, Vidy?ra?ya has imposed his opinion on the Vivara?a text, and he clearly demonstrates that Vidy?ra?ya?s view is incorrect (VP 8.14, 350-1; section 7.4.1, p. 242). Here too, Ni?cald?s is pointing out a defect in the argument of Vidy?ra?ya who is revered within the Advaita tradition and seeks to excuse Vidy?ra?ya?s overreach, but at the same time he helps the reader understand the right view and reach a clear understanding. Similarly, when the Sa?k?epa-??r?raka asserts that space can be immediately cognized only by the mind, Ni?cald?s points out that the explanation is not satisfactory. He then offers N?si?h??rama?s Advaita-d?pik? conception as a ?better, though still flawed? explanation, 626 even though both Sarvaj??tman and N?si?h??rama?s explanations are accepted ?on the basis of the result (phala-bala-tai?).? Ni?cald?s then explains Sarvaj??tman?s claim of the immediate mental perception of space as prau?hi-v?da, an extravagant assertion, and explains that in fact the immediate cognition of the substratum only occurs via the senses or via self-illumination, never via the mind (VP 8.71-2, 390-2; section 8.2.3, p. 285ff.). As presented by Ni?cald?s, even the Advaita-d?pik? explanation ought to be explained as prau?hi-v?da, but Ni?cald?s does not do so possibly because N?si?h??rama explains further that the anta?-kara?a?s v?tti in the form of the sight (?loka) of the light, which spreads through the all-pervasive space and thus assists in the 626 In all fairness, that is not N?si?h??rama?s final explanation. His siddh?nta (conclusion) is that ?space/sky is known by the witness consciousness, and the color blue is superimposed on it, ?asm?d ukta-vidhay? s?k?i-vedye gagane n?lam ?ropa iti? (N?si?h??rama, N?r?ya???rama, and Subrahmanya Sastri 1982, 2:418). For the full discussion see N?si?h??rama (1982, 2:415- 8). Further, in Advaita epistemology, each of the five basic elements is connected with a sense-organ, and space, being the medium of sound, is associated with the ear, and is not really considered perceptible by the eye, as it has no form/color. 391 perception of space, is itself manifest in the witness-illumined, i.e., self-illumined, space.627 By describing the S? argument as prau?hi-v?da, Ni?cald?s, at one and the same time, marks the argument as flawed and inconsistent with the Advaita doctrine, yet also allows its proponent, Sarvaj??tman, the benefit of the doubt. He implicitly accepts that Sarvaj??tman, as part of the teaching Advaita tradition, was a knower of Brahman, and thus there must have been a good reason for him to present a flawed argument. Ni?cald?s even uses the prau?hi-v?da stratagem to reconcile his own assertion in VS 6.306, 186, that dreams are perceived by illusory senses, an assertion that contradicts ?ruti (specifically BU 4.3.9, which states that dreams are self-illumined) and is thus incorrect (VP 8.75, 393). The implication is that although the VS assertion is incorrect, it was knowingly stated to simplify the discussion and renders no harm to Advaita?s soteriological efficacy. Also in the VS, in the section refuting non-Advaita views on direct significatory relation (?akti-v?tti), the commentator, Pt. P?t?mbar, explains that here Ni?cald?s accepts the flawed position of kevala-bheda, the acceptance of difference between the signifier (v?caka) and the signified (v?cya), that the Bh???a M?m??saka opponent accuses Advaita of, and still refutes the Bh???a objection (VS 6.425-7, 263-5). The prau?hi-v?da explanation is also used by other Ved?ntins, for example, by Appayya D?k?ita (1973, 274). 10.8 Diversity of Doctrinal Interpretations We have seen Ni?cald?s deal with differences in doctrinal interpretations in the previous section. There is a long tradition, even within Advaita Ved?nta itself, of attempting to explain the diversity of both traditional and current doctrinal interpretations. An oft-cited couplet of Sure?vara, ?a?kara?s senior-most disciple, states, ?By whatever system one learns of the inner self, that itself is [considered] proper here [in Ved?nta even if the system is] unsteady.? 628 Sure?vara may only be reflecting his teacher?s sentiments. As Ingalls (and many others) have noted, ?[?a?kara] concentrates on what he considers the heart of the matter, the teaching that is necessary for the attainment of mok?a. This teaching is that avidy?, whatever its modality, is 627 kintu sarvagat?k??o?pi pras?ta-prak???k?r?nta?-kara?a-v?tty-abhivyakta-s?k?i-bh?syam ?k??am (N?si?h??rama, N?r?ya???rama, and Subrahmanya Sastri 1982, 2:416). 628 BU Bh. V?rtika 1.4.402: yay? yay? bhavet pu?s?? vyutpatti? pratyag-?tmani; s? saiva prakriyeha sy?t s?dhv? s? c?navasthit? (Sure?var?c?rya and ?nandagiri 1982, 342). Vidy?ra?ya quoted the first three p?das in PD 8.72, and in its entirety in Anubh?ti-prak??a 13.95 (1983, 96) or 13.108 (1992, 417). Also Acyutak???a, in his commentary to the SLS (D?k?ita and T?rtha 1973, 4), Madhus?dana Sarasvat? in his Siddh?nta-bindu (Sarasvati et al. 1928, 6), and Murti (1983, 70). 392 never truly connected with the self. ? His interest in metaphysics and logic is always subordinated to the center of his attention? (1953, 72).629 There is a long-standing precedent for Ni?cald?s?s focus on soteriological efficacy. But if the chapters 5-9 reviewing Ni?cald?s?s thought as presented in the VP have shown anything, they demonstrate that this focus on spiritual liberation does not mean that the thinking of the various teachers in the Advaita lineage was unsystematic and imprecise or that it was primarily speculative, mystical, and theological. If anything, the many teachers whose works we have seen Ni?cald?s engage, as well as Ni?cald?s?s own views, are every bit as rigorous, systematic, and occasionally even pedantic as the best of Western philosophy. 630 ?They were writing for intelligent and critically minded readers and not pleading for the silence of mystic communion.? Rather, ?[they] wished to comprehend rationally what they apparently experienced through mystical insight. Or, ? they were driven to their mystical conclusion by the force of their logic? (Matilal 1977a, 6, 25). Nonetheless, these Advaitins never lost sight of the forest, i.e., liberation, for the sake of the philosophical trees. Gaurinath Sastri, in his foreword to N?si?h??rama?s Advaita-d?pik?, suggests that the methods used by the proponents of Ved?nta to lead one to the knowledge of Brahman ?retain no value in and by themselves? (N?si?h??rama, N?r?ya???rama, and Subrahmanya Sastri 1982, 2). Sastri then cites Bhart?hari: ?Only ignorance [i.e., the unreal] is described by the different methods of the ??stra;? 631 and also ?r?har?a: ?The capability [?j?? = s?marthya] of the arguments [used] in fulfilling one?s desire [namely, establishing the Ved?nta doctrine] is not even refutable [by me], just like a king?s command [which opposes the enemy forces] is not disobeyed [by his own forces]; thus why not use them [the very same arguments] even against Ved?ntic means as you [the opponent] wish??632 The 629 Also Mayeda: ??a?kara is primarily concerned not with the establishment of any epistemologically or philosophically perfect system but the salvation of people suffering from transmigratory existence here in the present world? (?a?kar?c?rya 2006, 2:43). 630 Matilal articulates the Western misperception of ?Indian philosophy? as ?a group off occult religious cults, a system of dogmas, and an odd assortment of spirituality, mysticism, and imprecise thinking, concerned almost exclusively with ?spiritual liberation?? (1971, 10). 631 Sastri only cites the first half of verse, in Sanskrit. The full verse reads: ???stre?u prakriy?-bhedair avidyaivopavar?yate; an?gama-vikalp? tu svaya? vidyopavartate. Only ignorance [i.e., the unreal] is described by the different methods of the ??stra. But knowledge [of the Real] itself remains unaffected by [these] differences. V?kyapad?ya 2.233? (Pillai 1971, 90). While citing Bhart?hari on means and methods, we can also add V?kyapad?ya 2.38: ?up?d?y?pi ye hey?s t?n up?y?n pracak?ate; up?y?n?m ca niyamo n?va?yam avati??hate. Even the means which are required are to be abandoned. The means do not remain required.? This is stated in the context of grammatical analysis (45). 632 Kha??ana-kha??a-kh?dya v. 27: abh???asiddh?v api kha??an?n?? akha??i r?j??m iva naivam ?j??; tat t?ni kasm?n na yath?bhil??a? saiddh?ntike ?pi adhvani yojayadhvam. Once again Sastri only cites the verse in Sanskrit and paraphrases its sense, but, due to the terse nature of the verse, I have made use of several commentaries to help determine the meaning (?r?har?a et al. 1914, 228-9; 1917, 139; 1962 (2019 V.S), 82-3; Jha 1986, 79). Granoff provides an alternate translation: ?And the use of 393 same methods and arguments can be used for or against one?s own system, particularly in ?r?har?a?s style of dialectics termed vita??a, where the opponent?s thesis is refuted without offering an alternative thesis. Nonetheless, Brahman, the ground of all being, is unaffected by such disputation. To stress the emphasis on the final goal, Sure?vara?s couplet is also cited by Acyutak???a in his K????la?k?ra commentary to the SLS, while explaining an opening verse where Appayya D?k?ita explains his motive for composing the (SLS) text: ?The ancient teachers, intent 633 on establishing the identity of the self as the highest, described [this identity] in different and contradictory ways, because they disregarded the matters based in the empirical sphere. I compile here the sources of these many differences in the correct view (siddh?nta) that were explained by my venerable father, for clarifying my mind.?634 Acyutak???a provides yet another statement by Appayya to explain this verse, this time from Appayya?s Parimala sub- commentary635 to the BS ?Bh: ?It is not a contradiction to conceive of imaginary entities as a means to understand a real object. For example, in order to point out the real [but hard to see] Arundhat? star,636 the stars to the East, North, etc., conceived of by different people as ?the bigger Arundhat?? do not contradict the real star.?637 Essentially, what matters is that one arrives at the knowledge of one?s self as Brahman, even if the means is flawed, imperfect, or imagined. Ni?cald?s himself uses similar arguments when concluding his treatment of anirvacan?ya- khy?ti. ?The difference between non-?tm? objects as real and unreal has been stated only for the sake of facilitating entry into the knowledge of Advaita for those seekers whose intellect is dull (sth?la), analogous to the arundhat?-ny?ya. 638 If one whose intellect is dull is told the correct doctrine (siddh?nta) right at the outset, then that person, who holds that non-?tm? objects are real, on hearing the marvelous meaning of the doctrine might become averse to the ??stra and refuting principles even in proving one?s desired aim is not banned by any law like the law of kings. Thus, why cannot you employ them at will, even on the path of your very own doctrines? (1978, 202)? 633 Here I take sannahyadbhi? as t?tparyavadbhi? following Acyutak???a, and in apposition with ?c?ryai?. 634 SLS 1.2: pr?c?n?caryair vyavah?ra-siddha-vi?aye?v ?tmaikya-sidddhau para? sannahyadbhir an?dar?t sara?ayo n?n?vidh? dar?it??; tan m?l?n iha sa?grahe?a katicit siddh?nta-bhed?n dhiya?-?uddhayai sa?kalay?mi t?ta-cara?a-vy?khy?-vaca? khy?pit?n (D?k?ita and T?rtha 1973, 4). 635 The Parimala is Appayya?s commentary on the Kalpataru, which itself is a commentary by Amal?nanda on V?caspati?s Bh?mat? on the BS ?Bh. 636 See n. 440, p. 215. 637 Parimala on BS 1.4.15: akalpita-vastu-pratipatty-up?yatay? kalpyam?ne?u pad?rthe?u virodho na do??vaha?, yath? t?ttvik?rundhat?-pratipatty-up?yatay? n?n?-puru?ai? kalpyam?n?su tat-pr?cyod?cy-?di-nak?atra-r?p?su sth?l?rundhat??u virodho na do??vaha? (?a?kar?c?rya and Sastri 1938, 403). 638 See n. 440, p. 215. 394 might stray from the pursuit of liberation (puru??rtha). Therefore, non-?tm? objects are said to have two-fold reality, empirical and illusory, while consciousness has ultimate reality. Then when the lesser reality of the created world (prapa?ca) relative to consciousness has been established in one?s intellect from the example of the dream and from the negative sentences of Ved?nta, one can know all non-?tm? objects to be illusory and bereft of reality and manifestation (satt?-sph?rti)? (VP 7.55, 288-9). Such an explanation of a gradation of teaching methods adapted to the student?s level and ability is common to Indian thought since the early times, as, for example, in the ?progressive teachings? of the BhG gradually leading the devotee to the highest revelation (Minor 1980, 340) and in the up?ya-kau?alya, ?skillful means? of Mah?y?na Buddhism (Williams 1989, 142-51). Even ?a?kara ?emphasizes repeatedly that the Veda itself adjusts its teachings to different levels of understanding and qualification, that it uses different methods of instruction and that it addresses different interests and capabilities. ? also within the "knowledge section" (jn?na- k??da), that is, the Upani?ads, it speaks at different levels. It offers various meditational and devotional methods and "symbolic'' devices (prat?ka), such as the om, to those who are of slow or mediocre understanding (mandamadhyamaprattipatti? prati? (Halbfass 1991, 57). Ni?cald?s himself describes the conventional view, s???i-d???i-v?da ? as holding that creation occurs first and then subsequently, by relation with a means of cognition (pram??a), perception takes place, and that non-?tm? objects have an empirical reality even when uncognized ? as the perspective of ?persons of unrefined vision (sth?la-dar??).? However, after study of Ved?nta, both empirical and illusory objects of perception are seen to be anirvacan?ya and not really existent since their substratum is cognized as pure consciousness, Brahman. Thus, since the empirical reality is then also seen as ultimately unreal, and the seeker is led to the end goal, Ni?cald?s holds that this view does ?no damage (h?ni) to non-duality, Advaita? (VP 8.77, 394). Implicit in this statement, however, is the fact that Ni?cald?s considers the theory of d???i-s???i, that perception is creation, to be superior, as will be discussed in section 10.9. Nevertheless, Ni?cald?s consistently reminds his reader that the empirical is also to be subsumed under the illusory upon Brahman-realization. A modern scholar is more outspoken regarding the doctrinal diversity: ?All the [teachers] agreed in the ultimate unity of the soul, and with the unreality of the phenomenal world. For the world of fiction, different explanations are given, according to the ingenuity of each [teacher]. What if different explanations are given for a mere fiction (Ramesan 1972, 92)!? 395 10.9 Ni?cald?s and D???i-s???i-v?da In chapter 8, we saw Ni?cald?s describe d???i-s???i-v?da (DSV), the theory that perception is creation, in the context of his discussion of the nature of reality and illusoriness. His treatment of this doctrine where either perception itself is creation, or creation occurs concurrent with perception, is rather understated; he simply mentions that DSV is accepted by all Advaita ??stras (VP 8.76, 394). This theory is also referred to as eka-j?va-v?da, the theory that there is only one j?va. DSV appears to be a form of metaphysical solipsism, which holds that the self is the only existing reality and that all other reality, including the external world and other persons, have no independent existence but are representations of the consciousness of that self. However, the difference between DSV and solipsism is that within DSV neither the ?self? nor the other dependent ?realities? are empirically real; the ?self? is consciousness, the non-dual substratum of everything perceived as though real, separate and independent, and there is nothing other than consciousness, i.e., Brahman. Compared to this understated and implicit acceptance of the DSV in the VP, Ni?cald?s is more emphatic in the VS, where he states that that DSV is the correct view (siddh?nta) of Ved?nta. In essence, consciousness is ever-liberated. Bondage, liberation, the Vedas, and gurus are not accepted as really existent. The transformations of ignorance apparently manifest in consciousness in various forms, but there is no harm whatsoever to ?tm?, which is ever unattached, unchanged (ekarasa). No one has become liberated in the past, and no one will be liberated in the future; instead, consciousness is ever-free. Ignorance and its transformations never have any relation to consciousness; therefore, the perception of bondage, Vedas, gurus, ?rava?a and the rest, sam?dhi, and even liberation are also born of ignorance, like a dream, and hence are false. The persistence of such notions for so long is also born of ignorance (VS 6.329, 203). Some scholars hold that DSV is the ?perfection of Advaita philosophy? (Ganguli 1988, 98). Vidy?ra?ya considered d???i-s???i to be the fast (avilambita) and direct (ha?h?t) path to knowledge of the self, likening it to a secret back-door granting direct access to the inner sanctum of the king. By contrast, study of the ?tat tvam asi? mah?-v?kya is like attempting to gain an audience with the king through the main palace entrance; it is also possible to gain knowledge by this means, but there are more obstacles and it takes a lot longer. 639 Ni?cald?s 639 Anubh?ti-prak??a 9.46cd-51ab: prau?hasya r?ja-gehasya dv?ra? sy?t purato mahat (9.46). The entrance to the grand palace will be large and in front. p???hato?nta?pura-dv?ra? cora-dv?r?khyam alpakam; The entrance to the inner sanctum is small and 396 himself implies the same when he mentions that the difference between non-?tm? objects, as either real or illusory, is merely for the sake of facilitating entry into the knowledge of Advaita for those seekers whose intellect is dull and who, if instructed in the DSV doctrine at the outset, might become averse to the scriptures (??stra) and stray from the goal of liberation (puru??rtha) (section 6.3.4, p. 188). Ni?cald?s also states that such people, who hold that sa?s?ra and bondage are real and that human effort is needed to attain liberation, would lose the hope of liberation if told that, according to DSV, nobody ever has become liberated. Therefore, as a kindness to such people, the ?ruti-sm?ti statements propounding the liberation of ?uka, V?madeva and others have not been termed subsidiary statements of praise (artha-v?da) but are instead considered to be injunctions (vidhi) for the pursuit of liberation, in other words, a teaching better suited their lower capabilities.640 DSV certainly is non-dualism taken to its limits, and the evidence that Ni?cald?s accepts it provides some insight on his choice to write in the vernacular. Ni?cald?s holds that one ought to perform good actions until the strong desire for knowledge arises, and then undertake the practice of continual ?rava?a, etc., to attain the knowledge of Brahman (section 8.5, p. 302). If, as per DSV, the empirical world is as though a dream and there are no Vedas or gurus, it is of no consequence whether one writes in Sanskrit or the vernacular, as such conventions are not real either. Facilitating access of greater numbers of persons to the teachings of Advaita that lead to liberation could be considered good karma, even though these other persons are merely conceptions of one?s own consciousness. Moreover, Ni?cald?s, if enlightened, would no longer be required to do anything. But the act of writing vernacular texts to facilitate the knowledge of Brahman could be considered one of the Divine Properties (daiv?-sampad?) that enlightened persons possess (see section 8.5.1, n. 572, p. 304), specifically, an expression of compassion to the rear, and is called the thief?s door. mah?-dv?re?a sahas? durlabha? r?ja-dar?anam (47). jana-sammarda-b?huly?d dv?r???? ca bahutvata?; An immediate audience with the king via the grand entrance is hard to obtain, due to crush of the crowd, and the multiplicity of gates. alpa-dv?re sv?mi-bhakto ha?h?d r?j?nam ?k?ate (48). d???i-s???y?nubh?ty-arth? vetty ?tm?nam tath? ha???t; [Whereas] the devotee of the king sees the king directly via the small entrance. Similarly, the one who seeks direct knowledge inevitably/directly knows the self by means of [the doctrine of] d???i-s???i. mah?-s???y? tat-pad?rtham ?dau j??tv? tath? puna? (49). tva?-pad?rtha? ?odhayitv? v?ky?d bodho vilambate. After first understanding the meaning of the word ?that (tat)? by means of the cosmic creation, then having clarified [one?s understanding of] the meaning of the word ?you (tvam),? [self-]realization through the [tat tvam asi] mah?-v?kya takes a long time [to achieve]. tasm?d ih?j?ta-?atrur b?l?ker avilambita? (50). pratyag-brahmatva-bodh?rtha? d???i-s???im avocata (51ab). Therefore, [King] Aj?ta?atru spoke of [the doctrine of] d???i-s???i to [the brahman] B?l?ki here [in the Kau??tak? Upani?ad], in order to immediately bring about [B?l?ki?s] realization of Brahman as [his] inner-self (Vidy?ra?ya 1983, 62). 640 For Ramana Maharshi?s perspective on DSV and its place in his method of what I earlier called the ?gradation of teaching methods adapted to the student?s level ability (p. 392),? see Arvind Sharma (2003, 53-5). 397 towards all beings (bh?te?u day?), or simply the karma one must do to exhaust one?s pr?rabdha karma. Acceptance of DSV would certainly also explain Ni?cald?s?s lack of interest in socio- political engagement, as that too would be seen as not real or of consequence to liberation, akin to the image of fire projected on a screen lacking any ability to burn anything. 10.10 Reason versus Revelation The argument that Ni?cald?s was influenced to write in the vernacular by his acceptance of DSV may seem extreme. Even without taking DSV into account, there is yet another explanation for Ni?cald?s?s action, which is also sanctioned by his Ved?nta views. Despite Ni?cald?s?s seemingly radical break with tradition in writing about Advaita in the vernacular, on the whole, he appears to be quite conservative and tradition-bound. In this section, a few notable examples are provided of Ni?cald?s?s position on the use of reason versus ?ruti, revelation, which reveal an interesting insight into his understanding of ?revelation.? What is the role of reason in understanding Brahman via ?ruti? In refuting the S??khya argument based on logic, namely, that Brahman cannot be the cause of the creation because Brahman is different from it, the BS points out that the same defect exists in the S??khya position too ?because reasoning is groundless. If you say it is to be proven by another way [to avoid the defect], even then you cannot escape [the defect]. tark?prati??h?n?d api, anyath??numeyam iti ced, evam api avimok?a-prasa?ga?? BS 2.1.11). Commenting on this s?tra, ?a?kara states, ?and hence the meaning of scripture (?gama) is not to be opposed by mere reason, because reason is based, not on scripture but on mere human fancy, and fancy is uncontrollable.?641 The word translated as ?reason? here is tarka, which more precisely means contra-factual argument, and one must recall that Ni?cald?s included tarka under erroneous cognition (VP 7.84, 342-3; section 7.2, p. 233). In the process of refuting the Ny?ya anyath?-khy?ti and defending anirvacan?ya- khy?ti (section 6.3.5.6, p. 206), Ni?cald?s cautions that it is inappropriate for an orthodox person (?stika) to twist the meaning stated in the Vedas by means of humanly-conceived tools of logic (yukti-samud?ya). Thus, for ?a?kara and also Ni?cald?s, when it comes to understanding scripture, particularly for the purpose of knowing Brahman, reason is not to be trusted. Both of them use reason when it is appropriate; in fact, in BS ?Bh 2.1.11, we see ?a?kara using reason to 641 ita? ca n?gamye?rthe kevalena tarkena pratyavasth?tavyam. yasm?n nir?gam?? puru?otprek??-m?tra-nibandhan?s tark? aprati??hit? bhavanti, utprek??y? nira?ku?atv?t (?a?kar?c?rya and Sastri 1938, 448). 398 argue for the inapplicability of reason in knowing scripture. Reason has its uses; it helps in understanding, correcting, and systematizing thought, but it cannot provide the knowledge of Brahman. The use of reason in Ved?nta is ?primarily a negative one, meant to refute or neutralize opposing doctrines? (Halbfass 1988a, 280). As we have seen, only verbal testimony (?abda pram??a) comprising scripture and the testimony of enlightened teachers is accepted by Ved?nta as the means of knowledge for Brahman. 642 Elsewhere, in the context of the Veda adjusting its teachings to suit the different levels of the students? qualifications, Halbfass suggests that ??a?kara is obviously convinced that such variability and didactic adjustment is legitimate and effective insofar only as it is ? rooted in revelation? (1991, 57; emphasis mine). When describing the diverse views on the relation between j?va and ??vara, Ni?cald?s states that the intent (t?tparya) of these different methods (prakriy?) and all the texts of Advaita is that only listening (?rava?a) to Ved?nta texts can provide the result of becoming free from suffering. Such Ved?nta texts provide the means of the knowledge of the nature of the ever-liberated ?tm? and the attainment of happiness and free one from the endless kinds of afflictions produced by an attitude of agency. Aside from this, listening to Ved?nta can never result in the destruction of bondage for ?tm? or the attainment of liberation in the form of ultimate happiness since, even before listening to Ved?nta, the ?tm? is ever-liberated and does not have the affliction of bondage. Nevertheless, since the endless, false bondage is erroneously apprehended, one engages in listening to Ved?nta only due to delusion; one who is not deluded will not engage in such activity. Towards the end of the VP, Ni?cald?s presents three different unattributed views on the final question pertaining to v?ttis, namely its use. These views differ concerning their conception of the j?va, ignorance, and the relation with objects. Ni?cald?s considers the point of primary difference is whether the j?va?s up?dhi is pervasive or delimited, and he suggests that this distinction is solely for the purpose of revealing the cleverness of one?s intellect (buddhi- prav??at?-khy?pana). However, since all views depend on a v?tti to effect a relation of the cognizer with the object, these views instead only demonstrate the lack of cleverness. It is as though Ni?cald?s is chiding his unnamed proponents for losing sight of the bigger picture in the midst of their intellectual wrangling and is cautioning the reader to avoid the same pitfall; instead 642 See also, Murti (1983). 399 the reader must remain aware that the ultimate purpose of a v?tti is to effect a relation with Brahman; he thus pulls the rug out from under all the intellectual constructs. As if to underscore the point, Ni?cald?s states within two pages that sa?s?ra, comprising the waking, dream, and deep sleep states caused by the v?ttis (which themselves are modifications of ignorance), is nothing but bondage, and the v?tti brought about by the mah?-v?kya, ?I am Brahman,? brings about the end to ignorance and the worldly creation (prapa?ca), i.e., liberation. Let us look at a few examples of how Ni?cald?s uses scripture to make his arguments. When arguing for the incorrectness of the view that considers ??vara to be the sheath of happiness (?nandamaya-ko?a), he writes that all authors have accepted the five sheaths (ko?a), including Vidy?ra?ya himself in his Pa?cako?a-viveka (PD 3), and, since the works of these authors cannot possibly be wrong, ??vara-ness does not reside in the sheath of happiness (VP 8.17, 353; section 7.4.1, p. 244). In his VS, Ni?cald?s declares Vidy?ra?ya?s Theory of Appearance (?bh?sa-v?da) to be superior to the Theory of Delimitation and, to strengthen his claim, mentions that ?a?kara also accepted the Theory of Appearance (VS 4.203, 113; 6.442, 275; section 7.4.5, p. 257). In the course of refuting secondary ignorance as the material cause of reference-superimposition, Ni?cald?s makes sure that ?the enlightened words (sarvaj?a-vacana) [of] Pa?cap?dik?? are not opposed.643 In his subsequent refutation of an objection, Ni?cald?s accepts as incontrovertible the Pa?cap?dik? statement referenced in the argument and proceeds to show that it has been misunderstood by the objector (section 8.1.5, p. 272ff). Ni?cald?s even extends the property of omniscience (sarvaj?at?) to the authors of other philosophical systems such as Ak?ap?da Gotama of the Ny?ya-s?tra, Ka??da of the Vai?e?ika-s?tra, and Kapila of the S??khya-s?tra (VP 7.63, 307; section 6.3.5.5, p. 204). Ni?cald?s argues in favor of the utility of performing ?rava?a, etc., even if one is not in the sanny?sa-??rama, the life-stage of renunciation, on the grounds that, eventually, the practice will lead the seeker to renunciation. To support his argument, Ni?cald?s quotes statements attributed to Gau?ap?da, the YogV?, and Vidy?ra?ya?s PD, alongside ?ruti (section 8.5, p. 302ff), and thus indicates that he considers these works to be scripture as well. Similarly, when refuting the Ny?ya-makaranda view that the cessation of the conceived is different from the substratum, 643 Ni?cald?s precedes this statement with an explanation that ?the teacher Padmap?da wrote the commentary (??k?) called Pa?cap?dik? to the [?a?kara-]bh??ya on the Brahma-s?tra, and he attained enlightenment [lit. omniscience] through the teachings [lit. words] of ?a?kara. ??r?raka-bh??ya k? ??k? pa?cap?dik? n?ma padmap?d?c?rya nai? kiy? hai, t?k?? bh??yak?ra ke vacana tai? sarvaj?at? hu? hai? (VP 8.53, 378). 400 Ni?cald?s argues that the Ny?ya-makaranda view contradicts the statements of BS bh??yak?ra ?a?kara, effectively elevating ?a?kara?s works to the status of scripture too (section 9.3.2, p. 341). This is not surprising since Ni?cald?s considers ?a?kara to be a knower of Brahman, i.e., enlightened.644 In support of the substratum of dreams as consciousness located within the body, Ni?cald?s states that to consider the substratum being located elsewhere would oppose the words of Gau?ap?da, in the vaitathya-prakara?a of the M????kya-k?rik? (M?K? 2.1-3), and of ?a?kara?s commentary to the same. (section 8.2.1, p. 282ff). Also in connection with dreams, Ni?cald?s raises a potential shortcoming in Sarvaj??tman?s Sa?k?epa-??r?raka statement on the self- immediacy of dream-superimpositions, and, in his remedy to this shortcoming, invokes the view of ?the honorable Prak???tman? (Prak???tma-?r?cara?a)645 that objects in a dream- superimposition are illumined without a v?tti due to their constant relation with the j?va- consciousness that is their substratum. The added reverence for Prak???tman is certainly puzzling because when Ni?cald?s is apparently reverential to Prak???tman elsewhere,646 he is actually critical of Prak???tman?s position. Nevertheless, it draws the reader?s attention yet again to Ni?cald?s?s high regard for the works of Prak???tman and also of Sarvaj??tman. Despite holding that all human beings are eligible for attaining liberation through the knowledge of Brahman, Ni?cald?s suggests that, in the case of those outside the ?twice-born? castes, the means of attaining this knowledge are the traditionally tolerated ones: namely, listening to the pur??as and itih?sa for ??dras, and listening to vernacular commentaries for the lowest caste. It appears as if the possibility that ??dras and lower castes might want and be able to study these texts on their own cannot itself be mentioned, to say nothing of their study of ?ruti and sm?ti. However, he is not as conservative on this issue as it may appear at first glance. When discussing the utility of action for gaining knowledge, Ni?cald?s does note that Amal?nanda (1247-1347 CE), the author of the Kalpataru, a commentary on V?caspati Mi?ra?s Bh?mat?, argued that even those outside the traditional ??rama system, such as the non-brahman carter, Raikva, and G?rg?, a woman, are considered by ?ruti to have knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, 644 See preceding note (n. 643). 645 See n. 536, p. 273. 646 This is not an isolated instance. In VP 3.18, 81, too, Ni?cald?s refers to Prak???tma-?r?cara?a as the author of the Vivara?a, in the context of the four accessories to verbal cognition (?abda pram?), namely: 1) expectancy (?k??k??); 2) compatibility (yogyat?); 3) intention (t?tparya); and, 4) proximity (?satti). There, he is actually critical of Prak???tman?s (and N?goj? Bha??a?s) view that intention is never the cause of verbal cognition. 401 all good actions, not just those prescribed by one?s ??rama, are useful for knowledge as long as they are nitya-karmas, obligatory actions. However, on the basis of Sarvaj??tman?s S?, and the Mah?n?r?ya?opani?ad, Ni?cald?s broadens the scope such that ?all good actions, performed by anyone, even those outside the three highest castes, and women too, are useful for attaining the knowledge of Brahman? since these good action eliminate the p?pas that impede the attainment of knowledge (section 8.4, p. 302ff). By now it should be evident that Ni?cald?s has a reverential attitude towards many Ved?nta texts, verging on considering them inviolate, but the Advaita tradition (samprad?ya) and teacher (guru) are also important. According to TS 59, the definition for verbal testimony as a means of cognition (?abda pram??a) is ??pta-v?kya?, the statement of a credible or authoritative person? (Annambha??a and Govardhanamisra 1963, 50); the teachings of a teacher, as well as works authored by realized persons within the tradition, satisfy this definition. Thus, in the process of correcting the misunderstanding that the sheath consisting of happiness (the ?nandamaya-ko?a) includes ??vara (in chapter 7), Ni?cald?s suggests that this misunderstanding of the M?U and Vidy?ra?ya?s PD stems from the study of Ved?nta texts without the benefit of a teacher and the tradition. When Ni?cald?s concludes that all humans are eligible for knowledge and devotion, his explanation asserts that even those of the lowest caste can develop a desire to know due to the impressions (sa?sk?ra) of prior births, and then, through human statements (pauru?eya vacana) as opposed to the divinely revealed Vedas, ?ruti, they can gain knowledge of Brahman and become liberated by the cessation of ignorance and its effects. Ni?cald?s states that the conclusion (nirdh?ra) of all ??stras, not just ?ruti, is that all humans are eligible for devotion to God and Brahman-realization (VP 8.111, 413; section 8.5.1, p. 304ff). Thus, we see that the scope of what constitutes scripture for Ni?cald?s is broadened to include not just sm?ti, or humanly conceived texts that include the itih?sa and pur??a texts, but also the texts created by wise persons (vidv?n) who have direct, experiential knowledge of Brahman (VP 8.167, 441; section 9.3.2, p. 341). Also, in VS v. 3.10, he states that ?a knower of Brahman is Brahman incarnate, and his speech is the Veda,?647 effectively elevating such texts to the level of ?ruti. Further, according to Ni?cald?s, all Ved?nta statements explain Brahman (VP 3.16, 78; section 5.4.3, p. 133). Essentially, anything that falls under verbal testimony as a means of cognition of 647 brahmar?pa ahi brahmavita, t?k? v??? veda. See section 4.1, p. 92 for full verse. 402 Brahman can be considered as scripture. Given such a broad stance on ?revelation,? the question of whether a text is composed in Sanskrit or the vernacular fades into irrelevance. An author with personal, direct, and firm knowledge of Brahman is qualified to write a text for the benefit of humanity, and, given that not everyone can understand Sanskrit, it is a natural and compassionate act to write in the vernacular, which permits the non-Sanskrit knowing populace a chance to realize Brahman. 10.10.1 Some Puzzling Exclusions Despite Ni?cald?s?s broad acceptance of traditional Advaita literature as revelation and the great familiarity he displays with this corpus (See Appendix, p. 409), there are at least two notable omissions: Appayya D?k?ita (1520-1593), and Madhus?dana Sarasvat? (ca. 1570). Appayya D?k?ita flourished ca. 1585 in present day Andhra Pradesh, and two of his most important works are the Siddh?nta-le?a-sa?graha (SLS), an independent survey of the variety of doctrinal interpretations and arguments in post-?a?kara Advaita, and the Parimala, a sub- commentary on V?caspati Mi?ra?s Bh?mat? (D?k?ita and T?rtha 1973, xi; Minkowski 2011, 207- 8). It is almost certain that Ni?cald?s was familiar with the SLS, since two of the views he presents and refutes are of the relatively obscure Ved?ntins, KCNB and Advaita-vidy?c?rya, whose views are known only through references in the SLS. There also seem to be several parallels to the SLS arguments in Ni?cald?s?s work. For example, in his discussion of DSV, the example of Kar?a seems to follow the SLS closely (see section 7.4.4, particularly n. 490, p. 241). Ni?cald?s?s description of the two types of DSV (VP 8.76, 393-4; section 8.3.1, p. 288) also appear to follow the SLS (Joshi 2010, 35). Ni?cald?s?s arguments on the instrumentality of ?abda in providing immediate knowledge of Brahman also seem parallel to those of the SLS, chapter 3 (D?k?ita, T?rtha, and ??str? 1890, 96-7) but are not exactly the same (VP 8.124-6, 418-20; section 9.1.2-3, p. 317ff). Madhus?dana Sarasvat? flourished in Benares ca. 1570. One of his important works, the Advaita-siddhi, is a response to the Madhva follower Vyasat?rtha?s Ny?y?m?ta, a polemical work against non-dualism. ?The Advaita-siddhi was a governing text for Advaita for the next two centuries, attracting many commentaries as well as replies from the dualists, which were in turn answered by Madhusudana?s pupils and later defenders? (Minkowski 2011, 210). Madhus?dana also wrote the Siddh?nta-bindu, a commentary on ?a?kara?s Da?a-?lok?, and the Vedanta- 403 kalpalatika, a refutation of non-Ved?nta schools of thought and also an explanation of the nature of liberation (Sarasvat? 1962, xiv-xv). Madhus?dana was also a leading defender of DSV, particularly in his Advaita-siddhi. However, I have as yet not been able to detect any parallels between Ni?cald?s?s work and that of Madhus?dana. Several possible explanations can be offered for Ni?cald?s?s failure to mention Appayya and Madhus?dana explicitly. For example, he may have had no disagreements with their standpoints, or perhaps he felt either that they offered no novel interpretations or that their views did not contribute to the understanding of Brahman beyond what was already stated in the VP. Further, in the case of Madhus?dana?s Advaita-siddhi, the polemics against the followers of Madhva and duality that occur in this text do not really have a place in Ni?cald?s?s overall scheme for the VP. 10.11 Philosophy versus Theology All along, and particularly in section 4.2, p. Error! Bookmark not defined.ff, I have argued that the VP and VS are philosophical texts on Ved?nta. But, according to Ved?nta, the Vedas are not eternal, because revealed scripture (?ruti) itself has described its creation, for example, in the puru?a-s?kta, Hymn to the Cosmic Person, RV 10.90.9. Only consciousness (cetana) is eternal, everything else, including the Vedas, is not. Verbal cognition (?abda pram??a), the only means for the direct realization of Brahman, requires an intent (t?tparya) on the part of the one creating the words. Ni?cald?s considers the Vedas and the Mah?bh?rata, etc., to be humanly authored. [But we must understand that these are extra-ordinary humans; otherwise, this would contradict Ni?cald?s?s statement elsewhere that the statements of ?ruti are not human-originated (apauru?eya) (VP 8.83, 398; section 8.3.2, p. 292)]. The Vedas are effortlessly created by ??vara via a mere intention (sa?kalpa) at the beginning of creation; ??vara recalls the Vedas and reproduces them faithfully from creation to creation. On the other hand, Vy?sa (the author of the Mah?bh?rata) and others who are omniscient create their sm?ti works according to their desire in each creation, and these created works are not necessarily identical to those of a prior creation. The Vedas, being a creation of ??vara, thus have an intent, which is reproduced faithfully and eternally from creation to creation, and this intent is the knowledge of Brahman (VP 3.20, 91-2; section 5.4.3, p. 138ff). Ni?cald?s also holds that the conclusion of all scripture (??stra) is that all humans are eligible for devotion to God, i.e., ??vara or Brahman with attributes (sagu?a Brahman), and can thereby 404 attain Brahman-realization (VP 8.111, 413; section 8.5.1, p. 305). The contemplation (up?san?) of sagu?a Brahman will help the practitioner become a middling aspirant (madhyama adhik?r?) (VS 5.303, 182-3), and, for this middling aspirant, the contemplation of the self as attribute-less (nirgu?a) Brahman (aha?-graha up?san?) is a means of Brahman-realization. For the best aspirant (uttama adhik?r?), ?rava?a (listening to scriptures), manana (reflection on the content of these texts), and nididhy?sana, (profound and continuous meditation on the same), alone are the means (s?dhana). The Hindu cosmology of an indefinitely repeating cycle of the creation , sustenance, and destruction of the universe itself is based upon Pur??ic scriptures, and we have seen, in section 10.10, that scripture, for Ni?cald?s, is essentially anything that comes under the means of cognition (?abda pram??a) of Brahman: namely, ?ruti, sm?ti, and the works and utterances of those who have a direct knowledge of Brahman. Also, the overview of the VP in section 10.5 showed his sustained and primary focus on soteriology, namely, liberation through the direct knowledge of Brahman. In light of this, is Ni?cald?s a philosopher or a theologian? Edelmann differentiates the two as follows: Philosophy engages argument, reason, and logical analysis, without assuming in the process of argumentation the authority of a particular religious or a revealed text, even though the philosopher may believe in the authority of a sacred text, and may even seek to establish its truth through rational argumentation. Theology, however, presupposes the value in providing a rational interpretation and explication of a sacred text as a self-sufficient means of understanding the truth. For theology, it is a legitimate form of argumentation to use scripture and tradition as a premise in an argument (2013, 429-30). Given what we have seen about Ni?cald?s?s attitude towards Advaita texts, particularly in section10.10 above and the Advaita position that Brahman is the only truth, he (and Advaita) is clearly on the theological side. He makes use of philosophical methods to refute non-Advaita positions, to compare competing Advaita standpoints, to evaluate the validity of a given view, and even to provide robust definitions that can help ones understanding. But the entire exercise is ultimately subordinate to the teachings of the wise in the tradition, namely, those who have direct knowledge of Brahman and have recorded their understanding in their works. And these Advaita works and tradition too are ultimately subordinate to the only means of cognition that can provide immediate knowledge of Brahman, namely the mah?-v?kyas of the Upani?ads, accompanied by ?rava?a, manana, and nididhy?sana. Philosophy is, in fact, an integral part of this process. ?a?kara defines manana as ?reflecting [on that which has been heard] by means of 405 reasoning. pa?c?t mantavyas tarkata?? (1986, 193), and Sad?nanda, as ?the incessant reflection on the non-dual essence [i.e., Brahman] that has been heard [from the teacher] by means of proofs that are in accordance with Ved?nta. manana? tu ?rutasy?dvit?ya-vastuno ved?nt?nugu?a-yuktibhir anavaratam anucintanam. Ved?nta-s?ra 191? (1974, 108). Clooney even makes the case that Advaita manana is ?theological reasoning? (2003, 47-9). But it all starts with ?rava?a, listening to scripture, as expounded by a teacher who is grounded in the Ved?nta tradition. Thus, it should be clear that the Advaita standpoint on scripture is not a literal, dogmatic position that entails the surrender of reason to faith. ?a?kara himself, in his commentary following BU 4.5.15, which discusses Y?j?avalkya renunciation of his household after his dialogue with his wife Maitrey? on the means of immortality, points out that ?scripture (?ruti- sm?ti) contains hundreds of contradictory passages as to whether renunciation is prescribed, and if so, when it is to be undertaken. Tradition is also similarly contradictory. Even learned scholars who expound the meaning of the scriptures (??str?rtha) differ in their opinions. Thus, it is not possible for persons of weak intellect (manda-buddhi) to arrive at the meaning of the scriptures by means of discrimination. Only persons who are thoroughly accomplished in scriptures and reasoning (ny?ya) can determine the difference between these [contradictory scriptural] passages.?648 Those with weak intellects must develop their capacity and cultivate understanding of both scripture and reasoning. In the same section, ?a?kara goes on to conclude that a wise person (vidv?n) can renounce householder duties ?simply through one?s firm understanding of one?s ?tm? as the unchanging Brahman devoid of any type of relationship to action.?649 Understanding one?s self to be Brahman by means of scripture aided by reasoning thus liberates the knower from all worldly constraints, and it is this state that Ni?cald?s embodies and conveys through his works. Further consideration of the theological aspect of Ved?nta offers fruitful possibilities for reconciling the split between reason and spirituality and advancing the study of Ved?nta with intellectual rigor, without balking at issues of faith. Of course, if Ni?cald?s were asked whether 648 eva? vyutth?na-vikalpa-krama-yathe????rama-pratipatti-pratip?dak?ni hi ?ruti-sm?ti-v?ky?ni ?ata?a upalabhyanta itaretara- viruddh?ni. ?c?ra? ca tadvid?m. vipratipatti? ca ??str?rtha-pratapatt???? bahuvid?m api. ato na ?akyate ??str?rtho manda- buddhibhir vivekena pratipattum. parini??hata-??stra-ny?ya-buddhibhir eva hy e??? v?ky?n?? vi?aya-vibh?ga? ?akyate?vadh?rayitum (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 384). 649 ato vidu?as t?vat p?rivr?jya? siddha? sa?prad?n?di-karma-k?raka-j?ty?di-??ny?vikriya-brahm?tma-d??ha-pratipatti- m?tre?a (?ankar?c?rya, ?nandagiri, and Vidy?ra?ya 1986, 386). 406 the VP is philosophy or theology, he would most likely remind us that names are only erroneous, empirical constructs that have no reality independent of Brahman. He would then sing us his opening doh? to the VP: asti bh?ti priya sindhu me?, n?ma r?pa ja?j?la; lakhi tihi? ?tma-svar?pa nija, hvai tatk?la nih?la. In the ocean of being, manifestation, and dearness [i.e. Brahman], name and form are a trap. Upon seeing the nature one?s own ?tm? there, one will immediately become happy. 10.12 A Final Summation As a final summation of the VP, it is instructive to apply the method suggested by Ni?cald?s to discern the intent (t?tparya) of a given text, namely, the determination of its relation to the six characteristics (?a?-li?ga), which assist in the comprehension of the work via verbal testimony as means of cognition (?abda pram??a): 1) the consistency of the introduction and conclusion (upakrama upasa?h?ra k? ekar?pat?); 2) repetition (abhy?sa); 3) originality (ap?rvat?); 4) result (phala); 5) praise (arthav?da); and 6) demonstration (upapatti) (VP 3.17, 79-80; section 5.4.3, p. 135). 1) Consistency of the introduction and conclusion: Ni?cald?s started the text with the three questions about a v?tti: its nature, cause, and purpose (VP 1.1, 1; section 5.2, p. 119). Towards the end of the text, he reminds of the three questions and finishes with the answer to the third (VP 8.145-6, 429-30; section 9.2, p. 330). 2) Repetition: As we have noted in sections 10.5 and 10.7, Ni?cald?s time and again reminds the reader that the goal of Ved?nta is the knowledge of Brahman. 3) Originality: The two major innovations of Ni?cald?s are as follows: a) his insistence that the knowledge of Ved?nta, namely, Brahman, is accessible to all humans, irrespective of caste; and b) his reorganization of over a millennium?s worth of post-?a?kara Advaita literature, in which he compares various prior standpoints on doctrinal issues and then presents what he considers valid and in keeping with Advaita doctrine, thereby helping the seeker along with either the refutation of conflicting views where relevant or, at times, the reconciliation of an apparent conflict. 407 4) Result: The cessation of the conceived and the knowledge of Brahman, which is arrived at by means of a v?tti in the form of Brahman (brahm?k?ra v?tti). 5) Praise: The attainment of happiness mentioned in the opening doh? (stated in the previous section), and also at the conclusion of the VP (8.172, 445-6; section 9.3.2, p. 346). 6) Demonstration: This can be understood as the use of reasoning (yukti) to support the stated result, the knowledge of Brahman, as seen throughout the VP, especially in the notable examples reviewed in section 10.7. Ni?cald?s himself professed to be a knower of Brahman (brahma-vit) (VS vv. 1.1-5; section 3.8, p. 71ff), and hence he considered his work too to be the equivalent of the Vedas and capable of providing the reader the knowledge of Brahman (VS v. 3.10; section 4.1, p. 80). He did not present this boastfully but from his perspective of ultimate reality. Thus, he considered himself to be a continuation of the lineage of other knowers of Brahman within the Advaita tradition, and his work to be a contribution to the Advaita tradition. Like those written before him, the VP expresses the same truth as Ved?nta scripture. ? ???? ? ?? ??????? ??? ? ???? ? ?????? ? 10.13 Future Directions In the course of my research for this dissertation, I had to constrain myself from exploring many interesting and related ramifications in order to keep the project manageable, or as Ni?cald?s would say, ?granth v?ddh? ke bhay se, for fear of prolixity.? Some of the topics left unexplored, which I hope to revisit at greater depth in the future, include (in no particular order): 1) A translation and analysis of Ni?cald?s?s least known and rarest published Advaita work, the Yuktiprak??, an independent treatise in which Ved?nta axioms are explained through d????nta-s, illustrations, and d?r???ntas, principles deduced from those illustrations and then reinforced with testimony from ?ruti and sm?ti, all of which are presented in the form of a dialog between a teacher and student, in thirty-nine yuktis, ?logical arguments.? 2) A study of the soteriological path laid out in the VS, which has some interesting, lesser discussed aspects. 408 3) A more detailed analysis of the KCNB-DJV arguments on the nature of superimposition in Advaita, and a comparison to the treatment of the same by Acyutak???a T?rtha in his K????la?k?ra commentary to SLS. 4) A closer look at the arguments in various Advaita prakara?a-granthas such as the Pa?cap?dik?, its Vivara?a, SLS, S?, Brahma-siddhi, I??a-siddhi, Advaita-siddhi, to better determine the parallels to Ni?cald?s?s ideas. 5) Ni?cald?s?s scriptural attitude to Advaita texts, as revealed by his three Ved?nta works. 6) Further consideration of the possibility that Ni?cald?s?s ?outsider status? might have some influence on his choice to write in the vernacular. The paucity of biographical information demands alternative sources for this issue, perhaps his works themselves. 7) A study of the evolution of what I called the ?caste-leveling sentiment,? particularly in the period between ?a?kara and Ni?cald?s. Such a study might focus on a comparison of the virtually coterminous approaches of Dayananda Saraswati (?rya Sam?j), Vivekananda, Ramakrishna, Ramana Maharshi or might also include the influences of Kabir, N?nak, D?d? and other nirgu?? sants. Vi?hob?, Ekn?th and the other Maharashtrian saints are also of interest in this regard. 8) As I explored the issue of caste, I came across the Vajras?c? Upani?ad, which expresses interesting caste-leveling sentiments. A study of this Upani?ad and its relation to A?vagho?a?s Vajras?c? would be a compelling project. 9) A more comprehensive treatment of caste across the Advaita corpus is another possible area for further exploration. 10) A study of the exact meaning of nididhy?sana in the Advaita tradition. See n. 161, p. 65, and n. 582 on p. 317 for the beginnings of an interesting issue. 11) Further development of the theological study of Ved?nta. Also, a study of ?rava?a, manana, nididhy?sana and parallels with the Christian lectio divina. Guigo II offers four stages of lectio, meditatio, oratio, and contemplatio (1981, ?1978). 12) Further identification and exploration of Ved?nta texts in Hindi and other vernacular languages that would provide interesting parallels and contrasts to the VP. 409 Appendix 1: Works and Authors Cited in VP All section and page numbers are to the KS edition of VP, Ni?cald?s (1899). All dates are CE, unless otherwise noted, and are based on Thangaswami (1980), unless more accurate information is available. Portions of the names within square-brackets either do not occur in the source, or occur inconsistently. A1.1 Works Cited by Name Text Author (* = not named), date Where cited Abheda-ratna Mallan?r?dhya* (1400-1500) 3.18, 83 Advaita-d?pik? N?si?h??rama, 16th c. 8.71-2, 390-1; 8.79, 395; 8.82, 397 Advaita-cint?-kaustubha Mah?dev?nanda Sarasvat?,* ca. 1650 1.1, 1 Ala?k?ra-candrik? Gajapati V?ra N?r?ya?adeva,* 17th c. 4.5, 97 Anirvacan?ya-v?da Brahm?nanda, n.d. 7.64, 314 Anyath?-khy?ti-v?da Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya, 1604-1709 1.16, 28 [A???dhy?y?-]Mah?bh??ya Pata?jali, 150 BCE 3.18, 83 Avayava-grantha [Gad?dhara] Bha???c?rya, 1604-1709 2.8, 43 Bh?mat? V?caspati Mi?ra, 842 3.18, 79; 8.92, 403; 8.124, 418 Bheda-dhik-k?ra N?si?h??rama,* 16th c. 6.34, 185; 6.34, 187; Brahma-s?tra ?Bh ?a?kara, early 8th c. 7.40, 276; 8. 93, 404; 8.97, 406 Brahm?nanda (PD 11-15) Bh?rat?t?rtha, 1300-1380 8.19, 355 Brahma-vidy?bhara?a Advait?nandabodhendra,* 1700 3.18, 79; 7.8, 224;7.9, 225; 7.64, 312; 7.64, 314 B?had?ra?yaka ?Bh ?a?kara,* early 8th c. 8.28, 362; 8.53, 378 B?had?ra?yaka V?rtika Sure?vara,* 8th c. 8.28, 362 Citra-d?pa (PD 6) Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.9, 348; 8.13-4, 350-1; 8.17, 352 D?dhiti Raghun?tha ?iroma?i Bha???c?rya, 1510 3.4, 48; 6.9, 126 D?g-d??ya-viveka Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.20, 355 Kalpataru Amal?nanda* 1247-1347 8.97, 406 K?vvya-prak??a Mamma?a, 11th c. 3.10, 61; 3.10, 62; 3.10, 65; 3.16, 79 K?vya-prak??a, unnamed comm. on Jayar?ma Bha???c?rya, 1620 3.10, 62 K?vya-prad?pa Govinda Bha??a, 14-15th c. 3.10, 61; 3.10, 62; 3.16, 79 Khy?ti-vic?ra Gau?abrahm?nanda, 1600-1700 1.17, 29 [Mah?]Bh?ta-viveka (PD 2) Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.23, 359 Ma?j??? (comm. on ?aktiv?da) N?goj? Bha??a, 1670-1750 3.3, 47; 3.18, 81; 3.18, 83; 6.26, 165 Nirukta Y?ska, 600-500 BCE 8.171, 444 410 Text Author (* = not named), date Where cited Ny?ya-kaustubha Mah?deva Pun?at?makara, ca. 1675 1.18, 32; 4.1, 93 Ny?ya-makaranda ?nandabodha Bha???r?ka,* ca. 1050-1150 8.163, 437; 8.164-8, 438-43; 8.171, 444 Ny?ya-s?tra Gautama, 150 3.4, 48 Ny?ya-sudh? Gau?e?vara J??nottama (Saty?nanda),* 1175 8.87, 400 Ny?ya-v?caspatya T?r?n?tha Tarkav?caspati Bha???c?rya, 1812-1885 7.49, 283 Pa?cada?? Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.131, 423 Pa?cako?a-viveka (PD 3) Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.17, 352 Pa?cap?dik? Padmap?da, 8th c. 1.21, 34; 7.19, 239; 8.53-5, 378-83 [Pa?cap?dik?-]Vivara?a Prak???tman, 11th c. 3.18, 81; 7.18, 238; 7.69, 324; 8.13-5, 350-1 ?abda-ratna (vy?kara?a) Harid?ks?ita, 1670 3.18, 82 ?abda-?akti-prak??ika Jagad??a Bha???c?rya,* ca. 1600 5.2, 105 ?aktiv?da Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya, 1604-1709 3.3, 47; 3.4, 48; 3.4, 51; 3.14, 73; 3.14, 74 Sa?k?epa-??r?raka (S?) Sarvaj??tman, 1050 3.7, 54; 7.4, 215; 7.16, 236; 7.17, 238; 7.19, 239; 8.6, 347; 8.69, 389-90; 8.72, 391-2; 8.89, 401; 8.98, 406-7 Sa?gati-grantha Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya, 1604-1709 1.15, 26 ??r?raka (BS) B?dar?ya?a, 200 BCE? 7.5, 219; 7.5, 220; 7.8, 223; 7.47, 281; 8.4, 345 [Siddh?nta-]Kaumud? Bha??oji D?k?ita, 17th c. 3.20, 89 ?itika??h? ?itika??ha, 15th c. 1.16, 27 ??dra-kamal?kara = ?udra- dharma-tattva-prak??a Kamal?kara Bha??a,* ca. 1860 8.109, 412 Tattva-d?pik? Citsukha,* 1120-1220 8.75, 393 Tattv?nusandh?na Mah?dev?nanda Sarasvat?,* ca. 1650 1.1, 1 Tattva-?uddhi J??naghana,* 950-1050 8.85,399-400 Tattva-viveka (PD 1) Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.6, 346 T?pti-d?pa (PD 7) Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 8.26, 360 Uddyotana (comm. on K?vya-prad?pa) N?goj? Bha??a, 1670-1750 3.10, 62 [Vaiy?karan?a-]Bh??a?a [-s?ra] Kau??a Bha??a,* 1640 3.3, 47 Ved?nta-c???ma?i = Ved?nta-?ikh?mani R?mak???a D?k?ita, 1625-1700 3.14, 75; 3.18, 82; 4.5, 96-8; 4.6, 101; 6.35, 188; 6.35, 191 Ved?nta-paribh??? Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra, 1550-1650 1.2, 4; 1.18, 32; 2.5, 40; 2.5, 41; 3.10, 64; 3.14, 71; 3.18, 82; 4.5, 96-8; 4.6, 101; 6.34, 184; 6.34, 187; 6.35, 191 [Ved?nta-]Siddh?nta- Prak???nanda,* 1550-1650 8.28, 361; 8.76, 394 411 Text Author (* = not named), date Where cited mukt?val? Ved?nta-?ikh?mani R?mak???a D?k?ita, 1625-1700 3.18, 83 Vic?rs?gar Ni?cald?s,* 1791-1863 1.1, 2; 1.17, 28; 1.19, 30; 1.18, 31; 2.3, 47; 3.8, 54; 3.13, 68; 7.7, 222; 7.8, 224; 7.58, 291; 8.18, 354; 8.75, 393; 8.90, 402 Vi?ayat?-vic?ra Raghun?tha [?iroma?i] Bha???c?rya, 1510, and Jayar?ma [pa?c?nana] Bha???c?rya, 1620 1.15, 26 Vy?pti-nir?pa?a Jagad??a Bha???c?rya, ca. 1600 2.1, 36 Vyutpatti-v?da Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya,* 1604-1709 3.4, 48 A1.2 Authors Cited by Name Author, date Where cited Advaita-vidy?c?rya, n.d. 8.135, 424; 8.139, 427; 8.144, 429 B?dar?ya?a (s?trak?ra), 200 BCE? 8.97, 406 Bh?rat?t?rtha, 1300-1380 8.19, 355 Brahm?nanda, n.d. 7.64, 314 Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra, 1550-1650 2.4, 41; 3.14, 71; 3.14, 73; 3.14, 74; 3.14, 75; 4.6, 101 [Cakravartti-]Gad?dhara-bha???c?rya, 1604-1709 1.15, 26; 1.16,28; 2.8, 43; 3.3, 47;3.4, 51; 3.10, 65; 3.11, 65 Ga?ge?opadhy?ya, 1320 6.10, 137 Gau?abrahm?nanda, 1600-1700 1.17, 29 Gau?ap?da, 7th c. 8.67, 388-9 Gaur?k?nt Bha???c?rya, 1620 1.11, 21 Gotama/Gautama, 150 2.4, 48; 7.63, 307 Govinda Bha??a, 14-15th c. 3.10, 61 Jagad??a Bha???c?rya, ca. 1600 2.1, 36; 3.20, 90 Jaimini, 200 BCE? 3.17, 79 Jayar?ma [Pa?c?nana] Bha???c?rya, 1620 1.15, 26; 3.10, 62; 7.60, 298 Ka??da, 1st c. 3.18, 82; 7.63, 307 Kapila, n.d. 7.63, 307 Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB), ca. 1283 7.17, 237; 7.17, 238; 7.22, 245-6; 7.23, 246-9; 7.25-34, 251-67 [Kum?rila] Bha??a, 600-700 1.2, 4; 6.30, 176; 6.34, 185; 7.75, 333-4; 7.79, 338 Mamma?a, 11th c. 3.10, 61; 3.10, 66 Mur?ri Mi?ra, 1150-1220. 7.74, 332; 7.78, 338 N?goj? Bha??a, 1670-1750 3.10, 62; 3.18, 81; 3.18, 83 Ni?cald?s, 1791-1863 8.83, 397 412 Author, date Where cited N?si?h??rama, 16th c. 3.20, 88; 8.71, 390-1; 8.84, 398 Padmap?da (pa?cap?dik?-k?ra), 8th c. 1.21, 34; 8.53, 378-9; 8. 121, 417 P??ini, 5th c. BCE 3.20, 89 Pata?jali, 150 BCE 2.3, 47 Prabh?kara, 600-700 7.65, 314; 7.73, 332; 7.80, 338; 8.135, 425 Prak???tman (as Prak???tma-?r?cara?a). 11th c. 3.18, 81; 8.70, 390 Prak???tman (as [pa?cap?dik?-] vivara?ak?ra), 11th c. 3.18, 83; 7.18, 238; 8.2, 343; 8.5, 346; 8.21-23, 356-8; 8.31-2, 364-6; 8.39, 369; 8.52, 378; 8.53, 379; 8.93-5, 403-5; 8.101, 407 Raghun?tha ?iroma?i Bha???c?rya, 1510 1.15, 26; 3.4, 48; 3.4, 50; 3.14, 74; 6.9, 126 R?mak???a D?k?ita (son of Dharmar?ja), 1625-1700 3.14, 75; 6.35, 188; 6.35, 191; 6.35, 194 ?a?kara (as bh??yak?ra), early 8th c. 7.8, 223; 8.28, 362; 8.67, 388-9; 8.91, 403; 8.109, 412; 8.167, 441 Sarvaj??tman, 1050 8.69, 390; 8.98, 406-7; 8.118, 416; 8.133, 424 Sure?vara (V?rtikak?ra), 8th c. 8.28, 362; 8.106, 409-10; 8.156, 435 Udayan?c?rya, 984 4.5, 98 V?caspati Mi?ra, 842 1.18, 30;1.21, 34; 7.4, 215; 7.4, 216; 8.2, 343; 8.30, 364; 8.92, 403; 8.94-5, 404-5; 8.124, 418 Vidy?ra?ya, 1296-1386 1.18, 30; 8.9-17, 348-56; 8.19, 335; 8.32, 365-6; 8.39, 369; 8.52, 378; 8.53, 379; 8.156, 435 Y?ska, 600-500 BCE 8.171, 444 413 Appendix 2: Source Text Excerpts and Translation This section provides some general observations regarding the different versions of the VP that have been consulted for this dissertation (A2.1). Reproductions of the original text from the manuscript or printed versions are provided in Appendix 3. A transliterated Devan?gar? excerpt of the VP source text is provided (A2.2), based on the manuscript version (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.27-8); this version is a hand-written copy, presumably of Ni?cald?s?s original. The selection provided pertains to the eligibility of ??dras for listening to scriptures other than the Vedas, VP 8.109-10. Paraphrased translations of portions from the these sections have been cited in sections 4.2 and 8.5.1.The word breaks and (lack of) punctuation follow the manuscript. Hyphens have been inserted by me to permit word-wrap. This is followed by the version in the KS edition (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 411-2), with deviations from the manuscript apart from punctuation and word-breaks noted in bold font for additions and strike-through font for deletions (A2.3). ?tm?nand Muni?s versions of the same (Ni?cald?s 1957, 576-7; 1969, 500-1) are provided next (A2.4), with similar conventions followed to indicate deviations, this time relative to the KS version, and, where applicable, between the two editions themselves. Lastly, a close literal English translation of the manuscript text is provided (A2.5). A2.1 Some General Observations on the Different Versions ? The manuscript version preserves sentence punctuations (in the form of double-da??as) for only the first eleven folios and recto of folio 12, VP 1. Midway through verso of folio 12, all punctuation ceases, except for the end of the individual prakara?as; sentence breaks are indicated by breaks in the rekh?, which are otherwise continuous. ? The manuscript version lacks any paragraph or section breaks, but is a very careful reproduction; there are very few errors that I have noticed. The microform version that I consulted (Ni?chalad?sa 1868; SAMP 12739), however, occasionally has pages out of sequence and/or missing. ? The KS edition inserts punctuations in the form of commas, colons, semicolons, quote marks, hyphens, and periods instead of da??as. The text is further divided into numbered subsections, with the addition of section headings. These are listed in the Table of Contents (vi?ay?nukrama?ik?) that precedes the text. The text attempts to be faithful to the manuscript 414 version,650 thought there are many errors in this version, such as spelling, missing words, sometimes even sentences, and occasional inversions of the intended sense through the addition or deletion of negating prefixes, e.g., adhik?ra instead of anadhik?ra (VP 8.108, 411). These errors do not appear to be intentional, editorial choices but seem to be the result of carelessness or lack of understanding of the content. ? The ?tm?nand Muni versions (Ni?cald?s 1957; 1969) attempt to clear up these errors and make the text easier to understand. The text is rendered in Modern Standard Hindi, thus revising the Hary?nv? language of the preceding versions. ? Where necessary, ?tm?nand Muni provides additional explanations, and often attempts to clarify a sentence, by restating implicit references and/or breaking up the sentence into multiple sentences. However, as will be seen in the excerpt that follows, a subtle shift in meaning is introduced. ? ?tm?nand Muni is also liberal with his use of the enclitic particles h?, bh?, and to, inserting these into the text and thereby adding further subtle shifts in meaning by way of emphasis or broadening of the clauses. ? It is interesting to note that the second edition of ?tm?nand Muni?s version is completely reset in a smaller type, and appears to have only minor changes such as changing ?dika to ?di. I have primarily consulted the first edition for this dissertation. ? Both the KS edition as well as ?tm?nand Muni?s editions tend to hyper-correct and Sanskritize the spelling, e.g., tatvaj??na?tattvaj??na, bhagavatn?ma?bhagavann?ma. A2.2 Manuscript Text anyagranthak?ro?k?yahamatahai upanayanap?rvakavedak?adhyayanakahy?hai au??drak?- upanayanakahy?nah?? y?tai?veda?rava?amai?to??drak?adhik?ranah??hai tath?pi?r?vayec- caturovar??nity?dikavacanatai?itih?sapur???dikanake?rava?amai???drak?v?adhik?rahai aup?rvauktavacanamai???drak??upade?ak?ni?edhakahy?hai t?k?yahaabhipr?yahai vaidikama?trasahityaj??dikakarmaupade?a??drak??nah?? karaitaisai?vedoktapr???dika- sagu?aup?san?k???drak??upade?anah??karaiupade?am?trak?ni?edhanah?? joupde?am?trak?- 650 It is possible that the manuscript upon which the KS edition is based on is different from the manuscript I have consulted and itself may have been a source of the errors noticed. 415 ni?edhahovaitaudharma??stramai???draj?tikedharmak?nir?pa?ani?phalahovaig? au- vidyopyogikarmakeabh?vatai?jovidy?mai?anadhik?rakahaihai? t?k?yahasam?dhanahai s?dh?ra?aas?dh?ra?asakala?ubhakarmanak?vidy?mai?upayogahai ausatyaasteyak?am??auca- d?navi?ayatai?vimukhat?bh?gavatan?moccara?at?rthasn?napa?c?k?arama?trar?j?dikanak?- japaity?dikasakalavar?akes?dh?ra?adharmanamai?tath???drakamal?karoktacaturthavar?ake- as?dh?ra?adharmanamai???drak?adhik?rahai tinakarmanakeanu??h?natai?a?ta?kara?a- k??uddhidv?r?vidy?k?pr?ptisa?bhavaihai y?tai?itih?sapur???dikanake?rava?atai?- vivek?dikanakesa?bhavatai???drak??v?j??n?rthitvahonetai? vedabhinnaadhy?tmagra?thana- ke?rava??dikanamai???drak?v?adhik?rahai aubh??yak?ranai?v?pratham?dhy?yaket?t?yap?da- mai?yahakahy?hai upanayanap?rvakavedak?adhyayanakahy?hai au??drak??upanayanake- abh?vatai?yadyapivedamai?adhik?ranah??hai tath?pipur???dika?rava?atai???drak??v?- j??nahoyaj?vaitauj??nasamak?lah???drak?v?pratiba?dharahitamok?ahovaihai isar?tisai?- bh??yak?rakevacanatai?v?vedabhinnaj??nahetuadhy?tmagra?thanake?rava?amai???drak?- adhik?rahai aujanm??tarasa?sk?ratai?a?tyaj?dikanak??v?jij??s?hoyaj?vaitaupauru?eya- vacanatai?tinak?v?j??nahoyakaik?ryasahitaavidy?k?niv?ttir?pamok?ahovaihai y?tai?deva- asuranak?n???sakalamanu?yak??tatvaj??nak?adhik?rahai ?tmasvar?pakeyath?rthaj??nak??- tatvaj??nakahaihai? ?tmah?nako??ar?rahovaitauj??nak?anadhik?rahovai y?tai??tmaj??na- k?s?marthyamanu?yam?tramai?hai A2.3 KS Text anyagranthak?ranak? r?tisai? ??drak?bh? vedabhinnapura?aitih?s?dir?pa adhy?tma- gra?thanake ?rava??dikamai? adhik?ra ?109?6 50651 anya granthak?ro?k? yaha mata hai:?upanayanap?rvaka vedak? adhyayana kahy? hai au ??drak? upanayana kahy? nah??; y?tai? veda?rava?amai? tauo ??drak? adhik?ra nah?? hai, tath?pi ??r?vayeccaturo var??n? ity?dika vacanatai? itih?sapur???dikanake ?rava?amai? ??drak?vbh? adhik?ra hai.652 au p?rva ukta vacanamai? ??drak?? upade?ak? ni?edha kahy? hai t?k? yaha abhipr?ya hai:?vaidika ma?trasahit yaj??dika karmauopade?a ??drak?? nah?? karai, taisai? vedokta pr???dika sagu?aup?san?k? ??drak?? upade?a nah?? karai, upade?am?trak? ni?edha nah??. jo upde?am?trak? ni?edha hovai tau dharma??stramai? 651 Section titles added in KS edition. 652 The KS edition uses periods for punctuation instead of the expected da??a in the Devan?gar? context. 416 ??draj?tike dharmak? nir?pa?a ni?phala hovaig?. au vidyopyogi karmake abh?vatai? jo vidy?mai? anadhik?ra kahai? hai?. t?k? yaha sam?dhana hai?s?dh?ra?a as?dh?ra?a sakala ?ubhakarmanak? vidy?mai? upayoga hai. au satya, asteya, k?am?, ?auca, d?na, vi?ayatai? vimukhat?, bha?gavatan?moccara?a, t?rthasn?na, pa?c?k?arama?trar?j?dikanak? japa, ity?dika sakala var?ake s?dh?ra?a dharmanamai? tath? ??drakamal?karokta caturthavar?ake as?dh?ra?a dharmanamai? ??drak? adhik?ra hai, tinakarmanake anu??h?natai? a?ta?- kara?ak? ?uddhidv?r? vidy?k? pr?pti sa?bhavai hai; y?tai? itih?sa pur???dikanake ?rava?atai? vivek?dikanake sa?bhavatai? ??drak??vbh? j??n?rthitva honetai? vedabhinna adhy?tmagra?thanake ?rava??dikanamai? ??drak?vbh? adhik?ra hai. au bh??yak?ranai?vbh? pratham?dhy?yake t?t?yap?damai? yaha kahy?hai:?upanayanap?rvaka vedak? adhyayana kahy? hai; au ??drak?? upanayanake abh?vatai? yadyapi vedamai? adhik?ra nah??, hai, tath?pi pur???dika ?rava?atai? ??drak??vbh? j??na hoya j?vai tau j??nasamak?lah? ??drak?vbh? pratiba?dharahita mok?a hovaihai. isar?tisai? bh??yak?rake vacanatai?vbh? vedabhinna j??nahetu adhy?tmagra?thanake ?rava?amai? ??drak? adhik?ra hai. manu?yam?trak?? bhakti au j??nak? adhik?ra a?tyaj?dimanu?yanak?? tattvaj??nak? adhik?ra ?110? aujanm??tara sa?sk?ratai? a?tyaj?dikanak??vbh? jij??s? hoya j?vai tau pauru?eya- vacanatai? tinako?vbh? j??na hoyakai k?ryasahita avidy?k? niv?ttir?pa mok?a hovai hai, y?tai? devaasuranak? n??? sakalamanu?yanak?? tattvaj??nak? adhik?ra653 hai. ?tmasvar?pake yath?rtha j??nak?? tattvaj??na kahai? hai?. ?tmah?na ko? ?ar?ra hovai tau j??nak? anadhik?ra hovai, y?tai? ?tmaj??nak? s?marthya manu?yam?tramai? hai, parantu:-654 A2.4 ?tm?nand Muni Text 107:655 anya granthak?ro?anak? r?tiseai? ??drak?bh? vedabhinna pura?a-itih?s?dir?pa adhy?tma_gra?tho?anake ?rava??dika656meai? ??drak? bh? adhik?ra ?109? anya granthak?ro?k? ais?yaha mata hai ki upanayanap?rvaka h? ved?ak? adhyayana kahy? kah? gay? hai, au parantu ??drak? ke liye to upanayana kahy? k? vidhi h? nah?? hai.657 y?tai? 653 The text that is provided unitalicized here appears bold-faced in the KS edition. 654 This last word appears with the next sentence in the manuscript version. 655 ?tm?nand Muni preserves the section titles found in KS edition. His numbering is slightly different here, as he has combined some earlier sections of the KS edition. 656 Differences between the second edition of ?tm?nand Muni (1969) relative to the first (1957) are shown with a gray background. 417 isaliye yadyapi veda?rava?ameai? toau ??drak? adhik?ra nah?? hai,; tath?pi ??r?vayeccaturo var??n? (c?ro? var?o?ko ?rava?a kar?n? c?hiye) ity?dika vacano?asetai? itih?sa- pur???diko?anake ?rava?ameai? ??drak?_bh? adhik?ra hai. autath? p?rvoa ukta vacanameai? jo ??drako?? upade?ak? ni?edha kahy? kiy? gay? hai, usat?k? yaha abhipr?ya yah? hai:? ki ??drako vaidika ma?tro?asahit yaj??dika karmo?k? upade?a athav? ??drak?? nah?? karai, taisai? vedokta pr???dika sagu?aup?san?k? ??drak?? upade?a nah?? karaikarn? c?hiye, parantu vah?? upade?am?trak? ni?edha nah?? kiy? gay? hai. joyadi upde?am?trak? ni?edha hovaim?n? j?ya toau dharma??strameai? ??dra j?tike dharmak? jo nir?pa?a hai vaha ni?phala hovaig?. au vidyopyogi karmake abh?vasetai? jo vidy?meai? anadhik?ra kahai? kah? gay? hai?., usat?k? yaha sam?dhana yaha hai?658 s?dh?ra?a-as?dh?ra?a sakalay?vat ?ubha_karmo?anak? vidy?meai? h? upayoga hai. auarth?t satya, asteya, k?am?, ?auca, d?na, vi?ayo?asetai? vimukhat?, bhagavatnn?moccara?a, t?rthasn?na, pa?c?k?arama?ntrar?j?diko?anak? japa,?ity?dika sakala jo sabh? var?o?ake s?dh?ra?a dharmanamai? hai? aura tath? ??drakamal?karaoktake vacano?ke anus?ra caturtha var?ake as?dh?ra?a dharmanamai? hai?, uname? to ??drak? bh? adhik?ra hai,. tiuna_karmo?anake anu??h?nasetai? ??drako bh? an?ta?kara?ak? ?uddhidv?r? vidy?k? pr?pti sa?bhavai hot? hai;. y?tai? isa prak?ra itih?sa-pur???diko?anake ?rava?asetai? ?udrame? vivek?diko?anak?e sam?bhavatai? hot? hai, vivek?diko?se ??drak??bh? j??n?rthitva honetai? sambhava hot? hai aura phira j??n?rthitva se vedabhinna adhy?tma_gra?tho?anake ?rava?a?dikanamai?dv?r? ??drak?bh? adhik?ra vidy? k? pr?pti sambhava hot? hai.659 au ?r?bh??yak?raneai?_bh? brahmas?tra pratham?dhy?yake t?t?ya_p?dameai? yaha kahy?aisa kathana kiy? hai:??upanayanap?rvaka h? vedak? ved?adhyayana kahy? k? adhik?ra hai; au, parantu ??drako?? upanayanake abh?vasetai? yadyapi usak? vedameai? to adhik?ra nah??, hai,; tath?pi pur???dikea ?rava?asetai? h? yadi use ??drak??bh? j??na hoya j?yavai toau j??nasamak?la_h? usa??drak?_bh? pratiba?dhakarahita mok?a hovai_j?t?_hai.? 657 ?tm?nand Muni uses da??as for punctuation. 658 A new paragraph break is introduced. In general. the KS edition has far fewer paragraph breaks compared to ?tm?nand Muni?s version. 659 Not only has the present passage been made overly prolix, the meaning has been subtly shifted to where the emphasis is not on the ??dra?s right (adhik?ra) to listen to, contemplate and meditate on non-Vedic scripture but on the possibility of the ??dra acquiring knowledge through listening. 418 isar?tisai?_prak?ra ?r?bh??yak?rake vacano?asetai?_bh? ?udrak? vedabhinna j??nahetu adhy?tma_gran?tho?anake ?rava?ameai? ??drak? adhik?ra hai. 108: manu?yam?trako?? bhakti aura j??nak? adhik?ra tath? a?tyaj?di_manu?yo?anako?? tattvaj??nak? adhik?ra ?110? janm?n?tarake sa?sk?ro?asetai? yadi a?tyaj?diko?anako??_bh? jij??s? hoya j?yavai toau pauru?eya_vacanasetai? utinako?_bh? j??na hoyakarai k?ryasahita avidy?k? niv?ttir?pa mok?a hovai j?t?_hai,. isaliyey?tai? deva_va_asuro?anak?ke sam?nan??? sabh?sakala_manu?yo?anako?? tattvaj??nak? adhik?ra660 hai. ?tmasvar?pake yath?rtha j??nako?? tattvaj??na kahatei? hai?. yadi ko? ?ar?ra ?tmah?na ko? ?ar?ra hovai toau use j??nak? anadhik?ra kah? j?yahovai, isaliyey?tai? ?tmaj??nak? s?marthya to manu?yam?trameai? h? hai., parantu:- A2.5 Literal Translation (of Manuscript Version) The opinion of other authors is [that] the study of Vedas is only spoken of after upanayana [the sacred thread ceremony which only the upper three castes are eligible for], and the upanayana of a ??dra is not spoken of. Therefore, although a ??dra is not eligible for listening to the Vedas, nevertheless, from statements such as ??r?vayec caturo var??n, [all four castes ought to be read to (from causative of ?to listen?)],? even a ??dra is eligible for listening to itih?sa and pur??as, etc. And the prohibition of instructing a ??dra in what was stated earlier, its intent is: the instruction (upade?a) of Vedic mantras and rituals such as yaj?as, etc., is not to be imparted to a ??dra. Similarly the instruction of sagu?a meditation (up?san?) on breath, etc., mentioned in the Vedas should not be imparted to a ??dra. Mere instruction is not prohibited. If mere instruction were to be prohibited then the description of the duties (dharma) of the ??dra caste in the dharma??stra [texts] would be in vain. And the reconciliation of the stated ineligibility [of the ??dra] for knowledge owing to the absence of the [??dra?s performance of] actions useful for knowledge is: all good acts, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are useful for knowledge. And truth (satya), not stealing (asteya), forbearance (k?am?), purity (?auca), charity (d?na), abstaining (vimukhat?) from [sense-]objects, reciting the name of God, bathing at pilgrimage sites (t?rthasn?na), recitation of the five syllable ?king of mantras? [om nama? ?iv?ya] and other 660 Unlike the KS version, the text here is not emphasized in bold-face font but appears in the same font as the preceding and following text. 419 [mantras], etc., [which are] the universal duties (s?dh?ra?a-dharma) of all castes, and, according to the ??dra-kamal?kara [a text also known as ?udra-dharma-tattva-prak??a, a manual on the conduct of life and social behavior for ??dras, see Appendix 1.1] the extraordinary duties of the fourth caste [??dras], the ??dra is eligible for [all these duties]. By the performance of these actions, it is possible for even a ??dra to attain knowledge through the purification of the anta?- kara?a. Thus because of the possibility of discrimination (viveka) and the rest661 [arising] through listening to the itih?sa, pur??as, etc., from which a ??dra too can have the desire for knowledge, even a ??dra has eligibility for listening to [and contemplating and meditating on] texts about the ?tm? that are not Vedic. And even ?a?kara has stated in BS[?Bh] 1.3, ?The study of the Vedas is only stated after the upanayana, and although a ??dra is ineligible for study of the Vedas due to the absence of the upanayana, nevertheless, if knowledge may occur to even a ??dra through listening to the pur??as, etc., then even the ??dra?s liberation occurs at the same time that knowledge occurs, without any obstacles remaining.? Thus even according to ?a?kara, a ??dra, for the sake of knowledge, is eligible for listening to texts about the ?tm? which are other than the Vedas. [VP 8.110:] And, due to the latent tendencies (sa?sk?ra) from prior births, if even those of the lowest caste, etc., develop a desire to know (jij??s?) [Brahman], then, by means of human words, they too can get knowledge and get liberated in the form of the cessation of ignorance along with its effects. Therefore, like gods and demons, all humans are eligible for Brahman-realization (tattva-j??na). The true knowledge of the nature of the ?tm? is called Brahman-realization. If some body (?ar?ra) were without an ?tm?, then it could be considered ineligible for knowledge. Therefore, only humans have the capability of self-knowledge (?tma- j??na). 661 The s?dhana-catu??aya, four-fold means of discrimination (viveka), detachment (vair?gya), the six ?wealths? (?a?-sampatti, see n. 198, p. 81), and the desire for liberation (mumuk?ut?). 421 Appendix 3: Reproductions of Select Pages of the VP from the Versions Consulted This section contains images of the following: ? Figure 11: The opening page of the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 1.0). ? Figure 12: The colophon to the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). ? Figure 13: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.2) (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.27-8). ? Figure 14 and Figure 15: Examples of the errors found in the KS edition, VP 8.57, 384; 8.123-5, 418. ? Figure 16 and Figure 17: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.3), (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 411-2). ? Figure 18 and Figure 19: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.4), (Ni?cald?s 1957, 576-7; 1969, 500-1). 422 Figure 11: The opening page of the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 1.0). 423 z` Figure 12: The colophon to the manuscript edition of the VP (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.41). 424 Figure 13: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.2), (Ni?chalad?sa 1868, 8.27-8). (Grayed-out text is not considered in Appendix 2) ? (n ex t p ag e) 425 Figure 14: An example of the errors found in the KS edition, VP 8.57, 384. 426 Figure 15: An example of the errors found in the KS edition, VP 8.123-5, 418. 427 Figure 16: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.3), pt. 1 (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 411). 428 Figure 17: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.3), pt. 2 (Ni?cald?s 1899, VP 8.109-10, 412). 429 Figure 18: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.4), pt. 1 (Ni?cald?s 1957, 576-7). 430 Figure 19: The text presented in Appendix 2 (A2.4), pt. 2 (Ni?cald?s 1969, 500-1). 431 Glossary This is a collection of salient Sanskrit or Hindi terms frequently used in this dissertation. In the spirit of Ni?cald?s, for ease of use, the terms are given in the alphabetical order of today?s vernacular, namely, English. ab?dhita unsublatable, uncontradicted abh?va non-existence abheda sambandha identity relation abheda- sam?n?dhikara?ya identity coordination abhivya?gya that which is manifested abhivya?jaka that which manifests, ?manifester? ?dh?ra locus, basis adharma unrighteousness, injustice, bad conduct, demerit adhik?ra prerequisite, eligibility adhikara?a substratum; section (in the context of BS) adhik?r? one who is eligible adhi??h?na substratum adhy?sa superimposition ?dhy?tmika spiritual ad???a unseen potentiality advaita non-duality advaitin one who subscribes to the advaita view ?gantuka adventitious agnihotra fire sacrifice, a Vedic ritual aha?k?ra "I"-sense, ego ajahal-lak?a?? inclusive implication aj??na ignorance akha??a impartite, undivided akh??? center, a place where holy persons (s?dh?s) assemble akhy?ti-v?da the theory that the erroneous cognition is the failure to distinguish between the real recollection and real substratum alaukika extraordinary, superhuman ?loka sight a??a portion, which is without size and indivisible ?nanda happiness, joy ?nandamaya-ko?a sheath of happiness anavasth? infinite regress aneka-j?va-v?da the doctrine that there are multiple j?vas anirvacan?ya logically undefined, neither absolutely real nor empirically false 432 anirvacan?ya-khy?ti- v?da the Advaita theory that the object of erroneous cognition is logically indeterminate anta?-kara?a inner-organ, comprising of buddhi, manas, aha?k?ra, and cit antya-j?ti lowest caste anum?na inference anupalabdhi non-cognition anuvyavas?ya after-cognition, reflexive cognition anuyogin correlate, subjunct, locus; see n. 379 anyath?-khy?ti-v?da the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real, but is present elsewhere anyath?-siddha dispensable antecedent aparok?a immediate ?patti shortcoming apram? indirect; see n. 304 apram?tva invalidity aprasiddha uncommon apuru??rthat? the absence of human pursuits, primarily liberation (puru??rtha) ap?rva unseen consequences of actions ?rjava honesty/uprightness ?ropa factitious supposition artha material wealth arth?patti postulation asamav?y? k?ra?a non-inherent cause asat / asad unreal asat-khy?ti-v?da the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is unreal ??rama stage of life; monastery ??rama-karma duties associated with a particular stage of life ??raya locus ativy?pti over-pervasion (in logic) ?tm? self; see discussion on p. 124 ?tma-khy?ti-v?da the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is a mental state projected by the self avabh?sa apparent cognition avacchedakat? sambandha delimiting relation av?ntara v?kya subsidiary Upani?adic statement ?vara?a concealment, i.e., ignorance avasth?-aj??na secondary ignorance avayava part, which is measurable and divisible avidy? ignorance avy?k?ta the form of macrocosm during the deep sleep state 433 ayath?rtha false b?dha negation b?dha- sam?n?dhikara?ya negated grammatical co-ordination b?dhita negated, contradicted bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a?? inclusive-and-exclusive implication bhakti devotion bh??? vernacular bh?va-r?pa positive; having the appearance of existence bhrama erroneous notion Brahman the undifferentiated, indivisible ground of all being brahman the priestly caste, one of the three ?twice-born? castes (Skt. br?hma?a, H. br?hman) brahm???a universe buddhi intellect c????la / ca???la untouchable, an outcaste, born of a ??dra father and a brahman mother cetana consciousness cit consciousness citta consciousness D?d?panth? a follower of the D?d? Panth, the way of D?d? Day?l daiv?-sampad? divine properties dar?an viewing dar?ana a system of Hindu philosophy day? compassion ?er? camp, quarters dharma (1) duty, morality, (religious) merit, good conduct, righteousness, ethics dharma (2) property, quality, attribute dharmi-j??na substantive cognition dharmin / dharm? property-possessor, property-qualified object digvijaya ?conquest of the four quarters,? triumphant travels doh? a rhyming couplet do?a defect dravya substance d???i-s???i-v?da the doctrine that perception is creation eka-j?va-v?da the doctrine that there is only one j?va gadd? center (lit. seat) 434 gau??-v?tti subsidiary significatory relation gaurava lack of economy, undue complexity (in a syllogism) gu?a quality; the three attributes sattva, rajas and tamas guru teacher gurudv?ra teacher's residence hetu reason, probans = li?ga hira?yagarbha the form of macrocosm during the dream state homa ritual oblation, offering, usually of clarified butter indriya sense organ ??vara the theistic creator itih?sa historical texts, including the R?m?ya?a and MBh jagat world jahad-ajahal-lak?a?? inclusive-and-exclusive implication jahal-lak?a?? exclusive implication j?ti caste j?va individual, living being j?van-mukta one who is liberated while alive j?van-mukti the attainment of liberation while living j??na knowledge, cognition j??na-lak?a?a relation to the here and now of the features of a thing which was known previously at another place and time j??tat? cognized-ness, known-ness, being known j??tatva known-ness, cognized-ness, being known kalpa time period equivalent to 4,320,000,000 years k?ma pleasure k?mya-karma optional acts kara?a instrument karma action kart?tva agency kh?nd?n family, dynasty khy?ti-v?da theory of error ko?a sheath k?am? forbearance k?atriya warrior caste k?obha perturbation k??astha immutable consciousness (lit. ?that which is located at the peak?) 435 l?ghava economy (in a syllogism) lak?a?a inherent nature lak?a??-v?tti indirect/implied signification laukika ordinary li?ga sign, probans = hetu mahant religious head mah?-v?kya great Upani?adic statement; see n. 343 mala impurity manana reflection on the content of canonical Ved?nta texts; accompanied by ?rava?a and nididhy?sana; see n. 160 manas mind m?y? indeterminate and ultimately unreal creative power that manifests the empirical world mithy? unreal, illusory mithy?tva unreality, illusoriness mok?a liberation mukhya- sam?n?dhikara?ya principal (grammatical) coordination m?l?j??na primary/primordial ignorance mumuk?u seeker of liberation nididhy?sana profound and continuous meditation on the content of canonical Ved?nta texts; accompanied by ?rava?a and manana; see nn. 161, 582 nimitta k?ra?a efficient cause niravayava undivided nitya-karma obligatory ritual acts niv?tti negation, cessation, involution, refraining from activity, withdrawal (see discussion on p. 210) Ny?ya A school of Indian Philosophy, logical realism p?duk? wooden sandals pak?a locus where the li?ga/hetu (probans) is perceived p?pa demerits, ?sin.? See n. 564 par?mar?a recollection p?ram?rthika ultimate, absolute parok?a mediate pradh?na primordial (inert) matter which constitutes creation, = prak?ti pr?gabh?va prior non-existence praj? subjects (of a king) 436 pr?j?a the form of j?va during the deep sleep state prakara?a-grantha independent treatise prak?ti primordial inert matter which constitutes creation, = pradh?na pram? valid/direct cognition; see n. 304 pram??a means of valid cognition pram?t? cognizer pram?tva validity prapa?ca the visible, empirical world; apparent/material creation pr?rabdha karma past accumulated actions [and their results] prasa?khy?na continuous meditation pratibandhak?bh?va absence of obstacles pr?tibh?sika illusory pratiyogin counter-correlate, adjunct, counterpositive, absentee; see n. 379 pratyabhij?? re-cognition pratyak?a (immediate) perception; see n. 386 prau?hi-v?da (temporary) acceptance of the opponents? view while refuting their objections to one?s own view. See n. 486 prav?tti inclination, activity, effort towards some end, active involvement with the world; see discussion on p. 210 pu?ya merit pur??a sacred texts containing stories, legends, hymns and instructions of various deities, sages and kings puru??rtha the human pursuits, namely, dharma (1), artha, k?ma, mok?a p?rva-pak?a prima-facie view r?j? king rajas the attribute of activity, passion; see gu?a Ram nirgu?a Brahman ?abda verbal testimony s?dhana means s?dh? monk, ascetic s?dhya probandum, the term to be proven ??kh? branch, school s?k??tk?ra immediate cognition s?k?? witness (consciousness) ?akti power, capacity ?akti-v?tti direct significatory relation sam?n?dhikara?ya grammatical coordination s?m?nya general characteristic s?m?nya-j??na general cognition 437 samav?ya inherence samav?y? k?ra?a inherent cause sambandhin relatum sam?c?na proper sa?s?ra empirical existence, cycle of birth-living-death-rebirth; see n. 551 sa?sk?ra residual trace, impression, tendency. Also, purifying ceremony (In a ritual context) sa?yoga contact sanny?sa renunciation sant holy man, religious teacher; see n. 101 santo?a contentment s?ra essence ??stra scripture sat / sad existence, being; real satsa?g meetings with holy teachers sat-khy?ti-v?da the theory that the object of erroneous cognition is real satt? reality, being sattva the attribute of purity, light; see gu?a satya truth siddh?nta doctrine, ultimate purpose, conclusion, correct view sm?ti recollection; secondary scriptures that are humanly conceived sphura?a manifestation sph?rti manifestation ?raddh? faith ?r?ddha death anniversary ritual; see n. 527 ?rava?a listening to canonical Ved?nta texts expounded by a teacher; accompanied by manana and nididhy?sana; see the discussion on p. 65, and n. 159 s???i-d???i-v?da the theory that creation precedes perception ?ruti revealed scripture sth?la-?ar?ra gross body stotra hymn ??dra lowest caste s?k?ma-?ar?ra subtle body ??nya void svar?pa (inherent) nature, form, essence t?d?tmya identity taijasa the form of j?va during the dream state tamas the attribute of sloth, inertia, dullness; see gu?a tarka contra-factual argument 438 t?tparya meaning, intent, goal tattva truth; element tattva-j??na Brahman-realization tripu?? triad of cognizer, cognized and cognition tuccha false, imaginary, empty t?l?j??na secondary ignorance up?d?na k?ra?a material cause up?dhi ?limiting adjunct; adventitious condition.? See discussion on p. 173. upalak?a?a designating expression upam?na analogy upanayana sacred-thread ceremony, an initiation rite marking the passage of a boy from the upper three castes into adulthood, after which he is considered ?twice-born? up?san? meditation, contemplation vair?gya detachment vai?v?nara the form of j?va during the waking state; = vi?va vai?ya trader, farmer caste var?a caste v?san? latent tendency Ved?nta a school of Indian Philosophy, here synonymous with advaita Ved?ntin a follower of the school of Ved?nta vic?r contemplation vidy? knowledge vij??na consciousness vij??namaya-ko?a sheath of the intellect vik?epa distraction, projection vir?? the form of macrocosm during the waking state vi?aya object vi?e?a particular vi?e?a?a qualifier vi?e?ya qualificand vi?i??a qualified vi?va the form of j?va during the waking state. = vai?v?nara viveka discrimination v?tti (1) ?mental modification by which cognition occurs,? see discussion on p. 120 v?tti (2) significatory function vy?dhi ailment, disorder vy?kara?a [Sanskrit] grammar 439 vy?p?ra intermediate cause, mediate activity, function vy?pti invariable concomitance / co-existence vy?pya that which is pervaded vyavah?ra empirical utility vy?vah?rika conventional, empirical vy?vartaka that which differentiates or excludes, differentiator vyavas?ya determinate cognition vy?v?tti differentiation yaj?a sacrificial ritual yath?rtha true yoga spiritual practice yog? a practitioner of yoga yoga-janya-dharma- lak?a?a relation to that which is learned of via supernatural faculties yukti logical argument, reasoning 441 Bibliography Primary sources cited in this dissertation are prefixed by a ?, secondary sources by ?, and entries that appear without any prefix denote sources consulted but not directly cited. 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Non-English words that are not proper nouns appear in non-capitalized italics. ?ib?dat ..................................................... 47 ab?dhita .................. 150, 152, 159, 295, 367 Abdul Fazl, Shaikh ............................. 42, 43 ?bh?sa-v?da ... 225, 239, 240, 256, 257, 258, 261, 263, 371, 386, 399 abh?va ...... 92, 119, 144, 146, 147, 158, 162, 200, 240, 268, 365 abheda ..................................... 70, 175, 330 Abheda-ratna ......................................... 409 abheda-sam?n?dhikara?ya .................... 240 abhivya?gya ........................................... 333 abhivya?jaka .......................................... 333 absence of obstacles ....................... 149, 231 Acyutak???a T?rtha . 170, 171, 176, 391, 393, 408 ?dh?ra .............. 71, 171, 194, 331, 350, 379 adharma... 122, 124, 146, 151, 227, 323, 326 adhik?ra.. 72, 82, 91, 92, 101, 102, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 431 adhikara?a ........ 93, 128, 136, 162, 235, 240 adhi??h?na ..............................162, 171, 367 adhy?sa . 6, 94, 117, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 273, 367 adhy?sa-bh??ya ..................................... 162 ad???a .............................. 122, 149, 159, 366 Advaita-cint?-kaustubha .........120, 121, 409 Advaita-d?pik? 285, 290, 292, 293, 308, 374, 388, 390, 392, 409 Advait?nandabodhendra ................. 208, 409 Advaita-siddhi ................................ 402, 408 Advaita-vidy?c?rya 325, 327, 330, 350, 402, 411 ?gantuka ......................... 277, 278, 290, 372 agnihotra ............................................... 107 Ag?dhadeva ................................ 70, 83, 361 aha?k?ra .................................121, 125, 164 Ahmedab?d, Gujarat ................................ 37 aicchika lak?a??..................................... 133 Aitareya Upani?ad ................................. 255 Aitchison .................................................. 31 AiU 3.1.1 ................................................ 134 ajahal-lak?a?? ................................ 132, 156 aj??na ... 6, 80, 117, 118, 120, 121, 155, 172, 225, 233, 234, 236, 260, 263, 265, 335, 337, 351, 363, 370, 379 ?k??k?? .................................. 119, 136, 400 ?kara-grantha ........................................ 288 Akbar ................................41, 42, 43, 50, 73 akhy?ti ....115, 117, 161, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 232, 259, 368, 369 Ak?ar-Ananya .......................................... 84 Ala?k?ra-candrik? ......................... 384, 409 Allah .................................40, 47, 49, 51, 60 ?loka .............................................. 285, 388 Amal?nanda ............ 301, 359, 393, 400, 409 Amarad?sa ............................................. 384 Amber ...................................................... 42 ?mer ............................................ 42, 43, 45 Amritsar ................................................... 14 a??a....................................................... 237 analogy....115, 118, 119, 123, 130, 138, 139, 143, 146, 150, 155, 157, 169, 363, 365, 383 ?nandabodha ... 79, 313, 337, 338, 341, 382, 410 ?nandagiri? ............................................ 100 ?nandamaya-ko?a .. 240, 242, 244, 246, 386, 387, 389, 399, 401 anavasth? ............................................... 228 aneka-j?va-v?da ...................................... 316 anirvacan?ya .. 125, 145, 163, 165, 166, 167, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 187, 188, 191, 197, 208, 225, 233, 236, 240, 248, 250, 257, 258, 260, 264, 289, 290, 296, 305, 308, 313, 339, 340, 341, 345, 346, 352, 371, 374, 380, 386, 394 482 anirvacan?ya-khy?ti ... 6, 115, 117, 125, 161, 164, 167, 168, 176, 178, 180, 184, 187, 189, 196, 206, 207, 208, 225, 259, 368, 369, 384, 386, 393, 397 Anirvacan?ya-khy?ti-siddhi? .................. 209 anirvacan?ya-pr?g-j?tatva ...................... 167 Anirvacan?ya-v?da ......................... 209, 409 anta?-kara?a...... 80, 92, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 146, 149, 151, 155, 159, 169, 173, 175, 176, 177, 200, 239, 241, 242, 244, 246, 247, 249, 251, 252, 257, 282, 285, 300, 307, 310, 312, 313, 319, 322, 326, 327, 330, 331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 344, 347, 350, 351, 363, 366, 373, 375, 376, 379, 380, 383, 387, 388, 390, 419 Antarkar, W. R. ........................................ 99 Antary?m? Vidy? .................................... 317 antya-j?ti................................................ 305 anubandha-catu??aya ............................... 80 Anubh?ti-prak??a 09.46-51 ............................................. 395 13.095 ................................................ 391 13.108 ................................................ 391 anum?na . 115, 118, 123, 127, 128, 130, 155, 363 anumiti ....................................127, 128, 201 anupalabdhi ... 115, 118, 123, 130, 143, 146, 147, 150, 155, 158, 324, 346, 363, 365 Anu??sana-parvan ......................... 102, 105 Anuvy?khy?na ........................................ 296 anuvyavas?ya .......... 141, 206, 209, 227, 229 anuyogin .................................144, 145, 183 anyatar?dhy?sa ...................................... 162 anyath?-khy?ti 124, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 182, 187, 190, 191, 192, 196, 198, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 296, 368, 397 Anyath?-khy?ti-v?da .............................. 409 anyath?-siddha............................... 275, 372 anyony?dhy?sa....................................... 162 Apar?dityadeva ...................................... 210 Apar?rkadeva ......................................... 210 aparok?a ... 81, 147, 150, 165, 170, 185, 207, 230, 270, 283, 284, 322, 324, 325, 335, 351, 379, 386 aparok?at? ..................................... 170, 320 ?patti ........142, 231, 254, 265, 284, 330, 337 Appayya D?k?ita 93, 170, 325, 360, 393, 402 Appearance, Theory of ... 225, 226, 239, 240, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 264, 271, 305, 306, 371, 372, 386, 387, 389, 390, 399 apram? 6, 117, 119, 121, 148, 150, 153, 161, 221, 226 apram?tva ....... 223, 225, 226, 259, 263, 369 apuru??rthat? ................................. 340, 341 ap?rva ............................. 142, 300, 303, 320 Arabic ...............................40, 45, 46, 47, 73 ?ra?yaka-parvan............................ 104, 106 ?ropa...................................................... 233 arth?dhy?sa ................................... 162, 177 arth?patti 115, 118, 119, 123, 130, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 155, 158, 321, 363, 365 artha-v?da .............................. 137, 255, 396 arundhat?-ny?ya ............................. 188, 393 ?rya Sam?j .................................. 2, 25, 108 ?ryabha??a .............................................. 104 as?dh?ra?a k?ra?a ................ 149, 159, 366 asamav?y? k?ra?a .......................... 148, 314 ???nand, Sv?m? ....................................... 15 asat .. 167, 168, 183, 235, 313, 339, 340, 368 asat-khy?ti ....... 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 368 ?satti ...................................... 119, 136, 400 ??rama ............ 104, 298, 299, 301, 303, 400 ??rama-karma ........................................ 301 ??raya ......124, 126, 234, 260, 275, 319, 383 Ass? Gh?? ................................................. 14 A?vagho?a .............................................. 408 Athalye................................... 126, 227, 233 ativy?pti ......................................... 230, 336 ?tm? 22, 24, 49, 55, 72, 80, 82, 94, 100, 103, 119, 124, 134, 135, 139, 142, 146, 147, 151, 152, 158, 162, 163, 166, 184, 188, 189, 208, 227, 229, 233, 235, 255, 258, 260, 261, 262, 264, 267, 275, 280, 287, 288, 289, 296, 297, 304, 306, 308, 315, 316, 336, 347, 356, 365, 369, 370, 373, 374, 395, 398, 405, 406, 419 ?tma-bodha .............................................. 77 ?tma-khy?ti .... 161, 181, 184, 185, 187, 368, 386, 389 ?tmapur??a ............................................. 14 483 ?tm?r?m Sany?s?, Vaidyar?j B?b? ........... 30 ?tma-tattva-viveka ................................. 123 atyant?bh?va...........................144, 255, 346 aupani?adatva ........................................ 319 AV .................................................. 134, 138 avabh?sa ......................... 162, 165, 230, 367 avacchedakat? ............................... 172, 175 avaccheda-v?da ..... 225, 239, 249, 251, 252, 256, 261, 371, 387, 389 av?ntara-v?kya ......... 81, 134, 151, 156, 364 ?vara?a ..... 80, 121, 126, 171, 172, 234, 237, 238, 248, 256, 260, 261, 331, 370, 371 avasth?-aj??na 263, 264, 278, 305, 371, 372 avayava .......................................... 237, 314 Avayava-grantha .................................... 409 avidy? 91, 101, 120, 124, 145, 149, 155, 159, 166, 176, 178, 222, 234, 238, 251, 260, 335, 351, 363, 366, 368, 370, 379, 391 avidy?-le?a ..................................... 312, 314 avy?k?ta ................................................. 244 ayath?rtha 119, 150, 153, 159, 161, 210, 367 Ayurveda .............. 16, 19, 21, 24, 67, 80, 82 B?dar?ya?a .............................. 95, 410, 411 Bader, Jonathan ........................................ 98 b?dha ....... 184, 189, 207, 233, 247, 267, 268 b?dha-sam?n?dhikara?ya ...................... 240 b?dhita .................... 152, 153, 159, 167, 367 Baga? ?er? ............................................... 17 Bajrang D?s, Swami ................................. 24 Bakhn? ..................................................... 40 B?lagop?lendra ........................................ 99 B?l?kr?m.................................................. 41 bal?varda-ny?ya ..................................... 125 B??gr? ................................ 3, 22, 28, 79, 91 beginning six items without ................................ 145 Belvalkar, S. K. ............................ 96, 98, 99 Benares12, 14, 17, 26, 34, 39, 79, 88, 90, 96, 108, 353, 362, 402 Bengali.................................. 26, 77, 88, 361 bh?ga-ty?ga-lak?a?? ...............132, 134, 156 Bhagavat, H. R. .................................. 98, 99 Bhagv?n D?s, R?j? ....................... 41, 42, 43 Bhair?n? ................................................... 45 Bhaktam?l .......................................... 37, 40 bhakti ....................................................... 74 Bhaktivijaya ............................................. 38 Bh?mat? .... 79, 125, 133, 151, 234, 249, 256, 261, 298, 301, 310, 312, 318, 348, 359, 371, 387, 389, 393, 400, 402, 409 Hari?candra, Bh?ratendu .......................... 88 Bh?rat?t?rtha ...... 70, 119, 246, 247, 409, 411 Bhart?hari ............................................... 392 Bhart?prapa?ca ................................. 81, 135 bh???. 3, 9, 12, 13, 19, 22, 24, 28, 35, 45, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 94, 114, 178, 305 Bh???-pariccheda .................................... 87 bh??yak?ra ............................................. 412 Bh???a M?m??s? ...... 78, 115, 123, 144, 146, 158, 365, 391 Bha???r?ka .............................................. 410 Bha??oji D?k?ita ...................................... 410 bh?va-r?pa ..... 146, 231, 234, 260, 272, 346, 370 bh?va-vik?r?, ?a? ................................... 345 Bheda-dhik-k?ra ..................... 146, 390, 409 BhG ............................. 95, 99, 107, 108, 394 03.42 .................................. 125, 126, 383 04.13ab............................... 107, 108, 359 09.32 .................................. 100, 107, 359 12.13 .................................................... 72 16.01-03 ......................... 48, 93, 304, 376 18.41 .................................................... 54 18.41-45 ..................................... 107, 359 18.47 .................................................. 107 BhG ?Bh .................................................. 99 09.32 .................................................. 100 18.41 .................................................. 100 Bh?msi?ha ............................................... 30 Bhiv?n?, Haryana...................................... 17 Bhomasim?a H??? .................................... 32 bhrama 55, 80, 122, 152, 165, 170, 189, 233, 249, 256, 259, 262, 294, 336, 351, 356, 367, 370, 380 b?gh? .................................................. 17, 32 bimba-pratibimba-v?da .. 225, 239, 247, 256, 257, 261, 263, 371 B?rbal ........................................... 41, 42, 43 Bi?ansi?ha, Mah?r?o ......................... 31, 33 Brahm?.....51, 52, 71, 97, 103, 105, 106, 107 brahma-cetana ....................................... 323 484 brahman .... 14, 37, 41, 42, 45, 79, 93, 95, 96, 100, 103, 104, 106, 109, 278, 302, 304, 358, 359 Brahman 2, 35, 40, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 80, 82, 84, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 103, 108, 119, 125, 126, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 166, 168, 172, 174, 177, 233, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 245, 247, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 277, 279, 280, 283, 284, 289, 290, 292, 293, 297, 299, 301, 304, 305, 309, 310, 311, 313, 316, 320, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 342, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 354, 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 371, 374, 376, 378, 380, 382, 383, 386, 389, 390, 392, 394, 396, 397, 400, 401, 406 Brahm?nanda (author) ....... 38, 209, 409, 411 Brahm?nanda (PD 11-15) .......... 2, 246, 409 Br?hma?as ............................................. 138 Brahman-consciousness . 253, 266, 284, 306, 323, 334, 349, 372, 378 brahm???a ............................................. 251 brahmanization......................................... 40 Brahman-realization ... 6, 7, 74, 93, 110, 118, 305, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 347, 348, 362, 376, 377, 383, 384, 386, 394, 401, 404 Brahman-realization ............................... 377 Brahma-siddhi ....................................... 408 Brahma-s?tra ..... 4, 22, 76, 95, 99, 100, 123, 159, 181, 236, 272, 301, 367, 399, 410 Brahma-vidy?bhara?a ............208, 209, 409 Brahmo Sam?j ....................................... 108 Braj .......... 3, 22, 28, 29, 30, 45, 84, 108, 476 Brajballabh Haripras?d ....................... 26, 90 BS 1 152 1.1.1 ................................................... 137 1.3.34-38 .............................. 92, 100, 358 1.4.15 ................................................. 393 2.1.11 ................................................. 397 2.1.26 ................................................. 237 2.2 .............................................. 181, 236 2.2.12-17 ............................................ 236 2.2.28-32 ............................................ 181 2.3.45 ................................................. 237 2.4.17 ................................................. 125 3 152 3.2.1 ........................................... 191, 207 3.3 ...................................................... 317 3.4 ...................................................... 298 BS 2 152 4 152 BS ?Bh .................... 151, 171, 208, 234, 409 1.1 ...................................................... 162 1.1.1 ................................................... 298 1.1.4 ................................................... 137 1.3 ...................................................... 419 1.3.34 ................................................... 92 1.3.34-38 ............................................ 107 1.3.38 ........................................... 93, 106 1.3.9 ..................................................... 95 2.1.11 ................................................. 397 3.3.20 ................................................. 299 BU..................... 99, 107, 254, 298, 302, 359 1.4.10 ...101, 134, 151, 255, 336, 351, 380 1.4.16 ................................................. 101 2.1.20 ................................................. 254 2.3.6 ................................................... 296 2.6.3 ................................................... 245 3.6, 3.8 ....................................... 302, 360 3.7.22 ................................................. 251 3.7.2-23 .............................................. 317 4.3 ...................................................... 286 4.3.10 ......................................... 191, 207 4.3.7 ................................................... 134 4.3.9 ................................... 287, 307, 391 4.4.19 .......................... 148, 158, 234, 366 4.4.22 ................................. 298, 299, 302 4.4.8 ................................................... 101 4.5.15 ................................................. 405 BU Bh. V?rtika 1.4.402 ............................................... 391 BU ?Bh .................................. 100, 101, 409 1.4.15 ................................................. 147 485 1.4.7 ................................................... 147 2.4.5 ................................................... 101 intro ................................................... 100 Buddhan................................................... 38 buddhi ....... 23, 107, 121, 125, 151, 178, 188, 208, 227, 239, 241, 246, 293, 335, 398 Buddhism ............................................... 394 Buddhist............ 50, 161, 181, 184, 185, 368 B?nd? .... 3, 9, 18, 23, 28, 31, 32, 34, 78, 110, 353, 357 Callewaert . 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 51, 56, 57, 58 c????la ........... 83, 96, 97, 99, 104, 107, 359 Ca???d?n .................................................. 30 Caturved?, Para?ur?m . 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 51, 66, 67, 68, 79 Cauh?n ..................................... 30, 354, 357 caupa? ...................................................... 59 cetana ..... 124, 138, 145, 150, 153, 157, 159, 164, 233, 239, 247, 260, 294, 322, 364, 367, 370, 403 cid?bh?sa ....................................... 241, 247 Citra-d?pa (PD 6)2, 239, 241, 242, 243, 247, 387, 409 Citsukha ......................................... 296, 410 Citsukh? 1.3 ............................................ 287 citta .......................................... 58, 121, 125 common cause. 149, 159, 264, 305, 366, 371 compatibility ...........................119, 136, 400 Cop??, Lak?min?r?ya? ............................. 10 creation .................................................. 138 cyclic nature of ................................... 138 CU 2.23.1 ................................................. 304 3.14.1-4 .............................................. 317 4.1, 4.2 ............................................... 302 4.1.7 ................................................... 302 4.1-2 ................................................... 360 6.1.3 ................................................... 135 6.16.3 ................................................. 135 6.2.1 ................................................... 135 6.8.7 ....................................134, 156, 364 7.1.3 ....................................142, 158, 365 7.1.4 ................................................... 104 Dabist?n-i-Maz?hib ................................. 38 D?d? Day?l .... 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 85, 108, 109, 355, 356, 360, 361, 408 Akbar, meeting with ............................. 41 Comparison to Ni?cald?s?s hagiography ......................................................... 63 Daughters ............................................. 38 Guru of ................................................. 38 Hagiographic tropes.............................. 43 Islam, familiarity with .......................... 46 Marriage ............................................... 44 Miraculous birth of his children ............ 44 On Hindus and Muslims ....................... 49 On j?ti (caste) ....................................... 53 Patrons ................................................. 41 Powers.................................................. 44 D?d? Janma L?l? ... 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44 D?d? Mah?vidy?laya .......................... 10, 24 D?d? Panth . 3, 10, 12, 13, 17, 23, 27, 37, 62, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 109, 353 Dakhan??h? ........................................... 67 Kh?k? ............................................. 66, 67 Kh?ls? .................................................. 66 N?g? ..................................................... 66 Sth?ndh?r? ............................................ 67 Tapas? ................................................... 67 Uttar??h? ......................................... 66, 67 Virakta ........................................... 66, 67 D?d? Panth Paricay ............. 10, 12, 17, 353 D?d? V??? .. 3, 17, 37, 40, 45, 56, 62, 66, 67, 73, 353, 356 On religion and caste ............................ 45 D?d?, Sukhday?l ...................................... 68 D?d?, S?ratr?m 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 22, 25, 68, 72, 73 D?d?-dv?r ................................................ 66 Daftar?, Mohan ......................................... 45 daiv?-sampad? .... 48, 93, 264, 304, 311, 376, 396 Dalmia, Vasudha .......................... 88, 89, 90 dama ......... 81, 298, 299, 300, 304, 310, 375 Dasapu?jaj? .............................................. 14 Da?a-?lok? .............................................. 402 Dasgupta, S. N. ..........................................2 486 Day?r?m ............................... 19, 20, 25, 381 deep sleep ... 7, 118, 191, 239, 244, 246, 287, 312, 331, 334, 335, 336, 350, 351, 379, 399 Delhi ............... 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 67 Delimitation, Theory of .. 225, 239, 249, 251, 252, 261, 371, 387, 389, 399 detachment ....72, 73, 81, 299, 302, 310, 375, 419 Dhan???, Haryana .................................... 13 dharma (good conduct) 28, 40, 79, 107, 122, 124, 146, 151, 227, 301, 302, 304, 323, 326, 418 dharma (property) .... 94, 162, 174, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 195, 200, 201, 226, 229, 231, 235, 236, 241, 248, 249, 251, 257, 258, 261, 264, 265, 266, 282, 292, 295, 322, 326, 327 Dharmar?ja Adhvar?ndra 113, 116, 128, 136, 139, 147, 148, 383, 410, 411 dharma??stra ............................. 87, 93, 418 Dharmavy?dha ................................. 92, 104 dharmi-j??na-v?d? . 170, 171, 176, 178, 368, 385, 388, 408 dharmin .. 162, 183, 184, 189, 249, 258, 264, 266, 269, 290, 292 D?dhiti.................................................... 409 ?i?gal ...................................................... 30 discrimination ...... 14, 34, 55, 79, 81, 89, 91, 110, 198, 215, 353, 357, 361, 419 Divine Properties ..... 93, 264, 304, 311, 376, 396 DJL 1.16 ...................................................... 39 1.6 ........................................................ 39 1.6.3 ..................................................... 37 1.7 ........................................................ 38 11.8.7 ................................................... 43 14.7 ...................................................... 43 16.27 .................................................... 41 3.9 ........................................................ 39 4.3 ........................................................ 39 4.5 ........................................................ 39 4.5.1-2 .................................................. 39 6. 26 ..................................................... 42 7.12.2 ................................................... 42 8.5 ........................................................ 42 doh? ... 23, 59, 69, 82, 83, 119, 382, 406, 407 ma?gala ...................... 35, 71, 72, 75, 354 do?a ................................ 122, 147, 184, 242 dravya ..................... 180, 200, 235, 259, 314 dream .... 7, 83, 118, 207, 244, 263, 278, 281, 282, 283, 287, 307, 312, 331, 350, 372, 373, 379, 391, 394, 399 dream-superimposition ... 263, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 307, 373 D?g-d??ya-viveka...................... 70, 247, 409 v. 20 ................................................... 119 v. 32 ................................................... 247 d???i-s???i-v?da ..... 7, 82, 201, 226, 239, 252, 255, 261, 263, 288, 289, 308, 371, 373, 394, 395, 402 DV 1.79 ...................................................... 52 13.107-13 ............................................. 53 13.25-8 ................................................. 48 13.43 .................................................... 49 13.44 .................................................... 49 13.45 .................................................... 49 13.84-91 ............................................... 51 14.36 .................................................... 55 16.42-6 ................................................. 50 17.12-13 ............................................... 54 18.36 .................................................... 50 2.18 ...................................................... 49 228 ....................................................... 51 29.4 ...................................................... 49 4.189 .................................................... 52 4.211-15 ............................................... 46 56.0 ...................................................... 49 7.9 ........................................................ 62 DV pad 316 (21.3) ............................................. 39 375 (24.23) ........................................... 39 84 (2.14) ............................................... 46 DV s?kh? 3.137 .................................................... 46 DVN 13.117 .............................................. 54 East India Company ................................. 31 efficient cause 148, 159, 166, 250, 257, 278, 315, 366, 373 487 eka-j?va-v?da ..... 7, 225, 239, 252, 254, 257, 261, 316, 371, 395 Ekn?th.............................................. 38, 408 elements five ..................................................... 140 Eliot, Charles ........................................... 95 Emerson, Ralph Waldo ...................... 64, 65 erroneous cognition three kinds of ..................................... 233 expectancy ............................................. 119 extraordinary relations three kinds of ..................................... 192 factitious supposition ............................. 233 fallacy mutual-dependence............................. 322 of unknown conception .............. 187, 386 reciprocal-dependence .........322, 328, 329 Farsi ............................................. 45, 80, 82 Gad?dhara Bha???c?rya .. 131, 133, 409, 410, 411 Gahlot ................. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 353 Gajapati V?ra N?r?ya?adeva ........... 384, 409 gala-graha-ny?ya ................................... 218 Gane?a ............................................... 71, 98 Gang?r?m .......................................... 29, 30 Ga?ge?a .......................... 123, 195, 219, 411 G?rg? V?caknav? .....................302, 360, 400 Gau. Dh. S?. 11.29 .................................................. 107 12.4-6 ................................................... 93 Gau?abrahm?nanda ........................ 409, 411 Gau?ap?da .............. 282, 303, 399, 400, 411 Gau?e?vara J??nottama .................. 296, 410 gau??-v?tti ...................................... 131, 245 gaurava ........................... 147, 167, 186, 189 Gaur?k?nt Bha???c?rya ............................ 411 Gautama .................. 107, 204, 399, 410, 411 gavaya ........................................... 138, 139 Gokulpras?d 'Brij' .................................... 84 Gop?lab?la ............................................... 99 Gop?lsi?ha .............................................. 30 Gotha??, Rajasthan ................................... 32 Govinda Bha??a .............................. 409, 411 gr?mya-dharma ..................................... 346 Grimes, John A. ..................................... 120 gross body ................................................ 94 Gujarati ..................... 26, 45, 77, 84, 85, 361 gu?a .... 51, 54, 100, 107, 226, 228, 230, 235, 237, 245, 250, 275 gu?j? berries........................................... 180 Guru Granth S?hib ................................... 51 Guru Samprad?ya .............................. 38, 39 vv. 8-9 .................................................. 38 gusala ................................................ 46, 47 Gussner, Robert E. ................................... 98 Hacker, Paul ....................................... 98, 99 hagiography .. 37, 42, 63, 65, 66, 74, 97, 355 Halbfass, Wilhelm .................... 85, 394, 398 Ham??kh?? ................................................. 30 H??? ......................................................... 30 Hard?s ...................................................... 62 Harid?ks?ita .............................................. 410 Haridwar .............................. 15, 26, 90, 362 Hari?candra, Bh?ratendu ........................ 108 Haryana ................. 9, 1, 3, 13, 17, 27, 67, 68 Hary?nv? ................................ 3, 22, 28, 414 Hatcher, Brian .................................... 88, 89 hetu28, 79, 83, 100, 127, 128, 129, 140, 149, 204, 217, 228 Hindu .... 2, 27, 41, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 64, 73, 74, 90, 110, 138, 355, 356 Hinduization ................................... 111, 361 hira?yagarbha ................................ 244, 296 Hopkins, E. W. ....................................... 104 ignorance.6, 80, 83, 101, 108, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 126, 134, 135, 147, 149, 153, 155, 159, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 188, 223, 225, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 245, 246, 247, 248, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 268, 269, 270, 279, 282, 283, 284, 286, 290, 293, 294, 297, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 330, 331, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 340,341, 346, 350, 351, 362, 363, 366, 368, 371, 372, 375, 376, 379, 385, 386, 395 removal of .......................................... 313 ignorance, cessation of . 7, 91, 118, 145, 233, 255, 260, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 281, 286, 304, 306, 307, 310, 488 313, 316, 317, 336, 347, 348, 351, 370, 372, 376, 377, 380, 382, 386, 401 ignorance, cessation of ........................... 329 ignorance, cessation of ........................... 329 ignorance, trace ...... 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 347, 348, 377 impression .....35, 42, 73, 124, 127, 128, 155, 166, 194, 198, 202 Indra ................................................ 96, 254 indriya .................... 124, 126, 151, 287, 383 inference . 114, 118, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 140, 141, 150, 155, 179, 197, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 217, 218, 219, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 259, 321, 322, 324, 363, 370 anvaya-vyatireka ................................ 140 keval?nvayin ...................................... 140 vyatirekin ........................................... 140 Ingalls, Daniel H. H. ... 95, 99, 100, 144, 391 inherent cause ........................................ 148 intention .... 33, 100, 119, 136, 138, 242, 275, 293, 400, 403 invariable concomitance . 118, 127, 140, 155, 156 ??? Upani?ad ............................................ 24 Islam ................. 38, 46, 62, 64, 73, 355, 356 i??a-s?dhanatva .............................. 218, 219 I??a-siddhi ....................... 116, 216, 382, 408 ??vara .... 6, 72, 102, 117, 122, 131, 134, 135, 136, 138, 142, 145, 147, 149, 150, 157, 159, 174, 225, 234, 237, 238, 239, 242, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 253, 256, 258, 260, 261, 263, 280, 282, 283, 322, 331, 344, 347, 364, 366, 371, 386, 387, 389, 399, 401, 403 ??vara-consciousness ...................... 283, 334 itih?sa82, 92, 93, 94, 95, 104, 106, 109, 111, 358, 359, 360, 400, 401, 416, 417, 418, 434 Jagad??a Bha???c?rya ...............195, 410, 411 Jagann?th ................................................. 45 jagat.......................... 97, 237, 264, 280, 371 jahad-ajahal-lak?a?? ..................... 132, 156 jahal-lak?a?? ..........................132, 134, 156 Jaimini ........................................... 104, 411 Jain .......................................................... 50 Jaipur ................................10, 24, 28, 42, 67 Jaipur? ...................................................... 45 Jalandhar, Punjab ..................................... 14 jam??at ..................................................... 47 Janaka .................................................... 104 Jangop?l ................................. 38, 42, 63, 73 Jap j? ........................................................ 51 J?? ....................... 13, 14, 19, 20, 34, 79, 353 j?ti. 4, 16, 21, 53, 54, 74, 79, 89, 91, 94, 102, 107, 110, 295, 356, 357 Jayanta Bha??a ........................................ 210 Jayar?ma Bha???c?rya ..................... 409, 411 Jayat?rtha ................................................ 296 Jhunjhun??, Rajasthan ............................. 17 jij??s? 91, 120, 137, 298, 304, 310, 376, 419 jij??su ......... 70, 81, 139, 148, 158, 294, 366 j?va .. 2, 6, 7, 53, 82, 117, 118, 119, 126, 129, 134, 142, 143, 145, 156, 174, 225, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 279, 282, 283, 284, 307, 312, 313, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 344, 347, 350, 363, 364, 366, 371, 373, 376, 378, 379, 387, 389, 390, 398 J?vanl?l, ?s?nand ..................................... 30 j?van-mukta .... 172, 269, 312, 314, 317, 347, 376 j?van-mukti ...................... 315, 316, 347, 382 J??na-c?r?a ............................................. 77 j??n?dhy?sa ................................... 162, 177 J??naghana ..................................... 294, 410 j??na-lak?a?a . 192, 193, 194, 199, 202, 203, 205, 206, 209, 227 J??na-ma?jar? .......................................... 77 J??nasamudra .......................................... 84 j??tat? .................................... 228, 334, 338 j??tatva ................... 222, 342, 344, 352, 380 Jodh B?? ................................................... 41 Jodhpur .................................................... 84 Kabir ..... 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 62, 85, 108, 110, 356, 360, 408 son, Kam?l ........................................... 44 Kadam, Har? Li?g? ................................... 33 Kaivalya Upani?ad 1.2 ........................... 298 kaivalya-??kh? ....................... 298, 302, 319 489 K?k?r?m, ?r? ................... 14, 15, 16, 34, 353 kalam? ............................................... 47, 59 Kal?naur ?er? .......................................... 17 kalpa ...................................................... 244 Kalpataru ........ 133, 301, 359, 393, 400, 409 Kamal?kara Bha??a ................................. 410 k?mya-karma ..........................302, 310, 375 Ka??da ....................................204, 399, 411 Kanak?vati, queen of R??hor .................... 43 Kannada ....................................... 27, 84, 85 K??va .................................................... 302 Kapil . 2, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 67, 68, 79, 90, 91, 362 Kapila .....................................204, 399, 411 Kap?rthal? ............................................... 14 kara?a..... 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 138, 149, 155, 200, 249, 251, 252, 257, 261, 312, 317, 350, 351, 379, 383 k?ra?a-?ar?ra ......................................... 247 K?rik?vali ................................................ 87 karma 7, 73, 83, 92, 101, 107, 117, 122, 134, 142, 149, 152, 229, 252, 254, 264, 297, 298, 299, 359, 382, 396 Kar?a ......................................253, 254, 402 kart?tva ........................... 166, 321, 349, 378 K??? Dharma Sabh? ................................ 108 Ka?ha Upani?ad ....................................... 24 Kau??a Bha??a.................................. 80, 410 Kau??tak? Upani?ad ................................ 396 Kavit?rkika Cakravart? N?si?ha Bha??op?dhy?ya (KCNB) ...169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 222, 368, 385, 388, 402, 408, 411 K?vvya-prak??a ..................................... 409 K?vya-prad?pa ............................... 409, 410 Keshavd?s ................................................ 78 Ke?or?y P??a?, Rajasthan ......................... 31 KeU ................................................. 24, 100 1.6 .............................................. 319, 378 kevala-lak?a?? ........................132, 135, 156 KGCSI ................................................... 354 Kha??ana-kha??a-kh?dya ..................... 123 v. 27 ................................................... 392 Khar??, Rajasthan ..................................... 31 Kha?? Bol? ................................................ 45 Khemr?j ?r?k???ad?s ... ix, 23, 26, 69, 77, 90, 114, 115, 143, 219, 247, 274, 316, 362, 409, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 421, 425, 426 khy?ti-v?da............................. 160, 161, 168 Khy?ti-vic?ra ......................................... 409 Kiha?aul?, Haryana . 3, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27, 68 Kisan Mah?r?j, ?S?khare? ........... 26, 90, 362 kle?a ............................................... 256, 262 Ko??, Rajasthan .................................. 28, 31 krama-samuccaya................... 298, 309, 375 k?cchra-c?ndr?ya?a ............................... 301 kriy? ............................................... 229, 235 K???a...... 13, 26, 96, 100, 107, 254, 359, 362 K???a Bha??a........................................... 131 K????la?k?ra .................. 170, 176, 393, 408 K??nami?ra ............................................... 84 k?atriya....14, 79, 91, 94, 100, 103, 109, 264, 278, 304, 305, 310, 359, 376 k?obha ............................................ 170, 173 Kubera ..................................................... 71 Kum?rila Bha??a .............. 210, 230, 296, 411 Kunt? .............................................. 253, 254 Kuppuswamy Raju ................................... 70 k??astha ........................... 239, 240, 241, 242 l?ghava ........... 147, 187, 189, 196, 286, 308 Lahore ...................................................... 14 Lak??nanda ................................ 26, 90, 361 lak?a??-v?tti .................... 126, 131, 156, 319 lak?ita-lak?a?? ............................... 132, 156 lak?ya ................ 73, 131, 132, 133, 156, 328 latent impressions ............ 127, 130, 155, 166 lectio divina ............................................ 408 liberation .23, 70, 77, 81, 82, 92, 94, 95, 102, 104, 107, 111, 118, 134, 148, 152, 153, 158, 159, 188, 247, 254, 255, 262, 292, 298, 305, 309, 312, 316, 331, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 342, 345, 347, 350, 351, 352, 357, 358, 359, 361, 366, 367, 374, 379, 380, 382, 392, 394, 395, 396, 398, 400, 419 Light of Truth ....................................... 2, 25 li?ga ............................................... 127, 129 Madh?ma?jar? vy?khy? ............................ 99 Madhus?dana Sarasvat? .................. 391, 402 490 Madhva .................................... 19, 296, 402 madhyama adhik?r? ......... 317, 348, 377, 404 M?dhyamika ........... 161, 181, 182, 184, 368 Madhyandina ......................................... 302 Mah?bh?rata ..... 4, 24, 25, 30, 76, 102, 106, 138, 157, 255, 354, 359, 364, 403 Mah?bh??ya (A???dhy?y?) ...................... 409 mah?bh?ta ..............................153, 159, 367 Mah?bh?ta-viveka (PD 2) .......... 2, 250, 409 Mah?deva Pun?at?makara ........................ 410 Mahadevan, T. M. P. ............. 96, 97, 99, 120 Mah?dev?nanda .......... 5, 113, 120, 409, 410 Mah?n?r?ya?opani?ad........................... 401 22.1 .................................................... 302 mahant ......................................... 12, 17, 27 Maharashtra ........................................... 108 mah?-v?kyas .... 81, 119, 129, 130, 134, 135, 143, 147, 150, 151, 156, 157, 240, 241, 246, 248, 253, 254, 312, 319, 323, 324, 329, 349, 364, 377, 378, 390, 399, 404 the four............................................... 134 Mah?y?na .............................................. 394 Mahipati ................................................... 38 Maitreyi ................................................. 101 M?K? ............................................. 100, 282 2.1-3 ........................................... 283, 400 Malayalam ................................... 27, 84, 85 Mallan?r?dhya ....................................... 409 Mamma?a ........................ 132, 133, 409, 411 M?n Singh, R?j? of Amber ......42, 43, 44, 45 M??akbodh .............................................. 85 M??akd?s ................................................. 77 manana65, 81, 102, 152, 153, 159, 317, 348, 356, 363, 367, 377, 385, 404, 408 manas ............................................ 121, 125 Ma??ana Mi?ra ...................................... 238 Mangald?s, Sv?m? 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25 Ma?iprabh? ........................................... 384 Man?r?m ......................... 19, 20, 24, 35, 354 Ma?j??? ......................................... 131, 409 Manohard?s ....................................... 77, 85 mantra ................................................... 418 Manu ..................................................... 255 Manu-sm?ti 4.80a ............................................ 91, 358 Marathi............. xi, 9, 26, 45, 77, 85, 90, 361 Marcaurelle, Roger ................................... 95 M?rw??? ............................................. 30, 45 material cause ......................................... 148 Matilal, B. K. ......................... 106, 195, 392 M?U ................ 240, 244, 246, 247, 387, 401 2 134 5-6 ...................................................... 244 m?y? ... 71, 72, 134, 142, 145, 147, 149, 159, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 247, 251, 260, 340, 366, 370 Mayeda ................... 100, 121, 126, 383, 392 MBh ....................................................... 104 12.314.45c ...................................... 359 12.314.45 ........................................... 104 12.314.45c ............................................ 92 13.131 ................................................ 102 13.131.45-51 ...................................... 105 14.54 ............................................ 96, 104 3.197-202 ..................................... 92, 104 3.285.9-10 .......................................... 254 5.138.11 ............................................. 254 MBh 12.314.40b.......................................... 359 12.319.87 ........................................... 104 13.131 ................................................ 359 13.314.40-44 ...................................... 106 3.177 .......................................... 104, 106 McGregor ........................................... 84, 85 M?m??s? 6, 23, 78, 80, 84, 87, 95, 113, 115, 127, 131, 136, 137, 157, 161, 225, 229, 296, 364, 368, 382 M?n? tribe................................................. 31 mithy?tva.... 7, 117, 142, 146, 158, 178, 179, 263, 264, 268, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 308, 365, 374 modifications of being, six ..................... 345 mok?a .......23, 77, 81, 92, 255, 316, 338, 391 MP .............. 61, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 107, 359 mukhya-sam?n?dhikara?ya ... 241, 242, 248, 390 m?l?j??na 172, 263, 264, 278, 305, 332, 371 Muni, ?tm?nand .... 26, 27, 90, 91, 237, 277, 287, 288, 294, 315, 316, 324, 342, 362, 413, 416 Mur?ri Mi?ra .......................... 225, 229, 411 491 Mur?r?d?n ................................................ 30 Muslim . 2, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58, 61, 62, 73, 74, 90, 110, 356, 361 MuU 1.1.4-5 ................................................ 319 2.2.3 ................................................... 319 2.2.8 ..................................................... 98 3.2.9 ..................................................... 80 MW ......................... 120, 138, 278, 297, 342 n??? ........................................................ 283 Nadiy?, Bengal..................................... 2, 15 Nagar, J?van L?l ....................................... 30 N?goj? Bha??a ..........................409, 410, 411 Nahu?a ................................................... 104 Nai? 2.88 ................................................ 107 Nakamura, Hajime ................................. 237 N?mdev ................................................... 62 N?nak ................................. 62, 85, 356, 408 N?r?in D?s .................... See Singh, N?r?yan Narain? ...................................38, 43, 45, 66 N?r?ya?d?s, Sv?m?..... 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 55, 68, 69, 77 Narnaul, Haryana ..................................... 25 n?stika ........................................... 181, 184 N?tha ....................................................... 85 nididhy?sana ...... 65, 81, 317, 319, 348, 356, 363, 377, 385, 404, 408 Nigam?nand ....................................... 10, 22 Nigambodh Gh?? ...................................... 19 N?laka??h? ................................................ 25 Nimb?rka ............................................... 109 nimitta k?ra?a .........................148, 159, 366 nirgu?a Brahman . 40, 52, 53, 65, 72, 74, 85, 93, 103, 109, 317, 318, 348, 355, 356, 360, 377, 404 Nirukta ........................................... 345, 409 nirvikalpa sam?dhi ......................... 143, 158 Ni?cald?s........................................ 353, 411 Advanced Studies ................................. 14 Biographical Sources .............................. 9 Comparison to D?d??s hagiography ...... 63 Death ................................................... 19 Early Life ............................................. 13 Influence of .......................................... 25 p?duk?.................................................. 27 Patronage ............................................. 18 Post-Benares......................................... 17 Reasons for using the vernacular .......... 76 Successors in the lineage ...................... 19 Unpublished Works .............................. 24 Uttar??h? ............................................... 67 vis-?-vis Pollock?s Theories of Vernacularization ............................. 84 Within the D?d? Panth ......................... 66 Works written ....................................... 22 nitya-karma ..... 152, 301, 302, 310, 375, 401 niv?tti .. 6, 100, 117, 120, 167, 210, 212, 213, 225, 233, 247, 260, 267, 337, 347, 370, 380 non-cognition . 115, 118, 119, 123, 130, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 150, 155, 324, 346, 363 non-inherent cause.......................... 148, 314 N?si?h??rama 146, 147, 285, 293, 308, 387, 388, 389, 390, 392, 409, 412 N?UTU 9 ................................................ 237 Ny?ya .. 2, 14, 15, 18, 23, 34, 78, 80, 87, 113, 114, 119, 123, 124, 127, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 161, 165, 166, 180, 190, 192, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 235, 236, 259, 271, 275, 353, 357, 368, 369, 382, 397 Ny?ya-kaustubha .................................... 410 Ny?y?-kusum??jali ................................. 123 Ny?ya-makaranda .... 79, 313, 337, 339, 341, 342, 345, 381, 382, 399, 410 Ny?ya-ma?jar? ....................................... 210 Ny?y?m?ta .............................................. 402 Ny?ya-mukt?val? .................................... 210 Ny?ya-sudh? ................... 296, 309, 375, 410 Ny?ya-s?tra ............................ 204, 399, 410 Ny?ya-v?caspatya .......................... 183, 410 Odhav, L?l?dhar ............................... 33, 354 Om ......................................................... 246 O? ......................................................... 394 Oriya .................................................. 84, 85 Orr, W. G ................................................. 41 492 Orr, W. G. . 13, 17, 27, 28, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 66, 67, 73, 110 Osborne, Arthur ................................. 22, 89 pada ........................ 46, 51, 73, 83, 131, 140 Padmap?da ..... 113, 125, 126, 186, 198, 210, 216, 272, 316, 348, 377, 410, 412 Pahlajrai .............................. 2, 123, 246, 247 Paila ....................................................... 104 pak?a ...................... 127, 128, 129, 218, 228 Pa?cada??2, 26, 79, 237, 239, 246, 247, 250, 323, 410 Pa?cako?a-viveka (PD 3) .... 2, 244, 399, 410 Pa?cap?dik? .. 113, 171, 186, 198, 210, 216, 222, 263, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 316, 368, 384, 399, 408, 410 P???ava ................................................. 253 Pande, G. C. ............................... 98, 99, 100 Pandharpur, Maharashtra .......................... 26 P??ini ..................................................... 412 p?pa 100, 122, 149, 152, 302, 303, 310, 375, 376, 401 param?nanda .............. 28, 79, 347, 352, 381 par?mar?a ....................... 118, 127, 128, 217 param?rtha .................................... 162, 238 p?ram?rthika ..... 72, 90, 108, 111, 130, 133, 146, 148, 156, 158, 163, 172, 247, 257, 290, 292, 358, 360, 364, 366 Parame??hin ................................... 245, 298 Parame?vara (astronomer) ...................... 104 parata? pr?m??ya ...................226, 259, 369 Parimala ........................................ 393, 402 parok?a ... 134, 147, 165, 185, 320, 324, 349, 367 Pata?jali .......................... 115, 131, 409, 412 PD 11.62-3 ............................................... 246 1-10.................................................... 246 11-15 .................................................. 246 6.18 .................................................... 239 7.106 .................................................. 304 7.22-28, 247-250 ................................ 147 7.86 .................................................... 252 8.72 .................................................... 391 9.1-13 ................................................. 318 Pehl?dpur-Kirholi, Haryana................ 17, 20 perception .... 7, 82, 114, 118, 123, 124, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 144, 147, 150, 155, 157, 167, 169, 172, 175, 186, 190, 192, 194, 195, 198, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211, 228, 230, 257, 263, 269, 288, 289, 293, 297, 308, 309, 318, 320, 323, 349, 363, 364, 373, 374, 377, 395 Persian .................. 38, 40, 45, 46, 47, 73, 76 phala-cetana .......................................... 335 philosophy ............... 8, 14, 53, 403, 404, 406 moral .................................................... 87 Six Hindu schools of .......................... 114 Phule, Jyotirao ........................................ 108 Pi?gal ....................................................... 29 P?t?mbar 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 23, 26, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 90, 113, 114, 120, 354, 361, 391 Pollock, Sheldon .... 4, 76, 77, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 110, 357 postulation ...... 115, 118, 119, 123, 130, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 150, 155, 158, 321, 325, 349, 363, 365, 378 two types of ........................................ 142 Potter, Karl .......... 98, 99, 100, 125, 168, 296 Prabh?kara ............................................. 412 Pr?bh?kara M?m??s?78, 115, 123, 161, 162, 210, 211, 215, 225, 229, 325, 326, 368, 369 Prabodhacandrodaya ............................... 84 pradh?na ................. 234, 235, 237, 260, 370 pr?gabh?va .................................... 144, 149 pr?j?a ............................................ 244, 334 Praj??nanda, Sv?m? ................................ 336 prakara?a-grantha ............................. 85, 86 Prak???nanda........... 252, 257, 261, 371, 410 Prak???tman ... 136, 171, 186, 198, 216, 222, 225, 234, 238, 247, 248, 257, 260, 261, 263, 284, 299, 368, 370, 371, 384, 388, 410, 412 Prak???tma-?r?cara?a .............. 284, 400, 412 prak?ti .....234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 260, 261, 370, 371 pr?k-siddhatva-dharma .......................... 167 pram? .. 6, 117, 119, 121, 124, 130, 141, 142, 148, 150, 151, 153, 158, 159, 161, 170, 493 172, 173, 177, 217, 226, 227, 271, 318, 365, 367, 377 pram??a.... 6, 23, 78, 97, 116, 118, 122, 123, 126, 130, 141, 142, 146, 147, 150, 152, 155, 156, 158, 172, 185, 205, 289, 346, 348, 349, 363, 364, 365, 377, 378, 383, 394 pram??a-cetana ..................................... 335 pram?t?-cetana ...................................... 335 pram?tva ..... 6, 117, 223, 225, 226, 230, 232, 259, 263, 369 prapa?ca . 7, 8, 117, 139, 148, 153, 157, 158, 159, 178, 188, 234, 235, 245, 253, 256, 260, 264, 277, 289, 293, 294, 307, 308, 336, 340, 351, 365, 367, 369, 370, 372, 374, 380, 386, 394, 399 pr?rabdha karma ... 267, 269, 306, 315, 317, 346, 347, 348, 372, 376, 377, 397 prasa?khy?na .. 312, 317, 318, 321, 348, 377 prasth?na-tray? .......................... 95, 99, 358 pr?tibh?sika ... 153, 164, 179, 247, 250, 257, 291 pratibimba ..................................... 261, 371 pratibimb?dhy?sa .................................. 265 pratibimba-v?da ..................................... 258 pratiyogin 144, 145, 146, 183, 200, 214, 215 pratyabhij?? ........................................... 190 pratyak?a 114, 118, 123, 124, 130, 136, 147, 150, 155, 157, 169, 185, 197, 201, 204, 206, 227, 228, 321, 323, 363, 364 prau?hi-v?da...... 7, 147, 242, 286, 287, 308, 389, 390, 391 prav?tti .. 6, 94, 117, 210, 211, 212, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 245, 256, 259, 262, 304, 337, 369 primordial ignorance ...... 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 280, 286, 305, 307, 332, 350, 371, 372 prior non-existence ......................... 145, 149 probandum ..... 118, 127, 128, 129, 140, 141, 155, 204, 218 probans ... 118, 127, 129, 140, 141, 155, 204, 217, 218, 219, 228 progressive teachings ............................. 394 proximity.119, 133, 136, 174, 192, 240, 248, 257, 258, 271, 273, 276, 320, 400 Punjabi ............................................... 40, 45 pu?ya ........................ 33, 122, 149, 152, 303 pur??a ... 51, 52, 82, 92, 93, 94, 95, 104, 106, 108, 109, 111, 245, 305, 358, 359, 360, 400, 401, 436 Pur??a, Bh?gavata................................. 108 puru??rtha ...... 188, 255, 292, 331, 339, 340, 341, 345, 346, 347, 350, 352, 374, 379, 380, 394, 396 p?rva-pak?a ........................................... 272 Quran ................................................. 52, 56 R?dh? ..................................................... 253 Radhakrishnan ............................................2 R?ghavd?s .......................................... 37, 40 Raghun?tha ?iroma?i Bha???c?rya . 409, 411, 412 Raid?s ................................................ 41, 62 Raikva .................................... 301, 360, 400 rajas ............................................... 122, 237 Rajjab .... 4, 37, 40, 45, 55, 56, 61, 62, 74, 76, 356 On religion and caste ............................ 61 Sarv??g? ............................. 37, 40, 41, 56 Rajjab ..................................................... 109 Ram .... 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 71, 72 R?m Singh II, Sawai of Jaipur .......... 28, 109 R?m Singh, R?j? of Ko?? .......................... 28 Ramakrishna .......................................... 408 Ramakrishna Mission ............................. 108 R?mak???a (1380-1480 CE) ................... 287 R?mak???a D?k?ita (1625-1700 CE) ...... 128, 139, 141, 148, 384, 410, 412 Ramana Maharshi ...... 2, 22, 25, 89, 396, 408 R?m?nand .........................15, 18, 20, 21, 25 R?m?nuja ................................... 19, 95, 179 Ramazan ............................................ 47, 60 Rambachan, A .......................................... 95 R?mpur?, Delhi ............................ 18, 20, 21 R?msi?ha, R?j? of B?nd? .... 3, 9, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 78, 89, 113, 353, 354, 357, 361, 381 Rasapu?jaj?............................................... 14 Ravid?s .................................................... 85 494 Reflection, Theory of ..... 225, 226, 238, 239, 247, 249, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 264, 271, 305, 306, 371, 372, 387, 389 reflection-superimposition ......263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 280, 306, 307, 372 Rekht?...................................................... 45 renunciation ..44, 91, 94, 262, 263, 264, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 310, 375, 399 eligibility for ...................................... 304 Revathy, S .............................................. 176 revelation .......10, 8, 125, 394, 397, 398, 402 Rishikesh ........................ 26, 28, 71, 90, 362 Rohtak, Haryana ...................................... 17 Roy, Raja Rammohun ............................ 108 roz? .......................................................... 47 RV .......................................................... 134 10.90.5a ............................................. 245 10.90.9 ....................................... 138, 403 S??khya ................................................. 115 S?barmat? ................................................. 37 ?abda .. 51, 80, 115, 118, 123, 126, 130, 136, 155, 156, 157, 192, 289, 312, 318, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325, 329, 330, 348, 349, 363, 364, 377, 378, 398, 401, 403 ?abda-ratna ........................................... 410 ?abda-?akti-prak??ika ............................ 410 Sad?nanda ........................................ 65, 405 Sad??ivendra ............................................ 99 ?ad-dar?ana ........................................... 114 s?dhana-catu??aya ................................... 80 s?dh?ra?a k?ra?a ... 149, 159, 264, 366, 371 s?dhya...... 127, 128, 129, 140, 204, 218, 337 ?a?-li?ga ................. 119, 130, 135, 137, 406 sagu?a Brahman ............... 93, 318, 360, 404 S?? B?b? ............................................... 2, 26 ?aiva ........................................................ 50 S?khare ........... See Kisan Mah?r?j, 'S?khare' s?kh? ................................. 45, 46, 56, 60, 97 s?k?? 125, 151, 175, 201, 230, 259, 288, 308, 344, 369, 373, 383 ?akti .. 15, 119, 131, 142, 195, 234, 237, 238, 260, 261, 370, 371 ?akti (goddess) ......................................... 71 ?aktiv?da ................................131, 409, 410 ?akti-v?tti ......................... 131, 156, 245, 320 ?akti-v?tti ................................................ 391 ?akya ...................................... 131, 132, 156 S?lemahammad, ?ar?f ............................... 90 ?ama.......................... 81, 298, 299, 310, 375 sam?dh?na ............................... 81, 298, 337 sam?dhi .................................................. 395 samanvaya-s?tra (BS) ............................ 137 s?m?nya ..169, 173, 190, 228, 287, 313, 347, 376 s?m?nya-j??na ....................................... 171 s?m?nya-lak?a?a .................... 192, 193, 198 sama-samuccaya .................................... 298 samav?ya ............................... 183, 192, 207 samav?ya sa?bandha ............................. 145 samav?y? k?ra?a .................................... 148 samaveta-samav?ya........................ 192, 227 sambandh?dhy?sa .................................. 241 Sambandha-v?rtika ........................ 101, 107 Sa?k?epa-??r?raka ... 79, 113, 151, 170, 171, 172, 222, 238, 283, 285, 297, 302, 308, 309, 368, 375, 381, 382, 384, 387, 390, 400, 408, 410 samprad?ya ........................ 19, 83, 245, 401 sa?s?ra ...7, 52, 83, 100, 118, 168, 173, 254, 255, 258, 261, 268, 269, 277, 294, 297, 309, 312, 313, 316, 328, 331, 336, 337, 338, 340, 341, 344, 350, 351, 352, 375, 378, 380, 387, 396, 399 sa?sarg?dhy?sa ............................. 163, 187 sa?sarga-vi?i??a-j??na ................... 220, 221 sa?sk?ra .... 91, 92, 122, 124, 127, 151, 155, 166, 200, 211, 304, 310, 320, 321, 324, 325, 349, 358, 376, 378, 379, 401, 419 sa?v?d? bhrama ............................. 318, 377 sa?yoga ......................................... 192, 228 sa?yoga-sambandha .............. 192, 193, 227 sa?yukta-samav?ya................................ 192 sa?yukta-samav?ya-sambandha ... 192, 194, 227 sa?yukta-samaveta-samav?ya ................ 192 sa?yukta-vi?e?a?at? ............................... 192 ????ilya Vidy? ....................................... 317 Sa?gati-grantha ..................................... 410 ?a?kara1, 2, 4, 25, 61, 65, 72, 76, 81, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 495 106, 107, 111, 121, 123, 135, 162, 166, 254, 272, 282, 298, 300, 301, 342, 355, 358, 359, 383, 387, 389, 391, 394, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 408, 409, 412 ?a?kara-dig-vijaya ................................... 97 S??khya ............................ 15, 138, 235, 397 S??khya-s?tra ................................ 204, 399 sanny?sa . 7, 91, 99, 117, 264, 299, 302, 310, 399 Sanskrit .... xi, 3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 45, 46, 64, 66, 67, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 94, 102, 110, 111, 114, 132, 183, 193, 345, 353, 355, 357, 361, 396, 402 Sanskritization ................................. 40, 414 sant ... 17, 19, 20, 39, 40, 46, 62, 67, 85, 108, 110, 111, 356, 358, 360 Sant D?s ................................................... 45 ??nti-parvan ............................ 92, 104, 359 Sapta??i .................................................. 188 SAR 17.40-42 ............................................... 56 22.8-12 ................................................. 56 60.21 .................................................... 57 Sar??......................................................... 45 Sarasvat?, Sw?m? Satsvar?p?nanda ........... 89 Saraswati, Dayananda (1824-83) ... 2, 19, 25, 108, 408 ??r?raka ................................................. 410 Sarvaj??tman ... 79, 113, 151, 170, 171, 222, 238, 284, 302, 315, 324, 347, 368, 382, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 400, 410, 412 ??stra .. 14, 94, 101, 188, 210, 283, 288, 289, 300, 305, 308, 311, 314, 320, 341, 349, 374, 376, 378, 392, 393, 395, 396, 401 ??str?rtha .............................. 17, 19, 33, 405 ??str?, D?modar ....................................... 15 ??str?, R?m Prak?? ................................... 17 sat ...... 69, 167, 168, 235, 313, 339, 340, 368 ?ata-pra?n?............................................... 77 sat? ......................................................... 108 sat-khy?ti 115, 161, 179, 180, 181, 189, 368, 384 ?a?-pra?n? ................................................ 77 ?a?-sampatti ............................. 81, 298, 419 satt? .. 72, 162, 164, 169, 188, 208, 230, 253, 263, 268, 280, 288, 296, 307, 308, 322, 339, 367, 369, 373 sattva......................... 18, 122, 237, 243, 295 Saty?nanda ..................................... 296, 410 Saty?rthaprak??a ................................. 2, 25 saugata................................................... 185 scripture 9, 1, 6, 7, 51, 52, 64, 65, 91, 94, 96, 125, 129, 138, 157, 207, 209, 237, 287, 290, 291, 292, 295, 298, 303, 305, 310, 355, 356, 375, 380, 383, 385, 388, 397, 399, 401, 403, 404, 405, 407 secondary ignorance264, 266, 267, 269, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 286, 372, 399 secondary ignorance ............................... 371 Shivkumar, Kamal ......................................1 Shrivastava, Surendra Kumar ............... 1, 85 siddh?nta.. 81, 119, 123, 128, 129, 132, 136, 139, 146, 155, 180, 184, 188, 208, 229, 252, 288, 297, 298, 308, 313, 329, 340, 362, 366, 374, 376, 386, 390, 393, 395 Siddh?nta-bindu ............................. 391, 402 Siddh?ntabodha ....................................... 84 Siddh?nta-kaumud?................................. 410 Siddh?nta-le?a-sa?graha ..... x, 93, 170, 176, 254, 303, 320, 321, 325, 360, 391, 393, 402, 408 Siddh?nta-mukt?val? ................................. 87 sijd? ......................................................... 47 ?ikh?ma?i ............... 139, 141, 148, 384, 389 Si?ha, Jasvant .......................................... 84 Si?ha, Ra?j?t.... 1, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 25, 33, 34, 67, 68, 353 Sindhi ....................................................... 45 Singh, N?r?ya? ......................................... 43 ?itika??h? ................................................ 410 ?iva ........ 71, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 359 ?iva Pur??a 1.18.25 ............................... 303 skillful means ......................................... 394 ?loka ma?gala ............................................. 121 Sm?rta-?aiva ........................................... 109 Smith, W. L. .................... 41, 43, 63, 73, 355 496 sm?ti (memory, recollection) ..118, 128, 131, 150, 151, 159, 162, 190, 195, 212, 279, 367 sm?ti (scripture) .. 24, 78, 82, 92, 94, 95, 125, 127, 155, 191, 207, 209, 295, 297, 309, 318, 360, 375, 387, 396, 400, 401, 403, 407 ?ok-vin??.................................................. 84 solipsism, metaphysical .......................... 395 Some?vara .............................................. 296 soteriological efficacy 7, 387, 388, 389, 391, 392 soteriology .......................... 9, 1, 5, 366, 404 sphura?a ........................................ 171, 267 sph?rti..................... 188, 280, 307, 339, 369 ?raddh? ............................................ 81, 298 ?r?ddha .................................................. 278 ?rava?a ... 65, 81, 91, 92, 131, 152, 153, 159, 256, 262, 298, 301, 303, 304, 310, 315, 317, 320, 337, 338, 347, 348, 349, 356, 363, 367, 375, 376, 377, 378, 385, 395, 396, 398, 399, 404, 408 Sreeram, Lala ............................................. 1 ?r?har?a .......................................... 123, 392 s???i-d???i-v?da ................ 264, 288, 289, 394 ?ruti .... 8, 24, 65, 78, 95, 101, 125, 128, 129, 138, 155, 191, 207, 209, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 251, 256, 287, 290, 291, 292, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 301, 304, 309, 310, 315, 318, 319, 320, 349, 355, 360, 364, 374, 375, 378, 387, 391, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 403, 404, 405, 407 S? 1.29-38 ............................................... 170 1.31-2 ................................................. 171 1.41 .................................................... 283 1.42 .................................................... 284 1.43 .................................................... 284 2.52 .................................................... 283 4.38 .................................................... 316 4.39-40 ............................................... 316 Stark, Ulrike ............................................. 90 sth?la-?ar?ra .................................... 94, 247 stotra ....................................................... 98 stylometric study ...................................... 98 substance begining-less ...................................... 239 substratum ...... 136, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 184, 186, 187, 197, 208, 210, 227, 230, 235, 239, 240, 241, 247, 248, 257, 258, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296, 306, 307, 313, 322, 326, 327, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 346, 352, 367, 368, 372, 373, 380, 384, 385, 388, 390, 394 subtle body ......................................... 45, 94 ??dra 58, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 264, 304, 305, 310, 358, 359, 376, 400, 418 ??dra-dharma-tattva-prak??a................. 410 ??dra-kamal?kara .......................... 410, 419 Sufi ........................................ 38, 46, 50, 73 ?uka ........................ 104, 254, 255, 359, 396 s?k?ma-?ar?ra ................................... 94, 247 Sumantu ................................................. 104 Sundard?s ... 4, 14, 37, 38, 40, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 74, 76, 84, 85, 109, 110, 356, 361 On religion and caste ............................ 61 ??nya .............................................. 181, 261 ??nya-v?d? ...................................... 181, 184 superimposition .. 6, 117, 146, 153, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 187, 242, 257, 263, 266, 267, 269, 270, 275, 283, 286, 288, 306, 307, 321, 349, 367, 368, 372, 378, 385, 399, 408 four objections to ................................ 165 S?rajmal ............................... See S?ryamalla S?rajmalla ............................ See S?ryamalla S?rd?s ...................................................... 78 Sure?vara.... 65, 76, 100, 101, 107, 108, 171, 254, 335, 391, 393, 409, 412 S?rya Siddh?nta ..................................... 104 S?ryamalla .................... 29, 30, 34, 353, 354 Suryanarayan Sastri, S. S. ....................... 170 s?trak?ra ................................................ 411 SV .......................................................... 134 Sv?m?, Arjun D?s ..................................... 17 497 Sv?m?, Arvind .......................................... 17 svar?pa ..... 71, 136, 164, 167, 184, 188, 189, 193, 242, 248, 252, 295, 315, 325, 347, 351, 373 svar?p?dhy?sa ............................... 163, 241 svata?-pr?m??ya..... 225, 228, 230, 259, 369 svaya?jyoti br?hma?a ........................... 286 ?vetU 4.10 .............................................. 236 t?d?tmya .. 145, 164, 187, 207, 279, 293, 329 t?d?tmya sambandha ............................. 145 Tad?ya Sam?j ......................................... 108 taijasa ............................................ 180, 244 Tamil .... 2, 22, 25, 26, 27, 70, 71, 77, 84, 85, 361 Tantra .....................................161, 182, 368 T?r?n?tha Tarkav?caspati Bha???c?rya... 183, 410 tarka ............... 129, 181, 233, 259, 370, 397 Tarkad??ti ................................................. 82 tasb?? ....................................................... 47 t?tparya .. 119, 130, 135, 136, 137, 157, 231, 256, 262, 292, 364, 398, 400, 403, 406 Tattvabodha ........................................... 247 7.3.2.2 ................................................ 121 Tattva-cint?ma?i .................................... 123 Tattva-d?pik? .................................. 287, 410 tattva-j??na ....7, 93, 118, 304, 313, 347, 376 Tattv?nusandh?na ....... 5, 113, 120, 121, 410 Tattva-?uddhi .......... 294, 296, 309, 375, 410 Tattva-viveka (PD 1) ...................... 237, 410 teaching methods, gradation of ....... 394, 396 Telugu............................. 26, 27, 77, 85, 361 tenth person story ........................... 147, 323 Thangaswami 2, 99, 120, 121, 139, 171, 209, 296 theology ..................................... 8, 403, 406 theology ................................................. 404 Thiel-Horstmann, Monika 27, 40, 41, 43, 46, 48, 55, 67, 69, 72 ??l? .......................................................... 45 titik?? ............................................... 81, 298 Tod, James ................................... 29, 31, 33 Trikam, N?r?ya?a ............................ 33, 354 Trilokr?m, Sw?m? ............................ 33, 354 Trip??hi, M. S. ............................................ 9 tripu?? ......................................227, 229, 325 T?pti-d?pa (PD 7) ....................... 2, 252, 410 TS 12 ....................................................... 180 4 151 4,73 .................................................... 124 44 ....................................................... 127 58 ....................................................... 138 59 ....................................................... 401 64 ....................................................... 233 73 ....................................................... 151 TU ................................... 100, 107, 126, 359 1.12.1 ................................................. 101 2.1.1 ..................................... 80, 134, 235 2.4.1 ................................................... 319 2.9.1 ................................................... 319 2.9.1 ................................................... 126 TU ?Bh 2.1 ...................................................... 147 tuccha ............. 235, 236, 260, 339, 340, 371 Tuk?r?m ................................................... 38 t?l?j??na .172, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 270, 273, 278, 305, 306, 307, 371, 372, 373 Tulpule ..................................................... 85 Tuls?d?s ........................................ 12, 78, 85 twice-born 97, 102, 103, 109, 359, 360, 400, 438 ubhayata? p???-rajj?-ny?ya ................... 219 Uda?ka ...................................... See Utta?ka Udayana ......................................... 123, 412 Udd?laka ?ru?i ...................................... 317 Uddyotana .............................................. 410 Um? ............................................... 102, 359 up?d?na k?ra?a ..... 124, 145, 148, 159, 235, 366 pari??m? ............................. 259, 264, 371 vivarta ................................................ 259 Upade?a-s?hasr? .. 95, 96, 98, 240, 257, 317, 387 US 1.12.3............................................ 147 up?dhi . 71, 72, 143, 173, 237, 238, 240, 242, 246, 248, 250, 251, 252, 257, 258, 263, 264, 265, 269, 271, 276, 277, 278, 282, 305, 312, 320, 327, 331, 334, 342, 351, 371, 372, 379, 398 Up?dhy?ya, Baldev ............................ 98, 99 upahita ................................................... 380 498 upalak?a?a ............................................. 343 upalak?ita .............................................. 380 upam?na . 115, 119, 123, 130, 138, 139, 146, 155, 157, 363, 365, 383, See analogy upanayana ............................... 92, 418, 419 Upani?ads ... 81, 95, 101, 135, 137, 312, 358, 378, 394, 404 ten principal ......................................... 99 upar?ma................................................... 81 uparati ................................................... 298 up?san? .... 73, 137, 152, 244, 246, 317, 404, 418, 438 aha?-graha ................. 317, 348, 377, 404 up?ya-kau?alya ...................................... 394 uttama adhik?r? ............... 317, 348, 377, 404 Utta?ka ............................................ 96, 104 V?. Dh. S? 18.11-12 ................................. 93 V?caknav? ................... See G?rg? V?caknav? V?caspati Mi?ra . 78, 79, 125, 126, 151, 155, 234, 249, 256, 260, 298, 299, 300, 301, 310, 318, 348, 370, 383, 393, 400, 402, 409, 412 V?caspatyam .......................................... 183 vair?gya ..... See detachment, See detachment Vai?amp?yana ........................................ 104 Vai?e?ika................................................ 114 Vai?e?ika-s?tra............................... 204, 399 Vaishnava ............... 39, 40, 62, 84, 108, 284 Vaishnavization ....................................... 40 vai?ya .. 91, 94, 100, 103, 109, 264, 304, 305, 310, 359, 376 vaitathya-prakara?a ....................... 282, 400 Vaiy?karan?a-bh??a?a-s?ra .................... 410 Vajpeyi, Ananya ...................................... 93 Vajras?c? Upani?ad ................................ 408 V?kyapad?ya 2.233 .................................................. 392 2.38 .................................................... 392 V?kya-v?tti ..................................... 257, 387 validity extrinsic ...................... 226, 231, 259, 369 intrinsic ....... 225, 228, 230, 232, 259, 369 Vallabha ................................................. 109 V?madeva ...............................254, 255, 396 Va??a Bh?skar .......................... 29, 30, 357 Vana-parvan .......................................... 104 V??? Vil?s ................................................ 98 V?rkar? ............................................. 26, 362 var?a ................... 15, 55, 102, 107, 301, 356 v?rtika ...................................................... 76 V?rtika ........ 65, 76, 239, 247, 254, 335, 409 Pa?c?kara?a, 33-4 ............................... 121 v?san? ..................... 239, 240, 242, 243, 386 Vasi??ha ....................................... 2, 25, 188 Vasudevendramuni ......................... 121, 247 V?zind Kh?n ............................................ 40 Veda ... xvi, 14, 51, 52, 56, 70, 80, 81, 82, 83, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 157, 181, 207, 299, 301, 302, 345, 359, 364, 394, 395, 397, 401, 403, 418 Ved?nta-c???ma?i ................................. 410 Vedanta-kalpalatika ............................... 403 Ved?nta-paribh??? . 113, 116, 127, 135, 136, 139, 141, 147, 148, 169, 383, 389, 390, 410 Ved?nta-prad?pik? ............................ 90, 361 Ved?nta-s?ra (Manohard?s) ..................... 77 Ved?nta-s?ra (Sad?nanda) 182 ....................................................... 65 184 ..................................................... 135 191 ............................................... 65, 405 192 ....................................................... 65 65-69 .................................................. 121 Ved?nta-siddh?nta-mukt?val? . 252, 288, 410 Ved?nta-?ikh?mani ................................. 410 Venka?e?var Steam Press ............ 26, 90, 362 verbal cognition .............................. 364, 403 types of............................................... 133 verbal testimony ..... 115, 118, 123, 126, 129, 130, 135, 136, 147, 150, 155, 157, 165, 197, 318, 319, 323, 324, 348, 349, 363, 364, 377, 378, 398, 401 vernacular1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 22, 24, 28, 30, 34, 37, 64, 66, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 108, 110, 111, 114, 179, 297, 305, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 361, 396, 397, 402, 408 vernacularization ...... 4, 76, 84, 85, 110, 111, 357, 358 Vic?ra Ma?i M?l? .......................... 2, 22, 25 499 Vic?rs?gar 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18, 22, 77, 90, 411 Victoria, Queen ................................ 31, 353 vidhi ............. 54, 71, 137, 236, 256, 315, 396 Vidura ...................................................... 92 vidy? . 17, 100, 105, 234, 254, 260, 293, 301, 309, 370, 375 Vidy?ra?ya.. 2, 26, 70, 79, 81, 100, 101, 119, 123, 147, 225, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 250, 252, 257, 258, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268, 271, 273, 287, 335, 371, 385, 386, 387, 389, 390, 391, 395, 396, 399, 401, 409, 410, 412, 470 vij??na ..... 184, 185, 186, 189, 209, 239, 246 vij??namaya-ko?a .................................. 239 Vij??nav?din .................................. 184, 190 vik?epa80, 171, 173, 234, 238, 260, 303, 370 Vimukt?tman ..........................116, 216, 382 vir?? ....................................................... 244 vi?aya-cetana ......................................... 335 Vi?ayat?-vic?ra ...................................... 411 vi?e?a 151, 209, 227, 278, 313, 347, 368, 376 vi?e?a?a .......................... 192, 193, 203, 342 vi?e?ya ........................................... 192, 203 vi?i??a ....... 107, 127, 192, 214, 342, 352, 380 Vi?i???dvaita .......................................... 179 Vi??u ................................................. 71, 98 Vi?uddh?nanda......................................... 14 vi?va....................................................... 244 Vi?van?tha Tarkapa?c?nana ..................... 87 vita??a ................................................... 393 Vi?hob? .................................... 26, 362, 408 Vi?h?hala??str? .. 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 32 Vivara?a ..... x, 123, 136, 171, 172, 173, 174, 186, 198, 216, 222, 225, 234, 236, 238, 239, 241, 247, 248, 249, 257, 258, 260, 261, 264, 267, 268, 271, 273, 284, 299, 300, 301, 303, 310, 368, 371, 384, 387, 389, 390, 400, 408, 410 vivarta.................................................... 153 viveka ....................................... 81, 241, 419 Viveka-darpa?a ........................................ 85 Vivekananda ............. 2, 22, 25, 77, 108, 408 vividi??................................................... 298 VP doh? ................................... 119, 178, 252 intro. v. 1 .............................................. 78 V?ddh?nand .............................................. 38 v?tti 1, 4, 6, 9, 23, 69, 88, 113, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 136, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 159, 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 184, 187, 197, 200, 201, 222, 225, 233, 243, 248, 260, 263, 283, 284, 285, 286, 312, 313, 317, 319, 322, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 347, 348, 350, 351, 366, 368, 370, 373, 376, 377, 379, 380, 381, 383, 388, 390, 406 brahm?k?ra .... 5, 113, 148, 155, 318, 363, 407 cause of .............................................. 148 impartite (akha??a) ............ 233, 260, 370 purpose of........................................... 330 significatory function ... 119, 130, 131, 156 V?ttiprabh?kar 1, 2, 9, 22, 23, 24, 25, 70, 90, 113, 119, 155, 362 V?ttiratn?val?.................................... 90, 361 VS 6.401 v. 1-2 .......................................... 83 v. 1.29 .................................................. 69 v. 1.8 .................................................... 22 v. 2.15 .................................................. 69 v. 3.10 ............... 80, 82, 90, 361, 401, 407 v. 3.23 .................................................. 69 v. 3.7 ...................................................xvi v. 4.120 ................................................ 69 v. 5.170 ................................................ 69 v. 6.2.5 ................................................. 69 v. 6.2.60 ............................................... 70 v. 7.113-4 ............................................. 79 v. 7.115 ................................................ 18 v. 7.116 ................................................ 70 v. 7.117 ........................................ 70, 119 vv. 1.1-5 ............................... 71, 354, 407 vv. 1.7-8 ....................................... 76, 361 vv. 7.111-2 ........................................... 15 vv. 7.113-4 ........................................... 28 Vy?dha-g?t? ...................................... 92, 104 vyadhikara?at?....................................... 336 vy?kara?a ....................... 14, 15, 23, 78, 113 vya?jan?-v?tti ......................................... 131 500 vy?p?ra ... 118, 127, 139, 146, 149, 155, 159, 281, 366 vy?pti ....... 127, 128, 155, 156, 204, 205, 218 Vy?pti-nir?pa?a ..................................... 411 vy?pya............. 141, 206, 217, 218, 228, 233 Vy?sa 41, 104, 105, 106, 138, 157, 359, 364, 403 Vyasat?rtha ............................................. 402 vyavah?ra121, 149, 214, 221, 241, 257, 269, 305, 321, 324, 326, 327, 328, 331, 334, 336, 338, 345, 350, 378 vy?vah?rika 72, 89, 130, 133, 153, 156, 162, 163, 164, 179, 247, 250, 257, 364 vy?vartaka ..................................... 342, 345 vyavas?ya ...................................... 227, 245 Vyutpatti-v?da ........................................ 411 waking .. 7, 97, 118, 137, 157, 186, 188, 191, 239, 244, 246, 247, 252, 263, 278, 279, 281, 287, 307, 312, 331, 335, 336, 350, 351, 364, 369, 372, 379, 380, 399 yaj?a ....................... 301, 302, 304, 418, 439 Yaj??valkya ........................................... 317 YajV ............................................... 134, 302 101 ??kh?s .......................................... 319 Y?ska ..................................... 345, 409, 412 yath?rtha .119, 122, 150, 151, 153, 161, 185, 209, 210, 221 yoga ................................... 72, 85, 195, 245 P?ta?jala ............................................. 115 Yog?c?ra ................. 161, 184, 185, 209, 368 yoga-janya-dharma-lak?a?a ................... 193 YogV? .................................................... 399 3.22.24 ............................................... 304 yogyat?................................... 119, 136, 400 yojana .................................................... 104 Yudhi??hira..................................... 104, 106 yukti .... 8, 135, 166, 177, 178, 188, 207, 259, 262, 397, 407 Yuktiprak?? ................... 1, 9, 22, 23, 91, 407 501 VITA Prem Pahlajrai was born in Pune, India. While growing up there, he was oblivious to the worlds of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy, choosing instead to earn a Bachelor of Engineering degree in Computer Engineering at Pune University. He came to the U.S. to pursue a doctorate, but after completing a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology, he worked in the corporate sector for over a decade helping design microprocessors. He has lived in Seattle since 2000 and earned a Master of Arts in 2005, and a Doctor of Philosophy in 2013, both at the University of Washington in Asian Languages and Literature. Since 2005, he has been teaching Hindi at the same university.