

The Sophistic Roman: Education and Status in Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny

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Abstract

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This study is about the construction of identity and self-promotion of status by means of elite education during the first and second centuries CE, a cultural and historical period termed by many as the Second Sophistic. Though the Second Sophistic has traditionally been treated as a Greek cultural movement, individual Romans also viewed engagement with a past, Greek or otherwise, as a way of displaying education and authority, and, thereby, of promoting status. Readings of the work of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny, first- and second-century Latin prose authors, reveal a remarkable engagement with the methodologies and motivations employed by their Greek contemporaries—Dio of Prusa, Plutarch, Lucian and Philostratus, most particularly. The first two chapters of this study illustrate and explain the centrality of Greek in the Roman educational system. The final three chapters focus on Roman displays of that acquired Greek *paideia* in language, literature and oratory, respectively. As these chapters demonstrate, the social practices of *paideia* and their deployment were a multi-cultural phenomenon.

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Introduction

During the first and second centuries CE—a cultural and historical period termed by many as the Second Sophistic¹—the construction of identity and self-promotion of status often depended upon an elite education. While themes and arguments have varied, some common features come to the surface in most discussions of this period and the terms by which an ancient author is deemed “sophistic.” These include a preoccupation with the following: elite education in the literary canon; linguistic purity, archaism and novelty; and competitive epideictic oratory and rhetoric including invective and encomium.

This period of history in the Mediterranean offered fertile ground for advancing status by means of these academic pursuits.² By 50 CE administration of the Mediterranean had firmly shifted from the hands of imperial Italian aristocrats to one individual *princeps*. With this shift, one of the primary avenues to political and civic power—the military—was closed off to an even larger majority. Positions in the imperial circle were not limited to high-born Roman aristocrats such as the Claudii, but extended as far as provincials and even freedmen. And thus skill in the arts of rhetoric or philosophy, which could be kept out of the political sphere (at least on the surface) became a safer means to advancement—and one open to Mediterraneans from various cultural and social backgrounds.³

¹ This period (50-250CE), known to Classical scholars as the Second Sophistic, has been defined variously by the originator of the term, Flavius Philostratus, in the third century CE, German scholars such as Erwin Rohde and Wilhelm Schmid in the nineteenth century, American and British scholars such as Glen Bowersock, Ewen Bowie and Graham Anderson in the twentieth century and an increasing number of contemporary scholars around the globe today. See Eshelman 2012: 4n16, Swain 1996: 1 and Whitmarsh 2005: 4-10 for definitions and surveys on the term and its scholarship.

² This shift did not begin at once. Signs are clear in the work of Cicero, Pollio and Varro, who found an alternative means to advancement in their studies. Displays of *paideia* were likewise a favorite *topos* of poets as early as the Neoterics. This movement, then, is better seen as an ongoing process that reached a peak during the high empire.

³ There are, of course, limits here. The majority of social climbers were already of relatively high status. Likewise, rhetoric and philosophy could very well lead to exile. But this was not a necessary conclusion.

In discussing this cultural and historical period of opportunity, however, scholars have observed a link between these academic preoccupations and an attempt at emphasizing a “Greekness” or Greek identity which bolsters status.⁴ In emphasizing Greekness, few scholars have even considered Latin authors as participants in the Second Sophistic. Those who have done so have either focused on later Antonine figures such as Apuleius, Aulus Gellius and Fronto,⁵ or have focused on organized imperialistic strategies by which an organized Roman power adopted Greek culture only to display dominance.⁶ Yet, for individual Romans, just as for Greeks, engagement with a past, Greek or otherwise, provided a way of displaying education and authority, thereby promoting status. We ought, then, to be willing to recognize this type of engagement with the Greek past not just in Greek authors or marginal Roman figures, but among imperial Latin authors at large.

I aim to press this suggestion by examining the ways in which Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny, first- and second-century Latin prose authors, display a remarkable engagement with the methodologies and motivations employed by their Greek contemporaries—Dio of Prusa, Plutarch, Lucian and Philostratus, most particularly.

We might understand the elasticity of this multi-culturalism better if we consider how much the social and political “Roman” world was constituted by those who were not native Romans. Even the three Latin authors I shall investigate, though identified as Roman, were provincial. Quintilian was born around 35 CE at Calagurris in Spain and, after some education at Rome, returned to Spain before being recalled to the capital by Galba. Tacitus was likely born around 56 CE in Gallia Narbonensis in southern France and has at least familial connections to

⁴ E.g., Bowie 1974, Swain 1996, Whitmarsh 2001 and 2005.

⁵ E.g., Sandy 1997, Harrison 2000, Baldwin 1975, Holford-Strevens 2003 and Champlin 1980.

⁶ E.g., Spawforth 2012, Wallace-Hadrill 2008 and Whitmarsh 2001.

the originally Greek colony Massilia. Pliny the Younger was born around 61 CE in Comum, a *municipium* of Transpadane Gaul. All of these men were *novi homines*.

Likewise, many of the eastern authors (with whom I shall compare the work of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny), although often identified as Greek, were not from Greece at all, but other eastern provinces of Asia Minor or Syria. Furthermore, they often had Roman social and political ties. Dio Cocceianus (Chrysostom), for example, was born around 50 CE in Prusa, a city of Bithynia, to parents who both had Roman citizenship. Mestrius Plutarchus was, in fact, born in Greece at Chaeronea in the 40s CE. Yet, as his Roman name (like Dio's above) illustrates, he had Roman ties. Not only was he a Roman citizen, but it seems that he was awarded the *ornamenta consularia* under Trajan. Lucius Flavius Philostratus, who coined the term Second Sophistic, was from the Greek island of Lemnos, but seems to have spent time in Rome in the circle of Julia Domna. Little is known of Lucian, but that he connects himself with Samosata in Syria, where Greek would not have been his first and only language. Other eastern intellectuals who will appear variously throughout this study include Marcus Antonius Polemo, who was born in Laodicea-Lycus and was also a citizen of Smyrna; Aelius Publius Aristides, who, born in Mysia, spent most of his life in Pergamum and Smyrna; and Tiberius Claudius Atticus Herodes, who, though of Athenian origin, became *consul ordinarius* in 143 CE. All of this is to demonstrate that in the multi-cultural world of the ancient Mediterranean the lines by which one defined himself as Greek, Roman or other, were not always clearly drawn.

While the issues I intend to investigate are ultimately social, political and historical, my approach at first will be literary and textual. Reading a selection of passages from Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny alongside Greek passages that have been accepted as exempla of the Second

Sophistic, I shall note similar methods, styles, and ideas.⁷ At the second level I shall investigate the ways in which the concerns and anxieties of each author reflect the shared culture of the Mediterranean in its social, political and historical contexts. I shall proceed generally by theme, rather than by author or chronology.

The first chapter investigates the benefits available to those who acquire an elite education, the keystone of *paideia*. For the ancient Mediterranean male,⁸ *paideia* was “a means of arrogating to the subject a series of empowered identities.”⁹ Didactic on didacticism, such as the Plutarchan tract *On the Education of Children* and Lucian’s satirical *Teacher of Rhetoric*, reveals an awareness that education was not simply the molding of the morally upright, but a means toward social advancement. Unsurprisingly, this interest in the institution of education as a means of empowerment is far from unique to Greek speakers. This chapter illustrates that recognition of the importance of *paideia* is omnipresent among the Roman elite of this period through select readings from Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*, Tacitus’ *Dialogus de Oratoribus* and Pliny the Younger’s *Epistles*.

The second chapter argues (against scholarly suggestions to the contrary) that Romans embraced Greek education. Their anxiety, I suggest, was not with Greek *paideia*, but with lack of moderation. Enthusiasm for Greek education, in Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*, by various interlocutors in Tacitus’ *Dialogus* and throughout Pliny’s *Letters*, leaves no doubt that *paideia* held a focal place among Roman elites. By reading their anxiety using the methods that Maud Gleason and Joy Connolly have employed in their studies of imperial Greek sophists, it becomes

⁷ While I limit my study mostly to literary texts, similar studies in epigraphy, sculpture and architecture would, I believe, yield fruitful returns.

⁸ While there is some evidence for education among women, it is an unpleasant truth that the overwhelming majority of those who could pursue and benefit from elite education were male. This study makes no attempt at hiding that fact.

⁹ Whitmarsh 2001: 129. See below, p. 14-9 for my attempts at defining *paideia*.

clear that these members of the Roman elite were careful to show off Greek *paideia*, but simultaneously understood the importance of moderation in doing so.

The third chapter begins to investigate the ways in which the sophistic Roman displayed this acquired *paideia* by means of linguistic and stylistic mimesis, appropriation and invention. Greek authors—Lucian and Philostratus especially—display a preoccupation with linguistic purity in the form of Atticism and moderate archaism. Strategies among Roman authors were necessarily different, yet translation exercises prescribed in Quintilian's *Institutio* and Pliny's *Epistles* and the use of Greek syntax and Latin archaism across Tacitus' works are evidence of a similar preoccupation with a moderate linguistic cult of the past.

The fourth chapter continues to evaluate modes of paideutic display—this time by means of literary quotation and allusion. The attachment to and manipulation of Greek authors of the past has been widely recognized as a feature of the Second Sophistic and a claim to Greek heritage. Yet, as I shall illustrate through comparison of Pliny's *Epistles* and Philostratus' *Heroikos* and of Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus* and Dio of Prusa's *Borystheniticus*, appropriation of authors such as Homer and Plato was available to Greek *and* Latin authors.

The fifth and final chapter treats rhetorical strategies in the field of epideictic oratory. Dio of Prusa and other Greek sophists whom Philostratus describes advanced their status through display oratory, achieving social and political privileges for themselves and their communities and making political friends and enemies along the way. Again, such media and strategies were available to Romans as well. Primarily through a reading of Pliny's *Panegyricus*, I shall illustrate the ways in which the sophistic Roman could deploy encomium to advance his political position

and provide political advice, while including enough doublespeak and invective to maintain his social superiority among contemporaries.

There are, indeed, differences between the eastern and western authors that I shall treat. The goal of this project, however, is not to highlight such differences, but rather to demonstrate shared cultural values as they figure into the social world of the educated elite. In highlighting cross-cultural aims and acquisitions in antiquity, it is my hope that modern scholars will further embrace opportunities to study Greek and Latin language, literature and culture together and that the distinction between Hellenist and Latinist in modern academia will be blurred in the same fashion as was the distinction between Greek and Roman identity in antiquity.

Chapter One

Investing in Education

Paideia pervades texts, ancient and modern, that deal with the social and intellectual world of the so-called Second Sophistic. Thomas Schmitz’s study, for example, on the social and political function of the Second Sophistic is entitled *Bildung und Macht* and he defines *Bildung* as *paideia*.¹ Thomas Schmidt and Pascale Fleury place *paideia* first among their defining characteristics of the Second Sophistic,² following Tim Whitmarsh, who argues that *paideia* is a crucial element of elite ambition, manliness, Hellenism and identity—all defining markers in his outline of the Second Sophistic.³ The list goes on,⁴ but the focalization of *paideia* in this period is stated most clearly by Whitmarsh: “The period of Greek history spanning the early centuries of the Roman Empire (often known as the ‘Second Sophistic’) invested more than any other in education. Or, rather, in *paideia*, the Greek term which carries an altogether different range of meanings both sociological and semantic from the English ‘education.’”⁵ *Pepaideumenoι*—those who had invested in this education—are widely taken to be a larger group of elite intellectuals of which sophists were a part.⁶ In short, without *paideia*, there would be no Second Sophistic.

This preoccupation with *paideia* is founded upon ancient ways of thinking. The Pseudo-Plutarchan tract *On the Education of Children* encapsulates the sentiment: “For the source and root of good and noble things is the achievement of traditional *paideia*” (πηγή γὰρ καὶ ῥίζα καλοκαγαθίας τὸ νομίμου τυχεῖν παιδείας)⁷ and “*paideia*, alone of the things belonging to us

¹ Schmitz 1997: 15.

² Schmidt and Fleury 2011: xi.

³ Whitmarsh 1998: 193-200, 2001: 7, 13, 29, 113 and 2005: 13, 15, 33.

⁴ See, e.g., Anderson 1993: 8, Borg 2004: 1, Bowie 1991: 196-8, Eshleman 2012: 7, Swain 1996: 33.

⁵ Whitmarsh 1998: 192-3. Further discussion on defining *paideia* follows below.

⁶ See Anderson 1989: 82n2 and Brunt 1994.

⁷ [Plut.] *Mor.* 4c. All translations are my own. On the authenticity of *De liberis educandis*, see Albini 1997: 69n2, including a brief survey and bibliography of scholarship. Albini (59) points out that, though the authenticity has

humans, is immortal and godlike” (παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστὶν ἀθάνατον καὶ θεῖον).⁸ Dio of Prusa, sophist and philosopher under Domitian, Nerva and Trajan, views *paideia* as an important element of elite identity, statesmanship and civilized society.⁹ Lucian, the second-century Syrian satirist and rhetorician, displays his preoccupation with *paideia* through his personification of it in *The Dream*. Other Lucianic characters, such as the ignorant book collector, attempt to fool people into believing that they are *pepaideumenoι*.¹⁰

Claims to *paideia* transcend the literary world. The epigraphic record illustrates a preoccupation with the virtue: as Marc Kleijwegt points out, the inclusion of *paideia* in inscriptions is a display of the social prominence of the honoree.¹¹ In the world of live encomiastic performance, *paideia* would have been frequently called upon, as Schmitz observes its frequency in grammatical handbooks that treat encomium.¹²

Power and *Paideia* in the Second Sophistic

Why this preoccupation with *paideia*? Pragmatically, it seems to have been one of the central means to arrogation of power under a Roman principate, which closed off many avenues to success via military skill.¹³ The military success that brought power to Marius or to Caesar during the Republic, for example, would lead Corbulo and Agricola to robbed triumphs and early deaths during the principate.¹⁴ Simon Goldhill, following Plutarch, remarks:

rightly been questioned, the tract “bears witness to the theory of education around Plutarch’s time, if not within Plutarch’s philosophical circle itself.” Bloomer (2011: 220 n.12) is not entirely convinced that the tract is not authentically Plutarchan. See Whitmarsh 2001: 98-9 for a discussion of *paideia* and Hellenism in this tract.

⁸ [Plut.] *Mor.* 5e.

⁹ See, e.g., Dio Chrys. *Or.* 13.31, 18.1, 26.7, 32.3, 44.11.

¹⁰ Lucian *Pseudol.* 1-4. See Johnson 2010: 158-70 for a useful sociological reading of the *Ignorant Book Collector*.

¹¹ Kleijwegt 1991: 86.

¹² Schmitz 1997: 49-50.

¹³ See Goldhill 2001: 8 for similar discussion, but with reference to epigraphic evidence.

¹⁴ See Martin 1981: 32-3 on the changing success of *viri militares* under Domitian.

There was no opportunity to emulate the military heroes of the Greek past (“nowadays the affairs of cities no longer include leadership in war, the overthrow of tyrants, grand alliances”; *Moralia* 805a). Success in rhetoric was a requirement of political prestige.¹⁵

Tacitus’ *Dialogus de Oratoribus* perhaps illustrates this shift by means of a series of metaphors in the speeches of both Aper and Maternus, who describe oratory as weapon under the principate. For Aper, weapons no longer serve, but words: “If a threat to your person rushes forth, no breastplate and dagger on the battle line is a firmer defense than eloquence to the defendant and the endangered, a protection and a weapon.”¹⁶ Maternus attempts to undermine Aper’s argument by agreement: “As you were saying, Aper, eloquence has been discovered in place of weapons.”¹⁷

At times, however, even oratory needed a supplement.¹⁸ Roland Mayer describes the situation well with respect to Pliny and his quest for distinction:

He was no *vir militaris*, and however good he was as an orator—and he rivaled Tacitus in prestige—his cases were generally too slight to command even his own interest, let alone posterity’s, and he knows it (*Epistles* 2.14.1). Since the late republic, however, a third way to *gloria* had been opening up, namely literary composition.¹⁹

¹⁵ Goldhill 2009b: 231-2.

¹⁶ *Sin proprium periculum increpuit, non hercule lorica et gladius in acie firmitus munimentum quam reo et periclitanti eloquentia, praesidium ac telum* (Tac. *Dial.* 5.6).

¹⁷ [*Usus eloquentiae*] *ut tu dicebat, Aper, in locum teli repertus* (Tac. *Dial.* 12.2).

¹⁸ In spite of the changes in oratory from Republic to Principate, the waning of oratory should not be overstated. This is, as it were, central to Mayer’s argument in the article cited below. See Rutledge 2007 for a concise overview of the staying power and importance of imperial oratory.

¹⁹ Mayer 2003: 228. See similarly Morello 2003 in which she argues that Pliny uses non-specific “cover letters” that suggest massive literary production as a strategy of compensating for diminished public activity. See Woolf 2006: 170 on Plin. *Ep.* 7.25 as evidence of Pliny’s preference of scholarly activity over martial prowess.

Literary composition and oratory—two fields in which *paideia* was indispensable—worked in tandem for Pliny and his quest for *gloria*. Acquisition of *paideia* had clearly become a more accessible route to power under the principate.²⁰

Maud Gleason and Thomas Schmitz, with a number of followers since, have understood this use of *paideia* during the principate in terms of symbolic capital as it operates in the theories of Pierre Bourdieu.²¹ Statements like the following from Tim Whitmarsh are commonplace, and rightly so: “*paideia* was both a sign of elite status and a highly charged locus within which the elite staked out their competing claims for status.”²² This fruitful way of discussing *paideia* follows from ancient ways of thinking as well. Ps.-Plutarch, for example, links *paideia* with *philotimia*, or ambition toward distinction.²³ Dio of Prusa argues that the elite political man cannot do without *paideia*.²⁴ Lucian, one of our best sources for elite advancement via *paideia*, personifies *Paideia* and has her promise renown and standing as follows: “You will be honored and praised and respected for the best qualities and regarded by men of birth and wealth, wearing such fancy clothes as these [...] and being deemed worthy of power and office.”²⁵ William Johnson rounds out his study of Greek and Latin reading culture in the Empire by noting that economic and political benefits stemmed from literary expertise: “What one read, how one read, how one understood what one read, and how one deployed mastery of language and literature so

²⁰ See Hopkins 1974: 110.

²¹ See esp. Gleason 1995: xxi and Schmitz 1997: 26-31 and 50-63 with Bourdieu 1977 and 1984. See also Preston 2001: 89, Sidebottom 2009: 97, Whitmarsh 1998: 198, 2001: 19, 96-108 and 2005: 38. For a similar application in Roman education, see Bloomer 2011: 80. See Harris 1989: 26-42, partially drawing on Lévi-Strauss, on literacy and power.

²² Whitmarsh 1998: 198.

²³ [Plut.] *Mor.* 9b. See Schmitz 1997: 108 for further discussion.

²⁴ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 18.1. See Schmitz 1997: 47 for discussion.

²⁵ τιμώμενος καὶ ἐπαινούμενος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις εὐδοκίμων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν γένει καὶ πλούτῳ προϋχόντων ἀποβλεπόμενος, ἐσθῆτα μὲν τοιαύτην ἀμπεχόμενος [...] ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ προεδρίας ἀξιούμενος (Lucian *Somn.* 11). See Lucian *Somn.* 18, *Bis Acc.* 26 and *Rhet. Praec.* 3 for similar instances of education or rhetoric advancing Lucian from poverty to wealth and power. For discussion of *paideia* and status in Lucian, see C.P. Jones 1986: 9-16, König 2009: 36, Swain 1996: 308-29 and Whitmarsh 2001: 279-93.

attained, mattered.”²⁶ Recent scholarship has suggested that Philostratus’ invention of the Second Sophistic with its attendant focus on *paideia* was a social maneuver to establish himself as privileged arbiter of *paideia*, and thus a member of the elite in his own right.²⁷

Defining *Paideia*

Paideia was clearly an empowering and desirable acquisition. For all of the attention paid to it in modern scholarship, however, a clear definition has been elusive. The quotation from Whitmarsh with which I began this chapter suggests as much. In his work on education in antiquity, some fifty years prior to Whitmarsh’s grappling with *paideia*, Henri Marrou found it similarly intriguing, if problematic. For Marrou, “Παιδεία comes to signify ‘culture’—not in the sense of something active and preparational like education, but in the sense the word has for us today—of something perfected: a mind fully developed, the mind of a man who has become truly a man.”²⁸ It seems, however, that Marrou has sold education short here and that the process itself was indeed an integral part of *paideia*. It is perhaps useful to note that the first entries in LSJ for *paideia* are “the rearing of a child” and “training and teaching, education.”²⁹ Lucian’s biting satire against those who do not travel the proper avenue to *paideia*, but only display a feigned form of it, further illustrates that the process of acquisition is very much part of its essence.³⁰

²⁶ Johnson 2010: 206.

²⁷ See esp. Eshleman 2012: 125-39 and Schmitz 2009: 54-5.

²⁸ Marrou 1956: 99.

²⁹ The significance of the process of education and its child-centric connotations is apparent not least of all in the παιδ- root of the word. Criore (2001: 243-4) rightly, I think, understands in *paideia* both the educative elements of childhood and the continued process of cultural maturation and assimilation in adulthood.

³⁰ A good example can be found in Lucian *Pseudol.* 3-4, where Lucian rails against his opponent thus: “You would not dare to say that you have received *paideia* or that it ever concerned you to make use of books or that you had so-and-so as a teacher or learned with so-and-so. But you hope to overcome all of those things through one single thing, purchasing a bunch of books.” See also Lucian *Rhet Praec.*, *passim*, Eshleman 2012: 34-6 on “the imposter problem” in Lucian and others and Whitmarsh 2001: 258 for vapid *paideia* in Lucian, but with an interpretation that rests blame on Roman materialism. But see C.P. Jones 1986: 82 for a less anti-Roman interpretation.

Yet it does seem clear that *paideia* must mean not only the process, but also the resulting fruits of education, which inevitably include literature and culture. There is, however, something problematic in Marrou's further treatment of *paideia*—something which has persisted among scholars since. For Marrou, this culture so becomes a marker of Greek civilization that he defines the Hellenistic period, the education that grew out of it and its wide appeal across the Mediterranean as “the civilization of παιδεία.”³¹ This emphasis on the Greekness of the thing was picked up by Ewen Bowie in his treatment of *paideia* and the Second Sophistic.³² Graham Anderson further states of *paideia*, “it presupposes someone who has read the approved canon of classical texts and absorbed from them the values of Hellenism and urban-dwelling man alike, and who applies those values in life.”³³ Whitmarsh adds, “To practise *paideia* was to strive for a very particular form of identity, a fusion of manliness, elitism, and Greekness.”³⁴ While their work does not explicitly define *paideia* as Greekness, Schmitz's study of education and power deals primarily with the Second Sophistic “in der griechischen Welt” and Simon Swain's study of education and power during this period is entitled *Hellenism and Empire*.

Indeed *paideia* is the Greek term for education and culture, but to equate *paideia* with Greekness or even to define *paideia* as an attempt at achieving Greekness fails to answer two crucial points.³⁵ First, Greeks discuss *paideia* in terms that extend beyond Greek. For example, in his *Fourth Oration on Kingship*, Dio of Prusa, a paradigm of sophistic Hellenic learning, has Diogenes define earthly *paideia*, at least as understood by most of his contemporaries, in the following way:

³¹ Marrou 1956: 100.

³² Bowie 1974 *passim*, esp. 168-74, 1982: 53-4, and 1991: 204. Similarly Swain 1996: 88: “The second sophistic is the name given to manifestations of this intensified feeling of Greekness.”

³³ Anderson 1993: 8.

³⁴ Whitmarsh 2005: 15. See also Whitmarsh 2001: 90-130.

³⁵ Woolf 1994 remains perhaps the best treatment of the intricacies in the relationship between Greek and other, primarily Roman, cultures, though it must be admitted that many scholars, including those quoted above, have voiced anxieties about Greek culture and its relationship with the Roman world.

And many call this [human sort of education] “*paideia*,” although I think it is “*paidia*,” and they think that the person who knows the most literature—Persian, Hellenic, Syrian and Phoenician—and who has read the most books, is the wisest and definitive *pepaideumenos*.³⁶

Cassius Dio, second- and third-century Greek intellectual and Roman senator from Bithynia, likewise refers to *paideia* beyond the bounds of Greekness.³⁷ Hannibal, he argues, succeeded because “in addition to natural virtue he also attained much *paideia*—both Phoenician in accordance with his homeland, and Hellenic.”³⁸ Marcus Aurelius succeeded by a similar manner: “He was aided also so very much by his *paideia*, he always took his fill of Greek and Latin rhetoric and philosophical learning.”³⁹ If *paideia* is inherently an expression of Greekness, what can these Greek authors mean by Persian, Syrian, Phoenician or Latin *paideia*?⁴⁰

The second point of concern is that if *paideia* is defined as “Greekness” and if it is the surest means to arrogating power, then it seems that only one ethnic group within the Mediterranean can attain to it. Certainly the Roman population would have had access to the

³⁶ καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ταύτην μὲν «παιδείαν,» καθάπερ οἶμαι «παιδιάν,» καὶ νομίζουσι τὸν πλεῖστα γράμματα εἰδότα, Περσικά τε καὶ Ἑλληνικά καὶ τὰ Σύρων καὶ τὰ Φοινίκων, καὶ πλείστοις ἐντυγχάνοντα βιβλίους, τοῦτον σοφώτατον καὶ μάλιστα πεπαιδευμένον (Dio Chrys. Or. 4.30). It is worth pointing out that the speaker here is Diogenes and thus the inclusion of Roman *paideia* would have risked anachronism. See Bowie 1991: 198-201 for a discussion of earthly vs. heavenly *paideia* in Dio Chrys. Or. 4. Dio here is opposing the commonly held view of *paideia* as literary and cultural (which he jests ought to be called *paidia* or child’s play), and is supporting the idea of a philosophical and virtuous *paideia*. But he is clearly running against the grain in doing so.

³⁷ On Cassius Dio as participant in the Second Sophistic, see Ameling 1984, B. Jones (forthcoming), Reardon 1971: 206-11, Swain 1996: 401-8.

³⁸ ὅτι πρὸς τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἀρετῇ καὶ παιδείᾳ πολλῇ μὲν Φοινικικῇ κατὰ τὸ πάτριον πολλῇ δὲ καὶ Ἑλληνικῇ ἥσκητο (Cass. Dio F 54.3).

³⁹ οὕτω [...] ἐκ τῆς παιδείας ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὠφελήθη, Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Λατίνων ῥητορικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων λόγων [...] ἀεὶ διεπίπλατο (Cass. Dio 71(72).35.6). Though strictly speaking *paideia* is not modified directly by Λατίνων here, that seems to be the implication. Lucian likewise seems to conflate rhetorical training with *paideia*, particularly in *The Double Indictment* and *The Teacher of Rhetoric*. Bowie has thus noted that rhetoric is such a major part of education, it is sometimes synonymous with it (1974: 168 and 204).

⁴⁰ Kemezis 2014: 390 is instructive concerning Greek self-definition in the Second Sophistic: “To our eyes, the Greeks of the second century CE defined themselves by very different criteria from those of the fifth century BCE. In particular, our Roman-era sources stress linguistic, literary, and cultural practices that are often restricted to the elite, as opposed to the factors of politics, geography, and ancestry that are more prominent in earlier sources. Furthermore, the self-proclaimed Greeks of the Roman Empire often simultaneously identified with categories that seem to us to be distinct non-Greek ethnicities.”

surest means of arrogating power without sacrificing its Roman culture and identity. Similarly, provincial elite from regions that were not ethnically Greek—Asia Minor, Syria, Gaul and Egypt, for example—strove for *paideia* while maintaining local loyalties, pride and culture. Some attempt has been made at reconciling a lack of Greek ethnicity with attainment of *paideia* by arguing that the intellectual elite “became” Greek by becoming educated.⁴¹ This seems to be the negotiation Aristides makes in his *Panathenaicus* and *To Rome*. As Daniel Richter notes, “although Isocrates limited the transformative power of *paideia* to those who were already Greek in terms of their *genos*, Aristides suggested that the possession of Hellenic culture could make a Hellene even out of a barbarian.”⁴² Such redefinition of Greek identity based on culture rather than ethnicity is lampooned by Juvenal, as Moroccans, Thracians, Sarmatians and Syrians all become Athenians in Rome.⁴³

No less a strange case is that of the sophist-philosopher Favorinus of Arles, who is perhaps the most celebrated example of such cosmopolitanism. A Gallo-Roman writing in Greek, Favorinus argues, or more accurately, has a statue of himself argue that it is wrong of the Corinthians to take down a bronze statue of him since he has aimed not only to seem, but to be Greek, who, though Roman, has become Hellenized: ἵν’ αὐτῷ περιῆ ἔν ἀντι πάντων Ἑλληνι δοκεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι [...] Ῥωμαῖος ὢν ἀφῆλληνίσθη.⁴⁴ Whitmarsh has noted that Favorinus is self-conscious about this self-fashioning, and thus links *paideia* to it in such a way that he can transcend the usual bounds of nature.⁴⁵ In short, it is through a manipulative sleight of hand that Favorinus *becomes* Greek. Swain draws attention to Favorinus’ controversial position as speaker,

⁴¹ Whitmarsh 2001: 299 uses the term “translative” identity to describe the phenomenon by which “Greekness is now not simply a question of ethnicity, but can be acquired.”

⁴² Richter 2011: 125.

⁴³ Juv. *Sat.* 3.79-80. See Uden 2015: 112 for discussion.

⁴⁴ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 37.25-6.

⁴⁵ Whitmarsh 2001: 119-20. See also Gleason 1995: 3-20 and Swain 1996: 44-5.

sophist and philosopher, Gleason to his biological anomalies.⁴⁶ Even Favorinus describes himself in terms of paradoxes: “Although being Gallic, he was Hellenized, although being a eunuch he was charged with adultery, and he quarreled with the emperor and lived.”⁴⁷ Unique figure that he is, Favorinus, then, is perhaps not the best person from whom to draw an example or definition.⁴⁸

It is certainly true that *paideia* included education and knowledge of the Greek past. In fact, given the comparative preponderance of Greek literary and cultural masterworks, *paideia* would have included many Greek elements.⁴⁹ But this does not mean that one *becomes* Greek by discovering Greek culture in the process of achieving *paideia*. It does not even necessarily mean that one is bolstering Greekness or Greek culture, but, rather, that one is simply learning about it and displaying it. In this sense even the idea of a cultural, as opposed to ethnic, Hellenism, though a part of the identity of various *pepaideumenoι*, should not be taken as a granted for all *pepaideumenoι*. If we think in modern terms, an American scholar may very well acquire and parade knowledge in the language, literature and society that is central to German *Kultur* without self-identifying as an ethnic or a cultural German. That scholar would, however, be displaying erudition. Joy Connolly strikes a similar note in suggesting that “Greco-Gallo-Hispano-Africo-Roman culture” was unified among members of the upper echelon through their rhetorical education.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Swain 1996: 45. Gleason 1995: 3.

⁴⁷ Γαλάτης ὦν ἐλληνίζειν, εὐνοῦχος ὦν μοιχείας κρίνεσθαι, βασιλεῖ διαφέρεσθαι καὶ ζῆν (Philostr. *VS* 489).

⁴⁸ Other figures treated by Whitmarsh as “becoming Greek” include Musonius Rufus and Apollonius of Tyana. The argument for Musonius (142) hinges on his using Greek language and seems insufficient grounds for claims of becoming Greek. Bilingualism was not unusual, especially for a philosopher. The argument for Apollonius (24) is more convincing and has support from Philostr. *VA*. Apollonius, however, is perhaps an even stranger figure than Favorinus in that he transcends the bounds of sophistic philosopher into the realm of philosophic mystic.

⁴⁹ See below, pp. 48-69.

⁵⁰ Connolly 2007b: 160.

To summarize, *paideia*, which I define as an individual's acquisition and display of literary and cultural knowledge, was used as a means of arrogating power under the principate, as displayed by Greek authors such as Lucian, Dio of Prusa, Philostratus and Plutarch.⁵¹ Although scholars have primarily used these Greek authors in illustrating the power of *paideia*, the phenomenon was not strictly Greek. My further, but related, contention, which will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter, is that Romans were equally interested in acquiring and deploying *paideia*.

Paideia Romana?

In discussing the complexities of culture in antiquity, Andrew Wallace-Hadrill lights upon *paideia*, which he argues has no Roman equivalent:

Disciplina (or *studia*) in the sense of literary education and learning, and *humanitas* (the combination of education and the humane behavior of a civilized man) cover various aspects, but even the latter, which has the widest semantic field, has very different connotations [...] *Humanitas* implicitly denies the Greek claim to a monopoly of good education and civilised behaviour. It also leaves adequate space for the core Roman concept of *mores*, and the construction of Roman *mores* as in fundamental opposition to mere Greek *paideia*.⁵²

I shall discuss and attempt to refute the idea that Roman *mores* were in opposition to Greek *paideia* in my next chapter.⁵³ For now, I want to focus on the remaining defining features of *humanitas* in Wallace-Hadrill's view. I am in agreement that *humanitas* denies Greek monopoly

⁵¹ Goldhill 2009b: 231 similarly translates *paideia* as "education, or culture, or sophistication" with an emphasis on rhetorical training rather than ethnic origin.

⁵² Wallace-Hadrill 1997: 8.

⁵³ Spawforth 2012: 272 comes close to refuting Wallace-Hadrill's notion, but avoids the term *paideia*. One purpose of Augustus' cultural revolution, Spawforth argues, was to make Hellenism respectable "so that the Greek *humanitas* which imperial Rome claimed to champion and with which members of its ruling elite identified, to judge from Pliny and Tacitus, could be seen as compatible with *mos*."

on education and civilization, but on different grounds—partially for reasons argued above concerning Greekness and *paideia*, but partially because the term *humanitas* is, in fact, an attempt at putting *paideia* into Latin. That this is the case is evident from Latin authors themselves. Aulus Gellius is adamant about this meaning of *humanitas*: “Those who have put together Latin terms and have employed them properly [...] have called *humanitas* something near what the Greeks call *paideia*, we say it is ‘education and training in liberal arts.’”⁵⁴ He further tells us that Varro and Cicero, in like manner, translated *paideia* as *humanitas*.⁵⁵

A well known letter from Pliny to Maximus instructing him on proper governance in Greece offers another example of this very difficulty of defining education and culture.⁵⁶ Pliny writes, “Know that you have been sent to the province of Achaëa, the true and pure Greece, in which first of all, *humanitas*, literature and even agriculture are believed to have been founded.”⁵⁷ In Pliny’s letter, placing *humanitas* in Greece either removes the very Roman nuance that Wallace-Hadrill suggests or else is in the tradition that Gellius applies to Cicero and Varro—a translation of *paideia*. While translation does not necessarily mean definite equation,⁵⁸ the attempt at translation is a statement of participation and therefore denies monopolization. But it is worth noting the similarities between Wallace-Hadrill’s definition of *humanitas* and my own

⁵⁴ *Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt [...] “humanitatem” appellaverunt id propemodum quod Graeci παιδείαν vocant, nos “eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes” dicimus* (Gell. NA 13.17.1).

⁵⁵ Gell. NA 13.17.2.

⁵⁶ See Méthy 2007: 248-55 for a discussion of *humanitas* in Pliny’s *Epistles*. She views Pliny as operating between the concepts of φιλοφροσύνη and παιδεία that Gellius discusses: “*humanitas* désigne donc soit une disposition bienveillante envers les autres hommes soit l’éducation et la culture.”

⁵⁷ *Cogita te missum in provinciam Achaiam, illam veram et meram Graeciam, in qua primum humanitas litterae etiam fruges inventae esse creduntur* (Plin. Ep. 8.24.2). See Woolf 1994: 119-20 for the Greek origin of *humanitas*, though he views the Roman adoption of it as an imperialist strategy. This, to my mind, is one, but not the only use of *humanitas*.

⁵⁸ Contra Marrou 1956: 380, where he claims “Παιδεία=*humanitas*=culture.” In fact it is rare that Latin is able to provide the perfect equivalent for a Greek term—hence, the borrowing of technical vocabulary and the practice, recommended by Quintilian, of translating by means of abundance. That is to say, elaboration and, therefore, context are often essential to understanding the Greek term that is being rendered in Latin. It can thus be the case that *studia*, *humanitas*, *eruditio*, *institutio* and others, given the appropriate context, could be circulating around the idea of *paideia*. See Hutchinson 2013: 135-64 on the complexity of translation and intertextuality across Greek and Latin.

of *paideia*. Even if one were to deny equation between these similar terms, regarding them as in opposition to each other seems ungrounded and extreme.

Moreover, Teresa Morgan has shown that, though there is no normative social context for education in the ancient Mediterranean, greater disparity in literate education (a central avenue to the acquisition of *paideia* and *humanitas*) occurred not between Greeks and Romans, but between elite and sub-elite groups.⁵⁹ This idea is only beginning to catch on. In one of the most recent studies on the social and intellectual world of the Roman Empire, Kendra Eshleman defends the Flavian starting line for her study on the grounds that the Flavian period “inaugurate[d] a surge in the visibility and prestige of sophistic, buoyed by imperial patronage and the emergence of *paideia* as a privileged locus of competition among Greek (and Roman) elites.”⁶⁰ Eshleman’s inclusion of the Roman elite in her study will hopefully continue the momentum, such that Romans are not parenthetical in future discussions of competition over *paideia*.

It seems that one of the obstacles in accepting Romans as participants in this sophistic movement has been the false notion that Romans pursued *paideia* strictly for imperialistic purposes.⁶¹ This will be discussed more in the subsequent chapter, but it must be addressed at least in brief here and perhaps best by a parallel with the Greeks. It has rightly been accepted that Greeks could participate in Roman government for its potential personal benefit, either moral or pragmatic, without forfeiting other elements of their identity. Glen Bowersock’s words bear

⁵⁹ Morgan 1998a: 45-6.

⁶⁰ Eshleman 2012: 16.

⁶¹ See below, p. 48n1.

repeating: “It was possible for a proud Greek to be a Roman without any loss of national pride or abnegation of cultural tradition.”⁶² What mattered was individual profit.

If we apply the same individualized view to Romans, as there is no reason not to do, then just as a Greek could take up Roman politics, a Roman could take up Greek culture without forfeiting his Roman identity.⁶³ In this context, there is all the more reason to treat Romans equally with Greeks during the principate and, similarly, there is a reason why Eshleman sees the Flavian period as the beginning of a boom in intellectual competition among Greek and Roman elites, which would grow under the Antonine period and culminate under the Severans: the stake in the Roman Empire for a citizen who lived in Rome was not necessarily greater than that of a citizen who lived in Athens. Citizenship grants and access to governmental office and wealth had begun to move outward from Italy.⁶⁴ This can be stretched even further and we could ask if a citizen with origins in Spain or Gaul had any greater intensity of Roman loyalty than a citizen with origins in Asia Minor or Greece.⁶⁵ But as Whitmarsh rightly notes, we will never know the “feelings” of an ancient intellectual.⁶⁶ Thinking in terms of individual profit, rather than nationalistic patriotism, then, seems to be the best way of understanding the motives of the intellectual elite during this period.

Early Investments

⁶² Bowersock 1969: 16. See further Bowersock 1965: 30-41 and 1969: 15-6, 43-58. It is also an interesting exercise to read Swain’s chapters on Greek authors of the Second Sophistic, all of whom have Roman political ties that necessitate some explanation in term of their relationship between “Hellenism” and “Empire.”

⁶³ So Hutchinson 2013: 136: “Roman authors who write in Greek for the most part firmly maintain their Roman identity.”

⁶⁴ See esp. Bowersock 1965, Hammond 1957, Millar 1977: 477-90 and Talbert 1984: 29-38.

⁶⁵ See Madsen 2009, esp. 59-82 on points of (dis)similarity between Roman and provincial loyalties.

⁶⁶ Whitmarsh 2001: 3.

What could offer more personal motivation than the acquisition and expenditure of education? Morgan offers its benefits thus:

The educated have everything that it takes to control society. They possess a vast range of linguistic and cultural information of a kind associated with certain dominant social and ethnic groups. They hold ethical principles and behave in a way characteristic of the same groups. They have the ability to impose their ideas on others by articulating them in a language which is associated not only with power and status but also with reason and truth.⁶⁷

This seems to be motivation enough to pursue education through *enkyklios paideia* or, in Quintilian's Latin translation, *orbis doctrinae*.⁶⁸ And it is the Latin author, Quintilian, who offers the longest and most coherent system of obtaining this education and its attendant advantages. The Plutarchan tract *On the Education of Children*, discussed above as evidence of Greek interest in *paideia*, not only offers just a tiny fragment of the precepts offered by Quintilian, but has even at times been taken on a similar plain as its Roman contemporary, as a work on Roman educational theory indicative of the imperial ideology of its time.⁶⁹

Both the Greek and the Roman treatises display awareness that education is something so important that it must not be neglected even from the earliest stages.⁷⁰ Ps.-Plutarch desires that the father begin the educational process even before birth by choosing a good spouse and avoiding drunkenness during conception.⁷¹ From infancy there can be no risk taken in choosing

⁶⁷ Morgan 1998a: 269. See Dressler 2013: 18 for a reading that emphasizes the privileged position of the educated in Tacitus' *Dialogus* specifically.

⁶⁸ *Ut efficiatur orbis ille doctrinae quem Graeci encyclion paedian vocant* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.1). See Morgan 1998a: 33-9 and below, pp. 61-2 for further discussion of *enkyklios paideia*.

⁶⁹ See Bloomer 2011: 53-80.

⁷⁰ Criboire 2001: 123 sees similar emphasis on early education in Roman Egypt, seemingly using Libanius as a central source of data.

⁷¹ [Plut.] *Mor.* 1a-b, 1d.

the child's attendants, companions and teachers.⁷² No precept is too trivial and no pupil is to be discarded.⁷³ This awareness of what is at stake in education is not lost on Quintilian, who, like Ps.-Plutarch, believes no precept is too trivial and shows serious care about selecting the child's attendants, companions and teachers.⁷⁴ Although his aim is to teach the "ideal orator," he nevertheless believes that something can be gained by most students if their education is applied immediately and properly. In fact, the first chapter of the first book begins by saying so:

Therefore once the son is born, may the father have higher than highest hopes for him; thus he will be more diligent from the beginning. For false is the complaint that the power of understanding that is handed down has been conceded to a very small number of men [...] for on the contrary you could find very many who easily understand and are ready to learn [...] But while one will accomplish more or less, no one can be found who has achieved nothing from study. From the moment he becomes a parent, may the one who understands this devote the keenest possible care to his hope in the future orator.⁷⁵

This paternal interest in education in Roman society is further confirmed by its satirical treatment by Petronius and Juvenal. In the *Satyricon*, Petronius has a father brag to Agamemnon about his son, who shows promise in math and literature, and records his advice to his other less inclined son: "whatever you learn, you learn for your own benefit [...] literature is a treasury, and art never dies."⁷⁶ Juvenal describes with disgust the father who pushes for profit through his son's education, describing him as waking the boy in the middle of the night by exclaiming, "Take up

⁷² [Plut.] *Mor.* 3c-4c.

⁷³ [Plut.] *Mor.* 2a-3b.

⁷⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.4, 1.1.6, 1.1.8, 1.1.21. See my discussion of these passages below, pp. 48-56.

⁷⁵ *Igitur nato filio pater spem de illo primum quam optimam capiat: ita diligentior a principiis fiet. Falsa enim est querela, paucissimis hominibus vim percipiendi quae tradantur esse concessam [...] nam contra plures reperias et faciles in excogitando et ad discendam promptos [...] sed plus efficiet aut minus: nemo reperitur qui sit studio nihil consecutus. Hoc qui perviderit, protinus ut erit parens factus, acrem quam maxime datur curam spei futuri oratoris inpendat* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.1, 1.1.3).

⁷⁶ *Quicquid discis, tibi discis [...] Litterae thesaurum est, et artificium nunquam moritur* (Petron. *Sat.* 46).

your notebook, write, boy, wake up, plead cases, read those laws of our ancestors thoroughly!”⁷⁷

Appreciation for the power of *paideia* seems to have been prevalent, as Quintilian’s preface asserts that his work was undertaken at the insistence of other interested parties and in spite of many other compositions on the subject. He writes in the proemium:

After my well-earned retirement from my studies, which for twenty years I had dedicated to educating the youth, when some people close to me requested that I compose something about the theory of oratory, I resisted for a long time, because I was not unaware that famous authors in both languages had left to posterity many very careful writings that pertain to this topic.⁷⁸

Quintilian’s call to write nicely encapsulates the social aspect of the acquisition of education. He does not begin the *Institutio* in a vacuum, but at the request of others, who seem to have had a similar set of values as the fathers whom Petronius and Juvenal satirize.

Later Investments and Returns

The preface further draws attention to the fact that for Quintilian, much as for his Greek contemporaries, the art of speaking—rhetoric—was the summit of literate education and power.⁷⁹ On the Greek side, “the performance of rhetoric is integral to our understanding of the Second Sophistic—and to the self-representation of the authors of the period. Standing up and speaking is a route to power and influence in this era as much as it is in the classical city.”⁸⁰ On the Roman side, “rhetoric was the final step of the ladder of education, and thus it was by nature

⁷⁷ *Accipe ceras, / scribe, puer, vigila, causas age, perlege rubras / maiorum leges* (Juv. 14.191-3).

⁷⁸ *Post impetratam studiis meis quietem, quae per viginti annos erudiendis iuvenibus inpenderam, cum a me quidam familiariter postularent ut aliquid de ratione dicendi componerem, diu sum equidem reluctatus, quod auctores utriusque linguae clarissimos non ignorabam multa quae ad hoc opus pertinerent diligentissime scripta posteris reliquisse* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.pr.1).

⁷⁹ Of Greek rhetoric, see Swain 1996: 90: “The study of rhetoric was the commonest form of higher education followed by the elite.”

⁸⁰ Goldhill 2009a: 98.

open only to those who came from financially secure backgrounds and were afforded the opportunity to spend more time and money on education. The study of rhetoric had prestige as well as practical benefits.”⁸¹ In short, the opportunity to obtain an education in rhetoric marked elite status for both Greeks and Romans.

The benefits of a rhetorical education are perhaps most often cited, however, from numerous Lucianic pieces. *The Professor of Rhetoric*, for example, begins with the gains in prestige:

You ask, young man, how you might become a rhetor and seem to personify the most holy and honored name of sophist; you say that life is not worth living unless you can cast about you such great power in words that you are unconquerable and irresistible and wondered and gazed at by everyone, seeming to Greeks a person worth hearing.⁸²

In the *Double Indictment*, personified Rhetoric lists the political and material benefits that Lucian gained because of his “marriage” with her:

Not knowing what to do with himself, I took him in and gave him *paideia* [...] I yoked myself to this ingrate, who was poor, obscure and young, adding no small dowry in the form of many and wonderful speeches. Then, once married, I enlisted him among my clan and made him a citizen [...] I made him famous and renowned, fixing and dressing him up finely. I won’t say much about Greece and Ionia, but when he wished to travel to Italy I sailed with him across the Adriatic and going with him as far as Gaul, I made him wealthy.⁸³

⁸¹ McNelis 2007: 189.

⁸² Ἐρωτᾶς, ὃ μαιράκιον, ὅπως ἂν ρήτωρ γένοιο καὶ τὸ σεμνότατον τοῦτο καὶ πάντιμον ὄνομα σοφιστῆς εἶναι δόξαις· ἀβίωτα γὰρ εἶναι σοὶ φήσ, εἰ μὴ τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν δύναμιν περιβάλοιο ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἄμαχον εἶναι καὶ ἀνυπόστατον καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀπάντων καὶ ἀποβλέπεσθαι, περισπούδαστον ἄκουσμα τοῖς Ἑλλησι δοκοῦντα (Lucian *Rhet. Praec.* 1).

⁸³ ὃ τι χρήσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδὸτα παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα [...] τῷ ἀχαρίστῳ τούτῳ ἑμαυτὴν ἐνεγγύησα πένητι καὶ ἀφανεῖ καὶ νέφ προῖκα οὐ μικρὰν ἐπενεγκαμένη πολλοὺς καὶ θαυμασίους λόγους. εἶτα ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς

Perhaps less frequently cited in discussions of the benefits of rhetorical education, in spite of its greater sincerity, is the conclusion to Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.⁸⁴ In the antepenultimate chapter, Quintilian remarks:

Add that even moderate eloquence bears great fruits and if someone were to measure these studies by utility alone, eloquence would be nearly perfect. It would not be difficult to make obvious by ancient and modern examples that from no other source does greater abundance of wealth, honors, friendships and present and future praise come upon a man.⁸⁵

Quintilian's pupil, Pliny,⁸⁶ speaks to the prestige that Quintilian promises through rhetorical education and eloquence, and in a manner that is not dissimilar to that of the pupil of Lucian's teacher of rhetoric. In a letter to Quadratus, Pliny argues that glory and fame can be perfectly fine motivations for pleading a case: *aequum enim est agere non numquam gloriae et famae, id est, suam causam*.⁸⁷

Tacitus, Pliny's colleague in rhetoric, offers an even more detailed list of advantages offered through rhetoric than perhaps all the collected arguments in Lucian's corpus. He does so through the mouth of Aper, who, in spite of some accusations to the contrary, is a solid representative of contemporary tastes.⁸⁸ As Craig Champion aptly put it, "Aper's concern with

φυλέτας τοὺς ἔμοὺς παρενέγραψα καὶ ἄστὸν ἀπέφηνα καὶ κλεινὸν αὐτὸν [...] καὶ αἰοίδιμον ἐποίουν κατακοσμοῦσα καὶ περιστέλλουσα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας μέτρια, εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀποδημῆσαι θελήσαντι αὐτῷ τὸν Ἴονιον συνδιέπλευσα καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα μέχρι τῆς Κελτικῆς συναπάρασα εὐπορεῖσθαι ἐποίησα (Lucian *Bis Acc.* 27). See Goldhill 2009b: 232-4 for further discussion.

⁸⁴ See Dominik 2007 for discussion of the advantages of rhetorical education in imperial Rome, most especially in the cases of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny. See van den Berg 2012: 192-3 and 2014: 1-14 for nuanced discussion of the history of *utilitas* in Roman rhetoric.

⁸⁵ *Adde quod magnos modica quoque eloquentia parit fructus, ac si quis haec studia utilitate sola metiatur, paene illi perfectae par est. Neque erat difficile vel veteribus vel novis exemplis palam facere non abunde maiores opes honores amicitias, laudem praesentem futuram hominibus contigisse* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.29).

⁸⁶ See Plin. *Ep.* 6.6 and further discussion below, p. 39, on Pliny as pupil of Quintilian.

⁸⁷ Plin. *Ep.* 6.29.3.

⁸⁸ See van den Berg 2014: 125-39, Champion 1994, Dominik 2007: 330-4 and Goldberg 1999 for defenses of Aper and histories of scholarly attacks upon him.

public recognition of status lay at the core of the Roman aristocratic mentality.”⁸⁹ Stephen Rutledge even suggests Tacitean sympathy for Aper and his position and opinions.⁹⁰ Aper sings the praise of *eloquentia*, the fruit of rhetorical training, across roughly three chapters of the *Dialogus de Oratoribus* and is to be taken seriously in doing so. In terms of the practical utility that Quintilian mentions above, rhetoric exceeds any other field, offering near invincibility in its power and authority:

For if every plan and deed of ours is to be shaped toward life’s utility, what is safer than exercising this art, armed with which at all times you might bring protection to friends, resources to strangers, safety to those in trouble, and indeed fear and terror to the invidious and hostile, yourself secure and protected by a sort of invincible power and authority?⁹¹

Rhetorical prowess likewise brings a prestigious retinue of followers similar to those mentioned by Lucian’s teacher: “Of what art can the fame and praise be compared with the glory of orators? Who is more illustrious in the city not only among accomplished and busy men, but among young men and teens?”⁹²

The wealth and social climbing of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, which Aper describes at length, seem very similar to the fruits of Lucian’s marriage to Rhetoric. Of their wealth, Aper recounts, “It is not the 200 million or 300 million sesterces respectively, but their eloquence that furnishes this [fame], although they can be taken to have come upon this great

⁸⁹ Champion 1994: 155. See also Luce 1993: 34 and Bo 1993: 227, with further bibliography on Aper as representative of the contemporary scene.

⁹⁰ Rutledge 2012: 71. Dominik 2007: 332 suggests that Tacitus would identify with Aper in terms of style.

⁹¹ *Nam si ad utilitatem vitae omnia consilia factaque nostra derigenda sunt, quid est tutius quam eam exercere artem, qua semper armatus praesidium amicis, opem alienis, salutem periclitantibus, invidis vero et inimicis metum et terrorem ultro feras, ipse securus et velut quadam perpetua potentia ac potestate munitus?* (Tac. *Dial.* 5.5). See Mayer 2001 ad loc. on textual variants.

⁹² *Fama et laus cuius artis cum oratorum gloria comparanda est? Quid? Non inlustres sunt in urbe non solum apud negotiosos et rebus intentos, sed etiam apud iuvenes vacuos et adulescentis* (Tac. *Dial.* 7.3). See also Tac. *Dial.* 6.2.

wealth through their gift of eloquence.”⁹³ This acquisition of wealth and power is all the greater because of their rise from humble origins.⁹⁴ They also achieve many of the criteria that scholars use to characterize the Greek sophist. Like Favorinus, for example, they earn statues. Gleason remarks of Favorinus and his statue, “an honorific statue like those awarded him in Corinth and at Athens was an enduring symbol of his ability to reenact countless transient triumphs.”⁹⁵ Aper remarks of Marcellus and Crispus, “A very small thing among so many and such great accomplishments, they win *imagines* and inscriptions and statues, things which nevertheless are not neglected, by Hercules, any more than wealth and material resources.”⁹⁶ Like many sophists they gain imperial connections.⁹⁷ Philostratus draws attention, for example, to Polemo’s favor under Trajan and Hadrian, and Polemo himself writes of his experience as a *comes* to Hadrian.⁹⁸ Of the Roman orators, Aper carries on at some length about their relationship with the emperor, remarking that “they are leading men in the circle of friends of Caesar.”⁹⁹ Their competitive and controversial relations with their contemporaries and eventual fall from imperial grace likewise mirrors the experience of many a Greek sophist. One might take as an example the case of Dionysius of Miletus, who was made prefect, knight and member of the museum by Hadrian, but then apparently overthrown by the same man.¹⁰⁰ Epruius Marcellus ranged from obtaining

⁹³ *Nec hoc illis alterius bis, alterius ter milies sestertium praestat, quamquam ad has ipsas opes possunt videri eloquentiae beneficio venisse, sed ipsa eloquentia* (Tac. *Dial.* 8.2).

⁹⁴ Tac. *Dial.* 8.3. These humble origins share some similarity with those of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny, as discussed in my introduction.

⁹⁵ Gleason 1995: 8. See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 37 for Favorinus’ statue.

⁹⁶ *Minimum inter tot ac tanta locum obtinent imagines ac tituli et statuae, quae neque ipsa tamen negleguntur, tam hercule quam divitiae et opes* (Tac. *Dial.* 8.4).

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Anderson 1993: 30-5 and Bowersock 1969: 30-58.

⁹⁸ Philostr. *VS* 532-3; Polemo *Phys.* 1, p.138, l. 14. See Bowersock 1969: 120-3.

⁹⁹ *Nunc principes in Caesaris amicitia agunt* (Tac. *Dial.* 8.3).

¹⁰⁰ Philostr. *VS* 524. Cass. Dio 69.3.4. See Bowersock 1969: 52 on Dionysius, 43-58 on sophist-emperor relations more broadly.

pardons, priestships and pardons from Vespasian, to bitter accusations against Thræsea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus, to condemnation from Titus and forced suicide.¹⁰¹

Aper's biographies of Marcellus and Crispus ought not to be passed over or read as undermining his argument.¹⁰² It is through Marcellus and Crispus that "Aper well demonstrates the expediency of eloquence by stressing social mobility."¹⁰³ Nor do Marcellus and Crispus stand alone—Tacitus mentions ten contemporary orators in the *Dialogus*. Pliny mentions nearly sixty contemporary speakers in his *Epistles*.¹⁰⁴ The catalogue of orators offered by the two affirms that the belief that symbolic and material capital is earned through rhetorical education is not unique to Aper. Suetonius sums up this development across early imperial history, ranging from Cicero to Nero in the following way: "Gradually rhetoric itself also appeared useful and honorable and many sought it for the sake of protection and glory."¹⁰⁵

Declamation: Exercising Education and Power

This awareness of the power of rhetorical pedagogy had its results. One, in particular, was an interest in declamation, the role of which in education and society became a matter of controversy among intellectuals of antiquity. Opinions on declamation ranged from outright rejection to guarded appreciation.¹⁰⁶ And yet, increased publication of handbooks such as Seneca's *Suasoriae* and *Controversiae* and Ps.-Quintilian's *Major* and *Minor Declamations*

¹⁰¹ Tac. *Hist.* 2.95, 4.6-8 and 4.43.

¹⁰² See Gallia 2009: 178-9, Goldberg 1999: 228 and 2009: 77 and Luce 1993: 36 for defenses of Aper's use of Marcellus and Crispus.

¹⁰³ van den Berg 2014: 135, closing a longer reading of the social elements of Aper's speech.

¹⁰⁴ Dominik 2007: 336. Rutledge 2007: 110 adds that roughly one-third of Pliny's letters from his first nine books attest to the power of oratory.

¹⁰⁵ *Paulatim et ipsa utilis honestaque apparuit multique eam et praesidii cause et gloriae appetiverunt* (Suet. *Gram.* 25.3). For commentary and discussion of "the reception and teaching of rhetoric at Rome," see Kaster 1995: 269ff.

¹⁰⁶ See Bonner 1949: 71-83 for a survey of ancient criticism and reception of declamation. See Gunderson 2003: 12-17 for a survey of modern criticism and reception. See Bloomer 2011: 170-88, Bonner 1949, Criboire 2001: 231-8, and Spawforth 2012: 72-80 for general treatments to Roman declamation. See Murphy 1991: 2290-1 for a discussion of Messala's depiction of declamation in the *Dialogus*.

makes it difficult to doubt that declamation became popular among students, teachers and writers as a means of establishing elite identity under the changed political world of the principate.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, enthusiasm for Isaeus' and Hadrian of Tyre's performances at the Athenaeum in Rome is further evidence of declamation's popularity.¹⁰⁸ In short, a shift occurred from the schoolroom to society. Martin Bloomer notes that "declamation continued some of the social function of Roman oratory by forecasting the stars of the coming generation and by ranking and re-ranking professional speakers."¹⁰⁹ Thus, excellence in declamation, an advanced school exercise, served as a form of symbolic capital.¹¹⁰

As with many other facets of *paideia*, some have highlighted the Greekness of declamation. Swain, for example, notes that the themes of declamation deal mostly in mythology or in classical and Hellenistic history,¹¹¹ remarking that orators "strove collectively to maintain the glory of their culture and Greekness" and that "exceptions are unimportant."¹¹² Differences between Greek and Roman declamation form another line of scholarship. George Kennedy, for example, notes that Greek declamation differs from its Roman counterpart in its emphasis on the historical.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ See Bonner 1949: 39-44 and Gunderson 2003, esp. 148: "To the extent that declamation seems to become more prominent and more important to Romans of the imperial period—and again one must remember that the genre was important to Greeks of all generations and Romans of earlier ages as well—we can perhaps see an institution that gains prominence precisely as the opportunities for the articulation of identity in the official rhetoric of public life have begun to fade."

¹⁰⁸ For Isaeus, see Plin. *Ep.* 2.3. For Hadrian of Tyre see Philostr. *VS* 589. See Hutchinson 2013: 55 for discussion of both with relation to the Athenaeum.

¹⁰⁹ Bloomer 2007: 298. See also van den Berg 2014: 41-7, Bloomer 1997: 64 and Bonner 1949: 39.

¹¹⁰ See Schmitz 1999: 75 for an emphatic interpretation of declamation's social function with the conclusion that "every sophistic declamation was an arrogation of power."

¹¹¹ Swain 1996: 91-3. See also Bowie 1974: 172, Cribiore 2001: 232-3, Kennedy 1974: 19, Pernot 2005: 153 and Russell 1983: 107, who counts 350 Greek themes, 43 dealing with the Persian War, 90 with the Peloponnesian War, 125 with Demosthenes and 25 with Alexander.

¹¹² Swain 1996: 91, 93.

¹¹³ Kennedy 1974: 22.

These and other differences do indeed exist. But there are similarities as well, as one would expect given that Roman declamation developed out of a Greek model.¹¹⁴ For example, Latin *controversiae* and *suasoriae* were a near equivalent to the Greek *meletai*.¹¹⁵ *Suasoriae* bear a striking resemblance to Aeschines' *hypotheses*, which Philostratus delineates as essential features of the Second Sophistic.¹¹⁶ While the Roman *suasoriae* sometimes concerned Roman history rather than a Greek past, Graham Anderson points out that there are occasions in which the Roman declaimer employed the Greek past both in its own right and as a means of treating the Roman present.¹¹⁷ Roman declaimers sometimes even adopted Greek language. Pliny suggests, and Seneca the Elder confirms, declaimers performed not only in Latin, but also in Greek.¹¹⁸ The oratorical style employed by the Roman declaimer likewise drew upon a Greek model. Gerald Sandy, accepting Apuleius' use of Greek models for the *prolalia* of his declamations, views the *Florida* as "evidence for Apuleius' affinities to the oratorical practices and themes of the Greek Second Sophistic."¹¹⁹ In short, as Ruth Webb concludes of Greek sophistic performance, "declamation provided a means of staying (temporally) Roman while becoming Greek."¹²⁰ The sentiment applies equally to members of the Roman elite.

The similarities between imperial Greek and Roman declamation were great enough that directions of influence are not always clear. Anthony Spawforth, for example, has suggested that

¹¹⁴ See Bonner 1949: 11. See Bloomer 2011: 177-8, where the Athenian courts are taken as a model for both Philostratus' sophists and for Roman declaimers. Greek origin of declamation should not be taken to mean Greek origin of public declamation. So Spawforth 2012: 74: "It needs stressing that there is no evidence that upper-class Greeks habitually declaimed in public at a date earlier than their Roman counterparts."

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Kennedy 1974: 19-20, Marrou 1956: 202, Russell 1983: 10 and Whitmarsh 2005: 20-1.

¹¹⁶ See Bloomer 2007: 301-2.

¹¹⁷ See Anderson 1986: 91 on Latin rhetoricians and Greek themes.

¹¹⁸ Plin. *Ep.* 4.11.3 discusses the rhetorician Licinianus, who makes a point of clarifying the language in which he will declaim: *Latine declamaturus sum*. Seneca observes a change in garment and language while the same speaker argues the same point: *cum Latine declamaverunt, toga posita sumpto pallio quasi persona mutata redibant et Graece declamabant* (*Contr.* 9.3.13).

¹¹⁹ Sandy 1997: 163.

¹²⁰ Webb 2006: 45.

Philostratus' documentation of Greek declamation under the term Second Sophistic "is something of a misnomer insofar as it veils what appear to be the essentially Roman *social* origins of the practice of public declamation among high-status elements in imperial society."¹²¹ While Sandy portrays Apuleius as learning from Greeks, Gregory Hutchinson adds that the "forerunners of Apuleius' Greek contemporaries are the Latin and Greek rhetors whom we already see as established and well-known figures in the Rome of the Elder Seneca."¹²² Notably these rhetors are not only Greek, but also Latin. The sources from which we derive the majority of our knowledge of Greek and Roman declamation, moreover, are Romans: Seneca the Elder and Quintilian.¹²³ Hence, what we understand as Greek declamation is passed to us through a Roman lens.

The most significant parallel, however, is declamation's *function* for both Greek and Latin speakers. Concerning the audience and participants of declamation Whitmarsh remarks, "they were gathering as members of the educated elite, parading and exercising their status, scrutinizing their peers as their reputations were made and broken, and testing the role of traditional Greek manhood within the demanding environment of imperial aristocratic culture."¹²⁴ One can just as easily claim, as Christopher van den Berg has, that "declamation had established itself not only as a forensic training ground for the budding orator, but also as a competitive arena for the display and evaluation of Roman aesthetic and social values."¹²⁵ The arrogation of social and political power and the statement of cultural identity by means of what was originally a school exercise is therefore a shared phenomenon.

¹²¹ Spawforth 2012: 39.

¹²² Hutchinson 2013: 243.

¹²³ See Anderson 1993: 18-9, Bonner 1949 *passim*, esp. 23, 38, 34, 37 and Russell 1983: 8.

¹²⁴ Whitmarsh 2005: 3.

¹²⁵ van den Berg 2014: 42. See Gunderson 2003: 22 for a similar sentiment.

Patronage and Pedagogy

Following closely upon an interest in declamation as a means of arrogation of power was an increased desire in acquiring teachers of rhetoric to help develop a pupil's declamatory skill. This enthusiasm for teachers of rhetoric is lampooned by Lucian, who has his speaker in *On Salaried Posts* warn his friend as follows:

But since you have a long beard and there is something august in your expression and you are neatly wrapped in a Greek mantle and everyone knows that you are a grammarian or rhetorician or philosopher, it seems a good idea to keep such a figure among those who lead or escort him; for he will therefore seem to be a lover of Greek learning and in general fond of *paideia*.¹²⁶

For Quintilian, however, the search for a rhetorician is a serious matter: when the time for rhetorical training approaches, it is essential to hire a rhetor with impeccable character.¹²⁷ He must also be as skilled as possible. Quintilian unleashes roughly three pages of admonitions upon parents who are so foolish that “they do not believe that their boys must be handed straight over to the most eminent rhetorical teacher.”¹²⁸ Such foolishness will only lead to development of poor habits in their child's rhetoric, which will be difficult for the eminent rhetorician to undo. Pliny echoes this sentiment in a letter to Corellia Hispulla, advising her that a teacher of rhetoric must be sought whose discipline and morals are excellent.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ ἐπεὶ δὲ πάγωνα ἔχεις βαθὺν καὶ σεμνός τις εἶ τὴν πρόσοψιν καὶ ἰμάτιον Ἑλληνικὸν εὐταλῶς περιβέβλησαι καὶ πάντες ἴσασι σε γραμματικὸν ἢ ῥήτορα ἢ φιλόσοφον, καλὸν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἀναμεῖχθαι καὶ τοιοῦτον τινα τοῖς προιοῦσι καὶ προπομπεῦουσιν αὐτοῦ; δόξει γὰρ ἐκ τούτου καὶ φιλομαθῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μαθημάτων καὶ ὅλως περὶ παιδείαν φιλόκαλος (Lucian *De Merc.* 25).

¹²⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 2.2.1. For further discussion see below, pp. 58-9.

¹²⁸ *Non tamen continuo tradendos eminentissimo credunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.3.1).

¹²⁹ *Iam circumspiciendus rhetor Latinus, cuius scholae severitas, pudor, in primis castitas, constet* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.3.3). See below, p. 59, for further discussion.

This is not empty literary rhetoric on the part of Quintilian and Pliny. Pliny not only displays his eagerness to help his friends find reliable teachers, but also shows his concern for education among the youth of Como. In *Epistle* 4.13, he asks Tacitus to send any teachers that he finds in Rome to Pliny's Como, as Pliny has recently promised to pay one-third of the cost of educating the pupils there. To the people of Como, he says, "May you attract such famous teachers that education will be sought from here by nearby towns and so that just as now your children travel to other locales, others will soon rush to this place."¹³⁰ To Tacitus, he begs, "I implore and beg you in the name of the magnitude of this task to keep a look out for teachers from among the hoard of learned men that encircles you out of admiration of your genius, whom we may solicit."¹³¹ Elsewhere, Pliny refers to a donation of his for the construction of a library in Como, further known to us through an inscription once set above the baths there.¹³² Certainly this local beneficence, similar to that of such Greek contemporaries as Dio of Prusa,¹³³ promises glory to Pliny. But ultimately glory would be bestowed only for a deed that would be well-received by society. Evidence of the arrogation of power through education thus extends into another realm, namely the patronage of the arts and education, and is, furthermore, displayed perhaps most of all by the Roman Pliny.

The Benefits of Teaching

¹³⁰ *Atque utinam tam claros praeceptores inducat, ut finitimis oppidis studia hinc petantur, utque nunc liberi vestri aliena in loca ita mox alieni in hunc locum confluent* (Plin. *Ep.* 4.13.9).

¹³¹ *Iniungo autem et pro rei magnitudine rogo, ut ex copia studiosorum, quae ad te ex admiratione ingenii tui convenit, circumspicias praeceptores, quos sollicitare possimus* (Plin. *Ep.* 4.13.10).

¹³² Plin. *Ep.* 1.8.2; *CIL* 5262. See Syme 1958: 84 for a summation of Pliny's beneficence.

¹³³ For Dio's local benefaction, see C.P. Jones 1978: 104-14. For euergetism among Greek sophists more generally see Anderson 1993: 24-8, Bowersock 1969: 26-9. Bonner 1977: 157 observes that Pliny's euergetism was "in accord with the Greek spirit of the day and may well have been tried elsewhere." See Schmitz 1997: 102 for building as a sign of *Bildung*.

As the power to be gained by pupils and patrons through learning and supporting education increased, so too did the potential for teachers themselves. Gains must have been good enough that Tacitus' Messala could complain that teachers were desirous enough of a position to flatter their way into the field.¹³⁴ No doubt, tension continued to exist between the conservative elite and the typically lower social strata to which most teachers of rhetoric belonged, thereby upholding a degree of difficulty in social, political and economic climbing.¹³⁵ Yet Fergus Millar, following Glen Bowersock, has pointed out the social and political opportunity that could be gained from the teacher of rhetoric who had success in his local province.¹³⁶ The complexity of the rhetor's place in society is illustrated in a letter from Pliny to Nepos about Isaeus' oratory and profession:

At more than sixty years old he is still just a teacher; no one is more honest, sincere or good than this group of men. For we, who are occupied in the forum with real litigation, gain much malice, although we don't wish it; the school and the auditorium and the harmless matters of a fictive case are innocuous and no less pleasing, especially to the elderly. For in old age what could be more pleasing than that which is sweetest during youth? Therefore I not only judge Isaeus the most eloquent, but also the most blessed; and if you do not wish to make his acquaintance, you are hard and stubborn as rock and iron.¹³⁷

On one hand, Pliny admires Isaeus' talent and character. On the other hand, even while praising the man and his choice of profession, Pliny cannot resist the occasional snubbing of an educated

¹³⁴ "For they collect students not by the strictness of their discipline nor by proof of talent, but by ambition in making morning-calls and by the enticements of flattery" (*colligunt enim discipulos non severitate disciplinae nec ingenii experimento, sed ambitione salutationum et inlecebris adulationis* (Tac. *Dial.* 29.4)).

¹³⁵ See Crihiore 2001: 59-65 on the varying standing of grammarians and rhetoricians, Kaster 1988: 99-134 on grammarians, Bloomer 1997: 61 on the teacher as *locus* for expressing ethnic and cultural tension in Rome.

¹³⁶ Bowersock 1969: 28-9 and Millar 1977: 60.

¹³⁷ *Annum sexagesimum excessit et adhuc scholasticus tantum est; quo genere hominum nihil aut simplicius aut sincerius aut melius. Nos enim, qui in foro verisque litibus terimur, multum malitiae, quamvis nolimus, addiscimus; schola et auditorium et ficta cause res inermis, innoxia est nec minus felix, senibus praesertim. Nam quid in senectute felicius quam quod dulcissimum est in iuventa? Quare ego Isaeum non disertissimum tantum, verum etiam beatissimum iudico; quem tu nisi cognoscere concopuscis, saxeus ferreusque es* (Plin. *Ep.* 2.3.5-7).

man who chooses to remain in a schoolroom.¹³⁸ Yet, for the implication that there is something at least somewhat unsettling about declamation and rhetorical teaching, it must be admitted that Isaeus has gained enough status to appear among Pliny's friends, to say nothing of the presumed wealth that the rhetor had acquired. The fruits of his success might even have had political significance if an inscription set up by a descendant has any truth—a statue of Isodotus at Eleusis states that he was “descended from Isaeus, leader in wisdom, who indeed was responsible for the noble instruction of the faultless Emperor Hadrian in the arts of the Muses.”¹³⁹

Isaeus' success also earned him a place in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, the keystone of Second Sophistic studies. Philostratus' work essentially reads as a biographical list of rhetors who gained wealth and status often not from performing, but from teaching. Scopelian, for example, gained at least thirty talents from Herodes alone (who called him his teacher)¹⁴⁰ and was even able to impress Domitian enough to save Smyrnaean vineyards from imperial prohibition.¹⁴¹ He takes a seat atop the Second Sophistic stemma, as teacher of Herodes and Polemo and therefore forefather of some twenty sophists mentioned by Philostratus.¹⁴² But the ladder to power through rhetoric was just as Roman as it was Greek. Suetonius notes in his introduction to his discussion of rhetors that “since a great zeal had been instilled in men [for rhetoric], a great abundance of professors and teachers also flooded forth and flourished to such an extent that some from the nadir of fortune advanced to the senatorial order and to the highest offices.”¹⁴³ In addition to Epirus Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, who perhaps fit this description,

¹³⁸ See Uden 2015: 89-116 on the ambiguous place of Isaeus in the estimation of Pliny and, moreover, Juvenal.

¹³⁹ ἔγγονον Εἰσαίου τοῦ σοφίας ὑπάτου, / ὅς δὴ καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀμύμονος Ἀδριανοῦ, / Μουσάων ἀγαθὴν εἶχε διδασκαλίην. See Puech 2002: 273-6 for text and discussion. I am indebted to Uden 2015: 116 for the reference.

¹⁴⁰ Philostr. *VS* 521.

¹⁴¹ Philostr. *VS* 520.

¹⁴² See the stemma of Eshleman 2012: 130.

¹⁴³ *Quare magno studio hominibus iniecto magna etiam professorum ac doctorum profluxit copia adeoque floruit ut nonnulli ex infima fortuna in ordinem senatorium atque ad summos honores processerint* (Suet. *Rhet.* 25.3).

Tacitus treats Junius Otho with similar disgust, but nevertheless as an educated social climber, remarking, “Junius Otho’s old skill was in running a school; soon, as senator through the agency of Sejanus, he defiled his obscure beginnings with daring impudence.”¹⁴⁴

Grammarians, though generally less successful, also found some space to climb. According to Suetonius, Sevius Nicanor was the first teacher to achieve fame through teaching.¹⁴⁵ Suetonius’ biographies of famous grammarians testify to their potential prominence, not least in the case of Marcus Antonius Gniphio, for example, who found his way into the Julian house.¹⁴⁶ While Favorinus and Dio of Prusa esteem statuary as a symbol of prestige among Greek sophists, Roman grammarians were also receiving similar awards. Suetonius reports with detail on a statue of Lucius Orbilius Pupillus, an orphan turned grammarian: “His statue is displayed in Beneventum in the capitol on the left side, in marble, with him seated and in a pallium, with two writing tablets set nearby.”¹⁴⁷ A similar description exists of the grammarian Marcus Verrius Flaccus.¹⁴⁸

In addition to statuary honors, rhetors measured their success in terms of stipends and tax exemptions, as is clear from Philostratus’ *Lives of Sophists*.¹⁴⁹ His account of the run-in between the sophist Philiscus of Thessaly and Caracalla is a fine example of the sophistic hope for exemptions from public service. Philiscus argues with Caracalla, “You have given me an

¹⁴⁴ *Junio Othoni litterarium ludum exercere vetus ars fuit: mox Seiani potentia senator obscura initia impudentibus ausis propolluebat* (Tac. *Ann.* 3.66.4). See also Sen. *Controv.* 9.33.37 on Junius Otho’s rhetorical ability. See Kaster 1995: 278 and McNelis 2007: 289 for brief discussion of Junius Otho and other successful rhetors.

¹⁴⁵ *Sevius Nicanor primus ad famam dignationemque docendo pervenit* (Suet. *Gram.* 5.1).

¹⁴⁶ Suet. *Gram.* 7.2.

¹⁴⁷ *Statua eius Beneventi ostenditur in Capitolio ad sinistrum latus, marmorea, habitu sedentis ac palliati, adpositis duobus scriniis* (Suet. *Gram.* 9.6).

¹⁴⁸ Suet. *Gram.* 9.6.

¹⁴⁹ See Anderson 1993: 30-5 for a survey of sophists’ claims to distinctions and exemptions.

exemption from liturgies when you gave me the chair of rhetoric in Athens.”¹⁵⁰ A number of Philostratus’ sophists held a chair of rhetoric in Rome, Athens or both—Rome notably being the more prestigious of the two.¹⁵¹

However, these imperial benefits originated not with Greek sophists, but with their Roman contemporaries. The Chair of Rhetoric that Vespasian established began as solely Latin, and belonged to none other than Quintilian, at a pay-rate of 100,000 sesterces.¹⁵² And indeed, Quintilian is an outstanding figure among educators advancing their status.¹⁵³ An equestrian from Spain, he acquired and held the Chair of Rhetoric for twenty years, culminating with a position as tutor to Domitian's great-nephews.¹⁵⁴ Ausonius, furthermore, reports that he was awarded consular rank.¹⁵⁵ Quintilian’s success was extraordinary. Juvenal’s *Seventh Satire* suggests as much, noting that more teachers pleaded for fees than acquired them.¹⁵⁶ But the potential for success was there, such that Juvenal could likewise quip, perhaps with Quintilian in mind, “If fortune wishes, you will be turned from rhetor to consul.”¹⁵⁷ Pliny similarly quotes Licinianus as complaining, “Fortune, what games you play! For you make senators of teachers

¹⁵⁰ σύ μοι λειτουργιῶν ἀτέλειαν δέδωκας δοῦς τὸν Ἀθήνησι θρόνον (Philostr. *VS* 623).

¹⁵¹ See Brunt 1994: 26n4 for a list of sophists with their status, benefactions and imperial relations.

¹⁵² On the endowed chair of rhetoric, see Eshleman 2012: 26 with bibliographical note. On Quintilian’s chair, see Jer. *Chron.* 186b Helm, Bonner 1977: 161, Kennedy 1969: 19 and Woodside 1942: 124.

¹⁵³ On Quintilian’s success in this area, see Bonner 1977: 155 and 161, Kennedy 1969: 15-22 and McNelis 2007: 289-290.

¹⁵⁴ “Since in fact Domitian Augustus has delegated the care of his sister's grandsons to me” [...] (*Cum vero mihi Domitianus Augustus sororis suae nepotum delegaverit curam* (Quint. *Inst.* 4.pr.2)).

¹⁵⁵ *Quintilianus consularia per Clementem ornamenta sortitus honestamenta nominis potius videtur quam insignia potestatis habuisse* (Auson. *Grat. Act.* 7.31).

¹⁵⁶ *Rara tamen merces quae cognitione tribuni / non egeat* (Juv. 7.228-9).

¹⁵⁷ *Si fortuna volet, fiet de rhetore consul* (Juv. *Sat.* 7.197). Martial similarly calls attention to Quintilian’s success with the epithet of “glory of the Roman toga” (*gloria Romanae, Quintiliane, togae* (Mart. 2.90.2)).

and teachers from senators.”¹⁵⁸ These teachers, though sometimes Greek, could likewise be Roman.

***Pepaideumeno* and Social Security**

The prestige that rhetors could obtain is further illustrated by the social circles to which they belonged and, moreover, by the followers whom they acquired. Long observed is the fact that Philostratus’ *Lives of the Sophists* reads as a popularity contest, won by those who are connected to the right intellectual, mainly Herodes Atticus.¹⁵⁹ A rising pupil would gain prestige by associating himself with a proven sophist, just as a sophist would advance his reputation by having many and good pupils. The mutual benefit is well illustrated in the case of Herodes and his pupil Amphicles of Chalcis, who use social, just as much as rhetorical, clout to shame Philagrus of Cilicia, a rival sophist.¹⁶⁰ Kendra Eshleman’s study demonstrates that the importance of social networks applies not only to these and other Greek sophists, but to Christians as well. A similar social phenomenon exists among Roman intellectuals, perhaps culminating with Gellius’ *Noctes Atticae* in which literary gatherings include the likes of Plutarch, Arrian, Favorinus, Suetonius, Herodes and Fronto, yet Gellius often portrays his own teachers as offering more than these contemporary luminaries.¹⁶¹ The phenomenon existed beforehand among Roman intellectuals such as Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny, for whom the social network of intellectuals, teachers and pupils is an honored tradition, taking its form in the

¹⁵⁸ *Quos tibi, Fortuna, ludos facis! Facis enim ex professoribus senatores, ex senatoribus professores* (Pl. *Ep.* 4.11.2).

¹⁵⁹ See Anderson 1986: 83, Eshleman 2008: 397-400 and 2012: 129-32 and Kemezis 2011.

¹⁶⁰ Philostr. *VS* 578-9. This phenomenon exists outside of Philostratus’ corpus as well, as Aelius Aristides shows a similar enthusiasm for praising his teacher, who in this case is not a rhetorician or sophist, but a grammarian: Alexander of Cotiaem. See *Or.* 32 with discussion in Flintermann 2004: 367-8.

¹⁶¹ See Johnson 2010: 102-3 for further discussion.

tirocinium fori.¹⁶² Quintilian scatters praise of Domitius Afer through the *Institutio*, saying, not least, that he was the *summus orator* of his age.¹⁶³ It is to the best orator that Quintilian attaches himself, noting that as a young man he worshiped the elder orator, not only reading his work, but also learning from the master himself.¹⁶⁴

Tacitus portrays himself as a young member of an intellectual circle revolving around Julius Secundus and Marcus Aper. He is careful to point out the public prestige of the men with whom he has a personal connection:

Marcus Aper and Julius Secundus came to him. The two were the most celebrated at that time for their talent in our forum; I used to listen to them zealously not only in court, but at home too, and I used to follow them in public out of an awesome desire within my studies and a sort of youthful passion, such that I took in deeply their tales and arguments and the secrets of their private discussions.¹⁶⁵

As William Johnson notes, Tacitus shows here, and throughout the *Dialogus*, that “*studia* play a central role in the fashioning and fabric of the social group and its relation to broader society.”¹⁶⁶

Tacitus’ awareness of the linkage between training and social connections seems to have paid off, as Pliny later implies that Tacitus has reached the prestigious position of leader of the social

¹⁶² One need only consider the prosopographical work of Ronald Syme to see the significance of social connections in the Roman world and the study of it. Syme 1958: 21 unsurprisingly stated with reference to Agricola, “To make his way, a man required support and patronage.” He makes similar statements in regard to Pliny (1958: 86). On *tirocinium fori* see Bonner 1977: 84-5 and Rutledge 2007: 111.

¹⁶³ This particular epithet admittedly comes in contrast to the decline that Afer experienced in old age. But it does not depreciate his former strength, and it is even qualified, as Quintilian asserts that his work was not bad, just not as good as it once had been: *Vidi ego longe omnium quos mihi cognoscere contigit summum oratorem Domitium Afrum valde senem cotidie aliquid ex ea quam meruerat auctoritate perdentem [...] neque erant illa qualiacumque mala, sed minora* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.3).

¹⁶⁴ *Sufficiebant alioqui libri duo a Domitio Afro in hanc rem compositi, quem adolescentulus senem colui, ut non lecta mihi tantum ea sed pleraque ex ipso sint cognita* (Quint. *Inst.* 5.7.7). See Kennedy 1969: 16-8 on Quintilian’s relationship with and views of Afer.

¹⁶⁵ *Venerunt ad eum Marcus Aper et Iulius Secundus, celeberrima tum ingenia fori nostri, quos ego utrosque non modo in iudiciis studiose audiebam, sed domi quoque et in publico adsectabar mira studiorum cupiditate et quodam ardore iuvenili, ut fabulas quoque eorum et disputationes et arcana semotae dictionis penitus exciperem* (Tac. *Dial.* 2.1).

¹⁶⁶ Johnson 2010: 65.

and intellectual circle in *Epistle* 4.13, in which he notes the herds of learned men who envelop Tacitus out of admiration.¹⁶⁷

Beyond the oratorical world of the *Dialogus*, Tacitus does, in fact, reveal some concern for publicizing his success. First, he, perhaps necessarily, admits political advancement under the Flavians in the prologue of the *Histories*. Second, and moreover, in an almost Plinian statement of modesty,¹⁶⁸ he mentions his praetorship and priesthood among the quindecimviri and at once apologizes for doing so in rather unconvincing fashion:

For [Domitian] also put on Secular Games, and I was quite attentively present at them—endowed then with the quindecimviral priesthood and praetorship. I do not refer to this to boast, but because the care of the Games has belonged to the college of quindecimvirs from antiquity and the office of praetor mostly used to carry out the duties of the ceremonies.¹⁶⁹

Pliny, likewise happy to mention his official positions, is also eager to praise the *tirocinium fori*¹⁷⁰ and to establish his social and intellectual connections to esteemed teachers and rhetoricians of the time.¹⁷¹ Like Quintilian and Tacitus, he boasts of his earlier education. In a letter to Fundanus asserting Julius Naso's worth he simultaneously sneaks in a bit of his own résumé:

Naso had the greatest affection not only for liberal studies, but also for those who studied, and almost daily he came to hear Quintilian and Nicetes Sacerdos, whom

¹⁶⁷ *Copia studiosorum, quae ad te ex admiratione ingenii tui convenit* (Plin. *Ep.* 4.13.10).

¹⁶⁸ On Plinian modesty and strategy, see R. Gibson 2003.

¹⁶⁹ *Nam is quoque edidit ludos saeculares, iisque intentius adfui sacerdotio quindecimvirali praeditus ac tunc praetor. Quod non iactantia refero, sed quia collegio quindecimvirum antiquitus ea cura, et magistratus potissimum exsequebantur officia caerimoniarum* (Tac. *Ann.* 11.11.1).

¹⁷⁰ Plin. *Ep.* 8.14.

¹⁷¹ Johnson 2010: 38 notes Pliny's inclusion of social arts among the traits of the *pepaideumenos*. See Méthy 2007 *passim* for a similar (though not explicit) argument.

at that time I was following. He was a prestigious and serious man in other respects and one whose memory ought to benefit his son.¹⁷²

Pliny will have us believe that his educational and literary autobiography runs similarly to Tacitus'. He points this out to Tacitus in a letter that illustrates well the nexus of social, educational and literary interactions among the elite of this period. For this reason, I quote it in full:

I read your book and, as diligently as possible, noted what I thought should be edited or deleted. For I have been accustomed to tell the truth and you have been accustomed to listen willingly. For nobody accepts criticism more patiently than those who deserve praise the most. Now I expect my book with your notes. O what pleasant, what beautiful exchanges! How much it pleases me that if posterity cares about us at all, it will be told everywhere with what harmony, simplicity, loyalty we have lived! It will be rare and notable that two men just about equals in age and rank, not without names for literary pursuits (for I must speak sparingly about you, since I am likewise discussing myself), have nourished each other's studies. As a young man I followed you, who were already coming into fame and glory, and I was quite eager to be and to be held as nearest you, but with a long gap between. And there were many extremely famous minds; but you seemed the most imitable (since we were of such similar natures) and the most worthy of imitation. I am all the more pleased for this reason that whenever there is a conversation about intellectual pursuits we are named together, that I come to the minds of those talking about you. There are not lacking people who are preferred to each of us. But we are connected and it does not matter to me in what place; for in my opinion the best place is the one nearest to you. Indeed you ought to have noticed in wills that unless one of us happened to be a very close friend of the deceased, we have both received the same and equal inheritance. What all this

¹⁷² *Erat non studiorum tantum verum etiam studiosorum amantissimus ac prope cotidie ad audiendos, quos tunc ego frequentabam, Quintilianum Niceten Sacerdotem ventitabat, vir alioqui clarus et gravis et qui prodesse filio memoria sui debeat* (Pl. Ep. 6.6.3). See also Plin. Ep. 2.14.9 where Quintilian is claimed by Pliny as *praeceptor meus*.

points to is that we should esteem each other even more deeply since intellectual pursuits, character, reputation and most of all the final assessments of men link us together by so many bonds. Farewell.¹⁷³

In the beginning, even as Pliny attempts to establish their social intimacy, he cannot help but shift from book exchange and lifelong friendship to literary *nomina*. In the second half of the letter, conversely, Pliny cannot help but turn from literary fame and glory to non-literary connections. He closes with an appeal to the ways in which they are viewed by others, a note that strikes upon social elements in a private and public, literary and non-literary sense. It becomes clear by this alternating within the letter that to the sophistic Roman it matters *both* what you know (*paideia*), and whom you know (*pepaideumenoï*).

Pliny reaffirms this notion in a letter to Maximus that claims greater glory through this socio-literary renown than even civic honors—a sentiment, which if taken seriously, further exposes the problems of interpreting Roman *paideia* in strictly civic and political terms. Again, I quote at full length:

Frequently it has happened to me when giving a speech that all the centumviri, once they have restrained themselves for a long time within the bounds of the

¹⁷³ *Librum tuum legi et, quam diligentissime potui, adnotavi quae commutanda, quae eximenda arbitrarer. Nam et ego verum dicere assuevi, et tu libenter audire. Neque enim ulli patientius reprehenduntur, quam qui maxime laudari merentur. Nunc a te librum meum cum adnotationibus tuis exspecto. O iucundas, o pulchras vices! Quam me delectat quod, si qua posteris cura nostri, usquequaque narrabitur, qua concordia simplicitate fide vixerimus. Erit rarum et insigne, duos homines aetate dignitate propemodum aequales, non nullius in litteris nominis (cogor enim de te quoque parcius dicere, quia de me simul dico) alterum alterius studia fovisse. Equidem adolescentulus, cum iam tu fama gloriaque floreres, te sequi, tibi 'longo sed proximus intervallo' et esse et haberi concupiscebam. Et erant multa clarissima ingenia; sed tu mihi (ita similitudo naturae ferebat) maxime imitabilis, maxime imitandus videbaris. Quo magis gaudeo, quod si quis de studiis sermo, una nominamur, quod de te loquentibus statim occurro. Nec desunt qui utrique nostrum praeferantur. Sed nos, nihil interest mea quo loco, iungimur; nam mihi primus, qui a te proximus. Quin etiam in testamentis debes adnotasse: nisi quis forte alterutri nostrum amicissimus, eadem legata et quidem pariter accipimus. Quae omnia huc spectant, ut invicem ardentius diligamus, cum tot vinculis nos studia mores fama, suprema denique hominum iudicia constringant. Vale (Plin. Ep. 7.20).*

authority and dignity of judges, suddenly jump up and praise me as if overwhelmed and out of control; frequently I have received all the glory I could possibly have desired: yet I have never taken greater pleasure than I recently did from a conversation with Cornelius Tacitus. He was telling me that he had sat with a Roman knight at the most recent races. After various learned discussions he asked: “Are you Italian or provincial?” Tacitus replied, “You know me from my intellectual pursuits.” The knight replied: “Are you Tacitus or Pliny?” I am unable to express what a delight it is for me that our names echo in literature as if they belong to it rather than men, and that each of us has become known from these intellectual pursuits to those who would otherwise be ignorant of us.

Another similar thing happened just a few days ago. A distinguished man, Fadius Rufinus was reclining for dinner with me and on the other side of him was a fellow townsman of his who had just come to the city that day. Pointing me out Rufinus asked, “Do you see him?” and then having said much about my work, the other said, “It’s Pliny.” I shall confess the truth: I take great enjoyment of my labor. If Demosthenes rightly rejoiced because an old Attic woman recognized him, saying, “This is Demosthenes,” then why shouldn’t I be pleased by the celebrity of my name? I am pleased and I am saying that I am pleased. For I am not afraid that I seem too boastful when I am professing not my own opinion of myself, but others’, especially in writing to you who never envy the praise of anyone and build upon ours. Farewell.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ *Frequenter agenti mihi evenit, ut centumviri cum diu se intra iudicum auctoritatem gravitatemque tenuissent, omnes repente quasi victi coactique consurgerent laudarentque; frequenter e senatu famam qualem maxime optaveram rettuli: numquam tamen maiorem cepi voluptatem, quam nuper ex sermone Corneli Taciti. Narrabat sedisse secum circensibus proximis equitem Romanum. Hunc post varios eruditosque sermones requisisse: 'Italicus es an provincialis?' Se respondisse: 'Nosti me, et quidem ex studiis.' Ad hoc illum: 'Tacitus es an Plinius?' Exprimere non possum, quam sit iucundum mihi quod nomina nostra quasi litterarum propria, non hominum, litteris redduntur, quod uterque nostrum his etiam e studiis notus, quibus aliter ignotus est. Accidit aliud ante pauculos dies simile. Recumbebat mecum vir egregius, Fadius Rufinus, super eum municeps ipsius, qui illo die primum venerat in urbem; cui Rufinus demonstrans me: 'Vides hunc?' Multa deinde de studiis nostris; et ille 'Plinius est' inquit. Verum fatebor, capio magnum laboris mei fructum. An si Demosthenes iure laetatus est, quod illum anus Attica ita noscitavit: οὗτος ἐστὶ Δημοσθένης, celebritate nominis mei gaudere non debeo? Ego vero et gaudeo et gaudere me dico. Neque enim vereor ne iactantior videar, cum de me aliorum iudicium non meum profero, praesertim apud te qui nec ullius invides laudibus et faves nostris. Vale (Plin. Ep. 9.23).*

After establishing a preference for social and literary esteem, Pliny implicates that he is not alone. Tacitus, whom the modern reader often perceives as quietly austere, points out his own literary fame to his fellow racing fan. He then apparently reported the interaction to Pliny. If Pliny is not fabricating (I see no reason to believe he is) Tacitus appreciates the symbolic power of literary education and expertise in a manner similar to that of Pliny or even Philostratus' Philagrus. Pliny closes the letter by one-upping Tacitus, as he adds another complement to himself along with a similarity drawn between himself and Demosthenes and an outright admission of his high esteem for reputation.

Furthermore, as implied by the Roman knight's question about origins and stated outright with respect to Fadius Rufinus, the social world of the Roman *pepaideumenoī* moves beyond the confines of Roman schoolrooms or even Roman senate meetings into practically the entire cultured *oikoumenē*. Pliny's interest in international prestige plays out elsewhere in his references to his study under Nicetes and his interest in Isaeus, both members of Philostratus' Second Sophistic. In fact, as James Uden points out, Pliny mentions nearly every contemporaneous sophist of Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, and then some. Uden comments, in this connection, that "we would misrepresent the dynamics of the early second-century world by treating Greek and Roman figures in complete isolation from one another"¹⁷⁵—a statement that holds true of the Roman figures discussed here and is affirmed in other directions as well. For example, Plutarch addresses his *Parallel Lives* to Quintus Sosius Senecio, who was not only a Roman and an interlocutor in Plutarch's *Table Talks*, but one of Pliny's addressees.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Uden 2015: 90.

¹⁷⁶ On Plutarch's relationship with Senecio see C.P. Jones 1971 and Swain 1996: 144-5. Pliny addresses him in *Ep.* 1.13 and 4.4.

Indeed, addressees and dedicatees offer further insight into the importance of a social network that was not only powerful, but also educated. Quintilian's addressee Marcus Vitorius Marcellus, for example, was suffect consul in 105 and addressee of Statius' *Silvae* 4. Tacitus addresses the *Dialogus de Oratoribus* to Lucius Fabius Iustus, suffect consul in 102 and political player mentioned by Pliny at *Ep.* 1.5.8. The range for the prosopographer provided by Pliny's *Epistles* needs no further demonstration than that provided especially by the work of Birley, Sherwin-White and Syme.

Conclusion

Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny write about the importance and the benefits of education, both in terms of learning and teaching, in a manner strikingly similar to their Greek contemporaries such as Plutarch or Lucian. They also write themselves into their educational works with such self-awareness that they achieve the role not only of author, but also of participant in a manner strikingly similar to Greek sophistic biographers such as Philostratus. The sophistic Roman was aware that an individual's acquisition and display of literary and cultural knowledge was a means to advanced social, economic and political power and prestige. With these benefits on the line, it should not be surprising that, like his Greek contemporaries, he was preoccupied with *paideia*. This preoccupation with *paideia* and its resulting symbolic capital necessitated interactions across the cultured *oikoumenē* in a manner that, as my next chapter will argue, left no place for ethnic or cultural isolationism, but rather led to shared sets of values.

Chapter Two

Learning Greek (and) Self-Control

The previous chapter illustrated that the interest in literate education as a means of arrogating social and political power was just as much a Roman phenomenon as it was a Greek one. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Roman anxieties concerning Hellenism, though existent, rarely led either to rejection of Greek *paideia* or to limited acceptance only as a display of Roman power.¹ That this is the case is immediately apparent from the Hellenocentric educational handbooks and the pedagogical methods employed from the earliest to the final stages in the Roman educational process. As Simon Goldhill states, “there was no escaping Greek culture for the educated Roman.”² While anxieties about proper methods of education surely existed, the question was not consistently one of inclusion or exclusion of Greek language and literature, but rather a question of selection, method and measure. Roman intellectuals, like their Greek contemporaries, handled this anxiety by moderating the content and then the display of their education. The correct education and moderation therein confirmed elite male identity.

Problems with Hellenism in Roman Education?

The appreciation for Greek literate *paideia* among Romans existed during the Republic and is evidenced in myriad ways, not least through its representation in the comedy of Plautus

¹ See esp. Petrochilos 1974. Dubuisson 1991: 334-5 takes for granted Greek-Roman cultural opposition independent of considerations of political power. See McNelis 2007, esp. 294-5, largely following Syme 1988, linking Roman Hellenistic education to imperialist strategy. Follet 1991: 208-9 has a balanced assessment of *paideia* and Rome, with a focus on Philostratus. See Wallace-Hadrill 1997 *passim*, esp. 8 and 16 for tension with and integration of Greek culture, including *paideia*, among Roman *mores*. See Whitmarsh 2001: 13-6 for discussion of the acceptance of Hellenism by Romans as a symbol of socio-economic exploitation during the time of Cicero and as tool for imperial self-presentation from the time of Nerva and Trajan. See also Whitmarsh 1998: 196-9 and Woolf 1994. I suggest in this chapter and elsewhere that discussion of tension between Greek identity and Roman government is unnecessary in terms of accepting Roman interactions with Greek *paideia*. Greek education was of benefit at an individual level, regardless of racial, ethnic and national (if such a thing existed) identity.

² Goldhill 2009b: 230.

and Terence³ and through the adoption of Greek luminaries such as Panaetius, Polybius and Archias.⁴ It is true that Hellenism as a whole was received ambivalently by some Republican figures.⁵ But the better part of any resistance or hesitance resides more frequently with ancillary fields, not with Greek literary education and the standard curriculum.⁶ The rejection of standard *paideia*, such as that of Marius, more likely stemmed from lack of opportunity for the *novus homo*, whereas an elite who had the chance would not only accept *paideia*, but boast of it.⁷ Of Suetonius' statement in his *De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* that Romans were initially resistant to Greek rhetorical education,⁸ Anthony Corbeill notes, "the opposition was, however, only apparent, since eventually these Greek teachings grew to characterize the Roman elite."⁹ Robert Kaster suggests that Greek rhetorical training might have held, paradoxically, a more stable position than Latin rhetoric in the Roman *mos maiorum*.¹⁰ In fact, when Plotius Gallus' school of Latin rhetoric threatened to supplant Greek rhetorical training in 92 BCE, the senate squashed the attempt in a display of elite philhellenism.¹¹ Even Cato, who is often put forth as a paradigm for anti-Hellenism, had mastered Greek language and literature.¹² Plutarch adds to his suggestion of Cato's Platonic, Thucydidean and Demosthenic readings that "his writings have been

³ On Hellenism in Roman comedy, see Bloomer 2011: 31-6.

⁴ So Bowie 1982: 41-2 following Bowersock 1965 and Millar 1977: "the movement of educated Greeks from the upper classes of Eastern cities into the service of Roman dynasts did not begin with the Second Sophistic. The process was already under way in the late Republic." See also Hutchinson 2013: 60-4.

⁵ See Gruen 1992: 223-7, Mellor 2008: 92, Petrochilos 1974, Whitmarsh 2001: 9-17 and Woolf 1994.

⁶ See Stroup 2007, esp. 29-30 for refutation of the idea of Roman hostility against Greek rhetoric in the Republic. See also Bloomer 2007: 299. Kaster 1995: 269-91 remains an extremely useful discussion on reception of rhetoric in Rome. See Swain 1996: 9 and 39-40 for Roman bilingual and multicultural education.

⁷ See McDonnell 2003: 251-8 for discussion of Marius and competing ideals of manliness.

⁸ Suet. *Rhet.* 25.1.

⁹ Corbeill 2007: 70, with the further argument that education was restricted to private Greek teaching so that the elite could withhold the status marker provided by education from non-elite Latin speakers. See similarly Gruen 1990: 184. Kaster 1995: 273 and 293 is resistant to the idea that education and elite responses to it were democratized.

¹⁰ Kaster 1995: 274.

¹¹ See Bloomer 2011: 37-52.

¹² See e.g. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2.4, 8.8, 9.3, 12.4-5, 19.2, 20.2-3, 23.1-2, 27.4, Gell. *NA* 3.7.19 and 13.18.3, and Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.23 with further discussion by Bloomer 2011: 24-31 and Gruen 1992: 56-9. See also Kaimio 1979: 45-6 and Mellor 2008: 95, who follows Momigliano 1975: 20. They, however, view Cato's Hellenism as a way of promoting Roman preeminence. On other Republican figures embracing Greek education and culture, see Pelling 1989: 203 and 215 for a discussion of Marcellus and Aemilius, respectively.

thoroughly seasoned with Greek sayings and stories; many of these translated word for word, are placed among his apothegms and gnomic statements.”¹³

Furthermore, evidence of Cato’s Greek *paideia* is given by authors of the first and second centuries CE—Gellius, Plutarch and Quintilian.¹⁴ Their demonstration that Greek *paideia* was important even for the conservative Roman indicates wider acceptance of Greek literate *paideia* in their own times.¹⁵ This sentiment is summed up nicely by Pliny the Younger in a letter to Maximus:

Know that you have been sent into the province of Achaëa, the true and pure Greece, in which first of all civilization (*humanitas*), literature and even agriculture are believed to have been founded; you have been sent to conduct the affairs of free states, that is, to the most humane of humans, the most free of free people, who have retained the right granted by nature, virtue, merit, friendship, treaty and religion.¹⁶

The ultimate message is that Maximus should not have an imperial mindset that runs contrary to the *humanitas* that Romans have learned from the Greeks.¹⁷ In speaking of Roman education as described by Ps.-Plutarch and Suetonius, Martin Bloomer might as well have been analyzing this letter of Pliny: “The Romans were thereby historical, real heirs and practitioners of the great

¹³ τὰ μέντοι συγγράμματα καὶ δόγμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ ἱστορίαις ἐπιεικῶς διαπεποικίλται, καὶ μεθρημηνευμένα πολλὰ κατὰ λέξιν ἐν τοῖς ἀποφθέγμασι καὶ ταῖς γνωμολογίαις τέτακται (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2.6).

¹⁴ Quintilian makes a similar such case in his discussion of Cicero’s discrediting Greek witnesses: “Attempting to drag down the credibility of Greek witnesses, he concedes to them learning and literature and professes himself a lover of their race” (*detracturus Graecis testibus fidem, doctrinam his concedit ac litteras seque eius gentis amatorem esse profitetur*) (*Inst.* 11.1.89). On Quintilian’s use of Cato to promote his own authority see Morgan 1998b: 261.

¹⁵ See Whitmarsh 2001: 15 on the greater intensity for Greek literature among Romans during the principate. See van den Berg 2014: 36 for the overwhelming depth of Greek influence on imperial orators in Rome.

¹⁶ *Cogita te missum in provinciam Achaïam, illam veram et meram Graeciam, in qua primum humanitas litterae etiam fruges inventae esse creduntur; missum ad ordinandum statum liberarum civitatum, id est ad homines maxime homines, ad liberos maxime liberos, qui ius a natura datum virtute meritis amicitia, foedere denique et religione tenuerunt* (Plin. *Ep.* 8.24.2).

¹⁷ See Woolf 1994: 121-5 for a fine discussion of Pliny and the Roman *officium* in the Greek east of preserving Greek civilization and history from contemporary faults. See also Anderson 1993: 7 and Schmitz 1997: 184.

paideia of the Hellenistic and the classical Greek past.”¹⁸ The preoccupation with learning and Hellenism pervades the Roman mind and educational system to such a degree that Ronald Syme included a chapter in his monograph on Tacitus entitled “Tacitus and the Greeks” and to begin it thus:

The Romans from the western provinces not only strengthened the governmental order—they were now in control. Yet by paradox they might seem (some of them at least) to be agents for the furtherance of Greek civilization rather than Roman. Their addiction to the higher education was largely the cause.¹⁹

Even in Syme’s view it seems that *paideia* can at times trump empire.

Beginning with Greek Nurses and Pedagogues

At the earliest stages of education, Quintilian suggests that his pupil learn Greek, because, he says, it is the fount of Latin: “I prefer that the boy begin with Greek conversation [...] since he should be educated in Greek studies first, whence even our own have sprung.”²⁰ He is, therefore, very proud of his late son for having attained correct pronunciation in *both* Latin and Greek.²¹ While Quintilian’s contemporaries, Plutarch and Tacitus, demonstrate a clear preference for education directly under a family member,²² it seems that the child was more often entrusted to a Greek nurse.²³

¹⁸ Bloomer 2011: 25. Dupont 2009: 144 goes further: “The *litterae latinae* are, so to speak, *litterae graecae* in Latin.”

¹⁹ Syme 1958: 504.

²⁰ *A sermone Graeco puerum incipere malo [...] quia disciplinis quoque Graecis prius instituendus est, unde et nostrae fluxerunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.12). See Clarke 1975: 98 for the priority of Greek in Quintilian’s educational model. See Kennedy 1969: 41-3 for general discussion of primary education in Quintilian.

²¹ Quint. *Inst.* 6.pr.11.

²² Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.3, [Plut.] *Mor.* 1b-3d.; Tac. *Agr.* 4.2, *Dial.* 29.1, *Germ.* 20.4. See also Albini 1997: 62-3.

²³ Marrou 1956: 262. See also Gleason 1995: 142.

The familial preference of Plutarch's Cato or Tacitus' Messala is not, however, a matter of resistance to Greek language learning. Cato's concern deals with issues of slave-master status, not Roman-Greek education. Cato taught his son himself rather than entrusting him to a "very good grammarian, Chilo," because, as Plutarch says, "he thought it unfit to have his son reprimanded by a slave [...] nor would he be indebted to a servant for such a great a thing as his learning."²⁴ Some have seen Tacitean racism in Messala's use of the derogatory *Graeculus* in the following passage:²⁵

But now the infant is handed over straight from the womb to some little Greek (*Graeculae*) maid, to whom some slave or other is attached, often the most wicked and suited to no serious task. By the vulgar and incorrect chit chat of these people, the fresh and unshaped souls are imbued; and nobody in the whole house cares a jot what he says or does when the young master is present. And even the parents themselves do not make their little ones accustomed to decency and self-control, but rather accustom them to petulance and low banter, through which little by little impudence takes over and contempt for themselves and others.²⁶

²⁴ καίτοι χαρίεντα δοῦλον εἶχε γραμματιστὴν ὄνομα Χίλωνα, πολλοὺς διδάσκοντα παιῶδας· οὐκ ἤξιον δὲ τὸν υἱόν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, ὑπὸ δούλου κακῶς ἀκούειν [...] οὐδέ γε μαθήματος τηλικούτου δούλω χάριν ὀφείλειν (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.4).

²⁵ Most notably Petrochilos 1974: 50, also providing a history and analysis of the use of the term in Roman literature. See also Dubuisson 1991: 327, where Tacitus' use here is taken as especially concerned with race. Syme 1958: 530 regards Tacitus' general view of Greeks as prejudiced and angry, but admits that this evaluation excludes their renown in arts and letters. Malissard 2007 has re-evaluated Tacitus' position toward Greece and Greeks and, taking his treatment of Germanicus at *Ann* 2.53-5 as evidence, suggests that the historian was not as culturally biased as often believed. On the term *Graeculus* in Pliny, especially the *Panegyricus*, see Rees 2014. Woolf 2006: 176, however, evaluates Pliny's position briefly: "Pliny has, evidently, no general or consistent objection to Greek culture."

²⁶ *At nunc natus infans delegatur Graeculae alicui ancillae, cui adiungitur unus aut alter ex omnibus servis, plerumque vilissimus nec cuiquam serio ministerio adcommodatus. Horum fabulis et erroribus virides statim et rudes animi imbuuntur; nec quisquam in tota domo pensi habet quid coram infante domino aut dicat aut faciat. Quin etiam ipsi parentes nec probitati neque modestiae parvulos adsuefaciunt, sed lasciviae et dicacitati, per quae paulatim impudentia inrepat et sui alienique contemptus* (Tac. *Dial.* 29.1-2).

It is worth noting that Messala is one of a number of interlocutors in the *Dialogus*. While at times he might preach Tacitus' opinion, there are likewise times when other interlocutors do so. For example, Winterbottom (1975: 81) suggests that Messala represents Quintilian, whereas Dominik points out areas of similarity both between Quintilian and Messala (1997: 61) and between Quintilian and Aper (2007: 330-4). Many have viewed Maternus as Tacitean (Syme 1958:111, Kennedy 1972: 518, Winterbottom 1975: 80-1), but this too has been challenged by Dominik

Indeed, Messala cannot mean anything flattering towards the *ancilla* here. But it is not much later in his speech that he expresses admiration for Cicero, who, when discontented with the teaching available in Rome, went to Greece and Asia.²⁷ Messala, in fact, assumes and promotes Greek learning.²⁸ His concern is one of morality—the maid and her entourage are likely to fill the infant’s ears with idle chit chat. But laxity in moral education is not unique to the Greek nurse; the Roman parents are equally to blame in such instances. Morality and ethnicity are not relative to each other in Messala’s scheme.²⁹ Unsurprisingly, given his likely influence upon Tacitus,³⁰ Quintilian voices this concern for moral decency in his nurse, adding admonitions about her proper speech: “Above all may the nurse’s speech be free of error [...] Of course the first concern is that their characters are in no way dubious, yet may they speak correctly too.”³¹ Like Tacitus’ Messala, Quintilian places the blame for moral depravity not solely on nurses, but moreover, and graphically so, on the parents, as he laments, “If only we ourselves did not ruin the character of our own children! We destroy them immediately from infancy with luxuriousness. That soft education, which we call indulgence, breaks every sinew of their mind and body.”³²

This anxiety is not a strictly Roman phenomenon. The Pseudo-Plutarchan tract *On the Education of Children* likewise prioritizes maternal nursing and failing that, emphasizes the

(1997: 63), who sees Aper as representative of Tacitean views. See Dominik 2007 for recent discussion and survey of scholarship. For our purposes, Messala’s opinion about education is best to be taken as one of a few opinions that were persistent among intellectuals at the time.

²⁷ Tac. *Dial.* 30.3. On the prestige of Roman study abroad see Daly 1950 and Howley 2014.

²⁸ See *Dial.* 31.5-7 and 32.5-6 for other instances of Messala’s assumption of a bilingual tradition. The same assumption is made by Aper (*Dial.* 15.3 and 16.5-7) and by Maternus (*Dial.* 12.5 and 37.6).

²⁹ Tac. *Dial.* 29.2. Pliny, meanwhile, praises the philosopher Euphrates, a Greek, for raising his children with the utmost care (*Ep.* 1.10.8).

³⁰ See Brink 1989: 486-92 on Quintilianic influence on and exchange with Messala.

³¹ *Ante omnia ne sit vitiosus sermo nutricibus [...] et morum quidem in his haud dubie prior ratio est, recte tamen etiam loquantur* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.4). See Atherton 1998: 228 for a positive interpretation of Quintilian’s views on nurses and linguistic development.

³² *Utinam liberorum nostrorum mores non ipsi perderemus! Infantiam statim deliciis solvimus. Mollis illa educatio, quam indulgentiam vocamus, nervos omnis mentis et corporis frangit* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.2.6).

importance of a *Greek* nurse who will nurture upright character in the child: “Nurses and maids are not to be chosen at random but only the most excellent ones. And first of all let them be Greek in character.”³³ In each of these cases, the issue is not *whether* Greek language ought to be taught from the gate, but rather that it ought to be taught with care.³⁴ This is borne out further in the selection of the child’s household learning companions. Quintilian simply repeats what he says about nurses, while Ps.-Plutarch even adds that in addition to good character the familial slaves ought to speak with distinction—περίτρανα λαλεῖν.³⁵

Shortly after the child’s time with the *nutrix* or perhaps even during that time,³⁶ his education would be in the hands of the *paedagogus*, regarding whom Quintilian offers the same directions as he does concerning the nurses, adding that the pedagogue ought not overextend his role in education.³⁷ If he does not know more than the alphabet, it is better to leave it at that and avoid corrupting the child’s Greek.³⁸ But in ideal conditions, the pedagogue would lead the child into his initial foray with Greek conversation.³⁹ The Plutarchan tract continues its preoccupation with good character when choosing a pedagogue, who should have a virtuous nature such as that of Phoenix, Achilles’ tutor.⁴⁰ That the Roman system of education began with Greek and was

³³ ἀλλὰ τὰς γε τίθησας καὶ τροφούς οὐ τὰς τυχοῦσας ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα σπουδαίας δοκιμαστέον ἐστί. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἤθεσιν Ἑλληνίδας ([Plut.] *Mor.* 3d-e). Soranus likewise recommended Greek nurses for reasons of both language development and general caretaking. See *Gyn.* 2.19.15; 2.44.1-2. On the authenticity of *De liberis educandis*, see above, p. 10n7.

³⁴ See Bonner 1977: 100-1.

³⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.8; [Plut.] *Mor.* 4a.

³⁶ Tac. *Dial.* 29.1 seems to suggest that the pedagogue worked in tandem with the nurse: *cui adiungitur unus aut alter ex omnibus servis.*

³⁷ See Atherton 1998: 231-2 for a discussion of anxieties in choosing a pedagogue.

³⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.8.

³⁹ Bonner 1977: 44-5.

⁴⁰ δεῖ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον παιδαγωγὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν οἴοσπερ ἦν ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγός ([Plut.] *Mor.* 4a-b). Phoenix’s line from Hom. *Il.* 9.443 on tutoring Achilles in being a speaker of words and doer of deeds, seems to be a favorite of Plutarch, who references it multiple times. See, e.g., Plut. *Mor.* 795e and 798b. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.3.12, (also discussed below, pp. 57-8) where he uses the same comparison in choosing a rhetor: *sit ergo tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus qui ad Phoenicis Homericum exemplum dicere ac facere doceat.*

concerned that this portion of the education was done well is telling—Greek literate *paideia* was embraced and prioritized.

Formal Education: Grammar and Rhetoric

The next step was to choose a *grammaticus* and begin formal literate education. Further illustrating that Greek *paideia* is not in tension with Roman *mores*, the preoccupation with moral character persists in choosing the best teacher,⁴¹ while the enthusiasm for Greek *paideia* is indubitable. Educational handbooks of the period corroborate the philhellenic precepts of Greek and Roman intellectuals. Teresa Morgan’s tables of chronological distribution of school texts, for example, reveal an unprecedented surge in wordlists, gnomic texts and authors/scholia, as well as high levels of grammatical, rhetorical and other such texts during the first and second centuries CE.⁴² While strictly Latin school texts exist in small quantities, the majority are bilingually Greek and Latin.⁴³ Furthermore, these school texts, discovered among papyri of the Nile Delta, are likely to represent the education of a less elite class than the intellectuals with which we are primarily dealing. Although Egypt is a unique place, it is reasonable to assume that, if sub-elites obtained a bilingual education there, Quintilian would have had even more extensive bilingual training.⁴⁴ The *Hermeneumata Pseudodositheana*, including western educational *colloquia* mostly collected by the end of the second century CE and likely circulated in the east and west, likewise display bilingual education.⁴⁵ The *colloquia*, which range from journal-like entries on a schoolboy’s routine to lists of grammatical cases and Homeric references, typically include two columns of prose: one in Greek, the other in Latin, each one a close translation of the other. The

⁴¹ See e.g. Plin. *Ep.* 3.3; Quint. *Inst.* 1.2.3-8; Plut. *Mor.* 4b-5c.

⁴² Morgan 1998a: 290-1.

⁴³ See, e.g., the collections of Cavenaile 1958, Cribiore 1996 and Gaebel 1969-70.

⁴⁴ See Morgan 1998a: 39-47 for a similar discussion.

⁴⁵ See Dickey 2012 *passim*, esp. 37-54 for dating and origin. See previously Bonner 1977: 171, Marrou 1956: 263 with 428n18 and Morgan 1998a: 65-7.

content of these *colloquia* is similar to the Egyptian school texts, further suggesting that Greek was an essential element of early education among Romans outside of the Nile Delta. That Greek held a prominent place in the educational texts used by Romans is unsurprising given that the Roman educational system was built from Hellenistic foundations.⁴⁶

In his introduction to *grammatikē*, Quintilian once again professes his preference for Greek language learning, but admits that both Greek and Latin education follow the same path: “It does not matter whether I speak about Greek or Latin, although I prefer that Greek be first: the path is the same for both languages.”⁴⁷ Accordingly, Quintilian abundantly cites Greek grammatical and rhetorical predecessors in his first book, referring by name to the studies of Aristarchus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristotle, Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, Eratosthenes and Theodectes.⁴⁸ In short, Quintilian confirms his declaration in the proemium that he will choose the best strategies of oratorical education from famous authors in *both* languages.⁴⁹ Consistent comparison between Latin and Greek vocabulary, morphology and grammar displays not only Quintilian’s knowledge of grammatical and rhetorical treatises, but

⁴⁶ See Bonner 1977: 165, Marrou 1954: 265 and Morgan 1998a: 24 and esp. 45n147: “Educated Romans were in some sense Greek while many Greeks were Roman sympathizers and Greek literature could expect a western audience.”

⁴⁷ *Nec refert de Graeco an de Latino loquar, quamquam Graecum esse priorem placet: utrique eadem via est* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.1). See also Quint. *Inst.* 1.12.6. See Kennedy 1969: 43-7 for discussion of Quintilian’s book on *grammatikē*.

⁴⁸ Aristarchus: 1.4.20, Aristophanes of Byzantium: 1.1.15, Aristotle: 1.4.18, Chrysippus: 1.1.4, 1.1.16, 1.3.14, 1.10.32, Diogenes of Babylon: 1.1.9, Eratosthenes: 1.1.16, Theodectes: 1.4.18. Treatment seems often to follow Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see Russell 2001 v.1: 114), though he is not mentioned by name. Kennedy 1969: 107 raises the possibility that Quintilian gained some of his knowledge of Greek theory from Latin translation or summary. This is certainly a possibility, but it is also clear that Quintilian had the ability to work directly from the Greek sources, making it difficult to say with any certainty what his process was, at least in terms of these general references.

⁴⁹ “For a long time, indeed, I was reluctant because I was not unaware that extremely eminent authors of both tongues had left to posterity many diligently written works that pertain to this subject” (*diu sum equidem reluctatus, quod auctores utriusque linguae clarissimos non ignorabam multa quae ad hoc opus pertinerent diligentissime scripta posteris reliquisse*) (Quint. *Inst.* Pr.1.1).

also his application of bilingual school texts.⁵⁰ The necessity of learning Greek in parallel with Latin is nicely summed up by Quintilian's observation that Romans use Greek words, Greeks Latin words: "we openly use Greek words when ours are lacking just as they sometimes take a share in ours."⁵¹

It perhaps follows from this notion of shared language that translation between Greek and Latin is an essential part of the pupil's *progymnastica*. Suetonius includes translation (*Graecorum scripta convertere*) among such essentials of the *progymnastica* as the *chreia*, *apologus*, and *narratio*.⁵² The practice stretched from school years into adulthood and was *en vogue* at least as far back as Cicero's time. As Quintilian notes, "Our ancient orators judged translation of Greek into Latin as the best exercise. In Cicero's *de Oratore* Lucius Crassus says that he did this very thing."⁵³ Quintilian upholds the practice, stating simply, "The reason for this exercise is obvious. For Greek authors abound in richness and introduce much art into eloquence."⁵⁴ In his letter to Fuscus about a return to liberal studies, Pliny places translation into and out of Greek at the head of his advice:

You ask in what way I think is most fitting for you to study during a retirement, which you will enjoy for a long period of time. Useful in the first order and prescribed by many, is to translate either from Greek into Latin or from Latin into Greek. From this type of exercise a precision and splendor of diction, abundance

⁵⁰ Instances of comparative linguistics in Quintilian's first book abound. See e.g. 1.4.7-8, 1.4.14, 1.5.22-4, 1.5.29, 1.5.32, 1.5.42, 1.59-64, 1.5.68-70, 1.6.31, 1.6.36-8, 1.7.11, 1.7.17-9.

⁵¹ *Et confessis quoque Graecis utimur verbis ubi nostra desunt, sicut illi a nobis nonnumquam mutantur* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.58).

⁵² Suet. *Rhet.* 25.4. See Kaster 1995: 279-81 for discussion.

⁵³ *Vertere Graeca in Latinum veteres nostri oratores optimum iudicabant. Id se L. Crassus in illis Ciceronis de Oratore libris dicit factitasse* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.5.2). For further discussion of translation see my third chapter.

⁵⁴ *Et manifesta est exercitationis huiusce ratio. Nam et rerum copia Graeci auctores abundant et plurimum artis in eloquentiam intulerunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.5.3). See below, pp. 82-5.

of figures, power of exposition are acquired, not to mention a faculty for original creation through imitating similar points in the best authors.⁵⁵

We shall discuss the utility of translation as display in the following chapters, but for now it is worth noting that translation between Greek and Latin was widely considered a useful step in the educational process.

In addition to linguistic learning, the *grammaticus* was to begin the process of steeping the pupil in literature, Latin *and* Greek. Quintilian begins his reading list as early as the middle of his first book, before reaching his famous rhetorical canon in Book 10. Under the *grammaticus* the pupil will begin reading with Homer and Vergil; then, once his morals are secure, he will read Menander, followed by a series of Latin authors.⁵⁶

After this initial foray into Greek literature, the pupil would eventually make his way into the hands of a rhetor. As with the selection of nurses, pedagogues and grammar teachers, choosing an upright teacher of rhetoric is not to be taken lightly. Quintilian elaborates:

Concerning the teachers of rhetoric, in the first place it is necessary to inspect character. And I have begun by drawing this out most of all in this part not because I do not think one must examine this very thing as carefully as possible as regards the other teachers too, as I showed in the previous book, but because the very age of the pupils makes mentioning this thing more necessary now.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *Quaeris, quem ad modum in secessu, quo iamdiu frueris, putem te studere oportere. Utile in primis, et multi praecipunt, vel ex Graeco in Latinum, vel ex Latino vertere in Graecum; quo genere exercitationis proprietates splendorque verborum, copia figurarum, vis explicandi, praeterea imitatione optimorum similia inveniendi facultas paratur* (Plin. *Ep.* 7.9.1-2).

⁵⁶ Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.5-12. See also Plin. *Ep.* 2.14 for the use of Homer at the start of a literary education. For moral development and its relationship to literary education in Tacitus, see Costa 1969: 29.

⁵⁷ *Quorum in primis inspicere mores oportebit: quod ego non idcirco potissimum in hac parte tractare sum adgressus quia non in ceteris quoque doctoribus idem hoc examinandum quam diligentissime putem, sicut testatus sum libro priore, sed quod magis necessariam eius rei mentionem facit aetas ipsa discentium* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.2.2).

Again, the anxiety is one of morality, not of ethnicity, as the rest of the chapter continues to make clear with its list of the proper behaviors and responsibilities of the rhetor. The subsequent chapter argues for hiring the most eminent rhetor, judging by ability again, not by ethnicity.⁵⁸ Quintilian closes with a Greek *exemplum*, which we have already seen in Ps.-Plutarch: “Thus the one who, to use the example of Homer’s Phoenix, teaches to speak and to do, should be most excellent just as much in eloquence as in character.”⁵⁹ Pliny offers a similarly moralizing perspective in choosing a Latin rhetor: “Now his studies must be pursued outside of the home, now a Latin rhetor must be sought, whose seriousness, decency, most of all whose purity in teaching is proven.”⁶⁰ Concern for character, as we see here, is not relegated only to choosing Greek teachers.⁶¹

Greek Reading Lists

With his books on rhetorical training, Quintilian’s interaction with Greek intellectual predecessors expands too widely for complete discussion here.⁶² Even quoting his history of rhetorical scholarship at *Inst.* 3.1.8-18 would be too much. The list, which runs for pages, begins with Corax, Tisias and Gorgias, following through the sophists, along to Isocrates, Aristotle and other Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers, rounding out the Greek side with the more recent and often used Hermagoras and the useful and popular Apollodorus and Theodorus, who have left

⁵⁸ On the importance of an eminent rhetor, see above, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁹ *Sit ergo tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus qui ad Phoenicis Homerici exemplum dicere ac facere doceat* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.3.12). See above, p. 54.

⁶⁰ *Iam studia eius extra limen proferenda sunt, iam circumspiciendus rhetor Latinus, cuius scholae severitas, pudor, in primis castitas, constet* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.3.3).

⁶¹ Gill 1983 *passim*, esp. 475 notes the preoccupation with character as a multi-cultural phenomenon, taking Plutarch and Tacitus as his frames for discussion.

⁶² See Eshleman 2012: 183-6 on Quintilian’s succession list.

pupils in Quintilian's own time.⁶³ Quintilian closes the section by professing his knowledge of so many predecessors: "I myself collect the findings of many into one, content to earn a reputation for carefulness wherever there is no room for originality."⁶⁴ His references to Greek theorists, as well as his comparisons between Greek and Latin usage, carry on through the entire work.⁶⁵ In fact, he comes near to closing the entire opus with a comparison of Greek and Latin elocution, in which Latin, "similar to Greek and even a pupil of it, barely has a chance of imitation when it comes to modes of eloquence."⁶⁶ It will have to suffice here to accept that Quintilian's educational theory in rhetoric not only expects or even embraces Greek *paideia*, but boasts it.

Continued literary learning in pursuit of rhetorical mimesis was carried out under the direction of the rhetor. In choosing models for imitation, Quintilian further develops the reading list that he had begun in his first book. On the Greek side, he calls for readings from Demosthenes and Homer first of all. Other nondramatic poets include Hesiod, Panyasis, Apollonius, Aratus, Theocritus, Callimachus, Philetas, Archilochus, Pindar, Stesichorus, Alcaeus and Simonides. Of comic poets, Quintilian includes Aristophanes, Eupolis, Cratinus and especially Menander, of tragic poets, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. Among the historians, he recommends Thucydides, Herodotus, Theopompus and Philistus, adding Xenophon among the philosophers. The orators Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias, and Isocrates make the ranks in

⁶³ See also Tac. *Dial.* 16.4-23.6, where Aper gives a less precise history of rhetorical theory, concerned mostly with Romans, but lighting upon Hermagoras and Apollodoros.

⁶⁴ *Ipse plurimum in unum confero inventa, ubicumque ingenio non erit locus curae testimonium meruisse contentus* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.22).

⁶⁵ See Eshleman 2012: 184-7 for a brief discussion of Quintilian's bicultural orientation.

⁶⁶ *Similis Graecae ac prorsus discipula eius videtur, ita circa rationem eloquendi vix habere imitationis locum* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.27).

addition to Demosthenes. Plato reigns supreme among other philosophers, Aristotle and Theophrastus.⁶⁷

The sheer volume of Greek authors with whom Quintilian expects his pupil to be familiar is striking. Add to the number the fact that Greek literature frequently is rated higher than Roman. Homer excels Vergil, Roman comedy falters greatly, there is little Roman attempt in iambic and lyric poetry and few distinguished Roman philosophic writers exist worth mentioning.⁶⁸ Even in some of their strongest pursuits, Roman authors take pride simply in equaling their Greek counterparts.⁶⁹ In history they do not yield to them.⁷⁰ In oratory, they are equals.⁷¹

Quintilian's canon not only promotes Greek literature, but, moreover, shares a great deal of similarity with the canons of prior and subsequent Greek intellectuals, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Dio of Prusa.⁷² There seem to be enough echoes to suggest shared sources, but not enough to concede blind copying. All three critics break literature into four groups: poetry, history, oratory and philosophy, placing Homer as best of all, and Menander, Euripides,

⁶⁷ Demosthenes: 10.1.22, 10.1.39, 10.1.76. Homer: 10.1.46-50. Hesiod: 10.1.52. Panyasis: 10.54.1. Apollonius: 10.1.54. Aratus: 10.1.55. Theocritus: 10.1.55. Callimachus: 10.1.58. Philetas: 10.1.58. Archilochus: 10.1.59. Pindar: 10.1.61. Stesichorus: 10.1.62. Alcaeus: 10.1.63. Simonides: 10.1.64. Aristophanes: 10.1.66. Eupolis: 10.1.66. Cratinus: 10.1.66. Menander: 10.1.69. Aeschylus: 10.1.66. Sophocles: 10.1.67. Euripides: 10.1.67. Thucydides: 10.1.73. Herodotus: 10.1.73. Theopompus: 10.1.74. Philistus: 10.1.74. Xenophon: 10.1.75, 10.1.82. Aeschines: 10.1.22, 10.1.77. Hyperides: 10.1.77. Lysias: 10.1.78. Isocrates: 10.1.79. Plato: 10.1.81. Aristotle: 10.1.83. Theophrastus: 10.1.83.

⁶⁸ Homer: 10.1.85, comedy: 10.1.99, iambic and lyric: 10.1.96, philosophy: 10.1.123.

⁶⁹ Even in his discussion of contemporary rhetoric, Quintilian can only find one realm—pettiness in following rules of eloquence—in which Greeks are worse than Romans: *nam hoc solum peius nobis faciunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 5.14.32).

⁷⁰ “But history does not belong to Greeks. I would not be afraid to place Sallust with Thucydides, and Herodotus would not be insulted to be placed equally with Livy” (*At non historia Graecis. Nec opponere Thucydidi Sallustium verear, nec indignetur sibi Herodotus aequari Titum Livium*) (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.101).

⁷¹ “Orators especially can produce a Latin eloquence that is equal to that of Greece” (*Oratores vero vel praecipue Latinam eloquentiam parem facere Graecae possunt*) (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.105).

⁷² See Cribiore 2001: 192-203, Cousin 1936: 563, Kennedy 1969: 106-7, Moles 1990: 372n110, Rutherford 1998: 40-3, Tavernini 1953: 17-51 and Usener 1889: 110-4 for discussion of Quintilian with Dionysius and Dio of Prusa and potential sources. Lucian offers an abbreviated reading list at *Lexiphanes* 22, where Lycinus recommends the following course in fixing stylistics: read the poets, then the orators, then Thucydides and Plato, then comedy and tragedy.

Thucydides and Demosthenes as best at their trades.⁷³ Xenophon receives special treatment as historian and philosopher, useful for stylistics and pragmatics.⁷⁴ But Quintilian is unique in his treatment of lyric poetry, his omission of Lycurgus from his list of orators, and his inclusion of Theophrastus among philosophers. In short, he appears to be working in line with his Greek counterparts, who certainly had no reason to despise Greek *paideia*, but his points of individuality are arguments that he is expressing opinions of his own, not simply reproducing from a Greek source. All of this is to demonstrate that Quintilian has no qualms about advancing Greek *paideia* throughout his educational program.

Although it is through the *Institutio Oratoria* that we have the fullest account of Greek literate education in Roman action, Quintilian is not alone in expecting and embracing this sort of *paideia*. Pliny and Tacitus follow suit, and unsurprisingly so, given that their own educations were undertaken in the Quintilianic milieu. It is certain from his letter to Marcus Fundanus that Pliny attended lectures under Quintilian.⁷⁵ While we can only speculate on Tacitus' education, his knowledge of Quintilian's work and his connection to Pliny make attractive the hypothesis that he studied with Pliny and under Quintilian.⁷⁶ In any case, there can be no doubt that both Pliny and Tacitus received a Greek literate education. Pliny reports, for example, that he attended lectures under Nicetes of Smyrna, who we might recall is Philostratus' first noteworthy sophist since Aeschines.⁷⁷ Neither Pliny nor Tacitus compiles an organized Greek reading list in the manner of Quintilian, Dionysius or Dio, but each provides the references to envision a Greek

⁷³ Homer: Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 2.1, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 18.8, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46-50. Menander: Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 2.11, Dio *Or.* 18.6, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.69-72. Euripides: Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 2.11, Dio *Or.* 18.6, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.67-8. Thucydides: Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 3.1, Dio *Or.* 18.10, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1. 73-4. Demosthenes: Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 4.4, Dio *Or.* 18.11, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.76.

⁷⁴ Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 3.2, 4.1, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 18, 14-9, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.75 and 10.1.82.

⁷⁵ Plin. *Ep.* 2.14.9-11 and 6.6.3. See above, p.42, on Pliny's study under Quintilian.

⁷⁶ See Ogilvie and Richmond 1967: 8 (following Güngerich 1951: 159ff) and more recently López 2007: 308.

⁷⁷ Plin. *Ep.* 6.6.3. Philostr. *VS* 511. Tacitus mentions Nicetes at *Dial.* 15.3 through the sarcastic mouth of Messala.

curriculum. References by both to Aeschines, Demosthenes, Euripides, Homer, Hyperides, Lysias, Plato and Xenophon, in addition to Pliny's mention of Callimachus, Eupolis and Thucydides and Tacitus' mention of Lycurgus and Sophocles, accord with the earlier canons of Greek literature.⁷⁸ Tacitus even makes additions of his own to the canon with the inclusion of Epicurus and Metrodorus.⁷⁹ He likewise contributes to the canonization of orators through Messala's first speech: "among Attic orators, first place is given to Demosthenes, then Aeschines as well as Hyperides, and Lysias and Lycurgus take the next place."⁸⁰ Pliny perhaps joins the discussion with *Epistle* 1.20, addressed to Tacitus, in which he gives his lengthiest discourse on orators, responding to an unnamed critic thus, "He points out to me the orations of Lysias from the Greeks, from our Romans those of the Gracchi and Cato, many of whose speeches are certainly concise and direct; I reply to Lysias with Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides and many others besides."⁸¹ As the passages above suggest, Greek *paideia* extended well into adulthood. This sophisticated application of literary education will be discussed further in the following chapters. For now, what I hope is apparent is the dedication to Greek literate education among Romans in the social, cultural and political milieu of the first and second centuries CE. Moreover, the Roman process of selecting teachers, educational models or a literary canon need not be a statement of ethnic superiority or imperial domination over Greece.

⁷⁸ Aeschines: Tac. *Dial.* 15.3, Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.4, 2.3.10, 4.5.1, 9.26.9-11. Demosthenes: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5, 15.3, 16.5-7, 25.3, 32.5, 37.6, Plin. *Ep.* 1.2.2, 1.20.4, 2.3.10, 4.5.1, 4.7.6, 6.33.11, 7.30.4, 9.23.5, 9.26.9-11. Euripides: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5, Plin. *Ep.* 4.11.9. Homer: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5, *Ep.* 1.7.1, 1.7.5, 1.18.1, 1.18.4, 1.20.22, 2.14.2, 3.9.28, 4.3.3, 4.11.12 (quoting a Quintilianic quotation of Homer), 5.6.43, 5.19.2, 5.20.7, 6.8.3, 8.2.8, 8.4.4, 9.1.4, 9.13.20, 9.26.6. (For Pliny and Homer, see my discussion below, pp.117-30). Hyperides: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5, 16.5, 25.3, Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.4. Lysias: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5, 25.3, Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.4. Plato: Tac. *Dial.* 31.6, 32.5, Plin. *Ep.* 1.10.5. Xenophon: Tac. *Dial.* 31.6, Plin. *Ep.* 7.32.2. Callimachus: Plin. *Ep.* 4.3.4. Eupolis: Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.17. Thucydides: Plin. *Ep.* 4.7.3, 5.8.11. Lycurgus: Tac. *Dial.* 25.3. Sophocles: Tac. *Dial.* 12.5.

⁷⁹ Tac. *Dial.* 31.6.

⁸⁰ *Inter Atticos oratores primae Demostheni tribuuntur, proximum autem locum Aeschines et Hyperides et Lysias et Lycurgus obtinent* (Tac. *Dial.* 25.3).

⁸¹ *Mihi ex Graecis orationes Lysiae ostentat, ex nostris Gracchorum Catonisque, quorum sane plurimae sunt circumcisae et breves; ego Lysiae Demosthenem, Aeschinem, Hyperidem multosque praetere* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.4).

Philosophia Graeca? Moderatio Romana?

An early chapter of Tacitus' *Agricola* both builds upon and draws into tension this idea of Greek *paideia* among Romans. Agricola fared so well in his education partly because of the place in which it occurred: Massilia.⁸² Strabo says Massilia was preferred to Athens as a center of Greek rhetoric and philosophy.⁸³ Tacitus himself describes it as a "place mixed and nicely composed of Greek elegance and provincial parsimony."⁸⁴ Here both Greekness and provinciality (which necessarily implies a lack of imperialistic power) are praised for their educational advantages.

The very next sentences in *Agricola*, however, have appeared to some to pose problems with this conclusion that Romans happily undertook Greek *paideia*.⁸⁵ Tacitus further reports his father-in-law's intellectual activities as a youth:

I remember that he himself was accustomed to say that he in his early youth would have drunk too keenly of the study of philosophy, beyond that which is acceptable for a Roman and a senator, had the prudence of his mother not quelled his kindled and burning spirit. No doubt his lofty and upright nature was seeking the beauty and notion of a great and exalted glory more vehemently than

⁸² See Lomas 2004 for an intricate discussion of elite Greco-Roman culture in Massilia. See Hutchinson 2013: 120-3 for a discussion of Massilia in terms of Greco-Roman literary studies.

⁸³ Strabo 4.179-81.

⁸⁴ [*Statim parvulus sedem ac magistram studiorum Massiliam habuit,*] *locum Graeca comitate et provinciali parsimonia mixtum ac bene compositum* (Tac. Agr. 4.2).

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Petrochilos 1974: 188: "The idea of philosophy as unsuitable for important statesmen seems to be so consistent with the Romans' impression of themselves as practical, in contrast with the more theoretical Greeks, and with the value they set on their own *gravitas* as opposed to Greek *levitas*, that it is surprising not to find it more often expressed in nationalistic terms. It seems to have been left for Tacitus to formulate the view that there is a limit which Romans must, *qua* Roman, set to the study of philosophy, in the famous confession which he recalls hearing from this father-in-law Agricola." Syme 1958: 20 likewise condemns philosophy, but admits the merits of moderation therein. Mellor 1993: 50 likewise comes down hard on philosophers in Tacitus' scheme. See also Griffin 1989: 19-20.

carefully. Soon reason and age moderated and he retained a proper measure of philosophy, a very difficult thing to do.⁸⁶

First worth noting is that philosophy was not a regular part of the Greco-Roman curriculum and, therefore, that the point of Tacitus' words should not be interpreted as resistance to Greek *paideia*.⁸⁷ Even Quintilian, who is keen to reconnect rhetoric with philosophy, does not include philosophy in his outline of *enkyklios paideia* or *orbis doctrinae*, limiting himself to music and geometry when outside the bounds of grammar and rhetoric.⁸⁸ On the Greek side, Ps.-Plutarch makes strict division between *enkyklios paideia* and philosophy, albeit with a purpose seemingly contrary to Tacitus'.⁸⁹ Hellenistic and Roman education, as Tacitus implies, trains the pupil in geometry, music, grammar, and only then perhaps dialectic, ethics and physics.⁹⁰

It must be admitted that Roman historians generally kept some distance from philosophy, but there are generic concerns to consider here as well.⁹¹ Tacitus employs intertextuality with Greek philosophy sparingly in his historical writings, but, as we shall see in my fourth chapter, he engages at greater length in the *Dialogus*, a work of a different genre. Beyond considerations of rhetorical education, *enkyklios paideia* and genre, Tacitus does not necessarily suggest

⁸⁶ *Memoria teneo solitum ipsum narrare se prima in iuventa studium philosophiae acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse, ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset. scilicet sublime et erectum ingenium pulchritudinem ac speciem magnae excelsaeque gloriae vehementius quam caute adpetebat. mox mitigavit ratio et aetas, retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientia modum* (Tac. Agr. 4.3).

⁸⁷ See Cribiore 2001: 3, Marrou 1956: 206 and Morgan 1998a: 7.

⁸⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.1-49. On similarities between treatment of *enkyklios paideia* in Quintilian and Tacitus, see Brink 1989: 502-3.

⁸⁹ [Plut.] *Mor.* 7c. Ps.-Plutarch in contrast to Tacitus prefers to see philosophy taught with greater enthusiasm than the subjects of *enkyklios paideia*.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Messala's praise of Cicero for his learning in all fields of the curriculum: "Therefore, by Hercules, from the works of Cicero one cannot conceive that he lacked knowledge of geometry, music, grammar, not anything of the liberal arts. He had learned the subtlety of dialectic, the utility of ethics, the movements and origins of things" (*Itaque hercle in libris Ciceronis deprehendere licet non geometriae, non musicae, non grammaticae, non denique, ullius ignuae artis scientiam ei defuisse. ille dialecticae subtilitatem, ille moralis partis utilitatem, ille rerum motus causasque cognoverat*) (Tac. *Dial.* 30.4). See, e.g., Kennedy 1972: 351, Marrou 1956: 206-16 and Morgan 1998a: 193 on philosophy, rhetoric and education.

⁹¹ See Hutchinson 2013: 227-9 on Latin historiography and philosophy.

ignoring Greek philosophy.⁹² First, there is no adjective attributing Greekness to the branch of learning that Agricola sought too keenly, and therefore, no reason to draw a comparison between Greeks and Romans on an ethnic plane.⁹³ While Tacitus does often prefer *sapientia* to *philosophia* when describing appropriate Roman participation in philosophy, his treatment of Musonius Rufus illustrates that good Romans could, in fact, participate in *studium philosophiae*. The Roman philosopher, whom Tacitus generally portrays in positive light,⁹⁴ is described as such in the *Histories*.⁹⁵ The use of *Romano* in this *Agricola* passage, like *senatori*, underlines issues of political (more than ethnic) privilege and status. It is used to describe a citizen pursuing the *vita activa* and could have just as well indicated the likes of Arrian, Dio or Plutarch, as it does Agricola. Second, as the final sentence shows (*mox mitigavit ratio et aetas, retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientia modum*), there is no call for exclusion of philosophy, but rather for moderation—a characteristic virtue of Agricola throughout the narrative.⁹⁶ Michael Trapp, in a nuanced reading of this section of the *Agricola* (and of Quintilian’s *Institutio*) that takes into account Roman philosophers and Greco-Roman moderation, remarks that there is a “balancing act” performed with respect to *philosophia*.⁹⁷ It was likely not completely assimilated into Roman culture, but it could be described as a “part of shared cultivation of the cultivated elite, Hellenic and Roman alike, under the early and high Empire.”⁹⁸

⁹² As Griffin 1989: 18-9 notes, “despite all this testimony to detachment and casualness, there is, in fact, abundant evidence that the Romans did expect their fellows to be affected in their conduct by their constant exposure to philosophy.”

⁹³ *Contra* Griffin 1989: 13: “the Roman attitude to philosophy was inseparable from their complex attitude to all things Greek.”

⁹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 14.59 and 15.71.

⁹⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 3.81.1.

⁹⁶ See Ogilvie and Richmond 1967: 144.

⁹⁷ Trapp 2013: 42.

⁹⁸ Trapp 2013: 40.

Indeed, appreciation for philosophy could be Roman. So too could anxiety concerning it belong to Greeks. And so it had, long before it did in the case of Romans.⁹⁹ Graham Anderson summarizes the relationship in the Greek world well:

The sophists of the Empire, then, were able to continue the feud between philosophy and rhetoric which was already emerging in the activities of their fifth-century predecessors. They borrowed enough of the philosopher's tools, and even of their literary decor, to be able to hold their own ground and share uneasily some common territory.¹⁰⁰

Tacitus seems to join the conversation with his Greek counterparts, as we can see if we read his passage above alongside a passage from Plato's *Gorgias*:

For, Socrates, philosophy is indeed a delightful thing, whenever one obtains it moderately in the right time of his youth. But if one spends more time with it than is appropriate, it is man's ruin. For even if one is good-natured but engages in philosophy far beyond that right time of his youth, he necessarily becomes inexperienced in everything in which it is necessary to be experienced if he intends to be honorable and noble and of good repute.¹⁰¹

The moderate man, according to both Plato's Callicles and to Tacitus' Agricola, is marked by his care in learning just enough philosophy to improve his pragmatic service. Imperial participation in this originally Greek conversation is pervasive. Lucian expresses admiration for the

⁹⁹ On the relationship and potential rivalry between orators and philosophers, see, e.g., Anderson 1993: 133-43, Connolly 2007a: 121-9, Eshleman 2012: 44-5, Hahn 1989: 86-99, Schmitz 1997: 86, Stanton 1973, Trapp 2013: 45-6, Whitmarsh 2001: 5-6, 158-9, 228-9. See Bonner 1977: 87-8 for discussion of moderate philosophy prior to the period of our study here.

¹⁰⁰ Anderson 1993: 142.

¹⁰¹ φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄνηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστὶν ὧν χρηὶ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κάγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα (Pl. *Grg.* 484c-d). See the following chapter for further discussion of Tacitus' reading and use of Plato.

philosopher who maintains moderation and participates in the *vita activa* in his praise of Demonax:

Not changing anything as regards way of life in order to excite wonder and be gazed at by those he encountered, but maintaining the same way of life as everyone and being ordinary, he was not at all preoccupied with vanity and he was an active citizen.¹⁰²

Tacitus offers a Roman parallel with Helvidius Priscus, who “lent his illustrious nature to higher studies in his youth, not, as many do, in order to veil slothful leisure with a grand name, but in order to enter upon public life all the more fortified against chance.”¹⁰³ Plutarch and Quintilian have similar preoccupations with reconciling philosophy and politics.¹⁰⁴

In the *Dialogus* Messala praises the pupil who pursues philosophical education, but with moderation. The Peripatetics, Plato, Xenophon, Epicurus and Metrodorus have something to offer, but with a caveat: “Indeed we are not shaping a philosopher or a lackey of the Stoics, but one who ought to gulp down certain skills and to taste all the rest.”¹⁰⁵ As John Murphy puts it in reference both to Messala and Tacitus, “The range of subject that the orator is expected to have studied is impressive and demanding, but Messala does not expect the mastery of the expert in all fields. His immediate parallel is the *sapiens* of the philosophers. He wants the orator to know philosophy, but does not require the lofty status of the sage.”¹⁰⁶ Obsessive loyalty to one branch

¹⁰² οὐ παραχαράττων τὰ εἰς τὴν δίαίταν, ὡς θαυμάζοιτο καὶ ἀποβλέποιτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων, ἀλλ’ ὁμοδαίτος ἅπασιν καὶ πεζὸς ὢν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον τύφῳ κάτοχος συνῆν καὶ συνεπολιτεύετο (Lucian *Demon.* 5). See similarly Lucian *Nigr.* 29 and *Bis Acc.* 34, on which see Richter 2011: 154-5.

¹⁰³ *Ingenium illustre altioribus studiis iuvenis admodum dedit, non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo firmior adversus fortuita rem publicam capesseret* (Tac. *Hist.* 4.5).

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. [Plut.] *Mor.* 8a, Plut. *Mor.* 791c and Griffin 1989: 23-5 for further discussion of Plutarch. See Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.35-6 for another such attempt at reconciling philosophy and politics in spite of differences and tensions.

¹⁰⁵ *Neque enim sapientem informamus neque Stoicorum comitem, sed eum qui quasdam artes haurire, omnes libere debet* (Tac. *Dial.* 31.7).

¹⁰⁶ Murphy 1991: 2295. See too van den Berg 2014: 64, summing up with a paraphrase of Aper: “being rhetorically acute in Tacitus’ day also meant being philosophically aware.”

of philosophy is lampooned by Lucian in his *Philosophies for Sale*. The Cynics who advise immoderation, barbarism and avoidance of education come off worst, but even the manly Stoic ultimately turns out to be absurd.¹⁰⁷ Pliny joins the discussion of moderate philosophy with his description of Euphrates in *Epistle* 1.10. As Stanley Hoffer suggests, Euphrates is praised because he is a “tame philosopher.”¹⁰⁸ In fact, his moderate character and eloquence make him a model for liberal arts in Rome. Pliny gushes, “If ever our city has flourished in liberal arts, it flourishes most of all now. There are many eminent examples: let one suffice, Euphrates the philosopher.”¹⁰⁹ But, as Hoffer also points out, Euphrates, *qua* philosopher, must hold an inferior position to his father-in-law Pompeius Julianus, *qua* statesman.¹¹⁰

Quintilian, ever aware of the discussion of rhetoric, philosophy and politics, takes care to explain that his philosophical jargon is actually rhetorical: “Therefore, although I confess that I will use certain things which are contained in the books of philosophers, nevertheless I would argue that these things rightly and truly belong to our work and pertain particularly to oratorical art.”¹¹¹ He returns to this discussion at the end of his work as well, lamenting that some of the virtues of philosophy are necessary for the orator and yet the orator has abandoned teaching them just as much as the philosopher has abandoned acting them out.¹¹² Before outlining the necessity of understanding ethics, physics and logic, he states bluntly, “Thus this exhortation of mine does

¹⁰⁷ See Lucian *Vit. Auct.* 8-11 for Cynics, 20-5 for Stoics. See Griffin 1989: 15 for the notion of rhetorical training calling for a knowledge and selection from various philosophical schools without loyalty to any single one.

¹⁰⁸ Hoffer 1999: 126. See Hoffer 119-40 for detailed discussion of this epistle. Hoffer emphasizes Pliny’s sarcasm as a method of keeping the Greek philosopher subordinate to the Roman statesman. He makes a good deal of careful points. But if Pliny is indeed aiming at contrast, it need not be between Greek and Roman, but simply between philosopher and politician. There are, after all, Roman philosophers. Likewise, Greek sarcasm concerning overwrought philosophical discourse occurs too, as Hoffer points out (130) in Plato’s *Protagoras*.

¹⁰⁹ *Si quando urbs nostra liberalibus studiis floruit, nunc maxime floret. Multa claraque exempla sunt; sufficeret unum, Euphrates philosophus* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.10.1-2).

¹¹⁰ Hoffer 1999: 134. See Bradley 2010: 394-5 for a, perhaps rightly, more sympathetic reading of Euphrates.

¹¹¹ *Quare, tametsi me fateor usurum quibusdam quae philosophorum libris continentur, tamen ea iure vereque contenderim esse operis nostri propriaeque ad artem oratoriam pertinere* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.pr.11).

¹¹² Quint. *Inst.* 12.2.1-9.

not mean that I would like the orator to be a philosopher.”¹¹³ The preoccupation with moderation in terms of philosophical education is indeed a motif in the educational theory of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny as it had been for their Greek predecessors and contemporaries.

Learning Moderation Abundantly: Language, Style, Comportment

The practice of moderation, however, was not limited to questions of philosophy. It features in other realms of education, beginning even with initial language acquisition. Although the student ought to begin with Greek in Quintilian’s language program, he ought also to moderate his pace and eventually allow Latin to stride side-by-side:

Yet I would not want [Greek language learning] to happen so radically that he speaks and learns only Greek for a long time, as is often the custom. For because of this behavior many faults of pronunciation, corrupted by foreign sound, and of speech occur, since Greek figures of speech stick through constant habit, and in different modes of speaking, endure tenaciously. And so Latin ought to follow not far behind and quickly go along equally. Thus it will happen that when we begin to work on both languages with equal care, neither will hinder the other.¹¹⁴

Excessive acquisition of *paideia*, especially in Greek language, is a source of anxiety for Quintilian’s Greek counterparts as well. Plutarch lets loose an attack on vapid hyper-Atticism in his tract on *Listening to Lectures*:

But he who from the very beginning clings not to the matter at hand, but thinks that the speech must be Attic and lean, is similar to one who refuses to drink an

¹¹³ *Quapropter haec exhortatio mea non eo pertinet, ut esse oratorem philosophum velim* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.2.6). See Dominik 1997: 53 for discussion of Quintilian’s anxiety and potential grudge against philosophy.

¹¹⁴ *Non tamen hoc adeo superstitiose fieri velim ut diu tantum Graece loquatur aut discat, sicut plerisque moris est. Hoc enim accidunt et oris plurima vitia in peregrinum sonum corrupti et sermonis, cui cum Graecae figurae adsidua consuetudine haeserunt, in diversa quoque loquendi ratione pertinacissime durant. Non longe itaque Latina subsequi debent et cito pariter ire. Ita fiet ut, cum aequali cura linguam utramque tueri coeperimus, neutra alteri officiat* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.13-4).

antidote unless the vessel has been made from the finest Attic clay [...] For these diseases have produced much emptiness of mind and good sense, as well as pedantry and wordiness in schools.¹¹⁵

Lucian's corpus is likewise marked by preoccupation with archaism, Atticism and neologism.¹¹⁶ His concern is often that the *pepaideumenos* will use these tools beyond the bounds of moderation.¹¹⁷ For instance, he respects Demonax because “he thought worthy of mockery those who use excessively archaic and foreign words in regular conversation.”¹¹⁸ The target of Lucian's invective in the *Pseudologista* is similarly attacked for his arcane vocabulary and reading list: “For in what books do you find these [arcane words]? Buried in the corner of some poet who composes dirges—moldy and full of spider's webs? Or from the tablets of Philainis?”¹¹⁹ Quintilian likewise warns against excessive archaism: “But there is need for moderation, such that [archaism] is neither frequent nor obvious.”¹²⁰ Catherine Atherton nicely sums up the desire for moderation and the authority it produces: “Grammatical expertise consisted precisely in constructing and defending the nice, and normative, balance between strict regularity, in all its manifestations, and permissible variation.”¹²¹

Moderation applies not only to Greek grammar and language learning. In his discussion of genres appropriate to the student of *grammatikē*, Quintilian notes that the teacher must beware

¹¹⁵ ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμφυόμενος ἀλλὰ τὴν λέξιν Ἀττικὴν ἀξίων εἶναι καὶ ἰσχνὴν ὁμοίος ἐστὶ μὴ βουλομένῳ πιεῖν ἀντίδοτον, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κωλιάδος ἢ κεκεραμευμένον [...] ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ νοσήματα πολλὴν μὲν ἐρημίαν νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολλὴν δὲ τερθρείαν καὶ στῶμυλιαν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς πεποίηκε (Plut. *Mor.* 42d-e). See Anderson 1993: 93 and Swain 1996: 136-7.

¹¹⁶ These points of linguistic *paideia* and play are discussed at length in my third chapter.

¹¹⁷ See König 2009: 36-7, Schmitz 1997: 69 and 147, and Whitmarsh 2005: 45-7.

¹¹⁸ καταγελᾶν ἡξίου τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις πάνυ ἀρχαίοις καὶ ξένοις ὀνόμασι χρωμένων (Lucian *Demon.* 26). Demonax goes on to mock hyper-atticizing.

¹¹⁹ ποῦ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν βιβλίων εὐρίσκεῖς; ἐν γωνία που τάχα τῶν ἰαλέμων τινὸς ποιητῶν κατορωρυγμένα, εὐρῶτος καὶ ἀραχνίων μεστά ἢ που ἐκ τῶν Φιλαινίδος Δέλτων (Lucian *Pseudol.* 24). For Lucianic criticism of similar excess see *Lexiphanes* 17 and 20, *Rhet. Praec.* 20, *Solecist* 3.

¹²⁰ *Sed opus est modo, ut neque crebra sint haec nec manifesta* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.40).

¹²¹ Atherton 1998: 239.

of licentiousness, choosing moderate sections of Greek tragedy and Horatian lyric.¹²² In creating poetry exercises, it is the Greek rhetors who maintain limits, while the Romans go too far.¹²³ Pliny recommends the rhetor Junius Genitor because of his maintenance of the golden mean: “your son will hear nothing from this man except what will profit, he will learn nothing that it would be better not to know.”¹²⁴

The focus on maintaining moderation throughout the various stages and realms of education, as one would expect, carries over to a similar anxiety in adulthood. Thus moderation in speaking, style and general behavior becomes a basis for judging gentlemanliness among the professional class. Particularly interesting is the connection between lack of learnedness and lack of moderation in Quintilian’s analysis of selection and arrangement of argument: “The unlearned seem to have greater abundance because they say everything, but discrimination and moderation belong to the learned.”¹²⁵ For Quintilian’s Greek contemporary absence of education likewise explains inability to control one’s self.¹²⁶ For Plutarch, who likewise marks lack of control as an attribute of the ignorant,¹²⁷ it is not only education, but Hellenism that aids self-control.¹²⁸

A similar relationship exists in terms of stylistic balance and propriety in Quintilian’s evaluation: “the educated speaker, just as he knows in his speech to moderate, to vary, to arrange many things, so too in delivery does he know how to accommodate his actions to the tone of the

¹²² Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.6.

¹²³ “Latin rhetors have abandoned the rest of the larger and spirited work to the grammaticus. Greeks know the burdens and limit of their work better” (*cetera maioris operis ac spiritus Latini rhetores relinquendo necessaria grammaticis fecerunt: Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.6)).

¹²⁴ *Nihil ex hoc viro filius tuus audiet nisi profuturum, nihil discet quod nescisse rectius fuerit* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.3.6).

¹²⁵ *Interdum videntur indocti copiam habere maiorem, quod dicunt omnia, doctis est et electio et modus* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.12.6).

¹²⁶ See Pelling 1989: 232 for this conclusion with regard to Plutarch’s *Lives of Marius and Coriolanus*.

¹²⁷ “For lack of control which some young men think is freedom is the mark of a lack of *paideia*” (ἀναρχία μὲν γάρ, ἣν ἔνιοι τῶν νέων ἐλευθερίαν ἀπαιδευσίᾳ νομίζουσι) (Plut. *Mor.* 37d).

¹²⁸ See Pelling 1989: 213-5 for Philopoemon’s and Flaminius’ Hellenism and self-control and for the opposite in Cato.

matter about which he is speaking and, if there is any point worth consistent observation, he prefers to be and to seem moderate.”¹²⁹ The learned speaker’s opposite confuses force with violence, showing no control in presentation, “for they shout in every direction and bellow everything with, as they say, uplifted hand, carried away in much running about, panting, gesticulation, going mad with headbobs.”¹³⁰ Simply put, the safest route is down the middle: *tutissima fere per medium via, quia utriusque ultimum vitium est.*¹³¹ The practice of judging a speaker by his moderate delivery is not limited to Romans of the Quintilianic period. It is certainly apparent, for example, in Seneca’s *Epistle 59*, which calls for concise and appropriate word choice and avoidance of bombastic thoughts or utterances.¹³²

This same method of judgment, moreover, is applied in the Greek rhetorical world, both Classical and Imperial. Compare the attacks on wild gesticulation in Aeschines and Achilles Tatius, for example:

After we had spoken, last of all Demosthenes arose gesticulating wildly, as he is accustomed, and rubbing his forehead¹³³

Thus he spoke, gesticulating wildly and rubbing his face.¹³⁴

Lucian expands on the foolishness of excessive oratorical delivery when Pan analyzes both sophistic and philosophic argument in *The Double Indictment*:

¹²⁹ *Ille eruditus, ut in oratione multa summittere variare disponere, ita etiam in pronuntiando suum cuique eorum quae dicet colorum accomodare actum sciat, et, si quid sit perpetua observatione dignum, modestus et esse et videri malit* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.12.10).

¹³⁰ *Nam et clamunt ubique et omnia levata, ut ipsi vocant, manu emugiunt, multo discursu, anhelitu, iactatione gestus, motu capitis furentes* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.12.9).

¹³¹ Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.80.

¹³² *Pressa sunt omnia et rei aptata; loqueris quantum vis et plus significas quam loqueris. Hoc maioris rei indicium est: apparet animum quoque nihil habere supervacui, nihil tumidi* (Sen. *Ep.* 59.5).

¹³³ Ἐφ’ ἅπασιν δ’ ἡμῖν ἀνίσταται τελευταῖος Δημοσθένης, καὶ τερατευσάμενος, ὥσπερ εἶθε, τῷ σχήματι καὶ τρίψας τὴν κεφαλὴν (Aeschin. 2.49).

¹³⁴ ταῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ τερατευσάμενος καὶ τρίψας τὸ πρόσωπον (Achilles Tatius 8.10.2).

At first they begin their conversations peacefully, but once the introductions occur they stretch their voices to a high pitch such that over-straining and wishing to speak at the same time, their faces turn red and their necks swell and their veins stand out [...] In fact, they throw their arguments into confusion and blur the original matter, most of them having insulted all the rest, wiping the sweat from their foreheads with a bent finger, and whoever is the loudest and most impudent and last to leave seems to have won [...] To me they seem like phonies.¹³⁵

Pan's attack on the speaker's falsetto falls in line with Quintilian's judgment in Book 11 of his *Institutio Oratoria*: "The voice that is excessively thin and immoderately clear is both beyond nature and incapable of modulating the delivery and bearing the strain for a length of time."¹³⁶

Pliny, who is not opposed to ornate style,¹³⁷ likewise uses lack of moderation to disparage his enemy Regulus, whom he cites as an example of boldness confirming audacity, and who is thus a perversion of Cato and Quintilian's orator, a "bad man unskilled at speaking": *est vir malus dicendi imperitus*.¹³⁸ His absurdity is related with a Demosthenic insult on immoderate public speech: "[tell me] whether you have read this melancholy book of Regulus, like a quack in the forum, as Demosthenes puts it, raising his voice and roaring jubilantly."¹³⁹

¹³⁵ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα μὲν εἰρηνικῶς ἐνάρχονται τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους λόγων, προιούσης δὲ τῆς συνουσίας ἐπιτείνουσι τὸ φθέγμα μέχρι πρὸς τὸ ὄρθιον, ὥστε ὑπερδιατεινομένων καὶ ἅμα λέγειν ἐθελόντων τό τε πρόσωπον ἐρυθριᾷ καὶ ὁ τράχηλος οἰδεῖ καὶ αἱ φλέβες ἐξανίστανται [...] διαταράξαντες γοῦν τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκοπούμενον συγγέαντες ἀπίασι λοιδορησάμενοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ πολλοί, τὸν ἰδρῶτα ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου ἀγκύλω τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀποξυόμενοι, καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖν ἔδοξεν ὃς ἂν μεγαλοφωνότερος αὐτῶν ἦ καὶ θρασύτερος καὶ διαλυομένων ἀπέλθη ὕστερος [...] ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἀλαζόνες τινὲς ἐδόκουν (Lucian *Bis Acc.* 11).

¹³⁶ *Et ille praetenuis et immodicae claritatis cum est ultra verum, tum neque pronuntiatione flecti neque diutius ferre intensionem potest* (Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.41). Quintilian also criticizes excessively low pitches. See Gleason 1995: 103-30 for moderation of voice in oratory; for the case of Quintilian see 113-21, esp. 120-1.

¹³⁷ See, e.g., Plin. *Ep.* 1.20 and 9.26, where he defends both his lack of brevity in selection and his use of lofty style, almost as if responding to Quintilian.

¹³⁸ Plin. *Ep.* 4.7.5. See further below, pp. 178-82.

¹³⁹ *Num etiam ipse tu hunc luctuosum Reguli librum ut circulator in foro legeris, ἐπάρας scilicet, ut ait Demosthenes, τὴν φωνὴν καὶ γεγηθῶς καὶ λαρυγγίζων* (Plin. *Ep.* 4.7.6).

Tacitus' *Aper*, like Pliny, is not opposed to ornamentation.¹⁴⁰ But his defense of this flowery speech is in contrast to an overly severe and antiquated style. In short, he is arguing for moderation from another direction. He advises, "let the orator flee from shameful and foolish buffoonery and may he not arrange every clause in one and the same manner."¹⁴¹ When he attempts to praise the oratorical styles of Maternus and Secundus, he emphasizes overall variety and moderation:

In such a way do you mix splendor and elegance of words with gravity of perception, and have that discernment in selection, arrangement of argument, richness whenever the matter demands it, brevity whenever the matter permits it, grace of composition, perspicuity of thought, in such a way do you give expression when struck with emotion and temper freedom of speech, that even if malevolence and envy hinder our judgment, posterity will certainly speak the truth about you.¹⁴²

The importance of moderation in rhetorical education and its effects as illustrated by Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny is best summarized by a Greek counterpart:

Just as, then, with theatricality and mock-tragic style (for I return to the theme from the beginning of the work), so too do I advise to beware and to flee triviality and lowness of speech; for excessiveness is not for the statesman, and thinness is excessively bold. But just as the body must be not only healthy but sturdy, so too should speech be not only sound but strong. For the careful is only praised, while the daring is admired. I happen to have the same opinion concerning the

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., Tac. *Dial.* 19.5, 20.3, and 21.1. It is worth noting that moderation in style does not mean flowery style is always inappropriate. As Quintilian remarks, "different styles of eloquence befit different people" (*ipsum etiam eloquentiae genus alios aliud decet*) (Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.31).

¹⁴¹ *Fugitet foedam et insulsam scurrilitatem, variet compositionem, nec omnes clausulas uno et eodem modo determinet* (Tac. *Dial.* 22.5).

¹⁴² *Ita gravitati sensuum nitorem et cultum verborum miscetis, ea electio inventionis, is ordo rerum, ea quotiens cause poscit ubertas, ea quotiens permittit brevitatis, is compositionis decor, ea sententiarum planitas est, sic exprimitis adfactus, sic libertatem temperatis, ut etiam si nostra iudicia malignitas et invidia tradaverit, verum de vobis dicturi sint posteri nostri* (Tac. *Dial.* 23.6).

disposition of spirit. For it is not fitting for a man to be bold nor cowardly and fear stricken; for the one leads to shamelessness and the other to servility. But the middle course in all things is both artistic and proper.¹⁴³

One might wonder why the grave anxiety about maintaining moderation in rhetoric existed. Quintilian answers, “for speech often reveals inner character and uncovers the secrets of the soul; not without cause have the Greeks professed that one speaks as he lives.”¹⁴⁴ Moderation in the field of rhetoric, then, translated to moderation within the soul.¹⁴⁵

A preoccupation with the noble, i.e. moderate, soul is omnipresent in Greek and Roman thought and literature, but analysis of external signifiers of internal virtue surged during the Second Sophistic, when male elites competed for social superiority by means of physical behavior and comportment.¹⁴⁶ During a time in which military prowess and brute strength brought little political advantage, there occurred a crisis in the establishment of manliness among the intellectual elite. One solution was to promote *paideia* as a form of *andreia* or at least a necessary element in obtaining it.¹⁴⁷ Yet anxiety still existed. As Joy Connolly puts it:

In imperial Greece, not only provincial grammarians, but Roman citizens of property and good family who became eminent teachers of philosophy and

¹⁴³ “Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ἐπανάγω γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν τὴν θεατρικὴν καὶ παρατράγωδον, οὕτως αὖ πάλιν καὶ τὴν σμικρολογίαν τῆς λέξεως καὶ ταπεινώσιν παραινῶ διευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέρογκος ἀπολίτευτός ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἰσχνὴ λίαν ἀνέκπληκτος. καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα οὐ μόνον ὑγιεινὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὸν εἶναι χρὴ, καὶ τὸν λόγον ὡσαύτως οὐκ ἄνοσον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐρωστον εἶναι δεῖ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς ἐπαινεῖται μόνον, τὸ δ’ ἐπικίνδυνον καὶ θαυμάζεται. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διαθέσεως. οὕτε γὰρ θρασὺν οὐτ’ ἄτολμον καὶ καταπλῆγα προσῆκεν εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν, τὸ δ’ εἰς ἀνδραποδοδίαν περιίσταται· ἔντεχνον δὲ τὸ τὴν μέσσην ἐν ἅπασι τέμνειν ἐμμελές τε ([Plut.] *Mor.* 7a-b). See similarly Plutarch’s caution against overly flowery and effeminate speech in *De Recta Ratione Audiendi* (Plut. *Mor.* 42a).

¹⁴⁴ *Profert enim mores plerumque oratio et animi secreta detegit: nec sine causa Graeci prodiderunt ut vivat quemque etiam dicere* (Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.30).

¹⁴⁵ See Gunderson 2000: 63-4.

¹⁴⁶ See Gleason 1995 *passim*, esp. xxii-xxvi with Foucault 1986: 85. See also Eshleman 2012: 36, Johnson 2010: 162, Whitmarsh 2001: 113 and Whitmarsh 2005: 26-32. The anxiety is drawn out by Quintilian: “perhaps one would say that plucked hair, a feeble gait, womanly clothes are signs of a man who is soft and unmanly if it seemed that those things stem from immodesty” (*fortasse corpus vulsum, fractum incessum, vestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum viri signa, si cui [...] illa ex inpudicitia fluere videantur* (Quint. *Inst.* 5.9.14)). Spawforth 2012 *passim*, esp. 4-11 views these issues of manhood and proper Greek behavior (belonging to *vera Graecia*) as central to Augustus’ program.

¹⁴⁷ See Bloomer 2011: 60. See also Bowie 1991: 198 and Connolly 2003: 298.

rhetoric, like Dio and Aristides, were aware that the symbolic capital they achieved derived not from great deeds in war or even politics, the traditional arenas of *andreia*, but from intangibles of wit, memory, knowledge and charisma.¹⁴⁸

Lucian is quick to expose this anxiety when he plays with the relationship between *paideia* and manliness. His *Teacher of Rhetoric* offers two avenues. The first, which is difficult and follows the footsteps of Demosthenes and Plato, is guided by “a strong man, hardened, manly in his stride, showing the sun’s effect on his body, masculine in his stare.”¹⁴⁹ The second, which is smooth, easy and shirks difficulty, presents “a very clever and handsome man, agitated in his stride, weak at the neck, womanly in his stare, honeyed in voice, reeking of perfume.”¹⁵⁰ In short, *paideia* could bring about masculinity or femininity depending on the method and the pupil.¹⁵¹

The next step in the sophistic solution, then, was to link *paideia* with self-control or *sophrōsunē*, the Latin *moderatio* that we have seen throughout this chapter.¹⁵² The fixation by our Roman authors on moderation in the various paideutic realms discussed above is the product of anxiety about seeming courageous and superior to others. In fact, the issues of comportment and self-presentation that Maud Gleason highlights in her study of Polemo and Favorinus are of the same ilk as those of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny. Their anxiety, like that of their Greek counterparts, concerns not ethnicity, but masculinity.¹⁵³ The roughly 135 sections of Quintilian’s

¹⁴⁸ Connolly 2003: 290.

¹⁴⁹ καρτερός τις ἀνὴρ, ὑπόσκληρος, ἀνδρώδης τὸ βᾶδισμα, πολλὸν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι δεικνύων, ἀρρενωπὸς τὸ βλέμμα (Lucian *Rhet. Praec.* 9).

¹⁵⁰ πάνσοφόν τινα καὶ πάγκαλον ἄνδρα, διασεσαλευμένον τὸ βᾶδισμα, ἐπικεκλασμένον τὸν αὐχένα, γυναικεῖον τὸ βλέμμα, μελιχρὸν τὸ φώνημα (Lucian *Rhet. Praec.* 11). Lucian sets up a similar contrast in *Bis Acc* 31, where manly Demosthenic rhetoric turns into a courtesan and in *Dream* 13, where, paradoxically, manly sculpture, without *paideia*, is incapable of manly thought.

¹⁵¹ See Connolly 2003: 296 for an excellent discussion with examples of this phenomenon in Plutarch, Dio of Prusa, Quintilian and Hermogenes. See Richlin 1992: 83-104 and 1997: 93-9 for discussion of the forum as a place for masculine definition and imputations of femininity. See Brink 1989: 478 for brief treatment of declamation and virility in Quintilian.

¹⁵² As Connolly (2003: 315) says of Aristides’ message in *Or.* 18-21, “The refined control of sophistic oratory is shown to be superior—more courageous, in fact—than crude outbursts of passion.”

¹⁵³ So too was the case for Seneca the Elder. See Gleason 1995: 109 and Johnson 2010: 162.

book that deal with gesture, voice and dress are not a far cry from the instructions about deportment in the pseudo-scientific treatise of Polemo—a Greek who was chosen to serve as ambassador to the emperor because his “eloquence and deportment embodied the essence of Hellenism.”¹⁵⁴ Similar elements of dress and appearance are not lost on Tacitus or Pliny, even if they are marked as potential trivialities, as by Messala in the *Dialogus*, or dismissed, as by Pliny in his description of Euphrates.¹⁵⁵ These aspects of rhetoric, like the content of literate education, both shape and display inner character, which, as we know from our discussion of earliest education, is a constant point of anxiety. When our Latin authors emphasize the importance of moderation during the educational process, they follow the same lines as the sophists that Gleason and Connolly treat.

Gleason neatly sums up the process and effect of a rhetorical education thus: “The rhetorical performer embodied his civilization’s ideal of cultivated manliness. The young men who consciously studied his rhetorical exempla unconsciously imitated the gestalt of his self-presentation.”¹⁵⁶ The elite, masculine *epiprepeia* displayed by a sophist like Polemo was the result of the training in *moderatio* such as that which Quintilian or Agricola’s mother offered. If we view the emphasis on moderate behavior and knowledge of Classical models as an avenue to elite masculine status rather than as a form of nostalgia for a lost Greek past, there need be no Roman anxiety about Greek *paideia*. Simon Goldhill has remarked that “Roman writers use knowledge of Greek as a sign of sophistication—and also use knowledge of Greek as a sign of lack of good Roman values.”¹⁵⁷ We might add to this that the ability to know how much Greek

¹⁵⁴ Gleason 1995: 22. See also Connolly 2009: 135-6. See Gleason 1995: 63 for similarities between Quintilian and Polemo, though it should be noted that Gleason views Quintilian as squeamish about Greek culture in general (116), a view with which I cannot entirely agree.

¹⁵⁵ Tac. *Dial.* 39.1; Plin. *Ep.* 1.10.

¹⁵⁶ Gleason 1995: xxiv.

¹⁵⁷ Goldhill 2009a: 104.

sophistication to use is a sign of possession of good Roman values. Or, as Wallace-Hadrill has put it, “To be Roman, go Greek.”¹⁵⁸

Conclusion

Two central goals of Roman education were to teach the pupil Greek literacy and moderation, the former conflicting neither with the latter nor with establishment of “Romanness.”¹⁵⁹ The sophistic Roman, like the sophistic Greek, embraced Greek *paideia* from an early stage, taking care, like Agricola or like Polemo, to practice the moderation characteristic of an elite male.¹⁶⁰ Once this education was established, the sophistic Roman was prepared to show it off for socio-political gain. This practice will be the subject of the following chapters.

¹⁵⁸ Wallace-Hadrill 1998 *passim*, esp. 86 on cultural codeswitching as a Roman means of negotiating between anxieties about and attachments to Greek culture.

¹⁵⁹ Spawforth 2012 *passim*, esp. 28 and 274 describes a similar set of goals in the Augustan and Hadrianic periods as “Romanity.” See also Malissard 2007: 330 for a similar notion.

¹⁶⁰ Compare Bowie’s (1991: 198) description of *paideia* in Dio of Prusa as a combination of book learning and self-control or Saïd’s (2001: 290) similar argument that Hellenism was defined by “good education and refined behavior.”

Chapter Three

Roman Imitation and the Attic Past

We have established that the sophistic Roman sought to obtain Greek *paideia* as a means to social and political advancement. Yet, as a type of symbolic capital, *paideia* was most useful not simply in its acquisition, but in its expenditure. One way to parade familiarity with the cultural world of the *pepaideumenos* was to imitate the works of the classical canon. Because so many of those works originated in fifth- and fourth-century Athens, mimesis in the Second Sophistic often took its form in atticizing language, vocabulary and style.

Atticism and the Second Sophistic

Atticizing—the deployment of the Attic vocabulary, dialect and style of the Classical Greek past—became a popular way of displaying *paideia* and elite status.¹ Language, after all, is one of the leading ways of separating mass from elite.² As Simon Swain remarks, “the aim of *attikismos*, stylistic and linguistic, was to differentiate the leaders of Greek letters and speech from the broad mass of Greek speakers in order to signal clearly that they had command of the best sort of Greek.”³ Rather than using the *koinē* or common Greek language of conversation and writing at least since the third century BCE,⁴ a first- and second-century CE movement recalled the language of Demosthenes, Aeschines, Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides and others. These

¹ Schmid 1887-97 remains the most thorough study of Atticism. Norden 1915: 251-70 and 357-67 also offers useful discussion of the phenomenon in the Late Republic and, then, in the High Empire. See Swain 1996: 17-64, Kim 2010b, Richter 2011: 136-76 and Spawforth 2012: 18-26 and 264-5 for the best recent cultural and sociolinguistic treatments of Atticism.

² Though I generally avoid the term *diglossia* in this study, following Adams’ (2003: 537-41) discomforts with it, the sentiment of hierarchical language use does have some truth to it. *Diglossia*, that is, the use of High (H) and Low (L) forms of language for prestigious/formal and non-prestigious/colloquial purposes, when correctly applied and identified, attests to the premise of language as a way of separating mass from elite with which I operate in this chapter. See Ferguson 1959 for the origin of the term. See Adams 2003: 537-41, Adams, Janse and Swain 2002: 9-10, and Swain 1996: 33-42 for *diglossia* in both modern and ancient Greece.

³ Swain 1996: 21. See similarly Kim 2010b: 469 and Webb 2006: 37.

⁴ On *koinē* in the Hellenistic and Second Sophistic periods see Swain 1996: 19.

authors, whom we recognize from the elite reading lists of Dionysius and Dio and of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny,⁵ would have been available only to those with *paideia*. This stylizing, then, as Lawrence Kim notes, was acquired through schooling, not “naturally” and therefore was not necessarily a function of ethnicity, but one of elite status.⁶

Among ancient authors, Lucian provides some of the best examples of atticizing tastes and their importance in the social and cultural milieu of the period. His *Lexiphanes* and *Solecist*, for example, attack incorrect diction and usage to the embarrassment and social expense of those in error. Conversely, Lucian also provides biting replies to excessive adherence to Atticism in his *In Defense of a Slip in Greeting* and *The False Critic*.⁷ In these cases, as Tim Whitmarsh points out, misuse or “hyper-Atticism” is exposed and Lucian reminds us of the importance of moderation.⁸ Lucian’s satires of Atticism, of course, stem from a social world, which we can see in Philostratus’ *Lives of the Sophists* in the oft-cited conflict between Philagrus and Amphicles.⁹ Here, a battle for social position revolves around Attic diction. Philostratus relates that after some verbal jostling, “Amphicles, who happened to be Herodes’ best student, latched on to a foreign utterance that Philagrus let escape in his anger, and asked, ‘In what classic might that word be found?’ ‘In Philagrus,’ the other replied.”¹⁰ In both the satirical world of Lucian and the social world of Philostratus, then, the ability to atticize properly is a mark of *paideia* and power.

⁵ See above, pp. 60-3.

⁶ Kim 2010b: 470. See also Kemezis 2014: 393-4 for a discussion concentrating on ethnicity and *paideia* displayed through Atticism.

⁷ For further discussion of these texts and of Plutarch’s criticism of Atticism in *De Aud.* 42D see above, p. 70.

⁸ Whitmarsh 2001: 127 and 2005: 45-9. See also Schmitz 1997: 69 and 147-8.

⁹ See, e.g., Anderson 1986: 44-5 and 1993: 86, Eshleman 2013: 7-10, Swain 1996: 46, and Whitmarsh 2005: 34-5.

¹⁰ ἐκφύλου δὲ αὐτὸν ῥήματος ὡς ἐν ὀργῇ διαφυγόντος λαβόμενος ὁ Ἀμφικλῆς, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐτύγγανε τῶν Ἡρώδου γνωρίμων τὴν πρώτην φερόμενος, «παρὰ τίνι τῶν ἐλλογίμων» ἔφη «τοῦτο εἴρηται;» καὶ ὡς «παρὰ Φιλάργῳ» ἔφη (Philostr. *VS* 579).

Also apparent in Philagrus' reply is that the standards of Atticism were not tightly defined. The difficulty in establishing a standard of Atticism has its effect on, and is clear from, modern treatments of the phenomenon.¹¹ Wilhelm Schmid, for example, stressed Roman participation in Atticism as a sign of its variance from spoken Greek, whereas Simon Swain has stressed Greek participation as a sign of its "repristination" of features that would have been comprehensible to educated Greek speakers.¹² Questions of the relationship between the Atticism that Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus discuss as an oratorical opponent to Asianism, and the Atticism, that is employed by Imperial Greeks such as Aristides, Aelian and Lucian, led Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff to differentiate between rhetorical and linguistic Atticism.¹³ It is perhaps the case that a Greco-Roman intellectual would likewise find it difficult to define the term.¹⁴ We can, however, trace at least some atticizing tendencies. Most who study the phenomenon will point out a preference for $-\tau\tau$ over $-\sigma\sigma$, $-\rho\rho$ over $\rho\sigma$ and $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ / $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\omega$ over $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ / $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\omega$, and a restoration of the dual, the Attic second declension, the dative case, the middle voice and the optative mood among many other features.¹⁵

Atticismos Romanus?

¹¹ See Kim 2010b: 472-6 for a concise chronology of scholarship.

¹² Schmid 1887-97: 1.21-6. Swain 1996: 33-5.

¹³ Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1900: 41. Cf. Schmid 1887-97: 1.10 for stylistic and grammatical / lexical Atticism. See Whitmarsh 2005: 7-8 on the importance of this discussion in studies on the Second Sophistic. Quintilian's discussion of Atticism and Asianism (*Inst.* 12.10-26) is evidence that rhetorical Atticism remained of interest after the work of Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See Wisse 1995 for a brief summary of the scholarship on rhetorical Atticism. Though I do not intend to deal closely with questions of Atticism under Cicero or Dionysius, it is worth noting, given my suggestion (later in this chapter) that linguistic Atticism played to the advantages of Romans, that Wisse argues of rhetorical Atticism that it "harks back to the old models of the classical Athenian period" (65) and yet "the movement was originally Roman, and was passed on to Greeks working in Rome" (74). See also Spawforth 2012: 264-70 on Attic oratory in the Second Sophistic.

¹⁴ See Kim 2010b: 474: "The distribution of individual 'Atticisms' among these authors displays no particular pattern, suggesting that they were operating without a consistent set of guidelines as to what constituted 'Attic.'"

¹⁵ See Anderson 1993: 86-100, Kim 2010b: 470, 473-4, Schmid 1887-97: 4.579-734, Schmitz 1997: 67-96 and Swain 1996: 44-56.

The reader of a study of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny will have paused by this point to ask how a Latin author could participate in Atticism—a Greek and primarily linguistic phenomenon. One might expect that a Roman could not write Attic Latin. Obviously a Roman could atticize if writing in Greek.¹⁶ The Atticism that was a sign of *paideia* in the Second Sophistic, then, would seem at first glance to be exclusively Greek. If we move beyond the simple binary of Greek not being Latin and Latin not being Greek, however, the question of Roman participation in Atticism becomes much more complicated. As Daniel Richter has suggested, “the early imperial elite used language and in particular literary Atticism to create a model of the unity of the *oikoumenē*.”¹⁷ Romans, of course, were part of that lived universe.

While a Roman might not have used *koinē* Greek in conversation, he would have been familiar with Attic Greek from his education. Jorma Kaimio persuasively suggests that it was elite Roman interest in the Greek cultural past that propelled Atticism to popularity, emphasizing that “what the Romans most admired was not the language spoken by the Greek common people, but that written by Attic authors many centuries earlier, and no doubt taught by many Greek rhetoricians and teachers.”¹⁸ The Roman education system certainly supports such an argument. We might recall the reading lists discussed in the previous chapter, noting the abundance of Attic Greek authors therein; and we might surmise that the educated Roman more frequently dealt with Attic Greek than any other dialect. For example, in the Neronian period, an epigram attributed to Lucilius mentions the proliferation of Attic terms in the Roman rhetorician’s

¹⁶ In the second half of the second century Marcus Aurelius, Fronto and Apuleius provide evidence for this very thing. See, e.g., Swain 1996: 29n28 for Marcus, Sandy 1997 *passim* on Apuleius, Champlin 1980: 29-59 on Fronto and his circle. See Anderson 2007 more generally.

¹⁷ Richter 2011: 138.

¹⁸ Kaimio 1979: 325. In discussing Roman antipathy for contemporary Greek and admiration for its past, Kaimio succinctly remarks (46): “Culture yes, people no.” Kemezis 2014: 394 notes that because Atticism could be acquired from handbooks, ethnicity played little role in its acquisition. See Spawforth 2012: 18-9 on Roman idealization of fifth and fourth century Athens as *Graecia vera et integra*, morally and linguistically.

repertoire in a satirizing manner that anticipates Lucian's *Teacher of Rhetoric*. Lucilius complains of deictic iotas and double taus, among other atticizing and archaizing tactics.¹⁹ Lucian, in turn, satirizes Atticism through the mouth of his rhetorician: "Having selected fifteen or no more than twenty Attic words and having paid them strictest attention, keep them ready at the tip of your tongue."²⁰ Unlike Lucilius and Lucian's elite targets, an ethnic, but uneducated Greek would not have had much opportunity to employ Attic Greek, if he understood it at all. This Greek *diglossia*, then, played into the hands of the members of the Roman elite. Anthony Spawforth notes:

For Romans the *genus Atticum* in oratory, whether Latin or Greek, came to define subjectively a manner of speaking which could be claimed to conform to Roman standards of excellence and moral propriety. Athens provided a canon of Greek orators with specific stylistic traits which Romans sought to imitate, whether speaking in Latin or in Greek, because they were perceived as embodying "Roman" qualities.²¹

Paradoxically, Atticism, often taken as a sign of Greekness, was denied to the majority of ethnic Greeks, but embraced by Romans, or elite Romans at any rate.²² Richter, therefore, seems right to dismiss Atticism as an avenue for Greeks to display Greekness through an Athenian past. Instead, he suggests that linguistic Atticism became the *koinē* of the elite because "it was inert, unchanging, and in a very real sense, common property. As a learned linguistic register used self-

¹⁹ Πολλοῦ δεῖ καὶ «σφὶν» καὶ τρεῖς παρ' ἕκαστα «δικασταὶ ἄνδρες» καὶ «λέγε δὴ τὸν νόμον ἐνθάδε μοι» καὶ «ταυτὶ» καὶ «μῶν» καὶ «τετταράκοντα» καὶ «ἄττα» σκεψάμενος καὶ τοὶ «νῆ Δία» καὶ «μὰ Δία» ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ Κρίτων καὶ παιδία πολλὰ διδάσκει· προσθήσει δ' αὐτοῖς «γρῦ», «φαθὶ» καὶ «μὴν» ἔτι.

(*Anth. Pal.* 11.142). I am indebted for the reference to Kim 2010b: 475.

²⁰ ἔπειτα πεντεκαίδεκα ἢ οὐ πλείω γε τῶν εἴκοσιν Ἄττικὰ ὀνόματα ἐκλέξας ποθὲν ἀκριβῶς ἐκμελετήσας, πρόχειρα ἐπι' ἄκρας τῆς γλώττης ἔχε (Lucian, *Rhet. Praec.* 16).

²¹ Spawforth 2012: 264.

²² See Kemezis 2014: 392.

consciously as different from everyday speech, Atticism belonged to everyone precisely because it belonged to no one.”²³ Greek, Roman, Syrian or other, he who had the time and money to study Attic Greek could take possession of it.

Linguistic and Stylistic Translation

From school, the educated Roman would not only read, but would also copy, translate and imitate these canonical Greek texts. Quintilian points out the tradition of doing so in Roman rhetoric:

Our ancient orators judged translation of Greek into Latin as the best exercise. In Cicero’s *de Oratore* Lucius Crassus says that he did this very thing. Cicero himself very frequently prescribes it. And he even published books translated from Plato and Xenophon in this manner. The practice pleased Messala, and there are many speeches by him written in this mode, going so far as to emulate the subtlety of Hyperides’ defense of Phryne, a most difficult task for Romans. The reason for this exercise is obvious. For Greek authors abound in richness and introduce much art into eloquence. And it is for us to use the best words in translating them: for we use all of our own words.²⁴

Familiarity with the Attic Greek of Plato and Xenophon would, of course, be necessary in rendering a translation. Furthermore, as can be gleaned from Quintilian’s statement that there is art in Greek eloquence, the sophistic Roman learned to transfer certain points of Attic eloquence into Latin—a point on which Pliny elaborates in a letter to the retiring Fuscus Salinator, demonstrating that the appreciation for Greek does not end with school. He begins the letter thus:

²³ Richter 2011: 145.

²⁴ *Vertere Graeca in Latinum veteres nostri oratores optimum iudicabant. Id se L. Crassus in illis Ciceronis de Oratore libris dicit factitasse: id Cicero sua ipse persona frequentissime praecipit, quin etiam libros Platonis atque Xenophontis edidit hoc genere tralatos: id Messalae placuit, multaeque sunt ab eo scriptae ad hunc modum orationes, adeo ut etiam cum illa Hyperidis pro Phryne difficillima Romanis subtilitate contenderet. Et manifesta est exercitationis huiusce ratio. Nam et rerum copia Graeci auctores abundant et plurimum artis in eloquentiam intulerunt et hos transferentibus verbis uti optimis licet: omnibus enim utimur nostris* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.5.2-3).

You ask in what way I think is most fitting for you to study during a retirement, which you will enjoy for a long period of time. Useful in the first order and prescribed by many, is to translate either from Greek into Latin or from Latin into Greek. From this type of exercise a precision and splendor of diction, abundance of figures, and power of exposition are acquired, not to mention a faculty for original creation through imitating similar points in the best authors.²⁵

Translation, as we see in Quintilian and Pliny, encouraged competition and independent expertise.²⁶ Eleanor Dickey observes even in seemingly simple colloquia of the *Hermeneumata Pseudositheana* that these bilingual texts sometimes illustrate original composition rather than strict translation.²⁷

Indeed, Attic authors were imitated not only in word-by-word translation, but for their style as well.²⁸ Pliny tells us as much in the second letter of his collection, in which he writes to Maturus Arrianus, asking for corrections on a recently composed speech.²⁹

I beg you to read and edit this book, as is your habit, and all the more because I think that I have never before written with quite this style. For I have tried to imitate Demosthenes, your perennial favorite, and my recent favorite Calvus, yet

²⁵ *Quaeris quemadmodum in secessu, quo iam diu frueris, putem te studere oportere. Utile in primis, et multi praecipiant, vel ex Graeco in Latinum vel ex Latino vertere in Graecum. Quo genere exercitationis proprietas splendorque verborum, copia figurarum, vis explicandi, praeterea imitatione optimorum similia inveniendi facultas paratur* (Plin. *Ep.* 7.9.1-2). See Whitton 2013a: 5 for a discussion of intertextuality between Pliny's letter and Quintilian's treatment in the *Institutio*. Whitton, in fact, calls Pliny's letter an "*Institutio* in a nut-shell."

²⁶ See Sandy 1997: 69-72 for further discussion of mimesis, translation and competition, all of which would only experience further growth under Apuleius and Fronto. See Galimberti Biffino 2007: 290-1 on translation in Plin. *Ep.* 7.9.

²⁷ Dickey 2012: 49. See also Criboire 2001: 132 on the competitive spirit of imitation in Greco-Roman education.

²⁸ See De Lacy 1974: 6 for stylistic imitation of Plato. Kim 2010b: 472 uses Lysias and Thucydides as examples of Attic models for Roman authors.

²⁹ See Gibson and Morello 2012: 84-6 and Marchesi 2008: 27-30 on oratorical, epistolary and poetic intertextuality and emulation in this letter.

only in figures of speech; for only a special few are able to follow the force of such men.³⁰

We might first note that while Pliny claims to follow only in a narrow stylistic space, namely figures of speech, he does play some linguistic games of mimesis as well, opting for the Greek rhetorical term ζῆλος.³¹ Stylistically, Pliny has chosen the most Attic of Roman orators as his model: Calvus is criticized, for example, for being too Attic at Cicero's *Brutus* 284. Demosthenes, as here, appears throughout the *Epistles* as an Attic exemplar, but in no letter more than 9.26, which defends Demosthenes as the “standard and yardstick of oratory.”³² Pliny, then, offers himself as a model to the sophistic Roman who uses Attic predecessors while passing from translation and linguistic mimesis into stylistics. Through mimesis, he achieves the goal of Quintilian's pupil: to speak with Attic charm, or as Quintilian puts it, “to speak in atticizing fashion is to speak best” (*Attice dicere esse optime dicere*).³³ Quintilian's appreciation specifically for Attic Greek, apparent in this quotation and in his insistence on Latin's inability to reproduce the grace of Attic Greek (*gratiam sermonis Attici*)³⁴ anticipates a similar sentiment in Lucian, who attains to Attic grace (χάρις Ἀττική),³⁵ and in Aristides, who praises Athens for its Attic dialect, which “all men have come to accept as something of a landmark of education.”³⁶ Quintilian and Pliny have done all they can, and in a necessarily limited way, to beat Lucian and Aristides to the Attic punch.

³⁰ *Hunc rogo ex consuetudine tua et legas et emendes, eo magis quod nihil ante peraeque eodem ζῆλῳ scripsisse videor. Temptavi enim imitari Demosthenen semper tuum, Calvum nuper meum, dumtaxat figuris orationis; nam vim tantorum virorum, “pauci quos aequus ...” assequi possunt* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.2.1-2).

³¹ See below, pp. 99-100, for further discussion.

³² *Demosthenes ipse, ille norma oratoris et regula* (Plin. *Ep.* 9.26.8).

³³ Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.26. See Hutchinson 2013: 160-3 for further discussion of Quintilian's appreciation for Attic charm.

³⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.144 and 12.10.35.

³⁵ Lucian *Zeux.* 2.

³⁶ πάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τήνδε ἐληλύθασιν ὥσπερ ὄρον τινὰ παιδείας νομίζοντες (Aristides *Panathenaicus*: Jebb 181.6).

From Translation to Admiration, Imitation and Composition

Indeed, for a Roman, much like the Lucianic or Philostratean Greek, Attic production mattered. In reference to a Gellian recollection of Cato, Francesca Mestre notes, in the foreword to a collection of essays subtitled *Homo Romanus Graeca Oratione*, that “the use of Greek, even if not completely correct, was a question of prestige to which one should aspire.”³⁷ Thus Lucian’s Roman householder demands applause for good Attic usage, even when in error: “They [Roman householders] must be sophists and rhetors, and if they accidentally let loose a solecism, this very utterance must seem to be fully Attic and of Hymettus and it must be the law from then on to speak with such words.”³⁸

Outside of Lucian’s satire, we find sincere Roman attempts at proper Attic usage, apparent not least in the well-worn Roman epithet *utraque lingua eruditus*.³⁹ We see this phrase not only in literary sources, but also scattered widely across the Roman epigraphic record.⁴⁰ The family of one young Roman participant in the Capitoline Games of 94 CE took pride enough in his Greek to boast as much and add a Greek epigram to his epitaph.⁴¹ Indeed, as remarked by Kaimio, Greek poetry was a Roman *jeu de société* as attested by the fact that one-third of the authors from *The Garland of Philip* have Roman names.⁴² Pliny offers further evidence of such

³⁷ Mestre and Gómez 2013: 10. See similarly Madsen and Rees 2014: 8-9 and Woolf 2006: 170-1.

³⁸ γρη δὲ καὶ σοφοὺς καὶ ῥήτορας εἶναι αὐτοὺς, κἂν εἴ τι σολοικίσαντες τύχωσιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τοῦ Ὑμηττοῦ μεστοὺς δοκεῖν τοὺς λόγους καὶ νόμον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτω λέγειν (Lucian *de Merc.* 35). We might note that the Roman householder anticipates the behavior of Philagrus discussed above. For those who read Lucian’s Roman householder as a stand in for the emperor, near universal bilingualism among emperors is further worth noting. See Madsen and Rees 2014: 7 with further bibliography.

³⁹ See further Kaimio 1979: 195-209. See also Holford-Strevens 1993 for its continued application in the work of modern scholarship.

⁴⁰ See Kotula 1969: 386-92.

⁴¹ *CIL* VI 33976 = *IGUR* 1336. See further Kaimio 1979: 223.

⁴² Kaimio 1979: 218-9 and 223.

tastes, as he recalls with some amount of pride his youthful Greek (presumably Attic) compositions in a letter to Pontius Allifanus: “I have never been a stranger to poetry (if I dig deeper into the past); in fact, at fourteen years old I wrote a Greek tragedy.”⁴³ His admiration for good Greek composition remains in adulthood, as his epistles to Arrius Antoninus illustrate.⁴⁴

Let us treat each of the three in turn. Pliny writes in the first:

That you have been consul twice in a manner fitting to our ancestors, that you were proconsul of Asia like hardly anyone before or after you (your modesty forbids me from saying like nobody), that you are a leader of the state in integrity, in authority, in age, indeed is an honorable and beautiful thing; yet I marvel even more at your recreational activities. For to unite a certain seriousness with an equal pleasantness, and to join to utmost gravity such affability, is no less difficult than it is great. You achieve this with an incredible charm in conversation, but especially so with your pen. For the famed honey of Homer’s old Nestor seems to pour over you as you speak and bees seem to fill and intertwine what you write with flowers. I certainly felt this myself when I was reading your Greek epigrams and then your mimes. What elegance (*humanitas*), what charm, how sweet, how old-fashioned, how sagacious, how correct! I thought I held Callimachus or Herodas or even something better; although neither of these pulled off or even put their hands to both types of verse. Is it possible for a Roman man to speak with such Greek? I would say that Athens herself could not be more truly Attic. What else can I say? I envy the Greeks because you preferred to write in their language. For it is not difficult to guess what you would be able to express in your native tongue when carrying out such illustrious works in a foreign and acquired tongue. Farewell.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Numquam a poetice (altius enim repetam) alienus fui; quin etiam quattuordecim natus annos Graecam tragoediam scripsi* (Plin. *Ep.* 7.4). See Bradley 2010: 411-2 and Syme 1958: 93 for a brief discussion of Pliny’s Greek poetic tastes and the Trajanic literary milieu. See Marchesi 2008 *passim* on poetic backgrounds to Pliny.

⁴⁴ See Uden 2015: 92-3 for a more moderate evaluation of Pliny’s philhellenism in the Antoninus letters.

⁴⁵ *Quod semel atque iterum consul fuisti similis antiquis, quod proconsul Asiae qualis ante te qualis post te vix unus aut alter (non sinit enim me verecundia tua dicere nemo), quod sanctitate quod auctoritate, aetate quoque princeps*

One will immediately note that Pliny bestows the greatest prestige not for civic achievements, great though they be, but for literary ones.⁴⁶ More striking, perhaps, the literary achievement is in Greek. Antoninus, the *princeps civitatis*, is admirable most of all because his speech is more Attic than Athens itself. Pliny both asks and answers the very question we raised about Roman ability to participate in atticizing tastes. Not only can it happen, but it can even be done better in Rome.⁴⁷

In the subsequent letter to Antoninus, Pliny has taken up his own advice from *Ep.* 7.9, namely translation between Greek and Latin. He writes a brief letter:

How can I better prove to you how much I marvel at the work of your Greek epigrams than that I have tried to imitate and express some in Latin? To their detriment though. This occurs first because of the weakness of my talent, and next because of the lack or rather, as Lucretius says, the poverty of our native tongue. Yet if these, which are in Latin and my work, seem to have any charm to you, just think how much grace there is in those, which are produced by you and in Greek! Farewell.⁴⁸

civitatis, est quidem venerabile et pulchrum; ego tamen te vel magis in remissionibus miror. Nam severitatem istam pari iucunditate condire, summaeque gravitati tantum comitatis adiungere, non minus difficile quam magnum est. Id tu cum incredibili quadam suavitate sermonum, tum vel praecipue stilo assequeris. Nam et loquenti tibi illa Homerici senis mella profluere et, quae scribis, complere apes floribus et innectere videntur. Ita certe sum affectus ipse, cum Graeca epigrammata tua, cum mimiambos proxime legerem. Quantum ibi humanitatis venustatis, quam dulcia illa quam antiqua quam arguta quam recta! Callimachum me vel Heroden, vel si quid his melius, tenere credebam; quorum tamen neuter utrumque aut absolvit aut attigit. Hominemne Romanum tam Graece loqui? Non medius fidius ipsas Athenas tam Atticas dixerim. Quid multa? Invideo Graecis quod illorum lingua scribere maluisti. Neque enim coniectura eget, quid sermone patrio exprimere possis, Cum hoc insiticio et inducto tam praeclara opera perfeceris. Vale (Plin. Ep. 4.3).

⁴⁶ For a similar preference for the literary to the civic, see my discussion of Pliny's exchanges with Tacitus in the fourth chapter. See conversely Uden 2015: 92.

⁴⁷ Cathy Connors points out to me that Pliny has created an odd image of bees using flowers to fill and intertwine another object, rather than as sources to be depleted. Is it possible that Antoninus' unusual strength in foreign language somehow reproduces the odd bee imagery?

⁴⁸ *Quemadmodum magis approbare tibi possum, quanto opere mirer epigrammata tua Graeca, quam quod quaedam Latine aemulari et exprimere temptavi? In deterius tamen. Accidit hoc primum imbecillitate ingenii mei, deinde inopia ac potius, ut Lucretius ait, egestate patrii sermonis. Quodsi haec, quae sunt et Latina et mea, habere tibi aliquid venustatis videbuntur, quantum putas inesse iis gratiae, quae et a te et Graece proferuntur! Vale (Plin. Ep. 4.18).*

Pliny once again praises the Greek achievement of Antoninus here by translating Antoninus' work rather than that of a learned Greek from the Classical or Hellenistic past. In this way, the Roman Antoninus has supplanted the Attic models for imitation discussed above.⁴⁹ It is not only Antoninus, however, who shines by comparison, but the Greek language as a whole. As Pliny points out with his quotation from Lucretius, the poverty of Latin was a well-known *topos* among Latin literati.⁵⁰

In fact, this sentiment surges in our period, as we see through Pliny's letters and perhaps more so in Quintilian's work. A rather upgraded sense of the poverty of adequate rhetorical terminology is apparent throughout the *Institutio*, as Henri Marrou, for example, points out Quintilian's preference for Greek terms where Cicero and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* had used Latin: "Quintilian wrote ἀναγκαῖον, ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, ἀποσιώπησις, εἰρωνεία, ἐτυμολογία – not, like his predecessors, *necessitudo*, *enumeratio*, *reticentia*, *dissimulatio*, *notatio*. He seems to have considered these technical terms so rich and so precise in their original tongue that they could not be translated without loss of meaning."⁵¹ It requires no close examination of the twelve books of the *Institutio* to find dissatisfaction with Latin and praise for Greek language. The sentiment proliferates. After a directive at *Inst.* 9.4.145-6, Quintilian sets into a full diatribe running from *Inst.* 12.10.27-39. He begins thus: "Latin eloquence [...] seems to me to have hardly any scope for imitating Greek when it comes to elocution. For straight away it is harsher

⁴⁹ See further Galimberti Biffino 2007: 296.

⁵⁰ See Hutchinson 2013: 158-9 for succinct discussion and bibliographical notes. See also Marrou 1956: 255-6.

⁵¹ Marrou 1956: 286. The list here is far from exhaustive. See further Cousin 1936, II. The practice of maintaining Greek terms where Latin near equivalents were available occurs even more abundantly in philosophical texts.

in sound itself, since we do not have the most pleasant letters from Greek.”⁵² After a number of pages on the dissonant effect of the Latin alphabet, he continues:

But we also have a less charming accent with its particular harshness and regularity, since the last syllable is never acute or circumflex, but always ends with a grave or two. Therefore the Greek language is so much more pleasant than Latin that our poets adorn their poems with Greek words whenever they want a sweet song. Even more important than this, because many things lack names in Latin, metaphor and periphrasis are necessary: and even among those things for which we do have names our extreme poverty rolls us back all too frequently upon the same term. But the Greek have not only an abundance of words but also of dialects nuanced among themselves. Wherefore whoever demands that well-known charm of Attic speech from Latin should give me the same pleasantness and equal abundance in speaking.⁵³

For Latin’s deficiencies, however, Quintilian is not defeated, but advises the Latin orator to compete with Greek by adding metaphor and careful selection and arrangement of material, making the most of the weaker Latin language.

This is precisely what Pliny has set himself to do in translating Antoninus’ epigrams. And in the process, as often, Pliny implicitly celebrates his own aptitude. The ability to translate into Latin, albeit to the modest detriment that Pliny admits, assumes an ability to understand and operate in Greek. Any failure of his *ingenium* is softened by the *egestas Latinae*. Pliny’s final

⁵² *Latina mihi facundia, [...] videtur, ita circa rationem eloquendi vix habere imitationis locum. Namque est ipsis statim sonis durior, quando et iucundissimas ex Graecis litteras non habemus* (Quint. Inst. 12.10.27).

⁵³ *Sed accentus quoque cum rigore quodam, tum similitudine ipsa minus suaves habemus, quia ultima syllaba nec acuta unquam excitatur nec flexa circumducitur, sed in gravem vel duas gravis cadit semper. Itaque tanto est sermo Graecus Latino iucundior ut nostri poetae, quotiens dulce carmen esse voluerunt, illorum id nominibus exornent. His illa potentiora, quod res plurimae carent appellationibus, ut eas necesse sit transferre aut circumire: etiam in iis quae denominata sunt summa paupertas in eadem nos frequentissime revolvit: at illis non verborum modo sed linguarum etiam inter se differentium copia est. Quare qui a Latinis exiget illam gratiam sermonis Attici, det mihi in loquendo eandem iucunditatem et parem copiam* (Quint. Inst. 12.10.33-5).

letter, conversely, assumes full responsibility for any inferiority. In an even briefer letter he writes:

When I emulate your verses I understand most of all how good they are. For just as paintings hardly fashion a beautiful and pure face except for the worse, so too I slip and fall short of the archetype. I urge you all the more to produce as much as possible so that everyone can aspire to imitate, though nobody or very few will be able. Farewell.⁵⁴

Pliny seems to have progressed from admiration in his first Antonine letter, to translation in the second, finally to emulation, apparently in Greek, in the third. Given his youthful Greek compositions and his extensive Greek quotation throughout the *Epistles*, a command of Attic Greek and the ability to produce an epigram ought to be little surprise. What is interesting is that his proposed model, albeit one whom he has chosen likely out of courtesy, is Roman.⁵⁵

Purity beyond Urbanity and Ethnicity

Arrius Antoninus and Pliny are not alone in their Greek composition and Atticism. One of Pliny's role models and three-time consul, Spurrina, is held up as an *exemplum* partially because of his ability to lend time for Greek and Latin composition in a busy schedule: "He sits again or retires to his room and pen. For he writes most learned lyric poetry in both languages."⁵⁶

As Roy Gibson and Ruth Morello point out, Pliny is carefully attentive to emulation of such routines.⁵⁷ As he later describes his own routine in *Ep.* 9.36, he, like Spurrina, devotes time to both languages: "Then I read Greek or Latin clearly and with emphasis not so much for my voice

⁵⁴ *Cum versus tuos aemulor, tum maxime quam sint boni experior. Ut enim pictores pulchram absolutamque faciem raro nisi in peius effingunt, ita ego ab hoc archetypo labor et decido. Quo magis hortor, ut quam plurima proferas, quae imitari omnes concupiscant, nemo aut paucissimi possint. Vale* (Plin. *Ep.* 5.15).

⁵⁵ See Galimberti Biffino 2007: 296 on Pliny's interest in contemporary Romans' production of Greek.

⁵⁶ *Iterum residit vel se cubiculo ac stilo reddit. Scribit enim et quidem utraque lingua lyrica doctissima* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.1.7)

⁵⁷ Gibson and Morello 2012: 115-23 with a useful chart on p. 118.

as for my stomach.”⁵⁸ The correct use of *otium* often distinguishes men of the most elite echelon,⁵⁹ yet a letter to a certain Rufus shows us that Greek pursuits are not limited only to consulars. In a sketch of Terentius Iunior, Pliny maintains what seems to be an ongoing preference for literary above civic achievement, but adds that sometimes rusticity provides a better opportunity for *paideia*. He describes Terentius and his interaction with him thus:

O what a number of the erudite does either their own modesty or retirement cover and withdraw from fame! But when we are about to give a speech or a reading we only fear those who parade their studies, although those who are silent accomplish this all the more because they respect an excellent work with silence. I write what I write out of experience. Terentius Iunior, having performed the military offices open to knights and even having held the procuratorship of the province of Narbonensis with utmost integrity, retired to his country estate, and preferred a most peaceful leisure to procured offices. I used to look upon him as a good father of his household, as a hard-working farmer, and when receiving an invitation from him, I was going to talk about those things in which I figured he was well-versed; and I had begun to when he recalled me to literary studies by his most learned conversation. How pure is all he says, how Latin, how Greek! For he is so strong in both languages that he seems to excel the more in whatever he is speaking. How much has he read, how much does he remember! You would think that he lives in Athens, not a country house. What more can I say? He has increased my anxiety and has made me revere those who are retired and somewhat rustic no less than those whom I know to be very learned. I urge the same to you: for as in military camps, so too in our letters, having inspected carefully, you will find many who are girded and armed with a rustic look, but also a dazzling talent. Farewell.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *Mox orationem Graecam Latinamve clare et intente non tam vocis causa quam stomachi lego* (Plin. Ep. 9.36.3).

⁵⁹ On the use of *otium* for *studia* see Méthy 2007: 373-8.

⁶⁰ *O quantum eruditorum aut modestia ipsorum aut quies operit ac subtrahit famae! At nos eos tantum dicturi aliquid aut lecturi timemus, qui studia sua proferunt, cum illi qui tacent hoc amplius praestent, quod maximum opus silentio reverentur. Expertus scribo quod scribo. Terentius Iunior, equestribus militiis atque etiam procuratione*

The contrast between city and country and the ability of a rustic to produce pristine language are not new literary *topoi*. Nevertheless Pliny's Terentius, not only in Latin but, more importantly, in Greek, seems to anticipate the rustic and pure Atticism sought after and admired by Greek sophists—the most notable case being Herodes' admiration for the rustic Agathion, known also as Sostratus in Lucian's *Demonax*.⁶¹ Philostratus depicts a bizarre encounter between Herodes and the gigantic and godlike rustic, unbrowed and fed on milk, and yet a model for the *pepaideumenos*:

“And what about your language?” asked Herodes. “How were you educated and by whom? For you do not seem to me to be one of the uneducated.” Agathion replied, “The interior of Attica is a good teacher to a man wishing to converse, for in the city the Athenians, hiring young men from Thrace, Pontus and myriad others pouring in from barbarian races, destroy their speech more than they push better language upon others. But since the interior is not mixed with barbarians, their speech there is pure and their dialect achieves the Attic summit.”⁶²

Thus Philostratus' prince of the sophists comes to admire the rustic because of his ability to produce pure Attic Greek, in a manner not entirely at odds with Pliny's admiration of Terentius.

Narbonensis provinciae integerrime functus, recepit se in agros suos, paratisque honoribus tranquillissimum otium praetulit. Hunc ego invitatus hospitio ut bonum patrem familiae, ut diligentem agricolam intuebar, de his locuturus, in quibus illum versari putabam; et coeperam, cum ille me doctissimo sermone revocavit ad studia. Quam tersa omnia, quam Latina, quam Graeca! Nam tantum utraque lingua valet, ut ea magis videatur excellere, qua cum maxime loquitur. Quantum ille legit, quantum tenet! Athenis vivere hominem, non in villa putes. Quid multa? Auxit sollicitudinem meam effecitque ut illis quos doctissimos novi, non minus hos seductos et quasi rusticos verear. 6 Idem suadeo tibi: sunt enim ut in castris sic etiam in litteris nostris, plures cultu pagano quos cinctos et armatos, et quidem ardentissimo ingenio, diligenter scrutatus invenies. Vale (Plin. Ep. 7.25).

⁶¹ Uden 2015: 93 reads Terentius' rusticity as essentially a Roman phenomenon. Philostratus' account of Agathion at least illustrates parallel values in the Greek world. On Herodes and Agathion or “Herodes' Herakles,” see Ameling 1983: 1.155-8, Anderson 1986: 14 and 67-8, Kemezis 2014: 395, Schmitz 1997: 190-2, Swain 1996: 79-83 and Whitmarsh 2001: 105-8. On similarities between Agathion and the initial exchange of the *Heroikos*, see Anderson 1986: 67-8, 100 and 108 and Whitmarsh 2001: 106 and 2009: 219.

⁶² τὴν δὲ δὴ γλῶτταν, ἔφη ὁ Ἡρώδης, πῶς ἐπαιδεύθης καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων; οὐ γὰρ μοι τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν φαίνει. καὶ ὁ Ἀγαθίων ἢ μεσογεία, ἔφη, τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγαθὸν διδασκαλεῖον ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ διαλέγεσθαι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει Ἀθηναῖοι μισθοῦ δεχόμενοι Θράκια καὶ Ποντικὰ μεράκια καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν βαρβάρων ξυνεργηκότα παραφθείρονται παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν φωνὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ξυμβάλλονται τι αὐτοῖς ἐς εὐγλωττίαν, ἢ μεσογεία δὲ ἄμικτος βαρβάρους οὕσα ὑγιαίνει αὐτοῖς ἢ φωνὴ καὶ ἢ γλῶττα τὴν ἄκραν Ἀτθίδα ἀποψάλλει (Philostr. *VS* 553). One notes similarity in views on language acquisition between Agathion and Tacitus' Messala. See above, pp. 51-4, for discussion of Roman language acquisition.

For the Greek and Roman sophistic intellectual, ability to produce Attic Greek can be admired even in those who are not traditionally urbane, thereby leaving space for exceptional *ingenium*.⁶³

Pure language can likewise transcend ethnicity. For example, Philostratus tips his cap to the Roman Aelian for his pure Attic speech: “Aelian was Roman, but he atticized as if he were an Athenian from the interior of Attica. He seems worthy of praise to me, first, since he toiled after pure speech although he lived in a city of men who speak another language.”⁶⁴ Pliny, although Roman, is perfectly fit to be the arbiter of Attic style, as he sings the praises of the Greek sophist Isaeus, partly for his memory and delivery, but also because his Greek is Attic:

Great fame had preceded Isaeus, he exceeded the fame. His skill, variety, abundance is unparalleled; he always speaks *ex tempore*, but as if he had drafted for a long time. His speech is Greek, Attic in fact; his prefaces are pure, graceful, dulcet, yet solemn and lofty. He asks for several *controversiae*; he lets the audience choose the topic, often even the side he is to take; he rises, wraps his cloak about him, begins; immediately everything is at his disposal and usually in equal fashion, concealed meanings occur to him, his words—but what quality!—are well-chosen and polished.⁶⁵

Pliny’s appreciation for Isaeus’ rhetorical expertise, not least with respect to his atticizing, anticipates Philostratus’ treatment of the sophist in his *Lives of the Sophists* to such an extent that Graham Anderson takes the letter as the best example of the Roman perspective on the Second Sophistic, remarking that Pliny’s Isaeus “appears to perform in Rome exactly as Philostratus

⁶³ On the importance of *ingenium* or natural talent in achieving *paideia* see especially Quint. *Inst.* Pr.1.

⁶⁴ Αἰλιανὸς δὲ Ῥωμαῖος μὲν ἦν, ἠττικίζε δέ, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ μεσογείᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι. ἐπαίνου μοι δοκεῖ ἄξιος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος, πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ καθαρὰν φωνὴν ἐξεπόνησε πόλιν οἰκῶν ἑτέρα φωνῇ χρωμένην (Philostr. *VS* 624).

⁶⁵ *Magna Isaeum fama praecesserat, maior inventus est. Summa est facultas copia ubertas; dicit semper ex tempore, sed tamquam diu scripserit. Sermo Graecus, immo Atticus; praefationes tersae graciles dulces, graves interdum et erectae. Poscit controversias plures; electionem auditoribus permittit, saepe etiam partes; surgit amicitur incipit; statim omnia ac paene pariter ad manum, sensus reconditi occurrant, verba - sed qualia! - quaesita et exculpta* (Plin. *Ep.* 2.3.1-2). See Kim 2010b: 475 for brief discussion and identification of this epistle as the “first unambiguous reference to grammatico-lexical Atticism.”

expects sophists to do, and with the same effect.”⁶⁶ Paradoxically, then, the appreciation for Isaeus’ atticizing expertise seems to be Roman before it is Greek.

Plinius Ἑλληνιστὶ Scribit: Code-Switching in Pliny

This appreciation is visible beyond Pliny’s reports of pure Attic language and style in the work of Isaeus, Terentius, Spurinna and Antoninus. It likewise exists beyond the translation and composition exercises that Quintilian and Pliny recommend. While we do not have any fully Greek composition from Pliny, we can note his taste for scattering Greek terms across his *Epistles*. Quotation and code-switching (discussed below) allow Pliny to write in Latin and for a Latin audience, while displaying his familiarity with and ability in Greek. The corpus of Pliny’s *Epistles* includes as many as 463 Greek words.⁶⁷ I will discuss selected instances of Pliny’s Greek quotation in the following chapter, but for now we might note that he includes 48 quotations from the Greek canon—a statement not only of his knowledge of the canon, but also of his desire to insert it into his Latin world.⁶⁸

Code-switching, that is, the practice of using two or more languages within a single speech or writing act,⁶⁹ is yet another way for our Latin authors to insert a Greek, if not necessarily Attic, flavor to their writing. In one of a number of studies on code-switching in Cicero’s letters, J.N. Adams posits as potential motivating factors for the phenomenon the following: attempts at highlighting critical terms, medical terminology or proverbs; finding the

⁶⁶ Anderson 2007: 342. See Philostr. *VS* 512-4 on Isaeus.

⁶⁷ The count includes *Ep.* 9.26 with a number of disputed readings. Without *Ep.* 9.26, the Greek word count is still an impressive 196. Venini 1952 treats Pliny’s Greek terminology with an eye to epistolary and Ciceronian tradition.

⁶⁸ So, Méthy 2002: 463-4: “son bilinguisme, associant langue latine et langue grecque, au bénéfice de la seconde, qui occupe une place quatre fois supérieure à la première.” For a list and treatment of Pliny’s quotations, Greek and Latin, see Méthy 2002: 465. She counts 46 Greek quotations with near equal representation of prose and verse.

⁶⁹ For definitions of code-switching see Adams 2003: 19 with bibliography.

mot juste; and including or excluding the addressee.⁷⁰ Most prominent in his study is code-switching's function of marking shared culture and promoting social status:

Code-switching in this role has social intention, in that it establishes a special type of cultural solidarity with hellenophile addressees [...] To some extent code-switching of this type is an artificial game played by two intimates using what is in effect a secret language which fosters a conspirational air. Both parties must have the same attitude to such pretentiousness. The game is played with the cultural resources supplied by a literary/rhetorical/philosophical education in Greek, as well as with current Greek.⁷¹

Pliny follows this Ciceronian tradition and with similar purpose and effect.⁷² In fact, the “literary/rhetorical/philosophical” education that is put on display, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, had only been further developed and appreciated by the time Pliny composed his *Epistles*. A full-length study on the subject in Pliny is still lacking, but Stanley Hoffer sums up the point well and in a way that demonstrates the similarities in the function of code-switching for Cicero and Pliny: “[Pliny’s] frequent use of Greek, taboo in more formal genres, often has a specific point beyond displaying the prestigious bilingual culture of Pliny and his friends. Greek can give learnedness, distance, lightheartedness, or philosophical weightiness.”⁷³

The addressees of letters containing code-switching also offer fertile field for examination. Nearly all of those who receive “Greek letters” are either senators, equestrians or unidentifiable.⁷⁴ At least eight were *consulares*. Not one is a woman. All of this suggests that

⁷⁰ In addition to Adams 2003: 308-47, see Baldwin 1992, Dubuisson 1992, Dunkel 2000, Steele 1900, Wenskus 1998.

⁷¹ Adams 2003: 344-5.

⁷² See Swain 2002 on code-switching in Cicero’s letters.

⁷³ Hoffer 1999: 14, including brief bibliography. My one contention with Hoffer would be that it seems that rhetorical and legal expertise are at stake in Pliny’s code-switching more so than anything philosophical.

⁷⁴ Julius Genitor is the sole addressee receiving Greek who is identifiably not a senator or equestrian. He is, however, a teacher of oratory and clearly educated. Six others cannot be securely identified (Lupercus, Cornelianus,

Greek was generally reserved for those who clearly received an elite education, thereby confirming Adams' suggestion that epistolary code-switching was the game of the elite class. Perhaps more notably, the recipients of letters with Greek tend to be frequently addressed and discussed throughout the *Epistles*. The leading addressees—Tacitus, Calpurnius Fabatus, Caninius Rufus, Novius Maximus, Arrianus Maturus and Voconius Romanus—account for 50 of Pliny's 247 letters in Books 1-9.⁷⁵ Each one of them receives at least one letter with code-switching, a number of them being repeat customers. All of this supports the idea of code-switching in Pliny as a sign of intimacy.⁷⁶ Pliny, then, is keen to display intimacy with members of the educated elite and to display his own ability to code-switch where it mattered most socially.

Pliny's code-switching usually occurs in the form of rather simple quotation or reference. But there are points at which he displays a more complex bilingualism. A letter to Suetonius, for example, compensates for a lacking active or middle aorist participle in Latin by using Greek to introduce a Homeric quotation: *Egi tamen λογισάμενος illud εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πατρὸς*.⁷⁷ We have already seen another intricate example of code-switching above, to which I would like to return. In *Ep.* 1.2.1-2, Pliny asks Arrianus Maturus for comments on his mimetic speech: "I beg you to read and edit this book, as is your habit, and all the more because I think that I have never before written with quite this style (*Hunc rogo ex consuetudine tua et legas et emendes, eo magis quod nihil ante peraeque eodem ζήλω scripsisse videor*)."⁷⁷ The code-switch from Latin to Greek here is interesting for several reasons. First, it might not even be a proper

Cornelius Ursus, Maesius Maximus, Catus Lepidus and Octavius Rufus), for whom it is likely that identification would reveal equestrian status. See Birley 2000b: 35-100 and Deane 1918: 41.

⁷⁵ See Birley 2000b: 17-19.

⁷⁶ For a similar conclusion with respect to Greek quotation in particular, see Méthy 2002: 474-5. On Greek as a sign of epistolary intimacy more generally, see Whitton 2013b: 24.

⁷⁷ Plin. *Ep.* 1.18.4. See below, pp. 123-5, for further discussion of this quotation. See below, p. 105, for Tacitus' Latin application of aorist participles.

code-switch, but rather a case of borrowing, as the term ζήλος was elsewhere used as a rhetorical term to describe Attic and Asian styles. Quintilian uses the term *cacozelon* (κακόζηλον) throughout the eighth book of the *Institutio* to describe bad affectations perpetrated by various stylists, but most of all by Asianists.⁷⁸ Pliny returns to the usage in *Ep.* 7.12, where he calls Minicius Fundanus εἰζηλος to signify his Atticist preferences.⁷⁹ The usage appears in Greek works of the period as well. Plutarch, for example, reports that Antony “deployed the so-called Asian manner (Ἀσιανῶ ζήλω) of rhetoric.”⁸⁰

If Pliny did not have rhetorical semantics in mind here, then his use of Greek was indeed a code-switch. Furthermore, the code-switch extends beyond the range of rhetorical and onto grammatical Atticism, as the cases of ζήλω and its Latin modifier *eodem* illustrate. This sort of intra-sentential switching is particularly complex in inflected languages and provides Pliny with the opportunity to demonstrate his awareness of the ablative function of the dative in Greek, and, moreover, to highlight it by modifying it with an ablative in Latin.⁸¹ He chooses an interesting point of display with an ablative dative—a function that was less frequently used in Hellenistic Greek, but that returned with the atticizing movement.

Here, Pliny is proof that Latin authors play the atticizing game. But we might likewise notice an absence of similar games in other Latin authors. Genre plays a particularly significant role in the application of code-switching.⁸² The epistolary genre is a breeding ground for such machinations. Its remove from the Roman public world lends itself both to a more carefree

⁷⁸ The term is introduced at Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.56. See also Str. 14.1.41: τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ λεγομένου ζήλου.

⁷⁹ Plin. *Ep.* 7.12.2.

⁸⁰ ἐχρήτο δὲ τῷ καλουμένῳ μὲν Ἀσιανῶ ζήλω τῶν λόγων (Plut. *Ant.* 2.8).

⁸¹ See Adams 2003: 497-508 on the Roman Greek dative.

⁸² See Adams 2003: 308.

treatment of Greekness and Romanness and to a greater intimacy with a single addressee.⁸³ Conversely, one would be hard pressed to find code-switching in the historical works of Tacitus.⁸⁴ But this does not mean that it goes without value among historians and orators. It is perhaps of some significance that when Pliny praises the style and eloquence of Tacitus' speech in the prosecution of Marius Priscus, he does so by code-switching into Greek. As he reports, "Cornelius Tacitus responded most eloquently and, a thing which stands out in his oratory, solemnly (*Respondit Cornelius Tacitus eloquentissime et, quod eximium orationi eius inest, σεμνῶς*)."⁸⁵ Eduard Norden suggested that speaking with σεμνότης was a mark of the aristocrat and drew upon authorities of the past, Thucydides especially.⁸⁶ Pliny thus places a spotlight on abilities to produce a Greek quality in his writing—his own being one of Greek vocabulary, Tacitus' being one of Greek stylistic practice. Pliny's description of Tacitus illustrates that having obtained a large degree of stylistic Atticism and some degree of linguistic Atticism, the sophistic Roman was keen to put his appreciation and skill on display. Tacitus cannot appropriately deploy code-switching in his *Annales* because of generic limitations and customs, but Pliny seems to suggest in his *Epistles* (a genre that permitted code-switching) that Tacitus' speeches, and perhaps lifestyle, embodied Greek qualities.

Attic and Roman *Urbanitas*

The *praeceptor* Quintilian was no stranger to code-switching. Cousin's 119-page catalog and discussion of Quintilian's *vocabulaire grec* testifies to this fact. The function, however, is

⁸³ See Adams 2003: 309-10 and Dubuisson 1992: 193.

⁸⁴ Tacitus does describe (but not participate in) code-switching at *Ann.* 2.10.3 when describing Arminius' interactions with his brother.

⁸⁵ Plin. *Ep.* 2.11.17. Syme 1958: 102-3 offers a description of the background and significance of the prosecution. See also Gibson and Morello 2012 *passim* on the significance of the trial in terms of the relationship between Pliny and Tacitus.

⁸⁶ Norden 1915: 330-1. Norden offers as near synonyms of the term: *sanctus*, *augustus*, *antiquus*, and *gravis*.

complicated by the nature of Quintilian's work and the not-infrequent necessity to borrow Greek rhetorical terms, perhaps without intending any pointed cultural statement. Yet a statement of status is nonetheless implicit. Quintilian must write for those, like himself, who are of a social standing that allows for a bilingual education.

It must be admitted that Quintilian prefers Latin translation of Greek quotation and, for the most part, reserves Greek vocabulary for rhetorical terms.⁸⁷ His deployment of Greek is therefore often different from Pliny's. Here, therefore, I would like to look briefly at a Quintilianic attempt at paralleling Greek Atticism that does not require code-switching or quotation, namely that found in his treatment of *urbanitas*.⁸⁸ Quintilian turns to comedy—Greek and Roman—for this discussion of *urbanitas* and the related concepts *elegantia* and *venustas*. This treatment, as Gregory Hutchinson suggests, seems to follow Caesarian linguistic theory, in which “the more Latin Terence's language, the more like Attic—by analogy. For both Attic and Latin could be seen as needing preservation from pollution.”⁸⁹ In fact, Quintilian says of the old Latin poets that “in their comedies elegance (*elegantia*) and a sort of Atticism (*atticismos*) can be found.”⁹⁰ Later, while taking Domitius Marsus' treatment of *urbanitas* to task, Quintilian defines the term as follows:

In my judgment this is *urbanitas*, a thing in which nothing can be detected that is discordant, nothing uncultivated, nothing without order, nothing foreign in terms of meaning, words, pronunciation or gesture, such that it does not belong to

⁸⁷ See Kaimio 1979: 313.

⁸⁸ See Cousin 1936: 19-20 and 56 on *urbanitas* in Quintilian as an imperfect parallel to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' ἀστεισμός, yet one that does “semble représenter toute la grâce de l'hellénisme.” Desbordes 1991: 44 discusses *urbanitas* in Cicero as “un ultra-latin, sur le modèle de l'ἄττικισμός, l'ultra grec, la parfaite langue de la capitale, dont l' indéfinissable saveur tient surtout au choix des mots, et plus encore à la prononciation.”

⁸⁹ Hutchinson 2013: 160.

⁹⁰ *Comoediis elegantia et quidam velut atticismos inveniri potest* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.8).

individual words as much as the whole tone of speaking, just as among the Greeks their Atticism rings of the true flavor of Athens.⁹¹

It is important to note that we are dealing only with analogy here and that Quintilian, with the exception of a preserved Greek nominative inflection of *atticismos* maintains a *latinitas* of his own. In short, he is not attempting to atticize himself. Yet Quintilian's analysis of *urbanitas* suggests that an atticizing effect was possible without actually using Greek words. It might be impossible for a Latin poet to atticize in a strictly linguistic sense, but functionally Atticism and Latin *urbanitas* operate on the same plane and with the same motivation.⁹²

Grecism and Tacitus

The preceding examples illustrate that a display of bilingualism, especially one that employed Attic Greek, was admired, esteemed and, therefore, highly sought after by the sophistic Roman. Translation, code-switching and quotation opened avenues toward Atticism for Pliny and Quintilian. When a Latin author found that Atticism was impossible, as was often the case, he might resort to analogy or parallel methodology, as we saw in the previous example from Quintilian. It will have been noticed that Tacitus has appeared infrequently thus far in our discussion of Greek usage. Indeed, his use of Greek is different from Pliny's and Quintilian's but it nevertheless exists.

In the remainder of the chapter, I aim to illustrate analogous or parallel stylistic trends between the Greek atticizer of the Second Sophistic and Tacitus, an author who is often (and

⁹¹ *Nam meo quidem iudicio illa est urbanitas, in qua nihil absonum, nihil agreste, nihil inconditum, nihil peregrinum neque sensu neque verbis neque ore gestive possit deprendi, ut non tam sit in singulis dictis quam in toto colore dicendi, qualis apud Graecos atticismos ille reddens Athenarum proprium saporem* (Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.107).

⁹² Marrou 1956: 277 draws similar analogies in terms of *auctoritas*: "Latin was—it was there for all time in the great writers; the science of correct speaking—*recte loquendi scientia*—was based in the last analysis on *auctoritas*. This was the Latin equivalent of the Atticism of their Greek contemporaries, the Later Sophist rhetors." Alain Gowing points out to me similar localizing phenomena in *urbanitas* as the language and wit of the Roman *urbs*, Atticism as that of Athens.

often rightly) taken to be resistant to the use of Greek.⁹³ However, that Tacitus engages in methods that run parallel to those of Greek atticizing authors will perhaps illustrate just how prevalent literary Greek was among the Roman elite and just how useful it could be in terms of establishing authority, and it will certainly illustrate shared literary and cultural ideals, intentional or not.

Tacitus' biography bears mentioning at this point.⁹⁴ Likely born in Narbonese Gaul, Tacitus perhaps felt the effect of Massilia, a Greek colony where Greek was still the common language in the first and second centuries.⁹⁵ There is some reason to believe that he served as legate in Greek-speaking Asia in 85/6 and we can be certain that he was proconsul there in 112/3.⁹⁶ Glen Bowersock noted Tacitus' penchant for naming Asia and Achaëa together—a tendency that does not occur among the works of his contemporaries Pliny and Suetonius.⁹⁷ Anthony Birley explains the connection as geographical, with Asia and Achaëa leading to one another, and, moreover, as cultural: “the two provinces represented Classical Greece, the motherland itself and western Asia Minor, especially Ionia, hence were the goal of many an upper-class Roman traveller.”⁹⁸ All of this is to suggest that Tacitus' knowledge of Greek was embedded not only in his literary, but also in his lived, experience.

⁹³ Furneaux 1896: 72, for example, states that the majority of Grecisms used by Tacitus would have been ordinary in imperial Latin and that “the list of Greek words used by him (see Nipperdey on 14.15.6) is not large, and consists wholly of terms more or less technical, and which have no strict Latin equivalent.” See also Janaccone 1950: 90 on vocabulary and Syme 1958: 504-19 on politics and culture. Kaimio 1979: 314 takes a more moderate position.

⁹⁴ Birley 2000a is the most comprehensive recent treatment. Syme 1958: 63-74 and Bowersock 1993 are still of use.

⁹⁵ See Birley 2000a: 233.

⁹⁶ See Birley 2000a: 238 and 245 (contra Bowersock 1993) on the suggestion of Tacitus' early service in Asia. An inscription from Mylasa confirms his proconsulship. See Smallwood 1966 no. 203 with Birley 2000a: 236 for further comment.

⁹⁷ Bowersock 1993: 3-10. Birley 2000a: 246 (contra Bowersock) notes the connection in other authors, but his selection of quotations lack the same Tacitean pop.

⁹⁸ Birley 2000a 245-6.

It should come as no surprise given his experience within Greek cultural worlds that though he does not code-switch, Tacitus does employ Grecisms. A few examples here will suffice to illustrate their somewhat extensive presence across his works. Greek case usage deserves mention. The Greek accusative, of which Quintilian notes a rise in popularity in Latin authors,⁹⁹ features prominently in Tacitus, with Henry Furneaux remarking that it is used “more freely by Tacitus than any prose writer except Apuleius”¹⁰⁰ (who, of course, is keen to parade his Greek). This type of accusative of respect, which Quintilian calls the *saucius pectus* construction, is echoed, for example, by Tacitus’ *manum aeger* construction at *Hist.* 4.81.3.¹⁰¹ The Greek genitive, also discussed by Quintilian,¹⁰² appears throughout Tacitus’ works and, if Furneaux and Goodyear are correct, inventively at *Ann.* 1.49.1, on which Goodyear comments, “the ‘Greek’ genitive with *diversus* is an extension of usage of which Tacitus was capable (for some analogies see Draeger §71).”¹⁰³

We can note secondly a willingness to employ Greek infinitive and participial usages. The epexegetic infinitive, for example, occurs numerous times, perhaps most notably with *manifestus* at *Ann.* 2.57.4 and *Dial.* 16.3.¹⁰⁴ Roland Mayer notes of the construction, which is not found earlier in Latin, that it “may be indebted to a Greek model, δῆλός ἐστι + part. (so Persson (1927) 23-4).”¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Tacitus’ use of *dare* with the infinitive, for example at *Dial.* 7.1, is

⁹⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.17: “now common in the *acta* is the ‘*saucius pectus*’ usage.” Russell *ad loc.* notes further that the usage developed under Greek influence, as Quintilian says.

¹⁰⁰ Furneaux 1896: 44.

¹⁰¹ A plethora of similar usages exist in Tacitus. See, e.g., *Germ.* 17; *Hist.* 1.85; *Ann.* 1.50, 2.13, 2.17, 6.9, 15.64. See also Woodman 2009b: 37 for an exceptional usage and Draeger 1882: 19 for general comment.

¹⁰² Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.17: “Horace approves of the following usage: *nec ciceris nec longae invidit avenae*.” Russell *ad loc.* calls this use of the genitive a grecism.

¹⁰³ Goodyear 1972: 311. See Furneaux 1896: 50 for more general discussion, Martin and Woodman 1989: 127 for a particular usage (with *compertum*) later favored by Apuleius. Draeger 1882: 35 remarks further that the influence of Greek upon Tacitus is clear in this respect.

¹⁰⁴ See Goodyear 1981 and Mayer 2001 *ad loc.* and Furneaux 1896: 56.

¹⁰⁵ Mayer 2001: 138.

borrowed from Greek syntax with *δίδωμι*.¹⁰⁶ The aorist present participle, which can be traced back to Thucydides 2.2.5 and Xenophon *Hell.* 2.4.25 and can also be seen in Plutarch, occurs with some frequency in the *Annales*,¹⁰⁷ including a use of *praemonente* seen first in Latin at *Ann.* 11.35.2.¹⁰⁸ One can see in a usage such as this a monolingual version of the code-switch that Pliny performed in his letter to Suetonius, discussed briefly above.

Other Greek idioms and borrowings can be detected, for example, in Tacitus' use of *amare* on analogy with *φιλεῖν* to mean "to be accustomed,"¹⁰⁹ *simul* on analogy with *ἅμα*,¹¹⁰ and—a favorite of Tacitus—the use of *specie...ceterum ut* as an echo of Thucydides' *λόγῳ μὲν... ἔργῳ δέ*.¹¹¹ The latter example, along with other Thucydidean usages, confirms Tacitus' affinity for following his Greek precursor.¹¹² Thus, many of Tacitus' usages that occur in Livy and Sallust as well as in Thucydides must be viewed as borrowings that are as Greek as they are Latin. While one often reads that Tacitus' grecisms occur elsewhere in Latin, this does not mean that he is unaware of their Greek origin. In short, as Dylan Sailor notes, "once you have established a link to Sallust, Thucydides comes with him, as there is no getting the Greek historian out of his Roman counterpart's style."¹¹³ The Roman historian, then, at least from the time of Sallust, had adopted Thucydides as a stylistic model in a manner that, though different in many ways, is not without some similarity to that of the Greek Atticist of the imperial period. While many of the grecisms noted above do not strictly parallel any of the new atticizing

¹⁰⁶ See Mayer 2001 *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁷ See Draeger 1882: 84, Furneaux 1896: 58-9 and Malloch 2013: 134 for citations and discussion. See also Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.9.

¹⁰⁸ See Malloch 2013 *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁹ See Tac. *Ann.* 4.9.2 with Martin and Woodman 1989 *ad loc.* Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.17 highlights the *amat fieri* clause as a grecism. See Mayer 1999: 161-6.

¹¹⁰ See Tac. *Ann.* 3.64.3, 4.55.3, 6.9.5 with Furneaux 1896: 61 and *ad loc.*

¹¹¹ See Goodyear 1972: 299 and Martin 1951: 175-6.

¹¹² See, e.g., Woodman and Martin 1996 on *Ann.* 3.74.2 and Martin and Woodman 1989 on *Ann.* 4.11.3 for potential Thucydidean echoes in vocabulary. See Adams 1971: 9, Mayer 2001: 29 and Woodman and Martin 1996: 80 on Thucydidean origins of Tacitean hyperbaton.

¹¹³ Sailor 2008: 150.

tendencies of Tacitus' Greek contemporaries, they do display a certain amount of linguistic and grammatical *paideia*.

The Greek-speaking atticizer, however, could not avoid many of the grecisms that Tacitus meaningfully deployed for poetic punch. An epexegetic infinitive, for example, was standard Greek and did not necessarily parade any stylistic flourish or *paideia* in the way it might have for Tacitus. The atticizer did, however, have other ways of displaying his linguistic and grammatical *paideia*, often deploying, for example, the dative case, the middle voice and the future participle—features that had dropped out of use in the Hellenistic period and were rarely seen in non-elite texts.¹¹⁴ Similar trends exist in Tacitus, some already well entrenched in Latin historiographical tradition, some unique to Tacitus, but all aiming at an aura of authority and sometimes doing so by borrowing from an Attic predecessor. The future participle, particularly with ὄς, was a marker of Atticism.¹¹⁵ Tacitus deploys the future participle with *ut* in similar fashion.¹¹⁶ Insofar as the middle voice could be affected by strong reflexivity, Tacitus attempts such a usage, for example at *Hist.* 2.20.1, with *indutus*.¹¹⁷ Most notable and very much characteristic of Tacitean style is the extended use of the dative case, which, thanks to the Greek Atticists, was beginning to reclaim usages in Greek that extended beyond the indirect object. One particularly favored use of the dative, likely borrowed from Greek, is the dative of agent, which Tacitus employs “frequently and sometimes audaciously, ignoring restrictions once recognised,” namely usage only with gerundives and adjectives in *-bilis*.¹¹⁸ Cynthia Damon counts thirty

¹¹⁴ Kim 2010b: 470.

¹¹⁵ It was actually used rarely in true Attic prose, except in Xenophon, but became popular among imperial atticizers. See Smyth §2193-2203.

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Goodyear 1972: 307 on *Ann.* 1.47.3. The usage appears earlier in Livy.

¹¹⁷ See Ash 2007 *ad loc.*: “*indutus* has a strong reflexive element, functions like a Greek middle and takes an accusative object (a poetical or post-Augustan usage).” On middle and passive verb usage in Tacitus see Draeger 1882: 21.

¹¹⁸ See Goodyear 1981 on *Ann.* 2.50.3.

instances of the dative of agent in Tacitus, and treatment of the unusual usage has not escaped the notice of commentators across the Tacitean corpus.¹¹⁹ Tacitus also extends the use of the so-called Greek attracted dative, in which a relative pronoun takes its antecedent's case by attraction.¹²⁰ Previously restricted, in Latin, to phrases including the participles *volenti* and *volentibus*, Tacitus employs it with *invitis* and *cupientibus* at *Ann.* 1.59.1.¹²¹

While the parallels are striking, that Tacitus employed these usages on analogy with contemporary Greek atticizers certainly cannot be confirmed. It cannot be denied, however, that many of the features of Tacitean prose that have an exotic or novel element to them result from his invocation of past grammatical usages, many of which are Greek.

Archaism and Tacitus

As we saw above, grammatical nostalgia and novelty could be a source of authority. Invocation of the past, a feature of the Second Sophistic, often demonstrated itself linguistically as well. Thus Lawrence Kim notes that “the most striking contrast between Atticist and colloquial language, however, is in vocabulary; Atticizing writers avoid using words not attested in Classical texts, substituting the Attic equivalent.”¹²² Atticizing, then, was often synonymous with linguistic archaism.¹²³ While Suzanne Saïd has viewed archaism as a “major component of Hellenism,”¹²⁴ a parallel archaism occurred in Latin as well, suggesting that Romans and Greeks

¹¹⁹ See Damon 2003 on *Hist.* 1.34.2, but see Gudeman 1914 on *Dial.* 4.4 for a different count. See also, e.g., Ash 2007 on *Hist.* 2.80.3, Furneaux 1896: 46, Goodyear 1972 on *Ann.* 1.1.2 and 1981 on *Ann.* 2.50.3, Malloch 2013 on *Ann.* 11.27, Martin and Woodman 1989 on *Ann.* 4.3.5, Mayer 2001 on *Dial.* 4.1, Ogilvie and Richmond 1967 on *Agr.* 10.1.

¹²⁰ See Furneaux 1896: 45 and Ogilvie and Richmond 1967 on *Agr.* 18.2. Cf. Thuc. 2.3.2: τῷ πλήθει οὐ βουλομένῳ ἦν. See Smyth §1487.

¹²¹ See Goodyear 1981 and Furneaux 1896 *ad loc.*, Draeger 1882: 24 on this dative usage in general in Tacitus.

¹²² Kim 2010b: 470.

¹²³ See Bowie 1974: 166-7 on Atticism as linguistic archaism, with bibliography.

¹²⁴ Saïd 2001: 291.

both enjoyed a cult of the past. Thus, even Ewen Bowie, who champions Greek heritage as a focal point of the Second Sophistic, admits that “Latin and Greek archaism must have influenced each other.”¹²⁵ Ronald Mellor states further, “The Latin archaism (e.g., Aulus Gellius; Fronto) of the same era was surely influenced by, and perhaps even influenced in return, the Atticism of the Second Sophistic, though Apuleius is the only surviving Latin ‘Sophist.’”¹²⁶ Champlin, Harrison, Holford-Strevens and Sandy have all illustrated various ways in which Latin and Greek archaism operated on similar planes in the intellectual world of Fronto, Aulus Gellius, Apuleius and their Greek contemporaries.

Rarer is a treatment of archaism in Tacitus with an eye to Greek contemporary trends. But while it is true that archaism is likewise a part of the historiographical tradition, Tacitus’ employment of it is not without parallel to the Greek and Latin intellectuals of the second century CE. Thus, we might wonder if he should not be included among the authors of whom John Marincola writes in treating mimetic models in historiography:

More transient, but no less influential, would be variations in current taste, such as the Atticising movement, which derogated the authors of the entire Hellenistic period, and influenced both Greek and Latin historians; the Palatine library at Rome which enshrined those writers of whom the ruling emperor especially approved; and archaising movements, which resurrected little-read historians and poets.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Bowie 1974: 167.

¹²⁶ Mellor 2008: 116. See also Holford-Strevens 2003: 354-63 and Hutchinson 2013: 240.

¹²⁷ Marincola 1997: 18-9.

As transient and resistant to strict analysis such phenomena can be, I will not attempt an exhaustive list of historiographical v. intellectual archaisms in Tacitus.¹²⁸ I do, however, want to note briefly the manner and motive of his archaizing, while keeping an eye on the same in the work of his Greek contemporaries. R.H. Martin and A.J. Woodman sum up Tacitus' archaism well:

Now archaisms are a regular feature of Latin historical prose, because historians often wish their narrative to reproduce something of the flavour of the past ages with which they are concerned. But whereas T.'s main model, Sallust, had been criticised by Asinius Pollio for his excessive affectation of archaisms (Suet. *Gram.* 10), T. himself prefers "mild archaisms" to those which are obtrusively odd.¹²⁹

The "mild archaism" of Tacitus seems to follow the advice of Quintilian, who emphasizes that charm and authority in archaizing is only achieved if done so moderately:

Words regained from olden days not only have great men to recommend them, but also add a certain majesty that is not without charm to a speech: for they have the authority of antiquity and, since they have been set aside for some time, they offer a grace similar to novelty. But there is need for moderation, so that they are not too frequent or obvious, since nothing is more otiose than affectation, and so that they are not regained from the deepest forgotten times.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ See Ash 2007: 15-6, Goodyear 1972: 334-5, Furneaux 1896: 72 and Martin and Woodman 1989: 20 for brief discussions and examples of archaism in Tacitus' works.

¹²⁹ Martin and Woodman 1989: 20. See similarly Ash 2007: 15.

¹³⁰ *Verba a vetustate repetita non solum magnos adsertores habent, sed etiam adferunt orationi maiestatem aliquam non sine delectatione: nam et auctoritatem antiquitatis habent et, quia intermissa sunt, gratiam novitati similem parant. Sed opus est modo, ut neque crebra sint haec nec manifesta, quia nihil est odiosius adfectatione, nec utique ab ultimis et iam oblitteratis repetita temporibus* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.39). See further discussion at Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.25-9.

This message from Quintilian, supported by Tacitus' usage and Pollio's criticism of Sallust, attains to a use of archaism that more closely parallels that of Lucian or Philostratus than it does that of Sallust. Lucian's *Demonax*, for example, is praised for avoiding excessive archaism:

Moreover he thought worthy of mockery those who use excessively archaic and foreign words in regular conversation: to one man who was asked a question by him and who answered in a hyper-attic manner (ὑπεραττικῶς), he said, "I asked you now, my friend, but you answer me as if I asked Agamemnon."¹³¹

Similarly Critias is praised by Philostratus for employing proper Atticism: "He atticized, but not immoderately, nor unnaturally—for rashness in atticizing is barbaric."¹³² In short, Tacitus' archaism, like the type praised by his Greek counterparts, follows a cult of the past in order to achieve authority and solemnity, but maintains moderation such that the effect is not jarring or ludicrous. His archaism follows historiographical tradition while incorporating stylistics of the contemporary intellectual milieu.

Conclusion

The balance between tradition and contemporary tastes is central to ancient mimetic practice and is a product of the education discussed in my second chapter. Accomplishing the proper balance led to the authority and prestige discussed in my first chapter. The phenomenon of Atticism provided a fitting way for imperial Greeks to parade *paideia* in accordance with the ideas and ideals discussed in previous chapters. Yet, an appreciation for and display of Attic Greek language and usage can be traced also in the works of Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny,

¹³¹ Καὶ μὴν κάκεινων καταγελᾶν ἤξιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις πάνυ ἀρχαίοις καὶ ξένοις ὀνόμασι χρωμένων· ἐνὶ γούν ἐρωτηθέντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λόγον τινα καὶ ὑπεραττικῶς ἀποκριθέντι, Ἐγὼ μὲν σε, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, νῦν ἠρώτησα, σὺ δέ μοι ὡς ἐπ' Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀποκρίνη (Lucian *Demon.* 26).

¹³² ἀττικίζοντά τε οὐκ ἀκρατῶς, οὐδὲ ἐκφύλωσ—τὸ γὰρ ἀπειρόκαλον ἐν τῷ ἀττικίζειν βάρβαρον (Philostr. *VS* 503).

Roman authors who preceded Attic champions such as Lucian, Aristides and Philostratus. The application and appreciation of Atticism among these Romans were limited, it must be stressed. I do not mean to overstate Roman atticizing tastes or abilities. Furthermore, these Latin authors, as we have seen, often have very different ways of revealing their familiarity with Greek. Yet, this variety of engagement—the dictums of Quintilian, the positive exempla of Pliny and the style of Tacitus—perhaps speaks to the abundance and importance of Greek in the world of the Roman elite. In spite of generic limitations and differing styles and tastes, these authors seem to give a place to Attic Greek in the sophisticated culture of the imperial Greek *and* Roman elite world. Simon Swain’s statement, with which I began this chapter, rings true: “The aim of *attikismos*, stylistic and linguistic, was to differentiate the leaders of Greek letters and speech from the broad mass of Greek speakers.” But perhaps it is not only leaders of Greek letters and speech to whom the statement applies.

Chapter Four

Roman Allusion to a Greek Past

The display of Greek *paideia* was not limited to mimesis, dialectical or stylistic. Familiarity with a set of Greek texts, themes and content was of additional and perhaps greater value. As Tim Whitmarsh puts it, “To possess *paideia*—that is, to be *pepaideumenos*—meant to be familiar with a set of canonical texts, mostly in prose, predominantly from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.”¹ And so it was that appropriation of past literary models by means of allusion and playful correction was a popular sophistic maneuver towards parading learning in that it required an exclusive knowledge of the canon and a seemingly innate interpretive ability.

The appropriation of Classical Greek authors as central to *paideia* is well illustrated, albeit through satire, by Lucian’s *On Salaried Posts*, in which he reports both what members of the elite were reading and why they did so. He first lists the three most cited authors during the Second Sophistic, reporting that the wealthy householders “reach with yearning for the wisdom of Homer or the intensity of Demosthenes or the sublimity of Plato.”² However, it is not really wisdom that the wealthy Roman seeks, but rather the appearance of Greek learning and the prestige that attends it; that is, he wants to “seem to be a lover of Greek learning and in general fond of *paideia*.”³ Criticizing empty parades of Greek literacy is not unique to Lucian or to Greek authors, for that matter. In discussing Homeric appropriation in Rome, Joseph Farrell points to similar passages in Petronius’ *Satyricon* in which Trimalchio is lampooned through a “ludicrously weak” grasp of Homer, and in Seneca’s *Epistle 27*, in which Calvisius is skewered

¹ Whitmarsh 1998: 193.

² ἐκτετήκασιν τῷ πόθῳ τῆς Ὀμήρου σοφίας ἢ τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος ἢ τῆς Πλάτωνος μεγαλοφροσύνης (Lucian, *De Merc.* 25).

³ δόξει γὰρ ἐκ τούτου καὶ φιλομαθῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μαθημάτων καὶ ὅλως περὶ παιδείαν φιλόκαλος (Lucian, *De Merc.* 25).

for attempting to display familiarity with Greek classics in spite of a clear lack of literate education. These stories, Farrell remarks, display that Homer “was valued by the elite not merely as a context for appreciating Latin literature but as a mark of their social rank, and that this knowledge could not be counterfeited if one wished to be accepted by polite society.”⁴

Not every acquisition of a reputation for *paideia* was so shallow or, at any rate, so unsuccessful as those of Lucian, Petronius and Seneca’s wealthy fools. Philostratus, for example, seems sincere in praising Dio of Prusa as a true *pepaideumenos*, since he showed his excellence, among other ways, by adapting Plato and Demosthenes with ingenuity.⁵ Such learning and display, as Simon Swain notes, was probably not unique to Dio: “In this period more than before or after, social and political reasons pressured many, perhaps most, among the leading classes of the Greek world into claiming and advertising a high degree of classical education and culture.”⁶ Matthias Ludolph reveals a similar situation in the case of Pliny the Younger, who, for social and political reasons, takes a literary approach to self-promotion.⁷ While Lucian’s criticism, therefore, ought to be taken with a grain of salt, it does usefully provide a short list of authors to be paraded: Homer, Demosthenes, Plato. These authors lead in citations among educative textbooks and offer necessary information and assistance to the orator engaging with popular themes of declamation.⁸ These canonical authors, furthermore, provide fodder for the world of literary production in the Second Sophistic. Graham Anderson notes that Homer “was ubiquitous” and that Plato and Demosthenes, along with select dramatic poets and historians,

⁴ Farrell 2004: 268-9.

⁵ Philostr. *VS* 486-8.

⁶ Swain 2000: 24.

⁷ Ludolph 1997. See also Marchesi 2008: 2-3.

⁸ See above, pp. 59-63, for a more detailed discussion of reading lists and canon among the educated elite, both Greek and Roman. See my first chapter for more detailed discussion of the potential prestige incorporated in the acquisition of *paideia*.

could “expect to be imitated and recognised.”⁹ His chapter on “Communing with the Classics” accordingly reads appropriations of Homer and of Plato as quintessentially sophistic paradigms. At least since Jan Fredrik Kindstrand’s *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik* and Phillip De Lacy’s “Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A.D.,” such readings in imperial Greek appropriation have been the norm.

My chapter will follow suit, taking Homer and Plato as the two Classical authors who, because they were central in elite literate education, offered widest range for sophistic appropriation. While my approach differs little from others’, my aim is substantially different, though not necessarily at odds. I take Lucian’s biting satire of the superficial Roman as my beginning—namely, the premise that Roman authors were interested in displaying Greek *paideia* through literary allusion. But I want to suggest further that Romans under the Roman Empire, like their Greek contemporaries, could be adept at sophistically appropriating Greek texts and that they often did so for similarly socially and politically driven reasons.¹⁰

Homer and the Second Sophistic

“So, as Aratus thinks that one must begin with Zeus, so too we shall find it proper to begin with Homer.”¹¹ Homer’s centrality in the intellectual world of the Roman Empire is well attested, not least by more than 1000 Homeric papyri.¹² As Quintilian’s *incipit* into a discussion of literary canon suggests, and as Froma Zeitlin states, “beginning with the Hellenistic period, Greek intellectuals point to Homer as proof of their entitlement to archetypal wisdom as founders

⁹ Anderson 1993: 70.

¹⁰ Sandy 1997: 59-60 makes a similar case for Apuleius.

¹¹ *Igitur, ut Aratus ab Iove incipiendum putat, ita nos rite coepturi ab Homero videmur* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46).

¹² See Criboire 2001:194-7. Euripides’ papyri, the second largest number of recovered literary and educational papyri, come in around 100. Criboire points out that the papyri indicate a preference for the *Iliad* and for the earlier books therein. We see support for this trend in popularity in Pliny’s use of Homeric quotation, discussed below, pp. 116-32.

of civilization and masters of *paideia*.”¹³ What may be new, however, is the degree to which members of the intellectual elite sophistically deployed knowledge of Homer to advance their social position. In his study of this very phenomenon, Lawrence Kim takes as granted an increased importance of *paideia* in self-definition during the Second Sophistic and argues persuasively for Homer’s role “as avatar of Greek culture”: “In a culture where elite identity was tied up with the literary authority of the classics, to quote Homer, to appeal to his poetry, was part of the continuous process of asserting one’s membership in the ‘cultured’ and therefore ‘Greek’ elite.”¹⁴

The bibliography on imperial Greek deployment of Homer is vast and ever-growing, but for our purposes here, let us turn to one popular *locus* for such studies, and an appropriate one at that, given its author, who literally invented the Second Sophistic. Philostratus’ *Heroikos* is a centerpiece of imperial Greek appropriation, manipulation and correction of Homer.¹⁵ A Phoenician merchant meets an apparently rustic, but verily educated, vine dresser in the Thracian Chersonese. The vine dresser, a devotee of Protesilaus, passes through discussions of the Mysian expedition, Homer’s poetry and a catalogue of heroes with focus on Palamedes and Achilles, correcting Homer’s version of the war at Troy along the way. Externally, the Homeric references and corrections are a showcase of Philostratus’ literary education. Internally, Homer serves as a field for social competition. The Phoenician and the vine dresser open the dialogue with a certain hostility, the vine dresser accusing the Phoenician (and his people) of greed and the Phoenician returning the insult:

¹³ Zeitlin 2001: 204. See also Ford 2002: 194-7. See Hunter 2004: 249-53, Kim 2010a and Porter 2001: 85-92 on Homer’s cultural power in the imperial period.

¹⁴ Kim 2010a: 9-10. See also Kim 2010a: 216.

¹⁵ See Kim 2010a: 175-213, Rusten 2004, Whitmarsh 2004 and 2009, and Zeitlin 2001: 255-66 for cultural readings of the *Heroikos*.

Vine dresser: Just as you are praised for sailing, so too are you slandered because of your trading as lovers of money and greedy.

Phoenician: Aren't you money loving, vine dresser, living among these vines and perhaps seeking someone to gather the grapes for a drachma in pay and someone or other to whom you may sell a sweet wine or one with a fine bouquet? Wine which, I think, you say you have hidden away, just like Maron.

Vine dresser: Phoenician stranger, if there are somewhere on earth Cyclopes, whom, it is said, earth nourishes although they are lazy and plant and sow nothing, fruit would grow unattended, although it belongs to Demeter and Dionysus, and nothing from the earth would be sold.¹⁶

Within this exchange lies a series of Homeric references—Phoenician greed from *Odyssey* 14.288-9, Maron's hidden wine from *Odyssey* 9.197, the Cyclopes' lack of farming from *Odyssey* 9.109.

Once they have displayed and competed in *paideia* and have proven their membership among the cultured class, the two interlocutors grow friendlier toward each other and the dialogue can then proceed.¹⁷ And it proceeds with Homer at the center, yet not as a center for a simple exchange of references, but as a canvas for correction. As the vine dresser relies on the ghost of Protesilaus to correct Homer's lies, we see that although Homeric references might be enough to establish oneself as educated, requisite to the advancement of one's status among the sophistic elite was familiarity with the secondary scholarship, so to speak. Kim remarks of

¹⁶ A: ὡσπερ δὲ τὰς ναυτιλίας ἐπαινέισθε, οὕτω τὰς ἐμπορίας διαβέβλησθε ὡς φιλοχρήματοί τε καὶ τρῶκται.

Φ: Σὺ δὲ οὐ φιλοχρήματος, ἀμπελουργέ, ζῶν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἀμπέλοις καὶ ζητῶν ἴσως ὅστις μὲν ὀπωριεῖ καταβαλὼν σοι δραχμὴν τῶν βοτρυῶν, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀποδώσῃ τὸ γλεῦκος ἢ ὅτῳ τὸν ἀνθοσμῖαν; ὄν, οἶμαι, καὶ κατορωρυγμένον φῆς ἔχειν ὡσπερ ὁ Μάρων.

A: Ἐένε Φοῖνιξ, εἰ μὲν εἰσὶ που τῆς γῆς Κύκλωπες, οὓς λέγεται ἢ γῆ ἀργοὺς βόσκειν φυτεύοντας οὐδὲν οὐδὲ σπεύροντας, ἀφύλακτα μὲν τὰ φυόμενα εἶη ἄν, καίτοι Δήμητρός γε καὶ Διονύσου ὄντα, πωλοῖτο δ' ἄν οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς (Philostr. *Her.* 1.3-5).

¹⁷ So Kim 2010a: 182: "The encounter exemplifies the way that Homer functions as a universal 'language' under the Empire that transcends ethnicity or national identity."

Protesilaus and his revisionism, “one can see that it is not just the interest in Homer, but the familiarity with Homeric criticism and awareness of the revisionist tradition in particular that marks Protesilaus as ‘modern’ despite his otherwise archaic credentials.”¹⁸

Philostratus’ Homeric references display his symbolic capital. His appropriation and revision increase that capital. But in doing so, he also undermines Homer, that avatar of Hellenism, thereby questioning the foundation and defining qualities of Hellenic identity.¹⁹ Noting this paradox, Zeitlin ends her study of Homeric vision and revision thus: “Homer, I will insist, both exemplifies Greek culture in its most fundamental manifestation and at the same time stands apart from (and above) it as an almost universal commodity, to be disseminated among Greeks and non-Greeks alike.”²⁰ Philostratus’ treatment of Homer is an excellent example of how Greek *paideia* can be deployed as a means of affirming, questioning or rejecting what it means to be Greek, depending on authorial motivation. In other words, one can use Homer variously in addressing issues of culture. Yet when it comes to social and intellectual exchange, he can be nothing but a valuable commodity to be traded for prestige.

Homer and the sophistic Roman

The opportunity to deploy Homer as social capital while maintaining cultural ambivalence opens the door for the Latin rhetorician Quintilian to begin his canon with Homer. In fact, of all authors cited in Quintilian, Homer is behind only Cicero, Demosthenes and Vergil.

¹⁸ Kim 2010a: 199.

¹⁹ See Kim 2010a esp. 216-8, who views Homer as a key to Hellenic identity and Philostratus’ (and Dio of Prusa’s) treatment of him as critical of unthinking reverence of a Hellenic past. See also Porter 2001: 85-90 for a similar discussion of Homer as a *locus* for cultural ambivalence in Dio of Prusa—an author to be discussed later in this chapter.

²⁰ Zeitlin 2001: 266.

Quintilian's 41 citations to Homer even trump Dionysius of Halicarnassus' 37.²¹ Quintilian places Homer atop excellence in eloquence: "to every part of eloquence Homer has given the *exemplum* and the origin."²² More importantly, Homer is not just great, but the ability to understand him brings greatness. Quintilian closes his Homeric section by placing the understanding of Homer as the measure of virtue: "To follow his virtues, not by imitation, which is impossible to do, but by intellectual understanding is the mark of a great man."²³

With this, I would like to turn to Pliny's *Epistles* and investigate the ways in which Quintilian's pupil took to heart these encouragements to pursue Homeric learning. To what extent, like the characters in Philostratus' *Heroikos*, did he deploy Homeric references as social markers and, like Philostratus, place himself in the critical literary tradition, thereby advancing his position further?

Pliny's *Epistles* contain at least twenty references to Homeric lines.²⁴ Of these, seventeen are what Kindstrand would identify as *metrische Entlehnungen*, or word-for-word borrowings. This number falls far short of those presented by Kindstrand in his study of Dio of Prusa, Maximus of Tyre and Aelius Aristides,²⁵ but with allowances for overall length and the primary language of the corpora at hand, Pliny's deployment of Homer is nevertheless impressive. As discussed in the previous chapter, Pliny shows a remarkable preference for Greek quotation.²⁶

²¹ See Morgan 1998a: 317-8 for citations in Quintilian.

²² *Omnibus eloquentiae partibus exemplum et ortum dedit* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46). See Galimberti Biffino 2007: 295-7 for discussion of Pliny's and Quintilian's admiration of Homer. Traces of this appreciation appear in Tacitus' *Dialogus* as well when Maternus reminds Aper that the ancient Homer has been held in as high honor as the more recent models of rhetorical excellence: *concedes, Aper, non minorem honorem Homero quam Demostheni apud posteros* (Tac. *Dial.* 12.5).

²³ *Magni sit viri virtutes eius non aemulatione, quod fieri non potest, sed intellectu sequi* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.50).

²⁴ See Deane 1918 for a discussion of Greek in Pliny, including a list of most of Pliny's Homeric references. Galimberti Biffino 2007 and Méthy 2002: 465-75 treat Homeric quotation with an eye to select instances.

²⁵ See Kindstrand 1970: 19-26, 49-55 and 77-84.

²⁶ See above, p. 97. See Whitton 2013a: 8-9 on this tendency for Greek quotation in comparison to that of Quintilian.

This holds true with respect to his use of Homer, as he chooses Latin translation or paraphrase only three times out of the twenty Homeric tags. The mere existence of Homeric quotation on its own might be insufficient cause for discussion, but Pliny's use of Homer, as Ilaria Marchesi notes of his allusive technique generally, is a means more than an end. His allusion to Homer is a self-reflexive construction of his literary and social identity.²⁷ Just as Philostratus' interlocutors immediately prove their chops through Homeric reference, Pliny opens his collection with seven Homeric quotations in the first book of his *Letters*.²⁸

Pliny's unmarked Homeric quotation

The reader with *paideia* will know from the outset that Pliny is a member of the cultured elite. As he proves himself to be a *pepaideumenos*, like the vine dresser and the Phoenician in the *Heroikos*, Pliny uses his Greek *paideia* both to exclude the *illiterati* and to include the *literati*.²⁹ One of the best ways to do so is through seemingly improvised quotation that is unmarked, or without indication of its original source. Philostratus provides a good example of this technique in his *Lives of the Sophists*. He relates an exchange between Marcus Aurelius and Herodes Atticus concerning the sophist Polemo of Laodicea: "When the Emperor Marcus asked him, 'What do you think of Polemo?' Herodes, fixing his eyes, said 'the clap of swift-footed horses strikes about my ears,' indicating the sonorousness and resonance of his speech."³⁰ Here Herodes adapts a Homeric line—ἵππων μ' ὠκυπόδων ἀμφὶ κτύπος οὔατα βάλλει—to the situation at

²⁷ See Marchesi 2008: ix. See also Cova 2003: 88n9 for Pliny's use of intertextuality for argumentation.

²⁸ See Sherwin-White 1966: 509 on the prevalence of Greek generally in the early books.

²⁹ See Trisoglio 1972b: 4n3 on the distancing effect of Greek quotation. See Hoffer 1999: 219 on the easing of tone resulting from Greek quotation.

³⁰ Μάρκου δὲ τοῦ αυτοκράτορος πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος «τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ Πολέμων;» στήσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ Ἡρώδης «ἵππων μ'» ἔφη «ὠκυπόδων ἀμφὶ κτύπος οὔατα βάλλει.» ἐνδεικνύμενος δὴ τὸ ἐπικροτὸν καὶ ὑψηλὰς τῶν λόγων (Philostr. *VS* 539). Interestingly, Suetonius has Nero quote the very same line just before his death at *Nero* 49. This seems to suggest that the line was a popular one. If Philostratus was familiar with Suetonius, then the line perhaps assumes a more complex significance in Philostratus. For Homeric quotation in Suetonius see Mitchell 2015. See also Connors 1994 on Nero's exit.

hand.³¹ The charge of horses at war in the *Iliad* becomes a way of measuring rhetoric, both making Herodes' eloquence heroic and challenging the interlocutor to understand the unmarked and seemingly unrelated quotation. With an intellectual interlocutor like Marcus Aurelius, Herodes places himself on the highest social stratum by connecting on this unusual plane, in which Homeric heroism applies to rhetorical performance.

Pliny fashions a few such instances of his own. They grant perhaps even greater prestige because in his *Letters* Pliny takes the role of both Philostratus and Herodes, as reporter and reported. Let us turn first to four unmarked Greek quotations in the *Letters*.

Epistle 8.2 to Calvisius Rufus reports a generous rebate that Pliny offered to those who invested in a poor harvest of grapes at his estate. Pliny ends the letter by displaying that he understands that symbolic capital can be better than financial capital:

This system or good nature has cost me a good deal, but it was of just as great worth. For the novelty of the rebate and its form is praised by the whole region. Among those also whom I measured not by one pole, so to speak, but distinctly and by grade, whoever is good and upright has left feeling proportionately obliged to me, having learned from experience that it is not the case with me that “the evil and the good among us are held in equal honor.”³²

This Homeric quotation from *Iliad* 9.319—ἐν δὲ ἰῆ τιμῆ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός (“the evil and the good among us are held in equal honor”)—originally comes from the mouth of Achilles, and deals not with horticulture, but with Agamemnon's failure to honor his deserving soldiers

³¹ Hom. *Il.* 10.535.

³² *Magno mihi seu ratio haec seu facilitas stetit, sed fuit tanti. Nam regione tota et novitas remissionis et forma laudatur. Ex ipsis etiam quos non una, ut dicitur, pertica sed distincte gradatimque tractavi, quanto quis melior et probior, tanto mihi obligatior abiit expertus non esse apud me* <ἐν δὲ ἰῆ τιμῆ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός> (Plin. *Ep.* 8.2.8). The Greek quotation, one must note, does not appear in either manuscript M or θ. It appears in the 1506 Aldus edition, which was compiled on the basis of a no longer extant manuscript Π, along with Aldus' own conjectures.

such that the good and bad meet an equal end. For the gravity of Achilles' expression, Pliny's easy tone gives the impression that the quotation is unrehearsed. Thus, Pliny takes an unmarked, unrehearsed and seemingly unrelated Homeric line and puts it to his own use in a manner not so different from Philostratus' Herodes. If this Calvisius is a more careful reader than his Senecan namesake, perhaps he will even realize that Pliny has placed himself in the position of a king who, in contrast to Agamemnon, treats his citizens justly.³³ Pliny's self-promotion, *mirabile dictu*, is even greater than it first appears.³⁴

Epistle 6.8 offers another self-serving Homeric quotation, this time in a letter to a certain Priscus.³⁵ En route to asking for Priscus' help in securing money owed to Atilius, Pliny remarks on his closeness to Atilius and his past loyalties. The emphasis on social connections and loyalties finds parallels in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*.³⁶ So too does the use of Homeric quotation, as Pliny writes:

You know and love Atilius Crescens. For what even slightly distinguished person does not know and love him? I cherish him firmly and uniquely. Our hometowns are separated by only a day's journey; as youths we began to love each other, which makes for the warmest love. This has remained since and has not receded with further judgment, but has grown stronger. For he also circulates my friendship with the widest possible pronouncement, and I make it obvious how much of a care his peace and security are to me. In fact, when he feared that the

³³ There is good reason to believe that Calvisius Rufus would have been a keen reader, as one of Pliny's most respected friends, or *contubernales* (contra Bradley 2010). Suetonius, to whom Pliny sends letters with similarly unmarked Greek quotation is also in this group of close associates. See Gibson and Morello 2012: 140-2.

³⁴ See R. Gibson 2003 on Pliny's strategies of self-promotion.

³⁵ Identification of Priscus is murky. See Birley 2000b: 83 and Sherwin-White 1966: 363.

³⁶ See above, p. 40.

insolence of a certain tribune of the plebs would fall upon him, and he indicated it to me, I responded: “Not as long as I am alive.”³⁷

The Greek tag, οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος (“not as long as I am alive”), refers to *Iliad* 1.88, where Achilles promises to protect Kalchas from the wrath of powerful Greeks, Agamemnon most of all. Now, this tag may be more fitting to the circumstance than Herodes’, given that both Achilles and Pliny are dealing with protection of friends. And the Greek quotation within a Latin letter would certainly alert the reader to its special significance. Nevertheless, it, like Herodes’ line, shows that Pliny not only had an elite education, but could apply it to his own situation. The reference, furthermore, places Pliny in the position of a heroic Achilles and anyone who fails to co-operate in the position of an unruly Agamemnon. If Priscus does not help Pliny, then he lacks either the *paideia* to understand Pliny’s letter or the humanity to care.³⁸

Pliny’s learned application of Homer has been discussed most of all with respect to *Epistle* 1.18. Here, he replies to an apparent request from Suetonius to secure a postponement of a private legal case due to an uneasy feeling about a recent bad dream.³⁹ Pliny’s response: *Difficile est, sed experiar, καὶ γάρ τ’ ὄναρ ἐκ διός ἐστιν* (“It is difficult, but I shall try, ‘for a dream comes from Zeus’”).⁴⁰ As often, Pliny turns to himself for an example, continuing thus: “I had undertaken a case on behalf of Junius Pastor when a vision came to me while sleeping that

³⁷ *Atilium Crescentem et nosti et amas. Quis enim illum spectatior paulo aut non novit aut non amat? Hunc ego non ut multi, sed artissime diligo. Oppida nostra unius diei itinere dirimuntur; ipsi amare invicem, qui est flagrantissimus amor, adulescentuli coepimus. Mansit hic postea, nec refrixit iudicio sed invaluit. Sciunt qui alterutrum nostrum familiarius intuentur. Nam et ille amicitiam meam latissima praedicatione circumfert, et ego prae me fero, quanta sit mihi curae modestia quies securitas eius. Quin etiam, cum insolentiam cuiusdam tribunatum plebis inituri vereretur, idque indicasset mihi, respondi: οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος* (Plin. *Ep.* 6.8.1-3).

³⁸ Hoffer 1999: 214 remarks of Homeric allusions that “Homeric authority takes away more than it gives,” and in this case it is used merely to reinforce traditional Roman values. It is true that it coincides with Roman values, but as soon as Homer is introduced, Pliny is acknowledging that these values belong to other cultures as well, namely Greek. As I attempt to lay out with these examples, Pliny’s use of Homer indeed can (and often should) be taken seriously.

³⁹ See Baraz 2012: 107-13, Büttler 1970: 20, Hoffer 1999: 211-20, Lefèvre 2009: 160-3, Marchesi 2008: 220-1 and Méthy 2002: 468-71 for discussion of Pliny’s Homeric quotation in this letter.

⁴⁰ Plin. *Ep.* 1.18.1.

my mother-in-law begged me on bended knee not to take the case [...] yet I took the case considering that ‘the single best omen is to fight for one’s country.’”⁴¹ This final quotation is spoken by Hektor at *Iliad* 12.243. In Pliny we receive it in a “window reference” through Cicero, who quotes the same line in discussing his role in a disputed agrarian law of 60 BC.⁴² For Hektor the words prove to be ominous, if not simply wrong. Cicero adopts them to express his fear that a similar outcome will be his. Pliny, however, as Yelena Baraz notes, “appropriates and rewrites Hector himself as the model for his own success. Like Hector and Cicero, he faced formidable foes, but unlike them, he was able to put his interpretation of a portent—in his case, a dream, into reality. The new context in which Pliny places the lines changes its meaning, stripping it of its ambivalence, and showcases Pliny himself as a potent interpreter of both texts and dreams.”⁴³

What originally seems to be a simple Homeric tag, then, at closer examination shares a Ciceronian *locus* as well, thus placing Homer within the epistolary tradition. Pliny, in turn, takes over Cicero’s Homeric epistolary authority. He first sets up the shared quotation with other Homeric references, doubling or perhaps tripling Cicero’s Homeric output and thereby taking the literary edge for himself.⁴⁴ Thus here, where it might at first seem that he humbly borrows, Pliny most proves true Gibson and Morello’s characterization of his intertextual relationships: “Pliny’s readers are invited to see (at least) double: Pliny rejects both Cicero and Seneca, but manages then to compete with both, and with others as well. Pliny’s relationship with Cicero, in

⁴¹ *Susceperam causam Iuni Pastoris, cum mihi quiescenti visa est socrus mea advoluta genibus ne agerem obsecrare [...] tamen λογισάμενος illud εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.18.4).

⁴² Cic. *Att.* 2.3.4. See Thomas 1986: 188 on “window reference”: a reference in which the author points to an earlier source through reference to a more recent one.

⁴³ Baraz 2012: 110-1. To my mind, Baraz’s interpretation, similar to Hoffer’s (1999: 217), is more fitting than Marchesi’s (2008: 221), who describes Pliny’s window reference as an “intertextual rhetoric of understatement.” It seems that Pliny is, in fact, making bold moves here.

⁴⁴ See Baraz 2012: 109 for a potential follow-up reference to the initial Homeric quotation: “Given that Homeric intertext—specifically, the first book of the *Iliad*—has already been activated, the tableau of Pliny with a supplicating mother-figure at his knees recalls the supplication of Zeus by Thetis.”

particular, is complex and multi-faceted.”⁴⁵ Next, Pliny redefines Homer’s line in a way that displays his own socio-political success. This appropriation and re-interpretation through other windows is, perhaps, a forerunner to the Homeric criticism that Kim notes as a sure sign of imperial Greek *paideia*.⁴⁶ As Eckard Lefèvre puts it plainly, “Zwei Zitate aus Homer und zwei Anspielungen auf Cicero appellieren an literarische Bildung.”⁴⁷ It is probably not without significance that Pliny appeals to literary *paideia* in a letter to Suetonius, a rising member of the literary elite.

We shall return shortly to Pliny’s addressees and to his ability to re-invent Homer. But let us first glance at one more Homeric reference, again unmarked and suited to the moment, but this time a Latin reference rather than direct Greek quotation. In a brief letter thanking Calpurnius Flaccus for a gift of thrushes, Pliny confesses that he will not be sending a gift in return:

I have received the most lovely thrushes, to which I can make an even match neither in presents from the city, being at my Laurentine estate, nor in presents from the sea, since the weather is so unpleasant. Ergo, you will receive epistles of blank and simple thanks, not even imitating the shrewdness of Diomedes in exchanging gifts.⁴⁸

The passage to which Pliny refers, in which Diomedes exchanged armor with Sarpedon, must have been well known.⁴⁹ Pliny’s ingenuity is in applying it to his genteel world, where an epistle and a few thrushes have taken the place of weapons. The reference, then, asserts in various ways

⁴⁵ Gibson and Morello 2012: 103.

⁴⁶ See above, p. 116, and below, p. 126.

⁴⁷ Lefèvre 2009: 160.

⁴⁸ *Accepi pulcherrimos turdos, cum quibus parem calculum ponere nec urbis copiis ex Laurentino nec maris tam turbidis tempestatibus possum. Recipies ergo epistulas steriles et simpliciter ingratas, ac ne illam quidem sollertiam Diomedis in permutando munere imitantes* (Plin. Ep. 5.2.1-2).

⁴⁹ Hom. Il. 6.235ff.

his position as cultured man of society. First, he knows his Greek literature and, like the interlocutors of Tacitus' *Dialogus*, has exchanged *arma* for *eloquentia*.⁵⁰ Second, by cleverly comparing an unaccompanied letter with the manipulative trade of Diomedes, he portrays himself as generous, at least relatively so, and quietly suggests that a letter from him is a gift in itself, once again taking the position of social superiority.

With this position of superiority in mind, it is worth pausing now, having looked at five unmarked Homeric references, to remark on their similarities. In all cases Pliny is acting as patron of a lesser client, whether he is making sure a tribune of the plebs leaves Crescens alone, securing a postponement for Suetonius or rebating investors. His Homeric quotations put him in the position of Achilles to Kalchas, an anti-Agamemnon to the Achaeans, Hektor to Polydamas. His intertextual maneuvers serve at least two purposes, both connected and both ultimately social. Pliny requires the reader first to recognize an unmarked Homeric quotation and consider its original context. This intellectual game on its own has social implications in its demonstration of an elite education.⁵¹ Second, Pliny uses Homer to point out his own superior social position. The reader with *paideia* will understand Pliny's coy self-definition and self-promotion. That Pliny chooses Homeric quotation for this maneuver is a sign of Homer's continued authority in imperial Roman circles. That Pliny is able to deploy him so craftily is a sign of Pliny's *paideia*.

Pliny's Homeric repurposing

Now, to return to participation in Homeric criticism, let us recall the special class in which Kim places those who not only have the mastery to quote Homer, but can parody and

⁵⁰ See above, pp. 11-2, for a discussion of words replacing weapons in elite imperial society.

⁵¹ See similarly Méthy 2002: 473-5.

question him as well.⁵² Although we see Pliny revising Homer’s meaning to suit his purposes (as discussed above especially of *Epistle* 1.18), I shall not try to argue that Pliny portrays himself as a master of Homeric minutiae or as a skeptical revisionist. But I will mention, following Stanley Hoffer, that Pliny does partake of a bit of Homeric parody that Athenaeus later deployed with his *Deipnosophists*—a standard work of Homeric revisionism.⁵³ Pliny’s jesting Homeric quotation to Octavius Rufus, who asked Pliny to refrain from acting in a case on behalf of the Baetici, looks back to *Iliad* 16.250, where the Homeric narrator notes of Achilles’ hope for Patroclus’ success in battle and safe return that, “the father granted him the one request and denied him the other” (τῷ δ’ ἕτερον μὲν ἔδωκε πατήρ, ἕτερον δ’ ἀνένευσε). It likewise looks ahead to Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophists* 8.350D, in which Stratoniceus’ witty parody of the line “grants a flute player to play poorly, and denies him the ability to sing well.”⁵⁴ Pliny’s wit is perhaps not so sharp, but he shows his readiness to use Homer playfully in his reply to Octavius’ request:

See on what a height you place me since you have given me the same power and rule as Homer gave Jupiter Optimus Maximus: “and the father granted him one request and denied him the other.” For I can respond to your request with a similar assent and denial. For, although it is proper, especially since you are urging it, for me to excuse myself from advocacy against an individual on the Baetici’s behalf, it is not consistent with my loyalty and firmness of character, which you value, to act against the province to which I am devoted through so many tasks, and so many personal risks at various times.⁵⁵

⁵² See Kim 2010a: 15-18 on parody, reinvention and rewriting of Homer. Revisionists such as Plutarch, Gellius and Athenaeus form part of this group due to their interest in deploying Homeric minutiae as social performance. As I argue here, Pliny shares a number of interests and aims with this class. Kim places Dio of Prusa, Lucian and Philostratus, focal authors in his study, in an even more exclusive class, to which Pliny does not belong given his lack of interest in Homer as historic figure.

⁵³ Hoffer 1999: 219n11.

⁵⁴ κακῶς μὲν κιθαρίζειν ἔδωκεν, ἄδειν δὲ καλῶς ἀνένευσε (Athen. 8.350D).

⁵⁵ *Vide in quo me fastigio collocaris, cum mihi idem potestatis idemque regni dederis quod Homerus Iovi Optimo Maximo: τῷ δ’ ἕτερον μὲν ἔδωκε πατήρ ἕτερον δ’ ἀνένευσεν. Nam ego quoque simili nutu ac renutu respondere voto*

This game of wry reapplication seems to have been in fashion throughout Pliny's elite world, as he reports Veiento applying to a senatorial decision a line from *Iliad* 8.102 in which Diomedes rescues Nestor from a Trojan onslaught that is too much for the senior soldier. In the wake of Pliny's glorious *de Helvidi ultione*, Veiento was ignored as he attempted to rebut Pliny. Pliny reports Veiento's frustration and subsequent quotation of Homer:

Meanwhile the consul called out names, took a vote and dismissed the senate, and he left Veiento still up to this point standing and trying to speak. He has complained much about this insult (as he called it) with a Homeric verse: 'Old man, the young fighters are really beating you down.'⁵⁶

Athenaeus picks up this line as well, manipulating it to fit the dice-playing of Rhodopon, as reported by Comon through Hegesander: "Hegesander of Delphi refers to certain individuals as *exoinoi* saying the following: Comon and Rhodopon, who were members of the political class in Rhodes, were *exoinoi*. Comon made fun of Rhodopon for shooting dice, saying: 'Old man, young dice-players are pressing you very hard.'"⁵⁷ Pliny does not participate in the revision that became popular for Athenaeus and Gellius, but he does seem to provide a bridge from Homeric lines to Homeric revisions by means of his reapplications. The overlap between Pliny and Athenaeus in quotable Homeric lines further suggests a shared curriculum and interest between Pliny and the later torchbearers of *paideia*.

Pliny's Homeric rhetorical criticism

tuo possum. Etenim, sicut fas est mihi, praesertim te exigente, excusare Baeticis contra unum hominem advocationem, ita nec fidei nostrae nec constantiae quam diligis convenit, adesse contra provinciam quam tot officiis, tot laboribus, tot etiam periculis meis aliquando devinxi (Plin. Ep. 1.7.1-2).

⁵⁶ *Inter moras consul citatis nominibus et peracta discessione mittit senatum, ac paene adhuc stantem temptantemque dicere Veientem reliquit. Multum ille de hac (ita vocabat) contumelia questus est Homericis versu: ὦ γέρον, ἦ μάλα δὴ σε νέοι τείρουσι μαχηταί* (Plin. Ep. 9.13.20).

⁵⁷ Ἡγήσανδρος δ' ὁ Δελφός καὶ ἐξοίνους τινὰς κέκληκε λέγων οὕτως· Κόμων καὶ Ῥοδοφῶν τῶν ἐν Ῥόδῳ πολιτευσαμένων ὄντες ἦσαν ἐξοίνοι. καὶ ὁ Κόμων εἰς κυβευτὴν σκώπτων τὸν Ῥοδοφῶντα ἔλεγεν· ὦ γέρον, ἦ μάλα δὴ σε νέοι τείρουσι κυβευταί (Athen 10.444E).

Pliny also shares with these imperial Homerists an interest in Homer as a *locus* for literary criticism that reaches beyond the Homeric poems themselves. While Homer and his critics were fertile ground for discussions of geography for Strabo or of historical accuracy for Philostratus or Dio of Prusa,⁵⁸ Pliny applies Homeric criticism to rhetoric and seems to be following tradition in doing so, as his Homeric quotations on rhetoric appear in the work of other rhetoricians.⁵⁹ *Epistle* 1.20 to Tacitus on the proper style and length of a speech deploys three Homeric quotations while explicating and justifying his attack on the affectation of *brevitas* in rhetoric. Pliny gives a defense of his position in the following Homeric terms:

Indeed when I say this I do not approve of that Homeric “unbridled of tongue,” but “words like flakes of winter snow,” not that this one does not please me too: “briefly but very clearly.” Yet if a choice were given, I want that speech which is similar to flakes of winter snow; it is abundant and unremitting but also copious, divine and heavenly.⁶⁰

The “unbridled tongue” is that of Thersites at *Iliad* 2.212, the speech like falling snow is that of Odysseus, as reported by Antenor at *Iliad* 3.222 and the brief but clear speech that of Menelaus as reported at *Iliad* 3.214. These quotations serve more than to showcase Pliny’s Homeric knowledge. They also draw Tacitus back to Quintilian, who had quoted similar lines in the *Institutio* 12.10.63-4:

Thus if it were necessary that one of these three types [of eloquence] be chosen, who would hesitate to prefer this [middle one] to all others, and in any case it is

⁵⁸ See Kim 2010a: 47-84 for discussion of Strabo and Homeric geographic criticism, 85-139 and 175-215 for Dio’s and Philostratus’ Homeric historical criticism.

⁵⁹ See Cugusi 2003 for Pliny’s rhetorical theory in *Ep.* 1.20 and 9.26 in relation to other rhetorical theorists. See 108-10 for the presence of Pliny’s Homeric quotations elsewhere. See Whitton 2013a: 9-10 on Pliny’s use of Homer and simplification of Quintilianic rhetorical theory.

⁶⁰ *Nec vero cum haec dico illum Homericum ἀμετροεπῆ probō, sed hunc: “καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν εὐκότα χειμερήσιν,” non quia non et ille mihi valdissime placeat: “παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως” si tamen detur electio, illam orationem similem nivibus hibernis, id est crebram et assiduam sed et largam, postremo divinam et caelestem volo (Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.22).*

the most powerful and best suited to the greatest Causes? For Homer too gave Menelaus an eloquence brief but pleasing and appropriate (for this is his “not wandering in words”) and lacking superfluity. These are the virtues of the first type of eloquence. And from Nestor’s mouth, Homer said, speech flowed sweeter than honey, and nothing can be achieved greater than this pleasure: but in expressing the utmost eloquence he attributes to Ulysses a magnitude of voice and a force of speech equal to winter snow in its abundance and impact.⁶¹

Given that there would have been other terms in which to discuss rhetorical style, Pliny’s use of the same Homeric tags as Quintilian represents a conscious choice to follow not only Homer, but also Quintilian and perhaps Cicero.⁶² Pliny is concerned to display his awareness of later literary criticism, but he is equally concerned to contribute to that tradition, displaying direct Homeric knowledge by replacing Quintilian’s Nestor with Thersites.

The very next Homeric reference in Pliny’s corpus, a comparison of Arrius Antoninus and Nestor, confirms Pliny’s awareness of Nestor’s place in the discussion of rhetorical style, further suggesting that the substitution here is intentional and pregnant.⁶³ The substitution suits his concession, but also changes the definition of what the “middle” style entails. Pliny’s “high” style might reach the extravagance of Nestor, but few would say he lacks restraint in the same way as Thersites. By switching the two, then, Pliny turns his “high” style into the golden mean.⁶⁴

⁶¹ *Quare si ex tribus his generibus necessario sit eligendum unum, quis dubitet hoc praeferre omnibus, et validissimum alioqui et maximis quibusque causis accommodatissimum? Nam et Homerus brevem quidem cum iucunditate et propriam (id enim est non deerrare verbis) et carentem supervacuis eloquentiam Menelao dedit, quae sunt virtutes generis illius primi, et ex ore Nestoris dixit dulciorem melle profluere sermonem, qua certe delectatione nihil fingi maius potest: sed summam expressurus in Ulixae facundiam et magnitudinem illi vocis et vim orationis nivibus hibernis copia atque impetu parem tribuit* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.63-4).

⁶² Cic. *Brut.* 40 and 50 apply similar Homeric tags, but in a less compact manner. See Cugusi 108-9 for discussion.

⁶³ Plin *Ep.* 4.3.3. He praises Antoninus’ Greek literary achievement in the following terms: “For the famed honey of Homer’s old Nestor pours over you when you speak and bees seem to fill and entwine what you write with flowers” (*Nam et loquenti tibi illa Homericis senis mella profluere et, quae scribis, complere apes floribus et innectere videntur*). See above, pp. 89-90, for further discussion of these lines. The honeyed speech of Nestor is also a favorite reference for Dio of Prusa. See, e.g., *Or.* 2.20 and 57.8.

⁶⁴ See Whitton 2013a: 9-10 on this letter and the simplification of Quintilianic rhetorical theory to an issue of length. Whitton treats the exclusion of Nestor differently (though convincingly) than I do. One considerable difference

His choice of Greek quotation as opposed to Latin translation distinguishes his argument from Quintilian's and perhaps even attempts to demonstrate greater Homeric authority. In this way, Pliny uses Homer to gain authority even over his *praeceptor*.⁶⁵

Epistle 9.26 to a certain Lupercus follows a near identical pattern as *Epistle 1.20* in deploying Homeric quotation as a defense of Pliny's "high" style:

Why do I write? Because you seem to have noted in my writings certain portions as swollen, what I judged as sublime, as unwarranted, what I judged as bold, as too much, what I judged as full. But it matters greatly whether you are noting phrases as faulty or remarkable. For everyone notices what stands out and above; but one must judge with keen attention whether something is extravagant or grand, lofty or immoderate. And to touch upon almighty Homer, on whatever side one takes, is it possible to miss "great heaven rang about like a trumpet," "the spear leaned upon the air," and that whole "The swell of the sea does not roar so loud?"⁶⁶

This time the Homeric tags do not seem to follow a Quintilianic precedent, but Dio of Prusa does tap into two of the references, suggesting the tags' place in contemporary discussions of rhetorical style.⁶⁷ Pliny hedges his claims, but simultaneously implies a genius of his own as displayed in his high style: "Now I do not think that I have said something similar to these

between our interpretations, if I have read him correctly, is that in his view Odysseus represents "high" style, Nestor "middle" style, whereas I see Nestor as "high" and Odysseus as "middle." My interpretation stems from the characterization of Nestor in the Homeric epics and from Quintilian's preference for the "middle" and for Odysseus, suggesting that Odysseus is exemplar of "middle" style. In any case, Odysseus certainly becomes the "middle" stylist in Pliny's treatment where Menelaus and Thersites are the bookends.

⁶⁵ See Cova 2003: 88-93 on the differences between Pliny's and Quintilian's rhetorical theory in the context of the three styles represented by the Homeric quotations here.

⁶⁶ *Cur haec? Quia visus es mihi in scriptis meis adnotasse quaedam ut tumida quae ego sublimia, ut improba quae ego audentia, ut nimia quae ego plena arbitrabar. Plurimum autem refert, reprehendenda adnotes an insignia. Omnis enim advertit, quod eminent et exstat; sed acri intentione diiudicandum est, immodicum sit an grande, altum an enorme. Atque ut Homerum potissimum attingam, quem tandem alterutram in partem potest fugere ἄμφι δὲ σάλπιγγεν μέγας οὐρανός, ἥ ἐρι δ' ἔγχος ἐκέκλιτο et totum illud οὔτε θαλάσσης κῦμα τόσον βοάα?* (Plin. *Ep.* 9.26.5-6). See Hom. *Il.* 21.388, 5.356 and 14.394.

⁶⁷ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.30 quotes the two lines that follow Pliny's first quotation here. In discussing Homer's invention of words and phrases, *Or.* 12.68 refers to the very same phrase as Pliny's third quotation here.

phrases or that I am able to (I am not so crazy), but I want it to be known that the reins of eloquence must be lax and that the onrush of genius must not be confined in the narrowest of circuits.”⁶⁸

One brief tag will be our final Plinian nod to Homer’s place in rhetorical tradition and Pliny’s awareness of it. In a letter to Cornelius Minicianus, Pliny describes Herennius Senecio’s pithy speech concerning Valerius Licinianus’ flight to Sicily: “Herennius Senecio spoke on behalf of the absent Licinianus in the style of ‘Patroclus is dead.’ For he said, ‘I have become a messenger instead of an advocate. Licinianus has withdrawn.’”⁶⁹ Pliny’s *tale quiddam, quale est illud* κείται Πάτροκλος not only quotes *Iliad* 18.20 and not only applies it in a contemporary political situation, but further implies that the brevity of the “Patroclus is dead” speech was well known and imitated by contemporary Romans. And indeed references to it by Quintilian and Pseudo-Plutarch confirm such suspicions. Quintilian praises Homer for his brevity thus: “Who can narrate more briefly than the one who announces the death of Patroclus?”⁷⁰

A final window to Homer in Pliny

I shall end this section on Pliny with one final Homeric appropriation, in *Epistle* 9.1, where Pliny tries to convince Maximus that publishing his less than laudatory work on Planta will not be frowned upon since the work was completed before the subject’s death:

⁶⁸ *Nec nunc ego me his similia aut dixisse aut posse dicere puto (non ita insanio), sed hoc intellegi volo, laxandos esse eloquentiae frenos, nec angustissimo gyro ingeniorum impetus refringendos* (Plin. Ep. 9.26.7). On Pliny’s profession of the impossibility of truly imitating Homer see Galimberti Biffino 2007: 297.

⁶⁹ *Locutus est pro absente Herennius Senecio tale quiddam, quale est illud: κείται Πάτροκλος. Ait enim: “Ex advocato nuntius factus sum; Licinianus recessit”* (Plin. Ep. 4.11.12).

⁷⁰ *Narrare vero quis brevius quam qui mortem nuntiat Patrocli (quis significantibus potest quam qui Curetum Aetolorumque proelium exponit?)* (Quint. Inst. 10.1.49). See also [Plut.] *VPH* 83. See Whitton 2013a: 9 for a list of further citations.

At the same time you will avoid that “unholy act over the dead.” For whatever has been written about a living man, whatever has been recited about a living man is publishable against a dead man just as if he were still living if it is published immediately.⁷¹

The Homeric tag here, as Guillemain noted, appears in a letter from Cicero to Atticus and thus we have another “window reference.”⁷² More interestingly, the “Homeric” tag in Pliny and in Cicero carries a different participle than the typically accepted reading in the Homeric original. Where Pliny and Cicero write οὐχ ὅσῃ φθιμένοισι, the manuscript tradition reads οὐχ ὅσῃ κταμένοισιν (ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι) at *Odyssey* 22.412.⁷³ Marchesi concludes that “Pliny inherits the entire package from Cicero: the Homeric expression, its textual modification, and the field of its application.”⁷⁴ There are a number of ways of viewing this quotation with respect to its Ciceronian resonance. One might interpret this wholesale borrowing from Cicero as an indication that Pliny had not looked at Homer and is simply using the closer Roman author as a source. This, to some extent, could be supported by Pliny’s abundant interaction with his epistolary predecessor.⁷⁵ But it is perhaps worth noting that Pliny alludes to Homer elsewhere with some depth, presumably enough to know that his appropriation is more Ciceronian than it is Homeric. Might it then be the case that Pliny has knowingly preferred the Ciceronian version of the *Odyssey* and has appropriated Homer into the world of epistolography to such an extent that even Homer does not get Homer right? It takes another epistolographer, namely Cicero, to give

⁷¹ *Et simul vitabis illud οὐχ ὅσῃ φθιμένοισι. Nam quod de vivente scriptum de vivente recitatum est, in defunctum quoque tamquam viventem adhuc editur, si editur statim* (Plin. *Ep.* 9.1.4).

⁷² Cic. *Att.* 4.7.2. See Guillemain 1929: 78. Unfortunately a lacuna in the Ciceronian text clouds any exact reading. But it seems clear enough that Cicero is similarly discussing the question of how to discuss a recently dead enemy.

⁷³ Philodemus likewise writes φθιμένοισι in a quotation employed in *On the Good King According to Homer*. While it is more likely that Pliny would be aware of Cicero’s usage, an intertext with Philodemus would impact my reading of Pliny’s *Panegyricus* as parallel with Greek kingship literature (see below, pp. 152-74).

⁷⁴ Marchesi 2008: 219.

⁷⁵ See Marchesi’s appendix for a list of Pliny’s Ciceronian borrowings. See Gibson and Morello 2012: 74-103 for a discussion of Pliny’s literary relationship with Cicero.

the proper Homeric reading. Perhaps a far-fetched idea, but in the context of a letter on literary creation and publication, such a move would play well to the Plinian self-promotion we have seen elsewhere. In any case, the misquotation gives the reader with Homeric *paideia* an opportunity to continue the game of quotation and correction—and this, it would seem, becomes a popular game by the end of the second century.

Homer and Hellenism?

If Pliny is eager, as I suggest he is, to parade Homeric *paideia* for social and intellectual benefit, then the question arises of how he differs from his Greek counterparts. One potential line of argument, and a well-traveled avenue in its own right, is the question of the degree to which Hellenic identity was at stake during such appropriations.⁷⁶ We might return yet again to Lawrence Kim’s remark on Homeric interaction as an avenue to membership among “the ‘cultured’ and therefore ‘Greek’ elite.”⁷⁷ One might look to Lucian’s satire, with which we began this chapter, and suggest that Romans would by nature be incapable of totally achieving Greek *paideia*.⁷⁸ Dio of Prusa’s *Thirty-Sixth Oration* on the Borysthenites will serve as an even more oft-cited and perhaps fruitful example of such negotiations between Hellenic literature and identity.⁷⁹ Dio stands as a particularly good point of reference, as he is one of Pliny’s contemporaries and is even mentioned by Pliny himself in a letter to Trajan.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Hunter 2004, Kim 2010a, Swain 1996, Whitmarsh 2001, 2004 and 2009 and Zeitlin 2001—only a few of many careful discussions of the relationship between Homeric literature and identity.

⁷⁷ Kim 2010a: 10. See above p. 116.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Swain 1996: 320.

⁷⁹ The last twenty-five years have seen as many discussions of the *Borystheniticus* as any other imperial Greek text. On questions of Hellenic identity in the oration, see e.g., Anderson 1993: 216-20, Kim 2010a: 197-9, Moles 1995: 184-92, Porter 2001: 85-89, Russell 1992: 23, Schofield 1991: 57-92, Swain 1996: 83-5 and 2000 *passim*, and Zeitlin 2001: 264.

⁸⁰ Plin. *Ep.* 10.81 and 10.82.

In his *Borystheniticus* Dio tells his hometown, Prusa, of his exilic wanderings to the frontier town of the Borysthenites at Olbia. He recalls Homeric discussions with one young Borysthenite, Callistratus. This young and handsome soldier was held in high esteem for various reasons, among them his knowledge of Homer and his interest in oratory and philosophy.⁸¹ But his and his companions' interest in Homer seems not to be emphasized for the intellectual authority one gains from familiarity therewith, but rather because it is a sign of their Greekness. Dio describes their enthusiasm at hearing him speak in terms of Hellenicity: "But in general they were such eager listeners and Hellenic in manner that almost all of them were present under arms, wishing to listen."⁸² Dio moves next to a lecture he gave at the urging of a self-called ἐραστής Πλάτωνος.⁸³ The philosophical Hieroson establishes his Greekness, not by language, but by his pleasure in associating with Plato, who is noted first of all as the "Greekest," then the "wisest."⁸⁴ With Hieroson, it seems that familiarity with Plato is prioritized for its symbolism of Greekness over its potential for displaying intellectual authority. Nearly all studies of this oration have subsequently investigated, if not focused on, the paradox of Hellenism at the frontier, with John Moles remarking that "a central concern is Greekness, focused here with peculiar sharpness by the city's marginal, perilous and ruinous state."⁸⁵

Plato and the Second Sophistic

⁸¹ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.8. See Schofield 1991: 60 on Platonic knowledge and the ἐρώμενος in Dio's oration.

⁸² ἀλλ' ὁμως οὕτως ἦσαν φιλήκοοι καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ Ἕλληνας ὥστε μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπαντες παρήσαν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, βουλόμενοι ἀκούειν (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.16).

⁸³ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.26.

⁸⁴ καίτοι ἴσως ἄτοπον βαρβαρίζοντα τῶν πολιτῶν μάλιστα τῷ ἐλληνικωτάτῳ καὶ σοφωτάτῳ χαίρειν καὶ ξυνεῖναι (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.26).

⁸⁵ Moles 1995: 184. See also Anderson 1993: 216-20, Russell 1992: 23 and Swain 1996: 83-5.

Yet one might wonder if the discussion of Hellenism is a red herring. The ambivalence towards these half-barbarians has been noted elsewhere,⁸⁶ as has their paradigmatic virtue.⁸⁷ Dio thus seems to fluctuate in how he defines Hellenism, at one time privileging the Borysthenites, at another time the Prusans.⁸⁸ By the time he delves into his final myth, questions of the definitive Hellene are cast aside. His manipulation of Plato, Stoic and Mithraic myth perhaps gives the Borysthenites the semi-exotic Greekness they desire while maintaining an insider's barbarism by means of Zoroastrianism, just as among the Prusans, his use of Zoroaster attempts to demonstrate foreign knowledge while maintaining insider status via Platonism and Stoicism.⁸⁹ By the end of the myth, it seems the message—if one must exist—is one of cosmopolitanism.⁹⁰ Multiple myths of varying cultures are thrown together with an apparent message that we are all citizens of the world.⁹¹ If we return to Hieroson and his intellectualism, a sort of cosmopolitanism is confirmed. For, as soon as Plato becomes the property of this barbaric, yet elite, elder the employment of Plato becomes an act not of cultural Hellenism, but of social elitism.⁹² The question Dio poses to both Borysthenes and Prusa is not “who is Hellenic?” but “who can understand specialized knowledge?” Or as Dio says himself, the *pepaideumenos* is not the person who “knows the name of everything,” but the person who “understands the meaning of what he says.”⁹³ In other words, Greeks who cannot determine meaning are just like barbarians.⁹⁴

⁸⁶ Porter 2001: 85-6 and Russell 1992: 23.

⁸⁷ Moles 1995: 186.

⁸⁸ This ambivalence shares some similarity with that of Tacitus both with respect to Britons in the *Agricola* and the *Annales* and Germans in the *Germania*.

⁸⁹ See Moles 1995: 184-92 for a discussion of Dio's use of these myths in the context of Greekness.

⁹⁰ This message may have resonated with Romans more than is initially apparent. See my second chapter for the ecumenical nature of Roman views on education and status.

⁹¹ Richter 2011: 119-24 offers a nuanced reading treating the tensions between a universal and Hellenic *oikoumenē*. See also Moles 1995: 192, Russell 1992: 23 and Schofield 1991: 84-92.

⁹² Hieroson is described as *πρεσβύτατος αὐτῶν καὶ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα ἔχων* (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.24).

⁹³ See Schofield 1991: 60 for further discussion in terms of Platonic knowledge.

⁹⁴ οἱ δὲ πεπαιδευμένοι τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἴσονται ἐκάστου οὗ λέγουσιν· οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα πάντες οὕτω λέγουσιν οἱ ἐλληνίζοντες, ἐὰν δὲ πύθη τινὸς αὐτῶν ὅ, τι ἐστὶ τοῦτο, λέγω δὲ ὁποῖόν τι

The specialized knowledge for Dio, as his play between the rarely-celebrated Milesian gnomic poet Phocylides and Homer makes clear almost immediately, is in Greek literary canon. The intellectual challenge to understand Dio's meaning requires, most of all, an ability to locate Plato in this oration, which contains at least twenty echoes of Plato's work.⁹⁵ Michael Trapp, rightly I think, has focused his studies of this text and its Platonic appropriations not on Greekness, but on intellectual history. Dio's Platonic references tend toward those works that were familiar to the educated elite, as opposed to the technical philosopher.⁹⁶ Trapp concludes, in fact, that Dio's employment of *Phaedrus* in the seemingly Iranian myth of the heavenly city has very little which is eccentric.⁹⁷ It seems, rather, that Dio is showcasing how well versed he is when it comes to Plato's *Phaedrus* and its reception. Whatever the "lesson" to be learned from the *Borystheniticus* may be, one thing is certain: Dio fills the work with Platonic references that demonstrate his educated and therefore elite status. Only similarly elite *pepaideumenoι* will understand the meaning of what Dio says. And his closing remarks to the Prusans (note, not to the foreign Borysthenites) illustrate this well:

If the form of my speech comes off as completely lofty and out of sight, just as specialists at augury say that the bird that goes excessively high and hides itself in the clouds makes the divination incomplete, it's not right to blame me, but rather those of the Borysthenites, since they pushed me to speak.⁹⁸

καὶ καθ' ὃ μηδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταυτὸν, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ δεῖξαι μόνον αὐτὸν ἢ ἄλλον, ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.19).

⁹⁵ My count accepts only the most convincing of those pointed out in Russell 1992. My estimate, then, is likely conservative. See Trapp 1990: 149-52 for a selection of the Platonic allusions with which the work is "shot through." See also Trapp 2000.

⁹⁶ See further Trapp 2000: 236.

⁹⁷ Trapp 1990: 154-5.

⁹⁸ εἰ δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ὑψηλὸν τε καὶ ἐξίτηλον ἀπέβη τὸ τοῦ λόγου σχῆμα, ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τοὺς ὄρνιθιάς φασι τὸν σφόδρα ἄνω χωρήσαντα καὶ τοῖς νέφεσιν ἐγκρύψαντα αὐτὸν ἀτελεῖ τὴν μαντείαν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐμὲ ἄξιον αἰτιᾶσθαι, τὴν δὲ Βορυσθενιτῶν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς τότε ἐκεῖνοι λέγειν προσέταξαν (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36. 61).

In essence, Dio tells his Prusan audience that he will not apologize for the loftiness of his oration. It is the job of the *pepaideumenos* to understand Plato well enough to know that this exotic myth is not so exotic after all.

Such displays of *paideia* through allusion to works from the Greek canon have led scholars to offer Dio of Prusa's *Borystheniticus* as a paradigm of Second Sophistic literature. This Platonic education, however, was not the exclusive property of Greeks. The Platonic literary interest of Roman intellectuals seems to have matched the Homeric interests we explored above.⁹⁹ The 41 citations to Homer in Quintilian's *Institutio* are chased by 40 Platonic citations, making Plato his third-most-cited Greek author and the fifth-most-cited author overall.¹⁰⁰

Plato and the sophistic Roman

Plato's firm position in Roman intellectual history can be illustrated by his firm position in the work of Tacitus, a potentially surprising *locus* for Platonic allusion, as, it is worth remembering, many scholars have argued that Tacitus rejected philosophy.¹⁰¹ Ronald Mellor, for example, calls him "distrustful of philosophers," claiming that "he hardly derived his moral standards from philosophy."¹⁰² Tacitus has also been characterized as increasingly prejudiced against Greeks by no lesser authority than Ronald Syme.¹⁰³ If these descriptions of Tacitus are true, his appropriation of Plato must not be an attempt to become a Hellene in any way like his fellow Gaul Favorinus is said to have done. His display of Platonic knowledge, then, an act of

⁹⁹ Thus, Zeitlin's (2001: 196) remark that Homer alone becomes available to non-Greeks as a marker of intellectual authority ought to be modified at the very least to include Plato. Alain Gowing suggests to me that, for political purposes at least, Plato could, in fact, have become even more available to Romans than to Greeks under the principate.

¹⁰⁰ See Brinton 1983 for the influence of Plato on Quintilian. If there is truth to the conjecture that Tacitus was a student of Quintilian, Brinton's article has additional bearing on the Tacitean uses of Plato discussed below.

¹⁰¹ This is discussed and largely qualified above, pp. 62-7. But it is true that Tacitus was no philosopher by contemporary standards and likely would have contested any description of himself as such.

¹⁰² Mellor 1993: 50.

¹⁰³ Syme 1958: 530.

paideia, will be a display not of Hellenism or of philosophy, but of intellectual prestige. Like that of Dio of Prusa, a display of learnedness advances his own social and, moreover, literary position and challenges his readers to prove theirs.

Several scholars have focused on Tacitus' employment of Plato. Franz Egermann long ago noted the similarity of arguments concerning philosophy and oratory in Plato's *Gorgias* and Tacitus' *Dialogus*, including Tacitean borrowing of important and striking phrases.¹⁰⁴ June Allison has elucidated influences of Plato's *Symposium* on the setting and characterization of the *Dialogus*, and of the *Republic* on its discussion of genre and *eloquentia*.¹⁰⁵ Steven Rutledge has added to both of these studies in an article illustrating Tacitean characterization with borrowings from the *Symposium* and *Gorgias*, and he points out further Tacitean use of Plato's *Phaedo* in the *Annales*.¹⁰⁶ Elsewhere he adds Plato's *Protagoras* and *Republic* to the list of influential works.¹⁰⁷

While a study of Tacitus' use of Plato across his entire corpus would certainly yield fruitful results, here, I propose a reading of the *Dialogus* as an extended appropriation of Plato's *Republic*—an appropriation, like that of Dio of Prusa, which is not satisfied simply with passing references, but challenges the reader to match the author's *paideia* and draw new conclusions from canonical Greek texts. Such Platonic readings within Tacitus are further supported, I think, in two ways. The first is by a Tacitean willingness to engage in Richard Thomas' "window reference."¹⁰⁸ Tacitus' use of Latin authors as windows to Greek predecessors has been identified elsewhere by Tony Woodman and Christopher van den Berg, for example.¹⁰⁹ Van den Berg

¹⁰⁴ Egermann 1936. See also Keyßner 1936, Häussler 1969 and Saxonhouse 1975.

¹⁰⁵ Allison 1999. See also Breitenbach 2010.

¹⁰⁶ Rutledge 2000.

¹⁰⁷ Rutledge 2012: 67. The borrowing from *Protagoras* follows Voss 1973.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas 1986: 188 on "window reference." See above, pp. 123-4 and 133-4, for window references in Pliny *Ep.* 1.18 and 9.1. It seems that this exercise was en vogue in Pliny and Tacitus' literary circle.

¹⁰⁹ Woodman 2012: 284-5 discusses a window in the *Agricola* through Cato and to Xenophon's *Symposium*.

illustrates that a “window reference” in the *Dialogus* to Plato’s *Gorgias* through Cicero’s *de Oratore* presses the problem of defining oratory.¹¹⁰ In short, Tacitus uses Plato to comment on Cicero and rhetoric. The second supportive element is evidence of Tacitus’ direct engagement with Plato’s depiction of the tyrant. At *Annales* 6.6.1-2, Tacitus describes Tiberius with reference to the tyrant in *Gorgias* 524e. While the direct reference is to *Gorgias*, there is likely engagement with the general features of the tyrant as depicted in the ninth book of the *Republic*.¹¹¹ That is, we can safely say that Tacitus uses Plato to discuss political constitutions.

Tacitus’ Platonic characterization, *aporia* and dialogic form

Let us begin our investigation by glancing at characterization and its effects in Tacitus’ *Dialogus* and Plato’s *Republic*. Although Aper has been linked with a number of Ciceronian and Platonic interlocutors, here I would like to point to some of his similarities with Thrasymachus, the first being their mutual preference for expediency over morality. Aper begins his defense of oratory by professing its utility in helping friends and harming enemies: “For if every plan and deed of ours is to be shaped toward life’s utility, what is safer than exercising this art, armed with which at all times you might bring protection to friends, resources to strangers, safety to those in trouble, and indeed fear and terror to the invidious and hostile?”¹¹² This is the position Thrasymachus takes in defining justice, putting it simply, “it still seems to me that to help friends and to harm enemies is justice.”¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Van den Berg 2014: 234-6.

¹¹¹ See Syme 1958: 512, Gill 1983: 483 and Woodman 2006: 184 for further discussion.

¹¹² *Nam si ad utilitatem vitae omnia consilia factaque nostra derigenda sunt, quid est tutius quam eam exercere artem, qua semper armatus praesidium amicis, opem alienis, salutem periclitantibus, invidis vero et inimicis metum et terrorem ultro feras?* (Tac. *Dial.* 5.5).

¹¹³ τούτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς (Pl. *Resp.* 334b).

In addition to a sort of amoralism, Thrasymachus is characterized by his vehemence and beastly readiness to attack. Socrates reports Thrasymachus' actions thus: "Coiling himself up like a wild beast he rushed at us as if to tear us to pieces."¹¹⁴ Aper follows suit, one might say like a wild boar.¹¹⁵ In his first speech, he speaks fiercely and with a strained face: *quae cum dixisset Aper acrius, ut solebat, et intento ore.*¹¹⁶ Later, Maternus will receive Aper's second speech by describing, perhaps with a bit of irony, Aper's Thrasymachean excitement. He exclaims, "Did you recognize the force and ardor of our Aper? With what torrent, with what an onslaught did he defend our age!"¹¹⁷ The praise bears some resemblance to Socrates' sarcastic replies to Thrasymachus variously as a clever and wise man.¹¹⁸

These characterizations and exchanges in the *Dialogus* probably share more direct references with those of Antonius and Crassus in Cicero's *de Oratore*,¹¹⁹ but with one important exception. In the *de Oratore* we know that Antonius, like Philus in the *de Re Publica*, is playing devil's advocate, and we know that Crassus is therefore being playfully ironic. In the *Dialogus*, as in Plato's *Republic*, we receive no admissions of insincerity. This affects the reading in two significant ways. The first is an issue of interpretation. We are left wondering about the true dynamic among the interlocutors. Are Maternus and Aper even on the same page?¹²⁰ Is Maternus turning between a Socratic fear and defiance?¹²¹ Is he being ironical?¹²² Are he and Tacitus

¹¹⁴ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἤκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος (Pl. *Resp.* 336b).

¹¹⁵ The play on *aper* could be even more interesting than Edwards (2008) suggests, as Pliny (*Ep.* 2.3.10) uses Demosthenes' θηρίον on a parallel with *vis*, one of the words with which Maternus characterizes Aper's manner of speech. See Cugusi 2003: 116-8.

¹¹⁶ Tac. *Dial.* 11.1.

¹¹⁷ *Adgnosctisne, [inquit Maternus], vim et ardorem Apri nostri? Quo torrente, quo impetu saeculum nostrum defendit! Quam copiose ac varie vexavit antiquos!* (Tac. *Dial.* 24.1).

¹¹⁸ E.g., ἐλεείσθαι οὐδ' ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι (Pl. *Resp.* 336e) and σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Θρασύμαχε (Pl. *Resp.* 337a).

¹¹⁹ See van den Berg 2014: 65-6 for Aper's relationship to Antonius. See 65n36 for a history of the relevant scholarship. One might add Levene 2004: 189 and Michel 1962: 27-8 to the list of worthwhile discussions.

¹²⁰ Gowing 2005: 115-7.

¹²¹ Rutledge 2000.

employing a more intricate doublespeak?¹²³ Are we to employ the hermeneutics of conspiracy?¹²⁴ Or should everyone be taken at their word?¹²⁵ The near impossibility of pinpointing a single aim and message, we may note, is markedly similar to that of Dio's *Borystheniticus*. Both authors employ a touch of Socratic characterization to create this protean effect.

The second implication occurs within the dialogue itself. Aper's apparent sincerity and unwillingness to budge prevents the dialogue from moving forward to the question Fabius posed to Tacitus: why has there been a decline in the renown granted by eloquence? Because Aper denies decline, the interlocutors hit a stalemate and this portion of the dialogue is ultimately aporetic. A similar *aporia* occurs at the end of the first book of the *Republic* because of Thrasymachus' stubborn character. We might note here that Cicero's dialogues lean more towards doctrinal than aporetic conclusions. This is, in part, due to characterization. Cicero has devil's advocates, Tacitus and Plato have devils. Even within the corpus of Platonic aporetic dialogues, the *Republic* is unique. In the *Gorgias* the troublesome interlocutors, Callicles and Polus (who have also been linked with Aper),¹²⁶ are allowed to continue their stubborn exchange with Socrates. In the *Republic*, however, Socrates ends the first book in *aporia*, but allows himself to abandon both the elenchus and Thrasymachus in favor of the more "constructive" books 2-10.¹²⁷ In a similar manner, Aper is shaken off after the first two paired speeches and left to listen on the sideline with the understanding that he will not be converted. Dio of Prusa employs a similar dismissal of interlocutor and change of topic and form, albeit by a more

¹²² See Brink 1993: 346-7, Desideri 1985: 91, Heubner 1980: 208-9, Köhnken 1973, Syme 1970: 132.

¹²³ Bartsch 1994: 115. See also Strunk 2010.

¹²⁴ Dressler 2013.

¹²⁵ See Goldberg 1999: 236-7, Manuwald 2001 and Mayer 2001: 43-4.

¹²⁶ See, e.g., van den Berg 2014: 96, Bo 1993: 232 and Saxonhouse 1975: 57.

¹²⁷ See Blondell 2002: 11.

organic shift in setting from outside to inside the city walls of Borysthenes, when he moves from dialogue with Callistratus to a monologic myth.

Tacitus' Platonic education, imitation and morality

With the shift in the dialogue within the *Dialogus*, Messala addresses the causes of a decline in oratory. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, he blames the now assumed, though never proven, decline on the educational system, beginning with early childhood and finding fault with the nurses and their companions who corrupt young malleable minds with misguided tales: *horum fabulis et erroribus virides statim et rudes animi imbuuntur*.¹²⁸ While this preoccupation with early childhood education has a much more recent predecessor in Quintilian, Plato offers the same concern through the mouth of Socrates, who decides that because a child's young mind is malleable, stories ought not be told by any old person if they have corruptive potential:

Socrates: You know, don't you, that the beginning of every deed is the most important, generally and especially in whatever is young and tender; for it is shaped especially then, and it takes in whatever impression one wishes to be imprinted upon it.

Adeimantus: Exactly.

Socrates: So shall we recklessly allow children to hear whatever stories are made up by whatever people and to take into their souls opinions opposite to those which we think they should have when they grow up?

¹²⁸ Tac. *Dial.* 29.1. See above, pp. 51-4, for discussion.

Adeimantus: We shan't allow it at all.¹²⁹

References to Plato throughout Messala's speech, one on the sublimity of his style, the other on his role in shaping Demosthenes' eloquence, invite us to keep Plato in mind as we discuss educational theory.¹³⁰

Eventually Messala lands upon what seems to be his largest qualm with contemporary education: declamation. The problem with declamation is that it is an empty imitation of true eloquence. In the old days, students were imbued with true and uncorrupt eloquence: *igitur vera statim et incorrupta eloquentia imbuebantur*.¹³¹ The trusty teacher of old offered the face of eloquence, not an image: *qui faciem eloquentiae, non imaginem praestaret*.¹³² There is, again, Quintilianic precedent here.¹³³ But it is difficult not to recall in a face, as opposed to image, of true and uncorrupt eloquence, Socrates' banishment of imitative poetry in his ideal state. At *Republic* 597e, for example, Socrates tells us that the tragedian is an imitator and is thus three times removed from truth.¹³⁴ Messala's declaimer seems to be of the same ilk. His incredible

¹²⁹ οὐκοῦν οἴσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέφ καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὄψου; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστῳ.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως οὕτω παρέσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀηοῦειν τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπαντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἅς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς;

οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν (Pl. *Resp.* 377a-b).

¹³⁰ "The Academics will endow pugnacity, Plato sublimity, Xenophon charm (*dabunt Academici pugnacitatem, Plato altitudinem, Xenophon iucunditatem*)" (Tac. *Dial.* 31.6); "If there is need for witnesses, whom better could I name than Demosthenes among the Greeks, who, it may be recalled, gave most diligent audience to Plato (*Si testes desiderantur, quos potiores nominabo quam apud Graecos Demosthenem, quem studiosissimum Platonis auditorem fuisse memoriae proditum est?*)" (Tac. *Dial.* 32.5).

¹³¹ Tac. *Dial.* 34.4.

¹³² Tac. *Dial.* 34.5.

¹³³ See, e.g., Quint. *Inst.* 10.2.11: "Add that whatever is similar to something else is necessarily less than what it imitates, just as a shade with respect to a body and an image with respect to a face and the performance of actors with respect to true emotions (*Adde quod quidquid alteri simile est necesse est minus sit eo quid imitatur, ut umbra corpore et imago facie et actus histrionum veris affectibus*)." These lines are likewise applied to criticism of declamation in Quintilian. See Brink 1989 for some speculations on Tacitean theory of rhetorical decline in relation to Quintilian's.

¹³⁴ "This is true of the tragedian then, if he is an imitator, he is in nature three times removed from a king and the truth, and the same is true of all imitators (τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγωδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστιν, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί)" (Pl. *Resp.* 597e). See 395a for comedy and tragedy as imitations. 601a-b for the evil of poetic imitation.

themes, such as the reward of the tyrant killer or the incestuous mother,¹³⁵ share with the work of Socrates' poets the lack of practical benefit and the potential avenue to vice.¹³⁶

Tacitus' Platonic oratory and political constitution

We thus find ourselves again in the shadow of Plato's *Republic*, but as was the case with Dio of Prusa, the nods toward Plato are not yet strong enough to clarify a concrete purpose to the allusion—not, that is, until we pass on to Maternus' final speech. Here, he turns to Roman politics and the state of speech therein. One of his most famous lines connects oratory with the license of the democratic mob:

We are not discussing a leisurely and peaceful matter and one which takes pleasure in goodness and discretion, but that great and remarkable eloquence is the foster-child of license, which the foolish used to call liberty, comrade of sedition, a catalyst of the unrestrained masses, without pliancy, without discipline, insolent, rash, arrogant, which does not arise in a well-constituted government.

Non de otiosa et quieta re loquimur et quae probitate et modestia gaudeat, sed est magna illa et notabilis eloquentia alumna **licentiae, quam stulti libertatem vocabant**, comes seditionum, effrenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine severitate, contumax, temeraria, adrogans, quae in bene constitutis civitatibus non oritur.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ “Thus it happens that they declaim with hefty words ‘the rewards of tyrannicides’ or ‘the choices of the violated’ or ‘the remedy of plague’ or ‘the incest of mothers’ or whatever is discussed daily at school, but rarely or never in the forum: but when it comes to true cases (*Sic fit ut tyrannicidarum praemia aut vitatarum electiones aut pestilentiae remedia aut incesta matrum aut quidquid in schola cotidie agitur, in foro vel raro vel numquam, ingentibus verbis persequantur: cum ad veros iudices ventum*)” (Tac. *Dial.* 35.5).

¹³⁶ See Pl. *Resp.* 389e-391e for banning immoral stories and 606d for imitative poetry nurturing vice.

¹³⁷ Tac. *Dial.* 40.

The phrase relating license to liberty seems to borrow from Cicero's *de Re Publica*, where it is appended to his translation of Plato's *Republic* 562c-563e, which discusses the formation of tyranny from democracy.¹³⁸ Cicero's Scipio concludes the translation thus:

And now to return to the author of my lecture, out of too much of this license, which they think is the sole liberty, [Plato] says that the tyrant comes into being from some root and is, so to speak, born.

Atque ut iam ad sermonis mei auctorem revertar, ex hac nimia **licentia, quam illi solam libertatem putant**, ait ille ut ex stirpe quadam existere et quasi nasci tyrannum.¹³⁹

Significantly, Scipio ends the translation just before reaching Plato's discussion of speech-making idlers in democracy. Cicero omits these words from Socrates:

But in democracy, this group [the idlers] is in charge, excepting a few, and the fiercest of this group does the talking and acting, while the rest sit near the speaker's platform and make a hubbub and prohibit an opponent from speaking, so that, in such a constitution, with few exceptions, everything is managed by a group such as this.¹⁴⁰

Through a "window reference," then, Tacitus places Cicero's *licentia* and *libertas* back in their Platonic setting, while highlighting the Ciceronian omission of oratory's role in the license of democracy. Maternus emphasizes what Cicero elides, namely that *eloquence* is the foster-child of license, the comrade of sedition.

¹³⁸ Cic. *Rep.* 1.66-8. See Gudeman 1914: 497 for Platonic precedent and other parallels, including lines from Plutarch and Quintilian. See also Keeline 2014: 313-5, Mayer 2001: 199, Michel 1969: 251n1 and Zetzel 1995: 152-4.

¹³⁹ Cic. *Rep.* 68.2.

¹⁴⁰ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρὶς τινῶν ὀλίγων (Pl. *Resp.* 564d).

Thus, what at one point might seem to be the original work of Maternus then seems to be the work of Cicero, and finally it is Plato who brings the whole speech together. We saw Pliny take a similar course with Cicero and Homer. Dio of Prusa likewise seemed to be giving an original speech that then appeared to borrow from Mithraism, but ultimately resonates with the inclusion of Plato.¹⁴¹ The sophistic Roman, like the sophistic Prusan, takes his Plato-steeped education and puts it on display, but only in such a way that similarly educated and therefore elite readers could understand. Furthermore, Tacitus uses Plato to advance his own literary and rhetorical place with relation to Cicero in a manner not entirely different from Pliny's with respect to Cicero and Quintilian, as discussed above. These Romans seem to be ready to compete with their Roman predecessors by employing references to Greek predecessors.

For Tacitus' part, this window reference is cemented with more Platonic resonance, as we read further to meet Maternus' ruler, the *unus et sapientissimus* who might as well be Socrates' philosopher king.¹⁴² What is the need for eloquence, Maternus asks, when "the untrained masses do not deliberate concerning the republic, but the one trained best in wisdom?"¹⁴³ The training in *sapientia* and the role as charge of the state evokes Socrates' rulers, who, "spending most of their time with philosophy, when their turn comes around, will labor at politics and rule for the sake of the city."¹⁴⁴ The results of this kingship are likewise similar for Maternus' oratory and Socrates' drama. Should there be a ruler, *unus et sapientissimus*, there would be no oratory. Should there be a philosopher king there would be no dramatic poetry.

¹⁴¹ On Platonism as the ultimate referent, see, e.g., Porter 2001: 87: "its central vehicle is, as has often been remarked, neither Stoic nor Persian but transparently Platonic." See also Moles 1995: 190-2, Russell 1992: 22-3 and 223 and Trapp 1990: 149.

¹⁴² Interestingly, the philosopher king is trained in a manner similar to that which Messala prescribes for his pupil. Compare Pl. *Resp.* 539a-b to Tac. *Dial.* 34.

¹⁴³ *Quid multis apud populum contionibus, cum de re publica non imperiti et multi deliberent, sed sapientissimus et unus?* (Tac. *Dial.* 41.4).

¹⁴⁴ τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοῦντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἔνεκα (Pl. *Resp.* 540b). See also 540d.

So the *Dialogus* ends, mostly without conclusion, yet with one more coy intertext with Plato. Maternus, rising and embracing Aper, jests that he will denounce him to the poets. Aper returns that he will denounce the two to the rhetoricians and professors: *Ac simul adsurgens et Aprum complexus “Ego” inquit “te poetis, Messala autem antiquariis criminabimur.” “At ego vos rhetoribus et scholasticis” inquit.*¹⁴⁵ The threat of denouncing the literary critic is one that Socrates voices at *Republic* 595b, where he will carry on his literary criticism only in private, as he says, “for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other imitative artists.”¹⁴⁶ With that we return to the dialogue’s exterior, which is marked only by a first-person plural verb, *discessimus*. The distance of our author from his interlocutors is remarkable. Only Plato kept greater distance from his dialogue on the state.

We might recall that Plato writes a dialogue in which the interlocutors prescribe an ideal state where drama does not exist, by using a dramatic form. Then we might recall that Tacitus writes a dialogue in which interlocutors prescribe an ideal state where oratory does not exist, by using rhetoric. Both authors, then, suggest that they themselves are not part of an ideal state. Tacitus, for his part, deliberates about multiple Republics—literary and political—in doing so. We might say the same of Dio of Prusa, who at Hieroson’s urging turns from the human city to the heavenly one.¹⁴⁷ Both Tacitus and Dio, then, do not employ Plato simply at a literary level, but carefully extend his thought into their own political world.

Conclusion

¹⁴⁵ Tac. *Dial.* 42.2.

¹⁴⁶ Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρησθαι, οὐ γὰρ μου καταρεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς, λῶβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα (Pl. *Resp.* 595b).

¹⁴⁷ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36.27.

Tacitus and Pliny seem to have followed the precepts of Quintilian in a number of ways. They must have familiarized themselves with the canon that Quintilian and others prescribed in order to allude to Homer and Plato in the careful manner that they do. Their writing Homer and Plato into their literary works is certainly not a matter of simple show, but—a thing which Quintilian would have appreciated—had practical purpose. That purpose could be debated and explained in various ways. In the examples reviewed in this chapter, Pliny’s practical use of Homer seems to have been primarily literary and social.¹⁴⁸ Tacitus’ use of Plato seems to have been primarily literary and political. These Greek authors could have been adopted and deployed differently as well. The variety of their use and instruction in a Roman context is a testament to their prevalence.

There seems to be little evidence, however, to suggest that Pliny’s employment of Homer or Tacitus’ of Plato serves some imperialistic purpose by which these Roman authors help overrun Greek arts or transform them into Roman ones. It seems, rather, that these authors have displayed the ways in which Greek intellectualism can be practical in their Roman world, while maintaining the authority and tradition of the Greek past. That the Greek authors are at times given priority over Cicero, as we have seen through window references or repurposed quotation, offers some evidence of this. Simon Swain’s statement, then, about Greek learning under the principate applies equally to our sophistic Roman as well: “In this period more than before or after, social and political reasons pressured many, perhaps most, among the leading classes of the

¹⁴⁸ However, if it is true, as Moles 1990: 312 and 337n43 suggests, that Homer was Trajan’s favorite poet and offered opportunity for political devices, then political readings of Pliny’s Homeric quotation would not be unfounded.

~~Greek~~ [Roman] world into claiming and advertising a high degree of classical education and culture.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Swain 2000: 24. My strikethrough. Quoted above, p. 112.

Chapter Five

Epidictic: Sophistic Strategies of Self-Fashioning

While the literary display of *paideia* discussed in the previous chapters was indeed central to the work of the *pepaideumenos*, the Second Sophistic as Philostratus described it was characterized, moreover, by live, oratorical and performative displays of *paideia*.¹ As we shall see, the majority of scholarly attention has focused on Greek participation in such paideutic performances. But, as I shall argue, the sophistic Roman was equally engaged in the practice.

These paideutic performances, like their literary companions, blended the contemporary world with a cult of the past, but in the form of (at least apparently) epidictic oratory.² That is to say, the performances were not designed immediately for a courtroom (forensic/dicanic) or for a political assembly (symbouleutic/deliberative). Epidictic oratory, then, included the exercises in declamation discussed in my first chapters, as well as oratorical performances of encomium or praise and invective or blame.³ Tim Whitmarsh describes epidictic and its centrality to the movement as follows:

The speeches [of epidictic ...] were delivered for the occasion alone, to solicit the pleasure, admiration, and respect of the audience [...]. The audiences were gathering as members of the educated elite, parading and exercising their status, scrutinizing their peers as their reputations were made and broken, and testing the role of the traditional Greek manhood within the demanding environment of imperial aristocratic culture.⁴

¹ Gleason 1995, Schmitz 1997 and Whitmarsh 2005: 23-40 are the most thorough discussions of the performative aspects of the Second Sophistic.

² See König 2009: 42.

³ See König 2009: 41-2 for a concise treatment of Greek oratory in the Roman Empire.

⁴ Whitmarsh 2005: 3.

It is clear from Whitmarsh's description that construction of the self is central to these epideictic displays—the self of both the speaker and his audience.⁵ A well-done work of praise promoted the prestige of the audience; the audience in turn promoted the prestige of the speaker. Aelius Aristides' oration *To Rome* or Dio of Prusa's *To the Apameans* are fine examples of this device at play.⁶ A well-done work of invective defamed competitive rivals and advanced the speaker in the zero-sum game of imperial oratory.⁷ Polemo's attacks on Favorinus' manliness offer an example of this device.⁸

The mechanisms of self-construction, however, are not simple. The *pepaideumenos*, therefore, employed epideictic in intricate ways. What may appear to have been a simple piece of display oratory often had a socio-political aspect. On this view, the sophist used his epideictic expertise to establish intimacy with the emperor, thereby advancing his own position and perhaps even opening avenues toward privilege and aid for his province.⁹ As an intimate of emperor, the *pepaideumenos* might assume the role of a discreet advisor or critic.¹⁰ On one hand, the result is yet another construction of identity, perhaps as paideutic counselor to the emperor or bold opponent to the tyrant—two positions of prestige.¹¹ On the other hand, praise and invective have a protreptic force and thus what appears to be epideictic, through figured speech may become deliberative as well.¹² In some instances the figured speech of epideictic has likewise been

⁵ On negotiations of prestige between audience and performer see Eshleman 2012: 38-43.

⁶ See Swain 1996: 207-8 in response to the interpretations of Salmeri 1982. See also Madsen and Rees 2014: 13.

⁷ See Winkler 1990: 47 on zero-sum game (in Classical Athens), in which “winners won at the direct expense of losers.” Gleason 1995 aptly applies zero-sum game analysis to the world of imperial sophistry.

⁸ See Philostr. *VS* 491 with Gleason 1995: 21-54.

⁹ On personal admission to points of imperial power via epideictic expertise see Anderson 1993: 31-5 and Bowie 1974: 206. For broader political implications, see Bowersock 1969 with a response from Bowie 1982.

¹⁰ Bowie 1982: 51 suggests that this role is overstated—perhaps true in terms of historicity, but less so in terms of identity construction.

¹¹ Flintermann 2004 offers a fine discussion of the sophist's and the philosopher's social and political maneuvering bound up in advising the emperor. Still of import on this discussion is Palm 1959.

¹² The seminal work on figured speech is Ahl 1984. See Whitmarsh 1998, 2001: 33, and 2005: 57-9 for its application in the sophistic imperial world, an application supported by Philostratus *VS* 519 and 560-1.

interpreted as a sort of condemnation of the Roman Empire, thus giving it an aspect that approaches a forensic function of sorts.¹³

Deliberative Epideictic in Dio's *Kingship Orations*

The work of Dio of Prusa offers a good and well-discussed example of the complicated functions of epideictic oratory among Greek *pepaideumenoι*. In a series of orations, primarily the so-called *Kingship Orations* (*Or.* 1-4), Dio uses epideictic toward many of the ends mentioned above.¹⁴ The orations purport to be directed at the Emperor Trajan, with the first and third having been addressed to him and perhaps even given in his presence.¹⁵ The first oration may have been given shortly after Trajan's entry to Rome in 99/100 with the second, fourth and third following in that order between 100 and 104.¹⁶ More likely, however, as Whitmarsh suggests, these orations were not sincere, but performative, the evidence for Trajan's presence being "fragile."¹⁷ On either interpretation, Dio seems to have had both a Roman and an eastern audience in mind.

The *First Oration*, which seems to have been spoken in Dio's own character and from the position of a philosopher, aims to state directly "the characteristics and disposition of the good king, running through what they are in brief."¹⁸ Influence of Homeric and Platonic kingship theory is evident throughout.¹⁹ The *Second Oration* is set as a dialogue between Philip of Macedon and Alexander, in which Alexander draws upon Homer to put forth a discussion on kingship (περὶ βασιλείας). Philip is pleased with Alexander's treatment and the dialogue closes

¹³ See Swain 1996: 192-206 for one such analysis.

¹⁴ Moles 1990 is the most comprehensive treatment of the *Kingship Orations*. They have been treated at length elsewhere by Desideri 1978: 283-375, Swain 1996: 192-206 and Whitmarsh 1998 and 2001: 181-216.

¹⁵ Suggested *passim* by von Arnim 1898. See more recently Moles 1990: 333.

¹⁶ Moles 1990: 360. Dating these orations is a matter of conjecture.

¹⁷ Whitmarsh 1998: 186-8.

¹⁸ [Φέρε εἴπωμεν] τὰ τε ἦθη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ χρηστοῦ βασιλέως, ἐν βραχεῖ περιλαμβάνοντες ὡς ἔνεστιν (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.11).

¹⁹ See Moles 1990: 305-37 for analysis of *Or.* 1.

with his gratitude to Aristotle for teaching such noble precepts.²⁰ The *Third Oration*, like the first, is spoken in Dio's character and in the role of philosopher on analogy with Socrates. The addressee, purportedly Trajan, is set on analogy with the Persian king. The most laudatory of the *Kingship Orations*, this one runs through the addressee's virtues as parallel to those of the ideal king, promising sincerity throughout.²¹ The *Fourth Oration* returns to dialogue, this time between Alexander of Macedon and Diogenes, with Diogenes censuring Alexander for a poor conception of kingship.²²

Unsurprisingly, the circumstance of a Bithynian philosopher/sophist discussing kingship with a Roman emperor in terms that range from encomium to thinly veiled dialogic analogy has led to scholarly debate about the deliberative and critical functions of Dio's *Kingship Orations*. In the *First Oration* Dio's praise of Trajan can be viewed as encouragement to continue ruling virtuously and to avoid vice. Dio states this very function of epideictic: "For this discourse, spoken plainly without any flattery or blame in its own right points out the person who is like the good king and praises him insofar as he is like that good king, but brings the one who is unlike that good king to trial and reproaches him."²³ On this view, as John Moles points out, Dio compliments as a way of giving "moral encouragement." If the speech was, in fact, delivered in 99 or 100, it would be important to let the emperor know what type of behavior he should maintain beyond the very early years of his reign.²⁴ The numerous contrasts between good and bad rulers and suggestions of Domitianic vice would, conversely, teach Trajan what type of

²⁰ See Moles 1990: 337-48 for analysis of *Or. 2*.

²¹ See Moles 1990: 350-60 for analysis of *Or. 3*.

²² See Moles 1983 for analysis of *Or. 4*.

²³ οὗτος γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἀπλῶς λεγόμενος ἄνευ πάσης κολακείας ἢ λοιδορίας αὐτὸς ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τὸν μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ γνωρίζει τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνῳ ὅμοιος, τὸν δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἐξελέγγχει τε καὶ ὀνειδίζει (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.15).

²⁴ See Moles 1990: 313.

behavior was unacceptable.²⁵ Deliberative and epideictic functions converge here, as Moles suggests that there is a “conditionality” of praise by which Dio will commend Trajan, but only if the emperor follows his advice.²⁶

Philhellenism and Sophistic Posturing

Whitmarsh extends this rhetoric of conditionality to the dialogic kingship orations as well. In the *Second Oration* emphasis on Alexander’s educated and controlled behavior “articulates the importance of *paideia*, its necessary priority to good kingship.”²⁷ In the *Fourth Oration* “Dio/genes” shows Alexander that “the route to good kingship can be voluntarily chosen and accessed through Greek literary-philosophical acculturation.”²⁸ The *Kingship Orations* as a whole have a deliberative message for Trajan: “*paideia* is the sine qua non of good rule, and Greek wisdom must guide Roman power.”²⁹

If the *Kingship Orations* are read as declarations of philhellenism, especially if taken as part of a zero-sum cultural game, they may be not only deliberative, but critical of Trajan and Roman government. Figured speech that aligns Trajan with a rash Alexander, for example, leaves open critical interpretations of Trajan’s expansionist policies.³⁰ Simon Swain, taking the *Fourth Oration* together with the *Second Tarsian Oration* (*Or.* 34) and the *Olympic Oration* (*Or.* 12), advances the notion that a Greek audience was encouraged to view Roman imperial ambitions in relation to the destruction of the Greek world.³¹

²⁵ See Moles 1990: 315 and Trisolgio 1972a: 28-33.

²⁶ Moles 1990: 313.

²⁷ Whitmarsh 2001: 203.

²⁸ Whitmarsh 2001: 209.

²⁹ Whitmarsh 2001: 211.

³⁰ See, e.g., König 2009: 49 and Schmidt 2011: 113.

³¹ Swain 1996: 202, contra Jones 1978: 123, who suspects no good reason for covert criticism. See also Madsen 2009: 109-19 and Whitmarsh 2001: 215.

While interpretations of the initial function of the *Kingship Orations* vary, most have in common the position that any advising or criticizing of the emperor has further implications in terms of Dio's self-construction and self-advancement. On one reading, Dio's encomiastic orations had the aim of his becoming an *amicus* of Trajan and other powerful Romans. This closeness would boost Dio's prestige at Rome while potentially opening an avenue to tangible benefits for his hometown of Prusa.³² A famous anecdote reported by Philostratus illustrates the intimacy with Trajan and prestige in Rome that Dio acquired as a result of sophistic oratory:

And the power of persuasion of the man was such that it enchanted even those who did not have a firm knowledge in Greek; in fact, the Emperor Trajan, placing Dio next to him at Rome on the golden chariot on which kings lead the triumphant procession, said, turning often to him, "What you are saying, I do not know, but I love you as I do myself."³³

The anecdote also hints at another aspect of Dio's self-construction with an eye to his eastern audiences. Swain, thus, linking Dio's imperial intimacy, his figured speech within the *Kingship Orations* and his open criticism of Rome in other orations, argues for a character construction that would appeal to a Greek:

Claims of "friendship" (*philia*) with the emperor look like a way of furthering Dio's standing and of controlling rivals. Criticism of Rome, including outright

³² See Moles 1982 and 1990: 332 with further references and bibliography. On this function generally see Bowersock 1969: 30-58. On political benefits of friendship for Romans as posited by Dio, see Salmeri 2000: 89.

³³ καὶ γὰρ ἡ πειθὴ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οἷα καταθέλξει καὶ τοὺς μὴ τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀκριβοῦντας· Τραιανὸς γοῦν ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ ἀναθέμενος αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰώμης εἰς τὴν χρυσοῦν ἄμαξαν, ἐφ' ἧς οἱ βασιλεῖς τὰς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων πομπὰς πομπεύουσιν, ἔλεγε θαμὰ ἐπιστρεφόμενος εἰς τὸν Δίωνα «τί μὲν λέγεις, οὐκ οἶδα, φιλῶ δέ σε ὡς ἑμαυτόν» (Philostr. *VS* 488). See Swain 1996: 397 and Whitmarsh 2001: 241-4 on the passage.

attacks on the governors, is a means of asserting his independence as a man who has the Greeks' best interests at heart.³⁴

On such a reading, Dio's ability to manipulate the Roman emperor increases his prestige in its own right. This manipulation, moreover, ingratiates Dio with his Greek audience, further increasing his prestige because of its empowering effect. Harry Sidebottom applies a theory of cultural creolization to the *Kingship Orations*, whereby Dio as member of a subject group accepts the culture of kingship, but makes kingship his own by judging it in terms of Greek virtue and vice:

Dio "repeating" orations *On Kingship* before a Greek audience summoned up an image of the Roman emperor heeding the message of Greek philosophy. This could make the Greeks feel better about the Roman present. The ruling power listened to, respected, and should act in accordance with the core values of Greek culture. The Roman was revealed as becoming Greek.³⁵

On this reading Dio achieves a heroic status as preserver of Hellenism under the amicable, if ignorant, rule of Trajan—a construction that builds well off of Dio's self-presentation elsewhere as exilic resistor to the tyranny of Domitian.³⁶

To summarize, Dio of Prusa's *Kingship Orations*, epideictic oratorical pieces, which on the surface either praise Trajan or discuss meritorious forms of kingship, potentially serve other purposes for Dio: protrepsis, criticism, self-presentation, to name a few. We might further note that these protreptic, critical or self-constructive purposes are frequently bound with Greekness to some degree by Dio himself and to a larger degree in the scholarship I have cited. In fact,

³⁴ Swain 1996: 211. See, similarly, Swain 1996: 194 and Whitmarsh 2001: 201, where the emphasis is on Dio's self-construction as man of Greek learning, who represents "himself as a paideutic specialist, an educator of Trajan, and thus as a paradigm of Greek culture as defined against the unlearned but empowered Roman."

³⁵ Sidebottom 2006: 152. See similarly Whitmarsh 2001: 211-2.

³⁶ See Whitmarsh 2001: 156-67.

Sidebottom suggests that one “underlying trend which may have encouraged Dio [to write on kingship] can be found in the rise of the Second Sophistic. This cultural renaissance, with its stress on ‘Greekness’ and the Greek past, was created by the Greek elite from the late first century AD in large part to fill the distressing gap between their contemporary economic and social prosperity and their lack of political autonomy.”³⁷ One might add that Dio chooses a type of oratory that Roger Rees notes was Greek in origin and was associated with Greeks throughout the Republic and into the Imperial period to such an extent that Quintilian would say of panegyric that it usually discussed the interests of Greece.³⁸

Epideictic at Rome

Complicating this view, however, is Pliny’s *Panegyricus*, a piece of epideictic oratory by a Latin author and contemporary of Dio of Prusa. What has come down to us as the *Panegyricus* is a published version of a recitation in praise of Trajan given by Pliny to his friends.³⁹ It differs from the act of a declaimer in that, as William Johnson remarks, Pliny brings “*amicos in cubiculum*, not *populum in auditorium*.”⁴⁰ Yet we ought to remember first that the performance context for Dio’s *Kingship Orations* is unclear. We can further note that though the *Panegyricus* is, as Paul Roche remarks, “a radical extension of the generic norms obtaining in the first century CE,”⁴¹ it does in fact have at its root an *actio gratiarum* spoken in public before the senate. Pliny himself describes the origins of the speech thus:

The office of consulship bound me to give a speech of thanks (*gratias agerem*) to the *princeps* in the name of the Republic. And once I had completed this task in

³⁷ Sidebottom 2006: 151.

³⁸ See Rees 2014: 110 with Quint. *Inst.* 3.4.14: *plerumque de utilitatibus Graeciae locuntur*.

³⁹ Plin. *Ep.* 3.18.1-4. See Braund 2012: 99-100 with n. 39 on the expansion of the original *actio*.

⁴⁰ Johnson 2010: 48. Spawforth (2012: 64) points out that *recitatio* too was originally a Greek practice, popularized in Rome by Pollio.

⁴¹ Roche 2011: 3.

the senate as befit the place and the time, I believed that it was most appropriate for a good citizen to build upon the same speech more spaciouly and fully in a written volume.⁴²

The speech of thanks primarily takes the form of a *laudatio* to Trajan. It is an epideictic performance concerning Trajan and good kingship, and therein has a number of similarities (and differences) with Dio's *Kingship Orations*. Comparisons, therefore, between Dio and Pliny's speeches to and about Trajan are abundant; and I do not intend to contribute to discussions of the primacy of one over the other in terms of influence, prescriptive force, or sincerity, among other topics.⁴³ I am interested, rather, in examining to what extent Pliny and Dio may have been driven by similar motives and may have employed similar methods in their performances and publications of epideictic oratory.

A preliminary point must first be made so as to avoid falling into the trap, which the reference to Quintilian above (*Inst.* 3.4.14) perhaps sets, of thinking of epideictic oratory as un-Roman.⁴⁴ There are, in fact, some occasions in which simple epideictic is appropriate for the Roman. As Quintilian remarks, "I won't deny that certain material of this type is composed solely for show, such as the praise of gods and men produced in past ages."⁴⁵ This, of course, is an exception. Yet, while Quintilian does not generally support the use of epideictic in its most

⁴² *Officium consulatus iniunxit mihi, ut rei publicae nomine principi gratias agerem. Quod ego in senatu cum ad rationem et loci et temporis ex more fecissem, bono civi convenientissimum credidi eadem illa spatiosius et uberius volumine amplecti* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.18.1).

⁴³ Most treatments of Dio's *Kingship Orations* recognize similarities (and differences) with Pliny's *Panegyricus*, and *vice versa*. B. Gibson 2011, Moles 1990, Sidebottom 2006 and Trisoglio 1972a, e.g., include more directed analyses.

⁴⁴ See Hutchinson 2013: 242-5 for some Roman examples of epideictic. Cicero's *Pro Marcello* and Seneca's *De Clementia* are notable kin of panegyric prior to Quintilian's work. Slightly later than Quintilian, Apuleius provides a full collection of epideictic display oratory. George Kennedy (1972: 607) notes of the *Florida* that "Apuleius came closer than any other Latin writer we know to several kinds of epideictic oratory being practiced by Greek sophists." See also Sandy 1997 *passim*, esp. 150.

⁴⁵ *Neque infitias eo quasdam esse ex hoc genere materias ad solam compositas ostentationem, ut laudes deorum virorumque quos priora tempora tulerunt* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.3). Quintilian treats epideictic in its non-practical function, as aiming solely at the listeners' pleasure (*solam petit audientium voluptatem*), at *Inst.* 8.3.11 as well. His treatment of it in this context seems to suggest that, for all his protestations, display oratory did in fact occur regularly enough at Rome to include it in the *Institutio*.

radical sense, that is, as a simple demonstration (*demonstrativum/ἐπιδεικτικόν*), he does note that “Roman custom also has mixed this function into practical matters.”⁴⁶ For this reason, presumably, he prescribes early training in epideictic for his pupil, suggesting that he stretch his learning “to praise famous men and blame the wicked; and there is not only single-fold utility in this.”⁴⁷ His first example of such an instance of public utility follows thus: “Funeral speeches (*funebres laudationes*) frequently stem from some public office and are often entrusted to magistrates by way of senatorial decree (*senatus consulto*).”⁴⁸ And indeed these epideictic orations were given by men of high political, social and literary standing. One elite funeral orator, for example, is Tacitus, who performed the *laudatio funebris* of Verginius Rufus. Pliny reports that “he was praised by the consul Cornelius Tacitus; this a sort of final pinnacle of Verginius’ good fortune—the most eloquent of funeral orators.”⁴⁹

The cause of Verginius’ death is even linked with epideictic oratory. Pliny describes the tragic incident to Voconius Romanus:

When he was preparing his voice, as he was going to give an address of thanks (*acturus ... gratias*) for his consulship to the *princeps*, a rather heavy book, which he happened to pick up, fell because of its weight, the man being old and on his feet. As he reached to pick the book up, he fell, losing his footing because of an uneven and slippery floor and he broke his hip.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *Sed mos Romanus etiam negotiis hoc munus inseruit* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.2).

⁴⁷ [*Inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet*], *laudare claros viros et vituperare improbos: quod non simplicis utilitatis opus est* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.20).

⁴⁸ *Nam et funebres laudationes pendent frequenter ex aliquo publico officio atque ex senatus consulto magistratibus saepe mandantur* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.2).

⁴⁹ *Laudatus est a consule Cornelio Tacito; nam hic supremus felicitati eius cumulus accessit, laudator eloquentissimus* (Plin. *Ep.* 2.1.6). See Birley 2000a: 238-9 on the impact of the *laudatio* on Tacitus.

⁵⁰ *Nam cum vocem praepararet acturus in consulatu principi gratias, liber quem forte acceperat grandiozem, et seni et stanti ipso pondere elapsus est. Hunc dum sequitur colligitque, per leve et lubricum pavementum fallente vestigio cecidit coxamque fregit* (Plin. *Ep.* 2.1.5).

If we callously pass over the tragic fall, we note that Verginius was preparing to perform an *actio gratiarum*, or a speech of thanks to Nerva—a piece of epideictic oratory of the same ilk as Pliny’s. Pliny, then, is not the sole Roman epideictic orator—far from it. Marcel Durry demonstrated that *actiones gratiarum* existed as early as Augustus’ time;⁵¹ Ronald Syme remarked that Pliny’s *actio* was far from novel, but for its expansion and publication;⁵² and Doreen Innes points out that there could in theory be twelve *actiones gratiarum* each year in the time of Quintilian and Pliny.⁵³ In short, epideictic oratory was a regular part of Roman life.⁵⁴ That we have only Pliny’s *Panegyricus* as an example from this period is an issue of publication, not of prevalence. We might just as well note that its existence is very much due to its power as a model for later panegyrists to follow.⁵⁵

Pliny’s Deliberative Epideictic: Encomium

With the understanding that epideictic could be Roman and that Pliny’s performance, at least in its original version, had Roman precedent, let us turn to Pliny’s motives in producing and reproducing this panegyric. The first motivating factor is alluded to in the portion of the letter to Voconius quoted above, but is expressed explicitly by Pliny in the *Panegyricus*: the senate commanded Pliny to give a speech of thanks. He opens his speech by asking, what occasion is better for praying to the gods than at a gathering “when by the command of the senate (*imperio senatus*), with the authority of the Republic we are stirred to give thanks to the best *princeps*?”⁵⁶

⁵¹ Durry 1938: 3-4.

⁵² Syme 1958: 95.

⁵³ Innes 2011: 70.

⁵⁴ See Innes 2011: 70, Radice 2012: 77 and Roche 2011: 1.

⁵⁵ See Rees 2011 and 2012: 3-48.

⁵⁶ [*Qui mos cui potius quam consuli aut quando magis usurpandus colendusque est, quam*] *cum imperio senatus, auctoritate rei publicae ad agendas optimo principi gratias excitamur?* (Plin. *Pan.* 1.2).

There is in addition, however, another purpose to Pliny's speech of thanks and praise likely present in the initial speech before the senate and certainly present among his friends during the expanded recitation. Again, Pliny himself relates what this purpose is in a letter to Vibius Severus:

I believed that it was most appropriate for a good citizen to build upon the same speech more spaciouly and fully in a written volume, first in order to commend our emperor for his virtues with sincere praise, and next in order to advise future emperors not as if by the method of a teacher, but by the use of an example, by which path they might most of all achieve the same glory. For to give precepts of what a *princeps* ought to be is indeed a fine thing, but onerous and almost arrogant; to praise the best *princeps* and through this to show to posterity a sort of light from a beacon that they might follow has the same utility without the arrogance.⁵⁷

This amounts to an admission by Pliny that his speech had protreptic aims made safe through exemplarity and the figured speech of encomium. Dio made similar claims in his *First Oration*.⁵⁸ As Susanna Braund remarks, "Pliny was also seizing the opportunity offered by an obligatory speech of thanks to express a broader political vision for the future."⁵⁹

Protreptic or, we might say, deliberative epideictic seems to be the best form of epideictic in Quintilian's scheme. Its practicality is highlighted in his treatment of Cicero's *Cato*, on which he comments, "The whole speech, however, has something similar to deliberative speeches,

⁵⁷ *Bono civi convenientissimum credidi eadem illa spatiosius et uberius volumine amplecti, primum ut imperatori nostro virtutes suae veris laudibus commendarentur, deinde ut futuri principes non quasi a magistro sed tamen sub exemplo praemonerentur, qua potissimum via possent ad eandem gloriam niti. Nam praecipere qualis esse debeat princeps, pulchrum quidem sed onerosum ac prope superbum est; laudare vero optimum principem ac per hoc posteris velut e specula lumen quod sequantur ostendere, idem utilitatis habet arrogantiae nihil* (Plin. *Ep.* 3.18.-3). Pliny states similarly in the *Panegyricus* itself: "good rulers might recognize what they are doing, bad ones what they ought to do (*boni principes quae facerent recognoscerent, mali quae facere deberent*)" (Plin. *Pan.* 4.1).

⁵⁸ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.15. Quoted above p. 151.

⁵⁹ Braund 2012: 100. See similarly Madsen 2014: 20 and Roche 2011: 5. cf. Innes 2011: 83-4.

since the same things tend to be persuaded in the one (deliberative speech) as are praised in the other (encomium).”⁶⁰ Furthermore, Quintilian teaches his pupils these practical tactics so that they are prepared for real situations in which they are called upon for consultation. The audience for such consultation might even include the *princeps* himself: “When they begin to be called into the consultation of friends, to give their opinions in the senate, to persuade the *princeps* if he consults them, they will be taught by practice what they perhaps would not believe in precepts.”⁶¹ Quintilian seems to have something of a kingship oration in mind for his pupil.

Figuring Praise

One of the fields in which Quintilian wants his pupil to be practiced is figured speech, to which he dedicates Book Nine of his *Institutio*. Figured speech, he notes, is not that which is stated frankly; rather “those things which are simulated and composed by craft are without a doubt to be considered figures.”⁶² When might it be appropriate to employ figured speech? According to Quintilian “there are threefold uses for this device: one is when it is unsafe to speak openly, another if it is not seemly to do so, a third which is put to use simply for the sake of elegance.”⁶³ His first example of a situation in which speaking openly is unsafe is in the case of tyranny—a theme that will resurface in Pliny’s treatment of Domitian and Trajan in the *Panegyricus*.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ *Totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.28). We might imagine that the *Cato* of Maternus in Tacitus’ *Dialogus de Oratoribus* had similar function. See Levene 1997: 66-7 for a brief discussion and list of citations concerning the forensic and deliberative utility of epideictic.

⁶¹ *Ceterum cum advocari coeperint in consilia amicorum, dicere sententiam in senatu, suadere si quid consulat princeps, quod praeceptis fortasse non credant usu docebuntur* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.70).

⁶² *Adsimulata et arte composita procul dubio schemata sunt existimanda* (Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.27).

⁶³ *Eius triplex usus est: unus si dicere palam parum tutum est, alter si non decet, tertius qui venustatis modo gratia adhibetur* (Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.66).

⁶⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.67-8.

Pliny seems to have learned well from his *praeceptor*. His deployment of figured speech extends intricately to the very style of his prose, as Mark Morford points out in analyzing Pliny's panegyric form and function:

Style and purpose are inseparable, as Pliny shows in his description of the reworking of the speech in *Letters* 3.18. The intermediate style, with its *figurae*, was the only choice for the orator who wished to make policy suggestions that might also imply criticism of the *princeps*.⁶⁵

In addition to paying attention to his own stylistic choices, Pliny is keenly aware of the use of figured speech toward emperors elsewhere. And thus, as Shadi Bartsch notes, “in large part, the *Panegyricus* is an obsessive attempt to prove its own sincerity.”⁶⁶ In the opening sections, for example, Pliny argues for his own sincerity by providing particular examples of how figured speech works and stating that he has no fears of Trajan finding such figures in his speech:

There is no danger that when I speak of humanity, he will believe that arrogance is reproached in him; that when I speak of frugality, I mean luxury; by clemency, cruelty; by generosity, avarice; by kindness, malice; by temperance, excess; by hard work, sloth; by courage, fear.⁶⁷

Pliny's friend Tacitus expresses a similar sentiment in short when he says that in the happy times of Nerva and Trajan “you may feel what you want and say what you feel.”⁶⁸ Bartsch traces such methods of displaying sincerity, with the conclusion that sincerity itself, or at least proof of it, was “a lost feature of the more distant past.”⁶⁹ Pliny's letter to Vibius seems to confirm this

⁶⁵ Morford 2012: 133.

⁶⁶ Bartsch 1994: 149.

⁶⁷ *Non enim periculum est, ne, cum loquar de humanitate, exprobrari sibi superbiam credat; cum de frugalitate, luxuriam; cum de clementia, crudelitatem; cum de liberalitate, avaritiam; cum de benignitate, livorem; cum de continentia, libidinem; cum de labore, inertiam; cum de fortitudine, timorem* (Plin. *Pan.* 3.4).

⁶⁸ [*Rara temporum felicitate ubi*] *sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet* (Tac. *Hist.* 1.1.4). Cf. Plin. *Pan.* 66.4: *iubes quae sentimus promere in medium: proferemus*.

⁶⁹ Bartsch 1994: 149.

conclusion. There is simulation involved in praising Trajan, with the unstated purpose of commending certain characteristics of the current *princeps* and giving advice on future action.

The *dissimulatio* or doublespeak that Bartsch discusses is a type of figured speech outlined by Quintilian and well known to Pliny and his peers. A similar anxiety about sincerity appeared in Dio's *Third Kingship Oration*, and a similar potential for figured speech existed in all four orations. But given the prevalence of the same among Dio's Roman contemporaries, it might be worth reassessing the sentiments put forth by Whitmarsh that "sophistry was the medium of 'figured speech'" or that "Greekness consists precisely *not* in revealing one's inner intentions, but rather in demonstrating an impressive facility with the manipulation, innovation, and combination of personae, both 'literary' and 'cultural.'"⁷⁰ If Pliny, Quintilian and Tacitus are any indication, dissimulation is far from being solely a Greek phenomenon.

Paideutic Precepts and Senatorial Aims

For the sophistic Greek and Roman there must be something more at stake than a display of Greekness or Romanness. Behind the figured speech, there is carefully crafted advice. We noted above, for example, that Dio may have been pressing against imperialistic military strategy or for the acquisition of *paideia*. Pliny also seems to have something in mind for Trajan and the *res publica*. Roche, in fact, describes the *Panegyricus* as a political program and even a "manifesto in the true sense of the word."⁷¹ Morford has suggested that a significant portion of that program was to "define a working relationship between senate and *princeps*," a notion cleverly embodied by Alain Gowing's transformed *SPQR: Senatus princepsque Romanus*.⁷² That the *princeps* belonged in the formula was unquestioned by this point. It was the *S* that was under

⁷⁰ Whitmarsh 2001: 33.

⁷¹ Roche 2011: 5.

⁷² Morford 2012: 138. Gowing 2005: 125.

threat.⁷³ Pliny's *Panegyricus* thus attempts to resecure the senatorial role by leveling the political field that had been so damaged under Domitian. He strategically praises the characteristics in Trajan that might help doing so. Roche has thoroughly catalogued these characteristics along with their implicit advice. Among his catalog one finds the advice that the emperor "sustain the notion of his own social parity with his peers," "cultivate the appearance of his former status as private citizen," "allow the senate a sensible and dignified function" and "encourage the senate to be free and to participate in the running of the state."⁷⁴ The emphasis on finding common ground between senate and *princeps* is evident in statements such as these.

In tandem with such precepts for rule, Pliny's collection of virtues aims at this leveling of ground between citizen and *princeps*. The list of those supporting Roche's catalog being too long to analyze, I would like to focus on two virtues in particular: *moderatio* and *humanitas*. *Moderatio* appears the most of any virtue in the *Panegyricus* (sixteen times)—again too many times to list and analyze exhaustively.⁷⁵ Pliny even exclaims, "How much I have said about *moderatio*, and how much more still remains!"⁷⁶ The term, along with its synonym *modestia* (also used sixteen times in the speech), is used most frequently with relation to Trajan's titles, offices and acclaim (4.3, 21.1, 56.3, 63.8) and the relationship between Trajan and the senate (47.6, 54.5, 79.4). The praise of Trajan for being moderate or taking a middle road has protreptic force with regard to his relationship with the senate.

⁷³ So Gowing 2005: 127 on Pliny's "hint that the memory of the Senate is just as important as that of the emperor."

⁷⁴ Roche 2011: 6-7. See also Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 312 for a list of imperial virtues in the *Panegyricus*.

⁷⁵ See Braund 2012: 94, Roche 2011: 8 and, especially, Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 41-2 for treatments of this virtue.

⁷⁶ *Quam multa dixi de moderatione, et quanto plura adhuc restant!* (Plin. *Pan.* 56.3).

This message is cemented further by Pliny's treatment of *humanitas* and Trajan.⁷⁷ Trajan's moderation between *humanitas* and *divinitas* is an immediate point of interest in the *Panegyricus*; as Pliny asks in the second section, "Are we accustomed, as love and joy prompt us, to celebrate universally the divinity of our *princeps* or the humanity, temperance, agreeableness?"⁷⁸ The answer might be provided at the end of the speech, where Pliny highlights imperial mortality:

For the extent of life is just as brief and fragile for *principes* as it is for other men, even for those *principes* who think themselves gods. And so it befits the best man to strive and strain to benefit the Republic after his own life, no doubt by monuments of moderation and justice—virtues which a consul is most able to achieve.⁷⁹

The mortality of deluded *principes* refers to Domitian, but is nevertheless worth bearing in mind for Trajan. The negotiation between divinity and humanity ought to be a chief concern for him. Closely linked to this negotiation of divinity and humanity is that of citizen and *princeps*.⁸⁰ It follows that Pliny's assessment of Trajan's *humanitas* elsewhere includes most prominently his equal estimation of his subjects (24.2, 71.5) and his willingness to give them an audience (47.3). Braund has noted in these uses of *humanitas* a Plinian emphasis on courtesy⁸¹—a value that

⁷⁷ See Braund 2012: 93 and 98 on *humanitas* as a key theme in the *Panegyricus*. See also Levene 1997: 80-2 and Rees 2001: 163. Lefèvre 2009: 169-221 offers an analysis of *humanitas* in Pliny's *Epistles* as operating in the fields of Roman rule, slavery, women and death. His analysis excludes any treatment of the *Panegyricus*, but is a testament to the varied spheres of use for the term. See also Méthy 2007: 248-72 on *l'humanité* as social and moral virtue (but one that is second to *l'amour*).

⁷⁸ *Divinitatem principis nostri, an humanitatem temperantiam facilitatem, ut amor et gaudium tulit, celebrare universi solemus?* (Plin. *Pan.* 2.7). Roche 2011: 10 notes that *humanitas* and *divinitas* are used equally in the *Panegyricus* (seven times).

⁷⁹ *Ut enim ceterorum hominum, ita principum, illorum etiam, qui dii sibi videntur, aevum omne ei breve et fragile est. Itaque optimum quemque niti et contendere decet, ut post se quoque rei publicae prosit, moderationis scilicet iustitiaeque monumentis, quae plurima statuere consul potest* (Plin. *Pan.* 78.2).

⁸⁰ Wallace-Hadrill 1982 is the best treatment of this negotiation.

⁸¹ Braund 2012: 93.

would, like *moderatio*, bring the appearance of near equality between senate and *princeps* to the fore.

Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's study of the *princeps* and his virtues confirms this conclusion by illustrating that the virtues outlined by Pliny dealt primarily not with justification of monarchy, but with social virtues from which the educated upper class stood to gain most.⁸² In a recitation to an audience likely composed of senatorial friends, Pliny's emphasis on virtues such as *moderatio* and *humanitas*, which bring *princeps* and senate together in power, has a creolization effect similar to that which Sidebottom suggests in relation to Greek kingship orations. In fact, elsewhere Wallace-Hadrill draws parallels (while noting differences as well) between the role of *moderatio* in the *Panegyricus* and μετριότης in Greek kingship theory.⁸³ With these parallel strategies in mind, one could recraft and reapply Sidebottom's assessment to Pliny and his Roman audience:

Διο [Pliny] “repeating” orations *On Kingship* before a ~~Greek~~ [Roman senatorial] audience summoned up an image of the Roman emperor heeding the message of ~~Greek~~ [Roman] philosophy. This could make the ~~Greeks~~ [Romans] feel better about the Roman present. The ruling power listened to, respected, and should act in accordance with the core values of ~~Greek~~ [Roman] culture. The Roman was revealed as becoming ~~Greek~~ [Roman].⁸⁴

The sophistic discourse with its figured speech could in this way represent and empower a subordinate class, whether it be composed of provincials or Romans.

⁸² Wallace-Hadrill 1981 *passim*, esp. 317-8. See Rees 2014: 107 on the senatorial make up of Pliny's audience.

⁸³ Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 41.

⁸⁴ Sidebottom 2006: 152. My manipulations in brackets.

Such discourse was not peculiar to Dio and Pliny. Chris Whitton has illustrated shared strategies and meanings in Tacitus' *Agricola*. Reading Pliny's *Epistles* 2.11 and 8.14 together with the *Agricola*, Whitton concludes the following:

Pliny is co-opting Tacitus as his co-advocate, borrowing and adapting the language of his *eloquentissimus* fellow consular for this performative display of senatorial participation. Like Tacitus in the *Agricola*, Pliny both proclaims the return of life to the Senate after its Flavian stagnation and leads the way in the continuation of its revival.⁸⁵

The comparandum in the *Agricola* is from the third chapter, in which Tacitus sets out upon a *laudatio* of his father-in-law with a nod to the freedom of speech of the period: "Nevertheless, I shall not be reluctant even in an unfinished and unpolished voice to collect in writing the memory of our prior servitude and a testimony of our present good fortune."⁸⁶ This statement and numerous others, as Whitton points out, are significant for a study of Pliny's senatorial voice, due in part to the many potential instances of intertextuality. We might note further that though Tacitus refers to his work as a *liber*, it has numerous affinities to *laudationes* not entirely unlike Pliny's speech to and for Trajan, and in this way shares elements of a figured and empowering epideictic.⁸⁷

The Panegyrist's Posturing

The central figure in such discourses, Dionian, Plinian or Tacitean, however, is not that large and underrepresented group of senators and powerful provincials. It is not even the

⁸⁵ Whitton 2010: 138. On speech's role in the calculation of elite freedom in the *Agricola* see also Sailor 2008: 64.

⁸⁶ *Non tamen pigebit vel incondita ac rudi voce memoriam prioris servitutis ac testimonium praesentium bonorum composuisse* (Tac. *Agr.* 3.3).

⁸⁷ See most recently Woodman and Kraus 2014: 1-11 with treatment of the genre and encomiastic elements of the *Agricola*. For the (ever slight) suggestion of Tacitean performance see Sailor 2004: 159 and Syme 1970: 14. Figured speech occurs frequently in the narratives of Tacitus' histories. On his critical narrative, see Sailor 2008: 250-313.

emperor himself.⁸⁸ It is the speaker.⁸⁹ Epideictic performance, even when it figured to provide practical advice to another, was an opportunity for the speaker to display his own education and status. The opportunity and act of performing an *actio gratiarum* signaled high standing in its own right.⁹⁰ It required the position of consul—an office that was as social as it was political, since it implied a certain intimacy with the emperor and support of the senatorial class.⁹¹ The *Panegyricus*, along with the letters that parade it and such public speaking, marked Pliny's success. A remark of John Henderson on Pliny's aims in the *Epistles* holds true for his panegyric aims as well: "The point is for us to see the *novus homo* who has reached the consulate and enjoyed continuous advancement throughout a sparkling and accelerated career, and to see him nonchalantly set at the top of his own social pyramid."⁹²

Of course, the opportunity to speak was not enough on its own to confirm excellence. The performance and its content were essential. While much of the *Panegyricus* does focus on Trajan, Pliny inserts himself and propels his own authority carefully and crucially. Like Dio, he projects an air of *paideia*. We see this in his role as arbiter of *moderatio* and *humanitas*—two key terms throughout the *Panegyricus*, which were likewise central to our discussion of *paideia Romana* in my second chapter. A fine example of Pliny's authoritative self-presentation appears in a section that on the surface praises and encourages Trajan's appreciation for *humanitas* and *studia*, but also implies Pliny's role as leader in those fields. Pliny narrates through exclamation.⁹³

⁸⁸ But see Rees 2001 *passim*, esp. 166 for Trajan's centrality.

⁸⁹ See Noreña 2011: 29 on Pliny, Whitmarsh 1998: 190-1 on Dio.

⁹⁰ See Noreña 2011 *passim*, esp. 29.

⁹¹ See Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 46 on proximity to the monarch as a form of social organization.

⁹² Henderson 2003: 116. See also Guillemin 1929: 13-22 and Mayer 2003.

⁹³ See Rees 2010: 116-7 on this narrative strategy in panegyric.

What honor do you reserve for teachers of rhetoric, what dignity for masters in philosophy! How liberal arts have retained their life, vigor and country under you! The heinousness of past times punished these things with exile, since a *princeps* well-acquainted with every vice relegated arts that were hostile to vice because of his fear as much as his hatred. But you take up those same arts with open arms, eyes and ears. For you are an example of their precepts, and you delight in them just as much as you are approved for them. And whoever declares their culture (*studia humanitatis*) should praise all of your actions but most of all the ease of obtaining your audience.⁹⁴

Trajan's position as patron of the arts and Domitian's as their enemy are elaborated upon here, but Pliny inserts himself into a position of perhaps greater authority. That person who declares proficiency in *studia humanitatis* is responsible for extolling the qualities of a good *princeps*. This, of course, is precisely what Pliny is doing in his *actio gratiarum*. The implication is that he embodies the *humanitas* that he encourages Trajan to pursue. It is, then, Pliny who leads the intellectual revival that followed Domitian's assassination.⁹⁵

Pliny not only professes his *paideia* in the form of cultivating *humanitas*, but he also performs with the *moderatio* that befits a *pepaideumenos* and even manages to do so with an air of spontaneity that characterized many of Philostratus' most heavily praised sophists.⁹⁶ Pliny sets out his aims and challenges thus:

Therefore may we individually and thoughtfully maintain that temperance that we all preserve in a sudden surge of dutiful affection, and may we know that there is

⁹⁴ *Quem honorem dicendi magistris, quam dignationem sapientiae doctoribus habes! Ut sub te spiritum et sanguinem et patriam receperunt studia! Quae priorum temporum immanitas exsiliis puniebat, cum sibi vitiorum omnium conscius princeps inimicas vitiis artes non odio magis, quam reverentia, relegaret. At tu easdem artes in complexu, oculis, auribus habes. Praestas enim, quaecumque praecipiant, tantumque eas diligis, quantum ab illis probaris. An quisquam studia humanitatis professus, non cum omnia tua, tum vel in primis laudibus ferat admissionum tuarum facilitatem?* (Plin. Pan. 47.1-3).

⁹⁵ See Rees 2014: 122.

⁹⁶ See above, pp. 63-78, on the importance of *moderatio* in Roman education.

no more sincere nor welcome type of thanks than that which we emulate in those acclamations that lack the time for contrivance. I shall work as much as I can to make my speech conform to the modesty and moderation of the *princeps*.⁹⁷

Scholars have rightly viewed such statements of moderation as promises of sincerity and commitment to avoid flattery and the attending insult.⁹⁸ Yet equally important here, Pliny is performing *moderatio* and in so doing behaves as a *princeps* ought.⁹⁹ His practice is instructive and, moreover, self-promoting. In fact, Pliny closes the *Panegyricus* not with Trajan's character and accomplishments, but his own. Among them is his *modestia*, a synonym of *moderatio*, as praetor.¹⁰⁰

Elsewhere too, Pliny praises Trajan's *moderatio* in a manner that promotes Pliny's position as a member of the social and intellectual elite. We have noted in various letters that Pliny places literary and social achievement on a pedestal, at times even superior to military accolades—a self-serving method for an intellectual who had little recourse to advanced status through military achievement.¹⁰¹ Trajan, on the other hand, perhaps more than any emperor to that point in Roman history, advanced his position and Rome's borders by means of military prowess. Nevertheless, it is Trajan's *moderatio*, this time in the form of loving peace, that is to be praised: “But all the more your moderation ought to be heralded, because though nurtured on martial praise, you love peace.”¹⁰² We get the sense from Pliny's praise of Trajan's *humanitas*

⁹⁷ *Igitur quod temperamentum omnes in illo subito pietatis calore servavimus, hoc singuli quoque meditatique teneamus; sciamusque, nullum esse neque sincerius, neque acceptius genus gratiarum, quam quod illas acclamationes aemuletur, quae fingendi non habent tempus. Quantum ad me attinet, laborabo, ut orationem meam ad modestiam Principis moderationemque submittam* (Plin. *Pan.* 3.1-2).

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Bartsch 1994: 158-9 and Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 39.

⁹⁹ On the *Panegyricus* as maintaining a performative more than a cognitive function, see Bartsch 1994:148-87 and Rees 2010: 111.

¹⁰⁰ Plin. *Pan.* 95.1.

¹⁰¹ See further above, pp. 10-2 and 89.

¹⁰² *Sed tanto magis praedicanda est moderatio tua, quod innutritus bellicis laudibus pacem amas* (Plin. *Pan.* 16.1).

and *moderatio* that the underlying prescription is that the *princeps* would do best to imitate the behavior of the senatorial *littérateur*.

When Pliny slyly presents himself as a cultured man whom the emperor should imitate, he deploys a method which we saw in Dio's *Kingship Orations*. Like Dio, he places himself as superior not only to the *princeps*, but to the remaining elite as well. Again, professions of sincerity serve a second selfish purpose. The *Panegyricus* is marked by its abundance of contrasts between the good Trajan and the bad Domitian.¹⁰³ Scholars have noted that the negative depiction of Domitian serves to argue for Pliny's sincerity in treating Trajan and, furthermore, that the same strategy is deployed by Dio.¹⁰⁴ What interests me here is how the two distance themselves from Domitian. Pliny closes the *Panegyricus* by turning to his own career and, in yet another passage, suggesting that Trajan ought to follow the lead of Pliny, this time by perennially behaving as if up for election. On the way to this finale, Pliny records his career under Domitian as follows:

If indeed I was propelled in my career by that most treacherous *princeps* before he professed a hatred for good men, after he professed as much, I stood still; since I saw what type of shortcut opened the way to offices, I preferred a longer route; if in bad times I counted myself among those sad and fearful men, in good times I count myself among the safe and happy.¹⁰⁵

Pliny suggests here that from 93 until Domitian's death, he stopped in his tracks—a champion of moral political behavior—waiting to continue along the *cursus honorum*. Bartsch, however, following Syme and Giovannini, notes that “Pliny's distinction between his situations of pre- and

¹⁰³ On the praise/blame binary, see Bartsch 1994: 148-87, Bruère 1954, Moles 1990: 306, Roche 2011: 8-14 and Trisoglio 1972a: 19.

¹⁰⁴ Bartsch 1994: 159-79 and B. Gibson 2011: 114-5.

¹⁰⁵ *Si cursu quodam provectus ab illo insidiosissimo principe, antequam profiteretur odium bonorum, postquam professus est, substiti; cum viderem, quae ad honores compendia paterent, longius iter malui; si malis temporibus inter maestos et paventes, bonis inter securos gaudentesque numeror* (Plin. *Pan.* 95.3-4).

post-93 A.D. is not only artificial; it is false.”¹⁰⁶ In fact, Pliny held the prestigious imperial position of prefect of the *aerarium militare*. Pliny, therefore, takes the opportunity of praising Trajan and, with it, denigrating Domitian, as a means of clearing himself of implications with a tyrannical regime.

Dio’s distancing from Domitian bears close resemblance. He boasts in his *Third Kingship Oration* that “when it seemed necessary to everyone else to lie out of fear, I alone dared to tell the truth, even when doing so endangered my life.”¹⁰⁷ Combined with this self-aggrandizing statement is Dio’s claim of exilic status primarily in his *Thirteenth Oration*, but mentioned variously elsewhere.¹⁰⁸ Through his references to imperial defiance and exile, as Whitmarsh remarks, “Dio arrogates to himself the status of a paradigm, as though this alienated figure somehow essentialized the true values of the Greek philosophical heritage, values that have elsewhere been diluted or dissipated.”¹⁰⁹ Yet, like Pliny, Dio seems to deploy a sleight of hand. Whitmarsh notes:

Although Dio [...] tells us in his speech on his exile that the reason for his exile lay in his friendship with an enemy of the emperor (*Or.* 13.1), he elsewhere claims to have been ‘railing openly’ (ἐρεθίζων ἄντικρυς) against Domitian during his reign, and implies (or does not discourage the implication) that this caused his exile (45.1).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Bartsch 1994: 168. See also Giovannini 1987: 233 and Syme 1958: 77.

¹⁰⁷ ὅτε πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει ψεύδεσθαι διὰ φόβον, μόνος ἀληθεύειν ἐτόλμων, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 3.13).

¹⁰⁸ *Or.* 1 and 45 also refer to Dio’s exile. See Whitmarsh 2001: 156-67 for nuanced treatment of Dio’s “Exile and Sophistry,” including further bibliography. See also, more recently, Madsen 2009: 107-19.

¹⁰⁹ Whitmarsh 2001: 196.

¹¹⁰ Whitmarsh 2001: 157.

Philostratus gives further reason to check Dio's facts, remarking, "I don't think it's right to call his trip to the Getic people exile, since there was no order for him to go into exile."¹¹¹ That is, Dio perhaps is cashing in on the cache of exile. But his exile, like Pliny's and Cicero's before, could very well be an "internal exile."¹¹² As much as Dio might want to be included among Greek philosophers and keepers of an exiled Greek *paideia*, his position with respect to Domitian is no more cultural (nor, perhaps, factual) than Pliny's.¹¹³ As Jesper Madsen notes, Dio maintains a politically active life that in itself refutes the notion that he rejected Roman culture or politics.¹¹⁴

It must be acknowledged that Dio and Pliny's epideictic to or for Trajan are not mirror images and do not serve identical purposes. But both take their speeches on kingship as opportunities to fashion themselves, even if falsely, as social superiors due in great part to their awareness and embodiment of *paideia* and their rejection of its opposite, which was embodied by Domitian.

Pliny's Forensic Epideictic: Invective

Although the *locus* which we have examined for this self-fashioning thus far has been encomium or at least a related field, my discussion of these distancing strategies has also begun to reveal the opposite side of the epideictic coin—invective.¹¹⁵ And it is to this that I would like to turn with attention to strategies of social self-making. As we saw in the case of Pliny and Dio above, invective could be used against political figures in order to gain greater authority among

¹¹¹ τὴν δὲ ἐξ τὰ Γετικά ἔθνη πάροδον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς φυγὴν μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὀνομάζειν, ἐπεὶ μὴ προσητάχθη αὐτῷ φυγεῖν (Philostr. *VS* 488).

¹¹² See Whitton 2010: 130, following Doblhofer 1987: 221-41.

¹¹³ But see conversely Whitmarsh 2001: 137. Rees 2014 likewise offers a cultural reading of the *Panegyricus*.

¹¹⁴ Madsen 2009: 118.

¹¹⁵ See Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.19 on the two-fold nature of epideictic.

members of a subjugated group. Because it is perhaps easier to see the ways in which invective would be self-serving in a zero-sum socio-political game, I will not dwell on its existence, but to mention that Pliny and Tacitus employ it in great abundance. Therefore, to consider criticism of the Roman imperial regime to be a solely Greek phenomenon would be an oversight of the critical nature of second-century Latin prose literature. Scholars have elsewhere demonstrated, as Madsen has, that “what has been described as Greek cultural criticism may indeed equal a universal criticism of Rome, also found in Latin texts of the same period.”¹¹⁶ Just as figured speech within encomiastic epideictic was not solely Greek, as I have argued above, so too was invective epideictic available to Romans. Taking this for granted, I would like to turn our attention instead to a particular strategy of invective that was rooted in the training of the *pepaideumenos*—physiognomy.

Sophistic Rivalry and Physiognomy

This pseudo-science, which determines the subject’s inner character by analyzing physical features ranging from animal and ethnic characteristics to facial expression and gesture,¹¹⁷ has a long and complex history.¹¹⁸ Elements of physiognomy appear as early as the *Iliad* with the description of Thersites, and pseudo-Aristotelian treatises from the fourth century BCE appear to have led the way for more formal study. Polemo of Laodicea composed a treatise in the second century CE on the basis of these Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises and others from a Hellenistic physician, Loxus. Polemo’s treatise survives in Arabic translation, Greek epitome and, to some degree, through a derivative fourth-century Latin treatise. The variety of points of analysis and conclusions to be made by the physiognomist further complicates our

¹¹⁶ Madsen 2009: 8-9. See similarly Anderson 1993: 119 and Madsen 2014: 5.

¹¹⁷ See Ps.-Arist. *Phys.* 805b.

¹¹⁸ See Barton 1994, Gleason 1995 and Swain 2007a.

understanding. As Simon Swain cleverly remarks, “there was of course no Association of Physiognomists to rule on correct correspondences between signifier and signified.”¹¹⁹ Modern scholars have, therefore, varied in their interpretations of ancient physiognomy and its uses.¹²⁰

Voula Tsouna, however, offers a serviceable definition:

Physiognomy has as its province those natural and acquired affections that produce changes in the bodily features that can be treated as characterological signs. Its governing principle is that body and soul interact with each other and that they change simultaneously in all natural affections.¹²¹

This pseudo-science, as Maud Gleason’s influential study on sophists and self-presentation has articulated, served a social purpose. Gleason summarizes the case of Polemo as follows:

Polemo was not a physiognomist by accident or caprice. Rather, physiognomy as an elaborated science was a crystalline precipitate of certain habits of thought and social interaction that, in solution, pervaded his culture: the competitive face-to-face world of educated upper-class males. Polemo was perfectly adapted to his environment. The principles of physiognomic science were but the implicit prejudices that had molded his own education, made explicit as a system of universal rules. As an adroit manipulator of this system of signification, Polemo could use it for personal ends: to enhance his own reputation for dignity and omniscience, to define to his advantage the terms of his professional rivalry with Favorinus, and to claim for himself some of the freedom to censure the behavior of others that was traditionally accorded to philosophers.¹²²

In the case treated here, Polemo relies on his elite education to develop physiognomic invective against Favorinus, traces of which Gleason elsewhere finds in Polemo’s treatise.¹²³ The result of

¹¹⁹ Swain 2007b: 154.

¹²⁰ See Rohrbacher 95-7 for a summary of scholarship.

¹²¹ Tsouna 1998: 177.

¹²² Gleason 1995: 28.

¹²³ Gleason 1995: 46-8.

this physiognomic invective with its necessary *paideia* is social and professional advancement for Polemo at the cost of his rival, Favorinus.

Whitmarsh elaborates on Polemo's skill and its social significance thus:

It is no coincidence that one of the most significant figures in second-century oratory was also a physiognomist: sophistry, as we have seen, demanded hyperattentiveness to the body and its comportment. These flamboyantly dressed limelight-hoggers inevitably posed serious questions about the behaviour proper to real Greek men.¹²⁴

This hyperattentiveness to the body and its comportment, a sort of *moderatio* we might say, was evident in the encomiastic work of Pliny treated above and is very much a result of the Roman educational system. Here we see that it plays a role in vituperative epideictic as well and, once again, serves the purpose of self-fashioning. But hyperattentiveness to comportment, physiognomic invective and self-fashioning are not the concern of Greek men alone. Rather, they concern the elite, both Greek and Roman. Philostratus' description of the rivalry between the two sophists further demonstrates that the anxieties were not as cultural as they were social:

The quarrel that arose between Polemo and Favorinus began in Ionia since the Ephesians favored the latter, and because Smyrna thought Polemo awesome, but it increased in Rome. For consuls and sons of consuls, by praising the one or the other, started an ambitious rivalry between them, which often inflames envy even in wise men.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Whitmarsh 2005: 30.

¹²⁵ Ἡ δὲ γενομένη πρὸς τὸν Πολέμονα τῷ Φαβωρίνῳ διαφορὰ ἤρξατο μὲν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ προσθεμένων αὐτῷ τῶν Ἐφεσίων, ἐπεὶ τὸν Πολέμονα ἡ Σμύρνα ἐθαύμαζεν, ἐπέδωκε δὲ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, ὕπατοι γὰρ καὶ παῖδες ὑπάτων οἱ μὲν τὸν ἐπαινοῦντες, οἱ δὲ τόν, ἤρξαν αὐτοῖς φιλοτιμίας, ἢ πολὺν ἐκκαίει φθόνον καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν (Philostr. *VS* 490).

The rivalry reported by Philostratus here crosses from east to west and is of interest to and augmented by not only Ionians and Ephesians, but, remarkably, Romans as well.¹²⁶ It is with this Roman interest in sophistic rivalry and the sometimes-attending physiognomic invective in mind that I would like to turn to Roman uses of this invective strategy and its consequences in the social and professional arena.

That this invective technique was popular among Romans is clear. Quintilian refers frequently throughout the *Institutio* to attempts at disguising inner immorality with clothing, facial expression and gesture. As early as the proemium to the first book, Quintilian attacks false philosophers, who “did not by virtue and study toil to be considered philosophers, but putting on a gloomy face and an odd form of dress, disguised their terrible characters.”¹²⁷ Elsewhere he criticizes excessive use of cosmetics, concluding that “bodily beauty seems to come from bad character.”¹²⁸ In a discussion of signs, Quintilian turns to a physiognomic metaphor: “perhaps one could say that a plucked body, an uneven gait, womanly clothing are signs of a soft and effeminate man, if they seem to flow from immoderate behavior, just as blood flows from murder.”¹²⁹ Like Polemo, Quintilian viewed the eyes as a window to the soul, remarking in his chapter on delivery, with a focus on gesture and *habitus*, that “in the face most powerful are the eyes, from which the soul shines most of all.”¹³⁰

With such weight placed on appearance and its indication of inner character, it is not surprising that Quintilian notes that physiognomy is a popular tool for invective. Just as physical

¹²⁶ Sandy 1997: 164-9, taking the case of Apuleius with Favorinus, Polemo, Dio and Aristides, draws parallels between rival sophists in the East and in the Latin West.

¹²⁷ *Non enim virtute ac studiis ut haberentur philosophi laborabant, sed vultum et tristitiam et dissentientem a ceteris habitum pessimis moribus praetendebant* (Quint. *Inst.* 1.pr. 15). See similarly Quint. *Inst.* 8. pr. 20.

¹²⁸ *Pulchritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis morum* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.5.12).

¹²⁹ *Fortasse corpus vulsum, fractum incessum, vestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum viri signa, si cui [...] ut sanguis e caede, ita illa ex inpuicitia fluere videantur* (Quint. *Inst.* 5.9.14).

¹³⁰ *Sed in ipso vultu plurimum valent oculi, per quos maxime animus elucet* (Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.75).

beauty plays a role in encomium, in invective “defects of body or fortune bring contempt upon some, such as Thersites and Irus.”¹³¹

Physiognomy at Rome I: The Ugly Tyrant

Quintilian’s precepts are very much visible in his successors’ works. To return to treatments of Domitian, we see Pliny describing him as “terrible to meet and see: arrogance on his brow, anger in his eyes, a feminine pallor in his body, impudence pouring upon his face with a great blush.”¹³² Tacitus deploys similar physiognomic invective in the *Agricola*, culminating a section on the Domitianic persecution by stating that “under Domitian a particular part of our sufferings were seeing and being seen, when our sighs were noted down, when that savage and blushing face, through which he guarded himself against shame, took pleasure in noting the pallor of so many men.”¹³³ The physiognomic invective against Domitian contrasts with the encomium that Trajan receives, for example, in Pliny’s *Panegyricus*. Various notes on his towering stature are augmented by a description of his overall physiognomy: “What gravity of thoughts! How unaffected was the truth of his words! What earnestness in his voice! What affirmation in his face! How much honesty is in his eyes, his pose, his gesture, in his whole body!”¹³⁴ We see in this binary how physiognomy could advance or collapse Roman prestige.

¹³¹ *Corporis ac fortunae quibusdam mala contemptum, sicut Thersitae atque Iro* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.19). On praise of beauty in encomium see Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.12.

¹³² *Ipse occursu quoque visuque terribilis: superbia in fronte, ira in oculis, femineus pallor in corpore, in ore impudentia multo rubore suffusa* (Plin. *Pan.* 48.4)

¹³³ *Praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et aspici, cum suspiria nostra subscriberentur, cum denotandis tot hominum palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem muniebat* (Tac. *Agr.* 45.2). See also Suet. *Dom.* 18.1, Juv. 4.74-5 and Philostr. *VA* 7.28.

¹³⁴ *Quae enim illa gravitas sententiarum! Quam inaffectedata veritas verborum! Quae asseveratio in voce! Quae affirmatio in vultu! Quanta in oculis, habitu, gestu, toto denique corpore fides!* (Plin. *Pan.* 67.1).

Vituperative physiognomic strategy was not reserved strictly for Domitian.¹³⁵ Tacitus, for example, unleashes similar invective upon Tiberius, albeit through historiographical narrative rather than epideictic performance. The *vultus* that is so crucial in the physiognomic discussions of Quintilian and Polemo appears no fewer than seven times in descriptions of Tiberius, which range from arrogant and dark (*Ann.* 1.33.2) to emotionless (*Ann.* 2.29.2) to callous (*Ann.* 4.34.1) to brutal and beaming falsely (*Ann.* 4.60.2). Perhaps most interesting for the physiognomist is Tacitus' report of Tiberius' retirement to Campania and its alleged motives. Tacitus reports: "There were those who believed that in old age his physical appearance too had been a source of shame: he had spindly and stooping loftiness, a summit bereft of hair, a face that was ulcerous and generally patched with cosmetic medications."¹³⁶ Parts of the description, especially if taken with the facial attributes scattered through the narrative, bear resemblances to portions of Polemo's *Physiognomy*. Polemo's "sad man," for example, has "a peeling face, bringing together what is between the eyes, with a huge forehead, eyebrows locked together, a furtive gaze, eyelids joined together, and frightened by fear."¹³⁷ Elsewhere Polemo tells us that "a stooping man is not good, unless he also has suppleness of limb and the other signs are elegant, in which case, think that he is active and fond of hunting."¹³⁸ Tacitus' physiognomy of Tiberius becomes more potent if we read it with the final summary of Tiberius' life:

His character changed over time: it was exceptional in life and reputation as long as he was a private individual or in commands under Augustus; secretive and treacherous in his fabrication of virtues while Germanicus and Drusus survived;

¹³⁵ Elizabeth Evans has produced numerous studies and catalogs of physiognomy in Roman history and biography. See especially Evans 1935 and 1969. More recently, Gladhill 2012 has studied "bodily and corporeal ecphrasis" in Suetonian narratives.

¹³⁶ *Erant qui crederent in senectute corporis quoque habitum pudori fuisse: quippe illi praegracilis et incurva proceritas, nudus capillo vertex, ulcerosa facies ac plerumque medicaminibus interstincta* (Tac. *Ann.* 4.57.2).

¹³⁷ Leiden Polemo B50. Trans. Hoyland 2007.

¹³⁸ Adamantius *Phys.* B12. Trans. Repath 2007.

he was simultaneously a blend of good and evil during his mother's lifetime; infamous for his savagery, but with his lusts cloaked, while he both delighted in and feared Sejanus; at last he erupted into crimes and degradation after he gave into his true nature with his shame and dread removed.¹³⁹

Notably, as his physical appearance worsens into a stooping, ulcerous and balding embarrassment, Tiberius' behavior worsens until his true nature is revealed both in criminal and degraded action and in physical defects.

Physiognomy at Rome II: Regulus, the Ugly *Delator*

A study of Tacitean physiognomy could go on at much greater length. But having seen that Polemo's physiognomic tactics could well apply within the realm of the Roman historian and his literary narrative, let us turn back to physiognomic invective in the social world of the sophistic Roman. Pliny's posturing in the *Panegyricus*, as a paradigm of resistance against the immoral benefits available to those willing to climb under Domitian offers a portal back to the competitive social world. In such a world of zero-sum competition, Pliny's refusal to benefit under Domitian implies others' willingness to do so. There is no better target for a sly attack of this sort than Aquilius Regulus,¹⁴⁰ whom Pliny portrays in the *Epistles* as an opportunistic informer. In a letter to Voconius Romanus, Pliny insists that Regulus never gave up this occupation: "Have you seen anyone more fearful, more lowly than Marcus Regulus after the death of Domitian, under whom he had committed no smaller, though better hidden, crimes than

¹³⁹ *Morum quoque tempora illi diversa: egregium vita famaue quoad privatus vel in imperiis sub Augusto fuit; occultum ac subdolum fingendis virtutibus donec Germanicus ac Drusus superfuere; idem inter bona malaque mixtus incolumi matre; intestabilis saevitia sed obtectis libidinibus dum Seianum dilexit timuitve: postremo in scelera simul ac dedecora prorupit postquam remoto pudore et metu suo tantum ingenio utebatur* (Tac. Ann. 6.51.3).

¹⁴⁰ See Méthy 2007: 142n108 for bibliography on Regulus as historic figure.

he had under Nero?”¹⁴¹ As Stanley Hoffer has shown, Pliny’s inferences of this sort align Regulus with Domitian as bad orator/emperor and Pliny with Trajan as good orator/emperor.¹⁴² Sherwin-White pointed out that Regulus is the only living person who receives direct invective by name in Pliny’s *Epistles*.¹⁴³ Though he does not mention Regulus by name in the *Panegyricus*, parallels can be drawn between Pliny’s treatments of Domitian and Regulus,¹⁴⁴ providing reason to suspect that Pliny takes the opportunity of his performance to tarnish Regulus’ reputation, contributing to the *delator*’s fearful and lowly state under Nerva and Trajan.

The rivalry between Pliny and Regulus¹⁴⁵ offers evidence that Polemo and Favorinus were not the only competitive orators and members of the elite operating in Rome and, furthermore, that competitive oratory is far from limited to the sphere of the Greek sophist. Moreover, as I aim to illustrate, physiognomic tactics celebrated in the work of Polemo are employed also by Pliny in his rivalry with Regulus.¹⁴⁶

In the same letter to Voconius Romanus that implicated Regulus in the delatorial activities under Nero and Domitian, Pliny describes a clash with Regulus in a trial of Arrionilla in the Centumviral Court. During the trial, Regulus attempted to lay a deadly trap (*capitaliter lacessisset*) for Pliny while further disgracing the recently exiled Mettius Modestus.¹⁴⁷ Pliny

¹⁴¹ *Vidistine quemquam M. Regulo timidiorem humiliorem post Domitiani mortem? Sub quo non minora flagitia commiserat quam sub Nerone sed tectiora* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.5.1).

¹⁴² Hoffer 1999: 55-91. See Gibson and Morello 2012: 68-73 for oratorical rivalry in the “Regulus cycle.”

¹⁴³ Sherwin-White 1966: 55.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Méthy 2007: 147-51.

¹⁴⁵ See Gibson and Morello 2012 *passim*, esp. 54-5 and 68-73, Hoffer 1999: 55-91, Lefèvre 2009: 50-60, Ludolph 1997: 142-67 and Méthy 2007: 142-51.

¹⁴⁶ Tac. *Dial* 8.3 provides evidence that Pliny was not alone in attacking rivals by means of physiognomy. Aper admits that the *delator* Marcellus was spurned for his *habitus corporis*. See Gudeman 1914 *ad loc.* Interestingly, Marcellus’ career (though Aper would not have been the one to point it out) suggests a similar immorality to that of Regulus.

¹⁴⁷ Plin. *Ep.* 1.5.4-5.

further records Regulus' reaction when, in a later meeting, Pliny turns the conversation back to Modestus:

He grew noticeably pale, although he is always pale, and he replied stammering, "I made the interrogation to harm Modestus, not you." See the cruelty of the man, who does not hide the fact that he wished to harm a man already in exile. He added an excellent motive: "He wrote in a letter which was recited with Domitian in attendance: 'Regulus, the most foul of all bipeds.'"¹⁴⁸

Regulus' foul behavior led Modestus to characterize him as a beast—a bit of physiognomic invective in its own right. More importantly here, though, Pliny describes Regulus' pallor as a sign of his cruelty. Pliny seems able not only to interpret the pallor, but also to make it grow. Even after Regulus' death, Pliny continues his physiognomic interpretation. In a letter to Maturus Arrianus professing some regret at Regulus' absence from the courts, Pliny remarks again on his rival's pale complexion: "He was fearful, he was pale, he used to write out his speeches, though he was never able to learn them by heart [...] he used to paint about his right eye for one case, the left eye for another."¹⁴⁹ Here Regulus' pallor indicates both his weakness as an orator and his awareness of it. His painting around his eye seems to have been for good luck,¹⁵⁰ but in proximity to the reference to his paleness there may be additional raillery at his use of cosmetics to cover up his physical and oratorical weakness.

Elsewhere Pliny connects physical and oratorical weakness to Regulus' immoral character. He describes Regulus to Catus Lepidus as follows:

¹⁴⁸ *Expalluit notabiliter, quamvis palleat semper, et haesitabundus: "Interrogavi non ut tibi nocerem, sed ut Modesto." Vide hominis crudelitatem, qui se non dissimulet exsuli nocere voluisse. Subiunxit egregiam causam: "Scripsit" inquit "in epistula quadam, quae apud Domitianum recitata est: 'Regulus, omnium bipedum nequissimus'" (Plin. Ep. 1.5.13-4).*

¹⁴⁹ *Timebat pallebat scribebat, quamvis non posset ediscere [...] oculum modo dextrum modo sinistrum circumlinebat (Plin Ep. 6.2.2).*

¹⁵⁰ See Sherwin-White *ad loc.*

He has weak lungs (*imbecillum latus*), jumbled speech (*os confusum*), stammering tongue (*haesitans lingua*), the slowest faculty of rhetorical invention, no memory, nothing except an unhealthy nature, and nevertheless through his impudence and madness he has achieved the reputation of an orator. And so Herennius Senecio marvelously adapted that line from Cato about the orator to him: “the orator is a bad man unskilled at speaking.”¹⁵¹

Notably Regulus’ oratorical weaknesses are described using bodily terms: *latum*, *os*, *lingua*. They furthermore indicate moral depravity that shows all the more in his oratorical performances. His lack of control or *moderatio*, which is elsewhere described with respect to his oratorical style and his ridiculous show of mourning, reveals itself even in physical attributes.¹⁵²

While Pliny aptly applies physiognomy to Regulus in these various places, Regulus’ attempts at the same science are failures. Pliny describes Regulus’ misuse of physiognomy in a shameful recitation of the prosecution of Arulenus Rusticus:

He had assisted in the peril of Arulenus Rusticus, he had exulted in his death to such a degree that he put forth a recitation and publication, in which he inveighed against Rusticus and even called him a “Stoic ape” and added the insult “branded by a Vitellian scar” (you can recognize the eloquence of Regulus).¹⁵³

As Hoffer has pointed out, Regulus mocks a scar that reveals not a character flaw, but a virtue, as it is not a natural defect, but one acquired while attempting to save citizen lives.¹⁵⁴ The misapplication of physiognomy draws a further contrast between rivals. Pliny knows that

¹⁵¹ *Imbecillum latus, os confusum, haesitans lingua, tardissima inventio, memoria nulla, nihil denique praeter ingenium insanum, et tamen eo impudentia ipsoque illo furore pervenit, ut orator habeatur. Itaque Herennius Senecio mirifice Catonis illud de oratore in hunc e contrario vertit: “Orator est vir malus dicendi imperitus”* (Plin. *Ep.* 4.7.4-5).

¹⁵² See Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.14, 4.2.3 and 4.7.6-7. On Regulus’ vicious characteristics generally, see Méthy 2007: 142-7.

¹⁵³ *Rustici Aruleni periculum foverat, exsultaverat morte; adeo ut librum recitaret publicaretque, in quo Rusticum insectatur atque etiam “Stoicorum simiam” appellat, adicit “Vitelliana cicatrice stigmosum” (agnoscis eloquentiam Reguli)* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.5.2).

¹⁵⁴ Hoffer 1999: 69-70.

Regulus' pallor reveals fear and shame. Regulus does not understand that Rusticus' scar reveals senatorial virtue.

By calling attention to Regulus' physical infelicities and their attaining moral flaws, Pliny simultaneously displays himself as free of these problems. He does not have a constant pallor and, therefore, does not have an immoral character and guilty conscience. His practiced *moderatio*, as is evident from his lack of physical weakness is a sign of his upright character and deserved claims to the tag *vir bonus dicendi peritus*—an epithet that has both moral and social weight. His ability to understand and apply physiognomic interpretation to Regulus is a sign of *paideia*.

Conclusion

Physiognomy is only one of a number of methods for invective, but for the sophistic Roman it is an attractive one. Without the proper education and a natural ability one cannot maintain physical *moderatio* nor detect its lack in others. Moderation was linked with inner goodness and elite manliness. Deploying physiognomic invective in either the arena of competitive rivalry or political criticism displayed others' lack of *paideia* while bolstering one's own abundance thereof. The passage of time requires us to view these performances in literary forms, whether through the publication of a recitation such as the *Panegyricus* or narrative adaptations such as the vituperative descriptions of emperors in Tacitus' historical works. Yet the emphasis on *habitus* invites us to remember that for the sophistic Roman there was a performance context and an important one at that.¹⁵⁵ Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny are aware that the way in which a man displayed himself was an indication of his status. Moreover, as we saw

¹⁵⁵ Sailor 2004: 159 draws attention to the fact that even Tacitus' magisterial works would have had origins in the "anxious literary culture of *recitatio*."

in our discussion of encomium, displays of education and status were not restricted to invective. Figured speech and sly analogy opened similar avenues to self-advancement, encomium requiring a similar understanding of elite virtues and perhaps an even greater ability to manipulate words and deploy rhetoric.

The display oratory of Dio of Prusa or Polemo of Laodicea served greater purposes than a simple parade of art for art's sake.¹⁵⁶ The same is true in the case of Pliny of Comum and his associates. These members of the elite were performing before audiences, which, as Tim Whitmarsh states, "were gathering as members of the educated elite, parading and exercising their status, scrutinizing their peers as their reputations were made and broken, and testing the role of traditional Greek manhood within the demanding environment of imperial aristocratic culture."¹⁵⁷ It may be the case that members of the elite were competing over Greek manhood, but the competitors were drawn from the west just as they were from the east.

¹⁵⁶ See Webb 2006: 44 for a similar interpretation in the field of declamation.

¹⁵⁷ Whitmarsh 2005: 3. Quoted above, p. 148.

Conclusion

The sophistic Roman developed pure Greek language, an appreciation and ability to imitate canonical Greek literature and a sensitivity for doing so moderately from the very beginning of his education. Quintilian's precepts and canon, though original in a number of ways, look back to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, across to Plutarch of Chaeronea and forward to Dio of Prusa.

As Quintilian's *puer* grew into a public figure in his own right, the display of an elite education became essential to his identity. Pliny, then, practiced, imitated and played with Attic Greek and Tacitus combined Grecism and archaism in manners that resulted in unique and learned styles of their own. Their preoccupation with and manipulation of the language of the past anticipated the same in Lucian of Samosata. Pliny and Tacitus not only deployed quotation of and allusion to Homer and Plato, but also did so in a way that asserted their deep intimacy with the canon and creativity in reappropriating it. Here, they were not so different from Philostratus of Lymnia or Dio of Prusa.

These sophistic figures, moreover, operated beyond the walls of literary production, deploying epideictic rhetoric in ways that promoted their own personal interests and those of the classes they represented. So Pliny's *Panegyricus* or Tacitus' narrative invective could have produced a creolization effect similar to that which is visible in the works of Dio of Prusa. Pliny's rivalry with Regulus parallels the rivalry between Favorinus of Arelate and Polemo of Laodicea in its deployment of physiognomy.

In short, Quintilian, Tacitus and Pliny obtained and deployed their *paideia* in ways that often paralleled those of sophistic intellectuals from the Greek East. In spite of ethnic

differences, these figures often shared cultures. One of a number of reasons for this engagement with paideutic culture was that it offered venues for social advancement. Quintilian, Tacitus, Pliny and their Latin-speaking contemporaries would have been just as interested in advancing their own personal interests and those of their communities as a figure from Philostratus' Second Sophistic. The preoccupation with social networks and the repeated emphasis on the practical power of rhetoric in Quintilian's *Institutio*, Tacitus' *Dialogus* or Pliny's *Epistles* provides solid evidence of this fact.

Therefore, although there are ways in which western and eastern intellectuals differed from each other, there are enough commonalities to suggest that the period and cultural movement that we often describe as the Second Sophistic was as interested in personal advancement through elite education as it was in any assertion of ethnic or cultural Greekness or in any assertion of Roman imperialistic strategy.

At the risk of anachronism, we might draw a few conclusions with an eye to the modern world. It is normal for the American student to gain some proficiency in a foreign language and culture. Some will pursue this interest beyond the requirements of secondary or university education. It would be odd to say that the American who has acquired linguistic, literary and cultural proficiency in, say, French, is attempting to become ethnically French. It would be equally odd to say that he has acquired this French *paideia* in order to display American domination. It is quite possible, however, that there is some desire to become culturally French or at least to engage closely with French culture. And it is possible that such a desire is an end in its own right. Yet is there not a certain social *je ne sais quoi* attached to the ability to converse in French? Is there not some social capital to gain from a reference to Flaubert or appreciation for

Monet? Certainly, at least, one's potential in the professional world increases with certain language acquisitions.

This is to say that the acquisition and deployment of multi-cultural education undoubtedly has benefits at the individual level, while motivations that come from a larger group cannot be taken for granted. With so many ways in which our Greek and Roman ancestors differ from us, their appreciation for the power of *paideia* and their understanding of the importance of negotiating that *paideia* in an increasingly multi-cultural world offers an instance in which we can learn through similarities rather than differences.

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