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dc.contributor.author Lundberg, J.C.
dc.contributor.author Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-28T14:02:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-03-28T14:02:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-03
dc.identifier.citation 8 WASH. J.L. TECH.& ARTS 473 (2013) en_US
dc.identifier.issn 2157-2534
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1773.1/1227
dc.description Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Volume 8, Issue 4, Winter 2013 en_US
dc.description.abstract Abstract: In United States v. Kramer, the Eighth Circuit upheld a two-level sentence enhancement for a defendant who made calls and sent text messages from a cellphone to a minor in order to lure her across state lines for criminal sexual activity. This enhancement was based on a provision in the United States Sentencing Guidelines that incorporates the definition of “computer” from the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The broad language of that statute encompasses not only computers—in the plainest sense—and cellphones, but also a myriad of other devices such as automobiles equipped with GPS navigation. In contrast to the sentencing context, this conception of many electronics devices as “computers” does not extend into issues related to searches. There, courts tend to permit broader examination of cellphones and other electronic devices in searches incident to arrest, despite the general protection computers are usually afforded under the Fourth Amendment. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Seattle: Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, University of Washington School of Law en_US
dc.subject Litigation en_US
dc.title [8WashJLTech&Arts473] When Is a Phone a Computer? en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.rights.holder Copyright 2013 J.C. Lundberg en_US


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