Abstract:
Wadie E. Said: Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Abstract: A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a
high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far.
He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to
call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and
trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid
informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal
assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant’s services. In the years
since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism
prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in
such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of
generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States.
Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive
and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question
whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This
Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to
generate terrorism prosecutions.
