Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly? 

      Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (The Royal Society, 1997)
      Zahavi's handicap principle, originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection of elaborate male traits (Zahavi, 1975) suggests that signalling can be honest if less desirable signallers must pay a higher cost in ...
    • Signalling among relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel. 

      Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (Academic Press INC Elsevier Science, 1998)
      Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a ...
    • The Red King Effect: Evolutionary rates and the division of surpluses in mutualisms 

      Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (MIT Press, 2003)
      Mutualisms generate surpluses. While much of the theoretical literature to date focuses on mechanisms by which cooperation is stabilized so that these surpluses can continue to be produced and enjoyed, we address a second ...