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Mind in Dispute: The Section on Mind in Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhi

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Abstract

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This dissertation is an in-depth study of the dispute on the doctrines regarding the structure of mind as recorded in the fourth century CE Abhidharma work, the **Tattvasiddhi* (成實論, TatSid hereafter) by Harivarman. Despite the specific differences among the various Buddhist Abhidharma analyses of mind, in general they can be divided into two major positions. Some propose that mind is composed of consciousness (*citta* or *viññāna*) and various numbers of mental factors (*caitasika* or *caitta*), which are mental phenomena that are different from but associated (*samprayukta*) with consciousness. Others oppose the existence of *caitasikas* as entities separate from consciousness; instead they suggest that *caitasikas* are not different from *citta* by nature but are only *citta* in different modes. In chapters 60-67, the TatSid records arguments representing both sides of the dispute. The present study consists of an annotated English translation (chapter

5) of chapters 60-67 of the TatSid as well as detailed analyses of and comments on each of the arguments for or against the notions of “mental factor” (*caitasika*) (chapter 2) and “association” (*saṃprayoga*) (chapter 3). The study also includes a general introduction (chapter 1), and in the introductory sections in chapters 2 and 3 extensive surveys of the origins and development of the two interconnected doctrines regarding *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga* in the sūtras, Abhidharma, and Yogācāra texts.

Unlike previous scholarship on the TatSid, which views the work primarily from the perspective of doctrinal history and investigates the sectarian or school affiliations of its arguments, the present study is based firstly on the textual and philological examination of the work itself as well as the texts quoted in it. This textual investigation reveals that Harivarman and the TatSid have a close relationship with the Sarvāstivāda lineage, and the doctrinal positions of Harivarman regarding the structure of mind bear great affinities with those of the so-called Dārṣṭāntikas as recorded in other Abhidharma texts. In addition, by comparing extensively the cited texts and the doctrinal positions in the arguments of the TatSid with the sūtras and extant Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, this study also demonstrates how Buddhist teachers differed in their understanding of fundamental Buddhist doctrines and also how doctrines changed throughout history.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	I
LIST OF TABLES.....	V
ABBREVIATIONS.....	VI
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
<i>Prologue</i>	1
1.1 <i>The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi and Past Scholarship on This Text</i>	3
1.1.1 The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi	3
1.1.2 Past Scholarship on the *Tattvasiddhi	5
1.2 <i>Theories of Mind in Buddhism and the Dispute of “Mental Factors” and “Association”</i>	7
1.3 <i>The Author Harivarman</i>	13
1.3.1 Date and Life	14
1.3.2 Harivarman’s School Affiliation	18
1.4 <i>The *Tattvasiddhi</i>	23
1.4.1 Kumārajīva’s Translation.....	23
1.4.2 The Title	26
1.4.3 Study of the *Tattvasiddhi in China and Japan.....	29
1.4.4 Structure of the *Tattvasiddhi and the Section on Mind	31
1.4.5 Textual Lineage.....	35
1.5 <i>General Background: Buddhist Abhidharma</i>	37
1.6 <i>Methodology</i>	42
CHAPTER 2. THE DISPUTE ON MENTAL FACTORS (CAITASIKA)	47
2.1 <i>Introduction</i>	47
2.1.1 The Term “caitasika” in Early Sūtras	47
2.1.2 Lists of Mental Phenomena in the Sūtras and Early Abhidharma Texts	51
2.1.3 Caitta/cetasika in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Theravāda Abhidhamma	58
2.1.4 Mental Factors in the Yogācāra Tradition	69

2.1.5 Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika Teachers who are Against the Doctrine of Mental Factors	76
2.2 Caitasika in the *Tattvasiddhi	81
2.3 Harivarman’s Arguments against caitasika, the Opponent’s Refutations, and Harivarman’s Rejoinders	86
2.3.1 Harivarman’s Argument 1 (60.1-3, 62.1, 64.1)	86
2.3.2 Harivarman’s Argument 2 (60.4, 62.2, 64.2)	88
2.3.3 Harivarman’s Argument 3 (60.5-11, 62.3-7, 64.3-6).....	93
2.3.4 Harivarman’s Argument 4 (60.12, 62.8-9, 64.7)	96
2.3.5 Harivarman’s Argument 5 (60.13, 62.10, 64.8)	102
2.4 The Opponent’s Arguments for caitasika and Harivarman’s Refutations	107
2.4.1 The Opponent’s Argument 1 (61.1-2, 63.1).....	107
2.4.2 The Opponent’s Argument 2 (61.3, 63.2).....	109
2.4.3 The Opponent’s Argument 3 (61.4, 63.3).....	110
2.4.4 The Opponent’s Argument 4 (61.5, 63.4).....	111
2.4.5 The Opponent’s Argument 5 (61.6-7, 63.5).....	112
2.4.6 The Opponent’s Argument 6 (61.8, 63.6).....	114
2.4.7 The Opponent’s Argument 7 (61.9, 63.7).....	114
2.4.8 The Opponent’s Argument 8 (61.10, 63.8).....	116
2.4.9 The Opponent’s Argument 9 (61.11, 63.9-12).....	116
2.4.10 The Opponent’s Argument 10 (61.12-3, 63.13).....	119
2.4.11 The Opponent’s Argument 11 (61.14, 63.14-5).....	120
CHAPTER 3. THE DISPUTE ON ASSOCIATION (SAMPRAYOGA)	123
3.1 Introduction	124
3.1.1 Inception of the Notion of Association in Early Sūtras	124
3.1.2 Development of the Notion of Association in Early Abhidharma.....	126
3.1.3 Analyses of Association in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Systems	132
3.1.4 Association in Yogācāra texts	144
3.1.5 “Non-Abhidharma” Interpretations of Association	159

3.2 Harivarman's Theory of Association in the *Tattvasiddhi	163
3.3 Harivarman's Arguments against Association.....	167
3.3.1 Harivarman's Argument 1 (65.1)	167
3.3.2 Harivarman's Argument 2 (65.2)	169
3.3.3 Harivarman's Argument 3 (65.3-4)	170
3.3.4 Harivarman's Argument 4 (65.5-6)	171
3.3.5 Harivarman's Argument 5 (65.7)	174
3.3.6 Harivarman's Argument 6 (65.8-10)	176
3.3.7 Harivarman's Argument 7 (65.11-16)	178
3.3.8 Harivarman's Argument 8 (65.17-25)	187
3.3.9 Harivarman's Argument 9 (65.26-33)	193
3.3.10 Harivarman's Argument 10 and Conclusion (65.34-5).....	194
3.4 The Opponent's Arguments for Association and Harivarman's Refutations.....	195
3.4.1 The Opponent's Argument 1 (66.1-3, 67.1-2)	195
3.4.2 The Opponent's Argument 2 (66.4, 67.3).....	198
3.4.3 The Opponent's Argument 3 (66.5, 67.4).....	199
3.4.4 The Opponent's Argument 4 (66.6, 67.5).....	202
3.4.5 The Opponent's Argument 5 (66.7, 67.6-7).....	203
3.4.6 The Opponent's Argument 6 (66.8, 67.8-9, 20).....	208
3.4.7 The Opponent's Argument 7 (66.10, 67.10, 67.21).....	210
3.4.8 The Opponent's Argument 8 (66.9, 67.11-19).....	213
3.4.9 The Opponent's Argument 9 (66.11, 67.22-3).....	218
3.4.10 The Opponent's Argument 10 (66.12, 67.24-6).....	221
CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION	224
4.1 Recapitulation of the Positions	224
4.2 Possible Causes for the Dispute	226
4.2.1 The Ontological Shift from Sūtra to Abhidharma	226

4.2.2 The Hermeneutical Gap	228
4.2.3 The Experiential Gap	231
4.2.4 Other Possible Causes of the Dispute	233
4.3 <i>Final Notes</i>	235
CHAPTER 5. ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF CHAPTERS 60-67 OF THE * <i>TATTVASIDDHI</i>	237
<i>Chapter 60. Proving the Non-existence of caitasikas</i>	237
<i>Chapter 61. Proving the Existence of caitasikas</i>	242
<i>Chapter 62. Refuting the Non-existence of caitasika</i>	247
<i>Chapter 63. Refuting the Existence of caitasikas</i>	251
<i>Chapter 64. Illuminating the Non-existence of caitasikas</i>	256
<i>Chapter 65. There is no Association (samprayoga)</i>	260
<i>Chapter 66. Proving the Existence of Association</i>	274
<i>Chapter 67. Refuting Association</i>	281
BIBLIOGRAPHY	291
<i>Online Dictionaries and Text Corpora</i>	291
<i>Primary Sources</i>	291
<i>References</i>	292

List of Tables

Table 1 Sarvāstivāda classification of mental factors according to the Abhidharmakośa	67
Table 2 Mental factors in the Pāli <i>Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha</i>	68
Table 3 The <i>caittas</i> in the <i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> , two Yogācāra classifications, and the corresponding <i>Sarvāstivāda</i> classification.....	74
Table 4 Lists of dhammas in the <i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi</i> that are related to <i>cetasika</i>	129

Abbreviations

A	<i>Aṅguttaranikāya</i>
AS	<i>Abhidharmasamuccya</i>
ASBh	<i>Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya</i>
Abhidh-av	<i>Abhidhammāvatāra</i>
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i>
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary
CPD	Critical Pāli Dictionary
D	<i>Dīghanikāya</i>
DĀ	<i>Dīrghāgama</i>
Dhp	<i>Dhammapada</i>
Dhs	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi</i>
Dhs-a	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇī atthakathā (= Atthasālinī)</i>
Divy	<i>Divyāvadāna</i>
EĀ	<i>Ekottarikāgama</i>
Ja	<i>Jātaka</i>
JP	<i>Jñānaprasthāna</i>
Kv	<i>Katthāvatthu</i>
M	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i>
MĀ	<i>Madhyamāgama</i>
MVŚ	<i>*Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra</i>
MW	Monier-Williams 1899
Nidd	<i>Niddesa</i>
P	Pāli
PTSD	Pāli Text Society Pāli-English Dictionary
S	<i>Samyuttanikāya</i>

SĀ	<i>Samyuktāgama</i>
Skt	Sanskrit
Taishō	T
TatSid	* <i>Tattvasiddhi</i>
Vibh	<i>Vibhaṅga</i>
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i>
YBh	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i>

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Prologue

Scholastic debates concerning the structure of mind comprise an especially noteworthy facet of Buddhist philosophical speculation. Those recorded in the fourth century Buddhist Abhidharma text, the **Tattvasiddhi* (成實論, TatSid hereafter), though to date understudied, have the potential to shed much light on the nature of early Buddhist scholastic inquiry concerning this topic. Here the term “scholastic” is intended to refer to a flavor of Buddhism that is mainly focused on the understanding and interpretation of Buddhist teachings and doctrines, contrasting with the other emphases or aspects of Buddhism such as monastic rules, meditation practices, and religious rituals.¹ The division of Buddhist literature into three “baskets” (*piṭaka*) in part reflects these differentiated interests; the *vinaya-piṭaka* focuses on monastic rules, the *sūtra-piṭaka* is more practice-oriented, and the *Abhidharma-piṭaka* deals with doctrinal issues. Most of the contents of the *Abhidharma-piṭaka* can be safely labelled with the western term “philosophy” in the sense of a vigorous pursuit of knowledge and understanding, involving logical argument and interpretation of and commentary on the Buddha’s teachings contained in *sūtra* and *vinaya* literature. The TatSid is an encyclopedic Abhidharma text that was intended to cover all major teachings and doctrines that were discussed and debated among Buddhist teachers of its time, and the nature of mind is one of the central topics discussed in that work.

From its very beginning, Buddhism considered mind as playing a central role in the suffering of sentient beings, proposing that one can only attain liberation from suffering by the application of practices of training and purification of the mind. Early *sūtra* texts contain abundant teachings on how to tame the mind, that is, how to rid it of defilements that are obstacles to liberation and how to develop positive mental qualities contributing to enlightenment and liberation. However, the *sūtras* never explicitly clarify what the nature of those positive and negative mental qualities really are. Are they separate entities

¹ On scholasticism in general, see Cabezón 1998; also Cabezón 1994.

that can be connected to and detached from mind or consciousness? Or, are they just consciousness itself appearing merely in different modes of functioning? Since the sūtras do not provide answers to such questions, later Buddhist teachers proposed various theories to account for the mind-training practices taught in the sūtras. Regarding the structure of mind and the nature of mental qualities, the various opinions of Buddhist teachers can be characterized generally as falling into two camps: some teachers propose that mind consists of consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*) itself and a number of entities as “mental factors” (*caitta* or *caitasika*) that are “associated” (*samprayukta*) with consciousness; other teachers disagree with the “mental factor” and “association” theory, and argue that the so-called “mental factors” are nothing but consciousness itself in different modes. Debates between teachers of these two positions can be traced back to the early period when the sūtras were compiled, but the Abhidharma texts of different schools further record numerous arguments offered on both sides of the debate, and among Abhidharma texts, the TatSid preserves the most comprehensive record of such things.

The TatSid is an Abhidharma treatise extant only in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation and no record of this treatise or of its author Harivarman (訶梨跋摩) is found in any extant Indian source. According to the Chinese accounts, Harivarman is a Buddhist teacher ordained and trained in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, and probably in the lineage of teachers who are called “Dārṣṭāntikas.” He is well versed in teachings of different schools of his time, but he is disappointed with the Abhidharma theories current in his day. He feels that those theories stray away from the original teachings of the Buddha. In order to persuade his contemporaries to return to the “original teaching,” and to promote what he considers the correct teaching of the Buddha, he wrote the TatSid.

The TatSid is an ambitious work that is intended to cover systematically all the major teachings of Buddhism. It has 202 chapters, each of them dealing with a specific doctrinal topic, and all the chapters are organized according to the teaching of the four noble truths. The two purposes of Harivarman, namely, to promote his understanding of Buddhist teachings and to argue against the opinions of other teachers, shape the architecture of the TatSid, and determine that the TatSid contains both exegetical and polemical contents. Most often, Harivarman’s doctrinal positions are different from those of other major

Abhidharma schools such as Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Pāli Abhidhamma, as well as the Yogācāra tradition, and, as a result, the chapters in the TatSid provide a fresh perspective on doctrinal points that have a long developmental and textual history. Moreover, the various texts cited in the TatSid, especially sūtras quoted in its arguments, are sometimes interestingly different from the extant sūtra collections available to us today. These characteristics of the TatSid provide us the opportunity to study the development of Buddhist texts and Buddhist doctrines within a particular historical setting, and this is precisely the objective of the present study.

1.1 The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi and Past Scholarship on This Text

1.1.1 The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi

The **Tattvasiddhi* is a Buddhist Abhidharma, or philosophical treatise, composed around the third or fourth centuries CE.² Its composition comes in the middle of one of the most prolific periods of intellectual innovations in Buddhist history, a period when the Sarvāstivāda and the Pāli Theravāda Abhidharma systems had become well established and influential, the Mahāyāna movement(s) were becoming more and more popular, and the new Yogācāra movement was beginning to coalesce but had not yet come to maturity as it would a few decades later in the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both ca. the 5th century CE), the two most important early Yogācāra philosophers and commentators. Many Buddhist teachers from different groups and geographical regions were debating concerning different understandings of sūtras, and were also arguing with each other for or against newly established philosophical doctrines. The author of the TatSid, Harivarman, is very knowledgeable about, and very critical of, the Abhidharma systems of his period, and records extensively in the TatSid both arguments and rejoinders from teachers with different opinions regarding the issues disputed. The texts quoted and mentioned in the TatSid include early sūtra materials as well as references to positions that can be traced in various Abhidharma treatises of different teachers and schools. These records make the TatSid a rich source of early Buddhist textual materials, and

² Sections 1.5 and 1.6 will introduce the author Harivarman and the contents of this text in greater detail.

hence make it a good candidate for textual and philological investigations. Furthermore, this treatise was translated into Chinese around 411-412 CE, which is significantly earlier than the translations of the two other Chinese translators of Abhidharma texts: about 150 years earlier than Paramārtha (真諦),³ and more than 200 years earlier than the translations by Xuanzang (玄奘).⁴ As we know the transmission of such texts is usually accompanied by constant revision and expansion. Because of its relatively earlier translation date, the TatSid provides a special “snapshot” of the period when many textual and doctrinal issues were still being debated among Abhidharma teachers, and the records of textual inconsistencies and doctrinal controversies are preserved and not yet filtered and revised as they are in later texts and even in early texts preserved today, such as the Pāli texts, which have been heavily edited. Thus, the textual materials preserved in the TatSid, together with the texts that precede and follow it, provide an extremely valuable historical frame of reference for the history and development of Buddhist texts and doctrines.

The TatSid is organized according to the principle of the four noble truths.⁵ It has an introductory section, and four sections corresponding to the truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation, and the path. The section on the truth of suffering is further divided into five subsections corresponding to the five aggregates (*skandha*): material form (*rūpa*), consciousness (*viññāna*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), feeling (*vedanā*), and volitional formations (*saṃskāra*).⁶ Each subsection extensively records issues regarding the corresponding aggregate (*skandha*) as discussed and debated among various Buddhist teachers. The present work is a study of the subsection on consciousness or mind (*viññāna* 識) in the TatSid, or more specifically, chapters 60-67 in the subsection recording arguments concerning “mental factors” (*caitasika/caitta* 心所) and “association” (*saṃprayoga* 相應). In brief, these two terms are central to the analysis of the structure of mind: on the one hand, some teachers believe that mind can be analyzed into mind or

³ Paramārtha translated Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa in the year 564 CE.

⁴ Xuanzang’s translations of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts were mostly made between 650 and 660 CE.

⁵ For a more detailed description of the structure of the TatSid, see section 1.4 below.

⁶ Note that in the TatSid the five *skandhas* are listed in a different order from other Buddhist texts. This is probably because Harivarman understands the five *skandhas* as describing a cognitive sequence:

rūpa[+eye]→*viññāna*→*saṃjñā*→*vedanā*→*saṃskāra*. See TatSid 67.4.

consciousness itself (*citta* or *vijñāna*), and a number of mental factors (*caitasika/caitta*) that are associated (*samprayukta*) with it. On the other hand, other teachers reject the very notion of “mental factors” and “association,” and argue that mind is not analyzable into *citta* and *caitasikas*; instead there is only *citta* itself, all those so-called *caitasikas* are nothing but *citta* in its different modes. The chapters studied in the present project record about fifty arguments from both sides of the dispute. Some arguments quote sūtra passages, while others utilize logical reasoning to support their positions and argue against the opponent’s positions. These arguments not only focus on the analysis of mind but also relate it to other issues such as the distinctions between different versions of texts, the veracity of different interpretations of Buddhist theories of causation, cognitive process, religious practice, and so forth. This study is designed to analyze the arguments in the text of TatSid concerned with the various doctrinal positions regarding the concepts of *caitasika* and *samprayoga*, tracing their historical development with due regard to other sūtra and Abhidharma texts preserved in Pāli, Sanskrit, and Chinese languages.

1.1.2 Past Scholarship on the *Tattvasiddhi

After its translation by Kumārajīva in the early fifth century CE, for about two hundred years the TatSid was very popular in China. Historical accounts have recorded nearly one hundred teachers who were known for their study and teaching of the TatSid, and at least two dozen commentaries on it were written. However, in the seventh century, Xuanzang’s systematic introduction and translation of Indian Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts into China brought the study of the TatSid to an abrupt end. After that no study of this treatise was mentioned in Buddhist historical accounts, and all the commentaries written by Chinese Buddhist teachers were lost.⁷ Since this text is now extant only in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation, no manuscript of this text in any Indic language has been found, and all of its early Chinese commentaries are lost, the study of this text would be extremely difficult. This perhaps explains the scarcity of modern scholarship on this text. To date, there are only two monographs dedicated to the study of this text (Fukuhara 1969, Katsura 1974), and these two studies focus mostly on the doctrinal

⁷ See section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of the TatSid’s transmission in China.

issues, paying little attention to the textual issues. In the 1970s, N. Aiyaswami Sastri translated the Chinese text into Sanskrit and English (Sastri 1975, 1978), representing decades of work on this text. However, Sastri's understanding of the Chinese text is not always accurate. In addition, although he compares the text of the TatSid with other Buddhist texts, primarily with those in Pāli and Sanskrit, he does not pay enough attention to important texts such as the Āgamas and the Abhidharma texts in Chinese translations. Therefore, much more remains to be done in the study of this text.

Even though the TatSid is little studied in modern Japan, there have been valuable contributions in the past century. There are three Japanese translations of the TatSid (Ui 1933, Koyo 1975, Hirai et al. 1999-2000), among which the earliest one by Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽 remains the most valuable one even today because of its notes on textual, historical, and doctrinal issues. However, none of these Japanese translations presents an in-depth study of the text. In the case of difficult passages in the text, most Japanese translators simply follow the original Chinese translation, adding modern punctuation, gloss verbs and nouns with corresponding Japanese forms, and sometimes mark *Kanji* with Japanese pronunciation. Strictly speaking, such methods represent a gloss rather than a translation of the original text. Therefore, these translations are far from sufficient for a detailed textual study of the TatSid.

Aside from the monographs and translations, several authors have discussed issues related to the TatSid in their studies of Buddhist history or of Abhidharma texts and doctrines. A search in the INBUS database yields a few dozen articles related to the TatSid, most of which discuss certain doctrinal points and try to locate the TatSid in the context of different schools of Abhidharma. For example, Yinshun (1981a:573-92) considers this text in the context of the development of Abhidharma, Mizuno Kōgen (Mizuno 1931) discusses the possible connection between the TatSid and the so-called Dārṣāntikas, and Tokoro Rie (Tokoro 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) presents a series of articles discussing the TatSid and its possible relation with the Dārṣāntikas and the Sautrāntikas. These studies do not pay enough attention to textual issues before dealing with doctrinal and historical issues. In other words, the TatSid as a source of textual materials has not yet received the attention it deserves. The present study will present first the research on the textual materials, and with this solid foundation, the research on specific doctrinal and

historical issues such as mental factors and association will yield better in-depth insights.

1.2 Theories of Mind in Buddhism and the Dispute of “Mental Factors” and “Association”

The concept of mind occupies a central position in both theoretical and practical perspectives in Buddhism and is a perennial focus of inquiry in its history over two and a half millennia. As is stated in the beginning of the Pāli Dhammapada, “All phenomena are preceded by mind, have mind as their leader, are made by mind.”⁸ Also, in the verse that is described as summarizing the essence of the Buddha’s teaching, “The avoidance of all evil; the undertaking of good; the cleansing of one's mind; this is the teaching of the awakened ones.”⁹ Hence, it is no surprise to see that most Buddhist teachings in some way are connected to the interpretation of mind and methods of its purification and cultivation.

However, in Buddhist texts from different historical periods and different traditions, we can find different ideas and theories concerning the mind. Mind is a fluid concept that undergoes change throughout Buddhist history. As a result, we cannot attempt to determine a single interpretation of mind that applies to all Buddhists in all periods nor can we assume that the different interpretations of mind all assume or are based upon the same concept of mind. Hence, we must make clear that a particular interpretation represents a certain teacher or a certain group in a specific historical period. Furthermore, since Buddhist theories of mind, like all things, arose through various causes and conditions, we must make clear the reasons why and purposes for which ancient teachers developed their ideas and took certain positions.

How is mind structured? This is the basic and central question that the two competing theories of mind are debating in the TatSid. Before we discuss in more detail the doctrinal dispute, we need to clarify three key terms that are central to the mind

⁸ Dhp 1, verse 1: *manopubbaṅgamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā manomayā*. K. R. Norman (Norman 1997: 1) translates *dhammā* as “mental phenomena,” which is an interpretation perhaps influenced by later commentaries. The term *dhammā* can be used to refer to all “phenomena,” “mental” and “physical” alike, and, even though this verse refers to “mind,” it is possible that its intention is to refer to experience in general.

⁹ Dhp 52, verse 183: *sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ, kusalassa upasampadā. sacittapariyodapanam, etaṃ buddhānasāsanaṃ*. K. R. Norman’s translation, Norman 1997: 28.

theories: mind or consciousness (*citta*, *viññāna*, and *manas*), mental factors (*caitasika*), and association (*samprayoga*).

In English the words “mind” and “conscious” are more or less synonyms. However, “mind” is more general and can be used as an umbrella term to refer to all the mental aspects of a sentient being. “Consciousness” usually refers to three aspects of a sentient being’s experience. First, it means “being conscious,” in contrast to “unconscious” states such as dreamless sleep, coma, or death. According to John Searle, this is a state that begins every day when we awaken from a dreamless sleep, continues throughout the day, and temporarily stops when we enter deep sleep again.¹⁰ This is a state of sustained alertness and awareness in general. Second, when a person cognizes an object, we say that the person is “conscious of” the object. This is the perceptual experience of the awareness of a specific object or content. Third, when we say somebody does something “consciously,” we mean that the person performs an activity with deliberation. Although in English we use the same word “conscious” in all these circumstances, still we can distinguish different aspects of mental experience by the context.

Likewise, Buddhists have also noticed the different aspects of mental experience, and in early Buddhist literature, they use different terms to describe more precisely those aspects of mind. In the early sūtras, or the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts consisting of discourses attributed to the Buddha and his major disciples, there are three terms, namely, *citta*, *viññāna*, and *manas*, which can be understood as representing three aspects of “mind.” In a general sense, all three Indic terms can be understood as corresponding to the English word “mind,” but they are used in different contexts. In brief, *citta* identifies an individual sentient being and differentiates it from other beings. In this sense, *citta* is the identity bearer and carries the traits and characteristics of a being, and it also maintains the continuity of the identity of a sentient being. Moreover, *citta* is described in the sūtras as more passive. It is always said that *citta* is polluted and one needs to practice to make it purified; the other two terms are never used in this context. The more active aspects of mind are represented by the terms *viññāna* and *manas*. In descriptions of a cognitive process, as, for example, when a person perceives an object, the word *viññāna* is

¹⁰ Searle 1998:40-1: “By ‘consciousness’ I mean those states of sentience or awareness that typically begin when we wake up in the morning from a dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until we fall asleep again.”

always used; in other words, *vijñāna* is the perceptive aspect of mind. In descriptions of the mind performing good or bad actions, it is always the term *manas*, which indicates that *manas* is understood as the agent of mental actions.

Nonetheless, despite their different shades of meaning and their different usages in different circumstances, sometimes in the sūtras they are used indiscriminately as synonyms, which indicates that when used in a general sense as “mind,” they have the same referent. Moreover, it should be emphasized that in early Buddhism mind is understood as always intentional, which means it must have an object. This can be derived from the verbal roots of the three terms for “mind”: *citta* is from √*cit* and *vijñāna* is from √*jñā*, both meaning “to know” while *manas* is from √*man*, which means “to think.” Because both of these mental actions of knowing and thinking require specific contents, “mind” or “consciousness” as represented by these three terms always requires an object. In this sense, no matter how the mind is understood, whether as an identity and traits bearer, or perceptive consciousness, or the agent of action, the perceptive element always exists.

Aside from the three terms for “mind” or “consciousness,” various Indic terms that identify different mental functions and properties are found scattered throughout the early sūtras. The following are some examples of such mental terms:

- Basic cognitive experience and mental functions: contact (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), attention (*manaskāra*), and so forth.
- Wholesome mental qualities that one should develop: faith (*śraddhā*), strength (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), tranquility (*praśrabdhi*), equanimity (*upekṣā*), and so forth.
- Unwholesome qualities that one should eliminate: lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), conceit (*māna*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), wrong view (*dṛṣṭi*), and so forth.

Although very frequently used in the sūtras, these mental terms are never explicitly defined in terms of their nature and ontological status. If one inquires about the mental

phenomena to which these mental terms refer, and more importantly, about the relationship between “mind” in general (*citta*, *viññāna*, and *manas*) and these mental phenomena, there is no explicit answer given in the early sūtras.

However, these terms and the mental phenomena they represent are extremely important for both Buddhist theorists and practitioners. As mentioned above, Buddhists believe that the causes of suffering lie in a being’s mind, and, in order to be liberated from suffering, one has to understand his own mind better, and make efforts in practice to decrease and eliminate those unwholesome qualities and to cultivate and develop wholesome qualities. For these purposes, one has to make clear how mind is structured, what these basic wholesome and unwholesome mental qualities are, and how these qualities are related to “mind” or “consciousness.” Because these questions are not explicitly answered in the sūtras and in order to account for or justify their mind-training practice more clearly and coherently, Buddhist followers had to create a theory of mind partly based on their understanding of the teachings in the sūtras and partly based on their own experience, especially introspective experience in meditation experience. This is exactly what those Buddhist scholastic philosophers, or Abhidharma teachers, have done.

As always happens, people have different opinions on the same issue. In Buddhist communities, teachers had different interpretations of and opinions regarding the teachings of mind and mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, and proposed two contrasting models of mind. Some teachers proposed that, aside from consciousness itself (*citta* or *viññāna*), there are a few dozens of elementary mental phenomena, which exist as real entities, meaning that they cannot be further analyzed or reduced to more elementary parts. Together with consciousness, these mental phenomena are the elemental constituents of a being’s mind and are referred to as “mental factors” (*caitasika*) that always occur accompanying consciousness in a relationship of “association” (*samprayoga*). On the other hand, some other teachers rejected such mental factors as distinct entities apart from consciousness. Instead, they proposed that these so-called “mental factors” are not actually things different from consciousness but are in their nature precisely consciousness manifested in different modes. As a result, for these teachers, since there are no mental factors, there is also no association between mental factors and consciousness. This is precisely the dispute upon which the present study

focuses.

Similes may help us to understand the two positions more clearly. For the supporters of the “mental factor” theory, mental factors are just like minerals and metals in the physical world: there are numerous different kinds of minerals that exist as real material in the world and sometimes combine assisting one another to achieve a common purpose. For those teachers who reject the concept of mental factors as real entities, mental phenomena are like different utensils made of the same material. For example, gold can be made into rings, chains, bowls, bracelets, and so forth; all these things are gold by their nature but appear in different forms, and, because of their different forms, they can serve different functions. In a similar way, mental phenomena such as feeling, apperception, volition, and so forth, are nothing but consciousness by nature, but, since they are different modes of consciousness, they can perform different activities and functions.

Supporters of the existence of mental factors propose different lists of mental factors, but all lists that are preserved have a similar structure consisting of several classes:¹¹

- Universal mental factors: mental factors that occur in every moment of consciousness, including mental phenomena such as the contact (*sparsā*) between consciousness and its object, as well as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), attention (*manaskāra*), and so forth.
- Wholesome mental factors: mental phenomena that are morally wholesome, such as faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), and so forth.
- Unwholesome mental factors: mental phenomena that are morally negative and will cause suffering, such as lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), conceit (*māna*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), and so forth.

These lists of mental factors are actually collections of mental terms gathered from the sūtras, which are then reorganized and classified according to their functions and

¹¹ Readers interested in the details of the mental factors can consult the tables in section 2.1.2 for the lists from three major Buddhist traditions.

properties. These lists have great significance in Buddhist practice since Buddhists believe that the causes of suffering and liberation lie deep in the mind, and can be identified with these negative or positive mental factors. Thus, the purpose of practice is to reduce the activity of these negative mental factors, ultimately eliminating them all together, and to cultivate and increase the positive mental factors that can lead to liberation.

The opponents of mental factors do not believe that these mental phenomena exist as separate and real entities. Although still acknowledging that these mental terms represent mental states or activities, they propose that each of these terms is essentially consciousness in a different mode. Nonetheless, these teachers who oppose “mental factors” would agree that practice entails reducing and eliminating negative modes of consciousness and eventually attaining liberation from them.

Moreover, as for the relationship between mental factors and consciousness, the supporters of the mental factor theory propose that they are “associated” (*samprayukta*) with one another and with consciousness, and this relationship of “association” (*samprayoga*) is defined by the following characteristics:

- Mental factors occur with consciousness at the same time; they arise together, function together, and cease together. In other words, mental factors and consciousness always occur simultaneously.
- Mental factors and consciousness have the same sense faculty (*indriya*) as their basis. For example, in a moment of visual consciousness, both the mental factors and the consciousness at this moment are based on the sense faculty of eye.
- Mental factors and consciousness have the same object. In the example of the moment of visual consciousness, visual consciousness has form as its object, and all the other accompanying mental factors such as contact, feeling, apperception, attention, volition, and so forth, are all coordinated and have the same form as their object.

Buddhist teachers also use similes to illustrate this association relationship between consciousness and mental factors. They propose that such a relationship is like a bundle

of reeds. A single reed cannot stand by itself but can stand as a bundle only when many reeds are bundled together. Just as reeds in a bundle support each other, so also consciousness and mental factors support each other in performing mental functions and activities.

Thus, according to the supporters of the mental factor theory, “mental factors” by definition exist as entities distinct from consciousness and yet are associated with it. On the other hand, Harivarman and certain other Buddhist teachers reject this definition of “mental factors” and argue that there exist no mental phenomena distinct from consciousness itself. Since these so-called “mental factors” are nothing but different modes of consciousness, as a result, there is no relationship of association.

The section on mind in the *TatSid* preserves more than fifty arguments from both the supporters and the opponents of the theory of mental factors and association, and most of them are not found in other extant Abhidharma texts. This fact makes this section in the *TatSid* an invaluable source for tracing the early stages in the development of Buddhist theories of mind. However, before discussing in more detail the text of the *TatSid*, the next section 1.3 will introduce the author Harivarman based on available Chinese sources. Section 1.4 will discuss in more detail the *TatSid* and its arguments.

1.3 The Author Harivarman

As mentioned previously, the **Tattvasiddhi* is only extant in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation, and no Indic manuscript of this treatise has been found, and there is no record of the author Harivarman in any extant Indic source. What little information there is about the author and the text comes from Chinese sources. Only one short biography of Harivarman survives, supplemented by a number of references to him and to the *TatSid* scattered in Chinese materials dated from the fifth to seventh centuries CE. Most of the Chinese accounts do not identify their Indic sources, and they sometimes contradict each other. As a result, the information given in these accounts is questionable. The Chinese accounts of Harivarman have been thoroughly studied by previous scholars, namely, Yinshun (1981a), Fukuhara Ryōgon (Fukuhara 1969), Ui Hakuju (Ui 1933), and Katsura

Shōryu (Katsura 1974).

1.3.1 Date and Life

According to the biography by Xuanchang (玄暢 416-484 CE), Harivarman was born in the nine hundredth year after the Buddha's nirvāṇa,¹² which corresponds to approximately 263 CE.¹³ However, different dates are given in other Chinese sources. Senrui (僧叡 ca. 4th-5th century CE), a prominent student of Kumārajīva and the first Chinese to teach the TatSid after Kumārajīva's translation was made, wrote in his preface to the TatSid that Harivarman's date is 890 years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa.¹⁴ Another preface to a Chinese commentary on the TatSid states that Harivarman was "[born] more than 800 years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa."¹⁵ Nonetheless, these accounts agree with each other in general and place Harivarman's birthdate around 250 CE.¹⁶

In addition to these records, indirect evidence also provides an approximate date for Harivarman. First, according to the historical records of Kumārajīva's life, Kumārajīva obtained the TatSid no later than 384 CE. Hence, it is reasonable to estimate that Harivarman lived between 250-350 CE.¹⁷ Moreover, according to Xuanchang's biography, Harivarman was a student of a Sarvāstivāda master named *Kumāralāta (究摩羅陀).¹⁸ This *Kumāralāta may be the teacher identified as a Dārṣṭāntika who was also later considered the first "Sautrāntika."¹⁹ According to the records of the lineage of Sarvāstivāda teachers and Xuanzang's records, Kumāralāta likely lived soon after

¹² No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78c3-4: 訶梨跋摩者。宋稱師子鎧。佛泥洹後九百年出。

¹³ According to Ui Hakuju, Kumārajīva and his disciples date the Buddha's nirvāṇa to the year 637 BCE. Ui 1917: 43. Cited in Katsura 1974:15.

¹⁴ Senrui's preface to the Tatsid is lost. This passage is quoted by Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE): No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3b17-19: 昔羅什法師翻成實論竟。命僧叡講之。什師沒後。叡公錄其遺言。製論序云。成實論者。佛滅度後八百九十年。罽賓小乘學者之匠鳩摩羅陀上足弟子訶梨跋摩之所造也。

¹⁵ The commentary itself was lost, but the preface was preserved in an anthology of Chinese Buddhist writings. No. 2103 廣弘明集 (卷 20) T52, p244a12-14: 自佛滅之後八百餘年。中天竺國婆羅門子名訶梨跋摩。梁云師子鎧。

¹⁶ Another record by Jizang (吉藏) in his *Dasheng Xuan Lun* (大乘玄論 *The Treatise on the Profundity of Mahāyāna*) says that Harivarman lived 700 years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa. No. 1853 大乘玄論 (卷 5) T45, p65b2-3: 成實論主。從曇無德部出。出於七百年。名訶梨跋摩。The above cited passage from Jizang's *Sanlun Xuan Yi* (三論玄義 *The Profound Meanings of the Three Treatises*) indicates that he is familiar with Senrui's (僧叡) record of 890 years after the Buddha; hence, as Yinshun (1981a: 574) notes, it seems likely that this reference to "700" is a scribal error for "900."

¹⁷ This is Ui Hakuju's observation. Ui 1933: 8.

¹⁸ No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, 78c9-10: 遂抽簪革服為薩婆多部達摩沙門究摩羅陀弟子。

¹⁹ No. 2087 大唐西域記 (卷 12) T51, p942a9-16: 尊者童受論師... 呬叉始羅國人也... 即經部本師也。

Aśvagoṣa, perhaps around 120-250 CE,²⁰ and the same lineage record places Harivarman later than Āryadeva but earlier than Vasubandhu.²¹ It is estimated that Āryadeva lived between 170-270 CE,²² and Vasubandhu likely lived from 350-430.²³ Hence, these records also support the estimate that Harivarman likely lived between 250 and 350 CE.

Xuanchang's biography²⁴ provides the following information about Harivarman's life. He was born in central India (中天竺) in a Brahmin family (婆羅門子). In his youth, he learned the Vedas and other sciences, and later he was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order (薩婆多部) and became a student of the "monk of doctrine" (**dharmaśramaṇa* 達摩沙門) *Kumāralāta (究摩羅陀). *Kumāralāta taught him the "great Abhidharma of Kātyāyana (迦旃延) with thousands of *gāthās*," probably the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text *Jñānaprasthāna*. Having fully learned this work, Harivarman was unsatisfied and disillusioned with Abhidharma. He then spent several years studying the entire Tripiṭaka and traced all the different teachings of the "five sects" (五部) and "nine branches" (九流 **srotas*)²⁵ back to their common origin. Thereafter, he engaged in debates with other Buddhist teachers and tried to persuade them to return to the original Buddhist teachings. Those teachers were reluctant to abandon their sectarian doctrines. As a result, Harivarman became unpopular among them. However, the Mahāsāṅghikas (僧祇部) in the city Pāṭaliputra (巴連弗邑), who also claimed that their doctrines were the origin of the "five sects," heard about Harivarman and invited him to live with them. There Harivarman studied Mahāyāna (方等 *vaipulya*) and the teachings of all traditions. He wrote the **Tattvasiddhi*, in which he investigated and criticized the different doctrines from various traditions, especially Kātyāyana's Abhidharma system. Harivarman's stated purpose in writing this work was to "eliminate confusion and abandon the later

²⁰ Yinshun 印順 1981a: 535-6.

²¹ No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 12) T55, p89b14, 21, 22: 提婆菩薩第三十五... 訶梨跋摩菩薩第四十三 婆秀槃頭菩薩第四十四. Cited in Yinshun 印順 1981a: 574.

²² Ui 1933: 8.

²³ Florin Deleanu's extensive investigation of Vasubandhu's date is the most convincing one to date. (Deleanu 2006:186-194).

²⁴ No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78c1-79b25.

²⁵ The "five sects" are likely the five Buddhist sects with their own vinayas and monastic orders. The "nine branches" is likely a non-specific term referring to multiple groups. See the discussion below.

developments, with the hope of returning to the origin” (除繁棄末慕存歸本). The biography concludes with a record of Harivarman’s victorious debate with a Vaiśeṣika teacher, from which he earned a great reputation.

Xuanchang (玄暢 416-484 CE), the author of this biography, lived in the period when the study of the TatSid was very popular in China. Since he was not a direct student of Kumārajīva, it is likely that he obtained his information from commentaries on the TatSid circulating in that period and not from Kumārajīva himself.²⁶ Since the information in these Chinese commentaries may be traced back to Kumārajīva and his students, it is also likely that the information had an Indic source.

There are few things that are noteworthy in this biography. First, it states that Harivarman was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order (薩婆多部) and that his teacher was *Kumāralāta (究摩羅陀), who was likely the teacher believed to be the “original teacher of the Sautrāntikas” (經部本師)²⁷ and also referred to as a “Dārṣṭāntika” (譬喻師). Traditional sources present several views about the Sautrāntikas. For example, according to Xuanzang’s student Puguang (普光), the Sautrāntikas, who claim that sūtras are the ultimate authority, separated from the Sarvāstivādins, who believed that reasoning should be the authority. Kuiji (窺基), another student of Xuanzang, states that the Sautrāntikas originated from the Dārṣṭāntikas and that Kumāralāta was the first Sautrāntika.

Thus, these sources present the following information:

- (1) Kumāralāta was a teacher in the Sarvāstivāda order;
- (2) He was called a “Dārṣṭāntika;”
- (3) He was also the first “Sautrāntika” teacher.

The fact that the accounts apply all three terms “Sarvāstivāda,” “Dārṣṭāntika,” and “Sautrāntika,” to the same person suggests that these terms are not mutually exclusive, and their meanings overlap. According to Kuiji, the Dārṣṭāntikas likely received this

²⁶ For a discussion of the Chinese commentaries on the TatSid, see 1.4.3.

²⁷ No. 2087 大唐西域記 (卷 12) T51, p942a9-16: 尊者童受論師... 呬叉始羅國人也... 即經部本師也。No. 1821 俱舍論記 (卷 2) T41, p35c4-7: 鳩摩邏多。此云豪童。是經部祖師。於經部中造喻鬘論。癡鬘論。顯了論等。經部本從說一切有中出。以經為量名經部。執理為量名說一切有部。No. 1830 成唯識論述記 (卷 3) T43, p274a7-14: ...此破日出論者。即經部本師。佛去世後一百年中。北天竺恒叉翅羅國有鳩摩邏多。此言童首。造九百論。時五天竺有五大論師。喻如日出明導世間名日出者。以似於日。亦名譬喻師。或為此師造喻鬘論集諸奇事。名譬喻師。經部之種族。經部以此所說為宗。當時猶未有經部。經部四百年中方出世故。

name because they were renowned for using examples or stories in their teachings.²⁸ The name “Sautrāntika” indicates that such a teacher claims to take only the sūtra teachings, or the “original teachings of the Buddha,” as the ultimate authority. Thus, these two names indicate styles of teaching and opinions about which Buddhist texts are authoritative and should not be assumed to be names for Buddhist sects that maintained a distinct vinaya collection and ordination lineage. However, certain teachers labeled with these names do appear to have had certain doctrinal proclivities and characteristic doctrines, most notably, the teachers Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva as recorded in the **Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVŚ). Furthermore, chapters 60-67 of the TatSid contain many passages that indicate that Harivarman’s doctrinal positions regarding “mental factors” and “association” almost always agree with those of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva as recorded in the MVŚ. Given that Harivarman’s teacher *Kumāralāta was labeled both a “Dārṣṭāntika” and a “Sautrāntika,” it may appear reasonable that Harivarman’s doctrinal positions agree with those of the Dārṣṭāntikas and that Harivarman maintained an attitude of “returning to the origin,” which could be associated with the label “Sautrāntika.”²⁹ However, in my reading of the section on mind in the TatSid, I do not find any explicit statement by Harivarman that rejects the authority of Abhidharma, and he even agrees with the Ābhidharmikas, or teachers who are explicitly affiliated with a certain Abhidharma tradition, on some doctrinal points. This indicates that we may not simply label Harivarman as a “Dārṣṭāntika” or a “Sautrāntika.” The next section 1.3.2 will discuss in more detail the school affiliation of Harivarman.

Xuanchang’s biography also says that Harivarman learned the “great Abhidharma of Kātyāyana (迦旃延), which has thousands of *gāthās*.” That Abhidharma work is likely the *Jñānaprasthāna*, which came to be considered the most important treatise among the Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma texts. The voluminous Sarvāstivāda *Vibhāṣā*, of which there are three versions extant in Chinese translation, is a detailed commentary on this treatise. Thus, Harivarman is presented as well learned in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, which can be confirmed by his references to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

²⁸ See the quotation in footnote 27 above.

²⁹ For further discussion of Kumāralāta, see Yinshun 1981a:535-40.

texts³⁰ and the numerous Abhidharma doctrines he quotes and criticizes in the TatSid.

The biography also mentions that Harivarman had contact with the Mahāsāṅghikas (僧祇部) as well as familiarity with Mahāyāna (方等 *vaipulya*). Moreover, he is described as aware of all the various teachings of his age but critical of most of them because he considered them later developments and not the “original” Buddhist teachings. He is described as intent upon persuading his contemporaries to abandon these later, developed teachings and return to the early sūtras, which he thought represented the original teachings of the Buddha. As a result, he was marginalized by Buddhists of the Sthavira traditions and had to find companionship in the Mahāsāṅghika community. Although the biography suggests that Harivarman earned a great reputation in India by defeating a Vaiśeṣika teacher in debate and was honored by the king, there is no account of this feat nor any record of the TatSid found in any Indic source. As a result, it is certainly possible that the introduction of the TatSid into China was a result not of its importance in India but rather a result of Kumārajīva’s isolated effort that reflects merely his own preference.

1.3.2 Harivarman’s School Affiliation

The school affiliation of Harivarman is a very thorny issue that has bothered Buddhist scholars for hundreds of years. Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE), a Chinese master who is considered the founder of the *Sanlun* School (三論宗 “The School of Three Treatise”), criticized the doctrines of the TatSid extensively in his works. In his *Profound Meanings of the Three Treatises* (三論玄義), he lists several opinions about Harivarman’s school affiliation.³¹

Question: As Harivarman rejects the eight *skandhas* [of the *Jñānaprasthāna*] and criticizes the five sects, then what is the doctrine that the **Tattvasiddhi* school relies on?

Answer: Some say that [he] chooses and follows those who are right and records whoever is superior. [He] discards those inferior [teachings] of

³⁰ For a list of the places in the TatSid that mention the titles of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts and give quotations from them, see Ui 1933: 6.

³¹ No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3b24-c1: 問跋摩既排斥八犍。淘汰五部。成實之宗正依何義。答有人言。擇善而從。有能必錄。棄眾師之短。取諸部之長。有人言。雖復斥排群異。正用曇無德部。有人言。偏斥毘曇。專同譬喻。真諦三藏云。用經部義也。檢俱舍論。經部之義多同成實。

different teachers and adopts the superior [teachings] from different sects. Others say that though he rejects all different [teachings], he mainly adopts [the teachings of] the Dharmaguptaka sect (曇無德部).

Others say that [he] criticizes extensively the Abhidharma,³² and agrees specifically with the Dārṣṭāntikas.

The Tripiṭaka master Paramārtha (真諦三藏) says that [Harivarman] adopts the meanings of the Sautrāntikas (經部). When the *Abhidharmakośa* is examined, those meanings attributed to the Sautrāntika sect mostly agree with the **Tattvasiddhi*.

In this passage, Jizang lists four opinions on the school affiliation of the TatSid:

(1) Not affiliated with any specific sect. It is an eclectic work that adopts from many different sources teachings considered by Harivarman to be correct.

(2) Harivarman adopts the doctrines of the Dharmaguptaka sect.

(3) Harivarman is a Dārṣṭāntika and criticizes the Abhidharma teachers.

(4) According to Paramārtha, by comparing the records of the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośa* with the positions in the TatSid, it is clear that Harivarman is a Sautrāntika.

In another place, Jizang also records another opinion that (5) the TatSid emerged from the Bahuśrutīya sect (多聞部).³³ And Jizang also notes that in Kumārajīva's time some Chinese considered (6) Harivarman a Mahāyānist and the TatSid a Mahāyāna text.³⁴

Katsura Shōryū (Katsura 1974:29) has also noticed that in addition to these positions regarding Harivarman and the TatSid's school affiliation, Fukuhara Ryōgon (Fukuhara 1969: 25-52) in his study of the TatSid offers more positions: (7) Harivarman is a Sarvāstivādin; and (8) he is a Mahāsāṅghika.

Both Fukuhara and Katsura take the same approach as the ancient Chinese Buddhist historians to the issue of the school affiliation of Harivarman and the TatSid: they examine the doctrinal positions of Harivarman as laid out in the TatSid and compare them with those recorded in the Abhidharma texts and in Buddhist doxographical accounts.

³² 偏斥毘曇 can also be understood as “he is inclined to criticize the Abhidharma.”

³³ No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p9a8-17: 至二百年中。從大眾部內又出一部。名多聞部。大眾部唯弘淺義棄於深義。佛在世時有仙人。值佛得羅漢。恒隨佛往他方及天上聽法。佛涅槃時其人不見。在雪山坐禪。至佛滅度後二百年中。從雪山出覓諸同行。見大眾部唯弘淺義不知深法。其人具足誦淺深義。深義中有大乘義。成實論即從此部出。時人有信其所說者。故別成一部。名多聞部。

³⁴ No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3c17-20: 或有人言。此論明於滅諦。與大乘均致。羅什聞而歎曰。秦人之無深識。何乃至此乎。吾每疑其普信大乘者。當知悟不由中。而迷可識矣。

And by such comparisons, they reach the same conclusion, namely, that Harivarman's positions agree mostly with the Bahuśrutīyas (多聞部). Fukuhara (Fukuhara 1969: 25-52) examines all the accounts and finds that the TatSid has doctrinal positions shared with all of the schools mentioned. His conclusion that Harivarman was a Bahuśrutīya is mainly based on the account from the translator Paramārtha (真諦 499-569 CE), and he believes that Paramārtha's account came directly from India and hence must be more reliable (51). Katsura (1974: 29-49) examines the ten points of controversy discussed in the introduction section of the TatSid,³⁵ finds that on these ten issues only the Bahuśrutīyas, the Prajñāptivādins, and the Theravādins have no disagreement with Harivarman. But the Prajñāptivādins and the Theravādins have issues other than these ten that disagree with Harivarman. Thus, the Bahuśrutīya is the only option left.

I would suggest that such a quest for a school affiliation is based on an unjustified notion of “school,” and hence unfruitful. I want to draw attention to one sentence in Xuanchang's biography of Harivarman, which records that Harivarman spent several years studying the tripiṭaka extensively, investigated the origin of the “nine branches” of Buddhist teachings, and realized that “the [division] of the five sects (部 **nikāya*) founded the base for the flow of the branches (五部創流盪之基), and that Kātyāyana started the partisan competition (迦旃啟偏競之始).”³⁶ Here, Xuanchang differentiates two notions regarding Buddhist groups, namely, “sects” (部 **nikāya*) and “branches” (流 **srotas*). Apparently, the five “sects” refer to the five Buddhist sects that have their own monastic ordination orders based on their own Vinaya lineages. As Yinshun (2000b: 138-9) has noticed, the knowledge of the division of the five sects after Upagupta has been noted in a few Chinese translations of Indic texts and works written by Chinese monks. The five sects are the Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya,

³⁵ The ten points of controversy discussed in the introductory section of the TatSid are: (1) Do the past and future exist? (2) Does all exist? (3) Is there an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) between death and rebirth? (4) Are the four truths understood successively or simultaneously? (5) Can an Arhant relapse? (6) Is *citta* by nature pure and radiant? (7) Are *anuśayas* associated with *citta*? (8) Does past karma exist? (9) Is the Buddha included in the saṅgha? (10) Does a “person” (*pudgala*) exist?

³⁶ No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78c19-21: 遂乃數載之中。窮三藏之旨。考九流之源。方知五部創流盪之基。迦旃啟偏競之始。“Partisan competition” (偏競) likely has the sense of identifying oneself with a certain group or school, in competition with other groups.

and Mahīśāsaka. Their respective vinayas are extant in Chinese translations.³⁷ Aside from the five sects, Xuanchang also mentions nine “branches” (流 **srotas*). The number “nine” is not likely to be used as an exact number, because in Chinese the number “nine” can be understood as a general term meaning as “quite a few.” So it appears that Xuanchang believes that in Harivarman’s time there were five Buddhist Vinaya sects and several more “branches” or schools that disagreed with each other. This might not be an exact description of the situation in Harivarman’s time, but there is no doubt that at that time the Buddhist community already had a number of groups disagreeing and arguing with each other upon doctrinal issues. Xuanchang suggests that Harivarman was disillusioned with these divisions, studied all the Buddhist texts available, and believed that he had found the origin of all the sects and branches.

Any attempt to reconstruct the early history of these five Vinaya “sects” and various “branches” quickly reveals that the history of Buddhist groups is very complicated, far more complicated than the simple picture presented even in a comparatively early doxographical text such as the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* attributed to the Sarvāstivāda master Vasumitra. Traditional Buddhist historians such as Vasumitra failed to recognize the difference between Vinaya sects and doctrinal schools, and combined these two categories in their accounts. In addition, doctrinal schools may be congruent with Vinaya sects, as, for example, in the case of the Sarvāstivādins. Furthermore, the term “doctrinal school” might be inaccurate in the case of labels such as Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda, especially in the early period. Respectively, these two names literally mean “those associated with the doctrine that everything exists” and “those associated with discrimination” and would at most suggest perhaps types of Buddhist teachers who held certain doctrinal positions or approaches. It is entirely possible that in the earliest period such teachers did not constitute formal groups or schools but were just loosely described by these names. Other later names such as the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas may also be such loose descriptors. However, disputes and debates among the various teachers may have intensified over time, resulting in clearer distinctions among doctrinal positions, which together with certain other social factors may have led

³⁷ For a survey of Vinaya literature, see Prebish 1994. For more extensive studies of the Vinaya texts, see Yinshun 印順 1988a: 66-88, 105-462; also Hirakawa 1999-2000.

to self-identified and generally recognized sects or schools.

Furthermore, as Xuanchang in his biography of Harivarman records, Harivarman blames Kātyāyana as the first one who started the “partisan competition” (迦旃啟偏競之始). It is interesting to note that among the extant Abhidharma/Abhidhamma texts, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts appear to be more overtly polemical and record disputes between the Sarvāstivādins and teachers of other groups, most notably in the *Vijñānakāya* and the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, which is a commentary to the *Jñānaprasthāna* attributed to Kātyāyana, or Kātyāyanīputra. It also appears that the Sarvāstivādins were more likely to identify their opponents by mentioning the names of teachers and groups, while the *Kathāvatthu*, the only polemical Pāli Abhidhamma text, does not contain the names of opponents. So Xuanchang’s characterization of Harivarman’s view, namely, that the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas initiated this practice of debate that classifies positions by the names of teachers and groups would appear to be consistent with the extant texts. And, we might view accounts of Buddhist teachers, sects, and schools in works such as the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* as not simply passively recording history but instead actively creating, at least in the minds of the compilers and readers, sects and schools that accord with the names used. For example, the Dārṣṭāntikas, according to Kuiji, were teachers who liked to use stories in their teachings, and this style of teaching may not be related to specific doctrinal positions. However, in the MVŚ the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhasikas singled out the Dārṣṭāntika teachers Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, and attacked their doctrinal positions. By doing so the Vaibhāṣikas actually turned the term “Dārṣṭāntika” from a style classifier into a group identifier. If such a group identifier were then accepted and became a convention, the group would come to exist and be understood as an actual historical entity by later historians.

From this perspective, any attempt to determine the “school affiliation” of Harivarman is doomed to failure simply because we cannot be certain about the history of those “schools” with which we might attempt to affiliate him. These names that were understood as schools in the Abhidharma texts were actually fluid and changing throughout history. The method that Fukuhara and Katsura adopted of comparing his doctrinal positions with characteristic doctrines of schools recorded in traditional Buddhist history and Abhidharma texts is based on the same presupposition held by the

ancient Abhidharma teachers, namely, that school labels refer to specific historical groups with distinct doctrinal positions. Although these later views constitute important historical data in their own right for the period in which they were formed, they cannot be expected to yield accurate historical descriptions of an earlier period.

Nonetheless, it is still possible to say something about Harivarman's affiliation. First of all, according to the biography, he was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order and was thus a Sarvāstivādin at least in vinaya lineage or monastic affiliation. However, he did not subscribe to the doctrine that "all dharmas exist all the time." Moreover, Harivarman's teacher Kumāralāta was labeled a Dārṣṭāntika and in fact many of Harivarman's opinions in the TatSid agree with those of teachers such as Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva whom the MVŚ labels as Dārṣṭāntikas. Thus, he can at least in part be considered a Dārṣṭāntika, provided the label is understood not as a sect or a separate doctrinal school but as describing certain teachers within the Sarvāstivāda order who shared some common doctrinal positions.

1.4 The **Tattvasiddhi*

1.4.1 *Kumārajīva's Translation*

A brief postscript to the Chinese translation of the **Tattvasiddhi*, which was apparently added by the Chinese editor of the translation,³⁸ records vividly how the treatise was translated.³⁹

In the thirteenth year of the Great *Qin* (大秦) *Hongshi* (弘始) era, when the year star (i.e. Jupiter) was in the constellation of *Shiwei* (豕韋), on the eighth day of the ninth month, the *Shangshuling* (尚書令 a title of a court official) Yaoxian (姚顯) requested that [Kumārajīva] translate this treatise. [The translation] was not finished until the next year on the fifteenth day of the ninth month. The foreign dharma master (法師) Kumārajīva (拘摩羅耆

³⁸ The postscript is not present in the Taishō edition of the TatSid but is preserved in the *Chu Sanzang Ji Ji* (出三藏記集) composed by Sengyou (僧祐 445-518 CE), which is a collection of prefaces and postscripts from Buddhist texts.

³⁹ No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78a7-10: 大秦弘始十三年歲次豕韋九月八日。尚書令姚顯請出此論。至來年九月十五日訖。外國法師拘摩羅耆婆。手執胡本口自傳譯。曇曇筆受。

婆), holding the foreign manuscript (胡本)⁴⁰ in his hand, conveyed the translation orally. Tan’gui (曇晷) received and wrote [it] down.

The date of the translation corresponds to 411-12 CE, near the end of Kumārajīva’s translation career in China.⁴¹ No record is found regarding the identity of Tan’gui (曇晷). Yinshun (2000a: 196) suggests that “Tan’gui (曇晷)” is likely a scribal error for “Tanying (曇影),” a prominent student and assistant of Kumārajīva. The biography of Tanying in the *Biographies of Prominent Monks* (高僧傳 T2059) contains the following record:⁴²

[Yao]xing (姚興 366-416 CE, an emperor of the Later *Qin* 后秦) ordered [Tanying] to reside in the *Xiaoyao* Garden to assist Kumārajīva in the translation of sūtras. The first translation [with which he was involved] was the *Chengshilun* (成實論 the **Tattvasiddhi*), in which the questions and answers within debates are all presented back and forth, one after another. [Tan]ying disliked the disjointedness of [the text], so [he] organized [it] into five parts (五番). When it was finished, [he] presented [it] to Kumārajīva. Kumārajīva said, “Great! You have understood my intention very well.”

This passage presents a detail describing Tanying’s role in the translation of the TatSid. He noticed that the TatSid contained many arguments presented by different parties in debates, which were “disjointed” (支離) and difficult to track, and as a result he organized the text into five parts (五番).⁴³ This record confirms that Kumārajīva’s assistant in the translation of the TatSid was Tanying (曇影).

In addition, a later commentary of the TatSid notes that the translation had two

⁴⁰ Daniel Boucher (2000) suggests that the term *huben* (胡本) sometimes indicates that the manuscript was written in Kharoṣṭhī script.

⁴¹ Kumārajīva (343-413) came to China in the year 401 CE, and started to translate Buddhist texts into Chinese from 402 CE. He died in the year (413 CE) following his translation of the TatSid.

⁴² No. 2059 高僧傳 (卷 6) T50, p364a7-10: 興勅住逍遙園助什譯經。初出成實論。凡諍論問答皆次第往反。影恨其支離。乃結為五番。竟以呈什。什曰大善。深得吾意。

⁴³ Perhaps the account here regarding the organization of the TatSid is a little exaggerated. The **Catuhṣatyanirdeśa* by Vasuvarman (四諦論 T1647, translated by Paramārtha in the 6th century CE), another treatise related to the Dārṣāntikas/Sautrāntikas, is also organized according to the four noble truths (see Yinshun 1981a: 594-6). It is possible that Tanying did not “reorganize” the TatSid but rather merely divided the 202 chapters into five sections, and gave the five sections each a title according to their contents. In other words, the original order of the 202 chapters perhaps already implied the five sections; Tanying may simply have made the implicit explicit.

versions:⁴⁴

In the thirteenth year of the *Hongshi* era under the reign of the *Qin* emperor Yaoxing, *Shangshuling* Yaoxian requested that the dharma master translate this treatise. There was an audience of 300 people. It was received and written down by [Tan]ying. When it was first translated, before the Chinese was corrected, the monk Daosong (道嵩) made [it] public. When the text was revised, the previous version had already circulated widely. As a result, both versions circulated. The previous version has the [term] *nianchu* (念處) for *smṛtyupasthāna*, while the latter version has *yichu* (憶處).

This passage provides more details on the translation. It notes that the translation process was something like a public class: Kumārajīva translated the treatise orally in front of an audience of 300 people, and Tanying wrote it down. After that, the written text was further revised and polished. However, it appears that the monk Daosong (道嵩) was too eager and published a draft of the translation before it was revised. As an example of difference between the draft and the final version, this record cites the translation of one term: for the word *smṛtyupasthāna* in the original, the draft version has *nianchu* (念處), while the final revised version has *yichu* (憶處).

It is not clear how accurate this record is regarding the translation and circulation of the text. A search of the Taishō edition of the *TatSid* indicates that both *nianchu* (念處) and *yichu* (憶處) occur in the text.⁴⁵ *Nianchu* (念處) is the standard term used by Kumārajīva to translate *smṛtyupasthāna*, and *yichu* (憶處) never occurs in his other translations. The fact that both *nianchu* (念處) and *yichu* (憶處) are present in the Taishō edition conflicts with the record of this commentary and makes difficult to determine whether the Taishō edition represents the draft or the final version of the translation. The

⁴⁴ This passage is from Zhizang's (智藏 458-522 CE) *Chengshilun Dayi Ji* (成實論大義記), a commentary to the *TatSid*. This commentary has been lost, but this passage has been quoted in a commentary on the *Sanlun Xuanyi* (三論玄義) composed in Japan in the thirteenth century CE: No. 2300 三論玄義檢幽集 T70, 418a7-16: 案大義記初卷序論緣起云。曇無部此土不傳。成實一論。制作之士名訶梨跋摩梁語師子鎧。又云。秦主姚興弘始十三年尚書令姚顯請者波法師於長安始譯此論聽眾三百。亦影筆受。其初譯國語未暇治正而沙門道嵩便齋宣流。及改定前傳已廣。是故此論遂兩本俱行。其身受心法名念處者前本也。名為憶處者後本也。今檢論本或有二十卷或有十六卷。

⁴⁵ 憶處 occurs in chapters 19, 185, 187; 念處 occurs in chapters 5, 17, 18, 21, 60, 65, 82, 116, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189; and in chapter 186, there is one case of 憶念處.

TatSid in the Taishō edition (T1646) is based on the 2nd Edition of the Korean Canon (高麗藏再雕版 1236-1251), collated and compared with the same text in the Zifu Canon (資福藏 ca.1241-1252), the Puning Canon (普寧藏 1277-1290), the Jingshan Canon (徑山藏 1589-1712), the Chongning Canon (崇寧藏 1080-1112), and the Shōsō-in (正倉院) Manuscript Collection (739-740).⁴⁶ In this study, the Taishō edition of the text is compared with the Zhonghua Dazangjing (中華大藏經) edition, which is also based on the 2nd Edition of the Korean Canon (高麗藏再雕版), and was edited through comparison with several other editions of the Chinese canon: the Fangshan Stone-Carved Canon (房山石經 ca. 1095), the Zifu Canon (資福藏), the Jin Canon (金藏 ca.1139-1172), the Qisha Canon (磧砂藏 1216-1322), the Puning Canon (普寧藏), the Southern Canon of the Yongle Era (永樂南藏 1413-1420), the Jingshan Canon (徑山藏), and the *Qing* Canon (清藏 1735-1738). In chapters 60-67 of the TatSid, which are examined in the present project, no significant variations are found between the Taishō and the Zhonghua editions. A couple of minor variations, which do not affect the meaning of the text, are noted in the footnotes to the translation presented in chapter 5.

Regarding the different translations *nianchu* (念處) and *yichu* (憶處), in the sections studied (chs. 60-67), the term corresponding to *smṛtyupasthāna* in all cases is *nianchu* (念處), and *yichu* (憶處) is not found. Moreover, since *yichu* (憶處) only occurs in three chapters of the text and *nianchu* (念處) in thirteen chapters, it is possible, as Fukuhara concludes, that the widely circulated version of the TatSid is the so-called “draft” version.⁴⁷

1.4.2 The Title

Kumārajīva translated the title of text as *Chengshilun* (成實論) “the treatise that accomplishes reality.” Because no Indic reference to this text remains, the original Indic

⁴⁶ Deleanu includes an extensive survey of the Chinese editions of the Buddhist canon. See Deleanu 2006: 112-9; 130-1.

⁴⁷ This is the opinion of Fukuhara (1969: 5), but he does not notice that 憶處 also occurs in the Taishō version.

title is uncertain. Some scholars reconstruct the title as *Satya-siddhi*.⁴⁸ However, the more common translation of the term *satya* in Chinese is *di* (諦) “truth,” so if the title were *Satya-siddhi* then the Chinese translation of the title would more likely be *Chengdilun* 成諦論 instead of *Chengshilun* 成實論. Katsura (1974: 1) suggests that La Vallée Poussin’s rendering **Tattvasiddhi* appears to be more suitable, because in the translation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* Kumārajīva translates *tattva* as *shi* 實 “reality,” and *satya* as *di* 諦 “truth.”

Recently, Yao Zhihuan (Yao 2005: 98) has noticed that in a thirteenth century commentary to the *Sanlun Xuanyi* (三論玄義 *Profound teachings of the Three Treatises*) written in Japan, the author Chōzen (澄禪 1227-1307 CE) quotes an early commentary on the *TatSid*, which records the original Indic title:⁴⁹

The *Chengshilun*’s (成實論) complete Indic Sanskrit title is preserved; it should read *shenajia* (闍那迦) *bolouwu* (波樓侮) *youpotishe* (優婆提舍). *Shenajia* (闍那迦) is also called *piliu* (毘留), translated as *cheng* (成 accomplished); *bolouwu* (波樓侮) is also called *yetaba* (夜他跋), translated as *shi* (實 reality); *youpotishe* (優婆提舍 *upadeśa*) is translated as *lunwen* (論文 treatise text).

This passage gives a transliteration of the Indic title as *shenajia-bolouwu-youpotishe* (闍那迦波樓侮優婆提舍). The last part is clearly the standard rendering of *upadeśa*, but it is much more difficult to reconstruct the original Indic terms from the first two parts, which correspond to the Chinese *chengshi* (成實 the accomplishment of reality). Yao Zhihua (Yao 2005: 98) suggests that it is *janaka-parama*. Even though *janaka* phonetically matches 闍那迦, *parama* does not match 波樓侮, in which *lou* 樓 more likely corresponds to *ru* or *lu*, and 侮 more likely corresponds to *mu*. Furthermore, since the meaning of *janaka-parama* does not match the meaning of “accomplishing reality” well, *janaka-parama* is not likely as the original title of the text.

⁴⁸ For example, Sastri 1975. Katsura 1974: 219n1.

⁴⁹ Chōzen 澄禪 (1227-1307) No. 2300 三論玄義檢幽集 T70, p417c1-5: 四論玄第十成壞義云。成實論具存天竺之正音應云闍那迦波樓侮優婆提舍也。闍那迦亦名毘留此翻為成。波樓侮亦名夜他跋翻為實。優婆提舍翻為論文。

Willemen (2006) proposes another reconstruction of the title. He suggests that *shenajia* 闍那迦 is an abbreviated form of *Jñānakāya*, *bolouwu* 波樓侮 corresponds to *prodbhūta*, so the reconstructed title should be *Jñānakāyaprodbhūtopadeśa*. However, this theory cannot account for the sentence “*Shenajia* (闍那迦) is also called *piliu* (毘留), translated as *cheng* (成 accomplished).” So Willemen suggests that the sentence is incomplete due to a scribal mistake, and the full sentence should be like 闍那迦[翻爲智身。波樓]亦名毘留此翻爲成。 “*Shenajia* (闍那迦 **jñānakāya*) is [translated as *zhishen* (智身 body of knowledge). *Bolou* (波樓)] is also called *piliu* (毘留), translated as *cheng* (成 accomplished).”

Willemen’s reconstruction too is unsatisfactory. First, the transliteration *shenajia* 闍那迦 also occurs in Kumārajīva’s translation of Nāgārjuna’s **Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (大智度論 T1509), in which *shenajia* 闍那迦 is a personal name for a “medicine king” (藥王 *bhaiṣajyarāja*).⁵⁰ In a Sanskrit-Chinese glossary made in the Tang dynasty (T2130 翻梵語), the name of this particular medicine king is rendered “accomplishing work” (成事).⁵¹ Thus, it is likely that *Shenajia* (闍那迦) does indeed mean “accomplish” and is not a transliteration of *jñānakāya*. Possible transliterations corresponding to *Shenajia* (闍那迦) include *janaka*, *canaka*, or *jñānaka*, but, since none of these has the meaning “accomplish,” the Indic equivalent for this part of the title is still uncertain. As for the next part *bolouwu* (波樓侮), if Willemen’s reconstruction of the first part as *jñānakāya* is incorrect, then the *bolouwu* (波樓侮) also cannot be *prodbhūta*. It is more likely a transliteration for something like **palumu*, but other than *parama*, which is not likely as an equivalent, it would be difficult to find another Indic word that resembles **palumu* and has the meaning “reality.” Further research is needed to solve the mystery of the title. Thus, this study will follow Katsura and simply use the title **Tattvasiddhi*.

⁵⁰ No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 8) T25, p118c3-5: 復次九十六種眼病。闍那迦藥王所不能治者。唯佛世尊能令得視。

⁵¹ No. 2130 翻梵語 (卷 4) T54, p1008c14: 闍那迦藥王(譯曰成事)。

1.4.3 Study of the *Tattvasiddhi in China and Japan

Following Kumārajīva's translation, the TatSid was first taught by Sengrui (僧叡 or 僧睿, ca. 4th-5th c. CE), one of Kumārajīva's prominent Chinese students. The biography of Sengrui in the *Biographies of Prominent Monks* (高僧傳)⁵² records one anecdote concerning the TatSid:⁵³

Later Kumārajīva translated the TatSid and commanded Sengrui to teach it. Kumārajīva said to Sengrui, "Seven places in this polemical treatise refute Abhidharma, but [they were] expressed implicitly. One would have to be a genius to understand them without asking." Sengrui expounded the profound and subtle [teachings of the treatise] without consulting Kumārajīva, and [his teaching] agrees with [Kumārajīva's understanding]. Kumārajīva exclaimed, "Meeting you in my [career of] transmitting and translating Buddhist sūtras and treatises leaves me really no regret!"

This story suggests that TatSid began to be studied and taught immediately after Kumārajīva finished the translation. Moreover, it would appear that at least part of the reason Kumārajīva and his students studied this treatise was because it contains criticism of Abhidharma. Kumārajīva is known as a promoter of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka tradition, and the main target of criticism in the Madhyamaka tradition is the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. However, in Madhyamaka texts, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma positions were not always clearly stated. As a result, it is understandable that Kumārajīva would use the TatSid as a textbook for his students to study Abhidharma in a critical way, namely, to know and understand the Abhidharma theories and positions without agreeing with them. It would appear that Sengrui understood his intention very well. Nonetheless, two other students of Kumārajīva were more renowned for their study and teaching of the TatSid:⁵⁴ Sengdao (僧導 362-457 CE) and Sengsong (僧嵩 date unknown).

After Kumārajīva died, Sengdao (僧導) was stationed primarily in the city Shouchun

⁵² Compiled around 519 CE by Huijiao 慧皎 (497-554 CE).

⁵³ No. 2059 高僧傳 (卷 6) T50, p364b7-11: 後出成實論令叡講之。什謂叡曰。此諍論中有七處文破毘曇。而在言小隱。若能不問而解可謂英才。至叡啟發幽微果不謬什而契然懸會。什歎曰。吾傳譯經論得與子相值。真無所恨矣。

⁵⁴ The following discussion of the study of and commentaries on the TatSid depends mainly on Tang 1955: 720ff.

(壽春)⁵⁵ and wrote a commentary on the TatSid. Several of his students also became famous for their studies of the TatSid, the most prominent being Daomeng (道猛 413-475 CE). Because this lineage of the study of the TatSid began with Sengdao (僧導) and was centered in Shouchun (壽春), it is called the “Shouchun lineage” (壽春系). Kumārajīva’s other student, Sengsong (僧嵩), worked in Pengcheng (彭城)⁵⁶ and was likely the one who circulated the unrevised draft of the translation. Thus, he initiated the “Pengcheng lineage” (彭城系) of the TatSid. His student Sengyuan (僧淵 414-481 CE) was also renowned for his study of the TatSid, and he had four famous students: Tandu (曇度 ?-489), Huiji (惠紀 date unknown), Daodeng (道登 412-496), and Huiqiu (惠球 431-504).

During the remainder of the Southern and Northern dynasties (南北朝 420-589), the following Sui (隋 581-618) dynasty, through early Tang (618-690) dynasty, the study of the TatSid was very popular in China. Ui Hakuju (Ui 1933: 17-9) has listed nearly one hundred teachers who were known for their study and teaching of the TatSid, many of whom also wrote commentaries on the text. Tang Yongtong (Tang 1955: 728-10) collected the titles of twenty-four such commentaries mentioned in the historical records of this period. Unfortunately, all of these commentaries have been lost.

Certainly, the TatSid became a popular and important text, but it should also be mentioned that most of the teachers renowned for their study of the TatSid were also teaching other sūtras and treatises. Even though some of these teachers were called “*Chenshi* masters” (成實師), one should not assume that in the early period there was a separate school dedicated to the study of the TatSid alone. As Tang Yongtong has observed (Tang 1955: 718-9), it is only after Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE), who in his works fiercely attacked the TatSid from a Madhyamaka perspective, that people began to have the impression that there existed a separate school centered on the TatSid, and thus the term “*Chengshi* School” (成實宗) appeared.

Perhaps partly due to Jizang’s criticism, the TatSid came to be widely acknowledged

⁵⁵ Now, Shou County (寿县) in Anhui Province.

⁵⁶ Now, XuZhou (徐州) city in Jiangsu Province.

as a “Hīnayāna” text, and its study became less and less popular when most Buddhists in China identified themselves as “Mahayānists.” Also, during the Tang dynasty, new Chinese Buddhist schools such as Huayan (華嚴宗) and Chan (禪) were gaining more popularity, and, more importantly, the large number of Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts Xuanzang had brought back from India attracted more attention among those who were interested in Abhidharma studies. So the TatSid, as an old translation of “Hīnayāna” Abhidharma not associated with any particular school lineage, fell into oblivion. As Hirai Shunei (Hirai et al. 1999-2000: 31) noticed, the last record of the study of the TatSid states that Xuanzang had studied the TatSid with Daoshen (道深) in the year 622 CE before he went to India.⁵⁷ After that, no study of the text is mentioned in the biographies of Chinese Buddhists.

During the Tang Dynasty, the TatSid was transmitted to Japan.⁵⁸ In the era of the Tenmu emperor (天武天皇 673-686), the monk Daozang (道藏) from Baekje (百濟, a kingdom on the Korea peninsula), a monk of the Sanlun School (三論宗), came to Japan and first taught the TatSid there. He also wrote a commentary on the TatSid. However, the study of the TatSid in Japan has always been subsumed under the Sanlun School (三論宗), or the Chinese tradition of the Madhyamaka, and never constituted a separate school by itself. After Daozang, no new commentary on the TatSid was written in Japan. During the Kamakura period (鎌倉時代 1185-1333), with the new Buddhist movements such as the Pure land, Zen, and Nichiren, the study of the TatSid gradually disappeared completely. Daozang’s commentary to the TatSid, together with all the Chinese commentaries, were all lost in Japan as well.

1.4.4 Structure of the **Tattvasiddhi* and the Section on Mind

The **Tattvasiddhi* in the Taishō edition (T1646) has sixteen fascicles (卷), but some early Chinese catalogs record different numbers of fascicles such as fourteen, twenty,

⁵⁷ No. 2060 續高僧傳 (卷 4) T50, p447a18-19: 有沙門道深。體悟成實...

⁵⁸ The discussion of TatSid studies in Japan is based on Koyo 1975: 9 and Hirai et al. 1999-2000: 31-2.

twenty-four, or twenty-seven.⁵⁹ This is understandable because the number of fascicles varies depending on the size of the written characters, the size of the pages, and how many pages were bound in a fascicle (卷). However, all catalog records unanimously agree that the TatSid has 202 chapters (*pin* 品). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a biographical record claims that it was Kumārajīva's Chinese student Tanying (曇影) who divided the chapters into five sections (聚 *skandha*).⁶⁰ Historical records do not provide further details about the text and its translation, so it is not clear whether the order of the individual chapters reflects the Indic original, or whether the chapter titles were added or changed by the translators.

The TatSid translation as extant is organized according to the principle of the four noble truths. It consists of an introductory section (發聚), and four more sections corresponding to the four truths, with each section (except for the section of the truth of cessation) containing several sub-sections. The following is a brief list of the contents of the five sections:⁶¹

- I. Introduction (發聚) (chapters 1-35)
 - 1. The three treasures of Buddhism (三寶) (1-12)
 - 2. Introduction to the treatise and its content (13-18)
 - 3. Ten points of controversy (19-35)
- II. The truth of suffering (苦諦聚) (36-94)
 - 1. Form (*rūpa* 色) (36-59)
 - 2. Consciousness (*viññāna* 識) (60-76)
 - 3. Apperception (*samjñā* 想) (77)
 - 4. Feeling (*vedanā* 受) (78-83)
 - 5. Volitional formations (*saṃskāra* 行) (84-94)
- III. The truth of origin (集諦聚) (95-140)

⁵⁹ No. 2157 貞元新定釋教目錄 (卷 6) T55, p810a9: 成實論二十卷或二十四或二十七或十六或十四...

⁶⁰ See chapter 1, footnotes 42 and 43.

⁶¹ The list presented here mainly follows Katsura 1974:4-5.

1. Karma (業) (95-120)
2. Defilements (煩惱 *kleśa*) (121-140)
- IV. The truth of cessation (滅諦聚) (141-154)
- V. The truth of the path (道諦聚) (155-202)
 1. Concentration (定 *samādhi*) (155-188)
 2. Insight (慧 *prajñā*) (189-202)

The present study focuses on the mind (or consciousness *viññāna*) sub-section within section II, whose contents are as follows:

II.2 Consciousness (識 *viññāna*)

- Chapter 60. Proving the non-existence of mental factors (立無數品)
- Chapter 61. Proving the existence of mental factors (立有數品)
- Chapter 62. Refuting the non-existence of mental factors (非無數品)
- Chapter 63. Refuting the existence of mental factors (非有數品)
- Chapter 64. Illuminating the non-existence of mental factors (明無數品)
- Chapter 65. There is no association (無相應品)
- Chapter 66. Proving the existence of association (有相應品)
- Chapter 67. Refuting association (非相應品)
- Chapter 68. There are multiple consciousnesses (多心品)
- Chapter 69. There is one consciousness (一心品)
- Chapter 70. Refuting multiple consciousnesses (非多心品)
- Chapter 71. Refuting one consciousness (非一心品)
- Chapter 72. Illuminating multiple consciousnesses (明多心品)
- Chapter 73. Consciousness stays temporarily (識暫住品)
- Chapter 74. Consciousness does not stay (識無住品)
- Chapter 75. Multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously (識俱生品)
- Chapter 76. Consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously (識不俱生品)

These seventeen chapters can be reorganized into five groups according to the topics discussed:

Chapters 60-64, on mental factors (*caitasika*)

Chapters 65-67, on association (*samprayoga*)

Chapters 68-72, on the multiplicity of consciousness

Chapters 73-74, on the momentariness of consciousness

Chapters 75-76, on whether multiple consciousnesses can occur simultaneously

Each major topic contains the arguments of both Harivarman and his opponents, but each chapter only records the arguments of one side. For example, in the group of chapters on the topic of mental factors (*caitasika*), chapter 60 lists Harivarman's arguments against the notion of *caitasika*, chapter 61 lists the opponent's arguments for the existence of *caitasikas*, chapter 62 lists the opponent's refutation to Harivarman's arguments in chapter 60, chapter 63 lists Harivarman's refutation of the opponent's arguments in chapter 61, and finally chapter 64 lists some further arguments from Harivarman to support his conclusion that *caitasikas* do not exist. In the case of topics that are not so complicated, for example, the last group including chapters 75 and 76, there may be only two chapters that list the arguments of Harivarman and his opponent separately.

The present study focuses on the first two inter-related topics of mental factors (*caitasika*) and association (*samprayoga*) discussed in the first two groups, chapters 60-64 and 65-67. The original organization of the arguments of the two sides of the dispute is complex. For example, the opponent's refutation to an argument of Harivarman in chapter 60 is listed in chapter 62, and Harivarman's rejoinder is listed in chapter 64. In this way the relevant arguments regarding one doctrinal point appear in different chapters and are hard to follow. In the following chapters, in order to make the text clear and easy to follow, the arguments in these chapters will be reorganized around each doctrinal point, with relevant arguments from different chapters placed together. However, in the translation of the original text, the original order of the arguments will remain intact.

1.4.5 Textual Lineage

As mentioned in previous sections, it makes little sense to consider Harivarman's doctrinal positions in terms of a specific school affiliation. However, by comparing different versions of a text or by noting references to other texts, it may be possible to trace the preservation and transmission of texts, and understand the development of these texts as well as of the doctrines contained in them. In the TatSid, both Harivarman and his opponents quote numerous early sūtras as scriptural authority in their arguments to prove their own positions and argue against the other side. Fukuhara (1969: 18-22) has identified seventy sūtras that are quoted in the TatSid. In the present study of chapters 60-67, sūtra references have been identified, and when there are differences among the version(s) preserved in the Chinese *Āgamas* and the Pāli *Nikāyas*, the versions quoted in the TatSid almost unanimously agree with the Chinese version(s). The following list gives the location of such sūtra references in chapters 60-67 of the TatSid:

60.12: The sūtra passage quoted (SĀ no. 294) by Harivarman has the phrase “internally there is the body with consciousness” (**antardhā savijñānaḥ kāyaḥ* 內有識身), but the parallel Pāli version (S II 23-4) has only *kāya*, and an extant Sanskrit fragment of the sūtra has *savijñānaḥ kāyaḥ* but not **antardhā*.

65.26: The sūtra quoted in the TatSid on the seven *bodhyaṅgas* has an extra sentence that is absent in the Pāli version (S V 312-3, 331-3), but exists in the Chinese SĀ nos. 281, 810 and the quotation in the *Dharmaskandha*.

65.30: The name of the seventh purification 行斷知見淨 **pratipadāprahāṇajñānadarśanaviśuddhi* is the same as the one in the Chinese MĀ but different from *ñānadassanavisuddhi* in the Pāli and the Chinese EĀ versions.

65.31: The sūtra quoted 因緣經 **Hetupratyaya* occurs only in the SĀ (no. 334) and has no parallel in the Pāli *Nikāyas*.

66.1: The sūtra quoted has an expanded formula of the view of personal-existence (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), which exists in the Chinese SĀ (no.109) but not in the Pāli *Nikāyas*.

66.2: The *Manuṣya-sūtra* quoted is present in the SĀ and is the same as the one quoted in the AKBh, but this sūtra has no Pāli parallel.

66.4: The sūtra quoted has a phrase 智相應 **jñānasamprayukta* that is present in the Chinese MĀ (no.186), the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, and the *Dharmaskandha*, but is absent in the Pāli parallel (M I 320).

It should be noted that in these seven cases, three sūtras are also found to be quoted by Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, and the versions quoted in the Abhidharma texts agree with both the versions preserved in Chinese *Āgamas* and the TatSid. The other three are not quoted in other Abhidharma texts, and the versions quoted in the TatSid agree with the versions in the Chinese SĀ or MĀ, but not the Chinese EĀ and Pāli versions. Since the Chinese SĀ and MĀ would appear to be associated with the Sarvāstivāda school, these six sūtra quotations suggest that Harivarman and his opponents base their arguments on a Sarvāstivāda lineage of sūtra texts. This would accord with Harivarman's biography, which states that he was ordained and educated in the Sarvāstivāda monastic order.

However, there is one case in which the sūtra quoted in the TatSid does not agree with the Sarvāstivāda version but agrees with the Pāli version: the sūtra quoted in 67.22, in which the Chinese SĀ version and the version quoted in the MVŚ include a key word *samādhi*, which is missing in both the Pāli version and the version quoted in the TatSid. It is possible that since the word *samādhi* in the passage would determine the doctrinal position as that of the Sarvāstivādins, Harivarman followed a version of the sūtra that would support his position and yet differs from the Sarvāstivāda version.⁶²

Aside from the sūtra quotations, many of the arguments recorded in the TatSid can find parallels or similar arguments in other extant Abhidharma texts. These parallels indicate that the arguments listed in the TatSid are likely not invented by Harivarman; perhaps he had learned them from his teachers and during his study of early Abhidharma texts. All these parallels are marked and compared in the translation and discussion in chapters 2-3 and 5.

In order to better understand the arguments in the TatSid, we need to understand first the Abhidharma style of argument, which in turn requires knowledge about Abhidharma

⁶² For more detail on this sūtra quotation, see the translation of 67.22 in chapter 4, and the discussion in 3.4.9.

in general. The next section, 1.5, provides a general introduction to Abhidharma and a brief introduction to Abhidharma styles of argument.

1.5 General Background: Buddhist Abhidharma

Despite the common characterization of early Buddhism as comprising two major traditions, namely, the northern and the southern traditions, both textual and epigraphical evidence from the early period provides evidence of many groups. According to later Buddhist historical records, these groups had their own collections of canonical and post-canonical texts, but most of these early Indian Buddhist texts have been lost. Today the only extant complete collection of canonical texts in an Indic language is that in Pāli. A large number of early Buddhist texts have been preserved in Chinese translation, and these texts have been related to a number of Buddhist sects or schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Sammatīya, and so forth.

Historical and textual sources refer to Buddhist textual collections consisting of different numbers of parts, but many comprise three (*tripitaka/tipitaka*): (1) *vinaya*, or texts related to monastic rules; (2) *sūtra*, or discourses attributed to the Buddha himself or his major disciples; and (3) *abhidharma* or treatises on Buddhist doctrines. The term *abhidharma* has many meanings,⁶³ and among these two are more emphasized within the two major traditions. In the northern tradition, the meaning “concerning dharma” is the dominant interpretation of the term,⁶⁴ while in the Southern tradition *Abhidhamma* is understood as “distinguished teaching.”⁶⁵ Nevertheless, both in the Buddhist community and in modern scholarship the term “Abhidharma” is generally used in three senses: (1) Abhidharma as a method of exegesis; (2) Abhidharma as a genre of literature; and (3) Abhidharma as a philosophical system.

From a historical perspective, Abhidharma as a method of exegesis is no doubt the

⁶³ The **Mahāvibhāṣā* gives a long list of meanings for the term *abhidharma*. See T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 1) T27, p4a-c.

⁶⁴ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* verse 1, p.2:10-11: *tad ayam paramārthadharmam vā nirvāṇam dharmalakṣaṇam vā pratyabhimukho dharma ityabhidharmaḥ*. Here, the interpretation of the prefix *abhi* is *pratyabhimukho* “facing toward,” hence, “regarding, concerning.” See also Norman 1983: 97.

⁶⁵ Dhs-a, p.2: *taṭṭha kenatthena ‘abhidhammo’? dhammāṭirekadhammavisesatthena. atirekavisesatthadīpako hettha ‘abhi’ saddo*. Buddhaghosa points out that here the prefix *abhi* is taken as the same as the prefix *ati* “superior.”

earliest one among these three senses. In the early stratum of Buddhist literature, which is roughly represented by the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas that are available to us today, the Buddha's teaching (*dharmadhamma*) is said to have nine parts or "limbs" (*aṅga*).⁶⁶ Some later sources expand the list to twelve *aṅgas*.⁶⁷ Among these *aṅgas*, three can be understood as styles or methods of exegesis: namely, *vyākaraṇa/veyyākaraṇa*, *vedalla/vaipulya*, and *upadeśa*. *Vyākaraṇa/veyyākaraṇa* means analysis and explanation.⁶⁸ The *aṅga vedalla* in the Theravāda tradition is understood as "question and answer," while the corresponding *vaipulya* in the Northern tradition means "explain extensively."⁶⁹ The *upadeśa* is a later addition to the list of *aṅgas*. It means "extensive exposition" or "commentary."⁷⁰ Obviously, the meanings of these three *aṅgas* overlap in that they are all forms of "explanation" or "exposition." In other words, these terms reflect various styles and methods of exegesis of the Buddha's teachings within early Buddhism, and they would correspond to Abhidharma in the sense of "regarding/referring to/concerning dharma." Some Japanese scholars propose that the origin of Abhidharma is related to the style of question and answer, "dialogues concerning doctrine" (*dharmakathā*),⁷¹ which can also be understood in terms of these three *aṅgas* as styles and methods of exegesis.

Abhidharma literature as the third "basket" (*piṭaka*) in the Buddhist canon is generally acknowledged to be a later addition to the other two *piṭakas* of *sūtra/sutta* and *vinaya*. In some early *sūtras*, the term *māṭṛkā/māṭikā* is used in reference to the three divisions of Buddhist teaching.⁷² *Māṭṛkā/māṭikās* are lists of doctrinal topics used by Buddhists in their memorization and recitation of the Buddha's teachings. In the Pāli

⁶⁶ V III 8, 9; M I 133; A II 7, 103, 178, 185; A III 86, 87, 88, 177, 361, 362; A IV 113. The list of nine *aṅgas* can also be found in the following Chinese sources: 大集法門經 (**Samgūṭisūtra*) T1 p227b; 佛說法集經 (**Dharmasamgūṭisūtra*) T17, p612a; 本事經 (**Itivṛttaka*) T17 p679b, 684a, 697c.

⁶⁷ No. 212 出曜經 (卷 6) T04, p643b; No. 1463 毘尼母經 (卷 3) T24, p818a; No. 1451 根本說一切有部毘奈耶雜事 (卷 38) T24, p398c; No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 12) T26, p981b; No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 126) T27, p659c; No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 44) T29, p594c; No. 1646 成實論 (卷 1) T32, p244c; No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 25) T30, p418b. See Lamotte 1988a: 143-7 for a discussion of the nine and twelve *aṅgas*.

⁶⁸ *Vyākaraṇa* can also mean "grammar" or "grammatical analysis." For a detailed study of the term, see Maeda Egaku 前田惠學 1964: 281ff. Also Yinshun 印順 1988a: 519-39.

⁶⁹ Maeda Egaku 前田惠學 1964: 389ff.

⁷⁰ Maeda Egaku 前田惠學 1964: 472ff.

⁷¹ Cox 1995:8, 17n29.

⁷² A II 147, 148, 169, 170: *dharmadharā vinayadharā māṭikādharā*. T No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 52) T01, p755a17: 比丘持經. 持律. 持母者。

tradition, these lists are believed to be predecessors of early Buddhist Abhidharma literature.⁷³ And indeed some early Abhidharma texts are organized on the basis of these lists, such as the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and the *Vibhaṅga* of the Theravāda tradition, and the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Saṅgītipariyāya* of the Sarvāstivāda tradition. However, with the further development of Abhidharma, texts no longer followed the structure of the *mātrkā/mātikā* lists. From the first century BCE onward, many Abhidharma treatises were associated with Buddhist schools, and today there are two sets of nearly complete canonical Abhidharma texts: the seven books of the Sarvāstivāda tradition and the seven books of the Theravāda tradition. In addition to these canonical texts, other Abhidharma texts are preserved that discuss teachings in the canonical texts, or to develop their own new doctrines.

With the development of the Abhidharma texts, teachers of different Buddhist groups developed their own interpretations and philosophical systems. The Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda canonical texts record the interpretations of their teachers, but, aside from certain texts that are preserved in Chinese translation, most original texts of other groups are lost. These later Abhidharma texts contain records of disputes among teachers of different schools, and the *TatSid* as one such text can provide information about the disputes among Abhidharma teachers.

The *TatSid* also reflects all three senses of the term Abhidharma:

(1) It contains quotations from numerous early sūtras, and both Harivarman and his opponents utilize different methods of exegesis to build their arguments that are based on these sūtra passages.

(2) Harivarman's biography indicates that he studied Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts. In the *TatSid*, a number of positions can be identified as representing different Abhidharma traditions. Moreover, in a number of places, Harivarman mentions the names of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts.⁷⁴

(3) The *TatSid* proposes a well-developed and coherent Abhidharma philosophical system that is different from those of the Sarvāstivādins, the Theravādins, and the

⁷³ Bronkhorst 1985. Gethin 1992. Frauwallner 1995:1-11.

⁷⁴ See Ui 1933: 6. In chapter 135, Harivarman mentions the *Abhidharma-kāya* (阿毗曇身), which is an epithet for the *Jñānaprasthāna*; chapters 104, 110, 134 mention the “six feet” (六足) of Abhidharma, which are the six canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

Yogācārins.

Therefore, there is little doubt that the TatSid can be considered an Abhidharma text. In order to clarify the often complex arguments in the TatSid that are relevant to the present study, it will be helpful to note the different styles of Abhidharma exegesis that it employs. Some chapters in the TatSid bear the characteristics of early Abhidharma methods. For example, chapter 18 **Dharmasaṃgraha* (法聚品) preserves a *māṭṛkā*, or list of topics, that is very similar to those preserved in early Abhidharma texts such as the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the *Dhātukāya*.⁷⁵ Such *māṭṛkās* or lists of topics are not only a way of organizing Buddhist teachings, which help Buddhists in their memorization and recitation of texts, but also a way of generating new doctrines and systems through the analysis and combination of categories within the *māṭṛkā* lists. With regard to the dispute on “mental factors” (*caitasika*) and “association” (*samprayoga*), it is very likely that these two terms, especially the latter one (*samprayukta* in the *māṭṛkā*), may have gained its meaning as “association” in the Abhidharma philosophical sense through the development of the *māṭṛkā* list.⁷⁶ Also scattered throughout the TatSid are exegeses in the style of questions and answers. For example, the chapter 78 on the aggregate of feeling (*vedanāskandha*) starts with a question, “What is feeling?” (問曰云何為受), and immediately following the question is the definition of *vedanā*: “pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant.” (答曰苦樂不苦不樂).⁷⁷ This is exactly the same method of exposition that occurs in the early Abhidharma texts such as the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*.

However, most of the chapters in the TatSid are polemical, which means that they record arguments of different parties on specific doctrinal issues. These arguments also follow the Abhidharma tradition of debate, and can be classified into two types:

- (1) Scriptural (*āgama*) arguments, which are arguments based on passages from authoritative discourses (*sūtra*) attributed to the Buddha and his major disciples.
- (2) Philosophical reasoning (*yukti*), which are arguments not based on scriptural

⁷⁵ For more detailed discussions of *māṭṛkās*, see Frauwallner 1995; Gethin 1992.

⁷⁶ See the detailed discussion of the development of the notion of “mental factor” (*caitasika*) in 2.1, and the development of “association” (*samprayoga*) in 3.1.

⁷⁷ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p281c17: 問曰云何為受。答曰。苦樂不苦不樂。

authority but on logical reasoning grounded in common sense or in basic presuppositions accepted by all the parties in the debate.

Both of these two types of arguments can be found in the TatSid. For example, in 61.10, the opponent quotes a sūtra passage that contains the term *caitasika* and argues that the doctrine of “mental factors” was taught by the Buddha himself. Similarly, in 66.4 a sūtra passage containing the term “associated” (*samprayukta*) supports the argument that the Buddha taught the doctrine of association. These two are direct scriptural (*āgama*) arguments. The TatSid also contains arguments not based on sūtra teachings but on common sense and logical reasoning. For example, in 65.11, when arguing that there are no other mental phenomena that exist simultaneously with consciousness, Harivarman uses the common-sense example of one person seeing another person: at the moment that the eye sees, there is no discrimination of whether the other person is an enemy or a friend. In other words, in our daily experience, in the first moment that the eye sees another person, the mind does not yet discriminate whether this person is an enemy or a friend. Such discriminations occur in the following moments. In 61.12, the opponent argues that consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*) is different from mental factors such as feeling (*vedanā*), because they have different functions just as water and fire are different because of their different functions. In 63.13 Harivarman responds that the different functions of these mental phenomena simply reflect consciousness in its different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*); by nature, they are all consciousness (*citta*). These two are arguments by reasoning (*yukti*).

However, in the TatSid, these two methods of argument are usually mixed together. Because the doctrines of “mental factors” (*caitasika*) and “association” (*samprayoga*) are developed within the Abhidharma traditions and not directly taught in early sūtras, the majority of the arguments in chapters 60-67 involve a sūtra passage that mentions certain mental phenomena, with both sides of the dispute interpreting the sūtra passage in a way that favors their own positions. A good example is the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three (namely, the eye, the form, and eye-consciousness) is contact (*sparśa*)...

In 60.13, Harivarman quotes this passage and argues that, in this description of the cognitive process, the Buddha does not mention any “mental factor.” And if mental factors existed apart from consciousness, as the opponent suggests, at the moment of contact there should more than simply the three things of eye, form, and consciousness. But the Buddha only mentions three things in this passage; therefore, mental factors do not exist. By contrast, the opponent argues in 62.3 that the Buddha mentions consciousness alone because it is the most prominent or superior dharma among all mental phenomena. Furthermore, in 62.4 he adds that because people in the world are more familiar with consciousness than mental factors, in such cases the Buddha mentions consciousness alone, but this does not mean that mental factors do not exist.

Moreover, sometimes one side of the dispute examines the opponent’s position and argues that such a position would lead to a conclusion that contradicts a well-accepted Buddhist teaching. For example, in 66.3, the supporter of *caitasika* and *samprayoga* points out that, since in Harivarman’s opinion there are no *caitasikas* that exist together with *citta*, at one moment only material forms (*rūpa*) can coexist with *citta*. As a result, there should be two and not five aggregates (*skandha*), and this obviously contradicts Buddha’s teaching. Harivarman answers in 67.2 that the Buddha’s teaching of five *skandhas* does not necessarily mean that these five must occur all together: just as when people say that a person has feelings, this does not mean that the person has three kinds of feelings, namely, pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral, all at once.

The many arguments in the TatSid, back and forth from different sides, can be extremely complicated, but they are all based on the basic Abhidharma styles of argument that use scriptural (*āgama*) and logical reasoning (*yukti*).⁷⁸

1.6 Methodology

The research in the present project is conducted from three perspectives:

- (1) Textual criticism and philological analysis
- (2) Doctrinal and philosophical interpretation

⁷⁸ For a more detailed discussion of Abhidharma exegesis methods, see Cox 1995: 10-16.

(3) Historical analysis

These three aspects are based on the model that a text is a vehicle that carries meanings, and meanings imply intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth, that are superimposed on the words and sentences of the text. For a text such as the TatSid that has a long history, the intentional states that are carried in the text are complex: the text available to us is not a product of one person at one time but instead has been reworked by many people through different historical periods, in different geographical areas, and in different cultures. The method of textual criticism attempts to trace the changes of the texts in history, and analyze the possible factors that may have influenced these changes. The philological method attempts to read the text and understand it with regard to relevant historical and cultural contexts. Moreover, since the TatSid is an Abhidharma text that records disputes on many philosophical issues, it needs to be read from a philosophical perspective with regard to the interpretation of the doctrines discussed in the text. Finally, both the text itself and the doctrines it presents are historical, which means that they are determined by their historical context and change in different historical periods. Accordingly, research on both the text and the doctrines contained within it should consider their historical dimension. In brief, in the present study of the TatSid's section on mind, the "philological" method refers to the close reading of the text and comparisons with all other extant texts that are relevant to a specific topic. The "philosophical" method takes the doctrines presented in the texts as ancient philosophers' attempts to understand a specific issue, in this case, the structure of mind, and analyzes the presuppositions and logic of the positions and arguments within the texts. And lastly, the "historical" method is the attempt to determine changes in both the texts and the doctrinal positions over a period of time by comparing accounts in texts of different historical periods. All these aspects of the study are inter-related and cannot be easily separated.

An example may better demonstrate the methods used in the present study. In 60.13, Harivarman cites the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three (namely, the eye, the form, and eye-consciousness) is contact (*sparśa*); depending on *sparśa* there is feeling (*vedanā*), apperception

(*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), and so forth.

The Chinese translation of the passage contains no textual problems. Kumārajīva's translation is clear and easy to understand, and there are no variants in the extant Chinese versions of the TatSid. However, there is a textual problem in the quoted sūtra passage. In the TatSid chapter 85, Harivarman points out that there are two versions of the description of the same cognitive process: one is the version cited above, the other version is as follows:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three gives rise to contact (*sparśa*); depending on *sparśa* there is feeling (*vedanā*)...

An examination of the extant Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas reveals that the Chinese *Samyuktāgama* contains both versions of the passage, while the Pāli Nikāyas contain only the first version. Moreover, the second version is also attested by a quotation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Through these textual facts, we may conclude that: (1) The Pāli Nikāyas may have been edited or redacted in a way that the textual inconsistencies were removed; (2) Harivarman likely shares the same lineage of sūtra texts with the Chinese SĀ and the AKBh, which are all related to the Sarvāstivādins. These tentative conclusions can be drawn from textual investigation.

Furthermore, this textual issue is closely related to a doctrinal issue. The Sarvāstivādins subscribe to the theory of “mental factors” (*caitasika*), and in their system contact (*sparśa*) is a kind of *caitasika* that has its own nature, which is distinct from consciousness (*citta* or *viññāna*). The first description of the cognitive process states that “the coming together of eye, form, and consciousness is contact,” which apparently contradicts the theory that contact (*sparśa*) is a real entity different from *citta*. In the second version of the sūtra passage, *sparśa* would more easily be understood as an entity separate from *citta*. This suggests that a doctrinal position may have influenced the adoption of a certain version of a text. It is also possible that the second version of the passage was a later interpolation informed by a sectarian intention.

Moreover, the sūtra materials are supposedly earlier than Abhidharma texts, and the

Abhidharma philosophical theories are assumed to have developed gradually through centuries. The textual discrepancy regarding this sūtra passages reveals that sūtra texts are not as stable as most Buddhist followers believe. It also shows how the changes in texts are closely related with developments of philosophical doctrines. Later chapters will include numerous examples that demonstrate how a slight difference in versions of a text influences a Buddhist teacher's doctrinal position and the philosophical arguments, and also examples of doctrinal positions that influence the adoption of certain forms of a text. In contrast to many other early texts whose textual and historical inconsistencies were filtered out and "corrected" by later authors or redactors, the relatively early date of the Chinese translation of Harivarman's TatSid makes it a rare textual treasure that may help us understand better the history of Buddhist texts and doctrines.

In summary, this study of the **Tattvasiddhi* will begin by examining the text itself and comparing available documents to trace possible changes within the text. Next, the text will be translated from Chinese into English, and the tools of textual criticism and philology will be used in the reading and understanding of the text. The doctrinal points and arguments recorded in the text as well as the logic and philosophical presuppositions underlying the arguments will be clarified. Moreover, by comparing the text with other relevant texts from different historical periods and affiliated with different traditions, the text as well as the doctrinal points and arguments that it presents will be placed in historical context, and if possible, attempts will be made to trace their origins and development.

This study of the section on mind in the TatSid consists of two main parts. Part I contains the main body of this study, which has three chapters (2-4). Chapter 2 investigates the notion of "mental factors" (*caitasika*) in Abhidharma texts. It first traces the possible origin of this notion in early sūtras and Abhidharma materials and introduces different opinions on this issue in different Abhidharma schools. Next, it discusses and comments on the arguments regarding mental factors in chapters 60-64 in the TatSid. Chapter 3 discusses the issue of "association" (*samprayoga*). Following the same method as in the previous chapter, it first traces the origins of this notion in the sūtras and early

Abhidharma texts, and introduces different opinions on association among different Abhidharma schools and teachers. Then the chapter discusses and comments in detail on the arguments about association in chapters 65-67 in the TatSid. Finally, chapter 4 presents some concluding remarks regarding the dispute of the doctrines of “mental factors” and “association.” The last part, chapter 5 of the study, is an annotated English translation of Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of TatSid chapters 60-67 with detailed footnotes dealing with textual and some doctrinal issues in the text.

Chapter 2. The Dispute on Mental Factors (*caitasika*)

2.1 Introduction

Chapters 60-64 of the **Tattvasiddhi* (TatSid) deal with the issue of mental factors (*caitta/cetasika* P. *cetasika*). Mental factors, or mental concomitants, are proposed by some early Abhidharma teachers as a class of mental phenomena that are different by nature from consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*). *Caitasika* is a fundamental category in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Theravāda Abhidhamma to account for the rich content and properties of mental states; it is also an important part of the Yogācāra theory of mind, which in large part is derived from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. On the other hand, there are teachers of the so-called Dārṣāntikas and the later Sautrāntikas who argue against the notion of mental factors as entities different from consciousness. The dispute between these two parties regarding the issue of mental factors was no doubt very influential, and it was well documented in Abhidharma texts such as the **Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (MVŚ). Harivarman dedicated five chapters (60-64) in the TatSid to it, and three more chapters (65-67) to the closely related topic of association (*samprayoga*),¹ which even can be considered an integral part of the same dispute. This chapter will briefly introduce the formation of the notion of mental factors in early Buddhism, and the full-fledged theory of mental factors in the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra Abhidharma systems, as well as the doctrines of the Dārṣāntikas and the Sautrāntikas who oppose the notion of mental factors as phenomena different from consciousness. This introduction will provide the necessary background for an understanding of Harivarman and his opponent's arguments recorded in these chapters of the TatSid.

2.1.1 The Term “*caitasika*” in Early Sūtras

There are two terms in Pāli and Sanskrit Abhidharma texts that denote the notion “mental factor.” The Sanskrit term *caitta*, which is a derivative from the word *citta*, does not

¹ Chapter 3 of the present study is dedicated to the notion of “association” and TatSid chs. 65-7.

occur in Pāli suttas, commentaries, or Abhidhamma texts. In Pāli, the word used as “mental factor” is exclusively *cetasika* (corresponding to Skt. *caitasika*), which is a derivative of the word *cetas* (P. *ceto*), a term used as a synonym for *citta* in the suttas.² From the Chinese translations, it is not clear exactly which term was used in their Indic originals, and in the Sarvāstivāda Sanskrit texts *caitta* and *caitasika* are used interchangeably. Because in the Pāli suttas only the term *cetasika* is used, for convenience in my translation I will use mainly the term *caitasika*, the Sanskrit form equivalent to the standard Pāli term *cetasika*. But I will also use *caitta* occasionally when it is necessary in the discussion, and the form *cetasika* with references from Pāli texts.

In early sūtras the word *caitasika* is used as an adjective referring to “mental phenomena” in contrast to physical phenomena.³ For example, in the following sutta passage, the Buddha says:

Monks, there are two kinds of pleasure. What two kinds? Bodily (*kāyika*) pleasure and mental (*cetasika*) pleasure.⁴

And also:

Monks, there are two kinds of illness. What two kinds? Bodily illness and mental illness.⁵

There are also cases where *cetasika* is used as a neuter noun:

And what is the miracle of telepathy? Here, a monk reads the minds (*citta*) of other beings, of other people, reads their mental states (*cetasika*), their thoughts (*vitakkita*) and ponderings (*vicārita*).⁶

Here, the word *cetasika* is a noun in the singular and most likely refers to a “mental state.”

² See Johansson 1965: 179-82. Johansson (182) notices that *cetas* is used mostly as a synonym for *citta* but emphasizes its “instrumental, cognitive, meditative, and supernatural functions.”

³ In the following discussion of the term *caitasika* in early sūtra texts, I mainly follow Mizuno Kōgen’s observations (Mizuno 1964: 215-220).

⁴ A I 81: *dvemāni, bhikkhave, sukhāni. katamāni dve? kāyikañca sukhaṃ cetasikañca sukhaṃ.*

⁵ A II 142-3: *dveme, bhikkhave, rogā. katame dve? kāyiko ca rogo cetasiko ca rogo.*

⁶ D I 213: *katamañ ca kevaddha ādesanā-pāṭihāriyaṃ? idha kevaddha bhikkhu parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisati cetasikam pi ādisati vitakkitam pi ādisati vicāritam pi ādisati.* Walshe’s translation (1995: 176).

It still does not have the meaning of a mental phenomenon separate from consciousness (*citta*).⁷

However, there are a few cases in the Chinese Āgamas in which the term *caitasika* or *caitta* is likely used in the sense of a “mental factor.” For example, as Mizuno Kōgen has observed, in this passage in the Chinese MĀ, *caitasika* in the phrase 心心所有法 (**citta-caitta-dharma* or **citta-caitasika-dharma*) likely means “mental factors”:

If [a person] at the moment of death gives rise to wholesome *citta* [and] *caitasikas* that are associated with right view, because of this and conditioned by this, on the dissolution of the body [his] life ceases, [and] he is born in a heaven of good destination.⁸

But in the corresponding Pāli sutta, the term *cetasika* does not occur.⁹ Similarly, in another sūtra in the Chinese SĀ, the term 心法 (*caitta* or *caitasika*) is also obviously used with the sense of a “mental factor,” but this sūtra is absent in the Pāli Nikāyas:

Depending on the two conditions, eye and form, there arise *citta* and **caitta*; *viññāna*, *sparsā*, as well as *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, and so forth, arise together [with them]. [They] all have causes, [and they are] not I, nor mine ...¹⁰

Moreover, aside from the fact that neither of these aforementioned Chinese passages using *caitasika* as “mental factor” has a parallel in Pāli, there is no extant Abhidharma text, including our **Tattvasiddhi*, that quotes these two passages as an Āgama proof for the existence of *caitasikas*. Therefore, as Mizuno has suggested, perhaps we can conclude that these two passages are very likely post-Āgama developments.

⁷ PTSD s.v. *cetasika* suggests that here *citta-cetasika* means “mind and all that belong to it, mind and mental properties.”

⁸ MĀ no. 171, 分別大業經. T No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 44) T01, p708b20-22: 或復死時生善心。心所有法正見相應。彼因此緣此。身壞命終。生善處天中。 It should be noted that in this passage it is said that the wholesome *citta-caitasikas* are “associated” (相應 **samprayukta*) with right-view (*samyag-drṣṭi*), which indicates that the composer(s) or redactor(s) of this sūtra already have the notion of “association” (*samprayoga*) together with the idea of *caitasika* as “mental factor.” “Association” is another topic of controversy discussed in chapters 65-67 of the **Tattvasiddhi*, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (ch. 5).

⁹ M no. 136, *Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta* (III 214): ... *marañakāle vāssa hoti sammādiṭṭhi samattā samādinñā, tena so kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ marañā sugatim saggam lokam upapajjati.*

¹⁰ SĀ no. 307. T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 13) T2, p88b1-3: 眼色二種緣 生於心心法 識觸及俱生 受想等有因 非我非我所 ...

On the other hand, in the Pāli suttas,¹¹ the term *cetasika* is never used in the sense of a “mental factor.” Mizuno (1964: 216-7) notices that in the *Katthāvatthu*, a verse is quoted as an Āgama proof for the position that *cetasikas* are separate dhammas,¹² in which the term *cetasika* is in plural form and obviously means “mental factors.” But this verse is absent in all extant Pāli Nikāyas. Hence, the usage of the term *cetasika* in Pāli sutta materials confirms our observation in the case of the Chinese Āgama references that *caitasika* does not mean “mental factor” in the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts.

However, a passage in the *Kāmabhū* sūtra in the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* and the Chinese SĀ, both of which contain the term *caitasika*, is quoted in several Abhidharma texts, including the **Tattvasiddhi*,¹³ as a canonical proof that the term is used as a “mental factor” in the sūtra in reference to mental phenomena such as *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* (or *vedanā* in the Pāli version). In the sūtra, the elder Citra (Pāli *Citta*) asks the bhikṣu Kāmabhū about “formation” (行, Skt. *saṃskāra*, P. *saṅkhāra*). Kāmabhū answers that there are three kinds of formations: bodily, vocal, and mental. The passage in question in the Chinese translation of the SĀ reads as follows:

[*Kāmabhū*] answers, “*Samjñā* and *cetanā* are mental-factor dharmas (心數法 **caitasika-dharma*). [They] depend on *citta*, belong to *citta*, and function based on *citta*. Therefore, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* are mental formations (*citta-saṃskāra*).”¹⁴

In the Pāli parallel, the two mental formations mentioned are *saññā* and *vedanā* instead of *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*.¹⁵ Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* also quotes the passage with

¹¹ Pāli suttas here refers to the suttas in the four major Nikāyas and also to some early texts included in the Khudaka Nikāya such as the *Sutta-nipata* and the *Dhammapada*.

¹² Kv vii. 3 (p. 339): *natthi cetasiko dhammoti? āmantā. nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatā “cittañhidaṃ cetasikā ca dhammā, anattato saṃviditassa honti; hīnappañītaṃ tadubhaye viditvā, sammaddaso vedī palokadhamman”ti. attheva suttantoti? āmantā. tena hi atthi cetasiko dhammoti.*

¹³ See below **Tattvasiddhi* 61.4, 61.10.

¹⁴ SĀ no. 568, T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 21) T2, p150a29-b1: 想思是心數法。依於心屬於心想轉。是故想思名為意行。The meaning of 想轉 here is uncertain. In some other Chinese editions, it is 相轉 or 相縛 (See T2 p150n10,11). Perhaps it is a translation of *paṭibaddha* “bound to.”

¹⁵ S 41.6 (IV 293): *saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā. ete dhammā cittappaṭibaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro.*

the two *citta-saṃskāras saṃjñā* and *vedanā*,¹⁶ which is interestingly different from the SĀ. By comparing the Chinese passage with the corresponding Pāli version, we can see that the Chinese term for “mental factor” (心數法) is likely translating *caitasika* (P. *cetasika*), which means that the sense of the term here is based on an Ābhidharmika interpretation of the term as a “mental factor” per se. We can also see later in the **Tattvasiddhi* that such an interpretation of this passage is exactly what Harivarman’s opponent proposes (see TatSid 61.10). However, the Pāli version suggests that the term *cetasika* would be more properly understood as a simple adjective meaning “mental,” and this is precisely how Harivarman interprets it (TatSid 63.8).

Furthermore, as noticed by Mizuno (1964: 219), in an early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, the **Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, the author Dharmatrāta specifically notes that this teaching of *caitasikas* is from a “Sarvāstivāda sūtra” (薩他筏底契經).¹⁷ This indicates that the Abhidharma teachers noticed that sūtra collections affiliated with different Buddhist groups may differ in passages important for certain doctrinal points.

2.1.2 Lists of Mental Phenomena in the Sūtras and Early Abhidharma Texts

We have seen that the term *caitasika* in early sūtras should be understood as the adjective “mental,” and the notion of “mental factors” as mental phenomena different from consciousness was not explicitly raised in this period. However, in the early Āgamas and Nikāyas we find lists enumerating a wide range of mental phenomena that reflect the introspective character of early Buddhist doctrines and practice. The sophistication of these lists shows that Buddhist psychoanalysis reached such a depth and sophistication that surpasses even modern Western psychology to some extent. On the other hand, such an analysis of minute mental phenomena in the sūtras also poses a challenge to later Buddhist commentators and teachers: precisely what is the nature of these mental phenomena? Are they different from consciousness, or do they represent just different aspects or modes of it?

¹⁶ AKBh p.24.13-4: ‘*saṃjñā ca vedanā ca caitasika eṣa dharmāścittānvayāccittaniśrita*’ iti sūtre vacanāsarāgacittādi vacanācca.

¹⁷ T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a24-6: 薩他筏底契經中言。復有思惟。諸心所法依心而起繫屬於心。又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心起屬心。

In chapter 61 of the TatSid, Harivarman's opponent uses several such lists of mental phenomena as scriptural proofs for his arguments supporting the position that these phenomena are mental factors different from consciousness by nature. As one example, the five aggregates (*skandha*), one of the most prominent lists in early Buddhism, places physical and mental phenomena into five categories: form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*), and consciousness (*viññāna*).¹⁸ In these five categories, if we put aside (material) form (*rūpa*), and consciousness (*viññāna*), which is considered *citta* itself, what are the natures of the other three categories of mental phenomena, namely, feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional formations (*saṃskāra*)? Since they are listed as separate categories aside from *viññāna*, does this imply that they are phenomena different from consciousness? We will see in 61.5 Harivarman's opponent citing the five aggregates as scriptural proof to show that *saṃjñā* and *vedanā* should be taken as different from consciousness, while Harivarman argues in 63.4 that they are just different modes of consciousness and not different from it by nature.

The five aggregates are mentioned in another sūtra passage that is quoted in the TatSid in relation to a cognitive process:

Depending on the eye and form (*rūpa*), eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact (*sparśa*). With contact as condition there is feeling (*vedanā*)...¹⁹

Within the cognitive process of seeing an object by the eye, this passage introduces the mental phenomenon of contact (*sparśa*), which is defined as the meeting of the three, namely, the eye, forms as the object, and eye-consciousness. Once more the commentators face the question, what precisely is contact? Does it differ from consciousness, or is it just a special mode of consciousness?

Another example list of mental phenomena is the so-called *dhyāna-aṅgas*,²⁰ which

¹⁸ Hamilton 1996 is an in-depth study of the five *skandhas*.

¹⁹ M I 111: *cakkhuñcāvuso, paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññānaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā* ... Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation (Bodhi and Ñanamoli 1995: 203). This is a problematic passage. See the detailed discussion regarding 60.13, 61.6, 62.10, and 63.5.

²⁰ It should be noted that the term *dhyānaṅga/jhānaṅga* does not occur in the early sūtras. It was coined later in commentaries and Abhidharma texts.

are experienced in states of absorption (*dhyāna/jhāna*). The first *dhyāna* is accompanied by applied thought (*vitarka/vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), rapture (*prīti/pīti*), and pleasure (*sukha*). Sometimes the list also includes the one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā/cittekaggatā*).²¹ Here, one can raise the same question of whether these mental phenomena are different from *citta*, or just *citta* in its different modes.²²

Similarly there are abundant other mental phenomena listed in early sūtras. The following are some examples of the lists that are related to Buddhist doctrines such as dependent origination and Buddhist practice.

◇ The twelve-linked dependent origination formula:

Conditioned by ignorance (*avidyā*), there is volitional formations (*saṃskāra*); conditioned by volitional formations, there is consciousness (*viññāna*); conditioned by consciousness, there is name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*); conditioned by name-and-form, there is the six-fold base (*ṣaḍāyatana*); conditioned by the six-fold base there is contact (*sparśa*); conditioned by contact there is feeling (*vedanā*); conditioned by feeling there is craving (*trṣṇā*); conditioned by craving there is clinging (*upādāna*); conditioned by clinging there is being (*bhava*); conditioned by being there is birth (*jāti*); conditioned by birth there is aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) ...²³

In this list of twelve factors with the exception of consciousness itself (*viññāna*), the six-fold base (*ṣaḍāyatana*) as the faculties of mental experience, and the last three factors, being (*bhava*), birth (*jāti*), and aging-and-death (*jarāmaraṇa*), which are states of being, all the other factors are either mental phenomena themselves, such as ignorance (*avidyā*), volitional formation (*saṃskāra*), contact (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), craving (*trṣṇā*), clinging (*upādāna*), or categories that can be understood as including mental phenomena,

²¹ E.g. S IV 262: *viviceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicāram vivekajam pītisukham paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharāmi.*

²² In 66.6 Harivarman's opponent quotes the five *dhyāna-aṅgas* as a scriptural proof, and argues that they are *caitasikas* associated with *citta* in the first *dhyāna*.

²³ E.g. M I 263: *iti kho, bhikkhave, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññānaṃ, viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ, saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmarāṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.* There are a number of variations in the number of these factors in different sūtras. The twelve-linked formula is the one adopted by later commentaries as the standard formula. For an extensive study of dependent origination in early Buddhism, see Saigusa 2000.

namely, name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*).

◇ Early sūtras also list a large number of mental qualities that are described as essential in Buddhist religious practice. They are classified under a number of categories, for example:

- The four applications of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna/sati-paṭṭhāna*) regarding body, feeling, mind, and dharmas
- Five faculties (*indriya*) and powers (*bāla*): faith (*śraddhā*), strength (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), and insight (*prajñā*)
- Seven factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*): mindfulness (*smṛti*), discrimination of dharma (*dharma-vicaya*), strength (*vīrya*), rapture (*prīti*), tranquility (*praśrabdhi*), concentration (*samādhi*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*)
- The noble eight-fold path (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*): right view (*saṃyak-dṛṣṭi*), right intention (*saṃyak-saṃkalpa*), right speech (*samyag-vāk*), right action (*saṃyak-karmānta*), right livelihood (*samyag-ājīva*), right striving (*samyag-vyāyāma*), right mindfulness (*saṃyak-smṛti*), right concentration (*saṃyak-samādhi*)

These lists of positive mental qualities are later included in a meta-list called factors that contribute to awakening (*bodhipakṣya*).²⁴ We will see below that both Harivarman and his opponents quote these lists of mental phenomena or qualities that appear in the sūtras within their arguments for or against the doctrine of mental factors.²⁵

◇ There are also quite a few lists of negative mental phenomena or qualities that are proposed as the causes of suffering, or as obstacles on the path of practice, which one should strive to eliminate. The following are a few examples of such lists of negative mental qualities:

²⁴ Gethin 2001 presents an extensive and in-depth study of the thirty-seven *bodhipakṣyas*.

²⁵ See 60.3, also 65.26-27 as arguments for “association of mental factors and consciousness.”

- 10 Fetters (*saṃyojana*): (1) view of personal-existence (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi/sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); (2) doubt (*vicikitsā/vicikicchā*); (3) wrong grasp of behavior and observances (*sīlavrataparāmarśa/sīlabbataparāmāsa*); (4) sensual desire (*kāmacchanda*); (5) ill-will (*vyāpāda/byāpāda*); (6) lust for form (*rūparāga*); (7) lust for the formless (*arūparāga*); (8) conceit (*māna*); (9) restlessness (*auddhatya/uddhacca*); (10) ignorance (*avidyā/avijjā*)²⁶
- 5 obsessions (*paryavasthāna/paryuṭṭhāna*): (1) sensual lust (*kāma-rāga*); (2) ill-will (*vyāpāda/byāpāda*); (3) dullness and drowsiness (*styāna-middha/thīna-middha*); (4) restlessness and remorse (*auddhatya-kaukr̥tya/uddhacca-kukkucca*); (5) doubt (*vicikitsā/vicikicchā*)²⁷
- 7 underlying tendencies (*anusāya/anusaya*): (1) sensual lust (*kāma-rāga*); (2) aversion (*paṭighā*); (3) views (*dr̥ṣṭi/diṭṭhi*); (4) doubt (*vicikitsā/vicikicchā*); (5) conceit (*māna*); (6) lust for existence (*bhava-rāga*); (7) ignorance (*avidyā/avijjā*)²⁸

The lists quoted here are just some examples and not exhaustive. There are still more lists on each general topic scattered throughout early sūtra texts, which contain terms describing different mental phenomena, but these lists are sufficient to show the sophisticated analysis of mind in early Buddhism. In summary, all the mental phenomena listed in the sūtras can be roughly classified in the following categories:

1. Fundamental cognitive experience and mental functions, such as the contact (*sparśa*) gives rise to feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional formations (*saṃskāra*). The latter three also constitute three of the five *skandhas*.

²⁶ For example, A V 17. The English translation of terms follows Bodhi 2012: 1350. There are also lists of three and seven *saṃyojanas*. See PTSD s.v. *saṃyojana*.

²⁷ A V 323. SĀ no. 926, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 33) T02, p235c21-236a11. The English translation of terms follows Bodhi 2012: 1560. Note that the term used in this sūtra is a verb form *pariyuṭṭhita*. The noun form *pariyuṭṭhāna* is used in A V 156-7, but the list there has ten items, which are different from the five items quoted here. The latter sutta does not have a Chinese parallel.

²⁸ A IV 9. Chinese EĀ 40.3, T No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 34) T02, p738c23-25: 一者貪欲使。二者瞋恚使。三者憍慢使。四者癡使。五者疑使。六者見使。七者欲世間使。The Chinese list has a different order. The English translation follows Bodhi 2012: 1003. As noted in PTSD s.v. *anusaya*, this seven-item list is a collection of *anusayas* mentioned separately in passages scattered in earlier sūtras. In later Abhidharma texts, the items in the list are either combined or further divided to make lists of six or ten *anusayas*. TatSid adopts a list of ten *anusayas*, which likely follows the standard list in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

2. Positive mental qualities that one should cultivate and develop, and by developing these qualities one ultimately reaches nirvāṇa. These qualities include the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), five faculties (*indriya*) and powers (*bala*), seven factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*), the eight-fold path (*āryāṣṭāṅga-mārga*), and so forth.
3. Negative mental qualities that one should suppress and eliminate. These are fetters (*saṃyojana*), obsessions (*paryavasthāna/paryuṭṭhāna*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya/anusaya*) and so forth.

All of these various mental qualities and phenomena are scattered, unorganized, and unsystematized in the early sūtra texts. This is understandable given the literary form and purpose of the sūtras. In the early sūtras or discourses, each sūtra usually deals with one specific topic. In a typical scene, someone, for example, a monk or a lay person, encounters a certain problem and then goes to the Buddha and asks for help. The Buddha analyzes the situation, points out where the problem lies, and then offers a method of practice that will solve the problem. The teachings of different mental phenomenal are in accordance with the specific topic each sūtra treats. Because of the extensive variety of topics treated in different sūtras, it is understandable that the mind is analyzed from so many different perspectives in relation to so many mental phenomena.

In the later stage of the compilation of the sūtras, Buddhist teachers collected together these scattered lists, and already started to organize and systematize them. For example, the *Samyukta Āgama* and the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* are collections of sūtras dealing with a vast variety of topics, but short sūtras are collected and grouped in such a way that sūtras dealing with similar topics are put together, and the groups of sūtras are organized in accordance with a certain “list of lists,” or *māṭṛkā* (P. *mātikā*), which is a mnemonic list of topics.²⁹ The SĀ is organized according to a *māṭṛkā* with the following topics:³⁰

- (1) Aggregates (*skandha*); (2) bases (*āyatana*); (3) dependent origination

²⁹ For a study of *māṭṛkā/mātikā*, see Gethin 1992.

³⁰ This *māṭṛkā* of the *Samyukta-āgama* is recorded in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See Yinshun 印順 1983:10; 1988a: 632.

(*nidāna*); (4) nutriments (*āhāra*); (5) the four noble truths (*satya/sacca*); (6) elements (*dhātu*); (7) the Buddha and his disciples; (8) applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna/satipaṭṭhāna*) ...

When the sūtras are grouped and organized, the lists of mental phenomena are also collected and organized accordingly. Actually, as early as in the Pāli *Majjhima Nikāya*, we can already see an early attempt to organize mental phenomena. In the *Anupada Sutta*, the Buddha describes how Sariputta analyzes his own mental states when he enters the first *jhāna*:

And the states in the first *jhāna*—applied thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), rapture (*pīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and one-pointedness of mind (*cittakaggatā*); contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), volition (*saṅkhāra*), and mind (*citta*); zeal (*chanda*), decision (*adhimokkha*), energy (*vīriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), equanimity (*upekkhā*), and attention (*manasikāra*)—these states were defined by him one by one as they occurred.³¹

This list of sixteen mental states is actually a concatenation of several shorter lists from early sūtras: the first five are the *dhyāna-aṅgas*; from contact (*phassa*) to mind (*citta*) is a combination of the list of cognitive process plus the latter part of the five *skandhas*. The remaining six states are either from other lists such as the factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*), or are mentioned individually in the sūtras.

This way of gathering and organizing lists of mental phenomena continues in early Abhidharma texts. One prominent example of such an early attempt is in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. In the chapter on the “genesis of consciousness” (*cittuppādakaṇḍa*), a long list enumerates the many mental states that accompany each type of consciousness. The list is too long to be quoted here, but it is sufficient to point out that this long list is a concatenation of a number of short lists from the sūtras such as the *skandhas*, *dhyānāṅgas*, *indriyas*, *aṣṭāṅgamārga*, as well as a number of items that are not from the sūtras but developed in Abhidhamma texts.³² A similar list can also be found in the early

³¹ M no. 111 *Anupada Sutta* (III 25): *ye ca paṭhame jhāne dhammā vitakko ca vicāro ca pīti ca sukhañca cittakaggatā ca, phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ chando adhimokkho vīriyaṃ sati upekkhā manasikāro—tyāssa dhammā anupadavavattiṭṭhā honti*. Bodhi’s translation (1995: 899). This sutta does not have a Chinese parallel.

³² See Mizuno 1964: 258 for a discussion of the list in more detail.

Northern Abhidharma text the **Śāriputrābhidharma*.³³

2.1.3 *Caitta/cetasika in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Theravāda Abhidhamma*

In early Abhidharma texts, the term *caitasika* is still used as an adjective as in the early sūtras. For example, in the early Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma text the *Abhidharmavijñānakāya*, a number of mental phenomena, such as little desire (**alpecchā* 少欲), shame (**hrī* 羞慚), and underlying mental tendencies (*anuśaya* 隨眠), are qualified with the adjective **caitasika* (心所有).³⁴ Also, the gathering and organizing of names of mental phenomena scattered in the sūtras continues. However, although the individual mental phenomena and some shorter lists are mentioned throughout different parts of the sūtra texts, a long list gathering nearly all such phenomena is relatively novel, and Buddhist teachers and commentators had to find the proper position for the newly assembled list within the well-established lists from the sūtras such as the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, eighteen *dhātus*, twelve-factored dependent origination (*pratītyasamudpāda*), and so forth. Also it should be noted that in early Abhidharma the usage of the term “dharma” (P. dhamma) has had a semantic shift: the term can be understood as having various meanings in the sūtras as “teaching,” “good conduct,” “truth,” “nature or quality,” “law or order,” or “state or thing.” As Gethin proposes that among these meanings “nature or quality” is the basic one, and the list of mental phenomena given in the sūtras as “dharmas” should be understood as mental qualities (Gethin 2004: 521). But in Abhidharma the term “dharma” began to be used more in the sense of “constituent element,” which bears more ontological emphasis than in the sūtras.³⁵ Accordingly, the analysis of mind in terms of lists of mental phenomena

³³ No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p526c4-11: 云何法入。受想行陰。若色不可見無對。若無為。是名法入。云何法入。受想思觸思惟覺觀。見慧解脫無貪無恚無癡。順信悔不悔悅喜心進心除。信欲不放逸。念定心捨疑怖使。生老死命結。無想定得果滅盡定。身口非戒無教。有漏身口戒無教。有漏身進有漏身除。正語正業正命正身進正身除智緣盡非智緣盡決定法住緣。空處智識處智不用處智。非想非非想處智。是名法入。 See the discussion of the *caitasikas* in the **Śāriputrābhidharma* in Mizuno 1964: 273-284.

³⁴ No. 1539 阿毘達磨識身足論 T26, p535c27: 少欲是何法。是心所有法與心相應。p536a11-2: 羞慚是何法。是心所有法與心相應。p578b13-4: 欲界繫見苦所斷心所有隨眠。

³⁵ For a general survey of the shift of emphasis in the “dharma theory,” see Bronkhorst 2009:61-114. Also Cox 2004 discusses the ontological emphasis on dharmas in the Sarvāstivāda school.

consists part of the analysis of the world as consists of “dharma.”

In extant early Abhidharma texts from different traditions, we can see that this long list that nearly exhaustively collects mental phenomena is uniformly included in the *saṃskāra-skandha* among the five *skandhas*, the *dharma-āyatana* in the twelve *āyatanas*, and the *dharma-dhātu* in the eighteen *dhātus*. Such assignments are also attested in the TatSid 61.3. A good example is the early Northern Abhidharma text *Dharmaskandha*, in which the *dharma-āyatana* in the twelve *āyatanas* is defined as follows:

Thus all dharmas of the past, present, and future, are referred to as *dharma-āyatana*, and also referred to as “to be known” (**jñeya*), to be well achieved (**samudāgamya*). What are these [dharmas]? Namely, feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), contact (*sparśa*), attention (*manaskāra*), purpose (*chanda*), determination (*adhimokṣa*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), heedlessness (*pramāda*), heedfulness (*apramāda*), wholesome roots (*kuśala-mūla*), unwholesome roots (*akuśala-mūla*), undetermined roots (*avyākṛta-mūla*), all the fetters (*saṃyojana*), bindings (*bandhana*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*), obsessions (*paryavasthāna*), all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), all views (*drṣṭi*), all kinds of complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*), possession (*prāpti*), equipoise of non-conception (*asaṃjñāsamāpatti*), equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), state of non-conception (*āsaṃjñika*), vitality (*jīvita*), homogeneous character (*sabhāgatā*), possession of the substratum (**āśrayaprāpti* or **upadhiprāpti*), possession of the given entity (**vastuprāpti*), possession of the basis (**āyatanaprāpti*), birth (*jāti*), old age (*jarā*), continuance (*sthiti*), impermanence (*anityatā*), name set (*nāmakāya*), phrase set (*padakāya*), syllable set (*vyañjanakāya*), space (*ākāśa*), cessation resulting from consideration (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation not resulting from consideration (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), and the remaining [things] which are known by the faculty of mind (*mano-indriya*), cognized by mind-consciousness (*manovijñāna*), ...are referred to as dharmas, *dharma-dhātu*, and *dharma-āyatana*, ...³⁶

This list is supposed to include all possible dharmas that are capable of being objects

³⁶ No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p500c16-25: 如是過去未來現在諸所有法。名為法處。亦名所知。乃至所等證。此復云何。謂受想思觸作意欲勝解。信精進念定慧。尋伺放逸不放逸。善根不善根無記根。一切結縛隨眠隨煩惱纏。諸所有智見現觀。得無想定滅定無想定。命根眾同分。住得事得處得。生老住無常。名身句身文身。虛空擇滅非擇滅。及餘所有意根所知意識所了。所有名號。異語增語。想等想。施設言說。謂名法。名法界。名法處。名彼岸。

of *manovijñāna*, and all from the first item *vedanā* to the item *abhisamaya* are mental phenomena. Moreover, in the *skandha* chapter of the same treatise, the *saṃskāra-skandha* is defined as of two kinds: *saṃskāra* dharmas that are associated with *citta* (*cittasamprayukta*), and *saṃskāra* dharmas that are dissociated from *citta* (*cittaviprayukta*).³⁷ The *saṃskāra* dharmas that are associated with *citta* (*cittasamprayukta*) are defined as the following:

What is the *saṃskāra-skandha* that is associated with *citta*? Namely, volition (*cetanā*), contact (*sparsā*), attention (*manaskāra*), and so on up to all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), views (*drṣṭi*), complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*), and as well as other dharmas of the same kind which are associated with *citta*, are referred to as *cittasamprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha*.³⁸

This passage regarding *saṃskāra-skandha* appears to be based on the previously quoted passage concerning *dharmā-āyatana*, or the list of all dharmas that can be objects of *mano-vijñāna*, since it defines the *saṃskāra-skandha* by referring to a standard list of dharmas that starts from *cetanā* and ends at *abhisamaya* among the dharmas that are associated with *citta* within the *dharmā-āyatana* list.³⁹ It should be noted that the two items preceding *cetanā*, namely, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, are omitted from this definition of *saṃskāra-skandha* because they are each separate *skandhas* among the five *skandhas*. As a result, they would not be included in the *saṃskāra-skandha*. In this passage on

³⁷ No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p501b16-17: 云何行蘊。謂行蘊有二種。一心相應行蘊。二心不相應行蘊。

³⁸ No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p501b17-20: 云何心相應行蘊。謂思觸作意。廣說乃至。諸所有智見現觀。復有所餘如是類法。與心相應。是名心相應行蘊。

³⁹ Yinshun 印順 1981a: 131 suggests that this part of the *Dharmaskandha* which defines the *dharmā-āyatana* and the *saṃskāra-skandha* was revised in a later time because of the influence of the new *pañca-vastu* categories. However, in the early Vibhajyavādin Abhidharma text **Śāriputrābhidharma*, the definitions of the *dharmā-āyatana* and the *saṃskāra-skandha* are very similar to the *Dharmaskandha*: No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p526c4-11: 云何法入。受想行陰。若色不可見無對。若無為。是名法入。云何法入。受想思觸思惟覺觀。見慧解脫無貪無恚無癡。順信悔不悔悅喜心進心除。信欲不放逸。念定心捨疑怖使。生老死命結。無想定得果滅盡定。身口非戒無教。有漏身口戒無教。有漏身進有漏身除。正語正業正命正身進正身除智緣盡非智緣盡決定法住緣。空處智識處智不用處智。非想非非想處智。是名法入。p547b14-17: 云何行陰心相應。行陰若心數。思乃至煩惱使。是名行陰心相應。云何行陰非心相應。行陰若非心數。生乃至滅盡定。是名行陰非心相應。 Also in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the categories *citta-sampayutta* and *citta-viprayutta* are already present in the *mātikā*, and in the *Vibhaṅga* it is said that the *saṅkhāra-khandha* is *citta-sampayutta*, e.g. p41: *ekavidhena saṅkhārakkhandho cittasampayutto*. These early examples indicate that even though the sophisticated and long lists of dharmas in the *dharmā-āyatana* and *saṃskāra-skandha* may not have existed, in the proto-*Dharmaskandha* categories such as *citta-samprayukta* and *citta-viprayukta* may have been present.

saṃskāra-skandha, it is clear that the compatibility between the old Buddhist category of the five *skandhas* and the new category of *cittasaṃprayukta* is not so neat: the latter includes *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and part of the *saṃskāra-skandha*, namely, only *cittasaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha*. Some Japanese scholars suggest that the introduction of the *saṃprayukta* and *viprayukta* division into the *saṃskāra-skandha* could have been a major factor that influenced the establishment of the five-category (*pañca-vastu*) classification system.⁴⁰

In the early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatise the *Prakaranapāda* attributed to Vasumitra, all dharmas are classified according to five categories: form (*rūpa*), consciousness (*citta*), mental factors (*caitta/caitasika*), factors dissociated from *citta* (*citta-viprayukta*), and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). The *caitasikas* are defined as follows:

What are *caitasika-dharmas*? They are phenomena (*dharma*) associated with *citta*. What are they? Feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formation (*saṃskāra*), contact (*sparśa*), attention (*manaskāra*), purpose (*chandas*), determination (*adhimokṣa*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), heedlessness (*pramāda*), heedfulness (*apramāda*), wholesome roots (*kuśala-mūla*), unwholesome roots (*akuśala-mūla*), undetermined roots (*avyākṛta-mūla*), all the fetters (*saṃyojana*), bindings (*bandhana*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*), all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), all views (*dṛṣṭi*), all kinds of complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*), and other dharmas of similar type which are associated with *citta* are in general named *caitasika* dharmas.⁴¹

This list of mental phenomena in this passage is no doubt a compilation from shorter lists scattered in the sūtras, and it also closely resembles similar lists in early Abhidharma texts such as the *Dharmaskandha*, the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. However, in this passage this list is named with a new category: *caitta* or *caitasika*, which is no longer an adjective, as it was used in the sūtras, but a noun

⁴⁰ Sakurabe 1969-71; also Fukuda 1997b. See also Cox 2004: 553.

⁴¹ T26, p692b29-c5: 心所法云何。謂若法心相應。此復云何。謂受想思觸作意欲勝解念定慧信勤尋伺放逸不放逸善根不善根無記根。一切結縛隨眠。隨煩惱纏。諸所有智。諸所有見。諸所有現觀。復有所餘如是類法與心相應。總名心所法。

meaning “mental factors,” or phenomena “associated” (*saṃprayukta* P. *samppayutta*) with *citta*. Here, we can see early Abhidharma exegesis at work: items scattered in different sūtras are collected and reorganized, and in this process a new theoretical framework is also gradually established. Finally, the reorganized list is subsumed under the new category of *caitta* or *caitasika* that did not exist in the earlier sūtra texts.

We can also observe a similar development of the notion of *cetasika* in the Pāli texts, though in the Theravāda tradition, it appears much later than in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. As mentioned previously, in the early Pāli Abhidhamma text, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, there is a long list of mental phenomena similar to lists in early Northern Abhidharma texts such as the *Dharmaskandha* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the categories *cittasampayutta* and *cittavippayutta* also appear in its *mātikā*. In the *Vibhaṅga*, the *saṅkhāra-khandha* is said to be exclusively *citta-sampayutta*, associated with *citta*.⁴² However, the term *cetasika* did not become a separate category as “mental factor” even in the 5th century CE *Visuddhimagga*.⁴³ Only in the *Abhidhammāvatāra*, an Abhidhamma manual of Buddhadatta, who is slightly later than Buddhaghosa, does the term *cetasika* become a separate category as “mental factors”⁴⁴ in the four-fold division of all dhammas as *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa*, and *nibbāna*.⁴⁵ This four-fold division was adopted by the 12th century Abhidhamma manual *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* by Anuruddha, which is perhaps the most widely studied Abhidhamma introductory manual today.⁴⁶

Moreover, in early Abhidharma texts, the *caitasikas* are not only gathered together and assigned to a new category as “mental factors” separate from *citta*, but they also

⁴² Vibh 40: *katamo saṅkhārakkhandho? ekavidhena saṅkhārakkhandho cittasampayutto*.

⁴³ The discussion of mental factors in the *Visuddhimagga* (XIV.133-184) appears under the section of *saṅkhāra-khandha*, and it follows closely the DhS with regard to the classification of eighty-nine *cittas* and those dhammas that are associated with each *citta*. The term *cetasika* is not used here as a noun meaning a “mental factor.”

⁴⁴ Abhidh-av 16: *thatha cittasampayuttā citte bhavā vā cetasikā*.

⁴⁵ Abhidh-av 1: *cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānaṃ ti niruttaro, catudhā desayī dhamme catusaccappakāsano*. Pāli texts available to us now do not provide sufficient evidence on the development of doctrines in the commentarial and Abhidhamma tradition. It is possible that Buddhadatta’s usage of the term *cetasika* might be influenced by northern Abhidharma thought, but we do not have any evidence to prove that.

⁴⁶ The *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* has at least two English translations (Nārada 1979; Bodhi 1999), and its commentary is also translated in to English (Gethin 2002).

begin to be classified and systemized according to different themes. We have seen above that in the sūtras mental phenomena are grouped in accordance with their applicability to specific circumstances. For example, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna* are mentioned together as the four non-material *skandhas*; *sparśa* is said to give rise to *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*; the five *dhyāna-aṅgas* always occur together in the descriptions of the *dhyānas*; the positive mental factors such as the five *balas* and *indriyas*, the seven *bodhyaṅgas*, the *aṣṭāṅgamarga*, and so forth, and the negative mental phenomena such as the *saṃyojanas*, *paryavasthānas*, *anuśayas*, and so forth, are for the most part mentioned in groups in the sūtras.⁴⁷ In early Abhidharma texts, these mental phenomena are gathered together and to a certain extent retain their grouping in new and longer lists. For example, in the early Pāli Abhidhamma text, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, when mental phenomena are listed as associated with a certain *citta*, it appears that the text simply includes lists from the sūtras with only minor adjustments and then mechanically places them together. As a consequence, there are numerous overlapping categories and repetitions in the new list.⁴⁸ With the development of Abhidharma, Buddhist teachers appear to have noticed this problem, and began to remove the repetitions from the list.⁴⁹ For example, the previously quoted list of mental phenomena in the *dharmā-āyatana* list in the *Dharmaskandha* is obviously neater in this respect as compared to the list in the Dhs.⁵⁰ Further, in the aforementioned lists in the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Prakaraṇapāda*, the lists are free of repetition.

Nevertheless, in the new, cleaned-up single list of mental phenomena, still some grouping features remain. For example, the items in the list in the first chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda*⁵¹ can be roughly divided into the following groups:

General cognitive functions: Feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formation (*saṃskāra*), contact (*sparśa*), attention (*manaskāra*)

⁴⁷ See the discussion of examples of these group lists in 2.1.2.

⁴⁸ See a discussion of this feature in the Dhs list of *cetasikas* in Mizuno 1964: 258-9.

⁴⁹ In the *Visuddhimagga*, when discussing the *citta-sampayutta-saṅkhāra* dhammas, Buddhaghosa eliminates the repetition in the Dhs list even though he follows its structure. As a result, he gives only a condensed list of mental factors. See e.g. Vism XIV.133.

⁵⁰ However, a few synonyms (from the later Abhidharma perspective) do appear in the list such as *dr̥ṣṭi* and *prajñā*. See Mizuno 1964: 274-5.

⁵¹ See the translation of the list on page 61.

Morally undetermined: purpose (*chandasa*), determination (*adhimokṣa*)

Positive factors: mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), heedfulness (*apramāda*), wholesome roots (*kuśala-mūla*), all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), all views (*drṣṭi*), all kinds of complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*)

Negative factors: heedlessness (*pramāda*), unwholesome roots (*akuśala-mūla*), all the fetters (*saṃyojana*), bindings (*bandhana*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*)

The implicit grouping feature of the mental phenomena in the list inevitably leads to later explicit classifications of the *caitasikas*. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the first group of *caitasikas* that is singled out as a distinct class is the universals (*mahābhūmika*). In the *Jñānaprasthāna*, when the *saṃprayukta-hetu* is defined, it states that this type of cause applies specifically to these ten dharmas: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā*, *sparsā*, *manaskāra*, *chanda*, *adhimokṣa*, *smṛti*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*.⁵² These ten dharmas are exactly the ten *mahābhūmikas* in later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, though the term *mahābhūmika* is not yet used in the *Jñānaprasthāna*.⁵³ In the relatively later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, such as the part of *Dhātukāyapāda* and chapter 4 of the *Prakaraṇapāda* containing lists of *caitasikas*, these classes of mental factors are mentioned:⁵⁴

- 10 *mahābhūmikas* 十大地法
- 10 *kleśamahābhūmika* 十大煩惱地法

⁵² No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p920c6-10: 云何相應因。答受與受相應法。為相應因。受相應法與受。為相應因。想思觸作意欲勝解念三摩地。慧與慧相應法。為相應因。慧相應法與慧。為相應因。是謂相應因。

⁵³ The MVŚ tries to explain why the JP mentions only the ten *mahābhūmikas* in the definition of *saṃprayukta-hetu*: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b3-8: 問何故但說十大地法為相應因。非餘法耶。答是作論者意欲爾故乃至廣說。有說應說而不說者當知此義有餘。有說若法一切界一切地一切趣一切生一切種一切心可得者。此中說之。餘法不爾故此不說。

⁵⁴ *Dhātukāyapāda*, T No. 1539 阿毘達磨識身足論 (卷 16) T26, p614b12-14: 有十大地法。十大煩惱地法。十小煩惱地法。五煩惱。五見。五觸。五根。五法。六識身。六觸身。六受身。六想身。六思身。六愛身。Chapter 7 of the *Prakaraṇapāda* has the same content. However, Xuanzang's translation of the Prak_x includes the class of ten *kuśalamahābhūmika* (十大善地法) after the first ten *mahābhūmikas*, but this class is absent in Guṇabhadra's translation Prak_g (No. 1541 眾事分阿毘曇論 (卷 2) T26, p634a). Yinshun (1981a: 147-61; 162-5) proposes that chapter 4 of the Prak was not a work by Vasumitra but was made by Sarvāstivāda teachers later than him, and he suggests that *kuśalamahābhūmika* in Xuanzang's translation was a later interpolation following the MVŚ.

- 10 *parīttakleśamahābhūmika* 十小煩惱地法
- 5 *kleśas* 五煩惱
- 5 *dr̥ṣṭis* 五見
- 5 *sparśas* 五觸
- 5 *indriyas* 五根
- 5 *dharmas* 五法

In the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, mental factors are classified differently. They are divided into seven classes:⁵⁵

- 10 *mahābhūmikas* 大地法
- 10 *kleśamahābhūmika* 大煩惱地法
- 10 *parīttakleśamahābhūmika* 小煩惱地法
- 10 *kuśalamahābhūmikas* 大善地法
- 5 *akuśalamahābhūmikas* 大不善地法
- 3 *nivṛtāvyaḥkṛtamahābhūmikas* 大有覆無記地法
- 10 *anivṛtāvyaḥkṛtamahābhūmikas* 大無覆無記地法

About one century after the completion of the Sarvāstivāda **Mahāvibhāṣā*, Dharmasreṣṭhin wrote a concise Abhidharma manual called **Abhidharmahr̥daya*.⁵⁶ According to Yinshun, Dharmasreṣṭhin is perhaps a Sarvāstivāda teacher with some Dārṣāntika proclivities.⁵⁷ Therefore, it is understandable that in the **Abhidharmahr̥daya*

⁵⁵ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p220a-b: 復次此中因說心所。應說大地等法。謂大地法有十種。一受。二想。三思。四觸。五欲。六作意。七勝解。八念。九三摩地。十慧。大煩惱地法亦有十種。一不信。二懈怠。三放逸。四掉舉。五無明。六忘念。七不正知。八心亂。九非理作意。十邪勝解。... 小煩惱地法有十種。一忿。二恨。三覆。四惱。五諂。六誑。七矯。八慳。九嫉。十害。大善地法有十種。一信。二精進。三慚。四愧。五無貪。六無瞋。七輕安。八捨。九不放逸。十不害。大不善地法有五種。一無明。二昏沈。三掉舉。四無慚。五無愧。大有覆無記地法有三種。一無明。二昏沈。三掉舉。大無覆無記地法有十種。即前大地受等十法。

⁵⁶ The dating is based on Yinshun's (1981a:488-9) study. Some Japanese scholars such as Yamada Ryūjō 山田龍城 propose that the **Hṛdaya* is earlier than the *Vibhāṣā*, but Yinshun (1981a: 470-5) argues that their dating is due to misinterpretation of certain Chinese historical records.

⁵⁷ Yinshun 印順 1981a: 487-91. Yinshun also argues that the **Abhidharmahr̥daya* is based on the

the classification of the *caitasikas* does not follow the **Mahāvibhāṣā*. About one century later, Dharmatrāta wrote a new commentary to the **Abhidharmahṛdaya*, named **Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya* 雜阿毘曇心論. Dharmatrāta re-worked the *caitasika* lists and the classes so that they return more or less to the Vaibhāṣika system. In the **Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya*, the classification of *caitasikas* is as follows:⁵⁸

- 10 *mahābhāmikas* 十大地法
- 10 *kuśalamahābhūmikas* 十善大地法
- 10 *kleśamahābhūmika* 十煩惱大地法
- 2 *akuśalamahābhūmikas* 二不善大地法
- 10 *parīttakleśamahābhūmika* 十小煩惱大地法

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* adopts Dharmatrāta's classification of *caitasikas* in the **Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya* with some minor adjustments:⁵⁹

- 10 *mahābhāmikas* 十大地法
- 10 *kuśalamahābhūmikas* 十大善地法
- 6 *kleśamahābhūmika* 六大煩惱地法
- 2 *akuśalamahābhūmikas* 二大不善地法
- 10 *parīttakleśabhūmika* 十小煩惱地法
- 4 *anityatas* 四不定

Later works such as Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* closely follow the *Abhidharmakośa* with only minor adjustments. Table 2.1 gives the list of *caitasikas* according to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

**Abhidharmāmṛtarasa*.

⁵⁸ No. 1552 雜阿毘曇心論 (卷2) T28, p881a-882a. See also Mizuno 1964: 299-300.

⁵⁹ AKBh verses 2.23-27, pp.54.11-57.9.

Table 1 Sarvāstivāda classification of mental factors according to the Abhidharmakośa⁶⁰

<p>1. Universals (<i>mahābhūmika</i>) that occur in all <i>cittas</i> (10)</p> <p>(1) <i>vedanā</i> (feeling), (2) <i>cetanā</i> (volition), (3) <i>saṃjñā</i> (apperception), (4) <i>chanda</i> (purpose), (5) <i>sparsā</i> (contact), (6) <i>prajñā</i> (insight), (7) <i>smṛti</i> (mindfulness), (8) <i>manaskāra</i> (attention), (9) <i>adhimokṣa</i> (determination), (10) <i>samādhi</i> (concentration)</p> <p>2. Wholesome universals (<i>kuśalamahābhūmika</i>) that occur in all wholesome <i>cittas</i> (10)</p> <p>(1) <i>śraddhā</i> (faith), (2) <i>apramāda</i> (heedfulness), (3) <i>praśrabdhi</i> (calm), (4) <i>upekṣā</i> (equanimity), (5) <i>hrī</i> (shame), (6) <i>apatrāpya</i> (regard to consequence), (7) <i>alobha</i> (lack of greed), (8) <i>adveṣa</i> (lack of hatred), (9) <i>avihiṃsā</i> (non-hurting), (10) <i>vīrya</i> (energy)</p> <p>3. Universal defilements (<i>kleśamahābhūmika</i>) that occur in all defiled <i>cittas</i> (6)</p> <p>(1) <i>moha</i> (delusion), (2) <i>pramāda</i> (negligence), (3) <i>kauśīdya</i> (slackness), (4) <i>āśraddhya</i> (lack of faith), (5) <i>styāna</i> (sloth), (6) <i>auddhatya</i> (restlessness)</p> <p>4. Unwholesome universals (<i>akuśalamahābhūmika</i>) that occur in unwholesome <i>cittas</i> (2)</p> <p>(1) <i>āhrīkyā</i> (shamelessness), (2) <i>anapatrāpya</i> (disregard to consequence)</p> <p>5. Minor defilements (<i>parīttakleśamahābhūmika</i>) (10)</p> <p>(1) <i>krodha</i> (anger), (2) <i>upanāha</i> (ill-will), (3) <i>sāṭhya</i> (treachery), (4) <i>īrṣyā</i> (envy), (5) <i>pradāśa</i> (vexation), (6) <i>mraṅka</i> (concealment), (7) <i>mātsarya</i> (miserliness), (8) <i>māyā</i> (deceit), (9) <i>mada</i> (pride), (10) <i>vihimsā</i> (cruelty)</p> <p>6. Indeterminate (<i>aniyata</i>) (8)</p> <p>(1) <i>kaukrītya</i> (regret), (2) <i>middha</i> (torpor), (3) <i>vitarka</i> (applied thought), (4) <i>vicāra</i> (sustained thought), (5) <i>rāga</i> (lust), (6) <i>pratigha</i> (aversion), (7) <i>māna</i> (conceit), (8) <i>vicikitsā</i> (doubt)</p>
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In the Pāli Abhidhamma, the development of the classification of the *cetasikas* is less complicated.⁶¹ There is no explicit classification of *cetasikas* in the seven Pāli canonical Abhidhamma texts and their commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*). Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* follows the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and also does not include a *cetasika* classification. Only in

⁶⁰ Adopted with slight alterations from pp. 44-5 in Dhammajoti 2007b.

⁶¹ Or more likely, there is not enough extant textual evidence to show the Pāli Abhidhamma system's development.

Buddhadatta's manual *Abhidhammāvatāra* are the *cetasikas* divided into three classes: universal factors (*sabbacitta-sādhāraṇa*), wholesome factors (*kusala*), and unwholesome factors (*akusala*). Buddhadatta's system was further refined in Anuruddha's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, which became the most popular and standard system in the Theravāda tradition. Table 2.2 shows the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha cetasikas* and their classification.

Table 2 Mental factors in the Pāli *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*⁶²

<p>1. Universals (<i>sabbacittasādhāraṇā</i>) that occur with all consciousness (7)</p> <p>(1) <i>phassa</i> (contact), (2) <i>vedanā</i> (feeling), (3) <i>saññā</i> (apperception), (4) <i>cetanā</i> (volition), (5) <i>ekaggatā</i> (one-pointedness), (6) <i>jīvitindriya</i> (life-faculty), (7) <i>manasikāra</i> (attention)</p> <p>2. Particulars (<i>pakiṇṇakā</i>) arise in particular circumstances (6)</p> <p>(1) <i>vitakka</i> (applied thought), (2) <i>vicāra</i> (sustained thought), (3) <i>adhimokkha</i> (decision), (4) <i>virīya</i> (energy), (5) <i>pīti</i> (joy), (6) <i>chanda</i> (purpose)</p> <p>3. Unwholesome (<i>akusala</i>) mental factors (14)</p> <p>(1) <i>moha</i> (delusion), (2) <i>ahirika</i> (shamelessness), (3) <i>anottappa</i> (disregard for consequence), (4) <i>uddhacca</i> (restlessness), (5) <i>lobha</i> (greed), (6) <i>diṭṭhi</i> (view), (7) <i>māna</i> (conceit), (8) <i>doṣa</i> (hatred), (9) <i>issā</i> (envy), (10) <i>macchariya</i> (miserliness), (11) <i>kukkucca</i> (regret), (12) <i>thīna</i> (sloth), (13) <i>middha</i> (torpor), (14) <i>vicikicchā</i> (doubt)</p> <p>4. Beautiful (<i>sobhana</i>) mental factors (25)</p> <p>The beautiful universals (<i>sobhanasādhāraṇa</i>) (19)</p> <p>(1) <i>saddhā</i> (faith), (2) <i>sati</i> (mindfulness), (3) <i>hiri</i> (shame), (4) <i>ottappa</i> (fear of wrong doing), (5) <i>alobho</i> (non-greed), (6) <i>adoso</i> (non-hatred), (7) <i>tatramajjhataṭṭatā</i> (neutrality), (8) <i>kāyapassaddhi</i> (tranquility of the body), (9) <i>cittapassaddhi</i> (tranquility of consciousness), (10) <i>kāyalahutā</i> (lightness of body), (11) <i>cittalahutā</i> (lightness of consciousness), (12) <i>kāyamudutā</i> (malleability of the body), (13) <i>cittamudutā</i> (malleability of the consciousness), (14) <i>kāyakammaññatā</i> (wieldiness of the body), (15) <i>cittakammaññatā</i> (wieldiness of the consciousness), (16) <i>kāyapāguññatā</i> (proficiency of</p>
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⁶² Adopted with slight alterations from Bodhi 1999: 79-91. Most of Bodhi's translations are preserved here because the Pāli terms may have different shades of meanings from the corresponding Sanskrit terms. A comparative study of the terms will be a separate project.

the body), (17) *cittapāguññatā* (proficiency of the consciousness), (18) *kāyujjukatā* (rectitude of the body), (19) *cittujjukatā* (rectitude of the consciousness)

The abstinences (*viratī*) (3)

(1) *sammāvācā* (right speech), (2) *sammākammanta* (right action), (3) *sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood)

Illimitables (*appamaññā*) (2)

(1) *karuṇā* (compassion), (2) *muditā* (appreciative joy)

Non-delusion (*amoha*) (1)

(1) *paññā* (insight)

2.1.4 Mental Factors in the Yogācāra Tradition

The most significant difference between the Yogācāra system and other Ābhidharma systems such as the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda is that it proposes that multiple consciousnesses can occur simultaneously on different levels of mind. On the other hand, despite the drastically different mind model, the Yogācāra tradition has adopted many doctrines from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. For example, in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, we can see that the Sarvāstivāda five-category division of all dharmas as *rūpa*, *citta*, *caitta/caitasika*, *cittaviprayukta*, and *asaṃskṛta* is employed,⁶³ though the Yogācārins disagree with the Sarvāstivādins on the numbers of dharmas in the lists and on whether certain dharmas are real or unreal. From this we can see that, just as in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, in the Yogācāra system also the *caitasikas* are considered a separate category of dharmas apart from *cittas*. Although I have not located a formal definition for the term *caitta/caitasika* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁶⁴ this term appears to be used in exactly

⁶³ For example, the discussion of *dharmadhātu* in the Basic Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* lists fifty-three *caitasikas*, two *dharmāyatana-paryāpanna rūpas*, twenty-four *viprayuktas*, and eight *asaṃskṛtas*. No doubt this is based on the Sarvāstivāda *pañcavastu* division since most *rūpas* and all *cittas* are already included in the other seventeen *dhātus*. YBh p. 68.12-69.7. Also, in the relatively later part the *Bodhisattvabhūmi Vinīścaya* in the *Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī*, the Sarvāstivāda *pañcavastu* are explicitly used in the analysis of the Yogācāra *pañcadharma*. No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 72) T30, p697c5-7: 問如是五事。幾色幾心。幾心所有。幾心不相應行。幾無為。答相通五種。名唯心不相應行。分別正智。通心及心所有。真如唯無為。

⁶⁴ *Caitsika* is defined in a text later than the YBh: No. 1602 顯揚聖教論 (卷 1) T31, p480c29-481a2: 心所有法者。謂若法從阿賴耶識種子所生。依心所起。與心俱轉相應。 “*Caitsika* refers to dharmas that arise from seeds in the *ālaya-vijñāna*, depend on *citta*, function together with *citta*, and are associated [with *citta*].” In this definition, except for the reference to the Yogācāra notion of “seed,” all other aspects of *caitsika* are the same as in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. See Mizuno 1964: 210.

the same sense as in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts. Furthermore, the Yogācāra system also has a theory of association (*samprayoga*) very similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In other words, the Yogācāra system has a notion of *caitasikas* as “mental factors,” which does not differ significantly from the Sarvāstivāda category of *caitasika*.

The earliest record of the Yogācāra list of the *caitasikas* occurs in the Basic Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.⁶⁵ In the *Manobhūmi*, under the rubric that describes those phenomena that are the company (*sahāya*) of consciousness, it gives a list of fifty-one *caitta* dharmas,⁶⁶ which are presented as a single, unclassified list similar to the previously mentioned lists in the *Dharmaskandha* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*. However, in another subsection of the *Manobhūmi*, the treatise classifies the fifty-one *caittas* into several groups according to the following four criteria:⁶⁷

⁶⁵ For more detailed discussions of the lists of *caitasikas* in the YBh, see Shimizu 1979; 1981; 1982; Mizuno 1964: 318-322; 328-335.

⁶⁶ YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p.11.14-21: *sahāyaḥ katamaḥ / tad̐yathā / manaskārah sparśo vedanā saṃjñā cetanā chando'dhimokṣaḥ smṛtiḥ samādhiḥ prajñā śraddhā hr̐rapatrāpyamalobho'dveṣo 'mohovīryaṃ prasarabhirapramāda upekṣāhimsā rāgaḥ pratigho'vidyā māno draṣṭīr vicikitsā krodha upanāho mraḥṣaḥ pradāsa īrṣyā mātsaryaṃ māyā śāṭhyaṃ mado viḥimsāhr̐kīyamanapatrāpyaṃ styānamauddhatyamāśraddhaṃya kausīdyāṃ pramādo muṣītasmr̐tītādhiḥkṣepo 'samprajanyaṃ kaukr̐tyamidham vitarko vicāraś cety evaṃbhāgīyāḥ sahabhūsampreyuktās caitasā dharmāḥ sahāya ity ucyante ekālambanā anekākārāḥ sahabhuva ekaikavṛttayaḥ svabījanīyatāḥ samprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāsrayāḥ //*

No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷1) T30, p280b13-21: 彼助伴者。謂作意觸受想思。欲勝解念三摩地慧。信慚愧無貪無瞋無癡。精進輕安不放逸捨不害。貪恚無明慢見疑。忿恨覆惱嫉慳誑諂僞害。無慚無愧。昏沈掉舉。不信懈怠放逸。邪欲邪勝解忘念散亂不正知。惡作睡眠尋伺。如是等輩。俱有相應心所有法。是名助伴。同一所緣非同一行相。一時俱有。一一而轉。各自種子所生。更互相應。有行相。有所緣。有所依。

It should be noted that Xuanzang lists fifty-three *caittas* including two extra *caittas*, 邪欲 *mithyāchanda* and 邪勝解 *mithyādhimokṣa*, that are absent from the Sanskrit list. Further, in the later subsection of the *Manobhūmi*, both the Chinese and Sanskrit versions mention fifty-three *caittas*, but the Tibetan version gives only fifty-one.

⁶⁷ YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p57.8-17: *tatra cittacaitasakalāpe cittaṃ copalabhyate caitasāśca tripañcāśad upalabhyante / tad̐yathā manaskārādayo vitarkavicāraparyavasānā yathānirdiṣṭhāḥ / eṣaṃ caitasānāṃ dharmāṇaṃ kati sarvatra citta utpadyante sarvabhūmike sarvadā sarve ca / āha / pañca manaskārādyāścetanāparyavasānāḥ / kati sarvatropadyante sarvabhūmike na ca sarvadā na sarve / pañcaiva śraddhādayaḥ prajñāvasānāḥ / kati kuśala eva na sarvatra / api tu sarvabhūmike na sarvadā na sarve // śraddhādayo 'himsāparyavasānāḥ / kati kliṣṭa eva na sarvatra na sarvabhūmike na sarvadā na sarve / rāgādayaḥ samprajanyaparyavasānāḥ //*

No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷3) T30, p291a1-12: 復次於心心所品中。有心可得及五十三心所得。謂作意等。乃至尋伺為後邊如前說。問如是諸心所。幾依一切處心生。一切地一切時一切耶。答五謂作意等。思為後邊。幾依一切處心生。一切地非一切時非一切耶。答亦五。謂欲等。慧為後邊。幾唯依善非一切處心生。然一切地非一切時非一切耶。答謂信等。不害為後邊。幾唯依染污非一切處心生。非一切地非一切時非一切耶。答謂貪等。不正知為後邊。幾依一切處心生。非一切地非一切時非一切耶。答謂惡作等。伺為後邊。

The four criteria are not specifically explained in the YBh, but several later Chinese commentaries provide clear explanations. No. 1828 瑜伽論記 (卷1) T42, p333a27-b2: 一切處者。唯識第五解云謂三性處。一切地者有二義。一云有尋等三地。二云九地。謂從欲界乃至非想。一切時者。心生必有。一切耶者。隨其自位起一必俱。No. 1829 瑜伽師地論略纂 (卷2) T43, p20c1-5: 一切處者。唯識第五解云。謂三性處。一切地者。有二義。一云。有尋等三地。二云。色四無色四。并欲界一。合為九地。一切時者。心生必有。一切耶者。隨其自位。起一必俱。No. 1830 成唯識論述記卷第五(末) T43, p422c16-23: 以四一切辨五位別。謂彼言一切處。一切地。一切時。一切耶

(1) Whether or not the *caitta* occur in *cittas* of all three moral qualities (*sarvatra citta*), namely, wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*), and morally neutral (*avyākṛta*).

(2) Whether or not they occur in all levels of existence (*sarvabhūmike*). According to the commentaries, there are two different interpretations for this category. First, the term *bhūmi* refers to the four *dhyānas* in the *rūpadhātu*, the four *samāpattis* in the *arūpyadhātu*, and plus the *kāmadhātu* totaling nine *bhūmis*; another explanation states that *bhūmi* here refers to the *sarvitarkā savicārā bhūmi*, the *avitarkā vicāramātrā bhūmi*, and the *avitarkāvicārā bhūmi*, the three stages of meditation in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

(3) Whether or not they occur all the time (*sarvadā*);

(4) Whether or not they always occur together with other members of the same group (*sarve*).

With the different combinations of the four criteria, the fifty-one *caitasikas* are divided into five groups:

(i) Occurring in *cittas* of all moral types (*sarvatra citta utpadyante*), all levels of existence (*sarvabhūmika*), all the time (*sarvadā*), and always together with each other in the same group (*sarve*).

(ii) Occurring in *cittas* of all moral types (*sarvatrotpadyante*), all levels of existence (*sarvabhūmike*), not all the time (*na sarvadā*), not together with other *caittas* in the same group (*na sarve*).

(iii) Occurring only in wholesome *cittas* (*kuśala na sarvatra*), all levels of existence (*sarvabhūmike*), not all the time (*na sarvadā*), not together with other *caittas* in the same group (*na sarve*).

(iv) Occurring only in defiled unwholesome *cittas* (*kliṣṭa eva na sarvatra*), not all levels of existence (*na sarvabhūmike*), not all the time (*na sarvadā*), not together with other *caittas* in the same group (*na sarve*).

(v) Occurring in *cittas* of all moral types (*sarvatra*), not all levels of existence (*na*

此中解言。謂一切性。及地。時。俱。俱者即一切耶。謂定俱生故。處者三性。三性之處皆得起故。言時者。謂或一切有心皆有。或無始不斷。或緣一切境故總言時。地有二說。一云三界九地。二云有尋等三地。此解為勝。輕安不遍故。性即三性。

sarvabhūmike), not all the time (*na sarvadā*), not together with other *caitasikas* in the same group (*na sarve*).

However, the criteria used in this part of the YBh for the grouping of the *caitasikas* were not considered sufficiently clear, and a new classification of the *caitasikas* was proposed. In a later part of the YBh, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, the same *caitasikas* are classified in a new way into two major classes: universals (*sarvatraga* 遍行) and non-universals (**asarvatraga* 不遍行). The latter is further divided into superior non-universals (**pranīta-asarvatraga* 勝不遍行), wholesome (*kuśala*), and defiled (*kliṣṭa*); the defiled are further divided into defilements (*kleśa*) and minor defilements (*upakleśa*).⁶⁸

This new classification system of *caitasikas* becomes more influential in later Yogācāra texts. Treatises and commentaries after the *Yogācārabhūmi* divide the fifty-one *caittas* into six groups under the following six categories:⁶⁹

- (1) universals (*sarvatraga* 遍行)
- (2) particulars (*viniyata* 別境)
- (3) wholesome (*kuśala* 善)
- (4) defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱)
- (5) minor defilements (*upakleśa* 隨煩惱)
- (6) indeterminates (*aniyata* 不定)

These six classes are actually a slightly revised version of the classification of *caitasikas* found in the later part of the YBh with the “superior non-universals”

⁶⁸ No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p601c10-13: 問諸識生時。與幾遍行心法俱起。答五。一作意。二觸。三受。四想。五思。問復與幾不遍行心法俱起。答不遍行法乃有多種。勝者唯五。一欲。二勝解。三念。四三摩地。五慧。p602b13-17: 問善法... 何等為自性。答謂信慚愧。無貪無瞋。無癡精進。輕安不放逸。捨不害。如是諸法名自性善。p603a9-10, 21-22: 復次諸染污法二相所顯。一本煩惱。二隨煩惱。...問煩惱自性有幾種。答有六種。一貪。二瞋。三無明。四慢。五見。六疑。p604a13-15: 復次隨煩惱自性云何。謂忿恨覆惱。嫉慳誑詔。憍害無慚。無愧昏沈。掉舉不信。懈怠放逸。忘念散亂。不正知惡作。睡眠尋伺。

⁶⁹ E.g. *Triṃśikā* verse 9: *sarvatragair viniyataiḥ kuśalaiś caitasair asau, samprayuktā tathā kleśair upakleśais trivedanā.*

(**pranīta-asarvatraga* 勝不遍行) becoming “particulars” (*vinīyata* 別境) and a new class of “indeterminates” (*anīyata* 不定). This six-fold division of *caitasikas* eventually becomes the standard in the Yogācāra tradition and is followed by most later Yogācāra texts in India and China.⁷⁰ Furthermore, these six types match the previously mentioned early five categories in the YBh quite well:⁷¹ (1) (2) (3) and (6) correspond exactly to (i) (ii) (iii) and (v) respectively, and (4) and (5) equals (iv) in the early *caitasika* classes of YBh.

Finally, if we compare the Yogācāra classification of the *caittas* with the classical Sarvāstivāda classification system (see the discussion in 2.1.3), we can observe close and undeniable resemblances between these two classification systems:⁷² the ten *caittas* in the Yogācāra universals (*sarvatraga*) and particulars (*vinīyata*) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda *mahābhūmikas*; the Yogācāra wholesomes (*kuśala*) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda *kuśalamahābhūmikas*; the Yogācāra defilements (*kleśa*) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda *kleśamahābhūmikas*; and the Yogācāra minor defilements (*upakleśa*) roughly correspond to Sarvāstivāda *parittakleśamahābhūmikas* together with its two *akuśalamahābhūmikas*; and finally the Yogācāra indeterminates (*anīyata*) roughly correspond to the category of *anīyatamahābhūmikas* of Sarvāstivāda. Table 2.3 gives the list of the fifty-one *caittas* in the YBh and the corresponding classifications in the two Yogācāra systems and the Sarvāstivāda system.

⁷⁰ This six-fold division of *caitasikas* can be found in Asaṅga’s *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, No. 1602 顯揚聖教論 (卷 1) T31, p481a; Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaka*, No. 1612 大乘五蘊論 (卷 1) T31, p848c; Vasubandhu’s *Śatadharmaparakāśamukha*, No. 1614 大乘百法明門論 (卷 1) T31, p855c; and so forth. Mizuno (1964: 324-28) has noticed that in Paramārtha’s translation of Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā*, the class of indeterminates (*anīyata* 不定) is absent. It is likely that the *anīyata* class was separated from the *upakleśa* class at a relatively late date.

⁷¹ The correspondence of these two classification systems is pointed out in the CWSL: No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 5) T31, p26c27-p27a8: 雖諸心所名義無異而有六位種類差別。謂遍行有五。別境亦五。善有十一。煩惱有六。隨煩惱有二十。不定有四。如是六位合五十一。一切心中定可得故。緣別別境而得生故。唯善心中可得生故。性是根本煩惱攝故。唯是煩惱等流性故。於善染等皆不定故。然瑜伽論合六為五。煩惱隨煩惱俱是染故。復以四一切辯五差別。謂一切性及地時俱。五中遍行具四一切。別境唯有初二一切。善唯一。謂一切地。染四皆無。不定唯一。謂一切性。

⁷² See the comparison of the two *caitasika* classification systems in Lusthaus 2002: 550-1 (Appendix three).

Table 3 The *caittas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, two Yogācāra classifications, and the corresponding *Sarvāstivāda* classification

<i>caittas</i> in the YBh	YBh classification	<i>Triṃsikā</i> classification	correspondence with Sarvāstivāda classification
(1) attention (<i>manaskāra</i> , 作意)	<i>sarvatra citta utpadyante, sarvabhūmike, sarvadā, sarve</i>	<i>sarvatraga</i>	= <i>mahābhūmika</i>
(2) contact (<i>sparśa</i> , 觸)			
(3) feeling (<i>vedanā</i> , 受)			
(4) apperception (<i>saṃjñā</i> , 想)			
(5) volition (<i>cetanā</i> , 思)			
(6) purpose (<i>chanda</i> , 欲)	<i>sarvatrotpadyante, sarvabhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarve</i>	<i>viniyata</i>	
(7) determination (<i>adhimokṣa</i> , 勝解)			
(8) mindfulness (<i>smṛti</i> , 念)			
(9) concentration (<i>samādhi</i> , 三摩地)			
(10) insight (<i>prajñā</i> , 慧)	<i>kuśala na sarvatra, sarvabhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarve</i>	<i>kuśala</i>	
(11) faith (<i>śraddhā</i> , 信)			
(12) shame (<i>hrī</i> , 慚)			
(13) regard for consequence (<i>apatrāpya</i> , 愧)			
(14) lack of greed (<i>alobha</i> , 無貪)			
(15) lack of hatred (<i>adveṣa</i> , 無瞋)			
(16) lack of delusion (<i>amoha</i> , 無癡)			
(17) energy (<i>vīrya</i> , 精進)			
(18) tranquility (<i>praśrabdhi</i> , 輕安)			
(19) heedfulness (<i>apramāda</i> , 不放逸)			
(20) equanimity (<i>upekṣā</i> , 捨)			
(21) non-hurting (<i>ahiṃsā</i> , 不害)			
(22) lust (<i>rāga</i> , 貪)	<i>kliṣṭa eva na</i>	<i>kleśa</i>	≈ <i>kleśamahābhūmika</i> +

(23) aversion (<i>pratigha</i> , 恚)	<i>sarvatra, na</i>		<i>akuśalamahābhūmika + parīttakleśamahābhūmika</i>
(24) ignorance (<i>avidyā</i> , 無明)	<i>sarvabhūmike, na</i>		
(25) conceit (<i>māna</i> , 慢)	<i>sarvadā, na sarve</i>	<i>upakleśa</i>	
(26) wrong view (<i>draṣṭi</i> , 見)			
(27) doubt (<i>vicikitsā</i> , 疑)			
(28) anger (<i>krodha</i> , 忿)			
(29) ill-will (<i>upanāha</i> , 恨)			
(30) concealing (<i>mraṅga</i> , 覆)			
(31) vexation (<i>pradāśa</i> , 惱)			
(32) envy (<i>īrṣyā</i> , 嫉)			
(33) miserliness (<i>mātsarya</i> , 慳)			
(34) deceit (<i>māyā</i> , 諂)			
(35) treachery (<i>śāṭhya</i> , 誑)			
(36) pride (<i>mada</i> , 憍)			
(37) cruelty (<i>vihimsa</i> , 害)			
(38) lack of shame (<i>ahrīkyā</i> , 無慚)			
(39) disregard for consequence (<i>anapatrāpya</i> , 無愧)			
(40) sloth (<i>styāna</i> , 惛沈)			
(41) restlessness (<i>auddhatya</i> , 掉舉)			
(42) faithlessness (<i>āsraddhaṃya</i> , 不 信)			
(43) laziness (<i>kausīdya</i> , 懈怠)			
(44) negligence (<i>pramāda</i> , 放逸)			
(45) forgetfulness (<i>muṣitasmr̥titā</i> , 忘 念)			
(46) distraction (<i>adhikṣepa</i> , 散亂)			

(47) absent-mindedness (<i>asamprajanya</i> , 不正知)			
(48) regret (<i>kaukr̥tya</i> , 惡作)	<i>sarvatra, na sarvebhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarve</i>	<i>aniyata</i>	\approx <i>aniyatamahābhūmika</i>
(49) torpor (<i>middha</i> , 睡眠)			
(50) applied thought (<i>vitarka</i> , 尋)			
(51) sustained thought (<i>vicāra</i> , 伺)			

2.1.5 *Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika* Teachers who are Against the Doctrine of Mental Factors

The previous sections (2.1.2-4) discussed the theories of mental factors in Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra texts. In contrast to these Abhidharma doctrines that mental factors (*caitta/caitasika*) are phenomena different from but associated (*saṃprayukta*) with consciousness (*citta*), some teachers even as early as in the pre-*Vibhāṣā* period proposed that mental phenomena such as *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* do not exist as dharmas apart from consciousness. Regarding the **Tattvasiddhi*, it is obvious that the author Harivarman holds a position that is strongly critical of the Sarvāstivāda *caitasika* theory. In the Northern traditions, the Sarvāstivādins attribute such a position to the *Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas*;⁷³ in the Southern tradition, a record in the Kathāvatthu commentary proposes that the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold a similar position.⁷⁴

On a number of occasions, the **Mahāvibhāṣā* records that the *Dārṣṭāntikas* (譬喻者)⁷⁵ hold the doctrine that *caittas/caitasikas* are not separate dharmas different from

⁷³ MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 127) T27, p661b: 覺天所說...心所即心。 “The [Dārṣṭāntika teacher] Buddhadeva says that ... *caitta* is *citta*.” **Nyāyānusārasāstra*, T No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p394c: 有譬喻者說唯有心無別心所。 “Some Dārṣṭāntikas say that there is only *citta*, and there is no *caitta* different from [it].” For a recent review of studies regarding the *Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika*, see Kritzer 2003a. Also Cox 1995: 37-41; Katō 1989; Dhammajoti 2007a: 5-40; Yinshun 印順 1981a: 355-407, 528-610.

⁷⁴ Kv-a 94-5: *tattha yasmā tilamhi telam viya na vedanādayo saññādīsu anupaviṭṭhā, tasmā “ natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampayuttā, evaṃ sante ñāṇasampayuttantiādi niratthakaṃ hotī ” ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikānaññeva*. English translation Law and Davids 1969: 116-7. See also Katsumata 1961: 401-2; Mizuno 1964: 244-5.

⁷⁵ *Dārṣṭāntikas* are teachers within the Sarvāstivāda tradition who take sūtras as the higher authority in contrast to

citta.⁷⁶ Instead, they propose that *citta* and *caitasikas* occur successively one after another and cannot occur simultaneously, i.e. there is no simultaneous relationship association (*samprayoga*) among them as defined by the orthodox Sarvāstivādins.⁷⁷ Furthermore, different positions are attributed to different teachers even within the Dārṣṭāntikas. The **Mahāvibhāṣā* refers to two Dārṣṭāntika masters, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (大德法救) and Buddhadeva (覺天), who maintain theories of *caitasika* that are slightly different from each other.⁷⁸ Dharmatrāta is a prominent Dārṣṭāntika master within the Sarvāstivāda tradition.⁷⁹ According to the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, Dharmatrāta proposes that *citta* and *caitta* are different dharmas; however, both *citta* and *caitta* are nothing but *cetanā* (思) in different modes with different names:

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says that ... *caitasika-dharmas* are not the same as *citta*.⁸⁰

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says thus: *citta* and *caitasika* are different modes of *cetanā* (**cetanā-viśeṣa*).⁸¹

And according to Yinshun and Dhammajoti, based on a passage in the **Ārya-Vasumitra-saṃgrhīta*,⁸² Apparently, Dharmatrāta believes that only three dharmas

Ābhidharmikas who take Śāstras as their authority. Some modern scholars believe that Dārṣṭāntikas are predecessors of the later, post-Vibhāṣā Sautrāntikas that are mentioned in Vasubandhu's *AKBh* and Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra*. See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 355ff; Dhammajoti 2007a: 6ff.

⁷⁶ For example, No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p216b: 謂或有執思慮是心。如譬喻者彼說思慮是心差別。無別有體。(卷 42) T27, p0218c: 謂或有執。尋伺即心。如譬喻者。

⁷⁷ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 9) T27, p44b: 或有執智與識不俱。如譬喻者。(卷 52) T27, p270a: 謂或有執。諸法生時漸次非頓。如譬喻者。(卷 90) T27, p0463a: 或復有執。心心所法次第而起互不相應。如譬喻者。(卷 95) T27, p0493c: 謂或有說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如譬喻者。(卷 145) T27, p745a: 如譬喻者說心心所次第而生。

⁷⁸ For a more detailed discussion of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, see Dhammajoti 2007a: 114-120; also Yinshun 印順 1981a: 245-272.

⁷⁹ Yinshun 印順 1981a: 245-8. All the doctrinal points in the MVŚ under the name 大德 can be attributed to Dharmatrāta. The same is true of the teachings under the name “尊” in the **Ārya-Vasumitra-saṃgrahīta*, T No. 1549 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論。

⁸⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 127) T27, p661c: 尊者法救說。離大種別有造色。說心所法非即是心。

⁸¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p8c: 尊者法救作如是言。諸心心所是思差別。

⁸² No. 1549 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論 (卷 1) T28, p724a: 痛及想及心及識。有何等差別 ... 尊作是說。眼緣色生眼識。自相受識。識流馳此諸法。還更以此差降。意有三法。識別與識共。俱彼所得苦樂。造諸想追本所作。亦是心所行法。Yinshun 印順 1981a: 255-6; Dhammajoti 2007a: 118-120. Dhammajoti suggests that 意有三法。識別與識共 be interpreted as follows: “There are three *caittas*. They are distinct from *vijñāna*, [while] co-existing with *vijñāna*.”

are proper *caitasikas*, namely, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*. All other *caitasikas* in the Sarvāstivāda system, according to Dharmatrāta, are nothing but different modes of *cetanā*. As Dhammajoti points out, here in Dharmatrāta's interpretation, *cetanā* likely means general “mental activity” instead of the specific dharma of “volition” in the Āhbidharmika sense. And the reason the Dārṣṭāntikas propose only these three dharmas as *caittas* is perhaps that these three are enlisted in the standard list of five aggregates aside from material form (*rūpa*) and consciousness (*viññāna*).⁸³

Dharmatrāta also thinks that *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot occur simultaneously but only occur successively, one after another:

Some say that *caitasikas* arise successively and not simultaneously, such as the Dārṣṭāntikas. The Bhadanta [i.e. Dharmatrāta] also says, *caitasikas* arise one after another and not simultaneously, just as many merchants passing through a narrow path, [they] have to pass through one by one, not by two or more [simultaneously]. *Caitasika-dharmas* are likewise: [they] arise one by one from their individual character of birth (**jāti* 生相), and it is definitely impossible [for them] to arise simultaneously in an assemblage.⁸⁴

In this passage, Dharmatrāta compares the mind to a band of merchants passing a narrow path: just as a path allows only one merchant to pass at a time, the mind at one moment can have only one instance of *citta*, and no two *cittas* can occur simultaneously.

However, the **Mahāvibhāṣā* also records that Dharmatrāta proposes that consciousness (*viññāna*) occurs simultaneously with feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, and the relationship of association (*saṃprayoga*) means companionship (同伴侶) between consciousness and *caitasikas*:

The Bhadanta says, consciousness together with *vedanā*, and so forth, arise as one assemblage (一和合, **sāmagrī*). Just as consciousness is one [entity], *vedanā*, and so forth, [each] is also one [entity]. Hence, there is no fallacy [of two *cittas* arising simultaneously].⁸⁵

⁸³ Dhammajoti 2007a: 116ff.

⁸⁴ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p493c-494a: 謂或有說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如譬喻者。大德亦說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如多商侶過一狹路。要一一過非二非多。諸心所法亦復如是。一一各別生相所生。必無一時和合生義。The English translation depends in part upon Dhammajoti's translation. Dhammajoti 2007a: 114-5.

⁸⁵ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p50a: 大德說曰。心與受等一和合生。如心是一受等亦一。故無

The Bhadanta says, companionship (同伴侶) is the meaning of association (相應, *samprayoga*). *Citta* and *caitasikas* contain each other, arise simultaneously, and grasp the same object; this is association.⁸⁶

These two passages apparently contradict the passage quoted earlier, which suggests that Dharmatrāta claims that *citta* and *caitasikas* arise sequentially instead of simultaneously. Yinshun thinks that the latter two passages are mistakenly attributed to Dharmatrāta by the compilers of the **Mahāvibhāṣā*.⁸⁷ However, after carefully examining the passages together with the passage in the **Ārya-Vasumitra-saṃgrhīta*,⁸⁸ Dhammajoti proposes that these passages can be understood in such a way that, in Dharmatrāta's view, *caitasika* dharmas such as feeling (*vedanā*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), and mental activity (*cetanā*) all have the element of cognition (*vijñāna*) within them. Therefore, although consciousness (*vijñāna*), *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* arise sequentially, in each moment of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* the element of *vijñāna* always exists. Hence, these two passages do not contradict other positions attributed to Dharmatrāta.⁸⁹

Another Dārṣṭāntika master, Buddhadeva,⁹⁰ holds a slightly different view concerning *caitasikas*. He proposes that *caitasikas* are nothing but different states or modes of *citta* (**citta-viśeṣa*):

The Venerable Buddhadeva states thus: the nature of all *citta* and *caitasikas* is *citta*.⁹¹

Buddhadeva states that material forms (*rūpa*) are nothing but [the four] great elements (*mahābhūta*); *caitasikas* are the same as *citta*. He says that derivative forms are different modes of the great elements, and *caitasikas* are different modes of *citta*. For what reason does he say this? [He makes these statements] based on the sūtras ... in the sūtra it is said, “What is

有過。The translation depends in part upon Dhammajoti 2007a: 115.

⁸⁶ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81a: 大德說曰。同伴侶義是相應義。識與心所互相容受俱時而生。同取一境乃是相應。

⁸⁷ Yinshun 印順 1981a: 255.

⁸⁸ See footnote 82 above.

⁸⁹ Dhammajoti 2007a: 120.

⁹⁰ Except for the few quotations in the MVŚ that identify him as a Dārṣṭāntika within the Sarvāstivāda tradition, there is no further biographical information about Buddhadeva.

⁹¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p8c: 尊者覺天作如是說。諸心心所體即是心。

samādhi? It is the wholesome one-pointedness of consciousness.” Because of this [he] says *caitasikas* are *citta*.

Question: then how does he establish *dhātus*, *āyatanas*, and *skandhas*?

Answer: He states thus: ... As for the [five] *skandhas*, the four *mahābhūtas* are established as the *skandha* of *rūpa*, and concerning those different modes (*avastha-viśeṣa*) of *citta*, some are named *vedanā*, some are named *saṃjñā*, some are named *cetanā*, some are named *viññāna*; thus are the four *skandhas* established.⁹²

Buddhadeva’s position appears to be different from that of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, but actually their positions are quite similar. While disagreeing with the Vaibhāṣikas on the number of *caitasika* dharmas, Dharmatrāta seems to agree with them that *citta* and *caitasikas* are different, though by nature all *citta* and *caitasikas* are nothing but *cetanā*. Buddhadeva explicitly denies that *caitasikas* are a category of dharmas separate from *citta* but contends that *caitasikas* are simply *citta* in different modes of existence (*avastha-viśeṣa*). He argues for this position based on a definition of concentration (*samādhi*) in the sūtra. In both the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda Abhidharma systems, *samādhi* is a *caitasika* different from but associated with *citta*. As in the passage by Buddhadeva quoted above, *samādhi* is defined in the sūtra as one-pointedness of *citta* (*cittasyaikāgratā*),⁹³ namely, a state in which the mind is focused on one object; it is not something different from *citta*, which exists associated with *citta* as proposed by the Ābhidharmikas. The same principle also applies to other dharmas such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* among the five *skandhas*: they are all different states or modes (*avastha-viśeṣa*) of *citta*. Nevertheless, to say the *caitasikas* are *citta-viśeṣa* is actually not much different from saying that all *citta* and *caitasikas* are *cetanā-viśeṣa*. In this

⁹² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 127) T27, p661b: 覺天所說色唯大種。心所即心。彼作是說。造色即是大種差別。心所即是心之差別。彼何故作是說。依契經故。如契經說。眼肉團中。若內各別堅性堅類。近有執受名內地界。乃至各別動性動類。近有執受名內風界。彼依此經故說造色即是大種。又契經說云何等持。謂善心一境性。由此故說心所即心。問彼復云何立界處蘊耶。答彼作是說諸四大種。有是能見。有是所見。乃至有是能觸。有是所觸。諸能見者立為眼界。諸所見者立為色界。乃至諸能觸者立為身界。諸所觸者立為觸界。心中有依眼根。乃至有依意根。依眼<661c>根者立眼識界。乃至依意根者立意識界。即六識身無間已滅立為意識界。即心差別有名為受。有名為想。有名為思。并三無為立為法界。如界處亦爾。蘊者。諸四大種立為色蘊。諸心差別有名為受。有名為想。有名為思有名為識。立為四蘊。AKBh (verse viii-9, p.440) mentions this position but does not attribute it to Buddhadeva: *avasthāviśeṣo ’pi hi nāma cetasaścaitasiko bhavati*. See also Dhammajoti 2007a: 97.

⁹³ M no. 44 *Cuḷavedalla Sutta*, (I 301): *yā kho, āvuso visākhā, cittassa ekaggatā ayaṃ samādhi*. MĀ no. 210 法樂比丘尼經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 58) T01, p788c24-5: 若善心得一者。是謂定也。Note that the Pāli version does not have the word “*kusala*” while the MĀ has 善 “*kuśala*,” which is the same as the passage quoted in the MVŚ. Also in the TatSid ch. 155, 道諦聚定論中定因品第一百五十五, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 12) T32, p334b: 心住一處是三昧相。AKBh p.54.23-4: *samādhiścittasyaikāgratā*. See also Kritzer 2005: 384-5.

sense, Dharmatrāta's and Buddhadeva's positions regarding *caitasika* are more or less the same but only phrased in different ways. Below in the discussion of the arguments in the **Tattvasiddhi* we will see that Harivarman's position regarding *caitasika* is almost exactly the same as Buddhadeva's position as recorded in the MVŚ.

The influence of the Dārṣṭāntikas continues in Buddhist history after the **Mahāvibhāṣā*. Both Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* record the teachings of Śrīlāta, the Sautrāntika master of early 5th century CE. His opinion regarding the *caittas* appears to be very similar to that of Dharmatrāta: there are only three *caitasikas*, namely, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*; *citta* and *caitasikas* arise sequentially and not simultaneously; and in each moment of a *caitasika*, there is always the element of cognition (*viññāna*).⁹⁴

2.2 *Caitasika* in the **Tattvasiddhi*

In the **Tattvasiddhi*, Harivarman dedicates five chapters (60-64) to the issue of *caitasika*, and three chapters (65-67) to the closely related issue of association (*saṃprayoga*). From this we can see how important Harivarman considers these issues to be and how heated the debate was among different teachers of that time. Also, as mentioned earlier, Harivarman opposes the Ābhidharmika theory of *caitasikas* as “mental factors” that are different from *citta*. At the beginning of chapter 60 in the **Tattvasiddhi*, he defines *citta* as a dharma that is capable of taking an object (60.1);⁹⁵ and because feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional formation (*saṃskāra*) all take their corresponding objects, they are all *cittas* in different modes (**citta-viśeṣa* 心差別) (60.2-3). As seen earlier in 2.1.5, this is exactly the same position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva in the MVŚ.

Regarding the term *caitta/caitasika*, apparently Harivarman conforms to its meaning in the sūtras, where it is used as an adjective meaning “pertaining to mind” or “mental,” or as a noun meaning “mental state.”⁹⁶ In chapter 63, he explicitly defines *caitasika* as “dharmas born depending on *citta*,” which is basically an etymological analysis of the

⁹⁴ Dhammajoti 2007a: 120-130. Katō 1989: 202-216.

⁹⁵ Also in TatSid chapter 18, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b: 心法者能緣是也.

⁹⁶ See section 2.1.1.

term *caitta* or *caitasika*: *caitta* is a derivative from *citta*, *caitasika* is a derivative from *cetas*, and they both mean “mental” or “things belonging or pertaining to mind.” Based on this analysis of the term, he further states that since one moment of *citta* arises depending on the previous moment of *citta*, the latter moment of *citta* should be called *caitta* or *caitasika* in contrast to the previous moment of *citta* (63.8 and 63.12).⁹⁷ Therefore, Harivarman’s position regarding the term *caitasika* indicates that he is not against using the term *caitta/caitasika* to refer to the numerous mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, but he does not understand these mental phenomena as dharmas different from *citta* as the Ābhidharmikas do. Instead, he understands them as *citta* by nature, which occurs in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*).

As for a list of *caitasikas*, the **Tattvasiddhi* contains discussions of several dozen mental phenomena scattered throughout different parts and chapters. Apparently, there is no strict classification of *caitasikas* as in the later Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts. Mizuno (1964: 338-9) counts all *caitasikas* mentioned in the **Tattvasiddhi* at forty-nine dharmas as follows:

From the section on the five *skandhas* (chs. 77, 78, 84-93):

(1) *saṃjñā* 想 (2) *vedanā* 受 (3) *cetanā* 思 (4) *sparśa* 觸 (5) *manaskāra* 念 (6) *chandas* 欲 (7) *prīti* 喜 (8) *śraddhā* 信 (9) *vīrya* 勤 (10) *smṛti* 憶 (11) *vitarka* 覺 (12) *vicāra* 觀 (13) *apramāda* 不放逸 (14) *alobha* 不貪 (15) *adveṣa* 不嗔 (16) *amoha* 不癡 (17) *praśrabdhi* 猗 (18) *upekṣā* 捨

From the section on *kleśas* (chs. 122-133):

(19) *lobha* 貪 (20) *dveṣa* 嗔恚 (21) *avidyā* 無明 (22) *māna* 憍慢 (23) *vicikitsā* 疑 (24) *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* 身見 (25) *antagrāha-dṛṣṭi* 邊見 (26) *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見 (27) *dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa* 見取 (28) *śīlavrata-parāmarśa* 戒取

⁹⁷ Also in TatSid ch. 18, No. 1646 成實論 (卷2) T32, p252b: 心數法者若識得緣即次第生想等是也。

From the *upakleśa* chapter (ch. 134)

(29) *styāna* 睡 (30) *middha* 眠 (31) *auddhatya* 掉 (32) *kaukr̥tya* 悔 (33) *māyā* 諂 (34) *śāthya* 誑 (35) *āhr̥kyā* 無慚 (36) *anapatrāpya* 無愧 (37) *pramāda* 放逸 (38) *kūhanā* 詐 (39) *lapanā* 羅波那 (40) *naimittikatā* 現相 (41) *naiṣpeśikatā* 慍切 (42) *lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣā* 以利求利 (43) *tandrī* 單致利 (44) *arati* 不喜 (45) *vijṃbhika* 頻申 (46) *bhakti asamatā* 食不調 (47) *cetaso līnatva* 退心 (48) *daurvacasya* 不敬肅 (49) *pāpamitratā* 樂惡友

There are a few points that can be noted from this list of *caitasikas*. First, in accordance with the parts and chapters in the treatise in which these *caitasikas* are discussed, they are roughly grouped as (i) morally neutral and wholesome (1-18), (ii) *kleśas* (19-28), and *upakleśas* (29-49). As for the first group (1-18), Harivarman does not explicitly divide them into subgroups such as *mahābhūmika* or *sarvatraga* as in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts. Second, in the *upakleśa* group, items (38-49) are not included either in the Sarvāstivāda or in the Yogācāra *caitasika* systems. These mental phenomena occur scattered in the sūtras, and some of them are gathered in some early Abhidharma texts such as the *Vibhaṅga*, the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the *Dharmaskandha*.⁹⁸

From these observations, we can probably speculate that Harivarman is likely depending upon a proto-Abhidharma tradition, which is similar to the stage of development presented in the early Abhidharma texts such as the *Vibhaṅga*, the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the *Dharmaskandha*, and not a fully developed, sophisticated *caitasika* classification system comparable to those of the Sarvāstivāda and the Yogācāra texts. But this does not mean that Harivarman has no knowledge of the *caitasika* systems in these Abhidharma traditions. For example, in the TatSid chapter 138, Harivarman quotes an opponent who mentions the list of the ten *akuśalamahābhūmikas* and states that these ten *caitasikas* are always associated with all defiled *cittas*. Harivarman answers that for him association means *citta* arises sequentially after the previous *citta*; hence, it is

⁹⁸ Mizuno 1964: 339.

impossible for these ten *caitasikas* all to occur simultaneously with a defiled *citta*.⁹⁹ As seen in 2.1.3, the *caitasika* class *akuśalamahābhūmika* is a relatively late development in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system after the first establishment of the ten *mahābhūmikas* in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. This suggests that even with full knowledge of the developed Vaibhāṣika *caitasika* classification system, Harivarman has no intention of adopting it into his system. This is likely because the Vaibhāṣika *caitasika* classification is based on the *citta-caitta* association theory, which Harivarman does not accept, and the division of the *caitasika* classes is based on the analysis of the *caitasikas* that exist in specific types of *cittas*. If one rejects this theoretical foundation, as Harivarman does, it is senseless to classify *caitasikas* as *mahābhūmikas*, and so forth. Therefore, it is reasonable that Harivarman does not analyze the *caitasikas* into more detailed analytical categories.

However, some later commentators on the TatSid seem not to be satisfied with the absence of a more detailed classification and make an attempt to analyze and further classify the *caitasikas* listed in the TatSid. A prominent example is the Chinese scholar monk Huiyuan (慧遠, 334-413 CE). In his *Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章), he lists thirty-six *caitasikas* gathered from the TatSid, and divides them into four classes: (1) universal (通數); (2) wholesome (善數); (3) unwholesome (不善數); and (4) morally neutral (無記數).¹⁰⁰ Moreover, because in the TatSid system these *caitasikas* are not mental factors accompanying *cittas* but *cittas* themselves, the criterion for the division of *caitasika* classes is no longer based on the theory of association but rather on the occurrence of these *cittas* in different realms of existence and their moral qualities. For example, according to Huiyuan, the first class of *caitasikas* of ten “universals” (通數) can

⁹⁹ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 11) T32, p323a13-23: 論者言一切煩惱多十使所攝。是故當因十使而造論。十使者。貪。恚。慢。無明。疑。及五見。問曰。十煩惱大地法。所謂不信。懈怠。忘憶。散心。無明。邪方便。邪念。邪解。戲調。放逸。是法常與一切煩惱心俱。此事云何。答曰。先已破。相應但心法一一生。是故不然。又此非道理。何以知之。或有不善心與不善信俱。或有不善心而無信。精進等亦如是。故知非一切煩惱心中有此十法。又汝說睡掉在一切煩惱心中。是亦不然。若心迷沒爾時應有睡。不應在調戲心中。有如是等過。

¹⁰⁰ No. 1851 大乘義章 (卷 2) T44, p493a7-11: 成實法中。心數不定。攝末從本。有三十七。隨末別論。則有無量。云何從本有三十七。如彼論說。通數有十。思觸念欲喜信懃覺觀憶。前四後一。與毘曇同。餘五別異。...p493a25-27: 以此十種處遍三界體通三性故名通數。善數有十。通前二十。所謂定。慧。無貪。瞋。癡。慚。愧。猗。捨。及不放逸。...p493b10-15: 不善之中數有十四。通前合為三十四也。何者十四。十使煩惱相從為六。五見之心。合為邪見。即以為一。貪瞋癡慢及與疑使。復以為五。通前六也。十纏之中。別數有五。謂無慚。愧。掉。悔。及覆。通前十一。...p493b20-21: 六垢之中有諂及誑。通前十三。...p493b25-: 加其放逸。通前十四。不善如是。無記有三。謂識想受。彼宗之中行前三心。唯無記故。以此通前。為三十七。See also Mizuno 1964: 337-8.

occur in all three realms of existence (i.e. *kāma-*, *rūpa-*, and *arūpya-dhātu*), and the nature of these *caitasikas* (which are also *cittas*) can be morally wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral (*kuśala*, *akuśala*, and *avyākṛta*).¹⁰¹ Even though such attempts to classify the *caitasikas* mentioned in the TatSid may be considered acceptable as doctrinal development of the TatSid system, it must be noted that such developments are not explicitly present in the text of the TatSid itself, and no doubt they are influenced by other systems such as those in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra traditions.

Having surveyed the background of the dispute of the *caitasikas*, next we will look at the arguments in the **Tattvasiddhi's* chapters 60-64. In chapter 60, Harivarman proposes his position, namely, there are no *caitasikas* aside from *citta*, and then he lists a number of arguments, mainly quoting the sūtras, to support his position. In chapter 61, an unnamed opponent proposes the position that there are *caitasikas* different from *citta*, and quotes a number of sūtras to support his position. In chapter 62, the opponent refutes Harivarman's arguments presented in chapter 60, and in chapter 63, Harivarman refutes the opponent's arguments presented in chapter 61. Finally, in chapter 64, Harivarman answers the opponent's refutation of his arguments in chapter 62.

The next two sections (2.3 and 2.4) will discuss in detail the arguments from both sides as presented in chapters 60-64. However, because in the original text an argument and its refutation from the other side of the dispute are scattered in different chapters, it is difficult for the reader to track the arguments and their respective refutations. Hence, the next two sections will reorganize the arguments in these chapters and group the relevant arguments and refutations together. Section 2.3 will discuss Harivarman's arguments proposed in chapter 60, the opponent's refutation to these arguments in chapter 62, and Harivarman's rejoinder to those refutations in chapter 64. Section 2.4 will discuss the opponent's position and arguments presented in chapter 61, and Harivarman's refutation in chapter 63. However, chapter 5 presents a more literal translation of the text, and the arguments there are presented in their original order.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p493a25-27: 以此十種處遍三界體通三性故名通數。

2.3 Harivarman's Arguments against *caitasika*, the Opponent's Refutations, and Harivarman's Rejoinders

2.3.1 Harivarman's Argument 1 (60.1-3, 62.1, 64.1)

(60.1-3) Harivarman begins chapter 60 by stating that (60.1) the three terms *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* have the same denotation and refer to the same thing. Then he defines *citta* as “a dharma that can take objects (*ālambana*).” His opponent immediately challenges this definition (60.2), stating that if this is the case, those *caitasika* dharmas such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and so forth, all should be *citta* because they all function by taking objects. Harivarman answers (60.3) that this is exactly the case: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are *citta* by nature but only in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*). Then he gives several examples to show that dharmas such as mindfulness (*smṛti*), insight (*prajñā*), and concentration (*samādhi*) are referred to by different names on different occasions. He concludes that all these mental phenomena are nothing but *citta*.

(62.1) The opponent answers with a quotation from a sūtra, in which the three mental phenomena *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, which constitute three of the five *skandhas*, are defined by their “characteristics” (**lakṣaṇa*, 相): to cognize (*vijānāti*) is the characteristic of *vijñāna*; to experience (*vedayati*) the unpleasant and pleasant is the characteristic of feeling (*vedanā*); to perceive (*sañjānāti*) is the characteristic of apperception (*saṃjñā*); to initiate action (*abhisamkaroti*) is the characteristic of [volitional] formation (*saṃskāra*).

(64.1) Harivarman apparently answers this challenge by citing the etymological analysis of the key terms: *vijñāna* is from the root $\sqrt{jñā}$ “to know,” *vedanā* is from the root \sqrt{vid} which can also mean “to know,” and *saṃjñā* is also from the root $\sqrt{jñā}$. As a result, to be conscious of (**vijānāti*) an object, to experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings (**vedayati*), and to perceive (**sañjānāti*), all basically mean “to know;” hence, there is no difference in their functions or characteristics.

Comments:

(60.1) At the beginning of 60.1 Harivarman states that *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are synonyms. This represents an old tradition in Buddhism that can be traced back to early sūtra texts. However, careful reading of the sūtra texts reveals subtle differences among these terms. Also, with the development of Buddhist doctrines, especially in the Yogācāra system, these terms gained new meanings and new ontological statuses. This issue is not central to the dispute concerning *caitasika*, but I will discuss it in more detail in a separate study of the development of Buddhist mind models.¹⁰²

The definition of *citta* as a “dharma that can take objects” is quite interesting because I do not find any parallel for this definition in Northern Abhidharma texts, but it is very close to the definition in the Dhs-a.¹⁰³ It would appear that Harivarman is very knowledgeable of doctrines from various Buddhist groups and does not restrict himself to one doctrinal school but adopts doctrines that he considers reasonable regardless of their source.

(60.3) As mentioned previously in 2.1.5, Harivarman here holds the same position as Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntika master recorded in the MVŚ: specifically, dharmas such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, which are taken as *caitasikas* (or a collection of *caitasikas* in the case of *saṃskāra*) in the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems, are nothing but *citta* in its different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*).

Harivarman’s etymological analysis of the terms *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, and *saṃjñā* provides more in-depth information about the so-called Dārṣṭāntika position regarding *caitasika*. I do not find any parallel to this in any other Abhidharma texts. The message conveyed here is that *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, and *saṃjñā* are basically all forms of “knowing” because all these terms are derived from roots that have the meaning “to know.” This resembles the discussion of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta’s position in 2.1.5,¹⁰⁴ which proposes that for each moment of mental activities such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*, there is always the element of consciousness (*vijñāna*). From this perspective, Harivarman’s etymological analyses of the relevant terms here can be seen as supporting such a

¹⁰² These three terms are briefly discussed in the conclusion chapter 5.1. Johansson 1965 is an indepth investigation of these terms in the Nikāyas. A separate study of these terms in Abhidharma texts is planned.

¹⁰³ Dhs-a 112: *ārammaṇaṃ cintetī ti cittaṃ ti*.

¹⁰⁴ See the discussion of Dharmatrāta on page 79.

position.¹⁰⁵ However, Harivarman does not perform a similar etymological analysis on the term *saṃskāra*, which the opponent has defined as “to initiate action” (*abhisamkaroti*) in 62.1. Perhaps Harivarman finds it difficult to extract a sense of “knowing” from the root \sqrt{kr} “to do” and dodges this issue

From 60.4 to 60.10 Harivarman quotes ten sūtra passages to prove his position that there are no *caitasika* dharmas different from *citta*. However, the opponent only answers four as given in 60.4, 5, 12, and 13. Apparently, the opponent assumes that by refuting 60.5, he has effectively refuted all of Harivarman’s arguments in 60.5-11. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, I will list 60.4 as Harivarman’s argument 2, 60.5-11 as argument 3, and 60.12 and 60.13 as arguments 4 and 5 respectively.

2.3.2 Harivarman’s Argument 2 (60.4, 62.2, 64.2)

(60.4) Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that *citta* is liberated from three kinds of taints (*āsrava*): sensual desire (*kāma*), existence (*bhava*), and ignorance (*avidyā*). He then states that if there were *caitasikas* different from *citta*, as the Ābhidharmikas suggest, the sūtra passage should have mentioned *caitasikas* and not *citta* alone.

(62.2) The Opponent answers by quoting another sūtra passage, which states that insight (*prajñā*) is liberated by removing ignorance (*avidyā*). This means it is not the case that the sūtras mention only *citta*.

(64.2) Harivarman answers the opponent’s challenge from three perspectives. First, he clarifies his own mind model, in which mind is an aggregate (**rāsi* 聚) with *citta*, defilements (*kleśa*), and ignorance (*avidyā*) all connected or integrated (**samprayukta* 相應) as a whole. Based on this model, both *citta* and *prajñā* are themselves instances of such aggregates, which subsumes various mental states, and it is nonsensical to say that

¹⁰⁵ This is also the position Sue Hamilton (1996: 91-95) suggests in understanding the cognitive process described in early sūtras and the relationship between *viññāna* and *vedanā*, *saññā*, and *paññā*. See more detail in the next chapter (ch.5) regarding the doctrine of association (*saṃprayoga*). In other words, if we put aside later commentaries and Abhidharma interpretations and read early sūtras by their face value, we can indeed find in early sūtras passages suggesting a similar position to those of Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and Harivarman.

citta is polluted by *kleśa* and that *prajñā* is polluted by *avidyā*. In other words, when there is defilement, there is always ignorance existing as an integral constituent of the aggregate (**rāsi*) of *citta*. If so, then stating that *citta* is liberated by removing defilements, and *prajñā* (which is part of *citta* in this model, and characterizes certain instances of *cittas* when it is in a dominant position in the *citta* aggregates) is liberated by removing ignorance is also nonsensical, because in these cases one cannot separate clearly *citta* from *prajñā*, and *kleśa* from *avidyā*.

Second, Harivarman proposes that the sūtra stating that *citta* is liberated by removing defilements and *prajñā* is liberated by removing ignorance is a non-definitive (*neyārtha* 不了義) sūtra, which means that we should not accept the teaching at face value but must seek the hidden meaning that is not explicitly stated. He quotes another sūtra passage to support this point. It is said in the sūtra that *citta* is liberated from three kinds of taints (*āsrava*): sensual desire (*kāma*), existence (*bhava*), and ignorance (*avidyā*).¹⁰⁶ Since ignorance is a kind of *āsrava* from which *citta* can be liberated, then it is nonsensical to say that only *prajñā* is liberated from ignorance. In this case, we should understand the two kinds of liberations as two stages: the liberation of *citta* from defilements means a practitioner attains the abandonment by prohibition (遮斷 **samvara-prahāṇa* or **vikkhambhana-prahāṇa*), which temporarily suppresses the functioning of the defilements; and the liberation of *prajñā* from ignorance is the ultimate, complete elimination (畢竟斷 *atyanta-prahāṇa*), because ignorance is the cause of all defilements.¹⁰⁷

Finally, Harivarman argues by *reductio ad absurdum*. If it is the case that *citta* and *prajñā* are different dharmas as the opponent proposes, given that *citta* is liberated from defilements and *prajñā* is liberated from ignorance, then there are other sūtras that state that one should eliminate negative qualities such as anger, and so forth. In these cases, what is the thing from which anger, and so forth, are removed?

¹⁰⁶ E.g. D I 84: *tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati*. This formula occurs frequently throughout Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas.

¹⁰⁷ We can supplement details of this teaching from the passage in TatSid chapter 187. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p358b17-23: 若經中說修止斷貪。是說遮斷。何以知之。色等外欲中生貪。若得止樂則不復生。如經中說。行者得淨喜時捨不淨喜。若說無明斷是究竟斷。何以知之。無明斷故貪等煩惱斷滅無餘。經中亦說離貪故心得解脫是名遮斷。離無明故慧得解脫是畢竟斷。

Comments:

Here, the controversy is related to two terms from the sūtras: *cetovimukti* (P. *cetovimutti*) and *prajñāvimukti* (P. *paññāvimutti*). Harivarman in 60.4 quotes a sūtra passage, which states that *citta* is liberated from three taints (*āsrava*). It should be noted that in this passage the sūtra only mentions *citta*. His argument is that if there were *caitasikas* aside from *citta*, the sūtra should mention not only *cetovimukti* but also *caitasikavimukti*. Then his opponent quotes another sūtra passage (62.2) to show that actually this is exactly the case: indeed, a sūtra mentions another kind of *vimukti*, namely, *prajñāvimukti*, and in the opponent's system, *prajñā* is a *caitasika*. Apparently, Harivarman considers this a significant challenge since he dedicates a very long passage (64.2) to his response, which is rare in the TatSid. First he proposes his own model of mind, in which mind is not analyzed into separate *citta* and *caitasikas*, but all those mental phenomena such as *citta*, *kleśa*, and *avidyā*, are unified as a whole aggregate (**rāśi* 聚). The implication is that both *citta* and *prajñā* as instances of such aggregates include all of these constituent elements, and they are not distinguishable because they are both **rāśis*, so that it would be nonsensical to say that *citta* is liberated only from *kleśas* and *prajñā* is liberated only from *avidyā*.

Harivarman apparently considers the passage quoted by the opponent to be from an authentic sūtra even though he rejects the opponent's interpretation of it. Therefore, adopting an accepted exegetical maneuver, he says that this sūtra should not be understood in the explicit and definitive sense (*nītārtha* 了義) but rather in the non-definitive and implicit (*neyārtha* 不了義) sense. He points to the sūtra passage he quoted in 60.4, which states that *citta* is liberated from three *āsravas*: *kāma*, *bhava*, and *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* is explicitly mentioned as one *āsrava* from which *citta* is liberated, then it is wrong to say that only *prajñā* is liberated from *avidyā*. This proves that the sūtra passage quoted by the opponent in 62.2 must be understood in a non-literal way. Harivarman proposes that we should understand the two *vimuktis* as two stages on the path of liberation: *cetovimukti* is the stage in which the practitioner temporarily suppresses the defilements by meditation, while *prajñāvimukti* is the stage in which all

defilements, including *avidyā*, are ultimately eliminated.

Finally, Harivarman criticizes the opponent's position that *prajñā* is a *caitasika* that is different from *citta* by extending the opponent's rationale of reading the sūtras literally. He observes that it is said in the sūtra that *citta* is liberated from *kleśas*, and *prajñā* is liberated from *avidyā*, but sūtras also mention that one should be liberated from other negative mental qualities such as anger, and so forth. Given the opponent's claim that two different things are liberated from two different negative mental qualities, we should also expect there exists something different from *citta* and *prajñā* that can be liberated from yet further negative mental qualities such as anger. But the sūtras do not state that anger is removed from something other than *citta*, in the same manner we should not take *citta* and *prajñā* as different things.

Harivarman and his opponent's exchange regarding the meaning of *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* intertwines textual and exegetical issues with doctrinal issues and hence does little to clarify their disagreement concerning the issue of *citta* and *caitasikas*. A careful examination of the two terms in the sūtras reveals that their meanings are not neatly defined.¹⁰⁸ However, past efforts made by both ancient Buddhist commentators and some modern scholarship to understand terms of this kind are based on two fundamental assumptions. (1) Each of these terms has a specific and distinct technical meaning. In other words, each term in the texts of all periods corresponds to a specific notion and different terms must refer to different things. (2) The sūtra texts, in this case the Pāli Nikāyas, constitute a closed corpus that has an underlying coherent doctrinal system. This implies that although in the sūtras the doctrinal system was not explicitly spelt out clearly as in the Abhidharma texts, one can take these sūtra texts as a reliable source of such an early doctrinal system, and by careful reading of the sūtras and piecing together the fragments scattered throughout the Nikāyas, one can reconstruct the whole picture of the system hidden in the sūtras. However, in his investigation of the dispute concerning whether meditation is necessary for enlightenment, which is an issue closely related to the two notions *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti*, Richard Gombrich (1997: 96-134) has attempted, and I think quite convincingly, to show that both of these two

¹⁰⁸ See de Silva 1978 for a detailed survey of these two terms and other relevant notions in the Pāli Nikāyas.

assumptions are problematic. He suggests (Gombrich 1997: 116-7) that in the most common formula describing the final liberation containing the two terms: “with the destruction of the taints, he realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation of insight, and having entered upon it, dwelled in it.”¹⁰⁹ *cetovimutti* and *paññāvimutti* “refer to the same thing.”¹¹⁰ Also we should understand in these cases the term *citta/ceto* and *paññā* not as technical terms, but just general terms meaning “mind” and “understanding.” In other words, it is not necessarily true that each term used in the sūtras has a specific technical meaning.¹¹¹

On the other hand, it is also true that there are passages in the sūtras using the terms *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti*, which appear to have specific technical meanings. For example, in a passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* these two types of liberations are defined as follows:¹¹²

[T]hrough dispassion for passion (*rāga-virāga*) there is liberation of the mind; through dispassion for ignorance (*avijjā-virāga*) there is liberation by insight.

Gombrich (1997: 113n12) notices that this passage is awkward because *raga-virāga* is a tautology, and *avijjā-virāga* is “nonsensical.” He suggests that such a dichotomy of *cetovimutti* and *paññāvimutti* is a product of “scholastic literalism” and debates among Buddhist teachers holding different opinions.¹¹³ In other words, this awkward passage that clearly defines *cetovimutti* and *paññāvimutti* is likely a later addition to the canon by the compilers of the sūtra texts in the belief that each term used in the sūtra should have a specific and distinct meaning (in Gombrich’s terms, “scholastic literalism”), and also for the purpose of providing scriptural proof for their position in the doctrinal debate.

¹⁰⁹ E.g. D I 156; M I 35-6; S II 214; A I 107: *āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati*. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation with slight adjustments (Bodhi 2012: 206).

¹¹⁰ Gombrich argues that there are several redundancies in this sentence: *anāsavaṃ* is redundant after the phrase *āsavānaṃ khayā*, and two of the three absolutes *abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja* are redundant. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that *cetovimuttiṃ* and *paññāvimuttiṃ* must refer to the same thing.

¹¹¹ Gombrich (1997: 119-20) also gives several other examples to show that *cetovimutti* and *paññāvimutti* have the same referent.

¹¹² E.g. A I 61: *rāgavirāgā cetovimutti, avijjāvirāgā paññāvimutti*. Gombrich’s translation (1997: 113) with some adjustments.

¹¹³ Gombrich 1997: 97, 110ff. Gombrich also analyzes other examples involving *paññāvimutti*.

From this perspective, I suggest that the debate between Harivarman and his opponent regarding *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* confirms Gombrich's observation to some extent. First of all, in 60.4 Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that *citta* is liberated from three *āsravas*. In this passage, only *citta* is mentioned and *prajñā* is absent. In 62.2, the opponent answers by quoting another sūtra passage stating that *prajñā* is liberated by removing *avidyā*. On the basis of Harivarman's paraphrase of this sūtra passage in 64.2, we can be certain that the sūtra passage quoted here by the opponent is exactly the "awkward" passage Gombrich mentioned and suggested was dubious as a later addition to the canon. Indeed, Harivarman also challenges the surface meaning of the sūtra passage. Even though he is not willing to claim that it is spurious, he still suggests that one should not accept the passage's literal meaning and offers an alternative interpretation for the passage, in which he understands the *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* as two different stages of the path to liberation.

2.3.3 Harivarman's Argument 3 (60.5-11, 62.3-7, 64.3-6)

In 60.5-11, Harivarman actually follows the same rationale as in 60.4. He quotes a sūtra passage and points out that in each case the Buddha only mentions *citta* and does not mention *caitasikas*; therefore, *caitasikas* do not exist. Because the opponent responds to all of these passages as a whole, I include here all of these arguments in 60.5-11 under Harivarman's argument 3.

(60.5) It is said in the sūtras that when the Buddha knows that a being's mind is ready, he will teach the four noble truths. No *caitasika* is mentioned in this sūtra.

(60.6) It is also taught in the sūtras that because of the defilement of mind (*cittasaṃkleśa*), there is the defilement of sentient beings (*sattvasaṃkleśa*); because of the purity of mind (*cittavyavadāna*), there is the purification of sentient beings (*sattvaviśuddhi*). Again no *caitasika* is mentioned in this sūtra.

(60.7) It is also said in the sūtras that when a bhikṣu enters the fourth *dhyāna* and attains the purified, unmovable mind, then he knows as it is (*yathābhūta*) the four noble truths.

(60.8) In the twelve-linked dependent origination taught in sūtras, it is said, conditioned by volitional formation (*saṃskāra*), there is consciousness (*viññāna*). No *caitasika* is mentioned.

(60.9) The sūtras also taught that a person consists of six *dhātus*; among the six only *viññāna* is listed as a *dhātu*, and no *caitasika* is mentioned.

(60.10) It is also said in the sūtra that nothing changes more easily (**laghu-parivarta*) than mind.

(60.11) There is also a simile taught in the sūtra that a being is like a city while the mind is the lord of the city.

In each of the sūtra passages quoted above, the Buddha presents a doctrinal point regarding mind (*citta* or *viññāna*), and *caitasikas* are never mentioned. Harivarman argues that because in all these sūtras the Buddha does not mention *caitasika*, they do not exist.

In 62.3-7, the opponent raises a series of explanations for the fact that the Buddha does not mention *caitasikas* in these sūtras.

(62.3) The Buddha mentions only *citta* because it is superior.

(62.4) People in the world are more familiar with *citta* but not *caitasikas*.

(62.5) There are teachings in the sūtras that are non-exhaustive. In other words, something might be left out as in the case of the *caitasikas* here.

(62.6) The opponent gives an example to show that in some cases the sūtra teaches non-exhaustively. The Buddha mentions in a sūtra that if one can abandon one dharma, namely, greed (*lobha*), one is certain to reach the path of non-returner (*anāgāmin*). But actually one who reaches this path needs to abandon other *kleśas* in addition to *lobha*. In other words here, the Buddha does not give an exhaustive list of dharmas to be abandoned by an *anāgāmin* but rather emphasizes *lobha* alone.

(62.7) The opponent concludes by saying that this argument, namely, that the Buddha does not teach exhaustively and leaves *caitasikas* out, can be applied to all the passages mentioned by Harivarman from 60.5.

In 64.3-6, Harivarman answers and refutes one by one the opponent's arguments in 62.3-7.

(64.3) Harivarman first answers 62.3, in which the opponent says that the Buddha only mentions *citta* because *citta* is superior. Harivarman asks the opponent, what is exactly the “superior meaning” (勝義) of *citta* that other *caitasikas* such as *prajñā* do not have?

(64.4) The opponent argues in 62.4 that the Buddha teaches only *citta* because people in the world are more familiar with *citta* but not *caitasikas*. Harivarman points out that people in the world are also familiar with pleasant and unpleasant feelings (*vedanā*). Why does the Buddha not teach *vedanā* in these cases but only *citta*?

(64.5) The opponent says in 62.5 that some sūtras teach unexhaustively and leave dharmas like *caitasikas* out. Harivarman asks why in all these cases only *citta* is mentioned and *caitasikas* are left out? In other words, why is there never a case in which the sūtra mentions *caitasikas* only and leaves out *citta*?

(64.6) Harivarman challenges the opponent’s example in 62.6 as demonstrating the non-exhaustiveness of teachings in the sūtra. Harivarman contends that we must understand this sūtra passage with regard to its specific context. In that sūtra, the Buddha was teaching for those who have excessive greed (*lobha*); therefore, the Buddha singles out *lobha* for them and says that if you can abandon this one dharma you will certainly reach the path of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*). Because this sūtra is taught for such a specific purpose and it is not expounding a general doctrinal point, one should not use it to prove a general doctrinal point. In other words, this passage cannot be a proper *āgama* to prove the existence of *caitasikas*.

Comments:

The arguments from both sides are clear and straightforward. Here, I would point out that among the four reasons the opponent gives in 62.3-6 for why the sūtras do not mention *caitasikas*, only the first one, namely, that *citta* is superior, appears in other Abhidharma texts such as the MVŚ and the **Nyāyānusāra*. The TatSid provides perhaps the best record of the debate on the *caitasika* issue among the extant texts, and there are specific points and textual references preserved only in this text.

2.3.4 Harivarman's Argument 4 (60.12, 62.8-9, 64.7)

(60.12) Harivarman quotes a sūtra with a parallel in the SĀ, which states that for a sentient being internally there is the body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*), and externally there is name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*). These two, namely, *savijñānaka kāya* and *nāma-rūpa*, constitute a dyad (*dvayaṃ*). Also in this sūtra passage the Buddha refers to the sentient being as a “body with consciousness” (*savijñānaka kāya*) and does not mention any *caitasikas*.

(62.8) The opponent's answer is based on the same sūtra and claims that the reference to “external” (*nāma-rūpa*) is equivalent to mentioning *caitasikas*, because in the Abhidharma analysis of the twelve bases (*āyatana*), *caitasikas* are included in the *dharma-āyatana*, the object of *mano-vijñāna*, both of which are included in *nāma-rūpa*.

(62.9) The opponent further states that actually there are three things mentioned in this sūtra passage: “the body with consciousness” (*savijñānaka kāya*) can be analyzed into (1) consciousness and the (2) body, which is equivalent to the faculties (*indriya*), and the (3) external name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), which are the external objects. So in total there are three things and not only two. Also in the sūtra the Buddha has used “all external signs” (外一切相 *bahidhā sabbanimittā*) in place of external *nāma-rūpa*, and these “all external signs” include *caitasikas*.

(64.7) Harivarman replies that to understand the external *nāma-rūpa* as including *caitasikas* is the opponent's own speculation and is not the intention of the quoted sūtra. Here, the external *nāma-rūpa* should be understood as the objects (**ālambana*) of mind.

Comments:

This round of exchanges between Harivarman and his opponent is fascinating in terms of both textual and doctrinal exegesis. In 60.12, Harivarman quotes a sūtra, very likely SĀ 294,¹¹⁴ which states, for a sentient being “internally there is the body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*), externally there is name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*); these two are a dyad (*dvaya*).” Dependent on this dyad there is contact (*sparśa*), which is of six kinds in accordance with the six bases (*āyatana*). Harivarman points out that here the sūtra says

¹¹⁴ SĀ no. 294, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 12) T02, p83c24-6: 愚癡無聞凡夫無明覆。愛緣繫得此識身。如是內有識身。外有名色。此二緣生六觸入處。

that the internal *savijñānaka kāya* and the external *nāma-rūpa* constitute a dyad, which precludes any other things such as the *caitasikas*. Moreover, He also points out that in referring to a sentient being the sūtra uses the term “body with consciousness” (*savijñānaka kāya*); again it mentions only *vijñāna* and not any *caitasika*.

The opponent answers (62.8) that actually the dyad mentioned in the sūtra does not leave out *caitasikas* because the “external *nāma-rūpa*” includes *caitasikas*. He also explains that they are called “external” because they are included in the *dharma-āyatana* within the category of twelve *āyatanas*, and the *dharma-āyatana* is “external” in contrast to *mano-āyatana* which is “internal.” Here, the opponent, who is a supporter of *caitasikas*, understands *nāma-rūpa* as the material (*rūpa*) and the four non-material *skandhas* (*vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna*) in the standard Abhidharma interpretation,¹¹⁵ and the four non-material *skandhas* includes all *caitasikas*. Furthermore, when they are taken as objects of *manovijñāna*, they are included in the *dharma-āyatana*, which is external in contrast to the internal *manovijñāna*. The opponent also points out (62.9) that, although the sūtra mentions the internal and the external as a “dyad,” strictly speaking the “internal” *savijñāna kāya* can be further analyzed as the physical body and the six internal faculties (*indriya*). As a result, the “dyad” should not be taken as definitive but can be further analyzed into three. And the “external *nāma-rūpa*” represents the external objects (*ālambana*) of the *indriyas*. In 62.9, the opponent quotes another sūtra, which uses “all external signs” (外一切相 **bahirdhā sarvanimitta*) in the place of “internal *nāma-rūpa*.” The opponent claims that in this case “all external signs” include *caitasikas*, which is basically the same argument as including *caitasikas* in the *dharma-āyatana*.

The sūtra quoted in 60.12 by Harivarman has a parallel in SĀ no. 294,¹¹⁶ in which the Buddha describes the cognitive process: dependent on the dyad of the “body with

¹¹⁵ See, for example, AKBh 142.15-16: *atha nāmarūpamiti ko 'ritha? rūpaṃ vistareṇa yathoktam. nāma tvarūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ*. Also Vism XVIII analyzes *nāma-rūpa* as “mentality and materiality” as Ñānamoli (1956: 679-92) puts it.

¹¹⁶ SĀ no. 294, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 12) T02, p83c24-7: 愚癡無聞凡夫無明覆。愛緣繫得此識身。如是內有識身。外有名色。此二緣生六觸入處。此六觸入所觸。愚癡無聞凡夫苦。樂受覺。因起種種。 A Sanskrit fragment of this sūtra reads (Tripāṭhī 1962: 140-44): *avidyayā nivṛtasya bālasya tṛṣṇayā saṃyuktasyaivam ayam bālasyaśrutavataḥ pṛthagjanasya savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ samudāgataḥ. ity ayañ cāsya savijñānakaḥ kāyo bahirdhā ca nāmarūpam. evam dvayaṃ. dvayaṃ khalu pratītya sparśaḥ. ṣaḍ imāni sparśāyatanāni yañ sprśaḥ sprśto bālo 'śrutavān pṛthagjanaḥ sukhaduḥkhaṃ pratisaṃvedayati. ato vā punar upādāyateṣāṃ vānyatamena. Pāli S no.12.19, II 23-4: avijjānīvaraṇassa bhikkhave bālassa taṇhāya sampayuttassa evam ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato. iti ayaṃ ceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpam, itthetaṃ dvayaṃ. dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso saḷevāyatanāni, yehi phuṭṭho bālo sukhaduḥkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedayati etesaṃ vā aññatarena.*

consciousness” (*savijñāna kāya*) and “name-and-form” (*nāma-rūpa*) there is contact, which occurs through the six bases (*āyatana*). In 62.8-9, the opponent follows the same analysis by placing *nāma-rūpa* and “all external signs” (*bahidhā sabbanimittā*) within the *dharmā-āyatana* as objects of *mano-vijñāna*. And in 62.8-9 the opponent is likely quoting two sūtras with parallels in the Chinese SĀ (nos. 198, 199).¹¹⁷ In these sūtras, the Buddha instructs Rāhula that in order to get rid of the “I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit” (我 . 我所見 . 我慢使繫著 **ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānānuśaya*) in regard to both “the body with consciousness” (此識身 *savijñāna kāya*) and “all external signs (外境界一切相 **bahirdhā sarvanimitta*), one should contemplate the six internal *āyatanas* (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) as well as the six external *āyatanas* (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas). All of these whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, beautiful or ugly, far or near, are all not oneself (非我), not different from self (不異我), and not mutually inclusive (不相在).¹¹⁸ These two sūtras in the Chinese SĀ do not have exact parallels in Pāli; the closest are S no.18.21-22, 22.91-92.¹¹⁹ In these suttas, the opening is exactly same as the Chinese sūtras: Rāhula approaches the Buddha and the Buddha teaches him what to do in order to get rid of the “I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit” (*ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā*) with regard to both “the body with consciousness” (*imasmiṅca savijñāṇake kāye*) and “all external signs (*bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu*). But in the main body of the Pāli suttas, the Buddha states that one should analyze the five *skandhas* instead of the twelve *āyatanas* as in the Chinese SĀ sūtras. However, it should be noted that in the Chinese SĀ, two other sūtras (SĀ nos. 23-4)¹²⁰ have the same content as the Pāli suttas in which “all external signs” are analyzed as the five *skandhas*.

Here, we see a textual issue that is connected with a doctrinal issue. Harivarman quotes a sūtra with a parallel in the SĀ sūtra no. 294, which mentions the dyad of the internal “body with consciousness” (*savijñāna kāya*) and the external “name-and-form”

¹¹⁷ T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 8) T2, p50c7-51a14.

¹¹⁸ Here, the English translation is based in part on Bodhi 2000: 948. For the last phrase, Pāli and Chinese versions have different readings.

¹¹⁹ S II 252-3, III 135-7.

¹²⁰ T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p5a11-b25.

(*nāma-rūpa*); the corresponding Pāli sutta (S no.12.19) agrees with the Chinese version at this point. Then in 62.8-9, the opponent quotes a sūtra with a parallel in SĀ 198-199, in which the dyad is not *savijñāna kaya* as opposed to *nāma-rūpa*, but *savijñāna kaya* as opposed to “all external signs” (**bahirdhā sarvanimitta*). Because of the parallelism of the two pairs, it is natural for a commentator to take *nāma-rūpa* and *sarvanimitta* as equivalent. But we also see the discrepancy in the analysis of the latter dyad: all the Pāli suttas analyze “all external signs” as the five *khandhas*, while the sūtra quoted by Harivarman and his opponent analyze the dyad in terms of the twelve *āyatanas*. The related doctrinal problem is the question of what exactly *nāma-rūpa* is. Apparently, there are different opinions. In 62.8-9 the opponent follows the standard Abhidharma interpretation that understands *nāma-rūpa* as the five *skandhas*: *rūpa* is *rūpa-skandha*, and *nāma* corresponds to the four non-material *skandhas*, which in turn include all the *caitasikas* in the Abhidharma system. But in 64.7, Harivarman summarily rejects this interpretation. He says that such an understanding of *nāma-rūpa* is only the opponent’s speculation (*samjñā-vikalpa* 憶想分別) and not what the sūtra intended. A proper understanding of *nāma-rūpa* equates it with the objects (**ā lambana*) of mind (心緣).

The fact that all of the Pāli versions of the relevant sūtra uniformly analyze *nāma-rūpa* as the five *khandhas*, while the corresponding Chinese versions of the sūtra in the SĀ have both twelve *āyatanas* and five *skandhas*, indicates that the compilation of the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* is likely redacted, and possibly in accordance with Abhidhamma interpretations. The fact that the Chinese SĀ preserves both versions of the sūtra suggests that the sūtras were not necessarily uniform on this point. It is not unreasonable to assume that the compiler(s) of the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* may have made an effort to ensure that the suttas in the collection were uniform and coherent and, by doing so, may voluntarily or involuntarily have allowed later Abhidhamma doctrines to influence the choice of which suttas to include in the collection as well as their form.

Moreover, Harivarman’s suggestion that we should understand *nāma-rūpa* as the “objects of mind” (心緣) is intriguing given that almost all commentaries and Abhidharma sources interpret *nāma-rūpa* as an abbreviated form for the five *skandhas*, and even most modern scholars take this interpretation for granted without further

examination.¹²¹ However, as Sue Hamilton (1996: 125) has noticed, nowhere in the Sutta Piṭaka is *nāma-rūpa* defined in terms of the five *khandhas*. The only explicit definition of *nāma* given in the Sutta Piṭaka equates it with five mental phenomena of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra*, *phassa*, and *manasikāra*, and *rūpa* is defined as the four material elements and their derivatives.¹²² It is understandable that commentators would understand this particular definition of *nāma-rūpa* as implying the five *skandhas*, but, as Hamilton (1996: 123) points out, to understand *nāma-rūpa* as the five *skandhas* does not fit well in the context of the teaching of dependent origination. In the twelve-linked formula of dependent origination, *nāma-rūpa* is the fourth link which is dependent on *viññāṇa*; and in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* in the Dīgha Nikāya, dependent origination has only nine links, in which *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are said to be inter-dependent. If *nāma-rūpa* is equivalent to the five *khandhas*, which already include *viññāṇa* as one *khandha*, how can it be dependent on *viññāṇa* which is a separate link in the chain of dependent origination?

Sue Hamilton (1996: 126-7) suggests that the explanation of *nāma-rūpa* in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* is especially helpful for an alternative understanding of *nāma-rūpa*. The passage is so important that I think it worth quoting in full here:¹²³

“It was said: ‘With *nāma-rūpa* as condition there is contact (*phassa*).’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way.

“If those qualities (*ākāra*), traits (*līṅga*), signs (*nimitta*), and indicators (*uddesa*) through which there is a designation (*paññatti*) of the body of name (*nāma-kāya*) were all absent, would verbal impression (*adhivacana-samphassa*) be discerned with regard to the body of form (*rūpa-kāya*)?”

¹²¹ For example, Gethin 1998: 150. Harvey 1995: 116-9. Hamilton 1996: 136n20 gives several other examples. Also Bodhi 1995: 18.

¹²² M I 53: *vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro -- idaṃ vuccatāvuso, nāmaṃ; cattāri ca mahābhūtāni, catunnañca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ -- idaṃ vuccatāvuso, rūpaṃ. iti idañca nāmaṃ idañca rūpaṃ -- idaṃ vuccatāvuso, nāmarūpaṃ.*

¹²³ D II 62: *nāmarūpapaccayā phasso ti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, imināpetam pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā nāmarūpapaccayā phasso. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi līṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu līṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho rūpakāye adhvācānasamphasso paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi līṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho nāmakāye paṭiṅhasamphasso paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi ... pe ... yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho adhvācānasamphasso vā paṭiṅhasamphasso vā paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi ... pe ... yehi uddesehi nāmarūpassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho phasso paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. tasmātiḥānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo phassassa, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ. English translation depends in part upon Bodhi 1995: 59 with some adjustments of the key terms according to Hamilton 1996: 126.*

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a designation of the body of form (*rūpa-kāya*) were all absent, would sensory-impression (*paṭigha-samphassa*) be discerned with regard to the body of name (*nāma-kāya*)?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a designation of the body of name (*nāma-kāya*) and the body of form (*rūpa-kāya*) were all absent, would either verbal impression or sensory impression be discerned?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of *nāma-rūpa* were all absent, would contact (*phassa*) be discerned?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for contact (*phassa*), namely, *nāma-rūpa*.”

This passage describes how *nāma-rūpa* functions as the condition for contact (*sparśa*, P. *phassa*). Here, contact is analyzed as having two components: verbal or conceptual impression (*adhivacana-samphassa*) and sensory impression (*paṭigha-samphassa*).¹²⁴ Also, *nāma-rūpa* is analyzed into *nāma-kāya* and *rūpa-kāya*. Here, I think we should understand *kāya* as used in compound-final position to denote a multitude of factors taken as a whole; *nāma-kāya* then means *nāma* in its multitude taken as a whole. So that *nāma-kāya* and *rūpa-kāya* have no significant difference from *nāma* and *rūpa* used alone. The statement that “through those qualities (*ākāra*), traits (*liṅga*), signs (*nimitta*), and indicators (*uddesa*) there are the designations (*paññatti*) of *nāma* and *rūpa* (*yehi ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa/rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti*)” strongly suggests that *nāma* and *rūpa* do not refer to the four non-material *khandhas* and the *rūpa-khandha* respectively as most commentators understand them. Instead, they constitute the abstract “blueprint” of an individual, which is constructed through “qualities (*ākāra*), traits (*liṅga*), signs (*nimitta*), and indicators (*uddesa*),” namely, “all signs” (*sarvanimitta*) as objects of consciousness. As Sue Hamilton puts it (1996: 127):

Rather than representing ‘mind’, *nāma* provides an abstract identity for the

¹²⁴ Sue Hamilton (1996: 49) suggests that *paṭigha-samphassa* is the contact of the five sensory faculties with their objects, and *adhivacana-samphassa* is the “metaphorical” contact of the *manodhātu* with its objects.

individual. And we arrive at a meaning which is also the literal meaning of the word *nāma*: the individual's ‘name’. This is not mere name, but, rather, ‘name’ as the entire conceptual identity of the individual. *Rūpa* provides ‘form’ or recognisability to the individual in the sense of giving shape to that abstract identity which, eventually, is apperceptible by means of sensory impression.

In other words, we should understand *nāma-rūpa* more in its literal meaning “name-and-form” rather than as the five *skandhas*. In the context of the chain of dependent origination, this name-and-form is the prototypical identity of an individual, and, in a more general sense, *nāma-rūpa* is the name-and-form of any object of mind.¹²⁵

Now let us return to the issue of the “internal body with consciousness (*savijñāna kāya*)” and “external name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*)” about which Harivarman and his opponent are arguing. We have seen that the opponent suggests that the external *nāma-rūpa* includes *caitasikas*, which follows the Abhidharma interpretation that *nāma-rūpa* is equivalent to the five *skandhas*, in which the *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* account for all the *caitasikas*. But Harivarman points out that this is merely the opponent’s speculation and has no basis in the sūtras. Rather, he suggests that we should understand *nāma-rūpa* as “objects of mind (心緣),” or more precisely “what the mind takes as its objects,” namely, the name and form of the object. In this light, the meaning Harivarman proposes is very close to what Sue Hamilton has observed in the sutta: *nāma-rūpa* is the name-and-form of an object of mind.¹²⁶

2.3.5 Harivarman’s Argument 5 (60.13, 62.10, 64.8)

(60.13) Harivarman quotes a statement in the sūtra regarding the generation of contact (*sparśa*) to prove that there are no *caitasika* dharmas. It is taught in the sūtras that,

¹²⁵ This understanding of *nāma-rūpa* as “name-and-form” resonates the meaning of this term in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. See Hamilton 1996: 121-3. Also Reat 1990: 70-79.

¹²⁶ According to Saṅghabhadra, the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta defines *nāma* as “that which leads to the completion of a specific sentient being’s continuum of existence.” (No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 29) T29, p502c: 上座意謂順成彼彼有情相續。故說為名。是能為因。順成彼義。) The sentence is awkward and hard to understand, but it likely means what Sue Hamilton calls the “abstract blueprint” of a sentient being. If so, then what Śrīlāta says would refer to the meaning of *nāma-rūpa* in the context of dependent origination. Harivarman’s interpretation is more general and concerns all possible objects. Both of these interpretations represent aspects of the meaning of *nāma-rūpa* that we can deduce from sūtra texts but do not fit within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system.

depending on the sense faculty eye, with regard to the object form (*rūpa*), there is eye-consciousness (*caṅṣu-vijñāna*); the coming together (*saṅgati*) of the three is contact (*sparśa*), and depending on contact there are feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth. Here, the sūtra states that the coming together of *three* (namely, the sense faculty, the object, and the corresponding consciousness) is *sparśa*. If there were *caitasikas*, the number should be more than three.

(62.10) In response, the opponent apparently uses an argument similar to 62.3 and 62.5. In 62.3, he proposes that the Buddha only mentions *citta* in his teachings because *citta* is superior, and in 62.5 he suggests that sometimes the teachings in the sūtras are not exhaustive, some dharmas are left out. Here, the statement about contact (*sparśa*) is similar: because *sparśa* gives rise to *vedanā*, and so forth, it is more important than other *caitasikas* in this particular context. Therefore, the sūtra only mentions *sparśa* and leaves out the other *caitasikas*.

(64.8) Harivarman responds that the opponent's argument in 62.10 is subject to a major error. He points out that according to the opponent's Abhidharma doctrine, and hence the case in Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems, *sparśa*, *vedanā*, and so forth, as *caitasikas* are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with *citta*, and, in all those Abhidharma systems, association (*saṃprayoga*) means they occur all simultaneously. If so, then *sparśa*, *vedanā*, and so forth, must occur simultaneously. Why then does the sūtra state that *sparśa* is the cause of *vedanā*, and not the other way around, that is, that *vedanā* is the cause of *sparśa*?

Comments:

This round of exchanges is focused on the sūtra passage regarding contact (*sparśa*). There is no doubt that both Harivarman and his opponent consider the sūtra passage describing the arising of contact (*sparśa*) to be extremely important. Harivarman uses it here as a scriptural proof (*āgama*) for the non-existence of *caitasikas*, and later in 61.6 the opponent quotes this same passage to prove that *caitasikas* exist as dharmas separate from *citta*. Moreover, since *sparśa* has a pivotal position in the process of cognition as described in the sūtra, it is understandable that the commentators feel compelled to explain it. The TatSid has a separate chapter devoted to *sparśa* (ch. 85). However, in this sūtra passage describing the arising of *sparśa* in the cognitive process, there is a serious

textual problem that is correlated to the two opinions concerning whether or not *sparśa* is a real individual dharma (*dravya*) or just a designation (*prajñapti*). And this textual problem is noticed by both Harivarman and his opponent. In the TatSid chapter 85, the opponent points out the discrepancy regarding *sparśa* in the sūtras:¹²⁷

There are two kinds of *sparśas* mentioned in the sūtras: (1) the coming together of three things [is] *sparśa*; [and] (2) because of the coming together of the three things, there is *sparśa*.¹²⁸ Therefore, one should know that there are two kinds of *sparśa*: one has self-nature (**svabhāva*), and one is a designation (*prajñapti*).

This problem concerning the arising of *sparśa* is already present in the Chinese *Samyukta Āgama*. In total, twelve sūtras¹²⁹ in the SĀ contain a passage describing the arising of contact in the cognitive process. Eight¹³⁰ of these present the passage in form (1) mentioned by the opponent in this passage in the TatSid:

The eye (*cakṣu*), taking form (*rūpa*) as object, gives birth to eye-consciousness (*cakṣu-vijñāna*); the coming together of the three things [is] contact (*sparśa*).¹³¹

The other four cases present the passage in form (2):

Depending on the eye and form there arises eye-consciousness; the coming together of the three things gives birth to (生) contact.¹³²

Here, “the coming together of the three things gives birth to contact” most likely corresponds to “*trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśaḥ*” as attested in the AKBh. This formula in

¹²⁷ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c: 又經中有二種觸。一三事和合觸。二三事和合故觸。故知觸有二種。一有自體。二是假名。Tripāthī 1962: 207n226 notes that the *Arthaviniścaya Sūtra* commentary also refers to the same problem.

¹²⁸ Vasubandhu’s AKBh also mentions the variant readings in the sūtra regarding the different definitions of *sparśa*, but the passage he quotes is an expanded version: p.143.20-23: *ye punaḥ saṃnipātādanyaṃ sparśamāhusta etatsūtram katham pariharanti "iti ya eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ saṃgatīḥ saṃnipātaḥ samavāyāḥ sa sparśa" iti. na vā evaṃ paṭhanti. kim tarhi? "saṃgateḥ saṃnipātāt samavāyād" iti paṭhanti*. Apparently, he adopts the second reading in his own definition of *sparśa*: AKBh p132.10: *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśo bhavati*.

¹²⁹ SĀ nos. 68, 213, 214, 221, 228, 273, 276, 306, 307, 308, 460, and 551.

¹³⁰ SĀ nos. 213, 214, 221, 228, 273, 306, 307, 308.

¹³¹ 眼緣色。生眼識。三事和合觸。No. 99 雜阿含經 T02, p54a, 55a, 55c, 72c, 87c, 88b.

¹³² 緣眼及色。生眼識。三事和合生觸。No. 99 雜阿含經 T02, p18a, 74b, 117c, 144b.

form (2) occurs only in the Chinese SĀ and not in other Āgamas. And in the Pāli Nikāyas, the passage regarding *phassa* never occurs in form (2) but is uniformly in the form “*tiṅṅaṃ saṅgati phasso*,”¹³³ which matches form (1) mentioned by Harivarman’s opponent. Among the four sūtras that follow form (2) in the Chinese SĀ, with the exception of SĀ sūtra no. 68, which does not have a parallel in Pāli, the other three are allegedly taught by the Buddha’s disciples rather the Buddha himself.¹³⁴ Moreover, in the Pāli parallels to these three,¹³⁵ the formulaic passage describing the cognitive process involving *sparśa* does not occur at all.

The formula in form (2), which has “the coming together of the three things gives birth to *sparśa*” (三事和合生觸), not only occurs in the Chinese SĀ but also in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts such as the *Dharmaskandha* and AKBh.¹³⁶ Given that the Chinese SĀ is likely a text of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, and in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma *sparśa* is a *caitasika* as a real individual entity, they cannot accept the teaching that it is simply “the coming together of three things.” Therefore it is quite possible that the passages in the Chinese SĀ that follow form (2) are later interpolations with a sectarian partisan motivation.

Nevertheless, in these discussions in 60.13, 62.10, and 64.8, Harivarman and his opponent do not mention the different readings of the sūtra passage. Harivarman simply quotes the passage saying that the coming together of the three is *sparśa*, and if there were *caitasikas*, the Buddha would have mentioned them and the number would be more than three. In 62.10, the opponent does not challenge the sūtra passage Harivarman has quoted, but answers that the Buddha mentions *sparśa* alone because it is the most important *caitasika* in this circumstance. In 64.8, Harivarman does not answer the opponent’s argument in 62.10 directly, perhaps thinking that this argument has already been refuted in 64.3 and 64.6. Instead, Harivarman raises a new argument against the opponent’s position that *sparśa* is a separate *caitasika* that is associated (*samprayukta*)

¹³³ MI 111-2, III 281-2, 285-6; S II 72-75; IV 32, 33, 86, 87, 90.

¹³⁴ SĀ no. 276 by Nandaka, no. 460 by Ānanda, and no. 551 by Kātyāyana.

¹³⁵ SĀ no. 276 ≈ M no. 146; SĀ no. 460 ≈ S no. 35.129 (IV 113); SĀ no. 551 ≈ S no. 22.3 (III 9).

¹³⁶ *Dharmaskandha* No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 12) T26, p509a: 眼及色為緣生眼識。三和合故生觸。AKBh 132.10: *trayāṅgāṃ samnipātāt sparśo bhavati*.

with *citta*. Association means that the *caitasikas* and *citta* occur simultaneously, but the sūtra passage states explicitly that *sparśa* is the cause of *vedanā*, and so forth. In that case, how it is possible that they occur all simultaneously? This argument is based on a fundamental doctrine in the TatSid that a cause (*hetu*) and its effect (*phala*) cannot occur simultaneously; as a result, consciousness and other mental phenomena must occur successively in a sequence.¹³⁷ The TatSid does not give further answers from the Ābhidharmikas on this question. The MVŚ records two Ābhidharmika answers: one resorts to a special concept of “leading power” (**anunaya-bala* 隨順力) assigned to *sparśa*, which makes *sparśa* must precedes *vedanā* and not the other way around. The second answer the MVŚ gives is based on the Sarvāstivāda notion of “dependent origination regarding state” (*āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda*). In brief, the theory proposes that in each moment of the cognitive process, all five *skandhas* exist. In other words, in each moment there are always *vijñāna* and *caitasikas*. But since, in a specific moment in the cognitive process, there is a dominant factor that characterizes that moment, it is named after the dominant factor. For example, in the first moment when consciousness impinges on the object, the dominant factor is *sparśa*; hence, this moment is called *sparśa*. In this moment, *caitasikas* such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* all exist but their functions do not constitute the primary activity, so that they are not mentioned. In the next moment, the mind experiences pleasant or unpleasant feelings from contact with the object. Even though other *caitasikas* such as *sparśa*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* still exist, this moment is dominated by *vedanā*; hence, it is called *vedanā*.¹³⁸ Vasubandhu in the AKBh

¹³⁷ See TatSid 65.3-4, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 5) T32, p276b: 又因果不俱。識是想等法因。此法不應一時俱有。故無相應。又佛說。甚深因緣法中是事生。故是事得生。又如穀子牙莖枝葉花實等現見因果相次。故有識等。亦應次第而生。Also 31.11, (卷 3) T32, p258c: 因果不得一時合故。The Sarvāstivādins consider the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, as well as between one *caitasika* and other *caitasikas*, as representing the association cause (*saṃprayoga-hetu*), and this cause is a subset of the co-existent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*). Saṅghabhadra records in his **Nyāyānusāra* that, similar to Harivarman, the Sthavira Śrīlāta also denies the existence of *sahabhū-hetu* and *saṃprayoga-hetu*. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 15) T29, p421b: 又上座說。諸行決定無俱生因。This is a position that has been attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Abhidharmadīpa*: *Abhidh-dīpa* p.47.13-48.2: *dārṣṭāntikasya hi sarvamapratyakṣam pañcānām vijñānakāyānāmātīta viśayatvādyadā khalu cakṣūrūpe vidyete tadā vijñānamasat. yadā vijñānam sat, cakṣūrūpe tadāsatī, vijñānakṣaṇasthityabhāve svārthopalabdhyānupapatteśca.*

¹³⁸ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 23) T27, p120b: 問觸受俱起。何故此經但說觸緣受。不說受緣觸耶。答二雖俱起而觸緣受非受緣觸。隨順勝故。謂觸於受勝。非受於觸。如燈與明。雖復俱起。而明因燈在燈因明。此亦如是。復次此經中說分位緣起。前位名觸後位名受。故不應責。問何故前位諸蘊名觸。後位諸蘊名受耶。答前位未能分別苦樂境界差別。但樂觸對種種境界。故說為觸。後位能了苦樂境界。避危就安故說為受。復次前說觸受雖復俱起。而觸於受隨順力勝故。觸為受因。非受為觸因。因前果後其理必然。不應為責。問何故觸順受勝非受順觸勝耶。答要因觸境方受違順。非受違順乃觸境。故觸於受隨順為勝。非受於觸隨順為勝。此

also has a long discussion of the issue, and he agrees in general with the Vaibhāṣikas that *sparśa* should arise together simultaneously with *vijñāna* other *caitasikas*, but he does not mention the notion of *āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda*.¹³⁹ Thus, it would appear that this issue concerning *sparśa* was quite troublesome for the Vaibhāṣikas, particularly the sūtra teaching concerning the causation from *sparśa* to *vedanā*. That will be a topic of a separate study.

2.4 The Opponent's Arguments for *caitasika* and Harivarman's Refutations

In chapter 61 of the TatSid, Harivarman collects his opponent's arguments for the existence of *caitasikas*, and in chapter 63 he attempts to refute those arguments one by one. But unlike his own arguments in chapters 60 and 64, he does not allow his opponent to offer counter arguments in response to his refutations. Perhaps he thinks, or he wants to suggest, that his refutations are definitive with no possible response. In the following, I will present each of the opponent's arguments in chapter 62 accompanied by Harivarman's refutation.

2.4.1 The Opponent's Argument 1 (61.1-2, 63.1)

(61.1) The opponent argues that *caitasika* dharmas, which are different from *citta* and are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with *citta*, must exist because of their relationship of association (*saṃprayoga*) with *citta*. If *caitasikas* did not exist, then there would be no association. Since in fact there is association, then *caitasikas* must exist.

(61.2) The opponent continues with the argument of association. Assuming that Harivarman might answer that association should be understood as a relationship between one *citta* and another *citta*, the opponent quotes a verse from the Dharmapada in which the Buddha says that *citta* travels alone. He interprets "travels alone" as excluding the possibility that one *citta* can be accompanied by another *citta* because all *cittas* are of

依緣起理趣而說。不依相應俱有因說。For a detailed discussion of *āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda*, see Cox 2000: 573-572.

¹³⁹ AKBh p.145.3-146.24.

the same nature. But the verse does not exclude *caitasikas*, which are of a different nature from *cittas*, and association does exist between things of a different nature. The opponent uses a simile to demonstrate his point: just like a bhikṣu is referred to as alone even when there are other beings such as animals and beasts nearby, a *citta* is still referred to as alone when it is accompanied by *caitasikas*.

(63.1) Harivarman answers that the opponent's argument supporting *caitasika* is based on a specific definition of association, namely, that association is the relationship between things of different natures (*citta* and *caitasikas*) that occur simultaneously. Harivarman denies that there is such a relationship in the case of mental events, and claims that the verse "*citta* travels alone" indeed excludes the existence of *caitasikas*.

Comments:

Here, the opponent builds his argument on the basis of the inter-dependence between the doctrine of *caitasika* and the doctrine of association (*saṃprayoga*). He argues that because there is a relationship of association between them, which is defined as a relationship between things of different natures and not things of the same nature, *citta* must be associated with something different from it by nature, namely, the *caitasikas*. This position is very close to the position of the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas. In the MVŚ, the relationship of association (*saṃprayoga* 相應) is explicitly defined as the relationship between *citta* and the *caitasikas*.¹⁴⁰

However, this inter-dependence of the doctrines of *saṃprayoga* and *caitasika* actually subjects the opponent's position to circular reasoning: he defines *saṃprayoga* as a relationship between *citta* and *caitasika*, and then uses this relationship to argue for the existence of *caitasikas*. So logically this argument cannot stand. Moreover, by tying the doctrine of *saṃprayoga* to the doctrine of *caitasika*, the opponent puts both of them in danger: if either is refuted, the other will automatically be refuted. And this is exactly what Harivarman is trying to do.

In 63.1, Harivarman first proposes that there is no *saṃprayoga* relationship between dharmas, and the phrase "*citta* travels alone" should be understood literally, that is, there

¹⁴⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80a17-8: 云何相應因。謂一切心心所法。

is just *citta* alone and no other dharmas simultaneously accompanying it. Therefore, there are no *caitasikas* that exist as mental factors associated with *citta*. He does not give the further details of his argument here perhaps because he presents detailed arguments against *saṃprayoga* in chapters 65-7, which will be discussed in chapter 5.

2.4.2 The Opponent's Argument 2 (61.3, 63.2)

(61.3) The opponent argues that the existence of *caitasikas* as dharmas different from *citta* can be deduced from their affiliations with different categories of the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatana*s, and eighteen *dhātus*. The technical term for a dharma's inclusion in these categories is *saṃgraha* (攝). He argues that *citta* belongs to the *vijñāna-skandha*, the *mana-āyatana*, and the six *vijñāna-dhātus* plus the *mano-dhātu*; and *caitasikas* belong to the three *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, the *dharma-āyatana* and the *dharma-dhātu*. In brief, *citta* is included in seven *dhātus*, one *āyatana*, and one *skandha*; and the *caitasikas* are included in one *dhātu*, one *āyatana*, and three *skandhas*. The opponent concludes that because *citta* and *caitasika* belong to different categories, they must be different dharmas.

(63.2) Harivarman points out that the method of “inclusion” (*saṃgraha*), which determines how a dharma belongs to or included in different categories such as the *skandhas*, *āyatana*s, and *dhātus*, was actually never taught by the Buddha. Since it was a creation of the sūtra compilers, it cannot be used as a proof for the existence of *caitasikas*.

Comments:

Harivarman is correct in saying that the sūtras never taught “inclusion” (*saṃgraha*). In the sūtras, it is common that the *skandhas*, *āyatana*s, and *dhātus* are mentioned in formulaic passages presenting the dharmas that are included in each category, but the sūtras never take the reverse approach, that is, to consider a dharma that is not mentioned in the formula and determine the categories to which this dharma belongs. The sūtras also never mention the relationships among category systems, for example, how the five

skandhas are related to the twelve *āyatana*s, and so forth. In this sense, Harivarman is correct that the practice of analyzing dharmas and categories from the perspective of inclusion (*saṃgraha*) was developed later than the sūtras, that is, by the “Sūtra compilers.” As we have seen in the *Samyukta Āgama/Samyutta Nikāya*, and the *Ekottarika Āgama/Aṅguttara Nikāya*, the sūtras are organized and grouped more or less by the classification of their topics according to certain category systems, and the analyses of dharmas according to the category systems are further developed in Abhidharma texts, in which *saṃgraha* becomes an important method of interpretation.¹⁴¹ Abundant examples of the application of *saṃgraha* can be observed in early Abhidharma texts such as the **Śāriputrābhidharma*¹⁴² and the *Prakaraṇapāda*.¹⁴³

In brief, here the opponent uses *saṃgraha* to argue for the existence of *caitasikas*. By contrast, Harivarman responds that *saṃgraha* is a later exegetical tool that did not exist in the age of early sūtras. Therefore, the opponent’s argument is invalid.

2.4.3 The Opponent’s Argument 3 (61.4, 63.3)

(61.4) The opponent quotes the sūtra, which states that *caitasikas* function depending on *citta*, and claims that, based on this sūtra passage, *citta* is the basis (**āśraya* 依處) of *caitasikas*.

(63.3) Harivarman does not challenge the authority of this sūtra passage, but he offers a different interpretation of the notion of “basis.” He points out that, according to the sūtras, *mano-vijñāna* depends upon *manas*, and *manas* is an alternative term for *citta*; therefore, *vijñāna*, which is also a synonym for *citta*, must be said to depend on *citta*. As a result, the fact that one *citta* depends on another *citta* does not make it a *caitasika* in the sense of a “mental factor.”

Comments:

First of all, the sūtra passage that the opponent quotes appears in various forms in the extant collections of sūtras. There are discrepancies in the Chinese and Pāli versions of

¹⁴¹ See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 79-83.

¹⁴² No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 20) T28, p661a-671b.

¹⁴³ No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 2) T26, p697c-698b.

the sūtra concerning who gives the teaching and the *caitasikas* that are mentioned.¹⁴⁴ However, Harivarman does not challenge this passage and hence agrees that this is a genuine sūtra passage. This indicates that perhaps Harivarman and his opponent may have access to a common source of sūtras.

Harivarman's counter-argument that *manas* is the basis of *mano-vijñāna* is based on the teaching of eighteen *dhātus* in the sūtras, which states that depending on *mano-dhātu* as the faculty and *dharmadhātus* as objects, there arises *mano-vijñāna-dhātu*. This teaching is acknowledged by all Buddhist schools. However, in the Abhidharma schools and the Yogācāra tradition, teachers have different opinions concerning what exactly *manas* is: the Sarvāstivādins propose that *manas* is the previous moment of *citta* of any kind; the Theravāda Abhidhamma understands *mano-dhātu* as the specific moments in the cognitive process; and the Yogācārins suggest that *manas* is the defiled substratum of consciousness that constantly grasps the *ālaya* as the self. Here, Harivarman understands the notion of *manas* in a way similar to the Sarvāstivādins.¹⁴⁵

It is also noteworthy that, in the sūtra passage quoted by the opponent, the term *caitasika* is understood by the opponent as the noun “mental factor.” However, actually this term in this context is ambiguous: it can also be understood as the adjective “mental.”¹⁴⁶ The opponent chooses to understand the passage in the sense that can support his own doctrinal position, while the passage itself does not contain the specific technical meaning.

2.4.4 The Opponent's Argument 4 (61.5, 63.4)

(61.5) The opponent argues that if *caitasikas* do not exist as dharmas different from *citta*, the number of the *skandhas* would not be five. Because, in most Abhidharma systems, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are understood as *caitasikas*, if they are nothing but *citta*,

¹⁴⁴ See the footnote in the translation of 61.4 in chapter 5.

¹⁴⁵ In 63.8, Harivarman defines a *caitasika* as a *citta* born from a previous *citta* and states that the previous moment of *citta* is *manas* in the Sarvāstivāda perspective.

¹⁴⁶ This is exactly how the Chinese translators understand this term. They translate *caitasika* here as “屬於心,” literally “belonging to *citta*.” T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 21) T02, p150a29-b2: 想。思是意行。依於心。屬於心。依心轉。是故想。思是意行。

which is equivalent to *vijñāna*, then the five *skandhas* by nature should be only two: *rūpa* and *vijñāna*. But since the Buddha mentions five *skandhas*, *caitasikas* must exist as dharmas different from *citta*.

(63.4) Harivarman answers that the three *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are different modes of *citta* (**citta-viśeṣa*).

Comments:

In 60.1-4, Harivarman gives the same definition of the three *skandhas* as *citta-viśeṣas*, and in 60.4 he adds that in the same way as the single dharma of *smṛti* is mentioned under different names such as *smṛti-indriya*, *smṛti-bala*, *smṛti-bodhyaṅga*, and so forth, so also *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are just different names for different modes of *cittas*. This is exactly the position of the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva as recorded in the MVŚ.

However, Harivarman's appeal to *smṛti* does not constitute a valid response to the opponent's position. *Smṛti* is mentioned with different names in *different lists* among the thirty-seven *bodhipakṣa* dharmas, but it only occurs once within any given single list. In the case of the five *skandhas*, if *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna* are all *cittas*, then the same dharma occurs in the same list for four times, and the five *skandhas* ultimately should be only two as the opponent contends. Because the list of the five *skandhas* is so fundamental a teaching in Buddhism, for most Buddhists reducing them to only two is unacceptable. This is perhaps the reason why Dharmatrāta, the early Dārṣṭāntika master recorded in the MVŚ, proposes that not all the *caitasikas* in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system are unreal; instead, three *caitasikas* should exist as separate dharmas: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* (or *saṃskāra*) are *caitasika* dharmas that are different from *citta*.¹⁴⁷

2.4.5 The Opponent's Argument 5 (61.6-7, 63.5)

(61.6) The opponent argues that *caitasikas* exist apart from *citta* because they arise in different ways. He quotes the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

¹⁴⁷ See the discussion in 2.1.5.

“Depending on the eye regarding the object of form, there arises eye-consciousness. The coming together of the three things is contact (*sparśa*). Depending on contact there arises feeling (*vedanā*).” He argues that this description indicates that consciousness (*viññāna*) arises from two things: the eye (*cakṣu*) and the form object (*rūpa*). But feeling (*vedanā*), which is a *caitasika*, arises depending on three things: the eye, the object, and consciousness.

(61.7) The opponent further quotes the teaching of dependent origination as presented in the sūtras to demonstrate his point. He points out that, in the dependent origination formula, consciousness (*viññāna*) depends on name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), but feeling (*vedanā*) depends on contact (*sparśa*). He suggests that this confirms his argument in 61.6 that, since *viññāna* and *caitasikas* arise in different ways, they must be different.

(63.5) Harivarman points out that this sūtra passage describing the cognitive process not only cannot be used as proof for the existence of *caitasikas*, but it also actually demonstrates that the doctrine of *caitasika* cannot be correct. In the opponent’s system, *caitasikas* are dharmas associated (*samprayukta*) with *citta*, and *citta* and *caitasikas* all occur simultaneously. If this is the case, then when *citta* (= *viññāna*) arises there must be *caitasikas* accompanying it simultaneously, and it would be impossible to say that two things give rise to *viññāna* and three things give rise to *caitasikas*. It is more reasonable to understand that *viññāna* and *saṃjñā*, and so forth, are all mental events as *cittas*, and this cognitive process is a successive sequence of *cittas*.

Comments:

There is no doubt that the models of the cognitive process and dependent origination pose a difficult problem for the Abhidharma *caitasika* theory. The sūtras explicitly mention that contact (*sparśa*) gives rise to other mental phenomena such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*). And in the dependent origination formula, *sparśa* gives rise to feeling (*vedanā*), and in turn *vedanā* gives rises to craving (*trṣṇā*). In the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems all these dharmas, *sparśa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā*, *trṣṇā*, are *caitasikas*. And according to the Abhidharma association (*samprayoga*) theory, all these *caitasikas* should occur simultaneously with consciousness (*citta* or *viññāna*). In 64.8, Harivarman raises the same challenge against

the Abhidharma *caitasika* theory, and the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas answer with the theory of “dependent origination regarding state” (*āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda*).¹⁴⁸

2.4.6 The Opponent’s Argument 6 (61.8, 63.6)

(61.8) The opponent argues that *citta* and *caitasikas* can be distinguished by their different roles in their relationship of association. *Citta* is the basis, and *caitasikas* depend on *citta*. They share the same object and occur in the same moment, but *citta* does not depend on *caitasikas*. In this respect, *citta* and *caitasikas* are different; hence, the *caitasikas* exist.

(63.6) Harivarman simply answers that the opponent’s argument is a repetition of his argument with regard to association (*saṃprayoga*) given in 61.1, to which Harivarman responded in 63.1. Basically the answer is that there is no such a relationship as association; hence, the opponent’s argument is invalid.

Comments:

As Harivarman points out, the opponent here repeats the argument in 61.1, which is presented in 2.4.1 on association (*saṃprayoga*), and also in chapter 5, also on association.

2.4.7 The Opponent’s Argument 7 (61.9, 63.7)

(61.9) The opponent cites the teaching of the four reliances (*catvārī pratisaraṇānī* 四依) to prove the existence of *caitasikas*. Among the four reliances, the fourth one is the reliance on knowledge (*jñāna* 智) instead of ordinary, discursive consciousness (*viññāna* 識). The opponent argues that the Buddha teaches that one should rely on *jñāna* and not *viññāna*; therefore, *jñāna* and *viññāna* must be different. Since *jñāna* is a *caitasika*, *caitasikas* must exist.

¹⁴⁸ For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see 2.3.5.

(63.7) Harivarman answers that *jñāna* and *vijñāna* are actually two kinds of *cittas*. There is no fault in saying that one should rely on one the kind of *citta* as *jñāna* and should not rely on another kind of *citta* as *vijñāna*.

Comments:

The four reliances (*pratisaraṇa*) mentioned here are as follows:

- (1) Teaching or doctrine (*dharma*), not a person;
- (2) Meaning (*artha*), not the word (*vyañjana*);
- (3) The sūtra of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*), not the sūtra of implicit meaning (*neyārtha*)
- (4) Knowledge (*jñāna*), not discursive consciousness (*vijñāna*)

As noted in the footnote in the translation of 61.9, the four reliances are not found in the Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, and, as observed by La Vallée Poussin (1988) and Lamotte (1988b), they only occur in texts pertaining to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika and Mahāyāna traditions. Here, the exchange between Harivarman and his opponent regarding the four reliances indicates that they both have access to a common northern textual source, which is different from the Southern Pāli collection of texts.

And once more in 63.7, Harivarman adopts the Dārṣṭāntika position of Buddhadeva that all so-called *caitasikas* are just different kinds of *cittas*. In this case, both *jñāna* and *vijñāna* are *cittas*. But he does not explain how *jñāna* and *vijñāna* differ from each other even though they are both *citta* by nature. The discussion of insight (*prajñā*) in the TatSid chapter 189 perhaps provides a clue. In that chapter, Harivarman defines *jñāna* (智) as the “true insight” (**bhūta-prajñā* 真慧),¹⁴⁹ which means *jñāna* is the knowledge that has the true reality (*bhūta*) of emptiness and non-self as its content. In contrast, *vijñāna* is the *citta* that takes worldly (*laukika* 世間) designations (*prajñapti* 假名) as its content.¹⁵⁰ In other words, these two kinds of *cittas* differ by their content and not by their nature.

¹⁴⁹ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p360b10: 真慧名智。真者謂空無我。是中智慧名為真智。

¹⁵⁰ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p360c11-2: 世間心緣假名。出世間心緣空無我。

2.4.8 The Opponent's Argument 8 (61.10, 63.8)

(61.10) The opponent claims that the Buddha has mentioned the term *caitasika*. He quotes a passage presumably from a sūtra, which states that, because those dharmas are born from *citta* and depend on *citta*, they are called *caitasikas*.

(63.8) Harivarman appears to agree that there is such a passage, but he understands the term *caitasika* differently: he suggests that the term *caitasika* can refer to a dharma that is born from *citta* or one *citta* that arises depending on [a previous] *citta*. Apparently, in Harivarman's understanding, *caitasika* is an adjective that means "from *citta*" or "dependent on *citta*."

Comments:

The opponent's argument is similar to the one presented in 61.4 and is based on the understanding of the term *caitasika* in the sūtra passage as a substantive noun means "mental factor." By contrast, Harivarman's answer is that the term should be understood as an adjective means "from *citta*" or "dependent on *citta*." For a more detailed discussion of this term see 2.1.1, and for Harivarman's understanding of this term, see 2.2.

2.4.9 The Opponent's Argument 9 (61.11, 63.9-12)

(61.11) In this section, the opponent appears to step back from the position that the term *caitasika* refers to the noun "mental factor" in the sūtra. However, he argues that even if the Buddha never uses the term *caitasika* with the meaning (*artha* 義) "mental factor," the sūtras never explicitly state that mental factors do not exist and only *citta* exists. He argues that, if one follows Harivarman's rationale appealing to a doctrine that is not explicitly taught in the sūtras, then in the same manner one can claim that there only exist *caitasikas* and no *citta*, since the Buddha never presents this position either. Harivarman's

rationale, as the opponent suggests, is to argue only based on explicit names or words (**vyañjana* 名字) mentioned in the *sūtras*.¹⁵¹

(63.9) Harivarman agrees that in the *sūtras* it is never said that there are no *caitasikas*. Furthermore, he himself does not claim that *caitasikas* do not exist but understands *caitasikas* to exist in the sense that they are different modes of *citta* (*citta-viśeṣa*).

(63.10) Harivarman continues to challenge the opponent's rationale that supports a doctrine based on what is explicitly taught in the *sūtras*. He suggests that the correct way is to judge an argument is by proper reasoning (**yukti*). If a doctrine is reasonable, even it is not taught explicitly in the *sūtra*, one should understand the *sūtras* as if it were taught; if a doctrine is unreasonable, even when it is taught explicitly in the *sūtras*, still one should understand the *sūtras* as if it were not taught.

(63.11) Next Harivarman returns to the meaning (*artha* 義) of the Buddha's teaching to which the opponent refers in 61.11. He proposes an analysis of the meanings of the terms *citta* and *caitasika* used in the *sūtras*. He states that mind is called *citta* because it accumulates, which is an etymological analysis of the term *citta* based on the root \sqrt{ci} meaning "to accumulate." He further states that *caitasikas* such as *vedanā*, and so forth, all contribute to the accumulation of future existence, and in this respect these *caitasikas* are the same as *citta*. Therefore, they are all *cittas*.

(63.12) Finally, Harivarman repeats his definition of the term *caitasika* as in 63.8, which is also an etymological analysis of the term *caitasika*, namely, what is born from *citta* (= *cetas*) is a *caitasika*. Since both *citta* and *caitasikas* are born from *citta*, they are all *caitasikas*. He concludes that if one claims that *caitasikas* are different from *citta*, one should be able to analyze the meaning of the terms (**nāmārtha* 名義) and determine the difference between them, but in fact one cannot. Hence, the occurrence of the term *caitasika* in the *sūtras* cannot be used as proof for the existence of *caitasikas*.

Comments:

¹⁵¹ As noted in the translation of 61.11, this passage is difficult to understand and the interpretation offered here may not be accurate.

This round of exchanges is focused on the contrasting notions of name or word (**nāma* or **vyañjana*) and meaning (*artha*). At first the opponent seems to acknowledge that the term *caitasika* is not used in the sense of “mental factor” in the sūtras, but he points out that the Buddha has neither explicitly stated that there is only *citta*, nor that *caitasikas* do not exist. Apparently, here the opponent refers back to Harivarman’s arguments in 60.4-11, in which he gives a number of example passages in the sūtras where the Buddha mentions only *citta* and not *caitasika*. The opponent argues (61.11) that one should not deny the existence of a dharma solely on the basis of whether or not the name is used in the sūtras.

Harivarman agrees (63.9) at this point with the opponent that the term *caitasika* does not mean “mental factor” in the sūtras, and he repeats his definition of *caitasika* as “born from *citta*.” Then in 63.10 he states a very important principle of his exegesis: one should not argue simply on the basis of whether something is taught explicitly in the sūtras; instead one should argue by reasoning. Regardless of whether a doctrine is or is not taught in the sūtras, if it is reasonable, one should accept it, if it is unreasonable, one should reject it. This principle is likely a rephrasing of the second *pratisaraṇa* mentioned in 2.4.7: one should rely on the meaning or intention (*artha*) of a teaching rather than the words taught (*vyañjana*). As Lamotte (1988b: 13-4) has noted, even though the four *pratisaraṇas* were not formulated in full in the early sūtras, the notion that a teaching consists of meaning (*artha* P. *attha*) and words (*vyañjana* P. *viyañjana* or *byañjana*)¹⁵² and the possibility that one can catch the words but misunderstand the meaning¹⁵³ has long been established in the early sūtras.

Nevertheless, it appears that both Harivarman and his opponent here agree on this principle. The opponent in 61.11 seems to accuse Harivarman of being too literal in interpreting sūtras, because Harivarman’s arguments in 60.4-11 are merely based on the fact that the term *caitasika* is not explicitly mentioned in the sūtras. However, in 63.10 Harivarman clarifies that he is not judging the validity of a doctrine by scriptural tradition (*āgama*) alone, rather he prefers evaluating by reasoning (*yukti*); when a doctrine is

¹⁵² This formula occurs frequently in the Nikāyas describing the Buddha’s teaching: D I 87: *so dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhakalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ...*

¹⁵³ For example, D III 128-9: *ayaṃ kho āyasmā atthaṃ hi kho micchā gaṇhāti vyañjanāni sammā ropeti.*

reasonable, even it is not taught in the sūtras, it is still a valid teaching. From this it would appear that Harivarman does not restrict himself to particular scriptural or sectarian traditions, making it difficult to determine his school affiliation.¹⁵⁴

Next (63.11-12) Harivarman gives etymological analyses of the terms *citta* and *caitasika*. Apparently, he considers analyzing words in terms of etymology a proper way of reasoning (*yukti*). He argues that etymologically *citta* and *caitasika* refer to the same thing and they have no difference; therefore, *caitasikas* are *citta*, and one should not understand *caitasikas* as mental factors different from *citta*.

2.4.10 The Opponent's Argument 10 (61.12-3, 63.13)

(61.12) The opponent states that dharmas are different if they have different functions (所作 **kriyā*), just as water has the function of soaking, and fire, of burning. In the same way, *vedanā*, and so forth, function differently; therefore, *citta* and the *caitasikas* are different.

(61.13) The opponent continues by quoting a sūtra passage, which states that awareness (覺) arises in *citta*. From this he argues that awareness and *citta* function differently. Therefore, awareness, i.e. a *caitasika*, is different from *citta* since a *citta* should not give rise to another *citta* within itself.

(63.13) Harivarman answers that both of the opponent's arguments in 61.12-13 can be answered in the same way as in 63.9-12: namely, since *caitasikas* are *cittas* in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*), they have different functions. Also, since one moment of *citta* arises from the previous moment of *citta* and is not simultaneous with it, there is no problem that a *citta* arises within another *citta*.

Comments:

Apparently, here the opponent takes the functions (所作 **kriyā*) of dharmas as the criterion to determine whether a dharma has its own identity and is different from other

¹⁵⁴ See the discussion of Harivarman's school affiliation in 1.3.1.

dharmas. On the other hand, Harivarman proposes that a dharma's function cannot be used as the criterion to determine its identity: *cittas* have the same nature but exist in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*) and hence have different functions. It should be noted that neither of the two parties in the dispute mentions notions such as “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*) and “real entity” (*dravya*), which are important categories in the later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma analysis of dharmas. In this sense, perhaps we can say that the arguments recorded here reflect a relatively early stage in the development of Abhidharma systems in which notions such as *svabhāva* and *dravya* are not yet fully developed.¹⁵⁵

2.4.11 The Opponent's Argument 11 (61.14, 63.14-5)

(61.14) The opponent quotes the same sūtra passage that Harivarman quoted in 60.6, which states that “a sentient being is defiled because of the defilement of the mind (*cittasamkleśa*); when the mind is pure (*cittavyavadāna*), the sentient being is pure (*viśuddhi*).” The opponent proposes that defilement or purification is determined by the presence of certain *caitasikas*. For example, when the *caitasika* ignorance (*avidyā*) is present, the mind is defiled; when the *caitasika* insight (*prajñā*) is clear, then the mind is pure. Without these *caitasikas*, there would be no cause for the defilement and purification of mind. Therefore, *caitasikas* must exist.

(63.14) Here, Harivarman merely asserts, without explanation, that it is not the case that the defilement and purification of the mind would be causeless without *caitasikas*. Perhaps 63.14 should be read as a continuation of 63.13, in which he states that different modes of *citta* do function differently. In other words, a defiled mind and a pure mind are different modes of *citta* that function differently, and the notion of different *caitasikas* is unnecessary as a reason for their difference.

(63.15) Harivarman concludes by reiterating his position that *caitasikas* do not exist because they have no characteristics that are different from *citta*. He points out further that the opponent's notion of *caitasikas* as dharmas different from *citta* depends on the

¹⁵⁵ For a discussion of these notions in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see Cox 2004.

theory of association (*samprayoga*), but in fact there is no association. He also mentions that association will be the topic discussed in the following part of TatSid (chapters 65-67).

Comments:

It is noteworthy that Harivarman and his opponent quote the same sūtra passage to prove opposite positions. Harivarman quotes the passage in 60.6 as indicating that the defilement of the mind is the cause of the defilement of sentient beings, and the purity of mind is the cause of the purification of sentient beings. Because in this sūtra passage the Buddha does not mention mental factors at all, *caitasikas* do not exist. However, in 61.14, the opponent quotes the same passage but interprets the defilement (*samkleśa*) and purity (*vyavadāna*) of mind in terms of *caitasikas* such as ignorance (*avidyā*) and insight (*prajñā*). When defilements like *avidyā* are associated with *citta*, *citta* becomes defiled; when pure *caitasikas* like *prajñā* are associated with *citta*, *citta* becomes pure. The opponent argues that, without the existence of *caitasikas*, the defilement and the purification of mind would be causeless (無因 **ahetu*), and hence absurd.

This is a good example that offers us an opportunity to see how scriptural tradition (*āgama*) is treated in the context of doctrinal innovation. Since the Abhidharma doctrine of mental factors (*caitasika*) does not exist in the early sūtras, proponents of the new doctrine must then project it into the sūtra texts since any position must be justified by both scriptural tradition (*āgama*) and argument (*yukti*). It also accords with the ostensible purpose of Abhidharma to provide a better account for and a deeper understanding of the old teachings in the sūtras. In this case, the Abhidharma theory of *caitasika* no doubt offers a more detailed account of the mechanism underlying the defilement and purification of a sentient being's mind.

In 63.15, Harivarman appears to be quite confident that he has refuted the opponent's position and there is no further need to discuss the issue of *caitasika*. As a result, he briefly recounts his position that *caitasikas* are just *cittas* and suggests that the discussion should move on to the related issue "association" (*samprayoga*), the next part of the TatSid and the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 3. The Dispute on Association (*saṃprayoga*)

The previous chapter discusses the history of the concept of *caitasika* as well as the arguments regarding *caitasika* between Harivarman and the proponents of *caitasika* as recorded in the **Tattvasiddhi*. There the notion of “association” (*saṃprayoga*) is brought up repeatedly by the opponent in his arguments supporting *caitasika*.¹ Also, as noted earlier, “association” is a theory closely related to the theory of mental factors (*caitta/caitasika*); or, more precisely, these two theories are more or less mutually dependent. As a result, it is impossible to discuss *caitasika* without the notion of association, nor to discuss association without the notion of *caitasika*. In other words, these two notions are two aspects of the same issue, namely, the issue of the structure of mind.² However, these two theories still have their different emphases: the theory of *caitasika* appears more focused on the ontological status of mental factors as dharmas existing apart from *citta*, while the theory of association focuses more on the causal relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*. Such a difference of focus makes it possible to discuss these two theories separately.

This chapter will discuss in detail the arguments between Harivarman and his opponents regarding the issue of association presented in chapters 65-67 of the **Tattvasiddhi*. Prior to the discussion of the specific arguments, in section 3.1 I will first survey the history of the theory of association and discuss the inception of the notion of association in early sūtras and its development in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Theravāda Abhidhamma, and Yogācāra texts, as well as position of teachers who opposed the notion of association. Section 3.2 will introduce Harivarman’s theory of association, which is significantly different from other Abhidharma traditions. Section 3.3 will discuss Harivarman’s arguments against the Ābhidharmika theory of association in TatSid chapter 65, and section 3.4 will discuss the opponent’s arguments for the notion of association in TatSid chapter 66 as well as Harivarman’s refutation of each of them in

¹ See TatSid 61.1, 61.8, 63.1, 63.6.

² See 2.4.1.

TatSid chapter 67.

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Inception of the Notion of Association in Early Sūtras

The standard term in Abhidharma texts for “association” is the nominal form *saṃprayoga* (P. *sampayoga*) or the corresponding past participle form *saṃprayukta* (P. *sampayutta*), which literally means “joined together.” Strictly speaking, this term in the sense of “association” or “associated” specifically in the case of *citta* and *caitasikas* does not occur in early sūtras. In TatSid 66.4, the proponent of association claims that this usage does occur, but a comparison with the corresponding Pāli version of the sūtra quoted shows that the term *sampayutta* in this sense is absent in the Pāli sutta, which suggests that the wording in the version of the sūtra quoted in 66.4 may have been influenced by a particular sectarian doctrinal position.³ In the Pāli Nikāyas the term *sampayutta* in this specific sense occurs in only one sutta in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (S no.51.20, V 276), the *Vibhaṅga-sutta*, where the term *sampayutta* clearly means “associated.”⁴ However, since this sutta has no parallel in the Chinese Āgamas, it is not a sutta transmitted in all areas or accepted by all Buddhist groups and may be influenced by later sectarian discussions.

The term *saṃprayoga* (P. *sampayoga*) does occur in sūtras with the meaning “association” or “union,” but it is used in a more general sense instead of the Abhidharma sense restricted to *citta* and *caitasikas*. For example, the most prominent usage of this term is in the explanation of the four noble truths, in which the truth of suffering is analyzed with the enumeration of eight kinds of suffering, and two of them are the suffering of association with those who are displeasing (*appiyehi sampayogo dukkho*) and the suffering of dissociation from those who are pleasing (*piyehi vippayogo dukkho*).⁵

³ The sūtra passage quoted is MĀ no. 186 求解經. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 48) T01, p732a3-5: 若有此行. 有此力. 深著如來信根已立者. 是謂信見本不壞智相應. The term **nānasampayutta* is absent in the corresponding Pāli M no. 47 *Vīmaṃsaka-sutta* (I 320): *yassa kassaci bhikkhave imehi ākārehi imehi padehi imehi byañjanehi tathāgate saddhā nivijjhā hoti mūlajātā patijjhātā, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave ākāravatī saddhā dassanamūlikā dalhā*. See discussion of this sūtra quotation in the translation of 66.4 and its footnote.

⁴ S V 277: *katamo ca bhikkhave, atilīno chando? yo bhikkhave chando kosajjasahagato kosajjasampayutto—ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave atilīno chando*. Apparently here, *sampayutta* is used as a synonym for *sahagata*, and they both mean “accompanied” or “associated.”

⁵ For example, S V 421: *idaṃ kho pana bhikkhave dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ--jātipi dukkhā jarāpi dukkhā byādhipi*

Thus, the term *saṃprayoga* in the early sūtras has a broader and more general sense, which can refer to the association or connection among any things or persons, and it is not used in the Abhidharma sense that is restricted to the association relationship only between *citta* and *caitasikas*.

Nevertheless, though the technical meanings for the terms *saṃprayoga* and *saṃprayukta* are not developed in early sūtras, some passages in the sūtras do imply that certain mental phenomena occur together with consciousness, and these passages can be seen as the inception for the later Abhidharma notion of mental factors and their “association” with consciousness. For example, in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, Sāriputta tells Mahākotṭhita that insight (*paññā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are conjoined (*saṃsaṭṭha*) and it is impossible to separate them from each other.⁶ And in the same way, feeling (*vedanā*) and apperception (*saññā*) are also conjoined with consciousness.⁷ Here, the term “conjoined” (*saṃsaṭṭha*) strongly suggests that these mental phenomena occur simultaneously with consciousness. There are also occasions where *citta* is described as having lust (*sarāga*), hatred (*sadosa*), or delusion (*samoha*).⁸ In this case the prefix *sa-* carries the sense of possession, which means that the mind possesses these traits, implying that each of the qualities (*rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*) can occur together at the same time with *citta*. Another example is the standard formula describing the practice of absorption (*jhāna*, Skt. *dhyāna*) meditation. When the practitioner has conquered the five hindrances of meditation, he enters and abides in the first *dhyāna*, which is accompanied by the applied thought and sustained thought (*savitarka savicāra*), and with rapture and pleasure (*prītisukha*).⁹ These mental qualities enlisted in the description of *dhyāna* are later in

dukkho maraṇampi dukkhaṃ appiyehi sampayogo dukkho piyehi vippayogo dukkho, yampicchaṃ na labhati tampi dukkhaṃ--saṃkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā pi dukkhā. In 67.3, Harivarman quotes this passage to show that the terms *saṃprayoga* and *saṃprayukta* in the sūtras do not have a technical meaning as in the Abhidharma texts.

⁶ M I 292-3: *yā cāvuso, paññā yañca viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. yaṃ hāvuso, pajānāti taṃ vijānāti, yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti. tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetu.* English translation Bodhi and Ñanamoli 1995: 293: “Wisdom and consciousness, friend—these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them. For what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands.”

⁷ M I 293: *yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. yaṃ hāvuso vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti. tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetu.*

⁸ For example, D I 79-80; D II 299; M I 34, 59; S II 121; A III 17-18.

⁹ For example, D I 294: *viviceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ*

Abhidharma systems called the limbs (*aṅga*) of absorption and are included in the *caitasika* lists.

Aside from the prefix *sa-*, there are two other terms, *sahagata* and *upasaṃhita*, which are also used to describe the mind possessing or accompanied by certain qualities or traits. For example, in the *Mettāsaḥagata-sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, it is said that in the meditation of the four *Brahma-vihāras*, one should practice with a mind (*cetasā*) connected with (*sahagata*) loving-kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*).¹⁰ Also in the *Vitakkasaṅḥāna-sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha says that from a certain sign (*nimitta*) one can have applied thought (*vitakka*) connected (*upasaṃhita*) with inclination (*chanda*), with hatred (*dosa*), and with delusion (*moha*).¹¹ Clearly in both of these cases *sahagata* and *upasaṃhita* denote a relationship among mental phenomena that accompany each other and most likely occur simultaneously.

To sum up, though the terms *saṃprayoga* and *saṃprayukta* are not used in the sūtras as describing the specific association relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* as in the Abhidharma texts, many examples in the early sūtras indicate the presence of the notion that certain mental phenomena can occur accompanying each other, which in turn could give rise to the later Abhidharma theory of association.¹²

3.1.2 Development of the Notion of Association in Early Abhidharma

As discussed earlier, the early *mātrkā*s (P. *mātikā*) as “lists of topics” are probably one of the origins of Abhidharma texts.¹³ Regarding the notion of association (*saṃprayoga*), the *mātikā* preserved in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* gives a glimpse of its early stage of

paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati.

¹⁰ S V 115: *mettāsaḥagatena cetasā ekam disaṃ pharivā viharatha... karuṇāsaḥagatena ... muditāsaḥagatena ... upekkhāsaḥagatena ...* Bodhi 2000: 1607-8. SĀ no. 743, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 27) T02, p197b23: 心與慈俱。

¹¹ M I 119: *bhikkhuno yaṃ nimittam āgamma yaṃ nimittam manasikaroto uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā vitakkā chandūpasamhitāpi dosūpasamhitāpi mohūpasamhitāpi, tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā tamhā nimittā aññaṃ nimittam manasi kātabbāṃ kusalūpasamhitāṃ.* MĀ no. 101 增上心經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 25) T01, p588a10-12: 念相善相應。若生不善念者。彼因此相復更念異相善相應。令不生惡不善之念。彼因此相更念異相善相應。Note here the Chinese does not have *chanda*, *dosa*, and *moha*, but has *kuśala* (善) connected (相應) with thoughts.

¹² Again it should be noted that in the Abhidharma systems, the theory of association (*saṃprayoga*) is mutually dependent with the theory of *caitasika* as “mental factors.” As discussed in chapter 2, in the sūtras *citta* and *caitasika* are not clearly distinguished as two distinct categories, and it is not necessarily the case that that the connected coexistence of certain mental phenomena entails an association between *citta* and *caitasika* in the Abhidharma sense.

¹³ See 1.5.

development. In this *mātikā*, the relationship among different dharmas is analyzed through the method of association, which determines which dharmas can occur together.¹⁴ As observed by Yinshun (1981a: 82), in the *mātikā* of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the term *sampayutta* is applied to the following eleven categories:¹⁵

- (1) Three kinds of feelings (*vedanā*)
- (2) Cause (*hetu*)
- (3) Taint (*āsava*)
- (4) Fetter (*saṃyojana*)
- (5) Knot (*gantha*)
- (6) Flood (*ogha*)
- (7) Yoke (*yoga*)
- (8) Hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*)
- (9) Wrong grasp (*parāmāsa*)
- (10) Consciousness (*citta*)
- (11) Clinging (*upādāna*)
- (12) Defilement (*kilesa*)

Apparently, in this early *mātikā*, which at least in terms of its underlying prototype represents an early stage of Abhidharma analysis, the notion of association (*saṃprayukta* P. *sampayutta*) is not centered on consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*) alone; any mental phenomenon can be in association with any other dharmas accompanying it. And in the case of each of the mental phenomena, with the exception of *citta*, in the list that has dharmas associated with it, for the question “what are the dhammas associated with it?” the answer is always *vedanākkhandha*, *saññākkhandha*, *saṅkhārakkhandha*, and *viññāṇakkhandha*, namely, the four non-material aggregates (*skandha* P. *khandha*).¹⁶

¹⁴ Frauwallner (1995: 6-7) also discusses briefly this method of analysis.

¹⁵ Dhs 1: *sukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā, adukkham-asukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 2: *hetu-sampayuttā dhammā, hetu-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 3: *āsava-sampayuttā dhammā, āsava-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 3: *saññojana-sampayuttā dhammā, saññojana-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 3: *gantha-sampayuttā dhammā, gantha-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 4: *ogha-sampayuttā dhammā, ogha-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 4: *nīvaraṇa -sampayuttā dhammā, nīvaraṇa-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 5: *parāmāsa-sampayuttā dhammā parāmāsa-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 5: *citta-sampayuttā dhammā, citta-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 5: *upādāna-sampayuttā dhammā, upādāna-vippayuttā dhammā*. Dhs 5: *kilesa-sampayuttā dhammā, kilesa-vippayuttā dhammā*.

¹⁶ Dhs 196: §1105: *katame dhammā āsavasampayuttā? tehi dhammehi ye dhammā sampayuttā vedanākkhandho*

Here, it is apparent that the four *khandhas*, including *viññāṇa*, are treated virtually equally, and they all can have a relationship of association with the mental phenomena listed in the *mātikā*.

However, in the same *mātikā*, in the group “more extensive pairs” (*mahantara-dukaṃ*), *citta* does receive some special treatment different from the other dhammas in the list. In this part of the *mātikā*, aside from the pair of categories of dhammas as associated with or dissociated from *citta* (*citta-sampayuttā dhammā*, *citta-vippayuttā dhammā*), seven additional pairs of categories regarding relationships between dhammas and *citta* are listed:¹⁷

Dhammas that are conjoined (*saṃsaṭṭha*) with *citta*; detached (*visaṃsaṭṭha*) from *citta*.

Dhammas that are sprung (*samuṭṭhāna*) from *citta*; not sprung from *citta*.

Dhammas that are coexisting (*sahabhuno*) with *citta*; not coexisting with *citta*.

Dhammas that are revolving (*anuparivattino*) around *citta*; not revolving around *citta*.

Dhammas that are conjoined with and sprung from (*saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna*) *citta*; not conjoined with and sprung from *citta*.

Dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with (*saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno*) *citta*; not conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with *citta*.

Dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around (*saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino*) *citta*; not conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around *citta*.

Table 3.1 gives the lists of *dhammas* under each one of these categories.

saññākkhandha saṅkhārakkhandha viññāṇakkhandho--ime dhammā āsavaṃsampayuttā. Similarly §§1127, 1143, 1151, 1166, 1179, 1221, 1244. In the case of *citta*, p.209 §1191: *katame dhammā cittaṃsampayuttā? vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saṅkhārakkhandho—ime dhammā cittaṃsampayuttā*. And the Dhs (p.210) also gives a note for the exclusion of the *viññāṇakkhandha*: *cittaṃ na vattaḃbaṃ citena sampayuttan ti pi citena vippayuttan ti pi*. “*citta* is not to be said as associated with or dissociated from *citta*.”

¹⁷ Dhs 5: *citta-saṃsaṭṭhā dhammā, citta-visaṃsaṭṭhā dhammā. citta-samuṭṭhānā dhammā, no citta-samuṭṭhānā dhammā. citta-sahabhuno dhammā, no citta-sahabhuno dhammā. citta-anuparivattino dhammā, no citta-anuparivattino dhammā. citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānā dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānā dhammā. citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānā-sahabhuno dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānā-sahabhuno dhammā. citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino dhammā*. English translation partially consulted Davids 1923: cix.

Table 4 Lists of dhammas in the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi* that are related to *cetasika*¹⁸

<i>cetasikā</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasampayuttā</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasaṃsaṭṭhā</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasamuṭṭhānā</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i> <i>kāyaviññatti vacīviññatti</i> <i>yaṃ vā panaññam pi atthi rūpaṃ cittaṃ</i> <i>cittahetukaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpāyatanaṃ</i> <i>saddāyatanaṃ gandhāyatanaṃ</i> <i>phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ ākāsadhātu āpodhātu</i> <i>rūpāssa lahutā rūpāssa mudutā rūpāssa</i> <i>kammaññatā rūpāssa upacayo rūpāssa santati</i> <i>kabaḷīnkāro āhāro</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasahabhuno</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i> <i>kāyaviññatti vacīviññatti</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittānuparivattino</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i> <i>kāyaviññatti vacīviññatti</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasaṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhānā</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasaṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhānasahabhuno</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>
<i>cittasaṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhānānuparivattino</i>	<i>vedanākkhandho</i> <i>saṅkhārakkhandho</i>	<i>saññākkhandho</i>

These lists of *dhammas* in the table indicate that, among the special terms that are

¹⁸ Dhs p.209-11.

applied to *citta*, “conjoined” (*samsaṭṭha*) is likely a synonym of *sampayutta* since the answer to the questions “What are dhammas conjoined with *citta*?” and “What are dhammas detached from *citta*?” are exactly the same as the answers regarding *sampayutta* and *vippayutta*.¹⁹ And the categories *cetasikā*, *cittasampayuttā*, and *cittasamsaṭṭhā* are equivalent because they all include the same dhammas. Similarly “coexisting” (*sahabhuno*) and “revolving around” (*anuparivattino*) are also likely to be synonyms, because dhammas classified as having these relationships with *citta* are exactly the same, namely, the three *khandhas* (*vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra*) plus bodily intimation (*kāyaviññatti*) and vocal intimation (*vacīviññatti*).²⁰

The last three composite categories in the table, namely, (1) dhammas that are conjoined with and sprung from (*samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna*) *citta*, (2) dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with (*samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno*) *citta*, and (3) dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around (*samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino*) *citta*, also have the same list of dhammas as the categories of *cetasikā* and *cittasampayuttā*. In other words, these composite categories denote the following equivalent relationships:

Citta-samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānā = *citta-sampayuttā* = *cetasikā*

Citta-samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno = *citta-sampayuttā* = *cetasikā*

Citta-samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino = *citta-sampayuttā* = *cetasikā*

Thus, it would appear that these four special terms, namely, (1) conjoined (*samsaṭṭha*) with *citta*, (2) sprung (*samuṭṭhāna*) from *citta*, (3) coexisting (*sahabhuno*) with *citta*, and (4) revolving (*anuparivattino*) around *citta*, can be understood as constituting an analysis that also functions as a definition for the category of “association” (*sampayutta*). In other words, association with *citta* is analyzed as a relationship among dhammas that are “conjoined” (*samsaṭṭha*) with *citta*, “sprung” (*samuṭṭhāna*) from *citta*, and “coexisting” (*sahabhuno*) or “revolving around” (*anuparivattino*) *citta*. This can be seen as an early scholastic attempt to clarify and define the notion of *sampayoga*. Similar lists of

¹⁹ Dhs p.210 §§1191-1194.

²⁰ Dhs p.210 §§1197-1120.

categories in the *māṭṛkā*s can be found in northern Abhidharma texts such as the *Prakaranapāda*²¹ and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*.²²

To sum up, the categories in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* that include the term association (*sampayutta*) suggest that the theory of association is still in a preliminary stage of development. At this stage, the relationship of association is not considered to be centered on *citta* or *vijñāna* alone, but can be applied to many other mental phenomena such as *vedanā*, *āsrava*, *saṃyojana*, *kleśa*, and so forth. On the other hand, even in this early stage, *citta* is featured prominently in the *māṭikā*, and thus an attempt is made to analyze how other dhammas are associated with *citta*.

With the development of Abhidharma, the status of *citta* is elevated, and the analysis of association becomes more focused on *citta* while associations with other mental phenomena gradually disappear in the *māṭṛkā*s. As Yinshun (1981a: 81) has noticed, in the *māṭṛkā* preserved in the chapter 6 of the *Prakaranapāda*, only four other items aside from *citta* have the term *saṃprayukta*,²³ while in the *māṭṛkā* in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, only one item aside from *citta* has *saṃprayukta*.²⁴ In other words, in the Abhidharma analyses of dharmas, the categories of *citta-saṃprayukta* and *citta-viprayukta* become increasingly more important than categories such as *āsrava-saṃprayukta* and *vedanā-saṃprayukta*.²⁵

Furthermore, in conjunction with the elevation in the status of the *citta-saṃprayukta*

²¹ No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b12-14: 心法。非心法。心所法。非心所法。心相應法。心不相應法。心俱有法。非心俱有法。隨心轉法。非隨心轉法。

²² No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 6) T28, p575b14-7: 心界。非心界。心相應界。非心相應界。心數界。非心數界。緣界。非緣界。共心界。非共心界。隨心轉界。不隨心轉界。p576a13-25: 云何心相應界。若法心數。是名心相應界。云何非心相應界。若法非心數。是名非心相應界。云何心數界。除心餘緣法。是名心數界。云何非心數界。若法非緣及心。是名非心數界。云何緣界。若法取相及心。是名緣界。云何非緣界。除心餘非心數法。是名非緣界。云何共心界。若法隨心轉共心生共住共滅。是名共心界。云何非共心界。若法不隨心轉不共心生不共住不共滅。是名不共心界。云何隨心轉界。若法共心生共住共滅。是名隨心轉界。云何不隨心轉界。若法不共心生不共住不共滅。是名不隨心轉界。

²³ No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b12-3: 心相應法。心不相應法。...p711b18: 業相應法。業不相應法。...p711b23-4: 有相應法。有不相應法。...p711c8: 因相應法。因不相應法。...p711c21-2: 相應法。不相應法。

²⁴ For example, No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p528b29: 十二入幾心相應幾非心相應。p529a24: 十二入幾業相應幾非業相應。

²⁵ However, in some extant Abhidharma texts the old method of analysis based on the old *māṭṛkā*s is still found. For example, in the northern Abhidharma text, *Dhātukāya*, all mental phenomena such as the *mahābhūmikas* and *kleśamahābhūmikas*, and so forth, are analyzed according to whether each of them is associated with all other mental phenomena. As Frauwallner puts it (1995: 26-7), the *Dhātukāya* and the fourth chapter of the *Prakaranapāda*, as well as the Pāli *Dhātukathā*, are likely “reworks” of the same old, original source.

category, the notion of *caitta/caitasika* as “mental factor” also achieved the status as a separate category in the Buddhist Abhidharma classifications.²⁶ In the developed Abhidharma systems of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Theravāda Abhidhamma, these two categories are identified with each other: those dharmas that are associated with *citta* (*citta-saṃprayukta*) are exclusively mental factors (*caitta/caitasika*), and mental factors are exclusively dharmas associated with *citta*. This identification of these two categories is clearly evident in the five categories of all dharmas (*pañcavastu*) in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text *Prakaraṇapāda*, which states that *caitasika* dharmas are those dharmas that are associated with *citta*.²⁷ Similarly in the Pāli Theravāda Abhidhamma tradition within Buddhādatta’s *Abhidhammāvatāra* where four categories of all dhammas are proposed, *cetasika* is also defined as those that are associated with *citta*.²⁸

3.1.3 Analyses of Association in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Systems

In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi mātikā*, the category of *sampayutta* is analyzed with several terms representing categories either coinciding with, or overlapping with it, and the combination of these terms gives an approximate definition of *sampayoga*.²⁹ However, the terms used in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi mātikā* are ambiguous and not clearly defined, and they represent a primitive stage in the development of the Abhidharma theory of association. Nevertheless, in the *Kathāvatthu*, a relatively later canonical Pāli Abhidhamma text, the term *sampayutta* is defined with seven more precise terms.³⁰

[Question:] Is it not the case that some dhammas are associated (*sampayutta*) with other dhammas?

²⁶ See the discussion of the development of the notion of *caitasika* in chapter 4, esp. 2.1 and 2.2.

²⁷ No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 1) T26, p692b29-c1: 心所法云何。謂若法心相應。

²⁸ Abhidh-av 16: *tattha cittasampayuttā, citta bhavā vā cetasikā*. It should be noted the *Abhidhammāvatāra* is a rather late work (around 5th century CE), and there is no textual witness extant in the Pāli tradition so we cannot be certain whether Buddhādatta was influenced by other sources.

²⁹ For a discussion of this part of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*’s *mātikā*, see p. 128ff.

³⁰ Kv VII 2, p.337: *n’ atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampayuttā ti? āmantā. nanu atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saḥagatā saḥajātā saṃsaṅṅhā ekuppādā ekanirodhā ekavattukā ekārammaṇā ti? āmantā. hañci atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saḥagatā saḥajātā saṃsaṅṅhā ekuppādā ekanirodhā ekavattukā ekārammaṇā, no vata re vattabbe. n’ atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampayuttā ti.*

[The opponent:] Certainly (*āmantā*).

[The Theravādin position:] Is it not the case that some dhammas are connected (*sahagata*) with, born together (*sahajāta*) with, conjoined (*samsaṭṭha*) with, arising together (*ekuppāda*) with, ceasing together (*ekanirodha*) with, having the same basis (*ekavatthuka*) with, and having the same object (*ekārammaṇa*) with some other dhammas?

Given the parallelism between the two sentences such that one has the term *sampayutta*, and the other has a train of terms describing the relationship between “some dhammas” (*keci dhammā*) with “some other dhammas” (*kehici dhammehi*), no doubt the second sentence is an elaboration of the first sentence, and the series of terms represents an expansion of the notion of *sampayutta*. The seven terms used here are “connected” (*sahagata*), “born together” (*sahajāta*), “conjoined” (*samsaṭṭha*), “arising together” (*ekuppāda*), “ceasing together” (*ekanirodha*), “having the same basis” (*ekavatthuka*), and “having the same object” (*ekārammaṇa*). A comparison of these seven terms with the four terms used in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi mātikā*, namely, “conjoined” (*samsaṭṭha*) with *citta*, “sprung” (*samuṭṭhāna*) from *citta*, and “co-existing” (*sahabhuno*) or “revolving around” (*anuparivattino*) *citta*, indicates that the terms in the *Katthāvatthu* are not only more clear and specific but also add more theoretical elements that do not appear in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi mātikā*. For example, aside from the term “conjoined” (*samsaṭṭha*) which occurs in both texts, the two terms in the Dhs *mātikā* “coexisting” (*sahabhuno*) or “revolving around” (*anuparivattino*) have more or less the same meaning and they both correspond to the term “connected” (*sahagata*) in the Kv. The term “sprung from *citta*” (*samuṭṭhāna*) in the Dhs *mātikā* has no correspondent in the Kv, which instead includes four terms absent from the Dhs *mātikā*: “arising together” (*ekuppāda*), “ceasing together” (*ekanirodha*), “having the same basis” (*ekavatthuka*), and “having the same object” (*ekārammaṇa*). And in the *Paṭṭhāna*, the last canonical Abhidhamma book in the Pāli tradition, only these four terms are used to define the condition of association (*sampayutta-paccaya*).³¹ Thereafter, these four terms, or the four aspects of the relationship of association represented by these four terms, become the standard

³¹ TikaPaṭ I 19-20: *ekavatthuka-ekārammaṇa-ekuppāda-ekanirodha-sankhātena sampayuttabhāvena upakārakā arūpadhammā sampayuttapaccayo*.

definition of “association” in the Theravāda Abhidhamma tradition.³²

In the northern traditions, the development of the notion of *saṃprayoga/saṃprayukta* appears to follow a similar course. As noted previously, the *mātrkā*s of early Abhidharma such as the *Prakaraṇapāda* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma* already contain hints of a preliminary analysis of *saṃprayukta* with terms such as **sahabhūva* (俱有, 共) and **anuparivartana* (隨心轉). However, in contrast to the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition in which the analysis of *sampayutta* with the four standard terms is established in the canonical *Katthāvatthu* and the *Paṭṭhāna*, the standard analysis of *saṃprayukta* in the Sarvāstivāda tradition is not uniform within its seven canonical Abhidharma texts. The earliest account of *saṃprayukta* which is comparable to the form in the *Paṭṭhāna* occurs in the post-canonical and pre-Vibhāṣā treatise **Āryavasumitrasaṅgītīśāstra*.³³ This treatise records ten interpretations of the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. But the Chinese translation of this treatise is so obscure that it is difficult to figure out what the interpretations are. Fortunately, the later Vibhāṣā compendia preserves quite a few positions regarding *saṃprayukta*, including many that appear in the ĀVS, and these provide a clearer view of the development of *saṃprayukta* in the early period of northern Abhidharma.

The MVŚ has a long passage discussing the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Because it records a large number of positions that are important for our understanding of the formation of the Abhidharma *saṃprayoga* theory, a full translation of the passage is presented here:³⁴

³² For example, this passage from the Kv is quoted in Buddhaghosa’s commentary to the Dhs, and *sampayutta* is defined with the four terms. Dhs-a 41-2: *yopanāyaṃ tīsupi padesu sampayuttasaddo tass’attho. samaṃ pakārehi yuttā ti sampayuttā. katārehi pakārehī ti? ekuppādatādīhi. “natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampayuttāti? āmantā” ti hi imassa pañhassa paṭikkhepe “nanu atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sahaḡatā sahaḡātā saṃsaṭṭhā ekuppādā ekanirodhā ekavattukā ekārammaṇā” ti evaṃ ekuppādatādīnaṃ vasena sampayogatto vutto. iti imehi ekuppādatādīhi samaṃ pakārehi yuttā ti sampayuttā. In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa quotes the *Paṭṭhāna*’s definition of *sampayutta-paccaya*: Vism XVII 94 (PTS ed. p539). In the later Abhidhamma manual, the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, these four terms are used to define *cetasika*: Abhidh-s 6: *ekuppādanirodhā ca, ekālambaṇavattukā. cetoyuttā dvipaññāsa, dhammā cetasikā matā.**

³³ This treatise is attributed to Vasumitra (婆須蜜), who is not likely to be the same person named Vasumitra associated with the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Yinshun (1981a: 389-393) suggests that this Ārya-Vasumitra is an Dārṣṭāntika master, and the later Sarvāstivādins confused him with the earlier Abhidharma master Vasumitra who is associated with the *Prakaraṇapāda*.

³⁴ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b25-81b3:

問相應是何義。答等義是相應義。

問諸心所法或多或少。謂善心多不善心少。不善心多有覆無記心少。有覆無記心多無覆無記心少。欲界心多色

Question: What is the meaning of *saṃprayoga*?

Answer: “To be equal” (等) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*.

Question: *Caitasika* dharmas are sometimes more [in number], and sometimes less, namely, [sometimes there are] more in wholesome *cittas* and less in unwholesome *cittas*. ... How could “to be equal” be the meaning of *saṃprayukta*?

Answer: (i) It is referred to as “to be equal” by being equal as real entities (*dravya*, 體). If in one *citta* there are two *vedanās* and one *saṃjñā*, this [situation] may not be referred to as being equal; but if in one *citta* there is one *vedanā* and one *saṃjñā*, and this is also the case for other *cittas*, therefore, one says “to be equal” is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*.

(ii) Moreover, “being equal and not separated (不相離, **vinirbhāga*)” is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*.

(iii) Moreover, “being equal and not different (不別異, **ananyathā*)” is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*.

(iv) Moreover, “carrying together (等運轉, **saṃvāha*)” is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Just as a chariot, which, when it operates, all its parts also

界心少。色界心多無色界心少。有漏心多無漏心少。云何等義是相應義。

答依體等義說名為等。若一心中二受一想可不名等。然一心中一受一想。餘亦如是。故說等義是相應義。

復次等不相離是相應義。復次等不別異是相應義。復次等運轉義是相應義。如車轉時眾分皆轉共辦一事。如是心車於境轉時。心所亦轉共成一事故名相應。復次等所作義是相應義。如秋鴿等一時詣場一時食一時起。非前非後。心心所法亦復如是。一時趣境一時受境一時捨境。故名相應。復次等相順義是相應義。如人相順即名相應。心心所法相順亦爾。復次等和合義是相應義。如水乳合說名相應。心心所法和合亦爾。

霧尊者曰。四事等故說名相應。一時分等。謂心心所同一刹那而現行故。二所依等。謂心心所同依一根而現行故。三所緣等。謂心心所同緣一境而現行故。四行相等。謂心心所同一行相而現行故。

復次五事等故說名相應。即前四事及物體等。謂心心所各唯一物。和合而起故名相應。

復次如束蘆義是相應義。如一一蘆不能獨立。要多共束方能得住。心心所法亦復如是。要多相依方能行世。取果與果。及取所緣。

復次如索義是相應義。如一一縷不能牽材木。多縷相合乃有牽用。心心所法亦復如是。廣如前說。

復次如連手義是相應義。如河漂急獨不能渡。多人連手乃能渡之。心心所法亦復如是。廣如前說。

復次如商侶義是相應義。如多商共為伴侶能過險路。心心所法亦復如是廣說如前。

尊者世友作如是說。相引生義是相應義。問若爾眼識意識亦互相引。彼相應耶。答彼所依異。若同所依。互相引者乃是相應。

復次不相離義是相應義。問若爾四大種亦不相離彼相應耶。答彼無所依。若有所依亦不相離乃是相應。

復次有所緣義是相應義。問若爾六識皆有所緣彼相應耶。答彼所依異。若同所依有所緣者乃是相應。

復次同所緣義是相應義。問若爾五識各與意識同一所緣應說相應。又多眼識應說相應。如多有情共觀初月等。

答彼所依異。若同所依同所緣者。乃是相應。

復次常和合義是相應義。問若爾壽煖識三亦常和合彼相應耶。答不爾壽煖二法無所依故。若有所依亦常和合乃是相應。

復次恒俱生義是相應義。問若爾四大種恒俱生彼相應耶。答彼無所依若有所依。恒俱生者乃是相應。

復次俱生住滅是相應義。問若爾隨心轉色。隨心轉心。不相應行。亦俱生住滅。彼相應耶。答彼無所依。若有所依俱生住滅乃是相應。

復次同一所依同一所緣。同一行相轉義是相應義。問云何知然。答寧知不然。

復次同作一事義是相應義。問若爾諸忍與智同作一事彼相應耶。答彼不俱生。若俱時生同作一事乃是相應。

大德說曰。同伴侶義是相應義。識與心所互相容受。俱時而生。同取一境。乃是相應。

尊者妙音作如是說。所依所緣行相所作一切同義是相應義。所以者何。諸有為法性羸劣故。展轉力持方能起作。曾不見有一大地法。獨起作故。

The other version of *Vibhāṣā* (T No. 1546, 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T28, p65c6-66b15) has the same list of definitions of *saṃprayoga* with only slight differences in their order.

operate, and all together accomplish the same purpose, in a similar way, when the chariot of *citta* operates regarding an object field (境, *viṣaya*), *caitasikas* are also operating and all accomplish together the same purpose. Therefore, [it] is referred to as *saṃprayukta*.

(v) Moreover, ‘having the same activity’ (等所作, **sama-kārya*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Just as autumn pigeons come to the courtyard all at the same time, eat at the same time, and fly away at the same time, not before nor after [one another], so also *citta* and *caitasika* dharmas, which approach the object field at the same time, experience the object field at the same time, and leave the object field at the same time. Therefore, [they] are referred to as *saṃprayukta*.

(vi) Moreover, ‘being equally agreeable to each other’ (等相順, **samaṃ anuḡaṇa* or **anukūla*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Just as people are referred to as being *saṃprayukta* by being agreeable to each other, *citta* and *caitasika* dharmas that are agreeable to each other are also [referred to as being *saṃprayukta*].

(vii) Moreover, ‘uniting together’ (等和合, **samaṃ prayukta*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*.³⁵ Just as the unification of water and milk is referred to as *saṃprayukta*, so also *citta* and *caitasika* dharmas united with each other are also [referred to as being *saṃprayukta*].

(viii) The elder *Vāṣpa (霧尊者) says that *saṃprayukta* refers to equality in four respects: first, being equal regarding time (*kāla* 時分) because *citta* and *caitasika* are active at the same moment; second, being equal regarding basis (*āśraya* 所依) because *citta* and *caitasika* are active depending on the same faculty (*indriya* 根); third, being equal regarding the object (*ālambana* 所緣) because *citta* and *caitasika* are active taking the same object field (*viṣaya* 境); and fourth, being equal regarding mode of function (*ākāra* 行相) because *citta* and *caitasika* are active having the same *ākāra*.

(ix) Moreover, equality in five respects is referred to as *saṃprayukta*: namely, the aforementioned four respects plus equality as a real entity (物體, *dravya*). Because *citta* and *caitasikas* are all individually real entities, [they] arise united together. Therefore, [they] are referred to as *saṃprayukta*.

(x) Moreover, the meaning of *saṃprayukta* is like a bundle of reeds (束蘆 *naḡa-kalāpa*). Just as individual reeds cannot stand by themselves but are able to stand only with many to form a bundle, similarly *citta* and *caitasika* need to be many and can function in the world depending on each other to receive and cause [karmic] results and take objects (所緣, *ālambana*).

(xi) Moreover, the meaning of *saṃprayukta* is like a combined rope (合索). Just as each thread cannot individually drag a log of wood but needs many threads combined to have the activity of dragging, similarly *citta* and *caitasika* [function together,] as explained earlier.

(xii) Moreover, the meaning of *saṃprayukta* is like hands joined (連手).

³⁵ AKBh p. 62.6-7: *saṃprayuktāḡ samaṃ prayuktatvāt*.

Just as a river torrent is difficult to cross by one person, and only many people with hands joined can cross, so also *citta* and *caitasika* [function together], as explained earlier.

(xiii) Moreover, the meaning of *saṃprayukta* is like merchants (**sārtha* 商侶). Just as many merchants together as companions can pass dangerous paths, similarly *citta* and *caitasika* [function together,] as explained earlier.

(xiv) The elder Vasumitra says that “leading to the birth of each other” (相引生, **ākṣepa*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, then because eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) lead to [the arising] of each other, should they be associated (*saṃprayukta*)? Answer: they have different bases (所依, *āśraya*). [Only] those [dharmas] that have the same basis and lead to the arising of each other are associated (*saṃprayukta*).

(xv) Moreover, “not being separated” (不相離, **vinirbhāga*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, since the four great elements (大種, *mahābhūta*) are not separated, are they associated? Answer: they have no basis (所依, *āśraya*). Only those have [the same] basis and are also not separated are associated (*saṃprayukta*).

(xvi) Moreover, “having an object” (有所緣, **sālambana*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, since the six types of consciousness all have objects, are they associated? Answer: they have different bases (所依, *āśraya*). Only those having the same basis and have an object are associated.

(xvii) Moreover, “having the same object” (同所緣, **ekālambana*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, when one of the five types of [sense] consciousness and the mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) have the same object, they should be referred to as associated. Moreover, multiple eye-consciousnesses should also be referred to as associated, like many sentient beings who look at the new moon all together. Answer: they have different bases (所依, *āśraya*). Only those [dharmas] that have the same basis and have the same object are associated.

(xviii) Moreover, “being constantly united” (常和合, **samsrṣṭa*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, since the three things life (*āyuh* 壽), heat (*uṣman* 煖), and consciousness (*vijñāna* 識) are constantly united, are they associated? Answer: no they are not, because the two, life and heat, have no basis. Only those that have [the same] basis and are constantly united are associated.

(xix) Moreover, “being always born together” (恒俱生, **sahotpāda*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, since the four great elements (大種, *mahābhūta*) are always born together, are they associated? Answer: they have no basis (所依, *āśraya*). Only those [dharmas] that have [the same] basis and are always born together are associated.

(xx) Moreover, “being born, staying, and ceasing together” (俱生住滅, **ekotpāda-sthiti-nirodha*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so,

those material forms (*rūpa*) that are revolving around *citta* (隨心轉色 **cittānuvartin rūpa*), *cittas* that revolving around *citta* (隨心轉心 **cittānuvartin citta*), and conditioned [dharmas] dissociated from *citta* (不相應行, *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra dharma*) are all born, stay, and cease together with *citta*; are they associated? Answer: they do not have a basis. Only those [dharmas] that have [the same] basis, born, stay, and cease together, are associated.

(xxi) Moreover, “having the same basis (*āśraya*), the same object (*ālambana*), and acting with regard to the same mode of function (*ākāra*)” is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: how [do you] know this is the case? Answer: how [do you] know it is not the case?

(xxii) Moreover, “carrying out the same activity” (同作一事, **ekakārya*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Question: if so, since patiences (忍, *kṣānti*) and knowledges (智, *jñāna*) have the same activity, are they associated? Answer: they are not born together (不俱生, **anekotpada*). Only those [dharmas] that are born together, and carry out the same activity are associated.

(xxiii) The Bhadanta (大德)³⁶ says that “being companions” (同伴侶, **sahāya*) is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Consciousness (*viññāna*) and mental factors (*caitasika/caitta*) contain (容受, **avakāśa*) each other, are born together, and take the same object, and thus are associated.

(xxiv) The venerable Ghoṣaka (妙音)³⁷ says that “having all the same basis (*āśraya*), the same object (*ālambana*), the same mode of function (*ākāra*), the same activity (*kārya*),” this is the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. Why? Conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) are weak by nature and can only perform a function by supporting each other; one never sees a single *mahābhūmika* dharma that performs a function by itself.

This passage starts by stating that *saṃprayukta* means “to be equal” (等 **sama*). It is likely that here the Vibhāṣā commentators are following the old Indian commentarial tradition, whereby the commentary begins by analyzing the term itself. “To be equal” is likely an interpretation of the prefix *sam-* in the word *saṃprayukta*. The commentators understand *sam-* as **sama*, which means “even, level,” and “same, equal.”³⁸ Someone may ask, as the commentators presume, if *saṃprayukta* means “to be equal,” then in what way are things said to be equal? Is it that the number of *caitasikas* in various *cittas* are

³⁶ The Bhadanta (大德) in the MVŚ likely refers to the Dārṣṭāntika master Dharmatrāta (法救). See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 245ff.

³⁷ Ghoṣaka is a prominent Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma master. See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 282-5.

³⁸ MW s.v. *sama*²: “even, smooth, flat, plain, level, parallel...same, equal, similar, like, equivalent, like to or identical or homogeneous with...” which is equivalent to Chinese 等.

equal? It is unlikely because in different *cittas*, such as wholesome or unwholesome *cittas*, the numbers and types of *caitasikas* are different. How then should one understand *saṃprayukta* as meaning “to be equal”?

In response, this Vibhāṣā passage lists twenty-four interpretations of *saṃprayukta*. These twenty-four interpretations can be divided into three groups: (1) i-ix continue the “to be equal” interpretation and list different answers to the question “to be equal to what.” (2) x-xiii contain four similes. (3) xiv-xxiv do not involve the analysis of the term *saṃprayukta* itself, but are descriptions of theoretical positions regarding *saṃprayukta*.

In group (1) i-ix, the text first answers the question of what it means “to be equal?” It says that “to be equal” should be understood in terms of status as a “real entity” (體 *dravya*), which means that in each moment of *citta* there can be only one instance of a certain type of *caitasika* such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and so forth. It is impossible that in one *citta* there exist two *vedanās* and one *saṃjñā*; that would be “unequal.” *Caitasikas* must be equal in number as *dravyas* such that there is only one *vedanā*, one *saṃjñā*, and so forth. Since *dravya* is a relatively late development in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system,³⁹ the commentators here start the list of interpretations with this relatively new notion and frame the discussion with the later Vaibhāṣika mind model.

Interpretations ii-vii contain various interpretations of *saṃprayukta*. Except for vii, which is an etymological analysis of the term *saṃprayukta*, all the other interpretations, namely, “being equal and not separated” (不相離, **vinirbhāga*), “being equal and not different” (不別異, **ananyathā*), “carrying together” (等運轉, **saṃvāha*), “having the same activity” (等所作, **sama-kārya*), and “being equally agreeable to each other” (等相順, **samānugūṇa* or **samānukūla*), represent discrete, unconnected doctrinal positions. They resemble the list of terms in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi mātikā* that are related to *sampayutta*, such as *saṃsaṭṭha*, *samuṭṭāna*, *sahabhuno*, *anuparivattino*, and represent early, unsystematized attempts to understand *saṃprayukta*.

Interpretations viii-ix within group (1) represent the systemized and mature Vaibhāṣika position on *saṃprayukta*. The text attributes this position to the Abhidharma master *Vāṣpa (霧尊者), who proposes that *saṃprayukta* means *citta* and *caitasika*,

³⁹ See Cox 2004.

which are equal in four respects: time (*kāla*), basis (*āśraya*), object (*ālambana*), and mode of function (*ākāra*). And in ix, the text adds that they should also be equal with regard to their status as real entities (*dravya*). These later become the standard Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma definition of *saṃprayukta*, which is followed by works such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra*, and the later *Abhidharmadīpa*.

Interpretations x-xiii within group (2), present four similes explaining *saṃprayukta*: reed-bundles, rope, joined hands, and a band of merchants. All of these similes show that a particular task must be performed by a collection of things as a whole, and each component cannot perform the task alone by its own force. In a similar way, *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot function alone without each other; they depend on each other to experience the results of karma, and cause future results, as well as to perform basic cognitive functions such as taking objects.

Interpretations xiv-xxiv within group (3) represent eleven positions or opinions regarding *saṃprayukta*, likely originating from different teachers. Some are attributed to a specific teacher; for example, xiv is the opinion of the elder Vasumitra, while xxiii is attributed to Bhadanta Dharmatrāta. And apparently, all of these positions are acknowledged as valid interpretations of *saṃprayukta*: all positions with the exception of the last two, xxiii and xxiv, are somehow confirmed with the full definition of *saṃprayukta* as presented in ix: *citta* and *caitasikas* should be equal with regards to time (*kāla* 時分), basis (*āśraya* 所依), object (*ālambana* 所緣), mode of function (*ākāra* 行相), and real entity (*dravya* 體). For example, in xiv it enlists the elder Vasumitra's opinion that *saṃprayukta* means "leading to the birth of each other" (相引生, **ākṣepa*). Then the passage raises a question: if so, eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness should also be associated because they lead to the arising of each other. The following answer resorts to the definition of *saṃprayukta* as being equal regarding five things: *kāla*, *āśraya*, *ālambana*, *ākāra*, and *dravya*. It picks up the relevant aspect of *saṃprayukta* that applies to this specific interpretation: things associated (*saṃprayukta*) with each other must have the same basis (*āśraya*). Because eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness have different bases, namely, eye-consciousness has the eye-faculty (*indriya*) as its basis, while mind-consciousness has mind-element (*manas* or *mano-dhātu*) as its basis, hence,

even though eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness mutually lead to the arising of each other, they do not meet all the five criteria of *saṃprayukta*. Therefore, they are not associated.

Interpretations xiv-xx as well as xxii are all presented in a similar way. They first present an interpretation regarding *saṃprayukta*, such as it means “not being separated” (不相離, **vinirbhāga*), “having an object” (有所緣, **sālabhāna*), and so forth. Then they raise some counterexample that seems to meet the description but should not be understood as associated, as for example the four material elements (*mahābhūta*), six types of consciousness, and so forth. Then the passage analyzes the counterexample for the definition of *saṃprayukta* presented in ix and points out that the example does meet a specific criterion in the definition, most frequently the criterion of having the same basis (*āśraya*). As a result, the counterexample does not stand. In other words, the passage shows that all the interpretations listed agree with the definition of *saṃprayukta* presented in ix, and they are logically equivalent but simply presented in different forms.

Interpretations xxi and xxiv present two versions of the definition of *saṃprayukta* with fewer criteria as compared to the full definition in ix. Interpretation xxi has only three criteria for *saṃprayukta*: possessing the same *āśraya*, *ālabhāna*, and *ākāra*. Interpretation xxiv, which is attributed to the Abhidharma master Ghoṣaka, has an additional criterion: activity (*kārya*). These “incomplete” definitions of *saṃprayukta* suggest that the “full” definition with five criteria as given in ix is likely an incremental product that assembles parts from different opinions of different teachers.

The position in (xxiii) attributed to the Bhadanta (大德) Dharmatrāta is interesting in that it appears to contradict a position previously attributed to Dharmatrāta. As discussed in 2.1.5, Dharmatrāta does not accept that *citta* and *caitasika* are separate entities but thinks that they are all varieties of *cetanā* (**cetanā-viśeṣa*). It is then surprising that here the MVŚ attributes to him the opinion that association refers to the fact that consciousness (*viññāna*) and *caitasikas* contain each other, are born together, and take the same object. This position appears to be quite similar to that of the Vaibhāṣikas. However, as noted in 2.1.5, Dharmatrāta also proposes that consciousness (*viññāna=citta*) always accompanies other mental phenomena such as *vedanā*, *sañjñā*, and so forth. *Citta* and the mental phenomenon it accompanies constitute an assemblage (一和合, **sāmagrī*), and

the components of the assemblage such as *citta* and *vedanā* cannot be separated from each other as individual entities.⁴⁰ It should also be mentioned that in the discussion of *saṃprayukta* in the *ĀVS*, this position of Dharmatrāta is the last one in the list of different positions, and possibly the one the composer of the *ĀVS* takes as the most authoritative position on *saṃprayukta*.⁴¹ This may confirm Yinshun's observation that the *ĀVS* is likely a work of the *Dārṣṭāntikas*.

To sum up, the twenty-four interpretations of *saṃprayukta* in the *MVŚ* suggest a possible course through which the Abhidharma theory of *saṃprayoga* was formed. As discussed in the previous two sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the concept of *saṃprayoga* used specifically in relation to *citta* and *caitasikas* is not attested in the early *sūtras*, though there are certain notions or contexts that can be taken as marking the inception of this concept. And during the early period of Abhidharma, the *mātikā* of the *Dhs* and *mātrkās* in the *Prakaraṇapāda* and the *Dhātukāya* as well as in the **Śāriputrābhidharma* represent early attempts to elaborate upon the concept of *saṃprayukta* with a number of terms such as *saṃsaṭṭha*, *sahabhuno*, *anuparivattino*, and so forth. The twenty-four interpretations likely emerged after these few canonical Abhidharma texts were composed since they do not contain similar interpretations, but they must be earlier or contemporaneous with the *Vibhāṣā* compendium since they are included in the *MVŚ*.

Moreover, the *MVŚ* not only records these interpretations but also offers its own judgment: apparently, it agrees with the interpretation of the elder **Vāṣpa* (viii), which is also more or less equivalent to the elder *Ghoṣaka*'s position (xxiv, and the last one in the list). According to this interpretation, two things are associated with each other when they share the following properties:

- (1) time (*kāla*), they must occur simultaneously
- (2) basis (*āśraya*), they are based on the same faculty (*indriya*)
- (3) object (*ālambana*), they must have the same object

⁴⁰ For details of Dharmatrāta's position on *caitasika*, see 2.1.5; also Dhammajoti 2007a: 115.

⁴¹ No. 1549 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論 (卷 3) T28, p738c: 或作是說。千義是相應義。識所適處各相開避。心所念法則有選數。Here 千 is likely a mistranslation of "companion" (**sahāya*). There are ten interpretations of *saṃprayukta* recorded in the *ĀVS*, which correspond closely to (xiv)-(xxiii) in the *MVŚ*. On the dating of the *ĀVS* and its relationship with the *MVŚ*, see Yinshun 印順 1981a: 380-87.

(4) mode of function (*ākāra*), they must function with regard to the same mode of function

The composers of the MVŚ also note in (ix) that in addition to these four, (5) the property of equality as a “real entity” (*dravya*) should also be a criterion of *saṃprayoga* because *citta* and *caitasikas* are different entities, and only different entities can be associated. This signifies the formal establishment of the theory of the five properties of association characterizing the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika tradition.

However, perhaps because certain doctrines relevant in the analysis of *saṃprayoga* such as mode of function (*ākāra*) and being a real entity (*dravya*) are particular Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika doctrines which may not be accepted by all Abhidharma teachers, Abhidharma texts later than the MVŚ contain analyses of *saṃprayoga* that include only some of the five properties. For example, in Ghoṣaka’s **Abhidharmāmṛtarasa*, association is only said to be the interdependent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*.⁴² In Dharmasreṣṭhin’s **Abhidharmahrdaya*, association is said to be the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* that depend on each other’s power, have the same object, and must be active simultaneously, never to be separated.⁴³ And in Dharmatrāta’s **Miśrābhidharmahrdaya*, the analysis of *saṃprayoga* is more or less in the same form as that presented in the Vibhāṣā: *citta* and *caitasikas* must have the same mode of function (行法 *ākāra*), basis (依 *āśraya*), time (時 *kāla*), and the same object (境界 **viṣaya* which is equivalent to *ālambana* here). It also points out that *citta* cannot be associated with *citta* because two *cittas* cannot occur simultaneously, and a dharma cannot have a dependent relationship with its own self-nature (自性 *svabhāva*).⁴⁴ This last point indicates that *citta* and *caitasikas* must have different self-natures and hence implies the Vibhāṣā position that the association relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*

⁴² No. 1553 阿毘曇甘露味論 (卷 1) T28, p970a23-4: 云何相應因。心諸數法因。諸心數法心因。是謂相應。Note that the Ghoṣaka associated with this treatise is not the elder Ghoṣaka of the Vibhāṣā. According to a record of the Sarvāstivāda lineage, this Ghoṣaka is a Western teacher (西方師 *pāścātya*) two generations later than the Ghoṣaka of the Vibhāṣā. See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 479-86.

⁴³ No. 1550 阿毘曇心論 (卷 1) T28, p811c13-14: 相應因者。心及心數法。各各力於一緣中一時行。相離則不生。

⁴⁴ No. 1552 雜阿毘曇心論 (卷 2) T28, p884b23-c3: 相應因今當說: 謂同一行法 一依亦一時 及一境界轉 是說相應因。若行若依若時若境界心轉。即彼行彼依彼時彼境界受等心法轉。若彼心法轉。即彼心轉性羸劣故。展轉力生如東蘆。是故說心於心法相應因。心法於心法及心因。非心於心因。何以故。三事故。無一剎那二心俱生。前心不待後心。一切諸法自性不自顧。色心不相應行無相應因。無緣故。

must have the separate real-entity (*dravya*) property. Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explicitly defines *saṃprayoga* as entailing equality in five respects: basis (*āśraya*), object (*ālambana*), mode of function (*ākāra*), time (*kāla*), and real entity (*dravya*).⁴⁵ On this point, Vasubandhu follows closely the analysis of the Vibhāṣā. Similarly Saṅghabhadra in his **Nyāyānusāra* also lists these five properties as the definition of *saṃprayukta-hetu*.⁴⁶

Finally, a comparison of the formalized analyses of *saṃprayoga* in the Pāli Abhidhamma and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma indicates that all four properties listed in the Pāli definition have parallels in the Sarvāstivāda definition: the Pāli items (1) a *cetasika* arises together with *citta* (*ekuppāda*) and (2) ceases together with *citta* (*ekanirodha*) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda item of the same time (*kāla*); (3) *cetasika* and *citta* have the same object support (*ekālambana*) corresponds to the criterion of same object support (*ālambana*) in the Sarvāstivāda version; and the (4) same basis (*ekavatthuka*) corresponds to same basis (*āśraya*).⁴⁷ Two items in the Sarvāstivāda definition, namely, the same mode of function (*ākāra*) and the property as real entities (*dravya*), have special doctrinal importance in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma but not in the Theravāda Abhidhamma. Therefore, it is no surprise to see them included in the Sarvāstivāda definition but not in the Theravāda one.⁴⁸

3.1.4 Association in *Yogācāra* texts

Section 2.1.4 demonstrated that the notion of *caitta/caitasika* as “mental factors” in texts of the *Yogācāra* tradition is very similar to that of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system. Similarly, the theory of association (*saṃprayoga*) in *Yogācāra* texts, which claims that different *caitasikas* can occur simultaneously with *citta*, is also very similar to that of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Following the list of the *caitasikas*, the *Yogācārabhūmi*

⁴⁵ AKBh verse ii.34, p.62.9-10: *pañcabhiḥ samatāprākārair āśrayālanbanākārakāladravyasamatābhiḥ. keyaṃ samatā? yathaiḥ hyekaṃ cittamevaṃ caittā apyekaikā iti.*

⁴⁶ No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 16) T29, p425c15-6: 但說相應。即知一切時依行相境事皆同。...p425c26: 由五平等義立相應因。

⁴⁷ Both *āśraya* and *vatthu* mean “basis.” For *vatthu* (Skt. *vastu*) as “basis,” see, for example, Dhs §679 (p.148): *kataman taṃ rūpaṃ cakkhusamphassassa vatthu? cakkhāyatanam idan taṃ rūpaṃ cakkusamphassassa vatthu.*

⁴⁸ For the meaning of *ākāra* in this context, see Miyashita 1978. For *dravya*, see Cox 2004.

states:⁴⁹

...[Dharmas] of that kind (*bhāgīya*) [as *caitasikas*], are dharmas belonging to mind (*caitasa*), are together and associated (*sahabhūsamprayukta*), and are called companions (*sahāya*). [They] have the same object support (*ekālabhāna*), various modes of function (*anekākāra*), are coexistent (*sahabhū*), function individually (*ekaikavṛttaya*), are determined by their own seeds (*svabījanīyata*), and are associated (*saṃprayukta*); [they] have modes of function (*sākāra*), have object supports (*sālabhāna*), and have bases (*sāśraya*).

This passage describes and analyzes how these *caitasika* dharmas are related to *citta* as its companions (*sahāya*). First it defines a companion (*sahāya*) of mind: a companion of mind (*citta* or *cetas*) is a dharma that belongs to mind (*caitasa*), and also occurs together with (*sahabhū*) and is associated with (*saṃprayukta*) mind. Here, the term *caitasa* is a derivative from *cetas*, and it is etymologically equivalent to *caitasika* or *caitta*. As discussed in 2.1.1, the term *caitasika* in the sūtras should be understood as an adjective “mental” or “belonging to mind;” here in this passage from YBh, the term *caitasa* is likely used in a similar manner as *caitasika* in the sūtras, and should also be understood as meaning “mental” or “belonging to mind.”

The compound *sahabhūsamprayukta* is especially interesting in this context. The two members of the compound, *sahabhū* and *saṃprayukta*, represent two types of *hetus* in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system. The coexistent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*) indicates the relationship between dharmas that occur together and cause the same result. The association cause (*saṃprayukta-hetu*) is a special kind of *sahabhū-hetu*: *citta* and *caitasikas* must occur simultaneously and together they cause the mental phenomena of the next moment of the sentient being. In this sense all dharmas being *saṃprayukta-hetus* to each other must also be *sahabhū-hetus* to each other, but not all *sahabhū-hetus* are *saṃprayukta-hetus*. For example, dharmas dissociated from *citta* (*citta-viprayukta*) coexist with *citta* but are not associated with it; also the four material elements

⁴⁹ YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p.11.19-21: *evaṃbhāgīyāḥ sahabhūsamprayuktāś caitasā dharmāḥ sahāya ity ucyante ekālabhānā anekākārāḥ sahabhūva ekaikavṛttayaḥ svabījanīyatāḥ saṃprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālabhānāḥ sāśrayāḥ //* No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 1) T30, p280b18-21: 如是等輩。俱有相應心所有法。是名助伴。同一所緣非同一行相。一時俱有。一一而轉。各自種子所生。更互相應。有行相。有所緣。有所依。The list of *caitasikas* at the beginning of this passage is discussed in the previous chapter, section 2.1.4.

(*mahābhūta*) are coexistent but not associated with each other either.⁵⁰ From this perspective, the compound *sahabhūsamprayukta* here in this YBh passage indicates that the composer(s) of the YBh very likely were familiar with the *sahabhū* and *saṃprayukta-hetus* of the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system and, by noting the companionship of these *caitasika* dharmas, also asserts their association (*saṃprayukta*) with *citta*, which in turn is also a special kind of coexistent (*sahabhū*) relationship.

Next, the passage deploys several technical terms analyzing such a companion (*sahāya*) relationship between these *caitasikas* and *citta*: (1) they have the same object (*ekālabhana*); (2) have different modes of function (*anekākāra*); (3) are coexistent (*sahabhū*); (4) function individually (*ekaikavṛtti*), (5) are each determined by its own seed (*svabījanīyata*); and (6) are associated (*saṃprayukta*). The last term (6) *saṃprayukta* likely serves as the conclusion for all of the previous terms, which may indicate that the previous five terms constitute an analysis of different aspects or properties of the association relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*. A comparison of these five terms with the analysis of *saṃprayukta* in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system presented in the MVŚ and the AKBh reveals similarities but also interesting differences. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma analyzes association with regard to five aspects:⁵¹

- (i) the same basis (*āśraya*)
- (ii) the same object (*ālabhana*)
- (iii) the same mode of function (*ākāra*)
- (iv) occur at the same time (*kāla*)
- (v) both occur as real entities (*dravya*).

In the YBh passage several terms are more or less parallel to the items in the Sarvāstivāda list: (1) same object (*ekālabhanā*) corresponds to (ii) the same object (*ālabhana*); (3) coexistent (*sahabhū*) corresponds to (iv) occur at the same time (*kāla*); two terms in the YBh passage, (4) function individually (*ekaikavṛtti*) and (5) each

⁵⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b6-8: ...於此應作是說。若相應因即俱有因。有俱有因非相應因。謂不相應俱有因是。...p81c11-2: 心與隨心轉不相應行為俱有因。隨心轉不相應行與心為俱有因。...p82a10: 復次俱生四大種展轉為俱有因。

⁵¹ See the previous section 3.1.3 for more details about the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika analysis of association (*saṃprayukta*).

determined by its own seed (*svabījaniyata*), are logically equivalent to the Sarvāstivāda (v) occur as real entities (*dravya*).⁵²

However, the most significant difference in the YBh list of terms from the Sarvāstivāda list is the assertion that *citta* and *caitasikas* have different modes of functions (*anekākāra*), while the Sarvāstivāda analysis says that they have the same modes of function (*ākārasamatā*). Furthermore, in the later corresponding *Viniścayagrahāṇī* part of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the Yogācāra commentator(s) gives a clearer definition of association that is very similar to the Sarvāstivāda definition:⁵³

Q: Why is it called association (**saṃprayoga*)?

A: Because [*citta* and *caitta*] are equal with regard to real entity (**dravya* 事), place (**sthāna* 處), time (*kāla* 時), and basis (**āśraya* 所依).⁵⁴

This is almost an exact repetition of the Sarvāstivāda definition except for the item *ākāra*. Then why did the composers of the YBh not believe that *citta* and *caitasikas* have the same mode of function (*ākāra*)?

The different understanding of the notion *ākāra* is a complicated issue and deserves a separate study.⁵⁵ In summary, the orthodox Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas claim that *ākāra* is nothing other than insight (*prajñā*).⁵⁶ In his AKBh Vasubandhu defines *ākāra* as the summoning of the object by the objects' mode or class (*prakāra*), which Saṅghabhadra claims to be a non-Vaibhāṣika position.⁵⁷ This interpretation appears to understand *ākāra*

⁵² Cf. AKBh p.62.9-10: *yathaiva hyekaṃ cittamevaṃ caittā apyekaikā iti*.

⁵³ T No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p602a24-26: 問何故名相應。答由事等故。處等故。時等故。所依等故。

⁵⁴ The Taishō edition of the MVŚ gives the last item as 所作, which would appear to be an obvious error for 所依. Kuiji's commentary to this passage confirms the reading 所依. See T No. 1830 成唯識論述記 (卷 6) T43, p332b: 五十五說。由四等故說名相應。謂事等。處等。時等。所依等。事。處相似名之為等。時。依定一名之為等。... 依謂依根。

⁵⁵ There are several recent scholarly studies dedicated to the investigation of this concept in the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra systems, most notably Dhammajoti 2007b: 348-62; also Chen 2007; Miyashita 1978.

⁵⁶ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 p408c25-409a11: 問言行相者自性是何。答自性是慧。應知此中慧是行相。亦是能行亦是所行。與慧相應心心所法雖非行相而是能行亦是所行。與慧俱有不相應行。及餘有法雖非行相亦非能行而是所行。

有作是說。言行相者總以一切心心所法為其自性。若作是說。諸心心所皆是行相。亦是能行亦是所行。餘一切法雖非行相亦非能行而是所行。

復有說者。所言行相以一切法為其自性。若作是說。諸相應法亦是行相。亦是能行亦是所行。不相應法雖是行相亦是所行而非能行。

評曰應作是說。言行相者自性是慧。如初所說。如是名為行相自性。我物自體相分本性。

已說自性所以今當說。問何故名行相。行相是何義。答於諸境相簡擇而轉是行相義。

⁵⁷ AKBh ii-34, p.62.6: *sākārās tasyaivāḷambanasya prakāreṇa ākaraṇāt*. (This reading is confirmed in Yaśomitra's

as the mental activity that takes an image of the object, and it applies to all *citta* and *caitasikas* instead of only *prajñā*. In Yogācāra texts, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the Yogācārabhūmi defines *sākāra* as the fact that *citta* and *caitasikas* function over the same object with many different *ākāras*.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, this leaves the concept *ākāra* unclear. Some later commentators propose that *ākāra* is the subjective aspect (見分) of a mental activity (*vijñapti* 了別),⁵⁹ while others propose that both the object aspect (相分), that is, the image of the object produced by mind, and the subjective aspect (見分), are *ākāras*, because both of these two aspects are *vijñaptis*.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, it should be noted that these interpretations of *ākāra* represent the views of later commentators. In earlier Yogācāra texts such as the YBh, the reason why *citta* and *caitasikas* must have different *ākāras* is not explained. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins propose that *ākāra* is nothing but the insight (*prajñā*) mental factor, and, at any given moment, since *citta* and all *caittas* function with a single insight mental factor *prajñā*, they share the same *ākāra*. Thus, these different understandings of the notion of *ākāra* entail different definitions of association (*saṃprayukta*). The Sarvāstivādins think that *ākāra*, as the mental factor insight (*prajñā*), is a universal mental factor that occurs all the time and in all types of *cittas*. Every mental activity and state must engage in such insight and experience the result of this insight, and in each moment there can be only one insight mental factor. Therefore, when *citta* and *caitasikas* are associated, they must share the same insight, that is, the same *ākāra*. The early Yogācāra teachers certainly understand *ākāra* differently, but it is unclear exactly what their understanding of *ākāra* might be. If the later commentators are correct that in their system *ākāra* means *vijñapti*, which means

AKVy p.141. Pradhan's edition has an alternative reading.) Also vii-13, p.401.21: *sarveṣāṃ cittaccaittānāmālambanagrahaṇaprakāra ākāra iti*. Saṅghabhadra suggests that here Vasubandhu is following the position of some other school. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 74) T29, p741b4-5: 此中經主依附他宗。作如是言。諸心心所取境類別。皆名行相。Yaśomitra states that here Vasubandhu is following the Sautrāntikas: AKVy p.629: *evaṃ tu yuktam syād iti. sautrāntikamatam. ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra ākāra iti*.

⁵⁸ No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p602a26-7: 問何故名有行[相]。答於一所緣作無量種差別行相轉故。

⁵⁹ No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 2) T31, p10a11-13: 此識行相所緣云何。謂不可知執受處了。了謂了別。即是行相。識以了別為行相 ... p10b2-3: 執有離識所緣境者。彼說外境是所緣。相分名行相。見分名事... p10b5-6: 達無離識所緣境者。則說相分是所緣。見分名行相... p10c12: 故識行相即是了別。了別即是識之見分。

⁶⁰ No. 1830 成唯識論述記 (卷 5) T43, p317b16-27: 謂於所緣相分之上有了別有。即行相故。是識見分非是餘分。然行相有二。一者見分。如此文說。即一切識等皆有此行相。於所緣上定有。二者影像相分名為行相。其一切識或有。或無。所緣不定故。如此論下所緣緣中。出二所緣緣體。又瑜伽等說同一所緣是也。今此且約諸識定有者說。或與小乘別體者說。以影像相為行相者。小乘同故。然唯初解無第二者。第八俱時五心所法。如何可說同一所緣不同一行相。故須二解。以影像相為行相者。出集量文。

“phenomenon” or “manifestation” of mind, and all mental phenomena including *citta* and *caitasikas* are different *vijnaptis*, then *citta* and *caitasikas* must have different *ākāras*.

Finally, following the list of fifty-one *caitasikas*, the passage in the YBh gives three terms to characterize these companions (*sahāya*) of *citta*: they are “having mode of function” (*sākārāḥ*), “having object” (*sālambanāḥ*), and “having basis” (*sāśrayāḥ*). Again, a comparison of the various descriptions of association (*saṃprayukta*) in the Vibhāṣā suggests that these terms are all used to describe the association relationship.⁶¹ Furthermore, these three terms also appear in Vasubandhu’s description of *citta* and *caittas* in the *Abhidharmakośa*.⁶² These three terms emphasize that *citta* and *caitasikas* are mental phenomena, which have these three characteristics distinguishing them from other non-mental phenomena such as physical, chemical, or biological phenomena in the world. *Citta* and *caitasikas* as mental phenomena depend on either non-mental or mental phenomena (*sāśraya*), but unlike non-mental phenomena they must have an object (*sālambana*). Moreover, when they take their object, they take hold of it in a certain mode of function (*sākāra*), even though Vasubandhu or the YBh and the Vibhāṣā disagree on what the modes of function (*ākāra*) really are. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the notion of association (*saṃprayukta*) presented in the YBh has a close connection with the Sarvāstivāda theory of association.

In the Yogācāra text, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* ascribed to Asaṅga who is also traditionally taken as the author, or the compiler, of the YBh,⁶³ there is a chapter dedicated to the topic of *saṃprayoga*.⁶⁴ In this chapter, *saṃprayoga* is said to be six-fold:

⁶¹ For example, No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p10b18-20: 若法相應。有所依。有行相。有所緣。有警覺。此中說之。彼法不爾。是故不說。 Similarly p52a, 52b, 52c, 73a, 108b, 359a, 380c, 384c, 387b, 498a, 536a, 590c, 683a, 713c, 774c, 939a.

⁶² AKBh 2.34 (p.62.1-4) *yathā cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānamekāṛthaṃ / cittacaitasāḥ sāśrayāḥ sālambanāḥ / saṃprayuktāśca pañcadhā // ...* AKBh (p.62.5-7): *eko 'rthaḥ / ta eva hi cittacaitāḥ sāśrayā ucyante indriyāśritatvāt / sālambanā viṣayagrahaṇāt / sākārāstasyaivāḥ sālambanasya prakāreṇa ākaraṇāt / saṃprayuktāḥ samaṃ prayuktatvāt / kena prakāreṇa samaṃ parayuktā ityāha //*

⁶³ For a discussion of the possible relationship between the YBh and the AS, see Bayer 2010: 24-7. On the uncertainties of the authorship and dating, see Bayer 2010: 37-9, and Deleanu 2006: 154-5.

⁶⁴ The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has two divisions (*mūlavastu* and *viniścaya*) with four chapters in each division. The chapter on *saṃprayoga* is chapter 3 (*saṃprayogapariccheda*) within the first division.

- (1) Unseparated association (*avinirbhāga-saṃprayoga*): all divisible material forms (*sarveṣāṃ deśinām*, literally “all those having parts”) have this unseparated association with regard to the location of their atoms (*paramāṇudeśe*).⁶⁵ In other words, this “unseparated association” is a relationship between actual material forms (*rūpa*) and the presumed atoms (*paramāṇu*) of which they consist.⁶⁶
- (2) Mixed association (*miśrībhāva-saṃprayoga*): divisible material forms mix with each other at a level higher than atoms (*paramāṇu-ūrdhva*).⁶⁷
- (3) Accumulative association (*samavadhāna-saṃprayoga*): the accumulation of combined (*samudāyin*) divisible material forms.⁶⁸
- (4) Coexistent association (*sahabhāva-saṃprayoga*): in one sentient being the five *skandhas*, eighteen *dhātus*, and twelve *āyatanas* exist simultaneously; they arise together, stay together, and cease together.⁶⁹
- (5) Activity-performing association (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-saṃprayoga*): things strive with regard to the same effort. Just like in the case of two monks, whatever one engages in, the other is always associated.⁷⁰
- (6) Concurrent association (*saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga*): *citta* and *caitasikas* are concurrent with regard to the same object (*ālambana*).⁷¹

⁶⁵ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* AS Li 2013 p.245.36: *avinirbhāgasamprayogaḥ katamaḥ? paramāṇudeśe sarveṣāṃ deśināṃ avinirbhāgaḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b4-5: 何等不相離相應。謂一切有方分色與極微處互不相離。ASBh p47.14-5: *paramāṇudeśe sarveṣāṃ deśināmity ekaparamāṇuparyāpannānām rūpādīnāmavinirbhāgaḥ samānadeśatvena vedīavyaḥ*.

⁶⁶ In the AS, atoms (*paramāṇu*) are not real entities (*dravya*). It is an abstract notion established as the limit of analysis of material forms. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p675b: 當知此中極微無體。但由覺慧漸漸分析細分損減。乃至可析邊際。即約此際建立極微。為遣一合想故。又為悟入諸所有色非真實故。

⁶⁷ AS Li 2013 p245.38: *miśrībhāvasamprayogaḥ katamaḥ? paramāṇo(r)ūrdhvan deśinām miśrībhāvaḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b6-7: 何等和合相應。謂極微已上。一切有方分色更互和合。ASBh p47.16: *tadyathā kaluṣe pānīye appṛthivīparamāṇūnām paramparam*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718a23-4: 如濁水中地水極微更互和合。 “Like in turbid water the atoms of water and earth are mixed with each other.”

⁶⁸ AS Li 2013 p246.1: *samavadhānasamprayogaḥ katamaḥ? deśinām eva samudāyinām anyonyasamavadhānam*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b8: 何等聚集相應。謂方分聚色展轉集會。No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718a25: 如二溷團相擊成聚。ASBh p47.17-8: *tadyathā bhittau mṛtpiṇḍena mṛtpiṇḍāntarasya*.

⁶⁹ AS Li 2013 p246.2-3: *sahabhāvasamprayogaḥ katamaḥ? yāni skandhadhātvyātanāni sahabhāvena vartante*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b9-10: 何等俱有相應。謂一身中諸蘊界處。俱時流轉同住住滅。ASBh p47.18-9: *sahabhāvasaṃ[pra]yoga ekātmabhāve kṣaṇikānām skandhādīnām*.

⁷⁰ AS Li 2013 p246.4-5: *kṛtyānuṣṭhānasamprayogaḥ katamaḥ / tadyathā dvau bhikṣū anyatasminn adhikaraṇe (')nyonyam saṃprayuktau*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b11-12: 何等作事相應。謂於一所作事展轉相攝。如二苾芻隨一所作更互相應。ASBh p47.19: *kṛtyānuṣṭhānasamprayoga ekasmin prayojane prayuktānām-anyonyam*.

⁷¹ AS Li 2013 p246.6-7: *saṃpratipa[tti]samprayogaḥ katamaḥ? cittacaitasikānām dharmānām ekālambanā*

The AS points out that this final variety of concurrent association has four qualities:⁷²

- (1) It engages *citta* or *caitasikas* of different natures (*parabhāva*) and not of its own self-nature (*svabhāva*). In other words, *citta* cannot be associated with *citta*, *vedanā* cannot be associated with *vedanā*, and so forth.⁷³
- (2) It engages *cittas* or *caitasikas* that do not conflict each other. For example, lust (*rāga*) cannot be associated with hatred (*dveṣa*), and wholesome (*kuśala*) cannot be associated with unwholesome (*akuśala*).⁷⁴
- (3) *Citta* or *caitasikas* are simultaneous (*sadrśakāla*); past or future *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot be associated with present ones.⁷⁵
- (4) *Citta* and *caitasikas* associated must be of the same sphere (*dhātu*) and level of existence (*bhūmi*). For example, *citta* and *caitasikas* of the sphere of sensual desire (*kāmadhātu*) cannot be associated with those of the sphere of form (*rūpadhātu*), and *citta* and *caitasikas* of the first absorption (*dhyāna*) cannot be associated with the second absorption.⁷⁶

Furthermore, concurrent association has ten sub-types:

- (1) Constant concurrent association (*sarvatraga-saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga*): feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), contact (*sparśa*),

saṃpratipattiḥ sa punaḥ saṃpratipattisaṃprayogaḥ. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b13-4: 何等同行相應。謂心心所於一所緣展轉同行。

⁷² In the newly discovered AS manuscript, aside from these four qualities of this type of *saṃprayoga*, there is an additional one listed as *saṃānāśrayayo(h)* “having the same basis.” Since this quality is not listed in Xuanzang’s translations of the AS (T1605) or the ASVy (T1606), nor in the extant Sanskrit ASBh, it is very likely a later interpolation.

⁷³ AS Li 2013 p246.6: *parabhāvena na sva[bhā]vena*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b14-5: 他性相應非己性。ASBh p47.20-1: *saṃpratipattisaṃprayogaḥ parabhāvena na svabhāvena tadyathā cittam cittāntareṇa na saṃprayujyate, vedanā vedanāntareṇetyevamādi*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b2-3: 如心不與餘心相應。受不與餘受相應。如是等。

⁷⁴ AS Li 2013 p246.7: *aviruddhyor na viruddhayoḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 不相違相應非相違。ASBh p47.21-2: *na viruddhayos tadyathā rāgadveṣayoḥ kuśalākuśalayorvetyevamādi*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b3-4: 如貪瞋不相應。善不善不相應。如是等。

⁷⁵ AS Li 2013 p246.7: *sadrśakālayo(h) na visadrśa[kālayoḥ]*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 同時相應非異時。ASBh p47.22-3: *na visadrśakālayos tadyathā vartamānānāgatayoratitavartamānayoṙvā*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b4-5: 如現在去來不相應。

⁷⁶ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.9-10: *sabhāgadhātubhūmikayor avisabhāga (dhātu)bhūmikayoḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 同分界地相應非異分界地。ASBh p47.23-4: *na visabhāgadhātubhūmikayostadyathā kāmāvacara-rūpāvacarayoḥ prathamadvitīyadhyanabhūmikayorvetyevamādi*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b6-7: 如欲界色无色界不相應。初靜慮第二靜慮不相應。如是等。

attention (*manaskāra*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*), these five *caitasikas* and consciousness itself (*citta*) are always present in all occasions (*sarva avastha*) and cannot be separated from each other.⁷⁷

- (2) Defiled constant (*kliṣṭa-sarvatraga*) concurrent association: the four types of defilements (*kleśa*) that are always associated with the defiled *manas* (*kliṣṭa-manas*).⁷⁸
- (3) Sporadic (*kādācitka*) concurrent association: *caitasikas* of the category of wholesome (*kuśala*), such as faith (*śraddhā*), and so forth, also those of the category of defilements (*kleśa*) and minor defilements (*upakleśa*), such as lust (*rāga*), and so forth, all arise in *citta* occasionally and are not always present.⁷⁹
- (4) Situational (*āvasthika*) concurrent association: some dharmas are associated with pleasant feeling, some are associated with unpleasant feeling, and so forth.⁸⁰
- (5) Uninterrupted (*avicchinna*) concurrent association: association between *citta* and *caitasikas* that is not interrupted when *citta* is present (*sacittikāyām avastha*).⁸¹
- (6) Interrupted (*vicchinna*) concurrent association: association between *citta* and *caitasikas* in the case of a practitioner who has attained the mindless achievement (*acittaka-samāpatti*); *citta* and the *caitasikas* will be interrupted

⁷⁷ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.10: *sarvatragasaṃprayogastadyathā vedanā saṃjñācetanāsparśamanaskāravijñānānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b16-7: 復有一切遍行同行相應。謂受想思觸作意識。ASBh p47.25-6: *sarvatragah saṃpratipattisaṃprayoga vedanādīnām ṣaṇṇāṃ sarvāsvavasthāsveṣāṃ vinānyonyamabhāvāt*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b8-9: 由此六法於一切位決定相應。隨無一法餘亦無故。

⁷⁸ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.11-2: *api khalu kliṣṭasarvatragah saṃprayogo manasi caturṇṇām kleśānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b17-8: 復有染污遍行同行相應。謂於染污意四種煩惱。No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b10-11: 由此四法於一切時恒相應故。For the lists of the four defilements, see AS Pradhan 1950: p12.2-4: *manaḥ katamat? yannityakālammanyānāmākamālayavijñānaṃ caturbhiḥ kleśaiḥ saṃprayuktam ātmadrṣṭy ātmasnehenāsmimānenāvidyayā ca*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 1) T31, p666a: 何等為意謂一切時緣阿賴耶識思度為性。與四煩惱恒相應。謂我見我愛我慢無明。Also Triṃsikā verse 6 (Buescher 2007: 147): *kleśaiḥ caturbhiḥ sahitaṃ nivr̥tāvyākṛtaiḥ sadā ātmadrṣṭyātmamahātmamānātmasnehasaṃjñūitaiḥ*.

⁷⁹ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.12-3: *kādācitkah saṃprayogastadyathā citte śraddhādīnām kuśalānām rāgādīnām ca kleśopakleśānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b18-20: 復有非一切時同行相應。謂依止心。或時起信等善法。或時起貪等煩惱隨煩惱法。

⁸⁰ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.13-4: *āvasthikah saṃprayogah sukhāyā vedanāyāḥ sasamprayogāyāḥ, evaṃ duḥkhāyā aduḥkhāsukhāyāḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b20-22: 復有分位同行相應。謂與樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。

⁸¹ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.13-4: *avicchinnaḥ saṃprayogah sacittikāyāmavasthāyām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b22-3: 復有無間同行相應。謂在有位心。

when he enters the mindless state and resume when he is out of the mindless state.⁸²

- (7) Outsider (*bahirmukha*) concurrent association: association between the majority of *citta* and *caitasikas* pertaining to the realm of sensual desire (*kāmapratisaṃprayukta*).⁸³
- (8) Insider (*antarmukha*) concurrent association: association between the majority of *citta* and *caitasikas* in stages of concentration (*samāhitabhūmika*).⁸⁴
- (9) Customary (*ucita*) concurrent association: association between *citta* and *caitasikas* of ordinary people (*pārthagjanika*) and of certain Buddhist disciples whether in training (*śaikṣa*) or having completed their training (*aśaikṣa*).⁸⁵
- (10) Uncustomary (*anucita*) concurrent association: association between transcendental (*lokottara*) *citta* and *caitasikas* and also between those *citta*

⁸² AS Pradhan 1950: p34.15: *vicchinnaḥ saṃprayogo 'cittakasamāpattiyantaritasya*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b23: 復有有間同行相應。謂無心定所問。For the distinction between “having mind” (*sacittikāya*) and “mindless” (*acittaka*), see YBh No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 13) T30, p345a6-12: 此中若具生因緣故。心便得生。名有心地。若遇不生心因緣故。心則不生。名無心地。分位建立者。謂除六位。當知所餘名有心地。何等為六。謂無心睡眠位。無心悶絕位。無想定位。無想生位。滅盡定位。及無餘依涅槃界位。如是六位。名無心地。See also Paul Griffiths’ study (1986) of mindless achievement in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Yogācāra traditions.

⁸³ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.15-6: *bahirmukhaḥ saṃprayogo yadbhūyasā kāma pratisaṃyuktānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b23-4: 復有外門同行相應。謂多分欲界繫心心所。

⁸⁴ AS Pradhan 1950: p34.16-7: *antarmukhaḥ saṃprayogaḥ yadbhūyasā samāhitabhūmikānām cittacaitasikānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b24-5: 復有內門同行相應。謂諸定地所有心心所。Rāhula and Boin-Webb translate *bahirmukha* and *antarmukha* as “extroverted” and “introverted,” which do not catch the meanings of these terms. Accord to the AS, all dharmas pertaining to the realm of sensual desire (*kāma-dhātu*) are *bahirmukha*, except for *citta* and *caitasikas* born from hearing and thinking about the Buddha’s teachings, and also *citta* and the *caitasikas* that accord with them. AS Pradhan 1950: 20: *kathaṃ bahirmukhaṃ kati bahirmukhāni kimarthaṃ bahirmukha pariṅṣā / kāmapratisaṃyuktaṃ bahirmukhaṃ sthāpayitvā buddhaśāsane śrutamayacintāmayatadanu-dharmaparigrhītām ścittacaitasikān dharmān / catvāro dhātavaḥ dve cāyatane tadanyeṣāṃ caikadeśaḥ / avītarāgātmābhīniveśatyājanārtham / kathamantarmukhaṃ katyantarmukhāni kimarthaṃ antarmukhapariṅṣā / bahirmukhaviparyayaṇāntarmukham / catuto dhātūn sthāpayitvā dve cāyatane tadanyeṣāmekadeśaḥ / vītarāgātmābhīniveśatyājanārtham*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 2) T31, p668c: 云何外門。幾是外門。為何義故觀外門耶。謂欲界所繫法是外門義。除依佛教所生聞思慧及彼隨法行所攝心心所等。四界二處全及餘一分。欲界所攝是外門。為捨執著不離欲我故。觀察外門。云何內門。幾是內門。為何義故觀內門耶。謂外門相違是內門義。除四界二處全及餘一分是內門。為捨執著離欲我故。觀察內門。In summary, to determine whether a dharma is *bahirmukha* or *antarmukha* is to distinguish whether or not this dharma pertains to Buddhist teachings. In this context, it would appear that “insider” and “outsider” are more suitable translations.

⁸⁵ Here the English translation mainly follows Rahula and Boin-Webb 2001: 75-6. AS Pradhan 1950: p34.17-8: *ucitaḥ saṃprayogaḥ pārthagjanikānām cittacaitasikānām tadekatyānām ca śaikṣāśaikṣānām*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b25-7: 復有曾習同行相應。謂諸異生所有心心所。及有學者一分心心所。ASBh p47.26-7: *ucitas-tadekatyānām ca śaikṣāśaikṣānāmityekāntalaukikānām kuśalānāmakuśalāvyaṅkṛtānām ca yathāsambhavam*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p0718b20-21: 一分言謂攝一向世間善不善無記法。如其所應。

and *caitasikas* acquired subsequent to transcendental [wisdom] (*lokottaraprṣṭhalabdha*) after the first moment (*ādyataduttara*).⁸⁶

This chapter of the AS is perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic analysis of *saṃprayoga* in Buddhist literature up to that time. The classification of *saṃprayoga* into six types is apparently a new theoretical development. No listing of these types as a whole appears in either Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma or other early Yogācāra texts, even though certain parts of the list, for example, the first two types of association in the AS, namely, the unseparated association (*avinirbhāga-saṃprayoga*), and the mixed association (*miśrībhāva-saṃprayoga*), may have been derived from the discussion of *rūpa* and *paramāṇu* in the YBh.⁸⁷ Tracing the history of these six types of *saṃprayoga* is beyond the scope of the present study, but several points should be noted.

First, as noted previously in the discussion of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma systems, *saṃprayoga* is a relation applicable exclusively to *citta* and *caitasikas*. And in the Sarvāstivāda system, *sahabhū-hetu* has a broader scope, covering not only *citta* and *caitasikas* but also *rūpa* and *citta-viprayukta* dharmas. However, here in this chapter of the AS, among the six types of *saṃprayoga*, the first five types all include material forms (*rūpa*). The first three types, namely, (1) unseparated association (*avinirbhāga-saṃprayoga*), (2) mixed association (*miśrībhāva-saṃprayoga*), and (3) accumulative association (*samavadhāna-saṃprayoga*), concern material forms (*rūpa*) in different levels of analysis. As in the analysis of *saṃprayoga* in the MVŚ,⁸⁸ such application of *saṃprayoga* to the analysis of *rūpa* is significantly absent in the Sarvāstivāda texts. The fourth type of association in the AS, namely, (4) coexistent association (*sahabhāva-saṃprayoga*), is applicable to all five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*,

⁸⁶ Again, the English translation mainly follows Rahula and Boin-Webb 2001: 76 with minor adjustments. AS Pradhan 1950: p34.19-20: *anucitaḥ saṃprayogaḥ lokottarāṇāṃ cittacaitasikānāmādyataduttarāṇāṃ lokottaraprṣṭhalabhānām* ca. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b27-9: 復有未曾習同行相應。謂出世間諸心心所。及初後時出世後所得諸心心所。ASBh p47.27-8: *ādyataduttarāṇāmityapūrvajātīyatvena prathamakṣaṇotpannānām dvitīyādikṣaṇotpannānām ca lokottarāṇāmanucitatvajñāpanārtham*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b23-5: 初後時言。為顯非先種類。初念已去。及第二念等已去出世心心法是未曾習性。

⁸⁷ No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 3) T30, p290a23-b1: 又不相離有二種。一同處不相離。謂大種極微與色香味觸等。於無根處有離根者。於有根處有有根者。是名同處不相離。二和雜不相離。謂即此大種極微與餘聚集能造所造色處俱故。是名和雜不相離。又此遍滿聚色。應知如種種物石磨為末以水和合互不相離。非如胡麻綠豆粟稗等聚。

⁸⁸ See the discussion of the twenty-four interpretations in the MVŚ in 3.1.3.

and eighteen *dhātus*. In other words, it includes all conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas of the world. Furthermore, the fifth type, (5) activity-performing association (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhāna-saṃprayoga*), emphasizes that things involved in such an association relationship must be engaged in the same undertaking. Again these five types of association are not limited to *citta* and *caitasikas* alone but have a much broader scope.

However, these five types of *saṃprayoga* share much in common with the notion of *sahabhū-hetu* in the Sarvāstivāda system. As it is stated in the MVŚ, *sahabhū-hetu* is applicable to all conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas.⁸⁹ The MVŚ also explains at length that material elements (*mahābhūta*) are *sahabhū-hetus* for each other.⁹⁰ Therefore, it is likely that the first five types of *saṃprayoga* in the AS are related to the Sarvāstivāda notion of *sahabhū-hetu*. As mentioned earlier, in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *saṃprayukta-hetu* is a special kind of *sahabhū-hetu* that is applicable only to *citta* and *caitasikas*; in other words, all *saṃprayukta-hetus* are *sahabhū-hetus*, but not all *sahabhū-hetus* are necessarily *saṃprayukta-hetus*.⁹¹ From this perspective, these five types of *saṃprayoga* expand the scope of the Sarvāstivāda notion of *saṃprayukta-hetu* and make it equivalent to the Sarvāstivāda *sahabhū-hetu*. This is especially true of (4) coexistent association (*sahabhāva-saṃprayoga*), which qualifies *saṃprayoga* with *sahabhāva*, which is etymologically equivalent to *sahabhū*. Moreover, in the fifth type (5) activity-performing association (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhāna-saṃprayoga*), the AS offers the simile of two monks engaging in the same activity, which resembles the similes of a man relying on his staff and people crossing a river with hands joined given in the MVŚ: *saṃprayukta-hetu* emphasizes the function of the staff as a support, while *sahabhū-hetu* is what one can do with the support of the staff; similarly in the simile that many people cross a river with hands joined used to explain the meaning of *saṃprayukta*. In the case of *saṃprayukta-hetu*, the emphasis is on the fact that their hands are joined, while *sahabhū-hetu* emphasizes that with their hands joined the people have crossed the river.⁹² Thus, these five types of *saṃprayoga*

⁸⁹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 17) T27, p85b22-5: 問俱有因以何為自性。答一切有為法已說自性。所以今當說。問何故名俱有因。俱有是何義。答不相離義是俱有義。同一果義是俱有義。相隨順義是俱有義。

⁹⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p82a10ff.

⁹¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b: 若相應因即俱有因。有俱有因非相應因。謂不相應俱有因是。

⁹² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b: 復次如執杖義是相應因。如執杖已有所作義是俱有因。復次如連手義是相應因。如連手已渡暴河義是俱有因。

appear to represent an attempt on the part of the author of the AS to incorporate the *Sarvāstivāda* notion of *sahabhū-hetu* into the new *saṃprayoga* typology.

Only the sixth type of association, namely, (6) concurrent association (*saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga*), which is exclusively applied to the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, corresponds to the *saṃprayukta-hetu* in the *Sarvāstivāda* system. This type of association is defined in the AS with the statement that *citta* and *caitasikas* are concurrent with regard to the same object (*ālambana*),⁹³ which corresponds to *ekālambana* in both the *Sarvāstivāda* and the *Yogācāra* analyses of *saṃprayoga*. In the four qualities of this *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* given by the AS, the first quality, (a) that *citta* or *caitasikas* can only be associated with *citta* or *caitasikas* of a different nature (*parabhāva*), corresponds to the characteristic of *saṃprayukta-hetu* in both the *Sarvāstivāda* system and the *YBh*, which requires that *citta* and *caitasikas* be real and separate entities (*dravya*). Quality (c) in the AS, which requires *citta* and *caitasikas* to be simultaneous (*sadṛśakāla*), corresponds to the *ekakāla* characteristic in both the *Sarvāstivāda* and the *YBh* definitions of *saṃprayukta*.

The second quality of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* mentioned in the AS, namely, (b) *citta* and *caitasikas* that are associated cannot conflict each other, is not included in the definitions of *saṃprayukta* in the *MVŚ* and the *YBh*. However, the notion that certain types of mental phenomena cannot coexist with each other, for example, lust (*rāga*) and hatred (*dveṣa*), is a very old idea, and is recognized in early *Abhidharma* analyses of mind, as in the meticulous lists of mental phenomena in the *Dhs* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*.⁹⁴ Perhaps the *MVŚ* and the *YBh* take this notion for granted thus do not include it as a part of their definitions of *saṃprayukta*.

The fourth quality, namely, that (d) *citta* and *caitasikas* as associated must belong to the same sphere (*dhātu*) and level of existence (*bhūmi*), is absent in the *MVŚ* definition but corresponds to the requirement of identity of place (處等) in the *YBh*

⁹³ See footnote 71 above.

⁹⁴ Although this principle is never explicitly stated in early *Abhidharma* texts such as the *Dhs* and the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, it is no doubt implied in their lists analyzing different types of *cittas*. For example, in the analyses of *cittas* in the *Dhs*, *rāga* and *doṣa* never occur in the same type of *citta*. This principle is also implied in the chapter of *saṃprayoga* in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, which analyzes the association among different kinds of mental phenomena including all types of *vijñānas* and *caitasikas*. The *MVŚ* clearly states that *rāga* and *dveṣa* cannot coexist: T1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 47) T27, p243b7-11: 若心起貪。瞋則不起。若心起瞋。貪則不起。此二心起決定有癡。所以者何。貪瞋行相更互相違。癡不爾故。貪行相歡。瞋行相感。無明行相俱不相違。

Viniścayagrahaṇī definition of *saṃprayoga*.⁹⁵ This suggests that the AS has a closer relationship to the YBh than the MVŚ and the Sarvāstivāda system.⁹⁶ However, a comparison of the AS’s analysis of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* with the definitions in the MVŚ and the YBh indicates that there is one item present in both the MVŚ and the YBh but significantly absent in the AS: that is, the requirement of the same basis (*āśraya*). The apparent equivalence of the *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* to the more traditional notion of *saṃprayoga* in the MVŚ and the YBh makes one wonder if the absence of *āśraya* here in the AS is a scribal error. In fact, in the recently published, newly discovered Sanskrit manuscripts of the AS, a reference to the “basis” occurs in the compound “having the same basis” *samānāśrayo*, which conspicuously stands between “are not conflicting” (*naviruddhayoḥ*) and “simultaneous” (*sadrśakālayoḥ*) (Li 2013: 246.8). However, certain facts make it unlikely that the original AS text contained this item of *samānāśrayoḥ* in its analysis of the *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga*: namely, the newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript is quite late (10—11 century CE, Li 2013: 242), no reference to the “same basis” appears in Xuanzang’s translations of the AS and the ASVy, and it is also absent in the Sanskrit manuscript of the ASBh.⁹⁷

Finally, the list of ten subtypes of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* appears to be unique to the AS, and other earlier Buddhist texts do not appear to contain a parallel list. However, the contents of the list are not completely new. Items (i)-(iii) bear a marked resemblance to the three major classes or divisions of *caitasikas* in the YBh *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.⁹⁸ *sarvatraga* is the class of universal *caitasikas*; *kliṣṭa-sarvaga* contains the four defilements that are always associated with the defiled *manas*; and *kādācitka* is logically more or less equivalent to the general category of non-universals (**asarvatraga* 不遍行) in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. In other words, here in the AS the three subtypes (i)-(iii) of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* analyzes the association relationship in terms of different classes of *caitasikas*, and the classification of *caitasikas* here in the AS generally follows

⁹⁵ See footnote 53 above.

⁹⁶ The principle that *citta* and *caitasikas* associated with each other must belong to the same sphere and level of existence do exist in early Abhidharma texts, but this principle is not included in their definition of *saṃprayoga*.

⁹⁷ The ASBh does not quote and explain every word in the AS but instead sometimes skips sentences with obvious meanings. However, in this part, the ASBh appears to explain all other words in this sentence except for *samānāśrayoḥ*. Therefore, it is very likely that the AS text on which the ASBh is commenting did not contain *samānāśrayoḥ* in this sentence.

⁹⁸ See the discussion of the YBh classification of *caitasikas* in 2.1.4.

the classification system in the YBh *Viniścayasamgrahanī*.

The fourth subtype, namely, (iv) situational (*āvasthika*) concurrent association (*saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga*), concerns the types of dharmas that can be associated in certain situations. For example, the other dharmas that can be associated with a pleasant feeling that is present. As noted earlier, in relatively later Abhidharma texts such as the MVŚ and the AKBh, discussions of association (*saṃprayoga*) are mostly focused on the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*; the association between different types of *caitasikas* is acknowledged but not emphasized.⁹⁹ However, earlier Abhidharma materials such as the *mātikā* in the Dhs discuss association in reference to many types of items such as *sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, *dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, and *adukkham-asukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, and so forth.¹⁰⁰ The fact that the AS includes such a subtype of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* suggests that the author is very careful to include all available earlier materials and attempts to build a system that covers them all, even those materials that may have been neglected by the compilers of the MVŚ.

The remaining six subtypes of *saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga* (v)-(x) do not concern *caitasikas* specifically but focus more on different states of mind, or more precisely, different stages of mind on the path of Buddhist practice. These states of mind are relevant to the analysis of *saṃprayoga* because each such state is a collection of *citta* and *caitasikas*, which are associated as a whole. In this respect these final six subtypes do not concern different types of association per se but different circumstances in which associations occur. For example, (v) uninterrupted (*avicchinna*) and (vi) interrupted (*vicchinna*) contrast the mental states of those who have attained the mindless meditation achievement (*acittaka-samāpatti*) with ordinary mental states. In the same manner, (vii) outsider (*bahirmukha*) and (viii) insider (*antarmukha*) distinguish mental states according to whether they are related to Buddhist meditation practice. And finally, (ix) customary (*ucita*) and (x) uncusomary (*anaucita*) contrast worldly (*laukika*) and transcendental (*lokottara*) mental states.

⁹⁹ See the discussion in 3.1.3, especially of the twenty-four interpretations of *saṃprayoga* in the MVŚ, most of which refer to *citta* and *caitasikas*.

¹⁰⁰ Dhs 1. See the discussion of such lists in early Abhidharma in 3.1.2. There are eleven such categories in the Dhs *mātikā*.

To sum up, Yogācāra texts contain analyses of *saṃprayoga* that differ in their form and contents. There are apparent similarities in the analyses of *saṃprayoga* in the Basic Section and the *Viniścayagrahāṇī* of the YBh with those presented in the MVŚ and the AKBh, but also differences, such as the denial of the Sarvāstivāda position that *citta* and *caitasikas* share the same *ākāra* and the emphasis on place (處), which is not mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda texts. Also, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* a further attempt is made to build a more comprehensive system regarding *saṃprayoga*, which is apparently intended to cover all available earlier materials including early Abhidharma *mātrkā*s, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, as well as early Yogācāra materials preserved in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. And, as in the case of the notion of *caitasika*, certain teachers such as Harivarman deny the existence of a simultaneous relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*. The next section will discuss opinions that counter the Abhidharma notion of simultaneous association and specifically Harivarman's position presented in the **Tattvasiddhi*.

3.1.5 “Non-Abhidharma” Interpretations of Association

Previous sections have presented the inception of the notion of association (*saṃprayoga*) in early sūtras, the diversity of opinions on the relationship of association, and the technical analyses of the association relationship among *citta* and *caitasikas* in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, Theravada Abhidhamma texts, and Yogācāra texts. All three of these traditions share a common notion of *saṃprayoga*, namely, that it is (1) a relationship among *citta* and *caitasikas* as separate entities, and (2) associated *citta* and *caitasikas* must occur simultaneously. Though different teachers may have different opinions regarding certain doctrinal details, all those who accept these two basic criteria for *saṃprayoga* are seen as proper “Abhidharma” positions in the MVŚ. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the MVŚ compiles a list of twenty-four such positions.

Nevertheless, there are still teachers who reject the notion of association (*saṃprayoga*) as the simultaneous and mutually dependent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* as separate entities. In the beginning of the section in the MVŚ discussing the *saṃprayukta-hetu* and before presenting the list of the twenty-four interpretations, the

MVŚ lists four positions that it considers unacceptable to the Ābhidharmikas (阿毘達磨諸論師) and refutes each of them with the proper Abhidharma position regarding the issue of *saṃprayoga*. Therefore, the label “non-Abhidharma” has been adopted for these positions. The following are the four such positions that are listed and refuted in the MVŚ:

- (1) *Citta* and *caitasikas* occur successively one after another rather than simultaneously. The MVŚ attributes this position to the Dārṣṭāntikas.¹⁰¹ The position described here is very similar to that of Buddhadeva (覺天) discussed in detail in 2.1.5, who denies *caitasikas* are dharmas different from *citta*, and proposes that they are nothing but different modes of *citta*. Because two *cittas* cannot occur simultaneously, they must occur successively, like a band of merchants passing through a narrow path. In brief, this position denies both core criteria of the Abhidharma theory of *saṃprayoga*: namely, (1) that *citta* and *caitasikas* are separate dharmas existing as different entities (*dravya*) and (2) that *citta* and *caitasika* can occur simultaneously.¹⁰² And more importantly, this is exactly the position Harivarman holds and defends in the TatSid. Harivarman’s arguments against *caitasika* have been discussed in chapter 2, and his position on *saṃprayoga* will be discussed in more detail in the following sections 3.2-3.4 as well as in the translation of chapters 65-67 in the TatSid.
- (2) Some teachers propose that *saṃprayoga* is a relationship between a dharma and its own self-nature (*svabhāva* 自性). According to the MVŚ, such teachers define *saṃprayoga* as a relationship of dharmas to be pleased or engaged (喜樂) with each other, and because nothing is “engaged” with a dharma to a greater extent than its own self-nature, a dharma is only associated (*saṃprayukta*) with

¹⁰¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c7-12: 謂或有執心心所法。前後而生非一時起。如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是。眾緣和合一而生。所待眾緣各有異故。

¹⁰² The MVŚ refutes this position in the name of the Ābhidharmikas. It says that each *citta* and *caitasika* has its own arising, staying, change, and cessation, so that, even if they arise as a whole (*samagrī* 和合), they are still separate. On the other hand, they also share the same basis (*indriya* 根 as the *āśraya* 所依) and the same object (*ālambana* 所緣); in this sense, they can be considered as a whole. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c12-18: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。心心所法有別因故。可說眾緣和合有異。有別因故。可說眾緣和合無異。謂心心所各各別。有生住異滅和合而生。是故可說和合有異。同依一根同緣一境而得生故。可說一切和合無異。是故一切心心所法。隨其所應俱時而起。

its own self-nature.¹⁰³ The Ābhidharmikas answer that only two separate things that occur together can be referred to as *saṃprayukta*, and a thing cannot be said to be associated with itself. For the Ābhidharmikas, to be pleased or engaged (喜樂) is a cognitive event, which must involve a subject (能緣) and an object (所緣 *ālambana*) as different dharmas.¹⁰⁴

- (3) Some other teachers propose that a dharma and its self-nature are neither associated (*saṃprayukta*) nor not associated. They agree with the Ābhidharmikas that only different dharmas can be said to be associated (*saṃprayukta*), and a thing cannot be associated with its own self-nature. However, they still adhere to the aforementioned definition that *saṃprayoga* refers to dharmas that are pleased or engaged (喜樂) with each other, and, in this sense, a dharma and its self-nature cannot be said to be not associated.¹⁰⁵ The Ābhidharmikas simply answer that, since no dharma can be said to be pleased or engaged with itself, this position concerning *saṃprayoga* does not make any sense.¹⁰⁶
- (4) Some other teachers propose that if dharma A is supported by the power (力任持 **bala-upastabdha*) of another dharma B, then A is said to be associated (*saṃprayukta*) with B. Because *citta* is supported by *citta*, *citta* is associated with *citta*; also because *caitasikas* are supported by *citta*, *caitasikas* are associated with *citta*. However, because *citta* is not supported by *caitasikas*, *citta* would not be associated with *caitasikas*. Similarly because *caitasikas* are not supported by each other, they also would not be associated with each other.¹⁰⁷ The Ābhidharmikas appear to agree to define *saṃprayoga* as “to be supported by another’s power” (力任持 **bala-upastabdha*), but they disagree that such a

¹⁰³ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c18-20: 或復有執諸法各與自性相應非與他性。彼作是說。相喜樂義是相應義。無法與法共相喜樂猶如自性與自性者。Here, the verb 喜樂 may correspond to *abhi-√ram*, which has both the meaning “delight in” and “to dwell.” See MW s.v. *abhi-ram*.

¹⁰⁴ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c20-3: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。二事和合可說相應。非於一物有相應義。亦無自體喜樂自體。能緣所緣有差別故。

¹⁰⁵ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c23-27: 或復有執自性於自性非相應非不相應。彼作是說要與他合方名相應。自於自性無他義故不名相應。互相喜樂是相應義。自於自性深喜樂故非不相應。

¹⁰⁶ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c27-8: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。無有自性喜樂自性。義如前說。

¹⁰⁷ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c29-80a5: 或復有執。力任持義是相應義。彼作是說。若法由彼法力任持生。此法與彼法相應。是故心與心相應。心力持心令得生故。心所法與心相應。心力持彼令得生故。心不與心所法相應。非彼力持而得生故。心所法不與心所法相應。非互相持而得生故。

relationship can exist between dharmas that occur asynchronously, or more precisely two *cittas* that occur in two consecutive moments. Moreover, the Ābhidharmikas propose that in the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* as well as among various *caitasikas*, they all mutually support each other and are therefore all mutually associated with each other.¹⁰⁸

Among these four positions enumerated and refuted by the Ābhidharmikas, only the first one is explicitly attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, while the other three are not attributed to any specific teachers or groups. It also should be noted that while the first position coincides with the view of the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva, the interpretation of *saṃprayoga* that appears to represent that of the other Dārṣṭāntika master Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is included in the list of twenty-four interpretations, which are accepted as valid interpretations.

Moreover, the three unattributed, “non-Abhidharma” positions regarding *saṃprayoga* listed above appear only in Xuanzang’s translation of the MVŚ (Taishō No.1545) and not in the other Abhidharma texts, even in the earlier translation of the Vibhāṣā (Taishō No.1546). Thus, it is likely that this list of “non-Abhidharma” positions concerning *saṃprayoga* and the corresponding Ābhidharmika refutations were inserted relatively late into the Vibhāṣā in the course of its history of continuous revision and expansion.¹⁰⁹

In Abhidharma texts later than the Vibhāṣā, all the discussions about “non-Abhidharma” or anti-Abhidharma position regarding *saṃprayoga* are focused on position (1) in this list, which is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas. As mentioned earlier, the issue of association is closely related to, or dependent on the notion of *caitasika*; those

¹⁰⁸ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80a5-8: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。心與心所。心所與心、心所。皆展轉力持而得生故。更互相應。一身二心不並起故。無相應義。

¹⁰⁹ There are three Chinese translations of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Vibhāṣā: (1) T No. 1547 鞞婆沙論, translated by Saṅghabhūti (僧伽跋澄) and Dharmanandi (曇摩難提) in the late 4th century CE; (2) T No. 1546 阿毘曇毘婆沙論, translated in the 5th century CE by Buddhavarman (浮陀跋摩) and Daotai (道泰); and (3) T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, translated by Xuanzang in the 7th century CE. Among these three translations, (1) is only a translation of the commentary on one chapter in the Jñānaprasthāna; (2) and (3) are complete translations. (2) had 100 fascicles (卷) when the translation was completed, but unfortunately forty of them were lost in the turmoil of war, and only the first sixty fascicles survive today. Xuanzang’s translation has 200 fascicles. A comparison of the extant part of (2) with corresponding parts in (3) suggests that Xuanzang’s translation (3) is a revised and expanded version. For a recent study of the three extant Vibhāṣās and their relationship, see Chou 2008.

who deny the existence of *caitasikas* as mental factors different from *citta* will certainly deny the existence of association as the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*. Indeed, in Abhidharma texts after the Vibhāṣā, almost all discussions of this issue are concerned with whether or not *caitasikas* exist as real dharmas aside from *citta*, and there is virtually no record of the dispute specifically on the issue of *saṃprayoga*. In this respect, the **Tattvasiddhi* is especially valuable because chapters 65-67 record a number of arguments for and against the Abhidharma notion of *saṃprayoga* that are not preserved in other Abhidharma texts. The next section (3.2) will present a survey of Harivarman's position regarding *saṃprayoga* in the TatSid.

3.2 Harivarman's Theory of Association in the **Tattvasiddhi*

Earlier sections have demonstrated that in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions association (*saṃprayoga*) is a notion closely related to, or more precisely interdependent with the notion of *caitasika* understood as mental factors. Because Harivarman does not agree with the Ābhidharmikas on the notion of *caitasikas* as dharmas that are “mental factors” different from *citta*, he will then necessarily reject the interpretation of *saṃprayoga* as the simultaneous association of *citta* and *caitasikas*. In chapters 60-64 of the TatSid, Harivarman argued against the existence of *caitasikas* as a category of mental phenomena apart from consciousness (*citta*) itself and refuted his opponents' arguments for *caitasika*. In the next three chapters 65-67, he argues that *saṃprayoga* as proposed by the Abhidharma traditions, that is, as the simultaneous, interdependent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, is not tenable and refutes his opponents' arguments for it.

However, although Harivarman does not accept the notion of *saṃprayoga* in the developed Abhidharma sense, he does acknowledge that this term is used in the sūtras as well as in the proto-Abhidharma *mātrkāś* and that it can be used to describe the relationship among mental phenomena. In TatSid 66.4, the opponent cites a sūtra containing the phrase “faith (*śraddhā*) with root (**samūlika*) and associated with knowledge (**jñāna-saṃprayukta*)” (有根智相應信), which the opponent uses to support his position that the notion of association (*saṃprayukta*) is already taught in the sūtra. In

67.3, Harivarman acknowledges that this phrase is from a genuine sūtra,¹¹⁰ but he interprets the term *saṃprayukta* in a different way; he proposes that in this phrase the term *saṃprayukta* should be understood in a non-technical sense, which simply means that faith and knowledge are serving the same purpose. Here, Harivarman's position is similar to Gombrich's suggestion that each term in the sūtras cannot be assumed to have a distinct technical meaning.¹¹¹ In the case of faith (*śraddhā*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), one should simply understand the phrase as indicating that *śraddhā* and *jñāna* are active in one's practice and serve the same purpose, namely, liberation. Harivarman claims that one should not read too much into the text and assign the term *saṃprayukta* the technical meaning of simultaneous association, which is not originally intended in the sūtra text.

Nevertheless, in another occasion Harivarman does offer a technical definition for the term *saṃprayukta*. Chapter 18, **Dharmasaṃgrāha* (法聚), of the TatSid presents a *mātrkā* similar to the one in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and some other northern Abhidharma texts such as the **Śāriputrābhidharma* and the *Prakaraṇapāda*, and this *mātrkā* includes items such as *citta-dharma*, *caitasika-dharma*, *citta-saṃprayukta-dharma*, and *citta-viprayukta-dharma*.¹¹² In his commentary on these *mātrkā* entries, Harivarman defines *citta* as “what can take objects,” and *caitasika* is “[dharmas] such as *saṃjñā*, and so forth, which *citta* immediately produces once it takes the object.” These definitions are consistent with the definitions given in chapters 60 and 63 (60.1, 63.8, 63.12) that a *caitasika* is what is born from *citta*, and by nature it is also *citta*.¹¹³ Next, he defines *citta-saṃprayukta-dharma* as “[dharmas] such as *saṃjñā*, and

¹¹⁰ A comparison of the Chinese and Pāli versions indicates that this phrase is textually problematic. See the discussion of this issue in 3.4.2.

¹¹¹ Harivarman's argument regarding the terms *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* is another example that would support Gombrich's position criticizing Abhidharmic “scholaristic literalism.” See the discussion in 2.3.2.

¹¹² The section in the TatSid *mātrkā* related to *citta*: No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252a: 心法。非心法。心數法。非心數法。心相應法。心不相應法。心共有法。心不共有法。隨心行法。不隨心行法。All these terms also occur in the Dhs *mātikā* (p5): *cittā dhammā, no citta dhammā. cetasikā dhammā, acetasikā dhammā. citta-saṃsaṅgā dhammā, citta-visaṃsaṅgā dhammā. citta-samuṭṭhānā dhammā, no citta-samuṭṭhānā dhammā. citta-sahabhuno dhammā, no citta-sahabhuno dhammā. cittānuparivattino dhammā, no cittānuparivattino dhammā. citta-saṃsaṅgā dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṅgā dhammā. citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānā dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānā dhammā. citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānā-sahabhuno dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānā-sahabhuno dhammā. citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino dhammā, no citta-saṃsaṅgā-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino dhammā. Also passim in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, for example, No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p528b-529a: 心非心; 心相應非心相應; 心數非心數; 緣非緣; 共心非共心; 隨心轉不隨心轉. And also in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b: 心法。非心法。心所法。非心所法。心相應法。心不相應法。心俱有法。非心俱有法。隨心轉法。非隨心轉法。*

¹¹³ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b17-8: 心法者能緣是也。心數法者若識得緣即次第生想等是也。TatSid 60.1:

so forth, that successively arise after *citta* has taken [its] object.”¹¹⁴ If compared with the definition of *caitasika*, it is clear that *citta-saṃprayukta-dharma* and *caitasika-dharma* are identical. In other words, Harivarman agrees with the Ābhidharmikas that *caitasikas* are precisely *citta-saṃprayukta-dharmas*, and the term *saṃprayukta* in its technical sense is applicable exclusively to *citta* and *caitasika*.

On the other hand, Harivarman’s definition of *caitasika* and *citta-saṃprayukta-dharma* as that which arises after *citta* takes its object clearly contradicts the Abhidharma notion of *saṃprayoga* as the simultaneous association of *citta* and *caitasikas*. According to the MVŚ, the notion of sequential arising is associated with the Dārṣṭāntikas,¹¹⁵ but, in the record of the MVŚ, Dārṣṭāntika masters such as Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva explicitly claim that there is no *saṃprayukta* relationship among *citta* and *caitasikas*. In the TatSid, Harivarman uses the term *saṃprayukta* in the same way as the Ābhidharmikas to describe the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, which are to be understood as subsequent occurrences of *citta*. Even though he accords with Buddhadeva’s notion of the sequential arising of mental events, he does not agree with Buddhadeva’s categorical denial of both *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga* as presented in the MVŚ. Harivarman understands *caitasika* to refer to mental phenomena such as *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*, and so forth; he does not say that *caitasikas* do not exist but only claims that they are nothing but *citta*. Regarding the terms “association” (*saṃprayoga*) or “associated” (*saṃprayukta*), Harivarman, like the Ābhidharmikas, uses them exclusively to denote the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, that is, a relationship among various instances of *citta*. However, for Harivarman such a relationship is not simultaneous and does not involve mutual dependency; instead, it entails a sequential and one-way dependency of the latter moment of *citta* on the previous moment of *citta*. In this case, why does Harivarman use these terms in a way similar to the Ābhidharmikas but interpret them in a different way? The answer to this question might lie in Harivarman’s attitude towards the *mātrkā*.

As mentioned in chapter 1 (1.2), *mātrkā*s (P. *mātikā*) are lists of topics or key terms

心意識體一而異名。若法能緣。是名為心。63.8: 汝言佛說依心生法名心數者。心所生法。名曰心數。心依心生。故名心數。63.12: 又心與心數。俱從心生。故名為心數。See also the discussion in 2.3.1.

¹¹⁴ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b18-9: 心相應法者謂識得緣次第必生如想等是也。

¹¹⁵ See the first “non-Abhidharma” position regarding *saṃprayoga* listed in the MVŚ discussed in 3.1.5.

used by early Buddhist teachers as a mnemonic tool to organize Buddhist teachings, and these lists played an important role in the formation of Buddhist Abhidharma doctrinal systems as well as of Abhidharma literature. Though one may find individual lists in early sūtras, combined lists that constitute the *mātrkā*s per se did not occur in the sūtras. The *mātrkā*s came to be associated in particular with Abhidharma, and, from this perspective, one might expect those teachers who deny the authority of Abhidharma and claim to adhere to the sūtras alone would also logically deny the ultimate authority of the *mātrkā*s. However, even though there are references in Buddhist literature to teachers denying the authority of Abhidharma, the authority of *mātrkā*s appears not to be denied in the same way. Harivarman presents his position regarding *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga* in an interesting way: instead of categorically denying *caitasika*, he carefully states that he only denies *caitasikas* as dharmas different from *citta* (e.g. in 63.15). *Caitasikas* do exist as *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*, and so forth, which are dharmas dependent on and born from the previous moment of *citta* (e.g. 63.8). As for *saṃprayoga*, though on occasion he plainly states that there is no association (65.1) as the Dārṣṭāntikas do in the MVŚ, in chapter 18 he also defines *saṃprayukta* as the necessary causal dependency of one moment of *citta* on the previous moment of *citta*. Moreover, his inclusion of the *mātrkā* and his commentary to it within chapter 18 of the TatSid strongly suggests that Harivarman takes this *mātrkā* as a genuine Buddhist teaching.

It has been noted previously that the term *caitasika* in the sūtras is mainly used in an adjectival sense as “mental.” Even when it is used as a noun, it only means “mental state” in the general sense, and in the sūtras it never has the meaning “mental factor” in the Abhidharma sense.¹¹⁶ However, in the aforementioned *mātrkā*, the meaning of the term *caitasika* in the entries *cetasikā dhammā* and *acetāsikā dhammā* is unclear: it is never used in this way in the sūtras, and the *mātrkā* itself does not provide any hint that might clarify the term in this circumstance. It has also been noted that Harivarman interprets this term more as an adjective similar to the sūtras, while the Ābhidharmikas (both Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin, as well as the Yogācārins) understand it as “mental factor” in the Abhidharma way. In the case of the term *saṃprayukta*, the *mātrkā* itself provides

¹¹⁶ See the discussion of this term in 2.1.1.

several parallel terms such as conjoined (*saṃsaṭṭha*) with, sprung (*samuṭṭhāna*) from, coexisting (*sahabhūno*) with, revolving (*anuparivattino*) around *citta*, and all these terms may be understood as synonyms or glosses on it and strongly suggest that in this *māṭṛkā* the term *saṃprayukta* may have already been assigned the meaning of simultaneous association.¹¹⁷ Harivarman interprets *saṃprayukta* as the sequential causal dependency between *cittas*, and the next two entries in the *māṭṛkā* that are related to *saṃprayukta*, at least in the version of the *māṭṛkā* in the TatSid, are **citta-sahabhūno dharmāḥ* (心共有法) and **cittānuparivartino dhammā* (隨心行法), Harivarman interprets the former as *rūpa* and *citta-viprayukta* dharmas that can coexist with *citta* simultaneously, and the latter as vocal and bodily unmanifested karma (*avijñapti-karma* 身口無作業), a notion that suggests Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma influence. It would appear that Harivarman is carefully distinguishing these two entries from *saṃprayukta*. Such a cautious attitude indicates that he takes this *māṭṛkā* very seriously, and makes an effort to massage out any possible contradictions with his own doctrinal position. The attitude of Harivarman towards this *māṭṛkā* would explain the careful treatments of the terms *caitasika* and *saṃprayukta* in the TatSid instead of a simple categorical denial.

On the basis of this introduction of Harivarman's doctrinal position regarding *saṃprayoga* in the **Tattvasiddhi*, the next two sections (3.3-4) will discuss and comment on Harivarman's arguments against the Abhidharma notion of *saṃprayoga* (3.3), his opponent's argument for simultaneous *saṃprayoga*, and Harivarman's refutations of the opponent's arguments (3.4) in greater detail.

3.3 Harivarman's Arguments against Association

3.3.1 Harivarman's Argument 1 (65.1)

(65.1) Harivarman begins chapter 65 by straightforwardly declaring his position regarding association (*saṃprayoga*): there is no dharma that is associated (*saṃprayukta*),

¹¹⁷ See the discussion of the development of the meaning of simultaneous association within the *māṭṛkā* in 3.1.2.

which means that nothing can be associated with other things. He further asks a rhetorical question: when there is no such thing as a *caitasika*, with what is *citta* associated (*saṃprayukta*)?

Comments:

Apparently, this statement serves as a transition from the previous chapters on *caitasika* (chs. 60-64) to the discussion of association (*saṃprayoga*). In the previous chapters, Harivarman argues against the Abhidharma notion of independent and distinct *caitasika*, refutes his opponent's arguments, and is confident that the issue of *caitasika* has been settled. So in the opening of this chapter, he takes the conclusion from the previous chapters as an argument against the closely related issue of *saṃprayoga* as understood by the opponent and states that, because there is no *caitasika*, *citta* cannot be associated with anything. As a result, *saṃprayoga* as an interdependent relationship between *citta* and *caitasika* as proposed by the Ābhidharmikas is impossible.

It is interesting to compare Harivarman's argument against *saṃprayoga* here with his opponent's argument for *caitasika* in 61.1. There the opponent states that, because *citta* and *caitasikas* are associated, that is, there is a relationship of association between them, if *caitasikas* do not exist, then there would be no association; but in fact there is association, and as a result there is *caitasika* (see discussion in 2.4.1). It is clear that for those who support the notions of *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga* as proposed in the Abhidharma traditions, these two notions are closely connected to each other and cannot be separated. And as mentioned previously, if one of these two notions is refuted, logically the other one will also be refuted. Here, in this argument, Harivarman's refutation follows the same pattern. However, as mentioned previously, in another place in the TatSid, Harivarman proposes a different definition of association (*saṃprayoga*).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ See the discussion in 3.2.

3.3.2 Harivarman's Argument 2 (65.2)

(65.2) Harivarman states that the mode of function (**ākāśa* 相) of mental phenomena such as feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, cannot be simultaneous.

Comments:

It is interesting that Harivarman here uses the phrase “the mode of function of feeling, and so forth,” instead of simply “feeling, and so forth.” The argument presented here is extremely terse, but it appears that Harivarman resorts to psychological introspection. The term “mode of function” (**ākāra*) literally means “form” or “appearance,” which is what one sees by observation. This suggests that Harivarman is not taking a theoretical position that mental phenomena such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and so forth cannot exist simultaneously, but instead is referring to the psychological experience that if one looks inside and observes one's own mental activities, one cannot experience feeling (*vedanā*) and other mental phenomena all at the same time. Saṅghabhadra also records such an argument in greater detail and attributes it to the Dārṣṭāntikas:¹¹⁹

There are some Dārṣṭāntikas who claim that there is only *citta* and no *caitasikas* separate from it because, if *citta* and *saṃjñā* occurred simultaneously, one could distinguish their different modes of function (*ākāra* 行相). What is the mode of function that only *citta* possesses while *saṃjñā* lacks? Even seeking deep and far, one only hears the difference between the two names but never finds any recognizable difference in their nature (**svabhāva* 體義).

This passage in the **Nyāyānusāra* indicates that some teachers use not only scriptural (*āgama*) and philosophical reasoning (*yukti*) arguments but also psychological introspective experience in their argument against *caitasika*. Saṅghabhadra's record shows that these teachers argue that if mental phenomena such as *citta* and *saṃjñā* can occur simultaneously, one should be able to distinguish them by their mode of function

¹¹⁹ No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p395a1-4: 有譬喻者。說唯有心無別心所。心想俱時。行相差別。不可得故。何者行相唯在想有。在識中無。深遠推求。唯聞此二名言差別。曾無體義差別可知。

(*ākāra* 行相),¹²⁰ namely, their “form” or “appearance” that is recognizable in experience by observing one’s own mental activities. Here, Harivarman likely uses the same type of argument.

Harivarman in the *TatSid* does not give the opponent’s answer to this argument. However, in the **Nyāyānusāra*, Saṅghabhadra records an answer likely taken from the *Vaibhāṣikas*: the difference between the nature and appearance of *citta* and *caitasikas* is so subtle that those of weak intellect are unable to distinguish them.¹²¹

3.3.3 Harivarman’s Argument 3 (65.3-4)

(65.3) Harivarman introduces the important doctrinal position that cause (因 *hetu*) and result (果 *phala*) cannot coexist simultaneously. In Harivarman’s view, since, in the case of consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*) and other mental phenomena such as *saṃjñā* and so forth, *citta* (= *vijñāna*) is the cause of *saṃjñā*, then *citta* must precede *saṃjñā* and there cannot be simultaneous association (*saṃprayoga*) between them.

(65.4) Continuing the causation argument, Harivarman provides two proofs for the fact that causation is not simultaneous. First, he quotes the “profound teaching of causation” in the *sūtra* that causation should be defined by the statement, “when this arises, that arises,” and suggests that this teaching of the Buddha proves that causation is sequential and not simultaneous. Second, he uses an example from our daily life. In the case of plants such as grain, the sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits, and so forth, grow out one after another. He suggests that consciousness and other mental phenomena should arise in the same manner as a causal chain instead of all arising together.

Comments:

Once again, Harivarman proposes the same doctrinal position as the so-called

¹²⁰ *Ākāra* is a difficult and troublesome term in Abhidharma texts. Having the same *ākāra* is one criterion in the Sarvāstivāda definition of *saṃprayoga*, while the Yogācāra definition of *saṃprayoga* states that dharmas associated have different *ākāras*. This term is discussed in 3.1.4. For a more in-depth study of this term, see footnote 55 above.

¹²¹ No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p395a19-24: 心心所法。共一境轉。生住滅等。分位是同。善不善等性類無異。體相差別。實難了知。非諸劣智能生勝解。故契經言。心心所法。展轉相應。若受若想若思若識。如是等法和雜不離。不可施設差別之相。故應於此發起正勤求生勝解了差別相。

Dārṣṭāntikas who deny that there are simultaneous causes, or *sahabhū-hetu*.¹²² In 65.4, he quotes the definition of causation in the sūtra as scriptural proof (*āgama*) for his position, but he gives only half of the sūtra definition of the formula of dependent origination in its short, abstract form.¹²³ The full definition is as the following.¹²⁴

When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.

Harivarman interprets this formula as implying only sequential causation. However, in the nine-linked causation chain presented in the *Mahānidāna-sutta*, the relationship between consciousness (*viññāna*) and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) is described in terms of a simultaneous mutual dependence,¹²⁵ and another sūtra states that consciousness and name-and-form are like bundles of reeds that stand only when leaning on each other.¹²⁶ In other words, the teaching of dependent origination in the sūtras is not exclusively interpreted as referring only to sequential causation.

3.3.4 Harivarman's Argument 4 (65.5-6)

(65.5) Harivarman quotes an opponent's opinion that [*citta* and *caitasika* coexist] in the same manner as mental defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) such as lust (*rāga* 貪), and so forth, and are coexistent causes (*sahabhū-hetu* 共因)¹²⁷ as are material forms (*rūpa* 色). Therefore, they should arise simultaneously. Harivarman answers that this is not correct,

¹²² The doctrinal position that denies simultaneous causation, or the *sahabhū-hetu* as proposed by the Sarvāstivādins, is attributed to Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. Saṅghabhadra attributes it to the so-called Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta. See the translation of 65.3 and its footnote, and also the discussion of the perceptual process regarding *sparsā* in 2.3.5, esp. chapter 2, footnote 137.

¹²³ The longer, expanded formula is the twelve-linked dependent origination.

¹²⁴ E.g S II 28: *imasmim sati idaṃ hoti, imass' uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati*. Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation (Bodhi 2000: 552).

¹²⁵ D II 64: *...yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ saha viññānena aññamaññaṃ paccayatā pavattati*.

¹²⁶ S no.12.67, (II 114): *seyyathāpi, āvuso, dve naḷakalāpiyo aññamaññaṃ nissāya tiṭṭheyyuṃ. evameva kho, āvuso, nāmarū-papaccayā viññānaṃ; viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ*. SĀ no.288, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷12) T02, p81b4-8:譬如三蘆立於空地，展轉相依，而得豎立，若去其一，二亦不立，若去其二，一亦不立，展轉相依，而得豎立，識緣名色亦復如是。展轉相依，而得生長。

¹²⁷ Xuanzang translates *sahabhū-hetu* as 俱有因, which then becomes the standard translation of this term.

because material forms (*rūpa*) do not entail cognition (**jñāna* 了知) and they cannot take objects whereas *citta* and *caitasikas* can take objects and can cognize. Since in one sentient being at one moment, only one cognition (了) can occur, the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot be the same as between *rāga* and *rūpa*. In other words, *citta* and *caitasika* cannot coexist because in one being there cannot be multiple cognitions in one moment.

(65.6) Harivarman further clarifies his position that in one sentient being there can be only one cognition (**jñāna* 了) in one moment. A sentient being is referred to as an individual because only one cognition occurs in each moment based on one physical body. If in one moment there were multiple *caitasikas*, and each *caitasika* entails cognition, there would be multiple cognitions in any given moment. Because for Harivarman an individual is determined by a single cognition, in the case of multiple cognitions there must be multiple individuals in one body, and this is unacceptable. Therefore, one moment of *citta* should not occur together with *caitasika* dharmas such as *vedanā*, and so forth.

Comments:

(65.5) The opponent appears to take *kleśas* such as *rāga*, and so forth, as coexistent causes like the four material elements (*mahabhūtas*) are to each other. In the same way, *citta* would coexist with *caitasikas*, and *citta* would be the cause of *caitasikas*. Harivarman answers that because for each *citta* and *caitasika* there is an element of cognition, but *rūpa* does not have cognition, the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* is not the same as the relationship between *rāga* and *rūpa*. Therefore, for Harivarman this comparison is invalid.

(65.6) In this passage, Harivarman argues by *reductio ad absurdum*: if *citta* and *caitasikas* can coexist as the opponent suggests in the previous passage (65.5) because each *citta* and *caitasika* has its own element of cognition (**jñāna* 了), when they coexist in a sentient being's body there would be multiple cognitions present in one moment in one body, and multiple individuals would coexist in one body, which is absurd. As a result, Harivarman concludes that *citta* and *caitasika* cannot coexist. This is a position similar to

the position of the Dārṣṭāntika master Dharmatrāta recorded in the MVŚ, who also proposes that each *citta* and *caitasika* has an element of cognition.¹²⁸

The later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika teacher Saṅghabhadra records the same argument in his **Nyāyānusāra*.¹²⁹ He also provides an answer to it from the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perspective: in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, cognition (**jñāna*) is the specific *caitasika*, insight (*prajñā* 慧). In each moment, while *citta* and multiple *caitasikas* coexist, there can be only one instance of *prajñā*; therefore, there is no fault of multiple cognitions coexisting in one being. Here, the fundamental difference between the two mind models becomes apparent. Dharmatrāta and Harivarman propose a model in which mind is a series of moments of *citta* (each of them is also a *caitasika* in relationship to the previous moment of *citta*), and in each of these *cittas* an element of cognition is embedded as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and so forth. But for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Ābhidharmikas, cognition is a separate *caitasika*, namely, the mental factor insight (*prajñā*), which is a universal mental factor (*mahābhūmika*) that exists in all *cittas*. Also for the Ābhidharmikas, one *citta* can have only one instance of each type of mental factor; for example, there can be only one *vedanā*, one *saṃjñā*, and so forth. So, in one moment of *citta*, there can be only one *prajñā*, while multiple other *caitasikas* such as *vedanā*, and so forth, coexist with it. Therefore, for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Ābhidharmikas, the fact that multiple *caitasikas* coexist with *citta* will not lead to the absurd conclusion that multiple cognitions would occur simultaneously within one sentient being.

¹²⁸ See the discussion of Dharmatrāta's position regarding *caitasika* in 3.1.5.

¹²⁹ No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p396a11-5: 有餘復言。若心心所。其體各異。於一心品。應有眾多。能覺了用。故心所法應不異心。此亦不然。能覺了用。體唯一故。覺了謂慧。非心心所皆慧為體。如何令餘非覺了性成覺了體。故無斯過。

3.3.5 Harivarman's Argument 5 (65.7)

(65.7) Here, Harivarman uses the example of the six types of consciousness to argue that *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot coexist. Both Harivarman and his opponent agree that in one moment there can be only one consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*). In the sūtras, consciousness (*vijñāna*) is said to be of six types: that arising from the eye (*caḅᅓu*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāᅇa*), tongue (*jihvā*), body (*kāya*), and mind (*manas*). Because they are all *vijñānas*, at one moment only one of them can function. Here, the opponent uses the Sarvāstivāda notion of the immediate condition (*samanantara-pratyaya* 次第緣) to explain why it is so: the occurrence of each moment of *citta* (= *vijñāna*) must depend on an immediate condition (*samanantara-pratyaya* 次第緣), and in one moment only one immediate condition can occur; hence, in one moment there can be only one *citta*. Therefore, among the six types of consciousness, only one of them can be active in one moment, which means they cannot arise simultaneously.

Harivarman next asks his opponent what obstacle, if any, prevents one immediate condition from giving rise to any one of the six types of consciousness in the next contiguous moment. Here, he does not give an explicit answer, but the context suggests that there is no such obstacle; in other words, one immediate condition can give rise to a moment of consciousness of any one type among the six.

Comments:

Here, Harivarman is using the opponent's Sarvāstivāda argument to support his own thesis. The Sarvāstivādins propose that one moment of *citta* and the *caitasikas* associated with it immediately give rise to the next moment of *citta* with its *caitasikas*. In this process of causation, the previous moment of *citta* is the immediate condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) for the next moment of *citta*.¹³⁰ They argue that at one moment there can be only one consciousness because every consciousness arises from one *samanantara-pratyaya*, and in one moment only one *samanantara-pratyaya* is

¹³⁰ MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p9c21: 前生心聚為後生聚等無間緣。AKBh p72.20-1: *aᅓtasyāpyastitvāt iᅓyate vaibhāᅓikaiᅓ samanantarapratyayatvam*.

possible.¹³¹ Harivarman appears to agree with this argument, but he interprets it in a way that favors his position regarding association. For Harivarman, all *caitasikas* are *cittas* by nature, and the principle that one *samanantara-pratyaya*, namely, an instance of consciousness, can give rise to a different type of consciousness, also applies to *citta* and *caitasikas*. Just as a moment of eye-consciousness can act as a *samanantara-pratyaya* and give rise to a *mano-vijñāna*, any *citta*, which is also a *caitasika* with regard to the previous moment of *citta*, can be a *samanantara-pratyaya* and give rise to a *caitasika* of any kind in the next moment. In the following sections 65.8 and 65.9, Harivarman continues to argue that the succession of *cittas* can be *vijñāna*→*saṃjñā*... or *vijñāna*→*vedanā* ...

However, if it is the case that in one moment there can be only one *samanantara-pratyaya*, then one may ask why there cannot be multiple *samanantara-pratyayas*. The MVŚ responds simply that that is simply the way it is (*dharmatā* 法爾):¹³² in one moment, there is one assemblage (和合) of *citta* and *caitasikas*, and this assemblage acts as the *samanantara-pratyaya* for the assemblage in the next moment. It is simply the way it is (*dharmatā* 法爾) that one assemblage gives rise to only one new assemblage; just as in the case of many people passing through a narrow path, or cows or sheep passing through a small pen gate,¹³³ they must pass through one by one in a succession. However, logically this is not a satisfactory answer. The Sarvāstivādins claim that in one moment there can be only one *citta* because there can be only one *samanantara-pratyaya*; and then they claim that there can be only one *samanantara-pratyaya* because that one assemblage can only give rise to only one new assemblage because it is the way it is (*dharmatā*). This is a circular reasoning.

¹³¹ No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b: 何故無一補特伽羅非前非後二心俱生。答無第二等無間緣。有情一一心相續轉故。

¹³² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p49b16-c6: 謂心心所法生必依止等無間緣。既無第二等無間緣。故必無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。此復應問。何故無第二等無間緣。故復答言。有情一一心相續轉故。謂有情心。法爾一一相續而轉。無二無多。此是展轉更相答義。有說。此文重答前問謂先問言。何故無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。今重答言。有情一一心相續轉。謂一一有情由法爾力。但有一心相續而轉。所以者何。未來心聚。必由現在和合故生。不和合則不生。現在但有一和合故。令未來心一一而起。猶如多人經於狹路。一一而過尚無二並。何況有多。又如牛羊圍門狹小一一而出。無二無多。如是有情未來心聚。依現和合一而生。設現在世有多和合。為開次者。則應一時有多心起。但無此事故一一生。又由和合有先後故。假使先有修道和合。後見道者則應修道。先見道生但無此事故。先起見道。由此無一補特伽羅。非前非後。二心俱生。

¹³³ Note that the simile is the same one used by the Dārṣāntikas in the MVŚ to argue that *citta* and *caitasika* cannot occur simultaneously: see 2.1.5.

As for the Yogācārin, they accept the Sarvāstivāda notion of *samanantara-pratyaya* and agree that the arising of a *viññāna* occurs through a *samanantara-pratyaya*,¹³⁴ but they also propose that in one moment multiple consciousnesses can occur. The six types of consciousnesses can occur simultaneously, and in addition the two extra consciousnesses, namely, *manas* and the *ālaya*, can also occur together with them. Because they agree with the Sarvāstivādins that each instance of consciousness arises from a *samanantara-pratyaya*, so there must be multiple *samanantara-pratyaya* in one moment.¹³⁵

3.3.6 Harivarman's Argument 6 (65.8-10)

In the following three passages (65.8-10), Harivarman quotes three sūtras to argue that, when consciousness is cognizing an object, other mental phenomena such as feeling (*vedanā*) or apperception (*saṃjñā*) cannot accompany it. Since all three passages apply scriptural proofs (*āgama*) to argue for the same position, they are treated as a group.

(65.8) Harivarman quotes a sūtra in which the Buddha teaches the bhikṣus that, when their eyes see an object, they should not grasp signs (*nimitta*) of the object. He points out that to “grasp signs” (*nimittodgrāha*) is what apperception (*saṃjñā*) does; in other words, this is the definition of *saṃjñā*. So, he argues that in this sūtra passage the Buddha acknowledges that at that moment there is eye-consciousness, which sees or cognizes the object, but denies that at the same moment there is *saṃjñā*. In his opinion, grasping signs (*nimitta*), that is, the occurrence of *saṃjñā*, happens only after one has seen the object. Therefore, Harivarman concludes that what actually occurs is a succession of events: the first moment is *viññāna*, the second *saṃjñā*, and so forth.

(65.9) Then Harivarman quotes another sūtra passage, which states that, when one sees form with the eyes, one explores form as productive of joy (*somanassaṭṭhānīya*), or

¹³⁴ The definition of *samanantara-pratyaya* in the YBh agrees with the MVŚ: No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 52) T30, p584b28-c2: 復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名眼界。

¹³⁵ However, this position of the Yogācāra tradition may lead to further doctrinal difficulties: can different types of *viññānas* be *samanantara-pratyaya* to each other? The CWSL has a long section discussing different opinions on this issue: No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 4) T31, p20c-21c. See also the discussion of *samanantara-pratyaya* in Lusthaus 2002: 498-500.

grief (*domanassaṭṭhānīya*), or equanimity (*upekkhāṭṭhānīya*).¹³⁶ Again in Abhidharma, feeling (*vedanā*) is that which experiences the three kinds of feelings.¹³⁷ Harivarman uses this sūtra passage to argue that the Buddha teaches that consciousness (*viññāna*) occurs first, and feeling (*vedanā*) follows. They do not occur simultaneously.

(65.10) Harivarman once again quotes from a sūtra stating that seeing is seeing, which he understands as meaning that when there is seeing, that is, cognition or consciousness of an object (*viññāna*), there is seeing alone, and no other mental phenomena such as feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, is present.

Comments:

Here, Harivarman uses three sūtra passages to show that the cognitive process consists of a sequential series of mental phenomena that starts with consciousness (*viññāna*) of the object and is then followed by apperception (*saṃjñā*) or feeling (*vedanā*). When there is *viññāna*, there is *viññāna* alone, and no other mental phenomena such as *saṃjñā* or *vedanā* accompanying it. The TatSid here does not record how the opponent would answer this challenge. However, as noted in chapter 2, the Ābhidharmikas do have an answer. For them, in each moment there must be one *viññāna* accompanied by a number of *caitasikas* such as *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *sparśa*, and so forth. But in the case of the cognitive process, at one moment one of the *caitasikas* always takes the dominant position. For example, when the mind first encounters the object, the dominant *caitasika* is contact (*sparśa*), and this moment is called *sparśa*; in the next moment, feeling (*vedanā*) dominates, and this moment is called *vedanā*. In other words, the Ābhidharmikas can account for these sūtra passages within their theory of *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga*.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ M no.137, III 216: *cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā somanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati, domanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati, upekkhāṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati*. English translation based in part on Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation (Bodhi 2001: 1067).

¹³⁷ AKBh verse 1-14c (p10.13): *vedanā 'nubhavaḥ*. AKBh p10.14: *trividho 'nubhavo vedanāskandhaḥ sukho duḥkho 'duḥkhāsukhaśca*.

¹³⁸ See the discussion in 2.3.5 and 2.4.5, esp. Chapter 2 footnote 137 with regard to the Vaibhāṣika theory of *āvasthaka praītyasamudpāda*.

3.3.7 Harivarman's Argument 7 (65.11-16)

In the next six sections (65.11-16) Harivarman argues that the five sense consciousnesses (*pañca-vijñāna*) are not accompanied by mental factors such as *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *cetanā*, *vitarka*, *vicāra*. These six paragraphs constitute one argument.

(65.11) Harivarman proposes that by analyzing the five types of sense consciousness (*pañca-vijñāna* 五識) it will become clear that *citta/vijñāna* is not accompanied by other mental phenomena. He gives an example from common sense or daily experience, to prove his position. At the moment when one first sees a person, one cannot at the same moment grasp the signs (*nimitta* 相) of the person as an enemy, or a friend, or someone neutral. As mentioned earlier, to grasp the signs of an object is referred to as apperception (*saṃjñā* 想).¹³⁹ So in Harivarman's opinion, at the moment of seeing, that is, the moment of consciousness (*citta/vijñāna*), there is no apperception (*saṃjñā*), as when one sees a person in ordinary experience. Then he states that someone else (或有人) points out that, at the moment of seeing, no mental defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) such as lust (*rāga* 貪), and so forth, exist, nor any volition (*cetanā* 思).

(65.12) Harivarman observes that in the Ābhidharmika's systems, the five types of sense consciousness are without discrimination (*nirvikalpa* 無分別). If so, then in the five types of consciousness there should be no applied thought (*vitarka* 覺) nor sustained thought (*vicāra* 觀). When one thinks and discriminates (**saṃ-√kṛp*), thought is initially gross (*audārika* 麁) and then becomes subtle (*sūkṣma* 細). For Harivarman, gross *citta* is *vitarka*, and subtle *citta* is *vicāra*, and these two *cittas* can only occur successively, not simultaneously.

(65.13) Harivarman continues with the topic of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. He quotes a verse from sūtras, in which the Buddha teaches that the root (*mūla* 本), or cause, of sensual desire (*kāma* 欲) is intention (*saṃkalpa* 思覺). If *saṃkalpa* is the cause of *kāma*, then these two cannot coexist simultaneously. And because, as demonstrated in the previous passage (65.12), *vitarka* is part of the process of *saṃkalpa*, accordingly at the moment the

¹³⁹ See the discussion of 65.8 in 3.3.6 above.

mind cognizes its object, which is the moment of consciousness (*vijñāna* 識), *vitarka* has not arisen yet.¹⁴⁰

(65.14) Harivarman quotes an unnamed teacher who claims that apperception (*saṃjñā* 想) is found in all of the five types of sense consciousness. However, since according to the sūtra *vitarka* is caused by *saṃjñā*, and since Harivarman believes that cause and result cannot exist simultaneously, when there is *saṃjñā*, *vitarka* cannot exist.

(65.15) Continuing the previous argument in 65.14 and perhaps representing the views of the same unnamed teacher, this section states that in the five sense consciousnesses there is no apperception (*saṃjñā*), nor applied thought, (*vitarka*) nor sustained thought (*vicāra*), because these five consciousnesses cannot grasp the signs of man or woman, which is the function of *saṃjñā*, nor can they discriminate different kinds of feelings, which is the function of *vedanā*. To sum up, in these five sense consciousnesses there is no discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) at all.

(65.16) Harivarman quotes some unnamed teachers who propose that within the mind process, one moment of sense consciousness (any one of the five types) must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*). The reason for such a doctrinal position is the fact that the five sense consciousnesses have no discrimination. Discrimination is the function of mind-consciousness, and, if the five sense consciousness could discriminate, the following moment of mind-consciousness would have no purpose.

Comments:

(65.11) Once again in this paragraph, Harivarman appeals to common sense and ordinary experience instead of abstract, theoretical arguments. First he points out that in our daily experience, when one first sees a person, at that moment one has only visual cognition and does not grasp the signs (*nimitta*) of that person such as that the person is an enemy or a friend. This means that at the moment of cognition there is merely cognition, namely, the cognition of the object, and at this moment cognition is not accompanied by the

¹⁴⁰ The cognitive process described in the sūtra as follows: eye and form (*rūpa*) give rise to eye-consciousness, the coming together of these three is contact (*sparśa*); because of *sparśa*, there is feeling; what one feels (*vedeti*), one apperceives (*sañjānāti*); what one apperceives (*sañjānāti*), one thinks about (*vitakketi*)... See the full quotation in the footnote on the translation of 65.14.

grasping of other signs or properties of the object, such as whether the person is a friend or an enemy.

Next he quotes someone else's opinion, which apparently he agrees with, stating that, at the moment of seeing, one has no defilements (*kleśa*) such as lust (*rāga*), and so forth, and therefore also no volition (*cetanā*). Here, Harivarman defines *cetanā* as seeking (**prārthanā* 求), which is rather peculiar, because in extant northern Abhidharma texts, *cetanā* is unanimously defined as the formational action or intention of the mind (*cittābhisamskāra* 心造作).¹⁴¹ This Abhidharma definition of *cetanā* as *cittābhisamskāra* is based on the sūtra teaching that *cetanā* is identical with the aggregate of formation (*saṃskāra-skandha* 行蘊),¹⁴² and *abhisamskāra* can be taken as a gloss on the term *saṃskāra*.¹⁴³ Harivarman acknowledges that there is such a definition of *cetanā* in the sūtras since he quotes the passage containing this definition in chapter 84 of the TatSid¹⁴⁴ and points out that the term *cetanā* is used as syntactically parallel with seeking (**prārthanā*) and wish (**praṇidhāna*).¹⁴⁵ In this sūtra passage, *cetanā*, *prārthanā*, and *praṇidhāna* are only three among approximately one dozen terms including *saṃjñā*, *vitarka*, *vācā*, and so forth. It is clear that although the terms in this long list are used as parallels syntactically, it is impossible to understand them as synonymous. The terms *cetanā*, *patthanā*, and *paṇidhi* may overlap in their meanings, but strictly speaking they are not synonyms, and Harivarman must have some reason for defining *cetanā* as *patthanā* (Skt. *prārthanā*) and *paṇidhi* (etymologically equivalent to Skt. *praṇidhāna*) in

¹⁴¹ No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 23) T28, p672b4-5: 何謂思。若思正思緣思。若心有作是名思。No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 1) T26, p693a12-3: 思云何。謂心造作性。即是意業。此有三種。謂善思不善思無記思。No. 1540 阿毘達磨界身足論 (卷 1) T26, p614c13-4: 思云何。謂思等思現思已思當思。思所攝造心意業。是名思。No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 2) T26, p927b14-5: 云何思。答諸思等思增思。思性思類。心行意業。是謂思。YBh p60.2-3: *cetanā katamā? cittābhisamskāraḥ. Pancaskandhaka 2.1.5 (p5): cetanā katamā? gūṇato doṣato 'nubhayataścittābhisamskāro manaskarma.*

¹⁴² S III 63: *katame ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā? cha yime bhikkhave cetanākāyā, rūpasañcetanā ... dhammasañcetanā. ime vuccanti bhikkhave saṅkhārā.* SĀ no.42, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p10b17-9: 云何行如實知。謂六思身。眼觸生思。耳鼻舌身意觸生思。是名為行。如是行如實知。

¹⁴³ The definition of *saṃskāra* as *abhisamskāra* also appears in the sūtras. S III 87: *saṅkhatam abhisamkharontīti kho bhikkhave tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti.* SĀ no. 46, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p11c: 為作相是行受陰。何所為作。於色為作。於受想行識為作。是故為作相是行受陰。

¹⁴⁴ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286a11-4: 經中說思是行陰...經中說作起故名為行。

¹⁴⁵ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286a11-2: 問曰。何等為思。答曰。願求為思。如經中說。下思下求下願。This quotes a sūtra corresponding to S no. 2.13 (II 154): *paṇītaṃ, kaccāna, dhātuṃ paṭicca uppajjati paṇītā saññā, paṇītā dīṭṭhi, paṇīto vitakko, paṇītā cetanā, paṇītā patthanā, paṇīto paṇidhi, paṇīto puggalo, paṇītā vācā.* SĀ no. 457, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 17) T02, p117a7-10: 緣下界，我說生下說、下見、下想、下思、下欲、下願、下士夫、下所作、下施設、下建立、下部分、下顯示、下受生。

contrast to the standard definition in the sūtras as well as most Abhidharma texts.

Although Harivarman does not explain why he offers this definition of *cetanā* in addition to the standard definition as *abhisamskāra*, it might be related to at least two of his doctrinal positions:

(1) For Harivarman *caitasikas* are nothing but different modes of *citta*, so *cetanā* as a *caitasika* is no doubt *citta* by nature. He points out in chapter 84 on *cetanā* that *manas* (= *citta*, *vijñāna*) is nothing other than *cetanā*.¹⁴⁶ One should understand *cetanā* as *citta* in the mode of seeking (*prārthanā*), so it is not something different from *citta*.

(2) It may also be related to Harivarman's understanding of causation and dependent origination. As noted earlier, in the sūtras *cetanā* is equated with *saṃskāra*, and *saṃskāra* appears both as a *skandha* in the five *skandhas* and also the second link in the twelve-fold dependent origination. Harivarman understands *saṃskāra* in both of these cases in a similar way. He understands the five *skandhas* as a description of the mental process: depending on eye and form (both are *rūpa*) there arises consciousness (*vijñāna*); then there arises the recognition of signs (*nimitta*) such as friend or enemy, which is apperception (*saṃjñā*); one can then have pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral feelings (*vedanā*) in the apperceptions; the three types of feelings may generate three kinds of defilements (*kleśa*); and according to Harivarman, the *kleśas* are the *skandha* of *saṃskāra*.¹⁴⁷ In his interpretation of the twelve-linked dependent origination, Harivarman analyses the chain in terms of the operation of the mechanism of *kleśa* → *karma*: ignorance (*avidyā*) is *kleśa*, which leads to karma (= *saṃskāra*); from these two arise successively consciousness (*vijñāna*), name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), the six bases (*āyatana*), contact (*sparśa*), and feeling (*vedanā*); from feeling arises craving (*trṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*), and these two are *kleśas*, which in turn give rise to new karma as existence (*bhava*); from existence arises the birth of future consciousness (*jāti*) and aging and death (*jarā-maraṇa*).¹⁴⁸ In the case of both the *skandhas* and dependent origination,

¹⁴⁶ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c3-7: 問曰。思與意為一為異。答曰。意即是思。如法句中說惡心所作所說皆受苦果。善心亦爾。故知意即是思。若意非即是思。何者為意業。意業名意行緣中。是故思即是意。

¹⁴⁷ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p251a16-20: 五陰者。眼色為色陰。依此生識能取前色是名識陰。即時心生男女怨親等想名為想陰。若分別知怨親中人生三種受是名受陰。是三受中生三種煩惱是名行陰。以此事起受身因緣名五受陰。

¹⁴⁸ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p251a25-b1: 是陰等法。云何當生。在十二時中故名十二因緣。是中無明是煩惱。行名為業。因此二事。次第生識名色六入觸受。愛取二法是名煩惱。有名為業。未來世中初受身識名之為

Harivarman emphasizes that *saṃskāra* (= *cetanā*) is born from *kleśas*, which are consequences of feelings (*vedanā*). In contrast, although the Ābhidharmikas understand *saṃskāra* in the dependent origination in a way similar to Harivarman's analysis here,¹⁴⁹ they interpret *saṃskāra-skandha* as including another sense. For the Ābhidharmikas, *saṃskāra-skandha* is also the collection of dharmas that are not included in the other four *skandhas*. For the Sarvāstivādins, it consists of conditioned dharmas associated with *citta* (*citta-saṃprayukta*), namely, the *caitasikas* except for *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*, as well as conditioned dharmas dissociated from *citta* (*citta-viprayukta*). In the Pāli Abhidhamma, *saṅkhāra-khandha* consists only of *cetasikas* associated with *citta*. Thus, Harivarman's definition of *cetanā* has at least two doctrinal benefits: (1) it avoids the issue of the multivalence of the Ābhidharmika interpretation of the term *saṃskāra* in the context of the *skandhas* and dependent origination; and (2) his understanding of *cetanā* as desire (*prāthanā*) or wish (*prañidhāna*), which are singular mental states, avoids possible confusion by identifying it with a term, namely, *saṃskāra*, which is interpreted by the Ābhidharmikas as representing a host of mental factors (*caitasika*). This would then be consistent with Harivarman's position that there is no *caitasika* apart from *citta*. However, the reasons underlying Harivarman's interpretation of *cetanā* require further study.¹⁵⁰

(65.12-13) In the next two sections, Harivarman discusses *vitarka* and *vicāra* and their relationship with intention (*saṃkalpa*), and argues that in the five sense consciousnesses there is no discrimination (*vikalpa*), so that in turn no *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Harivarman next clearly describes the relationship between *vikalpa* on the one hand and *vitarka* and *vicāra* on the other. Intentional discrimination (**saṃkalpa* 思惟分別) is a process that consists of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. When the mind is first applied to the object, it is gross (*audārika* 麁) and then becomes subtle (*sūkṣma* 細); gross *citta* is *vitarka*, and subtle *citta* is *vicāra*. And once again this position is identical with the one ascribed to the

生。餘名老死。

¹⁴⁹ For example, AKBh verse 3.21b (p.131.23): *saṃskārāḥ pūrvakarmanāḥ*.

¹⁵⁰ In his study of *cetanā*, Mizunō (1964: 410-11) observes that Harivarman's definition differs from that of others and points out that this position is the same as that attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. However, as Sue Hamilton (1996: 72-4) points out, in the sūtras the meanings of *saṅkhāra* as a *khandha* and as a link in dependent origination have different connotations; the former means "volitional constituent" and the latter "formative activities."

Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ.¹⁵¹

This connection between *vitarka* and *saṃkalpa* is also attested in the sūtras. In the formula of the eight-fold noble path (*aṣṭāṅgika-mārga*), the second *aṅga*, right-intention (*saṃyak-saṃkalpa*), is defined as the intention (*saṃkalpa*) for desirelessness (*naiṣkramya*, P *nekkhamma*), non-hatred (*avyāpāda*) and non-cruelty (*vihimsā*); but elsewhere in the sūtras, these three terms are also frequently associated with *vitarka*.¹⁵² Moreover, as Rupert Gettin has noticed (2001: 194n16), in M II 28 it is said that the three kinds of *saṅkappa* cease without remainder in the second *jhāna*. In the standard description of the *dhyānas/jhānas*, the transition from the first *dhyāna* to the second requires precisely this elimination of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Thus, Harivarman's use of *saṃkalpa* in his discussion of *vitarka* and *vicāra* does have a basis in the sūtras.¹⁵³

The Sarvāstivādins also relate the grossness of *citta* in relation to *vitarka*, and the subtleness of *citta* to *vicāra*,¹⁵⁴ but they reject the position that *vitarka* and *vicāra* are two modes of *citta* that cannot occur simultaneously. Instead, they propose that they are two separate dharmas that can occur together with *citta*. If so, how can grossness and subtleness coexist simultaneously in one *citta*? The MVŚ answers that *vitarka* and *vicāra* are not themselves *cittas*, but they are what make *citta* gross or subtle. It gives several similes to show that one can experience a gross and subtle thing at the same time.¹⁵⁵ Vasubandhu in his AKBh discusses the same issue, and he cites only one simile from the MVŚ, namely, that of ghee in cold water and under the sun. In such a situation, cold water and the heat of the sunshine are what make the ghee solid/gross or liquid/subtle, but they themselves are not ghee. One should understand *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the same way:

¹⁵¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p218c28: 謂或有執。尋伺即心。如譬喻者。

¹⁵² For example, M III 114: *nekkhamavitakko abyāpādatitakko avihimsāvitakko iti. 'evarūpe vitakke vitakkessāmī' ti.*

¹⁵³ See also Mizuno 1964: 434.

¹⁵⁴ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p218c7-8: 尋伺何差別。答心麤性名尋。心細性名伺。AKBh p60.25: *cittaudārikatā vitarkaḥ, cittasūkṣmatā vicārah.*

¹⁵⁵ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a13-b7: 問此中所說心麤細性顯何義耶。有作是說。此則顯心麤性細性。若作是說。尋伺應以心為自性。亦不相應。一物麤細不俱有故。有餘師說。此顯心麤時有尋性。心細時有伺性。若作是說。應顯尋伺非一心俱。心麤細時刹那別故。評曰。應作是說。此中顯示即一心中麤性名尋。細性名伺。若作是說。顯一心中有尋有伺。尋令心麤伺令心細。問云何一心麤細二法互不相違。答所作異故。尋性猛利。伺性遲鈍。共助一心故。雖麤細而不相違。問尋伺麤細其相如何。答如針鳥翻和束才族。身生受利鈍。尋伺亦爾。又如酢水等分相和置於口中。生識利鈍。尋伺亦爾。又如鹽麩等分相和置於口中。生識利鈍。尋伺亦爾。施設論說。如叩鍾鈴銅鐵器等。其聲發運。前麤後細。尋伺亦爾。法蘊論說。如天震雷人吹貝等。初大後微。尋伺亦爾。又作是說。如鳥飛空鼓翼翔翥。前麤後細尋伺亦爾。彼說皆顯尋伺不俱作用增時有前後故。有作是說。如以熟酥置冷水上。日光照觸。由水日故非釋非凝。如是一心有尋有伺。二力任持非麤非細。是故尋伺互得相應。尋令心麤伺令心細。

they can coexist simultaneously in one *citta* and are what make *citta* gross or subtle, but they are not themselves *cittas*.¹⁵⁶ However, Vasubandhu himself appears to be not quite certain on this issue. After quoting the ghee simile, he points out that some other teachers think that grossness and subtleness are properties relative to each other, and they cannot coexist at the same moment. Vasubandhu appears to be inclined to the latter position.¹⁵⁷

(65.14) In this section, Harivarman quotes an unspecified “someone” (或有人), who claims that within the five sense consciousnesses there is apperception (*saṃjñā*) but no applied thought (*vitarka*). In 65.11, Harivarman has already shown that there is no *saṃjñā* in eye-consciousness, because at the moment of seeing a person, one cannot grasp the signs (*nimitta*) such as whether the person is a friend or an enemy. So Harivarman does not agree with the “someone” here in this passage. However, this “someone” is not totally wrong. Although he claims that there is *saṃjñā* in the five sense consciousnesses, he rejects *vitarka*, and his argument is based on a sūtra passage that describes a cognitive process in which *vitarka* is said to be born from *saṃjñā*. On this point Harivarman agrees with him: when there is *saṃjñā*, there is no *vitarka*.

(65.15) This section offers a conclusion to sections 65.11-14. In these previous sections, Harivarman argued that there is no apperception (*saṃjñā* 想), nor applied thought (*vitarka* 覺), nor sustained thought (*vicāra* 觀) in the five sense consciousnesses. In summary, there is no discrimination (**nirvikalpa* 無分別) in the five sense consciousnesses, that is, there is no discrimination of male or female, nor discrimination of pleasant or unpleasant feelings, and so forth.

(65.16) In this section, Harivarman uses his opponent’s own doctrinal position to argue against him. In the unnamed opponent’s opinion, within the cognitive process, one

¹⁵⁶ AKBh p.60.26-61.3: *yathā 'psuniṣṭhyūtaṃ sarpiḥ sūryaraśmibhirūpariṣṭātspr̥taṃ nātiśyāyate nātilīyate evaṃvitarkavicārayogāccittaṃ nātiśūkṣmaṃ bhavati nātyodārika mityubhayorapi tatrāsti vyāpāraḥ. evaṃ tarhi nimittabhūtau vitarkavicārāvaudārika sūkṣmatayoḥ prāpnuto yathā payaścā tapaścāsarpiṣaḥ śyānatva vilīnatvayornatu punastatsvabhāvau.*

¹⁵⁷ AKBh p.61.3-13: *āpekṣikī caudārikasūkṣmatā bhūmiprakārabhedādityābhavāgrādvitarkavicārau syātām. nacaudārikasūkṣmatayā jātibhedo yukataḥ. aṅe punarāhuḥ. vāksaṃskārā vitrkavicārāḥ sūtra uktāḥ. "vitarkya vicārya vācaṃ bhāṣate nāvitarkyāvicārye"ti. tatra ye audārikāste vitarkāḥ ye sūkṣmāste vicārāḥ. yadi caikatra citte 'nyo dharma audāriko 'nyaḥ sūkṣmaḥ ko 'tra virodha iti. na syādvirodho yadi jātibhedāḥ syādvedanāsaṃjñāvat. ekasyāṃ jātāu mār̥dvadhimātratā yugapanna saṃbhavati. jātibhedo pyasti. sa tarhi vaktavyaḥ. durvaco hyasāvato m̥rdvadhimātratayā vyajyate. naivaṃ vyakto bhavati. pratyekam jātīnāṃ m̥rdvadhimātratavāt. neva hi vitarkavicārāvekatra cite bhavata ityapare. kathamidānīm prathamam dhyānam pañcāṅgayuktam. bhūmitastat pañcāṅgayukataṃ na kṣānataḥ.*

moment of consciousness of the five senses must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna* 意識). Since the five sense consciousnesses cannot discriminate the object by themselves, they must be followed by a moment of *mano-vijñāna*, which will distinguish and recognize what the object is. This might be related to the mind-process theories of a number of different doctrinal traditions. In the Pāli Abhidhamma commentary tradition, there is a full-fledged mind-process (*citta-vīthi*) theory, which entails a mind-process (*citta*) with a strong object that makes a big impact on the consciousness, consisting of seventeen moments:¹⁵⁸ (1) *bhavaṅga*, that is, the unperturbed continuum of passive, inactive *bhavaṅga* consciousness; (2) a vibration (*calana*) of *bhavaṅga*; (3) *bhavaṅga* interrupted (*bhavaṅgupaccheda*); then (4) the mind adverts to the sense-door of eye (*dvārāvajjana*), which leads to a moment of (5) eye-consciousness (*cakkhu-viññāna*), that is, the visual experience of the object. At this moment the mind is only aware of the object but does not know more about it. Following the eye-consciousness is mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāna*) (6) receiving (*sampaṭicchana*) the object as seen by the eye. Then there is the moment of (7) investigating (*santīraṇa*) consciousness, and after that the (8) determining (*voṭṭhapana*) consciousness, which recognizes the object and determines what to do about it. After the determination are several moments of active actions of consciousness called *javana* (running), which are karmically operative activities. The *javanas* can last for seven moments (9-15) if the impact of the object is strong enough. When the *javanas* are concluded, there can be two moments (16-17) of *tad-āramaṇa* (having the same object), which, as its name indicates, are two moments of *citta* that have the same object as the previous *javanas*. Commentators describe them as resembling an “after-taste” of the object. The *tad-āramaṇas* are very similar to *bhavaṅga* in the sense that they are both inactive and passive resultant consciousnesses, but, unlike the *bhavaṅga*, which has its own object, the *tad-āramaṇas* have the same object as the *javanas*. After the *tad-āramaṇas*, the mind falls back to the *bhavaṅga* state. In this context, it is important

¹⁵⁸ Here the brief description of the mind-process is based on the *Dhammasaṅgani-atthakathā* (= *Atthasālinī*, Dhs-a 266-87, 400-1.) and the *Visuddhimagga* (Vism XIV 114f; XVII 136ff), as well as the later Abhidhamma manual the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* (chapter 4). This mind-process theory is not fully laid out in the Pāli canonical Abhidhamma texts, though there are plenty of hints indicating that such a theory might have been developed in the canonical Abhidhamma text Paṭṭhāna. See Cousins 1981.

that after moment (6) eye-consciousness, there must be a moment of mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa*) which functions as the (7) receiving consciousness (*sampaṭicchana*).

Moreover, in the *Yogācārabhūmi* there is a mind-process theory which is simpler than the one in the Pāli commentaries. The *Yogācārabhūmi* mind-process is shorter and has only five stages:¹⁵⁹ (1) sudden occurring (*aupanipātika*); (2) investigating (*paryeṣaka*); (3) determining (*niścita*); (4) defiled or pure (*saṃkleśa* and *vyavadāna*); and (5) continuous flow (*naiṣyandika*). In this process the first moment of (1) sudden occurring (*aupanipātika*) is a moment of five sense-consciousnesses, and the following moment of (2) investigating (*paryeṣaka*) is a mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*).

The details of these two mind-process theories in the Pāli and *Yogācāra* traditions are not significant here. It is sufficient to note that in both theories the moment of five-sense-consciousness must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*).¹⁶⁰ Perhaps the opponent with whom Harivarman argues here is someone who holds a similar position regarding the mind's cognitive process, and proposes that eye-consciousness must be followed by mind-consciousness since eye-consciousness cannot discriminate and only mind-consciousness can discriminate. Harivarman answers that, if this is the case, then this mind-process theory contradicts the *citta-caitasika* theory. In the opponent's opinion, a *citta* (= *vijñāna*), including eye-consciousness, must always be accompanied by *caitasikas* such as *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *vitarka*, and so forth. If so, there

¹⁵⁹ YBh 10.1-7: *tatra caḥsurvijñāna utpanne trīni cittāny upalabhyante yathā kramam aupanipātikamparyeṣakam niścitaṃ ca / tatra ca adyaṃ caḥsurvijñānam eva / dvemanovijñāne / tatra niścitāc cittāt paraṃ saṃkleśo vyavadānaṃ ca draṣṭavyaṃ / tatas tan naiṣyandikaṃ caḥsurvijñānam apikuśalākūśalaṃ pravarttate / na tu svavikalpavaśena/ tāvac ca dvayor manovijñānacāḥsurvijñānayoḥ kuśalatvaṃ vā kliṣṭatvaṃ yāvat tan mano na-anything vikiṣpyate // yathā caḥsurvijñāna utpanna evaṃ yāvat kāyavijñānaṃ veditavyaṃ // Xuanzang's translation: T No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 1) T30, p280a22-27: 復次由眼識生。三心可得。如其次第。謂率爾心。尋求心。決定心。初是眼識。二在意識。決定心後。方有染淨。此後乃有等流眼識。善不善轉。而彼不由自分別力。乃至此意不趣餘境。經爾所時。眼意二識。或善或染相續而轉。如眼識生。乃至身識。應知亦爾。Kuiji has a long chapter dedicated to the five-consciousness mind-process theory. T No. 1861 大乘法苑義林章 (卷 1) T45, p252bff.*

¹⁶⁰ The MVŚ attributes this position to the so-called *Yogācārin*s (瑜伽師), though it is not clear who exactly these *Yogācārin*s are in the period of the MVŚ. (See Jonathan Silk's study of this term in Silk 2000.) But the *Vaibhāṣika*s have a different opinion. They agree that there are cases in which a moment of *mano-vijñāna* can follow immediately a moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness, but it is not required. A moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness can be followed by a moment of any of the six types of consciousness. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 131) T27, p0682b: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者違根蘊說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 1) T28, p0992a: 如是諸色於六識中二識所識。謂眼及意先用眼識唯了自相。後用意識了自共相。謂彼諸色住現在時。眼識唯能了彼自相。眼識無間起分別意識。重了前色自相或共相。... 眼識無間非定起意識。於六識身容隨起一種。若眼識無間定起意識者。則苦根不應為苦等無間。苦根唯在五識身故。若爾便違根蘊說。如說苦根與苦根為因等無間增上。

would be of no use for the following moment of *mano-vijñāna*.

Nevertheless, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas propose that the moment of *citta* after one of the five sense consciousness can be any type of the six, and not limited to *mano-vijñāna*. Such a position is based on a teaching in the *Jñānaprasthana*, which states that the faculty of suffering (*duḥkha-indriya*) can be the immediate-cause (*samanantara-pratyaya*) of another *duḥkha-indriya*, and because *duḥkha-indriya* can only exist in the five sense consciousnesses and not in the *mano-vijñāna*, it is possible that a moment of sense consciousness can be followed by another sense consciousness.¹⁶¹ In other words, for the Vaibhāṣikas it is not necessary that one moment of five sense consciousness must be followed by a *mano-vijñāna*. So it is unlikely that the opponent of this section is a Sarvasivada-Vaibhāṣika teacher.

3.3.8 Harivarman's Argument 8 (65.17-25)

In sections 65.17-25, Harivarman uses a number of examples, such as *vitarka* and *vicāra*, *avidyā* and *prajñā*, *vicikitsā*, *smṛti*, *chanda* and *acchanda*, and so forth, to show that different types of mental phenomena, especially those mental phenomena that have contradictory characteristics, cannot occur simultaneously in the mind.

(65.17) As Harivarman mentioned in 65.12, applied thought (*vitarka*) is a gross mode of thought, and sustained thought (*vicāra*) is a subtle mode of thought. Because a gross mode and a subtle mode of the same thing cannot coexist, in other words, they are mutually exclusive (相違), *vitarka* and *vicāra* cannot occur simultaneously in one *citta* as the Ābhidharmikas would claim. Harivarman then uses a simile to illustrate his point: when someone hits a bell, the first moment of sound is gross, which corresponds to *vitarka*, while, in comparison to the first moment, the sustained lingering sound of the bell is subtle, and this subtle sound corresponds to *vicāra*. In this simile, the subtle sound must follow the gross sound, and they cannot occur together. In the same way *vitarka* and *vicāra* cannot coexist simultaneously.

¹⁶¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 131) T27, p682b1-6: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者違根蘊說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。

(65.18) Continuing with the topic of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, Harivarman uses daily experience to argue for his position. If there were *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the five sense consciousnesses, one should be able to distinguish them by introspection, and describe and specify their activities (**kriyā* 業). But in fact, no one can distinguish them in their experience. So Harivarman concludes that *vitarka* and *vicāra*, as different types of mental phenomena, or more generally, *citta* and *caitasikas* must occur successively and not simultaneously.

(65.19) Harivarman uses another pair of mental phenomena, ignorance (*moha* or *avidyā* 癡) and wisdom (*prajñā* 慧), as an example to demonstrate his position. He argues that *moha* and *prajñā* are two opposite types of mental phenomena, by nature they contradict each other; hence, they are mutually exclusive and cannot coexist in the same moment of mind. One cannot know and not know about the same object at the same time.

(65.20) Harivarman argues that doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) is not a single moment of *citta* or *caitasika*. If one is uncertain whether a thing in the dark is a tree stump or a person, the mind is incapable of grasping the two objects of “a tree stump” and “a person” at the same moment. When one doubts, one must first think “this is a tree stump,” and in the next moment “this is a person.” The uncertainty or perplexity in this series of multiple moments of *cittas* is what Harivarman calls doubt.¹⁶²

(65.21) Next, Harivarman discusses the example of recollection (*smṛti* 憶). *Smṛti* is a mental activity that takes objects of the past. According to the *Ābhidharmikas*, *smṛti* is a universal *caitasika* that occurs in all *cittas*, including *cittas* taking present objects. If so, in a *citta* that takes a present object *smṛti* must be present, which according to its definition takes a past object. This indicates that this doctrinal position is self-contradictory. Therefore, *smṛti* cannot occur as a *caitasika* within a present *citta*.

(65.22) Harivarman continues with the discussion of recollection (*smṛti*). In this passage he uses a common experience as an example. When one recollects that such and

¹⁶² There is a passage in the MVŚ that expresses a similar position regarding doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑). No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b15-24: 問若爾疑相應慧應不名智。於所緣境不決定故。答彼亦是智。一剎那頃於所緣境亦決定故。然此聚中疑勢用勝。令心於境多剎那中猶豫不決。說名疑聚。如三摩地一剎那中於境恒住。有時若與掉舉相應。令多剎那於境轉易說名為亂。又如有情若多貪者說名貪行。若多瞋者說名瞋行。若多癡者說名癡行。一一非不有餘煩惱。此亦如是故無有失。

such a person is a friend who had helped him before, after this recollection, joy (*prīti* 喜) arises in his mind. According to the Ābhidharmikas, *smṛti* and *prīti* are both *caitasikas* that can occur simultaneously in one moment of mind. Here, Harivarman points out that in our daily experience, these two happen successively within a mental process and not simultaneously. Therefore, they cannot coexist in the same moment of *citta*.

(65.23) Next, Harivarman discusses the pair of mental phenomena, inclination (**chanda*) and non-inclination (**acchanda*). He quotes a sūtra passage stating that, if the bhikṣus are inclined toward the Buddha's Dharma, it will grow; if the bhikṣus are not inclined toward the Dharma, it will decrease. This implies that **chanda* and **acchanda* cannot occur simultaneously, that is, coexist in one *citta*.

(65.24) Then, Harivarman challenges the general principle of multiple *caitasikas* coexisting in one *citta*. He argues that if there were multiple *caitasikas* occurring together in one *citta*, for example, knowing and not-knowing, doubt and doubtlessness, faith and faithlessness, energy and slackness, and so forth, it would be a total disorder (**vaiṣāmya* 錯亂).

(65.25) Harivarman further extends his opponent's principle that *caitasikas* with opposite characteristics such as knowing and not-knowing can coexist. He argues that, if so, then in the same manner pleasant (*sukha* 樂) and unpleasant (*duḥkha* 苦) feelings should also coexist, and mental traits such as greed (*lobha* 貪) and anger (*dveṣa* 恚) should also occur together. But in some Abhidharma traditions, For example, the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition, *sukha* and *dukkha* cannot coexist in one *citta*, nor can *lobha* and *doṣa* coexist.¹⁶³ In other words, the Ābhidharmikas are inconsistent with themselves on this principle. Harivarman points out that to be consistent in all these circumstances, one must accept that mental phenomena with opposite characteristics, such as knowing and not-knowing, and so forth, cannot coexist in one *citta*. Therefore, he concludes that there is no association (*saṃprayoga*) of *citta* and *caitasikas*.

Comments:

(65.17-18) Harivarman discussed the issue of *vitarka* and *vicāra* and the grossness and

¹⁶³ The mutual exclusiveness of these mental phenomena is evident in the list of Dhṣ.

subtleness of *citta* in 65.12, which presents the position that the five sense consciousnesses have no discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) because discrimination is a process of intention (*saṃkalpa*) consisting of the gross *vitarka* and the subtle *vicāra*. Here in this section, he discusses the issue from a different perspective: namely, because *vitarka* is the grossness of *citta*, and *vicāra* is the subtleness of *citta*, and a *citta* cannot be gross and subtle at the same moment, these two cannot coexist in one *citta*.

(65.20) Harivarman's position that doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) is not a single mental event but a series of *cittas* is unique among the Buddhist traditions. Almost all other traditions, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the Pāli Abhidhamma, and the Yogācārin, consider doubt to be a defilement (*kleśa*), which means it is an individual mental factor (*caitasika*).¹⁶⁴ No other text proposes that doubt is a process rather than a single mental event.

(65.21-22) Apparently, Harivarman understands *smṛti* mainly in the sense of “memory” or “recollection.” The TatSid's chapter 91 is dedicated to *smṛti*.¹⁶⁵ In that chapter he defines *smṛti* as “one knows what has been experienced in the past.”¹⁶⁶ In the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, *smṛti* is one of the ten universal mental factors (*mahābhūmika* 大地法), which means it can occur in all *cittas*. As Collett Cox has pointed out (1992), in these circumstances *smṛti* appears to have two senses: retention and recollection. As a universal mental factor in the Sarvāstivāda system, it has more the meaning of “retention” or “mindfulness.” In other words, in the Sarvāstivāda perspective, *smṛti* is more than the memory or recollection of past objects but has a broader scope that can include objects of the past, present and future. Thus, Harivarman's criticism of the Ābhidharmikas' position is ineffective because, in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *citta* and the universal *smṛti* associated with it must have the same object,¹⁶⁷ regardless of whether the object is a past, present, or a future one. There would be no possibility that *citta* would have a present object, while *smṛti* has a past one.¹⁶⁸

(65.24-5) Harivarman argues that mental phenomena with opposite characteristics

¹⁶⁴ For a detailed discussion of *vicikitsā* in all of these tradition, see Mizuno 1964: 587-93.

¹⁶⁵ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p288b6-26: 憶品第九十一。

¹⁶⁶ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p288b7: 知先所更是名為憶。

¹⁶⁷ This is part of the definition of association (*saṃprayukta*). See the discussion of the definitions in 3.1, esp. 3.1.3.

¹⁶⁸ For more detailed studies of *smṛti* in Abhidharma, see Cox 1992 and Jaini 1992; for *smṛti* in the Yogācāra texts see Griffiths 1992.

such as knowing and not-knowing, and so forth, should not coexist in one *citta*. Again this is a position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ:¹⁶⁹

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that if a *citta* has knowledge (*jñāna* 智), then it does not have not-knowing (*ajñāna* 無知); if a *citta* has doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), then it does not have determination (**niyāma* 決定); if a *citta* has grossness, then it does not have subtleness. But the characteristics of dharmas as described by the Ābhidharmikas are like a messy forest: namely, in one *citta* are knowledge, not-knowing, and neither knowledge nor not-knowing; there are doubt, determination, and neither doubt nor determination; there are grossness, subtleness, and neither grossness nor subtleness.

In this passage in the MVŚ, the Dārṣṭāntikas take the same position as Harivarman. The basic principle is that mental phenomena with different or opposite characteristics should not coexist in one *citta*. All the examples that the Dārṣṭāntikas used in this MVŚ passage, namely, knowledge and not-knowing, doubt and determination, grossness and subtleness, are also used by Harivarman in sections 65.17-19. Such a position is understandable given that the Dārṣṭāntikas and Harivarman believe that all these mental phenomena are different modes of *citta* itself, when a *citta* is in the mode of knowing, it cannot be not-knowing, and when it is in a gross mode, it cannot be subtle. Here in this chapter of the TatSid, Harivarman does not give the Ābhidharmikas' answer to this challenge, but an answer is recorded in the MVŚ:¹⁷⁰

The Ābhidharmika śāstra-teachers say, what fault can there be if one agrees that these dharmas arise together? This is because these *caitasikas* arise supported by each other, associated to one *citta*, and each has its individual characteristic (相) and function (用): knowledge (*jñāna* 智) is wisdom (*prajñā* 般若), not-knowing (*ajñāna* 無知) is ignorance (*avidyā* 無明), and the remaining *caitasikas* are neither knowledge nor not-knowing; doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) is perplexity (**saṃdigdha* 猶豫), determination (*niyāma* 決定) is knowledge (*jñāna* 智), and the remaining *caitasikas* are neither doubt nor determination; what is gross is applied thought (*vitarka* 尋), what is

¹⁶⁹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b24-9 譬喻者說。若心有智則無無知。若心有疑則無決定。若心有龐則無有細。然對法者所說法相如鬪叢林。謂一心中。有智有無知。有非智非無知。有疑有決定。有非疑非決定。有龐有細。有非龐非細。

¹⁷⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b29-c6: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。許法俱生斯有何失。謂諸心所展轉力生。一心相應。相用各別。智謂般若。無知謂無明。非智非無知謂餘心所法。疑謂猶豫。決定謂智。非疑非決定謂餘心所法。龐謂尋。細謂伺。非龐非細謂餘心所法。如諸色法異類俱生。心所亦爾。故無有失。

subtle is sustained thought (*vicāra* 伺), and the remaining *caitasikas* are what is neither gross nor subtle. Just as material forms of different kinds arise together, in the same way *caitasikas* can also arise together. Therefore, there is no fault.

This passage from the MVŚ shows the fundamentally different position of the Ābhidharmikas from the Dārṣṭāntikas. For the Ābhidharmikas, each one of the mental phenomena mentioned is a mental factor (*caitasika*), which is a real entity (*dravya*) having its own individual self-nature (*svabhāva*).¹⁷¹ So for the Ābhidharmikas, knowledge (*jñāna*) is the mental factor wisdom (*prajñā*), and not-knowing is the mental factor ignorance (*avidyā*); doubt (*vicikitsā*) is the mental factor perplexity (**saṃdigdha*),¹⁷² and determination (*niyāma*) is the mental factor wisdom (*prajñā*); what is gross is the mental factor *vitarka*, and what is subtle is the mental factor *vicāra*. As all of these mental factors are individual dharmas of different natures, just as different kinds of material forms (*rūpa*) can coexist together in the world, in the same way all these different kinds of mental factors can coexist together in one *citta*.

However, a comparison of Harivarman's arguments presented in 65.17-25 with the answer given in the MVŚ indicates that Harivarman's arguments are based more on our ordinary experience and common sense. For example, in 65.17-8 he argues that *vitarka* and *vicāra* should not occur together just as gross and subtle sounds cannot occur together; in 65.19 he proposes that wisdom (*prajñā*) and ignorance (*moha*) cannot coexist; in 65.23 he suggests that desire and not desire cannot coexist. On the other hand, the MVŚ passage just quoted shows that the Ābhidharmikas' answer is based mainly on their doctrine of *caitasikas* as real entities (*dravya*); because these *caitasikas* are real individual entities, they can coexist like different kinds of material forms (*rūpa*).

¹⁷¹ This is one of the criteria in the definition of association (*saṃprayoga*) between *citta* and *caitasikas*. See the discussion in 3.1.3.

¹⁷² Here doubt (*vicikitsā*) is an interesting case. As seen in 65.20, Harivarman proposes that doubt is not a single mental event but a property of a series of *cittas*. But in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, in their classification of *caitasikas*, *vicikitsā* is one of the major defilements (*kleśa*). Here in this passage, *vicikitsā* is said to be perplexity (*saṃdigdha*), which is not included in the list of *caitasikas*. Also, the MVŚ passage quoted in footnote 162 regarding the explanation of doubt shows a position very similar to the Dārṣṭāntika's understanding of doubt as a property of the series of *cittas*. All of these interpretations suggest that in the period when the MVŚ was compiled, the sectarian division between the Ābhidharmikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas was not clear.

3.3.9 Harivarman's Argument 9 (65.26-33)

In the following eight sections (65.26-33), Harivarman quotes eight lists of mental phenomena from the sūtras and suggests that these mental phenomena occur successively instead of simultaneously. Since all eight passages are scriptural (*āgama*) arguments for the same thesis, they are grouped together as one argument.

(65.26) In the sūtra passage regarding the development of the seven factors of awakening (*bodhy-aṅga* 菩提分), these seven factors are developed successively.

(65.27) In the sūtra, the eight-fold noble path (*āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga* 八道分) is taught as a sequence.

(65.28) In the sūtra that presents the ten factors that start with being virtuous and ends with liberation, each of the preceding items in this list gives rise to the following one “naturally” (*dharmatā*): being virtuous (*sīlavant* 持戒) → no regret (*avipratīṣāra* 無憂悔) → joy (*prāmodya* 歡悅) in mind → rapture (*prīti* 喜) of mind → tranquility (*praśrabdha* 猗) of body → pleasure (*sukha* 樂) → mind concentrated (*samādhiyati* 攝) → knowledge [of things] as they really are (*yathābhūta* 實智) → disenchantment (*nirveda* 厭離) → liberated (**vimukta* 解脫).

(65.29) The sūtra presents the eight thoughts of a great person (P. *aṭṭha mahāpurisavitakka*) as a causal sequence.

(65.30) The sūtra presents the seven aspects of purification as a sequence of practice.

(65.31) The sūtra describes the cognitive process as a sequence: eye takes form → delusion → craving → karma.

(65.32) The *Mahānidānasūtra* presents the sequence of nine mental dharmas starting with craving (*trṣṇā* 愛) and ending with suffering.

(65.33) The four stream-entry (*srotaāpanna* 須陀洹) dharmas are intended as a causal sequence.

Comments:

The lists given in these eight passages consist of mental phenomena that in most cases are considered by the Ābhidharmikas to be mental factors (*caitasika*). In each case, Harivarman's argument is the same: each one of these lists should be understood as a

causal sequence with each item arising one after another. However, two lists he quotes are questionable: 65.29 the “eight thoughts of a great person” and 65.33 the “four stream-entry (*srotaāpanna* 須陀洹) dharmas” are not presented explicitly as causal sequences in the sūtras. However, it is possible to interpret them as successive sequences by analyzing the possible relationship between the consecutive members in the lists. Or, it is also possible that Harivarman is quoting sūtras that are not presently extant.

3.3.10 Harivarman’s Argument 10 and Conclusion (65.34-5)

(65.34) Once again, Harivarman quotes the sūtra passage describing the basic cognitive process: when the eye takes a form (*rūpa*) object, eye-consciousness (*viññāna* = *citta*) arises, and the coming together (*saṅgati* 和合) of these three is contact (*sparśa* 觸). Harivarman argues that if *caitasikas* arise together simultaneously with *citta*, then at this moment contact should not be the meeting of only three things: the eye, the form (*rūpa*), and consciousness (*viññāna*). Rather, there should be more things involved because a number of *caitasikas* such as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and so forth, are present in addition to the three.

(65.35) Harivarman concludes the chapter by stating that for these reasons he has proved that there is no association (*saṃprayoga*).

Comments:

This is exactly the same argument against *caitasika* presented in section 60.13.¹⁷³ However, in 60.13 Harivarman argues against the existence of *caitasikas* as real dharmas apart from *citta*, while here he tries to show that at the moment of contact there are no *caitasikas* present as dharmas associated (*saṃprayukta*) with *citta*. As a result, although the argument is exactly the same, the point is slightly different.

¹⁷³ See the detailed discussion of this argument in 2.3.5, and the opponent’s argument for *caitasika* in 2.4.5.

3.4 The Opponent's Arguments for Association and Harivarman's Refutations

In chapter 66 of the *TatSid*, the opponent presents several proofs for the position that *caitasika* exist as dharmas associated with *citta*. In chapter 67, Harivarman refutes the opponent's arguments. This section will arrange each of the opponent's arguments together with Harivarman's refutations so the reader may find it easier to follow.

3.4.1 The Opponent's Argument 1 (66.1-3, 67.1-2)

In (66.1-3) the opponent argues that the teaching of the five *skandhas* supports the position that *citta* and *caitasikas* can coexist as associated. The basic argument is that the five *skandhas* must exist simultaneously. In sections 66.1-2, the opponent quotes two different sūtra passages to support this position, and in 66.3 he argues on the basis of logical reasoning (*yukti*).

(66.1) The opponent quotes a sūtra passage describing the view of personal-existence (*satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*), in which an ignorant worldly being perceives (*samanupaśyati*) each of the five *skandhas* as the self, or the self as possessing the *skandhas*, or the *skandhas* as in the self, or the self as in the *skandhas*. The opponent points out that in the sūtra passage describing the view of personal-existence one takes feeling (*vedanā*) as the self and consciousness (*viññāna*) as in the self, that is, *vedanā*. In this case, obviously the sūtra passage is describing a situation in which *vedanā* coexists with *viññāna*. Even though the view that *vedanā* is the self and *viññāna* (= *citta* 識心) exists within (or dependent on 依) this self as *vedanā* is wrong, the analysis still supports the position that *viññāna* can exist simultaneously with *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and so forth.

(66.2) The opponent quotes a passage from the *Mānuṣyaka-sūtra*, which states that when the eye takes form (*rūpa*) as an object, eye-consciousness (*cakṣu-viññāna*) arises; the coming together of the three gives rise to contact (*sparsā*); and born together (*sahajāta* 俱生) with *sparsā* are feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra* 行 = *cetanā* 思). Various names such as sentient being (*sattva*), god (*deva*), human being (*manuṣya*), and so forth, are based on these five dharmas, or *skandhas*. In this passage, it is clearly stated that the *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and

saṃskāra arise together with *sparsā*.

(66.3) Continuing with the argument regarding the five *skandhas*, the opponent states that, if it were the case, as Harivarman claims, that *citta* and *caitasikas* can only arise successively one by one, then only one of the four non-material *skandhas* (*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*) among the five *skandhas* can exist at one moment. As a result, at any given moment only two *skandhas* would exist instead of five, namely, one *citta/caitasika* together with the material *skandha* (*rūpa*), and the three missing *skandhas* would exist only in the past or in the future. In this case, how can the sūtra say that a person exists with the five *skandhas*?¹⁷⁴ Therefore, the correct understanding of the sūtra passage must be that the five *skandhas* all exist at the same moment, and mental factors (*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāras*) coexist and are associated with consciousness (*vijñāna*).

(67.1) Harivarman argues that the opponent's understanding of the sūtra passage quoted in 66.1 is wrong, because an ignorant ordinary being (*prthagjana* 凡夫) cannot correctly analyze all the phenomena and determine that “this is feeling (*vedanā*)” and “this is what consciousness (*vijñāna*) depends on.” For if one were able to analyze correctly and distinguish the five *skandhas*, this person would no longer an ordinary being but would already have realized the truth of the emptiness of self. An ordinary being only perceives the continuous series of consciousness (*citta-santati* 心相續) but cannot correctly distinguish the *skandhas* in the series. So the statement “*vedanā* is the self and *vijñāna* exists within this self” is only playing with words and is not based on an accurate analysis of existence. In this sense, the opponent's statement is ignorant and deluded and hence not reliable.

(67.2) Harivarman answers the opponent's argument in sections 66.2-3. According to the opponent, since the sūtra teaches that a person is called a person (*pudgala* 人) based on the five *skandhas*, the five *skandhas* must exist simultaneously. If they can only exist successively and not simultaneously, then at one moment there could be only two *skandhas*, *rūpa* and one of the four non-material *skandhas*, and this contradicts the sūtra's teaching. As a result, the five *skandhas* must all exist at the same moment. Harivarman

¹⁷⁴ AKBh p465.10: *skandheṣveva pudgakādhye*.

answers that there is no problem in understanding the sūtra teaching as suggesting that a person is called a person based on the continuous series (*santati* 相續) of the five *skandhas*. In other words, to understand a person as a successive series of *skandhas* does not contradict the sūtra teaching that a person is called a person based on the five *skandhas*. Next, Harivarman uses an example to illustrate his point. He points out that people in the world sometimes call a person pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant. But any given person would not have all the three kinds of feelings all at the same moment. So in the same manner there is no problem to call a person a person with regard to only two *skandhas* at one moment.

Comments:

This exchange between Harivarman and his opponent regarding the sūtra passage involves two levels of analysis as carried out by an ignorant ordinary person. On the first level, the ordinary person analyzes a person in terms of the five *skandhas*; on the second level, the ordinary person analyzes wrong view as taking one of the *skandhas* as the self and assumes that *vijñāna* exists within or is identified with that *skandha*. In other words, the ordinary person has correctly analyzed a person into five *skandhas* but incorrectly takes one of the five, for example, *vedanā*, as the self, and considers the other *skandhas* such as *vijñāna* to exist within this self. The opponent considers the first level of analysis to be correct, but considers the second level of analysis regarding the self wrong. Therefore, even the ordinary person's view regarding the self is ultimately incorrect; it is still possible to analyze a person into five *skandhas* that coexist simultaneously, and one can mistakenly think that one of the five is the self and that the others exist within that self.

However, in Harivarman's view, the ordinary person is wrong on both levels: he is not only wrong in taking one of the *skandhas* as the self and thinking that the other *skandhas* exist within that self, but he is also wrong in understanding a person as consisting of the five *skandhas*. Harivarman proposes that the ordinary person does not understand the teaching of the five *skandhas* but only blindly follows the words. For Harivarman, the correct understanding of the teaching of the five *skandhas* recognizes that the four non-material *skandhas* are actually individual moments of *cittas* in a single

but continuous series of *cittas* (*citta-santati* 心相續). In other words, it is not necessary that all five *skandhas* exist together at the same moment in order to validate the claim that a being consists of the five *skandhas*; instead a being should be understood as a continuous series, and each moment in the series is one *skandha*. It is just like experiencing three types of feelings: pleasant, unpleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant. When one says that one has feelings, it does not necessarily mean that one experiences three kinds of feelings all at one moment.

3.4.2 The Opponent's Argument 2 (66.4, 67.3)

(66.4) The opponent claims that since the term “associated” (*saṃprayukta*) occurs in the sūtras, the teaching of association must have existed in the sūtras. As an example, he cites a sūtra that mentions a special type of faith (*śraddhā* 信), which has a root (*samūlika* 有根) and is associated with knowledge (**jñāna-saṃprayukta* 智相應).

(67.3) Harivarman answers that it is true that the term *saṃprayukta* does occur in the sūtras, but on these occasions the term does not have the meaning of “association” in the Abhidharma sense. He points out that, aside from mental phenomena such as faith and knowledge, in the sūtras other things are also said to be “associated.” For example, sometimes it is said that two bhikṣus are associated in the work of one task; other sūtras also refer to suffering that results from association with people that one dislikes (*apriya-saṃprayoga-duḥkha* 怨相應苦), and suffering that results from the separation from loved ones (*priya-viprayoga-duḥkha* 愛別離苦). Moreover, people in the world use the term *saṃprayukta* more often in the non-technical sense and, for example, say that material form (*rūpa*) is associated with other things. But in the strict Abhidharma sense, the term *saṃprayukta* is only applicable to *citta* and *caitasikas*, and *rūpa* cannot be associated in that sense with other dharmas. All of these examples indicate that, in the case of the sūtra passage regarding “faith associated with knowledge,” one should understand *saṃprayukta* in the non-technical sense; because faith (*śraddhā*) and knowledge (*jñāna* 智 = *prajñā* 慧 wisdom) together can achieve the goal of liberation, the sūtra says they are associated.

Comments:

Here, the arguments are focused on the understanding of the term “associated” (*saṃprayukta* 相應). The opponent points out that this term occurs in the sūtras, and in cases such as “faith is associated with knowledge” this term indicates the association relationship between mental phenomena as proposed in the Abhidharma systems. But Harivarman argues that in the sūtras the term *saṃprayukta* is not only used with regard to mental phenomena but is also applied to the relationship among other things such as people and material forms. So he suggests that the term *saṃprayukta* in the sūtras not be understood in the Abhidharma sense as “association;” instead, it only means two different things are engaged in the same task and achieve the same goal. Here, two different strategies of sūtra exegesis are employed: the opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, imposes the Abhidharma system on sūtra texts and understands terms in the sūtras in terms of their meanings in the Abhidharma system. In contrast, Harivarman proposes that the terms in the sūtras be understood as non-technical terms used in accordance with common sense.

3.4.3 The Opponent’s Argument 3 (66.5, 67.4)

(66.5) The opponent quotes a sūtra which states that feeling (*vedanā* 受), apperception (*saṃjñā* 想), and volitional formations (*cetanā* 思) all arise together (*sahajāta* 俱生) with contact (*sparśa* 觸) and concludes that there must be mental factors that occur simultaneously.

(67.4) Harivarman answers that it is true that such a statement occurs in the sūtras, but here the term “together” (俱) does not necessarily mean that these mental phenomena occur simultaneously. He uses two examples to demonstrate his point: (1) People in the world usually say that a teacher walks together (*saha*) with his students, even though the teacher is in the front and the students are following him behind; (2) in the sūtra it is said that as soon as the king Māndhātṛ has a thought of heaven (*sahacittopāda*), immediately he arrives there. Harivarman proposes that in both cases the term *saha* (俱) does not

denote a relationship of simultaneity but indicates a short distance in time between two occurrences. He also suggests that *saha* in the sūtra phrase “*vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā* arise together with *sparsā*” should be understood in this way: it means that *saṃjñā* arises immediately following *viññāna*, *vedanā* arises following *saṃjñā*, *cetanā* arises following *saṃjñā*, and so forth. In other words, these mental phenomena should occur as a successive sequence instead of all at once.

Comments:

Once again, two different strategies in the exegesis of sūtras are employed. Here, the dispute is focused on the term “together” (*saha* 俱). The opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, chooses to understand the term in a strict Abhidharma sense, and interprets the sūtra passage as saying that *sparsā* arises together, or simultaneously, with *vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā*. But Harivarman chooses to understand the term *saha* in a more or less loose and non-technical sense, in which the term can also indicate that things happen not simultaneously, but in a successive sequence separated by small temporal intervals.

Moreover, it is worth noting that the sūtra passage the opponent quotes with the sentence “arising together with contact (*sparsā*) are feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*)” occurs in only two sūtras in the Chinese *Samyuktāgama*, and not in the Pāli Nikāyas. Also among the extant sūtras containing a description of the cognitive process involving *viññāna, sparsā, vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā* (sometimes also *trṣṇā*), there are significant discrepancies among the versions of the process presented in different sources. Three versions of the process can be found in Chinese and Pāli sources:

- (1) The *Mānuṣyaka-sūtra* quoted in 66.2 and AKBh = SĀ no.306, also SĀ no. 273:¹⁷⁵

Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness (*viññāna*) arises; the coming together of the three is contact (*sparsā*); arising together (*sahajāta*) with contact are feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*).

¹⁷⁵ SĀ no. 306, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 13) T2, p87c26-7: 眼色緣生眼識。三事和合觸。觸俱生受想思。AKBh p465.10-12: “*skandheṣveva pudgalādhye*” *ti mānuṣyakasūtram*. “*caḥṣuḥpraṭītya rūpāni cotpadyate caḥsurviññānaṃ trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparsāḥ sparsāsahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā...*” SĀ no.273, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T2, p72c8-10: 比丘。譬如兩手和合相對作聲。如是緣眼色生眼識。三事和合觸。觸俱生受想思。

(2) SĀ no.276, also SĀ no. 304, and nos. 326-329; S no.35.93:¹⁷⁶

Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness (*viññāna*) arises; the coming together of the three is contact (*sparśa*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is feeling (*vedanā*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is apperception (*saṃjñā*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is volition (*cetanā*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is craving (*trṣṇā*).

(3) SĀ no.214, M no.148:¹⁷⁷

Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness (*viññāna*) arises; the coming together of the three is contact (*sparśa*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is feeling (*vedanā*); dependent on *vedanā*, there is volition (*cetanā*) or craving (*trṣṇā*).

In these three groups of texts, the first group (1) has only texts affiliated with the Sarvāstivādins; therefore, the description saying that *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* arise “together” (*sahajāta*) with *sparśa* is in accord with the Sarvāstivāda teaching. This group of texts are likely influenced by the Sarvāstivāda doctrines.¹⁷⁸

Among texts in the groups (2) and (3), it should be noted that the Pāli M no.148 *Chachakka-sutta* in group (3) presents the cognitive process described as a successive sequence (*phassa*→*vedanā*→*taṇhā*), and the Chinese SĀ no. 304 in group (2), which states that both *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* arise from *sparśa* (*sparśa*→*vedanā*, *sparśa*→*trṣṇā*), are actually parallel versions of the same sūtra, the *Ṣaṣṣaṭka*, with the similar content and structure in their narratives but only different in some points of detail.¹⁷⁹ Also the Chinese SĀ no.214 in group (3) and the Pāli S no.35.93 in group (2) are parallel texts as

¹⁷⁶ SĀ no.276, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p73c9-75c16: ...緣眼色。生眼識。三事和合生觸...觸緣受...觸緣想...觸緣思...觸緣愛。SĀ no. 304, T II p86c23-87a25: 云何六觸身。謂眼觸耳觸鼻觸舌觸身觸意觸。云何六受身。謂眼觸生受。耳觸生受。鼻觸生受。舌觸生受。身觸生受。意觸生受。云何六愛身。謂眼觸生愛。耳觸生愛。鼻觸生愛。舌觸生愛。身觸生愛。意觸生愛。S no.35.93 (IV 69): *phuṭṭho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti*.

¹⁷⁷ SĀ no.214, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 8) T02, p54a27-8: 眼色因緣生眼識 ... 此三法和合觸。觸已受。受已思。思已想。M no.148 *Chachakka-sutta* (III 282): *cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññāṇam, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā*.

¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, though in the Pāli suttas the term *sahajāta* is not used in this context, in Pāli Abhidhamma texts such as the Kv this term is used as a synonym for *sampayutta*. See the discussion of these terms in section 3.1.3.

¹⁷⁹ See Anālayo 2011: 838-40 for a comparative study of this sūtra. However, Anālayo does not notice this difference in the descriptions of the cognitive process in the different versions of the text.

well. Such discrepancies regarding this cognitive process in these parallel texts strongly suggest that in the early period, even before these canonical sūtras were settled, the early reciters already had different understandings of this cognitive process. In other words, the dispute between Harivarman and his Ābhidharmika opponents presented here in the TatSid can be traced back to very early Buddhist teachers who recited and compiled different sūtra collections.

3.4.4 The Opponent's Argument 4 (66.6, 67.5)

(66.6) The opponent uses the teaching of the five “limbs of absorption” (*dhyānāṅga* 禪枝) in the sūtras to demonstrate that *caitasikas* can occur simultaneously. Numerous sūtras teach that in the first *dhyāna* (初禪) there are five *dhyānāṅgas*: applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), rapture (*prīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and concentration (*samādhi*).

(67.5) Harivarman acknowledges that indeed the sūtras teach the five *dhyānāṅgas*. However, he understands the teaching differently. He proposes that these five *aṅgas* should be understood as mental phenomena that can possibly exist in the level (*bhūmi* 地) of the first *dhyāna*, but the sūtras do not teach that they occur all at once in the same moment. It is just like the feeling example that Harivarman used in 67.2. There are three kinds of feelings in the realm of sensual desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界): pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant. When it is said that someone has feelings, it does not mean that the person has these three feelings all at once. Similarly, when the sūtra says that there are five *dhyānāṅgas* in the first *dhyāna*, it does not mean that all five *aṅgas* occur simultaneously. In fact, the sūtra passage describing the first *dhyāna* actually lists the *aṅgas* first and then mentions the name of the *dhyāna* as the level (*bhūmi*) of practice.¹⁸⁰ In other words, the sūtras never explicitly state that these *dhyānāṅgas* occur simultaneously. Moreover, Harivarman points out that he has already argued elsewhere (65.12-3, 65.17) that two of these *aṅgas*, *vitarka* and *vicāra*, cannot occur together. To

¹⁸⁰ The formula of the first *dhyāna* (D I 73-4): *so vivicceva kāmehi, vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukkaṃ paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati.*

sum up, the teaching of the five *dhyānāṅgas* cannot be used as proof for the doctrine of *caitasikas* and association (*saṃprayoga*).

Comments:

It should be noted that the term *dhyānāṅga* (or P. *jhānaṅga*, 禪枝 or 禪支) never occurs in the Āgamas or Nikāyas but was coined by commentators in their exegesis of the sūtras. Similarly, the term *bhūmi* (地) is never used as “stage” or “level” of practice in the early sūtras preserved in the Āgamas and Nikāyas. As a result, it is clear that, even though Harivarman bases his arguments mainly on the teachings of early sūtras, he is also fluent in later commentarial and Abhidharma literature, and has no problem in using the more recent terminologies in his arguments.

3.4.5 The Opponent's Argument 5 (66.7, 67.6-7)

(66.7) The opponent quotes the sūtra that mentions the four stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti* 識住) to argue that *vijñāna* can coexist with *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and so forth. He argues that the sūtra teaches that *vedanā*, and so forth, are stations of consciousness; if *vijñāna* does not exist simultaneously with *vedanā*, how can it be said to be stationed within *vedanā*? Therefore, *vedanā*, and so forth, are the support station (**āśraya-sthiti* 依止住) for *vijñāna*. Furthermore, the fact that the sūtras do not teach that *vijñāna* is the station of *vijñāna* demonstrates that the understanding of station (*sthiti* 住) as support station (**āśraya-sthiti* 依止住) is correct; since one *vijñāna* cannot coexist with another *vijñāna*, *vijñāna* cannot be said to be a “support station” of another *vijñāna*.

(67.6) Harivarman answers that the opponent's understanding of *vijñāna-sthiti* as support-station (**āśraya-sthiti* 依處) is wrong; instead, the “station” (*sthiti* 住/處) should be understood as “object-station” (**ālambana-sthiti* 緣處). The opponent would object that, if *sthiti* were *ālambana-sthiti*, because *vijñāna* can take another *vijñāna* as its object, then there should be five *vijñāna-sthitis* instead of four. Harivarman answers that it refers to the “object-station” (**ālambana-sthiti*) because that *vijñāna* only stays for a

very short moment, and immediately following it *vedanā*, and so forth, will arise, and then there will arise craving (*tṛṣṇā*). As stated in the sūtra, if there is craving, consciousness will be established; therefore, *vedanā*, and so forth, are called stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti*), but consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself is not a *vijñāna-sthiti*. Moreover, in other sūtras the Buddha has mentioned seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, among which *vijñāna* is considered a *vijñāna-sthiti*.

(67.7) Harivarman further points out that one should understand this sūtra passage in terms of its meaning rather than on the basis of the words alone. He uses an example to demonstrate his point: in the *Dharmapada* it is taught that one can cross a river (a metaphor for *saṃsāra*) by faith (*śraddhā* 信), but actually one is liberated by wisdom (*prajñā* 慧). This example shows that the teachings in the sūtras are not always explicit and exhaustive; therefore, one should consider the meanings of the teachings rather than just following the words.

Comments:

This exchange is focused on the teaching of the four stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti* 識住). The sūtras state that the four of the five *skandhas*, namely, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, are the four stations of consciousness. However, like many key terms in the sūtras, no explicit definition nor any detailed explanation of the term *sthiti* (住 or 住處) is given in the sūtras. What does it mean that consciousness is stationed (*tiṣṭhati* P. *titthati*, literally “stands”) in *rūpa*, and so forth? And among the five *skandhas*, why is *vijñāna* itself excluded and is not considered a *vijñāna-sthiti*? Moreover, as Harivarman has pointed out in 67.6, in other sūtras the Buddha also mentions seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, in which the sixth *sthiti* is the base (*āyatana*) or realm of the infinity of consciousness (*vijñānānantyāyatana* P. *viññāṇañcāyatana* 識無邊處), which Harivarman understands as *vijñāna*; thus, *vijñāna* is considered a *vijñāna-sthiti* in this group of seven *sthitis*. If so, why is *vijñāna* included as a station of consciousness in the seven *vijñāna-sthitis* but excluded in the four *vijñāna-sthitis*?

Harivarman’s position regarding the last question is made clear in 67.7: he thinks that *vijñāna* is definitely a *vijñāna-sthiti* and should be included in both lists, but the first list,

namely, the list of the four *vijñāna-sthitis*, is incomplete. As a result, he says that in some cases the teaching in the sūtras is incomplete, and one should not attempt to understand such sūtras on the basis of their words alone.¹⁸¹

As for the meaning of the term *sthiti* in the context of the *vijñāna-sthitis*, the MVŚ gives four explanations:¹⁸²

For what reason is [a thing] referred to as a station of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti* 識住)? The answers are:

(1) Because *vijñāna* is stationed (**tiṣṭhati* 住) in this thing, stays equally (**saṃ-√sthā* 等住), stays close (**upa-√sthā* 近住); therefore, it is referred to as *vijñāna-sthiti*. Just as a place where horses, and so forth, are stationed is referred to as a horse-station, and so forth.

(2) Some say that because in such a thing consciousness is moistened by delight (*nandī-upasecana* 慧所潤), increases and expands, hence, it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

(3) Some say that because upon such a thing consciousness moistened by craving (*trṣṇā-upasecana* 愛所潤), grasps and does not let go, hence, it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

(4) Some say that because in such a thing tainted (*sāsrava* 有漏) consciousness, [or] consciousness engaged in grasping (**upādāna-upaga* 隨順取), begins to attach (執著) to, stands firmly (**pra-√sthā* 安住) and increases, hence it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

Among the four interpretations given in the MVŚ, the first one (1) is an analysis of the term *vijñāna-sthiti*. It first glosses the term *sthiti* with verbs derived from the same verbal root *√sthā* “to stand” such as *tiṣṭhati* “stands” (住), **saṃ-√sthā* “stays equally” (等住), and **upa-√sthā* “stays close” (近住). Then, it analyzes the compound, and compares it to the compound “horse-station:” just as a horse-station is where horses are stationed, similarly a station of consciousness is where consciousness is stationed. This is an interpretation based on the literal meaning of the term *vijñāna-sthiti*.

The second (2) and the third (3) interpretations are based on teachings in the sūtras.

¹⁸¹ For a more detailed discussion of Harivarman’s position on distinguishing meaning (*artha* 義) and words (*vyāñjana* 名字), see section 2.4.9.

¹⁸² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b27-c3: 何因緣故說名識住。答識於此中住。等住近住故名識住。如馬等所住名馬等住。有說。此中慧所潤識增長廣大故名識住。有說。此中愛所潤識攝受不離故名識住。有說。此中諸有漏識隨順取識生起執著。安住增長故名識住。

Interpretation (2) states that a station of consciousness is that in which consciousness is moistened by delight and hence increases and expands; this is a quotation from the sūtra that teaches the four *viññāna-sthitis*.¹⁸³ Interpretation (3) is not a direct quotation from sūtra¹⁸⁴ but might be based on a sūtra passage regarding the nutriments (*āhāra*). That sūtra says that if there is lust (*rāga*), delight (*nandi*), and craving (*taṇha*) as nutriments (*āhāra*), consciousness “becomes established (*patiṭṭhita*) there and comes to growth.”¹⁸⁵ Although the exact term *viññāna-sthiti* does not appear here, clearly it is implied by the terms “consciousness is established there” (*patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānam*). So the third interpretation (3) in the MVŚ can be seen as based on the sūtras, and it is understandable that Harivarman adopts these two interpretations in his arguments in 67.6.

The last interpretation (4) in the MVŚ is likely related to the term “engaged” (*upaga* P. *upaya*), which appears in the sūtras in relation to the *viññāna-sthitis*. In the sūtra that teaches the four *skandhas* as four *viññāna-sthitis*, it is said that consciousness is “engaged” with each of them. The term used in Pāli is *upaya*,¹⁸⁶ while in Sanskrit it is likely *upaga*. The verbal roots for these two terms, namely, √*i* and √*gam*, are synonyms meaning “to go,” so both *upaya* and *upaga* have the meaning “approaching, going toward” or “concerning.” Another possibility is that *upaya* may have come from a MIA form representing *upaga*. The Chinese translation of this term in the relevant sūtras in the SĀ is “concealed and stagnant” (封滯),¹⁸⁷ which has a strong negative connotation. Such a connotation perhaps comes from the statement in the same sūtra that “one who is engaged

¹⁸³ S no. 22.53, 54, 55 (III 53-58): *rūpupayaṃ, bhikkhave, viññānam tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya. vedanupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya ... pe ... saññupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya ... pe ... saṅkhārupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, saṅkhārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārapatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000: 890-4): “Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged with form; based upon form, established upon form, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion...”*

¹⁸⁴ Or, perhaps the sūtra upon which it is based is no longer preserved. I owe this observation to Professor Collett Cox (private communication, 3/25/2015).

¹⁸⁵ S no.12.64 (II 101): *kabalīkāre ce, bhikkhave, āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandī atthi taṇhā, patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānam virūlham*. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000: 600): “If, bhikkhus, there is lust for the nutriment edible food, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth.” Same with the other three nutriments: contact (*phassa*), volition (*cetanā*), and consciousness (*viññāna*).

¹⁸⁶ The PTS edition has *upāya*, but Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 1059n69) suggests that perhaps *upaya* is a better reading. The Sanskrit edition of the sūtra is not extant, but from the quotation in the AKBh it is likely *upaga*. AKBh p117.22: *rūpopagā viññānasthitir vedanopagā saṃjñopagā saṃskāropagā iti*.

¹⁸⁷ SĀ no.40, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p9b1-2: 色封滯識住。受想行封滯識住。

is unliberated.”¹⁸⁸ This negative connotation is echoed in interpretation (4) in the MVŚ in which *upāga* is glossed with “grasping” (*upādāna-upāga* 隨順取), and because of the grasping or attachment, consciousness is established (*pratiṣṭhita*) in *rūpa*, and so forth. Neither Harivarman nor his opponent mentions this interpretation in their arguments.

In addition to these four interpretations of *viññāna-sthiti*, the MVŚ also gives a list of five different types of stations (*sthiti*): (1) associated (*saṃprayukta* 相應) station; (2) coexistent (*sahabhū* 俱有) station; (3) support (**āśraya* 所依) station; (4) object support (*ālambana* 所緣) station; and (5) object field (*viśaya* 所行) station.¹⁸⁹ In 66.7, the opponent suggests that the *sthiti* in *viññāna-sthiti* should be understood as a support (**āśraya* 所依) station, while Harivarman argues in 67.6 that it should be understood as object support (*ālambana* 所緣) station. The interpretation of *sthiti* as *āśraya-sthiti* does not appear to be based on a sūtra reference and may simply result from the literal interpretation of the term *sthiti*, which is the first interpretation given in the MVŚ. In 66.7 the opponent asks, “if there is no association, how can *viññāna* be stationed in *vedanā*, and so forth?” However, the quoted sūtra passage does not explicitly state that *viññāna* stands (*tiṣṭhati*) in *rūpa*, but rather it says *viññāna* “while standing (*viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ*) might stand (*tiṭṭheyya*) engaged with *rūpa* (*rūpupayaṃ*), based upon *rūpa* (*rūpārammaṇaṃ*), established upon *rūpa* (*rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ*), with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion.”¹⁹⁰ In this passage only the term “established upon *rūpa* (*rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ*)” could be understood as suggesting that *viññāna* is “stationed in *rūpa*.” But the parallel phrase “based upon *rūpa* (*rūpārammaṇaṃ*)” indicates that actually both *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* are glossing the term “engaged with *rūpa* (*rūpupayaṃ*)” in the beginning of the sentence. In other words, if *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* are understood to be approximate synonyms for *rūpupayaṃ*, and the term *upāya* (or *upāga*) has a negative connotation related to “grasping” (*upādāna*) or attachment, then *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* would more likely mean that consciousness is taking *rūpa* as an object support and becomes

¹⁸⁸ S III 53: *upayo, bhikkhave, avimutto, anupayo vimutto*. Bikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi 2000: 890).

¹⁸⁹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b24-5: 有多種識住。謂相應識住。俱有識住。所緣識住。所行識住。

¹⁹⁰ Bikkhu Bodhi’s translation 2000: 890.

fixed on it. From this perspective, the term *vijñāna-sthiti* does not convey the ontological sense that *vijñāna* is standing within *rūpa*, instead it should be understood in the epistemological sense that *vijñāna* is taking *rūpa* as its basis and becomes fixed on it. Therefore, it would appear that Harivarman's interpretation presented in 67.6 is more in accord with the sūtra. On the other hand, the opponent's understanding of *vijñāna-sthiti* is more literal, but somehow misses the point of the sūtra. Moreover, regarding the dispute of *caitasika* and association (*saṃprayoga*), the opponent's ontological understanding of the sūtra apparently supports the *citta-caitasika* association mind-model, while Harivarman's epistemological understanding is more ambiguous and cannot be easily taken as supporting either position in the dispute.

Concerning the question of why consciousness itself is not included in the four *vijñāna-sthitis* but is included in the seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, the MVŚ gives several different opinions.¹⁹¹ The AKBh also records a number of arguments,¹⁹² and Saṅghabhadra also presents a long discussion of this topic.¹⁹³ However, time does not permit a full discussion of these arguments here.

3.4.6 The Opponent's Argument 6 (66.8, 67.8-9, 20)

(66.8) The opponent quotes a sūtra stating that dharmas that are with *citta* (心與法) are born from *citta*, and dependent on *citta*. This actually repeats the argument presented in 61.4 and 61.10, but here the opponent emphasizes the coexistent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, while in chapter 61 the opponent emphasized the thesis that *citta* and *caitasikas* are separate entities.

(67.8) Harivarman responds that the opponent's understanding of this passage is wrong. The fact that *caitasikas* are dependent on *citta* should be understood in the context of the cognitive process: first, *citta* cognizes an object, and after that it gives rise to *caitasikas* such as *saṃjñā*, and so forth.

(67.9) Next, Harivarman points out that, even though the sūtras teach that *vedanā*,

¹⁹¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706c-707a.

¹⁹² AKBh p117.28ff.

¹⁹³ No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 22) T29, p465aff.

and so forth, are dependent on *citta*, the dependent relationship is not like that between a painting and the wall on which it hangs. In other words, the dependent relationship does not necessarily denote the coexistence of *citta* and *vedanā*, and so forth.

(67.20) Later in chapter 67, Harivarman returns to this question again and says that it has already been answered earlier.¹⁹⁴

Comments:

The opponent's argument here repeats those presented in sections 61.4 and 61.10, and Harivarman's answer is also the same as in 63.8. However, here (67.9) Harivarman adds the simile of a painting and the wall, which does not occur in his earlier arguments. The relationship between a painting and the wall supporting it is a good depiction of the Ābhidharmika understanding of the relationship between *caitasikas* and *citta*: they must occur simultaneously, and *citta* supports the *caitasikas* as the wall supports the painting. But Harivarman points out that the relationship between *citta* and other mental phenomena is never presented in this way in the sūtras. Although he does not give further details in the passage, in the sūtra that contains the simile of painting and wall,¹⁹⁵ it is clear that the intention of the simile is to delineate a causal relationship rather than an ontological, coexistent relationship. The simile in the sūtra reads as follows:¹⁹⁶

Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or canvas. So too, when the uninstructed worldling produces (*abhinibbatento*)¹⁹⁷ anything, it is only form (*rūpa*) that he produces (*abhinibbateti*);¹⁹⁸ only feeling (*vedanā*) that he produces; only perception (*saññā*) that he produces; only volitional formation (*saṅkhāra*) that he produces; only consciousness (*viññāṇa*) that he produces.

¹⁹⁴ Sections 67.8-9 answer 66.8, 67.9-19 deals with other topics, then in 67.20 Harivarman suddenly returns to the topic in 66.8. It is likely that there might be some confusion with the order of the passages in the text.

¹⁹⁵ S no.22.100 (III 152). It corresponds to SĀ no. 267.

¹⁹⁶ Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation (2000: 959).

¹⁹⁷ The Chinese SĀ has 樂著 “enjoys and attaches” instead of “produces.”

¹⁹⁸ The sentence in the Chinese SĀ is “[the ignorant worldling] enjoys and attaches to *rūpa*; because [he] enjoys and attaches to *rūpa*, [he] gives rise to future *rūpas*.” (SĀ no. 267, T II 69c27: 樂著於色。樂著色故。復生未來諸色。) In accordance with the Chinese version, which appears to make more sense, the first verb is likely a form of **abhinandati* “be delighted in” instead of the *abhinibbatento* “produce” in the Pāli version.

The parallelism between the simile of painting in the first half of the passage and the doctrine given in the second half of the passage suggests an interpretation. First, it is clear that the painter represents the “uninstructed worldling,” namely, the subject or agent of *samsāra*, or more precisely the mind (*citta*) of the worldling. Second, this agent produces the five *skandhas*, which include the non-mental as *rūpa*, and the mental beginning with *vedanā*. Therefore, when Harivarman refers to “*vedanā*, and so forth,” he is referring to the four mental *skandhas*. It would be perhaps best to understand the simile as showing how the activities of *citta* (i.e. karma) causes future existence represented by the five *skandhas*, and this is the interpretation that Harivarman adopts in 67.8 and 63.8. As for what the wall or canvas means in the simile, the passage does not give explicit parallels in the second half of the passage.¹⁹⁹ In any case, it is clear that the wall does not represent *citta*, and thus the opponent’s interpretation that it represents the fact that *caitasikas* are dependent on *citta* as a painting depends on a wall definitely does not appear to be supported by the sūtra passage itself.

3.4.7 The Opponent’s Argument 7 (66.10, 67.10, 67.21)

(66.10) The opponent states that because *citta* and *caitasikas* are weak (**daurbalya* 羸劣) by nature, neither of them can work alone, and they have to depend on and assist each other to function properly with regard to an object. It is like bundles of reeds that must rely on each other to stand.

(67.21) Harivarman proposes a different understanding of the term “weak” (**daurbalya* 羸劣). For the opponent, “weak” means that *citta* or *caitasika* cannot work alone and must assist each other, but Harivarman proposes that a thing is called “weak” because it perishes moment by moment and cannot abide for a prolonged period of time. Also, he suggests that *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot assist each other, because, in that case, *citta* and *caitasikas* would need to abide temporarily, but in fact one cannot observe that they abide. Moreover, if they were able to assist each other, the theory of association (*samprayoga*) would be redundant.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ The Pāli commentary says that the wall represents *samsāra* with its three realms. See Bodhi 2000: 775n173.

²⁰⁰ It is uncertain what Harivarman means in this last sentence. For the Ābhidharmaikas, the relationship between *citta*

(67.10) In this passage, Harivarman answers the second part of the opponent's argument in 66.10 concerning the simile of bundles of reeds. He argues that the bundle simile used by the opponent contradicts the teachings in the sūtra. In the simile, the bundles rely on each other equally and there is no difference in their status in the inter-dependent relationship; in other words, it is not the case that one of the two bundles dominates and the other is subordinate. But since the sūtras only teach that *caitasikas* are born from *citta* and dependent on *citta*, and not the other way around, it is clear that in their relationship *citta* dominates and *caitasikas* are secondary. If the opponent responds that *citta* is dominant and arises first, and *caitasikas* follow in dependence on it, this is virtually the same position that Harivarman supports, namely, *citta* arises first, and *caitasikas* follow, and, at the moment of *citta*, *caitasikas* have not yet arisen. Therefore, *citta* and *caitasikas* do not arise simultaneously and assist each other.

Comments:

In the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma texts, the notion of “weak” (**daurbalya*) is not limited to *citta* and *caitasikas*. In the MVŚ, “weak” can be applied to all conditioned (*saṃskṛta* 有為) dharmas, that is, dharmas that arise from causes and conditions. It is said that conditioned dharmas are weak by nature, just as a weak person must stand relying on others, but a strong person does not need to rely on others.²⁰¹ Concerning why dharmas that arise from causes are weak, the MVŚ gives two opinions:²⁰²

The term “weak by self-nature (*svabhāva* 自性)” means that conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛta-dharma* 有為法) have a nature of arising from conditions (*pratyaya* 緣) established as their self-nature. Some say that because conditioned [dharmas] arise and cease so [they] are weak by

and *caitasikas* that assist each other is *saṃprayoga*; the “assistant power” (相助力) would not be something different from the capability of association. It appears likely Harivarman understands these two notions as different and mutually exclusive; otherwise, the phrase, “if one exists, the other...” would be redundant.

²⁰¹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 21) T27, p106a1-2: 有為法性羸劣故有因有作用故有果。如羸劣者依他而住非勇健者。

²⁰² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 55) T27, p283b29-c9: 自性羸劣者。謂諸有為法從緣生性立自性名。有說。有為有生滅故自性羸劣。有說。有為從緣生故自性羸劣。如契經說。苾芻當知。色是無常。諸因諸緣能生色者亦是無常。既是無常因緣所起色云何常。受想行識亦復如是。由羸劣故諸有為法。或四緣生或三緣生或二緣生。尚無一緣獨能生者。何況無緣。故有為法自性羸劣。如羸病者。或四人扶或三人扶。或二人扶方能起住。尚無一人獨令起住。何況無人。

self-nature. Others say that because conditioned [dharmas] arise from conditions, so [they] are weak by self-nature. As it is taught in the sūtra, “Bhikṣus, [you] should know, *rūpa* is impermanent, the causes and conditions that give rise to *rūpa* are also impermanent. How could *rūpa* that arises from impermanent causes and conditions be permanent?”²⁰³ *Vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *viññāna* are also thus. Because [they] are weak, some conditioned dharmas arise from four conditions, some from three, and some from two. There is no [dharma] that can arise from one condition alone, let alone without a condition. So, conditioned dharmas are weak by self-nature. Just like those who are weak by illness; some get up and stand supported by four people, some by three, some by two people. [A sick person] cannot get up and stand supported even by one single helper, let alone no supporter at all.

This passage from the MVŚ offers two opinions concerning why conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛta-dharma* 有為法) are “weak” (**daurbalya* 羸劣): (1) conditioned dharmas arise and cease, or they are impermanent; (2) conditioned dharmas arise from conditions, or, in other words, their existence depends on other dharmas, like a sick person who can stand only if supported by others. These two opinions can be correlated with the diachronic and synchronic aspects of the teaching of dependent origination. The first opinion regarding the impermanence of dharmas emphasizes a temporal and successive, i.e. i.e. diachronic, relationship, while the second opinion emphasizes the inter-dependent relationship among dharmas and hence a simultaneous or synchronic relationship.

Since both *citta* and *caitasika* are conditioned dharmas, the idea that they are weak could be understood as a natural extension of the more general idea that all *saṃskṛta-dharmas* are weak as shown in the MVŚ passage. It is obvious that in 66.10 the opponent adopts the second opinion in the MVŚ passage above, which proposes that a conditioned dharma cannot arise by itself but only functions with the assistance of other dharmas. This position is in accordance with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theories of the “coexistent cause” (*sahabhū-hetu*) and more importantly the “association cause” (*saṃprayukta-hetu*), which represent the two types of synchronic causation, with the later

²⁰³ SĀ no.11, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p2a22-6: 爾時。世尊告諸比丘。色無常。若因若緣生諸色者。彼亦無常。無常因無常緣所生諸色。云何有常。如是受想行識無常。若因若緣生諸識者。彼亦無常。無常因無常緣所生諸識。云何有常。S no.22.18 (III 23): *rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ. yopi hetu, yopi paccayo rūpassa uppādāya, sopi anicco. aniccasambhūtaṃ, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ kuto niccaṃ bhavissati...*

a special instance of the former.²⁰⁴ The MVŚ also records several similes used by the Abhidharma teachers to explain the *saṃprayukta* relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, including the simile of the bundles of reeds that stand relying on each other.²⁰⁵

By contrast, Harivarman's opinion in 67.21 that "weak" means that a dharma is momentary and impermanent emphasizes the diachronic aspect of dependent origination, which is associated with the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas in Abhidharma texts.²⁰⁶ For Harivarman, if two dharmas are said to assist each other, they must abide together temporarily, but in fact all mental phenomena perish moment by moment, and none of them can be observed to abide over time.²⁰⁷ So he concludes that it is impossible for *citta* and *caitasikas* to assist each other, and the opponent's understanding of "weak" is incorrect.

In 67.10 Harivarman attacks the opponent's argument that uses the simile of the bundles of reeds. He argues that, if it is the case, as the opponent argues, that *citta* and *caitasikas* assist each other like two bundles of reeds, which would entail that *citta* and *caitasikas* are in a mutually equal position in a synchronic or simultaneous causal relationship, then one would not be able to tell which one of them is dominant. How then can one account for the sūtra teaching that *caitasikas* are born from *citta* and dependent on *citta*, which explicitly asserts that *citta* is the dominant member in the relationship? This argument is not addressed in any extant Abhidharma text.

3.4.8 The Opponent's Argument 8 (66.9, 67.11-19)

(66.9) The opponent quotes the sūtra saying that the minds of sentient beings have long been polluted by lust, hatred, and so forth, and argues that, if there were no association of

²⁰⁴ See the discussion of the Sarvāstivāda theories of association in section 3.1.3. For the *sahabhū-hetu* and the dispute around it, see Dhammajoti 2007b:196-211.

²⁰⁵ The three similes used in the MVŚ to explain *saṃprayoga* are: (1) two bundles of reeds stand relying on each other; (2) many ropes joined to pull a log; (3) many people cross a river with hands joined. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b16-21: 問何故心心所法展轉為相應因。答展轉為因故。展轉力生故。展轉相引故。展轉相養故。展轉相增故。展轉相依故。如二蘆束相依而住。多繩相合能牽大木。多人連手能渡大河。有為諸法性羸劣故。展轉相依方辦事業義。 See also the discussion in 3.1.3.

²⁰⁶ This position is not explicitly attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. But Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* records the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta's arguments for such a position. See Dhammajoti 2007a: 152-3.

²⁰⁷ For a discussion of the Buddhist notion of momentariness with regard to mental phenomena, see von Rospatt 1995: 113ff.

citta and *caitasikas*, it would be impossible for negative mental phenomena, that is, defilements as *caitasikas*, to defile *citta*. It should be noted that the same sūtra was quoted by the opponent in 61.14 to argue that *caitasikas* exist,²⁰⁸ and Harivarman also quoted it in 60.6 as a scriptural authority (*āgama*) to show that, since they are not mentioned in the sūtra, *caitasikas* do not exist.²⁰⁹

(67.11-12) Harivarman answers that the opponent's argument is unreasonable. He argues that if it were the case, as the opponent proposes, that the nature of *citta* is pure and only accidental defilements such as lust, hatred, and so forth, were associated with *citta* making it polluted, this would mean that something that is pure by nature can be polluted and changes its nature. This contradicts the doctrine that the characteristic mark, which is the manifestation of the nature, cannot be changed. In other words, if the nature of *citta* is pure, because the nature of a dharma cannot be changed, defilements such as lust, and so forth, should not be able to pollute *citta*.

(67.13) Harivarman then responds from a different perspective, pointing out that it is said in the sūtra quoted by the opponent that, because a sentient being's mind is polluted, the sentient being itself is polluted. If it were true that this sūtra supports the doctrine that *citta* and defilements such as lust and so forth are associated with *citta*, then it should also support the position that the defilements are associated with sentient beings; but this is absurd. So if defilements cannot be associated with a sentient being, in the same manner they cannot be associated with *citta*.

(67.14-15) Harivarman then specifies his own theory on the process by which *citta* is polluted and liberated. He proposes that the pollution and purification of *citta* are not about individual moments of *citta* but describe the status of a continuous stream (*santati* 相續) of *citta*. In a series of *cittas*, if there are *cittas* that are defilements (垢), then this series of *cittas* is referred to as defiled or polluted; on the other hand, in a polluted series of *cittas*, when pure *cittas* arise, this series is called liberated.

(67.16-18) Harivarman uses the simile from the sūtra concerning clouds and fog that conceal the sun and the moon to illustrate the relationship between defilements and *citta*. He states that, even though clouds and fog are not directly associated with the sun and the

²⁰⁸ See 2.4.11.

²⁰⁹ See 2.3.3.

moon, they can still conceal them. Likewise, defilements such as greed, and so forth, though not associated with *citta*, can still pollute it.

The opponent points out that this simile is actually not consistent with Harivarman's position, because in Harivarman's theory both pure and defiled *cittas* are moments in the series, and, since there can be only one *citta* at one moment, these two kinds of *cittas* cannot occur simultaneously. But in the case of clouds and fog covering the sun and the moon, they do occur simultaneously. So this is not a proper simile to support Harivarman's position.

Harivarman answers in 67.18 that even though the two kinds of *cittas* cannot occur at the same moment, defilements can obstruct *cittas*. Therefore, there is no problem with the simile regarding his position.

(67.19) Harivarman concludes by restating his position that defilements are not associated with *citta* but occur in the series of *cittas* and can then be said to defile the stream of *citta*.

Comments:

Sections 67.11-19 present a rather lengthy answer to the opponent's statement in 66.9 that the *sūtra* teaching regarding the defilement of a sentient being's mind supports the *citta-caitasika* theory. The answer can be divided into four separate arguments:

(i) 67.11-12 is an argument that focuses on the nature of *citta*: namely, if the nature of *citta* is pure, then defilements would not be able to pollute it. The doctrine of "citta's original purity" (**citta-prakṛti-pariśuddha* 心性本淨) is usually attributed to the Vibhajyavādins (分別說部),²¹⁰ and also the Mahāsāṅghikas (大眾部).²¹¹ The Sarvāstivādins are against this doctrine, and the MVŚ dedicates a lengthy passage to refuting it.²¹² Apparently, on this point, Harivarman agrees with the Sarvāstivādins. In chapter 30 of the TatSid, Harivarman argues that it is not the case that the mind's nature is

²¹⁰ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b24-6: 謂或有執心性本淨。如分別論者。彼說心本性清淨。客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨。

²¹¹ No. 2031 異部宗輪論 (卷 1) T49, p0015b25-26: 此中大眾部。一說部。說出世部。雞胤部。本宗同義者...p15c27-8: 心性本淨客隨煩惱之所雜染。說為不淨。Cited in Yinshun 印順 1988b: 69.

²¹² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b26-141a28: 為止彼執顯示心性非本清淨客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨...

pure.²¹³ Here in 67.11-2, Harivarman is likely refuting an opponent who is also a supporter of the “original pure *citta*” idea, and his strategy entails *reductio ad absurdum*: if it is true that *citta* is pure by nature, and the accidental defilements such as lust come to be associated with and pollute *citta*, then it means that something that has a pure nature can be polluted. However, this is unacceptable given the model of a dharma’s characteristic (**dharmalakṣaṇa* 法相).²¹⁴

(ii) Section 67.13 presents Harivarman’s second argument against the opponent’s use of *āgama* supporting association. Once more, he takes the strategy of *reductio ad absurdum*. The opponent quotes the sūtra passage stating that, when sentient beings’ minds are defiled, these sentient beings are defiled, and argues that “defiled” refers to those defilements such as lust, and so forth, that arise and become associated with *citta*. Harivarman points out that, if this is the case, then the same principle can be applied to the other subject in the quoted passage, namely, the sentient beings; thus, the sūtra should also be understood to claim that the sentient beings are defiled. So according to the same logic, it should be said that defilements are associated with the sentient beings. But in fact, it is never claimed that the sentient beings are associated with the defilement. So, this sūtra passage cannot be taken as a proper *āgama* proof for the doctrine of association.

Moreover, this round of arguments raises the issue of sūtra exegesis once again. The opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, understands the sūtra passage more in relation to Abhidharma technical terms. For him, the notion of *citta* being defiled is equivalent to “being associated with defilements (i.e. *caitasikas*).” However, as Harivarman points out, if a technical sense of the term “defiled” is assumed in the passage, it could be applied to both *citta* and sentient being. But the opponent accepts the application of the term “defiled” in the Abhidharma technical sense only in reference to *citta*, and not in reference to “sentient beings.”

(iii) In 67.14-15, Harivarman explains how he understands the mechanism of the pollution of mind. For him, the “pollution” is the defilement of the “stream” of *citta*

²¹³ No. 1646 成實論 (卷 3) T32, p258b2-20.

²¹⁴ Saṅghabhadra records a similar argument from the Sarvāstivādins. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 72) T29, p733b17-9: 又若說心以淨為性。後與煩惱相應位中。轉成染者應失自性。既失自性應不名心。故不應說心本性淨。有時客塵煩惱所染。 For a more comprehensive study of the thought of the “original pure mind” in early Buddhism, see Yinshun 印順 1988b: 67-79; Mizuno 1997: 219-33.

instead of each individual moment of *cittas*. He proposes that if there are defiled *cittas* arising in a successive series of *cittas*, then the “stream” is defiled; and when there are purified *cittas* arising in the stream, it is liberated. If one understands it in this way, it would not be necessary to introduce the doctrine of association to account for the defilement and purification of *cittas*.

(iv) In 67.16-19, Harivarman uses the simile of clouds and fog as covering the sun and moon to argue that as clouds and fog that are not associated with the sun and the moon but can still obstruct their light, similarly defilements (*kleśa*) are not associated with *citta* but still can defile *citta*. Of course, as he has clarified in the previous passages, here too “defiled *citta*” actually refers to the defiled stream of *cittas*. But in 67.17, an unspecified opponent contends that this simile is not suitable for Harivarman’s theory of defilement because clouds and fogs exist simultaneously with the sun or moon. However, according to Harivarman, defilements are merely certain modes of *cittas* that may lead to future existence in *saṃsāra*,²¹⁵ further, at one moment there can be only one *citta*, and two *cittas* cannot coexist. As a result, in Harivarman’s theory *citta* and defilements cannot occur simultaneously, which obviously contradicts the simile that clouds and fog coexist with the sun and the moon and conceal their light.

In 67.18, Harivarman responds briefly that, since defilements can act as obstacles (**antarāyika* 障礙), they are similar to clouds and fogs. Therefore, the simile is suitable. Since Harivarman does not give further details, it is difficult to understand precisely how the cloud/sun relationship parallels the defilement/*citta* relationship. However, perhaps he understands that, because defilements pollute the stream of *cittas* and prevent beings from achieving liberation, this is equivalent to obstructing a sentient being’s liberation. If so, the parallelism between the simile and Harivarman’s theory is more abstract than figurative.

²¹⁵ No. 1646 成實論 (卷9) T32, p308c27-p309a1: 垢心行名為煩惱。問曰。何謂為垢。答曰。若心能令生死相續。是名為垢。此垢心差別。為貪恚癡等。

3.4.9 The Opponent's Argument 9 (66.11, 67.22-3)

(66.11) The opponent quotes a sūtra passage about the seven factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga* 覺意) to prove that *caitasikas* exist and are associated with *citta*. The sūtra passage states that, when a practitioner's mind is excited (*uddhata* 掉動), it is not suitable to practice three factors of awakening, namely, discrimination of dharmas (*dharmapracaya* 擇法), energy (*vīrya* 精進), and joy (*prīti* 喜), because they may make the mind more excited. Instead, one should practice tranquility (*praśrabdhi* 猗), concentration (*samādhi* 定), and equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨), because they inhibit the arousal of mind. The sūtra also states that, when the mind is sluggish (*līna* 懈沒), it is not suitable to practice tranquility, concentration, and equanimity. Instead one should practice discrimination of dharmas, energy, and joy because they can arouse the mind. Mindfulness (*smṛti* 念) can be helpful in both cases.

(67.22) Harivarman responds that when the sūtra states that on a certain occasion one should practice three factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*), it does not mean that the three are practiced all together at the same moment. He quotes another sūtra to prove his point: in that sūtra, Śāriputra claims that he can enter and abide in a certain *bodhyaṅga* at will whenever he wishes. One should also understand the sūtra passage quoted in 66.11 in a similar manner: when the sūtra teaches that one should practice three *bodhyaṅgas*, it means the practitioner should practice one of the three at a time, and not all three of them together.

(67.23) Harivarman adds that in addition to the sūtra the opponent quoted in 66.11, in another sūtra the Buddha also presents the seven *bodhyaṅgas* as a progressive sequence that a practitioner should achieve one after another. Because this repeats the same *āgama* argument given in 65.26, Harivarman does not give further details here.

Comments:

The sūtra passage quoted by the opponent in 66.11 is rather ambiguous. It states that on certain occasions one should practice three of the seven *bodhyaṅgas*, but it does not explicitly state that these three *bodhyaṅgas* are to be practiced together at the same time. The ambiguity of this passage is even more apparent in the MVŚ, which notes that the

Dārṣṭāntikas use the same sūtra passage to argue for the opposite position. According to the MVŚ, the Dārṣṭāntikas quote this passage as follows:²¹⁶

Since the *bodhyaṅgas* have proper and improper occasions to be practiced, therefore, one knows that *caitasikas* arise successively and not simultaneously.

But the Vaibhāṣikas answer that this passage should be understood as indicating that the three *bodhyaṅgas* are practiced together, and this is a proof that *caitasikas* do occur simultaneously.²¹⁷

As for the sūtra quoted by Harivarman in 67.22 regarding Śāriputra's claim that he can enter the *bodhyaṅgas* at will, the MVŚ also records that the Dārṣṭāntikas use the same sūtra to argue that a practitioner enters the *bodhyaṅgas* one at a time and not multiple *bodhyaṅgas* simultaneously.²¹⁸ Harivarman does not include his opponent's answer to this argument, but the MVŚ records the following:²¹⁹

The *Śāriputra-sūtra* they (i.e. the Dārṣṭāntikas) have quoted does not necessarily exclude the meaning that [the *bodhyaṅgas* can] arise simultaneously. [It] states that Śāriputra knows well the minds that enter and leave the concentrations of the factors of awakening (**bodhyaṅga-samādhi* 覺支定), [and he can] dwell in the **bodhyaṅga-samādhis* at will (自在) as his mind wishes. That means that he can dwell in the *bodhyaṅgas* in accordance with the occasion (**kāla* 時分) and not that the *bodhyaṅgas* arise separately one by one. Therefore, [this sūtra] cannot be a proof [for the position that the *bodhyaṅgas* are a progressive sequence].

Here, the Vaibhāṣikas argue that the sūtra does not mean that Śāriputra enters the *bodhyaṅgas* one at a time; rather it means that Śāriputra enters the “concentrations of the

²¹⁶ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a6-8: 彼作是說。覺支既有時非時修。故知心所次第而生。非一時起。

²¹⁷ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a15-18: 問若諸心所有一時生。云何通彼所引契經。答前契經說。時非時修三覺支者。乃證心所非要次第一一而生。說三覺支一時修故。證諸心所有俱時生。

²¹⁸ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a8-14: 又餘經說。舍利子言。我於七覺支定能隨意自在住。謂我欲於此覺支定日初分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日中分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日後分住。即便能住。彼作是說。既舍利子於七覺支隨所欲住。故知心所次第而生。非一時起其理決定。

²¹⁹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p494b21-4: 彼後所引舍利子經亦不定遮一時生義。謂舍利子。善知入出覺支定心。於覺支定。隨心所欲能自在住。此依時分說住覺支隨意自在。不說別起一一覺支。故不成證。 Following this passage, the MVŚ gives a number of examples of different types of *samādhis* as different “occasions.”

bodhyaṅgas” (**bodhyaṅga-samādhi* 覺支定), and, in each of the *samādhis*, there can be multiple *bodhyaṅgas* present. In this regard, each *samādhi* is an “occasion” (**kāla* 時分). So they argue that the sūtra claims that Śāriputra can enter at will different kinds of *samādhis* instead of individual *bodhyaṅgas*. So, they conclude that this sūtra cannot stand as an *āgama* proof for the Dārṣṭāntika position that each of the *bodhyaṅgas* arises individually and progressively.

However, this argument relies heavily on the term **bodhyaṅga-samādhi* (覺支定) and interprets *samādhi* as an “occasion” (**kāla* 時分) in which multiple *bodhyaṅgas* can occur. And indeed, the term *samādhi* is present in the version of the sūtra in the Chinese SĀ.²²⁰ However, since in the Pāli version of the sūtra, the key term *samādhi* is absent in this passage,²²¹ it appears more reasonable to understand this passage as stating that Śāriputra dwells with a certain, that is, one of the seven *bodhyaṅgas* present. Moreover in 67.22, Harivarman does not mention *samādhi* when he quotes this sūtra. Once again, it appears that a doctrinal position may have influenced the selection of different versions of a text. The Chinese SĀ is likely affiliated with the Sarvāstivādins, so it is no surprise that it agrees with the MVŚ. In many cases, Harivarman uses texts close to the Sarvāstivāda versions, but here because the keyword *samādhi* is so essential to his argument that one might suspect that he was aware of and chose another version of the sūtra without the word *samādhi*.

Regarding Harivarman’s statement in 67.23 that in the sūtras the seven *bodhyaṅgas* are also taught as a progressive sequence, the MVŚ records that the Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (尊者妙音) uses the same sūtra passage to explain why the seven *bodhyaṅgas* are presented in this specific order,²²² and it appears that the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas have no issue with this sūtra and the seven *bodhyaṅgas* as a sequential process.

²²⁰ SĀ no. 718. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 27) T2, p193b17-20: 此七覺分決定而得。不勤而得。我隨所欲。覺分正受。若晨朝時。日中時。日暮時。若欲正受。隨其所欲。多入正受。Here *samādhi* is translated as 正受。

²²¹ S no.46.4 (V 71): *imesaṃ khvāham āvuso sattannaṃ bojjaṅgānaṃ yena yena bojjaṅgena ākankhāmi pubbaṅhasamayam viharitum tena tena bojjaṅgena pubbaṅhasamayam viharāmi...*

²²² No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p497a29-b14: 問何故七覺支中先說念覺支。乃至後說捨覺支耶。答隨順文詞巧妙次第法故。復次隨順說者受者輕便次第法故。尊者妙音作如是說。已見諦者。憶念先時所現觀事而為上首。修習覺支令漸圓滿。如契經說。彼於此法繫念思惟令不迷謬。起念覺支修令圓滿。念圓滿已於法簡擇籌量觀察起擇法覺支修令圓滿。擇法滿已發勤精進心不退屈。起精進覺支修令圓滿。精進滿已發生勝喜心不染著。起喜覺支修令圓滿。喜圓滿已身心猗適離昏沈故。起輕安覺支修令圓滿。輕安滿已身心悅樂得三摩地。

3.4.10 The Opponent's Argument 10 (66.12, 67.24-6)

(66.12) In this passage, the opponent first clarifies that this argument represents the view of certain treatise teachers (**śāstrācārya* 論師), which implies that it is not based on sūtras. According to the śāstra teachers, a practitioner cultivates the factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipākṣika* 助菩提法) all at once and not separately.

(67.24) Harivarman first responds that this cannot be correct because, if one can practice all thirty-seven factors at the same time, then one can practice two factors of faith (*śraddhā* 信), and five factors of mindfulness (*smṛti* 念), and so forth. This is unacceptable, so the opponent's argument must be incorrect.

(67.25-26) Harivarman then attacks the opponent's position from another aspect. First, he tries to clarify what the opponent means by practiced “not separately” (不離) in 66.12. Harivarman suggests that the opponent interprets “to practice the *bodhyaṅgas* separately” (離修) to refer to achieving the factors one at a time, and the practitioner practices the factor on the occasion when he achieves it (隨得處修). The opponent disagrees but instead proposes that, when a practitioner enters a certain level of practice (*bhūmi* 地), such as the second *dhyāna*, multiple *bodhyaṅgas* are present at that level and the practitioner practices them all together and not separately. Harivarman responds in 67.26 that this cannot be correct because one cannot practice multiple dharmas in one moment of mind.

Comments:

The identity of the “treatise teachers” (**śāstrācārya* 論師) mentioned by the opponent in 66.12 is unclear. In the Pāli Abhidhamma commentarial tradition, according to Buddhaghosa, when a practitioner has attained the purification by knowing and seeing (*ñāṇadassana-visuddhi*), that is, when one has attained the knowledge of the four paths of

起定覺支修令圓滿。定圓滿已遠離貪憂心便住捨。起捨覺支修令圓滿。故七覺支如是次第。

stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, and arahat,²²³ the practitioner will fulfill the thirty-seven factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipāḥṣika* P. *bodhipakkhiya*) all at once.²²⁴ In other words, all the thirty-seven factors are present simultaneously in this single moment. Although the view of these “treatise teachers” (**śāstrācārya* 論師) agrees with that of the Pāli commentators such as Buddhaghosa, it is not at all certain that the opponent has these commentators in mind. First, the commentary only says that at that specific moment all thirty-seven factors are “fulfilled” (*paripuṇṇa*) and present, but does not mention that they are “practiced” (修). So strictly speaking, this position differs from that presented in 66.12, which states that the thirty-seven factors are “practiced at the same time” (一時修). Secondly, a number of northern Abhidharma texts also present the idea that multiple factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipāḥṣika*) may occur simultaneously. For example, the MVŚ states that all thirty-seven factors may occur in the first *dhyāna*, and thirty-four of them can coexist in the same moment.²²⁵ The AKBh also quotes a sūtra saying that when one has practiced and fulfilled the eight-fold noble path (*āryāṣṭāṅga-mārga*), all remaining twenty-nine factors among the thirty-seven are also practiced and fulfilled.²²⁶ However, no extant sūtra has yet been identified for this passage quoted by Vasubandhu.²²⁷

Thus, it is clear that many teachers believe that multiple factors among the thirty-seven *bodhipāḥṣikas* can occur simultaneously within one moment of *citta*. For the supporters of *caitasika* and *saṃprayoga*, this would be a good argument in support of their position. As presented in 67.26, Harivarman’s response to this argument is simple and straightforward. Since it is widely accepted among Buddhist teachers that at one moment there can be only one *citta*, and since the practice of one of the factors among the thirty-seven is an instance of a certain type of *citta*, and since there cannot be thirty-seven

²²³ Vism XXII.2 (PTS ed. p672): *sotāpattimaggo sakadāgāmimaggo anāgāmimaggo arahattamaggo ti imesu pana catusu maggesu nāṇaṃ nānadassanavisuddhi nāma.*

²²⁴ Vism XXII.32-33 (PTS ed. p678): *paripuṇṇabodhipakkhiyabhāvo...* XXII.39 (PTS ed. p680) *imesaṃ pana catunnaṃ nāṇaṃ uppattikāle ekacitte labbhanti.* See also Gethin 1998: 192; Gethin 2001: 23, 303-4.

²²⁵ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p497c8-9: 初靜慮中具三十七。唯三十四俱時現前。除三念住。

²²⁶ AKBh p385.7-8: *tathā hyuktam “āryāṣṭāṅge khalu mārge bhāvanāparipūri gacchati. catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni bhāvanāparipūriṃ gacchanti yāvāt sapta bodhyangāni”ti.*

²²⁷ La Vallée Poussin (1988: 1083n444) notes that this passage is similar to a passage in the M no. 118 the *Ānāpānasati-sutta* (III 87-8), but that sutta only states that when the four applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*) are fulfilled, the seven factors of awakening (*satta sambojjhaṅga*) are also fulfilled. The remaining factors among the thirty-seven are not mentioned.

cittas all occur in one moment, so it is impossible for a practitioner to practice all the thirty-seven factors simultaneously.

Harivarman does not record any response from the opponent, but this should not pose a serious problem for the Ābhidharmikas since, in their opinion, the thirty-seven factors contributing to awakening are nothing but *caitasikas* by different names. Among the seven sets, there are quite a few *caitasikas* repeated, as Harivarman mentioned in 67.25; for example, faith (*śraddhā* 信) appears twice and mindfulness (*smṛti* 念) appears five times. However, the Ābhidharmikas have taken care of this issue: the Vaibhāṣikas reduce the thirty-seven factors to eleven or twelve “real entities” (*dravya* 實體);²²⁸ Vasubandhu proposes that there are actually only ten;²²⁹ and the Pāli commentary reduces the thirty-seven to fourteen factors.²³⁰ Since multiple *caitasikas* can coexist with *citta*, there is no problem in allowing multiple factors among the thirty-seven to coexist in a practitioner’s mind.

²²⁸ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p496a22-28: 問菩提分法名有三十七。實體有幾耶。答此實體。有十一或十二。若以一切攝入覺支即七覺支。名既有七實體亦七信正思惟各唯一種正語業命。有說為二。正命即是正語業故。有說為三。正語業外有正命故。若說為二即唯十一。若說為三則有十二。AKBh p.383.21-384.1: *vaibhaṣikāṅgāṃ ekādaśa: kāyavākkarmanorasambhinnatvāt śīlāṅgāni dve dravye iti.*

²²⁹ AKBh verse vi.67a-c (p.383.7-11): *daśa dravyāṇi sarve bodhipakṣyāḥ. katamāni daśa? śraddhā vīryaṃ smṛtiḥ prajñā samādhiḥ prītyupekṣaṇe praśrabdhīśīlasaṃkalpāḥ ityetāni daśa dravyāṇi.*

²³⁰ Vism XXII 41 (PTS ed. p.680). See Gethin 2001:304-5.

Chapter 4. Conclusion

The previous chapters (2-3) discussed in detail the positions and arguments of Harivarman and his opponents regarding the issue of mental factors (*caitasika*) and association (*samprayoga*). Notes in the translation chapter (5) and the comments in chapters 2-3 focused mainly on textual, historical, and Buddhist doctrinal issues raised in the dispute. As a conclusion, this chapter will look beyond the minute textual, doctrinal, and historical details, and look at the “big picture” in terms of more general issues such as: What are the possible causes for the dispute, why do the parties in the dispute take their specific positions, and what we can learn from the dispute on mind? Section 4.1 in this chapter recapitulates briefly the main positions of the two parties in the dispute, and section 4.2 explores the possible causes and reasons for the different doctrines and positions among early Buddhist teachers.

4.1 Recapitulation of the Positions

The **Tattvasiddhi* records more than fifty arguments from teachers of two camps arguing for or against the theory of mind involving the concepts of “mental factors” (*caitasika*) and “association” (*samprayoga*). On the one hand, supporters of the “mental factor” theory of mind argue that mental factors are real entities different from consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*), but they must exist interdependently with each other and with consciousness as well; this interdependent relationship is “association” (*samprayoga*). On the other hand, Harivarman, who is likely representing the so-called “Dārṣṭāntika” teachers, argues that “mental factors” such as contact, feeling, volition, lust, craving, mindfulness, concentration, and so forth are not entities separate from consciousness; instead, they are precisely consciousness in its different modes.

Most of the arguments in the *TatSid* involve so-called “scriptural” arguments, or quotations from early sūtras, offered as authoritative proof (*āgama*) for a particular position. However, because the doctrines of “mental factors” and “association” are neither explicitly taught nor rejected in the sūtras, both sides of the dispute have to use

sūtra passages in a tactical way: they choose passages from the sūtras that contain names of mental phenomena, and interpret the passage in a way that supports their own position. A good example would be the early Buddhist teaching of the five aggregates (*skandha*), which asserts that a sentient being consists of the five aggregates of form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*), and consciousness (*viññāna*). Supporters of “mental factors” claim that aside from *rūpa*, which is material and non-mental, and *viññāna*, which is consciousness itself, the other three *skandhas*, namely, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, are mental factors (*caitasika*) that are distinct from consciousness. Some even suggest that the aggregate *saṃskāra* is an umbrella category that includes all the mental factors that are not explicitly listed as *skandhas*. On the other hand, Harivarman and those teachers who reject the notion of “mental factors” deny that this is the correct understanding of the sūtra teaching of the five *skandhas*. Instead, they suggest that the sūtra teaching that a person consists of the five *skandhas* should be understood as denoting that a person is a continuous series of moments of consciousness (*santati*), and the *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are all consciousness (*viññāna*) in different modes.¹

These arguments contained in the TatSid are sophisticated and logically well formulated in the context of the concerns of Buddhist teachers at the time. However, how should we, as modern readers two thousand years after the compilation of the texts, read and understand them? What are the possible causes that have led to the competing different models of mind and to the different understanding of the sūtras? The following section (4.2) offers three possible causes for the dispute from historical, doctrinal, and psychological perspectives respectively.

¹ This example is extracted from TatSid 65.3 and 67.2. See 3.4.1 for a more detailed discussion.

4.2 Possible Causes for the Dispute

4.2.1 The Ontological Shift from Sūtra to Abhidharma

Scholars have noticed that the early sūtras and the relatively later Abhidharma texts have different emphases in their concerns:² the teachings in the sūtras are more focused on understanding *how* a person is a person in terms of the causal relations among mental phenomena, and they have minimal concern, or even dismiss the ontological question of *what* these phenomena really are. But the later Abhidharma, especially as developed in the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda traditions, has a strong emphasis on the ontological status of such mental phenomena and develop notions such as “self nature” (*svabhāva*) and “real entity” (*dravya*) that reflect these ontological concerns. It is helpful to understand the origin of the discrepancy between the two opinions regarding “mental factors” and the debate between them in the general background of the shifting concerns between the early stage of Buddhism represented in the sūtras and the later stage represented by the Abhidharma texts.

In a number of sūtras, ontological questions such as “Is the world eternal?” “Is the world infinite?” “Does a person exist after death?” “Is there a s/Self?” and so forth,³ are dismissed and left unanswered because thinking about such questions is said to be “unbeneficial, irrelevant to the fundamentals of the holy life, and does not lead to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to nirvāṇa.”⁴ Hence, the sūtras suggest that one should not indulge in these questions. In the case of the mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, there is never an explicit ontological question, such as “what is the nature of feeling (*vedanā*)?” and so forth. Instead, these mental phenomena are always described as a part of causal processes. For example, in the case of feeling (*vedanā*), the sūtras never specify its nature or indicate whether it is the same as or different from consciousness. Instead, *vedanā* is often defined as the three kinds of feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) that lead to craving (*trṣṇā*), or as the products of the contact between the six senses and their objects. Also

² For example, Bronkhorst 2009:61-114; Ronkin 2005.

³ These are the “undetermined” (*avyākata*) questions, for example, S IV 374ff. See Collins 1982: 131-8.

⁴ S II 223: *na hetam, āvuso, atthasamhitam nātibrahmacariyakam na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya samvattati*. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi 2000: 680).

regarding the five *skandhas*, as Sue Hamilton (1996: xxiv) observes, the “analysis of the human being into five *khandhas* is not an analysis of what the human being consists of, but of those processes or events with which one is constituted that one needs to understand in order to achieve Enlightenment.” In other words, the mental phenomena are mentioned in the sūtras only because they are causally related to the human condition and religious practice, and not because the composers of the sūtras intended to establish an ontological system that exhaustively analyzes reality.

In contrast, it appears that Buddhist teachers engaged in the enterprise of Abhidharma were becoming more and more interested in exhaustive analysis and ontological issues. As mentioned in section 1.5, starting from the exegesis of the sūtras, early Buddhist teachers attempted to collect all the teachings from the sūtras and reorganize them according to certain principles. In the case of the mental phenomena scattered throughout the sūtras, Buddhist teachers first gathered them together, without concern for whether some items in the same list were actually the same by nature. The list in the Dhs provides a good example of this early type of list of mental phenomena (see 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 for the development of such lists). Over time, an attempt was made to eliminate repetition from the lists, which resulted in more condensed lists such as those in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, *Dharmaskandha*, and *Prakaranapāda*.⁵ Probably at the same time, the term *caitasika*, which was used in the sūtras as the simple adjective “mental” or a noun “mental state,” came to be used as a name for a class of dharmas that are different from consciousness (*citta*), and thereby constituting yet another class of dharmas. This can be described as an “ontological shift” in the development of Abhidharma: Abhidharma teachers such as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas were not only concerned with the causal relevance of the mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras in the context of religious practice, but also engaged in the analysis of the world and the mind into fundamental and “real” constituents that cannot be further analyzed. The lists of mental phenomena became a significant reflection of this enterprise. Hence, items in a list such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), and so forth, came to be regarded as real entities as “mental factors” (*caitasika*), and the Abhidharma analysis of

⁵ See the lists in 2.1.3.

mind became the analysis of the combination of these mental factors and their “association” (*samprayoga*) with consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*). Such a mapping of the structure of mind signifies the completion of an “ontological shift” from the practical concerns of the sūtras to the ontological concerns of the mature Abhidharma.

The origin of such an “ontological shift” in the development of Buddhist Abhidharma is still unclear. No matter how the ontological concern started, its consequence is significant: all extant Abhidharma traditions constructed ontological dharma systems that claim to represent an exhaustive analysis and classification of the world and all things in it including the mind along with all mental phenomena. However, such ontological dharma systems are not fully in accordance with the teachings in the sūtras because such concerns are alien to the sūtras, especially since, as mentioned above, an ontological quest of this kind is explicitly dismissed in the sūtras as unbeneficial for one’s practice and liberation. In this light, it is understandable that someone who claims that the teachings in the sūtras are the ultimate authority would no doubt reject the notions of “mental factors” and “association.” Therefore, it would appear that the development of the ontological concern in Abhidharma acted as a cause for the different theories of mind and the debates among the teachers subscribing to these different theories.

4.2.2 The Hermeneutical Gap

In TatSid chapters 60-67 studied in the present project, most of the arguments involve different interpretations of specific sūtra passages. Both sides of the dispute quote passages from early sūtras to support their doctrinal positions, and sometimes the same sūtra passage is used by both sides to argue for opposite positions. It is clear that the development of Abhidharma, especially the establishment of mature Abhidharma philosophical systems, is relatively later than the early sūtra materials.⁶ As a result, the Abhidharma teachers interpret early sūtra texts in a way that is not necessarily consistent

⁶ It should be noted that the extant sūtra collections are preserved and handed down by different traditions that also have their Abhidharma systems; thus, it is possible that some of the sūtra materials may have been influenced by Abhidharma thoughts both in their forms and their contents.

with the meaning of these texts in earlier periods. Hence, there is a “hermeneutical gap” between the early sūtra texts and the understanding of the sūtras espoused by Abhidharma teachers. This hermeneutical gap is another possible cause for the different positions in the dispute concerning “mental factors” and “association.” The following are two examples from the TatSid that demonstrate the “hermeneutical gap” and how it functions as a cause for doctrinal disputes.

Example 1.

In TatSid 60.12, Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that for a sentient being, internally there is the body with consciousness (*savijñāna kāya*), and externally there is name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*). Because this passage does not mention any mental factors (*caitasika*), Harivarman concludes that *caitasikas* do not exist. The opponent replies in 62.8-9 that “external name-and-form” (*bahirdhā nāma-rūpa*) should be understood as including all *caitasikas*. The TatSid does not explain why the opponent believes that *nāma-rūpa* includes all *caitasikas*, but in both the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Theravāda Abhidhamma, *nāma-rūpa* is interpreted as the five *skandhas*: *rūpa* is the *rūpaskandha*, and *nāma* represents the four non-material *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*. And in both of these two Abhidharma systems, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* represent all the *caitasikas*. Apparently, the opponent in 62.8-9 understands the sūtra passage in terms of the Abhidharma doctrine of the five *skandhas* and their equivalence to *nāma-rūpa*.

In 64.7, Harivarman states that the opponent’s interpretation of the sūtra passage regarding *nāma-rūpa* amounts to erroneous “speculation” (**saṃjñā-vikalpa*). Instead, one should understand *nāma-rūpa* as the objects (**ālambana*) of mind. Section 2.3.4 of this study demonstrated that this interpretation of *nāma-rūpa* accords well with the explanation of the term in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, which suggests that *nāma-rūpa* represents the “blueprint” of an individual as the object of consciousness (*vijñāna*) in the context of dependent origination, which is constructed through “qualities (*ākāra*), traits (*liṅga*), signs (*nimitta*), and indicators (*uddesa*).” Harivarman’s understanding of *nāma-rūpa* as “object of mind” is more suitable in the context of the sūtras, while the opponent’s interpretation that *nāma-rūpa* is equivalent to the five

skandhas is out of that context and more influenced by the Abhidharma theories.

Example 2.

In 66.7, the opponent cites a sūtra passage that mentions the four “stations of consciousness” (*viññāna-sthiti*) to argue that this sūtra passage supports the position that consciousness coexists with other mental factors such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and so forth. The opponent suggests that the term “station” (*sthiti*) in this passage has an ontological connotation, and one should understand mental phenomena such as *vedanā* as “support stations” upon which consciousness is stationed. In 67.6, Harivarman responds that the opponent’s understanding of “station” as “support station” is wrong; instead, “station” should be understood as “object station” (**ālabhana-sthiti*), which means that consciousness takes *vedanā* as its object and is fixed or attached to it. Apparently, Harivarman’s interpretation of the term “station” (*sthiti*) has a more epistemological connotation.

However, in the same sūtra where the *viññāna-sthitis* are mentioned, a passage that describes the relationship between consciousness (*viññāna*) and the other four *skandhas* indicates that the term “station” (*sthiti*) may be better understood in this epistemological sense:⁷

Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged (*upaya*) with form; based upon form (*rūpārammaṇa*), established upon form (*rūpappatiṭṭha*), with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion...

In this sentence, the syntactic parallelism of the three phrases “engaged (*upaya*) with form,” “based upon form (*rūpārammaṇa*),” and “established upon form (*rūpappatiṭṭha*)” suggests a parallelism in function as well. In the phrase “established upon form” (*rūpappatiṭṭha*) the term *patiṭṭha* (Skt. **prasthita*) can be understood as glossing the term *sthiti* in *viññāna-sthiti*. Hence, both *upaya* and *ārammaṇa* should be understood as related

⁷ S no. 22.53, 54, 55 (III 53-58): *rūpupayaṃ, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya. vedanupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya ... pe ... saññupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya ... pe ... saṅkhārupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, saṅkhārārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya.* Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000: 890-4).

to *sthiti*. Because *upaya* (in Sanskrit sources *upaga*) means “grasping” according to Chinese sources, and *ārammaṇa* also has the meaning of an epistemic “basis,” these two terms indicate that the *sthiti* in the *viññāna-sthiti* more likely has an epistemological rather than an ontological connotation in this passage. Thus Harivarman’s interpretation of *viññāna-sthiti* may be closer to the meaning of the term in its early sūtra context.

These two examples from the TatSid regarding interpretations of sūtra passages demonstrate the “hermeneutical gap” between the understanding of earlier sūtra texts and later Abhidharma doctrines. Sometimes Abhidharma teachers use their Abhidharma doctrines in their understanding of the passages from early sūtras, while other teachers, like Harivarman in these two examples, adopt an understanding that appears more consistent with the sūtra passage itself. Of course in their debates both sides would claim that their understanding is the correct and “original,” or “intended” teaching of the Buddha. Therefore, it would be understandable that the “hermeneutical gap” led to different doctrinal positions and debates among the teachers.

4.2.3 The Experiential Gap

Finally, it should be noted the debate between Harivarman and his opponents is about the subject of mind, which is something that everybody experiences every day. Even today modern disciplines of science such as psychology, cognitive science, and neural science that take mind as their subject still cannot fully understand what mind is or precisely how it works. Buddhist theories of mind are in large part based on the experience of introspection, or knowledge from the observation of one’s own mind. It is true that some theories are based on the teachings in the sūtras, but for Buddhists the sūtras also are records of the Buddha’s experiences; hence, all knowledge about mind in Buddhism is considered to come ultimately from introspection. However, knowledge that is based on introspection is inevitably subject to interpretation and may not reflect what is really happening. Thus, there is a gap between what we consciously experience and what is really happening in the mind, which might be designated as the “experiential gap.” And from this gap between what is experienced and what actually happens in the mind a

variety of interpretations of the mind and its activities arise. This process also helps to explain the centrality of debates over the veracity of different theories of mind proposed by various Buddhist teachers.

Many examples can be offered to illustrate the limit of introspection as a reliable source of our knowledge of mind. Jay Garfield (2011: 19) points out that most of us with normal eyesight have an experience that our entire visual field is colored, but in fact only the central 10% of the visual field is equipped with the proper cells for distinguishing colors, while the remaining 90% is black and white. The experience of the whole visual field as colored is actually “filled-in” by our mind, but this process of “filling-in” is beyond the scope of introspection: none of us would know that most of our visual field is actually black and white before modern biology revealed it to us. Thus, introspection may not be capable of providing reliable knowledge of even the very basic process of perception. Regarding the arising of feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*) after contact (*sparśa*), it is not surprising that three different descriptions of the same cognitive process are presented in the sūtras as demonstrated in 3.4.3:

Version 1: feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*) arise together (*sahajāta*) with contact (*sparśa*).

Version 2: dependent on *sparśa*, there is feeling (*vedanā*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is apperception (*saṃjñā*); dependent on *sparśa*, there is volition (*cetanā*). It is unclear from the sūtra passage whether these mental phenomena occur simultaneously.

Version 3: dependent on *sparśa*, there is feeling (*vedanā*); dependent on *vedanā*, there is volition (*cetanā*) or craving (*tṛṣṇā*).

These three descriptions of the same cognitive process do not reflect simply a textual issue but also reveal a deeply rooted “experiential gap,” namely, between what we can learn from introspection and what actually happens in the mind. If certain and unambiguous knowledge of mind were available through introspection, such variations in the texts regarding the cognitive process would be less likely. Certainly, disciplines such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind have much to contribute

that would engage Buddhist theories of mind, but such a comparative discussion of theories of the mind and mental processes are beyond the textual, historical, and doctrinal scope of the present study.

4.2.4 Other Possible Causes of the Dispute

Aside from the aforementioned three possible causes for the dispute on mind among Buddhist teachers, there are also other factors that may have contributed to the formation of different theories and stimulated the teachers to engage in debates.

First of all, debate appears to have been an important method of education and learning in Buddhist community from its very beginning. The sūtras record numerous occasions when the Buddha teaches his students in a heuristic way, or his disciples learn from each other in the question-and-answer style. The most notable examples are the *Mahāvedalla* and *Cūḷavedalla* suttas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* (nos. 43 and 44). According to Seishi Karashima (Karashima 2015: 136-7), the term *vedalla* might originally have represented an “unusual” or “irregular” type of sūtras that records the questions and answers of the Buddha’s disciples and then became one of the nine or twelve limbs (*aṅga*) of Buddhist teachings (*dharma/dhamma*). In later times, these *aṅgas* were in some way understood as genres of Buddhist scriptures, and the *vedalla aṅga* might have been a source of Abhidharma.⁸ Therefore, it would be natural to understand the style of question-and-answer as an integral component both in Abhidharma literature and in Buddhist monastic education. The debate tradition preserved in the Tibetan monastic education system may be a good example of this old tradition.⁹ So the disputes recorded in the TatSid may have been the product of such debates held in the Buddhist monasteries of the time, and compilers of Abhidharma texts such as Harivarman recorded these debates so that they could be used in the teaching and training of their students. This is also the likely reason for Kumārajīva’s translation of the TatSid. Furthermore, such debates among teachers provided an active and creative intellectual milieu, which made possible the interaction among different opinions and doctrinal synthesis. Records of

⁸ See the discussion of the origins of Abhidharma in section 1.5.

⁹ For a good description of the Tibetan debate training, see Dreyfus 2003: 195ff.

different teachers and their positions in the MVŚ provide a vivid picture of the competitive intellectual milieu of the period, and the AKBh and the TatSid are two good examples of doctrinal innovation and synthesis within such a milieu.

Moreover, debates may also occur for reasons other than pure intellectual or educational concerns. As a social and historical institution, the Buddhist community could not exist without proper financial and political support. In other words, debates among teachers within the Buddhist community, or with non-Buddhist teachers may also have served the purpose of winning support or patronage. There are abundant examples in Buddhist history. An early example is the Pāli record of the third council held in the Pāṭaliputra, where the so-called Vibhajyavādins won over all other teachers of different “heretical” doctrinal positions and, with the support of the king, expelled 60,000 non-Vibhajyavādins from the community.¹⁰ This account of the council might be an over-exaggeration reflecting a sectarian-biased perspective, but no doubt there is a certain element of truth regarding the role of political authorities in doctrinal debates. Xuanchang’s biography of Harivarman also records a debate between Harivarman and a Vaiśeṣika teacher (see 1.3.1). Hence, in this respect, we cannot rule out the possibility that the debates recorded in the TatSid reflect the influence of their sociopolitical and economic environments, but again this is beyond the scope of the present study.

¹⁰ Lamotte 1988a: 272-4 summarizes the Pāli accounts of this council.

4.3 Final Notes

The present study examined chapters 60-67 in the TatSid, and investigated the dispute between the supporters of the “mental factor” (*caitasika*) and “association” (*samprayoga*) theory of mind and those such as Harivarman who rejected this theory. More than fifty arguments from both parties were carefully read and analyzed, and parallels or similar positions were identified in extant Abhidharma texts. A comparison of the arguments and positions in these various Abhidharma texts suggests a probable course of historical development for these doctrines. Moreover, among the more than forty sūtra passages quoted in these arguments for which parallels were identified in the Chinese *Āgamas* and Pāli *Nikāyas*, eight of these passages were found to have differences between the Chinese and Pāli versions.¹¹ In seven of these cases, the TatSid follows a version similar to Chinese versions, which suggests that Harivarman and his opponents were likely sharing a textual lineage related to the Sarvāstivāda tradition. These textual, philological, and historical investigations shed new light on the brief arguments in the TatSid and reveal historical connections not fully recognized in previous scholarship. Further, the TatSid provides invaluable valuable first-hand evidence of an important period in the historical development of Buddhist texts as well as of the doctrines contained in these texts. The doctrinal topics selected for its chapter divisions and the arguments that it presents record the issues that were current in the 4th century CE as well as the variety of previous Abhidharma positions on these issues. Further, Harivarman’s critical evaluation of these positions indicates the direction in which later Indian scholastic investigations will proceed. Through an analysis of the arguments regarding *caitasika* and *samprayoga* in the TatSid, this study demonstrates that some of the later Abhidharma teachers are more concerned with the ontological status of mental phenomena, while Harivarman appears to be resistant to this “ontological shift.” Furthermore, this study also reveals how textual issues, such as different versions of a sūtra passage or different interpretations of the same passage, can be correlated with different doctrinal positions among Abhidharma teachers. These are all good examples of the “hermeneutical gap” between early sūtras and later Abhidharma teachers and doctrines. In this respect, the TatSid is a great textual

¹¹ See 1.4.5 for a summary of these differences in the sūtra passages.

treasure worthy of serious scholarly consideration that preserves invaluable historical information regarding the development of early Buddhist texts and doctrines.

The present study is concerned with only eight chapters (60-67) out of the seventeen (60-76) in the section on mind in the *TatSid*, and, given the limits of time, other important issues such as the multiplicity and momentariness of mind and the possibility of multiple consciousnesses occurring simultaneously have not been investigated. Taken as a whole, the various issues presented in Harivarman's *TatSid* represent virtually the entirety of early Buddhist investigations of the mind and would provide the basis for a comprehensive study of early Buddhist theories of mind. Hopefully, this study will draw more attention to the *TatSid* than it has previously received, especially to its value as a textual source for studies of early Buddhism.

Chapter 5. Annotated Translation of Chapters 60-67 of the **Tattvasiddhi*

T1646.p274c18

苦諦聚識論中立無數品第六十

Chapter 60. Proving the Non-existence of *caitasikas*

60.1 心意識體一而異名。若法能緣。是名為心。

Citta, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are the same in nature but different by name. If a dharma can take objects (**ālambana*), it is named *citta*.¹

60.2 問曰。若爾則受想行等諸心數法。亦名為心。俱能緣故。

[Opponent] challenges: If this is the case, then mental factors (*caitasika*) such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*) should all be named *citta* because they all can take objects.

60.3 答曰。受想行等。皆心差別名。如道品中。一念五名。念處。念根。念力。念覺。正念。精進等亦如是。又一無漏慧。而有苦習智等種種別名。又一定法。亦名為禪解脫除入。如是心一。但隨時故。得差別名。故知但是一心。

[Harivarman's] answer: feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*), and so forth, are all names for different [modes] of *citta* (**citta-viśeṣa*). For example, in the [thirty-seven] factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipāṅṣikā dharmā*), mindfulness (*smṛti*) as one [dharma] has five names: application of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna*), the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), the power of mindfulness (*smṛti-bala*), the awakening factor of mindfulness (*smṛti-sambodhyaṅga*), and right mindfulness (*saṃyāk-smṛti*). In the same way, energy (*vīrya*), and so forth, [also have multiple names]. Moreover, the taintless insight (*anāsrava-prajñā*) as one [dharma] has various alternative names such as the knowledge of suffering (*duḥkha-jñāna*), the

¹ This definition of *citta* is similar to the one given in the Dhs-a 112: *ārammaṇaṃ cintetī ti cittaṃ ti*. No parallel has been located in the northern Abhidharma texts.

knowledge of origination (*samudaya-jñāna*), and so forth. Moreover, concentration (*samādhi*) as one dharma is also called absorption (*dhyāna*), liberation (*vimukti*), and the basis of victory (*abhibhvāyantana*). In the same manner, *citta* as one [dharma], depending on different occasions, obtains various names. Therefore, one knows that [*vedanā*, and so forth,] are all the same *citta*.

60.4 所以者何。如經中說是人欲漏心得解脫。有漏。無明漏心得解脫。若別有心數。應說心數得解脫。

Why? As it is said in the sūtra, “Such and such a person’s mind is liberated from the taint of sensual desire (*kāma*), the taint of existence (*bhava*), and the taint of ignorance (*avidyā*).”² If there are *caitasikas* aside from [*citta*], the sūtras should also say that the *caitasikas* are liberated.

60.5 又經中說。佛若知眾生歡喜心柔軟心調和心堪任得解脫。然後為說四真諦法。是中不說心數。

Moreover, as it is said in the sūtra, “When the Buddha knows that a sentient being’s mind is joyous, soft, tamed, and ready to be liberated, then he will teach him the Dharma of the four noble truths.”³ Here, the sūtra does not mention *caitasikas*.

60.6 又經中說。心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra, “When there is the defilement of mind (*cittasaṃkleśa*), there is the defilement of sentient beings (*sattvasaṃkleśa*); because of the purity of mind

² Passim throughout Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas. E.g. D I 84; M I 384; S V 72; A I 165: *kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati*. DĀ Taishō No. 01 長阿含經 (卷 13) T01, p86c6-7: 彼如是知。如是見。欲漏。有漏。無明漏。心得解脫。MĀ No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 1) T01, p425a3-4: 如是知。如是見。欲漏心解脫。有漏。無明漏心解脫。解脫已。便知解脫。SĀ No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 29) T02, p211b25-7: 如是知。如是見。欲有漏心解脫。有有漏心解脫。無明有漏心解脫。EĀ No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p600b 6-7: 彼如是觀已。欲漏心解脫。有漏心無明漏心得解脫。

³ E.g. Vin I 15-16; D I 110; M I 379-80; A IV 186: *yadā bhagavā aññāsi ... kallacittaṃ muducittaṃ vinīvaraṇacittaṃ udaggacittaṃ pasannacittaṃ, atha yā buddhānaṃ sāmukkamsikā dhammadesanā*. D II 41: *yadā te bhagavā aññāsi kallacitte muducitte vinīvaraṇacitte udaggacitte pasannacitte, atha yā buddhānaṃ sāmukkamsikā dhammadesanā*. No. 01 長阿含經 (卷 13) T01, p88a17-19: 世尊知婆羅門心已調柔。清淨。無垢。堪受道教。如諸佛常法。說苦聖諦。集聖諦。苦滅聖諦。苦出要諦。No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 9) T01, p479c27-480a1: 佛知彼有歡喜心。具足心。柔軟心。堪耐心。勝上心。一向心。無疑心。無蓋心。有能。有力堪受正法。謂如諸佛說正法要。世尊即為彼說苦。習。滅。道。

(*cittavyavadāna*), there is the purification of sentient beings (**sattvaviśuddhi*).⁴

60.7 又說。若比丘入四禪中。得清淨不動心。然後如實知苦聖諦集滅道諦。

It is also said [in the sūtra], “When a bhikṣu enters the fourth *dhyāna*, and attains the purified, unmovable mind, then [he] knows as it is (*yathābhūta*) the noble truths of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.”⁵

60.8 又十二因緣中。說行緣識。

Moreover, in the twelve-linked dependent origination, it is said that conditioned by volitional formation (*saṃskāra*) there is consciousness (*viññāna*).

60.9 又說六種為人。

It is also said that the six elements (*dhātu*) make up a human being.⁶

60.10 又說輕躁易轉無過於心。

It is also said that nothing is more easily changing (**laghu-parivarta*) than mind.⁷

⁴ S III 151: *cittasaṃkilesā, bhikkhave, sattā saṃkilissanti; cittavodānā sattā visujjhanti*. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 10) T02, p69c10-15: 諸比丘。當善思惟觀察於心。所以者何。長夜心為貪欲使染。瞋恚愚癡使染故。比丘。心惱故眾生惱。心淨故眾生淨。 *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* ch.3 (<http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/4147>): *bhagavānavocāt “cittasaṃkleśena sattvasaṃkleśaḥ; cittavyavadānena viśuddhir” itī*.

⁵ E.g. Vin III 5; D I 83-4; M I 348: *so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyoḍāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneṅjappatte āsavānaṃ khayañāṅāya cittaṃ abhinīharatī abhininnāmeti. so idaṃ dukkhanti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhanirodhoti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadāti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 4) T01, p444c5-10: 彼已斷此五蓋。心穢。慧羸。離欲。離惡不善之法。至得第四禪成就遊。彼得如是定。心清淨。無穢無煩。柔軟善住。得不動心。趣向漏盡智通作證。彼便知此苦如真。知此苦習。知此苦滅。知此苦滅道如真。

⁶ 種 is an old translation of *dhātu*. Later translations usually use 界. E.g. M III 239: *cha dhāturo ayaṃ, bhikkhu, puriso ... pathavīdhātu, āpodhātu, tejodhātu, vāyodhātu, ākāśadhātu, viññādhātu*. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 3) T01, p435c21-3: 云何六界法。我所自知。自覺為汝說。謂地界。水。火。風。空。識界。是謂六界法。我所自知。自覺為汝說也。以六界合故。便生母胎。No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 42) T01, p690b27-8: 比丘。人有六界聚。此說何因。謂地界。水界。火界。風界。空界。識界。No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 29) T02, p710b13-6: 彼云何名為六界之法。比丘當知。六界之人稟父母精氣而生。云何為六。所謂地界。水界。火界。風界。空界。識界。是謂。比丘。有此六界。AKBh p.24.11-2 quotes a sūtra named *Gārbhavakrānti* 入胎經: “*ṣaḍdhāturayaṃ bhikṣo puruṣa*” itī *gārbhavakrāntau maulasatvadravyasaṃdarśanārtham*. Also No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 56) T30, p609a27-8: 雖復經言如是六界說名士夫。然密意說故無過失。

⁷ No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 4) T02, p562c3-4, 11-12: 爾時。世尊告諸比丘。我不見一法疾於心者。無譬可喻。猶如獼猴捨一取一。心不專定。心亦如是。A I 10: *nāhaṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ ekadhammam pi samanupassāmiyaṃ evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathayidaṃ cittaṃ yāvañ c' idaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukaraṃ yāva lahuparivattaṃ cittaṃ ti*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 180) T27, p902c10-12: 如世尊說。苾芻當知。我不見一法速疾迴轉猶如心者。所以者何。心速疾迴轉難作譬喻。是故汝等應學善知心善知心迴轉。

60.11 又經中說使詣城主。語其事實。語已還去。主名為心。

It is also said in the sūtra that a messenger approaches the lord of a city and tells him about the matter, and leaves after delivering the message. The lord is referred to as the mind.⁸

60.12 又說內有識身。外有名色。是名為二。又但說有識身。不說有心數。

It is also said that internally there is the body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*), externally there is name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*); this is referred to as the dyad.⁹ And [the sūtra] only mentions the body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*), [and] never mentions the existence of *caitasikas*.

60.13 又說三事合故名觸。若有心數。不名為三。而實說三。故知但心無別心數。

It is also said that the coming together of three things is referred to as contact (*sparśa*).¹⁰ If there were *caitasikas*, [the number] should not be referred to as three. But in fact it

⁸ The simile is in S IV 194-5, which corresponds to No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 43) T02, p0315c19-316a5: 譬如有邊國王。善治城壁。門下堅固。交道平正。於四城門置四守護。悉皆聰慧。知其來去。當其城中。有四交道。安置床榻。城主坐上。若東方使來。問守門者。城主何在。彼即答言。主在城中四交道頭。床上而坐。彼使聞已。往詣城主。受其教令。復道而還。南。西。北方遠使來人。問守門者。城主何在。彼亦答言。在其城中四交道頭。彼使聞已。悉詣城主。受其教令。各還本處。佛告比丘。我說斯譬。今當說義。所謂城者。以譬人身羸色。如篋毒蛇譬經說。善治城壁者。謂之正見。交道平正者。謂內六入處。四門者。謂四識住。四守門者。謂四念處。城主者。謂識受陰。使者。謂正觀。如實言者。謂四真諦。復道還者。以八聖道。The MVŚ also quotes this simile: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 180) T27, p903a11-2: 復次心名城主如契經說。言城主者即有取識。

⁹ SĀ no. 294, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 12) T02, p83c24-6: 愚癡無聞凡夫無明覆。愛緣繫得此識身。如是內有識身。外有名色。此二緣生六觸入處。 A Sanskrit fragment of this sūtra reads (Tripāṭhī 1962: 140-44): *avidyayā nivṛtasya bālasya tṛṣṇayā saṃyuktasyaivam ayam bālasyaśrutavataḥ pṛthagjanasya savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ samudāgataḥ. ity ayañ cāsya savijñānakaḥ kāyo bahirdhā ca nāmarūpam. evaṃ dvayam. Pāli S no. 12.19, II 23-4: avijñānīvaraṇassa bhikkhave bālassa tanhāya sampayuttassa evam ayam kāyo samudāgato / iti ayam ceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpam, itthetaṃ dvayaṃ. Note that both the Chinese and Sanskrit versions have *savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ* while Pāli has only *kāyo*. Also the Chinese has “internally” (**ādhyātmika* 內) which is absent in both Sanskrit and Pāli. It is likely that the sūtra quoted by Harivarman is very close to the Chinese SĀ. Saṅghabhadra quotes the sūtra identical to the version quoted here by Harivarman. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 29) T29, p505a18-9: 謂契經說。內有識身。及外名色。二二為緣。諸觸生起。乃至廣說。 See 2.3.4 for the discussion of the doctrinal significance with regard to 62.8-9 and 64.7.*

¹⁰ This is the standard definition of contact (*sparśa* P. *phassa*) in the sūtras. E.g. SĀ no. 273, T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p72c9-10: 三事和合觸。觸俱生受。想。思。MI 111: *cakkuñcāvuso, paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññāṇam, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā*. However, as Harivarman records in TatSid chapter 85 on *sparśa*, there is an alternative version of this passage: No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c21-3: 又經中有二種觸。一三事和合觸。二三事和合故觸。故知觸有二種。一有自體。二是假名。The alternative reading occurs only in the Chinese SĀ, e.g. SĀ no. 68, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 3) T02, p18a10-12: 緣眼及色眼識生。三事和合生觸。Vasubandhu also records the two versions of the definition of *sparśa* in the AKBh p.143.20-23. This is another example that sectarian doctrinal positions may influence texts. See the discussion of this issue in 2.3.5.

only mentions three. Therefore, one knows that there are no *caitasikas* aside from *citta*.

立有數品第六十一

Chapter 61. Proving the Existence of *caitasikas*

61.1 問曰。心異心數法異。所以者何。心心數法共相應故。若無心數則無相應。而實有相應。故知有心數法。

[Opponent] challenges: *Citta* and *caitasika* are different. Why? Because *citta* and *caitasikas* are associated with each other. If *caitasikas* do not exist, then there is no association. As in fact there is association, therefore, one knows that *caitasikas* exist.

61.2 汝意若謂心與餘心相應。是事不然。所以者何。經中說心獨行遠逝寢藏無形。是中但遮同性。雖與心數共行。猶名為獨行。如說比丘獨處雖有虫獸。以無類故。亦名獨處。故知心不與餘心相應。而實有相應。故知有數。

Your opinion is that if a *citta* associates with another *citta*, such a thesis is not correct. Why? The *sūtra* says that *citta* travels alone, departs far away, lies and hides itself, and has no form.¹¹ Here, it only excludes [the association of things] of the same nature. Although [*citta*] is accompanied by *caitasikas*, still it is said to be travelling alone. In the same manner, although there are animals and beasts, still it is said that a *bhikṣu* dwells alone. Because there are no [other beings] of the same kind, he is referred to as alone. Therefore, one knows that a *citta* does not associate with another *citta*, but there is in fact association [with *caitasikas*]. Therefore, one knows that *caitasikas* exist.

61.3 又心七界一入一陰所攝。心數法一界一入三陰所攝。

Moreover, *citta* is included in seven *dhātus*, one *āyatana*, and one *skandha*. *Caitasikas* are included in one *dhātu*, one *āyatana*, and three *skandhas*.¹²

¹¹ DhP verse no. 37.

¹² Katsura (1974: 135n*) points out that the MVŚ and AKBh have the same classifications. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b22-4: 問相應因以何為自性。答一切心心所法。即攝三蘊一蘊少分。一處一處少分。七界一界少分。No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 8) T26, p723c27: 心法七界一處一蘊攝。... p723c29-724a1: 心所法一界一處三蘊攝。AKBh p.11.17-8: *vedanādayaḥ skandhāstrāyo 'vijñaptirasamskṛtāni ca dharmāyatanaṃ dharmadhātus ca vijñānaskandho māna-āyatanaṃ ṣaḍ avijñānadhātavo manodhātus ceti*. Basically *citta* belongs to the *vijñāna-skandha*, the *mana-āyatana*, and the six *vijñāna-dhātus* plus the *mano-dhātu*; and *caitasikas* belong to the *vedanā*, the *saṃjñā*, and the *saṃskāra* three *skandhas*, the *dharma-āyatana* and the *dharma-dhātu*.

61.4 又心是依處。數法依止。如經中說是心數法皆依心行。

Moreover, *citta* is the basis (**āśraya*), on which *caitasikas* depend. As it is said in the *sūtra*, *caitasikas* all function depending on *citta*.¹³

61.5 又若無心數則無五陰。是則不可。

Moreover, if there were no *caitasikas*, there would not be five *skandhas*.¹⁴ This is unacceptable.

61.6 又此二生異。從二生心。從三生數。如經中說。因眼緣色。生眼識。三事和合名觸。觸因緣生受。

Moreover, these two, [namely, *citta* and *caitasika*,] arise differently. The arising of *citta* is from two [things], while the arising of *caitasikas* is from three [things]. As it is said in the *sūtra*, “Depending on the eye, regarding the object of form, there arises eye-consciousness. The coming together of the three things is called contact (*sparsā*). Depending on contact there arises feeling (*vedanā*).”¹⁵

61.7 又說。名色集故識集。觸集故受集。

It is also said that from the origination of name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) there is the origination of consciousness (*vijñāna*), and from the origination of contact (*sparsā*) there

¹³ This is likely a passage from SĀ no.568, T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 21) T02, p150a29-b2: 想。思是意行。依於心。屬於心。依心轉。是故想。思是意行。S IV 293: *saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhammā cittapaṭibaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro ti*. In this passage, the term *cetasika* is ambiguous: it can be understood as an adjective meaning “belonging to *citta*” but also can be interpreted as a noun meaning “mental factor.” Clearly here, Harivarman’s opponent takes the latter interpretation, which makes this *sūtra* passage an āgama or scriptural authority for his position. It should be noted that this passage is attributed to the elder bhikṣu 伽摩 (Pāli *Kāmaḥhū*) and not to the Buddha himself. In a quote in the T1555 **Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, this passage was attributed to *Kauṣṭhila* (俱胝羅) instead of *Kāmaḥhū*. T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a26-7: 又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心起屬心。Mizuno Kōgen (1964: 218) proposes that this passage belongs to a relatively later stratum of the *sūtra* materials and has already been influenced by the emerging Abhidharma theories during the compilation of the Nikāya/Āgama.

¹⁴ Three *skandhas*—*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are *caitasikas*. If there were no *caitasikas*, then there should be only two *skandhas*: *rūpa* and *vijñāna*.

¹⁵ This is the same *sūtra* passage quoted in 60.13. There, Harivarman uses this passage to argue that in this description of the cognitive process the *sūtra* does not mention *caitasika*, and, if there were *caitasikas*, it should not state that the coming together of three things (the eye, the object, and the consciousness) is *sparsā*; there should be more than three.

is the origination of feeling (*vedanā*).¹⁶

61.8 又心數法與所依相應。同共一緣。在一世中。心不如是。以是差別。故知心異心數法異。

Moreover, *caitasikas* associate with what they depend upon: [those things] which have the same object, and [those things] which are present at the same time.¹⁷ This is not the case with *citta*. Because of these differences [between *caitasikas* and *citta*], one knows that *citta* and *caitasikas* are different.

61.9 又四依中說。依智不依識。智若是識。云何言依。故知智非識也。

Moreover, in the [teaching of] the four reliances (*pratisaraṇa*), [it is said that one should] rely on knowledge (*jñāna*) instead of consciousness (*vijñāna*).¹⁸ If knowledge is [itself] consciousness, how can it be said to be relied on? Therefore, one knows that knowledge is not consciousness.

61.10 又佛自說心數法名。謂從心生。依止心故。名為心數。

Moreover, the Buddha himself mentions the term *caitasika*, stating that, because [they] are born from *citta* and depend on *citta*, they are called *caitasikas*.¹⁹

¹⁶ Here, the opponent is quoting the links in the formula of dependent origination as given in the sūtras. I follow Katsura's translation here (1974: 135). Also, Katsura points out that the order of *nāma-rūpa* and *vijñāna* is different from the standard twelve-linked dependent origination formula. However, there are sūtras that emphasize the mutually inter-dependent relationship between these two links, e.g. the *Mahānidāna Sutta* in the *Dīghanikāya* (D II 55).

¹⁷ This is part of the standard Abhidharma definition of association (*samprayoga*). See the discussion in chapter 5 on association.

¹⁸ According to Étienne Lamotte (1988b) the four *pratisaraṇas* are from the *Catuhpratisaraṇasūtra*, a relatively late sūtra that appears to exist only in Sanskrit and Chinese, and is quoted in the AK-vy p.174: *catvārīmāni bhikṣavaḥ pratisaraṇāni. katamāni catvāri. dharmāḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na pudgalaḥ. arthaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na vyaṃjanaṃ. nīṭārthasūtraṃ pratisaraṇaṃ. na neyārthaṃ. jñānaṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na vijñānaṃ iti*. They are also mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts such as the AKBh and Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra*, the Mahāyāna *Parinirvānasūtra*, as well as the **Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* attributed to Nāgārjuna. No. 374 大般涅槃經 (卷 6) T12, p401b27-9: 如佛所說是諸比丘當依四法。何等為四。依法不依人。依義不依語。依智不依識。依了義經不依不了義經。also (卷 6) T12, p0642a. No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 9) T25, p125a: 如佛欲入涅槃時。語諸比丘從今日應依法不依人。應依義不依語。應依智不依識。應依了義經不依未了義。 This is also found in other Mahāyāna sūtras like the No. 397 大方等大集經 (卷 29) T13, p205a; No. 310 大寶積經 (卷 82) T11, p478a, 638c-639a. See also La Vallée Poussin 1988: 1362n43. For the four reliances in the Abhidharma context, see Cox 1992a: 162-3. Also Katsura 1974: 135 footnote *****

¹⁹ There is no extant sūtra source that supports this claim. However, as noticed by Mizuno Kōgen (1964: 219), in an early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, the **Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, the author Dharmatrāta specifically notes that a quote regarding the teaching of *caitasika* was from a "Sarvāstivāda sūtra" (薩他筏底契經). T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a24-7: 薩他筏底契經中言。復有思惟。諸心所法依心而起繫屬於心。又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思

61.11 又佛不說此義。唯獨有心。而無心數。他人亦可言但有數而無心。汝若以名字破數。我亦以名字破心。

Moreover, the Buddha's teachings do not have this meaning (**artha*), namely, “there is only *citta* and no *caitasika*.” [In the same manner,] some others may also say, “There is only *caitasika* and no *citta*.” If you refute *caitasika* on the basis of whether its name-word (**vyañjana*) [appears or does not appear in that sense in a given sūtra], I can also refute *citta* on the basis of [whether its] name-word [appears or does not appear in that sense in a given sūtra].²⁰

61.12 又所作異故。諸法相異。如水能浸漬。火能焚燒。如是受等所作異故。知有異相。

Moreover, dharmas are different from each other because they have different functions (**kriyā*). For example, water can soak, and fire can burn. In the same manner one knows that feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, have different characteristics because [they] have different functions.

61.13 又諸經中說。心中生覺。故知心數異心。不應心中自生心故。

Moreover, in the sūtras it is said that awareness arises within *citta*,²¹ therefore, one knows that *caitasikas* are different from *citta* because *citta* cannot give rise to [another] *citta* within itself.

說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心起屬心。This indicates that sūtra collections affiliated with different Buddhist groups may have differences, especially concerning passages that were important for certain doctrinal points. Also AKBh p.24.13-4: “*sañjñā ca vedanā ca caitasika eṣa dharmāścittānvayāccittaniśrita*” *iti sūtre vacanāsarāgacittādi vacanācca*. See also the translation of 61.4 and its footnote.

²⁰ This argument is not clear to me. It might be that someone challenges the authority of the sūtras quoted to prove the teaching of *caitasika* and doubts they are from the Buddha himself. There is no sūtra accepted by all Buddhist groups that contains the term *caitasika* in the required sense. In other words, the text-proponent is trying to refute *caitasika* by pointing out that in the sūtras the term *caitasika* is not a name for “mental factors.” Hence, the supporter of *caitasikas* counteracts by saying that if you challenge my understanding of the term *caitasika* in the sūtras, I can also challenge the way you understand the term *citta*.

²¹ Katsura (1974: 136) translates 覺 as “awareness.” I am not sure what sūtra passage is quoted here. I suspect here Kumārajīva is translating the phrase “*vedanaṃ vedayati*,” because *vedanā* is always the first example of *caitasika* to be mentioned (e.g. 61.12, 62.1). E.g. S IV 208: *so sukhaṃ ce vedanaṃ vedayati, saññutto naṃ vedayati. dukkhaṃ ce vedanaṃ vedayati, saññutto naṃ vedayati*.

61.14 又如說心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。若但是心。則垢淨無因。是人不以無明故垢。慧明故淨。應自垢自淨。此則不可。是故有心數法。

Moreover, as you have said,²² because of the defilement of mind (*cittasamkleśa*), there is the defilement of a sentient being (*sattvasamkleśa*); because of the purity of mind (*cittavyavadāna*), there is the purification of a sentient being (**sattvaviśuddhi*). If there is only *citta*, then defilement and purification have no causes. Such a person should not be defiled because of ignorance (*avidyā*) [and] should not be pure because insight (*prajñā*) is clear but should be defiled or pure [by *citta*] itself. This is not acceptable. Therefore, there are *caitasikas*.²³

²² The same sūtra passage is quoted by Harivarman in the previous chapter. See 60.6.

²³ According to proponents of *caitasika*, whether or not a *citta* is defiled or purified depends on the type of *caitasikas* with which *citta* is associated. When *citta* is associated with defilements (*kleśa*), it is defiled; when it is associated with wholesome (*kuśala*) *caitasikas* such as insight (*prajñā*) and free from defilements, it is purified. Therefore, according to supporters of *caitasikas*, without *caitasikas*, there would be no defilement and purification of mind.

非無數品第六十二

Chapter 62. Refuting the Non-existence of *caitasika*

62.1 汝雖言能緣法名心。心差別名數。如道品中說。是事不然。所以者何。經中說。心相異。心數相異。能識是識相。覺苦樂是受相。別知是想相。起作是行相。故知心異心數亦異。

Even though you have said that that which can take objects is called *citta*, and different [modes] of *citta* are called *caitasikas* as in the case of [those dharmas] mentioned in the *bodhipakṣa* dharmas, this is not correct.²⁴ Why? It is said in the sūtra, *citta* and *caitasikas* have different characteristics (**lakṣaṇa*). To cognize (*viñānāti*) is the characteristic of *viñāna*; to experience (*vedayati*) the unpleasant and pleasant is the characteristic of feeling (*vedanā*); to perceive (*saññānāti*) is the characteristic of apperception (*saññā*); to initiate action (*abhisamkaroti*) is the characteristic of [volitional] formation (*samskāra*).²⁵ Therefore, *citta* and *caitasikas* are different.

62.2 汝言心得解脫。是亦不然。餘經中說。離無明故。慧得解脫。不但說心得解脫。You said *citta* attains liberation.²⁶ This is also not correct. In another sūtra it is said that insight (*prajñā*) attains liberation by removing ignorance (*avidyā*). [The sūtras] do not only claim that *citta* attains liberation.²⁷

²⁴ See 60.1-3.

²⁵ These are the definitions of the four non-material *skandhas* given in the sūtra. SĀ no. 46, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p11c1-11: 諸覺相是受受陰。何所覺。覺苦。覺樂。覺不苦不樂。是故名覺相是受受陰。復以此受受陰是無常。苦。變易。諸想是想受陰。何所想。少想。多想。無量想。都無所有。作無所有想。是故名想受陰。復以此想受陰是無常。苦。變易法。為作相是行受陰。何所為作。於色為作。於受。想。行。識為作。是故為作相是行受陰。復以此行受陰是無常。苦。變易法。別知相是識受陰。何所識。識色。識聲。香。味。觸。法。是故名識受陰。復以此識受陰是無常。苦。變易法。S III 86: *vedayatīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'vedanā'ti vuccati... saññānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'saññā'ti vuccati... saṅkhatamabhisamkharontīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'saṅkhārā'ti vuccati... viñānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'viñāṇan'ti vuccati.*

²⁶ See 60.4.

²⁷ Here, the supporters of *caitasika* apparently refer to the two kinds of liberation: liberation of mind (*cetovimukti*) and liberation by insight (*prajñāvimukti*). SĀ no. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 26) T02, p190b17-19: 離貪欲者心解脫。離無明者慧解脫。若彼比丘離貪欲。心解脫。得身作證。離無明。慧解脫。AI 61: *rāgupakkiliṭṭhaṃ vā, bhikkhave, cittaṃ na vimuccati, avijjupakkiliṭṭhā vā paññā bhāvīyati. iti kho, bhikkhave, rāgavirāgā cetovimutti, avijjāvirāgā pajñāvimutti.* It should be noted that here both Harivarman and the opponent interpret *prajñāvimukti* as “liberation of insight.” However, some later Abhidharma texts interpret it as “liberation by insight.” Cf. AKBh p.381.4-5: ... *prajñāvimuktah. prajñābalena kevalaṃ kleśāvaraṇavimuktatvāt.* Gombrich (1997: 112) also understands it as “release by insight.” See the discussion of these two kinds of liberation in 2.3.2.

62.3 又以心勝故但說心。

Moreover, [the sūtras] mention only *citta* because *citta* is superior.²⁸

62.4 又世間人皆多識心。數法不爾。故佛偏說。

Moreover, because people in the world are more familiar with *citta*, and it is not the case for the *caitasikas*, therefore, the Buddha teaches more [about *citta*].

62.5 又佛經中有不盡語。此言是也。

Moreover, in the sūtras there are teachings that are that are non-exhaustive. The term *caitasika* is an example of this.

62.6 又如經說。汝等比丘。能斷一法。我保汝等得阿那含道。所謂貪欲。而實不偏斷。是事亦然。

Moreover, as it said in the sūtra, “Bhikṣus, if you can abandon one dharma, I guarantee you will reach the path of non-returner (*anāgāmin*). [This one dharma] is greed (*lobha*).”²⁹ But in fact [an *anāgāmin*] does not abandon only [greed]. [The thesis of inexhaustive teaching] is also the case regarding the *caitasikas*.

²⁸ The same argument appears in the MVŚ: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p548a13-5: 問何故名他心智。答知他心故名他心智。問此亦知他諸心所法。何故但名他心智耶 ... p548a26-7: 復次以心勝故雖亦知心所。但名他心智。如王來等。Also No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p395b20-1: 識於諸處有勝功能。非諸心所。是故偏說。

²⁹ No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 4) T02, p566b7-8: 爾時。世尊告諸比丘。當滅一法。我證卿等成阿那含。云何為一法。所謂貪欲。諸比丘。當滅貪欲。我證卿等得阿那含。The **Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* also quotes this passage to argue for *vitarka* and *vicāra*. No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 17) T25, p186a21-5: 如佛說若斷一法我證汝得阿那含。一法者。所謂慳貪。實應說五下分結盡得阿那含。云何言但斷一法。以是人慳貪偏多。諸餘結使皆從而生。是故慳盡餘結亦斷。No parallel for this sūtra has been found in Pāli. The *Dharmaskandha* begins a sūtra quotation with this passage, but it then adds a long list of negative mental factors as dharmas to be abandoned. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 9) T26, p494c3-15: 爾時世尊告苾芻眾。汝等若能永斷一法。我保汝等定得不還一法。謂貪若永斷者。我能保彼定得不還。如是瞋癡忿恨覆惱嫉慳誑諂無慚無愧慢過慢慢過慢慢我慢慢增上慢卑慢邪慢憍放逸傲憤發矯妄詭詐現相激磨以利求利惡欲大欲顯欲不喜足不恭敬起惡言樂惡友不忍耽嗜遍耽嗜染貪非法。貪著貪惡貪有身見有見無有見貪欲瞋恚沈睡眠掉舉惡作疑瞢憤不樂頻申欠呿食不調性心味劣性種種想不作意龐重軀突饕餮不和軟性不調柔性不順同類欲尋患尋害尋親里尋國土尋不死尋陵蔑尋假族尋愁苦憂擾惱。於此一法。若永斷者。我能保彼定得不還。Similarly in the *Itivṛtaka* translated by Xuanzang: No. 765 本事經 (卷 1) T17, p665aff. In the **Nyāyānusāra*, Saṅghabhadra quotes a similar sūtra passage, but the dharma to be abandoned is not *lobha*, but *saṅkāyadrṣṭi*: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 53) T29, p641b25-6: 又如經說。若斷一法。我能保汝得不還果。一法者。謂薩迦耶見。非唯斷此得不還果。

62.7 歡喜心等。皆以此答。

All such [sūtras as state, for example, that the Buddha knows beings’] joyous mind, and so forth, should also be answered in the same manner.³⁰

62.8 汝言內外二法。是亦不然。說外有名色。即說心數。以外入攝故名為外。

Your statement concerning the two dharmas as internal and external,³¹ this also is not correct. When it is said [in the sūtra] that there are external *nāma-rūpa*, it is equivalent to mentioning the *caitasikas*; [they] are called “external” because they are included in the external bases (*āyatana*).³²

62.9 又是中佛說三事。內有識身。即說識與根。外有名色。即是說塵。汝言說有識身。是亦不然。此經中說外一切相即是心數。

Moreover, in the passage in question the Buddha mentions three things: “the internal body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*)” is equivalent to saying consciousness (*viññāna*) together with the faculties (*indriya*); “external name-and-form” (*nāma-rūpa*) refers to [external] objects. You said [that the Buddha only] mentions the body with consciousness (*savijñānaka kāya*); it is not correct. “All external signs” (外一切相 *bahidhā sabbanimittā*) mentioned in the same sūtra³³ are *caitasikas*.³⁴

62.10 汝言三事和合名觸。是事不然。觸與受等心數作因。是故獨說。

You said that the coming together of three things is referred to as contact (*sparśa*).³⁵ This is not correct. Because contact functions as the cause for *caitasikas* such as feeling (*vedanā*), it is mentioned individually.³⁶

³⁰ See 60.5.

³¹ See 60.12.

³² This passage shows that the opponent is following a sūtra analyzing the internal-external dyad with the twelve *āyatanas*. But in the corresponding Pāli suttas (S no. 18.21-22, II 252-3), the dyad is analyzed as one’s own five *khandhas* and other beings’ *khandhas*. This is also related to the next paragraph 62.9. See the discussion in 2.3.4.

³³ Here, the sūtras quoted are SĀ no. 198-199 T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p50c7-51a14, which have no exact parallels in Pāli but corresponds to S no. 18.21, 22 (II 252-2); 22.71, 72 (III 79-80); 22.91, 92 (III 135-7); also passages in M no. 109 (III 18-9).

³⁴ More precisely it reads, “all external signs include *caitasikas*.”

³⁵ See 60.13.

³⁶ Here, the argument is that when the sūtra says that the coming together of three things, namely, the object, the sense faculty (*indriya*), and consciousness, is contact (*sparśa*), the occurrence of all other *caitasikas* is implied. Because

contact gives rise to feeling (緣觸生受 *phassapaccayā vedanā*), in order to emphasize such causation, the sūtra mentions contact individually, but this does not exclude the existence of other *caitasikas*.

非有數品第六十三

Chapter 63. Refuting the Existence of *caitasikas*

63.1 答曰。汝言以相應故有心數法。是事不然。所以者何。諸法獨行。後當廣說。故無相應。是心獨行。亦以此答。非遮同性。是遮數法。

[Harivarman's] answer:³⁷ You said that because [there is] association, therefore, *caitasikas* exist.³⁸ This is not correct. Why? [Because] each dharma functions alone. [This] will be explained in detail later.³⁹ Therefore, there is no association. In the same manner, [I] would answer [your argument] regarding [the sūtra quotation] that *citta* goes alone.⁴⁰ [The sūtra] is not excluding [other *cittas*] of the same nature; it is excluding [the existence] of *caitasikas*.

63.2 汝言攝異故有心數。是作經者。自立名字。佛經中不說相攝。是故非也。

You said that because [*citta* and *caitasikas*] are included (攝 **saṃgraha*) in different [categories], therefore, *caitasikas* exist.⁴¹ The term [*saṃgraha*] was established by the compiler of the sūtras. The Buddha in the sūtras never mentioned inclusion [in different categories].⁴² Therefore, this is not correct.

63.3 汝言依處者。如汝意識依心。不以依故便名為數。如是心依於心。不得名異。

You said that [*citta*] is the basis (**āśraya*) [of *caitasikas*].⁴³ Just as you [agree] that

³⁷ The answers in this chapter likely represent Harivarman's own position.

³⁸ See 61.1-2.

³⁹ Perhaps Harivarman is referring to his later arguments against his opponent's position of association as a simultaneous relationship. In Harivarman's system, association is a sequential relationship between two *cittas*, and at each moment there is only one *citta*; hence, *citta* "goes alone." See TatSid chs. 65-67 and chapter 5 on association (*saṃprayoga*).

⁴⁰ See 61.2. The opponent's point is that the sūtra mentions *citta* only to exclude other *cittas*. In other words, in one moment there can be only one *citta*; therefore, the sūtra says, it "goes alone." It does not exclude the existence of *caitasikas* that are associated with *citta*.

⁴¹ This is a refutation of 61.3, in which *citta* is included in seven *dhātus*, one *āyatana*, three *skandhas*. *Caitasikas* are included in one *dhātu*, one *āyatana*, and three *skandhas*.

⁴² Here, 相攝 is ambiguous. It could mean "mutual inclusion," which can be understood as mutual inclusive relationships among different categories. It can also mean "inclusion by characteristics." Sastrī translate the phrase as **lakṣaṇasaṃgraha* (Sastri 1975: 160), which is closer to the second interpretation. For a discussion of the practice of "inclusion" regarding dharmas with their intrinsic nature in the Abhidharma context, see Cox 2004: 558-65.

⁴³ See 61.4.

mano-vijñāna depends on *citta*,⁴⁴ and [it] is not called *caitasika* because of such a dependence, in the same way a *citta* depends on *citta* and should not be named differently.

63.4 汝言無五陰者。是事不然。我以心差別故。有名為受。有名為想等。汝以心數別為三陰。我亦以心別為三陰。

You said that, [if there are no *caitasikas*,] there should not be five *skandhas*.⁴⁵ This is not correct. Because there are different [modes] of *citta* (**citta-viśeṣa*), I call some feelings (*vedanā*), some apperception (*saṃjñā*), and so forth. You take *caitasikas* separately as three *skandhas*; I take different *cittas* separately as three *skandhas*.⁴⁶

63.5 汝言生異。是事不然。若心與數法共生。何故言二生心三生心數。若但說心。則有此理。所以者何。是人先說識時。後說想⁴⁷等。

You said that [*citta* and *caitasikas*] arise differently.⁴⁸ This is not correct. If *citta* and *caitasikas* arise simultaneously, why do [you] state that *citta* arises from two,⁴⁹ and *caitasikas* arise from three?⁵⁰ If [the sūtra passage] is talking about *citta* only, then it is appropriate. Why? [Because] one can speak of *vijñāna* first, then *saṃjñā*, and so forth.

63.6 汝言相應緣世故知有異。是先已破。無相應故。

You said that one knows that [*citta* and *caitasikas*] are different because of association, the object, and the time.⁵¹ This is already refuted because there is no association.

⁴⁴ *Mano-vijñāna* depends on *manas*, and *manas* is *citta*.

⁴⁵ Refuting the opponent's argument in 61.5.

⁴⁶ Namely, the *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*. Here, the definition of these three as *citta-viśeṣas* repeats Harivarman's argument in 60.1-3.

⁴⁷ K has 相 here, but all other editions have 想.

⁴⁸ See 61.6.

⁴⁹ These two are the object and the sense faculty.

⁵⁰ The example in 61.6 is that the coming together of three things, the object, the faculty, and consciousness, is equivalent to the *caitasika* "contact" (*sparśa*). Indeed, this passage is problematic within the *citta-caitasika* mind model. According to this model, *citta* and *caitasikas* occur simultaneously. But this sūtra passage explicitly states that the object and sense faculty give rise to the consciousness (*vijñāna*), the coming together of these three gives rise to contact (*sparśa*), and depending on contact there arises feeling (*vedanā*). In this process, consciousness, contact, and feelings depend upon one another in sequence, and they occur successively rather than simultaneously.

⁵¹ See 61.8.

63.7 汝言依智非依識者。我說心有二種。一名為智。一名為識。故依智心。不依識也。

You have argued [by quoting] the reliance on knowledge (*jñāna*) instead of consciousness (*vijñāna*).⁵² I say that there are two kinds of *cittas*: one is called knowledge (*jñāna*), and one is called consciousness (*vijñāna*). Therefore, [one] should rely on *citta* that is *jñāna*, and not *citta* as *vijñāna*.

63.8 汝言佛說依心生法名心數者。心所生法。名曰心數。心依心生。故名心數。

You said that the Buddha has taught that a dharma that arises depending on *citta* is called *caitasika*.⁵³ A dharma that is born from *citta* is called *caitasika*. Because a *citta* arises depending on [the previous] *citta*, therefore, it is referred to as a *caitasika*.⁵⁴

63.9 汝言佛亦不說無心數者。我亦不言無心數法。但說心差別故名為心數。

You said that the Buddha never teaches that there are no *caitasikas*.⁵⁵ I too do not say that there are no *caitasikas*. [I] only say that because there are different modes of *cittas* (**citta-viśeṣa*), they are called *caitasikas*.

63.10 又若有道理。不說⁵⁶名說。如其無道理。雖說非說。是故不可以說為因。

Moreover, if [something] is reasonable, [even it] is unspoken, [still it can] be referred to as spoken. If it is unreasonable, even when it is explicitly spoken, [still it should be taken as] not spoken. Therefore, [you] should not take [whether it is] mentioned explicitly as a proof.⁵⁷

63.11 又我等當說心心數法名字義。以集起故名心。受等亦能集起後有。相同於心。故名為心。

⁵² See 61.9.

⁵³ See 61.10.

⁵⁴ Here, Harivarman is taking the term *caitasika* not as the noun “mental factor” in the Abhidharmic technical sense but in its original meaning in the canonical texts, in which it is an adjective meaning “belonging to *citta*” or “related to *citta*.” See the discussion of this term in 2.1.1.

⁵⁵ See 61.11.

⁵⁶ Although all editions have 可說 here, by context there should be only 說.

⁵⁷ See 61.11.

Moreover, we should discuss the meanings of the terms *citta* and *caitasika*. [The mind] is named *citta* because it accumulates.⁵⁸ In the same way, *citta*, feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, can also accumulate [and] give rise to future existence. Therefore, [they also] should be referred to as *cittas*.

63.12 又心與心數。俱從心生。故名為心數。若人但說有心數法。是人應說數法名義。而實不可說。是故非因。

Moreover, both *citta* and *caitasika* are born from *citta*; therefore, [they are all] called *caitasikas*. If someone says, “There are only *caitasika* dharmas,” such a person should clarify the meaning of the name (**nāmārtha*) *caitasika*. But in fact [he] cannot state [the difference]. Therefore, this is not a proof [supporting *caitasika*].⁵⁹

63.13 汝言作異及心生覺。皆以此答。所以者何。我以心差別故。所作業異。亦心中生心。名心生覺。

You said that [*citta* and *caitasikas*] have different functions (**kriyā*)⁶⁰ and also [said that] awareness arises within *citta*.⁶¹ Both of these should be answered in [the same] way.⁶² Why? I [propose] that because [*citta* and *caitasikas*] are different modes of *citta* (*citta-viśeṣa*), therefore, [they] function differently. Also, [when] a *citta* arises from within [the previous] *citta*, [it] is referred to as awareness arising [within] *citta*.

63.14 汝言垢淨無因。是事不然。雖無數法。而有垢淨。

You said that, [if there were no *caitasikas*], the defilement and purification [of *citta*] would have no cause (**ahetu*).⁶³ This is not correct. There are defilement and

⁵⁸ This is an etymological interpretation of the term *citta* as based on the root \sqrt{ci} .

⁵⁹ Once more, this is Harivarman’s refutation of the opponent’s argument on the basis of the names given in 61.11. He argues that *caitasika* means “born from *citta*,” and both *citta* and *caitasika* are born from *citta*; therefore, they both can be called *caitasikas*. If someone says that *caitasika* means only “mental factor,” then he must clarify the difference between *caitasika* as “mental factor” and *caitasika* as *citta*. However, Harivarman argues that, by the etymological interpretations of the meanings (**nāmārtha*) of *citta* and *caitasika*, one cannot find any difference; hence, one should not understand *caitasika* as something different from *citta*.

⁶⁰ See 61.12.

⁶¹ See 61.13.

⁶² Namely, according to the same arguments in 63.9-12.

⁶³ See 61.14.

purification [of *citta*] even without *caitasikas*.⁶⁴

63.15 又無異相故。無心數法。所以者何。汝以心相應故。名為心數。相應法無。後當廣說。故不從心別有數法。

Moreover, because [*citta* and *caitasikas*] do not have different characteristics, therefore, there are no *caitasikas*. Why? You [believe that mental factors exist] and are named *caitasikas* because [they] are associated with *citta*. [I] will discuss later in detail the fact that there is no association.⁶⁵ Therefore, there are no *caitasikas* different from *citta*.

⁶⁴ Perhaps here, Harivarman means that both defilement and purification of mind are different modes of mind (*citta-viśeṣa*); therefore, we do not need separate *caitasikas* to account for them.

⁶⁵ See the following TatSid chapters 65, 66, and 67.

明無數品第六十四

Chapter 64. Illuminating the Non-existence of *caitasikas*

64.1 汝言相異故有心數。是事不然。所以者何。若識若覺。是諸相等無有差別。若心識色。即名為覺。亦名想等。如世間言汝識是人即名為知。從受苦樂。亦即是知。當知識即受想。若此等法。有定異相。今應當說。實不可說。故無異相。

You have stated that *caitasikas* exist because their characteristics are different [from *citta*].⁶⁶ This is not correct. Why? [Concerning the meanings,] “to be conscious of” (*vi-√jñā* 識) and “to experience” (**√vid* 覺), the various characteristics [of these two] have no difference. When *citta* is conscious of form (*rūpa*), it is called awareness and is also called apperception (*saṃjñā*), and so forth. As people in the world say, when you are conscious of a person, it is called knowing; experiencing pleasant and unpleasant [feelings is] also knowing. Therefore, consciousness (*vijñāna* 識) is feeling (*vedanā* 受) and apperception (*saṃjñā* 想). If these various dharmas have definite, different characteristics, they should be specified now. But in fact they cannot be specified. Therefore, [*citta* and *caitasika*] are without different characteristics.

64.2 汝言慧得解脫。是事不然。無因緣故。隨心有染亦有無明。是心聚中染及無明。盡與相應。若言無明垢慧染垢心者。則無因緣。如是離無明故。慧得解脫。離染垢故。心得解脫。亦無因緣。又是名不了義經。如經中說離三漏故心得解脫。故知亦從無明心得解脫。若說從染心得解脫。是說遮斷。言從無明慧得解脫。是畢竟斷。若從染故。心得解脫。從無明故。慧得解脫。若從慧等。得何物解脫。是事應答。當知離心無得解脫。故但有心。

You said that insight attains liberation, [by abandoning ignorance, and so forth].⁶⁷ This is not correct because [such a statement] is groundless. When a *citta* is defiled, there is also ignorance (*avidyā*). In this aggregate (**rāsi*)⁶⁸ of *citta*, defilements (*kleśa*) and ignorance

⁶⁶ See 62.1.

⁶⁷ See 62.2.

⁶⁸ T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 72) T27, p371b9: 識是積聚義。

(*avidyā*) are all connected.⁶⁹ If [one] says ignorance contaminates insight (*prajñā*), and defilements contaminate *citta*, this also is groundless.⁷⁰ Thus, it is also groundless [to say] that by abandoning ignorance insight attains liberation, and by abandoning defilements *citta* attains liberation. Moreover, [this sūtra] is a non-definitive (*neyārtha*) sūtra. As it is said in the sūtras, by abandoning three taints (*āsrava*) *citta* attains liberation;⁷¹ therefore, one knows that *citta* also attains liberation from ignorance. When [the sūtra] says that *citta* attains liberation from defilements, this refers to the abandoning by prohibition (遮斷 **saṃvara-prahāṇa* or **vikkhambhana-prahāṇa*); when [the sūtra] says that insight attains liberation from ignorance, this refers to the complete elimination (畢竟斷 *atyanta-prahāṇa*).⁷² If it is *citta* that attains liberation from defilements, and it is insight that attains liberation from ignorance, then what are the things that are liberated from anger, and so forth? [If this is the case, you] should have a proper answer to it, [but you do not.] One should know that nothing attains liberation other than *citta*. Therefore, there is only *citta*.

64.3 汝言以心勝故但說心者。心有何勝義。而慧等法無。

You said that because *citta* is superior, therefore, only *citta* is mentioned.⁷³ [If so] what is the superior meaning that *citta* has and other dharmas like insight (*prajñā*) do not have?

64.4 汝言人多識心故但說心者。世間人亦多識苦樂。應說受等。

You said that because people are more familiar with *citta*, therefore, [the sūtras] mention only *citta*.⁷⁴ People in the world are also familiar with pleasant and unpleasant [feelings] Therefore, [the sūtras] should also mention feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, [in these cases, but in fact they are not mentioned.]

⁶⁹ Here, the Chinese translation uses 相應 “association,” which is the notion Harivarman is trying to refute; therefore, it is translated as “connected.” Sastri (1978: 131) translates it as “integrated.”

⁷⁰ Perhaps here, Harivarman means that there is no teaching in sūtras that can support such a statement.

⁷¹ See 60.4.

⁷² See also chapter 187. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p358b17-23: 若經中說修止斷貪。是說遮斷。何以知之。色等外欲中生貪。若得止樂則不復生。如經中說。行者得淨喜時捨不淨喜。若說無明斷是究竟斷。何以知之。無明斷故貪等煩惱斷滅無餘。經中亦說離貪故心得解脫是名遮斷。離無明故慧得解脫是畢竟斷。

⁷³ See 62.3.

⁷⁴ See 62.4.

64.5 汝言有餘諸經者。何故不但說心數。而但說心。

You said that the sūtras have left out some teachings.⁷⁵ Then why do [the sūtras] not mention *caitasikas* alone [and leave out *citta*], but instead mention *citta* alone [and leave out *caitasikas*]?

64.6 汝言但斷一法。是語有緣。佛隨眾生煩惱偏多。若常覆心者。說是一法。斷此法故。餘亦自斷。是故非因。

You said that [the Buddha teaches] that by abandoning one dharma [one can reach the path of a non-returner].⁷⁶ Such a teaching has a condition.⁷⁷ The Buddha teaches one such dharma for those beings who have excessive defilements that cover [their] minds. By abandoning this [single] dharma, all other [dharmas] will be automatically abandoned. Therefore, this is not a proof [for *caitasikas*].

64.7 汝言說名色⁷⁸故即說心數。汝自憶想分別。是經不說此義。汝若自生憶想分別。何不言以名色說心緣。可有此理。

You said that because [the sūtra] mentions *nāma-rūpa*, it is equivalent to mentioning *caitasikas*. This is your own speculation (*saṃjñā-vikalpa*);⁷⁹ and this is not what the sūtra means. In contrast to your own speculation, why not say that [the Buddha] was teaching about the objects (**ālambana*) of the mind using *nāma-rūpa*, which is more proper?⁸⁰

64.8 汝言觸與受等心數作因。是言多過。俱相應法。而言觸是受等因。非受等是觸因。有此等咎。故知但心無別心數。

⁷⁵ See 62.5.

⁷⁶ See 62.6.

⁷⁷ This means that this teaching should be understood within a specific context.

⁷⁸ All the editions have 名相 here. I suspect that one of the two “名相” in this passage is a scribal error from “名色.” This passage should be a response to 62.8-9, in which the opponent says “When it is said [in the sūtra] that there are external *nāmarūpa*, it is equivalent to mentioning the *caitasikas* (說外有名色。即說心數。) and ‘external *nāma-rūpa*’ referring to [external] objects”(外有名色。即是說塵。).

⁷⁹ Kumārajīva translates *saṃjñā-vikalpa* as 憶想分別. See Karashima 2001: 332.

⁸⁰ This passage is difficult to understand. However, Sue Hamilton’s study of *nāma-rūpa* is enlightening on this issue. See the discussion in 2.3.4.

You said that contact (*sparśa*) functions as the cause for *caitasikas* such as feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth.⁸¹ Such a statement commits a major error. [In your opinion] both [*sparśa* and *vedanā*] are [*caitasika*] dharmas associated [with *citta*],⁸² but [you] say *sparśa* is the cause for *vedanā*, and so forth; [you do] not [say that] *vedanā*, and so forth, are the causes for *sparśa*. Because of such faults as these, there is only *citta*, and no separate *caitasikas*.

⁸¹ See 62.10.

⁸² This means that they both occur simultaneously with *citta*.

無相應品第六十五

Chapter 65. There is no Association (*samprayoga*)

65.1 無相應法。所以者何。無心數法故。心與誰相應。

There is no associated dharma (*samprayukta-dharma*). Why? Because there is no *caitasika* dharma, with what is *citta* associated?

65.2 又受等諸相不得同時。

Moreover, the modes of function (**ākāra* 相) of feeling (*vedanā* 受), and so forth, cannot be simultaneous.

65.3 又因果不俱。識是想等法因。此法不應一時俱有。故無相應。

Also cause (*hetu* 因) and result (*phala* 果) cannot occur together.⁸³ Consciousness (*vijñāna* 識) is the cause of dharmas such as apperception (*saṃjñā* 想), and so forth. These dharmas should not all occur together in the same moment. Therefore, there is no association.

65.4 又佛說甚深因緣法中。是事生。故是事得生。又如穀子牙莖枝葉花實等現見因果相次。故有識等。亦應次第而生。

Moreover, the Buddha teaches the profound (*gambhīra*)⁸⁴ doctrine of dependent origination (*prātītyasamutpāda*): when his thing arises, that thing arises.⁸⁵ It is also like a grain plant: one sees that its seed, sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, and so forth, appear one after another as causes and results. In the same manner, consciousness (*vijñāna*), and so forth, should also arise successively.

⁸³ This is an important thesis attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 52) T27, p270a10-15: 謂或有執。諸法生時漸次非頓。如譬喻者。大德說曰。諸法生時次第而生無並起義。如經狹路有多商侶一一而過。尚無二人一時過義。況得有多。諸有為法亦復如是。一一從自生相而生。別和合生理不俱起。Saṅghabhadra records that the Sthavira Śrīlāta holds the same doctrinal position: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 15) T29, p421b18-19: 又上座說。諸行決定無俱生因。

⁸⁴ D II 55: *gambhīro cāyaṃ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca.*

⁸⁵ This is half of the “abstract formula” of dependent origination (e.g S II 28): *imasmim sati idaṃ hoti, imass' uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.* See Bodhi 2000: 552, 730n14, 744n59.

65.5 若汝意謂如貪等煩惱。與色共因。應俱生者。是事不然。色無了知。不能緣故。心心數法。有緣有了。是故一時不應俱有。無多了故。

If you think that [*citta* and *caitasika* are coexistent] in the same manner as defilements [such as] lust (*rāga*), and so forth, are coexistent causes (*sahabhū-hetu* 共因) as are forms (*rūpa*),⁸⁶ [and they all] should arise simultaneously,⁸⁷ this is not correct. Forms have no cognition, because they cannot take objects. *Citta* and *caitasikas* have objects and have cognition; therefore, [they] should not coexist at the same moment because there are no multiple cognitions [in one moment and in one body].

65.6 又以一身。名一眾生。以一了故。若一念中。多心數法。則有多了。有多了故。應是多人。此事不可。故一念中。無受等法。

Moreover, on the basis of one body, one is referred to as one sentient being because [a sentient being has] only one cognition. If in one moment there are multiple *caitasikas*, then there should be multiple cognitions; multiple cognitions means there should be multiple persons. This is unacceptable. Therefore, in one moment of thought there are no [*caitasika*] dharmas such as feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth.⁸⁸

65.7 又何故六識不一時生。問曰。諸識皆待次第緣生。故不一時。答曰。以何障故。一次第緣不得次第生六識耶。當知先因後果次第生故。

Moreover, why do the six types of consciousness not arise simultaneously?⁸⁹ [The opponent] answers: Because each consciousness (*vijñāna*) arises depending on one immediate condition (*samanantara-pratyaya* 次第緣); therefore, [they] cannot arise

⁸⁶ Kumārajīva translates *sahabhūhetu* as 共因. No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 17) T25, p187a28-9: 復有六因。相應因。共因。相似因。遍因。報因。名因。

⁸⁷ No discussion proposing that the *caitasikas* such as *rāga* are *sahabhū-hetus* with *rūpa* has been located in the extant Abhidharma texts.

⁸⁸ Saṅghabhadra records in the **Nyāyānusāra* the same argument attributed to the *Dārṣṭāntikas*: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p396a11-5: 有餘復言。若心心所。其體各異。於一心品。應有眾多。能覺了用。故心所法應不異心。此亦不然。能覺了用。體唯一故。覺了謂慧。非心心所皆慧為體。如何令餘非覺了性成覺了體。故無斯過。

⁸⁹ Here Harivarman's argument is that, just as the six types of consciousness do not arise simultaneously, so also *citta* and *caitasikas* do not arise simultaneously.

simultaneously.⁹⁰ [Harivarman] asks: Due to what obstacle does one immediate condition not produce [one of the] six types of consciousness in the immediate next moment? One should know that [in the case of immediate conditions,] the preceding cause and the following consequence [always] arise in immediate succession.

65.8 又經中說。眼見色不取相。取相即是想業。若佛聽識業而遮想業。當知或有識而無想。若人取相。是見已取。非是見時。故知識等次第而生。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra, the eyes see forms but do not grasp [their] signs (*nimitta* 相);⁹¹ grasping signs is the activity of apperception (*saṃjñā* 想).⁹² If the Buddha accepts the activity of consciousness (*viññāna*) but rejects the activity of apperception, one should know that there are cases in which consciousness exists without apperception. When a person grasps [an object's] signs, grasping [the signs occurs only] after seeing [the object]; it does not occur at the same moment as seeing [the object]. Therefore, one knows that consciousness (*viññāna*), [apperception (*saṃjñā*)], and so forth, arise in succession.

65.9 又經中說。眼見色已隨喜思惟。是中亦先說識業。後說受等。

Moreover, as it is said in the sūtra, “Having seen form (*rūpa*) with the eye, one explores (*upavicarati*) [a form] productive of joy, [and so forth]”⁹³ Here again, [the sūtra] mentions the activity of consciousness first [and] afterward mentions feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth.

⁹⁰ No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b21-3: 何故無一補特伽羅非前非後二心俱生。答無第二等無間緣故。有情一一心相續轉故。No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p49b16-21: 謂心心所法生必依止等無間緣。既無第二等無間緣。故必無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。此復應問。何故無第二等無間緣。故復答言。有情一一心相續轉故。謂有情心。法爾一一相續而轉。無二無多。此是展轉更相答義。

⁹¹ For example, SĀ no. 279, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p76b4-6: 多聞聖弟子眼見色。不取色相。不取隨形好。任其眼根之所趣向。常住律儀。 S IV 112: *etha tumhe, bhikkhave, indriyesu guttadvārā viharatha. cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā mā nimittaggāhino ahuvattha, mānubyañjanaggāhino.*

⁹² AKBh verse 1-14d (p.10.16): *saṃjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā.*

⁹³ Perhaps here Harivarman is quoting the *Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga-sutta* in the Majjhima-nikāya. M no.137, III 216: *cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā somanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati, domanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati, upekkhāṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati.* English translation based in part on Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation (Bodhi 2001: 1067). Corresponds to MĀ no. 163 分別六處經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 42) T01, p692c11-2: 眼見色已。分別色喜住。分別色憂住。分別色捨住。

65.10 又經中說。見是見等。故知非一切心盡有受等。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra that seeing is seeing, and so forth.⁹⁴ Therefore, not all *cittas* have feelings, and so forth.

65.11 又以五識相是事可明。所以者何。若人於眼識中。不能取怨親相及平等相。是則無想。亦無憂喜。無分別故。或有人說。是中亦無貪等煩惱。故知無思。能求後有。故名為思。此後當說。故知五識亦無思也。

Moreover, the fact that [there is only *citta* without associated *caitasikas*] can also be clarified by the characteristics of the five types of consciousness. Why? If a person in eye-consciousness cannot grasp the characteristics of enemy, friend, or neutral, then there is no apperception (*saṃjñā* 想) [in eye-consciousness]; there are also no pleasant or unpleasant [feelings], because there is no discrimination. Some others say, in this [eye-consciousness] there are also no defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) such as lust (*rāga* 貪), and so forth; therefore, one knows that there is no volition (*cetanā* 思)⁹⁵ since that which desires (**prārthayate* 求) future existence is called *cetanā*. This will be discussed later.⁹⁶ Therefore, one knows that within the five types of consciousness there is no volition.

65.12 又汝等五識不能分別。此中云何當有覺觀。思惟分別。先麤後細。故名覺觀。Moreover, you [believe] that the first five types of consciousness cannot discriminate (**nirvikalpa*). [If so,] how can there be applied thought (*vitarka*) and sustained thought (*vicāra*) in them?⁹⁷ When [*citta*] thinks and discriminates,⁹⁸ at first it is gross, then it is

⁹⁴ Sastri's Sanskrit reconstruction (Sastri 1975: 163): *sūtre dṛṣṭir darśanam iti*. The sūtra quoted here is uncertain. One candidate might be the *Chabbisodhana-sutta*, M no.112, III 29: *diṭṭhe diṭṭhavādītā, sute sutavādītā, mute mutavādītā, viññāte viññātavādītā*. Corresponds to MĀ 187 說智經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 49) T01, p732b28-c1: 賢者。世尊說四說。云何為四。一曰見見說。二曰聞聞說。三曰識識說。四曰知知說。Collett Cox (private communication 6/19/2014) suggests that this statement may simply mean "seeing is seeing," namely, seeing is merely seeing and is not associated with other dharmas such as feelings, and so forth.

⁹⁵ Mizuno observes that such a position can be attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, Vātsīputrīyas, Pāli Theravādins, and the Śāriputrābhīdharmas. Mizuno 1964: 86-89. See also Katsura 1974: 140n**.

⁹⁶ TatSid chapter 84 is dedicated to the discussion of *cetanā* 思. In that chapter, Harivarman defines *cetanā* as "wish, desire" (**prañidhāna* 願, **prārthanā* 求). p286a11-2: 問曰。何等為思。答曰。願求為思。

⁹⁷ As Katsura (1974:140n***) points out, the Sarvāstivādins suggest that the first five types of consciousness are *nirvikalpa*, and *mano-vijñāna* can be either *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 72) T27, p374b5-8: 問此六識身幾有分別。幾無分別。答前五識身唯無分別。第六識身或有分別。或無分別。且在定者皆無分別。不在定者容有分別。計度分別遍與不定意識俱故。It should be noted that the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

65.15 是故應受五識無想無覺無觀。所以者何。五識中無男女分別。亦無受等分別。是中何所分別。

Therefore, [one] should accept that the five [sense] types of consciousness have no apperception (*saṃjñā*), nor applied thought (*vitarka*), nor sustained thought (*vicāra*). Why? In the five types of consciousness, there is no discrimination of male or female, nor discrimination of feeling, and so forth. What can be discriminated in [them]?¹⁰⁴

65.16 又汝等說五識次第必生意識。以五識無分別故。若五識中有分別者。何用次第生意識耶。

Moreover, you said that *mano-vijñāna* inevitably arises immediately after the five types of consciousness, because the five types of consciousness have no discrimination (*nirvikalpa*).¹⁰⁵ If the five types of consciousness have discrimination, why is it necessary that *mano-vijñāna* arise immediately afterward?

65.17 又覺觀不應一心中生。以麤細相違故。譬如振鈴初聲為覺餘聲曰觀。彼喻亦然。

Moreover, applied thought (*vitarka*) and sustained thought (*vicāra*) should not arise within the same [moment] of *citta*, because grossness and subtleness are mutually exclusive.¹⁰⁶ As in the simile of ringing a bell, the initial [gross] sound is *vitarka*, and the

若所思便念。若所念便分別。No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 35) T02, p0743b18-21: 若眼見色而起識想。三事相因便有更樂。以有更樂便有所覺。以有所覺便有所覺。以有所覺便有想。以有所覺便稱量之。起若干種想著之念。

¹⁰⁴ Harivarman proposes that the five types of sense consciousness are without discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) in its literal sense: namely, they have no discrimination at all.

¹⁰⁵ This is perhaps related to the mind-process theories of different schools. In both the Theravāda and Yogācāra theories of mind-process, the moment of consciousness immediately following one of the five types of sense consciousness must be a *mano-vijñāna*. But the Vaibhāṣikas have a different opinion. They agree that there are cases in which one moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness can be followed immediately by a moment of *mano-vijñāna*, but it is not necessarily the case. A moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness can be followed by a moment of any of the six types of consciousness. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 131) T27, p682b1-6: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者違根蘊說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 1) T28, p992a16-29: 如是諸色於六識中二識所識。謂眼及意先用眼識唯了自相。後用意識了自共相。謂彼諸色住現在時。眼識唯能了彼自相。眼識無間起分別意識。重了前色自相或共相。... 眼識無間非定起意識。於六識身容隨起一種。若眼識無間定起意識者。則苦根不應為苦等無間。苦根唯在五識身故。若爾便違根蘊所說。如說苦根與苦根為因等無間增上。

¹⁰⁶ *Vitarka* is gross and *vicāra* is subtle; hence, they are mutually exclusive. The notion of grossness and subtleness

remaining [subtle] sound is *vicāra*.¹⁰⁷ Likewise, in the simile [the gross sound and the subtle sound are mutually exclusive].

65.18 若五識中。有覺觀者。應說其業。實不可說。當知心心數法次第而生。

If there were *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the five types of [sense] consciousness, [one] should [be able to] specify their activities; [but] in fact one cannot specify [them]. [Therefore,] one should know that *citta* and *caitasikas* arise in a succession.

65.19 又癡慧相違。不應俱有。云何一念中。亦知亦不知。

Moreover, ignorance and wisdom should not coexist because they are mutually exclusive. How within a single moment of mind can [one] both know and not know?

65.20 又一心中不容有疑。所以者何。若杌若人。不得一心中行。以心業無此力故。

Moreover, doubt should not occur within one moment of *citta*.¹⁰⁸ Why? [Deliberation about an object as] a tree stump or a person should not occur in one *citta* because the activity of *citta* lacks such capability.¹⁰⁹

65.21 又人言心數法中憶行過去世緣。現在心云何當有。

Moreover, some say that the mental factor (*caitasika* 心數法) of recollection (*smṛti*

regarding *vitarka* and *vicāra* has already been mentioned in 65.12. The MVŚ contains an answer to this challenge. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a7-23: 尋伺何差別。答心麤性名尋。心細性名伺。是謂差別。問何故復作此論。答欲令疑者得決定故。謂此二法展轉相似。見多尋者世人共言。此是多伺。見多伺者世人共言。此是多尋。或有生疑此二體一。欲令彼疑得決定故。顯此二種自體各別故作斯論。問此中所說心麤細性顯何義耶。有作是說。此則顯心麤性細性若作是說。尋伺應以心為自性。亦不相應一物麤細不俱有故。有餘師說。此顯心麤時有尋性。心細時有伺性。若作是說。應顯尋伺非一心俱。心麤細時刹那別故。評曰。應作是說。此中顯示即一心中麤性名尋。細性名伺若作是說。顯一心中有尋有伺。尋令心麤伺令心細。問云何一心麤細二法互不相違。答所作異故。尋性猛利。伺性遲鈍。共助一心故。雖麤細而不相違。

¹⁰⁷ This means that gross sound and subtle sound cannot coexist. According to the MVŚ, this simile is from the *Prajñaptiśāstra*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a27-9: 施設論說。如叩鍾鈴銅鐵器等。其聲發運。前麤後細。尋伺亦爾。

¹⁰⁸ For Harivarman, doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) is not a single moment of *citta* or *caitasika*, but a series of multiple *cittas*. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 10) T32, p315c16: 我不說念念中有疑。不決定心相續名疑。Chapter 129 in the *TatSid* discusses doubt in greater detail.

¹⁰⁹ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 50) T27, p258c5-7: 云何疑結。謂於諦猶豫。問何故說此於諦猶豫。答欲令疑者得決定故。謂如有人遠見豎物便生猶豫杌耶人耶。

憶)¹¹⁰ courses on objects of the past.¹¹¹ How can [such a *caitasika*] occur in a present *citta*?

65.22 又若念此人是我知識。曾利益我。念已生喜。是事云何。在一心中。

Moreover, if [one] considers that this person is my friend who had helped me. After considering [thus], joy arises. How can [all] these thoughts occur in one *citta*?

65.23 又欲不欲。云何在一心中。如經中說。若諸比丘樂欲我法。法則增長。若不樂欲。法則損減。云何當在一心中。

Moreover, how can inclination (**chanda*) and non-inclination (**acchanda*) occur in one *citta*?¹¹² As it is said in the sūtra, if the bhikṣus desire my Dharma, it will grow; if [they] do not desire it, the Dharma will decrease.¹¹³ How can [desire and not desire] occur in one *citta*?

65.24 又若一心中有心數法。法則錯亂。所以者何。於一心中。有知不知疑不疑信不信精進懈怠。如是等過。

Moreover, if there are *caitasikas* in one *citta*, [these] dharmas would be in disorder (**vaiṣamya* 錯亂). Why? Because [if this were the case,] within one *citta* there would be the fault of the coexistence of knowing and not-knowing, doubt and doubtlessness, faith and faithlessness, energy and slackness, and so forth.

65.25 又一切心數應盡在一心中。以何障故。苦樂貪恚等。不在一心中。若汝謂苦樂等相違故不在一心中者。知不知等亦相違故。不應在一心中。故無相應。

Moreover, [if there were association], all *caitasikas* should occur in one *citta*. What can

¹¹⁰ Here, the translation follows Kumārajīva and renders *smṛti* as “recollection” (憶). The term *smṛti* can also be translated as “mindfulness,” which is adopted in other parts of this study. See the discussion of these two senses of this term in 3.4.8 regarding 65.21.

¹¹¹ According to the Sarvāstivādins, memory entails becoming familiar with an object and having knowledge of a similar kind in later *cittas*. No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b23-5: 補特伽羅。既不可得。又無前心往後心。理何緣能憶本所作事。答有情於法。由串習力。得如是同分智。隨所更事。能如是知。See also MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 12) T27, p55cff; AKBh p472ff.

¹¹² The intended opponent here is uncertain.

¹¹³ This sūtra passage could not be identified.

prevent pleasant (*sukha* 樂) and unpleasant (*duḥkha* 苦) [feelings], greed (*lobha* 貪) and anger (*dveṣa* 恚), and so forth, from occurring in one *citta*? If you say that because pleasant and unpleasant [feelings], and so forth, are mutually exclusive, they do not occur in one *citta*, knowing and not-knowing and so forth, are also mutually exclusive, [and they also] should not occur in one *citta*. Therefore, there is no association.¹¹⁴

65.26 又七菩提分經中。佛次第說諸心數法。若比丘行四念處。爾時修習念菩提分。心在念中。簡擇諸法。簡擇諸法故生精進。精進力故能集善法。心生淨喜。心生喜故得猗。得猗故心攝。心攝則得定。得定故能捨貪憂。捨貪憂故知心數次第而生。Moreover, in the sūtra on the seven factors contributing to awakening (*bodhyaṅga* 菩提分), the Buddha presents [them] as a succession of *caitasikas* [as follows]: “When a bhikṣu is in the course of the four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupāsthāna* 念處), at that time he practices the awakening-factor of mindfulness (*smṛti* 念). [His] mind is in mindfulness, and discriminates (**pravīcayate* 簡擇) dharmas. Because of the discrimination of dharmas (*dharmapravīcaya*), energy (*vīrya* 精進) arises. Because of the power of energy, [he] can accumulate wholesome dharmas, and pure joy (*prīti* 喜) arises in [his] mind. Because joy arises in [his] mind, [he] attains tranquility (*praśrabdhi* 猗). Because of the attainment of tranquility, [his] mind is concentrated (**samādhiyati* 攝). When the mind is concentrated, he attains [the awakening factor of] concentration (*samādhi* 定). Because of the attainment of concentration, [he] is able to abandon greed and sorrow. Because of the abandoning of greed and sorrow, [that is, as a result of this succession of practices], one knows that *caitasikas* arise one after another.”¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ MVŚ attributes this argument to the Dārṣṭāntikas. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b24-9: 譬喻者說。若心有智則無無知。若心有疑則無決定。若心有龐則無有細。然對法者所說法相如鬪叢林。謂一心中。有智有無知。有非智非無知。有疑有決定。有非疑非決定。有龐有細。有非龐非細。The Vaibhāṣikas respond that each of the different *caitasikas* has its own characteristic and function; just as different material matters can coexist, so also the *caitasikas* can coexist in one *citta*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b29-c6: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。許法俱生斯有何失。謂諸心所展轉力生。一心相應。相用各別。智謂般若。無知謂無明。非智非無知謂餘心所法。疑謂猶豫。決定謂智。非疑非決定謂餘心所法。龐謂尋。細謂伺。非龐非細謂餘心所法。如諸色法異類俱生。心所亦爾。故無有失。

¹¹⁵ This is a description of the seven awakening-factors as a progressive process. SĀ no. 810. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 29) T02, p208b13-29: 阿難白佛。如是修習安那般那念。令四念處滿足。云何修四念處。令七覺分滿足。佛告阿難。

65.27 又八道分經中。亦次第說。若得正見。則從正見生正思惟乃至正定。

Moreover, in the sūtra on the eight-fold noble path, [the Buddha] teaches it as a successive process: “If [one] attains right-view (*samyag-drṣṭi* 正見), then from right-view arises right-intention (*samyak-saṃkalpa* 正思惟), and so on up to right concentration (*samyak-samādhi* 正定).”¹¹⁶

65.28 又次第經中。佛語阿難。持戒之人。不應願欲。心無憂悔。持戒人心法無憂悔。無憂悔者。不應願欲。心得歡悅。心無憂悔。法應歡悅。歡悅則心喜。心喜則得身猗。身猗則受樂。受樂則心攝。心攝則得實智。得實智則厭離。厭離則解脫。故知心法次第而生。

Moreover, in the sūtra on the succession (次第) [of dharmas], the Buddha said to Ānanda, “A person who is virtuous (*sīlavant* 持戒) should not exert the volition (不應願欲 *P. na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ*) to have no regret (*avipratīṣāra* 無憂悔) in [his] mind. For a virtuous person, it is natural (*dharmatā* 法) that there is no regret [in his mind]. When there is no regret, [he] should not exert the volition to have joy (*prāmodya* 歡悅) in [his]

若比丘身身觀念住。念住已。繫念住不忘。爾時方便修念覺分。修念覺分已。念覺分滿足。念覺滿足已。於法選擇思量。爾時方便修擇法覺分。修擇法覺分已。擇法覺分滿足。於法選擇分別思量已。得精勤方便。爾時方便修習精進覺分。修精進覺分已。精進覺分滿足。方便精進已。則心歡喜。爾時方便修喜覺分。修喜覺分已。喜覺分滿足。歡喜已。身心猗息。爾時方便修猗覺分。修猗覺分已。猗覺分滿足。身心樂已。得三昧。爾時修定覺分。修定覺分已。定覺分滿足。定覺分滿足已。貪憂則滅。得平等捨。爾時方便修捨覺分。修捨覺分已。捨覺分滿足。受。心。法法念處亦如是說。是名修四念處。滿足七覺分。 Also SĀ no. 281. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p77c19-78a8. For Pāli parallel passages see S V 312-3, 331-3. Harivarman also quotes the same passage in chapter 17. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p251c29-252a8. It should be noted that, near the end of the passage quoted here, there is the sentence 得定故能捨貪憂: “Because of the attainment of concentration [he] is able to abandon greed and sorrow.” This sentence is absent in the Pāli parallels but present in the SĀ version. Therefore, it is very likely that Harivarman is quoting the Sarvāstivāda SĀ. For a study of the seven awakening factors as a process, see Gethin 2001: 168-72. The northern Abhidharma text *Dharmaskandha* also quotes this sūtra. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 8) T26, p491b9-c2.

¹¹⁶ SĀ no. 749. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 28) T2, p198b19-21: 若起明為前相。生諸善法。時慚愧隨生。慚愧生已。能生正見。正見生已。起正志正語正業正命正方便正念正定。次第而起。 S V 1-2: *vijjā ca kho bhikkhave pubbaṅgamā kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ samāpattiyā anudeva hirottappaṃ. vijjāgatassa bhikkhave viddasuno sammādiṭṭhi pahoti. sammādiṭṭhissa sammāsaṅkappa pahoti. sammāsaṅkappassa sammāvācā pahoti. sammāvācassa sammākammanto pahoti. sammākammantassa sammāājīvo pahoti. sammāājīvassa sammāvāyāmo pahoti. sammāvāyāmassa sammāsati pahoti. sammāsatisa sammāsamādhī pahoti ti.* Modern Western scholarship generally does not accept the progressive aspect of the eight-fold noble path. For example, Gethin (2001: 207-212) tries to account for the strange order of the eight *aṅgas* in terms of the standard gradual path of *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā* by saying that the eight *aṅgas* are simultaneous as the “consummation of the development of *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *paññā*” (212). Peter Masefield (1986: 37-45) offers an explanation that the eight-fold path is restricted to those who have realized the four noble truths and attained *dharmacakṣu*, namely, who are nobles (*ariya*).

mind. For when [one] has no regret in [his] mind, it is natural there is joy. When there is joy, there is rapture (*prīti* 喜) of mind. When there is rapture of mind, there is the tranquility (*praśrabdha* 猗) of body. When there is tranquility of body, [he] experiences pleasure (*sukha* 樂). When he experiences pleasure, [his] mind will be concentrated (*samādhiyati* 攝). When [his] mind is concentrated, [he] attains the knowledge [of things] as they are (*yathābhūta* 實智). Having attained the knowledge as things really are, there is disenchantment (*nirveda* 厭離) [with regard to worldly objects]. Being disenchanted [with regard to worldly objects], [he] is liberated (**vimukta* 解脫).” Therefore, the *caitasikas* arise one after another.¹¹⁷

65.29 又八大人覺中。亦次第說。若比丘行少欲則知足。知足則遠離。遠離則精進。精進則正憶念。正憶念則心攝。心攝則得慧。得慧則戲論滅。

Moreover, in the sūtra on the eight thoughts of a great person (P. *aṭṭha mahāpurisavitakka*), [the Buddha] also teaches [the eight thoughts] as a sequence: “If a bhikṣu has few desires, [he will] be content; being content, [he will] resort to solitude; having resorted to solitude [he will] be energetic; being energetic, [he will] be mindful in the right way; being mindful in the right way, [his] mind will be concentrated; [with his] mind concentrated, [he will] attain wisdom; having attained wisdom, proliferation (*prapañca*) will cease.”¹¹⁸

65.30 又七淨中。亦次第說。戒淨為心淨。心淨為見淨。見淨為度疑淨。度疑淨為

¹¹⁷ The sūtra Harivarman quoted here corresponds to Pāli A 10.2 (V 2-4) and MĀ no. 43. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p485b22-25: 阿難。持戒者不應思。令我不悔。阿難。但法自然。持戒者便得不悔。阿難。有不悔者不應思。令我歡悅。阿難。但法自然。有不悔者便得歡悅。阿難。有歡悅者不應思。令我喜。阿難。但法自然。有歡悅者便得喜。P485c11-16: 因歡悅便得喜，因喜便得止，因止便得樂，因樂便得定心。阿難！多聞聖弟子有定心者便見如實、知如真，因見如實、知如真便得厭，因厭便得無欲，因無欲便得解脫。因解脫便知解脫。In the Pāli version of the sutta, the order of the ten factors is reversed in its summary part. Also in the Pāli version, the audience consists of unnamed bhikṣus, while in the Chinese version the interlocutor is Ānanda. Apparently, Harivarman here is quoting a version of the sūtra closer to the Sarvāstivāda MĀ. The sequence of the ten factors is also listed in A 10.1 (V 1-2) and MĀ no. 42, 中阿含習相應品何義經第一, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p485a-b. See also Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi 2012: 1340-1).

¹¹⁸ A 8.30 (IV 228-9). This corresponds to several Chinese translations: MĀ no. 74. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 18) T01, p540c. EĀ ch.42 no.6. No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 37) T02, p754a. There is also a very early separate translation by Zhiyao 支曜 in the second century CE: No. 46 阿那律八念經 T01, p835c. However, in all these sūtras, the eight items are given in a list that does not include any reference to the causal connection between each consecutive item.

道非道知見淨。道非道知見淨為行知見淨。行知見淨為行斷知見淨。

Moreover, in the [sūtra on] the seven purifications, [they are] also taught as a sequence: “Purification of virtue is for the sake of purification of mind; purification of mind is for the sake of purification of view; purification of view is for the sake of purification by overcoming doubt; purification by overcoming doubt is for the sake of purification by knowledge and vision of what is and what is not the path; purification by knowledge and vision of what is and what is not the path is for the sake of purification by the knowledge and vision of practice; purification by the knowledge and vision of practice is for the sake of purification by the knowledge and vision of the abandoning of practice.”¹¹⁹

65.31 又因緣經中。亦次第說。因眼緣色。生癡分濁念。是中癡即無明。癡者所求為愛。愛者所作名業。如是等。

Moreover, in the sūtra on causes and conditions, [the Buddha] also teaches [causes and conditions] as a sequence: “Because the eye takes forms as its objects, there arises an impure thought of the nature of delusion (*moha* 癡). Here, delusion is ignorance (*avidyā* 無明). What the deluded seeks is craving (*trṣṇā* 愛), what craving makes is called karma (*karma* 業),” and so forth.¹²⁰

65.32 又大因經中。亦次第說。愛首九法。因愛生求。因求故得。因得故投計。因投計故生染。因染故貪著。因貪著故取。因取故生慳心。因慳心故守護。因守護故便有鞭杖爭訟諸苦惱等。

Moreover, in the *Mahānidāna-sūtra*,¹²¹ [the Buddha] also teaches the nine dharmas beginning with craving as a sequence: “Because of craving (愛), there arises seeking (求); because of seeking, there is acquisition (得); because of acquisition, there is

¹¹⁹ M no.24 *Rathavinīta-sutta*, which corresponds to MĀ no. 9 七車經. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 2) T01, p429c; EĀ chapter 39 no. 10. No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 33) T02, p733c. However, the last purification in Harivarman’s list, 行斷知見淨 “purification by the knowledge and vision of the abandoning of practice” (Sastri 1975:166 reconstructs it as **pratipadāprahāṇajñānadarsānavisuddhi*) is the same as the version in the MĀ (道跡斷智淨) but different from the EĀ and the Pāli versions (*ñānadassanavisuddhi* 知見清淨).

¹²⁰ SĀ no. 334. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 13) T02, p92c5-7: 緣眼。色。生不正思惟。生於癡。彼癡者是無明。癡求欲名為愛。愛所作名為業。There is no Pāli parallel to this sūtra.

¹²¹ D no. 15 *Mahānidāna-sutta*.

decision-making (按計); because of decision-making, there arises lustful desire (染); because of lustful desire, there is attachment (貪著); because of attachment, there is appropriation (取); because of appropriation, there arises avarice (慳); because of avarice, there is the guarding (守護) [of possessions]; because of the guarding [of possessions], there arises suffering [resulting from the] whip, stick, quarrels, arguments, and so forth.”¹²²

65.33 又須陀洹法中。亦次第說。若親近善人。得聞正法。聞正法故能生正念。正念因緣。能修行道。

Moreover, [in the sūtra on] the stream-entry (*srotaāpanna* 須陀洹) dharmas, [the Buddha] also presents them as a sequence: “Because of [one’s] association with good companions, [one] is able to hear the true Dharma; because of hearing the true Dharma, [one] is able to generate right attention; because of right attention, [one] can practice the path.”¹²³

65.34 又經中說。因眼緣色眼識生。三事和合故名觸。若說心心數法一時生者。則無三事和合。若說一一生則有三事和合。

Moreover, as it is taught in the sūtra, “Because the eye takes form (*rūpa* 色) as its object, there arises eye-consciousness; the coming together (*saṅgati* 和合) of the three is called

¹²² D II 58-9: *iti kho Ānanda vedanaṃ paṭicca tanhā, tanhaṃ paṭicca pariyesanā, pariyesanaṃ paṭicca lābho, lābhaṃ paṭicca vinicchayo, vinicchayaṃ paṭicca chanda-rāgo, chanda-rāgaṃ paṭicca ajjhosānaṃ, ajjhosānaṃ paṭicca pariggaho, pariggahaṃ paṭicca macchariyaṃ, macchariyaṃ paṭicca ārakkho, ārakkhādhikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādāna-satthā-dāna-kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tuvaṃtuva-pesuñña-musā-vādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti*. There are several Chinese translations: DĀ no. 13 大緣方便經 No. 1. 長阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p60a; MĀ no. 97 大因經 No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 24) T01, p578b; the very early translation by Anshigao 安世高, No. 14 人本欲生經 T01, p242a; and a late translation by Shihu 施護, No. 52 大生義經 (卷 1) T01, p844c. There appear to be no significant differences in this passage among all the versions. This translation mainly follows Walshe’s (1995:224-5) understanding of the Pāli terms.

¹²³ The four *srotaāpanna* dharmas are given in SĀ no. 1125. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 41) T02, p298c4-7: 爾時。世尊告諸比丘。有四種須陀洹道分。親近善男子。聽正法。內正思惟。法次法向。S V 404, 410: *cattārimāni, bhikkhave, sotāpattiyaṅgāni. katamāni cattāri? sappurisasamsevo, saddhammassavanaṃ, yonisomanasikāro, dhammānudhammappaṭipatti--imāni kho, bhikkhave, cattāri sotāpattiyaṅgāni*. These four dharmas are also explained in two early Abhidharma texts, the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Saṅgūtiparyāya*. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 2) T26, p458b-c; No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 6) T26, p393a: 四預流支者。一親近善士。二聽聞正法。三如理作意。四法隨法行。No sūtra appears to state explicitly that these four dharmas constitute a sequence; however, logically it is possible to understand the four items as a chain with the latter items dependent on the immediate preceding ones.

contact (*sparsā* 觸).” If *citta* and *caitasikas* all arise simultaneously, then there would be no coming together of [only] three things. If one claims that they occur one after another, then there is the coming together of three things.¹²⁴

65.35 以是等緣故無相應。

For these reasons, there is no association (*samprayoga*).

¹²⁴ This repeats the argument in 60.13.

有相應品第六十六

Chapter 66. Proving the Existence of Association

66.1 問曰。有相應法。所以者何。若人見受是神。識心依之。以相應故。想陰等亦如是。若無相應。何由有此。

[The opponent] argues: there are dharmas that are associated (*saṃprayukta*). Why? [The sūtra teaches that] when someone perceives (*anupaśyati* 見) feeling (*vedanā* 受) as the self (*ātman* 神), *viññāna*, that is, *citta*, depends on it because of association. The same is true of the aggregates (*skandha* 陰) of apperception (*saṃjñā* 想) and so forth. If there is no association, how can it be like this?¹²⁵

66.2 又人經中說。因眼緣色生眼識。三事和合生觸。共生受想行等。於是法中。有種種名。所謂眾生天人男女大小。如是等名。皆因諸陰。

Moreover, in the *Mānuṣyaka-sūtra*,¹²⁶ [the Buddha] states: “Depending on the eye,

¹²⁵ Here, the opponent is likely quoting SĀ no. 109 (No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34a24-35a16), which has an expanded explanation for the formula regarding the view of personal-existence (*satkāya*). The basic formula is as follows (No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34b13-14): 愚癡無聞凡夫見色是我。異我。我在色。色在我。見受。想。行。識。是我。異我。我在識。識在我。This basic formula of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* also occurs passim in the Pāli Nikāyas (e.g. M III 17-8, S III 3-4, 46, 57, S IV 287, A II 214-5): *assutavā puthujjano ... rūpaṃ attato samanupassati rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā rūpaṃ rūpasmim vā attānaṃ; vedanaṃ attato samanupassati vedanāvantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā vedanaṃ vedanāya vā attānaṃ; saññaṃ attato samanupassati saññāvantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā saññaṃ saññāya vā attānaṃ; saṅkhāre attato samanupassati saṅkhāravantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā saṅkhāre saṅkhāresu vā attānaṃ; viññānaṃ attato samanupassati viññānavantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā viññānaṃ viññānasmim vā attānaṃ*. However, the sentence “若人見受是神。識心依之” indicates that here the opponent quotes the expanded version of the formula as in the SĀ no.109, which does not exist in the Pāli Nikāyas. (The expanded version does however occur in the Pāli *Paṭisambhidāmagga* 143-9.) The expanded version analyzes the wrong views as entailing the perception of each of the five *skandhas* as the self, or the self as possessing the *skandha*, or the *skandha* as in the self, or the self as in the *skandha*. The sentence quoted is in the paragraph analyzing the *skandha* of consciousness (*viññāna*), in reference to the phrase “consciousness is in the self” (*attani vā viññānaṃ*). No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34c26-8: 云何見我中識。謂色是我。識在中住。受。想。行是我。識在中住。是名我中識。 Patis 148: *kathaṃ attani viññānaṃ samanupassati? idhekacco rūpaṃ ... vedanaṃ ... saññaṃ ... saṅkhāre attato samanupassati. tassa evaṃ hoti “ayaṃ kho me attā. imasmiṃca pana attani idaṃ viññāna” nti. attani viññānaṃ samanupassati*. The commentator (Śāriputra in SĀ no. 109) explains that in this phrase the “self” refers to the four *skandhas* other than *viññāna*: namely, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*. An ignorant worldly being takes one of the four, in this case *vedanā*, as the self, and thinks that *viññāna* exists within this “self,” namely, *vedanā*. The opponent builds his case here based on the understanding that even though the sūtra is describing a wrong view regarding *vedanā* and *viññāna*, nonetheless the sūtra’s description of the situation suggests that *vedanā* and *viññāna*, as well as all the other *skandhas*, can coexist simultaneously. And, if they can coexist, they are associated.

¹²⁶ SĀ no. 306. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 13) T02, p87c26-9: 眼。色緣生眼識。三事和合觸。觸俱生受。想。思。此四無色陰。眼。色。此等法名為人。於斯等法作人想。眾生。那羅。摩[少/兔]闍。摩那婆。士夫。福伽羅。耆婆。禪頭。AKBh p465.10-14: “*skandheṣveva pudgalādhye” ti mānuṣyakasūtram. “caḥṣuḥpratītya rūpāni cōtpadyate*

which takes form (*rūpa*) as its object, there arises eye-consciousness (*cakṣu-vijñāna*); the coming together of the three things gives rise to (生) contact (*sparsā*);¹²⁷ arising together (*sahajāta* 俱生) [with *sparsā*] are feelings (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*) and so forth. Regarding these dharmas there are various names, namely, ‘sentient being’ (*sattva* 眾生), ‘god’ (*deva* 天), ‘human being’ (*manuṣya* 人), ‘man’ (*puruṣa* 男), ‘woman’ (女), ‘old [person]’ (*jīva* 大), ‘young [person]’ (*jantu* 小), and so forth.” Such names depend on the [five] *skandhas*.

66.3 若說心心數法次第生者。則因二陰有人。不應因五陰。所以者何。不可因去來陰得名為人。汝言現在無五陰者。云何說因五陰名人天等。而此中說因諸陰。非但二也。故因五陰有眾生名。

If [you] claim that *citta* and *caitasikas* arise in succession, then a person should only depend on two *skandhas* instead of five *skandhas*. Why? Because [one] cannot attain the name “person” in dependence [only] on past and future *skandhas*. You state that the present moment does not have [all] five *skandhas*; how can it be said that “god” (*deva*), “human being” (*manuṣya*), and so forth, are named in that way in dependence on five *skandhas*? But [the sūtra] states that they depend on the [five] *skandhas*, not on only two. Therefore, the names “sentient being” (*sattva*), and so forth, depend on five *skandhas*.

66.4 又經中說有相應語。謂有根智相應信。

Moreover, the term “associated” (*saṃprayukta*) is mentioned in the sūtras. For example, [the sūtra has mentioned that] faith (*śraddhā* 信) has a root (**samūlika* 有根) and is associated with knowledge (**jñāna-saṃprayukta* 智相應).¹²⁸

cakṣurvijñānam trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ sparśasahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā itīme catvāro rūpaṇaḥ skandhāśvakṣurindriyaṃ ca rūpametāvanmanuṣyatvamucyate. atreyaṃ saṃjñā sattvo naro manuṣyo mānavaśca poṣaḥ puruṣaḥ pudgalo jīvo janturiti. There appears to be no Pāli parallel for this sūtra. See also 60.13 and its footnote.

¹²⁷ Note here 三事和合生觸 “the coming together of the three things gives rise to contact” instead of 三事和合觸 “the coming together of the three things is contact.” See the discussion of the significance of this difference regarding *sparsā* in 2.3.5.

¹²⁸ MĀ no. 186 求解經. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 48) T01, p732a3-5: 若有此行. 有此力. 深著如來信根已立者. 是謂信見本不壞智相應. Corresponds to M no. 47 *Vīmaṃsaka-sutta* (I 320): *yassa kassaci bhikkhave imehi ākārehi imehi padehi imehi byañjanehi tathāgate saddhā nivīṭṭhā hoti mūlajātā paṭiṭṭhitā, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave ākāravatī saddhā dassanamūlikā daḥhā.* See Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation 1995: 418, 1245n490. Note that the MĀ sūtra has 智相

66.5 又經中說。觸即與受想思俱生。

Moreover, it is mentioned in the sūtra that contact (*sparśa* 觸) arises together (*sahajāta* 俱生) with feelings (*vedanā* 受), apperception (*saṃjñā* 想), and volitional formations (*cetanā* 思).¹²⁹

66.6 又說五枝初禪。

And also [some sūtras] state that the first *dhyāna* has five factors (*aṅga*).¹³⁰

應 “associated with knowledge” which is absent in the Pāli version. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, this phrase constitutes part of the definition of the faith in Buddha, which is one of the four 證淨 *avetya-prāsādas* (No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 6) T26, p393b7-9): 四證淨者。如契經說。成就四法說名預流。何等為四。一佛證淨。二法證淨。三僧證淨。四聖所愛戒。... p393b12-5: 彼以此相隨念諸佛。見為根本證智相應諸信信性。現前信性隨順印可。愛慕愛慕性心澄心淨。是名佛證淨。Similarly No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 2) T26, p461c-462a. Yinshun (Yinshun 印順 1981b: 302-310) points out that *avetya-prāsāda* originally should be *abhedyā-prāsāda*, which is the definition of faith (*śraddhā*). In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, these four purities are attainments of the *srotaāpannas*, which means that they must be accompanied by proper noble knowledges and are therefore 智相應 “associated with knowledge.” However, as Yinshun observes, in early sūtras and also in Yogācāra texts, such types of faith are not necessarily only related to the noble *srotaāpannas* but also occur in ordinary beings. This may explain why the phrase 智相應 “associated with knowledge” is present in Sarvāstivāda texts while absent in the Pāli versions and some other earlier sūtras.

¹²⁹ In 66.2, the opponent quotes the *Mānuṣyaka-sūtra*, which contains this statement; there is no exact Pāli parallel to this sūtra. However, regarding the cognitive process involving consciousness (*vijñāna*), contact (*sparśa*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*cetanā*), and sometimes also craving (*trṣṇā*), there are some textual discrepancies that have great doctrinal significance. A few sūtras in the Āgamas and Nikāyas contain the same or similar statements indicating that *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā*, and *trṣṇā* all exist simultaneously: for example, SĀ no. 273, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p72c8-10: 比丘。譬如兩手和合相對作聲。如是緣眼。色。生眼識。三事和合觸。觸俱生受。想。思。In the partial Pāli parallel for this sūtra, although it does not explicitly state that *sparśa* arises together (*sahajāta*) with *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*, it does say that the activities of feeling, thinking, and apperceiving all follow contact (P. *phassa*) (S no.35.93 (IV 69)): *phuṭṭho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti* (the same phrase occurs in SĀ no.276, T II 73c9-75c16, and also SĀ sūtra Nos. 326, 327, 328, and no. 329 regarding *trṣṇā*). However, some sūtras describe these mental phenomena as arising as a successive sequence: for example, in the Pāli version of the famous “six sixes” (*ṣaṭṣatka*, P. *chachakka*) sūtra, it is said that depending on eye and form there is eye-consciousness, the coming together of the three is contact (*phassa*), depending on *phassa* there is feeling (*vedanā*), depending on *vedanā* there is craving (*taṇhā*) (M no.148, (III 282)): *cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānaṃ, tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā*. (The Chinese version of this 六六 sūtra, SĀ no. 304, T II p86c23-87a25, states that both *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* depend on *sparśa*.) A similar sequence is described in SĀ no.214, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 8) T02, p54a27-8: 眼。色因緣生眼識 ... 此三法和合觸。觸已受。受已思。思已想。The Chinese SĀ has two sūtras stating that *sparśa* occurs together with *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*, but in Pāli the term “arise together” (*sahajāta*) is never used in this context, even though the claim that *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* are all dependent on *sparśa* might be understood as implying that they occur together. In summary, sūtras in both Chinese and Pāli preserve two versions of the description of this cognitive process: one version says that *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā*, and so forth, arise simultaneously with *sparśa*; while the other version says that they arise as a sequence one after another. Here, the opponent is likely quoting from a text similar to the Sarvāstivāda SĀ. See the discussion in 3.4.3.

¹³⁰ The five *dhyāna-aṅgas* (*vitarka, vicāra, prīti, sukha, samādhi*) occur frequently in the Nikāyas and Āgamas. For example, in D I 74-75 it is said that all these five *aṅgas* are present in the first *dhyāna*; the second *dhyāna* has *prīti, sukha*, and *samādhi*; the third *dhyāna* has *sukha*, and *samādhi*; and the fourth *dhyāna* has only *samādhi* accompanied by *upekṣā*.

66.7 亦說受等是識住處。若識無相應。云何識住受等法中。是住名依止住。所以者何。不說識是識住處故。

[Another sūtra] also mentions that feeling (*vedanā*), and so forth, are the stations (*sthiti* 住處) of consciousness (*viññāna-sthiti*).¹³¹ If there is nothing with which *viññāna* is associated, how can it be stationed in dharmas such as *vedanā*, and so forth? Here, “station” (*sthiti* 住) means what supports as a station (**āśraya* 依止住).¹³² Why? [The sūtra] does not state that *viññāna* is the station of *viññāna*.¹³³

66.8 又經中說。是心與法。皆從心生。依止於心。

Moreover, it is mentioned in the sūtra that dharmas that are with *citta* are all born from *citta* and depend on *citta*.¹³⁴

66.9 又說眾生心長夜為貪恚等之所染污。若無相應。云何能染。

Moreover, [the sūtra] states that sentient beings’ minds have long been polluted by greed, anger, and so forth.¹³⁵ If there is no association, how are [they] able to contaminate

¹³¹ The four *skandhas*, namely, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, are considered to be four *viññāna-sthitis*. SĀ nos. 39, 40, 64. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p9a, 9b, 17a. S nos. 22.54, 53, 55 (III 54-55, 53, 58). The list is also given in the *Saṅgīti-sūtra*: No. 01 長阿含經 (卷 8) T01, p51a19-21: 復有四法。謂四識住處。色識住。綠色。住色。與愛俱增長。受。想。行識中亦如是住。D III 228: *catasso viññānaṭṭhitiyo. rūpūpāyaṃ vā, āvuso, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭhati rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati; vedanūpāyaṃ vā āvuso ... pe ... saññūpāyaṃ vā, āvuso ... pe ... saṅkhārūpāyaṃ vā, āvuso, viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭhati saṅkhārārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati*. No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 8) T26, p400c16-20: 四識住者。一色識住。二受識住。三想識住。四行識住。云何色識住。答若色有漏隨順諸取。於彼諸色若過去若未來若現在。或生起欲或貪或瞋或癡。或隨一一心所隨煩惱。是名色識住。受想行識住。廣說亦爾。The MVŚ discusses the *viññāna-sthiti* in detail. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b-708b. Also AKBh p117.21ff.

¹³² AKBh p117.27: *pratiṣṭhā hi sthitiḥ*.

¹³³ The MVŚ offers several answers why *viññāna* itself is not a *viññāna-sthiti*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706c17-707a2: 問何故識非識住。答為識故立識住。如為王故立王座。如王座王床王路亦爾。如王非路路非王。是王所行故名王路。如是識非住住非識。是識所止故名識住。是故識非識住。有說。若法識所乘御。如象馬船人所乘御。彼法立識住非識。乘御於識故識非識住。復次若法與識俱生俱住俱滅。於識有用立為識住。識於識不爾。有說。識住法爾與識俱在現在。是識所住。非識與識得有此事。問自識他識俱在現在。何不展轉立識住耶。答自識於自識非識住故。於他識亦非無異相故。復次於自識親尚非識住。況於疎遠。有說。若法與識三和合生。互有作用立為識住。非識與識三和合生互有作用。故非識住。Also AKBh p117.28ff presents more arguments. See also Kritzer 2005: 138-9.

¹³⁴ This repeats the argument in 61.10, also related to 61.4, in which the opponent quotes the same sūtra to argue that *citta* is the basis or support (**āśraya* 依處) of *caitasikas*. See the discussion in sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.8.

¹³⁵ SĀ no. 267. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 10) T02, p69c10-15: 諸比丘。當善思惟觀察於心。所以者何。長夜心為貪欲所染。瞋恚愚癡所染故。比丘。心惱故眾生惱。心淨故眾生淨。比丘。我不見一色種種如斑色鳥。心復過是。所以者何。彼畜生心種種故色種種。S III 151: *tasmātiha, bhikkhave, abhikkhaṇaṃ sakaṃ cittaṃ paccavekkhitabbaṃ: ‘dīgharattamidaṃ cittaṃ saṅkiliṭṭhaṃ rāgena doseṇa mohenā’i. cittasaṅkilesā, bhikkhave, sattā saṅkiliṭṭhanti;*

[*citta*]?¹³⁶

66.10 又心心數法性羸劣故。相依能緣。喻如束竹相依而立。

Moreover, because *citta* and *caitasikas* are weak by nature, [they] can take objects depending on each other. It is analogous to [two] bundles of reeds that stand relying on each other.¹³⁷

66.11 又經中說。心掉動時。不宜三覺。謂擇法精進喜。更增動故。宜三覺意。謂猗定捨。止發動故。若心懈沒。則不宜三覺。謂猗定捨增退沒。故宜三覺意。擇法精進喜。能發起故。念能俱調。

Moreover, it is mentioned in the *sūtra* that, when [a practitioner's] mind is excited (*uddhata* 掉動), it is not suitable to practice three awakening factors (*bodhyaṅga* 覺意), namely, discrimination of dharmas (*dharmapraṇicaya* 擇法), energy (*vīrya* 精進), and joy (*prīti* 喜), because [they] may [make the mind] more excited. [In such a case] it is suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, tranquility (*praśrabdhi* 猗), concentration (*samādhi* 定), and equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨), because [they] can stop the arousal. If [one's] mind is sluggish (*līna* 懈沒), it is not suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity, [because they] can [make the mind] more sluggish. [In such a case] it is suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, discrimination of dharmas, energy, and joy, [because they] can arouse

cittavodānā sattā visujjanti. Note this is the same *sūtra* quoted in 60.6 and 61.14.

¹³⁶ This is a position attributed to the Vibhajyavādins in the MVŚ. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140c17-22: 有作是說。貪瞋癡相應心得解脫。問誰作是說。答分別論者。彼說染污不染污心其體無異。謂若相應煩惱未斷名染污心。若時相應煩惱已斷名不染心。如銅器等。未除垢時名有垢器等。若除垢已名無垢器等。心亦如是。

¹³⁷ This is recorded as one explanation for the *samprayoga-hetu* in the MVŚ. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b16-21: 問何故心心所法展轉為相應因。答展轉為因故。展轉力生故。展轉相引故。展轉相養故。展轉相增故。展轉相依故。如二蘆束相依而住。多繩相合能牽大木。多人連手能渡大河。有為諸法性羸劣故。展轉相依方辦事業義。Note in the MVŚ the simile has two bundles of reeds while Kumārajīva's translation of the TatSid uses "bundles of bamboo." Also No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81a28-b3: 尊者妙音作如是說。所依所緣行相所作一切同義是相應義。所以者何。諸有為法性羸劣故。展轉力持方能起作。曾不見有一大地法。獨起作故。No. 1552 雜阿毘曇心論 (卷 2) T28, p884b26-9: 若行若依若時若境界心轉。即彼行彼依彼時彼境界受等心法轉。若彼心法轉。即彼心轉性羸劣故。展轉力生如束蘆。是故說心於心法相應因。

[the mind]. Mindfulness (*smṛti* 念) can be helpful in both cases.¹³⁸

66.12 又論師言。一時修習助菩提法。不得相離。

Moreover, certain treatise teachers (**śāstrācārya* 論師) state that [one] should practice the factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipākṣika* 助菩提法) all at once and not separately.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ SĀ no. 714. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 27) T02, p192a14-22: 佛告比丘。如是微劣心生。微劣猶豫。當於爾時修擇法覺分。精進覺分。喜覺分。示教照喜。若掉心生。掉心猶豫。修猗覺分。定覺分。捨覺分。所以者何。掉心生。掉心猶豫。此等諸法。能令內住一心攝持。譬如燃火。欲令其滅。足其煤炭。彼火則滅。如是。比丘。掉心猶豫。修擇法覺分。精進。喜。則非時。修猗定捨覺分。自此則是時。S no.46.53 (V 112-5): "*yasmim, bhikkhave, samaye līnaṃ cittaṃ hoti, akālo tasmim samaye passaddhisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, akālo samādhisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, akālo upekkhāsambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya... yasmiñca kho, bhikkhave, samaye līnaṃ cittaṃ hoti, kālo tasmim samaye dhammavicayasambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, kālo vīriyasambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, kālo pītisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya... Yasmim, bhikkhave, samaye uddhataṃ cittaṃ hoti, akālo tasmim samaye dhammavicayasambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, akālo vīriyasambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, akālo pītisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya... yasmiñca kho, bhikkhave, samaye uddhataṃ cittaṃ hoti, kālo tasmim samaye passaddhisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, kālo samādhisambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya, kālo upekkhāsambojjhaṅgassa bhāvanāya...satiñca khvāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sabbatthikaṃ vadāmi*" ti.

The MVŚ records that this sūtra passage is used by the Dārṣṭāntikas to prove that *caitasikas* are not different from *citta* and cannot occur simultaneously; instead, they can only occur successively, one in each moment. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p493c25-494a8: 謂或有說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如譬喻者。大德亦說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如多商侶過一狹路。要一一過非二非多。諸心所法亦復如是。一一各別生相所生。必無一時和合生義。問彼依何量作如是說。答依至教量。謂契經說。若於爾時心沈恐沈。修三覺支名非時修。謂輕安定捨。修三覺支名是時修。謂擇法精進喜。若於爾時心掉恐掉。修三覺支名非時修。謂擇法精進喜。修三覺支名是時修。謂輕安定捨。彼作是說。覺支既有時非時修。故知心所次第而生。非一時起。

This passage is also discussed in Gethin 2001: 178-9. Also, it should be noted that in the opponent's quotation the excited state is mentioned first and the sluggish state the second, while all the other sources (Chinese SĀ, Pāli S, and the MVŚ) mention the sluggish state first. It could be the case that the opponent is quoting a version of the sūtra that differs from all the sources available to us, or it is also possible that the difference represents a memory slip and that the order should not be considered important.

¹³⁹ In the Pāli Abhidhamma system, when the practitioner has achieved purification by knowing and seeing (*ñāṇadassana-visuddhi*), all thirty-seven factors are fulfilled and will be present in one moment of *citta*. Vism XXII.2 (PTS ed. p672): *sotāpattimaggo sakadāgāmiṃmaggo anāgāmiṃmaggo arahattamaggoti imesu pana catusu maggesu ñāṇaṃ ñāṇadassanavisuddhi nāma*. XXII.32-33 (PTS ed. P678): *paripūṇṇabodhipakkhiyabhāvo... XXII.39 (PTS ed. P. 680) imesaṃ pana catunnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ uppattikāle ekacitte labbhanti*. See also Gethin 1998: 192; Gethin 2001: 23, 303-4. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma it is said that multiple factors among the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikas* can coexist in different levels of practice, but it never states that one should practice all the thirty-seven at once. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p497b24-c15: 問何地有幾菩提分法。答未至定中有三十六。除喜覺支。初靜慮中具三十七。靜慮中間及第三第四靜慮各唯有三十五。除喜覺支及正思惟。第二靜慮有三十六。除正思惟。前三無色有三十二。除喜覺支及正思惟正語業命。欲界有頂各有二十二。除覺支。道支唯無漏故。若覺支前說道支者。欲界有頂亦有道支通有漏故。已說依地。現在前今當說。問何地有幾菩提分法俱時現前。答未至定中有三十六菩提分法。唯三十三俱時現前。除三念住。所以者何。以四念住所緣各別。尚無有二俱時現前。況有三四。初靜慮中具三十七。唯三十四俱時現前。除三念住。靜慮中間及第三第四靜慮各三十五。唯三十二俱時現前除三念住。第二靜慮有三十六。唯三十三俱時現前。除三念住。前三無色有三十二。唯二十九俱時現前。除三念住。欲界有頂有二十二。唯有十九俱時現前。除三念住餘隨義說非要別體。The idea that the thirty-seven factors can arise simultaneously appears in some early Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras. For example, the *Daśabhūmika* p.37: *evamasya bhavanto jinaputrā bodhisattvasya dūraṅgamāyāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau sthitasya imā daśa pāramitāḥ kṣaṇe kṣaṇe paripūryante. evaṃ catvāri saṃgrahavastūni paripūryante, catvāri ca adhiṣṭhānāni, saptatrimśad bodhipakṣyāśca dharmāḥ, trīni ca vimokṣasamukhāni, samāsataḥ sarvabodhyaṅgikā dharmāḥ kṣaṇe kṣaṇe paripūryante*. No. 278 大方廣佛華嚴經 (卷 25) T9, p561c7-9: 是菩薩具足十波羅蜜時。四攝法。三十七品。三解脫門。一切助阿耨多羅三

66.13 故知有相應。

Therefore, one knows that there is association.

藐三菩提法。於念念中。皆悉具足。No. 220c 大般若波羅蜜多經 (卷 466) T7, p359a27-b1: 爾時具壽善現白佛言。世尊。云何菩薩摩訶薩行深般若波羅蜜多時。一心現起則能攝受六波羅蜜多。亦能攝受四靜慮四無量無色定。亦能攝受三十七菩提分法。No. 1604 大乘莊嚴經論 (卷 13) T31, p657c16-7: 第七地名得覺。菩薩住無相力。能念念中修三十七覺分故。

非相應品第六十七

Chapter 67. Refuting Association

67.1 汝言見受是神。是事不然。凡夫癡惑。妄生此見。不能分別此是受。此識依止。是人若能如是分別。亦能入空。是人見心相續不別。但著語言。故如此說。是癡惑語不可信也。

You said that one perceives feeling (*vedanā*) as the self, [and so forth].¹⁴⁰ This is not correct. An ordinary person (*pṛthagjana* 凡夫) comes to this [wrong] view by ignorance and delusion. [He] cannot distinguish, “This is feeling, this is what *viññāna* depends on.” If this person can distinguish in this way, he can also enter emptiness.¹⁴¹ The [ordinary] person sees the continuous series of consciousness (*citta-santati* 心相續), and cannot make the distinction [of the *skandhas*] but only attaches to words (**vacana*), so he makes such a statement. This is an ignorant and deluded statement and not reliable.

67.2 汝言因諸陰故名為人者。是因五陰相續名人。故說諸陰。如世間言樂人苦人不苦不樂人。不可一時有此三受。諸陰亦然。

You said that one is called a “person” (*pudgala* 人) based on the [simultaneous] five *skandhas*.¹⁴² One is called a “person” based on the continuous series (*santati* 相續) of the five *skandhas*; therefore, it is said that [a person] is the *skandhas*. Just as people in the world say someone [feels] pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant; [such a person] cannot have all these three feelings simultaneously. In the same manner, the *skandhas* [cannot occur simultaneously].

67.3 汝言有根智相應信。經中亦說餘事相應。如說二比丘於一事中相應。又說怨相應苦。愛別離苦。汝法中色無相應。而此以世俗故亦名相應。智信亦爾。信能信無常等。慧隨了知。共成一事。故名相應。

¹⁴⁰ See 66.1.

¹⁴¹ One who can correctly analyze the five aggregates should enter the truth of emptiness.

¹⁴² See 66.2.

You mentioned faith (*śraddhā*) that has a root and is associated with knowledge [as a proof for association].¹⁴³ [But] in the sūtras, other things are also mentioned as associated. For example, [the sūtra] says that two bhikṣus are associated with regard to a single task. [Other sūtras] also mention suffering from the association with people one dislikes (*apriya-samprayoga-duḥkha* 怨相應苦) and suffering from the separation from loved ones (*priya-viprayoga-duḥkha* 愛別離苦). In your system, form (*rūpa*) cannot be associated [with other things],¹⁴⁴ but [people] conventionally also refer to it as associated [with other things]. In the same manner, faith and knowledge are also [referred to as associated]. [One with] faith can have faith in [the teaching of] impermanence, and so forth, wisdom (*prajñā*) follows understanding, [and these two] together achieve the same goal. Therefore, they are referred to as associated (*saṃprayukta*).

67.4 汝言從觸即有受等俱生。是事不然。世間有事雖小相遠亦名為俱。如言與弟子俱行。亦如頂生王生心即到天上。是事亦然。凡夫識造緣時。四法必次第生。識次生想。想次生受。受次生思。思¹⁴⁵及憂喜等。從此生貪恚癡。故說即生。

You said that [according to the sūtra], from contact (*sparśa*), feelings, and so forth, arise together (俱).¹⁴⁶ This is not correct. In the world, there are things that are also referred to as “together” even though they [occur] slightly apart [from one another in] time (小相遠). Just like the statement that [a teacher] walks together with [his] students or the king Māndhātṛ immediately arrives at the heaven as soon as he has the thought (*sahacittopādād rājā māndhātā ... āgatya* 生心即到),¹⁴⁷ [in these two cases “together”

¹⁴³ See 66.4.

¹⁴⁴ In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *saṃprayukta-hetu* is only applicable to *citta* and *caitasika*.

¹⁴⁵ Although all the Chinese editions have two 思 here, the second 思 would appear to be a superfluous copy error; it breaks the four-character pattern, and grammatically it makes no sense in the sentence.

¹⁴⁶ See 66.5.

¹⁴⁷ This interpretation of the term *saha* 俱 also occurs in the MVŚ: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 161) T27, p818b16-8: 問若爾何故說俱行耶。答於前後義俱聲亦轉。如世尊說。曼馱多王起此想俱即便墮落。Saṅghabhadra also discusses this meaning of *saha* in the **Nyāyānusāra*: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 13) T29, p403b4-8: 曼馱多等。契經俱言。理實應顯無間起義。以非愛業與非愛果。決定不應同時生故。又彼經說第五轉故。如彼經說。曼馱多王惡心起故。俱時墮落。此顯後時方墮落義。But both the MVŚ and the **Nyāyānusāra* use the example that the king Māndhātṛ has an evil thought and immediately falls back to the human world from heaven, while Harivarman’s example refers to the king’s ascent to heaven. For the story of the King Māndhātṛ, see MĀ no. 60 四洲, T I 494b10-496a14; Divy no. 17 *Māndhātāvadāna* (Cowell and Neil 1886: 200-28; Vaidya 1959: 125-141); J no. 258 *Mandhātujātaka* (II 310-4).

(*saha* 俱) indicates a very short interval in time.] It is the same in this case [of *sparśa* and *vedanā*, and so forth]. When an ordinary being's consciousness takes an object, four dharmas must arise in succession: apperception (*saṃjñā* 想) arises after consciousness (*viññāna* 識), feeling (*vedanā* 受) arises after *saṃjñā*, volitional formations (*cetanā* 思) arise after *vedanā*, and after *cetanā*, unpleasantness and pleasantness (*duḥkha sukha* 憂喜), and so forth, and from these arise greed, hatred, ignorance. Therefore, it is claimed that [they] arise immediately.

67.5 汝言五枝初禪。是禪地中有此五枝。非是一時。如欲界三受。所以者何。以先說法後說地故。又覺觀不得相應。先已答。

You mentioned the first *dhyāna*, which has five factors (*aṅga*) [as a proof for association].¹⁴⁸ [This means that] in the level (*bhūmi* 地) of this *dhyāna*, there are such five factors; [it does not mean that] they are simultaneous. It is just like the three types of feelings in the realm of sensual desire (*kāma-dhātu*).¹⁴⁹ Why? Because [the sūtra] mentions the [*aṅga*] dharmas first, then mentions the level (*bhūmi*). Furthermore, as [I] have answered earlier, *vitarka* and *vicāra* should not be associated.¹⁵⁰

67.6 汝言識處者。此經中說識緣處。不說依處。何以知之。即此經中說識緣色喜潤故住。汝雖言若識緣識住。則應有五識處。是事不然。所以者何。是識時少。識識事已。心生想等。是中起愛。起愛因緣。說名識處。是故不說識是識處。又七識處中亦說識是識處。

You mentioned the stations of consciousness (*viññāna-sthiti* 識處) [as a proof for association].¹⁵¹ [But] in this sūtra, [the Buddha] mentions [the four *viññāna-sthitis*] as the object-stations (**ālabhana-sthiti* 緣處) of *viññāna*, not as the support-stations

¹⁴⁸ See 66.6.

¹⁴⁹ In 67.2, Harivarman uses feelings as an example to show that saying that someone has feeling does not necessarily mean that all three kinds of feeling must occur at once.

¹⁵⁰ Harivarman has argued in 65.12-13 and 65.17 that *vitarka* and *vicāra* cannot occur simultaneously. *Vitarka* and *vicāra* are two of the five *dhyāna-aṅgas*.

¹⁵¹ See 66.7. In this passage, Kumārajīva translates *sthiti* as 處, which is slightly different from 66.7, where he translates it as 住 and 住處.

(**āśraya-sthiti* 依處).¹⁵² How is this known? In the same sūtra, it is mentioned that *vijñāna* takes form (*rūpa*) as its object (*ālambana*) and is stationed in it because [form] is moistened with delight (*nandi-upasecana* 喜潤). You may argue that if a *vijñāna* can also take [another] *vijñāna* as its object, [then *vijñāna* should also be referred to as a station of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti*)], and then there should be five *vijñāna-sthitis*. This is not correct. Why? *Vijñāna* exists only a short time. Having cognized an object, it gives rise to apperception (*saṃjñā* 想) and so forth, and from them there arises craving (*trṣṇā* 愛). Because if there is craving, [consciousness is established,]¹⁵³ it is called *vijñāna-sthiti*.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, *vijñāna* is not said to be a *vijñāna-sthiti*. Moreover, in the [teaching of] seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, *vijñāna* is also referred to as a *vijñāna-sthiti*.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² The MVŚ lists five types of *vijñāna-sthitis*: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b24-5: 有多種識住。謂相應識住。俱有識住。所依識住。所緣識住。所行識住。

¹⁵³ This statement has its basis in the sūtra: S no.12.64 (II 101): *kabaḷikāre ce, bhikkhave, āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandī atthi taṇhā, paṭiṭṭhitam tattha viññāṇaṃ virūlham*.

¹⁵⁴ The MVŚ records four interpretations of the term *vijñāna-sthitis*; this sections presents the second and third opinions regarding delight (*nandi* 喜) and craving (*trṣṇā* 愛). No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b27-c3: 何因緣故說名識住。答識於此中住。等住近住故名識住。如馬等所住名馬等住。有說。此中慧所潤識增長廣大故名識住。有說。此中愛所潤識攝受不離故名識住。有說。此中諸有漏識隨順取識生起執著。安住增長故名識住。

¹⁵⁵ The *Mahānidāna-sutta* (D II 69; DĀ no. 3 大緣方便經, No. 01 長阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p62a25-b19) mentions the seven *viññāṇa-tiṭṭhis* and the two bases (*āyatana*) that supposedly cover all levels of samsāric existence. The seven *vijñāna-tiṭṭhis* are (based on Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation, 1995: 55-6): (1) beings diverse in body and diverse in perception (*nānattakāyā nānattasaññino*), such as human beings and some gods, as well as some beings in the lower realms; (2) beings diverse in body but identical in perception (*nānattakāyā ekattasaññino*), such as the gods of the Brahma-order who are generated through the first *jhāna* (*brahmacāyikā paṭhamābhiniḥṅgā*); (3) beings who are identical in body but diverse in perception, such as the gods of streaming radiance (*devā ābhassarā*); (4) beings who are identical in body and identical in perception, such as the gods of refulgent beauty (*devā subhakinhā*); (5) beings who arrive at the base of infinity of space (*ākāśānañcāyatana*); (6) beings who arrive at the infinity of consciousness (*viññāṇañcāyatana*); and (7) beings who arrive at the base of nothingness (*ākāśañcāyatana*). Among the seven, the sixth one is the level of “the infinity of consciousness” (*viññāṇañcāyatana*), which is why Harivarman claims that *vijñāna* is a *sthiti* within this list of seven. The two bases (*āyatana*) are the base of non-percipient beings (*asaññasattāyatana*) and the base of neither apperception nor non-apperception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*). Concerning the question why *vijñāna* is not a *sthiti* within the list of the four *vijñāna-sthitis*, but a *sthiti* in the seven, see No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p707af. AKBh p.115.20ff. Apparently, in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, among the seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, all five skandhas, including the *vijñāna-skandha*, are considered *vijñāna-sthitis*. The MVŚ answers why the four *vijñāna-sthitis* exclude *vijñāna* while the seven *vijñāna-sthitis* include *vijñāna* by interpreting the term “*sthiti*” differently in each case: namely, in the case of the four *vijñāna-sthitis*, “*sthiti*” refers to things that *vijñāna* “rides” (識所乘御), that function together with *vijñāna* (與識俱行。親近和合); in the case of the seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, “*sthiti*” refers to things that have a causal relationship with *vijñāna* (若法與識為因為果。展轉相資). No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p708a24-b1: 問何故四識住中識非識住。七識住中識是識住。答由別因故立四識住。由別因故立七識住。謂若有法識所乘御。與識俱行。親近和合。立四識住。識望於識無如是事故。不立在四識住中。若法與識為因為果。展轉相資。立七識住。識望於識有如是事。是故立在七識住中。AKBh (p.118.6-7) records another opinion, which proposes that in the case of the seven *vijñāna-sthitis* the five *skandhas* are taken as a whole and not analyzed: *evaṃ tarhy abhednopapattiyāyanasamgrhīṭesu skandheṣu sābhirāmāyāṃ vijñānapravṛttā vijñānaṃ vijñānasthitiḥ*.

67.7 又應思此經。勿但隨語。如說信能度河。是言不盡。而實以慧得度。是亦應爾。 Moreover, [you] should consider [the meaning] of the sūtra and not simply follow [its] words. For example, [a sūtra] states that [one] can cross a river by faith (*śraddhā* 信).¹⁵⁶ In such a case, the words are not exhaustive. In fact, one is liberated by wisdom (*prajñā* 慧). It should also be understood in the same manner in this case [regarding the four *vijñāna-sthitis*].

67.8 汝言心數依心。是事不然。先心識事後生想等故。

You mention [the sūtra teaches that] *caitasikas* rely on *citta* [as a proof for association].¹⁵⁷ This is not correct. *Citta* cognizes the object first, then gives rise to apperception (*saṃjñā*), and so forth.

67.9 又經中說。受等依心。非如彩畫依壁。是名心數依心。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra that feelings (*vedanā*), and so forth, depend on *citta*. It is not like the case of colorful paintings that “depend on” the wall.¹⁵⁸ [One should understand the statement that] “*caitasikas* depend on *citta*” in this way.¹⁵⁹

67.10 汝言心數相依如束竹者。與經相違。若俱相應。何故心數依心。而心不依數。若汝謂心先生。大故。數法依止。則成我義。以心生時。無數法故。

¹⁵⁶ This is from the *Dharmapada*. No. 210 法句經 (卷 1) T04, p560c8: 信能度河 其福難奪。

¹⁵⁷ See 66.8.

¹⁵⁸ S no. 22.100 (III 152): *seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, rajako vā cittakārako vā rajanāya vā lākhāya vā haliddiyā vā nīliyā vā mañjeṭṭhiyā vā supariṃṭṭhe phalake vā bhittiyā vā dussapaṭṭe vā iṭṭhirūpaṃ vā purisarūpaṃ vā abhinimmineyya sabbaṅgapaccaṅgim; evameva kho, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano rūpaññeva abhinibbattento abhinibbatteti, vedanaññeva ... pe ... saññaññeva ... saṅkhāreyeva ... viññāṇaññeva abhinibbattento abhinibbatteti*. SĀ no. 267, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 10) T02, p69c23-70a3: 譬如畫師畫師弟子。善治素地。具眾彩色。隨意圖畫種種像類。如是比丘。凡愚眾生不如實知色。色集色滅色味色患色離。於色不如實知故。樂著於色。樂著色故。復生未來諸色。如是凡愚不如實知受想行識。識集識滅識味識患識離。不如實知故。樂著於識。樂著識故。復生未來諸識。當生未來色受想行識故。於色不解脫。受想行識不解脫。我說彼不解脫生老病死憂悲惱苦。The simile also appears in S no. 12.64 (II 101-2). SĀ nos. 377, 378 (T II 103b18-19, b29-c2).

¹⁵⁹ The simile in the sūtra identifies *citta* with the painter rather than with the wall. Note the puns in the narrative: 畫師 “painter” (*citrakāra/cittakāra*) and 種種 “various” (*citra/citta*) are playing with the pun *citra* and *citta*. In MIA languages such as Pāli these two words are spelt in the same form *citta*. From this it is certain that this sūtra was composed originally in a MIA language. Also 集 “accumulation” is based on a pseudo-etymology of *citta* as from √ *ci* “to accumulate.” The Pāli commentary understands the painter as representing karma. See Bodhi 2000: 775n174.

You mention that *caitasikas* depend on each other like bundles of reeds¹⁶⁰ [as a proof for association]. This contradicts the sūtra. If [*caitasikas* and *citta*] are associated with each other, why [does the sūtra state that] *caitasikas* depend on *citta*, but not vice versa? If you say that *citta* arises first because it is prominent, [and] *caitasikas* depend on [it], then [this is tantamount to] my thesis because when *citta* arises there are no *caitasikas*.

67.11 汝言煩惱染心故知相應。此無道理。若心先淨。貪等來污。是即淨法可污。則害法相。

You said that because defilements contaminate *citta*, one knows that there is association.¹⁶¹ This is unreasonable. If *citta* is first pure, and greed, and so forth, come and contaminate [it], then a pure dharma can be polluted, which contradicts the characteristic of the dharma (**dharma-lakṣaṇa* 法相).

67.12 亦如先說。心性本淨。客塵來污。彼應答此。若心本性淨。貪等何為。

Also as mentioned earlier,¹⁶² [some suggest that] *citta* is pure by nature and accidental defilements (*akasmāt-kleśa* 客塵) come and contaminate it. One should answer thus: if *citta* is pure by nature, what can greed, and so forth, do [to *citta*]?¹⁶³

67.13 如言心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。然則眾生亦應相應。若眾生不可相應。貪等亦不相應。

As it is said [in the sūtra],¹⁶⁴ when [their] minds are defiled, sentient beings are defiled; when [their] minds are purified, sentient beings are purified. In that case, a sentient being should also capable of being associated [with defilements]. If a sentient being is not

¹⁶⁰ See 66.10. Section 67.10 contains the answer to the second half of 66.10; the first half of 66.10 is answered in 67.21.

¹⁶¹ See 66.9.

¹⁶² See chapter 30.

¹⁶³ Here Harivarman holds a position similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b24-c9: 復次為止他宗顯正義故。謂或有執心性本淨。如分別論者。彼說心本性清淨客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨。為止彼執顯示心性非本清淨客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨。若心本性清淨客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨者。何不客塵煩惱本性染污與本性清淨心相應故其相清淨。若客塵煩惱本性染污雖與本性清淨心相應而相不清淨。亦應心本性清淨不由客塵煩惱相不清淨。義相似故。又此本性淨心為在客塵煩惱先生。為俱時生。若在先生。應心生已住待煩惱。若爾應經二剎那住。有違宗失。若俱時生。云何可說心性本淨。汝宗不說有未來心可言本淨。為止如是他宗異執及顯自宗無顛倒理故作斯論。

¹⁶⁴ See 60.6 and 61.14.

capable of being associated [with defilements], greed, and so forth, also are not associated [with *citta*].

67.14 以心相續行中。生垢等心。污諸相續。故說染心。

In the continuous series (*santati* 相續) of *citta*, there arise defiled *cittas* that contaminate the series [of *citta*]. Therefore, it is referred to as polluted *citta*.

67.15 如說從染心得解脫。是心相續中。若淨心生。名得解脫。是事亦然。

In the same way, when *citta* is said to be liberated from defilements, pure *cittas* arise in the continuous series of *citta*; thus, it is called liberated. This case, [i.e. the purification of mind,] is the same [as the defilement of mind].

67.16 如雲霧等雖不與日月相應。亦能為翳。貪等亦然。雖不與心相應。亦能染污。又煙雲霧等能蔽日月。故名為翳。貪等亦爾。能障淨心。故名為污。

It is like clouds, fog, and so forth, although [they] are not associated with the sun and the moon, still [they] can conceal [the sun and the moon]. In the same way, greed, and so forth, although not associated with *citta*, still can contaminate [*citta*]. Also smoke, clouds, and fog can conceal the sun and moon and hence are referred to as “concealments” (**upakleśa* 翳). Greed, and so forth, can obstruct pure *citta* and hence are referred to as defilements (*kleśa* 污).¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ This is a simile from a sūtra. A no.4.50 (II 53): *cattārome, bhikkhave, candimasūriyānaṃ upakkilesā, yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhā candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti. katame cattāro? abbhā, bhikkhave, candimasūriyānaṃ upakkilesā, yena upakkilesena upakkiliṭṭhā candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti. ahikā... dhūmo rajo... rāhu, bhikkhave, asurindo candimasūriyānaṃ upakkilesa, yena upakkilesena upakkiliṭṭhā candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti.*

EĀ no. 28.2 No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 20) T02, p650a9-13: 爾時。世尊告諸比丘。今日月有四重翳。使不得放光明。何等為四。一者雲也。二者風塵。三者烟。四者阿須倫。使覆日月不得放光明。是謂。比丘。日月有此四翳。使日月不得放大光明。

JP No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p922b13-20: 世尊亦說。苾芻當知。此日月輪。五翳所翳。不明不照。不廣不淨。何等為五。一雲。二烟。三塵。四霧。五曷邏呼阿素洛手如日月輪。非與五翳相合相應相雜彼翳未離。此日月輪。不明不照。不廣不淨。彼翳若離。此日月輪。明照廣淨。如是非此心與貪瞋癡相合。相應相雜。而貪瞋癡未斷。心不解脫。貪瞋癡斷。心便解脫。

MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p141a2-28: 世尊亦說苾芻當知。此日月輪五翳所翳。不明不照不廣不淨。何等為五。一雲。二烟。三塵。四霧。五曷邏呼阿素洛手... 如日月輪非與五翳相合相應相雜。彼翳未離此日月輪不明不照不廣不淨。彼翳若離此日月輪。明照廣淨。如是非此心與貪瞋癡相合相應相雜。而貪瞋癡未斷心不解脫。貪瞋癡斷心便解脫。此中意說。如日月輪非與五翳從本已來相應相雜。後時離彼明照廣淨。

67.17 問曰。雲霧日月。在一時中。煩惱與心不如是。故此喻非也。

[The opponent] challenges: clouds, fog, the sun, and the moon can occur simultaneously. [But in your system,] defilements and *citta* are not [simultaneous]. Therefore, this simile is not appropriate.

67.18 答曰。障礙同故。是事已成。故無咎也。

Answer: Because [both clouds, and so forth, and defilements] can obstruct, hence [the simile] is successful [in showing the similarity]. Therefore, there is no fault.

67.19 是煩惱能污心相續。故名為染。

Because defilements can contaminate the continuous series of *citta*, they are named contaminants (*anuśaya* 染).

67.20 汝言數從心生依止心者。是事先答。

You mention that *caitasikas* are born from *citta* and depend on *citta* [as a proof for association].¹⁶⁶ I have already answered this.¹⁶⁷

67.21 汝言心心數法性羸劣者。以念念滅。故名羸劣。非相助故。能行於緣。若相助者。應得暫住。而實不見。有相助力。何用相應。

You said that *citta* and *caitasikas* are weak (**daurbalya* 羸劣) by nature [and they must assist each other in taking objects].¹⁶⁸ [*Citta* and *caitasika*] are referred to as “weak” because [they] perish moment by moment,¹⁶⁹ not because [they] must assist each other to

心亦如是。非從無始與貪瞋癡相應相雜。後時離彼名得解脫。是故要離貪瞋癡心後彼斷時名得解脫。其理決定。Note that A 4.50 and EĀ 28.2 both list four concealments (*upakleśa* P. *upakkileśa*), while the JP contains five. It is likely that the JP and the MVŚ follow the sūtra from the Sarvāstivāda EĀ, which is not extant now. We are not sure which version Harivarman follows because he does not give a list.

¹⁶⁶ See 66.8.

¹⁶⁷ This argument of the opponent was answered in 67.8 and 67.9. Similarly, in 67.21 Harivarman answers 66.10 once again. It is unclear why Harivarman responds to these arguments twice.

¹⁶⁸ This passage answers the first half of the opponent’s argument in 66.10. The second half is answered in 67.10.

¹⁶⁹ Chapters 73 and 74 of the TatSid record arguments concerning whether *citta* is momentary. Apparently, Harivarman’s position is that *citta* is momentary, and it cannot abide even temporarily.

be able to function with regard to an object.¹⁷⁰ If [they] assist each other, [they] should be able to abide temporarily. But in fact, [we] do not find [that they can abide]. [Also, if they] have the power to assist each other, what is the use of association?

67.22 汝言覺意相宜。是說隨時應修三覺。非一念中。如舍利弗言。我於七覺。自在能入。若心掉動。爾時應修猗等三覺。

[The sūtra] you have quoted teaches the proper practice of the *bodhyaṅgas*,¹⁷¹ that is to say, [the practitioner] should practice three *bodhyaṅgas* according to suitable occasions, not in the same moment. As it is said by Śāriputra, “I can enter the seven *bodhyaṅgas* at will.”¹⁷² When *citta* is excited, at that time [one] should practice three *bodhyaṅgas* such as tranquility, and so forth.

67.23 又佛亦說覺法次第。

Moreover, the Buddha also teaches the [seven] *bodhyaṅgas* as a sequence.¹⁷³

67.24 汝言一時修菩提分。是事不然。若一時修三十七品。則應一時並修二信及五念等。

You said that [one can] practice the [thirty-seven] *bodhipāṅśikas* all at once;¹⁷⁴ this is not correct. If [one can] practice the thirty-seven *bodhipāṅśikas* all at once, [he] should

¹⁷⁰ The MVŚ records two opinions on this notion of being “weak” (**daurbalya* 羸劣). Harivarman adopts the first opinion and attacks the second one concerning the relationship between *citta* and *caitasika*. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 55) T27, p283b29-c9: 自性羸劣者。謂諸有為法從緣生性立自性名。有說。有為有生滅故自性羸劣。有說。有為從緣生故自性羸劣。如契經說。苾芻當知。色是無常。諸因諸緣能生色者亦是無常。既是無常因緣所起色云何常。受想行識亦復如是。由羸劣故諸有為法。或四緣生或三緣生或二緣生。尚無一緣獨能生者。何況無緣。故有為法自性羸劣。如羸病者。或四人扶或三人扶。或二人扶方能起住。尚無一人獨令起住。何況無人。

¹⁷¹ See 66.11.

¹⁷² SĀ no. 718. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 27) T2, p193b15-22: 爾時。尊者舍利弗告諸比丘。有七覺分。何等為七。謂念覺分。擇法覺分。精進覺分。喜覺分。猗覺分。定覺分。捨覺分。此七覺分決定而得。不勤而得。我隨所欲。覺分正受。若晨朝時。日中時。日暮時。若欲正受。隨其所欲。多入正受。譬如王大臣。有種種衣服。置箱篋中。隨其所須。日中所須。日暮所須。隨欲自在。 S no.46.4 (V 71): *sattime āvuso bojjhaṅgā. katame satta. sattsambojjhaṅgo. dhammavicaya°. viriya°. pīti°. passaddhi°. samādhi°. upekkhāsambojjhaṅgo. ... imesaṃ khvāham āvuso sattannam bojjhaṅgānaṃ yena yena bojjhaṅgena ākāṅkhāmi pubbaṅhasamayam viharitum tena tena bojjhaṅgena pubbaṅhasamayam viharāmi...* MVŚ records this as an argument for the position that the *bodhyaṅgas* cannot coexist. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a8-14: 又餘經說。舍利子言。我於七覺支定能隨意自在住。謂我欲於此覺支定日初分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日中分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日後分住。即便能住。彼作是說。既舍利子於七覺支隨所欲住。故知心所次第而生。非一時起。其理決定。

¹⁷³ This repeats the same argument as in 65.26.

¹⁷⁴ See 66.12.

practice at the same time two faith factors, five mindfulness factors, and so forth.¹⁷⁵

67.25 若汝意謂隨得處修即是離修。又隨地所得如二禪等。故名不離。

If you think that “to practice separately” (離修) means that [one] practices [the *bodhyaṅgas*] according to the place [where one] attains [them], actually [one practices them] according to the level (*bhūmi* 地) [in which one] attains [them], such as the second *dhyāna*, and so forth, [and all the *bodhyaṅgas* are present in such levels]. Therefore, [it is in this sense that the *bodhyaṅgas*] are referred to as not [practiced] separately.¹⁷⁶

67.26 又一時三十七品。則無道理。所以者何。一念不得修多法。

Then it would be unreasonable [to say] that the thirty-seven *bodhipāṅśikas* occur all at once. Why? [One] cannot practice multiple dharmas in one moment.

¹⁷⁵ See 60.3. Faith (*śraddhā*) is both a faculty (*indriya*) and a power (*bala*). Mindfulness (*smṛti*) is included in five categories: *smṛty-upasthāna*, *indriya*, *bala*, *bodhyaṅga*, and *saṃyak-smṛti*.

¹⁷⁶ This sentence is difficult to understand, and the interpretation offered here may not be correct. Ui (1929: 153) simply glosses the words in Japanese and does not offer any additional comments. Both Katsura (1974: 143) and Sastri (1978: 141) skip this sentence in their English translations. Sastri (1975: 171) reconstructs the Sanskrit as follows: *yanmanyase yathāprāptisthānaṃ [kiñcit] bhāvayatīti. sa evā[nyasya] bhāvanāvīyogaḥ. dvayo dhyānādivadanya labdhavaśāttu aviyoga ucyate.*

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<http://gandhari.org/>

CBETA: 中華電子佛典協會 Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association

<http://cbeta.org/>

SAT 大正新脩大藏經テキストデータベース

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