

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2009:



*Counterterrorism Policy Recommendations and
Implications*

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
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"It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It's morale that wins the victory."

--George C. Marshall

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
*Counterterrorism Policy Recommendations and
Implications*

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

OVERVIEW

Consistent with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism published in 2006 and updated in 2007, we maintain that protecting and defending the Homeland—our people and their livelihoods—remains the most essential of our duties. We will not waver in its common defense, and we will continue to use all levers of our power to keep America safe.

America is at war. Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks executed by al Qa'ida operatives located in Afghanistan and supported by the Taliban. By February 2002, the Taliban had been driven from power and was reduced to a struggling political force with a discredited ideology. Yet initial success was quickly overshadowed by the difficulties of Operation Iraqi Freedom launched less than two years later. US military operations quickly displaced Saddam Hussein and his ruling Ba'ath Party from power, yet sectarian strife and the resulting lawlessness created an environment that was conducive to terrorist operations.

Our brave men and women in uniform have performed nobly in both of these endeavors, yet both campaigns are in need of strategic reappraisal if we are to succeed in our long-term goal: creating an international community hostile towards the notion that innocent civilians are legitimate targets of political violence. We will conduct a phased withdrawal of forces from Iraq and focus on finishing the job in Afghanistan.

This National Security Strategy begins with a simple premise. Our campaign against terrorism will be a protracted war of attrition requiring a nuanced approach to intelligence analysis and threat assessments. This requires us to revisit Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence while focusing our efforts on intelligence

gathering and law enforcement directed toward rooting out an enemy that does not respect the traditional rules of warfare.

America must employ a 21st century approach to international security that combines elements of military force where most effective, diplomacy where lacking, and local and multilateral support where it can be useful. Through this approach, we aim to enhance our international cooperative partnerships while reminding the world—friends and foes alike—that transnational terrorism is not strictly an American problem.

The United States maintains the world's most formidable military and sophisticated intelligence collection apparatus, and these resources remain vital to our national security. Our current strategy against terrorism accepts unsustainable risks in terms of American lives and money. Despite our enormous sacrifices, no clear victor has emerged. This is an indication that our current strategy is misguided.

Effective diplomacy will be central in our approach to counterterrorism. Military might alone is insufficient to convince the world that our actions are aligned with our professed values. Public relations campaigns will be waged in an effort to confront propaganda that masquerades violent radicalism as religion and seeks to portray the United States as an 'enemy' of Islam.

We recognize that as we engage in efforts to counter terrorist networks, the United States' material resources are not limitless. Transnational terrorist networks will be confronted with an international cooperative partnership that proactively identifies, tracks, and brings to justice those that would employ terrorism as a tactic to achieve political ends.

Vital to our strategy is a prioritization of America's counterterrorism efforts in order to secure the long-term interests of the United States. The following objectives are critical priorities in the mission to guarantee long-term US national security:

- Weakening the operational capability of al Qa'ida through combat operations directed at strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
- Diminishing the Taliban's influence in Afghani politics and civil society through a renewed approach to OEF;
- Containing radical elements within Pakistan through limited surgical strikes and increased cooperation with the Pakistani government;
- Identifying geopolitical shifts in the Middle East that will allow the US to develop successful approaches to diplomacy in the region;
- Renewing America's leadership on nuclear non-proliferation issues and strengthening existing policy to better address the growing threat of WMD in the hands of non-state actors;
- Identifying elements of Homeland Security that can be strengthened to improve intelligence collection and operational organization while reducing inefficiency and promoting better transparency.

The quiet achievements of America's intelligence and security agencies are confirmed by the fact that not a single terrorist organization has been successful in conducting an attack on American soil since 9/11. While the terrorist attacks in 2001 were a catalyst for revamping our National Counterterrorism Strategy, the conditions that foster violent extremism have been festering for much longer than America has been engaged in a War on Terror.

Our strategy must not overlook underlying factors such as poor infrastructure, weak economies, and social and political alienation as contributors to the safe havens in which terrorists find refuge. Terrorist groups embedded in communities are able to garner

support for their radical ideas by recruiting from populations suffering under the deleterious combination of ignorance and poverty. Overly aggressive military tactics that destroy and fail to restore stability can create environments more conducive to terrorist activity.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Transnational terrorist organizations represent one of the most formidable challenges to American security, particularly those adhering to the tenets of radical Islamic extremism. Islamic extremists use the alluring but false narrative that their religion is under assault from America, a message that resonates well within some of the most desperate regions of the world.

This National Security Strategy recognizes that our experience combating terrorism proves that conventional military tactics alone cannot sufficiently eradicate transnational terrorist groups. To further weaken and eventually eliminate the threat posed by transnational terrorism, the United States should focus on hampering terrorists' operational capabilities while de-legitimizing terrorism as an accepted method for political participation.

Al Qa'ida remains our foremost enemy in our fight against international terrorism. As the largest, most widespread, advanced network of violent Islamic extremists in the world, the group has in recent years morphed into an umbrella organization for smaller extremist groups who previously lacked international recognition, high profile leadership, logistical capabilities and financial capital. Al Qa'ida's member size, highly decentralized operational structure, broad-based communal support and strong religious foundations make the organization difficult to eliminate through combat operations alone.

DENY, DISRUPT, DISSUADE APPROACH:

DENY AL QA'IDA SAFE HAVENS

The US must focus on both the material and ideological support for terrorism that contribute to the spread of radical Islam as a viable political solution. Our strategy for targeting al Qa'ida is modeled on a Deny, Disrupt and Dissuade approach. To **deny** al Qa'ida and other transnational terrorist organizations the ability to threaten US security, we will **disrupt** the material support terrorists are able to garner and **dissuade** local communities from accepting the ideological foundation of radical Islam. To accomplish this, the US will:

- **Disrupt transnational hubs by locating and eliminating the scope and reach of its expansive network of cells.** Combat operations are necessary to continue targeting leadership and continually weaken al Qa'ida's highly decentralized command structure. Based in locations across Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the United States, we shall increase intelligence gathering capabilities by identifying local informants as well as cooperative intelligence and security agencies in countries where al Qa'ida has established strongholds in order to promote intelligence gathering and dissemination;
- **Dissuade communal tolerance for violent extremism.** We will conduct transparent public diplomacy to counter the idea that America is an enemy of Islam and promote local and regional cooperation against transnational terrorism. In doing so, we will directly challenge the notion that the west is responsible for the problems in the Muslim world.

DISRUPT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

Terrorist hubs are areas throughout the world where personnel, information, materials and funds are transferred between independent cells frequently and in high

volume. The most effective means to locate and destroy these hubs are efficient intelligence analysis and police work, including infiltration and investigation of terrorist groups, and capture of their members. We will identify countries whose police and intelligence services we can cooperate with, recognizing that the US may be required to train and equip local security forces.

It may be necessary for the US to employ military operations in cases where transnational terrorists are known to be actively planning and capable of carrying out attacks against American and allied interests. Additionally, securing local populations to reduce the appeal of local militias and armed insurgencies must be a key component in military operations. Terrorists find it more difficult to garner anti-American support in local communities where populations no longer rely on violent extremists for their security. Targeting financial and logistical supply lines between terrorist hubs and their support networks will be an important element in reducing the effects of state sponsorship of terrorism.

State Sponsorship of Terror

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has affiliated itself with a variety of extremist and anti-American factions. While Iran has consistently given aid and support to many of these radical groups, more recently Iran has emerged as the largest state sponsor of terrorist organizations. The two largest and most dangerous of the recipients are Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Eliminating Iran's ability to transfer funds and weapons will be an important step in isolating Iran from its terrorist affiliates. To do this, the US must:

- **Dismantle money-laundering schemes that can be detected and obstructed through increased oversight by banking institutions.** The United States has already identified several terrorist-funding schemes operating domestically.

Several American-based and Iranian-supported Islamic charity foundations have been identified as financial supporters of Hezbollah. Further investigations into money transfers must be approved by the federal government in order to pursue the individuals involved in these operations and to stop the considerable flows of money from the United States to terrorist organizations.

- **Establish cooperation for increased information sharing between the US banking system and the European Union in order to disrupt and dismantle terrorist funding schemes**—under the guise of “legitimate” businesses—in Europe, the main base of operations for Iranian-aligned Shia elites. These Shia elites and the business fronts they control generate a significant portion of the revenue used to support terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
- **Negotiations with the al-Assad government will be essential in constructing an agreement through which to stop the flow of terrorist funding originating in Iran.** Hamas is headquartered in Damascus and Syria is also one of the main supporters and contributors to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both Hamas and Hezbollah receive considerable operational funding from Iran (with a large portion of these funds passing through Syria). The United States should ensure that the expulsion of Hamas from Damascus and the cessation of financial support to Hezbollah are part of the negotiations regarding the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.

Eliminating terrorist financing operations is an unlikely goal, as these operatives employ inexpensive, off-the-shelf technologies to communicate and carry out their attacks. However, the current US bank restructuring may provide the US government with a unique opportunity to implement the aforementioned measures in an effort to identify and eliminate the major hubs of state-sponsored terrorist financing.

DISSUADE IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT

Military force is most effective when used with discretion in areas known to have significant civilian populations. Operations that cause extensive collateral damage undermine the US position that terrorism is a failed strategy because it targets innocent and unarmed civilians and feeds into radical ideology that claims the US is not sensitive to the concerns of Muslim populations.

We must further seek to publicly criminalize terrorist behavior by undermining the zealous ideological component, and to disenfranchise terrorist operatives by illuminating their indiscriminate practice of killing fellow Muslims as well as their departure from the basic tenets of Islam. To de-legitimize terrorism as the solution for ‘combating’ the West, the United States must:

- **Reduce local support for armed insurgencies and radical Islamic extremism by providing security for communities.** A key component of US military strategy will be ensuring that troops are equipped to provide security for local populations while training and equipping local security forces. Security provides legitimacy to local governments, reduces local dependency on terrorist organizations to provide basic services and strips terrorist ideologues of their ability to scapegoat the west as the source of the world’s problems.
- **Conduct transparent public diplomacy that refutes anti-Western propaganda.** Using mass media technology such as radio, television and internet will increase public awareness of US objectives in the region to highlight our understanding of the difference between terrorist operatives and the communities they exploit to achieve their ends. We will publicly criminalize terrorist behavior as a pariah on genteel societies by highlighting their indiscriminate practice of killing fellow Muslims as well as their departure from the basic tenets of Islam.

- **Engage representatives such as mosque leaders, tribal sheiks, political figures and respected community leaders** to encourage communities in accepting responsibility for their own futures. Local knowledge regarding political grievances will be key to establishing a better understanding of the needs and desires of local communities, demonstrating that political problems can be addressed in the political sphere.
- **Encourage socio-economic integration through NGO and humanitarian aid.** Terrorist organizations garner broad-based communal support for violent fundamentalism by establishing themselves as being the only capable providers of basic social services.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Afghanistan

After almost eight years of US and NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) intervention, Afghanistan remains a failing state with a rising insurgency and decreasing security, an economy based on foreign aid and opium production, a central government without centralized power and limited in resources, continued warring among local militias and leaders, and increasing territory under the control of the Taliban. To stabilize Afghanistan and overcome the Taliban-led insurgency, a coordinated US and international effort will be necessary that focuses on eliminating the ability of al Qa'ida and other violent extremists to use Afghanistan as a safe haven while increasing the security of Afghan citizens and fostering political reconciliation for factions within Afghanistan. In addition, securing the cooperation of the Pakistani government and denying insurgents bases in Pakistan will be vital to success.

Lessons Learned in Iraq

Counterinsurgency tactics successful in Iraq must be adopted in Afghanistan including first and foremost the commitment to provide civilian security by emphasizing manpower over firepower. Soldiers must be dispersed among civilians and Afghani security forces in order to create trust and cooperation among Afghans and NATO-ISAF troops. Afghanistan's vast and rugged terrain, low population density, underdeveloped infrastructure and economy, high illiteracy, widespread corruption, and rampant sectarian and ethnic divides will pose unique challenges and require great attention to local conditions and the ability to adopt flexible response capabilities. To decrease the troop deficit and to create a functioning Afghani civil society, the United States must:

- **Increase troop levels in Afghanistan to a level able to provide security to Afghan citizens and overcome the Taliban insurgency;**
- **Increase intelligence gathering by US and Pakistani forces and continue raids and strikes against key al Qa'ida and Taliban extremist leaders, bases, and supply lines;**
- **Create alliances with local militias and leaders and mediate power sharing deals between ethnic and sectarian leaders in Afghanistan;**
- **Secure the cooperation of the Pakistani government in the fight against terrorism and the Taliban insurgency;**
- **Develop an international team, including Russia, NATO, and regional allies, intent on winning the war in Afghanistan;**
- **Establish future supply lines into Afghanistan for troops and supplies.**

The US should identify differences and divides in the Taliban-led insurgency in order to reconcile Taliban insurgents to become a part of the counterinsurgency effort and exploit the dependency of Afghan leaders on foreign support and aid. Leaders of local militias should be co-opted to fight the insurgency while disenfranchised Pashtuns—the

greatest supporters of the Taliban—should be offered incentives to become part of Afghani security forces and development teams.

The primary objective of the US in Afghanistan must be security. Political, economic, and social development will only be effective in an environment with reduced violence. Troops in Afghanistan should follow the hold, protect, and deny strategy employed effectively in Iraq. Aid should be given to employ Afghans in security and reconstruction teams, providing employment and giving Afghans a stake in securing and developing their country. Diversifying the Afghanistan economy must be a secondary goal to establishing security, as eradication of poppy fields often turns local farmers and militia leaders to the insurgency.

Spillover into Pakistan

The US must increase its intelligence efforts at local levels in Afghanistan and work with the Pakistani government to identify Pakistani officials and officers supportive of extremist organizations in order to better assess the size and scope of Taliban and al Qaeda operational capabilities. Precision airstrikes will continue to provide cover for US troops and target specific locations assessed to house high-value targets, yet in highly populated areas the risk of widespread collateral damage continues to dampen the US image in the region. A troop surge in Afghanistan will allow the military to limit airstrikes by high-altitude and fixed-wing aircraft and instead focus increasingly on foot patrols and door-to-door operations, supported by helicopters and UAVs.

Incentives for the Pakistani government to secure the border region and fight violent extremism include developing mutually beneficial intelligence sharing, increasing non-military aid to Pakistan with stipulations that there will be improvements in border security, and shoring up specific deficiencies in the Pakistani military rather than providing blanket military aid. Diplomatic overtures to address the Kashmir dispute with

India would be a critical incentive for Pakistan to redeploy troops from areas in eastern Pakistan to lines along the Afghani-Pakistani border.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

The war in Iraq has had many direct and indirect consequences to US national security and America's counterterrorism strategy. US troops leaving behind a democratic Iraq capable of engaging responsibly in the region while providing for its own security will be a major strategic success. The goal for the US in Iraq is to transfer power to a stable Iraq capable of providing security for its citizens, denying terrorists a safe haven of refuge, and governing a democratic, pluralistic society with respect for international law. To accomplish this goal, the US must:

- **Promote the integration of ethnically divided elements and militias into Iraqi security forces and reconstruction teams;**
- **Find new areas of leverage in Iraq to promote political reconciliation and continued stabilization;**
- **Secure humanitarian assistance for the refugee crisis.**

US service members have performed nobly in their endeavors in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Enacting a hasty withdrawal not only threatens their safety but stands to undermine the many accomplishments of the last several years. Acknowledging that the planned troop withdrawal is fraught with dangers to our forces, we must begin a phased withdrawal that will maximize the United States' ability to respond to impending threats while allowing maximum flexibility in case rapid deployment of troops back to Iraq is necessary.

Presently there is too much effort placed in operations that provide no enduring

protection and too little emphasis on the coordination of security and reconstruction efforts. The US has established too high a priority on quickly fielding large numbers of Iraqi security forces and too low a priority on ensuring their effectiveness.

The Status of Forces Agreement negotiated with the Iraqi government calls for the total withdrawal of the US troops by 2011, decreases the current leverage of the US government as it is replaced by the increasing political power of a sovereign Iraqi government. To accomplish a successful phased withdrawal, the US must:

- **Relocate troops to rural basing areas when they begin moving out of Iraqi cities this year;**
- **Rotate troops from combat operations in Iraq to Afghanistan as their deployed status makes them ideal for operations in support of OEF;**
- **Reconfigure current workups schedules for forces en route Afghanistan to be deployed in a ‘deployment ready’ status at military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Turkey;**
- **Withdraw two-thirds of US troops by 2011, leaving approximately 50,000 troops to provide training for Iraqi security forces, engage in operations against terrorist cells and provide security for US personnel in the country.**

Once a majority of US combat troops are removed from Iraq, the threat of a Sunni-backed insurgency capable of destabilizing the country remains plausible. It is critical that the US prevent armed militias and insurgents from paralyzing the Iraqi political process that functioned healthily during Parliamentary elections this year.

The US will use its political influence to encourage the Iraqi Parliament to adopt power-sharing measures for the leadership of the armed forces and security forces to shore up divides between Iraq’s ethnically diverse regions. Additionally, the United States will help the Iraqi government establish an Iraqi Information Service to gather

intelligence on the insurgents and penetrate their infrastructure. American ‘neighborhood crime watch’ campaigns and anonymous information tip hotlines serve as useful models for implementing better local counterterrorism efforts.

Careful planning must precede the US troop withdrawal scheduled to begin this year with military commanders given maximum flexibility in order to respond to changing circumstances. A democratic Iraq capable of providing for its own citizens’ security, denying terrorists a safe haven for operations, and engaging responsibly with the region would improve the stability of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Gulf states have been crucial partners to the United States’ efforts to maintain stability in the Middle East. The United States will continue to rely on the historic relationships with the GCC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE) as a strong fixture of regional security. In the past two decades, these countries helped contain the aggressive behavior of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The 2003 invasion and toppling of the Ba’athist regime, however, caused significant changes to the geopolitical system of the Gulf Region, positing Iran as the center of a Shiite-dominant power axis stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian Gulf. The United States will continue to coordinate with our GCC partners to meet future challenges in the region.

Iraqi Integration into Regional Politics

Regional participation will be crucial to the reconstruction effort in Iraq and the reestablishment of regional stability. Our allies in the Gulf region have extended generous monetary packages for humanitarian aid and infrastructural rebuilding. The

United States not only wants a cohesive Iraqi state, but also one that enjoys amicable relations with the region. In order to promote this outcome, the United States will:

- **Push regional countries to establish embassies in Iraq.** A significant weakness of the Iraqi government is the lack of diplomatic support from the region. The only states from the Gulf region that have embassies in Baghdad are: Qatar, Oman, and Yemen.
- **Encourage GCC countries to follow through with their promises to extend debt-relief to Iraq.**
- **Continue to dissuade our allies in the region from forming an anti-Iranian bloc.** The United States and GCC countries share concern over the possibility of an Iraq under full Iranian influence. We want regional commitment and responsibility to the reconstruction of Iraq that could help create a more independent Iraq. However, an attempt to counter Iranian influence would widen the schism between Sunnis and Shi'a. Iraq and the international community have spent years curbing religious violence, and it is not in the United States' interest to invite conflict again.
- **Send a high-level representative to regional meetings for Iraqi reconstruction.** This is intended to express that the United States is supportive and encourages regional initiatives to ensure the future of Iraq. Efforts such as the UN-Iraq International Compact, the Expanded Neighbors Conference, or the Marmara Conference have not yielded satisfactory developments. However, regularly held meetings by regional officials can help establish the basis for future regional cooperation.

Arab – Israeli Conflict

We recognize that there may not be a peaceful short-term solution to this decades-old conflict. However, given its central role in regional politics—as both a recruiting platform for terrorists and a major source of contention between Western and Middle

Eastern powers—considerable effort and resources must be dedicated toward seeking a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To stabilize the region and develop conditions most suitable to a diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an expansion of oversight and law enforcement will be necessary to obstruct the funding of terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. A strong effort on the part of the United States to convince Israelis to pursue peace in spite of continuing violence from radical actors will be vital to constructing a new and uninterrupted peace process. The objectives of the United States in this process will be to:

- **Call upon Egypt to secure the Gazan-Egyptian border in order to prevent additional weapons transfers to Hamas;**
- **Curtail funding to Hamas;**
- **Moderate negotiations between Israel and Syria;**
- **Increase support and financial funding of Fatah;**
- **Function as moderator for a negotiation of an end of the conflict.**

Establishing border security as a priority for the 2010 Bright Star joint US-Egyptian military exercises will help Egypt improve its patrolling capabilities and demonstrate that America takes its commitment to regional security seriously. Egypt can facilitate the peace process by patrolling the Gazan-Egyptian border more effectively and obstructing the illegal arms trade that has supplied Hamas militants with money and weaponry. Egyptian cooperation is integral to the US commitment to arriving at a peaceful solution to the conflict. The United States must make this clear to the Egyptian government and establish cooperation as a precondition for sustained US military aid to Egypt. The Egyptian government has demonstrated—through efforts at mediation—that it too desires an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the United States should take advantage of this commonality in goals.

Curtailing support for Hamas should be initiated by US agencies. The US will accomplish this by using domestic intelligence agencies to ensure that American citizens are not contributing to Hamas through terrorist-funding schemes or illegal business fronts. The US should also open dialogue with other nations who contribute to terrorist funding and provide incentives to curtail or halt this practice.

The purpose of mediating Israeli-Syrian negotiations will be to encourage Syria to normalize relations with Israel and cease support for Hamas (which would include their expulsion from Damascus) in exchange for a return of the Golan Heights—as a strictly demilitarized zone—and an end to economic and diplomatic isolation. This would weaken the power of Hamas by taking away their headquarters and also cutting off the transport route of aid from Iran. The return of the Golan Heights would also require that Syria stop providing aid to Hezbollah, another threat to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Developing infrastructure in the West Bank functions dually to legitimize Fatah and to prepare for a Palestinian state in the region. This will additionally undermine the power of Hamas in Gaza. If conditions in the West Bank improve under Fatah, Gazan citizens will recognize that Hamas has not provided the same stability. Due to past incidences of Fatah corruption, all aid utilized by Fatah must be transparent and subject to American oversight.

Structure of Negotiations

The United States' focus will be on bilateral discussions between Fatah and Israel. Hamas has proven unwilling to compromise and trilateral negotiations involving Israel and both Fatah and Hamas are not concordant with the ultimate objective of a two-state, two-government solution. Negotiations toward peace should begin as soon as possible.

Hamas has rejected negotiations, consistently denied Israel's right to exist, and refused to cooperate with other powers attempting to find a solution. Negotiations will thus necessarily be held between Fatah and Israel. Hamas should not, however, be barred from negotiation if they are willing to subsequently make the necessary concessions.

A resumption of negotiations will rely upon the accomplishments of previous diplomatic efforts (such as Annapolis Accords and the Clinton Parameters), as a place to begin. Two areas of contention that will be the focus of the negotiations are the issues of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem.

If necessary, the United States will exercise our influence, both monetary and military, over Israel to ensure that Israel is willing to negotiate. However, these negotiations will be bilateral. It is not the responsibility of the United States to develop and present a solution. A lasting peace will necessarily be one that both sides have worked together to create.

A successful and sustainable peace agreement will involve regional participation. With the Arab League's Peace Initiative already demonstrating its willingness to participate, the United States will work to involve regional actors in the negotiations. The United States' main role, aside from moderating the negotiations, will be to police and enforce the terms of this binding treaty.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has created instability throughout the entire Middle East, affecting American activities and opportunities across the region. Most concerning for the United States, the conflict is an incubator for avowedly anti-American extremist and terrorist ideologies. In addition to foiling the efforts of terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, being a partner in bringing about a conclusion to this conflict

which has ravaged the region for so long will considerably improve the United States' reputation in the region.

The maintenance of stability in the Middle East has been a national security priority for the United States. Long-time objectives have been to ensure the unobstructed flow of fossil fuels to world energy markets and to support our regional allies from external threats. A resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem would have a positive impact on Middle Eastern geopolitics. However, a sustainable solution will require the United States to address other regional actors as well. A major supporter of anti-Israeli militancy and significant contributor to regional instability is Iran. A strategy to contain Iran and prevent it from interfering with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and other American efforts in the Middle East is essential.

Containing Iran

Our partnership with GCC countries had been crucial in our efforts to contain Iraq and Iran in the past. With the establishment of a democracy in Iraq, the United States' partnership with GCC countries will be focused on inhibiting Iran from materially supporting terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In order to achieve these objectives, the United States will:

- **Continue to offer assistance for GCC military capabilities.** It is in our interest to help build the GCC capability for multilateral defense. The process of building a reliable GCC deterrent will help reduce regional dependence on a US presence. Building regional capabilities could help alleviate some of the political burden that GCC governments shoulder due to GCC-US relations.
- **Extend nuclear technology cooperation to the UAE.** Under Section 123 Agreement of the US Atomic Energy Act, a deal with the UAE would include stipulations that they will not enrich their own fuel and that spent fuel will be

returned to the vendor nation. By extending help to a nation that is committed to nonproliferation, the United States could demonstrate that it is not against any country gaining nuclear power. Rather we are opposed to countries that pursue nuclear programs without respect for international agreements and norms.

- **Continue to push GCC countries to limit financial and commercial transactions with Iran.** It is difficult for the United States and the international community to pursue an effective strategy regarding Iran's nuclear program if regional allies do not cooperate. While sanctions have greatly limited Iran's financial and economic ties to Europe, GCC states still continue to trade and engage in resource project cooperation.

Looking for Political Openings

The United States has had considerable difficulty negotiating with Iran. Anti-Americanism is a major legitimizing factor for the revolutionary regime in Iran and concessions or open dialogue with the United States are unacceptable under the revolutionary atmosphere perpetuated by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. If an immediate working relationship is to be developed, areas of commonality must be identified and small avenues toward fuller negotiations should be pursued. In order to secure a long-term stable relationship between the United States and Iran, American foreign policy must focus on reorienting negotiations away from the revolutionary elements of the regime.

The United States and Iran have common interests in establishing a stable government in Iraq. Iran conducts a significant amount of economic trade with Iraq and Iran's Shiite religious pilgrims are able to conduct cross-border trips to Shiite holy sites in Iraq that were previously forbidden by Saddam Hussein. It is not in Iran's interest to witness Iraq develop into either an Islamic caliphate run by Sunni extremists or a failed state.

Establishing a working relationship with the Iranian government and allowing Iranian construction and support activity in Iraq will demonstrate that there is a place for Iran in the Middle East and that American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are not a prelude to similar activity in Iran. The United States should use Iraq as a platform for Iranian and American cooperation. To effectively reformulate the American approach to negotiations with Iran, the United States must recognize:

The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council in Iran maintain their legitimacy by portraying the United States and Israel as clear and present dangers to Iranian security and the Islamic Revolution. Immediately silencing or moderating these radical elements of the regime will be impossible without direct military intervention. However, the United States is pursuing a diplomatic solution to Iranian-American disagreements.

Negotiations with the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council are not likely to result in a lasting diplomatic relationship. In order to establish stable communications and cooperation, the United States can work to diplomatically undermine the revolutionary regime by excluding them from the negotiation process. By insisting that American-Iranian negotiations are conducted through communications between American diplomats and democratically-elected Iranian officials, the United States can transfer legitimacy from the theocracy to a more receptive negotiation partner.

In order to facilitate these negotiations, the United States should support the reform movement lead by Mohammad Khatami. It is in the greatest interest of the United States for Iranians to elect a president and parliament more receptive to American approaches and considerations. To encourage this desired outcome, the United States should stress that it is open to discussion and willing to cooperate on a variety of issues. Most recently, the reform movement has real potential to succeed due to the declining

economic situation in Iran and the increased importance of the presidency under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The United States should emphasize that it is not an enemy of the Iranian people. The revolutionary regime thrives on depicting the relationship between Iran and the United States as one of mutual antagonism. Negotiations are very difficult to initiate with the anti-American regime, but the establishment of negotiations will inevitably damage the legitimacy of the theocracy and may forestall Iran's continued path toward acquiring nuclear weapons.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Iranian Nuclear Program

Iran's semi-clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons carries the potential to destabilize the Middle East and cause considerable difficulties for the United States and its allies should Iranian acquisition prompt a regional arms race. Recent analysis by the IAEA has revealed that Iran possesses over one metric ton of uranium, an amount sufficient—after enrichment—to create a nuclear weapon. It is possible that Iran will attain this nuclear breakout capability as early as mid-2009. With this information, the administration must quickly begin a process of discussions with Iran with the aim of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

After thoroughly analyzing policy options, including US military strikes, a positive engagement approach, and a multilateral political and economic isolationist approach, the United States will develop a multilateral incentives package to provide Iran with incentives to divert from present nuclear operations while downplaying the threat of a US invasion. Part of Iran's nuclear aspirations derive in part from the perceived threat

of external aggression and tacit military threats do little to convince skeptics that there is a place for a non-nuclear Iran in the international community.

The United States has offered several incentives packages in the past, all of which have been declined by Iran. However, due to a sharp decline in Iran's economy and falling oil prices, an incentives package may seem more attractive at present. The incentives package will include, but does not have to be limited to the following:

- Assure Iran that compliance would result in a restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States;
- Assure Iran that regime change in Tehran is not an American objective;
- Pledge a commitment that military force would not be used against Iran for past nuclear transgressions;
- Affirm Iranian sovereignty and recognize its increasing influence within the Middle East, with an emphasis on what is expected from responsible nations by the international community;
- Affirm Iran's right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to possess civilian nuclear power plants;
- Increase international assistance to develop and modernize Iran's aging energy infrastructure;
- Guarantee access to supplies of fuel for light water reactors from Russia as well as access to international civilian nuclear research;
- Reiterate previous offers of incentives including foreign assistance in completing nuclear power plants, and encouragement of foreign investment in the Iranian economy;
- End all multilateral and unilateral sanctions by the EU3 plus 3.

In exchange for:

- An Iranian pledge to forego weaponization of its nuclear technology;
- Iranian reaffirmation of a commitment to abide by security and non-proliferation treaties, as well as the signing of a legally binding agreement to renounce withdrawal from the NPT;
- Iranian adherence to IAEA regulations with the adoption of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols;
- Reaffirmation of Iran's commitment to support and maintain a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction;
- An end to Iran's long-range missile program.

A multilateral engagement approach with Iran will be based on the premise that the US, along with other global powers with significant interests in the region such as EU3, China, and Russia, will provide Iran with one final opportunity to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Consequently, this incentives package should not stand alone, but rather be juxtaposed with corresponding sanctions to be imposed if Iran chooses to decline a negotiated settlement once again. If Iran refuses to make concessions and declines the stipulations of the incentives package, the United States, Russia, China, and the EU3 will work collectively to isolate Iran economically and politically.

Sanctions have been ineffective in the past due to a lack of solidarity on the part of the international community. In order for a sanctions package to be valuable, a commitment from the EU3, China, and Russia will be essential. In order to secure this commitment the United States should:

- End the ban on selling dual-use technology to Beijing;
- Pledge to increase industry information sharing of green technology to China;
- Cease support of NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine and instead encourage entrance into the European Union;

- Maintain flexibility regarding the forward-deployed location of anti-ballistic missile defense systems proposed in Europe.

Support from China and Russia will be crucial to establishing effective sanctions. Additionally, economic sanctions will be much more effectual with declining oil prices and a faltering Iranian economy. Consequences for continued Iranian non-cooperation should include, but are not limited to:

- The implementation of a set of previously agreed to legally binding sanctions against Iran by the EU3 plus 3;
- The implementation of private sanctions that would target the international financial institutions where Iran holds significant proportions of its finances;
- A comprehensive embargo on Iranian imports of refined-petroleum products.

Dealing with a Nuclear Iran

While the immediate goal remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, responsibility dictates that the US develop a strategy for dealing with a nuclear Iran. If Iran passes the nuclear threshold the United States will have several priorities:

- **Compel Iran to declare a no first use policy.** Not doing so may well have irreversible consequences for the Iranian people.
- **Enhance deterrence capacity by offering Israel a security assurance.** The United States should give political reassurance and pledge military support to Israel in order to prevent Israel from conducting unilateral military strikes against Iran. Additionally, a security assurance from the United States would serve to deter Iran from considering nuclear attacks against Israel;
- **Increase cooperation with Gulf States and discourage other nuclear programs** by providing positive security assurances for our allies;

- **Continue to utilize the NNSA to lead US efforts in nonproliferation** while establishing the IAEA as the central authority on nuclear issues in the Middle East tasked to create a new framework for nations that desire nuclear power;
- **Implement a red line requirement that any nation found in non-compliance with IAEA demands would be subject to previously established multilateral sanctions implemented by the EU3+3.** Shift the burden of proof to countries that may have committed past transgressions to their NPT obligations (North Korea, Iran).
- **Propose a NATO no-first use policy** to legitimize US demands that other nations declare their own NFU policies. If the United States wishes to convey the seriousness with which we approach nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, it would be wise to recognize that the world is looking to us to set the precedent. Such an overture would do little to change the US-NATO security dynamic, but would signal a major shift in strategic thinking regarding the implausibility of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

Pakistan: Threat of a Failed State with Nuclear Arms

The prospect of Pakistan becoming a failed state with nuclear weapons remains a major security challenge for the United States. Domestic unrest stemming from Islamic extremists in the Northwest Frontier region poses existential threats to the government, and the uncertainty surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons security raises serious questions about nuclear confrontation on the Asian continent.

Pakistan remains a major non-NATO US ally and has been provided extensive aid for its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda safe havens in the Northwest Frontier province. Pakistanis' distrust of American involvement in domestic politics stems from the widely held perception that US military and geopolitical actions in its neighborhood are part of a larger aim to control its nuclear weapons. Pakistan views its nuclear arsenal

as its sole guarantor of political longevity and main deterrent against neighboring India, whose conventional military superiority has been demonstrated on the battlefield.

The possibility of a breach in Pakistani nuclear security remains a real threat to US national security. A breach in control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons could happen in two ways. The first scenario would involve the political collapse and a resultant power vacuum being filled by violent extremists. The second scenario would involve proliferation of nuclear material by a rogue military official or scientist sympathetic to violent extremists in the region. The possibility that officials of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) are sympathetic to anti-US terrorist organizations remains real. The best strategy for the United States to pursue in order address the threat of a breached Pakistani nuclear program will involve the following:

- **Negotiate a 123 Agreement with Pakistan that would shore up security for its nuclear arsenal.** Due to past transgressions, (including the AQ Khan proliferation network) current law in Washington denies high technology nuclear trade. The idea that Pakistan is somehow more of a risk without these technological safeguards is not only antiquated, it is logically unsound. The US should reiterate that it does not seek to control Pakistani nuclear weapons but rather shares a mutual interest with Pakistan in its nuclear security integrity.
- **Persuade Pakistan to take a more comprehensive approach to countering insurgents within its borders.** Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid and receives considerable sums from the US for its support in Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States should use military aid as a bargaining tool to compel Pakistan to deal more effectively with domestic sources of terrorism. Both India and the United States have implicated Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency in the recent Mumbai terror attacks that killed hundreds of civilians.

- **Mediate the Pakistani-Indian Kashmir dispute.** Formulating a plan for stability over the Kashmir territorial dispute that has plagued inter-state relations between India and Pakistan since their independence is likely to be met with some resistance from India. However, it is unlikely that the US will achieve significant Pakistani support in combating al Qaeda safe havens in its Northwest Frontier while Pakistani domestic politics would prefer to have the military facing eastward.

North Korea and the Six-Party Talks

North Korea remains a thorn in the side of the nonproliferation community. In contrast to Russia and Pakistan—both of which have serious concerns over nuclear security due to their own self-preservation—a North Korean transfer of nuclear technology to terrorist elements remains a plausible scenario.

The North Korean record on proliferation is worrisome on two fronts: the DPRK is known to have sold high technology on the black market and was implicated as having assisted in the development of the clandestine Syrian nuclear facility that was destroyed in a 2007 Israeli air strike. Presently, it is impossible to gauge whether there are limitations to what North Korea would be willing to sell for the right price. While continuing to work within the Six-Party framework, the United States should:

- **Recommend a thorough review of the North Korean regime's compliance with the 2005 Statement of Principles agreed to by the members of the Six-Party Talks.** Continue to pursue full and verifiable disarmament in exchange for a return to full bilateral relations with the US and increased food and fuel aid.
- **Consult with the Six-Party nations and accept guidance from South Korea and China** on how to develop contingency plans for international assistance to help

stabilize the region should there be a succession of the North Korean regime.

Non-Proliferation Challenges and Successes

The dawn of the 21st century marked an era of unprecedented technological innovation, and the continued diffusion of technology will put weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and to a lesser extent, nuclear—materials dangerously within the reach of malevolent non-state actors. The United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world’s center for nonproliferation inspection and verification. The IAEA does not currently possess the ability to effectively carry out its mission. Safeguarded nuclear material has grown by a factor of six to ten times its size since the Cold War, yet budget constraints have forced a decline in IAEA inspections.

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is critical to the US government’s strategy of preventing nuclear terrorism. NNSA cooperates with agencies in over 100 countries to prevent nuclear proliferation. Doubling the NNSA budget post-9/11 has achieved numerous successes, and the NNSA should continue to lead the US effort toward non-proliferation through the following endeavors:

Secure Nuclear Warheads and Material

- Continue the return of highly enriched uranium from Soviet-origin, US-origin, and other sites around the world;
- Continue to lead on-the-ground efforts to disable North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in support of the Six-Party Talks;
- Continue enhancing US-Russian cooperation to sustain Russian nuclear security upgrades after 2012 when Russia assumes full responsibility for the security of its own sites.

Protect “Dirty Bomb” Material

- Continue working with IAEA to recover radioactive sources and upgrade the

physical security at nuclear facilities around the world;

- Continue radioactive contamination prevention and investigation efforts to recover radioactive materials stolen from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Complex in Iraq, once home to Saddam Hussein's Osiraq nuclear reactor.

Safeguard Research Reactors

- Continue providing security upgrades at civilian research reactors worldwide;
- Implement 123 Agreements with GCC countries and Pakistan, to offer assistance providing security upgrades at nuclear research reactors and to lessen the potential for non-state actors to acquire weapons and employ them against the US.

Prevent Nuclear Smuggling and Transfer of Nuclear Expertise

- Emphasize long-term research efforts to develop improved technologies for the detection of weapons of mass destruction;
- Complete radiation detection equipment installation at major US ports;
- Install radiation detection equipment at all Russian border crossings (350 sites total) by 2011 (6 years ahead of schedule), supplementing the 160 crossings already equipped.

As the US continues to lead nonproliferation efforts around the globe, we should continue to utilize the IAEA as the international center for nonproliferation while sustaining increased funding for the NNSA. Its proven track record of combining sophisticated technologic capabilities with a robust and highly skilled workforce demonstrates that the NNSA is capable of taking on challenging nonproliferation issues in accordance with existing multilateral agreements.

MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations

The United Nations is a crucial component of the international political system. It is in the interest of the United States for this international organization to effectively help ensure peace, development and human rights; provide humanitarian assistance; and enforce international laws and norms. However, the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling this role is questionable. Instances of corruption and ineffectiveness have tarnished the UN as an impotent institution. The United States can do several things to ensure that the United Nations fulfills its function as a pillar of the international community. The United States should:

- **Limit peacekeeping missions in favor of more humanitarian assistance.** UN peacekeeping missions have a poor track record. Peacekeeping missions have had difficulty identifying aggressors or have been plagued by partisanship. However, UN humanitarian missions have met with considerably more success. The UNRWA mission to assist Palestinian refugees is one example of a successful UN endeavor. In order to make the United Nations more cost-effective, the United States should encourage the UN to curtail its peacekeeping efforts and focus its efforts on humanitarian assistance.
- **Withhold funding from UN programs that are deemed corrupt or ineffective.** The United States has historically used funding as a means of effecting change within the UN. As the largest contributor to the United Nations, the US can continue to exert pressure for UN reform. The United States can reallocate funding from ineffective programs towards the creation of an internal control mechanism. As the OFFP revealed, the UN lacks effective oversight and clear authority. The implementation of a mechanism similar to the GAO could help ensure better UN functionality in the future.

- **Press for financial disclosure by UN officials.** This is another way in which UN accountability can be strengthened.
- **Strengthen Internal Controls.** In April 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggested that the United Nations increase internal controls to address the issues that came up during the Oil for Food Program. The United States will encourage the UN to adopt a system of internal controls modeled after other leading accountability organizations such as the International Organization of Supreme Audit institutions, the US Office of Management and Budget, and the GAO for all programs with considerable financial risk. This would address UN shortcomings during the course of the OFFP such as weak oversight, unclear authority and manipulation.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

A renewed commitment of NATO to the war in Afghanistan, coordination of a “secure, hold, and develop” policy by all NATO-ISAF and US troops and the reduction of national caveats of NATO troops is necessary to create effective NATO involvement in Afghanistan. NATO partners must be reminded that the world’s strongest military alliance was built on a concept of equal risk and equal burden. As evidenced in the London subway attacks and the Madrid train attacks, transnational terrorism poses serious risks not just for us, but for our NATO allies as well.

If NATO forces are unwilling to commit considerable numbers of troops to security operations, the United States will request that NATO utilize its Response Force, a rapid-response contingent that could be employed for limited periods in response to a massive counterinsurgency or during major political milestones, such as the upcoming August 2009 Afghani elections. Should NATO prove unwilling to cooperate on areas of

mutual risk/mutual burden, the US would be wise to remind our transatlantic allies that US initiatives such as European-based anti-ballistic missile defenses would need to be reconsidered in terms of their cost-effectiveness for American security.

The US can offer concessions on NATO expansion into Eastern Europe in order to establish cooperation with Russia and negotiate over the Manas airbase closure and the possibility of developing Russian-based US supply lines. If an agreement between the US, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia cannot be reached over the Manas airbase, alternative routes through Uzbekistan, Germany, or Turkey should be pursued.

We maintain that US counterterrorism efforts will be most successful when they combine elements of hard and soft power. Examining the status of multilateral institutions has helped identify some areas of improvement while suggesting ways to utilize these institutions in areas they can be most effective.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY

Africa Command

The spread of radical Islam throughout Africa is cause for concern. In 2007 the Department of Defense presented a new theater area of responsibility, Africa Command (AFRICOM). A multi-dimensional approach to international security through the combination of hard and soft power to develop partners, prevent conflict and foster development on the continent should be utilized. AFRICOM will pursue these objectives by incorporating elements from the following communities:

- **US Government:** Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and Energy;
- **International Partners:** UN, ICRC and European militaries;
- **Civil Society:** NGOs, humanitarian relief and development organizations, academic

‘think tanks’;

- **Business:** Corporate Council on Africa, Business Council for International Understanding, Chambers of Commerce.

Additionally, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), while not a new entity, will continue to employ an indirect approach to countering extremism through efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity for African security forces to operate effectively, promotion of regional cooperation and protection of Coalition interests to prevail against extremism.

Case Studies for Multi-Dimensional Approach in Africa

In 2005 the United States expanded its Pan-Sahel Initiative across Africa to include Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Success in the AFRICOM approach of multi-dimensional development has so far been limited:

- Al Qa’ida increased operations in the Sahel through 2006 and attacks in the region increased in both size and scope;
- In Sudan, violence in Darfur worsened;
- In North Africa in particular, there appears to be an influx of fighters returning from Iraq and looking for ‘employment’ with indigenous terrorist organizations.

Al Qa’ida Expands Support to Africa

In 2003 the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Algerian-based Afghanistan-trained terrorist group, allied itself with al Qa’ida in declaring a holy war against the United States. The same year the group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of several dozen European tourists in the Saharan desert. In subsequent years the group extended its operations across the Sahel region of northwest Africa, whose porous borders and lawless terrain make it a prime location for terrorist organizations.

In subsequent years, elements aligned with al Qa'ida formed AQIM, or al Qa'ida in Mauritania, receiving training from the GSPC. The democratic Mauritanian government was overthrown in a military coup in 2007 and the US subsequently withdrew its surveillance and Special Forces operations based in the country, and has since denied the military government assistance in combating terrorism. The Mauritanian case demonstrates the difficulty associated with US support for counterterrorism in non-democratic countries. Our commitment to democratically elected governments should not impede our counterterrorism efforts directed at operationally capable terrorist organizations that pose a direct threat to the United States.

Sudan

After emerging from a two-decade long civil war through a January 2005 cease-fire initiated by US-led negotiations, the situation in Sudan—particularly Darfur—has worsened. The National Islamic Front—comprised of government-supported Arab rebels receiving Chinese material support—from the north is accused of committing genocide against the Animist and Christian populations located in the south. So far the violence has killed an estimated 300,000 people and displaced another 2.5 million. AFRICOM contingents are working with Rwandan Defense Force peacekeepers assigned to the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). To end the genocide in Darfur and stabilize Sudan, the US must:

- **Endorse the International Criminal Court (ICC) decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.** President Bashir has been a major source of contention in several areas related to a cease-fire agreement. The US maintains a great deal of respect among factions in Sudan and should use its voice to support the ICC decision.
- **Create a no-fly zone enforceable by NATO and European allies operating out of the French airfield at Abeche, Chad with an open offer to utilize the larger**

runway at CJTF-HOA in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. President Bashir employs a military strategy dependent on aerial strikes. The US should offer command-and-control aircraft and aerial refueling capability in exchange for a similar commitment of supplies and peacekeepers from NATO and the UN in an effort to ensure government aircraft are prevented from conducting air strikes, while humanitarian aid is not kept out of the country.

- **Continue to use public diplomacy through the UN to draw attention to Chinese material support for the National Islamic Front (NIF).** As Sudan's largest trading partner, China wields considerable influence and must be held accountable for arms shipments and material support. As revealed in the prelude to the Beijing Olympics, China cares about its image in the international community and the US can use Darfur as an example of how China will have to behave more responsibly if it desires a role as a major global partner.
- **Pursue fractures among the rebel groups in Darfur and encourage Sudan's neighbors, such as Chad, to continue support for the southern rebels and demand an end to the government's genocide.**

Encouraging Chinese Contributions to Security

The People's Republic of China is an increasingly important regional player with the ability to wield considerable influence in the Middle East and Africa, areas where China secures a large portion of its oil supply. Competition between the US and China should be recognized as a natural byproduct of their status as major world players, and should not interfere in areas of mutual cooperation in the struggle against transnational terrorism. In that capacity, it is encouraging to see China utilizing its naval forces to help secure the sea-lanes near the Strait of Hormuz and the Horn of Africa.

China is most concerned with steady economic development. Large-scale economic and social inequities have been attendant with the population influx from the

rural inland to industrial and financial metropolises on the Eastern coast. With economic growth, China's oil consumption has risen considerably. Due to the stagnation of China's domestic production capabilities, they have become increasingly dependant on foreign sources, of which 60 percent comes from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the largest provider, providing 16 percent of China's oil; Iran is the second largest provider. To encourage China's rise as a responsible stakeholder in regional stability, the United States will:

- **Approach Beijing to hold USN-PLAN naval exercises in the context of piracy and shipping protection.** In recent years the People's Liberation Army – Navy development has been cause for alarm in Congress. However, PLAN ships patrolling the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz and around the Horn of Africa are evidence that China aspires to be a responsible naval power. To coordinate our navies in the region, as well as look ahead to the necessity for future cooperation, the USN and PLAN should hold naval exercises.
- **Postpone the sale of arms to the Republic of China.** After the election of President Ma Ying-Jeou, Cross-Straits relations have reached their calmest level in decades. A capable Taiwanese military is in the interest of the United States. However, maintaining close relations with China is also in our interest. As a result of the arms sale proposal, China cancelled further military-military meetings. Meetings such as this will be of greater importance to US-Chinese relations as the People's Liberation Army – Navy grows in capability and scope of operation.
- **Encourage China to pressure Iran to return to IAEA regulation.** Although Iran is the second largest source of Chinese oil, China is trying to promote itself as a responsible power. The US will encourage China to maintain its position that Iran must adhere to its IAEA obligations. The United States can offer to help

modernize China's energy infrastructure through the sharing of 'green' technology in exchange for a pledge that China will align itself with the US and EU3 on the Iranian nuclear issue.

- **Increase China's involvement at the International Energy Agency.** IEA member states are part of an emergency collective response system in the event of an oil crisis. China lacks significant stockpile reserves as well as national emergency procedures to deal with such scenarios. However, IEA member states are required to be members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, likely to prevent China from becoming a formal IEA member in the near future. To cement an informal relation between China and the IEA, the United States will propose formal agreements on the release of strategic oil stockpiles in the event of supply disruptions. This would be an effective means of dispelling notions in China that the US is trying to thwart their economic growth by denying it sources of oil. Likewise, this would be an opportunity for China to demonstrate that its growth is not a threat to other states' energy needs.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Protecting the Homeland

The FISA Amendment Act of 2008 instituted new regulations regarding intelligence collection against foreign entities, addressing many of the issues which warrantless wiretapping by the National Security Agency created. According to the new law, all surveillance must be conducted with warrants under FISA courts except under conditions deemed to present direct threats to national security, in which case a temporary, short-term exception can be made at the President's discretion.

This bipartisan piece of legislation will protect our citizens' privacy during this time of heightened security. The surveillance program is vital to our ability to identify threats to our domestic security and should not be scaled back while our counterterrorism campaign continues.

Intelligence gathering and analysis are our greatest assets in the prevention of future terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland security must increase its intelligence gathering capabilities against an enemy that employs off-the-shelf technology for its operations and maintains a power structure much more diffuse than a nation state. Human intelligence (HUMINT) recruiting needs to be expanded to gain access to terrorist organizations and analyze emerging threats. To meet these goals, the United States will:

- **Establish Intelligence Sharing Agreements and Cooperative Security Alliances to increase collaboration and information sharing between the US and foreign intelligence communities.** Such agreements need to be forged with foreign countries so that information about potential threats can flow between nations more efficiently, and points of departure into the US can be better screened and secured;
- **Increase funding for the Department of Homeland Security to further secure ports of entry.** Federal funding will be allotted to fill personnel gaps and update technology used to identify hostile actors at ports of entry. Additional funding should be provided to state-level law enforcement agencies for the explicit purpose of providing additional security to high-level targets and preparing law enforcement personnel to deal with the aftermath of potential attacks;
- **Identify and mend vulnerabilities in US infrastructure.** Create a task force within the DHS with the responsibility of examining potential vulnerabilities in

US infrastructure in order to prioritize the level of risk. Based on risk assessment, resources should be allocated to more efficiently protect valuable targets whose destruction would have potentially catastrophic, long-term consequences to US interests, such as nuclear reactors, national symbols, and major infrastructure.

Moving Beyond Guantanamo Bay

The urgency of gathering actionable intelligence in the wake of 9/11 promulgated several instances where Category III techniques—the harshest of the three categories of interrogation methods—were employed against detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. These instances were not in accordance with Presidential directives regarding the handling of detainees not covered under Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) status, issued as early as February 2002.

The difficulty in classifying detainees left them vulnerable to mistreatment and arbitrary detainment without review, with no legal protections under domestic or international law. American credibility eroded as transgressions surfaced regarding the improper handling of detainees. To restore America's prestige, we will initiate a course of action regarding detainees to reinforce our longstanding commitment to the values enshrined in our Constitution and international law while promoting our strategic and long-term interests as we continue the struggle against terrorism. Closing the detention center at Guantanamo Naval Base and processing the remaining detainees will be an important step. To do this successfully, the US must:

- **Conduct an individual review of each case** by an assembly of members of the Justice Department, State Department and Defense Department to determine the best course of action for each detainee: release, trial, or continued detention;
- **Release detainees for whom we do not have sufficient evidence to conduct trials**

that are not assessed as an immediate threat to US interests. Guidance from the assembly should determine how the detainee may best be served upon release. All efforts will be made to return the detainee to his country of origin when doing so poses no threat to the detainee or the United States. However, in cases where it is believed the detainee may face imprisonment or torture upon his return home or may return to battle if sent to his own nation, all efforts will be made to provide an alternative destination for the detainee in a neutral / allied country;

- **Try detainees for whom we have sufficient information for legal proceedings.** If the assembly determines that sufficient evidence has been collected on the case of any detainee, it will recommend that the United States move forward with a trial. When a detainee falls under federal jurisdiction, trials will take place in federal courts. Otherwise, trials will be held in the established military courts;
- **Continue holding those detainees who are deemed too dangerous for release** and for whom we do not have sufficient information to try. When the board determines that a detainee may neither be safely released nor brought to trial, it will be recommended that these detainees continue to be held at federal maximum-security prisons. This group will be limited to those detainees who pose the greatest threat to the United States, such as terrorist masterminds and operational leaders. There will be regular review of their cases to consider any new evidence that may arise with an ultimate goal that these detainees may eventually be brought to trial. These detainees will be held under the authority upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently in *Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli*, which states that a detainee who is deemed an enemy combatant may be held indefinitely by the President when the Congress empowers him to do so.
- **Create an international convention to create a standard for the treatment of**

terrorists. The United States should propose a measure to the United Nations to ensure that the classification status and method for treatment of these stateless actors are internationally standardized.

Closing Guantanamo Bay and processing the remaining detainees will be an important step toward reclaiming America's commitment to individual civil liberties and humane treatment of POWs, particularly during times of conflict. Part of what separates us from the terrorist is our unwavering commitment to the ideals enshrined in our Constitution.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The information presented here, through an examination of the current US approach to counterterrorism and other issues related to US national security, indicates that while the transnational orientation of terrorism has become more nuanced, American counterterrorism strategy has remained relatively static. The following recommendations should therefore be considered for adoption as part of our new national security strategy:

- **De-hyphenate 'democracy' and 'counterterrorism'.** The United States is committed to the promotion of democracy, free-market capitalism, and the right to self-government. Yet, democratic reforms ought not be mandated as a necessity for receiving US counterterrorism aid. *In a departure from previous national counterterrorism strategies, we reject as false the notion that democratic reforms are essential to counterterrorism efforts.* We do not view democracy and terrorism as inversely proportioned; not always does the promotion of democracy necessarily lead to decreases in terrorist activity, as evidenced most explicitly during our past five years' experience in Iraq. If forced to choose between democratic reform and providing assistance to combat operationally capable

terrorist organizations, the United States—while in support of both—should choose the latter.

- **Analyze the extent but also the nature of relations between ‘violent Islamists’ and ‘al Qa’ida’.** Case studies in Africa represent the ways in which violent Islamic extremists are too often assumed to operate under the al Qa’ida umbrella. It is known that al Qa’ida initiated a campaign in Africa to bring surrogate Islamic radicals under its wing, as evidenced by the widespread circulation of audiotapes with former lieutenant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi calling for African Islamists to join its ‘jihad’. However, the intelligence community must identify the fractures—evidenced in areas such as tactics and financing methodology—that are employed from area to area. Doing so will help us move away from the tendency to lump Islamic radicals under the al Qa’ida umbrella and instead focus on fractional divides existing between and even within organizations that may be exploited to the benefit of US interests.

The United States must continue to lead the international community in combating terrorism while following a set of carefully established priorities. Through reexamination of previous policy that has proven ineffective in countering terrorism, the United States can offer advice and seek consult from global security partners in an informed manner. As terrorists continue to employ off-the-shelf technologies and low-cost communication and operational methods, so must the US intelligence and security apparatus evolve their own institutional innovations. A more nuanced approach is necessary to gauge the vast complexities of various terrorist organizations that are too often lumped together under the al Qa’ida umbrella and are thus assumed to pose equal threats that require an equivalent strategy.

Striking a balance between containing Iran's nuclear aspirations while seeking to find openings for constructive diplomatic dialogue with Tehran will require a concerted effort by the US intelligence community and diplomatic core, yet convincing the region that there is a place for a non-nuclear Iran in the international community should remain a top US priority. Exploring areas for regional cooperation, including strengthening our alliance with GCC members and inviting Israel and Fatah back to the negotiating table, will be necessary as we continue to promote our world vision of sustainable peace and lasting security.

Multilateral institutions have the potential to transform their operational capabilities by redirecting their efforts to areas that have track records of success. The UN should redirect its peacekeeping efforts toward humanitarian development, while there are several opportunities to strengthen the NATO commitment and its concept of equal risk, equal burden.

The challenges before us are great, but they are not insurmountable. Success will not only be measured by our ability to inflict damage on our opponent, but also by how well we are able to adapt to new challenges and respond effectively in the face of setbacks. We conclude this strategy with full faith that our unrivaled ambitions for truth, justice and equality place us on the right side of history.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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SHORT TERM STRATEGIES FOR COUNTER TERRORISM

Alex Cargol

INTRODUCTION

The new Obama administration is faced with a global financial crisis, a troop draw down in Iraq, and a military surge in Afghanistan. Our allies in Europe are weakened, while Pakistan and the Horn of Africa teeter precariously on the edge of collapse. The financial crisis will exacerbate the threat of terrorist organizations, such as al Qa'ida. If ever there was a clarion call for a “fundamental rethinking of counterterrorism strategy”, now is the time.¹ However, we must not only perceive the challenges of today, but also prepare for those of tomorrow. Nevertheless, considering the realities of limited time, personnel, and financial and material resources, we must discern the most effective counterterrorism policies.

For a new administration, this paper will outline a new counterterrorism strategy based on two pillars: intelligence and law enforcement. In this struggle, all types of intelligence, but particularly human intelligence, will be critical to dismantling terrorist organizations. We must understand our enemy, infiltrate their organization, and inhibit all aspect, operational, personnel, and financial, necessary to functional operation. In most cases, law enforcement is ideally suited for this task. Not only are their investigations and arrest legitimized by a state, but their acquaintance with a community and discretionary tactics allow them to better infiltrate terrorist organizations and develop informant networks.

However, in unstable or insecure states, but also states that actively or tacitly support terrorism, other ancillary strategies will be necessary. Conventional military operations are effective against insurgencies. They not only provide security and stability necessary for development of police forces and intelligence services, but also for infrastructure that benefits the civilian population. Where conventional forces are unable to act, or such action would be imprudent, Covert Operations and Special Forces may be utilized. Finally, the ultimate success of this strategy relies on conducting a counter-

¹ Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. 2008. *How terrorist groups end: lessons for countering Al Qa'ida*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 3.

publicity campaign against the fundamentalist ideology and brutal practices of terrorist organizations.

BACKGROUND

Contemporary strategies have proven inadequate to deal with modern terrorist organizations. That is, they have failed to appreciate the complex networks that support terrorist organizations and the diverse locales where terrorist operate. The primary focus of this paper will be to offer short-term strategies to defeating international terrorist organization, particularly al Qa'ida. While other threatening terrorist organizations exist, al Qa'ida poses not only the greatest and most direct threat, but this threat grows stronger in an unstable global environment.²

The Al Qa'ida fundamentalist ideology remains appealing to a significant number of individuals, its attacks have increased in frequency and sophistication, its resources network has expanded, and its organizational structure has also evolved, consisting of both top down and bottom up leadership.³ These realities are the current challenges faced in dismantling the Al Qa'ida organizations. Such resolute religious ideology is difficult to deter. Clearly, al Qa'ida can adapt to new battlefields, recruits members, evolve its tactics, and support operations. A more traditional top-down approach involves issuing strategy and operations from a central hub in Pakistan while the bottom up approach encourages independent action from low level operatives.⁴ This decentralized authority increases the difficulty of capturing terrorist leaders, but also decreases the importance of the arrest of any one individual arrest. Furthermore, if either Iraq or Afghanistan reconstruction efforts fail, or Somalia's transitional government is deposed and replaced by a fundamentalist Islamic government, these countries will inevitably become new terrorist hubs.

² Homeland Security Advisory Council "Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force" 2007

³ Jones and Libicki, xv

⁴ Hoffman, Bruce. "A Nasty Business," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 289: 49-52; Jan 2002, 51.

While the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and other regional disputes are certainly worth addressing in the broader sense of US national security, these issues are not the primary reason for al Qaeda's existence or support.⁵ Thus, in purely countering al Qaeda, initially addressing such issues is unnecessary. Further distinction is drawn between the al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist networks that have or have considered allying with al Qaeda. It would be irresponsible to ignore the interest and ideological fissures between these groups, and the opportunities they present for exploitation.

Most terrorist organizations (43 percent) dismantle as a result of incorporation into a state's political process.⁶ However, al Qaeda's primary political goals of instigating a Islamic confrontation with the US and its allies, overthrowing Western friendly governments, and establishing a Salafist pan-Islamic caliphate in the Middle East and North Africa is irreconcilable with all affected governments.⁷ The next most efficient strategy (40 percent) for defeating terrorism is policing. Thus, implementing a similar counterterrorism policy, one that combines local law enforcement and intelligence services, will most effectively challenge the growing threat of al Qaeda and other terrorism organizations.

COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

Intelligence

Intelligence is the sine qua non for victory against terrorist and insurgents. Colonel Yves Goddard, the French leader of counterinsurgency against Algerian rebels, knew this simple fact.⁸ British Lieutenant General Gerald Templer, who led the most successful counterinsurgency campaign against communist guerrillas in Malaya, knew this as well.⁹ So too has current CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus elucidated the

⁵ Jones and Libicki., 122

⁶ Jones and Libicki, xii

⁷ Jones and Libicki, xii

⁸ Hoffman 2002 49

⁹ Peter Maass, "Professor Nagl's War," *The New York Times*, January 11, 2004,

unrivaled importance of intelligence.¹⁰ Conversely, due diligence was not paid to intelligence gathering in Vietnam, thus contributing to the US defeat. In both defensive and offensive operations, the overall effectiveness of police and military forces rest upon the ability to gather credible and actionable intelligence.¹¹

The new counterterrorism strategy will primarily rely on several methods of intelligence gathering, in order of efficacy: human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and financial intelligence (FININT). Human intelligence incorporates information gathered from informants, captured or rehabilitated terrorist or undercover agents. SIGINT includes such practices as tracking email correspondence, cell phone tracking, wiretapping, and radio surveillance. OSINT monitors media sources, government publications, blogs, chat rooms, personal and group websites. IMINT uses satellite and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) imagery and video to patrol areas, locate, and attack terrorist. And FININT monitors banking statements and transactions records. While these last three services are important, HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities often provide the most actionable counterterrorism intelligence. This is because they are more directly involved with actual terrorist. Thus, efforts should be focused on developing their capabilities. The centrality of intelligence to effective counter terrorism cannot be overstated.

Human and Signal intelligence

Case studies of successfully intelligence gathering are helpful in forming new policy recommendations. Japan's dismantling the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group offers one worthwhile example. After the terrorist group released sarin gas into Tokyo subway, Japanese intelligence services began developing a deep understating of Aum Shinrikyo's organizational structure, tactics, strategies, and how they produced chemical and

¹⁰ David Petraeus "Petraeus Outlines Afghanistan Strategy"

http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/02/petraeus_outlines_afghanistan.asp

¹¹ Posen, Barry R. "The Struggle Against Terrorism," *International Security*, 26 Winter 2001/2002: 39-55. 46

biological agents.¹² Not only did they gather their information through active surveillance of members, but the most critical knowledge was gathered from defectors or arrested members. This superior understanding allowed the Japanese police forces to systematically dismantle the organizations, prosecute its members, and freeze their resources. This strategy precludes a strong diplomatic state, capable intelligence services and law enforcement, and advance technological surveillance capabilities. In dealing with Islamic fundamentalist, this strategy is best suited for the US Europe, and the wealthier Gulf States. The West should not neglect intelligence, if several attacks and near-successes has not convinced Europe consider that, contemporary Islamist activists are educated in secular western schools¹³ and have all been “born again” in the west, not the Middle East or North Africa.¹⁴ Thus, when they adopt radical opinions in the West, where do they go to wage *jihad*? ”¹⁵ In states with fewer resources, and less security for that matter, further alternatives must be explored.

Terrorist and insurgents speak the native languages, wear the local garb, and know and understand local customs; allowing them to easily move throughout communities. Conversely, in not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Pakistan, US forces and intelligence services lack of a similar familiarity impedes their ability to discern real terrorists from mere angry civilians. The most “actionable” and therefore effective information in this amenable environment will come from human intelligence gathered mostly from the indigenous populations, not from “orders of battle, visual satellite transmissions of opposing force positions, or intercepted signals.”¹⁶

However, local support relies on a positive opinion and a believed legitimacy in the state government, and in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, support for international security forces. Thus, intelligence services must form congenial and respectful communication networks with locals. Primarily, with community leaders, such as tribal

¹² Jones and Libicki (2008, 59).

¹³ Saudis and Yemenis are important exceptions. However, Saudis who attend religious Koranic schools

¹⁴ Olivier Roy, “Islam in Europe: Clash of Civilizations or Convergence of religiosities” 2007, <<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-roy-en.html>> 8

¹⁵ Roy 2007, 8

¹⁶ Hoffman 2002, 49

sheikhs, mullahs, and prominent businessmen; such leaders generally have greater legitimacy to speak with security forces. On the other hand, the general public must not only be willing to act as informants, but that after providing information to intelligence services, feel they would be protected. While US and European Intelligence services would do well cultivate relationships with community leaders in their respective Muslims communities, it is absolutely imperative to do so, and on a larger scale, in the Maghreb, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Currently, US and its allies are simply too ill-equipped to engage in effective intelligence gathering, and thus must elicit the help of local populations. That criticism being laid, we must also cultivate our own forces. An immediate investment into increasing language proficiency among intelligence operatives must be made; the sluggish development thus far of linguistic expertise in critical languages is unacceptable.¹⁷ An increase in cultural knowledge and language expertise would not only streamline interaction with locals and result in formation better strategy, but it would also reduce dependence on translators, who are difficult to come by and are at times specifically targeted. Furthermore, we must also develop working relationships with foreign intelligence services, while this may be assumed within Iraq of Afghanistan; we must work closely with Interpol in Europe and the ISI in Pakistan. As Hoffman put it, the most effective and useful intelligence comes from places where terrorists conceal themselves and seek to establish and hide their infrastructure.”¹⁸

While the critical imperatives of “actionable” intelligence gathering would suggest the use torture, prudence and law both teach that there is rarely certainty about a suspect.¹⁹ Furthermore, the legal, moral, and practical ramifications of practicing torture on the public image, intelligence gathering, and the larger conflict are immense. There is littler certainty whether or not an individual is guilty, let alone has relevant actionable information. Given these reasons, the rarity of actual “ticking time bomb cases”, and the

¹⁷ Farah Stockman, “Tomorrow’s Homework: Reading, Writing, and Arabic,” *Boston Globe*, January 6, 2006

¹⁸ Hoffman (2006, p. 169)

¹⁹ Harmon, Christopher C. 2000. *Terrorism today*. Cass series on political violence, [7]. London: Frank Cass. 147. Christopher Harmon provides a strong critique of torture. It is recommended that it be read in full.

alternatives of skilled negotiation, the torture of a suspect is foolish—as well as immoral, and should only be used in the most exceptional of circumstances.²⁰

In areas where a state government and security are largely non-existent, such as the Pakistan tribal regions or Somalia, more covert intelligence tactics must be employed. However, even in these situations, the ability to communicate and interact with individuals is crucial. Thus, the acquisition of languages and cultural knowledge, particularly tribal societies, still remain relevant.

Imagery, Open source, and Financial Intelligence

Imagery Intelligence

There are currently 108 UAVs in the Air Force fleet, and the Department of Defense is pushing for more.²¹ Using Satellites and UAVs, IMINT can conduct patrols or aid counterterrorist operations, track terrorist, locate their supply lines and camps, and even attack terrorist camps. Furthermore, UAVs are relatively inexpensive, flexible in missions, do not risk military personnel, and have long flight times of UAVs. These characteristics make UAVs particularly well suited for the campaigns in Iraq and along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The alternative missile strike capabilities of UAVs have been used at various levels of success in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, in a recent article, Defense Secretary Gates questioned the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs in Iraq, and in turn, suggested more low-tech solutions.²² Imagery intelligence, despite its recent technological advancements, simply does not provide equally actionable or credible intelligence as human and signal intelligence. In dense populated areas, it is difficult to track, whereas in remote areas it is difficult to locate terrorist with mere images alone. If a US soldier has difficulties determining a terrorist from a civilian at point-blank, how difficult is it to discern from an image taking hundred feet above the earth? Acting on such intelligence,

²⁰ Harmon 147

²¹ Noah Shachtman, “Pilots Yanked Out of Planes for Drone Duty” March 31, 2008
<<http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/03/pilots-yanked-o.html>>

²² Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009 <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.html?mode=print>>

without credible supplementary evidence, increases the chances of collateral damage. The UAV bombings in the Pakistani Tribal regions are currently destroying public support for the US. As scholars Kydd and Walter point out, “faulty US intelligence has simultaneously protected al Qa’ida leaders from death and led to the destruction of thousands of Muslims civilians—exactly the response al Qa’ida was likely seeking.”²³ Indeed, notable examples of poor intelligence include the accidentally killing Gaddafi’s daughter, the Iraqi poet Laila bin Attar, and the destruction of a pharmaceutical plant that produced half the medicine for Sudan.²⁴

The problem of terrorism is not a problem of applying force per se, but one of acquiring intelligence and affecting beliefs.²⁵ I would add that the former is a more immediately tangible goal, while the latter is the long term strategy. Using UAV bombers to strike too often results in collateral damages that impedes the US long term goals. Thus, while the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of UAVS must continued to be implemented in counterterrorism, their strike capability should be used with extreme discretion.

Financial System and Funding

Al Qa’ida receives its funding from a variety of sources, including: front businesses, drug trafficking, credit card fraud, extortion, kidnapping, and money from covert supporters. They use ostensibly charitable organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for funding and recruitment. Money for their operations is transferred surreptitiously through numerous banks, wire transfers, debit or “smart” cards cash couriers, and alternate remittance systems (often known as “hawalas”)—some legitimate and others not.²⁶

²³ Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F. Walter, *Strategies of Terrorism, International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 49-80.,72

²⁴ Ahmed, 1998 53-54 These were all aerial bombings that targeted, respectively, Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden

²⁵ Kydd and Walter 2006 79

²⁶ Counter Terrorism Strategy, 7 See also National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006

However, as Pillar argues, emphasizing terrorist funding as a means to stop terrorism would be wrong.²⁷ Most terrorist do not use the conventional banking system as laundering money is unnecessary; when they do, they use false names and funds are often intermingle with funds for legitimate purposes. Seizing these funds can have humanitarian consequences. There are several others pertinent reasons why financial intelligence should not be the primary focus of counterterrorism. Beyond the US and some European countries, many states lack the financial institutions to effectively monitor and police suspicious transactions.²⁸ Second, launching a terrorist attack is relatively inexpensive.²⁹ In the case of September 11th, only twenty plastic box cutters were necessary. Third, obstruction of the formal banking system has ironically heightened the incentive and necessity to engage in illicit activities, especially narcotics trafficking.³⁰ This is currently happening in the Taliban managed opium poppy fields in Afghanistan. Resolving this issue will require a significant amount of attention and support itself. Not only does the Taliban force farmers to grow poppies, but it is difficult to grow any other crop in the harsh climate. Furthermore, the poppies provide much needed income to the poverty stricken area that other crops could simply not produce.

Finally, the financial system known in the Islamic world as *hawala* exists outside the regulated international financial system. Individuals in the Islamic communities around the world serve as go-betweens and facilitate the transfer of cash that is not taxed, recorded, or registered by banks. These informal *hawala* networks remain largely outside government control, and monitoring them presents a significant challenge to closing terrorist financial exchanges.³¹ Developing strong international financial institutions to monitor banking systems will take time, as will combating the opium trade. The majority of al Qa'ida's financing has come from small amounts of seed money provided by the

²⁷ Pillar, Paul R. "Terrorism Goes Global," Brookings Review, Fall 2001: 34-37., 37

²⁸ Ibid, 37

²⁹ Pillar, 37

³⁰ Ibid, 37

³¹ Jones and Libicki 133

organization, supplemented by operations engaged in petty crime and fraud.³² Thus, some sources of funding, such as individual donations and the *hawala* money transfer system may simply be beyond the scope of regulation. Extensive diligent work will produce results, but while these funding sources must be address, they should not be the primary focus of counterterrorism intelligence efforts

Media and Open Source

Little, if any, actionable intelligence can be gathered from open sources. Nevertheless, even a tardy warning of terrorist attack may provide a life-saving margin of time.³³ However, open sources reveal a great deal of ideological contradictions, organizational divisions, and participant trends. Information operations conducted through a “broad based public information campaign, using every instrument and channel at its disposal”³⁴ can counter the fundamentalist ideology of terrorist or disrupt their recruitment operation.³⁵ For example, in the Aum Shinrikyo case, Japanese started a media and information campaign to dissuade current and potential members from joining the organization.³⁶ The campaign was successful in turning public opinion against the organization.

Appropriate rhetoric and strong argumentation are crucial to a counter-publicity campaign. For example, “*War on Terror*,” and the more recent, “the Long *War*”³⁷ suggests a single battlefield, conventional military tactics, the rules of war apply to counterterrorism. This polemic explanation arouses “our emotions, rather than our intelligence.”³⁸ Arguments stronger than war, religious or cultural bifurcation, and national security do exist. For example: al Qa’ida leaders lack credible religious

³²Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 7-48.2006 36.

³³ Posen 46

³⁴ Walt, Stephen. “Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy,” *International Security*, Winter 2001: 56 78.73-74

³⁵ Jones and Libicki (2008, 61).

³⁶ Jones and Libicki (2008, 69)

³⁷ Emphasis added to “War”

³⁸ Ahmad, Eqbal. “Straight Talk on Terrorism,” *Monthly Review*, Jan 2002: 46-54., 47

schooling; al Qaeda actually harms more Muslims and innocent non-Americans than Americans and Jews; they wish to instigate conflict was Shia Muslims.³⁹

The US should also increase its diplomatic and representative presence on Arab media networks, such as al-Jazeera, while also expanding its own Arabic-language media outlets and websites. “Today, extremist media cells recruit, exhort, train, share expertise, and generate resources in cyberspace.”⁴⁰ Thus, reducing the homogenous reporting in the region, and also reaching a wider demographic of the population.⁴¹ In the case of Afghanistan, where there are large rural swatches that have no tv, let alone electricity, General Petraeus recommends hand-crank radios that can receive transmissions from local radio stations.⁴² The condemnation of al Qaeda activities by moderate Muslims and nonviolent Salafist imams and mullahs from across the world will be particularly damaging.⁴³ For example, the most common response among Jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda’s strategy and methods. When soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the US military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was... a ‘deafening silence’ from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of Jihadist went to fight the Americans.⁴⁴

Similarly, however, this strategy rest upon the US and its allies maintaining the moral high ground. This requires a better public opinion, trust, and legitimacy for the US and the assisted state. Practices such as torture should be widely banned, and reducing collateral damage should be a primary initiative. Furthermore, counterterrorism should be

³⁹ “Collateral damage” is not a sufficient answer. Collateral damage is not a “risk” in terror bombings; it is a certainty. The real uncertainties in terror bombings are whether the chosen targets(s) will actually be hit by the terrorists, and whether the person(s) targeted were actually culpable of any crime against terrorists” Harmon 149

⁴⁰ Fick and Nagl 2009

⁴¹ Walt 2002 73-74

⁴² Nathaniel C. Fick, John A. Nagl “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition” January/February 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=0

⁴³ Harmon 149-150; Stern, Jessica. “The Protean Enemy.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82: 24-40; Jul/Aug 2003.

⁴⁴ John Mueller, “Is There still a Terrorist threat” *Foreign Affairs*, 85.5 (Sep. 2006), 5

discussed in the context of the law, and terrorist as criminals.⁴⁵ This context delegitimizes terrorist as “holy warriors” and replaces it with the less heroic “common criminal”.

Furthermore, there is no shortage of ideological divisions over within the global Jihadist movement regarding issues and strategy.⁴⁶ The US objective must be to enlarge the movement’s internal inconsistencies and differences..⁴⁷ One of reason for Al Qa’ida “remarkable staying power is its willingness to forge broad—and sometimes unlikely—alliances. These strange discrepancies, such as with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Philippines Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which co-opt localized terrorist groups into the Global Jihad should be addressed.⁴⁸ Al Qa’ida has now come to encompass so many different groups and their respective goals that it hard seems likely that any can realistically be achieved. “Driving a wedge between the movement and its recent adherents” is crucial to undermining international support for al Qa’ida. It would be a devastating mistake to consider al Qa’ida as monolithic, and to not exploit these fissures within the fundamentalist Islamic community.

Therefore, the large opportunities for altering the perspectives of the general population in Iraq and Afghanistan through media should be exploited.

. Finally, extensive efforts should be made on the basis of diplomacy and mutual self-interest to cooperate with foreign intelligence agencies. The lack of interagency cooperation is an unfortunate problem that has only recently begun to be addressed. On the one hand the CIA’s Counter Terrorist center needs to be strengthened; all useful information gathered by *any* intelligence or law enforcement agency is concentrated for analysis⁴⁹ This includes forming working relationships and sharing information. While corruption and information leaks are a possibility, depending on the criticalness of the information, the foreign agencies should be provided benefit of the doubt.

⁴⁵ Jones and Libicki 132

⁴⁶Brachman, Jarret., Felter, Joseph., and Fishman, Brian. “The Power of Truth,” CTC Report at www.ctc.usma.edu.2008, 25

⁴⁷ Cronin 2006 42

⁴⁸ Stern 2003,

⁴⁹ Posen, Barry R. “The Struggle Against Terrorism,” *International Security*, 26 Winter 2001/2002: 39-55. 47

Local Policing and Law Enforcement

In 2006 counterinsurgency field manual, author General Petraeus stresses the importance of “serving, as well as securing, the population.”⁵⁰ This strategy consists of “protecting civilians over killing the enemy, assuming greater risk, and using minimum, not maximum force.”⁵¹ Building local security “capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”⁵² Local law enforcement officers are instrumental to building relationships of trust after a conflict so that subsequent terrorist attacks to not spiral into greater violence.⁵³

Police forces are specifically trained to interact with the public; their continual presence among the community allows them to develop a familiarity with the landscape, the society, and community leaders. This permanent presence further enables police forces to actively cultivate strong ties with community leaders, including elected official, civil servants, clerics, businessmen, and teachers, among others, and thereby enlist their assistance and support,⁵⁴ or rather; they develop credible human intelligence sources.⁵⁵ With this information, police officers can generally better “penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations.”⁵⁶ Local police officers notice, or are informed of, new arrivals to the community or large influxes of money. Furthermore, local knowledge allows local police forces to better investigate, surveil, gather evidence, and infiltrate terrorist organizations, arrest or kill terrorist and confiscate their weapons, monies, and other resources, and otherwise obstruct the work of international terrorists.⁵⁷ All of this contributes vital intelligence that allows states to dismantle the terrorist or insurgent organizations, command structure, communication, terrorists, logistics support, and financial and

⁵⁰ Fick and Nagl 2009

⁵¹ Fick and Nagl 2009

⁵² Gates 2009

⁵³ Kydd and Walter, 2006 75

⁵⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press. 2006. p 169

⁵⁵ Hoffman 2002 49

⁵⁶ Jones and Libicki (2008 p. 27)

⁵⁷ Pillar 37

political support.⁵⁸ Furthermore, their local affiliation, subordination to the state, and bond with community leaders provides them greater legitimacy to enforce the law than foreign forces.

After incorporation into the political process, the second most effective counterterrorism method is policing.⁵⁹ There is no shortage of examples of successful counterterrorist policing operations. For example, in the 1970s, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Quebec Provincial Police were able to arrest and convict Quebec's terrorists groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, the FBI assisted state and local police to quell Puerto Rican, black-liberation, and white supremacist groups. The success of the campaign rested heavily on gathering reliable informants, infiltrating the organizations, preempting attacks, and arresting terrorist.⁶⁰ "Hard intelligence work buttressed by raids" led to the capture of Saddam Hussein.⁶¹

Furthermore, police are capable of very specific targeted retaliation with minimal collateral damage, defense of potential targets, denying terrorist access to destructive weapons such as WMDs, minimizing the psychological costs of terrorism and the tendency people have to overreact, and even concessions.⁶² Because killing popular al Qaeda leaders will not affect the already decentralized command structure, and further may result a perceived martyrdom and public and political backlash, it is a better policy to capture and jail al Qaeda leaders—undermining their credibility and cutting off inflammatory communications are critical to demoralizing the al Qaeda following.⁶³ As al Qaeda recruitment has come mainly from local volunteers competing to win a chance to train or participate in some fashion, not pressure by senior al Qaeda members but mainly form,⁶⁴ police must investigate where individuals find information on joining al Qaeda. This should be done in Muslim communities, particularly around racial Islamic

⁵⁸ Jones and Libicki (2008, p. 60). See also Betts, *The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror* (2002, 33)

⁵⁹ Jones and Libicki, xiii. Forty percent of groups surveyed as a ended as a result of policing

⁶⁰ Jones and Libicki (2008, p. 30)

⁶¹ Maass 5

⁶² Kydd and Walter 2006 64

⁶³ Cronin 2006 22

⁶⁴ Cronin 2006 34

mosque and community centers. Islamic fundamentalist who advocated violent jihad must also be investigated. In addition, the internet has also becoming a primary tool of recruitment as well. Police must observe these internet channels where al Qa'ida preys on disenfranchised individuals. This strategy is ideal in the West, where daily life is secure and stable and police forces are experienced, well-funded, well equipped with modern surveillance equipment etc. Interagency "fusion," both domestic and foreign, drastically increases policing effectiveness.⁶⁵ There is also room within this strategy to respect civil and human rights.

However, where this is relatively little security or stability (Iraq), authoritative governments (Egypt, Saudi Arabia), or where states are having difficulty in controlling their population (Pakistan), the United States can help develop policing forces. Historically, the United States government has offered several types of assistance, including: providing arms and other equipment; training and mentoring security forces; and building infrastructures, such as prisons and police stations. These "train and equip" programs allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner nations"⁶⁶ However, currently, the US teams advising the afghan army are staffed at just half their authorized strength; and the police mentor teams are manned at barely a third of the necessary staff."⁶⁷ Given the paramount importance of local police forces, the US should move quickly to increase training personal and funding for training.

Criticisms of counterterrorist police force due exist, but so do further solutions. As with intelligence services, corrupt individuals or those sympathetic to terrorist causes must be purged from the ranks. During the Cold War, the United States developed security and police services to counter Soviet influence and subversion, but efforts resulted largely in the "strengthening the recipient government's capacity for repression".⁶⁸ The US must learn from these mistakes and refrain from ideological alignment. Finally, an attempt to develop police forces is impossible in failed states like

⁶⁵ Harmon 162

⁶⁶ Gates 2009

⁶⁷ Fick and Nagl 2009

⁶⁸ Jones and Libicki (2008, p. 28)

Somalia, and terrorism sponsoring states, like Iran or Syria, or states that have a powerful insurgency force, like Afghanistan. In these cases, it may be necessary to engage in conventional warfare or utilize covert action.⁶⁹

Military Force

To be clear, this strategy does not encourage US involvement in yet another war. However, where possible, a “monopoly over violence” must be established using military forces, and thus providing an opportunity to develop police forces. This strategy is currently relevant to Afghanistan, where al Qa’ida and deposed Taliban forces are currently engaged in an insurgency. International Afghanistan Security Forces (IASF) must determine the appropriate balance between military and the fledgling law enforcement services. IASF forces must also employ a “clear and hold” strategy to prevent insurgents from regaining territory. This requires the stationing of an adequate number of troops on the ever expanding security perimeter; plans for an additional troop surge as well as recent recommitments of non-US troops to Afghanistan will assist this process.

In Afghanistan, diplomacy will loom larger than military operations; and defensive military activities will loom larger than offensive; but, counterterrorism is a war of attrition, and the offensive component is necessary to win.⁷⁰ Military forces can easily destroy terrorist camps and bases, and can keep these groups perpetually on the move, thus reducing their capability to strike.⁷¹ Constant surveillance inhibits planning, while the threat of capture is exhausting. Generally, the military is too blunt of an instrument to be effective against terrorist, but militaries are effective when terrorist groups are large enough to conduct insurgencies because fighting becomes more conventional.⁷²

⁶⁹ Posen 44

⁷⁰ Posen 42

⁷¹ Posen 46

⁷² Jones and Libicki, 31. Military force is successful against terrorist/insurgencies 25% of the time, while only 7% of the time against terrorist alone.

Successful US military efforts in Iraq's Anbar province from 2006 to 2008 provide a good example of effective military use. Due to Al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) violence against other insurgency groups and their challenge to tribal authority and related business operations, many insurgency groups, at the urging of the tribal leaders in the Anbar Salvation council, joined police and security forces. In return, the US military protected the tribal Sheikhs from AQI.

Although it took tribal sheikhs several months to convince young Iraqis to join police forces, eventually, the active police force expanded beyond what was even necessary.⁷³ Iraqi familiarity with the AQI was critical to the strategies success. Until recently, these police officers had not only interacted with AQI, but fought alongside them.⁷⁴ By mid-March 2007, the conversion of al Anbar was largely complete; notably before the arrival of most of the additional US forces.⁷⁵ As General Petraeus noted, it would be extremely dangerous to assume that the same techniques used in Iraq can be applied to Afghanistan⁷⁶

However, once security and relatively stability has been establish in Afghanistan as it was in Iraq, the US military should adopt a more discreet supportive or instructive role. It should focus primarily on training professional indigenous law enforcement capacity⁷⁷, thus reducing the American "foot-print" in the conflict. While terrorist still exist within Afghanistan, because of the overwhelming force of modern militaries, continually deploying forces against terrorist organizations generally has the opposite effect of what is intended.⁷⁸ Reducing the American presence the further reduces the perception that the US is interfering in another state's affairs. Furthermore, it increases personal investment in achieving because the civilian population feels they control their destiny. The U.S should resist becoming involved in combat operations as much as possible; only acting when absolutely necessary to protect security and stability.

⁷³ Ibid, 91

⁷⁴ Jones and Libicki, 94

⁷⁵ Jones and Libicki, 97

⁷⁶ Fick and Nagl 2009

⁷⁷ Jones and Libicki (2008, p. xvi)

⁷⁸ Jones and Libicki (2008, p. xvii)

Wherever al Qa'ida is, it must be fought, but this does not necessitate that the United States fight every battle.⁷⁹ While there is a time and place for military operations, the US must take care not to “overreact with excessive and indiscriminate violence.”⁸⁰ Instead, in areas where America receives little or no support, covert action may be necessary.

Covert Action: Special operations, Rendition, and Assassination

Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates both greatly expanded the size and budget of the US Special Forces. These highly trained individual fighters are generally more effective and cause less collateral damage than cruise missiles or precision guided bombs; they also include expert at training and advising foreign soldiers.⁸¹

Whereas conventional military forces rely on slow supply conveyes moving through the frequently sabotaged Khyber Pass on the Afghan-Pakistan border, Special Forces or covert operators carry all supplies on their back, have a small impression on population, and can more easily locate and destroy small, dispersed targets.⁸² Special Forces and Covert operators should try to avoid contact with national armed forces, but also deter national armed forces from getting in the way, or to foil them if they try.⁸³

These forces are ideal for the mountainous Afghan-Pakistan border, but also where the US has no other military or diplomatic presence, such as Somalia or Iran. While these countries remain closed politically, gathering intelligence within these countries is crucial to counterterrorism efforts; particularly, in Somalia, where al Qa'ida presence is growing.⁸⁴

Assassination presents an alternative to capture in the case of a state-or-group protected terrorist. In the past, Israel, France, Spain, all have used political assassination to some success. However, when such action becomes public, there is extreme political

⁷⁹ Posen 43

⁸⁰ Posen 48.

⁸¹ Poser 49

⁸² George Friedman, “Afghan Supplies, Russia Demands,” *New York Times*, February 3, 2008.

⁸³ Posen 44

⁸⁴ Jeffery Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place in the World” *Foreign Policy*. March/April 2009

backlash.⁸⁵ The ideal target, Osama bin Laden, has deliberately avoided allowing the al Qaeda movement to revolve around his persona. However, he has announced the insignificance of his own fate and eagerness for martyrdom.⁸⁶ Furthermore, al Qaeda will not end if Osama bin Laden is killed because of organizational decentralization. There are further benefits to capturing and prosecuting Bin Laden, such as inspiring the esprit de corps and denying his expertise.⁸⁷ The new administration is already working hard to repair the United States' image, and therefore, should refrain from this tactic.

Distinct from deportation and extradition, rendition "entails the removal, often by force, of a wanted fugitive from someplace overseas."⁸⁸ Its legal basis makes rendition a useful, if not underused tool, for counterterrorism.⁸⁹ This tactic has been successfully used by Israel, France, and both democratic and republican US presidents successfully.⁹⁰ Compared with assassination or inaction, rendition is "moral and better (legally and politically)."⁹¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- *Develop intelligence services information gathering capabilities*
 - Expand networks of information sources, particularly human sources into civilian communities
 - Develop greater capabilities to process information, such as developing language expertise, cultural knowledge, and forming closer ties with other domestic and foreign intelligence services
 - Increase utilization of advance imagery technology to locate and track terrorist.
 - Develop capacity to monitor terrorist financial structures

⁸⁵ Harmon, 144

⁸⁶ Cronin 2006 40

⁸⁷ Cronin 2006 39

⁸⁸ Harmon, 145

⁸⁹ Ibid, 145

⁹⁰ Ibid, 145

⁹¹ Ibid, 145

- Observe media outlets and the internet; gather information relevant to terrorist organization; run counter-publicity campaign using appropriate rhetoric and strong argumentation condemning terrorist criminal behavior
- *Use local police forces to investigate, surveil, and arrest terrorist*
 - Develop close links with community leader and generate network of informants
 - Infiltrate terrorist organizations; gather evidence, sabotage activities
- *Use military to defeat insurgencies, create stability and security, and train local police and security forces*
 - Use discretionary force to reduce collateral damage
 - Allow local security forces to create security and stability
- *Utilize Special Forces and Covert Action in situations where political, diplomatic, or military solutions are not feasible.*
 - Use special forces or Covert operators for special missions, including attacks, assassination, and rendition

The short-terrorism counterterrorism strategy is two-fold:

We must strengthen our intelligence agencies. This includes hiring more trained language and analyst personnel, improving their technological reconnaissance capabilities, disrupting terrorist financing network, and beginning a counter-publicity campaign to challenge the claims and ideology of terrorist organization. Interagency communication must become more efficient and cooperative, as well as information sharing with foreign intelligence agencies.

We must also strengthen policing units around the world; particularly, within Afghanistan and Iraq. Not only will they increase their actionable intelligence, but they are best equipped to infiltrate and dismantle terrorist organizations and arrest or kill leaders.

Additionally, we must use US military power to fight insurgencies, but also create greater stability and security of the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Reducing collateral damage is crucial to winning the support of the population

We must also, should the situation deem necessary, utilize our Special Forces and Covert Operators to conduct missions within territories where a discreet and dynamic presence is necessary.

AFTERWARD

A good grand strategy, Christopher Harmon writes, requires “sober government leadership and all major aspects of national power, from the political and military through the economic and informational, deployed with focused energy and adequate resources”. He continues, “democracies are often at their best in these struggles: rallying after initial inaction; demonstrating adherence to principles, yet taking temporary exceptional measures, and drawing on little-used internal and external resources. Confronted with terrorist crisis, a country is thus saved by reaming united and acting with prudence and appropriate force”⁹²

Of course, there are many tools to fighting terrorism, and “all elements of national power” should be implemented, this paper has covered the primary short-term strategies that should be used in counterterrorism. This strategy has neglected domestic characteristics, such as budgets and laws. As articulated in this strategy, the importance of intelligence is paramount, thus a more significant portion of the counterterrorism budget must be allocated toward intelligence services, not the Department of Defense. Furthermore, it will take time and extensive debate to create the full range of laws necessary to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism. However, in due time, a constructive framework will develop, one consistent with US values, that will also allow intelligence and police services to do their jobs well. During this process, it should

⁹² Harmon, 180.

remain the primary goal of democratic states' counter-terrorist strategy to protect and maintain liberal democracy and the rule of law.⁹³

Adept diplomacy, whether using carrots, sticks, or cooperation, will be essential to global counterterrorism. Furthermore, the social, political, and economic “root” causes of terrorist behavior will need to be addressed if terrorism is to ever be truly defeated.

⁹³ Wilkinson, Paul, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 2nd ed., Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1986. p125

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LONG-TERM COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY:

End the Support of Militant Islam:

*US Relations with Potential Recruits &
Supportive Communities*

Caitlyn McCrone

ISSUE

Because violent extremists innately do not fit into the law-abiding world envisioned by the United States, we must not tolerate the spread of violent fundamentalism. However, the current US led War on Terror has not effectively reduced the threat of terrorism. We must recognize the following realities: First, terrorism is a tactic, thus winning a war against it is an intangible goal that may never be achieved. Second, semantics aside, the predominant use of military action, while resulting in short term remedies, has proven incapable of fully terminating the use of terrorism because it responds to, rather than addresses the root conditions that produce these acts of violence. Third, assuming terrorists are irrational, ignorant and underprivileged actors undermines our strongest tool to dismantle terrorism. Without seeking to understand root causes or underlying conditions that motivate the use of terrorism we cannot begin to move forward in creating a long-term strategy to diminish the reemergence of this tactic, as we will be prevented from actively dismantling the conditions under which new recruits emerge.

Strong communal support, active and passive, are crucial to terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and al Qa'ida to pose threats to the United States.⁹⁴ Much cannot be done to change the attitudes of deeply entrenched terrorist leaders.⁹⁵ On the other hand, communities often have legitimate grievances and endure conditions that predispose them to side with the terrorist organizations.⁹⁶ As formal governments fail to generate trust and are incapable of providing security, social services, education and basic infrastructure necessary for the livelihoods of their civilians, militant Islamists satisfy these needs and thus gain communal support. It is clear that many of these supporters do not agree with the tactics of these radicals but are receptive because of what they offer.

⁹⁴ Cronin, Audrey Kurth, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1 (summer 2006): 27.

⁹⁵ Richardson, Louise, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2006): 215.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Therefore, it is essential that the US focus on dissuading supportive communities and potential recruits by understanding the appeal of terrorist organizations, while simultaneously investigating an alternative means of satisfying these communities' grievances. In addition to the insecurity that makes civilians vulnerable and apt to join the cause against the United States, anti-American sentiments find support in past and present US political actions. Therefore, it becomes essential that the US diligently conducts transparent diplomacy, and demonstrates respect for the regional views. To fully diminish the threat of terrorism, the conditions and networks that harbor terrorists must be eliminated, and to do so the grievances of potential recruits and supportive communities must be addressed.

BACKGROUND

Islamic Militants

It must be noted that those imploring the tactic of terrorism are the weaker of the two actors in an asymmetrical conflict and are used generally by those who lack a formal political voice⁹⁷. Because terrorism is relatively inexpensive, it is logical to assert that this tactic will never be removed from the options of resistance.⁹⁸ However, in understanding these actors we will know how best to dismantle them.

With the fall of Arab nationalism in 1967, the end of the Cold War, and the political and economic weakness of these former Arab states, many extremist non-state actors, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and al Qa'ida, later rose to fill this power vacuum.⁹⁹ The main threat currently facing the US comes from radical Islamic fundamentalists.¹⁰⁰ Although not monolithic actors,¹⁰¹ Islamic extremists often are reacting to similar situations with comparable tactics, thus it will serve to look at their make up and how they generally operate.

⁹⁷ Richardson, 4.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 232; Cronin, 37.

⁹⁹ Migdal, Joel. Interview by task force 2009. Seattle, WA, Jan, 12, 2009.

¹⁰⁰ US Department of Homeland Security. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Sept. 2006):10.

¹⁰¹ Richardson, 215.

Militant Islamic groups use religion to justify the use of violence as an effective means of demanding attention to their cause.¹⁰² This allows them to proclaim they are engaged in a global war on behalf of all Muslims.¹⁰³ They are also deeply unsatisfied with secular politics as they see them as being unable to promote good governance and economic advancement in Muslim countries¹⁰⁴. These extremists recognize their ability to take advantage of these weak secular governments' inability to provide for even the most needy of citizens.¹⁰⁵ They see it as imperative that governments are inseparable from religion.¹⁰⁶ Herein where, these radicals view the US' promotion of church and state separation as an obstacle to the betterment of their governments.

These fundamentalists can also be seen as reacting to a crisis within Islam, frantically trying to assert Islam's place in this ever-globalizing world.¹⁰⁷ They feel like Islam is threatened within the current world system viewing it as "anti-Muslim, deeply unjust, and unchallengeable."¹⁰⁸ Some even argue that to preserve its power the US is working to undermine the creation of a united Arab force.¹⁰⁹

Contrary to common perception, these actors are from middle to upper classes, hold jobs and have consciously made the decision to use the form of terrorism to bring attention to their cause.¹¹⁰ They are not mentally unsound or acting without logic.¹¹¹ They rely heavily on mass media and modern technology rather than traditional political

¹⁰² US Department of Homeland Security. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Sept. 2006).

¹⁰³ Niva, Steve, "Addressing the Sources of Middle Eastern Violence Against the United States," *CommonDreams.org*, Sept. 14 2001, <http://www.commondreams.org> (accessed Feb. 10, 2009).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.; Pasha, Mustapha Kamal et. al, "Causes of Islamic Extremism," *United States Institute of Peace*, June 2002, <http://www.usip.org/> (accessed Jan. 28, 2009); Barsalou, Judy, "Islamic Extremists: How Do They Mobilize Support?" *United States Institute of Peace*, July 2002, <http://www.usip.org> (accessed Feb. 1, 2009).

¹⁰⁵ Barsalou; Butts, Kent Hughes, et. al, "The Military's Role in Addressing the Underlying Conditions of Terrorism," *Center for Strategic Leadership: US Army War College*, June 2006, <http://www.csl.army.mil> (Feb. 4, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Pasha; Barsalou.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Fuller, Graham E., *Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power*, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004: 328.; Wike, Richard and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "Where Terrorism Finds Support in the Muslim World," *PewResearch: Pew Global Attitudes Project*, May 23, 2006, <http://pewresearch.org> (accessed Jan. 10, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ Fuller.

¹¹⁰ Richardson, 210.

¹¹¹ Moghadam, Assaf. *The Roots of Terrorism*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2006: 17.

institutions to mobilize support, while simultaneously rejecting cultural modernity.¹¹² The essential use of media to establish prosperous public relations has been crucial to their appeal to the wider society. In fact, “In recent years, the emergence of videotapes and satellite television has popularized Islamic fundamentalist views [which] in some cases have fueled outbreaks of terrorism.”¹¹³ An increased access to technology has given widespread voice to resentment and has thus made terrorism even easier. In Pakistan specifically, the principle strategy by radical Islamists is to gain control over civil society institutions (media, education etc.) in addition to the legal system, to eventually capture the state.¹¹⁴ Not only have Islamic extremists used modern technology but many have created schools, *madaris*, that are not only known for terrorist training sites but offer education and social services that are not provided by the government.¹¹⁵

Muslim extremists strongly believe that Western societies, especially the American, are innately hostile to their religion and way of life, and therefore these they cannot co-exist.¹¹⁶ This fundamental guiding principle allows them freedom from constraint in using violence- as they view themselves as preserving their way of life.

It should be noted that a small percentage of Muslims can be classified as non-negotiable extremists, and rather many value family, seek justice, accountable governments, and do not believe Islam requires violence.¹¹⁷ However, these few radicals find support as everyday life is hard for citizens, and resentment towards the US goes unchallenged. The unfavorable conditions and negative light of the US that fuel the continued existence of terrorists will be fully explored in the following sections:

Lacking Opportunities due to Insecurity: Social and Economic Hardships

The communities surrounding Hamas, Hezbollah and al Qa’ida have been made vulnerable because within these unstable environments support from official

¹¹² Barsalou.

¹¹³ Prados, Alfred B, “CRS Report: Middle East: Attitudes towards the United States,” *Congressional Research Service Library of Congress*, Dec. 31 2001, <http://www.fpc.state.gov> (accessed Feb. 3, 2009).

¹¹⁴ Barsalou.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Prados.

¹¹⁷ Maghraoui, Abdeslam, “Special Report No. 164: American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” *United States Institute of Peace*, June 2006, <http://www.usip.org> (accessed Feb. 3, 2009).

governments in education, social services and outlets for free expression are formally lacking.¹¹⁸ In turn, terrorist organizations have provided much of these social services, which provide a level of stability and security for people. For example "Approximately 90 percent of its [Hamas'] work is in social, welfare, cultural, and educational activities."¹¹⁹ Hezbollah, as well, is a "major provider of social services, which operates schools, hospitals, and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Shiites."¹²⁰ Additionally, "high birth rates, low productivity, unresponsive economic structures, and inadequate educational systems have retarded economic growth and kept countries in this region from becoming competitive in the international market."¹²¹

Due to these poor and insecure conditions there is a high financial incentive to work for terrorists organizations versus within the civilian sector, as successful terrorist groups pay well. As documented by Barsalou "many members talk about the importance of money as a motivating factor."¹²² For instance a "mid level manager in Lashkar-e-Taiba [group based in Pakistan] said that he earns seven times what he would in the civilian sector."¹²³ Additionally, "Families of dead 'martyrs' sometimes receive financial rewards or better housing".¹²⁴ It is clear that "This is a job. They need to feed themselves. Idealism may matter at the top levels, but oftentimes people are motivated by money."¹²⁵ According to the Pew survey "local political, social, and religious factors" greatly influence the conditions that give rise to the use of terrorism.¹²⁶

In these conditions of basic survival individuals are easily manipulated and find it reasonable to align themselves with those who seem to understand their needs and provide for them. Resistance because of inconsistencies with these radicals' views and

¹¹⁸ Butts

¹¹⁹ "Hamas," *Council on Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 7, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org> (accessed Feb. 7, 2009).

¹²⁰ "Hezbollah," *Council on Foreign Affairs*, Aug. 13, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org> (accessed Feb. 7, 2009).

¹²¹ Prados.

¹²² Barsalou.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Whitelaw, Kevin, "The Terrorists' Paper Trail in Iraq," *USnews*, Feb. 6, 2008, <http://www.usnews.com> (accessed Jan. 11, 2009).

¹²⁶ Wike.

violent actions towards the US no longer becomes a practical choice when it rivals survival.

In combination with the above, is the extreme sense of disparity between Americans and many Arabs and Muslims. The U.S is highly criticized and resented because it is viewed as the leader of globalization, infringing upon the success of these Muslim economies and threatening their religion.¹²⁷ In a public opinion poll of Palestinians in October 2001 86.5% of respondents agreed with the statement that the United States is “[r]ich at the expense of poor nations.”¹²⁸

Lacking Trust in US Policy

Additionally, extremist groups find support as they cite contradictions between US policy and actions, and the U.S’ lack of concern for opinions expressed in the Middle East. “Many of 1.2 billion Muslim people are understandably aggrieved by double standards.”¹²⁹ It was revealed within the Middle Eastern Birzeit poll that many view that the “US applies justice and fairness to its own people, but not abroad.”¹³⁰ Specifically, “66.5% of respondents believe the United States respects the human rights of its citizens and 52.6% believe it practices democracy within its borders; however, much lower percentages believe it promotes these values abroad.”¹³¹ The list that follows highlights current grievances against past US policy that extremists use as evidence that the US is not committed to its stated principles nor values the opinions of those in the Middle East in order to bolster their support, justify the use of violence, and instill distrust in the US:

US uncommitted to up holding their principles:

- US support for dictatorships perceived as oppressive, corrupt, or un-Islamic¹³²
- Belief that US taught Egyptian police torture techniques, later used on the Shah.”¹³³
- US has inconsistencies when protecting Human Rights¹³⁴

¹²⁷ Prados.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Niva.

¹³⁰ Prados.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Niva; Prados; Maghraoui.

¹³³ Niva.

- US sells weapon to violent regions for US monetary gain¹³⁵

US disregard for opinions within the Middle East:

- US biased in favor of Israel unfairly requiring Palestinians to renounce violence while allowing continued Israeli settlement¹³⁶ (Specifically, 90% of Palestinians regard perceived US bias toward Israel as a very important factor shaping US-Arab relations.¹³⁷)
- US does not heed general opposition for the 5,000 military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia, the land of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina. This presence uncomfortably reminds them of European colonialism.¹³⁸
- US support for UN sanctions on Iraq, which resulted in the deaths of 5,000 children under the age of 5 each month and over 1 million Iraqi deaths during the 10 years of sanctions.¹³⁹ Resentment for containment policies remains to this day for the continued sufferings of the Iraqi people.¹⁴⁰

*US allowing Muslims to bare the brunt of violence:*¹⁴¹

- Serbian Croatian genocide against Bosnian Muslims
- Russian war in Chechnya
- Indian occupation of Kashmir

Regardless of the fact that these negative actions are real or perceived, they deserve our attention. If left unacknowledged, terrorists will continue to use them to effectively win support. A PEW survey found that “views about the US appear strongly associated with attitudes toward terrorism, with support for terrorism higher among people who have an unfavorable opinion of the US: those who believe American foreign policy does not consider the interests of countries like theirs, those who are concerned that the US may

¹³⁴ Prados; Zunes, Stephen, “10 Things to Know about the US Policy in the Middle East,” *University of San Francisco*, Sept. 26, 2001, <http://www.aztlan.net> (accessed Jan. 21 2009).

¹³⁵ Zunes.

¹³⁶ Niva.

¹³⁷ Prados.

¹³⁸ Ibid.; Niva.

¹³⁹ Niva; Zunes.

¹⁴⁰ Niva.

¹⁴¹ All references from Niva.

pose a military threat to their country, and those who believe the US opposes democracy in their country.”¹⁴² When it is perceived that “Islam is under threat [it] is positively correlated with support for terrorism.”¹⁴³ Additionally, “the perception that the US acts unilaterally in international affairs, concerns about the American military becoming a threat, negative views of the Iraq war, the belief that the US opposes democracy in the region, and a generally unfavorable view of America all drive pro-terrorism sentiments.”¹⁴⁴

The lack of explicit recognition for those in the Middle East creates a feeling of humiliation. In fact, the “single most common emotional feature among jihadi militants, regardless of rank, is their feeling that they have been humiliated and treated as “second class” by government authorities and others— even those jihadis from relatively rich countries or advantaged backgrounds”¹⁴⁵ Anger, desperation, in combination with the US’ lack of acknowledgement creates fertile soil for individuals to see violence as the most effective means of gaining voice.¹⁴⁶

The Birzeit poll reveals that crucial to the betterment of US-Arab relations, is that *Americans* must change their negative perception regarding those in the Middle East. “88% of respondents believed that perceived American animosity toward Islam is a very important factor in shaping US-Arab relations.”¹⁴⁷ “If you want the Arab people to prove they love America, let America prove they love the Arab people.”¹⁴⁸

It is clear that we must change the manner in which we work in the Middle East so we create reason to be intolerant of terrorism and disprove negative statements about the US. Citing these past examples, in combination with harsh conditions and manipulated information about the US, it becomes clear why— without other sources to counter these claims and actions to show that the US is in fact committed to their principles— citizens

¹⁴² Wike.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Barsalou.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.; Niva.

¹⁴⁷ Prados.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

would be at minimum, wary of the US, and even less likely to object to violence against Americans. As it stands currently, these extremists have been given the perfect conditions under which to receive support. Therefore we must address the perceptions that fuel anti-American sentiments through improved transparent public diplomacy and increased awareness between the US and the Middle East.

Current tactic

Today it appears that military action is creating more radicals and resentment towards the United States.¹⁴⁹ Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in October of 2003, “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists everyday than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”¹⁵⁰ The current ‘US strategy for ending the threat of terrorism through the use of military force will only exacerbate th[is] anger and desperation [already within this region].’¹⁵¹

The Necessity of Reaching Communities

It is clear, however, that the popularity of these radical Islamist groups fluctuates in conjunction with the strength and transparency (anti-corruption) of the official government. As stated previously it is a wrongful assertion that terrorists and those who harbor terrorists are monolithic actors. Those in the Islamic world are “not innately opposed to the US” in fact “many Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, including those most critical of US society and policy, are attracted to the democratic principles and economic opportunities that the United States has developed.”¹⁵² “Most people in the Islamic world want development and a better life, not [violent] jihad.”¹⁵³ It is also promising that, “popular attitudes are winning out in their ability to influence regional policies.”¹⁵⁴ However, considering the current environment, “public acquiescence or even

¹⁴⁹ Ahmad, Eqbal, “Straight Talk on Terrorism,” *Monthly Review*, Jan. 2002: 53.

¹⁵⁰ Richardson, 217.

¹⁵¹ Niva.

¹⁵² Prados.

¹⁵³ Zakaria, Fareed, “The World Isn’t So Dark,” *Newsweek*, Sept. 22, 2008, 49.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

sympathy for anti-US violence [has] increased”¹⁵⁵ and “unfavorable opinions of the US are still widespread in five traditionally moderate Muslim countries.”¹⁵⁶

We must use this popularity to our advantage by giving them the tangible means to refuse support of terrorists and a compelling reason to reflect upon and refute anti-American violence. It will be crucial that civilians have the opportunity to engage in alternatives and have hope for the future in order to reject extremist organizations. “Terrorists, after all, depend on a broader population for support, and the right US policies could do much to diminish the appeal of rejectionist groups”¹⁵⁷

INTERESTS

The United States has deeply invested interests in addressing and resolving the grievances and conditions of potential recruits and terror-supportive-communities because they are fundamental for the preservation of terrorist organizations and are the key factor which allow extreme individuals to threaten the security of the United States. Without support, radical terrorists will have an increasingly limited means of endangering the US and the further security of the American citizen will be reached.

OPTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Currently we cannot rely solely on military action, the creation of democracies nor economic sanctions to decrease the existing threat of terrorism. Military action alone cannot put an end to terrorism because it does not address the root problems driving this tactic. Without coupling force with recognition and action to alter the root motivations of these terrorists, our efforts will be futile because as we dismantle terrorists others will continue to emerge and fight. On the other hand, democracy promotion may lead to the empowerment of fundamentalists because the societies are not fully formed.¹⁵⁸ Currently free elections in the Middle East do not ensure just leadership, but more accurately reflect

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.; Fuller; Maghraoui.

¹⁵⁶ Wike.

¹⁵⁷ Stern, Jessica. “The Protean Enemy.” *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 2003, 24-40.

¹⁵⁸ Cronin; Maghraoui.

the view of the majority while subjugating the minority.¹⁵⁹ Lastly, current economic sanctions do not accurately put the pressure on those whom are to be targeted and should therefore be used with much precaution, so as not to generate more enemies.¹⁶⁰

There is no denying that reversing the resentment of the US and regaining the trust of these communities will take time. However, as Petraeus states “sustained progress will require sustained commitment.” In our commitment to put an end to the threat of terrorism, we must begin immediately by addressing the supportive communities and potential recruits in which terrorism is sustained. The specifics in this action plan can and will be adjusted to adequately respond to each area where we are dismantling terrorism. Terrorists will find it increasingly difficult to find broad based support and continue their operations because the US will:

1. Differentiate terrorists from their communities and accordingly apply different tactics to deter their actions. Using local contacts and intelligence gathering we will best identify our true adversaries. We will capitalize on the intimate knowledge these locals have of their own language and culture. In recognizing that terrorists and the surrounding community are not unitary actors, we will be able to: 1. Recognize their differing grievances, 2. Use tactics most effective to address these differing actions/motives, 3. Exploit their differences by satisfying and addressing those of the communities, and 4. Prevent ourselves from creating more terrorists due to inappropriate treatment of community members.¹⁶¹ Communities, unlike terrorists, often times have negotiable demands— legitimate grievances and conditions that predispose them to support terrorist organizations. Therefore, by addressing these factors we will begin to alter their sentiments that fuel their support for terrorism. We will address grievances that can be satisfied without compromising US values or security (ex. not implore religious rhetoric).¹⁶² We will use conciliatory policies and soft power to deter communities and

¹⁵⁹ Maghraoui.

¹⁶⁰ Niva; Zunes.

¹⁶¹ Cronin; Richardson, 215-216.

¹⁶² Richardson, 215; “Gates: Fight Terrorism with ‘soft power’,” *The Associated Press*, Nov. 26, 2007, <http://msnbc.msn.com> (accessed Feb. 3 2009).

potential recruits from supporting and thus enabling violent actors. However, coercive policies will be directed at terrorist leaders and direct perpetrators of violence.¹⁶³ Although forcing us to make our methods more precise, this distinction between terrorists and their communities will prevent us from creating new opponents.

2. Provide security to civilians in areas where we are physically dismantling terrorism. Most importantly, we will secure the communities surrounding major terrorist hubs to make our offensive operations worthwhile. Securing the local populace will take away their immediate desperation for survival and provide an alternative to supporting terrorism; thus isolating these violent actors. US military and NATO forces will be used to increase the stability and the security of these communities. Where possible, US and NATO forces will operate alongside local police and military forces to establish the security of the people. Providing security with the local forces will not only increase the legitimacy of the US government, but the local government as well. The US also will further confidence in the local government by condemning explicit corruption, such as fraud, in these local government's police and military forces.¹⁶⁴ The inclusion of local police and forces is important because it allows civilians to see that they are part of ensuring their own security. As confidence is gradually restored in the both the US and local government, these individuals will have reason to challenge the negative views of the US, and end their dependency on terrorists. All of which are necessary to renounce terrorism. As US forces and local government's troops increase the safety of their citizens, economic and social aspects of society will reemerge. This further decreases the reliance and need for terrorist groups.¹⁶⁵ Although establishing security within democracies would work best, we cannot aim for regime change because our resources are sufficiently limited. However, providing security and stability to communities remains a priority because, as stated above, security allows civilians to begin to satisfy

¹⁶³ Richardson, 205.

¹⁶⁴ Butts; Petraeus, General David H., *The US Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007:105.

¹⁶⁵ Petraus.

their other basic needs. With these needs met these communities no longer have the strong incentives to support terrorists who bring violence to their communities.

3. Increase US transparent public diplomacy. We will eliminate uncertainty about the US' motives by clearly describing our actions and intentions to the local populace through mass media, such as TV, radio, internet, so they do not fall victim to the manipulated portrayal of the US. First, we will clarify that the "US is at war not with Islam but rather with small groups of violent extremists acting against the basic tenants of Islam".¹⁶⁶ Using rhetoric common between the West and highly Islamic cultures in mass media, we will counter the propaganda and challenge the statements of extremists. We will also simultaneously publicize and criminalize the violent acts of these terrorists to show these locals that they have security and stability to gain.¹⁶⁷ As we change the US image, people will begin to see what security and opportunities they have to gain and that the US is not an overall threat to the region. They then begin to have reason to deny even passive support to terrorists.

4. Accurately understand the Islamic culture and empower moderates. We will disseminate education about moderate Islam and the cultures of the communities wherein it is practiced. US civilians, diplomats and military officials will be educated to decrease cultural misunderstandings and animosity due to cultural ignorance that undermines broader US policy. We will also emphasize learning critical languages. Understanding that terrorists and those supporting them are not mentally ill, but see themselves as rational actors, will allow us to execute more appropriate plans because they will be based on factual characteristics.

We will also work with non-violent moderates and support them in civil society by providing opportunities for them to further develop their ideas and study in American universities so these ideas can be drawn upon when new policy is made.¹⁶⁸ As discussion and debate of how Islam and modernization are compatible, radical interpretations will be

¹⁶⁶ Hass, Richard N. and Martin Indyk, "Beyond Iraq: A New US Strategy for the Middle East, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> (Jan. 31, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Petraus; Maghraoui; Richardson, 218.

¹⁶⁸ Maghraoui.

addressed and provide usable alternatives to the compatibility of modernization and Islam.¹⁶⁹

5. Work with local and international actors to increase effectiveness and demonstrate respect: Diplomats and military officials will consult and engage with willing local leaders, such as tribal sheiks, businessmen, government officials, and mosque leaders, so as to understand their thoughts, keep in tune with the local sentiments and ensure our actions on the ground are accomplishing our aims.¹⁷⁰ Our local awareness will allow us to adapt our tactics as necessary. Because domestic plans and actions are most positively looked upon, local input will reaffirm that our actions are not selfish or insensitive to others' perspectives. Under this same premise, gaining multilateral support will be sought. Furthermore, US foreign policy will be equally critical and reflective regarding all actors in the Middle East, including Israel's actions, so the US' power is not undermined by the belief that it will extend unconditional support.¹⁷¹ This outwardly demonstrates our willingness to weigh different perspectives.

6. Decrease our military footprint where possible. Much of the anti-American resentment is re-enforced as first hand images capture the US as part of the violence, danger and perpetually harsh living conditions in these communities. Where military force is determined as the best and most effective tactic, deliberate adherence to the other recommendations outlined here will be imperative.

7. Identify and support NGOs & local actors to provide for lacking socioeconomic conditions and opportunities: As stated above, when communities are secure, the local population and NGOs will be able to reestablish themselves. This portion of reconstruction will be slow and gradual. The UN and NATO are institutions to be used for the rebuilding of civil society. They should especially be used to help rebuild the infrastructure and provide humanitarian aid in Iraq and Afghanistan. Where possible, the US will support local relief organizations and NGOs with development and humanitarian

¹⁶⁹ Fuller.

¹⁷⁰ Petraus; Ricahrdson, 220.

¹⁷¹ Niva.

aid. In societies where work, education, and basic infrastructure are present, the desperation and anger on which terrorism feeds is reduced and the ideology terrorists use to garner support is undermined.¹⁷² Additionally, because many businessmen have monetary incentives to keep the West and Islam compatible, business is positive for the US.¹⁷³ Therefore, investment by locals and foreigners in the local infrastructure will be positive for this region as it will provide more jobs and opportunities. Because many individuals join terrorist groups for social rather than ideological reasons¹⁷⁴ a functioning civil society that provides alternative opportunities for involvement and communal connection, will be effective at curbing the appeal of terrorist organizations.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, because many NGOs are lacking in the Middle East, the US will support the creation of a “Muslim World Foundation,” similar to the Asia Foundation, a non-profit organization that “cultivates peaceful, prosperous, and open Muslim societies and polities.” Being independent and non-governmental it would also be able to effectively act as a mediator.¹⁷⁶

The above recommendations create a greater connection with the US and provide the means and reason to object to terrorism as a valid tactic.

CONCLUSION

It is all too clear that “the center of gravity of this war is the people who provide the necessary safe havens, support and foot soldiers to terrorists.”¹⁷⁷ We must put an end to their desperation caused by ill providing governments by first establishing their security.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, we must utilize transparent public diplomacy, adhere to our principles, demonstrate our respect for their concerns and beliefs, while creating opportunities that give civilians the means to reject the violent actions and distortions of

¹⁷² Richardson, 223.

¹⁷³ Fuller; “Islam and the West: When Religions talk.” *The Economist* (June 14, 2008): 74.

¹⁷⁴ Cronin, 35-36; Moghadam, 23.

¹⁷⁵ Richardson, 221.

¹⁷⁶ Maghraoui.

¹⁷⁷ Butts.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid; Petrus.

extremists. Only then will we fully be able to proclaim we are working for a safe America by targeting the threat of terrorism from its source. Our successes will indeed be achieved gradually, but will result in equally lasting solutions.

The execution of the cohesive 2009 strategy is intricately bound to the effectiveness of dissolving the threat of terrorism to the United States. Specifically, in tandem with taking action that addresses the underlying cause of terrorism, as outlined above, it will be essential to simultaneously address the leaders and radicals who cannot be reached at this level, as outlined in Appendix Cargol to successfully diminish the threat facing America.

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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Gabriel Ellzey

ISSUE

The following study is an examination of the challenges that United States military forces face if they are going to continue to effectively seek victory in long-term counterterrorist operations and yet still be prepared to face other potential threats to the security and stability of the nation. It will look at the conventional strategies that have produced positive results in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and discuss some of the various options the US military has available to increase the effectiveness of these operations. It will also examine what role that military guard and reserve forces should play in active duty campaigns as well as the potential benefits of non-traditional types of warfare, such as the use of special operations warfare, information technology and soft-power policies to defeat violent Islamic extremists and states who are sympathetic to their cause. It will conclude by proposing that some structural changes must be made and additional resources must be allocated in order for the military to remain strong for future conflicts while effectively completing current operations.

Furthermore, this study will take a look at the current structure of domestic security and the steps that the Department of Homeland Security and other national agencies are taking to protect American interests at home and abroad. It will examine which policies have been effective in securing the homeland thus far and suggest additional actions that could be taken to provide further security for potential terrorist targets on US soil. In addition the efficiency of the US intelligence gathering community, which is the backbone of both of these endeavors, will be examined and recommendations will be provided on how intelligence agencies can improve upon their operations and reduce wasted resources. Ultimately, it will decide that both of these institutions require additional resources, personnel, and a more consolidated focus to increase efficiency and expand their capabilities into the future.

INTERESTS

The ultimate goal of this commission is to create policy which will bring about a primarily diplomatic resolution to the global terrorist threat in which sustained US military operations will no longer be required to maintain peace. However, until that time, it is an undeniable reality that the United States must be ready and able to face any and all threats to its national security, both at home and abroad. In order to accomplish this, the United States must be prepared to use both diplomacy and varying degrees of force to deal with hostile parties that may pose a risk to the nation's security. In the end, the challenge of effectively combating the terrorist threat while keeping the homeland secure from attack will be faced on three fronts: on foreign soil, on the home front and within the United States intelligence community.

Most military dangers we face from abroad today are from “asymmetric threats” – strategies and tactics that avoid our strengths head-on, and instead, hit us where we are weak.¹⁷⁹ With this in mind, it is in the best interest of the United States to always remain vigilant with a standing fighting force that can take on any enemy in addition to being prepared to adapt to new situations and new threats that are continually arising in this turbulent modern age. Furthermore, the US must maintain a strong and tight, yet adaptable defensive structure that is capable of using both manpower and new equipment to secure all ports of entry into the United States and capture all dangerous materials and persons that are trying to enter into our borders. Finally, it must develop a cohesive and comprehensive intelligence system that is able to assess any threat, and prepare for any hostile scenario by successfully utilizing a combination of advanced, modern technologies and highly skilled personnel to accurately analyze the information at our disposal.

Without these things, the United States would be completely defenseless and at the mercy of those who seek to do us harm. That is why when considering the well being of the nation all changes that are necessary to improve security and adapt to the ever

¹⁷⁹ Bruce Berkowitz. *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*. (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 7.

changing threats of the 21st century should be implemented despite the cost. In the end, there should be no financial burden that is too great if the threat of danger is real and the consequences of inaction are severe enough to warrant a transformation.

BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2001, a brutal attack on the United States by a group of violent, Islamic extremists set in motion a series of events that would test the structure and capabilities of a number of American institutions. First, the intelligence community would face a great deal of criticism because of its failure to intercept the information required to predict and prevent an attack of such incredible magnitude on US soil. From there, the ability of the United States to protect its citizens from harm would be called into question, eventually forcing the government to respond by creating the Department of Homeland Security and restructuring the current defense capabilities of the homeland.

Then, shortly after the attacks the United States would commit itself to engage in a campaign to eliminate every terrorist group of global reach¹⁸⁰ that could pose a threat to the US and its allies worldwide. From its inception, the “War on Terror” was expected to be a lengthy campaign, unlike any other that had ever been seen,¹⁸¹ its scope and scale reaching from a massive ground war in the Iraqi desert designed to eliminate a hostile regime suspected of supporting terrorist organizations, to strategic, special ops raids in the mountain villages of Afghanistan which targeted the very perpetrators of deadly terrorist attacks.

Now, nearly eight years after these events began, the measure of progress made by the US as a result of these operations is difficult to ascertain. In war, both conventional and non-conventional tactics have seen their share of successes and failures and there have been many instances where a victory on one front is met by the challenge of defeat on another. For instance, at the same time the 2008 troop surge in Iraq appeared to

¹⁸⁰ George W. Bush, "President Bush Address the Nation." United States Congress. Washington D.C. 20 September, 2001. *The Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html (10 February 2009).

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

reduce the number of violent insurgencies which had threatened to destabilize that nation's budding democratic regime, the US also had to deal with issues of severe corruption within the Afghan government that they helped to establish, as well as face the return of a more powerful Taliban regime less than six years after their initial defeat. Now, as the war on terror drags on with out an end in sight, potential new threats to US national security are emerging from the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea to the turbulent Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and the gradual breakdown of relations with current allies in Russia and Pakistan. If the US truly intends to attain victory against terrorist organizations and still maintain the capabilities to protect itself from other rising dangers, then the 20th century policies of US military, intelligence, and security forces must be revisited and modified to deal with the new and unconventional threats that of the 21st century.

OPTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Military

As the organization that is responsible for engaging hostile forces in battle and protecting the homeland from danger, the United States military perhaps plays the most vital role in eliminating the threat of terrorism from the world. They are typically the first to directly engage the enemy in combat, the first to represent US interests to the civilians of enemy states, and they are actively involved in any efforts of rebuilding and restructuring that may occur within the defeated state after the conclusion of combat operations. Therefore, the decisions that the United States military makes and the resulting consequences of those decisions are not only vital to determining the successful outcome of combat operations, but are important factors in US foreign policy and the maintenance of peace as well. If the US is to achieve victory in the War on Terror it will be not only through the brute strength of our military, but also in the manner they relate to potential hostiles and defeated parties, because there is arguably no more dangerous enemy than the one with nothing left to lose.

In order to determine the steps that the United States military must take to effectively play their part in eliminating terrorism, this study will first examine what exactly victory means to the American people before it begins to evaluate the best course of action for obtaining those goals. Historically, the American criteria for establishing victory in war typically entail the successful completion of six objectives¹⁸²:

- Defeat enemy military forces and its economic infrastructure.
- Control the enemy state.
- Achieve political and governmental reform.
- Rebuild the economy and infrastructure.
- Realign the enemy state's foreign policy.
- Build a new strategic relationship with the defeated state.

Before proceeding it is important to note that the majority of these objectives do not necessarily require the use of force for them to be achieved and that potential conflicts which lead to war can often be resolved before they result in violence. With that in mind the subsequent section will describe some of the various aspects of the United States Armed Forces and discuss the roles that they play in order to achieve these objectives in the War on Terror. It will ultimately propose a number of recommendations for the US military to implement in order to deal with some of the adverse issues that the pursuit of victory has led to.

The Role of Conventional Forces

Conventional warfare is defined as the type of warfare which is conducted using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics, between the organized militaries of two or more states. The forces on each side of the battle are well defined, primarily target enemy combatants, and typically abide by the Hague Conventions which define the internationally observed laws of war. Conventional war practices *do not* involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, and instead are characterized by the deployment of

¹⁸² William C. Martell. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),

troops in the form of traditional ground forces such as tank battalions and infantry units, maritime forces such as aircraft carriers, submarines and destroyers, and air forces which are used to engage in combat activities.

Since its formation nearly 250 years ago every major combat operation that the US has been involved in has featured some aspect of conventional warfare, and as a result, the US military has structured itself to primarily engage in this type of conflict. In consequence, the United States has amassed, by far, the world's most powerful conventional military force which has proven itself to be essentially unmatched in conventional battlefield operations time and time again. For example, over the past two decades in the Balkans, the Middle East, and in Afghanistan, formal combat operations have been completed swiftly, efficiently, and with remarkably few casualties or loss of resources for allied forces once US military intervention has occurred.

Situations like these have shown with little room for doubt that, if necessary, the United States Armed Forces have the military might to eliminate the war making capabilities of any other nation on the planet. This knowledge has helped to dissuade potential threats to the United States by forcing potential enemy states to evaluate their potential for success against our armed forces before engaging in hostilities against us. Therefore, even for purposes of deterrence alone, it seems to be within the interest of the United States to maintain conventional force levels that are above and beyond those of other nations in order to remain the world's military hegemony.

Furthermore, the conventional forces of the United States are also essential in that they provide the basic framework for all other non-conventional military operations to occur; all of the other aspects of the military which will be outlined later in this study essentially cannot function on their own. For instance, US Special Operations Forces not only require the support of the military intelligence structure to know how to effectively carry out their missions but conventional attacks, such as bombing raids, are vital to making many missions safer, and increasing the possibility for success. In addition, the advanced technology of the US military requires highly skilled and trained personnel to

maintain and operate, and soft power forces rely on the security provided by conventional troops in order to conduct their missions in unstable regions. Therefore, without the conventional military structure, many of the other tools that are being implemented to achieve success against unconventional enemies would prove to be ineffective.

Issues with Conventional Forces

Where the US conventional forces have begun to break down, however, is when they are forced to engage in long term combat and security operations, especially when they must engage enemies on multiple fronts. Despite the fact that the United States Armed Forces are the largest and most powerful in the world, the conventional force structure of the US military does have its limits which are becoming increasingly apparent as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to drag on. The most apparent and problematic of these limitations include:

- Combating unconventional enemies, such as al Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations, requires non-conventional tactics. A conventional force structure that is designed and organized to engage in combat with hostile militaries is not as effective in combating the types of urban and guerrilla warfare, terrorist tactics, and insurgencies that have been prevalent in the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts.
 - Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have required substantial increases in the number of US service members deployed and the frequency with which units are sent overseas. Through December 2006, over 1 million active-duty personnel and 400,000 reserve personnel had been deployed to these theaters. To maintain the forces necessary to conduct those operations, the military must be able to recruit significant numbers of volunteers. However, all three components of the Army have had trouble achieving their recruiting goals in one or more recent years.¹⁸³
- This is resulting in forces that are being spread very thin in combat zones, and is

¹⁸³ Congress of the United States, The. Congressional Budget Office. *The All Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf> (30 January 2009).

placing a great deal of stress on personnel who are being forced to deploy more frequently and for longer periods of time than they were meant to in order to maintain adequate force strength in the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts.

- Lengthy deployments to these theaters have also placed increasing stress on the Army as it seeks to preserve its institutional commitments to training its soldiers, and to maintaining a pool of ready units that can respond rapidly to new contingencies.¹⁸⁴ The depletion of major equipment such as tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and especially helicopters and armored Humvees has left many military units in the United States without adequate training gear and many US units are rated "unready" to deploy.¹⁸⁵
- The conventional military structure that currently exists is incredibly expensive to build and maintain. The base budget for general operational and maintenance costs for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year of 2009 was \$515.4 billion.¹⁸⁶ It should be noted that this figure does not include the additional expenses which are required to conduct the current War on Terror, upgrade and expand forces, care for veterans or other subsequent military expenditures.

The Role of Guard and Reserve Forces

The strain on active duty forces in the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts has forced the military to increase the mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces in order to sustain operations in these regions. In addition to active-duty troops, reserve personnel have been mobilized in large numbers—a total of 580,000 reservists had been mobilized through March 2007 and of those, more than 410,000 reservists had deployed to combat

¹⁸⁴ Lynn E. Davis. "Summary," In *Stretched Thin: Army Forces for Sustained Operations*. (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG362.pdf (30 January 2009), xi.

¹⁸⁵ Anne Scott Tyson. "US Army Battling To Save Equipment; Gear Piles Up at Depots, Awaiting Repair," *The Washington Post*, December 5, 2006, <http://www.proquest.com/> (30 January 2009).

¹⁸⁶ United States Department of Defense. *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2008. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/defense.pdf> (23 February 2009).

operations through December 2006.¹⁸⁷ Initially, the majority of these units that were activated were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan to fill in supportive roles for combat forces that were deployed in the initial waves. However, Guard and Reserve personnel are being used more frequently to fill in combat roles as conflicts drag on, and are becoming increasingly more important to the rotation of troops as active duty forces are being spread thin.

The dilemma is that both of these branches of the military were established with the intent that they would be secondary, part-time forces that would serve primarily supportive roles in the US military and were meant to be activated only during times of crisis. For instance, the primary mission of the National Guard is to serve as the first line of defense for the United States homeland, and provide emergency assistance during natural disasters and times of public unrest. Furthermore, Reserve forces were created at the beginning of the 20th century in order to have a pool of skilled people, primarily doctors, at the president's disposal for times of national crisis. Before the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, these reservists spent an average of one day per year on active duty in support of exercises and operations. In the years before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that measure rose to about 14 days; since 2003, it has grown to more than 70 days per year, on average.¹⁸⁸

Despite the fact that legislation and court rulings over the past several decades has made it easier for the President to call up these forces for active, overseas operations, they remain structured, supplied, and funded to serve in part-time supportive roles. Therefore, as conflicts continue it is becoming increasingly more difficult for Guard and Reserve branches to maintain their obligations to domestic security and crisis relief when they must commit so many of their limited resources to the war against terrorism. If the US government chooses to continue utilizing these forces in full time, active roles that

¹⁸⁷ Congress of the United States, The. Congressional Budget Office. *The All Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf> (30 January 2009). 1.

¹⁸⁸ Congress of the United States, The. Congressional Budget Office. *The All Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf> (30 January 2009). 1.

are separate from their original missions, then serious restructuring and reallocation of resources will be required to maintain the abilities of the National Guard and Reserve branches of the military.

Issues with Guard and Reserve Forces

That being said, some of the problems that have resulted from the increased role that the Guard and Reserve have been required to take in Iraq and Afghanistan are explored below:

- A substantial portion of National Guard and Reserve personnel and resources are being committed to overseas deployment which significantly reduces the capacity for these forces to fulfill their duties in the event of a major natural disaster or national crisis. The situation is so severe that a 2008 congressional commission reported that there is "an appalling gap" between the threat of a chemical, nuclear or biological terrorist attack on US soil and the ability of reserve forces to respond.¹⁸⁹
- Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because: prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required war-time items and Guard units returning from overseas operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over \$1.2 billion overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations.¹⁹⁰

The Role of Special Operations Forces

¹⁸⁹ Tyson, Ann Scott. "'Appalling Gap' Found in Homeland Defense Readiness." *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/31/AR2008013101833.html> (23 February 2009).

¹⁹⁰ United States Government Accountability Office. *Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to Be Reexamined*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d06170thigh.pdf> (20 February 2009).

Quite different from conventional warfare, special operations warfare involves the use of nontraditional techniques and tactics to achieve the goals of combat operations. By the terms of their definition, Special Forces are small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt military operations of an unorthodox and frequently high risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy.¹⁹¹ They are the nation's key penetration and strike forces, able to respond to specialized contingencies across the conflict spectrum with stealth, speed, and precision and they are also warrior-diplomats capable of influencing, advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations.¹⁹² The most well known of these groups in the United States Military include the Navy SEALs, Marine Force Recon, and the Army's Delta Force, Rangers and Special Forces (Green Beret) units.

Because of the unique nature of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Forces units have played a key role in the successes that have been achieved during and after major combat operations. For example, in 2004 Green Berets waged the famous "hearts and minds" campaigns with locals in the north and south while garnering valuable intelligence, as Rangers searched towns for arms caches, SEALs cleared mines from rivers and harbors and Air Force combat controllers parachuted into hostile territory to call in air strikes. In Baghdad, super-secret Delta teams and CIA operatives were responsible for hunting down Hussein regime officials¹⁹³ while every night in Iraq, US Special Operations forces carried out as many as a dozen raids aimed at terrorist leaders allied with al Qa'ida, other insurgent fighters and militia targets.¹⁹⁴ In addition, Special Forces have been essential in training the Iraqi security forces that are being prepared to take over the protection of the nation after US forces withdraw.

¹⁹¹ Gray, Colin S., *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. (London: Phoenix Press, 2006), 252.

¹⁹² William S. Cohen, "Chapter 4 – Special Operations Forces." In *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. <http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr98/chap4.html> (23 February 2009).

¹⁹³ Dyhouse, Tim. "'Black Ops' Shine in Iraq War." *VFW Magazine*. February, 2004. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0LIY/is_5_91/ai_113304758 (28 February 2009).

¹⁹⁴ Shanker, Tom. "No shortage of targets for US special forces in Iraq." *International Herald Tribune*, May 29, 2007, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/05/29/news/troops.php> (23 February 2009).

Issues with US Special Operations Warfare:

However, despite the valuable role that Special Operations forces are currently playing, like all forces, there are issues that must be addressed if these forces are to continue to play an active role in defeating terrorism:

- While Special Operations warfare is becoming increasingly necessary in defeating the unconventional, non-state enemies that the US military is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan, they do not serve as a substitute for winning conventional battles against enemy states. As the US prepares additional units for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, they risk depleting the capability of forces to defeat the militaries of hostile states.
- Special Operations typically involve high risk operations which are conducted by small, self-supportive units that often function separate from the conventional force structure for extended periods of time. These types of operations effectively place US military personnel in situations where they face a substantially increased risk of harm.
- Special Operations require extensive training of soldiers in order to be effective. The US conventional force structure is already facing a substantial drain on its resources from extended operations in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, making it incredibly difficult to provide basic combat training to new soldiers. With this drain on resources it is becoming even more complicated to prepare soldiers for Special Forces operations when they require preparation above and beyond that of the typical soldier.

The Role of Information Technology

Information technology is becoming a major factor in the outcome of wars today by providing a tactical advantage to an army that otherwise may not exist. American led combat operations of the past twenty years have proven this fact as the technological superiority of the United States and its allies have led to incredibly lopsided victories on the battlefield time and time again. The first major instance of this came during the first

Gulf War in 1991, when the United States and Coalition forces were able to defeat the Iraqi army, the third largest in the world while losing only 240 people in the process compared to the estimated 10,000 battlefield deaths suffered by Iraqi forces. The reason for this substantial gap was that Americans could see at night, drive through the featureless desert without getting lost, and put a single smart bomb on target with a 90 percent probability,¹⁹⁵ effectively eliminating the advantage that Iraqi forces had by being well dug in on their home soil.

In addition, United States technological superiority was also the catalyst for a lopsided battlefield victory in the former Yugoslavia in 1999, where the Serbian army was defeated by NATO forces whose losses amounted to a single downed fighter jet and zero fatalities. In this situation, the US took advantage of the antiquated anti-air defenses of the Serbian military by utilizing their superior air force to conduct high altitude bombing raids that avoided the range of Serbian surface-to-air missiles while successfully eliminating targets on the ground with high tech weaponry. Furthermore, information technology played a substantial role in achieving swift victory over the Taliban in 2001, as well as bringing about a quick end to formal combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom after only 41 days. Today, the United States is still taking advantage of its technological superiority to help defeat the remaining terrorist and insurgent threats in these theaters.

Some of the technological advancements of the last decade which have dramatically increased the capabilities of US forces include:¹⁹⁶

- All Air Force and Navy strike aircraft employed in the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts are now equipped with precision-guided bombs. In addition, all B-52 bomber aircraft have been upgraded with laser- and satellite-guided smart bombs.

¹⁹⁵ Bruce Berkowitz. *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*. (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 2-3.

¹⁹⁶ Jeremy K. Brown, ed. "Warfare in the 21st Century." Vol. 75. 3rd ed. In *The Reference Shelf*. (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2003), 143-152.

- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), known as Predator Drones, are essential in locating and destroying enemy positions that ground forces cannot easily reach, especially in the treacherous mountain regions of Afghanistan.
- The tanks which played a major role in the ground war in Operation Iraqi Freedom were equipped with better infrared night vision than they had during the first Gulf War, as well as being upgraded with weapons systems that are capable of firing at one target while locking onto another.
- The Long-bow Apache helicopter is capable of firing 16 laser-guided anti-tank missiles in 30 seconds, allowing it to destroy its target and leave before the enemy can return fire.
- Computers, GPS guidance systems, and advanced communications equipment, have allowed commanders to better track force positions on the battlefield, and give orders and receive responses in real time.
- A number of combat brigades have been provided with upgraded personal equipment that provides them with greater vision and communications capabilities in addition to being designed to provide better protection against weapons and extreme environmental conditions, while weighing less than equipment of the past.

Issues with US Information Technology

Although technology has provided American forces with a tactical advantage in every major combat operation of the past twenty years, there are a number of drawbacks to its use as well:

- Without constant investment in technological research and development, the United States information technology superiority is quickly fading in some areas as equipment becomes cheaper and easier to obtain. For instance, terrorist enemy groups now only require a personal home computer, an internet connection and a credit card to purchase the same types of night-vision equipment that have given US forces an advantage during night operations for the past 20 years. In addition, these groups can download fairly recent satellite imagery from the internet, as well

as instructions to build the majority of the improvised explosive devices that are being used to disable American machinery and kill personnel. Furthermore, terrorist cells are actually gaining an advantage over US intelligence forces by making use of disposable cellular phones, and public computer access to make communication and avoid being tracked.

- Information technology is essentially a tool that is used to extend the capabilities of the soldiers that are using them. Without highly trained and capable personnel to maintain and operate the equipment, it becomes useless. In other words, the US military cannot rely solely on technology to fight wars, and they must maintain an adequate force size and structure in order to take advantages of the benefits of technology.
- Information technology is often incredibly costly to build and maintain. For example, each unmanned drone that is currently being employed in operations in Afghanistan cost between \$30.5 and \$53.5 million to build.¹⁹⁷

The Role of Soft Power Policies

Soft power is defined as the type of foreign relations that a nation engages in which does not include the use of force, coercion, or payment to achieve goals. Rather, it is essentially a type of pro-active diplomacy in which political objectives are pursued through co-option and attraction, with the idea in mind that if you can get others to be attracted to want what you want, it costs you much less than the use of force or direct payment could in the end.¹⁹⁸ While this type of diplomacy relies on finding commonalties and working towards mutually beneficial goals, it is not uncommon for one nation to provide incentives to the other through the form of aid and support. In this event, the nation seeking a change in policy would typically employ its own resources,

¹⁹⁷ "Factsheet: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System" *Air Force Link*. <http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122> (28 February 2009).

¹⁹⁸ Joseph S. Nye and Joanne J. Meyers. "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics." *Carnegie Council: The Voice for Ethics in International Policy*. <http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/4466.html> (26 February 2009).

knowledge, and manpower to provide to assist in such areas as infrastructure [re]building, education, and health care.

As a result of the complications that have been arising from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a strong push in recent months by a number of government and military leaders to shift the focus in these regions and other areas of potential conflict from the use of force to the use of soft power policies to achieve US goals. Perhaps the two most prominent voices in this campaign are Secretary of Defense Robert Gates¹⁹⁹ and Admiral Michael Mullen²⁰⁰, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have both recently emphasized the greater need for soft power in order to achieve a successful outcome in these regions. While neither of these men is suggesting that the use of military force is completely obsolete, they do believe that violence alone is no longer sufficient to win in these conflicts. It is their opinion that economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.²⁰¹

In theory shifting towards soft power policies would provide a number of benefits that cannot be achieved from hard power tactics. First, shifting towards soft power policies could help to eliminate the burden that is currently being placed on the US military by reducing the need for active forces to achieve goals in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the US can work to improve its image among anti-American groups overseas by promoting soft power and providing aid to the citizens of hostile states, rather than continuing with economic sanctions that tend to only hurt the general

¹⁹⁹ Gates, Robert M., “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.” Landon Lecture, Kansas State University. Manhattan, Kansas. 26 November, 2007. *US Department of Defense*.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (30 January 2009).

²⁰⁰ Kruzel, John J., “Mullen Urges Emphasis on ‘Soft Power’ in Foreign Policy.” *US Department of Defense*.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/News/newsarticle.aspx?id=52664> (30 January 2009).

²⁰¹ Gates, Robert M., “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.” Landon Lecture, Kansas State University. Manhattan, Kansas. 26 November, 2007. *US Department of Defense*.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (30 January 2009).

populace. In addition, as soft power initiatives assist states with rebuilding economies and creating stable governments, it will open the door to future opportunities for trade and other cooperative relationships between the United States and former enemies.

Issues with US Soft Power Policies

Despite their surface appeal, soft power initiatives carry with them their own unique set of dilemmas which make them difficult to implement in a number of situations. For instance:

- At the end of the Cold War the soft power arsenal of the United States was completely gutted and has not yet been rebuilt. The US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies typically responsible for foreign affairs only receive a combined \$40 billion annually for their operations.²⁰² If the United States is to shift its focus onto soft power policies it will require either a major redistribution of funding to these organizations, the restructuring of some military forces to be employed for infrastructure rebuilding, aid distribution and other ambassadorial roles, or both.
- Soft power policies do not and will never realistically eliminate the need for military force to be employed in some circumstances. While a shift towards demilitarized foreign relations may be on the horizon it is important not to completely sacrifice the capabilities of the US military in order to keep the United States secure and retain the ability to engage hostile actors that can not be swayed by soft power policies.

Recommendation

While it is recommended that all diplomatic channels are pursued in order to resolve conflicts between the United States and hostile actors, the unfortunate reality is that these methods are not always successful and oftentimes are not even viable such as the case when dealing with most extremist, non-state factions. At the point when diplomatic channels break down it becomes a necessity to authorize the use of violent

²⁰² William Matthews. "Can Obama Get Results From 'Soft Power'?" *Defense News*. January 19, 2009. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3907876> (20 February 2009).

force in the form of military action against these hostile parties in order to guarantee the security of the United States and its interests. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the threat has been fully eliminated, a partial victory by US military forces cannot be considered an option. Once they have committed to violent action the United States must be able and equipped to not only defeat the enemy that they face and destroy their operational infrastructure, but to remove their ability to return to power by instigating and supporting reform within regional politics, economics and foreign policy relations as well. The following proposition will outline this process in three stages and detail any steps that the armed forces must take in order to achieve these goals:

Among the experts, there appears to be a general consensus that an effective military strategy for achieving victory in the War on Terror cannot rely on any one approach from the armed forces alone. For instance, although many claim that information technology has become so important in defining military power that it overwhelms almost everything else²⁰³ many military commanders would argue that it is still not a substitute for preponderant power on the ground.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, because a military victory always has two components, its physical reality and its psychological impact,²⁰⁵ it is necessary to consider alternative approaches to military intervention which will address the diplomatic and humanitarian consequences of military conflicts as well. In itself, the War on Terror presents a unique challenge since the United States is facing a primarily unconventional threat in the form of extremist, non-state groups which hide among the innocent and utilize calculated terrorist and insurgency tactics to circumvent US military strengths. Therefore, in light of these observations it is recommended that the US military implement policy which would utilize various types of military forces

²⁰³ Bruce Berkowitz. *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*. (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 2.

²⁰⁴ Maj. Michael R. Fenzel and Capt. Christopher E. Hornbarger, US Army, eds. *Fletcher Conference November 2-3, 1999: Strategic Responsiveness, Early and Continuous Joint Effectiveness Across the Spectrum of Military Operations*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000),

²⁰⁵ William C Martell. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),

and encompass a number of the different strategies discussed above in order to complete the following objectives and subdue hostile threats:

Defeat enemy military forces and its economic infrastructure

Because of their unparalleled success in traditional battle scenarios, the conventional military fighting force of the United States should be maintained, no matter what the financial cost, in order to provide swift and complete victory when engaging in combat against enemy states which harbor and support terrorist organizations. Furthermore, conventional military forces must also remain strong so that they can provide the basic infrastructure required to stage and support the non-conventional military operations that are becoming increasingly important in defeating non-state terrorist actors. The unique tactics of terrorist organizations and insurgency groups have provided the US military with a distinctive new challenge that they must counter by relying more on these non-conventional practices. Therefore:

- In order to preserve adequate personnel strength the United States military needs to provide incentives which will ensure that military enlistment quotas are met, and exceeded if possible, so that an all volunteer military force can be maintained for current and future operations. The primary motivators could include pay and benefits for new officers and recruits which are competitive with the private sector, as well as grants that can be used to pursue individual educational and business interests, and other forms of compensation.
- The US budget for military spending should be maintained at a level in which conventional active forces will, at minimum, be able to adequately conduct combat operations in two separate regions at the same time, while still being able to engage in smaller scale security and peace keeping missions when necessary. This is considered a reasonable structure which will allow for active military engagement to occur in one location and still have forces ready in the event that

hostilities arise in other parts of the world without personnel and resources being spread too thin.²⁰⁶

- In order to deal with the unique challenges that counterterrorist operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters present, the United States military should increase the number of Special Operations forces available and/or begin additional training of conventional units to deal with this threat. While the best option is to have fully trained units that are specifically designated to deal with this unique threat, any units that will be conducting counterterrorist operations should be trained in the use of guerilla warfare, urban warfare, and counterinsurgency tactics, among other special operations training.
- Funding for military research & development should be maintained at a level which is high enough to allow the United States military to retain its technological superiority over other military powers without neglecting the need for conventional forces to use and operate this equipment. Technological superiority not only allows US forces to be more effective in battle compared to their adversaries, but in some instances technology can prove to be more successful in completing tasks than human beings, such as the case with the unmanned predator drones which are being utilized to strike inaccessible targets in the treacherous mountain regions of Afghanistan.
- In the near future, there should be a phased upgrade of all existing combat units so that they possess the latest weaponry and communications technology in order to make them more efficient on the battlefield. This will not only allow for real-time battlefield coordination and instant adaptability to unexpected scenarios, but past examples have shown that implementing technological upgrades on existing forces

²⁰⁶ Congress of the United States, The. Congressional Budget Office. *Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1997), <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/3xx/doc301/army-21c.pdf> (14 February 2009).

can substantially increase the effectiveness of units without the need for costly new machinery.²⁰⁷

Control the enemy state

Once victory in battle is achieved, the next step is to prevent violent uprisings and insurgencies from occurring within the recently defeated state in order to allow the rebuilding process to begin. Thus far in the War on Terror this has proven to be the most tedious and difficult task that US forces have faced, resulting in a major drain on personnel and resources both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite swift victories over conventional forces, our long-term commitments to securing these regions from aggressive insurgents have left US forces stretched thin and vulnerable to other potential dangers. In light of this fact it is recommended that:

- The United States military must reorganize its support structure so that it can be deployed faster, and for extended periods of time. National Guard and Reserve forces should be returned to their traditional supporting roles and be employed in overseas operations explicitly for these types of duties, while active duty forces play the primary role in combat and security operations. Currently, the majority of Guard and Reserve forces are not set-up to participate in active duty combat roles which means that they take longer periods of time to prepare for deployment, and are unable to function as efficiently when deployed. Furthermore, an additional benefit of using Reserve and Guard forces for these types of missions is that these troops can receive extensive training for support roles from their civilian occupations effectively reducing the burden on US military resources which are already strained. Finally, by using Guard and Reserve forces solely in supportive roles, it will reduce their commitments to international deployment and allow them to focus once again on their missions to protect the homeland from disasters and unrest.

²⁰⁷ Jeremy K. Brown, ed. "Warfare in the 21st Century." Vol. 75. 3rd ed. In *The Reference Shelf*. (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2003), 152.

- The United States government should also begin working with civilian contractors within the US and other allied states to cover noncombat support roles such as catering, and laundry services, etc.²⁰⁸ This will not only allow for military personnel to be employed more effectively in other, more sensitive duties such as providing security and reconnaissance, but it will also help to reduce the number personnel that must be deployed to these regions in the first place.
- The United States military should provide greater incentives for skilled soldiers with experience in combat situations to re-enlist after their contracts have expired in order to retain quality personnel. These incentives could include re-enlistment bonuses, providing pay increases that are competitive with private industries, providing additional benefits for soldiers and their families who extend their contracts with the military, and enacting reform within the US Department of Veterans Affairs which will make the organization better prepared to take care of the needs of soldiers when they return home from combat. By retaining skilled personnel the need to train new units can be substantially reduced. This will in turn alleviate the demands for military equipment in training scenarios and allow it to be employed in more productive areas.
- The United States must work to bolster relations with her allies and renew commitment to existing defense treaties, such as NATO, so the burden of international peacekeeping does not fall entirely onto the shoulders of our military. Cooperation with allied states would not only help to alleviate the need for US forces in support roles, but it would also encourage shared responsibility in international policing operations in minor skirmishes. Furthermore, with additional support from allied military units the United States would be able to distribute equipment and personnel to conflict zones they are already engaged in more

²⁰⁸ Congress of the United States, The. Congressional Budget Office. *Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1997), <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/3xx/doc301/army-21c.pdf> (14 February 2009).

effectively as well as reduce redeployment rates for units that are experiencing substantial wear and strain after multiple, lengthy tours.

Achieve political and governmental reform; rebuild the economy & infrastructure; realign the enemy state's foreign policy; build a new strategic relationship with the defeated state

Whenever possible, it should be the duty of the President and the US Department of State to attempt to develop diplomatic means as the first option in achieving the remaining goals above before force is implemented. However, when military action has been deemed necessary the United States Armed Forces and the Department of Defense should assist in these efforts through their commitment to various soft power policies:

- Because of the substantial budgetary differences that exist between the United States Armed Forces and US foreign relations agencies, the military should begin to play an active role in promoting soft power policies as well. This is not to suggest that the military should make a drastic shift away from its primary focus of combat operations and security, but simply to provide intermediary support to the organizations whose missions are diplomacy and foreign aid. This could be accomplished if the military begins to recruit social scientists out of universities, non-governmental organizations and other private fields in order to build task forces which would be able to assist the Department of State with realignment and nation building priorities after combat operations have ceased. In addition, the military could also strongly promote the recruiting of engineers and other scientists who are already well trained in their fields so that a pool of highly skilled personnel is readily available to begin initial infrastructure rebuilding within the defeated state. These forces could be based out of Reserve units, which would prevent a drain on private sector positions.
- The US military should begin secondary training programs for the soldiers of occupying forces to prepare them to deal with the cultural boundaries that they will encounter during long term occupations of enemy states. This training should

include basic language training for communicating with citizens of the state, as well as basic culture training so that soldiers can understand the way of life of the people that they are protecting. This will not only help to make transitions smoother for all parties involved, but increased cultural sensitivity among occupying forces can help to prevent tensions which could lead to further hostilities.

Domestic Security

Over the past fifteen years a number of attacks on United States interests at home and abroad have revealed a startling range of holes in the US domestic security structure which have left many Americans questioning the ability of their government to protect them from harm. The horrific events of September 11, 2001, along with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City have demonstrated that despite decades of relative security the United States is no longer immune from attacks within its borders. Furthermore, the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen show that US interests overseas face a substantial risk of harm from hostile parties as well. Although the seven years that have passed since the September 11th disaster have been devoid of further assaults on American interests, various attacks on our allies and the arrests of persons with the intent to cause destruction to US interests has shown that the threat to our national security has not vanished.

Assessing the Threat

When approaching the subject of domestic security it should first be understood that threats can attack anywhere, but defenders cannot reasonably defend everywhere.²⁰⁹ Because the availability of information and resources are always finite, and the potential targets that our enemies could attack are infinite, perfect protection can never be attained. Rather than sitting back and trying to defend all of the potential targets that exist within a 3.8 million square mile area, the United States must take a more proactive approach to

²⁰⁹ Fred Cohen. "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Issues and Answers." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 223.

domestic security and find better ways to make use of the resources that are available to them in order to remove the ability for hostile parties to conduct an attack on American interests.

While many may argue that this would require protecting the United States and its citizens from millions of people around the world that wish us ill will, in reality there are, perhaps, only tens of thousands of people and several military organizations which are of a serious enough bent that they would actually take actions to attempt to damage the US infrastructure. Of those, only a few thousand probably have current access to the US, and there are fewer still who have insider knowledge, adequate skills, and workable plans to initiate such an attack. Furthermore, at any given moment, only a few are ready to act, fewer are positioned to act, and, of course, these relatively few people are fighting against many people that are actively defending the US infrastructure.²¹⁰ Based on this knowledge, the key to eliminating threats of attack on US soil lies in using the resources that are at hand to actively seek out these few capable actors and remove their ability to conduct an attack.

Overseas, these methods include the kinds of active military engagements that are currently in effect in Afghanistan to forcefully eliminate the means for terrorist organizations to operate, as well as the diplomatic strategies that are being employed to discredit the legitimacy of these groups around the world. At home, this means taking the initiative to prioritize the level of risk to various different facets of the US infrastructure and allocating personnel and resources to protect these areas in a more effective manner. For instance, rather than sending personnel from the Department of Homeland Security to protect individual targets within the United States, these people would be more effectively employed if they were serving in positions in the Travel Safety Administration, or US Customs and Border Protection agencies where they could actively monitor ports of entry into the United States. This is because while it is virtually impossible to determine when and where an attack may occur on US soil it is, on the

²¹⁰ Fred Cohen. "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Issues and Answers." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 224.

other hand, reasonable to expect that increased security at ports of entry into the United States can help to substantially reduce the possibility that attacks will be able to occur in the first place by capturing dangerous people and materials before they reach their targets.

Securing Borders & Ports of Entry

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, major changes and improvements have been made to the United States domestic security structure which have, thus far, been able to prevent another attack from occurring on US soil. The most notable of these transformations was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which combined a number of domestic agencies, such as the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Travel Safety Administration (TSA), and United States Coast Guard under the same national director to improve sharing of information, and more efficiently allocate resources to keep the nation secure. Since its formation, the DHS has effectively implemented some of the following programs and security upgrades:

- In 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a multinational program designed to protect the container shipping industry through better pre-screening processes and the use of smarter, more secure containers was implemented. As of September 2006, CSI was operational in 50 ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North, Central and South America and screened approximately 82 percent of all containerized merchandise imported into the US²¹¹ CBP is continuing to work toward strategically locating CSI teams in additional ports in order to detect and deter attempts to conceal terrorist weapons destined for the United States.²¹²

²¹¹ United States Customs & Border Protection. United States Department of Homeland Security. "Container Security Initiative Reaches Gold: Fifty Seaports Now Targeting and Pre-Screening Cargo Destined For US" *CPB.gov*. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2006_news_releases/102006/10032006.xml (23 February 2009).

²¹² United States Customs & Border Protection. United States Department of Homeland Security. *Container Security Initiative: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf (23 February 2009), ii.

- In 2005, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) was begun to help prevent illegal border crossings into the United States. The technological division of SBI, or *SBI_{net}*, develops and deploys new integrated technology solutions to provide enhanced detection, tracking, response, and situational awareness capabilities to help front-line CBP personnel to more effectively deter, detect, and resolve illegal cross-border activity. In addition, the SBI Tactical Infrastructure Program, has implemented a number of physical barriers, such as the 370 miles of fencing across the southwest border, to slow and delay illegal border crossing activities.²¹³
- Since 2001, advancements have been made to aviation security with the creation of the Federal Air Marshal Service to deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting US air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews, and the tightening of security standards at airports across the United States by the TSA. As of today, over two million passengers are screened at airports each day along with millions of additional bags and cargo which are process through over 7,000 electronic screening devices.²¹⁴

As one can see, a substantial number of changes have been made to improve border security and identify foreign visitors to the United States in order to keep weapons and hostile parties from gaining access to the US. However, despite these advancements there is still a number of areas within US border and port security that remain insufficiently guarded or completely unsecure. In order to achieve adequate protection, each of these issues needs to be addressed, including the following:

- Roughly 300 border-crossing points, 360 deepwater seaports, and 430 commercial airports represent official points of entry into the United States. However, these ports of entry cover less than 1 percent of America's entire 20,000 mile long perimeter.²¹⁵

²¹³ United States Customs & Border Protection. United States Department of Homeland Security. "About SBI." *CBP.gov*. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/sbi/about_sbi/ (23 February 2009).

²¹⁴ United States Department of Homeland Security. "Aviation Security." *DHS.gov*. <http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/aviation-security.shtm> (23 February 2009).

²¹⁵ Graham Allison. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004), <http://books.google.com/books?id=s9qoSQx-UuoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Nuclear+Terrorism> (22 February 2009).

- The US Customs and Border Protection Agency lacks the resources and manpower to effectively patrol the thousands of miles of US borderlands between Canada and Mexico allowing an estimated half million²¹⁶ illegal border crossings to occur each year.
- Despite the efforts of the CSI, the US government reports that it is able to actually inspect only about 5.6% of all containers inbound to US ports per year, or roughly 540,000 containers, by using either X-ray or gamma ray technology or by physical devanning of the container.²¹⁷ This low percentage creates an incredibly high potential for weapons, dangerous materials, and even people to slip through if they were undetected by pre-screening, or if transported by sea from non-CIS ports.

Recommendation

Because of the finite amount of information and resources at the disposal of the United States Military, Department of Homeland Security, and other federal protection agencies, it is absolutely impossible to provide complete and total protection for all US interests at home and abroad. However, that being said the need to maintain a constant defense for US interests may be an over exaggerated concern anyway considering that the actual threats that have adequate capabilities and intents to do serious harm to the United States' people and infrastructure are fairly limited.²¹⁸ While it is ultimately recommended that additional recourses be allocated for domestic security purposes, the primary focus of United States protection agencies should be on finding ways to use the resources they already have at their disposal in more efficient ways to identify potentially hostile parties and eliminate the possibility for illegal weaponry to find its way through ports of entry. If the means of carrying out an attack on US soil are eliminated, and the

²¹⁶ United States Government Accountability Office. *Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf> (23 February 2009).

²¹⁷ Secure Ports.org. "Enhance the Government's Security Targeting and Screening of Containerized Cargo Shipments." *Coalition for Secure Ports*. http://www.secureports.org/improving_security/factsheet_screening.html (23 February 2009).

²¹⁸ Fred Cohen. "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Issues and Answers." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 224.

people who would intend to carry out these attacks are kept from entering our borders, then the need to provide defensive security measures for the countless number of targets within the United States is substantially reduced. Therefore:

- Funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should be increased with the specific intent to hire additional personnel to fill security positions in organizations such as the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Travel Security Administration (TSA), Coast Guard and Port Authorities, which monitor the movement of goods and people in and out of US borders. Furthermore, these organizations should be provided with the most updated, and efficient technologies for data collection and cargo screening in order to keep potentially hostile actors, weapons of mass destruction, other illegal weaponry, and potentially hazardous materials from crossing into US borders. By providing additional security personnel and resources at points of entry, there is a far greater potential to recognize dangerous individuals and confiscate dangerous cargo before they can reach their targets, effectively eliminating the ability for an attack to be conducted on US soil.
- The DHS must begin close collaboration and information sharing with the intelligence community in order to identify hostile actors and determine where potential targets lie within US borders.
- The DHS should create a task force with the responsibility of examining potential vulnerabilities in the US infrastructure, in order to prioritize the level of risk to potential high-level targets such as major financial centers, nuclear facilities, telecommunications hubs, and major urban centers where large numbers of people gather at a time. By prioritizing the level of risk the US government will be able to allocate resources more efficiently to protect targets whose destruction would have potentially catastrophic, long-term consequences to US interests.
- Federal funding should be provided to state level law enforcement agencies for the explicit purpose of providing additional security to the above mentioned high-level

targets. Furthermore, this funding should also be used to train state and local law enforcement personnel to deal with the aftermath of potential attacks, natural disasters and civil unrest. This is especially important if National Guard and military Reserve forces continue to be deployed to active duty operations overseas, as there will not be enough manpower to effectively manage the repercussions of these events if they occur. Without the intervention of official, emergency personnel, these situations could be greatly exacerbated by widespread panic and rioting, or additional loss of life from a lack of resources required to rescue survivors.

- Intelligence agreements and cooperative security alliances, much like the Container Security Initiative mentioned above, need to be forged with foreign countries so that information about potential threats can flow between nations more efficiently, and ports of departure into the US can be better screened and secured.
- To protect American interests overseas, additional military security personnel and security technologies should be provided to all military bases, embassies, and consulates, especially in instable regions, or areas where anti-American sentiment is high such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa.

Intelligence

After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, the United States intelligence community came under serious criticism. The combined failure of intelligence organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept intelligence that could have prevented an attack of this magnitude on US soil left many in doubt about the capabilities of these agencies and their role in protecting US interests. This doubt was intensified further when three years later the 9-11 Commission revealed that they had discovered serious gaps in information sharing both within individual agencies and between agencies in the US intelligence community which had prevented these

organizations from forming a comprehensive and adequate assessment of potential threats to US security. However, the breakdown in communication between these organizations was just one of the most prominent in a series of setbacks that the US intelligence community has faced since the end of the Cold War when these organizations were reorganized to pursue new objectives. If the United States is to continue to maintain effective intelligence gathering operations in order to support both military and domestic security endeavors, then efforts must be initiated to not only restructure the intelligence community into a more cooperative and efficient hierarchy, but to make sure it has the adequate resources necessary to perform its duties.

Intelligence Gathering

Within the intelligence community there are four major disciplines of collecting information:

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) which entails the collection of signals, communications, and electronic data using satellites, ships, and planes. The type of data collected from this type of intelligence gathering ranges from intercepted phone call, e-mails, and SMS messages, to data from weapons tests, and electronic emissions from tracking systems.
- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) which consists of geographical imagery and cartographic data which is collected from satellites and planes. This type of intelligence includes high resolution photographs of target sites, as well as infrared imagery which can detect heat signatures of hidden machinery and troops, among other applications.
- Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) which is technically derived intelligence gathered from a wide variety of sensors used to detect and identify distinct signatures of target sources. In other words, this type of intelligence is employed to recognize such things as the presence of specific molecules in the air, as well the composition of soils, industrial pollutants, and various chemicals. This intelligence can then be translated to identify the types of machinery and

weaponry that hostile forces are using, and determine whether a group has obtained biological, chemical or nuclear weapons among other uses.

- Human Intelligence (HUMINT) which consists of espionage and spying by human operatives during clandestine and covert operations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US intelligence apparatus has used the majority of its resources to obtain information from the technological disciplines of SIGINT, GEOINT and MASINT, with far less focus on HUMINT gathering. While all of these forms of intelligence gathering have produced a substantial amount of data for analysis some have proved to be more effective than others in particular situations. For example, prior to the Iraq war in 2003, high resolution geographic imagery of the Iraqi battlefields collected from GEOINT satellites allowed military commanders to walk through the potential dangers of invasion routes before troops even set foot on the ground.²¹⁹ Also, SIGINT has played an active part in assessing the reality of potential nation-based threats, such as Iran and North Korea, by monitoring the communications and other electronic emissions of these nations. However, these same technological collection systems, which were designed to work against large nation-states, have proven to be far less functional against smaller terrorist non-state operations such as al Qa'ida.²²⁰

First, terrorist cells are small, usually operate either out of densely populated areas or remote locations, and tend to be highly dispersed which makes them virtually immune to GEOINT techniques. Furthermore, their lack of sophisticated technology and equipment means that MASINT would serve little function in gathering intelligence against them unless they were somehow able to obtain a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon which left a distinct signature that could be traced. However, even in this scenario intelligence personnel would have to know what they were looking for before they could find it. Finally, while SIGINT can prove useful in obtaining information on the plans and

²¹⁹ Ralph M. Erwin. "Geospatial Intelligence." *Military Review*. January-February, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_85/ai_n13821826 (23 February 2009).

²²⁰ Thomas A. Johnson. "An Introduction to the Intelligence Process for Addressing National Security Threats and Vulnerabilities." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, ed., (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 11.

movements of terrorist organization, most of these groups have become aware of these types of intelligence gathering techniques through the mass media. As a result, they have found ways to work around this intelligence gathering method by using untraceable, disposable cell phones for communicating and either avoiding, or coding any other technological means of contact.

In light of this, in this modern war on terrorism it is crucial to once again turn towards HUMINT as a primary means of intelligence gathering. Despite the fact that HUMINT tends to put the agents acquiring intelligence into highly stressful and dangerous situations, it is unfortunately becoming the only way to penetrate terrorist organizations and learn about their planned activities.²²¹

Intelligence Processing & Analysis

As of 1995, the National Security Agency was capable of intercepting the equivalent of the entire collection of the US Library of Congress, or 1 quadrillion bits of information every three hours, via the intelligence gathering methods described above.²²² Nearly 15 years later, this amount has only increased further, causing the NSA to actually be overwhelmed with information which allows them to only able to process about 1 percent of intercepts.²²³ As one can see, despite the recent criticisms in the wake of September 11th, the problem with the US intelligence gathering community has not been the amount of data collected, or even the quality of information, but the lack of skilled manpower to successfully analyze, interpret and apply intelligence to combat current threats.

All of the information that is gathered by the United States intelligence community requires interpretation by well-trained analysts before it is useful. The intelligence analyst's responsibility is to fully describe and provide as much usable and explanatory

²²¹ Thomas A. Johnson. "An Introduction to the Intelligence Process for Addressing National Security Threats and Vulnerabilities." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, ed., (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 11.

²²² Thomas A. Johnson. "An Introduction to the Intelligence Process for Addressing National Security Threats and Vulnerabilities." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, ed., (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 8.

²²³ Ibid.

information about the intelligence target as possible²²⁴ from highly complex, scientific, and technological data that often must be decoded or translated from a foreign language. However, despite the fact that a large number of skill personnel is required for intelligence to be to translate intelligence into usable information, the United States intelligence community has been experiencing a continual decrease in the number of available personnel, resulting in a 22 percent overall reduction since the end of the Cold War in 1990.²²⁵ As it currently stands, the US intelligence community is substantially ineffective, primarily due to its lack of skilled analysts, and if it is to become an effective player in defeating terrorism, then this trend must be reversed.

Recommendations

While it is virtually impossible to interpret all of the data that is already being collected by the US intelligence community, a number of changes can be made to help prioritize the importance of intelligence gathering and make communication between agencies more efficient. Furthermore, additional steps need to be taken in order to secure additional intelligence about our enemies that we know to be lacking, even if it means making the difficult decision to put the lives of some American citizens at risk. It is the recommendation of this commission that the US intelligence community implement the following objectives as soon as possible, in order to be able to effectively collect and interpret intelligence that is vital to the security of the United States:

- Additional federal funding should be provided to the US intelligence community to increase the number of personnel available for intelligence collection and interpretation. This recommendation includes implementing a program to actively recruit new analysts out of university programs so that fully educated personnel can

²²⁴ Thomas A. Johnson. "An Introduction to the Intelligence Process for Addressing National Security Threats and Vulnerabilities." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, ed., (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 11.

²²⁵ Thomas A. Johnson. "An Introduction to the Intelligence Process for Addressing National Security Threats and Vulnerabilities." In *National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology*, Thomas A. Johnson, ed., (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 12.

enter the intelligence community readily prepared to read the massive amounts of technological and scientific intelligence that are collected, as well as interpret and decode data that is encrypted and in foreign languages. More, better trained personnel, means that more intelligence can be processed efficiently and accurately, which will help to substantially eliminate many of the oversights that currently exist.

- More emphasis must be placed on inserting agents in the field to engage in clandestine and covert operations and gather HUMINT which is vital to understanding the terrorist organizations that have thus far been overlooked by other means of intelligence gathering.

CONCLUSION

Many current US national security policies remain based upon dangers that were experienced during the 20th century and have proven to be inefficient or ineffective when dealing with the 21st century threats posed by non-state terrorist actors. While many changes and advancements have been made to domestic institutions since September 11, 2001 to deal with these new threats, there are still a number of issues within the United States Armed Forces, the Department of Homeland Security, and the US intelligence community that must be addressed if these organizations are to remain effective in providing security to the United States and its interests. In addition to pursuing individual policy changes within each organization, it is recommended that a broad reallocation of federal funding be provided to each of these organizations, as this study shows that they are all severely lacking the resources and manpower that they require to perform their duties. Furthermore, each of these institutions must begin to focus on using what resources they do have in more efficient manners and begin greater cooperation with each other to achieve common goals so that they can continue to be fully capable in completing their mission to achieve victory against the terrorist threat.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR: Restoring the Rule of Law and US Credibility

Melissa Dorn

ISSUE

Our ultimate goal in the fight against terrorism is to lead a world in which the global community adheres to the rule of law, yet we face certain domestic challenges in achieving this goal in addition to those which we face internationally. The core of these challenges is the supposed compromise which must be made between security and freedom, a choice which has been an issue of much debate since the beginning of our country and particularly since the beginning of the War on Terror. The experiences of the last eight years illustrate the difficulties of finding an adequate balance between these two needs. In light of the many dangers which the United States faced, the previous administration sacrificed some liberties in the name of security. This sacrifice was often deemed necessary to ensure our common security. However, its consequences have created obstacles to obtaining the global community which we wish to see: one which works multilaterally through international institutions, is respectful of the rule of law, and is compelled to support US goals. US opinion internationally has fallen exponentially since the beginning of the conflicts in the Middle East. Governments are unwilling to align themselves with the United States because of its stance in the recent past on issues such as torture. Terrorist networks use examples such as the treatment of detainees in Guantánamo Bay to encourage extremist activity. While it may be true that certain freedoms may need to be temporarily scaled back in time of war, some of the policies enacted over the last eight years have gone too far. This overstep must be resolved in order to move forward in creating the world which we wish to see.

The heart of this problem is the damage US reputation and credibility have sustained because of the policies adopted concerning detainees. While claiming to promote “human dignity”²²⁶, the past administration authorized acts in direct violation of basic human rights, such as those established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions, to ensure domestic security. These violations included the problematic classification of detainees as ‘enemy combatants’, the passing

²²⁶ (National Security Council (US) 2006)

of laws such as the USA Patriot Act, the authorization of special holding facilities such as that in Guantánamo Bay, the authorization of torture tactics employed in these special facilities, and the practice of extraordinary rendition.

The laws passed since 9/11 have not only infringed upon the basic rights of noncitizens but of Americans as well. The government has willingly eroded our civil liberties in the name of security. In times of war, it is difficult for any legal body to dismiss any addition in security because of a possible subtraction of rights, especially if they are the rights of a minority. But in this case as well, there have been oversteps which now must be corrected. Law enforcement officials have employed USA Patriot Act provision in hundreds of non-terrorist cases. Officials overtly use profiling in order to target who they perceive as being a potential terrorist based on ethnicity, race, and age. This singles out and alienates minority groups who could be used more effectively. Finally, the extent of the surveillance and warrantless wire-tapping program, which not only surveyed international communications but all domestic communications as well, is just now beginning to fully emerge.

The United States government's actions towards citizens and noncitizens alike have violated the rule of law, sacrificing it in favor of increased executive power. This country was created so that we may be governed by our values as presented by our Constitution, not the desires of a small group who has the privilege of holding high office. Our country has not been working as it was designed to work, with checks, balances, and accountability, over the last eight years; and the world has seen this. By taking actions outside of the law, we inadvertently invite other countries to do the same. This is especially challenging in a time when we are attempting to globally promote liberal democracies which adhere to that very rule that we have been violating. We can only effectively influence our will over developing countries by setting an example to global community of how a democratic, pluralistic society effectively functions. According to Madeleine Albright, America is exceptional "because we have led in creating standards that work for everyone, not because we are an exception to the

rules.”²²⁷ It is fatal to our mission to abandon these standards domestically as we are attempting to promote them globally. In addition, we can not hope to win the war in which we are currently involved, lead international institutions to aid in achieving our goals, nor have truly peaceful relations with other nations when our actions have been morally questionable. Our refusal to adhere to international law, treaties, and norms alienates potential allies in many areas. By ignoring the rule of law, we have broken trust with the world community. We must take drastic steps in order to restore that trust so that we may ensure that we will have the allies necessary to pursue the peaceful resolutions to our troubling situations.

Faltering in the ideals which make our democracy the strongest creates perhaps the greatest internal vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Alienating religious and racial minorities breeds resentment against the government. Hard liners on either side illustrate to the global community the divisiveness of our policy. Our country continues to be split by policies which hurt our reputation abroad in order to protect our security, yet we must remember the ideals which make our country both unique in the world order and a cohesive nation. What made America unique is that its sovereignty is ultimately derived from the people it governs so that the government is in place to protect the interests of the governed. It was our forefathers’ desire to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,”²²⁸ and this can not be done by offering up our freedom for the government to protect. It is our duty to ensure that our government stays within the bounds of the sovereignty which we the people have granted it by demanding transparency in its actions and policies.

We must not compromise in our values, our treatment of human beings, or our commitment to the international community. The internal divisions and international alienation which these mistakes create opens doors to new weaknesses. Our compliance in carrying out acts of torture in violation of international treaties threatens torture being used against our own soldiers, for example. We must create policy moving forward

²²⁷ (Albright 2008, 21)

²²⁸ (United States Constitution)

which adheres to our domestic values and those presented by international treaties, such as the Convention against Torture. We must show our resolve to the international community by effectively closing the detention centers which have been so troublesome. We will review the information available on all those detainees and then find destinations for their transfer, trial, or humane detention on an individual case basis. We will adopt new policies in the holding of new prisoners internationally to ensure that they are held lawfully and that information is gleaned from them respectfully. In addition, it is our international duty to look back to violations of the past and thoroughly investigate any crimes which may have taken place. The American people must demand the utmost transparency from their government going forward to preserve our liberty, and part of this is to ensure that past wrong doings are corrected. Allowing our government the power to forsake America's ideals without accountability to its people is likely to lead to further oversteps and abuses. We must move forward steadfast in our ideals, from a platform of restored moral authority and credibility from which the US can be poised to lead the global community and from which the world will be willing to accept us.

Long Term Goals

- Effectively balance security and liberty
- Restore US global credibility
- Increase multilateralism by adhering to International Law and norms

Short Term Goals

- Create policy which adheres to national values and international norms
- Effectively handle enemy detainees domestically and abroad
- Bring the International community into the fight against terror
- Renew our commitments to Human Rights
- Increase accountability in the government
- Resolve laws and practices which have had negative effects on human rights and civil liberties

Means

- Transfer detainees out of special holding facilities and secret prisons, taking advantage of international cooperation in this process
 - Free those who are approved to be freed by finding appropriate states for them if they are unable to go to their own
 - Give required information of detainees to governments that are willing to take them
 - Those who are not to be freed will be transferred to supermax security federal prisons, and public campaigns will be launched to ensure the public that these people are of no threat to them in these facilities
- Set up an appropriate means of trying those detainees in US custody while being respective of challenges such as classification of evidence
 - Try those whose cases do are under proper US jurisdiction (US residents, crime committed in the US) in federal courts while those with classified information or committed internationally should be held in military courts
 - Continue to process the writs of Habeas Corpus in federal courts
- Provide indefinite holding areas for those detainees who may neither be returned nor tried at this time in which these prisoners' rights will be maintained
- Treat future detainees in a way which respects their rights, whether in domestic or foreign facilities
 - Cease practices such as torture and humiliating acts
 - Require comprehensive records be made for each detainee
- Cease the practice of extraordinary rendition
- Investigate Human Rights and Civil Liberties grievances from the previous administration, emphasizing truth and accountability
- Make an international declaration of our commitment to the Convention against Torture

- Propose a new convention at the U.N. to internationally agree to the treatment, detention, and trying of stateless agents
- Actively work to find better ways to gather information about possible terrorists within our borders
 - Adopt interrogation practices which respect the dignity of each detainee
 - Increase transparency of government wiretapping operations, including time limits and restrictions on whose information they may access
 - Build relationships with minority groups within our country rather than alienating them through profiling
- Encourage through elections and popular action that all branches of office adhere to the Constitution and international law
 - Discourage addendums which make it difficult for other branches to resolve issues in their policy
 - Support the practices of agencies such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the ACLU which promote transparency and accountability in government

BACKGROUND

Violations of Human Rights

The challenges that we face in regard to human rights and civil liberties infringements stem from policy decisions made since the closing of the Cold War and, most significantly, from post- 9/11 reactions, particularly those approving extraordinary rendition, torture techniques, and the marginalization of detainee rights. In the face of changes in the type of enemies and battles that we are fighting, certain policies have been implemented which have seriously damaged the integrity and moral authority of the US. We have substantially lessened our commitment to international human rights since the 9/11 attacks, even with a doctrine which professed to increase human dignity and ensure equality for all people. Enemy detainees must be treated in a way which preserves their

rights. Georgetown Professor David Cole says that, “When we balance liberty and security, we should do so in ways that respect the equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons and not succumb to the temptation of purchasing security at the expense of noncitizens’ basic rights”²²⁹ Regrettably, some actions taken during the current war have not held up to this ideal. Issues at Guantánamo Bay and other detention facilities have brought about allegations of abuse and torture. Detainees have been generally denied *habeas corpus* or proper legal access, being held during the extent of the conflict without an ability to challenge their classification. Extraordinary rendition has been used on High Value terrorists in order to extract information with the lowest level of legal oversight. Many actions are in direct violation of the Geneva Convention, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and more recent US legislation, such as parts of the Detainee Treatment Act.

The detention facility at Guantánamo Bay stands as a symbol of the wrong doings of the past administration. The site was chosen because of its legal autonomy: no local government would intervene, and since the land still technically belongs to Cuba, it was outside the jurisdiction of federal courts. Several hundred detainees have been processed through the site, yet there have only been three convictions to date, along with countless complications and allegations of wrong doings. An executive order was signed on January 22nd, 2009 to close Guantánamo along with all other secret prisons within a year. Along with the closures, the order required that the work of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards be halted. There are numerous challenges which the closing of these detention centers present; and due to these challenges, the facility has stayed upon far longer than anyone wished it to. What to do with the prisoners is, of course, the greatest challenge, and it is complicated by the often ambiguous status of those being held.

At the beginning of the operations in the Middle East following 9/11, the US government found that the terrorists and the suspected members of terrorist organizations

²²⁹ (Donohue 2008, 4)

that we apprehended would not be subject to any of the protections given by the Geneva Convention. Under the Geneva Convention, Prisoners of War and Enemy Combatants are granted special, undeniable rights which the Bush administration attempted to circumvent. White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett stated that “We strongly believe that terrorists picked up off the battlefield – who don't represent a nation, revel in killing the innocent, and refuse to wear uniforms – do not qualify for protections under Geneva.”²³⁰ There are two possible articles under which terrorists may be imperfectly classified, the third and fourth. The government was correct in finding that the combatants did not fit the model set forth by the fourth Common Article of the Convention that requires combatants to satisfy the following conditions:

- (a) “That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- (c) That of carrying arms openly;
- (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”²³¹

However, the third Common Article could more readily apply based on its interpretation. The third article states that “in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum” to several stipulations, which include the protection of detainees.²³² The problem of this phrase arises from the use of the term *international*. If interpreted as *global*, the Geneva Convention would not apply; however, if interpreted as *inter-national*, as in between nations, the Convention would apply since terrorist groups are non-state groups. Despite the interpretation, these rules were originally created during an age of conventional warfare which is outdated compared to the war which is being waged in the Middle East. Additionally, it is primarily set forward to deal with conflicts between states. Non-state actors do not fit

²³⁰ (Babington 2006)

²³¹ (Conference for Revision of the Geneva Convention of 1864, 1906 1916)

²³² (Conference for Revision of the Geneva Convention of 1864, 1906 1916)

well into the treaty and are left without any advocacy. The only guarantee of the detainees' treatment in the beginning of the War on Terror was a statement from the executive office ensuring that those held would be treated humanely. Unfortunately, many of the Geneva rights were blatantly disregarded in the early years of this war because of this lack of accountability. For example, Article 3, part C of the Convention states that "(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment" "shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever."²³³ The events at Abu Ghraib vividly illustrate the violations which took place, even though these activities were soldiers that were acting independently of any orders. However, there are many practices which took place at Guantánamo, such as water boarding, that were carried out under orders. Treatment of "The 4th Hijacker," Zacharias Moussaoui, is perhaps the most blatant example of intentional abusive treatment.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Bush administration on June 29, 2006, saying that the third Common Article of the Geneva Convention rules did apply to the treatment of detainees in the case *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*. Hamdan, a Yemeni, was picked up in Afghanistan, which is a Party to the Geneva Convention. He petitioned that what the military commissions were planning to charge him with, conspiracy "to commit...offenses triable by military commission,"²³⁴ did not actually violate the rules of war and thus was not subject to trial at a military commission. He also argued that he must be able to see the evidence presented against him, which was to that time denied. The court found that the *international* in the third Article of the Geneva Convention did mean between nations and thus applied to the situation in Afghanistan. The department of defense, as a result of this finding, decided to apply the third Geneva Convention to all detainees. A July 7, 2006 Memo from the Deputy Secretary of Defense called for agencies to adhere to Article 3 in the conflict against al-Qaeda.²³⁵ Also, the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations was published later in 2006. The

²³³ (Conference for Revision of the Geneva Convention of 1864, 1906 1916)

²³⁴ (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* 2006)

²³⁵ (England 2006)

McCain Amendment states that no detainee under Department of Defense control should be subject to interrogation techniques not approved in this Manual. The third Common Article of the Convention guarantees humane treatment and requires that any judgment on a case be done by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”²³⁶

The *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* case not only brought the detainees under the protection of common article 3 of the Geneva Convention, it also granted detainees the right to dispute their status as an enemy combatant. Detainees were denied the right to *habeas corpus* since the beginning of the conflict. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 stated that no court in the United States had jurisdiction to hear any *habeas corpus* petition filed by any detainee in the Guantánamo detention center.²³⁷ However, it is a vital right to have in this type of conflict. As the terrorists apprehended from places such as Afghanistan do not fit in to the regulations presented by Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, it is difficult to definitively determine their involvement in the conflict. Without uniforms or emblems of their party, enemies are often indistinguishable from civilians. Many prisoners held at the Guantánamo facility were being detained indefinitely before the decision of the court in this case. The right to *habeas corpus* was recently reaffirmed in the executive order to close the Guantánamo Bay facility.²³⁸ The United States became a ratifying Party of the Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1994 under President Clinton. Article 2-2 of this treaty states that “[N]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”²³⁹ The US made many capitulations as to what constituted torture apart from the definition given by the UN Convention.

²³⁶ (Conference for Revision of the Geneva Convention of 1864, 1906 1916)

²³⁷ (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* 2006)

²³⁸ (Obama 2009)

²³⁹ (United Nations 1984)

The United States is also a Party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which two articles are particularly relevant to the issue of detainees:

- Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
- Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

As the name of this declaration states, these rights are to be universal. Under no circumstances, therefore, has the US been justified in its recent actions. However, many detainees have been subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, in Guantánamo and other facilities. Former CIA director Michael Hayden testified in early 2008 to a congressional committee that the CIA had used torture techniques, such as water boarding on detainees in secret facilities. One such detainee was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Water boarding is simulated drowning and a recognized means of torture. The US charged a Japanese officer for using the technique on an American soldier during World War II, sentencing him to fifteen years of hard labor. It is ironic the US adopted the policy itself. We are setting a horrible example to the rest of the world and opening doors to the same methods being used against our own soldiers, especially if we choose not to investigate and prosecute.

The CIA has used extraordinary rendition since the beginning of the War on Terror to deal with those deemed High Value Terrorists. The practice of extraordinary rendition was originally put in to place so that the president could order the capture of a suspect in a foreign country as long as there was congressional approval and the detainment was for the purpose of transfer to a trial. This changed greatly following the 9/11 attacks. The CIA was doing everything possible to prevent another attack from happening on US soil and to defeat the terrorist networks we saw as such a threat. As a result, the CIA began to use the extraordinary rendition program to interrogate detainees who they deemed as having very sensitive information. Prior to the War on Terror, suspects were captured and transferred to countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Morocco,

where it is recognized that torture of these detainees could have occurred.²⁴⁰ Many of those detained have been released without charges actually being brought against them. However, since the beginning of this conflict, the CIA has started to do the interrogations itself and has raised many questions as to the treatment of the detainees under CIA control. The CIA set up several secret prisons, or “black sites,” and the secrecy of this program has been a key feature. While some black sites were near the conflict, the CIA later negotiated with Romania and Poland to construct secret facilities there.²⁴¹

Infringements on Civil Liberties

The USA Patriot Act, which was enacted in 2001 following the terrorists acts of 9/11, has done more to diminish civil liberties in the United States than any other piece of legislation before or since. While its ideal is noble, to facilitate information gathering of possible terrorists within the US border, its repercussions have been rampant abuses in many areas of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

The act expanded the ability to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), originally passed in 1978 in order to collect intelligence on “foreign powers” or “agents of foreign powers.”²⁴² The FISA allows government agencies to use wiretapping and surveillance of communications on these foreign powers with a warrant from a special FISA court. This court requires far less information to obtain a wiretap warrant than typical courts. The 2001 USA Patriot Act added non-state actors, such as terrorists, to the list of people about whom information could be collected under FISA control. Along with these changed rules, there was an influx of FBI personnel who were transferred to the national security arena from areas such as white collar crime and narcotics. This led to more than a doubling of FISA cases in four years.²⁴³ Following this, the USA Patriot Act improvement and reauthorization act of 2005 further stretched the power of the FISA, extending renewal deadlines for terrorist suspects. While all other

²⁴⁰ (Grey 2007)

²⁴¹ (Grey 2007)

²⁴² (United States Title 50)

²⁴³ (Caproni 2007, 1092)

suspect monitoring approval must be renewed every 90 days, terrorist suspects must only be renewed on a yearly basis. This lowered the number of FISA applications even though the number of active cases continued to increase.

The Bush administration was not satisfied with FISA progress in obtaining information about terrorists within our borders due to the restriction which were in place early on, so the President created a special surveillance program under the National Security Agency. The warrantless wiretapping program, which was intended to only be targeted at those Americans who had overseas communications, in other words those that could potentially be in contact with terrorists, began as a secret. The first leaks to the media about the program were in 2005. The news was met with public outrage and calls to bring the program under stricter FISA controls. This was finally done in January 2007, much to the administration's discontent.

The FISA Amendment Act (FAA), signed in on July 10th, 2008, came as a compromise to the Bush administration's desire to continue the warrantless wiretapping program. It limited the role of the special FISA court in granting approval and gave the president the ability to authorize surveillance on foreign agents or powers for up to one year with the certified, written approval of the Attorney General.²⁴⁴ For American citizens the time limit for surveillance is one week with the Attorney General's approval. In addition, the president has the power to authorize emergency surveillance for up to one week if it is deemed vital to national security.²⁴⁵ Finally, the FAA granted blanket immunity to communication companies such as AT&T in their involvement in sharing consumers' information. This leaves the FISA with very few independent controls and transparency. While created to protect Americans from unjust monitoring by their government, it now has many powers in place which could lead to abuses.

Additionally, recent whistle blowing is only now revealing the true extent of the warrantless wiretapping program and the extent to which it has violated the rule of law within our nation. According to a former NSA analyst, the agency had access to all

²⁴⁴ (United States Title 50)

²⁴⁵ (Lichtblau 2008)

Americans' phone, fax, and internet communications, domestic and abroad, regardless of foreign contact. Journalists, key organizations, and political rivals were targeted around the clock.²⁴⁶ While the FISA had protections in its creation to ensure that no access was granted without sufficient cause, the warrantless wiretapping program targeted many who they knew were not involved in terrorist schemes. Wiretapping instead had political targets and was used for non-security purposes. Fortunately, part of the FAA compromise created an Inspector General position to investigate the wiretapping program. The report is due July 2009. The Federal wiretapping program continues to be imperfect even though it is now entirely under the control of the FISA courts.

In addition to the problems with wiretapping, the USA Patriot Act has also simplified intelligence collection on US citizens and non-citizens alike. The Act allows law enforcement officials to enter and search premises without notice if terrorist activity is suspected. However, this provision has been used for hundreds of nonterrorist cases. And because of the lack of review, no proof of terrorist suspicion actually needs to be submitted to an independent party such as a judge. Thus we are relying solely on the judgment of a law enforcement official to protect the rights of the people. This type of unchecked power is detrimental to democracies.

Finally, the domestic counterterrorism force is not effectively respecting the rights of US citizen minorities nor effectively using them in the fight against terror. Religious and ethnic minority communities could act as a powerful ally to counterterrorist networks by providing information on their communities to authorities as well as influencing the opinion of their youth towards non-extremist views. Courts are also unwilling to protect minorities from policies and laws which unfairly target them. Professor Gad Barzalai states that "courts do not incline to protect minority rights, especially in times of national security crisis."²⁴⁷ An infringement on one group opens up doors to infringements on all. We must make sure that our national security needs are balanced with the rights of all people, not just the majority.

²⁴⁶ (Tice 2009)

²⁴⁷ Class lecture 2/17

When officials are given powers beyond those entitled to them by the constitution, it is difficult for these powers to be retracted. They become essential to daily operations within a field. For example, police officers endowed with the special powers of the USA Patriot Act, which allow an official to search without notice if terrorist activity is suspected, have used this as justification for warrantless searches of criminal activity. The ‘all tools in the toolbox’ approach for National Security opens up the door to an abuse of power which will be difficult to scale back and irresponsible to do at a fast pace.

INTERESTS

In fighting this war, we must preserve our democratic ideals. Part of our role in the global community is to peacefully promote accountable nations around the world which adhere to the rule of law. We have assisted in building a democracy in Iraq which is proving to be more and more promising, holding truly free elections this past year. We continue to be a hegemonic power to which other nations look for example. Laura K. Donohue in The Cost of Counterterrorism argues that the US is “setting global counterterrorist norms and risk[s] the transfer of these detrimental effects to other liberal, democratic states”²⁴⁸ Our treatment of detainees is not something that we want to be adopted universally lest our own soldiers be tortured and detained indefinitely. The laws and policies that we pass here in the United States have far reaching repercussions beyond our domestic interests. Decisions to grant detainees the right to *habeas corpus* will not only be reviewed internationally but are likely to be adopted as policy by other nations as well. We remain an example to democratic nations around the world, especially those that are emerging with our support. Thus we must consider our policy and actions on an international scale as they affect the entire democratic community.

It is both our political and moral responsibility to deal with detainees correctly. If we continue to dismiss detainees’ rights, we send an example to other nations that justice need not be dealt to terrorists in the same way as it is dealt to other criminals. Of course,

²⁴⁸ (Donohue 2008, 3)

there are exceptional cases which require different actions, such as terrorist masterminds like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 organizer who can not at this time be charged and should not be released. However, there are no exceptional cases when it comes to torture. Our torture practices not only set an inappropriate example of a democratic nation's behavior, but they also leave our own soldiers vulnerable to this treatment in future conflicts. If we choose to dismiss international laws and treaties, we risk foregoing our own troops' perceived protection under these laws to the international community. Protecting detainees' rights is thus protecting our own troops' future interests. Not only is this key politically but also morally. We are party to treaties which champion human rights, yet these were dismissed in difficult times to ensure our security. Treaties are not only for times of peace. They are put in place for times of peace and war to ensure certain behavior across borders despite of circumstances. While the times following 9/11 were difficult and our current challenges continue to be critical to our future, it is precisely the instant to send a message to the global community that it is during our hours of greatest crisis that our morality matters most. If the greatest country on earth caves on international laws and treaties when it faces challenges, it sets a precedent for other democratic nations that treaties may be dismissed when they stand in the way of expedient action in conflicts. We must not allow this latter message to be the one which reaches developing democratic nations throughout the world.

In order to fight a global War on Terror, allies are essential. However, the actions which we have taken following the 9/11 attacks have broken down our network of allies. According to Donohue, "American use of coercive interrogation and rendition after 9/11 meant that other nations...refused to extradite suspects to the United States. Likewise, the US decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions alienated countries and diminished their ability to openly support US foreign policy in a range of areas."²⁴⁹ If our actions are questionable or even reprehensible, we will gain no supporters. It is necessary to set forth policy which gains friends instead of putting them off as we have

²⁴⁹ (Donohue 2008, 28)

been doing over the last several years. Fixing the problems in our policy that pertain to the human rights and civil liberties of citizens and noncitizens alike is a solid step in winning back the support and approval of key allies.

Winning back our credibility not only increases our likelihood to have international allies, it also expands our ability to act unilaterally when needed. While we are attempting to create a more multilateral fight against terrorists, there are still instances in which it is in the United States' best interests to exercise its will. We need to be able to compel the international community to accept these actions, and the best way of doing this is increasing our credibility.

In addition to winning credibility and protecting our troops, it is in the interest of each American to ensure that his or her liberties remain intact despite of challenges to national security. As I have discussed before, it is difficult for policies and privileges enacted on a procedural level to later be scaled back. Law enforcement and intelligence offices become accustomed to the new means of performing necessary tasks. An example of this is the use of wiretapping. Senator Frank Church led a truth and reconciliation committee over 30 years ago to investigate instances of spying on American citizens. His work is what created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This act was expanded in 2001 to include suspected terrorists, and it has since been discovered to affect every American's communication, domestic and abroad. To scale back to a time when all wiretapping had stringent restrictions would not only be unrealistic but would almost definitely hurt our security. The ideals of many policies are correct. We must find a way to discover terrorists and their plans within our borders, and monitoring their communication is one of the most effective ways to do this. However, allowing policies which allow for such abuses such as the warrantless wiretapping program should no longer be allowed. We must elect officials who will recognize the possible abuses which their laws and policies may lead to. It is in our best interest to ensure that government action is transparent so that our system of checks and balances may be properly carried through and so that we ourselves may be informed

voters. A democracy runs properly only when it is accountable to its people, and that includes being accountable to those people's rights and values. If we do not resolve the oversteps of the past in a way which sends a clear message that these types of actions will not be tolerated again, future oversteps and abuses will be more likely.

OPTIONS

Effectively Handle Enemy Detainees

The detention center at Guantánamo bay and other extra-legal prisons around the world must be closed, and all evidence suggests that they will be closed within the coming year. However, there many problems with closing these detention centers and transferring prisoners to other locations which must be addressed. The years of ambiguous and often unclear labeling of the detainees' status makes this task that much more daunting, especially when trying to provide legal justification for certain practices.

The first challenge in closing the special detention centers is determining which prisoners are to be charged, which must be released, and which, if any, must continue to be held. There are currently 145 detainees being held at Guantánamo Bay. Each of these must be considered on a case by case basis. No blanket solution is applicable to all detainees. There are currently 59 detainees who are approved to be released but for whom release negotiations have not been concluded with other nations. There are 21 detainees who the United States is currently prepared to try. The other 165 detainees are where problems arise most. Evidence in many cases is convoluted, circumstantial, or tainted by having been attained under less than ideal conditions; yet some of these classified detainees are too dangerous to be allowed to go free. Thus, the first step is to consolidate and consider all the information which is known by the Federal Government of each detainee. As each case is reviewed individually, the determinations will be carried out on a rolling basis: release to a foreign nation, transfer for trial, or transfer for continued detainment. The cases should be reviewed by a non-Partisan board of government officials, including Secretaries or appropriate representatives of the State

Department, Department of Defense, Justice Department, Department of Homeland Security, and other government employees who the heads of this board deem necessary. The writ of *habeas corpus* cases which are currently being considered by federal courts continue and should continue to be heard there.

There are many detainees who are either already approved for release or who may be approved in the coming review process, yet the troubles of constructing a proper release for many of these detainees remain. The United States' hope is to return each detainee to their own nation, yet it would be impossible or unlawful for many of these detainees to be returned to their home countries. Some may be wrongly punished by their own nations if returned, namely those from China, the Uighurs. Uighurs are Muslims from the Western region of China. The Chinese government has demanded that they be returned to China to faces charges for separatism and treason.²⁵⁰ Numerous judges have deemed that they are to be set free, yet we can not legally return them to a country which we know would use questionable practices on them in interrogations and would be likely to sentence them to death for charges of treason. These detainees arguably qualify for refugee status, but the United States does not wish to release them within our borders. The United States needs to be able to work with China on issues such as Iran, and China has already suggested that it will deem any country which takes in these men as harboring terrorists.²⁵¹ Suitable sites must be found for these prisoners. It has been argues that other detainees may return to fighting. This requires that we demand provisions for release which include restricting the movement of the detainee to within the country to which he is released. Many countries, especially those from which the largest number of detainees come, simply do not have the political ability to correctly restrict those returned. Further problems include countries such as Yemen which refuse to negotiate the repatriation of prisoners altogether as they do “[not] want to be seen as doing anything for the United States,” according to an unnamed source within the

²⁵⁰ (Spiegel 2009)

²⁵¹ (Spiegel 2009)

Yemeni government who spoke to Newsweek.²⁵² The United States requires that those detainees released will remain under the control of those countries to which they are released.

Even if approved for release, it is highly unlikely that any detainee will be released on American soil; so the US should take advantage of this opportunity to build international cooperation and reinstate this fight against terror as a global cause. This can be done by transferring those detainees who are approved for release to our allies. The United Kingdom is currently working with US officials on the transfer of Binyam Mohamed, who was a resident of the U.K. at the time of his detention to Guantánamo. Other countries have offered to take some of the 59 detainees who have been cleared for release but are unable to return to their own countries. These are mostly Western allies and include Germany, Norway, and Canada.²⁵³ The challenge which this poses is that countries open to taking detainees demand “full assessments, including classified information, on the risk the detainees may pose”²⁵⁴ This challenge originates from convoluted evidence which we have on many detainees. As we have already deemed the detainees who are approved for release as posing no threat to our interests, the United States should negotiate with our allies to determine what level of information is needed for each transferred prisoner and be willing to make concessions on the classified prisoner material as long as it does not pose a threat to American interests. We should also demand in our negotiations that those governments in turn classify any sensitive information which may need to be released. The important thing to remember in this case is that these detainees have not been deemed as a threat to US interests, and as such any information which would need to be released to guarantee their security in an ally’s country would be unlikely to pose a threat to us.

We must then make a decision as to whether the detainees for whom we have sufficient information to charge should be tried in military or federal courts. Once again,

²⁵² (Ephron 2008)

²⁵³ (Spiegel 2009)

²⁵⁴ (Finn 2009)

this should be determined on a case by case basis. There are detainees who can legally be charged in the criminal justice system, namely those who are US citizens or committed crimes within our borders. US Criminal courts have a much higher rate of success in convicting terrorist suspects than do the military commissions that were set up in Guantánamo. Since 2001, Criminal courts have convicted 145 terrorist suspects to the military commissions' three.²⁵⁵ The majority of the time, classified information is successfully maneuvered around as substantial evidence may be available without its inclusion. Many of those prisoners whom we are prepared to charge may be prosecuted without the need to share or declassify information for that detainee.

In addition to those prisoners who can be released and those who can be tried, there will be a small number who will need to continue to be held at this time. Those who continue to be held should meet very particular criteria:

- Must be a member and of prime importance to a terrorist organization
- Must have committed or been a primary organizer of acts of violence or terrorism against the United States or its interests
- Must pose either a physical or financial gain to terrorist networks upon their release, regardless of the location of that release

In reviewing, the board must do its best to limit this group as much as possible, keeping in mind that this group is for the terrorist masterminds, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and the "high-value terrorist," who were the last transferred to Guantánamo by the CIA. Prisoners must be treated with the utmost respect and dignity from here forward. There must be regular reviews of the prisoners' continued detention, considering the legality, the prisoners' threat, and any new evidence which may have been discovered. Prisoners must also have access to legal counsel during the duration of their detention.

These holdings should also be carried out with the utmost legality possible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently ruled in *Al-Marri v.*

²⁵⁵ (Mendelson 2008, 16)

Pucciarelli that an enemy combatant may be held indefinitely when commanded by the President who has been empowered by the Congress to do so, as long as that enemy combatant has been given “sufficient process to challenge his designation.”²⁵⁶ The ruling of this case may be used, with congressional approval, to further detain the terrorist masterminds which we deem most dangerous to our national security. Using this ruling depends on the Supreme Court not reversing it later. There is a very good chance that this will be reversed since it can apply to anyone, including US citizens. What is really needed is a permanent solution to this problem.

With the internationally changing face of battle, it is vital that laws made to protect human rights in times of conventional war be revised to include unconventional war. All aspects of the Geneva Conventions are not applicable to a conflict fought between a state and stateless combatants. The United States should either propose a revision of the Geneva Convention or suggest that a separate convention be created so that international norms regarding the treatment of stateless agents may be agreed upon. This proposal can be done in the United Nations. While these norms can not be dictated by the United States and need to be reached by the international community as a whole, topics to agree upon would include:

- Detainees be treated humanely and in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Ability to hold stateless agents without charge
- Whether stateless actors be charged criminally or militarily

America should also show support for the ICC and start discussing the eventual handling of non-state or terrorist cases in the future by this body. This transfer would be beyond the scope of this task force, once this court has had sufficient time to prove itself as legitimate and just.

Finally, the detainees who must continue to be held are going to be transferred to supermax security prisons. These may include military facilities such as those in

²⁵⁶ (United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 2008)

Charleston, SC, or Fort Leavenworth, Kans while detainees are awaiting trial.²⁵⁷ The more long term detainees will likely go to the supermax federal prison in Florence, Colorado, the ADX. Much of the public is uneasy about detainees being sent to these prisons: they fear that they will pose a danger to their neighborhoods, could be released in to the public, and would demand regional funding to boost security in the area. Supermax security prisons are already fitted to deal with terrorist inmates. Zacarias Moussaoui, one of the men involved in 9/11, is already being held at the ADX in Colorado.²⁵⁸ If acquitted in trial, detainees will then go through a release process with the state department determining where they should be sent; however, it should be known that the 21 people who the United States are prepared to try at this time have complete cases. We would not choose to put this group in this category unless the evidence against them was solid. As for funding, facilities like the ADX are already prepared to handle these detainees, so the cost would likely be less than operating special facilities in places like Guantánamo. Additionally, since the detainees will be handled by the federal facilities, the cost will continue to be upon the federal government, not states or municipalities. Public campaigns should be launched in the areas where detainees are to be held to ensure that everyone is well informed that these detainees will not pose any risk to them. These campaigns should include interviews with local news groups and should emphasize transparency to the American public about the holding process.

Moving forward, we must also be concerned with the detainees which we are holding in other parts of the world, such as Bagram in Afghanistan. Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia University, states that “Guantánamo is a symptom of a larger problem.”²⁵⁹ The entire way in which we hold terrorist suspects, domestically and abroad, must be rethought. While this should be done by a new international convention, as I have already suggested, there are thing which need to be implemented immediately. First, we must use stricter over site in the handling of detainees. No torture or

²⁵⁷ (Ephron 2008)

²⁵⁸ (Vick 2007)

²⁵⁹ (Ephron 2008)

humiliating or degrading treatment should be used. If it is, immediate and strict disciplinary actions need to be taken against these rogue handlers. To facilitate this, we must create new training programs to ensure that those soldiers who are working at Bagram know how to properly handle and question detainees. No inexperienced handlers should be given individual and unrestricted control of a detainee again. In addition, to resolve the problems with evidence which we are now facing with the Guantánamo detainees, better records must be kept.

Renew our Commitment to Human Rights

We must undeniably renew our commitment to human rights on an international scale. This should include a declaration of our commitment to international agreements such as the Convention on Torture. While an executive order was signed renouncing all use of torture, that order did not necessarily require that CIA agents adhere to those guidelines set forth by the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation. We must make a statement internationally that no US agent anywhere will use tactics which are not in line with international norms and treaties on human rights. We should review our agreement to the Convention against Torture and amend the language of our stipulations to that agreement. Torture, according to the convention, is

“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”²⁶⁰

Yet the US stipulated in signing this convention that severe pain or suffering, mental or physical, is a prolonged act. The U.S must decree on an international scale that any act of

²⁶⁰ (United Nations 1984)

torture, whether singular or abusive, constitutes as torture and that no US agent is in any way authorized to perform these acts. This would most effectively be done with a revision to our stipulations to the Convention against Torture.

The increased authority for the CIA must also be re-thought. If we are to send a message that no agent of the United States tortures, that message can not include stipulations for the CIA. It must also comply with the interrogation techniques spelled out in the Army Field Manual. Moreover, the practice of extraordinary rendition for the purpose of interrogations or torture must cease. The extraordinary rendition option must remain open for its original intent: to transfer suspects with congressional approval for the purpose of taking them to trial. However, abductions, torture, and release without charge must never again be carried out by US agents. We send no message to the international community if we say we don't torture without unconditionally involving the CIA. Not only must we do this from a credibility standpoint, but as an example democracy as well. Other countries around the world have also used rendition. A group of people were rendered to Ethiopia from Mombasa, Kenya in early 2007, and it is rumored that this was carried out with US backing.²⁶¹ This rendition involved women, children, and people who did not have any sensitive information. The US must not be involved in these kinds of practices. In this global conflict, the CIA's enhanced abilities and resources cause insecurity and mistrust in the global community as well as set examples of behavior for other countries.

Increase Accountability in the Government

In addition to our declaration of renewed commitment to human rights, we must also hold those responsible for violations accountable for their actions and orders. The statute of limitations for torture is only 8 years, so these crimes must be investigated promptly. Senator Leahy (D-VT) is currently advocating a truth and reconciliation committee modeled after that which was set up in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, a model which is internationally recognized as being a failure. This

²⁶¹ (Grey 2007)

committee would offer immunity to those who testified and shared the full extent of their knowledge. Those who did not wish to share everything would then only be subject to charges of perjury. This is simply not great enough a signal to send to either the international community or our own government officials. No one is above the law, and this definitely includes government officials. The past administration is working under the flawed Nixonian creed that if the president does it, it isn't wrong. It has taken the idea of executive privilege and spread it to the President's secretaries and advisors. However, if any of these officials have violated our constitution and laws, it is Attorney General Eric Holder's legal obligation to investigate and pursue a case against them. While this process may be costly and lengthy, our country can not afford to allow the abuse of our system to go unrequited. By doing nothing, the American people lose confidence in their country, and the international community also loses confidence in both our commitment to the human rights cause as well as to our own people. By not requiring accountability for these actions, we send a signal to possible future abusers of power that their actions may also go unrequited. We must not leave our country so vulnerable to abuses from within.

In addition to investigating human rights violations, ensuring that the legality of programs which have blatantly infringed upon our civil liberties is investigated will also help to increase government accountability. In the case of warrantless wiretapping, the FAA allowed for the position of an inspector general to be created. This inspector is due to give a report on the transgressions of the warrantless wiretapping program in July. If crimes were committed, charges must be made.

"I believe that successfully addressing our national security needs while protecting our basic freedoms and civil liberties requires continual Congressional oversight, and I will continue to work to assert the role of this body in carrying out this grave responsibility." This sort of responsibility towards our constitution on a congressional level should be commended and sought out in the leaders which the American people choose to vote for. There are countless agencies that petition government agencies to

ensure accountability, transparency, and legality. These agencies, such as the ACLU, Human Right Watch, and Amnesty International, should be supported to provide independent overview of the actions of our government.

Resolve Questionable Policies

We must find more efficient ways of information sharing in order to identify potential terrorists rather than continuing with the current practices of broad surveillance and profiling. This should include better means of interrogating detainees which do not involve torture or other inhuman treatment, but which respect each detainee's dignity. Handlers must be trained and must be required to comply with the interrogation techniques that are included in the Army Field Manual.

The practice of widespread warrantless wiretapping has been stopped, but we must find a way to responsibly use this technology in the future. Personal and sensitive information gathering must be done with the knowledge of US citizens and with the best attempt not to infringe upon those citizens' rights. During times of war or emergency, citizens are more willing to concede their rights to ensure their security; however, any infringements upon rights must be done with the upmost transparency possible as well as with time limits and contingencies to check possible government abuses.

RECCOMENDATIONS

We must move forward with policy on our current global challenges which is respectful both of our values as a nation and the international rule of law. President Obama said in his inaugural address what many American hope to hold true, that "our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint."²⁶² We wish to win the current war in a manner which does not erode our standing. We will not reach this goal by violating the laws of our country, international law, or our own morality.

²⁶² (Text of President Barack Obama's inaugural address 2009)

As stated before, there are specific actions which the US must take in order to achieve our goals:

- Transfer detainees out of special holding facilities and secret prisons, taking advantage of international cooperation in this process
 - Free those who are approved to be freed by finding appropriate states for them if they are unable to go to their own
 - Give required information of detainees to governments that are willing to take them
 - Those who are not to be freed will be transferred to supermax security federal prisons, and public campaigns will be launched to ensure the public that these people are of no threat to them in these facilities
- Set up an appropriate means of trying those detainees in US custody while being respective of challenges such as classification of evidence
 - Try those whose cases do are under proper US jurisdiction (US residents, crime committed in the US) in federal courts while those with classified information or committed internationally should be held in military courts
 - Continue to process the writs of Habeas Corpus in federal courts
- Provide indefinite holding areas for those detainees who may neither be returned nor tried at this time in which these prisoners' rights will be maintained
- Treat future detainees in a way which respects their rights, whether in domestic or foreign facilities
 - Cease practices such as torture and humiliating acts
 - Require comprehensive records be made for each detainee
- Cease the practice of extraordinary rendition for the purpose of torturing
- Investigate Human Rights and Civil Liberties grievances from the previous administration, emphasizing truth and accountability
- Make an international declaration of our commitment to the Convention against Torture

- Propose a new convention at the U.N. to internationally agree to the treatment, detention, and trying of stateless agents
- Actively work to find better ways to gather information about possible terrorists within our borders
 - Adopt interrogation practices which respect the dignity of each detainee
 - Increase transparency of government wiretapping operations, including time limits and restrictions on whose information they may access
 - Build relationships with minority groups within our country rather than alienating them through profiling
- Encourage through elections and popular action that all branches of office adhere to the Constitution and international law
 - Discourage addendums which make it difficult for other branches to resolve issues in their policy
 - Support the practices of agencies such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the ACLU which promote transparency and accountability in government

The actions which must be taken in light of these challenges are not without problems. These are imperfect, complicated situations and unfortunately, lend themselves to imperfect answers. The ideological divide which exists within our country on these issues is deep. The debate on the relationship between security and liberty has existed within this country since before our country began. It was Benjamin Franklin who said that “they who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety”²⁶³ during the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1775. While many believe that a difficult choice must be made in this debate, many believe that there is no choice to be made. America can be secure and maintain the freedoms and beliefs on which it is built. It is this latter message which must be adopted for the coming years of

²⁶³ (Franklin 1818, 270)

this administration. We will not falter in our morality and commitment to the rule of law in order to buy temporary security.

As the detainee cases are all individual, it would take a much deeper assessment and access to boundless classified information to be able to give a solid recommendation on each, yet these guidelines will start our country heading in the right direction. Revising our treatment of detainees is the first step in restoring our credibility abroad and protecting the future interests of our own troops. This step goes hand in hand with ensuring that other programs and policies which have been implemented, such as torture, extraordinary rendition, and warrantless wiretapping, are irrevocably ceased. Investigating wrong doings of the past is the second step of restoring the favorability of international opinion towards the United States. It is not enough that policies are merely changed. This sends a message to the international community that the same oversteps may not be made during this term, but they could be reinstated in the future if there is another shift of power within our government. This is not the message that we wish to send. We want to undeniably restore our credibility so that nations around the world know that not only will these mistakes not be repeated by this administration but that they are not likely to be repeated by any administration in the future.

Ultimately, it is our responsibility to ensure that the proper relationship between our country and its citizens is upheld. It is the government's responsibility to protect the interests and rights of its people, and it is the citizen's responsibility to demand accountability from his or her leaders. We must demand accountability by supporting agencies such as Human Rights Watch and the ACLU to ensure that our government does not enact practices and policies which can become abusive.

While we have dealt with many problems in the recent past regarding human rights and civil liberties abuses, now is the time to take a new direction. By effectively balancing our liberty and security and denying that there is an ultimate choice which must be made between them, we will make our country more secure and its citizens more free. The steps which we will take to make this balance effective will also restore our credibility on

an international scale. This will not only increase our ability to work multilaterally with renewed allies but also our legitimacy to work unilaterally when needed. Enacting these internal changes is vital to winning the war on terror and creating the international community which we wish to lead.

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FUTURE OF US-GCC RELATIONS

Ryo Kato

A major priority for the United States is to maintain the stability of the Middle East. The primary objective of this concern is to secure the free flow of fossil fuels for the international market. To secure the stability of the region, the United States has relied on countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the security partnerships with these countries helped contain both Iraq and Iran, while both of these states restrained each other. However, following the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the geopolitical system of the Middle East changed. Iraq is no longer a military threat. Without a Ba'athist Baghdad, Iran is not constrained with the fear of a powerful neighbor. The regional system on which the security relationships we have had with our GCC allies has changed. Despite this the United States will continue to cooperate with the GCC allies to maintain stability in a new Middle East. This paper will examine the past and current realities of the Middle East while focusing on the Gulf region. Following this examination, this paper will posit how the US-GCC relationship will confront current issues that face the region. These issues will include: the Iranian nuclear program, rehabilitation of Iraq into the regional system, and the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

The Gulf Cooperation Council

The United States has relied on our relationships with our allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to maintain stability and prevent the ascension of a hostile regional hegemon. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or formally the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, is a trade bloc established through an agreement made on May 25th 1981 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On November 11th, 1981 a unified economic agreement was signed in Riyadh. The agreement was concluded between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The member states share similar political systems based on Islamic beliefs. The primary stated objectives are as follows²⁶⁴:

²⁶⁴"The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf The Charter." 2007. <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=1> (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

- Formulating similar regulations in various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation, and administration;
- Fostering scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources;
- Establishing scientific research centers;
- Setting up joint ventures;
- Encouraging cooperation of the private sector;
- Strengthening ties between their peoples; and
- Establishing a common currency by 2010

Some of the fastest growing economies are part of the GCC. These countries have saved decades of revenues from exporting oil and natural gas. More recently, the area is also seeing a building and investment boom backed by decades of saved petroleum revenues as well as foreign investment. The GCC is primarily a trade bloc, although they were formed, in part, as a response to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Balance of Power Prior to 2003

This portion will briefly describe the balance of power prior to 2003. Iran under the Shah was a close, regional partner to the United States. Although Iran's military cast a large shadow over the region, Tehran did not exert political influence over the Gulf. Before 1979, it was Egypt and Saudi Arabia that influenced most of the region. During this time, the Shah emphasized Iran's Persian history, keeping a certain amount of distance from the politics of the Arab and Islamic world. This changed, however with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Aside from Iran's sudden hostility to the United States, the Revolution greatly affected the regional structure.

The revolutionary Shi'i state under Khomeini did several things to alter the geopolitical system of the Middle East. First, the Islamic Republic by trying to represent the Arabic and Islamic world, Tehran became another powerful center of a multipolar region. Second, the Shi'i revolution in the Persian nation sparked a strong reaction from the Sunni dominant Arab countries. In 1980 Iraq launched a war against Iran that lasted

eight-years, inflicting great losses to both sides. Iran was threatening for several reasons. It was the first nation with a Shi'i dominated government. Its revolutionary and anti-monarchical rhetoric, as well as support for opposition groups in the region were a reason for the Saudi kingdom and Gulf emirates to fear. The Gulf countries have sizable Shi'i populations that they feared would be more loyal to Tehran and take irredentist or otherwise disruptive action against their own country. Thirdly, the new Iranian state was also ideologically dynamic. It represented a fresh alternative to secular pan-Arabism that arguably fell out of favor with Sadat's peace with Israel. It was also an alternative to the religious Sunni conservatism promoted by Saudi Arabia. Despite the ideological differences, the secular and religious states found a common interest in opposing Iran. Fourth, Iran also was key supporter of the Shi'i Hezbollah movement's attempts to push Israel out of southern Lebanon during the 1980s. By supporting Hezbollah Tehran gained credentials in the Middle East as a country that, although indirectly, faces Israel. This also support also helped to establish the deep-seated strength of non-state organizations in the security and political affairs of the region.

The revolution in Tehran also helped to draw the United State's long-term influence in the region. As stability in the Middle East and the free access to resources was iterated as a fundamental American interest, the US also had a stake in the containment of Iran. Iraq received support from the US during the 1980-1990 Iran-Iraq war. Saudi Arabia was also responsible for raising funds and Arab consensus for containment. Through the 1990s, even after the economic sanctions and containment of Iraq that followed the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was preserved as an able counterbalance to revolutionary Iran. Following the dislodging of Iraq from Kuwait in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the United States and the GCC practiced the policy of "dual containment." A large military presence was stationed in Saudi Arabia, as a direct presence to enforce the containment of Iraq.

The end of the pre-2003 system brought two changes to the US-GCC relationship. First, Iran is at greater liberty to extend its influence now that the power balance that

restrained both Iraq and Iran is gone. Tehran's close cooperation with Damascus, influence within the Iraqi Shi'a population, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon; the prediction made by King Abdullah of Jordan in 2004 seems to be accurate. Second, due to the alterations in the geopolitical order and differing threat perceptions to these changes, the United States has had difficulty in organizing consensus on how to rebuild the regional system. This paper will now examine the past and current realities of the Middle East while focusing on the Gulf region. Following this examination, this paper will posit recommendations on how to advance US-GCC countries relationships in order to better confront the current and recent issues that face the region.

US-GCC Military Cooperation

A defining characteristic of the relationship between the United States and the GCC countries has been the long-time military partnerships. GCC countries have relied on US arms sales and direct presence in the region for security from external threat and assistance in maintaining stability in the region. In the 1980s and 1990s, our partnership was designed to contain the threats posed by Iran and Iraq. The GCC was founded in the first year of the 1980-1988 War, and its inception was partially to hedge militarily against Iran and Iraq.²⁶⁵

Into the future, our partnership will remain based on our mutual interests in the maintenance of regional stability, securing the free-flow of fossil fuel to international markets and the protecting Gulf countries from external threats. For this reason, the United States will continue to provide arms systems and training to the GCC countries so that they may defend the region in a coordinated manner.

Firstly, Iran persists to pose a threat in the Persian Gulf. For instance, Bahrain announced mid-February of this year that it has halted natural gas import negotiations with Iran following comments that were perceived to endanger its sovereignty.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ The Elephant in the Gulf: Arab States and Iran's Nuclear Program
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2424>
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2424>

²⁶⁶ Khalifa, Reem. "AP Bahrain Halts Gas Talks with Iran over Insult." Feb 19, 2009.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090219/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_bahrain_iran (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

However, Iranian-Bahraini relations had thawed since the 2007 visit of president Ahmadinejad, during which a memorandum of understanding concerning natural gas imports was signed. The improvement to bilateral relations, as well as the import agreement was shot when a former Iranian Parliament speaker stated that Bahrain was the 14th province of Iran until 1970.²⁶⁷ This drew sharp condemnation from GCC countries. Riyadh made an official statement expressing “strong indignation” and rejection of such claims.²⁶⁸ This statement struck a chord with historical fear on the part of Sunni Arab governments of a Shi’a revolt. In the 1980s, the Ayatollah Tehran has since taken official steps to distance itself from these remarks, but the statement served as a reminder of the potential threat of Iranian intentions in the future.

Another, longer-standing point of contention is between the UAE and Iran over the Three Islands by the Strait of Hormuz: Abu Musa, Great and Lesser Tunb. On November 30, 1971, Iran under the Shah seized the three islands a day before the UAE’s independence from Britain. Nothing was done because Britain, as it was in the process of withdrawal, was not in position to stop Iran; and the UAE, being a small grouping of island nations, was too weak to resist. At the time, the US supported this occupation, as it filled the vacuum of the British presence, and also because at the time Iran was a close regional partner to the US. Sharjah, one of seven emirates that comprise the UAE that claims sovereignty over Abu Musa had reached a tentative understanding with Iran in 1971. Sovereignty is to be maintained by Sharjah, but Iran would be permitted to have a military presence in the northern section of the Island. Furthermore, oil reserves surrounding the island were to be shared. However, when the Iranian military occupied Abu Musa as agreed upon, they also seized Greater and Lesser Tunb. Although, a loud Arab out cry followed this later action, the issue concerning the Islands became secondary following the establishment of UAE-Iranian relations in 1972 and the more pressing concerns of the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s.

²⁶⁷ Khalifa, Reem. "AP Bahrain Halts Gas Talks with Iran over Insult." Feb 19, 2009.http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090219/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_bahrain_iran (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

²⁶⁸ "Asia News: Manama Suspends Negotiations with Tehran, winning Arab Solidairty." Feb 19, 2009.<http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=14521&geo=11&size=A> (accessed Feb 19, 2009).

However, from the 1990s, Iran has increased its position over the islands. In 1992, Iran expelled the UAE and claimed full sovereignty over all three Islands. In 1994 and 1995, Iran increased its military presence in just five months from 700 to 4,000 personnel.²⁶⁹ The UAE raised the issue to the other members of the GCC and also referred the issue to the International Court of Justice, the latter of which Iran has rejected on several occasions. Tehran has preferred bilateral negotiations with its weaker neighbor, rather than a third-party mediation. Iran has become more entrenched, building an airport in 1996 and two shipping office buildings as recent as August 2008. This was followed by renewed outrage from the GCC, to which Tehran made little comments in response. It is also important to note that the UAE does not enjoy overwhelming Arab support as it once did in 1971. Under Hussein, Iraq had supported UAE sovereignty, however the Iraqi delegation to the 13th Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in 2008 had expressed its reservation regarding the communiqué of support for the UAE.²⁷⁰

While the threat of a conventional Iranian military attack against the territories of GCC states is not imminent, the statements and actions of Iran continue to concern the Gulf nations. Because the ultimate intentions of Tehran are unclear, it is important for the United States to be persistent in providing material and training support to the capabilities of GCC militaries.

Secondly, it is important to continue this process in augmenting the GCC countries' own military capabilities because a large US military presence in the Gulf region is materially and politically taxing for the US and our allies. Gulf countries that host US military facilities within their borders face a difficult dilemma. While they must rely on their partnership with the United States to provide arms, as well as US presence in the region, the GCC states find public perception is largely dissatisfied with this relationship. To begin relying more on GCC militaries in the future, the interoperability and intra-GCC communications will have to be improved. In 1984, GCC defense

²⁶⁹ "Island Dispute Between Iran and the UAE." <http://www.american.edu/ted/abumusa.htm> (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

²⁷⁰ Henderson, Simon. "The Persian Gulf's Occupied Territory: The Three-Island Dispute." Sep 8, 2008. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2927> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

ministers created the Peninsula Shield force. Based at Hafar al Batin in Saudi Arabia, this a force comprised of two brigades, one Saudi and the other a composite of member-states, is headed by a Saudi general.²⁷¹ The efficacy of Peninsula Shield to work as an independent regional collective security system failed utterly with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The GCC immediately condemned the Iraqi action, but when GCC defense ministers met three weeks later, they could only agree on strengthening the Peninsula Shield force.²⁷² If we hope to depend less on direct US involvement, and have our allies take more responsibility for regional security, the capability of the GCC Peninsula Shield must be augmented.

A recent poll indicated that merely 6 percent of respondents found Iran to be a major security threat, whereas 80 percent responded that the US and Israel are the two biggest regional threats. Furthermore, fewer than 25 percent responded that Iran should be pressured to halt its nuclear program. 60 percent responded that Tehran had the right to pursue nuclear development even if it aimed to build a weapons program. Meanwhile, the use of GCC territory for US military personnel is also a source of public dissatisfaction with their governments. In 2003 US military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia were redeployed to several other facilities hosted by other GCC countries. Both sides explained that the move did not occur under pressure from Riyadh. It was stated that with the threat of Ba'athist Iraq destroyed, it was no longer necessary to base US forces in Saudi Arabia.

The relationship with the United States has been the cause of terrorism in Saudi Arabia in the past. Most notably the Khobar Tower bombing in June 25, 1996 and November 8, 2003 bombing in a residential area of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has essentially been drawn into a conflict with terrorist organizations that the religious conservative elements it has, and continues to do to some extent, supported.

²⁷¹ "Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council." Jan 1993.<http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11070.html> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

²⁷² "Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council." Jan 1993.<http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11070.html> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

The process of developing the GCC states' own military capabilities faces some difficulty arising from GCC countries have preferred to diplomatically engage Iran and avoid the possibility of conflict. Qatar in particular enjoys close relations to Iran, due to joint control over a large oil field. Despite this Doha demonstrates that it wants to hedge all bets; Qatar still plays host to US CENTCOM forward headquarters. Although the GCC has extended diplomatic meetings with Iran, they are not doing so because they no longer see Iran as a threat. On the contrary, they are doing so to smooth out relations and avoid antagonizing a potentially hostile Iran in the future. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the GCC countries out of self-preservation will receive US material and training support and continue to be a partner in securing the Gulf region.

Iranian nuclear program

The most pressing reason to coordinate with the GCC states is the issue of Iran's nuclear program, and the likelihood that this program is intended to produce atomic weapons. If left unregulated, there is the danger that enriched nuclear material can be passed off to terrorist organizations meaning harm against the United States or its allies. Second, a nuclear-armed Tehran may be emboldened to threaten neighboring countries, as well as lend further support to Hamas and Hezbollah. Thirdly, an Iran encouraged by its development of nuclear arms would complicate the implementation of US policy in the region. Finally, such a development would diminish the Middle East's confidence in the United States' ability to provide regional security. This may lead to further proliferation on the part of Arab states. For these reasons, Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear arms.

The United States does not have the GCC countries support in taking preventative action and physically destroying the ongoing enrichment of nuclear material. Although it is a common interest to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, all of the Gulf states have iterated that an attack cannot be carried out on Iranian nuclear sites from US facilities within their territories. The United States could stage an air strike on suspect nuclear sites in Iran from the two carrier groups currently in the Persian Gulf. Alternatively, we could

coordinate a strike with Israel. These would destroy the current capacity to enrich uranium, however, it comes with certain risks that make this option unfavorable.

First, Iran claims that if the US or Israel were to strike at its nuclear facilities, Iran would take steps to close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic. It would not be simple or quick task. De-mining the straits would require a sustained naval and air campaign to protect mine-clearance vessels against Iranian surface-based anti-ship missiles and missile boats. This could take weeks or months before commercial traffic can fully resume, and even longer for oil markets to be convinced of the areas safety. For example, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 halted oil exports of both countries and oil prices more than doubled. Prices did not return to preinvasion levels for almost a year. Such a conflict in the Strait also comes with the danger of escalation. The requirements of protecting the mine-clearance vessels would include the elimination of surface-based anti-ship missile batteries as well as targeting radar, which would add days, weeks or months to a prolonged naval and air campaign. Such developments would have little public or international support. Our public would adamantly resist the possibility that this conflict requires ground involvement.

Second, the United States must be prepared to defend GCC allies that are hosts to US military facilities. Iran has professed that it would retaliate against American forces throughout the region.²⁷³ This could entail that the Iranian proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah, and militias in Iraq – would renew attacks using rocket and terrorist. Third, the reaction from the GCC and international community could be negative enough that we lose further support to pressure Iran. Our allies in the Gulf already face a dilemma. They are reliant on US security presence but face strong popular perception that condemns the close bilateral relationships with the US. Therefore, it is possible that the GCC countries will even more constrained from openly cooperating with the US. Then it is a possible consequence that preventative action could allow Iran to develop its program with greater

²⁷³ Peterson, Scott. "How Iran would retaliate if it comes to war." Jun 20, 2008. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0620/p07s04-wome.html> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

liberty. It is not advised to take preventive action against Iran's developing nuclear capabilities.

The United States should continue to use economic sanctions to pressure Tehran. Ahmadinejad is facing criticism from numerous Iranian newspapers and politicians regarding the state of the economy. In 2005, he had won in a landslide victory on a populist platform. He had promised improve lives of the poor and the lower classes by "putting petroleum income on people's tables."²⁷⁴ Since his election, Ahmadinejad had tried to fulfill his campaign promise by raising minimum wage, pensions, loans for lower-income families, preferential loans for small-industries, as well as numerous popular projects. This has exacerbated Iran's double-digit inflation rates. To add to this, Ahmadinejad's hard-line stance has brought external pressures through sanctions on the economy as well.

Although apprehensive of a nuclear Iran our allies in the GCC have largely not joined our calls for stricter limitations on trade with Iran. A former British ambassador to the UAE described the Gulf leaders' position, "tone it down, and please do not interfere with our rising prosperity and trade which keeps our societies stable, and keeps the wheels of commerce turning."²⁷⁵ While they are adverse to the idea of confronting and thus possibly radicalizing Tehran's foreign policy further, the GCC is also opposes sanctions because they have an economic interest in relations with Iran. Qatar, a perennially self-styled nonaligned state, shares oil fields with Iran. Our closer allies have also gained from ties to Iran. Saudi-Iranian trade grew from \$500 million in 2006, \$850 million in 2007.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, the UAE enjoys the greater share of the \$14 billion trade relation with Iran, making the small islands nation Iran's largest trade partner. Although the GCC countries enjoy profitable economic relations with Iran, it may be fruitful to

²⁷⁴ Bakhtiar, Abbas "Ahmadinejad's Achilles Heel: The Iranian Economy." Jan 25, 2007. <http://www.payvand.com/news/07/jan/1295.html> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

²⁷⁵ Gupte, Pranay. "An Empowered Middle East – Part I." Jan 10, 2008. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10174> (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

²⁷⁶ "Iran-Saudi Trade Could Reach \$1 Billion End of 2008." Feb 26, 2008. <http://memrieconomicblog.org/bin/content.cgi?news=1299> (accessed Feb 20, 2009).

press the UAE introduced more export control laws against Iran.²⁷⁷ The UAE serves as a re-exporting hub for Iranian goods coming into GCC countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia does not allow the direct import of certain goods, but accepts them if they go through the UAE first. Several UAE banks closed financial dealings with Iran after receiving some American pressure. Considering the especially close relationship that the US has with the UAE, it may be fruitful to push the Emirates especially for further financial and economic limitations.

In conjunction with continued efforts towards economically isolating Iran, the United States should sell nuclear technology to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain through the 123 Agreement. The UAE has agreed that it would not enrich own uranium, and will have vendor nation take spent fuel. The previous Administration has also made similar agreements in early 2008 with the Saudi and Bahraini government to provide support for nuclear technology in exchange for commitments to non-proliferation.²⁷⁸ We can use these agreements as an example that the US is not against other countries acquiring nuclear capabilities through lawful and safe circumstances. Saudi statements have also indicated that they are willing to use their peaceful nuclear programs to punctuate their calls for Iran to follow IAEA regulations.²⁷⁹

Several high-profile meetings between GCC officials and Iranian counterparts have underscored that the United States does not have the leverage necessary to convince GCC states to keep Iran economically or politically isolated. To have the GCC countries' cooperation, the United States should lead a meeting with Iran that involves the GCC governments. First, the GCC countries already have established diplomatic channels with Iran. As the US pushed for tougher economic sanctions and the political isolation of Iran, the GCC states were active in efforts to engage Tehran. For instance, President Ahmadenijad of Iran made a landmark appearance, where he delivered the opening

²⁷⁷ Henderson, Simon. "Unwanted Guest: The Gulf Summit and Iran." Dec 7, 2007. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2691> (accessed Feb 19, 2009).

²⁷⁸ United States Supports Saudi Arabian Civil Nuclear Program <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080516160353idybeekcm0.3394586.html>

²⁷⁹ Saudi defends Gulf Arab atom plans, criticizes Iran <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0521283720070305>

speech on the first day of the 2007 GCC summit in Doha, Qatar. Not only did Ahmadinejad become the first Iranian head of state to speak at a GCC summit, the same month he became the first Iranian head of state to be invited and perform the Hajj in Saudi Arabia.²⁸⁰ In 2007, the Iranian Shura Council head Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel met with the Kuwaiti National Assembly Speaker Jassem al-Kharafi, where al-Kharafi made the statement, "Kuwait and its people are keen to have the best relations with Iran and its people. Although these instances may largely be symbolic gestures, they are significant considering the GCC countries are still apprehensive of Tehran, as well as the relationship these three nations have with the United States. Secondly, the GCC countries are afraid that bilateral US-Iranian meetings would sell the GCC's interests short. Meaning, they are afraid that the US will willingly provide too many concessions to Tehran. This would mean that the GCC would be most receptive of a multilateral format for diplomatic engagement of Iran.

There will be disagreements regarding the red-line of Iran's nuclear development, however. The United States has successfully raised three UNSC economic sanctions on Iran for enriching uranium outside of IAEA regulations. The GCC countries on the other hand have made various statements to the effect that they do not condemn what they perceive as Iran's peaceful nuclear program. If we are to focus on bringing Iran back to IAEA regulations, that would require the US to convince GCC countries to condemn Iran's current program. For instance, at a GCC winter summit in Riyadh, the final communiqué called for Iran to join GCC states to make the region safe from nuclear accidents. The leaders expressed serious concerns over Tehran's nuclear program and called on Iran to provide guarantees against "any radioactive leakage."²⁸¹ However, the GCC's rather moderate approach in demanding the accountability of the Iranian program may have been affected by the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Mousa. It has been

²⁸⁰ Iranians hope Ahmadinejad hajj will help Arab ties Dec 20, 2007

<http://afp.google.com/article/ALEqM5iN4qVW4CTNTToVdVroXL2KcFT04wA> Retrieved 1-29-09

²⁸¹ "Goliath: UAE - GCC Rulers' Meeting and Iran Nuclear Issue." Dec 26, 2005. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-5353495/UAE-GCC-Rulers-Meeting-Iran.html (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

purported that his personal connections had dampened the GCC's communiqué. Secretary-General Mousa had frustrated GCC leaders by meddling with the GCC summit to highlight Israel's nuclear capabilities rather than Iran's.²⁸² However, more recently, Secretary-General Mousa has called for Arab-Iranian dialogue concerning Iran's nuclear program, among other regional issues.²⁸³ This could indicate a more unified position that Iran's nuclear capability is more pressing than Israel's.

The United States should not undergo a preventative strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The impact of a vowed Iranian retaliation on our allies, and its pledge that it will disrupt traffic going through the Strait of Hormuz, should be taken seriously. If Iran continues to rebuild its nuclear capabilities, the US will need to confront an emboldened Iran with less regional support. Although the economic sanctions on Iran has not stopped Iranian uranium enrichment, it is putting a squeeze on the Iranian economy. We have had some success in pressuring our allies to raise sanctions as well. Finally, the United States should engage Iran in a regional format with our allies of the GCC. Our allies fear that the US may sell them short will almost guarantee that they would attend such a meeting with Iran. However, our allies have not explicitly condemned Iran's enrichment of uranium outside of IAEA regulations. This means they will likely be most cooperative with calling Iran to join safety regulations rather than stopping enrichment. This also means the GCC will be more likely to be helpful in negotiating a no-first-use agreement, if Iran was to acquire nuclear weapons.

Regional Cooperation over Iraq

This section will first present opportunities and problems that the US will face in finding greater support from GCC states to rebuild Iraq and also to discuss with Iran concerns over Iraqi on regional stability. As the United States prepares for its gradual

²⁸² Henderson, Simon. "The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Elephant in the Gulf: Arab States and Iran's Nuclear Program." Dec 21, 2005.<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2424> (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

²⁸³ "International Herald Tribune Arab League chief urges talks with Iran." Dec 23, 2008.<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/23/news/ML-Arabs-Iran.php> (accessed Feb 5, 2009).

withdrawal of combat brigades from Iraq, the United States needs mainly three things from our GCC allies.

The United States wants the GCC countries to: 1) provide more aid and investment for the reconstruction of Iraq, 2) extend greater diplomatic and political support so that Iran is not the only option for a regional partner, and 3) participate in regional dialogue to reach an understanding of mutual-interest in Iraq.

Iraq has the third largest oil reserve, following Saudi Arabia and Canada. The revenues of production and export would prove a boon to the reconstruction of Iraq. Iranian investment is encouraging in that these are reasons for Tehran to limit its support of violent destabilizing actors, such as the Mahdi Army. For instance, in 2005 a \$1 billion credit line was extended to Iraq. Some of this funding was used to build roads in Kurdistan, an airport in Najaf to accommodate the more than 20,000 Iranian pilgrims that each month visit the Imam Ali Shrine. Iran has also made agreements with Baghdad to commit further aid to transportation and energy links agreements in 2005. As part of this agreement there has been established a free-trade zone in Basra, where Iraq is buying electricity from Iran. Recent trade relations have made Iraq the 2nd largest non-oil export market for Iran, with over \$2 billion worth of goods bought in 2007. During a trip to Iran August 2007, president Maliki received that Iran's pledges to curb aid to Shi'a militias. As well as further energy agreements with a Basra-Abadan (Iran) pipeline. The United States could use these reconstruction efforts to highlight that this is one area in which there is congruent interests with Iran.

We could expect for Iran's support for militias to be drawn further down with better relations. The Iranians support for the insurgents was a security measure. Iraq was invaded with the intention of creating a pro-American model democracy in the Middle East. Furthermore, attendant with the goal of democratization was the refutation of containment. The Administration made clear that regime change was a possibility for Tehran as well. Therefore, it was in Iran's favor to foment Shi'a insurrections to assure Iraq does not become a strong democracy capable of being aimed at Iran by the United

States. To make an analogy, Iraq is Iran's "Dagger in the hands of the enemy." However, the complete disintegration of the Iraq as a country is also not in Iran's favor, especially now that there is a Shi'a lead government friendly to Iran.

It is a suspicion held by our Gulf allies that Iranian influence with Shi'a populations and politicians is simply preparing to assert dominance over Iraq. However it should not be assumed that these inroads are necessarily leading to an Iraq that is under Iran's thumb. The fact that Iraq is a Shi'a majority nation does not indicate that Iran has the ability to include Iraq into the Iranian fold based on religious lines. Firstly, for instance, Iraq is the historical center for Shi'a theology. It is possible that Najaf may return as primary Shi'a theological center, instead of Qom, Iran. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Shi'a theological center had fled from Najaf to Qom under persecution by Saddam Hussein's government. With a Shi'a led government in Baghdad, the scholars may return to the historic hub now that it is safe for them. Second, Baghdad also finds problematic the Iranian breach of Iraqi sovereignty during shelling of Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), Iranian Kurdish separatist organization. Although Iraq enjoys friendly relations with Iran, its still precarious state will be wary of external forces that tries its sovereignty and risks instability. Thirdly, the recent elections showed a decreased preference for religious political affiliations. Additionally, even during the Iran-Iraq war, most Shi'a were loyal to Iraq. Therefore, the argument that the religious supremacy of Tehran creating a subservient Iraq is not a necessity.

The rapprochement between Iran and Iraq should be understood more as a matter of security. The two countries fought a devastating war, launched by Saddam Hussein, from 1980-1988. Even after Iran was reeling from the destruction of an eight year conflict, and Iraq was constrained by international sanctions during the 1990s, both states hedged against each other's military threats. Now that there is the Shi'a majority to serve as a commonality, the two countries can try to avoid the burden of being enemies. Therefore, it is beneficial for Baghdad to enjoy friendly relations with Iran, and vice-versa. At the same time, Iraq needs friendly relations with the other Gulf countries in the

GCC. Considering the historical animosities that underline Iraq's relationships in the Gulf, Baghdad does not want to be presented as an Iranian pawn. It cannot afford to lack regional support, let alone be isolated from the Gulf. For the same reasons raised earlier, the United States military presence in Iraq cannot remain as the primary guarantor of the balance of power. The United States needs to look to the trend of diplomatic engagement by Gulf region states as the basis of a regionally endogenous balance of power.

Although the GCC countries have been extending economic and diplomatic relations, there is more progress to be made to incorporate Iraq. The primary reason for the difficulty in reintegrating Iraq into the regional order is the differing interests that our GCC allies have in Iraq. For example, Saudi Arabia had played a key role in US policy to maintain stability in the region, especially since the first Gulf War until the 2003 Iraq War. As Riyadh finds itself in a dilemma of balancing the necessity of a US security presence and growing public dissatisfaction with relations to the US, the toppling of Saddam Hussein also presented challenges to the relationship. The containment of Iraq had been a major common interest between the two countries, however, with the Ba'athist threat from the north destroyed, there will be some incongruity with US interests in Iraq. Firstly, historical animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iraq will continue to persist. Secondly, the United States interest in a democratically elected government in Iraq will not be favored. This comes from the third point of apprehension towards a Shi'a led government. Because the majority of the Iraqi population Shi'a, Riyadh feels elections would greatly diminish the Sunna political voice that it prefers. Saudi Arabia is taking steps to curb conservative, violent Wahhabi ideologies to help avoid additional Sunna militants from entering the sectarian fray in Iraq. Recently, Saudi Arabia has been running more reeducation camps to wean terrorists from violent ideologies. Despite the efforts and intentions on Riyadh's part to help the US effort in stabilizing Iraq, the government faces continued pressure from public opinion to its bilateral relationship with the US. This will not halt Saudi support, but it will decrease Riyadh's willingness and ability to do so.

Saudi reluctance to offer greater support to Iraq can be seen in several cases:

- The 2005 Saudi pledge of \$1 billion for reconstruction was mainly a “renewed” commitment made the year previous.
- \$300 million in humanitarian aid has been given, diplomatic relations are still forthcoming
- Saudi Arabia has “pledged” to write off large portions of debt accrued by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, but it seems Riyadh is using the promise to leverage Iraq, rather than gain goodwill from Iraq through action.
- Although not as problematic as the Syrian-Iraqi border, the Iraqi-Saudi border is still porous
- King Abdullah’s personal ties to Syria could be used to have Damascus implement better control over their border

Despite these difficulties, Saudi Arabia and the US share common interests in a stable Iraqi state. The immediate interests in a cohesive state that is not dominated by Iran should be the most prominent area of discussion with Riyadh.

Kuwait has been the most supportive of US security efforts in the Gulf. Because it shares a border with Iraq, Kuwait has a keen interest in curbing the geographical spillover of sectarian violence as well as concern over increasing Iranian influence over Baghdad. The two countries share a close relationship since the US leadership role in liberating Kuwait in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Kuwait hosts at least 20,000 military personnel.²⁸⁴ Kuwait also provides substantial subsidies for oil and gasoline for the US military. Furthermore, Kuwaiti support was awarded in 2004 with “major non-NATO ally status. Kuwait has also been helpful in curbing the influx of Sunni extremists into Iraq by exerting more control over extremist clerics, as well as putting to trial clerics who have tried to foment extremist ideologies in Kuwaiti and Egyptian youth. Kuwait is also the most active contributor to the rebuilding of Iraq. Private business is aggressively

²⁸⁴ Alterman, Jon B.. "Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear." United Institute of Peace Special Report 189, no. (2007)p. 5

promoting investment, while the government has created a \$1 billion fund to invest in Iraq. They have provided \$450 million in humanitarian aid and has pledged an additional \$500 million. Along with provisions for fuel, Kuwait has also helped to train Iraqi oil workers on its own facilities. However, Kuwait is limited in its ability to provide further aid due to lingering historical animosity towards Iraq, as well as a relatively small private sector that can invest. Although it has promised to write-off \$25 billion debt owed by Iraq, it has lagged in its commitment, most likely to gain more energy concessions and finalization of prisoner exchanges from 1990.

Qatar is another GCC state that has strongly supported the US presence in the region, yet presents pertinent obstacles to building regional cooperation over Iraq. The forward headquarters of the US Central Command, as well as the Combined Air Operations Center are both located in Qatar. As the US presence in Saudi Arabia became increasingly controversial in the late 1990s, Qatar immediately took the initiative to build permanent basing for troops and pre-positioning facilities for tanks and armored personnel carriers. It has also pledged \$100 million in aid to Iraq and hosted International Reconstruction Fund Facility donors conference in 2004. It has also provided \$5 million commitments to all for UN-World Bank reconstruction funds. However, Qatar's connection to Iraqi Ba'athists presents a problem for political support for Baghdad. There are indications that former high-level officials of Ba'athist Iraq play influential roles in education and politics. For instance, Riad al-Qaysi, a former Iraqi Foreign Ministry official was part of the Qatari delegation to the December 2005 GCC summit.

Secondly, Qatar is also home to several Sunni conservative elements that aggressively push for greater Sunni political voice in Iraq, some even calling for Sunni "resistance" in Iraq.²⁸⁵ The prominence of this Sunna element in Qatar is problematic for the efforts to curtail sectarian violence. Furthermore, Qatar, unlike Saudi Arabia, is safe from the possibility of sectarian conflict spilling into its territory. While it is host to a

²⁸⁵ Alterman, Jon B.. "Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear." United Institute of Peace Special Report 189, no. (2007). P. 9

sizable troop presence as well as important command centers, Al-Jazeera provides the Qatari government with a level of regional legitimacy that Saudi Arabia is losing. Qatar assessment of threat from Tehran is low, as evidenced by Qatar casting the sole dissenting vote against calls on Iran to halt nuclear enrichment by the UN Security Council in 2006. This can be partially explained by the fact that Qatar shares an oil field with considerable reserves with Iran. They find an economic interest in good political relations with Tehran.

The United Arab Emirates is yet another state that the United States has cooperated with in the region. Yet here too interests concerning Iraq diverge. The United Arab Emirates primary threat is Iran. Most prominently the ongoing Three Islands dispute is of prominence. They are also wary of a Shi'a led Iraq in concert with Iran. United States continues to be the primary provider of security and arms sales. Although military cooperation is not visually prominent, the US-UAE intelligence cooperation is supposedly very close. Furthermore, Dubai is the busiest foreign port of call for US Navy ships.²⁸⁶ However, the UAE finds interests in steady relationship with Tehran. First, there is a very large population of Iranians living in Dubai. Second, Iranian is a major investor in the UAE. Third, the emirates that make the UAE also see divergent interests. While Dubai favors commercial links to Tehran, Abu Dhabi is also concerned with maintaining close security relations with the US.

The common reasons for GCC reluctance to extend more substantial support can be identified as such:

- Apprehension towards an Iraqi government that is perceived as too closely aligned to Tehran.
- Hesitation of supporting a Shi'a led government in Iraq due to fears of public dissatisfaction.
- Historical animosity towards Iraq.

²⁸⁶ Alterman, Jon B.. "Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear." United Institute of Peace Special Report 189, no. (2007). P. 10

- The possibility of a hostile Iraq in the future.
- Differing threat assessments of Iraq and Iran.
- The persistent dilemma of reliance on US security and growing public discontent over the US military presence.
- Fear of US-Iranian rapprochement selling the GCC short.

The above shows that even the GCC states most helpful to the American war effort have varying interests in Iraq, as well as in relation to Iran. Not only would it be difficult to gather their support in blatantly opposing Iranian influence in Iraq, it threatens to exacerbate divisions along sectarian lines. It is easy to imagine that the last few years of progress in building the peace in Iraq would be torn asunder if situations lead to power grappling between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These states are the two largest, most powerful Gulf countries. If they were to wrestle over Iraq the conflict would certainly take on the historical dichotomies of Arab-Persian/Sunni-Shi'a. Although it is not a forgone conclusion, heightened tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Iraq may lead to respective supporting of Sunni and Shi'a militias. Saudi Arabia has been censoring clerics, patrolling the Iraqi border, as well as reeducating captured insurgents in a concerted effort to curb the rate of individuals joining terrorist organizations or insurgencies in Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia's moderation in pushing for more Sunni minority political voice, and its lack of support for violent Sunni groups have been helpful to build Iraqi peace.²⁸⁷ It is not suggested that the United States pushes our allies to provide greater support for the Sunni minority to seek a voice with violent means rather than through politics

The United States should instead favor the ongoing regional dialogue and the possibility of a future organization comprised of Gulf region states, including Iran. Firstly, the United States should resume high-level talks in with Iran within this regional format. The United States had begun talks with Iran in Iraq through an offshoot of the Expanded Neighbors Conference that had been held in Baghdad in March 2007, Egypt in

²⁸⁷ Religious Strife Is Pushing Iraq towards Civil War
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,404503,00.html>

May 2007, and Kuwait of April 2008. US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker led the bilateral meeting with Iranian Ambassador Kazemi-Qomi in May 2007. However, talks were postponed when the US insisted on meeting Iran through a working-group established in a prior meeting, rather than talks at the higher ambassadorial level. In May 2008, Iran indefinitely stopped the working group as well, citing US inflicting casualties in Sadr City. The US offering to renew high-level meetings may be interpreted as a concession. In order to bring Iran back to the table and also to demonstrate Washington's renewed commitment to regional diplomacy, the US should offer to hold talks at the ambassadorial level or higher. Secondly, the United States should continue attend ongoing regional meetings on Iraq such as the UN-Iraq International Compact launched jointly on November 27 2007. This is an international effort to secure monetary and humanitarian assistance packages for Iraq. It also calls for creditor states of Iraq to extend debt relief to the rebuilding nation. Another regional meeting format that the US needs to continue to attend is the Expanded Neighbors conference that met first in Riyadh April 18 2003, again in Istanbul November 2007, and for a third time at Kuwait April 22 2008. Iraq's Arab neighbors, as well as Turkey, Iran, and the five permanent members of the UNSC attend to discuss ways in which to decrease sectarian violence and reconstruct Iraqi infrastructure. Endorsing track-two conferences would also be of use to build more regular meetings between the neighbors, such as the Marmara conferences held by the United States Institute for Peace in March 21-23 2007.

Regularly held regional meetings can be looked upon to be the fundamental step towards finding agreement to regional stability. Continuing to dispatch high-level officials to regional meetings that include Iran could increase Tehran's sense of security. The United States should signal to Iran that its demonstrated interest in rebuilding Iraq is valued by the United States and the region. If Iranian interests are involved in the discussion concerning the reconstruction of Iraq and its political and economic reintegration into the Middle East, their perception that the United States is trying to confound all Iranian intentions in the region can be refuted. This is not meant to condone

Iran's support of Shi'a militias in Iraq. Furthermore, this would not produce a groundbreaking change. If successful, however small, this would be a positive effort that could elicit less hostile behavior on the part of Iran.

Although an all-encompassing regional organization would be preferred, as a first step the United States could particularly take up the initiative in organizing regional agreement for Iraq's refugee problem. A January 2008 report by the Migration Policy Institute, states that there were close to 4.5 million displaced Iraqis (2.2 refugees and 2.3 internally displaced).²⁸⁸ This is an issue that impacts, quite negatively, Iraq's neighbors, giving incentive for them to find a solution. The meetings are intended to do several key things for Iraq and the region. Firstly, this would bring Iraqi neighbors together to discuss how to care for and arrange the return of the displaced. Secondly, this will call on the participating nations to stop arming militias and curb the risk of renewed fighting to avoid another refugee crisis. If Iraq's neighbors seriously approached the negotiations for responsibility in easing displacement, they would also necessarily have a stake in maintaining the peace of Iraqi neighborhoods.

The problem of managing the return and care of Iraqi displaced peoples threatens the stability of the region. Countries with large unwanted refugee populations like Syria and Jordan are stretched thin.²⁸⁹ Since the change in US strategy began to focus on community peace rather than terrorist hunting, the refugee crisis has not become worse.²⁹⁰ However, it is in the interest of Syria to provide support to the improvement of peace in Iraq. This is because Syria is facing a heavy and unwelcome burden of a large Iraqi population displaced by neighborhood violence in Iraq. In order to better ensure that Syria will not have to deal with a second refugee crisis in the future, it would be in

²⁸⁸ Bruno, Andorra, Rhoda Margesson, and Jeremy M. Sharp. CRS Report for Congress. *Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008. P. 1

²⁸⁹ Bruno, Andorra, Rhoda Margesson, and Jeremy M. Sharp. CRS Report for Congress. *Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008. P. 7

²⁹⁰ Bruno, Andorra, Rhoda Margesson, and Jeremy M. Sharp. CRS Report for Congress. *Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008. P.1

Syria's interest to better patrol the borders in order to curb the flow of militants and arms into Iraq. It is imperative that Syria perceives its own and Iran's support for militants a potential danger to itself. Likewise the solution must also have the cooperation of Iran. These meetings can test Iran's commitment to the well-being. Iran's has interest in an economically rebuilt Iraq that is suitable for greater trade relations. A large portion of the refugees are Iraq's middle-class professionals, being the least sectarian elements in Iraqi society, fled their homes to avoid the sectarian conflict as well as the threat of kidnapping. Therefore, if Iran is seeking to create profitable economic relations with Iraq in the future, it is in their interest to bring the professional class back into Iraq. This, again, means that Iran too will need to stop supply sectarian militias, once under the bankroll of Tehran to slow the American military progress. Iraqi government officials that enjoy close relations with Tehran have also become more vocal in calling on Iran to stop its support of Shi'a militias.²⁹¹ These are some reasons as to why Syria and Iran, both having played adversarial and spoiler roles with their support of sectarian violence in the past, may be expected to cooperate with the US and GCC countries in trying to solve the current refugee issue and avoid a second crisis.

It is also in the interest of the GCC states to engage in meetings to agree on responsibilities for the return of refugees and the prevention of a future crisis. The Sunni Arab governments of the Gulf find it in their interest to help the refugee – many of whom are Sunna from western Iraq. Jordan receives aid from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to support poor Iraqi refugees. This aid, also given directly to the government, helps Jordan's own health and education systems. It could be a risk that Jordan may be unwilling to part from this foreign assistance, however, the refugee situation is too

²⁹¹ Ware, Michael. "CNN: Iraqi Leaders Turn Wary of Iran, Petraeus Says." Apr 11, 2008. <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/10/iraq.petraeus/index.html> (accessed Jan 29, 2008).

burdensome to make such aid worth it.²⁹² They currently host nearly 700,000 Iraqi refugees in a country comprised of 6 million citizens.²⁹³

If regional cooperation pays particular attention to the issue of Iraqi refugee, with a successful outcome this could build confidence that cooperation is possible between Iraq's neighbors. The cooperation on solving the current and preventing future refugee requires that Syria and Iran pledge to stop its support of Shi'a militias in Iraq. This is intended to make the Iraqi neighborhoods that are being rebuilt safer for refugees to return.

A regionally conceived, rather than an externally founded effort like UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, is preferable. The United States wants to see a regional framework develop from the nucleus the hopefully successful end to the refugee issue. It is the hope of the United States that further meetings or agreements on other issues are conceived endogenously. Essentially, the United States wants frameworks for cooperation and dialogue between regional states that maintains stability with minimal US military presence.

When the United States redeploys military personnel from Iraq, the hole that we leave must be filled with greater participation by the GCC countries. Last year, GCC secretary general Abdurrahman bin Hammad al-Attiyah responded to Ahmadinejad's 2007 call for a GCC-Iranian security agreement over Iraq.²⁹⁴ The United States should not discourage GCC-Iranian security negotiations for Iraq and the Gulf region. The quicker the region takes greater initiative for stability, the United States can continue to decrease its presence in the region.

A possible risk to the development of a regional security understanding is the need for the United States to maintain a troop presence in other Gulf countries even after the redeployment from Iraq. Especially immediately following the deadline fast approaching

²⁹² Seeley, Nicholas. "Christian Science Monitor: In Jordan, Aid for Iraqi Refugees is often Redirected." Jul 2, 2008.<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0703/p04s02-wome.html> (accessed Feb 15, 2009).

²⁹³ Byman, Daniel L.. "Brookings Institute: Iraqi Refugees Carriers of Conflict." Nov 1, 2006.http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/11iraq_pollack.aspx (accessed Jan 28, 2008).

²⁹⁴ Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. "Asia Times: A Strike Against 'Iranophobia'." Nov 4, 2008.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JK04Ak03.html (accessed Feb 15, 2009).

in 19 months, the United States should have a contingency plan for the stability of Iraq that would include military capability based in Qatar and Kuwait to respond quickly. As described above, our GCC allies rely on our presence for regional security. The momentum for the process of filling the US hole in Iraq may not gain momentum until the US has already redeployed. This would be the most crucial point when the diplomatic and economic participation of our GCC allies is necessary.

Israel and Egypt

The previous administration had hoped that by reviving the Arab-Israeli peace process, Israel and Arab countries would be able to face Iran. However, this strategy cannot be implemented considering Israeli and Palestinian positions are not conducive to the necessary diplomatic breakthrough. A grand reconciliation is an unlikely outcome for the Arab-Israeli conflict in the near future. The United States should take two steps to try and prevent further exacerbation of the tensions following the Gaza incursion. First, the United States should support the Israel-Egyptian bilateral relationship. Second, the United States should try to approach Syria in order to assist the ongoing Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Both of these efforts are intended to better manage the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, while also adding to the stability to the region.

The United States should make sure that Egyptian-Israeli relations do not deteriorate. Egypt and Israel share common interests with the United States regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Firstly, it is Cairo's position that Fatah should play the leadership role in the Palestinian Authority. Although active in attempts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, Egypt's preference is visible as it continues to drum up support for the Palestinian Authority under Abbas in the West Bank. This position is largely consistent with US and Israeli positions. The United States will not deal with Hamas, but Egypt's preference of Mahmoud Abbas is well received. Israel's also, to some extent, supports the West Bank. As evidenced by its announcement on February 23 that jailed Fatah leader Marwan al-Barghouti will be released in two weeks. This can be understood as Israeli Prime Minister Olmert trying to empower President Abbas before the next Israeli government forms.

Secondly, Egypt and Israel share interest in limited traffic between the Sinai and Gaza through the Rafah crossing. The border had been sealed by Egypt when Hamas' victory in legislative elections and after fighting broke out Hamas and Fatah 2007. After the 2008 Breach of the barrier, Egypt was able to peacefully force the Palestinians back into Gaza, and subsequently built a stronger wall. Egypt takes the position that the Rafah crossing would not be opened unless the Palestinian Authority. Although Israel wants the border to remain closed to stem the smuggling of arms into Gaza, they do not want the Palestinian Authority to control the Rafah crossing. They have citing that they are not confident about the security that the PA can provide.

Although there are some differences to Egypt and Israel's positions on the Gaza Strip, this bilateral relationship offers the United States regional allies willing to curb the strength of Gaza. This relationship is of crucial importance to Israel. Though Egypt may not be pressuring Hamas as much as Jerusalem would like, Egypt is taking political risks to cooperate with Israel.

First, Egypt faces growing anti-government sentiments over dissatisfaction with Cairo's ties to Washington and Israel. Egypt's unwillingness to open the Rafah crossing for humanitarian assistance, as well as Cairo's seeming complacency during the Israeli offensive into Gaza, feed to popular dissatisfaction. The recent bombing of a bazaar in Cairo could be a violent expression of this perception. Second, Israel's condemnation that Egypt is not doing its full potential places Cairo in an awkward position. As mentioned above, Cairo's Gaza policy is domestically unpopular, but compatible with that of Israel. However, harsh demands on Cairo from Jerusalem exacerbate the perception that Egypt is a puppet of the West. Thirdly, Egypt feels snubbed by a recent announcement by Prime Minister Olmert that the release of captured IDF soldier Gilad Schalit is a prerequisite for cease-fire negotiations. As Egypt was close to concluding an agreement, this statement came as a surprise to Egypt. There are voices among Israeli government also question the wisdom of embarrassing Egypt. Amos Gilad the Defense Ministry diplomatic-military

bureau chief responsible for negotiations with Egypt made a similar statement.²⁹⁵

Although Gilad was reprimanded for his criticism of the Olmert government, the existence of such opinion among high-level officials could be of help to ease tensions in Egyptian-Israeli cooperation. Restarting negotiations with this condition may demonstrate Egypt's commitment to take a tough stance on Hamas. On the other hand, because Israel had not informed Egypt, the embarrassment it has caused for Egypt may make future cooperation cooler. A tougher stance on Hamas could make Egypt's already unpopular Gaza policy all the more detested.

It is in the interest of the United States for Egypt and Israel to cooperate in Gaza. It is also in the interest of Israel to maintain better relations with Egypt, one of the few countries that diplomatically recognizes and cooperates with Israel. Especially, after the Gaza offensive, the likelihood of an over-encompassing peace settlement is unlikely. However, the Egyptian-Israeli partnership over Gaza is crucial in trying to keep the situation from getting worse. The bilateral partnership both agrees on limiting further rocket attacks. Both in principle want a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. Finally, both parties find interest in the eventuality of a peaceful settlement in Gaza. The United States should take several steps to try and alleviate further tensions that may come between Jerusalem and Cairo.

Provide additional equipment and training to help the Egyptian military better patrol the border. If Egypt was able to more effectively curb the smuggling of arms through the Philedaphi Corridor tunnels, this may help take pressure off of Cairo from Jerusalem. Although, it may be most effective if the Multinational Force & Observers were to assume a larger role in denying tunnel routes for smuggling, Cairo would not agree with greater foreign function in the matter. Therefore, the best alternative is to provide additional material and training to help the Egyptian military better monitor the

²⁹⁵ Keinon, Herb. "The Jerusalem Post: Olmert and Amos Gilad duel on Schalit Policy." Feb 19, 2009.<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304821697&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull> (accessed Feb 20, 2009)

border. Denying Hamas the ability to attack or threaten Israel with rockets and mortars is the first step towards the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations for statehood. Disarming Hamas will not directly change their political behavior towards Israel. However, this would prevent another necessary military response like the 2009 Gaza incursion that would further derail the peace process. Pressure Jerusalem to coordinate more closely with Cairo's role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel. The Egypt has not effectively stopped all smuggling, however, having a cooperative government to the west is an important asset to Israel. The United States government should use its influence with Israel to affect this change in attitude.

Although these two recommendations do not help alleviate the negative regional perception of Egypt, these should help from Israeli-Egyptian relations to sour. It also crucial to help Egypt because the Israeli militaries overwhelming attacks on Hams and Hezbollah do not effectively destroy their leadership or organizational infrastructure. In both cases, victory was claimed by the terrorist organizations simply because the organization survived. The United States should discourage Israel from entering into conflict with these organizations to deal a decisive blow. Failure to accomplish the stated goal serves to bolster Hamas, Hezbollah, and their backers in Tehran and Damascus. While, at the same time, this places domestic pressure on GCC allies that are supportive of a moderate approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Support for Hamas is intended to keep pressure off Iran by keeping Israel occupied with short-term problems, and spoil the Arab-Israeli peace process. By effectively stopping Hamas' capability of derailing the peace process, this would be a step towards shifting more attention to the containment of Iran's problematic behavior.

CONCLUSION

The United States will continue to rely on our GCC allies to help maintain stability in the Middle East. In consideration of the changes to the geopolitical order caused by the

fall of Saddam and subsequent rise in Iranian influence, the US-GCC partnership will have to change accordingly. To conclude and to reiterate the United States should:

- Continue our military partnership with the GCC states: US military presence and strengthening the GCC military capability
- Sell nuclear technology to our allies that are committed to safety and non-proliferation.
- Hold coordinated, multilateral negotiations with the GCC and Tehran
- Demonstrate our commitment to regional responsibility over Iraq
- Promote the return of refugees to Iraq as a central regional issue
- Offer more military support to Egypt, so that Egyptian-Israeli relations will continue to be a positive force for the Arab-Israeli peace process.

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PAKISTAN

Michael Bo-Linn

September 11, 2001 marked a new era in American foreign policy, national security strategy and the reevaluation of power in the global community. In today's world, the United States remains the sole super power, however begins to be confronted by smaller, new powers in the form of militant non-state actors. More and more of these power centers are not nation-states. Regional and global organizations are challenging from above, and militias of violent extremists in the form of terrorist organizations are challenging states from below²⁹⁶. America's vision is being challenged by a transnational violent extremist movement based on radical ideologies involving terroristic, non-traditional warfare with opaque routes to pacific intercourse.

The goal of the United States' national security strategy first and foremost is to protect the Homeland, its citizens and help build a global community where American ideals may peacefully exist. America's vision is

A global community bound by the rule of law where conflicts are engaged through pacific intercourse and accepting of pluralistic societies, sustained by international institutions.

One of the major threats to the United States' world vision, and more threatening in the near future to security of the Homeland is the increasingly volatile state of Pakistan.

Pakistan is a key State in ensuring the goals of the United States' national security strategy because it is the most likely nuclear weapon state, where the transfer of nuclear weapons, or fission material could occur, and it is on the verge of failing.

A failed state of Pakistan would mean a complete collapse of the Pakistani's government ability to rule. There would be a complete loss of the monopoly of power over the Pakistani citizens, and a dismantling of the military structure, leaving a power vacuum left to be filled by a growing extreme Islamist movement.

²⁹⁶ Haass, Richard N. "The age of Nonpolarity." *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008): 44-56. JSTOR. University of Washington, Seattle. 18 Jan. 2009
<<http://file:///Users/studentuser/Desktop/taskforce/The%20Age%20of%20Nonpolarity%20-%20Richard%20N.%20Haass.webarchive>>.

The combination of nuclear material in the control of a terrorist organization or the nuclear state of Pakistan under Islamic extremists control is the greatest threat to the security of the United States and its allies. Although, this is a worst case scenario, “Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban, and enough nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, that there are grounds for real worries,”²⁹⁷.

The existence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan makes preventing the country’s collapse and strengthening the current United States’ trust in Pakistan more important than Afghanistan or Iraq because more is at stake. It is a nuclear weapons state centered among America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and America’s ideological war against Islamic extremists. Pakistan has become the regional entity challenging America’s vision from above, and home of the violent extremists challenging America from below. The United States’ national security goal specific to Pakistan is:

A politically stable State able to effectively contain violent extremism domestically, and able to guarantee the United States’ security expectations regarding material relevant to nuclear weapons.

This is the most realistic achievable goal that has the greatest ability to meet or exceed the United States’ national security objectives. It acknowledges that Pakistan is where the combination of strengthening non-state actor terrorist organizations and unregulated nuclear fission material is greatest.

The following pages will identify and analyze the major threats to the United States’ world vision and America’s goal for Pakistan:

- Nuclear Weapon Security
- Islamic extremist control over Pakistan’s Northwest Territory
- Nuclear weapons under terrorist control
- Growing anti-American sentiment

²⁹⁷Kagan, Frederick W., and Michael O. Hanlon. "Pakistan's Collapse, Our Problem." The New York Times 18 Nov. 2007. The New York Times. 19 Jan. 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html?_r=2&scp=5&sq=pakistan&st=Search>.

It will analyze the conflict in priorities between Pakistan and the United States by identifying Pakistan's security priorities:

- Protecting nuclear weapons from India and/or the United States
- Control of Kashmir
- Prevention of US or Indian control in Afghanistan

Finally it will acknowledge that terrorist organizations, anti-American sentiment and nuclear weapon technology will never be completely eliminated. However America's new national security strategy is the United States' best opportunity to achieve the stated goal.

The latter half will identify and analyze *establishing transparency and an agreement on Pakistan's security priorities and the United States' priorities for Pakistan* as the best strategy to best effectively execute the following means:

- Securing Pakistani nuclear weapons and materials relevant to nuclear programs
- Denying the use of nuclear weapons by extremist organizations
- Securing the Pakistani-Afghani border from arms and drug trade, and migration of terrorists
- Eliminating known Islamic extremist headquarters and training camps
- Strengthening the legitimacy, monopoly of power and ability to provide basic civil services of a civilian Pakistani government
- Improving socioeconomic conditions that breed violent instability

These means will best achieve the responsibilities of securing the Homeland and American citizens. Without Pakistan's active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and work towards eliminating international terrorism.

Threats

Nuclear Weapons Security

First, Pakistan is a nation-state with nuclear weapons with intermediate range ballistic missiles. The United States' first concern is the security of these weapons from potentially being used by a non-state extremist organization against the United States.

Pakistan is estimated to have 30-52 nuclear weapons suspected of being stored, disassembled at six missile and air bases²⁹⁸. A nuclear reactor facility is located in Joharabad, and a uranium enrichment facility with possible plutonium producing capabilities is located in Kahuta, a northern Pakistan city.

Pakistan's delivery systems include ballistic missiles, and F16s. Their ballistic missiles have a range 100km to 4500km. Shaheen III is Pakistan's largest intermediate range ballistic missile capable of a nuclear payload. It is originally based on Shaheen I, a single stage solid fuel missile thought to be reversed engineered from the Chinese M-9 missile²⁹⁹.

Pakistan began its nuclear ambitions in the 1960's, admitted to the technology in the 1980s and conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. Its nuclear ambitions are widely considered India-centric, a counter balance to India's own nuclear capabilities. Pakistan's government had previously stated they were in support of nuclear arms treaties, but have never ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

It is a near impossibility that Pakistan will give up their nuclear weapons, or that the United States will be able to completely denuclearize the state without a colossal military operation. Therefore, the largest concern for the United States regarding Pakistan's nuclear weapons is their ability to safely prevent the transfer or use of any material relevant to nuclear weapons to a radical violent non-state organization.

²⁹⁸ Wood, David. "Can Pakistan Keep Lid on Nukes?" The Seattle Times 8 April. 2006

²⁹⁹ Friedman, Ben. "Pakistan Nuclear Delivery System." June 2002. Center for Defense Information. University of Washington, Seattle. 5 Jan. 2009
<<http://http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/panukes.html>>

However, Khalid Kidwai, a member of Pakistan's Nuclear Command Authority, a group that includes the prime minister, military officials and elected politicians³⁰⁰ insists that there is no threat of such a situation. He cites the "personal-reliability program" he created as an efficient screening process. It "monitors nuclear employees' private bank accounts, foreign trips and meetings with anyone who might be extremists." In addition, Kidwai insists that they have a nuclear arming security system of its own, similar to America's "permissive action links;" (PAL) codes and computer hardware that authorize only a select few to arm and detonate a nuclear weapon just as effective as the Americans'.

Yet, he admits there are roughly 70,000 people who work in the nuclear complex in Pakistan, including 7,000 to 8,000 scientists and the 2,000 or so with "critical knowledge."³⁰¹ There is also doubt in Pakistan's "PALs" system. Under US law, Washington cannot transfer "PALs" technology to the Pakistanis, even though it is nuclear technology to make their weapons safer, because the country is a rogue nuclear state³⁰².

Pakistan defects the United States' insistence to improve their nuclear security as hypocritical. They reference the United States' 2007 incident where nuclear weapons were unaccounted for 36 hours as need for the United States to improve itself, as well as criticize the storage of hundreds of US nuclear weapons completely assembled. Kidwai informs that if Pakistan is able to create successful technology to nuclear weapons and launch mechanisms, then of course Pakistan is able to create technology to securely safeguard those weapons.

³⁰⁰ Rubin, Trudy. "How Safe are Pakistan's Nukes? – The Bottom Line is: There is no Way to Know" Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 9 Dec.

³⁰¹ Sanger, David E. "Obama's Worst Nightmare - What to do About Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal." The New York Times 8 Jan. 2009. 4 Feb. 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html?pagewanted=1&sq=obama%20pakistan&st=Search&scp=3>>.

³⁰² Sanger, David E. "Obama's Worst Pakistan Nightmare." The New York Times Magazine 8 Jan. 2009. The New York Times. 20 Jan. 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=obama%20pakistan&st=Search&scp=3>.

However the United States' debate to the Pakistani's is not American doubt in the country's effort or current ability to secure their nuclear weapons, but the likelihood of a breach in security is far too great. The United States' concern with Pakistan's nuclear security is a breach or compromise in security by rogue scientists or military officials. To the United States, this chance increases with the increase of extremist organizations and anti-American sentiment in the country.

Concerns of Security

A breach in control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons could happen in two ways. The country collapses and the power vacuum controlling the weapons is filled by violent extremists. Or a rogue military official or scientist, sentimental to violent extremists in the region transfers sensitive material to the extremist organization. According to reports in the former Bush administration, "foreign-trained Pakistani scientists, including some suspected of harboring sympathy for radical Islamic causes, were returning to Pakistan to seek jobs within the country's nuclear infrastructure"³⁰³. In addition, increasing diffusion of modern technology has made detecting illicit materials and technologies relevant to nuclear weapons harder to track³⁰⁴.

Most recently, Pakistan freed Abdul Qadeer Khan from house arrest. Gordon Duguid, acting Deputy State Department spokesman said, "We [the United States] believe A.Q. Khan remains a serious proliferation risk..."³⁰⁵ He is the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and regarded as a national hero. According to two decades of American intelligence and his own admittance, he is responsible for selling nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran³⁰⁶.

A compromise in security could come within the government itself. The United States' is most concerned with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).

³⁰³ Reference endnote vi. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html?pagewanted=5&_r=1&sq=obama%20pakistan&st=Search&scp=3

³⁰⁴ Deutch, J. 1996. "Fighting Foreign Terrorism: The Integrated Efforts of the Law Enforcement Community". *VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY*. 62 (24): 738-740. [Worldcat](#) University of Washington Feb. 12, 2009

³⁰⁵ Masood, Salman. "Pakistan Lifts Restrictions on Nuclear Scientist." *The New York Times* 6 Feb. 2009. 6 Feb. 2009 <file:///Users/studentuser/Desktop/taskforce/AQ%20khan%20released.webarchive>

³⁰⁶ Masood, Salman. "Pakistan Lifts Restrictions on Nuclear Scientist." *The New York Times* 6 Feb. 2009. 6 Feb. 2009 <file:///Users/studentuser/Desktop/taskforce/AQ%20khan%20released.webarchive>

The ISI was formed under General Zia ul Haq and is considered an equivalent to the US CIA. However it is regarded more as a “shadow government” with relations to Islamic terrorists³⁰⁷ like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JED). Under General Zia, and its cooperation with the CIA in the 1980s, Pakistan’s ISI increased its domestic power leading to, “independence not equaled by any other branch of the armed forces, nor subject to constraint imposed by the president³⁰⁸”.

ISI’s relationship with terrorist organizations continued in the 1990’s employing them to act as militant groups against India in Kashmir. Since then, ISI’s support of terrorist organizational activities has extended into Afghanistan and India.

Following September 11, 2001, American and Pakistani officials acknowledged the ISI’s ties to al Qa’ida³⁰⁹, and in 2002 revealed 128 ISI sponsored training camps for militants that train a thousand members of LeT and JED in northwest Pakistan. American spy agencies have documented regular meetings between the ISI and Lashkar operatives since 2002 where information concerning Indian operations in Kashmir were shared.

Most recent of evidence linking the ISI to terrorist organizations, and aid to terrorism were the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, and a December 2007 meeting between former President Bush, and Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani. In an effort to show the Bush administration Pakistan’s control over the ISI, Mr. Gilani confidently informed President Bush of a recent raid on a terrorist affiliated madrassa. However, unknown to Mr. Gilani, the Bush administration’s National Security intelligence already knew about the raid, and discovered the madrassa was warned prior by the government.

³⁰⁷ "Inter Service Intelligence." Time Topics-Organization. 14 Jan. 2008. The New York Times. 6 Dec. 2008 <http://http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interservices_intelligence/index.html?inlinen=nyt-org>.

³⁰⁸ Roberts, Mark J. "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" Joint Forces Quarterly (2008): 104-10. Joint Forces Quarterly. Jan. 2008. Join Forces Quarterly. Feb. 2009 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i48/25.pdf>.

³⁰⁹ Schmitt, Eric, and Mark Mazzatti. "Pakistan's Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Seige." The New York Times 7 Dec. 2008. The New York Times. 7 Dec. 2008. 7 Dec. 2008 <<http://http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/world/asia/08terror.html?ref=todayspaper>>.

Third, a weakness in Pakistan's nuclear security is the vulnerability of the weapons when transported. Some American government officials believe terrorist attacks on India may be intended to provoke the movement of nuclear material in Pakistan making it easier to acquire for a violent extremist organization. Although Pakistan stores its nuclear weapons disassembled, a terrorist attack on India could instigate Indian counter attacks, which could then prompt the assembling of, and transfer of nuclear weapons.

These breaches in nuclear security are of growing concern because of the growing instability in the region and the growing power of Islamic extremist organizations. The rise and headquarters of these terrorist organizations are located in northwest Pakistan. America's most pressing current security threat, greatest hindrance to success in Afghanistan, and best strategy to avoid the collapse of Pakistan if dissolved is the terrorist organizations based in Northwest Pakistan.

Pakistan's Northwest Frontier

The second of great threats to the United States relevant to the ultimate catastrophe of a terrorist organization controlling nuclear weapons is the very fact that terrorist organizations are headquartered and operate effectively in Pakistan. The presence of these sub-state actors increase tensions between Pakistan and India, complicate American efforts in Afghanistan, and weaken the legitimacy of Pakistan's civilian government.

According to the CIA, "these groups are part of a loose association of politically committed, mixed nationality Islamic militants, apparently motivated by revenge, religious fervor, and a general hatred for the West." Pakistan has lost control of these groups in the northwestern part of its country, and they are responsible for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.

In 2002, The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the "United Action Forum" a Pakistani political party representing six Islamic parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, (JUI) won control over the Northwest Frontier Province and the Baluchistan Province.

Both border Afghanistan. It believes in implementing Islamic law (Shariah), the creation of an Islamic theocratic state, are anti-American and pro-Taliban.

Major cities like Peshwar in the Northwest Territory, and Quetta, the capital of the Baluchistan province, have seen increased rule by the Taliban since 2002. In both cities, the Taliban and sympathizers hold pockets of power in and around the cities. They hide in Afghan refugee camps, or in the cities' neighborhoods. Leaders hide in the mountainous outskirts where they are hard to locate, identify and kill. These leaders like, Mullah Muhammad Omar direct Taliban commanders, receive capital and deliver guns and soldiers to the cities or battlefronts. The majority of these soldiers are knowingly being trained and housed in camps or in madrassas across the region.

The Taliban and similar groups are responsible for the continued insurgencies along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. They traffic communication, weapons and supplies to guerrilla militants that kill American and allied forces.

A recent example of their control is increased violence in the area. Since 2007, suicide bombings, bomb explosions or missile attacks have averaged more than one incident per week. At the end of January 2009 in Peshawar, an American United Nations official was kidnapped, and his driver killed.

Even the Pakistani government has conceded, and indirectly acknowledged the Taliban's control over the region. On February 15, 2009 the Pakistani government and the Taliban agreed on a ten- day cease-fire in the Swat Valley of the Northwest Frontier Province. Militants agreed to the cease-fire after government concession to allow the imposition of Islamic law in the region³¹⁰. This comes after over the past few months, 12,000 Pakistani soldiers have lost ground to only 3,000 Taliban militants.

Agreements as above have been brokered before but to no permanent success. This goes against the United States' stance not to negotiate with the Taliban, and its urge that Pakistan fight more aggressively against such organizations.

³¹⁰ Khan, Ismail. "Pakistan and Taliban Appear Near Deal." The New York Times 15 Feb. 2009. The New York Times. 15 Feb. 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/world/asia/16pstan.html?ref=world>>.

The factors responsible for the increased instability in Pakistan's Northwest region, and the civil government's inability to effectively maintain power over the population are a deep culmination of social, political and monetary issues.

One of those issues and a cornerstone in accomplishing the United States' goals in Pakistan, but further increasing the success of America's overall security strategy is overcoming growing anti-American sentiment.

Anti-American Sentiment

Growing anti-American sentiment is the umbrella source of several destructive factors to the war in Afghanistan and accomplishing stability in Pakistan. It can attribute itself to the loss of control in Northwest Pakistan, the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani army in the fight against terrorist organizations, and the lack of transparency of Pakistan's nuclear program.

Much of the rise in American anti-sentiment has occurred following the United States' invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and under the leadership of pro-American General Musharoff, the former president of Pakistan. It has grown within the Pakistani military, been encouraged through Pakistan's madrassas, and is a consequence of actions taken by the United States.

Three major sources of anti-American sentiment specific to Pakistan are the increased airstrikes on Pakistan by American military drones, the Indo-US nuclear deal, and the credibility gap under former President General Musharoff. *These factors are also representative to the conflict in priorities between the Pakistan government and the United States that will later be discussed as the crux of the American problem in Pakistan.*

The American airstrikes by unmanned drones in the Northwest region of Pakistan have increased anti-American sentiment because they have resulted in collateral damage involving innocent civilians. According to Farhatullah Babar, spokesman for President Zardari, although American airstrikes have killed some key al-Qaeda operatives, the proportion of killed civilians, they have made the Pakistani population become,

“galvanized and become sympathetic to militants”³¹¹. Unilateral airstrikes by the United States is interpreted as a disregard for Pakistani sovereignty, and lack of participation allowed by the United States to the Pakistani government and army regarding their national security.

Second is the United States’ recent nuclear deal with India. The deal will provide US assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program, and increased cooperation in satellite technology in exchange for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and increased effort to ratifying the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)³¹². This deal is unique in that it violates the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ends a thirty -year moratorium on nuclear trade with India.

Pakistan is obviously upset because it has not received a similar deal on nuclear energy from Washington. India is Pakistan’s sworn enemy, and such a deal is interpreted as US favoritism toward India. Any deal with India is cause for concern in Pakistan, but a nuclear deal is catastrophic.

Third, the Pakistani government’s credibility gap created under General Musharoff is a source of anti-American sentiment because it is associated with pro-American government policy. In the last years of General Musharoff’s presidency, his administration was viewed as a puppet government to American foreign policy. The relationship is perceived by the Pakistani population as the source of the Musharoff government’s inability to provide basic social services, and stimulate an economy despite billions of dollars in foreign aid.

In the past two decades Pakistan has been unable to provide basic social services like education, healthcare, sanitation and effective law enforcement. A combination of poor leadership, lack of government transparency and widespread corruption has lead to social unrest.

³¹¹ Perlez, Jane. "A Visit to a US Ally, but an Increasingly Wary One." The New York Times 8 Feb. 2009. 8 Feb. 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=1&fta=y>.

³¹² Pan, Esther. "The US-India Nuclear Deal -." Council on Foreign Relations. 2 Oct. 2008. Council on Foreign Relations. 17 Feb. 2009 <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/#9>>.

Organizations like the Taliban and LeT that are able to provide education in the form of madrassas, healthcare and basic aid to victims of natural disasters have begun to delegitimize the civilian government. As a result, they have growing political and ideological support. For example, they use the over 25,000 madrassas in the country that provide education to instill their radical ideologies, train militants, and collect capital from the population³¹³.

These madrassas not only serve as a pulpit against the West, but are also sources of capital for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Madrassas run by groups like Jamaat –ud-Dawah function as charitable organizations. Founded by Haffiz Muhammad Saeed, leader of Lashkar – e – Taiba, the organization responsible for the Mumbai bombings, the Pakistani government legalized its ability to collect donations after providing aid to Kashmir earthquake victims in 2005.

The combination of these factors: a stagnant economy, incompetent, ineffective political institutions, and a hostile regional environment have resulted in a growing, young and ill-educated restless population that is susceptible to political mobilization by Islamic radicals. Even if the beliefs are not wholeheartedly absorbed, for a large portion of the population, “terrorism is a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings, either perceived or real, of indignity and frustration³¹⁴.”

Noting the top security concerns of the United States, it is evident that these problems are growing in severity rather than subsiding. Despite renewed declaration by the Pakistani government that eliminating terrorist activity and dismantling Islamic extremist organizations is atop their domestic agenda, the United States has seen little change and is losing confidence. Since 2001, Pakistan has been given the benefit of the doubt by the United States concerning their true domestic security goals. However, it must be confronted that Pakistan has a different domestic security agenda than the United States, and their agenda is doing more harm than good to the United States and Pakistan.

³¹³ Bajoria, Jayshree. "Lashkar-e-Taiba." Backgrounder. 2 Dec. 2008. Council of Foreign Affairs. 9 Dec. 2008 <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/profile.html>>.

³¹⁴ Alan Kureger and Jitka Maleckova. "Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002.

The top priorities of Pakistan that encourage the stated threats to America, and the United States' overall vision for the region are:

- Protecting nuclear weapons from India and/or the United States
- Control of Kashmir
- Prevention of US or Indian control in Afghanistan

These priorities are rooted in Pakistan's volatile history with India, distrust in American intentions in the region, and the politicization of nuclear weapons. *These priorities must change in order for the United States' goal for Pakistan, and success in Afghanistan to be attainable*

Pakistan's Security Agenda

One of Pakistan's top security priorities is retaining full control over its nuclear weapon arsenal and nuclear weapons program. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is the most effective foreign policy tool that the failing country has to counter Indian political and military dominance in the region, and command attention from Washington.

Since 1998, Pakistan has used the combination of its instability and nuclear capabilities to deter aggressive conventional military action from India. The asymmetry of Pakistan's and India's conventional powers has generated a situation in which Pakistan under its nuclear umbrella continues to nurture terrorist groups as a means of securing its geopolitical goals. According to Paul Kapur, under the *instability/instability* theory of South Asia, "strategic instability encourages weaker Pakistan to engage in conventionally aggressive behavior, secure in the belief that its nuclear deterrent will insulate it from full-scale Indian retaliation³¹⁵." If the opposite were true and Pakistan were to engage in strategic stability, by reducing the deterring effects of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, India could be encouraged to increase conventional military operations into Pakistan or Kashmir. Thus retaining control over their nuclear weapons, with a cloud of unknown stability around them has worked to Pakistan's advantage.

³¹⁵ Kapur, S. Paul. Dangerous Deterrent : Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia. New York: Stanford UP, 2007

Thirdly, Pakistani strategic planners interpret President Obama's plan to send more troops to Afghanistan as a direct threat to Pakistan and in particular to its nuclear arsenal. According to a senior Pakistani military officer, American forces will spill over to Pakistan and, "are designed to create a mess in the tribal areas and in Pakistan and take the nukes,"³¹⁶ Additionally, pressure since 1998 from the Americans on increased transparency of Pakistan's nuclear security programs have been interpreted as an American strategy to infiltrate their nuclear program and control Pakistan's ability to assemble, move or produce more nuclear weapons if desired.

Kashmir

The second of top priorities for Pakistan is control over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Rooted in six decades of fighting, Kashmir represents Pakistani and Indian pride and their violent struggle to deny each other of control.

Lost in the 1947 War with India, Kashmir's disputed territory is split between Pakistan, India and China. Under UN resolutions from 1949, Pakistan is in control of Azad Jammu and Kashmir province, and India controls Jammu and Kashmir. Neither side believes in an independent State or is willing to accept a loss in territory over Kashmir.

In its refusal along with India, to agree on Kashmir territory, Pakistan's government has supported continued terrorism to counter Indian control. Pakistan has taken responsibility for the 1999 Kargil war, and 2002's rise of tensions. However, terrorism in Kashmir after Pakistan's pledge to help in the War on Terror has been cited by the government as rogue militants acting on their own accord. However, according to US intelligence and sources close to the Pakistani government, the military has not adjusted its attitudes toward Kashmir, or reigned in terrorists in the region.

In Kashmir continued support for terrorism is an indication that Islamabad has not changed any of its strategic objectives. For Pakistan, the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir are essential tools of regional policy. This strategy, sold as growing

³¹⁶ Perlez, Jane. "A Visit to a US Ally, but an Increasingly Wary One." *The New York Times* 8 Feb. 2009. 8 Feb. 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=1&fta=y>.

radical Islamic threats resonates in the United States and its European partners, allowing Islamabad to extract anymore concessions from them than would otherwise be possible.

Afghanistan

Since, the United States initiation of the War on Terror, Afghanistan has become a key factor in Islamabad's Indian policy, and focus of the international community.

Pakistan fears continued occupation by US forces and the possibility of Indian control in the country if US forces do leave.

Pakistan's fear of a larger, more powerful India has caused the country's leaders to use the low-intensity conflict of terrorism to preserve Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and to weaken India. However, it's pledged alliance puts Pakistan in a unique position of helping both sides.

Pakistan trains, equips, and provides shelter to the Taliban while providing logistics to NATO and ISAF at the same time. Afghanistan and the need for complete cooperation by Pakistan to help combat terrorist organizations has become a tool for leverage against the United States.

Allowance of violent extremist organizations to be headquartered in Pakistan's Northwest Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) aids in the struggle to win in Afghanistan. Local intelligence and witness cite that soldiers, supplies and capital are transported from large al-Qaeda and Taliban hubs like Quetta to Afghanistan's military operations in the south-central Afghanistan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Zabol³¹⁷. Another factor to Pakistani lack of enforcement on terrorist organizations is officer anti-American sentiment, as discussed previously.

Pakistan's government disputes any connection or support toward actions by extremist organizations. They plead a lack in military aid and equipment has resulted in the increased violence, and instability of the region. However the \$10 billion US dollars

³¹⁷ Robert Kaplan, "The Taliban's Silent Partner," *New York Times*, July 20, 2006. The International Crisis Group provided the same information, quoting NATO sources, in its recent report, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," Asia report no. 123, November 2006, www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf.

in military aid since 2001, and President Bush's 2006 approval of sending F16s to the Pakistani Air Force³¹⁸ has exponentially raised the opinion that Pakistan has been able to take advantage of the conflict in Afghanistan to maintain its leverage with the West. Pakistan has not provided the fullest possible cooperation, and the thought that Pakistan is actively undermining American efforts in Afghanistan is outweighing the argument that Pakistan is merely unable to do better.

It is clear that it is no longer a question of Pakistan's capability, but their willing capacity. A 2007 visit by then Vice President Dick Cheney grossly exemplifies this observation. In the week that Mr. Cheney visited, Pakistan had experienced seven suicide bombings, killing 88 people while at the same time tested its latest version of long range missiles, the Shaheen II. In the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan's successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood³¹⁹.

RECOMMENDATION

The latter half of this essay will now discuss how the United States will best *establish transparency between and agree upon Pakistan's security priorities and the United States' priorities for Pakistan* in order to achieve the United States goal, *A politically stable State able to effectively contain violent extremism domestically, and able to guarantee the United States' security expectations regarding material relevant to nuclear weapons*. Identifying Pakistani domestic national security priorities was the first step in concluding resolutions to establish transparency between the United States and Pakistan.

³¹⁸ Grare, Frédéric. "Rethinking Western strategies toward Pakistan an action agenda for the United States and Europe." 2007. World Cat. University of Washington, Seattle. 21 Feb. 2009
<http://http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/156549821?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.carnegieendowment.org%2Ffiles%2Fgrare_pakistan_final.pdf%26checksum%3D74c23cfae9472447f3a9ed12fe064ad&title=&linktype=digitalObject&detail=>

³¹⁹ United States. US Policy Toward Pakistan: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, March 21, 2007. Washington: US G.P.O., 2007.

The United States' means to achieve its Pakistani goal consists of a short-term strategy and a long term strategy. The United States' short term strategy consists of:

- Securing Pakistani nuclear weapons and materials relevant to nuclear programs
- Denying the use of nuclear weapons by extremist organizations
- Securing the Pakistani-Afghani border from arms and drug trade, and migration of terrorists
- Eliminating known Islamic extremist headquarters and training camps

The following text will discuss each means in detail. They coincide with the general new attitude towards Pakistan of renewed accountability, a strict system of reward and consequences based on measured success, and persuasion that this is not America's war but a collaborative international effort.

Securing Nuclear Weapons

The process of securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons is not an easy one, and best expectations are to improve transparency or knowledge of their security protocols. Knowing Pakistan's fears, and distrust in American intentions toward their nuclear program, the United States' must immediately dispel inaccurate accusations that they intend to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons, and must reverse US law banning nuclear technology assistance to Pakistan.

A reverse in US law, that states the United States may not exchange any nuclear relevant technology to a rogue nuclear state must be reversed in order for the United States to offer assistance to security systems like the PAL. It is hard to argue that not allowing the US to offer technological assistance will improve Pakistani security systems. Technological assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program will offer some counter to the US-Indian nuclear deal which has further increased anti-US sentiment and distrust.

This also extends an opportunity to re-establish a level of cooperation among Russia, and initiate a partnership with China to participate in securing Pakistan, and stabilizing South Asian security. Both governments share the United States' security goals of limiting nuclear proliferation, securing Pakistani nuclear weapons, and

preventing the use or transfer of nuclear material in extremist control. Multilateral pressure, especially from China and Russia demonstrates that Pakistani nuclear security is not an American issue, but a global issue. Pakistan will mostly likely respond better to international pressure, and may realize in order to be respected in the nuclear club, members must follow the rules. If multilateral pressure is accomplished, further request that IAEA inspections be allowed should be pushed.

A formal address and dialogue to the Pakistani government stating their nuclear weapons are only a concern, and therefore a problem with the United States, because of strengthening extremist organizations in FATA. These talks should be made by the State Department and Department of Defense, with the goal of proposing a possible cooperative threat reduction program. Additionally, India must be pressured to formally address that accepted improvements and transparency of their nuclear weapons security are in Pakistan's best interest concerning future communication, especially involving Kashmir.

Additionally, if Pakistan fails to agree that their nuclear weapons are a problem, and they either don't accept international assistance in improving their nuclear security, or increase transparency to their nuclear safeguards and storage locations, the United States should implement an embargo on arms sales. It should be highlighted that Pakistan needs to upgrade their military in order to match that of India. Multilateral cooperation must come from Europe, Russia and China to be extremely effective. China's cooperation however, is somewhat doubtful. They may feel continued arms trade is essential to protect Pakistan from India, however if the embargo is in concert with nuclear security, China may be willing to cooperate.

Eliminating Known Islamic Extremist Headquarters and Training Camps

The umbrella of means in short term goals for Pakistan, eliminating known extremist headquarters and training camps involves several factors. Though the described factors will eliminate extremist headquarters, they also contribute equally to *securing the*

Afghan-Pakistan border and denying the use of nuclear weapons by an extremist organization.

First the US must increase its intelligence on the local level. An increase of US intelligence through trusted sources on the local level will give the United States greater accuracy in targeting important individuals and hubs of extremist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Since 2002, when Pakistan pledged to contribute to the war on terror confidence that their military and intelligence agency could be relied upon has weakened.

By employing the help of local police, and military officers based in selective cities of Pakistan's FATA, the United States will not have to go through Islamabad. These officers have more at stake concerning the security of their families, and business, and must be extensively persuaded of that. This can be attained in cities like Peshawar where the Taliban has not yet taken complete control over the city, but targets local police and soldiers. The Taliban there have, "undermined public faith in the government, sown distrust and made the police fearful for their lives³²⁰."

They also offer a level of legitimacy and knowledge that the US will never be able to attain using its own forces. These police officers and military commanders have greater knowledge of the individuals in power, the local culture, relations with local tribal leaders, and the day to day operations of the city. They will be able to implement positive US opinion through vehicles of communication like the radio, and local market.

Positive re-enforcement must be practiced to those who comply with US intelligence requests. The United States must convince these human intelligence agents that American support for their actions is lasting, and on a level of higher ground than groups like al-Qaeda. The US must clearly communicate their intentions to provide security and economic prosperity, rather than impose Western ideals and imperialism. Further monetary and educational incentives can be offered to confirm cooperation.

³²⁰ Perlez, Jane. "Frontier Insurgency Spills Into Peshawar." *The New York Times* 18 Jan. 2009. The New York Times. 16 Feb. 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/world/asia/18peshawar.html>>.

Additionally, if these community security forces or leaders do not know proper intelligence tactics, US Special Forces may be employed to educate them on the basics of intelligence.

Second, local intelligence will help the United States accurately target individual people and hubs to terrorist organizations. Although organizations like the Taliban and al-Qaeda are a spider web like leadership structure, the elimination of key leaders and hubs that are the source of communication, supplies and capital can severely cripple the effectiveness of an organization to execute terrorist attacks. Individual leaders like Osama bin Laden, Maulana Fazlullah, Baitullah Mehsud, and [Ayman al-Zawahiri](#) offer tactical instructions, and inspiration to potential recruits should be top targets.

Local intelligence can inform the United States of these individuals' locations, or figures aware of their locations, and apprehension or elimination of them can be executed by US covert forces, Pakistani forces or local policy, according to the circumstances

One area in particular the US must immediately focus on is Quetta, the capital of the Baluchistan province and the Taliban shura, "They are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency³²¹." Disrupting the top Taliban leaders will weaken the fight in southern Afghanistan, and may bring rise to politically moderate Taliban. Quetta is unique, because intelligence reports it is the link to the strongest insurgencies in Afghanistan, and its intelligence officials have the least amount of cooperation with US/NATO troops. In this circumstance, any information that confirms the location of prominent shura leaders, US and NATO forces should conduct covert operations to eliminate the target. The benefits of eliminating key Taliban leaders outweigh the consequences of a predicted negative Pakistani response. In addition, the same strategies used to identify reliable intelligence sources should increase in order to reverse the low level of cooperation amongst intelligence officials and soldiers.

³²¹ Schmitt, Eric, and Mark Mazzatti. "Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fear." The New York Times 9 Feb. 2009. The New York Times. 9 Feb. 2009
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/world/asia/10quetta.html?pagewanted=1&hp>>.

The third factor in eliminating Islamic extremist headquarters and in alliance with increased intelligence is identification of government, military and intelligence officials linked to supporting extremist organizations. This will pressure President Asif Ali Zardari, and Pakistan's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Tariq Majid to re-establish their commitment to the providing security for the country.

Based on collective United States, allied and Pakistani intelligence, officials identified as supporting extremist organizations must be penalized. The priority, are individuals with leadership positions. Sanctions on travel VISAs and the freezing of assets of individuals and their family suspected of collaborating with extremist organizations should be a strategy stipulated by the United States to President Zardari. The United States can withhold part of its military aid allocated for budgetary support (i.e. salaries, incentives, investments in industry) based upon President Zardari's efforts to enforce accountability.

Multilateral cooperation involving Europe and China must be pushed concerning the sanctions. In order to demonstrate that it is a world responsibility, and not a unilateral request by the United States, it can be argued under the UN Charter. For example, UN Charter Article 1, resolution 1373 states, "Freeze without delay, funds...of those contributing to terrorist acts³²²." This is a specific step to clarify Pakistan's real intentions of committing fully to defeating extremist organizations. Results are intended to be more psychological, that physical within the Pakistani government. It will be a measure of their capacity to adhere to their pledge to defeat extremist organizations. At the same time, it employs accountability, a step towards re-legitimizing Pakistan's democracy, something further discussed in the United States' long term goals.

The fourth factor is a reiteration that the Taliban or any other extremist organizations are not to be negotiated with. In reflection of the recent truce by the Pakistani government and the Taliban in the Swat valley, the government has conceded to

³²² The United Nations. "UN Charter, article 1, resolution 1373" 28, September 2001. The United Nations Security Council. 18 Feb. 2009 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

aggressors, and abdicated a large portion of the Swat region. Fears now are that Taliban and al-Qaeda aggression will begin take hold in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and wealthy region. Strategic means to challenge extremist control over large regions are rooted in those that look to eliminate extremist headquarters and secure the border.

Pakistani officials argue that a truce was necessary to provide for safety and support from the civilian population. However, according to a Pakistani official, the Taliban took advantage of the populations growing dissent with the ineffective judicial system³²³. An explanation by I.A. Rehman, a member of the Human Rights Commission says, "For its part, the government is handicapped because of its failure to offer good governance, guarantee livelihoods, and restore people's faith in the frayed judicial system," a well phrased synopsis in which the United States' long-term goals plan to address. If additional truces are made between the Pakistani government and al-Qaeda or the Taliban in locations where the United States is involved in drone strikes or covert military operations, the US will not recognize the truce, and continue its agenda in the area.

Securing the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border

In order to secure the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the preceding strategy to eliminate extremist headquarters must be administered in conjunction with the following.

First, although doubt is high to Pakistan's real effort in securing the border, if Pakistan's army's shortcomings are due primarily to a lack of adequate equipment and training for the war on terror, US financial support should be directed explicitly at these shortcomings. Of the \$10billion dollars in military aid given since 2001, about \$5 billion has been used to support coalition forces that include Pakistan. Withholding funds has had little success in the past, and at this point in the war to secure the border, limiting funds would do more harm than good. Military aid should be specifically allocated and accounted for specific requests of equipment and training by the leading officers along

³²³ Perlez, Jane. "Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven." The New York Times 16 Feb. 2009. 22 Feb. 2009
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?pagewanted=1&sq=drone%20air%20strikes&st=cse&scp=3>>.

the major strategic locations of the border. Additional aid can be based on the measured success of each establishment receiving aid and training.

Second, despite the consequential opinions resulting from drone strikes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, they are effective in limiting the capabilities or forcing the reallocation of extremist organizations. The United States should continue executing drone predator strikes in the intention to eliminate key extremist operatives and source of leverage over the Pakistani military. Although drone strikes forces militants move to places like the Swat region, or reform even more exclusive training camps, the disturbance they do cause is valuable until the Pakistani army proves effective. Increased militant migration into Pakistan will further pressure to government to retain its legitimacy and implore United States and European help.

Strikes should not target Afghan refugee camps or targets with a high level of collateral damage. Training camps, supply routes and locations sheltering extremist leaders should be the drones' targets.

In conjunction with infiltrating intelligence sources at a local level, and public statements to the Pakistani government the United States' should one; invite the Pakistani Air Force to follow through with the government's pledge to combat violent extremists and assist in bombing; two; cite that drone strikes will stop if a legitimate effort by the Pakistani army is put forth along the border region. A legitimate effort is defined by a large movement in forces from the Indian border to the Afghanistan border.

Third, initiate structured talks again with India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Though this may bring political concentration away from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the results of open communication allows for less military concentration. The United States' Secretary of State Clinton and China should mediate peace talks by piggy backing on recent successes. In fall of 2008, trade routes opened in Kashmir, and Pakistan vowed to prosecute those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. One route of compromise is founded upon former President Musharoff's four part solution. It involves, "keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of Control that divides

Kashmir irrelevant, demilitarizing both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for self governance of Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India and Pakistan to jointly supervise the region³²⁴.”

Unfortunately, based on sixty years of history, and many foreign policy experts, “There really isn't a game plan, other than just hoping something like American pressure will work over time³²⁵.” Both soft and hard power have been used to solve the situation but to no success. However, the United States goal is not solving the problem. Its only intention is to allow an opportunity for any forward progress concerning the region to be made which makes the reallocation of some Pakistani troops possible.

Long Term

The direct threats of Pakistan to the security of the United States are threats that have evolved over time. Although, the United States’ has strategy to quell threats in the short run with sanctions on the Pakistani government, aid based on accountability and continued drone strikes, the threats will not be completely eliminated unless there is a long term strategy.

The rise of anti-American sentiment and increasing control of the Northwest frontier in Pakistan are rooted in the growth of dissatisfaction, and illegitimacy of the government, and the institutions responsible for security, social services and economic prosperity. The combination of a stagnant economy, ineffective political and judicial institutions, and a hostile regional environment have resulted in a growing, young and ill-educated restless population that is susceptible to political mobilization by Islamic radicals. Even if the beliefs are not wholeheartedly absorbed, for a large portion of the

³²⁴ United States. Cong. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Gary L. Ackerman, Hussain Haqqani, Marvin G. Weinbaum, and Lisa Curtis. 110th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 110-21. JSTOR. University of Washington, Seattle. 18 Feb. 2009 <<http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>>.

³²⁵ Waldman, Amy. "India Pressed on Kashmir Attacks." *The New York Times* 9 Apr. 2003. 22 Feb. 2009 <<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEEDA1E38F93AA35757C0A9659C8B63&scp=24&sq=kashmir&st=cse>>

population, “terrorism is a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings, either perceived or real, of indignity and frustration³²⁶.”

In order to combat factors that are the source of Pakistan’s instability, the United States’ long term strategy is the following:

- Strengthening the legitimacy, monopoly of power and ability to provide basic civil services of a civilian Pakistani government
- Improving socioeconomic conditions that breed violent instability

This strategy will coincide with the United States’ short term strategy, a cooperative effort with the Pakistani government to ensure security in the region. As long as violence destabilizes the country significant economic growth and government legitimacy will not occur. However, if security is accomplished then the benefits of such strategy will be seen. In the mean time, the United States long term strategy will battle anti-US sentiment and violent instability.

The first mean to US strategy is increasing the amount and oversight of US non-military aid. Since 2001, less than one billion dollars was allocated to improve Pakistan’s infrastructure, healthcare system and education. The United States’ top two priorities in social aid allocation must be education and healthcare. Aid would be overseen by USAID, with end use responsible by not just the Pakistani government, but more non-governmental organizations based at the local center of Pakistan’s problem.

Less than 2% of Pakistan GDP is allocated to education, and that which is, allocated to higher education institutions³²⁷. The United States’ strategy aims to providing aid to primary education. Youth of primary education age are the main demographic of madrassas, and most impressionable. Aid should be given to the government, more so non-governmental organizations based in the different areas of Pakistan. Increased aid is

³²⁶ Alan Kureger and Jitka Maleckova. “Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002.

³²⁷ Grare, Fr  d  ric. "Rethinking Western strategies toward Pakistan an action agenda for the United States and Europe." 2007. World Cat. University of Washington, Seattle. 21 Feb. 2009
<http://http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/156549821?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.carnegieendowment.org%2Ffiles%2Fgrare_pakistan_final.pdf%26checksum%3D74c23cffae9472447f3a9ed12fe064ad&title=&linktype=digitalObject&detail=>

stipulated on increased literacy rates and teacher training. Also encouragement of culture diffusing programs, like student exchanges, should be funded to aid in the ideological battle posed by religious extremists.

This will not only ensure more accountability but weakens the perception that Pakistan is a puppet of America, and America support of education is their strategy to undermine Islamic minds. It can actually become a vehicle of communication to persuade America's commitment of bettering Pakistani lives. Increased primary education will contribute to re-legitimizing the Pakistani government's ability to provide for basic social services.

The second top factor to US strategy is increasing the amount and oversight of US aid to basic healthcare programs. Healthcare is important because it reaches the Pakistani population on all levels. It is universal in providing government legitimacy and confidence. Aid should be overseen again by USAID, with limited allocation to the government, and more so to non-governmental institutions. US aid will provide basic necessities in the local hospitals, and pediatric care. Part of the funds must be allocated to helping the government's ability to provide care in the case of a natural disaster or an attack that causes a large number of injuries.

An example of the impact of healthcare aid was demonstrated in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. Association with help and the United States' transcend the idea that the United States is destructive.

Similar strategy to that of human intelligence will be applied to US social aid. Instead of going through Islamabad, US aid should be assigned to specific locations with specific needs. The US will rely on local leaders, law enforcement, public health institutions and based non-governmental institutions to ensure the majority of funds are correctly used. These areas include cities and towns somewhat and not yet ruled by the Taliban. Major cities like Quetta where Pakistan rule is about 70% must reduce al-Qaeda and Taliban rule before aid can effectively and safely be implemented.

Politics

Noting that Pakistan is actually one of the freer more democratic of Muslim states, the United States must limit the rise of radical Islam and protect some notion of civil liberties through supporting all mainstream political parties and insisting Pakistan's government to the same as a condition of aid. As long as the parties do not preach or tolerate leaders and movements of violence against the United States, India or Afghanistan, and they're willing to participate in a parliamentary context, they should be respected and allowed existence. US and NATO assistance in ensuring transparent future presidential elections, an increase in aid and specialist aimed at restructuring Pakistan's judicial system to make it more efficient are examples of democratic programs the US can involve itself in.

CONCLUSION

On September 11th, 2001, foreign attack on the United States focused the responsibility of keeping the homeland safe abroad. Since then, the United States' effort to provide security domestically, South Asia has become a center focus in eliminating violent extremist organizations like al-Qaeda that are responsible for the September 11th attacks and more. Pakistan in particular is of most importance to the United States because it is a nuclear weapons state, with a failing government, centered among the war in Afghanistan.

The lack of progress made by the Pakistani military and intelligence agency, and their connections of support to violent extremist organizations is an immediate call to change the United States' security strategy, specifically toward Pakistan.

The US's goal is to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons from being acquired by terrorists, and improving the government's ability to provide domestic security. Although the Pakistani government has pledged its full cooperation and a hundred percent effort in the fight against terrorism, doubt remains of their true intentions. It has become clear that in order to win the war in Afghanistan, and eliminate terrorist organizations in Pakistan,

the Pakistan government has to reprioritize its national security priorities. The new US national security is reflective of the US's worn patience, appreciates the enormity of the task, and confident that continued US efforts will result in victory.

The United States' short term strategy calls for continued drone strikes, covert operations against high ranking influential leaders, increased cooperation with local police and military, and a more transparent dialogue with the Pakistani government on what is acceptable and what is not. Included in the dialogue is improved cooperation within the government agencies, and a more aggressive stand against extremist organizations. Their level of success will result in positives like increased aid, or negatives like an arms embargo, and sanctions.

A differentiation from current strategy is increased social aid, not allocated through Islamabad, focused on primary education and healthcare. Requests for increased multilateral cooperation from the European Union, Russia and China are centered around the idea that violent extremists in a failing nuclear weapons state are not an American predicament, but a global concern. It recognizes Pakistani focus on Kashmir, and understands the inevitable link that progress in Kashmir, means progress along the Afghanistan border.

The United States' needs full Pakistani cooperation in order to guarantee stability in nuclear South Asia, and prevent the complete collapse of Pakistan as a state itself. This strategy is focused to do just that.

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AFGHANISTAN: Terrorism and US National Security

Megan Krilanovich

INTRODUCTION

After eight years of US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and eliminate the ability of al Qa'ida to use Afghanistan as a safe haven, Afghanistan remains a failing state with a rising Taliban-led insurgency and decreasing security. To stabilize Afghanistan and overcome the insurgency, a coordinated US and international effort will be necessary that focuses on eliminating the ability of al Qa'ida and other violent extremists to use Afghanistan as a future safe-haven while increasing the security of Afghan citizens and fostering political reconciliation for warring factions within Afghanistan. The following issues will be discussed with recommendations of how to achieve these objectives in Afghanistan:

- Denying al Qa'ida safe haven
- Overcoming the Taliban insurgency
- Fostering political reconciliation
- Creating long term stability
- Securing regional and international cooperation for stabilizing Afghanistan
- Implications of the Afghanistan war in Iraq and Pakistan

BACKGROUND

Afghanistan: a Failed and Divided State

Afghanistan is a land-locked country located at the nexus of Central Asia and bordered by many powerful and contentious nations including Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China. One hundred of Afghanistan's total two hundred and fifty years of statehood have been wrought by internal conflict.³²⁸ Afghanistan is currently one of the poorest countries in the world, with an economy dependent on foreign aid and the illegal drug trade of opium.

For the past thirty years Afghanistan has been in the midst of a civil war. As a result, one-third of the Afghan population has left or been displaced and over one million

³²⁸ M. Nazif Shahrani, "Taliban and Talibanism in Historical Perspective," *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi eds., (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008) 161.

Afghans have been killed.³²⁹ Each subsequent regime has failed to establish a central state able to control both the capital, Kabul, and the peripheries. This vacuum of centralized power has led to a system of patronage, fragmented regional governance, powerful tribal leaders, independent militias, warlordism, as well as a lack of trust in national government. Due to the low levels of economic development inside of Afghanistan, competing groups within this country are dependent on outside sources of funding, arms, and aid to gain power and provide public goods and security to their supporters.³³⁰

Afghanistan is divided along ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian lines. The main ethnic groups are the predominantly Sunni Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, and the primarily Shia Hazaras. The Pashtuns have been the dominant ethnic group and political force inside of Afghanistan since the mid 18th century³³¹ and no regime has succeeded in holding power for an extended period of time without Pashtun support.³³² Pashtun tribes extend across the southern and eastern portions of Afghanistan and into the border region of Pakistan.³³³ However, the Pashtuns and all ethnic groups within Afghanistan are not homogenous but are further divided by differences in language, politics, and tribal loyalties.

Effects of the Cold War

Afghanistan has a long history of international intervention and proxy wars. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and continued to financially support the Afghan communist regime until the fall of the USSR.³³⁴ In reaction to the communist takeover, militias called Mujahideen formed, calling for jihad against the Soviets.³³⁵ The

³²⁹ J. Alexander Their, "Introduction: Building Bridges," *Future of Afghanistan* J. Alexander Their ed., (United States Institute of Peace, 2009) 3.

³³⁰ Shahrani, 177.

³³¹ Ibid, 160.

³³² Their 27.

³³³ Manmath Narayan Singh, "Ethnicity and Politics in Afghanistan," *The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives* K. Warikoo ed., (Bhavana Books and Prints: New Delhi, 2002) 26.

³³⁴ Robert D. Crews, "Moderate Taliban," *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert d. Crews and Amin Tarzai ed., (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008) 247.

³³⁵ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, "Introduction," *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert d. Crews and Amin Tarzi ed., (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008) 39.

Mujahideen were supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and the US. The US gave 3 billion dollars to the anti-soviet jihad movement and another 1.5 billion to Pakistan in return for their cooperation and support of the Mujahideen.³³⁶ After the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the communist government in Afghanistan, leaders of the Mujahideen began to fight for political power, a struggle that continues to this day.

The Cold War proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union and the ensuing civil war has had critical consequences for the current situation in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen were the first radical Islamic regime that sought to consolidate power in Afghanistan into an “Islamic” state. However due to infighting between the Mujahideen leaders and discontent among Pashtuns about the preeminence of Tajik and Uzbeks in the regime, the Mujahideen government was weak and the country became further separated into provincial militias and localized systems of governance. The Cold War left a highly armed population full of unsolved grievances, a failing state, and leaders with experience in warfare divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.

In addition, as a result of the Soviet invasion, three million Afghans fled to refugee camps across the Pakistani border.³³⁷ Islamic groups, such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, based in Pakistan, offered social services and schooling in madrassas (religious institutions) to Afghan refugees. These madrassas and refugee camps became the origins of Taliban fighters and leaders. Similar services and schools were offered by Iranian Islamist groups, such as Hizb-e-Islami, to further numbers of refugees. Like Pakistan, the Iranians radicalized Afghan refugees. The Iranians arrested Afghan moderates and transformed Afghan Islamic refugees into extremist, “political armed groups.”³³⁸

Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban, led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, emerged in 1994 and took control of Kabul in 1996. The rise of the Taliban was aided by the Pakistani intelligence agency

³³⁶ Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan’s Policy in Afghanistan,” *The Afghanistan Crisis*, (Bhavana Books & Prints: New Delhi, 2002), 385.

³³⁷ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, “Introduction” 4.

³³⁸ Neamotollah Nojumi, “The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,” *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi eds., (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008) 97.

(the ISI), the CIA, and the Saudi state with the intention of ending the Mujahideen infighting and creating a stable Afghan state that could serve as a profitable energy corridor through Central Asia. The Al Qa'ida terrorist organization also assisted the Taliban, providing fighters, funding, and assassinating key opposition leaders.³³⁹

The Taliban was highly successful in gaining control over Afghanistan and established the most unified government in Afghanistan since 1979.³⁴⁰ Before the US led invasion, the Taliban controlled ninety percent of the country.³⁴¹ In contrast, the current Karzai regime controls an estimated thirty percent of the Afghan state. The Taliban, a Pashtun-led organization, was successful because of their foreign funding and support from the ISI and the CIA, and because they were able to negotiate complicated Pashtun politics and co-opt Pashtun and minority leaders to their cause. Their strategy was to approached weak or vulnerable leaders first, creating regional competition, before killing or co-opting stronger commanders into their organization.³⁴²

Relations between the Taliban, Pakistan, the US, and Saudi Arabia changed as the radical Islamic nature of the regime, their repressive and violent policies, and their decreasing malleability could no longer be ignored. The presence of Al Qa'ida training camps and Osama bin Laden's connections to the Taliban regime attracted the disapproval of the US and Saudi governments after the al Qa'ida bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.³⁴³ The Saudis stopped their funding to the Taliban and demanded that the Taliban extradite Osama bin Laden. In 1998 the US declared a \$5 million dollar bounty for the capture of bin Laden and in 1999 the US and the UN applied sanctions against Afghanistan for their continued support of bin Laden.³⁴⁴ In 2001, Afghanistan was invaded by US-led coalition forces and the Taliban regime was overthrown for harboring the al Qa'ida terrorist network.

³³⁹ Abdulkader H. Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*, (Cornell University: London, 2008) 241.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, 223.

³⁴¹ Abdulkader Sinno, "Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns," *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi eds, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008), 79.

³⁴² Sinno, 79.

³⁴³ Nojumi, 189.

³⁴⁴ Nojumi, 201.

Al Qa'ida and Afghanistan

Al Qa'ida is an international terrorist organization characterized by a loose knit and mobile network and founded by Osama bin Laden. Al Qa'ida calls for jihad against the United States and any other country or group not practicing their view of Islam.³⁴⁵ The history of Osama bin Laden and the development of al Qa'ida are closely linked to Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden first came to Afghanistan during the Mujahideen and founded al Qa'ida as an offshoot of the Mujahideen movement. Osama bin Laden created training camps in Afghanistan and used Afghanistan as a base of operations until the US led invasion in 2001. It is believed that key al Qa'ida headquarters and leaders have now relocated to the border region of Pakistan.

Operation Enduring Freedom

In 2001, the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom and invaded Afghanistan in response to the September 11th attacks perpetrated by al Qa'ida with the objective of overthrowing the radical Islamist and al Qa'ida supportive Taliban regime, destroying al Qa'ida bases in Afghanistan, and transforming Afghanistan into a stable democracy supportive of human rights and the rule of law. After eight years of US and NATO-ISAF intervention, Afghanistan still poses a threat to US national security and the regional security of Central Asia and the Middle East. At first appearing to be overthrown, the Taliban have re-grouped across the border in Pakistan to form an insurgency which has effectively negated the US and NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Attacks by insurgents and the territory regained by the Taliban-led insurgency are increasing, and the Taliban now controls many of the major provinces in Afghanistan. In 2004 there were only 900 security incidents in Afghanistan and in 2007 close to 9,000 security incidents were reported.³⁴⁶ Insurgents are applying successful techniques developed in Iraq such as suicide and roadside bombings and are conducting a low cost insurgency that could be

³⁴⁵ Yonah Alexander and Micheal S. Swetnam, *Usama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda: Profile of a Terrorist Network*, (Transnational Publishers, 2001), 2.

³⁴⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Strategic Chaos and Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia*. 110 Congress, 2nd Sess., April 2nd, 2008, 11.

sustainable for many years. The cost of the insurgency is estimated at \$30 million a year, whereas it costs the US at minimum \$1 billion per month to sustain a military presence in Afghanistan.³⁴⁷

The US initially relied on local militias and an anti-Taliban coalition called the Northern Alliance in order to defeat the Taliban, using low levels of US troops but high levels of force and firepower. After the Taliban government was ousted, Afghanistan adopted the Bonn Agreement and established an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai. Karzai was later elected through a traditional tribal council or *loya jurga* to lead Afghanistan as president. The democratically elected Karzai regime has failed to consolidate power into a central authority, build institutions such as a working judiciary, or create a functioning Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police capable of providing domestic security. The Karzai regime lacks legitimacy for many Afghans and is viewed as a puppet government of the United States. The United States and NATO intervention, due to continued use of aerial attacks and a prolonged occupation with decreasing security, has caused resentment to build towards the US and NATO forces.

The US-NATO intervention in Afghanistan was designed to take a lead-nation, multilateral, coordinated approach where each donor country was primarily responsible for ensuring one aspect of security in Afghanistan. Lack of coordination of the international effort and insufficient support from NATO allies has created a collective action problem detrimental to success in Afghanistan. The US was the lead nation for reconstructing the Afghan National Army, Germany was the lead nation for building an Afghan National Police, and the United Kingdom was the lead nation for counternarcotics.³⁴⁸ However the United States has supplied the majority of support for many of these projects. In addition, NATO forces have been limited and constrained by caveats, causing the US to lead in the counterinsurgency effort as well. The US has 30,000 troops in Afghanistan while in 2007 the UK supplied over 7,000 troops, Germany

³⁴⁷ Sinno 242

³⁴⁸ House Committee on Foreign Affairs “Strategic Chaos”, 25.

over 3,000, and Spain provided less than 800.³⁴⁹ Many NATO forces are not authorized for counterinsurgency combat but are supposed to be assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs. In addition there has been no overarching plan between nations on tactics for counterinsurgency and development of Afghanistan, and in many cases efforts in one area have negated efforts in another. Due to an uncoordinated and unsupported international effort in Afghanistan, US forces have become overstretched regionally between conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and internally between their many different responsibilities in Afghanistan including development, police training, and counter-insurgency combat.

In addition, regional cooperation from Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and countries of the former Soviet Union for Operation Enduring Freedom and stabilizing Afghanistan remains convoluted and uncertain, with factions in these countries supporting factions within Afghanistan for their own purposes and politics. For example, since the Cold War, the Pakistani government and sectarian groups residing within Pakistan have been instrumental in providing funding and support for conflict inside of Afghanistan. After the collapse of the communist regime, the ISI wanted to establish a pliant regime that could be an ally to Pakistan in the event of war with India, and could be used as a stable energy corridor through Central Asia. The Pakistani Armed forces and the ISI supported the Taliban and helped it to gain power. The Pakistani government is now officially the United States' partner in overcoming the insurgency in Afghanistan. However, factions within Pakistan and the ISI continue to support the insurgency.

Pakistan provides a safe haven to al Qa'ida and the Taliban because many groups within Pakistan are sympathetic to and supporters of al-Qaeda, the northern border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan known as the Federal Administered Tribal Region, FATA, is largely uncontrolled by the Pakistani government, Pakistan was a major destination of Afghan refugees fleeing the post-Soviet invasion war, and because the Pashtun tribes, which are the majority supporters of the Taliban, extend across the border.

³⁴⁹ Daniel Korski, "Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War, *European Council on Foreign Relations* (Jan 1, 2008).

The Federal Administered Tribal Region, FATA, along Afghanistan's northern border is known to be a base for al Qa'ida and the Taliban. In addition many leaders of the Taliban insurgency are thought to be living in the refugee camps further south along the border region in the city of Quetta.³⁵⁰

To a lesser extent Iran and Russia also hold veto power for defeating the Taliban insurgency and creating a stable Afghanistan. Iran has always supported Shia factions within Afghanistan, who while not the majority are a powerful bloc. Russia has not been overtly militarily involved in Afghanistan since their defeat in the Cold War, but Russia has recently been implicated as a key player in Kyrgyzstan's decision to close the Manas airbase, a critical US and NATO supply line for the counterinsurgency.

INTRESTS

Denying Al Qa'ida safe-haven

Al Qa'ida remains a prominent threat to the national security of the United States within the Afghanistan-Pakistan region due to its proven capability to attack the US and US interests and citizens abroad. It is imperative that the United States win the war in Afghanistan and overcome the Taliban insurgency in order to deny al Qa'ida a supportive government and base of operations. The US, with the support of the Pakistani government, has conducted drone strikes to target al Qa'ida operatives based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. These strikes have reduced key al Qa'ida leadership, causing less experienced members to take up leadership roles and effectively disrupting the organization and command structure of the network.

While there has been success in capturing and killing some al Qa'ida leaders, Osama bin Laden and other top Qaeda operatives have proven to be elusive. The al Qa'ida organization's integration into the FATA region and the large refugee camps in Pakistan make al Qa'ida operatives such as Osama bin Laden difficult to locate and target. In addition, strikes by unmanned aircraft and other covert operations rely on

³⁵⁰ Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazetti, "Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears," *New York Times*, February 9, 2009.

intelligence from the CIA and the ISI to target Qaeda operatives. The US reliance on Pakistani cooperation and intelligence brings further complications as it is known that elements of the ISI and the Pakistani population support al Qaeda. In addition, every action taken by the US has a reaction. Attacks by the US or NATO forces against al Qaeda or the Taliban have often caused civilian casualties and heightened support for al Qaeda and the insurgency as the US is perceived as a foreign occupier who uses indiscriminate force.

Overcoming the Taliban Insurgency

Although the Taliban regime surrendered political control of Afghanistan in 2001, a Taliban-led insurgency emerged in 2002 and has been significantly regaining power and territory since 2005.³⁵¹ However, not all insurgents are members of the Taliban, some are independent provincial militias using the cover of the Taliban insurgency for their own aims. It is important to view the Taliban that emerged after 2001, or the neo-Taliban, as the following diverse groups with various objectives: members of the old Taliban who were released during a Taliban amnesty enacted by Hamid Karzai in order to foster reconciliation, foreign insurgents wishing to reignite conflict in Afghanistan, freshly armed warlords released from Taliban rule settling old conflicts or fighting over poppy cultivation, and Pashtun dissenters of the Karzai regime.

Ethnic politics and sectarian divides have continued to be a source of dissent and violence. The majority of supporters of the Taliban regime and the insurgency are Pashtuns. The Bonn Agreement gave greater power to minority leaders of the Northern Alliance while politically marginalizing Pashtuns from their usual dominant position in politics.³⁵² Many Pashtuns ally with the Taliban as a way to seek more political control and because the Karzai government is seen as an illegitimate and unable to fulfill its promises. While the Karzai regime has promoted reintegration of the Taliban into post-Taliban Afghanistan, attempts at reconciling members of the Taliban have also had

³⁵¹ Amin Tarzi, "The Neo-Taliban," Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, "Introduction," *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* Robert d. Crews and Amin Tarzi ed., (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2008), 275.

³⁵² Ibid, 287.

negative effects. Blanket reconciliations that integrate “moderate Taliban” by the Karzai government have alienated other ethnic groups such as the Hazaras, who were harshly persecuted under the Taliban, deepening divisions within the country rather than creating greater unity.³⁵³

The United States must devise a new tactic to win against the insurgency, which currently has broad cross-border support in Afghanistan and Pakistan and is conducting a relatively inexpensive war, in order to establish greater security in Afghanistan. The US faces the great challenge in Afghanistan of conducting a counterinsurgency in a failing state which is extremely undeveloped, relies on decentralized governance, has a population spread thinly over a large and rugged territory, and historically has resisted occupation of foreign forces much larger than that employed by NATO-ISAF.

Recent success in Iraq has provided new tactics for performing counterinsurgency operations that can be applied to local conditions in Afghanistan. The Iraq troop surge centered around two main principles. First focusing on defensive rather than offensive operations and providing security to civilians, and secondly finding factions which can be reconciled to the counterinsurgency.³⁵⁴ These tactics are based on the principle that “victory cannot be gained until the people stop actively and passively supporting the insurgents.”³⁵⁵ Such tactics require a greater number of troops and a greater risk to them as they are dispersed to live among the population in order to create a secure environment for citizens. It also involves splitting the enemy and exploiting differences in the ideology and objectives of insurgents. In Iraq the greater number of troops on the ground was accompanied but what has become to be known as the Iraqi Awakening Movement, in which members of Sunni militias formerly supportive of al Qa’ida became part of the counterinsurgency effort and paid by the US. This model, first successfully implemented in Anbar province, was replicated throughout Iraq. The Iraqi troop surge was successful

³⁵³ Robert D. Crews, “Moderate Taliban,” 271.

³⁵⁴ United States Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command: June 16, 2006), 106.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

because it increased security which allowed political reconciliation and community development to take place while targeting insurgents.

Studies of counterinsurgency efforts have concluded that 4 troopers per every 1,000 habitants is the minimum requirement for combating an insurgency, which in Afghanistan would roughly equal 128,000 troops, a troop level that would require a heavy surge of troops into Afghanistan.³⁵⁶ However while a troop surge appears to have been successful in Iraq, the vast and tugged territory, highly illiterate population, rampant corruption, large number of sectarian and ethnic divides, a cross border safe-haven for insurgents, and underdeveloped infrastructure and economy will pose unique challenges in Afghanistan that may lessen the effectiveness of a troop surge and require new tactics to be formulated. While clearly complicated, there remains the possibility of weaning Taliban supporters from al Qa'ida while surging troops, and finding supporters of the Taliban who will become part of the counterinsurgency effort. Greater information on local leaders and local conditions will be necessary to determine which factions can be approached and how they can be co-opted to the counterinsurgency cause. In addition, the counterinsurgency forces must establish legitimacy with civilians by providing an increase in security and by lessening civilian casualties to the lowest number possible even if this requires greater risks to be taken by counterinsurgency security forces.

Fostering Political Reconciliation

In addition to the Taliban insurgency, another related threat to the security of Afghanistan comes from highly armed local militias and powerful warlords. The site of a long and protracted civil war, lasting security will not be gained in Afghanistan without reconciliation between sectarian leaders and negotiations of power sharing. For example, the Northern Alliance proved that it could be a powerful force when it helped overthrow the Taliban regime while the Pashtun belt has proven to be a resilient tribal faction and a stronghold of the Taliban insurgency. While there have been attempted programs for disarmament of local militias, the US has generally armed and aided local militias in

³⁵⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 27.

return for their support against the insurgency. However not only has this assisted in undermining the building of a central government, it has also sustained another volatile force inside of Afghanistan.

In addition to foreign aid, provincial leaders and militias are also financed by the illegal growth and trafficking of opium, a trade which contributes further to the violence, corruption, and instability in Afghanistan and which has increased during the occupation. The dependency of Afghan warlords on foreign support and the opium trade is both detrimental and holds possibilities for creating alliance and furthering the US goal of stabilizing Afghanistan. The negative effect of this policy is that continued funding of warlords creates no incentives for internal factions to turn away from war because violence creates their primary income. Afghanistan has the lowest rate of revenue to GDP in the world with revenues that are 4% of the GDP.³⁵⁷ This means that the central and regional governing bodies receive the majority of their funding from outside sources and foreign aid, and that they are more accountable to their donors than to their constituents. Years of an aid and opium based economy have created deep rooted corruption and systems of patronage that “encouraged the commodification of loyalties and the dependency of patron-client relationships at all levels of Afghan society.”³⁵⁸ Effectively loyalties can be bought by the highest bidder. If the United States negotiates and offers regional autonomy and funding to tribal leaders, they could in return gain greater support against the insurgency. The backlash of such a policy would be the further destabilization of central authority and the continued lack of a monopoly on force and violence by the state.

Creating Long Term Stability

Economic and Political Development

The final solution in Afghanistan is not military, but is the political, economic, and social transformation of Afghanistan from a failed to a functioning state. However such development aspirations face severe challenges in Afghanistan and will be a long term

³⁵⁷ Ali a Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan”, *Parameters* (Spring 2006), 15.

³⁵⁸ Tarzi, 276.

project. For example, eradicating the opium trade and providing alternative industries to opium production will be crucial in establishing a legitimate economy in Afghanistan and in decreasing the culture of corruption and violence. At present, Afghanistan produces ninety percent of the world's supply of opium and many of the warlords and the insurgents use money made from cultivation and trafficking of opium and heroin. A significant percentage of the Afghan population participates in the cultivation of the poppy fields, although these farmers receive only a minuscule portion, estimated at 1%, of the profits from this industry.³⁵⁹ While, the elimination of opium production in Afghanistan will be an important factor in creating a strong state and good governance in Afghanistan, combating the drug trade could be detrimental in the short run to stabilizing the country. Farmers who have had their poppy fields burned have greater incentive to side with the Taliban who not only offer to protect their fields but also derive a substantial profit by doing so. In addition, a ban on poppy cultivation could alienate warlords who could have interest/motivation in fighting against the insurgency. The most stable regions in Afghanistan have also had record opium production in the last year, showing how security may have to be reached before opium eradication. Currently, ISAF forces have done little to combat the opium trade, partially in fear of the repercussions and increased attacks on already strained troops this would cause.³⁶⁰ Slash and burn approaches to eradicating poppy are especially counterproductive because they alienate potential supporters of the counter-insurgency effort and target the poor farmers instead of the drug or warlords. Economic and political development must be achieved as security is established but cannot be a precursor to security. If security is not initially established, roads built one day are bombed the next, and money given to the Karzai regime is wasted as the government loses more control to the Taliban daily.

The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police

³⁵⁹ Ali a Jalali, 12.

³⁶⁰ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia*. 110th Congress, 1st Sess., October 4, 2007.

The establishment of a functioning Afghan National Army, ANA, and Afghan National Police, ANP, is tantamount to achieving short term security in Afghanistan and for creating in the long run an Afghan state less dependent on foreign assistance and less vulnerable to foreign agendas. The creation of strong Afghan security forces will also preclude the ability of US and NATO troops to withdraw from Afghanistan in the future. Since 2002, the United States has provided more than \$6.2 million dollars to train and equip the ANP but 3/4th of the Afghan National Police force are still assessed at the lowest capability rating.³⁶¹ Equipment shortages, police corruption, collusion with the insurgency, and personnel shortages and unreliability all contribute to the inadequacy of the ANP. Rebuilding the ANP may require long term support from the US, reform of the Afghani Department of Interior, and further training and cohesion building among this force.³⁶² Recent efforts by the US have removed entire garrisons for training together in the hope of building loyalty and coordination, but the results of this are still to be seen. Similar problems of corruption and collusion with insurgents exist for the Afghan National Army. The ANA is also complicated by fluidity between local militias and the national army. The ANA is currently supposed to reach a target goal of 80,000 troops and the ANP 70,000, but no plan exists for the long term financing, arming, or training of these forces.³⁶³ Greater numbers of military and police trainers and funding will be required to build a functioning ANSF, Afghan National Security Force. In addition, incentives such as increased pay will have to be offered to promote troop loyalty and institutions such as a functioning judiciary and a reformed Ministry of the Interior will have to be established to promote security and the rule of law.

Securing Regional and International Cooperation for Stabilizing Afghanistan

Regional Cooperation: Pakistan, Russia and Iran

³⁶¹ GAO, "Afghanistan Security: US Efforts to Develop Afghan Police Forces Face Challenge and Need a Coordinated Detailed Plan to Ensure Accountability," *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives*. GAO, June 18th, 2008. 2.

³⁶² Ibid, 14.

³⁶³ Ibid.

Securing the cooperation of Pakistan is imperative to achieving a positive outcome in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself is a very factious state, with clear pro Taliban and al Qa'ida blocs, and the continual goal to achieve a regime in Afghanistan that would be pliant to the Pakistani government. Pakistan poses a grave danger to the US and Middle Eastern and Central Asian regional security as it is a highly volatile nation in possession of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is unable, and or unwilling to control the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the elimination of terrorist and insurgent safe-havens within this region is necessary in order to stop the insurgency in Afghanistan and eliminate bases for violent extremist organizations.

The Pakistani government and the ISI are key players in the fight against the Taliban and al Qa'ida and are necessary for intelligence and for securing the border region. The Pakistani government outwardly supports the US and has received large amounts of military aid from the US, but also recently stated that any unilateral action taken by US forces without the consent of Pakistan would be considered a attack on Pakistan.³⁶⁴ In addition, the Pakistani government appears to be further losing control to extremists groups within the country. After recent violence erupted in the Swat Valley, the Pakistani government negotiated a ceasefire with the Swat Valley Taliban with the condition that Sharia law would be imposed on this area. It is unclear if the Pakistani government is intentionally building alliances with the Pakistani Taliban in the event they are needed to support Pakistan in a fight with India, or if Pakistan is a failing state and will soon come under the rule of extremist, anti-American factions.

US relations with Russia also affect the war in Afghanistan. Russia has both shown a willingness to work with the US to combat al Qa'ida and the Taliban and the desire to limit US involvement in the region and NATO expansion. Recently Kyrgyzstan announced that the US government would not be allowed to continue to use its base in Manas, a critical resupply route for the US-NATO coalition. This announcement came

³⁶⁴ Eric Schmidt, "Pakistan Warns US of Fighting on Its Own," *New York Times*, Jan 12, 2009.

after Russia offered a \$2.15 billion aid package to Kyrgyzstan.³⁶⁵ Russia denied its involvement in the decision and offered that the US and NATO could use supply lines through Russia as an alternative for “non-military” cargo, but it is highly unlikely that the closure of the Manas base was not influenced by Russia.³⁶⁶ Currently negotiations continue between Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and the US and the Manas airbase closure will have to be ratified by the Kyrgyzstani parliament before becoming final. The Cold War illustrated that competition between Russia and the US in Afghanistan can have devastating effects. Russia is motivated by a fear of radical Islam and drug trafficking, and the US must try to engage Russia to work through these common interests rather than promote regional competition. However, US, Russia and NATO are often in conflict over spheres of influence and Russia feels threatened by NATO expansion. Therefore negotiations with Russia could prove difficult and alternative air supply lines through Beirut, Kuwait, Turkey, Uzbekistan or Germany may have to serve as substitutes for securing forward basing capabilities into Afghanistan.³⁶⁷

Iran is another country that could possibly hold veto power for security in Afghanistan, a situation complicated by the rise of Shia and Iranian regional influence due to the ousting of the Sunni regime in Iraq, and by the turbulent state of Iranian-US relations exacerbated by Iran’s dogged development of nuclear weapons technology. However, like Russia, Iran holds a common interest in stopping a radical Islamic Sunni regime from taking hold in Afghanistan. Iran has continually supported the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, and failure for the Hazaras to receive appropriate political representation within a new Afghanistan regime could prompt Tehran to promote a Shia uprising in Afghanistan. There also exists the possibility that if US-Iranian relations were to worsen, Iran would align itself with the Taliban or al Qa’ida such as it has with other radical Sunni Islamic groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas.

NATO and International Assistance

³⁶⁵ Tom Shanker and Ellen Berry, “Despite Kyrgyz Vote to Close Base, Gates Explores Options to Keep it Open,” *New York Times*, Feb 19, 2009.

An international effort is crucial for providing funding, expertise, training, legitimacy, and troops for the US-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. A renewed commitment by NATO to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan would provide critical international support and funding and create greater legitimacy for the counterinsurgency. NATO efforts inside of Afghanistan have been confounded by inaction, lack of political support among NATO allies, and coordination problems. For example, at the beginning of the war, NATO military authorities took ten months to negotiate agreements for outposts, giving enemy forces time to plan “coordinated complex attacks” against ISAF forces.³⁶⁸ NATO has not met pledges for combat troops, helicopters, or military trainers and NATO forces retain many caveats for when and what kind of combat they can participate in.

The international community holds a stake in securing Afghanistan since the threat of al Qa’ida, radical Islamic terrorism, and even the narcotics trade span into many borders. Europe is highly exposed to the threat of al Qa’ida and radical Islam since European states are a more accessible target for terrorist organizations fighting against the “West”. In addition, Europe receives 90% of its opium and heroin from Afghanistan. The United States and many European countries differ on what approach should be taken in Afghanistan. While the US advocates for a military led approach, the EU believes in greater diplomatic efforts and state building. If NATO countries were to supply greater resources, they could rightfully have greater control over tactics used in Afghanistan. EU countries have spent less than one-seventh of the funds spent on reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Afghanistan. If NATO countries were to supply greater numbers of troops to Afghanistan, less firepower could be used and reliance on tactics such as aerial bombardment would not be necessary, tactics which result in high civilian casualties and have made the Afghanistan war unpopular, and there could be increased focus on protecting all Afghan citizens as well as counterterrorism efforts.

Implications of the Afghanistan War in Iraq and Pakistan

³⁶⁸ Dexter Pilkins, “Afghans and US Plan to Recruit Local Militias,” *New York Times*, Dec 23, 2009.

The war in Afghanistan is affected by and has important consequences for Russia, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq and Pakistan are the countries most interconnected to the war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Iraq form the forefront of US military engagement in the Middle East, with close to 200,000 US troops deployed between these conflicts. Failure in Iraq or Afghanistan would have geo-political and political consequences for the US, and it is in the US interests that a stable, semi-democratic state is achieved in Iraq and that greater stability is brought to Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgency is defeated.

The withdrawal of troops from Iraq and the resolution of this conflict will allow for greater troops and resources to be redeployed to Afghanistan. The Iraqi and the US government have recently negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement that calls for the complete withdrawal of US troops by 2011. President Obama has announced that all troops except a contingency force of 30,000-50,000 will be withdrawn by 2010.³⁶⁹ There are many risks of US troop withdrawal from Iraq including a return to sectarian violence, the rise of another political strong man equal to Saddam Hussein, decreased leverage of the US government over the Iraqi government, increased influence of Iran in Iraq, and the safety of US troops as they pull out. The US will need to allow for a contingency force able to re-secure Iraq should this prove necessary while re-deploying some of the forces in order to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan also has the potential to escalate conflict in Pakistan and lead it to become a failed state. Increasing troop levels in Afghanistan and an even more strident counterinsurgency effort by US and NATO troops may further push insurgents into Pakistan and cause greater destabilization. Greater destabilization of Pakistan could increase the possibility of violent extremists coming into control of the central government, of violent extremists acquiring a nuclear weapon, or for conflict between India and Pakistan, with tensions already escalated over Kashmir and the Mumbai attacks, to implode. However the risks are also high to continue to let instability in

³⁶⁹ Julian E. Barnes, "Obama Sees Most Troops Out of Iraq By August 30, 2010," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb 28, 2009.

Afghanistan to build which would also provide an opportunity for violent extremists to use the Afghan state. Therefore, the US should take action to strengthen the Pakistani central government, their control of their nuclear weapons, and their ability to counter violent extremism in order to lessen the backlash of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States strategy for Afghanistan must take into account the history and geo-political context of Afghanistan in order to develop a coordinated international effort, aware of local conditions that will increase security in Afghanistan, overcome the Taliban insurgency, eradicate extremist safe havens, and set the grounds for state building and development. This strategy combines an increase in troops, diplomatic pressure, incentives for US partners, and achieving security before development. In order to achieve these objectives in Afghanistan the United States must:

- **Increase troop levels in Afghanistan to a level able to provide security to Afghan citizens and overcome the Taliban insurgency.** Counterinsurgency tactics successful in Iraq must be adopted in Afghanistan including emphasizing man-power over firepower, civilian security, and taking more risk to troops. Troop levels in Afghanistan need to be sustained at a level proven as an effective counterinsurgency effort, and soldiers must be dispersed among civilians and Afghani security forces in order to create trust and cooperation among Afghans and NATO-ISAF troops. The vast and rugged territory, low population density, underdeveloped infrastructure and economy, highly illiterate population, rampant corruption, and large number of sectarian and ethnic divides will pose unique challenges in Afghanistan that will require great attention to local conditions. In addition, the United States and NATO partners must continue to provide more military trainers, funding, and equipment for developing the Afghan National Army and Afghani National Police which, will help to decrease the troop deficit and to begin to create a functioning Afghani security force.

- **Secure the cooperation of the Pakistani government in the fight against terrorism and the Taliban insurgency.** The cooperation of the Pakistani government is vital for combating the Taliban insurgency which relies on cross-border havens to continue attacks in Afghanistan. The US must offer the Pakistani government incentives and resources to combat violent extremism within its borders. Incentives for the Pakistani government to secure the border region and fight violent extremism include developing mutually beneficial intelligence sharing, increasing non-military aid to Pakistan with stipulations that there will be improvements in border security, and shoring up specific deficiencies in the Pakistani military rather than providing blanket military aid. Decreasing the security threat of India will also lessen incentives for the Pakistani government to ally with the Taliban in order to fight India, and will allow Pakistani troops to be redeployed to the Afghan-Pakistan border. To this end, the US government ought to act as a mediator between Pakistan and India in negotiations over Kashmir.
- **Increase intelligence gathering by US and Pakistani forces in order to continue raids and strikes against key al Qa'ida and Taliban extremist leaders, bases, and supply lines.** Covert operations and drone strikes have proven to be successful tactics in eliminating al Qa'ida and Taliban operatives, especially in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US must increase its intelligence at a local level in order to receive even more accurate information to conduct these strikes. In addition, the US must work with the Pakistani government to identify Pakistani officials and officers supportive of extremist organizations in order to gather more accurate intelligence. While a useful tool, drone and aircraft strikes must be employed as a tactic only when lesser force cannot be employed in order to reduce civilian casualties which have caused distrust of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
- **Create alliances with local militias and leaders and mediate power sharing deals between ethnic and sectarian leaders in Afghanistan.** As experienced in

Iraq, co-opting insurgent factions to the counterinsurgency cause is a necessary tactic to achieving stability and overcoming the insurgency. The US should identify differences and divides in the Taliban-led insurgency in order to reconcile Taliban insurgents to become a part of the counterinsurgency effort and exploit the dependency of Afghan leaders on foreign support and aid. Leaders of local militias should be co-opted to fight the insurgency and disenfranchised Pashtuns, who are the greatest supporters of the Taliban, should be offered incentives and pay to become part of security forces and development teams.

- **Develop an international team, including Russia, NATO, and regional allies, intent on winning the war in Afghanistan.** It is not in the interest of the US to conduct a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan without international support by regional actors and NATO allies as counterinsurgency and development is very costly and takes large commitments of troops, and because regional actors could act as spoilers in Afghanistan. A renewed commitment of NATO to the war in Afghanistan, coordination of a secure, hold, and develop policy by all NATO-ISAF and US troops and the reduction of national caveats of NATO troops is necessary to create effective NATO involvement in Afghanistan. Even though NATO allies and the US share many common interests in creating a secure and stable Afghanistan, NATO allies have proven unwilling to offer long term and full support of the counterinsurgency and development operations. If NATO allies continue to be unwilling to take responsibility by becoming effective contributing members of the NATO partnership, the US may wish to withdraw support for installing forward deployed Anti-ballistic defense systems in Poland, the primary goal of such a system being to secure European NATO countries, in order to provide incentive for NATO to rethink its commitment to collective security. To initiate a renewed commitment NATO ought to create a new NATO Alliance Strategic Concept which implicitly states a commitment to equal risk and equal burden and develops a comprehensive strategy to act on areas of mutual interest

shared by the US, NATO allies, and the EU in Afghanistan including eliminating the threat of violent extremist attacks.

- **Establish future supply lines into Afghanistan for troops and supplies.** As the closure of the Manas airbase demonstrates, Russia has the ability to disrupt US operations in Afghanistan. However Russia and the US share common interests in Afghanistan including a fear of violent extremism and therefore Afghanistan could be a site of US-Russian cooperation. The US can offer concessions on NATO expansion into Eastern Europe in order to establish cooperation with Russia and negotiate over the Manas airbase closure and possibility of Russian supply lines. If an agreement between the US, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia cannot be reached over the Manas airbase, alternative routes through Uzbekistan, Germany, or Turkey should be employed.
- **As security is established, promote economic development and the creation of a stable government that provides public goods, security, and economic opportunity for Afghan citizens.** The primary objective of the US in Afghanistan must be security. Political, economic, and social development will only be effective in an environment with reduced violence. Troops in Afghanistan should follow the hold, protect, and deny strategy employed effectively in Iraq. Aid should be given to employ Afghans in security and reconstruction teams, providing employment for Afghans and giving Afghans a stake and active role in securing and developing their country. The eradication of opium production must also be a secondary goal to establishing security as eradication of poppy fields often turns local farmers and militia leaders to the insurgency. After security is established, Afghani political and judicial institutions and Afghani security forces can continue to develop, leading ideally to political reconciliation and development of infrastructure and the economy for a more stable Afghanistan.

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AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: State Building and Reconstruction

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ISSUE: AFGHANISTAN

In relation to US national security interests, the issue in Afghanistan is that the state is extremely unstable, the Taliban is resurging, and the central government lead by Hamid Karzai lacks power and resources. Al Qa'ida and other militant insurgents are exploiting Afghanistan's instability by setting up training camps, and recruiting militant terrorists from rural communities. Furthermore, narcotics trade is rampant and on the rise which provides a steady stream of income for the Taliban who now wield control over 72% of Afghanistan v. 54% only a year ago. Afghanistan is in jeopardy of becoming a failed narco-state that will be a safe haven and hospitable environment for international terrorist organizations (Security, Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance, December 2008). While classic security instruments such as military intervention and intelligence will be necessary in the fight against the Taliban, this paper will focus on other elements such as sustainable job creation, effective counter-narcotics policy, and the development of a rule of law which should also be seen as key security instruments in the long-term fight against terrorism.


Political Sphere

There are many concerns surrounding the political environment in Afghanistan, which contribute to a lack of power and lack of perceived legitimacy for Hamid Karzai's nascent government. First and foremost, there is wide-spread corruption within the government which contributes to a negative perception, lack of legitimacy and renders the task of winning the "hearts and minds" of the Afghani population substantially more difficult (Aras & Toktas, 2008). The corruption and subsequently induced negative perception of the Afghani governing bodies has created conditions favorable to terrorists, who exploit these perceptions in an effort to win support from local tribesmen and warlords. The Iraqi government is composed of a President, a House of People (Wolesi Jirga) and House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga) and a Supreme Court. To illustrate the scope of corruption within the Assembly, there are 24 criminal gang members, 40 commanders with relations to militia forces, 17 drug smugglers, 19 war criminals, and 50% former Mujahideen fighters (Aras & Toktas, 2008). Corruption within the House of Elders and

House of People further exacerbates both the narcotics trade issue, and tribal factionalism which prevents Afghani's from forming a national identity.

Compounded with a corrupt government is a weak and corrupt police force and a complete lack of institutions, primarily judicial institutions. "The almost total absence of well-trained and accountable judiciary has led to a culture of security violations and impunity. Criminal acts do not reach the courts, and crimes go unpunished"(World Bank). Despite the establishment of an independent judiciary which assures that all laws and legislation are in accordance with Islamic principles, the judiciary is wholly ineffective due to the limited source of trained judges in Afghanistan. Twenty-three years of war and a prolonged lack of education and institutions has left Afghanistan with a dearth of educated individuals, many of whom are trained solely in Islamic law (Sharia). In most tribal areas, low level judges are extremely under-qualified and local law, Islamic law, and application of Taliban laws is still customary (Aras & Toktas, 2008).

Finally, the political process in Afghanistan is largely ineffective due to deep regional and ethnic divides, a lack of national identity, and lack of national language. Afghanistan is divided into 7 main ethnic groups, many of which speak their own distinct language and do not identify themselves as "Afghans". The Pashtun and Tajik populations which are dominant prefer a strong centralized state although the Tajiks would like more power in the central government. The Hazara and Uzbek populations however, demand decentralized, regional authority and recognition of their separate identities (Aras & Toktas, 2008). Even within these ethnic groups, tribes have formed and years of war, turmoil and strife have activated a return to local legality, and a deep sense of tribal, communal identities.



Economic Sphere

The main sources of revenue in Afghanistan are opium production and foreign aid. Currently, 70 % of the Afghan population survives on 1\$ per day, while paying an average of 100\$ per year in bribes to the Taliban or local government and police forces (Zakaria, 2009). Foreign aid is the readiest source of income, however due to stealing and mismanagement only ½ of the money goes into local projects, and ¼ of foreign aid is actually distributed into the countryside to the Afghani citizens (Zakaria, 2009). The Taliban, benefitting from the lack of control in the central government and instability across Afghanistan, has been able to profit from foreign aid, and opium production which consequently strengthens their ability to recruit army forces, and provide much-needed social services in rural areas, ultimately bolstering their support. Through the use of violence, Taliban army members are able to extract both foreign aid, and narcotics profits from local populations with ease and impunity. It has been said that the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, and degeneration into a failed narco-state is a “worse cancer than terrorism” (Aras & Toktas, 2008). Not only does poppy trade fund global terrorism and the resurging Taliban regime, the Afghani opium production also accounts for 75% of the heroin on the global market, and 95% of European heroin (Zakaria, 2009). Currently, the violence and instability, lack of governmental control, as well as lack of tax revenue, has made economic development in Afghanistan virtually impossible.

Infrastructure and Social Services

Many political and economic issues which detract from the security and stability of Afghanistan are resultant from a lack of infrastructure, and a lack of social services. For example, while legal agricultural alternatives to poppy production exist, a major infrastructure and pre-financing effort would need to be undertaken in order to make legal agriculture a feasible alternative. Currently, pre-financing of poppy growth is undertaken 1 year in advance by the Taliban, and transportation of opium is carried out by the Taliban and drug smugglers (Zakaria, 2009). Realistically, in order to successfully substitute poppy growth with legal agriculture, pre-financing of roads, fertilization and irrigation systems, storage units, and cooling units needs to commence immediately. This lack of basic infrastructure makes alternative economic options impossible for rural Afghans.

Lack of education and health services is also contributing to instability and a stalled political process for a multitude of reasons. Notably, the lack of education makes engaging in the political process substantially more difficult, and thus renders rural Afghani's susceptible to manipulation by Taliban and militia forces. The prolonged lack of education has also contributed to the stagnant economic development, and a lack of qualified Afghani's for government positions.

More importantly, a lack of civic support, infrastructure building, and social services has caused extreme resentment towards the United States by the Afghani population, as well as a vacuum that the Taliban and Al Qa'ida have successfully exploited. "In Afghanistan we failed to deliver on a post-Taliban peace dividend that provided good governance, basic justice, security and services" writes Robert Pape in reference to lessons learned in the last 8 years (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). The United States has failed time and again to deliver on democracy's promises in Afghanistan, and we are now suffering the consequences of this failure. Elections alone will not suffice. The Afghani population craves social services, education, a working economy, institutions, and most importantly, opportunities for the future. The toppling of the Taliban and lack of state-

building which followed has left Afghani's with a very negative perception of the US, which perhaps may never be repaired.

BACKGROUND

The story of Afghanistan is extremely tragic, as it is one of the most beleaguered, war-torn and impoverished nations in the world. The nation has been beset by invasion, external pressure and internal upheaval since the early 19th century, with little changing except regimes, and the weaponry they use to gain power. For the purposes of US national security strategy, it is most prudent to examine the past 25 years of Afghani history, and US involvement in the region.

Historically, the United States has failed to recognize the importance of nation-building in Afghanistan, and has focused almost entirely on military strategy and security, neglecting to invest in much-needed socio-political and economic institutions which could have provided Afghani's with long-term stability and a chance for democracy (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). "In [Afghanistan and Pakistan], the United States has also often created a false choice between democracy and security by not recognizing that improved security is not just attained through military means, but may require gaining public support through a more just governing system and improvement in people's lives" (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). Most notably in 1989, the United States squandered an opportunity to create a lasting influence in Afghanistan after funding and providing weapons to the Mujahedeen (Islamic guerilla forces) in a successful military effort against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. After providing training, funding, and what equated to billions of dollars of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry to Mujahedeen mercenaries, the US Congress abruptly lost interest and exited Afghanistan, and the country disintegrated into a bloody, civil war which lasted until the Pakistani backed Taliban took power in 1996. It was during this violent period between 1989 and 1996 that warlords brought terror to the countryside, as they vied for power and ruthlessly attempted to expand their fiefdoms by challenging neighboring rivals. It is

estimated that one warlord, Barhanuddin Rabbani killed over 60,000 Afghani's during his reign, and thousands of women were raped. This factionalism and warlord rivalry is relevant to the current war, as a return to these tribes and warlord locales is occurring as a direct result of the government inadequacies and US invasion (Aras & Toktas, 2008).

Since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, both Al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other insurgency forces have slowly gained power throughout Afghanistan, and the US has been increasingly losing both the ideological and military battle. First, the US is battling the Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Omar who is acting independently outside of the country. It is estimated the Taliban has recruited an active army of 5,000 young foot soldiers from inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, but commands a total fighting force of up to 20,000 people, largely derived from ethnic Pashtuns in the south and eastern parts of Afghanistan (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). According to the International Council on Security the Taliban currently controls 72% of Afghanistan, up from 54% only a year ago. Of the 4 highways leading into Kabul, Taliban forces are now in control of 3 out of 4 (Security, Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance, December 2008).

Beyond the Taliban fighting forces, Al Qa'ida has set up training camps in Afghanistan which are becoming increasingly sophisticated, causing Al Qa'ida in Afghanistan to operate more as a force multiplier than a fighting force in its own right. "Numbering in the region no more than a few hundred Arabs from various countries, they provide training, technical expertise, some planning, motivation, ideological rigor, and to some degree, financing" (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). There is no shortage of young, radicalized men in Afghanistan, and these training facilities and support systems from Al Qa'ida serve to fill the gap between radicalized youth, and violent insurgent.

In addition, the ISAF is also combating insurgents backed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and another group under the leadership of the Haqqani family. Both insurgents have sanctuaries within Pakistan, and are the two "best-equipped and motivated forces behind the insurgency" (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). While the commanding forces of Al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and the growing insurgents may still be

smaller than the ITAF forces in Afghanistan, the main problem is the readiness of Afghani youth to ally themselves with the Taliban, or other anti-US forces. As Marc Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute explains, “In Afghanistan, who’s tribal areas are extremely disadvantaged, many are motivated to join the Taliban as fighters simply because they are paid, usually paid more than the policemen and the soldiers who are fighting them.

Additionally, these Afghans are attracted by the Taliban’s contention that they are fighting against outsiders, against occupation, and that Islam is under attack. They are made to feel that their honor and that of their family is at stake. In a tribal society, honor ranks as the most important value. Although it is not ordinarily considered Islamic to kill innocents, violence is justified as the only option against those who accept the occupiers” (Pape & Weinbaum, 2008). According to John Esposito and Dalia Mogahead who extensively analyzed Gallup poll statistical data, one of the main differences between politically radicalized and politically moderate Muslims is that the radicalized convey a sense of occupation or domination by the US, and a consequent sense of powerlessness which drives them to rationalize jihad, based on their Islamic principles.

“When asked to define their greatest fears about the future of their country, the politically radicalized most frequently cite interference in their internal affairs by other countries, national security, colonization, intrusion, occupation, manipulation, the fear that ‘might is right,’ and US dominance. In contrast, moderates rank economic problems as their top concern” (Esposito & Mogahead, 2008). In Afghanistan, it seems that prolonged poverty, strife, and warfare coupled with a perceived domination by the US and enticing opportunities, financial benefits, and social services offered by the non-state actors has created a climate where political radicalization thrives.

INTERESTS

The United States immediate interests in Afghanistan cannot be underestimated. In the “war on terror” Afghanistan has been deemed the central front, and many Afghani and

national security experts believe that without substantial progress in the next 12 months, Afghanistan may devolve into a failed state which is beyond repair (Fick & Nagl, 2009). If either Afghanistan or Pakistan succumbs to radicalized forces, the result will be a regional destabilization of both countries, one of which is nuclear-armed. Furthermore, as the central source of opium production, the narco-trade in Afghanistan is largely contributing to the ability of outside terrorist organizations to finance their operations. A destabilized, failed Afghanistani narco-state will undoubtedly become a safe haven for terrorists, providing a large pool of dissatisfied, uneducated, impoverished youth who resent and despise the United States. Furthermore, the Afghan-Pakistan border will become increasingly radicalized and unstable which will affect the entire region. While it is in our immediate interest to use military force, intelligence, police forces and counter-insurgency tactics to root out violent insurgents who threaten destabilization, it is also in our long-term interest to provide Afghanistan with the political and economic foundation which will allow for sustainable security and stability. Winning the hearts, minds, and trust of the Afghan population will be a key instrument to ensuring lasting peace, and the future repudiation of Taliban extremism.

OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is critical in Afghanistan for a two-pronged approach to be taken with respect to security and stability. Neither stability nor security can be reached without both a military effort, and a reconstruction effort, both of which will complement one another. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on state-building and reconstruction activities that can be used to promote economic growth, provide opportunities for Afghani's outside of poppy production, while creating stability, civil society, and a national identity. Stability and opportunities inside Afghanistan will undermine sub-state actors and the Taliban, and remove a main source of strife which they have exploited and manipulated to attract foot soldiers. Additionally, a lack of a national identity or any sense of unity in Afghanistan is making it difficult for the government to exert control, or be perceived as legitimate by

the people. This is exacerbated by the fact that the government is unable to provide basic social services, institutions, or infrastructure that is desperately needed throughout the countryside, causing the citizens to further lose faith in the promise of democracy.

Economic Sphere

The international community's policy in Afghanistan must be to bring about the conditions in which social and economic development can ultimately be created and sustained by the Afghans themselves. The international community's strategy in Afghanistan must be a serious commitment to improve the lives of Afghans in an immediate and substantial manner. This is essential in counteracting the Taliban's propaganda against the West and the Afghan Government. A coherent hearts and minds strategy to address the poverty in Afghanistan's provinces will help international troops achieve their mission of a stable and secure Afghanistan.

The total lack of economic opportunity and endemic poverty throughout the country must be addressed through reconstruction projects, and eradication of the poppy trade. There are many options of legal agriculture that could replace the narco-trade which is financing terrorism, and fomenting government corruption, however to implement them there needs to be an investment in infrastructure and institutions. Potential agricultural replacements to poppy trade include: weaving, cotton, fruit, and wheat, peanuts and vegetable seeds, however an investment in storage units, cooling units, irrigation and fertilization equipment, and roads for transportation of the products need to be pre-financed before legal agriculture can be a viable option (Barry & Thomas, 2009).

The current policy of forced poppy crop eradication destroys the source of income for Afghani's without providing them with an alternative livelihood. In this context, the Taliban has managed to present itself as a protector of local livelihoods by allowing opium production to continue in the areas under its control (Security, December 2008). Furthermore, offering Afghani's the opportunity to partake in reconstruction of their own communities, and a path to a stronger, more diverse economy will show that Americans

are committed to Afghani long-term success, and help us win the battle of “hearts and minds”. Institution of economic development programs however, must follow the “clearing” of insurgents from an area, as setbacks to progress by insurgents will be costly and poor for morale. The inclusion of local leaders and community members into the reconstruction process will also help deter insurgent or Taliban destruction of infrastructure. Insurgents and Taliban forces know that destroying schools or roads which are built locally and provide opportunities for Afghani’s only lessens support for their cause. This is evidenced by the fact that almost none of the schools constructed through the National Solidarity Program have been destroyed, due to the fact that Taliban forces know that local civilians contribute capital, labor and materials to these projects and they would lose allies by destructing them (Fick & Nagl, 2009).

While opium production has been on the rise in Afghanistan since 2005, there have been areas in the northern and eastern regions where a successful partnership between USAID and local provincial governors has resulted in a reduction in poppy production (USAID, 2008). USAID alternative development programs provide the basic economic incentives needed for farmers and laborers to successfully avoid or abandon poppy production, including access to seeds, fertilizers, market roads, and improved irrigation. The north and east, which were formerly poppy-rich areas, have been supported by USAID in their dramatic shift away from poppy in terms of access to short-term employment as well as development focused on the longer-term needs of these agriculturally-rich and strategic provinces.

According to USAID, in the formerly poppy-rich northern and eastern provinces of Badakshan, Takhar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan, “USAID-funded programs paid approximately \$22 million to 209,000 Afghans to build or repair 700 km of roads and nearly 3,300 km of irrigation and drainage canals. As a result of this work, over 197,000 hectares of farmland are now under improved irrigation and farmers have better access to local and regional markets.” Decreases in violence in these regions, as well as a commitment to forging partnerships with local leaders were the key to the

success of the projects in these areas. (USAID, 2008)

In the case of Badakhshan province, local governors such as Majid Abdul reached out to community leaders in the province, and convinced many to forgo poppy production and take part in USAID programs, such as Cash-for-Work, Seed programs, Alternative Livelihood programs, or the Islamic Investment and Finance Cooperative (USAID, 2008). If funding and support for such programs could be increased, and supported by NATO allies as well as the US, then similar results could be achieved throughout Afghanistan after the Taliban is driven from the provinces.

A key to the success of these projects has been the willingness of provincial governors and leaders to cooperate with NATO and ISAF forces, and travel throughout the province making the case for legal agriculture. A local leader speaking directly with local farmers has been exponentially more effective than U.S.-led anti-narcotics team. Furthermore, after the provinces have begun eradicating poppy growth, reconstruction efforts have begun such as a small electricity plant in Badakhshan which is currently providing enough electricity for one light bulb per household per day, and working to increase capacity. (USAID, 2008)

To achieve the goal of poppy eradication and economic diversification it will be necessary to:

Provide Alternative Economic Opportunities:

Elimination of the opium trade is a critical step towards the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan. The Afghani population will require assistance in diversifying their economy, however if economic opportunity can be jumpstarted by the US and international community, this will demonstrate that we are committed to the livelihood and well-being of Afghani's, and provide an alternative to supporting the Taliban. This will be a lengthy process, which must begin after trust has been built between NATO and ISAF forces and local leaders, and after a province has been secured. Creating a sustainable economy in Afghanistan will require a multi-step approach:

- **Diversify the Afghan economy** by promoting legal forms of agriculture to diminish illegal narcotics trade. This can be achieved by:
 - **Extending small loans and vouchers to farmers who agree to switch from poppy growth to a legal form of agriculture**, as well as technical assistance during harvest season, and fertilization assistance.
 - **Requiring farmers to repay loans, and place repayment in a community development fund which is managed and overseen by cooperative provincial governors**, and local community leaders. USAID should assist leaders in utilizing funds effectively for reconstruction projects, and agricultural development
 - **Utilization of local radio stations to disseminate retail and wholesale market price information** as to facilitate sale of legal agriculture at fair market prices
 - **Assisting in coordination of farmers with retailers to facilitate sales of legal agriculture** and jumpstart business relationships necessary for successful legal agricultural sale, and assist in providing basic agricultural tools (tractors, plows, etc).
 - **Promoting economic opportunities via local radio stations, and by building partnerships with community leaders and clerics.** Radio stations are the best option for dissemination of information due to the need for electricity and low literacy rate in rural Afghanistan.

Build Partnerships

US, NATO and ISAF forces must build partnerships and win the support of provincial leaders, such as governors and clerics, and offer incentives for provinces which successfully diminish poppy production. As in Iraq, identifying potential partners in Afghanistan will be crucial to winning the support the Afghan population (Fick & Nagl, 2009). Farmers are unlikely to be convinced by NATO or ISAF forces to participate in economic development programs unless they are supported by trusted community leaders. Provincial leaders who are able to bring security, stability, opportunity and foreign aid to their provinces will gain support which will be necessary to win future elections, and the US must work to gain their trust, and show that it is in their best interest to cooperate.

Expanding Upon Current Successful Programs

Rather than re-inventing the wheel, programs which have already been tried and tested should be implemented in newly secured areas. While an increase in funding for such projects will be necessary, ensuring transparency, oversight and effective utilization of reconstruction will also be vital. Funds should not be distributed to government officials, but instead should be overseen by post reconstruction team members on the ground, and with coordination between USAID workers, PRT's, and local leaders. There will need to be strict oversight, inspection teams, and quarterly reports detailing how funds are being distributed and spent, and where progress is being made. It is recommended that:

- **NATO, the EU, and the U.N. should work to expand all current successful crop substitution, cash-for-work, Alternative Livelihood and microfinance programs and aggressively promote programs via local radio stations and with the help of local leaders**
 - **Local leaders must identify specific needs within each community**, and work in partnership with reconstruction teams to fill these needs.
 - **Hire Afghans** to participate in all reconstruction projects within their own community.
 - **FDI should be used only jumpstart reconstruction projects**, with sub-contracts being offered to Afghan companies
 - **An Afghan Community Fund should be set up in each province** where positive actions by the Afghan public would be rewarded by mutual investment by the government, and the international community. The leadership of these Funds should be comprised of Post Reconstruction Team leaders, provincial elected officials, and community leaders such as shura or clerics. Funds should be utilized for infrastructure projects, as well as distributed as a small loan to Afghani's who demonstrate a commitment to legal agriculture or small business entrepreneurship (Security, Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance, December 2008).

Help Fund Reconstruction

These efforts should be financed first by the United States and NATO allies, and should be an expansion of successful USAID programs and Provincial Reconstruction Team work. As Afghanistan becomes more secure and stable and the economy begins to thrive, responsibility can shift from the United States to the provincial governors to finance reconstruction projects.

Political Sphere

Economic recovery in Afghanistan cannot take place without simultaneous political reform. Currently, the Afghani population has little faith in Hamid Karzai's government, because they have yet to see tangible results that effect their daily lives and well-being. Economic recovery will provide many of the desired changes, but a more inclusive, stronger centralized government that is absent of corruption is necessary as well. Many political issues in Afghanistan are catalyzed by two specific problems that must be addressed: a failing judiciary, and corruption. These issues must be addressed simultaneously, as they are exacerbated by one another. It is key that the government has the ability to dispense justice which is perceived as fair, legitimate, and in accordance with Afghan cultural norms. Currently, Afghanistan has two justice systems: a formal state system, and an informal traditional system. To have an effective judiciary, it is essential that these two systems are folded into one, which reflects both formal state law and traditionally observed Afghani law. The successful melding of formal and traditional law will serve to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal system, and decrease confusion. After the Taliban is expelled militarily, and a new leader has been chosen after elections in the summer, the US should use every means necessary to pressure the government to make significant judicial reforms, and dispel corrupt members of the government.

Traditional Justice System

Traditional justice mechanisms in Afghanistan operate through two key informal institutions – *jirga* and *shura*. The *jirga* is an institution unique to the Pashtun people. It is a community-based process for collective decision making and is often used as a dispute settlement mechanism, including imposing agreed sanctions and using tribal forces to enforce its decisions. The term *shura* refers to a group of elders who make decisions on behalf of the community they represent. A quarter of a century of civil strife in Afghanistan weakened not only the central state but also its various systems such as

the formal justice system, which meant that people relied more on the informal justice system to resolve their disputes (Senier, 2006). The weakness, if not virtual non-existence of state systems during this period ensured the continued salience of the informal traditional system. The use of *shura* to dispense justice at local levels was also endorsed by the Taliban during their period in power (Rennie, 2008). Due to the geographic terrain, lack of roads, and lack of central authority, the informal justice system has been retained throughout many parts of Afghanistan, even as a formal justice system emerged, and it is largely viewed as more effective and trustworthy.

Formal Justice System

The current justice system in Afghanistan was institutionalized in 2001, as a result of the Bonn Framework, and it worked to further the secularization of the law, as well as integrate human rights and international standards of procedures into the justice process. Currently, the Supreme Court is appointed by the President, with nine members who serve 10 year terms. (Senier, 2006) Under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are high and appeals courts, which exist in every province. The high and appeals courts at local levels however, are lacking in trained jurists and often succumb to pressure from local leaders, or abide by local traditional law. Furthermore, rampant corruption within the government causes the courts to be rendered illegitimate by many Afghans. (Senier, 2006)

According to a study performed between 2006 and 2008, 46% of the population believes the state courts are effective at delivering justice, while 74% believe the traditional system is fair. (Rennie, 2008) It is also interesting to note that the utilization of traditional courts and state systems differs depending on what type of case is being pursued. Often times, Afghans consider the potential outcome of utilizing the *jirga* and *shura* forms of dispute resolution, as well as the state system and make a decision as to where to take their case. Other times, when the party is not satisfied with the state or traditional system, they will take up their case once again with the other system in hopes

of achieving a better result. No system holds a higher authority than the other, and often-times the *shura* communicate with *jurists* about disputes, working together to come to a resolution.

It is essential in Afghanistan that rule of law be established, and a functioning, accessible judiciary exist which can combat crime and corruption. It will be necessary for the US government to pressure the Afghan government to make reforms to the judiciary, and start tackling corruption. Afghanistan is highly dependent upon foreign aid, and after security is established this can be used as leverage to convince the government to begin reforms. It will also be essential that the government wins the support of the Afghani population, and the US and international community should help ensure that August 2009 elections are fair, transparent, and free of violence. The following recommendations will help create a foundation for a sustainable democracy in the future:

- **The US should assist in restructuring the Afghan Ministry of Justice and establishing plurality between state and customary law.** Reform of the state system, construction of judicial buildings in each province, and education of trained and competent jurists, and construction of roads from rural areas to judicial institutions will be costly, and require a long time commitment. In the interim, the traditional system should be slightly modified and institutionalized so that some form of law can be dispensed effectively by the government. This can be achieved by pressuring the current government to:
 - **Formalize and institutionalize customary law**, overseen by Supreme Court
 - Set minimal standards of procedure for customary courts
 - **Formalize which types of disputes are settled by the Jirga and Shura, and which are settled through state system**
 - Land disputes, commercial disputes, minor criminal disputes should be overseen by the Shura and Jirga councils. Currently, the Afghans overwhelmingly turn to the Jirga councils for these types of disputes, both out of convenience and accessibility, and because they trust the local shura and have traditionally relied upon them for these types of dispute resolution (Rennie, 2008).
 - Serious criminal disputes, gender based disputes, disputes of national interest should be relegated to the state system.
 - **Customary law decisions should be eligible for dispute in state courts**, with appeals venue chosen by parties

- **The US should assist in educating Shura on adherence to human rights standards** and provide incentives for application of these standards in customary law
- **The U.S should support and provide funding for local civic groups which are inclusive** of women, youth and minorities, provide civic group leaders with the opportunity to work in small provincial offices which oversee human rights complaints. This will provide a check on the traditional legal system.
- **Pressure the Afghan government and the Supreme Court to remove and prosecute corrupt members** of the Afghan government, offering positive incentives for progress, and intelligence assistance in determining which members of the government are corrupt
- **Promote upcoming elections aggressively through local radio stations**, and encourage known cooperative tribal and provincial leaders to become more active in the political process
- **Pressure the United Nations to deploy the Rapid Response Force during the August 2009 elections** to assure that elections are fair, transparent and free of violence
- **Build an extremist rehabilitation center in Afghanistan** and institute comprehensive and aggressive rehabilitation programs for radicalized youth. Pressure the judiciary and government to require known extremist youth to undergo rehabilitation
- **Encourage the Afghan government to reach out to war-lords and militia members** and offer amnesty and employment in Afghan army or police force in return for renunciation of extremist ideology, and completion of rehabilitation programs

While there remains a long road ahead in Afghanistan before the area is secured and stable, a nuanced approach which couples security with a bottom up development strategy will be the best way to achieve success. Partnerships and trust building between US forces, aid organizations and local community members will be essential to ensure that development and stability can be lasting and effective.

CURRENT ISSUE: IRAQ

With respect to the national security of the United States, the security and stability of Iraq is of utmost importance. Iraq is currently a fledgling democracy with deep ethnic divides, a lack of national identity and civil society, in an unstable, critical region of the world. Additionally, Iraq is a symbol of US ideological superiority, and military strength,

and a descent into chaos in Iraq would forever stain the reputation of the US in this region. The ongoing mayhem in Iraq has halted reconstruction efforts, delayed a return to normalcy for local communities, intensified tensions between international occupying forces and Iraqis and created a power vacuum of lawlessness and chaos. At the same time, Iraq's nascent civil society is slowly working to shift the atmosphere towards a democratic framework. Despite the current and long term challenges facing the US and Iraq, a motivated Iraqi citizenry has surfaced even while extremists attempt to impose their agenda upon the society. The task before the US and Iraq is to maintain security and order within Iraq, and rebuild the economy and civil society so that Iraqis may freely enjoy the benefits of their newfound, emerging democracy; a shining example in the chaotic unstable region.

Political Sphere

Politically, Iraq's most significant challenge in the coming years will be to maintain a strong, credible democracy in the face of sectarian divides and foreign fighters that threaten to destabilize the government. The country of Iraq is made up of approximately 60% Shiite Muslims, 30% Sunni, and 10% Kurds (CIA.gov). Under Saddam Hussein's secular, Ba'ath party rule, both the Shiite population and Kurdish populations were marginalized, and violently oppressed due to Saddam's fear of independence movements, or being overthrown. This repression of the populations has caused deep rooted resentment, and a desire for revenge which is especially prevalent between Sunnis and Shiites. In combination with pre-existing sectarian divisions, the US led invasion in 2003, and chaos which ensued has caused the Iraqi population to retreat into ethnic forms of identification rather than a form a sense of national Iraqi identity. In the coming years, it will be critical to establish a national identity that is unrelated to religious and ethnic differences, as well as a civil society where discourse between can occur and common ground can be reached. Within the government, a concerted effort to include Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turkmens in representative proportions must be made, and they must also be included in the army and other ministries of the government.

As evidenced by the largely successful provincial elections on January 31, 2009, Iraqis are eager and willing to participate in democratic elections, and as civil society begins to flourish, and economic opportunity, education, and security are on the rise, they begin to focus on political development and engaging in the democratic political system (Rubin, 2009).

On January 31st, with a turnout of 51% in the provincial elections, Iraqi citizens largely rejected religious zealots for more secular parties, and showed support for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal Al Maliki's Dawa Party. Parties such as the Supreme Council, which relied heavily on a Shiite religious identity during the campaign lost seats even in Baghdad, while the Iraqi National List led by Ayad Allawi won surprising gains in multiple provinces. " 'This really reflects that Iraqi society is looking for alternatives — they do not necessarily believe that the Islamists should lead the country,' said Qassim Daoud, a member of Parliament and one of the leaders of an independent, secular-leaning party. 'The public are interested in services, and this election has shown them that they can change anything by democratic means if they are not satisfied.' Members of another independent party, the National Reformation Movement, expressed similar views. 'At least we will get some seats and we will make alliances with other blocs,' said Moad al-Obaidi, a party member" (Rubin, 2009). With the recent military successes and quelling of violence in Iraqi, the nation has finally reached a long-awaited turning point where the fruits of democracy can finally be felt by the people, and they can begin to see the benefits of representative government. This democracy is young, and fragile, and the task at hand will be to ensure that is strong, and legitimate enough to survive on its own after the inevitable reduction in US troops, and amidst regional pressures and instability.

Economic Sphere

Economically, Iraq is blessed with more natural resources than many other Middle Eastern countries. While Iraq's economy is capable of flourishing thanks to oil fields, these oil fields are not evenly dispersed throughout the country, and have served to create a source of tension between ethnic groups. Oil fields are concentrated in the southern-

most point of Iraq, with 71% of oil fields in Basra, Mesan and Nisiriya provinces, which are divided between Sunni and Shiite populations. 12% of the oil fields are also located in northern Iraq, within Kirkuk province which is largely Kurdish (Mehaidi, 2006).

Distribution of oil wealth throughout the country, and exploration of oil fields in other provinces will be necessary to prevent a total breakdown of the government, and an increase in ethnic tensions and violence. It is absolutely critical that oil profits are distributed to all provinces, and the central government maintains a strong authority over oil fields and oil production. Furthermore, strong security around oil fields will need to be provided as Coalition forces drawdown, as violence surrounding the fields is a major threat to Iraqi stability.

Beyond oil production, other economic opportunities must be provided for the Iraqi population, especially with respect to the much-needed reconstruction of their own country. Allowing the Iraqi population to finance and take part in Iraqi reconstruction efforts will help foster a sense of ownership and national identity, while simultaneously providing jobs and opportunities for the Iraqi citizenry. Iraq is at an advantage because its population is relatively educated, capable of business administration, banking, and economic activity. The economy however, has been decimated and extremely stagnant as a result of the US invasion, insurgency and chaos, corruption, and US reconstruction contracting to non-Iraqi companies.

Civil Society

In Iraq, the linchpin of democracy will be a flourishing civil society. Currently, the civil society and public sphere are slowly emerging, and need to be nurtured and supported by the US and international community. Civil society creates a space for discourse, which does not necessarily revolve around ethnic or religious identities, and can be used to mitigate violence and pursue compromise. Furthermore, by working together through non-governmental organizations, Iraqi citizens can come to respect other ethnicities, and understand them through the vehicles of commonality. This will consequently help alleviate sectarian tensions and foster a national identity (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2008).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Much of the current skepticism about democracy's long-term viability in Iraq is based on the assumption that the country has no foundation to build on, no history of civil society or plurality, or a politically aware citizenry. Most skeptics only point to sectarian divisions between the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish regions of Iraq, and argue that the ethnic rifts are too deep to withstand a Coalition withdrawal and sustain democracy themselves. A historical perspective of Iraq however, paints a different picture. While sectarian divisions may exist, such arguments ignore the traditions of moderate civil society and cultural pluralism that existed before the Ba'ath Party took power in 1968, and "that remained, albeit dormant, during 25 years of repression" (Stanski, 2005). Post World War I Iraq under the rule of the Hashemite monarchy enjoyed a rich and varied society of ethnic inclusiveness, artistic freedom, civic involvement, and social justice. A nationalist movement against British rule in Iraq forged partnerships between Sunni, Shiite Arabs in 1920, during which Sunni and Shiite took part in demonstrations together, prayed in each others mosques, and united around a common Iraqi identity and cause. While the nationalist movement lost the battle against the British, the subsequent Hashemite monarchy which was installed in 1921 was still committed to a secure and inclusive Iraq (Stanski, 2005). During the Hashemite monarchy a flourishing Iraq civil society emerged with the formation of numerous professional associations, including a highly respected legal profession, a vibrant press, political parties, artist ateliers, writers associations, labor unions, and an extensive coffeehouse culture (Davis, 2003).

This nascent civil society expanded greatly after the end of World War II. During the 1950s, large numbers of Iraqis participated in Iraqi politics through the many new political parties, such as the National Democratic and Independence parties formed after the war. In 1954, with the temporary relaxation of state control, a coalition of Iraqi nationalists and moderate Pan-Arabists competed in the June elections, running a highly

professional campaign and scoring impressive victories in 13 of the country's most important electoral districts in 2 of Iraq's main cities, Baghdad and Mosul (Davis, 2003). During this time there were also great strides in literature such as the Free Verse Movement and other artistic breakthroughs (Davis, 2003).

In 1958 the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown and from 1958 until his execution by the Ba'athist Regime in 1963, Abdal-Karim Quasim was the only modern ruler of Iraq who refused to exploit sectarian division for political ends, and tried to provide Iraqi's with land reform, social justice, peace and stability. Following the rise of Ba'ath party, and Saddam Hussein's rise to power in 1979, the middle class was decimated as well as economic diversity and the burgeoning business class, while the vast majority of wage-earning Iraqi's become employees of the state. "In such an environment, traditional groupings based on kinship and religion gained preeminence; Iraqis turned to their tribes and religious sects for protection in the face of a ruthless and arbitrary regime" writes Victoria Stanski of the Journal of Third World Studies (Stanski, 2005). In such a volatile, repressive environment only networks based upon religions and ethnicity survived while independent civil society vanished and has remained dormant for the past 3 decades.

Despite the repressive rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime, the democratic government which was formed in 1991 in the Kurdish region following the Gulf War "boasted of parliamentary elections, ideologically diverse press, new schools and cultural and political tolerance" (Stanski, 2005). The Kurdish experience and dedication to democracy despite Saddam Hussein's economic embargo and hostility from neighboring countries shows that Iraqis desire for democracy was not entirely suppressed by Saddam Hussein.

After ousting Saddam Hussein in 2003, a Coalition Provisional Authority was named the temporary governing body under United Nations Resolution 1438, and a 25 member Iraqi Governing Council served as the interim representative governing body. The CPA then turned over power to the Iraqi government in June, 2004, and by 2006 the

Iraqi Constitution ensured that Iraqi was a constitutional representative democracy with a federal system of governance (Affairs, 2008). Currently, the government consists of an Executive Branch which is comprised of Presidents and Ministers, a Legislative Branch which consists of the Council of Representatives, and the Judicial Branch (Affairs, 2008).

As discussed in the previous “Issue” section of this report, Iraq moves towards a more secure state, and the government gains trust and provides opportunities for Iraqi’s, the Iraqi citizenry is slowly returning to the pre-Ba’athist era in which civil society grew, and ethnic diversity was tolerated. Women’s organizations, in particular, have shown a greater shift towards democratization, inclusiveness, and prevention of violent conflict by coming together to address their regional and national interests and to take part in the political process.

Furthermore, it appears that as progress is made in both security and infrastructure, building, the Iraqi citizenry which was once opposed to Coalition forces now see US assistance as an asset to the restructuring of their nation. As General Petraeus explains, “ In Iraq, (reconciliation) was aided by gradual recognition that al Qa’ida brought nothing but indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and an extremist ideology to which the people really didn’t subscribe. Beyond that, incentives were created to persuade the insurgents that it made more sense to support the new Iraq” (Fick & Nagl, 2009). In Iraq, reconciliation is certainly plausible and the emergence of the Sons of Iraq during the Sunni Awakening Movement shows that gradually, Iraqi’s are becoming interested in investing in the “new Iraq”, which is stable, secure and democratic, and they will reject the extremist ideology and violence associated with such ideology. It is important to keep in mind, that while this process will be long and require a supporting commitment from the United States and international community, it is not entirely absent of a historical foundation from which to launch from. Skeptics should examine the history of Iraq, and understand that the ethnic and regional strife and violence is rooted largely in the repressiveness of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and can be

reconciled gradually as Iraqi's reinvest in their future, form a national identity, and create spaces in which non-violent dispute resolution can occur and tolerance can be promoted.

INTEREST

The US has a strong national security interest Iraq, which is central to the war on terror as well as the stability of the Middle East. A stable and secure and democratic Iraq, is critical to the national security interests of the United States. While Iraq is currently experiencing a lull in violence, and a downturn in insurgency, a return to previous levels of violence and extremist influence is not a scenario the US can allow. Failure in Iraq would not only damage the reputation of the US in the region, it would also be perceived as a failure of democracy, and a failed test of our nation's founding principles. Furthermore, US military superiority, and our nations stamina for prolonged military operations would be questioned throughout the region. Iraq's proximity to the unstable, anti-American Islamist Iranian regime also makes it of utmost importance to the U.S, as a spill-over of Iranian ideology into Iraq would destabilize the entire region, and likely increase terrorist activity. The goal in the United States must not be precipitous withdrawal, but must be success. The United States has invested far too much of her blood and treasure in Iraq to jeopardize success with an early withdrawal, and thus we must be careful to support Iraqi institutions, and train the Iraqi police force so that they can sustain their own peace and security in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS

Political Sphere

The transformation from an authoritarian regime to successful democracy is challenging in any nation, but Iraq's lack of strong institutions, civil society, and ethnic divisions makes the task considerably more daunting. Power sharing and integration within the government are essential to quelling ethnic tensions, and providing for a fair and just political system. Within the army and police force, it is essential the all ethnicities are provided equal opportunities for employment and that the selection process

is perceived as fair and transparent. The Sunni Awakening Movement which is largely attributed to the success of the “surge” represents both a potential opportunity for reconciliation and inclusion, as well as a potential threat to stability. The Sons of Iraq have been receiving paychecks from the United States in return for working to oust militias and insurgents from their communities. They have received training in security, and are largely responsible for the changing tide in Iraq during 2008, which has led to the increasingly secure environment which exists today. As the United States begins to drawdown troops, and support for Iraq, it will be critical that the Sons of Iraq be incorporated into the Iraqi army or National Police Force. A failure to accomplish this will only fan the flame of sectarian strife and division, and could result in the Sons of Iraq returning to the side of the insurgency.

There are also many deficiencies within the government and ministries in Iraq, which need to be addressed immediately. Most ministries are largely ineffective and little more than “patronage machines” (Zakaria, 2009). Corruption within the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Health is contributing to a lack of faith in the government, and rendering the ministries largely ineffective. Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki needs to take a harder stance against corrupt officials, even when they are political allies or members of his party (Noorbaksh, 2008). The Ministry of Interior, in particular, oversees the Iraqi police force and is in need of a number of reforms. Fixing the Ministries and making them more functional is extremely important, as their ineffectiveness contributes to a larger negative perception of the government, and is indicative of a greater need for institutions. For example, while a need for Iraqi security forces is certainly present, a need for an institution which can effectively distribute their paychecks so police forces are not constantly deserting their post during work hours is necessary, as well as an effective and credible banking institution in which they can deposit these paychecks. Often times, Iraqi police forces leave the force for days in order to return home and give their paycheck to their families, because the banking system is in such disarray (Noorbaksh, 2008).

Some recommendations for the Ministry of Interior are as follows:

- **Focus on ministerial reforms**
 - The US and international community should lead an advisory team of experienced, staffed individuals who can reform the Ministry of Interior and are skilled in management, budgeting, personnel, procurement, and other administrative functions
- **Focus on evaluation of results v. numbers**
 - The pace at which the US has attempted to build up the Iraqi police force has outweighed the MOI's capacity to control the process, a focus on quality should be coupled with the need for quantity
- **Broaden the sectarian composite of the police**
 - The Iraqi National Police is still largely composed of Shiite Muslims, despite repeated claims for a more inclusive process. Sectarian and factional loyalties should not be the basis for employment, and an immediate inclusion of the Sons of Iraq (members of the Sunni Awakening movement) should be undertaken

Beyond the Ministry of the interior, a strong effort to lessen the importance of sectarian identities, and foster a sense of national unity, and national Iraqi identity will be critical to sustaining peace when Coalition troops begin to drawn down. The U.S should use our leverage and political capital to encourage the Iraqi government to:

- **Increase interaction between society and government**
 - **Create city councils and community partnerships** which can address local issues more effectively
 - **Establish inter-ethnic schools and joint school exchanges** as well as state-wide sports programs
 - **Increase funding for civic groups**, youth organizations and women's organization which are ethnically inclusive
- **Foster a sense of national Iraqi identity**
 - **Provide funding for reconstruction of National Museums, Libraries and holy sites**
 - **Provide funding for Iraqi National sports teams as well as inter-mural sports programs for adults and children**

Economic Sphere

A thriving economy in Iraq and a sense of opportunity for the youth (which represent a large majority of the population) is essential to ensuring long-term stability and rejection of extremism in Iraq. A dual approach must be taken with respect to the economy, focusing both on oil production and distribution of oil profits, as well as reconstruction projects which will provide Iraqi's with jobs. Security of Oil Fields will be of utmost importance as the Coalition forces draw down, as a power struggle over oil field control presents a direct threat to stability in Iraq. Controlling inflation and implementing structural reforms such as bank restructuring and private sector development will also be key to Iraq's economic growth. These efforts include infrastructure development, private sector development, increased wheat production, training and technical assistance in developing policies on sustainable water resources, management, and building Iraqi natural resources management (Affairs, 2008). It is recommended that the United States should:

- **Assist in reforming and expanding the banking system to make it more comprehensive, accessible and effective**
 - A team of specialists from the United States and the international community should be available to advise the Iraqi Ministries about banking reform and monetary policy to combat inflation
 - The focus should be on creating a comprehensive banking system which is accessible to all Iraqi's without forcing them to travel long distances
- **Sub-contracts for Iraqi infrastructure projects should be given to Iraqi companies**, with FDI being an option only in necessary cases, and only to jumpstart the project.
 - **Iraqi civilians should be hired for all reconstruction programs** before foreign contracts are issued
- **Vocational training programs should be provided for Iraqis** who want to contribute to reconstruction efforts or need training in agricultural development practices

- **Microfinance loans should be issued to individuals and organizations** who display an interest in business pursuits, both in the rural and urban regions, and equally among both men and women
- **Oil production profits should be distributed evenly between provinces,** and maintain under the control of the Ministry of Oil with a strong, centralized authority exerting control over the fields
- **Expansion of production capacity and construction of extraction infrastructure at undeveloped fields should commence**
- **The government should be encouraged to provide amnesty for former militia members or insurgents** after completion of a Saudi-style rehabilitation program, and employment in Iraqi security forces should be offered
- **Current plans to expand trash removal, sewer, electrical and water capacities to prewar levels should continue,** employing Iraqi citizenry whenever possible

Iraq finds itself at a pivotal moment in history, and a sustained commitment by the United States, the international community, the Iraqi government, and most importantly the Iraqi citizenry to providing Iraq with a stable and secure democracy will be necessary to ensure success. Iraqis emerging civil society, recent lull in violence and rejection of extremist ideology during the 2009 elections should give us hope that the Iraqi people are committed to stability and democracy in their nation.

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US AND IRAQ: Struggle for Stability

Machot Lat

INTRODUCTION

Events Leading to the Opposition to the War in Iraq

In 2003, the Bush administration, faced with the defiance by Saddam Hussein of the UN and intelligence reports that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction, decided to go to war with Iraq and received Congressional approval to do so. Once war was declared, the objective of the US strategy for the war was to leave the country in a better condition than it had been under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Following the initial phase involving armed conflict, the US was faced with organizing an Iraqi-led government to run the country. A complicating factor that the administration faced in trying to organize a government was the diverse and hostile elements that became established in the country. These elements included foreign Islamic extremists, and Shia, Sunni and Kurdish nationalists. Each organized armed militias in order to establish a power base in the country and to achieve their conflicting objectives. Another factor was created by the fact that the United States also disbanded the Iraqi military and the controlling political party, the Baath Party, thereby creating a power vacuum and eliminating the ability of the Iraqis to administer their own government, provide for their own security and protect their population.

Despite the intelligence reports in 2003, no weapons of mass destruction could be found. Then, as the United States became an occupying power, it faced insurgent forces that began to inflict casualties on the US forces and upon the forces of the nations allied with the US that also supported with troops. Also, the three sectarian elements fought each other, bringing the country to the brink of an all out civil war. This phase of the war began to stretch out with no end in sight; casualties grew and surpassed 4,000, as did the cost of the war, which is currently estimated to be approaching \$600 billion. As casualties mounted with no end in sight, political opposition within the United States grew and the war lost favor with the people in the United States.

However, progress was being made in Iraq to constitute a government. On October 15, 2005, an Iraqi constitution was approved by referendum³⁷⁰. Then, on December 15, 2005, general elections were held to elect permanent 275-member Iraqi Council of representatives. There was a voter turnout of 79.6%³⁷¹. Nouri al-Maliki became prime minister of Iraq, and his 37-member cabinet was approved by the National Assembly on May 20, 2006. Al-Maliki had started in politics as a Shia dissident under Saddam Hussein's regime in the 1970s and rose to prominence after he fled a death sentence into exile more than 20 years ago. During his time abroad he became a senior leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, coordinated the activities of anti-Saddam guerillas, and built relationships with Iranian and Syrian officials whose help he sought in overthrowing Hussein.³⁷²

As opposition to the war was growing, the US Congress, on March 15, 2006, appointed The Iraq Study Group³⁷³, a ten-person bipartisan panel was charged with assessing the situation in Iraq and the US-led Iraq War and making policy recommendations. In its report, the Group took the position that "The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of US military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceeded, US combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq. The report recommended that the US should eventually end combat operations in Iraq and help in training Iraqi

³⁷⁰ "Constitution of Iraq,"

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, accessed February 20, 2009.

³⁷¹ "Iraqi legislative election, December 2005,"

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, accessed February 20, 2009.

³⁷² "Nouri al-Maliki", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki, accessed February 20, 2009.

³⁷³ "Iraq War troop surge of 2007,"

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

troops. It did not, however, endorse a complete removal of troops from Iraq by a specific date. This report framed the arguments that would follow.”³⁷⁴

Results of the Midterm Elections in 2006 – A New Policy (The Surge)

In the elections of November 2006, the Democrats won a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. Opposition to the war in Iraq contributed to heavy Republican losses. On the day after the elections, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld resigned and President Bush nominated Robert Gates, a former CIA director, to replace him.

On January 5, 2007, other changes were announced.

- US National Intelligence Director – Retired Admiral John M. McConnell replaced John Negroponte, who became Deputy Secretary of State.
- CENTCOM commander – Navy Admiral William Fallon replaces General John Abizaid
- Commander of Multinational Force Iraq – counter-insurgency expert General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey
- US Ambassador to Iraq and ambassador to the United Nations – Ryan C. Crocker replaced Zalmay Khalilzad, who became US ambassador to the United Nations and the first Muslim to serve in that position.

The President then began a series of meetings for the purpose of coming up with a new strategy for Iraq. As a result, in a nationally televised address on January 10, 2007, President Bush stated, “America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them – five brigades – will be deployed to Baghdad”.³⁷⁵ Concerning the increase in the number of troops in Iraq

³⁷⁴ James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs. With Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson. “The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward — A New Approach”, Executive Summary. Authorized Ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).

³⁷⁵ ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION, January 10, 2007 Press Release, The White Office of the Press Secretary, Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State. Web site: <http://usinfo.state.gov>

outlining their purpose in supporting the Iraqi government maintain control, the President had this to say in his State of The Union message to Congress later that month:

“In order to make progress toward this goal, the Iraqi government must stop the sectarian violence in its capital. But the Iraqis are not yet ready to do this on their own. So we're deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq. The vast majority will go to Baghdad, where they will help Iraqi forces to clear and secure neighborhoods, and serve as advisers embedded in Iraqi Army units. With Iraqis in the lead, our forces will help secure the city by chasing down the terrorists, insurgents, and the roaming death squads. And in Anbar Province, where al Qaeda terrorists have gathered and local forces have begun showing a willingness to fight them, we're sending an additional 4,000 United States Marines, with orders to find the terrorists and clear them out. We didn't drive al Qaeda out of their safe haven in Afghanistan only to let them set up a new safe haven in a free Iraq.”³⁷⁶

Opposition to the New Policy

The substance of the debate that followed the speech reflected widespread disagreement with the Bush administration over its proposed solution, and growing skepticism that the United States made the right decision in going to war in the first place. Some issues of contention were divisions over the advisability of committing more troops versus complete withdrawal, and the 'winnability' of the Iraq War regardless of a surge.

Immediately after the speech, opposition to the new policy, or “the surge” as it came to be known, by the Democrats in Congress began to take shape. On February 16, 2007, the House of Representatives passed a resolution stating:

1. Congress and the American people will continue to support and protect the members of the United States Armed Forces who are serving or who have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; and
2. Congress disapproves of the decision of President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.

³⁷⁶ Transcript, President Bush's 2007 State of the Union Address (As Delivered in the House Chamber), Courtesy CQ Transcripts Wire, January 23, 2007

“Following passage in the House, the Senate on February 17, 2007, considered an identically worded resolution. However, the measure was tabled when a cloture motion failed on a 56-34 vote (four votes short of the 60 votes needed to end debate). House Speaker Pelosi announced that despite opposition to the surge, she wouldn't push for blocking congressional funding for additional troops.”⁴

During 2007, information at first indicated some doubt about the effectiveness of the surge. “Three months after the start of the surge, troops controlled less than a third of the capital, far short of the initial goal, according to an internal military assessment completed in May 2007. Violence was especially chronic in mixed Shiite-Sunni neighborhoods in western Baghdad. Improvements had not yet been widespread or lasting across Baghdad.”³⁷⁷ Then, reports became more encouraging. “On September 10, 2007, General David Petraeus, in his part of the Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, concluded that ‘the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met’. He cited what he called recent, consistent declines in security incidents, which he attributed to recent blows dealt against Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the surge. He added, ‘We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq.’ He argued that Coalition and Iraqi operations had drastically reduced ethno-sectarian violence in the country, though he stated that the gains were not entirely even. He recommended a gradual drawdown of US forces in Iraq with a goal of reaching pre-surge troop levels by July 2008”³⁷⁸ and stated that further withdrawals would be ‘premature’.”³⁷⁹

Throughout the balance of 2007 and 2008, argument about the troop surge continued, with the Bush administration and members of Congress supporting the surge

³⁷⁷ Cloud, D.S. and Cave, D. "Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal" New York Times, June 3, 2007.

³⁷⁸ Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

³⁷⁹ "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq." United States Department of Defense central website. Released September 10, 2007.

claiming that it was successful, and, in time, the opposition claiming that other factors were contributing to progress in Iraq more so than the surge itself.

The Endgame

By the end of the summer of 2008, the US military had withdrawn the five Army brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions and the Marine expeditionary unit that made up the surge force. At that point, there were 146,000 US service members in Iraq. At the height of the surge, there were about 166,000. On September 8, 2008, President Bush announced that a further 8,000 US troops would be withdrawn from Iraq by February 2009 without being replaced. “The war in Iraq has entered the ‘endgame’ phase and it is important to get it right,” Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said during testimony on Capitol Hill on September 9, 2009.³⁸⁰

Despite these announcements, the arguments concerning the success of the surge and troop reductions continued through the presidential election of November 2008. Pressure to completely withdraw troops continued with some calling for a timetable. During the presidential debates, Senator Obama promised to withdraw the troops by 16 months following his election.

Recent Agreements Between the US and Iraq

However, before the end of 2008, the United States and Iraq would enter into agreements that would affect the issue concerning troop withdrawal.³⁸¹

“While the UN Security Council did not explicitly authorize the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the council did approve the presence of foreign forces in an annually renewed resolution first adopted in October 2003. Because Iraq's government requested that the Security Council not renew the mandate upon its expiration at the end of 2008, US officials had to accelerate negotiations on a detailed legal framework for the

³⁸⁰ Jim Garamone, “Iraq Conflict Enters ‘Endgame’ Phase, Gates Says,” American Forces Press Service, September 10, 2008.

³⁸¹ Greg Bruno, “US Security Agreements and Iraq”, *Backgrounder*, Council on Foreign relations, December 23, 2008.

US presence in Iraq.”¹² Two major agreements - a Status of Forces Agreement stalled on the issue of legal immunity for US troops and dates for a full withdrawal, and a broader strategic framework agreement -were approved by Iraq's parliament in late November 2008. Iraqi hard-liners kept up their opposition following parliamentary voting in November 2008. “Anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who called on Shiite followers to protest the agreement, denounced the cabinet's approval and urged supporters to take up arms against Americans. But other opponents of the pact softened their position. Maliki succeeded in building support for the pact among Shiite and Kurdish leaders. Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who objected to previous versions of the accord, did not publicly oppose the version passed by the cabinet.”¹²

“The administration characterized talks for a SOFA in Iraq as a hopeful step toward stability. The final version shows that significant concessions were made on the US side. For instance, the United States agreed to a total withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 subject to possible further negotiations that could delay withdrawal and a referendum scheduled for mid-2009 in Iraq that may require US forces to completely leave by the middle of 2010. The final version also called for additional restrictions on how US troops conducted missions, and required a pullout from Iraqi urban areas by July 2009.

The second accord, referred to as a ‘strategic framework agreement,’ was broadly aimed at addressing issues not covered by the SOFA, including those outlined in a ‘declaration of principles’ document signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in November 2007. Among these issues: the US role in defending Iraq from internal and external threats; US support of political reconciliation; and US efforts to confront terrorist groups. But the final version of the strategic framework focuses primarily on shaping future cooperation on cultural, energy, economic, environmental, and other issues of mutual interest.”¹²

In the following paper I will outline policy recommendations for the United States concerning Iraq security. I will focus on two areas of concern:

- Combat troop withdrawal from Iraq.
- Security arrangements following combat troop withdrawal.

Combat Troop Withdrawal

Issue: Now that there is a new administration in Washington, DC, there is a fresh opportunity to end the war in Iraq and to bring the US troops home. During the presidential campaign, President Obama promised to remove the combat troops from Iraq in sixteen months from the day he took office. He also promised that any withdrawal would be executed effectively and safely for the troops. The motivating forces influencing the President are his desire to end a war that, in his view, involved "an occupation of undetermined length, with undetermined costs, and undetermined consequences."³⁸² Moreover, there is a desire to redeploy some of the troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, where there is a growing threat.

Factors: There are a number of factors that must be taken into account in reaching a decision on when to withdraw the combat troops and how to withdraw them. These are:

Strategic Factors

In reaction to President Obama's statement that, "On my first day in office, I will bring the Joint Chiefs of Staff in, and I will give them a new mission, and that is to end this war responsibly and deliberately but decisively," senior defense official warned that there are risks associated with changing the mission, so it shouldn't be done lightly. Acting too quickly may jeopardize the progress achieved since the troop surge and the strategy revamped by General Petraeus two years ago. "A key to the turnaround in Iraq in the past two years was the decision to redefine the mission, focusing it on protecting the civilian population."¹⁴

Clearly, stability in Iraq is in the interest of the United States as it seeks to establish stability in the Middle East. This means that the US should support Iraq such that they

³⁸² "Obama-Biden Iraq Agenda, January 2009," Council on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2009

can defend their borders, defeat terrorists and protect its population.

- **Military Factors**

A number of senior officers have warned that rapid withdrawal could put the troops at risk, as well as American diplomatic and civilian personnel.

- **Domestic Political Factors**

First there are the expectations of those who are opposed to the war and voted for the President. As one said, “I take him at his word. He could not have been clearer as a candidate. There’s no reason for me to believe he will not fulfill that campaign pledge of 16 months.” So, it is important to the administration to signal a commitment from his presidency’s inception.³⁸³ However, the administration must also be sensitive to people in the military who served their country so well in Iraq and the widows of troops who sacrificed their lives for their mission there.

- **Commitments to Iraq**

The United States has made significant commitments to Iraq. These include:

In the Status of Forces Agreement³⁸⁴,

- That US combat forces will withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and
- That all US forces will be completely out of Iraq by December 31, 2011, subject to possible further negotiations which could delay withdrawal and a referendum scheduled for mid-2009 in Iraq which may require US forces to completely leave by the middle of 2010.

In the Strategic Framework Agreement³⁸⁵, from the section concerning
Defense and Security Cooperation

³⁸³ Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, “Obama Meets With Officials on Iraq, Signaling His Commitment to Ending War”, New York Times, January 22, 2009.

³⁸⁴ US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

³⁸⁵ Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, Preamble, November 17, 2008, www.globalsecurity.org, accessed on February 20, 2009.

- “In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory. Such security and defense cooperation shall be undertaken pursuant to the *Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq* and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.”

US officials have stated that neither of these agreements ties the hands of the new administration in that they do not establish permanent bases in Iraq, nor do they specify in any fashion the number of American forces to be stationed there. There is no legally binding promise to come to the aid of Iraq.¹²

RECENT BACKGROUND

“On his first full day in office (January 21, 2009), Mr. Obama summoned senior civilian and uniformed officials to the White House to begin fulfilling his campaign promise to pull combat forces out of Iraq in 16 months. . . . ‘I asked the military leadership to engage in additional planning necessary to execute a responsible military drawdown from Iraq,’ Mr. Obama said in a written statement after the meeting. . . . The session did not focus on specific withdrawal proposals but instead featured a broad discussion of the political climate and security situation, according to senior officials.”

“Among the topics were the challenges as Iraq moves through a series of critical elections this year and the required changes to the location, size and mission of the American military force under a new agreement between Washington and Baghdad, the officials said. General Petraeus, the top commander of American forces in the Middle East, also weighed in on the regional implications of Iraq.” Others who attended the meeting were General Ray Odierno, the commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, who

participated by secure videoconference from Baghdad; the departing United States ambassador, Ryan C. Crocker; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen; Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.; Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser; Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff; and other top advisers. “Officials said Mr. Obama would meet in the coming days with the rest of the Joint Chiefs, who include the heads of all four services.”¹⁴

OPTIONS

As a result of the positions established by the administration prior to President Obama taking office and the US military commanders and the Pentagon, there are two basic options being considered.

Option 1: Gradual Withdrawal: Withdrawing two of the remaining fourteen combat brigades by summer or fall, pull combat forces out of Iraqi cities by June, and withdraw all combat forces out of Iraq by the end of 2011, which would be 36 months after the President took office. This option complies with the SOFA.

Option 2: Accelerated Withdrawal: Remove all combat forces from Iraq in 16 months at the rate of one to two brigades a month. That would accomplish a withdrawal by the summer of 2010. This option may become mandatory if required by the results of the referendum in Iraq in mid-2009, and fulfills the President’s promise made during the presidential campaign

Security Arrangements Following Combat Troop Withdrawal

Issue: The security of Iraq will depend on more than US military presence. There must also be a strategy “to contend with Iraq's neighbors - some of which are capable and willing to undermine Iraqi stability”, according to Henri Barkey. “Iraq's neighbors . . . have specific interests and, sometimes through surrogates, have been actively involved in Iraq. These activities have often been at odds with US and Iraqi government wishes. A withdrawal plan, which creates a political vacuum, invites intervention by Iraq's

neighbors to shape the nation's internal evolution in accordance with their own security considerations.”³⁸⁶ Therefore, a strategy must consider efforts to reach an understanding with Iraq’s neighbors not to meddle in Iraq’s affairs and, until an understanding is reached, to deter intervention on the part of Iraq’s neighbors in its internal affairs, which is the role that military presence plays. The strategy should then have a military component and a diplomatic component.

BACKGROUND

About the Military Component: President Obama announced a plan¹³ for a residual force to remain in Iraq and in the region to conduct targeted counter-terrorism missions against al Qa’ida in Iraq and protect American diplomatic and civilian personnel. Under the plan, they will not build permanent bases in Iraq, but will continue efforts to train and support the Iraqi security forces as long as Iraqi leaders move toward political reconciliation and away from sectarianism. President Obama has been quoted as saying “I said that I would remove our combat troops from Iraq in 16 months, with the understanding that it might be necessary — likely to be necessary — to maintain a residual force to provide potential training, logistical support, to protect our civilians in Iraq.”¹⁸ “Publicly at least, Mr. Obama has not set a firm number for that “residual force,” though one of his national security advisers, [Richard Danzig](#), said during the campaign that it could amount to 30,000 to 55,000 troops. Army planners acknowledge privately that they are examining projections that could see the number of Americans hovering between 30,000 and 50,000 — and some say as high as 70,000 — for a substantial time even beyond 2011.”³⁸⁷

About the Diplomatic Component: As Henri Barky points out, “The US and Iraq's neighbors share one common goal: Iraq's territorial integrity. Where they disagree is on the internal arrangements.”

³⁸⁶ [Henri Barkey](#), “US Troop Withdrawal Missing A Political Strategy,” *Washington Times*, October 3, 2008.

³⁸⁷ Thom Shanker, “Iraq Now Muted by Reality”, *New York Times*, December 4, 2008.

- “Two of Iraq's neighbors, Iran and Syria, have been at loggerheads with Washington. Lines of communication are all but closed and replaced by complete mistrust. . . . Washington consistently has accused both countries of supporting Iraq's insurgency; and in the case of Iran, accusations include the transfer of arms and training for insurgents.”
- “By contrast, the other four neighbors - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait - are long-standing allies of the US”
- “Iran and the Saudis are eyeing each other nervously in Iraq. Riyadh, already unnerved by Iran's nuclear program, sees Iran attempting to use a Shia-dominated Baghdad as an ally in its quest for regional dominance. Tehran, in turn, fears Saudi-supported Sunni jihadist movements and the emergence of a pro-US Iraq aligning itself against Iran.”
- “Turks, Iranians and Syrians would like to see the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) subjugated to Baghdad's control, if not disappear altogether. In their minds, a Kurdish province in an Iraqi federal state could inspire secessionist impulses among their own much-maligned Kurdish populations.”
- “Saudis and other Arabs are unsympathetic to federalism, believing that Kurdish aspirations will one day lead them to secede and carve out another non-Arab country in the region or the Shia will create a super-federal region of their own.”¹⁴

RECCOMENDATIONS

- The decisions with respect to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq and residual forces remaining there should be announced within the context of a foreign policy initiative.
- The policy should have both military and diplomatic components.
- The further drawdown of combat troops should reflect the commitment of the US to finally bringing the war in Iraq to an end. The withdrawals

already underway should continue in July 2009, with the objective of completing them in July 2010, 18 months following the President's inauguration.

- Assessments should be made along the way to assure that the drawdown schedule is not jeopardizing Iraq's security. In no event will US combat forces remain in Iraq after June 2011.
- The US should support Iraq in its efforts to maintain its stability and sovereignty, counter terrorism, and protect its population by providing US troops with a mission significantly different than the one that they've had. This mission will be to provide assistance to the Iraq security forces through training and logistical support, and to protect American civilians in Iraq, as well as assuring the safety of our troops that remain there. They will also be on hand to help with operations against threats that may exist from al Qaeda or other terrorist groups that threaten peace and stability in Iraq and in the region.
- The United States should initiate a diplomatic effort to secure the borders of Iraq, ensure its territorial integrity and establish stability in the region. When this initiative is begun, consideration should be given to constructing a region-wide understanding.
- Consideration should be given to a "first step of working with the allies individually to unscramble conflicting US and Iraqi concerns on one side and Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian and Kuwaiti ones on the other."¹⁷
- Differences with Iran and Syria should be put aside in order to focus on those issues upon which the US and Iraq, on the one side, and Syria and Iran, individually, can agree. The issues should be limited to Iraq's security and territorial integrity. Discussions about regional stability with these two nations would be too difficult at this stage because of differences over issues related to Israel, and Iranian nuclear technology, among others.

Conclusions About the Surge

The initial strategy in Iraq did not work. So, in 2006, President Bush made some changes in his administration, commenced a series of meetings, and settled on a new strategy, one devised by General Petraeus. The initial strategy of the US, “which lasted from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in mid-2003 until the US surge in early 2007, essentially consisted of a three-way civil war, in which the United States, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias fought each other. The American strategic goal appears to have been to defeat both the insurgents and the militias,”³⁸⁸ was devastating to the civilian communities where the battles were being fought. Petraeus changed the nature of the war. He deployed his forces differently than his predecessors. Instead of keeping them in garrisons, he dispersed some of them in small units based in villages and neighborhoods contested by insurgents. That was not a trivial change. He also opened political discussions with local leaders.

As George Friedman explains, Petraeus observed “that the civil war was much more than a three-way struggle. Tensions also existed within both the Iraqi Sunni and the Shiite communities. Petraeus’ strategy was to exploit those tensions, splitting both his opponents and forming alliances with some of them. Petraeus recognized that political power in the Sunni community rested with the traditional tribal leaders — the sheikhs — and that these sheikhs were both divided among themselves, and most important, extremely worried about the foreign jihadist fighters from al Qa’ida.”

“Al Qa’ida ultimately wanted to replace the sheikhs as leaders of their respective communities. It used its influence with younger, more radical Sunnis to create a new cadre of leaders. The more US pressure on the Sunni community as a whole, the less room for maneuver the sheikhs had. US policy was inadvertently strengthening al Qa’ida by making the sheikhs dependent on its force against the United States. Similarly, the Shiite community was split along multiple lines, with Iran deeply involved with multiple factions.”

³⁸⁸ George Friedman, “Petraeus, Afghanistan and the Lessons of Iraq,” Stratfor, May 6, 2008.

“Petraeus changed US policy from what was essentially warfare against the Sunnis in particular, but also the Shia, as undifferentiated entities. He sought to recruit elements previously regarded as irredeemable, and with threats, bribes and other inducements, forced open splits among Sunnis and Shia. In doing so, Petraeus also opened lines to the Iranians, who used their fear of a civil war among the Shia — and a disastrous loss of influence by Iran — to suppress both intra-Shiite violence and Shiite violence against Sunnis.”

“The result of this complex political maneuvering coupled with the judicious use of military force was a decline in casualties not only among American forces, but also among Iraqis from intercommunal warfare. The situation has not by any means resolved itself, but Petraeus’ strategy expanded splits in the Sunni and Shiite communities that he tried to exploit. The most important thing Petraeus did was to reduce the cohesion of US enemies by recognizing they were not in fact a cohesive entity, and moving forward on that basis.”¹⁹

Many political leaders in the US interpreted the surge to be only the commitment of addition of forces to fight in Iraq, which they opposed. They were either unaware of its strategic and essentially political element or did not understand the significance of it. Some may never admit to its success. In fact, many segregate the addition in the troops sent to Iraq to execute the strategy from the strategy itself. But, the surge is over and the additional forces sent to Iraq as part of the surge have returned home. With the level of violence reduced, it appears that it was successful. There is a more stable environment in Iraq, though sectarian violence does occur sporadically. But no one will say that the war is over.

Now the question is what lessons can be learned from the surge that could be applied elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. It is true that forces will be added to fight the Taliban. But the situation there is entirely different than it was in Iraq. I will not go into the situation there, but would encourage the reader to read the referenced article by George Friedman. As most anyone engaged in strategic planning will tell you, there is no

“one-size-fits-all” strategy for each circumstance is unique. Even General Patraeus would say so.

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IRAN: Terrorist Affiliates and Diplomatic Opportunities

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ISSUE

The Iranian regime is currently the most dangerous and openly antagonistic enemy of the United States. Given the volatility of the region, developing a targeted strategy cohesive with the broader vision of the United States is vital to success in the Middle East. A strong military and ambitious outreach program in the hands of an aggressively anti-American government is something the United States cannot tolerate. International consternation has failed to stem the belligerent rhetoric espoused by Ahmadinejad and his administration. Sanctions passed by the United Nations have proven to be ineffective at quelling their escalatory tactics and continued support of terrorist organizations.

An appraisal of the Iranian political structure is vital in constructing an informed and effective approach to negotiation. Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in August of 2005, the official Iranian stance towards the United States and its allies has become increasingly militant and confrontational. Despite the overwhelmingly anti-American attitude of the president and his cabinet, significant elements of the majles (Iranian parliament) are not supportive of Ahmadinejad's radical agenda. More importantly, public appraisal of the administration's activity (particularly with regards to economic policy and the deteriorating relationship with the West) has become increasingly critical. With the June presidential elections approaching and with key moderates (like former president Mohammad Khatami) announcing their candidacy, the United States has a tremendous opportunity to facilitate a peaceful transition of power.

Refusing the oversight of international institutions, Iran has neglected the obligations of a responsible member of the international community, preferring instead to increase its global footprint through illegal, illegitimate, and lethal methods. With the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military, Iran has stepped up its long-standing efforts to forge pan-Shia ties throughout the Middle East. In addition to Iran's economic and military support to sectarian allies, the current administration has taken new approaches to regional politics in an effort to undermine the United States' efforts in the Middle East.

Funding Terrorist Organizations

While the Iranian government, particularly, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, makes peaceful overtures at international events and public appearances, the administration is strengthening ties to terrorist allies and the Iranian military is developing more advanced offensive weapons.

A clearer understanding of Iran's objectives can be gained by examining the groups and individuals the Iranian government chooses to assist and associate with. The most dangerous recipients of Iranian support are violent terrorist organizations. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel and the Palestinian territories are the strongest and most visible of the organizations receiving significant support from Iran.³⁸⁹ Hezbollah operates on an annual budget of approximately \$200 to \$500 million annually. More than \$120 million is provided by Iran.³⁹⁰ The director of the Congressional Task Force on terrorism and Unconventional Warfare concluded that "the key to effective terrorism in and out of the Arab world is firmly in the hands of the two main sponsoring states—Iran and Syria."³⁹¹

Iran's interactions with terrorist groups have initiated several important changes in inter-organizational dynamics. Most importantly, cooperation between previously unrelated or even antagonistic groups has been facilitated by Iranian funding and support. Hezbollah trains and equips Hamas fighters and other Islamic militants in return for Iranian money and the use of Palestinian and Syrian banking systems.³⁹²

Iran has recently adopted the Palestinian cause as a way to antagonize Israel (and by extension the United States). While Hamas is a Sunni-radical party, Iran nevertheless provides them with weapons (through Egypt), and training and funding through Hezbollah. Iran's networking efforts have significantly increased the danger of terrorist

³⁸⁹ Iran was an early supporter of Hezbollah. Lebanon, a country divided between Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims, has been the scene of bloody civil wars and constant infighting. Ayatollah Khomeini, consistent with his calls for pan-Shia unity, saw the Shia in Lebanon as a terrific opportunity to expand Iranian influence. Selecting the strongest and most pro-Iranian group in Lebanon, Iran forged a lasting alliance with Hezbollah that has fueled Hezbollah's militarism and Iran's aggressiveness towards Israel.

³⁹⁰ Ehrenfeld, 124

³⁹¹ Ibid, 124

³⁹² Ehrenfeld, 125

organizations. Iran has been able to overcome the Sunni-Shia divide in several key areas. Forging ties between Sudan and Hezbollah in 1991, Iran was able to create training facilities and a haven for Islamic terrorists in spite of the radically different ideology of the Sunni Sudanese. Compromise is unacceptable to these subversive and radical elements. Espousing ideologies intolerant of mediation and reserve, the only course of active aggressively pursued by these groups is violent and militant in nature. By adopting an anti-Western, anti-Israeli, pan-Islamic approach, Iran has been able to extend its influence beyond the concentration of Shia populations making Iran a truly global threat.

Methods of Funding

Iran is able to maintain its network of terrorist allies through international companies established by Shiite elites. Many of these companies are controlled by Hezbollah leaders who use the revenue to fund small business which in turn generate more revenue and provide venues in which to proselytize the radical agendas of Hezbollah and Iran.³⁹³

There are several high-profile examples of international businesses functioning as fronts to illegal money laundering activity and transfer of funds to terrorist organizations. International Metro was established in 1979 soon after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. With its headquarters in London and its transportation office in Geneva, International Metro was in the position to establish many smaller companies throughout Europe. SAVAMA, the Iranian Intelligence Ministry owned a fifty-one percent stake in International Metro with the other forty-nine held by Agha Has Abedi, owner of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. International Metro was used as a mechanism to facilitate the creation of businesses to fund terrorist organizations, particularly Hezbollah, through illegal activity.

Impact

Iran has been using its terrorist connections as political extensions. Functioning as destabilizing elements, terrorist groups are capable of disrupting attempts by the United States or its allies to accomplish our goals. Iran has recognized the tremendous veto

³⁹³ Ibid, 126

power they can exercise through alliances with terrorist groups. While the nuclear program in Iran has understandably received the majority of attention from the international community, Iran's economic and military support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have already demonstrated their potential for reversing diplomatic progress. Eliminating Iran's ability to funnel weapons and money to dangerous organizations will be critical to the success of any diplomatic efforts. Without removing Iran's ability to exercise veto power through non-Iranian (but allied) sub-national groups, the United States cannot enter into fair negotiations with Iran. The United States cannot allow Iran to possess illegitimate means with which to manipulate international diplomacy.

BACKGROUND

To better understand the prevailing attitudes and dispositions of Iranian politics, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of their development. The political theology of Iran is inextricably linked with the broader political theology of Shia Islam.

The approximately 160 million Shias compose only ten to fifteen percent of the world's Muslims. In only five countries do Shias constitute a majority of the population: Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, and Iran. Being a relatively small group in comparison to the vast majority of Muslims who are Sunni, the Shia have traditionally held the status of minority even in regions where they lived in great numbers. The legacy of Shia survival under Sunni political domination has influenced the very core of Shia political theology and has informed the Shia stance on worldly power relationships.

Ayatollah Khomeini instituted an ideological system of his own creation called vilayet-e-faqih. The main concept of the faqih was that a Guardian, Khomeini himself, was required to properly maintain an Islamic state. The Guardianship Council would assist Khomeini, but the Ayatollah's mandates would ultimately be the final word. This seemingly authoritarian positioning of his political role, however, was again complicated by his frequent deference to the Majles and his insistence on the democratic principle of popular sovereignty and government accountability to the people. Khomeini's behavior

only served to exacerbate the confusing division of powers amongst the strange array of seemingly incompatible government institutions each functioning under a different conception of political authority.³⁹⁴

The fragile Shia political theology of the Iranian state flourished when under attack by Saddam Hussein, who was easily painted as the anti-Shia aggressor. The end of the Iran-Iraq war, however, necessitated the creation of new enemies to maintain a political theology reliant upon outside oppression. Supporting the claim that charismatic leadership is able to reconcile or at least control conflicting political theologies and by extension can preserve and prolong unstable political theologies that otherwise would have to be reconsidered, Khomeini was largely successful in propping up the Iranian state using his own persuasion and the geopolitical climate to his advantage. Khomeini effectively created “imaginary” antagonistic forces by emphasizing a rhetoric of Iranian exclusivism and isolation, but also managed to create real enemies by espousing an opposing position of aggression and expansion in which the call to export the revolution was accompanied by increased Iranian intervention in the Middle East (notably Lebanon and the funding of Hezbollah) and provocative political maneuverings in relationship to the international community (particularly the United States).

The loss of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose charismatic leadership was able to reconcile the inconsistencies between the theocratic-authoritarian precepts of *vilayet-e faqih* and the nominally democratic operations of the *majles* prompted a crisis in Iranian politics that has yet to be resolved. The title of Supreme Leader was passed down to Ali Khomeini who still maintains his position. Unlike the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, however, Khomeini does not possess the charisma or the respect to dictate the decisions of the *majles*. With his authority limited to fatwas and religious matters, a small but profound shift in authority from the Supreme Leader to the president and the parliament has occurred over the past two decades. While the results of this shift have been mixed,

³⁹⁴ In a quote attributed to Khomeini in 1983, it becomes evident that Khomeini was at least somewhat aware of this troublesome fact when he lamented, “my only fear is that we may fail to hand over things to the next generation in a consolidated manner.”³⁹⁴

the change nevertheless provides the United States an opportunity to form a new Iranian-US relation untainted by the anti-Western ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini.

As the office of the presidency and the democratically elected majles gain importance in Iranian politics, the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini, which has for so long prevented any serious dialogue between Iran and the United States can be replaced by the more informed and secular concerns currently being discussed by the Iranian public. The government structure of Iran, with all candidates having to be approved by the Guardian Council, controlled by Khomeini-minded hard-liners, is still caught in the revolutionary attitude preserved by Khomeini and Khomeini. As long as the revolutionary mindset persists, Iran will never welcome normalized relationships with the West. Preserving the revolutionary atmosphere requires the supreme leader, Council of Experts, and Guardian Council to maintain enemies to the Iranian state. Normalizing relations with the United States or Israel is not in the interests of the hard-liner Iranian elements keen on maintaining power through a revolutionary atmosphere.

President Ahmadinejad, while an incredibly dangerous individual, has done the United States a favor by emphasizing the role of the president and increasing the political legitimacy of the office in the minds of Iranians. While the United States cannot tolerate the militant and confrontational agenda proposed by Ahmadinejad, we can ill afford to accept the status quo in Iran and deal with a political system bound to the tenets and philosophies of Khomeini and the revolution.

INTERESTS

The United States' interests and progress in the Middle East are directly related to the Iranians and their activities the region. Iran currently possesses the capability to severely disrupt our efforts and the efforts of our allies. In Iraq, Iran's efforts to undermine reconstruction and reconciliation have created serious setbacks to a peaceful transition to a stable Iraqi government. Iran's support of Shia militias in Iraq—part of a broader effort to create an arc of Shia-aligned allies from Iran in the east through Iraq, Syria, and

Lebanon in the west—have the potential to destroy all of the accomplishments the United States has been able to oversee in Iraq. Likewise, the more recent Iranian adoption of the Palestinian cause has given Iran incredible power over the peace process.

As long as Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, parade ICBMs with anti-Israeli slogans painted on their casings, and provide funding and weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel will not tolerate its security situation. An insecure Israel not only severely hampers the peace process between Israel and Fatah, it elevates regional tensions and increases the potential for war between Israel and Iran; a war that would inevitably drag other Middle Eastern nations (and potentially foreign allies) into a large and devastating conflict.

If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to ever be resolved, Iran must be checked. Currently, Iran has been playing a destructive role by disrupting the peace process. By channeling rockets and funds to Hamas, Iran is well aware that it is bolstering a party that will accept nothing less than the destruction of the state of Israel and the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in its place. By cutting off Iranian money and weaponry, the United States and Israel would greatly improve the atmosphere of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Hamas cannot survive on its own; once Iranian money runs out, Hamas will soon have to choose between buying rockets or providing social services. If Hamas loses the ability to provide social services to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, it will lose its legitimacy. Israel cannot afford to negotiate with two Palestinian governments, particularly when one calls for the destruction of Israel and is funded and supplied by a nation that espouses the same sentiments.

Lebanon and Syria are two nations that are frequently left out of Middle Eastern policy considerations, a mistake that has proven costly. Lebanon has proven to be an important element in the Israeli-Palestinian issue as well as the overall stability of the region. Lebanon, if it is lost to Hezbollah, will form the final piece of the puzzle in Iran's strategy. If Hezbollah gains control of Lebanon to the extent that the Sunni and Christian portions of Lebanese society lose veto capability, Iran will have successfully engineered

an arc of Shia-aligned countries from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. It is critical that the United States work to cut off Iranian funding to Hezbollah. Israel's military campaign to eradicate Hezbollah from southern Lebanon hampered Hezbollah's ability to constantly harass Israel, but failed to crush the organization. A crackdown on international banking, particularly on Shia-owned businesses in Europe will be necessary in ensuring that money gained through illegal activity is stopped before it reaches Hezbollah.

Syria will play even more important role in the United States' strategy. The al-Assad regime in Syria is comprised of Alawi elites, a minority group that has aligned itself with Iran since the Islamic Revolution. Syria is integral in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and is certainly the weakest link in the Shia-aligned crescent from Iran to Lebanon. Syria is a country that is overwhelmingly Sunni dominated by an Alawite minority that was not considered Shia until Ayatollah Khomeini welcomed them into the fold.

If the Syrian government is convinced that Iran can no longer provide the security and support that they need, the regime will be placed in a situation where negotiation with Israel and the West is a much more realistic and attractive option.

OPTIONS

The United States' options for dealing with Iran are unfortunately limited. Direct military action, while a definite possibility, would be unwise. Expanding the area in which American forces would have to patrol and maintain stability would not be a wise use of our military assets. More importantly, a destabilized Iran could have the adverse effect of compromising our efforts in Iraq. Isolating Iran by constructing and aiding strong and effective governments in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide a longer lasting obstacle to Iranian militarism than direct intervention in Iran.

While direct and decisive military intervention seem to possess the potential to crush Iranian ambitions at becoming a regional superpower, the United States can ill afford to widen its military obligations (and troop deployment) to another country larger than Iraq

and Afghanistan combined. Controlling the borders between Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan is difficult. By opening a new campaign in Iran, the three countries would be united east to west. While the United States is surely capable of destroying Iran's armed forces, it has become unfortunately clear that it would be left to American forces to maintain a presence on the ground and assist in nation-building efforts.

Without responsible allies that the United States can rely on to assist in reconstruction and security, we have to assume that the United States would necessarily comprise the majority of ground forces and reconstruction services. The economic and military obligations that the United States has in Iraq and Afghanistan already compromise our ability to intervene conventionally in other regions of the world, an ability that the United States needs to maintain.

Aside from direct military intervention in Iran and an occupation of the country to bring about regime change, the United States possesses the ability to destroy key targets in Iran through targeted strikes. Whether these targets are nuclear research facilities, centrifuges, weapon caches, military installations, or individuals, limited American military intervention is sure to provoke strong responses from the Iranian government and people.

The political ramifications of such strikes—in addition to the fact that limited strikes can only postpone and not terminate the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons—make the cost of both unlimited and limited military engagement too high for the given outcome.

Regime change should be a goal of the United States. However, regime change should be pursued through non-military means. The United States has several options with regards to this issue and all avenues should be explored. The current Iranian political structure, with the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council holding ultimate political authority is not conducive to long-term stability. The need of a Supreme Leader is based upon the premise that a revolutionary (and anti-American) atmosphere must be preserved through *vilayet-e faqih*. As long as the Supreme Leader remains the ultimate source of

political authority in Iran, the United States will never have sustainable diplomatic relations with Iran.

A long-term strategy for changing the orientation of Iranian politics should be pursued. Nothing short of direct military action would be capable of removing the Supreme Leader from power in a rapid manner. However, the United States can and should exploit the fundamental contradictions between democracy and theocracy in Iran. By increasing the legitimacy of the democratic elements of the Iranian government—the president and the majles—the United States can effectively strip legitimacy from the theocracy. A significant number of political reformists have run for elections and secured the popular vote in Iran. The United States should support reformist movements

The past four years have been a period of deteriorating relations between the United States largely due to the strong alignment that has occurred between the theocratic and democratic institutions in Iran. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been praised by the Supreme Leader Khomeini for his anti-American stance and his restoration of Islamic values to Iranian society.³⁹⁵ The Reformist movement, spearheaded by Mohammad Khatami, has the potential to restore the division between the theocracy and the parliament; something that needs to be done for the United States to make any progress with diplomatic relations.

Supporters of Mohammad Khatami cite improved relations with the West in general and increased cooperation with the United States specifically as motivating factors in voting for Khatami. Although the United States' history with the reform movement in Iran has been mixed, there is no doubt that Mohammad Khatami would be a much more willing and reasonable negotiation partner than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been.³⁹⁶

Mohammad Khatami's defiance of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini's advice not to run for the office of the presidency further shows that Khatami is willing to stand up to

³⁹⁵ Karimi, Nasser. "Khatami Energizes Iran's Ailing Reformist Camp" *The Boston Globe*. February 9, 2009.

³⁹⁶ Yeranian, Edward. "Ahmadinejad Ready for 'Mutual Respect' Talks with US." Reflective of the increasingly dire economic situation in Iran—and perhaps indicative of a more desperate political atmosphere—even President Ahmadinejad has called for talks between Iran and the United States.

theocracy.³⁹⁷ Consequently, the United States should support the reform movement by emphasizing our willingness to negotiate and cooperate. Issues of common interest—economic investment, and particularly stability in Iraq—should be emphasized as concerns the United States is eager to discuss with Iran. The current regime has enjoyed the support of many Iranians who desire Iran to play a larger role in regional politics. However, many Iranians have criticized the regime for doing this at the expense of relation with the international community. The United States can show the Iranian people that they can have both an increased role in the region and improved relations with the international community through cooperation with the United States.

The legitimacy of the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader rely on the attitude of the Iranian public. The fact that Mohammad Khatami's candidacy has been approved by the Guardian Council—which has the authority to deny candidacy to anyone it deems unacceptable—is proof that populism, if not democracy, can pose a strong challenge to theocratic authority. The authority of the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader are not as solid as many believe. The entire Iranian political structure is contradictory to itself and is only maintained due to the supremacy of the mullahs over the parliament and democratically elected officials. By undermining the strength of the mullahs, the United States can bolster Iranian democracy.

Many attempts at internal reform have been thwarted by the overruling of the Supreme Leader. The stronger the democratic elements of Iranian society become, the harder it will be for the theocracy to exercise the veto power they have wielded for the past thirty years.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Simply stating that we are eager and willing to speak with Iran is not productive or helpful. While ignoring Iranian demands and considerations will likely result in

³⁹⁷ Peterson, Scott. "Iran's Reformers Put Hope in 'New Khatami.'" *The Christian Science Monitor*. Feb. 26, 2009. This is an indication that Khatami's resolve is greater than it was when cooperation was sought under the Bush administration. Efforts at cooperation were deemed a failure due to the perceived "weakness" of Khatami.

continued deterioration in relations, an open an unconditional resumption of diplomatic ties would be equally unintelligent. The United States must make sure that the international community, and Iranians in particular, realize that the we are open to civilized discussion, but will not deal with an administration aggressively working to undermine our efforts in the Middle East, and vocally adamant about the destruction of our allies.

Recommendations will address the two largest (non-nuclear) Iranian issues: support for terrorism and approaches to negotiation.

- **Isolate Iran from its terrorist affiliates in order to hamper the ability to interrupt negotiations or interfere with American activities or the activities of our allies** (namely Israel). To do this, the United States should pursue two courses of action. First, the elimination of Iran's ability to fund and supply terrorist organizations and second, the establishment of agreements with other Middle Eastern nations to decrease Iran's influence through terrorist organizations.
- *Expand cooperation with the European Union in order to disrupt and dismantle terrorist funding schemes*—under the guise of “legitimate” businesses—in Europe, the main base of operations for Iranian-aligned Shia elites. These Shia elites and the business fronts they control generate a significant portion of the revenue used to support terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. In particular, an extension and expansion of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) with increased cooperation and access to The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) should be pursued aggressively.³⁹⁸
- *Domestic money laundering schemes—primarily run by Iranian-owned businesses—can be detected and obstructed through increased oversight by banking institutions.* The United States has already identified several terrorist-funding schemes operating domestically. Several American-based and Iranian-

³⁹⁸ In response to rulings by the Belgian government, SWIFT is in the process of reorganization to guarantee security to its clients, while still being able to provide the CIA and Treasury Department with relevant information regarding the flow of terrorist funds.

supported Islamic charity foundations have been identified as financial supporters of Hezbollah. Further investigations into money transfers must be approved by the federal government in order to pursue the individuals involved in these operations and to stop the considerable flows of money from the United States to terrorist organizations.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) division of the Treasury Department has been particularly valuable in facilitating information sharing between law enforcement agencies and financial institutions in the United States. Article 314 (a) of the Patriot Act has enabled FinCEN to access information—most notably Suspicious Activity Reports and Currency Transaction Reports—from many financial institutions. However, FinCEN and analysts at financial analysts have only had a mediocre record of identifying and addressing terrorist financing schemes.

Many failures are the result of a lack of terrorist-specific training. Terrorist funding schemes often operate in ways much different than typical fraud or money laundering systems that FinCEN and individual financial institutions must address every day. Having a force dedicated to the identification and disruption of terrorist financing activity would be an effective solution to this problem. In addition, the Treasury Department and the intelligence community in the United States should devise a method through which to grant security clearance to personnel in financial institutions in order to better share information and better inform financial institutions about what they should be looking for in order to target terrorism-related activity.³⁹⁹

- *Negotiations with the al-Assad government will be essential in constructing an agreement through which to stop the flow of terrorist funding originating in Iran.*

³⁹⁹ This is a recommendation posited by Dennis Lormel. For further information on the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), refer to his article “Terrorist Financing: Balancing the Benefits and Burdens of Reporting Requirements” at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/terrorist_financing_balancing.php.

Discussions between Israel and Syria is an avenue towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict recommended by our National Security Strategy. The ramifications of a political agreement between Tel Aviv and Damascus extend far beyond the boundaries of Israel and the Palestinian territories, however. Syria has stood as a strong ally of Iran for the past thirty years and an agreement between Syria and Israel—which will likely involve the return of the Golan Heights to Syria in return for official recognition of the state of Israel and a normalization of diplomatic relations—should be taken advantage of by the United States.

Hamas is headquartered in Damascus and Syria is also one of the main supporters and contributors to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both Hamas and Hezbollah receive considerable operational funding from Iran (with a large portion of these funds passing through Syria). As the United States will take a central role in mediating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in addition to related diplomatic efforts, we will have considerable influence over potential agreements. The United States should ensure that the expulsion of Hamas from Damascus and the cessation of financial support to Hezbollah are part of the negotiations regarding the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.

- **Reformulate American Approach to Negotiations:**

Hampering Iran's ability to fund and support terrorist organizations will help produce the necessary conditions for a stable diplomatic relationship between Iran and the United States. Direct interaction with the Iranian government, however, will require the United States to exercise careful judgment and target negotiations to best facilitate a transition to an Iranian regime more well-disposed to pacific intercourse.

- *Identify areas of agreement.* Successful negotiations necessitate willing participants. Essential to the establishment of an initial working relationship between the United States and Iran is the recognition by both nations that they possess a number of common interests. Negotiations with Iran will not initially be

on a large scale. Small steps towards creating a diplomatic dialogue will be necessary before stable relations are to be attained;

- *The United States and Iran have an important and overarching common interest in establishing a stable government in Iraq.* Establishing a working relationship with the Iranian government and allowing Iranian construction and support activity in Iraq will demonstrate that there is a place for Iran in the Middle East and that American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are not a prelude to similar activity in Iran. Tehran already has strong ties to the Iraqi government in Baghdad and contributes a significant amount of financial and political support.⁴⁰⁰ While the United States generally refuses to acknowledge the full extent Iranian influence in Iraq, a legitimization of Iranian activities could be taken advantage of. The United States should use Iraq as a platform for Iranian and American cooperation. Cooperation in Iraq would be a small first step towards improved diplomatic relations.
- *The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council in Iran maintain their legitimacy by portraying the United States and Israel as clear and present dangers to Iranian security and the Islamic Revolution.* Immediately silencing or moderating these radical elements of the regime will be impossible without direct military intervention. However, the United States is pursuing a diplomatic solution to Iranian-American disagreements. Negotiations with the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council are not likely to result in a lasting diplomatic relationship. In order to establish stable communications and cooperation, the United States can work to diplomatically undermine the revolutionary regime by excluding the theocracy from the negotiation process. By insisting that American-Iranian negotiations are conducted through communications between American diplomats and democratically-elected Iranian officials, the United States can transfer legitimacy from the theocracy to a more receptive negotiation partner.

⁴⁰⁰ "Certain Countries do not want to see warm Iran-Iraq Ties."

- *Support the reform movement lead by Mohammad Khatami.* It is in the greatest interest of the United States for Iranians to elect a president and parliament more receptive to American approaches and considerations. To encourage this desired outcome, the United States should stress that it is open to discussion willing to cooperate on a variety of issues. Most recently, the reform movement has real potential to succeed due to the declining economic situation in Iran and the increased importance of the presidency under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While Ahmadinejad has fallen in line with the theocracy, Mohammad Khatami has demonstrated that he is willing to stand up to the Supreme Leader.⁴⁰¹ The Guardian Council's approval of Khatami's candidacy is a testament to his popularity, and his stated desire to improve relations with the United States should be taken seriously. The United States should seek out the political figures most willing to cooperate. Mohammad Khatami is certainly one of them.
- *The United States should emphasize that it is not an enemy of the Iranian people.* The revolutionary regime thrives on depicting the relationship between Iran and the United States as one of mutual antagonism. By emphasizing a desire for cooperation, the United States can damage the foundations of theocratic authority in Iran. American efforts at isolating Iran diplomatically have fed the anti-American elements of Iranian politics with more reason to label the United States as an enemy. Negotiations will be difficult to initiate, but the establishment of negotiations will inevitably damage the legitimacy of the regime.

Through a strategy of isolating Iran from its terrorist affiliates and orienting negotiations to take advantage of and widen the schism between theocracy and democracy in Iran, the United States can make significant progress towards normalized relation. Thirty years of antagonism between Iran and the United States cannot be forgotten by either side and a stable diplomatic relationship will not be constructed

⁴⁰¹ Khatami's decision to run in defiance of Ayatollah Khomeini's "encouragement" not to run is a very promising sign of Khatami's willingness to stand up to the theocracy.

rapidly. However, the United States can sew the seeds of democratic revival in Iran and utilize the very contradictions of the Iranian governmental structure to bring about the political conditions most conducive to healthy relations between two countries. The current economic deterioration in Iran and the potential for political change that the upcoming June presidential elections hold for Iran make the next few months a very important window for the United States to act. The sooner the United States begins the slow process of developing a dialogue with Iran, the sooner an enduring diplomatic relationship can be attained

Notes:

On the subject of the Majles: While Khomeini's authoritative role as Supreme Leader has miraculously remained entrenched even after the Ayatollah's death, the role of the Majles has been a shifting one. Not only because of its varying degrees of authority and legitimacy during Khomeini's lifetime (incumbent upon whether Khomeini gave his support or emphasized his own authority), but also because of several stipulations imposed upon candidates for the Majles and the shifting political views of those who constitute it. In 1984, for example, it became a requirement for all candidates for election to the Majles to have "spiritual, as well as revolutionary commitment to Islam... and total loyalty to the 'Great Leader' Imam Khomeini, and the institution of faqih."⁴⁰² This seemed to be at least tacitly in contradiction Khomeini's declaration during the election season that "no power in Iran can impose anything on the people and the elections are in the hands of the people."⁴⁰³ Halfhearted attempts to reconcile the relationship between the faqih and the Majles by the following regime (under Khomeini) by declaring the "freedom" of the Majles full and democratic, but only under the definition of state "interests" by the faqih, did not prove effective.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰² Brumberg, 131

⁴⁰³ Ibid, 131

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, 159

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IRAN: Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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ISSUE

The Obama administration, similar to previous administrations, will be challenged to address the escalating national security challenge from Iran's growing nuclear ambitions. Due to compounding choices made by past administrations, Iran presently emerges as a strong regional leader in the Middle East with the power to influence the region's chronic security dilemmas—such as the Israel-Palestine peace process, stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the mounting strength of terrorist organizations—Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran's growing influence in addition to its long history of limited relations with the United States will complicate a US attempt to restrain the progress of Iran's present nuclear program.

Past attempts by the international community to create a framework for hindering Iran's nuclear weapons attempts have remained largely unsuccessful. The secret framework protecting the Iranian nuclear program has continued to constrain the success the international community can heed in determining the nature and progress of Iran's current nuclear program. Furthermore, Leadership in Iran, most notably President Mohammad Ahmadinejad has highlighted the nuclear issue as an obstruction of Iran's national sovereignty as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under Article Five of the NPT, Iran is entitled access to the peaceful usage of nuclear technology.⁴⁰⁵ However, a key stipulation for exercising this right is that any nation attempting to build a peaceful nuclear program must comply with the full demands of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement to protect against the application of dual-use technology to the development of weapons programs. Iran presently refuses to comply with these verification demands of the IAEA.

Current progress in determining the extent of Iran's weapons program under the IAEA remains at a standstill. Although the IAEA has resolved many of its past discrepancies concerning Iran's secret enrichment and reprocessing activities, the agency

⁴⁰⁵ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129]. p.99

has been unable to provide sufficient evidence to prove that Iran has restarted its nuclear weapons program.⁴⁰⁶ Recent analysis by the IAEA officials declared that Iran has amounted over a ton of uranium, which is sufficient with added purification, to create a nuclear weapon.⁴⁰⁷ With this information, the Obama administration must quickly begin a process to initiate a new era of diplomatic relations with Iran to deter the nation from continuing clandestine nuclear weaponry activities.

After thoroughly analyzing policy options, including US military strikes, a positive engagement approach, and a multilateral political and economic isolationist approach, the recommendations for engagement with Iran are to first openly acknowledge the significance the nation plays within the Middle East while attempting to restrain it and redirect it through a last attempt at multilateral positive engagement. This multilateral engagement approach with Iran will be based on the premises that the US, alongside of global powers with significant interests in the region such as EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany), China, and Russia, will provide Iran with one final opportunity to diplomatically relinquish its current nuclear operations. If Iran elects to accept an agreement to end its nuclear weapons program it will be highly rewarded. However, if a last effort through positive engagement with Iran fails, the US, EU-3, China and Russia must have a prepared alternative response. This alternative response will conclude that Iran has passed the redline of allowed nuclear activity, which will result in the espousing of a hardliner multilateral political and economic isolationist approach by the EU-3 plus 3 (China, Russia, and the United States).

To begin multilateral negotiations, the US must completely remove preconditions for negotiating with Iran. Direct US engagement with Iran will be a crucial component

⁴⁰⁶ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 99.

⁴⁰⁷ Broad, William J., David E. Sanger. "Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than We Thought." *The New York Times* (February 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html?_r=1 (accessed February 20, 2009).

for developing a successful resolution. However, an opening of relations may be slow to materialize as a result of a long history of anti-American sentiments, engrained into the rhetoric and ideological framework of the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, Iranian leaders may be discouraged from holding open-talks based on the belief that engagement with the US may undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. As a result, dialogue with Iran should be held in an undisclosed manner, to ensure that Iranian leaders will be able to save face if they elect to negotiate with the United States.

To ensure the legitimacy and success of negotiations with Iran the US must also obtain strong international support. Without the support of regions with key interests in Iran it will be difficult, if not impossible, for any US devised strategy to espouse change in Iran's current nuclear activity. Thus, to develop a strategic plan for engagement with Iran the US should seek to work through the existing multilateral framework laid down by the EU-3 (France, Germany, Britain) plus 3 (China, Russia, and the United States). Through this framework the US will be able to create a plan based on severe multilateral action if Iran chooses to not accept a positive engagement option.

A challenge to the US led formation of a severe multilateral initiative will be in persuading Russia and China to agree. In order to convince both nations to commit to a US proposal to possibly cut political and economic ties with Iran the US must locate policy options to strategically offer both nations in order to entice them to solicit an end to the interlocking of their national interests with those of Tehran.

Furthermore, the administration will also have to diffuse a possible military explosion between Israel and Iran. Israel's political officials have openly expressed their intolerance with the progress of Iran's current nuclear program. Israeli leaders have also claimed they will by no means accept a nuclear Iran and will resort to preemptive military strikes if deemed necessary. In order to diffuse a possible destabilizing situation, the Obama administration must increase Israel's perception of security within the Middle East. The US will want to consider offering Israel a nuclear security assurance, in order to deter Israel from acting out on its rational fears of Tehran with a unilateral strike. The

US should also utilize the unstable relationship between Israel and Iran to promoting peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in particular Syria, which is currently allied with Iran and its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. The formation of a strategic relationship between Syria and Israel would weaken Iran's influence in the region, reduce the external support for both Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as improve prospects for a more stable Lebanon.

The current Iranian nuclear crisis represents a scenario that at its present rate will lead to very unpredictable future in the Middle East. As a rising Shia power in a Sunni dominated Middle East, a nuclear Iran would undermine the already unstable regional dynamics of the Middle East by giving it a political advantage to intimidate other nations as well as strengthen the ambitions of terrorist proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah.

A precedent must be set with Iranian-case, that in order for a nation to be granted its right under the NPT, it would have to remain in full compliance of IAEA protocol by adhering to strict oversight. In other words, as regions such as Iran act upon their rights under the NPT, the international community must actively request these nations to work under full compliance of the IAEA. Thus, as nuclear fuel becomes a dominant energy source in the future, it necessary for the United States to lead the international community in developing a multilateral non-proliferation regime that will respect the international sovereignty of all nations under a framework capable of limiting Iran's access to nuclear dual-use technology as well as the possible extension of nuclear know-how to terrorist organizations.

BACKGROUND

The Middle East has continued to emerge on the international nuclear proliferation radar for the several decades. In the case of Iran, its nuclear program has traveled a long road in an apparent quest for nuclear energy and a clandestine nuclear weapons program as it continues to confront regional insecurities as well as promote its own regional ambitions and radical ideals within the Middle East. Iran's route towards developing nuclear weapons began in the mid-1970's, as part of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's

ambitions to secure dominance in the Persian Gulf.⁴⁰⁸ These nuclear ambitions included plans to develop civilian fuel-cycle facilities, consisting of both enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that would be capable of developing a nuclear weapon option if the need ever surfaced. However, with the onset of the radical 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Shah's nuclear ambitions were largely shattered, as scientist fled the country and sources of external assistance faltered. After the Shah was over thrown in 1979, US suspicion of Iran's real nuclear ambitions heavily increased, especially as Iran fell under the power of an anti-US regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini.⁴⁰⁹

In the mid-1980's progress slowly resumed under the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini even as he remained highly suspicious of the nuclear technology due to its conflicting nature with Islamist ideals.⁴¹⁰ Under this nuclear program initiative, Iran began small-scale research on centrifuge enrichment technology it had secretly acquired from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network. Then with Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1989, the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani decided to accelerate Iran's covert enrichment program as well as to pursue nuclear reactor deals with both Russia and China.⁴¹¹ The US continued to place pressured on both Russia and China to refrain from assisting. However, Iran's perseverance persuaded Russia into selling the design technology for the production of light water and heavy-water reactors.⁴¹² In 1995 Russia signed an 800 million dollar contract to build two light-water reactors at Bushehr, which in the spectrum of international proliferation are considered far less of a concern in comparison to heavy-water production.⁴¹³ This technological exchange with Russia along with the arrival of

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 96.

⁴⁰⁹ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Treat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 96.

⁴¹⁰ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 97.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 97.

⁴¹² Ibid., 97.

⁴¹³ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Treat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 107.

several hundreds of Russian technicians, allowed Iran to initiate a secret plutonium production program alongside of the existing clandestine enrichment program.

It was not until August 2002 that an Iranian dissident group called the National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly exposed Iran's secret enrichment and heavy-water reactors.⁴¹⁴ Within a month, commercial satellite photographs indicated large partially underground construction projects underway at Natanz and also near Arak, which alluded to the development of secret nuclear programs.⁴¹⁵ This exposure of Iran's internalized clandestine programs, painted a terrifying picture for the US, seeming as it had recently entered into war in the Middle East to fight against the spread of Weapons of Mass destruction and terrorism. Thus, it was the combination of surfacing clandestine nuclear activities compiled with extensive support for terrorist activities that led President Bush to declare Iran as a member of the "axis of evil." The declaration of the Iranian regime as an evil regime as well as the swift invasion in Iraq added new dimensions to Ayatollah Khamenei's perspective concerning US intentions for Iran. Thus, the combination of the American military presence in Afghanistan on Iran's eastern border and the US invasion of Iraq on its western boarder caused Tehran to feel encircled by the US ultimately leading Iran to believe it had a security reasons to obtain a nuclear device.⁴¹⁶

In March 2003, in order to block US efforts to refer Iran to the UN Security Council as a result of its violations of its NPT agreements, Iran turned towards the EU-3, which agreed to begin negotiations with Iran.⁴¹⁷ On December 18, 2003 Iran, under the pressure of the EU-3, agreed to suspend all of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, "as defined by the IAEA" and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, to enhance the inspection process, which ultimately revealed the grand scale and history of the Iran

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.,107.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.,107.

⁴¹⁶ Inbar, Efraim. "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2006): [1-20] .2

⁴¹⁷ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 97.

nuclear program.⁴¹⁸ This progress in revealing the nature of Iranian nuclear program came to a close in June 2004, when Iran announced it would continue to manufacture centrifuges, contrary to the 2003 agreement with the EU-3 and the IAEA.⁴¹⁹ This action by Iran to retreat from its EU-3 and IAEA agreements of promoting transparency to ensure the authenticity of its nuclear programs bolstered further international suspicion concerning Iran's nuclear intentions. However, Iran continued to declare that its nuclear activities were in full adherence of NPT obligations and that it would voluntarily provide the additional transparency required under the Additional Protocol to the NPT to prove the civilian nature of its nuclear programs. Iran, however, did not offer to provide additional transparency to its programs in order to ensure that its efforts were solely based upon civilian energy.⁴²⁰

The limited success of the EU-3 in limiting the progress of the Iranian nuclear programs experienced a twist with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005. As the hardliner president assumed power, he supported the full resumption of Iran's nuclear activities. The IAEA responded to this turn of events by referring the Iranian file to the UN Security Council, in order to find another route to limit the program. Shortly after, in a conference in New York the EU-3, China, Russia, and the US devised a set of sanctions against Iran to pressure the Islamic Republic to again suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities.⁴²¹ However, UN sanctions were unsuccessful in altering the course of the Iranian nuclear regime due to external and internal factors. For one, the high price of oil insulated the Iranian economy from the effects of UN sanctions. Second, during the negotiations, internal division surfaced amongst the big powers concerning the extent of the economic and political sanctions to implement against Iran. In other words, differing strategic and financial interest in Iran, largely

⁴¹⁸ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Threat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 109.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁴²⁰ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 97.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 97.

weakened the UN Security Council's efforts to develop a multilateral sanctions package that could significantly elicit change in the direction of the Iran's nuclear programs.

Then in July 2008, the Bush administration decided to drastically change US policy by sending envoy William Burns to join the EU-3 plus 3's pre-negotiations with Iran. This action from Washington signaled an end to US preconditions for holding formal negotiations with Iran. The decision to join negotiations with Iran were largely preempted by Washington's fears that Iran would make use of fractional interests amongst the EU-3, Russia, and China to reduce the risk and severity of sanctions and/or military attacks while it continued resolving technical challenges in its current centrifuge programs.⁴²² In May 2008, the EU-3 plus 3 made an offer to assist Iran's civil nuclear program by providing access to European technology and design for light water power and research reactors as well as legally binding assurances of fuel supply if Iran would accept a ten-year moratorium on its enrichment and reprocessing of heavy-water based research reactor programs.⁴²³ Iran rejected the offer, claiming that it needed to develop its own fuel supply at the Natanz enrichment plant as a backup in case sanctions preempted Russia to cut off fuel supplies to the Russian supplied Bushehr facility.⁴²⁴ In other words, even with the offer of foreign aid in developing a civilian nuclear program, Iran continued to hold strong to the belief that under the NPT it should be allowed full access to develop a nuclear program.

Presently, multilateral efforts to stop Iran's escalating nuclear program have remained ineffective. This failure in combination with the current progress in Iran's production of fissile material brings to life the emanate threat Iran's nuclear progress poses to the international community. According to the IAEA's most recent reports, Iran's Natanz site is feeding uranium into nearly 5,600 centrifuge machines and has presently produced a total of 1,010 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, which is

⁴²² Ibid., 98.

⁴²³ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 98.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., 98.

sufficient to make a nuclear weapon.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, Iran is also beginning production on two new machines the IR-2 and IR-3, which are far more technically efficient than the P-1 machine of the 1960's, and the P-2 machine of the 1970's—both were developed in Europe.⁴²⁶ The development of these machines along with the rapid development of fissile material reveals vast improvements in Iran's mastery of nuclear technology.

The timeline for Iran's development of a nuclear weapon is quickly diminishing as it increases its mastery of centrifuge technology and is now capable of producing a large stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which could be used to produce weapons grade, or highly enriched uranium (HEU).⁴²⁷ However, exactly when Iran develops nuclear breakout capability largely depends on the strategic agendas and ambitions the Iranian regime hopes to accomplish with a nuclear weapon. Thus, Iran's breakout strategy is largely a confounding reality based on both its political strategy and technical capacity. Under the worse case scenario, Iran would opt to breakout once it has a minimum capacity, a sufficient stockpile of LEU, which would mean Iran would produce a nuclear weapon within a very short timeframe. Whereas on the other hand, Iran may postpone its breakout capability until it has the capacity to build a small arsenal. Either option from a US standpoint would largely challenge US interests in Iran as well as in the Middle East.

INTERESTS

The primary goal of the United States government is to provide security for the American people. Today, this innate role is challenged by the broadening growth of clandestine nuclear operations within Iran. The possibility of a nuclear Iran, would not only threaten US interests at home but would also complicate US defined interest in the Middle East. The US has dedicated a substantial amount of time, finances, and lives to lessen the stronghold of regional terrorist networks within the Middle East. Iran, as a

⁴²⁵ Broad, William J., David E. Sanger. "Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought." *The New York Times* (February 19, 2009), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html?r=1> (accessed February 20, 2009).

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 100.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 101.

documented supporter of terrorist organizations, could choose to supply these dangerous extremists with nuclear materials. Recognizing this challenge the US must quickly conduct diplomatic relations with Iran to end its nuclear weapons program. The opening of political relations with Iran could also supply the US with an opportunity to discuss subsequent long-term goals with the Iranian republic such as an end to the regime's support for terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah, radical position towards Israel, human rights abuses, and expansion of extremist anti-American ideology. The US must recognize the powerful role Iran has amassed in the Middle East and by doing so identify the greater US political and ideological goals for the region, which include but are not limited to:

- An end to Iran's nuclear weapon endeavors and long-range missile program
- An Iran subject to strict regulations of the IAEA
- The Ratification of the IAEA's Additional Protocol by Iran
- The full relinquishment of Iranian support for terrorist organization such as Hamas and Hezbollah
- Iran's support of a peaceful Israel-Palestine resolution
- A diversion from an Iran's authoritarian nature with the promotion of civil society through a gradual opening of political space and strengthening of independent institutions

OPTIONS

Iran's timeline of questionable nuclear activity points to the logical conclusion that Iran is attempting to conceal a thriving nuclear weapons program.⁴²⁸ It is clear from the international attempts under the UN that mild economic sanctions lack the scope or power to compel any favorable change in Iran's behavior. Thus, the Obama administration as well as the international community must develop a different set of options to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran. In order to devise such a set of policy options, the Obama administration must analyze the threat from the perspective of the

⁴²⁸ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Threat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008.

United States, EU3, China, Russia, Israel, and the Gulf States in order to formulate a possible framework for engaging with all parties to arrive at a favorable compromise for dealing with Iran.

Zero Option:

From a non-proliferation standpoint, a total moratorium on Iran's enrichment and reprocessing facilities would be the superior solution in comparison to various other options for limiting the scope of Iran's nuclear program. However, the "zero option" many no longer be achievable. Iran has invested too much pride, money, and scientific talent into building its nascent nuclear infrastructure to abandon it completely.⁴²⁹ From the beginning of Iran's nuclear negotiations in 2003, the Islamic Republic has continuously rejected demands to suspend its nuclear enrichment programs for any significant period of time, furthermore, illustrating to the international community its commitment to maintain its existing nuclear energy program. Any allowance of limited Iranian nuclear sites would set a dangerous precedent in terms of arms control by displaying that a country caught in violation of the NPT agreement would be allowed to benefit from a civilian energy program.⁴³⁰ Thus, if the US decides to allow Iran to continue a nuclear program it will have to develop strong verification mechanisms to safeguard against Iran's high propensity for violating its nuclear commitments.

Military Option:

As Iran continues to approach the nuclear threshold, the option of resorting to military attack continues to present itself as an alluring response for the US and foremost Israel. However, opting to use military intervention to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons should be carefully analyzed through a cost and benefit analysis in order to

⁴²⁹ Perkovich, Geroge. "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. (2003): [1-15], 2.

⁴³⁰ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129], 107.

determine whether this option could achieve US strategic goals without incurring immense costs.

First, attacking suspected nuclear sites located in populated areas would undoubtedly cause massive casualties, which in the long run, could tarnish US international reputation as well as turn more moderate Iranians towards a more extremist position. Today, the population in Iran is dominated by a younger generation. This gives hope for a revival of more progressive views within Iran's domestic and foreign politics. An aggressive military attack by the United States against Iran's nuclear sites could spark a wave of nationalism, which would be utilized by the current regime to bolster further anti-American sentiments. Furthermore, due to the decentralized setup of Iran's nuclear sites, it would be very unlikely that a military strike could destroy all nuclear sites. A military operation could also cause Iran to withdrawal from the NPT in order to speed its commitment and flows of finances towards accelerating its nuclear program. As a matter of historical reference, an attack against Iran's nuclear sites could yield a similar response by Iran as to that of Iraq after Israel's attack on Osirak in June 1981, which served rather to increase Saddam's desire for a nuclear arsenal.⁴³¹ We must also consider that even if the Iranian government decided against resuming nuclear operations as result of a military strike, there would still be a large base of intellectual capital composed of Iranian scientists and technicians.⁴³² This intellectual base would remain a challenge as such intellectual capital could be transmitted to other clandestine weapons programs. Finally, by drawing on the historical lessons from Iran's long past of clandestine attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program, it is plausible that Iran has already developed clandestine facilities unknown to US or Israeli intelligence.

A further option that the Obama administration must consider is the possibility of a preemptive attack eliciting regime change in Iran. Even if such an option may be

⁴³¹ Ruster, Karen., Sammy Salama. "A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequence." *Monterey Institute of International Studies* (August 12, 2004), <http://www.cns.miis.edu/stories/040812.htm> (accessed February 2, 2009), 3.

⁴³² Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Treat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 124.

feasible especially in the mist of the upcoming election in Iran, a successful regime change in Iran would only be able to take place in a sustained and subtle manner, through an overcoming of a deeply ingrained ideological battle between the US and Iran, which would take far more time than the progress of Iran's current nuclear program has allotted.⁴³³ Furthermore, regime change would be difficult to accomplish in a police state like Iran where suppression is effective in paralyzing any meaningful political opposition.⁴³⁴

If needed the US Air Force and Navy could successfully carryout an attack on known/suspected Iran nuclear plants. Thus, it is not the attack but rather the aftermath, which is the decisive factor. To decide whether to use a military attack against Iran, the US must analyze the possible response from Iran after an attack on its nuclear facilities. Iran could opt to respond with a direct retaliation on US soil or more inadvertently through attacking US interests and assets abroad. Such targets could include US warships in the Persian Gulf or an attack against US naval assets.⁴³⁵ Iran could also attempt to carryout an attack against US forces in Iraq, which could complicate current US progress within the region. Furthermore, as a historical enemy, Israel could also become a target for Iran's retaliatory measures. This retaliatory force could stem from a direct Iranian attack as well as from increased support for Hezbollah and Hamas, which currently challenge Israel stability. Iran may also try to use its influence over oil markets as a response to a military attack. Iran exports slightly more than 5% of world's oil; by closing supplies it could significantly affect the world's oil markets.⁴³⁶ However, to the contrary of this decision, the oil-market is estimated to provide 60% of Iran's national budget, a substantial amount that would yield large consequences for the already stagnant economic condition of the region.⁴³⁷

⁴³³ Ibid., 124.

⁴³⁴ Inbar, Efraim. "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2006): [1-20], 11.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 125.

⁴³⁶ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Treat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 125.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 126.

If the Obama Administration determines that a nuclear Iran is far too dangerous to be accepted into the nuclear club, it may be faced with the decision of whether to resort to military force. Therefore the US must not remove the military option from the table. Instead we will place a large influence that the military option will be put on a back burner, as a last resort option if Iran fails to comply with the international community's demands.

Positive Engagement Policy Option:

To avoid the unpredictable dilemma of a military option, the Obama administration could attempt to resolve the nuclear predicament through open and direct engagement with Iran. To initiate diplomatic negotiations, the Obama administration will face substantial obstacles. First, as already mentioned, the long history of limited diplomatic relations and embedded anti-American sentiments within the Islamic Republic will make the road to open diplomacy problematic. Second, due to limited knowledge regarding where political power lies within the Iranian Republic, it will be difficult for the Obama Administration to decide whom its negotiations should target. Third, the framework for negotiations would rely heavily upon the international participation by regions such as the EU3, China, and Russia to expend a proposal with significant incentives to positively alter Iran's nuclear program.

The difficulty with offering an incentive-based proposal stems from the historical record of Iran's defiance and refusal to accept past offers. For instance, in the past the EU-3, China, and Russia offered Iran a far-reaching package that stated if Iran took the steps required by the IAEA the EU-3 Plus 3, the nation would be provided with several positive concessions such as the withholding of further action by the UN Security Council, an offer to help build power stations, a guarantee of fuel supplies, and a cooperative approach for future sharing of civilian nuclear research. However, Iran refused to accept the offer based on the premises that such an agreement would jeopardize progress on its own civilian nuclear programs as well as the possibility that Russia may falter on its commitments to guaranteed fuel supplies. This past failure at

achieving a positive engagements resolution reveals that such an approach will not influence Iran unless it includes dire ramification. Thus, even if a positive approach towards ending Iran's nuclear program would be a favorable route, the likelihood of such an offer espousing change appears to very limited.

Negative Engagement Policy Option:

As a result of the US inability to use solely use positive engagement, the US could also focus on composing a set of all encompassing economic and political pressures to trigger a change in Iran's nuclear program.⁴³⁸ In particular with the support of Russia and China as well as other EU members (foremost from Germany and France, Iran's largest trading partners), the International community could reshape the past failures of the negotiating process with Iran thereby hopefully altering the future course of the regime's nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, with a renewed multilateral effort the UN could impose sanctions that would out match the modest sanctions imposed in late 2006 and in early 2007. The implementation of newly devised sanctions would have to be sweeping in nature to deal a critical blow to the already faltering economy. The combination of these factors with an already shaky economy could push the barrier of social unrest to the point of eliciting an end to Iran's nuclear program.⁴³⁹

The obstacle to the creation and implementation of comprehensive sanctions is a matter of national interests. Threats of tightened sanctions by the US against Iran remain trivial due to long-standing unilateral sanctions. However, to the contrary an increase in the strength of sanctions by Russia, China, and the EU-3 which all have significant interest in Iran in combination with falling oil prices could pressure Iran to relinquish its nuclear activities. For instance, Russia is tied to Iran through trade and geopolitical interests; Germany, Italy, France, UK and the Netherlands all provide Iran vital investment and banking credit; and China has increased relations with Iran as a result of

⁴³⁸ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Treat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 126.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., 128.

its growing need for sources of energy.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, the weakness of past international efforts to limit Iran's nuclear progress stems from the intrinsic characteristics of the interdependent world, where a faltering economy in one part of the world vibrates throughout the rest. In other words, when these regions break ties with Iran they place their own economies in both direct and indirect jeopardy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Since, the dawn of the nuclear age, every US administration has struggled with the challenges preempted by the spread of nuclear weapons. Much of challenge has been dealt with under the framework of the IAEA, which today continues to play an important role in monitoring nuclear proliferation activities. Alongside of the IAEA, the NATO's expansion of security assurances has also been a key international legal instrument to nurture the nuclear non-proliferation regime. International non-proliferation has also largely relied on the efforts of the UN Security Council and the work of its member nations to collaborate through sanctions in an attempt to compel nations to forgo internationally condemned nuclear activities.

In total, the international community, with the US often taking the lead, has dedicated significant political, financial, and intellectual resources towards nuclear non-proliferation. However, even with significant investments on the part of the US, Iran continues quickly approach the nuclear threshold. The existence of a nuclear Iran will very likely trigger other nations especially within the Middle East to begin development of clandestine nuclear programs. Thus, as the possibility of a nuclear race within the Middle East draws near, the US must develop a strategy that not only curbs Iran's current progress but also simultaneously limits the ability for other nations to execute a similar route towards developing nuclear power. To accomplish this task there are a series of international measures that can be taken to build and improve on past successes and failures to construct a new nonproliferation regime capable of preventing the spread of

⁴⁴⁰ Caravelli, Jack. *Nuclear Insecurity. Understanding the Threat from Rogue Nations and Terrorists*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008, 128.

nuclear weapons as well as pressuring Iran to end its current nuclear weaponry operations.

New Framework for a non-nuclear Iran:

The recommended strategy the US should pursue with Iran's combines elements of the positive engagement and the negative isolationist approach to ultimately limit the costs the United States may face in creating a plan capable of espousing change in the direction of Iran's nuclear program. To limit the nuclear progress in Iran the US must:

- Develop a positive multilateral package to provide Iran with incentives to divert from present nuclear operations
- Develop a clear set of multilateral negative consequences if Iran resolves to not accept a positive package
- Find ways to strategically bring Russia and China into accordance with the new security plan
- Create a Middle East security plan, to protect against a nuclear Iran—with a focus on the stabilization of Israel, non-nuclearization of the Middle East, and an Iranian adoption of a “No First-Use Policy”

Positive Incentive Package for Iran:

To create an opportunity for positive engagement with Iran, the Obama administration should offer inducements to begin a process of normalizing relations with Iran. This must include a US assurance against an attempt to cause regime change in Iran, a declaration of respect for Iran's status within the Middle East, as well as the recognition of Iran's right to strictly civilian nuclear energy under the NPT. Such a change of stance by the Obama administration along with solidified international support by the EU-3 plus China and Russia, would depict a renewed eagerness to develop a peaceful and beneficial resolution to end Iran's clandestine nuclear operations. Although, past attempts to achieve a positive resolution have been unsuccessful, it is possible that a renewed American and Iran relationship in combination with strong participation by the EU-3 plus

3 will be able to provide enough incentive to push Iran to recommit to the IAEA devised framework for developing peaceful civilian nuclear energy. In order to make this the case, the US must first bear the challenge of convincing China and Russia to agree to a new multilateral positive engagement approach. Strengthening of Russian and Chinese support would not only further encourage Iran to accept a positive package but would also harden the multilateral response against Iran if negotiations proved unsuccessful.

Currently, Russia and China have supported sanctions targeted at entities and individual directly associated with Iran's nuclear programs.⁴⁴¹ However, both nations have also remained unwilling to support the implementation of broader economic sanctions that could significantly convince Iran to yield a compromise. This discrepancy in the US-Russia-China agreements over sanctions reveals the deeper ideological disagreements concerning the geopolitical threat perceptions Iran emits. However, even as Russia and China have waned on taking a stricter role in pressuring Iran to forgo nuclear activity, both regions would most likely be unwilling to jeopardize relations with the US or Europe over the Iran nuclear predicament.⁴⁴² Thus, the US should focus on making Iran a central issue for US bilateral relations with both Moscow and Beijing.

Strengthening US-Russia Relations

Present bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington have become increasingly entangled with the Iranian issue amongst other key security issues such as US missile defense projects in Europe, NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The emergence of these diplomatically contending issues between Russian-US have largely strained Russia's support for international efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weaponry program.⁴⁴³ Thus, as long as conflicts of interest remain between Russian and the United States it will be difficult to formulate a common approach towards dealing with Iran. To re-orient the strategic

⁴⁴¹ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*. Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129]., 111.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 111.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 111.

relationship between the US and Russia, to devise a common Russia-US position towards dealing with Iran, the US should:

- Suspend EU and NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine
- Defers developments of missile defense in Poland

Strengthening Chinese-US relations

In comparison to Russia, negotiations over a nuclear Iran have not become entangled within broader Chinese geo-strategic issues and old cold-war power rivalries. Instead the present challenges in bringing China on board with a new positive engagement strategy stem from China's growing dependence on Iranian oil and gas. In other words, China has a strong interest to avoid actions that may lead to oil price-spikes and supply disruptions as it presses to become an emerging industrial leader in the twenty-first century. To the advantage for Obama administration, it has been noted that China routinely refrains from using its veto power to block actions that other permanent members of the Security Council support.⁴⁴⁴ Thus, if the US can meld its goals with Russia, to bring Russia into an agreement on a broader set of economic sanctions against Iran, it is unlikely that China will exercise its veto power. However, to increase China's commitment towards participating in a multilateral engagement approach the US should:

- Suspend the selling of arms supplies to Taiwan
- End the ban on selling arms and dual-use technology to Beijing
- Pledge to promote more lenient carbon caps for China

The Terms of Positive Multilateral Engagement approach:

Once, the Obama administration has successfully persuaded China and Russia to participate under a new positive engagement framework, the EU-3 plus 3 will be able to implement a finalized positive engagement package. The final positive engagement offer to Iran would include:

⁴⁴⁴ Riedel, Bruce, Gary Samore, and "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East ." *Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President*: Saban Center at Brookings Institution Press, (2008): [93-129]., 113.

- The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States
- An end to all multilateral and unilateral sanctions by the EU-3 plus 3
- A commitment that force would not be used against Iran for past nuclear activities
- Increased international assistance to develop and modernize Iran's aging energy infrastructure
- An agreement to allow Iran to develop a safe, economically viable, and proliferation-proof civilian nuclear power and research program
- Guaranteed access to fuel supplies for light water reactors from Russia
- Offer a US security assurance against nuclear attacks

In exchange for Iranian Republic's agreement to:

- End all Iranian nuclear weapons fuel-cycle activities
- Reaffirm a commitment to abide by security and non-proliferation treaties
- Agree to a legally binding agreement to renounce withdraw from the NPT
- Commit to the adherence of IAEA compliance mechanism with the adoption of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol
- Reaffirm a commitment to support and maintain a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone
- End to long-range missile programs

Negative Isolationist package

The implementation of a multilateral positive approach towards resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis will only work if the EU-3 plus 3 can successfully convince leadership in Iran that rejecting a generous offer will yield greater costs for Iran in terms of political isolation, economic punishment, and potential military action. Thus, if Iran's

refuses to retreat from the redline of allowed nuclear activity, it will trigger the implementation of harsh multilateral political and economic sanctions as a last effort to elicit the desired change in Iran's nuclear course. Thus, the positive engagement strategy with Iran must be matched by a set of negative steps that EU-3 plus 3 will be prepared to take if Iran fails to accept a positive offer. The implementation of newly devised multilateral sanctions in combination with the present slide in oil revenues, will largely complicate Iran's already faltering economy, which will make the positive resolutions offered by the EU-3 plus 3 appear far more appealing. The negative Isolationist approach by the EU-3 plus 3 will be composed by a set of previously agreed to legally binding sanctions against Iran by the EU-3 plus 3 that may include and are not limited to:

- The banning of travel by Iranian officials, business leaders, and nuclear scientists
- The restriction of international flights and other means of transportation and communication into and out of Iran
- The restriction of worldwide sales of arms and dual-use tech equipment
- The barring of loans from private international banks or international agencies to Iran
- A freeze on Iran's assets in foreign institutions
- The expulsion of the Islamic Republic from all international organizations
- A comprehensive embargo on Iranian imports of refined-petroleum products

Enhancing Deterrence Capacity for a nuclear Iran:

The final element of the new security framework would be to create means for enhancing deterrence in case Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. The implications of a nuclear Iran would be profound for the entire Middle East. Iran's foreign policy options would increase immensely, which may compel Sunni dominated regions to develop

nuclear capability, sparking a chain of very unpredictable events. Thus, Iran would become the obvious focal point for the global community to begin creating a strategy for nuclear deterrence within the Middle East.

The US would need to begin diplomatic engagement with Sunni Arab regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other smaller Gulf States, to reduce the formation of a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race as a result of a nuclear Iran. The US should offer a nuclear umbrella for all Arab States that promise to forswear the development of nuclear arms. This approach will give the regions a heightened sense of security furthermore reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons programs. The international community should also place significant effort on publicizing the negative consequences Iran will face from developing nuclear weapon arsenal. Taking a transparent route towards dealing with a nuclear Iran will depict to surrounding Arab nations that developing nuclear weapons programs does not provide further security or desired geopolitical results.

To target the actual usage of nuclear weapons, the Obama administration must secure Israel in a world with a nuclear Iran. Embarking on any endeavor to encourage Israel to refrain from a preemptive attack against Iran must focus on strengthening Israeli confidence of its security within the Middle East. The perceived Iranian threat along with Israel's determination to maintain a nuclear monopoly within the Middle East will make it difficult to diffuse the current radical relationship between Israel and Iran as well as prevent a preemptive war. To increase Israel's tolerance for a more drawn out diplomatic engagements with Iran, President Obama should bolster Israel's deterrent capabilities with a security assurance guarantee from Washington. Even though it is noted that Israel has full capacity to exercise a massive retaliation strike against an Iranian attack, a nuclear guarantee from the US would provide both psychological and political reassurance as well as strengthen deterrence against a nuclear Iran. However, the US must make clear that a nuclear assurance would be subjected to conditions to only protect Israel as long as it did not initiate conflict with other Gulf States or against Iran. Another

recommendation is to utilize Israel's present insecurity to strengthening its relations with its Middle East neighbors. For instance, peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in particular Syria, which is currently, allied with Iran and its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies would benefit the US interest to weaken Iran's influence in the core of the Middle East as well as reduce support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

CONCLUSION

A nuclear Iran poses a serious threat to the Middle East as well as the United States. Thus, the Obama administration must emphasize that the Islamic Republic must be denied nuclear weapons capability at all costs. The United States cannot allow a regime that harbors extremist ideals, pursues destabilizing regional ambitions, and continually supports global terrorist networks, to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, the US must quickly bring the international community together to provide a compelling offer to convince Iran that it will remain regionally powerful as well as more secure without the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In doing so the US must also strategically promote security for Israel and surrounding Arab nations in order to defend against both war as well as a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. To accomplish these goals the US will have to begin a new era of global diplomacy focused on the strengthening of global commitments to protect against the extension of nuclear dual-use technology to radical regimes and terrorist organizations. However, if such diplomacy fails with Iran, the United States must hold all options open in order to protect the life and liberty of its people against an Iranian nuclear threat.

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ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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ISSUE

- This report examines the violent land dispute between Israelis and Palestinians and recommends what the United States should do to most effectively address this problem.

It is in the interests of the United States to work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The most effective means at moving towards an end to this conflict is a multi-faceted approach characterized by the following strategies:

- The provision of humanitarian aid to improve the living conditions in Gaza
- A continuing crackdown on terrorist funding
- Calling upon Egypt to create a secure border zone
- US led negotiations between Syria and Israel
- Weakening Hamas by strengthening Fatah
- American led Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for an end to the conflict

BACKGROUND

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one which dates back for decades. Understanding the origin of the conflict is an essential step towards ascertaining a viable solution. The tension over this issue goes back to the very initial existence of the state that is now called Israel. Professor Migdal from the School of International Studies at the University of Washington, sums up the conflict as “an old-fashioned turf war.”¹ Though this may seem to summarize the conflict too simply, this is in fact exactly what it is.

The conflict is essentially two groups fighting over the same land that each side claims as their rightful homeland. Tensions first arose when Zionists in search of a state for the Jewish people decided on the land which we now know as Israel, which at that time was the British Mandate of Palestine. The main problem with this goal was the fact that Israel was not vacant but rather was inhabited by the unorganized group of Palestinians. In 1947, the United Nations proposed Resolution 181, a partition plan that

would divide up the land in question into two states, one for the Palestinian people and another for the Jewish people.⁴⁴⁵

This Resolution was ultimately rejected. In 1948, as the British pulled out of the area, a violent war ensued. In the end, the more organized Jewish state was successful. The victorious state of Israel maintained the area delegated to it in Resolution 181 and captured a large portion of greater Palestine. The Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians occupied the remainder. This meant an emergence of a Jewish state and not a Palestinian state. Unfortunately, violence did not end with this civil war. Unhappy Palestinians have continued for decades to attempt to gain sovereignty over some or all of the land. This conflict has often resulted in violence inflicted on and by both sides. As Israeli University of Washington Professor Gad Barzilai stated, “Tragically, both sides are committing war crimes that inflict damage on innocent civilians.”⁴⁴⁶ This is a conflict that has warped not just the nation of Israel but also the entire region causing strife and instability throughout the Middle East.

The United States has historically sided with Israel, finding in Israel a similar nation-state like itself. “US policy as regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped directly out of this core relationship, but has to be successfully married with US foreign policy position on democracy promotion, the free flow of oil (and thus support for the Arab supporters of the Palestinian cause), and anti-colonialism (in the past).”⁴⁴⁷

There is one important factor in the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has significant influence on the situation and hence should be understood and explained in detail. That factor is the Islamic Resistance Movement also known as Hamas. It is this group that is currently in control of the Gaza strip and has been a major cause of contention. Hamas was founded in 1987 from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ stated goal is the elimination of the nation of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state of Palestine in its place. Their strategy for achieving

⁴⁴⁵ (Milton-Edwards 2009)

⁴⁴⁶ (Barzilai, Steps Obama Should Take to Avoid a Wider War in the Middle East 2009)

⁴⁴⁷ (Hroub 2006)

this goal is three pronged: social welfare programs to build support, political competition with the PLO and the PA, and the use of guerrilla and terrorist attacks on Israelis. Also, the organization's political, social, and military branches are all run under the same authority. Additionally, the organization retains its own military force.⁴⁴⁸

The Islamic Resistance Movement is extremely religious in nature. An examination of their Covenant, the document the group created to outline their goals, strategy, and group doctrine, portrays this. Within the text of the Covenant there is frequent use of religious passages imbedded throughout the document. Also, the goals and statements of the movement are also stated in very religious terms. They proclaim themselves as consisting "of Moslems who have given their allegiance to Allah whom they truly worship" and also as "a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam."⁴⁴⁹ The very slogan itself reflects how much religiosity is at the core of the group's beliefs. "Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes."⁴⁵⁰ In fact, Hamas's reason for Jihad on Israel is grounded in the belief that the land of Palestine, or the current state of Israel, is actually an Islamic Waqf or a land that has been consecrated for future generations of Moslems until judgment day.⁴⁵¹

Hamas's relationship with the United States over the years has for the most part been one of non-contact. In the 1980's and the early 1990's, not much was known of the group. At this point in history, Hamas was supported by the Israeli government in the hopes that they would put strain on the PLO (at the time supported by Yasser Arafat). Between 1992 and 1993 the United States actually had contact and meetings with Hamas officials at the US embassy in Amman. During this period in time, the United States was still attempting to find out what exactly Hamas stood for.⁴⁵² These relations soon caught

⁴⁴⁸ (Levitt 2006)

⁴⁴⁹ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

⁴⁵⁰ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

⁴⁵¹ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

⁴⁵² (Hroub 2006)

the eye of Israel, however, who protested and the United States decided to cut off relations with the organization. Hamas responded to this decision by denouncing the United States saying that their actions only proved how controlled the US is by the Jewish lobby in Washington. Only weeks after cutting off ties with Hamas, the United States named the organization as a terrorist organization in the 1993 Report on Global Terrorism. In 1996, hostilities amplified and Hamas put into full practice their suicide bombing tactics. At this time, the US took a stronger stance against Hamas and began pressuring Fatah, the opposition group, to contain Hamas. The US also stated that they “saw no role for Hamas unless it would disarm itself completely, denounce ‘terrorism’ and recognize Israel.”⁴⁵³ This was not something that Hamas was interested in.

In 2006, the United States sponsored what they thought was long overdue democratic elections in the Palestinian territories. Ironically, these elections did not go exactly as the US hoped and Hamas received the majority of votes in the Gaza strip. The United State’s response was “stopping all financial aid to Palestinians, bringing millions of Palestinians who mostly rely on the salaries paid by the Palestinian Authority to the verge of starvation.”¹⁰ Despite these aggravations, due to their policy of not attacking other states, Hamas stopped one step short of declaring the United States an enemy.⁴⁵⁴

INTERESTS

It is the overarching interest of the United States to take actions in the Middle East which would move in the direction of creating a stable, non-violent atmosphere in which pacific intercourse is the mode by which disputes are settled. Solving the Palestinian question would lay to rest an issue that has been wreaking havoc on the entire region. This chaotic instability has global repercussions, many of which reverberate all the way to the United States. Also, in light of previous actions of the United States, which by some were viewed negatively, it is also in the interest of the United States to have a

⁴⁵³ (Hroub 2006)

⁴⁵⁴ (Hroub 2006)

positive role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would improve the United States' image in the region.

It is in the more regionally- specific interest of the US to weaken Hamas in any and all ways possible. Hamas is a formidable obstacle on the path to peace and is a major perpetrator of violence in the region. Hamas is an extremist organization who refuses to compromise or negotiate and this is the primary reason that the influence of the organization must be weakened. A Hamas official, showing his contempt for compromise led by the United States, has stated the following in an interview,: “But we do not beg for such dialogues because the American administration tries to impose preconditions. We cannot give in to blackmail.”⁴⁵⁵ The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement itself shows even more clearly the unwillingness of Hamas to cooperate. “Initiative, or so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”⁴⁵⁶ In this Covenant passage the organization outright says they are against any means of international cooperation. They cannot be a member of negotiation because they are suspicious of the West. The Covenant states, “These conferences are only ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitrators. When did the infidels do justice to the believers?”⁴⁵⁷ Another official states, “Our message to the United States is this: your attempt to force us to give up our principles or our struggle is in vain.”⁴⁵⁸ The message behind this is very clear. And in their own words it is Hamas belief that, “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.”⁴⁵⁹

It is this mode of thinking that makes it necessary for the United States to weaken the role of Hamas in order to move forward. There is criticism that the conflict has waged on for so long that there is no hope at actually solving the problem. In light of the recent violence in the Gaza Strip and continued attacks by Hamas onto southern Israeli

⁴⁵⁵ (Peraino 2007)

⁴⁵⁶ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

⁴⁵⁷ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

⁴⁵⁸ (Tamimi 2007)

⁴⁵⁹ (Hamas Covenant 1988 1988)

cities, there remain parties willing to take advantage of a hope for peace. Regionally, nations have begun to show their enthusiasm for a resolution of the conflict. The Prince of Saudi Arabia's proposal for a solution illustrates this. This enthusiasm centers on several different factors. One such factor is the effects the conflict is having on nations in the region. Many moderate Arab countries such as Syria fear the spread of Islamic extremism that often seems to accompany this conflict. Neighboring countries fear militant ideologies, like those of Hamas, spilling across their borders. Also, the conflict has several times drawn other nations into violent armed conflicts. Additionally, Iran and the Shia arch of power it is attempting to create are worrisome for not only the US and Israel but also for many other powers in the region. It is in the best interest of all to resolve this conflict so that a regional alliance can be made to combat other issues such as Iranian power.

Lastly, it is not in the character of the United States to give up and call the conflict unsolvable. We should not condone violence because it is unsolvable. There is a solution to every problem as long as the right amount of effort is applied. In the last eight years, not enough attention has been given to the problem to make any notable advancement on the issue. It is time to apply a renewed effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the above and the threat the current status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has both on the region's order and that of the entire global order, it is therefore in the best interest of the United States to aid in alleviating this problem. The following are recommendations, based on the situation of the nation and those in the region, on the actions the United States of America should take regarding this issue. These recommendations include a multi-faceted approach at increasing peace in the region.

It is also important to recognize the fact that previous policy has employed a strong arm approach to countering terrorists in the region which involved waving the American stick and refusing to take part in pacific intercourse. This report argues for a

change in this policy. While the stick approach is at times needed, at other times a more incentive-based diplomatic strategy should be employed. In other words, this report recommends the combined stick and carrot approach that would suggest American strength coupled with an incentive-driven, diplomatic program.⁴⁶⁰ This combined approach would help the US to reach a larger range of possibilities.

The provision of humanitarian aid to improve the living conditions in Gaza

- *The United States should provide humanitarian aid to the impoverished people of Gaza. This aid is important because Hamas retains its support over the people by providing the social services that no one else is able to provide for them. These social services should be distributed through non-governmental organizations such as Red Cross and United Nations organizations so as to ensure aid is not funneled to Hamas hands and then redistributed to the people through Hamas, only further increasing the people's reliance on Hamas for social services.*

The first step in the process of remedying the situation in the region would be to provide immediate aid to the people of Gaza. In light of the recent war in between Gaza and Israel, the people of Gaza have been left even more bereft than before. That is why at this point it is important for the Gazans not be left to suffer any longer. The reasoning behind this is that it is imperative not push the people any further into the arms of Hamas.

Gazans initially supported the Islamic Resistance Movement because Fatah was unable to provide for the people because of corruption and stagnation in the Palestinian Authority. Unemployment rates for Palestinians are cited to be as high as 33.2 percent. In 2003, 30 percent of Palestinian children under the age of five suffered from chronic malnutrition and 21 percent suffered from acute malnutrition.⁴⁶¹ In 2004, three fourths of the Palestinian population were living below the poverty line of \$2 a day. Standards of living in Israel are 17 times higher.⁴⁶²

It was these circumstances that put the Palestinian people into the right position for Hamas to come in and take advantage of their desolate social situation. People will take desperate measures to ensure that they have the necessities of life. These desperate

⁴⁶⁰ (Salem 2008)

⁴⁶¹ (Levitt 2006)

⁴⁶² (Hroub 2006)

measures may even lead to the election of a terrorist organization. Michael Neumann discusses this concept in his article, “Terror and Expected Collateral Damage.” In this article Neumann states, “At a minimum, and barring extreme scarcity, people are thought entitled to have a life free from hunger, cold, physical abuse, and a general level of health and welfare consistent with the capacities of their society to guarantee it.”⁴⁶³ He goes on further to state, “The satisfaction of basic needs may be taken as the level below which individuals might be entitled, *prima facie*, to take drastic action to preserve them. Those who are starving when there is no scarcity may, perhaps, fight to get food.”⁴⁶⁴

Palestinians see the living standard of the Israelis and then compare it to their own. From this comparison, they ascertain that there is no reason why they should be forced to live under certain conditions while the nation right next to them is living under vastly better conditions. This knowledge may force the people to take drastic actions in order to obtain these basic needs.

This reasoning can be seen as one of the underlying causes behind the Palestinians following the leadership of Hamas and seemingly condoning the violence of the group. Hamas recognizes this too. That is why they made social programs one of the prongs of a three pronged strategy to gain the land of Israel. This is also why they chose to make food donations to the people of Palestine during the period prior to elections. They knew that people would choose the group they thought could provide for them.⁴⁶⁵ This idea is reaffirmed by the statements of University of Washington Professor Gad Barzilai. “Gaza’s economic prosperity must be safeguarded. If this road is not taken, the next general war in the Middle East may not be avoided.”⁴⁶⁶

Also, it is in the interest of the United States for its own image and for the implementation of further recommendations to provide aid to the region. Providing aid to Gazans will improve our reputation in the region. American endeavors in the region lately have lowered regional opinion of the United States. Aiding Gazans would show

⁴⁶³ (Neumann 2008)

⁴⁶⁴ (Neumann 2008)

⁴⁶⁵ (Levitt 2006)

⁴⁶⁶ (Barzilai, Steps Obama Should Take to Avoid a Wider War in the Middle East 2009)

the international community that the United States has compassion both for the Gazan people in specific and the Arab world in general. Also, this bettered reputation could possibly lead to better relations which would in turn enhance the United States' ability to successfully complete the remainder of these recommendations.

Along these lines, it is also in the best interest of the United States to pressure the Israeli military to execute necessary military actions with maximum concern for minimizing the amount of casualties and damage. When the state of Israel feels reasonably sure that such a measure is needed, it is accepted that they will launch a military attack to maintain themselves. However, this military attack should not exceed the amount of military force necessary to eliminate the threat. The reasoning behind this lies in the fact that any unneeded force only further exasperates the problems stated earlier in this section rather remedy them.

Though, the US should provide humanitarian support to the people of Gaza, this support should be provided in a very specific manner. It is important to not further enable Hamas with additional aid. All humanitarian funds provided must be fully accountable. The mode that this accountability should be achieved is through the medium of non-governmental organizations such as Red Cross and United Nations associated organizations. No funds should be given directly to Hamas. Humanitarian aid should be given to reliable NGO's who will be given the responsibility of providing aid directly to the Palestinian people. This will eliminate the possibility that US humanitarian funds could actually further empower Hamas. One problem that could occur is Hamas refusing to allow these NGO's to administer aid. If this is to occur the United States and NGO's will have to work with the situation as best as they can and hope that economic and social pressures will force Hamas to allow humanitarian aid. Under no circumstances will the United States allocate aid directly to Hamas.

A Continuing Crackdown on Terrorist Funding

- *The United States should act to curtail funding to Hamas. The US should do this by using intelligence to ensure that American citizens are not contributing to Hamas and undermining the US's national security strategy. Secondly, the US should attempt to*

have dialogue with other nations who have been known contributors to terrorist funding and make agreements that would trade non-contribution to Hamas for other incentives.

The problem with increasing humanitarian aid is that though it is necessary, it is a very tricky process. The goal of the first recommendation of this report is to eliminate the suffering and social issues of the Palestinians in a hope to alleviate the Palestinians' reliance on Hamas. However, at the same time, that is not to say that we want to pour money into the country without knowing where it goes or to fund the Hamas organization itself. All aid that is distributed to the Palestinian people should be accountable. The goal is not to fund terrorist activities. In the interest of alleviating terrorist activities, it is in the best interest of the United States to continue efforts to curb funds going to terrorist organizations.

Particularly disturbing is the fact that Americans themselves have been discovered to be donors to Hamas. In fact 30 million of Hamas money came from Americans in 2001.⁴⁶⁷ This is important to note, because while the American government may have little ability to stop nations and charities funding Hamas outside our borders, we have a much stronger ability to control the monetary transactions and doings of our own people. In fact, in recent years, the United States has cracked down on organizations who were funders of Hamas. One prime example of such a crackdown is that of The Holy Land Foundation. This foundation was a tax exempt charity headquartered in Richardson, Texas. The charity funneled their money through a bank in Amman, Jordan. This bank was the same bank through which it is known that an al-Qaida cell in Madrid transferred money to the September 11th hijackers.⁴⁶⁸ The organization was founded in 1989 and described itself as the largest Muslim charity within the United States. However, the Foundation soon came under suspicion for providing Palestinian terrorists with funding. In fact a US document states that they had "established that these funds were used by Hamas to support schools and indoctrinate children to grow up into suicide bombers."⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁷ (Ehrenfeld 2005)

⁴⁶⁸ (Ehrenfeld 2005)

⁴⁶⁹ (Ehrenfeld 2005)

The group raised \$13 million for Hamas. President George W. Bush shut down the organization in 2001.⁴⁷⁰ It is the United States' responsibility to ensure that its own citizens are not contributing to the terrorism that the government is trying to prevent.

Additionally, it well known that other states have condoned their citizens funding terrorist and some situations states have even supported it. Saddam Hussein was a known financial supporter of the PLO's terrorist practices. In fact, Saddam Hussein was known to give out checks at celebratory ceremonies honoring terrorist activities.⁴⁷¹ Also, the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia in the past has held telethons to raise money for the families of suicide bombers. At one telethon, an incredible \$174 million dollars was raised.⁴⁷² These issues are much more difficult for the United States to prevent as it does not wish to deny a nation its sovereignty. Tactics in this arena must be much more thought out and carefully planed and executed. The recommendation for the solution to this problem given by this report is that of pacific intercourse. It is both unwise and ineffective for the United States to try and coerce all other nations into more desirable practices. The US should discourage other nations from funding such organizations by using diplomatic relations. The US should obtain countries' agreements to discontinue state funding of terrorist in any and all talk, agreements, and treaties with known offenders. The US should get other nations to join such agreements by offering incentives for such behavior.

Pressure on Egypt to Create a Secure Border Zone

- *The United States should call upon Egypt to secure the Gazan-Egyptian border from additional weapons transfers to Hamas. The US should make this request to Egypt with an assurance to Egypt that this is all part of US commitment to arriving at a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would be beneficial to Egypt. Also the US should provide military and other aid for the Egyptians if they do have the capabilities to adequately secure the border. Failure to comply with this request should be interpreted as Egyptian unwillingness to promote peace and stability and hence an unwillingness to maintain friendly relations with the United States. As we are the biggest contributor of aid to Egypt, the US should consider drastically cutting funds.*

⁴⁷⁰ (Ehrenfeld 2005)

⁴⁷¹ (Ehrenfeld 2005)

⁴⁷² (Ehrenfeld 2005)

Another important factor in this strategy is Gaza's Egyptian border. This border is of utmost importance because it is the avenue through which Hamas smuggles weapons via tunnels from Egypt to Gaza. In the interest of decreasing violence in the region, it is essential that this route of weapons acquirement is eliminated. There are only two ways in which Hamas could be receiving these weapons, through Israel or through Egypt. With Israel's immense security and strong motives to prevent Hamas' acquisition of weapons, it is highly unlikely that these are coming through Israel. Therefore, that leaves Egyptian leniency or carelessness as the culprit. It is known that extensive tunnels from Egypt to Gaza exist.

The United States should attempt to quell the surge of weapons from Egypt into Gaza by putting stronger pressure on the Egyptians to uphold the security on their side of the border with more force and effectiveness. If United States pressure is effective and weapons transporting from Egypt to Gaza is decreased, this could be a step towards a peaceful situation in the area. At the moment, Hamas is the most violent agitator to Israel. Decreasing Hamas's access to weapons is one way to start moving towards peace. By taking away their weaponry, one can decrease Hamas's power.

US strategy towards Egypt should be to call for Egypt to provide absolute security of the borders. Egypt should be assured that the US has made achieving a peaceful resolution in the region a priority. A peaceful resolution can only be beneficial for Egypt who now deals directly with the consequences of a hostile neighbor. If the Egyptians feel that they do not have the capability to adequately carry out this request, the US should provide the aid, both military and otherwise, which is necessary for the completion of this task. If the Egyptians fail to comply with this request, this should be seen as refusal to work towards a peaceful solution and should also be seen as Egyptian unwillingness to work with friendly relations with the US towards and end to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The United States is the top contributor of aid to Egypt. From 1975 to 2006 the United States provided Egypt with \$28 billion dollars in aid.⁴⁷³ Refusal to contribute to a

⁴⁷³ (US Aid from the American People 2007)

solution should be seen as a threat to friendly relations with the United States and this immense funding should be drastically cut.

Negotiations with Syria

- *The United States should moderate negotiations between Israel and Syria. The aim of these negotiations should be for Syria to agree to normalize relations with Israel and stop support of Hamas (which would include their expulsion from Damascus) in exchange for a return of the Golan Heights and an end to isolation. This would weaken the power of Hamas by taking away their headquarters and also cutting of their transport route for aid from Iran. This negotiation would mandate that Syria stop aid to Hezbollah, which would eliminate another threat to peace.*

This strategy that has been brought up by a number of commentators and scholars. It is in the interests of the United States to abandon their previous strategy of refusing to have relations with Syria and become a facilitator for negotiations between Syria and Israel. The reasoning behind this strategic maneuver is simple. Hamas is a negative factor in the region. If an effort at peace is to be effective then Hamas's influence and power must be decreased. Syria is a big factor in Hamas's power for two reasons. The first is that the head officials of the Islamic Resistance Movement are not based in Gaza but within the security of Syria's capital, Damascus. The second reason is that Hamas's main backer is Iran. Funding and material support from Iran gets to Hamas by traveling through Syria. Due to hostile relations with Israel, Syria at this time condones such events and behavior.

Part of the reason for Syria's hostile relations is due to their anger at losing the Golan Heights to the Israelis in 1967 . Since then, they have been unable to get it back and that has caused animosity. Syria's recent strategy to get back the Golan Heights is waging a proxy war against the Israelis in an attempt at getting back their land.⁴⁷⁴ This proxy war has meant supporting other groups who have continually been Israeli agitators such as Hezbollah and the PLO. An effort at improving diplomatic relations could replace this proxy war with something more productive such as normalized relations. To achieve these normalized relations a treaty would have to be approved. This treaty would

⁴⁷⁴ (Salem 2008)

have to include Israel returning the Golan Heights to the Syrians. Also, it would involve the Syrians normalizing relations with Israel and agreeing to no longer support Hamas. The discontinuing of support would include stopping financial support to the organization and expelling Hamas officials from Damascus.

This solution is beneficial for both parties involved. Syria's interest in creating this connection with its Jewish neighbor state revolves around its instability. The current president Bashar Assad is the successor of his father. However, he has handled the affairs of the country poorly and has managed to squander many of the ties that his father created. This has left Syria dangerously dependent on its ally Iran. This proves dangerous because Iran can neither provide stability nor can it assure the return of the Golan Heights. Syria cannot afford to be estranged in the way that oil rich countries like Iran and Venezuela can. They do not have the economic resources for such a strategy.⁴⁷⁵ Also, Syria is a very diverse nation with many different sects of people, such as the Alawites, Sunnis, Kurds, etc. It is important to note the fact that the ruling class of Syria is in the ethnic minority also adds to the fragility of the situation. Syria must carefully manage this diverse society or else it is likely that certain sects such as the Islamists or the Kurds will rise up.⁴⁷⁶ Lastly, in light of the Lebanon War, Hezbollah no longer has the ability to play the role of the constant Israeli harasser as it had done in the past. This takes away from Syrian strategy options.

Entering into a peace agreement with the Israelis would serve various positive purposes. For one, regaining the Golan Heights would serve to better the reputation of the ruling regime. As Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writer, Paul Salem, states, "The return of the Golan Heights to Syria would be—and would be promoted as—a historic political and strategic achievement."⁴⁷⁷ This would help improve the image of the ruling class and in turn create more stability in the face of discontented sects. This would also help Syria end its isolation. Such an agreement would increase Syria's status

⁴⁷⁵ (Salem 2008)

⁴⁷⁶ (Kaplan 2008)

⁴⁷⁷ (Salem 2008)

in the United States' eyes which would in turn yield some protection. Also, the end of isolation would most likely lead to financial dividends; for example, possible entrance into the World Trade Organization and easier attraction of foreign investment. In light of the Hariri Tribunal, an international tribunal investigating the death of a Lebanese Prime Minister in which Syrian officials are thought to have been involved, it is important for the Syrians to have signed a treaty or be in negotiations with the Israelis as a face-saving mechanism.⁴⁷⁸

For the Israelis, the agreement's advantages would have more caveats, yet there would be substantial advantages nonetheless. The Israelis are fearful that if they give up the Golan Heights, the feeble Syrian government may collapse making the loss of the Golan Heights all for nothing.⁴⁷⁹ However, Syrian annexation of the Golan Heights would more likely strengthen the regime rather than weaken it due to the prestige such an achievement would give the regime. There is also a question of the military advantage that the Israelis would be giving up. This area would most likely be a demilitarized zone which would greatly alleviate any military threats. Israelis have critiqued Syria for its current alliances, questioning its reliability. Conversely, the Syrians claim that it is these alliances that made the Israelis willing to come to the negotiating table in the first place. Nevertheless, there are many advantages that the Israelis would gain. For one, it "would neutralize Israel's last significant Arab State opponent"⁴⁸⁰ and begin to put pressure on Lebanon to follow in Syria's steps. It would also eliminate strategic opportunities for terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah as they would not longer have the Syrian state actor on its side. Additionally, it would reopen the Arab Peace Initiative as a possibility. This would trade an end to the conflict and a two state solution for normalization of relations with Arab nations. This would not only be good for the normalizing factor but also because it would build up a block against Iran who is currently Israel's biggest enemy.

⁴⁷⁸ (Salem 2008)

⁴⁷⁹ (Milton-Edwards 2009)

⁴⁸⁰ (Salem 2008)

Despite the proclamations of skeptics, an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement is now a definite possibility. Peace was almost achieved in both 1996 and again in the year 2000. In fact, five Israeli prime ministers have recognized the value of such a negotiation.⁴⁸¹ Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert himself was believed to have the political skill to maneuver such an arrangement, but unfortunately personal allegations of corruption ended his political career before an arrangement was reached.⁴⁸² Recent talks hosted by Turkey between the two parties have shown the willingness of each country to open up a dialogue.⁴⁸³ Currently, Israel has decided that they have had enough of Hamas violence and have launched a war on Gaza. Syria also experiences economic pressures and the stresses of isolation. Owing to these facts, it is possible that now both countries are ready to begin negotiations.

The United States has nothing to lose and everything to gain in this endeavor. As long as the United States approaches the situation wisely, a solution is most assuredly on the horizon. “US interests in the Middle East include a more stable Iraq, a weaker Iran, progressing the Arab-Israeli peace process, a stable Lebanon, a weaker Hezbollah, a weaker Jihadist movement, and an improved American image. Peace between Syria and Israel would have a positive impact on them all.”⁴⁸⁴ Previous US policy has been refusal to mediate talks between the two nations. This is not a wise strategy because Hamas expects it. When asked whether they feared US intervention in Syria would threaten their place in Damascus, one Hamas official gave the following response:

“The American administration should know that we are confident of the Syrian position, and that any additional pressures on Hamas, inside or outside [the territories], will not be useful. We’re not worried about anything...Bush continues to adopt the same

⁴⁸¹ (Salem 2008)

⁴⁸² (Milton-Edwards 2009)

⁴⁸³ (Salem 2008)

⁴⁸⁴ (Salem 2008)

philosophy: if power does not succeed in achieving the objective, then more power will.”⁴⁸⁵

We must step away from this process of simply “a wave the stick” strategy and move towards a more diplomatic approach. “The new administration thus needs to develop a balanced approach combining pressure, incentives, and diplomacy to make this peace possible.”⁴⁸⁶

Weaken Hamas by Strengthening Fatah

- *The United States will increase support and financial funding of Fatah. The US should continue to provide financial support to Fatah, the more moderate Palestinian group, so that they can gain in power in the West Bank. However, due to corruption issues all funds must be accountable and uses must be transparent to the United States. The US will also provide support in things such as building a strong effective government, improving infrastructure, and improving the overall stability of the West Bank. These efforts will be made in hopes that they will improve conditions in the West Bank. This will hopefully in turn undermine the power of Hamas as Gazan citizens as they see that Hamas has not provided the same stability and hence create a strong political competitor against Hamas.*

The US should work to weaken Hamas through a continuing effort to strengthen the power of Hamas’s opposing party group, Fatah. This group is much more moderate than the radical Islamic Resistance Movement and hence would be more open to negotiations and attempting to find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Michael Herzog alludes to this fact in his article “Can Hamas be Tamed?” He says,

“The international community was poised to invest a tremendous amount of political and financial capital in promoting domestic Palestinian reform. Those investments should now be provided only if they can be used to equip moderates to compete more effectively with Hamas in both the security and social spheres. Aid should also be designed to create a pragmatic Palestinian political center by

⁴⁸⁵ (Peraino 2007)

⁴⁸⁶ (Salem 2008)

revamping Fatah and encouraging reform-minded activists and parties.”⁴⁸⁷

Hamis initially took power because Fatah was corrupt and unorganized. Essentially, it was unable to provide for the needs of the Palestinian people. By funding and supporting Fatah, the group can be aided in rising out of their structural issues and make a real change in the Palestinian community. If Fatah is strengthened and creates a better situation for the people of the West Bank, this most assuredly will reverberate to the Gaza Strip.⁴⁸⁸ Overall, the United States should continue to and increasingly financially back Fatah because if Fatah power increases, Hamas power decreases, and the chance at arriving at a peace agreement is greater.

American Led Negotiations

- *The United States should function as the moderator for a negotiation of an end of the conflict. These negotiations should begin as soon as possible. As Hamas has refused to negotiate thus far, denying Israel’s right to exist and refusing to cooperate with other powers attempting to find an end to the solution, these negotiations will be held between Fatah and Israel. However, this is not barring Hamas from negotiation is they are willing to make the necessary concessions.*
 - *Negotiations will use previous efforts such as Annapolis and the Clinton Parameters, as a place to begin. These negotiations, especially the Clinton Parameters have laid out very concretely what has been done and what still needs to be done. The areas of contention that will be the focus of the negotiations will be the issue of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem.*
 - *These negotiations will be lead by the United States with the United States using their influence, both monetary and military, over Israel to ensure that Israel is willing to negotiate. However, these negotiations will be between Israel and Fatah. It is not America’s responsibility to hand them a plan to sign. The most lasting peace will be one that both sides have worked to create.*
 - *A successful peace agreement will involve regional participation. With the Arab League’s Peace Initiative as an example, the United States will involve all regional actors in the negotiations. This is the only way to ensure a lasting peace and stability in the region.*
 - *The United States will police and enforce the terms of this binding treaty.*

The last step that the United States should take in this conflict is to be a leader in negotiation processes. When negotiations are to be made between Israel and the

⁴⁸⁷ (Herzog 2006)

⁴⁸⁸ (Migdal 2009)

Palestinians, the United States should take a leadership role in moderating and leading these negotiations. With two sides who have been in conflict for such a long period of time it is absolutely necessary to have a strong middle party to moderate any talks and negotiations that occur.

One of the reasons that the US is the preferred mediator for this conflict is simply the power the US has over both nations. It is logical that the United States could have pull over a more impoverished people like the Palestinians. But the United States also retains influence over Israel. That power stems from the massive amount of money that the American government contributes to the Israeli military. “It is argued that US economic support to Israel has assisted it in enjoying a military asymmetry of power against the Palestinians that has never been duly recognized as such in subsequent American-brokered peace talks.”⁴⁸⁹ The argument is that the United States has played a key role in helping them to maintain their military superiority. The aid that the United States has given Israel over the course of the conflict adds up to over more than twice the cost of the Vietnam War. This equates to \$500 dollars to each Israeli annually.⁴⁹⁰ “Yet, there has only been one occasion when America has chosen to use the issue of its funding to Israel to act as a lever in persuading the Israeli government to go to the negotiating table with the Arabs.”⁴⁹¹ These facts show that the United States is the ultimately the authority that has the power to make negotiations happen. That is not to say that the United States should force any of the parties into a resolution that they do not want. However, the United States can and should use enough authority to keep negotiations moving towards a resolution to the conflict.

This report also recommends the United States to work off existing results of previous negotiations to achieve a resolution to the conflict. It is futile to go back to square one when the last few decades have already laid out so much of the ground work.

⁴⁸⁹ (Milton-Edwards 2009)

⁴⁹⁰ (Milton-Edwards 2009)

⁴⁹¹ (Milton-Edwards 2009)

Two particular works at negotiation should be noted as worthy for the basis of future negotiation.

The first of these is the Clinton Parameters.⁴⁹² This was a historic breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations. This document was created in December 23, 2000 by President Clinton at the end of his term. This document is momentarily helpful because it lays out what has already been established by the two parties. This document should be used as the framework for a peace settlement as it gives direction to any negotiations. As the document shows, the two issues that will need the most negotiation from both sides are the issue of refugees and Jerusalem. The refugee issue is centered around Palestinian refugees displaced by the conflict, specifically after the 1948 war. The main question is with regards whether these refugees should be given the “right of return.” Regarding Jerusalem, Palestinians claim the right to East Jerusalem which is currently occupied by the Israelis. These two questions will be at the center of negotiations because they are the most contentious. The Clinton Parameters do not provide a solution to the problem. They only provide a framework to how this solution can be reached. The reason this document and others have not proven helpful in finding an end to the conflict is because there has not been continuous effort at reaching a resolution. The only way that a resolution can be reached is through continuous and strenuous efforts to work out the issues.

The next document is the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by the Arab League, and in particular Saudi Arabian Prince Abdullah Bin Abdulziz, on March 28, 2002.⁴⁹³ This initiative is important to the peace process because of the positive effect an agreement of this sort could have on the geopolitics of the region. This agreement would exchange a two state solution for normalized relations with Israel. It would not only create peace but it would get other countries involved in various aspects of creating that peace.⁴⁹⁴ This gives other countries more of a stake in the issue. The implications of this would be a

⁴⁹² (The Clinton Parameters: Clinton Proposal on Israeli-Palestinian Peace 2000)

⁴⁹³ (The Arab Peace Initiative: Arab League Beirut Declaration of 28 March 2002 2002)

⁴⁹⁴ (The Arab Peace Initiative: Arab League Beirut Declaration of 28 March 2002 2002)

Middle East where all the Arab states are at peace with Israel. The positive effects of this would be colossal. The Initiative was also endorsed by a purely Palestinian Initiative in June of 2002.⁴⁹⁵ Any peace negotiations should try to incorporate the geopolitical cooperative essence of this initiative. Ensuring a peace that will last necessitates regional cooperation. If regional powers are involved they will have more of a stake in ensuring that the peace is permanent.

These documents will assist in helping pave the way towards a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once the agreement is enacted it will be important to ensure that the agreement is enforced. There will assuredly be some protest during the early phase of the agreement. Particular groups who are likely to oppose a peaceful settlement are Hezbollah, The Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qa'ida, and other jihadist groups. Opposition is to be expected but should not be interpreted as a failure. It is important for the world to see the strength of any agreement that is reached. That is why it is necessary for US involvement to continue even after an agreement is decided upon. The US has the strength to enforce any agreement, and as it would have been under our moderation that this agreement was achieved, it is also in our own best interests to see that the resolution is successful. The US should also ask the help of other nations and international bodies to ensure that the resolution is upheld. Therefore, it is the duty of the US, and any other nation or entity that agrees to join the US in its efforts, to both police and enforce these agreements by whatever means necessary.

CONCLUSION

All of the above provides a comprehensive strategy for moving towards a more peaceful and stable Israel and Palestine. The strategy calls for pacific intercourse to achieve these goals while remaining strong in our presence and goals. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one that has wracked the region for far too long. The previous policy of inaction has proven ineffective. In response to this fact, it is the

⁴⁹⁵ (The Palestinian Peace Initiative: The Palestinian Vision of Negotiations based on the Arab Peace Plan 2002)

recommendation of this research that the United States adopt this multi-faceted strategy which would heavily involve the United States in pacific intercourse and aid in supporting the peace process.

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NATO IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Liz Forman

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The 20th century has been called the “American Century” because of the United States’ overwhelming role in creating stability and promoting the ideals of democracy around the world.⁴⁹⁶ Most major conflicts during this period were between states challenging the world order, in order to gain more power. The beginning of the 21st century, on the other hand, has upset this golden age by proving the US as vulnerable to outside terror. The greatest threats to the United States today are not strong states like the Soviet Union and Germany of the past century, but non-state actors, specifically, extremists and terrorists. These individuals and organizations are intent upon seeing the complete destruction of the American way of life. Such terrorists are often supported by regimes that view the strength and values of the US as threatening to their own activities. Consequently, the US has constructed strategies, described below, to alleviate these threats and protect what is important to the country.

It is the goal of the United States to protect its citizens, interests, and allies. Therefore, the national security of America is dependent upon eliminating the threat posed by terrorists. The US wishes to see:

*A global community bound by the rule of law where conflicts are resolved through
peaceful intercourse. This community must be accepting of pluralistic societies, sustained
by international institutions.*

The United States views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an institution necessary in promoting its security interests and political goals. Not only is it a valuable alliance designed around the premise of collective defense, it is also actively engaged in achieving the ends of defeating terrorism. In order for the US to be successful in creating a more secure world, it must work alongside NATO in identifying and removing those whose aim is to inflict terror in and harm western nations, while proposing changes which will serve in strengthening the alliance. It is the goal of this National Security Strategy in Combating Terrorism to see NATO develop into a less

⁴⁹⁶ Harold Evans, Harold Evans, Gail Buckland, and Kevin Baker, *The American Century* (New York: Knopf, 1998).

reactive and a more proactive institution that fits the security challenges posed by the 21st century, specifically that of terrorism. The US would like to see an organization with greater flexibility and improved burden sharing, both physically through troop commitments as well as monetarily.

INTRODUCTION

The original function of NATO was to offset the threat of communism posed by the Soviet Union and its allies through collective defense and ensure peace in Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the organization adapted to fit a new world order, championing stability in areas of Europe caught up in civil war. More recently, due to the rise of global terrorism, NATO now operates on a worldwide level, militarily in engagements in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as on a alliance level, with partnerships extending all over the world. The statement of purpose of NATO remains the same as at its inception. The Washington Treaty states the allies “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.”⁴⁹⁷ The desire to protect the security of the citizens of NATO is still the basis of the alliance, however 21st century challenges, in the form of non-state actors operating in areas outside the NATO geographic sphere, pose operational challenges to the multinational organization. The founding premise of sharing resources for collective defense proves difficult because some nations contribute significantly more than others, with the United States supplying the most. In order to be successful against terrorists, NATO will need to address this flaw in the alliance.

The United States believes NATO to be an invaluable partner politically and militarily on many security issues and the US seeks to maximize its relationship with the

⁴⁹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949 (Washington, DC: 1949), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>.

alliance. This is crucial to make significant strides in combating terrorism. In the Global War on Terror, strong international institutions are critical to removing terrorist threats and preventing more deadly attacks by terrorists throughout the alliance.

The following paper seeks to explain the partnership of the US and NATO in protecting their interests and removing security threats to the alliance. The two major areas of concern for the strategy in combating terrorism are:

- Winning the War in Afghanistan
- Improving general security against terrorists.

The War in Afghanistan

Issue

Currently, NATO is actively engaged in the War in Afghanistan. Many link the future of the alliance to a successful completion of the engagement in the country. Several areas of difficulty have arisen in Afghanistan that require the attention of the United States in order to make greater strides alongside NATO on the battlefield and in reconstruction. They include:

- Increasing boots on the ground and defense and reconstruction funds while addressing the problem of burden sharing of troops and financial support for the war.
- Standardizing practices within Afghanistan, especially among the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other reconstruction efforts.
- Finding new, more reliable supply lines into Afghanistan.

Background

Following the attacks of September 11 on the United States, NATO invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which describes an attack on one being an attack on all members of the alliance.⁴⁹⁸ When an attack occurs, each member of the alliance “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked.”⁴⁹⁹ Therefore, on September 12, 2001, NATO pledged assistance to the US if an attack on the Taliban government in Afghanistan was

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

deemed necessary. The Taliban government was the main line of support for the terrorist efforts of Al Qaida, the culprit behind the attacks on the US. The ensuing war in Afghanistan has removed the Taliban government. However, resurgent groups of the Taliban and Al Qaida are still a significant threat to the security of both US and NATO troops, and attacks are on the rise.

In the last few years, NATO has assumed a larger responsibility in the War in Afghanistan. It is currently in charge of all International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) operations within the country.⁵⁰⁰ The mission statement of ISAF is to disarm local militias that support the Taliban, train the national army and police force, reconstruct the justice system, assist in the effort to disable the production of narcotics, and ensure security during elections.⁵⁰¹

One of the largest impediments to victory in Afghanistan and the mission statement above is a deficient number of troops on the ground actively securing the country. In an area as large as Afghanistan, a significant increase of soldiers will be required to support successful missions. General McKiernan, head of ISAF forces stated:

“There is no doubt that Afghanistan has not received the resources from the international community needed to meet its requirements for security, governance, or development. Militarily, we have never had enough forces to conduct a proper counterinsurgency campaign across Afghanistan. To do that – clear out insurgents, keep them separated from the population, and set the conditions for reconstruction and development – all of that translates to boots on the ground, and we are short of them.”⁵⁰²

Although there are troops serving in Afghanistan from many NATO countries, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands bear most of the burden of fighting.⁵⁰³ Of the near 53,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan the United States has around 20,000 troops in the ISAF and an additional 18,000 within the context of Operation Enduring

⁵⁰⁰ Dr. Olaf Theiler, “Sword or Plowshare?: New Roles for NATO and the Changing Nature of Transatlantic Relations,” *The Marshal Center Occasional Paper Series*, no.17 (2008): 24.

⁵⁰¹ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2008, 5.

⁵⁰² Anthony H. Cordesman, *Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), iv.

⁵⁰³ *NATO in Afghanistan*, 6.

Freedom, Great Britain has deployed around 8,700, Canada with about 2,800, and the Netherlands around 1,700. Having the most active number of troops means these four countries bear the largest burden of risk and casualties.⁵⁰⁴ They are the only countries with troops stationed in the more violent southern and eastern provinces of the country. National caveats, which place restrictions on what troops can do within NATO and where they can operate, have proven detrimental to multinational security efforts. These caveats have been reduced slightly throughout the course of the war. Troops such as the French and Germans now having the ability to respond to emergency situations, however success in the war requires greater flexibility with more troops.⁵⁰⁵ The same problem, of few countries carrying a majority of the weight, is also true to the funding of the war and reconstruction. Greater burden sharing is critical to improving the war.

In addition to combating the insurgency and providing security, one of the missions of NATO within Afghanistan is to provide reconstruction to the war torn country as well as work with Kabul to improve governance and rebuild the economy. Currently, different NATO partners in Provincial Reconstruction Teams head reconstruction efforts throughout the country. These teams are composed of both military and civilian members working and are relatively independent from one another. There is no standard model of operation for these teams and some are meeting with more success than others.⁵⁰⁶

An additional area of concern for NATO operations in Afghanistan deals with supply lines into Afghanistan. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan serves as the main transportation line for NATO troops and supplies into Afghanistan. The region is familiar to frequent attacks by resurgent Al Qaida in the area. The recently damaged

⁵⁰⁴ Robert Sibley, "NATO's Future at Stake in Afghanistan: MacKay," *Ottawa Citizen*, February 16, 2009, <http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/NATO+future+stake+Afghanistan+MacKay/1295958/story.html>.

⁵⁰⁵ *NATO in Afghanistan*, 6.

⁵⁰⁶ *NATO in Afghanistan*, 8.

bridge across the Khyber Pass brings more attention on the need for additional, safer routes for supplies and troops.⁵⁰⁷

Interests

When considering recommendation to NATO, the United States believes it is vital to winning the war in Afghanistan and protecting against further terrorist attacks for other nations to take up more of the burden of troop deployment as well as increasing their financial and/or supply contributions. This allows the US more flexibility if another significant security or military situation were to occur. In addition, the US would like to see troops (both its own and NATO's) fully utilized in military operations, providing security, and training the Afghani police and army, as opposed to reconstruction efforts that can be accomplished by civilians or other international aid institutions.

Options

In providing policy options it is important to remember that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is far from perfect and will never be and act exactly how the United States wishes it could. Therefore, the following options and recommendations are designed to address areas of the alliance the US can fix to make it function more efficiently. Although the US is undoubtedly the most powerful member of the alliance, recommendations by the US to NATO are not guaranteed to occur. NATO decisions are based on an informal vote by all members of the alliance, if one state opposes the suggestions of the US and places a "no" vote, the change will not be made. However, if no states directly oppose the issue, this includes states that choose not to vote, the matter passes.⁵⁰⁸

2009 presents a great opportunity for the US in addressing changes it would like to see in the organization. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the alliance as well as an important Summit meeting in April. The meetings in Strasburg and Kehl may provide a medium with which the US can facilitate their ideas. As outlined by NATO Secretary

⁵⁰⁷ Salman Masood, "Bridge Attack Halts NATO Supplies to Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/asia/04pstan.html?_r=2&scp=3&sq=khyber%20pass&st=cse.

⁵⁰⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 34.

General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in a press conference in January of this year, the agenda of the upcoming Summit will address the accession of Croatia and Albania into the alliance, issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the possibility of France becoming a full member of the Military Council, and the renewing of NATO's Strategic Concept.⁵⁰⁹

Increasing Troops and Reducing National Caveats

When discussing troop levels and the need for funds in Afghanistan, it is important to stress the importance of burden sharing within NATO. As discussed above, the notion of a collective security in which members share equal burdens and equal risks is an important underlying assumption of NATO. Although it is not described how each NATO member will participate in alliance, the Washington Treaty does call for the action of "each" member in the assistance of an attack party when invoking Article 5. Therefore when describing options for increasing resources in Afghanistan, it is important to call for equal participation of all members of NATO.

Option 1-Appealing to NATO in the forum of the Atlantic Council that the situation in Afghanistan is dire.

This option is similar to the approach the United States has pursued with regards to NATO in the most recent past. An example of this is Secretary of Defense Robert Gates requesting more troops and the reduction of caveats in December of 2007.⁵¹⁰ It has seen only small successes, for example the ability now of German and French forces to respond to emergency situations (as mentioned above). Some reasons for European reluctance with this strategy have been linked to qualms about the war in Iraq, lack of support for the previous US administration, or the trend of the US to bypass the alliance and form ad hoc coalitions for military operations. Perhaps a new administration can evoke more flexibility out of the alliance's European partners. One area of leverage in this issue is the recent pledge by President Barak Obama for the deployment of an

⁵⁰⁹ Video from NATO website.

⁵¹⁰ Reuters, "Gates Seeks NATO Help in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, December 12, 2007, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E1DA1E39F931A25751C1A9619C8B63&scp=4&sq=NATO%20in%20Afghanistan&st=cse>.

additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan. This could act as an example for other nations to follow.

An additional option within this same field would be to request the reduction of caveats on a temporary basis. This would take place for a period of 6 to 12 months in order to quell resurgent Al Qaida and Taliban attacks as well as provide additional security during the elections in Afghanistan this summer.

Whether these ideas are purposed during an official NATO meeting or in another medium, in reality, this option has the same likelihood of success now as it did in 2007. There is no reason the administration cannot ask for this, however another option may be necessary to create more real changes in troop levels.

Option 2- Manipulate European weaknesses to US advantage.

Europe needs the United States to assist in its defense. This is because European nations have not employed nearly as many resources in maintaining and improving their armed forces as the US has. A specific example of this is the European attempt to stabilize the Balkan region. Prior to US intervention, European troops met with no success, unable to prevent a massacre.

The United States could use this as leverage in obtaining more troop contributions from European allies. Europe has a higher risk for a terrorist attack than the US, with much larger Muslim populations and is also in closer proximity to Iran, who is dangerously close to creating a nuclear weapon. Threatening to halt funding for the anti-ballistic defense system in Poland could scare European allies into being more flexible with the US

Option 3-Propose an alternative area of contribution for those countries reluctant to send soldiers.

This option would allow nations reluctant to engage more of their own soldiers in Afghanistan to sending additional funds and supplies for combating Al Qaida to make up for deficient national force contributions. There are already recommended levels of troop

commitments and NATO funding each country (as suggested by NATO) tries to meet.⁵¹¹ Those that would rather stay off the battlefield would be required to contribute more monetarily to the alliance in place of more troops.

One can relate this to the practice of rich people buying their way out of a draft. This option is in strict opposition to the notion of equal risk and equal burden as described above. It would most likely mean the need to commit even larger scores of American troops to participate in an Article 5 operation of the organization.

Option 4- Place a heavier emphasis on training the Afghan National Army and Police to aid in security and patrolling.

The ultimate goal of the War in Afghanistan is for Afghanistan to eventually take over operations for its own governance and security. An emphasis needs to be placed on Afghan forces that it is important for them to contribute to their own safety. The US does not want to repeat the situation in Vietnam where the United States bore the brunt of the fighting while the citizens and ARVN of Southern Vietnam willingly evaded responsibility.

This option would require NATO to allocate more resources to training, as the police and army forces are significantly deficient in proper training and supplies. It would also require more standardized practices in training, outlined by the Military Council. The US would need to propose this idea through a representative to a particular council or committee and then request an investigation and recommendations by the Military Council. This could also be accomplished through an organizational wide survey of military operations in Afghanistan, specifically in an area where improvement would be deemed necessary. Italy has already committed an additional 500 troops for this purpose.⁵¹²

Option 5 - Free up military personnel currently involved in Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

⁵¹¹ *NATO Handbook*, 86.

⁵¹² RTT News, "Italy to Raise its Troop Levels in Afghanistan," *RTT News*, February 12, 2009, <http://www.rttnews.com/ArticleView.aspx?Id=853347&SMap=1>.

This option would see civilian engineers and specialists taking the place of NATO troops, thereby freeing these troops to participate in security and counter insurgency operations. NATO nations, other organizations like the UN, or local Afghanis would need to send civilians throughout Afghanistan to participate in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. This measure would need approval by the Atlantic Council and could be assisted by the recommendation below of standardized practices within the PRTs. A US representative in NATO would present this to the Council or in a committee for further investigation.

Option 6 – Requesting reviews by NATO members on the needs for successful operation in Afghanistan.

Currently, Washington has been sending requests to European nations for their input on what is needed in Afghanistan.⁵¹³ This option would suggest that Washington continue requesting these assessments for Afghanistan, specifically for troop levels and funds necessary for military and reconstruction success. By documenting their own observations in Afghanistan and presenting their own recommendations for operational success, NATO members would then be more inclined to contribute to collective security operations if they were collectively requested for their recommendations. Previous criticism of the US by NATO allies is the United States' willingness to disregard the opinions of NATO members and act unilaterally. This policy alternative ensures allied consultation before decisions are made.

To implement this, the US and NATO need to consolidate this information into a piece of policy recommendations the Council can vote on, preferably in time for the NATO Summit in April. This policy would contain the number of troops, civilians and funds needed for the coming year in Afghanistan.

Option 7 – Deploying NATO's Rapid Reaction Force to assist in security operations during the election in Afghanistan this summer.

⁵¹³ David E. Sanger, "How Obama Plays, or gets played around," New York Times, February 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/weekinreview/15sanger.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1.

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander General John Craddock mentioned this as an option to increase troops at a recent meeting of NATO defense ministers in Krakow.⁵¹⁴ It would consist of a temporary deployment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which can number up to 25,000, to assist in providing security and ensure the legitimacy of the national elections in Afghanistan this coming August. It is composed of soldiers from most members of the alliance and is only deployed for a short period of time. The force would operate prior to and during the elections.

Decision to deploy the NRF occurs within the Atlantic Council. The US could champion this recommendation suggested by Gen. Craddock within the Council, pressing for a decision during the Summit in April.

Standardizing Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Option 1 – Survey Provincial Reconstruction Teams and create a model in which to operate.

In an effort to gain more success among PRTs, this option calls for investigation of operations within different reconstruction teams. Its goal is to create a standard approach to reconstruction by closely examining what has worked and what has not between different members of the PRTs. Some lack civilian engineers and technicians to rebuild the infrastructure of the communities they work in. There are no standard services PRTs are required to provide, nor are there operating procedures in the proper way to engage with local officials and citizens.⁵¹⁵

The result of the investigation would provide information to create an overarching mission statement and a standardized operating guide through which PRTs would function. It would be preferred if the investigation is begun by the time of the April Summit meeting.

An investigation like this should take place either by NATO or a contracted, independent research group. Like Option 5 of the section above describes, the

⁵¹⁴ Thom Shanker, "NATO Allies Offer Support for Afghans," *The New York Times*, February 20, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/world/asia/21nato.html>.

⁵¹⁵ *NATO in Afghanistan*, 8.

information presented would not be dictated by the US and NATO allies would be more likely to request a standardized operating guide for PRTs.

Option 2 – Enlist the aid of another organization to assist in reconstruction of Afghanistan.

NATO should approach another international organization like the European Union or the United Nations to take over reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. This option would be severely complicated, coordinating with another party. In addition, when examining this option it is important to consider the degree of leadership NATO would be able to hold if it gives up control over reconstruction efforts to another body.

New Supply routes in Afghanistan

The geography of Afghanistan, as well as relations between the United States, NATO, and the surrounding countries pose challenges in obtaining effective supply lines into region. The increasingly less secure route of transportation through the Khyber Pass from Pakistan into Afghanistan creates a need to develop new transportation lines. In addition, with the proposed Kyrgyzstan closure of the Manas airbase, finding new ways into Afghanistan is crucial to the success of the war. The near elimination of the aforementioned routes creates a significant problem, not only for moving more troops in and out of Afghanistan, but also supplies for the war and reconstruction. In addition, NATO is acting within territory heavily influenced by Russia's whims. Some claim this is the reason for Kyrgyzstan threatening the air base closure.

Option 1 – Working with Russia and its allies to pursue a land based transport non-lethal supplies.

Russia is beginning to allow NATO transportation of supplies across Russia, through its allies into Afghanistan. This is a complicated issue because in exchange for access to transportation, Russia demands the cancelation of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic as well as a guarantee that NATO will drop all talks of the accession of the Ukraine and Georgia into NATO's military alliance. The proposed

route would only be for transporting supplies troops and reconstruction efforts and would not be allowed to transport weapons or physical troops.⁵¹⁶

On the topic of counter terrorism, Russia has similar concerns as those of NATO. It is in Russia's interest to quell Islamic extremism in Chechnya and surrounding areas. In addition, Russia would like to see NATO successful in Afghanistan to aid in reducing its narcotics problem. However, relations between NATO and Russia as well as the US and Russia have been rocky in the past because Russia views NATO expansion as impeding on its sphere of influence. Russia views the proposed missile defense systems in Poland as targeted at Russia, instead of as a defensive measure against possible Iranian nuclear missiles. The US and NATO view Russia's stipulations as a way for Russia to gain control in Central Asia again. In addition, the closure of the Manas airbase has been attributed to Russia's influence on Kyrgyzstan.⁵¹⁷

It would be in the best interest of NATO to accept this offer. NATO has no real need to accede the Ukraine or Georgia into the alliance. The allies are more interested in these countries as economic partners and would do better to incorporate them into the European Union. However, Russia's request to end the missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic would require concessions from Russia. A nuclear Iran could pose a security risk to Russia as well as the rest of Europe and such a missile defense system could be beneficial to both sides. The US/NATO might be able to negotiate a different location of these missile defense systems, perhaps farther south, or even a bit farther west.

Vice President Biden, in a recent speech at a security conference in Munich proposed to "set the reset button" in regard to Russia.⁵¹⁸ The option outlined above would appear to be in the best interest of the US to pursue with NATO.

⁵¹⁶Ellen Barry, "US Can Ship Afghan Aid through Russia, Kremlin Says," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07russia.html?scp=7&sq=Russia&st=cse>.

⁵¹⁷"Poker Faced, Russia flaunts its Afghan Card."

⁵¹⁸Vice President Joseph R. Biden, "Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference," February 7, 2009, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238.

There are very few options for new transportations lines if this one is refused because Pakistan is proving to be a larger problem as time progresses, especially after its negotiation with the Taliban over control in the Swat province. In addition, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated NATO's refusal to actively engage in Pakistan.⁵¹⁹

Reccomendations

NATO in Afghanistan

- Goal: Increase Boots on the Ground and Reduce National Caveats
 - Request both national governments of NATO members as well as the NATO Military Council create assessments for the number of troops and funds necessary for military victory and reconstruction success in Afghanistan.
 - The US working within the Military Council should consolidate this information in specific policy recommendations on the exact number of military troops and civilians are needed over the next two years. This document should be ready for decision by the NATO summit in April.
 - After the conclusion of member research on resources needed in Afghanistan, the US along with other NATO allies (in particular Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands) and the Secretary General will request member states explain how they can contribute to ensuring security and success in Afghanistan.
 - Replace military personnel in Provincial Reconstruction Teams with more civilian specialists, so as to free up more people for security forces.
 - These civilians should come from countries that are unable or unwilling to donate more combat troops to Afghanistan. Or those countries which place caveats on troops (i.e. France and Germany).

⁵¹⁹ Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Transatlantic Leadership for a New Era," Speech at the Security and Defense Agenda, January, 26, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090126a.html?aid=2784&lid=326>.

- Within the Military Council, create a standardized plan for the training of the Afghan National Army and Police forces. This way, the Afghani government can aid in its own security.
- To increase security during the elections in Afghanistan this summer, within the context of the Atlantic Council, request the NATO Rapid Response force be used for increase security throughout the country to provide for added security during the elections.
- As a last resort, threaten the cessation of funding for the anti-ballistic missile defense systems in Eastern Europe as a way to gain increased troop contributions from the European Allies.
- Goal: Standardization of Provincial Reconstruction Teams
 - Request NATO or a contracted research group to investigate the successes and failures of reconstruction efforts by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and compile a standardized operating guide for teams to be more successful with rebuilding the many provinces in Afghanistan. Preferable if this is done, or at least begun by the time of the April Summit meeting.
- Goal: New Supply Lines to Afghanistan
 - Working with Russia to create new supply routes to Afghanistan
 - This will require concessions on the part of NATO including:
 - Suspending NATO expansion efforts in George and the Ukraine.
 - Work with Russia on finding a more appropriate location for the missile defense systems designated for Poland and the Czech Republic

Improving General Security against Terrorists

Issue

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a crucial organization in the Global War on Terror as well as in the war in Afghanistan. The following section will identify other

areas in which NATO combats terrorism and increases US security. The following issues will be discussed:

- Creation of a new Strategic Concept
- The Mediterranean Dialogue

Creating a New Strategic Concept

Background

The Strategic Concept is the starting point of NATO defense planning. It outlines the approach, taken by NATO, of military and security operations and identifies security threats to the alliance. The last Alliance Strategic Concept for NATO was published in 1999 and is out of date. It is important to have a current concept in order to make more informed policy decisions. Although the most recent version identifies terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as threatening to security of the alliance, these are not highlighted as the areas of largest concern.

Interests

It is important for the United States to have input in the creation of a new Strategic Concept so as to encourage support for US interests.

Options

The April Summit meeting will see a new declaration of the Alliance Security. It is the hope of Secretary General Scheffer to begin work on a new Strategic Concept. The following are options the US wants to include in the Concept:

- An emphasis on the premise of burden sharing, perhaps with a stipulation to ensure a more equal distribution of risk. With the difficulty in burden sharing the US has experienced in Afghanistan, it is in the best interest of the US to prevent problems like these in the future.
- Identifying terrorism as the largest threat to the alliance and designing the concept around that principle.

- Defining what constitutes NATO action in the future. NATO applied Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to its assistance in the War in Afghanistan. Will NATO continue to pursue out of area operations? The US should suggest NATO pursue necessary security operations outside of the alliance and partnership area in combating the security threat posed by the war on terror.
- Defining the War on Terror. Currently the United States and Great Britain refer to the mission against terrorists as the “War on Terror.” A majority of other European countries refer to it as the “Fight Against Terrorism.” In order to be more effective in combating terrorism, a standard definition needs to be agreed on. Saying that, the US prefers to use “War on Terror” terminology because it emphasizes the great threat of terrorism.
- Acknowledging NATO as an invaluable global organization.

The US needs to work with the other members in the Military Council to develop a new Concept following the Summit in April.

Operation Active Endeavour

Background

Operation Active Endeavour evolved from NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It is a maritime operation in the Mediterranean Sea to deter terrorist activity in the waterway. Functions of NATO include monitoring suspect ships and boarding when necessary to inspect for the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and WMD’s, providing requested escorts to member and partner merchant vessels, and increasing perceived security throughout the Mediterranean.⁵²⁰ NATO’s Secretary General has voiced the need for more naval ships to patrol the area as well as the area north of Europe in the Arctic region.

Interests

⁵²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Operation Active Endeavor*, http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html.

It is in the interest of the United States to see the continuation of this program because it creates a more secure environment for shipping as well as naval operations in the region. In addition, it has the potential capability to combat piracy.

Options

Option 1- Initiate the construction of new naval ships to be used to assist NATO in the future.

These ships would be used by the United States Navy in cooperation with NATO to assist in Operation Enduring Freedom, patrolling the Mediterranean. If need be, they could be used to aid in the protection of allied merchant ships in the transportation of goods near the coast of Africa, an area frequented by pirates. The construction of naval ships takes several years and therefore should be begun in anticipation of the need for more. The current US navy fleet is aging and will need to prepare for new ships to replace ones that may become obsolete in the future. As described below, these ships would also support protection of energy shipments to Europe and the US

Recommendations:

Partner in the War on Terror

- Goal: Creation of a new Strategic Concept
 - The April Summit meeting will see a new declaration of the Alliance Security. This can allow the framework for a new Strategic Concept. The US needs to work with the other members in the Military Council to develop a new Concept to have ready for voting in April at the Summit.
 - This Strategic Concept should outline a standardized strategic plan for the current War on Terror.
 - It will need to address what future NATO missions will consist of, whether or not NATO will call combating terrorism a “War on Terror,” and include Partnership for Peace countries into strategic planning.
- Goal: Continuing Operation Active Endeavour

- Continue the counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean.
 - Confront the need for more naval ships in patrolling the Mediterranean region as well as the northern waterways of Europe.

This will include initiating plans to build new US naval ships to be used in US as well as NATO operations.

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THE UNITED NATIONS

Julie Cochran

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations is an international organization that works in the areas of ensuring peace, development, human rights, providing humanitarian assistance, and promoting disarmament and enforcing international law. It is made up of a General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Secretariat, and an International Court of Justice. Over the past twenty years, the United Nations has become increasingly involved in global conflicts through peacekeeping missions, world health initiatives and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Some of these programs have proven helpful in offering oppressed populations significant assistance (UNRWA, the OFFP) while simultaneously bringing flaws to light in the United Nations' system that render the organization less effective and cause it to be viewed as corrupt.

It is in the United States' interest that global organizations, such as the UN, act as effective agents in enforcing security measures, like fighting terrorism. This strategy proposal will outline how to increase the effectiveness of the UN by reviewing the following: problems with UN peacekeeping efforts, previous attempts at reform, major issues with the Iraqi Oil for Food Program, and options to address these issues. This discussion leads to several recommendations. Arguably, the successes and failures of the UN in the Middle East support the conclusion that the best option for the United Nations will be to keep peacekeeping missions limited and increase transparency and accountability by applying more internal controls in the model of other International Institutions. Internal control reforms will enhance the United Nations' ability to operate as a functional institution.

Ideally, the UN will employ necessary reform measures that enable it to maintain a legitimate position at the heart of the multilateral system.

BACKGROUND

the United Nations' and the Middle East

The United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping activities in the Middle East for around 60 years. UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees) and UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) and the OFFP are just some of the programs which have sought to assist countries of the Middle East. A background of these programs' impact will help establish what, historically, the United Nations has been able to accomplish in the region. This information will be useful in assessing how the UN can be used in the future help further the United States' long term goal of securing the Middle East.

UNEF

UNEF was the first UN Peacekeeping force established during an emergency special session of the General Assembly held between November 1st and November 10th, in 1956 to address the conflict that erupted when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company at the protest of France and the United Kingdom—Israeli forces also launched an attack on Egypt and occupied the Sinai and Gaza strip. The UNSC discussed the matter on October 31st, 1956, but no resolution could be arrived at because of the veto power of France and Britain. As of November 1956, the General Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories. UNEF was established to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. Rather than a peace-enforcement operation, UNEF was a peacekeeping operation to be carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Units were to use their arms only in self-defense and exhibit restraint. Following the dispatch of UNEF to the area, the French and British forces left the Suez Canal Zone by December of 1956. Withdrawal of Israeli forces was complete by March of 1957. UNEF was withdrawn in May-June 1967, at Egypt's request. UNEF was successful in that it put to end a conflict and maintained peace between Egypt and Israel for more than ten years. However, peace could not be maintained in the absence of UNEF forces and because Israel refused to accept UNEF on its territory, “the force had to be deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border, and

thus its functioning was entirely contingent upon the consent of Egypt as the host country. Once that consent was withdrawn, its operation could no longer be maintained.”⁵²¹

UNRWA

UNRWA was first established in 1949 to assist the Palestinian refugees. The UNRWA mandate has been consistently renewed due to the absence of a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem (most recently, the mandate has been extended until June of 2011). The UNRWA program has assisted and protected a population of “4.6 million refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territory.” Currently; “750,000 Gazans rely on UNRWA Food Aid, 200,000 children attend 221 UNRWA schools throughout Gaza, and UNRWA operates 18 health centers throughout Gaza. At the peak of the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis, UNRWA provided refuge for 50,896 people in 50 shelters, supplied medicines, blood and generator fuel for hospitals and public institutions and was a focal point for Humanitarian Aid and brought in donated items from sister UN organizations, institutions, and governments.”⁵²²

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is the most extensive UN operation in the Middle East. In 1978, Israel sent forces into Lebanon in retaliation for an attack carried out by the PLO which killed many Israelis. At the request of the Lebanese government, the UNSC created UNIFIL in conjunction with the passage of resolutions 425 and 426 which “called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory.” Resolution 425 also called for “strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within internationally recognized boundaries,” and second, “that Israel immediately

⁵²¹ The United Nations. “First United Nations Peacekeeping Force.” Accessed at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefi.htm

⁵²² The United Nations. “Statement by UNRWA Commissioner-General to the United Nations Security Council Closed Consultations Session.” Accessed at: <http://www.un.org/unrwa/>

withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory.” Resolution 426 authorized resolution 425 and contained guidelines for the operation of UNIFIL. Following a full invasion in 1982, Israel partially withdrew from Lebanon in 1985, but retained control of an area of southern Lebanon manned by the IDF (Israeli Defense Force). Over the course of the second half of the 20th Century, tension and hostility between Lebanon and Israel has continued. UNIFIL has repeatedly been unable to prevent Israel from invading Lebanon, and has therefore, has not fulfilled its mandate—to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon entirely and restore authority to the Lebanese government. To address the recent conflict in 2006, the Security Council authorized up to 15,000 troops, supported by localized and civilian staff for UNIFIL. As of December 2008, UNIFIL had 12,435 military personnel supported by some 317 international civilian and 640 local civilian staff. UNIFIL is also supported by around 50 UNTSO military observers of the Observer Group Lebanon.⁵²³

Oil for Food Program (OFFP)

On December 10th, 1996, the United Nations began the Oil for Food Program, created to alleviate human suffering in Iraq while maintaining the enforcement of 1991 Gulf War-related sanctions. The program imposed controls on Iraqi oil exports while holding profits in an UN-controlled escrow account, not accessible to Saddam Hussein’s regime. On April 15th, 1995, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to export \$2 billion in oil every six months. After the first year of the program, the oil export ceiling was raised to \$5.256 billion per six month phase, but eventually the export limit was abolished entirely in order to meet the food and medical needs of the Iraqi people, and provide incentive for Iraq to cooperate with the new program of UN WMD inspections.⁵²⁴ The OFFP is acknowledged as having been

⁵²³ The United Nations. “Lebanon—UNIFIL—Facts and Figures.” Accessed at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html>

⁵²⁴ Blanchard, Christopher M. “Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations.” Congressional Research Service. Updated January 24th, 2007.

very successful in providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq. A UN Report found that 60% of Iraq's families "relied solely on the food ration under the program to meet all household needs" while malnutrition rates declined significantly in some parts of the country, the deterioration of water facilities was halted by the OFFP, and infant mortality declined. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the program generated \$67 billion in oil revenue and \$31 billion in humanitarian assistance to Iraq.⁵²⁵ However, underlying these significant gains, the Oil for Food Program had some serious problems which will be discussed in the "Issue" section of this report.

Trends in Middle East Peacekeeping Efforts

Conflicts in the Middle East involving UNEF, UNRWA, and UNIFIL, have highlighted a few problematic trends in United Nations' Peacekeeping efforts. First of all, the UNSC is not always able to identify the aggressor and agree on action to be taken when conflicts arise. In these situations, it must resort to non-forceful peace-keeping, "which cannot deal with military force or armed conflict, or even low-level violence." Furthermore, "when a large majority of its membership becomes partisan of one side in a conflict, the United Nations loses much of its credibility as a mediator with the other side." This enables governments to use UN peacekeepers instead of their own forces in conflict, which is problematic when there is no peace to keep and it is difficult to accomplish anything. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance provided by such programs as UNRWA, has been helpful and UN-sponsored truces, armistice arrangements, and peace keeping forces "have provided long periods of quiet on hostile frontiers at a time when parties either could not or would not talk to each other." It is important to keep in mind that while the results of UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East have been mixed, "Its [the UN's] exercises in peace-keeping have been a key element in whatever peace the people of the region have enjoyed."⁵²⁶

⁵²⁵ Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06330.pdf>

⁵²⁶ Urquhart, Brian. "The United Nations in the Middle East: a 50-year Retrospective." *The Middle East Journal* 49.4 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 572-581.

United States' Stance on UN Peacekeeping

Initially, the United States enthusiastically supported the expansion of UN Peacekeeping efforts after the Cold War. During the first Bush Administration, sixteen Observer Peacekeeping Missions were launched between 1988 and 1992. Notably, the first Bush Administration placed a major emphasis on “gaining Security Council authorization for the use of force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait...as a means of rallying support both from a Democratic Congress and from potential coalition parties.” As a result of the successful invasion of 1991, “popular enthusiasm for the United Nations peaked” and “support for the United Nations grew markedly among conservatives, Republicans, whites, and men, traditionally the groups most skeptical of the world body.”⁵²⁷

In 1993, President Clinton approved US support for six more peacekeeping operations in Georgia, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia. While none of these missions were large-scale initially, due to ongoing high cost and high risk missions taking place in former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, the “cumulative weight [of United States involvement in UN Peacekeeping] began to worry Americans.” That same year, for the first time, the United States’ Congress was billed over \$1 billion for UN Peacekeeping. This prompted President Clinton to call for a drawdown of United Nations’ involvement in conflicts. In 1994, he stated in an address to the General Assembly, “The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN Peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say ‘no’.” (Clinton quoted by Foot)

This statement was a clear signal that President Clinton advocated a decrease in United States involvement in UN Peacekeeping operations. This intention became more obvious when Clinton signed legislation “unilaterally imposing a 25 percent ceiling on US peacekeeping payments to the UN, well below the 31.7% then assessed by the world body,” despite the fact that this decision represented a violation of US treaty obligations.

⁵²⁷ Foot, Rosemary, S. Neil Macfarlane, and Micheal Mastanduno. US Hegemony and International Organizations. University Press, Oxford: 2003.

Studies by the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office were commissioned to examine the past effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping missions. The results prompted the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, Benjamin A. Gilman, to call on the permanent members of the Security Council to “ensure that the United Nations conducts only peacekeeping and not peacemaking operations, and that they be done on a cost efficient basis fully consistent with their mandate.” Unfortunately, the genocide in Rwanda occurred just after the encouragement by Congress that the UN restrain its involvement in enforcing peace keeping internationally. At the time the conflict was unfolding, the experts warned that further violence was likely if the US and the UN did not become more involved.⁵²⁸

Bush Administration and UN peacekeeping

After the restrictions to UN funding were applied by President Clinton, it is not surprising that during the Bush administration, two prominent questions were: “(1) what is the appropriate level of US funding for UN systems and programs? (2) What US funding actions are most likely to produce a positive continuation of UN reform efforts?”⁵²⁹ For calendar years 2001-2004, Congress passed legislation which raised the funding cap for assessed US peacekeeping donations (formerly limited to 25%) to 28.15% for FY 2001, 27.9% for FY 2002, 27.4% for 2003 and 2004. In 2005, Senator Biden introduced S. 2095 to raise the US peacekeeping cap to 27.1% for calendar years 2005 and 2006. In 2005, UN peacekeeping costs reached \$4.7 billion. In 2006, the Bush Administration voted for “a seven-fold expansion of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Lebanon; the expansion of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur; reauthorization of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Haiti; and a renewed peacekeeping mission in East Timor.”⁵³⁰

⁵²⁸ Foot, Macfarlane, Mastanduno.

⁵²⁹ Browne, Marjorie Anne and Vita Bite. “United Nations System Funding: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. Updated June 16th, 2006.

⁵³⁰ Browne, Marjorie Anne. “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. Updated January 30th, 2008.

Broader History of United Nations Reform

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, there have been repeated, cyclical attempts to reform the organization. In the past, reforms have generally focused on three areas of concern: (1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of accountability in the UN Secretariat; (2) duplication and redundancy of UN mandates, missions, and/or programs; and (3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse and/or mismanagement of UN resources. Each of these issues present continuous concerns. During the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of reform in the U.N. dealt with the goal of increasing membership in the UN Security Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council. As the gap grew between 1st and 3rd world nations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, “the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to recommend structural changes that would help the United Nations address ‘problems of international economic co-operation.’”

In the 1990s, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced broad reform proposals in reports, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992) and ‘An Agenda for Development’ (1994). These two speeches were presented at a time when the United Nations had a second chance “to create the world that the UN Charter envisioned,” after the Cold War Era had passed. Reform suggestions in the Agenda for Peace include a request for greater funding to the United Nations (“A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it. The truth of the matter is that our vision cannot really extend to the prospect opening before us as long as our financing remains myopic.”)—including a Peace Endowment Fund, the implementation of better training for peace-keeping personnel, and the institution of a regular meeting schedule for the General Assembly and Security Council.

In “An Agenda for Development,” Boutros-Ghali emphasizes that development can occur in war-torn environments; “Conflict, terrible as it is...can provide opportunities for major reform and consolidation.” He calls for a reduction in military spending “to make more funds available to finance development, satisfy consumer demands and meet

basic social welfare needs,”—and also so that workers in the armament manufacturing industry could put their valuable skills to other uses.^{531 532} Among the outcomes of “the Agenda for Peace” was the “Creation of a 24 hour operations or situation center; transfer of the Field Operations Division from the Department of Administration and Management to the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of \$150 million to help with financing for start-up of an operation; Adoption of a Convention on Protection of UN Personnel; Creation of a military planning cell in DPKO; Improvement of three major departments related to peacekeeping (DPKO, Department of Political Affairs, and Department of Humanitarian Affairs); and; Creation of a Task Force on United Nations Operations to coordinate among departments and provide Secretary-General with options and recommendations on policy issues.”⁵³³

Reform under Kofi Annan

UN Secretary General from 1997 to 2003, Kofi Annan focused on UN Peacekeeping operations, cutting Secretariat and administrative costs, consolidating departments to create one large Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), and creating the post of Deputy Secretary General. Notably, Annan also created a High-level Panel on “Threats, Challenges, and Change” to evaluate how the UN addressed “present-day threats to international peace and security.” The 2005 World Summit produced the Summit Outcome Document which “laid the foundation for reforms such as: establishing Peace-building Commission; strengthening the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), establishing a Democracy Fund; strengthening the Security Council; improving UN system coordination; and creating a Human Rights Council. Members also agreed to Secretariat and management reforms, including (1) establishment of an ethics office; (2)

⁵³¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali. “An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping.” The United Nations. January 31st, 1992.

⁵³² Boutros, Boutros-Ghali. “An Agenda for Development.” The United Nations. May 6th, 1994.

⁵³³ Marjorie, Ann Browne. “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. Updated on January 30th, 2008.

greater whistle-blower protection; (3) strengthening oversight capacity; (4) review of all General Assembly mandates over five years old; and (5) full financial disclosure by the UN Staff.” Of these initiatives, changes to the CERF, the establishment of a Human Rights Council, and the creation of a Peace-building Commission have already been completed or are underway whereas initiatives related to internal oversight; human resources reform and Security Council enhancement are stalled or have not been addressed. The World Summit Document also called for a systematic review of all UN documents five years or older.

Bipartisan Taskforce on the United Nations: *American Interests and UN Reform*

In 2004, United States’ Congress commissioned a bipartisan Taskforce on the United Nations to be completed by the United States Institute for Peace. The report was chaired by Newt Gingrich—former speaker of the House of Representatives, and George J. Mitchell. Notable suggestions for the enhancement of UN Peacekeeping operations included the following:

- “Member states must substantially increase the availability of capable, designated forces properly trained and equipped for rapid deployment to peace operations on a voluntary basis. The Secretariat should enhance its capacity to coordinate an increase in member state contributions to the Stand-by Arrangement System. [pg. 97]
- The United States should consider upgrading its participation in this voluntary program (the UN Stand-by Arrangements System)’ by providing more detailed information about the support it might consider. (pg. 97)
- The United States should support (1) creation of a senior police force management unit to conduct assessments and assist in the establishment of new peace operations; (2) assessed funding for first-year, quick impact peacekeeping operations, as well as the full range of early disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration assistance when those have been identified in permission assessments as critical for success; and (3) the adoption of two-year budgets for

support of peacekeeping to ensure greater stability, permit more careful planning and reduce administrative burdens. (pg. 97-98)'''⁵³⁴

Members of the taskforce also note their disappointment with the allegations of sexual harassment committed by UN Peacekeepers and emphasize support for the recommendations made in Prince Zeid's 2005 Report, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Specifically, support for an increase in deployment of women in peacekeeping missions is discussed.

Ban Ki Moon and UN reform

Current UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has also taken action to help make the UN a better organization by taking several measures such as submitting his mandatory personal financial disclosure form, increasing staff mobility by announcing the availability of several Secretariat positions to be filled by internal UN staff, and calling for Security Council reform via enhancing the UNSC.⁵³⁵ Ban Ki Moon has also proposed a "reconfiguration of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into two departments: the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Field Support." This separation would, he stated; "'allow a separate, concentrated Department of Peace Operations to focus on the work it needs to do: strategic as well as day-to-day direction and management of peacekeeping operations; new mission planning; implementation of policies and standards; and fostering partnerships with a broad range of United Nations and non-United Nations Organizations.'" ⁵³⁶ By June 2007, this proposal was accepted by the UN General Assembly.

ISSUE

Corruption and Accountability Issues: the Oil for Food Program

Numerous scandals have come to light after investigations have been conducted into the OFFP. Investigations conducted by the United States, the UN, and Iraqi officials

⁵³⁴ American Interests and UN Reform. *United States Institute for Peace*. Discussed in Marjorie.

⁵³⁵ Blanchfield, Luisa. "United Nations Reform: US Policy and International Perspectives." Congressional Research Service. Updated August 5th, 2008.

⁵³⁶ Ban Ki Moon quoted by Marjorie

have found that Saddam Hussein's regime used two distinct methods to illicitly generate funds despite UN sanctions in the period between 1990 and 2003. First, the Hussein Regime illicitly sold oil to some neighboring countries in violation of UN sanctions and "allegedly exploited loopholes in the UN OFFP regulations to impose surcharges on buyers purchasing OFFP-approved oil shipments purchased with funds from the UN OFFP escrow account...some of which were used to procure military supplies and commodities banned under the UN sanctions regime." (CRS-12) Oil sales outside of UN auspices took place with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and the Iran and Persian Gulf. The IIC reports that Iraq "raised illicit funds through surcharges on OFFP oil shipments and kickbacks on UN approved commercial and humanitarian goods contracts," and that the country created "a secret oil voucher system to allocate oil that was approved for sale under the OFFP to politically sympathetic individuals and entities."

UN Stewardship Issues and Internal Control Problems

On January 25th, 2004, UN official, Benon Sevan—executive director of the OFFP—was named as one of 270 individuals who allegedly benefited from oil vouchers granted by Saddam Hussein's regime according to a list published by Iraqi newspaper *Al Mada*. Allegations concerning abuse and mismanagement of the UN OFFP prompted UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to announce an "Independent High Level Inquiry" (IIC) on March 20th, 2004. Final findings of this report estimate that Iraq earned "\$12.8 billion in illicit revenue between 1990-2003, of which \$10.99 billion was earned from non-OFFP 'trade protocols' with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt. The IIC report estimates that \$228.8 million was earned from surcharges on OFFP-approved oil sales and that \$1.58 billion was earned from kickbacks on OFFP humanitarian supply contracts." The IIC also found that Benon Sevan "participated in the Iraqi government's oil allocation scheme and profited from the sale of Iraqi oil via a third party." Said third party was the African Middle East Petroleum Co. LTD (AMEP) from which Sevan received several million barrels of allocations of oil from 1998-2001. Sevan was indicted in New York in January 2007, on charges of bribery and conspiracy to commit wire fraud charges.

The IIC also investigated the role of Kojo Annan, son of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and former employee of Cotecna—an Inspection Service that had been in charge of authenticating goods under the OFFP: “From the end of 1998 to February 2004, Cotecna paid Kojo Annan \$2,500 monthly under the terms of a ‘non-competition’ agreement that forbade Annan from working with Cotecna’s competitors in West Africa.” The final draft of the IIC Report found that there was “no credible evidence that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan influenced or attempted to influence the selection of Cotecna for the OFFP inspection contract.” The report does state that Kojo Annan failed to cooperate fully with some aspects of the IIC’s investigations and was untruthful to his father regarding “his continuing financial relationship with Cotecna.” Also, initial drafts of the IIC report were more critical of Secretary General Kofi Annan’s role in the OFFP scandal. Notably, both authors of the IIC Report—Robert Parton and Miranda Duncan—resigned “reportedly in protest over the final content of the IIC Report on Secretary General Annan’s role in the OFFP scandal.”⁵³⁷

The OFFP ended in March of 2003, when the UN agreed to phase out the program at the request of the United States. While the OFFP succeeded in providing humanitarian assistance, there were also many issues in how the program was carried out. The illicit activity that was happening with UN officials such as Benon Sevan and UN-related figures, such as Kojo Annan has caused the organization to lose substantial credibility.⁵³⁸

Response and further Issues: Maintaining Integrity and Effective Performance

In response to the findings of the Independent Inquiry Committee, Kofi Annan made two separate statements in front of the United Nations Security Council noting his disappointment and regret regarding the failings of the Oil for Food Program. Specifically, he noted his feelings of regret at the findings of corruption amongst the UN Staff and his carelessness in failing to conduct an investigation of his son’s involvement with Cotecna. Furthermore, Annan accepts responsibility for the failures of the

⁵³⁷ Blanchard, Christopher M. “Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations.” Congressional Research Service. Updated January 24th, 2007.

⁵³⁸ Blanchard.

Secretariat and emphasizes the importance of reform to address these issues. He also notes that the IIC reported an “unclear demarcation of roles and responsibilities between the Security Council, the 661 Committee and the Secretariat...” Finally, Annan states that the IIC report reveals important lessons about accountability, oversight, and “the need for the United Nations to maintain the highest possible standards of integrity, and of effective performance.”⁵³⁹

INTEREST

As one of the founding members of the United Nations in 1945, the United States has a great stake in the success of the organization. Currently, the US government serves as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and is also the biggest financial contributor to the UN (the United States contributed 22% of the regular budget funds in 2006).⁵⁴⁰

Prior issues with UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance programs highlight areas for improvement and should be the focus of future reform in the United Nations. When used successfully, the UN can provide a way for countries to avoid risky unilateral interventions in favor of mobilizing international support (such as was the case when the United States sought authorization from the UNSC prior to invading Iraq during the first Gulf War). When the organization fails to remain accountable throughout high risk endeavors such as the OFFP, it loses credibility and support from global powers. It is in the interest of the United States and the two thirds of the United Nations members that are electoral democracies, that the organization improves its credibility and effectiveness.

OPTIONS

A few options can be exercised by United States governmental bodies and UN officials to address the problems that plague the United Nations. Some methods have

⁵³⁹ Kofi Annan. Address. United Nations Security Council. New York, September 2005.

⁵⁴⁰ Marjorie and Bite.

already been implemented with varied levels of effectiveness. The following options for further reform are discussed in this section: reforming the UNSC, withholding funding from UN programs, increasing financial transparency and accountability, and strengthening internal controls. The UN must restrict peacekeeping missions with goals that the peacekeepers will not realistically be able to accomplish, such as preventing conflict between two nations. The UN has been successful in offering aid and humanitarian assistance to war-torn countries—despite instances of corruption and illicit behavior (sexual abuse) by UN Officials involved in these programs.

Reforming the UNSC

As mentioned earlier, reform of the Security Council was brought up during the 2005 World Summit, initiatives related to expansion have stalled or not been addressed. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning the ways in which the UNSC could be reformed. The first would be to amend the UN Charter so that more members can join the council. The second would be to replace the veto option (which has been criticized as outdated and undemocratic) of permanent members with a majority voting system. It has been suggested that permanent membership should be increased from five to ten and temporary membership be increased from fifteen to twenty or twenty-five. Enhancing the UNSC would increase regional representation from Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Additionally, including such countries as Germany and Japan would also lead to stronger financial support. However, reform of the UNSC would require amendment of the UN Charter. This is unlikely to happen because even one veto from a permanent member of the Security Council can block it from happening. Also, enhancing Security Council membership could potentially lead to “more peacekeeping involvement,”⁵⁴¹ because more nations would have leverage to push their interests within the council. This would be problematic because the UN is already over-stretched as a global peacekeeper.

UN Peacekeeping

⁵⁴¹ Whitaker, David J. United Nations in the Contemporary World. New York, Routledge, 1997.

There are many problems with UN peacekeeping operations. The range of issues with UN peacekeeping is difficult to summarize. Discussed previously were the problems of distinguishing the aggressor in conflicts, the requirement that UN peacekeepers get consent from the countries they intend to help, and the lack of resources in the UN to address conflicts of colossal magnitude. Some suggestions to address these problems with UN peacekeeping include the following: prioritizing preventative diplomacy via “an early networking team that would use high tech information gathering and analysis,” diluting the monopoly of the permanent members of the Security Council by expanding membership, improving liaisons with regional bodies, NGOs, and research institutions, clarifying criteria for intervention in conflict (ie. “...do observation and report reveal everyday life to be under direct, widespread threat? Further, is there any prospect of alleviation by responsible internal authorities?”), and re-examining the funding of peacekeeping.⁵⁴² These are legitimate areas for improvement but the actual accomplishment of these suggestions is unrealistic. There is little foreseeable downside to acquiring better intelligence via preventative diplomacy in regions where forces will be deployed. More than likely, this would help set the stage for better conflict management. While it would be beneficial to incorporate more UN members into the decision-making process with regard to peacekeeping operations and the authorization of force, it is unlikely that the five permanent members will authorize expansion of the United Nations Security Council. Peacekeeping operations are already incredibly costly so it is unlikely that more resources will be allocated to programs. However, funding is certainly an area that should continue to be evaluated very carefully.

Withholding Funding

Historically, the United States has used funding as a tool for UN reform. The United States’ Congress can limit funding as a mechanism for influencing UN policy. In some cases, Congress has withheld funding for programs it did not approve of, such as regular budget programs including the UN Special Unit on Palestinian Rights (for

⁵⁴² Whitaker.

projects involving the PLO), and the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea. One potential issue involved in withholding funding is that it is not always effective. If a program will be funded by the UN regular budget and the United States withholds a proportionate share of its normal contributions, the cost of the program will most likely be covered by surplus regular funds. In these cases, the United States' actions are largely symbolic and do not have a significant impact. However, it should be noted that in instances where programs are funded primarily by UN member states, US funding withdrawal can have an impact. It is also possible that withholding funding may weaken the United States' influence in the United Nations and undercut its ability to conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions. Last, if the United States chooses to withhold *assessed* payments to the United Nations it infringes on US treaty obligations and alienates other UN member states.

Conversely, some argue that withholding funding is one mechanism for the United States to use its position as the largest UN financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. Also tying United States funding to UN reform may motivate countries to find common ground on divisive issues.

Strengthen Internal Controls

In April 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggested that the United Nations increase internal controls to address the issues that came up during the Oil for Food Program. The UN could adopt a system of internal controls modeled after other leading accountability organizations such as the International Organization of Supreme Audit institutions, the US Office of Management and Budget, and the GAO for all programs with considerable financial risk (ie. the OFFP). The only downside to this option is that it would take significant time and energy to evaluate how control strengthening should be implemented. Increased controls might require a greater number of staff members which would mean increased salaries. However strengthening internal controls would address a few critical issues experienced by the UN during the course of the OFFP such as weak oversight, unclear authority and manipulation.

Financial Disclosure and Transparency

Financial disclosure is a key component to ensuring accountability of UN Officials. During the 2005 World Summit, a number of initiatives were introduced that related to increased transparency and accountability in the UN secretariat. In 2007, the US mission to the United Nations established the UN transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI) which tracks the adoption of management reforms by UN funds and programs. The new UN Financial Disclosure Program is meant to address “potential conflicts of interest arising from staff members’ financial holdings, private affiliations or outside activities.” Staff members required to participate in the Program are listed as follows:

“All staff members at Director level and above; All staff members who are procurement officers, or whose principal duties are the procurement of goods and services for the UN; All staff members whose principal duties relate to the investment of assets of the UN, the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund or of any accounts for which the UN has fiduciary or custodial responsibility; all staff members who have direct access to confidential procurement or investment information and; all staff members of the Ethics Office.”⁵⁴³

The push for increased financial transparency is a positive development in the United Nations because it addresses past issues related to corruption and irresponsible fiscal activity by UN authorities. Under pressure from the UN Ethics Office in 2006, Kofi Annan finally released his financial disclosure, after initially refusing to do so. Ban Ki Moon has made many statements indicating that financial disclosure is an important aspect of decreasing corruption within the United Nations. The fact that Moon willingly submitted his financial disclosure form is significant because he is not technically required to do so as he is not a UN staff member. It is also significant that he made his

⁵⁴³ “Ethical Standards: Voluntary Public Disclosure of Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interests Statements,” <http://www0.un.org/sg/PublicDisclosure.shtml>

form public. This trend toward transparency signals a change in the actions of the United Nations' leaders.⁵⁴⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

In going forward, the positive reforms that have been made in the United Nations must continue in order for the organization to retain its credibility as the leading international institution in the Global Community. Steps have been taken in the past which have succeeded in addressing major problems such as the lack of transparency. Nonetheless, areas for improvement remain. Submission of financial disclosure forms should continue in instances where officials embarking on programs of significant financial risk. The strengthening of internal controls within the UN is also an important step that will improve the organization's capacity to function.

Financial Disclosure

All developments related to financial disclosure by UN officials are positive and should continue. There is no foreseeable downside to increasing financial transparency in the United Nations. It will improve accountability and is especially important for UN officials involved in programs of considerable financial risk.

Strengthen Internal Controls

The United Nations should adopt a system of internal controls modeled after that of other leading accountability organizations such as the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Accounting Office (GAO)—for all future programs with considerable financial risk. Throughout the OFFP, the UN sanctions committee was successful mitigating the import of military items and illicit oil surcharges. However, there were four serious weaknesses with internal control standards related to risk assessment (“failed to address challenges posed by Iraqi contracting and program expansion”), control activities (“Did

⁵⁴⁴ The Associated Press. “Annan Files Financial Disclosure Form.” *The International Herald Tribune*. October 2nd, 2006. Accessed online at: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/02/news/UN_GEN_UN_Annan_Disclosure.php

not prevent smuggling or kickbacks”), information and communication (“Lack of disclosure on kickback schemes and poor coordination among UN Agencies hindered projects”) and monitoring (“No internal audits of commodity contracts and audit findings not fully addressed”).⁵⁴⁵ Risk Assessment measures are generally put in place to “identify the internal and external risks an organization faces, determine the likelihood of their occurrence, and form the basis for a plan to manage those risks.” Control Activities are “the policies and procedures that help ensure that management’s directives are carried out and risks are addressed.” Relevant, reliable, and timely information and communication “is needed for an organization to control its operations.” “Monitoring assesses performance over time and ensures that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.”

A better system of internal controls would address the diffusion of responsibility among multiple UN entities which—during the OFFP—contributed to “unclear authority, manipulation and weak oversight.” A control framework would have “established a clear line of authority for responding to the program’s mismanagement and corruption.”⁵⁴⁶ The United Nations should strengthen internal controls throughout the entire UN System by adapting principles of internationally accepted internal control standards like those of the institutions mentioned earlier.

CONCLUSION

Looking to the Future

The United Nations is an organization with significant potential for improvement. With support from most of the world’s democratic governments, there is no excuse for this organization not to do everything it can to implement constructive reforms. The UN, therefore, should continue to prioritize giving aid and assistance while strengthening the internal controls that monitor the activity of UN members involved in this process.

⁵⁴⁵ Government Accountability Office. “United Nations: Lessons from the Oil for Food Program Indicate the Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight Activities.”

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