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SIMPLICIUS AS A SOURCE FOR AND AN INTERPRETER OF PARMENIDES

University of Washington

PH.D. 1983

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Simplicius as a Source for and an
Interpreter of Parmenides

by

Bruce Millard Perry

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Doctoral Dissertation

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Date May 9, 1983

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Special Abbreviations

N.B. The abbreviations of L'Année Philologique are used for periodicals wherever possible.

<u>adv Col</u>	<u>adversus Colotem</u> , Plutarch <u>Moralia</u> Vol. VI. Fasc.2, ed. M. Pohlenz (Leipzig, 1952).
<u>adv Math</u>	<u>adversus Mathematicos</u> , Sextus Empiricus <u>Opera</u> , Vol. II, III ed. H. Mutschmann and J. Mau (Leipzig, 1912-1914, 1954).
<u>CAG</u>	<u>Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca</u> , Berlin Academy (Berlin, 1882-1907).
<u>DG</u>	<u>Doxographi Graeci</u> , ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1879).
<u>DK</u>	Diels-Kranz, <u>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</u> , 3 vols. 6th ed. (Berlin, 1974).
<u>DL</u>	Diogenes Laertius, <u>Vitae Philosophorum</u> , ed. H. S. Long 2 vols. (Oxford, 1970).
Guthrie	W. K. C. Guthrie, <u>A History of Greek Philosophy</u> , Vol. II <u>The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus</u> (Cambridge, 1965).
<u>in Cael</u>	<u>Simplicii in Aristotelis de caelo commentaria</u> , ed. I. L. Heiberg <u>CAG</u> VII (Berlin, 1893).
<u>in Parm</u>	<u>Procli Philosophi Platonici opera inedita pars tertia continens Procli commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem</u> , ed. V Cousin (Paris, 1864).
<u>in Phys</u>	<u>Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria</u> , ed. H. Diels <u>CAG</u> IX (Berlin, 1882). <u>Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor posteriores commentaria</u> , ed. H. Diels <u>CAG</u> X (Berlin, 1895).

- in Tim Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed.
E. Diehl 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-1906).
- LSJ Liddell-Scott-Jones-McKenzie, A Greek-English Lexicon,
9th ed. revised by H. Stuart Jones with a Supplement
(Oxford, 1968).
- PT Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, ed. H. D. Saffrey and
L. G. Westerink 4 vols. Société D'Édition "Les Belles
Lettres" (Paris, 1968-1981).
- Ross Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1936).
- Tarān Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and
Critical Essays, ed. Leonardo Taran (Princeton, 1965).

Introduction

Simplicius, a Neoplatonist of the sixth century, wrote learned commentaries on several works by Aristotle¹. His commentary on Physics I is of fundamental importance for the history of ancient philosophy because it contains extensive quotations from the major Presocratics. Simplicius's paramount concern here is to demonstrate the harmony of doctrines, both physical and metaphysical, propounded by the Presocratics. To this end he elaborates an interpretation of many of them, quoting freely from their works and commenting on passages which are crucial for his interpretation. By a singular fate, however, all but Simplicius's actual quotations have been ignored or haphazardly treated. Part of this neglect is due to the emergence of the Vorsokratiker of Diels-Kranz as the standard source for the Presocratics². All the fragments have been collected in the B sections, while only select testimonia are presented in the A sections. Since the testimonia are largely limited to early sources, namely Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus (via the doxographical tradition), late authors like Simplicius are poorly represented. Although the Vorsokratiker is not an exhaustive collection of Presocratic material, it is widely held to obviate the need to revert to the original sources. Those passages which it does not contain have

by and large been neglected.

That Simplicius is a late Neoplatonist, and a mere commentator at that, has contributed even more to the neglect of him as an interpreter of the Presocratics. In the nineteenth century the stock of Neoplatonism, particularly of later Neoplatonism, was low among historians of ancient philosophy. The most influential of them, Eduard Zeller, passed the following verdict:

However much we may admire the last revival of antique thought in the philosophic system of Plotinus, it nevertheless bears the stamp of a non-Greek nature and traces of decadence which become more numerous and more pronounced in his successors. In the hands of Iamblichus and Proclus philosophy was petrified into scholasticism, the characteristic of which is that it no longer sought to supersede mythical ideas by rational thought, but saw its task in supporting the traditional religion and in presenting it as intellectually comprehensible. Here knowledge is replaced by revelation in ecstasy. After Greek philosophy had performed this self-castration it sank exhausted into the arms of religion; as Proclus expresses it in one of his hymns to the gods:

"And so let me anchor, weary one, in the
haven of piety."³

The primitive state of Neoplatonic scholarship then made such simplistic assessments possible. Presumptive judgements against the Neoplatonists, however, insured their continued obscurity. While the past fifty years have seen a renaissance in Neoplatonic studies, acceptance of Neoplatonism as serious philosophy has not been universal. The reasons are complex and cannot be fully pursued here⁴. One of the most persistent sources for censure is the attempt, so characteristic of late Neoplatonism, to harmonize

the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle⁵. Since it is assumed that both philosophers are in reality articulating Neoplatonic doctrines, apparent differences or contradictions between them are readily resolved. This harmonization appears to be predicated on wholesale anachronism and revisionism. Further, it calls into question the acumen of the Neoplatonists; are they so philosophically myopic in other matters? Because Simplicius attempts an even more ambitious scheme, to include all the Presocratics as well, his interpretations of them have been dismissed as patent anachronisms. Tarán, for example, rejects Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides on the following grounds:

This Neoplatonism presupposes post-Parmenidean philosophic conceptions which cannot be ascribed to Parmenides as they are by Simplicius, whose interpretation of Parmenides is sufficiently discredited in any case by the very Parmenidean fragments which he has preserved for us.⁶

Finally, Simplicius shares the fate common to many commentators, that he is considered wholly or largely derivative. The commentator's task is by nature the codification of accepted doctrine, not innovation or significant modification. One expects to find in Simplicius standard Neoplatonic doctrines as propounded by Proclus⁷. Simplicius's numerous, apparently precise quotations of ancient authors, most notably the Presocratics, have rendered his works little more than quarries, as it were of invaluable information; the Neoplatonic rubble is first cleared away before the finer stone can be worked⁸.

Granted that Simplicius has been ignored as an interpreter of the Presocratics, the question arises whether this makes any substantial difference for Presocratic scholarship. After all, the fragments which he quotes seem to render his own remarks otiose; what new light can Simplicius shed on authors who have already been extensively, not to say exhaustively, examined? It has been claimed that the study of Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides would in all likelihood yield more information concerning Neoplatonism than Parmenides himself⁹.

Simplicius's interpretations might then appear to merit antiquarian interest at best. Their importance for the study of the Presocratics, however, has been unduly minimized. In the first place, it is bad methodology to reject a priori any testimonia from the principal source of a given author, particularly of one whose work survives only in fragments. Secondly, his interpretations cannot be divorced from his quotations, because they condition both what he quotes and how accurately he quotes it. If, for example, one could prove that he misrepresents or grossly misunderstands a Presocratic, his quotations would be properly suspect. Although meter might provide a safeguard for the fragments of Empedocles and Parmenides, there would be no guarantee that lines were not wrenched from context, transposed, omitted, or even recombined to yield the sense which Simplicius thinks appropriate. Prose authors might be altered even more. Even if Simplicius does not tamper with his material, a 'quotation'

intended merely to capture the gist of a doctrine, or even an innocent lapsus memoriae or lapsus calami on his part might give rise to a bogus fragment¹⁰. Regardless of the merits of his interpretations, the reliability of Simplicius as a source for the Presocratics cannot be established independently of his interpretations.

Thirdly, an examination of the focus of Simplicius's interpretations is of value (admittedly in a negative way) in placing his quotations in proper perspective. If Simplicius's interests are exclusively or predominantly epistemological, that he does not mention nor quote passages relating to ethics need not mirror the importance of ethics for a given Presocratic. The same principle no doubt determines why he does not treat some Presocratics at all.

Fourthly and lastly, Simplicius's interpretations are intrinsically valuable for Presocratic scholarship. Even a cursory glance at his commentaries reveals that he neither on the one hand a religious humbug, incapable of independent rational thought, nor on the other a revisionistic blunderer. If anything, his interpretations of the Presocratics are models of philology; both in scope and in detail they are unique in antiquity. Moreover, he had at his disposal and clearly read with care complete works of many of the Presocratics. While Simplicius employs Neoplatonic conceptions to explicate the Presocratics, it is unclear why he is any more guilty of revisionism on this score than are

modern scholars who read twentieth century philosophical conceptions into the Presocratics. By rejecting Simplicius's interpretations for the reason that they presuppose Neoplatonic conceptions, Presocratic scholarship does itself a great disservice.

A systematic study of Simplicius's interpretations of all the Presocratics is not feasible here. Conversely, a survey or sketch of all these interpretations would not reveal his modus operandi. It seems more advisable therefore to examine a single Presocratic in detail; the results of such an examination could well be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the rest of the Presocratics he treats. I have chosen to study his interpretation of Parmenides because he is perhaps the most important, if also the most problematic, of the Presocratics. Simplicius quotes 101 out of the 154 extant Greek verses of Parmenides, and devotes considerable space in his commentary on Physics I, augmented by several passages from his De Caelo commentary, to interpreting Parmenides. There is thus considerable material for study.

Because Simplicius's interpretation does not arise ex nihilo, some consideration must be taken of the formative influences on and the possible sources for his interpretation. More specifically, Simplicius rejects the criticisms of Parmenides by Plato in the Sophist and by Aristotle in the Physics and argues that his own interpretation silences both criticisms. Chapter I comprises a sketch of Parmenides's influence on Plato (Republic V 476e6-

480a13), and an examination of Plato's criticism in the Sophist (244b6-245e2). Similarly, Chapter II considers Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides in Metaphysics A (986b27-987a2) and Physics I (184b15-187a11). The other possible influences or sources are considered in Chapter III: the doxographical tradition, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and the Neoplatonists.

The large amount of material on Parmenides in Simplicius necessitates a division into manageable topics or sections. While such a division is by nature arbitrary, the nine sections I have decided upon in Chapter IV represent reasonably discrete subjects: I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The Aletheia; V. The Doxa; VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides. Each section contains at least two parts: a detailed list of the relevant passages (A), and a summary of their contents (B). For the first five sections commentary is provided (C); particularly detailed commentary is devoted to the Aletheia (IV) and the Doxa (V). A summary of Simplicius's interpretation is found at the beginning of Chapter IV, and a set of conclusions follows Chapter IV.

Appendix A contains English translations of all the passages which bear on Parmenides in Simplicius. A detailed list of Simplicius's quotations from Parmenides forms Appendix B. The verses with variant readings from CAG VII and IX are collected in

Appendix C. Appendix D is a skeletal Index Locorum.

Two additional points deserve notice. While I have consulted a number of modern works on Parmenides, I have consciously avoided adopting ready-made an interpretation of Parmenides against which to measure that of Simplicius. Likewise, I have shunned, as far as possible, the temptation to inject my own thoughts concerning Parmenides into this study. For better or worse, Simplicius's interpretation deserves to be presented in its own right. Secondly, W.K.C. Guthrie's translation of Parmenides are adopted throughout; all deviations will be noted.

Notes to the Introduction

¹Simplicius's commentaries on Aristotle are found in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG), Berlin Academy, vols. VII-XI. VII = in De Caelo, ed. I.L. Heiberg, 1894; VIII = in Categorias, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 1907; IX = in Physicorum Libros I-IV, ed. H. Diels, 1882; X = in Physicorum Libros V-VIII, ed. H. Diels, 1895; XI = in De Anima, ed. M. Hayduck, 1882. (The authorship of this De Anima commentary is disputed.) Simplicius also wrote a commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus; the standard edition of this is in Theophrasti Characteres, ed. F. Dübner (Paris, 1840). It is soon to appear newly edited and translated in the Budé series by I. Hadot.

For a recent survey of his life and an attempt to date his works, see I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), pp. 17-32. Cf. further "Simplikios" # 10 RE 2,5 (1927) coll. 204-213 (K. Praechter).

²Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch, Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, 3 vols., 6th edition, 17th printing (Berlin, 1974).

³Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 13th edition, revised by W. Nestle, translated by L.R. Palmer (Cleveland and New York, 1967), p. 337.

⁴The most prominent reason is that Neoplatonism embodies the dogmatic metaphysics that has been assailed since Kant. Against the background of logical positivism and interest in natural language, the abstruse speculations of the Neoplatonists appear quixotic.

⁵Cf. e.g. H.J. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries," Phronesis 21 (1976), 67.

⁶Leonardo Tarán, Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays (Princeton, 1965), p. 295. Many of the fragments of Parmenides do not yield a straightforward interpretation.

⁷Cf. A.C. Lloyd, "Introduction to Later Neoplatonism," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 272-282.

⁸Cf. Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, III Teil, II Hälfte, 7th edition, ed. W. Nestle (Leipzig, 1923), p. 910: "Diese Commentare dieses Philosophen sind das Werk eines grossen Fleisses und einer umfassenden Gelehrsamkeit; sie bilden nicht allein für uns eine schätzbare Fundgrube von Bruchstücken älterer Philosophen und von Nachrichten über dieselben, sondern sie geben auch, trotz der Umdeutungen, von denen kein neuplatonischer Commentar ist frei, eine sorgfältige und meist verständige Erklärung des Textes." Zeller next relates the weaknesses of Simplicius as a philosopher, pp. 910-914.

⁹Tarán, p. 295.

¹⁰The condition of the texts which Simplicius had at his disposal and the manuscript tradition of his commentaries further complicate the picture. On the latter see A.H. Coxon, "The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius's Commentary on Aristotle's Physics I-IV," CQ N.S. 18 (1968), 70-75.

Chapter I: Plato and Parmenides

One of the central theses in Plato is the being-seeming antithesis, which is closely bound up with both his epistemology and ontology. The obvious precursor for the antithesis, at any rate, is Parmenides, who rigidly distinguishes being from seeming or opinion in his poem. In the persona of Socrates Plato speaks reverentially of Parmenides in the Theaetetus (183e3-184a1) and Sophist (217c2-7); the Parmenides is further testimony to his indebtedness¹. A complete treatment of the relation between the two philosophers is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a rough sketch is indispensable for understanding the interpretations of Parmenides by Aristotle and Simplicius². Two passages, Republic V 476e6-480a13 and Sophist 244b6-245e5, have been selected for this purpose.

In Republic V Socrates proposes that for the ideal state to be realized its rulers must be philosophers (473c11-e5); he undertakes to define the philosopher and thereby demonstrate his unique qualifications for ruling (474b4-c3). There ensues a section of etymology, in which the name 'lovers of spectacle' (φιλοθεαταί) is shown to apply fitly to the other classes of the state, while 'lover of wisdom' (φιλόσοφος) is the proper term

for the philosopher-ruler (474c8-476c1). After he shows that the philosopher lives wide awake and the lover of spectacle in a dream, Socrates advances an argument to convince the latter of his error (476c8-e2). Glaucon, answering for the lover of spectacle, readily grants two points to Socrates: that he who knows knows something (ὁ γινώσκων γινώσκει τι 476e9), and that what he knows is something that is and not something that is not (ὅν 477a1). The reason given for the latter concession appears to be borrowed from Parmenides:

πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὅν γέ τι γνωσθεῖη; (477a1)

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν).
(B 2.7; cf. B 8.8-9)

Glaucon next admits that the fully existent is fully knowable and the utterly non-existent utterly unknowable:

τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὄν δὲ μηδαμῇ
πάντη ἄγνωστον. (477a3-4)

There are parallels for this also in Parmenides, although they are not as clear as the previous:

ἢ δ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστι τε καὶ ὥς χρεὼν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι
τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθεῖα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν. (B 2.5-6)³

Parmenides nowhere qualifies either being or non-being with such terms as παντελῶς or εἰλικρινῶς, but he seems to be talking about absolutes and Plato clearly takes him to be doing so⁴.

The admission here, however, does not strictly follow. It also raises prima facie the possibility that there is something knowable in some less than absolute way; the faculty argument that

follows (477c1-d5) will collapse if this holds good. It can also be objected that levels of being are what the argument is to demonstrate, not assume as hypotheses. A partial reply is that the admission is intuitively appealing, for it rests upon the proportion:

τὸ ὄν : γνωστόν :: τὸ παντελῶς ὄν : παντελῶς γνωστόν⁵.

Secondly, the introduction of qualifiers serves to improve on the formulation of the argument. Lastly, the divided line of Book VI (esp. 511d6-e4) differentiates two kinds of knowledge (νόησις - διάνοια) and opinion (πίστις - εἰκασία), each of which shares in truth (or being) in descending order. The seemingly loose phraseology here may foreshadow the subsequent distinctions. A corollary is derived from this admission; if anything can both be and not be, it would be situated intermediate between absolute being and non-being (477a6-8). Further, since knowledge is set over being and nescience necessarily (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) over non-being, one must consider whether some sort of intermediate cognition is set over the hypothesized intermediate 'being' (477a9-b1). It is to be noted that no 'absolute' qualifiers are used though required, and that ἀγνωσία/ἄγνοια is considered as a faculty.

Socrates and Glaucon next consider δόξα. It is admitted to be something (εἶναι τι 477b2)⁶, and since it is a faculty different from knowledge, it is set over something different from the object of knowledge (477b2-9). Socrates anticipates the outcome of the faculty argument (478a6):

οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γινῶναι ὡς ἔστι
τὸ ὄν; (477b10-11)

but realizes that this argument must first be expanded (477b11-12).

Faculties (δυνάμεις) are stated to form a class of existent things in virtue of which we are able to do what we are able (to do):

αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα. (477c1-2)

Sight and hearing are cited as examples. Faculties are distinguished from one another in two ways: that over which they are set, and what they affect as to their objects:

δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ
ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτη ἐνάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα.⁷
(477c9-d2)

'Hearing', for example, is the name given to the faculty which is set over audible things and produces our hearing them (or, is that in virtue of which we are able to hear what is audible)⁸. An additional concession by Glaucon allows the faculty argument to work, that both knowledge (477b7-8) and opinion (477e1-3) are faculties. It was previously allowed that knowledge and opinion were different (477b5-9); Socrates mentions this at 477e4-5. The reason for this agreement, however, was they are different faculties. (One suspects circular reasoning here.) At any rate, Glaucon states that they differ in that knowledge is infallible (τὸ ἀναμάρτητον) but opinion is not (τὸ μὴ ἀναμάρτητον) (477e6-7). The faculty argument is strengthened by the assertion of an in-

dependent reason for their difference. Socrates concludes that since each is a different faculty, each is by nature set over a different object (478a3-4). With a slight change in phrasing, the anticipatory remark of Socrates at 477b10-11 is reasserted on the strength of the definition of a faculty:

ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὄν γινῶναι ὡς ἔχει;
(478a6)

Likewise, δόξα is admitted as having the capacity to produce opining (δοξάζειν 478a8-9). The obvious question is what is it that opinion is set over? The first possibility considered is that it produces opining with respect to the same objects as knowledge does knowing. In consequence, the two faculties will have the same objects (478a10-11). Glaucon replies that this is impossible, and in so doing clearly states the steps in the argument (477a12-b2). To recapitulate, the argument runs:

- 1) one and only one faculty is set over one and only one (type or class of) object
- 2) both opinion and knowledge are faculties
- 3) opinion and knowledge are different
- 4) therefore, they are not set over one and the same object (or, the same thing cannot be both knowable and opinable).

On the basis of this argument, since what is knowable is being, what is opinable is something other than being. The next candidate considered is non-being or what is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν 478b6). This proves to be impossible; the object of opinion must be some one thing (ἓν γέ τι 478b10), but non-being is 'not one thing' but

rather 'nothing at all' (μηδέν 478b12). The object of opinion is neither being nor non-being, which are apprehended by knowledge and nescience respectively.

A reductio argument to locate both opinion and its object follows. First, it is stated that it does not fall outside of knowledge and nescience, since it then must either surpass the former in clarity or the latter in obscurity (478c10-12). Since it seems to be darker than knowledge yet brighter than nescience, it properly belongs between (μεταξύ) them (478c13-d4). Socrates reminds Glaucon of the earlier hypothesis (477a6-b1), that if anything appeared both to be and not be, it would be situated between absolute being and non-being; and it would be the object neither of nescience nor knowledge, but rather the intermediate cognitive faculty (478d5-10). The argument to this point has shown that opinion is intermediate between them. The intermediate object remains to be discovered:

ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείπειτ' ὅν ἡμῖν εὖρειν, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέ-
ρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον
εἰλικρινῶς ὁρθῶς ὅν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ,
δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύαμεν, τοῖς μὲν
ἄλλοις τὰ ἅλλα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξύ τὸ μεταξύ ἀποδιδόντες.
(478d1-5)

Glaucon, proxy for the lover of spectacle who admits only particulars and not universals, grants that some particular beautiful thing will also appear ugly, and similarly with something just or holy (478e7-479b2). This point is abruptly introduced and quickly accepted, perhaps because it is commonplace in Plato.

Similar pairs are mentioned in the Theaetetus, for example:

. . . ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ὥς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ μικρὸν φανεῖται καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦρον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὥς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιοῦν. (152d4-6⁹)

In the present case the lover of spectacle is brought over to admit that every particular is as much as is not, although the precise nature of the 'is' in either case cannot be known with certainty:

καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμρότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. (479c3-5)

There appear to be four propositions here: 1) x is; 2) x is not; 3) x both is and is not; 4) x neither is nor is not¹⁰. Of a 'heavy' thing we cannot know with certainty that 1) it is (heavy), or 2) it is not (heavy), for under suitable circumstances it will appear to be the opposite of what it is said to be, and neither designation is correct. The conjoint statements, that 3) it is both (heavy) and is not (heavy), and 4) it is neither (heavy) nor is not (heavy), apply similarly. A 'heavy' thing will not seem both heavy and not heavy to the same person at the same time in the same way, still less neither heavy nor not heavy¹¹. The phrase παγίως νοῆσαι is crucial here, for things over which opinion is set cannot be certainly known or else they will be the objects of knowledge. This argument from opposites shows that opinables (δοξαστά) do belong intermediate between being and non-being (479c6-d10); this conclusion was already deduced from the faculty argument. It is worthy of note that the light and darkness

imagery used in locating opinion is employed also for its objects¹².

The proposed discovery of what shares in being and non-being (478e1-5, note εὑρεῖν) is concluded at 479d3-5:

Ἡὐρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα
καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ
τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.

The objects commonly apprehended by the many 'tumble about' somewhere intermediate between absolute being and non-being. By previous agreement (478e3-5), if anything of this nature should come to light it would properly be called δοξαστόν rather than γνωστόν, because it wanders in the intermediate region and is apprehended by the intermediate faculty:

τῇ μεταξύ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξύ πλανητὸν ἀλίσκόμενον.¹³
(479d8-9)

The argument has thus proven that the lovers of spectacle have opinion only, philosophers knowledge; the former should be called 'lovers of opinion' (φιλόδοξοι) (479e1-480a13).

Aside from the possible circular reasoning mentioned previously, the faculty argument is open to two serious objections. The first is that two faculties may well apprehend the same object. It is true that one sees visible things and hears audible things, and that these are in a sense different. Yet it is not true that different ontological levels enter in here, since one can see and hear one and the same airplane passing overhead; for the faculty argument to work there can be no overlap of objects. Secondly, nescience (ἄγνοια) has to be granted full status

as a faculty; otherwise opinion will not be an intermediate faculty (cf. 479d8). Plato seems aware of the problems that arise from making it a real faculty, since he frequently uses the phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης to justify setting nescience over non-being. An application of the formula for a faculty brings out the difficulties:

- 1) ἐπιστήμη ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκεν, γινῶναι ὥς ἔχει τὸ ὄν.
- 2) ἄγνοια ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι πέφυκεν, ἀγνῶναι ὥς ἔχει τὸ μὴ ὄν.¹⁴

Little if any sense can be wrenched from 2), especially in light of the assertion that that which is not is nothing at all (478b6), and is presumably not an object at all.

These difficulties aside, it is clear that Plato adopts the Parmenidean dictum that only being can be known, while what is not is utterly unknowable. It is probable that he also has Parmenides in mind when he locates opinion in the mid-ground. The goddess advised Parmenides not to travel the way on which mortals wander (πλάττονται), since they confuse being and non-being:

οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται
 κού ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.
 (B 6.8-9)¹⁵

Although their interpretation is debated, the concluding verses of the proem are arguably evidence that Parmenides allows some sort of existence to the content of mortal opinions:

ἦδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθείς.
 ἀλλ' ἐμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα
 χρὴν δοκίμως εἶναι, διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.
 (B 1.30-32)¹⁶

While in Republic V Plato is content to use ready-made the Parmenidean injunctions about being and non-being, in the Sophist he investigates what being and non-being are and attacks Parmenides on two counts (244b6-245e5). In fact, the program of much of the dialogue as announced by the Eleatic Stranger is explicitly anti-Parmenidean:

Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγου ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνο-
μένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὥς
ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὄν αὖ πάλιν ὥς οὐκ ἔστι πη.
(241d5-7)¹⁷

An analysis of the entire dialogue is out of the question here, but a brief summary of how Plato demonstrates that non-being is and conversely that being is not will prove useful for understanding the criticisms he levels at Parmenides and Simplicius's replies.

At 251d6-259e6 Plato proves the need for and demonstrates the mechanism of a communion or interweaving of Forms (κοινωνία, συμπλοκή εἰδῶν)¹⁸. Only the five greatest kinds of Forms are considered; being (τὸ ὄν), sameness (ταυτόν), otherness (ἄτερον), motion (κίνησις), and rest (στάσις). All five, not to mention the other Forms, share or partake of one another, although not all do so with all. True to the workings of participation in the earlier dialogues, for a thing (including Forms) to have the property x it must share in x-ness¹⁹. It is sufficient to consider the Form of motion to illustrate Plato's method, since this is the Form he treats most fully (255a11-256d9). Motion is other

than rest (i.e. shares in otherness with respect to rest) and so is not rest (οὐ σάσις ἐστίν). It also is (ἐστί, ὄν) in virtue of its participating in being (διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος). It shares in otherness with respect to sameness and therefore is not the same (as sameness) (οὐ ταυτόν ἐστί), but shares in sameness with respect to itself and 'really is' the same (ἦν ταυτόν); that is, motion is motion. Lastly, it shares in otherness with respect to being, even though it does share in being, and both is not and is (ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστί καὶ ὄν). The equivalence of 'is other than' (ἕτερον) with 'is not' (οὐκ ἐστί, ὄν) is crucial in this passage and in the dialogue as a whole. It allows Plato to speak meaningfully of non-being, for everything except being itself is non-being, and even being itself 'is not' in that it shares in otherness with respect to everything else. Parmenides had asserted that what is not will never be:

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δομῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
(B 7.1)²⁰

Plato does him one better by showing that what is 'is not' as well (258d5-e3). Plato, however, admits that the non-being he discusses is not the contradictory of Parmenidean being. Earlier in the dialogue he rehearses the Parmenidean arguments for its being inexpressible and unthinkable²¹. At the same time, Plato's Form of being has striking similarities with Parmenides's one being. It is par excellence, since it alone shares in sameness with respect to itself, and is one. It too is eternal, uncreated,

indestructible, and motionless (in the physical sense). The principal difference is that it does not exhaust the ontological possibilities of the universe. More to the point, the properties being has it has in virtue of participating in other Forms. Other things partake of it as well, and since they also partake of otherness and sameness, there is a plurality of discrete existents.

Set against this background the passage 244b6-24535 makes good sense. For convenience, the first criticism will be called the linguistic argument (244b6-d13), the second the part-whole argument (244d14-245e5). The linguistic argument is to hold good for all extreme monists:

παρὰ τῶν ἓν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἄρ' οὐ πειστέον εἰς δύναμιν
τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν; (244b6-7)

These monists admit to two statements: 1) that they say that only one thing is or exists (ἓν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι; 244b9-10); and 2) that being is something (ὄν καλεῖτέ τι 244b12). A question arises from the apparent inconsistency between 1) and 2):

Πότερον ὅπερ ἓν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχράμενοι δυοῖν
ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς; (244c1-2)

If the monists agree that they are using two names for the same thing, they make a mockery of a rigid monism:

τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν
ἓν καταγέλαστόν που. (244c8-9)

On the other hand, for them even to allow someone to say that a name is something would be inexplicable (λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον 244d1). Two possibilities are considered: 1) if one assumes that a name

is other than that of which it is the name, he is in a sense speaking of two things (δύο λέγει πού τινε 244d3-4); 2) if one assumes that the name is the same as the thing (ταυτόν αὐτῷ 244d6), then either a) he will be forced to say that it is not the name of anything at all (244d6-7), or b) if he says that it is the name of something, the name will merely be the name of a name and of nothing else (244d7-9). The illustration of 2b) at 244c11-12, however, contains a textual corruption²². A reconstruction is possible, if offered with diffidence. The general assumption is that the name (somehow) is the same as the one thing. A very strict interpretation of ταυτόν (2a) rules out the possibility of a name existing at all, because the name alone would exist and would not be a name in the ordinary sense. Now 2b) appears to allow that this name somehow names itself:

συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ
οὐδενὸς ὄν. (244d8-9)

Further, by 1) the monist cannot hold that there are two names, and any emendation of 244d11-12 should reflect this. A tentative suggestion is:

καὶ τὸ ἐν ὄν ὄνομα ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ἐν ὄν.

"That is, 'the one being' being a name, and 'the one being' (a name) of the name." It is tempting to argue that Plato here blurs a use-mention distinction to allow the monists a single word, but 2a) patently outlaws the use of a word, and the name to be mentioned is not a name anyway. But, as Cornford notes²³, the point

of the passage is made even by omitting 244dl1-12 altogether. The linguistic argument turns on the impossibility of discourse in a radical monism. The best a monist of this sort can muster is a single name, and even that is not a name in any ordinary sense. Seligman thinks that in 244b6-d13, "Plato has produced only a dubious ad hominem argument against the Parmendean notion [of being]," in that he tries to force Parmenides's own notion of being upon names²⁴. On the contrary the argument is telling; Parmenides's insistence on only one thing can fairly be turned against his use of language. Further, Plato here appears to attack the Parmenidean verse he quotes in the Theaetetus (180e1):

† οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι †.

It is true that Plato relies on a referential theory of language here; it might be possible to undermine his attack by asking him to what "or", "but", and so forth refer. The onus, nevertheless, rests on Parmenides to explain what sense is to be attached to all but one of the words which he uses.

The part-whole argument, on the other hand, is not so telling. Bluck to the contrary, this argument is not a simple continuation of the linguistic argument, but rather a separate attack on the monists' claim of unity for their one entity²⁵. To illustrate the monistic claim that the one being is the whole (244dl5) Parmenides is cited:

Εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου ἀραίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ

μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.
(244e2-5; B 8.43-45)

This comparison of being to a sphere is taken in a literal sense:

τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν τὸ μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ
ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς; (244e6-7)

The balance of the part-whole argument hinges on this literalism.

Before further comment, it will be well to spell out the argument:

1) being is a whole

1a) being is either a whole of parts or unity itself

1b) according to Parmenides it is a whole of parts

1c) therefore it is not unity itself

1d) therefore there is more than one thing, and being is
no longer one

2) being is not a whole

2a) assume that wholeness itself exists

2b) therefore there are two things that are, and since
being lacks what is lacks itself, and is not being²⁶

2c) assume that wholeness itself does not exist

2d) for a thing to be or to come to be, it must do so as
a whole -- that is as a definite quantity

2e) therefore being does not exist nor come to be²⁷

Equally absurd conclusions result for the monists whether they assert or deny that being is a whole; wholeness is meaningless for them. Several points are worthy of note in this argument. The first is that the monists are allowed two and only two types of wholeness; that which consists of parts and unity itself. If another candidate can be discovered, the argument will collapse.

Secondly, it is incredible that Parmenides's simile is treated as a statement of fact²⁸. Thirdly, Plato injects his own theory of Forms by the use of such terms as 'wholeness itself' and 'unity itself'; besides, ex hypothesi Parmenides cannot grant existence to anything but being. The argument does make one important point, that a concept as fundamental as being carries in its train a retinue of interrelated concepts. Number and wholeness do enter into Parmenides's account of being, and recourse to a distinction between 'natural' and 'logical' properties will not alleviate the problem²⁹. The part-whole argument is as much an argument for the Forms as it is a serious criticism of Parmenides. For Plato discourse (λόγος) is based on the interrelatedness of concepts³⁰. Both the linguistic and part-whole arguments are designed to bring out the absurdities inherent in denying or neglecting this interrelatedness; they demonstrate a fortiori the plurality of concepts or Forms. Although the part-whole argument is not convincing, Aristotle also criticizes Parmenides on his claim that being is one along similar lines (Physics 185a20-186a3, esp. 185b11-16, 186a32-b14).

This overview of Plato's treatment of Parmenides is sufficient to show the degree to which Parmenides influenced him. The Parmenidean dictum that only what is can be known and conversely what is (absolutely) not cannot remain intact in Plato's system. Plato replaces the absolute unity of being and the preclusion of

plurality at all ontological levels which he finds in Parmenides by an interweaving of distinct Forms and participation of particulars in Forms. Lastly, each of the Platonic Forms retains the features of Parmenidean being.

Notes to Chapter I

¹The Theaetetus and Sophist passages are both reminiscences of the alleged meeting of Socrates and Parmenides, described in the Parmenides. Tarán (pp. 3-5), among others, does not think that the meeting ever occurred. These references to the Parmenides are hints from Plato that familiarity with this dialogue is a prerequisite for the Theaetetus and Sophist.

²Chapter II takes up Aristotle's critique of Parmenides, particularly in Physics I.2-3. This passage from the Sophist appears frequently in Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides.

³Parmenides clearly conjoins being with knowing:

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. (B 3)

ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα·
οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔοντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἐστίν,
εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν. (B 8.34-36)

but does not use a term for 'absolute' with either (but cf. B 8.11).

⁴Cf. B 8.11 and Sophist 237a2-239b10.

⁵The negative proportion is similar:

τὸ μὴ ὄν : ἄγνωστον :: τὸ μηδαμῇ ὄν : πάντῃ ἄγνωστον.

⁶It is interesting to speculate whether δόξα itself is something that exists in the truest sense and is knowable, or in an intermediate and opinable way.

⁷In the next lines Socrates more fully brings out the principle that if a faculty is set over x and produces some effect in regard to it, it is one (and the same) faculty x^1 , while that which is set over some y is a different, i.e. y^1 faculty:

καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργα-
ζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἑτερον

ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. (477d2-5)

⁸J. Adam (The Republic of Plato [Cambridge, 1969], I. pp. 342) does not comment on the syntax of the infinitive in the formula (e.g. γινῶναι 477b10). There may be an ellipsis of a phrase such as: καί ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις ἢ δυνάμεθα. This, or its equivalent, is represented in the phrase ὃ ἀπεργάζεται of 477d1. Two points in the formula are interesting. The first is that Plato is relatively free with his terminology in this passage. Examples are the synonymous uses of ἐπιστήμη with γνῶσις and of ἄγνοια with ἀγνωσία. Further, there are three apparently equivalent constructions with ἐπὶ '(set) over': 1) with ἐστί ; 2) with τέσσται ; and 3) with πέφικεν. Secondly, knowledge is properly set over what is knowable (τὸ γνωστόν) not what is or exists (τὸ ὄν). It was argued that only what is is knowable (476e10), but this established that being is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being known. However, by the faculty argument, if knowledge is one faculty and has one and only one object, being and being known are identical.

⁹F.M. Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge [London, 1935], pp. 36-39) notes that this passage and Republic 477A ff. are versions of a Heraclitean-cum-Protagorean 'inseparability of opposites' doctrine, and deals with Plato's relation to this doctrine. There are some important differences despite the parallels. In the Theaetetus 'becoming' and 'passing away' replace 'being' and 'non-being' for particulars. Secondly, the Theaetetus here deals with perception (αἴσθησις), while the Republic opinion (δόξα).

¹⁰This is J. Adam's interpretation (The Republic of Plato, I. p. 343 n 17).

¹¹The claim that a heavy thing will also appear light is expanded in Theaetetus 152e6-187a6, where the thesis under consideration is whether knowledge is simply perception. One example given is that the same wind will appear cold to x but warm to y (152b2-10). To y the wind will not be cold while to x it will not be warm, and to neither will it appear both warm and cold or neither warm nor cold. It is therefore not a matter of certain knowledge what the wind really is.

¹²J. Adam (The Republic of Plato, I. 341 n 18) notes that these terms, ἀληθεία - ἀσφαλεία, are fully explained at 508 D ff., where the relation between truth and light is first introduced.

¹³Cf. B 6.3-9.

¹⁴There is no verb ἀγινώσκω in Greek, but an infinitival form of it has been invented here to avoid adding still more negatives to the sentence. Another liberty taken is the combination of two formulas into one:

477b10-11 οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε,
γινῶναι ὥς ἐστι τὸ ὄν;

478a6 ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὄν
γινῶναι ὥς ἔχει;

¹⁵There are some interpreters who think that this way of mortals represents a third way of inquiry and a truly 'real' mode of existence. For a criticism of this view see Tarán, pp. 228-230 esp. n 61.

¹⁶A.P.D. Mourelatos (The Route of Parmenides [New Haven and London, 1970]) devotes an entire chapter to the interpretation of these two lines, and deals with all the relevant bibliography, (Chapter 8, pp. 194-221).

¹⁷βασανίζειν . . . βιάζεσθαι appears to allude to the practice of torturing slaves to procure information. Cf. Aristophanes Ranae 616-629, Antiphon 2.4.8 (cf. 5.3.6), and LSJ s.v. βασανίζω II and βάσανος III. βιάζομαι (LSJ s.v. II) regularly means 'overpowering by force', 'use force upon'. If this allusion is correct, the sentence should be translated, "We will have to put the statement of father Parmenides on the rack and force it to confess that . . . ". Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 214 n 2) notes that, "βιάζεσθαι may allude to Parmenides' own word δομῆ (δομάζω) in the lines quoted above [B 7.1-2]"; cf. also B 7.3 βιάσθω.

¹⁸Most of my remarks on the interweaving of Forms are drawn from J.L. Ackrill ("ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ" in Plato I, ed. Vlastos [New York, 1971]; some from Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 255-298, esp. 285-294).

¹⁹A qualification is in order here. The Forms participate with one another as equally 'real' entities (as opposed to a Form and a particular); this allows reciprocal-participation.

²⁰The quotation of the same lines (B 7.1-2) at 237a8-9 and 258d2-3 is a clear stylistic device, which serves to frame the whole discussion of Parmenides.

²¹Plato's version is more clearly articulated than Parmenides's, although he uses nearly identical vocabulary throughout. Compare 237b7-239c8 with B 2.5-8 and B 8.8-9, 15-18.

²²L. Campbell (The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato [Oxford, 1867], p. 111 n 10) considers five different emendations and concludes that, "none of the emendations hitherto made are satisfactory". The emendation offered here differs from the five he mentions in that only one 'word' is used. Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 222 n 1) follows Campbell's lead and is ready to omit this and the preceding remark of Theaetetus.

²³Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 222 n 1.

²⁴P. Seligman, Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato's Sophist (The Hague, 1974), p. 26. Further, he states, "To raise the question of the being of the name 'being' lay beyond Parmenides' conceptual reach", p. 26 n 2. Parmenides does in fact deal with names, albeit not "being"; cf. B 8.53, B 9.1, and B 19.3. Cf. B 8.38 and Theaetetus 180e1.

²⁵R. Bluck, Plato's Sophist: A Commentary (Manchester, 1975), p. 73. Although the argument does not consider the word or name (ὅνομα) "whole", it does not simply fit another, superfluous name back into the linguistic argument. Further, Bluck is incorrect to deny that, "the Eleatic Visitor (EV) is talking about Unity, Wholeness, an Being", *ibidem*. At 245a5-6 the EV uses the phrase αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, and at 245a9 τὸ ἀληθὺς ἓν. Similarly, the EV speaks of αὐτὸ τὸ ὅν at 245c2 and of τὸ ὅν passim.

²⁶The phrase 'lacks itself' is found in two forms; ἐνδεές τὸ ὅν ἑαυτοῦ (253c2-3) and ἑαυτοῦ στερόμενον (245c5). The former is probably a reference to Parmenides B 8.33: [τὸ ἓν] ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές (ἐπιδές in several manuscripts of Simplicius).

²⁷I follow Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 222-223) in viewing the argument as a series of paradoxes, but differ from him in many details. Seligman (Being and Not-Being, pp. 26-27) is even more hostile to the part-whole argument than to the linguistic argument.

²⁸In fairness to Seligman (Being and Not-Being, p. 25), it should be noted that he brackets the qualifiers 'logical' and 'natural'. It is unclear that this makes a substantial difference for Plato, who holds that sameness and otherness are not

intrinsic logical properties of things, but rather are properties whose acquisition is identical with that of shortness, tallness, whiteness, etc.

²⁹Plato sometimes does less than full justice to his opponent's position; e.g. Thrasymachus's claim that the advantage of the stronger is justice (Republic I) and Protagoras's claim that man is the measure of all things (Theaetetus).

³⁰Cf. Parmenides 135b5-c3 and J.L. Ackrill (ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ), pp. 206-209.

Chapter II: Aristotle and Parmenides

Aristotle does not share Plato's high regard for Parmenides. He credits him with only slightly more insight than the 'rather naive' (ἀγροικότεροι) Xenophanes and Melissus:

Παρμενίδης δὲ μᾶλλον βλέπων ἔοικέ που λέγειν.

But Parmenides perhaps seems in places to speak with more insight.¹

As with many of his predecessors' views, Aristotle dismisses Parmenides's conception of being outright. Moreover, in the major passage in which Aristotle attacks Parmenides it is the refutation itself, not Parmenides's positive doctrines, which is of philosophical interest². Aristotle's attack is thought to be cogent by Charlton and others³. Simplicius, however, defends Parmenides against Aristotle, largely because the Parmenidean one being fits well in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Therefore, in this chapter Aristotle's attack will be considered in some detail in order both to elucidate Aristotle's arguments and to set the stage for Simplicius's replies.

In his précis of philosophy in Metaphysics A, Aristotle first treats Melissus and Parmenides as material monists (984b1-8). But as if to distinguish them from the latter, he sets out their views proper after his discussion of the Pythagoreans (986b18-987a2). They generated the universe from a single, immaterial

principle -- number (985b23-986b18). Strictly speaking the Eleatics denied generation altogether, but their one principle, especially that of Parmenides, is more conceptual than material⁴.

Aristotle's summary of Parmenides is as follows:

For, claiming that, besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity one thing exists, viz. the existent and nothing else (on this we have spoken more clearly in our work on nature), but being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in definition, but more than one according to sensations, he now posits two causes and principles, calling them hot and cold, i.e. fire and earth; and of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non-existent.⁵

In the Doxa Parmenides does not range the hot with being and the cold with non-being, nor call his principles hot and cold. It seems unlikely that after having discredited non-being in the first part of his poem, Parmenides would grant it equal footing with being in the second part⁶. Aristotle here adumbrates the argument Parmenides allegedly makes for the unity of being; since only being exists, it must necessarily be one. The same argument is attributed to him in the Physics and rejected as invalid.

The most interesting point in Aristotle's summary is that he takes both the Aletheia and the Doxa as referring to the material world (cf. 984a27-b4). His rejection of Parmenides and Melissus as physicists both here (986b10-17) and in the Physics (184b25-185a5, 18-20) is based on this understanding.

In a scheme reminiscent of the Sophist, Aristotle sets out

an analytical division of his predecessors in the Physics according to the number and type of principles they held⁷. He states that the question of how many things there are (τὸ ὄντα) is equivalent to the question of how many first principles or elements there are. Since previous thinkers were in fact seeking for the ultimate entities in the world, they too were searching for first principles (184b22-25).

Aristotle next contends that the Eleatics, Parmenides and Melissus, lie wholly outside the ken of physics and that they construct merely eristic arguments for their doctrines. Nevertheless, the refutation of their doctrine brings out problems of interest both to physics and philosophy (185a17-20). Aristotle means to reject Parmenides and Melissus on the grounds that their one principle is not subject to motion (ἀκίνητον). They are relegated to a non-physical science or one common to all sciences⁸. The second of Aristotle's contentions, that they are merely eristic in their arguments, is treated in subsequent chapters by Aristotle.

Beginning his refutation on a facetious note, (ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκωτάτη παῶν), considers what they mean by 'being' (τὸ ὄν) and 'one' (ἓν) when they assert that being or everything is one (185a22-24). On the uses of 'being' see Metaphysics Δ 1017a7-b9. Since his categorial scheme is to include everything that exists, Aristotle first considers whether Parmenides and Melissus assign everything to a single category or to one single item of one category:

Do they mean that all things 'are' substance or quanti-

ties or qualities? And further, are all things one ⁹
substance -- one man, one horse, or one soul

They cannot allow that there be more than one category on pain of allowing a plurality of existent things (185a27-29). The second part of the disjunct is not considered, presumably because it would be absurd for the Eleatics to say that everything is one horse or the like. Aristotle next considers what will result if they embrace a non-substance category. This move will prove unsuccessful because substance alone is capable of separate existence (χωριστόν), while everything else is said of it as subject (185a29-32). To illustrate his contention he considers Melissus's claim that being is infinite. Since this can only be true per accidens of a substance, there must be two entities not one at issue. The final possibility, that everything is substance, is not in itself objectionable, except that one cannot in any way qualify it once all the other categories are denied. Hence Melissus cannot properly assert that being is infinite, nor presumably Parmenides that it is finite¹⁰. This argument against the Eleatics parallels that of Plato in the Sophist; their one being is shown to be a thoroughly empty concept.

Aristotle next treats of the uses of 'one' (ἓν): it is either 1) that which is continuous (τὸ συνεχές), or 2) that which is indivisible (τὸ ἀδιαίρετον), or 3) those things whose essential definition (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι) is one and the same (185b5-9). Now the Eleatics cannot opt for 1), since that which is con-

tinuous is infinitely divisible and its unity is in reality a plurality (πολλὰ τὸ ἓν) (185b9-10). What is continuous is infinitely divisibly potentially; the Eleatics have a legitimate quarrel with this notion. Furthermore, Parmenides explicitly states that being is one, continuous, and indivisible (ἓν, συνεχές B 8.6, οὐδὲ διαίρετον B 8.22); this claim is a contradiction in terms for Aristotle (cf. in Phys 86.19-87.18). At any rate, before considering 2) Aristotle introduces the question of the unity of a whole as against its parts. Its appearance in this passage points to the part-whole argument of the Sophist¹¹.

The second use of 'one', that of indivisibility, precludes the existence of either quality or quantity; the Eleatics will not be able to maintain that being is either finite or infinite (185b 16-19). Aristotle does not explain why this should be so, but the definition of quantity in Metaphysics Δ 1020a7, which has as its definiens 'that which is divisible into subsistents' (ποσὸν λέγεται τὸ διαίρετον εἰς ἐνυπάρχοντα) makes half the claim apparent¹². Charlton thinks that the denial of quality to being (or the universe) is directed against Parmenides's use of hot and cold as principles in the Doxa¹³. It seems more likely that the denial is either directed at the qualities of Parmenides's being in the Aletheia, e.g. αἰνήτητον (B 8.26) and ἀναρχον (B 8.27), or is merely another step in the overall reductio argument that Aristotle constructs to drive home the incoherence of the Eleatic conception of being.

The third and final use of 'one', that of unity of definition, will prove uncongenial to the Eleatic position as well. Aristotle states that if everything there is (πάντα τὰ ὄντα) is one in definition, then the Eleatics will embrace a Herclitean doctrine of synonymy (185b19-25). To assert that everything is one will be convertible salva veritate with the assertion that everything is nothing. As maintained in the linguistic argument of the Sophist, the Eleatics are being charged with making significant speech impossible¹⁴. The balance of the paragraph takes up the question of how one thing can also be many, the difficulties this seeming puzzle provided to post-Eleatic philosophers, and finally Aristotle's own solution to the question¹⁵.

To sum up, Aristotle attempts to make sense of the claim that being is one by considering the possible uses of 'being' and 'one'. The result of this procedure is a reductio ad absurdum for the Eleatic claim; no use of either term will prove viable for their fundamental claim and any ancillary claims, e.g. that being is finite. Eleatic being will prove at best a marginal concept, since it will resist all attempts at analysis and qualification. To assess Aristotle's critique to this point is difficult. He in effect forces the Eleatic conception of being into his own ontological scheme with predictably unhappy results. In a sense he has done no more than to illustrate the incompatibility or incommensurability of the two systems. Secondly, it is possible to break the back of the reductio argument by offering dif-

ferent uses of both 'being' and 'one' which justify the Eleatic claim. There is, however, much to be said in Aristotle's defense. His analysis of the words 'being' and 'one' can be seen as a legitimate attempt to make sense of the opaque claim that being is one. That is, it may be true that the Eleatics use both terms in odd and incomprehensible ways. Secondly, while distortions and misunderstanding are the inevitable result of Aristotle's attempt to explain or understand his predecessors in light of his own system, it does not follow that he acts out of malice¹⁶. Lastly, the philosophical absurdities he imputes to the Eleatics are richly deserved if they in fact maintained that the universe is one and motionless.

While in the first part of his attack Aristotle attempts to show the absurdity of the claim that all things are one, in the second he takes aim at the arguments which the Eleatics use to arrive at their erroneous conclusion (185a20-186a3; 186a3-187a11). Melissus is charged with an illicit conversion and with falsely inferring that if being is one it must therefore not be subject to motion (186a10-13). Aristotle's attack on Parmenides parallels that on Melissus, but is developed at greater length and complexity. He begins by setting out two grounds on which to refute Parmenides: 1) that he falsely assumes that 'being' is used in only one way, and 2) that the conclusion of his syllogism does not follow (186a23-25). Actually, both 1) and 2) are sides of the same coin, for the falseness of one of the premisses ensures the

unsoundness of the whole syllogism. In his attack on Parmenides's syllogism Aristotle substitutes 'white' for 'being', presumably to show that the fallacy is formal:

If we take only white things, and if white has a single meaning, none the less what is white will be many and not one. For what is white will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the sense that it must be defined in only one way.¹⁷

The syllogism at issue in Aristotle's counterexample is difficult to make out. A possible version runs:

τὸ πᾶν (ἐστὶ) λευκόν	Everything is white
τὸ λευκόν (ἐστὶ) ἓν	White is one (only)
τὸ πᾶν (ἐστὶ) ἓν	Everything is one. ¹⁸

The major premiss, that white is one, is false according to Aristotle, and therefore the conclusion that everything is one does not follow. Moreover, white is not one either in continuity or in definition. It is not stated why the former is not true, but brief consideration of this point will throw light on the whole criticism. The continuous is defined as 'that which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have any other', the paradigmatic case of which is a straight line (cf. Metaphysics Δ 1016a5-6). 'White' is not a candidate for having a natural movement. To maintain that it does is to commit a category blunder; substances move or change, not the properties that inhere in them¹⁹. Implicit in Aristotle's denial of continuity is his pluralistic categorial scheme, which figures in his denial of definitional unity as well. The argument for the latter is:

'Whiteness' will be different from 'what has white-

ness'. Nor does this mean that there is anything that can exist separately, over and above what is white. For 'whiteness' and 'that which is white' differ in definition, not in the sense that they are things which can exist apart from each other. But Parmenides had not come in sight of this distinction.²⁰

To paraphrase, even if one assumes that everything is white, and hence that nothing except white exists, it is still not true that everything is one. White considered by itself is a color, and its (essential) definition will differ from that of the substance in which it is present. Both, however, will be one (concrete) thing and be called 'white'.²¹

Several objections to Aristotle's critique in this part are in order. First, the substitution of 'white' for 'being' makes 'being' a mere quality and commits Parmenides to subsistent entities of which existence is an accidental attribute²². Secondly, although it is debated what Parmenides's argument for the unity of being is, there is nothing in the poem that closely resembles Aristotle's version²³. Thirdly, Aristotle's charge that Parmenides assumes that 'being' is said in only one way is obscure. He here assumes (for argument's sake) that this being is a quality, and then proceeds to show how qualities require substances for them to be in. Substance is then tried as a candidate but ultimately rejected. Aristotle appears to be constructing yet another reductio; a bare substance will defy qualification, while no non-substance can exist independently of substance. There is no need to specify either of the two kinds, since both are vulnerable to

the argument. Lastly, Aristotle does not consider the possibility that Parmenidean being is somehow one in kind²⁴. A partial explanation is that elsewhere he explicitly denies that being is a genus²⁵.

Aristotle's critique is not cogent. His first charge, that Parmenides committed a logical fallacy, is simply incorrect, for there is no reason to assume that his argument was such as Aristotle alleges. Secondly, his reductio arguments hinge on his own metaphysical scheme and on his assumption that Parmenidean being is or refers to physical being. In the remainder of his treatment of Parmenides, however, Aristotle attempts to make sense of his claim along less partisan lines.

His first attempt to rehabilitate Parmenides's claim is to insist that 'being' signify not merely one thing, but rather both 'real being' (ὅπερ ὄν) and 'real unity' (ὅπερ ἓν) (186a32-34). He clearly is speaking of essential being and unity; otherwise Parmenides will be speaking of accidental being and unity. That of which being is an accident will be something non-existent (τι οὐκ ὄν), since it is other than being (ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος)²⁶. Therefore both the 'being' and the 'one' of Parmenides will be non-existent and his whole claim meaningless.

The lines that follow are difficult:

Hence 'substance' will not be a predicate of anything else. For the subject cannot be a being, unless 'being' means several things, in such a way that each is something. But ex hypothesi 'being' means only one thing.²⁷

The point seems to be that if only real being is allowed, this cannot be anything in particular. The conclusion of the argument, that real being will not belong to anything other than itself, is meant to be a blow against Parmenides. That is, he will not be able to claim that his being is one or finite.

Aristotle next considers whether everything is an accident of 'real being', since the converse had unfortunate consequences (186b4-14). He resorts to his earlier example of 'being' being white, wherein 'white' is truly predicated of everything there is. If 'real being' is also white but white is not a truly existent thing, white will be non-existent on the principle enunciated above. Furthermore, its non-being or non-existence will not be qualified non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) but rather absolute non-being (ὅλως μὴ ὄν) (186b8-10). Aristotle here turns the tables on Parmenides, who had asserted that only being existed and that that which differed from it existed in no way at all. To put the matter in Aristotelian terms, while it is true that white (and other non-substances) is an accident of something, it is no less truly existent than that in which it occurs²⁸. If it is true that being is white, then being is no more being than non-being (186b4-6). Since this is patently absurd, one must either deny altogether that being is white (and everything else), or else allow that white also signifies being and admit a plurality of significations of being. The section concludes with a condensed version of the same argument directed against magnitude; Parmenides's claim that being

is finite is at issue²⁹.

Parmenides is forced to allow different significations of being in order to justify his claims for the unity, finiteness, and the like of being. While the whole is of a piece with his earlier critique, Aristotle does not explicitly, at any rate, employ his own terminology or categoriology. Ross to the contrary, τὸ ὅπερ ὄν is not a mere synonym of οὐσίᾳ³⁰. After allowing Parmenides the vague, nearly Platonic 'real being', Aristotle shows that this too will defy qualification unless there are other things that 'truly are'. The positive lesson here is that all metaphysical schemes must be pluralistic; this lesson is an a fortiori argument for Aristotle's own scheme.

In the final section of his critique, Aristotle argues that from the point of view of definition (λόγος) being must also be multiform³¹. The connection of this section with the preceding is clear; definitions are paradigmatic instances of essential being. For Aristotle a definition provides the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of a thing (cf. 185b8-9). Since a properly formed definition consists of two parts, a genus and differentia, one is committed to pluralism on at least the linguistic level if one adopts the Aristotelian version of a definition. Aristotle considers the case of 'man' (ὁ ἄνθρωπος)³². If one assumes that this is something that really is, it must also be true that 'animal' (τὸ ζῷον) and 'biped' (τὸ δίποδον) really exist (186b15-16). The alternative is to assume that both are accidents of 'man' or of

something else³³. An accident is either 1) that which is capable of being present or not, or 2) that in which is present the definition of what it is present in. Examples of both are offered: 'to be seated' (τὸ καθίσθαι) can be true or false of some subject, while in 'snubness' (τὸ σιμόν) the definition of nose is present. A caveat is appended to 2): in the definition of all those things which are in the definitory account or are the elements out of which it consists the definition of the 'whole' is not present. The 'whole' in this case is the definiendum, thought of as having the elements of its definition as parts. The definition of 'man' is not present in 'biped', nor 'pale man' in 'pale'³⁴. Aristotle returns to the hypothesis that 'biped' is an accident of 'man'. If this is true, then 'biped' may either be present or not in man, or the definition of 'man' will be present in the definition of 'biped'. As for the former, one would in effect be maintaining that man could either be a biped or not; this is clearly erroneous. But it is equally mistaken to include the definition of 'man' in 'biped', for the opposite is the case. The other half of the disjunct, that 'biped' and 'animal' are accidents of something other than man, also leads to an absurdity. If both are accidents and not truly existent, then 'man' will have the same status; there will have to be some fourth thing which has as three concomitant attributes 'man', 'biped', and 'animal'.

Aristotle has demonstrated the need for a plurality of truly existent things on the basis of another reductio argument.

In the present version he has shown that one cannot define some truly existent thing without positing the existence of at least two other things. The reply to this argument is straightforward. To use Aristotle's own example, it is not obvious that 'animal' is a truly existent thing in the same way as 'man' is, or better this particular man. Further, the ontological status of differ-entiae is debated³⁵. Aristotle also seems to be headed towards an infinite regress.

Aristotle concludes his critique by considering whether one can maintain that the universe ($\tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$) consists of 'indivisibles', if as in the present case what really exists is not an accident of anything yet is said to be composed of both things that are said of it (186b33-35). In addition to its straightforward meaning, 'indivisibles' ($\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha$) refers back to the beginning of the whole section, where the program of demonstrating the divisibility or analyzability of being is set forth (186b14). Of greater importance, though, are two concluding remarks which round off the whole treatment of the Eleatics. The first is:

But obviously it is not true that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same time mean the contradictory of this, there will be nothing which is not, for even what is cannot be without qualification, there is no reason why it should be a particular not-being.³⁶

Aristotle apparently means that even on the assumption that everything exists in the fullest or truest way, there will still be a perfectly sensible way in which non-being will exist; thus, this chair is not this table. There is no commitment here to abso-

lute non-being, although there is to a plurality of distinct entities. The ἑτερον doctrine of the Sophist, which lurks in the background here, is later exploited to account for change in terms of form and absence, the latter often being spoken of as non-being (cf. 190a21-26, 191b13-21). The second remark is another criticism of the Eleatic claim that 'being' must be one only:

To say that all things will be one, if there is nothing besides Being itself, is absurd. For who understands 'being itself' to be anything but a particular substance?³⁷

The notion of being itself or 'real being' can only be comprehended if it can be described as some specific thing. But once one allows some second thing distinct from being itself, a radical monism is impossible to maintain.

In sum, when Aristotle argues strictly from his own metaphysical presuppositions, his criticisms of Parmenides are not telling. In the second section of his critique, however, he formulates a more cogent attack, and one which parallels that of Plato in the Sophist. Aristotle finds the notion of absolute non-being no less abhorrent than did Parmenides, but makes a case for a non-absolute variety of it, namely a plurality of truly existent though distinct things (191b13-14). He argues that rigid adherence to being as a single indivisible unity is absurd, for one could never speak meaningfully of it.

Notes to Chapter II

¹Metaphysics A 986b27. Translation from W.D. Ross, Metaphysica, p. 699 (McKeon).

²Physics 185a17-20. The Eleatics are attacked en masse at 185a20-186a3; Melissus is treated in 184a2-44, Parmenides in 186a22-187a11.

³W. Charlton (Aristotle's Physics I, II: Translated with Introduction and Notes, Clarendon Aristotle Series [Oxford, 1970]), p. 62 and passim. Kirk and Raven (The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts [Cambridge, 1971], pp. 269-290), think that Parmenides was unclear about the copulative and existential uses of ἐστι, and further that he confused "negative predication and negative existential judgement"; both charges rest on Plato's and Aristotle's critiques.

⁴In Metaphysics A 986b18-21 Aristotle states that Parmenides's one being is one in definition - form (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), while Melissus's is one in matter (κατὰ τὴν ὕλην); cf. 986b31-33.

⁵986b28-987a2. Translation from W.D. Ross, Metaphysica, pp. 699-700 (McKeon).

⁶Aristotle may have B 8.53-54 in mind. Cf. Tarán, pp. 217-220.

⁷Compare 184b15-22 with Sophist 242c8-243a1. Further, at Theaetetus 180e1-5 Melissus and Parmenides as champions of motionlessness are opposed to all the other Presocratics, who are partisans of flux.

⁸185a2-3. Cf. Ross (Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary [Oxford, 1936]), p. 461.

⁹185a22-24. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 220 (McKeon).

¹⁰185a32-186b1. Parmenides's contention that being is finite is explicitly controverted in the discussion of 'one', 185b17-18.

¹¹185b11-16. Wicksteed and Cornford (The Physics: with an English Translation, 2 vols., The Loeb Classical Library, [London and Cambridge, 1957], I. p. 28), refer to this passage as an "admittedly irrelevant digression" which anticipates the discussion in IV.iii. In the Sophist the dilemma that Parmenides is presented with is whether he can maintain that his being can be one if it is a whole, for a whole is a whole of parts, 244d14-245b10.

¹²Ross π οὐδὲ πολόν, p. 469. As for the remaining half, Ross is probably correct in stating that a bare point or number does not have qualities.

¹³Charlton (Aristotle's Physics), p. 58 second paragraph.

¹⁴Although in the Sophist the criticism centers on the ontological status of 'names', the upshot seems to be that there could be a string of meaningless names of the one bogus name, 244d11.

¹⁵185b25-186a3 and Ross's notes, pp. 469-470.

¹⁶Harold Cherniss (Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy [Baltimore, 1935]) at times implies such, pp. ix-xiv, 347-404.

¹⁷186a26-28. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 222 (McKeon). Cf. Ross π 22b12, p. 473.

¹⁸This version draws heavily on Ross π 23-32, p. 473. To make it work, however, one has to replace σημαίνοντος by (ἐστι), or the major and minor premisses will be incompatible. Secondly, while Aristotle uses the plural μὲν τὰ λευκά, the singular is required if the syllogism is to be well-formed. Thirdly, τὸ πᾶν may mean 'everything' or 'the universe'. The advantage of this version is that when 'being' is resubstituted for 'white' a plausible argument emerges:

τὸ πᾶν (ἐστι) ὅν	Everything (or the universe) exists
τὸ ὅν (ἐστι) ἓν	Existence is one
τὸ πᾶν (ἐστι) ἓν	Everything (or the universe) is one.

¹⁹Unless the white moves per accidens.

²⁰186a28-32. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 222 (McKeon).

²¹Ross (n 29, p. 474) distinguishes between the color white and the thing that takes on the color white.

²²Aristotle demonstrates the absurdity of such an assumption in 186a34-186b2. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, "On what there is," in From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge, 1953).

²³It is unclear that Parmenides has an 'argument' proper for the unity of being, let alone a syllogism; cf. section VI of Chapter IV. If anything, he argues that being is one and continuous, a position which Aristotle rejects out of hand. Cf. Tarán, pp. 175-201, on the interpretation of B 8.6 $\epsilon\nu$, $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\chi\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$.

²⁴Ross discusses this omission under the treatment of 'one' n b7-9, p. 468. He thinks that unity in kind (or genus) implies numerical difference among the exemplifications of the one kind, while the Eleatics insisted on a numerical identity.

²⁵Several of the most important passages are: Posterior Analytics 92b14, Metaphysics B 998b22, and H 1024b25.

²⁶The phrase $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and the notion that what is other than being is non-being must draw on the Sophist 255D.

²⁷186b1-4. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 222 (McKeon).

²⁸That is, although substance is the favored and logically prior category in Aristotle's scheme, the remaining categories really exist with a different account of being for each.

²⁹186b12-14. Ross fleshes out this argument in n 11-14, pp. 475-476.

³⁰Ross, n 14, p. 477. He follows Alexander and Simplicius in this; cf. in Phys 129.32-131.29.

³¹186b14-187a11. Cf. Ross, pp. 476-481.

³²186b15 ff. Though 'man' is a substance, in theory the same argument would work for 'white', since color would not be an accidental property of white.

³³186b17. This argument continues on till 186b33; a close paraphrase follows.

³⁴The second example is unclear; one would not define 'pale' nor 'pale man' in terms of one another on any scheme.

³⁵Cf. J.L. Ackrill (Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione: Translated with Notes and Glossary, Clarendon Aristotle Series [Oxford, 1963]), pp. 85-86.

³⁶187a3-6. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, pp. 223-224 (McKeon).

³⁷187a6-8. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 224.

Chapter III: Parmenides in the Later Philosophical Tradition

Between Aristotle and Simplicius nearly a millenium elapsed, during which Parmenides fared no better than other Presocratics. Except for the quotation of the proem by Sextus¹, a handful of quotations and secondary accounts of his doctrines are to be gleaned from the extant philosophical literature up to Simplicius. Moreover, a large number of the latter are derived from Theophrastus's *Φυσικῶν Δόξαι*, often from second or third hand abridgments of it². The accounts of Presocratic causes preserved from this work repeat the accounts of Aristotle, and therefore do not constitute an independent source for the Presocratics³. It is necessary to determine the ancient communis opinio about Parmenides, for it is against this background that Simplicius's contribution both as a source and an interpreter is to be viewed.

In order to carry out this plan, all passages that treat of Parmenides must be located and then assessed in light of the contexts in which they appear, including at least some consideration of the authors' philosophical presuppositions⁴. The first step has been carried out by Hermann Diels, who collected much of the material relating to the Presocratics⁵. The second has not yet received its due, with the exception of the studies of Aristotle's and Theophrastus's treatment of the Presocratics⁶. The tendency to date has been

to read in vacuo the fragments and testimonia, often truncated and wrenched from context. In the case of actual quotation, the ipsis-sima verba are unquestionably of more value than any surrounding exegetical material for the reconstruction of a given work. For paraphrases or extended critiques such a mechanical separation will not do. Here careful examination is required to elicit useful information. Further, the role a Presocratic plays in later Greek philosophy is not a piece of antiquarianism; the testimonia of later authors are often the only source for doctrines of the Presocratics. The large amount of material, however, precludes for the present study a treatment of all the passages relating to Parmenides. Instead, only those passages which treat of the Aletheia will be considered. Thus biographical information, the proem, and the Doxa will be omitted from consideration unless light is shed on the first part of the poem. Finally, it is necessary to backtrack and treat those passages in Plato and Aristotle which have not yet been discussed, both for completeness' sake and in order to show how important the views of these two philosophers were for later interpretations of Parmenides.

The most striking feature of Plato's references to Parmenides is that none even hints at the existence of the second half of his poem; Parmenides is par excellence the philosopher of being⁷. Indeed, he and the other Eleatics are distinguished from the other Presocratics who espouse a theory of flux (οἱ ῥέοντες); the former are partisans of cosmic stability (οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται) (Theaetetus 181a4-b4; cf. 152e2-8). While there are slight differences in phraseology,

Parmenides's one, motionless being is everywhere stated to be the whole of reality⁸. Aside from the short quotation in the Symposium, all the explicit references concern the meeting between Socrates and Parmenides, which forms the body of the Parmenides⁹. That this meeting as reported ever occurred was doubted by Athenaeus, and his judgement is correct¹⁰. Though fictional, the meeting does represent Plato's conscious debt to Parmenides, a debt which led him to equate with parricide a refutation of Parmenides's prohibition about the inquiry into non-being¹¹. However, the dialogue, especially the second part, is enigmatic. It literally bristles with 'one' and 'being', but there seems to be no way to separate out the Parmenidean elements from those of Zeno or Plato himself. In view of these considerations, it is advisable to leave the dialogue out of account, however large it figures in an assessment of Parmenides's influence on Plato.

There remains to consider one passage that has received little attention from modern commentators¹². As a preface to his cosmogony, Timaeus argues that because the world has come to be and cannot be said to be in the fullest sense, it cannot be the object of knowledge, but only of opinion or belief. The language of his argument is redolent of the Republic passage previously examined:

That which is apprehensible by thought with a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real; whereas that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that becomes and passes away, but never has real being.¹³

Such being the case, he concludes that his story is only likely, as is fit for mortal man:

If we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely story and look for nothing further.¹⁴

More important than the faint verbal echoes in the passage is the fact that fundamental doctrines are the point of departure for the entire dialogue. The study of this changing world inhabited by men can have at best probability, both on Parmenides's and Plato's account. The differences between the two are no less profound. Plato's realm of being and knowledge, the Forms, is both pluralistic and is the paradigm of this sublunary realm; Parmenides's one being has no analog in the world of mortals. In sum, Parmenides's doctrines exerted a marked, though not restrictive, force on Plato throughout his philosophical career¹⁵.

Parmenides is referred to explicitly by Aristotle more frequently than by Plato, although his importance for Aristotle is undeniably less¹⁶. Two obvious reasons account for this disparity. While treating a subject, Aristotle frequently reviews the opinions of his predecessors to see if they have anything of value to contribute; the majority of his references fall into this category (cf. Metaphysics A, Physics I). Secondly, since the Presocratics offered Aristotle a host of straw-men for his doctrines, there was no better foil for his pluralistic conception of being than Parmenides and the other Eleatics¹⁷. Although his criticisms of his predecessors are at times demonstrably false, what he has to say about Parmenides is crucial because he, unlike Plato, mentions both parts of the poem and attempts to reconcile them. To be sure, some of his statements

about Parmenides cannot be reconciled, but they cannot be dismissed out of hand; they are decisive for later, especially Theophrastean-based reports, and interpretations about Parmenides. In this section, then, the inquiry will be restricted to Aristotle's critique of Parmenides's conception of and arguments for his one being, as well as his attempts to reconcile the two parts of the poem¹⁸.

Both the Protrepticus and On Philosophy related histories of the development of philosophy that seem to have been the raw material for the scheme of Metaphysics A¹⁹. To the latter dialogue has been assigned a report by Sextus that Aristotle called Parmenides and Melissus 'stationers of nature and non-physicists' (στασιώτας τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀφυσίκους κέκληκεν)²⁰. The only other mention of Parmenides in the supposed fragments of the dialogues is found in the Sophist, where he is said not to have been without experience in dialectic, since his friend Zeno was its originator²¹. Although a dialogue is presumably not at issue, Philoponus's report that Aristotle devoted a separated work to Parmenides, if true, would point to yet another lost work²².

Aristotle's other references to Parmenides will be considered in two groups. The first consists of expositions and refutations of the arguments which Parmenides advanced in behalf of his one being. In De Generatione et Corruptione 325a2-23 the Eleatic arguments against motion and plurality are set forth at some length²³. The Eleatics deny that void (τὸ κενόν) exists, because this is non-being, and they conclude that it necessarily follows that what is or rather being (τὸ ὄν) is one and not subject to motion. For void

is required both for motion and to separate objects from one another²⁴. Further, what is, or rather the universe (τὸ πᾶν), must be continuous and indivisible; otherwise it will be many and the void will reappear. Swayed by these arguments the Eleatics disdainfully transcend perception as a valid means of knowledge and obey the dictates of reason²⁵. Aristotle thinks that while these conclusions seemingly follow from their arguments, they so fly in the face of experience that to embrace them is akin to madness (325a17-23). A passage in De Caelo (298b14-24) is similar. Here the followers of Parmenides and Melissus are said to abolish generation and destruction altogether, because things that are only seem to us to come into being and pass away²⁶. In these two passages, then, Aristotle provisionally accepts as valid the arguments the Eleatics offer for denying plurality or motion in this world. In both stress is laid upon the sovereignty of reason and the concomitant denial of perception or seeming as valid means of knowledge. Further, Aristotle clearly takes them to be speaking of the physical world.

In the eleventh ἀπορία of Metaphysics B (1001a4-b25) Aristotle takes up the question of whether or not 'being' and 'one' are to count as the substances of things, and whether each respectively is only being itself and unity itself, or rather that some different nature is in question²⁷. If one admits that there is a being itself and unity itself, being and unity will be their respective substances, for they are said of everything that is or is one. But the admission that there is a being itself and a unity itself will force one to accept Parmenides's conclusion, that all

things are one and that this is being. What is different from being does not exist, and so being alone exists. Plato is clearly Aristotle's target here²⁸. Parmenides's argument is valid only on the assumption that there is some one 'being'; Aristotle explicitly denies this both here and in other passages (e.g. Physics 186b1-35). Further, Aristotle elsewhere denies that being and one are proper universals at all (Metaphysics B 998b21-22). What is important for the present inquiry is that Aristotle does not deny the validity of Parmenides's argument, but rather allows it to stand as the necessary and undesirable consequence for Plato's conception of being²⁹.

Near the end of Physics I Aristotle recapitulates his critique of his predecessors' views on change, and the doctrine of Parmenides is brought up three times (191a23-192b4). In the first, coming to be and passing away of what is are denied, because what comes to be must come to be either from being or non-being. Both alternatives are impossible; for what already is is and does not come to be, while nothing can come to be from non-being (191a28-31). Those who argue in this way generalize their conclusion so as to deny multiplicity as well. Aristotle then shows how his accidental-essential distinction when applied to 'being' will allow one to speak meaningfully of 'coming to be from non-being' (191a31-33). He asserts that it was ignorance of this distinction that led some of his predecessors to deny that anything comes to be and therefore to abolish all coming to be; Parmenides, although unnamed, is one these (191b10-13). He goes on to state that his potentiality-actuality distinction, as applied to that which underlies the change, solves

the difficulties that compelled his predecessors to deny palpable fact; for they turned away from the way of coming to be, passing away, and all change (ἐξετράπησαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν καὶ ὅλως μεταβολήν)³⁰. The language here is Parmenidean³¹. In the third passage he says that later philosophers agreed with Parmenides that nothing comes from non-being simpliciter, but were unable to grasp the true nature of the substrate in change (191b36-192a1). In all these passages Parmenides's argument is refuted in one of two ways; either the potentiality-actuality or accidental-essential distinction when applied to being will ensure the meaningfulness of 'non-being'. In the refutation of Parmenides early on in the Physics the semantic multivocity of 'being' was at stake, but only as applied to the categorial implications of existential claims³². A reference to this sort of refutation occurs in the Sophistical Refutations. Aristotle here states that some people refute (λύουσι) the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by asserting that 'one' and 'being' are used not in one but in many ways³³.

The second group consists of Aristotle's remarks about the relation of the two parts of the poem. As previously remarked, in Metaphysics A Parmenides is said to have grasped a conceptual unity of being, but to have been compelled to account for the plurality of the sensible world³⁴. This he did by introducing two principles or causes, hot and cold, which he called fire and earth, ranging the former with being and the latter with non-being³⁵. In De Generatione et Corruptione 318b6-7 Aristotle sketches how fire and earth might come to be and pass away into each other, and refers to Parmenides's

analogous scheme. His poles of change were two, being and non-being, which he called fire and earth. It is clear from the context that non-being in this case is not of the absolute sort, but rather relative to the other pole of change, viz. being.

From the preceding review it is clear that Aristotle is not consistent. He presents several disparate versions of Parmenides's argument and allows sometimes that it is valid, yet refutes it in other places. Likewise, he waivers on the relation of the two parts of the poem, and the precise nature of the two principles, light and night, of the Doxa³⁶. The role Parmenides and the Eleatics played in the history of philosophy is also variously related. For example, in the Metaphysics their doctrine is treated as a correction of early monism, while in the Physics it is held responsible for the misconceptions about being and non-being that plagued philosophy until Aristotle resolved them. It might be added that Aristotle nowhere mentions Parmenides's basic reason for rejecting non-being: that it is both unutterable and unthinkable. This omission is striking in light of Plato's obsession with the relation between being and knowledge and their opposites³⁷.

Although it forms part of the Aristotelian corpus, De Xenophane, Melisso, et Gorgia is thought to be a later Peripatetic³⁸. Parmenides is mentioned in it twice, and in both passages his contention that the one being is finite is cited to refute the opposite contention of both Melissus and Xenophanes (976a6-10, 978b8-10). Melissus is criticized for arguing that because the whole of being is uncreated it must also be infinite. Parmenides, on the other hand, held that

everything (τὸ πᾶν) was one and uncreated but was finite. Two verses from Parmenides (B 8.43-44) are quoted as proof; the Sophist is the source for the quotation³⁹. The author of the work may well have the Physics in mind as well, for there Aristotle contrasts Parmenides and Melissus on the same score and finds the view of Parmenides superior⁴⁰. Xenophanes is reputed to have held that god was infinite though one, and Parmenides's one being is for the sake of argument equated with god to demonstrate how an uncreated unity can be finite; the same lines from Parmenides are quoted⁴¹. Neither reference is of great significance as regards Parmenides, except perhaps to show that his sphere-simile was familiar.

Theophrastus's account of Parmenides is based on two, inconsistent passages in Metaphysics A⁴². Parmenides is credited with a two-fold philosophy; the one in accordance with truth, the other with opinion or seeming⁴³. Moreover, in the former the universe (τὸ πᾶν) is one, eternal, uncreated, and spherical. In the latter the common view of how things come to be is accounted for by the use of fire and earth as efficient and material causes⁴⁴. Lastly, Parmenides's argument for the unity of being is:

τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν, τὸ οὐκ ὄν οὐδέν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ὄν.

That which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; therefore being is one.⁴⁵

Though dependent on Aristotle, Theophrastus differs from him in making a rigid division between the two parts of the poem, the second of which does not, in his opinion, represent Parmenides's own doctrine⁴⁶. In the doxographical tradition this division, τὰ πρὸς

ἀλήθειαν versus τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, is frequently mentioned. Finally, Theophrastus apparently takes Parmenides to be speaking of the physical world⁴⁷.

The extent of Theophrastus's influence is evident in those doxographers who made direct use of his φυσικῶν Δόξαι.⁴⁸ Hippolytus says that Parmenides was one of the φυσικοί and implies that the second part of his poem represents his own doctrine: οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἐκφεύγων τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν⁴⁹. He supplies more details about Parmenides's universe (τὸ πᾶν) than are found in the scant remains of Theophrastus's account, but is otherwise wholly in accord with him⁵⁰.

Diogenes Laertius relates that according to Theophrastus Parmenides had a two-fold philosophy, and he quotes several verses from the poem to corroborate this report (IX 21-23; B 1.28-30). He adds that Parmenides makes reason (ὁ λόγος) the criterion because the senses are inaccurate; one again he quotes Parmenides to support his claim (IX 22; B 7.3-5). His other remarks are addressed to biographical matters and the Doxa. In addition to Theophrastus he cites five sources for his account of Parmenides⁵¹.

In his review of the theology of previous thinkers in De Natura Deorum I, Cicero has nothing to say about the goddess of the first part. Philodemus, who may have been Cicero's source, states that Parmenides and Melissus maintain that the universe is one and that the senses are false⁵².

Pseudo-Plutarch's Stomateis preserves the fullest and most faithful account of all those works which are based immediately upon Theophrastus (DG 580.20-581.4). Thus Parmenides declares that in

truth the universe is eternal and motionless, while coming to be is merely a mistaken notion, and he banishes the senses from (the realm) of truth⁵³. Pseudo-Plutarch also sets forth Parmenides's argument as follows: if there is anything besides being it is non-being; non-being does not exist at all; therefore being is uncreated. This version of the argument is garbled, or strictly speaking ill-formed, but its premisses are identical to those set out by Theophrastus⁵⁴.

All the other doxographers made use of the Vetusta Placita, a Stoic compilation from Theophrastus's work, or of an epitome of this compilation by Aetius, the Placita Philosophorum. None of the reports preserved from the Vetusta Placita deals with the first part of Parmenides's poem; in what follows the reports from the Placita will be considered⁵⁵. Stobaeus and Pseudo-Plutarch are the principle sources for the Placita, although chance citations in other doxographers are of value⁵⁶. Theodoreus, for example, reports that Parmenides followed his teacher Xenophanes in holding that the universe was one, spherical, finite, unborn, eternal, and wholly motionless; he cites a verse from Parmenides as proof⁵⁷.

The majority of Stobaeus's reports about Parmenides are about the Doxa, while some of those which relate to the Aletheia are suspect. He reports that Parmenides thought that god was the motionless, infinite, and spherical (DG 303b17-18). Likewise, he includes Parmenides among those philosophers who hold that there is one world; it is possible that in the Doxa Parmenides stated that there was only one world, but it is more likely that Aetius extrapolated this from the first part of the poem⁵⁸. On more solid ground is Stobaeus's

report that Parmenides and Melissus did away with coming to be and passing away because they believed that the universe was motionless (DG 320b17-19). His inclusion of Parmenides among a host of philosophers who think the senses are false may be derived from either or both parts of the poem⁵⁹. Lastly, the same three verses of Parmenides which Plato quotes in the Sophist appear in Stobaeus⁶⁰.

All the other references to Parmenides in the doxographical tradition are from Pseudo-Plutarch or works derived from it. However, Stobaeus did less abridging than did Pseudo-Plutarch, and little additional information is to be got from the latter. The only report he offers of the Aletheia is that Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno did away with coming to be and passing away because they believed that the universe was motionless⁶¹.

Eusebius made use not only of the Placita and Epitome of Pseudo-Plutarch, but also of Plato, Aristocles, and others in his treatment of the Presocratics⁶². His noteworthy reports are: 1) that Parmenides thought that the universe was one, uncreated, motionless, and had a spherical shape; 2) that he and Xenophanes did away with perception and thought that one should trust reason alone; 3) and that they thought that being was one, that the other [viz. non-being] did not exist, and that nothing came to be, passed away, or moved at all⁶³.

Galen has a single report concerning the Aletheia: that Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno denied coming to be and passing away, since they supposed that the universe was motionless (DG 619.21-22=320a11-13).

Hermias reports that Parmenides held that being (ἡ οὐσία) was one, eternal, infinite, motionless and like in all directions⁶⁴.

A distinct group of Parmenides interpreters consists of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus, who are independent of the Peripatetic interpretation, antedate Neoplatonism, and seem to have his complete poem in their possession. Plutarch treats of Parmenides in the course of his reply to an attack by Colotes, an Epicurean, against all non-Epicurean philosophers on the grounds that they make life impossible (adv Colotem 1107E, 1113E-1114F). Although Colotes's work does not survive, his criticisms of Parmenides can be made out from Plutarch's replies. Parmenides allegedly 1) uttered shameless sophistries and 2) denied the existence of the physical world by embracing the one being⁶⁵. From 1) Colotes argued that Parmenides justified all sorts of immoral behavior and thereby made the good or happy life impossible; from 2) that life as we know it is impossible. Plutarch replies to 1) by denying that Parmenides declared a moral holiday as the result of his arguments. The reply to 2) has two parts, the first of which is a tu quoque argument; the Epicureans say that everything is atoms and void, but the latter is nothing, and the former will be the only thing there is, as Parmenides's one being is (1114A-B). In the second, a more substantial argument, which is based on Plutarch's reconstruction of Parmenides's doctrines, is set out. Parmenides, he claims, anticipated Plato and Socrates in seeing that nature has two parts, one of opinion (τὸ δοξαστόν), the other of intellection or thought (τὸ νοητόν) (1114C). He did not

abolish either nature (φύσις), but attributed to each what is fitting; in fact, Parmenides provides an exhaustive account (διάνοσιμος) of the opinable or physical world on the basis of two elements, light (τὸ λαμπρόν) and dark (τὸ σκότεινον) (1114D; B-C). Plutarch goes on to demonstrate how Colotes misunderstood what Parmenides meant by his one being, and that acceptance of this does not necessitate rejection of the perceptible, physical world⁶⁶. Plutarch states that the one being is like itself and persistent in being, that the intelligible part falls under the category of the one being, and that Parmenides call this part 'being' because it is eternal and indestructible, and 'one' because of its homogeneity and inability to admit of difference (1114C-D). Lastly, he quotes several verses from Parmenides to show that truth belongs to the unchanging, intelligible part, while mortal opinions belong to the other (1114E).

That Plutarch interprets Parmenides as a precursor to Plato is perhaps predictable, but his quotations from and close adherence to what Parmenides says makes his interpretation more than mere cant. Unlike the Peripatetic interpreters, Plutarch dwells on the cognitive aspect of Parmenides's doctrines and ignores its purely ontological features, especially the argument for the unity of being. It is to Plutarch's advantage in his refutation of Colotes to stress Parmenides's acceptance of the physical world as no less real than that of being, and to gloss over the relation between the two parts of nature. It does not follow, however, that Plutarch manufactured his account for the occasion. For a Platonist the being-seeming dualism lies at the very heart of reality, and Parmenides can fairly

be said to have anticipated such a doctrine. Plutarch's willingness to read Plato back into Parmenides tends to vitiate his interpretation. Granted that Parmenides grasped a distinction between perception and knowledge and their objects, it does not follow that he granted full reality to the perceptible order. Plato holds that the world of seeming is a shadowy image of the world of being, but the two 'worlds' in Parmenides appear to be totally discontinuous. Parmenides's distinguishing between the two was drawn on by Plato, who articulated their natures and unified them through his degrees of reality doctrine. Plutarch is correct in seeing Parmenides as laying the foundations of Platonism, but his claim that much of the superstructure is Parmenidean as well is disputable.

Sextus Empiricus, a Sceptic of the second century A.D., quotes most of the proem (B 1.1-30) and interprets it allegorically; he has little to say on either the Aletheia or Doxa. On the basis of a three-fold division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, he ranges Parmenides among the physicists while granting him some claim to logic as well (adv Math VII.2-5, 16-24, P. II.13). Parmenides, Melissus, and unspecified others differ from the majority of physicists insofar as they deny that motion exists; Sextus's version of the argument for the denial of motion is Zenonian, not Parmenidean⁶⁷. Consonant with the physicists, however, is his rejection of the testimony of the senses in favor of reason as the sole guarantor of truth (adv Math VII.89). Sextus undertakes to answer the question of whether there is a criterion of truth and argues that all the physicists from Thales onward asserted that reason, not

sensation, was the criterion (adv Math VII.27, ff., P. I.21). It is largely because Parmenides is the best witness for this position that his proem is quoted in extenso, whereas the other physicists are cited far more briefly⁶⁸. At any rate, Parmenides rejected both opiniative reason (ὁ δοξαστός λόγος), which his acquaintance Xenophanes had accepted, and sensation as the criterion, and in their stead posited scientific reason (ὁ ἐπιστημονικός λόγος); the proem is here quoted (adv Math VII.111). Sextus interprets the chariot journey as an allegory of philosophical investigation, wherein the sovereignty of reason over sensation and opinion is affirmed⁶⁹. The details of this interpretation need not be pursued, although it is noteworthy that Sextus says that Parmenides's 'unshaken heart of rich-persuading truth' is the unmoving (ἀμετακίνητον) foundation of knowledge, while mortal opinions are unstable (ἀσέβαιον) (adv Math VII.114). Like Plutarch, to a degree at least, Sextus does not treat of the ontological aspect of Parmenides's thought, nor even mention the unity of being. He differs sharply in seeing Parmenides as altogether denying reality or truth to the Doxa. Although the task at hand calls only for evidence that as a physicist Parmenides discarded both sensation and opinion for reason, it is still remarkable that his one being is nowhere mentioned⁷⁰. Finally, Sextus's account is similar to that of Diogenes Laertius: both argue that for Parmenides reason is the criterion (of what Diogenes does not say), that sensation is unreliable, and quote from the proem for proof of their claims⁷¹.

Plotinus's interpretation of Parmenides and other Presocratics is analogous to that of Aristotle, in that both see the ancients as groping for their own systems. That is, in Aristotle the Presocratics are portrayed as aetiologists, while in Plotinus as vaguely grasping some one or two of the hypostases⁷². Plotinus denies any originality for his own doctrines, affirming that they were previously, though not explicitly, stated and that Plato's writings are proof of their ancient heritage⁷³. Even before Plato, Parmenides was coming to grips with Plotinian doctrines insofar as he attempted to identify being (τὸ ὄν) with intellect (νοῦς) and to locate the former in the non-perceptible order (V.1.8.14-18; B 3 = 17-18)⁷⁴. saying that being was motionless (ἀκίνητον) he was merely removing all corporeal motion from it to insure that it remain as it is; he likened it to a sphere's mass because it contains everything, including thought or intellection (τὸ νοεῖν), within itself (V.1.8.18-22; B 8.26 = 18, B 8.43 = 20). By calling being 'one' (ἓν) he incurred censure, because this 'one' is in fact a plurality (V.1.8.22-23; B 8.6 = 22). Parmenides of Plato's dialogue of the same name sets the matter straight; nonetheless, Parmenides was in accord with the three hypostases (V.1.8.23-27).

From Plotinus's account several observations are in order. To use Plotinian terminology, Parmenides apprehended the difference between the third hypostasis, that of soul or the physical world, and the second, that of intellect, to which belong 'being', 'intellecting', 'sameness', 'difference', and other forms; he erred in making a strict unity of the second (V.1.4.34-43). Secondly, Plotinus

interprets 'motionless' to exclude merely corporeal motion, because for him thought requires some motion or activity⁷⁵. Thirdly, he does not take 'mass of a sphere' literally; by this simile Parmenides only meant to indicate that being was all embracing⁷⁶. Finally, Plotinus states that Parmenides's claim that being is one drew criticism; by whom he does say, although Plato would seem to be the most likely candidate⁷⁷.

Although Proclus frequently comments on and quotes from Parmenides, in the main depends upon Syrian, his teacher, and Plato for his interpretation⁷⁸. Moreover, the Parmenides as interpreted by Syrian is his single most important source⁷⁹. It should be stressed that Proclus's interpretation is not consistent, and at times contradicts Parmenides's own words.

According to Proclus Syrian understood the Parmenides to be a serious attempt on Plato's part to examine (metaphysically) the whole of reality as a product of the One⁸⁰. The great respect shown Parmenides by Plato, evident in several dialogues, explains his taking the lead in the Parmenides, since he had himself had investigated 'what really is'⁸¹. (In similar fashion, the physicist Timaeus is the central character in Plato's eponymously named dialogue on the physical world.)⁸² Now, Parmenides's one being serves as the starting point for, not the content of, the first hypothesis, which is about the One⁸³. However, since Parmenides was aware of this 'one', discussed the seonce 'one' in the first part of his poem, and the third implicitly in the second, his role in the dialogue is unexceptionable⁸⁴. More specifically, in the first part he investi-

gated 'real being', the highest level of which ('being itself') he properly called 'one', since the One first manifests itself in or through this (in Parm 708.7-10, 1084.24-26, PT I 47.5). He also recognized that the noetic order was pluralistic and issued forth from this being itself; most of his critics failed to note this⁸⁵. Proclus even identifies Parmenides (presumably the dialogic character) with the stability (μονή) of the One, Zeno with the issuing forth (πρόοδος) of this into a plurality, and Socrates with the (intellect's) turning back (ἐπιστροφή) the second upon the first (in Parm 712.32-713.5). As for the Doxa, Proclus does little more than mention that Parmenides discoursed about the pluralistic, perceptible or opinable order in it⁸⁶.

The details of Proclus's interpretation are difficult to sort out. He expressly states that Parmenides, following a Pythagorean tradition, differentiated between a noetic and perceptible order; the two parts of his work, τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, treat of each order respectively⁸⁷. Further, while it is obvious that Parmenides posited a plurality in the perceptible order, it is clear that he did the same in the noetic order⁸⁸. The reasons for this claim, which Proclus finds clear, are in fact debatable. There seem to be four more or less distinct reasons. The first is that Proclus claims that Parmenides's predication of so many things of his one being proves that he was aware of its plurality⁸⁹. The second, adumbrated above, is Proclus's reading the doctrines of the Parmenides back into Parmenides. Since Plato formulates a three-fold world order and accurately presents Parmenides's own doctrines

there, one can conclude that he too 'saw' this three-fold order⁹⁰. Proclus does insist that Parmenides failed to see that his being was not one in the absolute sense, although he had true unity in sight⁹¹. Thirdly, Proclus quotes several verses from the Aletheia to demonstrate that Parmenides was talking about 'many' and not 'one'; several of these quotations can scarcely bear the interpretation Proclus puts upon them⁹². Since the majority of these quotations center on the sphere-simile of Parmenides, the Sophist, particularly the part-whole argument, is the fourth source for Proclus's claim⁹³. Proclus quotes both criticisms in Plato's Theology, and takes them not as a demonstration of Parmenides's error about the one, but rather as corroboration that Parmenides was actually talking about a derivative (πεπονηδός) one (III.20 pp. 69.16-71.6).

There is no need to criticize or catalogue the inconsistencies of this interpretation, although a few remarks are in order. Despite Proclus's superzealousness in admitting Parmenides into the Neoplatonic fold, that there is a legitimate philosophical genealogy that runs from Parmenides to Neoplatonism is undeniable. There are clear dangers in reading too much of the history of Greek idealism into Parmenides, but no less clear dangers attend on ignoring the familial resemblances altogether. Secondly, the reputed 'Pythagorean connection' of Parmenides is not first found in Proclus, since it appears early in the doxographical tradition⁹⁴. Proclus gives an explanation of what the Pythagorean features in Parmenides are, not merely the bald statement that there are such.

Ammonius mentions Parmenides three times in his commentary on

De Interpretatione (CAG IV.5): 9.13, 133.18, 133.18 (28 A 30 = 133.16-23), 136.24. In the first, Parmenides's statement that being is one (ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν) is cited as an example of an absurd supposition.

The other two treat of Parmenides's timeless and unchanging 'is'; both are based on B 8.5, which Ammonius misquotes in 136.24-25⁹⁵. In the former, Parmenides is credited with having anticipated both Plato and Aristotle in declaring that among the gods there is neither time nor change. Ammonius states in the second that Parmenides declares that timeless being or 'is' (ἐστὶ) belongs to everything intelligible.

The phrase ὁ μέγας Παρμενίδης (136.24-25), which appears in Sophist 237a4-5, is also found in Proclus, Damascius, and Simplicius⁹⁶.

Damascius mentions Parmenides some seven times in his Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis⁹⁷. Of importance for Simplicius's interpretation is Damascius's contention that Parmenidean being, which is a radical unity (I.131.3-6), is situated between the One and the pluralistic stage in intellect; it preceeds all distinction (I.131.10-11) and issuing forth (I.67.21-26). Like Proclus (in Parm 1078.13-26), he takes Plato's criticism in Sophist 245a1-9, that Parmenidean being is not true unity, to mean that Parmenidean being is not the One, but rather has 'one' as an attribute (I.131.8-11).

Notes to Chapter III

¹Sextus Empiricus, adv Math VII.111-114; cf. Tarán, pp. 17-31, on Sextus's allegorical interpretation. The remark of Plato (Sophist 242d4-5) that the Eleatic tribe began with Xenophanes or even someone earlier was taken up by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 986b21) and made history by Theophrastus; see J.B. McDiarmid, "Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes," HSCP 61 (1953), 119-120.

²Hermann Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879). Hermann Usener first collected the fragments of this work: "De Physicorum Opinionibus," in Analectea Theophrastea (Leipzig, 1858), pp. 25-48.

³McDiarmid, pp. 129-133.

⁴Harold Cherniss stresses the importance of examining Presocratic material in context, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Baltimore, 1935), pp. xi-xii.

⁵Fuller references are to be found in his Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, Vol. III Fasc. I of Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. by Willamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, 1901) than in DK. His Doxographi Graeci contains the extant parts of Theophrastus's Φυσικῶν Δόξαι and all accounts deriving from it. But even the great Hermann Diels nods; according to J.H. Waszink he overlooked a reference in Tertullian to Parmenides's conception of sleep, Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De Anima (Amsterdam, 1947), 43.2, n ad loc. p. 462.

⁶Cherniss for Aristotle, McDiarmid for Theophrastus.

⁷The quotation of B 13 in Symposium is from the second part, but is not so noted by Plato. Further, in Republic V 476e7-480a13 and Timaeus 27d5-29e3 Parmenides's insistence that only being can be the object of knowledge, while the world of mortals is only a matter of opinion or seeming, is taken as axiomatic, but without mention of Parmenides.

⁸Plato uses either τὸ πᾶν, πάντα, or τὰ πάντα as synonymous with Parmenidean being:

- Parmenides 128a8-b1 οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν (cf. De Caelo 298b17-18)
- Theaetetus 180e1-4 † οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ πάντι ὄνομ' εἶναι † . . . ὥς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται.
- Theaetetus 183e2-5 οἷ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν . . . ἢ ἐνὰ ὄντα Παρμενίδην
- Sophist 242d4-6 τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος . . . ὥς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων . . .
- Sophist 244b6-7 παρὰ τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἄρ' οὐ τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;

⁹In the Symposium (178b4-c2) Parmenides is cited along with Hesiod as authorities for Eros's having been the first born of the gods; the same collocation is found in Aristotle (Metaphysics A 984b25-31), Plutarch (Amatorius 756F-757A), Stobaeus (Eclogae I.9.5-6), and Sextus (adv Math IX.7). However, Sextus follows Aristotle in interpreting Eros as an efficient cause. As for the meeting described in the Parmenides, the references are remarkably consonant in detail:

- Parmenides 127b1-3 τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἦδη προεσβύτην εἶναι, ἀρόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθόν
- Parmenides 127c4-5 Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε ἀρόδρα νέον
- Theaetetus 183a5-184a1 Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται . . . συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ προεσβύτη
- Sophist 217c4-6 οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδην χαμένῳ . . . λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος προεσβύτου.

¹⁰Deipnosophistae 505F. T.L. Heath (Aristarchus of Samos: The Ancient Copernicus [Oxford, 1913], pp. 62-63) has a lucid account of the chronological issues. Tarán, pp. 4-7, takes Plato's chronology as preferable to that of Apollodorus, DL IX.26.

¹¹This is put in the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger (Sophist 241d3), who refers to Parmenides in fatherly terms twice (241d5, 242a1-2) and as 'great' once (237a4-5). The identity of the Stranger, who is announced to be of the school of Parmenides and Zeno (216a2-4), is un-

clear; similar sentiments are voiced by Socrates in the Theaetetus (183e4-6). Both the Stranger and Parmenides merit Homeric praise from Plato.

¹²Timaeus 27d5-29d3; cf. 51d2-52d1. F.M. Cornford (Plato's Cosmology [London, 1937], pp. 28-30) notes that Plato's use of the word εἰκώς "has a history going back to Parmenides and Xenophanes, and even Hesiod", and refers to B 8.60. He is content to refer the distinction between being/known -- becoming/opinion to Republic VI (the divided line). A.E. Taylor (A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus [Oxford, 1928], pp. 61-75) also sees the Republic (V 477 ff.) at issue, but nowhere mentions Parmenides.

¹³28a1-4. Translation from F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 22.

¹⁴29c7-d3. Translation from F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 23. He notes that τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον is similar to B 8.60 τὸν σοὶ ἐγὼ διάνοισμον πάντα φατίζω and that B 8.61 ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτέ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσει could "possibly be assimilated to λόγους μηδενὸς ἥττον εἰκότας", p. 30 n 1. The phrase φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην makes this a strong possibility.

¹⁵The possibility that the Parmenidean elements in Plato's thought are by the time of the Republic, let alone the Timaeus, no longer felt as such but as wholly Platonic cannot be dismissed. Still, three late dialogues of critical import for Plato explicitly take up Parmenides's doctrines: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist.

¹⁶Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus [Berlin, 1870], 569b15-18) lists twenty-one passages in which Parmenides appears, and two possible references. Of the twenty-one six do not mention Parmenides by name, but all are securely attributed. In addition, there are two references to Parmenides in Pseudo-Aristotle De Xenophane, Melisso, et Gorgia.

¹⁷As shown in Chapter II (pp. 35-36), Aristotle took Parmenides to task for assuming a single use of 'being' (Physics 185a20-b5, 186a24-25). To this passage should be added Sophistical Refutations 182b22-27 and especially Metaphysics N 1088b3 ff..

¹⁸The two most important passages for Aristotle's interpretation of Parmenides are treated in Chapter II: Metaphysics A 986b17-987a2 (pp. 33-34) and Physics 184b25-187a11 (pp. 34-47).

¹⁹Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, translated by Richard Robinson (Oxford, 1934), pp. 68,

128-138.

²⁰This fragment is so assigned by Ross, who follows Walzer: Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta OCT (Oxford, 1958), ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ 9 (W 9), p. 77.

²¹Ross, Fragmenta, ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ I (R² 54, R³ 65), p. 15.

²²Mario Untersteiner (Parmenide: Testimoniazze e Frammenti [Florence, 1958], p. 49 (pp. 221, 222-223)) briefly discusses the contrary views on this subject.

²³

This version of the argument is by far the closest approximation to that of Parmenides in that here being is one because it is continuous and indivisible (a5-12); cf. B 8.22-25. However, the equation of non-being with void (τὸ κενόν a3-4) suggests that Aristotle has Melissus rather than Parmenides in mind; cf. 30 B 7.7-10.

²⁴κίνησθαι δ' οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κενωμένου (a4-5); it is not clear that qualitative change requires void also.

²⁵ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ παρ-
ιδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν (a13-14). Cf. B 7.2-4 and numerous mentions of necessity in the Aletheia.

²⁶298b14-24. The phrase ὅλως ἀνεῖλον γένεσιν καὶ φθορᾷ (b15) reappears with slight variations in Aristotle and in other authors: Physics 191b12-13, Metaphysics A 984a31-b1, and e.g. Aetius I.24 (DG 320a11-13, b17-19). Cf. in Cael 556.3-560.10 and section V for a full treatment of this passage.

²⁷Ross's interpretation is here followed: Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1924), vol. I, pp. 244-246.

²⁸Besides the phrase αὐτὸ ὄν (a27), Plato is mentioned at a9.

²⁹However, at Metaphysics N 1088b35 ff. Aristotle says that Plato's refutation of Parmenides's dictum (οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δοκῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα B 7.1 = 1089a4 = Sophist 237a8, 258d2) was predicated on an old-fashioned misunderstanding. That is, the proof that non-being 'is' will only suffice to account for a plurality in number.

³⁰191b31-33. Ross's interpretation is here followed, p. 496, n 31.

³¹Cf. 28 B 6.4-9, where the goddess prevents Parmenides from following the way that erring mortals tread. However, at the beginning of this section (191a24-27) Aristotle uses identical language (ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην a26) to describe his predecessors' failure to make out the true nature of the substrate in change, a failure which led some of them to deny change altogether. The way they turned away from was that of Aristotle's philosophy.

³²185a20 ff., and Chapter II, pp. 35-36.

³³182b22-27. It is surprising that Aristotle refers to 'those who refute . . . ' while he belongs to that group.

³⁴Chapter II, pp. 33-34, Metaphysics 986b18-987a2.

³⁵Metaphysics A 986a33-987a2. Cf. Physics 188a20-22, 188b33, Metaphysics A 984b4-9, Γ 1004b32, De Generatione et Corruptione 328a1, 330b14.

³⁶Aristotle usually presents Parmenides's principles as material causes; De Generatione et Corruptione 328b33-329a1, 330b7-15, 318a35-b7, and Physics 188a20-21, b33. In Metaphysics A 984b1-8 Parmenides is mentioned as perhaps having made out the efficient cause, and this for him would be fire.

³⁷However, in De Generatione et Corruptione 318b18-28 Aristotle sets forth the opinion of most people concerning coming to be; they equate being with what can be perceived, non-being with what cannot on the assumption that what is knowable is, but what is unknowable is not (for they think that sensation has the force of reason), (ὥπερ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ὄν, τὸ δ' ἀγνωστον μὴ ὄν). He then contrasts this opinion with the truth (κατὰ δόξαν καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἄλλως). At the least the passage has some verbal and conceptual affinities with Parmenides; it is possible that Parmenides is actually being paraphrased here. (He is mentioned several paragraphs above (318b7).) Cherniss, p. 116, deals with this passage but does not mention any similarities with Parmenides.

³⁸DK I.116 n 28.

³⁹978b8-10; cf. Sophist 244e4-5 and e6.

⁴⁰Physics 207a15-17. Aristotle equates the one being with τὸ ὅλον, the whole of reality. Aristotle also quotes part of the same lines from Parmenides which are found in the Sophist and in the passage under consideration, μεσούθεν ἰσοπαλές (B 8.44).

⁴¹Metaphysics A 987b21-25 may be the source here.

⁴²984b1-18 and 986b18-987a2, on which see McDiarmid, pp. 120-123.

⁴³Diogenes Laertius IX.22 (= DG 483.4). Alexander speaks of Parmenides as having travelled on two ways, the one in accordance with truth, the other opinion (in Metaphysica 31.7-14 = DG 482.8-13).

⁴⁴Alexander in Metaphysica (CAG I) 31.7-11 = DG 482.8-11: ὡς αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν . . . ἐν τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀραιροειδὲς ὑπολαμβάνων.

⁴⁵Simplicius in Phys 115.11-13 = DG 483.10; cf. Alexander in Priora Analytica (CAG II.1) 346.17-21, 356.1-5. Cf. Metaphysics A 986b28-30, Physics 187a4-5.

⁴⁶Alexander in Metaphysica (= DG 482.10-12); cf. McDiarmid, pp. 121-122. At Metaphysics A 986b18-987a2 Aristotle states that the two-fold nature of Parmenides's philosophy arises from a distinction between reason or definition and perception, not truth and opinion.

⁴⁷Alexander in Metaphysica 31.7-14 (= DG 482.5-13) twice speaks of τὸ πᾶν.

⁴⁸A helpful schematization of the doxographers is to be found in W. Capelle, Die Vorsokratiker. Die Fragmente und Quellenbericht (Leipzig, 1935), foldout ad fin..

⁴⁹DG 553.5-7. The title φυσικός is a virtual synonym for 'Pre-socratic'.

⁵⁰DG 564.19-25. The additional details are that the universe is: 1) like (ὅμοιον), not having space in it (cf. B 8.29-30 and Theaetetus 180e3-4); 2) motionless (ἀκίνητον); and 3) finite/limited (πεπερασμένον). The first two adjectives are found in Parmenides: 1) = B 8.22, 2) = B 8.26, 38. The third is not found, although a similar word (τετελεσμένον B 8.42) does appear.

⁵¹He cites two works of Theophrastus, ἡ Ἐπιτομή (IX.21) and τὰ Φυσικά (IX.22). The other five are: Sotion (IX.21), Timon (IX.23), Favorinus (IX.23 bis), Callimachus (IX.23), and Speusippus (IX.23). Though not mentioned Apollodorus is his source for the chronological data in IX.23. That Diogenes cites all these sources makes it impossible to determine from which he draws his quotations from Parmenides. Theophrastus may be the source for the quotations, since he

is the last one mentioned before the quotations.

⁵²See A. S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri III (Darmstadt, 1955), p. 204 (lower left column). διὰ τὸ [τὰς] αἰσθησεις ψευδεῖς εἶναι; Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica, ed. S. Sudhaus (Leipzig, 1896), vol. 4, pl 169, fr. III.10-11. Cf. DL IX.22.

⁵³DG 580.22-23, DG 581.1-2. Pseudo-Plutarch quotes a verse which is not found in any of the other immediately Theophrastean accounts to support his claim that Parmenides held that the universe was eternal and motionless: μῦνον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἦδ' ἀγένητον (DG 580.24 = B 8.4*).

⁵⁴DG 580.22-23; see LSJ s.v. ὅλος, η, ον II.2.

⁵⁵Strictly speaking, Philoponus does use the Vetusta Placita, but his reports about Parmenides in in Phys do not draw on this work.

⁵⁶Diels prints in parallel columns the Epitome of Pseudo-Plutarch and Book I of Stobaeus's Eclogae in DG 268-444. See DG 141.2 for a comparison of passages relating to Parmenides in the doxographical tradition.

⁵⁷DG 284^{bt}12-13. The attribution to Xenophanes of the unity and so forth of the universe is suspicious, although a glance at DG 140 shows that this attribution is universal in the tradition. The verse is: οὐλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἦδ' ἀγένητον (= B 8.4*). Theodoretus states that "some say that this verse is his". Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch DG 580.24.

⁵⁸DG 327b6-9. Theodoretus has a slightly different list here, but Parmenides is included (DG 327^{bt}). In light of DG 332.1-3 this extrapolation seems likely: Ξενοφάνης Παρμενίδης Μέλισσος ἀγένητον καὶ αἰδιον καὶ ἀφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον.

⁵⁹DG 396b13-16. Diogenes also says that for Parmenides the senses were inaccurate (IX.22), and quotes B 7.3-5 as proof. Theodoretus (DG 170) says that Parmenides tried to corroborate Xenophanes's statement and thus showed that the criterion of the senses was false and in no way approached the truth: ψευδές δὲ ἀπέφηνε τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὸ κριτήριον ἥμισυ λέγων ἐρικνεῖσθαι τοῦτο τῆς ἀληθείας.

⁶⁰DG 311^{b26} n. Diels is unsure whether these verses were taken from the Placita or not (DG 313^{b1} n). That they are found in Plato, Aristotle, the compiler of De Xenophane, Melisso, et Gorgia, and Proclus makes it likely that they are stock lines or clichés.

⁶¹DG 320a11-13. With the exception of the mention of Zeno (11), this report is identical with Stobaeus's (DG 320b17-19).

⁶²DG 169-174. He quotes long passages from the Theaetetus (152 d7-153a3 = PE XIII.4.1-2; 179a1-181a3 = PE XIII.4.3-7) and the Sophist (242c4-243a4 = PE XII.4.7-8, 245e6-246c4 = PE XIII.4.9-11) to illustrate how Plato traduced his predecessors. (PE = Praeparatio Evangelica, Vol. II of Eusebii Caesariensis Opera, ed. W. Dindorf [Leipzig, 1867]).

⁶³PE: 1) = XIV.3.9 (DG 169-170); 2) = XIV.2.5 καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνελόντας and XIV.16.13 οἳ δὴ τὰς ἀνηροῦν . . . διὸ μὲν δειν πειστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ (cf. n 25 above) and XIV.17.1 (for which Eusebius relies on Aristotle's On Philosophy); 3) = XIV.17.1 ὁθεν ἡξιοῦν οὗτοί γε τὸ ὄν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μὴ εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαι τι μηδὲ φθείρεσθαι, μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τὸ παρόντων.

⁶⁴Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum 6 = DG 652.29-31. It is not clear which source in the doxographical tradition Hermias used, although the similarity of some of his remarks with those of Pseudo-Justinus would point to Pseudo-Plutarch's Epitome (DG 259-263).

⁶⁵adv Col 1113F: ἃ μὲν οὖν αὐτόν φησιν αἰσχροῦ σοφίσματα λέγειν ὁ Κωλώτης: 1114D: ἀπλῶς φησιν πάντα ἀναιρεῖν τῷ ἐν ὄν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν Παρμενίδην.

⁶⁶adv Col 1114E-F: ἦν οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὡς ἐν εἴῃ λόγος οὐκ ἀναιρεῖς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ δήλωσις αὐτῶν τῆς πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν διαφορᾶς.

⁶⁷adv Math X.45-47; cf. n 4 above. In P. III.65 Sextus uses a similar pun: αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως στάσεις.

⁶⁸Philolaus 3 lines (adv Math VII.92); Pythagoreans 3 (VII.94 bis, 109); Xenophanes 4 (110); Parmenides 36 (111); Empedocles 3 (121), 3 (123), 2 (124), 7 (125) 20 total; Heraclitus approximately 12 'lines' (123); Democritus approximately 15 lines (135-137), 8 (139-140), 3 (117) 24 total; Anaxagoras approximately 2 lines (140).

⁶⁹adv Math VII.112-115. Tarán, pp. 17-31, rejects this allegorical explanation of the proem, and summarizes attempts by scholars to interpret it; he also argues against Sextus's having a source for his interpretation, pp. 18-20.

⁷⁰Ontological considerations may have been omitted here because they are treated at length in the section on Gorgias, adv Math VII.

65-89, especially 65-76.

⁷¹DL IX.22.10-11: κριτήριο δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε· τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκριβεῖς ὑπόχειν. adv Math VII.111: τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τούτεστι τὸν ἀδιόπτωτον, ὑπέθετο κριτήριο, ἀποστὰς καὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστεως (cf. 114 end). DL IX.22.6-8 = B 1.28-30, 13-15 = B 7.3-5; adv Math VII.111 = B 1.1-30, B 8.1-2; VII.112-4 is a recapitulation of phrases or lines from 111. That there are similarities is clear, but how one is to account for them is not. There are at least three possibilities: 1) that they arrived at their versions independently; 2) that Diogenes used Sextus's account; or 3) that they shared a common source. 1) seems the least likely, since both authors are noted for their lack of originality; but Tarán, pp. 18-20, argues for Sextus's allegorical interpretation being his own creation. 2) is possible both on chronological grounds and because Diogenes twice mentions Sextus (IX.87, 116); the difficulty here is that Sextus is not mentioned in Diogenes's treatment of Parmenides. 3) is, by default, the most likely. A possible common source is Sotion, who in turn made use of the Φυσικῶν Δόξαι: whether they followed him on Parmenides is questionable. For Sotion in Diogenes, see I.1, 7, 98; II.12, 74, 85; V.79, 86; VI.26, 80; VII.183; IX.5, 18, 20, nb 21, 110, 112, 115; X.1, 4. For Sotion in Sextus see adv Math VII.5.

⁷²For Aristotle see Metaphysics A 983b ff., and Cherniss, pp. 218-288. Plotinus discusses Parmenides at V.1.8 and mentions him in passing in VI.6.18.42-43. He cites several verses of Parmenides without mentioning their author; see Index Fontium in Plotini Opera III, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Paris/Brussels/Leiden, 1973), p. 448.

Plotinus distinguishes between the historical Parmenides, who was still searching for the Plotinian system (so the conative imperfects ἤπτετο (14), συνῆγε (17), ἐτίθετο (17), and εἶχεν (23)), and his dialogic counterpart in Plato (23-24) who clearly made it out.

H.-R. Schwyzer ("Plotinos" RE I,41, col. 572) thinks that Plotinus did not read the Presocratics.

⁷³V.1.8.10-14. E.R. Dodds ("The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic 'One'," CQ 27 (1928), 129-142, esp. 132-133) has shown that Plotinus drew on the Parmenides of Plato for his doctrine of the One. In this section, Plotinus quotes from or refers to two Platonic epistles (2 and 6), the Phaedo, Timaeus, Republic, and the Parmenides as evidence (μοτυρίοις 13); cf. notes ad loc. in Plotini Opera, ed. by Henry-Schwyzzer OCT, vol. 2, pp. 197-198.

⁷⁴This same verse (B 3), with minor modifications, is cited in two other passages, I.4.10.6 and III.8.8.8. Of the first A.H. Armstrong (Plotinus, The Loeb Classical Library [London and Cambridge, 1966], vol. 1, pp. 198-199 n 1) states, "what Parmenides may actually

have meant by these lines is irrelevant here", and refers to V.1.8.17.

⁷⁵V.1.4.35-37: δεῖ δὲ καὶ κίνησιν λαβεῖν καὶ στάσιν. καὶ κίνησιν μὲν, εἰ νοεῖ . . . Further, sameness and difference are necessary conditions for thought, V.1.4.33-34, 37-41.

⁷⁶V.1.8.18-22. Plotinus's interpretation of the sphere-simile may be a direct criticism of Plato's literal-mindedness in Sophist 24432-245d11, esp. 244e2-8.

⁷⁷As noted above (n 73), Plato is in evidence throughout the passage, and his distinction between these 'ones' in the Parmenides is mentioned directly after this criticism is noted.

⁷⁸Many of Proclus's extant works are commentaries on Platonic dialogues (see L.J. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus: The Final Phase of Ancient Thought [New York, 1949], pp. 36-59). It seems that the high regard in which Parmenides was held by Plato (a matter which he mentions often) is used by Proclus to justify making Parmenides into a Neoplatonist.

It is possible that Proclus drew on the doxographical tradition. A verbal parallel between in Tim I.345.23-346.1 (λέγει δ' οὖν καὶ οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐπὶ διττοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔσι καὶ μὴ οὔσι, διττὰς εἶναι τὰς γνώσεις) and DL IX.22 (= DG 483.3-4) (δισσὴν τ' ἔφη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν) may not be wholly fortuitous; both quote from the end of B 1 to corroborate their claims. Further, both mention the sillographer, Timon, who composed verses about both Parmenides and Zeno (IX.5, cf. 23; in Parm 632.18, 638.25).

⁷⁹Strictly speaking, Syrian's interpretation, at least for the analysis into nine-hypothesis, is indebted to other exegetes, including Plotinus; see PT I.LXXV-LXXXIX, esp. LXXXVIII. At one point, however, Proclus states that he is following Syrian, who 'speaks with the greatest degree of truth' (in Parm 1033.20).

Proclus does not always distinguish among the three 'Parmenides' in his works; these are, P¹ = the historical Parmenides (whom he sometimes refers to as the 'Parmenides in verse'), P² = the character in the dialogue, and P³ = the dialogue itself. Since Proclus denies that P¹ is being parodied in P³ as P², but rather insists that P² faithfully reflects the doctrines of P¹ and that P³ is a serious work, there is ample room for confusion. Cousin's edition of in Parm has a very brief index which only refers to Parmenides's poem; it is quite possible that I have missed a reference to P¹, though it is likely that all the major references have been located.

Parmenides's one being, which was equated with the (unified) intelligible order, was presumably discussed at some length in the

commentary on the second hypothesis (142b5-155d1; see PT I. LXIX, CLXXVIII, pp. 46-59, III.XL-LI; further III.LXXVIII-XCIV and IV. XLIV-LXIII on Damascius's interpretation of the second hypothesis), but since this does not survive, recourse must be had to references in the commentary on the first hypothesis and other works by Proclus. There are some scholia on the second hypothesis (in Parm 1257-1287), but no clear mention of P¹ is found in them.

⁸⁰The purpose or goal (σκόπος, βούλησις) of the Parmenides is examined at length at in Parm 630.15-640.19; Syrian's views appear at 640.20-645.9. A recapitulation of both is found in PT I.8-12, esp. 9-11, pp. 30-58. Further, Syrian's (and other nameless interpreters') interpretation of P¹'s role in the dialogue appears at in Parm 1032.15-1036.23.

⁸¹PT I.9, pp. 36.12-39.6. Cf. 35.1-2: τὸν τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονα (= Republic V 475e4); 37.20-21: εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας: in Parm 1084.24-26: ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος: cf. 642.20-24, 1130.2-5.

⁸²in Tim I.13-4-14.3, especially 13.11-14, where Proclus says that the Parmenides and Timaeus are properly named after the men who investigated these two parts of reality: Τιμαίῳ τε γὰρ τοιοῦτό τι γράμμα περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός ἐγγράπτο φύσεως, καὶ Παρμενίδῃ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων.

⁸³in Parm 639.38-640.16. Proclus dwells on the fact that the first hypothesis is framed in a negative or apophatic mode and this is fitting for a transcendent One. At 1032.15-1036.15 Proclus, following Syrian, argues that Parmenides's one being is an assumption or hypothesis used to arrive at the unhypothesized One (this dialectical technique is ascribed to the Republic (VI 510B, according to Cousin)). The one being is closest to the One, and therefore affords the most economical hypothesis for arriving at the One; once this is reached, the generation of the whole of reality can proceed, the remaining eight hypotheses dealing with successively lower rungs on the ontic ladder. The second hypothesis, which deals with the noetic or intelligible realm (PT I; summary of Chapter 12, CLXXVIII-IX), is framed in a positive or assertoric mode; Parmenides asserted many things of his one, which is not the true One but a derivative 'one' (in Parm 1079.5-14).

⁸⁴That is, he was aware of all three 'ones'; see in Parm 1034.37-1035.5. That he was aware of the first, or 'unshared' one is related at in Parm 1079.7-9, and at 1033.9-18 Proclus mentions (in his survey of various opinions about Parmenides in the Parmenides) the possibility that Parmenides actually talked about this One with Zeno, insofar as it could be verbalized at all, in conversations

that were not written down. As for the second, see in Parm 710.11-16 and 704.6-18. The third 'one' is not ascribed to the Doxa by Proclus, but since it represents the hypostasis of soul for Proclus and is the subject of the third hypothesis of the Parmenides on his account, the ascription is not unwarranted; see PT I p. 49.5-7.

⁸⁵in Parm 708.7-709.6. Parmenides, according to Proclus, saw that being itself was removed from all things and was the most sublime of things that are, although he did not fail to notice that the intelligible order was pluralistic; Proclus quotes B 8.25, 5.1-2, and B 8.44 as proof. He concludes that Parmenides observed that the whole noetic realm issued forth from the one being, and that it derives its unity from or around it. Proclus is clearly working the sphere-simile hard (708.20-29, 36-40). Furthermore, Parmenides gave being the honorary title 'one', not because he failed to see that being is many, but rather to indicate the unity of derivation of 'all things that are' from being itself (708.40-709.6). For the widespread failure to see this, see in Parm 710.15-26, 711.13-16, and especially 721.33-723.11, 20-724.12.

⁸⁶His references to the Doxa are found at: in Parm 723.15-20, 1024.10-12, in Tim I.252.-4, 345.12-346.3 (cf. II.69.20-27).

⁸⁷in Parm 1024.10-12. Here Parmenides is cited with other philosophers who have, as it were, public and private doctrines (6-12); he is mentioned here after, but not with the Pythagoreans (7). Empedocles is said to be a Pythagorean as well (723.15-20); he like Parmenides thought that the whole noetic order was a sphere (22-26). See in Tim II.69.20-27, where Empedocles's 'two-fold' sphere has both a noetic and perceptible part (cf. in Tim I.251.33-252.4).

⁸⁸in Parm 723.15-20. The clarity is mentioned at 709.2-3.

⁸⁹in Parm 1077.23-1079, 1084.24-30; cf. 1134.20-1135.5. This claim on Proclus's part is integral to his interpretation of the role which P¹ plays in P³; viz. that he is not being parodied, but rather has his doctrines accurately reported and incorporated into the dialogue, especially in the second hypothesis.

⁹⁰This reading back of (a Neoplatonic) Plato into Parmenides must have gradually developed out of Plotinus's remarks on Parmenides in Enneads V.1.8 and his conception of the Parmenides; see PT I.LXXV-LXXXIX and in Parm 1032.15-1033.20.

⁹¹in Parm 1079.7-9: ἀπιδὼν δ' εἰς τὸ ἐν ἧ ἐν αὐτὸ μόνον καὶ οὐχ ὡς πεπονθὸς τὸ ἐν.

⁹²in Parm 708.12-20:

- 1) ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει (B 8.25)
- 2) εὐνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν ὅπποθεν ἄρξωμαι, τόθι γὰρ πάλιν
ἵξομαι αὖθις (B 5.1-2)
- 3) μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές (B 8.44)

These three lines are quoted as proof that Parmenides actually posited a plurality in the noetic or intelligible order. 1) is not convincing, particularly in light of Plotinus's having quoted it to demonstrated the opposite thesis, VI.4.4.23-26. Proclus apparently takes 2) to be referring to the sphere-simile of which 3) is a partial quotation. Further, at in Parm 1084.24-36 Proclus maintains that Parmenides portrayed 'real' being as a sphere, and that this is appropriate since the sphere and the intellect are properly intelligible, whereas the monad and perceptible order are 'spherical' in only an analogical way.

⁹³Proclus is fond of this simile. It appears at in Parm 665.28-29, 708.12-20, 1084.26-29, 1129.31-32, in Tim II.69.20-21, and PT II.20 p. 70.6-10 (Proclus here quotes B 8.43-45 apud Plato's Sophist), and IV.38 p. 110.20. He takes the sphere to represent the whole (πᾶν) noetic order as a sum (ὅλον) of parts; he concludes from the simile and the critique arising from it by the Eleatic Stranger that Parmenides was aware that this order is pluralistic (see in Parm 1078.21-1079.26).

⁹⁴DL IX.21 (Sotion). See in Parm 619.4-10 (28 A 4).

⁹⁵See H. Diels, Philosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta, p. 65 n 5.

⁹⁶De Providentia 2.16, in Parm 689.8; Dubitationes et Solutiones I.214.3; in Phys 650.14.

⁹⁷Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην, ed. C.A. Ruelle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1889): I.16.6, 67.24, 131.8; II.146.5-6. Ruelle also lists as Loci non reperti I.214.3, 274.21, 275.20. Damascius 'quotes' the following verses: B 4.2 (= I.67.23), B 8.24 (= II.146.5), B 8.25 (= I.131.7); B 8.48-49 may be intended in I.214.3.

Chapter IV: Simplicius on Parmenides

Simplicius's overall view of the role which the Presocratics play in the history of Greek philosophy must be considered in order that due weight be given to his comments on Parmenides. A brief summary of his interpretation of Parmenides will follow. The remainder of the chapter takes up all the passages in Simplicius which treat of Parmenides. These passages have been translated (Appendix A) and parcelled into nine sections: I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The Aletheia; V. The Doxa; VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides. For all nine sections a detailed list of passages and a summary of their contents are provided. Commentary is provided for the first five. Appendix B contains a list of the verses of Parmenides quoted by Simplicius, and Appendix C contains the verses proper with variant readings from CAG VII and IX. Appendix D is an abbreviated Index Locorum.

In the course of his elucidation of Aristotle's analytical scheme of the principles of the physicists, Simplicius digresses somewhat to demonstrate that for all their seeming diversity those who investigate physics do not contradict one another (in Phys 28.32-37.9). Simplicius's immediate concern is to silence certain unnamed Christians who criticize physicists on this score, but he subse-

quently uses part of this demonstration to answer Aristotle and Plato on Parmenides. The general scheme of this harmonization is diairetic; that is, he introduces several distinctions which explode any prima facie contradictions (in Phys 30.13-14, 36.15-20). The most important of these is the distinction he draws between those who explained all things on the basis of material or elemental principles alone with those who distinguished physical from metaphysical phenomena and ascribed distinct principles to each order (in Phys 6.31-7.15, 21.13-19). For example, although Thales and Parmenides each has a different 'one cause of things', they do not contradict one another because each is concerned with a different order of reality (in Phys 36.8-15). Further, the Eleatics, or more properly Parmenides and Melissus, do not deny change in the physical world when they deny it in the metaphysical order; on the contrary, they are in accord with all the other physicists on this point (in Phys 36.20-25).

Four questions remain to be resolved: how to reconcile the evident differences as to the number and kind of principles adduced for physics proper; similarly with the principles of metaphysics; what is the precise relation between these two sets; and finally how to account for the widespread failure to see the distinction which Simplicius draws. The last has a straightforward, if unsatisfactory, answer. The riddling nature (ἀνύγνωτος) of the expressions of the Eleatics, Pythagoreans, and others misled most people (in Phys 7.1-3, 21.14-19). He also maintains that Aristotle and Plato at times set

forth only the apparent meanings of Presocratic doctrines on behalf of those who, because of their superficial understanding, were misled by the obscurity of the Presocratics (in Phys 21.19-20, 37.6-7, in Cael 557.19-20).

As for the principles of physics, Simplicius distinguishes between those who employed only material or elemental principles and those who used non-elemental principles as well (in Phys 7.19-27, 36.15-19). This distinction appears to be based on a Peripatetic contrast between principles or causes proper, namely the efficient and final, and the subsidiary causes, matter and form (in Phys 3.15-19; cf. 1.12, 7.10-15, 259.1-15). Simplicius gives it a Neoplatonic twist by ascribing the first two to the noetic order, the second pair to the phenomenal. Within the class of material or elemental principles he makes a distinction between the proximate (προεχές) and the more fundamental (ἀρχαιοδέστερον); the former are, e.g. fire, air, and water, the latter form-matter and geometrical figures (in Phys 7.19-27, 36.15-17). Further, of those who embraced proximate principles some had a partial, others a more comprehensive view. Thus Heraclitus championed fire as the one principle, while Empedocles identified all four elements (in Phys 36.8-20). Simplicius also asserts that the physicists are in fundamental agreement with Aristotle on the nature of change; that there is some material substrate which underlies some polar opposites of change (in Phys 36.20-24, 188.13-16; 188b30-189a1). Simplicius in sum attempts to 'distinguish' away seeming contradictions as well as point out

common grounds among the physicists.

The two remaining questions can be treated summarily at present, for both will reappear in the course of Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides. It has already been noted that the two metaphysical principles are the efficient and final causes, although the paradigmatic cause of Plato constitutes a third. Simplicius allows a heterogeneous group of entities to be efficient causes and to operate over different domains. Anaxagoras's νοῦς is an efficient cause which operates both in the noetic and phenomenal orders, although in the former par excellence (in Phys 7.3-10, 34.18-35.21, 156.13-157.16). Empedocles's Νεῦκος and Φιλότης are both efficient causes which operate in both orders (in Phys 31.18-34.17). Parmenides's δαίμων is the efficient cause of the phenomenal order, its status in the noetic left unspecified (in Phys 31.10-17, 34.12-17, 39.12-20). Plato's divine intellect is the efficient cause of the phenomenal order, and its goodness is the final cause also (in Phys 7.17-19). Although Aristotle makes nature itself an efficient cause, it is so only proximately ; in the end it is parasitic upon his unmoved mover (in Phys 8.6-9).

Simplicius argues at length that Parmenides's one being as the intelligible is the final cause (in Phys 142.28-148.24). Moreover, Aristotle's prime or unmoved mover, which Simplicius takes as both the efficient and final cause par excellence, is based on this one being (in Phys 87.7-17; cf. 8.6-9).

Several observations are in order. The first is that Simpli-

cius in effect fuses the Peripatetic with the Neoplatonic version of the history of philosophy to produce his own account (in Phys 6.31-8.15; cf. Metaphysics A 981b17 ff.). Aristotle's scheme of the inexorable discovery of the four causes, begun by his predecessors and culminating in his own philosophy, is the basis of subsequent Peripatetic accounts (Chapter III, pp. 61-65). The Neoplatonic version is parallel, in that a rather haphazard discovery of the three hypostases is assumed; Plato, however, marks the culmination of this process (in Phys 7.11-15). Simplicius apparently holds that the discovery of material or elemental causes belies an awareness of the third hypostasis, or phenomenal world. The discovery of the metaphysical causes is tantamount to an awareness of the second, possibly the first, hypostasis. He credits Plato with the full discovery and articulation of all four Aristotelian causes, the realization that the two sets belong to the different orders, and with introducing the paradigmatic cause into the noetic order (in Phys 7.11-15). Aristotle is consigned to a minor role. His contribution lies in advances in logic, which enabled him to formulate more cogent proofs than his predecessors (in Phys 7.16-8.15).

Throughout his commentary on Physics I Simplicius appears untroubled by several differences or contradictions which do not yield to his method of reconciliation, as well as by what is a strained notion of what constitutes a full-blooded contradiction. That is, what does Simplicius think the truth about physics is? Paradoxical as it may sound, the answer is that he thinks that there is no ul-

timate or absolutely certain truth to physics. Following a doctrine of the Timaeus (27c8-d2, 59c5-7), he holds that the best one can do is produce a likely account (εἰκαστολογία) (in Phys 18.29-34). If there is no objective standard of truth, once absolute logical contradictions are eliminated, the disparate accounts that remain are equally valid.

Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides centers on the cardinal distinction stated above: that he distinguished the noetic from the phenomenal order and treated each in the Aletheia and Doxa respectively. Moreover, the majority of Simplicius's comments and quotations are designed to prove that in the Aletheia Parmenides was speaking of the metaphysical or noetic order exclusively. The felt need for this proof arises primarily from Aristotle's criticism of Parmenides in Physics I. This criticism consists of two parts; that Parmenides's denial of the physical world is patently absurd, and that his doctrine of the unity of being is incoherent. Simplicius replies that Parmenides did not deny the physical order or world of change, but rather formulated an account of nature that accords, even prefigures that of Aristotle. Further, since Aristotle seemingly denied the reality of the noetic order, he failed to appreciate Parmenides's articulation of that order. His first cause or unmoved mover in fact is derived from Parmenides's one being.

Not only did Parmenides conceive of the noetic order, but apprehended it in its most sublime manifestation, the intelligible

(τὸ νοητόν) or final cause. He speaks in the Aletheia of the συνηρημένη νοητὴ ἔνωσις, the absolute unity of the noetic order prior to its being parcelled into (logically) discrete entities in the intellectual stage (τὸ νοερόν). It represents the stage where νοῦς and its content or object (τὸ νοητόν) are identical. That Parmenides apprehended this stage of the noetic order serves as the cornerstone of Simplicius's reply to Plato's criticism in the Sophist. These would have force if Parmenides had been speaking about the differentiated or intellectual stage, which corresponds to the Forms.

Parmenides was to some extent aware of the first hypostasis as well.

In the Doxa Parmenides set forth as elemental principles fire and night, and as efficient cause or principle the δαίμων. Simplicius has little to say about the status of the δαίμων. His conviction that Parmenides discussed the two parts of Platonic reality in the two parts of his poem makes the relation of the two parts a non-problem for him.

Lastly, Simplicius maintains that despite their criticisms, both Plato and Aristotle were aware of the profundity of Parmenides's thought.

I. Biographical Information.

A. Passages.

<u>in Phys</u>	7.1		Tr. p. 278
<u>in Phys</u>	22.24 - 25		Tr. p. 282
		<u>DK</u>	<u>DG</u>
	22.24 - 25		482.7, 14 285 ^{bt} 14
	22.26 - 30	28 A 20	480.4-8
<u>in Phys</u>	25.20 - 21		Tr. p. 284
	25.20 - 21	28 A 10	477.17-19
		31 A 7	
<u>in Phys</u>	28.4 - 6		Tr. p. 285
		28 A 8	483.11-14
		67 A 8	
<u>in Phys</u>	99.13 - 14		Tr. p. 329
<u>in Cael</u>	556.25 - 30		Tr. p. 398
		28 A 14	
<u>in Cat</u>	4.2		Tr. p. 407

Related Passages. Cf. Plato's Parmenides 128a2-d6.

<u>in Phys</u>	99.9 - 10	
	102.28 - 31	
	134.4 - 9	
	138.19 - 22, 24-25	
	141.9 - 11	
<u>in Phys</u>	99.13 - 14	= Eudemus <u>Physica</u> fr. 37a (W) p. 27.12-13.

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius by and large omits biographical details for all the Presocratics, and culls most of his information about Parmenides from Theophrastus's *Φυσικῶν Δόξαι* via Alexander (see DG 102-118, esp. 113). Insofar as he undertakes to harmonize the doctrines of the physicists, detailed life histories would be otiose. Moreover, this harmonization rests ultimately on the assumption that the doctrines of Neoplatonism are truths, the apprehension of which transcends temporal and geographical boundaries. All the same there is one striking omission¹.

The biographical information Simplicius does relate is: 1) that Parmenides was the son of Pyres, and was from Elea (in Phys 22.24-25, in Cat 4.2); 2) that he was the pupil of Xenophanes of Colophon (in Phys 7.1, 22.27-29); 3) Empedocles of Acragas emulated him and was his disciple (in Phys 25.20-21); 4) Leucippus partook of his (and Xenophanes's) philosophy, but adopted a contrary doctrine (in Phys 28.4-6); 5) Zeno was Parmenides's companion (in Phys 99.13-14); (Simplicius frequently refers to or quotes from the introductory portion of the Parmenides, where Zeno is portrayed as coming to Parmenides's aid against scoffing objectors (in Phys 99.9-10, 102.28-31, 134.4-9, 138.19-22, 24-25, 141.8-11).); 6) he entitled his work On Nature (in Cael 556.25-30).

C. Commentary.

in Phys 7.1. This is the converse of in Phys 22.27-29. In section II the riddling nature (*αἰνιγματώδη* 7.3) of Parmenides's philosophy

will be discussed.

in Phys 22.24 - 25. The full name, Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης, is attested elsewhere in the doxographical tradition: DG 284^{bt}13, 590.18. Cf. 28 A 2 (Suidas).

in Phys 27 - 29. That Parmenides was Xenophanes's pupil or companion, is found in the doxographical tradition at: DG 284^{bt}13, 482.14, 580.5, 601.8 (problematic); cf. 28 A 2. See DG 141-2 for a conspectus of these and other passages relating to Parmenides. (The whole tradition probably is based mediately on Metaphysics A 986b22 (= 28 A 6) and ultimately on Sophist 242d4-6.

in Phys 25.20 - 21. Diels allows (DG 477.18 n) that the report that Empedocles was the emulator of Parmenides derives from Theophrastus, on the basis of Diogenes Laertius VIII.55 = 28 A 9. He thinks that the mention of Empedocles's following the Pythagoreans is not by Theophrastus, but rather by Simplicius himself. If he is the source, he implicitly denies the 'Pythagorean connection' of Parmenides which Proclus maintains.

in Phys 28.4 - 6. Diels (67 A 3 n 34) sees this 'participating' (κοινωνήσας) as occurring through the intermediacy of Zeno, the reputed teacher of Leucippus. Cf. Diogenes Laertius IX.30 = 28 A 8.

in Phys 99.13 - 14. In addition to (or more appropriately in de-

dependence on) Plato's Parmenides Zeno's relation to Parmenides is variously related; cf. 29 A 1, 2, 4, 7, 10. In the doxographical tradition he is not explicitly stated as being Parmenides's pupil or successor; the tradition on his successor is inconsistent (DG 581.5-6, 590.20-23, 601.8-9).

II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry.

A. Passages.

DKin Phys 7.3 Tr. p. 278in Phys 21.19 Tr. p. 280in Phys 36.30 - 31 Tr. p. 292

28 A 9

in Phys 120.27 - 29 Tr. p. 345in Phys 144.26 - 27 Tr. p. 370

28 A 21

in Phys 146.29 - 147.1 Tr. p. 371

28 A 20

in Cael 558.17 - 19 Tr. p. 400

Related Passages.

in Phys 30.4

31.3

116.7

117.2

(140.23)

146.6

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius adduces the obscurity or riddling nature of the expressions of the ancients in order to harmonize all those who investigated nature and to neutralize the criticism by Plato and Aristotle

of various Presocratics. In addition he takes an antiquarian delight in quoting from the Presocratics in order to counteract the widespread ignorance of and misunderstandings about them that arise, in part, from this obscurity¹. In the case of Parmenides, largely because he employed a poetic medium, reports of obscurity go back to Plutarch (see 28 A 13-21). It is possible that Simplicius draws on some of these reports, those of Proclus being likely candidates, but the evidence is slender².

More particularly, Simplicius holds that: 1) the ancients were accustomed to express themselves in a riddling way (in Phys 36.30-33); 2) the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras distinguished the physical from the metaphysical, but their obscure or riddling speech misleads most people that they did so (in Phys 7.3, 21.18-19); 3) Parmenides expressed his doctrines less clearly than did Melissus, who wrote in prose (in Cael 558.17-19; cf. in Phys 31.3-7); 4) Aristotle and Plato sometimes refute only seeming absurdities or the apparent meaning in their predecessors' doctrines on behalf of those of ordinary or superficial understanding (in Phys 21.20, 36.28-37.2, 6; in Cael 557.19-20); 5) in some cases their apparent refutations are merely clarifications of what was obscurely stated (in Phys 37.3-4); 6) Parmenides's simile of the well-rounded sphere is not to be literally interpreted, but rather ascribed to poetic fiction (in Phys 146.29-147.1); 7) the terseness (*βραχυλογία*) of the ancients, and of Parmenides in particular, did not accommodate the formulation of such a distinction as

that between substance and accident, but does not rule out their having been aware of the distinction itself (in Phys 120.27-29).

C. Commentary.

in Phys 7.3. αἰνιγματώδη. The adverbial form is used at in Phys 36.30; cf. 8.9-11.

in Phys 21.18 - 19. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are omitted in a similar passage in in Phys 7.3. The word ἀσαφεία (cf. in Phys 37.3-4 for its adverbial counterpart) may be a reminiscence of Proclus in Tim I.345.12 ὁ δέ γε Παρμενίδης, καίτοι διὰ ποίησιν ἀσαφὴς ὢν.

in Phys 36.30 - 31. Cf. note to 7.3 above. Simplicius refers to the Presocratics (or more properly the 'Preplatonic') by both the phrases οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ παλαιοί (cf. in Phys 120.29 for the former). As Diels notes (n 31), Simplicius erroneously applies what Plato says about Heraclitus to Parmenides (36.31-32).

in Phys 37.3 - 4. Cf. note to 21.18-19 above. Plato and Aristotle are the οὔτοι in 37.2. Simplicius is trying to explain away the seeming refutation by them of the Presocratics on several grounds, one of which is that they are in reality clarifying what is unclearly stated. Another is that that they fasten on the apparent meaning of their doctrines on behalf of the superficial (36.28-30, 37.6, 21.20).

in Phys 120.27 - 29. The rule (κανών 27, κανονικόν 28) which Simplicius mentions is that on the basis of the substance-accident distinction a thing can be both one and many simultaneously. At 20-27 he argues that Parmenides was (implicitly) aware of such a distinction with respect to his one being. This is in answer to Eudemus, who claims that Parmenides was misled because he was unaware of this sort of distinction, of ambiguity, and of syllogistic thought (120.6-11; cf. 115.16-116.4 for a fuller quotation).

in Phys 144.26 - 27. Simplicius speaks of Parmenides's verses in several other passages (in Phys 30.4, 31.13, 116.7, 117.2, (140.3), 146.6). Parmenides is sometimes distinguished from the Platonic dialogue named after him by Proclus, Damascius, and Ammonius as 'the Parmenides in verse' (e.g. ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι Παρμενίδης Dubit. et Sol. I.131.8); further in Damascius II.146.5-6. For Proclus cf. in Parm 665.18, 1129.36, 1177.12-13, PT I.9. p 37.6. For Ammonius cf. in De Interpretatione 133.18-19. Simplicius uses the same phrase, ὁ μέγας Παρμενίδης (in Phys 650.14), that is found in Proclus (De Providentia 4.16), Damascius (Dubit. et Sol. I.214.3 and perhaps I.24.14-15), and Plato (Sophist 237a4-5).

in Phys 146.29 - 147.1. That the sphere-simile is not to be taken literally is directed at Plato, who in the Sophist (244e2-245e2) does so. At in Phys 51.21-53.7 Simplicius applies Aristotle's disparaging remark about Melissus, that when one absurdity is granted

others necessarily follow, to Plato's literal interpretation of these lines.

in Cael 558.17 - 19. Simplicius states that Melissus, since he wrote in prose, set forth the distinction between being proper and 'seeming' being more clearly than Parmenides. Cf. 559.12-13, section V, and in Phys 31.3-7.

III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides.

A. Passages.

in Phys 28.32 - 31.17 Tr. pp. 286-289

	Verses <u>DK</u> 28	<u>DK</u> I
29.18	B 8.38*	
30.1-3	B 8.3-5	
30.6-10	B 8.29-33	
30.17 - 31.2	B 8.50-59	30.14 - 31.2 = 234.20-25
		31.3-7 = 240.11-15
31.13 - 17	B 12.2-6	31.10-17 = 242.7-9

in Phys 37.12 - 40.21 Tr. pp. 294-298

38.30 - 39.9	B 8.50-59	38.28 - 39.9 = 234.18-20
39.14-16	B 12.1-3	39.12-16 = 242.5-7
39.18	B 13.1	39.17-20 = 243.12-15
39.27 - 40.1	B 8.26-28	
40.3-6	B 8.30-33	

in Phys 37.12-15, 22-38.1 = Alexander in Physica (185b15-16)38.20-24 Cf. DG 482 n 10 (fr. 6)

40.12-15 = 30 B 7.7

40.18-21 = 30 B 7.7-9

B. Summary, Comments.

The two continuous passages listed above are treated separately from the following sections largely for convenience's sake. Once the overall scheme of Simplicius's interpretation is set forth, his remarks on specific topics may be better understood. In addition, both passages are found early in Book I, and those which follow by and large corroborate or supplement these¹.

Simplicius maintains that in the Aletheia Parmenides discourses about intelligible being as the final cause or principle of all existent things, while in the Doxa he sets forth two opposite, materio-elemental principles, light and night, and an efficient cause, the divinity, for things that come to be. Moreover, Alexander to the contrary, the Doxa is not totally false; since it treats of what is opinable, it lacks the absolute certainty and truth that attach to what is noetic. As part of his plan to harmonize all the physicists Simplicius asserts that in the Doxa Parmenides's account of change is in accord with that of Aristotle and everyone else. To reconcile the seemingly contradictory statements of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus on the intelligible principle, he introduces two distinctions: that Xenophanes apprehended the One, Parmenides the intelligible; that since Melissus's claim that the one being is infinite applies to time only, he is in accord with Parmenides on its being finite.

Simplicius does not dwell on the relation between the Aletheia and the Doxa. Like Plutarch, he simply finds the Platonic analysis

of reality into what is perceptible and what is noetic articulated in Parmenides². Of Neoplatonic origin is the further tripartite subdivision of the noetic order; the equation of Parmenides's one being with the first of these, the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), appears to be Proclus's contribution³.

C. Commentary.

28.32-29.5. οὐ . . . συμφέρονται. It is likely that Philoponus is the target of these disparaging remarks (cf. Index Nominum s.v. 'Ioannes Philoponus' CAG X pp. 1447-1448, CAG VII p. 771). Simplicius censures him for fastening upon the contradictory statements of ancient philosophers concerning the heavens (in Cael. 139.27-140.3; cf. 136.26-27, in Phys 640.12-14). On Simplicius's contempt for Christians cf. in Cael. 370.31-371.4.

29.5-6. καὶ . . . διελέχθησαν. Parmenides is included among those who distinguished physics from metaphysics and ascribed different principles to each order (cf. in Phys 6.31-7.3, 21.15-19). Simplicius sometimes says that Parmenides was investigating the principle or cause of the noetic order proper (as here and at in Phys 29.18), or of all being (in Phys 38.12, 45.28-32, 87.8-9, 144.12, 147.13), sometimes the noetic order itself, whether in its unified, intelligible stage (in Phys 34.18 ff, 38.11-12, 136.28-29) or in contradistinction to the perceptible order (in Phys 22.25-26, 31.17, 36.15, 38.19, 39.25-26, 78.1-2, 11, 24, 28, 79.11-12, 24-25, 80.3, 87.8-

9,17-18, 100.22-23, 162.12). There is no contradiction here, for a Neoplatonist at any rate, since the final cause of the noetic order is the same for the perceptible.

29.6-30.14. ὥς . . . λέγουσι. Simplicius undertakes to reconcile the doctrines of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus. He first argues for the correctness of the view that the intelligible principle is one and finite (in definition) (29.8-12). Thereupon, two alleged differences or contradictions are set out and resolved: 1) that Xenophanes clearly stated that his principle or god was beyond all contrariety, including that of finite-infinite and of motion-rest, while Parmenides, who states that the one being is finite and at rest, did not fully apprehend its transcendental nature (29.12-18); 2) Parmenides says that this cause is one and finite, Melissus one and infinite (29.7-8, 29.12-30.13). Simplicius sees no contradiction in 1) because the two are not talking about the same thing; Xenophanes apprehended the One, Parmenides the intelligible. Since both Parmenides and Melissus speak of what is infinite in time, there is no contradiction in 2) either.

29.8-12. ἀνάγκη . . . ἀπερίληπτον. That the intelligible principle must be one, Simplicius draws from [Aristotle] De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia (22.31 and note); that it must be finite/limited (in definition) he derives from Parmenides. This sentence (τὸ πᾶσι . . .) is a gloss on B 8.42-43 (cf. in Phys 147.12-14) and B 8.29-33 (cf.

in Phys 30.6-10, 40.3-6). Aristotle may also have influenced Simplicius on the latter point; cf. Physics 206b33-207a25 esp. 207a14-17, and in Phys 502.2-12.

29.12-18. πλὴν . . . εἶναι. This confusing passage differentiates Xenophanes from Parmenides, but at the same time records their common grounds. Simplicius gives two irreconcilable versions of Xenophanes's principle; both appear to rest on Theophrastus's authority. One is that it is motionless and finite (28.7-8, 29.7-9, cf. DG 483.11-15 (fr. 8)). The second is that it transcends all contrariety; it is neither in motion nor at rest, nor infinite nor finite (22.26-30, 23.4-14, 29.12-14, cf. DG 480.4-481.13 (fr. 5)). In the present passage Simplicius adopts the latter to argue that Xenophanes's principle is the One. The first hypothesis of the Parmenides is, for Neoplatonists, about the One (cf. Chapter III pp. 70-71). The intelligible principle of Parmenides, on the other hand, is one and beyond change; Simplicius equates it with the intelligible, not the One (in Phys 147.6-16). The harmony, then, between Parmenides and Xenophanes is that they both have a single, intelligible principle as the final cause of all existence. Simplicius also seems to imply that since Parmenides's principle is finite not as a body is but in definition, he does not contradict Xenophanes's assertion that the principle transcends (corporeal) finiteness and infinity.

29.15. τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως is a gloss on B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6); the same gloss appears at 143.14-15 (cf. 17) and 144.22. Proclus quotes this line three times (in Parm 1134.22, 1152.29, 1177.5) and paraphrases it once (in Parm 639.29-30). The gloss itself may come ultimately from Plato's Laws 898a8, which Proclus quotes as part of a discussion on the sphericity of the Νοῦς (in Tim I.69.16-17; cf. 20-21).

29.16-17. ἀκίνητον is a quote from 29.18 (= B 8.38*), and μόνον a gloss on οἶον of 29.18 also. As for πάντων ἐξηρημένων, Proclus uses the same phrase of Parmenides's being at in Parm 708.9.

29.19. Melissus's observation that the intelligible principle is not subject to change (ἀμετάβλητον) agrees with that of Parmenides (29.15-18) and perhaps Xenophanes (29.13; cf. note to 29.12-18).

29.19-28. Μέλισσος . . . ἀπεφάνητο. Simplicius argues that Melissus declared that the intelligible principle was infinite in virtue of the inexhaustibility of its essence or the infinity of its potentiality; both of these turn out to be temporal in nature (29.26-28). That is, Melissus speaks of what is infinite in time, and in almost the same words as does Parmenides (29.28-30.5). The phrase κατὰ τὸ ἀπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως and the balance of the passage is found nearly verbatim in Philoponus in Phys 22.24-30, esp. 20-21 εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῆς δυνάμεως.

29.28-30.5. τὸ . . . φησι. Simplicius quotes B 8.3-5 to prove that Parmenides and Melissus agree that the one being is infinite in time; there are numerous verbal correspondences between 29.22-26 (30 B 7.7) and 30.1-3 (B 8.3-5). Simplicius glosses ἀνώλεθρον 30.1 by ἀνέκλειπτον 30.4, and (so it seems) ἀτέλεστον 30.2 by ἄπειρον 30.4.

30.5-13. την . . . ὄρον. Simplicius, quoting B 8.29-33, returns to his earlier statements about the nature of limit or telos. 30.11-13 gloss B 8.29-33 (30.6-10), especially the last two lines. More specifically, he glosses οὐκ ἐπιδευές 30.10 by ἀνευδεές 30.11; he further glosses ἀνευδεές by τέλειον 30.11, then concludes on the basis of etymology that τέλειον = ἔχει τέλος = οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον 30.9. And as it has a τέλος 30.12 it also has a limit πέρασ and boundary ὄρος 30.12-13. Cf. 29.8-9, 40.2-8.

30.13-14. οὕτως . . . λέγουσι. This statement of harmony among Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus is the leading principle for all Simplicius's harmonizations; there can only be contradiction (or 'substantial' disagreement) when the same subject is at issue.

30.14-31.17. μετελθὼν . . . θηλυτέρῳ. Having demonstrated the harmony among the Eleatics on the noetic front, Simplicius proceeds to harmonize Parmenides with all the physicists. He further harmonizes the Eleatics, more particularly Parmenides, with Empedocles (31.18-

34.17) and Anaxagoras (34.18–35.21) as having apprehended the noetic order (cf. 36.15).

30.14–19. μετελθὼν . . . ἀνούων. Simplicius quotes B 8.50–52 (= 30.17–19) as proof that, after discussing the intelligibles in the Aletheia, Parmenides proceeded to the perceptibles in the Doxa (see also 38.24–39.12, fortasse 80.3–4, 146.26–27, 179.29–33). That the first part of Parmenides's poem is about the noetic order, the second the perceptible or opinable is found in Proclus (in Parm 723.17–19, 1024.10–12) and Plutarch (adv Colotem 1113F–1114F). Philoponus also makes this distinction (in Phys 22.2–21); their teacher, Ammonius, is a likely common source.

30.20–31.2. τῶν . . . τε. That Parmenides posited a pair of primary, opposite principles of things that come to be proves his agreement with all the physicists, including Aristotle (cf. 31.9–10). Simplicius offers four alternative sets of designations for this primary pair. Three are based on the verses he quotes here, B 8.53–59 (= 30.23–31.2): light (φῶς) and darkness (σκότος) ≈ φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ (B 8.56) and νύκτ' ἄδαῖ (B 8.59); dense (πυκνόν) and rare (ἄραιόν) = πυκινόν (B 8.59) and ἄραιόν (B 8.57); same (ταυτόν) and other (ἕτερον) = τώτόν (B 8.57) and ἑτέρω (B 8.58). Simplicius takes the fourth, earth (γῆ) and fire (πῦρ), either from Aristotle (cf. in Phys 146.28–29, 179.31–33, and Cherniss, p. 48 n 192), or Theophrastus (via Alexander) (cf. 38.22–24, 25.15–16); cf. also

274.24. Simplicius is clearly wrong to identify 'same and other' as Parmenides's principles; they belong to both principles, not one each. On the principles, cf. commentary to in Phys 179.27-180.13, section V.

31.3-7. καὶ . . . ἐκότερα." This scholion is probably not, Stein pace (cf. note ad 3), by Melissus.

31.7-10. οὕτω . . . ἐναντία. στοιχεῖον (11), according to Simplicius, is not exactly Aristotle's material cause, but rather a fusion of this with the formal cause (cf. in Phys 7.20-27). Simplicius insists that Parmenides clearly assumed two opposite elemental principles, presumably as substrata, to account for coming to be. In 31.8-10 καὶ . . . ἀποκαλύπτοντας he glosses B 8.54 (= 30.24); 'those who do not observe or who do not clearly bring to light the opposition of the elements that comprise coming-to-be err'. Moreover, he says, Aristotle himself follows Parmenides in positing opposites as principles (31.9-10). (Diels writes δὲ ἔγωγε for δὲ λέγω (31.8); 'Parmenides recognized that the one being was two'. This makes little sense. Further, Simplicius is here contrasting the first portion of the poem (πρότερον), in which being was shown to be one, with the second part, in which two principles are set forth. I have adopted the reading of all the manuscripts.)

31.10-17. καὶ ποιητικὸν . . . θηλυτέρω. The positing of an effi-

cient cause marks Parmenides (and others) off from those physicists who did not transcend elemental or subsidiary causes in their accounts of nature (cf. in Phys 6.32-7.6, 36.18). Simplicius's mention of an efficient cause distinct from the two elemental causes or principles looks ahead to the following passage (38.18-39.20), in which he criticizes Alexander for not having observed this. It is not clear to what Simplicius refers in his distinction between what is corporeal and incorporeal in coming-to-be (31.11-12). He may be distinguishing 'male' and 'female' (B 12.5-6), which are corporeal, from 'intercourse' and 'childbirth' (B 12.4), which he may view as incorporeal processes. Since Simplicius does not identify the αἵ of B 12.2 (sc. στεφάναι 'bands'), it is unlikely that they are what he means by corporeal or incorporeal.

37.12-40.21. This passage takes up Alexander's interpretation of Parmenides, especially the Doxa. Since Alexander closely follows Theophrastus, Simplicius's rejection of his interpretation holds good for the whole doxographical tradition. Alexander states that in the Doxa Parmenides, producing an account of nature in accord with popular opinion and appearances, no longer said that being was one and uncreated, but rather posited earth and fire as principles of things that come to be, earth as matter and fire as an efficient cause; and he called fire 'light' and earth 'darkness' (38.20-24). Simplicius recognizes some ambiguity in the phrase 'in accord with popular opinion and appearances'; if a) Alexander understands it in

the way that Parmenides intends, then there is no difficulty (38.24-26). But if b) Alexander understands by it that the account is wholly false, then he is wrong (38.27-28). Regardless of this ambiguity, Simplicius rejects c) Alexander's equation of fire or light with the efficient cause (38.27-28). Simplicius treats of b) in 38.28-39.12 and c) in 39.12-20. In 39.21-40.9 he recapitulates that Parmenides dealt with the noetic order in the Aletheia and did not mean that the physical world had the attributes of the noetic. Melissus is dealt with in 40.9-20.

37.12-38.18. Ὁ . . . ζητοῦσιν. Simplicius quotes extensively from Alexander's commentary on 185b15-16 and finds fault with everything he has to say. He censures Alexander in particular for not observing that both Parmenides and Melissus posited that the principle of being is one and motionless, not the whole of the physical world. Simplicius describes this principle as 'real, unified, and intelligible being' (38.11-13)

38.18-20. ὁμολογεῖ . . . λέγειν. With the exception of ἅπερ ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ὄντος, which is Simplicius's own comment, this sentence merely expands a clause from Alexander, οὔτε . . . ἀγενητόν (38.21-22).

38.20-24. "κατὰ . . . σκότος." Alexander draws on Theophrastus here; cf. DG 482 n 10 (fr. 6).

38.26. δοξαστόν τὸ αἰσθητὸν καλῶν. Parmenides does not use δοξαστόν in any extant fragment. Simplicius is apparently glossing δόξας of B 8.51 (=38.31), unless he simply uses δοξαστόν as synonymous with ἀπατηλόν of B 8.52 (= 38.32); cf. 39.10.

39.12-13. μετ' . . . οὕτως refers to 38.20-21 κατὰ . . . φυσιο-λογῶν, or more generally to the whole of the Doxa. ψευδεῖς πάντη is picked up by ψευδῇ ἀπλῶς 39.10.

38.27-28. καὶ . . . οἶεται. Simplicius exposes Alexander's error in equating light or fire with an efficient cause in 39.12-20.

39.28-29. συμπληρώσας . παρεθέμην. Simplicius insists that in the Aletheia Parmenides is talking about the intelligible or intelligiblebeing. τοῦ νοητοῦ echoes νόημα of B 8.50 (= 38.30). ἅπερ . . . refers to 30.17-19,24-31.2.

39.10-12. δοξαστόν . . . ἐκπεπτωκότα. On the basis of the passage just quoted (B 8.50-61 = 38.30-39.9), Simplicius concludes that the account Parmenides offers of mortal opinions is not totally false, but rather lacks certain truth. Now Alexander had not said that this account was totally false (38.20-24). Simplicius takes this as a possible, even likely, interpretation of his remarks (38.26-27), perhaps to have a 'straw-man' argument for his own interpretation (but cf. 39.20-21). As mentioned above, δοξαστόν does not

appear in the quotation, although ὁπατηλόν does (B 8.52 = 38.32). τῆς νοητῆς ἀληθείας echoes νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας of B 8.50-51 (= 38.31-32). On the other hand, τὸ . . . αἰσθητόν does not match anything in the quotation, although B 8.51-52 (= 38.31-32) and B 8.60-61 (= 39.8-9) are probably being referred to; Simplicius takes it for granted that Parmenides distinguished the phenomenal from the noetic.

39.12-13. μετ' . . . οὕτως. Simplicius points out that Parmenides's δαίμων is an efficient cause distinct from the two elements not only to repudiate Alexander's assertion that fire is the efficient cause (38.22-23), but also to bolster his own contention that the more discerning physicists had metaphysical principles.

39.13. τὸ ποιητικόν. Besides identifying her with an efficient cause, Simplicius has little to say about the δαίμων. In the lines that follow her 'efficient' functions over the heavens (39.14-16), the gods (17-19), and animate life (19-20) are indicated.

39.14. Simplicius does not say to what αἶ (B 12.1) refer; cf. 31.10-20.

39.20-21. ἀλλὰ . . . ἀναγκάζομαι. Cf. 36.24-25, 144.25-29.

39.20-40.9. εἰκότως . . . -νεῖται. Simplicius attempts to vindicate

cate Parmenides's argument for the motionlessness of being. Although it properly applies to the noetic order, the argument would also hold good for the physical world; a strict unity in the latter would make motion impossible too. Simplicius's intention is to refute Alexander's assertion (or rather interpretation of Aristotle) that it is incredible that the whole of being be one and motionless (37.30-32); if it is one, it must be unchanging also.

39.25-26. περὶ . . . ὄντος. Cf. 38.19-20 and note.

40.2. τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀκίνησιν. Simplicius understands B 8.32-33 (= 40.5-6) to be the reason or justification for all of B 8.26-31 (= 39.27-40.4, omitting B 8.29).

40.7-9. ὥς . . . -νεῖται. These lines are a paraphrase of B 8.32-33 (= 40.5-6); cf. 30.9-13 and notes. Simplicius has no difficulty in understanding the last half of B 8.33, although Diels daggers it. He understands μὴ εἶναι not as a protasis with the supplied predicate ἐπιδεῦς, but rather as τὸ μὴ εἶναι. Further, he supplies the correlatives ὥς . . . οὕτως, whereas Parmenides has only δέ. Simplicius glosses several words in B 8.32-33: παντὸς ἐδεῖτο by ἐνδεὲς πάντων, οὐκ ἐπιδεῦς by ἀνευδεῖς, and οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον by τέλειον.

IV. The Aletheia.

A. Passages.

in Phys 40.23 - 41.9 Tr. p. 300Verses DK 28DK I

41.8-9

B 8.50-51

in Phys 77.9 - 80.18 Tr. pp. 314-318

78.3-4

B 6.8-9

72.2-8

= 232.12-20

78.6

B 7.2

78.8-10

B 8.1-3

78.2-29

= 233.21-
234.4

78.12-23

B 8.3-14

79.32 - 80.2

B 8.26-28

in Phys 100.21 - 28 Tr. p. 330in Phys 114.25 - 115.9 Tr. p. 335in Phys 120.20 - 29 Tr. p. 345

120.23

B 8.4

in Phys 142.28 - 148.23 Tr. pp. 367-374

142.34 - 36

B 8.1-3

143.3

B 8.22

143.4-8

= 234.12-16

143.6

B 8.43

143.10

B 8.38*

143.13

B 8.5

143.15

B 8.29

143.22 - 25

B 8.34-36

143.31 - 144.1

B 7.1-2

144.25 - 28 = 221.17-20
(A 21)

144.29 - 146.25 = 233.20-21

145.1 - 28 B 8.1-27

146.1 - 25 B 8.28-52

146.29 - 147.2 = 221.7-10
(A 20)

146.30 B 8.43

147.13 - 14 = 234.9-10

148.28 - 29 = 234.25-26

in Phys 162.11 - 22 Tr. p. 377

162.18 - 22 B 8.6-10

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12 Tr. pp. 393-394

137.3 - 6 B 8.6-9

Related Passages.

<u>in Phys</u>	7.1-3	75.24-26
	21.15-19, 29-30	77.3-6
	22.9-12, 23-26	82.11-12
	28.7-8	87.4-5, 7-18
	29.5-8, 15-18	99.10
	30.1-16	102.30
	31.7-9	107.25-27
	36.15	115.16-17
	37.22-24, 30-31	126.34
	38.5, 11-17, 28-29	127.10, 28-32

39.11, 21-22, 25-26	131.33-34
40.2-9	136.28-29
41.12	138.21
40.29	141.11
41.12	179.26-20, 33
45.26-27, 31-32	236.6-7
46.3-4, 13-14, 20-22, 26, 27	243.5-14, 31-33
47.1-2	244.1-2, 11-12
48.1-2	502.3-8
51.12-14	650.9-14
53.10, 27	1195.6-15
71.7-8, 26-29	
72.27-29	

in Cael

140.3-5

556.3 - 560.10

especially 556.3-6, 13-16, 28-30

557.17-18, 20-27

559.15-18

560.1

672.29-32

in Phys

40.23 - 41.1 Excerpt from Alexander in Physica 184b16-17

77.11-21 = Alexander in Physica 185a20-b5

79.16-22 = Alexander in Physica 185a20-b5

80.7-10 = 30 B 7.7

80.11-14	= 30 B 7.7
143.1-8	= Eudemus <u>Physica</u> fr. 45 (W) pp. 26.25-30.8
147.32-148.3	= <u>Sophist</u> 258e6-259a4
148.14	Cf. <u>Theaetetus</u> 184a1
148.20	= <u>Metaphysics</u> A 1076a4
<u>in Cael</u> 136.18-26	= Ioannes Philoponus VI <u>Libri</u> τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ αἰδιότητος κόσμου)

B. Summary, Comments.

The fundamental distinction which Simplicius draws between the two parts of Parmenides's poem was set forth in the preceding section; namely, that the Aletheia deals with the intelligible order or 'real' being, while the Doxa is about the physical world or 'perceptible' being (cf. in Cael 556.13-14; 557.23-24). In this section those passages which deal predominantly with the Aletheia are examined; in addition, there are several miscellaneous passages which defy treatment elsewhere. Further, the numerous related passages listed above are, by and large, brief mentions, some not even by Simplicius, of doctrines that are found in the first part of the poem. A rough division of these is as follows: 1) that Parmenides holds that being (τὸ ὄν ≈ ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ πᾶν, πάντα) is one (ἓν), motionless (ἀκίνητον), finite (πεπερασμένον), and uncreated (ἀγένητον) = in Phys 21.29-30; 22.9-12, 23-25; 28.7-8; 29.7-8; 31.7; 37.22-24, 30-31; 38.5, 13-17, 19-22; 39.21-22; 40.2-9; 41.12; 45.26-27; 46.3-4, 13-27; 47.1-2; 48.1-2; 51.12-14; 52.8-9; 53.10, 27; 71.7-8; 72.27-29; 75.24-26; 77.3-6; 82.11-12; 87.4-5; 88.31; 99.10; 102.30; 107.25-27; 115.16-

17; 124.34; 126.4-5, 16-19; 127.10, 29; 131.33-34; 136.28-29; 138.21; 141.11; 179.29-30; 236.6-7; 243.5-14; 244.16; 502.3-8; 1195.13-14; in Cael 140.3-5; 556.1-6; 559.15; 560.1; 672.29-30; 2) that Parmenides distinguished the noetic from the phenomenal order = in Phys 7.1-3; 21.15-19; 36.15; in Cael 558.28-30; 557.20-23; 558.14-17; 3) that in the Aletheia Parmenides was speaking of 'real', 'intelligible', or 'absolute' being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τὸ νοητὸν ὄν, τὸ ἀπλῶς ὄν) = in Phys 22.25-26; 29.5-6; 38.11-13, 19, 28-29; (39.11) 39.25-26; 45.30-31; 1195.16; in Cael 556.15-16; 558.12-13. Cf. Index Nominum s.v. Παρμενίδης CAG X (pp. 1449-1450) and CAG VII (p.772) for more detailed divisions.

Of the passages under direct consideration, in Phys 142.28-32 is by far the most important, and is without question the single most important passage in Simplicius concerning Parmenides. Simplicius reviews his statements on Parmenides's one being, presents a lengthy argument for equating this with the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), and quotes most of the Aletheia (B 8.1-52 = in Phys 145.1-146.25) to substantiate this argument; see the detailed summary below. In in Phys 77.9-80.18, 162.11-12, and in Cael 136.18-137.12 (contra Philoponus) Simplicius takes up Parmenides's proof that being is uncreated (ἀγέννητον) in B 8.3-14; this is an important 'sign' which Simplicius employs in in Phys 142.31-36. (In in Phys 79.12-80.18 Simplicius also defends Parmenides's (and Melissus's) claim that being is motionless (ἀκίνητον) against Alexander.) Simplicius does little more than mention that Parmenides did 'philoso-

phize about the truth' (περὶ ἀληθείας) in in Phys 40.23-41.9, contrary to Alexander's insinuation that he did not. In in Phys 100.21-28 he mentions that Parmenides may have been aware of the One. In in Phys 114.25-115.9 he rehearses Aristotle's claim that Parmenides's being is one and finite. Lastly, in in Phys 120.18-19 he argues that Parmenides was aware of the 'one-many' distinction, since he predicated so many things of his one being.

A brief discussion is in order concerning what Simplicius means by 'the intelligible' (τὸ νοητόν); he equates Parmenides's one being with it (in Phys 144.12), but in his discussions of Parmenides provides scant information about it¹. The intelligible is the first of the three stages or orders (τάξεις) in the noetic order (cf. in Phys 88.11-22); it is the apex (τὸ ὅλον in Phys 88.13), that which remains (τὸ μένον in Phys 147.9), which combines within itself in an absolute unity all the discrete parts of the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν), the third stage of the noetic order (in Phys 88.17-22). Above all, the intelligible is the final cause of all existence (in Phys 38.11-13, 45.32, 87.7-18). Proclus had set forth the triadic structure of the noetic order, which he says is the content of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides; this in turn is about Parmenides's one being (cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72, and in Phys 88.11-13, 31-33). Although his debt is clear, Simplicius differs from Proclus in denying that Parmenides had any awareness of the two subsequent stages of this order and their creation through emanation (πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή: cf. in Phys 147.9-12); cf. in Parm

708.7-709.6, esp. 708.21-29. Likewise, he is hesitant to ascribe to Parmenides awareness of the One (in Phys 100.21-22, 147.12-16), while Proclus states that he had this in view (in Parm 1079.7-9).

C. Commentary.

in Phys 40.23 - 41.9. Simplicius briefly digresses (41.1-8) from his own paraphrase of Alexander's interpretation of 134bl6-17 to take up Parmenides's defense. In 40.23-41.1 Alexander holds that Aristotle places Parmenides and Melissus, the 'akinetic monists', in contradistinction to the physicists (φυσικοί) or 'kinetic monists or pluralists', since the former abolish nature (φύσις) and because people are accustomed to name philosophers after the branch of philosophy that is their sole or chief concern (cf. in Categorias 3.30-4.9). Simplicius agrees to his contradistinction (cf. in Phys 40.24-25, 14.2-5; see further 22.3-5, 23.21-22², 148.29), but rejects Alexander's later (ὅστερον) statement that 'it is Aristotle's custom to call those who philosophize about the truth "physicists"' (3-4). Simplicius evidently feels that Alexander is saying that for Aristotle (as opposed to the unspecified subject of εἰδέναι in 40.28) Parmenides (and Melissus) does not 'philosophize about the truth', since he does not call him a physicist. He asks how anyone failed to know that Parmenides 'philosophized about the truth' (5-7), and quotes B 8.50-51 (= 41.8-9) to refute this second statement of Alexander. περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (ἐφιλοσόφει) (41.6; cf. 41.4) is a prose paraphrase of ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης of B 8.51. Simplicius also quotes

quotes these lines at in Phys 30.17-18 (cf. 15-16), 38.31-32 (cf. 39.11-12), 146.23-24, and in Cael 558.5-6 (cf. 557.23-24). At 30.17 and 146.23 the present παύω appear, elsewhere the future παύσω.

Simplicius does not, it appears, quote this later statement by Alexander in his commentary. Diels cites no reference in his notes here, and his list of citations from Alexander (Index Nominum s.v. pp. 1437-1439) contains no parallel citations³. Further, in none of the commentary on lemmata containing either ἀλήθεια (188b30 (187.31-188.10), 191a25 (235.12-236.12 cf. below), 263a18 (1288.33-1291.24)) or φυσικοί (184b17 (40.23-42.5), 186a20 (113.22-114.22), 187a12 (148.26-153.24), 187a28 (161.23-163.28), 205a5 (479.30-481.34)) is such a statement to be found. (See Ross's Index Verborum to his Physics OCT edition.) It may be that by 'later' Simplicius simply means 'later in the same passage', since he paraphrases Alexander here. On the other hand, at in Phys 458.19-459.16 (esp. 458.19-21, 459.9-11) Simplicius offers Aristotle's definition of φυσικοί: those who are engaged in the physical part of philosophy, and particularly those who employ (a) material cause(s). Further, 458.19-21 is highly reminiscent of, if no less contradictory to, in Phys 40.28-41.3-4; again Alexander's statement is not to be found (he is mentioned at 459.5). The other references to φυσικοί and ἀλήθεια in Diels (Index Nominum s.v. p. 1455, 1371 respectively) do not contain Alexander's statement. (At 191a24 Aristotle uses the phrase οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων. This may have been Alexander's source.)

in Phys 77.9 - 80.18. This passage presents Alexander's own two objections to the doctrines of Parmenides and Melissus, and Simplicius's replies to these objections. Aristotle's analysis of the uses of 'being' (185a20-b5), which forms part of Alexander's objections, was set forth in 71.19-77.8. This passage is an important part of Simplicius's interpretations of Parmenides, because it details his claim that Parmenides's one being is 'real', 'proper', or 'absolute' being; both of his replies to Alexander are based on this claim. It also well exemplifies Simplicius's interpretative technique of quoting and glossing the ipsissima verba of the ancients to discredit refutations by later philosophers as being based on ignorance or on a superficial understanding of the ancients. In section IX all of Simplicius's criticisms of Alexander (concerning Parmenides) are collected.

At the outset Simplicius announces that he will show how Alexander's refutations have only apparent but no real force against the doctrines of the ancients (77.9-11). He concludes the passage on the same note: that Alexander's careless reading of the ancients led him to formulate irrelevant refutations (80.15-19). The rest of the passage falls into two unequal parts, each treating one of Alexander's objections. The first objection is that not only does 'eternal being' alone exist, as Parmenides and Melissus would have it, but even things which come to be and perish also exist (77.11-79.12). Simplicius answers that these things do in a sense 'exist', but not in the fullest and most proper sense, which applies to real

being alone. In the second, Alexander rejects Parmenides's and Melissus's argument that being is motionless (79.12-80.14). Simplicius replies that this argument is valid for absolute being, but not for the qualified being which Alexander champions.

77.21 - 27. Simplicius's general argument (κοινὸς . . . ὁ λόγος 22) is that both that which has x-ness or is x without qualification is properly (κυρίως 24) said to be 'x', and that which has x-ness or is x in some degree or other is said to be 'x', but only in a general and loose way (ὀλοσχερῶς καὶ καταχρηστικῶς 25); cf. in Phys 147.2-9 and notes. His answer to Alexander is that since what comes to be and perishes in a sense is (ἔστι, ὄν), it is called 'being, existent' (ὄν) in the second way only. Parmenidean being, on the other hand, is 'being' proper, since it exists without qualification; that which comes to be and perishes possesses non-being. (This argument appears to be based on Republic V 476d5 - 480a13; 478e1-5 is quoted below in the note to 78.28-29. Although Simplicius does not mention this passage here, he quotes from it earlier in the commentary; 476d8-9 = 13.2-3, 479d7-8 = 13.4-5. Simplicius's claim that that which comes to be and perishes has even more non-being than being (77.33, 79.6, 9) verges on the rhetorical.)

77.26-27. οὕτως . . . πάν. Although Diels does not so note it, the phrase τὸ κατὰ πάντα ὄν ὁμοῦ πάν is a gloss on B 8.5 (= 78.14). in Phys 143.11-18 provides strong evidence for this; in 16-17 Simplicius glosses B 8.5 (= 13) by τὸ ὁμοῦ πάν .

77.30. 'έν ταύτῳ μένον', as Diels notes, is a reminiscence of B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6*, 143.15, 146.2) ταύτόν τ' έν ταύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται. Proclus uses a similar gloss of this line: πῶς δὲ χρόνου μετέχον τὸ αἰώνιον; ἢ τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ κατὰ Παρμενίδην ἔν ὄν, ταύ- ἢ τὸν έν ταύτῳ μίμνον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν (in Parm 639.28-30; B 8.29-32 is quoted at 1134.22-25, B 8.29 at 1152.29, 1177.5).

77.31 - 33. ἦν . . . τοῦ ὄντος. The source here is probably Cratylus 402a8-10: Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι "πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει" καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς "οἷς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης." (≈ 22 A 6). In his note to 77.31 Diels refers to fr. 41 of Bywater; in DK this fragment is reassigned to both 22 B 12 and 22 B 91; cf. 22 B 49a. On ἡνίξατο (23) see section II, pp. 98-102.

77.34. τὸ . . . σημεῖα. γὰρ picks up the discussion that precedes the parenthetical remarks on Heraclitus, and in particular έν τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει μήδεποτε 'έν ταύτῳ μένον' (29-30). (Cf. 77.12, 79.5 for similar uses of έν 'subject to', and LSJ s.v. II.1, p. 552.) The argument is that the 'being' which is subject to coming to be and perishing and which also has non-being is properly called 'coming to be and perishing'; Parmenidean being, since it has different signs or marks, is properly called 'being' (cf. 79.8-10). In in Phys 143.29-144.1 and 148.5-6 Simplicius insists that Parmenidean being has no non-being at all. σημεῖα is a

gloss on σήματ' (α) 'marks, signs' of B 8.2 (= 78.9); cf. 78.11, 79.11, 142.32.

77.34 - 78.1. κάλλιον . . . αποδεικνυμένων. The genitive plurals seem to refer not to the 'signs' of 34, but more generally to 'things'. For τὸ κυρίως ὄν cf. 78.11, 24, 79.12, 24-25. Simplicius says that it is better (κάλλιον) (presumably than to paraphrase Parmenides) to listen to (ἀκούειν) his very words, and at 80.16-17 censures Alexander for 'rather aridly and carelessly listening to' (ἀκούειν) the doctrines of the ancients.

78.2. μεμψόμενος . . . νοητῷ is a free paraphrase of the following two verses B 6.8-9 (= 78.3-4): ἐν τῷ νοητῷ is Simplicius's own addition, based on his claim that Parmenidean being is the intelligible (cf. in Phys 144.12, 147.7). The unflattering description of (the way of) mortals in B 6.4-7 (= in Phys 117.8-11) justifies Simplicius's use of μεμψόμενος 'censured' here. He uses the same verb in 117.3 in his paraphrase of B 6.1-9 (= 117.4-6, 8-13): μέμψεται τοῖς εἰς ταύτῃ συνάγουσι τὰ ἀντικείμενα. τὸ ὄν is a gloss on τὸ πέλειν, τὸ μὴ ὄν on οὐκ εἶναι of B 6.8 (= 78.3). συμφέρουσι 'bring together, combine' is, by process of elimination, a gloss on (οἷς) . . . ταύτῃ νενόμισται | καὶ ταύτῃ B 6.8-9 (= 78.3-4). In 77.21-33 (esp. 23, 24, 26) Simplicius argues that being (proper) in no way possesses its opposite, non-being; mortals thus err in 'combining' them.

78.3-4 = B 6.8-9 (= in Phys 117.12-13).

78.5 καὶ . . . ζητούσης is a close paraphrase of the following verse B 7.2 (= 78.6). ἀποστρέψας 'having turned away from' is a gloss on (οὐ) . . . εἴργε νόημα "keep thy thought from". Simplicius renders τῆσδ' . . . ὁδοῦ διζήσιος "this way of inquiry" by τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ὄν ζητούσης 'the way that inquires into non-being'; he supplies τὸ μὴ ὄν from B 7.1 (= in Phys 135.21, 143.31, 244.1) οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτοδαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. Cf. in Phys 650.9-14.

78.6 = B 7.2 (= in Phys 135.22, 144.1, 244.2, 650.13).

78.7. For ἐπάγειν 'to add, conclude' as a preface to quotations, cf. in Phys 38.29, 40.2, 79.31, 80.11.

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78.8 - 10 = B 8.1-3 (= in Phys 142.34-36, 145.1-3); 78.12 = 30.1.

78.11. Simplicius sandwiches this comment between the two halves of B 8.3. λοιπόν here must mean "next, thereupon"; Diels (Index Verborum s.v. p. 1405) renders λοιπόν as "porro", and lists several occurrences, the present one not included. LSJ, on the other hand, has no such entry: cf. λοιπός, ἢ, ὅν p. 1060, note esp. 4-5. For τὸ κυρίως ὄν cf. note to 77.34-78.1. (τὰ) . . . σημεῖα 'signs, marks' is a gloss on σήματ' (α) of B 8.2 (= 78.9); cf. also 77.34, 79.10, 142.32. These signs are related in the following twelve verses.

78.12 - 23 = B 8.3-14 (= in Phys 145.3-14). 78.12 = 30.1.

78.24 - 29. ταῦτα . . . ὑφέστηκε. Simplicius paraphrases the verses of Parmenides just quoted, B 8.3-14. Cf. in Phys 162.11-17 for a similar paraphrase of B 8.6-10 (= 162.18-22).

78.24 ταῦτα . . . ἀποδείκνυσιν is a near verbatim repetition of 78.1 τῶν . . . ἀποδεικνυμένων. A similar bracketing of a quotation is to be found at in Phys 144.26 and 146.26.

78.24 - 25. ὅτι ἀγένητον τοῦτο τὸ ὄν. ἀγένητον is a quotation from B 8.3 (= 78.12). τοῦτο τὸ ὄν (i.e. τὸ κυρίως ὄν cf. 24) may well be a gloss on ἑόν, also of B 8.3. Simplicius does not in his paraphrase of this argument or proof mention 'indestructible' (ἀνώλεστον B 8.3); but cf. 79.30-31, 143.31-36 (B 8.1-3 = 143.34-36). At 77.27 and 79.8-10 he treats 'what comes to be' (τὸ γινόμενον) and 'what perishes' (τὸ φθειρόμενον) together (cf. 77.17, 18 for Alexander's identical treatment). Simplicius, following Parmenides, it seems, thinks that they are sides of the same coin, and that what is said contra 'coming to be' applies equally to 'perishing'.

78.25. οὔτε . . . ὄν. For another paraphrase of this half of the disjunct, similar in language and identical in order, cf. in Phys 162.12-13 μήτε ... ὄν). προὔπῃρχεν is echoed by προὔπαρχοι of 78.28, which has no correspondence in Parmenides.

78.25- 26. οὔτε . . . μὴ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 162.13-14 and notes.

The first clause is taken directly from B 8.7 (= 78.16) οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος. The second is more loosely based on B 8.8-9 (= 78.9-10) οὐ γὰρ . . . ἔστι. That is, since non-being cannot be spoken or thought of, it does not exist; cf. B 2.3-8 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1) and 116.26-27. Simplicius may also have τοῦ μηδενός of B 8.10 (= 78.19), which clearly is (τοῦ) μὴ ἐόντος, in mind. (οὔδέ is Diels's emendation for οὔτε DEF, οὐ a; based on in Phys 162.14 οὔδέν is possible.)

78.26 - 27. καὶ . . . ἐγένετο; Cf. in Phys 162.16-17 and notes.

This is a loose paraphrase of B 8.9-10 (= 78.18-19) τί δ' ἄν . . . φῶν; Simplicius retains the question form of the original, but uses 'and why' (καὶ διὰ τί δὴ) for 'what need' (τί . . . καὶ χρέος). Further, τότε does not correspond to anything in the original, nor does ἀλλὰ μὴ. πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον is a prose version of ὕστερον ἢ πρόοθεν. Lastly, ἐγένετο is perhaps a gloss on (ἔρρεν) . . . ἀρξάμεμον φῶν. (In in Phys 162.16-17 Simplicius states that this argument applies to 'from non-being', whereas here he offers no such qualification.)

78.27-28. ἀλλ' . . . γίνεται. Diels apparently thinks that this is gloss on B 8.12 (= 78.21), for he allows that on the basis of 78.27 one might read ἐκ πῆ ἐόντος; cf. note to 78.21 and Tarán, pp. 97-101. It is more likely that it is a gloss on B 8.11 (= 78.20) οὕτως ἢ πάντα πέλεναι χρεῶν ἐστι ἢ οὐχί. That is, Simplicius

takes the verse to be ruling out any tertium quid between absolute being and absolute non-being. He concludes that being cannot come from this tertium quid, although that which comes to be does. Alexander is the target of these remarks: cf. 77.12-13 μὴ εἶναι . . . ὄντα and 77.20-21 καθ' ὃ . . . τοῦτο

79.28 -29. οὐ γὰρ . . . ὑφέστηκε. Of this last phrase Tarán, pp. 97-98, says (of Diels): "πῇ [for B 8.12] he did not understand in the Neoplatonic sense, (obvious from the last part of the paraphrase), but as ὁπωσδήποτε." It is unclear what is peculiarly Neoplatonic about this use of the word; cf. LSJ s.v. πῇ esp. II.3, p. 1399; cf. also in Phys 1.21-22, 242.28 - 243.3. Secondly, at 79.5 Simplicius uses the phrase ὁπωσοῦν ὑφεστηκόςτα ; cf. further 77.22. Thirdly and lastly, the distinction Simplicius draws between absolute (i.e. Formal) being and qualified (i.e. phenomenal) being and their respective names, and on which he banks in his paraphrase of Parmenides, is Platonic. Cf. Republic 478e1-5: ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινές ὁρθῶς ἂν προσ-αγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἐν δίκῃ προσ-αγορευόμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἅκροις τὰ ἅκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. Cf. also 478b12-c1, d5-9. For τὸ ἀπλῶς ὄν (28) cf. 79.24, 26.

79.1 - 4 = Timaeus 37e4-38a1. (Burnet does not list ἀναφέροντες (79.1) in his apparatus.) Note that τὴν αἰδιον οὐσίαν (79.2) is the

same phrase Alexander uses at 77.13.

79.8. οὐ πολλῶν δεῖσεται λόγων. Cf. in Phys 140.27 καὶ τί δεῖ
πολλά λεγείν

79.10 - 11. οὔτε . . . κυρίως ὄν. As Diels notes, the quotation is
from Physics 186a33-34. Simplicius elsewhere holds that by τὸ ὅπερ
ὄν means (an) individual substance; in Phys 131.12-26, 132.16 (cf.
also 129.32-131.11).

79.9 - 10. οὔτε . . . σημείους τοῦ ὄντος παρηκολούθησεν. Cf. in
Phys 78.11, 80.16-17.

79.12 - 22. Although Alexander here criticizes the followers of
both Parmenides and Melissus for demonstrating that being is motion-
less, the demonstration sketched by Simplicius in 13-16 applies
more to Melissus than to Parmenides, cf. 80.4-14. But cf. in Phys
39.21-40.9 (section III, pp. 115-116); Melissus's denial of motion
is also discussed at 40.9-21.

79.16. ἄφθαρτον δὲ τὸ ὄν. Cf. 79.30-31 ὅτι ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτόν
ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν. ἄφθαρτον is Simplicius's gloss on ἀνώλεθρον of B 8.3
(= 78.12); cf. in Phys 142.32-36.

79.16 - 22. Alexander's argument, which is clear with the possible

exception of 79.20 ἀλλὰ . . . τήνδε, is as follows. If there were only essential change, Parmenides and Melissus would still be wrong to deny change of their 'being' on the grounds that what undergoes this change changes into nothing. But in fact that which changes essentially changes into what it was not. If, however, something were to change into nothing, this change would not be of the essential sort. But since there are other kinds of change, e.g. qualitative, this change into nothing could be subsumed under one of these kinds. Consequently, their denial of any change is groundless. Alexander clearly assumes that in non-essential change there is change without qualification into nothing; e.g. when Socrates removes his cloak, the attribute 'cloak wearing' of Socrates simply vanishes; cf. Physics 191b13-17. (In 79.27-29 Simplicius argues that Parmenidean being, since it has no accidents and is not an accident of anything, could hardly undergo qualitative change). As noted above, there is some difficulty in construing 79.20, but Simplicius's reformulation of this in 79.23-24 makes Alexander's meaning clear.

79.25 - 27. εἰ μὲν . . . γένοιτο; Simplicius replies to Alexander that 'qualified' being (τοιοῦνδε ὄν) can and in fact does change in the essential way into some other 'qualified' being, whereas absolute being (ἀπλῶς ὄν) could not give rise to anything. Simplicius here does not spell out his argument, but later does when he presents Melissus's argument that, if void does not exist, being cannot with-

draw into it by locomotion (80.4-14).

79.27 - 29. πῶς . . . ἔχον. Simplicius here answers Alexander's charge that qualitative change for Parmenides's and Melissus's being is possible (79.21). The whole phrase τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον is a paraphrase of B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6, 143.15, 146.2); cf. 29.15, 143.14, 17, 144.21, 22 (ἀεὶ, however, does not occur in these other cases). Cf. Republic V 479a2-3, 37-8, Laws X 898a8-9 (and Proclus in Tim II.69.16-18). The remaining two lines (28-29) are based on Simplicius's identification of ὅπερ ὄν (186a33 cf. 79.11), Aristotle's description of Parmenidean being, with (an) individual substance which possesses no (accidental ?) attributes; cf. in Phys 131.11-12, 32 - 132.4, and 82.16-19.

79.29 - 31. καλῶς . . . ἐπήγαγεν. Simplicius refers to his quotation of B 8. 3-14 (= 78.12-23) in the words διὰ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων. Simplicius here adds that Parmenides demonstrated that being is 'imperishable' (ἄφθαρτον) in those verses; in his paraphrase of B 8.3-14 in 78.24-29 he only mentions that Parmenides proves (ἀποδείκνυσιν) that being is uncreated (ἀγένητον); cf. esp 78.24-25. At any rate, ὅτι ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν is a close paraphrase of B 8.3 (= 78.12); cf. in Phys 142.32-33. Simplicius carefully notes the order of the verses which he quotes: προδείξας . . . [B 8.3-14] . . . ἐπήγαγεν [B 8.26-28]. For ἐπήγαγε cf. note to 78.7.

79.32 - 80.2 = B 8.26-28 (= in Phys 39.27-40.1, 145.27-146.1).

Scaliger's emendation of τῆλε (B 8.28) for τῆλε is universally accepted; cf. note to 80.2.

80.3 - 4. ἐξ οὗ . . . τὸ νοητὸν ὄν. Simplicius claims that it is also clear (ὀφλόν) from the preceding verses (B 8.26-28) that Parmenides knows that perceptible being and intelligible are different. (καί 'also' refers to the fact that it is clear that Parmenides's being proper is uncreated or ungenerated and imperishable.) This claim is based on B 8.27-28 ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος ἢ τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν. That is, Simplicius concludes that coming to be and perishing are banished from the order of intelligible to the order of perceptible being "in which there are coming to be and perishing" (ἐν ᾧ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος 3). Simplicius frequently states that in the Doxa Parmenides deals with the physical world, which is subject to change and is perceptible; cf. in Phys 7.1-3, 30.15, 20, 38.24-26, 39.10-12, 142.31-33, 146.27-28, 147.27-30. γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος (80.3) is a quotation from B 8.27 (= 80.1). For τὸ νοητὸν ὄν cf. in Phys 39.26.

80.7 - 14. Simplicius quotes Melissus B 7.7, 9-10 and briefly paraphrases B 7.8 (= 80.10-11); at in Phys 111.19-112.15 he quotes all of 30 B 7.1-10 (30 B 7.7-10 = 112.6-15); cf. also in Phys 40.12-21. Simplicius's paraphrase of 30 B 7.8 in 80.10-11 is both accurate and illustrates his care in preserving the order of the material he

quotes; cf. 79.30-31.

80.15 - 17. ταῦτα . . . δογμάτων. Cf. in Phys 36.24-25, 39.20-21; further, 29.3-5, 37.6-7, 90.20-22. Simplicius has little good to say of Alexander throughout the commentary, despite his heavy reliance on him (see Index Nominum s.v. pp. 1437-1439). For a particularly wry criticism, see 329.14-20. At in Phys 258.16-17, when agreeing with him, Simplicius refers to Alexander as τοῦ γνησιωπάτου τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγητῶν.

80.17 - 18. ὦν . . . τὸ πρῶτον. Simplicius also asserts that Aristotle's first cause (cf. Metaphysics A (esp. 6-10), e.g. 1069a33, 1071b2-5, 1073a3-5, 23-25) is indebted to Parmenides at in Phys 87.7-16 (note ἀκίνητον 11) and 148.19-22.

in Phys 100.21 - 28. In the course of discussing Plato's resolution of the 'one-many' dilemma (99.32-102.24; cf. 185b25), Simplicius briefly mentions Parmenides (100.22-23). The immediately preceding context is that Plato resolves the dilemma for the intellectual order by demonstrating that the Forms share or participate in one another. This mutual participation gives rise to a composite unity (ἐν τι ὅλον), but since each considered by itself 'is not' the others, there is also plurality (100.15-21). Simplicius concurs on the second point: "For in reality, where there is otherness, there is also non-being" (21-22). He then argues that both Parmenides

and Plato were aware of this principle; the former abolishes non-being to prove the unity of real being, while the latter introduces non-being into both the intellectual and perceptible orders to demonstrate plurality (22-26). That Parmenides was aware of this principle is highly dubious; cf. note to 100.22-23.

This passage is also of interest because Simplicius mentions the One in conjunction with Parmenides here; there is only one other such mention in the commentary (in Phys 147.12-16).

The present passage is sandwiched between quotes from the Sophist (251a8-c6) and the Parmenides (129c4-e4). Simplicius asserts that Plato resolves the one-many dilemma for the intellectual order in the former, for the perceptible in the latter dialogue (cf. esp. 101.10-24).

100.21 - 22. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὅπου πλῆθος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 143.27-28, 147.22-27 (esp. 25-27).

100.22 - 26. διὸ καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . καὶ ὁ Πλάτων . . . παραδίδωσι. Simplicius asserts that the preceding principle (cf. note above to 100.21-22) lies back of Parmenides's rejection of and Plato's introduction of non-being. What is not clear is whether he thinks that Parmenides consciously used this principle or merely that his rejection of non-being (which can be seen as forming the counterpositive of the principle) is tantamount to an acceptance of it.

100.22 - 23. ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν. Simplicius apparently refers to the transition from B 7 to B 8, that is from the path that inquires into non-being to the acceptance of the path of being, which he mentions at in Phys 78.5-23 (B 7.2 = 78.6, B 8.1-14 = 78.8-10, 12-23; cf. in Phys 243.31-244.1). However, the explicit reason Parmenides's goddess offers for rejecting the path of non-being is not that it introduces plurality, but rather that it is unknowable and inexpressible; cf. B 2.5-8 (= in Phys 116.30-117.1). (At 78.2 ff Simplicius treats B 7.2 as if it referred to the path of non-being and not the path of mortals of B 6, which represents a confusion of the paths of being and non-being, after which he quotes it.)

100.22. ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . τὸ ὄντως ὄν. Cf. in Phys 138.20-22, 24-25, and 126.3-7 (Adrastus). On τὸ ὄντως ὄν cf. in Phys 22.24-26, esp. 26 περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, 38.11, 162.12. Plato uses ὄντως with participial forms of εἶναι ; cf. Phaedrus 247c7-e2, Sophist 266e1, Republic 597d2, Timaeus 28a3-4. A close parallel to the present usage is Timaeus 52c5-6; there are echoes of Parmenides throughout 51c2-52a4.

100.22 - 23. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 147.12-16. 'That which is beyond being' is the One (cf. 147.14 ἀπλῶς ἓν). In both passages Simplicius tentatively (τάχα) ascribes awareness of the One to Parmenides.

100.23. ἀνεῖλεν τὸ μὴ ὄν. See in Phys 243.31-244.2 (B 7.1-2 = 244.1-2).

100.23 - 26. καὶ ὁ Πλάτων . . . παραδίδωσι. Cf. in Phys 100.26-29, 101.10-14. Simplicius frequently uses παραδίδωμι: cf. e.g. in Phys 78.11, 147.13, 157.27. W.F. Arndt and F.W. Gingrich (A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature [Chicago and Cambridge, 1952], s.v. p. 620) state: "of oral or written tradition, hand down, pass on, transmit, relate, teach."

in Phys 114.25 - 115.9. Simplicius sets out in general terms the points of similarity and difference between Parmenides and Melissus (114.25-115.1), and relates how Aristotle's refutation of both reflects these (115.1-9). Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides (cf. 186a22) occupies the next thirty-four pages of Simplicius's commentary (114.25 -148.24; cf. 187a11). A full commentary on this passage is not necessary, because Simplicius states nothing about Parmenides that is not already found in the Physics and the details of Aristotle's refutation and of Parmenides's arguments will emerge in subsequent passages.

Of doctrinal interest is Simplicius's report that Parmenides holds that being is one and motionless (τὸ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον 114.26-27, 115.3; cf. 184b16, 184b25-185a1) and finite (Παρμενίδην δὲ πεπερασμένον 114.27-28, τοῦ δὲ πεπερασμένον λέγοντος τὸ ὄν 115.8; cf. 185b17-18, 207a15-17).

Simplicius also sets forth the logical or syllogistic mistakes which Parmenides and Melissus make in common. At 114.28-29 he states that both 1) propound an argument in an invalid syllogistic manner (τό τε άσυλλογίστως έρωτῶν) and 2) assume false premisses (τό ψευδεῖς λαμβάνειν προτάσεις); cf. 185a8-10, 186a6-7, 24-26. Cf. section VI.

Philoponus's commentary (61.23-62.3) on 186a22 is strikingly similar to that of Simplicius; Alexander may well be their common source.

in Phys 120.20 - 29. Simplicius here refutes one of the charges brought by Eudemus against Parmenides: that he did not distinguish between essential and accidental predication (οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός 120.9-11; at in Phys 115.16-116.4 Simplicius quotes this passage in full from Eudemus's Physica fr. 43 (W)). Aristotle also denies that Parmenides 'saw' this distinction: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὕτω συνεώρα (186a31-32)⁴. Simplicius allows that some of the 'pre-Platonics' (cf. 120.9, 12), namely the Megarians, were ignorant of this distinction (12-20), but insists that Parmenides was aware of it, because he predicated so many things of his 'one' (20-24; B 8.4* = 23). He justifies this distinction for Parmenides's one being along purely Neoplatonic lines (24-27); the relation of these remarks to the foregoing is obscure. Lastly, Simplicius argues that Parmenides did not actually produce this distinction in the form of a rule, for such a rule was not appropriate to the terseness (βραχυλογία) of the ancients (28-29).

In the discussion that follows (120.29-121.25) Simplicius imputes to Aristotle a failure to discern the same distinction in his refutation of Parmenides (186a25-32). Aristotle, he claims, failed to distinguish whiteness (λευκότης) from that which possesses whiteness (τὸ λευκόν) in his counter-example of 'white' (τὸ λευκόν) to Parmenides (120.29-121.9); cf. section VIII. Simplicius holds that Aristotle's counter-example will hold good only if there is one thing in existence (cf. 120.26-30) which admits of different accounts or definitions; namely, the accounts of its substratum or substance and its accident(s); cf. 119.22-27. However, Simplicius argues that there is no one thing, not even the name, in the example of 'white', since the substratum is not itself 'white', but only the conjoint product substratum plus accident, whiteness, is white. He accuses Aristotle of a circular argument.

120.20 - 21. ὅτι . . . ὁῦλον. Simplicius pointedly answers Aristotle's assertion in 186a31-32 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὕτω συνεῖρα, and that of Eudemus, ἃ . . . διαψευσθῆναι (120.8-10).

120.20. μέντοι Παρμενίδης μάλιστα πάντων. πάντων "all" refers to all philosophers prior to Plato; cf. 120.9-10 οὔτε . . . ἔλεγεν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ Πλάτων πρῶτος and 12 οἱ δὲ πρότερον (both quotations from Eudemus). In 12-20 Simplicius offers the Megarian philosophers as examples of this error⁵; the adversative force of μέντοι is directed against them.

120.21 - 22. εἴπερ ἔν λέγων τοσαῦτα κατηγορεῖ αὐτοῦ. This is the reason or proof which Simplicius gives for Parmenides's awareness of the distinction between essential and accidental predication (cf. 18-20). That is, since Parmenides speaks of his 'one' as a 'many', he is implicitly aware of this distinction; otherwise he would not have predicated anything, except perhaps itself, of it. In 27-29 Simplicius admits that Parmenides did not formulate a rule to this effect.

120.23 = B 8.4*. ἀγένητον appears here instead of ἀτέλεστον ; cf. in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 145.4. Simplicius probably (mis) quotes this line from memory; it is possible that one of the many works at his disposal, e.g. Alexander's commentary, is his source for this version of the line; cf. DK.

120.24. All but one of the predicates in this line appear in Parmenides. ἀκίνητον is found in B 8.26 (= in Phys 39.27, 79.23, 145.27; cf. 143.8-11) and in B 8.38 (= in Phys 29.18*, 87.1, 143.10*, 146.11). αἰδιον 'eternal' does not appear in the extant fragments, although it may be intended as a paraphrase of B 8.3 ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν (= in Phys 30.1, 78.10, 12, 142.36, 145.5); cf. B 8.21 (= in Phys 145.22, in Cael 559.17) and B 8.27 (= in Phys 39.28, 80.1, 145.28). ἀδιαίρετον is a gloss of οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν B 8.22 (in Phys 86.24, 143.3, 145.23; cf. 143.1-2). Lastly, κυρία ἄλλα 'countless other things' (cf. τοσαῦτα 21) is an exaggeration,

although Parmenides does predicate other things of it as well; cf. in Phys 147.14-15.

120.24 -27. ὅτι . . . ἀναφέρομεν. Cf. in Phys 38.11-13, 147.10-12, 148.9-11. As mentioned above (note to 120.29) this passage is purely Neoplatonic. Simplicius argues that the predication of many, separate attributes to the one (being) does not thereby make a plurality of this one (being), because these attributes or predicates were originally one and were separated off by a single cause. (To venture a paraphrase, all things are 'essentially' one, but are only 'accidentally' many because of emanation.) It is far from clear, however, whether these remarks are merely parenthetical, or are intended to convey Parmenides's awareness that his being gives rise to a plurality, or even some middle-ground between these extremes. Since Simplicius is in general hesitant to credit Parmenides with the actual articulation of full-fledged Neoplatonic doctrines, but rather harmonizes or assimilates what he says into such doctrines, the proper interpretation lies nearer the first named extreme than the second.

Proclus, on the other hand, unequivocally asserts that Parmenides was aware of the plurality of the noetic order, and further that this plurality proceeded from his one being. Cf. in Parm 708.7-709.6, esp, 708.11-19: οὐχ ὥς ἀγνοῶν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νοητῶν· αὐτὸς ἥ γάρ ἐστὶν ὁ φᾶς· ἥ ἑὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει ἥ καὶ πάλιν· ἥ εὐνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν ἥ ὅποθεν ἄρξωμαι,

τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἴξομαι αὖθις ἥ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις· ἥ μεσσόθεν
 ἰσοπαλές. ἥ and 70836-40 οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἥ ἔκ-
 τε τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος οἶδε τὸ πλῆθος τὸ νοητὸν προῖόν καὶ
 πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων τὸ ὄν ἐν ἥ ἰδρυμένον, περὶ ὃ τὸ τῶν
 νοητῶν πλῆθος τὴν ἥ ἔνωσιν ἔχει.

120.27 - 29. τὸν . . . βραχυλογίας. On κανόνα (27) and κανονι-
 κόν (28) cf. 120.3-6; the rule in question is the distinction be-
 tween essential and accidental predication (cf. 120.9-10, 18-20).
 For βραχυλογία cf. section II pp. 98-102. In the first sentence
 τὸν . . . ἐξήνεγκεν, Simplicius provides a negative testimonium,
 as it were, that nowhere in Parmenides is such a rule to be found
 (cf. in Phys 140.21-23).

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in Phys 142.28 - 148.24. This is the longest continuous passage
 in Simplicius, or in any other ancient author, concerning Parme-
 nides, or more particularly his doctrine of the the one being. It
 contains a quotation of most of fragment 8 (B 8.1-52 = 145.1-52 -
 146.25) and comments and glosses on many lines in this fragment.
 At the outset, Simplicius gives two reasons for setting out this
 doctrine at the conclusion of the discussion of Parmenides in the
Physics (187all): to show how this is consistent with his own pre-
 vious remarks concerning it (142.29-30; cf. 144.25-28), and to
 inquire into the reasons for its having occasioned refutations
 (142.30-31), especially by Plato and Aristotle (147.16-17).

Strictly speaking, the first is treated in 142.3i-147.16, the latter at 147.16-148.24, but there are overlaps.

The first (142.3i-147.16) constitutes an argument by Simplicius for equating Parmenides's one being with the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν). Within it three parts are to be distinguished: a) a reply to (among others) Plato (142.3i-144.1), b) a reply to Aristotle (144.2-11), and c) the actual identification of the one being with the intelligible (144.11-147.16). Neither reply is so designated by Simplicius, but that they are to be taken as such is clear. In a) Simplicius attempts to locate the one being, beginning with the lowest rung on the (Neoplatonic) ontic ladder, corporeal objects, and concluding with the intellectual; none of these proves a viable candidate. By implication no refutation or objection directed against Parmenides based on an equation of his one being with any of these entities has any force. Since Simplicius later states that Plato constructed his refutation on the basis of the intellectual (147.17-20), that he has him in mind here is clear. In b) Simplicius undertakes to show that Parmenides's one being is neither a common property or universal nor an individual substance; Aristotle is the target here. Two points deserve notice in c) The first is Simplicius's rejection of a literal interpretation of the sphere-simile (146.2i-147.2); both Plato and Proclus so interpret it. Secondly, Simplicius admits that some of what Parmenides says about his one being, if heard in isolation, could be taken to apply to the soul or intellect (147.2-6) or the One (147.12-14). This

admission forms part of his larger scheme of harmonization, and more particularly makes the equation of the former by Aristotle and the latter by Plato with Parmenides's one being to some degree explicable.

In similar fashion, three claims are to be discerned in the second part: 2) that Plato's refutation is based on the intellectual (147.17-148.6); b) that Aristotle's whole dichotomous division applies properly to the world of coming to be, not to the intelligible (148.7-11); and c) an attempt to show that both Plato and Aristotle respected and depended heavily on Parmenides, and that their refutations are not of an ad hominem nature (148.11-23).

142.28. The limit (πέρας) here refers to Aristotle's critique of Parmenides, which ends at 187all. Cf. in Cael 672.24-25 for the same use of πέρας.

142.29 - 31. καλῶς . . . ἐπισκέψασθαι. Simplicius offers two reasons for his treatment of Parmenides's doctrine of the one being: 1) to demonstrate how it is consistent with his preceding remarks (τοῖς προκειμένοις and cf. 144.27-28), and 2) to examine why refutations were directed against it. He deals with 1) in 142.31-147.16, and with 2) in 147.16-148.24; both parts are complementary. Simplicius is concerned explicitly with the refutations of Plato and Aristotle in 2); Eudemus (as a witness for others' views) is mentioned in 1) (143.5), as is Zeno (144.15). Simplicius's refutation of Alexander at in Phys 77.11-79.2 is echoed in 142.30-36.

142.31 - 144.1. ὅτι . . . νόημα. This is a continuous argument. Simplicius here demonstrates what Parmenides's one being cannot be, by attempting to identify it with all possible candidates in the whole of reality. He begins by considering physical objects (142.31-143.3) then proceeds 'upwards', Neoplatonically speaking, to the heavens (143.4-8), the soul and hypostasis of Soul in general (143.8-18), and concludes with the intellectual (143.18-144.1). The two remaining candidates, the intelligible and the One are taken up shortly; the former at 144.11-147.12, the latter 147.12-16. Since his search up to and including the intellectual is unsuccessful, Simplicius implicitly rejects all interpretations that identify Parmenides's one being with any of these. Plato, who argues against Parmenides's one being on the basis of the intellectual (cf. 147.17-21), is the principle target of the argument, although materialist interpreters of Parmenides do not escape its force either.

142.31 - 36. ὅτι . . . ἐστίν. Simplicius quotes Parmenides B 8.1-3 (= 142.34-36) to prove that his one being is not something which comes to be and perishes. τὸ σημειῶν . . . ἔν (32) is a gloss on σήματ' (35 = B 8.2), as is ἀφθαρτον (33; cf. DK I 223.27 (Plutarch)) on ἀνώλεθρον (36 = B 8.3); ἀγέννητον is a quotation (36 = B 8.3); cf. 144.17-18, 147.3-4. This part of Simplicius's argument is a restatement of his refutation of Alexander (in Phys 77.11-79.12).

142.34 - 36 = B 8.1-3. Cf. 145.1-3.

143.1 - 3. οὐ . . . ὁμοῖον. The tacit assumption of this argument is that everything corporeal is divisible. Parmenides himself makes no such argument, although Simplicius is correct to claim that such is his intent. ἀδιαίρετον (1) is a gloss on οὐδὲ διαίρετον (3 = B 8.22); cf. 144.20-21, 148.8-11.

143.4 - 8. ὥστ' . . . ἀφιβεστιάτη. Simplicius's claim that what Parmenides says about his one being is not appropriate to the heavens relies both on the previous argument (143.1-3), that the one being is not corporeal, and because the heavens are a sphere, not like a sphere, which is a physical thing anyway. Eudemus is cited as the source for the report that some understand the sphere-simile to indicate the heavens (5); the immediate source, however, is Alexander, who reports that Eudemus said this in the first book of his Physica; Simplicius says that he was unable to locate this statement there (in Phys 133.21-29). ἀδιαίρετος (7) refers back to 143.3 (= B 8.22) and 143.1. ὁμοιος (7) is apparently a gloss on ἐναλίγκιον (6 = B 8.43), while the single word σφαῖρα (7) is used for the phrase σφαίρης . . . ὅγκῳ (6 = B 8.43). ὅγκῳ may lie behind the phrase ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀφιβεστιάτη (8); cf. in Phys 231.33.

143.8 - 11. ὅτι . . . ἐχούσης. Having ruled out any form of corporeal existence for Parmenides's one being (142.31-143.8), Simplicius rejects next animate or 'souled' (ψυχικόν) existence. The reason he offers is that the one being is motionless, while even

the Eleatics agree that animate existence/substance involves motion; cf. DK A 46, B 16. ἀκίνητον (9) is a quotation from B 8.38* (= 143.10); cf. in Phys 29.18, 87.1, and 146.11. Cf. also 144.21, 147.4.

143.11 - 18. λέγει . . . ὑπόστασις forms a conclusion to the previous arguments (142.31-143.11). Not only can Parmenides's one being not be equated with any particular thing in the physical world, it in fact transcends the whole hypostasis of soul. Simplicius bases this claim on two verses of Parmenides, B 8.5 (= 143.13) and B 8.29 (= 143.15), which he abbreviates respectively to ὁμοῦ πᾶν 'all together' (17) and κατὰ ταῦτά 'in the same condition' (17). Further, ὁμοῦ πᾶν εἶναι (12) is an indirect quotation of B 8.5, while κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν is a paraphrase of B 8.29; cf. Sophist 249b12 for the latter. The argument here, which Simplicius does not elaborate, runs roughly as follows. Since the being in question is 'all together' and 'in the same condition', these attributes are essential (κατὰ οὐσίαν 16); if they were accidental, then this being might not 'be' in some place or respect. (At in Phys 79.27 he denies that Parmenides's being is or possesses an accident.) Further, they hold with respect to both potentiality and actuality (16). At in Phys 29.15-18 Simplicius maintains that Parmenides sees that the one being's 'in the same condition' transcends all change and perhaps both actuality and potentiality. Here he says that this distinction clearly holds for being; the sense must be that the two attributes are to be viewed with respect to the actuality-potentiality distinction, and that from such a vantage

transcend the physical world, for nothing physical has these attributes. (Ultimately on the One properly transcends this and all other distinctions, as Xenophanes observed (in *Phys* 29.12-14).) At 148.21-22 Simplicius says that Parmenides observed that in his one being substance, potentiality, and actuality are one, not that it transcends them.)

Simplicius brings up both attributes several times in the balance of the passage (i.e. up to 148.24). For ὁμοῦ πᾶν cf. 144.19-20, 147.13-14 (and in *Phys* 77.27), and for κατὰ ταύτά 79.27-28, 144.21-22, 147.4-5, 8-9 (and 77.30).

Proclus quotes or paraphrases B 8.29 four times in *in Parm* (639.29-30, 1134.23, 1152.29, and 1177.5). He quotes B 8.5 once in the same work (665.26). Philoponus also (mis) quotes B 8.5 (in *Phys* 65.9; he mentions ὁμοῦ πᾶν at 65.12) as a verse that allows one to grasp Parmenides's conception of being (65.4-6). He also quotes B 8.4 (= 65.7) and B 8.25 (= 65.11), which are also quoted both by Proclus (in *Parm* 1152.27; 665.24, 708.13 respectively) and Simplicius (in *Phys* 30.2, 78.13, 120.23, 145.4, in *Cael* 557.18; in *Phys* 86.22, 87.23, 145.26 respectively).

143.18 - 144.1. μηδέποτε . . . νόημα. Simplicius argues against equating Parmenides's one being with the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν); Plato's critique of Parmenides in the *Sophist* is under attack, despite there being no actual mention of the dialogue here (but cf. 147.17-148.6). There are two arguments, both of which are predicated

on the fact that the intellectual involves plurality, while the one being is an absolute unity. The first runs: the intellectual exists by virtue of separation from and turning back upon the intelligible, whereas in Parmenides's one being there is no distinction at all among the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), the intellect (νοῦς), and intellecting (νοεῖν) (143.18-25; see notes below). In the second argument Simplicius states that the intellectual is divided into Forms (εἶδη) and that where there is division there is also otherness (ἑτερότης), which ushers in non-being, but that Parmenides completely banished non-being from his one being (143.26-144.1).

143.18 - 19. τὸ μὲν . . . ὑπέστη provides a definition of the intellectual, whose terms Parmenides's one being does not meet (20-25). Διόφρισις is nearly synonymous with πρόοδος: see 147.9-10 for the verbal counterpart.

143.20. τὸ . . . δηλονότι. The Greek may be corrupt. ταύτὸν εἶναι [φησι] νοεῖν τε καὶ νοητόν is a quotation-gloss of B 8.34-36 (= 143.22-25; that νοητόν is a gloss on οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα B 8.34 (= 143.22) 144.22-44 makes likely (cf. also in Phys 87.11-12). Assuming that εἶναι does double-duty, I translate the whole sentence as follows: 'but he [Parmenides] says that it is the same for being and intellecting -- that is to say clearly is what is intelligible and intellect, when he writes'. A partial remedy is to omit καὶ νοητόν καὶ νοῦν, which is deleted by E.

43.22 - 25 = B 8.34-36; cf. in Phys 87.14-16, 146.7-9. The intruded gloss $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tilde{\omicron}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\tilde{\omicron}$ (23) may be a reminiscence of 87.17.


143.26 - 144.1. $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\ .\ .\ .\ \nu\acute{\omicron}\eta\mu\alpha$. Simplicius takes up the second argument for rejecting the intellectual order as being Parmenides's one being. The first argument centered on the plurality that is inherent in the divided ($\delta\iota\omega\alpha\epsilon\kappa\rho\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$) intellectual order; the second takes up one of the products of the division, the Form of otherness ($\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\varsigma$). Since otherness ushers in (qualified or relative) non-being, Simplicius argues that to equate the intellectual with the one being flies in the face of Parmenides's explicit denial that the one being has non-being; cf. in Phys 100.21-23, 650.8-14. This argument is recapitulated at 147.22-27. (Simplicius argues that Parmenides does posit non-being in the perceptible order, 144.27-30.)

143.26 - 27. $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$ are the Platonic Forms, of which otherness ($\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\varsigma$) is one of the five greatest kinds set out in the Sophist. Simplicius here draws on the Neoplatonic doctrine that the Forms are part of the second hypostasis in its divided aspect to turn the tables on Plato.

143.28 - 144.1. These lines are a succinct refutation of Plato's critique of Parmenides in the Sophist. The equation non-being = other is set out at Sophist 255b8-258e5; the two verses quoted here by Simplicius, B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), bracket the whole critique

of Parmenides in the Sophist (237a8-9 - 258d1-2); see Chapter I, p. 21). (At 148.3-5 Simplicius says that the demonstration of non-being among the Forms is no great feat.) ὁ δὲ . . . ἐξορίζει (29-30) is a paraphrase of B 7.1-2; cf. 144.20. These lines have a parallel in 'Simplicius's' commentary on De Anima (260.23-24): ὡπερ τοῖς νοητοῖς οὐδαμῇ φησὶν ὁ Παρμενίδης τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐνθεαρεῖσθαι 'just as Parmenides says that non-being is nowhere to be seen among the intelligibles'. The non-being in question, however, is of the absolute sort (in Anima 260.26-36), not of the qualified sort (= 'other'), set forth in the Sophist, which really is found among the intelligibles; cf. in Phys 243.31-33.

144.2 - 11. ἄλλ' . . . κινήσει. Simplicius abruptly shifts from Plato's critique of Parmenides to Aristotle's. As discussed in Chapter II, pp.35-39, Aristotle's basic critique is a reductio argument based on a dichotomous division (cf. 148.4-11), the full scheme of which is:



Simplicius takes up only segment I here, since he readily concedes to Aristotle that B by definition introduces plurality (148.7-8), while he discredits II at 143.16. He further divides Ia) into a universal as a pure mental abstraction (144.2-4), or as immanent in

real objects (4-8). Citing some of the same signs of the one being he used in his reply to Plato, Simplicius concludes that the one being cannot fall anywhere under I. Aristotle viewed the absurdities that arose for Parmenides, no matter into what slot in the scheme his one being was put, as proof of the absurdity of his basic doctrine. Simplicius argues that these absurdities tell against Aristotle's interpretation, since the whole (dichotomous) division applies only the perceptible order (144.5-7, 9-11); by implication his interpretation is subject to the refutations produced above against equating the one being with this order (142.31-143.18).

144.2. κοινότητα. This is not Aristotle's normal term for 'universal'; according to Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus) 400all-13, this word appears only in the Ethics and Politics and in the sense of 'community', 'communality'. However, its collocation with διαφοράι 'differentiae' shortly below (144.6) and at in Phys 18.7-8 ensures that it means 'universal' in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. 'genus' or less likely 'species'.

144.2 - 4. οὔτε . . . αὕτη). ἀγένητος (3-4) and ἀνώλεθρος (4) are taken directly from B 8.3 (= 142.36); cf. 142.32-33. ἀγένητος is directed against ὑστερογενῆ (2) "of later creation" (literally "of later origin" LSJ s.v. p. 1906). At in Phys 490.31-491.2 the complex κοινότης ὑστερογενῆς is defined as a common property or univer-

sal abstracted from (concrete) objects by our minds; this definition fits well with the present context. In addition, the mention of a common property in objects (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς 490.34) accords with the following section, 144.4-8. The former is distinguished from the 'distinct' (τὸ ἐξηρημένον), which is the Form or universal in the intellectual order, from which the given common property in the perceptible order is derived.

Incidentally, Simplicius attributes the word ὑπερογενής in this sense to Aristotle (in Phys 491.1); according to Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus) 807a49-55, however, this word is found once outside the biological works in a similar meaning (Metaphysics N 1091 a33), but never in conjunction with κοινότης.

144.4 - 8. ἄλλ' . . . νοητόν. Simplicius rejects the equation of the one being with a universal immanent in things for two reasons: it would then be perceptible and fall within the purview of the second half of the poem (5-6); and it would be different (ἄλλη) with respect to its differentiae, and thus it would fail to satisfy two of the conditions or 'signs' which Parmenides prescribes for it, namely, that it be all together and embrace both intellect and the intelligible (6-8).

144.4 - 5. ἡ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐστὶ κοινότης; Cf. in Phys 490.34-491.1 τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑρεστώσαν κοινότητα and note to 144.2-4.

144.5 - 6. αἰσθητὴ . . . λέγει. The Doxa is treated in section V. This contention is elaborated in in Phys 30.14-31.17 and 38.28-39.20; cf. also 146.26-29.

144.6 - 7. καὶ ἄλλη . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν. The argument is dense. Simplicius tacitly assumes that a universal in the perceptible order depends upon one in the intellectual order (cf. in Phys 490.31-491.2). The former is subject to otherness and, by extension, non-being; so the former is a fortiori "already subject" (ἤδη πεπονθέναι 6) to them also. Thus the perceptible universal will be manifest in objects in a different way (ἄλλη) for each species its subsumes; that is, it will be delimited by the differentia(e) that determine each species. Consequently, this universal will not be 'all together', as Simplicius states in 7-8, and since it is 'other' it will not 'be'.

144.7 - 8. πῶς . . . νοητόν; Two 'signs' of the one being, which Simplicius mentioned above (143.11-13, 20-25), are brought to bear against equating it with a universal in things: 'is all together now' and 'contains within itself the intellect and the intelligible'. The first of these, τὸ νῦν εἶναι ὁμοῦ πᾶν (7-8), is an indirect quotation of B 8.5, while τὸ συνηρημέναι ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοητόν (8) is a paraphrase of B 8.34-36. As mentioned in the note to 144.6-7, the first sign is directed specifically against the universal's being different (ἄλλη) with respect to its differentiae,

not to mention its particulars. The second speaks to the external, concrete existence of this universal; by definition, this is distinct from a percipient subject.

144.8 - 9. ἀλλ' . . . ἀπόδει; Simplicius takes up individual substance as a candidate for the one being, and rejects it as being even more discordant (9), presumably that a universal with respect to the signs which Parmenides himself provides for his one being. οὐσίαν . . . τὴν ἄτομον (8-9) refers to Physics 185a23-25: πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἓν ἢ ἵππον ἓν ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν; cf. in Phys 72.9-10.

144.9 - 11. καὶ . . . κινήσει. Simplicius lists without further comment attributes of individual substance as his refutation. Each of these fails to answer to the signs of Parmenides's one being related and discussed in 142.31-144.8. The parallels are as follows:

9	γενητή	ἀγένητον B 8.3 (= 142.36). Cf. 142.31-33
10	ἑτερότητι διειλημμένη	Cf. 143.27-144.1 (B 7.1-2 = 143.31-144.1); perhaps ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν B 8.5 (= 143.13); cf. 143.11-12, 17-18.
	ἔνυλος	143.1-3, σωματικόν (1); B 8.22 = 143.3
	αἰσθητή	Cf. 144.5-6; 143.16-18
10 - 11	ἄλλη παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός	Cf. 144.6-8, in which B 8.5 (= 143.13) and B 8.34-36 (= 143.22-25) appear

perhaps B 8.29 (= 143.15)

- 11 διαιρετή οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν B 8.22 (= 143.3);
 cf. 143.1-2.
 ἐν κινήσει αἰνιχτόν B 8.38* (= 143.10); cf. 143.9

144.11 - 147.6. λείπεται . . . ἰδρυῖσθαι. Having completed his own reductio argument for equating the one being with any of the foregoing candidates (142.31-144.11), Simplicius concludes that the one being must be the remaining candidate, the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν ; this whole section is proof of this equation. (The One, which is also a possible candidate, is treated at the end of this section, 147.15-16.)

This section falls into three parts; 1) the equation proper, including the quotation of B 8.1-52 (144.11-146.29); 2) a discussion of some possible ambiguities in what Parmenides said (146.29-147.12); a brief discussion, or rather suggestion, of Parmenides's awareness of the One (147.12-16).

144.11. λείπεται οὖν refers to the whole of 142.31-144.11.

144.12. τὸ νοητόν πάντων αἴτιον 'the intelligible as cause of all things. Simplicius uses a similar phrase of Parmenides's (and others') one being at in Phys 29.5: τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς 'of the intelligible and primary first principle'.

144.12 - 13. ἐν ᾧ . . . ἡνωμένως. Cf. in Phys 38.11-13, 136.28, 143.26-27, 147.11, and 148.5-6, 20 for similar formulations. See also 28 A 34 (I.223.28 (Plutarch)).

144.14. ἐν ᾧ . . . ἐστί. This clause is directed specifically against the second criticism of Parmenides by Plato in the Sophist (244e2-245d11), that his one being is only derivatively one, not unity itself, since it is a whole of parts. Simplicius argues that in Parmenides's one being there is no difference whatsoever between being (itself) and unity (itself); cf. 144.15-16. Proclus equates the one being with being itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν in Parm 708.7-29), not the intelligible, which on Simplicius's view contains this. Cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72.

144.14 - 16. διὸ . . . συνεχροστώτος is an embellished paraphrase of a quotation from Eudemus's Physica; cf. in Phys 97.12-13 and 138.32-33.

144.16 - 25. τούτῳ . . . ὑπερβολή. The stated conclusions (τὰ εἰρημένα συμπεράσματα) refer to 142.31-144.11, although two refer to even earlier discussions, as noted below; all are recapitulated in the following lines, 17-25.

144.17 - 18. τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον is a quotation from B 8.3 (= 145.3); cf. also 142.31-36.

144.18. τὸ ὁλόκληρον μονογενές. Diels is correct to see this as a paraphrase of B 8.4 (= 145.4) οὐλον μονογενές. Simplicius does not discuss this sign or conclusion in 142.31-144.11, but does quote B 8.4 at in Phys 30.2, 78.13, in Cael 557.18.

144.18 - 19. τῷ . . . διαφρίσεως is a comment on μονογενές 'unique' of 18. That is, Simplicius argues that the 'being which is prior to all separation' (cf. 143.18-19, 26-27) must be 'unique', and not some second or secondary thing (δεύτερον).

144.19 - 20. τὸ ὁμοῦ πᾶν is a quotation from B 8.5 (= 145.5); cf. above 143.11-18.

144.20 τὸ μηδαμῇ χώραν ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ὄν is a paraphrase of B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), particularly B 7.1 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα. Cf. 143.29-30.

144.20 - 21. τὸ ἀδιαίρετον is a gloss on B 8.22 (= 143.3, 145.23) οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν. Cf. 143.1-3.

144.21 ἀκίνητον is a quotation from B 8.38 (= 143.10, 146.11).

144.21 κατὰ . . . κινήσεως is Simplicius's own addition to the foregoing two signs, 'indivisible' and 'unchanging'. Cf. in Phys 29.15-16 for 'change' (μεταβολή), as well as 143.9-11; 143.1-3 for 'division'.

144.21 - 22. τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄν is a paraphrase of B 8.29 (= 143.15; cf. 30.6, 146.2). Cf. 143.14-18.

144.22. πέρατι τῶν πάντων ἐστάναι. Diels is probably correct to suggest πέρας τι 'a certain limit' for πέρατι 'at the limit'. However, his referring this phrase to B 8.29 (= 146.2-4) is not correct; his supplementary reference to B 8.42 (= 146.15), πεῖρας πύματον, is the proper one; cf. 147.14-15.

144.22 - 25. εἰ . . . ὑπερβολή. These two sentences are difficult. Simplicius has B 8.34-36 in mind as proof that Parmenides's one being is the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν); if this is identical with intellecting (τὸ νοεῖν) their unity would be inexpressible. It is unclear how literally he employs these verses. It seems safe to see οὗ ἔνεκα τὸ νοεῖν (23) as a paraphrase of B 8.34 οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα. (οὗ ἔνεκα 'for the sake of', 'for the purpose of', 'the final cause of which' may well not be what Parmenides meant; DK (I.238.34 and note), following Fraenkel, renders it by "that" (dass).) τοῦτο (12) refers to τὸ ἔν ὄν (144.14), and Simplicius may take B 8.35-36 as evidence for equating the one being with 'that for the sake of which there is intellecting'; cf. in Phys 87.12-18. Once he makes this equation, he deduces that the one being is the intelligible by means of a premiss which is his own: τοῦ γὰρ νοητοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς 'for both intellecting and intellect are for the sake of the intelligible' (144.23-24). The protasis εἰ . . . νοητόν (24-25) is

a paraphrase cum-gloss of B 8.34 (with τὸ νοητὸν substituted for οὐνεκὲν ἔστι νόημα on the basis of 144.22-24), and part of B 8.29 (τούτὸν τ' ἐν ταύτῳ). The apodosis, ὅρατος . . . ὑπερβολή (25), is Simplicius's own addition, and is Neoplatonic.

144.25 - 27. καὶ εἴ τῃ μὴ δοκῶ γλίσχρός, ἡδέως ἂν . . . παραγράφαιμι closely parallels καὶ εἰ μὴ δοκῶ τισι τῶν ἐντευξομένων γλίσχρως μεταγγεῖν (in Phys 88.11). At the end of the whole section (148.22-24) he again apologizes for his excursus; cf. in Phys 36.24-25, 39.20-21. On γλίσχρός cf. note 7 (p. 327) to translation of in Phys 86.19-90.22.

144.26. τὰ . . . Παρμενίδου is repeated verbatim at 146.26 after the quotation of B 8.1-52.

144.27 - 28. διὰ τε τὴν πίστιν τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένων refers back in particular to 142.29-144.25 and more generally to all of his remarks about Parmenides up to 142.29. Further, the corroboration or proof (πίστις) of his claims based on Parmenides's own words stands in direct opposition to the unquestioning reliance on mere summaries, which Simplicius censures in his Christian antagonists (cf. in Phys 28.32-29.3).

144.28. διὰ τὴν σπάνιν τοῦ Παρμενιδείου συγγράμματος. That Simplicius quotes from this rare work in order to counteract the wide-

spread ignorance of this and of other ancient writings in his time, cf. in Phys 39.20-21: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα [τὰ ἔπη τοῦ Παρμενίδου (cf. 38.29-29.20)] μὲν διὰ τὴν πολλὴν νῦν ἄγνοϊαν τῶν παλαιῶν γραμμάτων μηκύνειν ἀναγκάζομαι. Cf. in Phys 36.24-25.

144.29. τὰ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίρεσιν. At in Phys 243.32-33 Simplicius states that Parmenides tried to abolish (absolute) non-being (ἀνῆρει τὸ μὴ ὄν 32) in B 7.1-2 (= 244.1-2). Similarly, at in Phys 78.5-10 he states that after Parmenides has turned away from the way that investigates non-being (78.5; B 7.1 = 78.6), he concludes that only the way of being remains (78.7; B 8.1-3 = 78.8-10). Simplicius leaves no clue as to how many verse elapse before Parmenides draws this conclusion. Cf. in Phys 143.29-144.1 and 650.11-14.

145.1 - 146.25 = B 8.1-52.

146.26. τὰ . . . Παρμενίδου appears verbatim at 144.26 to describe B 8.1-52 (= 145.1-146.25).

146.26 - 27. μεθ' ᾧ . . . διαλέγεται. On this transition from the one being (or the truth or the intelligible) to the opinables (or opinion/seeming or the perceptibles) cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 39.25-39.16, 179.33-180.12. As mentioned previously (note to 38.26 Section III), it is unclear whether Parmenides himself used δοξαστόν 'opina-ble' to describe either his account of mortal opinions or the ob-

jects/contents of these opinions. That opinion is about the opinable is etymologically correct; by using this word, however, Simplicius begs the question whether Parmenides used or even could have used it in its full-blown (Neo-) Platonic sense.

146.27. ἄλλας ἀρχάς. These principles, fire and earth, are different (ἄλλας) from the one being, which as the intelligible is the final cause or principle of both the noetic and perceptible orders; cf. in Phys 29.5-6 and note, and 144.10. In section V the Doxa and its principles will be taken up.

146.27 - 29. ὧν . . . γῆν". The quotation, "καὶ . . . γῆν" 28-29, is as Simplicius states, from a later passage in the Physics, 188a20-22. Although this passage is not treated as a lemma, it is quoted with additions, apparently from Alexander, at in Phys 179.31-33; cf. also in Phys 25.15-16, 30.21-22, 38.22-24 (Alexander from Theophrastus's Physicorum Opiniones fr. 6), 274.24.

146.29 - 147.1. εἰ . . . πλάσματος. Although these lines have been discussed in section II, several additional remarks are in order.

146.30 = B 8.43. Simplicius explicitly rejects as absurd Plato's literal interpretation of the sphere-simile (= B 8.43-45) in the Sophist 244e2-7, and by implication Proclus's also, at in Phys 52.21-53.7; he is content to ascribe it to poetic license (146.31-147.2). Simplicius quotes from this simile frequently: in Phys 107.26,

126.22-23, 133.27 (apud Eudemos), 137.16-17, 143.6, 146.16-18; at 52.23, 26-28 and 89.22-24 he quotes the verses apud Plato's Sophist (244e3-5), and an 502.6-7 part of B 8.44 apud Physics 207a17. Proclus is also fond of these lines and in accord with Plato interprets them literally; see note 93 p. 86.

147.1 - 2. τι . . . ἀργύρεον"; Simplicius quotes from Orpheus also at in Phys 33.16, 528.14, 641.32, and 643.30-31. DK does not include ὤσον ἀργύρεον among the fragments of Orpheus but does refer to Kern fr. 70.2; cf. 28 A 20 (I.221.9).

147.2 - 16. καὶ . . . ἰδρῶσαι. Simplicius recapitulates his argument that the one being is the intelligible (142.31 ff.) by dispelling possible ambiguities in what Parmenides said (147.2-3). He allows that one could understand some of Parmenides's words, if taken singly and in some secondary sense, to apply to soul or intellect (3-12) or even the One (12-16); but properly understood, his statements about the one being can only apply to the intelligible. In addition to driving home this argument and thereby convincing any remaining sceptics, this section serves to explain, in part, Aristotle's and Plato's interpretations and refutations of Parmenides's one being. To Simplicius's mind Aristotle equates the one being with soul (cf. 148.7-11), Plato the intellect (cf. 147.17-21). At in Phys 36.28-30 (cf. notes in III and also 37.6-7) Simplicius claims that Aristotle and Plato the apparent meaning in the predecessors'

doctrines on behalf of those of superficial understanding (τῶν ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀπορριμμένων οὗτοι κηδόμενοι 28-29); here he offers concrete examples of sources for such misunderstandings.

147.2 - 3. ὁλοσχερέστερον λεγόμενα is contrasted with εἰλικρινῶς ἀκουόμενα in 147.5. Further, ὁλοσχερεστέρας λεγόμενον is contrasted with τὸν κυρίως καὶ πρώτως λεγόμενον at in Phys 569.2-4; cf. also 113.7 (and 5). The meaning is 'rather roughly, generally, vaguely stated'. Diels (Index Verborum s.v. p. 1410) lists also 16.17, 17.15, 39 (not 29), 208.31, 265.5, 428.23; in these passages the meanings are 'general', 'universal', and 'confused'.

147.3 - 4. ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον is quoted from B 8.3 (= 142.36, 145.3). Simplicius mentioned this sign twice before: 142.32-33, 144.17-18; cf. 144.3-4.

147.4 - 5. ἀκίνητον καὶ ἐν ταύτῳ μένον is a conflation of two signs. ἀκίνητον is a quoted from B 8.38 (= 146.11, 143.10*); cf. 143.9-11, 144.21. ἐν ταύτῳ μένον is quoted from B 8.29 (= 143.15, 146.2); cf. 143.14-18, 144.21-22.

147.6 - 7. καὶ . . . παρήχθη. In 147.4-5 Simplicius allows that 'uncreated and imperishable' are appropriate to soul and intellect. here he takes up only 'uncreated', arguing that the soul and intellect are produced or derived (παρήχθη) from the intelligible, even

though they are in a sense 'uncreated'. He presumably means that they are not created in the way things in the perceptible order are, namely in time and space; their creation occurs in logical time and space. (Simplicius uses ἄν not only with the present indicative (as here), but also with the future indicative and optative (cf. Index Verborum s.v. p. 1372).)

147.7 - 10. καὶ . . . αὐτό. Simplicius takes up the second and third signs, ἀκίνητον καὶ ἐν ταύτῳ μένον, mentioned in 147.4-5; ἀκίνητον is quoted from B 8.38 (= 146.11), ἐν ταύτῳ μένον from B 8.29 (= 146.2). He offers a definition of ἀκίνητον 'motionless' in the clause ἐν ᾧ . . . διαμένονται (7-8) 'that in which actual motion is not even discerned', but is content with the tautology that 'remaining the same' applies properly to that which remains (8-9) for the second sign. In 9-10, ψυχὴ . . . αὐτό, Simplicius states that the soul and intellect issued forth from and turned back upon what remains; the conclusion to be drawn is that the two signs of 7-9 cannot properly apply to soul or intellect; cf. 147.5. ψυχὴ δὲ (cf. 147.6) may be an intrusion into the text. At 143.8-11 Simplicius maintains that soul is not 'motionless', and that 'remaining in the same condition' transcends soul, and in 147.4-5 says that these two signs apply to intellect. It remains true, however, that soul does emanate from that which remains.

147.10 - 12. ὁῦλον . . . προέληλυθε is an expansion on the preceding

sentence (9-10); cf. 144.11-14 and in Phys 88.5-8.

147.12 - 16. καὶ . . . ἰδρῶσθαι. Simplicius considers the possibility that Parmenides's one being is the One, for some its signs might be taken to apply to this (12-14). He rejects this identification by suggesting that since Parmenides did not call it simply 'one' but 'one being' and other things as well, he may be indicating that the One is situated above it (14-16). The argument here is that some of what Parmenides says admits of ambiguity, but a careful reading of his words makes clear his meaning; cf. 147.2-5. This section completes the search begun in 142.31 to locate the one being by process of elimination; all candidates fail to meet the signs which Parmenides provides for it except the intelligible.

147.13. ὡς πρῶτον αἴτιον. At in Phys 29.5-6 Simplicius states that Parmenides (and Xenophanes and Melissus) were discoursing about 'the intelligible and primary principle' (περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς). Shortly after (29.13-18) he adds the qualification that in effect Xenophanes was discoursing about the One proper, but that Parmenides observed some features in his one which can be applied to the One. In the present passage (147.12-16) the same point is more clearly made: that some of what Parmenides said may be taken, even properly so, to apply to the One or the first cause par excellence. The signs, however, in the earlier passage (29.5 ff.) are not found here.

147.13 - 14. ὁμοῦ τὸ πᾶν is quoted from B 8.5 (= 145.5); a more literal quotation could be produced by transposing τὸ with πᾶν or omitting it altogether with D. At 143.17-18 Simplicius states that ὁμοῦ πᾶν 'all together' transcends the hypostasis of soul; here (12-14) he allows that since Parmenides's being is 'one' and 'all together' it might seem (δοκεῖ) that he was speaking of the One, which also transcends soul. πεῖρας πύματος 'outermost limit', quoted from B 8.42 (= 146.15), is a second possibly ambiguous sign; it is not mentioned elsewhere by Simplicius. He takes the phrase πεῖρας πύματος as predicate to 'the one being'; cf. 147.15. Tarán, on the other hand, takes it as predicate to a supplied ἐστὶ 'there is', and translates the clause, "But since there is a furthest limit," p. 86 (he has no note on this verse in his commentary). DK also takes it so: "Aber da eine letzte Grenze vorhanden" (I.238). ἔν in 13 may be a quotation, although Diels does not so punctuate it, from B 8.6 (= 145.6).

147.14 - 16. εἰ . . . ἰδρῶσθαι. Simplicius argues against equating the one being with the One, but does allow that Parmenides might have been aware of the latter's transcendent status. The reason he gives is that the One is inexpressible (ἄρρητον 16) but Parmenides gives his being such attributes as 'one', 'unique', 'limit', and 'limited'; cf. also in Phys 120.20-28. Even the name 'one' should not be given to the One; cf. in Phys 88.31-33.

147.14. ἓν ὅν does not appear as a phrase in the extant verses of Parmenides, although at B 8.6 (= 145.6) Parmenides does say that being (έόν from B 8.4 = 145.4) is 'one' ἓν .

147.15. μονογενές is a prose rendition of μουνογενές of B 8.4 (= 145.4); cf. 144.18. Simplicius also quotes B 8.4 at in Phys 30.2, 78.13, and 120.23*, and in Cael 557.18*.

147.15. πέρας μὲν "τετελεσμένον" δέ. B 8.42 (= 146.15) is quoted in part here; πέρας is a prose version of πεῖρας. Since in 147.14 Simplicius seems to take πεῖρας πύματον (B 8.42) as the predicate of τὸ έόν, he allows that one might be led to conclude that the One is at issue; here he argues that this 'limit' is also 'limited', which is an impossible attribute for the One.

147.15 - 16. τάχα . . . ἰδρῦσθαι. Here, as at in Phys 29.15-18 and 100.22-23, Simplicius tentatively ascribes to Parmenides awareness of the One. At in Phys 88.31-33 he states that in the Parmenides Plato accepts Parmenides's one being and from it discovers what is beyond it (τὸ ὑπὲρ έκεινο); one can infer that Parmenides himself did not or was not able to do so. Simplicius holds nearly the opposite opinion from Proclus on Parmenides's awareness of the One; see Chapter III, pp. 70-71 and note 84 (p. 84). However, Simplicius follows Proclus's interpretation of the Parmenides and of Parmenides's role therein; see Chapter III, p. 70.

147.16 - 148.24. πῶς . . . ἐπεμβάλλοντες. Simplicius considers the second issue of the whole passage (142.28-148.24), how or why do both Plato and Aristotle refute Parmenides's doctrine of the one being; compare 142.30-3 with 147.16-17. This issue is all the more urgent now that Simplicius has shown that the one being can only be the intelligible (142.31-147.16). He feels the need to explain how Plato and Aristotle could have criticized so sublime an entity as the intelligible (cf. in Phys 88.22-23). The explanation he offers is that both misidentified the one being and that their refutations are not directed therefore against the intelligible; he argues that both make use of the intelligible in their own philosophies (147.17-22). This section falls into three parts: 1) Plato's refutation (147.17-148.7); 2) Aristotle's refutation (7-11); 3) a defense or apology of both refutations (11-22).

147.16 - 17. πῶς . . . Παρμενίδην. At 142.30-31 Simplicius states that he is going to investigate why or against what the refutations of the one being arise; here he specifies that Plato and Aristotle are the authors of these refutations.

147.17 - 148.6. ἥ . . . ὄντος. Plato's refutation of Parmenides's one being is here examined, albeit in a disjointed manner. A paraphrase, it is hoped, will bring out its underlying structure. Simplicius states that Plato tries to refute Parmenides on two counts: 1) that he, Parmenides, says that being is one; and 2) that he ut-

terly abolishes non-being (147.17-19). Simplicius discredits the attack on 1) (147.21-22) and 2) (147.22-148.6) by claiming that Plato's refutation is based on the intellectual order, which (by definition) is pluralistic and includes non-being (147.19-27, 148.3-5), whereas Parmenides's one being is the intelligible, which neither is pluralistic nor includes non-being (148.5-6). He also attempts on independent grounds to reject 2); that is, that Parmenides did not utterly abolish non-being. He argues that Parmenides allows qualified non-being to reside among the opinables (147.27-30), and only abolishes absolute non-being (147.31). Interspersed in this argument is some polemic directed against Plato. In 148.3-5, for example, Simplicius deprecates Plato's proof (ἐπιδείξει) that qualified non-being is found among the Forms (cf. 147.22-25), and in 147.27-148.3 he argues that both Parmenides and Plato agree both on qualified and absolute non-being; cf. section VII. At in Phys 88. 30-90.22 Plato's refutation is discussed and quoted in toto; Sophist 244b6-245e5 = 89.5-90.20.

147.18 - 19. διχῶς . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν. Both grounds come from the Sophist. The first, that Parmenides's claim that being is one (τὸ ἓν λέγειν τὸ ὄν 18) is open to objection, is found at 244b6-245e2. Plato formulates both a linguistic (244b6-d13) and a part-whole argument (244d14-245e2) argument against this claim; cf. Chapter I pp. 20-26. The second, that Parmenides utterly abolished non-being (τὸ τελέως ἀναιρεῖν τὸ μὴ ὄν 18-19), is at issue throughout 237a3-

258e5, and specifically refuted at 241d5-258e5 (note 258c6-35); cf. notes to 143.28-144.1 above.

147.19 -20. ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ διακεκριμένου διακόσμου τὴν ἀντιλογίαν πεποιήται: 'he [Plato] makes his refutation on the basis of the intellectual and (or 'i.e.') separated order'. At 143.18-144.1 (cf. notes above) Simplicius argues that Parmenides's one being cannot be the intellectual.

147.20 -21. ἐν ᾧ . . . ἓν. Simplicius maintains that Parmenides's one being is the intelligible, 'in which there is a single nature of both one and being' (ἐν ᾧ μία φύσις καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος) at 144.11-14; cf. notes above. On this and the preceding clause, (19-20) cf. in Phys 136.27-31. See further Chapter III, p. 73.

147.21. τὰ μέρη ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου is directed against the part-whole argument of the Sophist (244d14-245e2). As Simplicius states in the following sentence (21-22; cf. also in Phys 51.21-53.7), Plato argues on the basis of parts (ἐκ τούτων) distinct or separate from their whole that the one being is not one by many; cf. Chapter I pp. 24-26, and in Phys 88.33-89.5. Simplicius holds that the separation of parts from the whole (in this case the intelligible) is a feature of the intellectual order and consequently does not apply to Parmenides's one being. Plato's argument rests on his literal interpretation of the sphere-simile, B 8.43-45 (= Sophist 244e3-5; cf.

el-7). Shortly above (146.29-147.2 and cf. in Phys 52.21-53.7) Simplicius rejects such an interpretation.

147.21. ἐκ τούτων refers to the parts (τὰ μέρη) of 21. Cf. Sophist 244e6-7: τοιοῦτόν γε τὸ ὄν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν, and 245b1 τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν συμφέρεται τῷ [ὅλῳ] λόγῳ.

147.22 - 148.6. τὸ . . . ὄντος. Parmenides's alleged absolute rejection of non-being (144.18-19) is considered. As noted above (to 147.17-148.6) several arguments are interwoven throughout. Simplicius is particularly concerned to prove that Parmenides only banished absolute non-being (147.31), while allowing qualified non-being a place among the opinables (147.27-28).

147.22 - 23. τὸ . . . ἑτερότητας. Cf. 143.27-28 and Sophist 258d5-e3.

147.23 - 25. δι' ἣν . . . ἔστι. Cf. Sophist 255e3-6, 258d5-e3, 259a4-b6, and Chapter I, pp. 20-22; further, in Phys 136.21-23.

147.25 - 27. καὶ . . . διαστατικῶς. τοῦτο picks up τὸ μὴ ὄν (22) 'non-being'; ὅπου . . . ἑτερότης is a near verbatim repetition of 143.27-28; cf. also in Phys 100.21-22. The next two clauses specify the loci (note ἐκεῖ πάντως 147.25) and modes of being of non-be-

ing; it is found among the intellectual(s) as a Form (i.e. otherness) (26-27), and among the perceptibles separately (διστατικῶς) (27).

That is, the separation and otherness which usher in or are equivalent to non-being, are realized as logically discrete Forms in the intellectual, and as physically discrete objects in the perceptible order. Simplicius is hammering home his contention that non-being has no place at all in the intelligible, which is totally devoid of separation.

147.27 - 30. τοῦτο . . . ἡγούμενος. Simplicius argues that Parmenides himself posits qualified non-being among the opinables; this is to show that Parmenides, Plato to the contrary, did not absolutely abolish non-being (147.18-19). However, Simplicius argues more from doctrines set out by Plato in the Sophist than from Parmenides himself (cf. in Phys 137.10-20). Since Parmenides calls his ordering of mortal opinions 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν), and since deception (ἀπάτη) involves qualified non-being, Parmenides therefore 'manifestly allows' this kind of non-being among the opinables. Compare ὅπου . . . ἡγούμενος (147.29-30) with Sophist 260c3-6: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πού τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον. - οὕτως. - ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἐστὶν ἀπάτη: and 240e10-241a1 καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδῆς οὕτω κατὰ ταῦτά νομισθῆσεται τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι. (Cf. B 6.8-9 for this last phrase.)

At 240d1 ἀπατῶν and d2 ἀπατητικῇν are used of the sophist and his

art respectively.

147.28. ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς. As mentioned previously (notes to 38.26, 39.10 section III), it is unclear that Parmenides himself used the word 'opinable' (δοξαστόν). Here (cf. 147.27) as in in Phys 38.26 it is simply synonymous with 'perceptible' (αἰσθητόν).

147.28 -29. ἀπατηλὸν . . . δόξας is a close paraphrase of B 8.51-52 (= 146.24-25); it might even be termed a 'prose' translation of these verses. ἀπατηλὸν, κόσμον, and δόξας are quoted directly; ἐπῶν and βροτείους are prose equivalents of ἐπέων and βροτείας : but on the latter cf. in Phys 30.18, 38.34.

147.29 - 30. ὅπου . . . ἡγούμενος. Cf. note to 142.27 above. Simplicius's argument is etymological: ἀπάτη (29) and ἀπατᾶται (30) pick up ἀπατηλὸν (B 8.52 = 146.25) of Parmenides (147.28). It is conceivable that Plato's doctrine of falsehood or false statement in the Sophist draws, in some degree, from Parmenides. Cf. note to 147.27-30 above.

147.31 - 148.3. τὸ . . . λέγομεν". Simplicius argues that far from refuting Parmenides for abolishing absolute non-being, Plato is wholly in accord with him (cf. 148.18-19). Conversely, in 147.27-30 he argues that they also agree in not abolishing qualified non-being.

147.31. τὸ μέντοι παντελῶς μὴ ὄν οὐχ ὁ Παρμενίδης μόνος ἀναιρεῖ.

Cf. in Phys 243.32 ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης εἰς τὸ ἀπλῶς μὴ ὄν ἀποβλέπων ἀναιρεῖ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. also note to 148.3-6 below.

147.30 - 148.3. ἀλλὰ . . . λέγομεν". Simplicius's proof for his contention that Plato as well as Parmenides did away with absolute non-being is Sophist 258e6-8 (= 147.32-148.3; 258d7-259a4 = in Phys 238.24-239.3). At in Phys 135.18-136.10 Sophist 258c6-259b6 is quoted to refute Alexander's claim that Plato introduces absolute non-being (cf. in Phys 135.15-17, 136.31-32; and below 10-12). (258e 6-7 (= in Phys 136.12-13) is singled out as evidence sufficient to refute Alexander.) Parmenides's injunction about non-being, B 7.1-2, is quoted at Sophist 258d2-3 (= in Phys 258d2-3) to iterate its groundlessness. At in Phys 78.5 Simplicius paraphrases B 7.2 (= 78.6) thus: καὶ Παρμενίδης ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ὄν ζητούσης. In the present passage, the phrase which introduces the quotation is similar: ὁ Πλάτων, ὅς γε καὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἀποφεύγει τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ (31-32). Simplicius's contention that there is agreement between Plato and Parmenides on absolute non-being is slightly ironic.

148.3 - 6. καὶ . . . ὄντος. In the foregoing (147.17-148.3) Simplicius has distinguished three varieties of non-being: 1) absolute non-being (147.3); 2) qualified non-being in the intellectual (147.26-27); and 3) qualified non-being in the perceptible order (147.31-148.3). He argues that although Plato and Parmenides concur in

abolishing 1) (147.31-148.3), since Parmenides allows 3) (147.27-30), he does not absolutely abolish non-being (cf. 147.18-19). (Simplicius mentions Plato's position on 3) at in Phys 100.23-26.) In the present passage Simplicius contends that Plato's proof of the existence of 2) is 'nothing extraordinary' (οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν) (3-5). That 2) is not found in the intelligible at all is stated in 5-6.

148.4 - 5. οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. That this demonstration is 'nothing surprising' may be based solely on the Neoplatonic tenet that the intellectual order is pluralistic and admits of otherness (cf. 147.10-12, 25-27 where Simplicius states that this is 'clear' (δῆλον)). On the other hand, Simplicius's reply to Plato may be of a more general nature: that his refutation is circular. Since Plato assumes the existence of five kinds in the Sophist, including otherness, his proof of the plurality of 'being' or 'what is' and of the existence of non-being (= other) is a trivial consequence. At any rate, this somewhat sarcastic remark about Plato's refutation of Parmenides has a close parallel at in Phys 52.21-53.7, especially 53.6-7 οὐδὲν δυσκολόν.

148.4 - 5. ἐν . . . ἐπιδειξῆαι. Cf. 147.22-24 (τὸ . . . ἔστι.). Cf. further in Phys 244.3-5, 245.31-246.2.

148.5 - 6. ἐν . . . ὄντος. Simplicius repeats, in expanded form, 144.19-20: τοῦτω [τῷ ἐν ὄντι] δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁμοῦ πᾶν καὶ τὸ μηδαμῇ χάραν

ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ὄν. The latter 'conclusion' is based on B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), which Simplicius similarly paraphrases at 143.29-30 and 243.31-33; B 7.2 is paraphrased at in Phys 78.5, 650.11-12, 14; cf. 100.22. ὀλοτελής "quite complete" (LSJ s.v. p. 1219) does not appear in Parmenides, but Simplicius uses it to describe the intelligible here and at in Phys 650.5-6, 1155.7. It may be a gloss on τετελεσμένον B 8.42 (= 146.15); cf. 147.15 and especially in Phys 29.10-12. For νοητόν cf. e.g. in Phys 80.4, 144.12, 23. ὅν πάντα ὄντι πρὸ ὄντως ἡνωμένως cf. 144.12-14, 147.10-12, and 88.5-8.

148.7 - 11. ὁ . . . προειλημμένης. Simplicius now takes up Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides; cf. 142.30-31, 147.16-17. He discounts it as being based on a (dichotomous) division, which applies to the world of becoming and not to the intelligible. A fuller discussion of this refutation appears at in Phys 71.26-73.4 (at 73.2-4 Simplicius states that his account for the most part follows that of Porphyry); cf. also 88.11-29. Simplicius's reply to both Plato and Aristotle is that they misidentified the one being; the former with the intellect, the latter soul (cf. 147.2-12).

148.7. ὁ μέντοι Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκ διαιρέσεως τὴν ἀντιλογίαν. Cf. in Phys 71.26-29: διὸ τὸν Παρμενίδου καὶ Μελίσσου λόγου ἐλέγχειν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης προθέμενος . . . ἐκ διαιρέσεως ἀνασκειυάων.

148.7 - 9. ἡ . . . συμβεβηκός is a paraphrase of Physics 185a21-b5.

Only the phrase *πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν* is quoted from Aristotle.

148.9 -11. καὶ . . . προειλημμένης. Simplicius argues that if this division/separation into substance and accident become manifest in the world of coming to be, that is because it is precontained in the intellectual division as an effect. Consequently, it (or its products) has nothing to do with the intelligible. Simplicius may have, for οὐσία (8) at any rate, 144.2-11 (especially 8-11) in mind. Further, since one of the signs of the one being is its being indivisible (B 8.22 = 145.3), a refutation based on division belies ignorance on the part of its author. For the second clause, τῆς . . . προειλημμένης, cf. in Phys 88.20-22, 24-29, and 137.27-30.

148.11 - 24. μηδεὶς . . . ἐπεμβάλλοντες. Simplicius concludes the whole passage (142.28 ff) with a defense of Plato's and Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides (11-22), and an apology for his own metaphysical excursus (22-24). Simplicius does not so much defend these refutations, which he rejects in 147.16 - 148.11, as offer mitigating circumstances for their evaluation. He maintains that both Plato and Aristotle set forth the 'misunderstandings' of their predecessors in a generous way (11-13), and also testify to Parmenides's wisdom (13-17). In 17-22 he finds a consensus among the three on the one being; he makes no mention of a conscious debt of the two to Parmenides, but rather implies that they are ultimately in accord with him despite their misguided refutations. Cf. in Phys 36.25-

37.9.

148.11 - 13. μηδεὶς . . . προαναστέλλουσιν. Simplicius's claim that both Plato and Aristotle are 'generous' in their criticisms of the conceptions of others is questionable. Plato, for example, is fairly contemptuous of Thrasymachus in Republic I. Similarly, Aristotle accuses Anaxagoras of not understanding his own words in De Generatione et Corruptione 314a13 (which Simplicius quotes at in Phys 163.12-13), and uses the terms ἀγροικότερος (Metaphysics A 986b27) and φορτικός (Physics 185a10-11) of Melissus; cf. note to 148.16-17 below.

148.12. φιλανθρώπως. Cf. in Phys 88.30-31: Ὅτι δὲ οὐ διὰ φιλερεστίαν ἢ πρὸς Παρμενίδην ἀντιλογία γέγονε, δηλοῖ καὶ Πλάτων.

148.12 - 13. τὰς γενησομένας παρανοίας defies translation. παρανοοῦειν and its derivatives in this work (in Phys 700.20, 821.28, 1177.18; Index Verborum s.v. p. 1414) mean 'to be mistaken', 'to misunderstand'; but to speak of 'setting forth one's future misunderstandings' is incomprehensible. The simplest remedy is to emend γενησομένας to γενομένας: 'the misunderstandings of old'; cf. in Phys 36.25-28.

148.14 - 16. ὁ . . . παραδίδους. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus and Parmenides respectively. βάθος παντάπασι γενναῖον is

quoted from Theaetetus 183e8: καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. (As Diels notes (ad in Phys 36.31), Simplicius apparently confuses this quotation with one made concerning Heraclitus.) καὶ διδάσκαλον . . . παραδίδους (15-16) is a general reference to the Parmenides, although the 'training' (γυμνασία 135d7) may be intended. Further, at in Phys 88.31-33 Simplicius states that in the Parmenides Plato uses Parmenides's doctrine of the one being to discover the One and therefrom relates the orders of the one (cf. note to 148.17-18 below). He is in accord with Proclus's interpretation of Parmenides's one being in the Parmenides; cf. in Parm 1033.22-1036.23 and Chapter III, p. 70.

148.16 - 17. ὁ δὲ . . . ἀντιδιαστέλλων. As is the case with Plato (14-16), Simplicius cites two examples of Aristotle's awareness of Parmenides's wisdom. The first, ὁ . . . ὑπονοῶν (16), contains in που βλέπειν a truncated quotation from Metaphysics A 986b26-28 (i.e. ἀλλαχοῦ): οἱ μὲν δύο καὶ πάντων ὡς ὄντες μικρὸν ἀγροικότεροι, Ξενοφάνης καὶ Μέλισσος· Παρμενίδης δὲ μᾶλλον βλέπων ἔοικέ που λέγειν (cf. Physics 186a31-31). Cf. in Phys 37.1-2. The second, πρὸς . . . ἀντιδιαστέλλων (17) refers to Physics 184b16-17. Simplicius follows Alexander in seeing Aristotle here contrasting Parmenides and Melissus with the physicists; cf. in Phys 40.23-25 (and Diels' note), 41.2-3, 148.29-149.2.

148.17 - 22. ἐπεὶ . . . θεασάμενος. Simplicius sets out the agree-

ment among Plato, Aristotle, and Parmenides on the one being. However he does not state how this agreement serves to reveal Plato's and Aristotle's awareness of Parmenides's wisdom, nor again whether this agreement is fortuitous or belies a (conscious ?) debt of the two to Parmenides. A possible explanation is that Plato and Aristotle, by independently adopting the one being, ultimately testify to Parmenides's profundity. At in Phys 87.7-88.30, however, Simplicius states that both take over Parmenides's doctrine, not that they arrive at it independently. Cf. sections VII, VIII, and IX.

148.17 - 18. ὁ Πλάτων . . . ἀνυμνῶν. Simplicius appears to have the second hypothesis of the Parmenides (142b1-155e3, esp. 142c9-143a2) in mind; cf. in Phys 87.24-88.11, 30-33, and Chapter III, pp. 70-71. He may simply intend 128a8-b1, in which Parmenides is explicitly praised both for his doctrine and his proofs thereof; there is no explicit praise in the second hypothesis.

148.19 - 20. Ἀριστοτέλης . . . πολυκοιρανίη". The reference is to Metaphysics Α 1069a1-1076a4, especially 1071b3-1076a4, where Aristotle argues for the existence of a single, immaterial, imperishable substance which is the unmoved mover (i.e. final cause) of the whole universe, and which is the content of its own thought. αὐτό (19) refers to this entity; cf. in Phys 87.7-18. The quotation, οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη (148.20 = 87.10), is proximately from Metaphysics Α 1076a4 and ultimately from Iliad 2.204; cf.

Politics 1292a13-15.

148.20. πρότερον αὐτοῦ seems to indicate that Parmenides's anticipation of Aristotle in equating νοῦς with νοεῖν (20-22) is purely chronological, since there is no mention of direct or conscious influence. At in Phys 87.11-18, however, Simplicius states that Aristotle took (λαβὼν 13) this doctrine from both Plato and Parmenides.

148.21 - 22. ὅτι . . . θεασάμενος refers to Aristotle alone. In addition to the equation here of intellect and intelligible, ταῦτόν ἐκεῖ νοῦς καὶ νοητόν (cf. in Phys 87.11-18, 144.25, De Anima 430a2-8, and Metaphysics Δ 1072b20-21, 1074b33-35, 1075a3-5), the other terms of the equation, οὐσία καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια, are clearly Aristotelian. Simplicius is also claiming that in the unmoved mover of Metaphysics Δ all these entities are one; cf. e.g. 1071b2-3, 12-15, 1072a3-10. Cf. in Phys 29.15-18.

148.22 - 24. ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπεμβαλλόντες. For similar apologies cf. in Phys 39.20-21, 88.11-12, and 90.20-22. The proverb quoted here, ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα πηδᾶν 'to leap beyond the bounds', is found at Cratylus 413a7-b1: δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἔρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι.

in Phys 162.11 - 22. καὶ γὰρ . . . φῶν; Simplicius takes up Parmenides's proof that real being is uncreated (ἀγένητον), and in particular his denial and reason for denying that being comes to be from non-being (13-22; B 8.6-10 = 162.18-22). This passage occurs in the larger context of a discussion of Anaxagoras's doctrine of the homoiomerics (cf. 186a27-31). Closely following Aristotle (cf. 187a27-29), Simplicius says that one of the two reasons why Anaxagoras was led to this doctrine was his acceptance of the 'doctrine common to the physicists', nihil ex nihilo (162.7-11; the second reason is set out in 163.31 ff.). Simplicius thinks that this doctrine or axiom (cf. 24, 26) is not the common property of the physicists alone, for both Parmenides and Melissus make use of it (11-24). Simplicius here treats of Parmenides to criticize or correct Aristotle (and Alexander cf. in Phys 40.23-41.9), who sets them in contradistinction to the physicists (184b16-17), for his implicit denial that this doctrine is common to the 'anti-physicists' also.

162.11 - 23. καὶ γὰρ καὶ Παρμενίδης . . . καὶ Μέλισσος δέ. Cf. in Phys 87.5-6 for an almost identical construction. A good case can be made for understanding the passage as a criticism of Aristotle. Aristotle does contrast οἱ φυσικοί with Parmenides and Melissus at 184b16-17, and in his discussion of Anaxagoras here uses the expressions: τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν (187a27-28) and περὶ ταύτης ὁμογενικοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως (187a34-35); cf. notes to in Phys 41.5-9. Further, Simplicius asserts that Parme-

nides was the first ancient on record to propound this argument or doctrine of nihil ex nihilo (in Cael 136.30-137.6; B 8.6-9 = 137.3-6). If Ilsetraut Hadot is correct to claim that Simplicius's in Cael antedates his in Phys, it is difficult to avoid finding an ironic criticism of Aristotle here⁶. At in Phys 162.23-24 Simplicius uses the phrase [Μέλισσος] τῷ κοινῷ τούτῳ χρησάμενος ἀξιώματι with τὴν κοινὴν τῶν φυσικῶν in mind; cf. in Phys 103.13-15. At in Phys 162.2-6 Simplicius asserts that Aristotle discusses Anaxagoras after those who say that being is one, because their doctrine, which in effect does away with nature (φύσιν ἀναιρεῖν 5), seems the more absurd. Consequently, that the absurd, anti-physicists Parmenides and Melissus employ this axiom of the physicists is a pointed criticism of Aristotle.

162.11 - 17. καὶ γὰρ . . . ὕστερον. Simplicius presents Parmenides's argument or proof in B 8.6-10 (= 162.18-22) that (real) being is uncreated in the following order: 1) that it does not come to be from being (μήτε . . . ὄν 12-13); 2) that it does not come from non-being (μήτε . . . ἐστὶ 13-14); 3) an additional argument for 2) (τὴν . . . ὕστερον 14-17). The same order is found in in Phys 78.24-27, which paraphrases B 8.3-14 (= 78.12-23), a fuller quotation of the argument that (real) being is uncreated; cf. 79.29-80.4 and in Cael 136.30-137.6.

162.12. ὅτι ἀγένητον τὸ ὄντως ὄν ἐδείξε. Cf. in Phys 78.24-25,

79.29-30, in Cael 136.32-137.2. Of the various signs or marks of being which Parmenides relates (cf. B 8.2-3), Simplicius makes much of its being uncreated (ἀγένητον B 8.3); cf. in Phys 28.7, 30.4, 78.24-25, 79.29-30, 142.32, 144.32, 144.3-4, 9, 17, 147.16, in Cael 136.32-137.2. In addition to quoting ἀγένητον (12) from B 8.3 (= in Phys 145.3), Simplicius here paraphrases B 8.6-7 (= 162.18-19) τίνα . . . αὔξηθέν. On τὸ ὄντως ὄν cf. note to in Phys 100.22 above.

162.12-13. μήτε . . . ὄν). There is nothing in the extant fragments of Parmenides, and particularly in B 8.6-10, which corresponds to this half of the disjunct (cf. note to 162.11-17 above). The order of the paraphrase, however, might argue for its 'original' being in or between B 8.6-7 (= 162.6-7), for οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ εὐόντος of B 8.7, which has no correlative in B 8.6-10, is clearly paraphrased at 162.13 μήτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: cf. in Phys 78.25-26. Diels posits a lacuna after αὔξηθέν, which he supplies as follows: < οὐτ' ἐκ τευ εὐόντος ἐγένετ' ἄν· ἄλλο γὰρ ἄν πρὶν ἔην· > οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ εὐόντος. (Kranz, however, thinks that B 8.6-7 'self-evidently' sets forth coming to be and growth from being DK I.235 note to line 8.)⁷ Tarán emends B 8.12 to get the positive half of the disjunct, pp. 82, 95-102.

162.13 - 14. μήτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος repeats nearly verbatim B 8.7 = 162.19. Cf. in Phys 78.25-26 οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος and B 8.12 (= 78.21).

162.13 - 14. δεῖ γὰρ ἔκ τινος γίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ.

The first clause, which is explained in what follows (14-17), does not have a parallel in Parmenides (cf. in Phys 78.25-26 where only the second clause, in a slightly different form, appears). The second clause is not a close paraphrase of B 8.7-9 (cf. B 2.5-8 = in Phys 116.30-117.1), but does reflect other statements by Parmenides. That non-being, or its way of inquiry, is nothing both B 6.2 (= in Phys 117.5) μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστι and B 8.10 (= 162.22) τοῦ μηδενός, which Simplicius apparently equates with non-being in 15-16, make clear. Cf. in Phys 78.26 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν.

162.14 - 15. τὴν . . . προσέθηκεν. Simplicius begins his explanation of δεῖ γὰρ ἔκ τινος γίνεσθαι of 162.13, but more importantly sets out the claim that Parmenides added the reason for the 'absolute necessity' (δεῖν πάντως) of the axiom nihil ex nihilo, or rather its corollary that if anything comes to be it comes from being. Simplicius mentions Parmenides (and Melissus) in the passage to prove his accord with the physicists on this axiom (cf. note to 162.11-22); that Parmenides actually formulated a reason for its operation is the heart of the proof. Accordingly, Simplicius shifts from 'real' being, a merely putative candidate for come to be, to the more general '(everything) that comes to be' (τὸ γινόμενον); ὅλως γάρ in the following sentence (15) emphasizes this shift. He assumes that the non-being in question is of the absolute variety, for he argues that Parmenides allowed qualified non-being among the

opinables (in Phys 147.27-30); cf. in Phys 78.28-29. προσέθηκεν 'added' is apparently to be taken in its literal sense; after rejecting 'from non-being' in B 8.7-9 (= 162.19-21), Parmenides added a reason in B 8.9-10 (= 162.21-22).

162.15 - 17. ὅλως . . . ὕστερον; is a free paraphrase of B 8.9-10 (= 21-22) τί δ' ὅν . . . φῶν; Simplicius adds ὅλως γάρ 'for in short, in general' (cf. LSJ s.v. ὅλος III.2 p. 1218) to generalize B 8.9-10 from a statement about 'real' being to 'whatever comes to be' τὸ γινόμενον (15), which is to be supplied as the subject of ἐγένετο (16) and as subject-accusative to γενέσθαι (16). Further, ὅλως picks up δεῖν πάντως of 14. In εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος Simplicius draws either on οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος (B 8.7 = 162.19) or τοῦ μηδενός (B 8.10 = 162.22) to construct a protasis (εἰ) for the apodosis in B 8.9-10 ὅν . . . ᾤρεν . . . ; ἐγένετο is to be supplied by ellipsis from ὅτε ἐγένετο (16). τίς ἡ ἀποκλήρωσις is a gloss on τί . . . χρεός (and perhaps including ᾤρεν) of B 8.9; at in Phys 78.26 the paraphrase of these lines begins with διὰ τί δὴ alone. To judge from LSJ (s.v. p. 202), ἀποκλήρωσις must mean 'choice by lot or chance, unreasonable choice' (the adverbial phrase κατ' ἀποκλήρωσιν "without reason, at random, fortuituously" attested in Galen et al. conveys the sense required here); cf. in Phys 649.10 for the same phrase τίς ἡ ἀποκλήρωσις. (Diels, Index Verborum p. 1377, lists only 649.10 not the present passage for ἀποκλήρωσις: he also cites the verb ἀποκληροῦν med. 923.7 (ἀποκεκλήρωται, the form in question,

seems in fact to have a passive sense). τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ μή is Simplicius's addition; cf. in Phys 78.26-27. γενέσθαι may, however, be a gloss on ἀρξάμενον φῶν of B 8.10 (= 162.22). Finally, πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον is the inverse of the poetic hysteron proteron of ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν B 8.10 (= 22), πρότερον being substituted for πρόσθεν: cf. in Phys 78.27.

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12. εἰ . . . τὸ ὄν; Simplicius refutes Philoponus's claim that the ancients thought that there was coming to be from non-being, and that non-being therefore exists (136.18-20, 27-29). He mentions Parmenides as the first to have propounded the antithetical theseis that nothing comes to be from non-being (136.32-137.2), and as proof quotes B 8.6-9 (= 137.3-6); cf. in Phys 77.9-29, 162.11-22. A second point of interest is that Simplicius here censures Philoponus, as he did Alexander (in Phys 80.15-17), for failing to read the ancients with sufficient care.

136.18 - 26. "εἰ . . . παρήχθη" is quoted from Philoponus's work VI Libri τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ αἰδιότητος κοσμοῦ); cf. Index Nominum s.v. Ioannes Philoponus p. 771 and in Diels (in Phys) pp. 1447-1448. Simplicius's contempt for Philoponus, whom he does not deign to call by his proper name (cf. Indices mentioned above), takes on a nearly comical tone in in Cael 119.12-13 φέρε, τὸν μέγιστον Ἡρακλέα παρακαλέσαντες συνεργὸν ἐπὶ τὴν

κάθαρσιν τῆς κόπρου τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ καταβαινώ-
μεν and again in 135.31-136.1 ὅποτε καὶ νῦν οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως
τὸ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους σαφηνίσαι προθέμενος
εἰς τὴν Αὐγέου κόπρον ἐμπέπτωκα.

136.26 - 27. ἐν . . . ἀκηκώς. Although Simplicius sets forth a
disjunction here, it is clear that he endorses the second half; cf.
in Phys 38.24-28 (esp. 24, 26) and 79.5-12 (esp. 5, 7), both concer-
ning Alexander. The second half ἢ οὗτος φαίνεται τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγων
ἀσυνέτως ἀκηκώς is similar to in Phys 80.16-17 Ἀλέξανδρον ξηρό-
τερον καὶ ἀφερεπονῶς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀκούειν δογμάτων.

136.29 - 32. ἀλλ' . . . ἀδράνειαν. Simplicius twice states the
principle nihil ex nihilo; cf. in Phys 162.10, 27 and the quotation
of Physics at in Cael 137.7-11. The phrase (διὰ) τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
ἀδράνειαν 'the non-efficiency of non-being' (cf. LSJ s.v. ἀδράνεια
II p. 24) has a parallel in in Phys 815.23-24; it may echo B 8.8-9
(= 137.5-6). Simplicius mentions an efficient cause (ποιητικὸν αἷτιον)
(136.31 -32) to confute Philoponus's claim that there is creation
ex nihilo by God (137.16-20).

136.32 - 137.2. καὶ γὰρ . . . γέγραφε. Simplicius takes B 8.6-9 as
proving that Parmenides argued against 'from non-being' only. In
his paraphrase of B 8.6-10 (= in Phys 162.18-22) in 162.11-15 and of
B 8.3-14 (= in Phys 78.12-23) in 78.24-29 he speaks of 'from being'

only. (On the other hand, Aristotle's version of the dilemma below (137.7-11) contains both halves.) In both passages from in Phys Simplicius speaks of Parmenides's 'real' being (162.12) or 'being proper' (78.11, 24), while he adds no such qualification here.

136.32 - 137.1. καὶ γὰρ Παρμενίδης ὁ πρῶτος, ὃν ὁμοῦ ἴσμεν, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶν. Cf. in Phys 162.11, 14-15, 23 and esp. 27-28.

At in Phys 162.11-28 Simplicius does not state the relative chronology of the philosophers whom he mentions as being aware of or formulating this 'principle', the physicists, Parmenides, Melissus, and Anaxagoras (in order). Here he ascribes to Parmenides priority only in 'report/hearsay' (cf. LSJ s.v. ὁμοῦ I p. 51), not in time. On the phrase πρῶτος . . . ἴσμεν cf. in Phys 785.14.

137.1 - 2. ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι περὶ τοῦ ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 78.24-25, 79.29-31, 142.32-33, 162.12. (τοῦ) ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸ ὄν is a partial gloss on B 8.3 (= in Phys 30.1, 78.12, 142.36, 145.3), which Simplicius does not quote in in Cael.

137.3 - 6 = B 8.6-9 (= in Phys 78.15, 145.6-9, 162.18-21).

137.6 - 11 = Physics 191a27-31.

V. The Doxa.

A. Passages.

in Phys 25.14 - 16 Tr. p. 284Verses DK 28DK I25.15 - 16 = 222.34-36
(A 34)in Phys 30.14 - 31.17 Tr. pp. 288-289

30.17-19 B 8.50-52 30.14 - 31.2 = 234.20-25

30.23 - 31.2 B 8.53-59

31.13-17 B 12.2-6 31.10 - 17 = 242.7-9

in Phys 34.12 - 17 Tr. p. 291

34.14 - 16 = 242.10-11

in Phys 38.20 - 39.20 Tr. pp. 295-297

38.30 - 39.9 B 8.50-51 38.28 - 39.9 = 234.18-20

39.10 - 12 = 223.32-34
(A 34)

39.14-16 B 12.1-3 39.12 = 242.5-7

39.18 B 13.1 39.18 - 20 = 243.12-15

in Phys 80.3 - 4 Tr. pp. 317-318in Phys 87.5 - 6 Tr. p. 321in Phys 146.26 - 29 Tr. p. 371

147.28 - 29 = 234.25-26

in Phys 179.29 - 180.13 Tr. p. 378

180.1-7 B 8.53-59 179.31 - 180.7 = 234.26-29

180.9-12 B 9.1-4 180.8 - 13 = 240.7-9

in Phys 274.20 - 26 Tr. p. 388

in Cael 556.3 - 560.10 Tr. pp. 397-402

556.25 - 30 = 220.26-29
(A 14)

557.18 B 8.4

557.25 - 558.2 B 1.28-32 557.20 - 558.2 = 228.12-16

558.5-7 B 8.50-52

558.9-12 B 19.1-3 558.8 - 11 = 245.13-17

559.17 B 8.21

559.22-25 B 11.1-4 559.20 - 27 = 241.19-
242.4

in Cael 691.4 - 7 Tr. p. 406

in Phys 25.14 - 16 = Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 3 DG
477.12-14

38.20 - 24 Cf. Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 6
DG 482.5-13 n

188.32 - 189.1 = Prophyry Commentarius in Physica 188b30-189a7

189.1 = 21 B 29 (Xenophanes)

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius remarks on and quotes from the Doxa in order to justify two basic claims he makes concerning Parmenides: that the Aletheia and the Doxa each treat of a different order of reality, the noetic and phenomenal, and that his physical doctrines are in harmony with the other ancient physiologists (οἱ παλαιοὶ φυσιολόγοι in Phys 188.13). In in Cael 556.3-560.10 Simplicius argues at length that the Aletheia treats of intelligible, real being (τὸ

νοητὸν καὶ ὄντως ὄν 558.19), whereas the Doxa concerns perceptible, created, 'seeming' being (αἰσθητόν, γινόμενον, δοκοῦν ὄν 557.22-23); cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 38.19-20, 80.3-4. Moreover, in this part Parmenides accounts for the creation (γένεσις) of the entire cosmos, from the heavenly bodies down to the parts of animals (in Cael 559.20-27; cf. in Phys 31.10-12). Simplicius also claims that Parmenides posits both (qualified) non-being (in Phys 147.27) and bodies (in Phys 87.5-6) in the perceptible order. Simplicius synonymously calls that which constitutes this order 'perceptible' (αἰσθητόν), 'created' (γενητόν, γινόμενον), 'opinionable' (δοξαστόν), and 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν): see in Phys 30.15, 20, 87.5, 144.5, 146.27, 147.27-30, in Cael 557.22, 24, 558.4, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 559.18, 20, 26.

The second claim contains two parts. Parmenides posits a pair of opposite, elemental (στοιχειώδης) principles, variously described as hot-cold (θερμόν - ψυχρόν), fire-earth (πῦρ - γῆ), or light-night/darkness (φῶς - νύξ / σκότος); in Phys 25.14-16, 30.20-22, 31.7-9, 39.12, 179.31-33, 180.13, 274.24, in Cael 691.5-6. Simplicius follows Aristotle in claiming that the physiologists agree that the principles of physical objects are opposites; cf. 188a19-27, and in Phys 31.9-10, 34.12-14, 36.15-20. Secondly, Parmenides, along with the more discerning of the ancient philosophers (in Phys 7.1-3, 21.15-19, 36.18-20), posits an efficient cause, the divinity (δαίμων), for all coming to be; in Phys 31.10-12, 34.14-16, 38.27-39.20, in Cael 559.20-27.

Simplicius's treatment of the Doxa is perfunctory, relative to

that of the Aletheia. He quotes less extensively and frequently from the former than the latter, and shows no interest in the actual workings of Parmenides's physical scheme. The principle reason for this neglect is Simplicius's Neoplatonic bias for the noetic as against the perceptible world; see in Phys 4.17-5.25 (esp. 5.10-20), where he argues that the study of physics is a propaedeutic for metaphysics (see also in Phys 148.22-24). A secondary reason is to be attributed to the crudeness of Parmenides's physical doctrines. His elements or elemental principles are only proximate (προσέχης), while Democritus, the Pythagoreans, and others formulate yet more fundamental (ἀρχοειδέστερος) elements (in Phys 35.22-36.7, 15-20).

C. Commentary.

in Phys 25.14 - 16. τῶν . . . σιότος). Simplicius quotes mediate from Theophrastus's Physicorum Opiniones (fr. 3 DG 477.12-14 = 25.14-16; fr. 3 DG 477.12-478.15 = 25.14-26.4). Diels maintains that Simplicius never saw the Physicorum Opiniones, but quotes or excerpts from Alexander's excerpts (DG 102-118 esp. 112-113). Since he has numerous other commentaries at his disposal, it is likely that Simplicius sometimes quotes Theophrastus through some other intermediary; cf. in Phys 188.30-34 and Philoponus in Phys 125.27-28. Cf. in Phys 38.18 (≈ 71.6) and fr. 6 DG 482^a21.

25.16. ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν. Cf. in Phys 38.20-24 (Alexander) ≈ 71.6-8, 179.30-31; Philoponus in Phys 55.29-30, 110.2-3, 116.18-19, 126.1.

25.16. πῦρ καὶ γῆν. Cf. in Phys 30.21, 38.20 (Alexander), 179.32, 274..24, in Cael 691.5-6.

25.16. (ἡ μᾶλλον φῶς καὶ σκότος). Cf. in Phys 30.20-21, 38.23-24 (Alexander), 179.32-33 and notes.

in Phys 34.12 - 17. πλὴν . . . ἐθεόσατο. At the conclusion of his discussion of Empedocles (31.18-34.12), Simplicius states that he and Parmenides are in accord both on the opposition of elemental principles and that there is at least one efficient cause but that, while Parmenides posits a single efficient cause, Empedocles posits opposition in his efficient causes as well (34.12-17). This statement is intended to strengthen the claim in in Phys 28.32-29.5, that the seemingly contradictory opinions of the ancients on the principles of nature may be harmonized; cf. in Phys 36.15-20 and 188a19-27. (He makes a similar claim concerning the metaphysical side as well; cf. in Phys 29.5-8, 34.26-27, 36.15-20.) Simplicius here recapitulates his discussion of the Doxa in in Phys 30.14-31.17, and will revert to these same points in 38.24-39.20 (contra Alexander). See Section III, pp. 103-116, for these two passages.

34.12 - 13. πλὴν καὶ οὗτος [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς]. Cf. in Phys 31.18-34.12, esp. 31.29 and Diels's note.

34.13. οὐδὲν ἐνάντιον Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Μελίσσῃ φθέγγεται. Cf. in Phys

29.4, 30.13-14, 36.15-20. The agreement, or rather lack of contradiction, among Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus is on the intelligible or noetic order, particularly in its unified stage (in Phys 29.5-8, 31.18-19, 21-22); between Empedocles and Parmenides it is on the perceptible order as well (in Phys 30.14-31.23, 34.14). See pp. 87-92.

34.14. τήν τε στοιχειώδη ἀντίθεσιν ὥς καὶ Παρμενίδης ἐθεάσατο. Cf. in Phys 30.20, 31.7. Simplicius maintains that Empedocles locates the opposition (ἐναντίωσις) among his four elements in the principles, i.e. efficient causes, Love and Strife, rather than in these material principles themselves (31.29-31).

34.14 - 16. ποιητικὸν . . . τίθησιν. Cf. in Phys 31.10-12, 38.27-28, 39.12-20.

34.15. Ἐν κοινόν. Simplicius may mean that Parmenides's divinity combines the functions of unification (σύγκρισις) and separation (διώρισις), which have distinct agents in Empedocles's Φιλία and Νεῖκος: cf. in Phys 31.21-23, 32.2-3, 157.25-27, 161.13-20.

34.15 - 16. τὴν ἐν μέσῳ πάντων ἰδρυμένην καὶ πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίαν δαίμονα is a close paraphrase of B 12.3-4 (= in Phys 31.14-15; B 12.4 = 39.16); cf. the similar paraphrase at in Phys 31.10-12. ἐν μέσῳ . . . δαίμονα is a quotation, in oratio obliqua, of B 12.3

ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων. πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίαν is based on B 12.4
πάντα γὰρ <ἦ> στυγεροῦτο τόκου καὶ μίξις ἀρχεῖ.

34.16 - 17. οὗτος . . . ἐθεάσατο. Cf. in Phys 31.20-21, 30-31.

in Phys 179.27 - 180.13. Simplicius does little more than expand Aristotle's statement in 188a20-22 that even Parmenides, one of the akinetic monists, made hot and cold, which he called fire and earth, a pair of opposite principles. He adds that Parmenides also called these principles light (φῶς) and night (νύξ) or darkness (σκότος) and introduced them in the Doxa not the Aletheia (179.31-33). B 8. 53-59 (= 180.1-7) and B 9.1-4 (= 180.9-12) are quoted, and B 9.4 is paraphrased (13) to corroborate Aristotle's statement.

In στοιχειώδεις (179.28) 'elemental' Simplicius echoes the distinction he first draws in in Phys 6.35-7.19 that physiologists proper inquire into elemental principles, metaphysicians final and efficient causes; cf. pp. 87-92. Simplicius's perfunctory treatment of Parmenides's principles here is largely due to his fuller discussion of them in in Phys 30.14-31.4, 7-10 and 39.12-13. On the other hand, the Neoplatonic predilection for the noetic over the perceptible is reflected in his genuine interest in the Aletheia and relative neglect of the Doxa; cf. in Phys 39.20-21, 148.122-24 (and 5.10-20).

179.27 - 29. δέκνυσσι . . . διαφανῶσι is, with the exception of

δηλονότι . . . στοιχειώδεις, a summary of 188a19-26; that is, that Aristotle here sets forth the agreement of all the physicists in making their principles opposites. In 188b26-189a1 Aristotle states the differences among them, which Simplicius here mentions; cf. in Phys 187.31-190.20, esp. 188.13-16.

179.27 - 28. δηλονότι τῶν φυσικῶν πραγμάτων αἱ στοιχειώδεις is a parenthetical remark, which assumes Simplicius's distinction between the principles of physics, the 'elemental' principles or subsidiary causes, and those of metaphysics, the causes proper, the efficient and final; cf. in Phys 3.13-18, 6.31-7.17, 179.12-14, and pp. 87-92. Simplicius states that Parmenides's principles are elemental or elements at in Phys 30.20, 31.7, 34.14, 39.12. On this construction with δηλονότι cf. in Phys 143.20.

179.29 - 30. οἱ ἐν τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον λέγοντες is a slightly rephrased version of 188a19-20: οἳ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τὸ πᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον.

179.30 - 31. ὥπερ . . . ἀρχάς. Simplicius freely recasts 188a19 τάναντία ἀρχάς ποιοῦσιν, adding the clause ὥπερ Παρμενίδης perhaps to emphasize that Parmenides is an akinetic monist.

179.31 - 32. καὶ γὰρ . . . ποιεῖ. Cf. 188a20-21. Ὅν (τὰ πρὸς) δόξαν cf. in Phys 25.16, 30.16, 38.24-25, in Cael 556.14, 557.24.

Simplicius sometimes refers instead to τὰ δοξαστά, the objects that constitute this part; cf. in Phys 87.5, 146.26-27, 147.28, and Republic V 478e3-5.

179.32. ταῦτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν = 188a21-22. Cf Meta-physics A 986b33-34 and in Phys 146.28-30 for this and the preceding sentence.

179.32 - 33. καὶ φῶς καὶ νύκτα ἦτοι σκότος is Simplicius's own addition. In the quotations which follow, φῶς 'light' is mentioned in B 9.1, 3 (= 180.9, 11) and νύξ 'night' in B 8.59 (= 180.7) and B 9.4 (= 180.11); σκότος 'darkness' does not appear in the extant fragments of Parmenides. Moreover, Parmenides does not speak of the hot (θερμόν) an cold (ψυχρόν) as principles, nor call the latter 'earth' (γῆ), although he does speak of fire (πῦρ) at B 8.56 (= 180.4). Cf. in Phys 25.14-16 (from Theophrastus via Alexander) 30.20-22, 38.20-24 (Theophrastus via Alexander) (cf. 71.6-8), 274.24.

179.33. λέγει γὰρ μέτα τὰ περὶ ἀληθείας. Cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 38.28-29, 39.10-12, 146.26-27, in Cael 557.23-558.17.

180.1 - 7 = B 8.53-59 (= in Phys 30.23-31.2, 39.1-7).

180.8. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα πάλιν. Cf. in Phys 39.12. It is unclear how many verses omits; at in Phys 43.19 μετ' ὀλίγα represents a jump

of 40 lines of an OCT text; 43.15-19 = 52a1-6, 43.19-20 = 53b4-5
(Timaeus).

180.9 - 12 = B 9.1-4.

180.13. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρῳ μέτα μηδέν is a paraphrase of B 9.4 (= 180.12) ἐπεὶ οὐδετέρῳ μέτα μηδέν.

180.13. καὶ . . . δηλοῦται. Simplicius is content to cite B 9.4 alone as proof that Parmenides has a pair of opposite principles; his paraphrase is far from clear. However, at in Phys 30.14-31.2, 7-10 (cf. 38.28-39.13) he discusses B 8.53-59 (= 30.23-31.2) at greater length.

in Phys 188.27 - 189.1. καὶ τὸ . . . φύονται. Aristotle maintains that his predecessors in physics agree that its elements or principles are opposites, but differ in that some assume as elements things which are more knowable in perception and posterior in nature, while others things more knowable in reason and prior by nature (188a26-33). He cites the proponents of hot and cold and the proponents of moist and dry as examples of the former, and the proponents of even and odd and the proponents of Love and Strife of the latter (188b33-36). Simplicius notes (what is already clear from 188b35-36) that Aristotle described hot and cold and moist and dry to things posterior <by nature> (28), and then identifies the proponents of each

pair: Parmenides and Anaximenes respectively (188.28-199.1). He cites Alexander as attributing the second pair either to Parmenides or Empedocles (29-31), but finds Porphyry's attribution to Anaximenes more appropriate (31-32).

188.27. τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν: cf. 188b33.

Aristotle uses the plural οἱ: cf. in Cael 691.5-6 and note.

188.27 - 28. ὥς . . . ἀπένειμε. Cf. 188b31-33, 35-36.

188.28 - 29. τὸν . . . φησί. Cf. 188.30 and 189.29-30. Cf. 188a20-22, Metaphysics A 987b33-34, and in Phys 179.31-32.

188.32. † Ἀναξιμένην. Simplicius, or a later scribe, misreads Anaximenes for Xenophanes (in Porphyry); cf. Philoponus in Phys 125.27-28.

189.1 = 21 B 29.

in Phys 274.20 - 26. ὥστε . . . Ἀριστοτέλης. In 193a9-28 Aristotle sets forth as one of the meanings or uses of 'nature' (φύσις) the material substrate of a thing (cf. esp. 193a28-30). He cites those who state that some one or more of the simple bodies (cf. 192a10-12) is or are the 'nature' of all things to corroborate this meaning or use (193a21-23). Simplicius here identifies the pro-

ponents of these simple bodies, and adds Parmenides as someone who embraced more than one, fire and earth.

274.23. ὡς Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν. Cf. in Phys 25.15-16, 30.21, 179.30. Aristotle uses οἱ in 193a21-23 where the singular is in several instances required; cf. 188b33 and note to in Phys 188.27 above and to in Cael 691.5-6 below.

in Cael 556.3 - 560.10. Simplicius argues at some length against Aristotle's etiology of the error which led both Parmenides and Melissus to deny altogether that there is coming to be (γένεσις) and perishing (φθορά) cf. 298b14-24. (Simplicius is particularly concerned with 298b21-24, which he discusses in 557.1-560.10). Aristotle argues that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that nothing besides perceptible substance existed, but since they also understood the need for uncreated (ἀγένητα) and motionless (ἀκίνητα) objects for there to be knowledge, they concluded that what is perceptible is uncreated and motionless (298b21-24); cf. Alexander's succinct version of this argument in 560.5-10. Simplicius replies with some vehemence to Aristotle. He first asserts that Parmenides and Melissus in fact posited a two-fold reality (ὑπόστασις), one part of which is real, intelligible being, the other is the perceptible order, which is subject to coming to be, and which they call 'seeming being' (557.20-23). He then quotes B 1.28-32 (= 557.25-558.2), B 8.50-52 (= 558.5-7), and B 19.1-3 (= 558.9-11) to prove this assertion for

Parmenides; he concludes with two, pointed rhetorical questions directed at Aristotle in 298b21-24 (558.12-17; note (πῶς οὖν . . . , πῶς δέ . . . (12-13), and similarly πῶς οὖν ἂν τις . . . 559.14 (after the quotation from Melissus)). Melissus is treated in the same fashion in 558.17-559.13; 30 B 8 = 558.14-27. He next argues that Parmenides and Melissus did in fact abolish coming to be (γένεσις) from 'real' being, but clearly posit it for what is perceptible (559.14-27); he quotes B 8.21 (= 559.17) and B 11.1-4 (= 559.22-25) for these contentions respectively (30 B 8(3) = 559.19-20 is quoted for the latter only.) Simplicius concludes that Parmenides scarcely failed to know that he was created (γέννητος) or that he had two feet when he stated that being is one (559.27-560.1); Aristotle's refutation of only the apparent meaning in Parmenides is ultimately to be rejected in favor of his more favorable verdict in Metaphysics A 986b27-28 (560.1-4; cf. 557.1-2, 19-20).

This passage falls into three parts: 1) 556.3-30 a gloss or paraphrase of 298b14-20 (and the discussion of γένεσις in 298b8-299a1); 2) 557.1-560.4 is Simplicius's reply especially to 298b21-24, excepting 557.10-18, a clumsy attempt on his part to justify Aristotle's refutation (30 B 6 = 557.16-17, 28 B 8* = 557.18); 3) 560.5-10 Alexander's version of the argument in 298b21-24.

In addition to the quotation of three fragments from Parmenides not found in in Phys (B 1.28-32 = 557.25-558.2, B 11.1-4 = 559.22-25, B 19.1-3 = 558.9-11), there are several points of interest in this passage. One is the pointed, nearly trenchant criticism of

Aristotle in 557.1-560.4. Secondly, there are numerous close parallels with remarks on Parmenides in in Phys. Lastly, the epistemological aspect of Parmenides's thought, i.e. 556.4, 15-18, 557.4-6, mentioned here on Aristotle's authority (298b22-23), receives more attention here than in in Phys.

556.3 - 30. Τετραχῇ . . . ἐπιγράφειν. In this section three parts are to be distinguished: 1) an overview of Aristotle's four-fold précis of his predecessors' views on coming to be (γένεσις) and perishing (φθορά) in 298b6-289a1 (556.3-12); 2) a discussion of Parmenides's and Melissus's view, the first of the four, based on Aristotle's remarks in 298b14-20 (556.12-24); 3) a discussion of why Parmenides and Melissus should even be called 'physicists' (556.24-30). Simplicius provides a nearly word for word gloss of 298b14-20 in 1) and 2) (and cf. 298b21-24 in 557.2-6, 8-10).

556.3 - 12. Τετραχῇ . . . -θέμενα. Simplicius summarizes Aristotle's discussion of his predecessors' opinions on coming to be in 298b6-299a1 (cf. also in Cael 672.28-32). The four views, or rather their advocates, are as follows:

1) Parmenides and Melissus	556.3-6	298b14-24	cf. 556.12-24, 557.1-560.10, 560.13
2) Hesiod	556.6-8	298b24-29	cf. 560.13-27
3) Heraclitus	556.9-10	298b29-33	cf. 561.1-25
4) Plato/Academics	556.10-12	298b33- 299a1	cf. 561.26- 580.16

In his summary, Simplicius ignores 'passing away' (φθορά, φθείρεσθαι), despite Aristotle's frequent (but not invariable) use of it in his précis.

556.3 - 6. καὶ γὰρ . . . λέγειν. Simplicius closely follows Aristotle's phraseology in 3-4: οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνεῖλον γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν (298b14-5) is rendered by καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τελέως τὴν γένεσιν ἀναιροῦσι (3-4) (cf. 560.13, 672.29); οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτε γίνεσθαι φασιν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (298b15-16) by πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀγένητα λέγοντες (4). In 4-6 Simplicius is less literal: διὰ τὸ τῶν γενητῶν καὶ φθορῶν μὴ εἶναι γινώσιν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων αὐτῶν (4-5) is loosely based on 298b22-23 τοιαύτας δὲ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις [sc. ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀκινήτους cf. 298b19], εἴπερ ἔσται τις γινώσις ἢ φρόνησις (cf. 556.17-18) and on 298b29-30 (on the 'Heracliteans') οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι φασὶ καὶ ρεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδὲν (cf. Republic V 479c3-6): ὡς Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος ἐδόκουν λέγειν (5-6) on 298b17 οἷον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην [sc. φασιν from 298b16] (but cf. 12).

556.6 - 8. ὡς . . . γένετ'. Cf. 560.16-18 for a more intelligible version of the same point. (556.8 = 560.18 = Theogony 116.)

556.12 - 24. πρῶτους . . . πράγματα. In the course of fleshing out Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides's and Melissus's opinion on coming to be, Simplicius quotes all of 298b14-20 phrase by phrase,

adding to each his own exegetical remarks.

556.12 - 14. τοὺς . . . ἡμῖν. τοὺς περὶ Μέλισσον καὶ Παρμενίδην (12) picks up οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην (298b17), and (τὸ) ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν (14) is quoted from 298b16; Simplicius adds what intervenes. That Melissus does not in reality totally deny the existence of coming to be will be argued in 557.20-23 and especially in 558.17-559.12, 18-20 (but cf. note 9). Similarly, Parmenides's denial of coming to be only with respect to truth, not opinion/seeming (Παρμενίδης δὲ οὐ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς δόξαν 13-14), is discussed in 557.20-558.17, 559.14-560.1. Moreover, as B 1.28-32 (= 557.25-558.2), B 8.50-52 (= 558.5-7), and B 19.1-3 (= 558.9-11) make clear, Simplicius here alludes to the two parts of Parmenides's poem. In in Phys Simplicius mentions both parts of the poem (e.g. 30.14-16, 38.19, 24-25, (39.10-12), 179.31-33) and says that Parmenides did allow coming to be in the second part (cf. 25.15-16, 30.20, 31.10-12), but nowhere mentions that Melissus had a similar 'two-fold reality' (cf. 7.1-3, 21.15-19). At any rate, by the phrase διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε τὸ . . . ἡμῖν he means that Aristotle's awareness of the qualification stated in 13-14 lies behind his addition in 298b16 'but only seems to us' (ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν). οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην (298b17) is no more strict than οἱ περὶ Ἡσίοδου (298b28).

556.15. οὗτοι δέ, φησί, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα λέγωσι καλῶς is a close para-

phrase of 298b17-18 οὕς, εἰ καὶ τᾶλλα λέγουσι καλῶς.

556.15 - 18. τὰ γὰρ . . . ἀεὶ. Simplicius spells out the preceding clause (15); his remarks go far beyond what Aristotle intended (especially in 15-17 τὰ . . . ἐξέφηναν). τὰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος καὶ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως καλῶς τῷ ὄντι καὶ θείως (15-16): Simplicius strongly endorses Aristotle's 'well' (καλῶς 298b18), even adding 'and divinely'. Cf. in Phys 29.5-7: καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Ξενοφάνης τε καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος: 36.15 οὕτως οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰς νοητὸν [sc. διάκοσμον ἀφορῶντες 15]: 38.11-13 τὸ γὰρ ὄντως ὄν τὸ ἡνωμένον, ὃ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῶν πολλῶν καὶ διακεκριμένων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὡς στοιχειώδης ἀλλ' ὡς προαγωγὸς ἐκείων, ἐν ὃν ἔλεγον (cf. 38.4); cf. also 144.11-14.

556.16 - 17. ἐνόησάν τε καὶ ἐπομένοις ἐξέφηναν is an expansion of 298b22-23 νοῆσαι πρῶτοι.

556.17 - 18. καὶ τὸ . . . ἀεὶ is a loose paraphrase of 298b22-23 τοιαύτας . . . φρόνησις: cf. 557.3-6. In τῶν ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ κινήσει ὄντων he plays on ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα of 298b19. The phrase ἄτε ρεόντων ἀεὶ is Simplicius's addition, based on the Heraclitean doctrine of flux (ρεῖν) alluded to in 298b30; cf. further Metaphysics A 987a32-b1, especially ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις δόξαις ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ρεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης (a32-34). (In what follows (987b1-14) Aristotle credits Plato with

arriving at the Forms by synthesizing these Heraclitean doctrines with Socrates's search for definitions; Parmenides and Melissus are not mentioned as predecessors.)

556.18 - 19. ἄλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν = 298b18. Cf. Physics 185a17-19: οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὐ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν, in Cael 556.23-24, 560.9-10.

556.19. αὐτοὺς περὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν φιλοσοφούντας is an addition by Simplicius; cf. 556.28-29 and in Phys 7.1-3, 21.17-19, 22.25-26, 37.4-6, 39.21-22. It is, however, based on Aristotle's statement in 298b20; cf. note to 556.21-22 below.

556.19 - 20. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἅπτα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα = 298b19.

556.20 - 21. ὅπερ ἀπεδείκνυσον ἐκεῖνοι. Simplicius argues throughout this passage (e.g. 556.28-30, 557.20-22, 558.14-17) that Parmenides and Melissus only deny coming to be and motion in the intelligible order.

556.21 - 22. ἐτέρας . . . ἐχούσης is a recasting and expansion of 298b20 μάλλον . . . σκέψεως. In τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας explains προτέρας ἢ 'prior to'. and further defines 'inquiry into nature' (τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως) in the phrase τῆς περὶ τὰ κινούμενα ἐχούσης.

Aristotle makes the same point in Physics 184b25-185a3, esp. a2-3:
 ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς.

556.22 - 23. εἴπερ ἡ φύσις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Simplicius's explanation of the preceding phrase (22) draws on Physics 200b12-13: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις μὲν ἐστὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς. Cf. 191b21 254b17, and in Phys 46.13-16 (Alexander).

556.23 - 24. οἱ δὲ . . . πράγματα echoes Alexander's statement in 560.9-10. Cf. in Phys 46.13-14, 49.34-50.4 (both passages involve Alexander).

556.24 - 30. καὶ . . . ἐπιγράφειν is a digression, based on Aristotle's statement in 298b17-18 that Parmenides and Melissus do not speak as physicists (οὐ φυσικῶς . . . λέγειν). Simplicius also draws on Alexander's remarks on these lines in 560.7-10, and perhaps on Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides and Melissus in Physics 184b25-185a20 (esp. 185a17-19). Simplicius argues etymologically; both Parmenides and Melissus entitled their works 'On Nature' (Περὶ φύσεως), and because they did discuss 'natural phenomena' (τὰ φυσικά) as well as metaphysics (τὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν), they can properly be called 'physicists' (φυσικοί). Simplicius answers a possible objector (φαίη ἄν τις) to Melissus's and Parmenides's being called or censured as physicists; he is here silent as to why Aristotle so treats them¹.

556.25 - 26. ἢ ὅτι . . . Παρμενίδης. In in Phys Simplicius states that Melissus entitled his work 'On Nature' or 'On Being' (70.15-17, 71.8-10); cf. in Cael 557.10-11². He does not report this of Parmenides.

556.27. κοινόν . . . ὄνομα. Cf. in Categorias 25.16-17: καθὸ Πλάτωνα μὲν καλοῖς, Ξενοφῶντα δὲ κοινοῖς ὀνόμασιν κεχορησθαί φαμεν.

556.28 - 29. καὶ μέντοι . . . διελέγοντο. Cf. in Phys 7.1-3: ὁ τούτου μαθητὴς Παρμενίδης . . . περὶ τε τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν, and 21.17-18: οὐ διακρίνοντες τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ κρίνοντες μὲν, ὥσπερ . . . Παρμενίδης.

557.1 - 560.4. ἀλλ' . . . νομιστέον. Simplicius sets forth (557.1-18) and then refutes Aristotle's explanation of how Parmenides and Melissus were led to deny coming to be and motion among perceptible objects in 298b21-24 (557.11-560.4). Aristotle's explanation, or rather argument, is as follows: 1) Parmenides and Melissus assumed that only perceptible substance (ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσία) exists; 2) but they intuited the need for uncreated and motionless objects if there is to be knowledge; 3) they concluded that perceptible substance(s) is uncreated and motionless (cf. Alexander's version of this argument in 560.5-10). Simplicius agrees to 2) (557.4-7) but objects to 1) and 3) (cf. 557.1-2). That is, he argues that Parmenides and Melissus by no means assumed that perceptible substance

alone exists (558.12, 559.14); rather, they clearly distinguished the intelligible from the perceptible (557.20-22, 558.14-17). Moreover, he denies Aristotle's claim that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that the perceptible alone 'exists' or 'is'; they do not say that it 'exists' or 'is' but only 'seems to exist' or 'seems to be' (557.22-23, 558.16-17, 559.12-13). Lastly, he denies that they transferred (μετήνεγκον) the properties of what is intelligible to what is perceptible (558.13-14). They abolish coming to be (γένεσις) only in the intelligible (559.14-18), not in the perceptible (559.17-560.1).

Simplicius stops short of a blanket condemnation of Aristotle's argument. As is his custom, Aristotle merely objects to the outward expression of what is said in order that the most superficial might not be misled (557.19-20); his true view of Parmenides is to be found in Metaphysics A, where he credits him with more insight (560.1-4). Despite this effort to avoid direct criticism of Aristotle, Simplicius betrays a polemical attitude in 557.1-2, 558.12-14, and 559.14, 27-560.1.

557.1 - 2. ἄλλ' . . . ἀληθὲς ἦν. Simplicius prefaces his discussion of 298b21-24, which he paraphrases in 557.2-10 and attacks in 557.19-560.4. The harsh and false critique by Aristotle of Parmenides here is to be contrasted with his generous critique spoken of in in Phys 148.11-13.

557.2 - 3. ἐκεῖνοι . . . εἶναι is a close paraphrase of 298b21-22. Simplicius replaces the articular infinitive (τὸ . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν) introduced by the preposition διὰ by γάρ with the participle ὑπολαμβάνοντες, and μηθέν by οὐδέν. Excepting the addition of ἐν ὑποστάσει 'in real existence', everything else is repeated verbatim. In the critique that follows (557.19 ff.), Simplicius pointedly refers to these lines twice (558.12, 559.14).

557.3 - 5. πρῶτοι . . . φύσεις. Simplicius paraphrases 298b22 with more latitude than he does the preceding clause. He replaces the simple infinitive νοῦσαι, which depends on πρῶτοι, by the compound participial form ἐννοήσαντες. (Since Simplicius retains the μέν . . . δέ construction of the original, it is likely that he takes νοῦσαι (with subject nominative) to depend on 298b21 διὰ τό: the γάρ of his paraphrase is presumably to be taken with both clauses.) ὅτι ἀνάγκη . . . εἶναι is not entirely without warrant inserted, both for the sense and to retain the accusative case of φύσεις etc. in the original. In ἀκινήτους Simplicius explains what Aristotle means by τοιαύτας 'of this sort'; he draws on 298b19.

557.5. εἴπερ ἔστι γνώσις ἐπιστημονική is a paraphrase of 298b23: εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνώσις ἢ φρόνησις. Simplicius shifts the future ἔσται to the present ἔστι, drops τις and ἢ φρόνησις altogether, and adds ἐπιστημονική. It may be that Alexander's use of ἐπιστήμη (560.6) lies behind this addition; cf. 556.17.

557.5 - 6. τῶν γὰρ ἀεὶ ρεόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη. Cf. 556.4, 17-18 and notes above. Simplicius deduces this principle from 298b22-23 τοιαύτας . . . φρόνησις, and takes the Heraclitean flux (ρεῖν) from 298b29-33 (esp. 30). It is likely that Simplicius also draws on Theaetetus 181a3b1, where Plato contrasts Parmenides and Melissus, the 'stationers of the whole universe' (οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται a6-7), with the Heracliteans (cf. 179e2-4), whom he calls 'the fluxers' (οἱ ρέοντες a4).

557.6 - 7. καὶ λέγει . . . εἶναι. To corroborate the principle he enunciates in 557.5-6 (cf. note above) Simplicius cites the Parmenides. Only the phrase οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει is a quotation (135b8); Burnet does not list τις in his apparatus. Cf. Proclus in Parm 980.3-6. The remainder is a free rendition of 135b8-cl μὴ ἑὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι. Simplicius seems to quote from memory.

557.8 - 9. ταῦτα . . . λόγους. After a brief digression (557.5-7) Simplicius completes his paraphrase of 298b23-24: οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους. The paraphrase is faithful and improves on its laconic original. Simplicius renders οὕτω by ταῦτα οὖν ἐννοήσαντες: cf. 557.3-4 and 298b22. μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ is quoted verbatim. He paraphrases ταῦτα by τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ γενητὰ: αἰσθητὰ is justified by 298b21, γενητὰ is more loosely based on 298b19-20. τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους is expanded into τοὺς τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ αἰσθητοῖς

ἐφαρμαζόντας λόγους. τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἀκινήτοις is parallel with τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ γενητά: cf. 557.21-22. Aristotle does not speak of τὰ νοητά in 298b14-24, but does mention ἀκίνητα in 298b19. Simplicius refers to his paraphrase of these lines in 558.13-14.

557.9 - 10. εἴ γε . . . λέγουσι. Simplicius adds his reservations about the validity of Aristotle's etiology of Parmenides's and Melissus's unconditional abolition of coming to be in 298b21-24, especially their alleged superimposition of the intelligible onto the perceptible (298b23); cf. 557.1-2. Simplicius will later argue that Parmenides and Melissus distinguished the intelligible from the perceptible (557.20-23, 558.3-4, 13-17) and did not superimpose the former onto the latter (558.13-14). Further, they located coming to be in the perceptible order (557.22, 23-24, 559.18-27).

557.10 - 18. καὶ . . . ἀγένητον is a forced attempt to justify Aristotle's claim in 298b21-22 that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that nothing exists besides the substance of perceptible things; in 557.19-20 Simplicius abandons the attempt. Since nearly all of this passage is devoted to Melissus (10-17), it does not require detailed comment. Simplicius cites Parmenides as concurring with Melissus that being is one, and that there is nothing besides this (17); he quotes B 8.4* (= 557.18) as proof. Simplicius ends the verse with ἀγένητον here and at in Phys 120.23. At in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 145.4 he writes ἀτέλεστον. Since the two ἀγένητον readings occur when

the verse is quoted in isolation, while ἀτέλεστον appears in longer quotations, it is reasonable to ascribe ἀγένητον either to a quotation by memory or to one of the texts Simplicius has at his command. Further, since Plutarch, Pseudo-Plutarch, Clement, and Philoponus also end the verse with ἀγένητον³, the cliché version may well have had this form.

557.19 - 20. ἀλλ' . . . παραλογίζεσθαι. In several other passages Aristotle is said to object to the apparent meaning in what his predecessors say (ὑπαντῶν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ λόγου); 140.6-9, 141.8-11, 563.26-27, in Phys 21.19-20, 36.28-31, 37.6. (Cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπαντάω II.2 p. 1582.) In all these passages, with the exception of in Cael 563.26-27, Simplicius further claims that Aristotle does this on behalf of the (more) superficial (ἐπιπόλαιος); see sections VIII and X. For the present it should be stated that Simplicius nowhere says why Aristotle would pander to a superficial audience. One suspects that Simplicius's motive in formulating this claim is to avoid direct criticism of Aristotle; at 560.1-4 he asserts that Aristotle's remarks in Metaphysics A 986b27-28 represent his true view of Parmenides (cf. in Phys 37.1-2, 148.16-17). (Cf. in Categorias 435.20-27, esp. 24-25: ἵνα δὲ μὴ τολμηρόν τις ἡγήται με λίσαν, "ἀφράντως γαρύμενον Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον" κατὰ Πίνδαρον (Olympian 2.87)); as Kalbfleisch notes, in in Cael 42.17 Simplicius quotes this line (with ἀφραντα for ἀφράντως) to compare Philoponus with Aristotle.).

Simplicius's use of *προνοῶν* with an articular infinitive in the genitive has no parallel in LSJ (s.v. pp. 1490-1491), although this verb often takes the genitive (A II.2, B 2). In a similar context he uses *ὑπήντησε* with *ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ . . . ταραττεσθαι* (140.6-9).

557.20 - 23. οἱ . . . δοκοῦν ὄν. Simplicius refutes Aristotle's explanation of Parmenides's and Melissus's error in 298b21-24 (cf. 557.-10 and note) on two counts: 1) that Parmenides and Melissus posited that reality has two parts, namely the intelligible (*τὸ νοητόν*) and perceptible (*τὸ αἰσθητόν*) orders (20-22); and 2) that far from assuming that the perceptible order alone exists (*ὄν*), they grant it only seeming existence or being (*δοκοῦν ὄν*) (22-23)⁴. Simplicius quotes from Parmenides (B 1.28-32, B 8.50-52, B 19.1-3) and Melissus (B 8) in 557.25-559.14 to corroborate both counts. The phrase *τὴν τοῦ γινομένου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ* anticipates his argument in 559.14-560.1, that Parmenides and Melissus do not totally abolish coming to be (*γένεσις* cf. 298b14-15), but rather incorporate it into the perceptible order.

557.20 - 22. οἱ . . . αἰσθητοῦ. In *in Phys* Simplicius frequently states or argues that Parmenides distinguished between intelligible being or being proper and perceptible being, in which coming to be is found; cf. 7.1-3, 21.15-19, 39.10-12, 80.3-4, 179.29-33⁵. However, in that commentary he nowhere makes the same claim for Melissus, whom he treats exclusively as a metaphysician. By way of con-

trast, Xenophanes is mentioned as having made this distinction (7.1-3, 21.15-19), but his physical doctrines are nowhere discussed. (Simplicius follows Theophrastus in making Xenophanes Parmenides's teacher (7.1-3, 22.26-30); he may simply be crediting the teacher with his pupil's doctrines.)

557.22 - 23. ὅπερ οὐκ ἤξιουν καλεῖν ὄν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦν ὄν. Cf. 558.16-17, 559.12-13, in Phys 38.24-26, 39.10-12, 77.26-31, 78.28-29, 79.8-12, 26-29. Simplicius has τὰ δοκοῦντα (B 1.31 = 558.1), δόξας (B 1.27 = 557.27, B 8.51 = 558.6), κατὰ δόξαν ἔφω (B 19.1 = 559.9), and perhaps even δοκίμως εἶναι (B 1.32 = 558.2) in mind for Parmenides (but cf. note to 558.16-17 below). Melissus actually uses the phrase δοκεῖν εἶναι at B 8(3) (= 559.4) and B 8(5) (= 559.).

557.23 - 24. διὸ περὶ τὸ ὄν ἀλήθειαν εἶναί φησι, περὶ δὲ τὸ γινόμενον δόξαν. In two of the following quotations (B 1.28-32, B 8.50-52) Parmenides explicitly contrasts 'truth' with 'seeming/opinion'. Cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 38.17-20, 24-26, 39.10-12, 146.26-29, 179.29-33. (The reading φασι (DEc) is preferable to φησι (Ab), which Heiberg adopts. In the first place, the following sentence (24) is clumsy as the text stands; one would expect Παρμενίδης φησι (23) and e.g. λέγει γάρ in 24. Secondly, in 557.21 and 22 the plural forms ὑπετίθεντο and ἤξιουν are used. At the least, Heiberg ought to have put a full stop after δοκοῦν ὄν (23) if he adopts this shift of number. Thirdly, Melissus does speak of truth in conjunction with

being: τοῦ γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ κρεῖσσον (B 8(5) = 559.10 cf. 9), and opinion/seeming with coming to be: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι (B 8(3) = 558.29; cf. 559.19). Lastly, in 559.14-21 Simplicius twice uses the plural first to indicate agreement between the two, then states what each individually says. In support of Heiberg, however, is 556.13-14. He generally follows A (cf. Praefatio p. V), but at 557.21 he prefers DE(F) over Ab twice.)

557.25 - 558.2 = B 1.28-32.

558.3 - 4. ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπήγαγεν. Cf. the similar introductions to or comments on B 8.50 ff. in in Phys 30.14-16, esp. 38.28-29, 146.23-25, 179.32. On τὸ ὄντως ὄν used of Parmenidean being cf. 557.21, 558.21, in Phys 38.11, 162.12, and note to 29.5.

558.5 - 7 = B 8.50-52 (= in Phys 30.17-19, 38.30-32, 146.23-25; B 850-51 = 41.8-9).

558.8. παραδοὺς δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν διακόσμησιν ἐπήγαγε πάλιν. Cf. 557.15-16. Simplicius frequently uses forms of παραδίδωμι in conjunction with quotations; cf. 559.27, in Phys 31.12, 32.12, 33.6, 78.11, 157.27, and note to in Phys 100.23-26. διακόσμησιν (8 cf. 16) seems to paraphrase κόσμον of B 8.52 (= 558.7); it may be that Parmenides looks ahead in his exemplar of Parmenides to B 8.60 (= in Phys 39.8) διάκοσμον. On the other hand, Simplicius frequently

uses διακόσμησις: see Indices CAG VII, X; he offers a brief definition in in Phys 174.12: τάξις γάρ τις ἡ διακόσμησις.

558.9 - 11 = B 19.1-3.

558.12. πῶς οὖν τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον εἶναι Παρμενίδης ὑπελάμβανεν.

Simplicius reformulates 298b21-22 as a pointed rhetorical question; he repeats this question at 559.14 after the quotation from Melissus, and similarly renders 298b23-24 in 558.13-14. Cf. 557.2-3 for Simplicius's paraphrase of 298b21-22, and 557.20-21 for his insistence that Parmenides and Melissus posited not one but rather two orders of reality.

558.12 - 13. ὁ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφῆσας, ὅπερ νῦν περιττὸν ἐστὶ παραγράφειν. It is surprising that Simplicius does not quote more from the Aletheia than B 8.4* (= 557.18) and B 8.21 (= 559.17) in this section, for his contention that Parmenides discoursed about 'real' or 'intelligible' being in this part is largely unsupported (cf. 556.13, 28-29, 557.20-22, 24, 558.14-15, 559.15-17, in Phys 144.25-28).

For Simplicius's equation of Parmenidean being with the intelligible (being) (τὸ νοητὸν (ὄν)) cf. 557.21-22, in Phys 29.5-6, 38.19, 28-29, 39.11, 25-26, 80.3-4, 144.12. On ὅπερ (13) cf. LSJ (s.v. ὅσπερ I.1 p. 1262) and Denniston (Greek Particles p. 490 (3)); cf. 557.1, 22, 560.1.

558.13 - 14. πῶς . . . αἰσθητά. Simplicius again turns Aristotle's own words against him; he restates his paraphrase of 298b23-24 (οὕτω . . . λόγους) in 557.8-9. Cf. Alexander's paraphrase in 560.7-9.

558.14 - 17. ὁ χωρὶς . . . καλεῖν. For a similar use of the article cf. 558.12-13 and in Phys 143.7-8. (558.12-13 is identical in structure to 14-17, the anaphoric πῶς stressing this identity.) χωρὶς μὲν . . . χωρὶς δέ echoes 557.20-22.

558.14 - 15. τὴν ἔνωσιν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ὄντως ὄντος παραδούς. Simplicius in this section quotes B 8.4* (= 557.18) and B 8.21 (= 559.17) from the Aletheia, and only the first mentions the unity of being (cf. note to 558.12-13). Cf. 557.14, 15, 17-18, 560.1. On τὸ νοητὸν ὄν and τὸ ὄντως ὄν cf. 557.21-22, 558.3, 12-13, 559.15. (καί (15) is epexegetical here.)

558.16 - 17. καὶ μηδὲ ἀξιῶν τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ὀνόματι τὸ αἰσθητὸν καλεῖν recalls 557.22-23 τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ . . . δοκοῦν ὄν: cf. 557.14-15⁶.

Simplicius has the various derivatives of δοκεῖν that occur in the preceding quotations in mind: δόξας (B 1.30 = 557.27, B 8.51 = 558.6), τὰ δοκοῦντα (B 1.31 = 558.1), κατὰ δόξαν ἔφω (B 19.1 = 558.9); cf. note to 557.23. δοκίμως εἶναι resembles the name Parmenides reputedly gives to the perceptible, δοκοῦν ὄν / δοκεῖν εἶναι (cf. also 559.13). According to the Indices (CAG VII, VIII, X) there is one instance of a form of δόκιμος in Simplicius (in Categorias 15.27: καί

. . . δοκιμωτέρα 'more appropriate, proper'); no conclusion on what he takes δοκιμῶς here to mean is possible. Cf. Tarán, pp. 210-216.

558.17 - 19. ἀλλὰ . . . ῥητοῖς. That Parmenides did not express himself as clearly as Melissus, who wrote in prose (ὡς καταλογάδην γράψας 17), see section II, pp. 98-102.

558.21 - 559.12 = 30 B 8.

559.12 - 13. σαφῶς . . . εἶναι. Cf. 557.22-23, 558.16-18. The reason (αἰτία) Melissus adduces for denying that what is perceptible 'exists', but only 'seems to exist' is that it fails to meet the stringent conditions of 'true existence'; cf. 30 B 8(2) (= 558.22-23), (5-6) (= 559.8-12). Simplicius makes a similar claim for Parmenides at in Phys 38.24-39.12, namely that what is perceptible is 'opinable, subject to opinion' (δοξαστόν).

559.14. πῶς . . . εἶναι is a rhetorical paraphrase of 298b21-22; cf. 557.12, 13-14 and notes. Simplicius ironically makes Aristotle the subject (τις) of ὑπολάβοι: Melissus and Parmenides are the subject of ὑπολαμβάνειν in 298b22.

559.14 - 27. ἀλλὰ . . . παραδεδώκασιν. Simplicius now refutes the conclusion of the argument in 298b21-24 (cf. 557.1-9), Aristotle's contention in 298b14-15 that Parmenides and Melissus totally abolish

coming to be (γένεσις) (cf. 556.1-2, 560.13, 672.28-30). To this point Simplicius has argued that Parmenides and Melissus distinguished (even by name) the two parts of reality, and did not superimpose the noetic onto the perceptible part to the exclusion of the latter. Here he adds (ἀλλὰ καὶ 'moreover') that they abolish coming to be from the noetic order (14-18) but allow it in the perceptible (18-27); this distinction flows from that made in 557.20-22 (cf. in Phys 80.3-4). The quotations from Parmenides and Melissus in 17-25 all contain some form of γίγνεσθαι: Simplicius's literal-mindedness is nowhere better exemplified.

559.15. γένεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἀναιροῦσι. Cf. 298b14-15, paraphrased at 556.1-2, and in Phys 78.24-25, 79.29-31. On τὸ ὄντως ὄν see 557.22, 558.14-15, and in Phys 45.31.

559.17 = B 8.21 (= in Phys 145.22). Simplicius selects this line for quotation because it contains γένεσις: cf. γίγνεσθαι B 11.4 (= 559.25) and in Phys 80.1-4.

559.18. καὶ Μέλισσος ὡς Παρμενίδης. Simplicius refers in a general way to all of Melissus's work up to B 8; cf. 556.13, 558.17-21, esp. 19-20 εἰπὼν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὅτι ἓν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγένητον 30 B 1 (= in Phys 162.24-26) and B 2 (= in Phys 109.20-25 and 29.22-26) are arguments for the uncreatedness of being.

559.18. τῶν μέντοι αἰσθητῶν γένεσιν σαφῶς λέγουσι. Cf. 557.22 τὴν δὲ τοῦ γινομένου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, in Phys 80.3-4.

559.19 - 20. Μέλισσος . . . γίνεσθαι". Cf. B 8(3) (= 558.29-559.5).

559.20 - 21. Παρμενίδης δὲ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὄρεσθαι φησι λέγειν. Stein emends ὄρεσθαι to ὄρεσθαι (cf. apparatus). DK (I.241) apparently takes ὄρεσθαι λέγειν together as a paraphrase of Parmenides: "Ich will zu reden beginnen, wie die Erde". In his PGF (p. 69) Diels notes of B 11.1: "orditur cosmologiam; initio ὄρεσθαι e Simpl. suppleas". Tarán quotes only 559.22-25 without commenting on 20-21 (pp. 165-166). (I suspect that behind ὄρεσθαι λέγειν lies e.g. λέξω | ὄρεσθαι πῶς . . . (cf. in Phys 31.8 πεπλανῆσθαι δὲ φησιν = πεπλανημένοι εἰσὶν B 8.54 (= 30.24)); the goddess still speaks. At any rate, the phrase ὄρεσθαι φησι λέγειν is meaningless as it stands; perhaps λέγειν should be changed to λέγων (cf. in Phys 39.17).)

559.22 - 25 = B 11.1-4. On γίνεσθαι (B 11.4 = 559.25) cf. note to 559.17 above, and 559.18.

559.26 - 27. καὶ τῶν . . . παραδεδώκασιν. Cf. in Phys 31.10-17, 39.12-20, Plutarch adv Col 1114B-C (= DK I.241.8-11). DK I.242.4 and Diels (PGF, p. 69) read παραδίδωσι (DEc) without mentioning the alternative παραδεδώκασιν (Ab), which Heiberg adopts. Guthrie (II p. 60 n 2) notes these alternative readings but indicates no preference

In his discussion of Melissus, however, he argues against there being a 'seeming' part of Melissus's work (II p. 102 and n 2)⁷; this argument would support the singular, *παράδιδωσι*. Furthermore, Melissus's alleged statement of coming to be for what is perceptible (559.18) is set out in the *μέν* clause of 19-20 and is based solely on B 8. It seems more natural to take *φησι* (21) and *παράδιδωσι* (27) as coordinate (i.e. *καί* 26) and subsumed under the *δέ* clause, which concerns Parmenides only.

559.27 - 560.4. *δῆλον . . . νομιστέον*. Simplicius concludes his rejection of Aristotle's argument in 298b21-24 (557.1-559.27) by claiming that common sense dictates that Parmenides did not wholly abolish coming to be (and perishing) (559.27-560.1), and that Aristotle corrects his refutation here of what is merely the surface meaning of Parmenides in Metaphysics A 987b27-28, where he says that 'Parmenides has more insight' (1-4).

559.27 - 560.1. *δῆλον . . . τὸ ὄν*. Simplicius appeals to common sense in his claim that it is clear (*δῆλον*) that Parmenides did not fail to recognize that he was created (*γενητός*) or that he had two feet when he said that being was one and uncreated. Cf. in Phys 45.29-31 for the second half of this claim. Aristotle, on the other hand, describes both Parmenides and Melissus as 'madmen' precisely because they ignore the dictates of common sense (De Generatione et Corruptione 325a4-24); cf. section VIII, in Phys 77.9-

16.

560.1 - 4. ἄλλ' . . . νομιστέον. In in Phys Simplicius twice cites this statement of Aristotle (Metaphysics A 986b27-28) as his final judgement on Parmenides (37.2, 148.15). It is striking that Simplicius does not accurately quote this short clause in any of the passages. One suspects that his imprecision in this regard 'improves' Aristotle's actual words into forthright praise; cf. section VIII. τὸν τοῦ φαινομένου ἔλεγχον recapitulates 557.19-20 (cf. 1 ἐξελέγχων): πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον . . . ὑπήντησε.

560.5 - 10. ὁ . . . φύσιν. Simplicius adds without further comment Alexander's paraphrase of 298b14-24, esp. 21-24. Insofar as Alexander wholly concurs with Aristotle, he can be seen as being implicitly attacked by Simplicius here.

560.9 - 10. διὸ . . . φύσιν. Cf. 298b17-18 and 556.17-24. Alexander here echoes Physics 185a17-19; cf. 184b25-185a5, in Phys 46.11-16 (Alexander).

in Cael 691.4 - 7. τὸ δὲ . . . ἀποδιδόντας. Aristotle contends that none of his predecessors had given an account of both absolute and relative weight and lightness (308a7-13, 308a34-b3). He objects against the monists that they can only account for the relatively heavy and light (309b29-b32; cf. 690.20-21, 26-691.4). Con-

versely, he objects that those who posit a single pair of material opposites can only account for the absolutely heavy and light (309b34-310a3; cf. 691.18-692.6). Simplicius cites Parmenides as a possible target of this second objection.

691.5 - 6. τοὺς γῆν καὶ πῦρ, ὡς Παρμενίδης. Cf. De Generatione et Corruptione 392a2 and Theophrastus Metaphysics 6b25-26 (and notes in W.D. Ross and F.H. Fobes, Theophrastus Metaphysics: with Translation, Commentary, and Introduction [Oxford, 1929]); further, in Phys 25.16, 30.21, 38.22 (Theophrastus via Alexander), 146.29 (Aristotle), 179.32 (Aristotle), 274.24.

VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being.

A. Passages.

in Phys 51.8 - 27 Tr. pp. 303-304

in Phys 102.20 - 103.12 Tr. pp. 332-333

in Phys 114.25 - 115.9 Tr. p. 335

in Phys 115.11 - 118.25 Tr. pp. 336-341

Verses DK 28DK I

115.11 - 116.4 = 222.34-
223.9
(A 28)

116.28 - 117.1 B 2.3-8 116.25 - 117.1 = 231.3-6
117.4-6 B 6.1-3 117.2 - 13 = 232.14-17

117.8-13 B 6.4-9

in Phys 118.27 - 121.25 Tr. pp. 342-346

120.23 B 8.4*

in Phys 125.33 - 126.13 Tr. p. 349

in Phys 133.31 - 134.18 Tr. pp. 356-357

in Phys 235.12 - 236.12 Tr. pp. 380-381

in Phys 242.17 - 244.21 Tr. pp. 383-386

244.1-2 B 7.1-2

in Phys 649.35 - 650.13 Tr. p. 390

650.13 B 7.1-2

Related Passages.

in Phys 52.8-10

71.26-31

100.21 - 28

139.24 - 140.26

in Phys 115.11-13 = Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 7
DG 483.8-10 (cf. in Phys 118.2, 134.11-12)

in Phys 115.11 - 116.5 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) pp. 28.24-29.
15

118.10 = 115.17-18 (= 29.1)

118.11-13 \approx 115.21-23 (= 29.4-7)

118.14-15 = 115.23-24 (= 29.7)

118.9 = 115.22 (= 29.5-6)

120.6-12 \approx 115.25 - 116.4 (= 29.8-14)

121.13-17 \approx 115.21-25 (= 29.4-8)

in Phys 116.8 - 18 = Porphyry Commentarius in Physica 186a24

in Phys 125.23 - 126.13 = Adrastus Physica ? 186a32-b12

B. Summary, Comments.

The passages in this section deal with the argument which Parmenides allegedly formulated to prove his doctrine that being is one; this doctrine is treated as the conclusion of a syllogism. Objections to and refutations of the doctrine proper, however, will be treated in the following sections. This dual treatment follows Aristotle's own procedure. According to Simplicius, he first produces a general objection to the doctrine, then refutes (a fortiori) the argument that establishes it (in Phys 51.10-17, 102.20-103.12, 114.25-115.9). The general objection is that the doctrine is contradicted by our experience; nature is instinct with motion and plural-

ity (in Phys 51.10-17, 53.10-16, 71.19-73.4). Aristotle argues against Parmenides (and Melissus) that being neither is nor signifies one thing from his own pluralistic scheme of the Categories (cf. in Phys 72.4-10, 117.15-17). Simplicius will counter that the division (διαίρεσις) found in the perceptible order, on which Aristotle bases his refutation, does not apply to the radical unity of the intelligible, which is Parmenidean being (in Phys 71.32-72.1, 148.7-11).

Aristotle makes a two-fold objection to the argument: that it assumes false premisses, and that it is formally invalid (186a23-28). Since he does not explicitly state what the argument is (cf. in Phys 116.18-20), Simplicius relates versions by Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Porphyry, as well as the one which he takes Aristotle to mean (in Phys 115.11-116.24; for Aristotle cf. 187a4-5, Metaphysics A 986b28-30). Throughout the commentary Simplicius adopts the version by Theophrastus:

- 1) τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν What is besides being is non-being
- 2) τὸ οὐκ ὄν οὐδέν Non-being is nothing
- 3) ἔν ἄρα τὸ ὄν Therefore being is one.

(in Phys 103.8-11, 115.11-13, 117.28-118.5, 134.9-12; cf. Alexander in Priora Analytica (CAG II.1) 346.17-21, 357.1-5). Porphyry's version differs from this in that he infers from 1) and 2) that 3a) being alone exists (τὸ ὄν ἄρα μόνον ἐστίν), and from this 'deduces' by way of equivocation 3) (in Phys 116.10-11). For the major premiss (2)) Eudemus substitutes 2a): being is used in one way only (τὸ ὄν λέγεται μοναχῶς) (in Phys 115.13-14). The version Simplicius ascribes to Aristotle is: 1a) if being signifies one thing, and 2b)

the contradictory proposition is not possible, then 3b) nothing will exist except being (in Phys 116.19-24; cf. 187a4-5). Simplicius apparently thinks that all these versions are mutually compatible (in Phys 116.21, 26-27). At any rate, he quotes B 2.3-8 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1) to corroborate 1a)/2a) and 1) + 2)¹, and B 6.1-9 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1) to corroborate 2b).

Aristotle's objection to the premisses is that they assume that being is used in only one way, whereas it is used in the (ten) ways described in the Categories (in Phys 117.14-17, 118.5-7, 133.31-134.1). Simplicius applies this objection to both premisses of the Theophrastean version. Since 'being' or 'existent' (τὸ ὄν) is used in many ways, it is not true that what is besides some variety of being is 'non-being' or 'non-existent' in the absolute sense (in Phys 117.17-28). If, however, one sets forth the minor premiss on the assumption that 'being' signifies more than one thing, the major premiss, that non-being is nothing, is false. If a thing is a non-substance, it is not nothing at all, but rather a quality, quantity, and the like (in Phys 117.28-118.3).

Regardless of their truth values, these premisses do not yield the conclusion which Parmenides draws, that being is one; rather, that what is besides being is nothing (in Phys 118.3-5, 134.1-2). Parmenides's argument is less crude than that of Melissus since his premisses are well-formed and yield a conclusion (in Phys 103.8-12). Aristotle (and Eudemus) further argues that even if Parmenides's assumption that being signifies one thing were true, his deduction

that being is one in number still does not follow (in Phys 118.7-121.5 (cf. 131.33-35); cf. 125.33-126.24 for a similar argument by Adrastus). In the first place, a thing can be spoken of 'in one way only' as a genus or species; in either case plurality is introduced. If everything were white, it would not follow that everything would be one; for snow, swans, and white lead are not numerically one (in Phys 118.7-119.16). Secondly, even in the case of a single white thing, a logical distinction has to be made between the substrate which possesses the color and the color so possessed. Thus, plurality is a feature even of what is numerically one (in Phys 119.16-120.29). Simplicius argues against this second point in in Phys 120.29-121.25.

In two passages Simplicius relates that Plato agrees to Parmenides's minor premiss, that what is besides being is non-being (in Phys 134.14-18, 244.3-14). He adds the qualification that both have absolute or unqualified being in mind, for in the Sophist Plato clearly denies the major premiss by introducing qualified or relative non-being (in Phys 135.15-136.19, 147.31-148.6 (cf. 236.3-6), 242.17-244.21 (esp. 243.13-244.21); cf. 649.35-650.14; cf. Sophist 258c6-259b6). Simplicius quotes B 7.1-2 in several passages to prove that Parmenides had absolute being and non-being in mind (in Phys 78.6, 135.21-22, 143.31-144.1, 244.1-2, 650.13).

Zeno's argument from dichotomy is on several occasions mentioned as proving Parmenides's argument, by showing the absurdities that result from the antithetical thesis that being is many (in Phys 102.28-31, 134.2-12, 138.18-28, 141.8-11; cf. Parmenides 128a2-e4).

Simplicius rejects Porphyry's contention that this argument from dichotomy belongs to Parmenides himself (in Phys 139.24-140.27).

Lastly, although Simplicius does not state what he thinks of Parmenides's argument, it is likely that he concurs with Aristotle and others that it does not yield the conclusion which Parmenides draws. In the first place, he adopts the Theophrastean version of the argument, in which the conclusion patently does not follow from the premisses. Secondly, Eudemus censures the Presocratics in general, and Parmenides in particular, for three shortcomings: 1) no knowledge of equivocity or ambiguity; 2) a failure to distinguish between substance and accident; and 3) no use of logic or syllogistic in their demonstrations (in Phys 115.25-116.4; cf. 120.5-12). Simplicius replies only to 2) (in Phys 120.20-27). His silence on 1) and 3) is, of course, not conclusive of itself. Simplicius clearly accepts Parmenides's doctrine, but need not adopt the argument he adduced to prove it. Insofar as Simplicius equates Parmenidean being with the intelligible, he can argue that both premisses, contra Aristotle, are true. The intelligible does not admit of 'used in many ways' nor of difference.

VII. Plato on Parmenides.

A. Passages.

- in Phys 7.10 - 11 Tr. pp. 278-279
 7.1-9 = Eudemus Physica fr. 31 (W) p. 22.4-13
- in Phys 36.25 - 37.9 Tr. pp. 292-293
 36.31-32 Cf. DL II.22 and IX.22
- in Phys 52.21 - 53.7 Tr. pp. 305-306
 52.25 - 53.5 = Sophist 244e1-245a6
- in Phys 78.24 - 79.12 Tr. pp. 315-316
 79.1-4 = Timaeus 37e4-38a2
- in Phys 87.24 - 90.22 Tr. pp. 322-326
 87.25 - 88.4 = Parmenides 142d9-143a3
 89.5 - 90.20 = Sophist 244a6-245e5
- in Phys 99.7 - 10 Tr. p. 329
 Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6
- in Phys 99.32 - 101.24 Tr.* pp. 330, 331
 100.3 - 15 = Sophist 251a8-c6
 100.29 - 101.10 = Parmenides 129c4-e4
- in Phys 102.28 - 31 Tr. p. 332
 Cf. Parmenides 128a4-e4
- in Phys 115.25 - 116.1 Tr. p. 336
 115.11 - 116.5 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) pp. 28.24-29.15
- in Phys 120.6 - 10 Tr. p. 344
 120.6 - 12 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) p. 29.8-14
- in Phys 134.2 - 18 Tr. pp. 356-357

Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d2, Sophist 250c3 ff.

in Phys 135.15 - 136.32 Tr. pp. 358-360

135.18 - 136.10 = Sophist 258c6-259b6

136.11 - 16 = Cf. Sophist 257b3-259a4

in Phys 136.33 - 137.20 Tr. pp. 361-362

137.1 = Timaeus 27d6-28a1

137.12 - 20 Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.

in Phys 138.18 - 28 Tr.* p. 363

Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6

in Phys 141.8 - 11 Tr. p. 366

Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6

in Phys 143.11 - 144.1 Tr. pp. 367-368

Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.

in Phys 146.29 - 147.2 Tr. p. 371

Cf. Sophist 244e2-245e5

in Phys 147.16 - 148.6 Tr. pp. 372-373

147.32 - 148.3 = Sophist 258e6-259a4

in Phys 148.11 - 18 Tr. p. 374

148.14 Cf. Theaetetus 184a1

in Phys 242.17 - 244.21 Tr. pp. 383-386

242.28 - 243.3 = Eudemus Physica fr. 37b (W) p. 27.18-24

243.18 - 20 = Sophist 245d12-e2

in Phys 650.6 - 14 Tr. p. 390

Cf. Sophist 237a4-b3, 258c6-259a4

in Cael 139.27 - 140.9 Tr. pp. 395-396

Cf. Sophist 251b5-c6

in Cael 557.3 - 10 Tr. pp. 398-399

557.6 - 7 Cf. Parmenides 135b8-c1

in De Anima 260.23 - 25 Tr. p. 408

Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.

Related Passages.

in Phys 77.31-33 Cf. Cratylus 402a8-10

in Phys 148.22-24 Cf. Cratylus 413a7-b1

Verses DK 28

<u>in Phys</u> 52.23	= B 8.43	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 244e2 ff.
52.26 - 28	= B 8.43-45	= <u>Sophist</u> 244e3-5
89.22 - 24	= B 8.43-45	= <u>Sophist</u> 244e3-5
135.21 - 22	= B 7.1-2	= <u>Sophist</u> 258d2-3
137.16 - 17	= B 8.43-45	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 244e2 ff.
143.31 - 144.1	= B 7.1-2	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 258c6 ff.
146.30	= B 8.43	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 244e2 ff.
244.1 - 2	= B 7.1-2	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 258c6 ff.
650.13	= B 7.2	Cf. <u>Sophist</u> 258c6 ff.

B. Summary, Comments.

Most of Simplicius's mentions of or quotations from Plato in conjunction with Parmenides center on his criticisms of Parmenides

in Sophist 244b6-24535 and 258c6-259b1. He quotes the former in toto at in Phys 89.5-90.20, and less extensively at in Phys 52.25-53.5 and 243.18-20. Similarly, the latter is quoted in toto at in Phys 135.18-136.10, piecemeal in 136.12-17; cf. in Phys 243.26-31 (= 258a11-b7). Simplicius's isolated quotations of B 8.43-45 (= Sophist 244e3-5) and B 7.1-2 (= Sophist 258d2-3) appear to be based on Plato rather than on his manuscript of Parmenides (see Appendix B, Conclusion

Simplicius rejects Plato's criticism of Parmenides in Sophist 244B ff. for two reasons: 1) that it is based on too literal an interpretation of the sphere-simile of B 8.43-45 (in Phys 52.21-53.7, 146.29-147.2; cf. 87.32-88.8); and 2) that it in effect equates Parmenides's one being with the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν), which both is pluralistic and admits of non-being qua otherness (in Phys 143.11-28, 147.17-21). His rejection of Plato's criticism in 258C ff. is closely allied with 2): Parmenides's one being admits of no non-being, not even that relative to 'other' (in Phys 143.28-144.1, 18-20, 147.21-148.6, 650.9-14). He further argues that Plato accepts Parmenides's doctrine that absolute non-being is nothing at all (in Phys 136.10-27, 31-32, 147.31-148.3, 244.7-8), and that the minor premiss of his syllogism, that what is besides being is non-being, is true (in Phys 134.14-17, 243.22-24, 244.10-11; cf. in De Anima 260.23-35).

Simplicius palliates his refutation of Plato on Parmenides on the following grounds: 1) that Plato recognized the profundity of

Parmenides's thought and did not refute him out of mere disputatiousness (in Phys 36.31-32, 88.30-31, 148.11-16); 2) that some of his refutations are undertaken on behalf of the philosophically superficial (in Phys 36.25-31, 37.6-7); 3) that he adopted and clarified Eleatic doctrines (in Phys 7.1-19; cf. 37.3-4); 4) that Parmenides's one being is the both the starting point for discovering the One (in Phys 88.31-34) and the subject of the second hypothesis (in Phys 148.17-18) in the Parmenides.

Simplicius follows Plato in seeing Zeno's arguments as coming to the aid of Parmenides; he frequently refers or alludes to Parmenides 128a4-d6 (esp. c5-d6); in Phys 99.7-10, 102.28-31, 134.2-8, 138.17-28, 141.18-11. Simplicius also quotes from Parmenides 135b8-cl to corroborate Aristotle's claim in De Caelo 298b22-23 that Parmenides (and Melissus) saw the need for uncreated and motionless entities for there to be knowledge (in Cael 557.6-7).

Several of his quotations from and allusions to Plato are used to refute or attack other philosophers. Thus, in in Phys 79.1-4 (= Timaeus 37e4-39a2) and 135.15-136.10 (= Sophist 258c6-259b6) Alexander is the target. Similarly, Porphyry is being attacked in in Phys 136.33-137.20 (137.1 = Timaeus 27d6-28a1; 137.4-7 = Sophist 248e6-249a1; 137.12-20 = Sophist 244e2 ff.). In his bitter reply to Philoponus in in Cael 139.27-140.9, Simplicius alludes to Sophist 251b5-c6 (cf. in Phys 100.1-15 = 251b8-c6).

Simplicius appears to draw on the Cratylus in in Phys 77.31-33 (cf. 402a8-10) and in Phys 148.22-24 (cf. 413a7-b1).

Lastly, Simplicius quotes Eudemus as saying that Plato first introduced ambiguity (τὸ δεικνόν), the failure to recognize which led Parmenides and other Presocratics astray (in Phys 115.25-116.1, 120.6-10, 242.30-243.3; frr. 37b, 43 (W)).

VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides.

A. Passages.

<u>in Phys</u>	6.31 - 8.15	Tr.* pp. 278-279
<u>in Phys</u>	31.9 - 10	Tr. p. 289
<u>in Phys</u>	36.15 - 31	Tr. p. 292
<u>in Phys</u>	37.1 - 7	Tr. pp. 292-293
<u>in Phys</u>	38.1 - 11	Tr. p. 295
<u>in Phys</u>	45.26 - 46.8	Tr. p. 301
<u>in Phys</u>	79.8 - 12	Tr. p. 316
<u>in Phys</u>	80.17 - 18	Tr. p. 318
<u>in Phys</u>	86.19 - 87.23	Tr. pp. 321-322

Verses DK 28

86.22	B 8.25	
86.24	B 8.22	
86.27 - 28	B 6.1-2	
86.31 - 87.1	B 8.36-38	
87.14 - 16	B 8.34-36	
87.23	B 8.25	
<u>in Phys</u>	120.29 - 121.9	Tr. pp. 345-346
<u>in Phys</u>	144.2 - 11	Tr. pp. 368-369
<u>in Phys</u>	146.26 - 29	Tr. p. 371
<u>in Phys</u>	147.16 - 17	Tr. p. 372
<u>in Phys</u>	148.7 - 20	Tr. pp. 373-374
<u>in Phys</u>	179.27 - 180.13	Tr. p. 378
180.1 - 7	B 8.53-59	

180.9 - 12 B 9.1-4

<u>in Phys</u> 1195.6 - 11	Tr. p. 391
<u>in Cael</u> 139.27 - 140.9	Tr. pp. 395-396
<u>in Cael</u> 556.3 - 560.10	Tr. pp. 397-402

Cf. V. The Doxa, pp. 205-228.

<u>in Phys</u>	7.10 - 19	=	Eudemus <u>Physica</u> fr. 31 (W) p. 22.4-12.
	37.2	=	<u>Metaphysics</u> A 986b27-28
	87.10, 148.20	=	<u>Metaphysics</u> A 1076a4

B. Summary, Comments.

The list of passages above does not pretend to be exhaustive; with some exceptions, everything Simplicius has to say about Parmenides has some connection with Aristotle's treatment of him in both the Physics and De Caelo. Many references to Parmenides in in Phys and in Cael are in fact mere expansions or glosses on lemmata (cf. e.g. in Phys 70.1-3 and 185a17-19). The two most important passages for understanding what Simplicius thinks of Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides are in Phys 86.19-87.23 and in Cael 556.3-560.10 (see pp. 205-228).

Because Simplicius attempts to harmonize all ancient Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (in Phys 6.31-8.15, 28.32-36.20), he must somehow defuse Aristotle's explicit criticisms and refutations of his predecessors (in Phys 36.25-28; cf. 147.17, 148.7-9). He employs two lines of argument to this end¹: 1) that some of Aristotle's refutations are not in fact refutations; 2) that

Aristotle does not necessarily endorse the refutations he formulates. Simplicius subsumes three claims under 1): a) that sometimes Aristotle (and Plato) is merely supplying something omitted in what his predecessors said ; b) sometimes he clarifies what was obscurely stated; and c) sometimes he is drawing a distinction (in Phys 37.1-6). Complementary to these claims is Simplicius's assertion that the ancients were accustomed to express themselves in a riddling way (in Phys 36.30-31, section II).

As for 2), Simplicius argues on four grounds: a) that some of Aristotle's refutations are undertaken on behalf of the (philosophically) superficial (cf. e.g. in Phys 36.28-30, in Cael 140.3-9); b) that Aristotle is in fact in accord with his predecessors (in Phys 36.20-24); c) that he sometimes borrows doctrines or concepts from them (in Phys 7.10-27); d) as in the case of Parmenides, Aristotle testifies to the profundity of some of his predecessors (in Phys 37.1-2; cf. 161.23-162.2).

For Parmenides, at any rate, Simplicius provides few examples of 1a) and 1b). Aristotle's criticism of the logical fallacies in Parmenides's argument for the unity of being (Physics 186a22-32) appears to fall under one of these headings; cf. in Phys 8.9-15 and section VI. As for 1c), Simplicius maintains that Aristotle is aware of the fact that Parmenides's one being is a metaphysical principle of being, not the whole of physical being (in Phys 38.1-11, 45.26-46.8, 79.8-12, 1195.6-11).

Simplicius makes the most out of the least convincing of his

claims (2a)), that Aristotle refutes Parmenides for the benefit of a superficial audience (cf. in Cael 557.19-20). Predicated on this claim, it seems, is his rejection of Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides along categorial lines in Physics I and of his argument in De Caelo 298b14-24 that Parmenides denied coming to be and motion in the physical world. Simplicius holds that Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides in the Physics is based on a dichotomous division which presupposes Aristotle's own categorial scheme (in Phys 148.7-9; cf. 71.19-73.4). He maintains that Aristotle attempts to identify Parmenidean being with individual substance (in Phys 79.10-11, 131.12-133.29, 144.8-10) and to force Parmenides's 'one' into one of its Aristotelian meanings (in Phys 86.19-87.19). Both attempts are misguided because Parmenides's one being transcends the physical order, which does contain substances and concrete 'ones' (in Phys 142.31-144.11, 148.9-11); that Aristotle knows better is confirmed by 1c); cf. in Phys 21.15-20, 40.23-41.9. Simplicius makes the same argument in in Cael 556.3-560.4; when Parmenides speaks of uncreated and motionless being, he speaks of what is intelligible, for in the Doxa he clearly allows both creation (γένεσις) and motion. Moreover, Aristotle's 'superficial' refutation belies his awareness of this distinction (in Cael 557.9-10, 559.27-560.4). (Although Simplicius frequently invokes this principle of 'refutation on behalf of the superficial', I have not been able to locate a justification on his part for its application. There is nothing in the Physics or De Caelo to suggest that Aristotle addresses his remarks to the undiscerning.)

Simplicius uses Aristotle's own statement in Physics 188b30-189a1 to justify his claim that the Presocratics are basically in accord both among one another and with Aristotle himself (2b)) on physical (and metaphysical) doctrines (in Phys 36.20-24, 179.27-29, 188.14-190.20). More particularly, that Parmenides embraced a pair of opposite, material principles (in Phys 30.14-31.10, 34.10-12, 179.29-180.13) and an efficient cause (in Phys 31.10-17, 34.13-17, 39.12-20; cf. Metaphysics A 984a25-b4, 20-31) reveals that his agreement with Aristotle (in Phys 6.31-8.6 (but nb 8.1-2), 36.15-24).

Simplicius maintains (2c)) that Aristotle is indebted to Parmenides both for the insight that opposite principles are required for change (in Phys 31.9-10; cf. 2b) above) and for his unmoved mover as final cause of all existence (in Phys 80.15-17, 87.7-17, 144.22-25, 148.19-20 (cf. 8.6-10). On the latter cf. Metaphysics A 6-10, esp. 1076a4 (= in Phys 87.10, 148.20).

Lastly, Simplicius holds that (2d)) Aristotle was aware of Parmenides's profundity (in Phys 37.1-2, 148.11-16, in Cael 559.27-560.3) and does not refute him out of disputatiousness (in Phys 148.11-13); cf. Metaphysics A 986b27-28 (= in Phys 37.2, 148.16, in Cael 560.2-3). (Despite his attempts to reconcile Aristotle and Parmenides, Simplicius at times argues with some vehemence against Aristotle's criticisms of Parmenides; in Phys 120.29-121.9, in Cael 557.1-560.1.)

IX. Others on Parmenides.

Adrastus.

A. Passages.

in Phys 124.33 - 125.5, 33 - 136.13 Tr. p. 349

B. Comments, Notes.

Simplicius offers a long excerpt and quotation from Adrastus on τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ὄν 186a32-b12 (in Phys 122.33-136.13); Simplicius does not indicate which work of Adrastus's he consults. See Index Nominum s.v. p. 1437.

Alexander. Commentarius in Physica, Commentarius in De Caelo.

A. Passages.

in Phys 37.12 - 40.21 Tr. pp. 294-298lemma = 184b15-1638.20 - 24 Cf. Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 6
DG 482 n 10

Cf. III, pp. 112-116.

in Phys 40.23 - 41.9 Tr. p. 300lemma = 184b16-18

41.8 - 9 = B 8.50-51

Cf. IV, pp. 123-124.

in Phys 45.15 - 46.4 Tr. p. 301lemma = 184b22-25in Phys 51.21 - 27 Tr. pp. 303-304lemma = 185a5-10in Phys 71.4 - 8 Tr. p. 308

lemma = 185a17-19

Cf. 38.20-22

in Phys 77.9 - 80.18 Tr. pp. 314-318

lemma = 185a20-25

Cf. IV, pp. 125-137

in Phys 135.15 - 136.32 Tr. pp. 358-360

lemma = 187a1-11

135.17 - 136.10 = Sophist 258c6-259b6

Cf. 137.7-20

in Phys 141.8 - 11 Tr. p. 366

lemma = 187a1-11

in Cael 560.5 - 10 Tr. p. 402

lemma = 298b14-24

Cf. V, p. 228.

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius frequently cites Alexander, more often than not in order to dispute his interpretation (cf. Index Nominum s.v. 'Αλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀποδοσιεύς CAG VII pp. 766-767, CAG X pp. 1437-1439). He attempts to refute Alexander on Parmenides in two extended passages which have been treated in some detail: in Phys 37.12-40.9 (pp. 112-116), 77.9-80.18 (pp. 125-137).

Eudemus. Physica (Wehrli edition).

A. Passages.

in Phys 7.10 - 19 Tr. pp. 278-279

- fr. 31 = p. 22.4-13
- in Phys 99.7 - 16 Tr. p. 329
- fr. 37a = p. 27.7-15
- in Phys 115.11 - 116.5 Tr. p. 336
- fr. 43 = pp. 28.24-29.15
- Cf. 243.2-3
- in Phys 120.6 - 12 Tr. p. 344
- fr. 43 = p. 29.8-14
- Cf. 121.9-17
- in Phys 133.21 - 29 Tr. p. 355
- fr. 44 = p. 29.16-24
- 133.27 = B 8.44 (cf. 143.6)
- in Phys 143.1 - 8 Tr. p. 367
- fr. 45 = pp. 29.25-30.8
- 143.3 = B 8.22
- 143.6 = B 8.43

Related Passages.

- in Phys 97.9 - 13
- 138.30 - 33
- 144.14 - 16

Cf. fr. 37a p. 25.19-23; 33a, 33b p.23.3-9.

B. Summary, Comments.

The only significant passage in which Simplicius mentions Eudemus, in Phys 120.20-29, is treated in IV, pp. 141-145.

Philoponus. VI Librorum πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ αἰδιότητος κόσμου).

A. Passages.

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12 Tr. pp. 393-394

137.2 - 6 = B 8.6-9

137.7 - 11 = Physics 191a27-31

Cf. IV, pp. 191-193.

in Cael 139.23 - 140.9 Tr. pp. 395-396

Cf. Sophist 251b5-d6

B. Summary, Comments.

The second passage lends weight to Philoponus's being the target in in Phys 28.32-29.5 (- 36.20); cf. in Phys 640.12-18.

Simplicius frequently cites, and invariably attacks, Philoponus: cf. Index Nominum s.v. Ioannes Philoponus CAG VII p. 771, CAG X pp. 1447-1448. Philoponus is not explicitly mentioned in in Phys I - VII or in in Cael I.6 - IV.

Philoponus's treatment of Parmenides, especially in his commentary on the Physics (CAG XVI-XVII), deserves special study.

Porphyry. Commentarius in Physica.

A. Passages.

in Phys 92.29 - 93.5, 26-29 Tr. p. 328

lemma = 185b25-27

Cf. 92.25-29

in Phys 116.6 - 18 Tr. p. 337

lemma = 186a19-22

in Phys 136.33 - 137.20 Tr. pp. 361-362

lemma = 187a1-11

137.16-17 = B 8.43-44

Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.

in Phys 139.24 - 141.11 Tr. pp. 364-366

lemma = 187a1-11

B. Summary, Comments.

Only two of the passages listed above are of importance for Parmenides, 116.6-18 and 139.24-141.11. In the former Porphyry offers a version of Parmenides's argument for the unity of being, which Simplicius apparently approves of; cf. VI, p. 232. Porphyry's contention in the latter, that Parmenides used an argument from dichotomy, is forcefully rejected by Simplicius; cf. VI, pp. 234-235.

Theophrastus. Physicorum Opiniones.

A. Passages

in Phys 22.26 - 23.20 Tr.* p. 282

fr. 5 DG 480.4-481.13

in Phys 25.14 - 26.4 Tr.* p. 284

fr. 3 DG 477.13-478.15

in Phys 28.4 - 31 Tr.* p. 285

fr. 8 DG 483.11-484.18

in Phys 38.18 - 24 Tr. pp. 295-296

fr. 6 DG 482 n 10

in Phys 71.6 - 8 (= 38.20-22) Tr. p. 308

Cf. fr. 6 DG 482 n 10

in Phys 115.11 - 13 Tr. p. 336

fr. 7 DG 483.8-10

Cf. 103.8-11, 117.28-118.5 (cf. DG 483 n 8), 134.9-12 (cf. DG 483 n 8)

B. Comments.

Diels (DG 102-118, nb 112-113) argues convincingly that Simplicius cites Theophrastus via Alexander; compare 38.18-24 and 71.7-9 with fr. 6 DG 482.5-13. On 28.30-31 see DG 104 n 4.

Notes to Chapter IV

Notes to Section I.

¹In addition to such details being extraneous to the task at hand, Simplicius may omit them for the reason that they were readily available in summary form (which, incidentally, he detests); in Phys 28.33-34. He explicitly denies that his précis of the physicists is chronological at in Phys 28.30-31.

The striking omission is that Simplicius does not state any student-teacher relation or the like between Parmenides and Melissus, although he regularly treats them together throughout in Phys and in Cael. He follows Aristotle and perhaps eventually Plato (Theaetetus 180e2, 183e3) in treating them together.

Notes to Section II.

¹Cf. in Phys 28.32-29.5, 36.24-25, 37.6, and especially 39.20-21, 144.25-29, 148.12-13.

²See note on 21.18-19. This passage is the only parallel to be found. Proclus stress here (= 28 A 17) and at in Parm 665.12 (= 28 A 18) that despite Parmenides's use of poetry what he says is clear.

Notes to Section III.

¹The first passage (28.32-31.17) is Simplicius's first full statement of Parmenides's philosophy. The second (38.12-40.21) is a recapitulation of the first, designed as a reply to Alexander's interpretation of Parmenides.

²adv Col 1113F-1114F; cf. Chapter III, pp. 66-68. Simplicius quotes from Plutarch once (in Phys 8.20-30; 21-29 = Alexander 7.7 (668B)), but there is nothing in his interpretation of Parmenides that directly comes from Plutarch. The general lines of interpretation are the same.

³Cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72. It is quite possible that one of Proclus's Neoplatonic predecessors is the author of this thesis.

Notes to Section IV.

¹In addition to the passages in this section, the information he does provide about Parmenides's one being is to be found at: in Phys 22.25-26, 31.18-19, 36.15, 38.11-13, 39.11, 45.31-32, 87.8-9, 136.28-31. See also section VIII.

²Simplicius here takes φυσικοί (21) to refer to the 'kinetic monists' only (ὁδῶς 22), apparently taking 184b16-17 literally; cf. in Cael 561.2. Elsewhere he calls the 'kinetic pluralists' φυσικοί also.

³Diels's Indices (I-IV, pp. 1369-1455) are incomplete and often erroneous; he does not always list parallel passages in his apparatus.

⁴This agreement between Aristotle and Eudemus lends credence to Simplicius's claim that Eudemus follows Aristotle in everything: καὶ ὁ Εὐδήμος δὲ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει πάντα κατακολουθεῖν (in Phys 133.21-22).

⁵Simplicius does not state what the upshot of this error was for the Megarians. It may be that they, like the Eretrians, denied predication altogether and contented themselves with tautologies (cf. in Phys 91.28-31). The argument in 120.21-24 and Sophist 251b5-cl, if Antisthenes is the target (see Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 245), would support such an interpretation. Simplicius does not mention them again in his commentary. See Metaphysics Θ 1046b29 for the Megarians, and Δ 1024b32-34, H 1043b23-28, and Topics 104b20-21 for Antisthenes. See further "Megariker" RE Supplementband V coll. 707-724, esp. 723.25 ff. (Kurt von Fritz).

⁶Ilsetraut Hadot (Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius [Paris, 1978], pp. 27-32, esp. 27-28) argues that the 'autocitations' of Simplicius in in Phys to in Cael establish a relative chronology between the two works. The case is more complicated than this. It is true that there is a significant number of such authentic citations; Diels (Index Nominum s.v. Simplicius, p. 1454) lists 1118.3, 1146.27, 1169.7, 1178.36, 1330.2, 1335.1 (all references to in Cael I). As Diels notes (ibidem), all these citations involve Philoponus; the earliest explicit reference to Philoponus in in Phys is 1117.15 (see Index Nominum s.v., p. 1447). The autocitations allow the inference that in Phys VIII (1117-1366) post-

dates in Cael I. The relative chronology of in Phys I - VII and in Cael (I ?) may well be the opposite of what Hadot holds, especially if Simplicius's silence on Philoponus in the former is contrasted with his frequent (and usually bitter) references to him in the latter (see Index Nominum s.v. Ioannes Philoponus, p. 771; all references are in Book I (1-364) only). Only a determination of why Philoponus is mentioned where he would settle the issue. (Diels's Indices are not complete; Heiberg's may be also.)

⁷Diels (Parmenides Lehrgedicht [Berlin, 1897], p. 77) thinks that this 'line' was already absent from Simplicius's manuscript of Parmenides. He maintains that Simplicius's paraphrase reflects his own elaboration of the suppressed premisses of the syllogism, not Parmenides's text.

Notes to Section V.

¹In Physics 185a17-19 Aristotle states that, although Parmenides and Melissus do not speak about nature (φύσις), they nevertheless do raise 'natural problems/dilemmas' (φυσικὰς ἀπορίας) and therefore are of philosophical interest; see also 184b16-17. In On Philosophy Aristotle called them 'non-naturalists' (ἀφυσικοί) (fr. 9 (W 9) Ross OCT, p. 77).

²in Phys 70.15-17 εἴπερ, ὥς καὶ πρότερον ἔφη, ὁ Μέλισσος καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν οὕτως ἐποίησατο τοῦ συγγράμματος Περὶ φύσεως ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος (cf. also in Phys 71.8-10). Simplicius does not mention this earlier in in Phys; in 34.12 he refers to in Cael (528-529, according to Diels). The priority of in Cael to in Phys I - VII seems likely (cf. note 6 above). Diels lists neither reference in his Indices.

³According to Diels (PGF, p. 65 n v 4 (B 8)). All the authors he cites quote the line in isolation: Plutarch (adv Col 1114C), Pseudo-Plutarch (Stromateis 5), Clement (Stromateis V 14, 15; according to Ioannes Raeder (Theodoretī Graecarum Affectionum Curatio [Leipzig, 1904], p. 65) this = PE XIII 13.39, I.8.5 = Theodoretus Περὶ Ἀρχῆς B 108)), Philoponus (in Phys 65.7); add also Proclus in Parm 1152.25. (It is possible that this line appeared in this form in Theophrastus.) These authors cite the first part of the line in various forms: e.g. μόνον μουνογενές (Plutarch) οὐλομελές (Proclus).

⁴Aristotle's statement in 298b16 ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν is ignored throughout Simplicius's discussion in 557.1-560.4.

⁵ὅτι διττὴν ὑπόστασιν . . . αἰσθητοῦ (557.21-22) cf. 608.30-609.1, in Phys 157.5-7, 160.22-23, 26-27.

⁶Simplicius's interpretation parallels that of Plutarch (adv Col 1114B-F). The present contention (558.14-17 esp. 16-17) has a remarkable correspondence in Plutarch: ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὄντως ὄντι προσήκει διαμένειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ταῦτα [αἰσθητὰ καὶ δοξαστὰ] δὲ νῦν μὲν ἐστὶ νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἐξίσταται δὲ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταλλάσσει τὴν φύσιν, ἐτέρας φέτο μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐκείνου τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ δεῖσθαι προσηγορίας (1114 E).

⁷Guthrie bases his contention on Simplicius: "Melissus appears to have confined himself to discussion of reality and the folly of trusting the senses, without adding any description of the 'seeming' world corresponding to the second part of Parmenides's poem. Simplicius, who clearly possessed the works of both philosophers, writes: "Melissus simply says that there is no becoming at all, whereas Parmenides says that there is in seeming though not in truth"." In 556.12-14 Simplicius probably follows, even quotes, Alexander (cf. 556.23-24 and 560.5-10), for he argues throughout this passage that Melissus (as well as Parmenides) does not totally abolish coming to be, but rather allows it in the perceptible order (556.28-30, 557.20-23, 559.18-20; cf. 560.13).

Notes to Section VI.

¹τὴν μὲν τὸ 'παρὰ τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν καὶ οὐδὲν' λέγουσαν. (in Phys 116.26).

Notes to Section VIII.

¹In what follows an attempt is made to sort out Simplicius's scattered remarks relating to harmonizing Aristotle and Parmenides. The arrangement of the arguments and claims is not Simplicius's own.

Conclusion

A clear picture of Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of Parmenides has emerged from the preceding chapters, despite the complexity of issues and numerous insoluble problems raised concerning both Parmenides in his own right and the role which he plays throughout Greek philosophy. Definitive treatment of Simplicius on Parmenides would require detailed study of his interpretations of all the Presocratics he cites, fuller examination of the Neoplatonic sources for his interpretation, and finally a comprehensive account of Simplicius as a philosopher. It is hoped that the conclusions which follow throw into relief the more salient features of Simplicius's treatment of Parmenides.

I. Simplicius as a Source for Parmenides.

Simplicius's longer quotations from Parmenides are as a rule accurate; his manuscript of Parmenides was excellent (Diels, Parmenides Lehrgedicht, p. 26), although it was not wholly free of error (cf. in Phys 30.27 = 39.5 = 180.5 (B 8.57)). (Simplicius's longer quotations from Plato confirm accuracy of his longer quotations from Parmenides and other Presocratics; see in Phys 89.5-90.20 = Sophist 244b6-245e6 (nb παράφρασις 89.5) and Loci Platonici (in Phys 1456-1457).) His quotation of B 8.1-52 at in Phys 145.1-146.25, for example, is evidently from his manuscript (in Phys 144.25-26; nb

παράγραφοι 27). Further, the care with which he cites the context of his quotations makes secure the ordering of many fragments (cf. in Phys 77.34-78.33). The shorter, especially isolated quotations are more likely to be inaccurate. These appear to fall into three groups: 1) those from memory, i.e. tag-lines and clichés; 2) those based on a more immediate consultation of the text of Parmenides, particularly of lines which he quotes more than once; 3) those from some other written source at his disposal. An example of 1) is B 8.43-45 (in Phys 126.22-23, 137.16-17), of 2) B 8.50-51 (in Phys 41.8-9; cf. 38.30-31), and of 3) B 8.43 (in Phys 52.23; B 8.43-45). Sometimes the provenance of a quotation cannot be determined; cf. in Cael 137.3-6.

His short, isolated quotations of lines should therefore be accepted with reservation; cf. in Phys 120.23 = in Cael 557.18 ≈ in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 145.5 (B 8.4). A striking example is:

οἶον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι,

which Simplicius quotes twice (in Phys 29.18, 143.10). Cornford ("A new fragment of Parmenides," CR 49 (1935), 122-123) and Guthrie (p. 40 n v 38) take this to be a genuine quotation. Diels's contention that Simplicius is quoting from memory a garbled version of B 8.38 at Theaetetus 180e1 rather than from his manuscript, is more likely correct (in Phys Praefatio X, notes to 29.18, 143.10; cf. 87.1, 146.11). In the first place, Simplicius quotes freely from Plato throughout his commentaries (see Loci Platonici, in Phys pp. 1456-1457). Next, he quotes B 7.1-2 (in Phys 135.21-22) and

B 8.43-45 (in Phys 52.26-28, 89.22-24) apud Plato's Sophist, and apparently quotes Plato's version of the former (i.e. with ὄντα) at in Phys 143.31-144.1, 244.1-2. Leaving out of account B 7.1(-2), Simplicius's quotations from Parmenides contain 33 instances of the participial form of εἶναι from the following verses: B 2.7; B 6.1; B 8.3, 7, 12, 19, 24, 25, 32, 33, 35, 37, 46, 47 : but cf. B 1.32, B 8.56 (Appendices B and C). In three instances the form ὄντ- is found instead of ἐόντ-: in Phys 145.7 (B 8.7), 145.12 (B 8.12), 146.6 (B 8.33). While all three occur in the long quotation of B 8.1-52 (in Phys 145.1-146.25), the reading ἐόντ-, which is required by the meter, is attested in other quotations of these lines: B 8.7 = in Phys 78.16, 162.19, in Cael 137.4; B 8.12 = in Phys 78.21; B 8.33 = in Phys 31.10, 40.6. On the other hand, all three occurrences of B 7.1 have ὄντ- alone, and are found either in a quotation from the Sophist (in Phys 135.21) or in contexts in which Simplicius has the Sophist in mind (in Phys 143.31, 244.1). The likelihood is great that Simplicius follows Plato rather than the manuscript for his version of B 7.1 -2 ; that ἐόντα is the correct reading is confirmed by Aristotle, Metaphysics N 1089a4.

One might argue that Simplicius independently confirms rather than reproduces Plato's quotation in Theaetetus 180e1. Given, however, that the verse as quoted is nearly meaningless and that a verse that closely resembles it and is meaningful is attested (in Phys 87.1, 146.11 (B 8.38)), doubts as to the authenticity of the alleged fragment are inescapable. Guthrie's objection that in neither passage is a direct reference to the Theaetetus is to be

found is not telling. As mentioned above, Simplicius quotes several verses of Parmenides apud Plato. (It is likely that B 13 (in Phys 39.18) is a cliché verse, hallowed by Plato's quotation of it in the Symposium (cf. DK 28 B 13). As Simplicius ran over the Doxa, he may have selected this verse for quotation because he was familiar with it.) In addition, there are numerous references, direct and indirect, to Plato in Simplicius as in all Neoplatonists; cf. Loci Platonici, in Phys 1456-1457, in which three references to the Theaetetus are found. Thirdly, Simplicius is much concerned throughout his commentary on Physics I with Plato's treatment of Parmenides. Lastly, shortly after one of the quotations of the alleged fragment (in Phys 143.10), Simplicius paraphrases Plato's praise of Parmenides in Theaetetus 184a1 (in Phys 148.14-15; cf. 36.31); cf. PE XIV.4.6.

Simplicius's perfunctory treatment of the Doxa is the most striking feature of his treatment of Parmenides. He quotes only 29 verses from the Doxa; the longest of these quotations includes the transition from the Aletheia as well (B 8.50-16 = in Phys 38.30-39). If Diels's estimate that only ten percent of the Doxa survives, Simplicius's quotations (out of the total 43 extant lines) from this part must have been highly selective. Examination of his treatment of the Doxa reveals that Simplicius had no interest in the actual workings of Parmenides's physical scheme (cf. e.g. in Phys 39.12-21). His quotations are intended solely to prove the following contentions:

- 1) that Parmenides did not deny the reality of the physical world, but rather granted it 'seeming' being (τὸ δοκοῦν ὄν): in Phys 38.26-39.12, in Cael 557.20-558.17.
- 2) that Parmenides did not deny that coming to be (γένεσις) was part of the physical world: in Cael 559.14-560.14 (note that each quotation contains a form of γίγνεσθαι), cf. in Phys 45.29-32.
- 3) that Parmenides adduced light-night/fire-earth/hot-cold as opposite, elemental principles to account for physical objects: in Phys 30.20-31.10 (cf. 147.26-29), 179.29-180.14.
- 4) that the δαίμων mentioned in B 12.3 is Parmenides's efficient cause of the physical world, particularly of all coming to be: in Phys 31.10-17 (cf. 34.12-17), 39.12-20.

In his insistence that Parmenides presents a serious account of the physical world in the Doxa Simplicius is not breaking new ground. Among the Neoplatonists, Plotinus, Proclus, and Philoponus maintain the same thesis; the Platonist Plutarch anticipates this line of argument (Chapter III, pp. 65-67, 69-72). Simplicius is also in harmony with these philosophers in asserting that Parmenides had physical doctrines without elaborating on what they were. As a rule, the doxographical tradition is more illuminating on his physical doctrines than are Plutarch and the Neoplatonists.

Simplicius's relative neglect of the Doxa is in part due to his predilection for the noetic over the phenomenal. The principal benefit, he asserts, of the study of physics is that it prepares one for metaphysics (in Phys 4.17-5.26; cf. 18.24-34). A more decisive factor, however, is that on Simplicius's own version of the history of physics Parmenides's doctrines are primitive. He maintains that Parmenides and other early Presocratics championed some one or more

of the proximate elements, i.e. fire earth, etc., as the stuff of things (in Phys 36.8-20). Consequently, they did not achieve a complete insight into all four proximate elements, let alone make a more fundamental analysis of physical objects into form-matter, geometrical figures, or numbers (in Phys 7.19-27). It is with Parmenides's metaphysical advances that Simplicius is predominantly concerned.

II. Simplicius as an Interpreter of Parmenides.

A. The Interpretation Proper.

Simplicius is concerned in much of his commentary on Physics I with demonstrating the harmony of doctrines, both physical and metaphysical, among the Presocratics (in Phys 28.32-37.9). His history of Presocratic philosophy is a Neoplatonic reworking of Aristotle's account in Metaphysics A; the four Aristotelian causes are correlated with the hypostases of Neoplatonism (in Phys 6.31-8.15). He takes the formal and material causes to be physical and to apply properly to the hypostasis of soul. The efficient and final causes are metaphysical and pertain to the hypostasis of intellect or the One. Simplicius divides the Presocratics into two camps; those who employed physical causes only, and those who employed metaphysical causes as well. Most of the Presocratics were content to accept one or more proximate elements, i.e. fire, water, etc., as the stuff of physical objects. The Pythagoreans anticipated first Plato then Aristotle in analyzing physical objects into still more fundamental

causes or principles. Simplicius maintains that there is no contradiction between the proponents of proximate, elemental causes and the proponents of more fundamental causes; both are concerned with physical causes. The former simply have a cruder, less powerful theory of physics. Some of the cruder physicists, however, formulated metaphysical causes as well; namely, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Parmenides. Simplicius devotes considerable space to identifying the efficient and final causes in these philosophers (cf. in Phys 31.10-35.21). He does not attempt to demonstrate that all of the metaphysically perspicuous Presocratics embraced the same principles. Rather, they are in harmony insofar as they articulate, consciously or not, at least one efficient and final cause.

On this scheme Parmenides is both a crude physicist and a profound metaphysician. Simplicius insists that he did not deny the reality of the physical world. In the Doxa he set forth a pair of opposite, elemental causes, light-night/fire-earth/hot-cold, to explain the nature of physical objects. So far as he observed that physical causes had to be opposites to make change possible, Parmenides is in accord with both other Presocratics and Aristotle himself. Simplicius also identifies the δαίμων of the Doxa (B 12.3) as Parmenides's efficient cause. Beyond the identification of this divinity with an efficient cause, Simplicius has little to say on the δαίμων.

Simplicius spares no effort in identifying the one being of the Aletheia with the final cause. He insists that the signs of this, which are related in B 8.2 ff., force one to equate it with the

intelligible (τὸ νοητόν) (in Phys 142.28-147.16). The intelligible, according to Simplicius, is the first stage (μονή) of emanation in the hypostasis of intellect. In it there is a radical unity of 'one' and of 'being', as well as of thought and its content; it is also uncreated, motionless, finite, and eternal. Above all, the intelligible is the final cause of all existent things. Simplicius does not state that Parmenides himself was aware that qua the intelligible his one being was the cause of all being, physical and metaphysical. He asserts that Parmenides saw that his one being was the final cause of thinking, not of existence. The signs of the one being are Simplicius's justification for equating it with the intelligible, which according to Neoplatonic metaphysics is a final cause.

Simplicius has an ulterior motive in drawing this equation: to refute the criticisms of Parmenides by both Plato and Aristotle. He maintains that Aristotle misidentified Parmenides's one being with individual substance, Plato with the differentiated stage of intellect, the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν) or Forms (in Phys 147.16-148.11). Careful attention to Parmenides's own words, however, proves that he had in mind an entity yet more abstract than either of these two. Simplicius concludes that the intelligible better accords with the signs of being which Parmenides himself relates.

B. Method.

Simplicius's method throughout Physics I is to document by quotation, typically accompanied by a gloss or paraphrase, any point

he makes concerning Parmenides. He takes an antiquarian delight in quoting from the ancients (in Phys 29.3-5, 39.20-21). In several passages he states that facile criticisms of the Presocratics are easily refuted by consulting their ipsissima verba (in Phys 80.15-17, in Cael 136.26-30). A paradigm of this method is found at in Phys 77.1-79.12, where he refutes one of Alexander's criticisms of Parmenides.

Simplicius's glosses and paraphrases of lines from Parmenides reveal that he read the text with care; cf. in Phys 40.2-8. His interpretation of certain words or phrases are of course open to question (ΟΥΝΕΝΕΝ B 8.4 = τινος ἔνενα in Phys 87.17), but there is only one clear case of Simplicius's having misunderstood Parmenides (in Phys 30.21-22 ταύτὸν καὶ ἕτερον for B 8.57-61 (= 30.27-31.2)).

Simplicius's paraphrases are generally faithful and insightful, but must be used with caution. Consider the paraphrase of B 8.3-14 at in Phys 78.24-29. This begins with the positive half of the disjunct 'from being', although Simplicius's text has nothing of the sort. Diels holds that the paraphrase reflects Simplicius's desire to spell out in full syllogistic form Parmenides's argument rather than Parmenides's text (Parmenides Lehrgedicht, p. 77). He himself emends B 8.7-8 to supply this half of the disjunct, but holds that the line he supplies was absent from Simplicius's exemplar. Whether the emendation is correct is moot; his remarks on Simplicius's paraphrase and exemplar are correct. In the first place, Simplicius follows Aristotle's own order of this syllogism; cf. Physics 191a27-31, in Phys 162.11-14, in Cael 136.26-137.11 (nb 137.7-11 = Physics

191a27-31). Secondly, the lines in question, B 8.7-8, occur in four different passages in two different works (cf. Appendix B). It is highly unlikely that the same haplographic error could have occurred in all four passages.

His longer paraphrases thus have limited if any evidentiary value for the text of Parmenides. On the other hand, his glosses do reflect the text he possessed; cf. in Phys 78.5, 147.27-29.

C. Sources.

Omitting the obvious cases in which a source is named, it is difficult to determine when Simplicius draws on a particular source. Even when a possible or probable source can be documented, it does not follow that Simplicius actually consulted it. Conversely, the apparent absence of a source may be misleading. Simplicius had at his disposal a considerable library on ancient philosophy, and may well have used works that are not extant. In addition, since he was part of a long teacher-student transmission of philosophical doctrine, the influence of oral doctrines cannot be dismissed.

1). Overall Interpretation. The thesis that Parmenides treated of phenomenal or 'seeming' being in the Doxa but of noetic or 'real' being in the Aletheia is explicitly maintained by Proclus and implicitly by Plotinus (Chapter III, pp. 69-72). That Philoponus holds the same position may point to Ammonius, their common teacher, as Simplicius's immediate source (Philoponus in Phys CAG XVI 21.22-22.23). There are several, striking parallels between Plutarch's

intrepretation of Parmenides (adv Col 1113F-1114F) and that of Simplicius, but no evidence of any direct influence. Given that both, in effect, make a Platonist out of Parmenides, such parallels are perhaps to be expected.

2). The Aletheia. Simplicius's identification of the one being as the final cause of all existence is probably indebted to Proclus (cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-71). His insistence that the one being is a radical, undifferentiated unity of 'one' and 'being' apparently draws on Damascius (cf. Chapter III, p. 73). It is intended to refute Plato's criticism of Parmenides in the Sophist (cf. in Phys 147.17-148.6), and by implication Proclus's contention that Parmenides's being is not really one.

3) The Doxa. Although Simplicius pointedly rejects Aristotle's contention that Parmenides annihilated the physical world (in Cael 557.1-560.4), he clearly follows Aristotle (and Theophrastus via Alexander) in maintaining that the principles in the Doxa are opposites (in Phys 25.15-16, 30.20-22, 146.26-29, 179.180.13). His identification of the αἰτία of B 12.3 as an efficient cause is a direct refutation of Theophrastus via Alexander (in Phys 38.20-39.20).

D. An Assessment.

1) Weaknesses. The principal weakness of Simplicius's interpretation is also one of its strengths: literalism. He is content to cite single lines or signs from the poem to prove his contentions.

While he cannot be accused of quoting in a misleadingly selective way (in Phys 144.25-28), some of the signs he cites have at best an etymological connection with their Neoplatonic counterparts. For example, Simplicius takes μένων (B 8.38) to justify his equation of Parmenides's one being with the intelligible because of the 'remainingness' (μονή) of the latter (cf. in Phys 147.2-10). Again, Simplicius takes Parmenides's νοεῖν 'thinking, intuiting' (B 8.34, 6) as a sign that Parmenides somehow had νοῦς 'intellect' in the Neoplatonic sense in mind (in Phys 143.18-21, 144.22-25). Not all of these correspondences are purely verbal (in Phys 142.31-36).

A second point on which Simplicius is sure to find censure is his readiness to read too much Platonism back into Parmenides. No one doubts that Parmenides had a significant influence of Plato, but few find in Parmenides fully articulated Platonic doctrines. Even those who allow that Parmenides was trying to come to grips with the physical world in its own right in the Doxa would not argue that he granted this world 'seeming' being in the Platonic sense (cf. Republic V 479c6-d10, Timaeus 27e5-28a4, in Cael 557.20-24). By making Parmenides a Platonist, Simplicius resolves with one stroke the issue of the relation between the two parts of the poem; they simply treat of the two orders or aspects of Platonic reality.

Finally, Simplicius makes no attempt to assess the doctrines of Parmenides (or other Presocratics) in their historical context (cf. in Phys 28.30-31 and DG 104 n 4). He is simply one of the ancients (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι) who express their doctrines enigmatically (in Phys 7.1-3, 120.27-29). Simplicius believes that careful read-

ing of Parmenides shows that he was articulating Neoplatonic doctrines (cf. in Phys 77.34-79.10). He is, however, silent as to whether Parmenides was consciously articulating such doctrines or not.

2) Strengths. Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides is the longest, most elaborate, and above all the most carefully documented treatment of Parmenides in antiquity. Unlike more original philosophers, Simplicius had a keen interest in what Parmenides and other Presocratics actually said, not merely in the philosophical implications for his own system. Some of what he says is patently false, some dubiously applied to Neoplatonic ends. However, his philosophical presuppositions should be viewed as biases to be corrected for, not as grounds for rejecting his interpretation out of hand. By the same logic, one should also reject Aristotle's interpretation out of hand because it relies on Peripatetic doctrines.

Apart from helpful glosses on or paraphrases of particular verses, Simplicius's interpretation repays consideration as an eloquent case for reading Parmenides along Platonic lines. Simplicius and other Neoplatonists may go too far in welcoming Parmenides into the Neoplatonic fold, but it cannot be denied that Parmenides had a decisive influence on Plato and ipso facto the Neoplatonists. Whether the Neoplatonists correctly assessed this influence I cannot say; only a definitive treatment of Parmenides's influence on Plato, if that were itself possible, would yield a clear-cut answer. In the words of E.R. Dodds ("The Parmenides of

Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic 'One'," CQ (1928), 134),
"what is sauce for all the Neoplatonic and medieval geese should
also be sauce for their parent, the great Platonic gander".

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Appendix A: Translations

in Phys 6.31 - 7.19

But once I have added still a few more remarks I shall turn to the text. For of those who engaged in philosophy prior to Plato, those who follow Thales, Anaximander, and the like, insofar as then for the first time philosophy arose in Greece after the flood and the acquisition of the necessities [of life]¹, seeking the causes of things that come into being in nature, insofar as they began from the bottom up, observed and revealed the material and elemental principles in an indiscriminating fashion, since they reveal [them] as the principles of things that are. Xenophanes of Colophon, his student Parmenides, and the Pythagoreans propounded a most complete philosophy both about physical and metaphysical matters, but in a way that was riddling. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae established mind as an efficient cause, but in his causal accounts made the slightest use of it, as Socrates charged in the Phaedo². But perhaps this is nothing strange. For Timaeus, both in his own right and as the character portrayed by Plato, even though first positing an efficient, paradigmatic, and final cause of things that come to be, nevertheless produced his account of corporeal causes on the basis of plane figures and shapes and in a word on the nature of elements. Except that Plato, who clarified the doctrines of both the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, both praised, as is fit, metaphysical phenomena and distinguished the

elemental principles [found] among physical and created things from all the other [principles], and was himself the first to have named such principles elements, as Eudemus relates³. And in virtue of his own examination he differentiated the efficient cause, the final cause, and in addition to this the paradigmatic cause, the Forms. (Moreover, by using the same conceptions Aristotle later discovered matter, and similarly form.) He establishes the divine intellect as an efficient cause and as a final cause its goodness, in virtue of which he modeled the whole perceptible order after its intelligible exemplar⁴.

Notes to in Phys 6.31 - 7.19

¹Cf. Metaphysics A 981b17 ff., Physics 222a23, 26.

²97b8 ff..

³7.10-19 = fr. 31 (W) p. 22.4-13.

⁴Cf. Timaeus 29d7 ff..

in Phys 21.13 - 22.30¹

All the physicists, agreeing that there are principles of natural phenomena, are inquiring into the principle of being². For those who as philosophers investigated the principles were inquiring into them as principles of things that are: some in an indiscriminating way, not distinguishing physical from metaphysical phenomena; while others did distinguish, as for example the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, they went unnoticed by most people because of their obscurity. Wherefore Aristotle too refutes the apparent meaning [of their statements], coming to the aid of those of superficial understanding. That there are principles at all is demonstrated along with [the determination] that they are of such and such a kind or of such and such a number. Accordingly, on the assumption that principles exist, having shown that the knowledge of principles is necessary and having related in what manner one arrives at them, he thinks it reasonable not to reveal his own opinion on principles before examining the doctrines of his predecessors. Having assumed as an axiom of division "the principle is one or more than one" (for because of the axiom of contradiction it is necessary that it be one or not one, and if not one, many) "and if one" he says "it is necessary that this" again "be either motionless or in motion" he thereupon subsumes the previously established doctrines under the segments of the division. For either it is one and motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus seemed to say, or one and in motion, just as the physicists [said]. "If more than one either finite" in

number "or infinite, and if" on the one hand "finite either two or three or" limited with respect to "some other number". And "if infinite" either of the same kind or opposite in kinds. And since it is if possible to divide those who say [that the principle is] one into [proponents of] 'finite' and 'infinite', and those who say [that the principle is] more than one into [proponents of] 'in motion' or 'motionless', Alexander says "he arranged what is more appropriate under each segment of the division". For 'to be in motion or not' is more appropriate to a single principle, but 'to be finite or infinite' to more than one principle. It should be known that when he has proceeded to his remarks about them, after his refutation of Parmenides and Melissus, discussing the so-called 'physicists', he made the following division: either they say that being or rather the element is one or many; one, if it is some one of the three elements or what is intermediate; one and many, as for example Anaxagoras and Empedocles [say] -- he ranges Democritus with them because he speaks of the void and atoms³.

It is necessary to note that there is a difference between what is infinite and finite in number, which was appropriate to those who say that the principles are more than one, and the infinite and finite in magnitude, which he himself examines in his remarks about Melissus and Parmenides and which is appropriate to Anaximander and Anaximenes, who posited an element that was one but infinite in magnitude. Both 'in motion' and 'motionless' are for division's sake appropriate to both those who say that there is one principle and

and those who say that there are more than one principle. So for example even Eudemus says "if the principles exist, they are either in motion or motionless"⁴. But Aristotle omitted this division because a doctrine that states that the principles are more than one and motionless did not even arise. He seems to have passed over for the present the finite and infinite as regards a single [principle] out of brevity; yet in his remarks about Parmenides, as I mentioned, and Melissus, he examines these matters as well⁵. Perhaps it is better, once we have encompassed all the doctrines on the basis of a more complete division, to return to Aristotle's statements.

Therefore it is necessary that the principle either be one or not one, and this is the same as saying more than one, and if one either motionless or in motion. And if it is motionless it is either infinite, as Melissus of Samos seems to say, or finite, as Parmenides, the son of Pyres, [seems to say]; these men do not talk about a physical element, but rather about real being. Theophrastus says that Xenophanes of Colophon, the teacher of Parmenides, posits that the principle, or rather being, is one and all and is neither finite nor infinite, nor in motion nor at rest; he agrees that the mention of his doctrine belongs to some other inquiry than that into physics⁶.

Notes to in Phys 21.13 - 22.30

¹Cf. 185b15-25.

²Cf. 184b22-23.

³Cf. 187a12 ff..

⁴22.13 - 16 = fr. 33a (W) p. 23.3-6; cf. in Phys 42.13-15.

⁵Cf. 185a20 ff..

⁶Physicorum Opiniones fr. 5 DG 480.4-8.

in Phys 25.14 - 21¹

Of those who say that there are more than one [principle], some posited principles that are finite, others infinite in number. Of the proponents of the finite, some [posited] two, as for example Parmenides fire and earth (or rather light and darkness) in the Doxa, or the Stoics god and matter -- evidently not speaking of god as an element, but rather the former as the active principle, the latter the passive. Some three, as for example Aristotle matter and the opposites. Some four, as for example Empedocles of Acragas, who was born not much later than Anaxagoras, and who was the follower and disciple of Parmenides, and even more the Pythagoreans.

Notes to in Phys 25.14 - 21

¹Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 3 DG 477.12-18.

in Phys 28.4 - 13¹

Leucippus of Elea or Miletus (for both localities are related about him) partook of Parmenides's philosophy, but did not travel down the same road as did Parmenides and Xenophanes concerning things that are, but rather the opposite, it seems. For they make the universe one and motionless and uncreated and finite, and agree not even to inquire into non-being. He, on the other hand, posited atoms as infinite and ever-moving elements and that the number of shapes among them is infinite, because nothing has more of one quality than another. That is, he observes that there is unceasing coming to be and change among things that are. Furthermore, [he maintains] that being exists no more than non-being, and that both are equally causes of things that come to be.

Notes to in Phys 28.4 - 13

¹Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 8 DG 483.11-21.

in Phys 28.32 - 31.17

Those who hear so great a disagreement must not believe that it represents contradictions among past philosophers. This is precisely what some, who chance upon historical lists only and understand nothing of what is said, attempt to reproach them for -- despite the fact that they themselves are torn asunder by countless schisms not concerning the principles of physics (for they do not understand even a dream of these things) but rather concerning the overthrow of the majesty of god. Perhaps there is nothing wrong in my digressing somewhat in order to demonstrate to those with a rather greater desire for knowledge, how despite the apparent disagreement concerning their doctrines on the principles, the ancients are nevertheless in harmonious agreement. For some discoursed about the intelligible and first principle, as for example Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus; Xenophanes and Parmenides say that it is finite. For [they hold that] it is necessary that the one exist prior to the many, and that that which is the cause of the boundary and limit for all things be defined with respect to the finite rather than infinity, and that that which is in every respect perfect, which has its appropriate perfection, be finite, and more than all things be a perfection, since it is also a principle¹. Except that Xenophanes posits it as a cause of all things, supreme over all things, and as transcending motion and rest and all pairs of opposites, as Plato also does in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. Parmenides, seeing clearly that 'its being in the same condition' also transcends all change, and perhaps

both potentiality and actuality, proclaims it as motionless and alone as transcending all things,

It is alone, unmoved; therefore all things are a name².

Melissus himself also similarly observed its immutability, but declared that because of the inexhaustibility of its essence and the infinity of its power that it is infinite, just as it is also uncreated; his demonstration concerning its infinity, which was generated in accord with this conception, makes [this] clear. For he says,

Since it did not become, it is and always was and always will be, and has neither beginning nor end but is infinite. For if it came to be, it would have a beginning (having come into being, it must have become at some time) and an end (for having come to be, it would at some time have ceased); but since it neither began nor ended, it always was and always will be and has no beginning nor end [but is infinite]³.

So then, as Melissus contemplated that which is without a beginning or end in time and is always existent, he declared that it is infinite. And Parmenides too corroborates him on this sort of thing, since he says in roughly the same words,

That since it exists it is unborn and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable and without end.
It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be,
since it now is all together. (B 8.3-5)

So then he too says that as it is uninterrupted and as it is uncreated it is also infinite. And he made clear the conception of limit in these verses,

Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself and so remains firmly where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a chain that hems it around, because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would lack everything⁴. (B 8.29-33)

For if it is being and not non-being, it is non-lacking, and as non-lacking it is perfect, and being perfect it has a perfection and is not non-perfect, and as it has a perfection it has a limit and boundary. Thus then there is no disagreement among the conceptions of these men when they speak about the same thing. And when Parmenides moves on from the intelligibles to the perceptibles, or as he himself says from truth to seeming, when he says,

Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought
concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of
mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words.
(B 8.50-52)

he himself also posited the primary opposition as elemental principles of things that come to be, which he calls light and darkness <or> fire and earth or dense and rare or the same and different, saying immediately after the verses just quoted,

They made up their minds to name two forms,
of which it is not right to name one (it is in this that
they have gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary in
form and assigned marks apart from each other; on the one
hand flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in every
direction the same as itself⁵, but not the same as the
other; and also that other, separate, the very opposite,
blind Night, a dense and heavy form (B 8.53-59)

But above all there is inserted between the lines a brief statement in prose, as if Parmenides's own, which is as follows:

On the one side is the rare, hot, light, soft and the
light; on the other, which is the dense side, are named
the cold, darkness, hard, and heavy; for these were, each
set of them, separated off so as to be distinct.

Thus he clearly assumed two opposite elements; consequently, he earlier discerned that being is one⁶, and he says that those men go astray who do not observe or do not clearly reveal the opposition of

elements that produce coming to be. Aristotle too, following this point, posited opposites as principles. And Parmenides clearly propounded an efficient cause not only of bodies involved in coming to be, but also of immaterial things which bring to completion coming to be, when he says,

Those next to them with Night, but a due portion of flame is injected. And in the middle of these is the goddess who steers all things. For she it is who has charge of all the concerns of loathed birth and of union⁷, sending female to mingle with male, and again conversely male to female. (B 12.2-6)

Notes to in Phys 28.32 - 31.17

¹29.11. Diels's suggestion of ἀρχήν for ἀρχή is here adopted.

²DK takes this to be a garbled version of B 8.38,

οὔλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμειναι· τῷ πάντ' ὄνομα(α) ἔσται

So as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name.

Guthrie (p. 40 n y 38) thinks that it is separate fragment, but does not offer a translation. I have altered his rendition of B 8.38 to conform with Simplicius's text. Cf. pp. 258-260.

³30 B 2. Translation from Guthrie, pp. 107-108.

⁴DK (B 8.33) ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· [μὴ] ἐὼν δ' ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο. Guthrie (p. 34) retains the negative and adopts ἐπιδεές (DE) for ἐπιδευές.

⁵Cf. in Phys 180.5 and translation.

⁶Reading διέγνω (31.8); Diels emends this to δύ' ἔγνω. See commentary to 31.7-10, p. 110.

⁷DK (B 12.4) πάντα γὰρ <ἦ> στυγεροῦ τόκου καὶ μίξις ἀρχεῖ.

in Phys 34.12 - 17

Except that he [Empedocles] too utters nothing contrary to Parmenides and Melissus, but he clearly saw the opposition of elements, as Parmenides did also. The latter posits the divinity situated in the middle of all things and the cause of all coming to be as a single efficient cause; but he clearly saw the opposition in the efficient causes as well.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae seems to have observed that the difference among all the kinds is threefold; one is combined with respect to the intelligible unity, since he says, "All things were together, infinite both in number and smallness"¹. And again he says,

Before they were separated, since all things were together nor even any colour could be discerned. That was prevented by the mixture of all things -- the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark, since there was much earth in it and an infinite number of seeds in no way resembling each other. And since this is so, we must suppose that all things are in the whole.²

And this whole (σύνολον) would be the one being of Parmenides.

Notes to in Phys 34.12 - 17

¹59 B 1 (DK II.32.11-12). Translation from Guthrie, II p. 294.

²59 B 4 (DK II.34.17-35-35.2, 3-5). Translation from Guthrie, II pp. 294-295; last sentence supplemented from Kirk and Raven (The Presocratic Philosophers [Cambridge, 1971]) p. 369.

in Phys 36.15 - 37.9

Some have the intelligible, others the perceptible order in view; others investigate proximate, others more fundamental elements of bodies; some apprehend the nature of the elements in a rather partial, others in a more complete way; some investigate the elements only, others all the causes and subsidiary causes. Thus then, those who study nature assert things that are different, but by no means contradictory, if one is able to make the proper distinctions. Aristotle himself, who seems to point out their disagreements, will shortly say,

The differ, however, from one another in that some assume contraries which are more primary, others contraries which are less so; some those more knowable in the order of explanation, others more familiar to sense. Hence [he says] their principles are in one sense the same, in another different.¹

But I have been compelled to dwell on these matters at rather great length because of those who readily accuse the ancients of [mutual] disagreement. And since we shall hear Aristotle himself refuting the doctrines of his philosophical predecessors, and even before Aristotle Plato manifestly does this, and before both of them Parmenides and Xenophanes, we should understand that out of their concern for those of rather superficial comprehension they [Aristotle and Plato] refute what is apparently absurd in their statements, since the ancients were wont to declare their opinions in a riddling way. Plato clearly marvels at Parmenides on this score, whom he seems to refute, although he says that his thought requires a deep-sea diver². Aristotle also manifestly suspects the depth of his wisdom, since

he says, "Parmenides seems in places to speak < with more insight >"³. So then in these ways they appear to be making refutations: sometimes they are filling in what was omitted; sometimes they are clarifying what was stated unclearly; sometimes they discern that what is said in regard to what is intelligible is not appropriate to what is physical, as in the case of those who say that being in one and motionless; sometimes they set forth the facile interpretations of those who are rather superficial. And in this work I shall myself attempt to note Aristotle's refutation of each. But we must take up Aristotle's text again and describe distinctly what he says in it.

Notes to in Phys 36.15 - 37.9

¹Physics 188b30-33, 36-37. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 228 (McKeon).

²See Diels's note ad loc. (36.31).

³Metaphysics A 986b27-28. Translation from W.D. Ross, Metaphysica, p. 699 (McKeon).

in Phys 37.12 - 40.21¹

Alexander says,

Having said that one must begin from what is more knowable to us, he [Aristotle] acts in this manner also; for he began from a dichotomy that is complete, clear, and obvious to all. For what is more clear than the proposition of contradictories, which states 'one or not one, i.e. more than one'?

Now the statement that he began from a clear dichotomy is well taken; however, Aristotle did not exactly say that one must proceed from what is obvious to unobvious principles. For those obvious things are compound and more knowable in perception and are spoken of as whole, although they contain things that are more particular and unobvious. He will refute the false opinions concerning the principles on the basis of things that are perceptible, at any rate, and knowable to us, as we shall learn, and will confirm the true ones.

Alexander says,

He [Aristotle] did not say 'as for example Parmenides and Melissus' on the assumption that Parmenides and Melissus posit a single principle and assert that it is motionless. For they did not posit a principle at all; for they said that the universe is one -- this conflicts with the assertion that a principle exists. For those who posit a principle agree that what exists is more than one thing, since they introduce along with the principle those things of which it is the principle. But having stated the first dichotomy 'the principle is one or more than one', as regards one branch of what falls under the dichotomous division he in turn employs the dichotomy 'if the principle is one, it [is] either motionless or in motion'. Since the statement that there is one, motionless principle is incredible, he set it forth with an explanation. For it is no less incredible, nay it is even more incredible, than that [statement just cited] to maintain that the universe is one and motionless -- nevertheless [this idea] has as its proponents Parmenides and Melissus. For even if this is not exactly the same as that, nevertheless it concurs with it.

This then is what Alexander says in his own words; yet the explanation of one incredible position by one yet more incredible was not, I suppose, characteristic of Aristotle's great intellect. However, by no means does he [Aristotle] make mention of the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus as a different, incredible doctrine above and beyond that which states that the principle is one and motionless (for he refutes them for saying this); rather Aristotle prudently accepted this as [the doctrine] of these men.

A similar inquiry [he says] is made by those who inquire into the number of existents; for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or many.²

Therefore he supposes that these men examine philosophically a principle of existent things; and he marked off a segment of the dichotomous division for them, when he posited that the principle is one and motionless. For they were saying that real being, the unified, which is a principle and cause of the many, discrete [existents] -- not as an element of but rather as producing them -- is one being. And in turn having divided the other segment which states that the principle is one by a [logically] necessary dichotomy which states that the one principle is motionless or in motion, and taking up 'motionless', he refutes those who say that being is one and motionless on the very counts on which one ought to have refuted those who say that the principle is one and motionless; for even if they use other words, nevertheless they too are saying and investigating the same things. Alexander agrees that in the Aletheia, which is about intelligible being, Parmenides says that being is one, motionless,

and uncreated,

but when formulating an account of the physical world in accord with popular opinion and appearances [he says] no longer saying that being is either one or uncreated, he posited fire and earth as principles of things that come to be; positing earth as matter, fire as an efficient cause; and he calls [he says] fire light and earth darkness.³

If Alexander had understood 'in accord with popular opinion and appearances' in the way that Parmenides intends, it would be well. But if he supposes that those accounts are totally false and if he believes that light or fire is an efficient cause, his supposition is incorrect. For after he has completed his account concerning the intelligible, Parmenides adds these [verses] which I have already quoted [in Phys 30.17-31.2]:

Here I cease my trustworthy account and thought⁴
concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of
mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words.
They made up their minds to name two forms, of which it
is not right to name one (it is in this that they have
gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary in form and
assigned marks apart from each other; on the one hand
flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in every
direction the same as itself⁵ but not the same as the
other; and also that other, separate, the very opposite,
blind Night, a dense and heavy form.
This whole likely-seeming ordering I tell thee,
that no judgment of mortals may outrun thee.

(B 8.50-61)

Therefore he calls this account opinable and deceptive, not as absolutely false, but as falling from the intelligible truth into the apparent and perceptible, the seeming. And somewhat later, speaking again about the two elements, he introduces the efficient cause also, saying:

The narrower [sc. bands] were filled with unmixed Fire,
those next to them with Night, but a due portion of flame

is injected. And in the middle of these is the goddess who steers all things. (B 12.1-3)

And he says that she is also the cause of the gods, when he says,

First of all gods she devised Eros (B 13)

and so forth. And he says that she sometimes sends souls from the visible to the invisible, and sometimes vice versa. I am compelled to dwell on these matters at length because of the ignorance of the writings of the ancients that is so widespread at present. And since they say that being is one, they would appropriately say that it is also motionless, if they were discoursing about physical phenomena. For that in respect to which the motion [occurs] would be introduced along with the motion, whether in respect of quality, quantity, or anything else, and space would also be introduced, if the motion were of the physical sort, as it is different from what moves. But Parmenides, who speaks about intelligible being, says:

But unmoved in the grip of mighty bonds
it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be
and ceasing have been driven afar off, and true conviction has rejected them.⁶ (B 8.26-28)

And he adduces the cause of its lack of motion:

And so remains where it is; for powerful Necessity holds
it in the bonds of a chain that hems it all around,
because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would
lack everything.⁷

For as non-being lacks all things, he says, so being is non-lacking and perfect. But that which moves lacks that through which the motion takes place; therefore being does not move. Melissus also proved, again in virtue of the same conception, that it is motionless because

if being should move it is necessary that there be something void of being to which it will withdraw; he first proved that void does not exist. And he speaks as follows in his own work:

Nor is there any void, for void is nothing, and nothing cannot be. Nor does it [sc. what is] move, for it has no place to which it can withdraw, but is full. If there were void it would withdraw to the void; but since there is no void, it has nowhere to withdraw to.⁸

Therefore, since it is full it does not move -- not because motion through a plenum is impossible, as Alexander understood Melissus's statement -- but rather because being itself is full, on the grounds that nothing else exists besides it. At any rate, Melissus says:

The decision to be made about full and not full is this: if a thing has room for something else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it does not have room to take it in, it is full. Now it must be full if there is no void, and if it is full it does not move.⁹

Notes to in Phys 37.12 - 40.21

¹Cf. Physics 186a12-16, b15-16 (lemma).

²Physics 184b22-24. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 219 (McKeon). Simplicius apparently misquotes Aristotle here; cf. in Phys 45.13-14.

³Cf. DG 482 n 10, fr. 6.

⁴B 8.50. Simplicius here has the future παύω here and at in Phys 41.8 (DEE^a), and in Cael 558.5; the present παύω appears at in Phys 30.17 and 41.8 (aF). DK adopts the present.

⁵Cf. note 2 to translation of in Phys 179.27-180.13, p. 378.

⁶DK, following Scaliger, reads τῆλε for τῆδε (B 8.28).

⁷Cf. note 4 to translation of in Phys 28.32-31.17, p. 289.

⁸30 B 7.7 (DK I.272.3-8). Translation from Guthrie, II p. 104.

⁹30 B 7.9-10 (DK I.272.11-273.3). Translation from Guthrie,
II p. 104.

in Phys 40.23 - 41.9¹

Once he has set forth those who say that being or rather the principle is motionless, he proceeds to the other segment, and says "or in motion, as for example the physicists", setting those who say [it is] motionless in contradistinction to the physicists, since those who abolish motion are not physicists at all -- this he will immediately clarify and prove; for if nature (φύσις) is a principle of motion, how could one who abolishes nature itself be a physicist? People are accustomed to name those who pursued some part of philosophy, whether exclusively or for the most part, from that [part]; for example, they called Socrates an ethicist, but those who follow Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the like physicists.²

In this passage too I reject Alexander's interpretation; [since] he first says that he [Aristotle] set the physicists in contradistinction to those who say that [being is] one and motionless, but subsequently that it is Aristotle's custom to call those who philosophically investigated the truth 'physicists', since the goal of physics is not action but rather knowledge. For who was unaware that Parmenides also, in contradistinction to whom he [Alexander] says are set the physicists, was philosophically investigating the truth, since he clearly says,

Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought³
concerning truth? (B 8.50-51)

Notes to in Phys 40.23 - 41.9

¹Cf. 184b16-17

²As Diels notes (ad 40.23), Simplicius excerpts Alexander in 40.23-41.1.

³Cf. note 4 to translation of in Phys 37.12-40.12, p. 298.

in Phys 45.26 - 46.4¹

But since Parmenides and Melissus were inquiring whether being is one or many, and if one whether motionless or in motion, these men also, Aristotle says, were not, as one might suppose, inquiring into things that are, but rather into the principle of things that are, prudently accepting this as their doctrine. For he would never have believed that they failed to recognize the plurality among things that are or that they had two feet; rather, their argument was about real being and being proper, which is the principle and cause of all existent things whatsoever. And for this reason also he immediately takes up the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus [as a doctrine] of those investigate being². For if they should be inquiring whether being or even a principle is one or many, their inquiry is the same, even if they use different words. At any rate, what is stated in reference to those who say that being is one could be stated also in reference to those who say that the principle is one.

Notes to in Phys 45.26 - 46.4

¹Cf. 184b15-16. In this passage Simplicius disputes Alexander's interpretation of 184b22-24, which he quotes above (in Phys 45.15-22).

²Cf. 184b25 ff..

in Phys 46.25 -28

And taking up the first segments of his division (and these are whether the principle is one and motionless¹), he finds as proponents of this doctrine Parmenides and Melissus, who say that being is one, positing being in place of the principle.

Notes to in Phys 46.25 - 28

¹Cf. 184b15-16.

in Phys 51.8 - 27¹

Even if one should out of contentiousness attempt to formulate a fallacious syllogism, if he should construct the syllogism from premisses which are probable, the deception must be refuted, even if not for its/his own sake, at least for the sake of an ordinary audience. But if the premisses should not even have probability, but should be brought forth only in an eristic fashion, its refutation is more appropriate for the learned than laymen. Accordingly, if the argument of Parmenides and Melissus both does away with the principles of physics and establishes something incredible and incongruous, since it says that being is one; and if in the process of establishing what it intends through a syllogism it not only assumes false premisses but even combines them in an invalid syllogistic manner; for all these reasons it would not merit refutation, and least of all from the physicist, whose principles it abolishes. Since the syllogism, or rather anything that is composite, has two defects -- one relative to those things of which it is composed, the other to their combination -- he censures both [defects] in these arguments. For the premisses have been falsely assumed, and the manner in which they have been combined vis-à-vis the syllogistic figure is erroneous and belongs to those [figures] which do not necessarily yield a conclusion,

Alexander, however, says that Aristotle means these things in the following way:

Since the thesis of Heraclitus and one such as 'if one should say that being is a single man' are incredible,

the argument of both Parmenides and Melissus is eristic, i.e. sophistical, in terms of proof, and 'belongs to those [positions] made for argument's sake', i.e. to those not attested by the facts about which they speak, but rather by what is both false and idle.

Notes to in Phys 51.8 - 27

¹Cf. 185a5-10.

in Phys 52.8 - 53.7¹

He [Aristotle] says, "the argument of Melissus is cruder" because he not only said that being is one and motionless, as does Parmenides, but in addition to this he also posited that it is infinite; so then having argued against them on common grounds he concluded; "Melissus says that being is infinite. Being therefore has some quantity".² It is crude then, because although it introduced quantity, which must be in a subject, it nevertheless posited that being is one. He said "it offers no difficulty" because it is easily resolved and does not cause difficulty because it is superficial. For a shrewd argument is both that which has a bite and causes a difficulty, as is stated in the Sophistical Refutations³. "But when one absurdity is granted", he says, "the others follow." For indeed it [being] must be both motionless, if it is one and one in such a way that it alone exists; for if it moves it will possess both motion and change and the 'whence whither', or else from one condition to another, or else from one place to another, or in some other way. And it must also be infinite; for if it has a limit, it will possess both the limit and the thing limited. Accordingly then Plato also, because Parmenides says that being is a whole and like a sphere,

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere⁴,
(B 8.43)

demonstrates that it [being] is not one, because it has a center, extremities, and parts. And the following is written in the Sophist:

Then if it is a whole -- as indeed Parmenides says;

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equal everyway from the centre; for it may not be at all greater or smaller in this direction or in that.

(B 8.43-45)

If the real is like that it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not? -- It must. -- Well, if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way <one>, as being a sum or whole. -- Of course. -- On the other hand the thing which has these properties cannot be just Unity itself, can it?⁵

"It is nothing difficult", he [Aristotle] says, but the other absurdities must follow from the positing of one absurdity. Surely because it is nothing difficulty to see how the other absurdities follow from the granting of one absurdity.

Notes to in Phys 52.8 - 53.7

¹Cf. 185a10-12.

²185a32-33.

³Cf. 182b32-183a13.

⁴Guthrie renders $\sigma\phi\alpha\iota\rho\eta\varsigma$ in B 8.43 by "ball" (p. 43); "sphere" fits the present context better.

⁵244e2-245a6. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 223-224.

in Phys 70.3 - 5¹

Having offered several reasons why the discussion of Parmenides and Melissus is not appropriate for the physicist, but intending to refute it, he explained first that he is not producing its refutation to no purpose.

Notes to in Phys 70.3 - 5

¹Cf. 185a17-20.

in Phys 71.4 - 8¹

But how does Alexander here say that they did not speak about nature at all, even though he previously says in his own words that,

Parmenides, when formulating an account of the physical world in accord with popular opinion and appearances, no longer saying that being is one or uncreated, posited fire and earth as principles of things that come to be?²

Notes to in Phys 71.4 - 8

¹Cf. 185a17-20.

²Cf. in Phys 38.20-22, DG 482 n 10 (fr. 6).

in Phys 71.19 - 73.4¹

He who contradicts a doctrine makes his attack in two ways; for he either refutes the arguments which establish it, or fashions a general refutation of it. But he who refutes the arguments alone has not yet refuted the doctrine; for what if there are other arguments that establish it which are more powerful than those refuted? On the other hand, those who do not bring objections against the arguments which establish [it], but rather against the doctrine itself and make a general refutation of it, firmly refute the doctrine, but leave behind difficulties if they do not also refute the arguments themselves which establish [the doctrine]. Wherefore, since he has undertaken to refute the argument of Melissus and Parmenides, Aristotle first fashions a general objection to it -- that being is not one if one should understand [this] in the ordinary way -- making his refutation on the basis of dichotomous division; the by refuting their arguments as well -- if one should accept them [the arguments] as establishing some such one being. His attack, which originates from the distinction among things that are, proves to be dialectical; for it is possible for those who employ dialectic to establish the principles of the sciences. And the whole treatment is as follows. Whereas they say that being is one, and each of them -- 'being' and 'one' -- is said in many ways, they must be separately distinguished. Accordingly, since being has been shown to be used in ten ways, either as substance, quality, quantity, or some other of the ten categories, do those who say that being is one say that it

is one in name only, but many in fact, so that all things are said to be substance . . . ² there being ten that belong to things, or more [than ten compounded] from them (for let this also be added to the dichotomous division), or even one in fact, i.e. (a) substance, quality, quantity, so that all things are one substance in number? For if they should say [one] in genus or species, it is clear that they will be many in number. Accordingly, if they say that it is one in this manner, "as for example, one man or one horse or one soul or quality" [it is] not [one] in genus (for there would again be many), but rather [is] "this one, e.g. white [thing] or hot [thing] or something else of the remaining sort of things". For all these modes of interpretation both greatly differ from one another and are all of them impossible. For if what is called 'being' is one in name only, but in fact is substance, quality, quantity, and all the other kinds or some of those [compounded] from them, whether they are separate from one another or exist with one another, what is will be many. But if all things are some one of the ten kinds, e.g. substance, or quality or quantity, and for this reason are one -- because all things are subsumed under one of the ten kinds -- "whether substance exists or not" an absurdity will follow. For if, as naturally occurs when substance subsists beforehand, one of these things chances [to be] around it, again being is not one, but rather both substance and quality or whichever of the ten they posit being to be; but if substance does not exist, this too is impossible; for none of the other kinds can exist apart from substance, because substance

underlies the other kinds and they have their being in it. For let this be added in this manner also. However, as regards Melissus and Parmenides, even if being should be posited to be quality, and even if substance (for the argument will be common in the case of this also), since the one says that being is infinite, the other finite, quantity will immediately be introduced as well. "For 'infinite'" and 'finite' "belongs to the category of quantity", and it is not possible that either substance or quality or affection be infinite or finite, "unless per accidens", if they should at the same time be quantities also. "For the account of the infinite" and of the finite "makes use of the category of quantity, not substance nor even quality". But I, following Porphyry in the main, have thus produced both the dichotomous division of Aristotle and the objection with respect to each segment of the division.

Notes to in Phys 71.19 - 73.4

¹Cf. 185a15-b5.

²Diels proposes the following emendation for this lacuna (72.2); $\eta\ \pi\acute{o}\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \eta\ \pi\acute{o}\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ -- "or all things [are said to be] quantities or all things [are said to be] qualities".

in Phys 75.21 - 26

That some suspicion has arisen that being is a different kind than substance is confirmed by his statement that Melissus says that being is infinite¹, which is a characteristic peculiar to quantity. And he refutes those who say that being is something other than quantity, as not concurring with Parmenides and Melissus, the former positing being as finite, the latter as infinite.

Notes to in Phys 75.21 - 26

¹Cf. 185a32-33.

in Phys 77.3 - 6¹

For it is necessary that one posit being as either finite or infinite, and in each case it is necessary to say that being is a quantity, and he [Aristotle] adduces Melissus as a witness for this supposition; and he subsequently puts Parmenides in the same camp.

Notes to in Phys 77.3 - 6

¹Cf. 185a32-33, b17-18.

in Phys 77.9 - 80.18

Since Alexander of Aphrodisias deems it worthy to refute those who say that being is one with his own arguments, let us briefly consider both how he seems to speak well and how the philosophy of the ancients remains unrefuted. He says:

For to those who say that everything else that is involved in coming to be <and perishing> does not exist on the grounds that they at one time are but at another are not, but that only eternal being exists since it does not share in non-being at all, one must first reply on the basis of manifest facts and of common sense and usage. Secondly, if they deny that things exist because they come to be and perish [one must reply that,] since both that which comes to be comes to be something that is and that which perishes perishes from what is, both that which comes to be and that which perishes would be among things that are. For it is not the case that they do not exist unless they exist in the way eternal things do. Indeed if they do not exist because they perish, when are not perishing and so far as they are not perishing, that far and at that time they would exist.¹

Let us make a general statement against these remarks and their like. Just as we call 'white' both that which is in any way colored by whiteness, even if it is mixed together with its opposite, and also that which is not mixed with its opposite, and similarly with 'beautiful'; and just as each of these terms is used in the strict sense of that which is purely of this or that sort and is used in a general and loose way of that which is mixed with its opposite, so 'being' could be used in the strict sense of that which 'in all respects is all together' [cf. B 8.5]. But that which comes to be and perishes does not yet exist prior to its coming to be, and no longer exists after it has perished. And even when this seems to 'be', since while it is coming to be and perishing it never possesses being by

'remaining in the same' [cf. B 8.29], even then it would not properly be called 'being' but rather 'coming to be and perishing' because of the continuous flux which changes all things. This Heraclitus hinted at in his statement 'one could not step into the same river twice'², likening coming to be, which has more non-being than being, to the constant flow of a river; for being, as Parmenides says, has other signs. But it is better to hear just what he states and proves concerning being proper. For having censured those who combine being and non-being in the intelligible:

Who believe that to be and not to be are the same and
not the same (B 6.8-9)

and having turned away from the way that investigates non-being:

But do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry
(B 7.2)

he concludes:

One way alone is yet left
to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this way are marks
in plenty, (B 8.1-3)

and he then relates the signs of being proper:

that since it exists it is unborn and imperish-
able, whole unique, immovable, and without end.³
It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be, since it now
is, all together, one and continuous. For what birth of
it wilt thou seek? I shall not allow thee to say or
think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or
thought that 'it is not'. And what need would have
prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from
nothing? Thus it must either fully be or else not be.
Nor will the force of evidence suffer anything besides
itself to arise from what is not.⁴ Therefore Justice
does not relax her fetters and allow it to come into
being or perish. (B 8.3-14)

By saying this about being proper he clearly proves that this being

is uncreated; for neither [does it come to be] from being, for no other being preexisted; nor from non-being, for non-being is nothing at all. And indeed why then, but not sooner or later did it come to be? Nor again from that which in one way is but in another is not, in the way that that which comes to be comes to be; for that which in one way is, but in another is not, could not exist prior to absolute being, but exists subsequent to it. Indeed Plato's Timaeus says:

and 'was' and 'shall be' are forms of time that have come to be; we are wrong to transfer them unthinkingly to eternal being. We say that it was and is and shall be; but 'is' alone really belongs to it and describes it truly; 'was' and 'shall be' are properly used of becoming which proceeds in time.⁵

Therefore, if Alexander means to prove that things which are in the process of coming to be exist in some manner or other and for this reason are loosely called 'being' -- even if they are mixed together with more non-being -- and rests content with the popular use of the word, there will be no need for lengthy comment. On the other hand, if he thinks that that which comes to be and perishes, that in which there is more non-being than being, is 'being' proper, he neither followed the signs of being which Parmenides gave, nor does he notice that Aristotle rightly called Parmenidean [being] "just being", i.e. being proper.⁶

And Alexander also censures those who follow Parmenides and Melissus because they prove that being is motionless because that which moves appears to depart from that in which it is; accordingly, if being should also move, it would depart from that in which it is; but it is in being. And that which departs from being perishes; but

being is imperishable. He [Alexander] says:

Now if there were only essential motion (κίνησις), which one should more properly call 'change' (μεταβολή) but not motion, perhaps these [remarks] of theirs would be stated with good reason. Yet not even that which changes essentially changes without qualification into not being; but rather into not being that which it was, but something else; but if at all, that which essentially changes without qualification does not [undergo] this [qualified sort of change]. But since there is more than one [kind of] change, of which qualitative change is not of the essential sort, their fear is void and groundless.⁷

Indeed it is suprising that he himself having agreed that "that which changes essentially not [in] this [qualified way] but without qualification" would perish into non-being, finds fault with those who say that if absolute being and being proper should change, it perishes. For if it were of this sort of being and if it departed from this sort of being, there would be nothing to prevent it from changing <into> something else of this sort. But since it is absolute being, what could come into being by departing from this? And how could that being change which 'being always the same in this manner' [cf. B 8.29], which is neither itself an accident of anything else nor has anything else as an accident, but is itself that being which really is? Accordingly, after having first proved by means of the verses quoted above that being is uncreated, Parmenides properly concluded:

But unmoved, in the grip of mighty bonds, it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have been driven afar off.⁸ (B 8.26-28)

From this it is also clear that he knows that perceptible being, in which there is coming to be and perishing, and intelligible being

are different. Melissus also proves that being is motionless, by first removing void, i.e. non-being, from being. For, he says, if being were to move there would be something void of being into which being would move. But it [void] does not exist; for being is full.

And he writes as follows:

Nor is there any void, for void is nothing, and nothing cannot be. Nor does [sc. what is] move, for it has no place to which it can withdraw, but is full. If there were void, it would withdraw to the void; but since there is no void, it has nowhere to withdraw to.⁹

And then having shown that it is neither dense nor light¹⁰, he concludes:

The decision to be made about full and not full is this: if a thing has room for something else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it does not have room to take it in, it is full. Now it must be full if there is no void, and if it is full it does not move.¹¹

Well then, I have been compelled to dwell on these matters at rather great length, because Alexander, the more legitimate of Aristotle's commentators, understands the doctrines of the ancients in a rather arid and careless way, even though Aristotle followed these doctrines and himself demonstrated that the first [cause] is motionless¹².

Notes to in Phys 77.9 - 80.18

¹I have omitted ἡσυχία (77.12) to produce a continuous quotation.

²Cf. 22 B 91, Cratylus 402a8-10.

³Simplicius here (78.13) and at 30.2 and 145.4 has ἀτέλεστον "without end", but ἀγέννητον "unborn, uncreated" at 120.23 and in Cael 557.18 (B 8.4). DK adopts the former.

⁴Karsten emends this line (B 8.12) to yield the positive half of the disjunct 'from being'; ἐκ τοῦ ἑόντος (n ad 78.21). DK, however, retains the negative μή.

⁵Timaeus 37e4-38a2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 98.

⁶Cf. 186a33-34.

⁷I have omitted ὥς φησι (79.22) to produce a continuous quotation.

⁸On τῆλε for τῆδε (B 8.28) cf. note 6 to translation of in Phys 37.12-40.21, p. 298.

⁹30 B 7.7. Translation from Guthrie, p. 104. Cf. in Phys 40.12-15.

¹⁰Cf. 30 B 7.8.

¹¹30 B 7.9-10. Translation from Guthrie, p. 104. Cf. in Phys 40.18-21.

¹²Cf. Metaphysics A 1071b3-1076a4.

in Phys 82.8 - 19¹

If being is one and indivisible as a monad or point, things that are will have neither any quality (for quality is distinguished by bodies, and especially by physical bodies) nor quantity; for the indivisible is a limit of body. Therefore being is neither infinite, just as Melissus says, nor finite, as Parmenides thinks. For truly, everything finite or infinite has some quantity, but nothing indivisible in number or in magnitude has quantity; "for limit (τὸ πέρας) is indivisible, not what is limited/finite (τὸ πεπερασμένον)". In this passage also Aristotle deemed this signification of 'indivisible' alone worthy of refutation, because the rest are easily disposed of. And he argued against this [signification] not as against a token used as a probable argument², as his commentators take it, but rather as against the very sort of thing which the followers of Parmenides themselves would have posited -- that which is without both quantity and quality.

Notes to in Phys 82.8 - 19

¹Cf. 185b16-19.

²For this meaning of σημείον see LSJ s.v. II.3, p. 1593.

in Phys 86.19 - 90.22¹

I for one marvel that Aristotle has directed his refutation against those significations of 'one' which Parmenides himself says belong to the one being. For he proclaims that it is continuous (συνεχές),

Therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is (B 8.25)

and it is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον),

since it all equally is.
(B 8.22)

Moreover, Parmenides says that the account of being is 'one and the same for all' in these verses:

What can be spoken and thought of must be, for it is possible for it to be, but impossible for nothing to be.
(B 6.1-2)

Therefore, if whatever one may say or think is being, the account of being for all will be one,

Nothing exists or can exist apart from what is, since Fate has fettered it so as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name. (B 8.36-38)

And these men [Parmenides and Melissus] would admit what Aristotle deduces as absurd for these suppositions, if one should attend to them prudently. For their one being, since it is indivisible, will not be finite or infinite as [will] a body; indeed, Parmenides includes bodies among the opinables, and Melissus says,

and being one it must have no body. If it had thickness, it would have parts, and would no longer be one.²

Therefore the indivisible will also have limit, not as a limit of

body, but rather as an end and principle of all existent things, and in that very unconditional way in which Aristotle himself says that the intellect or rather the first cause if both one, proclaiming that "the rule of many is not good"³, and without parts, by showing that it is motionless and an end of all things, and this he gets not from Plato only, but also from Parmenides, who says:

What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same; for without what is, in which [i.e. in dependence on, or in respect of which] it is expressed [or revealed], thou shalt not find thought. (B 8.34-36)

For intellecting, being its end, exists for the sake of the intelligible, that is to say being⁴. But Aristotle deduced absurdities by assuming both 'the part' and 'the whole' and 'the continuous' as applying to a body. If they [these terms ?] should be understood according to their sense [in Aristotle ?], they would admit that both 'the possession of parts' would have a place in being, since he [Parmenides] says it is whole,

whole, unique, (B 8.4)

as well as 'its being infinitely divisible in respect of its continuity',

Therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is. (B 8.22)

Plato's Parmenides more clearly admitted this absurdity concerning the one being when he says in the second hypothesis:

Again, take each of these two parts of the One Being -- its unity and its being: unity can never be lacking to the part 'being', nor being to the part 'unity'. Thus each of the two parts, in its turn, will possess both unity and being; any part proves to consist of at least two parts, and so on forever by the same reasoning:

whatever part we arrive at always possesses these two parts, for a 'one' always has being, and a 'being' always has unity. Hence any part always proves to be two and can never be one. In this way, then, what is 'One Being' must be unlimited in multitude.⁵

Yet the fact that all things there [in the intelligible] have one and the same account of being and are the same as one another is no absurdity at all. For if it is the cause of all things and is all things before all things, it is clear that in it are precontained all things encompassed by a single unity -- that of the one being, owing to which each [thing] is all things when undivided into parts⁶. And this is Aristotle's opinion also, who says that the first intellect is the cause of all things, and who speaks of a two-fold order, the one relative to the cause, the other to the effect. And lest I seem to some chance readers to be changing course without offering sufficient proof, I would say that Aristotle himself is aware of the third order of the one being of the Parmenides and is thus alluding to it⁷. The summit is unified indivisibly; the intermediate by loosing its unity into a continuity becomes a whole and parts (wherefore Aristotle placed the dilemma concerning the whole in his discussion of 'continuous'). The third, producing in a unified way the separation of the Forms, displayed beforehand in itself all things causally, but because the separation is intelligible all things are governed by the unity of the one being, and whatever one considers as separated, by holding onto this discovers the intelligible unity of the one being; when separation becomes manifest causally, the infinite procession of the parts of coming to be from that source

obtains as its share uninterrupted pluralization. How then, someone might say, does Aristotle appear to argue against these divine doctrines? Surely because what is adduced for an investigation of nature appears to deviate from the truth. For the perceptible segment (*δυσσπαστός*) does not admit of the intelligible unity; nor is it the case that, just as unified existence among the intelligibles causally encompasses its pluralized separation -- so that one can observe it [the perfect unity of the One] there [in the noetic order], one can see among the perceptibles the perfect unity of the One. Consequently, 'indivisible', 'continuous' and 'communality with respect to one account' here [in the perceptible order] are not appropriate to the One.

And that his critique of Parmenides does not arise out of disputatiousness, Plato himself makes clear: in the Parmenides he agrees to Parmenides's one being and on the basis of this discovers what is beyond it, which he does not think fit to even call 'one', and relates the orders of the one that follow this⁸; and in the Sophist he clearly refutes him for saying that being is one, on the one hand by separating 'one' from 'being' as transcending 'being', and on the other hand by showing that in the first place 'being' is unified in respect to its participation in 'one', but subsequently is divided and made a plurality by otherness. And perhaps there is nothing wrong in quoting what Plato says in the Sophist for the sake of establishing his conceptions at the outset:

Again there are those who say that the All is one thing.
Must we not do our best to find out what they mean by

'reality'? -- Surely. -- Let them this answer this question, then: 'You say, we understand, that there is only one thing?' 'We do', they will reply, won't they? -- Yes. -- 'And there is something to which you give the name real?' -- 'Is it the same thing as that to which you give the name one? Are you applying two names to the same thing, or what do you mean?' -- What will their next answer be? -- Obviously, Theaeretus, it is not so very easy for one who has laid down their fundamental assertion to answer this question or any other. -- How so? -- In the first place, it is surely absurd for him to admit the existence of two names, when he has laid down that there is no more than one thing. -- Of course. -- And further, it is equally absurd to allow anyone to assert that a name can have any existence, when that would be inexplicable. -- How is it inexplicable? -- If, on the one hand, he assumes that the name is different from the thing, he is surely speaking of two things. -- Yes. -- Whereas, if he assumes that the name is the same as the thing, either he will have to say it is not the name of anything, or if he says it is the name of something, it will follow that the name is merely a name of a name and of nothing else whatsoever. -- That is so. -- . . . -- Necessarily. -- And what of 'the whole'? Will they say that this is other than their 'one real thing' or the same? -- Certainly that it is the same. In fact they do say so. -- Then if it is a whole -- as indeed Parmenides says:

Everyway like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,
evenly balanced from the midst in every direction; for
there must not be something more nor something less here
than here, (B 8.43-45)

if the real is like that, it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not? -- It must. -- Well, if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way one, as being a sum or whole. -- Of course. On the other hand, the thing which has these properties cannot be just Unity itself, can it? -- Why not? -- Surely Unity in the true sense and rightly defined must be altogether without parts. -- Yes, it must. -- Whereas a thing such as we described, consisting of several parts, will not answer to that definition. -- I see. -- Then, (A) is the Real one and whole in the sense that it has the property of unity, or (B) are we to say that the Real is not a whole at all? -- That is a hard choice. -- Quite true. For if (A) the real has the property of being in a sense

one, it will evidently not be the same thing as Unity, and so all things will be more than one. -- Yes. -- And again (B) if the Real is not a whole by virtue of its having this property of unity, while (a) at the same time Wholeness itself is real, it follows that the Real falls short of itself. -- Certainly. -- So, on this line of argument too, the Real will be deprived of reality and will not be a thing that is. -- Yes. -- And further, once more all things will be more than one, since Reality on the one side and Wholeness on the other have now each a distinct nature. -- Yes. -- But if, (b) on the other hand, there is no such thing as Wholeness at all, not only are the same things true of the Real, but also that, besides not being a thing that really is, it could never even become such. -- Why not?. -- Whenever a thing comes into being, at that moment it has come to be as whole; accordingly, if you do not reckon unity or wholeness among real things, you have no right to speak of either being or coming-into-being as having any existence. -- That seems perfectly true. -- And further, what is not a whole cannot have any definite number either; for if a thing has a definite number, it must amount to that number, whatever it may be, as a whole. -- Assuredly. -- And countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one. -- That is plain enough from those we have had a glimpse of now. One leads to another, and each carries us further into a wilderness of doubt about every theory as it is mentioned.⁹

But even if these matters afforded a rather long digression, let them have gratified our desire for them; nevertheless we must go on to what follows.

Notes to in Phys 86.19 - 90.22

¹Cf. 185b2-25.

²30 B 9 (DK I.275.11-13). Translation from Guthrie, p. 110 and note 1.

³Metaphysics A 1076a4.

⁴The text is surely corrupt (87.17); Simplicius holds that the

intelligible is the final cause of intellecting, not vice versa (cf. in Phys 144.22-25). The simplest remedy is to read τέλους ὄντος for τέλος ὄν.

⁵Parmenides 142d9-143a3. Translation from Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 138-139.

⁶Cf. in Phys 136.27-31.

⁷On γλίσχως cf. in Phys 144.26. Paul Shorey, Plato: The Republic, vol. 2 p. 17 n g (VI 488a2), writes: "The word γλίσχως is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 C it means "stingily"; in Cratyl. 414 C it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 C, usually misunderstood; in Crito 53 E of clinging to life; cf. Phaedo 117 A; in Plutarch De Is. et Osir. 28 of a strained allegory and ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace 482 of a dog."

⁸Cf. Parmenides 137a7 ff., and Proclus in Parm 1032.15-1036.15.

⁹Sophist 244a6-245e5. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 221-227.

in Phys 92.29 - 93.5; 93.26 - 29¹

Therefore he [Porphyry] says:

Once he has fully treated the difficulties that he has brought forth against each of the significations of 'one', he adds another difficulty that was directed against himself. For someone would say, 'you have brought forth difficulties by assuming that 'one' and 'being' are used in many ways; but if this is not so, perhaps you would not have brought forth these difficulties.' Against them he has produced a reply that at the same time is powerful and has not been noticed by his commentators, when he says that if being is not posited as being used in ten ways, not only will the followers of Parmenides and Melissus, but all the others as well will be thrown into confusion.

Therefore there is great confusion facing not only the followers of Parmenides, but all those without exception who assumed that being is synonymous -- i.e. they assume that it is one, but cannot reserve for it the pure conception of 'one'.

Notes to in Phys 92.29 - 93.5; 93.26 - 29

¹Cf. 185b25-27. Both passages are quotations from Porphyry, Commentarius in Physica; cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 1453. See further in Phys 92.25-28.

in Phys 99.7 - 16¹

Wherefore Zeno's argument here seems to be a different one than that preserved in his book, which Plato himself mentions in the Parmenides. For there he shows that many do not exist, coming to Parmenides's aid, who says that being is one, from the opposite direction². But here, as Eudemus says, he did away with the one (for he speaks of the point as the one), and agrees that the many exist. Yet Alexander thinks that in this passage also Eudemus mentions Zeno as doing away with the many. He says:

For as Eudemus relates, Zeno the pupil of Parmenides, attempted to show that what is cannot be many because there is nothing that is one among the things that are, but the many is a plurality of henads.

Notes to in Phys 99.7 - 16.

¹Cf. 185b25. 99.7-16 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) p. 27.7-15.

²Cf. Parmenides 128a4-d6.

in Phys 100.21 - 28

For in reality, where there is plurality, non-being is also there. So it is that Parmenides himself, intending to show that real being and perhaps even what is beyond being is one, first did away with non-being; and Plato, intending to show that non-being is found among the things that are, and not only in the perceptible [order] but in the intellectual [order] as well, first relates the separation and plurality of the Forms; in the Parmenides saying that the dilemma which states 'how is the same thing, which belongs to the perceptibles, one and many' has nothing serious to it, he removes it by saying that it is one in virtue of its participation in the one, but many in virtue of its participation in the many¹.

Notes to in Phys 100.21 - 28

¹129c4-e4, quoted below at in Phys 100.29 - 101.10.

in Phys 101.16 - 24

Therefore of this difficulty, how the same thing is one and many, we have solutions in Plato also; one being stated in the Sophist¹ as to the intellectual Forms -- i.e. that they are one in virtue of their reciprocal participation (and all the more [in virtue of] the sameness and unity in virtue of which each not only shares in the rest nor is merely the same as them, but rather all are, each one of them, unified with respect to themselves² -- the very thing Socrates in the Parmenides wishes to be demonstrated³), but many when each is considered in virtue of its own individuating property. But we have a different solution in the Parmenides⁴ as to the perceptibles, in virtue of the participation of the paradigms of both the one and the many in the same thing.

Notes to in Phys 101.16 - 24

¹251a8-c6; cf. in Phys 99.32-100.26, 101.13-16.

²The clause ἅλλ' . . . πάντα (20-21) may well be corrupt.

³127b7-c1, d6-130a2.

⁴129c4-e4; cf. in Phys 100.26-101.13.

in Phys 102.20 - 103.12¹

Having first undertaken the general refutation of the hypothesis, in order that it might not seem to be refuted owing to the weakness of the arguments in support of it², he [Aristotle] will next proceed to refute the arguments themselves on which they [Parmenides and Melissus] relied when they declared that being is one, and he does so not to corroborate their doctrine but rather to reassure those who must be puzzled by their arguments. For if it is the case that both in a general way a doctrine is refuted and the arguments which establish it could be exploded, the contradictory proposition will thereupon be undeniably corroborated. For if of contradictory propositions there is a direct refutation [of one], this is indirectly a proof [of the other] of the contradictories³. Therefore, when the claim that being is one is refuted, the claim that it is many is established. Thus Socrates was aware that Zeno's argument, because it proves that many absurdities follow for those who say that there are many existent things, comes to the aid of Parmenides, who says that being is one⁴. It is not difficult to refute their arguments, he says, because he will show that both the premisses and the figures of their combination are syllogistically invalid. And he finds more fault with Melissus's argument, as was said before, either because in addition to everything else he says that being is infinite, or because he seems to assume false premisses and to combine them in an invalid syllogistic form, when he says if what has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be does not have a beginning,

although it is necessary for one who makes a refutation on the basis of the consequent to say 'that which does not have a beginning does not come to be'; for in this way the second mood of the hypothetical syllogism yields a conclusion. Parmenides sets his premisses in order, but does not deduce the conclusion which follows from his premisses, but something else, since he says 'what is besides being is non-being, non-being is nothing', and does not conclude 'what is besides being is nothing' -- which does follow -- but rather 'therefore being is one'. But these things will be examined later.

Notes to in Phys 102.20 - 103.12

¹Cf. 186a4-13.

²Cf. in Phys 71.19-31.

³προηγούμενη (26) should probably be emended to προηγούμενῳς: cf. LSJ s.v. II, p. 1480.

⁴Parmenides 128a4-e4.

in Phys 107.16 - 28¹

Indeed for all these reasons it seems improper to assume that everything that has come to be has a beginning of the thing. Therefore the minor premiss, which states 'yet that which has come to be has a beginning', is not true, and the premiss that is generated by conversion, which states 'that which has not come to be does not have a beginning', not only seems to be generated wrongly from the conclusion, but also in itself seems to be false, if someone should assume a beginning of the thing and not of time. For the sun, moon, heavens, and the whole universe itself, though created in time, nevertheless have as a beginning that of the thing, because they are finite². Parmenides also, declaring that being is uncreated, makes it

equal everyway from the centre. (B 8.44)

This sort of thing, being finite, has as a beginning that of the thing. Therefore both premisses are false; the figure itself has been shown to be syllogistically invalid.

Notes to in Phys 107.16 - 28

¹Cf. 186a13-16.

²Cf. in Phys 105.18-20.

in Phys 114.25 - 115.9¹

Both in doctrine and in mode of establishing their doctrine some things are common to Parmenides and Melissus, but some things are specifically different. Common in doctrine is that being is one and motionless, but specifically different is that Melissus says that being is infinite, Parmenides finite. Common again to them in mode of establishing [their doctrine] is that they propound [their argument] in an invalid syllogistic manner and that they assume false premisses. But specifically different are the premisses themselves which each of them employed; for both do not fashion their demonstrations by means of the same [premisses]. Some parts of the refutation directed against them will be developed in the same manner, but others in a way different for each. For everything that was stated as abolishing in a general way the claim that being is one is said in common against both. For example, that for both the argument fails, and that it assumes what is false and that it does not follow; for this above all is adduced with respect to a common refutation [of their arguments]. But everything said against the premisses which are unique to each comes to bear against each in a specifically different way. And insofar as they differ in doctrine, since the one says that being is infinite, the other finite, in this respect also the refutations [against them] must prove to be different.

Notes to in Phys 114.25 - 115.9

¹Cf. 186a22-24.

in Phys 115.11 - 118.25¹

As Alexander relates, Theophrastus sets out Parmenides's argument in the first book of his History of Physics as follows: "that which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; therefore being is one"²; but Eudemus in this way: "that which is besides being is non-being; moreover being is used in only one way; therefore being is one"³. If Eudemus in so clear a manner wrote this in some other work I cannot say; but in his Physics he writes the following about Parmenides, from which it is perhaps possible to conclude what was stated [by Alexander]:

But Parmenides does not seem to show that being is one, even if one should grant him that being is used in only one way, except as that which is predicated of each thing in the category of substance, as for example 'man' of men. That is, when the accounts are given of each thing the account of being will be one and the same in all, as for example [the account] of animal in animals. And just as if all existent things were beautiful and one cannot find anything that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one but rather many things (for color, occupation, and anything at all will be beautiful), in this way also all things will be existent, but not one nor even the same; for water is one thing, fire another. Someone might then wonder at Parmenides's having followed arguments that are unworthy of credibility and being deceived by such things as were not yet at that time clarified (for no one spoke of 'in many ways', but Plato was the first to introduce ambiguity, or of per se and per accidens); but he appears to have been deceived by them. These things, as well as syllogistic, were clearly observed on the basis of arguments and counter-arguments; for they would not be agreed to, unless it should appear necessary; but earlier [philosophers] made their declarations without benefit of logical demonstrations.

Developing his remarks about Parmenides to this point, he went on to Anaxagoras.

And Porphyry himself also, partly from Parmenides's verses, as I think, partly from the statements of Aristotle and [from] those [statements] which one who wants to set forth Parmenides's doctrine in a persuasive way might make, writes as follows. And his account is as follows:

If there were anything besides white it is non-white, and if there is anything besides good it is non-good, and if there is anything besides being it is non-being. But non-being is nothing; therefore being alone exists; therefore being is one. For even if things that exist are not one but many, they will differ from one another either in being or in not being; but they could not differ in either being (for they are like in respect to being itself, and things that are like are not in fact different or other qua like, and things which are not other are one), or in not being; for things that differ must already exist, but things that do not exist do not differ at all from one another; therefore if he says that the alleged many cannot differ either in being or in not being and so be other than one another, it is clear that all things will be one, and that this is both uncreated and imperishable.⁴

However, Aristotle in what follows seems to state Parmenides's argument in roughly this manner:

If being signifies one thing and the contradictory proposition is not simultaneously possible, nothing will exist except being.⁵

But Aristotle also understands the same thing as the preceding [philosophers]. For if being signifies one thing, that which is besides this is non-being, and is nothing. And if the contradictory proposition is not also co-present, so that both what is and what is not are the same thing, it is clear that that which is besides being will be non-being and non-being is nothing.

And if anyone is eager to hear Parmenides himself stating these premisses, he will find the one that says 'what is besides being is

non-being and nothing', which is equivalent to that which says 'being is used in only one way', in these verses:

The one, that it is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends on Truth)⁶. The other, that it is not, and that it must necessarily not be, that I declare is a wholly indiscernable track; for thou couldst not know what is not -- that is impossible -- nor declare it. (B 2.3-8)

And that the contradictory proposition is not also true, he states by means of those verses in which he censures those who equate contradictories. For having said,

for it is possible for it to be,
but impossible for nothing to be. This I bid thee consider, for this way of inquiry is the first from which
<I hold thee back>, (B 6.1-3)

<he concludes>

But also from this one, on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander two-headed; for helplessness in their own breasts guides their erring mind. They are borne along, both deaf and blind, mazed, hordes with no judgment, who believe that to be and not be are the same and not the same, and the path of everything is one that turns back upon itself. (B 6.4-9)

Aristotle first refutes the falsity of the premisses of this argument, and then its invalid syllogistic form. That is, when he says that it is false because it assumes that being is used in only one way, while it is used in many ways -- in as many ways as have been demonstrated in the Categories. For the claim 'if something exists besides being, that does not exist', if being were used in only one way, perhaps this would be properly said; but in the case of things used in many ways no longer [is it properly said]. E.g. if someone should say: if something exists besides the crab, this is not a crab. For we

shall ask 'besides what sort of crab'? For besides the aquatic crab is the heavenly crab [i.e. Cancer] or the crab of bronze; that is, a crab besides the heavenly [crab] is not prevented from being another kind of crab. Similarly also, if something besides being exists, as for example besides substance, that is not substance, yet is not prevented from being quality or quantity, and if [there is] something besides quality, it is not quality, [but is not prevented from being] substance or quantity. And in this way there is nothing to prevent things that exist from being many, even being itself [from] being non-being, but not contradictories. And the premiss is absurd in another way. For the claim 'if anything besides being exists, it is non-being' is appropriate for those who also grant at the same time that the same thing is something and is not [something else]; but this is absurd in the case of what is said per se. If anyone should bring forth the first premiss in this way, on the grounds that being is used in many ways, this will be true, yet what follows immediately after it [will] no longer [be] true, which states 'non-being is nothing'. For this is equal to the claim 'that which is besides substance is nothing', yet there are many things which are not substances. Well then, in this way the premisses on Theophrastus's version are refuted as being false; [and they are refuted] as not yielding a conclusion because the conclusion that is deduced as a consequence was 'that which is besides being is nothing'. But he [Parmenides] concluded 'therefore being is one'. Even if someone posits that being is used in one way only, as Eudemus mentions⁷, he

too assumes a falsehood; for being is not [used] in one way only, if in fact [it is used] in ten ways. Secondly, not even on this assumption does it follow that being is one. Even if someone posits that nothing besides substance exists, nothing prevents substances from existing yet being more than one; this point Eudemus made clear in his statement, "not even if one should grant him that being is used in only one way"⁸, and the following statement, "and just as if all things that exist were beautiful and one can find nothing that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one but rather many [things] (for color, occupation, and anything at all will be beautiful)"⁹, and <Eudemus> demonstrated the same thing in the case of <'existent'>, "thus indeed all things will be existent, but not one nor even the same thing"¹⁰. And the conclusion which states 'therefore being is one' is false and is not derived from what is assumed. For even if being [is used] in only one way, being is not ipso facto one; for it is used in only one way both in regard to genus and species; in either way [there are] many [existent things]. And what Eudemus stated in the example of what is beautiful will result "that everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one"¹¹ in number; for things that are one in account are not ipso facto also one in number. Aristotle concluded the same things in the case of what is white. If someone should say that [Parmenides] concluded that being is not one in number, but rather in species or in genus, he immediately agrees that [Parmenides] says that things that exist are more than one in number; things that are one in genus are

also more than one in account. And if they [Parmenides and Melissus] say that being is one in this way, how will they still assert that it is motionless because it is one?

Notes to in Phys 115.11 - 118.25

¹Cf. 186a23-27.

²DG 483.8-10, fr. 7.

³115.11-116.5 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) pp. 28.24-29.15; cf. notes 7-11 below.

⁴Commentarius in Physica; cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 1453.

⁵187a4-5; cf. Metaphysics A 986b26-30.

⁶Simplicius has the nominative ἀληθείη here (B 2.4); DK, following Bywater's emendation, adopts the dative, as does Guthrie.

⁷Cf. in Phys 115.17-18.

⁸118.10 = 115.17-18.

⁹118.11-13 = 115.21-23.

¹⁰118.14-15 = 115.23-24. τὸ . . . Ἀριστοτέλης (13-14) is out of place here; cf. 118.20-21 and 186a26-27. The emendation offered here is conservative; more radical surgery is probably in order.

¹¹118.19 = 115.22.

in Phys 118.27 - 121.25¹

Even if someone grants him [Parmenides], he [Eudemus] says², that being is not used in many ways but rather in one way only, so that the premiss which states 'that which is besides being is non-being' is true, and being should signify one thing, not even on this assumption is being deduced as being one in number. For what is deduced is that 'what is besides being is nothing if not one'. If someone wishes to deduce the converse of this, as following what is deduced, which is what Parmenides seems to do, since the conversion occurs with opposition, the deduction will be 'the one therefore is being'. For if the consequence were 'that which is besides being, i.e. non-being is not one', there arises by conversion 'the one therefore is being'; but this is different from 'being is one or one is being'. He himself [Aristotle] demonstrates in the case of what is white now its inconclusiveness, by assuming that being is an accident, but shortly afterwards by assuming that being is a substance, and showing in each case that being cannot be one. For if only what is white and nothing else should exist, so that everything that is besides what is white is non-existent and what is non-existent is nothing, not even on this assumption is what is white proved to be one in number, but if at all, [it is one] either in genus or species, which is also more than one. But that it cannot be one in number he proves by mentioning the previously assumed distinction of this sort of 'one'³. For if it were one in number, it would be one either as a continuum or as indivisible, or as the same in account. But it is

necessary that it neither be one as a continuum; for when these premisses are assumed, that which is white can be more than one and discrete. For snow, a swan, and white lead are by no means a single white thing in virtue of continuity, but rather are discrete. Yet even if someone grants that it is continuous, what is continuous has been shown to be many in virtue of division. And on other grounds as well, even if someone grants that what is white is continuous, it will not be one in account; for each white thing when considered individually is divided into the substrate, which is called 'white' by sharing in whiteness, and into the color itself in which it shares. For indeed this white is said both to be white and to be a species of whiteness. And the account of each will be unique, of the one as substrate, as for example of the swan that it is such and such an animal of white color, but of the other as of a substrate or in a substrate, for in either case what is accidental is being stated by him -- that it is a piercing color of vision. Therefore what is white will be more than one, even if the premiss which states 'besides what is white is nothing' remains true; for the account of each is different, even though both are called 'white'. And it is necessary that we not be troubled lest we be compelled, by saying that the accident is different in account in comparison with the substrate, to grant him [Aristotle] that the actual existence of the substrate is separable. For it is not necessary that those things whose account is different also be separated from one another in actual existence. For indeed things which subsist with one another have unique

accounts and admit of a unique support of soul, as for example a surface and a solid body. For nor even insofar as it is separable does it in this respect have a unique account. "And this," he says, Parmenides was not yet able to see" -- that it is possible that things that are one in actual existence have different accounts and in this respect are more than one. And it was in no way surprising that systematic rules of accounts had not yet been distinguished, but were subsequently detected from things themselves and were thus brought forth as contributing to greater precision; as even Eudemus attests, when he says:

Someone might then wonder at Parmenides's following arguments that are unworthy of credibility and being deceived by such things as were not yet at that time clarified (for no one spoke of 'in many ways', but Plato was the first to introduce ambiguity, or of per se and per accidens); but he appears to have been deceived by them. These things, as well as syllogistic, were observed on the basis of arguments and counter-arguments. For they would not be agreed to, unless it should appear necessary; but earlier [philosophers] made their declarations without benefit of logical demonstrations.⁴

Owing to their ignorance of these matters even the so-called Megarian philosophers, assuming as a (self-) evident premiss that those things whose accounts differ are different, and that things that are different are separate from one another, seemed to prove that each man is separate from himself. For since there is one account of Socrates as musical, and another of Socrates as pale, even Socrates himself would be separated from himself. It is clear that with respect to the substrate, in virtue of which Socrates exists, he is the same, but with respect to his accidents he is different; there-

fore he is both one and many in the one respect or the other. That Parmenides least of all failed to know of this sort of distinction is clear, if while saying [that being is] one he predicated so many things of it. For it is

whole, unique, immovable and without end⁵ (B 8.4)

and motionless, eternal, indivisible, and countless other things, which owing to the indiscriminated unity there [in the noetic order] of these things that are predicated of it were all one, since all were separated off after it by a single cause, from which we ascribe to that the distinct categories. Parmenides did not, however, produce the rule itself; nor was this rule appropriate to the terseness of the ancients. But Aristotle in a rather forced way meant to prove that even in the case of that which is the same in actual existence, as in the case of white body, that what is white is more than one thing in account, both that as substrate and as that in a substrate. Yet these things do not even have the same name. For the substrate is not white nor even said to be [whitel] per se, except when it is taken in conjunction with whiteness; thus if at all, the same name occurs in different accounts, not of the substrate and of what is in the substrate, but of their product, because we call both that which shares along with its participation and the color itself which it shares in 'white'. But if one carefully distinguishes, these things do not even have the same name; for there is 'white' and 'whiteness', and 'quale' and 'quality'. Wherefore we define whiteness as a piercing color of vision, but white as a body sharing

in whiteness. Having understood these things, as it seems, Eudemus did not prove in a forced way the difference of accounts in the case of one and the same thing in actual existence, but rather made his demonstration in the case of what is beautiful as something common, which is appropriate to things which differ in account, so that once again what seems to be one is this in terms of the common property, but many in accounts. And he writes as follows:

And just as if all things that exist were beautiful and one cannot find anything which is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one but many things (for this color will be beautiful, and this occupation, whatever it is), in this way also all things will be existent, but not one nor even the same; for water is one thing, fire another.⁶

Perhaps Aristotle rejected this mode of demonstration because if being had been posited as a single, common thing, whether as a genus or species, or a homonymous term, more than one thing would immediately be introduced therewith. For that which is common must be common to more than one thing. Wherefore, positing it as one in number, since this sort of 'one' is one either as a continuum or as the same in account, or as indivisible, he proved that it is neither [one] as a continuum nor as the same in account, but the claim '[one] as indivisible' he omitted to set aright as evidently absurd, on the grounds that that which is indivisible is posited as a limit of body⁷.

Notes to in Phys 118.27 - 121.25

¹Cf. 185a25-32.

²Cf. 115.16-18 and note 3 to translation of in Phys 115.11-

118.25, p. 341.

³Cf. 185b5-25.

⁴120.6-12 \approx 115.25-116.4; cf. note 3 to translation of in Phys 115.11-118.25, p. 341. Diels suggestion that οὐκ ὄν should be restored after $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \text{ οὖν}$ in in Phys 115.25 = in Phys 120.6 is probably correct (n ad 115.25).

⁵Here (120.23) and at in Cael 558.17 Simplicius (mis)quotes this verse with $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\nu$ "uncreated, unborn", while at in Phys 30.2, 78.13, and 145.4 $\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ "without end" appears; the latter is adopted by DK.

⁶121.13-17 \approx 115.21-23; cf. note 3 to translation of in Phys 115.11-118.25, p. 341.

⁷Cf. 185b16-19, in Phys 87.4-16.

in Phys 121.28 - 122.5¹

It is possible that both the preceding remarks and these are said not with regard to Parmenides alone, but to Melissus as well. For, whereas of things that are some exist as accidents, but others as substrata, of which the accidents are accidents, and these things are not only not identical with one another but are in some sense opposites, both that which subsists in itself and that which has its existence in something else, it is necessary that each of them [Parmenides and Melissus] say that being is either what is accidental or what is the substratum of this.

Notes to in Phys 121.28 - 122.5

¹Cf. 186a32-34.

in Phys 124.33 - 125.5; 125.33 - 126.13¹

On the basis of these distinctions, it is clear that if being is one, as the followers of Parmenides say, there will be nothing else of which this is an accident, but of whatever thing it is predicated, that must immediately be called both 'real being' and 'real unity', just as if being itself is predicated of itself. For if being shall be spoken of something else not in this way but rather as an accident, that thing will be something different from being and for this reason [will] simultaneously [be] 'being' and 'non-being' -- this is absurd.

If then these things are impossible and 'real being' is something existent, as is assumed, it is necessary that both what is accidental to it and 'real being' be existent, if nothing else exists besides 'real being'. Therefore being signifies more than one thing, and no longer the one being but what is accidental to substance as well. And by these remarks Aristotle seems to me to be pointing out to Parmenides that although he means to abolish non-being and for this reason posits that being is one on the grounds that what is besides being is nothing, he not only introduces qualified non-being by his hypothesis, by even proves that being itself is non-being. This was already proved by Plato in the Sophist, as was that being is one but not many². For being is neither motion nor rest nor the other kinds. Yet Aristotle [proves it] because he will show that for those who say that being is one it is not only qualified non-being but also absolute non-being. The fact that by first assuming that being is a substance he proves once again that it is not an accident in the phrase "for the accident" and what follows produced a great deal of obscurity as far as his text goes.

Notes to in Phys 124.33 - 125.5; 125.33 - 126.13

¹Cf. 186a32-b12. Both passages are quotations from Adrastus (de ὄντι ὅντι); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 1437 and in Phys 122.33.

²Cf. e.g. Sophist 258d5-259b6.

in Phys 126.16 - 27¹

Next he show that it is necessary to say that the one being is neither finite nor infinite, replying to Parmenides and Melissus together. For if, he says, being is one, "it will not even have any magnitude". If it does not have magnitude, it is clear that it will neither be finite nor infinite; but Parmenides seems directly to predicate magnitude of it, since it is a whole and has parts, when he says,

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball,
equal from the center. (B 8.43-44)

Accordingly, it is clear that if it is one, it will not have magnitude, if 'one' is not many nor possesses many, while that which has magnitude has parts; that which has parts has many and is many, because the existence of each of the parts is different; and those things whose existence is different differ from one another and are many.

Notes to in Phys 126.16 - 27

¹Cf. 186b12-15 and Sophist 244e2 ff..

in Phys 127.8 - 14¹

But perhaps Aristotle does not impute to them this absurdity, which the majority of his commentators think he does, that being could not have magnitude, even though they say that it is infinite or finite (for he did not fail to recognize that they intended and proved that it is without parts and is indivisible), but rather that if being is posited as one only, nothing among things that are will have magnitude, nor even a whole and parts. This is quite contrary to manifest facts, because the perceptibles and all physical bodies have magnitude.

Notes to in Phys 127.8 - 14

¹Cf. 186b12-14.

in Phys 127.17 - 128.2¹

Alexander says,

Having shown that accidents are ushered in along with real being, he now shows that even if it be granted to them [Parmenides and Melissus] that real being alone exists because this exists in the strict sense, while its accidents exist in a different manner, in this way too being itself will not be one but there will be many real beings; for the division of it as magnitude, which he mentioned, will proceed into many real beings. It is necessary too that it be divided with respect to its account, i.e. its definition, into many real beings. Accordingly, having shown that with respect to magnitude and to the division of it into parts being proves to be more than one and different in species, if the account of each of the parts is different, he thereupon added division with respect to definition.

Now in these remarks Alexander has made his explanation on the assumption that Aristotle had demonstrated that real being has magnitude, although he says the opposite: "being, if it is real being, will not even have magnitude." Consequently, perhaps when positing that the assumption of these men [Parmenides and Melissus] is that being is one, he abolishes on the basis of this that it is finite or infinite or

on every side, like the mass of well-rounded ball"²
(B 8.43)

as Parmenides says; for since things of this sort are (a) magnitude and discrete, they are many and not one. And because of the fact that even this real being, which they posit as being one, is divided with respect to its definition into real beings, he proves that it cannot be one; therefore he is fashioning a refutation which leaves them no way out, which might be rendered in the following syllogism, in accordance with the so-called 'conversion by negation': 'If being

is one, it does not have magnitude, because it is not divided. If it is divided, as is clear with respect to its definition, it cannot be one.'

Notes to in Phys 127.12 - 128.2

¹Cf. 186b14-35.

²Simplicius clearly exchanges μεσσοθεν "from the center" from B 8.44 for παντοθεν "on every side" of B 8.43; cf. in Phys 89.22-23 (apud Plato).

in Phys 131.31 - 132.5¹

For one who maintains that there is only one thing, [doing so] on the assumption that it is one in number, would not say that this is one genus, because genus immediately ushers in with itself a plurality of species and individuals. But someone might say, 'On what basis is it clear that Parmenides spoke of 'one in number?'. But it is clear on the basis of the fact that he [Aristotle] did not speak of real being as a genus, but rather as a substance. For he shows that it is not an accident because what is accidental is predicated of a substrate -- which in fact is a substance subsisting in its own right and not requiring anything else to exist. But genus itself also belongs to things [said] of a substrate; therefore real being could not be a genus, if he clearly set '[said] of a subject' in contradistinction to it.

Notes to in Phys 131.31 - 132.5

¹Cf. 186b14-25.

in Phys 133.21 - 29¹

Eudemus also, who follows Aristotle in everything, did not understand 'real being' (τὸ ὅτι ὅν) as 'genus'. Indeed, in the first book of his Physics, when he speaks about Parmenides, he writes the following (as Alexander says; for I did not find this statement in Eudemus's book):

So then, he would not say [it is] what is common. For neither were such things yet the subject of inquiry, but subsequently proceeded from arguments, nor would they admit of what he attributes to being. For how will this be "from the centre equal" (B 8.44) and the like. But, it is said, almost all of these statements are appropriate to the heavens.

Notes to in Phys 133.21 - 29

¹Cf. 186b14-35. 133.21-29 = Eudemus Physica fr. 44 (W) p. 29. 16-24.

in Phys 133.31 - 134.18¹

Having himself refuted Parmenides's argument on the grounds that it both assumes false premisses (and the premiss was that being is said in only one way or rather 'what is besides being is non-being' or 'non-being is nothing', for these are equivalent) and makes a syllogistically invalid deduction (for the conclusion that is drawn does not follow), he [Aristotle] says, "some yielded to both arguments" both that of Zeno who wished to come to the aid

of Parmenides's argument against those who try to make fun of it by showing that his supposition, that there is a One, leads to many absurdities and contradictions²

by showing

that, on a thorough examination, their own supposition that there is a plurality leads to even more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of the One.³

For Zeno himself in Plato's Parmenides manifestly bears witness for this argument; for Parmenides's argument is that the one being is all things, if being signifies one thing. For what is besides it will be nothing. And as Theophrastus adduced [it]: "That which is besides being is non-being. Non-being is nothing"⁴. And he says that some people yielded to this argument. And to yield to an argument is to agree to the premisses which establish it or to the whole complex. Accordingly, it is said that Plato yielded to the premiss which states 'what is besides being is non-being' (for he says that motion, rest, sameness, and otherness are other than being in the Sophist⁵), but does not further agree that non-being is nothing; for truly he says that things that are other than being, even if they are not being,

nevertheless exist, and in this way introduces non-being⁶.

Notes to in Phys 133.31 - 134.18

¹Cf. 187a1-11.

²Parmenides 128c7-d2. Translation from Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 67.

³Parmenides 128d4-6; Simplicius adds ἡ λέγουσα (134.7) as a gloss on ἡ ὑπόθεσις (omitting the simple εἶ) and replaces ἡ by ἡπερ. Translation from Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 67. In the following sentence, Simplicius ascribed this quotation to Zeno in the Parmenides.

⁴DG 483.10 (fr. 7); cf. in Phys 115.11-13.

⁵258b8-e2.

⁶Sophist 258e6-259b6; cf. in Phys 135.15-136.10.

in Phys 135.15 - 136.32¹

But as regards Alexander it is sufficient to quote Plato's statement, which Alexander himself mentioned², which clearly shows, I think, that Plato did not introduce absolute non-being, but rather qualified non-being. The statement is as follows:

You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we have trespassed far beyond the limits of his prohibition. -- In what way? -- In pushing forward our quest, we have shown him results in a field which he forbade us even to explore. -- How? -- He says, you remember,

Never shall this be proved, that things that are not, are;
but keep back thy thought from this way of inquiry.

(B 7.1-2)

Yes, he does say that. -- Whereas we have not merely shown that things that are not, are, but we have brought to light the real character of 'not-being'. We have shown that the nature of the Different has existence and is parcelled out over the whole field of existent things with reference to one another; and of every part of it that is set in contrast to 'that which is' we have dared to say that precisely that is really 'that which is not'. -- Yes, sir, and I think that what we have said is perfectly true. -- Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever. But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements:

that the Kinds blend with one another;

that Existence and Difference pervade them all, and pervade one another;

that Difference (or the Different), by partaking of Existence, is by virtue of that participation, but on the other hand is not that Existence of which it partakes, but is different; and since it is differ-

ent from Existence (or an existent), quite clearly it must be possible that it should be a thing that is not;

and again, Existence, having a part in Difference, will be different from all the rest of the Kinds; and because it is different from them all, it is not any one of them nor yet all the others put together, but is only itself; with the consequence, again indisputable, that Existence is not myriads upon myriads of things, and that all the other Kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, in many respect are and in many respects are not.³

On the basis of this statement Alexander thought that Plato introduced absolute non-being because he assumed that being when considered as a genus is absolute being. And it was enough for him to listen to Plato's own statement, "Let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say"⁴, and that each of them exists in virtue of its participation in being, yet is not Existence⁵. And before this statement he evidently made clear what variety of non-being he does introduce, when he said,

When we speak of 'that which is not', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists, but only something that is different.⁶

And it was also enough for him to have listened to what was stated concerning absolute non-being and the opposite of being, because Plato rejected any discussion of it whatsoever. Even he who says that it exists and even he who says that it does not exist are open to objection. It is not safe to say anything at all about it. It is necessary to understand that the being Plato speaks of is that which is considered with respect to the bare individuating property itself of being, which is set in contradistinction to both the other

genera and to non-being; indeed he says that this, but not absolute being, which combines within itself all the genera, is a genus; of that, absolute non-being would be the opposite, if in fact it is possible to speak of 'begin the opposite of' with respect to it. But this sort of being could not be a genus, because genera are opposed by virtue of their mutual distinction. And these [genera] are described as already being discriminated, in virtue of their single individuating property, from the intelligible unity, in which all things are one, as Parmenides says, and first descended into the intellectual division, divided into parts that are not parts, and into the perceptible segment, and intermediately between these [two] into the coherence of soul. Therefore Plato is far from introducing absolute non-being as the opposite of absolute being.

Notes to in Phys 135.15 - 136.32

¹Cf. 187a1-11.

²Cf. in Phys 134.13-32.

³Sophist 258c6-259b6. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 294-296.

⁴Sophist 258e6-7. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 295. Cf. in Phys 135.23-25.

⁵Simplicius here (136.14; cf. 3-4) glosses Sophist 259a4-8.

⁶Sophist 257b3-4. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 290. In 136.17-20 Simplicius alludes to Sophist 237b7-239c7. (Addendum, tr. of 136.21-22: "So it was enough [for him to hear] what I said as well as these things.")

in Phys 136.33 - 137.20¹

Porphry has well observed that Plato does not introduce absolute non-being; but his statement that [Plato] in the Sophist relates that created being is non-being, about which he says in the Timaeus, "and what is that which is <always> becoming and is never real?"², seems to me to be worthy of attention. For Plato does not seem to discover non-being in the separation of the perceptibles, but rather in the separation of the intellectual Forms. For when would he say about enmattered and perceptible things the following:

But tell me, in heaven's name; are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real -- that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?³

I maintain against Alexander and Porphyry together that Aristotle would not censure Plato for introducing as being absolute non-being, since he so clearly states that qualified being exists. Nevertheless, he would not be arguing against Plato in these remarks on the grounds that his fear was groundless, that, if what is besides being is non-being, all things would be one, and for this reason introduces non-being. For it is not in virtue of his introduction of non-being that Plato proves that there are many existent things, but rather he showed this -- that 'one' is one thing, 'being' another -- making his proof from the fact that it is of whole limb,

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball, equal from the centre.⁴ (E 8.43-44)

And non-being was needed † because he calls the sophist 'a maker of

images', and an image contains some falsehood, and falsehood does not exist unless non-being exists. For he who states a falsehood either says that what is is not or that what is not is⁵.

Notes to in Phys 136.33 - 137.20

¹Cf. 187a1-11.

²27d6-28a1. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 22. Simplicius omits ἀεί (28a1).

³Sophist 248e6-249a2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 241.

⁴Cf. Sophist 244e2-245e5.

⁵Cf. Sophist 239c9 ff..

in Phys 138.20 - 25¹

Who [Zeno] on the contrary writes many critiques in the course of his abolishing the claim that there are many, in order that by abolishing the many the claim that all things are one might be firmly established, which is the very thing Parmenides himself maintained². Secondly, he [Alexander] ought to state what purpose is served by the mention of Zeno's argument and of those who vainly yielded to it, just as those who yielded to Parmenides's argument, but the purpose of those who introduce non-being is clear; for it is in order that it be proved that there many existent things, which is what Parmenides did not maintain.

Notes to in Phys 138.20 - 25

¹Cf. 187a1-3.

²Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6.

in Phys 139.24 - 141.11¹

Porphyry, however, says that the argument from dichotomy also belongs to Parmenides, who attempts to show on the basis of it that being is one. And he write as follows:

And Parmenides had another argument, which supposed that on the basis of dichotomy it shows that being is one only and without parts and indivisible. For if it should be divisible, let it be divided into two, and then let each of the parts be divided in two, and if this takes place without end it is clear that either some least and indivisible magnitudes, though infinite in number, will remain; or it will vanish and will no longer be resolved into anything, and will be composed of nothing; but these things are absurd. Therefore it will not be divided, but will remain one. For indeed, since it is 'like in every direction' (πάντη ὁμοιον), if it is divisible, it will be divisible in every direction equally, but not [divisible] in one part, but not in another. Let it be divided in every direction; consequently, it is clear once again that nothing will remain, but it will vanish, and if it will be composed, it will again be composed of nothing. For if anything will remain, it will no longer prove to have been divided in every direction. Therefore, on the basis of these considerations also it is clear that being will be indivisible, without parts, and one. Those who follow Xenocrates agreed that the first conclusion, i.e. that if being is one it will also be indivisible, remains, yet not that being is indivisible. Wherefore again [they say that] being is by no means one only, but rather many. Yet it is not infinitely divisible, but comes to an end at some indivisible entities. Yet these are not indivisible as being without parts and being ultimate, but rather as being divisible in number and matter and having parts, but indivisible in form and primary -- [Xenocrates] by positing that there are certain primary indivisible lines, and that plane figures and primary solids are [composed] of them. So then Xenocrates believes that the dilemma that one faces from dichotomy and generally from infinite cutting and division is resolved by his having introduced indivisible lines and having produced absolutely indivisible magnitudes, by avoiding the argument: 'if being is divisible, it is resolved into non-being and is bereft of those indivisible lines of which, if they remain uncuttable and indivisible, things are composed'.²

In these statements of Porphyry, that the mention of the argument from dichotomy, which introduces that which is indivisible and one because of the absurdity that follows from division, is apropos, it were well. But it is worthy of note whether the argument belongs to Parmenides and not to Zeno, as Alexander also thinks. For neither is anything of this sort said in Parmenides's verses, but the vast majority of historical accounts attribute the dilemma from dichotomy to Zeno. And above all, in the discussion about motion it is mentioned as belonging to Zeno³.

And what need is there to waste words, since it is in fact related in Zeno's own work? For showing again that if many exist, the same things are finite and infinite, Zeno writes the following in his own words:

If there is a plurality, things must be just as many as they are, no more and no less. And if they are just as many as they are, they must be limited. If there is plurality, the things that are are infinite; for there will always be other things between the things that are, and yet others between those others. And so the things that are are infinite.⁴

And in this way he proved numerical infinity on the basis of dichotomy. As for infinity in magnitude, [he previously demonstrated it] in virtue of the same dialectical reasoning. For having first shown,

If what is had no size, it would not even be,

he concludes,

For if it is, each thing must have a certain size and bulk, and one part of it must be at a certain distance from another part; and the same argument holds about the part in front of it -- it too will have some size, and some part of it will be in front. And it is the same thing to say this once and to go on saying it indefi-

nitely; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one part ever be unrelated to another. So if there is a plurality, things must be both small and great; so small as to have no size at all, so great as to be infinite.⁵

Perhaps, then, the argument from dichotomy does belong to Zeno, as Alexander maintains; not, however, because he abolishes the one, but far more the many -- because contradictions follow for those who posit them [the many] -- and in this way corroborates Parmenides's argument, which states that being is one⁶.

Notes to in Phys 139.24 - 141.11

¹Cf. 187a1-3.

²Commentarius in Physica; see Index Nominum s.v. p. 1453.
Several parenthical uses of $\phi\rho\sigma\iota$ have been omitted to produce a continuous translation (139.27, 29; 140.5).

³Cf. 239b9 ff..

⁴29 B 3 (DK I.257.9-258.5). Translation from Kirk and Raven, p. 288.

⁵29 B 1 (DK I.255.14-256.2). Translation from Kirk and Raven, p. 288.

⁶Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6.

in Phys 142.28 - 148.24

But since we have already come to the end of the arguments against Parmenides, it were well both to track down Parmenides's own doctrine about the one being [to show] that it is in accord with my previous remarks, and to examine what the refutations are directed against. Well then, that Parmenides does not posit the one being as one of the things that come to be and perish, one of its signs, which states that it is 'uncreated and indestructible', makes clear, when he says,

One way alone is
yet left to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this way are
marks in plenty that since it exists it is unborn and im-
perishable. (B 8.1-3)

And he does not maintain that the one being is corporeal at all, since he says it is indivisible, when he says,

Nor is it divisible, since it all equally is. (B 8.22)

Therefore, what he says is not appropriate to the heavens at all, as Eudemus¹ says some people understood by

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere.²
(B 8.43)

For the heavens are not indivisible; nor again are they like a sphere, but they are the most exact sphere among physical things. And that Parmenides says that the one being is not animate either, his statement that it is motionless makes clear,

It is alone, unmoved; therefore all things are a name.³

since animate substance has motion even according to the Eleatics. And he says that being is 'all together',

since it now is all together (B 8.5)

and that it is always the same,

Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself.
(B 8.39)

And it evidently is both 'all together' and 'the same' both with respect to its substance and to potentiality and actuality, which transcend the hypostasis of soul. Perhaps he does not even say that it is intellectual at all; for the intellectual subsists by virtue of its separation from the intelligible and its turning back upon the intelligible, and he says that the one being is the same for being and intellecting -- that is to say clearly is what is intelligible and intellect⁴ -- when he writes,

What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same. For without that which is (i.e. the intelligible) in which [i.e. in dependence on, or in respect of which] it is expressed, thou shalt not find thought. (B 8.34-36)

Furthermore, the intellectual is divided into Forms, since the intelligible contains beforehand in a unity the separation of the Forms. And where there is division, there also is otherness; and where this exists, there too non-being appears. For that which is other is not otherness itself, but Parmenides totally demarcates non-being from his one being.

For this shall never prevail, that things that are not are, but do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry.⁵ (B 7.1-2).

Nor again does he maintain that the one being is a common property, either that which exists in our minds as a secondary creation (for that is neither 'uncreated' nor 'indestructible'), nor again is it

the common property in objects; for that is perceptible and belongs to the opinable and deceptive, about which he speaks later, and is other because of its differentiae, so that it has otherness and non-being as attributes. And how could 'all together' or 'combines within itself the intellect and the intelligible' be true of this? But surely does he not say that the one being is individual substance, or is this even more discordant? For individual substance is distinguished by otherness, and is enmattered, perceptible, and other because of its accident(s). And it also is divisible and involved in motion. Accordingly, it remains that the intelligible -- as cause of all things, through which both the intellect and intellecting exist, in which all things are conjointly and as a unity pre-contained in virtue of a single unity -- this is the Parmenidean being, in which there is a single nature of both 'one' and 'being'. For which reason Zeno said that, if anyone should show him 'one', he would himself supply 'being', not because he did not understand 'one', but rather because it subsists along with being⁶. All of the conclusions which I have stated are appropriate to this one being; for the 'uncreated' is also 'indestructible' and the complete is 'unique'. For in reality, that which precedes all separation could not be a second thing along with something else. And appropriate to this are both 'all together' and 'non-being has no place in it anywhere' and further 'indivisible' and 'motionless' with respect to every kind of division and motion, and both the 'being always the same' and 'standing <as a limit>⁷ of all things'. And if this is the final cause of

intellecting, it is clear that it is the intelligible; for the intelligible is the final cause of both intellect and intellecting. And if intellecting and the intelligible are 'the same in the same', the preeminence of their unity would be ineffable. And lest I seem to anyone to be going too far⁸, I would gladly append Parmenides's verses about the one being, nor are there many, to these notes, both because they corroborate what I maintain and because Parmenides's writings are scarce. What follows the abolition of non-being is as follows:

One way alone is yet left to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this are marks in plenty that since it exists it is unborn and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and without end. It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be, since it now is all together, one and continuous. For what birth of it wilt thou seek? How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to say or think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or thought that 'it is not'. And what need would have prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from nothing. Thus it must either fully be or else not be. Nor will the force of evidence suffer anything besides itself to arise from what is not. Therefore Justice does not relax with her fetters⁹ and allow it to come into being or perish, but holds it fast. The verdict on this lies here; It is or it is not. But this verdict has already been given, as it had to be, that the one path should be left alone as unthinkable, unnamed, for it is no true path, and that the other exists and is real. How could what is afterwards perish?¹⁰ And how could it come into being? For if it came into being, it is not, nor yet if it is going to be at some future time. Thus becoming is extinguished, and perishing not to be heard of. Nor is it divisible, since it all equally is. It does not exist more fully in one direction, which would prevent it from holding together, nor more weakly in another, but all is full of what is. Therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is. But unmoved, in the grip of might bonds, it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming into being and perishing have been driven afar off¹¹ and true con-

viction has rejected them. Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself and so remains firmly where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a chain that hems it all around, because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would lack everything¹². What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same; for without that which is, in which [i.e. on dependence on or in respect of which] it is expressed [or revealed], thou shalt not find thought. Nothing exists or can exist apart from what is¹³, since Fate has fettered it so as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name which mortals have laid down [or agreed upon] believing them to be true [real]: coming into being and perishing, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright colour. But since there is a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball, equal in every way from the centre; for it may not be greater or smaller in this direction or in that; for neither is there what is not, which might stop it¹⁴ from reaching its like, nor is it possible that what is should be here more, and here less, since it is all inviolate; for equal on sides to itself, it meets its limits uniformly. Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. (B 8.1-52)

These then are Parmenides's verses about the one being. After them he then discourses about the opinables, positing different principles in them. Aristotle too makes mention of them later on when he says, "for Parmenides also makes hot and cold principles, and he calls them fire and earth"¹⁵. And if he says that the one being is

like the mass of a well-rounded ball, (B 8.43)

do not be surprised; it is because of his poetry that he makes use of a mythical fiction. How then did this statement differ from Orpheus's "silver-white egg". It is clear that used in a general way some of his expressions are also appropriate to other things that follow it [the one being]; as for instance 'uncreated and indestruc-

tible' is appropriate to both the soul and the intellect, and 'motionless and remaining the same' is appropriate to the intellect; but all [of these] when taken together and in their pure meaning befit that [the one being]. For even if the soul and intellect are uncreated in one sense, still they are derived from the intelligible. And the motionless is properly that in which not even actual motion is discerned, and 'remaining the same' is strictly appropriate to 'what remains'. But the soul and the much-prized intellect issued forth from that which remains and turn back toward it. And it is clear that as many things as are said to belong to it are precontained in it as a unity, but as separately, and as is evident by definition, issued forth from it after it. And accordingly, it seems to be related by Parmenides as a first cause, since it is one 'all together',¹⁶ and the 'last limit'. But if he did not say it was simply 'one', but 'one being', and 'unique' and 'limit' and 'limited', perhaps he is indicating that the ineffable cause of all things is situated above it. How is it then that both Plato and Aristotle manifestly direct refutations against Parmenides? Refuting him on two counts, both for saying that being is one and for utterly abolishing non-being, Plato makes his refutation on the basis of the intellectual and separated order, wherein 'being' was separated from 'one' and both did not remain one, and the parts [were separated] from the whole. For from these [parts] Plato demonstrated that what exists is not one but more than one; and he demonstrated [the existence of] non-being from the otherness that is found among the

separate Forms; owing to which 'being' in that realm, when grasped according to a single individuating property, is being, but is not motion or rest. And each of the others is what it is, but is not the others. And it is clear that that [non-being] is certainly there, where both separation and otherness were manifested, among what is intellectual as a Form and among the perceptibles as spatial separation. Parmenides himself manifestly allows this non-being among the opinables, since he calls the ordering of words concerning mortal opinions 'deceptive'; and where there is deceit, there is non-being. For he is deceived who thinks that what is not is or that what is is not. Yet Parmenides is not alone in abolishing absolute non-being, but Plato does also, since he shuns the inquiry itself into it, when he says:

Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever. But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements.¹⁷

It is in no way surprising to demonstrate [that] this sort of non-being [is found] in this sort of being, which is demarcated with respect to a single individuating property, although not even this sort of non-being has a place in the being which is intelligible, wholly-complete, and is all things before all things as a unity¹⁸. Aristotle, however, producing his refutation on the basis of dichotomy,

tomy, either, he says, 'being' is used in many ways and thus it will be many, or in one way only, and [it is] either substance or accident¹⁹. And it is clear that none of these things is appropriate to the intelligible, since this division is manifest in [the realm of] coming to be, and if at all, it is causally precontained in the intellectual division. But let no one censure Plato and Aristotle for refuting the conceptions of other men. For they are benevolent in the way they set forth <earlier>²⁰ misunderstandings; since the fact that they think that Parmenides is wise, Plato makes clear by testifying to the "altogether noble depth" of the man's intelligence²¹, and by relating him as Socrates's teacher of the most sublime knowledge²², and Aristotle by elsewhere supposing that he "in some places has insight"²³, and by putting him in contradistinction to the physicists²⁴. Whereas Plato spoke of this one being in his Parmenides²⁵, proclaiming its preeminence, as did Aristotle in the Metaphysics, contending that it is one and shouting "the rule of many is not good"²⁶ -- before him he [Parmenides] proclaimed its unity and well observed that there intellect, intelligible, substance, potentiality, and actuality are the same. But enough of these matters lest we seem to someone "to leap beyond the furrows", as the saying goes²⁷, by inserting the most sublime elements of first philosophy into a work on nature.

Notes to in Phys 142.28 - 148.24

¹Cf. in Phys 133.21-29.

²Cf. note 4 to translation of in Phys 52.8-53.7, p. 306.

³Cf. note 2 to translation of in Phys 28.32-31.17, p. 289.

⁴The text here (143.20-21) is probably corrupt.

⁵Cf. Sophist 258d1 ff..

⁶Cf. in Phys 97.12-13, 138.32-33.

⁷Diels's suggestion of πέρας τι for πέρας is here adopted; cf. note ad 144.22.

⁸Cf. in Phys 97.12-13, 138.32-33. in Phys 97.7-99.18 = Eudemus Physica fr. 37a (W) pp. 25.14-27.17.

⁹Guthrie (pp. 26-27), following DK, adopts πέδησιν for Simplicius's πέδησιν (B 8.14).

¹⁰Guthrie (pp. 26-27), following DK and others, reads ἐπειτ' ἀπόλοιτο ἑόν for Simplicius's ἐπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἑόν (B 8.19).

¹¹Cf. note 6 to translation of in Phys 37.12-40.21, p. 298.

¹²Cf. note 4 to translation of in Phys 28.32-31.17, p. 289.

¹³Guthrie (pp. 39-40) thinks that the verse (B 8.36) is probably corrupt and adopts the reading of DK.

¹⁴Guthrie (pp. 43-44) adopts οὐκ ἑόν of the Aldine (and DK) for οὐτ' ἑόν in Simplicius (B 8.46).

¹⁵188a20-22.

¹⁶Omitting τὸ with D (note ad 147.14).

¹⁷Sophist 258e6-259a4. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 295.

¹⁸Cf. in Phys 88.5-8.

¹⁹Cf. 185a20-187a11.

²⁰Emending the meaningless γενησόμενος (148.12) to γενομένου :
cf. in Phys 36.25-27.

²¹Theaetetus 184a1.

²²This appears to be a general reference to the Parmenides.

²³Cf. Metaphysics A 986b27-28 and Diels's note ad 148.16.

²⁴Cf. 184b15-18, in Phys 41.5-6, 148.26-149.2.

²⁵128a8-b1. Simplicius may have the whole second hypothesis
(142b1-155e3) in mind.

²⁶Metaphysics A 1076a4.

²⁷Cf. Cratylus 413a7-b1.

in Phys 162.11 - 22¹

Parmenides, too, demonstrated that real being is uncreated since it neither comes to be from being (for there was nothing existent before it) nor from non-being; for it must come to be from something; but non-being is nothing. And the cause of the absolute necessity of what comes to be coming to be from being Parmenides set forth in a wondrous way. For in short, he says, if [it comes to be] from non-being, what is the arbitrary selection² for its having come to be then when it did come to be, but not sooner or later? And he writes as follows:

For what birth of it wilt thou seek?
How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to
say or to think 'from what is not', for it is not to be
said or thought that 'it is not'. And what need would
have prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from
nothing? (B 8.6-10)

Notes to in Phys 162.11 - 22

¹Cf. 187a26-29

²τίς ἡ ἀπολήγουσις. LSJ s.v. II, p. 202, translates this phrase "what is there unreasonable in . . . "; the sense here is nearly the opposite, e.g. "it is absurd that . . .".

in Phys 179.27 - 180.13¹

And he [Aristotle] proves that the principles are opposites -- evidently the elemental [principles] of physical objects -- first on the basis of the agreement among nearly all the physicists on this point, even if they disagree on everything else. For indeed those who say that being is one and motionless, as for example Parmenides, they too make the principles of physical objects opposites. "For indeed" he "makes hot and cold principles" in the Doxa. "And he calls them fire and earth" and light and night or darkness. For he says after the Aletheia:

They made up their minds to name two forms,
of which it is not right to name one (it is in this that
they have gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary
in form and assigned marks apart from each other; on the
one hand flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in
every direction the same as itself², but not the same
as the other; and also that other, separate, the very
opposite, blind Night, a dense and heavy form.

(B 8.53-59)

And shortly afterwards again:

Then since all things have been named Light and Night,
and the names appropriate to their powers assigned to
these and those, everything is full alike of Light and
obscure Night, both equal, since there is nothing that
shares in neither. (B 9.1-4)

And if nothing does not share in neither, it is clear that they both are principles and that they are opposites.

Notes to in Phys 179.27 - 180.13

¹Cf. 188a19-22.

²Guthrie (p. 51) brackets ἥπλον in B 8.57.

in Phys 188.28 - 31¹

And Parmenides says that hot and cold [are principles more knowable by sense], but Alexander says that either it was he, who spoke of hot and cold, who said that they were moist and dry, or else it was Empedocles, who in addition to Love and Strife posited the four elements as principles.

Notes to in Phys 188.28 - 31

¹Cf. 188b30-189a7.

in Phys 235.12 - 236.12¹

That he rightly placed absence in addition to matter among the principles he demonstrates from the fact that some ancient philosophers, who did not understand it [absence], abolished coming to be and perishing, since they were defeated by one dilemma, and encountered other absurdities. And by first in philosophy he does not mean only those who preceded in time, but rather those who in the first instance investigated truth. He does not now speak of all of them, but rather of as many as tried to abolish coming to be. They are divided into two, or rather three camps. For some of them said that what exists is one and uncreated; others said that there are many existent things, but that they remain in existence when separated out -- abolishing coming to be, as for example Anaximander and Anaxagoras; some produced coming to be by the combination and separation of the primary elements, as for example Democritus and Empedocles. For coming to be does not exist, he says,

but only mingling and separation of what is mingled.²

These men abolished coming to be, he says, constrained by a dilemma, which they could not resolve. It is resolved by positing those kinds of physical principles which we have posited. And when he has first set out the dilemma³, having been thrust away by which from the way that leads to the truth they tried to abolish coming to be, and the absurdity that follows from the dilemma, he thereupon adds its solution. And the dilemma is as follows: it is necessary that what comes to be come to be from either being or non-being; if both are impos-

sible, coming to be could not exist; it is clear that both are impossible; for neither does being come to be from being (for being already exists prior to its having come to be), nor from non-being (for there must be something from which [it came into being]), and in a word non-being is nothing. The dilemma is of this sort. He adds the immediate consequence:

So too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things, maintaining that only Being itself is. Such then was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption.⁴

Defeated by the dilemma, as some seem, into which the concept of being and non-being had led them, which realizes that being proper and non-being proper alone exist and do not exist⁵, the dilemma progressed to its seeming conclusion⁶. And this is that being is one, as Melissus and Parmenides said, who say that what is besides being is non-being. For if existents should be more than one, it is clear that they both differ from one another and that their difference will exist besides being; and if there should be anything besides what is, it will either be existent or non-existent. But it is impossible either that what is besides being be existent or that what is non-existent exist. He deduced that the claim that being is one is more absurd than the claim that coming to be does not exist, and that this had occurred to them because of their dilemma⁷.

Notes to in Phys 235.12 - 236.12

¹Cf. 191a23-34.

²Empedocles, 31 B 8.3. Translation from Guthrie, p. 140.

³Simplicius, along with EJ, has ἀπορίας for the ἀπειρίας 'in-experience' (of FIVPT) adopted by Ross in 191a26-27.

⁴191a31-34. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 233 (McKeon).

⁵Cf. Metaphysics A 984a29-b1.

⁶The reading of a τῇ ἀπορίᾳ προῆλθον is preferable; "and in their dilemma advanced to the seeming conclusion".

⁷The Greek is obscure here (236.11-12).

in Phys 242.17 - 244.21¹

Whether the nature of absence is [the nature] of matter, which had it been seen would have resolved every dilemma²; or [the nature] of per se and per accidens and of 'in potentiality' and 'in actuality'; or [the nature] of both taken together (for the one [exists] in virtue of the other); this nature, he [Aristotle] says, some did not grasp at all -- all those who make being one or all those who say that all things exist beforehand in actuality, and without exception all those who abolish coming to be -- while some grasped it "but not sufficiently". Indeed he seems to say these things in reference to Plato. For he himself, saying in the Timaeus that matter is not a thing that actually exists, when he says that what underlies the Forms could not be

duly prepared unless it is free from all those characters which it is to receive from elsewhere³,

seems to have grasped in some way or other both matter and absence/lack (στέρησις); for that which is naturally disposed to receive or not, but does not possess, could properly be said 'to lack' (ἐστέρησθαι). Plato is manifestly the first to have distinguished both 'in potentiality and in actuality' and 'per se and per accidens', and 'in one way being, but in another non-being', as was stated before⁴. Indeed, in addition to the rest [of these distinctions] Plato precisely defined things that are used in many ways, as even Eudemus in his Physics testifies when he says, "For Plato, by introducing ambiguity, resolved many dilemmas concerning things"⁵. For these reasons, then, Plato could have grasped this sort of nature.

But he does not seem to have sufficiently grasped it in two ways, one of which is the extent to which he agrees to Parmenides's statement that being is one. For to this extent he produces coming to be out of absolute non-being and qua non-being. For it is not possible, if being is one, that there is something else that is existent per se, but is non-existent per accidens, and is existent in potentiality, but is non-existent in actuality, from which things that come to be will exist. For everything that is not that simply does not exist. For that which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; that alone is being; therefore by approving of Parmenides's statement that being is one, [Plato] himself produces coming to be out of absolute non-being.

Thus do nearly all of the commentators explain the text on the assumption that Plato agrees to Parmenides's statement that being is one. And this surprises me: for in the Sophist he clearly objected to Parmenides's statement, which states that being is one, with a host of criticisms; the criticisms were previously stated in the objections to Parmenides⁶, but to refresh out memory let us now set forth their conclusion, which is as follows:

And countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one.⁷

However, Aristotle by no means said that they agree that <something> without qualification comes to be from non-being, insofar as they agree that Parmenides speaks correctly. Accordingly, perhaps he is censuring him [Plato] for admitting the minor premiss of Parmenides,

which states that 'what is besides being is non-being', and on the basis of this agrees that non-being exists. For he says that that which is other than beautiful, since it is besides what is beautiful, is non-beautiful, and that that which is other than large, since it is besides what is large, is non-large, and adding other [examples] of this sort concludes:

So, it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different and a part of the nature of the Existent (Existence) are set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be permissible to say so, so much a reality as Existence itself; it does not mean what is contrary to 'existent', but only what is different from the Existent. -- That is quite clear. -- What name are we to give it, then? -- Obviously this is just that 'what-is-not' which we were seeking for the sake of the Sophist.⁸

It is clear that Parmenides had absolute non-being in sight when he abolished non-being, since he says,

For this shall never prevail, that things that are not are, but do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry.⁹ (B 7.1-2)

Plato, however, agreed to the minor premiss, looking to that non-being which is due to otherness, but he objected to the major premiss, which states that 'non-being is nothing'. But if this should be so, Aristotle would not now be censuring Plato for saying that coming to be [arises] from absolute non-being, since he agrees that "Parmenides speaks correctly". But neither does Plato concur that absolute non-being exists, nor much less Parmenides. But perhaps we are being too forceful in our assertion that Plato approves of Parmenides's statement that non-being exists. For even if he concurs with the minor premiss, which states that 'what is besides being is non-be-

ing', yet it is not as if Parmenides posits non-being. For he concludes that non-being is nothing. And in short, since he refutes Parmenides on the grounds that he indiscriminately abolishes non-being, he himself introduced non-being in the Sophist. Consequently, lest the commentators be making their explanations in an irrelevant way, perhaps let us say that Aristotle here has referred to what Plato says in the dialogue Parmenides, where Plato seems to marvel at Parmenides's assumption and demonstration that being is one¹⁰. It is clear that he proves that this being is really many, by carefully examining it with respect to one or the other orders. But I have written these things dizzy with consternation; if anyone should account in a less forced way [for] how Plato says that coming to be [arises] from non-being, because he agrees that "Parmenides speaks well", he prevails as a friend, not a foe.

Notes to in Phys 242.17 - 244.21

¹Cf. 191b35-192a2.

²Cf. 191b33-34.

³50d6-e1. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 186.

⁴in Phys 239.3-5.

⁵Cf. Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) p. 29.10-11, in Phys 115.27, 120.8-9.

⁶in Phys 88.30-90.20.

⁷245d12-e2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of

Knowledge, p. 227.

⁸Sophist 258a11-b6. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 291-292.

⁹Cf. Sophist 258d2-3.

¹⁰Cf. 128a8 ff..

in Phys 274.20 - 26¹

Therefore Antiphon seemed in a general way to call the substrate 'nature' (ἡ φύσις), while each of the rest also called whatever he said was the primary substrate 'the nature' of things that are; whether this was one, as for instance Thales said water [was the primary substrate], Anaximenes air, Heraclitus fire, or more than one, as for example Parmenides fire and earth, or the four, as for example Empedocles. But no one said that earth alone [was the primary substrate], but Aristotle inserted this as well out of analogy with the rest.

Notes to in Phys 274.20 - 26

¹Cf. 193a9-28.

in Phys 502.3 - 12¹

If whatever is whole and perfect is finite, Parmenides made a better declaration than Melissus about being. For Melissus, having said that it is infinite, also says that it is whole. On the other hand, Parmenides, saying that it is a whole, as "from the centre equal" (B 8.43) makes clear, (for that which has a center and stands at an interval equal from it in every direction assuredly has an extremity also); saying then that it is a whole he properly says that it is finite also. But Melissus combines what is contradictory. For if what is infinite is a whole, and what is whole finite, what is infinite would be finite. Therefore, he who says that what is infinite is a whole and a sum interweaves things that are not by nature to be interwoven; for there is a proverb said of these things.

Notes to in Phys 502.3 - 12

¹Cf. 206b33-207a18.

in Phys 649.35 - 650.14¹

And that this argument, which introduces void on the basis of motion, was ancient is confirmed by that fact that Melissus, employing as obvious the hypothetical syllogism which states 'if being moves, it moves through void', and then assuming in addition that 'however, void does not exist', concludes 'therefore being does not move'². That Melissus propounds the argument in approximately this way is clear. But he propounds it not concerning corporeal nor even particularized being, but rather about intelligible and quite-complete [being]. For he maintains that this is one and motionless, proving 'motionless', I believe, because it is all things and there is nothing besides it, towards which it will depart through void; for the void is not there [in intelligible being], and perhaps not even otherness, if it is all things. Non-being does not have a place in absolute being. For even if otherness is there, due to which the Forms are separated from one another, nevertheless otherness too is an existent thing. The void does not have a place in absolute being, just as non-being too does not.

But do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry,
(B 7.2)
the great Parmenides says.

Notes to in Phys 649.35 - 650.14

¹Cf. 213b4-15.

²Cf. 30 B 7.7 (DK I.272.3-273.3).

in Phys 1195.6 - 15¹

Thirdly, [he concludes] that he who says that all things are at rest not only abolishes nature and things in nature, nor even makes an attack against the physicist alone, but also against all the crafts and the applied sciences -- evidently those which operate with motion; for theoretical knowledge requires some physical motion. Wherefore, having said "against all the sciences" he added "so to speak". And he opposes "all the opinions" of physicists or even of all men "because they all employ motion". And one must observe from this passage also, so I suppose, that Aristotle by no means believes that those who follow Parmenides and Melissus hold the opinion that the whole of being is motionless, but rather only real and intelligible being.

Notes to in Phys 1195.6 - 15

¹Cf. 252a32-b2.

in Cael 7.20 - 26¹

If someone says that all these matters also are connected with bodies, nevertheless the discussion concerning space, time, and void would fall outside of things of this sort; likewise too that [discussion] concerning what is not physical but raises physical questions -- concerning which he spoke in the first book of the Physics in his discussion of Parmenides and Melissus².

At the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though Nature is not their subject;³

therefore, the discussion of these matters also falls somewhat outside of bodies.

Notes to in Cael 7.20 - 26

¹Cf. 268a1-6.

²184b25-187a11.

³Physics 185a17-19. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 220 (McKeon).

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12

For if something should come to be, they say, from absolute non-being, it will result that non-being exists; for it has changed into being. But if someone says that things that come to be come to be from non-being in the way that a ship does from [planks] of wood, i.e. from non-being itself as the substrate for what comes to be and changing into it, it will in truth result that non-being exists. But I do not suppose that anyone so lacks wits that he posits that there is coming to be from non-being in this manner, but rather insofar as each of the things that come to be comes to be though in no way existing prior, it was brought forth into being.¹

Indeed, either I totally fail to understand what he is saying in these remarks or else he manifestly understands the statements of the ancients in a non-sensical way. For neither did anyone try to reduce the claim that there is coming to be from non-being to this absurdity -- that non-being exists, but rather into the claim that nothing can come to be from non-being because non-being is inefficient. For believing that what comes to be comes to be both from a substrate, as it were, and because of an efficient cause, they properly said that nothing comes to be from non-being as an element or as from an efficient cause. For indeed Parmenides, the first of whom we know by report to propound this argument in his verses about the uncreatedness of being, writes the following:

For what birth of it wilt thou seek?
How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee
to say or think 'from what is not', for it is not to be
said or thought 'it is not'. (B 8.6-9)

And Aristotle also sets forth the dilemma as follows:

So they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to

be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be (because something must be present as a substratum).²

Who then is the man who reduces [their claim] into this absurdity -- that non-being changes into being?

Notes to in Cael 136.18 - 137.12

¹Johannes Philoponus, from VI Librorum τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ αἰδιότητος κόσμου); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 771. Several parenthical uses of φησί have been omitted to produce a continuous quotation (in Cael 136.20, 23).

²Physics 191a27-31. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Physica, p. 233 (McKeon).

in Cael 139.23 - 140.9

Whereas this man¹, having defeated, as he supposes, the more powerful of Aristotle's statements concerning the uncreatedness of the universe, immediately undertakes to shake the credibility of the common beliefs and perception of men as well, come let us consider his preparations against these statements also. Now since Aristotle states that all men, whether Greek or barbarian, allot the upper place to the deity, because the immortal is linked with the immortal², but shortly afterwards relating the opinions of his predecessors concerning the composition of the universe and saying,

That the world was generated all are agreed, but, generation over, some say that it is eternal, others say that it is destructible <like any other natural formation.> Others again, with Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, believe that there is alteration in the destructive process, which takes place now this direction, now that, and continues without end,³

this man believes a feast has been set for himself in that he [Aristotle], using the testimony of the common man, shortly afterwards introduces famous philosophers as offering contradictory testimony on the heavens⁴. Yet, if with regard to the claim that what exists is one he had both cited the common assumption that maintains that what exists is more than one and had undertaken to correct the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus, it would be wholly, I think, characteristic of the dull-witted to say that believing the common assumption to be true he objected to the outward expressions of these men lest those men, who pay rather superficial attention to their doctrines and who are unable to grasp their profundity, not be

confounded in the face of the parts of their doctrines that are so clear.

Notes to in Cael 139.23 - 140.9

¹Johannes Philoponus, from VI Librorum τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ αἰδιότητος κόσμου); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 771.

²Cf. 270b5-9. Translation based on J.L. Stokes, De Caelo, pp. 402-403 (McKeon).

³279b12-17 (the text quoted here (139.31-34) is a truncated version of this). Translation from J.L. Stocks, De Caelo, p. 419 (McKeon).

⁴Cf. Sophist 251b5-c6.

in Cael 556.3 - 556.10¹

He [Aristotle] divided the opinions about coming to be in a four-fold manner: 1) some totally do away with coming to be, saying that all things that are are uncreated because there is no knowledge of things that are created and perishable, since they are always in flux, as Parmenides and Melissus seemed to say; 2) some, in direct opposition to them, as for example Hesiod, who says that even the very first of things [that are] according to him came to be:

Verily Chaos came to be first of all; (Theogony 116)

3) some say that everything else comes to be, but they say that the one, common underlying thing alone is uncreated, from which everything else comes to be, as for example Heraclitus; 4) some say that no body is uncreated, but that all things come to be, by composition from plane figures. He first discusses those who follow Melissus and Parmenides. The former says that there is no coming to be at all, but Parmenides says that there is none in truth but there is in seeming. For this reason he [Aristotle] added "but only seem to us". "And these men," he says, "even if they say everything else well" -- for in reality 'well' and divinely they understood matters relating to the one being and the intelligible nature and also revealed to their followers that there cannot be knowledge of things that are subject to coming to be and motion, insofar as they are always in flux -- "still it is necessary to believe that they do not speak as physicists at any rate" since their philosophy is concerned with metaphysical things. "For the claim that some of the things that

are are uncreated and wholly without motion" -- which is precisely what they were trying to prove -- "belongs to another [inquiry]", first philosophy, to prove and not "to the inquiry into nature", because nature is a principle of motion, and by abolishing motion they abolish both nature and natural objects. And yet someone might say, 'what is there to prevent them from not being called 'physicists' nor again being refuted as physicists?' Is it because both Melissus and Parmenides entitled their works On Nature? But this would not be sufficient; for indeed the word 'nature' was common, insofar as people venture to speak even of 'god's nature' and we speak of 'the nature of things that are'; and moreover they did not in these works discourse about metaphysics only, but about physics also, and perhaps for this reason did not avoid using the title On Nature. No, the point on which Aristotle censures them, when he confutes the cause of their error, would be really harsh, if in fact it were true. For these men he says supposing that nothing else besides the substance of the perceptibles is found in actual existence, but being the first to understand that there must be some such uncreated and motionless natures, if in fact there is scientific thought -- for of things that are always in flux there is no knowledge, and even in Plato Parmenides says, 'nor will someone have a place to direct his thoughts to unless eternal Forms are posited to exist'² -- having understood these things then they transferred to things that are perceptible and created these statements which are appropriate to things that are intelligible and motionless, if in fact undertaking

to speak about nature the say what is appropriate to these other things. And if Melissus did use the title On Nature or On Being, it is clear that he believed that nature was being and that things that are are things in nature, i.e. the perceptibles. And perhaps in this way Aristotle said they assume that nothing else besides the substance of perceptible things -- when they say that being is one; for since what is perceptible clearly seems to be, if being is one, there would be nothing else besides this. And Melissus says:

To be <infinite> it must be one; for if there were two, they could not be infinite but would have limits in relation to [or be limited] by one another,³

and Parmenides:

whole, unique, immovable, and without end.⁴ (B 8.4)

But Aristotle, as is his custom, even in the present case has attacked the apparent meaning in statements, taking thought that the more superficial not be fallaciously misled; but those men posited a two-fold reality -- the one of being, the intelligible, and the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, which they did not deem worthy to call 'being' without qualification, but rather 'seeming being'; wherefore he says that truth is concerned with being, but seeming with what comes to be. At any rate Parmenides says:

It is meet for thee to learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth and also what seems to mortals, in which there is no true conviction. Nevertheless these things too shalt thou learn, namely that what seems had assuredly to exist, being indeed everything.⁵ (B 1.28-32)

Further, once he has completed the account about real being and on the point of giving an explanation concerning the perceptibles, he

added:

Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought⁶ concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. (B 8.50-52)

And having related the ordering of the perceptibles he again added:

Thus in appearance these things came into being and now are and having matured will come to an end in the future; and for them men have assigned a name to distinguish each one. (B 19.1-3)

How then did Parmenides assume that only perceptibles exist? (It is superfluous to quote here the sort of arguments he made in his discussion of the intelligible.) And how did he transfer things that are appropriate to the intelligibles to the perceptibles -- who separately related the unity of intelligible and real being, and separately [related] the ordering of the perceptibles in a clear manner and does not deem it worthy to call what is perceptible by the name 'being'? Moreover, Melissus, since he wrote in prose, still more clearly set forth his own opinion on these matters, both throughout his philosophy, but most of all in these statements; for having said about being that it is one, uncreated, and motionless, and separated by no void, but is wholly full of itself, concludes:

This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If there were a plurality, things would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and fire, and iron and gold, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that men say they really are -- if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we first decided, and they cannot be changed or altered, but each must be always just as it is. But, as it is, we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what

is warm becomes cold, and that what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed, and that what they were and what they are now are in no way alike. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the finger; and so with gold and stone and everything that we fancy to be strong, and that earth and stone are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strengths of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change from what we see each time. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what is has passed away and what is has come into being. So then, if there were a plurality, things would have to be of just the same nature as the one.⁷

This man, then, clearly even stated the reason why they say that perceptibles do not exist, but only seem to exist. How then could someone suppose that they believe that what is perceptible alone exists? But they also abolish coming to be from real being; for of this both Parmenides said:

Thus becoming is extinguished, and perishing not to be
be heard of, (B 8.21)

and Melissus as Parmenides; however, they clearly speak of coming to be for the perceptibles, Melissus in these words, "what is warm becomes cold" and what follows . . . "earth and stone are made out of water"⁸, and with regard to the perceptibles Parmenides says that they had a beginning, for he says⁹,

How earth and sun and moon
and either common to all and the Milky Way and highest
Olympus and the hot force of the stars started to come
into being, (B 11.1-4)

and he relates¹⁰ the coming to be of things that come into being and pass away down to the parts of animals. And it is clear that Parmenides did not fail to know that he was created, just as he by no means [failed to know] that he had two feet when he said that being is one. But what Aristotle stated well in the Metaphysics, "Parmenides seems perhaps <to speak> with rather more insight"¹¹, we certainly must believe that Aristotle added after his refutation of the apparent meaning.

Alexander says that these men employ the following syllogism: things that are perceptible alone exist; there is knowledge of existent things; those things of which there is knowledge are motionless; therefore things that are perceptible are motionless. And following this argument, he says, they transferred what is truly said of motionless substances to things that are perceptible -- unsoundly. Wherefore, it turned out that by speaking about things in nature not as scientists of nature they abolished nature.

Notes to in Cael 556.3 - 560.10

¹Cf. 298b14-24.

²Cf. Parmenides 135b8-cl.

³30 B 6. Translation from Guthrie, p. 106.

⁴Cf. note 5 to translation of in Phys 118.27-121.25, p. 347.

⁵Guthrie (p. 9) adopts the reading περ ὄντα because it is better attested in the manuscripts of Simplicius (B 1.32). DK, however, retains περὶ ὄντα of A; "passing through".

⁶Cf. note 4 to translation of in Phys 37.12-40.21, p. 298.

⁷30 B 8. Translation from Kirk and Raven, pp. 304-305.

⁸30 B 8.3. Translation from Kirk and Raven, p. 305.

⁹Emending λέγειν to λέγων: cf. in Phys 31.12, 32.12, 39.13, 17,
26.

¹⁰Reading παραδίδωσι (559.27) with DEc.

¹¹986b27-28.

in Cael 562.6 - 10¹

Perhaps he omitted the other doctrines for the present because he produced a long discussion concerning them in the Physics². Perhaps what is said with respect to other conceptions of Parmenides and Hesiod did not require a substantial reply; of the physicists one spoke of water, another air, another fire, another what is intermediate.

Notes to in Cael 562.6 - 10

¹Cf. 298b24-299a2.

²Cf. 187a12 ff..

in Cael 672.24 - 32

This then is the end of the third book of the treatise De Caelo; let the following be a succinct summary of it. Since he has undertaken to discuss the simple bodies in the whole universe, once he has offered an account of the cyclophoric and eternal body throughout the first two books of his treatise, in this [book] he teaches about things which have rectilinear motion and are created. He first inquires whether coming to be exists or not, for some totally abolished coming to be by saying that being is uncreated, as for example Parmenides and Melissus¹. But some said there is coming to be for all things without exception, as for example Hesiod; and some [say that there is coming to be] for all bodies, as for example those who fashion bodies out of plane figures.

Notes to in Cael 672.24 - 32

¹Cf. 298b14-24.

in Cael 691.4 - 7¹

And the statement "or more than one but only opposites" can comprise both those who speak of the void and the full, and of those who speak of fire and earth, as for example Parmenides, and those who speak of the dense and the rare, and those who explain coming to be by means of the multitude and fewness of plane figures.

Notes to in Cael 691.4 - 7

¹Cf. 309b29-310a3.

in Categorias 3.30 - 4.9

Well then the schools of philosophy are named in seven ways:

1) from him who established the school, e.g. the Pythagoreans and Platonists; 2) from the native land of the leader of the school, e.g. those [named] from [the native land of] Aristippus are Cyrenaics, those from Euclides Megarians, and those from Xenophanes and Parmenides Eleatics; 3) from the locale in which they pursued the study of philosophy, e.g. the Academics and Stoics; 4) from an incidental activity, e.g. the Peripatetics; 5) from their judgement as regards philosophy, e.g. those [named] from Pyrrho are 'Withholders' (ἑφεστικοί); 6) from the goal they propose of their philosophy, e.g. the Epicureans [are named] Hedonists; 7) from their form of life, e.g. the Cynics ['Canines']. For the goal at which they aim and the form of their lifestyle are different; for the Epicureans were not hunting after pleasure through pleasure, but rather most of all through exertions and self-control.

in De Anima 260.21 - 26¹

And it is well that he [Aristotle] did not take up negation anywhere in these remarks but only assertion, because, just as Parmenides says that non-being is not be observed anywhere among the intelligibles, so too the most sublime substance of the soul and the activity which exists in virtue of its substance, being full of themselves, do not afford space for non-being.

Notes to in De Anima 260.21 - 26

¹Cf. 430b26-29.

Appendix B: Simplicius's Quotations from Parmenides

The order and line numbers of the fragments are those of DK.
Unless marked in Cael, all references are to in Phys. (A = Aristotle
Physics; E = Eudemus Physica; P = Plato Sophist; on B 8.38 see pp.
259-260.)

B 1

25

26

27 in Cael

28 557.25

29 557.26

30 557.27

31 558.1

32 558.2

B 2

1

2

3 116.28

4 116.29

5 116.30

6 116.31

7 116.32

8 117.1

410

B 6

1	86.27	117.4
2	86.28	117.5
3		117.6
4		117.8
5		117.9
6		117.10
7		117.11
8	78.3	117.12
9	78.4	117.13

B 7

1		135.21 ^P	143.31	244.1	
2	78.6	135.22 ^P	144.1	244.2	650.13
3					
4					
5					
6					

B 9

1	180.9
2	180.10
3	180.11
4	180.12

B 11

in Cael

1	559.22
2	559.23
3	559.24
4	559.25

B 12

1		39.14
2	31.13	39.15
3	31.14	39.16
4	31.15	
5	31.16	
6	31.17	

B 13

1	39.18
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B 19

in Cael

1	558.9
2	558.10
3	558.11

B 8

1	78.8	142.34	145.1	
2	78.9	142.35	145.2	
3	30.1 78.10,12	142.36	145.3	<u>in Cael</u>
4	30.2	120.23	145.4	557.18
5	30.3	143.13	145.5	<u>in Cael</u>
6	78.15		145.6	162.18
7	78.16		145.7	162.19
8	78.17		145.8	162.20
9	78.18		145.9	162.21
10	78.19		145.10	162.22
11	78.20		145.11	
12	78.21		145.12	
13	78.22		145.13	
14	78.23		145.14	
15			145.15,16	
16			145.17	

412

[illegible]

34			87.14	143.22	146.7	
35			87.15	143.23,24	146.8	
36			87.16	143.25	146.9	
37			86.31		146.10	
			86.32			
38	29.18*		87.1	143.10*	146.11	
39					146.12	
40					146.13	
41					146.14	
42					146.15	414
43	52.23,26 ^P	89.22 ^P	137.16	143.6	146.16	146.30
44	52.27 ^P	89.23 ^P	137.17	133.27 ^E	146.17	502.6-7 ^A
45	52.28 ^P	89.24 ^P			146.18	
46					146.19	
47					146.20	
48					146.21	
49					146.22	

50	30.17	38.30	41.8	146.23	<u>in Cael</u> 558.5
51	30.18	38.31	41.9	146.24	558.6
52	30.19	38.32		146.25	558.7
53	30.23	39.1		180.1	
54	30.24	39.2		180.2	
55	30.25	39.3		180.3	
56	30.26	39.4		180.4	
57	30.27	39.5		180.5	415
58	31.1	39.6		180.6	
59	31.2	39.7		180.7	
60		39.8			
61		39.9			

Appendix C:

Verses of Parmenides, with variant readings, quoted
by Simplicius, as reported in CAG VII, IX.

For the sigla see CAG VII pp. V-X, XIV; CAG IX pp. V-IX, XII-XXII. Emendations by Diels's and Heiberg's predecessors, e.g. Stein and Karsten, are not presented here. Unless marked in Cael, all references are to in Phys.

B 1.28 - 32

in Cael

- 557.25 χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,
557.26 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέσ ἦτορ
557.27 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής·
558.1 ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσθαι, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα
558.2 χοῖν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντός πάντα περῶντα.
25 χρεῶδες ἔπαντα A
26 ἡμὲν D: εἰ μὲν AE εὐκυκλέος DE:
 εὐκύκλιος A
27 ἡδέ] ἡ δὲ E: εἰ δὲ E²
1 μαθήσθαι DE: μαθήσεται A: μυθήσμαι Fc
2 χοῖν DE: χοῖν A: χοή c εἶναι ABDEF:
 σ' εἶναι c περῶντα A: περ ὄντα DEF

B 2.3 - 8

- 116.28 ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστι τε καὶ ὥς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι
 116.29 πειθοῦς ἔστι κέλευθος (ἀληθείη γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ)
 116.30 ἡ δ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστι τε καὶ ὥς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι
 116.31 τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθεῖα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν.
 116.32 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
 117.1 οὔτε φράσαις.
 28 ἡμὲν a
 31 παναπευθεῖα aEF (cf. Hom.γ 88): παραπειεύθεα D:
 ἔμμεν' DF: ἔμμεναι aE
 32 ἂν om. F ἀνυστόν libri cf. 31 B 12.2

B 6.1 - 2

- 86.27 χρή τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' εἶναι ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
 86.28 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.
 27 τε νοεῖν libri τεὸν F: τὸ ὄν aDE
 ἔμμενε D
 28 μηδὲν δὲ libri
 117.4 ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
 117.5 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστι, τὰ γ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα,
 5 μηδὲν δ' a: μὴ δὲ οἶδ' D: μὴ δέοι δ' E:
 μὴ δὲ οἶδ' F ἔστι DEF: εἶναι a
 τὰ γ' ἐγὼ D: τὰ γε F: τοῦ ἐγὼ E: τὰ σε a

B 6.3 - 7

- 117.6 πρώτης γάρ σ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἶργω>,
 117.8 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν
 117.9 πλάττονται δίκρανοι· ἀμυχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
 117.10 στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον. οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται
 117.11 κωροὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε τεθηπότες ἄκριτα φύλα,

6 δ' DEF: om. a post διζήσιος supplevit
 Diels εἶργω, ἐπάγει: εἶργε νόημα ἐπάγει sup-
 plevit a ex 78.6

9 πλάττονται DEF: πλάζονται a ἀμυχανίη D

10 πλακτὸν DF¹ νόον] νόμον E

11 ὁμῶς EF τε om. F

B 6.8 - 9

- 78.3 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται
 78.4 κού ταῦτόν,
 4 κού] καὶ οὐ
 117.12 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται
 117.13 κού ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπὸς ἐστὶ κέλευθος.

B 7.1

- 135.21 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δομῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,
 21 apud Sophist 258d2 τοῦτο δομῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα
 E: τοῦτο μηδομῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα D: in lac. om F:
 τόγε μὴ ὄν οἷόν τε εἶναι a Parmenidi dandum

μὴ εἶντα (Diels)

- 143.31 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δοκῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,
31 τοῦτο δοκῇ DE: τούτου οὐδοκῇ (οὐδοκῇ F) aF
- 244.1 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δοκῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
1 τοῦτο δοκῇ E: τοῦτο μηδοκῇ D: τοῦτ' οὐδοκῇ
F: τόγε μηδοκῇ a ὄντι a
- B 7.2
- 78.6 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα,
6 ἀλλὰ σὺ om. (lac. X litt. rel.) F λέγων post
σὺ add. a τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ ADF: τῆδ' ἄμφ'
ὁδοῦ E διζήσεως E
- 135.22 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.
22 apud Sophist 238d3
- 144.1 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.
1 εἶσ γε νόημα E post νόημα habet οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ
τοῦ ἐόντος τούτεστι τοῦ νοητοῦ F
- 244.2 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.
- 650.13 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα,
13 διζήσεως F εἴργε a et si silentio fides EF
- B 8.1
- 78.8 μῶνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
8 μῶνος DE: μόνος aF δ' ἔτι a: δέ τι DEF
- 142.34 μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο

145.1 μοῦνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο

1 μοῦνος DE: μόνος aF δέ τι

B 8.2

78.9 λείπεται, ὥς ἔστι. ταύτη δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι

9 ἐπίσημα τ' D ἔασι a

142.35 λείπεται ὥς ἔστι. ταύτη δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι

35 ἔασι a

145.2 λείπεται, ὥς ἔστι. ταύτη δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι

2 ἔασι a

B 8.3

30.1 ὥς ἀγέννητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,

a ἀγέννητον ἔστι ἐὼν F

78.10 πολλὰ μάλα·

78.12 ὥς ἀγέννητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,

12 ἐστιν F: ἔν ἐστίν aDE

142.36 πολλὰ μάλ', ὥς ἀγέννητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν.

145.3 πολλὰ μάλ', ὥς ἀγέννητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,

B 8.4

30.2 οὗλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἥδ' ἀτέλεστον,

2 μονογενές DE τε om. aF ἥδ' ἀτέλεστον

aDE: ἡ δ' ἀτέλεστ⁶ (ἀτέλεστον) E^a: ἡ ἀτέλεστον F

78.13 οὗλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἥδ' ἀτέλεστον,

- 13 τε om. a ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον D: ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον F:
 ἡ δι' ἀτέλεστον E: ἡδ' ἀτέλευτον a
- 120.23 οὐλον μονογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀγένητον
 23 μονογενές D ἡδ' aF: ἡδὲ D: ἡ δὲ E
- 145.4 οὐλον μονογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον.
 4 μονογενές E
- in Cael
- 557.18 οὐλον μονογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀγένητον.
 18 μονογενές ADEF
- B 8.5
- 30.3 οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν.
 3 οὐδὲ ἔσται E νῦν EE^a: νυν aD: οὐν F
- 78.14 οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν
 143.13 ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
 145.5 οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν
- B 8.6
- 78.15 ἔν συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γέννην διζήσθαι αὐτοῦ;
 15 διζήσεται F
- 145.6 ἔν συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσθαι αὐτοῦ;
 6 γενεήν D διζήσθαι a: διζήσεται F: διζήσο
 ut vid. E (vox obl. in D)
- 162.18 τίνα γὰρ γέννην διζήσθαι αὐτοῦ;
 18 διζήσεται

in Cael

137.3 τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεται αὐτοῦ;

3 διζήσεται A

B 8.7

78.16 πῆ πρόθεν ἀύξηθέν; οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσω

16 ἐόντος E: ὄντος aDF

145.7 πῆ πρόθεν ἀύξηθέν; οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἐάσω

7 ἐάσω F

162.19 πῆ πρόθεν ἀύξηθέν; οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσω

19 ὄντος a ἐάσω F

in Cael

137.4 πῆ πρόθεν ἀύξηθέν; οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσω

4 οὐτε DE ὄντος AB ἐάσω D: ἐασέω AB:

ἐάσω Ec

B 8.8

78.17 φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν

17 σε libri

145.8 φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν

162.20 φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν

20 σ' a: σε DEF

in Cael

137.5 φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν

5 σ' c: σε DE: ἃ AB οὐτε c οὐ] οὐδὲ AB

B 8.9

- 78.18 ἐστὶν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἂν μιν καὶ χρέος ᾤρσεν
 145.9 ἐστὶν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἂν μιν καὶ χρέος ᾤρσεν
 162.21 ἐστὶν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἂν μιν καὶ χρέος ᾤρσεν
 21 οὐκ ἔστιν D

in Cael

- 137.6 ἐστὶν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι.
 6 ad ὅπως mg. ἢ ἄλλως ὃ (?) ὄντως οὐκ ἔστιν E²
 ἔστι] seq. ras. 1 litt. E: comp. A

B 8.10

- 78.19 ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῦν;
 19 φῦν E: φῦ[<] (ie. φῦν) F: φῦναι D: φύναι a
 145.10 ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῦν;
 10 μηδενῶς D αὐξάμενον E φῦν E: φύν D:
 φῦ[^] (sequitur spatium III litt.) F: φῦναι A
 162.22 ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῦν;
 22 ἡδενὸς E φῦν DEF: φῦναι a

B 8.11

- 78.20 οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πέλεναι χρεών ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχί,
 20 πέλεναι sic libri οὐχί sic libri
 145.11 οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πέλεναι χρεών ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχί.
 11 πέλεναι] πέλαινε D

B 8.12

78.21 οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς
 21 ἐκ μὴ ὄντος DE: ἐκ γε μὴ ὄντος aF: ἐκ πῃ ἐόντος
 ex Simplicii paraphrasi v. 27 efficias
 ἐφίσει aE

145.12 οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς
 12 εκ DE: ἐκ γε aF

B 8.13

78.22 γίνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτό. τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
 22 γίνεσθαι] γενέσθαι a

145.13 γίνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτό. τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
 13 γίνεσθαι DF

B 8.14

78.23 οὔτ' ὀλλυσθαι ἀνήκε δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν.
 23 οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι coniecit Diels Herm. XV 162
 πέδησιν EF Bergk: πέδησι aD: πέδησιν vulgo

145.14 οὔτ' ὀλλυσθαι ἀνήκε δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν,
 14 ὀλλύσθαι E

B 8.15 - 20

145.15 ἄλλ' ἔχει.

ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ δ' ἐνεστίν·

145.17 ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,

- 145.18 τὴν μὲν ἑὼν ἀνόητον, ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴς
 145.19 ἐστὶν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.
 145.20 πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν, πῶς δ' ἂν κε γένοιτο;
 145.21 εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.
 16 ἦδε EF ἡ δὲ κρίσις ——— ἐνεστὶν Simplicii
 esse vidit Stein in Symbola philol. p. 787
 ἐνεστὶν EF: ἔστι aD
 17 ἔστιν (ante ἦ) om. F
 18 ἀνόητον F: ἀνόνητον aDE
 20 πέλοιτο F κε aF: καὶ DE
 εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετ' EF: εἰ γὰρ ἔγετ' D: εἴ γε
 γένοιτ' a οὐκ ἔστ' a: οὐκ ἔστιν DF: om. E

B 8.21

- 145.22 πῶς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὀλεθρος.
 22 πῶς] πῶς D ἀπέσβηται a ἄπυστος F:
 ἄπυστος DE: ἄπιστος a

in Cael

- 559.17 γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὀλεθρος.
 17 ἀπέσβεσθαι E: corr. E² ἄπυστος A:
 ἄπαιστος DE

B 8.22

- 86.24 ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοῖον.
 143.3 οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοῖον.
 145.23 οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοῖον.
 23 διαιρετέον F

B 8.23 - 24

- 145.24 οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι,
 145.25 οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.
 24 τῇ: τη E
 25 δ' ἔμπλεόν DE: δὲ πλέον F: δὲ πλέον a

B 8.25

- 86.22 τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν· ἐὼν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
 22 τῷ aF: τὸ DE
 87.23 τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν· ἐὼν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
 23 τῷ aF: τὸ DE
 145.26 τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν· ἐὼν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
 26 ξυνὲς E

B 8.26

- 39.27 αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον, ψηρί, μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
 27 ἄταρ DE ἐμπείρασι E^a
 79.32 αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
 145.27 αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
 27 ἀκινήτων D

B 8.27

- 39.28 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος
 80.1 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος.
 1 ἀναρχον καὶ ἀπαυστον aF
 145.28 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον, ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος

B 8.28

- 40.1 τῇδε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ὥπως δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.
 1 τῇδε (τῇ δὲ E^a) libri constanter: restituit
 τῇλε Scaliger
- 80.2 τῇδε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν.
 2 ἐπλέγχθησαν E
- 146.1 τῇδε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ὥπως δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.
 1 ἐπλάγχθησαν a: ἐπλάχθησαν DEF

B 8.29

- 30.6 ταυτόν τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καὶ ἑαυτό <τε> κεῖται.
 6 ταυτόν τ' ἐν E^a: ταυτόν τε ὃν ἐν aDF: ταυτόν
 τε ὃν καὶ ἐν E τε μένον aE^aF: μένον καὶ
 DE ἑαυτό (om. τε) hic omnes libri
- 143.15 ταυτόν ὃν ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καὶ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.
 15 τὸ κεῖται μένον E τε κεῖται DE: κεῖται a
 et primum F qui iterum τε κεῖται correctum in
 γε κεῖται
- 146.2 ταυτόν τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καὶ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.

B 8.30

- 30.7 οὕτω ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη
 7 αὖθις Ea
- 40.3 οὕτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη
- 146.3 χούτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη
 3 χούτως DF: οὐχ οὕτως E: οὕτως a ut alias

B 8.31

- 30.8 πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει,
 8 ἔχον E^a τέ μιν hic libri ἀμφὲς (sic)
 εἴργει E^a
- 40.4 πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει,
- 146.4 πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει,
 4 τό μιν DEF: τέ μιν a

B 8.32

- 30.9 οὐνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὼν θέμις εἶναι.
 9 ἀτελεύτητον τ' ἐὼν D: ἀτελεύτητον τ' ἐὼν E:
 ἀτελεύτητον τεὸν F
- 40.5 οὐνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὼν θέμις εἶναι.
 5 τ' ἐὼν D(?) et E
- 146.5 οὐνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὼν θέμις εἶναι.

B 8.33

- 30.10 ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· † μὴ ἐὼν δὲ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.
 10 ἐπιδεές DE μὴ ἐὼν κτλ. legit Simplicius cf.
 Stein ad h. v. p. 790 δὲ DEE^a: γὰρ aF
 πάντως aD
- 40.6 ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· † μὴ ἐὼν δὲ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.
 6 ἐπιδευές aE^a: ἐπιδεές DEF
- 146.6 ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές, μὴ ὅν δ' ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.

B 8.34

87.14 ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὔνεκέν ἐστι νόημα.

14 οὔνεκεν E: οὐ ἔνεκα D: οὐ ἔνεκεν aF

143.22 ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὔνεκέν ἐστι νόημα.

22 οὔνεκεν F: οὐ ἔνεκεν aDE

146.7 ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὔνεκέν ἐστι νόημα.

7 οὔνεκέν E: οὔνεκεν DF: οὐ ἔνεκεν a

B 8.35

87.15 οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφωτισμένον ἐστίν,

15 πεφωτισμένον DE

143.23 οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος (τουτέστι τοῦ νοητοῦ), ἐν ᾧ
πεφωτισμένον ἐστίν,

23 πεφωτισμένον D

146.8 οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφωτισμένον ἐστίν,

B 8.36

86.31 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται [πάρεξ]

31 γὰρ ἔστιν corruptum cf. 146.9

87.16 εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

143.25 εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

146.9 εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν. οὐδ' εἰ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται

9 ἔσται] ἐστὶν D

B 8.37

- 86.32 ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε μοῖρ' ἐπέδθησεν
 32 πάρεξ et post ἄλλο et ante ponunt DEF
 146.10 ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος. ἐπεὶ τό γε μοῖρ' ἐπέδθησεν

B 8.38

- 29.18* οἷον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι.
 18 οἷον libri. παντὶ ὄνομα hic libri: πᾶν
 ὄνομ' a
 87.1 οὔλον, ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμμεναι. τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται.
 1 οὔλον] ὄλον D τ' super add. D ἔμμεναι
 libri τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται a: τῷ πάντ' ὄνομα
 ἔσται F: τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται E: τῷ πάντ' οὔνομα
 ἔσται D
 143.10* οἷον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει. τῷ πάντ' ὄνομα εἶναι,
 10 οἷον libri πάντ' scripsit Diels: πάντη
 ADF: παντὶ E εἶναι om. aD
 146.11 οὔλον ἀκίνητον τ' ἔμμεναι. τῷ πάντ' † ὀνόμασται
 11 ἔμμεναι a: ἔμμεναι EF: ἔμμενε D πάντ'
 ὀνόμασται DEF: πᾶν ὄνομ' ἐστὶν a

B 8.39 - 42

- 146.12 ὅσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
 146.13 γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὀλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί,
 146.14 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροᾶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

- 146.15 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ
 12 ὅσα D
 15 πείρας EF
- B 8.43
- 52.23 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 52.26 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 26 apud Sophist σφαίρης aEF: σφαίρας D
 ἐναλίγκιον F
- 89.22 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ
 22 apud Sophist
- 126.22 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ.
 22 πάντος sic D
- 127.31 μεσσοῦθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 31 μεσσοῦθεν D
- 137.16 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 143.6 πάντοθεν εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ.
 146.16 πάντοθεν, εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ.
 146.30 εὐκύνλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ
 30 ὄγκῳ om. DE
- B 8.44
- 52.27 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
 27 apud Sophist μεσσοῦθεν D γὰρ om. a

οὐκ ἔτι D

89.23 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον

23 apud Sophist τὸ γὰρ EF: τῷ γὰρ aD

107.26 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη

26 μέσσοθεν a: μέσοθεν DEF

126.23 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές.

23 μεσόθεν

133.27 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές

27 apud Eudemus μεσόθεν DF ἰσοπλατές E

137.17 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές.

17 μεσόθεν D

146.17 μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον

17 τὸ γὰρ om. F

502.6-7 μεσόθεν ἰσοπαλές

B 8.45

52.28 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεών ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,

28 apud Sophist βαιότερον (inter β et α una
ε αι
littera era) D πελέναι E^bF: πέλαινε D:

πελέμεν a τῇ (spatium IV litt.) η (spatium
III litt.) τοιοῦτον F

89.24 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πέλεναι χρεών ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,

24 apud Sophist ἢ τῇ] αὐτῇ E

146.18 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πέλεναι χρεών ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.

18 χρεόν E ἐστι πῇ (?)

B 8.46 – 49

- 146.19 οὔτε γὰρ οὔτ' ἐὼν ἔστι, τό κεν παύῃ μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
 146.20 εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ' ἐὼν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος
 146.21 τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ' ἴσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄσυλον·
 146.22 † οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.
 19 οὔτε ἐὼν D: οὔτε ὄν EF: οὐκ ἐὼν recte a
 παύοι DEF: παύῃ a κινεῖσθαι F
 20 εἰς ὁμόν E: εἰς ὁμόν AD: om. F οὔτε ὄν
 libri κεν Karsten: καὶ ἔν DEF: κενὸν a
 22 οἱ γὰρ DEF: ἡ γὰρ a: conicit Diels εἰ γὰρ
 vel ἡ γὰρ ἰσονάμως F κύρει Stein:
 κυρεῖ aEF: κυροῖ D

B 8.50

- 30.17 ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα
 38.30 ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα
 30 παύσω DEE^aF: παύω a ἡ δὲ E^a
 41.8 ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα
 8 σοὶ παύσω DEE^a: σοι παύω aF
 146.23 ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα
in Cael
 558.5 ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα

B 8.51

- 30.18 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης, δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
 18 ἀμφὶς F: ἀμφὶ aDE

- 38.31 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης, δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
 41.9 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης;
 146.24 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
 24 βροτείους cf. 147.29

in Cael

- 558.6 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης, δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας.

B 8.52

- 30.19 μάινθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀνούων,
 19 ἀπατηλῶν sed. corr. F¹
 38.32 μάινθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀνούων.
 32 ἀπατηλῶν E^a
 146.25 μάινθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀνούων.

in Cael

- 558.7 μάινθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀνούων.
 7 ἀπατηλῶν E

B 8.53

- 30.23 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμῃς ὀνομάζειν,
 39.1 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμῃς ὀνομάζειν.
 1 γνώμῃς DEE^aF: γνώμῃς a
 180.1 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμῃς ὀνομάζειν,
 1 γνώμῃς aF¹: γνώμῃς DEF²

B 8.54

- 30.24 τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·
 39.2 τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·
 180.2 τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·

B 8.55

- 30.25 ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο
 25 ἀντία aF: ἐναντία DE δ' ἐκρίναντο a:
 δὲ κρίναντο DEF
 39.3 ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο
 3 δ' ἐκρίναντο aF: δ' ἐκρίνοντο DE: δὲ κρίνον.
 το (sic) E^a
 180.3 ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο

B 8.56

- 30.26 χωρίς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ
 39.4 χωρίς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ
 180.4 χωρίς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ

B 8.57

- 30.27 ἥπιον ἢ τὸ μέγ' ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν, ἑαυτῷ πάντοσε πωλύτον,
 27 ἥπιον τὸ DE: ἥπιον ὅν aF μέγ' ἀραιὸν sic
 libri
 39.5 ἥπιον ἢ ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν ἑαυτῷ πάντοσε πωλύτον,
 5 ἥπιον ἀραιὸν (ἀραιὸν E^a) ἐλαφρόν sic DEE^a: ἥπιον

ὄν μέγ' ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν aF

- 180.5 ἥπιον † ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν ἑαυτῷ πάντοσε πωυτόν,
 5 ἥπιόν αφ> (i.e. αραιον) E: ἥπιον ᾠρ DF: ἥπιον
 ἐστίν a

B 8.58

- 31.1 τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ πωυτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
 1 κατ' αὐτὸν ταντία F: κατὰ ταυτό τάναντία DE:
 κατ' αὐτὸ τάναντία a
- 39.6 τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ πωυτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
 6 κατ' αὐτό: ταντία (sic) E^a: κατ' αὐτὸ duarum
 litterarum spatium) τάντία F: κατὰ ταυτό
 τάναντία DE
- 180.6 τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ πωυτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
 6 κατ' αὐτό aF: κατὰ ταυτό DE

B 8.59

- 31.2 τάντία, νύκτ' ᾠδαῖ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθεῖς τε.
 2 νύκτ' ᾠδαῖ πυκινὸν E: νύκτ' ᾠδα ἢ πυκινόν D:
 νυκτάδα ἢ (ἢδὲ a) πυκινὸν aF
- 39.7 τάντία νύκτ' ᾠδαῖ πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθεῖς τε.
 7 νύκτ' ᾠδαῖ E^a: νυκτάδα ἢ D: νύκταδ' ᾠδαῖ E:
 νυκτάδα, ἢ F. νυκτάδα ἢδὲ a πυκινὸν a
- 180.7 τάντία νύκτ' ᾠδαῖ πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθεῖς τε.
 7 τάντία E: τάναντία DF: ᾠντία a νυκτάδα ἢ

aF: νύκτα δ' ἄδαῃ DE

B 8.60 - 61

- 39.8 τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάνοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
 39.9 ὥς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσει.
 8 διανοόσμον DE
 9 παρελάσσει aE^aF: παρελάσει DE

B 9.1 - 4

- 180.9 αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ πάντα φάος καὶ νύξ ὀνόμασται
 180.10 καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρως δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσί τε καὶ τοῖς
 180.11 πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου
 180.12 ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδετέρω μετὰ μηδέν.
 9 ὀνόμασται aF¹: ὀνόμασται DEF²
 10 τὰ (post καὶ) om. E
 12 ἴσον D

B 11.1 - 4

in Cael

- 559.22 πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἥδ' ἐσελήνη
 559.23 αἰθήρ τε ξυνὸς γάλα τ' οὐράνιον καὶ Ὀλυμπος
 559.24 ἔσχατος ἥδ' ἄστρον θερμὸν μένος ὠρμήθησαν
 559.25 γίνεσθαι,
 24 θερμῶν DE
 25 γίνεσθαι DE: γίνεσθαι AF

B 12.1

39.14

αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πληντο πρὸς ἀφρήτοιο

14 πληντο scripsit Diels: παπντο (sine acc.) E^a:πάπντο D¹: πύηντο D²E: om. F spatio rel.:ποίηντο a ἀφρήτοις DE^a: ἀφρίτοις EF:

ἀφρίτοιο a: corr. Stein

B 12.2

31.13

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἷσα.

39.15

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἷσα.

15 δὲ (post μετὰ) om. D¹: τε D² ἵεται aDEF:οἷεται E^a

B 12.3

31.14

ἐν δὲ μεσῷ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ

14 δαιμονίη πάντα F

39.16

ἐν δὲ μεσῷ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.

16 ἢ πάντα D

B 12.4 - 6

31.15

† πάντα γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξις ἄρχει

31.16

πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μίγνεν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὔθις

31.17

ἄρσεν θηλυτέρω.

15 ἄρχει DE: ἀρχή aF

16 μίγνεν· τότ' (τότε DE) libri αὔτις F

B 13.1

39.18 πρώτιστον μὲν Ἐρωτα θεῶν μητίσαστο πάντων
 18 μητίσαστο DE

B 19.1 - 3

in Cael

558.9 οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφν τάδε καί νυν ἔασι
 558.10 καὶ μετέπειτ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα·
 558.11 τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντο ἐπίσημον ἐκάστω.
 9 ἔφντὰ δὲ DE: corr. E² καὶ νῦν ADEF:
 νῦν τε c
 11 ἐπίσημον ἐκάστω DE: ἐκάστω ἐπίσημον AF

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Vita

Bruce Millard Perry

Born: August 29, 1951, Fort Eustis, Virginia

Parents: Raymond and Andrée (née Torralba) Perry

Education: St. Christopher's High School, Richmond, Virginia

Graduate June 1969

The University of Washington, Seattle, Washington

B.A. Greek June 1973

M.A. Classics August 1975

Ph.D. Classics June 1983