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2013 Task Force Report Violent Crime Reduction in Rio de Janeiro

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Acronyms & Terms

AISP	Integrated Areas for Public Security
abordagens	To approach/search
BOPE	Special Police Operations Battalion
CAPS	Psychosocial Care Centers
CEDAE	State Company for Water and Sewage
CESEC	Center for the Study of Civil Engineering
CHAs	Community Health Agents
CNJ	National Council of Justice
CRIAR	Press Centre, Radio and Advice
CSM	Municipal Health Centers
DEGASE	General Department of Socio-Educational Action
DEPEN	National Penitentiary Department
Desfavelização	De-favelization
DPJM	Military Judiciary Police Station
ESAJ	School of Judicial Administration
favela	Slum or shantytown in Rio de Janeiro
favelado	A person who lives in a favela
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FFP	Fight for Peace
FHTs	Family Health Teams
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPAE	Special Areas Policing Group
HALE	Healthy Life Expectancy
IBASE	Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IETS	Institute for Work and Society
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPP	Instituto Pereira Passos
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
PAC	Growth Acceleration Program

PIO	Public information officer
PM	Military Police
CPROEIS	Coordination of the State Program on Security Integration
PSF	Family Health Program
RGI	General Registry for Real Estate
SAMU	Service of Mobile Emergency Response
SEAP	State Secretariat of Penitentiary Administration
SEEDUC	State Secretariat of Education
SESEG	State Department of Public Security
SIM	System of Targets of Results Monitoring
SMTR	City Department of Transportation
SMSDC	Ministry of Health/Secretariat of Municipal Health and Civil Defense
SUS	Unified Health System
TJRJ	Tribunal of Justice of Rio de Janeiro
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPAs	Emergency Response Units
UPP	Pacifying Police Units

Executive Summary

Nate Hickner

Rio de Janeiro is infamous for violence. In many of the city's large, informal settlements known as favelas, violent drug gangs have ruled with impunity while corrupt police officers contribute to distrust of formal government. The introduction of new Pacifying Police Units (UPP) in 2008 has resulted in impressive progress, but much still remains to be done.

The focus of this Task Force is to provide recommendations to ensure that the UPP program continues to be successful. Our recommendations are geared toward furthering UPP integration into communities in a way that 1) preserves the progress that has already been made and 2) ensures permanent change, both within Rio's troubled police force and in "pacified" communities. While much has been accomplished already, the task is far from complete.

Each of the policy recommendations presented in the following chapters was prepared for the Public Security Secretary of Rio de Janeiro José Beltrame, and is tailored to his position and responsibilities. However, we recognize that a systemic problem cannot be solved by one actor, and real change must come from a combination of efforts on the part of government, NGOs, and community members themselves.

The project is loosely divided into two broad sections. The first five chapters address ways internal police policies can be improved to strengthen the ability of UPPs to carry out their community policing mission. Topics include strengthening respect for community policing objectives within the police force, improving working conditions for officers, enhancing community control and involvement with local UPP units, coordinating with other governmental institutions to break the cycle of violence for convicted criminals, and including NGOs and

community members in devising training curriculum for officers.

The second half involves improving the means by which community upgrading projects and the provision of public services takes place after the UPPs are installed in communities. Topics include instituting a new system for coordinating public service works with ground-level community interests, improving access to healthcare within favelas by involving UPP officers in first-response systems, easing the process of land title formalization, and instituting programs to dissipate tensions between police and youth.

Introduction

Nate Hickner, Chloe Kachscovsky and Kevin Lee

Rio de Janeiro, a city renowned for its natural beauty and carnival celebrations, has also been plagued for decades by violent crime and high murder rates. In preparation for hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, city and state officials have faced the need to address the issue of violent crime throughout the city. In particular, the focus has been on Rio's large, sprawling informal settlements known as favelas. Characterized by informality, poverty, and territorial drug gang control, favelas have long been epicenters of violence.

Over a period of decades, the poor living conditions and disturbingly high murder rates in favelas have largely been ignored by policy makers and residents of the formal city alike. In the past, Rio's main tactic to curb violence in these communities came in the form of periodic military police (PM) raids, which essentially involved police entering favelas, shooting drug traffickers, and leaving. This militaristic policing approach lacked systemic solutions to reduce crime. Corruption and murder came to characterize the police system, and unwillingness on the part of the government to fully understand and address the problems within favela communities perpetuated fear and violence. Thus, distrust for the police grew as life in favelas was beset by expanding amounts of violence and insecurity.

Under pressure to reduce violence in Rio before the upcoming international mega events, in 2008 the State of Rio de Janeiro, through the office of Public Security, introduced a new type of police force which has attempted to change the poor relationship between police and favela residents and address the systemic problems that underlie violence.

Known as Pacifying Police Units (UPP), this new force represents an alternative to the

traditional approach to crime reduction. Instead of entering communities, killing drug traffickers, and leaving, the UPP attempts to improve relations between favelas and the formal city by expelling drug gangs permanently and replacing the nefarious quasi-governmental hierarchy of drug traffickers with formal police institutions.

This new approach has widely been considered a success, as it has managed to reduce murder levels to almost zero within these “pacified” communities. And the program is continuing to expand: as this report goes to print, the first steps for deployment of the 31st UPP unit are taking place in Complexo do Caju, and by 2014, a total of 40 UPPs are expected to be operating throughout the city in time for the World Cup.

But the fight is far from over--40 UPP units is a long way from the hundreds that would be required to reclaim every favela from control of gangs, and as the 2014 deadline approaches, there remain many doubts about the future of the UPPs and their ability to foster long-term change on the level necessary to truly rehabilitate these communities. The challenges of overturning decades of violence and mistrust are not easily met; constant commitment to long-term reform is needed if the UPP program is to continue to be a success.

The failure and ultimate withdrawal of past community policing programs such as the Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE) has contributed to skepticism of the permanence of this new policing effort. In the past, wavering political commitment to reform over long periods of time has jeopardized the long-term viability of new ideas. Today, while Rio’s influx of capital in preparation for the mega-events in 2014 and 2016 certainly provides enormous benefits to the UPP program, it has also led to speculation that the units are only for show. There is widespread worry that as soon as the events pass, the UPP will lose its power.

At this point in the UPPs history, the primary task remains ensuring reform of war-torn

communities for the long-term, and this involves providing resources to allow favelas to successfully navigate toward integration with the rest of the city. The enormity of this task is staggering: decades of isolation have led to situations in many favelas in which living situations are strikingly dire. Thousands of residents lack access to basic social services, and a culture of fear, distrust, and violence remains pervasive.

The aim of this Task Force is to advise the Public Security Secretary to ensure that the UPP continues on a path that encourages the long-term rehabilitation of these communities. This is a complex challenge, and though the focus of recommendations contained in this report are directed toward this office, true success depends on serious and sustained effort on the part not only of the government, but from NGOs, public service providers, and community members themselves.

The first five chapters of this report assess the ways in which UPP units can improve, preserve, and expand on the community policing model while also bridging institutional gaps that have contributed to the perpetuation of violence. Chapter One addresses the challenges inherent to running a community police operation within the militaristic Brazilian police system, and recommends ways to improve upon the suitability of institutional organization for this task. Chapter Two addresses the working conditions of officers with an eye toward ensuring that existing UPPs are well equipped to meet the demands of long-term community rehabilitation. Chapters Three and Four seek to improve upon the coordination and integration of the UPP with the communities they are involved in as well as NGOs that can help to support the community rehabilitation project. Chapter Five focuses on ways to improve inter-institutional cooperation in order to break the cycle of violence for criminals and rehabilitate them back into the community.

Chapters six through ten introduce avenues through which the UPP can foster community

involvement in the provision of services, and help to follow-up the introduction of police presence with improvements to the living conditions of residents. Chapter Six proposes a system to plan and prioritize infrastructure upgrades in a fashion that incorporates community input. Chapter Seven discusses the prospects of using the UPP as facilitator for healthcare improvements within favelas. Chapter Eight explores avenues through which new economic opportunities can build stronger fiscal communities as well as help break cycles of criminality. Chapters Nine and Ten evaluate the role of young favelados in improving security and minimizing police distrust through outreach programs for youth.

Finally, the last chapter attempts to combat the ways favelas have been characterized as hubs of violence, fighting preconceived notions of favelas and setting the tone for harmonious development and integration of favelas with the wider city.

With the creation of the UPP, Rio de Janeiro faces an enormous opportunity to break the cycle of violence in areas that were long considered to be beyond the capabilities of government to affect. Though the program has been a success so far, much remains to be done. The policies recommended in this report represent attempts to adapt the UPPs to be better able to attend to their objective of community rehabilitation and to sustain success for the long term.

Chapter One

Institutional Barriers

Sara Alstrom

Abstract:

One of the major concerns and criticisms of the UPP system is the sustainability of its institutional structure. Specifically, the concerns focus on insulating the existing UPP units from the greater PM culture while maintaining a progressive and accepting collaboration between the police forces. At the same time, the associated long-term goal is to encourage the demilitarized police mentality of the UPP to gradually take hold in the PM. These paradoxical goals bring many organizational issues to the forefront of policy concerns. In the following chapter I propose collaborative mechanisms that will legitimate the UPP within the PM institution and promote the pacified policing culture by:

- 1) Mitigating the rejection of the UPP by the PM through programs that link reductions in lethality to bonuses*
- 2) Creating a standardized, insulated monitoring/reporting system for UPPs and PMs*
- 3) Putting a focus on marginal successes of PM cultural change*

In combination with institutional barriers, protecting the pacification goals of the UPP from the military culture of the PM by:

- 1) Focusing on internal promotion and preventing PM leadership from transferring to UPP ranks*
- 2) Stemming the centralized hierarchical organization that breeds a military mentality.*

An equal focus on these two goals will help to improve the efficacy of the current UPPs and will help to ensure the success of future community policing programs in Rio de Janeiro.

Background:

The Police Militar (PM) is a state police institution that is located under the authority of both the state and the army. This dual authority results in a complicated organizational structure in which there are two chains of command. One vertebrae of hierarchy links the officers, commanding general of the PM, the Secretary of Public Security, and the governor, while the other vertebrae links the commanding general of the PM to the army commander, the defense minister, and the president. The Brazilian constitution limits the state's jurisdiction over police to 'orientation and planning' purposes, however, since the end of the military dictatorship, the federal branch and the army have not exercised their power over the police force. Still, this organizational peculiarity remains the law of the land, and tends to influence the organization and culture of the several police forces.

The positioning of the police under the scope of the army creates a police system that has an "inefficiency in fighting crime, [an] inability to exercise internal control (implying criminal involvement on a large scale), [and an] insensitivity in relationships with citizens." (Soares, "Reform of the Institutional Architecture of Public Safety in Brazil"). It is a hierarchical system that was set up for war purposes. It was not designed with the concept of public security in mind, and therefore, the changes made to it for public security reasons are often hard to implement. As Soares has stated, the complex challenges of public safety require an overall flexibility and decentralization. He prescribes a system where management is modular, flexible, and adaptive, rather than a rigid hierarchical system that is currently in place. (Soares, "Rebuilding the Police").

The UPP program represents a somewhat experimental attempt to circumvent this rigidity and military mentality. It was created to be an alternative to the militarized structures of the PM,

allowing for flexibility to focus on individual communities. UPPs are not intended or organized with the intention of providing policing to all urban areas, but rather are institutionally limited to implementation in specific cases where communities are outside of government control (Henriques and Ramos 243). As such, UPPs are in a unique institutional position. They represent a nascent vision of a less militaristic future for Brazilian police, but paradoxically must also function within the military organization. For example, the UPP officers are recruited from the same pool as the PM, though once recruited they are kept separate from the wider military police institution. Higher level positions in the UPP are given to select police officials who have a record of “buying into” or supporting the pacification mentality of policing.

The general hierarchy of command is as follows: General Commander of the UPP (Colonel Paulo Henrique Azevedo, who used to be the BOPE commander) reports to the General Chief of the PM (Eirir Ribeiro), who reports to the Secretary of Public Security (José Mariano Beltrame) who reports to the Governor (Cabral).

Cooperation among these positions is and has been of great importance to forming and maintaining the UPP program. While historically these offices have tended to work against each other, in recent years the men in these offices have been remarkably cooperative with one another (Suska 74). The UPP has also benefited from the consistent and long-term support of the current Secretary of Public Security, José Beltrame, whose record-long tenure has helped to keep the program afloat (Suska 71).

Despite the institutional grey area the UPP finds itself in, the future continues to look bright for political support of the UPP program--currently, all three positions continue to be inhabited by men that are fully supportive of, and whose reputation relies upon, the success of the UPPs: Governor Sérgio Cabral Filho, Mayor Paes, and Secretary of Security Beltrame. In

2011, Cabral was re-elected as governor of Rio de Janeiro and will serve his second term until 2014, and Beltrame was re-appointed as Secretary of Security. This solid political backing and consistent leadership means that currently, the UPP is supported by all relevant levels of government.

The current, unprecedented level of political coordination means that this is a time of enormous opportunity for the SESEG to continue to progress with positive reform of the police system. But at the same time, the corrosive and chaotic nature of corruption and violence that the police attempt to fight presents unique challenges: violence breeds violence, and corruption is infectious. How can long-term organizational and institutional change be fostered in such an environment of chaos?

With these concerns in mind, this chapter invokes policy recommendations that have a foundation in chaos and transformation theories where it is supposed that in complex situations, “organizational problems can no longer be solved or managed through traditional approaches and methods; they require new ways of thinking and solutions, nonlinear complex models of action, and chaotic models to deal with chaotic situations” (Farazmand 340). These types of policies must be both pro-active and re-active because of the complex and dynamic nature of the systems they try to affect. With this focus on the chaos of violence, we must look for the positive changes this organization can perpetually foster, for “without turbulence and change stagnation and decay prevail, causing a halt in system survival and continuity” (Farazmand 344).

As has already been stated, UPPs are situated under an overall institution, the PM, that is architecturally non-responsive to calls of change. It is that inflexibility and rigidity that make it very difficult for the organization to be responsive to the complexities that are inherent of the communities of the favelas. It is important for the institutional reforms that are adopted to be

focused on *quality* instead of quantity and for the reforms that are put into place to be fully supported by resources and leadership. As a police unit in Australia learned from the lack of leadership backup and resource allocation, a mindset of “the more new procedures implement the better,” when not supported by adequate follow through, can lead to an “obsession” with new procedures; overzealous implementation of reforms that clogs up the system (Chan and Dixon 45). What is needed, in contrast, are smart, structural changes that emphasize flexibility and end-goal orientation.

Section 1: Breaking Barriers with the PM

Since the creation of the UPPs, there has been hostility between what has grown into parallel methods of policing: the UPPs and PMs. This chapter argues that this hostility and non-communication can be helped to turn into an atmosphere of collaboration and mutual respect through the implementation of three important steps: 1) mitigating the rejection of the UPP by the PM through programs that link reductions in lethality to bonuses 2) creating a standardized monitoring/reporting system for UPPs and PMs and 3) putting a focus on marginal successes of PM cultural change rather than on their failures.

Recommendation 1: Systemize pay and bonuses to create acceptance of non-lethality

An example of an area that creates hostility between the two systems is the difference in pay between general PM officers and officers assigned to a UPP. “A simple PM soldier at the UPP earns today approximately R\$1,402 (890 USD) in relation to R\$909 (580 US Dollars)” in the general PM (Suska 30). The divide in pay between the two forces engenders hostility from the PM officers as well as a feeling that their work is not valued.

On a deeper level though, hostility between the UPP and wider PMs reflects incompatibility in policing philosophy and mentality between the two institutions. While this chapter recognizes that longstanding traditions and approaches to policing cannot change overnight, it also recognizes that changes are possible, and that they depend on dynamic and well-implemented strategies for long-term change.

Positive incentives for police forces have been studied and offered as solutions for police improvement. Ben Vollar, an expert in managing police incentives, offers the rationale that positive incentives help to improve performance by helping officers themselves identify best practices (Vollar 27). As a system of rewards, positive incentive structures work to link personal interests with interests of the wider organization, and help grant legitimacy to certain objectives.

From an organizational theory perspective, emphasizing common goals throughout the subsystems of an organization also helps to enhance interconnectedness of parts and help them to function in harmony toward reaching an end goal (Farazmand 343).

For these reasons, this chapter recommends the creation of a common goal of non-violence, through implementing a program compensation for non-lethality in the PM. This is a step that will allow the relevant ‘subsystems’ of SESEG, the PM and the UPP, to function in harmony and interconnectedness. This idea was introduced in Ignacio Caño’s study, “Os Donos Do Morro” which recommends the introduction of “police lethality reduction goals, linked to bonuses” (Michaels 2012). Implementation of this sort of program throughout the police system would help to set into motion a larger change in mentality. By structuring incentives in this way, UPP and military police will begin to share a common goal, and the system “would help to mitigate the rejection of UPP police by the rest of the force” (Michaels 2012).

This type of program, which links reducing crime and violence through collaboration within different police forces, has already been put in place in Brazil through a program called AISP. This specific program was put in place to encourage the collaboration of the PM and the civil police. In this system,

Targets and bonuses are based on the performance of a region which includes one military police base and one civil police base. This sectional system is called AISP, and there are 41 of them in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In order to increase their effectiveness and the chances of meeting the crime reduction targets for their region, the two forces have to work together, sharing information and coordinating efforts. Cash bonuses are given to all officers in top-performing AISPs, and not to individuals, to encourage group work. (Stahlberg 14)

Using an already-in-place, effective Brazilian police integration technique such as AISP will serve a good model for introducing this sort of mechanism to the PM. For this lethality-reduction incentive program, a PM region would be set up where lethality minimization goals would be set based off of the statistics in that area in a prior time period. From there, any improvement in violent crime or lethality would be rewarded, with larger improvements receiving larger rewards. Financial incentives should be put in real terms to officers, where success means a visible increase in their direct wages rather than a bonus to the unit, so that there is an individual incentive to support the collective goal. Interconnectedness and collaboration will be fostered by rewarding all improvements, rather than comparing how individual troops do to each other. This would foster collaboration of different PM regions, as they discuss what mechanisms worked versus those that were less successful. It would also create an atmosphere in which PMs could consult successful UPPs in their same area about strategies in reducing violent crime, creating a less hostile environment between the two units, because of the importance of a common goal.

Bonuses linked to reductions in lethality will need a standardized measuring system, like

AISP uses, so that the payments of bonuses are not generalized and privileges are not given to certain groupings (Ferreria 82). A standardized measurement system should be tiered, where the reduction of violent crimes, including police violence, is given much more weight than increasing arrests. The Sistema de Metas e Acompanhamento de Resultados (SIM) (System of Targets and Results Monitoring), which was developed for AISP in 2009, provides a good model from which to base such a system, as it is designed to support the idea that “those crimes that make the population feel most unsafe should count more” (Stahlberg 15). It is important that this system focus monetary bonuses as a way of acknowledging the marginal improvements of any one group, rather than comparing groups. As an example, if a troop failed to meet their set goal, instead of focusing on their failure, they should still be rewarded for any improvements to their own numbers. This will make them more likely to continue striving for better results instead of giving up the first time through.

Recommendation 2: Create a standard, insulated system of monitoring/feedback and goals.

Creating a standard system of monitoring police is an important step to creating transparency and accountability of the police to the public. As Ribeiro describes, in the current system of police accountability it is difficult to address crimes committed by police officers that are not characterized as military crimes, as military police have traditionally been under the jurisdiction of military courts, separate from civil courts. Currently, there are steps being implemented to fill what is seen as a gap between the two models of accountability (Cunha, 2012). Recently, in December 2012, Azevedo announced the deployment of “a Military Judiciary Police Station (DPJM), which will have exclusive assignment of investigating police misconduct” within the UPPs (Ramalho 2012). This station offers the first steps to filling the gap

of accountability, and has the potential to be used, expanded, and developed into a responsive and adaptive force that takes complaints from residents and police alike.

Though the introduction of the DPJM is a step in the right direction, the effectiveness of the institution is compromised by its organization. The DPJM is an internal oversight mechanism, working from within the military police internal affairs office (DPJM). As such, it is structurally limited to oversight only among lower ranks in the police, as at higher levels, the system is threatened by conflict of interest. In order to circumvent this issue, as Ignácio Cano suggests, such internal affairs oversight mechanisms should not be linked to the head of police, but rather directly to the Secretary of Public Security (Cano, “Public Security”). This reform in organization would insulate the DPJM from political pressure, and would help ensure that the DPJM could effectively carry out its mandate.

According to chaos theory, it is imperative that an organization possess “the concept of negative or neg-entropy” which is “a quality that enables systems to detect and correct malfunctions, system erosion, and parts that have performance disorder” (Farazmand 343). This suggests that in any organization, there needs to be a system that allows dynamic and reliable feedback and monitoring to correct ‘malfunctions’ so that paths that are not working can be quickly and efficiently corrected. If the DPJM, which is now dedicated to monitoring only the UPP, could be expanded and externalized in a manner that includes monitoring of the PM, it would help create a standard of accountability for the entire force. It could be the initial step before deciding if something qualified as a military crime. The DPJM would act as the collector of complaints, as first responders, and as delegates of situations to either the civil or military courts.

In order to increase the accountability of individual forces it is important to create a

culture and structure that is accepting and encouraging of keeping colleagues accountable. This was shown by another policing cultural reform in Australia. In this system, the introduction of an internal witness support group helped to support police that make allegations. Such a system helped to strengthen oversight mechanism, and made the process of following up on allegations easier (Chan and Dixon 48). It is not enough simply to have an incorporated complaint system in place; it also must have a support system to protect anyone who utilizes the service.

Within PM troops and UPP areas, there should be a specific position in charge of reporting both resident complaints, and officer complaints to the DPJM station. This person in the UPPs and PMs should all have the same title or position, so that this position standardized within the entire police force. Officers in this position should enjoy modest pay bonuses, so as to counteract the potential for negative perceptions of the position from others within the police force. Once a complaint is made and documented, there should be a client contact mechanism from the DPJM, so that those placing the complaints know who to contact in order to follow up. Conversely, in the event that complaints are not properly filed, this mechanism would help complainants become aware of the situation. This type of transparency for the person who filed the report will promote quick response and follow up by both the DPJM and the receiving officer. The transparency and accountability inherent in this type of system fosters an institution that is willing to learn and adapt to the calls of both the residents and police. It needs to focus around an institutionalized system for feed-forward and feed-back, because “learning takes through changes in structure, process, and values of the organizational system, and this learning needs to be institutionalized” (Farazmand 363).

Recommendation 3: Focus on Marginal improvements of PMs.

Another topic of great contention and source of hostility between the PM and the UPP are how the successes of the UPPs have been measured against the failures of the PM. Since the UPPs are institutionally under the PM, and they in effect, have the same boss, the increased negative portrayals of the PM have increased hostility and barriers between the reconciliation of the two institutions. The UPPs are constantly in media attention, and therefore are harshly scrutinized, but also glorified by the government when they have successes. In contrast, the PM is continually portrayed as the barometer for failed policing, with the government stressing the successes of the UPP when PM conduct is called to attention. This negative focus on PM officers and the positive attention on the UPP creates a hostile and defensive atmosphere, where, instead of fostering collaboration, there is a an 'us' vs. 'them' mentality, and the PM shuts down to suggestions of change. Vollard offers a valuable point about the effects of this lack of collaboration when he states that "the drive to improve performance may be weakened if such coordination problems block a combined effort to realize the objective of police work" (28).

The potential for backlash against community policing goals represents a significant danger to program success, as demonstrated in the failure of the previous community policing program, GPAE. That program, which was instituted in Rio de Janeiro in 2000, failed after only 4 years of operation. The system was the victim of sabotage, as "the GPAE were given the most truculent officers as a purposeful strategy to thwart its success, and in its first year 70 percent were transferred due to abuses against the residents and corruption with the traffickers" (Teirney 37). The community policing program was not supported by the greater PM leadership and was seen as a threat to the current police institution, so it was undermined by the appointment of officers who obviously did not support community policing goals. This history of hostility from

the PM toward community policing programs needs to be taken seriously, and combated.

Comparison of the two forces has led to a distinct divide and hostility between the PM and the UPPs. Instead of receiving internal support, many times the institution of the PM makes it hard for the UPP captains to get the internal support they need to set up effective units, which is demonstrated by one UPP captain who “said he is missing many resources because the force does not have support inside the corporation” (Stahlberg 27). A different UPP captain discussed his hardships saying, “I have no support from the institution. We are lacking so many things here, and everything that I achieve I have to do on my own because the pacification police aren’t supported inside the institution. It is supported from the outside, among the population of the city, but not inside the police itself” (Teirney 63). Although the UPPs enjoy obvious political and public support, it is important that there is a fostering of internal PM support for the program. If not, it will lead to UPPs being black-listed under the whole system.

One way of fostering more support and acceptance of UPPs is to praise and focus on the improvements the PM has made toward the UPP goal of pacifying police. The PM have been depicted in the media as ‘all things wrong’ with Brazilian policing, and praise for improving the situation has been mostly focused on the UPPs. An intentional and strong focus by the government on praising marginal improvements in the PM will foster a drive for further improvement, instead of creating an environment of competition. This idea is similar to the logic behind giving bonuses for any reductions in lethality. In the eyes of the media, the PM can never measure up to the success of the UPP, because the PMs are characterized as a great evil. This leads to a shutdown, a rejection to the idea of learning and trying, rather than a focus on positive steps to creating effective change. A first step for recognizing PM improvement can be centered on a push for leadership in the PM to acknowledge and congratulate reductions in police

misconduct, rather than trying to change the perception of the PM in the media. Having police leadership and the government focus on both the positive steps toward change the PMs are making, while not forgetting the great misconduct of the force in the past, will open the door to new positive conversations between the PM and the public.

Section 2: Creating insulation from a militarized culture

There are institutional hierarchies within the Brazilian police force that threaten the insulation and proliferation of the UPP community-oriented mentality. Measures must be taken in order to ensure the separation of the UPPs from the militarized culture of the general PM, in order to create a sustainable pacified policing program. The insulation of the UPPs from the PM culture can be preserved with two steps: 1) focusing on internal promotion and preventing PM leadership from transferring to UPP ranks and 2) stemming the centralized hierarchical organization that breeds a military mentality.

Recommendation 1. Internal Promotion

The failure of the last community policing project in Brazil can be explained by the pervasiveness of the military culture in policing and by reluctance to embrace a new approach. As of now, the commanders of UPP units are all hand-picked by the general chief of the PM (now Colonel Erir Ribeiro) on the basis of excellent references and social skills: “UPP commanders are already experienced and highly successful officers who were carefully selected by the UPP command. Their work is regularly evaluated through reports and meetings, and a workshop for UPP commanders is organized every few months to discuss problems and challenges” (Suska 76). Due to the newness of the UPP program, this system of appointment is

one of the few options open to commanding officers right now. Going forward, however, this process deserves careful attention, as past appointments of PM officers for community policing projects has been an area of mixed results.

For example, the previously failed community policing program, GPAE, was abandoned due to non-communication with the community it was located in and an increase in violence by the police. One of the major factors that contributed to this violence was that “a hard-line commander of the PM took over the leading position in 2003 and cut communication with community leaders and the NGO. As a result, police violence against the community increased” (Suska 45). The hard line commander, who was respected for his work in the PM, did not ‘buy in’ to the community policing mission or goals, and therefore rejected the new steps that needed to be taken in order to ensure success. Rather than supporting and advancing the program, he fell back into old habits and reversed progress.

Despite the relative success and political popularity of the UPP program, this history remains exceedingly relevant today. Memory of how quickly past community policing programs have failed brings doubt to the public about the success and continuation of new efforts. Stalwart support must come not only from the government, but also from within the UPP system.

In December 2012, the Commander of the UPPs was replaced by Colonel Paulo Henrique Azevedo, who had been a commander of BOPE. Many thought and were afraid that he would bring the same attitudes of ‘shoot first, ask questions later,’ common to the tactical response team, into the UPP system. This dissemination of militaristic, BOPE culture could be incredibly damaging to the mission of UPPs, as was demonstrated in the past. So far however, Azevedo has demonstrated his support of pacifying the police by stating that “We need to keep the balance, increase the troops’ training, but never changing the philosophy of the pacification. I have

experience in conflicts but that does not mean I will implement the [BOPE] ideology on the UPPs. What we want is to solidify the peace.” (Froio December 2012). The presence of leadership that has completely “bought in” to the UPP program is essential to its continuing success.

In order to ensure this leadership is indicative of the UPP culture, as the program matures and grows, I recommend a policy of internal promotion. Because “organizational leadership plays a key strategic role in creating, sustaining, and managing such culture of learning in modern organizations,” if a future leader is brought up in an environment of learning and adaptation within the UPP, he will have the tools to not only to continue the non-violent culture of UPPs but then start effecting the perceptions of other leadership (Farazmand 363). The UPP system has been lucky so far--it has benefited from strong political support which pushes for internal buy-in. If active leadership buy-in is going to become sustainable, however, and remain the norm after UPPs become less of a political hot-topic and after they disappear from the public eye, internal promotion will be a mechanism to ensure continued support and backing from within the police institution itself. New leaders who came up through the ranks of the UPPs will not only have bought into the pacified police culture, but they will have the skills and contacts to effect cultural change in other leadership throughout the police institution.

Internal promotion will also foster better relations with the residents of favelas. Favelados will see commanders who were previously officers on their streets and who they recognize as trustworthy people. Residents will feel more comfortable making complaints and holding the police accountable to changes they want to see made, improving the entire system and enforcing mechanisms of feedback that are set in place. They will also feel more comfortable about reporting crime when they can trust the person they are reporting to and can expect thorough

follow through. Internal promotion would also ensure an institutional barrier to the crossover of a militarized PM culture from superiors, and thus help prevent any repeats of failed pacified policing projects such as GPAE.

Recommendation 2. Expand decentralization to decrease militarization

Despite best efforts to prevent corruption, there are still many cases of police corruption in the UPPs that have come to the public eye, especially in the last 2 years. In July 2012, “a dozen UPP police officers in Mangueira were arrested on charges of extortion, when a family member of a known drug dealer made a complaint that the officers came into his home, apprehended drugs, two cell phones and demanded R\$3,500 in cash to not take away the drug dealer in question” (Araujo 2012). Since then, a specialized police force called the “Pacifying Police Coordinating team (CPP)” has been instituted and “will be working within and around the UPPs in various favela communities, in a concerted effort to rebuild the police force’s credibility and curtail corruption” (Araujo 2012). UPPs will be monitored closely to make sure their actions are free of corruption and misconduct.

In order to further combat these types of occurrences in the UPP it is important to create institutional barriers to stem the spread of militarized police culture that accepts corruption and views the communities they are working in as resources rather than as constituents that they are subordinated to. One of these mechanisms is a decentralization of power. This decentralization has already started to take effect: “A day after taking charge of the Coordination Pacifying Police, Colonel Paulo Henrique Azevedo de Moraes, 47, announced the creation of eight regional coordinators in order to decentralize the command of the 28 Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) active in Rio” (Ramalho 2012). These regional coordinators will allow for more

flexibility in implementation and strategies for fighting crime for each region. According to Azevedo, for example, the “slums of the Complexo do Alemão, Penha, Mangueiras, Favela do Maracanã, Santa Cruz and Manguinhos demand more attention due to recent conflicts” and with the regional coordinators in place, the police will be better able to adapt to these complexities (Ramalho 2012). This flexibility and space for adaptation are especially important in communities like favelas, where the communities are completely different, with different economies, different crime problems, and different development progress and agendas. Previously, the military hierarchy was organized straight from the General Commander of the UPPs. Now, with the introduction of a regional commander, this hierarchy will be broken up, providing UPP commanders with a more customized and need-oriented resource and place for collaboration.

This new initiative to decentralize command will need to strike a delicate balance between maintaining a unified face of the UPP system to residents, while creating a responsive police force to resident needs. In accordance with chaos theory, “crises management requires nonlinear thinking, flexible and fluctuating structures, and value systems that must transcend all barriers rapidly and instantaneously” (Farazmand). The decentralized system is one that is much more flexible and is capable of nonlinear thinking, which according to Vollard is very important because “by purposefully leaving discretion to the forces, the government can make use of expertise at the level of the police force on how to best achieve the objective. The police need detailed knowledge of local circumstances to be effective since crime and public order problems differ between localities” (Vollard 29).

However, if it falls to one side, being too centralized, or the other, being too decentralized, the police will be seen as either ineffective because they are disconnected from their centralized resources and unorganized, or authoritarian and disconnected in their

perceptions of resident and community needs. In order for the UPP system to be both stable and flexible to changing needs, it needs to adopt a system that is capable of learning and adjusting to its environment. Decentralization expands the possibility for adaptation, which is important because “organizations that learn, adjust, and adapt to the external pressures causing systems breakdown and bifurcations can survive and evolve, and their evolution comes through internal learning and transformation.” (Farazmand 362). Systems that do not respond the pressures of the external environment are much more likely to break down or become obsolete in a changing world.

The system now is based on reactive planning rather than pro-active planning, which “is always topical and reactive, so jerky, and lives with or surrenders to institutional inertia, which breeds practices such atavistic habits” (Soares, “Reform of the Institutional Architecture of Public Safety in Brazil”). The UPPs are currently trying to become a much more pro-active policing unit, however, it is important to push for accurate crime statistics, trends, and to keep up regular studies of crime in favelas in order to anticipate the trajectory of crime. In order to keep on a path of decentralization and adaptivity, I recommend a continued and focused investment in these crime studies. Every favela places differing importance on the reduction and focus on different types of crime. Due to the adaptive nature of decentralization, regional coordinators could become a location for bringing this crime information, and developing specialized plans for future improvement, which could include resident suggestions, and crime information from a tiered measuring system, such as SIM (referred to in Section 1 Subject 1). This type of crime data analysis would help fill a gap in the current police system, in which, as Soares suggests, “there is no reliable data, accurate diagnoses, consistent planning, systematic reviews, monitoring, or regular concealer” (Soares, “Reform of the Institutional Architecture of Public

Safety in Brazil”). UPP coordinators could then use these recommendations, based off of differing community trajectories, to anticipate where officers will be most in need. This will create a more prepared police force that can hierarchically be decentralized with an individual community focus, but can remain connected to the central system through its connection involvement in systems used to analyze crime. It would not be a force reactive to unexpected violence, but rather an expectant and proactive force, that is equipped with the skills to handle the most common crimes they will come in contact with.

Conclusion:

These recommendations are just a few institutional issues and changes that will help the sustainability of the UPPs, and therefore reduce violent crime in Rio de Janeiro. These measures, intended to lead to a more adaptive and supportive organization, will help the police organizations adapt to the particular challenges faced in a chaotic environment.

However, in the longer term, as a prerequisite for broader institutional change and widespread de-militarization of the entire police force, constitutional barriers will need to be addressed. As stated in Article 144 of the Constitution, the Army is responsible for "coordination and control" of the military police, while the state Departments of Safety have authority over "guidance and planning." (Soares, “Reform of the Institutional Architecture of Public Safety in Brazil”). In order to bring about greater, more widespread reform, there would need to be wide political and social support to change Article 144 of the constitution, which quite firmly solidifies the orientation of state military police under the command and control of the Army.

Starting a conversation of constitutional change is the first step to allow the possibility of the military police institution to be amended to look more like the UPP set up, which is the only

way to make sure that public security becomes the number one priority. As Eduardo Luiz Soares has suggested, “I postulate the amendment of the Federal Constitution that states be allowed to promote profound changes in organizational structure of the police (the ‘deconstitutionalization’ of police)” (“Rebuilding the Police”). He even suggests creating “new cops” which could be responsible for, for example, municipal cities above 1 million. He also suggests a change that would require new constitutional legislation to propose the requirement “that all new police officers should serve in the areas of training, information, management, external control, intersectoral coordination and expertise – and to call this set of rules the Unified Public Safety,” which would grant every police officer access to different parts of the job, so they are well rounded in their responses and experience. A dramatic change to the institution would take a re-imagination, in both politics and society, of crime and policing. It “implies a redefinition of the role of the police, against the federal mandate that the Constitution gives them.” This type of cultural, and eventually constitutional, change must first start with a conversation about how society wants to see policing done.

Until then, small changes in institutional contours, such as mitigating the rejection of the UPP by the PM through programs that link reductions in lethality to bonuses, creating a standardized monitoring/reporting system for UPPs and PMs, putting a focus on marginal successes of PM cultural change, focusing on internal promotion and preventing PM leadership from transferring to UPP ranks and stemming the centralized hierarchical organization that breeds a military mentality, will help to maintain, improve, and sustain the current UPP system.

Chapter Two

Working Conditions

Calla Chun and Nate Hickner

Abstract:

As discussed in the last chapter, the UPP's non-militarized, community-oriented approach to policing represents the first step toward the possibility of larger-scale reform of Rio de Janeiro's public security system. As such, much depends on the continued success and improvement of the existing UPP units and the progressive policing mentality they represent. Among the most important determining factors in the success of these UPPs are the officers themselves, the ground-level ambassadors of this new approach. However, according to studies conducted on UPP officers, their work is often hindered by inadequate working conditions. Inadequate police facilities and equipment, low pay, and high stress associated with the job of being a UPP officer incentivize corruption and threaten the reputation of the system. In order to address this issue of poor working conditions and ensure the long-term success of the UPPs and the community mindset they convey, this chapter makes the following recommendations:

- 1. Make maintaining and improving existing UPP headquarters a number one priority. Investment in ensuring the success of existing UPPs should be privileged over options to expand the program to new areas.*
- 2. As part of a broader strategy to enhance and incentivize community police objectives, prioritize investment in modest salary increases, while also continuing to pursue other methods for encouraging financial stability for officers.*
- 3. Reinstate psychological assessment for UPP officers and provide access to counseling services.*

Background:

Very few comprehensive studies have been conducted on the impacts of the UPP program and the opinions of the UPP officers. The two major research projects were conducted by the Center of Studies of Security and Citizenship and by the Brazilian Forum of Public Security. In their findings of the officers' opinions of the UPP project, both found that the biggest source of dissatisfaction among UPP officers involved poor working conditions. As officers are the face of the new police force and, by extension, the government, it is of utmost importance that officers are adequately prepared to meet their duties.

As this report goes to print, police are preparing to invade the Complexo do Caju, setting the stage for establishment of the 31st UPP in Rio de Janeiro ("Favelas do Caju"). The UPP program is well on its way to meeting the goal established by Governor Cabral of establishing 40 UPPs by 2014. In many ways, this is a fantastic success. However, the UPP project remains very much incomplete; many areas of Rio are still gripped by violent parallel power, and the goal of full-scale community integration is far from realized in pacified communities.

As a community policing program, the success of UPPs depend on effectively integrating into hostile communities. This is no easy task and cannot be accomplished overnight. Though the UPPs have been remarkably successful in advancing a new image of police, a 40-year legacy of police violence is difficult to undo. In newly pacified favelas, a tense initial relationship between UPP officers and pacified communities is and has been essentially understood.

The strength and promise of UPPs--and the community policing enterprise in general--is that progress can be made. If given time and adequate resources to open up to the community, the UPP officers have been able to change the residents' perceptions towards them and prove that the officers are not killing machines as many have come to believe (Soares, "Innovations for

Successful Societies”; Barrionuevo).

But unsatisfactory working conditions in existing UPPs inhibit the officers from carrying the project through to satisfaction. Problems faced by officers include but are not limited to overwhelmingly low salaries, lack of safety and security on the job, minimal permanent headquarters within the favelas, and the stress associated with working in communities that have negative perceptions of police. As a result, UPP officers and military police in general have a degraded view of themselves and suffer from mental issues as a result of psychological distress associated with the job (T. Vargas).

As the deadline for deployment of the 40th UPP approaches, and as the public calls for more UPPs become louder, it is important to reflect on the current status of UPPs and plan next steps accordingly. Long-term, serious police reform depends upon investing in a high-quality, well-supported force of UPP officers as a model for future progress. It is of utmost importance that the UPP project becomes an example as a successful method for urban reclamation and community integration, so as to set the stage for more long-term reform. With this goal in mind, the remainder of this chapter poses several policy recommendations in order to provide adequate support and improving working conditions of officers.

Recommendation 1: Make Maintaining and Improving Existing UPP Units a Number One Priority

It is impossible to ignore the complicated political implications of the UPP program, especially in regard to future expansion. The record-high investment in Rio (topping R\$200 billion) over the next two years indicates the scale of growth potential and capacity for urban renewal that the state and the city currently enjoy. But it also raises questions--to what extent is

this burst of investment related only to the upcoming mega-events? Can the rapid pace of growth that the city has undergone be sustained after 2016?

In regard to the UPP, criticisms related to these questions are numerous and varied. The UPP project is derided as a form of “corporate-city” engineering project, in which the selection of new UPP communities is governed by corporate interests (“Ele é o Cara”). Others cynically view the UPP program as a facade, set up only as a temporary solution until after the upcoming mega-events. As one favelado put it, the business of long-term pacification and occupation appears to be a lie, and “Right now, at election time, with the World Cup and Olympics, everyone is seeing this picture” (Naddeo, “Com Moradores Receosos”). All the while, communities that are yet to receive UPP units continue to be hubs of violence, sometimes experiencing murder rates as high as twenty times of those in pacified communities (Leite).

Such a situation requires careful balancing of interests. The evident success of the UPPs in communities so far must be considered alongside realistic concerns over maintaining their quality. The pressure to expand must be tempered by realistic appraisal of long-term efficacy.

The deployment of the 40th UPP in 2014 will undoubtedly raise serious questions about the next steps for the program, and the political pressure to expand UPPs to more communities will be enormous. This situation presents a serious danger to the success of the program, as too much pressure to expand quickly could lead to lack of planning and support of existing units. Before considering the possibility of scaling up the UPP program into dozens more favelas in the years to come, it is first necessary to evaluate the status of the current units and the opinions of the officers to ensure a strong foundation for further revitalization of the police force.

In many favelas that the UPP are working in, officers lack a respectable building to center their activities around, have no place to store their belongings, eat their food, provide resources

for favela residents, or establish a long-term presence. Many UPP units work out of containers. These evidently temporary structures often do not have air conditioning, telephones, water fountains, working toilets, or separate offices for the station chief (Cano, “Os Donos Do Morro”; Padua). Such uncomfortable and unsanitary structures fail to reflect the importance and permanence that must be associated with UPP installations if they are to continue to be successful.

Past efforts related to “professionalism, performance, and quality of service” among police include the Model Police Stations Program, introduced in 199 by then state governor Anthony Garotinho. The program was designed to provide a swath of services to bolster the civil police force including “continuous training and access to technology to make the civil police more professional, accessible, and better able to serve the people” (Uildriks). Although this program was expensive, it was also successful, and represented a shift towards improving civil policing efforts. And, importantly, subsequent governors continued the program because it provided results in improving the legitimacy and public trust in the police.

The Model Police Stations Program had a positive impact on the opinions of the civil police about their jobs and about themselves. Having an improved police station “contributed to their self-esteem and pride in their work” (Husain). Although the Model Police Stations Program and the UPP situation are quite distinct, such a program still provides an example of how investment in police infrastructure can have a truly positive effect on public perceptions of policing efforts, as well as improve morale among police themselves (Husain) This program provides an example of the benefits for individuals, communities, and relations between the two that could result from improved facilities. In the case of the UPPs, making the working conditions more suitable for the community policing presence will lend more legitimacy to the

UPP and demonstrate a commitment to long-term renewal in pacified communities.

The technical, planning-heavy legacy of the Model Police Stations Program is already evident in many UPPs. For example, in the hillside community of Rocinha, the landscape makes use of 4-wheeled vehicles impractical, and the numerous stairways and unmapped routes through the favela make patrols difficult. In response, the deployed UPP unit was prepared to meet the particular needs for occupation. Motorcycles, rather than cars, are used for patrols, and an extensive CCTV system was implemented to allow monitoring of police and residents in public spaces. Additionally, GPS units are used to track the positions of officers, and the use of an information sharing system, headquartered in a container, allows for quick response to developing situations (Naddeo).

The particularities of each favela present unique concerns and challenges. Naturally, different UPP systems have been more effective than others in responding to the situations of their respective communities. In general, however, comprehensive planning and attention to local issues help units become more effective.

As pressure continues to mount for more and more communities to be pacified, however, there is danger in the lack of comprehensive planning. Even the appearance of insufficient planning can have devastating results on the UPP program. As evidenced in the aftermath of the murder of UPP officer Fabiana Aparecida de Souza last year (Padua), events that call into question the preparedness of officers to fend off drug traffickers cast significant doubt into the viability of the entire community policing enterprise.

Because preserving the viability and integrity of existing UPPs is so important to long-term goals of more widespread police reform, it is recommended that serious priority be placed on sustaining and supporting the success of existing UPPs, adequately attending to needs, and

that such aims be implemented ahead of expansionary goals.

With that said, fortunately, at least for the near-term, the UPP project benefits from a Public Security Secretary who is uncommonly receptive to addressing the needs of officers. Secretary Beltrame is known to engage in weekly “Coffee with the Secretary” meetings, discussing problems with officers candidly and directly (Beltrame). Still, as evidenced by studies conducted on UPP officers themselves, the low-quality working conditions for officers remain a top concern. There is still much work to be done.

Recommendation 2: Sustain Salary Increases as Part of a Broader Effort to Enhance Community Policing “Buy-in” Within the UPP

Rio de Janeiro ranks 24th among 26 states for having the lowest salaries for the military police (United States of America; Terra). At the beginning of the UPP program, the police were paid as little as 30 reais a day, approximately \$15 USD, which is less than a house maid could make in a day (Reuters).

In 2012, after a series of strikes, the state of Rio de Janeiro agreed to raise wages 39% to be staggered over two years (“Police Strike in Rio”). This is a step in the right direction, but even with the increase, salaries for officers remain low.

The issue of low police salaries is not a new concern. Low salaries incentivize corruption, which in turn undermines the credibility of the UPPs in the eyes of favela residents. When incidents of corruption occur, they are detrimental to the program’s fragile reputation (Madden). But on a deeper level, like the problem of poor or inadequate headquarters, exceptionally low salaries contribute to low self-esteem of officers and the lingering appearance of instability among the force.

Realistically however, broad sweeping alterations to the pay scale, incentive structure, and bonuses are difficult to balance: they are expensive and there is no guarantee that the intended effects will occur. Considering the mistakes of salary modification policies of the past, caution and deliberation is necessary to ensure positive results. Poorly planned salary adjustments that fail to account for the complexity of issues are unlikely to bring about desired effects. A negative example can be found in Russia in 2003, where low pay was believed to be a driving force behind corruption. In an attempt to improve the situation, salaries of all police officers were doubled overnight. Rather than reducing corruption, however, these raises actually had a deleterious effect: corruption appeared continue or even grow because the increase in pay did nothing to affect the underlying culture of corruption in the force (Goodall, Malloch, and Munro 171).

Other ill-formed policies can and have had horrendous consequences: in the not-so-distant past, one method of rewarding officers in Rio offered bonuses for killing criminals (Barnes). What was intended as a policy to reduce crime turned out to have disastrous, bloody results. Although the practices of the police force have changed substantially, it is still important to use caution when considering new incentive structures.

The task is a difficult one. It depends on balancing reasonable decisions about pay against concerns over budget and effectiveness of reforms. Still, it stands to reason that a situation in which officers are being paid slightly more than a housemaid is not an effective strategy; the pay scale does not do enough to recognize the importance of the work of UPP officers.

This chapter recommends that modest but steady pay increases continue to be implemented in concert with a series of policies organized toward advancing internal legitimacy of community policing objectives within the UPP organization. Because the problems facing the

UPP are not simple, neither are the solutions; effective policies require a broader strategy to internally strengthen the anti-violence and community policing ideals within the police force.

In existing UPPs, officers complain about the institutional restrictions on police autonomy, which are believed to threaten safety. For example, the use of pepper spray is severely restricted; when pepper spray is used, officers must provide justification, and the quantity of pepper spray used must be verified (Padua). Restriction on the use of force such as this is clearly a good policy: such monitoring and validation police violence is absolutely necessary and helps to protect the reputation and effectiveness of police. It is the reluctance of officers to approve of such policies, not the policies themselves, that is the real cause for concern. Specific rules and regulations cannot stand alone, and in order for UPPs to be successful, each individual officer must understand and “buy in” to the ideals of community policing. It is impossible for a force to establish sufficient rules and regulations to establish best practices for every situation. The UPP system must cultivate an atmosphere of closely monitored officer autonomy so as to allow individuals to adapt big-picture community policing objectives to individual situations. As Ignácio Cano explains, a system of ground-level police autonomy is a crucial factor of community policing, and is one that the force currently lacks (Cano, “UPPs”).

The CCTV officer monitoring system, as implemented in Rocinha, provides an excellent platform for increasing the ability of the UPP to support measured autonomy for officers. Such a system allows officer response to particular situations to be monitored and analyzed. Particular situations which call for a degree of officer autonomy, such as conflicts with community residents, can be assessed in light of each particular situation. At the same time, breach of conduct can be addressed, as video evidence of bribe-taking or excessive use of force provides strong ammunition for disciplinary action. A system of feedback and constant appraisal of officer

response involving CCTV would enhance the capacity for officers to attend to their objectives as well as help sustain officer understanding and commitment to nonviolence.

It is thus recommended that salary increases are coupled with increased implementation of useful and ubiquitous CCTV officer monitoring technologies, so as to help provide officers a degree of autonomy while also providing capacity for effective monitoring.

Still, we recognize that this strategy is one that cannot stand alone. Policy recommendations proposed in other chapters of this report can also have a valuable impact on the ability of officers to carry out community policing objectives.

The previous chapter advanced the idea of internal promotion of UPP officers. Such a policy of internal promotion has been shown to be a strong motivation factor among officers in other police forces (Gaines, Tubergen, and Paiva). A policy of internal promotion on the basis of sustained commitment to community policing objectives could be used as a strong motivating factor for enhancing UPP buy-in.

The next chapter looks to training as a means of enhancing the perceptions of community policing within the entire force. As Ignácio Cano discusses, a main challenge of the current police force is attending to the reform of police mindset away from one that values violence: “We have to show them that elite police are those that get into dangerous circumstances without producing any casualties, both for themselves, and for the public” (Cano, “UPPs”). Advancement of training techniques is a crucial piece of the puzzle, and must be pursued in partnership with other reforms to increase the quality of officers on the job.

A Brief Aside: The Value of Alternative Programs for Officer Financial Security

Realistically, across-the-board salary increases are limited by budget, and are difficult to achieve. As a supplementary policy, the state has recently pursued new efforts to indirectly address the issue of crippling low salaries. Two such programs are Mais Polícia and the Programa Estadual de Integração na Segurança (PROEIS), both of which address the factors that push police towards corrupt measures to secure their living, such as accepting bribes and illegal employment (Belmonte; Roller). The benefit of Mais Polícia is that it provides an outlet for the UPP officers to seek additional work in a formalized and regulated manner whereas before, they were forbidden to accept additional work and had to ignore the law if desperate enough for additional income (Roller). Since Mais Polícia was implemented in April 2012, secondary jobs of the UPP officers are now regulated in such a way that the state can ensure that the officers are still not overworked by monitoring the hours per shift and the hours of rest in between shifts (Belmonte). Mais Polícia also allows UPP officers to work up to 96 hours per month of overtime shifts, provided that they still receive adequate rest (Roller).

The PROEIS program also allows police in the PM and UPP to potentially double their monthly income by working overtime (Michaels), and also provides the added benefit of allowing municipal services such as schools the opportunity to employ police officers for added security (“Proeis: Reforço”).

This report encourages the continuation of such programs, as they represent a means to indirectly improve upon the problem of low salaries in the face of realistic restrictions. These policies are a necessary short-term response to the systemic problem of under-supported police officers. Still, they remain limited solutions, and are no substitute for long-term reform and more full-scale improvement of police compensation strategies.

Recommendation 3: Reinstate Psychological Assessment for UPP Officers and Provide Access to Counseling Services

Stress factors associated with the UPP officer position include but are not limited to low pay, lack of proper work space and equipment, second jobs, and negative public image, all of which may amount to serious occupational stressors that preclude optimal work performance (Kroes). The psychological well being of the UPP officers is one of the least studied issues regarding the obstacles to an effective UPP force. One important issue concerning psychological assessments of the UPP is actually the lack of assessment. As a result of increasing pressure to expand the UPP program, the former psychological assessment that tested aggression and response to stress was removed from the necessary conditions to acceptance to the training program to become a UPP officer (Barnes). In other words, the standard for ensuring the ability to cope with stress has been removed (Barnes). This is worrisome, as policing involves a high level of stress, particularly policing in an innovative and new unit like the UPP and in sometimes violent atmospheres. Because psychological health is an important factor in the reliability and success of the UPP program, it is recommended that the assessment program be reinstated. In addition, counseling services should be provided to the UPP to assist officers in coping with stress.

So far in the UPP project, stress factors have also included poor equipment. This has included weapons that are prone to malfunction from being at least eight years old, bulletproof vests that do not properly protect the officers, non-functioning radios, cars that don't run, and paychecks that are disbursed weeks late (Padua). Though the official response has been one of reinforcing the mantra of non-violence--that the weapons in place are adequate for most non-violent needs, and that the focus should not be on means of war but rather on establishing a

presence of proximity policing (Fernandes, Freire, and Marcello)--such assertions do little to affect the actual psychological condition of officers on the ground.

A solution is to encourage the officers to be more open about their concerns and worries they accrue on the job. Open channels for communication are vital to easing stress (Kroes). A study on the self-esteem and quality of life of civilian police showed that groups of officers that shared humor and entertainment showed more positive group cohesion (Andrade, Sousa, and Minayo). It is important for officers to know that their stress factors are taken seriously. Officers also need to have a more solid understanding of institutional procedures and ways that they can deal with problems that come up when doing police work. As such, it is recommended that the UPP establish a position of psychological counselor within the police force.

Currently, no such psychological counseling is accessible to officers. As noted in chapter seven on community mental health, such services are virtually non-existent even in the wider civilian population. Addressing the psychological well-being and self-image is important to improving the working conditions of the UPP officers to maintain the program's efficacy.

Conclusion:

The future of the UPP is not guaranteed. Success with long-term police reform depends on successful support of existing UPP efforts. Starting with the existing UPPs, taking the time and money to ensure they are sustainable and successful will make it easier to implement future UPPs knowing that the framework for action has the capacity to cause real change. While this paper has suggested ways to improve the efficacy of the current UPPs in favelas, this is not to ignore the real difficulty of implementation. The concept of community policing is not new nor is it perfect; following a set of rules never ensures the desired end goal. UPP officers and the

higher state administration should place emphasis on being receptive to the concerns that they hear and being adaptable to change.

This chapter has argued that by prioritizing quality over quantity in UPP units, the program success will be protected. Additionally, smart, well-rounded adjustments to salary, coupled with broader reforms to ensure the “buy-in” of officers to the community policing program will enhance the ability of officers to carry out their mandate on the ground. Finally, providing a means of psychological support for officers will improve the ability of officers to cope with occupational stressors as well as provide a means for officers to find solutions to everyday problems.

Chapter Three

UPP Training

Elise Butterfield

Abstract:

The UPP has led to improvement in training not only for its specialized officers, but also for PM forces in Rio de Janeiro. Increased awareness of human rights, focus on alternatives to violence, and emphasis on public safety are some of the significant improvements in training curriculum. However, there are still elements lacking from UPP training. The following chapter will recommend that:

- 1. Community members, academics, UPP officers, civilians and government workers with requisite skills and/or experience oversee curriculum*
- 2. UPP holds training workshops for community members co-facilitated by community members and UPP officers that explain the UPP and community member responsibilities and develop problem-solving skills*
- 3. UPP facilitates a project for community members in tandem with an NGO in order to create a training video for officers in which community members tell the histories of their communities and personal stories*
- 4. Mediation skills workshops be expanded to train community members alongside officers and increase the amount of active officers trained through TJRJ programs, and community members be hired as mediators in Mediation Centers*
- 5. UPP expands partnerships with NGOs and other governmental offices to include those specialized in dealing with gendered and domestic violence, mentally ill persons, and medical emergency situations*

These incorporations will assist in further eliminating the “us vs. them” mentality of police officers and community members as well as help create a population more able to communicate and coordinate effectively, enhancing UPP’s ability to be an effective community policing force.

Background:

As a member of a police force oriented towards community integration, the role of the UPP officer is dynamic. Success requires collaboration and cooperation with the community in order to address community concerns, reduce violence and improve daily life. This expansion in the policing role beyond that of a traditional officer has necessitated expansion in training. But the complexities and peculiarities of UPP communities means that “there are no useful ‘off-the-shelf’ training models or materials to adopt” (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 101). Training must remain flexible and adaptive in order to consolidate best practices and enhance the overall preparedness of incoming officers for advancing the goals of community integration.

While there have been some reforms to UPP training, there is still room for improvement particularly in the areas of community relations, problem solving techniques, and specific issues such as domestic violence (Tierney; Soares, Lemgruber, Musumeci, and Ramos). Currently, UPP officers and Military Police (PM) officers receive the same training. However, a new curriculum is being developed by various officials within the UPP. Some of the focuses for the new UPP curriculum will be further policing skills, developing conflict resolution and peaceful mediation techniques, and better social integration of officers and community members (Vilaça). This report will make recommendations for curriculum currently being developed for future training, using these three focuses as points of reference, and should be assumed to be specific to the UPP unless otherwise stated.

Criticisms of current training practices:

Some of the best critics of UPP officer training are current UPP officers themselves (Tierney 56). The concerns of current officers ought to be considered not solely because these are the individuals who have graduated from the training, but because as a collaborative organization it is important that each member be given the opportunity to praise what they believe to be the program's strengths, and identify what they believe to be its weaknesses (Tierney 56). According to the study *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais*, produced by the Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania in Brazil, there are a few fundamental problems with UPP training in the eyes of current UPP officers. This study found that 63% of officers who completed the survey considered themselves prepared for the job. While this number constitutes a slight majority, it is not overwhelming, and, when looking at reported preparedness levels in specific skill sets, some numbers are even lower. For example, only about half of officers felt "adequately prepared" for developing a relationship to the public--about the same proportion that was comfortable with their marksmanship skills (53.5% and 52.5% respectively) (Soares, Lemgruber, Musumeci, Ramos 6-7). Though officers recalled receiving courses in ethics, community policing, cautious use of force, search techniques, human rights, self-defense, public relations, and shooting, they listed their most frequent responsibilities/activities in communities as "conflict mediation, domestic violence reduction and authorization of leisure activities" (Tierney 57-58). Clearly, there is some disconnect between what officers are being taught in training and what roles they are actually performing in the community. This suggests that they were not as prepared as they could have been and that an improvement in training could lead to improvement in UPP practice in communities.

Additionally, it is important to recognize that the UPP is already aware of some of these

issues and is currently working to address them. With a training and curriculum reform that was to go into effect in 2012, UPP representatives have been working with international and national organizations, such as Red Cross International and local universities, to design new structures that better fit the needs of the UPP and the new image of the police force as a whole. This includes an Integrated Education Committee that allows for greater collaboration and revision of curricula, attempts to standardize training procedures by paying trainers and encouraging a more streamlined curricula, adding an optional internship for new UPP officers, and extending the UPP training to include more officers from other units (Stahlberg). All of these reforms have been proposed with the goal of moving away from the earlier war ethos of the police force to a more collaborative, preventative force with practice in Proximity Policing (Stahlberg).

Suggestions for a successful training:

I. Developing integrative curriculum

The first step to a successful training is developing a curriculum that is complete, relevant, and consistent. This is an ongoing process and thus should be evaluated and revised often (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 102). In order to do this, the UPP must take into account the vital input of community members, UPP officers, community policing trainers from other areas, local organizations in Rio de Janeiro with similar goals, and scholars and academics from local universities with a particular knowledge of training, community policing, conflict mediation, and community organizing.

Of course, curriculum must include the development of practical policing skills such as how and when to use equipment, knowledge of police policies, etc. High-ranking police commanders both within the UPP and outside of it should be able to conduct this portion of

training. While this training is necessary, it must be presented as something to be used only in extreme cases and for the purposes of defending the community in which the UPP is working. Those conducting this training must be chosen with scrutiny, as any reinforcement of “us vs. them” mentality is not to be tolerated within any rankings of the UPP.

To this end, it is recommended that feedback on training practices be gathered from current or former UPP officers. Some of this work has already been done, for example by Soares and peers in the study “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais.” Those involved in this research could be included in training revisions. Additionally, community members ought to be able to give input on the preparedness of UPP officers in their community, and any training they receive (see section on Trainees and Methodology of training). This feedback can be collected via paper or electronic survey. The UPP training curriculum committee also ought to hold interactive conferences in active UPP offices (or an alternate community center) with community members and UPP officers to facilitate discussion of what they think is important for UPP officers to know. Community liaisons should be particularly useful in promoting these conferences among community members, giving personal feedback, and recruiting particularly helpful community members. The liaison should be involved in the planning process for a conference in her community. It is possible that conferences could be held as part of already scheduled meetings between officers and community members (see Chapter Four). Additionally, it is important that a mechanism exist for these stakeholders to give feedback after the initial conference. The Community Liaison (see Chapter Four) would be responsible for continuing this conversation and contacting the UPP training committee with any further suggestions. This may look like a physical forum for community feedback (a wall people can write on, a box people can drop notes into), or a virtual one (blog on the internet, email to

send messages to).

Next, curriculum committee members will need to identify agencies and community centers with which they can partner to develop specific portions of curriculum such as diversity awareness training, conflict resolution training, problem solving techniques training, and domestic violence prevention and awareness training. In the study, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” only 43% of police officers reported feeling prepared to deal with issues of domestic violence (Soares, Lemgruber, Musumeci, Ramos 8). However, according to Stahlberg, it is precisely issues such as domestic violence that are increasingly being reported as issues of drug violence dissipate (Stahlberg). Included agencies (government organizations, non-governmental organizations, and non-profit organizations) that have a specific focus on one of these areas and are interested in improving the capability of the UPP. This type of partnership will be mutually beneficial: knowledge transfer from specialized organizations will benefit UPP officers and hopefully improve their understanding of these issues, and partner organizations will be empowered by formal collaboration through official channels of the UPP. Specific partnership proposals can be found in following section on Training Methodology.

The curriculum committee may seek the guidance of scholars at local universities whose focus relates to the mission of UPP. These experts ought to not only review already established curriculum, but develop their own suggestions for curriculum where they see fit (similar to the partner agencies). Following the footsteps of successful community policing efforts such as those in Colombia, it may be preferable to bring UPP officers into the university to complete some coursework related to community organization, effective communication, human rights, tolerance, and diversity awareness (Quesada).

Despite contributions and revisions from various agencies and actors, it is vital that the message of UPP comes across as clear: UPP exists to collaborate with community members, change the image of police officers and favelados, eliminate everyday crime through preventative instead of reactive measures, and respond to community needs. It must be clear from the beginning that these officers are more “peace officers” than “police officers”. Emphasis should be placed on communication and conflict resolution rather than battle techniques and fighting drug lords. Likewise, it is essential to garner the support of staff from all areas of the police force. In order to have a truly effective team, everyone involved must be supporting the new path. Additionally, it will be important for officers and police employees to have a presence in training, a presence that reinforces the cooperative nature of UPP and leaves titles and hierarchy at the door. This will help establish from the beginning the emphasis on clear communication and collaboration not only between community members and UPP officers, but among the officers and the rest of the police team.

II. Trainers and Trainees:

As mentioned previously, it will be key to choose appropriate trainers for each portion of training. Hopefully, through the process of curriculum development, choices for trainers will be evident. However, it is key to note that trainers ought to not only be specialists in the field on which they are leading activities, but also be strong supporters of the UPP ready to combat the “us vs. them” mentality long associated with the police. Where possible, it may also be valuable to have trainers be from outside the police force, particularly favelados, in order to invert traditional and problematic hierarchies in which favelados fall at the bottom and police at the top. With the addition of the Talent Bank in 2012, which submits requests for individuals interested

in training police officers, reviews them, and accepts both police or military officers and civilians based on merit, the policies on trainers have changed in the last year (*Banco de Talentos*). The goal of this has been to improve the quality of trainers teaching UPP officers and to oxygenate the organization -- bringing in new knowledge and ideas from outside sources (*Banco de Talentos*). This has been a marked improvement in hiring for trainers, however it may make sense to use pre-chosen individuals from outside the force to teach some of the specific units proposed in this report that require specialized knowledge.

Training should not only include potential UPP officers, but also be open to officers from other units. This will allow for some of the values that UPP promotes (communication, collaboration, and tolerance) to permeate other areas of the police force and allow other police officers to feel connected to the UPP. The idea of this is that all officers will share in the successes of the UPP and be more willing to support the goals of the UPP. Additionally, this comradery will allow for more communication between types of police that can result in more cohesive prevention methods for and responses to conflict. All attendees should be compensated for their time in training. Furthermore, active officers ought to attend addendums to initial training on a mandatory basis.

A knowledgeable police force setting out to communicate and coordinate with community members, however, is no use unless community members also have some training in using these skills. Community policing programs where residents are unaware of both the police's responsibilities and their own has much less of a chance of success than one in which residents also have access to training (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 100). According to the authors of *On the Beat: Police and Community Problem Solving*, community residents in Chicago "had no inkling that they were supposed to be a part of the solutions as well

as identifiers of problems,” and thus were inhibiting Chicago’s newly implemented community policing program from achieving its goals (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 100). Thus, community members will be invited to attend workshops intended to equip them with the necessary knowledge of UPP and skills of problem-solving to be a responsible and collaborative public able to work in tandem with UPP officers. There are a few goals for this integration of officers and community members. First, it will attempt to introduce the two groups in a situation of equal footing, making an effort to dissipate the long-standing power hierarchy which places police above citizens. Second, it will help make the UPP program more transparent, thus increasing community members’ trust in and understanding of the UPP. Third, it will give community members skills to more effectively work with UPP officers and thus make the job easier for everyone.

At the end of training, all future UPP officers will be required to take a written exam in order to move onto the practicum portion of training. This exam ought to consist of a few real-life scenarios that require officers to use analytical skills they have honed during training to come up with a method for responding to the issue using the tools they have learned. Officers who do not pass may be required to re-complete the training in its entirety or just the sections in which they demonstrated ineptitude. It may also be possible for officers who have been cited for minor misconduct issues or have not fared well in the practicum to retrain in certain areas.

III. Training Methodology:

According to Russell Glenn, evaluator of community policing training with the Los Angeles Police Department, four key elements in conducting a successful training are: contextualize the learning, integrate key topics throughout the curriculum, build the scenario, and

conduct a thorough debriefing (Glenn 125). Here, contextualization means tying new information to previously acquired knowledge and real-life situations in order to encourage a deeper understanding of the concepts being taught (Glenn 125). This goes hand in hand with integrating key topics throughout the curriculum, a methodology that “recognizes that skills and knowledge are integrated (used together) in real life and should be developed and practiced in an integrated manner” (Glenn 126). Building the scenario helps to make learning in training more interactive and self-directed, recognizing that the best learning happens during real-life scenarios, through doing, and through reflection (Glenn 134). Thus, training should emulate these learning processes and give future UPP officers the skills to continue this type of learning after training officially ends. Scenarios in training should be accompanied by thorough debriefing to solidify learning and help refine officers’ skills in analysis and understanding. According to Glenn, “Effectively conducted, [debriefing activities] should improve student performance” (Glenn 139).

There are some overarching themes that should be incorporated throughout the training; i.e. there should not be a discrete “partnership” unit, but rather the topic of partnership should be something that is discussed throughout. Examples of other such themes are: affirming the non-violent nature of UPPs, emphasizing preventative not reactionary methods, problem-solving skills, and human rights (know them, abiding by them, etc). Additionally, the training will focus on how to equip UPP officers with the skills they need to be effective communicators. Borrowing from a definition used in Los Angeles Police Department reform in Russell Glenn’s book *Training the 21st Century Police Officer: Redefining Police Professionalism for the Los Angeles Police Department*, “To communicate effectively [as a community police officer] is to be skilled in the overt and the subtle, to make one’s intentions known whether the recipient is

deaf, unable to understand [Portuguese], mentally handicapped, enraged, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or simply unfamiliar with normal police procedure” (Glenn 120).

Methods that should be incorporated throughout training are use of real-life scenarios for problem-solving practice, and role-playing those scenarios. Role-playing has been shown to be particularly effective in training when those acting out the roles are confronting perceived (or actual) power hierarchies; therefore, there should be a special effort to incorporate this into units which have participants such as soon-to-be UPP officers, active military police officers, and community members (Tierney 53). In her study of the UPP, Tierney explains how a role play between UPP officers and adolescent favelados where the roles were reversed helped both groups understand the frustration of the other, and indeed resulted in friendly laughter among participants who could see the silliness of these often frustrating daily interactions (Tierney 53). Additionally, various international policing resources (LAPD and NYPD community policing programs in particular) advocate recreating with as much preciseness as possible the actual scenarios police officers may experience; role play is one way to achieve this (Glenn 122).

One of the first activities of UPP training should be defining what it is that the UPP does, and what they do not do. This would include an overall discussion of what community policing is, what its purpose is, and what it is not. For example, it will be important to explain that community policing takes a preventative approach to crime and works to improve the daily lives of community members. This is an opportunity to reinforce the differences between community policing and traditional policing and reject the “us vs. them” mindset of Rio’s PM (Reuland and Schwarzfeld 65). Additionally, it is imperative that from the beginning UPP work be defined as inherently different from social work (many officers felt their work was “women’s work” or social work, and not what they had signed on for (Tierney; Reuland and Schwarzfeld 59).

Having this conversation at the beginning of a training will help to set the tone for the rest of the training and participation in the UPP program beyond training (Reuland and Schwarzfeld 58).

Equally important as clarifying the role of the a UPP officer in breaking down “us vs. them” traditional policing mentalities is the humanization of favelados. In order for UPP officers to be able to successfully collaborate with the members of the favela in which they are assigned, they must have respect for them and see them as equals. This is something that ought to be reinforced through training in conjunction with the development of more technical skills. One way to do this is by having favelados tell their stories and the histories of their communities as they see them to the officers. Not only will this offer future UPP officers the chance to learn about favelas from a favelado, but it will hopefully empower the individual, giving import to their perspective and their unique knowledge (Roberto). However, due to logistical issues, it is unrealistic to have community members of favelas come in to every training to tell their stories. Additionally, asking someone likely still affected by the “us vs. them” police-favelado mindset, and potentially scared of being seen as collaborating with the police, to come in and talk to an entire room of future police may be overly intimidating. Thus, a video project is a feasible and reasonable alternative.

The video would be made by favelados and feature individuals from various favelas telling their stories. The end product would then be used in training both future UPP officers and PM officers as a method of offering future officers a new perspective on those with whom they will work and facilitating discussion about breaking down common misconceptions of favelados. This project would certainly not be the first video by and about favelados; in the past decade these types of media have increased in number and quality (Roberto). Such NGOs as Viva Favela have embarked upon campaigns to bring media to favelas for the sole purpose of

documenting the self expression and storytelling abilities of favelados (Baroni). Viva Favela's mission statement describes it as "attempting to change mainstream ideas about favelas and their inhabitants by shifting the focus from poverty, shortages, violence and criminality to images of the ordinary life which include the myriad events that occur in the day of the favela," and thus by changing the images coming out of favelas, changing the image of favelados (Baroni 49). In pursuing this project, the UPP should seek the advice and potential partnership of Viva Favela, as well other organizations working toward similar goals.

Activities that help develop the analytical skills of police officers should also be included; the role of a UPP officer is not to act a robot, but instead to exercise the autonomy and decision-making skills of a human in a humane and appropriate manner. The ability to do this is something that must be cultivated and incorporated throughout training, though it is likely these are skills that will continue to improve as officers gain experience in community work (Tierney 55).

IV. Community Member Training:

As previously mentioned, it is essential to the success of any community policing program that community members also receive some training. This training should define the roles of community police officers and the role of community members, and give community members the tools they need to fulfill their responsibilities (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 100). Ideally, the training of community members could happen concurrently to training of new UPP officers; placing the two previously distinct social groups in the same room, receiving the same training, with both in plain clothes, and carrying out role-playing scenarios. However, logistically this is quite complex; the workshop needs to happen outside of

traditional work hours, in the evening, and would likely need to take place in the favela, making it more accessible to community members but unfortunately less accessible to many UPP officers. For this reason, it may not be possible to require UPP officers to attend as part of their initial training. Instead current UPP officers should be encouraged to attend in regular dress and participate in community training workshops as much as possible.

In the case of the UPP, training workshops could look something like the community training workshops implemented in Chicago and offered on weekday evenings and a few Saturday mornings in a community center (perhaps UPP headquarters in favelas). The first workshop would consist primarily of 4 parts: 1. Defining community policing and clarifying responsibilities of various parties involved, as well as provide some basic information on the organizational structure of the UPP and common procedures. 2. Introduce the problem-solving process to community members; brainstorm what constitutes a problem that could relate to UPP work, and go through the steps of solving some common community-identified problems. 3. Have community members practice using their newly acquired problem-solving skills with scenarios, analysis, and role-play. Invite communities members to participate in future problem-solving workshops (supply schedule and opportunity to sign up). 4. Wrap-up by emphasizing the importance of the community's role, discussing opportunities for continued engagement (resident assemblies, community liaisonship, mediation workshops, garnering support for UPP within community, recruiting other community members to attend workshops), and allowing time for some question-answer and discussion (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 102). This process should be led by a partnership of a community member from a favela and a UPP officer (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig 101). The partnership with these individuals should be established prior to leading workshops, and they should receive

training in leading said workshops together. The successful partnership of the UPP officer and favelado should display some of what the lessons of the workshop are trying to teach; community policing is a group effort that requires mutual trust, respect, and cooperation of police officers and community members.

Following this initial basic training, workshops should be made available for community members to expand upon and hone their problem-solving skills. Potential topics might include prioritization of problems, group leadership or problem-solving, brainstorming common community problems to address, and skills for identifying and combating domestic violence. All workshops would be attended on a volunteer basis--it is important that community members come of their own accord and are prepared to actively participate (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser and Lovig).

While participants will be unpaid, particularly since workshops will happen outside of normal work hours, facilitators will need to be paid. The fee should not be large, particularly considering the amount of people one facilitator partnership can reach if just 40 people attend each workshop and a partnership facilitates two workshops a week.

V. Specialized Units and Partnerships

This chapter recommends that a few specific thematic units, based on strategic partnerships, be established on the basis of the following topics: conflict mediation and effective communication, domestic violence and gendered issues, diversity awareness, basic first aid, and interactions with mentally ill individuals. These topics relate back to some of the main responsibilities listed by UPP officers in the study “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais.” “conflict mediation, domestic violence reduction and authorization of

leisure activities” (Tierney 57).

Conflict Mediation:

One important program that already exists within the UPP is a partnership between the UPP and Rio de Janeiro’s Court System (TJ-RJ) and School of Judicial Administration (ESAJ) that provides training and infrastructure for UPP officer to open Mediation Centers in already pacified communities (“Mediação”). This program offers UPP officers training in conflict mediation in groups of about 20 with the goal of giving them the tools to then mediate conflicts between community members. Such conflicts might be over something such as housing leases and tenant responsibilities, disputes between neighbors, or domestic unrest. In each of these cases, community members would come to the table voluntarily to solve their arguments, and then be the ones to propose the solutions; UPP officers serve only to facilitate positive and productive communication and do not actually suggest courses of action or mandate any decisions (Oliveira). So far, this program has seen a fair amount of success, and has even won an Innovare award for embodying a progressive change in the judiciary system in Rio de Janeiro (Innovare). The program is useful not just because it allows community members to settle their disputes, but because it also facilitates positive interactions with UPP officers and community members. By helping to solve problems outside of the court system, the program also helps to take some of the burden off of the overloaded judiciary (Oliveira).

There are many great things about the joint TJ-RJ program with the UPP, however, there are a few things that could be done to improve it. These suggestions are as follows:

- 1) Include community members in mediation training: Mediation training for UPP officers ought to be opened up to the public so that community members are able

to attend said trainings. This type of programming has been implemented in other areas of Brazil, such as in the region of Ceará. In Ceará not only are there trainings open to the public, but there are also specialized conflict mediation trainings, such as business oriented mediation trainings and social service provider mediation trainings (Núcleos De Mediação Comunitária Do Ceará). These trainings are offered in conjunction with various mediation centers around the region, as well various universities, such as the Universidade de Fortaleza (Unifor) ("Parceria Promove Cursos Voltados Para a Mediação").

- 2) Have community members serve as mediators in mediation centers (both new and already established): After completing the same training as UPP officers, community members ought to be able to also serve as mediators in the community. Not only will this give community members an equal opportunity to participate in the bettering of their community, but it will also give UPP officers and community members a chance to learn and work side by side. Additionally, it may alleviate some community members' concerns about seeking mediation because it would be staffed not only with UPP officers, but with people they knew as well. In this system, some oversight would be necessary, and community members would need to complete an application process in order to work in these mediation centers.
- 3) Expand the capacity of the program (amount of officers trained): Including community members in mediation training and mediation centers means expanding the capacity of the mediation program. However, based on the already garnered public support for the program (as demonstrated by a number of popular

media articles, blog posts, and the Innovare award in 2011), it is likely this would be a popular political decision. It may require either that TJ-RJ and ESAJ are able to give more resources (staff to train, hours away from other projects, infrastructural resources, etc.), or it may mean seeking other potential partners able to give these resources. Based on other Brazilian mediation programs, universities, both in Brazil and internationally, may be good candidates for partners in mediation training. Additionally, it may be possible to bring on some already trained UPP officers with demonstrated success in mediation to assist in trainings in other communities.

Health Training: Mental and Physical Health Awareness and Responsiveness

As evaluations of police become more common and comprehensive, there is an increasing sense of need for police officers with both basic first aid skills and mental illness awareness. According to a study funded by Psychiatric Services entitled ‘The Police and Mental Health,’ “There is evidence that police training generally is inadequate to prepare police officers to identify and deal with persons with mental illness” (Lamb, Weinberger, and DeCuir). Additionally, a police officer’s ability to deal with emergency medical situations is essential not only to the survival of the individual, but also to upholding their image as one that is trustworthy and helpful (Alonso-Serra, Delbridge, Auble, Mosesso, and Davis). In order for UPP officers to be most successful and trustworthy, it is necessary for them to meet both of these needs of the community.

In order to do this, it is necessary to establish a partnership with the Secretariat of Municipal Health and Civil Defense (SMSDC). The SMSDC, in conjunction with Service

Mobile Response Units (SAMU) (also under the jurisdiction of the SMSDC), and potentially other capable private organizations, will then conduct a unit on basic first aid training and one on mental illness awareness and response. Completion of these units should occur during initial training for new UPP officers, and be offered as training addendums to current UPP officers who have not yet had this type of training.

The first aid unit ought to be fairly basic, introducing officers to essentials of emergency medical response and training them on procedure to follow in case of an emergency (see Chapter Seven). Mental illness awareness and response training will give officers tools to identify various kinds of mental illnesses, as well as attempt to reduce the stigma often associated with mental illness and those who suffer from it (Reuland and Schwarzfeld). Proper procedure in the event of an emergency medical situation involving mentally ill persons will also be reviewed (see Chapter Seven). The SMSDC will be essential in developing curriculum for and co-leading the training, as “Training led by both law enforcement and mental health professionals, with the active participation of police trainees, is thought to be the most effective teaching process” (Lamb, Weinberger, and DeCuir).

Gendered and Domestic Violence Training:

According to the study *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais*, 43% of officers described their training on domestic violence procedure as being improperly given and inadequate (Soares, Lemgruber, Musumeci and Ramos 7). Yet, reports of domestic violence have actually increased since the installment of UPPs in the majority of communities (Brazilian Forum of Public Safety 33), and 95% of UPP officers consider prevention and response to domestic violence to be one of their main duties as a community police officer

(Soares, Lemgruber, Musumeci and Ramos 8). These numbers imply that domestic violence training should not only be proper, but extensive for future UPP officers. Training should not just train officers on how to respond to issues of domestic violence post-incident, but “more emphasis should be placed on the prevention of domestic violence... Prevention of child abuse, spousal abuse, school desertion, delinquency, and drug addiction will have important impacts in terms of reducing future levels of domestic violence” (Larraín).

In order for the UPP to develop an effective and engaging training on prevention of and response to domestic violence, the UPP ought to establish a partnership with the State Council for Women’s Rights of Rio de Janeiro (CEDIM) and other relevant private and nonprofit organizations focused on women’s issues. These outside programs will have specific knowledge in domestic violence issues that many UPP officials do not have, and thus be able to contribute cogently to both the development of curriculum and facilitation of training for future UPP officers. While response training should emphasize non-judgemental approaches to any situation of domestic violence and the fact that domestic violence is a crime, prevention training should give UPP officers tools to help foster a community free of child and spousal abuse, school desertion, delinquency, and drug addiction (Woods).

Practicum:

Following a successful completion of training, UPP officers will be required to complete a practical training. In this training new officers will be paired with more experienced officers as his or her mentor. This partnership comes partially as a reaction to the need expressed by 48.5% of current UPP officers who participate in the study *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais* for more mentorship of new officers by experienced UPP officers (Soares,

Lemgruber, Musumeci, Ramos 6-7). This mentor will offer guidance and also test the skills the new officer was to learn in initial training during the first 6 months of practical UPP work. Officer and mentor will hold weekly check-in sessions in which the new officer can ask questions and the experienced officer can expound upon areas for improvement. Gradually new officers can begin to take on more responsibility as mentors see fit. If for some reason mentors find that their mentees are inadequately prepared for work as UPP officers they can recommend that they retake portions of initial training. A similar program was discussed by UPP officials previously, and thus plans for this may already be underway (Tierney).

Conclusion:

As the UPP program continues to develop and grow, it is important that the training for officers respond dynamically and effectively to these changes. Currently, officers are being trained very well in some areas; however, the areas in which training is the strongest are not necessarily reflective of what UPP officers do most often. Thus, as training is revised for future UPP officers, policy makers must work to be sure the needs of communities are being met, and that officers are being trained adequately for the tasks they will be performing on a daily basis. Some of the specific issues it needs to address in more detail are conflict mediation, social integration of officers and favelados, domestic violence response and prevention, mental illness awareness and basic emergency medical response. Each of these areas of training will be best developed and facilitated by experts in each speciality; for that reason the UPP needs to seek partnerships with these experts (other government organizations, nonprofits, and private organizations).

Additionally, training for UPP officers ought to engage with the goals of UPP directly

and foster empathy and respect in future UPP officers for favelados. It is crucial that from the get-go the traditional “us vs. them” mindset of police vs. favelados be rejected, and that the hierarchy of police over citizens be leveled. These goals can be achieved not only through more effective training of future UPP officers, but through the training of favelados, and the effective coordination of the two groups.

Training is the first experience future UPP officers have with each other, the organization, and the community in which they will be working. It is imperative that the expectations and goals are clearly laid out, mission properly explained and embodied, and necessary skills expertly developed in order for UPP officers to perform well individually and for the organization as a whole to thrive.

Chapter Four

Community Integration

Hallie Scott

Abstract:

Current UPP efforts should be commended for their attempts to foster community dialog, involvement, and accountability. Further attention should be given to these types of interactions, however, in order to achieve the level of trust necessary for the UPP to be successful in both the short and the long term. True dialog and trust requires UPP officers who are visibly and consistently responsive to citizens' concerns. The recommendations presented in this chapter are designed to allow for community oversight of any necessary alterations to the current policing model, according to the views of those at the ground level. Creativity and flexibility are emphasized as key to both the short and long term success of the UPP. Recommendations in the following chapter include:

- 1) Improve resident assemblies by implementing surveys for participants, training officers and community members to facilitate meetings that are professional, respectful, transparent, and welcoming; and requiring UPP attendance*
- 2) Require UPP officers to provide detailed public reports of the ways in which they integrate community feedback.*
- 3) Elect and train a Community Liaison within each favela to facilitate communication, conflict mediation, and accountability among the community, the UPP, and external public service providers.*
- 4) Establish a Community Oversight Committee with full investigative authority in the event that misconduct is reported. The committee should coordinate appropriate actors (or organizations) necessarily involved, depending on the severity of the situation.*

Background:

Before proposing further recommendations, the UPP is commended for opening new doors of opportunity where solidarity, dialog, and empowerment may yet come to fruition. By establishing practices, systems, and rhetoric for community dialog, the UPP has taken the first necessary steps toward addressing the mistrust and misconduct that contribute to violent crime on behalf of both citizens and officers (Tierney 44). Good intentions, however, do not in and of themselves produce peace and solidarity, nor functional policing. Instead, these are positive symptoms of true trust, which is built on nuanced and qualitative understandings of humanization and empowerment (Freire 31).

Due to the current state of mistrust and hierarchical power dynamics, change must be achieved through a process of humanization of “the other” in the eyes, ears, and minds of residents and officers alike (Tierney 46). Tangible manifestations of a collective and concentrated effort to do so should be transparent, publicly communicated, and celebrated. Transparency, accountability, and communication are empty words without continuous action, (re)education, and systemic safeguards to check and balance the power of the police. Efforts recommended in the following chapter include the continuation and utilization of community resident assembly meetings, the creation of a community liaison position, and the establishment of more thorough community oversight via a civilian review committee.

It should be noted, however, that good intentions and tangible efforts alone also fail to ensure successful community participation. There is no guarantee community members will choose to participate in ways delineated or anticipated by UPP authorities, this Task Force, or other community integration advocates. For this reason, UPP units must be exceptionally attentive to the communities they are engaged with. UPP officers must therefore prioritize skills

such as congeniality, listening, conflict mediation, and the ability to remain creatively flexible and adaptable in a professional context. Indeed, the UPP has made exceptional strides forward in their attempts to define and enforce such priorities already. As Soares described in a 2012 interview, ideal UPP officers possess “adaptive plasticity to local specificities; capacity for dialogue, leadership, mediation and diagnosis; freedom to adopt initiatives that mobilize other segments of corporate and government interventions across sectors.”

It is therefore important to note that if a lack of community participation persists despite highly visible attempts and accommodations for dialog, community members are not to be blamed. Instead, community members should be approached in ways that make more sense to their own expectations and assumptions of proper engagement. Real flexibility and “adaptive plasticity” requires patience, open minds, and continual re-education on behalf of both officers and citizens. In the meantime, visible efforts to encourage integration and communication may provide impetus for community discussions concerning the merits of cooperation with police, and may ultimately provide platforms for appropriate alterations to integration efforts.

Because pacified favelas to date have successfully established internal organization methods for coordinating community meetings (upprj.com), this Task Force does not propose an entirely new model for establishing such coordination. Instead, now is the opportunity to capitalize on the success of current community integration efforts, to build the trust that the UPP currently lacks, and to strengthen the reach of community oversight in order to further UPP transparency, accountability, and communication. The recommendations suggested here seek to capitalize on current momentum, redress current concerns, and explicitly allow for community oversight of any necessary alterations to these recommendations. Creativity, flexibility, and “adaptive plasticity” should be further emphasized as priorities for UPP success in the short and long term.

Recommendation 1: Improve resident assemblies by 1) Implementing surveys for participants; 2) Training officers and community members to facilitate meetings that are professional, respectful, transparent, and welcoming; and 3) Requiring UPP attendance.

Resident assemblies are valuable because they have the potential to be “vehicle[s] for building the autonomous capacity of residents to help themselves and to lobby effectively... to address their most pressing problems” (Skogan, *Police and Community* 140). Promoting the capacity of residents to involve themselves with decisionmaking would strengthen the UPP by integrating community insight with the ability to mobilize police resources and policies. However, privileging the perspectives of the community over the police or police over the community will lead to failed opportunities for community empowerment and crime reduction (Skogan, *Police and Community* 140).

Instead, a type of integration should be encouraged that strives for equal footing and partnership among the two groups. By sharing authoritative capacity, UPP police autonomy would be limited relative to other police divisions. This is not a bad thing, however, because it is the only way to form a truly productive democratic partnership between the police and the community. The UPP will benefit from local knowledge, priorities, and the political support necessary to reduce violence, change the cultural norms that perpetuate hatred and mistrust, and to also assist in tangible community development in powerful ways.

Currently, some resident assemblies function better than others, as a result of several factors: the internal dynamics of the community, how long the community has been pacified, how successfully meetings are advertised, and the ways in which the UPP has (or hasn't) already

engaged with residents. In cases such as in Babilônia, resident assemblies are well organized, with an elected board of community members and UPP officers who attend and receive complaints directly (Barbosa de Brito, interview). In other communities, such as Vidigal, meetings in April 2012 were canceled without notice, important local issues were neglected, and community input was dismissed in ways that negatively reinforced hierarchies between favelados and government officials (rioonwatch.org). A survey of 359 UPP police recruits by the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies at the University Candido Mendes in Rio de Janeiro reports that while most UPP officers “said that collaborating with public agencies, identifying community problems, developing sport and educational activities and providing social assistance was what they should be doing, only 5 percent said that they attend community meetings with frequency” (qtd in Tierney, 58). The survey points to a significant disconnect between good intentions and actual practice.

While many resident assemblies may already do several of the things suggested in this chapter, there is currently no unit by which to measure their qualitative success. Therefore, as an initial step, it is recommended that anonymous surveys be handed out to participants on-site at every resident assembly, and promptly reviewed by UPP officers and authorities as a source of immediate feedback. Introduction of surveys would provide an immediate means to measure the success of ongoing meetings, as well as provide insight as to how to improve future meetings. Though these surveys would not comprise a complete measure of community integration, they would be a start. Suggested survey questions include:

- Did the meeting begin and end when you expected it to? Do you consider this meeting a good use of your time?

- Do you feel important issues and concerns were addressed?
- Do you feel your concerns were specifically addressed?
- As far as you are aware, are the meeting minutes and agendas publically accessible? Are these meetings advertised adequately?
- What would you like to see changed in these meetings?
- What would you like to see changed in your community? How would you suggest addressing this and what do you think the role UPP officers should (or shouldn't) play?
- Do you have a complaint about the UPP? Feel free to use this anonymous survey to do so.

The success of each meeting depends in large part on successfully managing a variety of interests. Meetings must facilitate free discussion and imaginative thinking while also producing concrete means to improve police action within a community. This chapter identifies three separate characteristics of successful meetings. Meetings should be A) professional and respectful, B) transparent, and C) welcoming. Below are specific recommendations focused on improving meetings in order to further enhance these three characteristics:

A. Professionalism and Respect: Balancing Efficiency and Flexibility:

There is a fine line between efficiency and flexibility. While it is important to be flexible enough to address new issues and alternative narratives to the official agenda, it is also important to appropriately manage meetings so as to address important issues without wasting time or getting off topic. Being respectful of participants' time is just as important as being respectful of participants' concerns.

Enhancing professional legitimacy in the eyes of residents and officers alike will require

showing respect through punctuality, reliability, and efficient meeting management. In the case of Chicago's community policing project of the 1990s, Skogan cites that a major obstacle to success was that "many beat community meetings were not very well run" (Skogan, *On the Beat* 229). Cases of mismanaged meetings included instances where group conversations got off topic, police officers dominated discussions about neighborhood concerns, or police failed to give adequate progress reports on projects they had previously agreed to report on (Skogan, *On the Beat* 229).

It is therefore highly recommended that the UPP provide training for both residents and officers involved with resident assemblies in problem-solving, meeting management, and conflict resolution. In addition to training recommendations made in Chapter Three, the UPP should provide residents and officers in training specifically concerning meeting management with emphasis on the following.

- Meeting agendas need to be concise and straightforward, with tangential topics tabled and (importantly) scheduled for further review.
- Meeting minutes should be recorded and posted publicly online and on site (i.e. at the time of, or just after the meeting's adjournment).
- Meeting agenda should focus on local issues determined by community members rather than concerns directed solely by the UPP, UPP Social, or IPP (which occasionally happens, as cited by Cath). This would preemptively avoid replicating circumstances in Chicago's meetings where officers dominated community dialog (Skogan, *On the Beat* 229).
- Meetings should be, and usually are currently, held in locations that are locally well

known and easily accessible (Cath). This is important to continue in order to provide spaces that are familiar to residents so they feel it is a safe place to complain, coordinate, and mobilize.

- Surveys that include complaint forms (as suggested earlier) have been used in community meetings elsewhere in Chicago and Oakland as a way to air individual grievances in ways that do not dominate agendas that focus on broader, community-wide problem-solving efforts (Skogan, *Police and Community* 147).
- It is also important that resident assemblies be highly visible and extremely well advertised. The UPP should promote these meetings in pamphlets, newsletters, and on the radio (see Chapter Eleven). Community meeting members in Chicago often call participants on the phone to remind them of meeting dates and locations (Skogan 41). Other NGOs, schools, churches, and community groups may also be willing to spread the word through their own channels of communication and advertising. In this way, the UPP should be specifically responsible for telling people when outside service providers are invited to attend resident assembly meetings. The subject of social services will be further addressed later in this chapter.
- Resident assemblies should also be predictable in duration and monthly scheduling. Ideally, assemblies would be held at the same time every month and for the same duration of time so community members are able to plan around them. Accommodation and flexibility, however, is necessary to some degree to ensure a popular turn out.
- Progress reports on UPP responses to community concerns, and on other local problem-solving efforts should be prioritized on every agenda in order to help sustain enthusiasm and involvement. Self-evaluating the implementation of solutions to community-

identified problems is important to increase efficiency for future problem-solving efforts (Skogan, *Police and Community* 149).

In all of these logistical components of meeting management and training, community problem-solving should be at the heart of the UPP's approach to engaging with resident assemblies. Residents and officers alike should be trained in problem solving and should collaboratively tackle local issues accordingly. Community problems should be identified and prioritized by assembly participants, and thoroughly analyzed before strategizing possible solutions and eventually evaluating their implementation. A "problem" should be defined as an ongoing, chronic issue that concerns the community at large, and would not be resolved without active intervention (Skogan, *On the Beat* 35). This is important so as to collectively define the appropriate role of the UPP in solutions to community problems as they are identified and analyzed.

In Skogan's research on Chicago's community policing efforts, he cites this type of problem-solving as an attribute of effective meetings that became regular and reliable ways for the police and communities to coordinate (Skogan, *On the Beat* 228). Another example of effective community problem-solving occurs in Oakland, where community members prioritize problems and locations for police officers to invite representatives from service agencies (such as housing, fire, public works, vector control, and Pacific Gas and Electric) to inspect the sites and propose solutions (Green Mazerolle 3). However, the National Institute of Justice reported that these efforts in Oakland were effective only when a.) all parties reach[ed] consensus around the appropriateness of applying civil remedies to reduce crime and disorder problems, and b.) when community discussions successfully "articulate[ed] the purpose of the intervention strategies, the

situations that [would] invoke enforcement of the rules, and the nature of the responses. People need to know why, when, where, and how rules will be enforced” (Green Mazerolle, 6). It is therefore recommended that the UPP provide opportunities for communication between residents and service providers, and that miscommunications or conflicts are appropriately mediated if necessary to ensure favelados are treated fairly by outside service providers.

B. Transparency: Include Residents in Communication and Decision-Making:

It is recommended that the UPP utilize resident assembly meetings to further include residents in the decision-making process. By opening assemblies to round-table discussions about controversial regulations, the community would have opportunities to take ownership of the environment of their own favela. For example, such assemblies are appropriate forums to discuss and negotiate regulation of the *bailes funk*. While the dances were initially banned by the UPP, different communities have since negotiated different regulations (Stahlberg, 16). This type of discussion and flexibility should be encouraged and developed, and should delve further into areas of controversial decisions made by the UPP. By promoting collective community problem-solving and decision-making residents are able to determine appropriate ways to fill the power vacuum left by expelled drug traffickers (insightcrime.org). Such collaborative decision-making would also prevent UPP officers from stepping into that vacuum (out of necessity) in arbitrary, irregular, or controversial ways (insightcrime.org).

C. A Welcoming Atmosphere: Solidarity, Humanization, and Trust:

In order for resident assemblies to reach their full potential for community empowerment and integration, the atmosphere must avoid perpetuating oppressive hierarchies and power

dynamics. There are concrete things officers should preemptively avoid and proactively do to facilitate positive change.

While the educational nature of several current UPP meetings is a step in the right direction, it is easy to accidentally reinforce status and hierarchy in educational settings, defeating the purpose of community integration efforts (Cath). It is recommended that the education provided in community meetings avoid telling citizens what they already know, such as statistics about the day-to-day life and logistics favela residents experience intimately (Cath). Instead, community meetings should educate and remind participants of their legal rights and responsibilities as citizens and officers. It is just as important for citizens to understand the rights and responsibilities of new UPP officers as it is for citizens to understand their own rights. By ensuring every participant has a baseline of vocabulary and understanding of expectations, communication will be more efficient in the long term. An educational pamphlet about the rights of citizens, the police, and actions officers can and cannot do is one example of an effective and respectful educational tool. Residents in Santa Marta published one such pamphlet that includes descriptive cartoon illustrations so as to reach an even broader audience (Visão de Favela Brazil).

Due to the success of UPP officers in new roles such as dance instructors, karate teachers, and tutors, the UPP is making unprecedented strides toward re-defining interactions between residents and police officers (upprj.com). While these projects should be encouraged and promoted, further work must be done to address deep-set assumptions about power dynamics between police and favelados. Hierarchies unavoidably entrenched in “teacher/student” relationships should be complemented by more informal interactions. By requiring officers to interact with residents on creative and social levels while not wearing UPP uniforms, spaces will

open for trust to be built on more equal ground.

Educational role-playing of *abordagens* (approach and search) may prove to be one way for officers and residents at assembly meetings to gain understanding of each other's perspectives. This has been practiced successfully in other cases specific to UPP efforts, and should be encouraged in broader settings that reach more community members (Stahlberg, 17). According to an interview with Juliana Barrosa about community youth meetings (coordinated by The State Department of Public Safety and the Social Action Department), Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg concluded that such role-playing allowed "the youth [to] understand how hard it is to approach reluctant and distrustful teenagers, and also [the] officers [to] understand how youth feel discriminated against and disrespected" (17). To carry this idea further, Augusto Boal's *Theater of the Oppressed* may prove helpful in dissolving tensions between police and residents. *Theater of the Oppressed* is a process Boal developed to empower participants by allowing them to pause, reverse, and ultimately determine the outcome of real-life scenes played out on stage by group volunteers. In this way, participants reverse roles, experience alternative perspectives, and control the environment where social tensions are examined and where former antagonists become fellow participants together (Schaedler, 142). The fact that the State Department of Public Safety and the Social Action Department in Rio has already broken this ground in youth meetings that focus on police interactions is to be applauded, encouraged, and expanded.

Similarly less formal events would provide an increasingly participatory space for less regulated integration. In order to reduce atmospheres of formality and tension, perhaps residents would support bringing food and eating together socially after resident assembly meetings. This may provide incentive to keep meetings timely and efficient, and also provide time and space for

community members and officers to mingle socially when and if they feel comfortable to do so. Alcohol in such settings would be ill advised, as would food handouts from the UPP facilities. Such events would necessarily need to be defined and supported by officers and community members individually, in the style of a potluck. Eating together would humanize officers, while celebrating the talents and graciousness of good cooks in the community. It would provide a safe space for all ages to integrate, collaborate and enjoy being around each other. Providing informal spaces where officers can be seen as trustworthy people who are similar to residents and enjoy the same things as residents is a powerful way to break down barriers of hierarchy, distrust, and hatred.

It is also important for all UPP officers to be as informed as possible concerning community concerns and integration. UPP officers who visibly participate and invest in community integration are more likely to be trusted by community members. It is therefore recommended that resident assembly meetings include not only on-duty police officers, but also off-duty police officers as well, who would be monetarily compensated if necessary. These officers should also be encouraged to attend dressed in civilian clothes rather than police uniforms, to further humanize officers in the eyes of residents. According to the survey quoted earlier (conducted by the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies at the University Candido Mendes in Rio de Janeiro), most UPP officers said that attending resident assemblies “was what they should be doing” and yet only 5 percent actually go (qtd in Tierney, 58). Requiring attendance with pay would provide incentives for good intentions to be realized in proactive efforts.

Regardless of the event or activity, informal integration with community members is absolutely necessary to build trust and begin to dissolve decades of negative connotations,

oppression, and dehumanization. In order to begin to dissolve such a long history of police violence, it is imperative that the UPP become a face of the police that is approachable, trustworthy, and humanized (Tierney, 55). It is therefore highly recommended that UPP coordinate efforts with community members to promote integration on informal levels of interaction with respect, good humor, and congeniality.

Recommendation 2: Require UPP officers to provide detailed public reports of the ways in which they integrate community feedback:

While the UPP is commended for providing multiple ways for residents to submit feedback, there is more work to be done. Positive efforts currently in effect include the aforementioned resident assemblies, email forums via the UPP and Ouvidoria (state Ombudsman) website, and cases of personal phone numbers given to community members who report complaints to UPP superiors directly (Barbosa de Brito, interview). The fact that residents feel comfortable enough to contact UPP Captains directly is a huge success. The momentum of such progress should be capitalized on and further developed. Phone numbers to contact should be posted on UPP vehicle bumpers, and all UPP personnel and vehicles should be readily identifiable.

It is also recommended that UPP/Community feedback be directed both ways. By requiring UPP officers to provide detailed public reports of the ways in which they integrate and respond to community feedback, communication routes would open as two sided conversations of accountability. While current UPP efforts to receive complaints are making progress, it is imperative that they respond promptly and remain accountable for the feedback they are given. “Effective accountability mechanisms depend on the availability of information, sureness,

fairness, speed, and strictness with which sanctions are brought” (Bayley, 1985). If the community is not given explicit and regular reports of ways UPP units are responding, progressive efforts to date will prove null and void. Accountability is key to building trust, and to keeping current feedback systems effective. Resident assemblies would provide an established audience, atmosphere, and platform for detailing these reports.

Recommendation 3: Elect a Community Liaison within each favela to facilitate communication and accountability between the community, the UPP, and public service providers:

Going beyond resident assemblies, it is recommended that each UPP unit establish a community liaison to further coordinate communication between community members, the UPP, and service providers outside the favela. In the words of Sankar Sen, “[while] the public is to be seen as co-producer with the police of safety and order, community liaison officers strengthen the links between the community and police” (Sen, 30).

The role of the community liaison would be distinguishable from that of a state ombudsman in several key ways. First of all, each favela should have its own liaison. The community liaison would be a member of the favela community, nominated by his/her fellow favelados, and concerned only with internal affairs of that specific community’s relationship with their specific UPP officers and appropriate service providers. Secondly, the liaison should be monetarily compensated due to the time and effort required to attend to liaison responsibilities. However, because the liaison needs to be trustworthy in the eyes of citizens who are wary of the state, it is not recommended that the liaison become an employee of the state, the police, or the UPP. Further research should be done in order to develop an appropriate legal contract to ensure the liaison is paid appropriately for his/her work, while avoiding the

possibility of being accused of bias, bribery, or loyalty to anyone other than his/her favela.

The role of said liaison would include providing the community with specific representative oversight of the way the UPP and outside service providers interact with and are held accountable by community members. It is necessary for the UPP to share this authority with a highly visible and trustworthy community member in order to share responsibility for successful collaborative projects as well as to share accountability if projects fail (Sen, 30). The UPP and the community liaison should be seen as distinct parties collaborating for the development and empowerment of the community. Sharing authority is necessary for effective and even-sided collaboration. For this reason, a liaison should provide a distilled route of communication and accountability between the resident assembly, the UPP authorities, and outside service providers.

It is recommended that the UPP provide adequate training for the community liaison to attend to responsibilities such as:

- Conflict Mediation: Courses taught by instructors from the Rio de Janeiro Court System's (TJ-RJ) School of Judicial Administration (ESAJ) are currently offered to UPP officers and have proven helpful (Oliveira). These courses should be offered to the community liaison as well, so as to promote community leadership in coordination with UPP efforts.
- Attending resident assemblies, and managing them to the degree the assembly deems appropriate: It is highly recommended that the community liaison be trained (for free) in meeting management, conflict resolution, and the legal rights of citizens, police officers, and social service organizations. In this way, the

liaison will be a valuable resource to community resident assemblies.

- Using problem-solving skills to provide yet another route of communication concerning complaints, grievances, and constructive criticism of UPP police: The liaison would be charged with filtering, airing, and addressing community complaints, grievances, and support concerning UPP units (when federal investigation is not necessary). This would be internal in regard to the relationship between favela residents and UPP officers who work there, and should be established in addition to the current systems used by complainants.
- Hold service providers accountable for promised projects: Due to the complex nature of public and private service providers, the liaison should communicate community priorities and concerns to UPP officers. The UPP should then contact appropriate service providers, inviting them to attend resident assembly meetings so the community can show them problematic locations or issues to be addressed. After the UPP contacts appropriate service providers, it is the duty of the liaison to hold these service providers accountable for promptly following through on promised projects. Service providers may include water, sewer, garbage, civil infrastructure, legal advice, health care, and job training, among others. (See Chapter Four for further details.) During these transactions, it is recommended that a UPP officer be present to ensure communication is effective, conflicts are mediated, and legal rights are protected. The liaison should also be trained in this regard to share the responsibility of ensuring safe spaces for these transactions to be as effective as possible.
- Any other duties as determined by assembly participants.

The liaison's role to manage internal communication would vary depending on each community's goals, needs, and preferred routes of communication. However, it is to be noted that creating and facilitating universally accessible forums where community members can anonymously air complaints is vital to creating systemic accountability within individual UPP units. It is also advisable to have a system of internal process and review to relieve the more general UPP bureaucratic burden of attending to complaints of misconduct more appropriately settled internally at a local level. By addressing disagreements, concerns, and complaints internally, the community liaison would be in a position to add additional community oversight to promote a prompt and fair process of investigation, review, and redress.

The Liaison and the Police: Providing yet another route of communication concerning complaints, grievances, and constructive criticism of UPP police

While the UPP currently has online forms for anonymous complaints and suggestions, they require a gender, race, and marital status profile of the witness (upprj.com). A community liaison would prove advantageous since community members are more likely to feel comfortable complaining and making suggestions to someone they know and trust. The community liaison would also act as a primary filter in the event that frivolous complaints are made or hate mail is sent. It is recommended that the liaison have an independent business email account to deal with UPP concerns and communicate regularly with UPP officers. The liaison would need to be available to collect anonymous written concerns from physical drop-boxes in designated areas for people who prefer not to plug in online.

Promptness and reliability on behalf of both the officers and the liaison is strongly

emphasized. The community and their liaison should preemptively determine appropriate repercussions in the event that the liaison neglects his/her responsibilities. Explicit expectations of responsibilities and repercussions are necessary for effective communication in the long term. While the role of the liaison is to determine whether the UPP unit is prompt, reliable, and incorporates community feedback, the liaison should not have punitive authority over officers. That being said, if the liaison is prompt and reliable the community will know when the UPP is not. Appropriate local political pressure is therefore key to incentivizing UPP officers to respond quickly to community feedback.

When this happens effectively, it is also the liaison's duty to draw community attention to UPP growth and development in a celebratory way. Since it is recommended that community meetings include check-ups where UPP officers explain how their unit specifically incorporates community feedback, it is also advised that the liaison ensure this type of transparency and accountability is demonstrated on a month-by-month basis. While community oversight is important for accountability reasons, it is just as important to celebrate and support UPP improvement in ways that boost moral and solidarity.

The Liaison and Outside Services: Connecting community members with appropriate service providers

Due to the complicated system of networks that publically and privately provide services, the community liaison would be charged with communicating resident priorities to UPP officers. After the UPP connects social service providers to community members, the liaison should be charged with holding providers accountable for promised projects. This liaison responsibility is further explained in Chapter Four. It is therefore recommended that the UPP distill sources of

relevant information appropriate for concerns specified by community members. It is advantageous to have the UPP in charge of connecting resident assembly members to service providers such as:

- Secretaria Municipal de Assistencia Social
- Municipal Conservation River Light
- Municipal Works-Geo-Rio
- Secretaria Especial de Ciencia e Tecnologia
- Secretaria Municipal de Conservacao-Seconserva
- Secretaria Municipal de Conservacao-Comlurb
- SMTR: Secretaria Municipal de Transportes
- Secretaria Municipal de Urbanismo

The liaison would be in charge of keeping track of contractual agreements between service providers and favelados, and for reminding service providers to attend relevant meetings for project updates and reports. In this way, public pressure will provide incentive for civil projects to remain transparent and accountable. Communication between those receiving services and those providing services is vital to successful development in favelas.

Recommendation 4: Establish a Community Oversight and Accountability Committee with full investigative authority and the responsibility to coordinate appropriate actors (or organizations) necessarily involved, depending on the severity of the situation:

Civilian oversight is recommended in order to hold the police accountable not only to the law, but also to the citizens it protects and serves. Idealistically, “in a democracy, police remain ultimately accountable for its performance to the people. It has also a proximate responsibility to

the law of the land which expresses the will of the people” (Sen, 1). In reality, new systems of accountability and investigation need to be established in order to progress toward such ideals. Mechanisms of civilian review would provide demonstrative political systems to hold police accountable directly to the people. Furthermore, Civilian oversight committees would make UPP accountability efforts visible to the public, and if they are effective, they will lend legitimacy to the UPP’s appeal for change. The purpose of civilian oversight is not to punish every wrongdoing of police officers, but to demonstrate that the UPP is a responsible and trustworthy institution (Sen 3). If properly used, civilian oversight will also deflect unfounded criticisms of police, isolate officers who are “bad apples,” and win a higher public perception of trust and reliability (Sen 5).

Arguments that civilian oversight damages police morale are understandable. However, separate surveys by Douglas Perez (1994), and by Mike Maguire and Claire Corbett (1991) found that external oversight projects in several different American and British police establishments had no negative impacts on police moral or enforcement practices (qtd in Sen 39). Similarly, the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) in Australia released a 1997 report that external oversight of the Queensland police department was effective in numerous ways that also had no negative impacts on police morale (Brereton, 2000). Indeed, Andrew Goldsmith argues that civilian oversight strengthens police forces by fostering civilian cooperation, coordination, and support (Goldsmith 36). If the police lack this type of support from residents, they instill fear and mistrust instead, which is the opposite of the UPP’s intended effect (Sen 39).

In the case of Queensland, Australia, the external civilian oversight commission successfully “(a) institutional[ized] vigorous and independent investigations of complaints against the police, (b) employ[ed] various surveillance strategies... (c) ma[de] policy

recommendations directly to the police services, and (d) participat[ed] in external reviews [of police conduct]” (Sen 40). Despite such significant autonomy of the external oversight committee, CJC evaluations that incorporated interviews with veteran as well as junior police officers indicated that since establishing civilian oversight, police corruption and misuse of force decreased, while police morale remained the same (Sen 39).

Logistical Components of Creating a Civilian Oversight Committee

- A respected community member should be elected by the local resident assembly to lead the committee, and the UPP should monetarily compensate him/her in the event of investigation.
- The UPP should hire an independent private investigator to help gather and present evidence objectively. Full investigative authority should be granted to the independent investigator to ensure transparency and objectivity.
- The rest of the committee should be made up of 50% community leaders, and 50% UPP representatives.

If accusations of misconduct are made, the committee should first conduct an internal investigation to determine whether a federal investigation is warranted. Severe circumstances should be dealt with externally through the judicial systems currently in place. Severe misconduct includes allegations of corruption, torture, or otherwise perverting the course of justice (Sen 55). All accusations of illegal activity should be taken seriously, appropriately investigated and promptly referred to the correct state authorities. Suggesting an overhaul of the state judiciary is outside the scope of this task force.

In the event that initial committee investigations determine the affair would be more appropriately and promptly handled internally, the committee should have full internal investigative power to do so. Full investigative power is key to give civilian oversight the teeth necessary to be trustworthy and effective. Failed attempts of civilian oversight include the British Police Complaint Board established in 1976, due to its lack of autonomy. “It failed to command public confidence because of its lack of independent investigative powers and pro-establishment character of its members” (Sen 52). UPP superiors should therefore explicitly require officers to respect the investigative authority of the proposed civilian oversight committee, and the investigative body should be granted access to all UPP records and files.

During investigation, UPP officer(s) involved should be temporarily removed from the favela. It is important that the officer be removed from the heat of the situation in order to prevent further accusations of misconduct, and to give all parties involved space calm down. It is also a visible demonstration of tangible ways in which the UPP takes into account community grievances. This is not to say that the UPP should disavow their officer, if the accused is exonerated he/she should be welcomed back as quickly as possible. This is just a precautionary measure to protect the credibility of all parties involved.

If the investigative committee discovers the accused guilty of misconduct, UPP authorities should promptly delineate their intended disciplinary procedures and present these procedures to the civilian oversight committee before their enactment. The committee (made of 50% UPP representatives, 50% community members, the community liaison, and the independent investigator) should then collectively review the procedures, and propose further suggestions, comments, and concerns. UPP authorities should be obligated to prove ways in which the committee’s proposals were considered, enacted, or altered. UPP authorities and the

civilian oversight committee should be required to agree on proper disciplinary measures. Police scholars such as Corbett Clair have argued that, for less severe complaints, informal conflict mediation and resolution often have more success than punitive measures of punishment (Sen, 43). Supervised reconciliation meetings are therefore recommended in cases where complainants may feel more satisfied with an apology face-to-face.

The community liaison should then report an overview of the affair at the next resident assembly. (The community liaison should be charged with protecting sensitive details, names, and identities when appropriate.) This report should include a brief overview of the situation, as well as a detailed explanation of the intended disciplinary procedures as agreed upon by UPP authorities and the oversight committee. While the committee itself should not have disciplinary power over UPP officers, the community liaison should publicly report regular updates concerning the progress of said disciplinary measures. In order to give the committee punitive teeth without threatening the autonomy of UPP authorities, it is recommended that full transparency and communication be emphasized. UPP units should communicate promptly with the oversight committee, and the committee must be prepared to investigate in the event that communications falter. The oversight committee must also be transparent in their communication with the community's resident assemblies. Political pressure on behalf of the residents will give powerful incentive for police to follow through appropriately. The committee's punitive authority would therefore come from their full investigative power, so that officers and authorities alike know that the community is watching both internal and external ways in which UPP units respond to misconduct.

Conclusion:

While the UPP should be commended for unprecedented strides forward in changing the nature of community integration, transparency, and accountability, there is more to be done. It is at this moment that the momentum of the UPP must be appropriately utilized and expanded if the program is to ultimately succeed. With this urgency in mind, there are concrete things the UPP can preemptively avoid or can proactively do to collaborate with communities, facilitate positive change, and ensure future development. By utilizing the current resident assemblies as venues for transparency, accountability, and informal integration, UPP units would more effectively support the development and empowerment of their favela communities. In training both residents and officers in problem-solving, conflict mediation, and legal rights, the UPP would give all parties the necessary tools to coordinate solutions unique to situational circumstances. The UPP should also provide detailed monthly reports to residents to show how each community affects the ways in which UPP units make decisions, interact with residents, establish priorities, and respond to complainants. By establishing a community liaison the UPP would be able to utilize a distilled communication route between the police, the community, and outside service providers. And finally, to further democratize this proactive partnership with residents, a civilian oversight committee with full investigative power would further testify to the UPP's dedication to community integration, accountability, and transparency.

Chapter Five

Recidivism and Panel System

Ramiro Reyes

Abstract:

Recidivism involving violent crime poses a direct threat to the stability of safety and security within Rio de Janeiro. The deaths of multiple on duty UPP officers within the *Complexo do Alemão* in 2012 are proof that pacified favelas are not immune to violent crime recidivism. With prisons functioning as “gray social distortion centers” and recidivism rates being as high as 70 percent, there is a high potential for the proliferation of violent crimes due to corrupted and un-rehabilitated prisoners being released back into pacified favelas (Oliveira). Therefore it is necessary to ensure the appropriate measures are implemented and upheld both throughout the pacification process and the reintegration of criminals transitioning from the penal system into pacified favelas. This will ensure that released prisoners have been successfully rehabilitated and are competent to function as crime-free residents within the newly pacified favelas. These measures include expanding on inter-agency cooperation between government and non-government organizations in order to disable Rio’s penal system from functioning as a “school of crime” and appropriately provide the necessary rehabilitating resources and assistance for proper reintegration by:

1. Establishing a working relationship between the UPP and *Instituto Inovare* thus creating a catalyst that promotes cooperative action on behalf of government, NGO, and community agents in order to pool resources and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of any single organization
2. Taking steps to alleviate overpopulation within the penal system by promoting Mutiraos (non-violent conflict resolution programs), and restorative justice program alternatives to prison sentences for non-violent criminals

3. Focusing on reducing corruption and human rights abuses within the penal system by increasing the transparency of the facilities and increasing accountability of its employees, as well as implementing UPP based human rights training for prison employees
4. Eliminate the notion of impunity associated with crime by increasing criteria that prisoners must satisfy prior to their release, and incorporating the UPP into the parole system within favelas
5. Improving and enforcing rehabilitation programs by ensuring they are accessible to prisoners and are appropriately meeting their specific needs

The role of combating recidivism should not fall on a sole entity, but instead a coalition involving government and community agencies should be established in order to feasibly address the issues plaguing the penal system and improve the resources available for rehabilitating criminals.

Schools of Crime: The State of the Penal System

A 2010 report on Brazil's prisons and criminal justice system by the International Bar Association claimed that Brazilian criminal justice system appeared to be "as bad at punishing the guilty as it is at protecting the innocent" (One in Five). Rather than appropriately rehabilitating and releasing criminals back into society, the Brazilian penal system is characterized by its extreme overpopulation, corruption and overall inefficiency as a source of rehabilitation, thus resulting in prisons being popularly referred to as "schools of crime" (Skalmusky). A major issue within the penal system is overpopulation since it not only limits the

effectiveness and restricts the allocation of resources for prisoner rehabilitation, but it also directly facilitates the violation of human rights and perpetuates corruption due to the lack of proper supervision. This corruption refers to the corruption within prison guards and their mistreatment of prisoners, as well as further corruption among the prisoners themselves due to influential prison gangs.

The issues within the penal system are indelibly intertwined with each other, and therefore cannot be treated in isolation since doing so will enable other issues to undermine any progress made. This interwoven nature of issues is portrayed by the promotion of a sense of impunity among criminals due to chronic overpopulation, since often times the lack of room within prison facilities is what causes lax regulations regarding the release of prisoners without proper rehabilitation. The curtailing of this notion of impunity is crucial to reducing recidivism. However the sole increase of prison sentences or the construction of more prisons without addressing the underlying issues regarding rehabilitation will prove unsuccessful in long-term recidivism reduction due to ensuing poverty and criminal traps for families of criminal. These traps are the reason why violence ensues in the first place and therefore will only perpetuate more violence. Therefore the main issues regarding overpopulation, corruption, human rights violations, and prevalent notions of criminal impunity must all be simultaneously addressed, along with the improvement of rehabilitation programs, in order to appropriately reform the penal system's ability to mitigate recidivism and secure peace within Rio.

Reworking the rehabilitation process is no small task, but due to the autonomous nature of the State regarding its authority over the penal system and police force, the first steps at the state level should be implemented in order to ensure the security of the public. Since issues regarding the initial interaction with criminals are equally as important to fighting recidivism as

are the final rehabilitation programs and assistance with reintegration, the police and the judges should be held equally as accountable as prisons. Both the violation of Brazilian laws protecting the rights of prisoners and the abuse of the discretion allotted to the police and judges regarding the sentencing of non-violent criminals greatly contribute to the overpopulation which in turn contributes to issues of impunity and corruption. Therefore, although improving rehabilitation programs in order to mitigating recidivism is the ultimate goal, the underlying issues plaguing the penal system and the police force must first be reformed and this is not an effort that is feasible by a single organization. The promotion of interagency partnerships will be necessary to adequately tackle prison reform in order to establish a solid foundation for the improvement of rehabilitation programs. While specific institutions have the resources and already focus on particular aspects of the rehabilitation processes and penal system reforms, emphasis should be placed on cohesive action involving organizations from a variety of sectors in order to maximize the efficiency of their scarce resources and appropriately make headway in improving the penal system.

Inter-Agency Relations:

According to Augusto Rossini, a senior official at the justice ministry, the federal government's power to improve prison conditions is limited: "it is judges who pass sentences, and states that run prisons" (A Journey Into Hell). However, according to a human rights report on the Brazilian penal system by the International Bar Association, "more effort needs to be put into making the existing parts of the system work better together and encouraging the development of incremental, community-led and home-grown reform (One in Five)." Therefore, an interagency committee must be created to focus on increasing communication and

cooperation among the different sectors involved within the penal system, while also incorporating community and NGO actors. Cooperation between the State Secretariat of Security (SESEG), Secretariat of Penitentiary Administration (SEAP), and the Secretariat of Education (SEEDUC), should be supplemented by these state agencies directly working with the Tribunal of Justice of Rio De Janeiro (TJRJ), thus bridging the dichotomy between executive and judicial branches of government. Cooperation between the State of Rio de Janeiro and the TJRJ has already proven successful via the implementation of the Mediation Program in neighborhoods possessing UPP units. Still, cooperation should not be limited to government agencies but rather the involvement of a variety of different organizations with similar goals is necessary to produce the most efficient and effective results in fighting recidivism. Therefore, a public sphere, where discourse between such organizations and leaders of the communities that will house the released criminals is facilitated, is a top priority in order to ensure collective action. Such a sphere can be established via summits focusing on recidivism by:

- Establishing contact with Marcio Thomaz Bastos, the Chairman of the Council of the Innovare Institution in order to exchange resources and discuss the coordination of such a summit within pacified favelas
- Provide outreach to community leaders and local NGOs via the UPP, the TJRJ via *Instituto Innovare*, and other government agencies, specifically SEAP and SEEDUC, with the intent of promoting a summit focusing on Recidivism while stressing the fact that recidivism is essential to the stability of security

Cooperation is key to maximizing resources and efficiency, and *Instituto Inovare* has proven to be an organization that is competent in addressing issues relative to penal system reform and criminal rehabilitation. Therefore, in such a critical period of pacification, a partnership between the Secretariat of Security and an organization such as *Instituto Inovare* will prove to be greatly beneficial and a catalyst for further cooperation between different agencies with a focus on reducing recidivism.

The Educational Institute of Socio-Cultural Research, *Instituto Inovare*, is a non-profit civil society organization with a mission to develop, implement and transfer policies focusing on improving the performance of public organizations. Through its Premio Inovare award it acknowledges innovative practices contributing to the modernization of Brazilian Justice and has strong ties to the court systems, judges, prosecutors and public defenders throughout Brazil. Due to its strong credentials and experience, *Instituto Inovare* can function as a sort of mediator and legitimize summits focusing on recidivism in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, *Instituto Inovare* has already showed interest in the UPP through its 2011 awards: “Mediation Program in Communities Served by UPP” by Chief Judge Marilene Melo Alves won an award. Therefore, a strong outreach effort intending on solidifying a partnership should be pursued in order to obtain the necessary attention of other organizations and increase their willingness to participate in a summit focusing on recidivism.

Establishing a working relationship with *Instituto Inovare* should be a primary concern, but a partnership with the institute is not the sole partnership that should be promoted. Since the UPP embodies the state within the favelas and helps bridge the gap between the favela residents and the government, the UPP should be in charge of communicating the importance of fighting recidivism to local leaders as well as local NGOs within favelas that provide education programs

and assistance with obtaining employment. By enlightening the community leaders and NGOs about the importance of quelling recidivism, a summit focusing on recidivism will be regarded with greater importance thus encouraging attendance. Finally, representatives from different divisions within the state government including, but not limited to, SEAP and SEEDUC should also be contacted. It is important that SEAP realizes that the high recidivism rate is not only indicative of their incompetence, but also alludes to a larger problem that poses a grave threat to public security, thus tying the responsibilities of SEAP and SESEG together. Furthermore, with SEEDUC already possessing associated departments such as the General Department of Socio-Educational Action (DEGASE), it would be counterproductive to not cooperate and utilize these resources. Therefore contact with directors of these various departments is essential, specifically Rubens Cesar Monteiro De Carvalho of SEAP and Alexandre Azevedo de Jesus of DEGASE. Cooperation by these organizations is crucial, because only by diversifying resources will large issues impeding rehabilitation, such as overpopulation of prisons, become feasible.

Targeting Overpopulation:

According to DEPEN, Brazil's prison system is at 172% capacity (DEPEN). This severe overpopulation of prisons is facilitated via the huge backlog of cases that have resulted in increasing delays within the court system. This accumulation of cases can be attributed to the fact that over 80 percent of prisoners cannot afford a lawyer, and thus a large proportion of the population within the penal system is made up of pre-trial detainees (One in Five). Many people are imprisoned irregularly, spend years in pre-trial detention or remain in prison after the expiry of their sentence due to bureaucratic incompetence or systematic failings (One in Five). Moreover, although it has been stated that the reduction of violence, not the elimination of drug

trafficking, is the main focus of the UPP, at least a third of prisoners are in jail for minor drug offences (Pinherio). Therefore, if violence and not drugs is the real issue, alternative sentences for non-violent drug offences should be enforced. Within Rio, the extent of this overpopulation can be represented by a recent scandal involving the closure of makeshift holding cells where horse stalls and buses were used to hold prisoners (Barnes). Overpopulation directly impedes rehabilitation progress by limiting resources and enabling prisoners to be released after only serving part of their sentences due to lack of space within facilities. This early release also directly promotes notions of impunity. Therefore steps should be taken immediately to reduce this overpopulation by:

- Promoting and working with the Mutirao program in order to release the illegally held pre-trial detainees
- Promote alternatives to prison for non-violent criminals such as community service and restorative justice programs
- Ensure that appropriate methods of arrest are enforced and that prisoners know their rights therefore mitigating illegal detention

Brazil's penal system constantly violates Brazil's own laws and constitutional provisions for the protection of human rights regarding detention policies, and the National Council of Justice (CNJ) announced that one in five pre-trial detainees have been imprisoned irregularly as of 2009 (One in Five). The CNJ and ministry of justice are already promoting change at the federal level within the criminal justice system to ensure that it fulfills its current legal obligations to ensure that everyone enjoys the right to a defense and the right to social rehabilitation (One in Five). Therefore, at the state level, this effort should be assisted via the

implementation and promotion of the Mutirao program in order to alleviate the backlog of pre-trial detainees who have unjustly been incarcerated. Developed by the CNJ and implemented in Brasilia during 2009, the Mutirao program involves participation by the States' Court of Justice, Prosecutors, Public Defenders, Order of Lawyers of Brazil, Prisons Department, Ministry of State Security, SENAI, CNI, universities and other institutions seeking to ensure respect for the fundamental rights and guarantees of prisoners and convicts. Through the Mutirao program, provision of services through legal assistance is offered to the citizens imprisoned unlawfully with the intent of reducing the prison population in police stations. This is done by having a member of the public defender go into the police station thereby allowing the prisoner internal personal contact with his defender.

The Mutirao program reaffirms the notion that partnerships and cooperation is essential in order for programs to succeed, and in late 2011 the CNJ and TJRJ began implementing Mutirao programs within Rio's penal system. Therefore, it is critical to establish contact with the TJRJ, preferably via a cooperation with *Instituto Innovare*, thus bringing into fold the Mutirao program while focusing on establishing a relationship between the UPP, public defender and prisoner in order to determine whether prisoners are prone to recidivism after their release. Although they were held illegally, the release of some prisoners can threatened the security of Rio and therefore a working relationship between the Mutirao program and the UPP should be established in order to appropriately define and gauge the potential risks of released prisoners. This issue alludes to the greater conflict regarding the recognition of differences between violent and non-violent criminals and the respective sentences they each receive.

Brazil's drug law changed in 2006, ostensibly to make distinctions between users and dealers that would be helpful for its justice and penitentiary systems. However, according to the

U.S. Department of State, this seems to have backfired due to police labeling many young black users from favelas as dealers (2010 Report). The police force is entitled to use their discretion as they please because the 2006 law does not specify the quantities of drugs distinguishing between dealer and user. Furthermore, this new law also increased minimum drug trafficking prison terms from three to five years (Ferreira de Souza). According to the Economist, in 2005 a 10th of prisoners were incarcerated because of drug offences (A Journey into Hell). These prisoners who have committed nonviolent drug offences and other non-violent petty crimes are not exempt from the same treatment as the violent offenders, as , and thus may be susceptible to further personal corruption within the penal system due to the influences of prison gangs. Therefore, in order to reduce overpopulation and avoid unnecessary corruption of non-violent criminals actions must be taken to promote incarceration as only the last resort for violent criminals and provide alternative reform programs for non-violent criminals.

Cooperative promotion of restorative practices should be a focus within the Recidivism summit in order to enlighten different organizations on the benefits of such programs. Moreover, information regarding restorative justice practices should be directly provided to the UPP officers with the intention of spreading them throughout the community in form of brochures. Restorative justice is an ideology that emerged in Brazil and includes an expanded concept of justice that transcends the merely judicial applications principles and values. This is done by involving the victims of crime, families, schools, community and the criminal himself, in establishing the proper sentences for crime by focusing on the needs of the victims and offenders as opposed to merely satisfying the legal principles or merely punishing the offender. Institutions such as *Justica Para O Seculo 21* based in Rio Grande have proven to be a great resource and thus their participation in the recidivism summit should be promoted. *Justica Para O Seculo 21*

targets the youth, and since the UPP's target market is also the youth and has recently been involved with peaceful conflict mediation programs, cooperation between the two organizations will prove beneficial (Instituto Innovare). Furthermore, judges such as Joao Baptista Herkenhoff of Esperito Santos should be contacted and asked to be a guest speaker at the recidivism summit. According to *Instituto Innovare*, the retired Judge was able to bring the average recidivism of 67 percent down to 10 percent during his term as judge by employing ethical awareness and using prison sentences only in extreme cases. By having an individual with experience and success in minimizing recidivism speak directly with the UPP and the local judges within Rio, lessons can be obtained and ideas can be influenced which can produce the political will necessary to enforce alternatives to prison sentences.

Restorative justice practitioners and Judge Baptista Herkenhoff are both promoters of the ideology that alternative rehabilitative sentences should be promoted and prison sentences should only function as a last resort. The benefits of such rehabilitative sentences would result in fewer incarcerations and avoid non-violent criminals from being incorporated into the schools of crime while simultaneously developing their human capital. These rehabilitative sentences are in the forms of projects such as Project *Pro-Florescer* based in Rio de Janeiro. This program offers tutoring and vocational education by combining environmental and pre-vocational education and is promoted by the IV Special Criminal Court / TJRJ, Botanical Garden of Rio de Janeiro, and the Association of Friends of JB / RJ. Furthermore this particular program is funded with resources coming directly from the fourth criminal court. Other programs such as Project Manna based in *Codo* have a direct focus on teens with a history of drug offenses and by focusing on social responsibilities they provide rehabilitation programs through dance, music, art, and education which is very similar to the success that Affroreggae has seen.

These programs are few among many more that exist, and are proof that social programs play a critical role in undermining recidivism. Therefore considering that the UPP has already established contact with the TJRJ through the Conflict Mediation Program established by judge Melo-Alvez, further cooperation should be expanded upon this platform by transporting these practices into the penal system. Moreover, direct affiliation with Instituto Inovare will legitimize such efforts in the eyes of the public that may still be somewhat reluctant to believe programs supported solely by the government. Although overpopulation may be the penal systems' problem, the detrimental results due to this overpopulation affect the favela communities and therefore, due to the state's reputation, it would be beneficial if an NGO presence was also visible.

Mutiraos and alternatives sentences are vital to the reduction of overpopulation, but the role that the police play is also important. According to Brazilian law, citizens can only be arrested if there is a warrant for their arrest or if they are caught while committing a crime, therefor it is important to ensure that appropriate methods of arrest are enforced and that prisoners know their rights in order to avoid illegal detention. By having an educated population fully informed of their rights, accountability of the UPP to the public will be reinforced and thus former illegal practices of arrest facilitating the overpopulation of the penal system can be avoided. Therefore it is crucial that the favela residents are educated of their rights and the legal and illegal processes of incarceration and sentencing. This can be accomplished via informative brochures including the favela residents' legal rights and resources such as the Mutiraos and alternative rehabilitation programs offered to them. The UPP should be accountable to the public, and by educating the public, future corrupt methods of arrest and detention will be reduced thus helping reduce overpopulation.

I. Human Rights Violation/ Corruption:

Similar to how corruption within the police force and their ensuing human rights violations have directly attributed to the violence within favelas, corrupted prison guards and the constant violation of the prisoners human rights have proven incredibly detrimental to the rehabilitation process. According to UN Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, “Delays in processing transfers, combined with warden violence and poor conditions, encourage the growth of gangs in prison, which can justify their existence to the prison population at large by claiming to act on behalf of prisoners to obtain benefits and prevent violence (One in Five 11).” This is evident in the fact the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Sao Paulo’s most powerful and violent crime gang, “was initially formed by a group of prisoners to avenge the death of 111 prisoners who were killed during the riot of Carandiru (12).” In fact, according to 1 in 5 Brazil report, Brazil’s criminal gangs recruit most of their members in prison and organize many of their activities from there, and therefore imprisoning people for relatively minor offences has also been shown to be counterproductive and more likely to turn them into repeat offenders than a non-custodial sentence (10).” Although requiring a great amount of resources, effort, and time, the corruption and human rights abuses within the penal system can begin to be decreased by increasing transparency and accountability through:

- Incorporation of UPP based human rights training for the entire penal system supervision staff thus helping reduce human rights violation by prison employees
- increase transparency of prisons by establishing cooperating between UPP and Rio-based Justica Global, and reporting violations of human rights directly to SEAP

Although on paper the legal protections provided to the human rights of prisoners within the Brazilian criminal justice system are among the most progressive in the world, in practice they fall tremendously short of meeting the legal requirements. Therefore by increasing the transparency of facilities and holding them more accountable to their required duties, which also entails holding them accountable for any violations and enforcing the repercussion of illegal activities, one can promote a sense of responsibility within the prison employees. This apathy due to extreme underpayment and understaffing is very similar to the situation plaguing the military police. Therefore cooperation between the UPP and other organizations such as Rio based Justicia Global should be promoted in order to establish more routine inspections of prisons and report the findings directly to SEAP. After SEAP is notified regarding any existing violations and/or lack of reinforcement of legal practices, pressure by SESEG should be placed on SEAP to settle matters. Similar to how the military police's culture must undergo reform through UPP based human rights training, so must the prison guards undergo such training and if SEAP already knows this, then they should be constantly reminded.

The International Center for Prison Studies has led "The Prison Improvement Project" which began in Brazil in 2002 (Ferreira de Souza). This project followed two tracks, one used well tested methods of training staff in a human rights approach to prison management, while the other involved developing an organizational structure that was appropriate for local needs and which would ensure that the skill acquired were implemented in a way that they would become permanent. Previous attempts have already been made catering to human rights training, therefore since the UPP possesses a training program focused around human rights, it would prove very beneficial and effective if these training programs were offered within prisons and

included both prisoners and prison guards.

II. Undermining Criminal Sense of Impunity:

According to senior contributing reporter for The Rio Times, Amy Skalmusky, the prominent notion of “impunidade,” or impunity, permitted by lax regulations requiring violent criminals to only serve a part of their sentence before being allowed parole or progression to a minimum security facility, enables violent criminals to disregard the gravity of their punishment. According to Skalmusky, this impunity results in the 70 percent recidivism rate (Skalmusky). Due to the current maximum sentence of 30 years, parole or progression to open systems or minimum security facilities is granted to all inmates after only serving part of their sentence. The specific requirements are 1/6 of the sentence for common crimes, 2/5 for first time and 3/5 for repeat offenders of heinous crimes including murder, rape, and felony assault. Furthermore, the parole system allows prisoners to come and go from prison once they have served the necessary part of their sentence. Therefore, the parole system has received a great amount of criticism and according to the Inter-American Press Association, the current parole system encourages impunity by allowing prisoners to spend hours a day outside of jail to work and study after the completion of part of their sentence (IAPA). Therefore it is vital to review the process of granting parole to violent criminals and reinforce notions of the consequences of committing violent crimes by:

- Increasing requirements prisoners must satisfy prior the their release including the completion of conflict mediating programs involving the UPP as facilitators
- Incorporating UPP into the parole system by enlisting all paroled criminals into UPP

database and regulating UPP-prisoner interaction via regular meetings in order to establish a peaceful working relationship

- Enlisting all paroled prisoners into UPP based community programs as part of their parole.

Overpopulation and lax regulations regarding the early release of prisoners directly influence notions of criminal impunity. Therefore, as previously discusses, overpopulation must be reduced while also improving the prerequisites for release. However the requirements for release should not merely entail increasing prison sentences, but rather requirements should include appropriate fulfillment of certain programs that develop necessary skills to avoid recidivism and continues requirements of released prisoners to meet specific standards monitored by the UPP. If prisoners are held more accountable for their actions through different methods besides pure punishment, then the social responsibilities associated with committing a crime will reduce the sense of impunity. These social responsibilities include successfully completing education programs and conflict mediation programs. The UPP has already proven to be successful in facilitating such conflict mediation programs within pacified favelas, and therefore their role within such practices targeting prisoners about to be released should be promoted. The goal is to make prisoners earn their freedom via productive programs rather than merely serving a sentence as punishment. However the responsibilities of prisoners should not be limited to responsibilities prior to their release, but rather their responsibilities should be extended to the post-prison period. This extension of responsibilities includes direct communication between rehabilitating prisoner and the local UPP force.

Through cooperation between the UPP and SEAP a database should be established that

includes all released prisoners within pacified favelas with a history of violence. Such a database is necessary in order to help monitor potential risks of recidivism and coordinate periodic checkups, therefore allowing released prisoners to realize that they are still accountable for their actions. In addition to periodic checkups, during the initial months of a prisoner's reintegration into the favelas, it is crucial that the relationship with UPP officers that was initiated behind bars extends to the favelas. Regardless of rehabilitating prisoners' previous experience with police forces, the UPP present a new opportunity to alleviate the deeply imbedded tension between the state and the criminal, thus it is critical that communication and conflict mediation interaction that was initially established within the penal system is appropriately transferred to the pacified favela.

In addition to dialogue between the rehabilitating criminal and the UPP, released criminals should directly be incorporated into UPP based community programs as part of their parole. The UPP has already established itself as a promoter and facilitator of community programs focusing on sports, music, community conflict mediation and garbage collection. Involving former prisoners within procedures of cleaning up the favelas and improving garbage collection can prove especially beneficial by helping both the criminal and the neighborhoods. If former criminals are directly involved with improving their community, it seems less likely that they would contribute to its deterioration through violence. Therefore if the rehabilitating prisoners are made to contribute to community service via such programs where the UPP plays a central role, then the rehabilitating criminal's responsibility increases while simultaneously helping to change negative public perception that very often limits opportunities for rehabilitating individuals. This fostering of responsibility of the criminal can greatly transform his notions of impunity by realizing that the actions of crimes committed have more

consequences than merely the time spent incarcerated.

III. Reinforcing Rehabilitation Program:

Although Brazil's prison rules *Regras Minimas para o Tratamento do Preso on Brasil* (Minimum Rules of the Treatment of Prisoners in Brazil) state that the main purpose of imprisonment should be re-socialization and rehabilitation rather than punishment, and although they also encourage judges to use alternative sanctions to prison such as fines and community service, often times this remains merely on paper and not in practice. Often times the problems regarding rehabilitation of prisoners is not necessarily the programs themselves, but rather their implementation, or lack of, therefore the penal system should be held accountable by a variety of organizations that are directly assisting with rehabilitation programs in order to ensure that the penal system is respecting the laws and doing their just duty. Therefore by not limiting the responsibility solely to SEAP, but instead distributing the responsibility of rehabilitation through a variety of organizations, resources can be diversified thus more appropriately catering to the diverse needs of prisoners. The first steps to establishing these goals are:

- Incorporating and promoting religious, NGO, and community involvement within the rehabilitation process by facilitating their access to prisoners, preferably under supervision of UPP-trained faculty, thus creating a diverse set of rehabilitation programs catering to different needs of prisoners
- Improving opportunities for the development of human capital via rehabilitation programs and following up by providing assistance with obtaining employment and/or further education within favelas after prisoners release

- Contribute to rehabilitation process by incorporating UPP-Prisoner interaction via family visits thus reducing tension while establishing a benevolent relationship between prisoner and officer prior to their release

The rehabilitation process is a lengthy process that should not be restricted to rehabilitation within the penal system nor assistance by exclusively the penal system's limited resources. Instead, by direct cooperation between SEEDUC, SEAP, and SESEG contact with NGO's, local community organizations, and religious organizations should be established in order to incorporate them into rehabilitation programs within prisons. These programs should be focused on the particular organizations mission objective including providing religious services, education, and improving contact with family members. Furthermore, although certain rehabilitation programs should be required, the prisoner themselves should have some freedom regarding what programs he/she wishes to pursue. Although this may seem like a highly idealistic idea, isolated examples have proven that such efforts are effective and therefore cooperation in order to increase the effectiveness and availability of such programs is necessary.

The institutional culture of the penal system values punishment over rehabilitation and fails to hold its employees accountable for abusive acts (One in Five). However rather than focusing on punishment, throughout the rehabilitation process the emphasis should be developing the human capital of the criminal thus giving him/her the appropriate skills necessary to abstain from recidivism after their release. Therefore the penal system should not be solely charged with such a complex and important social issue such as rehabilitation. Different entities within the federal and state government, NGO's and other private groups, as well as religious groups possess a wide range of skills, resources and influence that can attribute proper

rehabilitation and therefore every available form of assistance should be acknowledged and invited to the recidivism themed summit.

The appropriate rehabilitation processes should include programs such as *Projeto Começar de Novo* where the new beginnings program consists of a set of actions aimed at raising public bodies and civil society in order to coordinate the proposed work and professional training courses for inmates and graduates of the prison system . This is done in order to implement actions to promote citizenship and reduce recidivism. Programs at the federal level such as CNJ's *Começar De Novo* which aims to obtain the support of Brazilian business who will agree to employ ex-prisoners to help with their rehabilitation and reintegration to society, can also be adopted at the state level and especially within the new favelas that are formalizing public services and fostering the growth of economic growth (Instituto Inovare). Additionally the PAS project created by a Public defender of Mato Grosso in 2007 exemplifies how isolated assistance programs conceived from the different needs of prisoners will prove beneficial. There are also private organizations such as APAC (Association for Protection and Assistance of the Damned) which are dedicated to the recovery and social reintegration of those sentenced to custodial sentences, and it directly assists the Judicial and Executive powers in the implementation and administration of the criminal enforcement of custodial regimes in closed, semi-open and open facilities. The Department of Socio-Educational Action (DEGASE) is the authority responsible for maintaining Rio de Janeiro's juvenile detention centers in conformity with the statute and in a manner that is consistent with international standards. Local churches should also be encouraged to participate in the rehabilitation process since faith based programs, specifically prisoner led Pentecostalism sermons, have proven to successfully reduce violence by and against participants of the religion. All of resource provide examples of different entities working for the

rehabilitation of prisoners, and therefore a recidivism summit would function as a platform to bring together these different organizations in order to establish a cohesive plan of action that would involve access to rehabilitation both within and outside of prison with an emphasis on developing the human capital of the prisoners.

The role of the UPP within the parole system was mentioned before, but in addition to the UPP playing a role within the favelas, the UPP should also be directly involved within the rehabilitation process within the prisons in order to ease the transition from prison to favela for the prisoners. If benevolent contact is established between UPP officer and prisoner prior to their release, there is a greater chance that a benevolent relationship that will manifest after their release. It is important to acknowledge that prior to the pacification process the likelihood that prisoners had any type of non-hostile interaction with police is slim. Therefore, after their release to newly pacified favelas if prisoners have not made any contact with the UPP it is likely that issues will ensue. Without prior interaction with such a new police entity, prior experiences are likely to create hostility and thus efforts of the UPP may be undermined. Therefore contact via meetings, preferably including family members to mitigate any tension, will greatly contribute to the establishment of a functional relationship between former criminal and UPP. This will be greatly influential in the future interaction between reformed criminal and UPP, and therefore can help fight recidivism.

Conclusion:

In order to ensure long-term reduction of violence and improve security throughout Rio de Janeiro, any notions of a quick and easy solution to the violent crime problem must be disregarded. Furthermore, increasing the number of prisoners, prisons and the length of prison

sentences should not be regarded as appropriate policies to mitigate violent crime. Instead an emphasis on preventive measures for non-violent criminals and the appropriate rehabilitation of released prisoners should be the focal point and goal of any future reforms. However, in order to achieve these goals, it is crucial that the current underlying issues within the penal system that threaten progress in achieving the rehabilitation of prisoners are addressed and steps are taken to improve these issues.

These issues regarding overpopulation, criminal impunity, corruption and human rights abuses are all very complex and intertwined, and if they are overlooked any attempts to improve prisoner rehabilitation will prove ineffective. Due to the extent of their deep rooted nature, no single institution possesses the resources to simultaneously reduce the graveness of all these problems. Furthermore, due to their intertwined nature, these issues have to be addressed concurrently since individually improving one will only be a temporary solution that will eventually dissipate due to the other issues. Therefore appropriate inter-agency cooperation, which in itself is no easy task to accomplish, is necessary in order to help reduce overpopulation, corruption, and impunity therefore establishing the appropriate context for rehabilitation programs to successfully help reduce recidivism.

Chapter Six

Infrastructure

Chloe Kachscovsky and Adi Sarosa

Abstract:

Integrating the voices of community members is essential to bringing legitimacy and ownership to the favelados. Still, we cannot ignore the fact that planning is often still done in a top-down fashion. In order to successfully translate favelados' needs into holistic and fair service provision, a team of stakeholders must come together to establish the community's goals and priorities. We recommend that biannual 5-year planning meetings be established in order to foster a platform for appropriate collaboration and planning of favela aimed service provision. These commissions will meet twice a year, once to discuss the needs of all of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and second to discuss individual favela-specific issues. These meetings are designed to:

1. Formulate long term goals for favela upgrading.
2. Determine priorities and timelines for upgrading plans.
3. Establish well defined responsibilities and roles for each project and each actor present.
4. Maintain accountability to the needs of favela residents.

These forums will establish a location in which all stakeholders can collaborate and cooperate to effectively plan upgrades for favelados according to the needs of community members. These forums will also hold all service providers accountable to these community needs, as dictated in the bottom-up communication established in resident assemblies.

On a local level, the UPP should be utilized as an institutionalized point person to address the lack of communication between favelados and service providers. The UPP will act as the government representative in the community and be the liaison to direct any infrastructural concerns to the appropriate service providers through resident assemblies, following this five-

step process:

1. *Favelados* will communicate grievances and needs to UPP officers either at resident assemblies or in informal discussions, depending on the extent of pacification and trust in the UPP presence.
2. *UPP* will request the attendance of appropriate service providers at the following community meeting.
3. *Service providers* will attend resident assemblies and hear the grievances and needs of the community.
4. *Service providers* will return to the community meeting with a concrete plan of action and listen to resident feedback. Top-down plans created without regard to residents' needs must also be presented at resident assemblies in this step.
5. *Service providers* will continue to attend meetings during their proposed timeline of implementation so that favelados can follow up with the progress of the plan.

These two forums will establish a space for favelados to:

- Appeal for housing price controls and eviction penalties.
- Communicate with urban planners in order to establish forums for social interactions between citizens, regardless of special boundaries.
- Communicate concrete relocation and displacement plans.
- Communicate transportation needs based on affordability and effectiveness in integrating individuals and connecting them with job opportunities.
- Appeal for other public services, as needed.

The UPP is dependent on the improvement of structures within the favela, and service providers also depend on the security the UPP provide in order to bring these services to favelados. Thus, improving and facilitating the discussions to address urban infrastructure issues will not only secure the community, but also legitimize the UPP presence in these favelas. Addressing these issues is an essential element to the crime reduction process in the favelas.

Introduction:

The Pacifying Police (UPP) have been effective in reducing crime in targeted communities which has opened the door for an influx of services in pacified favelas. Still, the favelados continue to call on relevant service providers for specific upgrades to further enhance accessibility of critical services. As the federal and local governments take steps to prepare for the Olympics and the World Cup, there has been a series of city-sweeping plans to upgrade the infrastructure sector. While these policies do affect favelas, they are often implemented without considering the direct needs of the favela residents. This disconnect between the needs of the people and planned projects proposed by service providers requires immediate attention.

The process of regularizing informal settlements is a challenging concept. It is virtually impossible to regularize every informal residence and to integrate them into urban centers. While these challenges are currently being tackled in a top-down planning fashion, favelados do not have the means to express their own concerns in regards to urban infrastructural issues in their respective favelas.

Currently, the issue of urban infrastructure is one of the largest challenges to improving favelados' quality of life. Asphalt roads are rarities, houses stack on top of each other, and

building's safety standards are often neglected (Tolosa 212). These deficiencies contributed to the issues of crime and gang violence. For one, the lack of viable roads has limited the mobility between the formalized city and the favelas, which has isolated life and issues inside the favelas (Doherty). Vidigal, which is one of the better-known favelas, exemplifies the issues faced by favelas and favelados throughout the state of Rio de Janeiro. This particular favela houses around 9,900 individuals, or about 2,600 families (Duarte 275). Its geographical location and population density has limited the potential to expand its infrastructure and add roads. The same issues hold true for other favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro.

Owing to the legacy of violence in favelas, favelados in general have been neglected by service providers, which has only further contributed to the hardship and struggle these favelados combat each day. Rather than insulating the problems that have arisen within favelas, the government should assist in improving living conditions and infrastructure in these communities.

Individuals living in informal settlements in Brazil have rights which are protected by the constitution, a result of past Brazilian governments avoiding implementing land reform (Handzic 12). In fact, favelados' rights are already assured in the current legal system. For example, the 1988 Federal constitution states that "...federal power should promote housing construction programs and [that of] the existing conditions of housing and basic sanitation [as well as] combat the causes of poverty and factors of marginalization [while] promoting social integration of less favored sectors..." (Fernandes 120). The constitution highlights that all levels of the Brazilian government are responsible for providing social services to every favelados.

UPP Social is one way the municipal government has attempted to promote the integration of favelas into the larger social fabric of the city. The municipality of Rio de Janeiro launched UPP Social in communities that already enjoy the benefits UPPs bring to the favelas.

Under the IPP (Instituto Pereira Passos), an agency with the purpose of collecting and delivering data about the city to support public administration, UPP Social aims to collaborate with communities and government entities to bridge the gaps in provision of social services. The UPP Social hosts forums that bring together local institutions, NGOs, community leaders, as well as representatives from the UPP and various levels of government to have a discussion regarding the community's needs (uppsocial.org.) One of the primary objectives of these forums is to connect favelados to service providers as a means of upgrading infrastructure in favelas. Ideally, UPP Social aims to use the information collected during their forums to integrate the concerns of each specific favela into the overall planning of Rio de Janeiro's services (Willis).

In their proposed mission, the forums established by the UPP Social are expected to expedite infrastructure upgrades according to the needs of the community. In practice, while the forums often attract residents, they do not appropriately address their concerns. In response, rather than implementing plans which integrate the needs of the community, service providing representatives often propose a top-down and non-negotiable plan which disregards the inputs provided by favelados through the dialogue fostered in UPP Social's forums (Smith). Fundamentally, these forums lack an avenue through which service providers can be held accountable to the needs of favelados. Without any transparency of the plan or genuine discussion, favelados will never become fully integrated into the larger city center.

In the past, the city government of Rio de Janeiro has tried to implement several projects and policies to upgrade favelas. One of these projects was the Favela Bairro project, which attempted to urbanize the infrastructure within these favelas in order to allow for the integration of these areas into the fabric of urban centers. In this project, favelas were treated as "...special social interest areas with their own special planning process and building codes..." (Handzic 13).

Favela Bairro mainly focused on upgrading infrastructure, recreational spaces, and promoting community development (Duarte 266). The infrastructure and recreation improvement manifested in building new roads, opening up community spaces, and providing public services. The community development focused on introducing educational and income-generating projects, as well as the construction of community buildings.

The Favela Bairro program showed promise in its early implementation through its efforts to modernize favela neighborhoods. In implementing its projects, Favela Bairro focused on a strategy of bringing about low-income urban development through a multi faced implementation program. This means that it was managed by city government officials, conducted by private firms, and finally selected through public competition (Duarte 288) ensuring inputs from a variety of stakeholders. The resulting improvement of these residential neighborhoods caused an increase in tourism, further exposure of these areas to the outside world, and reduced possibility of violence. Furthermore, improved infrastructure allowed for increased investment because revitalization of informal sectors attracts capital (Roy 148). The desire individuals have to improve their own living conditions is strong. Through the Favela Bairro project, these favelas shifted their reputation away from that of problematic sources of cheap labor and criminality to hubs of new investment opportunities.

Nonetheless, the long-term success of Favela Bairro was crippled by a few major problems, particularly in the failure to comprehensively plan and determine funding as well as in the inability to communicate the prioritization of community needs. Attention to these issues is essential when planning future improvements in these neighborhoods. The lack of funding left many different projects unfinished, especially as unexpected cost increases surfaced. For example, in the Favela Bairro project implemented in Vidigal, the “subterranean boulders that

had to be removed by hand made US\$1.8 million allocated by the city for this favela insufficient, and the original proposal was never fully implemented” (Duarte 284). The project also faced problems with unforeseen externalities: for example, families would often move into communities with planned infrastructure improvements in hopes of being included in new favela improvement plans (Duarte 285). This led to the relocation and displacement of various families in order to accommodate newcomers. Most of the time, the families being relocated were unclear about the details of their relocation process. All of these issues arise due to the lack of comprehensive planning and communication in order to connect the needs of the community with the organizations and sectors of society which have the capabilities of fulfilling these needs.

The benefits and drawbacks of previous favela improvement programs such as Favela Bairro highlight that although these programs can be effective in reducing crime and also improving other elements of favela life, a lack of sustainability and accountability has been the main problem, especially on the part of the city government to the favelados. Now that crime has been a focal point of policy actions in Rio de Janeiro, state and city governments should continue to consider the necessary improvements for these favelados’ quality of life. “The more the program design is based on a prior collective agreement, the greater are its possibilities for success. Society’s support for the design contributes to the creation of a framework that is favorable to its continuity,” (Magalhães 84). Community collaboration is crucial to the success of development projects and its longer term continuation.

The success of the UPP has allowed for enormous changes inside favelas. Officers have instrumentally reduced crime and drug trafficking while also fostering a sense of safety within these communities. The UPP has meant the development of police into more than simply a security presence. Their unique position within the favelas highlights their ability to act both as

police officers as well as the human faces of the government. Thus, not only has the UPP softened the police's approach to the favelas, they have also carved an avenue for change within these communities. The success of the UPP is dependent on the security they provide as well as their ability to encourage the growth of infrastructure in the communities they patrol. As Julia Tierney argues in her Master's Thesis, "The police [UPP] pave the way for service providers by enhancing security and making the informal settlements more visible and their infrastructure needs more pressing" (Tierney 11). On the one hand, the UPP provide opportunities for urban upgrading programs to thrive, on the other hand, they also depend on the success of these infrastructure developments to maintain institutional credibility. Tierney continues arguing that, "Despite their attempts to be responsive to the demands of the community, the pacification police are dependent on the support of urban upgrading projects and social services that only other public authorities can provide," (Tierney 66). The UPP lie at a pivotal intersection between the needs of the people and the services provided by state and city governments, which, if mediated properly, can produce illustrious results for the public security sector.

Recommendations:

We recommend two parallel forums be established as a means of planning infrastructure upgrades; (1) Biannual *5-year planning commissions* which work in a top-down fashion to create priorities and timelines for upgrades, and (2) A *5-step grievance mechanism* through which bottom-up needs can emerge and be accounted for.

5-Year Planning Commissions:

Integrating the voices of community members is essential in bringing legitimacy and ownership to the favelados, still, we cannot ignore the fact that planning is often still done in an

exclusively top-down fashion. In order to successfully translate favelados' needs into holistic and fair service provision, this chapter recommends that a team of stakeholders come together to establish the community's goals and priorities. We recommend that biannual 5-year planning meetings be established in order to foster a platform for appropriate collaboration and planning of favela-aimed service provision. These commissions will meet twice a year, first to discuss the needs of *all of Rio de Janeiro's favelas*, and second to discuss individual *favela-specific issues*. The meetings should be approximately 6 months apart from each other to ensure progress oversight. These meetings will establish a forum in which all stakeholders can collaborate and cooperate to effectively plan upgrades for favelados, according to the needs of community members. The stakeholders present at 5-year planning meetings should include: government agencies responsible for city and state planning, private and public service providers, prominent NGO leadership from each community, regional UPP commanders and UPP commanders from each favela, community liaisons, representatives from residence assemblies, and economic interests including both international and local players. The attendance of this wide variety of stakeholders strengthens the 5-year planning committee's ability to build tangible and realistic plans. The members that attend each of these meetings may vary based on the agenda of each meeting, which seeks to meet specific needs. For example, if transportation and roads in particular are the largest concern, providers of other services may not be required to attend this particular meeting. In addition, the meetings will also assist in ensuring that all actors remain responsible for their agreed upon upgrades and accountable to the needs of the community, as dictated by the bottom-up communication established in the 5-step grievance mechanism. The 5-year planning commissions aim to:

- Formulate long term goals for favela upgrading.
- Determine priorities and timelines for upgrading plans.
- Establish well defined responsibilities and roles for each project and each actor present.
- Maintain accountability to the needs of favela residents.

In order to focus on improving infrastructure in the long run, 5-year planning meetings will formulate long term goals. While these goals may vary between favelas, the goals set in city-wide meetings will allow for appropriate social-spatial integration and growth to be considered. These city-wide meetings will also allow for earmarks to be established in order to provide across the board services to all favelas. In addition, these meetings are a particularly essential means of incorporating the interests and concerns of all stakeholders relevant to favela upgrading. These meetings will prevent isolated ad hoc upgrades from disrupting the larger plan for favela betterment.

To effectively implement the goals established within these meetings, smaller benchmarks can assist in moving toward fulfilling these goals. Favelados' needs should inform the prioritization of the goals and the establishment of a timeline. These timelines will create an order through which the most necessary upgrades are given priority. Short, mid, and long term goals will facilitate accountability for the set achievements, under the considerations of the favelados. Unlike ordinary planning operations, each step of the goal creation, prioritization, and implementation process must maintain accountability to the community in which they will be implemented.

The five-year planning meetings will also clearly distinguish the responsibilities of each actor in each project they are involved with. The delineation of responsibilities will assist in

holding service providers and other actors involved in each project accountable for their accepted tasks. Thus, once specific projects are established, each involved actor must sign a memorandum of understanding to ensure accountability and to eliminate overlap. “Constructive debate about how specific project challenges can be met [and] can be better encouraged and outputs and consequences of the project more clearly defined when the relationship between the different parties is set in a formal framework.” (Baruah 1024). These memoranda will outline the responsibilities of each actor and will delineate the consequences of not following through with promised results. Funding streams can also be established and accounted for in this same fashion.

The social forums currently hosted by UPP Social provide the groundwork for the 5-year planning commissions. While these forums currently include a variety of stakeholders, they are unable to fully address the community needs. Thus, a more productive forum should be created. UPP Social will have the opportunity to continue to participate in the 5-year forums because their knowledge regarding community activities and functions is extremely beneficial. Nonetheless, they will not be responsible for the planning and execution of the biannual events.

Ultimately, the goals and priorities established in the 5-year planning meetings should be accountable to the needs of favelados. While planning meetings are organized by the State Department of Planning and Management (*Secretaria de Estado de Planejamento e Gestão or SEPLAG*), the presence of the resident assembly, the community liaison, as well in some cases, the UPP captain are all essential to clearly understand the community needs. The agendas and prioritization should integrate the needs and voices of these actors in particular. While other stakeholders can provide necessary insight into the implementation process, the needs of favelados should be at the forefront of the planning process. Projects should fully incorporate both the interests of community members as well as the participation and activism of favelados

as well. An increase in trust between residents of favelas and service providers will grow into an improved social relationship that can only benefit these communities in the future. Finally, if the projects implemented by service providers do not reflect the needs of the people, they can follow the below outlined 5-step grievance mechanism to voice their concerns and make changes to the implementation processes firsthand.

5-Step Grievance Mechanisms:

We recommend that the UPP provide favelados an avenue to connect their infrastructure issues or grievances with appropriate service providers. While all relevant government organizations and agencies involved with issues of urban infrastructure in the favelas may not fall directly under the jurisdiction of the Office of Public Security, coordination remains essential to reducing crime in the favelas. In pacified communities, the UPP should serve as a connection between favelados and service providers through the use of resident assemblies as a forum for discussion. The process of airing grievances will follow a five-step plan:

1. Favelados will communicate grievances and needs to UPP officers either at resident assemblies or in informal discussions, depending on the extent of pacification and trust in the UPP presence.
2. UPP will request the attendance of appropriate service providers in the next resident assembly.
3. Service providers will attend resident assemblies and hear the grievances and needs of the community.
4. Service providers will return to the community meeting with a concrete plan of action

and listen to resident feedback. Top-down plans created without regard to residents' needs must also be presented at resident assemblies in this step.

5. Service providers will continue to attend meetings during their proposed timeline of implementation so that favelados can follow up with the progress of the plan.

First, favelados will be encouraged to take their grievances and infrastructure needs to UPP officers. Depending on the extent of pacification this process of communication can take different forms. We suggest that in communities with high levels of trust for the UPP, grievance talks should occur more informally with UPP officers that patrol each neighborhood. In communities with greater hostility toward the UPP presence, favelados can express their concerns at resident assemblies, in which UPP officers are responsible for noting the needs of the residents. Alternatively, the community liaison noted in Chapter Four, whose job is to facilitate discussion between community members and UPP officers, can also bring the community's grievances to the UPP.

Second, UPPs will compile the needs of the community and request the presence of a representative from the appropriate service providers. The UPP will refer to a list of contacts compiled by the municipal government to request the presence of a representative. Representatives will attend at least one meeting in order to listen to the needs of the community and be able to fully follow up on the plans such provider has to fill these needs.

Third, a representative from a service providing company or organization will attend a community meeting and discuss the needs and status of infrastructure in the favela. This forum must foster a balanced dialogue between community members and service providers. This initial meeting is intended to give service providers the information necessary to create plans, which

will better meet the needs of the community by hearing directly their grievances. While the UPP should attend these meetings and can attest to their fairness, they may not administer the operations of the meeting. The UPP can publish the presence of specific service providers at resident associations through their newsletter. Newsletter format and publication methods will be outlined in Chapter Eleven. The resident association must negotiate a date and time for the service provider to return with their concrete plans for the favela.

Fourth, once they have created a plan to address the needs of the community, representatives of service providers must return to the meeting to provide residents their proposed plans to initiate or repair the services within the community. This opportunity for a second round of feedback is essential in order to ensure that the plans properly reflect the priorities and interests of residents, rather than the exclusive interest of service providers. Plans made by service providers or by the 5-year planning committee, which were not initiated through the bottom-up mechanism outlined in steps 1-3, can also enter the community dialogue at this stage. The UPP is responsible for ensuring that service providers return for this second meeting on a date agreed upon between the resident associated and the service providing representative at the initial meeting. This date can also be advertised through both resident association materials as well as the UPP newsletter. At this stage, the needs and voices of the community must be highly valued and prioritized before the upgrading of infrastructure services begins.

Fifth, throughout the construction and implementation process, service providing representatives must continue to attend resident assemblies in order to allow community members a voice in the implementation process and timeline. The meetings will foster a forum to maintain service providing entities accountable to the needs, interests, and concerns of the community. The UPP will be responsible for ensuring that a representative from the service

provider knows the time and dates of each community meeting as a means of continuing the service provider's attendance. If representatives fail to attend three or more consecutive meetings, the community liaison will select a forum through which the lack of participation will be mediated, either through conflict mediation, through the legal system, or through alternative community agreements.

Service providers can continually become involved in these resident assemblies as different projects arise or as different elements of infrastructure become more problematic within the favelas. Thus, while we outline a five step process, the feedback provided by the community members should be continuous and the process may repeat itself in order to perfect one project. We outline the four most important issues in the planning and construction of urban infrastructure projects in favelas. We suggest that the UPP begin to implement the five step system to address these particular concerns.

These two forums of discussion work in conjunction with one another to ensure that favelas obtain the attention necessary to upgrade the infrastructure, which will increase their standard of living. The bottom-up 5-step grievance mechanism will inform the planning and prioritization made by the 5-year planning commission. In addition, if necessary, the 5-step grievance mechanism can call for additional or more pressing upgrades from service providers, as needed. Thus, while the biannual meetings will inform large upgrading projects made over time, smaller upgrades can be addressed on a case-by-case basis, which will allow favelados more agency and control over issues in their communities. This is particularly essential to prevent the negative results and mistakes made during the Favela Bairro project. The 5-step grievance mechanism will ensure accountability from service providers as well as the city government in completing and installing infrastructure projects. The interaction between the 5-

year plans and the grievances addressed in the 5-step mechanism will result in more comprehensive planning, which is an essential factor absent in the Favela Bairro project. Nonetheless, it will be imperative for the 5-year planning commission to incorporate participation and collaboration with community members to effectively impart ownership while also strengthening bonds between favelados and service providers.

Multi-Level Participation: Overview of Specific Issues

Land Tenure Security:

One of the biggest concerns that the favelados have in anticipating the improvement and modernization of their houses, land, and neighborhoods is in regards to land security. Data has shown that security of tenure is largely absent in favelas; about 40-70% of the urban population illegally occupy their properties (Fernandes 102). It is essential that this issue be addressed because the illegality of favelados' properties and activities prevents them from fully taking advantage of the various economic opportunities. Many of these favelados "would like nothing more than to receive their land titles" (Handzic 14). They understand that by obtaining legal documents for their own property, they can expand their business, obtain loans, and gain many other advantages that could help them work towards a better life.

Nonetheless, the city government should be aware of different perceptions of land tenure security when planning and implementing policy reform. "What squatters and favelados perceive to be secured tenure will be different than those households living in legal housing" (Payne 5). Giving legal titles to their property might have dire consequences for the original owner of these properties. They fear that legalizing their land may result in land loss due to the inability to afford property taxes, the inability to prevent external market forces such as gentrification, or

pure relocation efforts in anticipation of upcoming mega-events, such as the World Cup or the Olympics. These favelados need a guarantee that they will not be evicted before they agree to register their properties and subsequently their lives into the formal legal system (Neuwitzth). The significance of these properties to the economic fulfillment of favelados manifests in caution when attempting to legalize their land.

There are several problems when considering regularizing these settlements. First, urban reform policy must be nationalized, which requires incorporating the needs and interests of several municipalities. Second, financial support for these city government policies is necessary because favelados cannot finance their own urban upgrading projects. Finally, the stability and continuation of political will from the different government agencies connected to these projects is necessary, to prevent the consequences of political flux (Imparato 135). All of these concerns must be considered before any substantial reform action can be implemented. Favelados are not opposed to the legalization and documentation of their property as much as they fear negligence from their city government in the event of relocation or development projects. The issue of land tenure concerns the accountability and sustainability of these development projects rather than the lack of legal avenues individuals can operate in order to gain land titles.

We recommend that land tenure security be one of the major issues being discussed in the 5-year planning commission as it pertains to the possibility of favelados making use of their property to better their quality of life and integrate with the urban center. A particular focus of discussion should revolve around the potential effects of legalizing land tenure in various favelas. The Registro Geral de Imóveis or the General Registry of Property, the government agency that processes registration of property (Handzic 13) should not just hand out property registration documents without analyzing the impact it might have on the favelas. The role of

community liaisons and resident assembly representative will be crucial in these biannual meeting as they will be able to remind the other stakeholders that legalizing favela properties would often result in increases in the cost of living, which impacts gentrification.

In this context, those with concerns about land tenure security could bring their grievances forward at their resident assemblies. UPP would then pass along these complaints to the Registro Geral de Imóveis or the General Registry of Property. The UPP will request a representative from Registro Geral de Imóveis to attend the favela resident assemblies in order to directly hear complaints and issues that favelados have in terms of land tenure security. This agency will then work out a plan to address these issues and provide favelados with required legal documents to officially secure the lands in their name. They will work out a time frame with the favelados to determine how long this process will take as well as to allow the favelados a means of monitoring the progress and holding the Registro Geral de Imóveis accountable for the work that is done.

Alternatively, the UPP can also connect favelados to NGOs such as Terra Nova, “a social enterprise dedicated to sustainable regularization of illegally occupied properties in urban areas” (Albuquerque). This organization is specifically founded to fill in the gap between favelados and government agencies that often clash in negotiations to determine land ownership. If the favelados see projects toward which NGOs can provide better assistance, organizations such as Terra Nova may send a representative to the resident assemblies to directly interact with these favelados and again work out a plan and time frame for favelados to legalize their land and obtain required documents. In both cases, the 5-step system allows favelados to hold either the Registro Geral de Imóveis or Terra Nova accountable to the community members for the plan that they have developed.

Gentrification:

Along with land tenure security, favelados are concerned with how they might also be affected by gentrification. As favelas are improved, public perception about the security in these neighborhood will shift to a more positive view. It is then expected that external investments will begin to pour in. However, as the Favela Bairro project showed, improvement projects often led to the displacement of many families. The Vidigal case revealed that although “new housing units were provided for these families, most chose cash payout and moved out” (Duarte 277). Many families chose not to occupy the alternative housing units built by the city government because they often ended up being relocated in areas far from their original favela, disconnected from their social circle, and received minimal government support in adapting to their new community. The people that are unable to accept being miserable in these alternative housing would then move out to new areas, which essentially moved the problem of illegal residence from one place to another.

The influx of external capital and investment opportunities in these improved favelas has played a major role in the gentrification phenomenon. These developments have created “realization of gains by entrepreneurs rather than [creation of] a stable community for existing residents” (Pamuk 460). The general perception is that developments are done by the city government to improve a city-wide image, especially in the face of upcoming world events such as the World Cup, Rio Summit, and Olympic Games. Furthermore, the incorporation of favelas into the market economy has the potential to generate increased rents and higher costs of living. This is especially damaging to the poorest residents, as they will not have the financial capabilities to stay in the area due to, “formal land titling pushing residents away” (Handzic 14). The informality that made these properties affordable for a particular segment of the population

is subsequently removed in the process of gentrification, showing that “legal systems are not only inflexible but also risky for the poor” (Handzic 15).

Essentially, the process of gentrification has led to three major effects: (1) Local displacement, due to reasons explained in the land tenure security section, (2) Homogenization of the community, as the incoming new residents rarely understand the culture and history of the favela, and (3) Urban dysfunction, where supply chains are less efficient when workers are located far from urban centers (Cummings).

Gentrification presents a dilemma to the government when deciding whether bad living conditions should be tolerated in order to keep the cost of living low. Alternatively, favelas could continue to accept new residents and develop in a fashion constructed by the educated urban citizenry, but consequently also force out the current poorest residents.

We recommend that the stakeholders at the biannual meetings be aware of the consequences of gentrification. While every development project results in some form of displacement and relocation, it is essential that the different stakeholders in the 5-year planning commission specifically discuss means to communicate the relocation process to affected favelados. This would entail ensuring that no favelados are left clueless about their fate in the event that they are relocated. It is in this planning commission that the Secretaria Municipal de Assistencia Social and other related service providers effectively communicate with the community liaison and resident assembly representatives the exact details and step-by-step plan to relocate favelados. The community liaison and resident assembly representative will then communicate these with the affected favelados.

In this case, the UPP can also connect favelados with service providers that would assist them with gentrification consequences from a bottom-up perspective as well. The UPP will help

communicate relocation plans for favelados that have agreed to be relocated. The main concern of favelados who are in the process of relocation is that the government does not clearly communicate relocation plans, which leaves these individuals lacking proper information to prepare for such relocation. Using the 5-steps system, the community meeting will again be utilized as a forum for favelados to understand the details of their relocation plan. Here the UPP will also request the attendance of a representative from the Secretaria Municipal de Assistencia Social. During the community meeting, favelados and representatives from the Secretaria Municipal de Assistencia Social will directly interact with one another to communicate concerns and details of the relocation process. If the favelados accept the terms discussed, the misunderstanding and miscommunication regarding how they will be relocated will be minimized. On the other hand, if these favelados do not accept the terms, they can continue to use the resident assemblies as forum to express their concerns on why they cannot agree with the relocation process, and ultimately derive a plan that fits the needs of both those being relocated and the agency responsible for relocation.

Socio-Spatial Growth:

Infrastructure provides the tools to bridge the gap that divides favelados from the remainder of Rio de Janeiro. Marginalized conceptions of favela resident's identities have been perpetuated throughout history, and throughout historical infrastructure upgrading projects. "...efforts to construct walls around the periphery of Rio's favelas, which are being called 'eco-barriers' by city planners and 'apartheid' structures by critics, signal an approach of containment." (McRoskey 95). The pacification police project provides an opportunity to tackle these ideologies, especially through the upgrading of physical space. Current construction

projects rely on survey data to collect information on the needs and expectations of the community. These surveys are then relayed to appropriate entities, either private or public service providers, which then make a plan to supply such services (Suksa 30). In their article about informal orders in Brazilian favelas, Gareth Doherty and Moises Lino e Silva suggest that data collection does not always consider all the stakeholders. "When it comes to discussing how many favelas there are in Rio de Janeiro and how many people live in them, one stumbles upon the formal/informal binary because the official data are not the same as those which one gathers living inside a favela," (Doherty, Gareth, and e S. M. Lino. 35). The binary they describe is one of the challenges to meeting specific needs, rather than addressing the broad apparent needs of the community as a whole. The divide between the formal and informal sectors of society thus continues to perpetuate the marginal identities that are constructed by such divisions. The unsustainable upgrading projects of the past, today are crumbling under the feet of the favelados. "Favela-bairro upgrades indeed worked away at some of the stigmas that historically surround favelas, treating them instead as deserving of public works on a large scale. But this scholarship also points to many instances of works deteriorating quickly due to poor materials and poor maintenance," (Osborn). The lack of accountability for the projects that are meant to upgrade the lives of these individuals proves both disrespect and disregard for those who appear to be on the margins. The broad sweeping urban upgrading plans in Rio de Janeiro today continue to disregard the needs of the people. While a complete rejuvenation of favelados' identity and location within the Rio community is not an option, the municipal government has claimed that particular upgrading projects have left the favelas with the same standard of living as other sectors of Rio's society. Thus, while the physical structures indicate that upgrading eliminates the stigma associated with favelas, the reality of these constructions suggests that the

socioeconomic and cultural divides created by Rio's citizens continue to exist. By claiming that favelas are no longer classified as favelas, the resources and attention they deserve becomes much more limited (Daflon). The municipal government is responsible for providing services, not limited to just infrastructure development, and when favelas are exclusively perceived as under developed land, it is easy to obscure the needs and interests of the people.

As favelas become increasingly dense, the lack of open public space becomes a concern. This absence of public space makes it difficult for favelados to interact with each other socially, which limits their ability to air communal grievances. Open public spaces - such as plazas or parks - allow favelados to interact socially with one another, which is increasingly essential to the security of favelas. "Livable environments are places that people like, satisfy their needs, promote human health, and contribute to a sustainable environmental system... the livability of residential environments relates to features that promote residential satisfaction, a sense of community, and environmental sustainability," (Del Rio 102). Improving public spaces will assist in bringing down the barriers that have isolated these favelas from the urban center, both physically and socially. Increased availabilities of public spaces will encourage exchanges of ideas and further open up possibilities to continue improving the favelas, and with it the living standards of the favelados.

We recommend that socio-spatial growth be considered as one of the primary goals at the 5-year planning commission meetings. Socio-spatial growth and marginalization issues in particular have to be considered on a larger scale. Thus, the planning commissions have both the authority and foresight to include possibilities of integrating community-wide needs in the building and planning of infrastructure in the favelas. For example, as the community seeks greater integration into the urban center, the planning commission can look for ways to improve

traffic flows in and out of favelas. This will not only increase movement between these isolated neighborhoods but will also allow for individuals to seek better employment opportunities through improved accessibility.

While these considerations may be interpreted in many different fashions, the 5-step grievance mechanism will allow favelados the opportunity to connect with urban planners if they disapprove of or have suggestions for plans to alter their community. The UPP can bring in Secretaria Municipal de Assistencia Social, for example, to work with the community to create a better plan to address their infrastructural and spatial needs. Changes established in the 5-year planning forum can be debated and changed in resident assemblies to better reflect the needs of the community. Thus, while the planning commission establishes long-term goals, the grievance mechanism allows community members an opportunity to voice their concerns and change the plans to better fit their needs.

Additionally, building and creating community centers which facilitate communal integration and collaboration can be spearheaded by communities themselves. Community access and interaction with service providers allow them the opportunity to not only voice their concerns but to also lobby their potential as planners and workers. Opportunities for participation will help break down the barriers of socio-spatial isolation by bringing more credibility to community members through institutionalized trust as well as community collaboration and work.

Public Services:

In order to overcome the issues of marginality and social exclusion, public services have provided an avenue to standardize Rio de Janeiro as a whole. While projects have varied across

the favelas and over time, now is a vital point in history to continue this integration. In order to provide a dynamic approach to inclusion in these communities, considering favelados' individual needs are essential to the process of growth. We have identified a series of issues in the application of infrastructure projects within favelas, which is essential to the continuation the pacification process and the unification of the city.

As the Olympic games and World Cup approach, a series of transportation projects have been planned to mediate the large influx of sports viewers. At the same time, similar projects have also been constructed to better mediate the flow of favelados both within their communities and down to the city center. These connections with the city center are essential for economic and social integration. While some attempts to carve these connections, such as the teleférico (or Gondola systems) of Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha, have gained attention from the global development community, their utility and accessibility has been questionable (Landesman). The majority of individuals use the teleférico in Complexo do Alemão on the weekends for tourism rather than for everyday business. This brings into question the audience and utility of these constructions. Favelas have historically been located in places that are closest to occupational opportunities, however individuals have been limited by their inability to access essential modes of transportation in order to reach these jobs (Perlman 109). As these communities grow, the lack of transportation insulates and condenses the issues of informal urbanized communities. "Even with the violence, many return to live in favelas, with many analysts concluding that poor public transportation has stimulated the growth of favelas," (Handzic 13). Thus, although the teleférico constructions, are highly visible and impressive, they only visually indicate an attempt to integrate favelados with the services and opportunities available in the urban center; the realities beneath these cable cars do not reflect these structures. In Providência, a plan to build a

teleférico will also destroy the community's largest and most utilized public space, the Praça Américo Brum, along with many individual houses along the route (Roller, "Losing Providence"). Symbolically the teleférico projects represent an ideal conceptualization of city integration, however in reality they fail to address the larger issues of continuity across informal and formal divides.

Infrastructure investment from the federal level has impacted many of Rio's most famous favelas. PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento) funds have sought to improve sanitation, housing, access to utilities, and transportation needs (Skalmusky). While these investments have funded projects such as community centers and large housing complexes, they have been under criticism from favelados for the prioritization and accountability for these structures. There has been widespread programs to bring community centers and sports facilities into favelas, yet many of their basic needs still fail to be addressed. In Rocinha for example, while upgrading plans have resulted in a large community sports facility, some individuals in Rocinha still live along side an open-air sewer, which is susceptible to floods and a pathway for the spread of disease. Through the eyes of one community member, "He was outraged that PAC spent R\$15 million on the *passarela* [footbridge] before making improvements to his neighborhood and the Valão [open air sewer]. Rua 2 remains narrow and congested, without a direct connection to the main streets of Rocinha," (Roller, "Acceleration Program Hits the Breaks in Rocinha"). These comments highlight the inconsistency between the direct needs of the people and the projects implemented in favelas. Similar complaints materialize in the discussion over government provided community-housing facilities, which were built fairly recently and are already seeing signs of erosion (Carman). The lack of accountability to the real needs of community, thus discounts the positive movement made on the part of the pacifying

police to build a relationship between service providers and favelados.

We recommend that in order to provide better and more appropriate services, community involvement, feedback, and consideration must all be integrated. Communities should have avenues through which issues can be addressed. Through the 5-step grievance mechanism, individuals have the opportunity to voice their concerns about particular projects. For example, during the planning and construction of the gondola system, individuals could have provided feedback on alternate, more accessible, and affordable means of transportation that would have better addressed their needs. These concerns could have been taken either to a UPP officer, to a resident assembly, or to the community liaison who would relay the information to the UPP. Subsequently, the UPP would request the attendance of representative from the Municipal Secretary of Transportation (SMTR) to the next resident assembly. Individuals could then speak with the representative and request plans reflect their needs, for example providing bus service in addition to gondolas to better accommodate individuals living at a distance from gondola stops. The representative would then return with plans to implement new bus routes, possibly in conjunction with road fixtures. The community could provide feedback on these plans both before and during implementation while a representative from SMTR continued to attend these meetings.

In addition, the communication between service providers and favelados in resident assemblies will help inform decisions made by the 5-year planning commission. By opening a dialogue about transportation, individuals will communicate both their long term and short term transportation needs which will be added to the goals established in the planning meetings. Thus, the needs of the people will translate into both bus systems to address current needs for mobility as well as gondolas for the future in order to assure accessibility and mobility for all favela

residents.

Our recommendations reflect planning done both in a top-down and bottom-up fashion. These two forums can also be a basis to include communities in the implementation process as well. In order to solve the sewage problem in Rocinha, for example, favelados can use the 5-step grievance mechanism to voice their concerns. Service providers and community members can work together to find solutions which not only integrates the open sewage into the greater sewage management network, additionally individuals can become responsible for the building and maintenance as well. One example of this type of community built solution is a condominial network, which builds water and sewage pipes inside favela communities relatively less deep in the ground so that community members can both install and maintain its operations. “Because residents were intricately involved in both designing and, in some cases, building the system, they knew where the pipes were and signed on to agreements that they were responsible for maintenance and repair of the system in their neighborhoods.” (Leal 53). Condominial networks are just one example of the influence and capabilities community members can have in bettering their own infrastructure.

Conclusion:

It is essential that service providers work together with favela residents to address their urban infrastructure needs. The UPP’s efforts to reduce crime in targeted favelas has created a platform for further social improvements in the favelados’ quality of life. The next step is to introduce infrastructure development that will allow favelados an opportunity to not only boost economic opportunities, but also access government social services.

Addressing urban infrastructure issues in different favelas will enhance connectivity

between favelas and the city. Developments in this sector will open up various opportunities for favelados to further improve their quality of life, which include increasing economic opportunities, health, education, and the presence of other social services in the favelas. The development of urban infrastructure will encourage improvements in the government's overall image while also deterring future criminal presence in the community.

As previously mentioned, the main factor that halted past upgrading projects was the lack of comprehensive planning, especially in terms of funding and communicating the community's needs. Similarly, UPP Social lacks the transparency and accountability in their efforts to develop favelas, which has resulted in a top-down and non-negotiable plan which disregards the inputs provided by favelados through the dialogue fostered in UPP Social's forums resulting vague goals. The implementation of the biannual 5-year planning commission along with the 5-step grievance mechanism is formatted to directly address the infrastructure issues that have arisen and will continue to emerge in favelas. The discussion of funding and prioritization is expected to occur in the biannual 5-year planning commission. These forums will address the need for a step-by-step plan through the creation of short and mid-term goals. The 5-step grievance mechanism, in turn, will ensure that transparency and accountability measures can be taken by the favelados during the implementation of these goals.

We hope that the 5-year biannual meetings will produce a more sustainable forum to continue the planning and discussion regarding urban infrastructure issues in various favelas beyond the 5 year timeline that we propose. It is desirable that in long run, with these two systems in place, favelas will achieve a similar level of infrastructure to that of the urban center, which will in turn open an abundance of new economic opportunities for favelados.

Chapter Seven

Improving Access to Healthcare in the Favelas

Grace Flott

Abstract:

Public health in the city of Rio de Janeiro reflects the residential and socioeconomic inequalities of Brazilian society. This inequality is never more obvious than in the difference between the health profiles of favelados and non-favela residents. Several indicators of health, including mortality and morbidity rates, show poorer conditions in favelas and reveal a clear need to improve access to health services in those communities. Although formal healthcare is precarious in most unpacified favelas, UPP presence is an important first step in expanding the public health system (SUS) to these areas. The UPP and the Secretariat for State Security (SESEG) have a unique opportunity to collaborate with the Secretariat of Municipal Health and Civil Defense (SMSDC) to address the remaining barriers to healthcare access in the following ways:

1. Development of more effective emergency care for favelados by a) training UPP officers in first aid and emergency medical response and b) creating teams of UPP and Service of Mobile Emergency Response (SAMU) personnel;
2. Development of more effective response to people with mental illnesses by a) training UPP officers to appropriately recognize the mentally ill and b) creating UPP-SAMU teams tasked with responding to the mentally ill in emergencies;
3. Support for the work of the Program of Community Health Agents by a) identifying and relating information about favelados in need of medical consultation to community health agents and b) serving as information sources on the availability of health services.
4. Additionally, it is recommended that future policies related to healthcare be accountable to the process of the 5-Step Grievance Mechanism outlined in Chapter Six in order to adapt policy to the fluctuating demands of the favelados it aims to serve.

Background: Health Inequalities Between Favela and Non-Favela Residents —

Constitutional Right to Healthcare

The 1988 Federal Constitution established the current health policy in Brazil. According to Article 196, healthcare is a constitutional right for all and a “duty of the state” (Brazil). Law 8.080/1990 regulates this right through a system based on a public-private network of care providers divided into three subsectors: the public sector, the Unified Health System (SUS), in which three tiers of government – federal, state, and municipal – coordinate the provision of care; the private subsector, including both for-profit and non-profit entities; and the private health insurance subsector, with different health plans of variable costs. The private and public components of the system are interconnected and people can use services from all three subsectors depending on their ability to pay (Paim 1785). In reality, however, more than seventy percent of the Brazilian population depends on the SUS for care (Simpatico 360). In Rio de Janeiro, this amounts to nearly 4.5 million people and includes the vast majority of favelados. The ability of most favelados to realize their constitutional right to health care is, therefore, contingent on the efficacy of the SUS.

Localization of Care the Public Healthcare System in the Community:

Preventive primary care is the focus of the SUS and its organization reflects an attempt to decentralize the delivery of services and emphasize community participation. The Family Health Program (PSF) is the main federal strategy of the SUS to regulate the provision of primary care, especially to at-risk and low-income population groups (Paim 1788). In Rio de Janeiro, the policies of the PSF are enshrined in the Health Gift Program (Saúde Presente), a municipal

initiative of the Municipal Secretariat of Health and Civil Defense (SMSDC), directed by Secretary Hans Dohmann ("SMS - Secretariat Municipal De Saúde").

According to the mission of Saúde Presente, health providers are responsible for implementing the directives of the PSF to the community. Rather than impose the federal agenda at the local level, providers are encouraged to utilize the PSF to address the specific needs of a given community. To this end, the Saúde Presente relies on personnel units known as family health teams (FHTs) for most aspects of primary care. FHTs are composed of one doctor, one nurse, one auxiliary nurse, and five to ten Community Health Agents (CHAs). Three to four of these teams operate in a given PSF clinic and each team is assigned to one of ten city planning areas. In a given area, the FHT is usually responsible for monitoring populations of 600 – 1000 families, or up to four thousand people (Paim 1791). Depending on infrastructural capacity of the clinic, the FHTs often pair with an oral health team made up of dentists, assistants, and technicians. Through Saúde Presente, FHTs are the “first point of contact with the local health system,” and their work reflects the mission of the SUS to localize the provision of care (Paim 1788). Although FHTs coordinate care with the greater municipal system by referring patients to specialized care elsewhere in the city, patients first encounter the SUS at a local health clinic or, if not in an actual facility, a community public space or private residence (Paim 1788).

Favelados and non-favela residents interface with FHTs in a variety of facilities that, while distinct in terms of services offered, target differential community needs. Briefly, Family Clinics (Clinicas da Família) and Municipal Health Centers (CSM) offer a wide range of primary care services aimed at prevention, such as prenatal care and maternal health, sexual health and family planning, and testing and treatment of chronic diseases like diabetes, dengue, tuberculosis, and leprosy (“SMS - Secretaria Municipal De Saúde”). In addition to primary care

clinics, the Saúde Presente includes 24-Hour Emergency Clinics (UPAs) that offer urgent and emergency care ("Portal Da Saude Do RJ"). Finally, public mental health services are the responsibility of clinics called Psychosocial Care Centers (CAPS). FHTs working in CAPS specialize in mental health recovery, social reintegration, or long-term inpatient stay for serious disorders. CAPS are further distinguished by their target population group, which is based on either age group or drug and alcohol dependency (Mateus, MD 2). Together, these facilities form the basic medical infrastructure of the Saúde Presente and the most visible space where residents can access public health care.

Indicators of Health Inequality Between Favelados and Non-Favela Residents:

Although the Constitution codifies health as a human right and the SUS operates based on the principle of universal accessibility, dramatic inequality in health conditions exist between favela and non-favela cariocas. Favelados report poorer conditions in all aspects of health, including infant mortality and maternal health, sexual health and violence, drug and alcohol dependency, chronic disease, and mental health disorders (Loewenberg 925; Markham). These differences denote a sharp disconnect between the ideal of universal access to healthcare enshrined in the Constitution and the lived experience of favelados in Rio de Janeiro.

Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy:

Life expectancy and health life expectancy (HALE) together reveal disparate mortality and morbidity rates between favelados and non-favela residents. When compared to non-favela residents and, especially, to cariocas who reside in upper socioeconomic sectors of the city, favelados have the shortest life expectancy for both men and women at all ages. Specifically, the

life expectancy at birth of men living in the wealthiest parts of the city is 12.8 years longer than that of men living in low-income areas. The differences by social strata among women are also pronounced, although smaller (Szwarcwald 520). Based on this indicator, socioeconomic level is a significant factor in health conditions.

Along with life expectancy, morbidity rates indicate that inequality is also striking across socioeconomic strata. HALE is the measure of the average number of years that a person can expect to live in “full health” by taking into account years lived in less than full health due to disease and/or injury (“Health Status”). Favelados of both sexes compare unfavorably with every other socioeconomic stratum and, when HALE is measured against total life expectancy, both male and female favelados have the highest percentage of years “lost” to disability after the age of 65 years. On the other hand, residents of the wealthiest sector have the highest proportion of healthy life after the age of 65 years – 92.3% healthy life for men, and 80.7% for women (Szwarcwald 521). Socioeconomic level correlates strongly with poorer health conditions given that favelados exhibit the lowest life expectancy and the highest percentages of life morbidity.

Overcoming Barriers to Healthcare the Importance of the UPP:

In light of health inequality, pacification is an instrumental first step toward expanding public healthcare into previously neglected favelas. Favelados face a basic hurdle, namely, a simple absence of inadequate number of formal health facilities and, subsequently, a lack of proximate healthcare personnel. Recent federal reform that expanded the number of community health agents in the PSF has begun to mitigate this problem; nonetheless, the expansion increased coverage by only ten percent in Rio de Janeiro between 2011 and 2013 (Dohmann). By

strengthening public security, the UPP plays an important role in establishing a safe environment for public health to flourish.

The absence of formal healthcare is a consequence of the historical conflict between the state and the organized drug factions that control some favelas. As is widely recognized, unpacified favelas have higher rates of violent crime. Additionally, if a drug faction controls the favela, this group usually exercises a monopoly over the provision of traditional public services (Suska 24). The question of violence is one of both the actual violent crime rates as well as the societal perception of unpacified favelas as inherently violent; together, they deter FHTs and workers who build and operate out of medical infrastructure from entering the favelas (Suska 67). Although drug traffickers often cultivate relationships with government officials and companies to receive free services, Suska explains that their rule still prohibits government medical infrastructure (67). As a result, the nearest health facility is often located in an adjoining neighborhood more than twenty minutes away by car (Suska 58). In this case, favelados must ask traffickers for transport assistance to a facility outside the area or for funds to pay for medicine and hygiene items (58). Even the few CHAs who do reach the unpacified favela must negotiate with drug faction leadership to establish a “mutual code of silence” that allows each to continue their work without disturbance (Zanchetta 613). In order to reach residents, these health workers must navigate the faction’s checkpoints, where their ability to provide care is subject to the rule of armed trafficker guards.

The very process of pacification undermines the strength of drug traffickers and, in turn, their ability to manipulate access to public services. Once pacification is complete, the UPP intelligently recognizes that early installation of a public health clinic or post benefits both officers and favelados. Construction of these clinics not only fosters favelado trust in the police,

it also enables long-term improvements in public health. Construction of a health facility, for example, a UPA, is often the determining factor in securing public acceptance of the UPP since even residents with the “most radicalized feelings and experiences against the police” cannot ignore this concrete state initiative to create a healthier and more secure environment (Suska 80).

The partnership between the SESEG and SMSDC is a crucial aspect of current and future pacification projects because improvements in public health depend upon the establishment and maintenance of security as well as the provision of appropriate health services. The remainder of this chapter will address persistent challenges to health care in the post-pacification period and present recommendations for strategic SESEG and SMSDC collaboration where the potential to fulfill the constitutional guarantee to healthcare is great.

Recommendations for UPP-SMSDC Collaboration:

The policies recommended are suitable for immediate implementation by the SESEG, in collaboration with SMSDC groups. The success of these policies depends upon consistent political will and financial backing along with the ability of the SESEG to adapt to the demands of the community members it serves. To this end, future SESEG-SMSDC policies in the realm of health care accessibility should be accountable to the “5-step Grievance Mechanism” outlined in Chapter Six. In accordance with this process, favelados are encouraged to voice concerns about health services in a space that is non-threatening and where they perceive that the state is accountable to its constitutional duty to provide healthcare.

1) Pre-Hospital Emergency Response

In pacified favelas, favelados continue to face limited access to an important component of the public health system, namely, emergency care. In 2009, the Service of Mobile Emergency Response (SAMU) covered less than seventy percent of the population of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Machado 6). A lack of UPA facilities, overcrowding, infrastructural barriers, and the legacy of territorial control of favelas by opposing drug factions all contribute to this problem. The city of Rio de Janeiro hosts only nineteen UPAs, the majority of which are not located within favelas (see map below), resulting in overcrowded facilities ("Portal Da Saude Do RJ"). Data collected by the National Survey of Household Sampling corroborates favelado testimonials from across the city that a persistent lack of vacancies and long queues for consultations, exams, and surgeries characterize SUS emergency services, especially pre-hospital (UPA) and hospital emergency rooms (O'Dwyer 1638). Geographically remote UPAs in combination with the haphazard infrastructure and narrow roads of many favela urban landscapes pose significant barriers for both favelados seeking direct access to UPAs and SAMU teams attempting to retrieve favelados in crisis. Moreover, the legacy of inter-favela power dynamics informs where residents access healthcare, given that favelados of separate pacified communities are less likely to use a UPA in a neighborhood formerly controlled by an opposing drug faction ("Brazil: The Red Cross Helps").

In addition to these barriers, resident demands that UPP officers respond to emergencies are unmet due to a lack of UPP training and the ill-defined partnership between the UPP and SAMU. Many residents depend upon the officers for the same emergency medical aid that they once received from traffickers, yet UPP officers receive minimal training in emergency medical

response (Suska 71). Currently, UPP officers administer first aid to victims at the scene of the emergency and provide transport of victims to medical facilities but, because officers have different comfort levels with first aid, the quality of their emergency response varies widely (71). The ambiguous partnership between the UPP and SAMU also exacerbates the problem of minimal training in terms of their respective roles in emergency response. No protocol exists that ensures effective intergovernmental coordination on emergency care and thus, pre-hospital emergency response in some favelas remains precarious.

In a similar vein, a recent resolution passed by the Sao Paulo State Secretary of Public Security may have ramifications for emergency response policy in Rio de Janeiro. The resolution, which took effect on January 8, 2013, bans police officers from administering first aid and from transporting victims with serious injuries to medical facilities. Instead, police officers are required to contact SAMU immediately following the discovery of an individual in crisis. Officers cannot administer treatment in any form to victims; SAMU is now solely responsible for this. Human Rights Watch has lauded the resolution for its intention to reduce the frequency of police tampering with crime scenes and unlawful “resistance” killings that take place during police transport of victims (Jordan). This resolution must be taken into consideration for policies that affect the UPP in Rio de Janeiro.

Figure 1 Distribution of UPAs in Rio de Janeiro (“UPA 24 Hours in Rio de Janeiro Municipality”) (See Appendix)

Policy:

SESEG-SMSDC collaboration in the field of emergency care services has the potential to expand the reach of the existing emergency response system so that a greater proportion of residents receive more immediate and appropriate care. To this end, the SESEG and the SMSDC must work together to define the parameters of their respective roles in emergency care to ensure that UPP officers view SAMU as a viable partner in the provision of public safety. In contrast to the recent policy adopted by the Sao Paulo State Department for Public Security to regulate the behavior of the Policia Militar (PM), a similar resolution targeting Rio de Janeiro’s UPP officers is not suitable for adoption. Based on the evidence presented in Chapter One, the UPP is distinct in culture from the PM and, thus far, favelados trust the UPP enough to demand that they provide emergency aid (Suska). With this in mind, it is recommended that UPP officers follow this protocol upon discovery of an emergency:

1) Assess the severity of the injury and need for emergency medical aid. Depending on the severity of the injury, officers should a) administer basic first aid or b) immediately telephone SAMU to request medical guidance and emergency transportation.

2) Remain in contact with SAMU while they arrive and administer further aid to the victim based on guidance from SAMU.

3) Relinquish medical aid services to SAMU upon their arrival.

OR

4) If SAMU is unavailable or unable to reach the emergency location, transport victims to the nearest appropriate medical facility.

The efficacy of this emergency protocol depends upon the ability of the SESEG and SMSDC to collaborate in the following ways:

a) Develop comprehensive training for all UPP officers in first aid and emergency medical response. Training should be administered by the SMSDC or an SMSDC-approved partner with requisite skills and experience in the field of emergency care, as per the recommendations in Chapter Three on best practices for training.

b) Create UPP-SAMU emergency response teams. The SESEG and SMSDC should develop formal liaisons between groups of UPP officers and SAMU teams assigned to the same jurisdiction in a given favela. Officers should train with their SAMU partners for emergency response and should prioritize contacting them first in the event of an emergency.

These recommendations will address the reality of favela geography and resident demands that UPPs assist in emergency response. Because officers are often the first to encounter an individual in need of emergency care, they must coordinate with and support the SAMU emergency protocol (Alonso-Serra 499). Together, better training and stronger coordination will ensure effective emergency care reaches more favelados and that favelados perceive the aim of the UPP to preserve public safety as legitimate.

2) Care for People with Mental Illness

In addition to supporting emergency care in the favelas, the UPP can also play a unique role in expanding the reach of the mental health system in Rio de Janeiro. The prevalence of mental health disorders is strongly associated with place of residence, gender, and age. Based on studies in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, favela residents are more likely to suffer from a serious mental disorder than non-favela residents, and mental illness is even more common

among favelado females and the elderly (Maia 653). Such health inequality stems from the same access barriers that affect emergency care services and, unfortunately, formal mental health facilities are largely absent from favelas. The CAPS units, hailed as the “cornerstone of the Brazilian Psychiatric Reform,” localize the provision of mental healthcare to the community level; however, it is clear that the number of CAPS is far from the ideal needed to serve the population since, citywide, Rio hosts only twenty-seven CAPS (“Rede CAPS Do Rio De Janeiro”). In other words, the ratio of units to habitants is one to 230,000 inhabitants. In this regard, access to CAPS is limited and UPP officers are often the first to interface with mentally ill persons (Lamb 1269).

Figure 2 Distribution of CAPS in the city of Rio de Janeiro (“Rede CAPS Do Rio De Janeiro”) (See Appendix)

UPP officers often encounter people with mental illnesses when others call to report disorderly or disturbing behavior because of unnecessary or uninformed fear about these individuals. Officers themselves, due to minimal training, often share these commonly held attitudes toward the mentally ill and, as such, respond inappropriately (“The Police Response”). Given that law enforcement “fulfills the role of gatekeeper” in deciding whether cariocas with mental illness enter the criminal justice system or receive care in the mental health system, police training in appropriate response to the mentally ill is very important, especially in emergencies. A major problem, however, is that police have little training in performing this kind of triage and, as a result, in Rio de Janeiro, mental illness is often misrecognized and criminalized (Lamb 1270).

Policy:

Stronger SESEG-SMSDC collaboration in mental healthcare has the potential to mitigate these barriers by ensuring that favelados with mental illnesses are appropriately recognized and efficiently connected with mental health services. Specialized training for select officers and greater coordination between officers and CAPS health providers and CAPS-affiliated SAMU teams is an important first step toward overcoming negative attitudes toward the mentally ill and addressing the difficulty of access to services (Lamb 1273). SESEG and SMSDC should collaborate in the following ways:

a) Train all UPP officers in responding to the mentally ill. Basic training in how to appropriately recognize people with mental illnesses should be required for all officers in order to reduce the incentive to immediately arrest these individuals unless it is determined that their illegal activity is of primary concern (Lamb 1274). The SMSDC or SMSDC-approved partner with requisite skills and experience in the field of mental health should administer this training, in accordance with the recommendations in Chapter Three on best practices for training.

b) Create UPP-SAMU emergency mental illness response teams. Select UPP officers should be trained with CAPS mental health professionals and CAPS-affiliated SAMU teams in order to create formal liaisons between officers and SAMU teams in the same favela jurisdiction. In the case of an emergency involving a mentally ill individual, UPP officers should follow the protocol outlined above for emergency response (see “Pre-hospital Emergency Response: Policy”). UPP-SAMU response teams should be limited to select UPP officers and SAMU teams connected to the nearest CAPS— limiting the number of UPP officers involved may save training costs. UPP officers reserve the right to make the final decision to arrest, but this decision

should be more educated, given that officers will work alongside mental health professionals (Lamb 1274).

SESEG-SMSDC coordination should expand opportunities for favelados to receive mental health care for long-term psychiatric disorders and drug and alcohol-related conditions at CAPS as well as reduce the incidence of misrecognition and arrest.

3) Limited Capacity of the Program of Community Health Workers

UPP officers and CHAs both utilize a community engagement approach in their day-to-day neighborhood patrols and, given the limited capacity of the Program of Community Health Agents (PACS), the UPP are in a unique position to support the work of the CHAs by expanding the reach of the PACS. PACS is a federal PSF program integrated into the Saúde Presente of Rio de Janeiro that manages the CHAs, again, the most visible agents of the family health teams (FHTs) (Paim 1788). In their role as the mobile units of FHTs, CHAs have been commended for their success in connecting favelados to formal healthcare, whether in residential homes or other public spaces. Although the PACS is attempting to bridge the gap in healthcare access, limited personnel capacity and a lack of health education among favelados continues to threaten the efficacy of the program.

As to the issue of limited personnel, many CHAs are overworked because of the large scope of the PACS. Each agent monitors approximately two hundred families and one nurse or physician supervises teams of about ten agents (Paim 1788). Even in favelas with the best ratio of CHAs to families, CHAs report exhaustion from long working hours that sometimes exceed twelve hours per day (Tardáguila). Rocinha, for example, is home to more than 69,000 people, three PSF health facilities, and more than two hundred CHAs; nevertheless, local favelados

report both overcrowding at the facilities and minimal interaction with CHAs ("FaveladaRocinha.com").

The fact that favelados lack exposure to formal health care and formal health education exacerbates the problem of limited capacity and continues to threaten the realization of the PACS's mission. Often, the most widely accepted medical standard in favelas is "medicina popular" or folk medicine because of decades spent without access to formal healthcare. Favelados often resist "professional scientific knowledge" about health as well as mistrust formal health services (Zachetta 610). In cases where favelados do not possess formal identification or an address, they may also be denied access to formal health care ("Brazil: The Red Cross Helps"). To combat these negative experiences, CHAs seek to translate professional medical knowledge into popular knowledge and equip favelados to utilize health facilities directly; however, due to limited capacity, CHAs cannot educate the entire population in need and many favelados thus remain skeptical of formal health care and unaware or unwilling to use it (Zanchetta 611).

Finally, the SESEG has made little effort to support the on-the-ground work of the CHAs in spite of the fact that UPP officers often receive health complaints and inquiries about health services from residents (Suska 67). Currently, no formal policy exists within the SESEG that requires officers to respond to such demands in a uniform manner. Officers also lack knowledge about the availability of health services and, consequently, are unable to direct favelados in need of care to the appropriate facility or CHA in the area.

Policy:

The SESEG must recognize the value of the CHAs and support their mission to expand formal health services to favelados because UPP officers utilize the same public space and community approach as CHAs. Coordination between the SESEG and SMSDC will allow the UPP to connect favelados with health services and information. To be clear, it is not recommended that the UPP act outside of its purview by providing health education or services directly; rather, SESEG-SMSDC collaboration can strengthen the PACS by supplementing the work of CHAs in the following ways:

a) UPP officers on neighborhood patrol should identify households or individuals in need of medical services and provide this information to local CHWs. The SESEG and SMSDC should formalize the relationship between UPP officers and CHAs that work in the same jurisdiction in order for officers to serve the latter in identification of households. Frequent contact and a formal UPP-PACS liaison should be established to transfer information between them. The policy is recommended based on the need to formalize UPP response to favelados that voice health complaints, especially those that live in areas that CHAs neglect to serve or do not have the capacity to serve.

In the case of a favelado health complaint, UPP officers should report the issue to the UPP-PACS liaison who, in turn, should communicate the information to the local CHAs. UPP officers must respect and protect the privacy of favelados in this regard and under no circumstances should the officers inquire about health issues, unless in the evident case of an emergency (Zureik 110). To clarify, officers should only communicate complaints that favelados voluntarily offer. In accordance with the training recommendations in the above sections on emergency response and response to the mentally ill, UPP officers should have the skills to

identify and assess the severity of common health conditions. These skills will allow them to recognize the favelados in need of CHA services.

b) UPP officers should serve as information sources on the availability of health services in the community and encourage favelados to utilize the 5-step Grievance Mechanism. In the same vein as the above recommendation, officers should support the work of the CHAs by serving as sources of information on local health services. The SESEG must ensure that officers are regularly tested on their knowledge of the logistics of the healthcare system, including how and where to access all PSF facilities and private services (for-profit and non-profit). Officers should not provide medical consultation, but rather relate information to favelados on where to seek consultation. If favelados express concern about their ability to access health services or distrust of formal facilities and state health providers, officers should encourage them to voice these feelings at local Resident Assemblies where UPP officers and service providers alike are made accountable to the 5-Step Grievance Mechanism outlined in Chapter Six.

These policies should formalize the partnership between the UPP and the PACS as well as the interaction between UPP officers and favelados with respect to favelado health complaints. Because both officers and CHAs work in community spaces in close contact with favelados, the SESEG has the potential to bolster the efficacy of the CHAs by strategically targeting neglected residents.

Conclusion:

Disparate health conditions in Rio de Janeiro reveal the precarious nature of healthcare for favelados. In many cases, this reality is a product of decades of living in an area controlled by

drug factions and, subsequently, in a community that boasts exorbitant rates of violent crime. The UPP officers work to establish public security and, in turn, their efforts to pacify favelas are a commendable and crucial first step toward expanding state services into these areas. The momentum for change as such is underway, but favelados still face huge access barriers due to the limited and inadequate number of health facilities and personnel along with poor SESEG coordination with government health agencies.

The public health agenda, to this end, must inform future SESEG policies for the UPP because the success of these community police officers to foster trust among favelados depends upon concrete progress in healthcare access. Improvements in the efficiency of UPP emergency response protocol, appropriate recognition and treatment of people with mental illnesses, and support of community health workers will all demonstrate the commitment of the UPP, not only to public safety, but also to public health. By undertaking these initiatives, the UPP will be perceived as allies to the favelados who aim to realize their constitutional right to healthcare. In the long-term, improvements in healthcare accessibility will also solidify the reduction of violence that the UPP is striving to achieve and legitimize state institutions in the eyes of favelados. When favelados access public services, especially to treat health problems, they will claim their right to health and, in turn, their right to access and influence a society beyond the favela.

Chapter Eight

Land Title Legalization and Economic Development

Tjos Hansen

Abstract:

Despite the many recent successes of the combined efforts of BOPE and the UPP, Rio de Janeiro cannot expect long-term peace without sustainable economic development in favelas. By capitalizing on several movements already underway and actively promoting the furthering of land right legalization and job creation in favelas, the UPP can greatly improve security by stimulating economic development. Necessary steps to consider include:

1. Further the issue of land title legalization to give favelados a sense of permanence and alleviate fears of eviction while providing invaluable opportunities through:
 - a. Partnership with established NGOs and private organizations for improving law enforcement and facilitating social work
 - b. Encouraging the government to play a more active role in the issue, specifically the *Registro Geral de Imóveis*
2. Create and actively promote well-established, accessible economic resources through:
 - a. Encouraging an increased presence of financial institutions in favelas
 - b. Offering classes revolving around financial awareness and management skills
 - c. Increasing community programs that serve as entrepreneurial hubs

In following these suggestions, the UPP will extend its influence as a security provider that ultimately will foster the right environment for sustained peace and economic growth.

Introduction:

The marginalization of favelas is not particular to Rio de Janeiro. Favelas, like shantytown districts throughout Latin American metropolises, are comprised of migrant-majority populations, whose poor reception amongst the metropolis is deep seated. Inherent in this situation is the city's negative perception of these areas and the lack of resources available to the favelados. A dearth of established institutions not only limits job opportunities but also economic development and, ultimately, means of betterment. Historically, favela economies have large informal jobs sectors and black markets, most notoriously drug trafficking. The subsequent pacification of many favelas in Rio has finally provided the opportunity for improvement. Favelados are slowly experiencing a changing mindset in many regards, which, if properly managed, will offer a timely method of economic development through several different channels.

Since pacification has greatly limited violent crime and murders, outside perspectives of favelas have changed, which may prove to be an impetus to further development. While contemporaneous foreign perceptions of favelas were shaped by reputation and movies like *City of God*, favelas are becoming somewhat of a tourist destination, despite an abundance of crime (Clarke 2011). In regards to outside perspectives in Rio, two *carioca* companies, CEDEA and Light, water and electricity providers, now offer special rates for residents of pacified communities (UPPSocial 2010). In areas under UPP jurisdiction, city and regional businesses are beginning to expand into favelas, previously a rarity and evidence of changing perceptions of favelas within the city. In response to this formalization of services, favelados are now expected to pay for these previously pirated services, and it is being done so in a matter of general acceptance. With the payment of such services comes the favelados' recognition of an enormous

improvement as tended-to customers. In an interview with *Time World*, Valdinei Medina, President of the *Chapéu Mangueira* Resident Association, said, “I used to spend an hour in the shower. Now that I am paying for it, I am in and out” (2011).

Favelado microeconomies typically respond favorably to formalized businesses and utilities. This indicates a moment of change. The UPP and others must capitalize on this changing mentality to smoothly enact the recommendations outlined in this policy proposal. Consistent gains in economic strength will solidify the reduction of violence and the advancement of security in the favelas.

Land Title Legalization Within Favelas:

I. Inconsistent property rights designations hamper economic growth:

Resolving property rights confrontations and land tenure questions have proved challenging. The Brazilian government has attempted to grant certain rights to favelados, most notably through Article 1240 of the 2002 Civil Code:

[O]ne that possesses an urban area of up to 250m² for five years uninterrupted and without opposition, utilizing it for his or her family’s dwelling, acquires it at command, if he or she is not an owner of another urban or rural property (JusBrasil 2002).

Article 1240 attempts to provide favelados with a modicum of land security. This is not enough. Additional articles and municipal- and state-level amendments should be made to ultimately improve the situation. Politics regarding favelas have changed from one end of the

spectrum to the other that even contradict one another. Intermittently over the past three decades, politicians favored favelados with limited protection rights placed on certain neighborhoods; while at other times adopting a *desfavelização* (literally: “de-favelization”) mentality (Soares Gonçalves 2006). The volatile policy shifts reflect regime changes in Brazilian government, which included the end of a long dictatorship in 1985 followed by periods of tumult.

Fairly recently, an amendment to “The Organic Law N° 9/2005” outlined the procedure for official evictions of favelas in attempts to “...contain the growth of favelas, be it vertically or horizontally” (Do Flamengo *et al.* 2005). This sort of policy employs a *desfavelização* attitude. However, this does not simply grant free reign to destroy people’s homes, for certain stipulations are in place. Despite a specified procedure for evicting favelados, in light of the two upcoming mega-events, illegal or underhanded evictions have drawn negative attention domestically and internationally (Romero 2012).

Regardless of some negative publicity concerning recent evictions, the government fosters strategies geared toward improving favelado life. A successful program designates land tenure to qualifying favelados, made possible by a large loan issued by the Inter-American Development Bank, or the IDB. The city is in the third phase of its program, a continuation from the original 1996 Favela-Bairro Program (Brakarz 2010). While the IDB has had general success in affecting change through investment, this should serve as a model and inspiration for larger-scale operations. As the chapter develops and other recommendations are brought into play, the importance of property rights will be highlighted.

II. Models and Inspirations for Land Title Legalization:

Some have argued that “Rio’s favelas have thrived for decades on informality” and therefore land tenure rights are not necessary (Handzic 2010). This political tack does not take into account Brazil’s rapidly improving economy, which simultaneously ushers in an increasing threat of gentrification in these informal existences. Ultimately, Handzic makes an unconvincing case for the continuation of this informal way of life largely due to his failure to address future threats. As mentioned in Chapter Six, “The influx of external capital and investment opportunities in these improved favelas has played a major role in the gentrification phenomenon.” This policy recommendation has highlighted early stages of gentrification. The present threat of eviction or pricing-out through gentrification will only continue to increase, especially if peace is to be sustained, which is the UPP’s basic goal.

The state of Paraná is the birthplace of *Terra Nova Regularizações Fundiárias*, the brainchild of André Albuquerque. This company mediates disputes between legal landowners and illegal squatters, many who have been occupying the land for up to fifteen years. Ten years after its conception, Terra Nova has served nearly 30,000 families (Ashoka 2009). Albuquerque has developed an interesting business model that he describes as a “win-win” for all parties involved. Navigating law and local governance, Terra Nova eventually reaches an agreeable contract between the two parties and draws up the paperwork. From the sum of transaction, 40% goes to the former landowner, 40% to Terra Nova for future projects and loan operations, and the remaining 20% is reinvested into the community through community projects and public works. Albuquerque has found that landowners are generally happy to receive any remuneration for their lands that otherwise may have never brought them a single *real*.

Quite often, the tenants (or emergent land title bearers) do not have the means to purchase

their houses from the legal owner. The 40% collected by Terra Nova is in part for the sake of providing loans to those in this situation. This method of negotiation between the involved actors takes anywhere from six months to a year, which is preferred to “government-led processes that can take as long as two or three decades” (Ashoka 2009). According to Albuquerque’s experience:

By creating an entrepreneurial process whereby families engage in and pay for the process to acquire land rights, the relationship of that person or family to the land is larger than mere ownership. It is a very different and much stronger relationship than when the government gives this title to the residents for free. (Albuquerque 2011)

According to Terra Nova, actively being a part of the land acquisition instills a deep sense of pride. Bolstering civic pride is one way to build trust, community solidarity, and social capital— aspects that are key to advancing human security.

Of course, not all situations are as convenient as the framework in which Terra Nova works, for occasionally there is no legal owner of the land. If this is the case, another way of procuring land rights must be established, perhaps based on the Terra Nova model. The efficiency disparity between Terra Nova and the traditional governmental route is both striking and concerning. Though increasing government efficacy in this matter is nothing the UPP can undertake on its own, it is worth mentioning as the Secretariat of Public Security plays a role in the inner workings of the government. In order for such a policy to develop, the *Registro Geral de Imóveis* (General Registry of Real Estate, or RGI) must be involved, and the UPP has more political leverage in the matter than favelados—the UPP should pursue such involvement. As an arm of law enforcement, the UPP and Sec. of Public Security Beltrame have a special obligation

to address economic and property management conditions in the favelas. UPP officers should be granted the capability to inform and edify their communities through advocating legitimized land use. By incorporating the conversation of land rights, the UPP can serve as a bridge between the bureaucracy of the government and the voice of the favelados—partially fulfilling the social work responsibilities of the UPP as intended by the government of Rio de Janeiro.

III. Opportunities with Land Tenure:

In the event that disputes of ownership arise, residents with legal documentation have proof of residence and can avoid such conflicts. Thanks to pacification, real estate prices have increased in specific favelas. According to SecoviRio, a real estate association, the pacification of the UPP has increased the value of real estate in the city by 15%. In pacified favelas the increase is much higher, as they are slowly becoming labeled as desirable neighborhoods. Economic externalities abound as a result of this rapid gentrification. Struggles over ownership are manifesting, as was the case for Andreas Wielend. Wielend, an Austrian engineer who purchased a dilapidated home prior to pacification, almost risked losing the property he bought after the former owner realized how much the value had appreciated and seized the house (Watts 2013).

Plans set forth by architecture firms such as AECOM for various Olympic structures have taken precedence over favelados' well being, resulting in hundreds of illegal evictions across the city. In fact, such evictions go against the United Nations' *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, which Brazil assented to in 1992 (United Nations 2013). Amnesty International highlighted the issue in a 2011 letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President and called for action:

The situation became so severe that in April 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, Raquel Rolnik, demanded urgent action from the Brazilian government in a formal letter issued after she received numerous complaints that indicated “a pattern of lack of transparency, consultation, dialogue, fair negotiation, and participation of the affected communities in the process concerning convictions undertaken or planned in connection with the World Cup and Olympics. (UN-Habitat)

Situations such as those mentioned in Amnesty International’s letter to the IOC would have, and could have in the future, been avoided with proper land right legalization.

Securing property rights can protect favelados in several ways. Registered property owners would not be forced from their homes in the event developers move in and desire to oust them, as the ownership gives them legal leverage. Also, owning such desired property gives favelados a unique opportunity to capitalize on their prime real estate, for, should they wish, the selling of such property provides the favelado owners with a means of upward social mobility. Ultimately, land title formalization provides favelados with equity options and the security of permanent residence.

UPP Role in Catalyzing Land Title Legalization:

The current situation—nascent pacification and the lead-up to more international exposure—presents an opportune time to instigate positive change in policy; however, residents need to be informed about *what* this opportunity could mean for them. The UPP stands to be an

effective actor in the process of land title formalization as it is the perfect medium between formal government institutions and informal favelas. As mentioned in Chapter Four, more UPP involvement in Resident Assemblies lays the groundwork for effective change, including the issue of land tenure. Using these Resident Assemblies as a means of disseminating information and resources, each favela has the possibility to address their particular issues as seen fit by local leaders, with the help of the UPP.

The UPP should work hand-in-hand with the Resident Assemblies to create forums open to the public that aim to inform on the rights and risks of land tenure. Whenever possible, businesses and NGOs, such as Terra Nova, that help navigate and mitigate the bureaucracy revolving this issue should be put in contact with Resident Assemblies. In addition, the UPP should investigate how to incorporate the RGI in the Resident Assemblies, which would more closely unite government institutions with favelas and hopefully lead to greater efficiency. Though land rights are imperative for the security of housing in favelas, equally important is proper education of newly acquired rights, as is generally the case when new policies and laws are enacted. In addition to creating public forums that will unite important actors, UPP officers who interact with the residents on a daily basis are excellent conduits of information.

Becoming a legal owner of one's home is the first step to minimizing marginalization. Legitimizing a large number of favelados is a strong political statement that speaks to the increasing level of involvement and cohesion in the *carioca* society. In the eyes of favelados, gaining property rights means abandoning fears of being evicted at any moment. Terra Nova states that land rights formalization coincides with a deep sense of pride in ownership (Albuquerque 2013). The daily conversations and frequent community meetings the UPP officers have with favelados are the first steps to education, recognition, and advancement of this

important impetus that provides different outlets for economic development.

Furthering the Access of Financial Institutions:

I. Two Different Avenues to Economic Development:

Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, is an important means of economic development. This method relies on a direct monetary investment via either purchasing a foreign company or simply expanding the existing business operations. Dr. Belay Seyoum, of Nova Southeastern University, found a direct correlation between informal institutions and FDI. His study concludes:

(1) Informal institutions based on trust and reputation have a significant and greater effect on inward FDI flows than formal institutions; (2) there is a positive relationship between informal institutions based on trust and reputation and formal institutions; and that (3) the relationship between informal institution and inward FDI flows is partially mediated by formal institutions (2011).

The UPP's successful establishments make favelas a more desirable destination for such investments. The incorporation of civil society and protection provided from a politically grounded institution points directly to the second large finding of the study, as mentioned above. Of course, long-term success would be necessary for serious FDI consideration; nevertheless, the UPP is laying the framework for just that.

Very recently, Brazil has gravitated toward policy that "is open to and encourages foreign investment" (U.S. Department of State, 2012). If bonds between the UPP and informal institutions in the favelas strengthen due to the current, future, and proposed UPP policies,

foreign investors may see potential in favelas. However, such a means of economic development is not likely (at least in a large, effective sense) in the immediate future, which actually stands to benefit favelados. A more organic form of economic development directly engages the community and allows it to prosper from both an individual and a collective standpoint. Entrepreneurship as a means of economic development has the potential to be extremely impactful. In this sense local entrepreneurs can extend influence and subsequent economic development outward throughout the community. The UPP has the capacity to encourage entrepreneurship in several ways, all in the name of furthering the access of financial institutions. The availability of financial resources provides countless opportunities to these communities, many of which have never had access to such amenities.

II. Financial Exclusion and the Dire Effects:

Financial exclusion is the lack of banking services extended to those living in poverty, which is most often the case in favelas. In her article, “Financial Exclusion in Latin America”, María Solo outlines its effects on the individual and the communal level concluding that all actors stand to benefit from financial *inclusion*: the individual, the community, the banks, and the government. More than simply not having a bank account, “...financial exclusion also reduces the capacity for aggregate savings and, in consequence, for aggregate investment, thus jeopardizing economic growth” (María Solo 2008). Jeopardizing economic growth would only perpetuate poverty in favelas and, in effect, undo what the UPP has accomplished, for pacification has fostered the right environment for economic burgeoning.

III. Effects and Examples of Accessible Financial Resources:

Entrepreneurial spirit exists throughout the favelas. A member of the Business Civic Leadership Center recalls, in an article, the various entrepreneurs he met in *Complexo Alemão*, formerly one of Rio's most notoriously dangerous favelas. This story serves as an example to everyone that favelados are more than willing to perpetuate and sustain economic development and simply need the resources to begin. Just within this favela alone, which is massive, there are several banking institutions such as Itaú, Santander, and Banco do Brasil. The three entrepreneurs highlighted in the article each received a microfinance loan from one of these organizations. Their drive and vision, coupled with the monetary means to see dreams come to fruition, led one man to establish a successful restaurant, another to greatly expand his existing store, and a woman to create a co-op recycling program. All three business ventures ultimately provide valuable services for the community as well as the opportunity for employment (Favela Entrepreneurs 2012). Though the three stories cited above are ones of promise and success, such services have not reached enough favelados, or perhaps they simply are not aware of them.

IV. UPP Role in Encouraging Financial Inclusion:

This past summer saw a great leap forward regarding the encouragement of economic development, as Flávio Duarte, a former president of the Commercial Association of Macacos, applauded "Comércio Legal" (Legal Trade), which was a gathering that allowed the community to congregate to "discuss future possible economic growth through incentives and lines of credit" (Hearst 2012). This event was created by the *Fundo UPP Empreendedor*, which extends microcredit loans to specific micro-entrepreneurs in eight favelas (Marotti 2012). Incorporating valuable resources such as the *Fundo UPP Empreendedor* into the Resident Associations would

have a tremendous impact on the communities. The UPP recognizes the importance of economic development, specifically through entrepreneurship, and has made gains in the right direction; however, even more should be done.

An idea to additionally foster entrepreneurial spirit is to provide tax incentives to new local businesses. For example, for a specified time, say the first five years, a favelado company might qualify for a business tax waiver. This would greatly incentivize local businesses in an organic way and provide many job opportunities to many community members. However, certain conditions would need to be put in place—household income and necessary expenditure estimates must be considered. This would help minimize the exploitation of incentives by those who are not the focus of the program. This is an idea the UPP can raise with different groups in governmental and business.

Mentioned earlier, the UPP officers' groundwork and personal relationships with the communities have the potential to play a crucial role in fostering economic development. Beyond the conversation regarding entrepreneurship through the *Fundo UPP Empreendedor*, another important matter regards basic job situations, for not everyone is an entrepreneur. As peace continues to flourish in the favelas, more and more possibilities arise, including vocational opportunities. The arrival of a handful of financial institutions in specific pacified favelas and an increased interest in businesses doing the same is likely to cultivate new jobs. UPP officers can easily help jobless favelados by staying updated on local job resources and services, which is a simple task that can have a huge impact.

Currently the UPP teaches and helps organize classes for community members that range from self-defense, music and dance, to English lessons. Along this vein, the UPP should begin offering classes revolving around financial literacy, such as basic bookkeeping. Doing so imparts

necessary knowledge required to thrive in the presence of arriving banking services, but even more, such classes have the potential to foster basic vocational skills as well. Of course, UPP officers may not be financial experts themselves, but they, and the larger organization itself, have the resources to organize such classes. There are numerous effective options for perusing this. In addition to teaching financial skills and concepts, these classes or community meetings can bring in financial experts from the incoming banking institutions to raise awareness about the various options. The most important aspect to be conveyed is responsibility.

Because civil society is incredibly important in favelas, it would be both wise and effective to also bring in local successful entrepreneurs into Resident Assemblies, such as the three mentioned from Complexo Alemão. Raising awareness of these business endeavors not only can foster respect and pride but also may spark an entrepreneurial spirit within others as well. Quite possibly these classes eventually can become a forum for local business, businesspeople, and entrepreneurs. Those who know what the favelados need most are the favelados. Outside of the favelas, the UPP as an organization should further encourage banking institutions to consider mirroring those like Itaú, Santander, and Banco do Brasil. However, it must be stressed that banks need always operate “FOR the community, not just IN communities” (Favela Entrepreneurs 2012).

V. Why Act Now?:

There is an intersecting importance of land title legalization and economic development. Establishing land title legalization in favelas provides the permanence and security necessary for job creation, a means of economic development. Job creation then generates increased income that is necessary to pay for the new property taxes that accompany land tenure. In fact, many

banking institutions require a home address to open an account and therefore get a line of credit. Informal property rights perpetuate financial exclusion. De Soto and Litan conclude their article, entitled “Effective Property Rights and Economic Development: Next Steps,” thusly: “the diffusion of property rights ... is necessary not only for enhanced economic growth but also for political stability in most parts of the developing world” (2001). Their article highlights the importance of developing countries’ governments not only acknowledging the need for more formalized property rights, but also taking progressive action in the matter. If their assertion that property rights leads to enhanced political stability is correct, then clearly favelas have much to gain. The UPP should raise the importance of property rights so that favelas can develop economically. In turn, the community, city and state will benefit.

Favelados are experiencing changing mentalities regarding legitimate business and interaction with the local government. Not to say they were irresponsible before pacification, but the formalization of certain institutions has required increased responsibility. One example of this is requiring payment for formerly pirated public services, such as electricity and cable—a new responsibility that has generally been well received. This positive reception is a product of favelados recognizing the benefits of such a formalization, which in turn gave them new rewards. In addition to timely customer service, LIGHT, a local electricity provider, provided new energy-efficient refrigerators and light bulbs to newly pacified, paying communities (UPPsocial 2013). Capitalizing on this recent change in mentality, which is associated with positive outcomes, evidenced by LIGHT’s actions, and ultimately increases the likelihood that future changes will also be accepted.

The increased accessibility of banks and their financial resources will foster opportunity and jobs. More permanent jobs are a way of helping to ensure peace. Drug traffickers are so

successful in maintaining control in favelas because, in addition to other factors, the violence that surrounded them greatly diminished social capital (Perlman 2006). Encouraging entrepreneurship and job creation undoubtedly increases social capital, and we can assume that both the presence of the UPP and the favelas' general gratefulness for the drug trafficker's diminished persuasion will greatly hinder a regression to pre-pacification ways of life. As services and social capital continue to improve and diffuse throughout pacified communities, so too will economic development.

Conclusion:

As this chapter outlines, successful UPP efforts in pacifying favelas construct the necessary platforms for furthered economic development, which ultimately supports the preservation of security. The aforementioned progressive policies recommend ways to improve existing programs and foster new ones. An important issue in many regards (evidenced by its appearance in multiple chapters of this report) is that of land tenure. The securing of property rights provides a sense of security and an alleviation of the omnipresent fear of eviction that some favelados live with. Organizations such as Terra Nova provide not only opportunity for development, but also a model others may follow in pursuing this reform. Ultimately the RGI must be involved in this process. The UPP has the opportunity to disseminate information through its increased involvement in Resident Associations and ultimately play an extremely important, though somewhat invisible, role in the matter.

The UPP's objective is extended pacification. The UPP has something to gain by promoting property rights, for land rights give favelados political leverage in the event that their peace and homes be compromised in the future. An extremely important aspect of the issue

involves RGI, which merits further investigation.

The emergence of land rights allows for many more financial opportunities that were previously unavailable to most favelados. This chapter outlined the expensive costs of financial exclusion, so continuing to promote the presence of financial institutions (that are run in a proper sense, which can be monitored by the UPP) has positive impacts across the board. The UPP has the ability to play a significant role in economic development through job creation and entrepreneurship. Serving as middlemen, UPP officers can connect community members to the right outlets for financial and vocational resources. Once again, using the Resident Assemblies as a vehicle, the UPP should unite community leaders with financial and vocational experts while also further promoting and involving the *Fundo UPP Empreendedor*. The wide range of classes taught by many UPP officers provides the platform for basic vocational training classes as well, which stands to benefit favelados immensely. Ultimately, all the recommendations outlined in this chapter aid the UPP in its mission of sustained peace in favelas and improving the lives of favelados.

Chapter Nine

Youth Outreach

Kika Kauai

Abstract:

A wall of mistrust and wariness exists between police and favelado youth. During the process of pacification, this presents a particular problem, as youth are most impacted by the drug trade, and their views will be sustained as they provide powerful mentorship to the youth of the next few generations.

Youth also pose incredible opportunity as a supportive and a positive group. As homicide rates have plummeted, youth have been seen attending meetings with police officers and other community members, though their influence remains limited (Stahlberg 15).

The UPP would greatly benefit from the continued positive development of favelado youth, and the organizations (UPP and its peripheral networks of social causes) should garner further trust and communication with youth to combat past frustrations, poor relationships, and prepare for a more complementary and sustainable future. In order to effectively gain this trust, the UPP should provide venues for cooperation, as well as work within already established community youth development programs. The UPP should go further to provide basic legal education, create mentorship programs that pair UPP members with you, and encourage positive interactions with community members, youth especially, as referenced in Chapter Four. These emergent programs would foster confidence and comfort between the two groups.

Through these provisions, you will find positive outlets that build confidence, pride, and community involvement, as well as better communal knowledge about basic rights and expectations of both the youth and the UPP.

Introduction:

Since the 1980's, youth have been the most involved age group in the illegal drug trade, making this group especially vulnerable to changes in police methods and civil codes enforced by the UPP. A series of studies by Luke Dowdney surveyed favelado youth. He found that most *donos* and *gerentes*, two of the top drug faction positions, were 16 and 17 year old young men. This suggests that candidates for these top positions were from a pool of youth, 18 and younger (Dowdney). Once in the drug trade, these youth have been “systematically” killed—“Brazilian youths 15 to 18 years old die more from murder than by any other cause of death” (Zaluar). The drug trade has affected youth more than other age group, evinced by: any “fifteen to 24 year old in Brazil is 170 percent more likely to be a homicide victim than those younger or older” (Suska 15). Due to a large percentage of youth involved in narco-trafficking networks, which proxy through gang alliances, mistrust between adolescent favelados and law enforcement is ubiquitous. This is manifest in a survey that showed over half of youth had been assaulted by police (Dowdney 177). Today, that cumulates in a fundamental disconnect that creates tension even as pacification police work to eradicate violence from the favelas.

Historical Mistrust Between Youth and Police:

There is a decisive lack of trust between youth and the police. The police have worked against gangs over decades, while the youth have seen police most after during BOPE raids, which almost always end in deaths, including innocent casualties, or during sporadic patrols. As an example of the pre-UPP relationship, 320 children were murdered in the first six months of 1993 in Rio de Janeiro (Levine). A particularly gruesome 1993 raid featured an “extermination squad” of uniformed police:

Gunmen killed eight homeless boys and wounded two others by cruising through downtown streets in a taxi and private car. They attacked a group of forty-five sleeping children in front of the gold-encrusted Candelaria Church with machine gun pistols, and killed two more boys sleeping in the gardens of the Museum of Modern Art. (Levine)

Of course, this relationship has two faces, as these killings were allegedly caused by, “the arrest a few days earlier of a youth for sniffing shoemaker’s glue, a narcotic. When his friends stoned a military police car, injuring one policeman, the vigilante squad moved into action” (Levine 72). Further, a 2003 survey asked a number of youth if they trusted the police. At 72%, a clear majority said no, while 24% said partially, and only 2% trusted the police fully. The final 2% had no answer (Dowdney 179).

Some may argue that these relationships were pre-UPP, and that the UPP has better current relationships. A decrease in death rates and rise in accountability supports this, as seen at the December 4th arrest of 63 corrupt officers who took bribes from drug traffickers (Lauzon). But the groups remain jaded because of historic events, word-of-mouth discontent, and subconscious fear, as the favelas have been pacified for as little as a year and unhealthy relationships persist. At a community meeting, a community representative of Cidade Unita opined during a round of questions:

We had expected the attitude of the UPP officers to be different. We had expected them to treat us with more respect, yet the other day I saw one police officer put a

10 year old boy against the wall to body search him, which is illegal. And every day I see the police cars passing with the loops of their guns sticking out of the window, pointing at whomever happens to be passing by on the street. These attitudes scare us and make us doubt all these beautiful words of “dialogue” and “working together” that have been expressed in this meeting by the UPP Social team. (Cath)

Even if crime and death rates have dropped, there remains distrust that creates a basic barrier in the empathy and communication between these groups.

A Lack of Venues for Police – Youth Communication:

A lack of opportunities for communication contributes to the ongoing mistrust between youth and the UPP. Currently, there are two main avenues for connection with the UPP: an anonymous call on the UPP phone line, or through the ombudsman. These options do not provide shared experiences for youth and the UPP. The UPP also hosts semi-regular meetings. The two entities remain distant, with no place or events to bring them together. The final option is community forums, which sound effective, but are thwarted by a prescribed adult nature; it is too formal a venue for youth to enjoy or to find worthwhile.

One program did try to reach out to all community members. For the anniversary of the UPP, Captain Odilon threw a community party. A doctoral student doing his dissertation on UPP interactions reminisces about the event, saying, “A great many people came” of all ages, “perhaps with the exception of young adults” (Wolff). He goes on to say, “That age group in any community around the world is likely to be diametrically opposed to any formal authority figures

(as you and I were), and especially in favelas, where age-old perceptions of police classify these figures as incorrigibly corrupt and murderous” (Wolff). This is an example of positive community programs that are not being positively received by the community youth, and of the especially jaded opinion of the favelado youth.

UPP has a social network established. This social network has programs that are advertised on various websites, such as a Shell sponsored tryout for a local soccer team (Shell Iniciativa Jovem Abre Inscrições). However, interpersonal contact wanes. The UPP shows no sign of direct involvement with youth beyond online suggestions for activities. Where this may be a viable venue for interacting with youth, most websites listed are more conducive to adult users. This shows a misallocation of resources that has not properly addressed youth-targeted policy.

Lack of Resources:

One last reason that youth are disgruntled with the UPP involvement is the eradication of their main opportunities for jobs and recreational activity. Through drug trafficking, youth can get money quickly and earn more than peers in legitimate jobs. Further, drug factions hosted and funded the popular recreational *Baile funks*, which the UPP shut down for their affiliation with the drug trades. Shutting these *Baile funks* down had a financial impact on communities as these events brought over one million dollars and employed over one thousand people (Scruggs). In some places, these problems are being resolved, as police and favelados are cooperating and continuing the *Baile funk* events with certain time limitations and expectations. Locals still hotly dispute curfews. Further, without the drug factions’ sponsorship, the prices of entry indirectly bar many favelados. There remains the need for youth to have increased opportunities for jobs,

furthered education and non-destructive activities, or youth will remain frustrated with the current situation and look for illicit alternatives.

Discussion and Recommendations:

I. Inform Youth and UPP Officers of Adolescent Rights and Build Trust in the System:

Police in Rio de Janeiro have been historically corrupt and known to abuse their powers. There have been repeated instances of police brutality of youth that lies beyond their legal jurisdiction. One study found that Rio de Janeiro is marred by a system of “unequal access to justice – which starts with the criminal policies ... moving on to a focus on public security policies, the selectivity of police action, judicial inquiry and proceedings, ending with the announcement of sentences” (Santos, et al). Youth accounts corroborate these findings. Of a pool of favelado adolescent interviewees in a 2003 survey, 23% said they had been assaulted by police at least once, of which at least 13% had been assaulted over five times (Dowdney 177). A 2004 investigation report from Human Rights Watch found that Brazil’s penal system is often incapable to provide due diligence and humane treatment to every incarcerated youth, as examined more closely in Chapter Five. As per example, even with the maximum, non-extendable period of forty-five days for pretrial detention, one fifteen year-old was held under arrest in Padre Severino for over ninety days—not allowed to talk to his mother or father, who, he feared, “did not know where he was” (“The Juvenile Justice System”). A sixteen year-old, Patricia K., had been held for more than 120 days. During another visit by the state to the Padre Severino youth facility, 13 young boys were found in a “dimly lit, poorly ventilated cell.” They had been “locked inside for days in close quarters...with no mattresses or bedding” (“The

Juvenile Justice System”). Mistreatment of adolescents has historically been rampant and awful.

These atrocities present an issue today because the youth of the favelas see police officers not as pro-social law enforcement agents, but as a group to fear. From a young favelado’s perspective, police are erratic and liable to treat them with disrespect and unnecessary cruelty. A 2000 survey found that 72% “of those interviewed did not trust the police at all” (Dowdney 179). Youth gave reasons such as “the police are corrupt,” “the police are unprepared,” and “the police fail to respect favela residents” (Dowdney 179). Given the nascent development of pacification methods, many of these feelings remain strong in the favela communities.

Law enforcement policy should not be so draconian towards adolescent favelados. Though murder rates remain staggering, the reputation surrounding many young men and women in favelas is a “misconception,” and “in fact, most youths charged under the Statute of the Child and the Adolescent in Rio de Janeiro are detained for nonviolent offenses” (“The Juvenile Justice System”). From September through October 2002, approximately 43% of youth crimes were drug trafficking violations. Including this group, “nearly 60 percent the total number of youths in [maximum-level] detention in September and October 2002, were held for nonviolent offenses” (“The Juvenile Justice System”). Contrarily, inferring the transitive, over 40% of youth crimes are connected to violence, and approximately 36% are convictions for crimes were stronged armed robbery or murders, most of which involved drug offences. These numbers are well-known amongst the police forces and underscore a problem of violence that peaked in the summer of 2002-03 after a series of improvements from a decades-long record high rate of murder in 1999 (“The Juvenile Justice System”). That these two groups—purported murderers and drug possessors—are held under the same weight of the law shows a stark

imbalance of judicial powers.

UPP pacification efforts have been strikingly effective, and their work is commendable. But systemic social changes must reflect systemic alterations in policy implementation, such as ensuring an informed public with fair treatment under the law. Prosecutions of youth have not manifestly changed the jurisdictional purviews of the legislative and penal systems, and youths who commit non-violent crimes are too-often held in similar conditions to perpetrators of much more egregious crimes. Incarcerations often have disastrous consequences for individual development#. Aggravating the issue is the paucity of legal counsel and education opportunities for favelado youth. Young favelados frequently misunderstand their rights, further embedding deep seated convictions of poor esteem for police forces and police initiatives. In 2004, President Lula da Silva rightfully, “energetically” rejected proposals to lower the minimum ages for youths to be tried as adults in court. Two important ministers supported him emphatically. Minister of Justice Bastos pronounced, “The way to lower crime is to increase the effectiveness of the police, the efficiency of the judiciary, and to improve conditions in the prison system.” The leader of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights declared, “Reducing the [age of] criminal responsibility doesn’t tackle the roots of violence. Offering more severe penalties for those who lead adolescents into criminal activities is a good proposal to restrict violence” (“The Juvenile Justice System”). Political favor shows strong advocacy for youth development, and improvements under Secretary Beltrame’s administration are noticeable, but not enough progress has yet been made to ameliorate the UPP’s influence in the lives of at-risk youths. Partnerships between UPP precincts and community organizations have already succeeded. Papo de Resposta, in Complexo da Maré, pairs police officers with members of AfroReggae to visit local schools, where they give brief information about their jobs, before opening up for discussion and

questions (AfroRaggae). Conflict resolution, non-violence and cooperation are stressed by both parties in a relationship of mutual legitimization and benefit. The UPP should actively pursue these relationships in other favelas.

Additionally, schools and community institutions should provide flyers or cards with information pertaining to UPP objectives and personnel, as well as offer them a contact number for UPP and other organizations' services. By providing this information, youth would also have a number to call if they need representation or legal help. The flyers would also provide resources for information and outside organizations. This promotes a government-*cum*-civil society shared sphere that immediately benefits the surrounding community.

II. Co-sponsor or Work with Mentorship Programs:

Many favelado youth have very few positive role models. This is especially true for youth who have become involved in the drug trade. Many role models (older peers or adults) are part of the drug trade. Dowdney writes, "children have also been increasingly influenced by the rising involvement of important reference groups, such as family, friends, and growing generations of parents that work within drug trafficking" (Dowdney 121). Role models are powerful factors for youth avoid, or join, destructive activities or associations. This truism is universal. A survey conducted in Los Angeles, California, interviewed a seventeen year-old member of a Chicano gang:

The Royal Dons [gang's name] have been here for a real long time. A lot of people from the community have been in it. I had lots of family in it so I guess I'll just have to carry on the tradition. A lot of people from outside this community wouldn't understand, but we have helped the community whenever they've asked

us. We've been around to help. I felt it's kind of my duty to join 'cause everybody expects it. ... No, the community doesn't mind that we do things to make some money and raise a little hell because they don't expect you to put in your time for nothing. Just like nobody expects guys in the military to put in their time for nothing. (Jankowski 47)

In order to promote increased opportunities for role models, the UPP should create or partake in relevant programs. Violence will perpetuate if cycles of gang influence persist. By becoming more and regularly involved in youth programs, the UPP would create the opportunity for themselves to educate students about their rights and opportunities, as well as adapt and clarify the role of the UPP. This program may feature mentorship between youth and UPP members exclusively, or incorporate other positive community members as well.

Various programs have employed the method of mentorship successfully. For example, one study compared mentoring programs across the state of California, and found them to be effective. One report stated that children who had one-on-one mentors were, "46 percent less likely to begin using illegal drugs, 53 percent less likely to skip school, [and] 33 percent less likely to hit someone" (Foster 14). Big Brothers, Big Sisters was a program in this study. It targets youth between ten and sixteen. The program pairs over 1,000 youth with pre-screened adults from the community, and thus not necessarily policemen. The youth/adult relationship is informal and based on their own commitment level and interest. A fireman brought his mentee to work and showed him the fire trucks and let him talk to other firemen. Another student was very driven, and met with her mentor to finish schoolwork. She has recently been accepted into a private high school and hopes to go to Harvard University (Real Life Stories). This program has seen outstanding success throughout California as well as many other states.

Another related program is called Shop With A Cop. Police departments distribute vouchers to impoverished community members to go Christmas gift shopping with local police officers. Communities raise money to fund the event, and many have picnics and barbecues following. The program has already expanded to dozens of cities across the United States (Martin).

III. Train “Everyday” Officers to Work Better with Youth:

All officers should receive a baseline level of training in order to promote positive relationships with youth. UPP assigned to work specifically with youth populations should be screened periodically to assess their desire, ethics and previous experiences that may influence their interactions with youth. Training should include strategies and techniques for successful interactions, both formally and informally. This will encourage confidence in the UPP force as an honest and trustworthy organization.

The State of Connecticut went through a very similar procedure. The study “refers to the problem of unequal treatment of white and minority juveniles in the juvenile system” (Sanderson). In order to combat these issues, Connecticut Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee created an education program for officers that would address various problems, such as “increase patrol officer awareness of disproportionate minority contact, increase officer knowledge of youth behavior and strategies for interactive effectively with youth, improve police attitudes towards young people...” amongst others (Sanderson). The program included knowledge tests regarding perceived importance of youth in the community, perceived impact of informal patrol officer contact with youth, and officer comfort with youth. The average pre-test scores were 46% positive, while the average post-test score was 77% (Sanderson). At the end of the test,

participants rated their experience very highly vis-à-vis usefulness in working in youth communities (Sanderson). The most notable change in attitude reported was “increased comfort in starting conversations with youth they don’t know, confidence in having the skills necessary for interacting with youth, and commitment to the idea that patrol officers can have a positive impact on youth without taking time away from their other enforcement from their enforcement activities” (Sanderson). To realize the same benefits, the UPP should immediately enact a similar program for discourse training and youth misconception alleviation.

IV. Participate in Community Youth Programs:

The UPP should create an impetus to enlist officers alongside or within civil society organizations, including NGOs, churches, and schools, to help support youth development and to create positive means of contact. Police officers could thus convey themselves as a community member and not just a part of law enforcement. Additionally, such a tactic would help establish increasingly positive role models and habits for youth. This step would also allow youth/UPP relationships to occur at venues in which youth are already comfortable, so youth would be relatively less reticent. Finally, this would provide a partial answer to the aforementioned dilemma of a lack of venues.

For decades, the easiest way for young favelados to gain respect was through success in the local gang faction. Via participation, youth would receive money, clothes, and other material compensation. They were given a system where they could feasibly move up in life, something that most other “opportunities” did not offer. Youth were also equipped with guns and weapons, which helped make them feel safer and more confident (Dowdney 176).

In order to effectively combat the “benefits” of being in a gang, the UPP should pair with

local entities to join or create programs that teach skills, such as soccer, languages or music. Through these programs, youth would be able to have a sense of community that was once, for many, mostly offered through participation in the drug trade. Further, the structure of these programs is of utmost importance. It has been found that sense of self is closely related to social structure (Stryker). Social structure used to be reliant on gangs, but organizations are now offering programs that accommodate this. The UPP is in a good position to fortify security efforts while engaging a tenuously improving part of the community.

Some ties have already been made. As mentioned previously in this chapter, police forces and the AfroReggae have paired up to create the program Papo de Resposta, which underscores police communication with youth. Rio de Janeiro is an especially good place to forge relationships like this. The city has been recognized for:

Associations and grassroots organizations [that] have been accumulating experience and knowledge in dealing with the issue of youth violence over a long period; promoting initiatives and programs mostly aimed at the prevention of youth violence, based on skills training, sports, empowerment and, to lesser extent, professional training and labor market integration. (Santos, et al 19)

Community members are calling for similar programs in other areas of Rio de Janeiro (O Que Papo E Esse?). Increased community involvement is a cost-effective means for powerful gains in public security.

Other programs show some results of community/youth/police interaction's many benefits. Police Working With Youth in Non-Enforcement Roles is a program in the State of Connecticut. It funds seventeen programs that provide a range of services and groups, including mountain bike clubs, athletics, as well as community programs that featured lectures and role

playing activities. Over 600 youth were asked to take extensive surveys before and after the yearlong program (Connecticut). Youth tested much higher in self assertive and self-regulative efficacy, empathy for others, and how strongly they felt the neighborhood was supportive in their development. Further, participants experiences were overwhelmingly positive. 97% of students felt like they “belonged”, 99% “felt safe”, and 97% felt “staff really cared about me” (Connecticut 8).

By creating or collaborating with social service organizations, the UPP would provide legitimate help to communities, reaffirm its jurisdiction and its message, and foster a more pacific environment.

V. Immediate Action by *Secretario do Seguridade* José Beltrame:

This chapter has proposed many programs to encourage youth/UPP collaboration and trust. What makes immediate action by the Secretary of Public Security difficult is the variety of needs in the different favelas. Differences include their degree of pacification, amount of youth, remaining existence of the local drug faction, current community programs and options for youth, and more. There is no simple answer that will work across the board, yet each favela needs increases in collaboration between youth and the UPP.

Instead of focusing on a rigid structure, Beltrame should take a more grassroots approach. First, information must be collected from specific favelas, from police and laypeople. By doing this, he will be able to more fully understand the needs and priorities of each community, instead of superimposing the thoughts of third parties.

Though this chapter shows the importance of actions, and provides basic proposals for change, it is also important to take the differences of each favela into account. Beltrame should

act to ensure a safer environment, by using suggestions in this and other policy papers, personal knowledge, and proposals from favelado groups.

Conclusion: Increasing Dialogue and Empathy

Given the fact that Rio de Janeiro's violent currents are robust, and government leaders are hard-pressed for pacification, it is safe to applaud the UPP for a very good job of their original objective of promoting safer streets. As the program continues to progress, the twin responsibility to create a more sustainable, supported, and organic pacification must not dissolve. The UPP needs to focus on the feelings of the favelados, and encourage increased two-way support and dialogue between community members and the UPP. This will provide ongoing support for the continued existence of both the UPP and the values for which they fight.

The state of Rio de Janeiro has focused on youth development. PRONASCI, established in 2008, has a budget of R\$6.7 billion. Law enforcement officials should be very familiar with this financial stimulus program: its actions target "youth between 15 and 24 years of age, especially those who were homeless, exposed to urban violence, or had been victims of violent criminality" (Santos, et al 16). The goals are there; Rio de Janeiro is aware that youth are a vital part of the solution to peace. Thus implementation is paramount. The UPP is finding that opportunities to revise are necessary adaptive steps to success. It is time that youth are recognized. Barriers will be broken and historic differences resolved.

In closing this chapter, it is clear that favelado youth have been significantly affected by the drug trade, treatment from police, and changes in their communities due to pacification. There are many strategies that have been suggested in this paper that would encourage positive futures for the youth, ultimately influencing the entire community.

Chapter Ten

Education

Bill Dow

Abstract:

Violence in the streets of Rio de Janeiro's favelas has severely crippled education in those communities, building a poverty trap that keeps future generations away from success. And while areas that have been pacified by UPP forces in previous years have seen academic gains in their schools, students are still lured into the drug trade both by its perceptions of a lavish lifestyle as well as a general lack of opportunities in legitimate job sectors for those who complete high school. While building job opportunities for favelados is discussed in Chapters Five and Eight, UPP forces have a chance to both provide opportunities for favelados, improve their pacification efforts, and build the police force as a whole by working closely with schools in the favelas. By implementing a high school police academy program similar to others around the world, in which high school students – as an optional part of their school curriculum – learn the skills needed in community building and law enforcement, the UPP can both improve its efforts and build for tomorrow. Students will become more engaged in their community and with UPP officers, with whom they have long had testy relations. Similarly, they will have greater incentive to stay in schools, for there will be the prospect of employment in law enforcement. Finally, the program, if successful, would deliver a plentitude of well-trained, young recruits to Rio de Janeiro's police force at a time in which they are constantly in need of increased numbers, both because of the upcoming sporting events and because of internal turnover. The program, while expensive and with a few concerns, could be implemented to both improve the community, give students opportunities, and fill the needs of the government as a whole, all for a relatively small investment.

Violence and education in Rio's favelas:

In Rio de Janeiro's favelas, gang-related drug violence and a failing school system for favelados go hand-in-hand. In fact, a large reason why the drug trade has gained such a foothold in many of these communities is that it is the only decent business for many favelados. Nowadays, "favela youth are ultimately presented with a choice to either commit to hard, subservient, low-paying work which offers them little respect and carries the additional costs of commuting, eating in the city and wearing a uniform, or join a gang and make enough money not only to support oneself, but buy consumer goods" (Simmons 21). Lack of adequate education and job opportunities is one of the quintessential reasons why favelados tend to join gangs. They offer wealth without the long-term commitment of schooling, and with arguably more predictability than a job in the formal sector.

Favela residents are often unable to find work because of inadequate schooling or lack of available jobs, joining the drug trade as their only means of subsistence. Young favelados, in particular, "face a number of difficulties that severely limit their full access to the formal work market and upward mobility within it," including social stigmas toward people that live in favelas as well as a lack of education and training to put them in productive work (Dowdney 131). In research completed by Luke Dowdney regarding the background of favelados and how they became involved in the drug trade prior to the UPP's pacification efforts, there is an obvious relationship between gang violence and schooling. According to Dowdney, "without exception, all interviewees had left school shortly before or immediately after entering the drug trade. Not a single interviewee had completed primary level education, on average having reached the fourth grade" (18). Similarly, favela students are far more likely than nonfavela students in Rio's public schools to fall behind or drop out. According to a study conducted between the two types of

students regarding dropout rates, “the risk associated with living in favelas close to wealthy and low-income neighborhoods, respectively, is 98% and 92% higher than the risk among students who do not live in favelas” (Alves 140). The same study also concluded that the risk of a favela-residing student falling behind by one or more years is 51% higher than that of a student that does not live in a favela. Clearly, students that live in favelas have a much higher predisposition to either dropping out of school or failing out due to their living situation, which subsequently leads to higher levels of violence and a stronger gang foothold in the local community.

But the problem goes even further; even for favela residents who have been successful in graduating. Job opportunities are slim, even with a reasonable level of education. Janice Perlman – a prominent researcher of Rio’s favelas – provides an anecdote, saying:

When I was living in the favelas in the 1960s, parents commonly warned their children, “If you drop out of [elementary] school, you won’t be able to get a job and you’ll end up collecting garbage.” Several years ago when I was in Rio, 200 vacancies opened up for garbage collectors. Over 4,000 people applied and a high school diploma was mandatory. (Perlman 264)

Perlman describes the similar experience of a Rio bus-fare collector in a talk she gave at a conference in 2003, saying, “after having been told what the pay would be, he subtracted his travel and lunch costs and the cost of the clothing and shoes he would need to buy and found out that his net earnings would be so low as to be totally insignificant. In addition, he would be traveling 3-4 hours a day and working another 12 hours” (Perlman). Although many had hoped Rio’s favelas would progress to provide more opportunities for future generations, the neighborhoods seem to be on a downward spiral for those seeking jobs. Economic development, as discussed in Chapter Eight, will improve conditions for favelados generally, though adults

will likely reap the largest results of pacification in this regard. The UPP should take an active stance in how their operations affect young favelados—an historic and immediate step towards retaining security as the younger generations progress in a less violent environment.

One potential reason for the failure of schools in Rio favelas is the issue of safety, which haunts the neighborhood. Because of the constant drug trade that riddles these areas, “commercial premises and municipal schools are often closed by shop owners and school directors respectively in affected favelas or neighboring areas of the city. In some cases, this is a spontaneous reaction caused by the fear that students or shopkeepers may be caught in the crossfire (Dowdney 110). It’s a legitimate worry, Dowdney says, because at least three schools have been closed in recent years by bandits’ demands. Janice Perlman reiterates this in an article, saying that although the schools are run by the government, drug lords have the power to shut them down at their mercy (Perlman 22). Although, it seems as if the main reasoning for school closures is for its patrons’ safety, and not as a power move by the drug cartels.

Teacher retention and turnover:

Constant closures, unpredictability, and fear of violence take their toll both on the staff and students of the favela schools. According to a study conducted by scholars from Harvard University and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, violence surrounding favela schools lowers academic performance and education supply (Monteiro 28). In fact, “in schools exposed to violence, principals were 7.7 percentage points more likely to report that there was a threat to teachers’ lives,” (26). Consequently, “there is also evidence that violence impacts teacher turnover , which increases by 5 percentage points...in violent years according to principals’ reports” (27). Likewise, the study found that schools exposed to violence also saw higher

principal turnover, saying that those schools “are 12 percentage points more likely to have a principal that is less than two years on the job, which represents a 31% increase in the sample mean” (27). Violence in high-risk areas also “caused a spike in work-related illnesses such as burnout syndrome and made it hard to recruit teachers for such schools” (Phillips). The most important factor, though, is student success. Unfortunately, that too was undermined by nearby violence, saying that “students from schools located close to conflict areas perform ... lower in violent years relative to their peers in the same schools in peaceful years” (28). The authors attribute this decrease to lessened instructional time and teacher absenteeism, though they also conclude that students do not respond to conflict by leaving schools, which is probably attributable to mobility costs (28).

Several academics have come to the conclusion that violence is a plague on education in favelas. They further argue in support of “the view that violence accentuates the poverty trap ... by decreasing the quality of learning in these areas,” which thereby makes it more difficult for students to succeed in the future (28). In the end, violence near schools has statistically lowered both student learning and school continuity, which is in doing so further creating the likelihood of violence as a whole new generation of favelados are not being given the opportunity to succeed in the formal workplace. As a result, they are more likely to join the same gangs the Brazilian government is trying to combat.

Increasing job opportunities:

But basic education, while a go-to first step in providing opportunity to favelados, should not be seen as a panacea. Much of the lack of progress in the favelas do not stem solely from an inadequate education system but a more general lack of job opportunities. And while it is a good

long-term strategy to invest in the education of favelados, individual favela residents often fail to see payoffs from their own education. Janice Perlman again elucidates an appropriate example:

For those who completed only four years of school, the expected income was the same for everyone – Rio residents, favela residents and nonfavela residents. But for every additional year of schooling after those first four, the earnings gap between favelas and nonfavelas widened. For those living in favelas, the more years they continued to study, the greater the gap between what they earned and what their nonfavela counterparts earned. (Perlman 262)

Similarly, young people in favelas often struggle attaining job opportunities with job training, pushing them into the drug trade and further perpetuating the cycle of violence in favelas (Dowdney 225). One such reason for the struggle of favela students to succeed is their inability to reach universities in Brazil, which have admissions processes favored toward students who attend more favored schools (by rates of matriculated students, typically expensive private schools) and perform well on the nation's standardized "*vestibular*" exams#. While uneducated and untrained favelados may understandably struggle to find productive work, decently well-educated or well-trained favela residents similarly struggle to both find work and achieve higher education, making productive life difficult to obtain solely because of their residence.

In the end, education is one of the most crucial aspects of development, and violence in Rio's favelas has significantly inhibited education in those areas. In violence-ridden areas, children are "only able to attend school relatively safely when there was no conflict," and fear of conflict led many parents to keep their kids at home – and away from school – when they went to

work for the day (Suska 32). For children that did make it to school, they arrived “nervous and anxious,” in part because some share experiences as gruesome as seeing bodies left over from shootings the night before while walking to school (33). Teachers react similarly, often skipping work to avoid violence in the surrounding areas. But expanding opportunities should not be limited to improving general school performance, and must instead be focused at providing individual opportunities for those in favelas to obtain productive employment and avoid falling into the lucrative drug trade. In the following section, I will explore ways in which the UPP can better collaborate with favela youth to not only provide them opportunities, but to benefit the city’s policing for the long term.

Recommendations for policy initiatives:

I. Successes of schools in pacified neighborhoods:

Admittedly, the deployment of UPP forces has gone a long way not only to improve safety in pacified neighborhoods, but also to improve educational outcomes. As safety concerns have decreased, academic performance has increased, absenteeism has dropped, and schools – as a whole – seem to be more successful than they were before. Measuring using the Ideb, or the Index of Development in Basic Education, Rio’s “eight schools located in pacified regions improved their score...by 42.8 percent, from a score of 2.8 in 2009 to a score of 4” (Averbuck). While the Ideb is scored out of 10 points, the Educational Development Plan set the baseline target to be 3.8 in 2005, gradually rising to the target 6.0 by 2021 (Neri 3). As of 2008, Brazil’s private schools scored a 6.0 (Neri 3). By contrast, the schools in non-pacified “violent areas” improved by 28.2 percent, to a present score of 4.04 (Averbuck). While these numbers might seem contradictory, given that the schools in the so-called violent areas have higher academic

numbers than those in the pacified regions, Averbuck says that is because the deployment of UPP forces were first prioritized to the worst areas with lower absolute scores, meaning they had more to make up in comparison. In fact, “eight out of ten public schools in communities with UPPs passed the educational target set by the ministry of education” (Suska 33). In many cases, the target was achieved not long after the UPP occupation first occurred, showing that an overall reduction in violence (and the fear of violence) can do much to improve academic performance.

The performance gains were likely due in large part to the decrease in absenteeism, which correlates to the study mentioned in the background. When the perception of violence in a neighborhood increases, student, teacher and principal truancy reaches much higher levels, leading to decreased educational performance. In areas that saw pacification from UPP forces, “the number of absences and dropouts have also fallen in 19 of the 32 schools” (Averbuck). According to the Rio paper *O Dia*, 94 percent of students interviewed “claimed that they frequent classes more often after the installation of the UPP” (Suska 33). But it isn’t just them; the attendance of teacher has also increased. Before, Suska writes, “it was difficult to persuade teachers to go to school,” because of consistent violence in areas and even threats of violence being directed toward teachers (33). In the months following pacification, according to Suska, “students and teachers attended school up to 90% more often, not only at Providencia but also at several other UPPs” (33). In conclusion, the UPP has done a fine job so far increasing education outcomes in areas it has already pacified, but there is much progress to also be made. According to the newspaper *O Globo*, 150,000 students and 50,000 educational service providers exist in Rio’s “high risk” areas, meaning a lot of human capital and lives are at stake.

II. UPP collaboration in schools:

While some of the previous recommendations might require more systemic change, the UPP can begin to make changes to create more opportunities for favelados in the near future. Pacifying forces have already involved themselves in the local community, strengthening connections with young favela residents in attempt to give them opportunity and drift them away from crime. An example of this is the Morro dos Prazeres project, in which 30 UPP officers have been trained by representatives from the Premier League in the United Kingdom to teach soccer and civics classes to favela children (Oliveira). The top 10 children with “the best combinations of on-field performance, academic standing, behavior and community service will go to the London headquarters of Premier Skills” (Oliveira). These types of programs have been successful in pacified favelas, leading to community building and – presumably – increased classroom performance. Clearly, UPP collaboration can benefit the growth of the favela community and its inhabitants.

The UPP should consider expanding its role in schools in order to provide better opportunities for older students. Because education is only compulsory until age 14, students in Rio’s schools should be given extra incentives to stay involved until they are 18 years old. One example of this, potentially, could be by implementing a basic security-training program for favela students in schools, almost as an introduction to law enforcement. An example of this is the Los Angeles Police Department’s *Police Academy Magnet School*, which “offers a rigorous, police officer-led high school curriculum developed for young men and women expressing an interest in a career in law enforcement” (Los). Los Angeles’ program has enrolled 500 students from five area high schools. It teaches students an understanding of the law, relevant vocational training, and serves the LAPD as a “high quality recruiting resource” for future cadets (Los). The

program lasts four years and emphasizes criminal justice, physical training, and general law enforcement principles. Among the goals of the program are to “develop good citizenship and ongoing community involvement,” which might be particularly analogous to the goals of the UPP in favela schools. The LAPD also includes a cadet program for ninth grade students, which allows adolescents who meet criteria to “assist police officers with crowd control, field searches for evidence, and station tours” (High School Students). This is a variant to the high school program course, and it could also be considered as a program to further engage youth.

Benefits for the community and favela youth:

Implementing a pilot program of this type might be a good idea for the UPP pacification efforts in favelas, in particular because of the effect it would have on the community at large. A successful program would work to better integrate students in their communities by promoting service and citizenship. By training young favelados, Rio’s police will have the opportunity to potentially keep traffickers out of these communities for the long term by building a stronger basis of police support throughout the community. A magnet program – if given adequate financial backing – would also likely reduce drop-out rates once interested students turn 14 years old, meaning more students will stay out of the drug trade and moving toward productive employment. Given that school attendance in favelas is inversely related to criminal activity among youth, a police academy would have significant impact. Finally, by providing a young base of police trainees with law enforcement futures, it might work to quell the anxieties of favelados who fear the UPPs will dissolve and the drug traffickers will reappear. Because the UPP would be further integrated in the community, the officers would be in a better position to more appropriately subdue those fears as well as those regarding police officers more broadly.

As Chapter Two elucidates: though improved, relations between favelados and law enforcement remain strained, if not hostile. In the end, a police academy program could have extraordinary benefits to the favela community, both in the short and long term.

Beyond that, such a program would provide long-term benefits to both participating favela students and the Rio police force. Young favelados would be given job training, opportunities, and experiences in a place and time where they have relatively few as a result of the program. Likewise, the program would meet an upcoming market void, as law enforcement in Rio will likely be a field with jobs for some time. As a result, trained favela youth could nicely fit those job openings, giving them gainful employment and strengthening their home communities. In the end, though, a competitive police training program in favela schools could not only work to provide some young favelados with job opportunities and keep them out of the drug trade, but also to set the foundations for long-term security as a whole. Similarly, by nurturing a relationship with favela youth and educating potential police recruits for several years while they attend high school, the UPP will likely be able to avoid issues related to poor training with these recruits. A big issue facing Brazilian security personnel is their training, and “in several states, recruits begin service as armed, uniformed police after only three months at a police academy” (Human). Similarly, the current “training necessary to convert a high school graduate into a public servant equipped to enforce the law is intensive and time consuming” (Human). By giving future recruits several years of training, Rio’s police forces will be able to get a better bang for their buck from future officers, who will have multiple years of experience. Along the same lines, they will have first-hand learning experience from officers who have conducted work in the field and will thus be able better prepared to enforce the law themselves.

Potential concerns of increased involvement, other issues:

While there are certainly many positives for creating a police-training program in favela schools, the proposal is not without downsides. By introducing favela youth into law enforcement, they could be put in awkward and potentially dangerous situations in areas that have until recently been controlled by gangs. Fears of retaliation toward UPP high school recruits is reason for concern, and must be adequately prepared for and monitored to ensure that favela youth are not introduced to more violence as a result of this program. Also, the program would not come without costs. Even though many UPP officers already conduct philanthropic volunteer work in favela schools, as an official program of the UPP, officers would have to be paid and a curriculum supported by increased funding. It is possible some of this money might be able to be found outside UPP cash reserves (such as from the state or schools themselves), but in an era of small budgets and limited resources, it might need to start small.

One way to do this might be to implement a program on a smaller scale. An example of this comes from North Carolina's Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, which hosts a one week program for area high school students to explore a year in law enforcement. The program mandates students maintain a "C" average or better, have no arrests or recent suspensions, and fit other criteria. While their program takes place over summer, when students are out on break, it only lasts a week and covers an array of topics, ranging from team building and defensive tactics to building searches and suspect encounters (High School Academy). Recruits certainly would not be in a position to enter the force as they would a more intensive program that has already been suggested, but a shorter, introductory program could set the foundations and improve relations between favela youth and UPP officers. Equally, UPP forces would make some inroads toward improving recruiting efforts, albeit minimally. In the end, while a one week program like

what is being done in North Carolina would not be as successful as a police academy program toward achieving community collaboration and long-term employment gains, it would be a cost-effective first step, and a foundation from which the UPP from build on in future years.

Many of the lessons that would be taught in the academy could be taught in regular classrooms more sporadically. In order to foster relationships between UPP officers and young favelados, it would be wise for the former to come in and regularly give updates about what they are doing to include the students in the process of community building. This could be done in a larger setting – such as an assembly – but would be better conducted in smaller groups (such as classes) to establish a closer connection with the students. In these meetings, officers could share their goals and methods – pacification and community building – and work to build relations. Likewise, they can show favela youth, which have long been wary of their presence, they are not there to strong-arm the locals. In order to develop a better relationship with favela youth (and then citizens in the long run), “the first step is to understand them and open up communication channels” (Stahlberg 16). Rio law enforcement is already ‘working with the Social Action department to hold meetings with community youth and UPP officers wearing plain clothes” to build their relationships (16). These relationships “started off conversations and also introduced some playful role-playing of *abordagens* (approach and search), so that the youth could understand how hard it is to approach reluctant and distrustful teenagers, and also so that officers could understand how youth feel discriminated against and disrespected” (16).

These types of trainings can and should become mandatory in school, even if they only occur sporadically. They will work to build relationships between youth and the UPP officers in a controlled setting, and will allow the latter to reach even though most distrustful of students who would not attend voluntary sessions. These types of role-playing scenarios would be

particularly effective at breaking down the hierarchical, distrustful relationship between the two groups. Admittedly, breaking down the walls at the start has and will continue to be a challenge, but it isn't until those barriers fall that a positive relationship between favela youth and UPP officers will develop. Furthermore, these meetings could be used to help engage and empower favela youth, which would allow Brazil to “avoid patterns of youth seeking alternative forms of power in society through involvement” (Talarico 3). By becoming the primary ambassadors from the state, the UPP officers can encourage a life of civic engagement, which will likely pay dividends in the years to come. And once that relationship grows, policing will be far more effective, and the community pacification efforts will almost assuredly be improved. Thus, UPP should continue working with youth to better relations, and they should work with school officials to make this a defined part of the curriculum each year on a relatively consistent basis.

Conclusion: collaboration beyond training:

UPP forces have been successful in reducing criminal activity in pacified favelas, which consequently has led to an improvement in academic outcomes. But there is still a good deal of work to be done in these neighborhoods, particularly for the long term. Many good actions are already being conducted by UPP officers in neighborhood schools, tutoring children and giving them opportunities to succeed. A police training program, be it short, long, or in-between, could be another valuable tool the UPP uses to engage the community, provide opportunities for young favelados, and keep the favelados in school and out of the lucrative, alluring drug trade. Just as importantly, a comprehensive training approach – while more expensive – would provide area police units a greater base of residents from which to recruit future officers. In the coming years, these security forces are going to be essential to the successful staging of both the World Cup

and Olympic Games, and by giving students an early training, they can be all the more prepared to join the forces in the years to come. The idea not only would be beneficial for the favelados and UPP forces operating with them, it could benefit the Rio police force as a whole. If funding is limited, a less intensive approach could also yield benefits, though they wouldn't be as wholesome as the original idea outlined.

While these recommendations will directly affect relationships between students and UPP officers, there are many favela youth that have dropped out of school and would therefore be ineligible for any such program. In some cases, these are the favelados that are more hostile to the UPP, and those with which the most collaboration needs to occur in order to establish better relations. This isn't to say that work is not already being done; we had previously discussed scenario training with favela youth, which is happening in community centers currently. This certainly is a step in the right direction, though it likely will not be enough. Chapter Five provides recommendations for how to integrate at-risk favela youth and how incarceration sets favelados back, and other chapters suggest community meetings and resident assemblies to increase collaboration. Ultimately, collaboration through public schools will not lead to the involvement of every young person in favelas, so more partnerships with favelados will be necessary to better relations with the UPP and accomplish the goals of both parties. Recommendations for these sorts of programs can be found in other chapters throughout this report.

Collaboration is essential to proper peacekeeping, particularly in areas with a history of violence. By working closely with favela youth to better monitor the area, UPP forces will build a greater sense of trust, and will alleviate some of the concerns younger favelados have had with their presence. Just as importantly, a program would provide extra incentive for kids to stay in

school, and could potentially provide them much-desired opportunities for a stable job once they graduate. Careful implementation will be needed to avoid any pitfalls that could endanger students or lead to retaliation, but the program does provide great opportunities for both those inside and outside the pacified favelas. Because pacification is a relatively recent phenomenon, this could go a long way toward building relationships between the two parties, and would likely set the groundwork for collaboration with the next generation of favelados. Some sort of training effort, be it a full-fledged police academy program for favela youth, a smaller-scale program, or a meeting every month or so, would go a long way to improving UPP-youth relationships and pacifying these neighborhoods for the long term.

Chapter Eleven

Public Relations

Camille Gommeaux

Abstract:

Prior to the introduction of UPPs, communication and collaboration among the police force and favelados was scarce. Through the prioritization of fostering relationships with the communities they work within, the UPP's approach to community policing has proven successful in creating a dialogue with favelados. Nevertheless, in order to sustain this progress the means of communication need to be reinforced, and the UPP must increase their transparency by creating a better platform on which they disseminate their information. Furthermore, the UPP's broader political support is contingent on transforming misperceptions of favelados, who are criminalized within the media. Therefore, it is imperative that the UPPs contribute to altering the narrow discourse around favela communities in order to create lasting support for their interventions. In order to achieve these objectives, this chapter proposes the following recommendations:

1. *Improve communication between the UPP and favelados, as well as increase UPP transparency and accountability by:*
 - a. *Expanding already existing communication mediums*
 - b. *Establishing community radio stations and newsletters*
2. *Challenge the current discourse characterizing favela communities through developing partnerships with organizations who are broadening these perceptions within the greater city of Rio de Janeiro.*

Introduction:

Prior to the UPP intervention, repeated acts of violence perpetrated by the PM and favelados created a space of violence that inhibited collaboration between the police and community members. The police were seen as “failing to provide all that they should in a democracy: reassurance, investigative capacity and success, and deterrence” (Hinton 217). The UPP’s non- militarized approach, however, has created an environment conducive to communication and has initiated a sense of trust between favelados and the UPP. Although progressing in the right direction, these dynamics are still being developed and need to be reinforced through increased public relation campaigns within favelas. In order to further the success of the UPP, relations between officers and favelados need to be maintained and improved through expanding mediums of communication.

In addition to improving communication within favelas, the current media representation of favelados must be altered. Currently, favelas are portrayed as lawless and violent, and little consideration is given to other occurrences within the communities (Koonings & Krujit, Dimmers). According to Ramos and Pavia, “the journalistic report about Brazil’s favelas and low income suburbs, especially in Rio de Janeiro, almost always regards these territories as ‘exclusive spaces of violence,’ and the voices and perspectives of favela dwellers are under-represented” (Wu 17). Oftentimes, simplifying urban violence and criminalizing civilians of favelas is used as “an element to boost sales” (Freitas 97). As reporting a sensational story that fits within current stereotypes is expected and lucrative, media culture significantly contributes to perpetuating a certain image of favelados. In order to create lasting support for the UPP’s unique intervention methods, however, it is imperative that the narrow representations of favelados be challenged. Fortunately, as the UPP’s non-militarized approach has created an

environment conducive to communication, and initiated a sense of trust between favelados and the UPP, the UPP has a unique opportunity to create a lasting impact both within favela communities and in the greater city of Rio de Janeiro.

Policy recommendation:

Improve communication between the UPP and favelados, as well as increase UPP transparency and accountability by:

1. *Expanding already existing communication mediums*
2. *Establishing community radio stations and newsletters*

Social Media

The UPP website is an effective means of communication between the UPP and those who seek contact with them. However, a few technical problems are present and should be improved. The section “*Fale Com a UPP*” was tried multiple times but no answer was ever received (upprj.com). Without a consistent system of response, the goal of this portion of the website is significantly diminished. In order to foster trust in the accountability of the UPPs to the public, areas of the website that engage commentary and feedback need to be improved.

Other means of communicating with the public include social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, which are widely used by various age groups and people of differing socio-economic classes. The benefits of sharing information through these sites include their worldwide accessibility and immediate updatability. Furthermore, as these sites are popular among youth, staying up to date with current social media could increase the UPP’s legitimacy

with younger generations. The UPP could make updates relating to happenings in the specific favelas they work within and spread information in a timely manner. Their presence on these sites would make them more accessible to the public, as well as increase their transparency. Although an effective means of connecting to favelados, other means of communication unrelated to devices relying on the Internet should also be considered in order to increase accessibility to all.

Community Radio

“A community radio station is one that is operated in the community, for the community, about the community and by the community” (Tabing 9). The creation of a community radio could foster UPP and favelado collaboration and communication through a mutual project, as well as create a platform for better dissemination of UPP information. Through the community radio, the UPP would also be able to increase their transparency and establish a trusted role within the pacified favelas. A community radio station seems to be the most equitable and pragmatic idea because it uses “technology appropriate to the economic capability of the people, not that which leads to dependence on external sources” (Tabing 11). Furthermore, “community media are capable, better than mainstream media, of addressing their audience’s needs because of the shared relevance that community issues have for both senders and receivers, given that they are all part of the same community” (Medrado 59).

The community radio station should be implemented in each favela in order to engage civilians within their neighborhood and create a sense of solidarity among the residents. The UPP’s role would be to facilitate the radio licensing process, as “political patronage can greatly speed the licensing” procedure. A recent study found that projects with a well-connected

‘political godfather’ in Brasilia were four times more likely to obtain a license from the ministry quickly” (Ortiz). Since UPP officers are the face of the government within favelas, their role in the implementation process reflects their dual position on the ground as well as in the state.

The radio station could be created with the help of CRIAR (Centro de Imprensa, Assessoria e Rádio), whose mission is to “support social movement organizations through strategic communication as production, consultancy, research and training in radio and other platforms - print, internet and audiovisual - aiming at realization of human rights, focusing on the right to communicate" (criarbrasil.org.br). This organization is recommended due to its passed involvement in vulnerable communities and its diversity in efforts. Its program “Zoasom” for example, is a radio station by and for young people, which mixes “music, information, and citizenship”. Other programs focus on health, popular culture, and workers’ rights (criarbrasil.org.br). The variety of topics CRIAR has focused on and the success they have had in implementing radio stations proves the organization is a viable option for the UPP to partner with. In addition to creating radio stations, CRIAR also takes care of training community members and gives them the necessary tools to run the radio station.

In order for the radio station to foster trust and communication between UPP officers and favelados, certain programs should be implemented. The radio would tackle matters such as civil rights, public engagement, and social policy matters. Ideally, a program resembling a talk show between the officers and favelados would be created with the intent of creating a respectful discourse. Favelados running the community radio should invite police officers on a regular basis in order for them to answer questions and concerns from community members. These Q&A sessions should not be seen as an ambush for police officers, but rather a platform where favelados and police officers can share opinions and apprehensions. As Cano points out, “the

challenge is to provide a negotiation between the behavior patterns of residents and police so that both feel respected. Indeed, the relationship between residents and police is an ongoing process” (Cano 124). Creating a mutual sense of respect between the two groups would work toward alleviating existing tensions and encourage mutual understanding of one another. Furthermore, interviews with UPP officers introduce a new sphere for feedback on policing, and would thus increase the UPP’s accountability to the communities they work in. The UPP should also ensure that those in charge of running the radio are informed about the different operations, events, and activities through weekly reports. That way, the station would be a reliable source of information where the UPP could broadcast their information, but also stay true to community concerns by providing a platform for people to share their opinion and give insights on a regular basis.

Example of a Community Radio:

The following case study examines *Radio Favela*, a successful community radio station developed in Vila Noosa Senhora de Fátima. The station focused on topics that were relevant to their creators and listeners, and proved to be an effective means of communicating important issues. According to Governor Itamar Franco of the central Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, *Radio Favela* is “one of the most important vehicles for the cultural, political and social expression of residents of shantytowns and outlying neighborhoods in our city, contributing to the exercise of their rights of citizenship” (Osaka). By focusing specifically on matters from within the community, the radio became a source of information that favelados could rely on. Although currently successful, *Radio Favela* struggled to obtain a license for almost twenty years (Osaka). The UPP therefore holds an instrumental role in providing an opportunity for community radios to be created. Through their ties to the government, the licensing process

would be quickened, and acquiring legitimacy would not be an issue of concern. By following the example of *Radio Favela*, the community radios would be run by favelados, but trained through organizations such as CRIAR, and provide the UPP with a platform to disseminate their information and foster communication with the community.

Newsletter

The newsletter would be a simple and inexpensive way to improve the media campaign of the UPPs. It would improve information access for favelados as well as further involve residents to work with the UPPs. The newsletter would be specific to each favela, be created bi-weekly, and reiterate information found on the UPP website. It would provide information about past and future events and have an accurate schedule of activities set up in the favela. The newsletter would be no longer than one page in order to be easily displayed on walls or windows of shops and other public places. Creating an accessible way of disseminating information about the UPP and happenings in the community would help unify favelas by creating an informed public. In order to further a sense of community, the newsletter could have weekly stories drawing attention to a positive occurrence between UPP officers and favelados, or highlight a member of the community that had a positive impact that week. The UPP officers could partner with schools to create this newsletter, that way favelado youth would be directly involved with the creation process. Not only would this apply students to a project outside of their studies, it would foster a sense of pride in their work as the newsletter would be displayed throughout the community. Creating links between UPPs and students also reinforces mentorship between youth and UPP discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.

Through bettering the UPP's social media outlets and establishing community radios and newsletters, the UPP can successfully broaden their media coverage within favelas, and create collaborative affiliations with favelados.

Policy recommendation:

Challenge the current discourse characterizing favela communities through developing partnerships with organizations who are broadening these perceptions within the greater city of Rio de Janeiro.

To legitimize the UPP's community policing approach over past-militarized methods, and in order to receive ongoing public support, it is imperative that the representation of favelados be disputed. According to Ibase (the Brazilian Institute of Economic and Social Analysis), more than 78% of *asphalts*, residents of formal neighborhoods, believe that 75% of favelados cannot be trusted, and 57.5% are lazy (Torched 19). Media perceptions of favelados as well as the city's history have contributed to residents' internalization of common stereotypes. Although these deep-rooted misconceptions are too complex to be entirely addressed by a set of policies, it is important to analyze the UPP's possible role in altering these stereotypes. As the UPP's success partially relies on continued public support for community policing approaches, it is imperative that the UPP partners with existing organizations which focus on humanizing favelados in the greater city of Rio.

As stated in Chapter Three, altering the training of UPP officers by alleviating the "us vs. them" mentality of past curricula is the first step in halting the otherizing of favelados. In order to further foster communication between UPP officers and favelados, community members could

present themselves during training sessions and provide information on the history of the favela as well as their own personal life experiences. If these sessions were filmed and archived, a rich and nuanced history of favela life would emerge, and eventually be able to challenge common misconceptions. These videos could be archived through non-profit organizations already present in the favelas such as Favela Museum, which already works to present art and culture of favelas within Rio (Godoy). Moreover, the stories could be used in conjunction with the community radio to document the local history and culture. This could provide favelados with a source of pride and confidence in their origin and values.

Various other non-profit organizations such as Project Favela, Viva Rio, and Catalytic Communities focus on challenging the representation of favelas by providing favelados with avenues to display accurate accounts of their communities and personal stories. As favelas have long been represented by outsiders, the UPP's involvement in pacifying favelas provides a unique opportunity for favelados to represent themselves in the media discourse (Roberto). Through incorporating the progress of such organizations on their website, the UPP can serve as a means to broaden the audience favelados are currently able to reach. In addition to challenging misconceptions of favelados, incorporating other organizations within the UPP website would increase partnership between the UPPs and organizations focused on humanizing favelados.

Conclusion

Through improving their public relations campaign, the UPPs have the opportunity to create sustainable relations with favelados, as well as change the status quo surrounding the misrepresentation of favelas in the media. By broadening their use of social media and creating new outlets for communication in favelas through community radios and newsletters, the UPPs

have the potential to foster a sense of trust with favelados and integrate themselves into the culture of the respective favelas they work in. Their unique positionality also allows them to provide avenues for favelados to challenge the media discourse in which favelas are narrowly portrayed as spaces of violence. Thus, if these recommendations are implemented, UPP and favelado dynamics could be vastly ameliorated, and the media discourse surrounding favelados could be meaningfully challenged and eventually lead towards acceptance of favelas into the greater city of Rio de Janeiro.

Conclusion

John B. F. O'Meara

The objectives of Task Force, as the capstone project of the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, are chiefly academic. Under the pedagogic watch of Professor Jonathan Warren, we sixteen students built this report over the span of several weeks. In truth, much of the material in these reports is likely to mirror actions or intentions already considered by Secretary of Public Security José Mariano Beltrame and others in his administration. They, much more than we, have engaged with the very difficult situations in the hill districts of Rio de Janeiro. As ardent supporters of constant renewal and reform of police tactics and ideologies in impoverished areas, this group commends the improvements of the UPP. But our celebration of UPP's successes remains necessarily sober. Much more work is required of the Secretariat of Public Security and the city government of Rio de Janeiro. We hope that this report will help inform policy decisions in the coming months and years.

The long-term viability of the UPP remains one of the most fundamental questions amongst those whose lives are affected by the program. Asfaltos and favelados alike worry that much time, effort and treasure will be spent for another ephemeral program that targets the poor and serves the rich. Our opinion of the UPP is not so simplistic.

As several chapters in this report elucidate, the factors that preclude violence most effectively, such as education programs and sustained economic development efforts, involve coordination, information, and sustained, thoughtful support on the part of many—unlike the old zero-sum military police mentality that focused solely on eliminating gang and narcotrafficking factions. The community rehabilitation mission of the UPP will undoubtedly be difficult to

sustain in absence of substantial, broad improvements in civil society and public services. On the flipside, efforts toward these social improvements must be supported by steadfast belief in the ability of agents and organizations to successfully perform their duties. That means encouraging ever-higher levels of community involvement and guaranteeing sustained security support. Though even basic pacification is preferable to war zone-like violence—this is axiomatic—favela communities will be able to develop faster and more sustainably if the foundations of peaceful rehabilitation are strong. Thus, the UPP must enact pragmatic policy to continually adapt its infrastructure and its objectives in order to more effectively serve favelados now, tomorrow, *ad infinitum*.

Government projects like the UPP are globally important. Cities, megalopolises, and countries today function within a worldwide dialogue of experimentation and shared learning. The UPP proves that fixing the unfixable is not a fool's errand but a noble and possible endeavor. The UPP reveals the merits of collective action and exposes the seams within fractured communities. We hope and trust that the UPP and the evolving, landmark policies led by Sec. Beltrame will one day create an environment of security that will allow the completion of economic and social development in Rio de Janeiro's many favelas. The UPP program has the support of this Task Force, though with recognition that adaptations must continue. We, and the world, will watch intently.

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
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A map of the study area in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It shows the locations of Queimados and Nova Friburgo, with a scale bar indicating distances up to 10 km. The map includes a legend for various land use types and a scale bar.






Figure 4 Distribution of CAPS in the city of Rio de Janeiro ("Rede CAPS Do Rio De Janeiro")