

Confronting for the Greater Good: Are Confrontations that Address the Broad Benefits of  
Prejudice Reduction Taken Seriously?

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**Abstract**

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This dissertation examines whether confronting prejudice for the greater good – confronting in a way that conveys the benefits of prejudice reduction to groups and institutions other than the targets of prejudice – can help targets of prejudice be taken more seriously by members of the perpetrating group. This dissertation first tested whether targets of prejudice are taken less seriously when they confront than members of the perpetrating group (i.e. allies). Two studies demonstrate that members of the perpetrating group (i.e., men, Whites) take confrontations by targets of prejudice (i.e., women, Blacks) less seriously than confrontations by allies and that these reactions may be explained by a tendency to attribute targets' confrontations to internal causes (i.e., tendencies to overreact). This dissertation next tested whether confronting for the greater good helps targets of prejudice to be taken more seriously when confronting. Four follow-up studies suggested that targets of prejudice were taken just as seriously as allies when confronting for the greater good. However, these latter experiments failed to replicate the effect

that targets of prejudice who confront without using the greater good strategy are taken less seriously than allies who engage in the same confrontation. However, a meta-analysis of all studies demonstrated, across studies, confrontations by targets of prejudice were taken less seriously than confrontations by allies, while confrontations for the greater good were taken equally seriously for targets of prejudice and allies. As such, the individual studies in this dissertation may have failed to demonstrate the predicted effects due to a lack of power. This dissertation thus suggests that confronting for the greater good is one strategy that might help targets of prejudice to be taken seriously when they confront, although further research is needed to better understand the boundary conditions of this effect and should explore other strategies prejudice confronters might also use to be taken more seriously.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

### **Confronting for the Greater Good: Are Confrontations that Address the Broad Benefits of Prejudice Reduction Taken Seriously?**

During her 2010 campaign for governor of California, Meg Whitman found herself a target of sexism by her opponent's camp. In a message left for candidate Jerry Brown, a staff member suggested that Brown's team seek to gain favor among voters by portraying Whitman as a "whore." The message went public and Whitman confronted it during a debate, declaring the message sexist and adding that Californians "deserve better than slurs and personal attacks" (Frank, 2010, October 13). What prompted Whitman to point out that eliminating sexism could benefit her constituents rather than simply criticizing the staffer's sexism?

Whitman's approach may have sought to assure that her constituents, and particularly her male constituents, took her confrontation seriously. Women's confrontations may not be seen as legitimate critiques of bias, but as efforts for personal gain (Czopp, Montieth, & Mark, 2006; Eliezer & Major, 2012). Whitman may have framed her confrontation this way in order to avoid being seen as motivated by personal interest and not taken seriously by men. Confrontations that point to the benefits of decreasing prejudice to society as a whole may deflect perceptions of self-interest and be seen as more warranted indictments of bias than confrontations that simply label actions prejudice. *Confrontations for the greater good* may be taken more seriously by emphasizing that reducing prejudice benefits everyone. This dissertation examines these issues.

### **Confronting Prejudice**

Stigmatized groups frequently find themselves the targets of prejudice. Women (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001) and racial minorities (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000) report daily encounters with stereotypes, derogation, and harassment. Confronting, or

expressing dissatisfaction toward people and groups who perpetrate prejudice, is one approach to challenging prejudice (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Other strategies for coping with prejudice focus on managing emotions and cognitions that arise in response to experiencing prejudice, whereas confrontation actually seeks to reduce its occurrence (Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000). Specifically, confrontation aims to stop perpetrators from repeating acts of bias (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006), thus changing how stigmatized groups are treated and altering the attitudes that underlie biased behaviors. Czopp et al. (2006) show that confrontation can fulfill this goal. Whites confronted over racist statements in an online conversation felt bad and provided fewer subsequent biased responses. Confrontations can thus encourage perpetrators to question their behaviors and change how they treat stigmatized groups.

Confrontation can also have emotional benefits for the confronter. Women who confronted sexism felt more positive affect (e.g. optimism, happiness, etc.) than women who wanted to confront, but did not (Shelton et al., 2006). Women who confronted a recent sexist encounter also had fewer negative feelings (e.g. less anger, shame, etc.) and dwelt on sexism less than women who did not confront. Relative to remaining silent, confronting also leads women to feel more empowered (Gervais, Hillard, & Vescio, 2007). In addition to decreasing prejudice, confronting buffers against negative feelings that emerge from experiencing prejudice.

The benefits of confronting extend beyond the confronter and perpetrator. Witnesses of confrontations come to recognize the scope of prejudice and see that expressing bias is not tolerated. For example, confrontations can help people see that subtle, patronizing efforts by members of high status groups are a form of prejudice (Becker, Glick, Ilic, & Bohner, 2011). Men who offer benevolently sexist help to women are viewed less positively when confronted than when their offers of help go unchallenged. By witnessing confrontation, people come to see

that behaviors they might otherwise see as benign are actually harmful. Just as believing that prejudice is socially acceptable can lead to more public displays of prejudice (Crandall, Eshelman, & O'Brien, 2002), if confrontation can make the disapproval of prejudice salient, it can reduce incidents of prejudice. Indeed, hearing arguments against prejudice leads people to more strongly oppose prejudice relative to hearing unrelated arguments (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard, Lily, & Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996). Confrontation can thus have far-reaching effects in getting people to recognize prejudice and align their behavior with anti-prejudice social expectations.

Changes in the attitudes of people who witness confrontations can also carryover to people who are not present during a confrontation. Witnesses can spread anti-prejudice attitudes through their social networks (Paluck, 2011). If people in that network come to think that the majority opposes prejudice, they will adopt similar anti-prejudice attitudes (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Further, those who witness confrontations may be empowered to confront similar experiences (Swim & Thomas, 2006), further propagating anti-prejudice norms. When these norms are made clear, prejudice reduction can endure and lead to a lasting shift in norms (Zitek & Hebl, 2007). Confrontation thus not only changes perpetrators' behavior, but also spreads anti-prejudice messages and leads to an increase in confrontations.

### **Negative Reactions to Confrontations**

To successfully reduce prejudice, however, confrontations must be taken seriously. If a confrontation is seen as a byproduct of some internal aspect of the confronter (e.g. personality, motivations) it may instead be dismissed as unwarranted and thus not taken seriously. Attribution theory states that we see behaviors as reactions to external stimuli or as reflections of internal traits or states (Kelley, 1973). When actions are attributed to internal aspects of an actor, external

factors are discounted as possible causes of the behavior. That is, if people see an internal cause (e.g. the actor's personality) as responsible for a behavior, they ignore possible external causes (e.g., bias). As such, when confrontation is blamed on internal causes, bias may be discounted as a possible cause of the confrontation. Witnesses may then condemn the confronter's actions rather than condemning the perpetrator's behavior that provoked the confrontation.

For example, if a woman confronts a male's sexist joke, others will not take her seriously if they believe she is overreacting (i.e., an internal cause). When the confrontation is blamed on her personality, the joke will be seen as humor to which she overreacted, rather than as a form of prejudice. The confrontation will be seen as an unwarranted response to a benign act. When confrontation is blamed on the joke (i.e., an external cause), the joke will be seen as prejudice and deemed unacceptable. The confrontation will be taken seriously as an appropriate response to a biased act. Attribution Theory thus suggests that, to be taken seriously, confronters should strive for their confrontation to be attributed to the act of prejudice (i.e., an external cause).

Getting confrontations to be taken seriously may be challenging. Research suggests that people attribute confrontations to a confronter's personality even when prejudice is blatant. In one study, participants read about a Black student who received a poor test score (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). When the student blamed the graders' racism for his score, participants rated him less positively and more hypersensitive than when he blamed other external factors, such as test difficulty. Participants found faults internal to the target of prejudice rather than acknowledging bias, the external cause, and thus did not take the claim seriously. In a follow-up study by Kaiser and Miller (2003), participants blamed claimants even when prejudice was clear. Participants read about a hiring manager's blatantly racist statements about Blacks and then about a Black job applicant who blamed the decision not to hire him on the manager's prejudice. Although the

manager's overt bias seems to confirm the Black applicant's suspicions, his claims were still seen as unwarranted, as participants thought he was overreacting. The derogation of people who blame outcomes on prejudice has been replicated with other groups and procedures (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp et al., 2006; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005; Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara, 2006; Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, & Wilkins, 2009; Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 2009; Saunders & Senn, 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). This research suggests a tendency to blame prejudice claims on causes internal to the target of prejudice rather than recognizing bias. Instead of taking targets of prejudice seriously, people derogate them for speaking up even when bias is blatant.

### **Men Do Not Take Women's Claims of Sexism Seriously**

Some people take confronters seriously. Members of the group targeted by prejudice (e.g., women who witness sexism) are more likely to take confrontations seriously than others. People are attuned to unfair treatment of groups to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and support efforts to disrupt bias directed at their group. Those who feel connected to their group embrace confrontations aimed at helping that group (Kaiser et al., 2009). Those who see bias as pervasive recognize confrontation as an effort to gain equality, rather than a threat to their group's status (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010). If women, for example, value being a woman or recognize that sexism is a widespread problem, they will see confrontations as warranted and recognize bias. Members of the targeted group thus take confrontations seriously.

On the other hand, members of the perpetrating group (e.g. men who see a sexist man confronted) are unmotivated to see prejudice. Members of high status groups may simply not recognize prejudice (Nelson, Adams, & Salter, 2013; Pettigrew, 1989). In one study, women and men tallied all incidents they observed in which women were treated differently than men

because of their gender (Swim et al., 2001). Despite explicit instructions to attend to differential gender treatment, men reported fewer incidents of sexism than women. In another study, men and women rated the degree to which derogatory statements about women were sexist (e.g., claims women are intellectually inferior to men; Rodin, Price, Bryson, & Sanchez, 1990). Despite these statements being overtly sexist, men were less likely to label them sexist than women. Indeed, a small but reliable gender difference emerges across 83 psychological and legal studies on perceptions of sexually harassing behaviors (Blumenthal, 1998). On average, men are less likely than women to recognize sexism.

Given this discrepancy, members of other groups may not agree when targets of prejudice believe they have experienced bias (Inman, 2001). Instead of recognizing prejudice, members of the perpetrating group may see only an indictment of their group as responsible for prejudice (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007) and thus not take confrontation seriously. This trend may be accentuated with subtle forms of prejudice. Men are less willing than women to label subtly unfair behaviors as sexist (Becker & Swim, 2011; Gervais, Hillard, & Vescio, 2010), which may be especially problematic given the often-subtle manifestations of modern prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Glick & Fiske, 1996). In general, members of the perpetrating group may not to take confrontations seriously.

### **Confrontations Attributed to Internal Causes Taken Less Seriously**

One reason confronters may not be taken seriously is the belief that they have an established interest in the outcome of their confrontation. Research on reactions to feminists provides insight into this prediction. Women who identify as feminists are more likely to confront sexism than other women (Leaper & Arias, 2011). These women are stereotyped as hypersensitive to sexism and as motivated to improve outcomes for women and themselves (Roy

et al., 2009). When participants read about a woman who blamed her failure to get a leadership position on sexism, they saw her as more of a complainer (i.e. overreacting) and less of a victim of prejudice when she first said she was a feminist than when she did not. Participants discounted prejudice as a factor in the hiring decision for the feminist woman, focusing on internal factors to explain her confrontation. Here, discounting may have resulted from one of two assumptions of the confronter. First, the confronter may have been viewed as group-interested, or acting in a way intended to benefit members of her group (i.e. women). On the other hand, the confronter may have been seen as self-interested, as the intended outcome of the confrontation could benefit her as an individual. The role of perceived self-interest in reactions to prejudice claims makes sense, as self-interested arguments are less persuasive than arguments that oppose self-interest (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). Indeed, both of these assumptions could be accompanied by the belief that the confronter is overreacting to a benign situation, rather than responding appropriately to an incident of bias. Confrontations by targets of prejudice may thus be undermined by assumptions that they are motivated by a desire to benefit the self and the group and emerge from a tendency of the confronter to overreact to situations.

However, some confronters may not be seen as self-interested or group-interested. Allies are people who align with targets of prejudice against that prejudice, but who do not share their stigmatized social identity. Both the extant literature in this area and this dissertation examine a specific subset of allies: people who belong to the same group as a *perpetrator of prejudice* yet challenge his or her actions in an effort to help or support targets of prejudice (e.g. anti-sexist men, anti-racist Whites). As neither these allies, nor the groups to which they belong, are seen as the main beneficiaries of such confrontation, allies may not be seen as self-interested or group-interested when they confront to the same extent as targets of prejudice. Inequalities tend to

benefit high status groups (i.e., privilege; Lowery et al., 2007), so allies may instead have something to lose by disrupting bias. As people often act in favor their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), allies' confrontations may grab attention due to their surprising nature (Petty, Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein, 2001). Arguing in favor of another group should draw attention to the biased actions rather than the confronters' motivations. As such, allies are not likely to be seen as self-interested or group-interested in the outcome of the confrontation, nor as overreacting to the situation, as the external cause is clearer when they confront than when the target or prejudice confronts. Thus, allies' confrontations will be attributed to external causes and thus taken more seriously than confrontations by targets of prejudice.

Research suggests that confrontations by allies are more persuasive than confrontations by targets of prejudice. White racism confronters are more convincing to other Whites than are Black racism confronters (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). White participants watched a video in which a White perpetrator disparaged Affirmative Action. The perpetrator's partner, a White or Black woman, then told the perpetrator that her opinion was racist. Participants agreed more with the confrontation and believed the perpetrator's actions were more sexist when the confronter was White than when the confronter was Black. Participants took the ally's confrontation more seriously than the confrontation by the target of prejudice.

Further evidence that allies may be taken seriously comes from research demonstrating that their confrontations lead people to question their biases. Whites expect to feel worse about making racist statements when confronted by a White person than when confronted by a Black person (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). White participants imagined acting racist (e.g., assuming the role of a doctor should be played by a White actor over a Black actor). They anticipated feeling worse about themselves and guiltier about their actions when they imagined a White confronter

than when they imagined a Black confronter. When imagining being confronted over sexism, men and women similarly anticipated feeling guiltier and more apologetic for their actions when confronted by a man than a woman. People thus predict they will take being confronted by allies more seriously than being confronted by targets of prejudice. These scenarios are similar to witnessing a confrontation and imagining how one would feel had they been confronted. Thus, people who witness a confrontation may take it more seriously if the confronter is any ally than if the confronter is a target of prejudice.

### **Confronting for the Greater Good**

If targets of prejudice can reduce the tendency of witnesses from the perpetrating group to make internal attributions about targets' confrontations, and draw attention to external causes, they may be taken as seriously as allies. Targets of prejudice are motivated to confront bias (Swim & Hyers, 1999), but little research has addressed strategies they can use to do so effectively (Major et al., 2000; Stone, Whitehead, Schmader, & Focella, 2011). Confronting in a way that reduces internal attributions such as perceived self-interest may be one such strategy. If targets of prejudice can disrupt perpetrating group witnesses' internal attributions about the confrontation, their confrontations may be attributed to perpetrators' bias (i.e., external causes) and taken seriously instead of creating the impression they are overreacting "troublemakers" (i.e., internal causes; Kaiser & Miller, 2001) whose actions are unwarranted.

Members of perpetrating groups may be more receptive to confrontations that convey the broad benefits of reducing prejudice. They may respond positively to confrontations that suggest a "greater good" of confrontation that benefits their own group or society as a whole. How can confrontations convey the greater good of these actions? Confrontation might be framed to appeal to people's morality and ideals of fairness. Supporting such confrontations would provide

people with a sense of integrity in living up to their values and supporting a cause that adheres to these values. For example, when a supervisor is confronted for being sexist, both male and female employees may derive a sense of self-integrity by supporting the confrontation and subsequently viewing themselves as morally fair and upstanding individuals. Confrontation could also be framed to draw attention to instrumental benefits of such action, such as improving interactions between groups and encouraging the exchange of ideas, thus benefiting institutions and high status groups in terms of productivity. For example, when a supervisor is confronted for being sexist, this action could benefit all employees (i.e. both women and men) by encouraging women to feel safe sharing ideas in discussions, thus increasing the number of people working to solve problems and helping the company's bottom-line. There may be any number of ways to frame a confrontation to make it clear that it appeals to the greater good. This dissertation begins to explore how focusing on these benefits might help confronters to be taken more seriously.

*Confronting for the greater good* may offer a desirable alternative to standard confrontations, which may be perceived to benefit only the individual enacting the confrontation. By encouraging members of the perpetrating group to see how prejudice reduction benefits members of other groups and institutions, they may feel less implicated in prejudice than when they are focused on how a confrontation might help the confronter. Confronting for the greater good may deflect assumptions that targets of prejudice are trying to benefit themselves, instead drawing attention to the prejudice. When sexism is confronted for the greater good, for example, men may be less likely to discount the perpetrator's actions as a cause of the confrontation. They may recognize that society, including men, could benefit from fairness rather than seeing only an indictment of men's role in gender inequality. Thus, I suggest that the perpetrating group will

take confrontations for the greater good more seriously than standard confrontations, while targets of prejudice will take both strategies equally seriously.

### **Current Research**

This dissertation examines whether members of perpetrating groups take confrontations by targets of prejudice less seriously than confrontations by allies. It then explores if shifting the attention of perpetrating groups to external causes of confrontation helps targets of prejudice be taken more seriously. There have been calls within social psychology to explore strategies for effectively confronting (Major et al., 2000; Stone et al., 2011). This dissertation explores if confrontations that explain the broad benefits of prejudice reduction—*confrontations for the greater good*—may be one such strategy. It first tests whether men take male sexism confrontations more seriously than female sexism confrontations. It then tests whether non-Black people take White racism confrontations more seriously than Black racism confrontations. Finally, it tests whether confrontations for the greater good lead perpetrating groups to take confrontations by targets of prejudice (e.g., women and Blacks) more seriously.

### **Hypotheses**

*Hypothesis 1:* Men will take sexism confrontations less seriously than women (tested in studies 1, 2, 3, and 4).

*Hypothesis 1a:* Men will take a sexism confrontation by a female less seriously than a sexism confrontation by a male. Women will take a sexism confrontation equally seriously regardless of confronter gender (tested in studies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6).

*Hypothesis 1b:* Non-Black people will take a racism confrontation by a Black confronter less seriously than a racism confrontation by a White confronter (tested in studies 1b and 5).

*Hypothesis 2:* Men will see sexism confronters to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested to a greater extent than women (tested in studies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6).

*Hypothesis 2a:* Men will see a female sexism confronter to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested to a greater extent than a male sexism confronter. Women will see female and male sexism confronters as equally overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested (tested in studies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6).

*Hypothesis 2b:* Non-Black people will see a Black racism confronter to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested more than a White confronter (tested in studies 1b and 5).

*Hypothesis 3:* Men's tendency to discount the seriousness of a female's sexism confrontations will be mediated by the extent to which they see her to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested (tested in study 1).

*Hypothesis 3a:* Non-Black people's tendency to discount the seriousness of a racism confrontation by a Black confronter will be mediated by the extent to which they see her to be self-interested and group-interested (tested in study 1b).

*Hypothesis 4:* Thinking about how decreasing sexism helps women will cause men to take a sexism confrontation by a female less seriously than the same sexism confrontation by a male. However, thinking about how decreasing sexism helps the greater good will cause men to take the sexism confrontation equally seriously regardless of confronter gender. Women will take sexism confrontations by males and females equally seriously irrespective of thinking about how decreasing sexism helps women or the greater good (tested in studies 2, 3, 4, and 6).

*Hypothesis 4a:* Non-Black people will take racism confrontations by Black confronters less seriously than racism confrontations by White confronters. Non-Black people will take

racism confrontations for the greater good equally seriously regardless of confronter race (tested in study 5).

## **Chapter 2: Study Methods and Results**

### **Study 1**

Study 1 tested whether men fail to take female sexism confronters seriously and whether internal attributions mediate these reactions. I manipulated whether participants read about a male or female confronter. The confronter claimed that a male teacher favored male students over female students, labeling the teacher's behavior sexist. I predicted that men would take confronters less seriously than women (hypothesis 1). Further, men would take the female confronter less seriously than the male confronter, while women would take confronters equally seriously regardless of confronter gender (hypothesis 1a). Why would this be the case? I predicted that men would tend to attribute confrontations to internal causes (i.e. overreacting, self-interest, group-interest) more than women (hypothesis 2). Further, men would see a female confronter as overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested more than a male confronter, while women would show no such difference (hypothesis 2a). Finally, I hypothesized that men's tendency to take confrontations by females less seriously than confrontations by males would be mediated by the extent to which they made these internal attributions (hypothesis 3).

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

One hundred thirty-five students ( $M = 19.07$  years,  $SD = .87$ ) at the University of Washington completed the study for partial course credit in a psychology course. Participants were mostly female (59.3%) and either Asian/Asian American (42.2%) or White/European American (40.0%). Two subjects were dropped from analysis for not identifying their gender.

#### **Design**

This study was a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) between-subjects design.

## Procedure

Participants completed the study as part of mass testing in a psychology course. The study was distributed in a lecture class within a packet of unrelated studies. Study order was randomized within each packet. Participant read a short article presented as a newspaper article to increase mundane realism. In the article, either a male or female student teacher confronted a teacher's behavior toward his female students. To convey confronter gender, the article included a male or female name for the student teacher ("Anthony" or "Amanda"), as well as one of four portraits (2 male, 2 female). The teacher's name and portrait always depicted him as male. The confrontation included the student teacher's complaint that the male teacher "refuses to call upon his female students" and that "female students get low participation grades" despite their efforts to engage in the class. Participants then completed a series of questions about the situation and actors portrayed within the article.

## Measures

Items were rated on a 7-point scale with end points 1 (*Not at All*) and 7 (*Very Much So*).

**Discrimination.** One way to assess the perceived seriousness of a confrontation is to examine the extent to which participants see the perpetrator's actions to be prejudiced. If a confrontation is to be taken seriously as a legitimate critique of a biased action, the observer must be willing to acknowledge that the confrontation took place in response to a discriminatory act. That is, if a participant recognizes that perpetrator's actions as discrimination, he or she is acknowledging that the confrontation may have been a legitimate response to prejudice. Three items assessed perceptions that the teacher's actions were sexist. Participants rated the likelihood the teacher discriminated against his female students, the extent to which the teacher is prejudiced against women, and the extent to which the teacher intended to discriminate ( $\alpha = .81$ ).

**Credibility.** Another way to assess the perceived seriousness of a confrontation is to examine participants' perceptions of the credibility of the confronter's actions. If a confrontation is to be taken seriously, the observer must recognize that the claim being made is credible. That is, the participant must acknowledge that the confronter's statements accurately reflect the perpetrator's behaviors. Four items assessed the extent to which the student teacher's claims were credible. Participants rated the extent to which the claim was legitimate, credible, and accurate, and the likelihood students would support the claim ( $\alpha = .82$ ).

### **Potential Mediators**

**Overreaction.** One internal attribution that might lead to not taking a confrontation seriously is the assumption that a confronter is overreacting to the situation. To test whether female confronters were perceived to be overreacting more than male confronters, participants completed a single item assessing the extent to which the student teacher was overreacting.

**Self-interest.** A second internal attribution that might lead to not taking a confrontation seriously is the belief that a confronter is self-interested. To test whether female confronters are perceived to be more self-interested than male confronters, participants completed a single item assessing the extent to which the student teacher was trying to benefit himself/herself.

**Group-interest.** A third internal attribution (distinct from but similar to self-interest) that might lead to not taking a confrontation seriously is the belief that a confronter is trying to benefit his or her gender group. To test whether female confronters are perceived to be more group-interested than male confronters, participants completed a single item assessing the extent to which the student teacher was trying to benefit members of his/her gender group.

**Demographics.** After the survey, participants provided their gender, age, and race.

## Results

Dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) Analysis of Variance. See Table 1 for correlations and Table 2 for descriptive statistics.

### Seriousness of Confrontation

To examine the extent to which participants took the confrontation seriously, I assessed participants' perceptions of discrimination and confronter credibility.

**Discrimination.** Men ( $M = 4.66$ ,  $SD = .89$ ) rated discrimination less likely than women ( $M = 4.97$ ,  $SD = .94$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 4.08$ ,  $p = .046$ ,  $d = .34$ . However, the predicted interaction between participant gender and confronter gender was not significant,  $F(1, 129) = 1.50$ , *ns*.

As *a priori* hypotheses predicted different patterns of responses for men and women, I nonetheless conducted simple effects examining the effect of confronter gender for male and female participants. Men rated discrimination marginally less likely when a female confronted ( $M = 4.43$ ,  $SD = .81$ ) than when a male confronted ( $M = 4.86$ ,  $SD = .91$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 3.00$ ,  $p = .086$ ,  $d = .50$ . Women, on the other hand, rated discrimination equally likely regardless of confronter gender (female:  $M = 4.95$ ,  $SD = .82$ ; male;  $M = 4.99$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ),  $F(1, 129) = .04$ , *ns*.

**Credibility.** Men ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = .96$ ) rated confrontation less credible than did women ( $M = 4.84$ ,  $SD = .85$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 8.37$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $d = .48$ . Additionally, regardless of gender, participants rated the male confronter ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = .84$ ) to be more credible than the female confronter ( $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = .98$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 5.17$ ,  $p = .025$ ,  $d = .35$ . The predicted interaction between participant gender and confronter gender was not significant,  $F(1, 129) = .51$ , *ns*.

Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I nonetheless conducted simple effects looking at the effect of confronter gender for male and female participants. Simple effects revealed the expected trend such that men rated the female's confrontation ( $M = 4.15$ ,  $SD = .97$ ) marginally less credible than

the male's confrontation ( $M = 4.62, SD = .92$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 3.71, p = .056, d = .50$ . Women, on the other hand, rated the female's confrontation ( $M = 4.72, SD = .93$ ) and the male's confrontation ( $M = 4.96, SD = .76$ ) to be equally credible,  $F(1, 129) = 1.53, ns$ .

### **Internal Attributions**

To test predictions about internal attributions, I examined participants' ratings of the extent to which the confronter was overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested.

**Overreaction.** Men ( $M = 3.83, SD = 1.32$ ) rated confronters to be overreacting more than did women ( $M = 3.00, SD = 1.17$ ),  $F(1, 127) = 15.12, p < .001, d = .66$ . Overall, participants also rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.56, SD = 1.32$ ) to be overreacting more than the male confronter ( $M = 3.10, SD = 1.23$ ),  $F(1, 127) = 5.88, p = .017, d = .36$ . However, the interaction between participant gender and confronter gender was not significant,  $F(1, 129) = 1.57, ns$ .

Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I nonetheless conducted simple effects examining the effect of confronter gender for male and female participants. Simple effects revealed that men rated the female confronter ( $M = 4.24, SD = 1.48$ ) to be overreacting more than the male confronter ( $M = 3.44, SD = 1.05$ ),  $F(1, 127) = 5.61, p = .019, d = .62$ . Women, on the other hand, rated the female ( $M = 3.13, SD = 1.00$ ) and male ( $M = 2.87, SD = 1.30$ ) confronter to be overreacting to the same extent,  $F(1, 127) = .86, ns$ .

**Self-interest.** Regardless of their gender, participants rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.69, SD = 1.37$ ) to be more self-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.05, SD = 1.32$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 5.96, p = .016, d = .47$ . No other main effects or interactions were found,  $ps > .17$ .

Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I nonetheless conducted simple effects examining the effect of confronter gender for male and female participants, revealing an unexpected pattern. Men rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.72, SD = 1.57$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 3.41, SD =$

1.31) to be equally self-interested,  $F(1, 126) = .71, ns$ . Women, on the other hand, demonstrated the pattern predicted for men, rating the female confronter ( $M = 3.67, SD = 1.24$ ) to be more self-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.81, SD = 1.30$ ),  $F(1, 126) = 8.02, p = .005, d = .68$ .

**Group interest.** Regardless of gender, participants rated the female confronter ( $M = 5.56, SD = 1.30$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.03, SD = 1.73$ ),  $F(1, 129) = 81.07, p < .001, d = 1.65$ . No other main effects or interactions were observed,  $ps > .13$ .


Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I again conducted simple effects examining the effect of confronter gender for male and female participants. Simple effects confirmed the expected pattern for men, as they rated the female confronter ( $M = 5.48, SD = 1.30$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.44, SD = 1.80$ ),  $F(1, 128) = 23.13, p < .001, d = 1.30$ . Counter to expectations, however, women also rated the female confronter ( $M = 5.62, SD = 1.31$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.76, SD = 1.64$ ),  $F(1, 128) = 70.26, p < .001, d = 1.93$ .

### **Moderated Mediation Analyses**

Overall, these data suggest that men take confrontations less seriously than do women (supporting hypothesis 1). However, men also take female confronters less seriously than male confronters, while women, on the other hand, take confronters equally seriously regardless of gender (supporting hypothesis 1a). I further hypothesized that the extent to which men took confrontations by females seriously would be mediated by their tendency to make internal attributions for a female's confrontation (hypothesis 3). To test this hypothesis, I conducted moderated mediation analyses. I suggest that the path between the independent variable and mediator (path a) is moderated by a third variable (i.e. model 2 in Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Specifically, I predict that the path between confronter gender and internal attributions

will be moderated by participant gender in predicting perceived discrimination and credibility. Internal attributions will mediate the pathway between confronter gender and confrontation seriousness (path c') for men, but not for women (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Mediation Moderated by Participant Gender



I conducted six moderated mediation analyses using the SPSS macro developed by Preacher et al. (2007) with 5000 bootstrap resamples. I tested whether perceived overreacting, self-interest, and group-interest mediated differences in perceptions of discrimination and credibility for men. In each analysis, confronter gender served as the independent variable, with male coded as 0 and female coded as 1. Thus, lower values for the female confronter (vs. male confronter) on the mediators and dependent variables are represented by negative values. To test the effects specifically for men, men were coded as 1 and women as 0.

**Men see less sexism when they perceive confronters to be overreacting.** There was no significant interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on overreaction ( $b = .54, SE = .43, p = .21$ ) or between confronter gender and participant gender on discrimination through overreaction,  $b = -.19, SE = .30, p = .52$ . The lack of interaction does not limit this analysis, however, as contemporary approaches to mediation focus on significance of indirect effects at different levels of the moderator (Hayes, 2009). Examining the conditional effects for males and females revealed that perceived overreacting significantly mediated the relationship between confronter gender and discrimination for men,  $b = -.25, SE = .12, p = .034$  (bias

corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.58, -.05]), but not women,  $b = -.08$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $p = .37$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.27, .08]). Thus, perceptions that a female confronter was overreacting accounted for men's levels of perceived discrimination when she confronted relative to a male confronter.

**Men see female confronters as less credible when they perceived confronters to be overreacting.** There was no interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on overreaction ( $b = .54$ ,  $SE = .43$ ,  $p = .21$ ) or on credibility through overreaction ( $b = -.03$ ,  $SE = .29$ ,  $p = .92$ ). Examining conditional indirect effects at each level of the proposed moderator (Hayes, 2009), however, revealed that perceived overreacting significantly mediated the relationship between confronter gender and credibility for men,  $b = -.24$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $p = .035$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.52, -.04]), but not women,  $b = -.08$ ,  $SE = .08$ ,  $p = .37$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.26, .07]). Thus men's perceptions that a female confronter was overreacting accounted for her lower credibility relative to the male confronter.

**Sexism not explained by perceived self-interest.** There was no interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on self-interest ( $b = -.55$ ,  $SE = .48$ ,  $p = .26$ ) or on discrimination through self-interest,  $b = -.37$ ,  $SE = .33$ ,  $p = .26$ . Examining the conditional effects for each gender (Hayes, 2009) confirmed that perceived self-interest did not mediate the relationship between confronter gender and perceived discrimination for either gender. The pathway was nonsignificant for men,  $b = -.02$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $p = .63$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.17, .02]) and women,  $b = -.05$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $p = .42$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.20, .05]). Thus, perceptions that a female confronter was self-interested did not account for the lower levels of sexism men saw for her relative to a male confronter.

**Credibility not explained by perceived self-interest.** There was no significant interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on self-interest ( $b = -.55$ ,  $SE = .48$ ,  $p = .26$ ) or on credibility through self-interest ( $b = -.21$ ,  $SE = .32$ ,  $p = .51$ ). Examining conditional effects for each gender (Hayes, 2009) confirmed that self-interest did not mediate the relationship between confronter gender and credibility for men,  $b = -.02$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $p = .56$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.17, .02]) or women,  $b = -.06$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $p = .27$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.21, .03]). Thus, self-interest did not account for the lower levels of sexism men perceived for the female confronter relative to the male confronter.

**Sexism not explained by perceived group-interest.** There was no interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on group-interest ( $b = -.82$ ,  $SE = .54$ ,  $p = .13$ ) or on discrimination through group-interest ( $b = -.30$ ,  $SE = .33$ ,  $p = .35$ ). Examining conditional effects for each gender (Hayes, 2009) confirmed that group-interest does not mediate the relationship between gender and discrimination for men,  $b = .13$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $p = .26$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.07, .36]) or women,  $b = .18$ ,  $SE = .15$ ,  $p = .24$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.14, .49]). Thus, belief that a female confronter was group-interested did not account for the lower levels of sexism men saw when she confronted relative to a male.

**Credibility not explained by perceived group-interest.** There was no interaction between confronter gender and participant gender on group-interest ( $b = -.82$ ,  $SE = .54$ ,  $p = .13$ ) or on credibility through group-interest ( $b = -.21$ ,  $SE = .32$ ,  $p = .52$ ). Examining conditional indirect effects at each level of the proposed moderator (Hayes, 2009) confirmed that perceived group interest did not mediate the relationship between confronter gender and credibility for men,  $b = -.04$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $p = .73$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.27, .21]) or women,  $b =$

-.05,  $SE = .15$ ,  $p = .72$  (bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI [-.38, .27]). Thus, perceived group-interest did not account for perceptions of the confronter's credibility for men or women.

## **Discussion**

Study 1 tested whether men and women react differently to sexism confrontations and whether these judgments differ based on confronter gender or are mediated by internal attributions. These data suggest that both male and female sexism confronters may find it difficult to be taken seriously by men. Men saw a perpetrator as less sexist and believed that confrontations were less credible than did women (supporting hypothesis 1). These data also suggest that, overall, female confronters may tend to be less likely than male confronters to be taken seriously. Men, but not women, perceived marginally less sexism and believed the confrontation to be marginally less credible when females confronted relative to when males confronted (supporting hypothesis 1a).

Why do people react differently to male and female confronters? Study 1 suggests that people discount the role of sexism – an external cause – and make internal attributions more when females confront than when males confront. Female confronters were seen as overreacting to a greater degree and more self-interested and group-interested than male confronters. Again, however, despite the lack of an overall interaction, it was men who had the greatest tendency to make internal attributions for the confrontation. Men believed confronters to be overreacting more than did women (partially supporting hypothesis 2). Men also rated the female confronter to be overreacting to a greater extent than the male confronter, while women showed no such difference (partially supporting hypothesis 2a). Both men and women perceived the female confronter to be more group-interested than the male confronter, with men showing this effect more strongly. However, examining simple effects, it was women who showed a stronger

tendency to see the female confronter as more self-interested than the male confronter. Perhaps women recognize that females confront sexism in order to get ahead, as oppression from men leads to missed opportunities. Men, on the other hand, may not recognize the personal benefits of confrontation and instead see anti-sexist actions as an effort to benefit women (i.e. the group).

But do men's internal attributions about women's confrontations explain differences in their reactions based on gender? Moderated mediation analyses (Preacher et al., 2007) showed that men saw the perpetrator as less sexist and the confronter as less credible to the extent that they saw female confronters to be overreacting (partially supporting hypothesis 3). This pattern was not seen for women. This process should be taken with some level of caution, however, as there are limitations to cross-sectional mediation analyses. Mediation based on cross-sectional data may not represent an overall longitudinal effect of the process (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). These processes may not occur in a causal path as suggested by the model and it is hard to tell whether the process actually occurs as claimed or if instead it reflects some bias by participants in seeking to explain their reaction to the stimuli. Additionally, internal psychological states (internal attributions, in this case) are difficult to measure and may only fit this model when measured in a specific way (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Other efforts to measure internal attributions might not result in supporting the same mediation model. Finally, as the overall interactions for gender in this model were not significant (see above) and the betas for overreacting as a mediator of discrimination (men  $b = -.25$ ; women  $b = -.08$ ) and credibility (men  $b = -.24$ ; credibility  $b = -.08$ ) were in the same direction and of similar magnitude for men and women, the difference in process for men and women should be considered with caution. A bigger sample size or different approach to measurement would provide a different outcome.

Failing to support hypotheses, perceived self-interest and group-interest did not explain reactions to the confrontation for men or women. It is surprising that self-interest did not predict responses to the female confronter. Work in persuasion (Eagly et al., 1978) and confrontation (Czopp et al., 2006; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010) suggests that self-interest would explain reactions to confrontations. As such, this dissertation continues to examine the role of self-interest in judging confrontations. However, these data do suggest that being perceived as overreacting to a situation can make it difficult to be taken seriously by men. Given that modern sexism is subtle (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) and may not be recognized as discrimination by men (Pettigrew, 1989), men likely often see women's efforts to confront everyday sexism as overreactions.

As another note of caution, it should also be noted that omnibus  $F$ -tests were not sensitive to the predicted differences in responses by men and women on my chosen dependent variables in this study. However, I do not view the failure of significant omnibus  $F$ -tests as a limitation, as simple effect revealed the expected patterns. The reliance on simple effects is warranted, as they were predicted *a priori* and the effects sizes were not menial (see Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989 for a discussion). To increase confidence in these data, however, subsequent studies in this dissertation sought to replicate these results.

Study 1 suggests that people who confront sexism risk not being taken seriously. Females who confront sexism are taken even less seriously than males and it seems to be men who are most likely not to take confrontations by females seriously. These data provide initial support for the theory that confronting prejudice that targets one's own group may be more challenging than confronting prejudice that targets a group to which one does not belong. Targets of prejudice may face more trouble confronting than allies, as observers question their reasons for confronting and whether or not their actions are warranted. However, study 1 speaks only to confronting

sexism and these tendencies may not replicate with confrontation targeting other forms of prejudice. To test whether such patterns are also seen with other prejudice confrontations, study 1b sought to replicate these findings in confronting racism against Blacks.

### **Study 1b**

Like women, are targets of other forms of prejudice also taken less seriously than allies when they confront prejudice? Study 1b seeks to build on study 1 by testing this theory with racism confrontations. I predicted that non-Black participants would take confrontations by Black confronters less seriously than confrontations by White confronters (hypothesis 1b). Further, I predicted that non-Blacks would also attribute confrontations by Black confronters more to self-interest and group-interest than confrontations by White confronters (hypothesis 2b; no measure of overreacting was included in this study). Finally, I predicted that the extent to which non-Black participants would take Black confronters seriously would be mediated by perceived self-interest and group-interest (hypothesis 3a). This study included only non-Black participants, due to underrepresentation of Blacks in the population sampled and thus did not test effects for members of the targeted group.

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

Sixty participants (34 female, 22 male, 4 unreported;  $M = 20.48$  years,  $SD = 2.37$  years) were approached on the University of Washington campus. There was no incentive offered for participating. Most participants identified as White/European American (36.7%) or Asian/Asian American (33.7%). Other groups each made up less than 12% (0% Black/African American). Ten percent who did not identify their race were included in the sample, based on experimenters being explicitly instructed to approach people who did not appear to be Black.

## **Design**

This study was a single factor between-subjects design (confronter race: Black vs. White).

## **Procedure**

Participants were approached on the University of Washington campus. Participants read an article (adapted from study 1) in which a Black or White student teacher accused a teacher of treating students inequitably based on race. The confronter stated that the White teacher “refuses to call on his Black students, resulting in low grades due to lack of participation.” A portrait of a White teacher and of either a Black or White student teacher was included to manipulate confronter race. Participants then responded to a series of questionnaires.

## **Measures**

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1=*Strongly Disagree* and 7=*Strongly Agree*).

**Seriousness of confrontation.** To assess how seriously participants took confrontations, two items assessed the extent to which they perceived the teacher’s actions to be racist (“How likely is it that the teacher discriminated against his Black students?”, “To what extent is the teacher prejudiced against Blacks?”;  $\alpha = .67$ ) and one item assessed the extent to which they saw the confrontation as credible (“To what extent was the student teacher’s claim legitimate?”).

**Internal attributions.** To assess the extent to which participants attributed confrontation to internal causes, participants completed one item assessing perceived self-interest (“To what extent was the student teacher trying to benefit himself by reporting his teacher?”) and one item assessing perceived group-interest (“To what extent was the student teacher trying to benefit members of his racial group by reporting his teacher?”).

**Demographics.** After the survey, participants provided their age, race, and gender.

## Results

Responses to items were compared across confronter race (White vs. Black). See Table 3 for correlations between measures and descriptive statistics.

### Seriousness of Confrontation

Supporting predictions, participants rated it more likely that the teacher discriminated when the White student teacher confronted ( $M = 4.83$ ,  $SD = 1.04$ ) than when the Black student teacher confronted ( $M = 4.32$ ,  $SD = .66$ ),  $t(58) = 2.29$ ,  $p = .026$ ,  $d = .58$ . Similarly, participants also rated the White student teacher ( $M = 4.80$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ) more credible than the Black student teacher ( $M = 4.07$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ),  $t(58) = 2.38$ ,  $p = .021$ ,  $d = .61$ . The White confronter was taken more seriously than the Black confronter on both measures.


### Internal Attributions

Participants rated the White ( $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ) and Black ( $M = 3.45$ ,  $SD = 1.66$ ) confronter equally self-interested, although means trended in the expected direction,  $t(57) = -.72$ ,  $ns$ ,  $d = .19$ . However, in keeping with predictions, the Black confronter was perceived to be group-interested ( $M = 5.30$ ,  $SD = 1.44$ ) more so than the White confronter ( $M = 4.30$ ,  $SD = 1.95$ ),  $t(53.41) = -2.26$ ,  $p = .028$ ,  $d = .58$ .

### Mediation Analysis

Using the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), I tested whether perceived self-interest and group-interest mediate the path between confronter race and how seriously participants took the confrontation (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Mediation Model



**Self-interest does not mediate the effect of confronter race on discrimination.** In step 1, participants saw less discrimination when the confronter was White versus Black,  $b = -.52$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $p = .026$ . In step 2, participants perceived the Black and White confronters to be equally self-interested,  $b = .28$ ,  $SE = .39$ ,  $ns$ . In step 3 and 4, controlling for confronter race, self-interest did not predict discrimination,  $b = -.06$ ,  $SE = .08$ ,  $ns$ , and confronter race still predicted discrimination,  $b = -.48$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $p = .044$ . Perceptions of self-interest thus did not account for the lower perceived discrimination for the Black confronter relative to the White confronter.

**Self-interest does not mediate the effect of confronter race on credibility.** In step 1, participants perceived the Black confronter to be less credible than the White confronter,  $b = -.73$ ,  $SE = .31$ ,  $p = .021$ . In step 2, the Black confronter and White confronter were seen to be equally self-interested (see above). In step 3 and 4, controlling for confronter gender, perceptions of self-interest did not predict credibility,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $ns$ , and confronter race still predicted credibility,  $b = -.77$ ,  $SE = .32$ ,  $p = .018$ . As such, perceptions of self-interest also did not account for the Black confronter's lower perceived credibility relative to the White confronter.

**Group-interest does not mediate the effect of confronter race on discrimination.** In step 1, participants saw less discrimination when the confronter was Black than when he was White (see above). In step 2, participants perceived the Black confronter to be more group-interested than the White confronter,  $b = 1.00$ ,  $SE = .44$ ,  $p = .028$ . In step 3 and 4, controlling for

confronter race, group-interest did not predict discrimination,  $b = .06$ ,  $SE = .07$ ,  $ns$ , and confronter race still predicted discrimination,  $b = -.62$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $p = .010$ . Perceptions of group-interest thus did not account for the lower level of racism perceived for the Black confronter.

**Group-interest does not mediate the effect of confronter race on credibility.** In step 1, participants perceived the Black confronter to be less credible than the White confronter (see above). In step 2, the Black confronter was seen to be more group-interested than the White confronter (see above). In step 3 and 4, upon controlling for confronter gender, group-interest did not predict confronter credibility,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $ns$ , and confronter race still predicted credibility,  $b = -.81$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $p = .015$ . Perceptions of group-interest thus also did not account for the Black confronter's lower credibility relative to the White confronter.

### **Discussion**

This experiment tested whether non-Black observers take racism confrontations by Black confronters less seriously than racism confrontations by White confronters. These data suggest that Black racism confronters face difficulty being taken seriously by members of outgroups. The Black confronter was seen as less credible than the White confronter and the perpetrator's actions were seen as less racist when confronted by a Black confronter than when confronted by a White confronter (supporting hypothesis 1b). Further, the Black confronter was seen as more group-interested than the White confronter, but equally as self-interested (hypothesis 2b partially supported). How seriously participants took the Black confronter was not explained by their perceptions of self-interest or group-interest (hypothesis 3a not supported).

Study 1b provides evidence that the tendency to take targets of prejudice less seriously than their allies may also occur with racism confrontations. Black confronters were seen to be more group-interested than White confronters, but, as in study 1, perceptions of group-interest

did not predict perceptions of discrimination or credibility by members of the perpetrating group. That these internal attributions did not mediate the relationship between confronter group and perceptions of the confrontation is consistent with study 1. It may be that this process does not exist or it could be that these internal attributions are simply difficult to measure and that my particular choice of constructs and measurement was unable to capture a real process (Spencer et al., 2005). While the data suggest that targets of prejudice who confront are taken less seriously than allies, the mechanism for these judgments remains unclear. A measure of overreacting was not included in study 1b, but was a significant predictor of how seriously participants took sexism confrontations in study 1. It has been theorized that Blacks who acknowledge racism may be seen as overreacting (see Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2003), but the possibility that it plays the same role in reactions to Black confronters as it did in reactions to female confronters was not tested in this study.

This study had limitations that are worth exploring. First, it did not test the full model presented for sexism confrontations (i.e. hypothesis 1a) with racism confrontations, as there were no Black participants. Thus, it did not test whether the tendency not to take Black confronters seriously was specific to non-Blacks or whether it might also be observed among Blacks. The omission of Black participants was a result of the population from which the sample was drawn, which is largely non-Black. Theoretically, Blacks would take indictments of prejudice directed at their group seriously. Work by Kaiser et al. (2009) suggests that Black people are accepting of other Blacks who oppose racism. As people are attuned to bias that affects their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), there is no reason to predict that Blacks would fail to see racism as a cause of confrontations. As such, Blacks should take Black and White racism confronters equally seriously and this effect should, theoretically, exist only for members of other groups. A second

limitation is that attributions were measured with single items in this study. As such, the results of this study should also be interpreted with caution. I sought to replicate these effects in study 5.

Across two studies, confrontations by targets of prejudice tended to be taken less seriously than confrontations by allies from the perpetrating group. Furthermore, sexism confrontations were taken less seriously to the extent that they were attributed to overreacting. As such, drawing attention away from the confronter (i.e. internal cause) and toward prejudice (i.e. the external cause) might help increase the extent to which confrontations are taken seriously. In study 2, I test whether thinking about the benefits of sexism reduction to the greater good makes men take confrontations more seriously than thinking about the benefits of sexism reduction to women (hypothesis 4).

## **Study 2**

In study 2, I tested if men take sexism confrontations by females more seriously when thinking about the greater good of sexism reduction than when not. I focused attention on how *men* benefit from sexism reduction, a strong manipulation of the greater good. If men react negatively to female confronters because they think confrontations are overreactions intended to benefit women, then when thinking about how their own group benefits from such efforts, they should take these confrontations more seriously. I test whether manipulating the greater good increases perceived seriousness and decreases internal attributions for confrontations.

Participants listed a benefit to men or women of reducing sexism against women and then read about a female or male who confronted a coworker's sexist statements. I predicted that men would take the female confronter less seriously than the male confronter when thinking about how women benefit from sexism reduction. When thinking about how men benefit from sexism reduction, on the other hand, I expected men to take male and female confronters equally

seriously. I predicted that women would take confrontations equally seriously regardless of the manipulation and confronter gender (hypothesis 4).

Although perceived self-interest and group-interest did not mediate the effect of gender on perceived seriousness in studies 1 and 1b, they were included in addition to perceived overreacting in study 2 as manipulating the greater good may demonstrate that these attributions play a role in reactions to confrontations. Given that internal attributions may be difficult to measure, this design may have significant advantages over a mediation design. When a manipulation has an effect on a proposed mediator and outcome variable, there is evidence of a moderation of process (Spencer et al., 2005).

## **Method**

### **Participants**

Participants were 224 (157 female, 67 male;  $M = 18.95$  years,  $SD = 1.29$  years) U.S. born undergraduates at the University of Washington, recruited via the online subject pool for partial course credit. They were mostly White/European American (45.5%) and Asian/Asian American (37.5%). Each other race made up less than 6.7% of the sample.

### **Design**

The study used a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (help prompt: Help Women vs. Help Men) between-subjects design.

### **Procedure**

Participants completed the study in MediaLab (Jarvis, 2006) on individual computers in groups of up to eight. Participants were randomly assigned to a Help prompt, in which they wrote about how decreasing sexism could be helpful to women (Help women prompt) or to men

(Help men prompt). Participants were then randomly assigned to read an essay depicting a male or a female confronting a man's sexist statements and completed questionnaires about the essay.

### **Help prompt**

To manipulate the greater good, participants completed an open-ended "thought listing survey" in which they were prompted to, "Write out one way that decreasing sexism against women is helpful to [*women/men*]. What benefit do [*women/men*] get from decreasing sexism?" The help women prompt served as a control condition, intended to align with men's assumption that anti-sexist actions are beneficial to women. The help men prompt was intended to manipulate the greater good by drawing men's attention to how people like them (i.e., men) could benefit from the confronter's actions and thus draw attention away from how the female confronter's actions might be an overreaction helpful only to her own gender group.

### **Confrontation Scenarios**

Participants read an essay in which the writer described confronting a male coworker's sexism. A writer profile manipulated the confronter to be a female ("Rachel") or a male ("David"). The essay was adapted from Kahn, Barreto, Kaiser, and Rego (under review):

I was having lunch at a restaurant with a bunch of people I work with one afternoon. Two of the guys were talking and I heard one of them, who is a supervisor at work, say to the other that he preferred to hire males instead of females at the company. He said that women are not as committed to the job as men and are too soft for the business world. I don't think he realized I could hear their conversation. I didn't like what he said. I told him what he said was offensive and sexist.

The only difference between conditions was the gender of the essay writer (i.e. the confronter). Participants then responded to a series of items about the essay.

## Measures

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree* and 7 = *Strongly Agree*).

**Manipulation check.** Two items assessed if the prompts manipulated perceptions of the beneficiaries of sexism reduction. Participants rated their agreement that sexism is mostly only a problem for women and that sexism is a problem for both men and women.

**Confrontation seriousness.** As one measure of the seriousness of the confrontation, 5 items assessed the extent to which the supervisor's statements were sexist. Participants rated their agreement that the supervisor: is prejudiced against women, was being sexist, was discriminating, and is sexist; and that his statements were sexist ( $\alpha = .89$ ).

As a second measure of the seriousness of the confrontation, 4 items assessed the credibility of the essay writer's confrontation. Participants rated their agreement that the essay writer's claims were: legitimate, credible, and accurate; and that other people would support the essay writer's claims ( $\alpha = .83$ ).

**Overreaction.** Five items adapted from Kaiser and Miller (2001) assessed the extent to which the confronter was overreacting. Participants rated their agreement that the writer seemed hypersensitive, irritating, argumentative, and like a complainer and a troublemaker ( $\alpha = .89$ ).

**Self-interest.** Six items assessed the extent to which the confronter was self-interested. Participants rated their agreement that the essay writer was trying help and benefit himself/herself, had a personal stake in the situation, was trying to make the world a better place for himself/herself, and that the essay writer's actions were intended to benefit and help himself/herself personally ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

**Group-interest.** Two items assessed the extent to which the confronter was group-interested. Participants rated their agreement that the essay writer was trying to benefit and help his/her gender group ( $\alpha = .82$ ).

**Demographics.** Participants provided their gender, age, race, and U.S. born status.

## Results

All dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (help prompt: help women vs. help men) Analysis of Variance. See Table 4 for correlations between measures and Table 5 for descriptive statistics.

### Manipulation Check

The help prompt did not predict participants' beliefs about the beneficiaries of sexism reduction. Regardless of prompt, participants agreed that sexism is mostly only a problem for women (help women:  $M = 4.47$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ; help men:  $M = 4.44$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ;  $F(1, 216) = .12$ , *ns*) and that that sexism affects both men and women (help women:  $M = 5.06$ ,  $SD = 1.43$ ; help men:  $M = 5.29$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ),  $F(1, 216) = .93$ , *ns*. As discussed below, the help prompts may not have successfully manipulated the beneficiaries of sexism.

### Seriousness of Confrontation

**Discrimination.** Replicating study 1, men ( $M = 5.18$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ) rated sexism less likely than women ( $M = 5.62$ ,  $SD = 1.17$ ),  $F(1, 216) = 6.42$ ,  $p = .012$ ,  $d = .39$  (hypothesis 1 supported). There were, however, no interactions between participant gender, confronter gender, and Help prompt,  $ps > .30$ .

To test *a priori* hypotheses, I nonetheless conducted separate two-way (confronter gender by help prompt) ANOVA for men and women. For men, the predicted two-way interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 63) = .03$ , *ns*. In the help women condition, men rated discrimination equally

likely for the female ( $M = 5.10$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ) and male ( $M = 5.25$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) confronters,  $F(1, 63) = .14$ , *ns*. This finding failed to replicate study 1, as men were expected to see more discrimination when a female confronted than when a male confronted (hypothesis 1a not supported). As predicted, in the help men condition, men rated discrimination equally likely whether the confronter was female ( $M = 5.06$ ,  $SD = 1.25$ ) or male ( $M = 5.32$ ,  $SD = .83$ ),  $F(1, 63) = .45$ , *ns*. As there was no difference in the control condition, however, the greater good manipulation did not reduce a discrepant reaction for men.

For women, as expected, the two-way interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 153) = .93$ , *ns*. There was, however, a marginal main effect of help prompt, such that women rate discrimination more likely in the help women condition ( $M = 5.78$ ,  $SD = .94$ ) than in the help men condition ( $M = 5.46$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ),  $F(1, 153) = 3.32$ ,  $p = .070$ ,  $d = .27$ . Thinking about how men benefit from sexism reduction lead women to report lower levels of discrimination. Women rated discrimination equally likely regardless of confronter gender in both the help women condition (female:  $M = 5.71$ ,  $SD = .88$ ; male:  $M = 5.88$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ;  $F(1, 153) = .42$ , *ns*) and the help men condition (female:  $M = 5.55$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ ; male:  $M = 5.36$ ,  $SD = 1.57$ ;  $F(1, 153) = .51$ , *ns*).

**Credibility.** There were no main effects or interactions on credibility,  $ps > .21$ . Results failed to replicate the main effect of participant gender and men's tendency to see female confronters as less credible than male confronters in study 1 (hypothesis 1 not supported).

To test *a priori* hypotheses, I again conducted separate two-way (confronter gender by Help prompt) ANOVA for men and women. For men, the predicted two-way interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 63) = .11$ , *ns*. In the help women prompt condition, men rated the female ( $M = 5.43$ ,  $SD = .96$ ) and male ( $M = 5.45$ ,  $SD = 1.65$ ) confronter to be equally credible,  $F(1, 63) = .00$ , *ns*. In the help men condition, they again rated the female ( $M = 5.28$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ) and male ( $M =$

5.49,  $SD = .79$ ) confronter to be equally credible,  $F(1, 63) = .30, ns$ . Although the results were as predicted for the help men condition, these data did not replicate study 1, as men saw female and male confronters as equally credible when thinking about how sexism reduction helps women (hypothesis 1a not supported).

For women, there was no two-way interaction as predicted,  $F(1, 153) = .39, ns$ . Women rated the confronter equally credible regardless of gender in both the help women condition (female:  $M = 5.67, SD = .73$ ; male:  $M = 5.41, SD = 1.36$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 1.15, ns$ ) and the help men condition (female:  $M = 5.71, SD = .90$ ; male:  $M = 5.67, SD = 1.24$ ;  $F(1, 153) = .03, ns$ ). The help prompt did not affect women's ratings of confronter credibility.

### **Internal Attributions**

**Overreaction.** Men ( $M = 3.46, SD = 1.27$ ) rated confronters to be overreacting more than did women ( $M = 2.90, SD = 1.09$ ),  $F(1, 216) = 8.70, p = .004, d = .47$  (supporting hypothesis 2). Additionally, participants rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.26, SD = 1.19$ ) to be overreacting more than the male confronter ( $M = 2.83, SD = 1.12$ ),  $F(1, 216) = 6.82, p = .010, d = .37$ . These main effects replicated study 1. No interactions reached significance,  $ps > .25$ .

To test *a priori* hypotheses, I conducted separate confronter gender by help prompt ANOVA for men and women. For men, the predicted two-way interaction was not significant ( $F(1, 63) = 1.48, ns$ ), but simple effects revealed the predicted patterns. In the help women condition, men rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.86, SD = 1.28$ ) to be overreacting marginally more than the male confronter ( $M = 2.94, SD = 1.33$ ),  $F(1, 63) = 3.83, p = .055, d = .70$ . In the help men condition, men rated the female ( $M = 3.44, SD = 1.36$ ) and male ( $M = 3.30, SD = 1.07$ ) confronters to be overreacting equally,  $F(1, 63) = .10, ns$ . When men thought about how women benefit from sexism reduction, they saw the female confronter to be overreacting more than the

male confronter. When they thought about how men benefit from sexism reduction, however, they saw the male and female confronter to be overreacting equally.

Women rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.07$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ) to be overreacting more than the male confronter ( $M = 2.70$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ),  $F(1, 153) = 4.42$ ,  $p = .037$ ,  $d = .34$ . However, as predicted, there was no interaction,  $F(1, 153) = .00$ , *ns*. Women perceived no difference in overreacting based on gender in the help women condition (female:  $M = 3.13$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ; male:  $M = 2.76$ ,  $SD = 1.16$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 2.27$ , *ns*) or the help men condition (female:  $M = 3.00$ ,  $SD = .92$ ; male:  $M = 2.64$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 2.15$ , *ns*). The lack of interaction for women was expected, but the main effect of confronter sex was unexpected. Men, not women, were predicted to perceive overreacting differently based on confronter gender.

**Self-interest.** Male frontiers ( $M = 2.87$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ) were seen as less self-interested than female frontiers ( $M = 4.35$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ),  $F(1, 216) = 76.59$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.30$ . This effect was qualified by a three-way interaction between participant gender, confronter gender, and help prompt ( $F(1, 216) = 8.14$ ,  $p = .005$ ), which was decomposed by conducting confronter gender by help prompt ANOVA for men and women, respectively.

For men, there was a marginally significant interaction between confronter sex and help prompt,  $F(1, 63) = 2.99$ ,  $p = .089$ . Simple effects revealed that in the help women condition, men rated the female confronter ( $M = 4.67$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ ) to be more self-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.64$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ),  $F(1, 63) = 19.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.56$ . In the help men condition, men again rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.93$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ) to be more self-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.97$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ), but the size of this effect was reduced,  $F(1, 63) = 5.01$ ,  $p = .029$ ,  $d = .79$ . In the help women condition, the extent to which men perceived females to be more self-interested than males ( $d = 1.56$ ) was much greater than in the

help men condition ( $d = .79$ ). This change in effect size magnitude suggests that the help men prompt reduced the extent to which men thought the female was self-interested.

For women, there was an unexpected interaction between confronter sex and help prompt,  $F(1, 153) = 5.97, p = .016$ . Women rated the female confronter to be more self-interested than the male confronter in both the help women condition (female:  $M = 4.57, SD = 1.05$ ; male:  $M = 2.68, SD = .88$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 58.95, p < .001, d = 1.95$ ) and the help men condition (female:  $M = 4.12, SD = 1.25$ ; male:  $M = 3.08, SD = 1.09$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 18.03, p < .001, d = .89$ ). However, as with men, the size of the effect was larger in the help women condition ( $d = 1.95$ ) than in the help men condition ( $d = .89$ ). As women perceived females to be more self-interested than males in study 1, this result suggests that the help prompt reduced the extent to which women thought females were more self-interested than males.

**Group-interest.** Replicating study 1, participants rated the female confronter ( $M = 4.91, SD = 1.22$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.77, SD = 1.26$ ),  $F(1, 216) = 123.08, p < .001, d = 1.73$ . However, this main effect was qualified by the expected three-way interaction between participant gender, confronter gender, and help prompt,  $F(1, 216) = 7.76, p = .006$ . To break down this interaction, I conducted separate confronter gender by help prompt ANOVA for men and women.

For men, there was a main effect of confronter gender,  $F(1, 63) = 28.09, p < .001, d = 1.27$ . Men rated the female confronter ( $M = 4.53, SD = 1.31$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.83, SD = 1.36$ ). However, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between confronter gender and help prompt,  $F(1, 63) = 8.98, p = .004$ . In the help women condition, men rated the female confronter ( $M = 5.07, SD = .88$ ) to be group-interested more than the male confronter ( $M = 2.45, SD = 1.59$ ),  $F(1, 63) = 32.10, p < .001, d = 2.04$ . In the

help men condition, men rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ) to be no more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.06$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ),  $F(1, 63) = 2.86$ , *ns*. Men's belief that the female confronter was more group-interested than the male confronter was reduced when prompted to think about how sexism reduction benefits men.

For women, there was also a main effect of confronter gender,  $F(1, 153) = 149.91$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.96$ . Women rated the female confronter ( $M = 5.08$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ) to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.75$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ). However, there was no interaction between confronter gender and help prompt,  $F(1, 153) = .10$ , *ns*. Women rated the female confronter to be more group-interested than the male confronter in both the help women prompt condition (female:  $M = 5.03$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ; male:  $M = 2.76$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 71.38$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.88$ ) and the help men prompt condition (female:  $M = 5.12$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ; male:  $M = 2.73$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ;  $F(1, 153) = 78.61$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.03$ ). This finding replicates study 1 and demonstrates that the help prompt did not influence women's belief that female confronters are helping their group more than male confronters.

## Discussion

Study 2 tested whether drawing men's attention to how their group benefits from sexism reduction would lead them to take female confronters as seriously as they take male confronters. I expected that men would take female confronters less seriously when thinking about how women benefit from sexism reduction and that thinking about how men benefit would reduce this difference. Whether thinking of men or women as beneficiaries of sexism reduction, however, men rated confrontations equally credible and sexism equally likely for male and female confronters. Study 2 did not replicate study 1, as when thinking about women as beneficiaries of sexism reduction, men took female confronters as seriously as male confronters

(hypothesis 1a not supported). Although results were as predicted in the greater good condition, there was no evidence that thinking about the greater good reduced a tendency on the part of men not to take female confronters seriously (hypothesis 4 partially supported).

Study 2 did, however, replicate study 1 in other important ways. Compared to women, men took confronters less seriously (hypothesis 1 supported) and attributed confrontations to internal causes to a greater extent (hypothesis 2 supported). However, study 2 also revealed that men attribute women's confrontations less to internal causes when thinking of men as the beneficiaries of sexism reduction than when thinking of women as the beneficiaries of sexism reduction. The extent to which men see female confronters as more overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested than male confronters was lower when they considered the greater good of sexism reduction. As noted above and failing to support predictions, however, these reductions in internal attributions were not accompanied by a tendency for men to take female confronters more seriously (hypothesis 4 partially supported).

### **Benefits to Women as Default Assumption**

The design of this study may have contributed to the failure to replicate the key finding that men take female confronters less seriously than male confronters. Standard confrontations may lead to thoughts about how women benefit from confrontations, but *explicitly* drawing attention to these benefits, as in the control condition study 2, may change the way people think about these benefits. Perhaps, when prompted, participants thought about legitimate benefits of confrontation or focused on positive outcomes, rather than negative expectations that may be associated with complaining about bias. That is, when simply seeing a female confront, people may think about various ramifications of these actions (i.e., not just positive outcomes, but also tension that arises from confrontation, etc.) whereas when specifically drawn to how women

benefit, they may think more about the specific benefits of such actions. The help women prompt may thus not map on to natural responses to standard confrontations by female confronters. If both prompts led to considerations of the harmful effects of prejudice and the positive outcomes of reducing bias, there was no true control condition against which to compare the effect of the greater good (i.e., the help men prompt).

### **Definition of the Greater Good**

The strong definition of the greater good used in study 2 also deserves consideration in interpreting these results. The help men prompt focused on a limited aspect of the greater good, considering benefits to men, rather than benefits to men, women, and institutions. The limited scope of this definition may explain why women, unexpectedly, thought discrimination was *likelier* after the help women prompt than after the help men prompt. Women may have reacted negatively to this form of the greater good. To be taken seriously by men, confronters may need to confront for the greater good in a way that avoids leading to women reacting negatively, or else risk losing the support of members of their own group. As such, the greater good may necessarily have to include broader societal or institutional benefits when used in confrontations.

### **Responses to Prompts**

Manipulation checks suggested that participants' beliefs about who is affected by sexism did not differ due to help prompts. The prompts may not have manipulated perceptions of the beneficiaries of sexism reduction (i.e. the greater good). Coding participants' responses to these prompts gives insight into what participants actually thought upon completing these tasks.

As expected, when given the help women prompt, participants provided responses that aligned with standard benefits of prejudice reduction for women. I coded participants' responses for inclusion of benefits for women, including words or issues related to justice, equality, or

opportunities for women (e.g., financial, social, or occupational standing). More than 86% of responses included a societal benefit for women and many that did not include such benefits mentioned less concrete intrapersonal benefits, such as increased confidence and self-esteem, which could fit the broad construct of “benefits to women.” As such, most participants in the help women condition provided a response that tapped into the thinking expected of this design.

The help men prompt, however, did not succeed in priming the greater good. I coded responses for themes broadly related to the greater good, including benefits to men, men and women functioning together, benefits to institutions, and positive financial outcomes (e.g., sharing ideas and increased productivity). Only 55% of participants provided responses that fit the greater good (e.g., men get “more perspective and ideas,” “increase communication,” etc.). Others missed the mark. Of the remaining 45%, I noted a recurrent theme of blaming women, suggesting that a subset of participants thought about women perpetrating anti-sexist actions, rather than benefits related to equality.

I next coded responses for whether participants in the help men condition mentioned women being uncooperative or oppositional. About 30% of participants provided responses that portrayed women in a negative light (e.g., “women will be in a better mood,” “innocent men won’t be stereotyped as sexist,” etc.). The remaining 18% of participants provided other responses that did not fit the greater good, including claims of no benefit to men and that men would face fewer awkward situations. While the help men prompt brought to mind the greater good for about half of the sample, the remainder instead wrote about perceived problems caused by sexism, with some even negatively stereotyping women who confront. I could not reanalyze the data after removing male participants who provided such responses without losing the power to detect effects. Overall, the help prompts did not manipulate the greater good.

In sum, the non-replication of men's tendency to take female confronters less seriously than male confronters is disconcerting, but the methodological concerns outlined above suggest it is too early to dismiss study 1 findings. In study 3, I provided information about whether sexism reduction helps women or helps all people (i.e. the greater good). This manipulation has two advantages over the methods used in study 2 for examining the effect of the greater good. First, it controls the benefits of sexism reduction, rather than relying on participants to think up these benefits themselves. Second, it incorporates a broader definition of the Greater Good, rather than focusing on benefits to men.

### **Study 3**

Study 3 provided a second test of the greater good by presenting participants with information about whether reducing sexism benefits women or the greater good (hypothesis 4). I predicted that men who read that reducing sexism benefits women would take a female confronter less seriously than a male confronter, replicating study 1. Further, I predicted that men who read that reducing sexism benefits the greater good would take a female and male confronter equally seriously. Lastly, I predicted women would take confrontations seriously regardless of confronter gender and sexism reduction benefit.

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

Participants were 270 U.S. residents recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk in return for \$0.50. Three participants were dropped from analyses for not indentifying their gender. All other participants successfully completed an item that assured they were paying attention (i.e. "Mark a 2 for this item if you are paying attention") and were able to describe the scenario in the

essay. Analyses included 267 participants (129 female, 138 male,  $M = 30.33$  years,  $SD = 10.61$  years) who were mostly White/European American (77.5%; other backgrounds < 9% of sample).

## **Design**

The study used a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (benefit condition: standard vs. greater good) between-subjects design.

## **Procedure**

Participants completed an online survey in Qualtrics. They first read a manipulation of the benefits of reducing sexism and then a short essay depicting a male or female confronting a male's sexist statements. Participants then completed questionnaires about the essay (item order randomized) and, finally, received a debriefing statement outlining the intent of the study.

**Benefit conditions.** Participants were randomly assigned to a second set of instructions that manipulated the benefit of reducing sexism. The instructions in the standard condition read, "Based on our past work, we have found that decreasing sexism against women is important because it provides women with opportunities, helps them get better jobs, and allows them to get ahead in their careers." In the greater good condition, the beginning of these instructions was the same, but the reason given was instead that, "it provides men with opportunities to work with women in the workplace where they can collaborate on new and exciting ideas and makes companies more productive and innovative."

**Confrontation scenarios.** Participants received the essay from study 2 and were randomly assigned to an essay writer profile to manipulate gender of the confronter. Participants then responded to a series of questionnaires about the essay.

## **Measures**

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree* and 7 = *Strongly Agree*).

**Manipulation check.** Participants rated their agreement that decreasing sexism against women is helpful to men and women on a single item.

**Seriousness of confrontation.** Five items used in study 2 assessed the extent to which they perceived the perpetrator's actions to be sexist ( $\alpha = .94$ ) and four items used in study 2 assessed the extent to which they perceived the confronter to be credible ( $\alpha = .92$ ).

**Internal attributions.** The same items were used to measure internal attributions as in study 2. Five items assessed the extent to which the essay writer was overreacting ( $\alpha = .92$ ), six items assessed the extent to which the essay writer's actions were self-interested ( $\alpha = .91$ ), and two items assessed the extent to which the essay writer's actions were group-interested ( $\alpha = .91$ ).

**Demographics.** Participants provided their gender, age, race, and U.S. born status.

## Results

All dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (benefit condition: standard vs. greater good) between-subjects Analysis of Variance. See Table 6 for correlations between dependent measures and Table 7 for descriptive statistics.

### Manipulation Checks

If the manipulation of the greater good was successful, participants in the greater good condition should agree more that decreasing sexism against women benefits men and women than participants in standard condition. However, there was no main effect of benefit condition,  $F(1, 259) = .05, ns$ . There was, however, a main effect of gender,  $F(1, 259) = 9.70, p = .002, d = .38$ . Men ( $M = 5.30, SD = 1.58$ ) rated decreasing sexism against women as less beneficial than did women ( $M = 5.85, SD = 1.30$ ). The main effect was qualified by an interaction between participant gender and benefit condition,  $F(1, 259) = 7.21, p = .008$ .

To decompose the interaction, I looked at the effects of benefit condition for men and women separately. Men believed that decreasing sexism was *less* beneficial for men and women in the greater good condition ( $M = 5.07, SD = 1.74$ ) than in the standard condition ( $M = 5.56, SD = 1.36$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 4.37, p = .038, d = .31$ . Women, on the other hand, believed that decreasing sexism was marginally more beneficial for men and women in the greater good condition ( $M = 6.07, SD = 1.09$ ) than in the standard condition ( $M = 5.66, SD = 1.44$ ).  $F(1, 259) = 2.94, p = .088, d = .32$ . The instructions did not manipulate perceptions of the greater good as intended.

### **Seriousness of Confrontation**

**Discrimination.** As in studies 1 and 2, men ( $M = 5.55, SD = 1.37$ ) rated discrimination less likely than did women ( $M = 6.28, SD = .99$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 24.57, p < .001, d = .61$ . There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .15$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I computed separate two-way ANOVA between benefit and confronter sex for men and women.

For men, there was no interaction between benefit condition and confronter gender,  $F(1, 134) = .03, ns$ . Men rated discrimination equally likely regardless of confronter gender in the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.62, SD = 1.14$ ; male:  $M = 5.84, SD = 1.10$ ;  $F(1, 134) = .44, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.22, SD = 1.54$ ; male:  $M = 5.53, SD = 1.56$ ,  $F(1, 134) = .88, ns$ ). As expected, there was no interaction between benefit condition and confronter gender for women,  $F(1, 125) = .02, ns$ . Women rated discrimination equally likely regardless of gender in the standard condition (female:  $M = 6.30, SD = .83$ ; male:  $M = 6.21, SD = 1.14$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .14, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 6.34, SD = .71$ ; male:  $M = 6.30, SD = 1.18$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .02, ns$ ).

**Credibility.** Replicating studies 1 and 2, there was a main effect of gender such that men ( $M = 5.51, SD = 1.24$ ) rated confronters to be less credible than did women ( $M = 6.03, SD = .92$ ),

$F(1, 259) = 15.25, p < .001, d = .48$ . There were no other main effects or interactions and no three-way interaction of participant gender, confronter gender, and benefit condition,  $ps > .12$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I again computed separate two-way ANOVA between anti-sexism benefit and confronter sex for men and women.

For men, the expected interaction of benefit condition and confronter sex was not found,  $F(1, 134) = .17, ns$ . Regardless of confronter gender, men rated confronters equally credible in the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.49, SD = 1.24$ ; male:  $M = 5.68, SD = 1.21$ ;  $F(1, 134) = .37, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.25, SD = 1.30$ ; male:  $M = 5.61, SD = 1.23$ ;  $F(1, 134) = 1.53, ns$ ). For women there was no interaction of benefit condition and confronter gender,  $F(1, 125) = .01, ns$ . Women rated confronters equally credible in the standard condition (female:  $M = 6.06, SD = .78$ ; male:  $M = 5.94, SD = .85$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .31, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 6.16, SD = .81$ ; male:  $M = 6.00, SD = 1.17$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .44, ns$ ).

### **Internal Attributions**

**Overreaction.** Men ( $M = 2.88, SD = 1.62$ ) rated the confronter to be overreacting more than women ( $M = 2.17, SD = 1.29$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 16.01, p < .001, d = .48$ . Additionally, there was a marginal interaction between participant gender and benefit condition,  $F(1, 259) = 3.47, p = .064$ . Men rated the confronter to be overreacting slightly less in the standard condition ( $M = 2.68, SD = 1.40$ ) than in the greater good condition ( $M = 3.06, SD = 1.78$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 2.40, p = .122, d = .24$ , while women rated the confronter to be overreacting slightly more in the standard condition ( $M = 2.30, SD = 1.39$ ) than the greater good condition ( $M = 2.03, SD = 1.17$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 1.19, p = .28, d = .21$ . These marginal trends contradict expectations and suggest men reacted negatively to the greater good. No other main effects or interactions were significant ( $ps > .24$ ) and the predicted three-way interaction was not observed,  $F(1, 259) = 1.35, ns$ . I again conducted

separate two-way ANOVA between anti-sexism benefit and confronter gender for men and women, based on *a priori* predictions.

For men, the predicted interaction between benefit condition and confronter gender was not found,  $F(1, 134) = .60, ns$ . Regardless of gender, men rated the confronter to be overreacting equally in the standard condition (female:  $M = 2.67, SD = 1.37$ ; male:  $M = 2.71, SD = 1.47$ ;  $F(1, 134) = .01, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 3.27, SD = 1.85$ ; male:  $M = 2.88, SD = 1.73$ ,  $F(1, 134) = 1.04, ns$ ). For women, there was also no interaction,  $F(1, 125) = .80, ns$ . Women rated the male and female confronter to be equally overreacting in the standard condition (female:  $M = 2.39, SD = 1.40$ ; male:  $M = 2.20, SD = 1.40$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .37$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 1.90, SD = 1.04$ ; male:  $M = 2.12, SD = 1.27$ ;  $F(1, 125) = .43$ ).

**Self-interest.** As in studies 1 and 2, there was a main effect of confronter gender such that the female confronter ( $M = 4.69, SD = 1.18$ ) was rated more self-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.04, SD = 1.28$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 118.47, p < .001, d = 1.34$ . There were no other main effects or interactions and the predicted three-way interaction was not observed,  $ps > .09$ . To analyze *a priori* hypotheses, I again computed separate two-way ANOVA between anti-sexism benefit and confronter gender for men and women.

For men, there was no interaction between benefit condition and confronter gender,  $F(1, 134) = 2.14, ns$ . Men rated the female confronter more self-interested than the male confronter in the standard condition (female:  $M = 4.36, SD = 1.35$ ; male:  $M = 3.24, SD = 1.47$ ;  $F(1, 134) = 11.63, p = .001, d = .79$ ) and in the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.71, SD = 1.25$ ; male:  $M = 2.94, SD = 1.22$ ;  $F(1, 134) = 32.24, p < .001, d = 1.43$ ). For women, there was also no interaction for benefit condition and confronter gender,  $F(1, 125) = .93, ns$ . Women also rated the female confronter to be more self-interested than the male confronter in both the standard

condition (female:  $M = 4.92$ ,  $SD = .96$ ; male:  $M = 3.26$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ;  $F(1, 125) = 36.92$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.44$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.80$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ; male:  $M = 2.75$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ;  $F(1, 125) = 49.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.85$ ). Simple effects only confirmed the main effect of confronter sex on perceived self-interest. As in studies 1 and 2, women were perceived to be more self-interested than men.

**Group interest.** Replicating studies 1 and 2, there was a main effect of confronter gender such that the female confronter ( $M = 5.77$ ,  $SD = .99$ ) was rated more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.95$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ ),  $F(1, 259) = 317.23$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.22$ . No other main effects or interaction, including the predicted three-way interaction, were found, all  $F$ s  $< .76$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I again computed separate two-way ANOVA between benefit condition and confronter sex for men and women.

For men, counter to predictions, there was no interaction between benefit condition and confronter gender,  $F(1, 134) = .41$ , *ns*. Men rated the female confronter to be more group-interested than the male in the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.78$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ; male:  $M = 2.95$ ,  $SD = 1.66$ ;  $F(1, 134) = 76.20$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.06$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.51$ ,  $SD = .92$ ; male:  $M = 2.97$ ,  $SD = 1.57$ ;  $F(1, 134) = 67.20$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.97$ ). For women, there was also no interaction,  $F(1, 125) = .35$ , *ns*. Women rated the female confronter to be more group-interested than the male confronter in the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.97$ ,  $SD = .77$ ; male:  $M = 2.88$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ ;  $F(1, 125) = 101.89$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.59$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.81$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ; male:  $M = 2.98$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ;  $F(1, 125) = 75.57$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.12$ ). Simple effects thus confirmed that female sexism confronters are perceived to be more group-interested than male sexism confronters, as in studies 1 and 2.

## Discussion

Study 3 incorporated a more complete definition of the greater good than study 2 and a more controlled manipulation of the greater good. In study 3, men took female and male confronters equally seriously, again failing to replicate the key finding from study 1 (hypothesis 1a not supported). Although men also took female and male confronters equally seriously in the greater good condition, I was unable to assess the effectiveness of the greater good manipulation without the predicted difference in the standard condition (hypothesis 4 partially supported).

Study 3 did, however, provide evidence that men take confrontations less seriously than women. Men rated confrontation less credible and the perpetrator less sexist than did women (partially supporting hypothesis 1). Men also believed that the confronter was overreacting more than did women (partially supporting hypothesis 2). Additionally, both men and women believed that the female confronter was more self-interested and group-interested than the male confronter, replicating studies 1 and 2 (hypothesis 2a partially supported).

As manipulation checks failed, the manipulation may not have been strong enough or may not have been manipulating what it was intended to manipulate. However, after the study, most participants were able to report whether the instructions had portrayed women or men and organizations as the beneficiaries of sexism reduction. Additionally, benefit condition influenced participants' perceptions of overreacting. Men believed confronters were overreacting more than did women, but, counter to expectations, men also saw confronters as overreacting more when thinking about the greater good than when thinking about benefits to women (providing further evidence against hypothesis 4). I expected that the greater good would lead to reductions in perceived overreacting in men, but saw this pattern only with women. Men were particularly put-off by female confronters when thinking about the greater good, suggesting they were

unconvinced by the information they received. However, as the manipulation did not affect how seriously men took female versus male confronters, perceptions of overreacting were not tied to these reactions, as predicted based on study 1 (hypothesis 3).

The manipulation was intended to lead participants to consider the benefits of sexism reduction, but may also have created demand. Men may have recognized the intent of the manipulation, which instructed them to see sexism as bad. As such, men may have compensated for their tendency not to take confrontations seriously and tried to come across as anti-sexist by taking female confronters seriously. Indeed, mean scores for credibility and discrimination were higher in study 3 (see Table 7) than in study 2 (see Table 5) despite using the same stimuli. As such, it is possible that the manipulation may have created a ceiling effect on the main dependent variables, making it impossible to see variance in these scores.

Study 3 provided further evidence that men take confrontations less seriously than women, but was unable to demonstrate that thinking about the greater good helps men take confrontations by females as seriously as those by males. To demonstrate the benefit of the greater good, it may be necessary for men's attention to be drawn to how a specific confrontation benefits the greater good. Rather than telling men that sexism reduction is generally beneficial, it may be more effective to explain how the confrontation they witness benefits the greater good. Such a manipulation may also decrease demand characteristics and provide a form of the greater good that could be readily incorporated into strategies for confronting everyday bias. Study 4 tests reactions to confrontations that incorporate the greater good versus those that do not.

#### **Study 4**

When confronting sexism for the greater good, confronters label an action sexist and then explain how sexism reduction benefits men and organizations. When confronting sexism with a

standard confrontation, on the other hand, the confronter labels an action sexist without further explanation. Study 4 tested whether men take confrontations for the greater good by female sexism confronters as seriously as confrontations for the greater good by male confronters. If successful in reducing men's tendency to take female confronters less seriously than male confronters, as observed in study 1, confronting for the greater good could offer a practical strategy for challenging sexism. To test this possibility, I manipulated whether a male or a female undertook a standard or greater good confrontation. I hypothesized that men would take a female confronter less seriously than a male confronter when each undertook a standard confrontation (hypothesis 1a), but that men would take a female and male confronter equally seriously when each confronted for the greater good. Confrontation strategy and confronter gender were not expected to affect how seriously women took confrontations (hypothesis 4).

## **Method**

### **Participants**

Two hundred seventy (164 female, 106 male,  $M = 35.02$  years,  $SD = 12.58$  years) U.S. residents completed the study online on Qualtrics through Amazon's Mechanical Turk for \$0.25 or \$0.50. The sample was mostly White/European American (77.0%) with other backgrounds each making up no more than 9.6% of the sample.

### **Design**

The study used a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) between-subjects design.

### **Procedure**

Participants received an essay and an essay writer profile to manipulate confronter gender. In the standard condition, the essay was the same as study 3 (adapted from Kahn et al.,

under review). In the greater good condition, a statement of the greater good was appended to the end of the essay. The confronter said, “I pointed out that men benefit from having women at their company because gender diverse companies are more successful.” I intended this statement to draw on benefits to men and institutions (i.e. the full definition of the greater good). Participants were randomly assigned to an essay writer gender condition and to a confrontation condition and then completed questionnaires (item order randomized) about the essay.

### **Measures**

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree* and 7 = *Strongly Agree*).

**Manipulation check.** Participants rated their agreement first that sexism is mostly only a problem for women and then that sexism is a problem for both men and women.

**Seriousness of confrontation.** Using the same measures as study 2, five items assessed the extent to which participants believed the perpetrator’s actions were sexist ( $\alpha = .95$ ) and four items assessed the extent to which participants believed the confronter was credible ( $\alpha = .91$ ).

**Internal attributions.** Using the same measures as study 2, five items assessed the extent to which the essay writer was overreacting ( $\alpha = .93$ ), six items assessed the extent to which the essay writer’s actions were self-interested ( $\alpha = .91$ ), and two items assessed the extent to which the essay writer’s actions were group-interested ( $\alpha = .92$ ).

**Demographics.** Participants provided their gender, age, race, and U.S. born status.

### **Results**

All dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (participant gender) x 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) Analysis of Variance. See Table 8 for correlations between dependent measures and Table 9 for descriptive statistics.

### **Manipulation Check**

Participants in the greater good condition ( $M = 3.98$ ,  $SD = 1.94$ ) agreed less that sexism is only a problem for women than participants in the standard condition ( $M = 4.47$ ,  $SD = 1.91$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 5.69$ ,  $p = .018$ ,  $d = .59$ . There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .14$ . However, participants in the greater good ( $M = 5.49$ ,  $SD = 1.44$ ) and standard ( $M = 5.43$ ,  $SD = 1.53$ ) conditions did not differ in their belief that sexism affects both men and women,  $F(1, 261) = .18$ , *ns*. There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .32$ . While the confrontation manipulation broadened participants' beliefs about the effects of sexism, it seemed not to change their beliefs about the extent to which sexism affects men.

### **Reactions to the Confrontation**

**Discrimination.** As expected, men ( $M = 5.85$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ) rated discrimination less likely than women ( $M = 6.25$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 8.46$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $d = .35$ . However, this effect was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between confrontation type, confronter gender, and participant gender,  $F(1, 262) = 4.42$ ,  $p = .036$ . I thus computed separate two-way ANOVA between confrontation type and confronter sex for men and women.

For men, there was a marginally significant interaction between confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 102) = 3.34$ ,  $p = .071$ . In the standard condition, failing to replicate study 1, men rated discrimination equally likely for the female confronter ( $M = 5.72$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 5.89$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ),  $F(1, 102) = .27$ , *ns*. In the greater good condition, men rated discrimination likelier for the female confronter ( $M = 6.21$ ,  $SD = .81$ ) than for the male confronter ( $M = 5.54$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 4.35$ ,  $p = .040$ ,  $d = .62$ . Female confronters were *more successful than males* in drawing attention to discrimination in the greater good condition.

For women, on the other hand, there was a main effect of confronter gender ( $F(1, 160) = 5.72$ ,  $p = .018$ ), but no interaction between confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 160) =$

1.00, *ns*. In the standard condition, women rated discrimination equally likely for the female confronter ( $M = 6.16, SD = 1.14$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 6.40, SD = 1.01$ ),  $F(1, 160) = .98, ns$ . In the greater good condition, women rated discrimination *less* likely for the female confronter ( $M = 5.92, SD = 1.43$ ) than the male confronter ( $M = 6.49, SD = .61$ ),  $F(1, 160) = 5.66, p = .018, d = .52$ . Simple effects thus suggested that women saw more sexism when males confronted than when females confronted and that the gap in perceived discrimination was larger for confrontations for the greater good than standard confrontations.

**Credibility.** Men ( $M = 5.53, SD = 1.23$ ) rated the confrontation less credible than women ( $M = 5.89, SD = 1.21$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 4.90, p = .028, d = .29$ . There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .13$ . To test *a priori* hypotheses, I computed separate two-way ANOVA between confronter gender and confrontation type for men and women.

For men, there was no interaction between confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 102) = .12, ns$ . Men rated male and female confronters equally credible in the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.57, SD = 1.34$ ; male:  $M = 5.29, SD = 1.36$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .65, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.68, SD = 1.15$ ; male:  $M = 5.57, SD = 1.08$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .10, ns$ ). For women, there was also no interaction between confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 160) = 1.72, ns$ . Women rated confronters equally credible regardless of gender in the standard condition (female:  $M = 6.10, SD = 1.10$ ; male:  $M = 5.90, SD = 1.22$ ;  $F(1, 117) = .55, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.58, SD = 1.34$ ; male:  $M = 5.88, SD = 1.19$ ;  $F(1, 117) = 1.23, ns$ ). Neither confronter gender nor confrontation style affected the extent to which men and women believed a confrontation was credible.

### **Internal Attributions**

**Overreaction.** Men ( $M = 3.10$ ,  $SD = 1.71$ ) rated confronters to be overreacting more than did women ( $M = 2.05$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 29.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .70$ . Additionally, there was a participant gender by confronter gender interaction,  $F(1, 262) = 4.39$ ,  $p = .037$ . Men rated the female confronter ( $M = 2.85$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 3.01$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ) to be overreacting equally,  $F(1, 262) = .39$ , *ns*. Women, on the other hand, as expected for men, rated the female confronter ( $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = 1.32$ ) to be overreacting more than the male confronter ( $M = 1.74$ ,  $SD = .93$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 6.59$ ,  $p = .011$ ,  $d = .45$ . There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .23$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I computed separate two-way ANOVA between confronter sex and confrontation type for men and women, respectively.

For men, there was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation type,  $F(1, 102) = .19$ , *ns*. Men rated female and male confronters to be overreacting to the same extent in both the standard condition (female:  $M = 2.87$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ; male:  $M = 2.89$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .00$ , *ns*) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 2.84$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ; male:  $M = 3.14$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .46$ , *ns*). Neither confronter gender nor confrontation style affected men's ratings of overreacting (as in study 3). This result did not replicate studies 1 and 2, as men were expected to view women as overreacting more than men with standard confrontations.

For women, there was a main effect of confronter gender as noted above ( $F(1, 160) = 9.42$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $d = .45$ ), but there was no interaction of confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 160) = 1.33$ , *ns*. However, simple effects suggested that women responded differently to confrontations depending on the style in which they were presented. In the standard condition, women rated the female confronter ( $M = 2.03$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 1.69$ ,  $SD = .94$ ) to be overreacting to the same extent,  $F(1, 160) = 1.86$ , *ns*. In the greater good condition, on the other hand, women rated the female confronter ( $M = 2.53$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ ) to be overreacting

more than the male confronter ( $M = 1.79, SD = .92, F(1, 160) = 8.80, p = .003, d = .59$ ). It was women, not men, who reacted differently to male and female confronters, but confrontations for the greater good made them see female confronters as overreacting more than male confronters.

**Self-interest.** Male confronters ( $M = 2.95, SD = 1.24$ ) were seen as less self-interested than female confronters ( $M = 4.40, SD = 1.46, F(1, 262) = 70.84, p < .001, d = 1.07$ ). Men ( $M = 3.83, SD = 1.49$ ) also thought confronters were marginally more self-interested than did women ( $M = 3.55, SD = 1.55, F(1, 262) = 3.22, p = .074, d = .18$ ). There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .10$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I computed separate two-way ANOVA between confronter sex and confrontation style for men and women.

Men rated female confronters ( $M = 4.52, SD = 1.41$ ) to be more self-interested than male confronters ( $M = 3.17, SD = 1.27; F(1, 102) = 27.12, p < .001, d = 1.01$ ), but there was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation type,  $F(1, 102) = 2.07, ns$ . Simple effects confirmed the main effect of gender, as men rated female confronters more self-interested than male confronters in both the standard condition (female:  $M = 4.74, SD = 1.35$ ; male:  $M = 3.01, SD = 1.32; F(1, 102) = 21.64, p < .001, d = 1.30$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.33, SD = 1.44$ ; male:  $M = 3.35, SD = 1.21; F(1, 102) = 7.25, p = .008, d = .74$ ).

Women also rated female confronters ( $M = 4.31, SD = 1.50$ ) to be more self-interested than male confronters ( $M = 2.81, SD = 1.20, F(1, 160) = 48.70, p < .001, d = 1.10$ ). There was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation type ( $F(1, 160) = .71, ns$ ) and simple effects only confirmed the main effect of gender. Women rated female confronters to be more self-interested than male confronters in the standard condition (female:  $M = 4.40, SD = 1.59$ ; male:  $M = 2.73, SD = 1.17; F(1, 160) = 31.01, p < .001, d = 1.20$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.19, SD = 1.41$ ; male:  $M = 2.88, SD = 1.24; F(1, 160) = 18.57, p < .001, d = .99$ ).

For men and women, female confronters were seen as more self-interested than male confronters, but changes in effect size suggest confronting for the greater good may reduce the extent to which female confronters are seen to be more self-interested than male confronters.

**Group-interest.** Male confronters ( $M = 3.16$ ,  $SD = 1.80$ ) were seen as less group-interested than female confronters ( $M = 5.68$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ),  $F(1, 262) = 170.75$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.60$ . There were no other main effects or interactions,  $ps > .50$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I computed two-way ANOVA of confrontation type and confronter gender for men and women.

In keeping with the main effect of gender, men rated female confronters ( $M = 5.67$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ) to be more group-interested than male confronters ( $M = 3.09$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 82.82$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.80$ . However, the expected interaction between confrontation type and confronter sex gender not observed ( $F(1, 102) = .03$ , *ns*) and simple effects only confirmed the main effect of gender. Men believed female confronters were more group-interested than male confronters in both the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.56$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ; male:  $M = 2.95$ ,  $SD = 1.66$ ;  $F(1, 102) = 42.12$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.72$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.77$ ,  $SD = 1.17$ ; male:  $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ;  $F(1, 102) = 40.70$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.90$ ).

Women also rated female confronters ( $M = 5.68$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ) to be more group-interested than male confronters ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = 1.83$ ;  $F(1, 160) = 97.28$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.56$ ) and there was no interaction between confrontation type and confronter gender,  $F(1, 160) = .14$ , *ns*. Simple effects confirmed the main effect of gender. Women believed female confronters were more group-interested than male confronters in both the standard condition (female:  $M = 5.64$ ,  $SD = 1.42$ ; male:  $M = 3.26$ ,  $SD = 1.90$ ;  $F(1, 160) = 45.61$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.42$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 5.73$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ; male:  $M = 3.16$ ,  $SD = 1.78$ ;  $F(1, 160) = 51.73$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.70$ ). Female confronters were seen as more group-interested than males regardless of

confrontation style, suggesting that the perceived benefits of confrontation to the targeted group may be too salient to overcome with confrontation for the greater good.

### **Discussion**

Study 4 tested whether confronting for the greater good helps female confronters to be taken seriously by men. Results for this prediction were mixed. When a female confronted for the greater good, men believed the perpetrator was *more* sexist than when a male confronted for the greater good, but this pattern was not replicated with beliefs about credibility. It is also difficult to interpret this result as a success of the greater good, as men also took female and male confronters equally seriously in the standard confrontation condition (failing to support hypothesis 1a). Greater good confrontations also failed to reduce the extent to which men attribute confrontations by females to internal causes.

These data replicated previous studies in that men took confrontations less seriously than women. Men perceived less discrimination than women, while believing that confronters were more credible (supporting hypothesis 1). Men also believed confronters to be more overreacting and marginally more self-interested than women (partially supporting hypothesis 2). However, men and women both believed that the female confronter was more self-interested and group-interested than the male confronter, supporting earlier studies, but not hypothesis 2a.

### **Effects of the Greater Good**

Study 4 suggests that, to some extent, men may take women more seriously when they confront for the greater good. However, regardless of confrontation style, men perceived female confronters to be more overreacting and self-interested than male confronters. Study 1 suggested that the extent to which a female was seen to be overreacting mediated men's tendency not to take her seriously relative to a male confronter. Study 4, however, suggests that confrontations

for the greater good may not help overcome these assumptions about the internal causes for women's sexism confrontations. In this particular case, confronting for the greater good did not reduce the extent to which female confronters were seen to be self-interested and may even have led women to believe female confronters were overreacting to the situation.

Indeed, women overall saw more sexism when a male confronted than when a female confronted, driven by their tendency to see less sexism when a female confronted for the greater good than when a male confronted for the greater good. Women thus may react negatively to a female who confronts for the greater good, although this trend was not replicated with credibility and should be interpreted with some caution. Furthermore, compared to men, women saw females who confronted for the greater good to be more overreacting. It may be that greater good confrontations by women are perceived to be inauthentic or unrepresentative of the situation and may thus elicit negative reactions from women in certain situations. As these results were only marginally significant, further research is needed to better understand the conditions under which confronting for the greater good might harm women in the eyes of members of their group.

This study suggests that confronting for the greater good is a strategy that warrants further consideration for two reasons. First, it is important to establish whether this strategy can help targets of prejudice be taken seriously when they confront. Second, it is unclear whether the counterproductive outcomes of this strategy among women in study 4 were an anomaly or a sign that this strategy may backfire with the ingroup. One way to further explore the greater good is to examine it in the context of other forms of prejudice. To further test the perceived seriousness of confronting for the greater good, study 5 examined confronting racism for the greater good.

## Study 5

Study 5 tested whether confronting for the greater good helps Black confronters to be taken more seriously by Whites. Study 1b demonstrated that non-Black observers take Black confronters less seriously than White confronters, but did not clarify the process behind this effect. Study 1 suggested that overreacting mediated men's reactions to sexism confrontations by females relative to males, but study 1b did not include a measure of overreacting. As such, study 5 also tested whether Black confronters are perceived to be more overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested relative to White confronters and whether confronting for the greater good reduces Whites' tendency to make these internal attributions. I manipulated whether a White or Black confronter undertook a standard or greater good racism confrontation. I hypothesized that White participants would take a Black confronter less seriously than a White confronter who undertook standard confrontations (hypothesis 1b), but that White participants would take Black and White confronters who confronted for the greater good equally seriously (hypothesis 4a). As there are few Blacks in the U.S. population of Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), I was once again unable to examine the full model of reactions to racism.

## Method

### Participants

Participants were 130 U.S. residents recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk in return for \$0.50. I excluded data from 24 participants: 8 for confusing the races of the people in the essay, 1 for being unable to describe the content of the essay, and 15 who did not identify as White/European American. Analyses thus included 106 participants (59 female, 47 male,  $M = 34.61$  years,  $SD = 11.27$  years).

### Design

The study used a 2 (confronter race: White vs. Black) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) between-subjects design.

### **Procedure**

The materials and procedure were the similar to those used in study 4, but adapted to a racism confrontation. Participants received an essay writer profile of a 39-year old Black (“Sharonda”) or White (“Rachel”) female. Participants then read the following essay:

I was having lunch at a restaurant with a bunch of other parents one afternoon. Two of the mothers were talking and I heard one of them say to the other that it's not fair that some of the kids in our neighborhood have to be bussed to schools in other neighborhoods so that more minority kids can be bussed into our neighborhood school.

She said that it's too much of a hassle for kids in our neighborhood and that the quality of our neighborhood school has gotten worse since they started bussing minority students in.

I don't think she realized I could hear their conversation. I didn't like what she said. I told her what she said was offensive and racist.

In the standard condition, this was the entirety of the essay. In the greater good condition, I appended: “I said that school integration benefits White children because contact with minorities makes them more creative and improves their academic performance.” Participants were randomly assigned to an essay writer race condition and a confrontation condition and responded to questionnaires about the confronter (“the essay writer”) and the perpetrator (“the mother”).

### **Measures**

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1=*Strongly Disagree* and 7=*Strongly Agree*).

**Manipulation check.** To check if confrontation condition effectively changed construal of the benefits of racism reduction, participants rated their agreement first that racism is mostly only a problem for minorities and then that racism is a problem for both minorities and Whites.

**Seriousness of confrontation.** Five items assessed the extent to which the perpetrator's actions were racist (the mother: is prejudiced against minorities, was being racist, was discriminating, is racist and the mother's statements were racist;  $\alpha = .96$ ). The four items used in study 4 assessed the perceived credibility of the confronter's actions ( $\alpha = .92$ ).

**Internal attributions.** The same items from study 4 assessed the extent to which participants thought the confronter was overreacting (5 items;  $\alpha = .93$ ) and self-interested (6 items;  $\alpha = .86$ ). Two items assessed the extent to which the essay writer was group-interested (the essay writer was trying to benefit and help members of her racial group;  $\alpha = .78$ ).

**Demographics.** Participants provided their gender, age, race, and U.S. born status.

## Results

All dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (confronter race: White vs. Black) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) Analysis of Variance. See Table 10 for correlations between dependent measures and Table 11 for descriptive statistics.

### Manipulation Check

Confrontation style may not have manipulated the greater good. Participants rated racism as mostly a problem for minorities marginally more for the Black confronter ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 2.01$ ) than the White confronter ( $M = 2.85$ ,  $SD = 1.71$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 3.21$ ,  $p = .076$ ,  $d = .35$ . There were no other effects of race or confrontation type on this variable ( $F_s < .10$ ) or on the belief that racism is a problem for minorities and Whites ( $F_s < 2.44$ ). Participants were close to the midpoint in their agreement that racism is mostly a problem for minorities ( $M = 3.18$ ,  $SD = 1.89$ )

and tended to agree that racism is a problem for both minorities and Whites ( $M = 5.66$ ,  $SD = 1.40$ ), suggesting an awareness of the greater good of prejudice reduction.

### **Seriousness of Confrontation**

**Discrimination.** There were no main effects on discrimination ( $F$ 's  $< 2.93$ ), nor the predicted two-way interaction between confronter race and confrontation style,  $F(1, 102) = .26$ , *ns*. Based on *a priori* hypotheses, I computed planned contrasts. Participants rated discrimination equally likely regardless of confronter race in the standard condition (Black:  $M = 4.16$ ,  $SD = 1.66$ ; White:  $M = 4.56$ ,  $SD = 1.65$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .80$ , *ns*) and the greater good condition (Black:  $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ; White:  $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = 1.96$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 2.24$ , *ns*. The standard condition did not replicate study 1b, but the pattern of means was in the predicted direction, suggesting a trend such that participants saw more racism for a White confronter than a Black confronter, regardless of confrontation style. Unexpectedly, this perceived difference was larger in the greater good condition than it was in the standard condition.

**Credibility.** As in study 1b, the Black confronter ( $M = 4.53$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ) was perceived to be less credible than the White confronter ( $M = 5.23$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 7.02$ ,  $p = .009$ ,  $d = .51$ . However, the predicted interaction between confronter race and confrontation style was not observed,  $F(1, 102) = .61$ , *ns*. I computed planned contrasts based on *a priori* predictions. In the standard condition, participants rated the Black confronter ( $M = 4.64$ ,  $SD = 1.54$ ) as credible as the White confronter ( $M = 5.15$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 1.94$ , *ns*. However, in the greater good condition, participants unexpectedly rated the Black confronter ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ) to be *less* credible than the White confronter ( $M = 5.33$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 5.36$ ,  $p = .023$ ,  $d = .76$ . The Black confronter's low credibility relative to the White confronter was driven by a

difference in the greater good condition. The predicted beneficial effect of confronting for the greater good was not observed and this strategy may have harmed Blacks' credibility.

### **Internal Attributions**

**Overreaction.** There were no main effects on overreacting ( $F_s < 1.96$ ), nor an interaction of confronter race and confrontation style,  $F(1, 102) = .10, ns$ . Based on *a priori* hypotheses I computed planned contrasts. Perceived overreacting was unaffected by confronter race for both the standard condition (Black:  $M = 3.70, SD = 1.79$ ; White:  $M = 3.34, SD = 1.66$ ;  $F(1, 102) = .65, ns$ ) and the greater good condition (Black:  $M = 3.38, SD = 1.81$ ; White:  $M = 2.82, SD = 1.29$ ;  $F(1, 102) = 1.35, ns$ ). Counter to predictions based on study 1b, the Black confronter was not seen to be overreacting more than the White confronter in the standard condition.

**Self-interest.** The Black confronter ( $M = 4.01, SD = 1.14$ ) was seen as more self-interested than the White confronter ( $M = 3.40, SD = 1.31$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 7.45, p = .007, d = .50$ . This main effect was qualified by a marginal interaction of confronter race and confrontation type,  $F(1, 102) = 3.30, p = .072$ . Unexpectedly, in the standard condition, the Black confronter ( $M = 3.90, SD = 1.19$ ) and White confronter ( $M = 3.68, SD = 1.30$ ) were seen as equally self-interested,  $F(1, 102) = .46, ns$ . However, in the greater good condition, the Black confronter ( $M = 4.13, SD = 1.10$ ) was seen as *more* self-interested than the White confronter ( $M = 3.04, SD = 1.31$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 9.44, p = .003, d = .90$ . This result is counterintuitive, as the White confronter explicitly noted benefits to her group when confronting for the greater good. To the extent that one's group identity is tied to one's self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the White confronter who draws attention to benefits to Whites would be expected to be perceived as self-interested. These results again suggest a possible detrimental effect of confronting racism for the greater good.

**Group-interest.** The Black confronter ( $M = 4.89$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ) was seen to be more group-interested than the White confronter ( $M = 3.49$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 25.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .96$ . There was also a main effect of confrontation type, such that confronters in the standard condition ( $M = 3.80$ ,  $SD = 1.66$ ) were seen to be less group-interested than confronters in the greater good condition ( $M = 4.70$ ,  $SD = 1.40$ ),  $F(1, 102) = 10.29$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $d = .59$ . However, the predicted interaction of confronter race and confrontation style was not significant,  $F(1, 102) = .53$ , *ns*. I nonetheless examined *a priori* predictions using simple effects. The Black confronter was seen to be more group-interested in both the standard (Black:  $M = 4.59$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ; White:  $M = 3.02$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ;  $F(1, 102) = 18.42$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.07$ ) and greater good (Black:  $M = 5.26$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ; White:  $M = 4.09$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ) conditions,  $F(1, 102) = 8.51$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $d = .90$ . Unexpectedly, simple effects showed that confronting for the greater good lead to an overall *increase* in perceived group-interest.

## Discussion

Study 5 tested whether Whites take Black confronters and White confronters equally seriously when they confront racism for the greater good. Although there was no significant difference in perceptions of discrimination in the greater good condition, there was a trend such that participants saw less discrimination with the Black confronter than with the White confronter. Further, the Black confronter was seen as less credible than the White confronter in the greater good condition. As such, there was only mixed support for hypothesis 4a.

Results of study 1b were partially replicated, as White confronters tended to be taken more seriously than Black confronters. While discrimination was equally likely regardless of confronter race, trends suggested that discrimination might be seen as more likely for a White versus Black confronter. Furthermore, the Black confronter was perceived to be less credible

than the White confronter (supporting hypothesis 1b). Unexpectedly, however, this lower credibility was driven by judgments of the Black confronter in the greater good condition.

In terms of internal attributions about confronters, study 1b was partially replicated. There was no difference in perceived overreacting based on confronter race, although trends were in the right direction, but the Black confronter was seen to be more self-interested and group-interested than the White confronter, regardless of confrontation style (supporting hypothesis 2b). However, as with credibility, it was responses to the Black confronter in the greater good condition that drove perceptions that she was self-interested (not judgments in the standard condition as in study 1b). Study 5 thus demonstrated that confronting for the greater good may not help Blacks to be taken more seriously than Whites in terms of deflecting internal attributions made by Whites about their confrontations.

Confronting racism for the greater good might even backfire among the very people it is intended to positively influence. Confronting for the greater good led to Black confronters losing credibility and being seen as more self-interested by White observers. One possible reason for these responses is that the confrontation was perceived to be an inauthentic statement. If the confrontation for the greater good was seen to be strategic and self-beneficial when undertaken by the Black confronter, it could harm credibility. It may be that a subtler greater good confrontation that draws attention to the situation while avoiding drawing attention to the confronter's intentions might be more effective. Thus, the greater good may have advantages by drawing less attention to a confronter's efforts to deflect negativity.

Another problem with this study is that the stimuli may not have captured the benefits of confronting racism for the greater good. Perceptions of self-interest and group-interest may not lead Whites to question Blacks' confronters when racism is blatant, as depicted in the essays

used in this study. If racism is obvious, observers may not think a confronter is simply self-interested, so confronting style would have little effect on perceptions of racism. However, the data seem not to support this possibility, as ratings of racism were close to the midpoint of the scale. If participants considered the racism presented in the essay blatant, I would expect for ratings of perceived racism to be on the higher end of the scale. As the racism was instead perceived to be moderate, it is unlikely the type of racist event depicted explains these results.

The stimuli may also have been problematic, as a stereotypically Black name was included (“Sharonda”) to manipulate race. Such stereotypic names may convey not just race, but high racial identity or low socioeconomic status. It is possible that these factors influenced the extent to which the confronter would be perceived to be internally motivated to confront prejudice differently than race alone. The use of images (with stimulus sampling) or subtler manipulations of race would have better measured how race alone influences reactions.

Study 5 did not provide support for the greater good hypothesis. Instead, confronting for the greater good had negative ramifications and thus may not be a viable strategy for opposing racist actions, at least in this form. This study also failed to demonstrate that targets of prejudice are not taken seriously when confronting prejudice, as perceptions of racism were no lower when Blacks confronted than when Whites confronted. Given that the effect observed in studies 1 and 1b was not replicated in four further studies, study 6 sought replication of this effect using same stimuli used in study 1.

### **Study 6**

Study 6 incorporated a manipulation of the greater good into stimuli adapted from study 1 in order to better understand if effects were specific to these stimuli, suggesting a boundary condition for the effect, or instead if these effects occurred by chance. Study 6 attempted to

replicate study 1 by examining if men take female confronters less seriously than male confronters. It also tested if confronting for the greater good helps men take female confronters seriously. Men read about a male or female who confronted a teacher's sexism with a standard or greater good confrontation. I predicted that men would take a female confronter less seriously than a male confronter in the standard condition, while in the greater good condition men would take the female and male confronter equally seriously (hypothesis 4).

## **Method**

### **Participants**

Eighty-two male participants ( $M = 22.99$  years,  $SD = 6.09$ ) were recruited on the University of Washington campus. Most identified as White/European American (62.2%) or Asian/Asian American (12.2%). Other groups each made up less than 8.5% of the sample.

### **Design and Procedure**

This study was a 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) between-subjects design. Participants read an article adapted from study 1, in which either a male ("Anthony") or female ("Amanda") student teacher confronted a teacher's sexist behavior. The student teacher outlined how the teacher's actions were harmful to female students (standard condition) or to the entire class, including male students (greater good condition). Confrontation style was manipulated in the final statement of the essay (standard condition: "Female students lose out by not having their voices heard. They get low participation grades and that lowers their overall grade in the class"; greater good condition: "The whole class loses out by not hearing female students' voices. Male and female students would benefit if everyone's ideas contributed to class discussions.") Participants were randomly assigned to confronter and confrontation conditions and completed questions about the article.

## Measures

All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1=*Strongly Disagree* and 7=*Strongly Agree*).

**Seriousness of confrontation.** Participants completed 3 items assessing discrimination (the likelihood the teacher discriminated against his female students, the extent to which the teacher is prejudiced against women, and the extent to which the teacher intended to discriminate;  $\alpha = .81$ ) and 4 items assessing credibility (the likelihood students would support the claim, and how credible and accurate was the information presented;  $\alpha = .77$ ).

**Internal attributions.** Single items assessed the extent to which the student teacher was overreacting and trying to benefit himself/herself and members of his/her gender group.

**Demographics.** Participants provided their gender, age, and race.

## Results

All dependent variables were analyzed with a 2 (confronter gender) x 2 (confrontation: standard vs. greater good) Analysis of Variance. See Table 12 for correlations between dependent measures and Table 13 for descriptive statistics.

### Seriousness of Confrontation

**Discrimination.** Men rated discrimination as likely when a female confronted ( $M = 4.45$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ) as when a male confronted ( $M = 4.61$ ,  $SD = .98$ ),  $F(1, 78) = .46$ , *ns*,  $d = .16$ . There was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation condition on discrimination,  $F(1, 78) = .00$ , *ns*. Nonetheless, based on *a priori* hypotheses, I examined simple effects. Men rated discrimination equally likely regardless of gender in both the standard condition (female:  $M = 4.52$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ; male  $M = 4.67$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ );  $F(1, 78) = .21$ , *ns*,  $d = .14$ ) and, as expected, the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = .98$ ; male:  $M = 4.54$ ,  $SD = .99$ );  $F(1, 78) = .25$ , *ns*,  $d = .16$ ). The standard condition did not replicate study 1.

**Credibility.** Men rated the confrontation equally credible when a female confronted ( $M = 4.65$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ) as when a male confronted ( $M = 4.89$ ,  $SD = 1.04$ ),  $F(1, 78) = .79$ , *ns*,  $d = .22$ . There was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation condition on credibility,  $F(1, 78) = 1.43$ , *ns*. Nonetheless, based on *a priori* hypotheses, I examined simple effects. Men saw the confronter as equally credible regardless of gender in the standard condition (female:  $M = 4.60$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ; male:  $M = 5.12$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ;  $F(1, 78) = 2.31$ ,  $p = .133$ ,  $d = .49$ ) and the greater good condition (female:  $M = 4.71$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ; male:  $M = 4.63$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ;  $F(1, 78) = .04$ , *ns*,  $d = .07$ ). Examining effect sizes, in the standard condition, means trended toward replicating study 1, while there was no such trend in the greater good condition. However, men perceived the male confronter as *less credible* in the greater good condition than in the standard condition.

### **Internal Attributions**

**Overreaction.** Men rated the female confronter ( $M = 3.15$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 2.97$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ) as equally overreacting,  $F(1, 78) = .28$ , *ns*,  $d = .13$ . Confronter gender and confrontation condition did not interact to predict overreacting,  $F(1, 78) = .33$ , *ns*. I nonetheless explored *a priori* hypotheses with simple effects. There were no gender differences in overreacting in the standard condition (female:  $M = 3.13$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ; male:  $M = 2.78$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ;  $F(1, 78) = .63$ , *ns*,  $d = .25$ ), failing to replicate study 1, or in the greater good condition (female:  $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = 1.40$ ; male:  $M = 3.19$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ;  $F(1, 78) = .00$ , *ns*,  $d = .01$ ).

**Self-interest.** Men rated the female ( $M = 2.72$ ,  $SD = 1.42$ ) and male confronter ( $M = 2.44$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ) to be equally self-interested,  $F(1, 78) = .72$ , *ns*,  $d = .19$ . There was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation style on self-interest,  $F(1, 78) = .00$ , *ns*. I nonetheless explored *a priori* hypotheses with simple effects. There were no gender differences in self-interest in the standard condition (female:  $M = 2.56$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ; male:  $M = 2.33$ ,  $SD =$

1.41;  $F(1, 78) = .41$ , *ns*,  $d = .15$ ) or, as predicted, in the greater good condition (female:  $M = 2.83$ ,  $SD = 1.59$ ; male:  $M = 2.56$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ;  $F(1, 78) = .31$ , *ns*,  $d = .17$ ). In both conditions, means were in the direction predicted for the standard condition.

**Group-Interest.** The female confronter ( $M = 4.96$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ) was perceived to be more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = 2.12$ ),  $F(1, 78) = 17.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .93$ . There was no interaction between confronter gender and confrontation style on group-interest,  $F(1, 78) = 2.43$ ,  $p = .12$ . To test *a priori* hypotheses, I examined simple effects. As in previous studies, in the standard condition, the female confronter ( $M = 5.21$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ) was seen as more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 2.84$ ,  $SD = 2.22$ ),  $F(1, 78) = 17.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.27$ . In the greater good condition, men rated the female confronter ( $M = 4.70$ ,  $SD = 1.84$ ) to be only marginally more group-interested than the male confronter ( $M = 3.63$ ,  $SD = 2.00$ ),  $F(1, 78) = 3.13$ ,  $p = .08$ ,  $d = .57$ . Confronting for the greater good reduced the extent to which men saw a female confronter to be more group-interested than a male confronter. The greater good confrontation did not just decrease group-interest for female confronters, but also increased group-interest for male confronters. Although not predicted, this trend makes sense, as males who confronted for the greater good explicitly noted how their actions might benefit other men, but makes the change in the size of this effect difficult to meaningfully interpret.

## Discussion

Study 6 sought to demonstrate the efficacy of confronting for the greater good in getting men to take female sexism confronters as seriously as male sexism confronters. As predicted, men took female confronters who confronted for the greater good as seriously as male confronters who confronted for the greater good. Regardless of confronter gender, men rated discrimination equally likely and the confronter equally credible when confronting for the greater

good. However, unlike in study 1, men also took female confronters just as seriously as male confronters in the standard confrontation condition (failing to support hypothesis 1a). As such, the results cannot be interpreted as a success of the greater good with any certainty (failing to support hypothesis 4).

Men also did not attribute confrontations by females more to internal causes than confrontations by males. Men saw female confronters to be no more overreacting or self-interested than male confronters. The trend for overreacting was in the right direction and may have been significant with a larger sample size. Study 1 was only replicated in that the female confronter was perceived to be more group-interested than the male confronter (partially supporting hypothesis 2a). Interestingly, while the female confronter was seen as more group-interested than the male confronter in the greater good condition, the size of this effect was smaller than in the standard condition. However, in the greater good condition, male confronters were seen as *more* group-interested than in the standard condition. Given that the male confronting for the greater good explicitly noted benefits to males, this effect is not surprising. However, it suggests that the reduced effect size in the greater good condition relative to the standard confrontation condition may overestimate the extent to which confronting for the greater good benefits female confronters.

Study 6 demonstrated that men took female confronters as seriously as male confronters. It did not provide support for the prediction that confronting for the greater good is beneficial for female confronters. Although with a larger sample size, replication may have been observed, this study was yet another failure to replicate the effect of confronter gender on perceived seriousness found in studies 1 and 1b.

## **Meta-Analysis of Studies**

To further explore the results in this dissertation with increased power, I conducted meta-analyses combining results from each study to examine 5 hypotheses using the random-effects model suggested by Field and Gillett (2010).

### **Meta-Analysis 1 (Hypothesis 1)**

To assess whether men took sexism confrontations more seriously than women, I created a composite score of perceived discrimination and perceived credibility based on studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 (See Table 14 for scale reliabilities and descriptive statistics). I combined the effect sizes (Cohen's  $d$ ) for these measures. The meta-analysis, with 894 participants, revealed a medium effect of participant gender on the extent to which a confrontation was taken seriously ( $d = .47, z = 6.67, p < .001$ ), confirming that men take confrontations less seriously than women.

### **Meta-Analysis 2 (Hypothesis 2)**

To assess whether men see sexism confronters as overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested to a greater extent than women, I combined effect sizes (Cohen's  $d$ ) for each of these measures from studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 (See Table 14 for descriptive statistics). The meta-analysis, with 894 participants, revealed a large effect of gender on the extent to which a confrontation was attributed to overreacting ( $d = .56, z = 7.98, p < .001$ ), but no effect for self-interest ( $d = .07, z = 1.08, p = .28$ ) or group-interest ( $d = .01, z = .19, p = .85$ ). This result suggests that men see confronters as overreacting more than women, but no more self-interested or group-interested.

### **Meta-Analysis 3 (Hypothesis 1a and 1b)**

To assess whether perpetrating group participants (i.e. men, non-Blacks) take confrontations by allies more seriously than confrontations by targets of prejudice, I combined effect sizes (Cohen's  $d$ ) for the composite discrimination and credibility from the non-Greater

Good conditions of studies 1, 1b, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (See Table 14 for scale reliabilities and descriptive statistics). The analysis of 365 participants revealed a medium effect of confronter group membership on the extent to which members of the perpetrating group took confrontations seriously ( $d = .34, z = 3.20, p = .001$ ). Members of the perpetrating group took confrontations by allies more seriously than confrontations by targets of prejudice. A power analysis suggested that a sample of 220 participants (110 per group) would be required to detect this effect ( $d = .34$  with power of 0.80 and  $\alpha = .05$ ; Lenth, 2006-9). This analysis helps explain why the small sample sizes of studies in this dissertation revealed null effects in contrast to the meta-analysis.

#### **Meta-Analysis 4 (Hypotheses 2a and 2b)**

To assess whether perpetrating group participants attribute confrontations by targets of prejudice more to internal causes than they do confrontations by allies, I combined effect sizes (Cohen's  $d$ ) for measures of overreacting, self-interest, and group-interest from the non-Greater Good conditions of studies 1, 1b, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (See Table 14 for descriptive statistics). There were 305 participants for overreacting (not assessed in study 1b) and 365 participants for self-interest and group-interest. The meta-analysis revealed no effect of confronter group membership on overreacting ( $d = .18, z = 1.21, p = .23$ ), but large effects of confronter group membership on self-interest ( $d = .59, z = 3.00, p = .003$ ) and group-interest ( $d = 1.39, z = 11.26, p < .001$ ). Members of the perpetrating group do not see targets of prejudice as overreacting more than allies when they confront. Furthermore, while members of the perpetrating group see targets of prejudice as more self- and group-interested than allies who confront, these results are not particularly interesting, as participants in the studies throughout this dissertation who were members of the targeted group also tended to demonstrate similar tendencies.

#### **Meta-Analysis 5 (Hypotheses 4 and 4a)**

To assess whether perpetrating group participants (i.e. men, non-Blacks) take confrontations by targets of prejudice as seriously as they take confrontations by allies when thinking about the greater good, I combined effect sizes (Cohen's  $d$ ) for the composite of discrimination and credibility from the Greater Good conditions of studies 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (See Table 14 for scale reliabilities and descriptive statistics). The analysis, with 247 participants, revealed there was no effect of confronter group membership on the extent to which perpetrating group participants took greater good confrontations seriously ( $d = .16, z = .87, p = .38$ ). As predicted, members of the perpetrating group took targets of prejudice and allies equally seriously when they confronted for the greater good.

### **Summary**

These meta-analyses suggest that the lack of some effects in individual studies in this dissertation may be a result of a lack of power. Meta-analysis 1 and 2 simply confirmed that men take confrontations more seriously than women, and believe confronters are overreacting more, as was observed in individual studies. Similarly, meta-analysis 4 simply confirmed expectations for internal-attributions. More importantly, however, meta-analysis 3 suggested that high status participants took confrontations by allies more seriously than confrontations by targets of prejudice, while meta-analysis 5 suggested that this effect was no longer observed with confrontations for the greater good. These meta-analyses thus suggest that the initial hypotheses that confronting for the greater good may indeed be an effective strategy for targets of prejudice. Thus, the confrontation for the greater good hypothesis warrants further consideration, and this dissertation provides guidelines with respect to the power needed for testing this hypothesis.

### Chapter 3: General Discussion

This dissertation examines whether targets of prejudice are taken less seriously than allies when they confront prejudice. I hypothesized that members of the perpetrating group would take confrontations less seriously than members of the targeted group (hypothesis 1) and that they would take confrontations by targets of prejudice less seriously than confrontations by allies (hypotheses 1a and 1b). Why might this be the case? I predicted that members of the perpetrating group would attribute confrontations to internal causes more than would members of the targeted group (hypothesis 2) and that they would make internal attributions more for targets of prejudice who confronted than for allies who confronted (hypotheses 2a and 2b). The extent to which members of the perpetrating group made internal attributions was predicted to mediate the extent to which they took confrontations by targets of prejudice less seriously than confrontations by allies (hypotheses 3 and 3a). Finally, I examined whether members of the perpetrating group who were made aware of the *greater good* of prejudice reduction would be less prone to attributing confrontations by targets of prejudice to internal causes and more likely to take their confrontations seriously (hypotheses 4 and 4a).

#### **Do Perpetrating Groups take Confrontations by Targets of Prejudice Seriously?**

Five studies demonstrate that men take sexism confrontations less seriously than women, regardless of confronter gender. Relative to women, men believed perpetrators to be less sexist (studies 1, 2, 3, and 4) and confrontations to be less credible (studies 1, 3, and 4), supporting hypothesis 1. A meta-analysis across studies confirmed this result (meta-analysis 1). Past research suggests that female sexism claimants, relative to male sexism claimants, risk being viewed as hypersensitive complainers when they draw attention to sexism (Eliezer & Major, 2012). This dissertation, on the other hand, suggests that sexism confronters *regardless of gender*

may also face a different challenge. When it comes to confronting sexism, both female and male confronters may struggle to get men to take their confrontations seriously. As such, when men or women confront sexism in the presence of other men, it may be unlikely that they will find an ally to support their perspective. This finding is discussed in greater detail below.

Based on the individual studies in this dissertation, the gender of the confronter seemed to matter less in men's reactions to confrontations than I predicted. Three of seven studies in this dissertation supported the prediction that members of perpetrating groups take confrontations by targets of prejudice less seriously than confrontations by allies (hypotheses 1a and 1b). In study 1, men took female confronters less seriously than male confronters (hypothesis 1a supported). Men perceived a male perpetrator's actions to be less sexist and a confrontation to be less credible when a female confronted than when a male confronted. Women, on the other hand, took confrontations equally seriously regardless of confronter gender. Despite this evidence in support of hypotheses, four follow-up studies cast doubt on the finding. In the control conditions of these studies (studies 2, 3, 4, and 6), men took female confronters just as seriously as male confronters. Men saw the perpetrators' actions as no less sexist and confrontations as no less credible when a female confronted than when a male confronted (failing to support hypothesis 1a). These results suggested that men may take confrontations equally seriously, regardless of confronter gender. However, the meta-analysis combining all relevant studies suggested that, instead, it might be that these studies were simply underpowered. Indeed, combining the results of 7 studies, I found that members of the perpetrating group take standard confrontations by allies more seriously than standard confrontations by targets of prejudice (meta-analysis 3).

Results for studies in this dissertation exploring sexism align with results from a paper published after data collection for this dissertation was complete. Gulker, Mark, and Monteith

(2013) demonstrate that the gender of a sexism confronter has no influence on how *perpetrators* react to being confronted about their own sexist behavior. Participants in their study completed a measure purported to reveal that they held sexist attitudes and were then confronted, receiving information ostensibly from the researcher that explained that their attitudes contributed to pervasive sexism and that they should change these attitudes. Participants' acceptance of this confrontation and attitudes toward the confronter were unaffected by the gender of the confronter. This result suggests that perpetrators of sexism take confrontations no less seriously whether undertaken by a female confronter or a male confronter. Based on this work and the null findings in this dissertation (studies 2, 3, 4, and 6), it would seem that members of the perpetrating group who observe confrontations may also react no differently based on the group to which a confronter belongs. However, the meta-analysis instead suggests that perhaps the effect of confronter status on the extent to which members of the perpetrating group take them seriously may instead be small and difficult to capture without a large sample size.

Results for individual studies on racism confrontations aligned more closely with predictions. In study 1b, non-Black observers tended not to take Black confronters seriously relative to White confronters. Participants perceived a White perpetrator's biased actions to be less racist and the confrontation to be less credible when the confronter was Black than when the confronter was White. These findings were partially replicated in study 5, as White participants perceived a Black confronter to be less credible than a White confronter. However, these participants also rated the White perpetrator's actions to be equally racist regardless of the confronter's race (hypothesis 1b partially supported). As such, these studies provide tentative evidence that confronter race may play a role in how members of the perpetrating group react to racism confrontations. The meta-analysis confirmed this effect.

Overall, there was evidence that members of the targeted group were taken less seriously than members of the perpetrating group. However, the effects may be stronger with reactions to racism confrontations than to sexism confrontations. This possibility makes sense, as racism is generally considered more offensive and prejudicial than sexism (Rodin et al., 1990). Indeed, perpetrators are more amused by accusations of sexism than accusations of racism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), suggesting that they take sexism confrontations less seriously than racism confrontations. It may take more evidence to acknowledge that a behavior is racist than to acknowledge that a behavior is sexist (and relatively harmless in the eyes of many). This possibility is supported by research published after data collection for this dissertation was complete, which suggests that while people react more negatively to poor arguments against racism by Blacks than those same arguments by Whites, this difference in reactions is not seen when a stronger argument is made against racism (Schultz & Maddox, 2013). Indeed, there is a higher bar to clear for Blacks to confront racism without suffering negative backlash.

Why else might male sexism confronters not have as big an advantage over female sexism confronters as White racism confronters have over Black racism confronters? As sexism confrontations are not taken very seriously (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), it may be that men's sexism confrontations are simply dismissed just as easily as women's confrontations. As people do not see sexism as particularly problematic, there is little reason to take sexism confrontations seriously regardless of who confronts. Racism, on the other hand, makes Whites feel guilty and awkward (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). As such, racism confrontations may remind Whites of these feelings, especially when undertaken by a Black confronter. As such, Whites may feel compelled to engage in defensive behaviors to reduce these aversive feelings and may be especially likely to downplay confrontations by Blacks. That is, by not taking Blacks' racism

confrontations seriously, Whites can avoid feeling guilty by suggesting that racism did not occur, a motivation that does not exist in response to sexism confrontations.

Furthermore, there may also be different intentionality inferred about men who confront sexism than Whites who confront racism. Men may be perceived to be acting as “knights in shining armor,” benevolently protecting women from harm, perhaps even with romantic intentions underlying their actions (see Glick & Fiske, 1996). If such assumptions are made, confrontations by males may not be taken very seriously. No such assumptions are likely to be made about Whites confronting racism, making it less likely that these confrontations not be taken seriously. For the reasons, it makes theoretical sense that the status of a sexism confronter matters less in how seriously confrontations are taken than it does for racism confrontations.

### **Do Perpetrating Groups Fail to Take all Confrontations Seriously?**

Members of the perpetrating group may simply tend not to take confrontations seriously, regardless of who confronts. Perhaps the most consistent finding across these studies was that men take confrontations less seriously than women (Studies 1, 1b, 2, 3, 4, and 5; meta-analysis 1; supporting hypothesis 1). This trend occurred regardless of the confronter’s gender and the strategy he or she used to confront and was confirmed by meta-analysis. I did not test whether members of other perpetrating groups (e.g., Whites) also take confrontations less seriously than members of targeted groups (e.g., Blacks) due to the population from which samples were drawn. However, it would make sense that members of perpetrating groups *in general* would have trouble taking confrontations seriously, as they tend to be unaware of the extent to which prejudice is a problem and affects the lives of groups targeted by prejudice (Nelson et al., 2013; Pettigrew, 1989). Indeed, relative to women, men fail to recognize derogatory comments about women as sexist (Rodin et al., 1990) and are reluctant to find in favor of a female plaintiff who

claims to have experienced prejudice (Blodorn, O'Brien, & Kordys, 2012). This dissertation suggests that further research should focus on when and why members of perpetrating groups fail to take confrontations seriously.

### **Confrontations by Targets of Prejudice Attributed to Internal Causes**

I provide some evidence that members of perpetrating groups tend to attribute prejudice confrontations to internal causes to a greater extent than do members of the targeted group. Men in my studies believed that confronters were overreacting more than did women, regardless of the gender of the confronter (studies 1, 2, 3, and 4; meta-analysis 2). However, men and women did not differ in their belief that confronters were self-interested or group-interested. Hypothesis 2 was supported for perceptions of overreacting, but not self-interest or group-interest and this was confirmed via the meta-analysis of all relevant studies.

I also provide evidence that members of perpetrating groups may attribute confrontations by targets of prejudice to internal causes more than for confrontations by allies. I predicted that men would see female confronters as overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested more than male confronters. Study 1 supported this prediction with perceptions of overreacting. Men believed that female confronters were overreacting more than male confronters. Men also believed that female confronters were more self-interested and group-interested than male confronters, but this effect was not specific to men. Rather, men and women both believed female confronters to be more self-interested and group-interested than male confronters (studies 1, 2, 3, 4). Meta-analysis combining relevant studies confirmed that high-status participants believed targets of prejudice were more self-interested and group-interest than allies (meta-analysis 4). There was no effect for overreacting. Hypothesis 2a was thus supported.

I also predicted that non-Black people would perceive Black confronters to be more overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested than White confronters (hypothesis 2b). While Black confronters tended to be seen as overreacting more than White confronters in study 5, this pattern was not significant, failing to replicate the results observed with reactions to female sexism confronters. Non-Black participants did, however, perceive a Black confronter to be more group-interested (studies 1b and 5) and self-interested (study 5; White participants only) than a White confronter, aligning with results of the meta-analysis (meta-analysis 4, as described above). Study 5 thus provides evidence that White people attribute confrontations by Black confronters to internal causes more than confrontations by White confronters. Hypothesis 2b was thus partially supported. As no Black participants were included in these studies, however, we cannot be sure that this tendency is specific to non-Black people and would not also be seen for Black people. Further, the full model suggested for sexism confrontations could not also be tested with racism confrontations in these studies.

An important caveat must be made about the measures of internal attributions across these studies. In some studies, measures consisted of only a single item, while in other studies scales comprised multiple items, but lacked reverse-coded items. Single items and lack of reverse coding can be problematic in that people may have a general tendency to agree with statements (Cronbach, 1950). As such, it is possible that our measure is less precise than ideal because of acquiescence to item wording. Additionally, the lack of reverse scored items may have prevented participants from closely attending to items (Cronbach, 1950). Despite this caveat, these studies suggest that members of the perpetrating group may blame confrontations on causes internal to confronters who belong to the targeted group. Attribution theory suggests that possible external causes will be ignored when an action is seen to emerge from internal

causes (Kelley, 1973). As such, it follows that members of the perpetrating group might take confrontations less seriously as a result of these attributions.

### **Does Perceived Overreacting Lead Confrontations Not to be Taken Seriously?**

I predicted that men would take female confronters less seriously than male confronters to the extent that they perceived them to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested (hypothesis 3). In study 1, moderated mediation suggested the possibility that to the extent that men thought the female confronter was overreacting, they took her less seriously than the male confronter (i.e. saw the perpetrator as less sexist and the female confronter as less credible). Perceptions of self-interest and group-interest, on the other hand, did not mediate the effect of confronter gender on perceived seriousness (hypothesis 3 partially supported). However, men consistently saw confronters as overreacting more than did women, while also taking their confrontations less seriously (studies 1, 2, 3, and 4). As such, it may be that to the extent men believe a confronter is overreacting they are less likely to take the confrontation seriously.

In study 1b, mediation analysis suggested that perceived self-interest and group-interest also did not explain the tendency not to take Black confronters seriously. As no measure of overreacting was included in study 1b, whether Black confronters are taken less seriously to the extent they are seen to be overreacting is unknown. Study 1b thus did not support predictions (hypothesis 3a) and the mechanism behind the reactions to Black confronters is unclear. Study 5 did demonstrate that, when faced with standard confrontations, Whites tend to take Black confronters less seriously than White confronters, while also seeing them as overreacting more than White confronters. However, these trends were not statistically significant. These data offer no evidence of a direct relationship between perceptions of overreacting and the extent to which Whites take Black racism confronters seriously.

It may be that the role of perceived overreacting in explaining reactions to confrontations is specific to sexism confrontations. Women are stereotyped as more sensitive and emotional than men (Glick & Fiske, 1996), while no such stereotype exists of Blacks (Devine & Elliot, 1995). As such, that female confronters are seen to be reacting out of proportion to the situation relative to male confronters may simply be a result of gender stereotypes, rather than a consistent reaction to targets of prejudice who confront. Whether targets of other forms of prejudice are also perceived to be overreacting when they confront thus remains an empirical question.

### **Comparing Reactions to Targets of Prejudice and Allies**

Why did the individual studies fail to support hypotheses when past work has shown that targets of prejudice are derogated more than allies for drawing attention to prejudice (Eliezer & Major, 2012; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010)? While meta-analysis captured these effects, there may be key elements in past work that were not accounted for in the individual studies in this dissertation, beyond simple issues of power. Some possibilities are discussed below.

#### **Claims versus Confrontations**

Eliezer and Major (2012) showed that a male who claimed that another man was sexist was viewed more positively than a female who made the same claim. In the vignette used in that study, a manager tells a woman that she was denied a grant because, “like most women... she is not assertive and [is] too emotionally involved with clients” (Eliezer & Major, p. 5). In the vignette, a male or female who overheard the manager’s explanation later consoles the woman, stating that the explanation was sexist. Note that this person does not *confront* sexism, but instead states *after the fact* that the boss’s blatantly prejudicial statement was sexist. Claims and confrontations may thus elicit distinct reactions. For example, because confrontations do not fit stereotypes of women as passive (Glick & Fiske, 1996), it may be that women who confront

prejudice are taken more seriously than women who claim prejudice. That is, people may think that a woman would only act non-passively if she were truly instigated to do so. On the other hand, because people may believe a man would generally be unaware of sexism (Pettrigrew, 1998), any effort to draw attention to sexism by a man, whether a claim or a confrontation, might be taken seriously. As such, the gender gap in perceptions of confrontations may be smaller than the gender gap in perceptions of claims, although this idea is speculative and has not yet been tested. Additionally, although participants in Eliezer and Major reacted more negatively to a woman who made a sexism claim than to a man who made a claim, there was no evidence that they actually took the claim less seriously. As such, it is possible that the derogation of prejudice claimants simply does not translate to taking claims less seriously and thus may not provide a basis for predicting that confrontations should be taken less seriously.

### **Possible Design Limitations**

Rasinski and Czopp (2010), on the other hand, focused on confrontation. They demonstrated that a White racism confronter is taken more seriously than a Black racism confronter. In their study, participants watched a video in which a White woman was confronted by either a Black or White confronter for opposing policies that address racial inequalities. Participants rated the White perpetrator's statement as more racist and unacceptable when the confronter was White than when the confronter was Black. Thus, the Black confronter was taken less seriously than the White confronter, as predicted in this dissertation (hypothesis 1b).

However, Rasinski and Czopp (2010) differed from the studies in this dissertation in several important ways. Confronters in their study challenged a person who spoke out against affirmative action, a policy that explicitly benefits Blacks. The Black confronter was thus supporting a policy *explicitly* designed to help her group, so perceptions of self-interest and

group-interest were salient. As such, the White confronter may have seemed particularly selfless and thus gained favor relative to the Black confronter in terms of credibility, increasing the size of a possible effect. This explanation would suggest a boundary effect for taking allies more seriously than targets of prejudice. Specifically, targets of prejudice may only be taken less seriously than allies when they confront racism that directly affects them, whether that be prejudice directed at them individually or policies that impact their opportunities. If this were the case, confrontation may be like any other form of persuasive arguing, as self-interested arguments are less persuasive than arguments that oppose self-interest (Eagly et al., 1978).

Of course, it may simply be that the vignette method used in this dissertation is not appropriate for capturing the effect. Rasinski and Czopp (2010) may have had fewer demand effects and greater mundane realism in their studies, as they provided participants with videos rather than vignettes. Not only did my design require that I explicitly draw attention to the race or gender of confronters in order to manipulate the group to which they belonged, but many of the items to which participants responded explicitly called out racism as an issue in the study, potentially increasing demand and decreasing the size of the effect. People are motivated not to express prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998). With my design, participants may have recognized that reacting negatively to a target of prejudice who confronts bias could be seen as prejudice on their part. As such, participants in my studies may have compensated for this risk by responding more positively to a target of prejudice who confronted than they might in real life. The ambiguous nature of the bias and the more realistic stimuli in Rasinski and Czopp may have prevented participants from doing the same.

As controlling prejudice takes cognitive energy, however, it may be meaningful that the only studies in this dissertation that suggested that targets of prejudice are not taken seriously

were those that took place during mass testing or on campus. When completing a series of studies under time pressure (i.e., mass testing) or trying to quickly complete a survey between classes on campus, participants may not have had the energy and motivation to control their responses. Perhaps, on the other hand, those who completed the study online or in the lab had the time and resources to be able to control their responses. This explanation might account for participants who completed the study in the lab, surrounded by peers and with the knowledge that the experimenter was nearby (thus increase the desire to control prejudice responding). However, it is unlikely to explain the results of participants who completed the study online (i.e., Amazon's Mechanical Turk). The anonymous nature of data collection online should, in theory, have *increased* willingness to report prejudice (Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003). Nonetheless, other, subtler approaches to measurement may be more effective than self-report measures in testing my predictions. Future studies exploring how members of the perpetrating group react to confrontations should measure difficult to control and subtle behavioral responses that might manifest in reactions to confrontations (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002).

### **Pursuing Small Effects**

Another possibility is that any effect of confronter group on how seriously confrontations are taken is simply smaller than might be assumed based on past work. Although some results of individual studies in this dissertation aligned with published data, most were null findings. It is reasonable to ask whether these null findings might be considered evidence that the proposed effect is smaller than expected. Published research that shows differences in reactions to targets of prejudice and allies may represent anomalously large effects (Rosenthal, 1979). There may be unpublished work that fails to support these results or perhaps suggests a small effect. Unfortunately, such data would not be easily available for consideration, as the scientific

publication process places such high value on significant results over interesting failures to replicate or explorations of variance in effect size (Rosenthal, 1979; Schooler, 2011).

Indeed, these published results probably represent a meaningful and replicable effect that is just smaller than expected (Schooler, 2011). Any number of potential explanations exists for follow-up work finding effects smaller than what would be expected based on early publications. With a new body of research, there may be a bias toward seemingly big effects, as researchers are most likely to publish these sexy effects without first replicating consistently and being sure the effect does not get smaller with repetition (i.e., regress to the mean). These effects may thus be more difficult to capture than expected and may require large sample sizes or specific methodological or analytical approaches in order to emerge. This is not to suggest that researchers have been unethical in publishing their data. Rather, it suggests that the null individual results presented in this dissertation could represent anything from methodological problems to a lack of sufficient power to important boundary conditions for replicating published effects. Targets of prejudice are taken less seriously than allies when they confront, but the variability in effects across these studies suggests that further exploration of the size of these effects and the potential for important moderator variables of the effects should to considered.

### **Confronting for the Greater Good**

I proposed confronting for the greater good as a strategy to help targets of prejudice be taken seriously when they confront. By explaining how all people (not just targets of prejudice) benefit from prejudice reduction, these confrontations aim to draw attention to external causes of confrontation (i.e. prejudice). This dissertation suggests that confronting for the greater good – at least in the form tested here – may help in getting confrontations to be taken seriously and may sometimes even be taken *less* seriously than standard confrontations.

## **Confronting Sexism for the Greater Good**

*Seriousness of confrontation.* Building on study 1, I predicted that focusing men on how reducing prejudice helps the greater good would lead them to take female and male confronters equally seriously. Women were expected to take confrontations equally seriously regardless of confronter gender or the perceived benefits of sexism reduction (hypothesis 4). To test this prediction, I tried to prime the greater good first by having participants list benefits of sexism reduction to men versus benefits to women (study 2) and then by presenting them with the benefits of sexism reduction for men versus benefits for women (study 3). Across two studies, men and women took male and female confronters equally seriously regardless of whether they thought about the benefits of sexism reduction to men or women (hypothesis 4 not supported).

To more directly test the hypothesis that focusing on the greater good could make men take female confronters as seriously as male confronters, I manipulated the content of sexism confrontations so that the confrontation either did or did not communicate that reducing sexism benefits the greater good (studies 4 and 6). In study 4, consistent with hypotheses, men took females' confrontations for the greater good just as seriously as males' confrontations. However, this result cannot be considered a success of the greater good, as men also took females' standard confrontations just as seriously as males' standard confrontations. Confronting for the greater good also failed to have the predicted effect on men's perceptions of the female confronter's overreacting, self-interest, and group-interest. Further undermining predictions, a follow-up study produced null results for all dependent variables as a function of confrontation style (study 6). Overall, studies 2, 3, 4, and 6 thus did not support the prediction that thinking about the greater good would reduce men's tendency to take females' sexism confrontations less seriously than males' sexism confrontations. However, meta-analysis suggested that my failure to capture

these effects may have been the result of a lack of power. Indeed, combining results across studies, I found that high-status participants tended to take standard confrontations by targets of prejudice less seriously than standard confrontations by allies (meta-analysis 3), but that this difference disappeared with confrontations for the greater good (meta-analysis 5).

*Internal attributions.* Another way that confronting for the greater good could get men to take confrontations more seriously is to reduce their tendency to make internal attributions for confrontations. Men might then acknowledge external causes of these confrontations (e.g., prejudice). Studies 2 and 3 provided some evidence for this possibility. In study 2, men's tendency to attribute confrontations by female confronters to overreacting more than confrontations by male confronters was eliminated when they first thought about how men benefit from sexism reduction. While this result suggested that the greater good might help decrease internal attributions on behalf of targets of prejudice who confront, the effect was not replicated in study 3. In study 2, thinking about benefits to men also decreased the extent to which the female confronter was perceived to be more group-interested than the male confronter by both men and women. For men, a similar effect was found for perceived self-interest. However, study 3 did not replicate these effects. Although in study 1 perceptions of overreacting mediated the extent to which men took female confronters less seriously than male confronters, there was no evidence that decreases in these internal attributions about female confronters' actions translated into meaningful differences in how they perceived female confronters. Thinking about the benefits of sexism reduction to men did not lead men to take confrontations more seriously. As such, there was only inconsistent evidence that confronting for the greater good might help men take confrontation more seriously (failing to support hypothesis 4).

### **Confronting Racism for the Greater Good**

I also predicted that, while non-Black participants would take confrontation by a Black confronter less seriously than confrontation by a White confronter, they would take a racism confrontation for the greater good equally seriously regardless of confronter race (hypothesis 4a). However, there was no difference in perceived racism based on confronter race or confrontation style in study 5. The White confronter was seen as more credible than the Black confronter regardless of whether she confronted for the greater good or undertook a standard confrontation. Confronting for the greater good did not reduce perceptions that the Black confronter was overreacting, self-interested, or group-interested. Hypothesis 4a was not supported based solely on data from individual studies on racism, but again was supported by meta-analysis combining all relevant studies regardless of type of prejudice confronted (meta-analyses 3 and 5).

The evidence presented in these studies suggests that confronting for the greater good may help targets of prejudice to be taken more seriously (hypotheses 4 and 4a).

### **Exploring Backlash Against the Greater Good**

Interestingly, confronting for the greater good seemed to backfire for Blacks who confronted racism in one study. When Blacks undertook standard confrontations in study 5, they were taken no less seriously than White confronters. However, Blacks who confronted racism for the greater good were seen as less credible and more self-interested than White confronters.

Why did an effort to draw attention to how the perpetrating group might benefit from confrontation lead members of that group to react more negatively to the confrontation? It may be that in this form, the greater good seems like a disingenuous effort to “soften the blow” of impending criticism. If members of the perpetrating group see confrontation for the greater good as a strategy to make them react less negatively to criticism, they may be defensive when they hear statements for the greater good without hearing the specific criticisms that follow. Members

of the perpetrating group may thus never think about what compelled the confronter to challenge prejudice (i.e., the external causes) and instead jump to blaming the confronter (i.e., the internal cause). This dissertation does not provide insight into these possibilities. Further work should explore other forms of the greater good, perhaps including more interpersonal and moral consequences of prejudice reduction than instrumental benefits, as well as other strategies for safely and effectively confronting prejudice.

### **Future Directions**

More than a decade ago, Major et al. (2000) called for social psychologists to research strategies for effectively confronting prejudice. To my knowledge, little such work has emerged since that time. Future research should build on promising directions in this work.

### **Confronting to Reduce Perceived Overreacting**

In this dissertation, I have suggested that one approach to confronting effectively might be to draw witnesses' attention to the external causes of confrontation (e.g., the act of prejudice) in order to reduce the tendency to attribute confrontation to causes internal to the confronter. In one study in this dissertation, the belief that a confronter was overreacting predicted the tendency of members of perpetrating groups not to take confrontations seriously. Strategies that address perceptions of overreaction may thus help confronters to be taken more seriously.

If observers are made aware of the severity of prejudice being confronted, they may be less likely to see these efforts as overreactions. In this dissertation, I focused on conveying the belief that a statement was unacceptable rather than on explaining *why* it was unacceptable and hurtful. If confronters can successfully convey answers to these questions, it may help increase credibility by making their confrontation seem less like an emotional reaction (i.e., overreaction) and come across more as a rationally constructed argument against prejudice. One such strategy

might involve clearly detailing the behaviors of concern prior to labeling them prejudice. If the confronter can identify specific problematic behaviors that help support a system of inequality and bias, they may be able to communicate how small changes in these behaviors can change this system. Indeed, the stronger the argument against prejudice, the less likely a target of prejudice is to suffer negative responses to their confrontation (Schultz & Maddox, 2013).

Another such strategy might involve downplaying the extent to which a confronter is seen to be someone who chronically overreacts to situations. When actions are attributed to internal causes rather than external causes, they may be seen as reflecting a personality trait of the actor rather than the situation (Kelley, 1973). By explaining that one's confrontation is unique to an incident rather than a common occurrence, the confrontation may be taken more seriously. This possibility is supported by research showing that when self-identified feminist women claim discrimination, they are thought to be complaining and the instigating actions seen as less prejudiced than when non-Feminist identified women make the same claims (Roy et al., 2009). Confronters might explain how a specific behavior is particularly hurtful or pervasive and convey that their action is intended to change that specific behavior, rather than to globally criticize members of the perpetrator's group. Confronters' goal should be to prevent observers from assuming that their confrontation represents their ongoing tendency to overreact and instead to get observers to recognize the need not to repeat the specific behavior being confronted.

### **Confronting to Boost Self-Worth**

One problem with conveying criticisms about a behavior may be the tendency for the perpetrator to feel threatened by the confrontation. Stone et al. (2011) demonstrated the role of self-worth in predicting responses to confrontations. Their research demonstrated that affirming perpetrators reduces their tendency to respond negatively to confrontation. In their study,

participants who were encouraged to think about how they treated someone fairly that week were more likely to want to interact with a confronter who criticized their behavior than participants who were not asked such affirming questions prior to reading about the confrontation. This research suggests that perpetrators' negative reactions to confrontations may be driven by threats to their self-worth. As such, strategies that augment the self-worth of witnesses from the perpetrating group may also reduce their tendency to react against being confronted.

Research should explore how such affirmation can be incorporated into confrontations in order to reduce backlash against confrontation from both perpetrators and witnesses. To achieve this goal, confrontations may need to be framed as a dialogue rather than a statement of criticism. If confrontations can encourage perpetrators and witnesses to think about their important values prior to labeling a behavior as prejudice, it may serve to boost self-worth and increase receptiveness to criticism. An added advantage of this strategy is that it may be able to take advantage of cognitive dissonance in the form of a disconnect between a perpetrator's ideals and actions or a witness's ideals and failure to act in order to create behavioral change and support for the confrontation. Further research is needed to explore how confrontations can include such affirming information in order to reduce negative reactions to confrontations.

### **Conclusion**

I have provided evidence that members of the perpetrating group do not take confrontations seriously, but tend to take those by allies more seriously than those by targets of prejudice. I suggest that the tendency to attribute confrontations by targets of prejudice to internal causes, rather than blaming perpetrators for provoking these efforts, may in part drive the tendency not to take confrontations seriously. Despite the inconsistencies in this research, it suggests that confronters—regardless of their group—may find their efforts are met with

skepticism from members of the perpetrating group. This dissertation also suggests that confronting for the greater good – at least in terms of drawing attention to the instrumental benefits of prejudice reduction for groups other than the targets of prejudice – may have potential in terms of helping confronters to be taken more seriously. There remains a fundamental need to further explore strategies for confronting in order to provide targets of prejudice and allies who are willing to stand up to injustice with tools to effectively confront perpetrators in a way that will be taken seriously by those witnessing such confrontations.

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## Appendix: Tables

*Table 1: Correlations between variables (Study 1)*

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.61***	-.42***	-.14	.08
2. Credibility	.60***	--	-.43***	-.11	-.04
3. Overreaction	-.46**	-.43**	--	-.38**	.14
4. Self-interest	-.02	-.19	.27*	--	.43***
5. Group-interest	-.08	-.28*	.20	.31*	--

*Note.* Correlations for women above the diagonal, for men below the diagonal  
\* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

*Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Study 1)*

	Male Confronter	Female Confronter	
<b>Discrimination</b>			
Men	4.86 (.91)	4.43 (.81)	4.66 (.89)
Women	4.99 (1.05)	4.95 (.82)	4.97 (.94)
	4.94 (.99)	4.75 (.85)	4.85 (.93)
<b>Credibility</b>			
Men	4.62 (.92)	4.15 (.97)	4.40 (.96)
Women	4.96 (.76)	4.72 (.93)	4.84 (.85)
	4.82 (.84)	4.50 (.98)	4.67 (.92)
<b>Overreaction</b>			
Men	3.44 (1.05)	4.24 (1.48)	3.83 (1.32)
Women	2.87 (1.30)	3.13 (1.00)	3.00 (1.17)
	3.10 (1.23)	3.56 (1.32)	3.33 (1.29)
<b>Self-Interest</b>			
Men	3.41 (1.31)	3.72 (1.57)	3.56 (1.43)
Women	2.81 (1.30)	3.67 (1.24)	3.24 (1.33)
	3.05 (1.32)	3.69 (1.37)	3.37 (1.38)
<b>Group-Interest</b>			
Men	3.44 (1.80)	5.48 (1.29)	4.42 (1.87)
Women	2.76 (1.64)	5.62 (1.31)	4.15 (2.06)
	3.03 (1.73)	5.56 (1.30)	4.26 (1.99)
<b>Participants (n)</b>			
Men	n = 28	n = 25	
Women	n = 41	n = 39	

*Note.* Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. Means with matching superscripts are significantly different from each other,  $ps < .05$ .

Table 3: Correlations between Variables and Descriptive Statistics (Study 1b)

	<u>Correlations</u>				<u>Means (Standard Deviations)</u>		
	1.	2.	3.	4.	White Confronter	Black Confronter	Overall
1. Discrimination	--	.45***	-.10	.11	4.83 (1.04)	4.32 (0.66)	4.57 (.91)
2. Credibility		--	-.01	.02	4.80 (1.30)	4.07 (1.08)	4.43 (1.24)
3. Self-Interest			--	.08	3.17 (1.31)	3.45 (1.66)	3.31 (1.49)
4. Group-Interest				--	4.30 (1.95)	5.30 (1.44)	4.80 (1.77)
					n = 30	n = 30	

Note. \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 4: Correlations between variables (Study 2)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.50***	-.35***	-.07	.03
2. Credibility	.27*	--	-.29***	-.09	-.04
3. Overreaction	-.30*	-.35**	--	.24**	.10
4. Self-interest	.05	-.30*	.37**	--	.69***
5. Group-interest	.03	-.28*	.27*	.79***	--

Note. Correlations for women above the diagonal, for men below the diagonal  
 \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (Study 2)

	Male Confronter		Female Confronter		
	Help Women	Help Men	Help Women	Help Men	
<b>Discrimination</b>					
<b>Men</b>	5.25 (1.12)	5.32 (.83)	5.10 (1.23)	5.06 (1.25)	5.18 (1.10)
<b>Women</b>	5.88 (1.01)	5.36 (1.57)	5.71 (.88)	5.55 (1.13)	5.62 (1.17)
	5.73 (1.06)	5.34 (1.36)	5.50 (1.04)	5.41 (1.17)	
	5.52 (1.24)		5.46 (1.10)		5.48 (1.17)
<b>Credibility</b>					
<b>Men</b>	5.45 (1.65)	5.49 (.79)	5.43 (.96)	5.28 (1.09)	5.41 (1.07)
<b>Women</b>	5.41 (1.36)	5.67 (1.24)	5.67 (.73)	5.71 (.90)	5.62 (1.06)
	5.42 (1.41)	5.61 (1.11)	5.59 (.81)	5.59 (.97)	
	5.52 (1.26)		5.59 (.89)		5.56 (1.07)
<b>Overreaction</b>					
<b>Men</b>	2.94 (1.33)	3.30 (1.07)	3.85 (1.28)	3.43 (1.35)	3.46 (1.27)
<b>Women</b>	2.76 (1.16)	2.64 (1.00)	3.13 (1.23)	3.00 (.92)	2.89 (1.09)
	2.80 (1.19)	2.86 (1.06)	3.37 (1.29)	3.13 (1.07)	
	2.83 (1.12)		3.26 (1.19)		3.06 (1.17)
<b>Self-Interest</b>					
<b>Men</b>	2.64 (1.38)	2.97 (1.19)	4.67 (1.21)	3.93 (1.24)	3.70 (1.46)
<b>Women</b>	3.08 (1.09)	2.68 (.88)	4.12 (1.25)	4.57 (1.05)	3.66 (1.32)
	2.98 (1.16)	2.78 (.99)	4.31 (1.26)	4.39 (1.14)	
	2.87 (1.07)		4.35 (1.20)		3.67 (1.36)
<b>Group-Interest</b>					
<b>Men</b>	2.45 (1.59)	3.06 (1.20)	5.07 (.88)	3.78 (1.47)	3.79 (1.57)
<b>Women</b>	2.76 (1.31)	2.73 (1.15)	5.03 (1.10)	5.12 (1.20)	3.99 (1.66)
	2.69 (1.36)	2.84 (1.17)	5.05 (1.02)	4.75 (1.41)	
	2.77 (1.26)		4.91 (1.22)		3.93 (1.63)
<b>Participants (n)</b>					
<b>Men</b>	n = 11	n = 18	n = 22	n = 16	
<b>Women</b>	n = 36	n = 37	n = 43	n = 41	

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis

Table 6: Correlations between variables (Study 3)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.16#	-.30**	.03	.05
2. Credibility	.55***	--	-.37***	-.04	.09
3. Overreaction	-.49***	-.52***	--	.25**	.05
4. Self-interest	-.20*	-.26**	.32***	--	.76***
5. Group-interest	-.08	-.15#	.12	.70***	--

Note. Correlations for women above the diagonal, for men below the diagonal  
 \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics (Study 3)

		Male Confronter		Female Confronter		
		Standard Definition	Greater Good Definition	Standard Definition	Greater Good Definition	
<b>Discrimination</b>						
<b>Men</b>		5.84 (1.10)	5.53 (1.56)	5.62 (1.14)	5.22 (1.54)	5.55 (1.37)
<b>Women</b>		6.21 (1.14)	6.30 (1.18)	6.30 (.83)	6.34 (.71)	6.28 (.99)
		6.03 (1.13)	5.89 (1.44)	5.95 (1.05)	5.73 (1.35)	
		5.95 (1.30)		5.85 (1.20)		5.90 (1.25)
<b>Credibility</b>						
<b>Men</b>		5.68 (1.21)	5.61 (1.23)	5.49 (1.24)	5.25 (1.30)	5.51 (1.24)
<b>Women</b>		5.94 (.85)	6.00 (1.17)	6.06 (.78)	6.16 (.81)	6.03 (.92)
		5.82 (1.04)	5.79 (1.21)	5.77 (1.07)	5.66 (1.19)	
		5.80 (1.13)		5.72 (1.13)		5.76 (1.13)
<b>Overreaction</b>						
<b>Men</b>		2.71 (1.47)	2.88 (1.73)	2.67 (1.37)	3.27 (1.85)	2.88 (1.62)
<b>Women</b>		2.20 (1.40)	2.12 (1.27)	2.39 (1.40)	1.90 (1.04)	2.17 (1.29)
		2.44 (1.44)	2.53 (1.57)	2.53 (1.38)	2.66 (1.68)	
		2.49 (1.51)		2.59 (1.52)		2.54 (1.51)
<b>Self-Interest</b>						
<b>Men</b>		3.24 (1.47)	2.94 (1.22)	4.36 (1.35)	4.71 (1.25)	3.80 (1.50)
<b>Women</b>		3.26 (1.31)	2.75 (1.14)	4.92 (.96)	4.80 (1.07)	3.90 (1.47)
		3.25 (1.38)	2.85 (1.18)	4.64 (1.20)	4.75 (1.66)	
		3.04 (1.28)		4.69 (1.18)		3.85 (1.48)
<b>Group-Interest</b>						
<b>Men</b>		2.95 (1.66)	2.97 (1.52)	5.78 (1.00)	5.51 (.92)	4.31 (1.87)
<b>Women</b>		2.88 (1.50)	2.98 (1.41)	5.97 (.77)	5.81 (1.26)	4.36 (1.94)
		2.91 (1.57)	2.98 (1.46)	5.87 (.89)	5.65 (1.09)	
		2.95 (1.50)		5.77 (.99)		4.33 (1.90)
<b>Participants (n)</b>						
<b>Men</b>		n = 30	n = 39	n = 36	n = 33	
<b>Women</b>		n = 33	n = 34	n = 35	n = 27	

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis.

Table 8: Correlations between Variables (Study 4)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.36***	-.32***	-.04	.05
2. Credibility	.58***	--	-.31***	-.04	.09
3. Overreaction	-.53***	-.55***	--	.16*	.05
4. Self-Interest	-.10	-.12	.23*	--	.66***
5. Group-Interest	.11	.04	-.03	.58***	--

Note. Correlations for women above the diagonal, for men below the diagonal  
 \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (Study 4)

	Male Confronter		Female Confronter		
	Standard	Greater Good	Standard	Greater Good	
<b>Discrimination</b>					
<b>Men</b>	5.89 (1.08)	5.54 (1.29)	5.72 (1.47)	6.21 (.81)	5.85 (1.19)
<b>Women</b>	6.40 (1.01)	6.49 (.61)	6.16 (1.14)	5.92 (1.43)	6.25 (1.09)
	6.18 (1.07)	6.14 (1.03)	6.01 (1.23)	6.04 (1.20)	
	6.16 (1.04)		6.02 (1.24)		6.09 (1.14)
<b>Credibility</b>					
<b>Men</b>	5.29 (1.36)	5.57 (1.08)	5.57 (1.34)	5.68 (1.15)	5.53 (1.23)
<b>Women</b>	5.90 (1.22)	5.88 (1.19)	6.10 (1.10)	5.58 (1.34)	5.88 (1.21)
	5.65 (1.30)	5.76 (1.16)	5.91 (1.20)	5.62 (1.25)	
	5.71 (1.23)		5.77 (1.23)		5.74 (1.23)
<b>Overreaction</b>					
<b>Men</b>	2.89 (1.63)	3.14 (1.68)	2.87 (1.63)	2.84 (1.63)	2.93 (1.62)
<b>Women</b>	1.69 (.95)	1.79 (.92)	2.03 (1.12)	2.53 (1.50)	2.00 (1.16)
	2.19 (1.40)	2.29 (1.41)	2.33 (1.37)	2.66 (1.55)	
	2.24 (1.40)		2.49 (1.46)		2.36 (1.43)
<b>Self-Interest</b>					
<b>Men</b>	3.01 (1.32)	3.35 (1.21)	4.74 (1.35)	4.33 (1.44)	3.83 (1.49)
<b>Women</b>	2.73 (1.17)	2.88 (1.24)	4.40 (1.59)	4.19 (1.41)	3.55 (1.55)
	2.85 (1.23)	3.05 (1.24)	4.52 (1.51)	4.25 (1.41)	
	2.95 (1.24)		4.39 (1.46)		3.66 (1.53)
<b>Group-Interest</b>					
<b>Men</b>	2.95 (1.66)	3.25 (1.47)	5.56 (1.45)	5.77 (1.17)	4.36 (1.93)
<b>Women</b>	3.26 (1.90)	3.16 (1.78)	5.64 (1.42)	5.73 (1.18)	4.43 (2.01)
	3.13 (1.80)	3.19 (1.66)	5.61 (1.42)	5.75 (1.17)	
	3.16 (1.72)		5.68 (1.30)		4.40 (1.98)
<b>Participants (n)</b>					
<b>Men</b>	n = 28	n = 26	n = 24	n = 28	
<b>Women</b>	n = 39	n = 44	n = 44	n = 37	

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis.

Table 10: Correlations between Variables (Study 5)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.48***	-.34***	.09	.05
2. Credibility		--	-.48***	-.09	-.06
3. Overreaction			--	.22*	.02
4. Self-Interest				--	.39***
5. Group-Interest					--

Note. \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics (Study 5)

	White Confronter		Black Confronter		
	Standard Confront	Greater Good	Standard Confront	Greater Good	
<b>Discrimination</b>	4.56 (1.65)	4.50 (1.96)	4.16 (1.66)	3.78 (1.45)	
	4.53 (1.78)		3.98 (1.56)		4.25 (1.69)
<b>Credibility</b>	5.15 (1.46)	5.33 (1.31)	4.64 (1.54)	4.40 (1.14)	
	5.23 (1.38)		4.53 (1.37)		4.87 (1.41)
<b>Overreaction</b>	3.34 (1.66)	2.82 (1.29)	3.70 (1.79)	3.38 (1.81)	
	3.11 (1.52)		3.55 (1.79)		3.33 (1.67)
<b>Self-Interest</b>	3.68 (1.30)	3.04 (1.31)	3.90 (1.19)	4.13 (1.10)	
	3.40 (1.33)		4.01 (1.14)		3.71 (1.27)
<b>Group-Interest</b>	3.02 (1.58)	4.09 (1.49)	4.59 (1.35)	5.26 (1.07)	
	3.49 (1.62)		4.90 (1.26)		4.21 (1.61)
<b>Participants</b>	n = 29	n = 23	n = 29	n = 25	

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis.

Table 12: Correlations between Variables (Study 6)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Discrimination	--	.49***	-.29**	-.02	.19#
2. Credibility		--	-.45**	-.35*	.12
3. Overreaction			--	.42***	-.10
4. Self-Interest				--	.07
5. Group-Interest					--

Note. \* < .05; \*\* < .01; \*\*\* < .001

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics (Study 6)

	Male Confronter		Female Confronter		
	Standard Confront	Greater Good	Standard Confront	Greater Good	
<b>Discrimination</b>	4.67 (1.00)	4.54 (.99)	4.52 (1.08)	4.38 (.98)	
	4.61 (.98)		4.45 (1.02)		4.52 (1.00)
<b>Credibility</b>	5.12 (1.00)	4.63 (1.06)	4.60 (1.12)	4.71 (1.19)	
	4.89 (1.04)		4.65 (1.14)		4.76 (1.10)
<b>Overreaction</b>	2.78 (1.35)	3.19 (1.38)	3.13 (1.45)	3.17 (1.40)	
	2.97 (1.36)		3.15 (1.41)		3.07 (1.38)
<b>Self-Interest</b>	2.33 (1.41)	2.56 (1.55)	2.63 (1.28)	2.83 (1.59)	
	2.44 (1.46)		2.72 (1.42)		2.60 (1.44)
<b>Group-Interest</b>	2.84 (2.22)	3.63 (2.00)	5.21 (1.41)	4.70 (1.84)	
	3.20 (2.12)		4.96 (1.64)		4.21 (2.05)
<b>Participants</b>	n = 19	n = 16	n = 24	n = 23	

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis.

Table 14: Summary of Effect Sizes for Meta-Analyses

Meta-Analysis 1 (Hypothesis 1): Men will take sexism confrontations less seriously than women.					
Study	Composite $\alpha$	Men	Women	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	.77	4.53 (0.83)	4.91 (0.80)	133	.47
2	.61	5.29 (0.87)	5.62 (0.97)	224	.36
3	.63	5.53 (1.15)	6.16 (0.73)	267	.65
4	.63	5.69 (1.07)	6.06 (0.95)	270	.36
<b>Overall Effect Size (n = 894):</b>					<b>.47</b>

Meta-Analysis 2 (Hypothesis 2): Men will see sexism confronters to be overreacting, self-interested, and group-interested to a greater extent than women				
Measure: Overreacting				
Study	Men	Women	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	3.83 (1.32)	3.00 (1.17)	133	.66
2	3.46 (1.27)	2.89 (1.09)	224	.48
3	2.88 (1.62)	2.17 (1.29)	267	.48
4	2.93 (1.62)	2.00 (1.16)	270	.66
<b>Overall Effect Size (n = 894):</b>				<b>.56</b>
Measure: Self-Interest				
Study	Men	Women	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	3.56 (1.43)	3.24 (1.33)	133	.23
2	3.70 (1.46)	3.66 (1.32)	224	.03
3	3.80 (1.50)	3.90 (1.47)	267	-.07
4	3.83 (1.49)	3.55 (1.55)	270	.18
<b>Overall Effect Size (n = 894):</b>				<b>.07</b>
Measure: Group-Interest				
Study	Men	Women	<i>N</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	4.42 (1.87)	4.15 (2.06)	133	.14
2	3.79 (1.57)	3.99 (1.66)	224	-.12
3	4.31 (1.87)	4.36 (1.94)	267	.03
4	4.36 (1.93)	4.43 (2.01)	270	.03
<b>Overall Effect Size (n = 894):</b>				<b>.01</b>

Meta-Analysis 3 (Hypothesis 1a and 1b): High Status participants (i.e. men, non-Blacks) will take standard confrontations by allies more seriously than standard confrontations by targets of prejudice.						
Study	Confrontation	Composite $\alpha$	Ally Confronter	Target Confronter	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	Sexism	.77	4.74 (0.79)	4.28 (0.82)	53	.57
1b	Racism	.60	4.82 (1.03)	4.19 (0.67)	60	.72
2	Sexism	.61	5.35 (0.84)	5.27 (0.99)	33	.09
3	Sexism	.63	5.76 (0.97)	5.55 (1.08)	66	.20
4	Sexism	.63	5.59 (1.12)	5.55 (1.00)	52	.04
5	Racism	.64	4.85 (1.31)	4.40 (1.49)	58	.32
6	Sexism	.66	4.89 (.80)	4.58 (0.96)	43	.35
<b>Overall Effect Size (n = 365):</b>						<b>.34</b>

Meta-Analysis 4 (Hypotheses 2a and 2b): High status participants will attribute standard confrontations by targets of prejudice more to internal causes than they will standard confrontations by allies.

Measure: Overreacting

Study	Confrontation	Ally Confronter	Target Confronter	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	Sexism	3.44 (1.05)	4.24 (1.48)	53	.62
1b	Racism	<i>Not Tested</i>			
2	Sexism	2.94 (1.33)	3.85 (1.28)	33	.70
3	Sexism	2.71 (1.47)	2.67 (1.37)	66	-.03
4	Sexism	2.89 (1.63)	2.87 (1.63)	52	-.01
5	Racism	3.34 (1.66)	3.70 (1.79)	58	.21
6	Sexism	2.78 (1.35)	3.13 (1.45)	43	.25

**Overall Effect Size (n = 305): .18**

Measure: Self-Interest

Study	Confrontation	Ally Confronter	Target Confronter	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	Sexism	3.41 (1.31)	3.72 (1.57)	53	.21
1b	Racism	3.17 (1.31)	3.45 (1.66)	60	.19
2	Sexism	2.64 (1.38)	4.67 (1.21)	33	1.56
3	Sexism	3.24 (1.47)	4.36 (1.35)	66	.79
4	Sexism	3.01 (1.32)	4.74 (1.35)	52	1.30
5	Racism	3.68 (1.30)	3.90 (1.19)	58	.18
6	Sexism	2.33 (1.41)	2.63 (1.28)	43	.22

**Overall Effect Size (n= 365): .59**

Measure: Group-Interest

Study	Confrontation	Ally Confronter	Target Confronter	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
1	Sexism	3.44 (1.80)	5.48 (1.29)	53	1.30
1b	Racism	4.30 (1.95)	5.30 (1.44)	60	.58
2	Sexism	2.45 (1.59)	5.07 (0.88)	33	2.04
3	Sexism	2.96 (1.66)	5.78 (1.00)	66	2.06
4	Sexism	2.95 (1.66)	5.56 (1.45)	52	1.67
5	Racism	3.02 (1.58)	4.59 (1.35)	58	1.07
6	Sexism	2.84 (2.22)	5.21 (1.41)	43	1.27

**Overall Effect Size (n = 365): 1.39**

Meta-Analysis 5 (Hypotheses 4 and 4a): High status participants (i.e. men, non-Blacks) will take confrontations by targets of prejudice as seriously as they take confrontations by allies when thinking about the greater good.

Study	Confrontation	Composite $\alpha$	Ally Confronter	Target Confronter	<i>n</i>	Effect size ( <i>d</i> )
2	Sexism	.61	5.40 (0.68)	5.17 (0.94)	34	.28
3	Sexism	.63	5.57 (1.26)	5.24 (1.23)	72	.26
4	Sexism	.63	5.55 (1.00)	5.94 (0.78)	54	-.43
5	Racism	.64	4.91 (1.27)	4.09 (1.12)	48	.68
6	Sexism	.66	4.59 (0.95)	4.54 (0.93)	39	.05

**Overall Effect Size (n = 247): .16**

*Note: positive d-scores represent effects in the predicted direction, negative d-scores represent effects opposite of the expected direction*