

“This Project We Call Spain”: Nationality, Autochthony, and Politics in
Spain’s North African Exclaves

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Abstract

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This dissertation begins by uncovering a puzzle in Spain’s two North African cities: why are significantly fewer native-born and foreign-born residents of Melilla Spanish citizens than comparable residents of Ceuta, despite the two cities sharing many social, political, economic conditions? In addition, why are the lowest rates of Spanish citizenship in Melilla found in the census tracts with the highest concentration of Muslim residents whereas in Ceuta nearly all residents—regardless of religious categorization and birthplace—are Spaniards?

Spurred by these questions, I then trace how variation in the constitutive elements of ethnic identity categories across the cities generate similar *names* of categories but different *shared meanings* of the categories, *sub-national “Spanish” identities*, and *activations*

of the identities. I argue that the most influential variation in the constitutive elements regards imagined, historical collectives defined and differentiated by their relative power, or “political homelands.” In Ceuta, I identify the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Arabness,” or to use the generalizable terms, “titular” and “indigenous.” In Melilla, I identify the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Amazighness” (or, “Berberness”), or to again use generalizable terms, “titular” and “autochthonous.” By drawing such distinctions in political homelands, I mean to underscore the impact of *double-colonization*: in Melilla more so than in Ceuta, Muslims residents are tied to shared political memories of autochtony and being colonized by, first, invading Arab armies and settlers, and second, French colonizers and post-colonial pan-Arab nationalists.

This dissimilarity in political homelands helps to produce different conceptualizations of being “Christian” and “Muslim” across the cities. The prevailing indigenous political homeland among Muslims in Ceuta helps to generate a “cultural identity” understanding of the Muslim category, which is more easily nested within the dominant Spanish category and reconciled with the Spanish nation state through its multicultural institutions. In contrast, the “national identity” understanding of the Muslim category in Melilla is less easily reconciled with other categories, as well as the nation state. These differing identities result in dissimilar behaviors when activated in specific contexts, such as the dominant “cultural identity” for Muslims in Ceuta leading to higher levels of Spanish citizenship and the dominant “national identity” for Muslims in Melilla leading to lower levels of Spanish citizenship.

I evaluate my argument in the final part of the dissertation through an ecological inference analysis of the cities’ two most recent local elections, occurring in 2007 and 2011. Supporting the notion that a “cultural identity,” with its weaker ethnic boundaries, is preva-

lent among Muslims in Ceuta, I estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Ceuta vote across ethnic lines—and for the mainstream center-right party—at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Melilla. In support of the argument that a “national identity,” with its stronger ethnic boundaries, is prevalent among Muslims in Melilla, I estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Melilla vote for the local party “of Muslim persuasion” at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Ceuta. These findings are further bolstered using a second indicator: electoral volatility, a marker of more fluid ethnic boundaries, has been higher in Ceuta than in Melilla since the cities have become self-governing.

This project provides several contributions to the study of ethnicity, ethnic politics, and Islam in Europe. To take one example, it stresses that ethnicity and nationality are not interchangeable, and that “ethnic groups” are not homogenous. This challenges the widespread use of nationality and ethnicity in the migration, ethnic studies, and political science literature. More generally, however, the project as a whole offers a detailed model of how research can approach ethnic politics when ethnicities are constructed and fluid, as is the case with today’s Muslim residents of Europe.

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In terms of geography, the [government land] covered the Atlantic Coastal Plain and the adjacent plains regions of Morocco only, considerably less than half the surface area of the country. Most of what remains in Morocco is either mountains or desert, and virtually all of this was *bled es-siba*, or “land of dissidence” and “disorder.”

—David M. Hart, *The Tribe in Modern Morocco*, 1972: 27

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Reflections on Ceuta and Melilla

When I disembarked onto the North African coast to begin my fieldwork in the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, I was anticipating a high degree of commonality across the two sites. In fact, I had chosen to conduct fieldwork in *both* cities to be able to pool (expected) similar observations and data, thereby increasing confidence in my (future) findings on boundary-making between “native” Spaniards and Muslim residents.¹ In an embarrassing display of naïveté, I developed this belief that Ceuta and Melilla would be similar thousands of miles away from the cities, through the analysis of publicly available data on conditions commonly attributed with causal power in theories of boundary-making.

Ceuta and Melilla share several of such conditions. As both part of Spain and the European Union (EU), they have similar educational systems, immigration policies, welfare regimes, and political systems. As cities, they share a common history that can be traced from Phoenician traders through colonial-era Spanish Morocco and up to today’s position as

¹The logic of increasing observations also motivated the selection of Ceuta and Melilla themselves as research sites. They presented an opportunity to maximize individual- and organizational-level observations since their populations of are each nearly 50 percent Muslim. In contrast, Muslim communities on mainland Europe constitute a smaller fraction of the population—an average of 3.56 percent in Western European countries and a high of 25 percent in Western Europe cities (Marseilles and Amsterdam) in the late 2000s (Laurence 2012). According to the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE), or the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain, Spain’s population is about 3.65 percent Muslim in 2013-14; it estimates that 30 percent of these Muslims are Spanish citizens (EuropaPress 2014a).

the southernmost outpost of “fortress Europe.” As both located on the North African coast, the Moroccan state broadcasts an ongoing, decades-long discourse of sovereignty that groups Ceuta and Melilla together and Moroccan immigrants in the cities have comparable levels of access to communities of origin. Finally, they share various social, demographic, and economic characteristics—some less tangible, such as the stratification of social positions, and some more easily measurable, such as the size of their Muslim populations (Table 1.1), population density (see Section 2.4), the size of their immigrant population (see Section 2.4), and recent unemployment rates (see Section 2.8).

After arriving in Ceuta and Melilla in the fall of 2011, however, I quickly realized my error: the cities are clearly distinct. Most importantly for my project, residents in similar social positions across the cities differed in how they expressed their sense of *belonging*, to use Yuval-Davis’s (2006; 2011) concept that ties together sentiments, place, and one’s narrative of the self (what she calls “identity”). That is, individuals positioned as “white”—or *peninsulares* (“of the [Iberian] peninsula”) or *christianos* (“Christians”)—in Ceuta often spoke of their community, how they belonged to it, and why and how others did or did not belong *differently* than the “white” residents of Melilla spoke of their community and neighbors. Similarly, Ceuta’s residents positioned as “Muslim,” or *musulmanes*, the widely-recognized, second largest social group, frequently spoke of their community, how they belonged to it, and why and how others did or did not belong *differently* than the “Muslim” residents of Melilla spoke of their home and neighbors.

1.1.1 Impressions from Ceuta

I based my impressions of *belonging* in Ceuta on my observations of the divisions between *christianos* and *musulmanes*, which, in general, seemed to be most often expressed in terms

Table 1.1: Estimated Growth in Muslim Population in Ceuta and Melilla

Year	Ceuta			Melilla		
	Total Population	Percent Muslim	Percent Muslim and Born in City	Total Population	Percent Muslim	Percent Muslim and Born in City
1875	–	0.9	–	–	–	–
1877	9,703	–	–	1,517	–	–
1887	10,744	–	–	3,539	–	–
1888	–	1.9	–	–	–	–
1910	23,907	–	–	39,852	0.2	–
1930	50,614	–	–	62,614	1.5	–
1935	–	5.3	–	–	–	–
1950	59,936	–	–	81,182	7.7	–
1960	72,182	9.7	–	79,586	9.5	–
1970	67,187	–	–	64,942	–	–
1975	–	–	–	–	21.8	–
1981	70,864	–	–	58,449	19	–
1986	65,151	23	17.24	52,388	34	23.78
1987	66,667	22.5	–	54,769	32.5	–
2003	74,931	32.3	–	68,463	–	–
2007	76,603	35.1	–	69,440	–	–
2009	78,674	40	–	73,460	–	–
2012	84,180	42.75	–	83,679	48.43	–
2013	84,963	42.35	–	84,450	50.25	–

Sources: Data compiled by the author from Carabaza and de Santos 1992: 92; Gold 2000: 91-2; Rantomé 2011: 90; demographic studies conducted by the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE), or the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain; an Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), or National Statistics Institute.

Note: All figures relating to the Muslim population are estimates because the Spanish state does not collect population data based on ethnicity, race, or religion. In addition, if a total population count for a year was not available, the percentage was calculated with the total population from the most recent year. The total population figures are from the INE.

of economic marginalization.² *Christianos* tended to either voice sympathy for the economic hardship faced by a disproportionate amount of *musulmanes* or speak of *musulmanes* as economic underachievers. For their part, *musulmanes* rarely spoke about *christianos*; when they did, it was often to say that *christianos* did not fully appreciate the difficult economic position faced by many *musulmanes*. Furthermore, my informants appeared to take great pains to portray the *musulmán* community as cohesive. When I asked about reported

²Torres Cólón (2008) reaches a similar conclusion after conducting his fieldwork in Ceuta in the mid-2000s.

disagreements over doctrine and community leadership,³ such incidents were brushed aside as “silly arguments.”

This is all to say that I found very little—if any—discussion over whether Muslims *belonged* in Ceuta, a Spanish city. This more remarkable in light of repeated, widely publicized raids on Al Qaeda cells in the city since the Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004.⁴ Indeed, in response to arrests of Qaeda affiliates in June 2013, the president of the city, Juan Jesús Vivas, declared that “co-existence is the principle quality, the most important challenge, and the primary necessity of [Ceuta].”⁵ Vivas’ political rival, the center-left party leader José Antonio Carracao, echoed him, stating that his party “has friends and colleagues who are Muslim and Islam is a religion that is against any type of violence.”⁶

Furthermore, after the June 2013 arrests, the discussion within the Muslim community was not focused on whether *musulmanes* are truly “Spanish” or if it is even possible for *musulmanes* to (peacefully) belong in Spain. Rather, it centered on how to be “better” Muslim citizens of Spain. Laarbi Maateis, the Islamist president of the city’s largest Muslim organization, Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de Ceuta (UCIDCE), or the Union of Islamic Communities of Ceuta,⁷ gave an interview focusing on the accurate meaning of jihad.⁸ A

³See, for example, Irujo 2010.

⁴For national level news media coverage of these raids, see Rodríguez and Abad 2006 and Irujo and Barca 2013.

⁵“La convivencia es la principal cualidad, el reto más importante, y la primera necesidad de nuestra sociedad” (Gardeu 2013a).

⁶“Tenemos amigos y compañeros musulmanes y el Islam es una religión que está en contra de cualquier tipo de violencia” (Gardeu 2013b).

⁷In further support of my impressions, Riay Tatary, the president of the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE), or the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain, UCIDCE’s parent organization, responded to the abdication of King Juan Carlos in June 2014 with the statement, “We respect the decision of *our* King and . . . I am sure [Prince Felipe VI] will guide [Spain] with his father’s own wisdom” [emphasis added] (“Respetamos la decisión de nuestro Rey y la valoramos mucho. Creo que él sabrá por qué ha tomado esta decisión. Y lo ha puesto en unas manos, las de Felipe VI, que estoy seguro lo va a pilotar con la sabiduría propia de su padre y con su formación y experiencia”) (EuropaPress 2014b).

⁸“I want to send a message to the young and adult Muslims of Ceuta as to the interpretation of jihad . . . I ask that you heed the wise, those that know what is jihad, when one can and cannot participate, and

local columnist, Nasama Ali, encouraged her fellow Muslims to increase their participation in the civic life of the city and become stronger members of “this project we call Spain” (Ali 2013).

1.1.2 Impressions from Melilla

I found a different discourse of *belonging* in Melilla. Conversations about social, economic, and political issues often incorporated frequent commentary on social inclusion and exclusion. For example, José Palazón, a local social justice activist and school teacher, told me in November 2011 that *christianos* and *musulmanes* “co-exist,” but “they are not friends” and the *musulmanes* are not integrated. There is a sentiment of frustration among Muslims, he continued, because of an overt hierarchy that propagates *christiano* dominance and, as a result, “[Muslims] are a new type of Spanish . . . they are building and living as a different type of Spanish than ever existed, but they do not feel like they can be very integrated.”

In addition, Melilla’s Muslim community leaders remarked on divisions in the city to a greater degree than those in Ceuta. Hassan Mohatar, the spokesperson for Coalición por Melilla (CpM), or Coalition for Melilla, the city’s largest Muslim-affiliated party (see Subsection 4.3.4), lamented that there is “not much unity in the [city’s] Muslim community” (interview October 2011). Samir Mohamed Tieb, the spokesperson for the Comisión Islámica de Melilla (CIM), or Islamic Commission of Melilla, started an interview in November 2011 by saying that, in Melilla, there is “no integration . . . there is only co-existence because people are obligated. There is no true mixing and no true equality.” He went on to

the true reasons . . . The jihad is to strive within the person, avoid wrongdoing within oneself and one’s own soul” (“Quiero transmitir un mensaje para los jóvenes y adultos musulmanes de Ceuta en cuanto a la interpretación de la yihad . . . Pido que se asesoren ante los sabios, que sepan lo que es la yihad, cuando se puede o no participar, las causas verdaderas . . . La yihad es esforzarse con la persona, evitar hacer el mal con uno mismo y su propia alma”) (Cortina 2013).

stress that that the city’s government “wants a divided Muslim population.” It gives money to support different associations that than act as “mercenaries” and split the community. He went on to condemn other *musulman* community leaders that promote a secular ethno-cultural identity, rather than Islam, to bolster community solidarity. Such a notion, he said, is “a virus.”

The tensions that people described to me appear to have been on display in a recent contentious public debate between two of the city’s most prominent Muslim leaders. Ad-berraman Benyahya, the general secretary of the secular-leaning Asociación Musulmana (“Muslim Association”), criticized the CIM, saying that the CIM’s

statements and actions have been more political than religious [and] that can damage the model of the city by which we work, affecting the co-existence and interfaith relations that keep all religions sharing the same space in the city.⁹

Such rifts among Melilla’s Muslim elites are not necessarily surprising in and of themselves. Pfaff and Gill (2006), for example, find comparable fissures between immigrant Turkish Muslim organizations in Germany due, in part, to disagreements rooted in Turkey’s politics.¹⁰ However, the comparative nature of my project, as well as my daily interactions with non-elite and *native born* Muslims, drew my attention to the dissimilarity in everyday notions and expressions of *belonging* across the cities.

During my time in Ceuta and Melilla, then, I became increasingly curious why the cities’

⁹ “[H]a habido declaraciones y actos más políticos que de tipo religioso que pueden dañar el modelo de ciudad por el que trabajamos, afectar a la convivencia y a las relaciones interconfesionales que mantienen todas las religiones que comparten el mismo espacio en la ciudad” (González 2013).

¹⁰ The relative cohesion I found in Ceuta, however, provides an intriguing counterpoint to the findings of Pfaff and Gill (2006). One potential reason for the disparity with their findings could be that Pfaff and Gill underemphasize the distinction between Turkish and Kurdish organizations and, as a result, do not closely examine rifts *within* these distinct communities—a point Steve Pfaff himself made to me. I return to this idea in my conclusion, when I discuss the implications of my findings for collective action. Part of this discussion touches on the interesting tension between my observation of greater organizational division in Melilla and my findings of stronger voting along “Muslim” lines in local elections.

Muslim communities in Ceuta and Melilla were different from each other. While I knew that the West’s common conceptualization of European Muslims as a homogenous mass is far from accurate (just like the treatment of “Latina/os” and “Hispanics” as a homogenous group in the United States), the cities’ Muslim communities seemed to *share* the factors that theories of ethnicity credit with generating *divergence* among social groups, such as institutions, transnational ties, ethnocultural attributes, socioeconomic conditions, and the presence of elites. As a result, I use this project to examine why and how the lives of *musulmanes* in two similar Spanish cities are notably distinct—and what this dissimilarity tells us about ethnicity, politics, and Islam in Europe.

1.1.3 Possible reasons for variation

Researchers of Ceuta and Melilla have often grouped the cities together, only noting differences across the cities in passing and choosing not to explore potential causes for variation. For example, Henk Driessen, in his insightful *On the Spanish-Moroccan Frontier: A Study in Ritual, Power, and Ethnicity* (1992), mentions in an aside that religious sentiment seems to be less of a source of solidarity among Muslim residents of Melilla than he expected.¹¹ Peter Gold, in *Europe or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla* (2000), is ultimately interested in Ceuta and Melilla as a unit, to assess their shared role as a crossroads of the EU and Morocco. When he does comment on variation across the cities, he attributes it to Melilla’s relative “remoteness.” I agree that Melilla’s geographic location—a multiple hour ferry ride from mainland Spain compared to

¹¹The CIM’s Tieb seemed to confirm Driessen’s observation when he told me that, “in past, there was more importance on secular ethnic identity because people in Melilla were not very knowledgeable about Islam . . . no one was really religious, it was an ethnic (*étnica*) community [here]. Thankfully, there has been an explosion of Islam since the 90s. This is a good thing because it unites people” (interview November 2011).

the hour-long ferry from Ceuta—may have played a role during its history, but this is likely to be a decreasingly important factor considering improvements in communication technology and transportation. For example, Melilla is as connected to the Internet as Ceuta and, unlike Ceuta, has an airport with regular flights to major Spanish cities. Furthermore, Gold’s emphasis on location still does not explain *why* or *how* Melilla has come to differ from Ceuta.

Beyond the limited number of studies specifically on Ceuta and Melilla, research on comparable contexts provide potential explanations for the cities’ relative distinctiveness.¹² One such explanation rests on variation in *alien rule*. Such an explanation would suggest that the population of one city views its authorities as either descriptive rulers—members of their same group—or legitimate alien rulers. In contrast, the population of the other city would see its authorities as illegitimate alien rulers (see Hechter 2013). Put concretely, perhaps the Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla have differed in the degree to which they accept “Spaniards” or *christianos* governing Muslim communities on the African continent, thereby affecting their notions and expressions of “feeling at home.”

Findings from my fieldwork dispel this potential explanation, however. No one with whom I spoke portrayed Spain as an illegitimate authority, although the Moroccan state repeatedly does so.¹³ In fact, the proximity of Morocco appeared to strengthen the legitimacy of Spain. A quick trip across the border—not to mention the daily rush of undocumented migrants attempting to get *into* the cities—reminds residents that Spain and the

¹²By “comparable contexts,” I mean places that share the colonial-*style* history and status of Ceuta and Melilla. Spain does not consider Ceuta and Melilla colonies, but rather as parts of the sovereign state. This is similar to how France once viewed and administered Algeria.

¹³While in Melilla, the legitimacy of Spain was best expressed by one Muslim resident who was almost speechless when I asked him if he identifies with Spain. He responded, “I am Spanish! My grandfather came [to Melilla] in 1926 after fighting for the French. My father fought for Franco. I was born and raised [in Spain]!”

EU provide markedly better governance than potential alternatives. Moreover, this more effective governance provides an increasingly appropriate set of collective goods, such as the freedom of religion along with the official recognition of major Muslim holidays,¹⁴ while the Moroccan state's provision of goods grows increasingly "inappropriate," in the eyes of the cities' residents. Consequently, the legitimacy of the local, national, and supranational state institutions has been boosted relatively equally *across* the cities (Hechter 2013) and residents, at least when speaking to me, expressed satisfaction that they were living in Spain and the EU.

Alternatively, perhaps Ceuta and Melilla are different types of "internal colonies," akin to how Ireland and Wales differ from one another as well as from the England and the dominant British narrative? Hechter (1999) points out how populations on the periphery can develop divergent economies and notions of ethno-cultural nationalism depending on variances in political administration and the cultural division of labor. So, for instance, if Muslims in Melilla were confined to a lower occupational status than Muslims in Ceuta, or if the Muslims in Melilla occupied fewer positions in higher status occupations than Muslims in Ceuta, then it is likely they would be more peripheral to the Spanish nation than Muslims in Ceuta.

Again, however, Ceuta and Melilla share many of the traits that would support this argument. Rather than one city being more institutionally autonomous than another—as eighteenth century Scotland was relative to other British internal colonies (Hechter 1999)—they have followed a similar path to their current institutional arrangements and relationships with the with the core Spanish state (see Subsection 4.3.1). In addition, the evidence suggests that the cities have long had similar cultural divisions of labor. Historically, *chris-*

¹⁴I discuss this progress in Section 2.3 and Subsection 4.3.1.

tianos occupied the elite positions of governance, business, the military, and education. *Musulmanes* were regulated to a merchant class, selling goods from the interior, as well as a larger class of laborers. Today, while both cities have a sizable Muslim middle class, most male Muslims remain small business owners, laborers, and service workers. Female Muslims are usually domestic workers, such as house cleaners and child care providers.

These conclusions are supported by the relevant quantitative data that is available. Spain does not collect data on how different ethnic groups are occupational segregated,¹⁵ but its Ministry of Employment and Social Security does collect such data on immigrants,¹⁶ whom are, in Ceuta and Melilla, mostly Moroccan and share many of the ethnocultural attributes and markers of difference with the cities' native-born Muslims (see Section 2.4). The most recent data, from 2009, show that most foreign-born males with employment contracts in Ceuta and Melilla are employed in construction and services while almost all foreign-born females are employed in services (Table 1.2). The key point in regards to the internal colonialism argument is that the occupational segregation of foreign-born workers—who share many of the cultural markers of difference as native-born Muslim in the cities—is similar across Ceuta and Melilla.

To summarize, by considering the alien rule and internal colonialism arguments together, I do not find strong support for an explanation positing that variation in colonial-style dynamics drive the differences across Ceuta and Melilla.

¹⁵Hechter also faced this problem in his study of the Celtic fringe in Britain (see Hechter 1999: Introduction).

¹⁶<http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/ObservatorioPermanenteInmigracion/Anuarios/> (last accessed 21 May 2014)

Table 1.2: Percent of All Foreign-Born Contracted Workers, by Gender and Occupational Sector, 2009

	Ceuta	Melilla
Males in agriculture	0.35 ^a	0.25
Females in agriculture	0	0
Males contracted in construction	59.6	58.31
Females contracted in construction	5.68	4.75
Males contracted in industry	3.18	3.57
Females contracted in industry	2.65	0.75
Males contracted in services	36.88	37.87
Females contracted in services	91.67	94.5

Source: Ministry of Employment and Social Security

^aPercents are of all the contracted workers with the same gender

Figures do not include non-contracted workers.

1.1.4 A local explanation

Near the end of my time in North Africa, when I was beginning to see the differences between Ceuta and Melilla more clearly, I explained what I had been noticing to one of my closest informants in Melilla. He reacted with surprise that the question even needed asking. Evoking David M. Hart’s depiction of Morocco, he responded, “Isn’t it obvious? Here [in Melilla] we [Muslims] are all Amazigh and there [in Ceuta] they are all Arab.”

In a second display of naïveté, this explanation had never crossed my mind. From afar—and in the popular discourse—Muslims in Europe are simply “Muslims” or representatives of a foreign nationality, such as “Moroccans” and “Turks.” Academic scholars of Muslims in Europe typically present a more nuanced perspective, with nearly all acknowledging the internal heterogeneity of the European Muslim population, but they frequently still end with an argument that “Muslims” do some outcome of interest or that “Islam” affects this outcome. Furthermore, once I had heard my informant’s explanation and considered its implications, I found it a little unsettling. The contemporary study of ethnicity rests almost

entirely on the constructivist doctrine: groups such as “Arab” and “Amazigh” cannot be taken as fixed entities with a uniform characteristics that explain current ethnic landscapes (for a recent review, see Wimmer 2009). In other words, I found myself instinctively doubting my informant because his perspective was *primordialist*.

But was he right? As a native of Melilla, he certainly knew more about the social dynamics of Spain’s North African cities better than I did. Yet, despite this, I did not feel comfortable simply explaining the variation across Ceuta and Melilla by claiming that “Arabs are different from Imazighen.” So, I devoted the following months to learning alternative explanations for what I had observed. I have discuss some of these alternative explanations above, when reviewing Hechter’s (1999; 2013) work, and I briefly address others in Chapter 2. None seem to shed light on my impressions of Spanish North Africa. I was left, then, with a puzzle consisting of two dimensions: first, *how and why are two similarly-situated European Muslim communities different* and, second, *how could this dissimilarity be related to historical, inherited, and seemingly “primordial” ethnicities?* From this puzzle, I derive the guiding questions of my dissertation, which I discuss below. However, I first review some terms and concepts that provide important context for my project.

1.2 Terms, concepts, and meanings

In this dissertation, I use various concepts to help make sense of a complex exploration of history, perceived descent, group categorization, and the activation of group categories in a diverse society. Many of these concepts, such as *descent-based attributes*, *autochthonous*, and *ethnic practice*, will be introduced and discussed in due course. Some other terms, meanings, and histories, however, should be introduced here, at the onset, to help provide

context relevant to this study.

1.2.1 Enclave or Exclave?

Although Ceuta and Melilla are usually referred to as “enclaves” and “the Enclaves,” I chose to refer to them as as “exclaves.” I base this decision primarily on what I found to be an overwhelming sense of “Spanish-ness” in Ceuta and Melilla. No one with whom I spoke—*musulmán*, *christiano*, Indian, Chinese, elite, non-elite, native-born, foreign-born—ever cast doubt on the fact that the cities are part of Spanish territory.¹⁷ As such, I choose to see them as extensions—exclaves—of Spain in North Africa.

1.2.2 The Maghreb or North Africa?

North Africa—widely considered to be composed of the current states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania—is frequently referred to as the “Maghreb.” People native to North Africa are “Maghrebis.” These terms are taken from the Arabic name for North Africa (*al maghrib*), which itself is derived from the Arabic words for “strange” (*gharb*) and “foreign” (*gharib*). (Early Arabs saw the “West” as different from the Arabic “East.”) Understandably, many Berbers, the indigenous people of North Africa, take offense with the term and the Amazigh Culture Movement promotes the use of the term “Tamazgha” (see Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 3-4). I do not adopt this term myself since it has not yet become widely accepted. I do, however, avoid the use of “Maghreb,” instead referring to “North Africa.”

¹⁷In contrast, the Moroccan state does contest Spanish sovereignty over the Exclaves and asserts that they should be part of Morocco. The forcefulness of and tension over this demand has waxed and waned over the last few decades. For example, Carabaza and de Santos, writing in 1992, devote a chapter of their book, *Melilla y Ceuta. Las Últimas Colonias* (“Melilla and Ceuta. The Last Colonies”), to what could occur during a hypothetical war between Spain and Morocco over the Exclaves. It is difficult to imagine a comparable chapter being written today.

1.2.3 Arab, Berber, or Amazigh?

North Africa is largely populated by an Arab culture and people along with a Berber culture and people.¹⁸ Such a statement may seem too general to be useful: neither of these populations are homogenous, each consisting of smaller groups defined by distinct kinship networks, economic class, territorial homelands, nationalities, language dialects, religious viewpoints, urbanization, and other markers of difference. However, acknowledging the Berber culture and people is a necessary step in any study of North Africa, due to centuries-long repression and marginalization by Arab elites as well as decades of post-colonial, state-sponsored Arabization projects and assertions that Berbers are in fact Arabs. Indeed, as I discuss below (and in Subsection 3.3.2), some contemporary public figures continue to deny that Berbers are a distinct culture and people.

The category name “Berber” is familiar to many in the West. In the United States, for example, students in U.S. History courses are taught that Thomas Jefferson’s waged a campaign against the Barbary pirates. The “Berber” name is widely used in France, which has the largest diaspora population of Berbers and is the home to the community’s major transnational interest organizations. Yet despite its commonplace usage, the term is increasingly seen as pejorative. It is derived from the Arabic word for “babble noisily” and “jabber” (*barber*), since Arabs found their language strange. Today, many Berbers prefer the term “Amazigh” (female singular, “Tamazight”; plural, “Imazighen”), meaning “free man” (see Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 2). This is the term I use.

The early history of the Imazighen is relatively unclear despite evidence of people re-

¹⁸There have been and currently are many other populations in North Africa, as well. The region, for example, once had thriving Jewish and Christian communities. Augustine of Hippo, for example, was born in 354 CE in what is now Algeria; the diocese of Hippo was also in present day Algeria. Today, North Africa is increasingly populated by people born in sub-Saharan countries.

siding in northwestern African for millennia. Archaeological surveys have found prehistoric cave art in North Africa and some contemporary anthropological theories trace the Imazighen's origin to the Nile delta and a proto-Egyptian society. Records dating from the second millennium BCE describe a light-skinned warrior people west of Egypt that held power over a darker-skinned farmer society. Pharonic Egyptian accounts depict raids by invaders from the west. Ancient Greeks and Romans referred to various disparate groups of people living along the northwestern African coast (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: Chapter 1).

It was not until Arab Muslim armies invaded the region that "Berbers" were first considered a collective and given a name. Ibn Khaldun, writing circa 1377 CE, depicts it this way: "Afrîqus b. Qays b. Sayfi . . . caused a great slaughter among the Berbers. He gave them the name of Berbers when he heard their jargon and asked what that *barbarah* was. This gave them the name which has remained with them since that time" (2005: 14). Conferring upon them the status of a "civilization," Ibn Khaldun (2005: 29-32, 131) goes on to describe the conquest:

The Berbers, the original population of the Maghrib, have been replaced by an influx of Arabs . . . the Arabs outnumbered and overpowered the Berbers, stripped them of most of their lands, and also obtained a share of those that remained in their possession . . .

The first Muslim victory over [the Berbers] and the European Christians (in the Maghrib) was of no avail. They continued to rebel and apostatized time after time. The Muslims massacred many of them. After the Muslim religion had been established among them, they went on revolting and seceding, and they

adopted dissident religious opinions many times. They remained disoriented and unmanageable. The ‘Irâq at that time was different, and so was Syria. The militia there consisted of Persians and Byzantines respectively. All the inhabitants were a mixed lot of town and city dwellers. When the Muslims deprived them of their power, there remained no one capable of making a deference or of offering opposition.

The Berber tribes in the West are innumerable. All of them are Bedouins¹⁹ and members of groups and families. Whenever one tribe is destroyed, another takes its place and is as refractory and rebellious as the former one had been. Therefore, it has take the Arabs a long time to establish their dynasty in the land of Ifrîqiyah [“Africa”] and the Maghrib.

Ibn Khaldun (2005: 270) also remarked on the distinctiveness of the Berbers, emphasizing that “[The Maghrib] belonged to the Berbers for thousands of years before Islam ... Furthermore, they have ... group feelings and common descent. No Berber group lacks these things ... [and they are drawn to] desert life and the avoidance of cities, which do away with bravery and make people dependent on others.”

Yet, despite these accounts, the conceptualization of the Imazighen as distinct from Arabs began fading during the Ottoman Empire. This accelerated during the post-colonial period, when pan-Arab nationalism subordinated minority groups to the visions of the new ruling Arab elites. For example, Qaddafi publicly asserted that the original Amazigh tribes had all died out and instead promoted his own Berber origin myth:

¹⁹Khaldûn (2005: 43) defines Bedouins as members of “a desert civilization as found in outlying regions and mountains, in hamlets near pastures in waste regions, and on the fringes of sandy deserts.” Despite calling Berbers “Bedouins” here and elsewhere (e.g., page 270), he acknowledges at several other points that some Berbers practice agriculture and are distinct from Bedouins.

We [Arabs] set out from Yemen unit we came here [to Libya]. We went by land, by land [*barr barr*], so they called us “Berbers” ... [It was colonialism which came and said,] “you are Berbers, a different people. You are not Arabs.” They wanted to make us err concerning our history, our origin and our civilization ... Libya is for Libyans. We will not tolerate in Libya any ethnic zealotry. No one can say “my origin is this, that, or the other.” Whoever says this is an agent of colonialism (quoted in Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 141).

In the late twentieth century, many social scientists also seemed to accept the outcome of general Arab-Muslim homogenization.²⁰ Gellner (1972: 13), for example, wrote that “in his heart, the Berber knows that God speaks Arabic and modernity speaks French.”

Today, despite the dominant popular and academic discourse on “Muslims,” the Imazighen are increasingly considered a distinct nation. This is primarily due to the efforts of elite activists, such as those involved in the Amazigh World Congress, the Amazigh Culture Movement, and the publication of *Le Monde Amazigh* (for a review see Maddy-Weitzman 2011). In Morocco, where 40–45 percent of Imazighen live, King Mohamed VI is slowly undoing decades of repression and “Arabization” by taking small steps to support the Amazigh culture (see Subsection 3.3.2).

1.2.4 Spaniards, Europeans, Christians, or christianos?

Despite my informant’s explanation for the difference across Ceuta and Melilla, I do not adopt a primordialist approach. Instead, I am interested in treating the construction and meanings of group categories as well as subsequent manifestations of “groupness” as the outcomes of interest. (I discuss “groupness” below, in Subsection 1.2.7.) Yet, to do so,

²⁰A notable exceptions is the work of David Montgomery Hart.

I still must refer to the everyday social classification schemes used by residents of the Exclaves.

One of the two major group labels in the cities' quotidian categorization scheme is *christiano*, or "christian." This category name refers to people whom casual observers, especially if drawing from representations in popular culture or American norms, may term as "white" or "European" or "Spanish." Residents of the Exclaves might also make such associations, as well as associations with particular languages, somatic markers, and positions of power. However, the primary force behind the term in the centuries-old system of classification based on religious cleavages (see also Torres Cólón 2008). Note that the term *christiano* is not made in reference to an individuals' personal religiosity—hence, the lower-case "c." Indeed, most *christianos* I met struck me as relatively secular.

It is important to stress that the label *christiano* is just a *name* of a category. Some scholars of ethnicity may equate such a name with the "essence" of an ethnic identity or group but in this dissertation—as in the typical usages by the residents of Ceuta and Melilla—the name only refers to a commonly recognized category and boundary. What it *means* to be a member of that group may change *independently of the name* (see Chandra 2012a: 113-15). Indeed, one of the main arguments of this dissertation will be that the *same* group category name may have *different* meanings across the Exclaves.

1.2.5 Moroccans, North Africans, Muslims, or musulmanes?

The second major group label in the cities' everyday social classification scheme is *musulmán*, or "muslim." As with the label *christiano*, this category name refers to a group of individuals who share a familiarity with Islam, regardless of individuals' personal religiosity. In the past, this label also strongly correlated with language and somatic markers and,

for many residents, it continues to do so. Today, however, increasing numbers of residents recognize that a *musulmán* may be fluent in Spanish and fair-skinned—although he or she would still be labeled *musulmán/a*.

In Ceuta and Melilla, then, most of the local populace is classified into two categories: *christianos* and *musulmanes*.²¹ These are the terms I use, although at some points I switch between *christiano* and “Christian” and *musulmán* and “Muslim” to improve readability. In these instances, I do not mean to imply a personal religiosity when I use the capitalized English terms. Finally, it is vital to understand these terms as just *names* people use. What it *means* to be a member of these categories or how these categories are activated and expressed may vary independently of the names.

1.2.6 Immigrants or natives?

Christianos do *not* solely comprise the native population; *musulmanes* do *not* solely comprise the immigrant population. In fact, most *christianos* and most *musulmanes* currently living in Ceuta and Melilla were born in Spain (see Section 2.4). Therefore, I do not refer to *musulmanes*, or any group of people, as “*n*-generation immigrants” unless if I am discussing individuals who were actually born in another country, such as Morocco. This is the case even if an individuals’ ancestors moved to Ceuta and Melilla at some point in the past.²²

²¹There are smaller groups, as well. These are also labeled by their religious affiliation, such as those of Jewish affiliation and those of Hindu affiliation.

²²Of course, the research of a large number of immigration scholars have shown that being the child or grandchild of an immigrant can affect one’s social position and identity. A classic example of this is Portes and Rumbaut’s (2006) work on selective acculturation and reactive ethnicity. However, I do not make the assumption that such processes are occurring. Instead, in this study, I just note the barest objective attributes of individuals—for example, their place of birth—and then analyze if differences in behaviors emerge. Regardless, Spain does not collect data on whether an individual is the child or grandchild of an immigrant, so even classifying individuals as such—and perhaps subsequently explore processes such as reactive ethnicity—is not possible on a large scale. Finally, it is worth mentioning that some research shows that the children of immigrants are very similar to the children of non-immigrants along certain dimensions. For example, Rumbaut (2002), drawing on a decade-long longitudinal study, finds that the majority of second-generation immigrant respondents felt that the United States was home and demonstrated no transnational attachment at all.

Such a stance contrasts with many scholars of ethnicity, including keen and highly regarded scholars such as Herbert Gans. For example, Gans (2014) recently referred to some Americans as *fourth*, *fifth*, and *sixth* generation immigrants, calling them “later-generation ethnics (LGEs)”!²³ The biggest downside of this perspective is that it presupposes that “LGE” individuals inherently have something inside of them we can call “ethnicity,” which social scientists can then “look for and at” (Gans 2014: 758). My approach generates different orientating questions. It encourages us not make assumptions of native-born (or immigrant) individuals and, instead, first ask, *is* there a distinct notion of “ethnic groupness”? Then, if so, what makes it distinct and how and when is it expressed as distinct?

1.2.7 Groups or groupness? Or, what is the *explanandum*?

Most studies facing the puzzle described above—how being “Arab” or “Amazigh” affects social life in the Exclaves—would claim to be concerned with “identity,” “ethnicity,” or “ethnic groups.” These studies would reach conclusions similar to, “Arabs, Imazighen, and Spaniards have distinct *identities*” and “Arab, Amazigh, and Spanish are different *ethnic groups* (or groups with “common interests,” or a “shared culture,” or a “shared memory,” or some other shared attribute), and, as such, generate dissimilar notions of *solidarity* (or *belonging*, or *boundaries*, or *cleavages*, or some other outcome).” Such arguments, however, are messier—and perhaps less helpful—than at first glance.

²³I suspect that the absurdity of this notion is only barely hidden. Gans (2014: 761) himself seems to reluctantly recognize this, writing that “late-generation European ethnicity has virtually disappeared or at least is no longer visible” and “Most LGEs are already or will soon be like all other Americans, the descendants of long-ago—and often forgotten—immigrants.” This second claim, though, betrays another level of fatuousness: “LGEs”—fourth, fifth, and sixth-generation Americans—*are* Americans. They are not “already” or “soon to be” *like* Americans. Holding on to such conceptualizations makes the social sciences complicit in the reification of racialized and essentialized identity categories. See also, Alba 1985.

Approaches to studying identity and ethnicity

One place to start when trying to clarify these existing arguments is to ask, what is “identity” and how does it work? For instance, is an “identity” the reason for there being something called “Arabs,” or “Imazighen,” or “Spanish”? Or, does the existence of things called “Arabs,” “Imazighen,” and “Spanish” generate an “identity” in someone?

Typically, answers to questions like these assert that individuals “identify with” groups—perhaps because of exchange relationships (see Tajfel 1981; Wimmer 2002; Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012)—and subsequently build up a repertoire of identified-with group categories, which the individual then switches between, or sees as most “salient,” depending on the social context. Many scholars argue that this “identification with” generates divisive classification schemes of “ingroup” and “outgroup” within individuals. When the schemes map onto patterns of association, these scholars begin to talk of “boundaries” (Wimmer 2013a).

The path from groups to “identification with” these groups to salient identities to boundaries could be helpful in the present study. For example, I could argue that residents identify with “Arab,” “Amazigh,” and “Spanish” differentially across the Exclaves because of, say, dissimilar exchange relationships, and that this results in different boundaries and solidary groupings—solidary groupings with names such as “Arab,” “Amazigh,” and “Spanish.” The problems with such arguments should now be clearer. Namely, (1) where do the groups to be identified with come from; (2) are boundaries always necessary for solidarity; (3) if individuals can identify with multiple groups, are multiple boundaries and multiple solidarities always possible; (4) do such argument simply state that if groups exist, some people will identify with them and, as a result, form (or reinforce?) the groups; and (5) why would

identifying with one group (e.g., Arab) generate a different sort of boundary and solidary landscape than identifying with another group (e.g., Amazigh)?²⁴

Some of these problems are addressed, or at least, bypassed, by the scholars of ethnicity who opt to follow in the footsteps of Weber (1978) and specify the attributes that produce “ethnic groups.”²⁵ (At this point, I narrow my discussion to the scholarship on ethnicity because I am dealing with commonly recognized ethnic categories, such as Arab and Amazigh.) This approach helps us to make sense of how lasting groups are generated (above, Question 1); uncover other factors, such as history and symbols, that may produce solidarity (above, Question 2); and explain why different groups may lead to different outcomes (above, Question 5). It also tends to result in lists of attributes credited with forming and distinguishing ethnic groups. For example, Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 6) offer the following list to define ethnicity:

[A] named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity.

Similarity, Fearon (2003: 7) identifies the following conditions for ethnic group formation (as summarized in Chandra 2012d: 70):

- (1) Membership is reckoned primarily by descent . . .
- (2) Members are conscious of group membership,
- (3) Members share distinguishing cultural features,
- (4)

²⁴Some of these questions are discussed in further detail in Billig 1995: 60-9 and Jenkins 2014.

²⁵I understand ethnicity as inclusive of nation and race. I define ethnicity as a subset of categories of differentiation (e.g., gender, class, educational attainment), “identities” (what Yuval-Davis (2011) refers to as narratives regarding the self and its boundaries), or notions of “groupness” (what Brubaker (2004) describes as an event of solidarity with a group (see also Jenkins 2014)) that require *descent-based attributes* for membership (Chandra 2012c). Thus, skin color attributes perceived as *based on descent* in a given context will produce a class of this subset commonly known as “race” (Chandra 2012c: 9). Attributes related to territory or birthplace that are perceived as *descent-based* will produce a class of this subset known as “nation” (Chandra 2012d: 64). See also, Brubaker 2014; Spillman and Faeges 2005; Wimmer 2013a.

These cultural features are valued by a majority of members, (5) The group has or remembers a homeland, (6) The group has a shared history as a group that is “not wholly manufactured but has some basis in fact.”

In yet another example, Hale (2008: 42-3), who conceptualizes of ethnicity as a tool for reducing uncertainty in the face of complex social world, lists the following as “core features” of ethnic groups: connotation of common fate, barriers to communication [with outsiders], visible physical differences that are hard to change or disguise, and correlation with other important factor.

Yet, while helpful, such definitions—which do the work of explaining how ethnic groups are generated—are not without their own flaws.²⁶ First, depending how they are used, many border tautology. For example, Hutchinson and Smith (1996) suggest that a group culture and group solidarity are necessary for the group to exist. Similarly, Fearon (2003) implies that distinct group cultural characteristics and group membership must pre-exist for that group to have members (i.e., be a group). Second, the conceptual homogeneity is never made clear.²⁷ Within each definition, is each attribute necessary? Are combinations of *some* attributes sufficient? Are some attributes continuous, and certain “levels” (e.g., the degree that culture is shared) are necessary or sufficient? If we pool various definitions together, should the entire range of attributes be considered necessary or are some combinations sufficient? Third, the approach of specifying how ethnic groups are formed, as a whole, violates the assumption of causal homogeneity.²⁸ That is, it is never made clear—or shown—that each attribute generates an ethnic group in the same way across cases.

²⁶For a more detailed and different review and critique of such definitions, including the examples given in this section, see Chandra 2012d: 69-71.

²⁷On conceptual homogeneity, see Mahoney 2010: 136-8.

²⁸On causal homogeneity, see Collier et al. 2010: 41-3.

Fourth, relying on such definitions to explain outcomes, such as why Arabs are distinct from Imazighen, risks conceptualizing the groups as concrete, tangible, bounded entities.

Groupness and the combinatorial approach

In this dissertation, I attempt to avoid the pitfalls of both the “identity approach,” discussed initially, and the “groupist” approach and by taking two steps. First, I focus on *groupness* as my broad outcome of interest. That is, I aim to explain, in general, *why* and *how*, some people display noticeable and distinct similarity and cohesion in specific places and at some times (Brubaker 2004, 2005; Jenkins 2014). This means that I am not necessarily claiming that one or many boundaries are present; instead, I am solely examining groups as *events*, or occurrences of differentiation (see Question 3, above). In addition, my focus on groupness does not require me to assume that groups are pre-existing. Rather, I am assuming that rich, diverse, and complex social, political, and economic landscapes exist in each community and, from this, occurrences of groups arise (see Question 4, above).

Second, I further avoid assuming the existence of fixed identities or groups in social contexts by adopting Chandra’s (2012b) combinatorial approach to studying ethnicity. This approach, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3, starts by specifying the *descent-based attributes* in a given population. These are the individual-level characteristics that are widely recognized, in that context, to be based on descent. The approach then entails explaining, using combinatorial logic, how these attributes are used to construct *viable* ethnic categories. In other words, it requires specifying *potential* instances of groupness, or possible manifestations of events that look like groups. In this dissertation, I adopt Chandra’s terminology and primarily refer to these potential events of groupness as “ethnic categories,” although, at times, I do use the term “groupness.”

It is important to stress two points about ethnic categories. One, they are distinct from one another because they are constituted by different combinations of descent-based attributes. As a result, they have different meanings, derived from understandings of their constitutive attributes. Two, they are only potential appearances of phenomena that we conventionally call “groups.”

Thus, ethnic categories are expressed, activated, manifested, or “made real” only at specific times in specific contexts. When such expressions—manifestations of groupness—are consistent and stable over time, I argue that “identities” are formed. By identities, I mean narratives that individuals tell themselves about their self and the symbolic and social boundaries they encounter (Yuval-Davis 2006, 2011). In other words, the *activation* of an ethnic category must be durable, widely recognized, and lasting for the crafting of self-narratives—identities and boundaries—to occur. Since different ethnic categories have different meanings, identities based on the prolonged activation of different categories also tend to be distinct. Yet, when two or more individuals consistently activate the same ethnic categories (from the range of finite possibilities), they are more likely to have shared identities. In Subsection 3.5.2, I will discuss two shared identities: “cultural identity” and “national identity.”

Activated ethnic categories and the shared identities they can produce are best observed during moments of “ethnic practice” (discussed further in Section 3.5). In other words, examining concrete behavior in specific contexts enables us to assess whether, first, the ethnic categories theorized to be viable are in fact able to be activated and, second, whether the categories theorize to be different are in fact different and partially generative of dissimilar behaviors (Chandra 2012b: 11). Consequently, in this dissertation, I devote Chapter 2 to examining whether individuals who are widely-recognized as members of the same ethnic

category (i.e., *musulmán*) demonstrate significantly different behavior in a given context (i.e., the acquisition of Spanish citizenship) across the Exclaves. When I find that there is variation in behavior, I use Chapter 3 to argue that the meaning and shared understanding of the *musulmán* ethnic category also varies across the Exclaves. I then develop a model for why such variation occurs. Finally, I evaluate my argument in Chapter 4 by analyzing another form of ethnic practice, the activation of ethnic categories in the context of local politics.


My treatment of identity, groups, and ethnicity admittedly seems complex. However, I believe it is a necessary framework because it helps to overcome many of the difficulties in the existing literature. To help explain why some groups are different than others, my approach ties specific attributes to group categories. To avoid tautology, I specifies the descent-based attributes, or basic elements, in a given population that help to generate instances of groups. To achieve conceptual homogeneity, my approach identifies which attributes are necessary for each category in a given context. To maintain causal homogeneity, it adopts strict contextual specificity: descent-based attributes generate ethnic groups through combinatorial processes across all cases, but the *specific attributes* vary across cases. Finally, the approach emphasizes that categories are just possibilities—they must be *activated* in specific contexts to shape groupness, the crafting of boundaries and identities, and behavior.

With these benefits in mind, I move forward with my project, devoting Chapter 3 to make my argument as simple and clear as possible. As a first step, I outline the basic stages in Figure 1.1. It depicts how descent-based attributes constitute ethnic categories. These viable ethnic categories, what they mean, and how are they understood, represent a first *explanandum*.²⁹ The viable ethnic categories may then be activated or expressed

²⁹This is the stage of my analysis in which I explore my informant’s argument that ancestral heritage—

as groupness. Such events, in turn, can come to shape identities and influence behavior, in certain contexts. These observable behaviors can be considered a second *explanandum*, but one clearly related to the first *explanandum*, the viable ethnic categories, as well as the possible identities the categories establish.

Figure 1.1: Basic Stages of the Argument



1.3 Guiding questions and outline of the dissertation

In this section, I present my three guiding questions, derived from the broad puzzle discussed in Section 1.1. After each question I outline how I engage the question, thereby providing a brief outline of the dissertation.

1.3.1 Chapter Two, “Citizenship: Ethnic Practice and Identities”

First, *do ethnic categories, or notions of groupness, differ across Ceuta and Melilla, and if so, in what ways?* In other words, were my impressions in 2011 accurate or simply a product of conversations with certain residents and community leaders? To explore whether the

whether an individual is “Arab” or “Amazigh”—influences current conceptualizations and understandings of groupness.

cities are in fact different, and, if so, how they differ, I devote Chapter 2, “Citizenship: Ethnic Practice and Identities,” to an analysis of Spanish citizenship among the cities’ residents between 2011 and 2013. I choose to study citizenship because it provides a meaningful window into the expression of categories among the Exclaves’ residents. In the case of Ceuta and Melilla, where citizenship is the result of a choice either of the acquirers or grantees, it serves as a reasonable indicator of a specific, widely recognized identity—namely, self-identification with the Spanish nation and its distinctive characteristics.³⁰ Furthermore, being a citizen plays a role in the generation of future ethnic categories and, as a result, the future crafting of identities and boundaries.

In conducting this analysis, I do not assign individuals to pre-determined categories, such as “white,” “Muslim,” or “Arab,” but rather use ecological inference methods to allow patterns of behavior to emerge from a survey of the entire population. In addition, I control for the dynamics of immigration, such as varying pathways of assimilation, as best as possible by accounting for residents’ place of birth. Indeed, my focus throughout this dissertation will be on *native-born* residents. I also control for gender, age, and education.

I find that the majority of *musulmanes* in the Exclaves are Spanish citizens. However, I also find that the rates of native-born residents with Spanish citizenship in Melilla are significantly lower than in Ceuta, where Spanish citizenship is nearly universal. Moreover, the *melillense* census tracts with the lowest rates of citizenship are the census tracts with the highest concentrations of Muslim residents. I do not find such a correlation in Ceuta—neighborhoods with high concentrations of Muslim also have high rates of Spanish citizenship. These findings suggest that, yes, notions of ethnic categories do differ across

³⁰Unlike the United States, Spanish citizenship is not granted *jus soli*. Unless a resident is the child of Spanish nationals, she must apply for citizenship. The specific requirements for gaining nationality are discussed in Section 2.3.

Ceuta and Melilla and that one of the ways they do so is in regards to nationality.

1.3.2 Chapter Three, “History, Power, and Ethnic Categories in the Exclaves”

Second, *why and how do the meanings and shared understandings of ethnic categories differ across Ceuta and Melilla?* That is, to paraphrase Brubaker (1996) what are the “actual existing” ethnic categories in the Exclaves, not just the names of the categories? I explore this question in Chapter 3, “History, Power, and Ethnic Categories in the Exclaves,” with the combinatorial approach to ethnicity, developed by Chandra (2012b) and her collaborators. The combinatorial approach is particularly helpful in this circumstance because it provides a language to think about the elements that comprise group categories. This enables the study of variation in categories’ constitutive parts and meanings even though the categories may “appear” similar on the surface (see also, Subsection 1.2.7).

In brief, I argue that while the residents of Ceuta and Melilla share many *descent-based attributes*—or individual-level attributes that residents believe are tied to descent—such as somatic markers and religious affiliation, the populations differ in a key attribute: *political homeland*. Political homelands are imagined historical collectives differentiated from one another by relative positions of power. In some communities or societies, individuals are tied to specific political homelands through claim-making, assignation, or a combination of both—links that are justified by referencing (perceived) inherited qualities, such as cultural idioms and discursive frames. Such links are often made and remade through everyday, banal references (Billig 1995).

I argue, then, that the communities of Ceuta and Melilla differ in how their members are tied to political homelands. Among Ceuta’s residents, the “available” political homelands

are *titular*, in this case “Spanish,” and *indigenous*, in this case “Arab.” Among Melilla’s residents, the available political homelands are titular and *autochthonous*, meaning “born out of the earth” and, in this case, referring to the Imazighen. As a result, the practical categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are generated from different “combinations” of values. In Ceuta, *christiano* is partially composed of the titular political homeland while *musulmán* is partially composed of the indigenous political homeland. In Melilla, *christiano* is also partially built on the titular political homeland but *musulmán* rests in part on the autochthonous, not indigenous, political homeland.

The latter parts of the chapter are devoted to discussing how such variation in political homeland affects the meanings, shared understandings, and activation of the resulting ethnic categories in each city. Finally, I discuss my argument’s implications for observable behavior in the context of local politics, implications which I evaluate in the following chapter.

1.3.3 Chapter Four, “The Politics of Autochthony: Ethnic Parties and Voting Across Categories”

The fourth, final empirical chapter addresses the question, *how are the differing meanings of the musulmán ethnic categories manifested in the context of local politics?* Engaging this question serves as an assessment of the argument presented in Chapter 3: if the meanings of *musulmán* do differ between Ceuta and Melilla, the categories should lead to different outcomes when activated during the formation of ethnic political parties and elections. Moreover, the specific meanings of the categories provides concrete expectations for both the types of ethnic political parties in each city and the voting behavior of *musulmans*.

Thus, Chapter 4, “The Politics of Autochthony: Ethnic Parties and Voting Across

Categories,” presents an analysis of local politics in the Exclaves. The analysis has three parts. First, I examine the political parties of the Exclaves. Here, I expect that the meaning of *musulmán* in Ceuta should result in smaller, and multiple ethnic political parties whereas the meaning of *musulmán* in Melilla should result in a stronger, stable ethnic political party. Second, I examine the voting behavior of the Exclaves’ residents in the two most recent elections, 2007 and 2011. The expectation is that *musulames* in Ceuta will be more likely to vote across ethnic lines and the *musulmanes* in Melilla. Finally, I examine the electoral volatility in the cities from 1979, the first election after the restoration of democracy, to 2011. Here, electoral volatility serves as an indicator of shared understandings and boundaries of categories—more permeable categories tend to produce greater electoral volatility while less permeable categories then to produce less electoral volatility (Ferree 2012).

1.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, my dissertation explores why and how it matters that *musulmanes* are “Arab” in Ceuta and “Amaizgh” in Melilla. What does it mean, in this context, to “be Arab” and “be Amazigh”? What are the consequences of these reified categories for contemporary group identities, boundaries, nationalities, and politics? By exploring these questions, I attempt to take my informant’s perspective seriously,³¹ albeit with a critical eye informed by constructivist notions of ethnicity and identity. In the end, I come to agree with him. The Amaizgh “political memory” *does* matter.

This conclusion provides a different perspective than most modernists scholars of Berbers, such as Gellner (1972), who predicted that the Amazigh people and culture would disappear into an Arab-Muslim milieu. It also differs from the practices of many contemporary

³¹See Subsection 1.1.4.

observers of European Muslims who homogenize the group into “Muslims” or classify them by nationalities of origin, as well as emphasize the (alleged) influence of Islam on a wide range of beliefs and practices. Instead, as I discuss in the following chapters, my research for this project emphasizes what John Stuart Mill (1993: 391) calls the “political antecedents . . . and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation” *within* communities such as “European Muslims.”

Such an emphasis will ultimately lead me, at the end of my project, to two general points. First, the Imazighen have been *double-colonized*. Not only was this point under-emphasized by some modernist social scientists and ignored by Arab nationalists, but it is often overlooked today by many scholars of post-colonial dynamics, immigration, and ethnicity—not to mention political and media voices. This is especially disappointing when we consider the how many double-colonized communities exist today: consider, for example, the Montagnards of Southeast Asia, the Tamils in some parts of South Asia, First Nations in the United States and Canada, and various autochthonous peoples in Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia. Second, history, in some cases, matters for contemporary ethnicity. However, this is not because group solidarity, shared cultures, or boundaries from the past still exist today, but because in these contexts individuals recall past power relations between *pre-modern* groups of colonizers and colonized when shaping their present social, political, and economic landscapes.

Chapter 2

Citizenship: Ethnic Practice and Identities

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I begin exploring the dissimilarity between Ceuta and Melilla by addressing the first guiding question of this dissertation, *do notions of groupness, or ethnic categories, differ across Ceuta and Melilla, and if so, in what ways?* I develop an answer to this question through an analysis of *which* residents and *how many* residents of each city hold Spanish citizenship. Two major themes emerge from this analysis. First, the Exclaves differ in regards to residents' acquisition of Spanish nationality. This conclusion provides support for my impressions from fieldwork (see Section 1.1). Second, because citizenship is a widely valued way to express, unite, and integrate residents of a state into a nation, the disparity in nationality provides some insight into the broader themes of this dissertation—namely, the relationship between ethnicity, perceived ethnic heritage, and the construction of subnational variations of a dominant national identity.

I begin this chapter by discussing how citizenship can be an “ethnic practice,” or an activation of one of the several overlapping and nested ethnic identities available to individuals (Chandra 2012c; Wimmer 2008a). I then introduce the comparison of Ceuta and

Melilla, emphasizing how the similarities in the two cities—spanning political institutions, regulatory regimes, economic conditions, and demographics—suggest that citizenship rates should *not* vary between the Muslim communities of each city.

I then turn to testing this assumption of similar citizenship rates. This analytical portion of the chapter begins with a discussion of the data and methodology, followed by the presentation of the findings. In this latter section, I discuss evidence that citizenships *do* in fact vary across the Exclaves, leading me to posit that this dissimilarity may be due to attributes related specifically to being Muslim in Melilla. Finally, returning to the understanding of citizenship as an ethnic practice, I frame the chapter’s empirical findings as a more generalized question: why and how are Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla using their descent-based attributes to construct notions of “Spanish-ness,” or subnational ethno-national identity, that vary across the cities? As mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, this question both motivates and previews the subsequent chapters.

Yet in addition to motivating the puzzle at the heart of my dissertation, the central analysis of this chapter—an ecological inferential analysis of citizenship rates in the Exclaves in 2011, 2012, and 2013—offers a pair of contributions to our understanding of ethnic and national groups. First, it underscores the fact that ethnicity and nationality are not interchangeable. That is, my analysis shows that variation in identity can and does exist *within* groups that share a nationality, thereby challenging the numerous studies of “ethnicity” that use nationality as a indicator (see, for example, Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Okamoto 2003; Platt 2014; Rumbaut 2002). Along this vein, it builds on the few studies that recognize the heterogeneity in Spain’s Muslim and Moroccan communities (see UCIDE 2012) by examining the potential causes and consequences of such internal variation.

Second, this chapter demonstrates the usefulness of ecological inference (EI) for ex-

aming identity and ethnicity. Namely, because EI methods provide information about individuals' behavior, such as the proportion acquiring citizenship or casting a vote for a particular political party, analyses of multiple years generates a picture of individuals' social position-taking over time, or their positionality (Anthias 2006). Furthermore, unlike response-driven research such as surveys, EI does not rely on an antecedent assumption of fixed and mutually exclusive identity categories. Instead, the method permits group-level patterns to emerge from an analysis of an entire population. In other words, the presence, characteristic behavior, and spatial boundaries of groups themselves are treated as the dependent variable (Wimmer 2008b).

2.2 Citizenship as ethnic practice

For much of modern history, citizenship in a nation-state had been considered a reflection of ethno-national identity. This link was largely due to the prevalence of conceptualizing nation-states as *ethnos*, or consisting of a fixed nation of people, and the granting of citizenship through *jus sanguinis*, or the right of blood. In other words, citizenship denoted a membership in a national polity that both depended on and signaled one's inherited—or, at least, assigned—ethnicity (for a discussion on the distinctions among citizenships see Brubaker 1992).¹

In recent decades, however, citizenship has been examined in the context of the *demos*, or civic, nation-state as a result of the increasing visibility of national minority identity movements, the growing influence of diasporas, and the global movements of immigrants.(see

¹It is commonly understood that in many pre-modern states, ethnicity—to the degree that it was recognized as such—was a necessary but not sufficient condition for citizenship. Instead, citizenship was understood as a privilege only accessible to some members of a certain class and gender.

Cohen 2008; Joppke 1998; Kymlicka 1995).² In this context, it has become more closely tied to *jus soli*, or the right of soil, and is seen as existing in a more complex relationship with ethnic identity. Unsurprisingly, the understanding of citizenship has become more nuanced, such as the shift towards studying “thick” citizenship, or the participation in social life and civil society (Somers 2005).

Part of this problematizing turn has been the exploration of citizenship’s potential *generation* of ethno-national identity through its binding of individuals to the particularism of a territorially-bound polity. Although the generative process is conceptualized in different ways, the basic idea is that since an individual’s rights and obligations are defined exclusively through attachment to the nation-state and because these largely end at the borders of a nation state, citizenship serves as a powerful, repeated reminder of where one does and does not *belong* (see Anthias 2006; Tilly 1995). Or, as Yuval-Davis et al. (2006: 7) put it, “citizenship is the participatory component of belonging.” Paradoxically, then, the deeper understanding of modern citizenship points to the same outcome as traditional notions: citizenship reflects ethno-national identity, although now due to a generative process rather than a primordial marker.

Of course, there are many cases in which citizenship should not be understood as indicative of ethno-national identity. Institutional barriers, purposeful exclusion by powerful actors, and a lack of human or social capital all can prevent individuals from having activating a chosen identity through citizenship (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). For example, undocumented migrants who enter the United States at a very young age may identify as American but never have the option to express that identity through the symbols of

²These historical changes have also resulted in a boom in “citizenship studies” (for a review, see Somers 2005). Google’s Ngram tool, for example, records a double-peaked trajectory in the use of the term “citizenship”: the frequency increases steadily between 1800 and 1921, then decreases until 1983, at which point it increases dramatically to its all-time peak in 2007, with mentions in 0.0018 percent of books.

American citizenship. Similarly, many German residents of Turkish descent are currently forced to choose between German or Turkish citizenship at the age of 18, regardless of whether they simultaneously identify with both nation-states. In opposite circumstances, individuals may hold citizenship but not associate it with a potential identity due to exclusionary practices by the national government or other actors. Furthermore, in cases of *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*, citizenship may be so taken-for-granted that individuals may rarely activate it as a practice or expression of identity (Joppke 2006). These conditions, then, illustrate how citizenship may provide little insight into individuals' self-identification with an ethno-nationality.

Yet under conditions in which individuals can attain citizenship through clear, open, and accessible regulations—rather than exclusively through *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli*—the acquisition of citizenship often represents an *ethnic practice*, or the purposeful expression of one of the several nested and overlapping ethnic or national identities available to individuals (Chandra 2012c).³ Put concretely, an individual's decision to become a naturalized citizen is often understood as an affirmation of her birth in the naturalizing country or, in instances when the decision is based on long-term residency, a signification of a willingness to adopt an identity widely understood to hold the same meaning as descent or ancestry. Moreover, acquiring citizenship represents a desire to provide future progeny with specific descent-based attributes and—when dual citizenship is not possible—to forgo *other* descent-based attributes.⁴

The reverse also holds. If citizenship is offered as a choice when similar rights and

³Hale (2008) makes a similar distinction between ethnicity identity and practice, the latter of which he terms “ethnic politics.”

⁴Of course, citizenship may be motivated by purely instrumental reasons, such the acquisition of a passport. In many cases, though, individuals are satisfied with the benefits of permanent residency; changing passports is not enough reason to acquire citizenship. For contemporary anecdotes relating why individuals choose not to change their passports for an American passport, see Semple 2013.

benefits are granted to permanent residents, then choosing *not* to become a citizen suggests a practical acceptance of a nation state but not its particularities, such as a shared history and sense of fate. In the case, the non-citizen may be activating an alternative ethno-national identity, typically due to birth in or ancestry traced to another nation state (Joppke 2008).

In sum, due to the institutional and regulatory conditions present in contemporary Spain—discussed in detail in the following section—I understand citizenship as providing a window into ethno-national identity. This is not because I conceptualize of citizenship as a marker of a primordial ethnicity or a deterministically generative of an identity. Rather, citizenship in the context of Ceuta and Melilla can be seen as a choice, or ethnic practice, that signals an activation of a particular ethno-national identity—it is, for many, a willing membership in a *de facto* descent-based category (Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad et al. 2008). And, even if this understanding is disputed—or in the instances in which attaining citizenship was not a choice—I side with the perspective that citizenship is generative of ethno-national identity at least to a small degree. Again, that is that while holding citizenship may at first be a superficial signal of loyalty and attempt to acquire rights, the associated social and political participation in a nation-state—and the simultaneous exclusion from other nation-states—come to shape an individuals’ ideas of their own identity over time (Bonacich 1973; Koopmans et al. 2005). As a result, I argue that the following analysis of citizenship rates in the Exclaves portrays recent ethnic practice as well as likely future ethno-national identities.

2.3 Citizenship in the Exclaves

Today, Spain offers the conditions under which the acquisition of citizenship is an ethnic practice for many of its residents. Spain's citizenship laws combine *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, meaning that unless an individual is born to parents of Spanish nationality, she has to select to pursue naturalization. For most people in this position, acquiring citizenship requires 10 years of legal residence in Spain or one year of residence if the individual marries a Spanish citizen or is born in Spain to foreign parents.⁵

In addition, many of the benefits of the welfare state, along with work and residence permits, are granted through residential registration, not citizenship or legal status. As a result, most non-citizens register themselves without pursuing citizenship, especially since personal registration information is not shared with immigration enforcement agencies (Bradatan and Sandu 2012; Reher and Requena 2009). For the purposes of the following analysis, it is important to emphasize that such a residential policy decreases the need to pursue citizenship for purely instrumental motives, thereby strengthening the link between citizenship and the expression of an ethno-national identity.

Of course, formal and informal institutional, regulatory, and discriminatory barriers have played a large role in denying minority populations from gaining citizenship in Spain, as in many other Western countries.⁶ This has been especially egregious in Ceuta and Melilla, where the cities' Muslim residents faced generations of discrimination at the hands of residents with European heritage. Most Muslims had no opportunity for upward mobility and little legal rights, living as stateless people until changes in the citizenship laws in the late 1980s (see Chapter 4).

⁵For a detailed discussion of citizenship laws in Spain, see Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes 2012.

⁶Here, many would begin this discussion by pointing to Spain's infamous expulsion of its Jewish population in 1492.

Within the Exclaves, circumstances for Muslims were slightly worse in Melilla, where, with a remote garrison at its core, the Spanish community was especially nationalistic and Catholic. During the era of Spanish Morocco, *melillenses* often differentiated the local Amazigh population from the coastal and urban Arabs—labeling the former *moro fronterizo*, or North Africans of the frontier, and the latter *moro del rey*, or those “of the king.” By the 1970s and 1980s, this racism had crystallized into a severe ghettoization of the city’s Muslims and fueled a tense atmosphere during the implementation of the 1985 Immigration Law. Melilla’s Muslims feared that the municipal government’s slow allocation of Spanish citizenship betrayed a conspiracy to deny them of the right to live in their city of birth; this resulted in widespread labor strikes, violent protests, and numerous injuries and fatalities at a level not seen in Ceuta (Driessen 1992).

Today, however, the Exclaves’ citizenship laws are in line with the rest of Spain and an entire generation has reached adulthood under the current citizenship regime. Of course, non-overt forms of discrimination persist in Ceuta and Melilla today but, for the most part, state institutions and government maintain equality among groups. For example, the Exclaves are the only jurisdictions in Spain to officially recognize and celebrate major Muslim holidays, such as Eid al-Fatr and Eid al-Adha. Ceuta even provides its military training grounds for massive outdoor prayers and celebrations during Eid al-Adha. In addition, both have several Muslim representatives in the municipal legislatures. In 2011, for example, Melilla elected the first representative to the national government who self-identifies as *musulmán*, Abdelmalik El Barkani.

In sum, Ceuta and Melilla provide a context in which citizenship can be understood as an indicator of ethnic practice, particularly among both their native- and foreign-born Muslim residents. The majority of *musulmanes* in previous generations—the parents of many of the

Exclaves' current residents—were not able to become Spanish citizens, meaning that many of today's *musulmanes*, even if native-born, need to decide to attain citizenship. As such, acquiring citizenship is a choice that reflects an identity built on descent-based attributes or sentiment and meanings that follow the logic of descent and ancestry.

Finally, because of the comparable social and institutional contexts between the Exclaves, there is reason to expect that the rates of citizenship will be similar across the cities. I explain this assumption below, but, as noted in the introduction, the assumption of similarity in citizenship levels will ultimately prove inaccurate.

2.4 Ceuta and Melilla

Relative to mainland Europe, Ceuta and Melilla are strikingly similar. They are clearly set apart from the Continent because of their unique geopolitical position and the accompanying transnational relationships (see Figure 2.1). In the Exclaves, local and international politics and social life are intertwined; the cities' governments and populaces routinely interact with EU representatives, the Spanish national government, and the Moroccan state and population in regards to immigration, trade, security, and regional development.

For instance, at a regional level, the Exclaves have established exclusive arrangements with their neighboring Moroccan provinces—Tetouan and Nador—that allow residents to cross the border in either direction with only a residency card. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 50 percent of the bilateral trade goods between Spain and Morocco currently crosses the border at Ceuta and Melilla (Oliva 2013) and, in Ceuta, 40 percent of the sales of local businesses are to Moroccan customers (EFE 2013a). At a trans-continental level, the Exclaves serve as transit points between Europe and Africa—during the summer of 2013,

2.2 million people passed through the cities (see Alcántara 2013; EFE 2013d).⁷

Moreover, while navigating the complex dynamics of national, regional, and continental borders, the Exclaves' municipal-level officials are often required to diffuse claims of sovereignty from the Moroccan national government. For example, when a 2013 dispute over an artificial reef hardened Spain's position on the sovereignty of Gibraltar, municipal officials of Ceuta and Melilla had to justify Spanish control of the Exclaves to the international press. Similarly, in November 2013, when an ex-prime minister of Spain, José María Aznar, revealed that he had told Morocco's King Hassan II in 1998 that if the king decided to go to war over the Exclaves, he would "lose," *ceutí* and *melillense* officials quickly emphasized that, today, their relationships with the Moroccan government are "better than ever" (EFE 2013c).

Figure 2.1: Ceuta and Melilla



⁷This figure includes nearby Tangiers, Morocco.

Relative to the Continent, the cities are also demographically similar (see Table 2.1). In 2013, each had a population of around 84,000 with a comparable sex ratio skewed towards males. In each city, around half the population are Muslim and a sizable minority (6.73% in Ceuta and 15.07% in Melilla) hold a foreign nationality. Of the foreign population, most are Muslim and nearly all were born in Morocco. (And nearly all of those born in Morocco are Muslim.) The foreign population in Ceuta has a similar sex ratio to the larger population whereas in Melilla the sex ratio of the foreign is skewed more towards males than the larger population. Finally, using a crude measure of religiosity—the total amount of students enrolled in Islamic education—the cities are similar. Unfortunately, these numbers of students cannot be compared to the total school-age Muslim population because, to the extent of my knowledge, that data does not exist.

Table 2.1: Comparing Ceuta and Melilla, 2013

	Ceuta	Melilla
Total population ^a	84,963	84,450
Population density ^a (people per km ²)	4,550	6,803
Percent Muslim of total population ^b	42.35	50.25
Percent foreign citizens of total population ^a	6.73	15.07
Percent Muslim of all foreign citizens ^b	81.30	83.16
Percent Moroccan of all foreign citizens ^a	81.99	82.82
Percent Muslim of all Moroccan-born ^b	98.9	99.59
Sex ratio of total population ^a	1.05	1.06
Sex ratio of foreign citizen population ^a	1.07	1.14
Total students enrolled in Islamic education ^b	6,452	7,893

^aSource: Spain's National Institute of Statistics

^bSource: Union of Islamic Communities of Spain

Overall, the similarity between the two cities supports the assumption that their citizenship rates will be comparable. To be sure, some differences in the demographic data

indicate that there may be some variation in citizenship. First, the greater proportion of Muslims in Melilla suggests that Muslims may feel more “at home” in the Exclave than their *ceutí* counterparts and, as a result, acquire Spanish citizenship at higher rates. Second, the greater gender imbalance in Melilla suggests that foreign-born males will be less likely to become Spanish citizens—and more likely to return to their countries of origin (for most, Morocco)—than either foreign-born females in Melilla or their male counterparts in Ceuta.

In the next section I test the general assumption of similarity—and others—through an ecological inferential analysis of citizenship rates in each Exclave.

2.5 Data and measures

To examine the citizenship rates in Ceuta and Melilla, I draw on two sources of data distributed by the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE).⁸ The primary source is the municipal registers of Ceuta and Melilla for 2011, 2012, and 2013. These registers are counts of a municipality’s residents conducted annually by the local government and reported to the INE, which revises, compiles, and publishes them as Spain’s official population counts. They are widely considered to be accurate because nearly all residents, including many undocumented residents, register themselves since registration grants access to work permits as well as medical care and is not shared with immigration enforcement (Bradatan and Sandu 2012; Sabater and Domingo 2012).

I only use the registers from 2011, 2012, and 2013 because these are the three years in which municipal governments record a resident’s country of birth. Previous to 2011, registers only indicate whether a resident was born in Spain or abroad; using this data would produce more inaccurate estimates than the data from 2011 through 2013. At the

⁸<http://www.ine.es/>

time of writing, the 2014 counts have not be completed.

The major limitation of the municipal registers is that its data are aggregated at the census tract level, rendering it impossible to know some individual-level attributes of a census tract's population. This is widely known as the ecological fallacy problem (see King 1997). For example, in the case of Spain, the municipal registers separately record the total number of Spanish citizens in a census tract and the total number of residents born in Spain in a census tract. From these marginals alone we cannot know the number of a census tract's residents who are native-born *and* Spanish citizens. To resolve this, I use methods of ecological inference (EI), which I explain below, in the Methods section. First, however, I discuss my measures.

2.5.1 Citizenship

I estimate residents' citizenship using the municipal registers' census tract counts of citizens. Because I am interested in individuals holding Spanish nationality, I collapse this data into a dichotomous variable: Spanish citizenship and citizenship of another country.

2.5.2 Place of birth

I estimate residents' place of birth using the municipal registers' census tract counts of birthplace. Because nearly all residents of Ceuta and Melilla are either born in Spain or Morocco (see Table 2.1) I collapse this data into three categories: born in Spain, born in Morocco, and born in a third country (that is not Spain or Morocco).

2.5.3 Other measures

Citizenship, immigration dynamics that lead to citizenship, and changes in ethno-national identities are often gendered (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). For instance, different stereotypes and expectations for females and males can lead to variation in how they approach the process to attain citizenship. In some cases, females may face more social social pressure than males to maintain closer ties to an ancestral homeland and forego citizenship. Similarly, female and males' different division of labor and mobility may result in variation in the ability to obtain citizenship (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Warikoo 2004). In Ceuta and Melilla, Muslim females—both native-born and foreign-born—typically find employment as domestic laborers in non-Muslim households while Muslim males often find employment in sectors that almost exclusively employ other Muslims. Such contexts can play large roles in an individual's incorporation into the larger society, sense of national belonging, and decision to acquire citizenship. I therefore consider variation in gender using data from the municipal registers tract counts. Gender is treated as a dichotomous variable.

Finally, I incorporate data on age. The most accurate estimates will result from examining citizenship among adults since this will, first, eliminate residents unable to become naturalized because they are minors and, second, increase the chances that residents who were born to foreign parents on Spanish territory or immigrated to Ceuta and Melilla when young have lived the requisite number of years in Spain (see Section 2.3). Because age is grouped in five-year increments in the registers, my analysis of adult residents is based on data from residents 20 years and older.

2.5.4 Covariates

As discussed earlier, various factors influence whether a resident becomes a citizen (see Section 2.2). Some of these are regulatory, such as requirements regarding time of residency and birthplace, while others are individual-level attributes. For example, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) find that human capital, particularly educational attainment, is the most significant individual-level attribute driving immigrants' acquisition of citizenship in the United States. Education increases earnings, which enables the immigrant to pay any requisite fees and associated costs, as well as the ability to navigate the regulations involved in obtaining citizenship.

In the following analysis, regulatory and other institutionalized factors are controlled through the comparison of Ceuta and Melilla (see Section 2.3). Assessing the effect of individual-level attributes on citizenship relative to ethnocultural attributes (and potential ethno-national identity markers) is more challenging. Spain, like many other Western European countries, does not collect data on residents' race, ethnicity, or religion. However, some data on the distribution of ethnocultural attributes, referred to below as ethnicity and Muslim residency, are available from non-state sources and existing scholarly research. Unfortunately, this data are is often estimated at highly aggregated levels, thereby only permitting an assessment of how education and inherited ethnocultural attributes influence citizenship through contextual pathways. That is, an analysis can assess whether education and inherited attributes, acting as contextual factors, may be grouping residents in specific census tracts or districts of Ceuta and Melilla and, through this sorting, affecting citizenship levels.

The effects of such factors on citizenship may operate at the contextual level, such as

in cases where similar individuals are grouped in an area far from government offices, making it more logistically difficult to apply for citizenship. Alternatively, effects may operate through the contextual conditioning of various individual-level mechanisms. For example, residential segregation or residential heterogeneity often structure the mechanisms that are identified in contact theories and theories on the convergence of identities through social networks (Lieberson 1969; Lubbers et al. 2007; Massey and Denton 1987; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Okamoto 2007). In addition, the spatial concentration of residents with similar levels of educational attainment may impact one's understanding of how to acquire citizenship. Similarly, the residential concentration of individuals with similar inherited ethnocultural attributes may shape individuals' experience of symbolic and social boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 2002), thereby influencing the choice to obtain citizenship.

Educational attainment

I measure the educational attainment of residents using data from Spain's 2011 census, the most recent census to be fully released. This census asked each household's respondent about their completed level of achievement. I convert this data first into a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not an individual had completed a post-secondary education program. Because this data is only available at the district level, I determine the proportion of each districts' population that has completed a post-secondary program and then assign the proportion to all the census tracts within that district.

Assigning a district's mean level of educational attainment to each of its census tracts is, of course, another ecological problem. Therefore, the estimates conditioned by the education measure should be taken with some skepticism—although given that Ceuta and Melilla are strongly segregated along district lines, it is likely the education rates at the

district level reflect those at the census tract level relatively well.

Residency patterns of Muslims

I measure the distribution of inherited ethnocultural attributes, or ethnicity, by using data depicting the residency patterns of Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla from the work of Herrero (2010) and Rontomé (2011). This research provides the proportion of Muslim residents in each city's districts (at least as perceived by the researchers). Fortunately, I am able to draw on the existing demographic work of these scholars because Spain, like some other West European countries, does not collect data on their residents' ethnicity, race, or religion. Unfortunately, the ethnicity data are only available at the district level, requiring me to assign the each district's proportion of Muslim residents to all the census tracts within that district. Because of this, estimates conditioned by the ethnicity measure should also be interpreted with caution. Although, again, since Ceuta and Melilla are strongly segregated along district lines, it is likely that rates of ethnicity at the district level reflect those at the census tract level relatively well.

Here, it is important to note that Herrero and Rontomé use “Muslim” in the *ceutí* and *melillense* sense: “Muslim”, or *musulman*, is a salient ethnic category—used by *christianos* and *musulmanes* alike—that reflects ethnocultural attributes, not personal religiosity (see also Driessen 1992; Gold 2000; Torres Cólón 2008). As noted in the Introduction, my use of the term “Muslim” earlier as well as in the following findings also refers to a “Muslim ethnicity” rather than religiosity.

2.6 Method

Producing estimates of individual-level data from ecological-level data requires the use of EI. Tools to conduct EI have improved in recent years, each adopting the technique of using available aggregated data to place deterministic bounds of ecological estimates (King 1997; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011). For example, by considering the total population of Spanish citizens in a census tract in an ecological inference model, estimates of native-born Spanish citizens are improved in that census tract. Estimates can be further improved by incorporating a variable—also measured with aggregate data—that likely played a role in non-randomly assigning individuals to units such as census tracts (see, for example, Haneuse and Wakefield 2004). In the analysis below, I use educational levels and perceived ethnicity as such covariates. I infer all estimates using the `ei` package with R 3.0.3 (Wittenberg et al. 2007).⁹

2.6.1 Estimating citizenship and place of birth

I begin by estimating citizenship by place of birth in each census tract of Ceuta and Melilla. This can be conceptualized as inferring the cell values in a 2x3 table, which is constructed by using known data (see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3) as marginals for the following rows and columns:

$$\begin{array}{c} \{\text{Spanish citizenship; Foreign citizenship}\} \times \\ \{\text{Born in Spain; Born in Morocco; Born in third country}\} \end{array}$$

In this instance, the deterministic bounds are set by the total population in each census tract. I infer these estimates separately for Ceuta and Melilla for each year (2011, 2012,

⁹Technical details can be found at <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/ei.pdf>.

and 2013).¹⁰

2.6.2 Estimating citizenship and place of birth, considering age

I then estimate citizenship by place of birth only for residents above the age of 20 (see Subsection 2.5.3). To do so, I first estimate the proportion of individuals in each census tract who are (1) Spanish citizens or not and (2) younger or older than 20 years. In other words, the known quantities for each census tract are two dichotomous variables: the number of Spanish and foreign nationals and the number of residents younger and older than 20 years.

The marginals for 2013 can be found in Appendix E and Appendix F.¹¹ In this step, the total populations for each census tract set the deterministic bounds.

Next, I estimate the proportion of individuals in each tract who are younger and older than the age of 20 by their place of birth, as defined by being born in Spain, born in Morocco, and born in a third country. For 2013, these marginals are found in Appendix K and Appendix L.¹² For these estimates, the total populations for each census tract again set the deterministic bounds.

I then use the point estimates from these inferences of the over-20 population to conduct a second round of EI. This consists of estimating the cell values of a series of 2x2 tables, constructed from organizing the point estimates into the following rows and columns:

¹⁰Marginals for 2012 can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B. Marginals for 2011 can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D.

¹¹Marginals for 2012 can be found in Appendix G and Appendix H. Marginals for 2011 are found in Appendix I and Appendix J.

¹²Marginals for 2012 are found in Appendix M and Appendix N. Marginals for 2011 are found in Appendix O and Appendix P.

Table 2.2: Marginals for Ceuta 2013 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	1797	134	1682	160	89	1931
2	5100101002	842	48	808	27	55	890
3	5100101003	1526	58	1450	60	74	1584
4	5100101004	1976	66	1890	83	69	2042
5	5100101005	1239	53	1190	61	41	1292
6	5100101006	1413	35	1358	53	37	1448
7	5100101007	1540	61	1480	80	41	1601
8	5100101008	1245	60	1174	84	47	1305
9	5100101009	1074	58	990	105	37	1132
10	5100101010	1678	40	1640	52	26	1718
11	5100102001	1289	73	1226	67	69	1362
12	5100102002	1525	132	1428	200	29	1657
13	5100102003	890	115	823	162	20	1005
14	5100102004	1331	83	1230	158	26	1414
15	5100102005	1485	89	1433	115	26	1574
16	5100102006	878	50	816	90	22	928
17	5100102007	1710	109	1570	223	26	1819
18	5100103001	1394	17	1345	45	21	1411
19	5100103002	1454	28	1391	63	28	1482
20	5100103003	1106	18	1078	28	18	1124
21	5100103004	928	29	911	25	21	957
22	5100103005	708	19	679	37	11	727
23	5100103006	1126	56	1076	86	20	1182
24	5100103007	1574	69	1505	106	32	1643
25	5100103008	737	76	703	98	12	813
26	5100103009	992	18	966	32	12	1010
27	5100103010	766	32	730	57	11	798
28	5100103011	1510	66	1412	126	38	1576
29	5100103012	841	7	812	23	13	848
30	5100103013	1882	32	1832	51	31	1914
31	5100103014	1362	142	1274	202	28	1504
32	5100104001	2264	78	2161	127	54	2342
33	5100104002	2173	201	2058	268	48	2374
34	5100104003	1694	33	1634	78	15	1727
35	5100104004	1161	20	1139	26	16	1181
36	5100104005	2113	117	1990	225	15	2230
37	5100104006	1934	272	1767	422	17	2206
38	5100104007	2019	320	1841	474	24	2339
39	5100104008	1334	115	1272	160	17	1449
40	5100104009	1114	90	1040	144	20	1204
41	5100104010	1572	262	1353	470	11	1834
42	5100104011	1929	199	1801	312	15	2128
43	5100105001	1177	90	1106	145	16	1267
44	5100105002	1218	72	1149	121	20	1290
45	5100105003	1574	117	1460	222	9	1691
46	5100105004	1693	194	1586	289	12	1887
47	5100105005	1020	91	918	163	30	1111
48	5100105006	1180	65	1137	83	25	1245
49	5100105007	1605	182	1445	334	8	1787
50	5100106001	1803	168	1696	247	28	1971
51	5100106002	2893	345	2633	597	8	3238
52	5100106003	2109	270	1919	451	9	2379
53	5100106004	2364	280	2179	452	13	2644
54	5100106005	751	214	697	48	220	965

Table 2.3: Marginals for Melilla 2013 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	1086	81	1015	128	24	1167
2	5200101002	1703	229	1510	371	51	1932
3	5200102001	1109	301	1040	296	74	1410
4	5200102002	1551	237	1415	336	37	1788
5	5200102003	1732	555	1595	608	84	2287
6	5200103001	905	400	783	476	46	1305
7	5200103002	892	559	838	565	48	1451
8	5200104001	767	587	690	636	28	1354
9	5200104002	1718	632	1477	827	46	2350
10	5200104003	2059	527	1631	926	29	2586
11	5200104004	2426	190	1976	614	26	2616
12	5200105001	1301	369	1077	568	25	1670
13	5200105002	1097	239	844	474	18	1336
14	5200105003	1920	553	1443	871	159	2473
15	5200105004	1153	324	931	519	27	1477
16	5200105005	1470	340	1207	592	11	1810
17	5200105006	3728	634	2988	1317	57	4362
18	5200105007	2043	258	1687	594	20	2301
19	5200106001	858	234	803	243	46	1092
20	5200106002	1388	257	1296	286	63	1645
21	5200106003	1635	445	1528	491	61	2080
22	5200107001	1711	237	1554	350	44	1948
23	5200107002	1400	279	1275	365	39	1679
24	5200107003	2747	630	2516	798	63	3377
25	5200107004	1595	359	1476	432	46	1954
26	5200107005	1381	196	1254	286	37	1577
27	5200107006	2155	264	2004	347	68	2419
28	5200108001	2380	387	2091	593	83	2767
29	5200108002	1032	213	873	356	16	1245
30	5200108003	2850	141	2669	194	128	2991
31	5200108004	2854	185	2569	407	63	3039
32	5200108005	2075	104	1957	168	54	2179
33	5200108006	1823	102	1685	209	31	1925
34	5200108007	2789	388	2594	435	148	3177
35	5200108008	2432	150	2214	308	60	2582
36	5200108009	757	23	698	62	20	780
37	5200108010	1441	54	1371	92	32	1495
38	5200108011	2031	210	1777	373	91	2241
39	5200108012	2377	302	2275	316	88	2679
40	5200108013	1477	350	1367	375	85	1827
41	5200108014	1220	86	1130	160	16	1306

{Spanish citizenship (over 20); Foreign citizenship (over 20)} x
{Born in Spain (over 20); Not born in Spain (over 20)}

{Spanish citizenship (over 20); Foreign citizenship (over 20)} x
{Born in Morocco (over 20); Not born in Morocco (over 20)}

{Spanish citizenship (over 20); Foreign citizenship (over 20)} x
{Born in third country (over 20); Not born in a third country (over 20)}

In this round, the deterministic bounds are set by the total population of age 20 and over in each census tract. The marginals (or, previous estimates) for 2013 can be found in Appendix Q and Appendix R.¹³ Again, I conduct the inferences separately for each city and for each year.

2.6.3 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering age and gender

To consider gender, I estimate the citizenship of female and male residents over the age of 20 by place of birth. To do so, I repeat the EI in Subsection 2.6.2 separately for the male and female portions of the population. This is possible because the municipal register collects data on each resident's gender along with the attributes of interest—nationality, place of birth, and age.

As in Subsection 2.6.2, the first step is to estimate the proportion of female individuals in each census tract who are (1) Spanish citizens or not and (2) younger or older than

¹³The marginals for 2012 can be found in Appendix S and Appendix T. For 2011, see Appendix U and Appendix V.

20 years. The known quantities for each census tract are number of female Spanish and foreign nationals and the number of female residents younger and older than 20 years. The deterministic bounds are set by the total female population of each census tract. I then estimate the proportion of female individuals in each tract tract who are younger and older than the age of 20 by their place of birth, as defined by born in Spain, born in Morocco, and born in a third country.

I next conduct the second round of EI:

{Spanish citizenship (females over 20); Foreign citizenship (females over 20)} x

{Born in Spain (females over 20); Not born in Spain (females over 20)}

{Spanish citizenship (females over 20); Foreign citizenship (females over 20)} x

{Born in Morocco (females over 20); Not born in Morocco (females over 20)}

{Spanish citizenship (females over 20); Foreign citizenship (females over 20)} x

{Born in third country (females over 20); Not born in a third country (females over 20)}

The point estimates from the preceding round of EI serve as known marginals, again, for each census tract. In this round, the deterministic bounds are set by the total female population of age 20 and over in each census tract. I conduct these estimates separately for each city and for each year and repeat the entire EI process for males. The 2013 marginals for the final EI step can be found, for females, in Appendix W and Appendix X, and for males in Appendix AC and Appendix AD.¹⁴

¹⁴For the marginals from 2012, for females, see Appendix Y and Appendix Z, and for males in Appendix AE and Appendix AF. For 2011, see, for females, Appendix AA and Appendix AB, and, for males, ??, and Appendix AH.

2.6.4 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering educational attainment

As discussed in Subsection 2.5.4, the Exclaves' residents may live in particular census tracts due to educational attainment. For this reason, I estimate citizenship by place of birth for residents over the age of 20 with the covariate of education. This entails running the model discussed in Subsection 2.6.2—EI of citizenship by place of birth for those 20 years old and over—while incorporating the proportion of individuals who have completed a post-secondary education program. I conduct these estimates separately for each city for each year.

2.6.5 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering ethnicity

Finally, I estimate citizenship by place of birth for residents over the age of 20 with the covariate of ethnicity, or Muslim residential patterns, as recorded by Herrero (2010) and Rontomé (2011). This also entails running the model discussed in Subsection 2.6.2 while incorporating the proportion of *musulmán* residents in each census tract. I consider ethnicity separately from education because these covariates are not individual-level determinants of individual-level behavior; they need not be compared as mean effects. Instead, they are factors that potentially helped to sort the population of Ceuta and Melilla non-randomly into census tracts (see Subsection 2.5.4). I conduct these estimates separately for each city for each year.

2.6.6 The EI method

Employing EI to examine identity has drawbacks but also significant advantages. Its primary weakness is that it does not rely on the subjects' verbalized claims of self-identification,

gathered through ethnography, interviews, field experiments, or surveys. However, such data types has their own pitfalls. Ethnography and interviews are costly to conduct, limiting the scope of data both temporally and in quantity of respondents. Field experiments create artificial situations for respondents, meaning findings are most applicable to the experimental setting. Survey data has well-documented limitations, such as the inadvertent priming of respondents and other uncontrollable contextual conditioning of responses (Condor 2006; Loveman and Muniz 2007). Moreover, surveys can be infrequent, such as censuses, and do not always ask questions of interest. For example, in Spain many nationally-representative surveys—including the census—do not ask respondents about their ethnicity, race, or religion.

In light of these methods' downsides, EI offers some advantages for studying identity. Primarily, EI provides information about an individuals' choices and behavior, such as casting a vote in an election or acquiring citizenship. That is, it captures what people *do* rather than what they say to a researcher. In addition, unlike censuses and surveys, it does not rely on the artificial construction and presumption of identity categories.¹⁵ Instead, groups are allowed to emerge from an analysis of the entire population; the presence and nature of the group itself is treated as the dependent variable (Wimmer 2008b). Finally, with EI, researchers can makes use of a broad range of regularly-gathered data, such as annual municipal registers, as well as data from important choice-points, such as elections.

2.7 Results

In this section I present the results of the multiple rounds of EI. The results show how levels of Spanish citizenship differ across Ceuta and Melilla, despite the reasonable assumption

¹⁵For a lively discussion of how censuses struggle in capturing identity, see Prewitt 2013.

that citizenship rates should not vary. The key point here is that while a majority of residents in both Exclaves are Spanish citizens, *members of Ceuta's Muslim community acquire citizenship at significantly higher rates than their counterparts in Melilla*. This eventual conclusion of this chapter is reinforced by three of the findings discussed below. First, citizenship rates are significantly higher among the native-born populations of Ceuta, relative to Melilla, and since Muslims make up a similarly large portion of the population in both cities (Table 2.1) some of the variation in citizenship rates must be occurring within the Muslim community. Second, citizenship rates among the Moroccan-born—and more universally Muslim—population are higher in Ceuta than in Melilla. Third, in Melilla, the census tracts with the lowest rates of citizenship are the same census tracts with the highest concentrations of Muslim residents.

So, this section examines the counter-intuitive difference in citizenship rates between the Exclaves. In the following analysis, we see this the outcome from different angles: the cities as whole units, the cities' female and male populations, across census tracts within the cities, and by considering the relationship of citizenship to education and ethnicity.

2.7.1 Citizenship of Residents

According to the point estimates of citizenship rates, more adult residents of Ceuta are Spanish citizens than residents of Melilla, regardless of place of birth in 2013 (see Table 2.4). This difference holds true in 2012 (Table 2.5) and 2011 (Table 2.6).

The difference between the Exclaves also holds when accounting for the variance within the city-wide estimates: estimated citizenship levels in Ceuta are higher than in Melilla across nearly all census tracts, regardless of birthplace (Figure 2.2).¹⁶ For each year,

¹⁶There is one census tract in Ceuta with a relatively low level of citizenship across all three birthplace groups. I suspect this is most likely due to an effect on the estimates from large number of Syrian

Table 2.4: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents by Place of Birth, 2013

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.981	0.917
	(0.023) ^a	(0.065)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.970	0.837
	(0.032)	(0.119)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.957	0.922
	(0.044)	(0.064)

^aStandard deviations in parentheses

Table 2.5: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents by Place of Birth, 2012

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.993	0.910
	(0.004) ^a	(0.072)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.987	0.823
	(0.005)	(0.124)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.988	0.917
	(0.005)	(0.034)

^aStandard deviations in parentheses

the differences in the levels of Spanish citizenship between each Exclave’s native-born and Moroccan-born populations are significant at the 0.01 level. The difference in citizenship rate among immigrants born in a third country are not significant.

The findings indicate that citizenship is relatively universal across nearly all of Ceuta’s census tracts while it varies more greater across the census tracts in Melilla. This variation is reflected in standard deviations of the point estimates—enclosed in the parentheses in

refugees—foreign-born non-citizens—entering from Morocco and settling along the border (Abad 2014). This population can be seen in row 54 of Table 2.2, and raised the number of non-citizens in this specific census tract by 26 percent from 2012 (for the change from 2012, compare row 54 of Table 2.2 to row 54 of Appendix A, and for 2011, compare to row 53 of Appendix C). The one-year change in the estimates can be seen graphically by comparing Figure 2.2 to the figure from 2012, found in Appendix AI. Indeed, the Exclaves saw a large jump in immigrants between 2012 and 2013. The Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía, or the Association for Human Rights of Andalucía, reports a 52.2 percent increase in immigrants—from 2,861 to 4,354 people—arriving in Ceuta and Melilla between 2012 and 2013, with the larger increase in Ceuta (756 to 1,846) (see EuropaPress 2014d).

Table 2.6: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents by Place of Birth, 2011

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.991	0.918
	(0.004) ^a	(0.063)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.992	0.803
	(0.004)	(0.126)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.982	0.938
	(0.007)	(0.021)


^a Standard deviations in parentheses

Table 2.4, Table 2.5, and Table 2.6—which are larger in Melilla than Ceuta. (Again, the variation is portrayed visually in Figure 2.2 and, for 2012, in Appendix AI.) I discuss this within-city variation in greater detail below, in Subsection 2.7.3.

The findings also suggest that in Melilla, levels of Spanish citizenship partially depend on place of birth. Native-born residents and those born abroad in a country other than Morocco have higher rates of citizenship than those residents born in Morocco—although still lower rates than all three groups in Ceuta. Because the Moroccan-born population in both cities are nearly all Muslim (see Table 2.1), this supports the emerging conclusion that *something about the Muslim community in Melilla depresses the acquisition of Spanish citizenship*, relative to Ceuta.

Finally, This higher citizenship rates among Melilla’s residents born in third country relative to its Moroccan-born residents suggests that Moroccan-born residents are not blocked from citizenship by barriers directed at immigrants in general. That is, among the immigrant population, lower levels of Spanish citizenship appear to be tied to being born *specifically* in Morocco. Similar levels of citizenship across all birthplace groups in Ceuta also suggest that no single foreign-born group is blocked from acquiring citizenship. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that this also holds for 2012 and 2011, respectively.

Figure 2.2: Estimates of Citizenship Rates Across Census Tracts, 2013



2.7.2 Citizenship and Gender

The dissimilarities in citizenship across the Exclaves, as well as internal patterns, remain when the city's population is disaggregated by gender. Female adults in Ceuta, regardless of place of birth, have higher levels of Spanish citizenship than female adults in Melilla (Table 2.7). And, as we saw with the adult population as a whole, female residents of Melilla born in Morocco have lower rates of citizenship than native-born females and females born in a third country. This variation by place of birth does not exist to the same degree in

Table 2.7: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Female Residents by Place of Birth, 2013

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.992	0.931
	(0.005) ^a	(0.054)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.979	0.822
	(0.009)	(0.062)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.988	0.879
	(0.005)	(0.096)

^a Standard deviations in parentheses

Ceuta.

The Exclaves' adult males follow the same pattern as adult females (Table 2.8). Males in Ceuta, regardless of place of birth, have higher rates of Spanish citizenship than their counterparts in Melilla. Among males in Melilla, citizenship again depends on birthplace. Moroccan-born males have lower rates of citizenship than males born either in Spain or in another foreign country. As with females, this variation does not exist in Ceuta. Finally, the patterns seen among female and male residents of Ceuta and Melilla in 2013 also hold true for 2012 and 2011.¹⁷

2.7.3 Variation within Ceuta and Melilla

As mentioned in Subsection 2.7.1, the larger standard deviations of the city-wide estimates for each birthplace group in Melilla (see Table 2.4) indicate greater variation in citizenship across its census tracts than in Ceuta. When examining this variation more closely, I find that variation in Spanish citizenship in Melilla is correlated with where Muslims live, with lower levels of citizenship occurring in tracts with greater numbers of Muslims.¹⁸ For

¹⁷For 2012, see Appendix AJ, and for 2011, see Appendix AK.

¹⁸In addition to my own fieldwork conducted in 2011, I use data collected by Herrero 2010 and Rontomé 2011 to identify the most heavily-concentrated census tract. See also Torres Cólón 2008 and Driessen 1992.

Table 2.8: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Male Residents by Place of Birth, 2013

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.967	0.870
	(0.042) ^a	(0.097)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.964	0.632
	(0.040)	(0.062)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.952	0.954
	(0.048)	(0.013)

^a Standard deviations in parentheses

instance, the census tract with the highest concentration of Muslim residents in Melilla has much fewer native-born Spanish citizens than the city as a whole (Table 2.9).¹⁹ This is not the case in Ceuta, where the census tract with the highest concentration of Muslim residents has a similar proportion of Spanish citizens as the city as a whole.

Table 2.9: Proportion of Native-Born Citizens in the Census Tract with Highest Concentration of Muslims

	Census Tract Estimate	City-Wide Estimate
Ceuta 2013	0.972	0.977
Ceuta 2012	0.976	0.993
Ceuta 2011	0.979	0.991
Melilla 2013	0.679	0.917
Melilla 2012	0.673	0.910
Melilla 2011	0.689	0.918

Melilla’s link between citizenship and the residency of *musulmanes*—and Ceuta’s lack of a link—extends across each city’s census tracts, made apparent by comparing maps of the concentrations of Muslim residents with maps of levels of Spanish citizens. While

¹⁹In the remainder of this section I focus specifically on the native-born residents so as to control, as best as possible, for the various processes related to immigration—for example, assimilation, acculturation, and integration—that can affect the acquisition of host-country citizenship.

both cities are segregated—Ceuta’s Muslim residents are concentrated in the neighborhoods of Benzú in the west and “El Príncipe” in the southwest and Melilla’s Muslim residents are concentrated in the neighborhoods of del Carmen and La Paz, in the city’s north (Figure 2.3)—the rates of Spanish citizenship among the native born are relatively universal across Ceuta’s census tracts but, in contrast, dip in the Muslim neighborhoods of Melilla (Figure 2.4).

The point estimates of native-born Spanish citizens for each census tract in Ceuta in 2013, 2012, and 2011 can be found in Appendix AL, Appendix AM, and Appendix AN, respectively. For Melilla in 2013, 2012 and 2011, the census-tract estimates of native-born Spanish citizens can be found in Appendix AO, Appendix AP, and Appendix AQ.


2.7.4 Citizenship, ethnicity, and education

In this final section of the analysis, I find that the contextual effects of education and “Muslim ethnicity”—which is perhaps better conceptualized as the concentration of Muslim residents, as measured by independent researchers—support the general argument of this chapter: attributes related to being Muslim *in Melilla* negatively impacts the acquisition of Spanish citizenship. I do not find evidence for a comparable relationship in Ceuta.

First, when comparing differences in citizenship rates across birthplace groups within Ceuta, net of the covariates, I find no significant differences in the rates of Spanish citizenship among the groups.²⁰ That is, even if educational levels or the residency of Muslims were to be equally dispersed across the city’s census tracts, all of Ceuta’s residents would

²⁰Here, and in the following findings (presented in this chapter and Chapter 4, significant differences in means were evaluated with Tukey’s HSD (honest significant different) test. I use Tukey’s HSD test because it corrects for experiment-wide error rate, making it more appropriate for multiple simultaneous comparisons than a series of pairwise t-tests. I did, however, also analyze my findings here and Chapter 4 with a series of pairwise t-tests and found no major differences in *p*-values. For more information on Tukey’s method, see Agresti and Finlay 1997: 448-9 and <http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/prc/section4/prc471.htm> (last accessed 1 June 2014).


Figure 2.3: Muslims Residents in Ceuta and Melilla, 2013



Source: Herrero 2010; Rontomé 2011

Note: Maps not to scale

Figure 2.4: Native-Born Spanish Citizens in Ceuta and Melilla, 2013



Note: Maps not to scale

Table 2.10: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Ceuta 2013

Resident Group 1		Resident Group 2		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
Spain	–	Spain	Education	0	-0.04	0.04	1
Spain	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Spain	–	Morocco	–	0.01	-0.01	0.05	1
Spain	–	Morocco	Education	0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.42
Spain	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.02	0.06	1
Spain	–	Third country	–	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.85
Spain	–	Third country	Education	0.02	-0.03	0.07	0.89
Spain	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.01	0.06	1
Spain	Education	Morocco	–	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Spain	Education	Morocco	Education	0.03	-0.04	0.07	0.48
Spain	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.02	0.06	1
Spain	Education	Third country	–	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.89
Spain	Education	Third country	Education	0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.92
Spain	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.03	0.06	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0	-0.02	0.04	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.02	-0.04	0.06	0.92
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.04	0.05	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.02	-0.02	0.06	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.01	-0.04	0.06	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.06	0.05	1
Morocco	–	Morocco	Education	0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.96
Morocco	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0	-0.04	0.05	1
Morocco	–	Third country	–	0.01	-0.03	0.06	1
Morocco	–	Third country	Education	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0	-0.04	0.05	1
Morocco	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	-0.02	-0.03	0	1
Morocco	Education	Third country	–	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	Education	Third country	Education	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.01	-0.03	0.05	1
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0	-0.04	0.04	1
Third country	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.03	0.02	1

continue to acquire Spanish citizenship at similar, near universal levels as with the current distribution of these covariates (Table 2.10). This finding generally holds in 2012 (see Appendix AU) and 2011 (see Appendix AV).

In contrast, I find that the contextual effects of educational attainment influence citizenship levels across groups within Melilla. For instance, while the analysis without covariates indicates that there is a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) in citizenship rates between the city's native-born and Moroccan-born residents, equalizing educational attainment across Melilla's census tracts would render this difference non-significant. Similarly, the significant difference between Moroccan-born residents and those born in a third country found earlier also becomes non-significant when controlling for the contextual effects of educational attainment (Table 2.11). Together, these findings suggest that the contextual effects of educational attainment are partially suppressing the acquisition of citizenship among Moroccan-born residents in Melilla relative to their native-born neighbors—a population which also includes many Muslims—and other immigrants.

In addition, I find that if Muslim residency was to be evenly dispersed across Melilla's census tracts, significant differences in citizenship levels between the city's birthplace groups would *not* change. An equal distribution of Muslim residency only impacts citizenship levels when educational levels also become evenly distributed across the city (Table 2.11).

The key insight from the comparative analysis of birthplace groups *within* each Exclave is that that educational attainment influences the acquisition of Spanish citizenship among Melilla's Moroccan-born immigrants—with lower levels of education being associated with lower levels of citizenship—relative to their neighbors born in Spain or another country, but not so in Ceuta. The disparity is likely due to the fact that nearly all of Ceuta's residents, in each birthplace group, are citizens, regardless of the distribution of educational attainment

Table 2.11: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Melilla 2013

Resident Group 1		Resident Group 2		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
Spain	–	Spain	Education	0	-0.04	0.05	1
Spain	–	Spain	Ethnicity	-0.04	-0.08	0.02	0.64
Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.84
Spain	–	Morocco	–	0.08	0.03	0.13	0.00
Spain	–	Morocco	Education	0.02	0	0.07	1
Spain	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.00
Spain	–	Third country	–	0	-0.04	0.04	1
Spain	–	Third country	Education	0.02	-0.06	0.03	1
Spain	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.07	0.03	1
Spain	Education	Morocco	–	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.00
Spain	Education	Morocco	Education	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.88
Spain	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.08	0	0.12	0.00
Spain	Education	Third country	–	0	-0.04	0.05	1
Spain	Education	Third country	Education	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	1
Spain	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.11	0.06	0.16	0.00
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.01
Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.1	0.05	0.15	0.00
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.02	-0.06	0.07	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.01	0	0.06	1
Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0.01	0	0.06	1
Morocco	–	Morocco	Education	-0.06	-0.01	-0.1	0.00
Morocco	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	1
Morocco	–	Third country	–	-0.08	-0.1	-0.04	0.00
Morocco	–	Third country	Education	-0.1	-0.1	-0.05	0.00
Morocco	–	Third country	Ethnicity	-0.1	-0.1	-0.05	0.00
Morocco	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.05	0	0.09	0.05
Morocco	Education	Third country	–	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.87
Morocco	Education	Third country	Education	-0.01	-0.03	0	1
Morocco	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	-0.04	-0.08	0.01	0.31
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	–	-0.08	-0.1	-0.03	0.00
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	-0.09	-0.1	-0.04	0.00
Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	-0.09	-0.1	-0.04	0.00
Third country	Education	Third country	–	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	1
Third country	Ethnicity	Third country	–	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	1
Third country	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0	-0.05	0.05	1

^aDifferences significant at the 0.05 level are in bold.

of Muslim residents. Indeed, this underscores that, relative to Melilla, Ceuta’s residents—including its Muslim residents—achieve high rates of Spanish citizenship *despite* an unequal distribution of educational attainment and segregated residency patterns.

Thus, the analyses of each Exclave with covariates support the argument that the Muslim communities of Ceuta and Melilla are somehow different, at least in regards to becoming Spanish citizens. To examine this difference further, I now compare the citizenship rates of birthplace groups across the Exclaves while controlling for the contextual effects of educational attainment and ethnicity. Because there are numerous comparisons, I only discuss the findings that directly relate to the Muslim communities of Ceuta and Melilla, whether native-born—which, again, includes the majority of the cities’ Muslim residents—or Moroccan-born.²¹

1. Without covariates, I find that the rate of Spanish citizenship between each city’s native-born population is significantly different at the 0.01 level, with higher levels in Ceuta than in Melilla (see row one, Table 2.12 and the first column in Figure 2.2). This difference becomes non-significant only when Muslim residency becomes evenly distributed across Melilla (see rows three, six, and nine, Table 2.12), indicating that the spatial concentration of Muslims in Melilla—but not Ceuta—decreases the acquisition of Spanish citizenship in Melilla.
2. Without covariates, I find that the rate of Spanish citizenship between Ceuta’s native-born and Melilla’s Moroccan-born population is significantly different at the 0.01 level, with higher levels in Ceuta than in Melilla (see row 10, Table 2.12 and compare the upper graph in the first column of Figure 2.2 with the lower graph of the second

²¹The complete results of the cross-Exclave comparison can be found in Appendix AR, Appendix AS, and Appendix AT. For a much abbreviated summary of the findings from 2012 and 2011, see Appendix AU and Appendix AV, respectively.

column). This difference remains significant net of both covariates, implying that an equal distribution of educational attainment or Muslim residency in either Ceuta, Melilla, or both would *not* increase levels of citizenship among the Moroccan-residents in Melilla to levels comparable with Ceuta's native-born residents. In other words, the citizenship rates among Melilla's Moroccan immigrants can be thought of as robustly lower than Ceuta's native-born population, which includes a large number of Muslims.

3. Without covariates, I find that the rate of Spanish citizenship between the Moroccan-born residents in Ceuta and the native-born residents in Melilla is significant at the 0.01 level, with higher levels in Ceuta (see row 19, Table 2.12 and compare the upper graph in the second column of Figure 2.2 with the lower graph of the first column). That is, more Moroccan immigrants in Ceuta are Spanish citizens than *native-born residents* in Melilla, a population that is almost half Muslim. When incorporating the contextual effects of the covariates, this difference remains significant at the 0.05 except under two conditions: when education is equally distributed in Ceuta (see rows 22, 23, and 24 in Table 2.12) or when Muslim ethnicity is equally distributed in Melilla (see rows 21, 24, and 27 in Table 2.12). This suggests two things. First, an *unequal* distribution of educational attainment in Ceuta is somehow *increasing* the citizenship rates of its Moroccan immigrants (but not its native-born Muslims) relative to Moroccan immigrants in Ceuta because Moroccan-born citizenship levels decrease in Ceuta—and become closer to the levels of Melilla's Moroccan-immigrants—when the estimation model controls for the contextual effects of educational attainment. (Note that the reverse does *not* hold for Melilla's Moroccan immigrants: an even distribution of educational attainment in Melilla would not increase their citizenship

levels to comparable levels with Ceuta’s native-born residents.) Second, these findings suggest that an equal distribution of Muslim residents would increase citizenship levels among Melilla’s native-born citizens to comparable levels with Ceuta’s Moroccan-born residents. This echoes the findings described in the first point, above, that the spatial concentration of Muslims in Melilla—but not Ceuta—decreases the acquisition of Spanish citizenship in Melilla.

4. Without covariates, I find that the rate of Spanish citizenship between the Moroccan-born citizens in each Exclave is significantly different at the 0.01 level, with higher levels in Ceuta (see row 28 in Table 2.12 and the second column of Figure 2.2). This difference remains significant net of both covariates, indicating that an equal distribution of educational attainment or Muslim residency in either Ceuta, Melilla, or both would *not* increase levels of citizenship among the Moroccan-residents in Melilla to levels comparable with Ceuta’s Moroccan-born residents. Similarly to the conclusion reached in the second point, above, the citizenship rates among Melilla’s Moroccan immigrants can also be considered to be robustly lower than Ceuta’s Moroccan-born population.

To briefly summarize the four points above, the comparison of the birthplace groups across the Exclaves provides two key insights into the cities’ Muslim communities. First, Melilla’s Moroccan-born residents acquire Spanish citizenship at significantly lower levels than the native-born and Moroccan-born residents on Ceuta. These lower levels are *not* a result of an unequal distribution of educational attainment or Muslim residency across Melilla’s census tracts. Moreover, since Melilla’s residents born in other countries have higher rates of citizenship than their Muslim neighbors—and at comparable levels with the

Table 2.12: Estimated Citizenship Rates of Birthplace Groups Across Exclaves, with Covariates, 2013

	Ceuta		Melilla		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted p -value
	Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
1	Spain	–	Spain	–	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.00
2	Spain	–	Spain	Education	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.00
3	Spain	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.58
4	Spain	Education	Spain	–	0.06	0.02	0.12	0.00
5	Spain	Education	Spain	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
6	Spain	Education	Spain	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.64
7	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.1	0.00
8	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.05	0	0.1	0.01
9	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.96
10	Spain	–	Morocco	–	0.14	0.09	0.19	0.00
11	Spain	–	Morocco	Education	0.09	0.04	0.14	0.00
12	Spain	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.14	0.09	0.18	0.00
13	Spain	Education	Morocco	–	0.14	0.1	0.19	0.00
14	Spain	Education	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
15	Spain	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.13	0.09	0.17	0.00
16	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.14	0.09	0.18	0.00
17	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.00
18	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.00
19	Morocco	–	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.1	0.01
20	Morocco	–	Spain	Education	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
21	Morocco	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.98
22	Morocco	Education	Spain	–	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.53
23	Morocco	Education	Spain	Education	0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.77
24	Morocco	Education	Spain	Ethnicity	0	-0.04	0.04	1
25	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.05	0.02
26	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.04	0	0.09	0.05
27	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.03	0.06	1
28	Morocco	–	Morocco	–	0.13	0.09	0.18	0.00
29	Morocco	–	Morocco	Education	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.00
30	Morocco	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.12	0.08	0.17	0.00
31	Morocco	Education	Morocco	–	0.11	0.07	0.16	0.00
32	Morocco	Education	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
33	Morocco	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.1	0.05	0.15	0.00
34	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.00
35	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.00
36	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.12	0.07	0.17	0.00

^aDifferences significant at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Moroccan-born in Ceuta (see Appendix AS)—it does not appear that the lower citizenship rates among Melilla’s Moroccan immigrants are due to formal or informal institutional barriers, social boundaries, or social dynamics related to immigration, such as xenophobic discrimination, assimilation, or integration.

Second, Melilla’s native-born residents—a population that is nearly half Muslim—would have citizenship levels comparable with Ceuta’s native-born population—which is also constituted by a large number of Muslims—*only* if Muslims’ residential patterns were to be evenly distributed across Melilla. This suggests that processes related to *Melilla’s* Muslims living near one another negatively impact the acquisition of Spanish citizenship (see Subsection 2.5.4).

2.7.5 Summary of findings

In sum, I find that Muslims in Ceuta acquire Spanish citizenship at higher levels than Muslims in Melilla, whether they are native-born or Moroccan-born. The evidence suggests that this disparity is not due to formal or informal institutions, regulatory regimes, the context of reception, or levels of educational attainment. I found support for one potential explanation: the spatial concentration of Muslim in Melilla. In other words, something about Melilla’s Muslim living near one another decreases levels of Spanish citizenship. However, this is not the case for Ceuta’s Muslims.

Based on these findings, I argue that *musulmanes* in Melilla relates to the Spanish nation differently than *musulmans* in Ceuta. I will eventually examine how this dissimilarity may be due to the inherited ethnocultural attributes of Melilla’s Muslims but before I do so, I use the following section to briefly explore alternative explanations based on economic interests. However, to be clear, the ultimate conclusion will emerge that there is something

unique about Muslims in Melilla when it comes to the acquisition of Spanish citizenship, relative to Ceuta.

2.8 Alternative explanations: economic incentives

In this section I examine two related potential explanations for the disparity in the Exclaves' citizenship rates: the economic circumstances in the Exclaves and the economic circumstances in the surrounding Moroccan regions, from where many of the cities' immigrants originate. The former explanation suggests that the disparity in citizenship is caused by one Exclave offering better economic opportunities and a lower cost of living, thereby incentivizing its residents to become Spanish citizens more so than the other Exclave. The latter suggests that the disparity is caused by one Exclave's surrounding Moroccan region having better economic circumstances than the other's, thereby incentivizing residents—particularly first-generation immigrants but also, potentially, later generations—to not become Spanish citizens and, instead, move or partially reside across the border in Morocco.

Data from Morocco's 2004 National Census and Spain's 2007 National Survey of Immigrants do not appear to support either explanation. The Exclaves' mean unemployment rates between 2005 and 2013—24.93 percent in Ceuta and 22.36 percent in Melilla are similar, and within one standard deviation of another. The unemployment among immigrants, as measured in 2007, is also similar, at 68.23 percent in Ceuta and 66.31 percent in Melilla. Furthermore, the Exclaves' mean consumer price indices between 2002 and 2013 are comparable—92.98 percent in Ceuta and 91.92 percent in Melilla—and within one standard deviation of another (Table 2.13).

Finally, residents in Ceuta and Melilla see comparable economic circumstances across

Table 2.13: Potential Economic Causes for Variation in Spanish Citizenship Rates

	Ceuta	Melilla
Consumer price index ^a	92.98 (7.47) ^b	91.92 (8.21)
Percent unemployed, total ^c	24.93 (7.86)	22.36 (6.96)
Percent unemployed, all immigrants ^d	68.23	66.31
Percent unemployed among all immigrants when emigrating to Spain ^d	75.47	78.53
Percent unemployed in neighboring Moroccan province ^e	56.4	61.1
Percent residents with some secondary schooling in neighboring Moroccan province ^e	81.5	86.5

^aMean rate from 2002 through 2013; *Source*: INE

^bStandard deviation in parentheses

^cMean rate from 2005 through 2013, individuals over 16 years; *Source*: INE

^d2007, individuals over 16 years; *Source*: INE

^e2004, individuals over 16 years; *Source*: Moroccan High Planning Commission

their respective borders. Emigrants, the majority of which are from Morocco, arrive with comparable unemployment histories—75.47 percent in Ceuta and 78.52 percent in Melilla—and the Exclaves’ neighboring Moroccan provinces offer similar opportunities for employment and education. Ceuta’s neighboring province, Tetouan, has a 56.4 percent unemployment rate and 81.5 percent of the population has some secondary schooling. Nador, Melilla’s neighboring province, has a 61.1 percent unemployment rate and 86.5 percent of the population has had some secondary schooling (Table 2.13).

2.9 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter, I find that more Muslim residents of Ceuta, both the native-born and those born in Morocco, are Spanish citizens than Muslims residents of Melilla. This difference holds across the three years for which data exists—2011, 2012, and 2013—as well as genders. It is most easily recognized when conducting a sub-municipal level analysis: in Melilla, the census tracts with the highest concentration of Muslim residents have the lowest levels of

Spanish citizenship; this is not true for Ceuta. In fact, the mean rate of Spanish citizenship among native-born residents in Melilla from 2011 to 2013 is just below 70 percent in the census tract with the highest concentration of Muslims whereas in Ceuta, for the same time period, it is nearly 98 percent (see Table 2.9).

Of course, the high levels of citizenship among Ceuta's native-born *musulmanes* is not surprising. Even when citizenship is not granted solely based on *jus soli*, place of birth is closely tied to citizenship—those born in a country are most likely to desire to belong to that country and have this desire validated by others, generally resulting in an easier path to citizenship (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010). For example, Platt (2014) shows that native-born ethnic and racialized minorities in the United Kingdom almost universally perceive themselves as British. Of these individuals, 99 percent claim British identity and citizenship—about the same percentage that I find among native-born Muslims in Ceuta.

The low levels among Melilla's native-born, however, are surprising. Indeed, this finding is one of the key contributions of the preceding analysis. Previous studies have shown that more Muslims in Ceuta are citizens than Muslims in Melilla—UCIDE (2012) estimates that 86.87 percent of *musulmanes* in Ceuta and 77.17 percent of *musulmanes* in Melilla are citizens—but it has thus far been unclear if the difference resulted from different sizes of the foreign-population. Without relying on classifying some residents as “Muslims” or not, the preceding analysis offers evidence that the disparity exists due to low rates of Spanish citizenship among both the native-born and Moroccan-born of Melilla.

The primary contribution of this chapter, however, is most clearly seen in the analysis of how the distribution of educational attainment and Muslim residency influences citizenship levels across the cities. Namely, I find evidence indicating that the spatial concentration of Muslim in Melilla has a significant effect on citizenship levels among the city's native-born

residents—but this is not the case in Ceuta. This finding underscores the central argument of this chapter: Melilla’s Muslim self-identify in relation to the Spanish nation differently than Ceuta’s Muslims, as seen through dissimilar citizenship rates.

When a significant number of native-born residents of a nation state are *not* citizens, as in Melilla, we can gain some insight into the nation state’s political institutions, governmental regulations, economic circumstances, and demographic context. In some cases, the state, powerful actors, or a majority population may be blocking some residents from becoming citizens (see Bloemraad et al. 2008). Alternatively, some residents may not possess the human capital necessary to navigate the nation state’s legal and regulatory institutions (see Portes and Rumbaut 2006). It is also possible that the residents may not have the economic incentive to acquire citizenship, instead perceiving greater opportunity in a country of origin or ancestry. Similarly, the residents—particularly if part of a marginalized population—may view their surrounding environment as unwelcoming or too challenging and instead expect to resettle in another nation-state.

However, in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, such conditions are unlikely to explain the disparity in citizenship rates since they are constant across the Exclaves. This suggests that for Melilla’s *musulmanes*, factors related to identification with the nation-state itself may be decoupling native birth or permanent residency from full formal and affective membership in Spain. In other words, the acquisition of citizenship is ethnic practice, the purposeful expression of an individual’s salient ethnic identity (Chandra 2012c). Particular notions of ethnic or national identity may be driving Ceuta’s Muslim population towards greater attachment to the Spanish nation—and, as a result, Spanish citizenship—whereas in Melilla, different ideas of ethnic or national identity may be depressing the attachment to Spain that is typically expressed through citizenship (see Anthias 2006; Brubaker 1992; Wimmer

2002). Put concretely, in Ceuta, Muslims' affective attachment to the Spanish nation state may be overlapping more with the formal institution of citizenship in Ceuta. But in Melilla, many Muslims may be appreciating and pursuing Spanish citizenship, but a different self-identification—different relationships with the Spanish nation state and other nations and communities—decreases the overall acquisition of citizenship.

In the following chapter I draw on the literature on ethnic and national identity as well as my fieldwork to explore why Muslims in Melilla have a different attachment to the Spanish nation state than Muslim in Ceuta, and, as a result, a distinct ethnic and Spanish identity. In addition, I emphasize how citizenship, an ethnic practice, is *generative* of ethnic structure, of the attributes of ethnic and national identities, over time. This underscores how the findings presented in this chapter are not only telling of past and existing identities in the Exclaves but also provide a window into their future ethnic landscapes.

Chapter 3

History, Power, and Ethnic Categories in the Exclaves

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. *The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living* [emphasis added].

—Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* ([1852] 1978: 595)

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I describe an explanatory model that accounts for why Spanish citizenship levels differ across Ceuta and Melilla. The model rests on the processes that constitute ethnicity, for two related reasons. First, common explanations for variation in the acquisition of citizenship—economic incentives, human capital (Portes and Rumbaut 2006), contexts of reception (Foner 2005)—can not account for the observed dissimilarity across the Exclaves, therefore increasing the likelihood that ethnicity plays some role. Second, the analysis in the preceding chapter—which did not rest on an *a priori* assumption of ethnic categories—suggests that there are significant differences in how the Exclaves’ widely recognized ethnic groups acquire Spanish citizenships. For example, in Melilla, citizenship rates are higher in *christiano* neighborhoods than in *musulmán* neighborhoods.

The explanatory model draws on the combinatorial approach to studying ethnic identity categories developed by Chandra (2012b) and her collaborators (see also Chandra 2006). This approach is particularly useful because it gives us a language to analyze the elements that constitute identity categories. That is, because the Exclaves' institutional environment and names of ethnic identity categories do not differ—*cristianos* and *musulmanes* populate both cities—but their associated behaviors do, it is probable that the *underlying* construction and meanings of the categories vary.

Following the combinatorial approach, the model begins with the *ethnic structure* of the Ceuta and Melilla and then moves to *ethnic practice* in the cities. Ethnic structure refers to the distribution of individual-level attributes across a given population that are *widely believed* to be based on descent. Some of these attributes are used generate nominal ethnic identity categories. Ethnic practice refers to how these ethnic identity categories are subsequently *activated* in a particular context, such as during the acquisition of citizenship, formation of political parties, and voting in local elections (Chandra 2012c).


In brief, the model follows an analytical sociological structure (Hedström and Bearman 2011), which I briefly summarize here. First, historical patterns of conquest, settlement, colonialism, and nation building generated configurations of micro-level power relationships. These produce collectivities—what I will call “political homelands”—that are consequently defined and differentiated by their relative power. In some contexts, such as the Exclaves, contemporary individuals come to be affiliated with these political homelands through *perceived* descent. These affiliations produce dynamics of empowerment and stigmatization between individuals that give unique meanings to the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories in the Exclaves today. Finally, these meanings promote different types of behavior, or ethnic practice, when activated.

I argue that in Ceuta, historical events helped to produce the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Arabness,” or to use the generalizable terms I introduce below, “titular” and “indigenous.” Following the model, how different segments of Ceuta’s population are affiliated with these homelands today generates corresponding systems of empowerment and stigmatization. The types of empowerment and stigmatization constitute the contemporary understandings of *being* “Christian” or “Muslim” in Ceuta, and result in relatively equal levels of Spanish citizenship and other patterns of behavior, such as voting (Figure 3.1).

For Melilla, I argue that historical events helped to produce the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Amazighness,” or to again use generalizable terms, “titular” and “autochthonous.” Again, these generate a corresponding system of empowerment and stigmatization among the different segments of Melilla’s contemporary population. These types of empowerment and stigmatization constitute what is understood as *being* “Christian” or “Muslim” in the Melilla today, and result in greater variance in the levels of Spanish citizenship and voting behavior (Figure 3.2), as I discuss in the following chapter.


The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of the ethnic structure in the Exclaves and surrounding region of contemporary Morocco, defining the population’s relevant *attribute-dimensions* as well as the *attribute values* that fall along each of these dimensions. Some of these dimensions—somatic markers, religion, and language—and their values are relatively uncontroversial descent-based attributes. In contrast, my use of the political homeland dimension and its values of “titular,” “indigenous,” and “autochthonous” is novel. As a result, I devote an entire section to discussing this aspect of the region’s ethnic structure, including its contribution to helping us understand ethnicity in contexts similar to Ceuta and Melilla. Following this, I describe how and why categories are constructed in the Exclaves. Afterwards, I discuss how these categories may be activated in particular

Figure 3.1: Explanatory model for Ceuta



Note: The subscript “c” indicates that the concept’s value is specific to Ceuta.

Figure 3.2: Explanatory model for Melilla



Note: The subscript “m” indicates that the concept’s value is specific to Melilla.

circumstances. I end with a brief discussions of the contributions and implication of my argument for the broader field of research on ethnicity and intergroup relations.

3.2 Ethnic structure

With the combinatorial framework, we can conceptualize individuals in Ceuta and Melilla as “combining” descent-based attributes to form operative, or feasible, identity categories that can subsequently become activated in particular contexts,¹ such as acquiring Spanish citizenship (see Chapter One) and voting in local elections (see Chapter Three). As noted earlier, these categories are termed the same in both cities: *christiano* and *musulmán*.² However, I argue the meanings of the categories differ because they are constituted from different *descent-based attributes* present in a community’s ethnic structure (Chandra and Boulet 2012).

3.2.1 Descent-based attributes

Descent-based attributes are characteristics of individuals—either by claiming them, having them assigned, or some combination—that are, on average, “stickier” and more visible than other (non-descent-based) characteristics. Being stickier means that it is costly to change both the attribute and other related attributes that would have to also change to make the first attribute believable. For example, skin color is sticky in many instances because it is difficult to change *and* for any change to be believable, an individual would also have to

¹This conceptualization echoes recent arguments developed by other scholars, such as Hale (2008) and Jenkins (2008), who emphasize the “stuff” within ethnic boundaries. Many such arguments, however, then go on to list a set of “things,” or attributes, composing this stuff, such as “shared sense of fate” and phenotypical markers. The combinatorial approach differs at this step. It instead allows such attributes to be defined contextually, as long as they are *believed* to be tied to descent, in that context.

²The term “*musulmán*” is used across Spain to label a diverse group of people including, but not limited to, those who speak Arabic, practice Islam, or have somatic markers widely associated with North Africa.

change other attributes that are costly to change, such as eye color and hair texture. Many other attributes are often less sticky. For example, in the contemporary United States, educational level is easier to change than skin color and does not require the changing of many other attributes that themselves are hard to change to be believable. Visibility refers to the ease of acquiring data on the attribute. While some descent-based attributes are not visible—DNA, for example—they are typically more available to be read through superficial observation than non-descent-based attributes (Chandra 2012a).

Stickiness and visibility, then, increase the likelihood that some attributes will be perceived as descent-based over others. Given populations then organize these descent-based attributes into discrete classes, or *attribute-dimensions*, such as gender, height, eye color, surname, income, language, and religion. For example, a particular population may recognize gender, height, income, and religion as based on descent whereas another population may recognize gender, height, and surname (but not income or religion) as based on descent.

Arrayed along each of these dimensions are *attribute values* that are exclusive and encompassing, meaning that all individuals must have one and only one value. This is also dependent on the context. For example, a particular population may believe brown and gray to be the only possible values on the eye color attribute-dimension whereas another population may believe blue, green, brown, and gray to be the possible values. Again, it is important to stress that which specific attributes are believed to be descent-based, how they are classified into a set of dimensions, and which values are arrayed on the dimensions are determined by a give population’s institutions that structure incentives, such as elections (see, for example, Laitin 1998; Posner 2005), or “institutions of cognition,” such as a census (for a review, see Brubaker 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Put another way, the particular institutions of any given society inform individuals which attributes to “see” as

potentially constitutive of its ethnic identity categories.

3.2.2 Repertoire of attributes for a population

Knowledge of a society's institutions and what are considered descent-based attributes enables us to specify the society's *repertoire of attributes* that is used to classify its population into ethnic categories. The repertoire of attributes is based on the attribute-dimensions and the possible values of those attributes (Chandra and Boulet 2012). In the Exclaves, the commonly recognized categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are based on the following attribute-dimensions:

- Somatic markers
- Religion
- Language
- Political homeland

The attribute-dimension “somatic markers,” akin to “phenotype” (see Hale 2008), refers to the class of highly sticky and visible attributes widely associated with the body. In addition, the class is understood as to encompassing attributes commonly seen to be co-occurring, so that if one somatic trait is present, another specific trait out of a range of possible markers is highly likely to be present, as well. For example, particular eye and hair colors are typically seen as co-occurring. The attribute-dimensions of religion and language are self-explanatory.

The attribute-dimension of “political homeland” is similar to Anderson's (1991) “imagined community.” I use the former term, however, because although “imagined community” is now frequently used to refer to any large community with a mutual interest or perspective, Anderson originally conceived of imagined communities as products of modernity

that make a claim of sovereignty. In contrast, “political homeland,” while also imagined in Anderson’s sense, is a class of historically-rooted collectivities with which individuals are affiliated through a “stance”—this is, by making a claim, by the assignation of others, or by a combination of the two. The affiliation is based on factors widely seen as decent-based, such as shared cultural idioms, discursive frames, shared notions of origin or fate, and, to use the terminology of Weber (1978: 398), “political memory” (Brubaker 2005; Hale 2008). The actual affiliation-making, or stance-taking, is likely to occur through everyday, banal references (Billig 1995).

Recall that attribute-dimensions are populated by values of descent-based attributes which are exhaustive—everyone in the population has a value—and mutually exclusive—everyone in a population can only have one discrete value. In Ceuta and Melilla, the values of the descent-based attributes for each attribute-dimension are as follows:

- Somatic markers: European, North African
- Religion: Christianity, Islam
- Language: *Dariya* (Arabic-Castilian), Castilian (“Spanish”), Tamazigh
- Political homeland: titular, indigenous, autochthonous

Along the somatic marker dimension, it is commonly understood that individuals can have the attribute values of either “European” *or* “North African.” These are in fact better conceived as *secondary attributes* because in other contexts it would be appropriate to de-aggregate them into more fine-grained categories, such as “Catalan,” “German,” “Nordic,” “Moroccan,” and “Arab.” Moreover, any of these categories are themselves comprised of other lower-level, or basic, attributes, such as skin color, facial features, and hair type. In everyday usage, however, *ceutís* and *melillenses* bundle the *basic-level attributes* into

the commonsensical descent-based attribute values of “European” or “North African” to describe how people appear, in terms of their physical, bodily appearance. The terms and appearances are self-explanatory.

Along the religious dimension dimension, it is commonly understood that individuals can have the attribute values of Christianity *or* Islam. In the Exclaves, these values do not refer to individuals’ religiosity but rather to their everyday practice. For instance, during my fieldwork, one’s value on the religious attribute-dimension came up most frequently in reference to what holidays one celebrated, whether one’s social life centered around a mosque’s community outreach programs or not, and in what neighborhoods one lived. These attributes are also secondary attributes since they could be defined with other attributes, such as the different branches of each religious tradition (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Maliki Islam). However, the values termed “Christian” and “Muslim”—*christiano* and *musulmán* (see Section 1.2)—are those that are used in everyday interactions.

Along the language dimension, individuals can have the attribute values of Arabic *or* Spanish *or* Tamazigh. That is, individuals are typically raised with one “mother tongue,” or the language primarily spoken at home. As with the other dimensions, the values of Castilian and Tamazigh are in fact secondary attributes. In certain contexts, the Castilian³ spoken in the Exclaves would be de-aggregated into basic attributes along dimensions of inflection and pronunciation—this is one of the reasons why, for example, natives of Madrid are known to mock their southern-born compatriots. Similarly, Tamazigh refers to the family of languages spoken by the Amazigh people of North Africa.⁴ It would be more

³Castilian is commonly known as “Spanish” in English. Here, the term Castilian is used to differentiate it from the other languages spoken in Spain, such as Basque and Catalan.

⁴The first evidence of a Tamazigh script, known as Tifinagh, dates to 220 BCE. The script fell out of usage after the Arab conquest and, as a result, Tamazigh was typically written using Latin or Arabic characters—when it was written at all. The modern derivative of the ancient script is known as neo-Tifinagh (although I will subsequently refer to it as simply “Tifinagh”). Moroccan schools officially began teaching Tifinagh in

precise, for example, to refer to the Tamazigh language spoken in northern Morocco by its regional dialect, Tarifit or “Riffian.” Again, however, these are the values residents of the Exclaves use to describe the attributes held by members of the population. Interestingly, *Dariya*, the local vernacular spoken in Ceuta—a hybrid of Arabic and Castilian—is perhaps better conceptualized as a basic category: although it is based on two other languages it is commonly understood as *sui generis*, unable to be de-aggregated into any sub-dialects—which do not exist—or its constitutive parts, which would just be different languages (i.e., Arabic and Castilian).

These three attribute-dimensions and their attribute-values are relatively uncontroversial. The dimensions of somatic markers, religion, and language appear in a wide range of studies on ethnicity spanning anthropology, history, political science, and sociology. For example, Laitin (1998) examines the role language plays in shaping the identities of Russian speakers living in the Baltic countries; Hale (2008) discusses the importance of phenotypical markers in using ethnicity as a heuristic tool to reduce uncertainty; and Brubaker (2013) has recently reflected on how language and religion are used to categorize people in the contemporary West. In Ceuta and Melilla, the dimensions and values have been noted in the work of local social scientists (Rontomé 2011) and various visiting anthropologists (Driessen 1992; Torres Cólón 2008).

However, the role that political homeland, the final attribute-dimension, and its attribute-values play in constituting ethnic identity categories is less obvious. Yet what distinguishes these values are a key part of this dissertation’s argument. For this reason, I devote the following section to discussing the political homeland dimension and its values of “titular,”

2003 and now hosts the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), which maintains the standards of the language, in Rabat. IRCAM’s official rendering of Tifnagh is depicted in Appendix AW. The use of Tifnagh is discussed further below, in Subsection 3.3.2.

“indigenous,” and “autochthonous” in detail.

3.3 Being titular, indigenous, or autochthonous

As discussed in the previous section, the attribute-dimension of “political homeland” refers to a class of imagined, historical collectivities with which individuals are affiliated due to a variety of factors that their community recognizes as descent-based, such as shared cultural idioms, discursive frames, shared notions of origin or fate, and “political memories” (Brubaker 2005; Hale 2008; Weber 1978). The actual generation of the affiliation most often takes place through—and can be observed occurring in—everyday, banal references (Billig 1995). However, the dimension is not populated by a Herderian list of fixed, presumed (ethnonational) groups to which individuals are assigned. For example, the political homeland dimension for contemporary Mexico would *not* hold the values, “Spanish,” “Zapotec,” “Mixtec,” and so on.

Rather, the dimension is populated by types of collectivities, as defined by their power relationships.⁵ The number and relative position of the collectives depend on a society’s current discourse, such as its official or widely-acknowledged history. Thus, the homeland values (or types) are distinct from one another by a basic dynamic of “relatively more power” versus “relatively less power,” so that value A is widely understood as having had a significant power over value B. Value B itself can consist of two or more groups so that value B₁ is understood as having had power over B₂, B₃ . . . B_n; value B₁ can be divided into B₁₁, with power over B₁₂, B₁₃ . . . B_{1n}.⁶

⁵Following Wimmer (2008b), who himself draws on Weber and Bourdieu, I define “power” as referencing endowments on three dimensions: economic capital, the ability to influence other actor’s choices against their will, and the prestige associated with one’s social standing (see also Emerson 1962).

⁶Bourdieu (1979: 143) describes this structure of relation as “doubtless one of the simplest and most powerful that a mythico-ritual system could use, since it cannot counterpose without simultaneously uniting, and it capable of integrating an infinite number of data into a single order by the endlessly repeated application

The political homeland values, then, are arrayed on the dimension in an order determined by power relations, with one collectivity's value representing a position of power over the next. To help make this argument as clear as possible, certain aspects of this attribute-dimension and its values should be stressed at this point. First, an individual's affiliation to a political homeland value is not indicative of her actual power. An individual may be personally powerful but still claim or be assigned affiliation with a relatively less powerful collectivity based on descent. Second, the number of values depends on a given population's discourse of collectivities and the boundaries (as defined by power) between each one. Third, the ordering of these collectivities depends on how members of a given population understand the power dynamics between each group. Taken together, the key idea is that, *in some populations, distinct "political homelands" are a relevant part of the shared discourse; these homelands can be ordered by relative power; and individuals are affiliated with one rather than another based on perceived descent and banal reference-making by themselves and others.*

I identify three generalizable values for the collectivities arrayed on the political homeland dimension: "titular," "indigenous," and "autochthonous." The distinction between titular and indigenous represents the most basic division possible in a given population. The term titular, typically used to signify the group after which a nation state is named, denotes the collectivity that is in the most powerful position. Therefore, *if the political homeland dimension is relevant to a given society's ethnic structure*, then the basic division between titular and indigenous will be present.

The indigenous value denotes the collectivity that is in a lower, perhaps subjugated, position of power. Here, it does not refer to a literal *indigenous group*—after all, titular

of the same principle of division."

groups may also be indigenous, or native to a nation state—but rather it refers to the collectivity of those in a lower position of power, relative to the titulars. For example, if analyzing the ethnic structure of contemporary Spain, many would consider the Castilian collectivity as the de facto titular collectivity (although not the literal titular group) whereas the Basques, who could not reasonably claim the dominant, or titular, position in Spain, could instead claim an indigenousness solidarity collective. An analysis of contemporary Great Britain would be similar: an English collectivity is widely acknowledged as de facto titular whereas a Welsh collectivity, which could not reasonably claim to be titular, could instead be represented by the indigenousness value. Of course, if the analysis focused solely on the Basque Country or Wales, then Basques and the Welsh, respectively, would be represented by the titular value—although, in fact, the political homeland dimension itself may become irrelevant.

In some contexts, indigenous notions of a collective could be de-aggregated further, into more deeply-rooted—and often older—power relations. I denote this division with the distinction between indigenous and autochthonous. Whereas the term indigenous refers to a collectivity based on nativity, the term autochthonous, derived from the Greek words for earth and soil, connotes a collectivity tied to, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* puts it, notions of being “born out of the earth.” In such a context, then, members of the population may feel a descent-based solidarity with the titular, or most powerful, notion of collectivity, or an indigenous, or less powerful, collectivity—and within the broader indigenous population, individuals may affiliate with the indigenous collectivity or an autochthonous, or less powerful, collectivity.

The indigenous/autochthonous division within indigenous groups are often overlooked in studies of ethnicities and nations. This may be a result of modernist and post-modernist

scholarship's focus on colonialism and post-colonialism: the majority of attention has been directed towards the boundary between either colonizers or the Global North (depending on the study) and the colonized or the Global South. Consequently, less attention has been paid to the feelings of groupness and the relative power dynamics between collectivities *within* ex-colonies and societies in the Global South. For example, much research on Latina/o immigrants in the United States neglects the power relationships between autochthonous collectivities within Latin American migrant streams. Similarly, research on the construction of identities among European Muslims often notes their ancestral nationality—for example, whether their parents were Algerian—but not whether they and those around them used perceived descent to generate affiliation with autochthonous groups, such as “Touareg” or “Kabyle.”

Activists in Morocco, a context obviously more relevant for this study, focus on what I am calling the indigenous/autochthonous distinction in a 2007 document titled, *Plateforme: Option Amazighe*, in which they use ties to “the land, the cradle of Amazigh civilization” to distinguish an Amazigh sense of collectivity from an Arab sense of collectivity.⁷ Maddy-Weitzman (2011: 175) summarizes their argument as such,

The Arabs, unlike the native Amazigh rooted to their soil, are a defined “ethnic group,” with a group consciousness deriving from linguistic, cultural, economic, and social commonalities and specific geographical roots, the Arabian Peninsula. The cardinal sin of Morocco's urban elites, backed by “foreign personalities, both French and Arab,” was their desire to establish a new conception of national identity, based on a “new order” (*al-nizam al-jadid*) with an “Arabist tendency”

⁷http://www.amazighworld.org/countries/morocco/documents/option_amazighe.php (Last accessed 7 May 2014).

(*al-naz‘a al-arabiyya*), on the ruins of the defeated Amazigh order. This “arrogance” and “hostility” toward “any presence of the Amazigh in his own country” resulted in their imposing a new kind of “cultural colonialism” on Morocco[.]

3.3.1 Why power and autochthony matter

Why would historical collectivities and their relative power be relevant for constructing contemporary ethnic identities and groups? And, what is the value of distinguishing between titularity, indigeneity, and autochthony, rather than using dichotomous values such as “more power” and “less power”? In brief, I argue that the particularities of pre-modern power dynamics between collectivities—which often involved a layering of power relationships due to waves of migration, conquest, and settlement—shape the meaning of ethnic categories today. Thus, when categories that are otherwise similar are activated in particular contexts, the dissimilar meanings affect social positions, patterns of association, and social closure.⁸

My argument differs from the common perspectives stipulating, to put it simply, that a group’s shared myths or sense of fate help to generate that group’s present internal cohesiveness and a distinction from others. This perspective would generate the claim, for example, that Kurds are an “ethnic group” partially because members of that group share a Kurdish origin myth and sense of fate. Instead, I argue that the distribution of links to past power positions across the members of a population today helps to constitute

⁸For a theoretical examination of how power influences social positions, boundaries, and social organization, see Wimmer 2008b, 2013a,b. In brief, Wimmer argues that groups with greater power can use legitimacy to exert long-lasting influence on an ethnic and political landscape. A relatively more concrete process can be traced with Fearon and Laitin’s body of work. They have recently argued that when migrants with relatively more powerful allies settle in an area dominated by an indigenous population, the latter group—termed “sons of the soil”—are forced into a long-lasting disadvantaged and aggrieved position. One common recourse for this group has been to take up arms and initiate intergroup conflict, which, in turn, further impacts social positions, patterns of association, and future identity categories (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 2011).

their current ethnic categories, imbuing them with particular shared meanings. So, to take the Kurd example, my argument suggests that what it *means* to be a “Turk” (a category name) differs from what it *means* to be a “Kurd” (another category name) because of a combination of elements constituting the categories, including the affiliation between the Kurd category and a historical collective with less power, relative to another collectivity that is widely associated with the Turk category.

The effect of imagined, historical power dynamics between collectivities on contemporary meanings of ethnic identity categories can occur through several related mechanisms, as John Stuart Mill (1993: 391) implied when writing in the nineteenth century:

[N]ationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of *political antecedents; the possession of national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.* None of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves [emphasis added].

Here, I highlight the two consequences Mill calls “pride and humiliation.” Reconceptualizing these as mechanisms that are likely to emerge from political homelands (echoing Mill’s “political antecedents”) and apply across cases—although by no means exhaustively—I (re)label them as, *empowerment* and *stigmatization*.

Through empowerment, individuals’ affiliation with a particular historical collectivity influences their resilience against discrimination, confidence in a supportive “we-ness,” and

manner of asserting a chosen identity during interactions with others. For example, the greater the power of a political homeland, the greater the empowerment of its affiliated individuals and the increased ability to handle discrimination and cross social boundaries (see Lamont et al. 2013; Lamont 2014; Wimmer 2008b).⁹

Furthermore, I posit that when individuals activate categories built on political homelands that grant greater empowerment, they will have relatively less motivation to maintain bright group boundaries—thereby helping to produce a greater permeability of categories—and pursue politics based solely on an ethnically-informed social organization. Indeed, I show evidence for this through my analysis of the (“indigenous”) Arab community in Ceuta in the following chapter. Alternatively, categories constituted by political homelands with lesser power (recall that this is not a comment any individuals’ personal power) will hinder its members’ navigation of discrimination and boundaries. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that group boundaries will be reified and individuals will pursue ethnic politics. I find support for this proposition in the following chapter’s analysis of the (“autochthonous”) Amzaigh community in Melilla.

Intertwined with empowerment is the mechanism of stigmatization. With the term stigmatization, I refer to how an affiliation with a political homeland affects an individual’s subjective ability to “pass” as a member of a more powerful identity category. Regardless of actual individual power, individuals affiliated with a titular political homeland would have very low stigmatization and a less challenges when claiming membership in a more powerful identity category. For example, a “titular” Spaniard will, on average, have an easier time claiming membership as a “member of the European Union” than non-“titular” Spaniards. Such individuals, for example those affiliated with a autochthonous group, will

⁹For a discussion on the social psychological mechanisms of this process and its occurrence among African-Americans in the modern United States, see Lamont et al. 2013: 147.

have higher stigmatization and more challenges whenever claiming membership in a more powerful category, regardless of actual individual power.¹⁰

As with empowerment, stigmatization affects how categories, when activated, are understood as relating to one another—particularly the degree to which they are “nested,” or seen as being included within one another, and “overlapping,” or seen as more easily crossed or blurred (for a detailed taxonomy of category changes, see Wimmer 2008a).¹¹ Here, I posit that the moderate stigmatization of the (“indigenous”) Arab community in Ceuta increases the likelihood that they will be part of the dominant group’s political projects whereas the higher levels of stigmatization of the (“autochthonous”) Amzaigh community in Melilla increases the likelihood that they will be excluded from the the dominant group’s political projects—and instead generate their own. I find evidence in support of this proposition in the following chapter.

While never couched in the specific terms of my model, Bourdieu depicts how descent-based ties to political homelands empower and stigmatize individuals in *Algeria 1960* (1979), his masterful study of Algeria’s Berber community, the Kabyles. Referring to “pre-capitalists,” “peasants,” and those from a “traditional society,” rather than Kabyles or Amazigh, Bourdieu’s observations—not to mention his *own interpretation*—display stigmatization when describing how the pre-capitalists struggle to succeed in the capitalist mode of economy and social organization. Namely, for Bourdieu, pre-capitalists do not have the “dispositions and ideologies” necessary for capitalism (which was imposed by the French,

¹⁰Or, as Lamont et al. (2013: 129) put it, individuals with greater stigmatization “often live with the expectation that they will be over scrutinized, overlooked, under appreciated, misunderstood, and disrespected in the course of their daily lives.”

¹¹Also related is Wilkinson’s (2012) discussion on the circumstances in which the order of values on a dimension has implications for the construction of categories. He hypothesizes that attributes positioned closer to each other on a dimension—such as “titular” and “indigenous”—will be more likely to generate overlapping categories than attributes positions further apart—like “titular” and “autochthonous.”

who, at this time, were the literal titular group).¹² Indeed, among the pre-capitalists of colonial Algeria, Bourdieu (1979: 5) writes,

remnants of the pre-capitalist mode of production persist despite everything, and with them, the associate dispositions. It follows from this that, both at the level of the economic structures and at the level of dispositions, representations, and values, the same duality is to be observed, as if these societies were not contemporary with themselves.

To be clear, Bourdieu did not believe the pre-capitalist “disposition and ideologies” were inherent in (some) Kabyles. Rather, they resulted from others’ (and Bourdieu’s) perception that the pre-capitalists lacked the “formal education, practical skills, and know-how bound up with an ethos and making it possible to act with a reasonable chance of success” (Bourdieu 1979: 7). This resulted in a persistent stigmatization that helped to cast Algeria’s pre-capitalist identity category as unable to “nest” or “overlap” with the French category, unlike the category of the Muslims who worked in the colonial system.¹³ However, such dispositions—and perceptions of dispositions—could be changed, he argued, through improvements in individuals’ economic and social position.

¹²Bourdieu (1979: 7) argues that the most significant disposition was towards time, specifically the ability to organize time “in relation to an absent, imagining vanishing point.” Interestingly, Evans-Pritchard (1940: Ch.3) also discusses the importance of varying conceptualizations of time in his study of the Nuer.

¹³Perhaps Bourdieu’s (1979: 27) best description of what the “pre-capitalist” or “peasant” category *meant* was that the world, for members of this category, was “enchanted,” in contrast to the “disenchanted” capitalist world: “The disenchantment of the world [the capitalist perspective] coincides with the failure of the endeavor to enchant the experience of time (*la durée*) by magico-ritual stereotyping of the techniques or rituals which tended to make the unfolding of time ‘the moving image of eternity.’ So long as activity has no other goal than to ensure reproduction of the economic and social order, so long as the whole group sets itself no other goal than to last, and objectively transforms the world without acknowledging that it does so, the acting subject lives in the very rhythm (*sure de la durée*) of the world with which he is bound up. He cannot discover himself as an historical agent whose action in the present, against the present order, is only meaningful in relation to the future and to the future order which it works to bring about. Traditionalism appears as a methodical undertaking (although not apparent to itself as such) aimed at denying the event *as* an event, i.e., as a novelty induced by innovatory action or tending to induce it; aimed at overcoming events by making chronological order depend on the eternal order of mythic logic.”

At this point, my perspective on stigmatization slightly deviates from Bourdieu. While I agree that a particular individual's "improvements" in economic and social position may change her "disposition," my argument suggests that there are path dependent effects of titular, indigenous, and autochthonous groups. So, for example, the relative power position of the autochthonous group at the time of incorporation into the modern state will continue to inform the ethnic identity categories of affiliated individuals far into the future, regardless of any individual-level "improvements" in each generation (as long as that attribute dimension is relevant in a given society).¹⁴ My perspective on empowerment, however, has further common groups with Bourdieu's observations: he notes how pre-capitalists sometimes relied on social networks and patronage to improve their living and working conditions.

In sum, I argue that in a given population, individuals' affiliation (through perceived descent) with various types of political homelands, themselves defined by relational power, ultimately affects the construction and meaning of ethnic identity categories in that population. This can occur through various mechanisms, including empowerment and stigmatization.

The inclusion of the political homeland attribute-dimension and its attribute values into our analyses of ethnicity helps to move beyond the somewhat tautological claims that a group's shared myths, history, or fate help to generate the group itself. Instead, my argument emphasizes how connections to *types* of pasts—affiliations with titular, indigenous, or autochthonous groups—produce mechanisms that, in turn, can potentially give unique meanings to categories. Such a specification also serves to clarify why the presence of shared myths, history, or fate does not always lead to identity categories: my argument suggests that a population must have ties to two or more historical collectivities that *vary in relative*

¹⁴I thank Steve Pfaff for noting this distinction from Bourdieu's argument.

power for such share memories to help form contemporary distinct categories. Furthermore, my argument also helps to explain variation in meaning among similar-appearing categories, such as the dissimilarity in the *musulmán* categories across Ceuta and Melilla or how “Hispanic” can mean different things in different parts of the United States. Namely, I suggest that how local communities understand the past power dynamics of relevant political homelands can differ—sometimes greatly—and, consequently, the construction, meaning, activation, and boundaries of categories can vary at sub-national levels. Again, I find evidence for this in the following chapter.

Finally, recognizing the layered power relations between various political homelands in a community’s past underscores the reality that colonial-type processes did not simply occur during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Just as colonization by European and North American states forced populations across the world into brutal submission and marginalization, so too did many contemporary “indigenous” nations once colonize, oppress, and marginalize autochthonous peoples. Or, to use Bourdieu’s (1979: 65) terminology, “norms and mental schemes which traditionally governed economic conduct” regularly collapsed during pre-modern waves of migration and conquest, as they did during the more recent era of colonialism. And, as I have tried to make clear in this section, these pre-modern power relations have a lasting effect in many contexts today. To maximize the clarity of my argument, I provide some examples of such effects in the following section before returning to the general discussion of ethnic structure in the Exclaves.

3.3.2 Examples of indigenous and autochthonous political homelands

Social scientists have long observed historical power dynamics, carried into the present through individuals’ (perceived) ties to past collectivities, play a role in the construction

of categories. However, researchers' attention has often followed in the footsteps of Barth's collaborators, Haaland ([1969] 1998) and Siverts ([1969] 1998) (studying southern Sudan and southern Mexico, respectively), and been focused on how individuals can transform, escape, or combat the effects of descent-based ties to historically-rooted endowments of power (see also Lamont et al. 2002). Moreover, contemporary sociologists and political scientists—if concerned with the construction of ethnic categories at all—typically overlook affiliations with pre-modern and multi-layered political homelands, perhaps because of the widespread reliance on data that only counts modern nationalities or conflates ethnicity with national origin nations.¹⁵

That being said, some social scientists are becoming increasingly aware to how past power dynamics are present in contemporary identity categories—although, to the best of my knowledge, these dynamics are not discussed in generalizable terms, as I attempt to do in this chapter. This awareness is currently most pronounced among some anthropologists, including those studying the movement of people from Latin America to the United States. Cruz-Manjarrez (2013), for example, describes how migrants from Yalálag, in Oaxaca, Mexico—commonly labeled as members of the Zapotec people—experience two sets of power relations when in the United States. First, a “Mexican system,” which stigmatizes the indigenous (in the Mexican context) people and culture while valuing the mestizo (or, in this context, “titular”) people and culture. Second, an “American system,” which re-identifies titularity and stigmatizes “Mexicans” more broadly. Interestingly, she finds that the migrants' children continue to self-identify as “Oaxacan” in certain situations, although, to be sure, they identify more frequently as “Mexican American” due to living in the American context. Similarly, Stephen (2008) finds that indigenous Mexican migrants have a

¹⁵There are a vast amount of examples of this which I could cite, so here I only mention the highly-regarded collections of studies in Levitt and Waters 2002 and Kasinitz et al. 2008.

more difficult time adapting to the United States than other Latina/o migrants and Foxen (2007) notes how other “ethnic” groups in the United States (e.g., Korean-born residents) stigmatize indigenous Mexicans more so than mestizo Mexicans.¹⁶

The question of indigenous and autochthonous political homelands in North Africa has been contentious for centuries, but there is increasing recognition that the Imazighen have been uniquely empowered and stigmatized due to their descent-based affiliation with an autochthonous political homeland. In pre-modern times, the Amazigh people were cast as different by Hellenized and Roman traders, soldiers, and settlers. This differentiation took on stronger norms of marginalization during the conquest by Arab-Muslim armies: Arabic was imposed both in the urban bureaucracy and countryside and Muslim scholars ascribed a western origin to the Amazigh people, thereby devaluing them relative to the Arab people, with eastern origins (i.e., the Arabian peninsula). The relative power difference between Arabs and Imazighen further increased under the Ottomans and Moroccan sultanate, when the entire region came to be widely seen as populated by a pan-Muslim—or, some would say, Arab—population (Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

Colonialism revived the distinction between the Arab and Amazigh people because the French generally favored “Berbers” in an effort to undercut the position of Arabs and weaken local society by sowing division. While this created a small cadre of elite Imazighen, it in fact resulted in increased marginalization for the Amazigh people in the post-colonial era.

The French system of preference allowed the now-ruling pan-Arab nationalists to claim that

¹⁶Another interesting possible point of convergence between descent-based political homelands and recent research into identity categories involves the growing body of work on genetic bio-ancestry. Some of this research asks why bio-ancestry tends to correlate with self-classification of ethnicity and race, considering that individuals do not typically have access to their genetic information (see Guo et al. 2013). One avenue of research could potentially trace how a population’s variance in bio-ancestry has been correlated with its power structures over time. For example, since Guo et al. (2013: Figure 2) record a difference in “North African” and “Middle Eastern” genetic markers, future work could examine the membership of those markers in particular political homeland categories across populations in contemporary North Africa and Europe.

the “Berbers” were a product of colonialism, invented by the French and not actually distinct from the Arab people. For example, when Ahmed Ben Bella became the first presidency of Algeria, he proclaimed *nous sommes des Arabes* (“we are [all] Arabs”) and put the country on a path of *socilaime arabo-islamquie* (“Arab-Muslim socialism”) (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 69).

This pan-Arab discourse went hand-in-hand with newly independent Morocco and Algeria’s policies of Arabization, under which the Amazigh language was barred, town and village names were rewritten in Arabic, and the first names of newborns could only be selected from an officially-approved list of Arabic names. Arabization also occurred in more subtle ways, such as the “big tent” of the Moroccan monarchy, which undercut Amazigh identity claims by conceptualizing the entire population as equal subjects—but under a sharifian Arab-Muslim king, of course. To be sure, many Amazigh groups called for greater rights and autonomy—two notable examples being Abdelkrim’s Rifian Republic (1921-1926) and the Kabyles’ “Berber Spring” (1980)—and some Amazigh even thrived and prospered in Arabized Morocco and Algeria.¹⁷

Although the pan-Arab discourse continues to be dominant and Imazighen are disproportionately poor and underrepresented in civil society, the Amazigh people and culture have recently gained greater recognition. Morocco’s current king, Mohamed VI, has visited the Rif, founded IRCAM, and mandated that Tifnagh, the recognized Amazigh script, be taught in schools.¹⁸ However, despite these advances, North Africa’s dominant understand-

¹⁷These Imazighen were sometime referred to as *Berbère de service*, or those in the service of Arab rulers in order to advance their own interests (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 94).

¹⁸The teaching of Tifnagh, however, has not been without some controversy. The royal office ignored the advice of the majority of its Amazigh advisors and decided that the official curriculum teach the Tamazigh language in the Tifnagh script, rather than the Latin script. This was seen by many as a way to subtly increase the marginalization of Amazigh, by putting it in a script that is not widely used (Maddy-Weitzman 2011). Perhaps not coincidentally, recent research has found that most Moroccan young adults have negative attitudes towards the usefulness, prestige, and implications of using the Amazigh language (Errihani 2008).

ing of history and contemporary society continues to place the Amazigh political homeland in a less powerful position relative to the Arab political homeland. Just as the Imazighen were subordinated to the nation-building projects of Arab-Muslim conquerors and European colonialists, today they remain secondary under the pan-Arab vision of the North African states and public. Furthermore, Rachid Raha, one of the founders of the World Amazigh Congress and the publisher of *Le Monde Amazigh*, the Amazigh community's most important media outlet, stressed to me in an interview in 2011 that the continued marginalization of the Amazigh people is likely to increase due to the growth of political Islam and pan-Islamism. For example, he described how the imams in Melilla, taught and paid by the Moroccan state, depict "Berber Islam" as a folk religion while praising a universal—that is, pan-Arab—Islam. Islamism, he argued, is an insidious force of marginalization because it allows Imazighen, who have been disaffected and oppressed for generations, to feel part of a strengthening group while, at the same time, devaluing the uniqueness of the Amazigh people and culture.

3.3.3 Summary

To summarize this section, I argue that the political homeland dimension and its values represent how members of a given population, interpreting their own descent and that of others, are affiliated with different past collectivities, each distinguished from one another by their relative power. This dimension is irrelevant in many societies, such as in cases where a plurality of collectivities is not part of the dominant discourse or, in cases with a plurality, collectivities are not ordered by their relative power. However, the dimension will be relevant when a population believes that different portions of its members commonsensically affiliate—through claim-making, assignation, or a combination of the two—with

widely recognized distinct historical collectivities that are understood to have had different degrees of power relative to one another. I identify the most basic division of such collectivities as “titular” versus “indigenous,” and argue that the latter category can be divided further with the use of the term “autochthonous.”

To a certain degree, it is not terribly novel to argue that historically-rooted power dynamics are carried into the present because they are seen as a descent-based attribute. Numerous scholars of ethnicity have used various terms to include a notion of inherited collective solidarity in their definition of an ethnic group: Weber (1978) mentions “memories of colonization or migration;” Horowitz (1985) writes of a “myth of a collective ancestry;” and Fearon and Laitin (2000) refer to a “conventionally recognized ‘natural history’ as a group” (see also Hale 2008; Smith 1996). These arguments, however, are somewhat tautological, essentially claiming that a group’s shared notion of groupness helps to generate a sense of a group. In response, my argument builds on these scholars’ insights to posit that connections to *types* of past power relationships—affiliations with titular, indigenous, or autochthonous groups—produce mechanisms that, in turn, can *potentially* form categories, each imbued with corresponding shared meanings.

3.4 Constructing ethnic identity categories

3.4.1 The population repertoire

Thus far, I have explained how the combinatorial approach to studying ethnicity encourages researchers to specify the attribute dimensions and attributes values present in a given population (Subsection 3.2.2). Together, these define that context’s *population repertoire*. The *individual repertoires* are the unique combination of each possible value from each

dimension that individuals can have, together generating the full range of *potential* ethnic identity categories (Chandra and Boulet 2012). In other words, the population repertoire across the Exclaves,

- Somatic markers: European, North African
- Religion: Christianity, Islam
- Language: *Dariya* (Arabic-Castilian), Castilian (“Spanish”), Tamazigh
- Political homeland: titular, indigenous, autochthonous

produces 36 individual repertoires—the possible combinations made from the two values on the somatic marker dimension, the two values on the religion dimension, the three values on the language dimension, and the three values on the political homeland dimension. All 36 individual repertoire combinations are listed in Appendix AX; three examples are:

- {European *and* Christian *and* *Dariya and* titular} (ECDT);
- {North African *and* Christian *and* Tamazigh *and* titular} (NCDT); and
- {North African *and* Islam *and* Tamazigh *and* autochthonous} (NITA)

Imagining the 36 individual repertoires makes it clear that in Ceuta and Melilla, as in all societies, many more categories are possible than are *operative*, or practical. For example, actual membership in the categories {European *and* Christian *and* *Dariya and* titular} (ECDT) or {North African *and* Christian *and* Tamazigh *and* titular} (NCTT) is unlikely, if not very rare. Consequently, the next step in analyzing the ethnic identities in Ceuta and Melilla is to identify the operative categories from the full range of individual repertoires, as well as the restrictions that make these particular categories—and not others—operative.

3.4.2 Individual repertoires

A given context can have multiple and overlapping restrictions that define operative repertoires, ranging from shared discourses to economic interests. In Northern Morocco and the Exclaves, the most significant restriction stems from the *nestedness* of attribute values. This means that attribute values are related to one another through a nested structure, so that one “node” constrains the available values for related “nodes” (Ferree 2012). For example, in the context of Ceuta and Melilla, the “European” attribute value has other attribute values fully nested within it (Figure 3.3). In contrast, the “North African” and “Islam” attribute values have different nested relationships with the other attribute values. While “Islam” is nested in “North African,” “Islam” contains the two distinct nested sub-structures of {*Dariya and indigenous*} and {*Tamazigh and autochthonous*} (Figure 3.4).¹⁹

The nestedness restriction depicted in Figure 3.3 indicates that individuals residing in the Exclaves with the “European” attribute are very likely to also have the descent-based attribute value set of {*Christianity and Castilian and titular*}. That is, once “European” is present, the other values and subsequent combination of attributes that constitute the ethnic category are restricted.


Similarly, the nestedness restriction depicted in Figure 3.4 indicates that individuals residing in the Exclaves with the “North African” attribute are very likely to also have the value of “Islam” on the religion attribute-dimension. However, they may have *either* the {*Dariya and indigenous*} set of values or the {*Tamazigh and autochthonous*} set of values.²⁰

¹⁹For these nested structures, I am not making the argument that the values are causally ordered. In other words, Castilian does not “cause” someone to have the titular value. Similarly, the Tamazigh value does not “cause” someone to have the autochthonous value. The relationship between attributes can flow in the either direction. For example, the autochthonous value could promote the Tamazigh attribute, and vice versa.

²⁰The argument for this nestedness restriction is supported by the claims of some of the most radical Amazigh activists in Morocco. They contend that while a North African heritage is inseparable from Islam, having these two attributes does not necessitate being Arab and speaking Arabic. See their

Which of these two language/political homeland sets is prevalent among North African and Islam attribute-holders in each Exclave results from long-term settlement patterns.

Figure 3.3: The nested values within the “European” attribute value




In recent history, individuals along the western coastal plains of North Africa—today, the western part of Morocco—and the northwestern Atlas mountains have been much more likely to self-identify with an Arab history, culture, and people. In contrast, individuals on the eastern slopes of the Atlas mountains have been more likely to identify with an Amazigh history, culture, and people. Importantly for the current analysis, Ceuta is situated in a

manifesto at http://www.amazighworld.org/countries/morocco/documents/option_amazighe.php (Last accessed 7 May 2014). Furthermore, the link between language and political homeland in North Africa has been long established. Khaldūn (2005: 440) observed that “Berbers in the West, who are strangers to the Arabic language and adopt it and are forced to speak it as the result of contract with the Arabs . . . have too small a share in the linguistic habit . . . They formerly had another linguistic habit—their own language—and part of their lives had gone by (before they got to know Arabic). Now, the most they can do is occupy themselves with the individual words and word combinations in correct use in the conversation of the (Muslim) urban population in their midst and which they are forced to use.”


historically Arab region whereas Melilla is situated in a historically Amazigh region. This difference is seen when charting the geographic distribution of the Tamazigh language and its dialects in Figure 3.5. In this map, the default language is Arabic (the light gray area) and the Exclaves are located near the top.

Figure 3.4: The nested values within the “North African” and “Islam” attribute values



Since Spain does not collect data on the ethnicity or race of its residents, it is impossible to know the actual proportion of individuals in each Exclave self-identifying with the Arab or Amazigh history, culture, and people. However, a handful of sources support the claim that Ceuta is situated in a predominantly Arab region and Melilla is situated in a predominantly Amazigh region. First, I arrived at this conclusion while conducting my fieldwork

Figure 3.5: Geographical Distribution of the Tamazigh Language



Source of image: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berber_languages; details added by author

in 2011—which combined participant observation with a dozen interviews with local civic leaders and many more informal conversations with local residents—as have several anthropologists and historians specializing in the region, such as the ethnographers Driessen (1992) and Torres Cólón (2008). In addition, Spain’s 2007 National Survey of Immigrants²¹

²¹Spain’s 2007 National Survey of Immigrants includes responses from 15,465 foreign-born residents over the age of 16 who have lived in Spain or intended to stay in Spain for at least one year, excluding foreign-born residents with Spanish citizenship by birth who moved to Spain before the age of two. It randomly selected respondents from municipal registers and achieved a response rate of 87.4 percent. For more information, see Reher and Requena 2009.

and Morocco’s 2004 national census provide further support with their data on the primary languages spoken by respondents. As seen in Table 3.1, the majority of immigrants in Ceuta and residents in the surrounding Moroccan province speak Arabic as a first language while the majority of immigrants in Melilla and residents in the surrounding Moroccan province speak Tamazigh as a first language.²² Indeed, the *christianos* in Ceuta and Melilla have long recognized this dissimilarity in North African the population, differentiating between the *moro del rey*—North Africans “of the king,” or Arabs—and the *moro foronterizo*—North Africans “of the frontier,” or the Amazigh people during the colonial era (de Larramendi and Nuñez Villaverde 1996).

Table 3.1: Prevailing Language in Each Region

	Ceuta	Melilla
Arabic as first language (percent of all immigrants) ^a	76.54	26.28
Tamazigh as first language (percent of all immigrants) ^a		
Residents in surrounding Moroccan province speaking a Tamazigh dialect (percent of total population) ^b	0	59.23
	7.1	86.2

^aSource: Spain’s 2007 National Survey of Immigrants

^bSource: Morocco’s 2004 national census

As a result, in Ceuta, a society situated in an Arab region, the descent-based attribute set of {*Dariya and indigenous*} is nested within the attributes of “North African” and “Islam” (see the lower-left branch of Figure 3.4). The opposite is true for Melilla, a society situated in an Amazigh region: the descent-based attribute set of {*Tamazigh and*

²²Ceuta and Melilla are each primarily populated by individuals from mainland Spain and individuals native to the immediate area, regardless of whether those individuals were born in the Exclaves or in the surrounding Moroccan territory. In other words, while most *musulmanes* in each Exclaves are native-born, the immigrants residing in each city are overwhelmingly from the surrounding Moroccan region. According to Spain’s 2007 immigrant survey, 93.73 percent of Ceuta’s immigrants arrived from Morocco and 93.93 of Melilla’s immigrants arrived from Morocco.

autochthonous} is nested within the attributes of “North African” and “Islam” (see the lower-right branch of Figure 3.4).

Thus, through the restriction of nestedness, the populations of Ceuta and Melilla have different “fixed sets” of elements that can be used to construct operative, or feasible, ethnic identity categories.²³ This produces an operative ethnic categories with the same name—*musulmán*—built from slightly dissimilar descent-based attributes, or to use Chandra and Boulet’s term (2012: 189), the *musulmán* category has a different *membership rule* in Ceuta than in Melilla.

The operative categories in Ceuta, then, can be conceptualized as

- *Christiano*: {European and Christianity and Castellano and titular}
- *Musulmán*: {North African and Islam and Dariya and indigenous}

whereas in Melilla, they can be conceptualized as

- *Christiano*: {European and Christianity and Castellano and titular}
- *Musulmán*: {North African and Islam and Tamazigh and autochthonous}

The important point is that the membership rules for the *musulmán* identity category differ across the Exclaves along the dimensions of language and political homeland. In Ceuta, being *musulmán* is associated with speaking *Dariya* as a “mother tongue” and having an indigenous political homeland, in addition to North African somatic markers and being familiar with the Islam. In contrast, in Melilla, the same ethnic category is associated

²³This relationship is similar to Goertz and Mahoney’s (2005) notion of *ontological mechanisms*, or non-temporally causal relationships between variables at two different levels. If two variables are tied through an ontological mechanism, then if an attribute at the sub-level changes, the variable at the higher level changes—regardless of being temporally prior. In other words, the sub-level variable is constitutive of the higher-level variable.

with Tamazigh as a “mother tongue” and an autochthonous political homeland, in addition to North African somatic markers and having familiarity with Islam.

Yet while both language and political homeland values differ, I argue that the variation in political homeland has greater influence than language on the shared understandings of the ethnic categories and, as a result, behavior.²⁴ This is because, in the Exclaves, language has a decreasing influence as a marker of difference. Put concretely, while the model specifies language as a relevant attribute-dimension, the reality is that nearly all permanent residents are bi- or trilingual.²⁵ In addition, Spain, like many Western countries, is increasingly accommodating of multiple languages and, often, even celebrates the diversity that multiple languages bring to a community (Brubaker 2013). So, while *musulmanes* in Ceuta and Melilla may differ based on their “mother tongue,” the difference is not as great as it may appear because, first, they also all speak Castilian and, second, the differing language values do not have a great impact on differentiation. As a result, language is slowly becoming decoupled from descent. Consequently, I argue that the dissimilar values for political homeland—indigenous and autochthonous—are the primary reason for different meanings of the Muslim ethnic category across the Exclaves.

3.4.3 Ethnic change

My discussion of the ethnic structure in the Exclaves is not meant to suggest that *cristiano* and *musulmán* categories are constituted from fixed characteristics, unable to be changed

²⁴Note that I am not arguing that the value on the political homeland dimension affects the symbolic and social boundaries between groups within Ceuta and Melilla—the boundary between *cristianos* and *musulmanes* is comparable across cities. Rather, I am arguing that the attribute value affects the meaning of the categories and, in turn, the behavior of members in each category. It is this behavior, such as patterns of association, that comes to define boundaries between groups over time. As a result, the variation in category-meaning could affect behavior differently, which could then cause the relationship between *cristianos* and *musulmanes* in Ceuta to differ drastically from the intergroup relationships in Melilla. While this may come to be over time, I am not arguing that it is the currently the case.

²⁵In fact, I found that many Moroccans in the neighboring Moroccan cities also spoke some Castilian.

by human action. My goal is not to impose primordial identities upon the residents of Ceuta and Melilla. Rather, I aim to specify which descent-based attribute *currently* differs among the Muslim residents of the Exclaves, *how* this difference shapes the shared meanings of ethnic categories in each city, and suggest that the dissimilar similar *can* play a role in generating different decisions and actions across the Exclaves, such as acquiring Spanish citizenship. (I briefly discuss the link between a population's ethnic structure and ethnic practice below.) That is, following Chandra (2012b), my discussion only suggests that the sticky and visible properties of descent-based attributes—in this case, the values on the dimensions of somatic markers, religion, language, and political homeland—make it so these attributes will be taken as fixed *in the short term*.

In fact, it is likely that the relevance and impact of the particular attributes-dimensions and attributes values I have identified above are not permanent. For example, mixed parentage between *christianos* and *musulmanes* could eventually enable many more individuals with the {Islam and (*Dariya* or Tamazigh) and (indigenous or autochthonous)} attribute set to also hold the “European” attribute on the somatic marker dimension, or vice versa—individuals with the {Christianity and Castellano and titular} could eventually potentially hold the “North African” attribute. Furthermore, if a large enough proportion of the population were subsequently able to decouple distinct somatic marker attributes from the attributes along the other dimensions, somatic markers may cease to exist in the Exclaves as a relevant attribute-dimension.

My fieldwork leads me to believe that the most likely change in the Exclaves' ethnic categories will be due to a subtraction of the political homeland attribute-dimension. As noted by others, the influx of Muslims into Europe over the last few decades has spurred the creation of a supra-national Islamism comprising Muslim communities in various European

countries (El-Tayeb 2011; Roy 2004: see, for example,). This could homogenize individuals' notions of a political homeland and, ultimately, eliminate the relevance of this attribute-dimension.

I found some evidence for this shift already occurring in Ceuta, where many Muslims insisted that they were European and rarely referred to an indigenous political homeland (in this case, Arab) unless prompted, such as when topics of discrimination, the September 11th attacks, and current events in the Middle East arose in conversation. I found less evidence for this in Melilla, where the attribute of an autochthonous (in this case, Amazigh) political homeland appeared to be much stronger and more resistant to an pan-Islam homogenization. However, the increasingly influential Comisión Islámica de Melilla (CIM), or Islamic Commission of Melilla, is attempting to decrease the relevance of an autochthonous political homeland. In an interview in November November 2011, the CIM's spokesperson, Samir Mohamed Tieb, told me that his organization encourages Melilla's Muslims to stop thinking of themselves as having ties to the Amazigh political homeland and instead primarily consider themselves as part of a universal Muslim community—what some call the *ummah*, but others, such as Maddy-Weitzman (2011), characterize as an “Arab milieu.”²⁶ In the language of this chapter's argument, Tieb was effectively crediting the autochthonous political homeland attribute with hindering a similar meaning in the *musulmán* category across the Exclaves. If the CIM succeeds in its mission—and evidence from Melilla suggests that it is making headway²⁷—the attribute-dimension of political homeland may become

²⁶Tieb recently expressed similar sentiments in an interview with the local *El Faro* newspaper (Nuñez 2013).

²⁷For example, Costa (2013a) reports on officials' concern over what they perceive as a recent spread in fundamentalist Islamism in Melilla and the surrounding area. As another example, officials in Melilla arrested members of Islamist terrorist cells in March and May 2014, for the first times in the city's history, to the best of my knowledge (Madridpress.com 2014; Sáiz-Pardo 2014). Not surprisingly, I found that many of the Exclaves' residents were concerned with the rise of radical Islam while I was confuting my fieldwork in 2011.

irrelevant and the categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* may be constituted only be values along the dimensions of somatic markers, language, and religion.

3.5 Ethnic practice

3.5.1 The activation of categories

In the previous sections, I draw on the combinatorial approach to ethnicity to make the case that the descent-based attributes of indigenous and autochthonous political homelands vary across the Exclaves. Ceuta's location in an Arab region leads to the distribution of the titular and indigenous values on the political homeland attribute dimension while Melilla's location in an Amazigh region results in the distribution of the titular and autochthonous values on the same attribute-dimension. Further, I argue that this variation in attribute values leads to dissimilar meanings in the ethnic category *musulmán* across the Exclaves. In Ceuta, being Muslim is "combined" from North African somatic markers, a familiarity with Islam, knowledge of *Dariya*, and an *indigenous political homeland*. In contrast, in Melilla, being Muslim means having North African somatic markers, a familiarity with Islam, knowledge of Tamazigh, and an *autochthonous political homeland*.

The dissimilar meanings of the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories are only observable when they are *activated*, or employed in what Chandra (2012b: 11) calls "ethnic practice." An activated category is distinct from the construction of the category itself (the latter of which has been the topic of the previous sections on ethnic structure). The distinction between category construction and practice is valuable because the activation of categories involve distinct fine-grained processes and social relationships, rather than one general causal path from an "ethnicity" to an outcome, as portrayed by much ethnic

studies research. Indeed, the distinction between categories and activation—or practice or behavior—is garnering increasing attention among scholars of ethnicity.²⁸ Hale (2008), for example, argues that ethnic identity categories are cognitive heuristics that help to make sense of a complex world; the particular ways in which these categories are used and the outcomes they produce is distinct, operating in the realm of what he calls “ethnic politics.” Similarly, Wimmer (2013a) explains that categorizing oneself and others *subsequently* shapes mutual association and behavior by influencing how people decide on schemes of interpretation and scripts of action. He further argues that categorization also increasing the likelihood that individuals will define their interests in terms of others who are affiliated with the same ethnicity and be responsive to pressure from these ethnic peers.

In the remainder of this section, I discuss how the different ethnic category meanings across the Exclaves result in dissimilar ethnic practices. That is, how do the attribute values of indigenous and autochthonous in Ceuta and Melilla, respectively, “act through” the ethnic categories to shape observable *expressions* of groupness? Or, to paraphrase Brubaker (1996), how does ethnic structure affect the “actual existing” categories that we can *see* (Brubaker 2004: see also,)?

The activation of an ethnic category, or a particular expression of groupness, depends on the social context. For instance, categories will be activated differently in private than in public, where they interact with distinct types of conditions, such as violence committed by neighbors or community-wide reactions to migration (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 2011). In this dissertation I am concerned with notions of groupness expressed in public for two reasons. First, the bulk of my data concerns the public—and, more specifically, the political—sphere.

²⁸More precisely, some scholars have consistently emphasized such a distinction—, for example—whereas the majority have often blurred the lines between “ethnic identity” and “ethnic mobilization” (Hechter 1999: see, for example,). The trend, though, is to clarify what generates notions of ethnicity in contrast to what promotes “ethnic” expressions (Gans 2014: see).

And, even though I did conduct many formal and informal interviews “in private” while in the Exclaves, I doubt that how the interviewees activated their ethnic categories in the presence of a foreign researcher is indicative of how they do so amongst friends and family. Second, as they are across mainland Europe, the categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are routinely activated in public across the Exclaves, which great consequence. For example, within the last year, these ethnic categories were publicly activated in regards to issues on education (A.Q. 2014), the celebration of holidays (P.L.C. 2013), economic conditions (EuropaPress 2014c), relations with Morocco (Cembrero 2013), and the rules governing municipal cemeteries (EuropaPress 2013).

3.5.2 Outcomes

Now I finally return to what may be causing the dissimilar levels of Spanish citizenship across the Exclaves. Here, I argue that in the public context of institutionalized politics, such as the process of acquiring citizenship, the different constitutive attributes of the *musulmán* ethnic category across Ceuta and Melilla—the attributes of indigenous and autochthonous, respectively—produce differing notions of groupness and, as a result, the observed disparity in citizenship.

Drawing on the findings from the previous chapter, I first argue that in the context of acquiring citizenship in both Ceuta and Melilla, the categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are activated in a manner that does *not* produce a great degree of difference. A large majority of the Exclaves’ residents are Spanish citizens, regardless of which category they are members and despite the different membership rules for the *musulmán* category across the two cities. Put another way, I find that most *christianos* and *musulmanes* express a sense of groupness inclusive of understandings, symbols, and schemas of the Spanish nation

in the context of acquiring Spanish citizenship, net of any differences in attributes between *musulmanes* in Ceuta and Melilla. This ethnic practice was recently on display during a protest by Muslims in Melilla, for example. The protestors were upset with what they saw as overly deferential treatment of the Moroccan state by the local government: their chant was, “No somos marroquíes; somos españoles!”, or “We are not Moroccans, we are Spanish!” (Cembrero 2013).

In addition, I argue that in the context of acquiring Spanish citizenship in Ceuta, the categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are activated with a *relatively* low degree of difference, or with greater more permeability. That is, the primary ethnic categories are activated in such a manner that expressions of groupness, such as being Spanish nationals, are more likely to cross the categories. This result results from the *ceutí* population’s consideration of which attributes are important markers of difference: the values along the somatic marker and religion dimensions, rather than the values along the language and political homeland dimensions. Language is an increasingly unimportant marker of difference (see Subsection 3.4.2) and the values on the political homeland dimension—titular, for *christianos* and indigenous, for *musulmanes*—are relatively more similar when considering the range of possible values (see Section 3.3). There are two other ways to think of this second point: one, the difference between affiliations to the titular or indigenous values is not sufficient to block incorporation into a contemporary, multicultural state and, two, relatively more “work” has been done in the public sphere to reconcile these two values.

Thus, the remaining difference in attributes are those values along the somatic markers and religion dimensions. And it is precisely differences in these values—how someone looks and what their religion is—that are more easily navigated through the institutions of citizenship in a multicultural state. In other words, these attributes produce *cultural identities*

of *christiano* and *musulmán* that are both relatively “at home” in a liberal Western state such as Spain. Moreover, Gould (2009) notes how the incorporation of diverse religious groups is easier in contemporary Spain than in other Western countries because Spain has relatively low religious polarization across its major political parties, meaning that one major party will not completely shun *musulmanes* based on religious grounds. Therefore, in sum, I argue that the meanings of Ceuta’s discrete categories, based on differences in somatic markers and religion, are not sufficient to hinder a cross-category Spanish groupness, as defined by a shared citizenship.

In contrast, the categories of *christiano* and *musulmán* are activated with a *relatively* high degree of difference in the context of acquiring Spanish citizenship in Melilla. In this context, these ethnic categories connote more distinct notions of groupness. I again posit that this results from the attribute values of the categories in Melilla, specifically the difference between the values on the political homeland dimension—titular, for for *christianos* and autochthonous, for *musulmanes*. The autochthonous value generates an activation of the *musulmán* category that, relative to Ceuta, is more akin to a *national identity*. This kind of groupness differs from that of a cultural identity (as seen in Ceuta) because in modernity—our world of nation states—it carries with it a unique claim to collective recognition. That is, the national groupness expressed through the *musulmán* category in Melilla generates more distinct manners of association and dissociation, coinciding more so with an organizing of the world into discrete nations (Billig 1995; Brubaker 2014; Spillman and Faeges 2005; Wimmer 2002, 2014).

As such, the *musulmán* category in Melilla is activated in a manner that poses a challenge for incorporation into a nation state, relative to categories activated as cultural identities. It also generates greater notions of groupness with a community *other* than the

Spanish nation state, whether that community is embodied in ancient Amazigh villages, the transnational Amazigh Identity Movement, or an imagined Amazigh community. Ultimately, the result is a lower level of Spanish citizenship among *musulmanes* in Melilla, compared to *musulmanes* in Ceuta and *christianos* in both cities—as I find in Chapter 2.

Another way to conceptualize my argument of how the *musulmán* categories are activated during the acquisition of Spanish citizenship is through Glazer’s (1953) famous typology of “melting pot” versus “nation of nations.” Namely, the differences in the attribute values of indigenous and autochthonous help to generate the conditions for a “melting pot” in Ceuta and a “nation of nations” in Melilla.

I evaluate my model further in the following chapter with an analysis of another public context: political parties and voting in local elections. I specify my hypotheses at the beginning of the chapter but, in brief, the core argument of this chapter generates two basic propositions. First, the difference in Muslims’ political homeland attribute values across the Exclaves will result in dissimilar political parties across the cities. Ceuta will have various smaller, less influential ethnic parties—reflectiveness of Muslims’ cultural identity, or a groupness that more easily crosses boundaries—whereas Melilla will have a strong, stable ethnic party—indicative of Muslims’ national identity, or a groupness that crosses boundaries less easily. Second, the difference in categories and the activation of categories across the Exclaves will lead to greater voting *across* ethnic lines in Ceuta but greater voting *along* ethnic lines in Melilla.

3.6 Conclusion and implications

3.6.1 Conclusions

In this chapter, I use the combinatorial approach to ethnicity, developed by Chandra (2012b) and her collaborators, to outline an explanatory model for the question raised in Chapter 2: why more *musulmanes* in Ceuta obtain Spanish citizenship than *musulmanes* in Melilla. The explanation rests on a close exploration of the Exclaves' ethnic structure, or how widely recognized *descent-based attributes* are used to construct and generate shared meanings and understandings of identity categories, and ethnic practice, or how these categories are *activated*.

In regards to the ethnic structure, I argue that the Exclaves share four attribute-dimensions, or the dimensions along which the population's descent-based attributes fall: somatic markers, religion, language, and political homeland. The combinations of the possible values for these dimensions,

- Somatic markers: European, North African
- Religion: Christianity, Islam
- Language: *Dariya* (Arabic-Castilian), Castilian, Tamazigh
- Political homeland: titular, indigenous, autochthonous

generate 36 individual repertoires, or ethnic identity categories with which an individual may possibly identify. However, only some of these are *operative*, or viable. In the context of the Exclaves, the operative categories are determined by how the attributes are *nested*. This means that individuals holding the “European” attribute, are more likely to also have the descent-based attribute value set of {Christianity *and* Castellano *and* titular}. Individual

with the “North African” attribute are more likely to also have the value of “Islam” on the religion attribute-dimension, but they may have *either* the {*Dariya and* indigenous} set of values or the {Tamazigh *and* autochthonous} set of values. The former combination of attributes prevails in Ceuta whereas the latter combination prevails in Melilla, due to historical settlement patterns.

The difference in attribute combinations has a direct impact on the shared meanings and understandings of the constructed categories. While the category *musulmán* is recognized in both Exclaves, the “indigenous” political homeland attribute present in Ceuta injects different notions of relational power into the category than the “autochthonous” attribute present in Melilla. This occurs, I argue, because of how affiliation with particular historical collectives enable past power dynamics to *empower* and *stigmatize* individuals today. To be clear, this does not mean that the *musulmán* category in each city has fixed, unchangeable implications for power relations. In fact, categories and their meanings can change depending on how members of the population understand which attributes are descent-based and distinctive. For example, if *musulmanes* cease to be affiliated with particular political homelands—or the common understandings of the relational power between homelands change—then the categories, meanings of categories, or both will change as a result.

The variation in the *musulmán* category across the Exclaves has consequences for ethnic practice. When these categories are activated in the realm of obtaining Spanish citizenship, the empowerment and stigmatization of the indigenous attribute among *ceutí* Muslims generate *cultural identity* notions of groupness, which are more easily navigated and reconciled with other identities through the institutions of a liberal, multicultural state such as Spain. This helps to promote greater levels of Spanish citizenship. In contrast, the empowerment and stigmatization of the autochthonous attribute among *melillense* Muslims generate a

national identity notion of groupness, which carries with it stronger claims to group recognition, more distinct manners of association, and brighter social boundaries. As a result, the acquisition of Spanish citizenship is depressed.

In the following chapter I further evaluate my model with an analysis of another realm of ethnic practice, the formation of political parties and voting in local elections. I will hypothesize that the indigenous attribute prevalent among *musulmanes* in Ceuta, by allowing empowerment to be enabled with relative ease while decreasing stigmatization, lowers the motivation for the maintenance of boundaries and political projects. In contrast, the autochthonous attribute prevalent among *musulmanes* in Melilla, which brings with it a more contentious and distinctive empowerment along with greater stigmatization, increases the motivation for bright boundaries and “ethnic politics.”

My argument offers two key contributions to the study of ethnicity, nations, and Muslims in Europe. First, it underscores how the categories based on religion (e.g., “Muslim”) and national origin (e.g., “Moroccan,” “Algerian”) that are commonly used in the West overlook and, indeed, erase, the internal diversity among populations with North African heritage. In fact, this can be said of almost all categories used in the majority of academic, political, and popular discourses to describe ethnic minorities and immigrants. Second, my argument moves beyond the typical use of shared myth, ancestry, or fate to describe an ethnic group. Instead, I specify the mechanisms by which affiliations with *types* of historical collectives generate mechanisms that can *potentially* shape the construction and meanings of ethnic categories today (see Subsection 3.3.1). This process, I show in the preceding and following chapter, can have observable consequences for citizenship and politics.

3.6.2 Implications

The argument presented in this chapter also has implications for research beyond the immediate focus of my dissertation. First, communities that have portions of its population affiliated to all three political homeland attributes may have a higher likelihood of exploiting some of its own members. This is because the portion of its membership affiliated with the indigenous political homeland value may be more likely to monopolize a middle-tier socioeconomic strata and have a greater interest in preserving stricter socioeconomic hierarchies to defend their position against the “othered” autochthonous segment of the population. Such an outcome recalls Hechter’s (1999) cultural division of labor argument, although my own formulation specifies the “cultural” attribute that helps to generate the division. It also outlines how a seemingly culturally homogenous group—for example, in Hechter’s case, the Welsh, or, in my case, *musulmanes*—may in fact stratify internally, along lines of power rather than “cultural” lines. As discussed earlier (see Subsection 3.3.2), a few social scientists note such an effect in some immigrant communities in the United States, although, to the best of my knowledge it has not been explain in general terms, as I do here.²⁹ In contrast, if all members of the population ascribe to the same political homeland, the socioeconomic hierarchies may still develop, but perhaps more slowly—“at its own rhythm”—and with less exploitation (see Bourdieu 1979).

Second, the distribution of political homelands affiliations may have an impact on inter-group and intrastate violence. For instance, if the overwhelming majority of a population considers itself linked with the same political homeland, then violence may be rare. However, consider a context in which a group affiliated with a titular political homeland is

²⁹Bourdieu (1979) notes a similar outcome among the semi-educated and non-educated Muslims in Algeria, portraying it as akin to a “foil” effect of the former against the latter. The proletariat position themselves in contrast to the sub-proletariat in an attempt to advance in the French colonial system.

dominant relative to a minority. If some members of this minority imagine themselves as affiliated with a relatively less marginalized indigenous collectivity while their neighbors see themselves linked with the a more marginalized autochthonous collectivity, the *latter* may be more likely to commit violence against the *former*, in an effort to politicize or radicalize them against the titular group. This provides an ethnic-structure explanation for cases such as the Basque Country, where separatists attacked fellow Basques to create a wedge between assimilationists and the Spanish state (see Laitin 1995).

Third, the distinction between indigenous and autochthonous populations matter for a wide range of social phenomena. For example, among economic migrants, an autochthonous affiliation may decrease identification with a country of origin, thereby depressing remittances and other forms of participation in the transnational-development nexus (Karell 2014). In addition, the distinction could potentially help to explain achievement gaps among immigrant populations. For example, recent studies have found that Chinese immigrants to the United States are higher-achieving than Latino immigrants, yet the evidence suggests that “ethnic culture” does not have an effect on this difference. Instead, various studies indicate that Chinese immigrants are more successful because of social capital that links these immigrants to higher-status co-ethnics; Latino immigrants, in contrast, are less likely to have ties to higher status co-ethnics (see Louie 2014). These studies propose numerous reasons why this would be the case, but, to the best of my knowledge, none discuss whether the Latino population in the United States includes similar numbers of indigenous and autochthonous affiliations, which could potentially decrease cross-class links. Alternatively, the majority of the Chinese population may be only affiliated with an indigenous political homeland, thereby facilitating a more inclusive category and more cross-class ties, as well as other communal ethnic practices.

Finally, the impact of pre-modern divisions should encourage us to revise theories of contemporary macro-sociological changes. For example, Inglehart's (1990; 1997) theorized pathways for changes in post-modernist and post-materialist values may vary when unfolding in populations with different distributions of indigenous or autochthonous political homeland affiliations. That is, rather than tracing shifts in the values of industrializing and industrialized societies, it may be more accurate to explore whether there are various pathways *within* contemporary societies, depending on the proportion of the population affiliated with titular, indigenous, and autochthonous political homelands. One segment of the population may be emerging as post-materialist while another is navigating a parallel, but different, threshold between life in an advanced industrial, post-modern society, and, as Bourdieu (1979) puts it, "pre-capitalist" culture.

Chapter 4

The Politics of Autochthony: Ethnic Parties and Voting Across Categories

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I outline a model tracing how affiliations with past collectivities defined by relative power affect the meanings of ethnic categories, or the notions of groupness, in the Exclaves today. I use this model to explain why levels of Spanish citizenship among *musulmanes* differ across Ceuta and Melilla. Namely, the “cultural identity” understanding of the *musulmán* category in Ceuta overlaps more with the dominant *christiano* category and is more easily reconciled with ideas of the Spanish nation state through its multicultural institutions. In contrast, the “national identity” understanding of the *musulmán* category in Melilla overlaps less so with the *christiano* category and is less easily incorporated into the nation state.

In this chapter, I evaluate my argument by examining how the categories are activated into another context—local politics—because my model suggests some counterintuitive outcomes. The general thrust of the ethnic politics literature suggests that the activation of the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories in the context of local politics will be similar across the cities due to a variety of conditions, such as equivalent state institutions, political sys-

tems, and patterns of democratization; comparable cleavages systems of stratification along peripheral, religious, and class lines; a roughly equal share of the population identifying as the ethnic minority; a comparable presence of ethnic elites; similar access to public and club goods; and an equal awareness of successful ethnic social movements and parties.¹ However, despite these comparable conditions, my model posits *dissimilarity* in the local ethnic politics of Ceuta and Melilla.

In brief, I posit that the shared understanding of the *musulmán* category in Ceuta generates more permeable social boundaries and an identity category “nested” within the traditional Spanish identity (see Wimmer 2008a). As a result, I hypothesize that native-born Muslims in Ceuta are more likely to vote across ethnic lines. In addition, I hypothesize that Ceuta will have greater electoral volatility since greater permeability among group categories is more likely to decrease the stability of electoral coalitions. I posit that the political homeland affiliation among Muslims in Melilla helps produce contrasting outcomes. I hypothesize that the native-born Muslims in Melilla are more likely to vote along ethnic lines and that electoral volatility will be lower.

I assess my hypotheses regarding voting behavior by estimating the proportion of votes cast by the native-born residents in each Exclave’s census tracts during the two most recent local elections, those of 2007 and 2011. I estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Ceuta vote across ethnic lines—and for the mainstream center-right party—at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Melilla. I also estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Melilla vote for the local party of “Muslim persuasion” at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Ceuta. Taken together, these findings provide support for the argument that native-born Muslims in

¹A large body of research is dedicated to identifying, specifying, and reviewing these conditions. See Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Horowitz 1985, Chandra 2004, Van Cott 2005, and Hale 2008.

Ceuta tend to vote across ethnic lines whereas native-born Muslims in Melilla tend to vote along ethnic lines. In addition, I find that electoral volatility has been higher in Ceuta than in Melilla since the cities have become self-governing, as hypothesized.

The analysis in this chapter supports my argument that affiliations with political homelands affects the shared meanings of ethnic categories. Here, I observe this effect through how the categories are activated in the context of local politics. Such findings challenge common notions that members of marginalized groups will vote for left-leaning parties (see Lipset [1960] 1963). They also challenge claims that European Muslims are a monolithic population forming their political preferences solely based on ethnicity—that is, that they participate in politics differently than native-born whites (for more on this debate, see Platt 2014; Sanders et al. 2014). More generally, my analysis provides a detailed example of how research can approach ethnic politics when ethnicities are constructed and fluid—that is, not fixed in cleavages that subsequently generate clear preferences.²

The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by briefly reviewing, first, relevant perspectives on the intersection of ethnicity and politics and, second, my general argument. I end this first section by presenting my hypotheses. I next discuss the political landscape of Ceuta and Melilla since the restoration of Spain’s democratic system. This is followed by a discussion of the data and methods. I then present my findings on the voting behavior of the Exclaves’ native-born and foreign-born residents, as well as my findings on electoral volatility. I end with a short discussion and conclusion.

²This contribution builds directly on the growing corrective to common research in ethnic politics led by Chandra and Boulet (2012), Ferree (2012), and Wilkinson (2012).

4.2 Ethnic politics

4.2.1 Intersections of ethnicity and politics

A large body of research across the social sciences has long argued that a community's ethnic landscape influences its political parties and electoral outcomes. A major branch of this work examines on how social identities—which may result from ethnic differentiation along with territorial and class divisions—help to determine voters' preferences and how these voters, aware of their interests, then vote accordingly and consistently, helping to institutionalize political parties (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Horowitz 1985; Boonen and Hooghe 2014). Another branch focuses on the institutional environments in which ethnicity becomes politicized, mobilized, and potentially violent (see Van Cott 2005). Yet another studies what ethnicity “does”—facilitate the distribution of resources, reduce uncertainty, organize labor markets, help form networks—to affect a community's political life (see Chandra 2004; Hechter 1999).

Running throughout this diverse field of research a basic argument: under certain conditions ethnic categories are *activated* in a manner that can be observed in political behavior, and this political behavior provides insight into how individuals understand their ethnic categories. Lipset ([1960] 1963: 253-7) provides an archetypal formulation of this reasoning when he proposes that party politics should be understood through the lens of *status* and *deprivation* rather than solely economic concerns. This, he suggests, helps to explain why working-class members of majority ethnic and religious groups often do not support leftist political parties, which would be more closely aligned to their economic interests. Instead, they often support conservative parties—consider working-class Protestants in the United States and working-class Catholics in Southern Europe—because these parties promise to

protect the privileged status of the majority ethnic or religious group. Indeed, it is often the middle-class members of less privileged groups that have supported liberal parties, such as Catholic voters in the United States. The key idea, then, is that how individuals vote is tightly coupled with their understandings of ethnic self-identification and the role of ethnicity in the larger social context, such as how it relates to cleavages and systems of stratification.

This general claim by the ethnic politics literature generates an *expectation of similar local politics for Ceuta and Melilla*, since they have comparable ethnic landscapes and contextual conditions. That is, the local political parties, political discourses, and voting behaviors in Ceuta should reflect those in Melilla due to the cities' equivalent state institutions, political systems, and patterns of democratization; comparable cleavages and systems of stratification along peripheral, religious, and class lines; roughly equal share of the population identifying as the ethnic minority; a comparable presence of ethnic elites; similar access to public and club goods; and equal awareness of successful ethnic social movements and parties.

Furthermore, the cities' comparable demographics and social and economic conditions produce the expectation of similarity in election results. In other words, Lipset's argument that voters typically vote along ethnic boundaries when cleavages of class and ethnicity intersect in an ethnically stratified context suggests that similar proportions of voters across the Exclaves will vote for parties with comparable platforms. In the context of the Exclaves, their ethnic minority group, *musulmanes*, which has long been situated at a lower status relative to the *christiano* group, should provide a left-leaning, ethnically-affiliated party with a constant base of support.

The second, more restrictive assumption of similarity is supported by three related

research agendas exploring the political life of ethnic and national groups in contemporary European and African multiparty democracies. First, recent research has found that ethnic minority voters in multiparty democracies assess political parties based on the party leaders' problem-solving capabilities—just like native-born whites—but also consider the distinctive situation of their own ethnic group. In other words, while ethnic voters vote “just like everyone else,” they also take into account the surround ethnic landscape (Sanders et al. 2011, 2014).

Second, while it is difficult to disentangle voter preferences and party position, recent work drawing on panel survey data indicates that political parties reflect voters' identities rather than shape their identities (Boonen and Hooghe 2014). Or, more directly, ethnic and nationalist parties tap into a pre-existing identity—they rarely supply or construct such identities. Third, parties' representation of identities is likely to be accurate in contexts like Ceuta and Melilla because communication, signaling, and coordination between constituents and parties are facilitated by the Exclaves' small size, high density, and modern technology (Bleck and van de Walle 2012).³

Taken together, this more recent body of work strengthens Lipset's argument that members of low-status ethnic or religious groups will vote for parties that reflect their ethnic identities, or at least parties that address the distinct concerns of the ethnic group. In the specific case of the Exclaves, then, both Ceuta and Melilla should have, first, a conservative, traditionally Catholic-affiliated party that reflects the identity of their *christiano* population and, second, a left-leaning, ethnically-affiliated party reflecting the identity of the *musulmán*

³The dynamics of coordination between constituents and parties provide insight into voters' activation of identity categories and the role of parties in shaping these categories. For instance, relatively easy coordination increases the likelihood that parties identify an established identity group and craft a message that appeals to that group. Alternatively, if a party's platform is observed to cross all potential identity categories in a context with high levels of coordination, then voters are most likely not activating those categories.

population.

However, the model from the previous chapter—indeed, the central argument of this dissertation—complicates such simplistic treatments of ethnicity in the Exclaves, and, as a result, the cities’ politics. I argue that the ethnic structures specific to each city—that is, the dimensions and values of what are (currently) perceived to be descent-based attributes unique to Ceuta and unique to Melilla—are shaping how their respective residents understand and activate the identity categories. Consequently, political parties, responding to the differential demand of distinct activated identities (see Boonen and Hooghe 2014), should in fact vary between the Exclaves as well as over time.

This argument that the political expression of identities in Ceuta and Melilla will differ presently and in the future is based on the corrective approach to ethnic politics being advanced by Chandra and Boulet (2012), Ferree (2012), Wilkinson (2012), and their collaborators. Namely, they reason that since ethnicities are known to be fluid and constructed, electoral choices cannot be used as indicators of long-term, fixed cleavages and identities. Instead, researchers should consistently keep in mind that identities change over time and use discrete electoral outcomes to examine identities at specific points in the ongoing transformation of ethnic landscapes.

4.2.2 Ethnicity in Ceuta and Melilla

The central argument in this dissertation is that variation in the ethnic structures of Ceuta and Melilla generate different shared meanings for the *musulmán* ethnic category in each city, which then result in dissimilar patterns of behavior when the category is activated. In this chapter, I assess this argument by examining how the category is activated in the context of local politics. In addition, use my analysis of this activation to explore how the

category is being transformed over time, a result of changes in the ethnic structure (see Subsection 3.4.3).

To summarize the argument presented in the previous chapter, I posit while the ethnic structure in each Exclave is very similar, the crucial difference occurs in how the cities' population understands the values on the political homeland attribute-dimension:

- Somatic markers: European, North African
- Religion: Christianity, Islam
- Language: *Dariya* (Arabic-Castilian), Castilian (“Spanish”), Tamazigh
- Political homeland: titular, indigenous, autochthonous

The cross-city similarity in ethnic structure includes the somatic markers perceived to be descent-based attributes and used to construct operative ethnic categories. However, since there is no variation across the Exclaves, somatic markers do not help to account for differences in the meaning and activation of identity categories. To be clear, Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla are racialized and “othered” based on visual, bodily traits, and this has a significant negative impact on their life chances (Torres Cólón 2008). I am simply arguing that these attributes are comparable in each city and, as such, are not likely to be producing variation across the cities.

Religion is also perceived to be descent-based and it helps to generate the distinction between the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories, but, again, the attribute values do not differ across the Exclaves and are not likely to be major factors in forming the distinct ethnic landscapes in Ceuta and Melilla. Moreover, while religion is an *increasingly* salient marker of difference across Western Europe—primarily because religions are typically transformative and substitutive, meaning that they act as a exclusive property, as well as easy to repro-

duce through generations (Brubaker 2013)—the state-legitimized religious pluralism in the Exclaves,⁴ Spain, and many of Europe’s liberal democracies means that religious affiliation is a *decreasingly* important descent-based attribute to activate in political contexts.

In contrast to the shared somatic and religious attributes, the descent-based attributes on the language and political homeland dimensions vary across Ceuta and Melilla. On both these dimensions, Arab-related attributes are common among the *musulmanes* of Ceuta whereas Amazigh-related attributes are prevalent among the *musulmanes* of Melilla: in Ceuta’s Muslim community, the Arabic language and an affiliation with an “indigenous” homeland is prevalent; in Melilla’s Muslim community, the Tamazigh language and an affiliation with an “autochthonous” homeland is prevalent (see Subsection 3.4.2). It is this variation that generates the disparity in how ethnic identity categories are constituted, imbued with meaning, and activated in the political context.

Yet, I do not argue that language attributes are the primary driver of difference across the Exclaves. Not only are nearly all Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla multi-lingual—being fluent speakers of Castilian—but language in the Exclaves is a decreasingly important marker of ethnic categories. In other words, it is becoming less associated with descent. This is due to language itself being an often additive attribute, meaning that individuals can master new languages without transforming their identity, and, second, that both states and individuals are becoming accustomed to—and, in some cases, even accommodative or supportive of—multilingualism (Brubaker 2013). In the Exclaves, for instance, Arabic and Tamazigh are sometimes taught in schools, spoken in public assistance organizations, and used in public signage. In Morocco, Tamazigh and the Tifinagh script have been taught in schools since 2003.

⁴See Torres Cólón 2008 for a detailed study of the cities’ official policy of *convivencia*, or “co-existence.”

The political homeland values, however, do play a large role in generating differences the ethnic categories and their activation. These affiliations with past collectivities, each defined by its relational power to other collectivities, (re)produce mechanisms that help to structure contemporary power dynamics. Two such mechanisms are *empowerment* and *stigmatization*; individuals seen as descending from specific political homeland are empowered and stigmatized to corresponding degrees. This process constitutes a descent-based attribute for each individuals—it is part of their “inheritance”—and helps to shape how categories are understood (see Subsection 3.3.1). Or, to put it in different terms, the power that a category “inherits” from members’ political homeland represents part of the category’s “cultural stuff.”⁵

Such power endowment for each ethnic identity category is subsequently manifested when activated in particular contexts. For instance, dynamics of power can serve as a type of “ethnic capital,” influencing the relative isolation of a community in contexts of the transnational circulation of material and social remittances (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). The types of empowerment and stigmatization flowing from the “titular” inheritance in the Exclave eases connections with mainland Spain; less so for individuals with an “indigenous” inheritance; and even lesser for individuals with an “autochthonous” inheritance. However, this outcome is somewhat reversed when considering transnational ties with Morocco and the greater Islamic world: the “indigenous” inheritance in the Exclaves facilitates connections with coastal and urban Arab Morocco, as well a transnational

⁵The argument that the substance of categories may matter for the formation of ethnic landscapes runs counter to the stricter argument from the boundary-making camp in the ethnic studies field. Yet scholars of boundary-making, including Barth ([1969] 1998) himself in his updated introduction, are increasingly recognizing that the “cultural stuff” may matter for how people understand the categories and, as a result, for how they draw boundaries (see Brubaker 2013; Jenkins 2008; Wimmer 2009). Of course, Chandra’s (2012b) combinatorial approach sidesteps this argument by separating how categories are formed and what they mean to people—what she calls “ethnic structure”—from the resulting patterns of association, closing of boundaries, and other manifestations of “ethnic practice” (see also Hale 2008).

Arab-Islamic *ummah*; the “autochthonous” inheritance eases connections with the Amazigh territorial homeland in the Atlas and eastern Morocco; and the “titular” inheritance hinders some types of transnational connections between the Exclaves and Morocco.

In regards to the political context, I proposed in the previous chapter if an ethnic minority group’s affiliated political homeland is positioned with greater power, such as the “indigenous” Arab community in Ceuta, its members would face proportionately less stigmatization while being better able to handle discrimination and cross social boundaries. As a result, there would be less motivation for maintaining bright group boundaries and political projects. I also proposed that if an ethnic minority group’s affiliated political homeland is position with lesser power, such as the “autochthonous” Amazigh community in Melilla, its members would face proportionately higher levels of stigmatization while being hindered in its negotiation and crossing of boundaries. This would result in more reified boundaries and a greater motivation for identity politics. I use these propositions to generate specific hypotheses in the following section.

4.2.3 Hypotheses

To evaluate the role of ethnic structure in Ceuta and Melilla—and especially the varying influence of the political homeland values—I assess two hypothesis derived from my argument. At a basic level, the hypotheses are the converse of the assumptions of similarity described earlier, in Subsection 4.2.1. Because the hypotheses address the activation of categories in the political context, I focus on the native-born population to control, as best as possible, for the effects of migration. A large body of literature has found that the economic conditions of migration as well as the social process surrounding immigration—assimilation, acculturation, integration—strongly affect voting behavior. (Unsurprisingly, I find support

for this in the following analysis.)

First, I posit that the affiliation with the autochthonous political homeland prevalent in Melilla's Muslim community will generate a shared understanding of the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories as relatively more distinct and, subsequently, an emergence of a more cohesive groupness among Melilla's native-born Muslims and brighter boundaries between groups.⁶ In the political context, I hypothesize that Melilla's *musulmán* category—with a more distinct and cohesive groupness—will be activated such that Muslims are more apt to vote for a left-leaning, ethnically-aligned political party. This is in line with Lipset's ([1960] 1963) postulate that members of lower status ethnic or religious groups will support liberal parties (see Subsection 4.2.1).

In contrast, the affiliation with the indigenous political homeland prevalent in Ceuta's Muslim community will help to produce a shared understanding of the *christiano* and *musulmán* categories as relatively more permeable. As a result, the *musulmán* category will be activated such that Ceuta's Muslims will tend to vote more frequently for issues other than ethnicity—even though they may continue to think of themselves as different than their non-Muslim neighbors. Or, put more simply, native-born Muslims in Ceuta are less likely their their *melillense* counterparts to support an ethnically-aligned party.

In a certain light, this hypothesis contradicts Lipset's ([1960] 1963) argument. However, if it understood that the inherited power endowment of the *musulmán* category in Ceuta generates a more porous ethnic groupness, thereby decreasing the impact of the “Muslim group's” status, then the hypothesis aligns with his expectation of greater interest in voting for economic interests as well as conservative parties.

⁶For discussions of “groupness,” see the previous chapter as well as Brubaker 2004, 2005.

H.1: *Native-born Muslims in Ceuta are more likely to vote across ethnic lines whereas native-born Muslims in Melilla are more likely to vote along ethnic lines.*

Second, the relatively more distinct and cohesive groupness of *musulmanes* in Melilla should help to generate a more fixed ethnic landscape over time. In contrast, the relatively more permeable groupness of *musulmanes* in Ceuta should be reflected in a more fluid ethnic landscape over time. These propositions can be assessed through an analysis of electoral volatility: greater permeability among activated categories is more likely to decrease the stability of electoral coalitions while relatively more distinct activated categories typically limit the number of coalitions that are possible (Ferree 2012). So, as I discuss below, while volatility should be high in both Ceuta and Melilla after 1995 because they are effectively new democracies and coordination between voters and parties is low, the variation in how the *musulmán* categories are understood should produce dissimilar levels of electoral volatility over time, as they become more mature democracies. This leads to the final hypothesis.

H.2: *In Ceuta, where ethnic categories are relatively more permeable, electoral volatility is likely to be higher over time than in Melilla, where ethnic categories are relatively more distinct.*

In the following section I briefly discuss the political landscape of Ceuta and Melilla. This includes short descriptions of the political parties that contested the two elections under analysis, those of 2007 and 2011.⁷ The purpose is to specify which parties can be considered ethnically-aligned—or, as I discuss below, of “Muslim persuasion”—and which are widely acknowledged as not affiliated with any ethnic attributes.

⁷At the time of writing, these are the two most recent elections and the two for which data on voters’ birthplace exists. The next election is scheduled for 2015.

4.3 The political landscape of Ceuta and Melilla

4.3.1 Stages of political development

Since the implementation of Spain's current constitution in 1978, the two most formative events in the political development of Ceuta and Melilla have been the 1985 Immigration Law (known as the *Ley Extranjería*) and the 1995 granting of autonomy. The former started the contentious process of granting citizenship to the majority Exclaves' Muslims residents while the latter enabled greater self-governance for the Exclaves.

Spain implemented the 1985 Immigration Law on 22 October 1985 in anticipation of gaining full membership in the European Community on 1 January 1986. The purpose was to regularize the status on non-European foreign nationals living in Spain, although its onerous requirements for acquiring residency were widely seen as an attempt to decrease the number of non-citizens in Spain through—to use a colloquial term from the contemporary discourse over immigration—“self-deportation.”

This law had an unanticipated explosive effect in the Exclaves. For generations, most Muslim residents of Ceuta and Melilla had been prevented from acquiring Spanish citizenship so as to preserve the “Spanish-ness” of the cities. As a result, when the law was introduced and implemented, including through its various delays, large numbers of native-born Muslims were not Spanish citizens (Table 4.1). Some of these stateless individuals had an official identity card first distributed in 1958 which did not grant welfare benefits or travel permission and, under the new law, was not guaranteed to be valid for residency. This meant that a large majority of Muslims in both Ceuta and Melilla faced possible deportation from Spain, *even though they were born on Spanish territory and had never lived in another country.*

Table 4.1: Legal Status of Muslim Residents as the Immigration Law is Enacted, 1987

	Total Muslims	Stateless	Stateless, with Identity Card	Spanish Nationality
Ceuta	15,000	81 ^a	3	16
Melilla	17,800	30	36	34

^aFigures are percents of total Muslim population

Source: Gold 2000: 91-2

Seeking greater assurances that they would be given Spanish citizenship, the Exclaves' Muslims mobilized in favor of revisions to the law. The *christiano* population and their allies in the local and national governments, however, resisted promising broader access to citizenship in a continuing effort to maintain the cities' "Spanish character." These positions produced major political and public confrontations between the communities in each Exclave, although more so in Melilla, where protests turned violent—and in some instances fatal for Muslim protestors—in 1986 and 1987. Adding to the tension, acrimony increased between the Exclaves' Muslims and their Moroccan neighbors, who viewed the pursuit of Spanish citizenship as a betrayal of the former's Muslim identities (Gold 2000).

Mobilization began to wane among the *musulmán* communities in 1988. This de-escalation followed years of protests, a handful of delays in the implementation of the law in the Exclaves, revisions to the law, and the official recognition of the Exclaves' first Muslim political party—the Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses (PDM), or the Party of the Democrats of Melilla, in Melilla—in 1986.⁸ However, the primary reason for the subsiding of outright public and political manifestations of tension over legal status was the state's gradual increase in the granting of citizenship to Muslims; Muslims residents

⁸In Ceuta, two Muslim organizations—the Asociación Musulmana Ceutí (AMC) and the Comunidad Musulmana de Ceuta (CMC)—tried to form political parties in 1983 and 1987 but did not find enough support to field candidates.

became less fearful that they would be deported from Ceuta and Melilla (Gold 2000). Consequently, the 1991 local elections were the first in which large numbers of the Exclaves' Muslims participated—and even greater numbers participated in the following local elections, in 1995.

The local elections of 1995 were also the first held under the cities' new status as *ciudades autónomas*, or autonomous cities. This meant that they were no longer parts of a mainland autonomous community (i.e., Andalucía), the administrative level below the federal state. Ceuta and Melilla could now elect their own local legislative assemblies and executive, or the president of the assembly, who served a function similar to that of a mayor or head of a province (the third level of political administration).

Not surprisingly, the path to autonomy was also contentious. Morocco, which had long claimed sovereignty over the Exclaves (or, from their perspective, enclaves), strongly opposed any degree of self-governance. It feared that self-governance would help Madrid portray Ceuta and Melilla as legitimate parts of Spain, rather than as colonies, thereby decreasing Morocco's chances of acquiring the cities. Residents of the Exclaves, who widely feared such an acquisition by Morocco, advocated for greater self-governance and incorporation into the Spanish state as a way to increase the likelihood that they would not become part of Morocco. The Spanish national government was caught in the middle—it wanted to maintain good relations with Morocco but faced increasing pressure from the Exclaves, including some of the largest protests ever seen in the cities—and, as a result, prolonged the negotiations over the “autonomy statutes” for several years.⁹

Considering the dates of these two formative events, the following analysis of the Exclaves' local politics starts with the elections of 1995—although it ultimately focuses on

⁹See Gold (2000) for a detailed history of the Exclaves' convoluted path to their current status as autonomous cities.

the elections of 2007 and 2011 due to data constraints. They could have potentially begun with the 1991 elections, which were the first with large numbers of Muslim voters, but the 1995 elections better mark the beginning of the current political landscape. In 1995, local parties contested true local representation for the first time and, perhaps more importantly, the public and political discourses were no longer singularly focused on the issue of self-governance.¹⁰ Instead, various issues—including those revolving around ethnicity, identity, and group boundaries—entered into campaigns and elections in a fashion that continues through today. The remainder of this section, then, discusses the political parties that have contested elections in the Exclaves since 1995.

4.3.2 Major national parties

In recent history, two political parties have dominated Spain's national politics. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), or the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, Spain's second-oldest party (founded in 1833), is positioned center-left. It has been the dominant party at the national level, winning the majority of seats in six of the eleven general elections that have taken place since 1977. The Partido Popular (PP), or the People's Party, is positioned center-right. It was founded in 1989 as a reformulation of the Alianza Popular (AP), or People's Alliance, a party founded and led by one of Franco's ministers. Although solidly in the mainstream today, the PP is still seen as representing Spain's conservative, Catholic, and free-market supporters—Franco's one-time base. The PP has frequently found itself in opposition at the national level, having only won elections in 1996, 2000, and 2011

¹⁰In addition, the center-right Partido Popular (PP), or People's Party, gained disproportional support during the debates over autonomy because it steadfastly supported greater autonomy. This position was possible because it was the opposition party at the national level and was therefore free from considering Morocco's position.

(Table 4.2).¹¹

Both the PSOE and PP have active local branches in Ceuta and Melilla, although the branches' platforms sometimes differ from those of the national parties due to Spain's decentralized federal structure. During the 2011 elections the discourse surrounding the PSOE and PP branches in the Exclaves centered on two issues. First, the PSOE, which led the national government during the onset of the economic recession of 2008–2014, was criticized for its handling of the crisis by the PP. This narrative resonated locally as well as at the national level. As a result, the PP easily won the general election as well as many local elections in 2011. In the Exclaves, the PP retained its majority.

Second, the parties sparred over issues of immigration, potentially the most significant topic in the Exclaves's public and political discourse. (The topic also played a large role in the 2007 elections.) For the last decade, Ceuta and Melilla have experienced nearly weekly assaults on its border by economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. During these *avalanchas*, or “avalanches,” the migrants form large groups and charge the fence and border crossings, hoping that at least some individuals will be able to evade security personnel. Less dramatic are the daily attempts at human trafficking by criminal organizations, who transport migrants in small boats or hide them in the bodies of cars.

The result is a near-daily debate between the parties—and the Exclaves' population—on how to manage immigration. The PP typically favors stronger controls, such as when it recently installed razor-sharp blades at the top of the border fences. The PSOE, along with smaller, more leftist parties, oppose the PP's policies using the discourse of human rights.¹²

¹¹The two remaining elections held since the restoration of democracy, in 1977 and 1979, were won by the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), or the Union of the Democratic Center. The UCD was a federation of centrist and rightist parties formed during the transition from Franco's dictatorship. It disbanded in 1983 due to declining support, a result of the moderation of the PSOE and the strengthening of the AP, the party that was to become the PP.

¹²It is unclear if the PSOE and other parties oppose the PP's policies on immigration simply because they

The migration discourse is also the arena in which the local PP parties deviate slightly from the national party. In the Exclaves, PP officials put great effort into maintaining good relations with the Moroccan government, on which they rely for help in policing the border. They repeatedly compliment, court, and accommodate Moroccan officials. They also deflect criticism of Morocco by local opposition parties, which frequently attack the Moroccan state for simultaneously mistreating migrants and being unable to manage the immigrant streams. However, at the national level, the PP sometimes criticizes Morocco for not doing enough to block migrants from its southern neighbors.

Table 4.2: National Parties that Contested the Exclaves' 2007 and 2011 Local Elections

Parties	Ideology	National Elections with Majority of Votes
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Center-left	1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 2004, 2008
Partido Popular (PP)	Center-right	1996, 2000, 2011
Izquierda Unida (IU)	Left	–
Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)	Center	–
Los Verdes-Group Verde (LV-GV)	Green; left	–
Alternativa Española (AES)	Conservative; Catholic	–
La Falange (FE)	Far right	–

Finally, the local PP and PSOE branches are also widely viewed through the tumultuous events of the 1980s and 1990s, not least because many of the same political leaders from that era continue to lead the contemporary parties. In general, the PP is understood as holding a position in opposition to the interests of the *musulmán* communities. For

are the opposition or because they have specific alternatives to managing immigration. Since the PP has dominated local politics for the last several years, during which immigration has reached record levels, the opposition parties have not had the opportunity to fully specify and implement their own policies.

example, Melilla's PP fiercely criticized the first Muslim president of the city, Mustafa Aberchán, after the 1999 elections (Gold 2000: 72-7). Similarly, the PP attacked the first Muslim representatives in Ceuta's Assembly after the 1999 and 2003 elections. Of course, this is only a general impression among residents—today, the PP in both cities contains several *musulmán* officials and gives financial support to Muslim organizations that promote the city's policy of *convivencia*, or “co-existence.”¹³ In contrast, the PSOE is broadly seen as being sympathetic to the interests of the *musulmán* communities. For example, many *christianos* still perceive the PSOE, which was the governing party at the national level during the citizenship debates, as having unfairly “given away” citizenship to *musulmanes*, thereby triggering the decline of “Spanish-ness” in the Exclaves (see Torres Cólón 2008).

4.3.3 Minor national parties

In 2007 and 2011, local branches of smaller national parties also participated in the elections (Table 4.2). Chief among these is the Izquierda Unida (IU), or United Left, a national party since 1986. It is composed of a various left-wing groups, although communists have traditionally been the dominant voice. The IU entered its own candidates in the Exclaves until 2003; in 2007 and 2011 it ran in federation with local parties.

A second national party active in the Exclaves is or Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD), or Union Progress and Democracy. Founded in 2007, the UPyD is a socially liberal party that advocates for a stronger federalized Spain—in contrast to a strengthening of the autonomous model, championed in the platforms of regional and local nationalist parties, such as the Basque Nationalist Party—as well as a nation-wide proportional electoral

¹³The most public versions of this financial support are the grants distributed by the Fundación Premio Convivencia, or the Foundation of the Co-Existence Prize, which has close ties to the municipal government (see <http://www.ceuta.es/premioconvivencia/index.php/es/>).

system.

Finally, there are three other small national parties that fielded candidates in Ceuta and Melilla in 2007 and 2011. The Los Verdes-Group Verde (LV-GV), or the Confederation of the Greens, was founded by environmental activists in 1983. The Alternativa Española (AES), or Spanish Alternative, advocates a self-described “social conservative” agenda based on Catholic doctrine. La Falange (FE), or the Falange, is a small fascist party. It rarely undertakes public activity or campaigning but appears on ballots across Spain.

4.3.4 Local parties

In addition to the local branches of national parties, the Exclaves have various local parties unique to the cities (Table 4.3).¹⁴ In Ceuta, the Unión Demócrata Ceutí (UDCE), or Democratic Union of Ceuta, and Coalición Caballas (Caballas), or Caballas Coalition, won seats in the city Assembly during the 2007 and 2011 elections, respectively.

Both parties continue a tradition within the city of small, local parties affiliated with Islam, or, as is it commonly said, of “Muslim persuasion” (*partidos de corte musulmán*). Most residents do not refer to these parties as outright “Muslim parties” because their leaders—who are all Muslim—and officials have constantly stressed that the parties are open all people, regardless of culture or religion, and primarily focus on solving the glaring economic and social disadvantages faced by the Muslim population. Indeed, when the parties address issues directly related to the Exclaves’ Muslim population, their discourse is always framed in terms of supporting a marginalized population rather than promoting Islam. For example, achieving official recognition of Ramadan was couched in terms of easing the life of the large population of fasting Muslims rather than as an attempt to make

¹⁴Sub-national parties are common in Spain, particularly in territories with strong nationalist sentiments, such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia.

the cities more Islamic (see Torres C3lon 2008: 189).¹⁵

Ceuta has had active parties of Muslim persuasion throughout its modern era of politics. In 1995, the Coalici3n Electoral Musulmana (CEM), or the Electoral Muslim Coalition, contested the first elections under autonomy. It only gained 3.9 percent of the vote, failing to win any seats. That same year, the Partido Democr3tico y Social de Ceuta (PDSC), or Democratic and Social Party of Ceuta, won 5.09 percent of the vote, giving its leader Mustafa Mizzian a seat in the assembly. The PDSC went on to become the dominant political party of Muslim persuasion for much of the 1990s; it managed to win 10.14 percent and three seats in 1999. It then declined in strength: it won only one seat in 2003 and did not win any seats in 2007 or 2011.

In 2002, Mohamed Al3, a young Ceuta-born activist, founded the UDCE, locally referred to as “Al3’s party,” and took part in the 2003 elections. Al3 and his colleagues saw themselves as a new generation of Muslim *ceut3s* and set themselves apart from the PDSC. Their hope was to present the city’s *musulmanes* as multidimensional residents that could bridge cultural or religious cleavages. In fact, Torres C3lon (2008: 221) recalls a UDCE member telling him that the party was “genuinely *caballa*,” referring to the universal nickname for (all) *ceut3s*.¹⁶ The party won three seats in 2003—and almost immediately spurred religiously-toned controversy across Spain when one of its representatives wore a headscarf in the assembly. In 2007, the UDCE federated with the IU and won four seats.

¹⁵The stated goals and positions of the parties differentiate them slightly from commonly understandings of “ethnic parties,” which have been seen as parties specifically dedicated to serving the interests of a particular ethnic group (Horowitz 1985) or that include and exclude members on the basis of ethnicity (Chandra 2004: 3). The “ethnic” parties in the Exclaves are more similar to those in South America, which Van Cott (2005) labels as “indigenous parties”: they aim to improve the conditions of a marginalized population while garnering support from the broader population.

¹⁶This nickname for all residents of Ceuta is derived from the *caballa*, or Atlantic mackerel, which is associated with the fishing banks off of Ceuta throughout the region.

Table 4.3: Regional Parties that Contested the Exclaves' Local Elections in 2007 and 2011

City	Parties	Ideology	Recent Elections Contested and Seats Won (in parentheses)
Ceuta	Unión Demócrata Ceutí (UDCE)	Center-left; Muslim persuasion	2007 (4)
Ceuta	Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta (PSPC)	Left	2007 (0)
Ceuta	Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta (PDSC)	Leftist; Muslim persuasion	2007 (0), 2011 (0)
Ceuta	Coalición Caballas (Caballas)	Center-left; regional Muslim persuasion	2011 (4)
Melilla	Convergencia de Melilla (CM)	Center-right; localist	2007 (0)
Melilla	Coalición por Melilla (CpM)	Center-left; Muslim and Amzigh persuasion	2007 (5), 2011 (6)
Melilla	Partido Populares en Libertad (PPL)	Right; Libertarian	2011 (2)
Melilla	Partido de los Demócratas de Melilla (PDM)	Center-left; Muslim persuasion	2011 (0)
Melilla	Plataforma Melilla Verde (PMV)	Green	2011 (0)

For the 2011 elections, the UDCE, still led by Alí, entered into federation with the Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta (PSPC), or the Socialist Party of the People of Ceuta, a marginal leftist party comprised of socialists and communists, and formed the Coalición Caballas. This federation underscored the boundary-crossing principles of the UDCE, which were further emphasized in the party's chosen name, based on the nickname for a *ceutí*, *caballa*, and its non-religious and pan-phenotype logo (Figure 4.1). Its platform is center-left while also calling for greater autonomy and national influence for Ceuta, on par with the mainland autonomous communities, and for greater recognition of the Arab culture in Ceuta, such as giving official status to *Dariya*, a local vernacular mixing Arabic and Spanish and spoken by many native-born Muslims in the city. In 2011, Caballas won

Figure 4.1: Current Caballas Logo



four seats in the Assembly; three were filled by native-born Muslims.

In Melilla, one local party has played a large role in local politics since Muslims have been permitted to acquire Spanish citizenship: the *Coalición por Melilla* (CpM), or Coalition for Melilla. The CpM was founded in 1995 by Mustafa Aberchán, a native of Melilla who became a Spanish citizen at the age of 27 and was originally involved in the youth wing of the city’s PSOE branch. He eventually left the PSOE—along with other leftist Muslims from the Exclave—to form the CpM.¹⁷ Since its founding, the CpM has advocated a left-leaning, of-Muslim-persuasion platform, winning such reforms as gaining official recognition of major Muslims holidays. During the last decade, however, the CpM has also pursued pro-Amazigh issues, such as making the Amazigh language, known as Tamazigh, an official language of the city. In fact, its logo now reads “CpM” in both Latin and Tamazigh characters (Figure 4.2). For the 2007 and 2011 elections, the CpM was federated with the local IU branch.

¹⁷Historically, the PSOE had included the few Muslim citizens of Melilla. The first Muslim candidate to run for any local office, in 1993, was a PSOE candidate, Mimona Mohamed Haddu.

Figure 4.2: Current CpM Logo



Several smaller parties have also been active in Melilla in 2007 and 2011. Convergencia de Melilla (CM), or Convergence Melilla, is a local party formed by disenchanted PP members that contested the 2007 elections but failed to win any seats in the Assembly. The Partido Populares en Libertad (PPL), or People’s Liberty Party, formed in 2011 for that year’s elections. Established by one-time PP officials, the PPL campaigned on a platform advocating for greater free-market reforms as well as “humanism and the values of the West.” It won two seats in the assembly.

The 2011 elections also saw the controversial return of a dissolved party, the Partido de los Demócratas de Melilla (PDM), or the Party of the Democrats of Melilla (see Subsection 4.3.1). The PDM was rekindled by its founder, an aging Muslim civil rights leader from Melilla, Aomar Mohamedi Duddú (also known as Aomar Duddú el Funti). After campaigning for greater rights for Melilla’s Muslims for decades, Duddú renounced his Spanish citizenship and became a minister in the Moroccan government in 1994.¹⁸ His return in

¹⁸Born in 1950 in Melilla, Duddú earned a degree in economics from the University of Málaga, becoming one of the few formally educated Muslims in the city at the onset of the debates over citizenship. During

2011—as well as his unsubtle reminders that his Moroccan ministry financially supported Melilla’s Muslims during their pilgrimage to Mecca—drew widespread criticism from the CpM, the PSOE, and leaders of the Muslim community. They accused the PP of orchestrating Duddú’s return as a ploy to divide the Muslim vote (Cembrero 2011). The PDM failed to win any seats in the assembly.

Finally, the Plataforma Melilla Verde (PMV), or Green Platform of Melilla, an environmental party founded in 2008, also contested Melilla’s 2011 elections. It failed to win any assembly seats.

In sum, both Ceuta and Melilla have local parties “of Muslim persuasion.” To a certain degree these parties are similar across the Exclaves: most notably, their platforms include greater recognition of North African culture. For example, Ceuta’s Caballas party advocates for the official recognition of *Dariya*, the local vernacular spoken by most of the city’s native-born Muslims. In Melilla, the CpM supports Tamazigh as an official language of the city. (Because it is pertinent to the following analysis, note that Caballa’s goal is specific to Ceuta while the CpM’s is tied to a regional and transnational campaign to strengthen the Amazigh people and culture.)

Yet, at the same time, the cities’ experiences with these parties differ. Since 1995, the “Muslim” parties in Ceuta have been small and multiple. The city has seen the the CEM, the PDSC, the PSOE, the IU, the UDCE, and now Caballas each positioning itself as a party of Muslim persuasion. In contrast, the “Muslim political position” in Melilla has been consistently dominated by the CpM since its inception in 1995, the first election under the autonomy statutes.

that time he played a significant role in gaining more rights for his fellow Muslims, but was eventually discredited after he relocated to Morocco—although he claimed he moved because of threats on his life. For a detailed history, see Gold 2000: Ch. 4.

The preceding examination of the Exclaves’ politics is telling of each city’s Muslim community, and it provides general support for the hypotheses. Namely, Muslims in Melilla are more likely to express themselves politically along ethnic lines and there is greater change among the Muslim parties of Ceuta. However, such an assessment of political history does not reveal how Muslims actually vote—how they choose to activate their identities in the political arena. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter I conduct a more detailed analysis of voting behavior within and across the Exclaves. While this includes an assessments of the hypotheses presented above, the larger goal is to provide some insight into the shared meanings and understanding of the *musulmán* ethnic identities. Before this analysis, though, I discuss the data and methods in the following section.

4.4 Data and methods

4.4.1 Data

The analysis in this chapter relies on various datasets to examine how the Exclaves’ *christiano* and *musulmán* Spanish citizens voted in the local elections of 2007 and 2011. Unfortunately, in regards to the goals of this project, Spain’s National Institute of Statistics (INE)¹⁹ does not collect data on residents’ race, ethnicity, or religion. As a result, the ethnic composition of communities must be inferred from qualitative studies or the limited surveys conducted by researchers and private organizations.

In the following analysis, blocks of voters are identified as *christiano* or *musulmán* based on their census tract of residency. As discussed earlier, using an aggregate-level identifier such as a census tract to ascribe individual-level attributes is an ecological fallacy (King

¹⁹www.ine.es

1997). However, this problem is mitigated by the dramatic segregation in the Exclaves. In terms of the attribute-dimensions of phenotype, religion, language, and imagined community, this means that residents of certain census tracts of Ceuta and Melilla can be relatively safely assumed to hold the descent-based values,

{North African *and* Islam *and* (Arabic *or* Tamazigh) *and* (Indigenous *or* Autochthonous)}

while the residents of other census tracts can assumed to hold the descent-based values,

{European *and* Christianity *and* Castilian *and* Titular}

I identify the characteristics of the Exclaves' census tracts by drawing on my fieldwork conducted in 2011; the research of Herrero (2010), Rontomé (2011), and Torres Cólón (2008); and local news media reports.

The analysis of voting only considers potential voters. I define potential voters as individual meeting two criteria: holding Spanish citizenship and being over 20 years of age. The reason being that, first, Spain requires proof of citizenship and residency rather than any sort of previous registration, to vote and, second, while the legal voting age is 18, Spain's municipal registers only measure age in five-year increments, prompting me to set the age cut-off at 20 years. In addition, I consider the birthplace of voters to account for the various processes associated with immigration, such as assimilation, acculturation, integration. This data on the residents of the census tract—proportions of permanent residents with Spanish nationality, age, and place of birth—are taken from the results of the analysis Chapter 2.²⁰

²⁰As discussed in greater detail below, the birthplace categories of Spain, Morocco, and a third country apply just to the 2011 elections. Previous to 2010, municipal registers only recorded whether residents were born in Spain or overseas. As a result, birthplace is a dichotomous variable in the analysis of the 2007 election.

Data on vote totals by census tract come from Spain’s Ministry of the Interior. While vote totals at the levels of provinces and autonomous communities are widely reported in various Spanish news media and academic publications, counts at the census tract (i.e., polling station) level are not publicly distributed. For this reason, I acquired the complete vote counts at all levels of aggregation—including the most micro-level, voting booths—directly from the Ministry in December 2011 during a personal interview. Ceuta’s local election vote totals from 1995 through 2011 are seen in Table 4.4. These data are plotted over time in Appendix AY. Vote totals from 1995 through 2011 for Melilla are seen in Table 4.5. Totals plotted over time can be found in Appendix AZ.

In sum, this chapter’s analysis relies on three types of information: (1) which census tracts have predominantly *christiano* or *musulmán* residents; (2) the proportion of potential voters identified by their place of birth in each census tract; and (3) the vote totals for each party in each census tract between 1995 and 2011.

4.4.2 Method

Potential voters

Spain does not collect annual individual-level data on age, place of residency, nationality, and place of birth, only during its decennial census. Instead, municipal registrars’ counts of birthplace are reported separately from the other attributes. Consequently, it is impossible to know the birthplace *and* nationality of individuals in each census tract previous to the 2011 and 2007 elections. However, knowing the aggregate counts enables the use of ecological inference (EI) methods to estimate the proportion of individuals in each census tract with each possible combination of nationality and birthplace. This is discussed in detail in Section 2.6.

The analysis in Chapter 2 provides the proportion of individuals over the age of 20 with Spanish and foreign nationality, by place of birth, in each of Ceuta and Melilla's census tracts in 2011. This analysis is then repeated with the data on age, place of residency, nationality, and place of birth for 2007. Unfortunately, previous to 2010 residents' places of birth were only recorded dichotomously—individuals were born in Spain or overseas—so, in terms of birthplace, the analysis of the 2007 elections only can only consider whether voters were born in Spain or in another country. I do not extend the analysis to elections before 2007 because the municipal registers do not report any data on residents' place of birth previous to 2005. As a result, the most telling data for the elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003 are the vote totals, as reported in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.

Voter turnout

With the point estimates of census tracts' proportion of potential voters, I first estimate the turnout in each census tract in 2011 and 2007. This is done by dividing the total number of votes cast by the estimated proportion of residents over the age of 20 and with Spanish citizenship.

Voting behavior, by place of birth

I next estimate the proportion of potential voters from each place of birth—in 2011, Spain, Morocco, or a third country; in 2007, Spain or overseas—that voted for each political party in the 2011 and 2007 elections, by census tract. This is done by using EI methods to estimate the cell values of a $R \times C$ matrix containing the aggregate values of potential voters and party's vote totals for each election in each city. In other words, the deterministic bounds for the ecological inferences are, first, the proportion of potential voters, identified

by birthplace, in each census tract—values calculated in Chapter 2—and, second, the proportion of votes won by each party in each census tract—data acquired from the Ministry of the Interior.

For Ceuta in 2011, the matrix has three rows,

- Born in Spain (and Spanish citizenship and over 20 years of age);
- Born in Morocco (and Spanish citizenship and over 20 years of age);
- Born in Third Country (and Spanish citizenship and over 20 years of age);

and seven columns, one for each party that contested that election. For Melilla in 2011, the matrix also has three rows—again, potential voters by each place of birth—and nine columns, one for each party that contested that election. For Ceuta in 2007, the matrix has two rows,

- Born in Spain (and Spanish citizenship and over 20 years of age);
- Not born in Spain (and Spanish citizenship and over 20 years of age);

and six columns, one for each party that contested that election. For Melilla in 2007, the matrix also has two rows, one for each place of birth, and four columns, one for each party that contested that election. The point estimates and standard deviations are reported below. Tests of significance are used to assess the differences in proportion of supports for each party across Exclaves.

This chapter's combination of data and methodology has drawbacks and advantages similar to those discussed in Chapter 2. Its core disadvantage centers on an inability to examine individuals claims and verbalized expressions of voting preferences. For example, I

Table 4.4: Proportion of Votes for Each Party in Ceuta's Local Elections, 1995–2011

	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Partido Popular (PP)	31.1%	28.29%	66.48%	65.61%	66.2%
	(8,867) ^a	(9,334)	(20,897)	(22,484)	(20,023)
Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC)	20.27%	1.89%	–	–	–
	(5,778)	(625)	–	–	–
Ceuta Unida (CEU)	14.63%	3.93%	–	–	–
	(4,171)	(1,297)	–	–	–
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	13.4% ^b	7.77%	9.24%	8.71%	11.82%
	(3,820)	(2,562)	(2,905)	(2,985)	(3,578)
Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta (PSPC)	8.09%	4.53%	4.46%	4.54%	–
	(2,307)	(1,496)	(1,402)	(1,557)	–
Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta (PDSC)	5.09%	10.14%	5.19%	3.67%	2.38%
	(1,449)	(3,340)	(1,722)	(1,258)	(720)
Coalición Electoral Musulmana (CEM)	3.9%	–	–	–	–
	(1,112)	–	–	–	–
Izquierda Unida (IU)	1.79%	3.4%	1.02%	–	–
	(510)	(1,318)	(322)	–	–
Ceuta Primero (CP)	1.43%	–	–	–	–
	(407)	–	–	–	–
Partido Ceutí (PC)	0.31%	1.08%	–	–	–
	(87)	(356)	–	–	–
Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL)	–	38.56%	–	–	–
	–	(12,721)	–	–	–
Unión Demócrata Ceutí (UDCE)	–	–	11.42%	16.51% ^c	–
	–	–	(3,589)	(5,659)	–
Partido Independiente Liberal de Ceuta (PIL)	–	–	2.93%	–	–
	–	–	(922)	–	–
Federación Ceuta (FC)	–	–	2.21%	–	–
	–	–	(696)	–	–
Unión del Pueblo Ceutí (UPCE)	–	–	1.82%	–	–
	–	–	(573)	–	–
La Falange (FE)	–	–	0.41%	–	0.47%
	–	–	(129)	–	(138)
Los Verdes-Group Verde (LV-GV)	–	–	–	0.85%	1.87%
	–	–	–	(326)	(566)
Coalición Caballas (CAB)	–	–	–	–	14.56%
	–	–	–	–	(4,404)
Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)	–	–	–	–	2.35%
	–	–	–	–	(815)

^aVote totals in parentheses

^bIn federation with the Socialist Party of Ceuta, or Partido de los Socialistas de Ceuta (PSCE)

^cIn coalition with the IU

Table 4.5: Proportion of Votes for Each Party in Melilla's Local Elections, 1995–2011

	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Partido Popular (PP)	47.68%	18.9%	55.64% ^b	56.75%	54.59%
	(12,425) ^a	(5,338)	(15,505) ^b	(16,102)	(16,820)
Coalición por Melilla (CpM)	15.63%	20.65%	26.62%	22%	23.99%
	(4,072)	(5,833)	(7,419)	(6,245)	(7,392)
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	20.08%	9.47%	12.12%	18.49%	8.64%
	(5,232)	(2,674)	(3,379)	(5,246)	(2,661)
Unión del Pueblo Melillense (UPM)	10%	11.53%	–	–	–
	(2,605)	(3,258)	–	–	–
Partido Nacionalista de Melilla (PNM)	3.87%	–	–	–	–
	(1,008)	–	–	–	–
Izquierda Unida (IU)	2.74%	0.9%	–	–	–
	(715)	(254)	–	–	–
Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL)	–	26.2%	–	–	–
	–	(7,402)	–	–	–
Partido Independiente de Melilla (PIM)	–	10.41%	2.66%	–	–
	–	(2,941)	(742)	–	–
Partido Social Demócrata de Melilla (PSDM)	–	1.76%	–	–	–
	–	(498)	–	–	–
Agrupación de Electores Independiente (ADEI-NUEVO)	–	0.17%	–	–	–
	–	(49)	–	–	–
Centro Democrático Social (CDS)	–	–	1.47%	–	–
	–	–	(410)	–	–
Los Verdes-Group Verde (LV-GV)	–	–	0.61%	–	–
	–	–	(171)	–	–
Izquierda Republicana (IR)	–	–	4.99%	–	–
	–	–	(139)	–	–
Partido Nacionalista del Rif de Melilla (PN RIF-MELI)	–	–	0.37%	–	–
	–	–	(104)	–	–
Convergencia de Melilla (CM)	–	–	–	2.76%	–
	–	–	–	(783)	–
Partido Populares en Libertad (PPL)	–	–	–	–	6.91%
	–	–	–	–	(2,128)
Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)	–	–	–	–	2.35%
	–	–	–	–	(664)
Partido de los Demócratas de Melilla (PDM)	–	–	–	–	1.71%
	–	–	–	–	(527)
Plataforma Melilla Verde (PMV)	–	–	–	–	1.78%
	–	–	–	–	(504)
Alternativa Española (AES)	–	–	–	–	0.19%
	–	–	–	–	(57)
La Falange (FE)	–	–	–	–	0.18%
	–	–	–	–	(56)

^aVote totals in parentheses^bIn federation with the UPM

do not analyze how individuals explain their votes to others. Nor do I compare individuals' expressed attributes, such as whether they self-identify as liberal or conservative.

However, the current approach does offer two important advantages for studying identity categories activated through voting behavior—especially considering the lack of data on religion, ethnicity, and religion. First, the object of analysis is an action, or how people *do* vote. This is at least as telling—if not more so—and certainly more consequential than verbalized assertions of self-identities and preferences. Second, the method does not rely on the presumption of fixed identity categories. Instead, EI allows patterns of behavior to emerge from an entire population. Put another way, instead of asking subjects to identify with one nominal category from a pre-selected repertoire—liberal or conservative, *christiano* or *musulmán*—and then examining how they vote, the following analysis first uncovers patterns of voting within and across the Exclaves, then examines what may be causing the observed patterns. This approach is useful for political sociological research dedicated to constructivist perspective of ethnicity: ethnic identities are not considered as fixed, but rather studied in relation to discrete political outcomes (see Chandra 2012c; Ferree 2012).

Electoral volatility

Finally, I calculate the electoral volatility between each election from 1979 to 2011, or the year of the first elections after the restoration of democracy up through the most recent elections, using Pederson's index of volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Pederson 1979).²¹ This entails summing the difference in each party's vote percentage between any two elections and dividing the absolute value by two. If a party is not present in one year,

²¹The election results for 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1991 are found at <http://www.historiaelectoral.com/aceuta.html> and <http://www.historiaelectoral.com/amelilla.html> (each last accessed March 25, 2014).

its value is zero. In this fashion, I determine, for each Exclave, Pederson's index comparing the 1979 and 1983 elections, the 1983 and 1987 elections, the 1987 and 1991 elections, the 1991 and 1995 election, the 1995 and 1999 elections, the 1999 and 2003 elections, the 2003 and 2007 elections, and the 2007 and 2011 elections. I also find the mean index value for Ceuta and Melilla between 1979 and 1991, the time period before self-governance (and a period during which the majority Muslims residents could not vote), and between 1995 and 2011, the time period beginning with autonomy for the Exclaves (and a period during which many Muslim residents were citizens).

Following Ferree (2012), I determine volatility with votes instead of earned seats in the local assemblies since votes are a more pure measure of voting preferences. Not only are earned seats a translation of rounded vote totals but, in Spain, seats are only awarded to parties that meet a threshold of having won five percent of the vote total. Therefore, measuring volatility with seat counts would miss the thousands of votes case for the handful of parties that do not meet this threshold.

4.5 Findings

4.5.1 Turnout

I estimate that about 60 percent of the Exclaves' potential voters participated in the last two local elections. While I expected this number to be lower than the actual recorded turnout because my estimates do not include 18- and 19-year old voters—due to the fact that the municipal registers in 2007 and 2011 only record age in five-year increments—my estimates are slightly higher than the reported turnouts, as reported by Spain's Historical Archive of

Elections (Archivo Histórico Electoral del Área de Análisis).²² However, the differences in estimated and reported values are well within the standard deviations (Table 4.6). They are also in line with historical trends: Gold (2000: 58) finds that the average turnout between 1977 and 2000 was 58.74 percent in Ceuta and 59.75 in Melilla.²³

The patterns of voter turnout across Ceuta and Melilla are not dramatically different. For the 2007 election, the difference in mean turnout between the cities is not statistically significant. In 2011, turnout drops in Exclaves and while the decrease is greater in Ceuta than in Melilla, the means remain statistically similar (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Mean Voter Turnout in Ceuta and Melilla, 2007 and 2011

	Ceuta		Melilla	
	2007	2011	2007	2011
Estimated mean turnout	0.63	0.53	0.62	0.6
Standard deviation	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.06
Reported turnout	0.6	0.51	– ^a	0.58

^aNo value reported

Source: Archivo Histórico Electoral del Área de Análisis

Within the cities, there is not a large of amount of variation among their census tracts on the whole. In Ceuta, four census tracts have a turnout less than one standard deviation below the mean in 2011. In 2007, only two are less than one standard deviation below the mean (Figure 4.3).²⁴ In Melilla, five census tracts have a turnout less than one standard deviation below the mean in 2011; in 2007, there are four (Figure 4.4).²⁵ These findings

²²I conducted my own estimates of turnout to be able to examine turnout at the census tract level.

²³Gold (2000) also notes that the Exclaves' turnout has been consistently lower than the turnout in mainland Spain, which has averaged 69.82 percent between 1977 and 2000. He credits this to a general weaker identification with the Spanish nations state among residents of the Exclaves, relative to mainland Spaniards.

²⁴The values of the point estimates for Ceuta in 2011 are reported in Appendix BA and, for 2007, in Appendix BB. Point estimates less than a standard deviation below the mean are shaded in gray.

²⁵The values of the point estimates for Melilla in 2011 are reported in Appendix BC and, for 2007, in

Figure 4.3: Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years of Age Casting Votes, Ceuta, 2007 and 2011





Figure 4.4: Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years of Age Casting Votes, Melilla, 2007 and 2011



Appendix BD. Point estimates less than a standard deviation below the mean are shaded in gray.

suggest that Spanish citizens in Ceuta and Melilla vote at comparable rates. Moreover, while there is a notable decrease in turnout in a few Muslim-dominated census tracts in Ceuta, this is not a general trend across all Muslim-dominated census tracts. Sanders et al. (2014) reach similar conclusions in their study of ethnic minorities in Britain: the find that minorities are engaged in British politics at similar levels than their native-born white counterparts.

4.5.2 Political expression

In this section I present the estimates of how different groups of Spanish citizens, as identified by place of birth, voted in the local elections of 2011 and 2007 across census tracts. Below, I only include the estimates for parties that won seats in the local assemblies of Ceuta and Melilla, except when otherwise noted.

The elections of 2011

Native-born voters

In the most recent elections, the majority of native-born voters in both Ceuta and Melilla voted for the PP. This is not a surprise, considering that the PP won 66.2 percent of the vote in Ceuta (Table 4.4) and 54.59 percent of the vote in Melilla (Table 4.5). Indeed, using Tukey's HSD analysis I find no significant difference in native-born voters' support for the PP between the Exclaves. This can be seen in Table 4.7 (second row, fifth column), which also presents the difference between estimates, the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval, and the adjusted p -value. Comparisons that are significantly different at the 0.05 level are in bold. In addition, the parties are arrayed in approximate order along the axes such that (1) the left-leaning parties are towards the left-hand end of

Table 4.7: Differences in Estimated Vote Totals of Native-Born, All Census Tracts, 2011

<i>Towards this corner: left-leaning</i>							
	0.05						Upper bound
PSOE	0.00						Estimated difference
Ceuta	-0.05						Lower bound
	1						Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	0.11^a	0.10					Upper bound
CpM	0.06	0.06					Estimated difference
Melilla	-0.01	0.01					Lower bound
	0.008	0.005					Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	0.07	0.06	0.01				Upper bound
Caballas	0.02	0.02	-0.04				Estimated difference
Ceuta	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08				Lower bound
	0.833	0.815	0.2				Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	0.34	0.34	0.28	0.32			Upper bound
PP	0.29	0.29	0.23	0.27			Estimated difference
Melilla	0.24	0.24	0.18	0.22			Lower bound
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	0.34	0.36	0.30	0.34	0.07		Upper bound
PP	0.32	0.32	0.26	0.30	0.03		Estimated difference
Ceuta	0.27	0.27	0.21	0.25	-0.02		Lower bound
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.6		Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.25	-0.28	Upper bound
PPL	-0.01	-0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.30	-0.33	Estimated difference
Melilla	-0.06	-0.06	-0.12	-0.08	-0.35	-0.37	Lower bound
	0.993	0.986	0.001	0.369	0.000	0.000	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	PSOE Melilla	PSOE Ceuta	CpM Melilla	Caballas Ceuta	PP Melilla	PP Ceuta	<i>Towards this corner: right-leaning</i>

^aThe cells of pairs significantly different at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Note: Vote totals can be found in Appendix BE and Appendix BF.

the x-axis and the upper end of the y-axis, whereas (2) the right-leaning parties are towards the right-hand end of the x-axis and the lower end of the y-axis.


In addition, I estimate that there is no significant difference in native-born voters' support for the parties of Muslim persuasion—Caballas in Ceuta and CpM in Melilla (see Table 4.7; fourth row, third column). This indicates that in the 2011 elections, native-born voters in the Exclaves, as a whole, supported the cities' "ethnic parties" at comparable levels.

However, the pattern of support for opposition parties differs across Ceuta and Melilla, revealing an important difference between the cities. In Ceuta, I estimate that there is no significant difference in support for Caballas or PSOE, the center-left national party (Table 4.7; fourth row, second column). This suggests that comparable proportions of Ceuta's native-born voters—at least non-PP supporters—consider ethnicity and economic class issues when voting. In contrast, in Melilla, the support for the CpM is significantly higher than for the PSOE (Table 4.7; fifth row, first column). This suggests that ethnic identities are serving as a distinct lens through which to understand economic issues among Melilla's native-born voters—again, at least for non-PP supporters.

Understanding this dissimilarity between cities more fully requires an examination of the variation in voting across census tracts *within* each city. Existing research, local news media reports, and data collected during fieldwork suggest that both Ceuta and Melilla are severely segregated residentially, with *christianos* and *musulmanes* typically living in separate neighborhoods. In Chapter 2 this segregation is found to be manifested in the acquisition of Spanish citizenship; here, I find confirming evidence in the estimates of voting behavior among native-born residents at the census-tract level.

I estimate that native-born voters in some of Ceuta's census tracts supported Caballas at

Figure 4.5: Estimated Proportion of Votes for Each Party, by Birthplace, Ceuta 2011




higher levels than the PP in 2011. This can be seen in the first row of Figure 4.5. Similarly, I estimate that native-born voters in some of Melilla’s census tracts supported CpM at higher levels than the PP, as seen in the first row of Figure 4.6.²⁶ Thus, the crucial question, for the purpose of this dissertation, is whether the voters in these census tracts—who are predominantly *musulmanes*—support Caballas and the CpM at significantly different levels.

To examine the difference in Spanish-born Muslims’ support for political parties, I compare the estimated votes cast in the census tracts within the *districts* widely known to have large populations of *musulmanes*. Even though my fieldwork enables me to identify

²⁶The values of the point estimates for each of Ceuta’s census tract are reported in Appendix BE and, for Melilla, in Appendix BF.

Figure 4.6: Estimated Proportion of Votes for Each Party, by Birthplace, Melilla 2011



the specific census tracts that are majority Muslim, I use districts here so as to remain aligned with the research of Herrero (2010), Rontomé (2011), and Torres Cólón (2008), each of whom only analyzes the Exclaves at the district level. I identify the *ceutí* districts and census tracts with significant Muslim populations in Table 4.8; these are Districts 4, 5, and 6, on the eastern periphery of the city, closest to the border with Morocco. The analogous districts and census tracts in Melilla are identified in Table 4.9. These districts—4 and 5—are on the north and eastern periphery of the city, also near to the border with Morocco. Both tables include the point estimates of the proportion of votes cast for each party.

Table 4.8: Districts in Ceuta with a Significant Muslim Population, 2011

District	Census Tract	Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born		
		PP	Caballas	PSOE
04	001	0.43	0.02	0.06
04	002	0.37	0.06	0.06
04	003	0.40	0.01	0.09
04	004	0.48	0.02	0.08
04	005	0.31	0.11	0.04
04	006	0.22	0.20	0.03
04	007	0.21	0.15	0.02
04	008	0.37	0.07	0.05
04	009	0.50	0.14	0.08
04	010	0.10	0.25	0.04
04	011	0.37	0.10	0.05
05	001	0.35	0.08	0.06
05	002	0.44	0.06	0.04
05	003	0.35	0.13	0.04
05	004	0.36	0.10	0.05
05	005	0.14	0.14	0.04
05	006	0.41	0.04	0.04
05	007	0.24	0.17	0.07
06	001	0.25	0.13	0.08
06	002	0.13	0.22	0.09
06	003	0.19	0.21	0.04
06	004	0.12	0.20	0.09
06	005	0.12	0.07	0.03

Comparing the voting patterns of these districts, I find that *native-born voters' support for the parties of Muslim persuasion differs significantly between Ceuta and Melilla*. In contrast to similar levels of support when considering the whole population (indicated by the p -value of 0.2, seen in Table 4.7), the difference in levels of support in areas with a significant Muslim population is now significant at the 0.05 level (indicated by the indicated by the p -value of 0.000, seen in Table 4.10; fourth row, third column).²⁷ This is a result of much stronger support for the CpM in Melilla's Muslim neighborhoods than for Caballas in

²⁷The difference remains significant ($p = 0.003$) when just comparing what are considered the "core" Muslim districts—District 6 in Ceuta and District 5 in Melilla.

Table 4.9: Districts in Melilla with a Significant Muslim Population, 2011

District	Census Tract	Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born			
		PP	CpM	PSOE	PPL
04	001	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.02
04	002	0.20	0.25	0.02	0.04
04	003	0.18	0.39	0.02	0.02
04	004	0.29	0.29	0.04	0.02
05	001	0.23	0.32	0.03	0.01
05	002	0.14	0.48	0.01	0.01
05	003	0.13	0.36	0.01	0
05	004	0.21	0.26	0.03	0.01
05	005	0.18	0.37	0.02	0.01
05	006	0.14	0.47	0.01	0.01
05	007	0.25	0.31	0.06	0.02

Ceuta’s Muslim neighborhoods (seen also by comparing estimated votes cast in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9).

Furthermore, support for the PP in these districts has also shifted. While there is no difference in support for the PP across Exclaves when comparing the entire population, there is now a difference significant at the 0.05 level when comparing the cities’ Muslim areas (see Table 4.10; second row, fifth column). *This is a result of greater support for the PP in Ceuta’s Muslim neighborhoods than in Melilla’s Muslim neighborhoods.* Together, these findings suggest that native-born *musulmanes* in Ceuta activate their identity differently than their counterparts in Melilla in the political context: in Ceuta, the *musulmanes*’ ethnic identity is understood in a manner so that relatively more individuals vote *across* ethnic lines whereas in Melilla, the ethnic identity appears to be associated with relatively greater voting *along* ethnic lines.

Table 4.10: Differences in Estimated Vote Totals of Native-Born, Subset of Census Tracts, 2011

<i>Towards this corner: left-leaning</i>								
		<i>0.10^a</i>					Upper bound	
	PSOE	<i>0.02</i>					Estimated difference	
	Ceuta	<i>-0.06</i>					Lower bound	
		<i>0.985</i>					Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.31^b</i>	<i>0.30</i>				Upper bound	
	CpM	<i>0.22</i>	<i>0.20</i>				Estimated difference	
	Melilla	<i>-0.12</i>	<i>0.12</i>				Lower bound	
		<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.000</i>				Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.16</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>-0.05</i>			Upper bound	
	Caballas	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>-0.14</i>			Estimated difference	
	Ceuta	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>-0.22</i>			Lower bound	
		<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.081</i>	<i>0.000</i>			Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.23</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.17</i>		Upper bound	
	PP	<i>0.17</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>0.09</i>		Estimated difference	
	Melilla	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>0.00</i>		Lower bound	
		<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.685</i>	<i>0.033</i>		Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.31</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>0.25</i>	<i>0.18</i>	Upper bound	
	PP	<i>0.26</i>	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.10</i>	Estimated difference	
	Ceuta	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>0.12</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	Lower bound	
		<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.629</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.01</i>	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>-0.02</i>	<i>-0.09</i>	<i>-0.20</i>	Upper bound
	PPL	<i>-0.021</i>	<i>-0.04</i>	<i>-0.25</i>	<i>-0.10</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.28</i>	Estimated difference
	Melilla	<i>-0.11</i>	<i>-0.12</i>	<i>-0.33</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.28</i>	<i>-0.36</i>	Lower bound
		<i>0.998</i>	<i>0.797</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.000</i>	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		PSOE	PSOE	CpM	Caballas	PP	PP	<i>Towards this corner: right-leaning</i>
		Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla	Ceuta	

^aThe cells containing paired comparisons with changed *p*-values from the full census-tract analysis (Table 4.7) are in italics.

^bThe cells of pairs significantly different at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Note: Vote totals can be found in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9.

Foreign-born voters

In the 2011 elections, Moroccan-born voters in Ceuta and Melilla exhibit slightly different voting patterns than their native-born neighbors—but patterns that add further support for the dissertation’s central argument. The differences can be seen by comparing the second rows with the first rows in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6.²⁸

Here, I briefly highlight the two key aspects that relate to the argument. First, I estimate that Moroccan-born voters in Ceuta and Melilla vote for the PSOE in larger numbers than their native-born counterparts, a difference significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.000$). Second, they also support the PP in less numbers than their native-born counterparts, again a difference significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.000$). These findings indicate that Moroccan-born immigrants are voting along economic class lines. That is, they support the center-left party over parties of Muslim persuasion as well as the center-right party. This suggests that, first, immigrants experience politics through the lens of economic migration and marginalization and, second, the construction of the ethnic identity categories unique to the Exclaves—the focus of this dissertation—takes place over time and through generations.

The other foreign-born immigrants residing in the Exclaves are not the focus of this dissertation, primarily because their small number poses challenges for arriving at general findings. It is interesting to note, however, that I estimate that immigrants from other countries generally lend their support equally across parties. Although, I do also estimate that third-country immigrants in Melilla support the PP more so than immigrants in Ceuta (see the third row in Figure 4.6).²⁹ A potential reason for this may be that the dominant opposition party in Melilla—the CpM—is clearly concerned with ethnic issues, thereby potentially alienating the few immigrants from other countries and driving them to the PP.

²⁸The values of the point estimates are reported in Appendix BG, for Ceuta, and Appendix BH, for Melilla.

²⁹The values of the point estimates are reported in Appendix BI, for Ceuta, and Appendix BJ, for Melilla.

Finally, note that I do not subset specific census tracts to analyze the voting patterns of Moroccan and other immigrants because I do not find evidence of variation across census tracts (see Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6).

Taken together, these findings provide support for the first hypothesis, particularly when considering only the native-born Muslim population of the cities. I estimate that native-born Muslims in Ceuta are more likely to vote across ethnic lines whereas native-born Muslims in Melilla are more likely to vote along ethnic lines. Specifically, significantly greater numbers of *ceutí* native-born Muslims support the PP than in Melilla. In contrast, significantly greater numbers of *melillense* native-born Muslims support their city's party of Muslim persuasion, the CpM, than in Ceuta

The elections of 2007

Native-born voters

The voting patterns of the Exclaves' native-born voters in the 2007 local elections parallel those of 2011. As for 2011, I estimate that more native-born voters in both Ceuta and Melilla voted for the PP than for other parties. Again, this is expected, considering the PP's vote percentages of 65.61 in Ceuta (Table 4.4) and 56.75 in Melilla (Table 4.5). Using Tukey's HSD analysis, I again find no significant difference in native-voters' support for the PP across the cities (see Table 4.11; first row, fifth column). Furthermore, there is again no significant difference in the support for the parties of Muslim persuasion, or the UDCE in Ceuta and the CpM in Ceuta (see Table 4.11; third row, third column).

Table 4.11: Differences in Estimated Vote Totals of Native-Born, All Census Tracts, 2007

<i>Towards this corner: left-leaning</i>						
		-0.01				Upper bound
	PSOE	-0.06				Estimated difference
	Ceuta	-0.13				Lower bound
		0.148				Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		0.03	0.17^a			Upper bound
	CpM	0.04	0.10			Estimated difference
	Melilla	0.11	0.03			Lower bound
		0.605	0.001			Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		0.06	0.11	0.02		Upper bound
	UDCE	0.00	0.05	-0.04		Estimated difference
	Ceuta	-0.07	0.01	0.11		Lower bound
		1	0.113	0.411		Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		0.33	0.37	0.29	0.32	Upper bound
	PP	0.25	0.31	0.21	0.26	Estimated difference
	Melilla	0.18	0.24	-0.14	0.19	Lower bound
		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		0.39	0.44	0.35	0.39	0.14
	PP	0.32	0.38	0.28	0.33	0.07
	Ceuta	0.25	0.32	0.21	0.26	0.00
		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.5
		PSOE	PSOE	CpM	UDCE	PP
		Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla
						<i>Towards this corner: right-leaning</i>

^aThe cells of pairs significantly different at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Note: Vote totals can be found in Appendix BK and Appendix BL.

Yet, as in 2011, there is variation in voting behavior across census tracts *within* the Exclaves. I estimate that native-born voters support the UDCE over the PP in some tracts of Ceuta and, similarly, native-born voters support the CpM over the PP in some of Melilla's tracts. For Ceuta, this can be seen in the first row of Figure 4.7; for Melilla, in the first row of Figure 4.8.³⁰ So, again, do the voters in these heavily Muslim-populated census tracts support the UDCE and the CpM at similar levels?


To examine the difference in Spanish-born Muslims' voting, I again compare the estimates of votes cast in the districts commonly understood to be home to the Exclaves' Muslim communities. This subset of districts is the same as in the analysis of the 2011 elections: in Ceuta, Districts 4, 5, and 6; in Melilla, Districts 4 and 5. They are identified, along with the point estimates of the proportions of votes cast for each party, in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13, respectively.

In the comparison of these Muslim neighborhoods, I find that the cross-Exclave difference in native born voters' support for the parties of Muslim persuasion becomes significant—the same finding as in the analysis of the 2011 election. In contrast to a non-significant difference ($p = 0.411$) when comparing the votes of the entire populations (see Table 4.11), the estimated difference is now significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.021$), as seen in Table 4.14 (third row, third column). *This, again, results from much stronger support for the CpM among Melilla's native-born Muslims than for UDCE among Ceuta's native-born Muslims* (seen also by comparing estimated votes cast in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13).

In addition, the estimated support for the PP between these districts is now significantly different at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.044$; see Table 4.14, first row and fifth column). *This suggests that a significantly greater amount of native-born Muslims in Ceuta support the*

³⁰The values of the point estimates for each census tract are reported in Appendix BK, for Ceuta, and Appendix BL, for Melilla.

Figure 4.7: Proportion of Votes for Each party, by Birthplace of Voter, Ceuta 2007



PP than their counterparts in Melilla in 2007. In sum, the analysis of the 2007 election reinforces the analysis from 2011, lending further support for the hypothesis that native-born Muslims in Ceuta are more likely to vote across ethnic lines whereas native-born Muslims in Melilla are more likely to vote along ethnic lines.

Figure 4.8: Proportion of Votes for Each party, by Birthplace of Voter, Melilla 2007




Table 4.12: Districts in Ceuta with a Significant Muslim Population, 2007

District	Census Tract	Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born		
		PP	UDCE-IU	PSOE
04	001	0.47	0.04	0.05
04	002	0.43	0.07	0.05
04	003	0.44	0.03	0.08
04	004	0.57	0.01	0.08
04	005	0.33	0.17	0.03
04	006	0.23	0.23	0.01
04	007	0.19	0.25	0.02
04	008	0.49	0.07	0.04
04	009	0.61	0.21	0.07
04	010	0.07	0.35	0.04
04	011	0.39	0.17	0.04
05	001	0.35	0.10	0.04
05	002	0.50	0.08	0.03
05	003	0.42	0.14	0.03
05	004	0.43	0.12	0.04
05	005	0.14	0.26	0
05	006	0.57	0.03	0.06
05	007	0.18	0.34	0.03
06	001	0.20	0.24	0.06
06	002	0.08	0.39	0.03
06	003	0.11	0.34	0.05
06	004	0.10	0.36	0.01
06	005	0.14	0.12	0.02

Table 4.13: Districts in Melilla with a Significant Muslim Population, 2007

District	Census Tract	Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born		
		PP	CpM	PSOE
04	001	0.25	0.20	0.06
04	002	0.24	0.24	0.12
04	003	0.19	0.42	0.06
05	001	0.22	0.29	0.07
05	002	0.14	0.43	0.05
05	003	0.11	0.38	0.10
05	004	0.21	0.20	0.12
05	005	0.20	0.31	0.09
05	006	0.11	0.50	0.05

Table 4.14: Differences in Estimated Vote Totals of Native-Born, Subset of Census Tracts, 2007

<i>Towards this corner: left-leaning</i>							
		<i>0.12^a</i>				Upper bound	
	PSOE	<i>-0.04</i>				Estimated difference	
	Ceuta	<i>-0.19</i>				Lower bound	
		<i>-0.976</i>				Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.47^b</i>	<i>0.47</i>			Upper bound	
	CpM	<i>0.27</i>	<i>0.311</i>			Estimated difference	
	Melilla	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.16</i>			Lower bound	
		<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.000</i>			Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.25</i>	<i>0.29</i>	<i>-0.02</i>		Upper bound	
	UDCE	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>-0.17</i>		Estimated difference	
	Ceuta	<i>-0.06</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>-0.33</i>		Lower bound	
		<i>0.429</i>	<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.021</i>		Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.14</i>	Upper bound	
	PP	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>-0.01</i>	Estimated difference	
	Melilla	<i>0.11</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>-0.38</i>	<i>-0.17</i>	Lower bound	
		<i>0.788</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.074</i>	<i>1</i>	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value	
		<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>0.25</i>	<i>0.31</i>	Upper bound
	PP	<i>0.24</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>0.15</i>	<i>0.16</i>	Estimated difference
	Ceuta	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>-0.18</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.00</i>	Lower bound
		<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>.996</i>	<i>0.001</i>	<i>0.044</i>	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
		PSOE	PSOE	CpM	UDCE	PP	<i>Towards this corner:</i>
		Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla	Ceuta	Melilla	<i>right-leaning</i>

^aThe cells containing paired comparisons with changed *p*-values from the full census-tract analysis (Table 4.11) are in italics.

^bThe cells of pairs significantly different at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Note: Vote totals can be found in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13.

Foreign-born voters

In the analysis of the 2007 elections, I also briefly examine the voting patterns of immigrants. Unfortunately, it is not possible to differentiate between immigrants from Morocco and other countries because previous to 2010 the Exclaves' municipal registers only recorded whether individuals were born in Spain or abroad. However, it is reasonable to assume that the following findings provide some insight into the Moroccan-born population since they constitute the majority of foreign-born citizens living in Ceuta and Melilla (see Chapter 2).

As in 2011, I find that immigrants display different voting patterns than their native-born counterparts in both Exclaves. The largest disparity is that immigrants vote for the PSOE in larger numbers than the native-born, regardless of city. They also vote in lower numbers for the PP than the native-born. These differences are significant ($p = 0.001$) and can be seen in the second rows of Figure 4.7, for Ceuta, and Figure 4.8, for Melilla.³¹ These findings also correspond with those from the 2011 elections, further supporting the argument that immigrants experience local politics through a lens unique to the migrant experience and, as a result, vote along class lines. Again note that I do not subset specific census tracts to analyze the voting patterns of immigrants because I do not find evidence of variation across census tracts (see Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8).

4.5.3 Change over time: electoral volatility

Finally, I find that electoral volatility has decreased over time since the first two elections after the restoration of democracy, in 1979 and 1983 (Table 4.15). The Pederson's index values comparing these first two elections in Ceuta and Melilla are the highest for the entire time period, at 72.66 and 74.28, respectively. In contrast, the two lowest values occur when

³¹The values of the point estimates are reported in Appendix BM and Appendix BN.

comparing the most recent elections, 2003 relative to 2007 and 2007 relative to 2011. This overall downward trend reflects the general consensus on electoral volatility: new democracies will have high levels of volatility and these levels will decrease as the democracy matures (Bielasiak 2002; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001). Moreover, the small increase in volatility from 1991 through 2003—the three elections after Muslims in the Exclaves are granted access to Spanish citizenship—corresponds to the argument put forth by Roberts and Wibbles (1999) that volatility also increases when new groups are enfranchised. This increase is followed by a sharp decrease—reflecting an expected stabilization after the enfranchisement (Figure 4.9).

Most directly applicable to the argument in this dissertation, I also find that the trends in the Exclaves' electoral volatility switch after greater numbers of *musulmanes* are permitted to become citizens in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This change is seen when comparing the mean of the index values between 1979 and 1991 and 1991 and 2011 (Table 4.15). Up to the 1991 elections, the first after Muslims were allowed to obtain citizenship, Melilla had slightly higher volatility than Ceuta, by an index value of 2.8. In contrast, after 1991 and through 2011, Melilla had less volatility than Ceuta, by an index value of 6.8. This trend can also be seen graphically in Figure 4.9, where the dotted vertical line demarcates the change to the Exclaves' current status under the autonomy statutes. These findings provides support for the third hypothesis, that in Ceuta, where ethnic categories are understood to be more permeable, electoral volatility is likely to be higher over time than in Melilla, where ethnic categories are relatively more distinct.

Table 4.15: Electoral Volatility, 1979–2011


Years	Ceuta	Melilla
1979–1983	72.66	74.28
1983–1987	30.94	26.61
1987–1991	42.16	53.22
1991–1995	49.67	29.55
1995–1999	46.07	45.1
1999–2003	57.72	50.56
2003–2007	10.9	12.48
2007–2011	22.22	14.94
Mean 1979–1991	48.58	51.37
Mean 1991–2011	37.32	30.52

4.6 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the political landscape and patterns of voting behavior in Ceuta and Melilla. The aim is to evaluate the argument that dissimilar descent-based attributes among the Muslim communities of the Exclaves are contributing to different meanings and activation of the *musulmán* ethnic category in each city. As such, I end by offering three conclusions regarding how the *musulmán* ethnic category is understood in Ceuta and Melilla.

First, native-born Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish—the Exclaves are their home. This was most dramatically demonstrated during the large mobilization and contentious politics surrounding their attempts to become Spanish citizens after the passage of the 1985 Immigration Law. It is demonstrated in a more mundane fashion through their politics: a majority of Muslims participate in local and national elections, during which they vote for established, mainstream parties. Many Muslims vote for the PP and PSOE—just like most *christiano* Spaniards on the mainland—and the Exclaves’ parties of Muslim persuasion faithfully participate in and uphold Spanish political institutions. Indeed, the

Figure 4.9: Electoral Volatility, 1979–2011



Note: Dotted line demarcates the change to the Exclaves’ current administrative status as autonomous cities.

Spanish-ness of the Exclaves’ *musulmanes* helps to explain why the Amzaigh-nationalist Partido Nacionalista del Rif de Melilla (PN RIF-MELI), or the Riffian Nationalist Party of Melilla, only managed to win 0.37 percent of votes (104 total) in one election, 2003 (Table 4.5). Contrast this to the popularity of other parties representing sub-national identity groups, such as the nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

Yet, at the same time, Ceuta and Melilla are different. This is well known among scholars of the Exclaves and, here, I demonstrate it further through an analysis of how the *musulmán* ethnic category is activated in the political context. Based on my analysis,

I suggest that many native-born Muslims in Ceuta could be considered “Spaniards of a Muslim persuasion.” By this I mean that the Muslim ethnic category is understood to have relatively permeable boundaries and any differences can be navigated through the institutions of a multicultural nation state such as contemporary Spain. Put another way, *ceutí* Muslims’ ethnic differences are “nested” within the broader Spanish imagined community (Wimmer 2008a). I posit that this results from the community’s prevailing Arab attributes on the dimensions of language and, to a larger extent, political homeland (see Chapter 3).

To be clear, I am not arguing that significant markers of difference do not exist between *musulmanes* and *christianos* in Ceuta. Today, Muslims in Ceuta remain a largely marginalized population and face both systematic discrimination and curtailed life chances. However, despite this difference, the majority of the community conceives of itself as wholly part of the Spanish nation. This is potentially why, for example, Ceuta’s Muslim community can be home to a disproportionate number of transnational radical Islamists and Salafists without calling for the creation of an independent Muslim state.³²

I argue that we can observe this understand of the *musulmán* ethnicity in the politics of Ceuta’s Muslim community as well as the city’s larger political landscape. Ceuta’s parties of a Muslim persuasion—the CEM, the PDSC, the UDCE, and Caballas—have either won small percentages of the votes despite the large Muslim population or have had short lives as parties. Voters in the Muslim areas of the city vote across ethnic lines, supporting the PP in significantly higher numbers than their counterparts in Melilla while supporting the UDCE or Caballas in significantly lower numbers than their *melillense* counterparts support the CpM. Of course, this could be because Muslim voters see the parties of Muslim persuasion as having negative valence—or lacking the ability to deliver favorable policy outcomes—

³²For reports on Ceuta’s militant Islamist cells, see Rodríguez and Abad 2006 and Irujo and Barca 2013.

but this alternative explanation raises the question of why negative valence would exist in Ceuta but not Melilla. It could be that the prevailing perception of the *musulmán* ethnicity in Ceuta has contributed to weaker parties of Muslim persuasion, which then results in negative valence.

Interestingly, the findings that large amounts of Ceuta's Muslim vote for the majority's conservative party challenge the classic arguments of Lipset ([1960] 1963) and much of the research on ethnic politics that has followed his research agenda—although some recent research is starting to stress that contemporary native-born ethnic minorities and majorities in Western Europe may not differ greatly in the political realm (see, for example, Sanders et al. 2014). Finally, the last piece of evidence I present in support of this conclusion is electoral volatility: the relatively higher electoral volatility in Ceuta suggests that individuals move more frequently across ethnic boundaries, indicating that identities are likely understood as nested (Ferree 2012).

Finally, I suggest that many native-born Muslims in Melilla could be understood as having a hyphenated identity: Amazigh-Spanish. The ethnicity is more distinct from the traditional Spanish identity, akin to how other ethnic groups in Spain consider themselves different from the Castilians but part of a federated Spanish community. In more abstract terms, ethnic identities may be “overlapping” to a certain degree—rather than being nested—but still able to become exclusive in certain situations. I posit that this is a consequence of the community's prevailing Amazigh attributes on the dimensions of language and, to a larger extent, political homeland (see Chapter 3).

As with Ceuta, I argue that this conceptualization of Melilla's Muslim ethnicity can be observed in the community's politics and the city's political landscape. Since 1995, there has been one stable party of Muslim persuasion, the CpM, that has also served as

the primary opposition party. In contrast to its counterparts in Ceuta, the CpM's imagery incorporates ethnic symbols, although, significantly, these are Amazigh, not Muslim. Furthermore, voters in the Muslim areas of the city vote along ethnic lines, supporting the CpM in larger numbers than their co-religionists in Ceuta support their parties of Muslim persuasion. And finally, the relatively lower electoral volatility in Melilla indicates the prevalence of ethnic group boundaries that, at times (such as elections), can be relatively essentialized.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this conclusion chapter I offer a brief summary of the dissertation by first answering the guiding questions presented in the Introduction (see Section 1.3).¹ I then devote the subsequent section to discussing several implications of my project for existing research agendas, along with potential directions for future work growing out of my dissertation.

5.1 Answers to the guiding questions

First, *do notions of groupness, or ethnic categories, differ across Ceuta and Melilla, and if so, in what ways?* I address this question in Chapter 2 through an analysis of citizenship rates across the census tracts of the Exclaves. Using data on nationality, place of birth, age, gender, education, and location, I employ ecological inference methods to estimate the proportion of each Exclaves' adult residents who (1) were born in Spain *and* have Spanish nationality and (2) were born overseas *and* have Spanish nationality.

I find that nearly all adult native-born and foreign-born residents of Ceuta are Spanish citizens. In contrast, I find that many native-born and foreign-born adult residents of Melilla are *not* Spanish citizens. Furthermore, the *melillense* census tracts with lower rates

¹Detailed conclusions and implications for each chapter can be found in Section 2.9, Section 3.6, and Section 4.6.

of citizenship are also the census tracts with higher concentrations of Muslim residents. Again, this is not the case in Ceuta, where census tracts with high concentrations of Muslim residents also have high rates of Spanish citizenship.

These findings lead me to answer that, *yes*, notions of ethnic categories differ across Ceuta and Melilla, at least in the context nationality. The dissimilarity in the acquisition of citizenship is particularly helpful for understanding variation in meanings of ethnic categories because, in the context of Ceuta and Melilla, holding a nationality is a relatively good indicator of individuals' expression of the dominant national identity. It also is indicative of the future expression of ethnic categories, since citizenship can play a role in *generating* ethnic categories in future generations. As such, my findings suggest that shared meanings of ethnic categories differ across Ceuta and Melilla now, and are likely to differ in the near future.

Second, *why and how do the meanings and shared understandings of ethnic categories differ across Ceuta and Melilla?* I engage this question in Chapter 3 through a theoretical discussion. I argue that a variation in political homelands—namely the indigenous homeland present in *ceutí* society and the autochthonous homeland present in *melillense* society—results in significantly different meanings and shared understandings of the group identity categories. In Ceuta, the *musulmán* category refers to a “cultural identity,” with differentiation resting on cultural markers such as religion. As such, groups in Ceuta come to have relatively more permeable boundaries and the *musulmán* group can be more easily included into the Spanish nation state through the institutionally- and publicly-sanctioned paths of multiculturalism.

In Melilla, however, the *musulmán* category carries the meaning of a “national identity,” in which differentiation rests more heavily on ties to an autochthonous homeland. As

a result, discourses and group relations are framed more frequently in terms of nations, which, in the contemporary world, creates a greater challenge for inclusion—today, multi-nation states are all but anathema to the “natural order.” As a result, stronger boundaries have emerged between *christianos* and *musulmanes* in Melilla, relative to *christianos* and *musulmanes* in Ceuta.² These boundaries—and their causes—help to explain why more Muslims have Spanish citizenship in Ceuta than Melilla (see Chapter 2). They should also be observed in other social contexts, thereby providing a way to evaluate the augment. This is goal of the final chapter.

The third and final chapter addresses the question, *how are the differing meanings of the musulmán ethnic categories manifested in the context of local politics?* In answering this question I assess the central argument of the dissertation, developed in Chapter 3. In brief, I find evidence in support of my argument: in the realm of politics, the *musulmán* ethnic category is activated differently in Ceuta than in Melilla. Furthermore, the *musulmán* category in Ceuta appears to operate akin to a “cultural identity,” as hypothesized, with relatively more permeable boundaries and being more easily incorporated into the broader Spanish nation. In contrast, the *musulmán* category in Melilla appears to operate more similarly to a “national identity,” with brighter boundaries and helping to generate a general perspective of multiple nations in the city—again, as hypothesized.

Specifically, I find that since 1991 and 1995, the elections in which large numbers of Muslims were first able to participate, Ceuta’s “Muslim” political parties have garnered small percentages of the votes relative to Melilla’s one “Muslim” party, which has consistently been the second-largest party in the city. In addition, I find evidence that *musulames* in Ceuta vote in higher numbers for the dominant, center-right political party than *musu-*

²Such brighter boundaries, however, do not necessarily imply stronger cohesion within the *musulmán* community (see Subsection 1.1.2).

lames in Melilla, most of whom vote for their city’s “Muslim” party. Finally, I show that, on average, electoral volatility in Ceuta has been higher than in Melilla since 1991. Taken together, these analyses lend confidence to my argument that the attribute values on the political homeland attribute dimension—titular, indigenous, and autochthonous—affect the meanings and shared understandings of ethnic categories and ethnic practice in the Exclaves today.

5.2 Implications and future directions

The relationships between *christianos* and *musulmanes* in the Exclaves can speak to a broad range of issues facing contemporary Europe, such as how education, youth, migration, and gender interact with Islam in Europe. However, due to practical constraints, I only address the implications that my project has for some of these topics: institutions and Islam in Europe; Political Islam; contemporary politics in Europe; collective action; separatism; and ethnicity. These thematic divisions are, of course, artificial—each one is closely related to the others—but I use this structure for easier organization and comprehension. Within my discussion of some of these themes, I also briefly point to potential future research that can grow out of my project.

5.2.1 On institutions and Islam in Europe

In recent decades, and especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become common for European politicians and public figures to comment on the “Islamic challenge.” Academia has not been insulated from this trend. Conceptualizing Islam in Europe as some sort of problem has served as a baseline motivation for a vast amount of research covering

topics from immigration to cultural symbols and symbolic boundaries.

In some ways, Muslims in Europe *have* presented a problem—but not because of religious traditions or cultural practices. Instead, European governments belatedly recognized that a large amount of these “others” would one day seek to become permanent residents, citizens, and active in the public sphere. Caught off guard, to paraphrase Laurence (2012), European governments were ill prepared for such societal changes: they had few institutional contacts with Muslim community leaders and no clear, definite way to meet Muslims’ diverse religious and cultural needs. Of course, this state of affairs contributed to the “foreignness” of Muslims, perpetuating the notion of an “Islamic challenge.”

Early on, Western European states responded by “outsourcing” the organizing of and service provision to resident Muslims to Muslim-majority states, an arrangement commonly known as “Embassy Islam.” Today, Embassy Islam is giving way to an increasingly common and institutionalized state-sponsored Islam, in which European states create, support, or foster Muslim religious organizations. In this way, European governments hope to exert greater influence on the religious and cultural lives of their (Muslim) residents (Gould 2009; Laurence 2006, 2012; Pfaff and Gill 2006).

Ceuta and Melilla have mirrored mainland Europe. The majority of Muslims were able to become Spanish citizens only in the late 1980s and the local governments did not start providing support for religious institutions until the 1990s and 2000s (see Subsection 4.3.1). However, the unique geopolitical and demographic conditions of the Exclaves has accelerated the evolution of the relationship between the local state and resident Muslims, resulting in a relatively advanced banalization of Islam. So, what lessons do Ceuta and Melilla have for the ongoing institutionalization of Islam in Europe?

First, even with the relatively high degrees of acceptance, incorporation, and institu-

tionalization of Islam in Ceuta and Melilla, the cities do not seem able to escape from a framework of religious dichotomy. That is, even though Muslims are present, active, visible, and powerful across settings—local government, widely-read media outlets, schools, hospitals, and the police—and symbols of Islam are relatively mundane—in 2013, Ceuta alone had 49 registered mosques and Islamic organizations in its seven square mile territory (A.Q. 2013a)³—many social, political, and economic issues continue to be framed in terms of a *potentially* conflictual relationship between *christianos* and *musulmanes*. For example, in 2013, an argument between Laarbi Maateis, the Islamist president of Ceuta’s largest Muslim organization, UCIDCE, and a teacher of his young daughter was portrayed by many local media outlets as a conflict between the hot-tempered *musulmán* community and the implicitly *christiano* rule of law.⁴

The stickiness of such a dichotomous framework is reminiscent of race in the United States. No matter how “post-racial” the country becomes in its organizations, media, and government, American society struggles to move beyond a racial framing of issues, particularly in regards to the white and African-American dynamic. The lesson for mainland Europe, then, appears to be that no matter how successful state-sponsored Islam is, European societies should expect generations of *christiano/musulmán* discourse.

Second, banalization does not mean homogenization. Life in the Exclaves is a reminder

³In 2011, a registry maintained by Spain’s Ministry of Justice and freely accessible on-line (at the now-defunct page: <http://dgraj.mju.es/EntidadesReligiosas/NCindex.htm>) listed 40 Muslim associations in Ceuta and 14 in Melilla, a territory of five square miles. However, when rechecked on 29 May, 2014, I found that the registry is now only available by request. See http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/en/1215197983369/Estructura_P/1215198058699/Detalle.html#id_1215327680721.

⁴This understanding of events is obviously my own interpretation, so I only cite it as an extreme example for illustrative purposes. (Mundane examples are plentiful—but simply consider the use of the term “*musulmán*,” even if the individual is a native-born, Spanish-speaking, fair-skinned, wealthy Spanish citizen.) I base my interpretation, first, on the detail reports use to describe Maateis’s behavior, noting that he said in Arabic that he would “break the legs” of the teacher, along with the frequent mentions of his leadership of the UCIDCE. And, second, on the detail of the careful, months-long deliberation of the city’s magistrates, who ultimately decided to prosecute Maateis. See A.Q. 2013b and EFE 2013b.

that even though Islam can be highly normalized and residents of all backgrounds can use the term “*musulmán*,” “Muslims” are a heterogeneous population. Moreover, the heterogeneous traditions of Islam, cultural practices, political homelands, somatic markers, languages, and intragroup dynamics *within* the “Muslim” category can each have varying affects on—and jointly influence—a wide range of outcomes, such as educational attainment, immigration, internal migration, transnational relationships, assimilation processes, and political participation. For example, I find that Imazighen, who tend to be more liberal and secular,⁵ *vote more often for an “ethnic party”* than Arabs. Similarly, many Arabs, who, in Ceuta, are conservative Islamists, *vote for often for mainstream Spanish parties* that Imazighen.

Third, this heterogeneity in the “Muslim” category is both an influence on and outcome of the institutionalization of Islam in Europe. This has two implications. One is that European governments and publics should recognize that the various expressions of groupness within the “Muslim” category will likely require equally nuanced characteristics and services from state-sponsored Islam. Laurence (2012) alludes to this when he remarks that there are lower degrees of organizational ties between groups such as Arabs and Turks than within these groups.⁶ The questions, then, are, to what degree are European governments willing to recognize and accommodate heterogeneity? What is practical? What are the effects of supporting particular minority groups within the larger Muslim category over others?

A second implication is that the European governments seeking to promote state-

⁵For further discussion on the prevalent trends of the contemporary Amazigh population, see Maddy-Weitzman 2011.

⁶I believe this issue to be crucial to our understanding of Islam in Europe, yet it is so often overlooked that I quote Laurence (2012: 97-8) here in full: “Islamic Youth Organizations are divided along linguistic and ethnic cleavages: Arabic-speaking, Turkish-Speaking, or Urdu-speaking. At a pan-European level, however, a linguistic common space emerged where second- and third-generation young people from Urdu- and Arabic-speaking families converse together in English and French. A separate German-speaking space exist among Arab- and Turkish-origin youth in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. However, these two groups—Arab and Turkish—other remain organizational segregated throughout Europe.”

sponsored Islam should consider how their decision will impact the homogenization of Islam in Europe. Will the policies implemented in Europe help to push the Imazighen into the Arab-Muslim milieu, in essence advancing Morocco's old policy of Arabization? Similarly, will these policies turn Kurds and Alevis into "Turks," thereby providing assistance to Turkish state's goal of national homogenization? How could these outcome be avoided? Should minorities, such as Amazigh representatives be guaranteed a place in the state-sponsored Islamic Councils? Must they be "Islamic" to take part in mosque-state negotiations, or are secular viewpoints—more prevalent in the Imazighen community—welcome?

Finally, foreign influence—variations of Embassy Islam—will not disappear with the advent of state-sponsored Islam. One of the primary motivations for European government to develop state-sponsored Islam has been their desire to decrease the influence of foreign states, which became involved in the lives of European Muslims during the period of "Embassy Islam."⁷ Yet, in Ceuta and Melilla, where the local governments provide funding for religious organizations, Islam-affiliated political parties contest elections, and "home-grown" Islamic organization wield influence, foreign states still have a presence. In Ceuta, the Moroccan state financially supports and staffs one of the city's largest NGOs, Luna Blanca ("White Moon"). In Melilla, the Moroccan state manages and staffs a large school for Muslim youths that follows the Moroccan curriculum, as well as provides imams for many of the city's mosques (see Costa 2013b).

Of course, these lasting foreign ties may indicate that state-sponsored Islam has not yet been fully realized in the Exclaves. This may be the case, but considering that Ceuta and Melilla have influential "native" Islam to a greater degree than most of mainland Europe,

⁷For their part, foreign states have various incentives for continued involvement, such as the increasing the flow of remittances, maintaining support for state regimes, and hindering potential opposition to the regimes.

the experiences of the cities point to the challenges in truly severing “European” Islam from Muslim-majority foreign states.

5.2.2 On Political Islam

European governments and portions of the public are also concerned with a different set of Muslims’ alleged international ties: those to transnational, politicized Islamist groups. Political Islam in Europe coalesced during the early period of institutional weakness, when elites in exile from Muslim-majority countries, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, gained support and influence among Muslim communities in Europe (Laurence 2006, 2012; Pfaff and Gill 2006). The foreignness and seemingly sinister transnational ties of Political Islam, not to mention its association with radicalism and terrorism, has subsequently drawn a lot of attention. Gilles Kepel, an influential French professor at Sciences Po, once remarked “either we train our Muslims to become global citizens, who live in a democratic, pluralist society, or on the contrary, the Islamists win, and take over those Muslim European constituencies” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 11).

My research suggests that such a dichotomizing of citizens as either European, “global,” democratic, and pluralist, on one hand, and Islamist, on the other, is misguided. The majority of Muslims in both Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish citizens, cosmopolitan, engaged in the democratic process, and respectful of their *christiano* neighbors. Yet, at the same time, fundamentalism thrives in Ceuta and is growing in Melilla (albeit more slowly). Indeed, one of the remarks I heard most frequently across the cities regarded the growth of Salafism.

The Exclaves’ civic leaders, residents, and Salafists themselves all named the same reason for the growing popularity of conservative Islamism: social marginalization and poverty. That is, support for fundamentalist Islam, and the attraction of radical imams

from Saudi Arabia (some of whom reside and work in Ceuta) and elites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, depends on the socioeconomic struggles of young people—not on alleged low degrees of global citizenry and understanding of democracy and pluralism.⁸ After all, it is in Ceuta where most Muslims are Spanish citizens *and* vote for the center-right mainstream political party *and* increasingly embrace Salafism.⁹ As one Salafist explained to me in 2011, being Spanish and embracing multiculturalism affords the freedom to follow Salafism.¹⁰

My research also suggests that many Muslims in Europe have very little interest in Political Islam. This has been noted by the few other scholars of Islamic theology in contemporary Spain, such as Gould (2009), who finds that most of the Muslim elites he interviews in (mainland) Spain support “universalism,” or a synthesis of liberalism and Islam.¹¹ Furthermore, Muslim communities that may appear to have characteristics of Political Islam—transnational ties, political consciousness, a willingness to be mobilized, lower degrees of integration, distinct voting patterns—may in fact have no interest in *jihad*. For example, the Imazighen of Melilla display these traits, but they are motivated to strengthen transnational identities and pursue specific political outcomes in an effort to support the Amazigh community in North Africa and Europe. This mobilization, which is relatively secular, aims at reversing centuries of repression, not challenging existing states.

⁸Others across Europe seem to have reached a similar conclusion. Laurence (2012: 94) quotes an Italian official who defines Political Islam as “Islam of the base, of the mosques, of the periphery, of the poor.”

⁹Ceuta has also been the base of a handful of different Al Qaeda cells over the last decade. The large majority of these Qaeda operatives are Spanish citizens (Rodríguez and Abad 2006; Irujo and Barca 2013).

¹⁰My informant’s stance reflects Joppke’s (2008) theoretical discussion on the paradox that “illiberal” conservative religion presents political liberalism. Joppke points out that political liberalism, under which individuals can choose their own actions with the state remaining “neutral about conceptions of the good life,” enables the ability to follow a conservative religious worldview, which, in turn, challenges a liberal worldview. One potential result, he argues, is liberalism becoming a “one-sided” identity in opposition to such illiberal identities, rather than an encompassing framework of toleration.

¹¹For similar findings from Germany, see Pfaff and Gill 2006.

5.2.3 On politics and Islam in Europe

Despite the attention on Political Islam, it is somewhat challenging to assess the political views of the majority of Europe's Muslim because they account for only a small fraction of voters, and will do so for generations. In fact, only a handful of mainland cities, such as Marseille and Malmø, are likely to become majority Muslim within the next several decades (Laurence 2012). The populations of Ceuta and Melilla, however, are already nearly half Muslim,¹² So, what do these sites tell us about the future of politics in Europe? How will a large Muslim population affect local politics?

Laurence (2012: 258) predicts that although most Muslims in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom seem to support center-left parties today, Muslims' political views will increasingly diversify and come to include support for socially conservative and economically liberal platforms. In addition, he posits that as a long-term minority community, Muslims' will not be able to support a viable ethnic party. Instead, existing mainstream parties will compete to recruit supporters and candidates from the Muslim community. My findings provide partial support for these predications. Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla do vote across the political spectrum but "Muslim" parties have also existed in the Exclaves since the 1990s. In Melilla, the party "of Muslim persuasion," CpM, has been the primary opposition party since 1999 (see Subsection 4.3.1).

How have such parties, especially CpM, become accepted and how do they remain viable in European, *christiano*-dominated cities? I argue that Laurence is correct in assuming that they cannot be "single-issue Muslim" parties. Instead, they appear to have

¹²Based on my analysis of the UCIDE's 2013 census of Spain's Muslim population (<http://ucide.org/sites/default/files/revistas/estadodemograf13.pdf>; last accessed 21 May 2014), it appears to report that Melilla is now majority Muslim (I calculate 50.25 % of the population), for the first time in its history. Nation-wide, Muslims compose 3.65 percent of the population; 30 percent of these Muslims are Spanish citizens (EuropaPress 2014a).

out-maneuvered—or, in the case of Ceuta, at least taken votes from—the center-left PSOE by addressing socioeconomic marginalization in the context of living as a Muslim in Europe. That is, they do not separate class and ethnic cleavages, instead addressing complex issues with a localized, nuanced perspective. This suggests that the issues facing marginalized titulars are perceived as distinct from the issues facing marginalized Muslims. As a result, leftist parties in Europe should adjust their message in communities where marginalization and ethnic stigmatization are intertwined.

The Exclaves also point to two other potentially interesting questions regarding Muslims and local politics in Europe. First, how has the incorporation—and increasing numbers—of *musulmanes* in the political landscape affected practical politics? At a quick glance, it appears that the “neo-clientelistic” strategies common in Southern Spain (Blakeley 2001) have been extended, unchanged, to the Muslim population. For example, while conducting my fieldwork some *musulmán* community leaders in both Ceuta and Melilla expressed concern during interviews that the center-right PP was “buying” the votes of *musulmanes*, thereby undercutting support for Caballas, PDSC, and CpM.¹³ While I obviously never witnessed this occurring, the analysis in Chapter 4 depicts unexpected support for the PP among *musulmanes* in Ceuta. Torres Cólón (2008: 207) found the same thing during his fieldwork, noting that “such incongruity leads [him] to believe that it is quite possible that members of the PP have some arrangement with certain musulmán political leaders,” although he rightly notes that “such an arrangement is [likely not] illegal because the PP could have simply gained these musulmán leaders’ support by making personal appeals and promising infrastructural improvements in the musulmanes’ marginalized neighborhoods.”¹⁴

¹³See, for example, Subsection 1.1.2. Also recall the accusations that the PP in Melilla orchestrated the return of Aomar Mohamedi Duddú and his PDM party in the 2011 elections (see Subsection 4.3.4).

¹⁴Our observations raise the possibility that the greater number of *musulmán* votes for the PP in Ceuta—one of the main findings presented in Chapter 4—could be explained by Ceuta’s PP having stronger

Yet, at the same time, the entrance and growth of an ethno-culturally distinct group in local politics *should* result in a change in the “supply” of clientelism (Piattoni 2001). That is, if we believe that *musulmanes* have different associational lives, understandings of political legitimacy, or particularist interests than *christianos*, then political parties should eventually develop distinct strategies for each of these two communities. If they have not or do not, then clientelistic strategies would seem to cut across “cultures,” thereby challenging culturalist explanations for patronage and clientelism. To the best of my knowledge, it has yet to be studied whether parties’ clientelistic strategies differ for *christianos* and *musulmanes* in the Exclaves.

In addition, other future work could explore whether the “identities” that I argue are emerging—cultural and national—influence existing practical politics. For example, the work of Hopkin and Mastropaolo (2001) suggests that particularistic, weakly cohesive societies are provide more fertile ground for clientelism. This leads to the hypothesis that clientelism should be stronger among the *musulmán* community of Ceuta than among the *musulmán* community of Melilla. Such findings would point to a tension for Spain and other liberal democracies: the less ethno-culturally distinct and cohesive (and more atomistic) Muslims become, the higher the possibility of today’s clientelistic “politics as usual.”

A second question regarding Muslims and local politics in Europe, regards the impact of “replenishment.” Just as in mainland Europe, newly arrived *musulmanes* settle in the

clientelistic capabilities than Melilla’s PP. While this is possible, neither Torres Cólón nor I were able to collect enough data to support this claim. However, there is reason to think that clientelistic strategies *do not* currently differ across the Exclaves to a significant degree. First, I heard complaints in both cities and, second, the “supply side” conditions that Piattoni (2001: 17) identifies as influencing clientelism appear to be constant across the cities: (1) the bureaucracy’s degree of independence from partisan pressures, (2) the motivations of politicians running for office, and (3) the shared understanding of political legitimacy. I believe it is more likely that the “demand side” for clientelism would differ across the Exclaves—such as the level of empowerment and associational life among *musulmanes* in each city—but this dovetails with my argument. That is, the research I present in this dissertation could help explain why the “demand side” differs between the Muslims of Ceuta and Melilla.

Exclaves every year. How will these new perspectives, interests, and networks—even if they involve individuals unable to vote—shape the political discourse and election landscape? Here, the literature on old and new “gateway cities” as well as Latina/o replenishment in the United States, such as Jiménez’s (2009) *Replenished Ethnicity: Mexican-Americans, Immigration and Identity*, may be useful. To the best of my knowledge, more research on replenishment has been conducted in the American context than in the European context.

5.2.4 On collective action

Another open question concerning the role of Muslims in Europe regards political mobilization beyond political parties, such as lobbying groups, interest organizations, and popular protest. The bulk of social movement research suggests that European Muslims should mobilize relatively easily due to the above average levels of marginalization and disadvantage in the wider community, as well as increasing rights and population size, the presence of elites and ethnic entrepreneurs, and efforts by states to incorporate Muslim voices in governance. Yet, such mobilization of representation and influence in conventional politics has been relatively rare.

Pfaff and Gill (2006) argue that collective action has been hindered by the highly decentralized and nonhierarchical nature of Islam in combination with the European Muslim community’s diversity in legal traditions, theological beliefs, ethnicity, national origin, and citizenship status. Such an environment provides opportunities for factions to “spoil,” or undermine, broad-based mobilization if such collective action is not aligned with their interests. This leads Pfaff and Gill to expect that Europe’s Muslims will organize around narrow, localized issues.

These same dynamics generally play out in the Exclaves. I found each of the cities’

most powerful organizations—both Islamist—working to build support among the broader Muslim community and decrease the influence of other organizations, particularly those with support from Morocco (see Subsection 1.1.1 and Subsection 1.1.2). In Ceuta, members of UCIDCE repeatedly criticized Luna Blanca, the city’s Moroccan-backed NGO, for undermining its unifying efforts.¹⁵ In Melilla, the CIM expressed distaste for Morocco’s involvement in the city, as well as Melilla’s Amazigh cultural organizations.¹⁶ In both cities, I interpreted these stances as clear frustration over the non-Islamist and foreign-backed “spoilers” in their respective communities.

However, such *internal* fissures do not necessarily determine broader collective action. This, I believe, is a key contribution of comparing Ceuta and Melilla: “ethnicity” is controlled as best as possible while types and degrees of collective action vary. This results in an uncovering of divisions *within* an ethnic community, such as religiosity and foreign ties, while, at the same time, a recognition of the community-based collective action that *does* occur.

I find that factors in the Exclaves’ ethnic landscapes are likely generating higher levels of collective action in Melilla than in Ceuta, in terms of a stronger political party as well as public protest, such as the massive demonstrations during the implementation of the Immigration Laws (Subsection 4.3.1) and, more recently, when residents were upset with perceived unjustified deference to Morocco (EuropaPress 2013) and living conditions in Muslim neighborhoods (EuropaPress 2014c). Based on my observations that such collective action is generally directed against stigmatization as *a group*, I argue that the strength of collective action in Melilla, relative to Ceuta, results from the greater levels of stigmatization associated with the Imazighen (see Subsection 3.3.1). In other words, Melilla’s *musulmanes*

¹⁵For examples of this tension manifested in contentious confrontation, see Irujo 2010 and ABC.es 2012.

¹⁶For quotes from the CIM’s spokesperson on this matter, see Subsection 1.1.2 and Subsection 3.4.3.

are resisting mistreatment due to, in their eyes, their Amazigh, or autochthonous, political homeland. This argument suggests that the *musulmanes* in Ceuta have relatively greater confidence that they are not being lumped together as “Arabs,” and perhaps believe they can more easily cross social boundaries.¹⁷ This permeability, which I discuss in Chapter 4, also has the added consequence of increasing the likelihood of spoilers, as discussed by Pfaff and Gill (2006).

5.2.5 On separatism

A specific type of collective action, ethno-national separatism, is especially pertinent to the study of ethnicity, not to mention the Spanish context. Recent Spanish history has lent support for the many theories positing, in general, that territorial separatism will follow disaffection based on ethnic identities (see, for example, Geertz 1973; Hechter 2000): Basques waged a long struggle for greater autonomy and Artur Mas and his supporters have recently been promoting a separatist campaign in Catalonia. Should we expect similar ethno-nationalist efforts in Ceuta and Melilla? After all, the cities have a large, ethnically distinct population that is starkly marginalized and excluded from the dominant Spanish national narrative. In addition, they are spatially concentrated and can communicate easily in mosques, schools, workplaces, and civic organizations. Moreover, Amazigh activists have increasingly been finding inspiration in the Catalan movement (Maddy-Weitzman 2011)—a trend echoed by Melilla’s conservative PPL party in its warning that *musulmanes* in the

¹⁷Harrison White’s ([1966] 2007) notion of “catnets” offers an alternative way to conceptualize this argument. I am suggesting that *musulmanes* in Melilla could be resisting an imposition, or “isolate representation” (174), of a categorization and a corresponding limitation of network opportunities based on their Amzighness, which would, in turn, “lock in” stigmatization. In contrast, *musulmanes* in Ceuta, because of the political homeland nature of Arab-ness, could be less concerned that their “nets” will come to solely correspond with their “cat.”

Exclaves will soon be pursuing a separatist agenda, “like the Catalans.”¹⁸

Furthermore, one of my main findings in this dissertation is a prevailing “national identity” among Muslims in Melilla, based on the meaning and shared understanding of the *musulmán* category. In other words, I argue that Melilla’s *musulmanes* organize the world as nations—seeing themselves as a distinct nation—more so than their co-religionists in Spain. So, why has there not been greater levels of nationalism in the Exclaves, and especially Melilla?

I suspect there is a significant “neighborhood effect” occurring in the Exclaves. The proximity of Morocco—geographically and psychologically—increases satisfaction with Spain. By this, I mean that Morocco serves as an ever-present reminder for the Exclaves’ residents that life is most likely better as part of Spain and the EU. Recall, for example, that Melilla’s *musulmanes* demonstrated for Spanish citizenship in 1985-6, despite accusations of being traitors to the Islamic community from their Moroccan neighbors (Subsection 4.3.1). My research suggests, then, that studies on ethno-national separatism should take greater account of regional conditions—a similar argument to Wimmer’s (2013b) thesis that nationalists have impacted nation state formation by instigating secessionist wars in neighboring territories. In addition, it also suggests that while Muslims may indeed affect change in mainland European society, there is little desire for the social and political systems of contemporary majority-Arab states.

5.2.6 On ethnicity, autochthony, and double-colonization

In addition to implications for research on Islam in Europe, my dissertation also engages broader themes in the study of ethnicity. In this final section, I briefly discuss two general

¹⁸Quoted in *El Faro*, 3 May 2014. Found at: <http://elfarodigital.es/melilla/politica/144713-ppl-europa-no-puede-ser-socio-de-un-pais-que-no-reconoce-melilla-y-ceuta.html> (last accessed 22 May 2014).

topics: (1) how autochthony relates to definitional issues in the study of ethnicity, and (2) how a better understanding of *double-colonized* groups improves our research on politics and boundary-making, migration, and the emerging biological turn in the study of ethnicity.

Autochthony and definitional issues

Ethnicities, inclusive of races and nations, have often been conceptualized as specific types of groups, differentiated from other groups such as genders and classes by specific shared characteristics.¹⁹ For example, Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 6) offer the following list of characteristics defining ethnic groups:

[A] named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity.

Similarly, Fearon (2003: 7) names the following characteristics (as summarized in Chandra 2012d: 70):

(1) Membership is reckoned primarily by descent . . . (2) Members are conscious of group membership, (3) Members share distinguishing cultural features, (4) These cultural features are valued by a majority of members, (5) The group has or remembers a homeland, (6) The group has a shared history as a group that is “not wholly manufactured but has some basis in fact.”

In yet another example, Hale (2008: 42-3) lists the following as “core features” of ethnic groups: connotation of common fate, barriers to communication [to outsiders], visible phys-

¹⁹For a detailed review and critique of such definitions, including the examples given in this section, see Chandra 2012d: 69-71.

ical differences that are hard to change or disguise, and correlation with other important factor.

Alternatively, Barth ([1969] 1998), in his seminal essay, details a different approach to conceptualizing ethnic groups with the metaphor of boundaries, drawing attention to how and when groups distinguish themselves from one another. This “boundary-making approach” has spurred numerous research agendas across various disciplines of social science and the approach has become all but hegemonic.²⁰

However, as I discuss in Subsection 1.2.7, both approaches have flaws. In an attempt to move beyond these pitfalls, I use my dissertation to both develop and model an alternative path. In simple terms, my approach can be understood as a middle course synthesizing the work of Kanchan Chandra and Rogers Brubaker. Similar to the “attribute-identifying,” or “groupist,” camp, I too emphasize the importance of attributes but, I take a different tack and stress the *contextual specificity* of which types of characteristics define a particular ethnic group. For instance, the attribute skin color may play a role in ethnicity in the United States, but not in India. To help specify this aspect of ethnicity, I employ the combinatorial language developed by Chandra (2012b) and her collaborators.

Furthermore, attributes structure ethnic groups in a particular context only to the extent that they are recognized (in that given context) as “combining” to form an actually feasible identity category. Discussing this aspect of ethnicity provides an opportunity to underscore the insights of Brubaker: the descent-based attributes at the foundation of ethnic categories generate expressions of “groupness,” or noticeable cohesion, as an *event* (Brubaker 1996, 2004, 2005, 2014).

²⁰Of course, there are important exceptions, such as the work of Richard Jenkins, which draws attention to the “cultural stuff” *within* boundaries. See, for example, Jenkins 2008 as well as his aptly titled 2014 essay, “Time to Move Beyond Boundary Making?”.

By building on Chandra and Brubaker I have aimed to harness the tools necessary to explore the question, *why and how do specific ethnic categories become activated?* The examination of this question in the context of Ceuta and Melilla leads me to emphasize the role of one kind of descent-based attribute that can have significant influence on social and political landscapes: political homeland. Starting in Subsection 3.3.1, I define this type of attribute, discuss *why* this type of attribute exists in some contexts, and theorize *how* it can shape the meanings and understanding of ethnic categories and their subsequent expression in ethnic practices. I also identify how the political homeland attribute can vary—between titular, indigenous, and degrees of autochthony—as well as the mechanisms these kinds of political homelands generate, such as empowerment and stigmatization.

Beyond modeling a novel approach to studying ethnicity, my dissertation draws special attention to the attribute-value of autochthony. Doing so makes two contributions. First, it adds analytical precision to one of the most-cited but under-specified characteristics of ethnicities and nation. For example, John Stuart Mill (1993: 391) refers to “political antecedents; the possession of national history” and Weber (1978: 389, 398) mentions “memories of colonization” and “political memory.” But how do characteristics like the possession of a national history and political memory *work*? *Why* and *how* do they matter?²¹ Or, put concretely, why exactly *should* a scholar of Muslims in Germany differentiate between Turks, Kurds, and Alevis? Why *should* scholars of Mexican immigrants in the United States differ between white, mestizo, and indigenous Mexicans?

My work in this dissertation is an effort to answer to such questions. Namely, the imagined historical power relations between titular, indigenous, and autochthonous groups that

²¹Without answering these questions, the practice of defining of ethnicities—and nations—by their group histories and memories risks becoming tautological. That is, such explanations would, in essence, assert that a group with shared group “memories” is a group. For a more detailed critique, see Chandra 2012d: 73-94.

sometimes exist *within* superficially homogenous “modernized” populations—the “Turkish,” the “Mexicans,” the “Arabs”—can be recalled in contemporary contexts, often through banal, everyday references, discourses, and behaviors. This potentially results in different *meanings* for similarly named identity categories, which, in turn, can affect ethnic practice. Put another way, when pan-ethnic groups are being constructed today, such as “Muslims” in Europe and “Asian Americans” in the United States, it matters if such identity categories are including people who have been *double-colonized*.

The significance of the double-colonization is the second benefit of drawing attention to the attribute-value of autochthony. Double colonization has been often overlooked by ethnicity scholars studying the post-colonial world; they typically begin with the nineteenth and twentieth century periods of colonization (not before). In contrast, my research encourages further questions regarding how the histories of the doubly-colonized (e.g., Imazighen) versus histories of the once-colonizers/once-colonized (e.g., Arabs) shape ethnic categories today. For example, perhaps North Africa’s pre-modern history of conquest and colonialism promotes the contemporary adoption of cultural identities among Arabs more so than among the Imazighen? In other words, perhaps the colonizing history of Arabs has a positive effect on the decoupling of ethnic identity from a fixed territorial home, or in the words of Billig (1995: 77), it has helped to break the “mystical bond” between a group and a place? As I discuss in this dissertation, this may then result in the higher probability of a cultural identity, more permeable group boundaries, and a distinct path of ethnic change—relative to communities that do not share such a history of being conquerers and colonizers.

The double-colonized in politics, boundary-making, migration, and biological ancestry

Greater attention to double-colonization deepens our understanding of several specific topics related to ethnicity. In the remainder of this section I briefly mention three: politics and boundary-making, migration, and the biological turn in the study of ethnicity.

First, the politics of Ceuta and Melilla appear to further contextualize recent sociological work on boundary-making that builds on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981). Briefly put, this body of research argues that, over time, exchange relationships generate shared norms which, in turn, become recognized as boundaries through the process of social closure (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012; Wimmer 2002, 2008b). Yet, in Ceuta and Melilla, some evidence suggests that the center-right PP engages in clientelistic exchanges with *musulmanes* precisely because they are different²²—exchange is a strategy to *cross* boundaries, when they exist, in an effort to gain political support. As a result, the provision and exchange of resources may be seen as less unnecessary (or unfruitful) among the traditional PP base.

So when may such exchange across boundaries result in a reshaping of those boundaries? If such exchange—practical politics, or “politics as usual” in much of southern Spain (Blakeley 2001; Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001)—is occurring in *both* Ceuta and Melilla, why do I find evidence of different ethnic practices across the cities? One possibility could be that the “national identity” that I argue emerges from the double-colonized Imazighen constrains the influence of exchange relationships on the reshaping of boundaries, relative to the “cultural identities” of the “indigenous” community of Ceuta. In other words, my research suggests that there is a higher probability that exchange-based mechanisms

²²See Subsection 1.1.2 and Subsection 5.2.3.

will form inclusive boundaries among titular and indigenous communities but lag in doing so when linking titular and autochthonous communities. Attention to double-colonized groups, then, can help place limits—or temper expectations—for how and why exchange relationships unite disparate groups. Consequently, the question shifts from, “do exchange relationships influence boundaries?” to “how do exchange relationships between various types of groups generate different kinds of boundaries?”

Second, a focus on double-colonized groups provides a significant corrective for the large majority of research on immigration. Most of this work conflates national origin with homogenous “ethnicity.” For example, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Korean are taken as the groups that may or may not be constituting a pan-ethnic Asian American identity (see, for example, Okamoto 2003). Or, Moroccans, Turks, and Indians residing in Europe practice exogamy at different rates (Lucassen and Laarman 2009). My research, however, should have clearly demonstrated that such national—or, as commonly referred to, “ethnic”—groups cannot be conceptualized as homogenous. Some will contain large populations from double-colonized groups while other will not. For instance, consider the power differentials within a Vietnamese migration stream that contains Viets and Montagnards. Similarly, as I have shown in this dissertation, the Moroccan migration stream—which contains large amounts of Arabs and Imazighen—will have a different impact on an outcome than a migration stream from a society without various political homelands, such as Egypt. Ignoring this within-group variation produces misguided impressions of how members of these national groups experience migration outcomes, as well as incorrect conclusions about how having a specific national origin affects a given outcome.

Finally, the emphasis on double-colonization can enrich the emerging biological turn in the study of ethnicity—a trend that I expect to gain momentum due to advances in

genetic analysis. In many ways, this research agenda is promising; it has the potential to uncover crucial factors that promote boundary-making. However, it still faces the same basic question confronting scholars of ethnicity: do some genetic markers—that is, some attributes—correlate with group categories and, if so, why?²³ This leads to findings such as, “bio-ancestry (the geographic origin of an individual based on genetic data) and social context interact to influence the classification of race and ethnicity,” (Guo et al. 2013: 2), or put more simply, the attribute of “geographic genetic origin” interacts with other perceived attributes to create groupness.

Alternatively, it may be more fruitful to incorporate genetic analysis into the study of ethnicity if it can be used to map autochtony—and other pre-modern groupings—in today’s ethnic landscape. That is, where, why, and how have double-colonized groups, as defined by bio-ancestry, remained distinct in terms of practical categories? And where, why, and how have they been incorporated into contemporary groups? In other words, the question shifts from *whether* bio-ancestry matters—to paraphrase Zartman (2011), the answer most likely is that it sometimes does and sometimes does not—to helping chart *when, why, and how* “people of the soil” continue to have an impact on ethnic landscapes, and *when, why, and how* have they “disappeared.”

To conclude, my emphasis on pre-modern patterns of power should be seen in relation to modernist and post-modernist perspectives on the world. Namely, despite modernist claims that pre-modern, marginalized, socioeconomically disadvantaged groups will homogenize into more modern, capitalist-orientated, pan-ethnic groups, I argue that in many instances pre-modern power relations between groups still shape today’s social, political,

²³Moreover, it depends on the initial categorization of bio-markers. A typical question would ask, for example, when and why do *African-American* bio-markers correspond with *African-American* self-classification?

and economic landscapes. Autochthonous peoples continue to live at the impoverished margins of industrializing cities; struggle with discrimination, incorporation, and assimilation in unique ways when migrating; and produce distinct political projects.

Furthermore, despite post-modernist claims that we live in an era with weak ideological mobilization, the dissolution of social cleavages, and an overemphasis on individual interests, I argue that in many instances pre-modern power relations between groups still generate political mobilization, national identities, and collective interests. I find, for example, that the double-colonized Imazighen of Melilla, along with their neighbors, draw on widely-held, pre-modern imagined histories to construct new, distinct, and shared versions of tomorrow's Spain.

Appendix A

Marginals for Ceuta 2012 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	1844	148	1729	169	94	1992
2	5100101002	880	57	848	28	61	937
3	5100101003	1533	63	1459	63	74	1596
4	5100101004	2024	74	1936	84	78	2098
5	5100101005	1242	65	1200	63	44	1307
6	5100101006	1436	31	1379	52	36	1467
7	5100101007	1510	62	1454	76	42	1572
8	5100101008	1296	72	1224	92	52	1368
9	5100101009	1095	66	1010	110	41	1161
10	5100101010	1474	24	1440	40	18	1498
11	5100102001	1225	70	1165	68	62	1295
12	5100102002	1490	135	1401	194	30	1625
13	5100102003	894	100	826	155	13	994
14	5100102004	1285	85	1190	153	27	1370
15	5100102005	1451	97	1397	119	32	1548
16	5100102006	871	41	811	80	21	912
17	5100102007	1688	115	1557	216	30	1803
18	5100103001	1448	19	1394	52	21	1467
19	5100103002	1417	25	1361	53	28	1442
20	5100103003	1193	24	1154	41	22	1217
21	5100103004	963	25	945	23	20	988
22	5100103005	715	19	687	38	9	734
23	5100103006	1100	66	1057	82	27	1166
24	5100103007	1574	68	1505	100	37	1642
25	5100103008	739	69	705	93	10	808
26	5100103009	1016	16	993	28	11	1032
27	5100103010	786	34	755	55	10	820
28	5100103011	1498	67	1399	121	45	1565
29	5100103012	850	8	820	24	14	858
30	5100103013	1900	39	1846	58	35	1939
31	5100103014	1365	125	1282	187	21	1490
32	5100104001	2138	75	2055	110	48	2213
33	5100104002	2146	226	2042	280	50	2372
34	5100104003	1718	34	1667	67	18	1752
35	5100104004	1188	24	1169	28	15	1212
36	5100104005	2147	143	2026	242	22	2290
37	5100104006	1924	259	1766	399	18	2183
38	5100104007	1989	307	1815	454	27	2296
39	5100104008	1310	108	1243	162	13	1418
40	5100104009	1033	84	972	124	21	1117
41	5100104010	1559	259	1331	473	14	1818
42	5100104011	1883	212	1770	311	14	2095
43	5100105001	1203	91	1129	151	14	1294
44	5100105002	1239	63	1176	106	20	1302
45	5100105003	1575	116	1468	214	9	1691
46	5100105004	1687	178	1573	283	9	1865
47	5100105005	1054	124	949	175	54	1178
48	5100105006	1196	61	1150	82	25	1257
49	5100105007	1621	211	1473	349	10	1832
50	5100106001	1767	190	1668	256	33	1957
51	5100106002	2822	371	2583	601	9	3193
52	5100106003	2097	288	1920	455	10	2385
53	5100106004	2357	309	2179	472	15	2666
54	5100106005	751	170	701	53	167	921

Appendix B

Marginals for Melilla 2012 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	1072	78	1004	125	21	1150
2	5200101002	1712	197	1512	347	50	1909
3	5200102001	1131	291	1049	319	54	1422
4	5200102002	1527	226	1404	312	37	1753
5	5200102003	1725	490	1583	559	73	2215
6	5200103001	890	382	767	465	40	1272
7	5200103002	803	467	731	493	46	1270
8	5200104001	740	546	670	579	37	1286
9	5200104002	1713	550	1442	784	37	2263
10	5200104003	2037	501	1594	924	20	2538
11	5200104004	2405	180	1954	608	23	2585
12	5200105001	1299	365	1058	577	29	1664
13	5200105002	1094	243	843	475	19	1337
14	5200105003	1832	499	1365	835	131	2331
15	5200105004	1115	293	884	494	30	1408
16	5200105005	1461	343	1195	593	16	1804
17	5200105006	3594	585	2846	1283	50	4179
18	5200105007	2047	235	1681	583	18	2282
19	5200106001	890	209	825	222	52	1099
20	5200106002	1309	242	1214	272	65	1551
21	5200106003	1584	361	1448	435	62	1945
22	5200107001	1690	205	1525	328	42	1895
23	5200107002	1300	240	1182	326	32	1540
24	5200107003	2636	552	2359	762	67	3188
25	5200107004	1545	305	1418	391	41	1850
26	5200107005	1371	164	1238	262	35	1535
27	5200107006	2132	217	1971	308	70	2349
28	5200108001	2262	302	1969	527	68	2564
29	5200108002	960	157	801	298	18	1117
30	5200108003	2818	152	2644	188	138	2970
31	5200108004	2759	172	2489	389	53	2931
32	5200108005	2090	81	1968	153	50	2171
33	5200108006	1817	109	1688	203	35	1926
34	5200108007	2622	333	2439	403	113	2955
35	5200108008	2487	135	2266	299	57	2622
36	5200108009	724	17	661	57	23	741
37	5200108010	1435	45	1369	82	29	1480
38	5200108011	1959	148	1709	342	56	2107
39	5200108012	2266	266	2154	294	84	2532
40	5200108013	1456	306	1336	339	87	1762
41	5200108014	1229	75	1142	144	18	1304

Appendix C

Marginals for Ceuta 2011 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	1772	84	1672	95	89	1856
2	5100101002	672	39	646	23	42	711
3	5100101003	1528	53	1454	63	64	1581
4	5100101004	2290	66	2202	79	75	2356
5	5100101005	1225	57	1179	63	40	1282
6	5100101006	1484	26	1428	50	32	1510
7	5100101007	1458	43	1406	59	36	1501
8	5100101008	1354	60	1277	85	52	1414
9	5100101009	1082	55	1005	93	39	1137
10	5100101010	1335	22	1304	40	13	1357
11	5100102001	1162	58	1108	55	57	1220
12	5100102002	1460	128	1390	156	42	1588
13	5100102003	942	92	871	153	10	1034
14	5100102004	1255	84	1155	153	31	1339
15	5100102005	1386	68	1330	100	24	1454
16	5100102006	847	40	794	71	22	887
17	5100102007	1561	105	1432	204	30	1666
18	5100103001	1462	13	1406	45	24	1475
19	5100103002	1419	24	1366	51	26	1443
20	5100103003	986	15	960	24	17	1001
21	5100103004	985	18	963	23	17	1003
22	5100103005	731	15	704	35	7	746
23	5100103006	2375	175	2267	239	44	2550
24	5100103007	1632	48	1563	87	30	1680
25	5100103008	755	63	727	79	12	818
26	5100103009	1042	14	1018	29	9	1056
27	5100103010	774	25	745	44	10	799
28	5100103011	1544	73	1445	122	50	1617
29	5100103012	872	8	840	24	16	880
30	5100103013	1907	30	1852	51	34	1937
31	5100104001	2149	48	2061	97	39	2197
32	5100104002	2143	190	2051	242	40	2333
33	5100104003	1739	40	1687	74	18	1779
34	5100104004	1235	19	1216	23	15	1254
35	5100104005	2183	107	2065	205	20	2290
36	5100104006	1894	223	1745	352	20	2117
37	5100104007	1918	284	1760	422	20	2202
38	5100104008	1298	106	1243	147	14	1404
39	5100104009	919	69	862	107	19	988
40	5100104010	1524	224	1309	426	13	1748
41	5100104011	1128	64	1065	113	14	1192
42	5100105001	1205	74	1135	132	12	1279
43	5100105002	1287	60	1227	104	16	1347
44	5100105003	1591	103	1485	199	10	1694
45	5100105004	1706	144	1607	232	11	1850
46	5100105005	1053	118	955	159	57	1171
47	5100105006	1180	40	1132	59	29	1220
48	5100105007	1587	181	1434	324	10	1768
49	5100106001	1738	155	1643	223	27	1893
50	5100106002	3833	493	3518	801	7	4326
51	5100106003	1458	190	1349	290	9	1648
52	5100106004	2641	340	2442	520	19	2981
53	5100106005	742	55	694	50	53	797

Appendix D

Marginals for Melilla 2011 (All Ages)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	1081	65	1021	108	17	1146
2	5200101002	1733	193	1526	347	53	1926
3	5200102001	1184	265	1096	284	69	1449
4	5200102002	1559	188	1436	280	31	1747
5	5200102003	1671	407	1521	482	75	2078
6	5200103001	885	292	761	383	33	1177
7	5200103002	772	429	698	466	37	1201
8	5200104001	702	498	651	516	33	1200
9	5200104002	1682	498	1413	728	39	2180
10	5200104003	1978	442	1537	863	20	2420
11	5200104004	2403	183	1966	596	24	2586
12	5200105001	1283	322	1047	533	25	1605
13	5200105002	1077	201	807	450	21	1278
14	5200105003	1792	501	1329	812	152	2293
15	5200105004	1100	287	887	469	31	1387
16	5200105005	1409	323	1162	553	17	1732
17	5200105006	3469	553	2761	1212	49	4022
18	5200105007	2017	226	1660	565	18	2243
19	5200106001	892	178	831	198	41	1070
20	5200106002	1286	204	1190	248	52	1490
21	5200106003	1563	324	1422	403	62	1887
22	5200107001	1627	192	1472	304	43	1819
23	5200107002	1242	186	1116	279	33	1428
24	5200107003	2582	396	2317	614	47	2978
25	5200107004	1513	240	1395	324	34	1753
26	5200107005	1336	140	1208	236	32	1476
27	5200107006	2043	204	1902	284	61	2247
28	5200108001	2203	272	1923	493	59	2475
29	5200108002	1050	125	888	269	18	1175
30	5200108003	2708	190	2548	186	164	2898
31	5200108004	2590	169	2327	380	52	2759
32	5200108005	2122	71	2005	145	43	2193
33	5200108006	1832	118	1708	207	35	1950
34	5200108007	2540	273	2359	357	97	2813
35	5200108008	2490	123	2272	293	48	2613
36	5200108009	660	12	600	59	13	672
37	5200108010	1472	39	1403	79	29	1511
38	5200108011	1975	144	1731	331	57	2119
39	5200108012	2259	240	2151	278	70	2499
40	5200108013	1434	253	1325	283	79	1687
41	5200108014	1227	67	1139	137	18	1294

Appendix E

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Ceuta 2013

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1797	134	1565	366	1931
2	5100101002	842	48	723	167	890
3	5100101003	1526	58	1293	291	1584
4	5100101004	1976	66	1616	426	2042
5	5100101005	1239	53	1018	274	1292
6	5100101006	1413	35	1145	303	1448
7	5100101007	1540	61	1264	337	1601
8	5100101008	1245	60	1013	292	1305
9	5100101009	1074	58	864	268	1132
10	5100101010	1678	40	1324	394	1718
11	5100102001	1289	73	1048	314	1362
12	5100102002	1525	132	1179	478	1657
13	5100102003	890	115	722	283	1005
14	5100102004	1331	83	984	430	1414
15	5100102005	1485	89	1191	383	1574
16	5100102006	878	50	709	219	928
17	5100102007	1710	109	1313	506	1819
18	5100103001	1394	17	1220	191	1411
19	5100103002	1454	28	1129	353	1482
20	5100103003	1106	18	906	218	1124
21	5100103004	928	29	813	144	957
22	5100103005	708	19	580	147	727
23	5100103006	1126	56	920	262	1182
24	5100103007	1574	69	1303	340	1643
25	5100103008	737	76	616	197	813
26	5100103009	992	18	870	140	1010
27	5100103010	766	32	637	161	798
28	5100103011	1510	66	1141	435	1576
29	5100103012	841	7	686	162	848
30	5100103013	1882	32	1350	564	1914
31	5100103014	1362	142	1041	463	1504
32	5100104001	2264	78	1734	608	2342
33	5100104002	2173	201	1711	663	2374
34	5100104003	1694	33	1384	343	1727
35	5100104004	1161	20	982	199	1181
36	5100104005	2113	117	1637	593	2230
37	5100104006	1934	272	1473	733	2206
38	5100104007	2019	320	1464	875	2339
39	5100104008	1334	115	1029	420	1449
40	5100104009	1114	90	860	344	1204
41	5100104010	1572	262	1199	635	1834
42	5100104011	1929	199	1357	771	2128
43	5100105001	1177	90	955	312	1267
44	5100105002	1218	72	925	365	1290
45	5100105003	1574	117	1159	532	1691
46	5100105004	1693	194	1284	603	1887
47	5100105005	1020	91	810	301	1111
48	5100105006	1180	65	968	277	1245
49	5100105007	1605	182	1158	629	1787
50	5100106001	1803	168	1377	594	1971
51	5100106002	2893	345	1914	1324	3238
52	5100106003	2109	270	1497	882	2379
53	5100106004	2364	280	1693	951	2644
54	5100106005	751	214	790	175	965

Appendix F

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Melilla 2013

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1086	81	921	246	1167
2	5200101002	1703	229	1335	597	1932
3	5200102001	1109	301	1107	303	1410
4	5200102002	1551	237	1364	424	1788
5	5200102003	1732	555	1612	675	2287
6	5200103001	905	400	924	381	1305
7	5200103002	892	559	987	464	1451
8	5200104001	767	587	884	470	1354
9	5200104002	1718	632	1586	764	2350
10	5200104003	2059	527	1695	891	2586
11	5200104004	2426	190	1684	932	2616
12	5200105001	1301	369	1105	565	1670
13	5200105002	1097	239	896	440	1336
14	5200105003	1920	553	1693	780	2473
15	5200105004	1153	324	998	479	1477
16	5200105005	1470	340	1114	696	1810
17	5200105006	3728	634	2580	1782	4362
18	5200105007	2043	258	1451	850	2301
19	5200106001	858	234	835	257	1092
20	5200106002	1388	257	1227	418	1645
21	5200106003	1635	445	1506	574	2080
22	5200107001	1711	237	1353	595	1948
23	5200107002	1400	279	1224	455	1679
24	5200107003	2747	630	2408	969	3377
25	5200107004	1595	359	1448	506	1954
26	5200107005	1381	196	1152	425	1577
27	5200107006	2155	264	1652	767	2419
28	5200108001	2380	387	1918	849	2767
29	5200108002	1032	213	879	366	1245
30	5200108003	2850	141	2176	815	2991
31	5200108004	2854	185	2175	864	3039
32	5200108005	2075	104	1694	485	2179
33	5200108006	1823	102	1455	470	1925
34	5200108007	2789	388	2381	796	3177
35	5200108008	2432	150	1966	616	2582
36	5200108009	757	23	626	154	780
37	5200108010	1441	54	1191	304	1495
38	5200108011	2031	210	1591	650	2241
39	5200108012	2377	302	2101	578	2679
40	5200108013	1477	350	1452	375	1827
41	5200108014	1220	86	1016	290	1306

Appendix G

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Ceuta 2012

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1844	148	1574	418	1992
2	5100101002	880	57	745	192	937
3	5100101003	1533	63	1279	317	1596
4	5100101004	2024	74	1619	479	2098
5	5100101005	1242	65	996	311	1307
6	5100101006	1436	31	1154	313	1467
7	5100101007	1510	62	1225	347	1572
8	5100101008	1296	72	1039	329	1368
9	5100101009	1095	66	881	280	1161
10	5100101010	1474	24	1123	375	1498
11	5100102001	1225	70	968	327	1295
12	5100102002	1490	135	1151	474	1625
13	5100102003	894	100	694	300	994
14	5100102004	1285	85	930	440	1370
15	5100102005	1451	97	1164	384	1548
16	5100102006	871	41	678	234	912
17	5100102007	1688	115	1275	528	1803
18	5100103001	1448	19	1238	229	1467
19	5100103002	1417	25	1094	348	1442
20	5100103003	1193	24	971	246	1217
21	5100103004	963	25	822	166	988
22	5100103005	715	19	562	172	734
23	5100103006	1100	66	903	263	1166
24	5100103007	1574	68	1307	335	1642
25	5100103008	739	69	616	192	808
26	5100103009	1016	16	856	176	1032
27	5100103010	786	34	631	189	820
28	5100103011	1498	67	1133	432	1565
29	5100103012	850	8	662	196	858
30	5100103013	1900	39	1368	571	1939
31	5100103014	1365	125	1023	467	1490
32	5100104001	2138	75	1610	603	2213
33	5100104002	2146	226	1687	685	2372
34	5100104003	1718	34	1363	389	1752
35	5100104004	1188	24	1000	212	1212
36	5100104005	2147	143	1677	613	2290
37	5100104006	1924	259	1449	734	2183
38	5100104007	1989	307	1469	827	2296
39	5100104008	1310	108	1011	407	1418
40	5100104009	1033	84	784	333	1117
41	5100104010	1559	259	1182	636	1818
42	5100104011	1883	212	1328	767	2095
43	5100105001	1203	91	970	324	1294
44	5100105002	1239	63	941	361	1302
45	5100105003	1575	116	1166	525	1691
46	5100105004	1687	178	1269	596	1865
47	5100105005	1054	124	753	425	1178
48	5100105006	1196	61	941	316	1257
49	5100105007	1621	211	1187	645	1832
50	5100106001	1767	190	1361	596	1957
51	5100106002	2822	371	1923	1270	3193
52	5100106003	2097	288	1489	896	2385
53	5100106004	2357	309	1692	974	2666
54	5100106005	751	170	609	312	921

Appendix H

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Melilla 2012

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1072	78	902	248	1150
2	5200101002	1712	197	1327	582	1909
3	5200102001	1131	291	1132	290	1422
4	5200102002	1527	226	1358	395	1753
5	5200102003	1725	490	1598	617	2215
6	5200103001	890	382	913	359	1272
7	5200103002	803	467	896	374	1270
8	5200104001	740	546	841	445	1286
9	5200104002	1713	550	1520	743	2263
10	5200104003	2037	501	1659	879	2538
11	5200104004	2405	180	1640	945	2585
12	5200105001	1299	365	1099	565	1664
13	5200105002	1094	243	892	445	1337
14	5200105003	1832	499	1586	745	2331
15	5200105004	1115	293	966	442	1408
16	5200105005	1461	343	1101	703	1804
17	5200105006	3594	585	2435	1744	4179
18	5200105007	2047	235	1413	869	2282
19	5200106001	890	209	857	242	1099
20	5200106002	1309	242	1180	371	1551
21	5200106003	1584	361	1442	503	1945
22	5200107001	1690	205	1320	575	1895
23	5200107002	1300	240	1145	395	1540
24	5200107003	2636	552	2305	883	3188
25	5200107004	1545	305	1360	490	1850
26	5200107005	1371	164	1124	411	1535
27	5200107006	2132	217	1610	739	2349
28	5200108001	2262	302	1799	765	2564
29	5200108002	960	157	806	311	1117
30	5200108003	2818	152	2158	812	2970
31	5200108004	2759	172	2089	842	2931
32	5200108005	2090	81	1686	485	2171
33	5200108006	1817	109	1460	466	1926
34	5200108007	2622	333	2240	715	2955
35	5200108008	2487	135	1960	662	2622
36	5200108009	724	17	600	141	741
37	5200108010	1435	45	1182	298	1480
38	5200108011	1959	148	1487	620	2107
39	5200108012	2266	266	2001	531	2532
40	5200108013	1456	306	1409	353	1762
41	5200108014	1229	75	1010	294	1304

Appendix I

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Ceuta 2011

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1772	84	1524	332	1856
2	5100101002	672	39	597	114	711
3	5100101003	1528	53	1313	268	1581
4	5100101004	2290	66	1869	487	2356
5	5100101005	1225	57	1013	269	1282
6	5100101006	1484	26	1192	318	1510
7	5100101007	1458	43	1183	318	1501
8	5100101008	1354	60	1097	317	1414
9	5100101009	1082	55	876	261	1137
10	5100101010	1335	22	1040	317	1357
11	5100102001	1162	58	925	295	1220
12	5100102002	1460	128	1144	444	1588
13	5100102003	942	92	744	290	1034
14	5100102004	1255	84	911	428	1339
15	5100102005	1386	68	1126	328	1454
16	5100102006	847	40	681	206	887
17	5100102007	1561	105	1210	456	1666
18	5100103001	1462	13	1271	204	1475
19	5100103002	1419	24	1108	335	1443
20	5100103003	986	15	830	171	1001
21	5100103004	985	18	851	152	1003
22	5100103005	731	15	577	169	746
23	5100103006	2375	175	1861	689	2550
24	5100103007	1632	48	1336	344	1680
25	5100103008	755	63	631	187	818
26	5100103009	1042	14	907	149	1056
27	5100103010	774	25	644	155	799
28	5100103011	1544	73	1148	469	1617
29	5100103012	872	8	700	180	880
30	5100103013	1907	30	1355	582	1937
31	5100104001	2149	48	1633	564	2197
32	5100104002	2143	190	1650	683	2333
33	5100104003	1739	40	1399	380	1779
34	5100104004	1235	19	1033	221	1254
35	5100104005	2183	107	1652	638	2290
36	5100104006	1894	223	1412	705	2117
37	5100104007	1918	284	1379	823	2202
38	5100104008	1298	106	1011	393	1404
39	5100104009	919	69	683	305	988
40	5100104010	1524	224	1126	622	1748
41	5100104011	1128	64	848	344	1192
42	5100105001	1205	74	965	314	1279
43	5100105002	1287	60	975	372	1347
44	5100105003	1591	103	1143	551	1694
45	5100105004	1706	144	1255	595	1850
46	5100105005	1053	118	860	311	1171
47	5100105006	1180	40	963	257	1220
48	5100105007	1587	181	1109	659	1768
49	5100106001	1738	155	1325	568	1893
50	5100106002	3833	493	2541	1785	4326
51	5100106003	1458	190	991	657	1648
52	5100106004	2641	340	1868	1113	2981
53	5100106005	742	55	656	141	797

Appendix J

Marginals for Citizenship and Age, Melilla 2011

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1081	65	916	230	1146
2	5200101002	1733	193	1340	586	1926
3	5200102001	1184	265	1151	298	1449
4	5200102002	1559	188	1373	374	1747
5	5200102003	1671	407	1510	568	2078
6	5200103001	885	292	851	326	1177
7	5200103002	772	429	839	362	1201
8	5200104001	702	498	785	415	1200
9	5200104002	1682	498	1462	718	2180
10	5200104003	1978	442	1563	857	2420
11	5200104004	2403	183	1606	980	2586
12	5200105001	1283	322	1057	548	1605
13	5200105002	1077	201	853	425	1278
14	5200105003	1792	501	1533	760	2293
15	5200105004	1100	287	950	437	1387
16	5200105005	1409	323	1053	679	1732
17	5200105006	3469	553	2322	1700	4022
18	5200105007	2017	226	1341	902	2243
19	5200106001	892	178	820	250	1070
20	5200106002	1286	204	1151	339	1490
21	5200106003	1563	324	1415	472	1887
22	5200107001	1627	192	1263	556	1819
23	5200107002	1242	186	1070	358	1428
24	5200107003	2582	396	2174	804	2978
25	5200107004	1513	240	1291	462	1753
26	5200107005	1336	140	1075	401	1476
27	5200107006	2043	204	1548	699	2247
28	5200108001	2203	272	1736	739	2475
29	5200108002	1050	125	866	309	1175
30	5200108003	2708	190	2076	822	2898
31	5200108004	2590	169	1940	819	2759
32	5200108005	2122	71	1695	498	2193
33	5200108006	1832	118	1479	471	1950
34	5200108007	2540	273	2141	672	2813
35	5200108008	2490	123	1931	682	2613
36	5200108009	660	12	549	123	672
37	5200108010	1472	39	1197	314	1511
38	5200108011	1975	144	1465	654	2119
39	5200108012	2259	240	1947	552	2499
40	5200108013	1434	253	1348	339	1687
41	5200108014	1227	67	1013	281	1294

Appendix K

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Ceuta 2013

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1682	160	89	1565	366	1931
2	5100101002	808	27	55	723	167	890
3	5100101003	1450	60	74	1293	291	1584
4	5100101004	1890	83	69	1616	426	2042
5	5100101005	1190	61	41	1018	274	1292
6	5100101006	1358	53	37	1145	303	1448
7	5100101007	1480	80	41	1264	337	1601
8	5100101008	1174	84	47	1013	292	1305
9	5100101009	990	105	37	864	268	1132
10	5100101010	1640	52	26	1324	394	1718
11	5100102001	1226	67	69	1048	314	1362
12	5100102002	1428	200	29	1179	478	1657
13	5100102003	823	162	20	722	283	1005
14	5100102004	1230	158	26	984	430	1414
15	5100102005	1433	115	26	1191	383	1574
16	5100102006	816	90	22	709	219	928
17	5100102007	1570	223	26	1313	506	1819
18	5100103001	1345	45	21	1220	191	1411
19	5100103002	1391	63	28	1129	353	1482
20	5100103003	1078	28	18	906	218	1124
21	5100103004	911	25	21	813	144	957
22	5100103005	679	37	11	580	147	727
23	5100103006	1076	86	20	920	262	1182
24	5100103007	1505	106	32	1303	340	1643
25	5100103008	703	98	12	616	197	813
26	5100103009	966	32	12	870	140	1010
27	5100103010	730	57	11	637	161	798
28	5100103011	1412	126	38	1141	435	1576
29	5100103012	812	23	13	686	162	848
30	5100103013	1832	51	31	1350	564	1914
31	5100103014	1274	202	28	1041	463	1504
32	5100104001	2161	127	54	1734	608	2342
33	5100104002	2058	268	48	1711	663	2374
34	5100104003	1634	78	15	1384	343	1727
35	5100104004	1139	26	16	982	199	1181
36	5100104005	1990	225	15	1637	593	2230
37	5100104006	1767	422	17	1473	733	2206
38	5100104007	1841	474	24	1464	875	2339
39	5100104008	1272	160	17	1029	420	1449
40	5100104009	1040	144	20	860	344	1204
41	5100104010	1353	470	11	1199	635	1834
42	5100104011	1801	312	15	1357	771	2128
43	5100105001	1106	145	16	955	312	1267
44	5100105002	1149	121	20	925	365	1290
45	5100105003	1460	222	9	1159	532	1691
46	5100105004	1586	289	12	1284	603	1887
47	5100105005	918	163	30	810	301	1111
48	5100105006	1137	83	25	968	277	1245
49	5100105007	1445	334	8	1158	629	1787
50	5100106001	1696	247	28	1377	594	1971
51	5100106002	2633	597	8	1914	1324	3238
52	5100106003	1919	451	9	1497	882	2379
53	5100106004	2179	452	13	1693	951	2644
54	5100106005	697	48	220	790	175	965

Appendix L

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Melilla 2013

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1015	128	24	921	246	1167
2	5200101002	1510	371	51	1335	597	1932
3	5200102001	1040	296	74	1107	303	1410
4	5200102002	1415	336	37	1364	424	1788
5	5200102003	1595	608	84	1612	675	2287
6	5200103001	783	476	46	924	381	1305
7	5200103002	838	565	48	987	464	1451
8	5200104001	690	636	28	884	470	1354
9	5200104002	1477	827	46	1586	764	2350
10	5200104003	1631	926	29	1695	891	2586
11	5200104004	1976	614	26	1684	932	2616
12	5200105001	1077	568	25	1105	565	1670
13	5200105002	844	474	18	896	440	1336
14	5200105003	1443	871	159	1693	780	2473
15	5200105004	931	519	27	998	479	1477
16	5200105005	1207	592	11	1114	696	1810
17	5200105006	2988	1317	57	2580	1782	4362
18	5200105007	1687	594	20	1451	850	2301
19	5200106001	803	243	46	835	257	1092
20	5200106002	1296	286	63	1227	418	1645
21	5200106003	1528	491	61	1506	574	2080
22	5200107001	1554	350	44	1353	595	1948
23	5200107002	1275	365	39	1224	455	1679
24	5200107003	2516	798	63	2408	969	3377
25	5200107004	1476	432	46	1448	506	1954
26	5200107005	1254	286	37	1152	425	1577
27	5200107006	2004	347	68	1652	767	2419
28	5200108001	2091	593	83	1918	849	2767
29	5200108002	873	356	16	879	366	1245
30	5200108003	2669	194	128	2176	815	2991
31	5200108004	2569	407	63	2175	864	3039
32	5200108005	1957	168	54	1694	485	2179
33	5200108006	1685	209	31	1455	470	1925
34	5200108007	2594	435	148	2381	796	3177
35	5200108008	2214	308	60	1966	616	2582
36	5200108009	698	62	20	626	154	780
37	5200108010	1371	92	32	1191	304	1495
38	5200108011	1777	373	91	1591	650	2241
39	5200108012	2275	316	88	2101	578	2679
40	5200108013	1367	375	85	1452	375	1827
41	5200108014	1130	160	16	1016	290	1306

Appendix M

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Ceuta 2012

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1729	169	94	1574	418	1992
2	5100101002	848	28	61	745	192	937
3	5100101003	1459	63	74	1279	317	1596
4	5100101004	1936	84	78	1619	479	2098
5	5100101005	1200	63	44	996	311	1307
6	5100101006	1379	52	36	1154	313	1467
7	5100101007	1454	76	42	1225	347	1572
8	5100101008	1224	92	52	1039	329	1368
9	5100101009	1010	110	41	881	280	1161
10	5100101010	1440	40	18	1123	375	1498
11	5100102001	1165	68	62	968	327	1295
12	5100102002	1401	194	30	1151	474	1625
13	5100102003	826	155	13	694	300	994
14	5100102004	1190	153	27	930	440	1370
15	5100102005	1397	119	32	1164	384	1548
16	5100102006	811	80	21	678	234	912
17	5100102007	1557	216	30	1275	528	1803
18	5100103001	1394	52	21	1238	229	1467
19	5100103002	1361	53	28	1094	348	1442
20	5100103003	1154	41	22	971	246	1217
21	5100103004	945	23	20	822	166	988
22	5100103005	687	38	9	562	172	734
23	5100103006	1057	82	27	903	263	1166
24	5100103007	1505	100	37	1307	335	1642
25	5100103008	705	93	10	616	192	808
26	5100103009	993	28	11	856	176	1032
27	5100103010	755	55	10	631	189	820
28	5100103011	1399	121	45	1133	432	1565
29	5100103012	820	24	14	662	196	858
30	5100103013	1846	58	35	1368	571	1939
31	5100103014	1282	187	21	1023	467	1490
32	5100104001	2055	110	48	1610	603	2213
33	5100104002	2042	280	50	1687	685	2372
34	5100104003	1667	67	18	1363	389	1752
35	5100104004	1169	28	15	1000	212	1212
36	5100104005	2026	242	22	1677	613	2290
37	5100104006	1766	399	18	1449	734	2183
38	5100104007	1815	454	27	1469	827	2296
39	5100104008	1243	162	13	1011	407	1418
40	5100104009	972	124	21	784	333	1117
41	5100104010	1331	473	14	1182	636	1818
42	5100104011	1770	311	14	1328	767	2095
43	5100105001	1129	151	14	970	324	1294
44	5100105002	1176	106	20	941	361	1302
45	5100105003	1468	214	9	1166	525	1691
46	5100105004	1573	283	9	1269	596	1865
47	5100105005	949	175	54	753	425	1178
48	5100105006	1150	82	25	941	316	1257
49	5100105007	1473	349	10	1187	645	1832
50	5100106001	1668	256	33	1361	596	1957
51	5100106002	2583	601	9	1923	1270	3193
52	5100106003	1920	455	10	1489	896	2385
53	5100106004	2179	472	15	1692	974	2666
54	5100106005	701	53	167	609	312	921

Appendix N

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Melilla 2012

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1004	125	21	902	248	1150
2	5200101002	1512	347	50	1327	582	1909
3	5200102001	1049	319	54	1132	290	1422
4	5200102002	1404	312	37	1358	395	1753
5	5200102003	1583	559	73	1598	617	2215
6	5200103001	767	465	40	913	359	1272
7	5200103002	731	493	46	896	374	1270
8	5200104001	670	579	37	841	445	1286
9	5200104002	1442	784	37	1520	743	2263
10	5200104003	1594	924	20	1659	879	2538
11	5200104004	1954	608	23	1640	945	2585
12	5200105001	1058	577	29	1099	565	1664
13	5200105002	843	475	19	892	445	1337
14	5200105003	1365	835	131	1586	745	2331
15	5200105004	884	494	30	966	442	1408
16	5200105005	1195	593	16	1101	703	1804
17	5200105006	2846	1283	50	2435	1744	4179
18	5200105007	1681	583	18	1413	869	2282
19	5200106001	825	222	52	857	242	1099
20	5200106002	1214	272	65	1180	371	1551
21	5200106003	1448	435	62	1442	503	1945
22	5200107001	1525	328	42	1320	575	1895
23	5200107002	1182	326	32	1145	395	1540
24	5200107003	2359	762	67	2305	883	3188
25	5200107004	1418	391	41	1360	490	1850
26	5200107005	1238	262	35	1124	411	1535
27	5200107006	1971	308	70	1610	739	2349
28	5200108001	1969	527	68	1799	765	2564
29	5200108002	801	298	18	806	311	1117
30	5200108003	2644	188	138	2158	812	2970
31	5200108004	2489	389	53	2089	842	2931
32	5200108005	1968	153	50	1686	485	2171
33	5200108006	1688	203	35	1460	466	1926
34	5200108007	2439	403	113	2240	715	2955
35	5200108008	2266	299	57	1960	662	2622
36	5200108009	661	57	23	600	141	741
37	5200108010	1369	82	29	1182	298	1480
38	5200108011	1709	342	56	1487	620	2107
39	5200108012	2154	294	84	2001	531	2532
40	5200108013	1336	339	87	1409	353	1762
41	5200108014	1142	144	18	1010	294	1304

Appendix O

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Ceuta 2011

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5100101001	1672	95	89	1524	332	1856
2	5100101002	646	23	42	597	114	711
3	5100101003	1454	63	64	1313	268	1581
4	5100101004	2202	79	75	1869	487	2356
5	5100101005	1179	63	40	1013	269	1282
6	5100101006	1428	50	32	1192	318	1510
7	5100101007	1406	59	36	1183	318	1501
8	5100101008	1277	85	52	1097	317	1414
9	5100101009	1005	93	39	876	261	1137
10	5100101010	1304	40	13	1040	317	1357
11	5100102001	1108	55	57	925	295	1220
12	5100102002	1390	156	42	1144	444	1588
13	5100102003	871	153	10	744	290	1034
14	5100102004	1155	153	31	911	428	1339
15	5100102005	1330	100	24	1126	328	1454
16	5100102006	794	71	22	681	206	887
17	5100102007	1432	204	30	1210	456	1666
18	5100103001	1406	45	24	1271	204	1475
19	5100103002	1366	51	26	1108	335	1443
20	5100103003	960	24	17	830	171	1001
21	5100103004	963	23	17	851	152	1003
22	5100103005	704	35	7	577	169	746
23	5100103006	2267	239	44	1861	689	2550
24	5100103007	1563	87	30	1336	344	1680
25	5100103008	727	79	12	631	187	818
26	5100103009	1018	29	9	907	149	1056
27	5100103010	745	44	10	644	155	799
28	5100103011	1445	122	50	1148	469	1617
29	5100103012	840	24	16	700	180	880
30	5100103013	1852	51	34	1355	582	1937
31	5100104001	2061	97	39	1633	564	2197
32	5100104002	2051	242	40	1650	683	2333
33	5100104003	1687	74	18	1399	380	1779
34	5100104004	1216	23	15	1033	221	1254
35	5100104005	2065	205	20	1652	638	2290
36	5100104006	1745	352	20	1412	705	2117
37	5100104007	1760	422	20	1379	823	2202
38	5100104008	1243	147	14	1011	393	1404
39	5100104009	862	107	19	683	305	988
40	5100104010	1309	426	13	1126	622	1748
41	5100104011	1065	113	14	848	344	1192
42	5100105001	1135	132	12	965	314	1279
43	5100105002	1227	104	16	975	372	1347
44	5100105003	1485	199	10	1143	551	1694
45	5100105004	1607	232	11	1255	595	1850
46	5100105005	955	159	57	860	311	1171
47	5100105006	1132	59	29	963	257	1220
48	5100105007	1434	324	10	1109	659	1768
49	5100106001	1643	223	27	1325	568	1893
50	5100106002	3518	801	7	2541	1785	4326
51	5100106003	1349	290	9	991	657	1648
52	5100106004	2442	520	19	1868	1113	2981
53	5100106005	694	50	53	656	141	797

Appendix P

Marginals for Birthplace and Age, Melilla 2011

	Census Tract	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Over 20 Years	Under 20 Years	Total Population
1	5200101001	1021	108	17	916	230	1146
2	5200101002	1526	347	53	1340	586	1926
3	5200102001	1096	284	69	1151	298	1449
4	5200102002	1436	280	31	1373	374	1747
5	5200102003	1521	482	75	1510	568	2078
6	5200103001	761	383	33	851	326	1177
7	5200103002	698	466	37	839	362	1201
8	5200104001	651	516	33	785	415	1200
9	5200104002	1413	728	39	1462	718	2180
10	5200104003	1537	863	20	1563	857	2420
11	5200104004	1966	596	24	1606	980	2586
12	5200105001	1047	533	25	1057	548	1605
13	5200105002	807	450	21	853	425	1278
14	5200105003	1329	812	152	1533	760	2293
15	5200105004	887	469	31	950	437	1387
16	5200105005	1162	553	17	1053	679	1732
17	5200105006	2761	1212	49	2322	1700	4022
18	5200105007	1660	565	18	1341	902	2243
19	5200106001	831	198	41	820	250	1070
20	5200106002	1190	248	52	1151	339	1490
21	5200106003	1422	403	62	1415	472	1887
22	5200107001	1472	304	43	1263	556	1819
23	5200107002	1116	279	33	1070	358	1428
24	5200107003	2317	614	47	2174	804	2978
25	5200107004	1395	324	34	1291	462	1753
26	5200107005	1208	236	32	1075	401	1476
27	5200107006	1902	284	61	1548	699	2247
28	5200108001	1923	493	59	1736	739	2475
29	5200108002	888	269	18	866	309	1175
30	5200108003	2548	186	164	2076	822	2898
31	5200108004	2327	380	52	1940	819	2759
32	5200108005	2005	145	43	1695	498	2193
33	5200108006	1708	207	35	1479	471	1950
34	5200108007	2359	357	97	2141	672	2813
35	5200108008	2272	293	48	1931	682	2613
36	5200108009	600	59	13	549	123	672
37	5200108010	1403	79	29	1197	314	1511
38	5200108011	1731	331	57	1465	654	2119
39	5200108012	2151	278	70	1947	552	2499
40	5200108013	1325	283	79	1348	339	1687
41	5200108014	1139	137	18	1013	281	1294

Appendix Q

Marginals for Ceuta 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.964	0.036	0.853	0.583	0.384	1565
2	5100101002	0.979	0.025	0.833	0.607	0.598	723
3	5100101003	0.985	0.015	0.844	0.501	0.530	1293
4	5100101004	0.987	0.011	0.823	0.468	0.302	1616
5	5100101005	0.984	0.017	0.811	0.563	0.445	1018
6	5100101006	0.990	0.010	0.804	0.546	0.601	1145
7	5100101007	0.984	0.015	0.807	0.599	0.457	1264
8	5100101008	0.982	0.017	0.811	0.499	0.385	1013
9	5100101009	0.984	0.019	0.801	0.480	0.558	864
10	5100101010	0.990	0.010	0.787	0.470	0.344	1324
11	5100102001	0.980	0.025	0.810	0.350	0.433	1048
12	5100102002	0.971	0.036	0.757	0.432	0.467	1179
13	5100102003	0.944	0.060	0.791	0.399	0.348	722
14	5100102004	0.978	0.023	0.734	0.412	0.581	984
15	5100102005	0.977	0.022	0.770	0.611	0.612	1191
16	5100102006	0.979	0.024	0.802	0.511	0.385	709
17	5100102007	0.977	0.022	0.763	0.462	0.394	1313
18	5100103001	0.995	0.005	0.882	0.521	0.437	1220
19	5100103002	0.991	0.008	0.786	0.404	0.401	1129
20	5100103003	0.993	0.006	0.822	0.374	0.529	906
21	5100103004	0.987	0.013	0.870	0.439	0.369	813
22	5100103005	0.990	0.009	0.816	0.532	0.556	580
23	5100103006	0.980	0.020	0.799	0.587	0.423	920
24	5100103007	0.985	0.016	0.824	0.415	0.576	1303
25	5100103008	0.950	0.054	0.787	0.588	0.382	616
26	5100103009	0.993	0.007	0.872	0.566	0.559	870
27	5100103010	0.984	0.017	0.835	0.365	0.600	637
28	5100103011	0.984	0.016	0.751	0.475	0.563	1141
29	5100103012	0.996	0.004	0.821	0.528	0.467	686
30	5100103013	0.991	0.009	0.717	0.465	0.415	1350
31	5100103014	0.959	0.041	0.732	0.489	0.348	1041
32	5100104001	0.988	0.015	0.761	0.537	0.397	1734
33	5100104002	0.966	0.035	0.759	0.479	0.448	1711
34	5100104003	0.992	0.009	0.818	0.498	0.467	1384
35	5100104004	0.993	0.006	0.843	0.507	0.483	982
36	5100104005	0.980	0.022	0.765	0.487	0.386	1637
37	5100104006	0.943	0.060	0.748	0.346	0.393	1473
38	5100104007	0.949	0.059	0.684	0.415	0.388	1464
39	5100104008	0.969	0.031	0.731	0.588	0.353	1029
40	5100104009	0.971	0.029	0.758	0.418	0.627	860
41	5100104010	0.930	0.074	0.749	0.383	0.595	1199
42	5100104011	0.970	0.033	0.666	0.493	0.292	1357
43	5100105001	0.971	0.033	0.782	0.576	0.480	955
44	5100105002	0.979	0.022	0.758	0.390	0.429	925
45	5100105003	0.974	0.029	0.724	0.441	0.560	1159
46	5100105004	0.964	0.046	0.745	0.328	0.663	1284
47	5100105005	0.969	0.038	0.804	0.350	0.492	810
48	5100105006	0.980	0.022	0.799	0.525	0.573	968
49	5100105007	0.967	0.038	0.713	0.378	0.506	1158
50	5100106001	0.963	0.032	0.718	0.583	0.522	1377
51	5100106002	0.968	0.039	0.637	0.400	0.538	1914
52	5100106003	0.963	0.052	0.700	0.338	0.525	1497
53	5100106004	0.972	0.046	0.658	0.561	0.441	1693
54	5100106005	0.835	0.216	0.867	0.550	0.709	790

Appendix R

Marginals for Melilla 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.965	0.035	0.838	0.437	0.614	921
2	5200101002	0.941	0.062	0.768	0.389	0.634	1335
3	5200102001	0.863	0.144	0.878	0.496	0.618	1107
4	5200102002	0.934	0.074	0.846	0.415	0.697	1364
5	5200102003	0.872	0.127	0.791	0.482	0.676	1612
6	5200103001	0.817	0.172	0.894	0.414	0.557	924
7	5200103002	0.769	0.263	0.873	0.391	0.645	987
8	5200104001	0.731	0.274	0.764	0.532	0.651	884
9	5200104002	0.862	0.150	0.852	0.364	0.549	1586
10	5200104003	0.904	0.099	0.811	0.382	0.615	1695
11	5200104004	0.954	0.048	0.697	0.470	0.635	1684
12	5200105001	0.903	0.115	0.780	0.438	0.586	1105
13	5200105002	0.902	0.090	0.843	0.369	0.594	896
14	5200105003	0.894	0.114	0.883	0.369	0.610	1693
15	5200105004	0.885	0.116	0.776	0.498	0.626	998
16	5200105005	0.916	0.084	0.728	0.390	0.544	1114
17	5200105006	0.924	0.066	0.749	0.238	0.577	2580
18	5200105007	0.941	0.067	0.671	0.518	0.641	1451
19	5200106001	0.875	0.131	0.881	0.394	0.642	835
20	5200106002	0.914	0.091	0.796	0.532	0.682	1227
21	5200106003	0.894	0.125	0.852	0.335	0.632	1506
22	5200107001	0.938	0.064	0.768	0.378	0.625	1353
23	5200107002	0.915	0.092	0.851	0.313	0.639	1224
24	5200107003	0.900	0.105	0.795	0.458	0.625	2408
25	5200107004	0.885	0.106	0.835	0.428	0.643	1448
26	5200107005	0.922	0.066	0.792	0.466	0.669	1152
27	5200107006	0.941	0.055	0.741	0.358	0.616	1652
28	5200108001	0.928	0.075	0.803	0.334	0.535	1918
29	5200108002	0.913	0.097	0.785	0.516	0.643	879
30	5200108003	0.974	0.024	0.755	0.377	0.643	2176
31	5200108004	0.964	0.035	0.777	0.358	0.499	2175
32	5200108005	0.973	0.028	0.810	0.450	0.610	1694
33	5200108006	0.969	0.031	0.793	0.459	0.668	1455
34	5200108007	0.928	0.069	0.802	0.474	0.630	2381
35	5200108008	0.964	0.035	0.822	0.345	0.624	1966
36	5200108009	0.985	0.018	0.846	0.343	0.690	626
37	5200108010	0.980	0.020	0.828	0.398	0.577	1191
38	5200108011	0.949	0.057	0.798	0.309	0.642	1591
39	5200108012	0.941	0.063	0.822	0.512	0.758	2101
40	5200108013	0.874	0.123	0.892	0.485	0.563	1452
41	5200108014	0.960	0.037	0.839	0.351	0.757	1016

Appendix S

Marginals for Ceuta 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.984	0.020	0.839	0.518	0.372	1574
2	5100101002	0.987	0.017	0.832	0.418	0.440	745
3	5100101003	0.990	0.011	0.830	0.558	0.423	1279
4	5100101004	0.988	0.009	0.803	0.403	0.385	1619
5	5100101005	0.989	0.012	0.786	0.519	0.430	996
6	5100101006	0.994	0.009	0.809	0.473	0.409	1154
7	5100101007	0.991	0.011	0.812	0.415	0.340	1225
8	5100101008	0.989	0.012	0.793	0.533	0.364	1039
9	5100101009	0.988	0.013	0.798	0.529	0.368	881
10	5100101010	0.995	0.007	0.758	0.528	0.529	1123
11	5100102001	0.990	0.011	0.782	0.465	0.396	968
12	5100102002	0.986	0.016	0.753	0.423	0.446	1151
13	5100102003	0.989	0.020	0.757	0.419	0.354	694
14	5100102004	0.988	0.014	0.741	0.271	0.279	930
15	5100102005	0.989	0.015	0.782	0.493	0.343	1164
16	5100102006	0.989	0.012	0.766	0.590	0.412	678
17	5100102007	0.986	0.012	0.761	0.361	0.440	1275
18	5100103001	0.995	0.005	0.858	0.589	0.341	1238
19	5100103002	0.993	0.007	0.780	0.354	0.483	1094
20	5100103003	0.993	0.006	0.811	0.557	0.493	971
21	5100103004	0.994	0.008	0.846	0.471	0.482	822
22	5100103005	0.994	0.008	0.785	0.468	0.410	562
23	5100103006	0.988	0.014	0.812	0.416	0.395	903
24	5100103007	0.991	0.011	0.834	0.384	0.352	1307
25	5100103008	0.986	0.018	0.789	0.590	0.357	616
26	5100103009	0.994	0.006	0.843	0.489	0.326	856
27	5100103010	0.988	0.012	0.799	0.428	0.414	631
28	5100103011	0.991	0.010	0.752	0.485	0.504	1133
29	5100103012	0.999	0.005	0.790	0.420	0.315	662
30	5100103013	0.991	0.008	0.725	0.399	0.304	1368
31	5100103014	0.988	0.014	0.727	0.447	0.468	1023
32	5100104001	0.991	0.008	0.750	0.461	0.357	1610
33	5100104002	0.987	0.018	0.766	0.352	0.476	1687
34	5100104003	0.992	0.007	0.794	0.456	0.351	1363
35	5100104004	0.993	0.007	0.836	0.592	0.339	1000
36	5100104005	0.988	0.015	0.772	0.422	0.393	1677
37	5100104006	0.986	0.018	0.693	0.550	0.451	1449
38	5100104007	0.987	0.017	0.721	0.338	0.386	1469
39	5100104008	0.987	0.014	0.756	0.405	0.476	1011
40	5100104009	0.989	0.016	0.742	0.420	0.483	784
41	5100104010	0.985	0.022	0.758	0.356	0.312	1182
42	5100104011	0.989	0.017	0.668	0.447	0.443	1328
43	5100105001	0.986	0.013	0.783	0.521	0.463	970
44	5100105002	0.991	0.011	0.755	0.434	0.292	941
45	5100105003	0.986	0.014	0.733	0.404	0.344	1166
46	5100105004	0.987	0.014	0.760	0.254	0.406	1269
47	5100105005	0.988	0.015	0.687	0.440	0.443	753
48	5100105006	0.989	0.011	0.780	0.402	0.395	941
49	5100105007	0.988	0.018	0.669	0.561	0.412	1187
50	5100106001	0.988	0.016	0.729	0.512	0.451	1361
51	5100106002	0.988	0.015	0.652	0.394	0.312	1923
52	5100106003	0.988	0.017	0.712	0.264	0.473	1489
53	5100106004	0.987	0.016	0.699	0.345	0.338	1692
54	5100106005	0.980	0.032	0.748	0.544	0.339	609

Appendix T

Marginals for Melilla 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.955	0.833	0.824	0.544	0.317	902
2	5200101002	0.906	0.810	0.756	0.464	0.450	1327
3	5200102001	0.767	0.570	0.866	0.633	0.390	1132
4	5200102002	0.864	0.712	0.820	0.589	0.489	1358
5	5200102003	0.723	0.519	0.764	0.636	0.436	1598
6	5200103001	0.604	0.423	0.838	0.536	0.455	913
7	5200103002	0.542	0.396	0.876	0.474	0.454	896
8	5200104001	0.473	0.303	0.690	0.630	0.358	841
9	5200104002	0.725	0.535	0.752	0.533	0.488	1520
10	5200104003	0.761	0.662	0.740	0.508	0.520	1659
11	5200104004	0.961	0.888	0.630	0.653	0.475	1640
12	5200105001	0.735	0.622	0.786	0.438	0.452	1099
13	5200105002	0.795	0.664	0.680	0.653	0.494	892
14	5200105003	0.789	0.592	0.794	0.530	0.460	1586
15	5200105004	0.735	0.604	0.673	0.725	0.431	966
16	5200105005	0.795	0.673	0.706	0.425	0.480	1101
17	5200105006	0.863	0.775	0.630	0.479	0.564	2435
18	5200105007	0.915	0.827	0.758	0.233	0.445	1413
19	5200106001	0.775	0.587	0.841	0.615	0.527	857
20	5200106002	0.835	0.648	0.859	0.413	0.379	1180
21	5200106003	0.751	0.594	0.782	0.630	0.568	1442
22	5200107001	0.881	0.794	0.738	0.549	0.341	1320
23	5200107002	0.804	0.665	0.812	0.516	0.507	1145
24	5200107003	0.790	0.644	0.778	0.574	0.493	2305
25	5200107004	0.802	0.650	0.784	0.593	0.379	1360
26	5200107005	0.882	0.759	0.790	0.519	0.334	1124
27	5200107006	0.913	0.821	0.702	0.617	0.508	1610
28	5200108001	0.875	0.775	0.744	0.588	0.372	1799
29	5200108002	0.844	0.715	0.753	0.654	0.500	806
30	5200108003	0.948	0.913	0.763	0.448	0.409	2158
31	5200108004	0.954	0.889	0.753	0.506	0.338	2089
32	5200108005	0.974	0.920	0.787	0.702	0.558	1686
33	5200108006	0.963	0.869	0.812	0.379	0.449	1460
34	5200108007	0.884	0.758	0.788	0.640	0.527	2240
35	5200108008	0.965	0.885	0.770	0.598	0.589	1960
36	5200108009	0.995	0.938	0.835	0.637	0.462	600
37	5200108010	0.985	0.926	0.821	0.558	0.360	1182
38	5200108011	0.949	0.863	0.772	0.441	0.341	1487
39	5200108012	0.895	0.771	0.829	0.586	0.473	2001
40	5200108013	0.791	0.618	0.864	0.621	0.470	1409
41	5200108014	0.965	0.874	0.809	0.531	0.448	1010

Appendix U

Marginals for Ceuta 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.985	0.004	0.139	0.777	0.300	1524
2	5100101002	0.979	0.004	0.120	0.756	0.499	597
3	5100101003	0.988	0.002	0.143	0.731	0.248	1313
4	5100101004	0.990	0.002	0.186	0.644	0.383	1869
5	5100101005	0.989	0.002	0.183	0.649	0.372	1013
6	5100101006	0.993	0.002	0.190	0.685	0.427	1192
7	5100101007	0.990	0.002	0.190	0.715	0.324	1183
8	5100101008	0.987	0.003	0.195	0.585	0.359	1097
9	5100101009	0.987	0.003	0.191	0.626	0.288	876
10	5100101010	0.993	0.002	0.213	0.750	0.592	1040
11	5100102001	0.987	0.003	0.207	0.745	0.433	925
12	5100102002	0.982	0.003	0.220	0.788	0.354	1144
13	5100102003	0.980	0.003	0.228	0.585	0.237	744
14	5100102004	0.986	0.003	0.273	0.684	0.241	911
15	5100102005	0.984	0.003	0.189	0.680	0.346	1126
16	5100102006	0.987	0.003	0.189	0.687	0.327	681
17	5100102007	0.986	0.003	0.222	0.622	0.419	1210
18	5100103001	0.996	0.002	0.116	0.692	0.420	1271
19	5100103002	0.993	0.002	0.208	0.729	0.477	1108
20	5100103003	0.994	0.002	0.157	0.679	0.290	830
21	5100103004	0.993	0.002	0.134	0.635	0.506	851
22	5100103005	0.993	0.002	0.198	0.756	0.587	577
23	5100103006	0.983	0.003	0.218	0.742	0.367	1861
24	5100103007	0.990	0.002	0.178	0.654	0.340	1336
25	5100103008	0.980	0.004	0.180	0.692	0.289	631
26	5100103009	0.994	0.002	0.124	0.688	0.383	907
27	5100103010	0.990	0.002	0.163	0.687	0.359	644
28	5100103011	0.988	0.003	0.239	0.763	0.554	1148
29	5100103012	0.995	0.002	0.188	0.618	0.435	700
30	5100103013	0.993	0.002	0.289	0.737	0.277	1355
31	5100104001	0.991	0.002	0.236	0.705	0.283	1633
32	5100104002	0.982	0.003	0.247	0.681	0.233	1650
33	5100104003	0.992	0.002	0.193	0.661	0.312	1399
34	5100104004	0.994	0.002	0.167	0.608	0.384	1033
35	5100104005	0.987	0.002	0.233	0.729	0.345	1652
36	5100104006	0.982	0.003	0.250	0.731	0.397	1412
37	5100104007	0.979	0.003	0.309	0.639	0.335	1379
38	5100104008	0.982	0.003	0.235	0.658	0.376	1011
39	5100104009	0.986	0.003	0.253	0.742	0.357	683
40	5100104010	0.977	0.003	0.234	0.732	0.331	1126
41	5100104011	0.988	0.003	0.237	0.756	0.418	848
42	5100105001	0.985	0.003	0.193	0.694	0.248	965
43	5100105002	0.988	0.002	0.232	0.733	0.657	975
44	5100105003	0.986	0.002	0.275	0.693	0.282	1143
45	5100105004	0.985	0.003	0.266	0.697	0.564	1255
46	5100105005	0.975	0.004	0.181	0.688	0.516	860
47	5100105006	0.990	0.003	0.182	0.715	0.358	963
48	5100105007	0.984	0.003	0.278	0.784	0.413	1109
49	5100106001	0.982	0.003	0.237	0.738	0.474	1325
50	5100106002	0.984	0.003	0.331	0.776	0.371	2541
51	5100106003	0.983	0.003	0.327	0.723	0.386	991
52	5100106004	0.983	0.003	0.313	0.661	0.318	1868
53	5100106005	0.976	0.004	0.137	0.666	0.264	656

Appendix V

Marginals for Melilla 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Foreign Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.966	0.032	0.182	0.230	0.224	916
2	5200101002	0.946	0.050	0.250	0.504	0.311	1340
3	5200102001	0.881	0.155	0.158	0.501	0.310	1151
4	5200102002	0.936	0.071	0.136	0.460	0.364	1373
5	5200102003	0.885	0.133	0.201	0.235	0.484	1510
6	5200103001	0.841	0.190	0.194	0.362	0.380	851
7	5200103002	0.762	0.301	0.155	0.445	0.366	839
8	5200104001	0.723	0.353	0.200	0.528	0.501	785
9	5200104002	0.889	0.149	0.190	0.302	0.314	1462
10	5200104003	0.914	0.107	0.188	0.351	0.449	1563
11	5200104004	0.954	0.029	0.337	0.270	0.328	1606
12	5200105001	0.891	0.111	0.218	0.353	0.445	1057
13	5200105002	0.907	0.086	0.224	0.339	0.202	853
14	5200105003	0.875	0.141	0.229	0.434	0.230	1533
15	5200105004	0.888	0.131	0.184	0.528	0.440	950
16	5200105005	0.903	0.097	0.303	0.226	0.337	1053
17	5200105006	0.919	0.072	0.267	0.185	0.354	2322
18	5200105007	0.938	0.046	0.326	0.293	0.454	1341
19	5200106001	0.899	0.120	0.177	0.292	0.272	820
20	5200106002	0.919	0.094	0.176	0.286	0.327	1151
21	5200106003	0.898	0.111	0.144	0.344	0.289	1415
22	5200107001	0.935	0.054	0.280	0.235	0.306	1263
23	5200107002	0.927	0.073	0.189	0.372	0.382	1070
24	5200107003	0.925	0.075	0.224	0.276	0.481	2174
25	5200107004	0.926	0.079	0.144	0.312	0.278	1291
26	5200107005	0.950	0.049	0.206	0.371	0.313	1075
27	5200107006	0.947	0.040	0.279	0.275	0.389	1548
28	5200108001	0.935	0.060	0.278	0.234	0.405	1736
29	5200108002	0.936	0.059	0.220	0.303	0.249	866
30	5200108003	0.958	0.034	0.252	0.430	0.530	2076
31	5200108004	0.961	0.030	0.249	0.274	0.317	1940
32	5200108005	0.980	0.015	0.202	0.263	0.388	1695
33	5200108006	0.967	0.027	0.226	0.284	0.255	1479
34	5200108007	0.949	0.054	0.201	0.525	0.474	2141
35	5200108008	0.969	0.021	0.219	0.265	0.354	1931
36	5200108009	0.990	0.008	0.155	0.462	0.345	549
37	5200108010	0.983	0.011	0.186	0.281	0.353	1197
38	5200108011	0.958	0.033	0.257	0.309	0.308	1465
39	5200108012	0.944	0.056	0.168	0.411	0.377	1947
40	5200108013	0.902	0.114	0.140	0.454	0.317	1348
41	5200108014	0.971	0.025	0.187	0.329	0.448	1013

Appendix W

Marginals for Females, Ceuta 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.981	0.873	0.283	0.422	729
2	5100101002	0.985	0.852	0.324	0.604	374
3	5100101003	0.991	0.852	0.354	0.580	674
4	5100101004	0.992	0.803	0.466	0.555	768
5	5100101005	0.991	0.827	0.318	0.552	514
6	5100101006	0.992	0.810	0.358	0.707	566
7	5100101007	0.989	0.821	0.566	0.646	645
8	5100101008	0.991	0.789	0.408	0.594	483
9	5100101009	0.986	0.818	0.382	0.466	437
10	5100101010	0.993	0.787	0.370	0.477	659
11	5100102001	0.986	0.811	0.468	0.597	542
12	5100102002	0.985	0.753	0.508	0.507	581
13	5100102003	0.972	0.806	0.404	0.495	340
14	5100102004	0.987	0.756	0.366	0.576	492
15	5100102005	0.989	0.781	0.297	0.497	518
16	5100102006	0.990	0.819	0.407	0.529	360
17	5100102007	0.989	0.775	0.310	0.483	644
18	5100103001	0.995	0.872	0.379	0.631	608
19	5100103002	0.994	0.781	0.259	0.734	510
20	5100103003	0.994	0.805	0.313	0.609	418
21	5100103004	0.991	0.872	0.344	0.682	416
22	5100103005	0.990	0.830	0.287	0.571	292
23	5100103006	0.988	0.820	0.450	0.679	476
24	5100103007	0.988	0.825	0.275	0.628	656
25	5100103008	0.974	0.786	0.304	0.558	274
26	5100103009	0.994	0.890	0.270	0.431	431
27	5100103010	0.990	0.831	0.350	0.634	328
28	5100103011	0.991	0.777	0.442	0.741	614
29	5100103012	0.995	0.829	0.442	0.414	353
30	5100103013	0.993	0.714	0.353	0.632	673
31	5100103014	0.983	0.733	0.380	0.500	496
32	5100104001	0.989	0.766	0.441	0.604	821
33	5100104002	0.981	0.776	0.301	0.582	835
34	5100104003	0.994	0.821	0.305	0.588	710
35	5100104004	0.993	0.846	0.373	0.705	494
36	5100104005	0.988	0.777	0.326	0.522	786
37	5100104006	0.975	0.783	0.244	0.567	727
38	5100104007	0.981	0.715	0.231	0.630	707
39	5100104008	0.985	0.758	0.432	0.642	521
40	5100104009	0.983	0.734	0.345	0.723	390
41	5100104010	0.977	0.751	0.308	0.472	600
42	5100104011	0.984	0.684	0.303	0.654	671
43	5100105001	0.984	0.829	0.307	0.442	471
44	5100105002	0.985	0.801	0.276	0.511	477
45	5100105003	0.988	0.729	0.323	0.506	576
46	5100105004	0.975	0.728	0.482	0.440	619
47	5100105005	0.982	0.777	0.410	0.662	317
48	5100105006	0.989	0.817	0.348	0.507	446
49	5100105007	0.981	0.749	0.288	0.422	594
50	5100106001	0.983	0.751	0.377	0.677	660
51	5100106002	0.985	0.690	0.211	0.548	954
52	5100106003	0.982	0.731	0.301	0.534	759
53	5100106004	0.982	0.677	0.376	0.540	800
54	5100106005	0.982	0.689	0.327	0.500	138

Appendix X

Marginals for Females, Melilla 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.966	0.866	0.240	0.441	446
2	5200101002	0.949	0.824	0.168	0.355	641
3	5200102001	0.888	0.944	0.306	0.314	524
4	5200102002	0.936	0.919	0.192	0.383	674
5	5200102003	0.906	0.863	0.223	0.470	749
6	5200103001	0.845	0.882	0.374	0.522	407
7	5200103002	0.821	0.909	0.240	0.441	426
8	5200104001	0.741	0.907	0.335	0.558	410
9	5200104002	0.869	0.915	0.248	0.477	738
10	5200104003	0.919	0.913	0.267	0.579	861
11	5200104004	0.956	0.848	0.186	0.341	913
12	5200105001	0.905	0.908	0.144	0.412	542
13	5200105002	0.913	0.884	0.337	0.609	446
14	5200105003	0.879	0.901	0.356	0.651	710
15	5200105004	0.906	0.917	0.235	0.355	485
16	5200105005	0.918	0.829	0.190	0.449	522
17	5200105006	0.937	0.822	0.241	0.312	1286
18	5200105007	0.948	0.858	0.187	0.437	780
19	5200106001	0.892	0.929	0.228	0.576	425
20	5200106002	0.936	0.849	0.219	0.417	592
21	5200106003	0.911	0.903	0.208	0.397	750
22	5200107001	0.947	0.823	0.134	0.519	662
23	5200107002	0.944	0.867	0.160	0.371	594
24	5200107003	0.931	0.866	0.187	0.305	1126
25	5200107004	0.913	0.907	0.239	0.371	700
26	5200107005	0.952	0.872	0.175	0.477	567
27	5200107006	0.955	0.788	0.199	0.363	812
28	5200108001	0.945	0.812	0.220	0.470	926
29	5200108002	0.930	0.908	0.321	0.422	424
30	5200108003	0.978	0.752	0.195	0.339	924
31	5200108004	0.961	0.798	0.281	0.545	1069
32	5200108005	0.978	0.850	0.261	0.390	893
33	5200108006	0.974	0.808	0.274	0.379	683
34	5200108007	0.948	0.840	0.256	0.465	1173
35	5200108008	0.972	0.868	0.296	0.359	1029
36	5200108009	0.978	0.906	0.186	0.378	302
37	5200108010	0.980	0.846	0.280	0.430	604
38	5200108011	0.960	0.836	0.166	0.418	789
39	5200108012	0.952	0.874	0.268	0.528	1039
40	5200108013	0.904	0.891	0.341	0.485	624
41	5200108014	0.968	0.876	0.178	0.442	537

Appendix Y

Marginals for Females, Ceuta 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.983	0.841	0.219	0.681	726
2	5100101002	0.985	0.822	0.196	0.730	374
3	5100101003	0.992	0.828	0.130	0.631	657
4	5100101004	0.992	0.798	0.167	0.758	787
5	5100101005	0.990	0.791	0.178	0.677	499
6	5100101006	0.993	0.797	0.250	0.784	567
7	5100101007	0.992	0.803	0.154	0.739	617
8	5100101008	0.989	0.810	0.197	0.763	520
9	5100101009	0.986	0.792	0.322	0.759	436
10	5100101010	0.993	0.763	0.190	0.628	549
11	5100102001	0.987	0.785	0.178	0.756	486
12	5100102002	0.983	0.774	0.268	0.707	565
13	5100102003	0.979	0.830	0.141	0.777	334
14	5100102004	0.988	0.741	0.185	0.818	464
15	5100102005	0.987	0.801	0.135	0.828	517
16	5100102006	0.992	0.781	0.301	0.701	343
17	5100102007	0.988	0.760	0.210	0.692	628
18	5100103001	0.995	0.852	0.196	0.789	613
19	5100103002	0.994	0.787	0.310	0.714	508
20	5100103003	0.994	0.819	0.239	0.775	448
21	5100103004	0.992	0.846	0.133	0.765	412
22	5100103005	0.990	0.804	0.140	0.693	287
23	5100103006	0.986	0.814	0.262	0.666	461
24	5100103007	0.989	0.837	0.169	0.762	659
25	5100103008	0.983	0.781	0.167	0.738	263
26	5100103009	0.995	0.859	0.166	0.824	427
27	5100103010	0.993	0.799	0.260	0.712	324
28	5100103011	0.991	0.801	0.167	0.676	599
29	5100103012	0.995	0.792	0.337	0.805	330
30	5100103013	0.993	0.707	0.348	0.792	682
31	5100103014	0.988	0.766	0.201	0.680	492
32	5100104001	0.990	0.756	0.179	0.772	768
33	5100104002	0.981	0.788	0.110	0.604	809
34	5100104003	0.995	0.817	0.236	0.859	718
35	5100104004	0.994	0.854	0.174	0.632	504
36	5100104005	0.989	0.780	0.409	0.609	821
37	5100104006	0.981	0.761	0.283	0.731	717
38	5100104007	0.980	0.754	0.101	0.658	706
39	5100104008	0.987	0.766	0.233	0.784	492
40	5100104009	0.984	0.761	0.209	0.777	374
41	5100104010	0.977	0.740	0.319	0.649	591
42	5100104011	0.984	0.721	0.136	0.675	661
43	5100105001	0.986	0.831	0.226	0.697	484
44	5100105002	0.988	0.800	0.217	0.694	482
45	5100105003	0.989	0.753	0.167	0.774	592
46	5100105004	0.982	0.747	0.377	0.654	611
47	5100105005	0.978	0.875	0.142	0.767	342
48	5100105006	0.989	0.780	0.185	0.618	422
49	5100105007	0.982	0.749	0.253	0.646	605
50	5100106001	0.981	0.780	0.167	0.697	635
51	5100106002	0.984	0.709	0.233	0.603	966
52	5100106003	0.984	0.752	0.128	0.677	746
53	5100106004	0.979	0.732	0.166	0.575	820
54	5100106005	0.985	0.707	0.174	0.751	134

Appendix Z

Marginals for Females, Melilla 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.966	0.846	0.383	0.511	436
2	5200101002	0.951	0.772	0.317	0.447	620
3	5200102001	0.880	0.911	0.479	0.560	539
4	5200102002	0.939	0.915	0.231	0.470	673
5	5200102003	0.903	0.850	0.307	0.469	750
6	5200103001	0.874	0.876	0.381	0.477	401
7	5200103002	0.819	0.857	0.384	0.478	390
8	5200104001	0.776	0.831	0.398	0.601	378
9	5200104002	0.904	0.893	0.262	0.427	708
10	5200104003	0.911	0.893	0.325	0.444	851
11	5200104004	0.954	0.822	0.218	0.633	884
12	5200105001	0.919	0.863	0.255	0.507	537
13	5200105002	0.919	0.826	0.421	0.514	441
14	5200105003	0.884	0.793	0.511	0.447	676
15	5200105004	0.915	0.841	0.397	0.617	471
16	5200105005	0.921	0.779	0.298	0.518	531
17	5200105006	0.933	0.807	0.228	0.520	1220
18	5200105007	0.951	0.793	0.316	0.432	768
19	5200106001	0.905	0.886	0.454	0.564	444
20	5200106002	0.929	0.878	0.234	0.464	576
21	5200106003	0.928	0.865	0.364	0.496	716
22	5200107001	0.950	0.812	0.266	0.413	654
23	5200107002	0.945	0.808	0.384	0.620	556
24	5200107003	0.931	0.845	0.266	0.528	1065
25	5200107004	0.930	0.868	0.251	0.567	655
26	5200107005	0.950	0.828	0.364	0.478	558
27	5200107006	0.956	0.769	0.297	0.513	791
28	5200108001	0.947	0.785	0.351	0.557	865
29	5200108002	0.941	0.889	0.369	0.469	389
30	5200108003	0.980	0.724	0.406	0.567	917
31	5200108004	0.969	0.780	0.412	0.427	1035
32	5200108005	0.981	0.836	0.407	0.575	904
33	5200108006	0.960	0.800	0.374	0.467	687
34	5200108007	0.949	0.839	0.305	0.571	1105
35	5200108008	0.972	0.830	0.409	0.505	1016
36	5200108009	0.980	0.902	0.355	0.456	291
37	5200108010	0.981	0.823	0.436	0.439	588
38	5200108011	0.958	0.798	0.278	0.475	733
39	5200108012	0.956	0.884	0.288	0.386	979
40	5200108013	0.926	0.886	0.359	0.490	608
41	5200108014	0.964	0.851	0.284	0.521	528

Appendix AA

Marginals for Females, Ceuta 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.988	0.150	0.284	0.560	698
2	5100101002	0.980	0.098	0.372	0.574	305
3	5100101003	0.990	0.128	0.420	0.558	665
4	5100101004	0.992	0.184	0.244	0.486	910
5	5100101005	0.985	0.178	0.348	0.351	497
6	5100101006	0.993	0.178	0.215	0.473	597
7	5100101007	0.992	0.155	0.168	0.586	626
8	5100101008	0.988	0.191	0.251	0.545	525
9	5100101009	0.987	0.172	0.228	0.571	446
10	5100101010	0.992	0.202	0.282	0.530	505
11	5100102001	0.985	0.192	0.264	0.526	465
12	5100102002	0.984	0.201	0.209	0.530	578
13	5100102003	0.977	0.169	0.311	0.454	366
14	5100102004	0.986	0.238	0.218	0.453	458
15	5100102005	0.989	0.185	0.235	0.505	514
16	5100102006	0.988	0.160	0.256	0.585	351
17	5100102007	0.985	0.218	0.348	0.474	603
18	5100103001	0.996	0.133	0.274	0.430	629
19	5100103002	0.994	0.224	0.253	0.398	499
20	5100103003	0.995	0.163	0.335	0.601	368
21	5100103004	0.992	0.135	0.212	0.377	423
22	5100103005	0.992	0.205	0.217	0.453	288
23	5100103006	0.983	0.213	0.162	0.454	904
24	5100103007	0.990	0.172	0.269	0.520	676
25	5100103008	0.971	0.185	0.219	0.509	271
26	5100103009	0.995	0.116	0.303	0.630	446
27	5100103010	0.993	0.167	0.254	0.516	321
28	5100103011	0.987	0.221	0.296	0.372	615
29	5100103012	0.994	0.176	0.347	0.631	351
30	5100103013	0.993	0.284	0.293	0.558	676
31	5100104001	0.989	0.225	0.215	0.477	775
32	5100104002	0.986	0.251	0.264	0.545	798
33	5100104003	0.993	0.179	0.212	0.545	721
34	5100104004	0.994	0.155	0.283	0.614	525
35	5100104005	0.990	0.225	0.193	0.507	812
36	5100104006	0.980	0.221	0.172	0.486	707
37	5100104007	0.976	0.303	0.239	0.463	659
38	5100104008	0.981	0.194	0.216	0.643	505
39	5100104009	0.985	0.254	0.271	0.473	326
40	5100104010	0.978	0.203	0.159	0.560	569
41	5100104011	0.989	0.228	0.169	0.510	402
42	5100105001	0.984	0.193	0.390	0.600	483
43	5100105002	0.987	0.210	0.362	0.506	503
44	5100105003	0.988	0.273	0.355	0.508	582
45	5100105004	0.980	0.234	0.148	0.405	601
46	5100105005	0.980	0.165	0.210	0.558	328
47	5100105006	0.990	0.179	0.277	0.475	438
48	5100105007	0.978	0.255	0.163	0.565	566
49	5100106001	0.983	0.234	0.302	0.480	630
50	5100106002	0.980	0.329	0.282	0.516	1284
51	5100106003	0.978	0.284	0.197	0.604	508
52	5100106004	0.979	0.313	0.281	0.512	891
53	5100106005	0.985	0.318	0.220	0.461	116

Appendix AB

Marginals for Females, Melilla 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.966	0.845	0.528	0.404	436
2	5200101002	0.950	0.754	0.392	0.405	630
3	5200102001	0.910	0.883	0.477	0.696	561
4	5200102002	0.953	0.855	0.532	0.394	664
5	5200102003	0.923	0.809	0.467	0.440	730
6	5200103001	0.902	0.750	0.625	0.385	388
7	5200103002	0.840	0.790	0.492	0.675	364
8	5200104001	0.799	0.837	0.362	0.532	347
9	5200104002	0.904	0.797	0.431	0.429	687
10	5200104003	0.931	0.813	0.448	0.249	807
11	5200104004	0.952	0.747	0.333	0.697	858
12	5200105001	0.933	0.779	0.391	0.458	523
13	5200105002	0.935	0.847	0.401	0.417	422
14	5200105003	0.917	0.771	0.519	0.454	635
15	5200105004	0.917	0.797	0.472	0.430	462
16	5200105005	0.928	0.791	0.302	0.571	521
17	5200105006	0.941	0.720	0.365	0.467	1158
18	5200105007	0.951	0.737	0.391	0.346	737
19	5200106001	0.925	0.845	0.531	0.542	416
20	5200106002	0.936	0.844	0.454	0.369	569
21	5200106003	0.942	0.863	0.356	0.523	695
22	5200107001	0.956	0.770	0.417	0.489	629
23	5200107002	0.943	0.815	0.416	0.496	532
24	5200107003	0.949	0.815	0.353	0.417	1017
25	5200107004	0.945	0.822	0.416	0.535	638
26	5200107005	0.955	0.809	0.409	0.348	532
27	5200107006	0.953	0.759	0.421	0.377	768
28	5200108001	0.951	0.736	0.546	0.513	842
29	5200108002	0.942	0.829	0.497	0.530	418
30	5200108003	0.973	0.712	0.420	0.510	880
31	5200108004	0.968	0.765	0.410	0.431	970
32	5200108005	0.984	0.824	0.414	0.463	906
33	5200108006	0.970	0.802	0.405	0.768	710
34	5200108007	0.953	0.807	0.548	0.417	1057
35	5200108008	0.974	0.796	0.535	0.510	1014
36	5200108009	0.984	0.888	0.458	0.731	274
37	5200108010	0.985	0.817	0.397	0.657	598
38	5200108011	0.958	0.763	0.316	0.528	721
39	5200108012	0.957	0.826	0.546	0.484	956
40	5200108013	0.939	0.875	0.417	0.511	585
41	5200108014	0.975	0.837	0.425	0.633	528

Appendix AC

Marginals for Males, Ceuta 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.952	0.890	0.196	0.464	836
2	5100101002	0.970	0.828	0.178	0.680	349
3	5100101003	0.981	0.846	0.283	0.513	619
4	5100101004	0.984	0.838	0.141	0.608	848
5	5100101005	0.977	0.824	0.141	0.534	504
6	5100101006	0.992	0.822	0.129	0.583	579
7	5100101007	0.983	0.811	0.195	0.564	619
8	5100101008	0.967	0.856	0.159	0.487	530
9	5100101009	0.979	0.838	0.097	0.602	427
10	5100101010	0.990	0.795	0.158	0.621	665
11	5100102001	0.977	0.799	0.149	0.522	506
12	5100102002	0.955	0.790	0.119	0.620	598
13	5100102003	0.931	0.809	0.159	0.529	382
14	5100102004	0.972	0.763	0.111	0.488	492
15	5100102005	0.966	0.822	0.166	0.469	673
16	5100102006	0.964	0.833	0.122	0.549	349
17	5100102007	0.970	0.811	0.194	0.602	669
18	5100103001	0.995	0.898	0.188	0.605	612
19	5100103002	0.989	0.797	0.156	0.483	619
20	5100103003	0.992	0.839	0.156	0.590	488
21	5100103004	0.985	0.866	0.214	0.526	397
22	5100103005	0.992	0.835	0.141	0.408	288
23	5100103006	0.970	0.812	0.187	0.550	444
24	5100103007	0.985	0.850	0.092	0.620	647
25	5100103008	0.941	0.867	0.194	0.617	342
26	5100103009	0.992	0.882	0.153	0.546	439
27	5100103010	0.973	0.855	0.161	0.662	309
28	5100103011	0.980	0.746	0.135	0.530	527
29	5100103012	0.998	0.824	0.155	0.483	333
30	5100103013	0.988	0.728	0.133	0.578	677
31	5100103014	0.946	0.801	0.128	0.410	545
32	5100104001	0.985	0.775	0.195	0.411	913
33	5100104002	0.956	0.810	0.083	0.622	876
34	5100104003	0.985	0.843	0.118	0.494	674
35	5100104004	0.993	0.843	0.229	0.571	488
36	5100104005	0.974	0.806	0.153	0.564	851
37	5100104006	0.933	0.786	0.121	0.525	746
38	5100104007	0.916	0.774	0.105	0.738	757
39	5100104008	0.955	0.773	0.144	0.518	508
40	5100104009	0.969	0.818	0.175	0.683	470
41	5100104010	0.880	0.872	0.103	0.615	599
42	5100104011	0.954	0.748	0.095	0.523	686
43	5100105001	0.962	0.822	0.147	0.557	484
44	5100105002	0.978	0.751	0.107	0.594	448
45	5100105003	0.958	0.782	0.166	0.685	583
46	5100105004	0.952	0.766	0.123	0.580	665
47	5100105005	0.961	0.835	0.178	0.434	493
48	5100105006	0.971	0.827	0.111	0.568	522
49	5100105007	0.952	0.731	0.230	0.670	564
50	5100106001	0.952	0.785	0.113	0.428	717
51	5100106002	0.956	0.689	0.117	0.545	960
52	5100106003	0.943	0.722	0.143	0.570	738
53	5100106004	0.940	0.762	0.143	0.440	893
54	5100106005	0.741	0.896	0.150	0.891	652

Appendix AD

Marginals for Males, Melilla 2013 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.960	0.810	0.658	0.625	475
2	5200101002	0.931	0.713	0.657	0.599	694
3	5200102001	0.814	0.820	0.721	0.548	583
4	5200102002	0.912	0.795	0.618	0.519	690
5	5200102003	0.800	0.760	0.6 34	0.490	863
6	5200103001	0.756	0.807	0.580	0.629	517
7	5200103002	0.682	0.830	0.550	0.494	561
8	5200104001	0.658	0.701	0.641	0.498	474
9	5200104002	0.819	0.751	0.592	0.405	848
10	5200104003	0.848	0.674	0.606	0.512	834
11	5200104004	0.955	0.636	0.543	0.534	771
12	5200105001	0.846	0.715	0.607	0.496	563
13	5200105002	0.876	0.746	0.524	0.600	450
14	5200105003	0.848	0.785	0.568	0.621	983
15	5200105004	0.835	0.711	0.617	0.552	513
16	5200105005	0.867	0.668	0.547	0.419	592
17	5200105006	0.904	0.542	0.656	0.596	1294
18	5200105007	0.929	0.562	0.725	0.553	671
19	5200106001	0.818	0.774	0.748	0.535	410
20	5200106002	0.881	0.797	0.673	0.478	635
21	5200106003	0.829	0.727	0.695	0.609	756
22	5200107001	0.907	0.682	0.758	0.574	691
23	5200107002	0.888	0.788	0.646	0.589	630
24	5200107003	0.856	0.798	0.517	0.552	1282
25	5200107004	0.852	0.759	0.642	0.472	748
26	5200107005	0.912	0.753	0.610	0.525	585
27	5200107006	0.918	0.676	0.696	0.506	840
28	5200108001	0.892	0.713	0.711	0.550	992
29	5200108002	0.860	0.743	0.530	0.518	455
30	5200108003	0.964	0.777	0.647	0.434	1252
31	5200108004	0.964	0.739	0.603	0.418	1106
32	5200108005	0.969	0.785	0.548	0.545	801
33	5200108006	0.970	0.797	0.618	0.461	772
34	5200108007	0.913	0.793	0.532	0.633	1208
35	5200108008	0.964	0.765	0.618	0.528	937
36	5200108009	0.987	0.803	0.665	0.572	324
37	5200108010	0.981	0.808	0.660	0.599	587
38	5200108011	0.936	0.750	0.605	0.519	802
39	5200108012	0.923	0.798	0.668	0.613	1062
40	5200108013	0.834	0.896	0.576	0.630	828
41	5200108014	0.953	0.804	0.572	0.580	479

Appendix AE

Marginals for Males, Ceuta 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.984	0.852	0.271	0.664	848
2	5100101002	0.987	0.829	0.367	0.466	371
3	5100101003	0.989	0.845	0.296	0.531	622
4	5100101004	0.990	0.796	0.363	0.599	832
5	5100101005	0.990	0.796	0.272	0.589	497
6	5100101006	0.993	0.824	0.189	0.618	587
7	5100101007	0.990	0.816	0.322	0.602	608
8	5100101008	0.987	0.801	0.154	0.616	519
9	5100101009	0.989	0.828	0.262	0.621	445
10	5100101010	0.994	0.769	0.266	0.562	574
11	5100102001	0.990	0.780	0.237	0.592	482
12	5100102002	0.988	0.768	0.277	0.536	586
13	5100102003	0.988	0.763	0.259	0.540	360
14	5100102004	0.989	0.745	0.201	0.561	466
15	5100102005	0.987	0.798	0.293	0.507	647
16	5100102006	0.987	0.800	0.298	0.557	335
17	5100102007	0.990	0.782	0.319	0.480	647
18	5100103001	0.995	0.887	0.262	0.443	625
19	5100103002	0.993	0.770	0.315	0.712	586
20	5100103003	0.992	0.819	0.308	0.487	523
21	5100103004	0.994	0.854	0.264	0.363	410
22	5100103005	0.994	0.798	0.239	0.482	275
23	5100103006	0.988	0.829	0.150	0.494	442
24	5100103007	0.991	0.829	0.368	0.593	648
25	5100103008	0.986	0.878	0.216	0.548	353
26	5100103009	0.994	0.833	0.217	0.591	429
27	5100103010	0.988	0.817	0.210	0.603	307
28	5100103011	0.988	0.746	0.226	0.542	534
29	5100103012	0.999	0.780	0.264	0.497	332
30	5100103013	0.992	0.733	0.201	0.518	686
31	5100103014	0.987	0.758	0.182	0.615	531
32	5100104001	0.990	0.760	0.193	0.547	842
33	5100104002	0.987	0.781	0.327	0.446	878
34	5100104003	0.990	0.778	0.344	0.620	645
35	5100104004	0.992	0.828	0.268	0.558	496
36	5100104005	0.988	0.782	0.273	0.475	856
37	5100104006	0.987	0.757	0.205	0.489	732
38	5100104007	0.986	0.741	0.308	0.586	763
39	5100104008	0.988	0.781	0.263	0.475	519
40	5100104009	0.988	0.761	0.294	0.577	410
41	5100104010	0.985	0.813	0.273	0.618	591
42	5100104011	0.989	0.703	0.299	0.479	667
43	5100105001	0.989	0.807	0.251	0.597	486
44	5100105002	0.990	0.742	0.222	0.387	459
45	5100105003	0.985	0.749	0.352	0.532	574
46	5100105004	0.990	0.755	0.210	0.578	658
47	5100105005	0.987	0.641	0.241	0.497	411
48	5100105006	0.990	0.810	0.183	0.299	519
49	5100105007	0.987	0.756	0.187	0.382	582
50	5100106001	0.987	0.776	0.186	0.442	726
51	5100106002	0.988	0.696	0.124	0.612	957
52	5100106003	0.989	0.711	0.242	0.488	743
53	5100106004	0.988	0.743	0.160	0.504	872
54	5100106005	0.983	0.761	0.276	0.439	475

Appendix AF

Marginals for Males, Melilla 2012 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.954	0.815	0.575	0.513	466
2	5200101002	0.896	0.725	0.649	0.671	707
3	5200102001	0.765	0.857	0.572	0.727	593
4	5200102002	0.863	0.818	0.537	0.659	685
5	5200102003	0.718	0.828	0.498	0.536	848
6	5200103001	0.598	0.792	0.643	0.585	512
7	5200103002	0.531	0.811	0.627	0.663	506
8	5200104001	0.463	0.717	0.624	0.652	463
9	5200104002	0.723	0.822	0.425	0.526	812
10	5200104003	0.757	0.627	0.665	0.554	808
11	5200104004	0.955	0.635	0.510	0.434	756
12	5200105001	0.722	0.759	0.518	0.720	562
13	5200105002	0.787	0.723	0.570	0.586	451
14	5200105003	0.781	0.734	0.638	0.669	910
15	5200105004	0.735	0.729	0.615	0.571	495
16	5200105005	0.778	0.590	0.678	0.545	570
17	5200105006	0.842	0.618	0.428	0.561	1215
18	5200105007	0.913	0.603	0.516	0.669	645
19	5200106001	0.770	0.808	0.699	0.436	413
20	5200106002	0.828	0.805	0.684	0.513	604
21	5200106003	0.743	0.814	0.531	0.438	726
22	5200107001	0.884	0.687	0.687	0.689	666
23	5200107002	0.795	0.806	0.632	0.630	589
24	5200107003	0.783	0.794	0.570	0.684	1240
25	5200107004	0.789	0.775	0.573	0.518	705
26	5200107005	0.880	0.777	0.476	0.635	566
27	5200107006	0.907	0.711	0.439	0.570	819
28	5200108001	0.867	0.730	0.669	0.471	934
29	5200108002	0.839	0.777	0.489	0.675	417
30	5200108003	0.949	0.778	0.579	0.556	1241
31	5200108004	0.952	0.714	0.660	0.666	1054
32	5200108005	0.977	0.770	0.571	0.605	782
33	5200108006	0.960	0.799	0.562	0.451	773
34	5200108007	0.883	0.789	0.586	0.679	1135
35	5200108008	0.965	0.746	0.590	0.597	944
36	5200108009	0.995	0.812	0.635	0.420	309
37	5200108010	0.983	0.825	0.499	0.648	594
38	5200108011	0.947	0.770	0.459	0.485	754
39	5200108012	0.889	0.805	0.668	0.572	1022
40	5200108013	0.788	0.857	0.712	0.701	801
41	5200108014	0.966	0.787	0.643	0.650	482

Appendix AG

Marginals for Males, Ceuta 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5100101001	0.986	0.108	0.813	0.543	826
2	5100101002	0.980	0.148	0.661	0.493	292
3	5100101003	0.989	0.144	0.650	0.517	648
4	5100101004	0.990	0.172	0.640	0.620	959
5	5100101005	0.988	0.182	0.711	0.471	516
6	5100101006	0.995	0.189	0.804	0.567	595
7	5100101007	0.986	0.212	0.732	0.379	557
8	5100101008	0.986	0.177	0.648	0.412	572
9	5100101009	0.984	0.190	0.606	0.379	430
10	5100101010	0.995	0.229	0.724	0.381	535
11	5100102001	0.987	0.221	0.635	0.445	460
12	5100102002	0.979	0.227	0.802	0.469	566
13	5100102003	0.981	0.234	0.760	0.465	378
14	5100102004	0.984	0.259	0.801	0.592	453
15	5100102005	0.986	0.176	0.767	0.572	612
16	5100102006	0.986	0.205	0.660	0.580	330
17	5100102007	0.982	0.205	0.722	0.465	607
18	5100103001	0.996	0.097	0.769	0.456	642
19	5100103002	0.992	0.190	0.826	0.570	609
20	5100103003	0.994	0.143	0.803	0.496	462
21	5100103004	0.994	0.133	0.713	0.473	428
22	5100103005	0.995	0.191	0.723	0.536	289
23	5100103006	0.981	0.215	0.721	0.427	957
24	5100103007	0.993	0.176	0.654	0.428	660
25	5100103008	0.983	0.143	0.848	0.499	360
26	5100103009	0.995	0.130	0.753	0.437	461
27	5100103010	0.988	0.147	0.768	0.617	323
28	5100103011	0.985	0.270	0.824	0.462	533
29	5100103012	0.997	0.195	0.764	0.464	349
30	5100103013	0.992	0.285	0.809	0.338	679
31	5100104001	0.994	0.226	0.849	0.464	858
32	5100104002	0.979	0.215	0.747	0.656	852
33	5100104003	0.989	0.197	0.761	0.271	678
34	5100104004	0.993	0.170	0.760	0.506	508
35	5100104005	0.984	0.230	0.751	0.492	840
36	5100104006	0.981	0.247	0.788	0.460	705
37	5100104007	0.977	0.240	0.807	0.565	720
38	5100104008	0.984	0.239	0.762	0.588	506
39	5100104009	0.983	0.232	0.856	0.501	357
40	5100104010	0.980	0.193	0.829	0.443	557
41	5100104011	0.984	0.240	0.707	0.596	446
42	5100105001	0.986	0.196	0.722	0.534	482
43	5100105002	0.988	0.265	0.746	0.544	472
44	5100105003	0.984	0.287	0.649	0.447	561
45	5100105004	0.986	0.253	0.845	0.415	654
46	5100105005	0.972	0.208	0.534	0.412	532
47	5100105006	0.989	0.174	0.738	0.521	525
48	5100105007	0.983	0.270	0.864	0.500	543
49	5100106001	0.980	0.232	0.821	0.501	695
50	5100106002	0.981	0.332	0.835	0.537	1257
51	5100106003	0.983	0.340	0.755	0.465	483
52	5100106004	0.983	0.259	0.840	0.475	977
53	5100106005	0.958	0.069	0.729	0.289	540


Appendix AH

Marginals for Males, Melilla 2011 (Individuals Over 20 Years)

	Census Tract	Spanish Citizenship	Born in Spain	Born in Morocco	Born in Third Country	Total Population
1	5200101001	0.970	0.165	0.355	0.637	480
2	5200101002	0.920	0.199	0.341	0.639	710
3	5200102001	0.807	0.133	0.515	0.694	590
4	5200102002	0.901	0.136	0.321	0.700	709
5	5200102003	0.797	0.099	0.256	0.612	780
6	5200103001	0.720	0.132	0.502	0.658	463
7	5200103002	0.608	0.167	0.550	0.656	475
8	5200104001	0.597	0.207	0.536	0.637	438
9	5200104002	0.775	0.231	0.496	0.588	775
10	5200104003	0.833	0.202	0.272	0.641	756
11	5200104004	0.954	0.325	0.321	0.625	748
12	5200105001	0.798	0.118	0.267	0.589	534
13	5200105002	0.882	0.208	0.411	0.548	431
14	5200105003	0.792	0.167	0.368	0.619	898
15	5200105004	0.790	0.102	0.307	0.593	488
16	5200105005	0.838	0.255	0.243	0.669	532
17	5200105006	0.890	0.408	0.479	0.563	1164
18	5200105007	0.928	0.391	0.381	0.600	604
19	5200106001	0.822	0.130	0.293	0.710	404
20	5200106002	0.879	0.160	0.532	0.568	582
21	5200106003	0.805	0.155	0.446	0.606	720
22	5200107001	0.907	0.226	0.265	0.583	634
23	5200107002	0.870	0.166	0.514	0.653	538
24	5200107003	0.875	0.127	0.273	0.642	1157
25	5200107004	0.860	0.146	0.242	0.613	653
26	5200107005	0.920	0.188	0.287	0.653	543
27	5200107006	0.923	0.270	0.318	0.639	780
28	5200108001	0.909	0.182	0.305	0.637	894
29	5200108002	0.913	0.178	0.397	0.670	448
30	5200108003	0.937	0.227	0.283	0.731	1196
31	5200108004	0.954	0.225	0.231	0.491	970
32	5200108005	0.977	0.212	0.347	0.657	789
33	5200108006	0.962	0.193	0.361	0.641	769
34	5200108007	0.920	0.170	0.351	0.631	1084
35	5200108008	0.968	0.229	0.267	0.707	917
36	5200108009	0.996	0.171	0.318	0.675	275
37	5200108010	0.984	0.187	0.428	0.663	599
38	5200108011	0.956	0.229	0.320	0.682	744
39	5200108012	0.910	0.174	0.366	0.669	991
40	5200108013	0.837	0.082	0.353	0.615	763
41	5200108014	0.962	0.169	0.318	0.622	485

Appendix AI

Citizenship Estimates Across Census Tracts, 2012



Appendix AJ

Citizenship of Residents, by Gender, 2012

Female residents

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.992 (0.005) ^a	0.941 (0.049)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.965 (0.011)	0.858 (0.108)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.993 (0.003)	0.898 (0.075)

^a Standard deviations are in parentheses

Male residents

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.992 (0.002) ^a	0.794 (0.158)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.970 (0.007)	0.722 (0.205)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.986 (0.005)	0.726 (0.201)

^a Standard deviations in parentheses

Appendix AK

Citizenship of Residents, by Gender, 2011

Female residents

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.992	0.951
	(0.008) ^a	(0.051)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.973	0.928
	(0.006)	(0.023)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.986	0.937
	(0.007)	(0.060)

^a Standard deviations are in parentheses

Male residents

	Ceuta	Melilla
Proportion born in Spain and has Spanish citizenship	0.991	0.859
	(0.008) ^a	(0.109)
Proportion born in Morocco and has Spanish citizenship	0.982	0.688
	(0.009)	(0.211)
Proportion born in third country and has Spanish citizenship	0.990	0.814
	(0.006)	(0.145)

^a Standard deviations are in parentheses

Appendix AL

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Ceuta 2013

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5100101001.000	0.971	28	5100103011.000	0.992
2	5100101002.000	0.991	29	5100103012.000	0.997
3	5100101003.000	0.985	30	5100103013.000	0.993
4	5100101004.000	0.992	31	5100103014.000	0.976
5	5100101005.000	0.992	32	5100104001.000	0.994
6	5100101006.000	0.991	33	5100104002.000	0.985
7	5100101007.000	0.991	34	5100104003.000	0.994
8	5100101008.000	0.985	35	5100104004.000	0.993
9	5100101009.000	0.989	36	5100104005.000	0.993
10	5100101010.000	0.994	37	5100104006.000	0.956
11	5100102001.000	0.985	38	5100104007.000	0.976
12	5100102002.000	0.980	39	5100104008.000	0.987
13	5100102003.000	0.955	40	5100104009.000	0.982
14	5100102004.000	0.990	41	5100104010.000	0.946
15	5100102005.000	0.983	42	5100104011.000	0.987
16	5100102006.000	0.985	43	5100105001.000	0.974
17	5100102007.000	0.981	44	5100105002.000	0.986
18	5100103001.000	0.995	45	5100105003.000	0.988
19	5100103002.000	0.991	46	5100105004.000	0.978
20	5100103003.000	0.997	47	5100105005.000	0.979
21	5100103004.000	0.992	48	5100105006.000	0.989
22	5100103005.000	0.992	49	5100105007.000	0.981
23	5100103006.000	0.988	50	5100106001.000	0.970
24	5100103007.000	0.988	51	5100106002.000	0.990
25	5100103008.000	0.973	52	5100106003.000	0.968
26	5100103009.000	0.996	53	5100106004.000	0.972
27	5100103010.000	0.987	54	5100106005.000	0.835

Appendix AM

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Ceuta 2012

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5100101001	0.988	28	5100103011	0.996
2	5100101002	0.990	29	5100103012	0.998
3	5100101003	0.996	30	5100103013	0.996
4	5100101004	0.996	31	5100103014	0.993
5	5100101005	0.993	32	5100104001	0.996
6	5100101006	0.997	33	5100104002	0.991
7	5100101007	0.994	34	5100104003	0.997
8	5100101008	0.995	35	5100104004	0.998
9	5100101009	0.994	36	5100104005	0.993
10	5100101010	0.997	37	5100104006	0.990
11	5100102001	0.994	38	5100104007	0.990
12	5100102002	0.992	39	5100104008	0.991
13	5100102003	0.991	40	5100104009	0.991
14	5100102004	0.994	41	5100104010	0.987
15	5100102005	0.994	42	5100104011	0.995
16	5100102006	0.994	43	5100105001	0.992
17	5100102007	0.995	44	5100105002	0.995
18	5100103001	0.998	45	5100105003	0.995
19	5100103002	0.997	46	5100105004	0.993
20	5100103003	0.997	47	5100105005	0.993
21	5100103004	0.997	48	5100105006	0.995
22	5100103005	0.996	49	5100105007	0.992
23	5100103006	0.992	50	5100106001	0.992
24	5100103007	0.994	51	5100106002	0.993
25	5100103008	0.987	52	5100106003	0.994
26	5100103009	0.997	53	5100106004	0.992
27	5100103010	0.994	54	5100106005	0.976

Appendix AN

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Ceuta 2011

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5100101001	0.965	28	5100103011	0.977
2	5100101002	0.965	29	5100103012	0.987
3	5100101003	0.966	30	5100103013	0.986
4	5100101004	0.975	31	5100104001	0.981
5	5100101005	0.968	32	5100104002	0.968
6	5100101006	0.981	33	5100104003	0.979
7	5100101007	0.973	34	5100104004	0.982
8	5100101008	0.971	35	5100104005	0.971
9	5100101009	0.965	36	5100104006	0.969
10	5100101010	0.984	37	5100104007	0.964
11	5100102001	0.973	38	5100104008	0.966
12	5100102002	0.963	39	5100104009	0.977
13	5100102003	0.963	40	5100104010	0.964
14	5100102004	0.977	41	5100104011	0.977
15	5100102005	0.968	42	5100105001	0.971
16	5100102006	0.973	43	5100105002	0.976
17	5100102007	0.971	44	5100105003	0.976
18	5100103001	0.985	45	5100105004	0.972
19	5100103002	0.985	46	5100105005	0.954
20	5100103003	0.981	47	5100105006	0.973
21	5100103004	0.976	48	5100105007	0.974
22	5100103005	0.982	49	5100106001	0.968
23	5100103006	0.969	50	5100106002	0.974
24	5100103007	0.975	51	5100106003	0.976
25	5100103008	0.964	52	5100106004	0.972
26	5100103009	0.978	53	5100106005	0.958
27	5100103010	0.974			

Appendix AO

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Melilla 2013

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5200101001.000	0.977	22	5200107001.000	0.949
2	5200101002.000	0.952	23	5200107002.000	0.917
3	5200102001.000	0.859	24	5200107003.000	0.899
4	5200102002.000	0.940	25	5200107004.000	0.882
5	5200102003.000	0.864	26	5200107005.000	0.927
6	5200103001.000	0.807	27	5200107006.000	0.954
7	5200103002.000	0.749	28	5200108001.000	0.935
8	5200104001.000	0.679	29	5200108002.000	0.916
9	5200104002.000	0.854	30	5200108003.000	0.995
10	5200104003.000	0.906	31	5200108004.000	0.981
11	5200104004.000	0.974	32	5200108005.000	0.987
12	5200105001.000	0.903	33	5200108006.000	0.985
13	5200105002.000	0.902	34	5200108007.000	0.935
14	5200105003.000	0.893	35	5200108008.000	0.978
15	5200105004.000	0.879	36	5200108009.000	0.997
16	5200105005.000	0.921	37	5200108010.000	0.994
17	5200105006.000	0.931	38	5200108011.000	0.961
18	5200105007.000	0.959	39	5200108012.000	0.949
19	5200106001.000	0.871	40	5200108013.000	0.871
20	5200106002.000	0.917	41	5200108014.000	0.972
21	5200106003.000	0.892			

Appendix AP

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Melilla 2012

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5200101001	0.971	22	5200107001	0.942
2	5200101002	0.943	23	5200107002	0.905
3	5200102001	0.846	24	5200107003	0.894
4	5200102002	0.918	25	5200107004	0.900
5	5200102003	0.872	26	5200107005	0.952
6	5200103001	0.796	27	5200107006	0.960
7	5200103002	0.685	28	5200108001	0.933
8	5200104001	0.673	29	5200108002	0.917
9	5200104002	0.857	30	5200108003	0.978
10	5200104003	0.873	31	5200108004	0.977
11	5200104004	0.972	32	5200108005	0.990
12	5200105001	0.852	33	5200108006	0.981
13	5200105002	0.893	34	5200108007	0.933
14	5200105003	0.869	35	5200108008	0.985
15	5200105004	0.872	36	5200108009	0.999
16	5200105005	0.894	37	5200108010	0.995
17	5200105006	0.928	38	5200108011	0.972
18	5200105007	0.954	39	5200108012	0.931
19	5200106001	0.867	40	5200108013	0.876
20	5200106002	0.905	41	5200108014	0.975
21	5200106003	0.889			

Appendix AQ

Estimated Proportion of Native-born Spanish Citizens by Census Tract, Melilla 2011

	Census Tract	Proportion		Census Tract	Proportion
1	5200101001	0.975	22	5200107001	0.941
2	5200101002	0.951	23	5200107002	0.924
3	5200102001	0.858	24	5200107003	0.918
4	5200102002	0.933	25	5200107004	0.927
5	5200102003	0.876	26	5200107005	0.946
6	5200103001	0.830	27	5200107006	0.945
7	5200103002	0.739	28	5200108001	0.942
8	5200104001	0.689	29	5200108002	0.939
9	5200104002	0.866	30	5200108003	0.970
10	5200104003	0.893	31	5200108004	0.973
11	5200104004	0.965	32	5200108005	0.992
12	5200105001	0.895	33	5200108006	0.969
13	5200105002	0.896	34	5200108007	0.938
14	5200105003	0.868	35	5200108008	0.978
15	5200105004	0.862	36	5200108009	0.999
16	5200105005	0.891	37	5200108010	0.997
17	5200105006	0.927	38	5200108011	0.960
18	5200105007	0.939	39	5200108012	0.947
19	5200106001	0.891	40	5200108013	0.901
20	5200106002	0.915	41	5200108014	0.976
21	5200106003	0.887			

Appendix AR

Estimated Citizenship Rates of Ceuta's Native-born Residents Compared to Melilla's Populace, with Covariates, 2013

	Ceuta		Melilla		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
1	Spain	–	Spain	–	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.00
2	Spain	–	Spain	Education	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.00
3	Spain	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.58
4	Spain	–	Morocco	–	0.14	0.09	0.19	0.00
5	Spain	–	Morocco	Education	0.09	0.04	0.14	0.00
6	Spain	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.14	0.09	0.18	0.00
7	Spain	–	Third country	–	0.06	0.04	0.1	0.00
8	Spain	–	Third country	Education	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
9	Spain	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0.05	0	0.09	0.04
10	Spain	Education	Spain	–	0.06	0.02	0.11	0.00
11	Spain	Education	Spain	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
12	Spain	Education	Spain	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.64
13	Spain	Education	Morocco	–	0.14	0.1	0.19	0.00
14	Spain	Education	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
15	Spain	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.13	0.07	0.17	0.00
16	Spain	Education	Third country	–	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
17	Spain	Education	Third country	Education	0.05	0	0.1	0.02
18	Spain	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0.04	-0.01	0.09	0.06
19	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.1	0.00
20	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.05	0	0.1	0.01
21	Spain	Ethnicity	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	0	0.04	0.96
22	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.14	0.09	0.18	0.00
23	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.00
24	Spain	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.00
25	Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.15	0	0.19	0.01
26	Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.03	0	0.08	0.19
27	Spain	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0.04	0	0.08	0.31

^aDifferences significant at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Appendix AS

Estimated Citizenship Rates of Ceuta's Moroccan-born Residents Compared to Melilla's Populace, with Covariates, 2013

	Ceuta		Melilla		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
1	Morocco	–	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.1	0.01
2	Morocco	–	Spain	Education	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
3	Morocco	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.02	0.007	0.98
4	Morocco	–	Morocco	–	0.13	0.09	0.18	0.00
5	Morocco	–	Morocco	Education	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.00
6	Morocco	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.12	0.08	0.17	0.00
7	Morocco	–	Third country	–	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
8	Morocco	–	Third country	Education	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.26
9	Morocco	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.41
10	Morocco	Education	Spain	–	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.53
11	Morocco	Education	Spain	Education	0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.77
12	Morocco	Education	Spain	Ethnicity	0	-0.04	0.04	1
13	Morocco	Education	Morocco	–	0.11	0.07	0.16	0.00
14	Morocco	Education	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.01	0.1	0.00
15	Morocco	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.1	0.05	0.15	0.00
16	Morocco	Education	Third country	–	0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.78
17	Morocco	Education	Third country	Education	0.01	0.03	0.06	1
18	Morocco	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.03	0.06	1
19	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
20	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.04	0	0.09	0.05
21	Morocco	Ethnicity	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.03	0.06	1
22	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.00
23	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.00
24	Morocco	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.12	0.07	0.17	0.00
25	Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.04	-0.06	0	0.09
26	Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.48
27	Morocco	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.66

^aDifferences significant at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Appendix AT

Estimated Citizenship Rates of Ceuta's Third Country-born Residents Compared to Melilla's Populace, with Covariates, 2013

	Ceuta		Melilla		Estimated Difference	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Adjusted <i>p</i> -value
	Birthplace	Covariate	Birthplace	Covariate				
1	Third country	–	Spain	–	0.04	-0.08	0	0.18
2	Third country	–	Spain	Education	0.04	-0.08	0	0.35
3	Third country	–	Spain	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.05	0.04	1
4	Third country	–	Morocco	–	0.12	0.07	0.17	0.00
5	Third country	–	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.00
6	Third country	–	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.11	0.02	0.16	0.00
7	Third country	–	Third country	–	0.04	0	0.08	0.36
8	Third country	–	Third country	Education	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.93
9	Third country	–	Third country	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.98
10	Third country	Education	Spain	–	0.04	-0.08	0	0.14
11	Third country	Education	Spain	Education	0.04	0	0.08	0.3
12	Third country	Education	Spain	Ethnicity	0.01	-0.04	0.05	1
13	Third country	Education	Morocco	–	0.12	0.08	0.17	0.00
14	Third country	Education	Morocco	Education	0.06	0.02	0.1	0.00
15	Third country	Education	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.11	0.06	0.16	0.00
16	Third country	Education	Third country	–	0.03	0	0.08	0.31
17	Third country	Education	Third country	Education	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.9
18	Third country	Education	Third country	Ethnicity	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.97
19	Third country	Ethnicity	Spain	–	0.05	0	0.09	0.02
20	Third country	Ethnicity	Spain	Education	0.04	0	0.09	0.05
21	Third country	Ethnicity	Spain	Ethnicity	0.02	-0.03	0.06	1
22	Third country	Ethnicity	Morocco	–	0.13	0.07	0.17	0.00
23	Third country	Ethnicity	Morocco	Education	0.07	0.03	0.12	0.00
24	Third country	Ethnicity	Morocco	Ethnicity	0.12	0.07	0.17	0.00
25	Third country	Ethnicity	Third country	–	0.04	0	0.09	0.06
26	Third country	Ethnicity	Third country	Education	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.49
27	Third country	Ethnicity	Third country	Ethnicity	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.67

^aDifferences significant at the 0.05 level are in bold.

Appendix AU

Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents, with Education and Ethnicity Covariates, Ceuta and Melilla 2012

Differences in Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Ceuta

	Base Estimate	Ethnicity	Education
Born in Spain, Spanish citizenship	0.993	-0.002	-0.009
Born in Morocco, Spanish citizenship	0.987	-0.005	-0.012
Born in third country, Spanish citizenship	0.988	-0.002	-0.003

Differences in Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Melilla

	Base Estimate	Ethnicity	Education
Born in Spain, Spanish citizenship	0.910	0.032	0.006
Born in Morocco, Spanish citizenship	0.823	0.013	-0.001
Born in third country, Spanish citizenship	0.917	0.040	0.029

Appendix AV

Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents, with Education and Ethnicity Covariates, Ceuta and Melilla 2011

Differences in Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Ceuta


	Base Estimate	Ethnicity	Education
Born in Spain, Spanish citizenship	0.991	-0.008	-0.008
Born in Morocco, Spanish citizenship	0.992	-0.008	-0.009
Born in third country, Spanish citizenship	0.982	0.015	0.006

Differences in Estimated Citizenship Rates of Residents with Covariates, Melilla

	Base Estimate	Ethnicity	Education
Born in Spain, Spanish citizenship	0.918	0.009	-0.010
Born in Morocco, Spanish citizenship	0.803	0.060	0.029
Born in third country, Spanish citizenship	0.938	-0.035	0.017

Appendix AW

Neo-Tifinagh



Source: IRCAM (<http://www.ircam.ma/>)

Appendix AX


Individual Repertoires

1. European and Christian and *Dariya* and titular (ECDT)
2. European and Christian and *Dariya* and indigenous (ECDI)
3. European and Christian and *Dariya* and autochthonous (ECDA)
4. European and Christian and Castilian and titular (ECCT)
5. European and Christian and Castilian and indigenous (ECCI)
6. European and Christian and Castilian and autochthonous (ECCA)
7. European and Christian and Tamazigh and titular (ECTT)
8. European and Christian and Tamazigh and indigenous (ECTI)
9. European and Christian and Tamazigh and autochthonous (ECTA)
10. European and Islam and *Dariya* and titular (EIDT)
11. European and Islam and *Dariya* and indigenous (EIDI)
12. European and Islam and *Dariya* and autochthonous (EIDA)
13. European and Islam and Castilian and titular (EICT)
14. European and Islam and Castilian and indigenous (EICI)
15. European and Islam and Castilian and autochthonous (EICA)
16. European and Islam and Tamazigh and titular (EITT)
17. European and Islam and Tamazigh and indigenous (EITI)
18. European and Islam and Tamazigh and autochthonous (EITA)
19. North African and Christian and *Dariya* and titular (NCDT)
20. North African and Christian and *Dariya* and indigenous (NCDI)
21. North African and Christian and *Dariya* and autochthonous (NCDA)

22. North African and Christian and Castilian and titular (NCCT)
23. North African and Christian and Castilian and indigenous (NCCI)
24. North African and Christian and Castilian and autochthonous (NCCA)
25. North African and Christian and Tamazigh and titular (NCTT)
26. North African and Christian and Tamazigh and indigenous (NCTI)
27. North African and Christian and Tamazigh and autochthonous (NCTA)
28. North African and Islam and *Dariya* and titular (NIDT)
29. North African and Islam and *Dariya* and indigenous (NIDI)
30. North African and Islam and *Dariya* and autochthonous (NIDA)
31. North African and Islam and Castilian and titular (NICT)
32. North African and Islam and Castilian and indigenous (NICI)
33. North African and Islam and Castilian and autochthonous (NICA)
34. North African and Islam and Tamazigh and titular (NITT)
35. North African and Islam and Tamazigh and indigenous (NITI)
36. North African and Islam and Tamazigh and autochthonous (NITA)


Appendix AY

Proportion of Votes for Each Party, Ceuta, 1995–2011



Appendix AZ

Proportion of Votes for Each Party, Melilla, 1995–2011



Appendix BA

Estimated Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years Casting Votes, by Census Tract, Ceuta 2011

	Census Tract	Proportion
1	5100101001	0.53
2	5100101002	0.52
3	5100101003	0.53
4	5100101004	0.51
5	5100101005	0.50
6	5100101006	0.53
7	5100101007	0.54
8	5100101008	0.50
9	5100101009	0.49
10	5100101010	0.63
11	5100102001	0.59
12	5100102002	0.51
13	5100102003	0.46
14	5100102004	0.56
15	5100102005	0.44 ^a
16	5100102006	0.53
17	5100102007	0.52
18	5100103001	0.52
19	5100103002	0.59
20	5100103003	0.53
21	5100103004	0.61
22	5100103005	0.60
23	5100103006	0.53
24	5100103007	0.57
25	5100103008	0.47
26	5100103009	0.58
27	5100103010	0.58
28	5100103011	0.59
29	5100103012	0.57
30	5100103013	0.63
31	5100104001	0.55
32	5100104002	0.54
33	5100104003	0.53
34	5100104004	0.61
35	5100104005	0.52
36	5100104006	0.51
37	5100104007	0.44
38	5100104008	0.53
39	5100104009	0.78
40	5100104010	0.50
41	5100104011	0.57
42	5100105001	0.53
43	5100105002	0.57
44	5100105003	0.55
45	5100105004	0.53
46	5100105005	0.35
47	5100105006	0.53
48	5100105007	0.55
49	5100106001	0.50
50	5100106002	0.49
51	5100106003	0.51
52	5100106004	0.47
53	5100106005	0.24

^aCensus tracts in gray are more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Appendix BB

Estimated Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years Casting Votes, by Census Tract, Ceuta 2007

	Census Tract	Proportion
1	5100101001	0.63
2	5100101002	0.60
3	5100101003	0.60
4	5100101004	0.62
5	5100101005	0.58
6	5100101006	0.62
7	5100101007	0.66
8	5100101008	0.61
9	5100101009	0.58
10	5100102001	0.69
11	5100102002	0.61
12	5100102003	0.56
13	5100102004	0.64
14	5100102005	0.56
15	5100102006	0.68
16	5100102007	0.63
17	5100103001	0.60
18	5100103002	0.65
19	5100103003	0.56
20	5100103004	0.69
21	5100103005	0.69
22	5100103006	0.62
23	5100103007	0.67
24	5100103008	0.54
25	5100103009	0.71
26	5100103010	0.71
27	5100103011	0.72
28	5100103012	0.61
29	5100103013	0.75
30	5100104001	0.59
31	5100104002	0.62
32	5100104003	0.57
33	5100104004	0.71
34	5100104005	0.60
35	5100104006	0.56
36	5100104007	0.54
37	5100104008	0.65
38	5100104009	1
39	5100104010	0.60
40	5100104011	0.68
41	5100105001	0.55
42	5100105002	0.65
43	5100105003	0.64
44	5100105004	0.64
45	5100105005	0.49 ^a
46	5100105006	0.70
47	5100105007	0.65
48	5100106001	0.58
49	5100106002	0.63
50	5100106003	0.58
51	5100106004	0.60
52	5100106005	0.31

^aCensus tracts in gray are more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Appendix BC

Estimated Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years Casting Votes, by Census Tract, Melilla 2011

	Census Tract	Proportion
1	5200101001	0.59
2	5200101002	0.63
3	5200102001	0.49 ^a
4	5200102002	0.59
5	5200102003	0.59
6	5200103001	0.50
7	5200103002	0.50
8	5200104001	0.43
9	5200104002	0.55
10	5200104003	0.63
11	5200104004	0.67
12	5200105001	0.62
13	5200105002	0.67
14	5200105003	0.55
15	5200105004	0.55
16	5200105005	0.62
17	5200105006	0.65
18	5200105007	0.68
19	5200106001	0.61
20	5200106002	0.56
21	5200106003	0.61
22	5200107001	0.64
23	5200107002	0.62
24	5200107003	0.60
25	5200107004	0.66
26	5200107005	0.67
27	5200107006	0.71
28	5200108001	0.58
29	5200108002	0.59
30	5200108003	0.57
31	5200108004	0.71
32	5200108005	0.65
33	5200108006	0.61
34	5200108007	0.62
35	5200108008	0.64
36	5200108009	0.56
37	5200108010	0.63
38	5200108011	0.65
39	5200108012	0.66
40	5200108013	0.52
41	5200108014	0.64

^aCensus tracts in gray are more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Appendix BD

Estimated Proportion of Citizens Over 20 Years Casting Votes, by Census Tract, Melilla 2007

	Census Tract	Proportion
1	5200101001	0.60
2	5200101002	0.66
3	5200102001	0.50 ^a
4	5200102002	0.60
5	5200102003	0.59
6	5200103001	0.49
7	5200103002	0.62
8	5200104001	0.54
9	5200104002	0.62
10	5200104003	0.68
11	5200105001	0.60
12	5200105002	0.62
13	5200105003	0.60
14	5200105004	0.55
15	5200105005	0.61
16	5200105006	0.66
17	5200106001	0.61
18	5200106002	0.61
19	5200106003	0.61
20	5200107001	0.69
21	5200107002	0.63
22	5200107003	0.63
23	5200108001	0.58
24	5200108002	0.64
25	5200108003	0.61
26	5200108004	0.68
27	5200108005	0.65
28	5200108006	0.63
29	5200108007	0.61
30	5200108008	0.66
31	5200108009	0.65
32	5200108010	0.66
33	5200108011	0.65
34	5200108012	0.59
35	5200108013	0.64

^aCensus tracts in gray are more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Appendix BE

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born, Ceuta 2011

Tract	PP	Caballas	PSOE
1	0.43	0.02	0.04
2	0.42	0.03	0.03
3	0.44	0.01	0.04
4	0.40	0.02	0.05
5	0.36	0.03	0.07
6	0.41	0.02	0.06
7	0.42	0.01	0.07
8	0.38	0.02	0.04
9	0.37	0.02	0.06
10	0.48	0.03	0.07
11	0.46	0.03	0.05
12	0.34	0.05	0.07
13	0.33	0.08	0.03
14	0.32	0.13	0.06
15	0.34	0.02	0.05
16	0.40	0.04	0.06
17	0.33	0.11	0.04
18	0.45	0.01	0.03
19	0.48	0.02	0.05
20	0.46	0.01	0.03
21	0.48	0.01	0.08
22	0.46	0.02	0.07
23	0.35	0.10	0.04
24	0.47	0.02	0.05
25	0.39	0.02	0.02
26	0.46	0.04	0.06
27	0.50	0.02	0.04
28	0.44	0.08	0.03
29	0.53	0	0.01
30	0.50	0.03	0.05
31	0.43	0.02	0.06
32	0.37	0.06	0.06
33	0.40	0.01	0.09
34	0.48	0.02	0.08
35	0.31	0.11	0.04
36	0.22	0.20	0.03
37	0.21	0.15	0.02
38	0.37	0.07	0.05
39	0.50	0.14	0.08
40	0.10	0.25	0.04 ^a
41	0.37	0.10	0.05
42	0.35	0.08	0.06
43	0.44	0.06	0.04
44	0.35	0.13	0.04
45	0.36	0.10	0.05
46	0.14	0.14	0.04
47	0.41	0.04	0.04
48	0.24	0.17	0.07
49	0.25	0.13	0.08
50	0.13	0.22	0.09
51	0.19	0.21	0.04
52	0.12	0.20	0.09
53	0.12	0.07	0.03

^aCensus tracts in gray have greater support for Caballas than the PP, the winning party.

Appendix BF

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born, Melilla 2011

Tract	PP	CpM	PSOE	PPL
1	0.40	0.05	0.04	0.07
2	0.37	0.14	0.05	0.04
3	0.31	0.04	0.04	0.05
4	0.44	0.05	0.03	0.04
5	0.36	0.08	0.04	0.07
6	0.24	0.16	0.02	0.03
7	0.22	0.17	0.04	0.05
8	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.02
9	0.20	0.25	0.02	0.04 ^a
10	0.18	0.39	0.02	0.02
11	0.29	0.29	0.04	0.02
12	0.23	0.32	0.03	0.01
13	0.14	0.48	0.01	0.01
14	0.13	0.36	0.01	0
15	0.21	0.26	0.03	0.01
16	0.18	0.37	0.02	0.01
17	0.14	0.47	0.01	0.01
18	0.25	0.31	0.06	0.02
19	0.37	0.07	0.08	0.07
20	0.36	0.05	0.04	0.06
21	0.37	0.10	0.05	0.03
22	0.38	0.12	0.07	0.05
23	0.38	0.09	0.07	0.05
24	0.37	0.11	0.05	0.04
25	0.43	0.09	0.07	0.04
26	0.44	0.09	0.07	0.05
27	0.45	0.08	0.06	0.06
28	0.31	0.16	0.05	0.03
29	0.34	0.15	0.02	0.03
30	0.41	0.04	0.04	0.04
31	0.43	0.14	0.07	0.03
32	0.46	0.02	0.09	0.04
33	0.42	0.08	0.05	0.03
34	0.41	0.06	0.06	0.06
35	0.41	0.07	0.07	0.05
36	0.44	0.04	0.02	0.04
37	0.43	0.03	0.06	0.07
38	0.36	0.16	0.04	0.04
39	0.45	0.04	0.07	0.07
40	0.32	0.07	0.07	0.03
41	0.46	0.05	0.06	0.04

^aCensus tracts in gray have greater support for CpM than the PP, the winning party.

Appendix BG

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Moroccan-born, Ceuta 2011

Tract	PP	Caballas	PSOE
1	0.09	0.14	0.38
2	0.09	0.14	0.36
3	0.10	0.15	0.31
4	0.09	0.14	0.34
5	0.14	0.15	0.31
6	0.10	0.16	0.32
7	0.10	0.13	0.34
8	0.09	0.14	0.33
9	0.11	0.15	0.34
10	0.09	0.16	0.32
11	0.09	0.18	0.32
12	0.09	0.17	0.33
13	0.10	0.18	0.35
14	0.10	0.15	0.36
15	0.10	0.17	0.29
16	0.09	0.14	0.33
17	0.11	0.15	0.33
18	0.10	0.17	0.33
19	0.10	0.15	0.36
20	0.09	0.15	0.33
21	0.11	0.15	0.35
22	0.10	0.15	0.31
23	0.09	0.15	0.33
24	0.09	0.14	0.36
25	0.09	0.16	0.31
26	0.08	0.17	0.31
27	0.10	0.15	0.32
28	0.08	0.13	0.35
29	0.11	0.13	0.31
30	0.09	0.17	0.29
31	0.09	0.17	0.33
32	0.09	0.18	0.29
33	0.07	0.18	0.34
34	0.09	0.16	0.34
35	0.08	0.16	0.34
36	0.07	0.16	0.38
37	0.09	0.20	0.35
38	0.11	0.16	0.30
39	0.09	0.15	0.32
40	0.11	0.16	0.33
41	0.08	0.15	0.33
42	0.08	0.16	0.30
43	0.11	0.13	0.31
44	0.11	0.19	0.36
45	0.09	0.15	0.32
46	0.09	0.17	0.36
47	0.12	0.15	0.31
48	0.11	0.16	0.33
49	0.09	0.22	0.30
50	0.07	0.17	0.40
51	0.09	0.17	0.36
52	0.07	0.19	0.42
53	0.09	0.15	0.36

Appendix BH

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Moroccan-born, Melilla 2011

Tract	PP	CpM	PSOE	PPL
1	0.10	0.12	0.17	0.15
2	0.11	0.11	0.19	0.15
3	0.11	0.11	0.17	0.15
4	0.12	0.11	0.17	0.15
5	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.15
6	0.10	0.09	0.17	0.12
7	0.12	0.11	0.15	0.16
8	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.12
9	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.15
10	0.11	0.14	0.20	0.17
11	0.12	0.13	0.17	0.13
12	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.11
13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.11
14	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.08
15	0.13	0.12	0.19	0.10
16	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.12
17	0.10	0.12	0.17	0.17
18	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.13
19	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.13
20	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.17
21	0.10	0.11	0.17	0.14
22	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.15
23	0.13	0.10	0.15	0.15
24	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.14
25	0.11	0.13	0.18	0.14
26	0.10	0.12	0.19	0.14
27	0.12	0.10	0.15	0.15
28	0.12	0.10	0.17	0.13
29	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.14
30	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.15
31	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.14
32	0.11	0.12	0.18	0.14
33	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.12
34	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.15
35	0.11	0.11	0.18	0.14
36	0.13	0.12	0.17	0.15
37	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.13
38	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.14
39	0.11	0.11	0.17	0.13
40	0.09	0.12	0.17	0.16
41	0.11	0.12	0.15	0.13

Appendix BI

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by Other Foreign-born, Ceuta 2011

Tract	PP	Caballas	PSOE
1	0.08	0.09	0.13
2	0.07	0.08	0.11
3	0.08	0.07	0.12
4	0.07	0.08	0.12
5	0.06	0.09	0.12
6	0.09	0.06	0.12
7	0.08	0.07	0.11
8	0.07	0.06	0.11
9	0.09	0.07	0.13
10	0.07	0.06	0.11
11	0.06	0.07	0.13
12	0.08	0.08	0.13
13	0.08	0.08	0.11
14	0.07	0.09	0.13
15	0.08	0.08	0.10
16	0.06	0.06	0.16
17	0.07	0.06	0.12
18	0.09	0.07	0.09
19	0.06	0.07	0.10
20	0.06	0.07	0.12
21	0.09	0.08	0.12
22	0.07	0.06	0.12
23	0.08	0.08	0.11
24	0.06	0.08	0.12
25	0.08	0.06	0.11
26	0.08	0.08	0.11
27	0.09	0.08	0.10
28	0.08	0.09	0.11
29	0.09	0.07	0.11
30	0.07	0.07	0.10
31	0.09	0.08	0.10
32	0.08	0.08	0.11
33	0.09	0.07	0.11
34	0.09	0.08	0.11
35	0.08	0.07	0.12
36	0.08	0.08	0.10
37	0.09	0.07	0.10
38	0.07	0.09	0.11
39	0.06	0.07	0.13
40	0.07	0.09	0.13
41	0.08	0.08	0.12
42	0.08	0.08	0.11
43	0.09	0.08	0.11
44	0.07	0.08	0.11
45	0.06	0.08	0.11
46	0.10	0.11	0.16
47	0.07	0.08	0.10
48	0.08	0.08	0.12
49	0.07	0.08	0.13
50	0.07	0.08	0.11
51	0.07	0.08	0.11
52	0.07	0.07	0.11
53	0.13	0.09	0.10

Appendix BJ

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by Other Foreign-born, Melilla 2011

Tract	PP	CpM	PSOE	PPL
1	0.21	0.09	0.11	0.10
2	0.19	0.09	0.13	0.09
3	0.22	0.09	0.10	0.11
4	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.10
5	0.20	0.11	0.09	0.11
6	0.20	0.10	0.11	0.11
7	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.11
8	0.20	0.09	0.11	0.11
9	0.20	0.11	0.10	0.12
10	0.20	0.09	0.13	0.12
11	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.11
12	0.21	0.09	0.11	0.09
13	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.11
14	0.28	0.15	0.13	0.07
15	0.21	0.10	0.10	0.10
16	0.22	0.09	0.10	0.11
17	0.21	0.09	0.09	0.12
18	0.21	0.10	0.09	0.11
19	0.20	0.10	0.11	0.10
20	0.20	0.08	0.10	0.12
21	0.22	0.08	0.10	0.09
22	0.20	0.08	0.10	0.09
23	0.19	0.08	0.10	0.09
24	0.18	0.10	0.09	0.11
25	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.09
26	0.18	0.10	0.09	0.12
27	0.20	0.08	0.10	0.13
28	0.18	0.08	0.10	0.09
29	0.20	0.08	0.10	0.13
30	0.22	0.08	0.12	0.10
31	0.20	0.09	0.08	0.11
32	0.19	0.09	0.09	0.10
33	0.20	0.08	0.09	0.10
34	0.21	0.10	0.10	0.11
35	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.12
36	0.20	0.11	0.10	0.10
37	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.12
38	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.10
39	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.09
40	0.20	0.09	0.10	0.09
41	0.19	0.11	0.09	0.09

Appendix BK

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born, Ceuta 2007

Tract	PP	UDCE-IU	PSOE
1	0.53	0.01	0.04
2	0.49	0.02	0.04
3	0.52	0	0.04
4	0.50	0.01	0.05
5	0.46	0	0.05
6	0.49	0	0.06
7	0.53	0.01	0.04
8	0.51	0.01	0.03
9	0.46	0.01	0.05
10	0.56	0.01	0.07
11	0.45	0.04	0.07
12	0.36	0.12	0.05
13	0.37	0.17	0.03
14	0.46	0.01	0.04
15	0.51	0.05	0.05
16	0.39	0.12	0.06
17	0.54	0	0.03
18	0.54	0.02	0.05
19	0.49	0	0.04
20	0.54	0	0.09
21	0.53	0.05	0.06
22	0.39	0.12	0.05
23	0.56	0.02	0.04
24	0.43	0.03	0.05
25	0.57	0.01	0.06
26	0.60	0.02	0.05
27	0.53	0.08	0.03
28	0.58	0	0
29	0.63	0.01	0.05
30	0.47	0.04	0.05
31	0.43	0.07	0.05
32	0.44	0.03	0.08
33	0.57	0.01	0.08
34	0.33	0.17	0.03
35	0.23	0.23	0.01
36	0.19	0.25	0.02 ^a
37	0.49	0.07	0.04
38	0.61	0.21	0.07
39	0.07	0.35	0.04
40	0.39	0.17	0.04
41	0.35	0.10	0.04
42	0.50	0.08	0.03
43	0.42	0.14	0.03
44	0.43	0.12	0.04
45	0.14	0.26	0
46	0.57	0.03	0.06
47	0.18	0.34	0.03
48	0.20	0.24	0.06
49	0.08	0.39	0.03
50	0.11	0.34	0.05
51	0.10	0.36	0.01
52	0.14	0.12	0.02

^aCensus tracts in gray have greater support for UDCE-IU than the PP, the winning party.

Appendix BL

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Spanish-born, Melilla 2007

Tract	PP	CpM	PSOE
1	0.43	0.05	0.10
2	0.38	0.14	0.12
3	0.38	0.04	0.07
4	0.46	0.04	0.08
5	0.39	0.09	0.08
6	0.25	0.12	0.10
7	0.37	0.15	0.08
8	0.25	0.20	0.06
9	0.24	0.24	0.12 ^a
10	0.19	0.42	0.06
11	0.22	0.29	0.07
12	0.14	0.43	0.05
13	0.11	0.38	0.10
14	0.21	0.20	0.12
15	0.20	0.31	0.09
16	0.11	0.50	0.05
17	0.40	0.04	0.13
18	0.43	0.06	0.09
19	0.42	0.09	0.09
20	0.47	0.08	0.14
21	0.40	0.08	0.13
22	0.41	0.12	0.09
23	0.32	0.15	0.10
24	0.36	0.18	0.09
25	0.47	0.03	0.10
26	0.41	0.11	0.14
27	0.47	0.02	0.14
28	0.43	0.07	0.11
29	0.42	0.05	0.11
30	0.41	0.06	0.17
31	0.55	0.01	0.08
32	0.48	0.03	0.13
33	0.42	0.10	0.10
34	0.44	0.03	0.09
35	0.41	0.07	0.15

^aCensus tracts in gray have greater support for CpM than the PP, the winning party.

Appendix BM

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Foreign-born, Ceuta 2007

Tract	PP	UDCE-IU	PSOE
1	0.13	0.16	0.39
2	0.18	0.13	0.34
3	0.20	0.11	0.38
4	0.16	0.15	0.40
5	0.14	0.10	0.45
6	0.18	0.15	0.36
7	0.15	0.11	0.38
8	0.15	0.14	0.43
9	0.15	0.18	0.37
10	0.16	0.15	0.34
11	0.13	0.13	0.35
12	0.12	0.13	0.38
13	0.12	0.15	0.35
14	0.15	0.16	0.36
15	0.14	0.17	0.36
16	0.13	0.14	0.34
17	0.15	0.17	0.34
18	0.09	0.16	0.36
19	0.15	0.13	0.34
20	0.14	0.18	0.32
21	0.16	0.14	0.36
22	0.12	0.11	0.29
23	0.13	0.17	0.43
24	0.16	0.18	0.29
25	0.18	0.17	0.31
26	0.15	0.15	0.38
27	0.15	0.16	0.33
28	0.15	0.12	0.39
29	0.16	0.19	0.27
30	0.14	0.17	0.34
31	0.15	0.17	0.29
32	0.15	0.12	0.35
33	0.13	0.16	0.36
34	0.15	0.17	0.37
35	0.15	0.19	0.38
36	0.15	0.23	0.31
37	0.18	0.18	0.30
38	0.13	0.11	0.48
39	0.15	0.17	0.38
40	0.13	0.15	0.37
41	0.17	0.16	0.37
42	0.14	0.16	0.32
43	0.15	0.18	0.36
44	0.13	0.15	0.34
45	0.18	0.20	0.23
46	0.14	0.16	0.32
47	0.15	0.17	0.36
48	0.12	0.18	0.40
49	0.12	0.13	0.41
50	0.13	0.19	0.36
51	0.14	0.21	0.36
52	0.15	0.15	0.35

Appendix BN

Estimated Proportion of Votes Cast by the Overseas-born, Melilla 2007

Tract	PP	CpM	PSOE
1	0.16	0.14	0.31
2	0.15	0.16	0.32
3	0.16	0.14	0.29
4	0.15	0.18	0.24
5	0.15	0.13	0.27
6	0.17	0.24	0.24
7	0.14	0.19	0.36
8	0.13	0.22	0.23
9	0.17	0.17	0.30
10	0.13	0.22	0.32
11	0.14	0.16	0.29
12	0.12	0.19	0.30
13	0.13	0.18	0.31
14	0.18	0.17	0.29
15	0.14	0.24	0.32
16	0.13	0.20	0.32
17	0.19	0.12	0.26
18	0.15	0.17	0.28
19	0.15	0.15	0.28
20	0.16	0.15	0.25
21	0.21	0.15	0.24
22	0.11	0.12	0.29
23	0.15	0.21	0.23
24	0.20	0.14	0.29
25	0.13	0.14	0.32
26	0.13	0.15	0.33
27	0.16	0.19	0.27
28	0.15	0.15	0.27
29	0.14	0.12	0.37
30	0.14	0.12	0.24
31	0.15	0.13	0.28
32	0.13	0.18	0.29
33	0.16	0.16	0.27
34	0.17	0.15	0.28
35	0.18	0.13	0.31

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