Reconciliation without Forgiveness: The EU in Promoting Postwar Cooperation in Serbia and Kosovo
I. Introduction

Long known as the "powder keg of Europe", the Balkans stands as a multi-ethnic region rich in history and the often-violent interactions between these different groups. As a longtime borderland between Christian Europe and the encroaching Muslim Ottoman Empire, the Slavic lands of the southeast and Germanic lands of north-central Europe, it comes as no surprise that the region has played a major role in several world conflicts. Concentrated in particular around the lands that would become Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslavia, the 20th century played witness to a great deal of bloodshed and terror. The Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s, along with names like Srebrenica, shocked a Western world that thought such days were behind it. The late 1990s saw again an eruption of violence between the government of Serbia and a growing ethnic-Albanian insurgent movement in its autonomous province of Kosovo, which ended in further ethnic cleansing, NATO bombs falling on Belgrade, and a forcible removal of the province from government control. In the wake of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, there are still many questions regarding the Serbia-Kosovo relationship that need answering moving forward after the devastation at the turn of the century.

Long locked in limbo, Serbia and Kosovo face a turning point at which living as neighbors could be a real possibility should a process of reconciliation be successful. Kosovo's autonomy and de facto independence is likely irreversible, and Serbia is slowly beginning to accept that its political and social exchanges with its former province, recognized or not, will need to occur within the status quo. The European Union holds a unique position as both a mediator and aspiration for Serbia and Kosovo, maintaining significant leverage over both nations' governments and societies. A nudge towards a gradual reconciliation between the two former enemies is complicated by the legal status of Kosovo, but certainly not impossible. This
paper will examine the current status of the Serbia-Kosovo relationship within reconciliation frameworks, and will argue that if the EU can play an active role in jump-starting an elite-driven reconciliation process through trust- and confidence-building measures, socio-economic development, and the gradual equalization of national narratives, a workable level of reconciliation and coexistence between the former foes, Serbia and Kosovo, is within reach.

II. Kosovo and Serbia: Myth-Making, War, and Separation

The place of Kosovo in Serbian national mythology has its roots in the year 1389, when on June 28 the advancing armies of Ottoman Turkey, pushing northwards into the Balkans, met with a force of Serbian defenders under the command of Prince Lazarevic on a field near the modern-day city of Pristina (Bieber, 187). Estimates vary, but leading Western historians often cite close to 30,000 troops for the Ottomans and around 20,000 for the Serbs, and the fighting was fierce (Malcolm, 64). Though both Serbian Prince Lazarevic and Ottoman Sultan Murad I were killed, "everything else about the battle of Kosovo is uncertain," though if it were indeed a small Serbian victory it would certainly be a Pyrrhic one (Malcolm, 61). However, "it does make sense to regard the battle of Kosovo as an important turning-point, the event which ensured that Serbian statehood would be extinguished sooner or later" (Malcolm, 58).

Over the next century, the Ottoman advance would continue, eventually conquering the Serbian lands and beginning nearly six centuries of Turkish rule over the region (Zivkovic, 189). The young Serbian state, reborn in the late 19th century, would not again have control of the mythical land of Kosovo until 1912, at which point hundreds of years of Turkish rule had realigned the ethnic makeup of the province to favor ethnic Albanian Muslims (Malcolm, 69).

Trouble had been brewing for years in Kosovo before the outbreak of widespread violence in the 1990s. Though the new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 granted what was...
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essentially self-governance and autonomy to Kosovo, it would be relatively short-lived (Zimmermann, 235). After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to fracture, slowly, along ethnic lines. Clashes between the primarily-Albanian police force and Serb minority in Kosovo fomented constant tensions through the 1980s in the form of rioting and protests on both sides. The year 1987 brought a new development: Serbian Communist leader Slobodan Milosevic, a relatively uninspiring party official, was dispatched to Kosovo "to mediate what was considered a minor incident in a dispute between the ethnic Albanian majority and minority Serbs" (Doder, 109). Though clearly uncomfortable with the horde of angry Serbs before him, indignant at what they claimed was abuse by the Albanian police, Milosevic famously uttered the words "No one will beat you again!", launching him to fame as hero of the Serbs and in an instant turning him against the anti-nationalist mantra of Marshal Tito (Zimmermann, 235; "Speech of Slobodan Milosevic at Kosovo Polje April 24, 1987.").

Two years later on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Field, on June 28, 1989, now-Serbian leader Milosevic again took to the podium. Before nearly two million chanting people, he proclaimed that "Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, [and] also defended Europe" ("Slobodan Milosevic's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."), extolling the nation's virtuous martyrdom in the face of the Turks and warning the crowd that "armed battles…cannot be excluded yet" ("Slobodan Milosevic's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."). The nationalistic fervor echoed the mythology of his 1987 speech, in which he asserted: "Yugoslavia and Serbia will never give up Kosovo!" ("Slobodan Milosevic's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."). The myth was complete, and Milosevic followed up his speech by revoking Kosovo's autonomous status that had been laid out in 1974 and asserting federal police control. Local Albanian leadership responded with a unilateral declaration of independence in 1990, which led Belgrade to respond
by totally dissolving the province's government and purging its administrative ranks of ethnic Albanians (Seifert, 218). The gradual formation of parallel shadow government by unofficial Kosovar Albanian President Ibrahim Rugova follows, as he warns Albanians in the coming years to defend themselves against Serb aggression (Daalder, 40).

Following the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and their lack of resolution for Kosovo, ethnic Albanians began to take more extreme action. By 1996, the newly-founded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was ramping up terror attacks against Serbian police forces and other targets, erupting into a full-blown uprising in the following two years (Zimmermann, 235). In March 1998, the situation in Kosovo quickly turned uglier, as a series of KLA assaults on Serbian police positions led to brutal reprisals from security forces. Between March 5 and 7, more than 50 residents of the town of Prekaz were killed by Serbian forces, prompting a wave of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations within both Kosovo and Serbia (Daalder, 61-62). Western-sponsored talks between Milosevic and Rugova, overseen by former negotiator of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke, got nowhere in the following months, taking place before the backdrop of more killings and reprisals by both sides in Kosovo (Fischer, 141).

By the late summer of 1998, Serbian army and police forces had succeeded in assaulting several villages in Kosovo's Drenica region, pushing Kosovar Albanians and KLA members out into the surrounding countryside and hills (Daalder, 61). On September 23, the United Nations Security Council voted to approve Resolution 1199 urging a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo and demanding the right of refugees to return to their homes, though this was met with little response by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Scattered violence continued throughout the rest of the year despite NATO's apparent victory in convincing Milosevic to withdraw many
security forces from Kosovo, including multiple massacres by Serb paramilitaries and retaliatory strikes by the KLA around the villages of Gornje Obrinje and Podujevo (Daalder, 70).

By the time dawn rose on 1999, peace was appearing increasingly unlikely, as President Clinton continued to draw up plans with his national security team and NATO renewed its force activation order to maintain its military threat should the need arise. Continuing talks in France between Kosovar Albanian and Serbian delegations, with the oversight of U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Senator Bob Dole, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, and others, eventually convinced the Albanians to accept autonomy within the remains of Yugoslavia; however, on March 18, Serbian representatives refused, the Serbian military prepared for spring assaults, and Western diplomats left Belgrade in droves. Milosevic refused to cave, and on March 24, 1999 NATO went to war for the first time in its history (Daalder, 5-10).

As the bombs fell on Serbia, Serb forces unleashed a massive ground offensive within Kosovo, rounding up ethnic Albanians and shipping them towards the border with Macedonia in a wholesale campaign of ethnic cleansing. Refugees poured out of Kosovo, and accusations flew at Serb forces detailing of horrifying massacres of ethnic Albanian civilians. Belgrade endured numerous air strikes and cruise missile impacts, and 78 days after the start of the NATO campaign Milosevic agreed to remove all Serbian troops from Kosovo. NATO troops and UN peacekeeping forces (KFOR) entered the province, and though the KLA had agreed to lay down its arms many ethnic Serb civilians fled for their lives as ethnic Albanian reprisals torched churches, burned homes, and threatened violence (Abrahams, 64).

In the wake of the war, it would be several years before Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership even held direct discussions regarding the status of the province. By the time this occurred in 2006, Ibrahim Rugova, champion of the independence movement, had been chosen
as Kosovo's president and subsequently died of cancer, former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj had been indicted on charges of war crimes, and 19 people had died in and around the northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica in ethnic clashes. Despite a Serbian referendum in October 2006 that affirmed Kosovo to be an unassailable part of national territory, the drive for independence was picking up steam ("Kosovo Profile - Timeline - BBC News."). Months of UN-brokered negotiations in 2007 over Kosovo's future status could not reach a compromise, and Kosovo declared unilateral independence on February 17, 2008. Though recognized by the United States and much of the European Union, major powers like Russia and China maintained that the declaration was illegal, as did Serbia ("Kosovo Profile - Timeline - BBC News."). Violence quickly broke out once more, as ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in northern Kosovo clashed with one another and peacekeeping forces in the area, leaving many injured. During this time, protests also erupted across Serbia, and culminated in the burning of the American embassy in Belgrade as thousands marched in the Serbian capital declaring, "Kosovo je Srbija!" ("Kosovo is Serbia!") ("US Starts Evacuation from Serbia."). After the Kosovo parliament agreed on a new constitution in the summer of 2008 and governmental power was transferred to majority-Albanian authorities, parallel Serb-dominated administrative structures began to arise in Mitrovica in the north of the country with the support of Serbia (Daalder, 203).

The second decade of the 21st century brought with it slightly more progress for the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, as the UN's International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's independence was not illegal with regards to accepted international law, and Serbia began to slowly accept the reality of the situation. In 2013, after several years of slow negotiations that included the normalization of border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo receiving its own telephone code, and Serbian government support for ethnic-Serb
populations within its former province, the two nations reached a huge turning point in which both agreed to not hinder one another's attempts at membership within the European Union moving forward ("After 7 Years of Independence"). This signaled the beginning of a de facto normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia that provides a great deal of precedent for the gradual development of the relationship into one of peaceful neighbors rather than bitter foes.

III. Interstate Reconciliation: Setting Parameters for Methodology

i. Defining Reconciliation: He’s Model

Though there are multiple schools of thought on reconciliation from a number of academic fields, this paper will utilize methodology related to intergroup reconciliation. The “groups” in this case are the societies and governments of states, as well as the states themselves at an international level. It is important to keep in mind that the process of reconciliation, according to many eminent scholars in the field, is an open-ended process, and one that can be inherently beneficial to the states involved regardless of the current status quo. As explained by Bar-Siman-Tov, reconciliation is “a psychological endeavor achieved through a psychological process,” in this case extrapolated onto an interstate tier.

It is the spectrum of reconciliation laid out by Yinan He that proves most useful and clear for comparing cases of reconciliation and maintaining a firm grasp on the process. This paradigm He has formulated lays out three indicators for determining the status of an interstate relationship, the severity (or lack) of which categorizes said relationships into three different levels of reconciliation (1160). These indicators are, as He describes: a shared expectation of war, national recognition, and economic interaction. All three go a great length towards identifying, at least generally, the health and status of an international relationship. Though Kosovo is not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia, five of the European Union’s 28
member states, and nearly half of the UN’s member states, the relationship functions for all intents and purposes as an international one.

He continues to clarify his aforementioned levels of reconciliation into three categories: non-reconciliation, shallow reconciliation, and deep reconciliation. Deep interstate reconciliation serves as the ideal goal for a relationship between former enemy states, and despite the process’ indefinite nature there are many benchmarks for determining progress, to be discussed later. Non-reconciliation stands as the lowest rung on the hierarchy, as in this state of affairs states maintain no official relationship, disagree about major sovereignty issues, have little economic interaction or interdependency, and, perhaps most importantly, expect that the possibility of war or violence is extremely plausible. Shallow reconciliation, the middle tier on the spectrum, sees states interacting with normalized relations and a notable level of economic interaction; however, sovereignty or territorial disputes remain unsettled and though war is not an immediate fear there remains no guarantee of long-lasting peace. Deep interstate reconciliation, the highest tier laid out by He, features an interstate relationship in which war or a return to violence is totally unthinkable and peace is the norm. There are no sovereignty disputes, and there are high levels of economic interconnectedness, interaction, and cooperation. Lastly, the societies in each state tend to hold one another is generally warm regard (He 1160).

This model provides an excellent framework for exploring the Serbia-Kosovo relationship thanks to its straightforwardness and relevant indicators; He’s comparison of Germany-Poland and Japan-China on the post-World War II international stage utilizes this same framework, allowing for a level of standardization in determining the level of reconciliation in an interstate relationship.

ii. Reconciliation without Forgiveness: A Philosophical View
It is extremely important to note in this regard Feldman's point that "the very nature of reconciliation...is [that of] an ongoing process typically without a definable end" (Feldman 7); even relatively advanced cases of reconciliation, such as Germany and Poland, are not at an "endpoint." By this measure, there is no true extant endpoint of reconciliation, as constructing interpersonal, intercultural, and intergovernmental ties, particularly within an institution like the European Union, can continue as long as both parties are willing and committed to the process. This philosophical and theological view of reconciliation stresses the idea that some crimes, specifically horrific evils like the Holocaust, will never be and can never be forgiven. However, that is not to say that the "sinner", the perpetrator, cannot be forgiven in a fashion that enables reconciliation. What is needed in this model of reconciliation is not, as Feldman describes, "the resurrection of old ties" (7), but rather a totally new relationship constructed on a reexamination of narratives, sources of conflict, and the prospects of future cooperation, which can help societies and governments develop a fundamentally lens through which to view former adversaries. Forgiveness, therefore, may be a part of the reconciliatory process, but Feldman argues that it is not necessary nor should it be expected. While forgiveness is a major aspect of traditional, interpersonal models of religiously-based reconciliation, interstate reconciliation on the international stage does not require such measures. At the very least, states can form a pragmatic relationship that amounts to peaceful coexistence without forgetting crimes perpetrated by or against them--as Feldman describes, "recognizes and accepts the past without condoning it, [and] compensates for the past without indulging it" (Feldman 18).

IV. **Historical Precedent: Case Studies of Interstate Reconciliation**

To say that Serbia and Kosovo are locked into an irresolvable situation is to discount entirely past examples of interstate reconciliation throughout the world. The 20th and 21st
centuries are ripe with case studies for comparison; though these interstate pairings today represent varying levels of success and progress on reconciliation, there are valuable lessons to be gleaned from the post-World War II world order.

i. Germany and Poland

Wedged precariously between Prussia, Austria, and various iterations of the Russian Empire, Poland has long experienced division and foreign rule over the past three centuries. After the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1940, Poland was again torn apart by the aggressions of Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi Germany. N occupation in particular took a horrific toll on the Polish nation and, combined with the systematic extermination of Jews in the country, left more than six million Polish citizens dead. The postwar division of Germany and incorporation of Poland into the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc provided huge hurdles for reconciliation between the two former enemies. While the Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) had formal relations with Poland, it remained unrecognized and vehemently opposed by its western counterpart in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). It was between the FRG and Poland that the process of reconciliation would take place.

The postwar climate was contentious, as West Germany under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) placed a great deal of emphasis on wartime German victimhood, rather than Nazi crimes. Of particular note was the Adenauer administration’s refusal to recognize the nation’s eastern border; that is, saw the border of East Germany with Poland as illegitimate due to Poland’s postwar territorial gains at the expense of Germany. A major reinforcement of this attitude came in the form of West Germany’s academic textbooks, which focused on German suffering as opposed to the Holocaust and Nazi belligerence. Of course, this concept had a counterpart in Poland, where communist authorities
played down the history of Soviet and Russian aggression while portraying Polish history as a constant sacrifice at the hands of bloodthirsty Germany. However, both of these government lines played heavily to long-standing prejudices between Germany and Poland, as appealed as much to popular belief as they did to any overarching Cold War ideological affiliation. Mutual misunderstandings and a lockdown on information on the Eastern side certainly did not help matters, as both sides took one another’s lack of remorse as a sign of aggression to come.

The leadership of Willy Brandt in the FRG after 1969 led to a thawing of relations, and the introduction Brandt’s policies of *Ostpolitik*. These initiatives focused on forming ties with the Communist bloc with the aim of fostering relations with East Germany. An increased openness and reflection on Nazi crimes and World War II-era Germany history in the West contributed to a gradual increase in collective memory, acknowledgment, and understanding of Germany’s aggressor role in the war. Perhaps most notable was Brandt’s apparently spontaneous gesture in December 1970: while visiting a memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Brandt unexpectedly knelt in silence before the monument, a move that was widely photographed and helped inspire a wave of positive sentiment in Communist Poland. The Treaty of Warsaw of 1970, in which the FRG accepted the Oder-Neisse Line as a legitimate border, also helped to reduce tensions. He emphasizes that this change in discourse did not come about entirely on its own, but rather was the result of a calculated, rationalized thought process for West German leadership. Were the FRG to have any chance of recreating a united Germany, it “had to secure a friendly relationship with the Eastern bloc countries so that they would tolerate closer connections between the two Germanys” (1186). He also cites what he calls the convergence of historical memory between publics in West Germany and Poland in the 1960s and 1970s as critical factor in driving the process of interstate reconciliation.
The Solidarity movement in Poland beginning in 1980 helped to inspire a reexamination of national history as well, despite the attempts by the military government of General Jaruzelski to clamp down on civil society. It was during this decade that intellectual debates arose regarding Poland’s “moral responsibility for the Holocaust” (1171) and the wartime actions and brutality of Poland’s erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Overall, the reflection contributed to a reduction in the Polish self-image of a victim, while simultaneously turning full blame for the atrocities away from Germany.

Popular feeling in both Poland and Germany, however, did not necessarily keep pace with interstate relations, signaling the postwar reconciliation may not have been as deep in all levels of society as it might seem at first glance. Even after German reunification and the fall of Communism in Poland, large chunks of both societies still viewed each other antagonistically according to polls, expressing doubt that there could ever be warm feelings between the societies. However, the 1990s saw a huge turnaround in this public opinion, the culmination of decades of elite-driven interstate dialogue and cooperation. Poland’s gradual integration into the larger European community and European Union helped to solidify German-Polish relations within a reliable framework, and alleviated the security concerns that had so often defined postwar dialogues between the two nations. It is important to note, however, that a deepening of interstate reconciliation does not signify an end of the road; in fact it is “an open-ended, continuing process in which history will not be forgotten or stop being debated” (1176).

ii. Japan and China

The historical relationship between Japan and China, much like that between Germany and Poland, featured a great deal of tension, violence, and hatred in the years before the Second World War. Beginning in 1937, the Sino-Japanese rivalry rose to new levels, as Japan’s war of
conquest against mainland China left nearly 10 million Chinese dead and countless wounded, mutilated, and scarred. Brutality of unprecedented levels was seen as invading Japanese forces killed, raped, and pillaged their way across the country. In the infamous “Rape of Nanking” in the winter of 1937-1938, it is estimated that more than 200,000 unarmed Chinese, according to the postwar Tokyo War Crimes Trial, were massacred in sadistic fashion by Imperial Japanese troops. This violence continued throughout the war as Japan ruled parts of China under various military governments and puppet states. Japan suffered greatly during the Second World War as well; though not in the position of “victim” as was China, Japan by the end of the war had lost millions of soldiers and civilians, seen its cities and industry destroyed, experienced nuclear weapons, and been occupied by the United States.

As was the case in Europe, postwar Japan and China quickly found themselves on opposite sides of the ideological divide that would morph into the Cold War. Once Mao Zedong’s Communists established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and aligned themselves with the Soviet Union, the victorious United States quickly became far more interested in propping up Japan as a regional ally than in promoting confrontation with its bloody wartime history. Mao’s China, ruled by the Communist Party, clamped down on civil society, and as a totalitarian state was not ripe ground for a discussion of China’s wartime role or its relationship with Japan.

It was in both of these countries that He’s idea of national myth-making came into play. Both Japanese and Chinese leadership constructed, implemented, and sustained narratives regarding their nations’ respective roles in the Second World War. Japan is notable due to the continuity of many wartime members of the government in the postwar administration; indeed, Japan did not undergo the type of postwar purges that Germany instituted as a part of its De-
Nazification process. This meant that conservative forces in the Japanese postwar government held a vested interest in downplaying wartime atrocities and instituting several pernicious national myths. **He** describes in his work three main national myths in postwar Japan, which attribute World War II in Asia to a small circle of military leaders, brush off Japanese atrocities in the Pacific, and attempt to glorify the sacrifices of ordinary Japanese soldiers. Another critical facet of He’s argument lies in the fact that even Japan’s postwar left-wing parties, such as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), displayed a great deal of opposition to the idea of collective national responsibility, instead focusing on the image of the Japanese nation as a victim or hostage to a military junta. Chinese Communist government line, though focused on demonizing the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan, placed a great deal of emphasis on Chinese wartime suffering at the hands of Japan.

After 1970, the international political atmosphere shifted; a falling-out between the Soviet Union and PRC and recognition of the PRC by the United States pushed Japan to do the same, and in 1972 Japan and the PRC normalized relations. While the threat of war receded between the two nations and in the minds of their publics, there is significant evidence to suggest that the relationship did not move beyond a stage of shallow reconciliation. Rather than engage in deep discussion of historical grievances, China and Japan instead generally paved over the memory of the Second World War in the interest of promoting bilateral trade, investment, and infrastructural development. However, even this progress saw setbacks during the mid-1980s, when an increase in Japanese defense spending, Chinese rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and controversial visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni war shrine contributed to a wave of anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese public sentiment in China and Japan, respectively. Japan’s pre-war colonialism in and postwar relationship with Taiwan did not help matters.
A battle in the Japanese Parliament (the Diet) erupted during the early 1990s centered, on socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s attempted apology to nations in Asia for Japan’s “war of aggression” (SOURCE), a battle that saw a deadlock over the phrasing and issuing of the official text of the apology. In the end, a watered-down substitute was adopted, symptomatic of the historical implications that have plagued the Sino-Japanese relationship since the end of the Cold War. During this same period, the PRC’s leadership was stoking nationalist fervor in an attempt to re-unite the nation around Communist ideology in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre and pro-democracy movements in China.

The turn of the 21st century sees Sino-Japanese relations at a rather low point, certainly not past a level of shallow reconciliation. Basic historical facts and memories are heavily disputed, and both sides feel on both public and governmental levels that they have been wronged. Polls suggest that many in China feel that Japan has tried to evade its responsibility to confront and heal its historical legacy and has downplayed China’s wartime suffering; however, similar polls in Japan expose a feeling of Japan serving as a scapegoat for China’s problems and a belief that the Chinese “obsession” with history precludes any improved relationship. This impasse highlights the huge gulf in Sino-Japanese historical memory, an issue that has not been dealt with in the same effective manner as Germany and Poland.

V. Situating Serbia and Kosovo on the Reconciliation Spectrum

The postwar relationships of Germany and Poland on the one hand and Japan and China on the other provide solid foundations for comparisons with Serbia and Kosovo, and upon further examination there are a number of similarities. For the purposes of clarity and succinctness, this paper will use “Germany-Poland,” “Japan-China,” and “Serbia-Kosovo” to describe each respective interstate pairing.
All three of these interstate relationships founds themselves after the cessation of hostilities on opposing sides of significant ideological divides, divides which played a profound role in promoting, hindering, and influencing the reconciliation process. Both the Germany-Poland and Japan-China relationships developed before the backdrop of the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union battled for influence in the post-World War II world. However, these basic conditional similarities did not lead to identical or even very similar trajectories of reconciliation.

West Germany and Poland had to interact across the Iron Curtain, and plenty of resentment remained between the two nations after World War II due to Poland’s suffering at the hands of the Nazis and the controversy over Germans expelled from former territories after the war. However, West Germany’s main domestic and foreign policy goal lay not in Poland, but in reunification with East Germany. Therefore, West German leadership pursued a concerted policy of forming friendlier ties with the nations of the Eastern bloc, notably Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, in hopes of forming tighter links with its Communist Eastern counterpart. After the 1960s, West Germany also placed a huge amount of emphasis on unilateral apologies and building relationships with its neighbors (and former victims) based almost entirely on the idea of rehabilitation and reconciliation (Feldman). After the fall of Communism in Poland in 1989 and the nation’s further integration with the budding European Union in the early 1990s, the Germany-Poland relationship enjoyed exponential improvement; common institutions, frequent interactions in civil society, and democracy helped to build a shared sense of pan-European identity in both countries, which was followed by a wave of joint historical studies intended to construct a shared narrative of the past. As of the second decade of the 21st century, Germany
and Poland, as full, interconnected members of the European Union, have progressed to a state of deep interstate reconciliation.

The Japan-China relationship suffers from many of the same ills that plagued West Germany and Poland in the first two decades following the Second World War: a huge disparity in historical memory, a lack of a shared international framework, and nagging national myths in each nation regarding the other. However, the difference in this relationship is that the post-Cold War era has not seen much of an improvement or even many attempts at improvement by the parties involved. Japan after the Second World War was pushed by the United States to transform itself from a recovering nation into a powerful regional ally and buffer against both Communist China and its ally in the Soviet Union. Coming to terms with the wartime in brutality in China was far from the minds of American leadership, and China’s authoritarian government under Mao Zedong was far more interested in perpetuating memories of Japanese atrocities for political gain than it was in undergoing a comprehensive process of memory convergence with their island neighbor. Though the early years of the 21st century saw Japanese and Chinese authorities attempt to make a number of minor amends regarding public perception, there is little evidence to suggest that national memory has experienced any kind of true convergence, and is instead little more than a bandage on a gaping wound. The Japan-China relationship, therefore, is in a state of shallow reconciliation; while the specter of war has dimmed, there is no real sense of international community in Asia as in Europe, which has precluded the formation of a shared regional identity.

The postwar Serbia-Kosovo relationship was defined, particularly directly following the 1999 NATO intervention, by an estrangement of Serbia from the European and Western communities as a whole, with Kosovo firmly under the protection and influence of the European
Though NATO peacekeeping forces have been present in Kosovo since the 1999 war, it is safe to assume that in the years directly following the intervention Kosovo and Serbia were in a state of non-reconciliation, where a return to violence remained very possible. However, much as in the cases of Germany-Poland and Japan-China, the Serbia-Kosovo relationship has been hugely influenced by outside forces, particularly the European Union. Perhaps even more relevant is the imposition of a process or pathway to reconciliation from within; Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic’s willingness to interact with Kosovo’s leadership despite strong public opposition to a normalization of ties is akin to much of West Germany’s post-Adenauer leadership, which essentially decided on a path of reconciliation with its neighbors that was not born of grassroots support. With Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, significant international recognition, and normalization of ties with Serbia, the relationship between the two nations functions essentially as an international one despite Serbia’s refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of its former province.

The 2013 agreement signed in Brussels between Belgrade and Pristina, which normalized relations between the two former foes, also contained a critical promise that both Serbia and Kosovo would refrain from impeding one another’s aspirations for EU accession. Two previous deals in 2011 saw the two nations end a mutual embargo of one another’s goods and allow unrestricted movement between their respective territories for Serbian and Kosovo citizens (BalkanInsight). The freedom of trade and movement was further enhanced in mid-2015, when Belgrade and Pristina agreed on cross-border telecommunications policies and an opening of the long-disputed bridge over the Ibar River in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo (BalkanInsight). These agreements, though not without setbacks between the two parties, were overseen and facilitated by the European Union, and according to He’s indicator criteria seem to solidly
suggest that Serbia and Kosovo have transitioned into a state of shallow interstate reconciliation. With Serbia as an official candidate country for the European Union, and Kosovo now party to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, they are developing ever-closer ties with the common European framework that proved so beneficial for improving ties between Germany and Poland, and improving them at a surprising speed.

1. The case of the Vucic government in Serbia

As mentioned previously, the attitude of the Serbian government under the leadership of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic and the government Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) bears watching thanks to an intriguing process described by Spiro Economides as a "pre-accession Europeanization" (1030). The process describes a set of deliberate policy choices enacted by the Serbian government as a concerted effort to forcibly move the country in line with European Union-style values, particularly with regards to the Kosovo dispute. What is notable here is that this is done in the face of public opinion rather than as a result of it, much as was the case with the aforementioned reforms in post-World War II West Germany under the Adenauer government; essentially, Economides argues, "an explosive issue of national interest was addressed in a very unexpected way for the purpose of managing it and achieving material gain" (1038), without the overwhelming support of the public.

This behavior on the part of the Vucic administration did not appear out of the blue—far from it. While the EU could not, due to divisions among its own member states, ask Serbia to recognize Kosovo as a direct condition for membership, the Brussels Agreement of 2013, along with the *acquis communautaire* (common law) of the European Union stipulated that Belgrade achieve a degree of normality in its dealings with Pristina before Serbia's accession could hope to be completed. Economides argues that this negative conditionality, which essentially ties a tacit
acceptance of coexistence with Kosovo to Serbian membership in the European Union, sparked a huge surge of pragmatism within Serbian leadership: as long as membership within the EU is the ultimate incentive, the process of accession remains an incredibly useful tool with which the EU can in turn influence Serbia's Kosovo policy. Though much of the Serbian public and government does not openly acknowledge Kosovo's split with Serbia, economic concerns, the migrant crisis, and other pressing issues seem to have overshadowed much of the political posturing on the former province. This seeming willingness to accept the loss of Kosovo, however painful, in exchange for the economic growth, security, stability, and opportunity offered by the European Union in the eyes of many Serbs may be a sign of Europe's success in the Balkans – though perhaps in more of a coerced fashion than many in Brussels may have originally envisioned. Economides asserts that attitudes within Serbia towards Kosovo since 2008 have undergone a "profound change…and that this transformation has come about as a direct result of the influence of the EU" and as a "direct result of consequentialist logic" within the Vucic government in Serbia (1039).

VI. Recommendations for the European Union

Using He's model that builds upon this sense of reciprocal mistrust, there appears to be decent evidence to suggest that Kosovo and Serbia were until recently in a state of non-reconciliation, described as lacking in "any formal diplomatic relationship" and characterized by "clash[es] over significant sovereignty rights" (He, 1160). However, this is where the European Union can push and has pushed its advantage: Thanks to the Brussels Agreement of 2013 and normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations, the European Union has in a way encapsulated the sovereignty dispute within a kind of collective safety net, acting as a security guarantor that ensures violent conflict is an extremely unlikely option. "As the Balkans are all more or less
turned towards EU help in terms of economic and financial support, but also at the political and individual person level," argues Hebert, "the compulsory, enabling and connective impacts of the EU can be very high" (12). By this measure, Kosovo and Serbia are in reality in a state of shallow reconciliation, as the sovereignty issues themselves remain unsettled but there is at least a decent consensus that disagreements will not again escalate to armed conflict and violence (He, 1161).

One of the most critical options and outcomes that the parties involved must consider is revisiting the idea of "reconciliation without forgiveness," (Gardner Feldman, 6), a philosophical state in which "resentment can still be present but is accompanied by some degree of mutual respect" between former enemies and between a victim and a perpetrator. Naturally, many people in Serbia and Kosovo, both within and outside of leadership positions, have differing personal views on who exactly represents the perpetrator and who the victim, but the concept applies equally both ways. This lack of total reconciliation, while made understandable by the fact that some wartime atrocities need not be forgotten due to their brutality and impact on a collective memory, does not entail a failure of the reconciliation process. "Reconciliation is peace building, not peace itself," and therefore requires a greater, overarching commitment from all involved parties in order to be successful (Tang, 714). According to Bar-Siman-Tov, the process of reconciliation itself, which must ultimately be an organic one focused on the long-term objectives of establishing a lasting peace and changing of societal perception, is beneficial, as it promotes a "mobiliz[ation] of society's institutions to support" the end goal of a "formation of new beliefs, attitudes, motivations, goals, and emotions that support the peaceful relations" (Bar-Siman-Tov, 36-37).
Encouraging symbolic actions on the part of both governments is a huge first step towards showcasing goodwill and good faith in restoring a working relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. While the key word regarding this idea is "symbolic," these motions need not necessarily be practical to have a far-reaching effect on the prospect of reconciliation. Hebert mentions briefly the importance of a vote by the Serbian Parliament in 2010, which acknowledged responsibility for crimes in Srebrenica committed by troops under the command of General Ratko Mladic. (Hebert, 12). While Serbia has oftentimes been reluctant to push such cases farther, there are encouraging developments in recent years. In an example from 2014, Serbia's War Crimes Chamber sentenced several former Yugoslav army members "for the killing of over 120 Albanian civilians in 1999," and indicted others, including a former general, for "crimes against civilians" ("World Report 2015: Serbia."). Though a small step, such willingness to prosecute war criminals within Serbia provides a beacon of hope that government and civilian forces in the country are not totally unwilling to admit a modicum of responsibility for wartime atrocities (Vasovic; Fischer, 180). Moreover, such actions serve as an "externalization and particularization of acts of violence—transferring them into a political sphere above and beyond society and attributing violence to single culprits and not social groups—allow a coexistence of groups… even after conflict," which argues that the memory of violence does not necessarily irreparably damage an inter-ethnic or inter-communal relationship (Seifert, 228).

The European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) also successfully appealed for the reopening of cases in Kosovo against former KLA operatives and commanders, accused of wartime human rights abuses, in 2013. While this is certainly not the end-all, be-all in terms of reconciling with past abuses from the Kosovo war, the pressure placed on local court systems in Kosovo in particular via EULEX (and, by extension, the EU) are a solid
demonstration of the oversight role that the EU should continue to play in the region, and a reinforcement of EULEX’s “crucial role in investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating crimes involving public officials, war crimes, and corruption” ("Kosovo: Approval of Special Court Key Step for Justice."). Perhaps most encouraging is the sheer number of cases pending in the Kosovo court system under the supervision of EULEX; with more than 160 cases in the works, involving both ethnic-Serb and ethnic-Albanian defendants, this should be taken as the first step in what Gardner Feldman describes as an "institutionalized transformation" that leads to "patterns of commitment by both individuals and collectives" that "can facilitate the development of joint interests" over time (15). Specifically with regards to Kosovo's ethnic-Serb population (regarding which the conditions for reconciliation take on a slightly different form due to their internal nature), these war crimes cases can serve confidence-building measures in Kosovo's judicial system, thereby showcasing the "conciliatory manner" of the government in Pristina towards its ethnic-Serb citizens (Pente, 4).

On top of this, the European Union in Kosovo in particular has an in-built advantage, as "public trust in international institutions such as the EU… is high, and the Kosovo public in particular appears to see a role for these institutions in holding Kosovo’s politicians to account," allowing Europe to serve as the type of "systematic external and internal pressure" for both Serbia-Kosovo relations and for Kosovo's own internal judicial and political processes (Zabyelina, 21). Europe's many ongoing challenges (including the migrant crisis, ongoing uncertainties regarding a potential exit by the United Kingdom, fear of a collapse of the euro, a general aversion to expansion, to name but a few) mean that an accelerated accession timeline for Serbia is unlikely at best, and less so for Kosovo, and therefore not a viable policy as the political willpower is simply unavailable for the time being. However, a continued dialogue
between the two nations vis-à-vis the European Union can continue to forge bonds and promote coexistence in the background, "however imperfect they may be" (O'Halloran, 115).

Of course, these policies are not without their obstacles; as recently as April of 2015, Serbia's war crimes court threatened to arrest Kosovo's Hashim Thaci (now the country's Foreign Minister) should he enter Serbia to attend, ironically, a reconciliation conference in Belgrade ("Serbia Will Arrest Thaçi"). The European Union will need to convince Serbia on high-profile cases such as this to consider a type of "unilateral concession" as described by Kupchan, as this demonstrates a huge amount of good faith in inter-elite and intergovernmental negotiations that can provide valuable political capital down the road; as a confidence-building gesture, these sorts of "unilateral accommodations" reinforce the perception between states "that any disputes that might emerge among them would be resolved through peaceful means" (Kupchan, 2).

Looking back at the recent history of both Serbia and Kosovo, it becomes apparent that both nations (under the umbrella of Yugoslavia and later in the breakup) have been heavily influenced by the process of national mythmaking and the cooptation of said myths by powerful elites. The immediate example that stands head and shoulders above the rest is the rise and rule of Serbian Communist (and later nationalist) leader Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic is often credited with exacerbating and amplifying the mythology of Serbia's spiritual attachment to Kosovo. Indeed, while many of the Serbian Orthodox Church's most important monasteries and religious sites lie within Kosovo's borders, including the monasteries of Gracanica, Decani, and Pec, it is the legendary status of the Battle of Kosovo Field that holds some of the greatest sway in Serbian lore. Though the battle certainly took place, it is important to note that "mythologization… achieves its effect typically not through out-and-out falsification but through distortion, oversimplification, and omission of material that doesn't serve its purpose or runs
counter to it" (He, 1161). It is this glorification of a battle more than 600 years in the past that contributes to Serbia's sense of victimhood with regards to Kosovo, as the ultimate defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire plays right into a similar constructed narrative about Serbia being victimized by the power of NATO (He, 1161). In fostering a new sense of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo, the European Union and other outside actors will need to tackle the crux of the problem described by He:

"The perpetrator country’s self-glorifying and whitewashing myths will lead to a lack of sympathy for the victim country, and it will develop disgust for and frustration with the victim country, which will seem to be obsessed with the past. The victim country will also tend to link the unrepentant attitude of the perpetrator to its remaining or reviving aggressive ambitions. Meanwhile, the perpetrator country will find the victim’s sense of entitlement unjustified and will see it as merely a disguise for that country’s own hostile intentions" (1161-1162).

It is immediately obvious that this should be a critical area of focus between Kosovo, Serbia, and the European Union moving forward. In this regard, constructing a "common psychological framework" as described by Bar-Siman-Tov within which communications, societal interactions, and memory can flow freely, enabling dialogue about past conflicts and exposing each party's respective public to opposing viewpoints and experiences (Bar-Siman-Tov, 18). This fundamental reframing of interactions between former enemies is one of the first steps towards achieving a workable, lasting peace, and the European Union needs to put pressure on both Serbian and Kosovar leadership to participate in continuous cycles of confidence-buildings measures that can assure one another that they have committed to "adopt[ing] the principle of peaceful conflict resolution… that can resolve any possible conflict and disagreement" without
even the slightest hint of violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 23). Not only does this build trust and
mutual respect, but it also plays a critical role in reducing "the perception of threat and feelings
of fear that often underlie the eruptions of violence" (Bar-Siman-Tov, 23).

The European Union, in order to promote a deeper, more permanent form of
reconciliation, must strike in Kosovo and Serbia while the metaphorical iron is hot and
"intervene in a multi-dimensional manner to convert the current reservations into cooperation"
(Pente, 4); even after the normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations via the Brussels
Agreement, the two Balkan "countries are clearly ‘unfinished’…” and this ‘unfinished policy’
mentioned by Hebert essentially allows the European Union to utilize the motivation of eventual
accession to membership as a tool of reform (Hebert, 11-12). Both Kosovo and Serbia are
examples of "a Nation State with limited sovereignty," and should the EU allow this window of
opportunity close it could very well go down in history as a sorely-missed chance for real
progress in forcing Kosovo and Serbia to accept cooperation with one another (Hebert, 12).

VII. Conclusion

The reconciliation, rehabilitation, and development of the post-war, post-normalization
relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is one of modern Europe's most pressing challenges, yet
it presents an opportunity for the European Union to both flex its peace-building muscles and
achieve a genuine sense of stability in a deeply-troubled region ("EU relations with Kosovo").
Challenges abound across the board, from persistent national narratives that stand in the way of
an acceptance of the status quo to unrequited demands for apologies and accountability for
wartime crimes, but the European Union in particular stands in a uniquely-advantageous position
in which it serves simultaneously as a model, an aspiration, and a benevolent enforcer for the two
states in question (Tomson). However, it is necessary to put the challenge of a joint Serbia-
Kosovo future within a dynamic and transformative framework, as the process of reconciliation with regards to these two former enemies does not fit any single model, but rather is a hybrid of several. Perhaps future cooperation and community-building between the two nations will be somewhat adversarial; that is not to say threatening, but it is to say that rivalry and some level of dislike is acceptable. Ultimately, Hebert perhaps does the most effective job of boiling this concept down to its bare bones: "if [Kosovo and Serbia] do not want to renew the bloody 1990's wars they have to at least accept coexistence with their neighbors" (12).
Bibliography


