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[Redacted] EL SALVADOR SECTION, JANUARY 1985 CENTRAL AMERICAN
MONTHLY

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1. FOLLOWING, BETWEEN TEAR LINES, IS THE EL SALVADOR SECTION OF THE JANUARY 1985 CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY. THE MONTHLY IS PREPARED BY [Redacted] AND IS DISTRIBUTED TO A LIMITED AUDIENCE WHICH INCLUDES HPSCI AND SSCL. THE CLASSIFICATION/CONTROLS OF THE FOLLOWING ITEM ARE [Redacted] [Redacted] MAY SHARE THE ITEM WITH HEADS OF APPROPRIATE [Redacted] SECTIONS, ON A BACKGROUND USE ONLY BASIS.

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EL SALVADOR

MILITARY:

THE SALVADORAN MILITARY INTENSIFIED ITS ALREADY AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS AGAINST GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS IN JANUARY, LAUNCHING OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN MORAZAN, SAN MIGUEL, AND THE GUAZAPA AREA, AS WELL AS IN NORTHERN CHALATENANGO. KEY ACTIONS INCLUDED SWEEPS BY FIVE ELITE US-TRAINED BATTALIONS, SUPPORTED BY AIR AND ARTILLERY, NORTH OF THE TOROLA RIVER AND IN THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO AREA, ACCORDING TO THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE. IN ADDITION, THE 4TH BRIGADE IN CHALATENANGO, LED BY COLONEL SIGIFREDO OCHOA, MOVED INTO GUERRILLA-CONTROLLED AREAS AND ESTABLISHED CIVILIAN DEFENSE TEAMS TO DENY THE INSURGENTS FREE MOVEMENT AFTER THE TROOPS LEAVE. MEANWHILE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TWO [Redacted] WAS ILLUSTRATED AT SAN BARTOLO ICHANMICO IN MID-MONTH, AS THE MILITARY REPELLED A LARGE REBEL FORCE. AIR FORCE CHIEF BUSTILLO CLAIMED HE WAS UNAWARE OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST SIMULTANEOUS [Redacted]

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INSURGENT ACTIVITY REMAINS FOCUSED LARGELY ON ECONOMIC WARFARE. THE GUERRILLAS SABOTAGED THE POWER GRID, CONTINUED ATTACKS ON THE COFFEE INDUSTRY, AND ATTEMPTED A NATIONWIDE

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TRANSPORTATION STOPPAGE IN JANUARY. ALTHOUGH THE REBELS PUBLICLY CLAIMED TO HAVE ENDED THE TRAFFIC DISRUPTION BY MONTH'S END, WE EXPECT RENEWED STRIKES AGAINST TRANSPORT-IN FEBRUARY. MEANWHILE, [REDACTED] ALSO REPORTED CONTINUING GUERRILLA TROOP MOVEMENTS TO WESTERN EL SALVADOR AMID OTHER REPORTS THAT SEVERAL GUERRILLA FACTIONS WERE RECEIVING AND STORING AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

DESPITE THESE PLANS, THE GUERRILLAS APPARENTLY CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, A DESERTER FROM THE LARGEST INSURGENT FACTION RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT ITS OPERATIONS ARE HINDERED BY FOOD AND OTHER SHORTAGES. THE DESERTER ALSO INDICATED THAT AMMUNITION SHORTAGES WERE CAUSING CADRE TO CARRY ONLY 150 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION EACH, DOWN FROM PREVIOUS LEVELS OF 225. REBEL POLITICAL LEADER MANUEL UNGO ALSO REPORTEDLY ADMITTED GROWING INSURGENT DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING BREAKDOWNS IN LEADERSHIP AND MORALE. HE INDICATED, MOREOVER, THAT THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES WERE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE AND COULD EXPLOIT GUERRILLA PROBLEMS, THUS PRECLUDING ANY CHANCE OF A SHORT-TERM GUERRILLA VICTORY. THESE INDICATIONS OF GUERRILLA WEAKNESS WERE REINFORCED BY INSURGENT EFFORTS THROUGH SALVADORAN CHURCH AND MEXICAN INTERMEDIARIES TO SECURE SECRET DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT EMISSARIES. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, THE GUERRILLAS APPARENTLY HOPED THESE TALKS WOULD AVERT FURTHER EROSION OF THEIR CREDIBILITY IN WESTERN EUROPE.

INTERNATIONALLY, THE SOVIETS AGAIN REFUSED TO PROVIDE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES TO THE INSURGENTS, ACCORDING TO A GUERRILLA INFORMANT. MOSCOW REPORTEDLY HAS PROHIBITED CUBA AND NICARAGUA FROM TRANSFERRING SA-7'S TO THE REBELS. THE INFORMANT ALSO SAYS ABOUT 60 COMMUNIST PARTY MILITANTS RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING IN THE USSR BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983 AND HAVE INFILTRATED BACK THROUGH NICARAGUA.

ECONOMIC:

THE US EMBASSY IN EL SALVADOR REPORTS THAT GUERRILLA DAMAGE TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE INCREASED IN 1984 TO MORE THAN \$21 MILLION, UP FROM \$19 MILLION IN 1983. IF INDIRECT COSTS ARE ADDED, SUCH AS LOSS OF PROPERTY OF OTHER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR INSTITUTIONS, THE TOLL IS SAID TO CLIMB RAPIDLY. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO US EMBASSY ANALYSIS, BUDGET OUTLAYS IN 1984 FOR DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY--23 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL EXPENDITURES AS COMPARED WITH 14.4 PERCENT IN 1980--HAVE STRAINED THE SALVADORAN BUDGET AND SQUEEZED OUT SPENDING FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND PUBLIC WORKS. DIRECT CUMULATIVE DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY AS A RESULT OF THE INTERNAL FIGHTING SINCE 1979 IS ESTIMATED AT OVER \$1 BILLION.

POLITICAL:

JANUARY SAW A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DUARTE AND THE MILITARY, AIDED, WE BELIEVE, BY A POSTPONEMENT OF THE THIRD ROUND OF PEACE TALKS WITH THE GUERRILLAS UNTIL AFTER THE MARCH ELECTIONS. AS A RESULT, THE POLITICAL PARTIES BEGAN CONCENTRATING ON THE CAMPAIGN, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A COALITION BETWEEN THE MODERATE RIGHTIST NATIONAL CONCILIATION PARTY AND ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON'S EXTREMIST

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NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE. THE TWO PARTIES HAVE DONE LITTLE ACTIVE CAMPAIGNING THUS FAR, ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, BECAUSE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR COALITION REMAINS IN DOUBT UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT RULES ON THE ELECTORAL LAW. CONSEQUENTLY, THE RIGHTIST-DOMINATED ELECTIONS COUNCIL VOTED TO MOVE THE BALLOTING FROM 17 MARCH TO 31 MARCH, THUS ALLOWING THE PARTIES AMPLE TIME TO CAMPAIGN AFTER THE COURT DECISION.

IN SPITE OF THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE COLLABORATION BETWEEN MODERATE RIGHTISTS AND EXTREMISTS IN PASSING BILLS UNDERMINING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMS, VARIOUS REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT SOME MODERATES ARE OPPOSED TO THE COALITION AND REMAIN AMENABLE TO COUNTEROFFERS BY DUARTE. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HAVE THE FUNDS AND MINISTERIAL POSITIONS THE CONCILIATION PARTY WANTS, BUT THEIR TRADITIONAL SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN AN UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, THEREBY HELPING SOLIDIFY THE COALITION.

NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE MOST MODERATE RIGHTISTS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH D'AUBUISSON, WHOM THEY VIEW AS IRRATIONAL AND WHOSE LACK OF POLITICAL ACUMEN THEY DISDAIN. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] MODERATES HAVE TOLD THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY THAT THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE EXTREME RIGHT WILL CEASE AS SOON AS THE VOTING IS OVER. THEY ALSO REPORTEDLY HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY EFFORT BY D'AUBUISSON TO USE PRESIDENT DUARTE'S ILL-CONSIDERED PARTIAL VETO OF THE ELECTORAL LAW TO PRESS FOR IMPEACHMENT WILL NULLIFY THE COALITION. (b)(1)
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THE MODERATES' LONGSTANDING RESERVATIONS OVER D'AUBUISSON'S RADICAL TACTICS ARE BEING ECHOED BY SOME OF HIS OWN PARTY MEMBERS. [REDACTED] SAYS FORMER WEALTHY BACKERS OF D'AUBUISSON BELIEVE HIS IMAGE IS HAMPERING EFFORTS TO BROADEN HIS PARTY'S BASE OF SUPPORT. [REDACTED] ALSO RECENTLY CONFIDED TO US EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT CONTRIBUTIONS ARE DRYING UP BECAUSE OF D'AUBUISSON'S FAILURE TO INTENSIFY ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNDRAISING EFFORTS. (b)(1)
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THE MOST SERIOUS INDICATION OF THE INCREASING UNEASE WITH D'AUBUISSON WITH THE PARTY IS REFLECTED IN REPORTS THAT DISSIDENT PARTY MEMBERS PLAN TO FORM A MORE MODERATE PARTY AFTER THE ELECTION. SUCH REPORTING PROBABLY REFLECTS A GROWING BELIEF AMONG KEY PARTY PLAYERS THAT D'AUBUISSON'S LIABILITIES ARE RAPIDLY OUTWEIGHING HIS ASSETS AS A CHARISMATIC CAMPAIGNER.

NEVERTHELESS, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WILL BE ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON SUCH DISSENSION REMAINS QUESTIONABLE. THEIR TRADITIONAL TENDENCY TO SEE THEMSELVES AS BEING UNDER SIEGE HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY RIGHTIST COOPERATION DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS. AS A RESULT, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS--AS EVIDENCED BY DUARTE'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS CHASTISING THE MODERATE RIGHT--APPEAR INCREASINGLY INCLINED TOWARD A STRATEGY OF CONFRONTATION.

-----TEAR LINE-----

2. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY HAS BEEN PRODUCED FOR SOME TIME, BUT NOT UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE WE CONSIDERED MAKING IT AVAILABLE TO APPROPRIATE STATIONS. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER OR

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NOT YOU FIND IT USEFUL AND WISH TO CONTINUE RECEIVING IT.

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