Civic Participation in Indonesia: Islam, Community, and Rural Development

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Indonesia entered the 21st century on the brink of imminent social change. The downfall of the Suharto government in 1998 marked the end of authoritarianism and led to a democratic transition whose first step consisted of a systematic decentralization of government. In cases like Indonesia, this transfer of decision-making power from the capital to the provinces has crucial consequences for local community development. For one thing, it impels local citizens to compensate for the goods and services that a central state no longer provides. However, motivating citizens to participate in local development has been a pressing challenge in the Global South in recent decades. A new global development paradigm emerged in the 1980's that promotes a strong rhetoric that community planning and development will be more sustainable if undertaken by local citizens.

The success or failure of community development depends on the capacity of citizens to participate in the creation of public goods. However, what motivates citizens to participate is not
well understood, limiting our knowledge of the types of citizens that are likely to participate, and how they will participate. In addition, while religious affiliation has a central place in the civic traditions of Western nations, the role of religion is much less understood in Muslim contexts. Social scientists remain divided on what role Islam is expected to play in a new democracy. Some deem Islam incompatible with liberal ideals, while others contend that Indonesia’s brand of Islam is more receptive to Western influences.

Using the 2007 wave of the PNPM Generasi survey, I examine these critical aspects of civic participation as it relates to community development. I begin by devising a framework that connects three highly salient topics in contemporary sociology: community development, civic participation, and religious pluralism. I then develop regression models to explain who participates in community development schemes, where participants are likely to fit on the socio-economic ladder, as well as their preferred mode of participation. I also use network methods to investigate the influence of religion on the structure of civic networks.

I find that a relatively robust civil society supports community development efforts in the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. Participation rates increased after the 2001 reforms, but they vary by socio-economic status, mode of contribution, and religious affiliation. Membership in a religious network leads to more diverse participation, but religion limits one's commitment to secular activities. Indonesia’s civil society is clearly separated along religious lines. There is no evidence, however, that Muslims are opposed to activities that are synonymous with Western democratic ideals. In fact, Islam supports pro-social civic engagement but not necessarily religious pluralism. These findings suggest that civic virtues and religious differences may have a more central role than previously assumed in the future of community development in Indonesia, and elsewhere in the Global South.
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DEDICATION

For my loving mother, Marie, with gratitude
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE PROBLEM

In recent years, civic participation has received a great deal of attention from scholars, and the media. Various authors have raised the point that civic participation has an important role to play in the development of poorer nations, especially those undergoing a democratic transition (Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik 2002; Malik and Waglé 2002, Putnam 2000; Stiglitz 1998). Civic participation in those countries is doubly relevant since, in those contexts, democratic values and community development are not separate but rather closely related concerns: community development depends on the sustained engagement of citizens in and their contributions to local civic groups (Mansuri and Rao 2012, 2004; Agrawal et al. 1999). Community development is best understood as “a process where community members come together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems” (United Nations 1995). Yet, those who are most negatively affected by these common problems do not always participate in devising a solution for them.

This is the problem of participation, and it raises serious concerns for community development, primarily because development, as a global initiative, has gone from being state-directed to being community-driven since the 1980’s. The rhetoric of participatory development, or community-driven development, as the World Bank calls it, aims to empower local citizens to take charge of their own progress by being engaged in local community initiatives. This calls for even the poorest of the poor – in fact, especially the poorest – to be involved in community-

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building projects. Still, the evidence shows that, due to the high costs of coordination (Olson 1971) or the lack of leadership skills, it is usually quite difficult to mobilize the poor (Booth 2012; Englebert 2000; Lewis 2007). The collective action theorists frame the problem as a misalignment of means and incentives: those with the means to finance public goods often lack the incentive to do so, while those with the incentive to engage in pro-social initiatives often lack the means to realize them (Olson 1971; Marwell and Oliver 1993). Some attribute the problem to elite dominance and elite capture\(^2\) (Crook and Manor 2000; Hulme and Siddiquee 1999), while others have argued that elite-capture is less harmful than typically assumed (Alatas et al. 2013). Many social scientists lament the marginalization of the poor in community development, but the literature lacks a comprehensive set of participation models that address the issue of who we expect to participate and via what mode of contribution.

In addition, nations in the midst of their democratic transition tend to decentralize government (Dillinger 1994; Huntington 1991). Decentralization is, however, a double-edged sword: it may increase efficiency at some level of local governance and increase opportunities for corruption in another (Kristiansen et al. 2009). Partly, decentralization is an attractive policy because it should, in theory, bring the decision-making power closer to the people most affected by the said decisions, e.g., the poor. Some have suggested that, in the event of decentralization, the activities of private citizens via voluntary associations can or should compensate for some of the community support the state no longer provides (Skocpol 2003). However, absent a central government that provides most public goods and services, more individuals and families may be excluded from the community development initiatives. This is because the distribution of good

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\(^2\) _Elite capture_ is a phenomenon whereby public resources are appropriated and/or used for the benefit of a few individuals of higher socio-economic status at the detriment of the welfare of the larger population that need them the most.
and services under a collective action scheme depends on voluntarism and reciprocity. Without the central state, some regions are likely to lack the social programs necessary to help remedy these dire situations. In principle, local communities (and their leaders) should have more accurate information than central governments about who is poor and who is likely to contribute towards common goals. The evidence shows, however, that local authorities and development agencies often lack this information and engage in local governance with a feeble understanding of their constituency (Mansuri and Rao 2012).

This problem of participation grows even more complicated once we acknowledge that the poor are not the only group that may be left out of a collective action scheme. Poverty is not the only basis of social differentiation that is connected to community development and participation. Among other social markers, differences in religious affiliation are likely to be reason enough to exclude some groups from the management and planning processes that guide development. Yet, while religiosity and religious affiliations have a central place in the civic traditions of western nations (Putnam 2000; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Uslaner 2002), the role of religion is much less understood in non-Christian, non-western contexts. In particular, the role that Islam plays in the community initiatives in majority-Muslim nations is sorely undocumented.

In this dissertation, I examine these aspects of the participation problem in the context of Indonesia – a transitioning democracy that decentralized its government as a way of putting local authorities and citizens in the driver’s seat of community development. Using data from the 2007 PNPM Generasi survey, I investigate two critical aspects of civic participation as it relates to community development. First, I consider the factors that help explain who participates in community development schemes, where participants are likely to fit on the socio-economic ladder, as well as their mode of participation. Second, I ask what role religion plays in the structure
of the civic networks that support these collective action schemes. Does Islam act as a watchdog against forms of community engagement that resemble western democratic institutions? Alternatively, do Indonesians use the faith-based groups in the local mosque as a way of connecting with others, including non-Muslims?

The first set of questions (who participates and how) addresses the socio-economic antecedents of participation at the micro level and will help clarify the affinity between levels of engagement in specific civic domains and a household's capacity to engage. Socioeconomic status, particularly measures of education and wealth, is the most commonly cited predictor of participation (Schofer and Longhofer 2011; Verba et al. 1995; Zukin et al. 2006). Yet, within social classes, individuals may prefer to participate in varying ways that communicate their commitment to specific public causes or their capacity to support them. Putnam (2000) noted how writing a check is a qualitatively different mode of participation than personally attending a club meeting or signing a petition. Social actors who use any of these modes of participation exclusively, or a combination thereof, convey a different sense of commitment and attempt to harness social capital in a distinct manner. Yet, even after acknowledging such nuances, most authors, including Putnam, fail to incorporate them in a comprehensive framework.

A corollary to downplaying the importance of modes of participation is the issue of conceptualizing and measuring participation. The literature contains many aggregated scales and indices that aim to capture how much participation takes place in a community. Most of these attempts rely on a rationale of how social capital operates, but none of them attempts to connect the components of participation to social capital conceptually. They fail to distinguish between how much participation takes place and how people (choose to or are constrained to) participate. As a result, the existing literature is rich in explanations for how intensely citizens commit to civic
domains while it lacks a measure of how diversely they engage. Yet, many authors consider diversity to be a key aspect of participation (Levine 2007; Putnam 2000). Civic diversity encourages pluralism – tolerating and engaging with different values, aspirations or even life chances. Pluralism may be broadly defined as the peaceful management of social difference, and it is a core principle behind a healthy democracy. In this dissertation, I offer an approach that helps fill this gap by connecting participation to the essential functions of social capital in the context of networks.

The second set of questions addresses the lack of attention to religion in non-western, non-Christian contexts. This inquiry pertains to the role of religion in the organization of civic life in general and, as such, it concerns both religious and secular civic activities. In the western world, religion has played a significant role in the organization of civic traditions. However, while the evidence shows a strong link between religious belonging and increased participation (Putnam and Campbell (2010), these hypotheses have not been tested in the Muslim world. What role should we expect Islam to play in the democratic culture of a Muslim nation in the midst of its transition from authoritarian rule? Should we expect Islam to be the cultural reference that provides the necessary impetus for public forms of engagement in Indonesia? Or should we expect Muslim leaders to deter followers from experimenting with western ideas and institutions that may seem contradictory to their faith? As mentioned above, religion features prominently in the civic culture explanations of the communitarian literature (Verba and Nie 1972; Inglehart 1977; Dalton and Welzel 2014) and the social capital inquiries of neo-Tocquevillian scholars (Putnam 2000; Halpern 2005; Paxton 1999). However, religion is often an overlooked social marker when investigating community development. This illustrates the persistent lack of theoretical and empirical linkages between civic behaviors and community development initiatives, even though development-
oriented action is essentially civic action and both processes depend on the same underlying mechanism of social capital activated within networks.

This dissertation offers a fresh approach to the intersection of three highly salient topics in contemporary sociology: community development, civic participation, and religious pluralism. The democratic transition in Indonesia provides a propitious context to study the mechanisms that undergird these social processes. This dissertation also gives analytical prominence to the effects of religion on participation, both at the household and community levels. Consequently, the findings in this study should have significant implications not just for Indonesia but also for other Muslim-majority nations in the process of their democratic transition. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I provide a brief background narrative on Indonesia and why it is a critical case. Next, I lay out the theoretical reasoning that knits the questions in this study. I conclude with an overview of the empirical chapters and their intended contributions.

1.2 BACKGROUND: PUTTING INDONESIA IN CONTEXT

1.2.1 Overview

Whether for its impressive geography or the diversity of its population and culture, the Republic of Indonesia easily draws strong interests from scholars across the social sciences. Bounded by Malaysia in the north and Australia in the south, the country consists of 13,670 islands spread over a geographic space the size of Europe (Romano 2010:181-2). Ethnically and culturally, it is also a highly diverse nation, with over 80 languages spoken by over 300 ethnic groups. Home to the world’s largest Muslim population (87% of the total population), Indonesia also allows the coexistence of Protestants (7%), Roman Catholics (3%), Hindus (2%) as well as Buddhists and
Confucians (almost 1%) among other faiths. The country is also host to the world’s fourth largest population and the Muslim nation with the largest Christian minority.

Despite the overwhelming number of Indonesian Muslims, the Indonesian constitution contains no clause that makes Islam the state religion. Despite numerous attempts by Islamic leaders, the constitution has never incorporated Shariah Law. In fact, the nation’s founder, General Sukarno incorporated in the 1945 constitution the doctrine of Pancasila – a set of five central principles that allegedly represent a pan-ethnic and traditional Indonesian culture. The Pancasila principles consist of: 1) belief in one supreme God; 2) humanitarianism; 3) nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; 4) consultative democracy; and 5) social justice. This doctrine continues to be the topic of controversial debates as it draws heavy criticism from conservative Islamic voices who decry its attempt to equate Islam with other monotheistic faiths like Judaism and Christianity.

1.2.2 A Brief Political and Economic History

A former Dutch colony, Indonesia became a sovereign republic in 1949. Its founding father, General Sukarno, became its first President and ruled with a parliament. From 1957, however, after a period of instability, Sukarno dismissed parliament, declared Martial Law and assumed absolute power indefinitely. After a failed coup in 1965, Sukarno gradually lost his control of the government and was replaced by General Suharto in 1967. Suharto instituted a “New Order” authoritarian regime that lasted until 1998. The legacies of these two rulers, and especially that of Suharto, were to mark the nation’s history and political future. Indonesia entered the 21st century on the brink of imminent social change. Between 1997 and 2000, the nation faced several imminent crises, among them the violent protests of separatists in Aceh and East Timor, the Asian
economic and financial crisis, as well as the end of the Suharto dictatorship and its implications for the country’s future. The economic and financial crisis of 1997-1998 seriously decreased the nation’s ability to respond to the demands of a rapidly growing Indonesian population. As the price of rice and other commodities skyrocketed, real GDP rapidly declined and along with it the living standards of most Indonesian families. In many regions, urban factory workers were being laid off and returning to their provincial roots.

Meanwhile, Suharto’s economic policies and the corruption of his entourage were glaringly evident to all. In addition to allegedly spending billions from the treasury for personal purposes, his administration amassed unsustainable foreign debt and tolerated poor corporate governance as well as white-collar fraud. As the economy nearly collapsed under the weight of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a student-led social movement culminated in the end of President Suharto’s 32-year rule. The Vice President, Mr. Habibie, became President and organized the nation’s first open elections in 1999. With this major political event, the country embarked on a series of reforms (reformasi) to consolidate the democratic order. In short, the country rushed towards the numerous challenges associated with a transition from autocratic rule to a democratic order in which government is responsive and accountable to common citizens. With Suharto’s discredited government out of the way, the reformers vowed to keep his powerful military cronies and associates out of power indefinitely, for fear that they would resume their system of oppression and corruption. In 2004, Indonesians had the first ever opportunity to directly elect their President without a parliamentary vote. To date, Indonesia has had four successful elections cycles without fraud or violence. Despite suffering from considerable setbacks during and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Indonesia re-emerged as Southeast Asia’s strongest economy. Since the end of Suharto’s three-decade long autocratic rule the economy has seen strong growth in many
sectors and has sustained relatively stable inflation (Elias and Noone 2011). This economic boost has been attributed to well-implemented government policies and the country’s growing labor force. In the first decade of the 21st century the government has renewed trade relationships with nearby neighbors, especially Australia. Currently, Indonesia is a member of the G-20 group of the world’s largest economies.

1.2.3 Decentralization and Participation in Indonesia

Indonesia offers an excellent venue to study civic participation and how it relates to community development, especially in light of the reforms implemented after Suharto’s rule. Among those reforms, none rivaled the decentralization of government due to its sheer scale and the swiftness with which it was carried out. Between 1999 and 2001, the Indonesian state went from being one of the most centralized to one of the most decentralized governments in the world (Hofman and Kaiser 2002). With Laws No. 22 and 25, Jakarta devolved most of its fiscal and budgetary powers to 473 regional districts, each with an average population of 500,000. Typically, decentralization is a step toward more efficient and more transparent governance. In theory, it should result in better local development, more accountability on the part of the authorities, and even inclusion of the poor and minority groups who should now be closer to the administration decision-making process. But many deemed Indonesia to have limited demonstrative capacities in the provinces, but worse of all weak democratic traditions, and a fragmented civil society that was just re-emerging from a 32-year latency during Suharto’s regime.

Some scholars noted that civil society even reached a point of near extinction in some regions (Manning and Van Diermen 2000). The repressive nature of Suharto’s regime was
followed by the fairly open but still controlling administration of Habibie. As Katyasungkana (2000) noted, under these regimes the words “the people” (rakyat) and “national consensus” (konsensus nasional) had been devalued and there was a strong need to breathe new meaning into them (264-5). Even as the democratic elections of 2001 were underway the very idea of self-governing “citizens” who can be proactive about their interests and hold their government accountable seemed highly questionable. Consequently, citizens’ needs to mobilize were stifled for a long time and that limited the growth and presence of voluntary associations, coalitions and other civic groups that are the backbone of any well-functioning democracy. As it is well known that a good democracy can hardly exist without political parties and a civil society, the reforms were not only injecting new life into the formal political arena in the form of many new parties and fair and open elections, but also in those civic associations that are the safeguards against abuse and corruption. The realities in Indonesia in the years after Suharto’s fall were marked by great skepticism that things could really change, especially for the poor and powerless.

With a sharply rising population of over 260 million citizens, Indonesia is the world's third most populous democracy. Should the decentralization policies bear their fruit and motivate successful and long-term mobilization efforts, this could usher into one of the largest citizens-led development initiatives the world has ever seen – certainly a noteworthy social experiment. Second, Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, which makes it a sociologically rich environment where democratic ideals are pursued against the backdrop of a strong non-western tradition. As the world watches the unfolding of its decentralization effort and democratic transition, Indonesia's eventual success or failure may to a large extent encourage a reconsideration of what is meant by "Muslim-majority" or "democratic" nation, especially because it aims to straddle these two identities at once. Given the reforms and the nation’s embracing of civic
institutions, what role does Islam have to play in pro-social participation schemes that support community development?

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.3.1 Defining Civic Participation

The term "civic participation" refers to activities directed towards solving a community problem or helping others in either a formal or informal manner (Barrett and Zani 2014; Zukin et al. 2006). In the interdisciplinary literature, the terms "civic participation" and "civic engagement" are used interchangeably, and this dissertation abides by that norm. Both terms are used in the broad sense that Robert Putnam and other prominent social scientists have used them to refer to a wide variety of civic activities ranging from trivial recreational groups to more politically inclined community or regional associations. In that sense, a civic community encompasses all these activities and those involved in them (Barrett and Zani 2014:5; Zukin et al. 2006; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005; Putnam 2000). A civic community is thus essentially a network (or a mix of networks) of civic actors working towards the realization or preservation of various collective goods or social pursuits. The term civic culture, as used by the communitarians (see Verba and Nie 1972), refers to the totality of these civic networks (a network of networks) as well as to the collective norms of voluntarism, collective action, and reciprocity in a region or nation. The importance of participation is found in the very manner that democracies function: to be successful, democratic orders require more than free elections and constitutions, but also a democratic culture supported by ongoing civic engagement (Hefner 2001; Putnam 2000).
1.3.2 Development as Organic Participation in Social Networks

The paradigm of participatory development that emerged in the 1980’s became the staple of global policies. Global development agencies, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), aggressively championed the participation rhetoric following the admonition by critics that, in order to be sustainable, development in poor countries must be undertaken by those who stand to benefit the most from it: local citizens (Mansuri and Rao 2012). Before the 1980’s, community development was typically framed as a problem for economists and as such a problem deserving an economistic answer. In congruence with this new paradigm of community-driven and participatory development, this study eschews such a reductionist perspective and, instead, poses the problem of accessing the mechanisms of development as one of civic agency and the practice of pluralism. Even a cursory look in the literatures across the social sciences would indicate that the terms “civic participation” and “participatory development” are currently used in each respective literature in a different way. Civic participation is used mainly by political scientists and political sociologists (Campbell 2009), while participatory development is a dominant buzzword in the academic and gray literatures on global development (Leal 2007). In truth, both terms refer to citizens’ engagement in problem-solving in their community and, despite the two slightly different names, when operationalized both concepts almost always end up addressing the same issues of needs, resources and opportunity.

In this dissertation, civic action is linked to community development directly, both theoretically and empirically, in a way that blurs these differences. Participatory development is not limited to government-led programs. Neither is civic participation limited to actions with immediate political relevance, although one can hardly separate economic development from
politics in the global south. When individuals pool resources together to address a communal problem, or when they convene publicly to discuss the gravity of a local issue they are taking action that is civic in nature and development-oriented at the same time. Despite this connection between civic participation and community development, the literature lacks a general framework to explain the range of plausible participatory models. While the new development paradigm emphasizes the active role of ordinary citizens, planners and local authorities often misjudge citizens’ capacity to activate enough social capital in support of community development (Mansuri and Rao 2004:4-7). Also lacking in the literature is a framework that places civic action and community development in the context of networks. Yet, all these civic actions (e.g. community development efforts) are citizens’ attempts to activate their social capital within and beyond their immediate networks.

Community initiatives call on residents to pool their resources and social capital – an essential ingredient for successful democratic governance and community building (Putnam 2000). However, “social capital relies on social inclusion”. It cannot be optimally activated if people are unwilling or unable to participate. (Shortall 2008:451). However, it is often unclear whether some groups remain excluded for participatory schemes for lack of interest in their collective well-being or for the sheer lack of resources. Coleman (1990) argued that the presence of a communitarian ideology can "create social capital by imposing on an individual who holds it the demand that he acts in the interest of something or someone other than himself"(320). The communitarian ideology to which Coleman refers has been evidently promoted in the new global development policies that emerged in the 1980’s. Also, Coleman’s logic implies that citizens are not selfish and under-socialized opportunists attempting to better their lot on their own, but rather members of networks, and the ties they weave in these networks are the structural repositories of
their social capital. Social capital, because it fosters trust and reciprocity, is the ingredient that fuels and sustains the communal endeavor we call community development.

The importance of participation in community development must be understood in terms of what it offers citizens and their families. An opportunity to actively contribute to communal goods is an opportunity for them to invest (time, money and skills, etc.) in a process that can potentially improve their lot. World Bank economists Mansuri and Rao (2012: 31) differentiate between induced and organic forms of participation. Participation is said to be induced when it involves state "guidance" that is supported by more or less elaborate bureaucracies. By contrast, civic participation is organic when it involves the spontaneous collective action of citizens (32). In their view, organic participation "is spurred by civic groups acting independently of, and often in opposition to, government" (31). Both forms of participation may occur under a decentralized system, but organic participation is distinctly marked by the decision of citizens to come together of their own volition in the pursuit of certain interests. Despite its appeal, organic participation has historically been less common in the developing world until in recent decades. This dissertation uses a survey of Indonesian households and villages to explain the structural components of as well as barriers to organic participation, and the way that it is structured at the village level. In Chapter 2, this organic form of participation is measured as direct contributions of time and money to civic associations that support development activities in local communities. In Chapter 3, it is measured more carefully as one’s attendance in civic association meetings.

For countries in democratic transition like Indonesia, participation may be an especially important way of tapping into collective resources to achieve a measure of social progress. Whether it is framed as an end in itself or as a means to certain ends, civic participation is crucial to economic development (Woolcock 2010; 1998). Participation in development efforts is a special
type of civic performance -- whether it is supported by the state or by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In sum, the analysis undertaken in this project starts with the premise that civic engagement and community development are mutually reinforcing social phenomena that both depend on collective social capital activated in networks. Furthermore, the idea that a flourishing civic community is likely to support effective development schemes is hardly new. This concept may in fact be traced back to Tocqueville's observation that voluntary associations, like the ones he observed in the United States in the 19th century, operate as veritable schools for democracy that allow members to develop civic skills such as a capacity for collective action and political mobilization (De Tocqueville [1835] 2003). These civic skills and the solidarity they foster are among the qualities that, as Putnam (2000) argues, give way to the creation of social capital -- an essential ingredient for successful democratic governance and community building.

1.3.3 Why Religion Matters

In the literature on civic participation, religion is relevant in two important ways. First, religious individuals tend to be more civically engaged than their secular counterparts. Putnam (2000) found that churchgoing is "arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America" (66). In his view, religion serves as an incubator for civic engagement where people learn civic skills and foster attitudes that make them more likely to engage in the public sphere. This relationship between religiosity and civic participation has found good support in studies in the United States and Canada (Lewis, McGregor and Putnam 2012, Putnam and Campbell 2010; Uslaner 2002; Paxton 1999; Verba et al. 1995). Secondly, besides supporting fraternizing among churchgoers, religion may also serve as a vehicle for secular forms of engagement. Many of the
aforementioned studies found that religious people are also more likely to engage in non-religious civic circles. However, the overwhelming majority of those studies focus on Christian faiths in either the United States or other western democracies. The attention given to Islam and its connection to civic engagement only increased in the past decade, and the results remain inconclusive at best. Even though it seems like religious Indonesians participate more in civic life than non-religious ones (Beard 2007), it is unknown whether Islam has an impact on civic habits that is similar to the effects that the Christian church has had in the West.

Also, the last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of religion as a major force in global politics and public affairs. From the threats of Al-Qaeda, to the hotly debated case of Hindu nationalism in India and extremist Buddhists in Thailand and Sri Lanka, the 21st century has thus far been marked by key events where religious ideals and political claims have become confounded. The ongoing third wave of global democratization, coupled with decentralization measures, that started in the late 1980’s has reignited a debate on the compatibility between Muslim cultures and democracy. In this post-911 context, and given the continuing threat of radical Islamists, it is no surprise that most of the attention given to religion has actually been directed toward Islam. In addition, the Arab revolts of 2011 in Libya and Egypt, have invited discussions of the possibilities for democratic rule in traditionally non-democratic (and traditionally non-Christian) nations of the Middle East and beyond. In Indonesia these discussions remain a part of daily politics as fundamentalist and terrorist groups persistently claim the advent of an Islamic state that would concentrate all powers in the hands of a righteous ruler, unsullied by political ambition and polemics. Decentralization and democratization steer the country further away from these aspirations of a complete Islamic revival. This discontent on the part of fundamentalists has typically been expressed via ethno-religious violence, primarily against Chinese Christians.
The influence of Islam on pro-social civil participation is largely unknown, and scholars disagree on what one should expect in the case of Indonesia. On the one hand, Islam has acquired a reputation for having a constraining effect on pro-social initiatives (Huntington 1993; Kuran 2011). This view highlights one of the vestiges of Modernization Theory, which assumed that people with strong religious traditions would inevitably be resistant to the progressive institutions associated with liberal democracy. On the other hand, other scholars have documented instances in which local Muslim democrats seem to foster considerable civic action and activism (Hefner 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2009). One of the most crucial implications of this question is whether Islam, as both religious ideology and a political force, can engender or even coexist with a vibrant civil society sector. Furthermore, how Islam coexists with other religions in the civic culture is not well documented. The strength of any claim of Islam's incompatibility with democracy depends on whether one can show that Islam's structural position in civic networks does not reflect a climate of pluralism and cross-faith integration. However, these works lack an analysis of Islam’s structural position in civic networks where Muslims face the decision to participate. The role of religion on secular participation is examined in Chapter 3 at the household level. Chapter 4 reconsiders the question at the community level and proposes a network-based approach to understanding the role of Islam in the organization of civic life.

1.4 PREVIEW OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS

1.4.1 Chapter 2: Between Giving and Doing: Participation in Community Development in Post-Reform Indonesia

The success or failure of community development depends on the capacity of citizens to participate in the creation of public goods. Yet, what motivates citizens to participate is not well
understood, limiting our knowledge of the types of citizens that are likely to participate, how they will participate, and the types of communities in which they reside. Despite the ubiquity of the participation rhetoric, the literature sorely lacks generalizable models of participatory development (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Reese and Rosenfeld 2002). These gaps in knowledge are especially salient in post-reform Indonesia, where state decentralization might have had a negative impact on community development. In Chapter 2, I propose a framework to explain who is likely to participate in development efforts and how. I conceptualize the decision to participate as a trade-off between one’s capacity to give (cash contribution) and one’s volition to do (time contribution). Using the 2007 wave of the PNPM Generasi survey, I examine three questions: (1) have the political reforms led to broader-based participation in Indonesia? (2) Are the poor included in the local development process? And (3) to what degree are religious minorities involved in these initiatives? The results suggest an upsurge in participation following the reforms.

This analysis extends some of the most important findings in Beard (2007), namely that education, wealth, and religion are significant predictors of contributions to community development. The dependent variable is measured as the total number of hours (doing) and the amount of cash contributed (giving) by a household to organizations involved in "infrastructure and construction" (cleaning and maintenance). These contributions are taken to be civic actions in the sense that both sociologists and political scientists have theorized civic behaviors (De Tocqueville [1835] 2003; Putnam 2000; Skocpol 1999). The regression models show that wealthy elites dominate development efforts, but even the poorest households actively contribute their time (doing). Wealthy Muslims, however, contribute more money but less time than wealthy Christians. While they bring good news for community development in Indonesia, the findings also raise concerns about how inclusive these initiatives are of the poor and marginalized. I conclude the
chapter with the most salient implications of the future of community development in rural Indonesia given the impact of the political reforms of 2001.

1.4.2 Chapter 3: Is Religion a Civic Bridge or a Silo? Measuring Diversity and Intensity of Participation.

Typical ways of measuring civic participation imply the concept’s direct link to social capital. Yet, none of the many scales that currently exist incorporates the core dimensions of bonding and bridging social capital in a measure. In other words, current operationalizations of participation fail to distinguish between repeated interactions within a single civic association or domain and interactions in multiple civic venues. In short, the literature on participation has thus far conflated depth and breadth, two qualitatively distinct dimensions of participation, in a single measure. My methodological starting point is a refinement on the concept of “doing” proposed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, doing is slightly redefined as the number of meetings household members attend in a given civic domain (intensity), or across multiple domains (diversity). Diversity of participation is often praised as an important aspect of a civic culture, and bridging is widely acknowledged as the more integrative aspect of social capital. Yet, no existing methodology or framework has a diversity or bridging component.

Chapter 3 fills an important theoretical and methodological gap by proposing a framework that links each aspect of social capital (bonding and bridging) to a dimension of participation (intensity and diversity). This chapter proposes the first ever measure for the concept of diversity of participation. I use this framework to test the effect of “religious belonging” (participation in faith-based associations) on other forms of civic participation. Using the same data set as in Chapter 2, I ask: do people who participate in faith-based civic associations participate with more
intensity or more diversity? Do these effects vary for Muslims versus non-Muslims? This chapter also explores a simple but generalizable typology of civic actors based on how intensely and diversely citizens participate. The results show that Indonesia’s civic culture is best described as an emergent "Generalist-Passivist" civic culture dominated by two classes of participants: a sizable group of Generalists who engage very frequently in multiple domains, and a class of Passivist citizens who engage minimally in one domain and across very few domains (if any). The strongest predictor of how intensely and diversely households participated was whether they belonged to at least one faith-based association. Overall, the results suggest that religion has a negative impact on secular participation. In rural Indonesia, religious institutions tend to curtail participation in secular activities, and this has important implications for how we understand the role of Islam in civic networks in non-western contexts.

1.4.3 Chapter 4: The Role of Islam in Community-Based Civic Networks

Chapter 4 begins by recasting the debate regarding Islam’s incompatibility with democracy into a discussion of whether or not Muslims adopt pro-social and pluralistic civic behaviors in local networks. While Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” argument has generated a rich literature of the topic, neither side of the debate has offered an easy way of measuring Islam’s impact on civic engagement in the context of the networks where this participation occurs. This chapter reframes the debate from a network perspective that allows us to observe how Muslim’s use the local mosque or other venues for civic purposes. Paxton (1999) pointed to the network of ties that civic organizations share through common members as an important area for future research (102). In this chapter the analysis goes one level higher and accounts for the civic network composed of ties between domains as opposed to organizations. While both the associations-based
and domain-based networks can inform understanding of what organizational vehicles citizens prefer to use for their civic goals, the domain-based network is closer to the policy and institutional level: the interface where authorities and civilians negotiate important social arrangements.

In this chapter, I used the village-level portion of the 2007 PNPM Generasi survey to construct the domain-to-domain network from the household-to-domain network. The central questions are: is Islam active in a civic network? and if it is active, is it connected to another domain or is it an isolate? Applying the same questions to other non-Muslim religions in the community, I explored a set of plausible types of networks we are likely to observe, given the theoretical expectations set in the literature. The results indicate that Islam tends to be active mostly in majority-Muslim villages, and that rural Indonesia is the site of very few civic communities that are religiously diverse. Contrarily to what Huntington (1996) might have expected, there was no evidence that Islam is an overbearing force that overpowers any semblance of public activity in its midst. While the findings support a moderate incompatibility thesis, they also give hope that a small class of tolerant Muslims may be emerging in this young democracy.
Chapter 2. BETWEEN GIVING AND DOING: PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-REFORM INDONESIA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, social scientists have shown a growing interest in the levels of civic participation in emerging democracies in the Global South. A recurring refrain has been that a more publicly engaged citizenry can help expand the reach of development initiatives because the civic organizations to which they belong may significantly improve service delivery and, consequently, their life chances (Chambers 1983, 1997; Stiglitz 1998; Malik 2001). This view implies that as more citizens join these civic organizations, a higher proportion of the poor will end up participating in community planning, which in turn would make development efforts more sustainable in the long run. A growing set of empirical studies helps make a case for citizens’ participation in development initiatives (Holland et al. 2015; Mansuri and Rao 2012; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Cohen and Uphoff 1980). Internationally-funded development programs in the Global South are increasingly keen on incorporating participation as an essential component of project design. Despite this strong connection between civic participation and community development, the literature lacks a general framework to explain the range of plausible participatory models. Planners and local authorities often misjudge citizens’ capacity to activate enough social capital in support of community development (Mansuri and Rao 2004:4-7). The consensus is that community development depends on the capacity of citizens to participate in the creation of public goods (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Woolcock 1998; Putnam 2000). Yet, what motivates citizens to participate is not well understood, limiting our knowledge of the types of
citizens that are likely to participate, how they will participate, and the types of communities in which they reside.

These concerns are particularly critical in countries where the state has decentralized, mainly because decentralization shifts most of the responsibility of providing public goods and services over to the provincial authorities. When provincial governments struggle to produce the expected levels of resources, the contributions of citizens become an even more crucial component of community development. Indonesia offers an especially salient context to investigate these concerns of resource allocation and citizens’ participation, especially since parliament signed two key legislations to decentralize government in 2001. As part of the democratic reforms, laws No. 22 and 25 devolved planning and budgeting responsibilities from Jakarta to the subnational authorities – provincial, municipal and village level (Hefner 2001; Cariño 2005). As the state was decentralizing, however, two shortcomings became apparent. First, some provincial governments failed to allocate enough resources to community development (Silver 2003). Such resource shortages are notable, because they more adversely affect impoverished families. Second, it was unclear whether the provincial authorities and elites in Indonesia would relax their stronghold on local affairs, regardless of how enthusiastic their constituents were about democratic ideals (Silver 2003). These concerns imply that some citizens, especially those from less privileged backgrounds, might have had fewer opportunities, if any, to contribute to community development efforts, and they might have benefited less than other citizens of higher status. In sum, despite the good intentions behind the reforms, the current conditions are likely to undermine widespread participation, especially for the poorest households and minority groups. Notwithstanding the growing interest in connecting civic participation to development, few studies have explored these issues in the Indonesian context. In this chapter, I outline a framework to explain the range of
participation models and understand which of these models prevails in post-reform Indonesia. I also use regression models to assess the degree to which Indonesian households differ by their preferred mode of participation, their socio-economic status, and their religious affiliation.

2.2 THE NEED-RESOURCE FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 Overview of the Framework

Since the colonial era, the traditional development model has consisted of aid transfers from advanced western economies to the governments of more impoverished nation-states. By the mid-1960’s, however, it was clear that many of those nations had been receiving aid transfers continuously but barely showed tangible signs of progress. Consequently, the traditional model of development drew considerable criticism as its failings became increasingly evident. During this period, the terms "civic engagement" and "participation" were already in use, but until the 1990's scholars did not formally discuss their relevance in global development studies (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002; Holland, Jones and Kardan 2015). Two historical trends coincided to facilitate the rise of "participation" as a central concept in development. First, more democratic regimes gradually replaced the coercive socialist governments in many nations in the Global South, and this ushered in an age of broad political reforms, the rise of civil society, and a more inclusive civic culture. Second, development discourse among academics, and eventually among practitioners, gradually shifted its attention from the role of the state to also consider the role of citizens. Some influential voices advocated for a shift from a development apparatus that was government-centered to one that would become citizen-centered (Chambers 1983; 1997; Sen 2000).
In this context, participation was "rediscovered as a tool to consolidate democratic systems and strengthen the global project of development" (Malik and Waglé 2002:6). Development thinking grew from a needs-based approach to a more integrated agenda at the center of which are the aspirations of local citizens and their ability to contribute to their own progress (Mansuri and Rao 2012; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). As a field of practice, development still aims to implement solutions to promote the socio-economic advancement and well-being of the global poor. However, the emerging paradigm entrusts local citizens to be among the most qualified actors to address these issues because bottom-up collective action is more likely to result in sustainable and lasting social change. This redirection of policies has been aptly labeled “participatory development,” in response to criticisms that the traditional top-down model led to state corruption, dependency, and elite capture.

Before long, however, this new paradigm that championed bottom-up organizing also came under scrutiny. Critics across the disciplines have lamented the disconnection between its bold promises and existing practices (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2008; Banks, Hulme and Edwards 2015). Its advocates claim that participatory development would increase transparency, accountability, and sustainability. In many countries around the world, however, the most impoverished citizens remain disengaged from the communal activities that could give them access to certain public goods. Although the new approach implicitly framed local community development as a civic endeavor, one of development’s most pressing challenges in the last thirty years has been how to inspire poor people to participate in their own development. This struggle to achieve critical mass among the poor relates directly to their lack of representation and difficulty in taking ownership of their socio-economic advancement (Barrett and Zani 2014:5; Zukin et al. 2006). The problem
is decidedly structural as it often involves ongoing competition among various social groups over access to resources.

One way of approaching this problem of participation is to frame the decision to participate and how to participate as a trade-off between need and resources. The resources in question include money, assets, other material goods as well as skills and physical labor. A citizen will participate in local collective action when the prospective benefits outweigh the cost of the resources she must deploy or when the opportunity cost of doing something else makes participating worthwhile. Therefore, we can interpret an actor’s contribution to community development as purposive “civic” action that depends on his level of need for some collective goods and her ability to contribute resources towards producing those goods. Contributing to local development constitutes a civic action because it is a deliberate engagement with one’s fellow citizens to produce a public, instead of a private, good (Cariño 2005:65; Putnam 1994:86). Understanding citizens’ decision to participate also warrants a consideration of broader community level conditions, such as the state of the local economy, the presence of infrastructures, or the ethnic composition of communities.

2.2.2 Interplay Between Need and Resources

We can envision a simple system with two intersecting axes: one is a resource continuum, and the other a need continuum, as in Figure 2.1 Let the resource continuum to be horizontal and the need continuum vertical. As in a Cartesian system, each social actor has a need and a resource coordinate. Where a citizen falls in this system is a combination of how much they need a public good and the amount of resources they have to help bring that good into existence. Some actors may have less or greater need for public goods just as they may have fewer or more resources to contribute toward producing those public goods. The axes meet at the point of perfect equilibrium
where actors have just enough need and enough resources to contribute. My argument begins with
the premise that no citizen has entirely zero need for a public good nor zero resource, since she
can contribute her labor toward producing the good — assuming that the citizen does not face
social barriers that exclude her for participating otherwise. At the extreme right on the horizontal
axis we find citizens who have a great amount of resources, and at the extreme left there are those
with few resources. Likewise, at the top of the vertical axis we have those who have great need for
a public good, and at the bottom those with very little, if any, need for that good. We can also
envision a certain middle range — an optimal range around the equilibrium point — within which
some citizens have just enough of a need for a public good and just enough resources to help
produce it.

A few testable hypotheses derive from these assumptions. For example, one could predict
that citizens are more likely to contribute either when they are most in need of the benefits they
stand to enjoy via pooled contributions; when they have abundant resources and thus little need
for most public goods; or when they have a moderate need for public goods and moderate resources
to contribute towards their creation. An actor’s civic behavior results from considering the first or
both of the following decisions: (1) to contribute or not, and (2) if contributing, then how. Citizens
may contribute to local development initiatives in one of three ways: they can apply their skills
and labor towards performing a service (“doing”), they can give cash or tangible goods (“giving”),
or they can do both (“doing and giving”). Insights from the literature suggests that “giving” and
“doing” operate on slightly different logics. How citizens contribute may reflect their perception
of how the mechanisms of development function in their locality. As Putnam (2001) noted, writing
a check is not necessarily equivalent to attending meetings or contributing one's skills to physical
tasks (51). Furthermore, the decision to participate is related to the form civic participation takes,
because not having access to any mode of civic contribution ultimately leads to non-participation. Having a need for the public good or the resources to contribute are no guarantee that a citizen will do so. For instance, a person may have her skills and labor to contribute (resources) but is unable to participate due to structural barriers.

2.2.3 Three Theoretical Models of Participatory Development

As mentioned above, one can hardly find a social group without some degree of need and some minimal amount of resources at its disposal. However, a group with lower need and few resources to activate will hardly have either enough interest or the appropriate means to partake in collective action. Accordingly, the bottom left quadrant in Figure 2.1 is left empty. The framework consists of three possible models: aptly labeled “poverty-driven,” “elite-driven” and “middle-class,” each characterized by a dominant mode of contribution (primarily giving, primarily doing, or a mix of giving and doing).

Poverty-driven participation

In the poverty-driven model, social actors lack the resources required to participate, but their high level of need takes precedence over that material shortcoming. In this model, the dominant mode of participation is by “doing” – in other words, by contributing labor and time more so than money. This model does not find much support in the literature. Oblitas and Peter (1999) document a rare case in which poor farmers in the Indian province of Andhra Pradesh successfully achieved a poverty-driven model of irrigation — partly because they were able to pressure the state to pass legislation on the matter. If properly motivated, the citizens who are most in need of public goods may reach critical mass and still drive the participation process. However, this model is quite uncommon, and partly because it is plagued by problems related to coordination.
and free-riding. The works of Lewis (2007) on Nigeria and Indonesia, as well as Englebert's (2000) on Ethiopia and Rwanda, suggest that in many cases it is quite difficult to mobilize the poor and "overcome collective action barriers to developmental leadership" (Booth 2012: 49). Collective action is hard to achieve in developing nations unless the masses experience a major shock such as natural disasters or political violence. Still, considering the poverty-driven model is theoretically appealing because its realization would be a triumph in policymaking. At the same time, the implausibility of such a model challenges the assumptions of participatory development as a remedy for long-term poverty (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996).

**Elite-driven participation**

The elite-driven model has two distinct versions, both of them characterized by a preference for “giving” over “doing.” In the first version, (panel b of Figure 2.1), citizens have greater amounts of resources and a greater need for public goods. Baland, Bardhan and Bowles (2006) have shown that having more wealth may increase wealthy citizens’ demand for some public goods, but that it also increases the opportunity cost of contributing their time. Such instances frequently result in the rich contributing money towards a communal project as the poor contribute their labor. In other cases, the rich may pay for a project more because they stand to benefit the most if the outcome is not a pure public good — for example a club good (Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Marwell and Oliver 1993:192). However, the elites do not always monopolize the benefits. For instance, Rao and Ibanez (2003) found that, in a sample of 500 Jamaican households, elite households tended to take control of the participation process, but that distribution and satisfaction was achieved on a broad scale.
Figure 2.1 Models of participatory development
In the second version of the elite driven-model (panel c), wealthy citizens have plenty of resources to contribute, but they do not have a great need for public goods. Still, Olson (1971) suggests that the rich often subsidize the cost of creating public goods for the majority, so long that they have selective incentives. These incentives may sometimes be in the form of prestige or social honor — especially when they do not directly draw material benefits from financing such public goods. Marwell and Oliver (1993) called these manipulable incentives, since they can be framed in a variety of ways to reward varying numbers of actors. In short, whether the rich have a great need for a public good or not, they have the resources to finance its creation if they have enough selective incentives in seeing it come to fruition. Because collective action requires enough interested and resourceful individuals who are connected, it is likely that the determinants of participation are observed mostly in the upper tail of the distribution. Several cases in the multi-state study of Indian watershed programs by Kerr et al. (2002) also support this elite-driven participation model. In those instances, collective action is made possible by the subset of social actors who are most interested in its realization. A more recent study by Beard (2007) found that, in Indonesia, households whose head was employed and owned more assets contributed more time and money to community activities than poorer households.

**Middle-class participation**

Each of the models in panels a) thru c) emphasizes a mode of engagement over another — *giving* or *doing*. The third model, however, offers a middle course. There is an optimal range along the need-resources continuum, in which citizens have enough of a need for public goods and enough resources to contribute to its creation. In this middle-class model, it is those citizens who have moderate levels of need and resources that drive participation. If this model accurately captures how citizens mobilize in rural Indonesia, we would find that either very low or very high
measures of socio-economic resources (assets, expenditures) decrease contributions. Meanwhile, this effect would be positive for actors with modest levels of need and moderate resources. The dominant mode of contribution in this middle-class model is an integration of giving and doing. Weinberger and Jutting (2001) found evidence of a middle-class model of civic participation in the Indian region of Kashmir and communities in the Central African Republic of Chad. Wiebe (2000) also reports a similar middle-class dominance over resources and decision-making in community projects in rural parts of Guatemala. Beard (2007) also found some support for a middle-class model of participation if one looks at the effects of per capita expenditures. Families with both low and high per capita expenditures gave less and did less, which suggests that families with moderate expenditures (the reference category) gave more and did more. A plausible conclusion is that participation was mainly driven by households of moderate need and resources, depending on how reliable household expenditures are as a measure of wealth.

To say that a participatory model is characterized by a dominant mode of contribution, for example “doing,” does not mean that citizens participate exclusively in such a way. It means, however, that they prioritize using that mode of participation over the other. For instance, doing is prioritized as a mode of contribution in the poverty-driven model, but poor citizens may also contribute some small amount of money sometimes, but much less often then they contribute time and labor. All three participatory models would potentially result in improved service delivery and better development outcomes, but the poverty-driven model would especially motivate the poor to participate. While measuring improvements in quality of service delivery is difficult, it is feasible to test for a greater inclusion of the poor. Indonesia offers an interesting context to understand how participatory development has worked in rural communities and whether recent efforts have
successfully engaged the poor – especially following the Indonesian state’s decentralization and
democratic reforms.

2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

2.3.1 The Impact of Political Reforms

Indonesia’s case is of great interest to scholars because it may help explain how
participatory development works in a Muslim nation that is in the midst of a democratic transition.
Among the few empirical studies on the subject, Beard (2007) found that nearly 20% of rural
households contributed some amount of money, and 48% contributed some time (614).
Participation varied by socioeconomic status and by religion: poorer households gave less time
and less money, and non-Muslims gave less time and less money. In short, Beard (2007)
documented a pattern of modest participation levels and found very little evidence for the poverty-
driven model. Instead, the study concluded that participation in Indonesia was driven by elite and
middle-class households and that poor households remained marginalized. Beard (2007) used data
from 2000, however, and Indonesia underwent some fundamental changes in its economic and
political institutions since then. Since Suharto’s fall from power in 1998, Indonesians have voted
in five open and successful democratic elections without fraud or illegitimate disruption. Indonesia
has since seen an average voter turnout rate of 75% in general elections, compared to a 60-62%
average in the United States in recent years (Figure 2.2). Also, despite suffering from considerable
setbacks during and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Indonesia re-emerged as
Southeast Asia’s strongest economy by the mid-2000’s (Figure 2.3). The economy has been
growing rapidly in many sectors (on average 5% GDP increase per year) and has sustained
relatively stable inflation (Elias and Noone 2011). This economic boost has been attributed to well-implemented government policies and the country’s growing labor force. In the first decade of the 21st century, the government has renewed trade relations with nearby neighbors, especially Australia. By 2004, Indonesia became a member of the G20 group — a consortium of the world’s 20 largest economies.

Figure 2.2. Voter turnout in general elections in Indonesia (2004-2014)

Source: World Bank
In the aftermath of all this social change, it is crucial to know if political decentralization has led to broader-based civic participation in Indonesia? Various observations from the literature suggest that we should see a general increase in civic participation after the reforms. For instance, Freedman and Tiburzi (2012) argued that the economic shocks of 1997’s Asian financial crisis may have triggered a greater need for civic or political action (149). Economic downturns, especially in more rural areas with smaller populations, can motivate the need for more collective action. The harsh economic prospects and increasing commodity prices might have enlivened the civic spirit of many Indonesian citizens who saw collective action as the only remedy. The reforms were expected to engender a more permissive climate for civil society instead of the repressive

Figure 2.3. Changes in Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1994-2009)

Source: World Bank
one the Suharto administration maintained for many years (Katyasungkana 2000; Manning and Van Diermen 2000). Thus, many expected the democratic reforms to not only inject new life into the political arena by increasing the number of parties and having fair and open elections but also to revive civil society (see Hefner 2001). The prospects of reform inspired quite a bit of enthusiasm among Indonesians. For instance, De Jong et al. (2009) noticed a sense of euphoria among certain groups in South Sulawesi upon the ratification of the two laws that launched the decentralization process. Given Indonesians’ general reaction to the reforms, I expect to see an overall increase in participation after 2001. This is our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: participation rates increase after the political reforms

2.3.2 Need and Resources

Also, even with a consistently growing economy, Indonesia still faces a grossly unequal distribution of resources among the nation’s regions and inadequate infrastructure at the level of villages and towns. The economic boom that started in 1999 did not move enough Indonesians over the poverty line and, by 2007, many still struggled with unemployment. By then, close to 25% of the rural population were living on less than $2 a day (Suryahadi et al. 2003). These persistent trends of inequality suggest a second research question: are the poor included in the community development process in the post-reform era or has community development followed one of the two other participatory models outlined above? In the poverty-driven model, those most in need of collective goods are also those who are financially least able to contribute. In the elite-driven model, the opposite is true: the most affluent citizens surely have the means to contribute
but have the lowest, if any, material need for collective goods since they can purchase almost anything on the open market. Still, the rich are likely to subsidize at least some public goods, if only for reputational credit, among other reasons. Therefore, it seems plausible that (as the middle-class model suggests) the individuals most likely to contribute to community development efforts are those who have both some level of need and some amount of resources to contribute, i.e., those situated in the middle range of the socio-economic spectrum. Also, this third model is theoretically advantageous for realizing collective action because it is potentially less prone to having coordination problems. However, the evidence in the literature gives primacy to elite-driven participation, although the middle-class model also finds some support. The conclusion in Beard (2007) emphasized that the most affluent Indonesian families dominate participatory initiatives. A sensible hypothesis is that the reforms might have initiated a reconfiguration of interests and opportunities to participate but not quickly enough that we would see dramatic results in the short term. Thus, the elite-driven model should still prevail in that context, which means that resources, not need, would drive the participation process immediately after the reforms. If the mode of participation matters, the logic of collective action dictates that one should expect the wealthier households to find giving more convenient than doing.

Hypotheses 2: households with more resources give more and do less.

2.3.3 Religion

As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has been the site of considerable conflicts since its independence in 1945, and minority religious groups have been violently attacked on several occasions. Varshney (2008) has documented more than 5,400 deaths related to Muslim-Christian
violence between 1990 and 2003. Most notable during that time frame was the anti-Christian riots in North Maluku in July 2000, which left over 3,000 dead and countless others maimed and brutalized. Religious minorities are typically considered to be among those at risk of disengaging, even in contexts where they peacefully coexist with the majority (Bertrand 2004; Davidson 2008). The question is whether the democratic reforms have appeased these religious tensions and allowed Christians and Muslims to co-exist in civic spaces and share common goals. Thus, a fourth and last critical question is: are religious minorities included in community development initiatives? Religious minorities tend to lack representation in public institutions, and consequently, should be less publicly engaged than Muslims. Also, they may see doing as a more rational mode of participation than giving. In fact, it is a doubly winning strategy for non-Muslims to do more and give less. By engaging in concrete activities, non-Muslim household heads can rub elbows with Muslims and possibly gain access to what Weber called fraternal societies (Weber 2009 [1969]: 311). At the same time, non-Muslims can help create a public good from which they stand to benefit, especially if it is a non-excludable public good like a road, a free clinic or a school. In other words, they can contribute their labor towards a good whose creation they can confirm and whose use they are guaranteed to enjoy. By contrast, giving money comes with no guarantee, and being in the minority may prevent them from confirming that donations went towards their intended purposes. In the climate of rampant corruption that characterizes many regions in Indonesia, it is probably common for mutual funds to be misappropriated and diverted towards creating club goods (Hefner 2001; Manning and Van Diermen 2000).

Overall, we can expect non-Muslims to be less central in the development process, given that they are the minority. Should they participate strongly, however, we would expect non-Muslim households to do more and give less than their Muslim counterparts since the majority is
likely to control a more significant portion of the wealth. It is unclear however whether being wealthier would change the participation rates of non-Muslims. This makes the interaction between wealth and being non-Muslim particularly interesting. Would wealthier non-Muslim households also favor giving over doing as their preferred mode of participation, or is the opposite more likely? A reasonable expectation is that wealthy non-Muslims (mostly Christians) may end up doing more and giving less than wealthy Muslims. Wealthy Christians may stand to receive less social honor when they subsidize public goods than wealthy Muslim households, and that may influence their willingness to participate. These expectations can be summarized with the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Muslims give more and do more than non-Muslims

Hypothesis 4: The interaction of wealth and being Muslim increases giving and doing (wealthier Muslim households do and give more than others)

In addition to socio-economic resources and religion, there are additional constraints on participation that must be accounted for. For instance, a household head’s ethnicity and gender are likely to affect that household’s opportunities to participate. I expect female-headed families to contribute less due to existing gender barriers that restrict the activities in which they are allowed to attend without a husband being present (Beard 2007). A similar hypothesis applies to households that belong to an ethnic minority (Barrett and Zani 2014). The interplay of needs and resources may also matter at the community level, since some villages and towns may be composed mostly of families that have a higher need but fewer resources to contribute, and vice versa. However, even citizens in the less affluent regions may find the motivation to increase their civic
participation if they had recently experienced some economic distress (a bad harvest, a decrease in average wages) or a natural disaster. The presence of a representative board in a community may have a similar effect. Following the decentralization reforms, some may have expected villages in rural Indonesia to become little democratic hubs where representation is commonplace. How the presence or absence of formal representation has since impacted household participation is unknown, and this study offers the first opportunity to assess that effect. We can expect the presence of a democratic representative board to increase people's involvement and make development more inclusive, even if marginally so. Lastly, population size may be relevant. For example, Olson (1971) suggests that smaller groups are usually more successful at achieving collective action. If this assumption holds, families residing in smaller communities may tend to participate more, since their initiatives may be easier to coordinate.

2.4 DATA AND METHODS

2.4.1 Data and Analytical Aims

I tested the hypotheses above by using the PNPM Generasi data set collected by the World Bank. The PNPM Generasi dataset is a larger, more recent random sample and contains a variety of measures that resemble those in Beard’s 2007 study (IFLS-3) ³. PNPM (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat), which means National Community Empowerment Program, is a government-led conditional cash transfer initiative pioneered by the World Bank in 2007. This ongoing participatory development program issues conditional block grants directly to

³ The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is an on-going longitudinal survey in Indonesia. IFLS-3 refers to the third wave of data collected in 2000.
communities, and local voluntary groups manage those funds. Its goal is to strengthen civil society while making local decision-makers efficient, transparent and accountable. Because the grants target specific World Bank Millennium Development Goals, the survey questionnaire focused primarily on statistics related to some of those goals, such as education and access to health care. The survey also covered a wide array of concerns, and household heads answered questions ranging from expenses and assets to migration and religion.

The Generasi data consists of three successive waves (2007, 2008 and 2009) with information on over thirty-five thousand people located in more than four thousand villages and wards in various parts of rural Indonesia. The present analysis relies on the 2007 wave of PNPM. Given that Beard (2007) relied on data from 2000 (IFLS-3), this sets up an easy comparison of civic participation trends before and after the democratic reforms. Also, the sample in Beard (2007) contained information on 8,718 households and offered limited information on village infrastructures, while the sample in this chapter contains 22,294 households, and the PNPM survey provides rich information on the villages in which they reside. This chapter advances the debate on participation and development by using rich data to compare pre-reform to post-reform trends in citizen engagement. My analytical strategy consisted of devising regression models to replicate and extend the findings in Beard (2007).

This chapter extends the findings from Beard (2007) in three important aspects: 1) by formally operationalizing a household’s degree of need for collective goods, 2) by considering the importance of a household’s ties to community leaders, and 3) by paying closer attention to community-level characteristics. First, while Beard (2007) alluded to an interplay between need and resources, that analysis did not include a direct measure of need in the models. As a result, both “need” and “resources” were confounded in the same set of socioeconomic variables.
Although one could infer a household’s level of need from the measures of assets and expenditures, I argue that a more direct measure is required to capture that effect. Conveniently, the Generasi survey includes information on households that have received cash assistance from local government. Receiving cash assistance indicates that a household unit has a financial deficiency that the government acknowledges as deserving of an institutional response. In short, direct cash assistance may give a family more buying power, but it is a different kind of socio-economic characteristic because it signals that family’s recognized need for public assistance. Households that receive cash assistance have a greater need for public goods and should, therefore, contribute less to community development.

Second, the effort in Beard (2007) to document the role of network ties among ordinary citizens was supplemented with a consideration of the impact that contact with local leaders had on participation. Previous studies have found that households with more ties to government officials tend to be more involved in communal activities (Agrawal and Gupta 2005:1110-11). Likewise, one can expect Indonesian household heads with more frequent contact with local leaders to be more civically engaged. In that case, however, the causal order is unclear since the reverse may be equally true: it is possible that those who are more civically engaged are more likely to gain frequent contact with local leaders. A third extension was to include more community-level characteristics in the regression models. Beard (2007) accounted for the macro-level context, but that analysis still lacked any indicator of the state of regional economies or their governance structures. These omitted variables can serve as controls that make the predictions more robust. To account for these macro-level effects, the extended regression models include measures of economic distress and the presence of a village representative body.
2.4.2 Measurements and Operationalization

The unit of analysis was the household, and the dependent variable was how a household participated in the environmental infrastructure domain, which comprised activities such as cleaning, construction, and repair work. The PNPM Generasi survey asked household heads whether they had contributed time or money to organizations involved in community development activities in their locality in the past year. These two forms of contribution correspond to the two modes of participation in the framework outlined in this chapter, namely doing and giving. Doing was measured in hundreds of hours and giving as hundreds of thousands of rupiahs contributed by all household occupants toward environmental infrastructure. The extent to which a household could give and/or do depended on the interplay between its need and resources and these measures also had to be operationalized with care. The notion of resources was operationalized as a set of variables that indicate affluence, buying power, formal education. Having high per capita expenditures and valuable household assets, as well as being employed and educated are all indicators of resources. Due to the lack of information on income in the data, a household’s financial capacity was estimated as the yearly amount of money spent on food and other necessities. Employment is a resource because it provides individuals the income necessary to exercise their buying power and acquire assets. While employed household heads are likely to have less free time for community activities, they are likely to belong to networks of (similarly employed) resourceful individuals who may have access to privileged information and a kind of support unavailable to individuals outside those networks.

One of the most critical resources citizens can have is their education, which was coded as a categorical variable with five levels: no education, primary, junior high, senior high and university. Junior high was used as the referent category. Education grants one a certain degree of
ingenuity and formative thinking that can play a crucial role in the decision to participate and how
to participate. Having a university degree indicates a different level of resourcefulness than merely
completing one’s primary education or junior high does. Still, having any formal education
constitutes a resource in and of itself, if only for the modicum of civic education interwoven in
most developmental programs. While being less educated may not always correlate with lower
levels of engagement, being uneducated is consistently shown to be a liability in the civic sphere
because it leads to disengagement (Barrett and Zani 2014; see also Levine 2007). Also, being
uneducated typically limits one’s opportunities for employment and the extent to which one may
access the social capital embodied in local networks. In a rapidly changing national economy in
which literacy and access to information matter more than ever, being uneducated puts one in a
precarious position and severely limits one’s life chances. For these reasons, a lack of education
was taken to be a signal of need and any level of formal education a resource indicator. Other
dimensions of need included having low expenditures and receiving direct cash assistance. Low
per capita expenditures indicate that a household has less buying power than those with moderate
or high expenditures and may be taken as a signal of relative economic need. Still, specifying need
as the converse of resource seemed somewhat limiting. As a remedy, I supplemented that measure
with a variable that stated whether or not a household received direct cash assistance from the
government.

Many of the variables used in this chapter follow the operationalization in Beard (2007)
(Table 2.1). Per capita expenditures also remained as brackets ranging, respectively, from the 1st
to the 25th percentiles (low), the 26th to the 75th percentiles (moderate) and from the 76th to the
100th percentiles (high). Ethnic homogeneity was still a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the three
largest ethnic groups in the community but updated for 2007. The population size of the villages
also reflects 2007 estimates. Some variables, however, had to be estimated differently than they were in Beard (2007) due to limitations in the data. Household assets, for instance, had to be estimated not as the total value of goods and possessions, but by merely accounting for their presence in the home (ownership). These possessions included anything from consumer goods (TV, radio, satellite, bicycle, etc.) to cattle as well as home construction materials and furnishings. A household’s assets index was the sum of its scores on more than 20 distinct physical assets. These physical assets are conspicuous signs of economic status and constitute a measure of wealth that has gained popularity among researchers across the disciplines in recent years. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) noted that assets represent a household’s long-term economic status and may be less sensitive to economic shocks than are expenditures. Additionally, interviewees are likely to be more candid about their physical possessions than their income or investments.

2.4.3 Methods of Analysis

The sample excluded households that had no opportunity to participate in any civic activity, but there remained some concerns about the source of zeros in the dependent variables. Many respondents listed “zero” as the amount of time or money their household contributed even though they initially indicated that they actually participated in some communal activities. This produced a censoring effect in the dependent variables, especially in the distribution of monetary contributions. This problem warranted the use of Tobit regression models. A standard Tobit model follows the equation:

\[ y_i^* = x_i \beta + \varepsilon_i \]
Where \( \mathbf{x}_i \) is a vector of independent variables, \( \mathbf{b} \) is a vector of parameter estimates, and \( e_i \) is the error term. The variable \( y^*_i \) is a latent outcome that is observed for values greater than 0 and censored for values less than or equal to 0. The dependent variable \( y_i \) is estimated as a function of \( y^*_i \) as follows:

\[
y_i = y^*_i \quad \text{if} \quad y^*_i > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad y_i = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad y^*_i \leq 0
\]

Both endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity could be serious concerns in these models. Endogeneity pertains to a possible recursive relationship between some predictors and the dependent variables. For instance, the assumption in the present models in that socio-economic status will impact a household’s decision to participate, but endogeneity would be a problem if the reverse were true, namely that participation itself influences a household’s socio-economic status directly. However, to date, no known study has established such a causal relationship, and thus the assumptions that household level characteristics will predict levels of participation is a sensible one. Lastly, unobserved heterogeneity at the village level could bias the estimates but including the village-level variables helps reduce its impact.

PNPM Generasi is a program that explicitly targets families in rural areas, and thus the urban component is missing from this analysis. Also, my analysis focuses on only one of the three domains of participation explored in Beard (2007) – community governance, social welfare and environmental infrastructure – the PNPM data only allow an analysis that addresses the third one. Notwithstanding this limitation, the results pertaining directly to environmental infrastructure should still be replicable. To that end, caution was used to estimate the same types of regression methods. Finally, in the data preparation stage, some variables were plagued by missing values.
Roughly 250 observations lacked measurements for household size and the community's population size. Instead of losing these observations, and in the interest of maintaining a stable working sample size, the missing values were successfully imputed by taking a random sample from the observed values (using the MICE package in the R environment). Although the imputation process involved the dependent variables (to obtain reliable estimates), their values remained unchanged since there were no values imputed for either time or money contributed.

![Distribution of the dependent variables](image)

Figure 2.4. Distribution of the dependent variables.

On average, Indonesian households contributed 60 hours and 19,000 rupiahs to community development activities related to environmental infrastructures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization in Beard (2007)</th>
<th>Operationalization in this study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time contributed</td>
<td>Hundreds of hours</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money contributed</td>
<td>Hundreds of thousands of rupiahs</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td>Household head is non-Muslim</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No education; Primary school, Junior high; Senior high; University</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>Natural log of the total value of all personal possessions, business assets and land.</td>
<td>Index calculated as the sum of binary entries for the presence/absence of personal possessions, business assets and land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita expenditures</td>
<td>Low: 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; to 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentiles  Moderate: 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; to 75&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentiles  High: 76&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; to 100&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentiles</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>Head of household is employed</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Household receives cash assistance from the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Household head is female</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>All persons living at a residence (as reported by household head)</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last two years, head</td>
<td>Head of household moved to current community in the last 2 years</td>
<td>Head of household moved to current community in the past year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to ethnic majority</td>
<td>Head of Household belongs to one of the 3 largest ethnic groups in the community</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Number of community leaders the household head knows closely (head)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>A Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 3 largest ethnic groups in the community in 1997</td>
<td>Same (for year 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
<td>Total number of community residents in the year 2000</td>
<td>Same (for year 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Index calculated as the sum of binary entries for each type of economic distress in the village (loss due to natural disasters, harvest failure, reduction in average income, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village representation body</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Presence of an active village representation body/board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2.5. Household characteristics (I)
Figure 2.6. Household and village characteristics (II)
Figure 2.7. Village characteristics (III)
2.5 RESULTS

2.5.1 Overview

The average Indonesian household in the sample was a Muslim family residing in a small, ethnically homogeneous and Muslim-majority community of about 4,000 people with few recent newcomers. More than 65% of households had four members, with a 43-year old male as the head (Figure 2.5). Most household heads completed their years of primary education. Roughly eight percent reported not having any education at all, and only two percent reported earning a university degree. As much as 95% of household heads reported being employed, although most of them were farmers. Almost six percent of household heads reported they had recently migrated to a new community, and as much as 82% reported they were part of the ethnic majority and resided in a homogeneous community. Also, 23% of household heads reported they were non-Muslim – which is on par with the overall 20% of non-Muslims in the Indonesian population (Figure 2.6). Overall, the trends highlight the importance of class-based differences between households that subscribe to one mode of participation instead of another, i.e., giving versus doing. In the remainder of this section, I discuss the most relevant findings by directly answering each research question.
Figure 2.8. Participation rates before and after the political reforms
2.5.2 Overall Participation Increased after the Reforms

If the reforms had a positive impact on participation, one should observe an increase in overall participation. Beard (2007) showed that, before the 2001 democratic reforms, citizens in rural Indonesia contributed an average of 9 thousand rupiahs and 128 hours to infrastructure-related initiatives (614). By contrast, the present study found that in 2007, Indonesian households contributed an average of 60 hours and 19 thousand rupiahs (Figure 2.4). On average, the number of hours contributed decreased while the amount of money contributed increased. Also, in 2007, the percentage of households that contributed time increase from 48% (before the reforms) to 92% (after the reforms), and a slightly higher percentage were contributing their money — 26% after the reforms versus 20% before the reforms (Figure 2.8). In short, the percentage of households engaged in “doing” increased from 48% to 92%, but the average hours of doing declined from 128 to 60. Regarding the average amount of money households contributed, 19 thousand rupiahs is equivalent to roughly $1.50 U.S. and is not much money, even when considering that the average income in Indonesia circa 2007 was $8,393 U.S. (World Wealth and Income Database). While it is difficult to say precisely to what degree this staggering increase in doing is due to the political decentralization policies, it is clear that the mode of participation seems to matter, and the question is: which mode is preferred by what type of households, based on socio-economic status and community level indicators? Instances in which giving is more likely than doing, and vice versa, qualify our understanding of the social actors involved and their motivation towards community development — signals that should be relevant to community leaders and policymakers alike. Answering this question also helps determine which of the three models of participation prevails and whether the poor and religious minorities were included in the development process. It is unclear what percentage of citizens preferred both giving and doing in prior studies, but 25% of
the households in this sample utilized both modes of contribution (see Table 2.2). Only 7.2% of the households did not contribute at all. Less than 1% of the participants contributing by only giving without any doing, compared to 67% of household heads who reported contributing by doing only without giving.

Table 2.2. Distribution of preferred mode of participation in the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DOING</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIVING</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.3. Tobit regression model predicting the amount of time contributed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource indicators</th>
<th>Before the reforms (using 2000 data)</th>
<th>After the reforms (using 2007 data)</th>
<th>Extended model for &quot;doing&quot; (using 2007 data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high education, household head</td>
<td>-0.413 *</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>-0.107 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education, household head</td>
<td>-0.891 *</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures (in 76th to 100th percentiles)</td>
<td>-0.452 *</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.164 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets *</td>
<td>0.126 *</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.008 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>0.732 *</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.232 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>-0.711 *</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>-0.202 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures (in 1st to 25th percentiles)</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>-0.163 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-muslim, head</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.400 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim * household assets</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>0.020 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>-0.842 *</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.146 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size b</td>
<td>0.022 *</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.229 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community geographic size</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic representation board (village)</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>-1.652 *</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>-0.542 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last two years, head c</td>
<td>-0.915 *</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.164 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.179 *</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.082 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.307 *</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of family network</td>
<td>0.060 *</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.137 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to ethnic majority</td>
<td>1.189 *</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.882</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>1.467 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-13864</td>
<td>4044</td>
<td>86163.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signif. codes: 0 "***" 0.001 "**" 0.01 "*" 0.05 "." 0.1 "1"

++ Beard (2007:615). The coefficients were reordered for an easier comparison (domain of environmental infrastructure).

* Household assets are logged in Beard (2007) but not in this study.

b Population size is logged in the replication and extension models.

c Migration period restricted to 12 months in this study.
Table 2.4. Tobit regression model predicting the amount of money contributed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource indicators</th>
<th>Before the reforms</th>
<th>After the reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model from Beard (2007) ++</td>
<td>Replication model for &quot;giving&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>using 2000 data</td>
<td>(using 2007 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y = Money</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
<td>0.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high education, household head</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education, household head</td>
<td>2.957</td>
<td>2.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures (in 76th to 100th percentiles)</td>
<td>-0.731 *</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets a</td>
<td>0.290 *</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need indicators</th>
<th>Before the reforms</th>
<th>After the reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model from Beard (2007) ++</td>
<td>Replication model for &quot;giving&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>using 2000 data</td>
<td>(using 2007 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y = Money</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>-0.791</td>
<td>0.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures (in 1st to 25th percentiles)</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Before the reforms</th>
<th>After the reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model from Beard (2007) ++</td>
<td>Replication model for &quot;giving&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>using 2000 data</td>
<td>(using 2007 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y = Money</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-muslim, head</td>
<td>-0.543</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim * household assets</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community characteristics</th>
<th>Before the reforms</th>
<th>After the reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model from Beard (2007) ++</td>
<td>Replication model for &quot;giving&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>using 2000 data</td>
<td>(using 2007 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y = Money</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size b</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community geographic size</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic representation board (village)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables</th>
<th>Before the reforms</th>
<th>After the reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model from Beard (2007) ++</td>
<td>Replication model for &quot;giving&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>using 2000 data</td>
<td>(using 2007 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y = Money</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>-0.773 *</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last two years, head c</td>
<td>-0.519</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.573</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of family network</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to ethnic majority</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-14.690*</td>
<td>6.649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log likelihood | -6689.5 | -29331.4 | -22982.4 |
Uncensored N | 1619 | 5722 | 5722 |
AIC | -------- | 46100.7 | 46100.9 |
BIC | -------- | 46253.0 | 46195.2 |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

++ Beard (2007:616). The coefficients were reordered for an easier comparison (domain of environmental infrastructure).

a Household assets are logged in Beard (2007) but not in this study.
b Population size is logged in the replication and extension models.
c Migration period restricted to 12 months in this study.
The top three coefficients are indicators of resources and the bottom three are indicators of need. For “giving” – the red coefficients – there is a clear difference by class. Households with more resources give more and those with a high degree of need give less. For “doing”, – the red coefficients – however, differences in resources and need do not seem to matter, since all the blue coefficients are practically zero.

Figure 2.9. Effects of need and resource indicators on giving and going
2.5.3 Class Matters, But Only for Participation by Giving

Each of the three participatory models outlined in this chapter would potentially result in improved service delivery and better development outcomes, but the concern of most policymakers and development agents is whether schemes to create public goods involve the poor. This concern underlies the expectation that needy families are more likely to enjoy public goods when they participate in their creation. The significant increase in the percentage of households that participated by “doing” (instead of “giving”) suggests that the poverty-driven model could have been a dominant feature of this post-reform shift. More precisely, if the poverty-driven model prevailed in this context, one would find that households with fewer resources and a higher degree of need (no education, low per capita expenditures, fewer assets) contributed more than other households. The reverse was true, however. In the replication model predicting time contributed (doing), the need indicators (no education and low per capita expenditures) significantly decreased the amount of time contributed. Meanwhile, having high per capita expenditures, more assets and being employed significantly increased the amount of time contributed (except for senior high education, which had a significant negative effect). In the extended model for “doing”, the effects of the resource indicators were somewhat less consistent. Having high per capita expenditures and being employed still increased the amount of time a household contributed, but surprisingly, assets no longer mattered, and having a senior high education or a university degree decreased the amount of time households contributed. Households with a high degree of need, however, still contributed less time.

It is evident that in the regression models for doing there is little variation in the magnitude of the coefficients for need, resource and religion – most are of the order of 0.1–0.3, and only “non-Muslim” has a coefficient of 0.4 (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). That was not the case, however, for the
model predicting giving, where the predictors of need, resource and religion had coefficients ranging from 0.2 to 1.5 in magnitude. In short, differences in social characteristics did not impact doing that much because virtually everyone contributed a little bit of their time. Overall, socio-economic differences among the households mattered much more for giving than they did for doing. Plotting only the need and resources indicators (see Figure 2.9) clearly shows that there was more variation among the households in terms of how much money they donated than in terms of how time they contributed.

In the replication model for giving, the need indicators were negatively associated with participation. Households whose head was uneducated and had low per capita expenditures contributed significantly less money (i.e., poor households gave less). Households with more resources not only did more but also gave more. Having at least a senior high education level, high per capita expenditures, and higher levels of assets significantly increased a household’s monetary contributions. The trends in the extended model for giving were similar: those with more need gave less, and those with more resources gave more. Households that received direct cash assistance significantly gave less than others. Both the replicated and extended models show that the data best supported an elite-driven model of participation. Poor households are participating more than they were before the reforms, but they are still giving less cash and doing less. Despite the post-reform upsurge in the percentage of households involved in doing, the poor still participated significantly less than the wealthy, regardless of the mode of participation. In sum, these findings partly confirm Hypothesis 2 that households with more resources gave more, but instead of doing less as expected, they also did more.
2.5.4  Participation Varies by Religious Affiliation

The questions regarding religious minorities (i.e., non-Muslims) were twofold: (1) do non-Muslims participate less than Muslims? And (2) does the impact of socio-economic status on doing and giving vary by religious affiliation? The first question pertains to the main effect of religious affiliation and the second aims to ascertain how the interaction between wealth (as measured by assets) and religious affiliation affects participation. In both the replication and extended models for “doing”, non-Muslim households (e.g. mostly Christians) contributed significantly more hours than Muslim ones. By contrast, in the replication and extended models for “giving”, Christian households contributed less cash than Muslims. These main effects signal that non-Muslim households did more but gave less than their Muslim counterparts. It makes sense that Christian households were more inclined to do than to give, and this was probably more common in places where Muslim clerics have much influence over the rules of economic life (Kuran 2011). This partially supports Hypothesis 3 that Muslims gave more than non-Muslims. But the second portion of the hypothesis – that Muslims would also do more than non-Muslims – was not confirmed. Rather, the opposite was true.

Emphasizing doing over giving can be a winning strategy for Christian household heads who could use the opportunity to rub elbows with Muslims and possibly join their networks. At the same time, Christians can help create a public good from which they stand to benefit, especially if it is a non-excludable public good like a road, a free clinic or a school. By contrast, giving money comes with no guarantee, and being in the minority may prevent Christians from confirming that donations went towards their intended purposes. In a country like Indonesia where corruption is rampant, there may be suspicions that mutual funds could be misappropriated and diverted towards
creating club goods \(^4\) (Hefner 2001; Manning and Van Diermen 2000). In the context of environmental infrastructures, the civic domain of interest here, the communal tasks are mostly cleaning and maintenance/repair. These tasks offer a great opportunity for fostering trust and integrating the community – outcomes that are aptly considered to be significant rewards. In sum, these are activities that occur frequently, are a relatively low-cost investment for building trust, and they yield non-excludable benefits.

Table 2.5. Distribution of wealth (household assets) by religious affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong> (1(^{st}) to 25(^{th}) percentile)</td>
<td>3951 (18%)</td>
<td>1623 (7.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid</strong> (26(^{th}) to 75(^{th})percentile)</td>
<td>8319 (45%)</td>
<td>2858 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong> (76(^{th}) to 100(^{th}) percentile)</td>
<td>4850 (22%)</td>
<td>693 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) Clubs goods are excludable but non-rivalrous.
Some of the Christian households might have been able to overcome this lag in giving, depending on their comparable level of wealth. Muslims in the sample, however, were wealthier than Christians on average (Table 2.5). Nearly 59% of Muslim households fell between the 26th and the 100th percentile, with Christian households accounting for the remaining 16% in that bracket. If we restrict the comparison to the top quartile of the wealth distribution, it is clear that there were also far more upper-class Muslim households (22%) than Christians ones (the remaining 3%). To assess the importance of these differences, the extended models included an interaction term between being non-Muslim (Christian) and household assets. In these models, the interaction term increased the amount of time contributed but decreased the amount of money contributed. More concretely, the interaction effects signal a couple of important findings (Figure 2.10). The results partly supported Hypothesis 4 that wealthier Muslim households would do and give more than others, but the nuances associated with that finding warrant a more detailed explanation. First, the amount of time Christians contributed was very sensitive to differences in their level of wealth, but that was much less true for Muslims. Based on the strong effects that the resource indicators (e.g. socio-economic status) had on participation, I expected poorer households to do less and give less than wealthier ones, and that hypothesis was supported within each religious node. Poor Muslims did less and gave less than wealthy Muslims, and likewise, poor Christians did less and gave less than wealthy Christians.

The differences, however, become apparent when we look at wealth across religious affiliations. Wealthy Christians did a lot more than wealthy Muslims. More importantly, even the poorest Christians did more than the wealthiest Muslims. Second, Muslims’ level of wealth (assets) strongly impacted how much money they gave, but the amount of money Christians gave was much less affected by their level of wealth. This pattern was the reverse of what we observed for
doing. Furthermore, poor Christians gave more than poor Muslims, but wealthy Muslims gave a lot more than wealthy Christians. In a large Muslim nation like Indonesia, those who are both poor and Christian are likely to constitute a politically and socially vulnerable group. It is possible that poor Christians were motivated to give more than poor Muslims because the former needed to make a gesture of goodwill to fit in with the majority. It is also likely that less wealthy Muslim families were keeping up with their zakat obligations by giving to the local mosque but not necessarily giving a lot to the community associations. Wealthy Muslim families, however, might be expected to give to both the mosque and local development organizations due to them having more conspicuous assets.
This graph shows how the effects of household assets and doing and giving varied by religious affiliation. Household assets is centered around the mean to avoid multicollinearity issues.
2.5.5  Other Household and Community-Level Effects

Overall, the groups traditionally at risk of non-participating contributed significantly less to community development. Female-headed households did significantly less and gave significantly less than their male-headed counterparts. This is not surprising given the constraints that female household heads are likely to face, including requirements that women participate in community development initiatives with their husband in attendance (Beard 2007:612). Also, single mothers may be excluded from certain networks where invaluable information circulate, and valuable ties are nurtured (Okten and Osili 2004). Females headed only eight percent of the households in the sample, but this finding echoes a trend noted in prior studies (Das 2014; Gibson 2012; Campbell 2009; Beard 2007; Andersen et al. 2006). Furthermore, households that belong to the ethnic majority did more, but the effect was not significant in the model predicting giving. This means that ethnic minorities did less than others. The effect of having a female head or that of belonging to an ethnic minority suggests a possible participation bias against members of these demographics. This finding has important implications for how local authorities and civic organizations can be more inclusive of marginalized groups in rural Indonesia.

The PNPM survey had limited information on households’ social networks, but households that had more ties to their community leaders significantly did more and gave more than others. This suggests that being connected to local decision-makers might have been a good incentive to be more involved, although this is not necessarily a one-way causal order. Household size also predicted greater participation. Larger families did more and gave more than smaller ones, but this effect was weak. Surprisingly, recent migrants also participated more than long-time community residents. This effect was stronger in the model predicting giving, and it contradicts the finding in Beard (2007) that recent migrants participated less. Newly arrived household heads might have
wanted to extend some goodwill to their fellow community members as a way of blending in and increase their social capital. They might have felt some social pressure to show even more commitment than long-term community members, probably given the new climate of collaboration fostered by the decentralization laws. According to Weber, newcomers claimed legitimacy and recognition in the young American democracy by joining the ranks of prominent sect-like associations. The surest way to gain acceptance was by securing membership to a fraternal society, religious or secular (Weber 2009 [1969]: 311). Similar mechanisms may be at play in these Indonesian communities.

This chapter answered the call from Beard (2007) to pay more attention to macro-level factors, such as the demographic composition of a locality. For instance, in the replication model for doing, ethnic homogeneity had a positive and significant effect on participation, but it lost its significance in the extended model. Ethnic homogeneity was a more consistent predictor of giving: in both the replication and extended models, the more ethnically homogenous its community was, the more cash a household contributed to environmental infrastructure. This is an important finding regarding how group homogeneity impacts collective action. Olson (1971) argued that a certain degree of homogeneity is instrumental because it may facilitate the alignment of interests that is necessary for collective action to occur. On the other hand, heterogeneity may be a driver of collective action for certain groups that can tap into the socio-political frictions of the day. Marwell and Oliver (1993) have shown that increased heterogeneity can increase collective action, but others in the literature have contested this positive correlation (Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Varughese and Ostrom 2001). The present finding does not settle the matter, but it suggests that the usual assumptions of how group composition affects collective action may need to account for the dominant mode of participation — “giving” versus “doing”.
Furthermore, households in more densely populated communities did more than those in smaller villages. This contradicts another finding in Beard (2007), but it supports the theoretical expectation that smaller groups are more conducive to the realization of collective action (Olson 1971) probably because it is easier to monitor cooperation in smaller groups. Apart from population size, some other village-level indicators also increased participation. Economic downturns, natural disasters, and other tragedies seem to have motivated rural Indonesians to engage more in collective action, and this makes sense because these occurrences most likely affected families at both extremes of the wealth and status continuum. Households located in communities that faced economic distress ended up giving more and doing more. Also, households in villages with a democratic representation board gave and did significantly more (with a stronger emphasis on giving) than households in other villages without such democratic bodies. This might be an indication that families are embracing deliberative fora and supporting progressive institutions, which is crucial to the future of democracy in Indonesia.

2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter examines household participation in community development initiatives in the domain of environmental infrastructure in Indonesia. Since the decentralization policies of 2001, community efforts have been increasingly dependent on household contributions of time and money. When the state diverged budgetary and decision-making power from the central government to provincial governments, some regions experienced a shortfall in resource distribution (Beard 2007:620; Silver 2003:422-3). In response to increasing economic demand and higher poverty levels, policymakers have a pressing need to understand what kinds of households will help create public goods and services. This chapter contributes to the literature by reframing
the question of who is likely to participate in community development as a civic action that involves a tradeoff between need and resources. I considered three possible participatory models: aptly labeled “poverty-driven,” “elite-driven” and “middle-class,” each characterized by a dominant mode of participation (primarily giving, primarily doing, or a little of both). The analysis highlights the importance of considering giving cash and contributing time (including skills and labor) as distinct modes of participation, each potentially more convenient to certain families depending on their level of need and access to resources. The framework also offers policymakers a straightforward way of developing expectations toward marginalized groups and how to include them in community development schemes.

I hypothesized that the political reforms of 2001 would result in higher levels of participation than before. In effect, overall participation increased after the reforms, although it varied by mode of participation. The percentage of households that contributed at least one hour to community development more than tripled and the numbers doubled for households that contributed money. There was more doing and more giving than before the reforms, but especially more doing. This surge in participation spells out good news for Indonesians and should attract development experts at global agencies as well as non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders who are interested in long-term development planning. The climate depicted in this study suggests that Indonesian communities are highly favorable to the logic of bottom-up community development, and planning agencies can tap into that spirit to design projects that engage local populations and enlist them as partners. The higher levels of doing we are seeing may reflect a shift in normative values that coincided with the political reforms. Future studies should attempt to document this potential social change by investigating the dominant norms related to volunteering and charitable donations before and after the political reforms of 2001.
In addition, I aimed to find out which among the three participation models was prevalent in rural Indonesia circa 2007 — six years after the decentralization policies had been implemented. Did a poverty-driven model prevail? While any participation model would benefit these rural communities, a collective action scheme that included the poor should be of primary interest to policymakers, if only because it guarantees that those with the highest need for most public goods and services were involved in their creation and thus had a greater chance of enjoying those goods and services. In addition to an overall increase in participation, almost every household contributed at least an hour of their time, regardless of class and status. Socio-economic differences did not impact how much households were engaged by doing. The real differences were in terms of giving — the poor gave less than the wealthy, as expected. When it comes to giving, community development in rural Indonesia follows an elite-driven model. Still, 25% of the households participated by both giving and doing (see Table 2.2). In fact, nearly every household that participated by giving was also involved in doing. The political reforms might have incentivized the poor to do more, but the Indonesian power structure has not been shaken enough to change how these local community initiatives are funded. Still, the stewards of Indonesian democracy should take great comfort in knowing that twice as many households participated by giving than we saw before the reforms. In short, participation via giving in rural Indonesia seems to fit a mixture of the elite and middle-class models, while participation via doing seems to transcend class.

Lastly, I examined whether religious minorities (mostly Christians) had an active role in development. The question is especially salient given the history of conflict between Indonesian Muslims and Christians, and because most of the communities in the sample were Muslim-majority villages. This chapter contributes to the literature by analyzing the modes of participation...
not only by socio-economic status but also by religious affiliation — more importantly, by paying attention to the interaction between wealth and religion. Being non-Muslim had no significant effect on participation in the infrastructure model in Beard (2007), but in the current study, I found religious affiliation to be an important predictor of participation. Being Christian had a negative impact on giving but a positive impact on doing. For instance, non-Muslim households did more but gave less than their Muslim counterparts. Within each religious group, the overall effects of class were clear: poor Muslims did less and gave less than wealthy Muslims, and likewise, poor Christians did less and gave less than wealthy Christians. The interaction of wealth and religious affiliation, however, indicated that wealthy Christians did a lot more than wealthy Muslims. Also, poor Christians gave more than poor Muslims, but wealthy Muslims gave a lot more than wealthy Christians. Even when controlling for differences in households’ assets, non-Muslims did more but gave less (Figure 2.10).

In summary, participation in community development seems to be organized along class lines and by the religious composition of Indonesian communities. Together, the findings pertaining to the poor and religious minorities imply that the decentralization laws have not yet fulfilled their promise of bringing the traditionally marginalized groups closer to the decision-making process. On the contrary, the reforms seem to have empowered a rural bourgeoisie whose members have the resources, interests and social capital to make local collective action productive and rewarding for themselves. Future studies would do well to investigate how the combined effects of class dynamics and religious affiliations impact participation over time.

Finally, the measure of participation used in this chapter, although useful, is limited in at least three aspects. First, the variable accounted solely for participation in projects in the domain of infrastructure but provided no information on participation in the other domains. Second, it was
unclear whether citizens contributed their time frequently or in irregular spurts of volunteerism. Third, partaking in a public infrastructure project does not necessarily signal that one is a dedicated member of an association in that civic domain. A more comprehensive way of measuring civic participation is by focusing on associational membership, which is an important form of doing because it highlights group identity and citizens’ commitment to public agendas. This kind of engagement may even be more important than giving because even those with few resources to contribute may attend a meeting. How much participation would we account for if we operationalized doing as attendance at associational meetings? And would we find that socio-economic differences still do not matter that much? Also, accounting for attendance would provide a better way of addressing questions regarding the inclusion of the poor and religious minorities. A good place to start is by assessing how much cross-domain participation occurs among citizens. Would we find that the reforms gave way to a civic culture that in the near future will support social integration? We cannot measure rates of integration using the available data, but we can investigate to what extent a civic culture is conducive to more diversity and social integration. Concerns regarding social integration and diversity are especially salient for transitioning democracies like Indonesia since they often face social problems warranting broad reforms that are better implemented when coupled with not only economic development but also social equity (Samuels and Abrucio 2000). Also, the ideal democracy rests upon an understanding that citizens are active stakeholders in a long-term nation-building (and community-building) project. Such an endeavor can hardly be sustainable without an agreement among citizens who may come from different backgrounds and have different interests. Equity and social integration are presumably best achieved when civic engagement is both vibrant and diverse (Levine 2007; Mealy 2013). As more developing nations implement democratic reforms, citizens can best secure their civil
liberties in a civic culture characterized by high rates of activity within and across a plurality of domains. In such a civic culture, network ties play a crucial role in bridging relationships between individuals with very different life experiences and backgrounds. However, it is unclear how different forms of social capital are harnessed in these networks. The next chapter takes up these questions by drawing heavily from the literature on social capital and by recasting participation as regular attendance in civic associations.
Chapter 3. IS RELIGION A CIVIC BRIDGE OR A SILO?
DIVERSITY AND INTENSITY OF PARTICIPATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the key findings in the literature on community development is that social capital plays a central role in regional governance and the creation of collective goods. Participating in public life is one of the most critical ways that citizens create and renew their stock of social capital (Halpern 2005; Putnam 2000; Gittell and Vidal 1998). Numerous studies have shown that higher levels of participation (a proxy for social capital) in voluntary associations correlate with a higher quality of life, better health (Smith 1997; Putnam 2000), and more successful development schemes (Gibson 2012). Increased participation also leads to more democratic vitality, greater confidence in government and increased institutional resilience (Putnam 1993; Heller 1996; Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997). A typical way of measuring citizens’ participation, however, is by devising aggregated scales and composite indices. These measures tend to capture how frequently citizens participate in distinct civic domains, but they obscure the importance of connecting across a broad range of domains. As a result, the existing literature is rich in indices that measure how intensely citizens commit to civic domains while it lacks a measure of how diversely they engage. Yet, many authors consider diversity to be a key dimension of participation (Levine 2007; Putnam 2000; Stiglitz et al. 2009). Citing Habermas (1989), Acton and Ryder (2013:4) discuss the importance of giving space to differing voices in a deliberative democracy as a way of supporting diversity and equality in political engagement and democratic

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5 A civic domain is a segment of interest in public life (sports, politics, religion, etc.) around which social actors may form one or several organizations.
participation. Putnam also noted that the depth and breadth of one’s social connections are consistently the best predictors of happiness and life satisfaction, not only in the United States but around the world (Putnam 2000:332). Social capital is most closely related to what some call “civic virtue,” but it is when this civic virtue is “embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations” that it is most instrumental in generating social change (Putnam 2000:19). Civic virtue is enhanced not only when citizens maintain strong network ties (intensity, or what Putnam calls depth) but, more importantly, when these ties extend beyond their immediate acquaintances and friends (diversity). Levine (2007) argues that participation should ideally be diverse as a way of achieving widespread civic education and establish the ethics that support democracy in the long term. Diversity in participation matters because it breeds tolerance and promotes both equity and social integration. In turn, a focus on social equity and diversity increases a democracy’s legitimacy (Ethier 1990).

In addition, the existing indices of participation lack a concrete connection to bonding and bridging, which are widely recognized as the principal dimensions of social capital. Bonding is the coming together of individuals who share similarities and are likely to be acquainted, while bridging refers to the collective action of individuals who have little in common and are not likely to meet on a regular basis. Bonding is reflected in intensity of participation and is already well accounted for with the existing measures, even though the analytical connections are rarely made. Bridging, however, relates to diversity of participation (cross-domain ties), and because prior studies have neglected the dimension of diversity, the participation indices they devised could not analytically explain the affinity citizens have to bridge network ties. While each function serves its purpose, most scholars agree that bridging (overlapping weak ties) is more crucial than bonding (creating strong personal ties), because bridging facilitates social mobility, integration and more
fruitful collective action (Ostrom and Ahn 2003: xxii). When bonding ties saturate the civic network, the benefits created tend to be concentrated among a more homogeneous group of people, while these benefits are off-limits to outsiders. By contrast, when bridging prevails over bonding there tends to be more diversity in the network ties, and consequently, the social provisions are more likely to reach the less privileged groups (Halpern 2005; Ostrom and Ahn 2003). White and Smucker (1998:1-3) observed that many regions in Haiti have a high density of local civil society groups and yet deteriorating social infrastructure and economic stagnation, due to the lack of bridging ties among citizens. A 1989 World Bank report on Rwanda and a study by Narayan and Nyamwaya (1996) in Kenya share similar conclusions. A preponderance of bonding ties and evidence of solidarity do not imply that the social capital that is created leads to socio-economic improvement for the poor and the marginalized. By contrast, when less privileged citizens have access to bridging ties, they are more likely to improve their social conditions. The importance of bridging is well documented for Latino immigrants in Los Angeles (Johnson et al. 1997) and community groups in the Monongahela Valley in Pennsylvania (Gittell and Vidal 1998:178). In short, bridging is the function of social capital that is more conducive to mobility and integration, but it remains obscured in any operationalization of participation that ignores diversity. Diversity matters because it is the dimension of participation that promotes bridging.

In the Western context, religion is one of the key institutions that support this bridging function of social capital. Using data on American communities, Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that individuals who belonged to a religious network engaged more diversely in both religious and secular civic activities than those who were unaffiliated. However, these hypotheses have not been tested in non-Western contexts. It is unclear, if Putnam and Campbell's findings will hold up in a country like Indonesia, which has a less tolerant religious economy then the U. S. and
in which Islam is the dominant faith. As the nation attempts to complete its democratic transition, post-reform Indonesian leaders have expressed their openness to other faiths besides Islam, renewing the promise of religious freedom embedded in the Indonesian constitution. The question is: at the micro level, does religion support bridging or does it have a constraining effect on Indonesians' pro-social behaviors? Using survey data, I explain the antecedents of diverse participation in Indonesia and test for the "religious belonging" effect that Putnam and Campbell (2010) observed. This chapter makes two additional contributions to the literature. First, the analysis fills an important gap in our understanding of participation by proposing a separate measure for diversity and distinguishing it from the strength of citizens' commitment to specific domains (intensity of participation). Second, I propose a typology of civic participants and their dispositions, and then use this typology to describe the civic culture in rural Indonesia. Given the characteristics of that civic culture, I consider some key implications for how the country completes its democratic transition.

3.2 EXISTING METHODS OF MEASURING PARTICIPATION

Although most scholars agree that civic participation is vital to democracy and community development there is no consensus on how to measure it. Much of the debate on participation reflects the different ways that authors have defined the concept in the first place. Consequently, there are almost as many approaches to measuring participation as there are definitions (see Adler and Goggin 2005), which tend to fall under a "restricted" or a "broad view". Authors who adopt a restricted definition focus on more traditional forms of engagement such as voting and political activism than with mundane communal tasks (Verba and Nie 1972; Teorell et al. 2007). Other scholars adopt a very broad definition of participation as anything done communally or related to
public life (Putnam 2000; Ekman and Amnå 2012). Scholars endorsing the broad view usually seek to be as comprehensive as possible and they insist on pointing out the limitations in the scales devised by those who adopt the restricted view. Conversely, those who champion the restricted view usually aim for more precision in their measurement, and they criticize a broad approach to participation as a misguided theory of everything from voting to entertaining one's neighbors. Although the two approaches seem to be diametrically opposed, a closer look at their methodologies will show that authors in both camps actually measure participation in similar ways.

Scholars who subscribe to the restricted view of participation usually adopt or build on the typology found in Verba and Nie (1972). That study proposed a "classic" index of participation based on activities ranging from voting to contacting public officials (56-63). Even though they included communal activities, Verba and Nie's focus is much more on political engagement, and as a result, their typology has been much more useful at measuring macro-level trends of participation as indicative of the health of a democracy. The distinctive feature among studies that have adopted this restricted view is a consensus that participation in voluntary associations or social participation is analytically and empirically distinct from purely political participation. Even when later studies expanded the definition offered by Verba and Nie (1972) they still overlooked most activities that some would deem to be important non-political forms of engagement. For instance, the studies by Brady et al. (1995), Parry et al. (1992) and Teorell et al. (2007) all extended Verba and Nie's approach, but their domain-specific indices of participation still excluded any activity not directed towards influencing elected officials, changing the political landscape or power dynamics in the workplace. Despite its Neo-Tocquevillian tone, the restricted view on participation downplays the fact that citizens also participate in important affairs that fall outside the scope of politics. More importantly, authors that adopt this restricted approach only measure
the frequency of civic activities within specific domains — in other words, they predict the antecedents of intensity but not diversity.

Scholars on both sides of the debate focus on how intensely citizens commit to any organization and communal activity, while neglecting how diversely citizens engage across many types of activities. Whether they adopt a restricted or broad definition of participation, most studies rely on survey questionnaires with four (Talò and Mannarini 2015; Brady et al. 1995), five (Teorell et al. 2007) or more than a dozen distinct categories (Putnam 2000; Ekman and Amnå 2012; Cnaan and Park 2016), which they use to compute either an aggregated index (total participation, see Putnam 2000) or an index for each civic category (activity-specific intensity). Despite the seeming differences in precision and comprehensiveness, the indices bear little variation in terms of their analytical aim. On the one hand, a total participation index confounds intensity and diversity in a single dependent variable — obscuring which individual social characteristics contributed to variations in either intensity or diversity of engagement. On the other hand, an activity-specific index of frequency only measures intensity of engagement in that activity alone, but not how broadly citizens engage.

3.3 A REvised APPROACH TO MEASURING PARTICIPATION

3.3.1 Intensity and Diversity

Almost all studies on participation and social capital treat social networks as the foundation upon which civic life is organized (Cnaan and Park 2016:8; see Skocpol and Fiorina 1999:2; Putnam 2000; Halpern 2005). Accordingly, I consider civic participation to be synonymous with pro-social behaviors in social networks — i.e., communal activities whose intent is to improve the
collective well-being and quality of life of community members. The goal is not to measure social capital but rather to assess the ability of citizens to form ties in relational structures where social capital is likely to be created: the voluntary associations to which they belong. In other words, I am interested in the bare components of "doing" — a distinct mode of participation that involves spending time with others in meetings or activities (as opposed to "giving"). I treat civic participation like any social activity by focusing on what social actors do when they participate, and how frequently they participate. How firmly committed citizens are to associational meetings is a signal of their propensity to form network ties. Likewise, what citizens do in their civic endeavors can vary widely, and that is a distinct characteristic of their civic action, namely how diversely they express their civic interests as reflected by the different types of associations to which they belong. Therefore, we can think of civic participation as constituted of a dimension of intensity (strength of commitment) and diversity (breadth of commitment). Intensity of participation refers to the frequency at which someone engages in repeated interactions with fellow citizens and neighbors in one or more civic associations. The more frequently a citizen participates in a domain (which many consists of several organizations of similar aims), the stronger his network connections grow, and the stronger is his contribution to bonding social capital. However, Levine (2007) argues that interactions among citizens within a narrowly constituted segment of society may lead to the denial of equal rights and fair opportunities for others outside of that segment. Therefore, a focus on intensity is necessary but not sufficient to describe a civic culture. Diversity also matters.

One’s level of civic diversity signals how broadly one spreads his civic activities. Citizens can cultivate social ties in many organizations with agendas that fall within a broad range of interests. For instance, some civic groups are as formal as a political party, while others are as
informal as a small-town soccer league. One can imagine the entirety of a citizen's civic presence as a sort of civic portfolio characterized not only by the sheer number of her network ties and the number of repeated interactions within specific civic domains but also by the number of distinct domains across which she maintains those network ties. The further out some of her network ties extend the weaker they potentially get but extended weak ties may help us reach parts of a network that we cannot access directly on our own (Granovetter 1973). For example, distant acquaintances who belong to different social circles than we do (thus, weaker ties) often connect us indirectly to information and resources that we would not be able to access via our close friends and relatives. These weak ties that are fostered by diversity are the repositories of bridging social capital (Putnam 2000; Gittell and Vidal 1998). This form of social capital fosters a kind of generalized interpersonal trust that goes beyond one’s immediate circle of kinship or friendship. That sort of trust supports various forms of cooperation in a community and is an especially important social lubricant for social actors who do not often engage in face-to-face interactions — people of very different backgrounds and life chances whose paths would seldom cross. In summary, intensity fosters in-group solidarity (bonding) and diversity supports cross-group connections (bridging). Diversity is therefore the integrative dimension of participation, and it matters both from the standpoint of the civic organizations and that of the individual.

3.3.2 Types of Civic Participants and Dispositions

Intensity and diversity are not mutually exclusive. We can assume that oftentimes citizens participate in a manner that is more or less intense, and simultaneously more or less diverse. High-intensity engagement indicates frequent interactions with others within a given domain, while low-
intensity engagement signals more sporadic contact. Likewise, high-diversity participation means that one is connected to many different types of civic associations, while low diversity indicates that one’s civic interactions tend to occur within one or very few different kinds of associations — or, put differently, within associations that share the same civic goals. At the community level, when the dominant way of “doing” is high intensity/low diversity engagement it signals that specific civic domains are highly active and foster in-group solidarity, but those efforts to engage may be concentrated within one or few civic domains. By contrast, a general pattern of high diversity/low intensity participation may reflect an open and heterogeneous civic community, but citizens may not be committed to any civic domain in particular. However, we can envision that social actors deploy their civic energy and attention by combining varying levels of intensity and diversity. Almost every study on participation has proposed a more or less intricate typology of civic activities, but very few consider different types of participants with differing civic dispositions. Accordingly, I developed a typology with four ideal-types of civic participants (see Table 3.1). This allows me to describe the civic culture not only in terms of the civic venues but also based on how participants are distributed in the civic sphere based on their civic profile.

In cell (A) of the intensity-diversity matrix (Table 3.1), we find citizens who have a disposition to participate with low intensity and low diversity. Due to their weak presence both within and across civic organizations, I call them passivists. These citizens have a loose affiliation with civic associations, even their primary civic venue. Furthermore, the civic venues they frequent (sporadically) are likely to have similar agendas, and it is likely that the citizens with whom they interact tend to have interests like their own. A civic community consisting mostly of passivists would foster indifference, minor involvement, and very little diversity. In such a civic climate, there may, in fact, be many civic domains available, but one would find very little activity within
and across these domains. Consequently, passivists can be expected to generate low levels of both bonding and bridging social capital, which is detrimental to the production of public goods.

Table 3.1. Four ideal-types of participants and civic dispositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low diversity</th>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak participation both within and across civic organizations:</td>
<td>Strong participation within civic organizations but weak participation across them:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low bonding social capital</td>
<td>High bonding social capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low bridging social capital</td>
<td>Low bridging social capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: The Passivist</strong></td>
<td><strong>B: The Zealot</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High diversity</th>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak participation within civic organizations but strong participation across them:</td>
<td>Strong participation both within and across civic organizations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low bonding social capital</td>
<td>High bonding social capital</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High bridging social capital</td>
<td>High bridging social capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C: The Dabbler</strong></td>
<td><strong>D: The Generalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low = below average  
High = above average
Next, we find the participants in cell (B) of the matrix — those who participate with high intensity but low diversity. They are civic zealots because they seem to be dedicated to civic action but only within a single or very few civic domains. In other words, their civic agenda is characterized by a strong degree of commitment but a narrow scope. Like the passivists in cell (A), one can expect zealots to mostly interact with others who tend to share their interests. Unlike the passivists, however, zealots have a relatively high number of repeated interactions with others within their preferred civic venues. Although they do not participate in a diverse range of organizations, they maintain a strong presence in the ones to which they belong. Since zealots engage with high intensity, they are likely to increase in-group solidarity in the community (high bonding), but their low degree of diversity means that they contribute little to social capital across groups (low bridging). A community dominated by committed zealots would likely produce public goods that would benefit some but not necessarily all social groups.

Passivists and zealots represent low-diversity civic dispositions, but the remaining two civic types are both high-diversity dispositions. In cell (C) we find those who generally engage with low intensity but high diversity. Although they have a weak presence within civic organizations, they are somewhat integrated into the civic community since they have a strong presence across different kinds of organizations. These citizens may be attached to many different types of associations, but their level of commitment to any specific group is weak. They are civic dabblers since they greatly diversify their civic interests across many civic domains but do not commit to any domain — they are the exact counterpoint to zealots. Dabblers do not partake in any one activity very frequently but rather sample various civic venues, and as a result, they are likely to encounter people of different backgrounds and interests. A civic community dominated by dabblers would likely be characterized by much diversity but a weak sense of solidarity among
citizens. Since dabblers engage with low intensity and high diversity, they can be expected to contribute more so to bridging social capital than to bonding social capital. Consequently, public goods that depend on abundant bonding ties may be lacking, but dabblers may help create the kinds of public provisions that rely on abundant bridging ties.

In cell (D) of Table 3.1. Four ideal-types of participants and civic dispositions, we have the fourth category of civic actors: those who participate with both high intensity and high diversity. This means that they have a strong presence in many different organizations. They are civic generalists. Because generalists commit both firmly and broadly, they have a preponderance of both robust and weak (cross-domain) ties. They frequently meet other citizens to discuss public affairs or partake in social activities, and they achieve a balance between in-group intensity and cross-group interactions. These are the most integrated citizens in any civic community. Generalists are a special group of civic actors because they can significantly contribute to the creation of both bonding social capital and bridging social capital. If a civic community consisted mostly of generalists, it would be a very vibrant civic culture with much diversity. Generalists are likely to be more sympathetic than others to issues that fall under the banner of “social justice”, and logically, their sense of civism (if not activism) leads them to attend membership meetings in a variety of civic venues with differing agendas. This type of civic participant probably has access to a considerable amount of resources to be able to engage in this manner.

In the typology outlined above, social actors must decide to engage in voluntary associations, and they must perform some cost-benefit calculations by weighing how intensely (number of meetings to attend) and how diversely (types of domains to frequent) they wish to participate. The decision is, however, easier if they inherit the civic habits of their parents, the household head or simply follow their friends. Citizens who are involved in multi-domain
participation play a vital role in supporting democracy and the civic culture that makes democracy sustainable. Two of the ideal-typical scenarios reflect a trade-off between intensity and diversity (dabblers and zealots). Citizens who fall in the remaining two categories either downplay both dimensions (passivists) or cultivate them both (generalists). Also, individuals of higher socio-economic status are more likely to display certain civic dispositions than others of lower social stock. For instance, wealthier and better educated citizens may engage more intensely than others in certain civic venues as a result of the resources available to them and how indispensable they are to organizing activities. Moreover, it is a well-known paradox that bridging network ties would be much more useful to the people who are less likely to have access to them: the poor and marginalized (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Ostrom and Ahn 2003). In other words, poorer households are not likely to display the traits of generalists or dabblers (high-diversity dispositions), but rather passivists or zealots (low-diversity dispositions). Lastly, these four civic dispositions do not exist in a cultural vacuum. A community with well-established civic traditions is likely to harbor individuals who are more engaged, just as individuals may be generally less interested in public affairs if a neighborhood has a history of neutrality and passivity.

3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The existing literature seems to rely on an assumption that a frequency index captures all we need to know about citizens' participation. I argue, instead, that participation has two related but distinct dimensions: intensity and diversity, and that each one signals different qualities of someone's engagement. Each dimension also has unique implications for how social actors contribute to bonding and bridging social capital, which in turn has crucial implications for the distribution of resources and equity in their community. A question of interest that emerges from
my revised model of participation is: what percentage of the Indonesian population falls in each cell in the intensity-diversity matrix, and which participation profile is most dominant? Another way of posing the question is: did the reforms give way to a dominant group of generalists (the ideal actors to support a vibrant democracy), and passivists (the least desirable civic type)? Or is the post-reform era dominated by domain-focused zealots and uncommitted civic dabblers? The results in the previous chapter showed a large increase in doing since the reforms of 2001. Although that analysis focused solely on the domain of infrastructure, it still suggests that rural Indonesians are not likely to be largely passivists who are indifferent to initiatives in their community. As noted above, a majority of generalists and dabblers is likely to yield a good amount of public goods and encourage good civic habits. Dabblers and, especially generalists, support a vibrant civic culture where citizens diversify their public engagement. By contrast, a civic sphere of mostly zealots and passivists would not be ideal for Indonesia's democracy because these two civic dispositions do not necessarily support diversity or produce a great amount of public goods that would be accessible to those with few bridging ties. Another sensible question is whether intensity and diversity are correlated. On the one hand, if they are uncorrelated, it would suggest that the two dimensions are mutually exclusive. On the other hand, a strong correlation would suggest that intensity and diversity are too similar to merit separate measures. Given this reasoning, I expect that:

Hypothesis 1: A household's intensity and diversity scores are weakly correlated

Beyond a discussion of civic dispositions and the correlation between diversity and intensity, the central question pertains to the role of religion in the civic sphere. The high levels of participation observed in the domain of "Infrastructure" (see Chapter 2) naturally raise the question
of how much participation takes place in the other civic domains. Barring Infrastructure's popularity, most of the remaining civic engagement was in the domain of "Religion" — nearly 60% of people in the sample participated in one or more faith-based organizations (see Figure 3.1). Religious institutions have long occupied a central role in the civic engagement literature. Tocqueville (2000 [1839]) noted that religious values were indispensable in a well-functioning democracy because they gave it its moral foundations. Ruiter and De Graaf (2006:197) found that, for the period 1981–2001, 46 percent of all volunteering reported in the World Values Survey was done in religious organizations. Also, members of faith-based organizations are likely to place a premium on trust, as well as norms of engagement and reciprocity, which are attitudes that favor the production of a rich stock of social capital. The PNPM survey did not allow for a distinction between religious and non-religious households, but it is possible to test for differences in intensity and diversity based on membership in religious associations.

Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that the very fact of belonging to a religious social network was a stronger and much more robust predictor of increased civic engagement than faith or religiosity alone (472). It is "religious belonging" that matters the most, the authors argue, "not religious believing" (473). If this holds true for Indonesia, we should see more intense and more diverse participation among households that belong to religious networks, regardless of their religious denomination. More than being Muslim, Christian or other, participating in a faith-based organization may motivate Indonesians to be more committed and attend more associational meetings. Perhaps the most crucial finding in Putnam and Campbell (2010) was that religious engagement does not suppress other forms of civic participation (see also Storm et al. 2015, for similar findings in Britain). Therefore, a sensible question is how much participation remains if we subtract the number of meetings in religious groups from the overall intensity and diversity
scores. How Indonesian households integrate the faith-based civic groups may have an important impact on their ability to diversify their participation — in other words, their religious participation may increase their secular engagement. Religious belonging may also encourage a stronger commitment (increased intensity) to a secular civic activity. Given this discussion, I expect that:

Hypothesis 2: Religious belonging increases diversity of participation

Hypothesis 3: Religious belonging increases intensity of participation

These hypotheses, while sensible, have not been tested in a non-Western context, and especially not in a Muslim nation in the midst of its democratic transition. My hypotheses regarding the effect of "religious belonging" on participation rely on evidence from studies on North American (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Uslaner 2002) and European democracies (Storm et al. 2015) — e.g., pluralistic religious economies characterized by low regulation and low tension. Also, those findings highlight the influence of "congregational" religious institutions in Western contexts. Therefore, testing these hypotheses in Indonesia rightfully raises skepticism, for at least two reasons. First, Islam is not usually categorized as a congregational religion \(^6\), and neither are the various schools of theology and jurisprudence within Islam. Second, Indonesia's history does not necessarily conjure in outsiders a sense of tolerance towards non-Islamic faith traditions. Yet, Muslims are the dominant group and the Christian community may not be large enough and resourceful enough (Muslims are wealthier on average) for us to assume that they are responsible for the major portion of the participation surge after the reform. It is sensible to assume

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\(^6\) Islam may have the structure of a “congregational” religion in the United States (and perhaps in other Western nations), but it is usually not categorized as such in either the Middle East or in South East Asia. Such a qualifier would be ill-suited to describe Indonesia's Islamic tradition.
that Muslims are responsible for a sizable portion of those initiatives. Still, in the previous chapter, I found that non-Muslim households contributed more time to infrastructure projects, but it was unclear whether that would be true in the other civic domains. More importantly, it was unclear whether non-Muslims (mostly Christians) participated with more intensity and/or more diversity than Muslims if we measured participation in terms of associational meetings (as opposed to hours contributed). Islam has acquired a reputation of having a constraining effect on pro-social initiatives (Kuran 2011), especially from the perspective of Western scholars. If that is true, then we would find that Muslims are less intensely and less diversely engaged than non-Muslims. However, the observations from Hefner (2001) undermine these expectations. Hefner's findings point to a trend of activism among Indonesian Muslims that the author calls "civil Islam", which points to a commonly shared spirit of pro-sociality. To the surprise of those who have deemed Islam anti-democratic or anti-progressive (see Huntington 1993), Hefner's ethnography depicts a transitional Indonesian state that champions democratic ideals in ways that prevent such ideals from falling prey to the pressures of fundamentalist groups. Following the fall of Suharto's dictatorship in 1999, Indonesia welcomed its first reformist and civilian government with the Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid as democratically elected president. President Wahid overtly, rejected the possibility of an Islamic state, and subsequent leaders have upheld this position.

Article 29 of the Indonesian constitution formally guarantees freedom of religion, and religious leaders along with state bureaucrats have publicly supported an ecumenical religious community that promotes pluralism. Indonesia's history is punctuated with sporadic confrontations between Christians and Muslims, but these tensions have largely subsided since the early 2000's and state officials have openly promoted what they call "Middle-path Islam" (or "Smiling Islam"). This is to reiterate Wahid's message that their brand of tempered Islam is more compatible with
democracy, less susceptible to the influences of radical Islamic groups that harbor terrorism, and thus more tolerant than its counterpoint in the Middle-East and elsewhere (Kamali 2015; Barton 2014). Still, this Middle-path agenda, couched in the Sunni theological tradition, has attracted much resistance from fundamentalist Salafi groups that support terrorism and demand a revival of long-lost Islamic purity and severity. As Stark and Finke (2000) noted, one expects Islam to be "the institutional basis of nationalism and opposition to colonialism" (248) or outside ideas in general. Muslim conservatives are also likely to envision a modernized future whose roots lie, not in Western ideals of democracy, but in their triumphalist past and long-standing Islamic culture (Martin 1991: 472). However, if actual policies reflect the adoption of Middle-path Islam’s theological openness, the pluralism it fosters might have encouraged the changes Hefner (2001) noticed, as well as the increase in mass (secular) mobilization observed in the previous chapter (see Stark and Finke 2000: 249).

Hefner's observations capture Indonesia's mood and the promise of a vibrant civil society even before the political reforms were implemented. If the reforms were effective, they likely empowered a critical mass of Indonesians to be more active in public life, regardless of their faith. Still, one could argue that the impact of religious belonging could vary depending on the demographic composition of the local religious economy in any given community. Following this logic, the climate of tolerance may be more or less observable if we look at a community in which Muslims are the majority versus when they are in the minority. The interaction of religious belonging and religious composition is likely to have a notable effect on intensity and diversity of participation. If, on the other hand, "Middle-path Islam" is an effective orientation in these communities, it should not matter whether those who belong to religious networks reside in a
Muslim-Majority community or not. Religious belonging should still have a positive effect on participation regardless of place of residence. Given these implications, I expect:

**Hypothesis 4:** The interaction of religious belonging and place of residence (Muslim-majority village) increases diversity of participation

**Hypothesis 5:** The interaction of religious belonging and place of residence (Muslim-majority village) increases intensity of participation

Indicators of socio-economic status are also likely to impact how diversely and intensely households participate. Differences in educational attainment, wealth and other resources can shape civic dispositions. In the previous chapter, I found that wealthier households participated more, but only in terms of giving. Socio-economic differences did not impact how much households were engaged by doing. However, that finding could have been the result of operationalizing doing as the number of hours households contributed in a single domain (Infrastructure). Will we find that there still are no differences in participation across social classes if the dependent variable is a maximum intensity or diversity score? Higher socio-economic status has consistently been a strong predictor of increased participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Brady et al. 1995; Beard 2007). Also, findings from the development literature suggest that high levels of participation (high intensity) do not necessarily translate into the inclusion of the poor and marginalized (World Bank 1989; White and Smucker 1998). Wealthier and better educated citizens may engage more intensely than others in certain civic venues as a result of the resources available to them and how indispensable they are to organizing activities. However, wealthy households that wish to convey their good will and "bourgeois virtues" (McCloskey 2006) need
not necessarily commit strongly to only one domain. We would expect the rich to also be more
diverse in how they participate because they have the leisure time to do so. This leads to two
additional hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6: Higher socio-economic status increases diversity of participation

Hypothesis 7: Higher socio-economic status increases intensity of participation

3.5 DATA AND METHODS

I began the analysis with a simple Pearson correlation test in order to better understand the
relationship between intensity and diversity. A weak correlation coefficient would support my
claim that intensity and diversity are related but distinct dimensions of participation, and thus
should be measured separately. The next step was to determine which civic disposition, among the
four ideal-types, dominated the civic culture in rural Indonesia. To answer this question, I used a
chi-square test to obtain the observed and expected counts for each cell of the $2 \times 2$ typology of
civic participants (see Table 3.1). The expected and observed counts indicate how the civic
dispositions were distributed in the sample. These estimates relied on household and village level
information from the 2007 wave of the PNPM Generasi survey. I accounted for the number and
variety of meetings household members attended (i.e., participation by doing, as opposed to
giving) over a period of 90 days. My previous operationalization of doing as the "number of hours
contributed" was limited to a single domain. Distinguishing giving from doing was already a
refinement on the concept of participation, but we can describe those who do with more precision.
The focus is no longer on who contributed time toward ad hoc infrastructure projects but rather
the degree to which citizens maintained a presence in and across all kinds of civic associations. To that end, I decomposed participation (associational membership) into its two core characteristics: intensity and diversity. By intensity, I mean the number of repeated interactions a household had with others within a single domain, and this measure is a proxy for in-group solidarity (bonding). The PNPM survey asked Indonesian household heads to report their activities in 11 distinct domains (Table 3.2), and it is possible to assign a household an intensity score for each domain. However, civic actors are likely to have at least one preferred venue in which they maximize their number of repeated interactions. Accordingly, I measured intensity as maximum attendance — the maximum number of repeated interactions (in whichever domain) household members had over the last 90 days (as reported by the household head). Diversity, on the other hand, was measured using Shannon’s entropy index — defined as:

\[ H = - \sum_{i=1}^{S} p_i \log p_i \]

where \( p_i \) is the proportion of households found in the \( i \)th civic domain, and \( S \) is the number of domains. Based on the reasoning in Shannon (1948), entropy is maximized when the number of households belonging to each civic domain is perfectly even. This evenness intuitively means that a civic domain that comprises a disproportionately small number of households is not effectively contributing to the civic community as a full domain. The evenness of a community affects complexity because households that are restricted to unpopular domains (say “Customs” in Figure 3.1) have little contact with the majority of the households in the civic sphere, and they do not contribute much to the variety of interactions. Shannon’s measure is especially useful because it compares the diversity of each domain to the overall diversity in the civic sphere (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002; Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004; White 1986). The index yields a diversity score
that is equally sensitive to less popular and highly frequented civic domains. If a household attended only one meeting in a single civic domain, its intensity score would be 1 but its diversity score would be $H = 0$. In nearly 15% of the cases, household members failed to attend any meeting in any domain. These households were removed from the sample. A brief description of these households that were left out can be found in Appendix A.

Because the range and shape of the dependent variables fitted different probability distributions, each one warranted the use of a different regression technique. Intensity, for example, represents counts ranging from 1 to 120 associational meetings and was therefore modeled using Generalized Poisson regression. The variance of the Generalized Poisson is equal, larger or smaller than the standard Poisson distribution, and this relaxes the equidispersion assumption of the standard Poisson model (Consul and Jain 1973; Consul and Famoye 1992). The Generalized Poisson model follows a probability distribution defined on the non-negative integers, for $0 \leq \lambda < 1$ and $\theta > 0$, by:

$$P_n(\theta, \lambda) = \frac{\theta(\theta + n\lambda)^{n-1}}{n!} e^{\theta-n\lambda}$$

The diversity measure, on the other hand, is semi-continuous — which means that it has a continuous distribution except for a probability mass at zero, indicating that a substantial number of households (39% of the sample) participated in only one civic domain ($H(1) = 0$). Diversity scores ranged from 0 to 2.11 and was best fitted using a "hurdle model" with two parts (Heilbron 1994; Mullahy 1986). The logistic portion of the hurdle model treats diversity as a binary ($diversity = 0$ or $diversity > 0$), while the second portion uses a Gamma distribution with a log
link to model the diversity scores greater than zero. The logistic portion was modeled using the equation defined by $\beta$ parameters as follows:

$$F(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta_0 + \beta_1 x}}$$

Some households crossed the hurdle of having a diversity score greater than zero, while some others did not. For the households that got over the hurdle, their positive diversity scores followed a gamma distribution defined as:

$$F(x, k, \theta) = 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{1}{i!} \left( \frac{x}{\theta} \right)^i e^{-x/\theta}$$

where $k$ and $\theta$ are, respectively, Gamma's shape and scale parameters (Duan et al. 1983).

Furthermore, I assumed every household head in the sample was religious, since there was no question in the survey to distinguish believers from non-believers. The question in the household survey was phrased as: “What is the religion of the household head?” If members of a household belonged to at least one faith-based organization, then that household was part of a religious network, and I used the term “religious belonging" to reflect the meaning conveyed by Putnam and Campbell (2010). Lastly, the regression models controlled for socio-demographic variables, such as household assets, levels of expenditures and the head of household’s educational attainment. I also accounted for household size, the age and gender of the household head, as well as the number of ties the household had to local authorities. In addition, I controlled for community-level variables like population size, ethnic homogeneity and the degree of economic distress households experienced in a given village (see Table 3.3).

---

### Table 3.2. Civic domains in rural Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic domain</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Community activities in repair/cleaning/maintenance/construction of village/neighborhood infrastructure and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Religious/traditional group or institution, such as Al Quran reading, prayer group, Al Quran study group, or mosque/church youth group, and other faith-based activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Social service group or institution such as school committee, housewives’ groups, Family Welfare Program, community security watch group, or integrated health post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit group</td>
<td>Credit/finance group, such as small credit circle, community group, or savings group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Governmental group or institution, such as Rukun Tetangga (division of villages), Rukun Warga (division of regions), or hamlet/neighborhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production group</td>
<td>Production group or institution such as agricultural group providing materials/extension services, weaving group, or small business group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers group</td>
<td>Workers group or institution such as plantation workers group or farmers group providing manpower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and leisure</td>
<td>Recreational group or institution, such as sports, dancing, shadow play, or youth sports group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Natural resource management group or institution, irrigation water users group, clean water group, greening group, or clean water group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Mass organization or political organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Traditional institutions; Preservation of history and culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.1. Membership in civic domains in rural Indonesia

This figure shows the percentage of households that participated in each civic domain. Because of simultaneous memberships in multiple domains, the estimates are not cumulative.
### Table 3.3. Variables and their operationalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Shannon’s entropy index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>Maximum number of meetings in a single civic domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total participation</td>
<td>Total number of meetings attended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td>Household head is non-Muslim (y/n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>Resides in a village where more than 50% of the population is Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging</td>
<td>Participates in a faith-based organization (y/n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No education; Primary school, Junior high; Senior high; University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>Index calculated as the sum of binary entries for the presence/absence of personal possessions, business assets and land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Per capita expenditures         | Low: 1st to 25th percentiles  
|                                 | Moderate: 26th to 75th percentiles  
|                                 | High: 76th to 100th percentiles                                                  |
| Employment status               | Head of household is employed                                                      |
| Receives direct cash assistance | Household receives cash assistance from the government                            |
| Female                          | Household head is female                                                           |
| Age                             | Age of household head                                                             |
| Household size                  | Number of persons living at a residence (as reported by household head)            |
| Migrated in last two years, head| Head of household moved to current community in the past year                      |
| Belongs to ethnic majority      | Head of Household belongs to one of the 3 largest ethnic groups in the community   |
| Ties to community leaders       | Number of community leaders the household head knows closely (head)                |
| Ethnic homogeneity              | A Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 3 largest ethnic groups in the community in 2007 |
| Community population size       | Total number of community residents in the year 2007                              |
| Economic distress (village)     | Index calculated as the sum of binary entries for each type of economic distress in the village (loss due to natural disasters, harvest failure, reduction in average income, etc.) |
3.6 Results

3.6.1 Composition of the Civic Culture

On average, citizens attended 12.5 associational meetings over a 90-day period, but when we removed religious meetings from the total the average decreased to almost four, suggesting that a substantial portion of the total participation was in faith-based organizations. The mean intensity score was 10.6, meaning that on average, households attended a maximum of roughly 10 meetings within a single domain. The diversity scores, which ranged from 0 to 2.11, had a mean of 0.43. Moreover, a Pearson correlation test showed that intensity and diversity were weakly correlated ($r = 0.15; p < 0.001$), which supports Hypothesis 1. Figure 3.2 shows a scatterplot of this relationship as well as a distribution of the four civic types outlined in my typology. Next, I used a Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction to obtain the expected and observed counts for each civic type (Table 3.4). Roughly 33% of the households in the sample showed a generalist disposition in their civic behavior, which means that they participated with above average intensity and diversity. The second most dominant civic disposition in the sample (close to 27%) consisted of passivists - those we expect to engage with both low intensity and low diversity. Not far behind, and accounting for 23% of the total, were household that showed the disposition of zealots, while dabblers came last with 18%. It is noteworthy that the difference between the observed proportions for zealots and passivists was fairly small, suggesting that the number of households that were either oblivious to public affairs or could not participate (due to social constraints) was not very different from the number of households that participated intensely in only one or very few civic domains. Also, both zealots and passivists have a disposition for low-diversity participation, which means that they are not very conducive to an integrative and open democratic society that champions equity and tolerance. On the bright side, passivists (which is
the civic disposition that is most at risk of disengaging) were really a minority if we look at the other civic dispositions combined, and the largest group of participants were generalists who are likely to combine domain-focused engagement with a broad sense of social awareness. Lastly, the high-diversity types (dabblers and generalists) accounted for over 50% of the sample when combined, which may be indicative of a civic culture in which bridging social capital is not lacking.

Figure 3.2. Scatterplot of intensity and diversity by types of participants.
Table 3.4. Distribution of the types of civic participants in the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O = 4912 (26.64%)</td>
<td>O = 4265 (23.13 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E = 4063 (22.04 %)</td>
<td>E = 5114 (27.73 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Low diversity**
- Mean intensity = 3.2 (2.5)
- Mean diversity = 0.02 (0.08)
- A: The Passivist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O = 4265 (23.13 %)</td>
<td>O = 4265 (23.13 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E = 5114 (27.73 %)</td>
<td>E = 5114 (27.73 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**High diversity**
- Mean intensity = 16.4 (12.8)
- Mean diversity = 0.12 (0.16)
- B: The Zealot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O = 3252 (17.63 %)</td>
<td>O = 6009 (32.60 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E = 4101 (22.2 %)</td>
<td>E = 5160 (28 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Mean intensity = 4.6 (2.6)
- Mean diversity = 0.8 (0.2)
- C: The Dabbler

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low intensity</th>
<th>High intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O = 6009 (32.60 %)</td>
<td>O = 6009 (32.60 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E = 5160 (28 %)</td>
<td>E = 5160 (28 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Mean intensity = 15.7 (10.2)
- Mean diversity = 0.8 (0.2)
- D: The Generalist

Low = below average  
High = above average  
O = observed value  
E = expected value  

Mean intensity in the sample = 10.6 (10.5)  
Mean diversity in the sample = 0.43 (0.41)

This table shows the proportion of civic participants in each category (or type) of civic participants. Intensity is the maximum number of meetings (among 11 possible scores) a household achieved in a single civic domain. Diversity is assessed using Shannon’s entropy index to account for overlapping civic ties across the various domains.

The observed and expected values in each cell come from a Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction, in which: df = 1; N = 18438; $\chi^2 = 633.2$ and $p < 0.05$.
Table 3.5. Hurdle regression models predicting diversity of participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Diversity Model 1: All civic domains included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Logit portion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.434 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging ‣</td>
<td>1.280 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.205 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log likelihood: -10530.4 | -1110.7 |
N: 18438 | 11183 |
AIC: 21286.8 | 2269.5 |
BIC: 21292.7 | 2445.2 |

‡ Religious belonging: household participated in at least one faith-based organization.

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 '' 1

Low per capita expenditures: 1st to 25th percentile; Low per capita expenditures: 76th to 100th percentile
Table 3.6. Hurdle regression models predicting diversity of participation (secular)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hurdle model with ( Y = ) Shannon’s entropy index</th>
<th>Diversity Model 2: Excluding faith-based organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2a. Logit portion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )  ( SE )  ( \exp(\beta) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.389 ** 0.126 0.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging †</td>
<td>-0.122 0.064 0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.003 0.076 0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>-0.507 *** 0.081 0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>-0.233 *** 0.047 0.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
<td>0.016 0.063 1.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>0.133 0.111 1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
<td>-0.161*** 0.043 0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
<td>0.200 *** 0.042 1.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>0.066 *** 0.006 1.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>0.438 *** 0.094 1.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>-0.008 0.040 0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of participation</td>
<td>0.035 *** 0.002 1.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>-0.246 *** 0.072 0.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
<td>0.068 0.067 1.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>0.059 0.047 1.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>0.001 0.071 1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
<td>-0.352 *** 0.025 0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>-0.003 0.002 0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.022 * 0.010 1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>0.117 *** 0.012 1.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>0.071 *** 0.017 1.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.835 ** 0.275 2.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-11273.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>22592.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>22772.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>2b. Gamma portion (( y &gt; 0 ))</strong> |                                                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \beta )  ( SE )  ( \exp(\beta) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.114 ** 0.033 0.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.040 *** 0.010 1.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.003 0.021 1.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \beta \) is the coefficient, \( SE \) is the standard error, and \( \exp(\beta) \) is the exponential of the coefficient. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

| † Religious belonging: household participated in at least one faith-based organization. |
### Table 3.7. Generalized Poisson regression models predicting intensity of participation

**Y = maximum number of meetings within a single civic domain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3: All civic domains included</th>
<th>Model 4: Religious domain excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.031 0.017 0.969</td>
<td>-0.001 0.021 0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging †</td>
<td>0.417 *** 0.006 1.517</td>
<td>-0.449 *** 0.007 0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>0.119 0.093 1.126</td>
<td>0.086 0.092 1.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>-0.065 *** 0.010 0.937</td>
<td>-0.054 *** 0.013 0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>-0.052 *** 0.006 0.949</td>
<td>-0.037 *** 0.007 0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>0.008 0.016 1.008</td>
<td>-0.062 ** 0.019 0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
<td>0.017 ** 0.006 1.017</td>
<td>-0.011 0.008 0.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
<td>0.068 *** 0.006 1.070</td>
<td>0.141 *** 0.007 1.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>-0.021 *** 0.001 0.979</td>
<td>-0.026 *** 0.001 0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>-0.023 0.012 0.978</td>
<td>0.071 *** 0.016 1.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>-0.071 *** 0.006 0.931</td>
<td>-0.061 *** 0.007 0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of participation</td>
<td>-0.263 *** 0.006 0.769</td>
<td>0.528 *** 0.008 1.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>0.021 * 0.010 1.021</td>
<td>-0.063 *** 0.013 0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
<td>0.021 * 0.009 1.022</td>
<td>0.056 *** 0.012 1.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>-0.089 *** 0.007 0.915</td>
<td>-0.088 *** 0.008 0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>0.082 *** 0.010 1.086</td>
<td>0.054 *** 0.013 1.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>0.001 ** 0.000 1.001</td>
<td>-0.001 * 0.000 0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>0.006 *** 0.001 1.006</td>
<td>0.027 *** 0.002 1.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>0.006 *** 0.002 1.006</td>
<td>0.036 *** 0.002 1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>0.006 * 0.002 1.006</td>
<td>-0.012 *** 0.003 0.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.986 *** 0.026 7.286</td>
<td>1.568 *** 0.034 4.796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log likelihood
-63405.3  -69235.1
N
18438  18438
AIC
126852.6  138512.2
BIC
127016.9  138676.4

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
3.6.2 Religious Belonging, Place of Residence and Participation

For the sake of clarity, the regression estimates for intensity and diversity are presented separately. In each regression table, the first model includes all civic domains, but the second model excludes meetings in religion from the dependent variable in order to accurately assess the impact of religious belonging on secular participation. I examine the results related to each hypothesis for each set of models. First, in Table 3.5 the logistic portion in the first diversity model (Model 1a) shows that religious belonging significantly increased the odds of having a non-zero diversity score. Households that belonged to a religious network were more likely to participate diversely compared to those that were unaffiliated, all civic domains included. The Gamma portion of the model (1b) indicates that among households with a positive diversity score, those that belonged to religious networks participated more diversely than others. In the second diversity model (Table 3.6), which excluded religious meetings from the diversity score, religious belonging lost its significance in the logistic portion (2a) but had a positive significant effect in the Gamma portion of the model (2b). For households that did have a non-zero diversity score, their diversity score was higher than that of unaffiliated households that participated in more than one secular group. The results from both diversity models supported Hypothesis 2 that religious belonging increases diversity of participation. Second, Hypothesis 3 found partial support. In the regression models predicting intensity in all civic domains (see Table 3.7), religious belonging increased intensity of participation, which means that religious belonging had an enhancing effect on a household's degree of commitment to a given civic domain (Model 3). However, religious belonging decreased intensity of participation after subtracting the number of religious meetings from the intensity score (Model 4). In sum, religious belonging increased intensity overall, but it decreased intensity of participation in secular organizations. Also, being non-Muslim did not have
a significant effect on a household's diversity score in any of the models, and it had a variance inflation factor (VIF) above 6. To minimize multicollinearity between non-Muslim and residing in Muslim majority village, I tried to include one variable while excluding the other. The models with “Muslim majority village” but excluding “non-Muslim” yielded more reliable results. A table containing the variance inflation factors (VIFs) can be found in Appendix B.

Moreover, residing in a Muslim-majority village significantly decreased the odds that a household's diversity score was different from zero, and among households with a positive diversity score those that resided in a Muslim-majority village had a lower diversity score. Residing in a Muslim-majority village had a negative effect on diversity of participation overall as well as in the diversity model net of religion. Contrary to expectations, the interaction of religious belonging and Muslim-majority village did not increase diversity of participation, which means that Hypothesis 4 did not find support. In fact, in the logistic portion of the first hurdle model for diversity (Model 1a), the interaction term decreased the odds that a household would have a non-zero diversity score. I found no evidence that the interaction of religious belonging and residing in Muslim-majority village increased a household's diversity score either overall or in secular domains exclusively. Hypothesis 5 was not supported either. The interaction of religious belonging and residing in a Muslim-majority village did not have a significant effect on a household's intensity score, and this result also holds in the intensity model net of religion (models 3 and 4).

3.6.3 Socio-Economic Status and Participation

Overall, households with more socio-economic resources were more likely to have a non-zero diversity score and their diversity score tended to be higher than that of poorer and less educated households. This shows support for Hypothesis 6. For instance, in models 1a and 1b
households with high per capita expenditures were more likely to participate diversely and have a higher diversity score than households with either median or low per capita expenditures. Conversely, having low per capita expenditures had a negative effect on diversity of participation, but that effect lost its significance in the model net of religion (Model 2b in Table 3.6). In addition, having more valuable assets and being employed were also associated with a greater likelihood of having a non-zero diversity score and a higher diversity score than other households with fewer assets and whose head was unemployed. This was the case in both models 1a and 1b in Table 3.5, which means that households with more financial stability were more likely to attend meetings in more than one domain, and they had a higher diversity score than the less resourceful households. However, the impact of being employed was no longer significant in the Gamma portion of Model 2b, suggesting that there is no evidence that employment still had a positive effect when the diversity score excluded the number of religious meetings. While households of higher socio-economic status were generally more inclined to participate diversely, those of lower status were less prone to do so. Households whose heads were either uneducated or had only completed primary school were less likely to have a non-zero diversity score. For those who had a positive diversity score, their score was lower than that of households whose heads had a higher level of education. Being uneducated or having only a primary school education had a detrimental effect on diversity of participation overall and participation in secular domains. Still, graduating from high school or having a university degree did not have a significant effect on how diversely households participated. Also, among households with a non-zero diversity score, those that received direct cash assistance participated less diversely than other households that did not depend on public assistance, and this finding held for both religious and secular participation (Gamma models 1b and 2b).
Clearly, those with little to no education or received direct cash assistance were less likely to commit to any given domain, and even when they did their participation was less intense than that of others with more resources. Conversely, those were employed, had earned a university degree, or had high per capita expenditures tended to participate more intensely (e.g. stronger commitment to a given civic domain). These results support Hypothesis 7 that higher socio-economic status would increase intensity of participation. However, the effects of these socio-economic indicators were not always consistent. For instance, low per capita expenditures lost its significance in Model 4 (intensity in a secular domain), indicating that the poor do not necessarily commit more intensely than middle-class households when they attend meetings outside of their religious network. Household assets had a significantly negative effect on intensity in both models 3 and 4, and employment only had a significant effect in the intensity model net of religion (Model 4). In fact, it is safe to say that Hypothesis 7 is mostly supported when the domain of religion is removed from the model, meaning that the positive effect of social class on intensity of participation is mostly in secular civic domains. Overall, households with more financial stability and resources were participating more intensely than those of lower socio-economic stock, which suggests that the poor had fewer repeated interactions with others in a given civic domain.

I end this section with a note on how the intensity and diversity scores affected each other in the regression models. In the models predicting diversity of participation, I controlled for the effect of intensity. Likewise, I controlled for the effect of diversity in the models predicting intensity of participation. It could be that one’s commitment to a civic domain is inversely related to how diversely one commits across domains. Likewise, the more diversely one commits may affect how strongly one commits to a given domain. In this study, intensity had a positive effect on diversity in the logistic portion of Model 1 (1a, overall participation) but a significantly negative
impact in the Gamma portion (1b). This suggests that the more intensely a household committed to any given domain the greater the odds that it would attend meetings in at least one additional domain (and thus have a non-zero diversity score). But among those households with a non-zero diversity score, those that participated more intensely had a lower diversity score (by a factor of 1.07). This effect persisted in Model 2 (excluding faith-based organizations), although the effect decreased in magnitude (a factor of 0.99). In Model 3 and Model 4 (predicting intensity), participating more diversely also decreased a household's intensity of participation in a single domain. This suggests a possible trade-off between how intensely a household committed to any one domain and how diversely they participated across domains. However, this effect was reversed in Model 4 — instead of decreasing it, diversity increased intensity in secular organizations by a factor of 1.7. The trade-off between intensity and diversity was only evident when we counted religious meetings as part of the intensity score. In other words, participating diversely diminishes the chances of citizens concentrating most or all of their civic energy in one domain (being a zealot), and that is not necessarily a bad thing for democracy. At the same time, some could see it as serious concern that some civic domain may not have enough individuals who commit to them strongly enough to sustain their collective action efforts.

3.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Despite the proliferation of instruments to measure civic engagement, the literature lacks a measure of how diversely citizens participate in a civic culture. This study was a first attempt at simplifying the measurement of participation to two core dimensions — intensity and diversity — that are analytically linked to bonding and bridging social capital, respectively. As I hypothesized,
intensity and diversity were significantly but weakly correlated, which supports my approach of treating these two dimensions as related but distinct aspects of participation, each deserving of its own measure. Starting with the premise that diversity in participation reflects social and political integration in a democratic society, this was also a first attempt at setting a typology of civic actors who are differentiated by their combined levels of intensity and diversity. Despite their elaborate inventories, prior studies on civic participation tended to focus solely on intensity and ignore diversity of participation. My simplified framework does not aim to replace but rather to supplement those previous approaches by going the extra mile to offer a separate measure for diversity and analytically connect participation to social capital's critical functions of bonding and bridging. The participation inventory proposed in Cnaan and Park (2016) covers a great variety of civic activities and seems especially well-suited for calculating intensity and diversity scores using the framework outlined in this chapter. Future studies that combine the two approaches are likely to give a richer and more comprehensive account of how participation works.

Based on the distribution of civic dispositions in the sample, we can most accurately describe Indonesia's civic sector as an emergent "Passivist-Generalist" culture. It is a culture largely dominated by two classes of participants: a sizable (almost 33%) group of generalists who engage very frequently in multiple domains, and a class of passivist citizens (27%) who engage minimally in one domain and across very few domains (if any). What this implies for Indonesia's democracy could be taken in two possible ways. On the one hand, one could focus on the passivists (27% of the sample) who present a serious challenge to encouraging participation and the practice of civic virtue, whether regarding the intensity of commitment in one domain or diversity of participation across domains. Despite the presence of many generalists (33%) and a moderate number of dabblers (18%), passivists should be the concern of policymakers and activists
interested in promoting civic norms. On the other hand, one could celebrate the fact that a considerable number of Indonesian citizens bridge their ties across a diverse number of civic domains. Five among the eleven civic domains attracted a membership roster that accounted for more than 30% of the sample, which suggests that a fair number of Indonesian households participated in more than one domain at a time. Also, one could say that the sizable class of generalists appear to be promising stewards of democracy and supporters of a vibrant civic culture, despite the presence of an almost equally large class of passivist actors who are more prone to disengaging.

Of course, we must consider these implications in light of the impact of religion as a persistently relevant force in social life, especially in Indonesia. Arguably, the most significant threats to democratic ideals in Muslim nations, at least from a Modernization Theory perspective, are Islam and traditions — and the two are inextricably linked. The role of religion is a prominent theme in the literature on civic engagement, but the most salient hypotheses on how religion impacts participation are rarely applied to a non-Western context. This chapter offers a rare test of these hypotheses in a Muslim-majority nation. Besides "Infrastructure" (which was the focus of the previous chapter), "Religion" was the most active civic domain in the sample. The strongest predictor of how intensely and diversely households participated was whether they belonged to at least one faith-based association. The results suggest that religion, generally speaking, might have had a negative impact on secular participation. First, "residing in a Muslim-majority village" significantly decreased a household's diversity score, overall and in secular domains, suggesting that Muslim communities inhibit how diversely residents participate. However, living in Muslim-majority community did not have a significant effect on how intensely Indonesians committed to a given civic domain. Third, households that belonged to a religious network and resided in a
Muslim-majority village were less likely to have participated in more than one civic domain. That interaction only mattered when religious meetings counted towards the diversity score (Model 1). I found no evidence that the interaction of religious belonging and "residing in Muslim-majority village" increased a household's diversity and intensity scores in secular activities. This last point suggests that the religious composition of the community matters, and that perhaps the local religious economy in Muslim-majority villages may not necessarily be conducive to a climate of openness and tolerance as the authorities claim to institute with their official promotion of "Middle-path Islam." Neither does it necessarily lead to households making more intense commitments to civic issues. There was no evidence that households in Muslim-majority villages were as intensely engaged as households in other communities where Muslims were not the dominant group. Fourth, there seemed to be a trade-off between intensity and diversity, but it was only evident when we counted religious meetings as part of the intensity score.

All these observations indicate that religious institutions curtail secular participation. Contrary to what Putnam and Campbell (2010) found in the United States, religious engagement seems to have a suppressing effect on secular participation in rural Indonesia. Religiously engaged households attended associational meetings much less frequently outside of their faith-based groups. Religious participation increased the maximum number of meetings in a single domain only when religion was included in the dependent variable, suggesting that the domain in which they maximized their frequency was almost certainly "religion." These observations beg the question of how religion itself, not only religious belonging, affects participation. At the institutional level, do other religions besides Islam tend to depress how intensely their adepts (and affiliates of their religious networks) commit to secular civic activities in rural Indonesia? The present analysis did not offer a clear answer to that question, and an affirmative answer would
raise doubt regarding the pervasiveness of what Hefner (2001) called "civil Islam" in the aftermath of the political reforms. An affirmative answer to that question would also raise important questions about the organization of Christian congregations in the Indonesian religious economy and how much secular participation Christian associations support. What is evident is that religiously engaged Indonesians did not participate very intensely in activities that fell outside of their faith-based commitments. In short, much of the bonding social capital in this civic sphere seems to have been generated in religious networks, and the existing religious associations constitute a powerful force with a suppressing effect on the amount of bonding that takes place within secular domains.

On the bright side, Indonesian households contributed to bridging social capital across faith-based groups and secular associations. Belonging to faith-based groups increased diversity of participation even when we subtracted religious meetings from the diversity score (Model 2), although the diversity index decreased slightly, suggesting that religion still had a mild inhibiting effect on how diversely households engaged in secular domains. Also, when we subtracted the number of religious meetings from the intensity measure, the effect of diversity on intensity changed from negative to positive and grew in magnitude (Model 4) — suggesting that religious participation serves as a buffer against excessively intense participation that is limited to a single domain. That would essentially mean a zealot-like disposition toward bonding at the detriment of bridging. As explained earlier, a prevailing zealot disposition or a majority of zealot participants would not necessarily produce public goods that are accessible to those who do not belong to the particular domain of interest. Despite rural Indonesia presenting a different cultural context than the United States, my analysis confirmed Putnam and Campbell's observation that religious belonging leads to broader (more diverse) civic engagement overall. More precisely, religious
belonging increased a household's intensity of commitment to a given domain overall, potentially contributing to increased bonding. However, the expectation that religious belonging would lead to more participation in secular activities was not supported. As explained above, religious belonging decreased a household's commitment to activities in a secular domain. Religious circles in rural Indonesia are prime areas for motivating social change and community development ideas because those who belong to those networks are also well-connected to outsiders. However, the apparent trade-off between intensity and diversity means that civic leaders should probably persuade citizens, especially the poor, to commit strongly enough to a desirable number of the most urgent civic causes.

As expected, socio-economic differences mattered as well. Controlling for community-level variables, households that had more valuable assets, high per capita expenditures, or an employed head were more likely to bridge ties across many domains. While graduating from high school or having a university degree did not affect their diversity scores, being uneducated or having only a primary school education decreased a household's chances of bridging ties overall or bridging them across secular domains. The silver lining for wealthier households is that they participated more intensely in their preferred civic venue and were, therefore, were more likely to promote within-group solidarity (bonding) in secular activities. Wealthy households demonstrated a more intense commitment to any single domain than the poor, and they were much more likely to participate in a variety of civic domains, perhaps as a way of displaying what McCloskey (2006) would call their "bourgeois virtues" (e.g., "being good by doing good"). In sum, having more wealth and being moderately educated means that one has the resources necessary to be a virtuous generalist. To be clear, households of lower socio-economic status participated with both less intensity and less diversity. This echoes the conclusion in Beard (2007) that the decentralization
measures have not necessarily brought the poor to the center of local decision-making schemes and where the action is in terms of community-level initiatives. Even though a higher percentage of poor households are publicly engaging in the post-reform era, they are still facing fewer opportunities to contribute to bonding and bridging social capital. Consequently, poor households are often less likely to enjoy the benefits derived from those public initiatives in their community. Contributing to bridging social capital might require the deployment of resources that are beyond the reach of many households, and this has important implications for the future of democracy because diversity and bridging are so crucial for how marginalized groups integrate the civic sphere.

The analysis in this chapter took an important step toward understanding the social organization of civic participation and the role that religion plays in it within a community. I have hinted at this meso-level analysis here, but it deserves a more thorough treatment that sheds light on many unanswered questions. For instance, the potential role of Islam in this generalist-passivist civic culture, as either a repository or a bridge for civic action at the community level, has yet to be fully clarified. Does the constraining effect I documented mean that Islam has a suppressing effect on pro-social behaviors? Answering this question warrants an understanding of the kinds of civic networks that exist in these Muslim communities — are they sparse networks in which Islam is less central? Is religion more central in the Christian-majority villages? Answering these questions will advance the debates on how enabling or prohibitive religion, and especially Islam, can be as a vehicle for social organization, and under what circumstances. Broadly speaking, these questions also pertain to an important, if controversial, debate regarding the affinity of Islam with pro-social democratic institutions.
In a sense, we just had a glimpse of the existing civic networks across rural communities and how households are connected in them across the various domains. Faith-based civic groups seem to play a bridging role for households to connect with other civic domains, but we need a better understanding of how these domains connect via the households they share. Democracy's future relies on the quality of the networks citizens weave in the civic sphere, and the quality of these networks has a lot to do with how much bridging they support. The relationship between associational life and social integration is affected by the ties households share within domains and their shared ties across those domains. As Baldassari and Diani (2007) noted, focusing solely on the features of specific organizations and the participation of actors is not sufficient. An essential aspect of the civic culture is the structure of inter-organizational connections that social actors generate via their cross-domain ties. While informative, this chapter did not adequately capture the "civic network" in each community as a web of collaborative ties and overlapping memberships. The next chapter takes up the question of how civic domains are connected via households at the village level, with particular attention to the role of religion.
Chapter 4. **THE DUALITY OF HOUSEHOLDS AND CIVIC DOMAINS: ISLAM’S INFLUENCE IN CIVIC NETWORKS**

4.1 **INTRODUCTION**

In the last twenty years social scientists have engaged in an intense debate over Islam's presumed incompatibility with liberal democracy. The third wave of global democratization that started in the 1970's (see Huntington 1991) and the geopolitical realignments that followed the end of the Cold War beg the question as to why Muslim nations struggled to transition into formal democracies. Some scholars of global politics theorized that the problem lies with Islam's core values, which are hostile to democratic institutions and are a threat to the West. Lewis (1993) and Huntington (1996), among others, argue that majority-Muslim nations lack a separation of church and state, and the pervasiveness of Islam throughout the culture makes government inimical to civic society groups that promote western ideas such as individual freedom and secularism. A growing opposition to the cultural alarmist view includes works that dismiss the culture argument and, instead, frame the issue as a set of structural dysfunctions that can be reversed with the appropriate reforms. According to this side of the debate, Islam may have elements that are aligned with democratic institutions but, even under the guise of formal democracy, their government is plagued with severe dysfunctions that undermine the success of Muslim democrats (Hefner 2001; Zakaria 2003).

While scholars on both sides have confronted the macro-level aspects of the problem, they have downplayed how Islam affects the micro and meso level processes of civic engagement that
are vital to democracy's success. Whether Islam advocates for or restricts individual liberties and whether it supports or prevents the emergence of a civil society are concerns that are equally as important as the health of the macro institutions like voting, fair elections and the rule of law. Islam's affinity with democratic institutions is salient at both macro and micro levels of analysis. Neglecting the crucial individual and community level components only limits our understanding of the relationship between Islam and intermediary associations -- both religious and secular -- in the organization of civic life. At the meso and micro levels, demonstrating Islam's incompatibility with democratic institutions warrants evidence that Islam is intolerant of other organizational entities in the context of civic networks. Civic networks matter because they provide the context and opportunities for citizens to activate their social capital and display their level of tolerance for others with different interests, different opinions, and even a different religion. Yet, a network-based approach is absent in this literature. There is a disconnect between the claims of incompatibility or affinity and the evidence used to support them. To fill this gap, this chapter addresses a distinct aspect of the debate, namely, Islam's relations with secular civic entities and other world religions in local civic networks. How scholars have answered the broad question regarding Islam's affinity with democracy has important implications for the plausible range of network configurations we should expect to observe, and the position the local mosque should occupy in these networks. I reframe the macro-level question of incompatibility as a micro and meso-level question whose answer lies in understanding the interplay between households and civic domains in community-based networks and the extent to which Islam is tolerant or not of pro-social and pluralistic civic participation.

The incompatibility debate has drawn considerable attention to Indonesia, especially since the nation began its democratic transition in 1999 and became one of the world's most scrutinized
non-Western democracies. Whether Islam's role in Indonesia's civic culture resembles that of Christianity in Western democracies is a question of great interest among social scientists. Even though Muslims seem to participate more in civic life than non-Muslim Indonesians (Beard 2007), the role that Islam plays in the social organization of civic life remains to be clarified. A crucial concern is whether post-Suharto reforms have facilitated the emergence of a civic culture in which Muslims meet those of a differing faith, especially Christians. This concern also implies that the civic organizations that are affiliated with a community’s mosque may engender civic norms that are different from those fostered by civic groups affiliated with other religions. If true, this would have crucial implications for how civic groups support Indonesia's democratic consolidation initiatives.

4.2 CURRENT VIEWS ON ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

4.2.1 The Debate

It is a defining feature of the modern world order that democracy has found its stronghold mostly in Western countries with a Christian tradition, while it has struggled to take root in non-Western (non-Christian) nations, and especially those with a predominantly Muslim tradition. To some social scientists, these trends constitute sufficient evidence of a natural affinity between democracy and Christianity and an inherent incompatibility between democracy and Islam. To emphasize the affinity between Christianity and democratic values, Huntington (1991:29-42) noted that "most of the new democracies since 1970 have been Catholic countries" (see also Fukuyama 1992). I refer to this group of scholars as the cultural alarmists because they perceive Islam to be a serious threat to the West and the post-Cold War world order (Lewis 1993; Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1993, 1996). Among these alarmists, Huntington (1996) has garnered the most
attention due to his warning that the world is headed toward an inevitable clash of civilizations. In Huntington's view, conflict in the post-Cold War era will no longer be over ideological differences (like communism versus western capitalism), but rather along civilizational lines. The deep-seated cultural differences between the West and the rest of the world, Huntington argues, will be the basis of political strife on the global stage. No cultural element will be as influential as religion, and this is especially true of Islam, which he perceives to be antithetical to democracy. The cultural alarmists generally see Islam as an obstacle to civil liberties as well as the kinds of civic values and institutions required for a healthy democracy. This idea is quite old, however, and may have to do with earlier depictions of Islam as a warrior-centric religion that is incompatible with rational thinking and modernism (of which liberal democracy is a key feature) (Weber 1964 [1922]: 265-266). In this warrior-centric culture, there is a ruler and his "subjects", but "not citizens" with civil rights and a sense of civic responsibility as citizens in the Western democracies possess (Lewis 1988: 62-63 ). Lewis suggests that, even in the modern era, the classical monarchic format of government has not been rooted out of the modern Muslim nations. Subjects, unlike citizens, are less likely to organize a civil society and challenge a government that claims its power derives from God's law. The distinction between church and state, Lewis and others assert, goes back to the very beginning of Christianity and is a reliable marker of pluralism (2) -- a socio-political hallmark they deem non-Western nations have yet to achieve (Lewis 1993:135; Huntington 1996:96-8).

Another group of researchers have challenged the cultural alarmists on grounds that their arguments are too culturally reductionist and deterministic (Roy 2004; Stepan 2004). Notable economist Amartya Sen has remarked that “clash of civilizations” arguments like the one advanced by Huntington (1996) tend to reduce nations and their collective aspirations to simplistic cultural
tropes that suggest erroneously that one’s cultural heritage inevitably dictates one’s destiny (Sen 2006). Sen’s critique implies that the authoritarian past of some Muslim nations does not necessarily write them off as perennial antitheses to democratic values. I refer to authors on this side of the debate as structural optimists since they seem to agree that most Muslim nations can overcome their history of militarization, corruption and other government inefficiencies that typically impede the democratization process. In fact, some argue that nations like Indonesia have already made great strides toward becoming successful democracies (Hefner 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2009). To structural optimists, the problem does not lie with Islam itself but rather with how politicians have used Islam to appeal to Islamic fundamentalists in order to earn their votes during elections cycles (Hefner 2001:37-39; Roy 2004; Hilmy 2010).

In short, the cultural alarmists base their arguments mostly on historical path dependence and what they perceive to be an immutable hostility to western ideas that is inherent to Islam. By contrast, the structural optimists argue that a country’s chances of democratizing successfully reside, not necessarily in their religion or their historical past, but rather in the agency and aspirations of citizens who are willing to reform their public institutions. In their view, Huntington’s "Clash of Civilizations" and Fukuyama’s "End of History" arguments erroneously assume that virtually all Muslims are opposed to democracy and pluralism. On the contrary, the works of Hefner (2001), Zakaria (2003), and Menchik (2016) have shown that Islam is decidedly multivocal (much like Christianity in the United States). Some Muslims favor authoritarian rule and await the advent of an Islamic state, but a growing number of them reject the very notion of it. Some Muslims favor tolerance and pluralism, while the more conservative ones prefer tolerance without liberalism, which in most instances primarily means a resistance to freedom of religion. Still, according to Hefner (2001), a growing number of Indonesians self-describe as “Muslim
democrats” and promote a brand of “civil Islam” inspired by the Koranic concept of "Middle-Path Islam" (see also Menchik 2016 and Roy 2003). The current popularity of Middle-Path Islam among Indonesians is the result of a long and global Muslim revival (Huntington (1996) called it "Islamic resurgence") that began in the 1970's and found its most potent voice during the last decade of Suharto’s authoritarian rule. This Muslim revival has championed women's rights, inter-faith dialogue and a liberal democracy based on pluralism (Hefner 2001:123-25; Menchik 2016).

4.2.2 The Existing Literature on Islam and Participation

The question of Islam's incompatibility or affinity with democracy is very broad and the answers have mostly focused on whether or not formal political institutions like having a parliament, voting and fair elections, as well as the separation of church and state are found in majority-Muslim nations (Huntington 1993; Lewis 1993; Hefner 2001; Menchik 2016). Surely, the high rates of voter turnout for national elections since 1999 indicate that a great number of Indonesians have embraced one of the fundamental institutions of democracy. But voting and fair elections are associated with formal political behaviors, not the whole range of desirable civic behaviors that support liberal democracy. Non-political civic behaviors that signal tolerance and pluralism are also a crucial aspect of what makes democracy work (De Tocqueville 2000; Putnam 1993; 2000) and neglecting them only limits our understanding of the role that Islam can play in a civic culture. How Islam restricts or enables free deliberation, or how it connects individuals with different backgrounds or faiths across different civic spaces, can only complement a macrocosmic analysis of political institutions or a narrative of historical path dependence.

The existing research attempts to account for the political dispositions and civic habits of Muslims [in Indonesia or elsewhere], but there lacks a detailed account of the underlying
mechanism that supports a democratic system in which the local mosque may or may not have a central and defining role. Lewis (1988; 1993) analyzed what he calls the "language of political Islam" extensively to conclude that there is no word in Arabic for "laity" and "ecclesiastic". The linguistic analysis does not really prove that majority-Muslim nations are anti-democratic. Rather, it barely suggests that these nations lack a western-like lexicon for democratic values. Fukuyama (1992) and Huntington (1993; 1996) both used an analytical method that is best summarized as historical conjecture, since it connects many world events since the end of the Cold War in a sweeping and often, empirically unsubstantiated, fashion. Fukuyama (1992) uses Hegelian philosophy to predict an ending of history in which the Western model of democracy is universal and inevitable, except for the Muslim world where it remains a foreign concept. Yet, even at the end of his book, it is not very clear why the concept must remain foreign to Muslims if the rest of the world will embrace it. Nor is it clear why Muslims adopting a modified version of the concept does not suffice to assuage the author's fears. Being more empirical than Fukuyama (1992), Huntington (1996) uses maps, statistical summaries and a re-imagining of the world order to conclude that a happy ending for the western democratic model is not necessarily inevitable. On the contrary, his point is that the West is in grave danger, primarily because of cultural/civilizational fault lines like the one between Islam and the West. Still, both works sorely lack testable causal statements. They also do not make a clear connection between Muslim culture (which they assume to be unitary) and everyday civic behaviors that are the backbone of a liberal democracy.

Like the cultural alarmists, the structural optimists also fail to offer a systematic way of gauging Islam's degree of engagement with the less visible and less politicized aspects of a liberal democracy, namely the civic behaviors in local voluntary associations. For instance, the
multivocality argument (see Roy 2004; Menchik 2016) is helpful in portraying Islam, not as a unitary cultural force, but one with an array of theological and philosophical interpretations of the Koran. Still, these theological orientations do not necessarily prove that Muslims have embraced liberal practices in their everyday interactions with non-Muslims. On the surface, their argument seems more coherent and offers a more balanced consideration of cultural and structural forces, [Hefner’s (2001) work is a good example], but the structural optimists do not provide irrefutable evidence that Islam is friendly to pro-social and pluralistic civic participation. They offer case by case rationales for why the arguments presented by Huntington (1996) and others are exaggerated, but they offer no systematic method of assessing Islam's "democratic fitness" in any given Muslim nation.

Both sides of the debate provide incomplete answers to the question of Islam's affinity with democratic institutions because they both leave a gap between what a particular aspect of their theory aims to show and what is actually supported empirically. The existing research falls short of connecting the question of Islam's influence on democratic processes with the underlying mechanism of civil society at the micro and meso levels of analysis. Given what sociologists know about the importance of social capital in the public sphere, it is fair to argue that the underlying mechanism that supports much of liberal democracy, particularly its less politicized aspects, lie in the structure of civic networks where social capital is activated. While the existing literature lacks a network approach, it is possible to derive a range of plausible network configurations based on what the key arguments in the incompatibility debate imply about the influence of Islam. I explore some of these possibilities in the next section. This, however, requires that we set a more specific and attainable goal rather than determining Islam’s incompatibility with democracy. Instead, the
next section focuses on narrowing the debate to an observable aspect of the question as it relates to pro-social and pluralistic civic participation.

4.3 **TOWARD A NETWORK-BASED FRAMEWORK**

4.3.1 *Recasting the Debate*

The central point of contention in the incompatibility debate is whether there is actual evidence of Islam clashing with the ideals and institutions of liberal democracy? This question is, however, vague and the terms "ideas" and "institutions of liberal democracy" warrant some clarification. The "ideas and institutions of liberal democracy" refer to a set of general dispositions and actions of individuals engaging in civic actions via voluntary participation. Liberal democracy depends on a stable government achieved through fair elections and the rule of law. Democracy also depends, however, on a vibrant civil society -- the existence of voluntary organizations that constitute a public sphere in which citizens can freely pursue those interests that are closer to their private lives but not too far removed from the realm of public issues. This chapter focuses exclusively on these extra-political institutions that are closer to the private lives of citizens and recasts the incompatibility debate within the restricted scope of pro-social civic participation that reflects a degree of tolerance and pluralism. To do so, the argument here focuses exclusively on those ideas and institutions of democracy that pertain directly to civil society. Put plainly, civil society is a network of civic networks. These civic networks are held together via the multiplicity of social ties among members of various voluntary organizations. The "ideas" concern the disposition, rights and liberties of those voluntary members, while the "institutions of liberal democracy" are the practices of public engagement and deliberation (in addition to government
and the rule of law). Individuals demonstrate that their dispositions are congruent with the ideals and institutions of liberal democracy by engaging with others within or across associations that make up these networks. The debate then is simplified as a matter of Islam’s presence and level of influence in a network and how this influence varies compared to that of other religions.

There is another layer of vagueness in the statement “Islam’s compatibility with democratic institutions”, in that it is unclear how exactly one is to gauge Islam’s affinity with civic behaviors. Islam itself is a vast array of cultural and religious norms and beliefs, and how its value system aligns with or repels democratic civic institutions may be hard to understand at the national or global level of analysis. One way of gauging Islam’s compatibility with civic traditions is to focus instead on how residents use the local mosque in a given community. Thus, the question of Islam’s compatibility with democratic virtues is inevitably about the affinity that Muslim individuals and communities have with pro-social and pluralistic practices. Islam may seem more or less attuned to democratic values depending on whether Muslims seem more or less attuned to civic engagement opportunities. If Christians report to have used their local church as a meeting place for faith-based or other purposes – hence as a civic venue – and Muslims fail to use their local mosque for similar purposes, one may deem those Christians to be more attuned to democratic civic traditions than Muslims. The opposite is equally true if Muslims use their mosque for those civic purposes and the Christians do not. This may serve as a simple test then to gauge who uses their faith-based venue as a civic gathering place, which in turn one may interpret as the religious institution embodied in the church or mosque. This simple test is even more useful if one can assess how these various groups use their place of worship for civic purposes in the same

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8 It is likely that a community center is attached to the local mosque and serves as meeting grounds for civic meetings. The use of the term “mosque” or “Muslim community” in this chapter refers more specifically to the people who frequent the place.
community. Therefore, we can recast the big debate about Islam and democracy in more practical terms as a debate over how individuals use their place of worship or whether the place of worship is actively used as a civic venue, in which case we consider it to be part of a civic “domain” so to speak, and the civic network is essentially the organization and interactions of individuals within and across several of these civic domains.

The big debate about Islam and democracy is simplified as one about the demonstrable capacity of Muslims to engage in pro-social and pluralistic participation by using their local mosque as a civic meeting ground. Pluralistic engagement does not mean simply diversity. As Eck (2007) has shown, diversity is the presence of groups of differing backgrounds and interests, but the majority’s response to diversity does not always involve a “recognition and acceptance of religious difference as part of the social order” (5). Diversity sometimes leads to ethno-religious strife and segregation. Pluralism, although often limited and compromised, is the active engagement of individuals from diverse groups. In the case of Islam in Indonesia, religious pluralism is what McCarthy (2007) refers to as "the management of religious difference". Therefore, in addition to Muslims using the mosque as a civic venue, the same opportunity must exist for followers of other religions. As the dominant religion, Islam’s connection with civic participation can either be tolerant or not of other religions that wish to do the same. Another way of looking at this is that, as the dominant religion, if Muslims do not use their mosque for civic purposes, they may or may not tolerate others for doing so. The issue further crystallizes as one pertaining to whether or not Muslims use the mosque as a civic venue and whether members of other religions do so as well in the same community.

Another layer of the question of pluralistic participation is whether Muslims who frequent the mosque for these civic purposes also belong to secular civic associations. Let us say that
members of a Muslim household frequently attend meetings for a faith-based group at the mosque, and at the same time also help organize some events for a local sports club. That household is then a member of two distinct civic domains, and thus links those domains via its dual membership. In that sense, the mosque (Islam) is linked with the domain of sports via that household. This insight from Breiger (1974) on the duality of individuals and groups is useful here to assess whether or not the mosque (via the Muslim residents) is connected to a network of other civic domains (like sports, social services or credit) or whether the mosque serves as a civic meeting ground but is isolated from all other civic domains in that community. Therefore, we can envision communities in which the mosque is not activated as a civic venue and some other communities where it is activated as a civic venue. In the communities where it is activated, we may ask whether the same is true of other places of worship – whether other temples are activated as civic venues. There may be communities in which the mosque is the sole place of worship that is activated as a civic venue, and some others where members of competing religions also activate their place of worship, and vice versa. Still, in the communities where both the mosque and other sacred places are activated as civic domains, we may ask whether they are connected to secular domains via their members or remain isolated. Naturally, for the mosque (and by proxy, Islam) to be connected to other domains in an existing civic network, it must first be an activated civic domain, meaning that Muslims must use the mosque as a gathering place for civic meetings and events.

The debate on Islam's compatibility with civic traditions may therefore be simplified as a two-step problem of (1) whether or not Muslims use the local mosque for civic purposes (the mosque is actively used as civic meeting place), and (2) whether or not Muslim households belong to other civic domains (the mosque is connected to other domains or isolated in the network). These two components constitute the basis of a relatively simple test of the neglected aspect of the
incompatibility argument that pertains to civic networks. This test focuses on the role that the mosque plays in these networks. Because the incompatibility debate is clearly set along religious lines, the structural role of Islam is best understood in comparison to that of other religions in the same community. We can describe how Islam (embodied in the mosque) interacts (or not) with other religions (embodied in their temple or church). By applying the two conditions above to both the mosque and other (non-Muslim) places of worship in a community, we may devise a few ideal-typical network configurations. In the framework that follows, I use the terms “Islam” as shorthand for civic activities Muslims partake in at their local mosque. Likewise, the term “other religion” refers to civic activities non-Muslims (Christians, Buddhists, Hindus or other) partake in at their church or temple. Furthermore, I use the term “active” to refer to instances in which the mosque or a non-Muslim temple is used as a civic venue. Conversely, the term “inactive” means that the places of worship were not used for civic purposes. In that sense, to say that “Islam is active” and “other religion is inactive” in a civic network signals that the mosque was used as a civic venue by Muslims but that others did not use their temple for similar civic purposes.

4.3.2 Some Plausible Network Configurations

Church over mosque (1A)

Besides the aforementioned limitations of Huntington's clash of civilizations argument, an additional problem is that it is ambiguous enough to be interpreted in at least two ways in the context of civic networks. For instance, it is unclear whether Islam and Muslim clerics exclusively forbid Muslims to partake in democratic institutions, or whether they stand categorically against all individuals with such interests. In the first instance, Muslim leaders would condemn such activities when undertaken by fellow Muslims but could turn a blind eye when pursued by non-
Muslims, whereas in the second instance they would not tolerate pluralistic civic behaviors from anyone. Since Huntington and his followers are unclear about which logic should prevail, it is best to explore both. Let us say that Muslim leaders are hostile to democratic civic associations because they seem to contradict Koranic authority, but these Muslim leaders allow others of a differing faith to pursue such interests publicly. Thus, Muslims would not use the local mosque or other venues sanctioned for public use by members of the Muslim community to pursue civic interests. This means that Islam would remain inactive as a potential civic domain even when others, perhaps Christians, used their place of worship as an active civic venue. It is a “church over mosque” kind of network.

To the cultural alarmists, Islam has its own moral code and inspires in individuals a different political orientation than does Christianity, whose prescriptions are conducive to democratic practices. Some, like Lewis (1988), suggest that Islam inculcates in its followers so great a fear of or hostility toward Western institutions that Muslims would refrain from partaking in civic activities altogether. In short, we can anticipate a type of networks in which Islam is inactive, but some other religion is active. This is the type of networks with an inactive mosque (1A), summarized in the first cell of Table 4.1. Also, Islam is believed to rally believers against non-believers, and this view is pervasive among authors who support the cultural alarmist side of the incompatibility debate (most notably Huntington 1996 and Lewis 1988). They argue that "in most Muslim countries, Islam is still the ultimate criterion of group identity and loyalty" (Lewis 1988:4). This implies that in other countries, people have other options besides their faith as a basis for political identity (they can be environmentalists, social justice activists, etc.) but not in Muslim

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9 I use the term “church” here to refer to all other religious temples besides the mosque because Christians are the largest minority.
nations. If Lewis (1988) is correct, Muslims are less likely than members of other religions to identify with causes and issues that lie outside the scope of religious law and conduct. Given the history of ethno-religious relations in Indonesia, however, we may not find many cases in which Islam is completely absent from the network and other religions are driving the local civic culture.

**Secular networks (1B)**

Another interpretation of the clash of civilization argument is that Islam is intolerant of all forms of democratic institutions, whether undertaken by Muslims or non-Muslims. In that case, Islam disagrees so violently with institutions that champion individual interests and free will that it discourages pluralistic civic action by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In the prior interpretation above, the mosque was inactive as a civic venue, but other religions were active. Thus, in this second type of network both Islam and other religions are inactive. This does not mean that Muslims and other religious individuals do not participate in public life, but rather that their faith-based community was not activated as such. Any civic network that exists under these conditions would be a completely secular network (cell 1B in Table 4.1). Given the historical importance of churches in the development of civil society in the West, it may be hard to imagine a civic sphere completely devoid of religion. Short of not having a civic sphere at all, however, the cultural alarmists are implying that it may exist outside the purview of Islam. Thus far, Indonesian Muslims and Christians have existed in a state of tension punctuated by sporadic outbursts of violence (Varshney 2008; 2010). In regions that have been more affected by this history of conflict, Christians may not openly partake in civic gatherings that are perceived by Muslim to be anti-Islamic. If those who depict Islam as anti-democratic and anti-Western are partly correct, then activities of a Western and democratic persuasion may be perceived as being defiantly anti-Muslim
by some or anti-Islamic by others (Hefner 2001; Menchik 2016; Hilmy 2010). Being perceived as flagrantly anti-Islamic is probably less than desirable to Christian minorities, which means that, like the Muslims in Huntington’s imagination, these Christians may refrain from participating in the main civic venues in their community.

Table 4.1. Four basic network configurations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam is inactive</th>
<th>Other religion is active</th>
<th>Other religion is inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Churches and temples serve as civic venues, but the local mosque does not.</td>
<td>Neither the local mosque nor other religious temples operate as civic venues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A: Church over mosque</td>
<td>1B: Secular networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam is active</th>
<th>Other religion is active</th>
<th>Other religion is inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The local mosque operates as a civic venue, and so do churches or temples that are affiliated with other faiths.</td>
<td>The local mosque operates as a civic venue, but not churches or temples affiliated with other faiths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D: Mosque alongside church (Religiously diverse networks)</td>
<td>1C: Mosque over church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mosque over church (1C)**

A third type of civic network is the converse of IA -- a network in which Islam is an active civic domain (because the mosque is used as a civic venue) but where other religions are not active (1C). It is the mosque prevailing over the church in the civic sphere. A few sources in the literature have alluded to a growing number of Muslims, especially in Indonesia, who wish to adopt some but not all aspects of democratic institutions, or at least not in the way that these institutions are understood in the West. This echoes an observation by Menchik (2016) that some Indonesians want to practice tolerance without liberalism – at least the way tolerance and liberalism are understood in that context as muted disapproval as opposed to engagement with or acceptance of the other. More specifically, liberalism, in this context, is understood as the retreat of religion from politics to the private sphere and the freedom for anyone to profess a faith that is contrary to the Prophet’s Law. This "tolerance without liberalism" might lead some Muslim leaders to promote a civic sphere that practices (limited) tolerance towards some secular activities but where the local climate is not very tolerant of non-Muslims engaging in their own faith-based groups. In other words, the freedom to gather publicly does not include the practice of toleration toward other religions. In this kind of network, Islam is the only religious tradition that serves as an active civic domain, which means there is no diversity of religion. More importantly, because Islam is disconnected from any existing civic network, Muslims are not likely to be a bridge between their faith and secular civic domains. This kind of a network, where the mosque is active but not the church, is very likely to be concentrated in majority-Muslim communities where the odds for other religions to have a prominent venue are already low.
**Mosque alongside church (1D)**

Lastly, we arrive at the type of network in which Islam would be most overtly favorable to pro-social civic participation and pluralism. Logically, there is only one last possibility: a network in which both Islam and other religions are active civic domains. Hefner (2001) and Menchik (2016) document the rise of a class of Muslim democrats who embrace toleration with varying levels of comfort towards liberalism. These Muslim democrats would likely be guided by less conservative interpretations of the doctrine of Middle Path Islam, which has shaped public debates in Indonesia and tolerates the expression of non-Islamic voices in the public sphere (Hefner 2001:227-29). This is the type of civic networks in which the mosque is active along with the church (a *religiously diverse network*) (1D). In this network, Muslims do not shy away from the opportunity to come in contact with western ideas and, possibly, members of another faith. Both the local mosque and other religion are used as active civic venues, but this does not necessarily imply that the mosque will be connected to other active domains. Diversity does not always lead to pluralism. This religiously diverse network would only guarantee the opportunity for interfaith or other connections, not their realization. The mosque being an active civic domain is a necessary but not sufficient condition to observe a broad range of civic participation that involves Muslims.

Should we find that networks with either an inactive (*church over mosque*, 1A) or active mosque (*mosque over church*, 1C) is the dominant configuration that reflects the organization of civic life in Indonesia, it would partly support the view that Muslims may not be very open to some democratic institutions. The secular network (1B) could also give some credence to the incompatibility thesis, but that is debatable because in that situation Islam is not the only religion that is inactive. Other religion being inactive implies that Christians are also not engaging in civic activities within their immediate community or using the church as a venue. Any assumption that
Christianity is compatible with democratic institutions and Islam is not, could be challenged if network 1B is highly prevalent in Indonesia. However, the only network configuration that strongly challenges the incompatibility argument is the religiously diverse network (mosque alongside church, 1D) in which both Islam and other religion are active. In network types 1D and 1C, the mosque has a chance to be connected to other domains via the Muslim members they share. However, interfaith connections that signal religious pluralism and tolerance are only possible in situations like 1D, where both mosque and church are active domains. To be clear, having the opportunities for interfaith connections is not compelling evidence that Muslims embrace democratic civic virtues. Observing actual ties between Islam and other domains is necessary to refute the incompatibility thesis, and a sizable proportion of such networks in a sample is necessary to make a strong case.

4.3.3 Four Types of Religiously Diverse Networks

The occurrence of this religiously diverse network (mosque alongside church 1D) would yield four additional network types that are defined by whether or not the mosque is connected to other domains, in addition to being active. When Islam is connected to any other node, it means that those who frequent the mosque also belong to other civic venues outside of it. Their multiple memberships link Islam to other civic domains. In that sense, Islam's connections in a network can establish pathways through which Muslims can potentially encounter non-Muslims. Like its active or inactive status, Islam's connectedness or isolation in a network is salient in light of the connectedness or isolation of other religions. The connectivity of the node representing other religions is important because it signals whether or not Muslims can tolerate a certain degree of pluralism, especially when Islam is the centrally dominant node. This religiously diverse network,
in turn, gives way to four other, more specific, types of network configurations (see Table 4.2). In these ideal-typical network graphs, the attention is on the structural position of the “Islam” and "other religion" nodes — most of the remaining domains are not labeled but shown only for illustrative purposes. For our inquiry, the structural position and influence of the other domains matter only in relation to the two religion nodes. Each of these four ideal-types of the diverse civic network has a network profile that will facilitate its identification in a sample. Each network type depends on the degree centrality scores of Islam and other religion. A node's degree centrality is the number of ties (or connections) it has in a network (Freeman 1979). Nodes that have more connections have a more influential position in the network because they are likely to have access to more resources through those connections. Likewise, nodes that are isolated have little to no structural power in the network. The first cell (2A) considers a situation in which Islam is isolated but other religion is connected to at least one other domain. This means that Islam is expected to have a degree centrality score of 0, while other religion should have a score of at least 1. Islam being isolated means that Muslims who participate in activities at the mosque do not partake in activities in other domains.
Table 4.2. Types of religiously diverse civic network.

2A: Diverse network with Islam isolated
degree of Islam = 0; degree of other religion ≥ 1

2B: Diverse network with all religions isolated
degree of Islam = degree of other religion = 0

2C: Diverse network with other religion isolated
degree of Islam ≥ 1; degree of other religion = 0

2D: Integrated pluralist network
degree of Islam ≥ 1; degree of other religion ≥ 1
There may also be instances where both Islam and other religion are active, but neither is connected to another domain (2B). In these instances, both Islam and other religion have a degree centrality score of 0, since they are both isolates. This means that religious adepts tend to gravitate to activities organized within the church or mosque but not outside of it. Muslims, for example, do not attend meetings outside of the mosque or other group activities organized by fellow Muslims or the clergy. The cultural alarmists may see this instance as the local mosque functioning like a moral counterweight to western influences by hosting exclusive engagements for Muslims as a way of restricting their enrollment in other public venues tainted by western ideas. The assumption is that most Muslims are not likely to partake in civic activities that support liberal democracy, but if they were to partake in civic circles they would do so exclusively through the channels provided by their religion, since it is, allegedly, their sole basis of public identity (Lewis 1988). If there is a discernible pattern of the mosque as the sole religious venue being excluded in an otherwise thriving civic network, it may be a signal that Islam is in fact resistant to democratic institutions. If, however, both Islam and other religions are isolated, it may indicate that the local religious economy is generally not welcoming to secular influences, and that Islam itself is not the issue.

Next, cell 2C in Table 4.2 illustrates a case in which Islam is a connected node but other religions are isolated in the network. The node representing Islam has a degree of at least 1 and the node representing other religion has a degree of 0. Here, other religions are active civic venues and their members engage in civic participation, but those members do not partake in activities in other domains, and notably not with Muslims. The mosque may be the center of this civic network, but its centrality (e.g. dominance) may vary based on other factors at play in the community. In any case, in such a network, civic activities would involve Muslims but would not welcome
individuals of a differing faith, even when they share a mutual interest to engage in some activity unrelated to their religion.

The fourth type of diverse network (1D) is where both Islam and other religion are connected to at least one more domain. Both Islam and other religion have a degree centrality score that is 1 or greater. As far as democracy is concerned, this is the best-case scenario: a pluralistic and integrated network in which both Muslims and non-Muslims are connected to secular civic domains. In this case, Islam coexists in (relative) peace with other religions. It is also plausible that in Indonesian communities where Muslims are the minority, another religion, instead of Islam, is the center of attraction, although such communities may be rare in a country like Indonesia where close to 90% of the population is Muslim. A preponderance of interfaith bridges among Indonesians would attest to a diverse, pluralistic and liberal civic culture. If Islam and some other religion share a third domain as a tie, then members of that domain become a link between the two religion nodes. An investigation of the influence of religion on pro-social civic participation would be incomplete without asking whether the existing civic venues allow Muslims to ever meet Christians. When Islam and some other religion share a third domain as a tie, then members of that intermediary domain potentially serve as a bridge between the two religion nodes. Finding even a moderate percentage of networks in which the two religion nodes have simultaneous ties to a third node would seriously challenge the argument marshalled by the cultural alarmists who deem Islam to be completely incompatible with tolerance and pluralism. While the presence of indirect interfaith ties is attractive and hopeful for democratic institutions to thrive, such a scenario may not be very common. The empirical evidence we saw in previous chapters dictates that the cases in which Islam is isolated should be more probable than the ones where it is connected. Notwithstanding the incompatibility argument, the local mosque in Indonesia is likely to operate
in a way that is separate and different from the way that other religions manage their presence in the civic sphere, which in turn means that we may see a good number of communities with a civic network that is split along religious lines.

In addition, there is likely to be some variability around the actual characteristics of each of these diverse networks (2A through 2D) if they are present in the sample. First, the incidence rate of each network type in the sample may vary based on density -- a measure of how much activity occurs in the network (the number of existing ties divided by the number of possible ties). Density may vary with population size and the majority-Muslim communities are likely to be larger than others. We can expect Islam's centrality score to increase as network density increases. A lopsided distribution of majority-Muslim networks in which Islam is active, connected and central is plausible, but there could possibly be some communities in which other religion is the dominant force in the civic network. In any case, it is important to account for the religious make-up of a community. Also, as Islam's centrality increases, the centrality of other religion should decrease, for both domains are unlikely to be equally as dominant in the same community. In the case of the integrated pluralist network (2B), further differentiation between Islam and other religion may be related to their respective betweenness score. A betweenness score indicates how much a node connects other nodes with each other (Freeman 1977), which is another way of saying that a node potentially plays the role of broker between two others. Brokering connections between other nodes would be compelling evidence that Islam plays a crucial role in terms of pluralistic connections in the civic sphere.
4.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This chapter reconsiders the debate on Islam’s compatibility with democracy by focusing on Islam’s actual role in pro-social civic participation at the community level. Using this network-based framework, the opaque question of whether Islam is incompatible with democratic institutions may be restated more clearly as a few more manageable and more precise questions. As shown above, for Islam to perform a pro-social and pluralistic role in a civic network, it has to be an active domain to begin with. A first set of questions then is: is there evidence that Islam (e.g. the local mosque) operates as an active civic domain in pro-social civic participation networks? What is the distribution of villages in the sample based on Islam's active/inactive status? And does the distribution of network types reflect a clear pattern based on the religious composition of the communities? Secondly, Islam may operate as an active domain, but it does not mean it will be connected to other domains. When Islam is active in these civic networks, is it connected to other civic venues or is it an isolated node? The same questions regarding the geographic distribution of these networks and the communities’ religious composition apply.

An important question is how frequent are instances in which neither Islam nor any other religion is active in the network. Also, does Islam’s level of influence in the network preclude other religions from being active or equally as influential? This, once again, has everything to do with religious pluralism and tolerance. A tolerant and "smiling" Islam, as the Middle Path proponents frame it in Indonesia, would compromise its influence or disapproval of democratic institutions for the sake of peacefully coexisting and acknowledging other religions. Does other religion’s centrality decrease as Islam’s centrality increases? Also, when Islam is active but isolated in the civic network, is it only Islam or is religion excluded in general (meaning that other religions, such as Christianity, are also excluded)? Lastly, are there opportunities for Muslims and members of
other religions to cross paths? Are Islam and other religions simultaneously connected to at least one more domain?

4.5 DATA AND METHODS

To answer the questions above, I used the 2007 wave of the PNPM Generasi data on Indonesian households and communities. The Generasi survey collected information on the civic habits of citizens in 5,100 villages across rural Indonesia. The civic activities pertained to 11 distinct associational domains, including religion, infrastructure, and sports (see Table 4.3). The PNPM survey asked participants whether they had attended public meetings or participated in community projects in their village in the past year. Respondents indicated which civic domains they belonged to, and if none of the respondents in a particular village indicate they participated in a domain, that domain is assumed to be “inactive”. For instance, citizens may have attended meetings in credit groups and participated in infrastructure related projects but not attended meetings hosted by the mosque. In that case, the mosque is assumed to not operate as an “active” civic gathering place. In order to distinguish between the role of the local mosque and that of other religious entities, I split the religion domain in two domains – one accounting for activities related to Islam and another representing all other religions. This resulted in a total of 12 domains per civic network. As the research questions above indicate, Islam's presumed antagonism or tolerance towards non-Muslim religions is a central concern. Thus, it makes sense to categorize the plausible networks based on the possibilities that Islam or any other religion may or may not be active at the same time, or when they are active they may or may not be connected to other nodes in a given network. The overall benefit of adopting a network perspective is that the interactions among social actors constitute a social structure and framework that, in and of itself, may be analyzed to reveal
patterns of exchange, communication, or in this case social organization (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994: xii). In the present case, civic communities are patterned networks of social contact and these networks have consequences for concerted collective behavior.

My analytical starting point is Breiger's (1974) duality of persons and groups framework. Taking a cue from Simmel's work of group affiliations, Breiger posits that a person's membership in multiple organizations constitutes a tie between those organizations, since they all share that person as a member. In his theory of the mutual constitution of persons and groups, Simmel was concerned with two key aspects of social structure: (1) person-to-person ties in the group and (2) group-to-group ties via the shared members. This same reasoning holds for the civic domains in question here. For instance, the credit/finance and social service domains share a tie if they count the same household as a member/contributor. Of course, not all members of the household need to belong to a domain -- a single household member's affiliation links that household to the domain. The duality between households and civic domains means that the organization of inter-household affiliations (e.g. members of one household interacting with members of other households) and that of inter-domain affiliations (e.g. one domain sharing members with other domains) are distinct but mutually constitutive. The structural positions in the inter-household space constitute the relational units of analysis in the inter-domain space, and vice versa. Breiger’s duality approach allows us to explore the interpenetration of a network of inter-domain ties and a network of inter-household ties. That civic network can be perceived on the one hand as a network of ties among households, and on the other hand as a network of interconnected civic domains. This chapter focuses only on the latter configuration -- the network of civic domains. In these networks, every node is a civic domain and every tie means that two domains share one or more households
as members. Each network is assumed to represent civic life within a distinct community (village or smaller settlement) in the PNPM sample.

Table 4.3. Civic domains in rural Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic domain</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Community activities in repair/cleaning/maintenance/construction of village/neighborhood infrastructure and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Religious/traditional group or institution, such as Al Quran reading, prayer group, Al Quran study group, or mosque/church youth group, and other faith-based activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Social service group or institution such as school committee, housewives’ groups, Family Welfare Program, community security watch group, or integrated health post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit group</td>
<td>Credit/finance group, such as small credit circle, community group, or savings group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Governmental group or institution, such as Rukun Tetangga (division of villages), Rukun Warga (division of regions), or hamlet/neighborhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production group</td>
<td>Production group or institution such as agricultural group providing materials/extension services, weaving group, or small business group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers group</td>
<td>Workers group or institution such as plantation workers group or farmers group providing manpower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and leisure</td>
<td>Recreational group or institution, such as sports, dancing, shadow play, or youth sports group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Natural resource management group or institution, irrigation water users group, clean water group, greening group, or clean water group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Mass organization or political organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Traditional institutions; Preservation of history and culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survey, however, does not provide ready-made network data, which means that the networks had to be constructed from the household and village level information on civic participation. I began by constructing an adjacency matrix $A$ that contains all the household-to-domain affiliations. Matrix $A$ consists of binary membership data for households within a civic network (i.e. a village). Each row of this translation matrix $A$ represents a household, and each column represents a unique domain to which that household belongs. An entry of 1 indicates that a household $i$ participates in activities pertaining to civic domain $k$, and an entry of 0 means the household does not participate in activities related to that civic domain. Following Breiger’s reasoning, transposing the matrix makes it possible for the domains to occupy the rows and the households to now occupy the columns (Breiger 1974: 183). The transpose of $A$ is $A^T$. Within this transposed matrix, the interpretation also changes – an entry of 1 now indicates that domain $k$ had household $i$ as a participant/member in its activities, and a 0 indicates that $k$ did not have that household as a participant/member. Since two-mode data can be transformed into one-mode via matrix multiplication, multiplying $A$ by its transpose $A^T$, and vice versa, yields two new one-mode matrices $H$ and $D$ as follows:

$$H = AA^T \quad (1)$$

$$D = A^TA \quad (2)$$

The product $AA^T$ yields a household-by-household matrix $H$ where each cell represents the number of domains households $i$ and $j$ have in common. Likewise, the operation $A^T A$ results in a domain-by-domain matrix $D$ in which each cell indicates the number of households that domains
$k$ and $l$ both share as members. In short, in matrix $H$ the nodes are the households and the domains are the relations, while in matrix $D$ the domains are the nodes and the households are the relations. The analysis in this chapter uses the contents of a set of domain-by-domain matrix $D$ that was constructed by using information pertaining to 18,438 households randomly sampled across 5,100 villages and settlements in rural Indonesia. Basically, I constructed a matrix like $D$ as the civic network for every community in the data set. These are, however, incomplete networks. Meaning that the network captured in the matrix $D$ for each village is not likely to be the complete set of civic activities in a given community, but rather a network that is artificially restricted in size and other characteristics by the sampling scheme used for the PNPM survey. This is obvious in the number of households per village – in the original data, some villages had a size of 1 or 2. Some of these communities are probably very small, but it is more likely that only one or two households were surveyed in that village. Using such small villages would result in problematic estimates for density, centrality and, especially, betweenness scores. To minimize the impact of the village size problem, any village with less than three households sampled were left out. This reduced the number of villages (thus, the number of networks) from 5,100 to 3,788.

The first part of the analysis explores the distribution of the four basic types of networks in which Islam is active or inactive (1A through 1D in Table 4.1) across the 3,788 communities. Next, I did the same for the four types of religiously diverse networks in which Islam is either connected or isolated (2A through 2D in Table 4.2). In both instances, I used a Chi-square procedure to note if there was a significant association between the expected and the observed proportions for each network type. For the latter set of network types, I computed a density score for each network – a low density score means that the network has few realized ties (out of the total of possible ties) and high density means the opposite. Because not all 12 civic domains are
likely to be active in every community, a density score could be misleading if it fails to account for the number of active domains in a village. For that reason, density was calculated in a way to count only the number of active domains. In addition, degree centrality and betweenness scores were computed for the Islam and other religion nodes in each network. Like density, centrality and betweenness were scaled in a way to capture only the number of active domains. Lastly, a co-citation measure was used to estimate the shared degree between Islam and other religion whenever they were both active in a network. the shared degree is the number of third nodes to which the two religion nodes are simultaneously connected.

4.6 RESULTS

4.6.1 Distribution of the Basic Network Types (1A through 1D)

Among the 3,788 networks analyzed, over 75% of them were in majority Muslim communities. Across these communities, Muslims accounted for 77% of all the households, Christians 22%, and other religious groups such as Hindus and Buddhists made up the remaining 1% (see Figure 4.1). On average, there were 4.4 households per village with a maximum of 19 households in a single village (see Table 4.4). The civic networks had 4.2 active domains on average, with a maximum of 10 – which means that there were no villages in which all 12 domains were simultaneously active. There was at least one domain active per network. The measures for network density, degree centrality and betweenness were standardized to account for the number of active nodes in a network, hence their restricted range. On average, Islam had higher degree centrality and betweenness scores than other religion, although these estimates likely varied across for the various network types devised in tables 3.1 and 3.2. Also, the religion nodes seem to have been connected to few other domains at the same time, with a maximum shared node count of 4
domains and average of merely 0.01. In fact, they shared a third common node in only 1% of all the networks. Instead of Islam, Infrastructure was the civic domain most likely to be the centrally dominant node in any given network. Out of the 3,788 communities, there were only 15 in which Islam was the centrally dominant domain, and other religion was active in none of them. Islam was the node with the highest betweenness score in 265 communities, but other religion was active in only 1 of those. These preliminary observations already suggest that Islam and other religion may have very different patterns of civic activities, seemingly because the two religion nodes may occupy very different spatial locations. The results from a chi-square test suggested a weak but significant association ($\phi^2 = 0.27$) between Islam's active status and the status of other religion, but that association is likely to be negative – e.g., when Islam is active, other religion is likely to be inactive, and vice versa.

We defined four basic types of networks related to Islam’s active/inactive status as well as the status of other religion in the 3,788 networks analyzed. A preponderance of the *church over mosque* (1A) or the *mosque over church* (1C) types of networks would support the incompatibility argument that Islam may not be open to tolerance and pluralism. Conversely, observing very few of these types of networks in the sample would be evidence against the incompatibility thesis. The secular network type (1B) would also support the incompatibility thesis, but only partially because in that scenario, not only Islam, but all religions are inactive. A prevalence of this type of network would make it difficult to argue that Islam, instead of religion in general, is antithetical to civic participation. The *mosque alongside church* type of network (1D) is the religiously diverse situation where Islam displays its tolerance for religious pluralism. If the results show a high percentage of religiously diverse networks where Islam and other religion were both active (*mosque alongside church*, 1D), then there is evidence against the incompatibility thesis. A high
incidence rate of 1D networks would support a view that the local mosque and other religious venues can coexist in a way that demonstrates civic diversity, with a potential for pluralism. If, on the contrary, there were few occurrences of this religiously diverse network, then the incompatibility thesis may have found some support.

If we combined the counts in cells 1A and 1B in Table 4.5, we would see that networks in which Islam was inactive account for a third of the sample – that is a sizable proportion of networks where there was a civic network, but the local mosque did not play an overt role in civic life. Islam was active in two thirds of all the networks, but almost exclusively where other religion was an inactive node. Among the four basic types of networks, *mosque over church* (type 1C) was the most prevalent in the sample – accounting for 66% of the sample. Besides the *mosque over church* networks (1C), the second most prominent type of network was 1B – *the secular network* where both Islam and other religion were inactive, accounting for 20% of the sample. Close to 50% of these secular civic networks (1B) were majority-Muslim communities (over 350 Muslim communities). Next were the *church over mosque* networks (1A), accounting for 13% of the sample. By contrast to the *mosque over church* networks (1C) that were overwhelmingly majority-Muslim communities, only 2% of the *church over mosque* civic networks were in majority-Muslim communities. Both the low occurrence and the distribution of these church over mosque networks were expected. At less than 1%, the religiously diverse civic network (where both Islam and other religion were active) had the lowest rate of occurrence in the sample. This means that there were very few communities in which the mosque was active along with the church as a civic venue. However, in these few religiously diverse networks, Islam and other religion had the same mean degree centrality score (see Table 4.6), which means they were equally as influential.
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics for the 3,788 networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of households per village</th>
<th>Number of active domains</th>
<th>Network density</th>
<th>Degree centrality of Islam</th>
<th>Degree centrality of other religion</th>
<th>Betweenness of Islam</th>
<th>Betweenness of other religion</th>
<th>Shared degree ++</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of villages with a Muslim majority: 75%

**Number of nodes to which Islam and other religion are simultaneously connected**
Table 4.5. Distribution of the basic types of networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam is inactive</th>
<th>Other religion is active</th>
<th>Other religion is inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Churches and temples serve as civic venues, but the local mosque does not.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neither the local mosque nor other religious temples operate as civic venues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs. = 493 (13 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Obs. = 761 (20.1 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. = 172 (4.5 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exp. = 1082 (28.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority-Muslim villages .......... 2% of obs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>majority-Muslim villages .......... 47% of obs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A: Church over mosque</td>
<td></td>
<td>1B: Secular networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam is active</th>
<th>Other religion is active</th>
<th>Other religion is inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The local mosque operates as a civic venue, and so do churches or temples that are affiliated with other faiths.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The local mosque operates as a civic venue, but not churches or temples affiliated with other faiths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs. = 28 (0.7 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Obs. = 2506 (66.2 % of the sample)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. = 349 (9.2 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exp. = 2185 (57.7 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority-Muslim villages .......... 57% of obs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>majority-Muslim villages .......... 99% of obs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D: Mosque alongside church (Religiously diverse networks)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1C: Mosque over church</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows the proportion of villages whose civic network resembles one of the four basic types of network configurations based on whether Islam and/or other religion were active. The observed and expected values in each cell come from a Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction, in which: $\chi^2 = 1032.4$; $N = 3788$; df = 1; and $p < 0.05$; $\phi^2 = 0.27$
Table 4.6. Descriptive statistics for the basic network types (1A through 1D).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1A: Church over mosque</th>
<th>1B: The secular network</th>
<th>1C: Mosque over church</th>
<th>1D: Mosque alongside church (diverse network)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority-Muslim villages</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent of observed counts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean degree of Islam</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Mean degree of other domains: 0.31 (0.3)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.5 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean degree of other religion</td>
<td>0.7 (0.3)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean betweenness of Islam</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Mean betweenness of other domains: 0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean betweenness of other religion</td>
<td>0.05 (0.09)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant civic domain</td>
<td>Infrastructure: 0.98 (0.07)</td>
<td>Infrastructure: 0.98 (0.1)</td>
<td>Infrastructure: 0.91 (0.06)</td>
<td>Infrastructure: 0.97 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean degree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean shared degree</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.7 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between Islam and other religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of active</td>
<td>5.3 (1.6)</td>
<td>3.5 (1.5)</td>
<td>4.2 (1.3)</td>
<td>5.6 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean network density</td>
<td>0.4 (0.2)</td>
<td>0.7 (0.4)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.3)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of</td>
<td>4.8 (1.4)</td>
<td>4.3 (1.1)</td>
<td>4.3 (1.2)</td>
<td>5.1 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6.2 The “Mosque over Church” Networks (1C)

The results suggest that network type 1C (Mosque over Church) was the most common way of organizing civic life in rural communities in Indonesia. In the vast majority of the villages, respondents reported to have used the mosque as a civic venue while other religion was inactive. There were more networks in the sample that fit this profile than one would normally expect at random (66% observed, versus 58% expected). As expected, virtually all 2,506 networks that fit this profile were majority-Muslim communities. In those 1C networks (Table 4.5), Islam also had its highest mean centrality score (0.8). Still, Islam might not have been the centrally dominant node in the majority of these “mosque over church” types of networks. If Islam was dominant, the incompatibility thesis may have some grounds, but if on average Islam was not the dominant node, then the incompatibility thesis is not entirely supported. In effect, the results show that, Islam was the centrally dominant node in less than 1% of these networks (33 out 2506). On average, the dominant civic domain in these (1C in Table 4.5) villages was not Islam but Infrastructure with a mean degree centrality score of 0.98, compared to Islam's mean centrality score of 0.83. Infrastructure also had the highest mean betweenness score (0.09, compared to Islam's mean of 0.05). This comes as no surprise since in the previous chapters, it was clear that infrastructure was by far the most popular civic venue among household heads. In sum, these results suggest that Muslims are prone to behaving in pro-social and pluralistic ways, but the local religious context in most of these communities does not seem to favor religious pluralism in connection to civic participation.
Table 4.7. Distribution of the types of diverse civic networks (2A through 2D)

2A: Diverse network with Islam isolated
- degree of Islam = 0; degree of other religion ≥ 1
- Obs. = 0; Exp. = N/A (exp. frequency < 5)

2B: Diverse network with all religions isolated
- degree of Islam = degree of other religion = 0
- Obs. = 0; Exp. = N/A (exp. frequency < 5)

2C: Diverse network with other religion isolated
- degree of Islam ≥ 1; degree of other religion ≥ 1
- Obs. = 1 (3.6%); Exp. = N/A (exp. frequency < 5)
  - * a majority-Muslim village
  - centrality of Islam .................. 0.33
  - betweenness of Islam ................. 0.00
  - network density .................... 0.23

2D: The integrated pluralist network
- degree of Islam ≥ 1; degree of other religion ≥ 1
- Obs. = 27 (96.4%); Exp. = N/A (exp. frequency < 5)
  - majority-Muslim villages .......... 57% of obs.
  - Mean centrality of Islam ....... 0.51 (0.19)
  - Mean centrality of other religion .. 0.52 (0.18)
  - Mean betweenness of Islam ..... 0.03 (0.05)
  - Mean betweenness of other religion .. 0.05 (0.08)
  - Mean shared degree ............... 1.74 (0.9)
4.6.3 *Distribution of the Religiously Diverse Networks (2A through 2D)*

There is a consensus in the civic participation literature that civic diversity is important (Levine 2007), but how this diversity knits a community and supports the organization of civic life is often unclear. The *mosque alongside church* (religiously diverse networks, 1D) type of networks characterizes situations in which this diversity factor is most salient, and the methodological approach in this chapter allows us to arrive at an answer for how diversity translates into pluralism. Having only 28 such cases of religiously diverse civic networks, however, is a serious limitation on the conclusions one can draw (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.7). Nonetheless, the lack of religious pluralism did not mean the absence of pluralism broadly defined, and Muslims showed some measure of tolerance toward secular domains. Among the 28 religiously diverse networks (Table 4.7), only one matched the profile of type 2C (diverse network with other religion isolated) and 27 matched type 2D (the integrated pluralist network). There were no cases that fit either profile 2A (diverse network with Islam isolated) or 2B (Diverse network with all religions isolated). In the 28 networks in which Islam and other religion were both active, they were also both connected to other domains in 27 of them. Whenever religious venues were actively featured in the local civic network (because individuals used them as such), they never remained isolated but rather were linked to other civic domains because their members also attended meetings and events in other civic venues and different. Only one religiously diverse network featured other religion as an isolated node. Also, over half of these 27 integrated and pluralist networks were in majority-Muslim villages (including the one where other religion was isolated), and this suggests that some majority-Muslim communities are favorable to religiously pluralistic civic networks. Furthermore, in 7 of these 27 integrated networks, Islam and other religion had the same degree centrality score.
They had the same betweenness score in 17 of the networks, which means that both nodes were structurally equivalent as brokers in 17 out of 27 integrated networks. In fact, the two religion nodes had a third node in common in all of the diverse networks, except in the one network where other religion was isolated. In short, there were 27 communities whose civic networks fit the profile of the type most compatible with pro-social and pluralistic participation. In these 27 communities, Islam and other religions were active civic venues and they were both connected to other civic domains. On average Islam and other religions were equally as central (0.5) but other religions had a betweenness score that was slightly higher – 0.05, compared to 0.03 for Islam. This means that other religion, in its role of civic broker, connected slightly more domains than Islam did. In these 27 diverse networks, Islam and other religion had a mean shared degree of 1.74 (compared to a mean of 0.01 in the rest of the sample) and the networks were on average a little less dense (0.33) than in the rest of the sample (0.6).

A few salient questions remain regarding the relationship between Islam’s structural position and that of other religion, namely whether Islam’s prominence affects that of other religion’s position in the same network. Calculating correlation coefficients for Islam and other religions over the entire sample would be misleading since there were only 28 cases in which they were both active. For that reason, these estimates were restricted to the 28 cases. An increase in Islam’s degree centrality score resulted in an increase of the centrality score of other religion \((r = 0.17)\). The scatterplot in Figure 4.2 shows, however, that Islam’s centrality affects the centrality of other religion differently depending on the community’s religious composition. In majority-Muslim communities, as Islam’s centrality increases, so too does the centrality of other religions. In minority-Muslim communities, however, the opposite is true: the more centrally dominant Islam is in a network the less dominant other religions tend to be. It is unclear why this is so, because the
reverse was probably expected – that Islam’s influence in the network would negatively impact the influence of other religion in majority-Muslim communities but not so much in minority-Muslim villages. In terms of their role as brokers (based on their betweenness score), however, the relationship was more predictable (Figure 4.3). As expected, Islam’s influence as a broker is negatively correlated with other religion’s ability to play the same role. As Islam’s betweenness score increases, the betweenness score for other religion decreases, but only slightly ($r = -0.07$). Finally, how density affected these estimates is interesting to note, for it highlights the importance of the number of active domains in a network (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5). An increase in network density results in an increase in Islam’s degree centrality, which means that Islam is more centrally dominant in the denser networks ($r = 0.40$). This makes sense because the denser networks would likely be in the communities with a larger population, which also tend to be majority-Muslim communities. Changes in network density affect the centrality of other religion in the same manner – other religion is also more central in the denser networks ($r = 0.37$).
Figure 4.2. How Islam’s centrality affects the centrality of other religions.
Figure 4.3. How Islam’s betweenness affects the centrality of other religions
Figure 4.4. How network density affects the centrality of Islam.
Figure 4.5. How network density affects the centrality of other religion
4.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Islam’s presumed incompatibility with democratic institutions is a matter of great controversy, not the least because it accuses an entire geographic, cultural and religious portion of the world to be antithetical to the thrust of human history and progress as defined by western standards. It is also a problematic claim because its proponents lack a thorough set of testable propositions that link the behaviors and institutions in question to empirical observations at the community level. Some may have written off Modernization Theory as defunct, but the modernization imperative lives on in the normative expectations that every nation must democratize and must do so in a way that resembles the western model. The global democratization process, as the world has seen it thus far, is almost always a modernization endeavor. This chapter’s analysis is much less a test of Islam so-called incompatibility with democratic values as it is the proposal of a network-based method for investigating the question of how Islam (and religion in general) fits in the social organization of civic participation in a transitioning democracy. Narrowing the question to one kind of democratic behavior (pro-social and pluralistic participation) brought it closer to the actual meso-level mechanisms of social capital and network interactions upon which these institutions depend. In the previous chapters, I envisioned the civic culture to be an interconnected web of smaller networks that have more or less porous boundaries. In this chapter, the analysis moves from a network of civic actors to a network of civic domains. The pluralistic behaviors of household members are embodied in how their diverse participation connect one civic domain to other domains via these households’ joint membership. Thus, the question of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy on a grand scale was recast as a question of Muslims displaying an affinity with pro-social participation and religious pluralism. Doing so required a translation of some key arguments in the literature into a set of expectations that were
directly applicable to civic networks. This approach allowed for a simple typology of network situations based on whether or not Islam (e.g. the local mosque) and other religion were active in a community’s civic network.

The bulk of the results, taken at face value, would seem to support the arguments of Huntington (1996) and other cultural alarmists, but they are in some ways encouraging for how Indonesians may work toward consolidating their democratic transition. First, 13% of all the communities in this study had a church over mosque type of civic network (1A). These communities were overwhelmingly minority-Muslim, which would support an incompatibility argument, even though such a test is beyond the scope of this analysis. Second, the prominence of the mosque over church (1C) type of civic network clearly indicated that, in most of the communities in the PNPM sample, Islam was an active civic venue, but other religion was not. At first glance, this seems to support the incompatibility thesis, if we accept that Muslims not using their local gathering place as a meeting ground for extra-religious purposes spells out hostility towards democracy. Those who support the incompatibility thesis may interpret this finding as evidence that Islam does not tolerate other religions in the public sphere, especially because less than 1% of all the networks in this random sample fit the profile of a religiously diverse civic network (e.g. where both Islam and other religions are active). However, critics of the incompatibility thesis may find solace in knowing that even in those networks where the local mosque served as the sole active religious domain, Islam was not the most dominant node overall – the most influential domain was infrastructure 10 (with a mean degree centrality score of 0.98 compare to Islam's mean centrality score of 0.83). At first, the incompatibility thesis seems to find

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10 Infrastructure also had the highest mean betweenness score of 0.09, compared to Islam's 0.05. This comes as no surprise since in the previous chapters it was clear that infrastructure was by far the most popular civic venue among household heads.
some support here, but it seems like when Islam is the only religious node active, it does not tend to overpower the network and participants do not make it an exclusively “Islam-centric” public space. If the cultural alarmists perceive Islam to be an overbearing cultural force that eclipses any form of rivalry in the lives of Indonesians and their identity, this was not evident in the results. In fact, the opposite was true: in 98% of the networks where Islam was the only religious domain it was connected to at least one secular domain – which means that Muslims were almost always affiliated with a secular civic cause in addition to their faith-based groups.

Third, Islam was inactive in only 14% of the networks, and both religion nodes were inactive in 20% of them. Under these circumstances, it is hard to say that Muslims are not engaged because of Islam per se, since Christians and other religious groups also remain unengaged. Close to 50% of these secular civic networks (1B) were in majority-Muslim communities (over 350 such communities in the sample). The cultural alarmists may perceive this as evidence that Muslims are indifferent to civic virtues. Religion in general seems to be a non-influential factor in the civic life of these communities. Islam can hardly shoulder the blame alone, if there is blame that religion does not engage with the civic sphere in those villages. Another way of interpreting this finding could be that it is unexpected and quite encouraging for Muslim democrats in Indonesia, because it means they can tolerate secular groups and associations that invite citizens to get involved in public issues (still infrastructure is the most popular domain here). The alarmists have assumed that Muslims should be unlikely to subscribe to secular public endeavors because Islam imbues them with the sole public identity they need, and because Islam leaves no room for other identities to rival its influence in the lives of these individuals. In light of the present findings, these assumptions seem exaggerated and unfounded. These alternative public identities are oftentimes closely connected to secular causes that are not necessarily antagonistic to religious piety but
whose expression is different and worldly. Still, an important question is whether there is really a mosque in the communities where we observe these secular networks where Islam is not active. Unfortunately, the PNPM survey lacks a preliminary question to help confirm what kinds of religious establishments, shrines or temples are available in a community. However, we can reason that perhaps there are not likely to be a great number of majority-Muslim communities without a mosque, unless they are very small.

Still, the fact that there were so few of the religiously diverse networks (1D) somewhat supports the view of the cultural alarmists that civic networks with opportunities for religious pluralism are not very popular in Muslim nations like Indonesia. The vast majority of the networks were not religiously diverse and offered very few opportunities to observe interfaith connections. Less than 1% of all the communities analyzed featured a civic network in which both Islam and other religion were active. It is likely that the cultural alarmists will attribute the cause of this observation to Islam’s presumed hostility directly. However, this bad news has a bit of a silver lining for Muslim democrats who desire to promote pluralistic engagement in Indonesia. Wherever Islam and other religion were both active civic domains in a community, they were virtually always connected to at least one other domain each, save for one village. Granted, there were few civic networks in which both Islam and other religion were active (28 to be exact), but in virtually all of these networks both religion nodes were connected to another domain, although never to each other. This is understandable because Mosques and churches do not share members and the more extended networks nurtured under each institutional umbrella may not easily inter-penetrate. There were no cases in which both Islam and other religion were active and isolated. Whenever they are both active, they tend to be connected to another domain. This is somewhat good news, because when they are active the two religion nodes promote pluralistic participation (bridging). This
finding, although supported by few cases, undermines the more extreme versions of the incompatibility thesis that assumes Islam to be completely out of sorts with tolerance and religious pluralism. An expected counterpoint from the cultural alarmists is that Indonesia probably had a more favorable context for democracy than do other Muslim nations. There had been a wave of progressive and pro-democracy intellectuals and students in Indonesia since the days of Sukarno's massacre of the communists in the 1960's. For that reasons, some may argue that civic traditions should have been further along in Indonesia, assuming that there is a such a historical trajectory towards modernism and democratic rule with which all nations must grapple, as Huntington (1996) and Fukuyama (1992) have assumed.

In addition, the average number of shared nodes in these diverse and religiously integrated villages was of 1.74, suggesting that some of the people who frequent the mosque also frequent at least one additional civic domain that some Christians, Hindus or Buddhists attend. It is doubly encouraging for Muslim democrats that over 50% of those integrated civic networks were in majority-Muslim communities. The caveat, once again, is that these networks were very rare, and the PNPM survey consists only of rural data. This question is definitely worth pursuing with an urban sample as well, and an urban/rural comparison similar to the one in Beard (2007) may be useful to clarify these patterns. Also, Islam was more centrally dominant in the denser networks, which also were more likely to be majority-Muslim. However, the brokerage influence of the two religion nodes varied in opposite direction of each other, although it is a very weak correlation. We would need a larger random sample than the 28 diverse communities to fully investigate this question, the trend here suggests that Islam’s influence tended to be concentrated in majority-Muslim communities. Islam’s presence in the diverse communities did not seem to deter other religious affiliation or the adoption of western pro-democratic institutions as much as Muslim
residents seemed to be sticking to civic circles that are most familiar to them: the company of fellow Muslims. In most of the communities in this data set, those households that are not connected to the local mosque tended to be located in communities where there may not be a mosque to begin with. To expect Muslims to engage in activities where they may potentially encounter Christians or Buddhists may be overlooking a related problem of ethno-religious segregation in Indonesia. Future studies would do well to look into the geographic distribution of ethno-religious groups and their settlements. An important aspect of civic engagement is location and access to active civic venues. This highlights a very basic truth about social organization in general. Beyond providing a detailed description of Islam’s role in Indonesian civic networks, the analysis here does not help determine whether Islam is resistant to sharing the public sphere with other faiths. In fact, the same question may be asked of the other faiths as well. Even though they are minority groups, in communities where they are dominant Christians, Buddhists, or Hindus may not wish to share the public sphere with Muslims for reasons that may or may not have to do with a long history of ethno-religious strife. Scholars often downplay the fact that Indonesia also hosts one of the larger Christian minority communities of any Muslim country. My point is, putting the burden solely on Indonesian Muslims to prove that they are tolerant and pluralistic with respect to other religions may be too simplistic for us to arrive at a rich understanding of a nexus of very complicated relationships.

This chapter’s contribution to the literature on democratic transition and civic engagement is two-fold. First, the monolithic question of whether or not Islam is compatible with democratic institutions is clarified and unpacked to yield more manageable research questions. The macro-level question that should be answered with cross-national comparative data was brought closer to the meso-level of interactions where the said democratic institutions actually emerge and function.
Some authors have noted how the majority of studies regarding Islam’s influence on civic habits tend to focus on citizens’ attitudes rather than their behaviors (Norris and Inglehart 2009; Sarkissian 2012). This chapter helps overcome this limitation by providing a description of civic networks defined by the behaviors of household members within and across civic domains. The analytical leap here has been to connect a question of Islam’s affinity with certain values and habits with an actual sample of Muslim actors with the opportunity to display those values and habits. Second, the literature lacks detailed descriptions of the contexts in which Muslims are expected to display their acceptance or rejection of democratic institutions. This chapter provides a much more granular look at how Islam structurally reacts to or engages with pro-social pluralistic initiatives. Using a network-based approach allowed for a direct observation of the role that the local mosque plays in the organization of a community’s civic life. Describing a civic network in a way that emphasizes Islam’s structural position in it can be very useful in assessing Muslim’s interactions with other domains, or the lack thereof. In sum, the macro-level debate between cultural alarmists and structural optimists benefits from an empirical description of actual civic networks in a Muslim nation in the midst of its democratic transition. The disagreements in the literature suggest that the relationship between Islam and civic participation deserves serious and ongoing attention. The hope is future studies can improve on the simple approach offered here, starting with the duality of civic actors and civic domains, to clarify the role that Islam and other religions play in Indonesia’s civic culture in both urban and rural areas.
Chapter 5. CONCLUSION

5.1 OVERVIEW

The primary goal of this dissertation has been to explain how participation in community development works in a Global South nation where government has been decentralized. I began by identifying three gaps in the inter-disciplinary literature on participation that warranted further attention:

(1) The lack of generalizable models of participation in community development. This prompted the question: does participation in post-reform Indonesia follow a model that includes the poor and religious minorities?

(2) The lack of comprehensive and yet simplified measures of participation that account for the underlying functions of social capital. Using such measures, I asked: how intensely and diversely do Indonesians participate? And how does belonging to a faith-based association affect one’s civic intensity and diversity?

(3) The neglect of religion’s role, particularly Islam, in civic participation schemes in Muslim nations. We have very little knowledge of whether and how citizens use the local mosque to integrate civic networks. Does Islam have a positive or negative effect on civic participation? Does it promote pluralistic engagement across religious lines?

Pursuing these questions required an understanding of participation as purposive civic action via which citizens activate their social capital in local networks – networks in which differences in social class and religious affiliations complicate the opportunity to engage. As a
middle-income, Muslim-majority nation in the process of a democratic transition, Indonesia offered an excellent case for this study. Reporting on the progress of decentralization measures in Indonesia, Colongon (2003) writes: "one of the most significant changes has been the way in which ordinary citizens have begun to engage in dialogues, meetings, and discussions on issues affecting the community"(97). Likewise, commenting on the state of the democratic polity in Indonesia, Antlöv (2003) reports that:

"One of the more exciting new mechanisms for political participation is what are commonly called social action groups, [...] or simply citizens' forums. These are formed around a common cause by groups of citizens in a town or district" (78).

One such notable organization (FM2S), Antlöv reports, counts among its members "pedicab drivers, hawkers, factory workers, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, teachers, religious leaders, and so on." Targeting the improvement of roads in their hometown of Majalaya (West Java), the group raised 250 million rupiahs \(^{11}\) in just two weeks to pave the roads. These two anecdotes highlight the degree to which some Indonesian communities had embraced democratic ideals just a couple of years after parliament officially ratified the reforms. These observations are noteworthy because they capture civic traditions in the making. Citizens deliberating freely and forming an association to invest in the maintenance of their community reflect the pursuit of common interests via the adoption of virtuous civic behaviors. I would be remiss in not pointing out the diversity in the composition of the FM2S group, which contains citizens of various professions, including religious leaders. This dissertation's goal has been to uncover the extent to

\(^{11}\) 250 million rupiahs are roughly equivalent to $17,216 U.S.
which groups such as the ones mentioned in these two examples are inclusive of the poor and religious minorities in rural Indonesia.

Some of my key findings reflect the observations in Colongon (2003) and Antlöv (2003) that, in many localities, Indonesians have assumed ownership of their social progress. Using the 2007 wave of the PNPM Generasi data, I found that participation rates for doing more tripled after the reforms (Chapter 2). There was more doing and more giving after the reforms than before, but especially more doing. The landmark reforms of 2001 seemed to have worked as a rallying call to all Indonesians to become active citizens who would form civic associations that help them pursue their interests, engage in community-building and enhance their quality of life (Woolcock 2010). Indonesia’s civic population is best described as an emergent "Passivist-Generalist" culture – e.g., a culture dominated by a class of passivist (27%, but they account for 35% if we include those who did not participate at all) citizens who engage minimally in one domain and across very few domains (if any), as well as a sizable group of generalists (33%) who engage intensely and diversify their ties across multiple civic domains. The average number of hours households contributed decreased, between 2000 and 2007, but a greater percentage of households were engaged in doing after the reforms. Households may be engaged less intensely (less committed) than before, but there is definitely a greater percentage of households engaged in participation after the reforms.

5.2 Main Findings and Contributions

5.2.1 Class Differences Matter

In Chapter 2, I found that, in agreement with the evidence from other countries (Das and Takahashi 2015), participation via giving in Indonesia mostly follows a hybrid model of elite and
middle-class dominance – those with more education and resources tended to give significantly more money. However, the class-based differences were negligible for doing – indicating that even the poorest households contributed some of their time toward the production or maintenance of collective goods. For the results in Chapter 3, it was clear that households with more resources (wealth and education) participated across a more diverse array of civic domains than poorer ones. Likewise, households of lower socioeconomic status participated with both less intensity and less diversity. This means that less resourceful households, for whom bridging would likely make the most significant difference, were less likely to bridge ties across domains.

Without a central state that can provide more social services, these passivists who do very little are likely to receive fewer benefits and chances to improve their life-chances. Addressing poverty and inequality is one of the toughest challenges facing Indonesia presently, and my findings suggest that policy at the local level should probably target the issue in tandem with the participation problem. Those who do not participate (or are at risk of not participating) are very likely to fall further behind in terms of opportunities and access to public services. Around 2000, before the democratic reforms were implemented, close to 40% of Indonesia's population was classified as "poor" and earning less than $2 a day (World Bank, country profile). By 2007, after the Indonesian economy had bounced back from the Asian financial crisis, 30% of the population were still classified as "poor" (Suryahadi et al. 2003), while a budding bourgeois and consumer middle class made up roughly 25% of the population.

What these estimates show is that the Passivist-Generalist trends of civic engagement I observed in Chapter 3 seem to partly reflect the existing social class dynamics in Indonesian society circa 2007. The generalist families seem to fit the profile of the growing educated bourgeoisie that can engage with a high degree of diversity. By contrast, the passivist households
seem to represent the less educated (or uneducated) class of rural poor who engage with lackluster commitment within any given domain and with very little diversity. Dabblers and zealots fall somewhere in the middle. The prominence of generalists in the sample should increase our hope that Indonesia's democracy will sustain many challenges and that citizens will be reasonably well-equipped to engage in local collective action and resolve their problems. However, those generalists are more likely to be members of wealthy, resourceful families who are much less reliant on the provision of public goods. This raises skepticism concerning how instrumental the political reforms have been to the rural poor. Moreover, the size of the passivist population is worrisome (27%), since this civic disposition is likely to be much less productive and politically resilient than the others, which is likely to keep less resourceful and much less engaged families in a precarious position of socio-economic dependency.

As McCloskey (2006) suggests, capitalism breeds a class of actors whose actions reflect a set of “bourgeois virtues.” Indonesia’s progressive leap toward modernity in the last 15 years seems to have bred a similar class of wealthier and better educated Indonesians with these traits of virtuous generalists – individuals who commit intensely to their civic causes and diversify their civic participation in at least a few domains. Contributing to bridging social capital might require the deployment of resources that are beyond the reach of less affluent households, and this has important implications for the future of democracy because diversity and bridging are so crucial for how marginalized groups integrate the civic sphere. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the civic habits of the bourgeois generalists naturally tend toward pluralism. It is therefore sensible to ask, “what brand of pluralism?” This is of great importance because those who define the terms and limits of pluralism in a society tend to shape them to fit their norms, values, and interests – which usually leaves the norms, values, and interests of the poor and less powerful groups out of the
picture. The decentralization policies might have inspired a resurgence of civil society and a renewed confidence in what citizens may accomplish for themselves and their community, but it has not necessarily reeled in the poor and religious minorities. As Indonesia comes to terms with its national identity, that identity may resemble more and more that of the emerging bourgeois class. The lens through which tolerance and diversity will be defined will decidedly be middle and upper class. This echoes the famous line by Schattschneider (1960) that in pluralist heaven “the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (as cited in Perrow 1964). The groups with the most at stake in redefining pluralism in a way to accommodate their needs and aspirations are usually not sitting at the decision table. In effect, challenges from less powerful groups to change the status quo is often qualified as disruptive, but those with the clout and resources to redefine the rules tend to find social change that accommodates their interests quite sensible (Roof 2007).

5.2.2 Islam: A Bridge to Secular Civic Life, But a Silo from Other Religions

The results in Chapter 2 show that religious affiliation was a significant predictor of participation. Overall, Muslims gave more but did less than non-Muslims, and this agrees with the logic of collective action that wealthier individuals are more willing to give than to do. On average, Muslims are wealthier than non-Muslims (see Appendix C). In addition, wealth interacted with religious affiliation to impact civic habits in interesting ways. For instance, wealthy Muslims gave more but did less than wealthy Christians, and poor Christians did more than poor Muslims. In Chapter 3, I found that belonging to a faith-based association was the most reliable predictor of how intensely and diversely a household was participating. Religion seemed to have a generally adverse effect on participation in secular civic domains, and this effect did not only pertain to
Islam, as some might have expected. Christians participated less intensely in secular activities than Muslims, and households in Muslim-majority communities tended to participate less diversely. Moreover, religious belonging decreased intensity of participation in secular activities, which means that religion may breed “secular dabblers, although not in Muslim-majority villages, where it decreased diversity of participation. These results suggest that both the local church and the local mosque might have inhibited how diversely households were forming cross-cutting ties beyond their faith-based groups.

The religious composition of the communities also mattered. For all the promotion of Middle Path Islam by the Indonesian authorities as a milder and more tolerant theology, Muslim-majority villages do not seem to welcome a plurality of religious expressions via open associations. This critical finding answers a question that many scholars might have raised after reading the conclusion from Putnam and Campbell (2010) that religious belonging increased participation. The question being: would that be true in a non-Christian context, say a Muslim one for instance? My findings suggest that, for the communities in this sample, the answer is both yes and no. It is a yes, because I was able to confirm that religious belonging leads to broader (more diverse) civic engagement overall. However, the answer is no if we hypothesize that religious belonging should increase participation in secular activities. On the contrary, religious engagement seems to suppress one’s intensity of participation in secular participation in rural Indonesia. Religiously engaged households attended associational meetings much less frequently outside of their faith-based groups. Religious participation increased the maximum number of meetings in a single domain only when religion was included in the dependent variable, suggesting that the domain in which they maximized their frequency was almost certainly "religion."
The latter finding was a first clue that religion may curtail some forms of participation in some situations while enhancing it in other contexts. In Chapter 4, the distribution of the types of networks in which Islam was either connected or isolated provided a complete picture. In over 66% of the 3,788 communities in the sample, the mosque was used as an active civic venue while the local church or temple of other religions was not. It would be speculative to conclude that this indicates that Islam, as Huntington (1996) and Lewis (1988) have argued, is incompatible with democracy. However, the finding does suggest that Islam and other faith-based civic venues do not co-exist in the majority of the villages. This means that the very opportunity for the local mosque or the local church to serve as a bridge to other religions is absent. More to the point, virtually all the villages in which Islam was the only active religious civic venue were in Muslim-majority communities – further reinforcing the idea that Islam may be a bridge to some secular activities, but it looks like a self-contained silo when it comes to other religions. Still, in these communities where the mosque was the only religious node to be activated as a civic venue, Muslims could have made connections to secular domains (say, credit or infrastructure) that would link those domains to the mosque via the members they share. In effect, in 98% of these villages in which Islam was active, it was also connected to at least one secular domain – acting as a civic bridge. However, the opportunity to connect with others of a differing faith was scarce. Most of the communities in the sample were not religiously diverse in the civic sense – Islam and other religion were both active civic venues in only 28 networks (less than 1% of the total).

This dissertation did not aim to test Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilization propositions directly, because they are best suited to cross-national comparisons. Still, the clash of civilization debate informed my approach to explaining how Islam might be structurally positioned in a civic network. Saying that these findings support Huntington’s (1996) incompatibility thesis would be
a stretch, but they do suggest that in the context of pro-social participation Muslims are less prone to pluralistic behaviors than one might expect in a democracy, granted Indonesia is a very young democracy. However, the onus of pluralism does not rest squarely on the shoulders of Muslims, since other religion was also inactive in a good number of communities. A fair conclusion is that religion in general works more like a silo than a bridge. The good news is that Islam and other religions were always activated in those 28 diverse villages, save for one of them. Also, Islam was not always the centrally dominant civic venue when it was active, and even less so when one other religion was also active. Using a measure of shared nodes between the two religion nodes, I found that some of the people who frequent the mosque also frequent at least one additional civic domain that some Christians, Hindus or Buddhists attend. It is doubly encouraging for Muslim democrats that over 50% of those integrated civic networks (both religion nodes are activated and connected to at least one secular domain) were in majority-Muslim communities.

The watershed events between 1999 and 2001, though they were challenging, offered Indonesians a chance to come to grips with their national identity and emerge anew out of an era of military-backed authoritarianism, as well as cronyism and other forms of corruption in government. The reforms of 2001 propelled the nation toward what many have since deemed inevitable: embracing modernity. The challenge for Indonesians as well as for any developing nation, however, is to do so in a way that still acknowledges and respects tradition. Wherein lies a contradiction of sorts since many perceive becoming modern as purposefully breaking away from tradition. A central part of this tradition is Islam, a religion some deem to be hostile to democratic values. Perhaps Indonesians wish to be modern enough, but not so much as to reject their religion and culture. They would be “modern Muslim democrats” in a world where this term still rings as an anomaly to many, especially in the West and to a sizable minority of Islamic extremists within
Indonesia itself. In effect, while most Indonesians have reportedly embraced democracy, a small class of Islamic fanatics in Indonesia have been waiting for the emergence of an Islamic state that would concentrate all powers in the hands of a righteous ruler, unsullied by political ambition and polemics (Hefner 2000; Hilmy 2010; Menchik 2016). In their view, reforms such as decentralization and, especially, democratization steer the country further away from these aspirations and the realization of a complete Islamic revival.

The earliest sociologists – Durkheim, Marx and Weber – theorized that religion’s influence would wane and eventually disappear. Marx (1843) famously wrote it off as opiate to the people and expected the class-conscious hordes of workers worldwide to overcome whatever setback religion had inflicted upon them. In Weber’s words, religion would make way for a less enchanted and thus more rational and more intellectual modernity (Weber 1969:155). However, religion continues to engage a significant portion of the world's population, not only in sacred traditions and rituals but also in their mundane endeavors. Instead of ushering in an ever-secular and enlightened age, modernity has welcomed religion back – to some, it feels as though religion never really left. Religion and the traditional luggage attached to it are often the basis of political understanding or disagreement not only between the West and the rest of the world but also within nations, the United States being a prime example of deep-seated divides between evangelicals and the rest of the population. All this is to say that, for all the alarm bells tolled by Huntington (1996), Fukuyama (1992), and Lewis (1988), religion seems to have made a real comeback on the global political scene and is here to stay. Contrary to these theorists’ warnings, Islam, in particular, is not always warrior-centric and necessarily antithetical to democratic values, at least there was no evidence of it in this study. Perhaps, as many suggest, Indonesia is unique, in that its brand of Islam was imported not by the sword but by traders and a merchant class. It is no surprise that the
dominant theological strands of Indonesian Islam have always been perceived to be less restrictive and less conflict-oriented than the theological strands in the Middle East.

The results from Chapter 4 show that the “Church over Mosque” civic networks were almost always in minority-Muslim communities, while the “Mosque over church” networks (66% of the sample) were virtually all majority-Muslim communities. This indicates a clear religious separation by geographic location, which suggests that the characteristics of the civic culture in Indonesia is as much, if not more so, a broader story of religious minorities (challengers) versus dominant religious groups (incumbents) as it is about Islam and other religion specifically. This is not to say that the dominant religious bloc is a uniform and univocal community itself. In fact, the literature has ample evidence of the contrary. Over the last decade, the tone of the debates on Islam and Indonesia has changed considerably. This is obvious in the number of books and articles with “Islamism” in their title (see Menchik 2016; Hilmy 2010). The discourse has shifted considerably from how “Islam and democracy” would coexist to how those who promote “Islamism” and those supporting democracy would find a balance. Perhaps scholars have realized that the primary roadblock to democratic consolidation in Indonesia (and elsewhere) is not Islam itself but rather the religion’s most extremist followers who, by all accounts, constitute a minority.

5.2.3 Contributions

A major theme connecting the various chapters in this dissertation has been that community development and democratization depend on the same underlying mechanism of civic participation. This mechanism is evident in how community development requires individuals with a diverse set of concerns to activate their social capital. It is also evident in the social organization of civic life as networks of households and domains of public interests -- these interests are pursued
via bonding and bridging processes that support commitment and pluralism. The agenda of community development is best served from below by the bonding and bridging functions of citizens engaging in local civic networks. It requires protection from above in the form of a democratic and decentralized governance structure that brings the marginalized and the poor much closer to the decision-making process. This connection between civic action and community development has important implications for how a country attempts to complete its democratic transition and consolidation. These issues are important aspects of the broader debate on the compatibility of certain cultures and democratic values, especially Muslim-majority nations.

Under this general theme, the theoretical contributions of this dissertation include the need-resource framework in Chapter 2, as well as the connection of intensity and diversity of participation to bonding and bridging social capital in Chapter 3. First, from the need-resource framework in Chapter 2, I derived three plausible models of participatory development. These models can be used to test whether existing community development schemes are inclusive of the poor and marginalized. Need and resources are sociologically intuitive and flexible enough to capture socio-economic differences in a wide range of situations. This model also invites policymakers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities involved in the process of community-planning to prioritize modes of participation into their strategy for motivating local citizens and setting reasonable expectations. There has been significant progress in researchers' attempts to understand the determinants of citizens' engagement. Socio-economic resources tend to be good predictors of participation, but how social actors deploy these resources or combine them to participate is not always clear (Beard 2007; Beard and Das Gupta 2006). This need-resource approach frames participation as a practical decision whose orientation depends on
how the actor perceives the cost and benefits of participating at all, as well as the costs and benefits attached to specific modes of participation.

Second, by decomposing participation into two core dimensions – intensity and diversity – I was able to propose and articulate the analytical importance of two distinct but related characteristics of civic engagement – each corresponding to one of the key functions of social capital, respectively bonding and bridging. In the literature strands on the civic culture and social capital, the terms “deep” and “broad” commitment are used interchangeably or to refer to concepts that are poorly defined (Putnam 2000; Dalton and Welzel 2014). To resolve this issue, I made a clear distinction between “frequency of repeated interactions” and “diversity of interactions” – allowing me to replace the terms deep and broad with intensity and diversity. Diverse participation is more intuitive than broad participation since diversity of engagement is a vital conduit to social integration and pluralism. Diverse participation across multiple domains signals the existence of a more vibrant civic culture where a plurality of interests and citizens of various social backgrounds are welcome. Several authors had previously hinted at this connection between participation and social capital (Woolcock 1998; Putnam 2000; Portes 1998), but the framework in Chapter 3 made the link explicit.

Chapter 3 also contains a first attempt to categorize civic actors based on how intensely and diversely they participate. The communitarian theorists have provided us with a vocabulary to describe civic cultures – Almond and Verba (1963) gave us “allegiant Vs. assertive citizens” (see also Dalton and Welzel 2014), Inglehart (1977) proposed the now famous “materialist vs. post-materialist” lexicon. While theoretically innovative and empirically useful, neither of these typologies helps us describe the civic culture in terms of the social actors involved and their interactions with one another. Both Almond and Verba’s (1963) and Inglehart’s (1977) typologies
describe the relationship between citizens and the state – they are more concerned with purely political identities. What of the less politicized aspects of the civic culture, the ones that fall closer to the private sphere but are still public? My approach may be more straightforward, but it accepts both political and nonpolitical civic participation, and unlike the previous typologies it focuses on the deployment of bonding and bridging social capital in networks – it is citizen-centered. The four civic types (Passivist, Zealot, Dabbler, and Generalist) are defined at the micro level but may be used to describe an overall civic culture as well as individuals.

Besides being a significant theoretical contribution, this intensity-diversity framework also allowed for a methodologically innovative way of measuring participation. While most measures of participation consist of cumbersome scales and aggregated indices, the intensity-diversity approach reduced multi-item metrics to two simple and intuitive measures. Also, this was the first formal measure of diversity of participation to date, a concept many allude to but whose assessment has been neglected. The measure for diversity is practical because, instead of a simple count of memberships, it relies on Shannon’s entropy index, which accounts for evenness in the distribution of memberships across civic domains (Shannon 1948; Reardon and Firebaugh 2002). This helps reduce measurement biases that would likely occur due to overcrowding in some domains versus the unpopularity of some others. While these measures of intensity and diversity were used in Chapter 3 to account for “doing,” they may also be used to measure “giving.” This neatly links the intensity and diversity approach to the need-resource framework of giving and doing in Chapter 2.
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

While we knew how much money households contributed to activities related to infrastructure within a year, we know neither the frequency with which these contributions were made nor whether they were representative of contributions in other civic domains. Poverty reduction is one of the most significant challenges facing the Indonesian government in the next decade or so, and local authorities will need to understand better how citizens engage by giving. Another notable omission in the PNPM survey is more accurate information on faith and religious habits. There currently lacks a question on whether or not the head of household actually believes in God or has a faith. As it stands, the question on record asks the household if he/she is a Muslim or other. It is likely that asking such a question is problematic in a society where not believing or not subscribing to a major world religion may be severely frowned upon. Also, there was no information on how often the household head or other household members attended the masjid in the mosque or another service if non-Muslim. It is unclear whether future waves of the PNPM survey will include this information, but future studies that can help clarify these issues would advance the state of knowledge on participation in developing nations in important ways.

Another glaringly missing piece here is the role of the clergy, particularly the Imam, in local affairs. With religion being such a central aspect of people’s lives, religious leaders may find themselves tending to extra-religious issues ranging from counseling to community-planning. Yet, the clergy is absent from the accounts provided here because the survey was administered to the village chief but not religious leaders. Authors like Kuran (2011) have shown that Muslim clerics tend to be unsympathetic to pro-social initiatives. However, these analyses focus on Middle-Eastern countries and are not necessarily applicable to Indonesia where Islam’s expressions are
notably different. Future accounts of civic life that can incorporate details on how clerics affect the organization of civic life in Indonesia would be an important contribution.

One of the primary limitations of this dissertation is that it focuses on households’ participation in community development initiatives, but we have no information on the outcome of these collective action arrangements. We often assume that collective action will improve living standards, but outcome measures are often lacking. An important piece of the puzzle of participation, in Indonesia and elsewhere, is how pro-social endeavors affect the life chances of local citizens. Although increased “citizen participation” is often cited as the main objective of decentralization and other government reforms, it is not always clear how these initiatives impact the quality of life of participants. The 2007 PNPM survey, unfortunately, lacked this kind of information. Although not every project will bear results that are easily measurable, the unavailability of progress markers is often tied to limited evaluation, which is one of the most important tools in policy (Boehmer 2016; Mansuri and Rao 2004). Future data collections on participation in Indonesia would fill an important gap by documenting the impact of communal initiatives. Even better, future studies could collect information on formal NGOs as well and document their impact on the local efforts to provide goods and services. The term NGO was rarely used under Suharto’s regime for fear that the state would interpret “non-governmental” to mean anti-government. As a result, the NGO sector lay dormant for the most part and did not find its footing until after the reforms. Yet, few studies have comprehensively followed that resurgence, and the existing reports are in the form of government briefs (see Scanlon and Alawiyah 2015) and tend to lack a causal analysis or a thorough network approach to map out the organizational field and its logic.
Another limitation lies in the fact that this study relied on data for non-political civic behaviors. While the village level portion of the survey includes “political parties” as a civic domain, the PNPM Generasi survey lacks information on voting habits, how often Indonesians petition the local government, or how they organize local political campaigns. An account of Indonesia’s civic culture remains incomplete without data on political behaviors. An important research question is whether the position of Islam in a purely political network differs from its position in a non-political civic network. In communities with more politically oriented or radical Muslim voices, do Muslims participate more overall? Is their participation restricted to the political realm or do they participate quite diversely in non-political issues as well? Future studies should address these important questions with data that include both urban and rural communities.

Also, the PNPM survey was exclusively designed for rural communities. Beard (2007) found that participation rates in rural areas may be different from patterns in urban areas. Every chapter in this dissertation would have benefited from a rural-urban comparison. For instance, the framework in Chapter 4 does not account for place-based variations in civic activities and also constraints imposed by the environment or local markets. Civic networks may look very different in a big city like Jakarta for example, and Islam’s role in those networks may also change where there are usually younger and more educated individuals with slightly different value systems than individuals in rural areas. Also, because the geographic location of the communities is unknown, it was impossible to compare different regions and towns based on economic performances, poverty and literacy rates, industrialization and infrastructure levels. The need-resource and intensity-diversity frameworks in Chapters 2 and 3, for instance, could also be more useful with data that provide richer information on the households’ geographic location. In 2010, the World Bank research team added an urban portion to the ongoing PNPM survey (PNPM-Urban). In future
research, I will examine what the models tested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation reveal regarding the trends of civic participation in urban settings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.


APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CHAPTER 3

In nearly 15% of the observations, household members failed to attend any meeting in any domain. Below is a brief description of these households that were left out of the analysis because they did not participate in anything at all. Their characteristics are listed below.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics for the non-participants (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age (head)</th>
<th>Household size</th>
<th>Household assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for the non-participants (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent with no education</th>
<th>Percent with only primary education</th>
<th>Percent with junior high education</th>
<th>Percent with senior high education</th>
<th>Percent with university degree</th>
<th>Percent employed</th>
<th>Percent Muslim</th>
<th>Percent female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.2 %</td>
<td>67.8 %</td>
<td>10.9 %</td>
<td>7.9 %</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
<td>92.3 %</td>
<td>83 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. Number meetings attended in the last 90 days (overall participation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic domain</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.80 (5.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.36 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.37 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and leisure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01 (0.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A4. Generalized Poisson regression models predicting total participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>y = Total number of meetings attended</th>
<th>All civic domains included</th>
<th>Religious domain excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>0.015 **</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
<td>-0.022 **</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
<td>-0.017 ***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>-0.007 ***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Need indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>0.031 ***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>-0.017 ***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim head</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>-0.037 *</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participates in faith-based association</td>
<td>0.321 ***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of participation</td>
<td>0.930 ***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of participation</td>
<td>0.033 ***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>0.045 ***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minority, head</td>
<td>0.029 ***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>0.020 *</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
<td>0.023 ***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>-0.006 ***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>-0.007 ***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.491 ***</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-62216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18438</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>124638.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
## APPENDIX B: MULTICOLLINEARITY REPORT FOR CHAPTER 3

Table B1. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for Table 3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity Model 1: All civic domains included</th>
<th>1a. Logit portion</th>
<th>1b. Gamma portion (y &gt; 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIF</td>
<td>VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>3.3302</td>
<td>1.2301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging</td>
<td>3.8087</td>
<td>2.9025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>2.0251</td>
<td>3.7425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>1.5688</td>
<td>1.4292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>2.0251</td>
<td>1.9456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
<td>1.5873</td>
<td>1.5922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>1.1816</td>
<td>1.1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
<td>1.2301</td>
<td>1.2319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
<td>1.3609</td>
<td>1.3814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>1.6063</td>
<td>1.6456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
<td>1.1787</td>
<td>1.1412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
<td>1.4692</td>
<td>1.4989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of participation</td>
<td>1.0760</td>
<td>1.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>1.1821</td>
<td>1.1404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
<td>1.0150</td>
<td>1.0155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>1.3846</td>
<td>1.4495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>1.0329</td>
<td>1.0380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
<td>1.5534</td>
<td>1.6123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>1.2098</td>
<td>1.1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>1.2557</td>
<td>1.2513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>1.1836</td>
<td>1.1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>1.0794</td>
<td>1.0933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B2. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for Table 3.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity Model 2: Excluding faith-based organizations</th>
<th>2a. Logit portion</th>
<th>2b. Gamma portion (y &gt; 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurdle model with Y = Shannon’s entropy index</td>
<td>VIF</td>
<td>VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>3.3302</td>
<td>3.5481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging</td>
<td>3.8087</td>
<td>3.0183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>3.9326</td>
<td>3.0058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>1.5688</td>
<td>1.3477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>2.0251</td>
<td>1.9032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
<td>1.5873</td>
<td>1.6122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>1.1816</td>
<td>1.2262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
<td>1.2301</td>
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<td>High per capita expenditures</td>
<td>1.3609</td>
<td>1.4091</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.6063</td>
<td>1.6855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.2098</td>
<td>1.1814</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
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<td>1.2464</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>1.1836</td>
<td>1.1649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>1.0794</td>
<td>1.1081</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table B3. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for Table 3.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity models</th>
<th>Model 43: All domains</th>
<th>Model 4: Religious domain excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIF</td>
<td>VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Poisson model with Y = max. number of meetings within a single civic domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>3.3301</td>
<td>3.3301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging</td>
<td>3.5824</td>
<td>3.6824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belonging * Muslim-majority village</td>
<td>3.7389</td>
<td>2.9389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education, household head</td>
<td>1.5689</td>
<td>1.5689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education, household head</td>
<td>2.0252</td>
<td>2.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high, household head</td>
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<td>1.5873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, household head</td>
<td>1.1816</td>
<td>1.1816</td>
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<td>Low per capita expenditures</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Household assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed head</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receives direct cash assistance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of participation</td>
<td>1.1337</td>
<td>1.1337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>1.1821</td>
<td>1.1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated in last 12 months, head</td>
<td>1.0150</td>
<td>1.0150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>1.3843</td>
<td>1.3843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
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<td>1.0329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community population size</td>
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<td>1.5516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.2097</td>
</tr>
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<td>Household size</td>
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<td>1.2558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to community leaders</td>
<td>1.1863</td>
<td>1.1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic distress (village)</td>
<td>1.0796</td>
<td>1.0796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM THE PNPM SAMPLE

This appendix contains additional descriptive statistics to complement the tables and figures used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Figure C1. Distribution of household assets by religious affiliation
Figure C2. Participation rates by mode of participation and religious affiliation.
Figure C3. Percentage of Muslim households per village

Mean = 76
SD = 40.2

Figure C4. Diversity of participation (Shannon’s H)

Mean = 0.36
Median = 0.12
SD = 0.4
Figure C5. Intensity of participation (maximum number of meetings attended in a single domain)

Intensity of Participation
Total number of meetings attended across all domains

Frequency

Mean = 8.76
Median = 8
SD = 10.4

Figure C6. Distribution of total participation (total number of meetings in all domains)

Mean = 9.7
Median = 6.0
SD = 13.2
VITA

Raphael Mondesir

EDUCATION


Dissertation: Civic Participation in Indonesia: Islam, Community and Rural Development.

Committee: Katherine Stovel (Chair), Steven Pfaff, Nathalie Williams, and Stewart Tolnay

Major Exam: Economic Sociology and Organizations

Minor Exam: Quantitative methods

M.A. Sociology, University of Washington, 2010

Thesis: Race, Culture and Social Status: Residential Segregation among Foreign-born Blacks in the United States

Committee: Stewart Tolnay (Chair) and Avery Guest.

Certificate in Statistics, Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences (CSSS), University of Washington, 2010

Coursework:

- Research Methods in Demography
- Mathematics for the Social Sciences
- Research Methods in Epidemiology
- Professional Seminar in Epidemiology
- Structural Equation Models
- Analyzing Categorical Data
• Event History Analysis (Survival Models)
• Multilevel Modeling
• Statistical Analysis of Social Networks
• Visualizing Data

BS Economics (Honors), Salem State University, Salem MA, 2005

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Religion and Civil Society; NGOs; Community Development; Social Networks; Economic Sociology and Organizations; Quantitative methods.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

“To Give or to Do: A Closer Look at Participation in Community Development in Indonesia”; Pacific Sociological Association (PSA), Long Beach CA, 2018.

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS

Research assistant to Professor Charlotte Gill, George Mason University (2013 - 2014)

*Project:* Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth.

An innovative, community-led violence prevention initiative to reduce youth victimization and crime and to improve relations with youth, police and the community. The goal was to identify and holistically address the underlying, place-based causes of youth victimization and crime at five focus locations, “hotspots” in the Rainier Beach neighborhood through non-arrest interventions.
Designed survey instruments; Administered surveys to Rainier Beach residents; Analyzed and presented crime data to local audiences; Conducted focus groups and interviews with at-risk youths and their parents.

Center for Workforce Development (CWD)
(Summer 2012)

Project: Support for underrepresented students in STEM majors

CWD offers graduate student mentoring programs, professional seminars, and ethics training in science and engineering. CWD designs research projects and implements strategies to promote ethnic minorities and other underrepresented groups in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) at various colleges across the U.S.

Produced data for affiliated colleges; Communicated results to deans and provosts of those colleges; Analyzed and presented data related to admissions and graduation in STEM programs; Wrote technical reports.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Seattle Pacific University
Department of Sociology
Assistant Professor
(2014 – Present)

Courses taught:
• Introduction to Statistics
• Inequality, Power & Privilege
• Introduction to Sociology
• Interdisciplinary Writing
University of Washington
Department of Sociology
Lecturer
(2011 – 2015)

Courses taught:
- NGOs in the Global Aid System
- Social Problems
- Economic Sociology

University of Washington
English Department
Interdisciplinary Writing Program (IWP)
Lecturer
(2009 – 2011)

Courses taught:
- Writing Link for “Intro to Sociology”
- Writing Link for “Social Problems”

University of Washington
Department of Sociology
Interdisciplinary Writing Program (IWP)
Graduate Teaching Assistant
(2007 – 2016)

Courses taught:
- Sociology of Sexuality
- Public Schools in America
- Race and Ethnicity in America
• Sociological Theory
• Introduction to Sociology
• Intro to Law, Societies and Justice
• Deviance and Social Control

ADDITIONAL WORK EXPERIENCE

University of Washington
Sociology Writing Center
Writing Consultant
(2010 - 2013)

Provided writing/editing assistance to students; Facilitated writing and research workshops; Collaborated with other writing centers across campus to better serve the undergraduate population.

University of Washington
Odegaard Writing and Research Center
Writing Consultant
(2010 - 2013)

Provided writing/editing assistance to students; Developed research workshops; Facilitated writing and research workshops; Planned outreach strategies; Trained other writing tutors.

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Basic: HTML, Adobe products suite, CSS, C++
Intermediate: Sweave, Markdown, LaTeX, RMarkdown
Advanced: R, SPSS, STATA
LANGUAGES

ENGLISH  Fluent
FRENCH  Native speaker
HAITIAN KREYOL  Native speaker
SPANISH  Basic conversation & vocabulary

SERVICE AND AFFILIATIONS

- American Sociological Association (ASA)  
  (2007 – present)

- Pacific Sociological Association (PSA)  
  (2016 – present)

- Associated Students of the University of Washington (ASUW)  
  (2007 – present)