

HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY *of* WASHINGTON



TASK FORCE

The Donald C. Hellmann Task Force Program



Making trans-Atlantic relations work for Europeans

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UNIVERSITY *of* WASHINGTON

Making Transatlantic Relations Work for Europeans

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

5G	Fifth-Generation Wireless
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defense
CECC	Congressional-Executive Commission on China
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFIUS	Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIH	Cyber Innovation Hub
COSCO	China Ocean Shipping Company
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation Program
DPQ	Defense Planning Review Questionnaire
DUIx	Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
East StratCom	East Strategic Communication Task Force
EC	European Commission
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Center
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDF	European Defense Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EU-CORD	European Christina Organization for Relief and Development
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUR	Euro
EWG	Executive Working Group
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
GCM	Global Compact on Migration
GCR	Global Compact for Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFR	Global Refugee Forum

HCoC	The Hague Code of Conduct
HSR	High-Speed Rail
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
INSTEX	Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges
IP	Intellectual Property
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Implementation Plan
NPT	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty
ORR	United States Office of Refugee Resettlement
PA	Palestinian Authority
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PoA	Program of Action
PPA	Port Authority of Piraeus
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
R&P	United States Reception and Placement Program
RA	Resettlement Agencies
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SRBM	Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
USD	United States Dollar
USRAP	United States Refugee Admissions Program
WR	World Relief
WTO	World Trade Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world"

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

For more than six decades, the transatlantic alliance has provided security and prosperity to the people of Europe and the United States. The United States and European Union's shared commitment to the most fundamental freedoms of mankind have contributed to the advancement of human rights, diplomacy, science, technology, and ultimately world peace and stability. The rule of law, democracy, human rights, and the free market economy are amongst the major principles that have solidified and established the powerful role that the West plays in the international community.

Today, however, the transatlantic alliance suffers from a sense of confusion and sometimes feels as though it stands on the brink of catastrophe. The EU's ability to navigate issues of ongoing proliferation of conflict, unprecedented challenges from other political actors, and uncertainty across all corners of the world test the Union's character and strength. Will it respond with the necessary determination and tenacity? The power of resilience in the twenty-first century foreign policy environment will enable the European Union to move its interests, position, and values forward. The transition to a multipolar world presents a threat to the liberal world order, but it also provides an opportunity for the EU to take leadership and responsibility to invest its money and time in the Union, and most importantly, for the European people.

This report sets out four broad areas in which cohesive action by the European Union can leverage the transatlantic alliance for the benefit of Europeans.

For decades, the European Union has relied on the United States and NATO for its territorial defense capabilities. Across the Atlantic, President Trump has undermined such mechanisms. However, the EU's ability to respond and become a credible and reliable security provider by implementing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects will result in greater resilience.

The EU cannot manage the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and North Africa alone. As these conflicts persists in the form of nuclear proliferation in Iran, uncontrolled irregular migration, and the Middle East Peace Process, an intensified diplomatic response with the U.S. will be necessary to create a durable solution.

Further east, the EU's relationship with China is increasingly focused on the deepening of trade and investment partnerships with the One Belt, One Road Initiative. However, access to the European market economy comes with considerable conditions that are tied to China's compliance with human rights and security and privacy standards.

Lastly, the foreign policy progress made by the European Union must not go unnoticed by citizens at home and abroad. Elements of Twitter diplomacy, civil misinterpretations and disinformation campaigns have created a rift in the transatlantic alliance. A communications and public relations strategy that promotes the interests of Europe's citizens and its foreign policy objectives can restore transparency and trust in the transatlantic alliance.

AUDREY ZHAO, EMMA YAMAMOTO

“A more credible European defence is essential for our internal and external security. More than ever, today, Europe needs to take greater responsibility for its own security.”

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

As relations with the United States continue to deteriorate and questions of American credibility proliferate more freely, it is time for Europe to look more critically at its autonomous defense capabilities. It is now within the EU's best interest to guarantee its own territorial defense. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a European defense capability that needs to be developed further. From the founding of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) at the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU should explore pursuing and implementing a more comprehensive strategy for European defense. PESCO and its projects should be harnessed in order to advance European defense strategies.

This chapter will recommend drafting a concrete new Headline Goal with the aim of moving towards realizing PESCO projects as a catalyst towards the creation of a permanent framework for European autonomous defense. Autonomy will be defined through the lens of responsibility, hedging, and emancipation. The overall recommendations of this chapter will center around the themes of efficiency and standardization in order to foster greater interoperability within the EU, as well as in cooperation with NATO, on issues that relate to European defense.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- *Directing the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) to draft a new Headline Goal to address enhancing PESCO projects in order to create an efficient and standardized framework managed by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) for autonomous European defense in **responsibility, hedging, and emancipation.***

1.1 | Creation of PESCO

In recent years, Member State leaders have publicly recognized the need for greater European defense capabilities outside of the U.S. and NATO framework. On September 26th, 2017, President Macron of France noted in his Sorbonne speech that Europe is confronted with a “two-fold” movement when it comes to security, including, the “gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States, and a long-term terrorist threat with the stated goal of splitting our [Europe’s] free societies.”¹ German Chancellor Angela Merkel echoed French President Macron in a speech to the European Parliament on November 13th, 2018, stating that Europe has “to work on a vision of one day creating a real true European army.”² While the term ‘European army’ is at times controversial, it most realistically refers to much higher level of military cooperation and integration between EU Member States.

The sentiments expressed by EU leaders also resonates within European public opinion. The 2017 Munich Security Conference report states that “75% of Europeans in six large states favor close cooperation between Europe’s national armies in the future”.³ These opinions, related to the apparent threat perception, correspond to recent increases in European defense spending across Europe. Defense spending trends analyzed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) categorizes Western Europe to include France, the UK, Germany, and Italy, and Central Europe to include Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.⁴ The most recent SIPRI analysis shows that between 2015-2016, defense spending increased, on average, by 2.5% in Europe. This upward trend continues in 2016-2017 with increased spending in Western Europe

¹ Marchand, Laurent. “Sorbonne Speech of Emmanuel Macron.” *Tout un Monde*. Initiative for Europe, Feb. 2019, Paris, Sorbonne University, international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html.

² “Debate on the Future of Europe: Opening Statement by Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor.” *Multimedia Centre*, European Parliament, 13 Nov. 2018, multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/debate-on-the-future-of-europe-opening-statement-by-angela-merkel-german-federal-chancellor-_I162933-V_rv.

³ Bunde, Tobias, et al. “More European, More Connected and More Capable: Building the European Armed Forces of the Future.” 2017. PDF, https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/EuropeanDefense_More%2520European%2520More%2520Connected%2520and%2520More%2520Capable.pdf.

⁴ Tian, Nan, et al. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016.” April 2017. PDF, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf.

by 1.7% (USD 245 billion) and 12% in Central Europe (USD 24.1 billion).⁵ When analyzing this trend, the statements by French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel reflect an upward shift in attention overall towards European defense capabilities.

Further encouragement of a more autonomous European defense capability can be found in the European Commission's projection of "a 22-fold increase in EU investment in defense spending" between the years 2021-2027.⁶ Of that, a EUR 13 million budget will be given to the European Defense Fund (EDF) over the same seven-year span. The EDF has the ability to allocate 30% rather than 20% of this additional funding towards Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects that are deemed "eligible" by the European Commission.⁷ As threat perceptions increase among European citizens and leaders, the realization of the need for autonomous defense becomes necessary. Due to this, Europeans are more willing to dedicate resources "to build [their] partners' capabilities and to guarantee Europe's safety."⁸

The ambition towards an increased autonomous defense mechanism is not a new phenomenon. This is evident through the evolution from the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The overarching framework of the CSDP lies in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in a series of articles. Of these, Article 42.7, otherwise known as the Defense Clause, deserves special attention because it allows member states to come to the aid of another EU country "that has become 'a victim of armed aggression on its territory.'"⁹ France requested the most recent invocation of Article

⁵ SIPRI. "World Military Spending: Increases in the USA and Europe, Decreases in Oil-Exporting Countries." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 24 Apr. 2017, www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2017/world-military-spending-increases-usa-and-europe.

⁶ European Commission. "EU Budget 2021-2027 Invests More and Better in External Action, Security and Defence." *EEAS-European External Action Service*, European Commission, 2 May 2018, eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/43885/eu-budget-2021-2027-invests-more-and-better-external-action-security-and-defence_fr.


⁷ Ibid.

⁸ European Union External Action Service. "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe." *EEAS-European External Action Service*, European External Action Service, June 2016, eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2SIF_MnTDizMXKa1rYnbpebxcjz5TQJ7xv1ZSww5p5365I41AYTrDVP00.

⁹ European Parliament. "Mutual Defence Clause: What the Requirement to Help Out Other Member States Means." *European Parliament*, European Parliament, 20 Jan. 2016,

42.7 during the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Numerous EU Member States, including the United Kingdom and Germany, responded to this incident by providing various forms of aid.¹⁰ The immediate engagement and deployment of assistance to counter direct threats demonstrates the potential for how the EU can be a responsive and united union, both politically and militarily. At this time, the scope of CSDP is relatively limited with only ten civilian missions, six military operations, and 4,000 personnel deployed to these projects.¹¹ What these missions lack, however, is the ability to achieve the defense aspirations that the EU needs, especially considering the transition in the transatlantic alliance in tandem with new emerging security threats, such as terrorism and organized crime. With increased European willingness to devote more resources to autonomous defense, PESCO has the ability to fill in shortcomings of the CSDP. As identified in Figure 1,¹² with 25 EU member states committed to this autonomous defense mechanism, the realization of PESCO's potential is gaining momentum.

Figure 1: Member States included in the PESCO Framework



www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20160119STO10518/mutual-defence-clause-what-the-requirement-to-help-other-member-states-means.

¹⁰ Anghel, Suzana Elena, and Carmen-Cristina Cirig. "Activation of Article 42(7) TEU France's Request for Assistance and Member States' Responses." 4 July 2016. PDF, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581408/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)581408_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581408/EPRS_BRI(2016)581408_EN.pdf).

¹¹ European Union External Action Service. "Military and Civilian Missions and Operations." *EEAS-European External Action Service*, European External Action Service, 3 May 2016, eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

¹² European Parliament. “Members of EU, NATO, and PESCO.” *European Parliament Research Service Blog*, European Parliament Research Service Blog, 15 May 2018, epthinktank.eu/2018/05/15/peace-and-security-in-2018-overview-of-eu-action-and-outlook-for-the-future/eu_nato_pesco/.

1.2 | Autonomy

To understand what is meant by more autonomous defense capabilities, the term “autonomous” must be addressed in the scope of this chapter. ‘Autonomous defense’ is defined by European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Security and Defense Editor, Daniel Fiott, as “the freedom *to* conduct missions and operations autonomously rather than the freedom *from* dependencies on the hegemon”.¹³

The development of European autonomous defense will allow the EU to build efficient capabilities that will enable increased efficiency through the standardization of equipment, procedures, training, and infrastructure. Standardization will increase interoperability between European military capabilities and reduce redundancies of existing procedures, regulations, and assets, which will allow for a more centralized European defense system that can move more decisively and cohesively in operations. In addition to responsibly coordinating increased European spending, the EU should also explore projects that can be implemented for greater efficiency in the medium term, such as the creation of a Military Schengen. This can be achieved through the standardization of regulations; technical infrastructure requirements; and equipment and training, as well as the encouragement of innovation through EU funded defense research and development. At that point, the EU will have the ability to explore the establishment of an EU military force.

Autonomy in these capacities will be a European pursuit. It will be essential to the development of European capabilities that will in the short, medium, and long-term increase European defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the creation of European defense allows for greater security in the international system as it will elevate Europe’s ability to contribute more to burden sharing. Specifically, for the transatlantic relationship, the development of European autonomy will be complementary to NATO capabilities through the creation of a more reliable and effective European partner.

¹³ Fiott, Daniel. “Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence.” November 2018. PDF, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012__Strategic%20Autonomy.pdf.

Autonomy will be explored through the lens of responsibility, hedging, and emancipation as defined by European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Security and Defense Editor Daniel Fiott. Responsibility is defined in the scope of this section as “a European recognition of the need to do more on security and defense”.¹⁴ It is also the least ambitious form of autonomy.

If responsibility is about understanding that Europe must do more in security and defense, then hedging is “a sort of *insurance policy* that guards against a deterioration in relations between two actors and/or should the hegemon cease to provide security to the hedging actor”.¹⁵ In this case, the two actors are the EU, the United States, and by extension, NATO. Hedging is the medium form of ambition in terms of autonomy. Emancipation is the complete reliance of the EU on the capabilities provided and owned by European states. This is the most ambitious level of autonomy as implementation would encompass complete independence in defense from other powers.

1.3 | Responsibility

Within the EU, each member state has its own independent deployment and procurement procedures, which makes it difficult to standardize a unified defense capability. In order to respond to this, organizing EU Member States into groupings based on military capability and specialization while implementing a top-down EU managed standardized defense procurement will be necessary. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) can be used to audit and standardize military assets, equipment, and personnel, thereby streamlining procurement and defense processes for future PESCO projects.

The European Union is embarking on what NATO for years could not make it do—increase defense spending. By 2024, Europe has the ability to have as much as EUR 123 billion of

¹⁴ Ibid.


¹⁵ Ibid.

additional funds available for defense spending by increasing current defense spending by 26%.¹⁶ This budget will be supplemented by the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF), which is slated to be established in 2020 with a EUR 10.5 billion budget over seven years.¹⁷ The EPF will be used to fund the cost of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operations, contribute to the financing of operations led by third states, and engage in operations to support partner countries' armed forces.¹⁸ The purpose of the EPF is to allow the CSDP to act more nimbly in terms of speed of deployment and financing of operations.

Standardized Procurement

As Europe will soon have a large amount of capital available through defense budget increases, it is in the EU's best interest to identify a means of efficient procurement. In the EU framework, procurement of military capabilities is a difficult and coordinated effort that requires responsible planning. To hypothetically purchase all the equipment needed for a mission like Operation Unified Protector (Libya 2011), Europe would need to spend around 1.3 years (in

Figure 2: Total Required Equipment Investment to Procure Equipment for Unified Protector (USD billions)



GDP terms) of its total 2024 defense equipment spending to purchase the 670 weapons systems used.¹⁹ In Figure 2, all the different weapons used in Unified Protector, Atalanta, and Enhanced Forward Presence are visualized.

¹⁶ Bunde, Tobias, et al., "More European, More Connected and More Capable: Building the European Armed Forces of the Future," 2017.


¹⁷ European Union External Action Service. "New European Peace Facility Worth €10.5 Billion to Bolster International Security," *EEAS - European External Action Service*, 13 June 2018, eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46331/new-european-peace-facility-worth-€105-billion-bolster-international-security_en.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bunde, Tobias, et al., "More European, More Connected and More Capable: Building the European Armed Forces of the Future," 2017.

Europe can save 30%, or USD 15 billion on equipment investment if it engages in joint procurement.²⁰ Joint procurement will also lend itself to increasing interoperability, standardized training, and standardized maintenance. Currently, Europe has six times higher diversity in weapons systems in comparison to the United States.²¹ The U.S. uses 30 different

Figure 3: Number of Weapons Systems: U.S. vs. EU



weapons systems, whereas Europe has a total of 178 different types.²² Additionally, “the EU has 19 types of armoured infantry fighting vehicle while the United States has one”.²³ Figure 3²⁴ illustrates all of Europe’s different weapons systems. Having so many different types of weapons systems creates redundancies in training, procedures, and equipment. It is in the interest of the EU to consolidate these systems in order to create more cohesion and efficiency in European defense.

Building effective defense capabilities is a long-term investment that requires careful planning in order to keep up with replenishing stock; this will require a consolidated European defense industrial base. The success seen in the German-Norwegian submarine program that yielded identical submarines and joint training proves that it is possible for Europe to consolidate.²⁵

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Bunde, Tobias, et al. “Munich Security Report 2017: Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?”, *Munich: Munich Security Conference*, 2017, p. 21, <https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/>.

²³ Friede, Alexandra M., and Elena Lazarou. “Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO): Beyond establishment.” *European Parliament Think Tank*, March 2018, PDF, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2018\)614739](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)614739).

²⁴ Bunde, Tobias, et al., “More European, More Connected and More Capable: Building the European Armed Forces of the Future,” 2017.

²⁵ Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO. “Germany Chosen as Strategic Partner for New Submarines to Norway.” *Norgesportalen*, www.norway.no/en/missions/nato/norway-nato/news-events-statements/news2/germany-chosen-as-strategic-partner-for-new-submarines-to-norway/.

A top-down approach should be created in order to manage procurement. Since there are 28 Member States, each state should be sorted into military and political groupings that reflect state defense capability objectives and defense specializations. This sorting will enable individual states and the European Union to define where they wish to streamline processes. Next, systems and standards should be normalized across military assets in order to remove the factor of each country favoring its own national manufacturer; this will also increase interoperability between assets. After these two steps are undertaken, the EU should examine suppliers in order to determine capabilities. These capabilities will suggest the types of incentives suppliers would need and what the EU can offer in order to collaborate under this new top-down approach to procurement. Consolidation of suppliers should also be explored at this stage. Throughout this process, states should be sharing resources, operations, maintenance, and training. It is important to note at this point that an increase in European spending is a pivot away from an unprecedented era of continued stagnation in defense spending. There is a possibility that this increase is a reaction to increasingly chaotic political climates. Regardless of its cause, however, it is important to utilize these additional resources effectively and efficiently.

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) can manage this process. Currently, CARD's mandate is to audit PESCO member states' military assets, including, personnel, equipment, and operational capabilities to foster cooperation and prevent duplication of member state assets. CARD assesses the three legally binding commitments that each signatory member state commits to: the regulation of defence budgets, the obligation to increase defence investments, and the obligation to increase joint and collaborative implementation projects.²⁶ Each member state has an individualized National Implementation Plan (NIP), which is used to guide member state fulfillment of these goals.²⁷ This is then presented to the EU High Representative to be

²⁶ European Council. "Council Decision Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States." 8 Dec. 2017. PDF, www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32000/st14866en17.pdf.

²⁷ European Union External Action Service. "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - Factsheet." 19 Nov. 2018. PDF, https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/wM5QZfoVgVbC4zSzD-u--4o8E9TqYoThT3aNfAC6TQA/mtime:1542983709/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_november_2018_en_0.pdf.

shared with the EU Council.²⁸ Though CARD remains in its trial and development stage, it could act as the future backbone of PESCO projects because it ensures that commitments are being met amongst member states and transparency is maintained. In order to streamline procurement and defense procedures, CARD should be implemented as a way to communicate the standards of PESCO projects. If implemented effectively, CARD could serve as the direct planning and organization center of all EU military capabilities, thereby serving as the efficiency auditor of EU defense capabilities. As all of the recommendations in this chapter are connected to creating efficiency and standardization in EU defense capabilities, CARD will implicitly be the force coordinating these efforts.

1.4 | Hedging

PESCO should be used to strategically implement and hedge against doubts regarding American reliability for NATO and European defense. Strategic hedging is not a complete pullback from the United States—it simply means the EU will be able to engage in economic and diplomatic terms with the United States while continuing to evaluate and focus on improving capabilities in domains that will be adversely affected if the United States gradually retreats from Europe. PESCO is the perfect framework to start the process of implementing a greater European strategy towards autonomy because it is a series of projects that have already been identified as essential to European defense by EU member states. Additionally, each of these projects is member state led, meaning that the delegation of project leadership has already been established.

Successfully implementing PESCO is more than just completing projects. Achieving PESCO projects means achieving more manageable goals that all culminate in the creation of a lasting and standardized structure for coordinating European territorial defense and strategic deployment to regions of concern. A standardization of equipment and procedures will allow for easier deployment, maintenance, and interoperability between states. Figure 4 shows the

²⁸ Ibid.

different standardization that will occur across EU defense capabilities with the implementation of PESCO projects. Military Mobility is specifically placed in the ‘OTHER’ row, as it is a catalyst and beneficiary for standardization in equipment and training.

Military Mobility

Military Mobility is PESCO’s flagship project and the first to gain EU backing through the EU Commission’s Action Plan on Military Mobility. It is also a project that will not only strengthen Europe overall, but will also be

of specific interest to NATO through its standardization of regulations, technical infrastructure requirements, and equipment and training that will all culminate in a Military Schengen. The need for a Military Schengen is informed by the fact that the “transportation of military personnel and equipment within Europe is still subject to physical, legal and regulatory barriers”.²⁹ The implementation of PESCO’s Military Mobility project will address all of these ramifications, but in the scope of this chapter, technical upgrades will be explored further.

In the Action Plan on Military Mobility, the EU Commission proposed identifying gaps in technical requirements as they pertain to trans-European and military transport networks. The Action Plan calls for identifying infrastructure within the trans-European transportation network fit for military transport, as well as necessary upgrades that will need to be made. This will mean standardizing technical requirements in infrastructure across Europe in order to facilitate quick, efficient, and effective mobility.

Figure 4: PESCO Standardization

STANDARDIZATION	PESCO PROJECT
EQUIPMENT	TIGER MARK III Attack Helicopters, Eurodrone MALE RPAS, Counter Unmanned Aerial System, Integrated Unmanned Ground System, EU Beyond Line of Sight Missile System
TRAINING	European Union Training Mission Competence Center, European Training Certification Centre for European Armies, Helicopter Hot and High Training, Joint EU Intelligence School, EU Test and Evaluation Centers
OTHER	Military Mobility 

²⁹ Fiott, Daniel. “Towards a ‘military Schengen’?”. November 2017. PDF, <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/186be818-da3b-11e7-a506-01aa75ed71a1>.

Additionally, as part of the next long-term EU Budget 2021-2027, the European Commission will renew the Connecting Europe Facility.³⁰ EUR 6.5 billion of the EUR 42.3 billion Connecting Europe Facility Budget will be earmarked for the improvement of military mobility across Europe.³¹ A first progress report should be presented to the Member States by the summer of 2019 and coherence and synergies of this project will subsequently be discussed with NATO.³²

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President Federica Mogherini stated, “By facilitating military mobility within the EU, we can be more effective in preventing crises, more efficient in deploying our missions, and quicker in reacting when challenges arise. It will be another step in deepening our cooperation at EU level, also in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation we have formally launched recently, and with our partners, starting with NATO. For us, as EU, cooperation remains the only way to be effective in today's world.”³³

Military Mobility for Strategic Deployment and Territorial Defense

Military Mobility will help the EU more rapidly deploy troops such as the EU Battlegroups, which are multinational military units that allow the EU to “independently and rapidly respond to emerging conflicts and crises”.³⁴ Battlegroups are designed for “small-scale rapid response missions” and are able to sustain missions for 30 days with a possible extension to 120 days.³⁵ Additionally, Military Mobility will allow EU partners, such as NATO, to quickly move through Europe in their own missions. This is especially important as 22 of the 28 EU Member States are

³⁰ European Commission. “EU Budget: Commission Proposes Increased Funding to Invest in Connecting Europeans with High-Performance Infrastructure.” *European Union*, Publications Office of the European Union, 6 June 2018, [european.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4029_en.htm](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/e300042f-323d-4761-9907-010101010101_6_en.pdf).

³¹ Ibid.

³² European Commission. “Action Plan on Military Mobility: EU Takes Steps towards a Defence Union.” *European Union*, Publications Office of the European Union, 28 Mar. 2018, [european.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2521_en.htm](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/e300042f-323d-4761-9907-010101010101_6_en.pdf).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ European Union External Action Service. “EU Battlegroups.” 5 October 2017, PDF, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_battlegroups.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid.

NATO allies as well; for many EU Member States and the EU as a whole, NATO is still essential to territorial defense.

The Horn of Africa is a region that would benefit from more intensive EU deployment and support. Battlegroups may not be the right solution for this region as it is a more long-term security concern. The Horn of Africa is an example that illustrates the need for further exploration of a PESCO command structure, particularly as a means of coordinating and standardizing operational capabilities between PESCO member states and the United States.

Case Study: Horn of Africa

While engaged in highly demanding missions, the United States has faced challenges in the Horn of Africa due in part to its geographical distance. In contrast, Europe has successfully exerted its influence in the region by apprehending approximately 166 pirates, protecting hundreds of vessels, and increasing maritime surveillance operations. PESCO can serve as the EU's autonomous defense force in areas such as Somalia to alleviate U.S. involvement in Europe's backyard. This would address U.S. burden sharing concerns, and ultimately make security more efficient for both sides of the Atlantic.

Under the CSDP, the EU currently has three major operations in the Horn of Africa, the most notable of which is Operation Atalanta. Operation Atalanta began in 2008 and is approved by the European Council to continue until 2020. It currently maintains its objectives of ensuring maritime security and support of other EU and international organizations in the region. This operation is of primary interest to the United States because it not only safeguards the waters against piracy, but also secures the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. A blockage of this strait would result in economic concerns for European and American markets, as it would hinder the delivery of Persian Gulf goods, such as oil. With the EU Council's extension of Operation Atalanta only lasting until 2020, it is within the best interest of Europe and the United States to create a more permanent presence in areas of strategic importance. Discussion of a command structure will aid in the ability for PESCO operations to deploy more rapidly and provide EU partners such as the United States increased transparency when it comes to coordination and communication.

Though the EU does not currently possess the means to form a cohesive command structure, PESCO projects should be enhanced in order to provide a catalyst for the creation of one. The PESCO projects proposing a Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) would build upon not only the current EU

Battlegroups capability, but also allow the EU to contribute more actively in crisis response to natural disasters, pandemics, or civil emergencies.³⁶ Additionally, the EU can enhance other PESCO projects such as the Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations project that can also be used to enhance the existing EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). CARD, an existing EU structure, can also be used to coordinate and organize EU member state capabilities. The MPCC possesses a mandate to plan and conduct the EU's non-executive military missions while serving as the permanent command and control structure at the military strategic level within the EU Military Staff that is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS).³⁷ These existing frameworks should be consolidated in order to facilitate a standardized command structure that has the capability to manage extraterritorial deployment of EU troops to regions of security concern, such as the Horn of Africa.

Other extraterritorial concerns for the EU center around humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is a large priority for European states. In 2016, the EU gave 56.7% of the world total in humanitarian aid.³⁸ Collectively, EU countries give a large amount of aid in comparison to the size of their economies. By investing in the PESCO Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR CROC, the EU would be able to mobilize physical aid if it chooses alongside or instead of financial aid.

By unlocking the Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR CROC's full capability, the EU will unlock the capability of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as a command structure. The MPCC already manages three missions: EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, and EUTM RCA.³⁹ The EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic

³⁶ European Council. "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) updated list of PESCO projects – Overview – 19 November 2018." 19 November 2018, PDF, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37028/table-pesco-projects.pdf>.

³⁷ European Union External Action Service. "The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)." November 2018. PDF, https://cdn4eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/aGKF41zrLDLuNeg8csm24scxmjEwj4JBvrRbaLeaY4M/mtime:154265675/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ European Union External Action Service, "The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)," November 2018.

(EUTM RCA), was launched in 2016 and is concerned with reforming the security sector of the state.⁴⁰

The EUTM RCA mission in the Central African Republic has been in conjunction with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission.⁴¹ EUTM RCA centers around “three domains: strategic advice, training and education”.⁴² Strategic advice centers around creating major documents such as a National Defense Plan, as well as deployment planning.⁴³ EUTM RCA has also trained four deployable infantry battalions, three specialized forces, and has taught special education courses to 886 officers and non-commissioned officers.⁴⁴ Furthermore, EUTM RCA has also reintegrated 232 former rebels through the National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) program.⁴⁵

The MPCC is a proven structure with a number of successes and its scope should be further explored in order to better respond to ongoing areas of concern such as the Horn of Africa that require longer terms of deployment or military strategic planning. Currently, the MPCC possesses the mandate of planning all non-executive military CSDP missions and one executive CSDP mission of up to EU Battlegroup-size by the end of 2020.⁴⁶ The Horn of Africa is an area of continued conflict with piracy, and thus will require continued military force in order to safeguard the region and secure the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. Military strategic planning will be helpful in coordinating these actions, but will also be useful in the case of if EUTM mission headquarters are ever attacked as the EUTM Mali field headquarters was in March of 2016.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ European Union External Action Service. “About Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA).” *EEAS - European External Action Service*, 20 June 2016, eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-rca/3907/about-military-training-mission-central-african-republic-eutm-rca_en.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ European Union External Action Service, “The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),” November 2018.

⁴⁷ Tardy, Thierry. *MPCC: towards an EU Military Command?*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 7 June 2017, www.iss.europa.eu/content/mpcc-towards-eu-military-command.

Case Study: 2011 Libyan Civil War

The lack of adequate European autonomous defense capabilities was felt acutely during the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector. Unified Protector was a NATO-led enforcement of the Libya arms embargo and no-fly zone following the United Nation's call to "protect the Libyan people" after the Gaddafi regime began targeting civilians in the Libyan Civil War that broke out after the Arab Spring in February of 2011. The United States, under the Obama Administration joined Operation Unified Protector in March of 2011, however, with U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, prolonged engagement in Libya would not have been possible due to limited American resources. Operation Unified Protector, though declared a success with the toppling of the Gaddafi regime, demonstrated the failure of NATO and the EU to mount an effective follow-up mission of defense and security reform. Former Libyan Prime Minister, Ahmed Maiteeq spoke in 2016 stating that "[Libya] was a one-man show for 42 years. Once this man [Gaddafi] has gone away we did not get the right help from our friends and allies from the west and Britain". The lack of continued follow up on the part of the west resulted in a power vacuum filled by criminals, armed factions, and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thereby exacerbating security concerns for Europe.

Libya remains a security concern for Europe both because it remains a failed state and also because of concerns surrounding the migrant crisis, and specifically, trafficking and smuggling in the Mediterranean. The EU mission, Operation Sophia, continues to address European concerns regarding Libya through EU training of the Libyan navy, and EU contribution to the UN embargo off the coast of Libya. Given an expanded mandate, the Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR CROC could serve as the EU contribution to partner projects such as the UN embargo.

Sources: Carnegie Europe, European Union External Action Service, New York Times, The Financial Times, The Guardian

In a more radical angle, the Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR CROC managed by the MPCC can be deployed to Libya in order to respond to the aftermath of Operation Unified Protector. The MPCC would seek to stabilize Libya's security sector by stabilizing the country's weak central government that has failed to consolidate power in the aftermath of the Libyan Civil War. These are not necessarily capabilities that the EU does not have as it has participated in reforming parts of states in EUTM RCA and EUTM Somalia, as well as rebuilding operational capabilities in EUTM Mali.⁴⁸

The Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package and EUFOR CROC would allow the EU to act more effectively in rebuilding Libya's (or another country with similar geopolitical

⁴⁸ European Union External Action Service, "The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)," November 2018.

magnitude) security sector, with the ability to act with or without partners. Creating an effective crisis management mechanism will take many years, but it is in the EU's interests to do so. The EU should have the capability to act unilaterally if necessary, as occasionally European interests are unique from American interests, or even NATO or UN interests. Additionally, it is also in the interest of the EU's potential partners that the EU can learn to act autonomously in its own strategic deployment so that resources are not spread thin and the burden of maintaining the international order can be shared more equally across multilateral organizations.

All of the capabilities proposed for strategic deployment above should and can be used when not deployed extraterritorially for territorial defense, and if needed, assisting in NATO activities. An enhancement of European defense capabilities constitutes as beneficial not only to the EU as a whole, but also to its individual member states and in cooperation with NATO. Military Mobility will catalyze the EU to build a framework for quickly and efficiently moving its assets, but an increased European military presence will also require more spending on military assets and equipment. Military Mobility will create the need for a streamlined and efficient procurement program.

Research and Development

Standardizing procurement is the first step towards creating a lasting infrastructure for defense, but standardizing a procedure to source, discover, and encourage new research and development for military assets and equipment will ensure the future of European defense. The EU has already started offering grants through the EDF for collaborative research in "innovative defence technologies".⁴⁹ EUR 90 million has been set aside for research grants until the end of 2019 and EUR 500 million has been set-aside after 2020.⁵⁰ In addition, for development, EUR

⁴⁹ European Commission. "A European Defence Fund: €5.5 Billion per Year to Boost Europe's Defence Capabilities." *European Union*, Publications Office of the European Union, 7 June 2017, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

500 million has been set-aside for 2019-2020, while EUR 1 billion has been set aside for after 2020.⁵¹ The EDF has the potential of becoming an engine for future standardization of military equipment, as well as the innovation of the future. Though PESCO projects do not directly fall under the EDF mandate, it is still possible to receive funding through it, most likely towards PESCO's various equipment development projects aimed at standardizing capabilities across national militaries.

Procurement processes can be consolidated under a top-down management approach; however, defense innovation should be looked at through a bottom-up approach that encourages civilian-military cooperation. U.S. projects, such as the U.S. Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), and U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are organizations that rely on an "outside-in" approach to encouraging defense innovation.⁵² An equivalent to DIUx, which reaches out to startups individually to encourage and tackle innovation, is Germany's Bundeswehr Cyber Innovation Hub (CIH).⁵³ The CIH is mostly concerned with cyber technologies, whereas DIUx has funded companies within the realms of artificial intelligence, human systems, autonomy, information technology, and space.⁵⁴

Interoperability has been discussed in the course of this chapter in terms of Europe only, but it can also be applied to the United States. The U.S. and NATO both seek to prosper from increased transatlantic cooperation regarding defense capabilities and interoperability of systems. First, increased sharing of innovation would create similar technologies that would standardize training. Second, it would encourage dialogue and cooperation between the United States and Europe to coordinate technology sharing. Third, it would increase trust between Europe and the United States.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. "Cyber Innovation Hub." *BMVg.de*, BMVG, www.bmvg.de/de/themen/cybersicherheit/partnerschaften-zur-cybersicherheit/cyber-innovation-hub.

⁵⁴ "Accelerating Commercial Innovation for National Defense." *Defense Innovation Unit*, www.diu.mil/.

The U.S. should seek to help Europe set up a DARPA-like structure funded by the EDF. The first projects undertaken should be the PESCO projects, but then innovation should be encouraged through outreach either through a DARPA structure or a structure similar to DIUx or CIH. Targets should lie outside of traditional defense enterprises, such as within the realms of technology or academia in order to encourage breakthrough thinking.

1.5 | Emancipation

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President Federica Mogherini stated during the press conference after the Foreign Affairs Council on November 20, 2018, that, “...we probably would have not managed to do all of this in the European Union, if it was not for a strong support and the strong coordination with NATO. Some of the projects under PESCO - think of military mobility - also respond to NATO needs and priorities and it is not by chance that as we strengthened the EU defence work, we have also strengthened in an unprecedented way our cooperation with NATO”.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the EU has stated in their EU-NATO Cooperation Factsheet that “the security of EU and NATO are interconnected: not only are 22 EU Member States also NATO Allies; together, they can also mobilise a broad range of tools and make the most efficient use of resources to address those challenges and enhance the security of their citizens”.⁵⁶ Moving towards complete autarky in security and defense is currently not in line with European defense and security ambitions.

Nevertheless, in 2017, President of the EU, Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his State of the Union Address, “By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it. And NATO wants it”.⁵⁷ At its most radical, a European Defence Union would result in a ‘European Army’.

⁵⁵ “Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the Press Conference Following the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence).” *EEAS-European External Action Service*, 20 Nov. 2018, eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/54123/remarks-hrvp-federica-mogherini-press-conference-following-foreign-affairs-council-defence_en.

⁵⁶ European Union External Action Service. “EU-NATO Cooperation.” *EEAS – European External Action Service*, November 2018, PDF, https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/otambGc7_PZ7cDdMdQqQki4M3aTBlo6-efph8-K1vFI/mtime:1542899750/sites/eeas/files/eu-nato_cooperation_factsheet.pdf.

⁵⁷ “PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE JUNKER'S State of the Union Address 2017.” *European Commission Press Release Database*, European Commission, 13 Sept. 2017, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm.

The 'European Army' solution entails that Europe embark on a path towards developing the ability to operate completely outside the United States/NATO framework.

Emancipation would mean expanding current EU capabilities such as strategic deployment and highly technical military capabilities. Currently, the EU has the capacity to rapidly deploy EU Battlegroups, which as stated earlier, constitute short-term and small-scale missions.⁵⁸ EU member states already possess a wide array of capabilities, many of which are available to NATO. A movement in the direction of emancipation as autonomy would result in the deployment of these capabilities toward European defense as well as constitute an expansion on these capabilities for longer and more strategic deployments. Battlegroups were formed because "there is a genuine European way to resolving external conflicts and crises".⁵⁹ Because there is a 'European way,' there is a fundamental difference between Europe and the United States, as well as the United States-led NATO when it comes to defense. A fundamental difference in defense suggests different priorities, different capabilities, and different perspectives. These fundamental differences validate the creation of a European defense force that serves to safeguard European interests.

Credible European Nuclear Deterrence

Moving beyond the concept of a deployable strategic European force is the more contentious aspect of defense autonomy: credible nuclear deterrence for the purpose of territorial defense. With the exception of the UK and France, Europe has always relied entirely on the United States for its credible nuclear deterrent capabilities within NATO, as opposed to maintaining its own nuclear capabilities. This is a direct result of NATO's nuclear policy; NATO's Article 5 provision, which provides protection to any NATO ally that comes under attack; as well as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the only "binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by nuclear-weapon States".⁶⁰

⁵⁸ European Union External Action Service, "EU Battlegroups," 5 October 2017.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ United Nations. "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA." *United Nations*, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

However, recent events such as statements made by American President, Donald Trump, Brexit, and the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) have made the question of a credible European nuclear deterrent more relevant and pressing. President Trump has made statements that seem to call Article 5 into question, such as, “if they fulfill their obligations to us the answer is yes”⁶¹ regarding if the U.S. would come to the aid of European countries given a Russian attack on the eve of his Republican nomination for president and that the U.S. could “go [our] own way”⁶² at the NATO summit in July of 2018. A Pew Research Center poll cited in the most recent Munich Security Conference Report that only 10% of Germans are confident that Trump will “do the right thing regarding world affairs”.⁶³ French and German citizens both have better faith in Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping than they do in President Trump.⁶⁴ Doubts surrounding American dedication to NATO, the end of the INF Treaty, as well as the imminent expiration date of the New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia set for July 2021 set the stage for the 2019 Munich Security Conference held February 15-17, 2019, where discussion centered almost completely on what Europe would do without guaranteed American defense support.

The United Kingdom is currently “only one of two member states possessing a ‘full spectrum’ of military capabilities (including a nuclear deterrent)”.⁶⁵ In 2018, the UK funded 16% (EUR 328 million) of the EU’s entire defense budget.⁶⁶ Despite this, “UK engagement in CSDP missions has been relatively modest in comparison to its defence capabilities,” contributing “just 2.3% of

⁶¹ Sanger, David E, and Maggie Haberman. “Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies Against Attack.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 20 July 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html?_r=0.

⁶² Herszenhorn, David M, and Lili Bayer. “Trump’s Whiplash NATO Summit.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 12 July 2018, www.politico.eu/article/trump-threatens-to-pull-out-of-nato/.

⁶³ Dempsey, Judy. “The European Blame Game.” *Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 15 Feb. 2019, carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/78372.

⁶⁴ Bunde, Tobias, et al. “Munich Security Report 2019: The Great Puzzle: Who Will Pick Up the Pieces?.” 2019, PDF, <https://www.securityconference.de/en/publications/munich-security-report/munich-security-report-2019/>.

⁶⁵ Institute for Government. “UK–EU Defence and Security Cooperation after Brexit.” *The Institute for Government*, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/uk-eu-defence-and-security-cooperation.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

total member state personnel contributions across all CSDP mission”.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is a significant contributor to the EU and Brexit has increased anxieties regarding the future of the Union’s integrity and security.

The United Kingdom and France have both signed the 2010 Lancaster House Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, which states in the preamble that any threats to each states’ “vital interests” would constitute a threat to both.⁶⁸ As the two current powers within the European Union that possess nuclear capabilities, this cements each state’s commitment to the other, and implicitly, despite Brexit, the UK’s commitment to the EU through a possible evocation of Article 42, which would induce the UK to act in protection of other EU member states. Despite this possible cooperation, the credibility of the indirect and conditional nature of the Lancaster House Nuclear Cooperation Treaty calls into question its ability to act as a credible deterrent. Therefore, it is imperative that the EU continues to explore other means of developing a European nuclear deterrent that does not rely so much on caveats.

To solve the conditionality problem of including the UK in a future nuclear deterrent program, Europe can build its nuclear arsenal around French nuclear capabilities. France has always been secretive regarding its nuclear program, but maintains an estimated range of 200⁶⁹ to 300⁷⁰ nuclear weapons. If France possesses 300 nuclear weapons, this would place it as the third largest nuclear power in the world.⁷¹ This number shrinks in comparison to the United States’ arsenal of an estimate of over 4,600 weapons, but perceived intent is still the key term. France maintains the ability to potentially increase its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the future should the political climate change or autonomous capabilities through PESCO are increased.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Rapnouil, Manuel Lafont, et al. “Can Europe Become a Nuclear Power?” *European Council on Foreign Relations*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 3 Sept. 1970, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_can_europe_become_a_nuclear_power.

⁶⁹ “Nuclear Disarmament France.” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2 Jan. 2019, www.nti.org/analysis/articles/france-nuclear-disarmament/.

⁷⁰ Trippe, Christian. “Could France Take the Lead in Europe’s Nuclear Security?.” *DW.COM*, Deutsche Welle, 16 Feb. 2019, www.dw.com/en/could-france-take-the-lead-in-europes-nuclear-security/a-47549878.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Regardless of a future nuclear program plan, be it with the UK and France together, or France alone, Europe possesses the capability to develop a credible nuclear deterrent. Despite potential French and UK cooperation, the EU should explore more seriously the path of developing French nuclear capabilities alone. As of the most recent 2019 Munich Security Conference, Former German Ambassador to the United States, and current Director of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, stated, “the Community must increasingly be able to defend on its own the citizens, territory, and external borders”.⁷² Ischinger also suggested a European nuclear deterrent centered around French nuclear capabilities funded by other EU member states. This may sound outlandish, but in 2007, when discussion over nuclear deterrence was not as prevalent as today, former president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, offered Germany participation in its nuclear capabilities on the condition that Germany contribute financially.⁷³ Germany declined then, but the political climate now, more than 10 years later, may render a different response. Developing this system will result in greater European control of not only its own nuclear deterrent capabilities, but also its credibility in seriously defending the European region.

1.6 | The Path Forward

The European Union has reached an impasse in which it should reevaluate its investment into its own territorial defense. It has recognized the need to have defense capabilities and has started implementing hedging mechanisms that will be beneficial for its own defense capabilities, as well as those of its partners. PESCO should press ahead with projects that will allow Europe to develop the framework to plan and conduct missions in the name of European defense. Europe currently lacks many critical capabilities, in part because it has relied on the United States to defend it. However, after the outcome of the Western Balkans conflict in the 1990s, the Libya bombings in 2011, and most recently, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it is

⁷² “Frankreichs Atomwaffen Sollen EU Schützen.” *n-Tv.de*, n-Tv NACHRICHTEN, 9 Feb. 2019, www.n-tv.de/politik/Frankreichs-Atomwaffen-sollen-EU-schuetzen-article20850074.html.

⁷³ Trippe, Christian, “Could France Take the Lead in Europe's Nuclear Security?,” 16 Feb. 2019.

increasingly apparent that it is a matter of responsibility that Europe is able to develop a better system of defense capabilities.

The Franco-British Joint Declaration adopted at Saint-Malo on December 1998 stated, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.⁷⁴ The Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 was a document expanding on the statements at Saint-Malo and called for the Headline Goal of 2003:

By the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, [EU Member States] will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty [Petersberg-tasks], including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.
(Helsinki Annex IV)⁷⁵

In 2004, after the reaching of the goals of the Headline Goal of 2003, the EU set a Headline Goal of 2010 with the objectives:

Be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union [i.e. the Petersberg-

⁷⁴ “Franco–British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998).” *Franco–British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)*, CVCE.eu by Uni.lu, www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.

⁷⁵ European Union External Action Service. “Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy.” *EEAS - European External Action Service*, 8 July 2016, eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en.

tasks] ...the EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.⁷⁶

With this Headline Goal, the EU implemented the Battlegroup project that was first proposed in 2004 and was discussed earlier in this section.⁷⁷ To this day, Battlegroups have never been deployed, and a new Headline Goal has not been created since 2010.

A new Headline Goal should be created in order to account for the EU's progress in its movement towards autonomous defense. Given developments in new structures, the Headline Goal should specifically address the need to enhance PESCO projects to the point in which a framework for European defense will be needed to manage the EU's defense capabilities.

In the name of the transatlantic partnership, it is in both the EU and the United States' interests for the EU to build its own defense capabilities. Realistically, the possibility of a 'European Army' is beyond the current EU strategy, both in legal framework and public stance, however, it has become apparent that it is no longer in anyone's interest that Europe remains dormant defensively. Thus, Europe must move towards creating its own autonomous defense capabilities in order to increase burden sharing and safeguard its own territories in an efficient and effective manner.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

Directing the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) to draft a new Headline Goal to address enhancing PESCO projects in order to create an efficient and standardized framework managed by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) for autonomous European defense with the following parameters:

Responsibility:

- *Organize EU Member States into groupings based on military capability and specialization to implement top-down EU managed standardized defense procurement culminating in standardized equipment, training, and procedures.*
- *Convene yearly CARD to assess member state military assets and capabilities to direct military planning.*

Hedging:

- *Continue implementation of Action Plan on Military Mobility.*
- *Implement and integrate CARD, Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), and other existing EU and PESCO project structures in order to realize a robust European military command structure for the purpose of managing executive and non-executive strategic deployment, both long and short-term, as well as coordinating territorial defense.*
- *Test effectiveness of EU Battlegroups to inform long-term plan for strategic deployment.*
- *Invite EU Member States to engage in joint research and development.*
- *Commence dialogue with the United States on collaboration in innovation and interoperability efforts.*

Emancipation:

- *Move towards continued development of EU autonomous capabilities in order to realize full spectrum military capabilities to establish Europe as a credible military force capable of territorial defense and extraterritorial activities.*
- *Move towards creation of European nuclear program overseen by CARD, operated by France, but funded by other EU member states to establish a credible nuclear deterrent.*

CHAPTER 2 | FOSTERING U.S. – EU COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The European Union continues to build its relationships with Middle Eastern countries and seeks to encourage political and economic cooperation in the region. It is in the EU's best interest to promote peace and stability, and to facilitate strong partnerships with Middle Eastern countries to achieve regional goals. Simultaneously, the partnership between the EU and the United States is essential in realizing shared goals in the Middle East. This report aims to address how to best utilize the transatlantic alliance in order to promote peace, stability, and liberal values in the region.

This report will discuss three key regional issues prioritized by the EU: First, it will discuss the ongoing issue of irregular migration flowing from the Middle East and North Africa. Secondly, it will address the current challenges undermining the Middle East Peace Process, and the future possibility for a two-state solution. Finally, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran will be analyzed, specifically in regard to U.S. participation and support.

Though this report acknowledges the importance of the Syrian crisis, due to the lack of clear EU policy towards the issue, it will not be discussed specifically. However, issues stemming from the war in Syria will be discussed in this report, as will be seen in the analysis of its effect on immigration into the EU. In addition, recommendations on how to best address these regional issues will be made, in the framework of transatlantic cooperation.

Although Russia is involved with many of the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, directly and indirectly, EU-Russia relations will not be discussed in the framework of these policies.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***The Issue of Migration***
 - *Coordinate a cohesive and sustainable U.S.- EU migration policy that functions in and out of times of crisis.*

- ***The Issue of the JCPOA***
 - *Establish cooperation between U.S. and EU to bring Iran into the international framework.*
- ***The Middle East Peace Process***
 - *Establish a consistent EU-U.S. response to Israeli settlements in order to preserve future opportunities for a two-state solution.*

2.1 | THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RESPONSE TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS

CASSIE LE

"We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies. The migration phenomenon, for example, requires a balanced and human rights compliant policy mix addressing the management of the flows and the structural causes. This means overcoming the fragmentation of external policies relevant to migration."

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

The issue of migration has tied the hands of the European Union for decades. EU political leaders have the obligation to respect and uphold the four freedoms of Europe -- the free movement of services, goods, capital, and people. Simultaneously, leaders must also honor the international right to asylum for those fleeing human tragedy. Recently, striking a balance between the two has been an increasingly difficult task because the EU, along with the U.S., is divided on a comprehensive response to mitigate the issue of irregular and unauthorized migration. The uneven solidarity towards the countries bearing the greatest burdens on the front lines, particularly Italy and Greece, has pushed the EU to pivot and enlist the non-member state Turkey, a candidate with complex relations with the Union. However, doing so presents a distinct set of vulnerabilities, and therefore makes creating a sustainable migration solution challenging. Though migration is certainly not a new phenomenon, the results of the prolonged

crisis, which reached record high numbers in 2015 and 2016, still pose threats to the transatlantic alliance and the borders of the EU today.

Bringing the United States back to the table for negotiations to share best practices in migration policy and diplomacy is important to progress the dialogue of migration. Although the U.S. chose to not participate in the 2018 Global Compact on Migration (GCM), isolating a major global actor would be negligent in advancing a long-term strategy. For this reason, it is critical for the EU to endorse a U.S. invitation for observer status to GCM dialogues and forums. Doing so would be beneficial to both U.S. and EU's interests, as it acts as a risk management and prevention mechanism to future threats in a globalized world.

In addition to including the U.S. in GCM forums, it is critical to simultaneously evaluate current gaps in the EU migration policy. This can be addressed by adopting successful elements of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which has proven to sustain program integrity in and out of times of crisis. This will not only require thoughtful dialogue with the U.S., but also an exchange of best practices in the reception, enhanced vetting, placement, integration, and data sharing within migration policy. By borrowing these elements, the EU has the potential to implement a migration policy that is durable, sustainable, and representative of the needs of its Member States.

To avoid further exhaustion of resources and expenditures, policies that include civilian dialogue within the EU in policy development will be necessary to demonstrate cohesion from both a supranational basis and localized basis. Part of what makes the USRAP functional in and out of times of crisis is its ability to empower government funded civil groups to integrate migrants into a new culture and society. The role of civil groups in the USRAP is to engage with migrants at the personal level and ensure that they become economically and socially self-sufficient shortly after arriving into the U.S. To further its integration efforts, the EU should consider funding U.S. organizations and encourage them to take a greater responsibility as a transnational establishment to aid the integration efforts in the EU. Empowering these civil

groups, such as churches, NGO, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), would not only serve to better integrate migrants but could also help bridge existing gaps on the perception of migrants.

According to the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugee status is granted to those who are able to prove a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and because of this fear, they are “unable or... unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country”.⁷⁸ Asylum seekers are processed similarly to refugees in that they must establish a credible, well-founded fear of persecution but are able to breach immigration rules to seek sanctuary in a third country of resettlement.⁷⁹ The term “migrant” is a broad term that is commonly used to generalize refugees and asylum seekers, as people who change their residence to or from a given area during a specific time period.⁸⁰ As the migrant crisis has prolonged, “mixed migration”, which includes refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, environmental migrants, and unauthorized migrants, has become a political pressure point for the borders of both the United States and the European Union. The pressures of mixed migration have prompted divisions, which complicate a global unified response to migration. Mixed migrants mobilizing from Central America and the Mediterranean have proven that policies in both the U.S. and the EU are simply not equipped to handle such large numbers of people. For the purpose of this report, the term “migrant” will be used to address all of these groups.

⁷⁸ United Nations. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” *High Commissioner for Refugees*, 31 January 1967, vol. 189, p. 137, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1954/04/19540422%2000-23%20AM/Ch_V_2p.pdf.


⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ European Commission. “Glossary:Migration.” *Eurostat* 4 July 2018, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Migration.

Crisis Response Mode: The Impact of the Dublin Regulation

Since the surge of migrants in 2015, the EU's migration policies have been largely focused on immediate crisis mode responses to diffuse emergency situations. The Dublin Regulation is an EU law that exemplifies how the EU's migration policy was not equipped to manage the constant stream of migrants in 2015. The Regulation affirms that the first country of entry is responsible for processing an asylum seeker's claim.⁸¹ Its main purpose is to prevent asylum shopping, which is the act by which an asylee is able to apply for asylum in multiple EU member states in an effort to be accepted to more than one and choose, by preference, which country to settle in.⁸² Doing so means that multiple member states are tasked with duplicative work for a single asylum applicant.

Figure 1: European Migration Routes, 2015



Under the Dublin Regulation, Italy and Greece became major points of unauthorized entry and were responsible for the initial processing of the 223,542 asylees that entered from the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes in 2015.⁸³

⁸¹ European Parliament, European Council. "Regulation (EU) No 604/2013." *EuroLex*, 26, June 2013, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=EN>.

⁸² European Commission. "Asylum Shopping." *Migration and Home Affairs*, 20 February 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/asylum-shopping_en.


⁸³ The Economist, "Looking for a Home." 29 August 2015, www.economist.com/europe/2015/08/29/looking-for-a-home.

As illustrated in Figure 1 above, Syrians comprised the majority of the refugees entering from the Eastern Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean, and Western Balkans that transited through Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco to Greece and Spain. In their journey to Italy, Eritrean and Nigerian refugees moved through Libya and Tunisia. This multiplicity of sources and routes underscored how quickly the Mediterranean became not only the place that symbolized near-freedom to migrants, but also a breeding ground for unauthorized disorder and exploitation of human trafficking, arms and drug smuggling, and migrant-violence. Despite the billions of Euros and resources allocated to alleviating these pressures, Italy and Greece remained in crisis mode until the EU integrated the agreement with Turkey in 2016.

EU-Turkey Agreement

On March 18, 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement was adopted, launching Turkey's major role in alleviating the pressures of irregular migration into Italy and Greece. In exchange for up to EUR 6 billion in European funding, Turkey would need to accommodate all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers transiting through Turkey to the Greek islands and all migrants whose

applications for asylum were deferred or denied.⁸⁴ The conditions of this agreement involve the accelerated discussion on Turkey's membership in the EU, visa-free travel of Turkish citizens and ongoing dialogues with the EU. In addition, for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled into the EU.⁸⁵ As illustrated in Figure 2, this agreement dramatically and



⁸⁴ European Parliament. "EU-Turkey Statement & Action Plan." <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan>.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

immediately affected the flow of migrants in Greece. However, although the agreement relieved Greece of tremendous pressures, it did not cater to the ongoing needs of other Member States in the Mediterranean, particularly Italy and its reception of migrants from North Africa. In addition, the agreement relies on Turkey's cooperation and the integrity of its institutions, which have liabilities and shortcomings ranging from political purges to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and beyond. The EU's heavy reliance on the agreement makes this short-term solution susceptible to future instances of crisis. Formulating a stronger policy that protects the most exposed member states in the Mediterranean is still necessary. In response to the lessons learned from 2015, the EU should develop a migration policy that not only serves the shared common interests of the transatlantic community, but also borrows features from durable migration approaches from other countries.

2.1.1 | Managing a Global Commitment to Migration Without the U.S.

The concept of equitable burden and responsibility-sharing is a principle that, if coordinated efficiently, is extremely powerful in transatlantic policy. However, the Trump Administration's America First policy presents challenges for the international migration community, as the U.S. opposed the comprehensive non-legally binding burden-sharing framework of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM).⁸⁶ As the first intergovernmental negotiated agreement of its kind, the GCM includes elements of the UN General Assembly New York Declaration, Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Although the U.S. decided to not participate in these efforts, it is critical to keep the U.S. engaged and continue to progress the conversation, especially because managing the issue of migration cannot be done by Europe alone.

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM)

On the global level, the most recent development on migration policy is the adoption of the UNHCR's GCM. The GCM has two unique and distinct elements. The first is the CRRF, which has

⁸⁶ United Nations. "General Assembly officially adopts roadmap for migrants to improve safety, ease suffering." *UN News*, 19 December 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028941>.

the main objectives of easing the pressure on host communities and countries, bolstering refugee self-reliance, expanding third-country solutions, and supporting conditions within countries of origin to ensure a safe and dignified return.⁸⁷ The second element is the Program of Action (PoA). The PoA seeks to spread burdens and responsibilities through national and regional arrangements, a Global Refugee Forum (GRF) every four years, and data sharing.⁸⁸ In addition, the PoA offers opportunities for follow-up and review on the development and management of migration. These latest policy developments are part of a prospective and comprehensive global solution to the ongoing migration crisis, which will require the attention, resources, and expertise of a large actor, such as the United States.

Considering that the EU and the U.S. are major migrant destinations, the new CRRF and PoA have the potential to support a more robust and cohesive migration system across the Atlantic. Although the GCM gained the majority of votes in the UN, President Trump issued a statement that marked America's opposition to the GCR under the recognition that every nation has its sovereign right to "set its own immigration policy in accordance to national interests".⁸⁹ The U.S.'s opposition to the GCM is founded on two elements expressed by President Trump himself at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September of 2018. The first is the vehemently employed "America First" National Security Policy, and the second is the recognition that the U.S. is the largest donor to the UNHCR.⁹⁰ As a result, the United States voted against the GCM, and will not participate in it. Similarly, in the same month, this position was used to justify the reduction of the U.S. refugee ceiling to 30,000, adopted by Secretary of State Pompeo.⁹¹ These recent events have demonstrated the U.S. disengagement from

⁸⁷ United Nations. "Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework." *UNHCR*, www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html.

⁸⁸ United Nations. "The Global Compact on Refugees." *UNHCR*, <https://www.unhcr.org/towards-a-global-compact-on-refugees.html>.

⁸⁹ United States of America. "Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly." *White House*, 25 September 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/>.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ United States of America, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo. "Remarks to the Media." *U.S. Department of State*, 17 September 2018, Web. <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/09/285960.htm>.

commitments abroad and will require the EU to embrace a leadership role that creatively seeks to restore and enhance mutual cooperation and ongoing dialogue between the Trump Administration and European leadership.

What does this mean for the Transatlantic Alliance?

The shift away from priorities of previous administrations to the Trump Administration's America First policies has diminished the impact and undermined the efforts made to solve global common security problems across the Atlantic. For the EU, establishing a common transatlantic approach that welcomes a cohesive assimilative migration policy is particularly important, because several studies have shown that poor integration and increased isolation incentivize youth engagement in homegrown radical and religiously inspired terrorism.^{92, 93} Part of the GCM, CRRF, and PoA seek to bolster cooperation on refugee self-reliance through means of integration, and support conditions within countries of origin to ensure safe return. Homegrown terrorism, however, is more of a phenomenon in Europe than the United States.⁹⁴ As displayed in Figure 3, between 2014 and 2017, the EU experienced 65 religiously inspired terrorist attacks.⁹⁵ According to Europol, "some terrorists" have tried to use migration routes to enter the EU, which is why increased and reinforced cooperation with Italy and Greece remains extremely attentive.⁹⁶ In contrast, the U.S. has experienced 15 lethal jihadist attacks since the September 11, 2001 attacks, 84% of which were committed by U.S. citizens and permanent residents.⁹⁷

⁹² Voortman, Aude. "Terrorism in Europe. Explaining the disparity in the number of jihadist foreign fighters between European countries." *Institut Barcelona Estudis Internacionals*, 11 September 2015, Web. http://www.ibe.org/ibe_studentpaper20_71964.pdf.

⁹³ Holtgraves, Lindsey. "The Politics of Identity: The Roots of Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism Amongst Second and Third Generation Immigrants in Europe." *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*, 2012, Web. <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:65b0a5f0-3ba1-4a2e-ab4a-0f7ac37ecc41>.

⁹⁴ Laurence, Jonathan. "The U.S.-EU Counter-Terrorism Conversation: Acknowledging a Two-Way Threat." *Brookings Institute*, 24 February 2010, Web. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-eu-counter-terrorism-conversation-acknowledging-a-two-way-threat/>.


⁹⁵ European Parliament. "Terrorism in the EU: terror attacks, deaths and arrests." *News*, 25 July 2018, Web. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terrorism-in-the-eu-terror-attacks-deaths-and-arrests>.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Bergen, Peter, et al. "Who Are the Terrorists?" *New America*, New America, <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/>.

Despite the U.S. disengagement in the GCM, the EU and U.S. share a common interest in ensuring that there is safe and orderly migration and blocking the growth and expansion of rogue groups in the Middle East and Africa. As the EU borders regions undergoing ongoing conflict, it cannot politically and economically afford to address future migration surges similar to the numbers in 2015. For these reasons, the U.S. remains a potent potential partner. Isolating the U.S. in GCM dialogues would be counterintuitive to the purpose and future of the GCM, especially within the global effort against crime and terrorism. Having the U.S. involved, even without an official commitment, is better than not having them involved at all. With this in mind, the EU's ability to take a leadership role on the issue of migration and endorse the observer status of the U.S. could help to restore confidence in addressing global migration.

Figure 3: Religiously Inspired Terrorism in the EU



2.1.2 | Reimagining an EU Migration Policy

Although the GCM sets the framework for a global response to the migrant crisis, it fails to address many internal issues that are unique to Europe. Finding a migration policy that fosters migrant economic self-sufficiency and works in and out of times of crisis will be valuable in preparing for future emergency situations. Identifying best practices within other migration policies, particularly the USRAP, in areas of data documentation, data sharing, integration, reception and placement could have the potential to create a more robust and sustainable network for refugees and migrants in the EU.

Borrowing elements of the USRAP and applying them to the EU migration policy could improve the integrity and durability of the existing program. In the U.S., after a migrant applies for refugee or asylum, the UNHCR vets the migrant and has the jurisdiction to determine if the applicant is eligible, under international law, to officially claim protected status. If eligible, the UNHCR refers the applicant to the Resettlement Support Center for application processing and additional enhanced vetting conducted by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Upon USCIS approval, the refugee or asylee will undergo the U.S. Department of State's Reception and Placement Program (R&P), which is a collaborative public-private program composed of nine local Resettlement Agencies (RA). The refugee or asylee will then work with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and the RAs to ensure that all core services are met to progress the refugee's self-reliance. These services include access to social services, cash and medical assistance, state programs, community schools, cultural and ethnic integration programs, and employment opportunities.⁹⁸ The USRAP balances their commitment to migrant communities by empowering private organizations to ease the transition to life in American civil society.

Civil empowerment in the migration dialogue

A more democratic approach that integrates and engages three major voices—the civil interest groups, the Parliament and department heads, and the private sector—has the potential to restore faith and a sense of common security for civilians in Europe. At the peak of migration in 2015, there was an overwhelming public sentiment that Europe had lost control of its borders. This concern contributed to the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. In addition, the migrant crisis jeopardized the EU's solidarity at a time when the Union had narrowly recovered from the 2010 Euro Crisis. In 2015, 52% of Europeans held negative views towards immigration, while 63.3% of Americans held positive views and thought that immigration levels

⁹⁸ United States of America. "Refugees." *U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Web.* <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/refugees>.


should increase.⁹⁹ In the same vein, the topic of immigration was perceived by Europeans as the most important public issue in 2016, ahead of terrorism and the economy.¹⁰⁰ As illustrated in Figure 4, particularly in Italy and Greece, Europe was divided on whether or not immigrants were beneficial or a burden as the crisis continued. Considering that migration affects local communities, within Europe and around the world, seeking greater representation to better integrate communities is vital in ensuring a greater sense of public security.

The USRAP can be used as an example of how civil empowerment within the migration dialogue can be managed to achieve beneficial results. In the USRAP, the RAs are community organized and religiously affiliated groups that utilize volunteers to aid the resettlement and integration process.¹⁰¹ Refugees that have been able to participate in this program are able to credit their success to the employment and entrepreneurship programs, educational services, social integration initiatives, and specialized services such as mental and children's health.¹⁰² Though much of the RAs attention is focused on their work in the United States, a number of these RAs and U.S. based organizations have committees that actively work with governments, municipalities, and local organizations within

Figure 4: Views of Immigrants in the U.S. and EU

Views of Immigrants in Europe and the U.S.

% who say immigrants today ...



Note: Don't know/refused and both/neither responses not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults, May 12-18, 2015; and Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey.

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⁹⁹ Migration Data Portal. "Public opinion on migration." 20 February 2019, Web. <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/public-opinion-migration#key-trends>.

¹⁰⁰ European Commission, "Autumn 2016 Standard Eurobarometer: Immigration and terrorism continue to be seen as the most important issues facing the EU." *European Commission Press Release*, 22 December 2016, Web. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4493_en.htm.

¹⁰¹ United States of America. "U.S. Refugee Admissions Program." *U.S. Department of State*, Web. <https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/>.

¹⁰² Mathema, Silva. "What Works: Innovative Approaches to Improving Refugee Integration." *Center for American Progress*, 28 February 2018, Web. <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/02/28/447283/what-works/>.

the EU. For example, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a non-profit humanitarian organization and USRAP RA, has supported 15 European countries by offering expertise and guidance on refugee integration. These programs have shared best practices in London, Brussels, Germany, Geneva, and the Netherlands as seen in their 80+ years of experience in assisting refugees.¹⁰³ Moreover, World Relief (WF), a USRAP RA, similarly conducts its work across the Atlantic as a member of the European Christian Organization for Relief and Development network (EU-CORD).¹⁰⁴ The IRC and WR's contributions across the Atlantic are examples of the significance and impact that transatlantic civil engagement can have in European communities. Reimagining an EU migration policy that encourages and empowers more transnational NGOs and private organizations to expand their missions and responsibilities in Europe, with particular attention to civil society, prove to be advantageous in gaining trust in EU institutions.

USRAP as a Model for EU Migration Policy

One of the most remarkable elements of the USRAP is its ability to adapt to changing migration circumstances around the world, as illustrated in Figure 5. This proves that the program is a sustainable mechanism capable of handling mass fluctuations of migrants.

Enhanced coordination with the U.S. in adopting an EU migration strategy that borrows similar features of the USRAP could have significant potential in underpinning the integrity and infrastructure of future European migration policy. The EU should foster a dialogue with the U.S. on its USRAP's best practices, including reception, enhanced vetting at the overseas RSCs, placement, integration, documentation and data sharing. Seeking EU-U.S. cooperation, and coordination, on one of the EU's most pertinent issues could result in a cohesive and comprehensive transatlantic migration policy, one that requires the engagement of civil society with refugees.


¹⁰³ International Rescue Committee. "Refugees in Europe." *The IRC in Europe*. <https://www.rescue-uk.org/page/irc-europe>

¹⁰⁴ EU Cord Network. "World Relief Germany." <https://www.eu-cord.org/member/wrg/>

Figure 5: Origins of Migration to the U.S. Over Time

The shifting origins of refugees to the U.S. over time

Number of refugees admitted to the U.S., by region of origin of principal applicant and fiscal year



Source: Refugee Processing Center, 1975-2016.

Note: Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants. Does not include refugees admitted under the Private Sector Initiative. Europe includes former Soviet Union states. Asia includes Middle Eastern and North African countries. Africa includes sub-Saharan Africa, but also Sudan and South Sudan. Latin America includes Caribbean. Data for fiscal 2017 are through Dec. 31, 2016; fiscal 2017 began Oct. 1, 2016.

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- **The coordination of a cohesive and sustainable U.S-EU migration policy that functions in and out of times of crisis:**
 - *Endorse observer status for the U.S. in future GCM dialogues and forums to continue transatlantic conversations.*
 - *Encourage and empower transatlantic civil engagement with American NGOs and private organizations.*
 - *Coordinate dialogues with the U.S. Government on best practices in migration policy in the areas of reception, enhanced vetting, placement, integration, and data documentation and sharing.*

2.2 | EU RESPONSE TO U.S. RE-IMPOSED SANCTIONS ON IRAN

ROBIN MCCOY

“Building on the Iran Nuclear deal and its implementation, it will also gradually engage Iran on areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration and societal exchanges. It will deepen dialogue with Iran and Gulf Coast countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crises and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy.”

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

On July 14th, 2015, the U.S. and its European allies signed the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The agreement guaranteed that Iran would not attain nuclear weapons in the future and allowed U.S. and EU businesses to invest in Iran.¹⁰⁵ Two years later, on May 8th, 2018, President Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.¹⁰⁶ Since the change in policy, the Trump Administration has targeted Iran through re-imposed U.S. sanctions aimed at Iran’s energy and financial centers; the Trump Administration cited Iran’s alleged violation of the JCPOA and sponsorship of terrorism as sufficient justification for withdrawal from the agreement.¹⁰⁷ However, this announcement came as a shock to the international community, particularly for the European Union. This was because in November of 2018 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report certified that Iran continues to comply with the JCPOA.¹⁰⁸ As such, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has prompted confusion over the official U.S. stance towards Iran. The European Union is

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State: *“Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action”* July 14th, 2015
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf>

¹⁰⁶ Landler, Mark. 2018 *“Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned.”* The New York Times, May 8th.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>

¹⁰⁷ Sanders-Zakre, Alicia. 2019 *“Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran.”* Arms Control Association. January 31.
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran>

¹⁰⁸ International Atomic Energy Agency: *“Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.”* November 12th, 2018. <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/11/gov2018-47.pdf>

seeking to contain the damage of the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA and restore clarity and common purpose to transatlantic policy toward Iran.

Complete abandonment of the JCPOA would create a dangerous situation. Leaving Iran outside of any international framework represents a significant setback for the EU foreign policy mission in Iran and jeopardizes the security of EU citizens. The European Union needs to work tirelessly to focus on proactive peacebuilding in the Middle East region, and on Iran's Ballistic Missile Program, to mend the transatlantic alliance. By doing so, it will ensure the human security of the EU and create long-term stability in Iran. The following recommendations support such an approach:

- Expand the existing INSTEX mandate to include all sectors of trade between the EU and Iran to maintain the integrity of the JCPOA.
- Issue joint sanctions on combat assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, with the U.S. cooperation, to curtail Iranian malign behavior.
- Continue dialogue through the JCPOA, but focus on developing a new agreement in joint partnership with the U.S. to address Iran's ballistic missiles program.

2.2.1 | INSTEX as the Special Purpose Vehicle

Since the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, European companies have looked to the EU to develop a plan to evade extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. sanctions. Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), the European 3 (E3) arranged special purpose vehicle that operates outside of U.S. markets, is a proposed solution that came short of responding to the needs of EU companies. In order to maintain the integrity of the economic and security benefits that the JCPOA provides for the EU and Iran, the EU should consider expanding the mandate and reach of INSTEX. Developing a robust INSTEX would, therefore, protect the economies of smaller EU nations from secondary U.S. sanctions. This would incentivize the stability of the Iranian economy, while maintaining and progressing the framework of the JCPOA.

On January 31st, 2019 the E3 ministers of the UK, Germany, and France announced the development of INSTEX, a new mechanism that aims to replace the U.S. controlled mechanism known as SWIFT. Where SWIFT complies with U.S. sanctions, INSTEX facilitates economic transactions without the interference of U.S. economic and foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ INSTEX ensures the exchange of humanitarian trade in pharmaceutical, medical, and agriculture goods, while also alleviating Iranian economic pressures from U.S. sanctions.¹¹⁰ Since INSTEX is still in its development phase, it intentionally has a narrow mission in order not to provoke the United States. However, in order to preserve the JCPOA framework, the EU will need to depart from U.S. economic policy of interference in Iran. Through INSTEX, the agreement will move financial transactions away from the central banks to avoid U.S. sanctions.¹¹¹ It aims to facilitate and coordinate trade payments exclusively between Iran and the EU.¹¹²

Recession in Iran has put increased pressure on the EU to develop and deliver INSTEX to avoid a premature disengagement by Iran. As of the time of writing, Iran's economy is suffering due to international sanctions, and therefore lacks incentive to continue the cooperation of the JCPOA. The U.S. sanctions are focused on cutting Iranian oil exports, which make up 40% of government revenue.¹¹³ This, in turn, could hamper Iranian government spending and cause a 50% reduction in Iranian oil exports. Furthermore, re-imposed U.S. sanctions have slowed Iran's GDP growth, and by 2020, the nation's GDP could contract by 3.7%.¹¹⁴ The situation has been aggravated further by the rise in inflation, 12% unemployment, and the devaluation of Iranian currency by 50% against the U.S. Dollar.¹¹⁵ These combined factors have caused a period of economic recession within Iran.

¹⁰⁹ Peel, Michael, 2018, "Swift to Comply with US Sanctions on Iran in Blow to EU." Financial Times. November 5th. <https://www.ft.com/content/8f16f8aa-e104-11e8-8e70-5e22a430c1ad>

¹¹⁰ Geranayeh, Ellie. 2019. "Trading with Iran via the special purpose vehicle: How it can work." European Council on Foreign Relations, February, 7th. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_trading_with_iran_special_purpose_vehicle_how_it_can_work

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ World Bank Group: 2018 "Iran Economic Monitor, Fall 2018: Weathering Economic Challenges." November. <https://elibrary-worldbank-org.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/doi/pdf/10.1596/31028>

¹¹⁴ World Bank Group: "Iran Economic Monitor, Fall 2018."

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

The current EU-Iranian trade is estimated to be around EUR 20 billion; while trade has plateaued, this figure demonstrates that the relationship offers a significant economic benefit for both parties.¹¹⁶ The EU provides machinery, chemicals, and other much need industrial products; in return, Iran exports oil to the EU.¹¹⁷ If the EU were to depart from the JCPOA framework and align with the U.S., the EU would exacerbate the economic conditions in Iran and discourage its participation from future diplomatic efforts. The expansion of INSTEX, to include oil and other major industries, for example, could be utilized as a channel of economic diplomacy to keep Iran compliant with the non-proliferation conditions outlined in the JCPOA.

The implementation of INSTEX will further divide the United States and the European Union in regard to Iran economic integration policy. In addition to the multiple U.S. lobbying campaigns that pressure EU disinvestment in Iran, the Trump Administration has expressed objections towards INSTEX.¹¹⁸ On February 14th of 2019, Vice President Pence stated, “The special purpose vehicle, we call it an effort to break up American sanctions against Iran... It is an ill-advised step that will strengthen Iran and create still more distance between Europe and the U.S.”¹¹⁹ Iran's former Foreign Minister Zarif also expressed his concerns over INSTEX saying, “INSTEX falls short of saving JCPOA... Europe now needs to walk the walk.”¹²⁰ Though the EU is in negotiations with the U.S. over exemptions for EU companies, no apparent progress has been made.¹²¹ This shift in U.S. priorities in the Trump Administration has pushed the EU to take a leading role in seeking alternative measures to ensure that the member state economies are protected. In order to support the integrity of the JCPOA without the U.S., the EU must acknowledge their commitments made to Iran by establishing a

¹¹⁶ Adebahr, Cornelius, 2018, “Europe and Iran: The Economic and Commercial Dimensions of a Strained Relationship.” Istituto Affari Internazionali, December. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1824.pdf>

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Cunningham, Erin; Witte Griff. 2019. “While E.U. tries to bypass U.S. Sanctions on Iran, Trump administration amps up pressure.” February 3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/while-eu-tries-to-bypass-us-sanctions-on-iran-trump-administration-amps-up-pressure/2019/02/02/6be486c0-1f22-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html?utm_term=.963fba5d9eef

¹¹⁹ White House: February 14th, 2019 “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Warsaw Ministerial working luncheon.” <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-warsaw-ministerial-working-luncheon-warsaw-poland/>

¹²⁰ Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2019, “FM Zarif’s speech at the 54th edition of the Munich Security Conference.” February 18th. <http://en.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=3&pageid=2029&newsview=501055>

¹²¹ Ibid.

broader INSTEX as a platform to pave the continuation of economic and diplomatic dialogue. This mechanism would function in the interim until the U.S. is willing to renegotiate the terms of the JCPOA.

2.2.2 | Iran's Support for Terrorism

The JCPOA was signed to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to integrate Iran into the international framework; however, Iran continues to employ its Revolutionary Guard forces in conflict zones while simultaneously supplying Hezbollah and Hamas with training, money, and weapons.¹²² EU-U.S. cooperation to place joint sanctions on combat assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard could be an important first step in curtailing Iranian malign behavior. In Syria, Iran has supported and supplied Assad with weapons.¹²³ Iran also backs Shia militants in Iraq and has been accused of committing war crimes inside Iraq.¹²⁴ Tehran's reach does not stop in the Middle East, but extends westward, as seen in the attempted assassination of an Arab separatist leader by Iranian intelligence officers in Denmark.¹²⁵ In France and Belgium, authorities foiled two bomb attacks that were targeting former Iranian dissidents. These plots were all planned and carried out through Iranian embassies.¹²⁶ A combined and coordinated response of the EU and U.S. is needed to thwart such terrorist activity and hold Iran responsible for these reprehensible actions.

Iran's support for terrorist actions in Europe should not be tolerated. The U.S. and EU both have shared values and a zero-tolerance policy on terrorist activity and believe governments that support terrorist must be held accountable. Since 9/11 the U.S. and E.U. have increased intelligence sharing

¹²² U.S. Department of State: 2017, *"Country reports: Ch2 State sponsored terrorism: Iran."*
<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282847.htm>

¹²³ Dr. Parsi Rouzbeh, Director, Esfandiary Dina, 2016. *"An EU Strategy for Relations with Iran after the Nuclear Deal."*
European Parliament: European Union: Director Directorate-General For External Policies Policy Department.
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578005/EXPO_IDA\(2016\)578005_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578005/EXPO_IDA(2016)578005_EN.pdf)

¹²⁴ U.S. Department of State: *"Country reports Ch2 State sponsored terrorism: Iran"*

¹²⁵ Sorensen Selsoe Martin, 2018, *"Iran Accused of Plot to Assassinate Dissident in Denmark."* The New York Times, November 1st
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/world/europe/denmark-assassination-iran.html>

¹²⁶ Dacey-Barnes Julien, Geranmayeh Ellie, 2018, *"Europe's Iran dilemma."* European Council on Foreign Relations November, 2nd
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_iran_dilemma_assassination_nuclear_deal

and cooperation on issues of terrorism and related security issues.¹²⁷ Sharing and cooperation of intelligence will sharpen the means to protect EU and U.S. citizens. In 2016, Europol created the European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) with the goal to provide operational support to EU member states and ensure cooperation between Europe and other counterterrorism authorities.¹²⁸ The European Union has demonstrated time and again its support to combating terrorism, both transnationally and domestically within the European Union. As a common interest, the U.S. and EU's priorities should be focused on working together in eliminating terrorism in America and Europe.

EU sanctions on Hezbollah

Another example of cooperation between the EU and U.S. in the Middle East are the sanctions placed on the military wing of Hezbollah. This partnership is an example of what can be accomplished through the transatlantic alliance. The U.S. and Israel called upon the European Union in 2013 to institute sanctions on Hezbollah. In Bulgaria, Hezbollah was implicated in the deaths of five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian after a bus exploded at the Burgas airport. In March of 2013, a man was captured and later sentenced after plotting terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens in Cyprus. Hezbollah has made its presence known in Syria by actively coordinating with the Assad regime.

Following lobbying efforts led by the U.S. and Israel as well as the result of the investigation and trial in Cyprus, the EU took action against the military wing of Hezbollah; listing it as a terrorist organization. Identifying Hezbollah as a terrorist group demonstrates that Europe was willing to act in cooperation with the U.S. to condemn terrorist activity. Imposing sanctions on Hezbollah would cut significant financial funding for terrorism. On July 23, 2013, the European Council implemented Regulation 1169/2001, which labeled the Hezbollah military wing as a terrorist organization. The regulation obligates members to freeze and ensure assets are not available to the sanction person or group.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, European Council, The New York Times.

Iran's support for terrorism puts European and American citizens in danger. Iran has made great strides to comply with the JCPOA, but Iran's support for terrorist organizations needs to be held accountable. In partnership with the U.S., the EU should sanction Iranian embassy officials in

¹²⁷ European Council: December 12th, 2018, "Response to the terrorist threat and recent terrorist attacks in Europe." <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/>

¹²⁸ EUROPOL: European Counter Terrorism Center: "A central hub of expertise working to provide an effective response to terrorism." <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc>

Denmark, France, and Belgium. The EU should use the power of its member states' law enforcement and intelligence services and increase surveillance of Iranian embassies, while monitoring Iranian Revolutionary Guard activity in Europe.

Iran Ballistic Missiles Program

For the EU and U.S., the Iranian ballistic missile program represents a growing security threat within the Middle East. On July 20th, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2231, that calls upon Iran to not “undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.”¹²⁹ However, Iran continues to develop its ballistic missiles program as a violation of international law. This mutual security threat presents an opportunity for the EU to engage with the U.S. in a long-term strategy that expands the jurisdiction of the JCPOA to include the non-proliferation of the Iranian ballistic missiles program in addition to nuclear weapons.

U.S.-EU concern for the development of the ballistic missile program is that it will provide a vessel for Iran to launch a nuclear missile in the future. In a speech given by Angela Merkel she expressed the need for a unified transatlantic approach towards Iran's Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's):

I see the ballistic missile program, I see Iran in Yemen and above all I see Iran in Syria. The only question on this issue between us, the United States and the Europeans, is to: help our common cause, our common goal, namely to contain the harmful or difficult effects of Iran, by terminating the only existing agreement or do we help the cause more by holding the little anchor that we have, in order to be able to put pressure on it in other areas

¹²⁹ The United Nations Security Council: 2015, “Ballistic missile-related transfers and activities.” Resolution 2231, July 20th. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/ballistic-missile-related-transfers-and-activities>

as well? That's the tactical question we're arguing about. But of course, the goals are the same.¹³⁰

Though Iran does not currently possess an ICBM, the U.S. has been wary of Iran's space program as a cover for the development of an ICBM.¹³¹ If Iran were able to develop these capabilities, it would be able to strike all of Europe, which puts Union member states at risk. Iran today has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with capabilities ranging from 300 KM to 2,500 KM.¹³² To add to this threat, Iran is also developing and

improving its arsenal's accuracy and deployment technologies.¹³³ Iran has been supplying Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and the Yemeni Houthis with Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM).¹³⁴ The SRBM's have been fired by Hezbollah and the Houthis against U.S. partners Israel and Saudi Arabia.¹³⁵ Figure 6 provides the current known arsenal of rockets being used

Figure 6: Iran's ballistic missiles



¹³⁰ Die Bundeskanzlerin: 2019, "Speech by Federal Chancellor Merkel on the occasion of the 55th Munich Security Conference on 16 February 2019 in Munich." February 16th. <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zur-55-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-am-16-februar-2019-in-muenchen-1580936>

¹³¹ Center For Strategic & International Studies, 2018, "Missiles of Iran." CSIS Missile Defense Project, June 14th. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/>

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Hildreth, Steven, Jabbari Cyrus, 2018, "Iran's Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Programs." Congressional Research Service, August 1st. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10938.pdf>

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

by Iran, and their ranges.¹³⁶ Iran's actions in regards to the proliferation of missiles to rogue non-state actors throughout the Middle East proves the need for regulation that expands beyond nuclear weapons. However, the EU cannot accomplish this alone, and will need to enlist the United States' support and cooperation to achieve a unified response to ensure stability in the region.

In a statement given by the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, she expressed her concerns about the Iranian program stating, "As a European Union we definitely want to address Iran's ballistic missiles programme... I believe this programme has a destabilizing effect in the entire Middle East."¹³⁷ To address the problem, there will need to be multilateral talks between the EU, U.S., and Iran. The European Union has taken the first step to develop clarity on the issue by calling Iran to join the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC).¹³⁸ The HCoC requires members to conduct annual reporting of their programs, and most importantly, the HCoC mandates that all members issue Pre-Launch Notifications (PLNs) when conducting missile and space-launch testing.¹³⁹ Weaving Iran into international agreements in the HCoC, at a minimum, would enable the EU and U.S. to negotiate with Iran to address possible concessions on the Iranian ballistic missiles program. Though the HCoC is not legally binding, and therefore is not an ideal instrument, integrating Iran into the HCoC to develop a more transparency between EU, U.S., and Iran is an important first step. The mutual understanding and cooperation with the EU and U.S. in regard to Iran's ballistic missiles offers a unique opportunity for the transatlantic alliance to address a common interest and implement and enforce a multilateral arms control treaty.

¹³⁶ Center For Strategic & International Studies, 2018, "**Missiles of Iran.**"

¹³⁷ European Union External Action Service: 2018, "Speech by High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Seventh EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference." EEAS Press Team, December 18th. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/55699/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-seventh-eu-non-proliferation-and_en

¹³⁸ Scott, Emma, 2019, "The EU Should Tackle Iran's Ballistic Missile Program." Atlantic Council, January, 7th. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-eu-should-tackle-iran-s-ballistic-missile-program>

¹³⁹ Nuclear Threat Initiative: 2018 "Hague Code Of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)." January, 31st. <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/hague-code-conduct-against-ballistic-missile-proliferation-hcoc/>

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***Establishing cooperation between the U.S. and EU to bring the United States back into the international framework for the JCPOA***
 - *Expand the existing INSTEX mandate to include all sectors of trade between the EU and Iran to maintain the integrity of the JCPOA.*
 - *Issue joint sanctions on combat assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, with the U.S. cooperation to curtail Iranian malign behavior.*
 - *Continue dialogue through the JCPOA, but focus on developing a new agreement in joint partnership with the U.S. to address Iran's ballistic missiles program.*

2.3 | AN APPROACH TO ILEGITIMATE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION

CECILIA ATKINS

As stated by the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), “the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental interest to the EU”.¹⁴⁰ However, Israeli settlements have stalled the peace process entirely. Recent enlargement of settlements into the West Bank and East Jerusalem have reached the highest levels of construction since 2013. Not only are these settlements deemed unlawful under UN Resolution 2334, but the expansion by Israel continues to undermine the possibility of a two-state solution.¹⁴¹ In 2018, the EEAS condemned Israeli settlements by emphasizing their position that “all settlement activity is illegal under international law and it undermines the viability of the two-state solution”.¹⁴² The prospect of maintaining a comprehensive peace process is unattainable without the resolution of the Israeli settlement issue.

¹⁴⁰ “Middle East Peace Process - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission.” *EEAS - European External Action Service*, 15 June 2016, eeas.europa.eu/regions/middle-east-north-africa-mena/337/middle-east-peace-process_en.

¹⁴¹ Al Jazeera. “Israeli Settlement Activity Surged in Trump Era: Monitor Group.” *Al Jazeera*, 1 Jan. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/israeli-settlement-activity-surged-trump-era-monitor-group-190102063008681.html.

¹⁴² European Union External Action Service (2018) *Statement by the Spokesperson on advancement of Israeli settlements*. Brussels, Delegation of European Union to Israel.

Notwithstanding the absence of current possibilities to achieve a peace framework between Israel and Palestine, the United States and the European Union should pursue a mutually accepted response to Israel's contentious enlargement of its settlements. Only by first addressing this issue can the U.S. and the EU jointly pursue stable peace negotiations for a two-state solution.

The EU's inability to exert real political power in support of a two-state solution is challenging. The EU has been unable to realize a meaningful role in facilitating peace talks between Palestine and Israel, partly because of Israel's distrust of Europe; consequently, Israel and Palestine have viewed the U.S. as their primary ally in the conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. holds unique influence on Israeli policy, especially when advocating for the Israelis in the United Nations.¹⁴³ For this reason, the EU's coordination with the U.S. is vital if the issue of settlements is to be addressed effectively.

The EU still maintains key economic relations with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. The EU is Israel's largest trading partner and contributes approximately 50 percent of the total PA funding. These strong economic ties, as well as the EU consensus to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, should be seen as assets when pursuing the issue of settlements.¹⁴⁴

The uniquely close relations between the Trump Administration and the Netanyahu Government in Israel present an opportunity for the EU, as well as a challenge. This report aims to utilize the transatlantic alliance in order to achieve regional goals in Israel and Palestine. In addition, this report will highlight how the EU should best utilize its historical diplomacy with Israel and Palestine, as well as with the U.S. as its transatlantic partner, to achieve a two-state solution.

¹⁴³ Miller, Rory. "Europe's Palestine Problem." *Foreign Affairs*, 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Miller, "Europe's Palestine Problem." 2011.

2.3.1 | Expansion of Israeli Settlements

In February of 2017, the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, passed the Regularization Law, authorizing the Israeli

expropriation of Palestinian land

to establish settlements. Despite

the stall in its execution by the

High Court of Justice, Israeli

settlements have continued to

substantially increase over the

past two years.¹⁴⁵ During 2017

and the first eight months of

2018, Israeli authorities approved

10,536 housing units in the West Bank with 5,676 issued vendors. In comparison to the 4,611

approved housing units and 592 issued vendors in 2015 and 2016, this is an unprecedented

increase in planned construction.

¹⁴⁶ This is noted in both Figure 7

and Figure 8, as provided, in

which construction tenders and

plans are compared from 2017 to

2018.


The United Nations have

responded consistently by

condemning the settlements


beyond the 1949 armistice lines as devoid of legal validity.¹⁴⁷ The UN Security Council solidified

Figure 7: Overview of the numbers of housing units promoted through plans and tenders during the first half of 2018



Source: Peace Now (Plans and Tenders for the West Bank) / Ir Amim (Plans for East Jerusalem)

Figure 8: Number of housing units promoted through plans and tenders in the occupied West Bank, and East Jerusalem, compared to the last reporting period



Source: Peace Now (Plans and Tenders for the West Bank) / Ir Amim (Plans for East Jerusalem)

¹⁴⁵ "World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Israel and Palestine." *Human Rights Watch*, Human Rights Watch, 18 Jan. 2018, www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/israel/palestine

¹⁴⁶ "World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Israel and Palestine." *Human Rights Watch*, Human Rights Watch, 17 Jan. 2019, www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine#.

¹⁴⁷ Hassan, Zaha. "Trump's Plan for Israel and Palestine: One More Step Away From Peace." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 Dec. 2018.

this position in Resolution 2334 in December 2016 by denouncing Israeli efforts to alter “the demographic composition, character and status”¹⁴⁸ of occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Resolution concluded by calling all parties to adhere to international laws and engage in negotiations through the framework of the Quartet Roadmap in order to end the 1967 Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.¹⁴⁹

Israeli settlement expansion into the West Bank and East Jerusalem between 2009 and 2016 resulted in the seizure and demolition of more than 4,800 Palestinian owned structures by Israeli authorities. This is particularly prevalent in Area C, which constitutes approximately 60% of the West Bank. Israel agreed to relinquish control of Area C to the Palestinians by 1999 under the Oslo Accords, though this has yet to be phased in.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, Palestinians are deprived of the right to apply for building permits; less than 1% of Area C and approximately 13% of East Jerusalem allow Palestinian applications for building permits.¹⁵¹

According to a 2018 analysis of the settlements by the EEAS, the advancement of Israeli settlements will enable up to 27,000 new Israeli settlers into the West Bank and East Jerusalem over the next several years.¹⁵² Furthermore, Israel has approved the development of roads and highways to connect Israeli settlements, while simultaneously transporting Palestinians directly from Ramallah to Bethlehem, without access to Jerusalem.¹⁵³

2.3.2 | Addressing Human Rights Violations

Consequences stemming from the unilateral expansion of settlements have created a plethora of human rights issues between Palestinians and Israelis. Within the areas of Israeli

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, 2016. Resolution 2334 (December 23, 2016) [Online]. S/RES/2334.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ European Parliament (2013) *Area C: More than 60% of the occupied West Bank is threatened by Israeli annexation*.

¹⁵¹ “Humanitarian Facts and Figures.” *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory*, United Nations, 2017, www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-facts-and-figures.

¹⁵² European Union Representative West Bank and Gaza (2018) *Six-Month Report on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem*.

¹⁵³ European Union Representative West Bank and Gaza, 2018.

settlements, Palestinians are continually denied access to water and electricity at the same rates as Israeli settlers. The added violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians due to the increase in settlements have intensified the conflict.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the displacement of approximately 17,700 Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has increased tensions between the Palestinians and Israelis.¹⁵⁵ Both the EU and U.S. have recognized the human rights violations committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.¹⁵⁶ ¹⁵⁷ The 2017 European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine states that:

The lack of control over land, water, physical boundaries and revenue; the administrative and political fragmentation; a discriminatory planning environment of fundamental uncertainty; and the regular and persistent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law prevent the Palestinian society and economy from realizing their potential in all respects.¹⁵⁸

The continued disregard for Palestinian human rights undermines the possibility for a two-state solution, and furthermore, peace between Israel and Palestine. Israel's recognition of fundamental human rights for Palestinians is essential for addressing a two-state solution. The U.S. and EU should utilize their diplomatic and economic ties to Israel in order to address human rights violations against Palestinians.

2.3.3 | The Problem of the EU - A Cohesive Response Without Strength to Act

The European Union has closely aligned its approach with that of the United Nations. Following Israel's announcement of its plans to construct over two thousand settlements in the West Bank in 2018, the EU released a statement denouncing Israeli settlements as detrimental to

¹⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, 2019.

¹⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, 2019.

¹⁵⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. *Israel Human Rights Report 2017*.

¹⁵⁷ European External Action Service, (2017) *European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine*, European Union.

¹⁵⁸ United States Department of State, *Israel Human Rights Report 2017*.

peace and illegal under international law, “as reaffirmed in UN Resolution 2334.”¹⁵⁹ Despite the EU’s consistent response to the issue of settlements, it lacks the hard power and influence in the region to act alone.

Historically, the EU has prioritized the Middle East Peace Process and its role in facilitating a two-state solution. The former EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana even stated that a two-state solution was not only vital for the Middle East, but “fundamental to [Europe’s] own security”.¹⁶⁰ More recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emphasized the importance of the Middle East Peace Process and ending the stalemate between Israel and Palestine.¹⁶¹

The instability and strife between Israel and Palestine threatens European economic interests in the region. The EU is, in fact, the top external trading partner with Israel, and a significant energy purchaser.¹⁶² The European Commission reports that the EU exported goods amounting to EUR 21.4 billion in 2017, and imported EUR 14.7 billion.¹⁶³ Given its strategic economic interests in the region, the EU has made it a priority to contribute economic aid to both Palestine and Israel.¹⁶⁴ The unique economic relationship the EU holds in the region, especially with Israel, is one of the strongest levers it possesses when confronting Israel.

Despite the EU’s strong economic ties to the parties, Israeli and Palestinian trust in Europe to act as a strong leader and mediator in the Middle East Peace Process is limited. This is due to a combination of historical diplomatic circumstances, such as French President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to align France with its Arab partners preceding the 1967 Six-Day War, as well as the EU’s history in siding with Palestine.¹⁶⁵ Europe’s inability to exert power in the region to

¹⁵⁹ Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations (2018), *EU Statement-United Nations Security Council: Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question*.

¹⁶⁰ Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

¹⁶¹ Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

¹⁶² Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

¹⁶³ “Israel.” *European Commission Directorate-General for Trade*, European Commission, 2018, ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/israel/.

¹⁶⁴ Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

¹⁶⁵ Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

counter U.S. alignment with Israel, ironically has left Palestine dependent on the U.S. to advance the Peace Process.¹⁶⁶ This is true in the UN, where Europe has been unsuccessful in countering U.S. support for Israel.

Because of this lack of trust, the EU cannot address the issue of Israeli settlements alone. In fact, it would be in the best interests of Europe to find middle ground with the U.S., due to its influential relationship with Palestine and Israel, to reach a joint response to settlements and borders. Without utilizing the transatlantic partnership with the U.S., Europe will not be able to exert real influence over this issue.

2.3.4 | The U.S. As an Inconsistent Mediator

In February of 2017, before President Trump planned to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the White House released a statement addressing the recent enlargement of Israeli settlements. Although it reaffirmed the goal to attain peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, it also stated that the United States does not find that “the existence of settlements” were “an impediment to peace”.¹⁶⁷ The statement is an example of the U.S.’s new, and so far ambiguous, stance on key elements of a two state solution. Though it purported to affirm the U.S.’s long-standing goal to attain regional peace in Palestine and Israel, it hints that the U.S. is abandoning the existing framework for a two-state solution.

The recent U.S. inconsistency in its policy towards Israel and Palestine leaves stakeholders confused and uncertain. Recent statements by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, adds to the confusion. In an interview with an Israeli news site in 2017, Friedman validated Israeli settlements in the West Bank as “part of Israel”.¹⁶⁸ In response to the Ambassador’s remarks, a State Department spokeswoman indicated that Friedman’s comments do not

¹⁶⁶ Miller, “Europe’s Palestine Problem.” 2011.

¹⁶⁷ United States, Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the Press Secretary*. February 2, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary/>.

¹⁶⁸ Morris, Loveday. “U.S. Ambassador Breaks with Policy: ‘I Think the Settlements Are Part of Israel’.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 29 Sept. 2017.

indicate a shift in U.S. policy, noting that other Administration figures, such as Jared Kushner, spoke with greater authority. The varying narratives from U.S. officials have left Palestinians angered and confused.¹⁶⁹

Current U.S. policy appears to reflect an interest in strengthening relations with Israel, while isolating Palestine until it must concede to U.S.-Israel terms. The U.S. ambassador to Israel even categorized U.S. policy as a “bankruptcy-type deal”.¹⁷⁰ Close ties with Israel have been reinforced by the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.

There has long been support for Israel within the U.S., however, there now exists new evangelical religious motivations behind the U.S.’s relationship with Israel. In fact, this constituency of American evangelicalists is an important part of Trump’s base and maintains reliable support for Netanyahu.¹⁷¹ This intense pro-Israel sentiment is seen in the current U.S. administration, in which Trump has surrounded himself with staunch pro-Israel advisors, such as Friedman.¹⁷²

To bring the Palestinians back to negotiations, the U.S. has taken actions to reduce Palestinian resolve. The United States has recently announced its defunding of Palestinian aid, the closing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s D.C. office, as well as the closing of USAID offices in the West Bank and Gaza. This punitive policy ignores important Palestinian motives, and could lead to the complete breaking of Palestinian trust in the U.S.¹⁷³ The breaking of trust between Palestine and the U.S. enforces the need for European initiative in addressing Israeli settlements, and preserving the integrity of the Middle East Peace Process.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Miller, Andrew. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2019, carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/23/israeli-palestinian-conflict-is-not-bankruptcy-sale-pub-78208.

¹⁷¹ Landler, Mark. "Trump Finds Support After the Pittsburgh Massacre, From the Israeli Government." *The New York Times*. 01 Nov. 2018. *The New York Times*. 02 Mar. 2019 <<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/us/politics/trump-visits-pittsburgh-shooting-israel.html>>.

¹⁷² Hassan, “Trump’s Plan for Israel and Palestine: One More Step Away From Peace.” 2018.

¹⁷³ Miller, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Not a Bankruptcy Sale.” 2019.

2.3.5 | Mitigating EU and U.S. Weaknesses Through Transatlantic Cooperation

The unchallenged expansion of Israeli settlements has not only undermined the possibility of a two-state solution but has also compromised the U.S. and the EU position to act as mediators and advocates for the Middle East Peace Process. Recent changes in U.S. policies have further undermined Palestinian faith in Washington as an honest partner, simultaneously the EU has yet to prove its ability to exert real power and influence in the region. Meanwhile, tensions between the Israelis and Palestinians have intensified as the two populations clash over territorial boundaries.

Where the United States now lacks a coherent policy in the region, the EU asserts strong consensus over both the issue of settlements and its detrimental effects on the possibility of peace. On the other hand, where the EU lacks the ability to exert influence on Israel and Palestine, the United States retains the potential ability to usher in change in the region and initiate momentum toward ending the political stalemate in negotiations. By utilizing the unique transatlantic relationship, the weaknesses of the U.S. and Europe can be mitigated, and their strengths applied toward tackling the issue of Israeli settlements, in order to facilitate renewed peace talks.

The EU and U.S. also share common security interests in the region. In both the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the U.S. National Defense Strategy, combating terrorism in the Middle East is a top priority.¹⁷⁴ ¹⁷⁵ Moreover, the U.S., EU, and Israel share strong concerns over Iran's activities in Syria. These shared security interests should be utilized to find middle ground amongst the three powers.

¹⁷⁴ Council of the European Union (2017) *CFSP Report--Our Priorities 2017*.

¹⁷⁵ United States, Congress, "Summary of National Defense Strategy." *Summary of National Defense Strategy*, Department of Defense, 2018, pp. 1–14.

To address the corrosive issue of settlements, the EU and U.S. will need to bring Israel back to the negotiating table. In the past Israel has stated that it was prepared to make “painful concessions” to ensure peace. In fact, in 2005 Israel hinted at relinquishing settlements in Gaza and the West Bank.¹⁷⁶ However, as of now, Israel faces no pressure to compromise on its settlements. Due to current U.S. policy towards Israel and settlements, the EU will need to leverage its economic influence with Israel to emphasize its opposition to the expansion of settlements.

Transatlantic Strategies for Negotiating with Israel

Rather than directly sanctioning Israel, the EU should consider using the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan to bring Israel back to negotiations. The EU and Israel maintain strong technology and information sharing capabilities, specifically through the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX). Israel is the most frequent user of TAIEX of the southern ENP partner countries and has especially made use of TAIEX in collaboration with its Ministry of Energy.¹⁷⁷ The EU's ability to leverage TAIEX to express its objection to Israeli settlements could help to advance EU policy objectives regarding settlements and the Middle East Peace Process.

Israel's recent alarm over Iran's presence in Syria, especially near the sensitive Golan Heights, has been a focal point in Israel's interest in preserving the U.S. troop presence in the region. This insecurity is seen in Israel's recent airstrikes targeted against Iran along the Israeli-Syrian border.¹⁷⁸ Israel's position on the Iranian threat is clear; for example, when speaking at a Munich security conference in 2018, Netanyahu held up a piece of downed Iranian drone and warned the Iranian Foreign Minister to “not test Israel's resolve”.¹⁷⁹ The growing sense of

¹⁷⁶ “Israel and the Palestinians: Can Settlement Issue Be Solved?” *BBC News*, BBC, 16 Feb. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38458884.

¹⁷⁷ European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission (2018) *Israel*.

¹⁷⁸ Lieberman, Oren. “Israel, Iran Exchange Fire as Tensions Soar.” *CNN*, Cable News Network, 22 Jan. 2019, edition.cnn.com/2019/01/21/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-targets-syria-intl/index.html.

¹⁷⁹ “Benjamin Netanyahu Tells Iran to Not Test 'Israel's Resolve'.” *BBC News*, BBC, 18 Feb. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-43104518/benjamin-netanyahu-tells-iran-to-not-test-israel-s-resolve.

insecurity stemming from Iran's proximity to Israeli borders may create an opening for Middle East Peace negotiations.

Addressing Hezbollah's status as a terrorist organization in the United Nations Security Council would offer Israel proof of European and U.S. support for its security interests. As discussed in the previous section, Hezbollah's terrorist actions have led to the U.S. and EU to recognize the entity as a terrorist organization. However, the UN has yet to designate the entity as a terrorist organization, something Netanyahu has urged the council to pursue.¹⁸⁰ If the U.S. and its European partners in the UN lobby for recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, Israel might be incentivized to participate in negotiations.

Gaining Russian support is essential for achieving a Security Council resolution. The recent Syrian peace talks and substantial withdrawal of U.S. troops, offer an opening to gain Russian support in addressing Hezbollah's terrorist affiliations. Though Russia has viewed Hezbollah as a strong partner in combating Syrian rebel forces, their end goals for Syria differ greatly. While Hezbollah, like Iran, benefits from a weak state in Syria, Russia is spearheading peace talks to reinstate a strong centralized government.¹⁸¹ The contending spheres of influence in Syria suggest problems for Iran and Russia in the near future. The changing dynamics in Syria may create an opportunity to build support against Hezbollah in the UNSC. If the European permanent members and the U.S. make efforts to establish a common policy towards Hezbollah, Israel might be more amenable to curtailing settlement activity and resume negotiations.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***Establishing a consistent EU-U.S. response to Israeli settlements to preserve future opportunities for a two-state solution.***

¹⁸⁰ "Israel Urges UN Action over Hezbollah 'Attack Tunnels'." *BBC News*, BBC, 19 Dec. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46618160.

¹⁸¹ Corbeil, Alexander. "Russia Is Learning About Hezbollah." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 Jan. 2017, carnegieendowment.org/sada/67651.

- *Encourage the U.S. to align its policies towards settlements with the EU by emphasizing the shared security interests in the region. The EU should emphasize:*
 - *Increased insecurity from regional conflict inflicted by settlements.*
 - *Compromising and conflicting nature of Israeli settlements to achieve long term peace.*
- *Incentivize Israeli cooperation over settlements by leveraging Israeli participation in information and technology sharing through TAIEX.*
- *Enlist U.S. support and incentivize Israel to negotiate settlements to meet the standard of international law, by pursuing UN recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.*
- *Encourage the acknowledgment by Israel of international human rights for Palestinians living in Area C and other Israeli controlled areas to maintain the integrity of the Middle East Peace Process. This should address: The Israeli restriction of water and electricity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.*

CHAPTER 3 | TOWARDS A MORE COHERENT EU – CHINA POLICY

MAGGIE FAN, HARRY LIU

"The EU has used its engagement with China on infrastructure connections between Europe and Asia to align investment better with EU strategic networks and to promote the principles of transparency, economic and social sustainability."

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

China's unfair trade practices, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and 5G network development raise economic and security concerns in Europe as well as in America. As a result, both the EU and U.S. have been demanding a more holistic economic reform to be carried out by the Chinese government.¹⁸² This shared goal requires effective cooperation between the EU and U.S. However, trade disputes, which have recently triggered threats and the imposition of tariffs on certain European products, have strained the transatlantic relationship. This provides a window of opportunity for the Chinese government to advance its economic interests in Europe in ways that may not align with European interests. Already, the EU sees growing division among its member states on policy decisions regarding China. Thus, the EU should redouble efforts to reach a unified China policy under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and then enhance cooperation with the United States to more effectively advance its own interests with the U.S. and China and improve the transatlantic relationship.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- *A Unified China Policy under the CFSP*
- *Enhancing the EU-US cooperation mechanism under the Executive Working Group (EWG)*

¹⁸² Dempsey, Judy. "Judy Asks: Is Europe Tough Enough on China?" *Carnegie Europe*, carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/78148, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

3.1 | BRI's Geopolitical Significance for the Transatlantic Relationship

Under the backdrop of trade tensions in the transatlantic relationship, and in regard to the upholding of liberal values and international rules, the EU is challenged to find a unified stance towards China. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes the 16+1 project and infrastructure investment and development in major European ports, pose certain economic concerns within EU markets and territories. Some countries, such as Germany and France, feel obligated to uphold international rules and to take a tougher stance towards China. Others, such as Italy, Greece, Portugal, and the 16+1 countries diverge from those concerns, and maintain a less skeptical stance towards China because of its economic incentives.

Under the BRI and 16+1 initiative, large amounts of Chinese investment have been flowing into Europe, and the EU sees it as an opportunity for economic growth. However, in order to reach a unified EU policy on China, EU cooperation and representation among all member states, particularly those who have increasing dependencies on China's influence in the region, will be necessary in maintaining control of the Single European Market. The EU needs to clarify the difference between investments that meet European interests and investments that negatively affect Europe's security and market competitiveness.¹⁸³ A unified China policy can only be realized under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework. However, the CFSP requires unanimous agreement on any decisions made under its jurisdiction, which makes reaching a coherent EU strategy towards China difficult because all European countries have the ability to veto major decisions. The weight of a unified China policy in the EU would assure President Trump that the EU would provide unwavering support for U.S. demand for China's structural economic reform.

Failures to reach a coherent strategy would deepen the divisions within the Union, increase the risk of provoking President Trump and putting his threats into practice, and disrupt bilateral

¹⁸³ Duchâtel, Mathieu, and Alexandre Sheldon Duplaix. "Blue China: Navigating the Maritime Silk Road to Europe." *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 23 Apr. 2018, www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/blue_china_navigating_the_maritime_silk_road_to_europe, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

trade between the EU and China. Provocation of U.S.-EU trade tensions and disputes would not only hold back European policy makers in seeking more cooperation with the U.S., but also prolong the unfair trade practices that the U.S. and EU endure in the Chinese market. The EU cannot afford to lose China or provoke the United States. As the EU's biggest trading partner and long-time ally in protecting international norms and liberal values, the U.S. seems to be in a reasonably good position to help the Union preserve and advance its interests.

BRI Implications for the EU and U.S.

The Belt and Road Initiative is a principle diplomatic agenda between China and Europe to promote Sino-European connectivity through an ambitious set of infrastructure, construction, and finance projects. The project combines the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that would eventually link China to Europe.¹⁸⁴ Once finished, it would extend across areas in South East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.¹⁸⁵ China's BRI project aims to connect the largest untapped markets in the world through extensive trade and infrastructure development. It seeks to establish Eurasia as the most significant economic market in the world.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, the BRI serves as an entrance into the Single European Market, as 11 out of 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) states are fully integrated into the initiative. This grants China access and the opportunity to use EU policy, which can be used to adjust European regulations to advance Chinese interests.

As a result, China's growing involvement in Europe poses potential risks to the EU-U.S. liberal economic system. According to the 2018 Trump Administration's U.S. National Security Strategy, China is considered a "strategic competitor" that is using various means, including the

¹⁸⁴ Casarini, Nicola. "Is Europe to Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative?" Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09729. Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Chance, Alek. "American Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative." Institute for China-America Studies, Nov. 2016, <https://chinaus-icas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/American-Perspectives-on-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 25. 2019.

BRI, to threaten “American influence and interests, and attempt to erode American security and prosperity.”¹⁸⁷

However, the U.S. casts doubt on its position as the EU’s largest trading partner by imposing tariffs on EU partners, which paved opportunities for China to fill this role.¹⁸⁸ For China, the BRI’s entry into the European market allows its economy to naturalize in the world’s largest integrated market and shift to a national market-based economy. The BRI project is also designed to increase Beijing’s geopolitical influence across the Eurasian continent, limiting the presence of the U.S., and thereby furthering the strains on the U.S.-China relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the BRI is set to increase China’s trade through its trading channels and increase cooperation and coordination between the leaders and governments of participating countries. Therefore, this could further restrict U.S. access to parts of the new developing global marketplace and undermine the liberal international order established by the U.S. With these risks present for both the EU and U.S., there are growing concerns that the BRI attempts to challenge the liberal economic order by destabilizing European unity, buying influence (including through cooperation), practicing unfair trade agreements, and targeting investment in strategic industries.

BRI Project: 16+1 Strategy

An element of the BRI is the 16+1 project, which not only further challenges the U.S., but is also a factor in the division within the European Union. The BRI infrastructure project has triggered concerns regarding Beijing’s use of “divide and rule” tactics.¹⁸⁹ The 16+1 framework, which is explicitly a part of the BRI project, intensifies cooperation between China and the 16 participating Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which include Albania, Bosnia,

¹⁸⁷ Ohman, Viking. "Responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative: Two Steps for a European Strategy." Mercator Institute for China Studies. June 26, 2018. <https://www.merics.org/cn/node/7506>, Accessed February 08, 2019.

¹⁸⁸ Meltzer, J. (2019). “China’s One Belt One Road initiative: A view from the United States.” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-a-view-from-the-united-states/>, Accessed 8 Feb. 2019.

¹⁸⁹ Grieger, Gisela. “One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's Regional Integration Initiative.” *European Parliamentary*, July 2016, [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)586608_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI(2016)586608_EN.pdf). Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.¹⁹⁰ CEE countries have economic aspirations that demand large external financial support, and the BRI project offers an opportunity to reduce the infrastructure and transportation gap between the CEE countries and Western Europe.¹⁹¹ High-Speed Rail (HSR) is one of the most crucial projects that would promote integration with the CEE countries. For example, Serbia last upgraded its High-Speed Rail line in 1980, at a time when the EU did not offer sufficient funding and technological support for modernizing HSR infrastructure.¹⁹² The regions of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe are situated at “the intersection of Chinese geopolitical and investment strategies”.¹⁹³ These countries face difficulties in upgrading domestic public transportation systems and facilities because of the government debt crisis and lack of financial help.¹⁹⁴ Because of their geopolitical significance, however, China has targeted them through the BRI. On the other hand, Western and Northern EU countries, which have sufficient funding and modernized infrastructure, seldom participate in the BRI.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, the BRI, which seeks to take advantage of specific EU economic weaknesses and inadequate infrastructure, has begun to undermine European unity by pursuing an integrative strategy with CEE states.

BRI Interests in Greek Ports

In addition to China’s involvement in the CEE states, the BRI aims to solidify China’s geopolitical and economic interests in the Mediterranean ports. For example, Athen’s Piraeus Harbor represents one of the most significant infrastructures of the Chinese market integration strategy in Europe. As displayed in Figure 2, since 2016, the China Ocean Shipping Company

¹⁹⁰ Wang, Xieshu. “One Belt One Road and the Reconfiguration of China-EU Relations.” *CEPN*, Mar. 2017. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01499020/document>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Pavličević, Dragan. “China’s Railway Diplomacy in the Balkans.” *Jamestown*, 23 Oct. 2014, <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-railway-diplomacy-in-the-balkans/>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

¹⁹³ Wang, Xieshu. “One Belt One Road and the Reconfiguration of China-EU Relations.” *CEPN*, Mar. 2017. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01499020/document>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

(COSCO) acquired and controlled 51% of the Greek Port Authority and gained an additional 16% stake following substantial investments.¹⁹⁶

Figure 1: COSCO Investments in Piraeus Port

2009	COSCO invested in the port's infrastructure and has brought in other leading operators (Hewlett Packard, Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company).
April 2016	COSCO gained the majority 51% stake of the Piraeus Port Authority for €350 million.
August 2016	COSCO increased its current acquisition to a 67% stake of the Piraeus Port Authority for a total €368.5 million.
2016-2025	COSCO will invest €350 million over the next decade to improve the port's facilities.

The acquisition of the Piraeus port, a major transshipment hub, grants China convenient export access to achieve the Maritime Silk Road initiative on the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, China has committed to investing in the high-speed railway that connects Piraeus with Budapest, which can further link the Black Sea port of Constanta to Vienna via Budapest. This has opened new trading routes between China and the CEE states, which would substantially reduce the transportation time for shipping Chinese goods by ten days — a very substantial saving in today's global marketplace.¹⁹⁸ Such efficiency increases the competitive position of Chinese companies in the European market.

The EU Response to BRI - Using the CFIUS as a Model

In 2018, the European Parliament and the Council of European Union approved the regulation of establishing a framework for screening foreign direct investments (FDIs) into the European Union, effective on March 5th, 2019.¹⁹⁹ This provides a coordinated system to screen potential security and public order issues over foreign investments. In this mechanism, the European Commission would be obliged to review all Chinese investments at the national level, including

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Corre, P. (2017). "Europe's mixed views on China's One Belt, One Road initiative." Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/23/europes-mixed-views-on-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/>, Accessed 11 Feb. 2019.

¹⁹⁸ Grieger, Gisela. "One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's Regional Integration Initiative." *European Parliamentary*, July 2016, [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)586608_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI(2016)586608_EN.pdf). Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

¹⁹⁹ "EU Adopts CFIUS-like Framework for Sake of National Security." *The National Law Review*, National Law Review, 19 Dec. 2018, www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-adopts-cfius-framework-sake-national-security, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

the entire BRI. Though the framework is effective in theory, the non-legally binding element of it presents certain limitations on its long-term application.²⁰⁰ In response to these limitations, the EU's ability to issue a binding opinion to enhance the effectiveness of the screening system on Chinese investments would protect the national security and order of any EU member states.

Although the Regulation was approved, there are several gaps that could be addressed by following a durable framework, such as the framework of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The CFIUS is "an interagency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States."²⁰¹ The U.S. approach to international investment aims to upgrade and strengthen an "open and rules-based system," according to U.S. national security and economic interests.²⁰² According to the Dealreporter, the CFIUS's screenings of China's FDI have successfully blocked 57% of Chinese Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) investments under the Trump Administration in 2018.²⁰³ The U.S. screening mechanism provides significant protection to ensure that proposed Chinese investments conform to U.S. strategic and economic interests. For example, CFIUS has taken action to block COSCO Shipping Holding's USD 6.3 billion acquisition of Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), the largest Chinese transaction since 2017, from entering U.S. markets.²⁰⁴ COSCO is the same Chinese company that acquired a majority share in the Piraeus port in the EU. Thus, CFIUS offers a practical model for EU policymakers seeking to adopt a more comprehensive inspection of proposed FDI for national security implications.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ "U.S. Department of the Treasury." *Role of the Treasury*, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²⁰² Jackson, James K. "The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)." *Congressional Research Service*, 3 July 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²⁰³ "CFIUS' Chinese Deal Reviews Have Steady 57% 'Success' Rate under Trump Administration – Data Analysis." *Dealreporter*, 27 July 2018, https://www.dorsey.com/~media/Files/Uploads/Images/Ward_CFIUS-Chinese-Deal-Reviews, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

The application of a CFIUS framework in the EU aims to increase collaboration and coordination between the U.S. government agencies and the European Commission in verifying and preventing Chinese investment that could potentially undermine national security. The EU should follow CFIUS criteria to standardize its new regulation. This includes examining whether current foreign investments have the potential to reduce any technological and industrial advantage of EU member states and assessing Chinese investments in their use of European transportation assets and other critical infrastructure.²⁰⁵ Beyond a CFIUS-style review mechanism, other gaps in the newly implemented EU regulation should be addressed by adding a net economic benefit test to the existing national interest test that the European Council administers.²⁰⁶

Furthermore, Europe should consider U.S. investment standards, such as prohibiting investments in a European industry by Chinese companies whose government prohibits investments in the same industry.²⁰⁷ This is important as it will ensure equal competition between European firms and Chinese companies, especially those financially supported by the Chinese government. It is crucial for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to openly display confidential information with EU authorities and share economic results across borders. The EU should urge China to follow the European and international rule of law and trading norms. Such reinforcement will encourage Chinese investors to become more accountable and transparent while participating in the BRI.

In addition to endorsing an EU-wide screening system, the EU should establish guidelines on the workings of the screening mechanisms, and adequately explain the evaluation of financial contracts, infrastructure frames, and bilateral agreements within the BRI project. This mission requires cooperation with the U.S. on consolidating the rules-based coordination and can improve the capability of the EU to check the potential risks and opportunities posed by China

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Jackson, James K. "The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)." *Congressional Research Service*, 3 July 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

by reciprocity. If the EU screening system demonstrates that China fails to follow the conventional norms of trade and exchanges on a broad scale, blocking the BRI infrastructure and Chinese investments would be necessary to protect the single market and maintain European economic interests.

The most effective way to advance the EU's position in its trade relations with China while defending the free market and liberal values is to cooperate with the United States. To achieve cooperation, the paramount task for the EU is to put forth a unified China policy. This requires all EU member states to reach a unanimously agreed CFSP decision regarding future dealings with China. Italy, Greece, Poland, Portugal, and Hungary have been reluctant to support a solid, unified China policy that subjects Chinese investment and relations to closer scrutiny. Those countries are afraid that a European-wide China policy would take away the current economic benefits brought by individual relationships with the Chinese government. For Italy, the share of its exports to China has shown the greatest increase amongst EU states in recent years. From 2016 to 2017, Italian export to China increased by 24.8%.²⁰⁸ Greece has received large amounts of Chinese investment in the past few years. Similarly, in Hungary, Chinese companies have invested heavily and have undertaken numerous construction projects for Hungarian infrastructure.²⁰⁹ Greece and Hungary have already acted to block the EU's draft everyday decisions on China. Both have "repeatedly blocked EU statements criticizing China's human rights record."²¹⁰ Therefore, negotiations that involve influencing those countries would be needed to realize the unified stance toward China. As long as the countries in question could be convinced that the unified policy would be beneficial, decisions towards it would be less likely to be vetoed. The EU could then use the weight of the combined strategy to assure President

²⁰⁸ "Italy's Top Trading Partners." *World's Top Exports*, 13 Jan. 2019, <http://www.worldstopexports.com/italys-top-import-partners/>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²⁰⁹ Matura, Tamas. "Chinese Investment in Hungary: Few Results but Great Expectations." *Chinfluence*, 14 Feb. 2018, <http://www.chinfluence.eu/chinese-investment-hungary-results-great-expectations/>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹⁰ Emmont, Robin, and Angeliki Koutantou. "Greece Blocks UN Statement on China Human Rights at U.N." *Reuters*, 18 Jun. 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

Trump that the EU was able to provide unswerving support for the U.S. demand for China's structural economic reform — also a long-standing European policy objective.

3.2 | Leveraging China's Economic Interests in the EU

Once the EU can establish coordination across the unified China policy within the CSFP, seeking an enhanced US-EU cooperation mechanism under an Executive Working Group (EWG) will be critical in achieving foreign and economic policy interests. Under the EWG framework, the EU and US can coordinate their interests in China through synchronized action and progressive dialogue. For example, their interests in seeking better protection for labor rights in China and intellectual standards related to the 5G network can be realized by exerting pressure on the economic interests of Chinese companies. Once a closer working relationship is established by the EWG, the US and EU should seek the application of the cyber defense screening framework from NATO to mitigate the 5G network involvement in Western infrastructures. China's economic interests in those areas could, in turn, be used as bargaining chips to demand labor reforms and respect of security and privacy standards of the 5G network. The EWG would be a useful platform to coordinate such economic and diplomatic activities.

One way to exert pressures on the economic interests of Chinese companies is to enact coherent and binding legislation for European imports of goods. This legislation would enhance the European Commission's (EC) current requirements for technical standardization, which only asks for voluntary applications of harmonized standards from manufacturers. Compliance with

Case Study: Huawei – What is 5G

Fifth-generation wireless (5G) is “the latest iteration of cellular technology, engineered to greatly increase the speed and responsiveness of wireless networks”. With the deployment of 5G network, data could travel over wireless connections at speed as high as 20 Gbps, which exceeds wireline network speeds. It can “offer latency of 1 ms or lower for uses that require real-time feedback”. 5G will also enable to tremendously increase the amount of data that transmits over wireless systems because of “more available bandwidth and advanced antenna technology”.

Sources Used: Search Networking

those standards should be mandatory. As a result, Chinese manufacturers would be required to meet the production standards of the European Union. If their products failed to do so, the EU's customs authorities could then suspend the release of those products.

It is of vital importance to cooperate with the U.S. to devise the security screening system, which examines the legal procedures of the Huawei 5G network.²¹¹ This may need the participation of the U.S.-led NATO military alliance through coordination with the EU on overseeing 5G networks. The overall ability provided in NATO would further help detect and defend network threats from infrastructure providers. This will strengthen the solidarity on protecting regional security between the U.S. and EU and upgrade international legal standards based on common transatlantic interest.

According to the Cyber Defense Policy in NATO, NATO adapted its Cyber Defense Pledge to strengthen and enhance national cyber defenses as a matter of priority.²¹² Each member state is obliged to fulfill the Alliance's core principle of resilient cyber defenses and cooperative security.²¹³ Cooperation of 5G networks involving European allies using Huawei 5G technology would breach the duty of cyber protection and jeopardize transatlantic security.

In 2015, the EU and China signed an agreement on cooperation on the 5G project, with the commitment to conduct joint development and research.²¹⁴ It offers European states advanced technologies at competitive prices. Nevertheless, the involvement of the Chinese company Huawei 5G network poses potential risks for cyber intervention, which jeopardize regional security in the transatlantic alliance. The standards and intellectual norms practiced by Chinese

²¹¹ Rouse, Margaret. "What Is 5G? - Definition from WhatIs.com." *SearchNetworking*, <https://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/5G>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹² "Cyber Defence." *NATO*, 16 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm?fbclid=IwAR0aPIRKwxrnzYGnPP5mwQZOCgRnWDrwYfSTk8epv1Fu6fQfKuG1vXyLO7c, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Elmer, Keegan Elmer. "EU Ban on Chinese Technology Would Imperil Trade, Analysts Say." *South China Morning Post*, 7 Feb. 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185085/eu-ban-chinese-technology-5g-revolution-would-hit-trade>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

companies fall short of international standards shared by the EU and the U.S., allowing the Chinese government to spy on users' communication and intelligence.

The U.S. has raised potential security concerns over Chinese technology in an effort to convince European allies to ban Huawei as a 5G supplier. For its part, the U.S. has banned the use of Chinese telecom providers, like Huawei, due to the associated security vulnerability.²¹⁵ Huawei has become the world's largest telecommunication manufacturer.²¹⁶ The Huawei reputation in the U.S. has been seriously tarnished, as it faces charges for stealing intellectual property from the U.S. hardware maker, Cisco, and violating various international economic sanctions.²¹⁷ The U.S. Department of Justice states that Huawei has been charged with Theft of Trade Secrets, Wire Fraud, and Obstruction of Justice.²¹⁸ One of the most significant security concerns about Huawei is that Chinese law "demands private companies and individuals cooperate with national intelligence agencies."²¹⁹ This means that Huawei could submit private information to the Chinese authorities, which violates the intellectual standards and threatens the security of user entities.

Not only can the deployment of Huawei equipment allow Chinese agencies to violate terms of privacy by providing confidential information of European states, but this also threatens the transatlantic communication and military links with the U.S. Enlisting NATO's Cyber Security

²¹⁵ Chiacu , Doina, and Patricia Zengerle Reuters. "US Intelligence Officials All Say They Wouldn't Use a Chinese-Made Huawei or ZTE Phone for Fear of Spying." *Business Insider*, 14 Feb. 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-intelligence-officials-say-chinese-made-huawei-zte-maybe-not-secure-2018-2?IR=T&fbclid=IwAR06PPw-y6dyYOOipj55xZveGkj1THBREoDxbklTzWMgedBNe8aqw01i-tE>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹⁶ MEYER , DAVID. "U.S. Urges Other Countries to Shun Huawei, Citing Espionage Risk." *Fortune*, 13 Nov. 2018, <http://fortune.com/2018/11/23/us-huawei-espionage/?fbclid=IwAR06PPw-y6dyYOOipj55xZveGkj1THBREoDxbklTzWMgedBNe8aqw01i-tE>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹⁷ Cilluffo, Frank J., and Sharon L. Cardash. "Global Scrutiny of Huawei Increases Amid Privacy and National Security Concerns." *Pacific Standard*, 21 Dec. 2018, <https://psmag.com/economics/global-scrutiny-of-huawei-increases>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹⁸ Doffman, Zak. "U.S., U.K. And E.U. Look Set To Deal Death Blows To Huawei's 5G Ambitions." *Forbes*, 18 Feb. 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/02/03/2018-was-a-disaster-for-huawei-but-heres-why-2019-will-be-much-worse/#77abfd44714b>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²¹⁹ Elmer , Keegan Elmer. "EU Ban on Chinese Technology Would Imperil Trade, Analysts Say." *South China Morning Post*, 7 Feb. 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185085/eu-ban-chinese-technology-5g-revolution-would-hit-trade>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

framework to apply and develop a more robust cyber defense system will be critical to detect any security breaches of the 5G network and preserve stability and cyber security in the transatlantic community.

3.3 | Human Rights – Labor Issues in China

When engaging with China, there are principles that the EU must follow, and the respect for human rights is one of the most important of these.²²⁰ This principle is repeatedly emphasized in most significant document regarding China relations. Last year, at the 20th EU-China Summit, human rights issues were brought up again as the main focus for reinforcing the partnership between the sides.²²¹ However, little improvement in human rights conditions in China has been made; indeed, conditions are deteriorating at a rate faster than ever before. Since he became Communist Party General Secretary in 2012 and President in 2013, President Xi Jinping has tightened the crackdown on lawyers, activists, journalists, and ethnic minorities.²²² A U.S. congressional report published last year by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) concluded that the human rights situation in China is “dire” and continues a “downward trajectory, by virtually every measure.”²²³

There are growing restrictions on expression, the continuation of the use of arbitrary detention and “black jails,” persistence of labor rights violations, and increasing suppression of ethnic minorities, etc. Among them, the persistence of labor rights violations is the most pertinent to the economic exchanges in the EU-China-U.S. triangle. This is because several European and American imports from China are mass-produced products manufactured by factory workers

²²⁰ Political and Security Committee, “CFSP Report – Our priorities in 2017.” *Council of the European Union*, 5 Jul. 2017, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10650-2017-INIT/en/pdf>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²¹ “Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit.” *European External Action Service*, 17 Jul. 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/48424/Joint%20statement%20of%20the%2020th%20EU-China%20Summit, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²² “China Events of 2017.” *Human Rights Watch*, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²³ “2018 Annual Report.” *Congressional – Executive Commission on China*, 2018. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Executive%20Summary_0.pdf, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

who are deprived of the basic rights set forth by international rules.²²⁴ For the EU, those products are mainly “industrial and consumer goods, machinery and equipment, and footwear and clothing.”²²⁵ For the U.S., they are mostly electrical machinery, machinery, furniture and bedding, toys and sports equipment, and plastics.²²⁶ Behind those products, the factory workers suffer from harsh working conditions and lack of union protections. According to the CECC report, the Chinese government “reported an increase in case of occupational disease and labor investigators to continue to document hazardous conditions in Chinese factories.”²²⁷ From 2015 to 2016, the number of cases of occupational disease increased from 29,180 to 31,789.²²⁸ Most of them were pneumoconiosis and other respiratory diseases.²²⁹ The factories owned by Catcher Technology, a supplier to IBM, HP, Dell, Sony, and Apple, were repeatedly reported to have hazardous working conditions.²³⁰ A Foxconn factory that makes products for Amazon was found to suffer from a lack of protective equipment and fire safety concerns, and inadequate safety training.²³¹

Moreover, workers have minimal capacity to obtain compensation for their illness.²³² Their rights to establish and join unions for purpose of collective bargaining is highly restricted as well.²³³ Those violations call “into question China’s stated commitment to the rule of law and its

²²⁴ “2018 Annual Report.” *Congressional – Executive Commission on China*, 2018, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Worker%20Rights.pdf, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²⁵ “China.” *European Commission*, 16 Apr. 2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²⁶ “The People’s Republic of China.” *Office of the United States Trade Representative*, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china>, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²⁷ “2018 Annual Report.” *Congressional – Executive Commission on China*, 2018. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Executive%20Summary_0.pdf, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²⁸ “2018 Annual Report.” *Congressional – Executive Commission on China*, 2018, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Worker%20Rights.pdf, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² “2018 Annual Report.” *Congressional – Executive Commission on China*, 2018. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Executive%20Summary_0.pdf, Accessed 25 Feb. 2019.

²³³ Ibid.

respect for international obligations.”²³⁴ Without addressing them, a unified China policy under CFSP is almost impossible to be realized. Otherwise, the EU would be in contravention of its own principles.

By using labor rights as a bargaining chip for Chinese cooperation, pushing an assessment system to evaluate the progress of the reforms can be created under the EWG framework. Under this system, an evaluation should be conducted every six months for the first five years by experts from both Europe and China. Such cooperation of expertise could lower the likelihood of criticisms from the Chinese government about violations of its sovereignty.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***A Unified China Policy under the CFSP***
 - *Influence EU member states in question to reach an unanimously agreed CFSP decision on China*
 - *Strengthen legally-binding elements of the new screening system for foreign direct investment (FDI) and enhance the system based on the CFIUS framework.*
- ***Enhancing the EU-US cooperation mechanism under the Executive Working Group (EWG)***
 - *Facilitate coordination with CFIUS and other U.S. government agencies to effectively adopt the CFIUS framework.*
 - *Foster progressive dialogues to materialize agenda items set forth by the EU and the U.S.*
 - *Pursue cooperation with NATO to oversee 5G networks by devising a security screening system.*
 - *Create an assessment system to evaluate China’s progress on labor reforms.*

²³⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4 | UTILIZING PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOR A STRONGER ALLIANCE

Public affairs have long shaped societies but never before has the world been more interconnected. It has become increasingly apparent that in order for nations and their policies to be successful, they must work to utilize various strategies to gain the support of global and local communities. This chapter will explore the various ways that public affairs strategies, specifically cultural diplomacy and social media, can be employed by the European Union in order to bolster the transatlantic alliance. This includes the management of media platforms by national regulators in order to maintain the continuity of free and fair information that can be accessed worldwide.

The first subsection will discuss the opportunities presented by lobbyists and influencers that can be utilized by the European Union in order to increase its clout in the transatlantic alliance. The consecutive subsection will analyze the challenges surrounding social media, specifically, disinformation. These investigations and recommendations are derived from polling data, which measure the responses of citizens in the United States and Europe. This chapter will look at specific instances in which public affairs strategies can mitigate current tensions or have the potential to lessen those in the future.

Topics discussed in this chapter can be applied across many fields, including those discussed in previous chapters of this report. Understanding the desires of the EU and U.S. is necessary to create a more successful and dynamic transatlantic alliance, and vital to multilateral cohesion to solve issues relating to PESCO, the Middle East, China and beyond.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- *Better utilizing public affairs and media to promote transatlantic interests and understanding.*
- *Employing lobbyist groups and various influencers as a means to further familiarize European interests within the United States.*

- *Monitoring and updating official media systems to ensure free and fair flow of information.*
- *Funding and analyzing more accurate and regular polling in both the United States and the European Union.*

4.1 | CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MAHIRA ADIPURA, MEREDITH DOBSON, EMILY HARRIS

“The EU will enhance its strategic communications, investing in and joining up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners.”

- Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy

Culture plays a central role in diplomacy and more importantly, the transatlantic alliance. Cultural diplomacy is a process that “reinforces the role of culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development,” while creating mutual understanding and promoting national interests.²³⁵ To strengthen the transatlantic alliance, it is necessary for the EU to continue to develop and extend its efforts of cultural diplomacy within the U.S. This idea of the use of culture in external relations is tied to the notion of soft power, defined as “the use of a country’s cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries to do something.”²³⁶ This has become increasingly important in the globalized world. Seen in this light, cultural diplomacy has never been more relevant and powerful. It is vital to have the ability to employ these influential, but often underestimated techniques. In this chapter, cultural diplomacy will be used to analyze public affairs strategies; these strategies can be used to exchange values and ideas across cultures and can be utilized in building a more successful multicultural partnership

²³⁵“Cultural Diplomacy (Working Definition).” *European Union*, Publications Office of the European Union, europa.eu/capacity4dev/pd-cd/wiki/cultural-diplomacy-working-definition.

²³⁶ “SOFT POWER | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary.” *Cambridge Dictionary*, dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power.

across the Atlantic. This can be done through the utilization of lobbyists and influencers by the EU to advance, advocate for, and create a platform of understanding of European interests in the U.S.

4.1.1 | Discrepancies Between U.S. and EU Perceptions of Lobbying

The minor role that lobbying plays in the EU has led European leaders to underestimate the potential rewards of lobbying activities in the U.S. The lobbying process entails “representing the interests of clients and endeavors to influence the adoption of suitable decisions in the legislative, regulatory and executive bodies.”²³⁷ While both European and American lobbyists utilize the same tactics, the impacts are seen differently within the political and social structures of the U.S. and EU.

Lobbying is perceived in the U.S. and EU in fundamentally different ways. In the U.S., leaders are aware that they will be held directly accountable in elections if they are not responsive to their voter base and campaign financiers. This has allowed lobbying to become an essential aspect of the political environment in Washington, often shaping public policy. On the other hand, European Union leaders are appointed, or, at most, indirectly elected, and therefore are not as swayed by private interest groups.²³⁸ European leaders should employ lobbyists within the U.S., where it is a common and successful practice, in order to advance European interests discussed in previous chapters of this report.

A distinct difference between lobbying in the EU and U.S. is transparency of financing. Lobbying requires a great deal of funding; therefore, a source of money is needed in order to properly execute lobbying campaigns. The Lobbying Disclosure Act in the U.S. enforces regulations, thus ensuring transparency between citizens and lobbying campaigns. In the U.S.,

²³⁷ Maňko, R. (2019). *EU Transparency Register*. Europarl.europa.eu. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-542170-European-Transparency-Register-FINAL.pdf>

²³⁸ Mahoney, Christine. “Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union.” *Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 27, no. 01, 2007, pp. 35–55., doi:10.1017/s0143814x07000608.

corporations are known to fund the majority of lobbying campaigns, but transparency has allowed this to become more accepted by society.²³⁹ The EU, on the other hand, has traditionally seen accepting money from private businesses as unethical.²⁴⁰ There has been little development of lobbying regulations over the past two decades in the EU which has added to the argument that lobbying practices are not transparent. Due in part to this, lobbying can be seen in the EU as immoral. However, in the U.S. it is widely accepted. Thus, the EU should not shy away from this political tool that can assist in advancing European interests in the U.S.

Case Study: Successful Egyptian lobbying in Washington

Lobbying has proven to be effective in bilateral U.S. diplomacy. Even on behalf of states that suffer high levels of public skepticism. The Egyptian intelligence directorate, Mukhabarat, appointed two U.S. public relations firms in Washington to lobby on behalf of Egypt to promote its external image. Thus, lobbying campaigns assisted Egypt in developing its “strategic partnership with the United States.” This also highlighted Egypt’s economic development, showcasing its civil society and publicizing Egypt’s “leading role in managing regional risks” in agreements worth USD 1.8 million annually.²⁴¹ Tourism in Egypt hit an all-time low in 2015 when a chartered Russian plane crashed in the Sinai Peninsula in a purported terrorist attack.²⁴² However, the political and economic situation in Egypt has stabilized. Visitors are returning to Egypt, there were 8.3 million tourists in 2017, and 2019 numbers look even more promising.²⁴³ Due to these joint-lobbying efforts, American public opinion of Egypt improved and the country saw a spike in American tourism. While the EU and Egypt have different goals in the U.S., the EU could use similar tactics to create a platform by which to advocate for European interests.

²³⁹ “EU and US Approaches to Lobbying.” *Euractiv.com*, EURACTIV.com, 1 Mar. 2005, www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/linksdossier/eu-and-us-approaches-to-lobbying/.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Rohan, Brian. “Egypt’s Mukhabarat Hires Washington Lobbyists to Boost Image.” *AP News*, Associated Press, 5 Mar. 2017, www.apnews.com/d8d55dbbcedb4e589d33555cc5fa8855.

²⁴² Fathom. “Why 2018 Is The Year To Visit Egypt.” *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 21 July 2018, www.forbes.com/sites/fathom/2018/07/21/cairo-egypt-guide-2018/#4565f1ce32d8.

²⁴³ Ibid.

Case Study: Successful U.S. Lobbying in Iran

As discussed in Chapter Two, the U.S. used diplomatic engagement effectively in Brussels and member state capitals to advance EU consideration of listing Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Similar diplomatic engagement by the EU and member states is relevant in the Washington policy environment, but other methods are also needed to increase leverage and improve prospects for meaningful action. In other words, diplomatic engagement is a necessary but not sufficient means for policy discussion in the U.S. political environment. Lobbying is just as necessary and can yield better results.

The case studies above demonstrate the influential role that lobbying plays in the U.S. Utilizing it would strengthen the transatlantic alliance by promoting pro-European policy within the United States as a means of creating meaningful cooperation. This has been successfully done by various national governments and is an accepted form of diplomacy in the United States. In order for EU interests to be represented in American politics and the larger transatlantic alliance, European leaders should begin to employ lobbyists.

4.1.2 | Influencers

The term influencer has taken on a much broader meaning in today's digital and interconnected world. Influencers are individuals who receive vast public attention and have the ability to instigate awareness and change. This includes academics, bloggers, social media communities, policymakers, employees, peers, and more.²⁴⁴ Influencers serve as "information shortcuts" to the public as they garner public attention, especially for the organizations they endorse. There are several areas where the EU can utilize influencers in transatlantic relations.

²⁴⁴ Wynne, Robert. "How Public Relations Pros Influence The Influencers." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 10 May 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/robertwynne/2017/05/10/how-public-relations-pros-influence-the-influencers/#2122fef862af.

Influencer endorsements have a long history in American politics. Endorsements by labor unions and international organizations date back to the early 20th century.²⁴⁵ Celebrity endorsements have been present almost as long. Historians trace the role of celebrities in politics to the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren Harding, who was endorsed by film stars such as Al Jolson and Mary Pickford.²⁴⁶ Many presidential campaigns since then have involved celebrities. For example, in 1960 John F. Kennedy was supported by “Rat Pack” members Sammy Davis Jr. and Dean Martin. Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan also received support from many celebrities, including Frank Sinatra.²⁴⁷ This shows that influencers have considerable power in steering public opinion. By employing similar tactics for topics of EU interest, the EU can more effectively publicize its interests in the U.S. and gain increasingly important soft power in transatlantic relations.

The Power of Media

Social media has expanded the reach and clout of influencers, making it a critical aspect of public affairs. One of the most useful features of social media is the capacity to foster dialogue and interaction both nationally and internationally. These conversations can promote understanding and assist with relationship building across the Atlantic. Social media is not only accessible, but it also connects the global community, and therefore should not be overlooked in EU policy engagement efforts.

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is one example of how modern-day influencers successfully employ the use of social media. Ocasio-Cortez is the youngest woman to be elected to Congress and has gained momentum by actively running her social media accounts.²⁴⁸ As of February 2019,

²⁴⁵ Wynne, Robert. “How Public Relations Pros Influence The Influencers.” *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 10 May 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/robertwynne/2017/05/10/how-public-relations-pros-influence-the-influencers/#4c88f19962af.

²⁴⁶ Garthwaite, C., and T. J. Moore. “Can Celebrity Endorsements Affect Political Outcomes? Evidence from the 2008 US Democratic Presidential Primary.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2012, pp. 355–384, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr031.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Hess, Abigail. “29-Year-Old Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Makes History as the Youngest Woman Ever Elected to Congress.” *CNBC*, CNBC, 29 Nov. 2018, www.cnbc.com/2018/11/06/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-is-now-the-youngest-woman-elected-to-congress.html.

the congresswoman had 3.81 million Twitter followers, showing that she can directly communicate to a diverse base of people worldwide.²⁴⁹ Her Instagram has also gathered close to 3 million followers.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's social media gives the European and global community a means of engaging directly with a U.S. lawmaker in a less formal forum. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is only one political influencer, yet she can create change not just through politics, but through the people who have connected to her message and social media platforms. This gives her a great deal of soft power, despite her relatively limited institutional role in Congress and the U.S.

President Barack Obama has utilized his platform as an influencer to promote positive change. The Obama Administration used social media to convey in an accessible way, messages that are important to the former president. One such example is how President Obama used social media in an effort admittedly only partially successful--to persuade the U.S. and the rest of the world to embrace more Syrian refugees.²⁵¹ His social media team posted a video of a five-year-old bloodied boy that was seen sitting in an ambulance in Aleppo, Syria. When the Administration posted the video on Obama's Facebook page, it drew the attention of people around the world and was viewed more than 30 million times worldwide.²⁵² This attention was important, however, followers did not continue the momentum to foster institutional change, something that present-day political influencers have worked to develop.

Although political actors like Obama and Ocasio-Cortez have used social media for positive engagements, there are also instances where partisan actors have used social media platforms for personal gain. This can also cause more significant issues when it is used as a tool by which to manipulate the greater population. There are allegations that the Russian government ran social media accounts with the purpose of advancing specific political agendas in the 2016 U.S.

²⁴⁹ Account, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Verified. "Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 5 Jan. 2019, https://twitter.com/AOC?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor

²⁵⁰ "Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@ocasio2018) • Instagram Photos and Videos." *Instagram*, www.instagram.com/ocasio2018/.

²⁵¹ Freking, Kevin. "Obama Makes His Mark as First 'Social Media' President." *The Seattle Times*, The Seattle Times Company, 6 Jan. 2017, www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/obama-makes-his-mark-as-first-social-media-president/.

²⁵² Ibid.

presidential election.²⁵³ While the investigations are ongoing, the U.S. agencies claim that President Putin and President Trump aimed to damage Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign. The Russian effort involved running state-backed social media accounts, paid internet "trolls," as well as covert operations, including illicit cyber activities conducted by Russia intelligence agents.²⁵⁴ Russia also took its influence campaign to highly trafficked social media channels, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.²⁵⁵ Likewise, according to the Internet Research Agency, 126 million people worldwide came into contact with Russian content on Facebook.²⁵⁶ Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, France, and Austria have also experienced similar incidences of Russian media interference.²⁵⁷ Media platforms can be a tool for major political actors, like Russia, to operate covertly and to attain their agenda. Influencers with both benevolent and malign agendas can use media platforms as a powerful tool to address the public. The issues of social media and disinformation will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

The European Union should hire influencers to advocate for European interests to their vast audiences. It is clear that influencers have the potential to cultivate positive and negative narratives that have far-reaching impacts; however, in hiring influencers, the EU can ensure that its desired narratives surrounding policy and culture are transmitted to the transatlantic and global community. Engaging with influencers and social media platforms is a cost-effective and efficient way to strengthen transatlantic relations by ensuring that the EU has a say in the global conversation.

²⁵³ "Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election.

²⁵⁴ *Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution*. Intelligence Community Assessment, 6 Jan. 2017, pp. 1–14. dni.gov, www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

²⁵⁵ Shane, Scott, and Vindu Goel. "Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought \$100,000 in Political Ads." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 6 Sept. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-political-ads.html.

²⁵⁶ Isaac, Mike, and Daisuke Wakabayashi. "Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 30 Oct. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html.

²⁵⁷ Dorell, Oren. "Russia Engineered Election Hacks and Meddling in Europe." *USA Today*, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 9 Jan. 2017, eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/09/russia-engineered-election-hacks-europe/96216556/.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***Employing lobbyist groups and various influencers as a means to further familiarize European interests within the United States***
 - *Address current European cultural and political misconceptions regarding the U.S. lobbying structures*
 - *Utilize lobbyists in the U.S. to spread awareness of EU interests*
 - *Use influencers to promote specific EU interests in the U.S.*

4.2 | MANAGING THE PROGRESSION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MEREDITH DOBSON, EMILY HARRIS

“We will improve the consistency and speed of messaging on our principles and actions. We will also offer rapid factual rebuttals of disinformation. We will continue fostering an open and inquiring media environment within and beyond the EU, also working with local players and through social media.”

- *Global Strategy, European Union Foreign and Security Policy*

To make public affairs efforts successful, it is important to analyze the opinions of citizens at the local level in order to make informed national and foreign policy decisions at the international level. This subsection will examine and take inventory of polling data collected from Europeans and Americans in an effort to interpret whether actions taken by the European Union reflect the desires and priorities of the population at large. Disinformation has challenged and continues to challenge the pillars of the transatlantic alliance, but addressing this obstacle serves as an opportunity for cooperation among the U.S. and EU. The transatlantic partnership is based on the importance of not just democratic values, but also principles of truth, integrity, and freedom of speech.

4.2.1 | Current Status of Relationship

Strong transatlantic relations are important in achieving social and political goals, economic stability, and national security. In an article from December 2018, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) states that the transatlantic relationship is too important to fail and blames the recent negative image of the alliance on bad press and stereotypes, rather than actual issues in EU-U.S. relations.²⁵⁸ That being said, the EESC also recognized irritants in the current transatlantic relationship. This situation is often made worse due to the use of social media and disreputable news sources.²⁵⁹

There are some basic issues that the EU and U.S. perennially must face. One is the fundamental difference in popular support for multilateral versus unilateral policies; the second, is finding a common ground of trust between the U.S. and the EU so neither party feels as though it is being exploited. In the European Commission strategy plan for 2016-2020, the clear mission statement of “Listen - Advise - Engage” resounded.²⁶⁰ President Juncker of the European Commission highlighted these expectations in his 2015 State of the Union speech, claiming that “we [the EU] have not yet convinced the people of Europe and the world that our Union is not just here to survive, but can also thrive and prosper.”²⁶¹ He also noted that communication is a key goal of the European Commission in coming years, and that “corporate communication will continue to raise public awareness about the EU as a whole, its values, and its work to address current issues. . .”²⁶² The Joint Strategic Plan for 2018-2022 of the Agency of International Development (USAID), clearly states, as goal number three, to “promote American leadership through balanced engagement.”²⁶³ Burden-sharing and free-trade are some of the looming problems for the U.S., especially in its relationship with Europe. U.S. policies are seeking to

²⁵⁸ *Transatlantic Relations – Too Important to Fail*. European Economic and Social Committee. December 2018.

<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/transatlantic-relations-too-important-fail>

²⁵⁹ *Transatlantic Relations – Too Important to Fail*

²⁶⁰ European Commission. *Strategic Plan 2016-2020*. DG Communication. 1-7. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/strategic-plans-2016-2020_en.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*


²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ U.S. Department of State. “Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022.” *U.S. Agency for International Development*, 1, February 2018. Online. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277156.pdf>

continue developing international relationships, but also are pursuing more “equitable” burden-sharing techniques.²⁶⁴ Common ground must be found between the EU’s idea of being a thriving multilateral community, versus the U.S.’s more zero-sum approach to international cooperation. The Trump administration’s views that the EU is only taking from the U.S.’s economic and political strength have strained the transatlantic relationship.

As shown in Figure 1, there is a growing lack of trust in global leaders by citizens which dramatizes divisions between Europe and the U.S. The election of President Trump has caused alienation between the U.S. and key Western allies, especially in the EU. In Germany, only 10% of the people polled have confidence in Trump. Likewise, citizens of France were polled at 7% confidence. On the other hand, 70% of international citizens who were polled have “no confidence” in Trump, while the popular perception of Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany and Emmanuel Macron, President of France are both seen in a much more positive light. This is true both in the EU and on the international stage, especially when compared to President Trump.²⁶⁵

Figure 1: Opinions of Global Leaders



Note: Percentages are medians based on 25 countries.
Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q35-e.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The EESC notes that the “America First” policy that President Trump often proclaims is another concern for the European Union, particularly since a trade war between the US and EU would be extremely damaging for both sides.²⁶⁶ Elements of the “America First” policy include the call for strict tariffs on EU goods, purportedly for the U.S. to gain more and not get “taken advantage” of. When looking at actual polling, 44% of Americans support the imposition of

²⁶⁴ *US Joint Strategic Plan*, 1

²⁶⁵ Wike, Richard et al. “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.” *Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes and Trends*. October 2018. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/>

²⁶⁶ *Transatlantic Relations – Too Important to Fail*. European Economic and Social Committee. December 2018. <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/transatlantic-relations-too-important-fail>

tariffs on the EU,²⁶⁷ while the majority support global trade and other multilateral actions to help the global economy. In this regard, the “America First” policy does not have the majority of popular support in the U.S.

Previous studies have shown that the majority of Americans still desire political and economic integration with Europe and acknowledge the importance of the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s statements, as the leader of the United States, demand and deserve attention; however, it would be wrong to assume they represent the opinions of all Americans as polling shows that this is not the case. Exposure to polling data can also amplify citizen’s political desires and remind national, as well as international governments and other audiences that the actions of political leaders do not always reflect those of the majority of citizens. This could in turn strengthen the transatlantic alliance by fostering dialogue, explaining real interests, and giving smaller institutions and individuals a platform to be heard. Thus, more polling, better exposure, and a broader view of opinions have the potential to help strengthen the transatlantic alliance by improving America’s standing among European citizens.

By increasing funding for polling, and supporting more accurate surveys, the EU can manage difficulties experienced by citizens, and better understand what citizens, both in the U.S. and in Europe, want out of the EU. Susan Danger, CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU, discusses how the complexity of the EU is often not understood by Washington, making cooperation even more difficult.²⁶⁸ This same issue is also seen among the general European population, as 57% of Europeans think that the EU is inefficient and 65% think that the EU does not understand the needs of its citizens.²⁶⁹

With better marketing and social media, a more balanced and holistic picture of the EU may come into view on both sides of the Atlantic. A recent Financial Times article discusses

²⁶⁷ Castillo, Alexandra, Poushter, Jacob. “Americans and Germans are Worlds Apart in Views of Their Countries’ Relationship.” *PEW Research Center*. November 2018. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/26/americans-and-germans-are-worlds-apart-in-views-of-their-countries-relationship/>

²⁶⁸ *Transatlantic Relations – Too Important to Fail*

²⁶⁹ Stokes, Bruce. *Key Takeaways from the European Union Survey*. Pew Research Center. May 2014. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/12/5-key-takeaways-from-the-european-union-survey/>

President Trump's disregard for the peacekeeping role of the EU and the EU's role in fostering the impressive seventy years that the continent has lived with no large-scale, inter-state conflicts.²⁷⁰ While focusing on just one part of the picture, such as unequal burden sharing, the remarkable successes of the EU and transatlantic alliance are quickly forgotten. A first step in solidifying EU and U.S. relations would be to make efforts to portray a clearer depiction of the EU to its citizens, to Washington, and to the United States more broadly. By using the media, the EU can explain its most significant structures to the people, to show the importance of the EU and the transatlantic alliance. Creating strong dialogue is key in a strong relationship; however, this is difficult to do when there are many levels in which misunderstanding can take place.

4.2.2 | Social Media and Disinformation

Media platforms are responsible for the large-scale circulation of information and thus play a crucial role in the lives of Americans and Europeans. As discussed earlier in this chapter, social media has the potential to transmit messages that can be used in both a positive and negative way. Though not a new phenomenon, disinformation --that is, the deliberate creation and circulation of false information in an attempt to cause public confusion-- has reached unprecedented levels in recent years.²⁷¹ Disinformation has been transmitted in part through various traditional and social media platforms in Europe and the United States. Social media cannot be utilized positively to its full extent without eliminating the threat of disinformation. It is crucial for the EU to work collaboratively with the U.S. to identify disinformation on social media while striking a balance that respects the freedom of speech. This will require a more thorough analysis of social media patterns, as well as alternative media systems in order to identify weaknesses and combat threats to the transatlantic alliance.

Social media platforms have become the predominant medium for disinformation in recent years and therefore deserve special attention. As of 2018, there were 203.1 million social

²⁷⁰ "Transatlantic Relations Take an Indecorous Turn." *The Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/0769197a-e8e7-11e8-a34c-663b3f553b35>

²⁷¹European Commission. *Action Plan Against Disinformation*. European Commission, 2018.

media users in Western Europe alone; this is 40% of the EU population.²⁷² Similarly, 213.85 million people in the United States use social media, which accounts for nearly 65% of the population.²⁷³ A PEW study conducted in 2018 found that 74% of American Facebook users visit the site daily.²⁷⁴ This same study also asked users how difficult it would be to give up social media in general, with 40% responding that it would be “hard” and 14% of those saying it would be “very hard”. Social media clearly plays an integral role in the lives of European and American citizens, creating new responsibilities for political leaders and institutions to engage and monitor in this media age. However, the power of social media has not gone unnoticed by malicious actors, including foreign entities and some political candidates, who have exploited it as a divisive tool to spread disinformation. As the transatlantic alliance is based on shared values and trust, both of which must be understood and visible throughout society in order to assure cohesion, it is incumbent upon us to manage this threat more effectively.

Many Europeans rely on social media as a news source, despite their lack of traditional, or any, media standards. Disinformation threatens nearly all levels of civil society in the European Union. In a PEW poll taken of eight European countries, the majority of respondents received their news primarily from social media, with 50% of Italian respondents getting their news from these sources daily.²⁷⁵ This demonstrates the power of social media in guiding the perspectives of Europeans, making them vulnerable targets for disinformation campaigns. Another poll administered by PEW found that respondents with populist views in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany were more likely to get their news from social media than alternative sources, including traditional media.²⁷⁶ This is extremely important as it means that the content seen by

²⁷² “Western Europe: Number of Social Network Users 2014-2018”. *Statistica*. Statistica, 2014.

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/260714/number-of-social-network-users-in-western-europe/>.

²⁷³ “United States: Number of Social Network Users 2017-2023”. *Statistica*. Statistica, 2019.

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/278409/number-of-social-network-users-in-the-united-states/>.

²⁷⁴ Smith, Aaron, and Anderson, Monica. “Social Media Use in 2018”. *PEW Research Center*, 01 March 2018.

<http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/>.

²⁷⁵ “Majorities in most European countries get news from social media”. *PEW Research Center*, 08 May 2018.

http://www.journalism.org/2018/05/14/many-western-europeans-get-news-via-social-media-but-in-some-countries-substantial-minorities-do-not-pay-attention-to-the-source/pj_2018-05-14_western-europe_5-01/.

²⁷⁶ “In France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, those with populist views are more likely to get news via social media”. *PEW Research Center*, 08 May 2018. http://www.journalism.org/2018/05/14/many-western-europeans-get-news-via-social-media-but-in-some-countries-substantial-minorities-do-not-pay-attention-to-the-source/pj_2018-05-14_western-europe_5-09/.

social media users can alter voting patterns in elections that shape the future of Europe. This presents distinct concerns given that an average of 29.5% of people in those same four EU countries reported that they do not fact check the reliability of news sources found on social media.²⁷⁷ Citizens' confidence in social media demonstrates the importance for nations to continue regulating traditional media outlets and creating the framework to do the same with social media.

European Responses to Disinformation

Disinformation has caught the attention of European leaders as a threat to the integrity of democratic institutions. On October 18th, 2018, the European Council called for the need to “protect the Union’s democratic systems and combat disinformation, including in the context of the upcoming European elections.”²⁷⁸ This acknowledgment of the dangers associated with disinformation led to the creation of an EU Action Plan. Emphasizing the real challenges of disinformation, the European Action Plan Against Disinformation discusses the importance of cooperation with both civil society and private sector entities in order to be successful.²⁷⁹ The action plan includes the East Strategic Communication Task Force (East StratCom), which was created in 2015 through the European External Action Service.²⁸⁰ This Task Force focuses on identifying disinformation in countries that border the European Union and work to raise awareness of disinformation by combating threats with factual information. Although East StratCom is a testament to the EU’s commitment to battle disinformation, the size of the Task Force is modest, consisting of just 16 personnel. The Task Force focuses on disinformation originating in Eastern Partnership Countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and challenges found within the EU itself.²⁸¹ This is a vast region to monitor for disinformation; more personnel are badly needed. While the European Council has recognized

²⁷⁷ “Sizable minorities of Western Europeans who get news on social media don’t pay attention to the sources”. *PEW Research Center*, 08 May 2018. http://www.journalism.org/2018/05/14/many-western-europeans-get-news-via-social-media-but-in-some-countries-substantial-minorities-do-not-pay-attention-to-the-source/pi_2018-05-14_western-europe_5-04/.

²⁷⁸ European Council. *European Council Conclusions*, 18 October 2018, 2018.

²⁷⁹ European Commission, *Action Plan Against Disinformation*.

²⁸⁰ European External Action Service. *Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force*, 2018.

²⁸¹ European External Action Service. *Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force*.

the challenges of disinformation, more development of the East Strategic Communication Task Force is important to make discernible progress.

American Responses to Disinformation

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the body that oversees and enforces America's communications laws and regulations, but the commission is in need of structural modernization.²⁸² Similar to European media regulators, the FCC works to ensure that citizen's rights are being upheld throughout various media platforms; however the scope of FCC operations is limited when dealing with disinformation.²⁸³ The commission has been hesitant to approach the topic of disinformation out of fear of inadvertently censoring and infringing on citizens' freedoms of press and speech. Additionally, the current structure of the FCC is not capable of properly managing social media platforms. In May of 2017 the FCC announced that it would be loosening existing regulations on social media, which at the time were already sparse.²⁸⁴ This was said to be a "step towards modernizing its rules to the benefit of American consumers."²⁸⁵ While it is true that the rule change worked to ensure more competition, it also allowed disinformation to take hold in the United States because the national regulator did not fully deal with the problem at hand.

Private social media companies have also begun to take action. In October of 2017, Twitter removed a campaign video for Congresswoman Marsha Blackburn as the platform felt that it contained an "inflammatory statement that [was] likely to evoke a strong negative reaction."²⁸⁶ While the scope of the FCC is limited, it is illegal for traditional news agencies to broadcast information that is intentionally distorted.²⁸⁷ The steps taken by Twitter aligned with

²⁸²"About the FCC". *Federal Communications Commission*. <https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview>

²⁸³ "Broadcasting False Information". *Federal Communications Commission*, 05 Jan. 2018. <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/broadcasting-false-information>.

²⁸⁴*Ibid.*

²⁸⁵*Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ Tsukayama, Hayley. "Twitter blocked a Congresswoman's antiabortion ad over 'baby body parts.' But it allowed an identical tweet" *The Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 10 Oct. 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/10/twitter-blocked-a-congresswomans-antiabortion-ad-over-baby-body-parts-but-it-allowed-an-identical-tweet/?utm_term=.13317cb89f55.

²⁸⁷"Complaints About Broadcast Journalism." *Federal Communications Commission*. 05 Jan. 2018. <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/complaints-about-broadcast-journalism>.

regulations on American news outlets, but due to the fact that Twitter is a social media platform and not a traditional news outlet, it is not held to the same regulations. In this incident, the Chairman of the FCC, Ajit Pai, condemned Twitter's actions claiming that the company infringed on free expression and lacked transparency.²⁸⁸ As shown through this situation, the FCC needs to evolve in order to allow for greater attention to social media as it has a huge impact on the lives of Americans and Europeans.

While the FCC has continued its regulation of news outlets, social media has remained nearly untouched. A PEW poll conducted in 2016 showed that of the ten European member states polled, 51% of respondents follow American news closely.²⁸⁹ Social media has the potential to connect Americans and European citizens every second of every day, and in order to ensure that both sides of the Atlantic are interacting with fact-based news, Europe needs the partnership of the United States. Furthermore, if Europeans are utilizing American sources to learn about day-to-day news and the happenings in the United States, false information could be taken as fact. Disinformation has the ability to erode the democratic processes that define Europe and the United States and thus threatens the important bond between the two entities. While the United States and Europe are very different, their alliance is based primarily on shared values, and any shift away from those values will strain the transatlantic alliance.

The Future of Disinformation

In order to contain the spread of disinformation and sustain the democratic process, the European Union should work with the United States to take greater action to mitigate disinformation campaigns. Disinformation has the potential to negatively impact democratic institutions in both the European Union and the United States and thus must be treated as a

²⁸⁸ Shaban, Hamza. "FCC chairman says social media platforms lack transparency in how they restrict conservative content". *The Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 12 Dec. 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/12/fcc-chairman-says-social-media-platforms-lack-transparency-in-how-they-restrict-conservative-content/?utm_term=.a787b9830156.

²⁸⁹ Poushter, Jacob. "Many people in other countries closely follow news about the U.S.". *PEW Research Center*. PEW Research Center, 16 Jan. 2017. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/16/many-people-in-other-countries-closely-follow-news-about-the-u-s/>.

shared top priority by both sides. The expansion of the East Strategic Communication Task Force can prevent the spread of disinformation quickly and efficiently while minimizing negative effects on the population. The European Union should also work with lobbyists in the United States to restructure and modernize the FCC so that the Commission has the authority to regulate social media. Creating a dialogue with the United States on the dangers of disinformation is a positive step towards solving this challenge.

Polling data shows that many problems that are seen as troubling to the transatlantic alliance actually stem from disinformation. At the same time, policies that are being put into place do not accurately reflect the desires of citizens, both in the European Union and in the United States. With a more informed public, leaders can gain a more accurate understanding of how to deal with problems discussed in previous chapters of this report. The public not only has an immense amount of soft power through social media but also the ability to shape policy with their votes. Social media can serve as a means of directly communicating with the public and can therefore enhance the viability of new policy. Examples of this will be presented through the following two case studies.

4.2.3 | Case Study: Economic in the U.S and EU

Economics is a large part of the discussion in relations between the U.S. and EU, and opinions on integrated economics and multilateral institutions differ greatly between the two. Since trade is one of the most important systems in the transatlantic relationship, maintaining strong relations and an equal playing field is vital. A common debate is whether retaliatory tariffs and protectionist policies actually help the U.S., or instead create economic difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic.


Recently, the U.S. has increased tariffs on many European countries, while the EU has in turn imposed retaliatory tariffs on the U.S. This has led to sometimes surprisingly hostile trade attitudes between the transatlantic partners. For example, the PEW Research Center writes,

“Americans oppose initial tariffs on Germany, but Germans strongly favor retaliatory tariffs.”²⁹⁰

This is not surprising when one considers the statistics of overall views on the state of the relationship between Germany and the U.S.: 73% of Germans believe the relationship between the U.S. and Germany is poor, while 70% of Americans think that the relationship is fine.²⁹¹

Typically, German citizens are very supportive of liberal free trade and do not support tariffs on trading partners; however, as shown in Figure 2, these statistics drive home the fact that many Germans are upset with the current state of the U.S., and are dissatisfied, overall, with the current transatlantic relationship. *The Washington Post* notes that many Americans do not want a trade war between the EU and U.S. to progress, citing a *Wall Street Journal* survey

Figure 2: Support of German Tariffs
Do you support or oppose the U.S. policy of increased tariffs on Germany?



Source: Question was preceded by the statement, “The U.S. has recently increased tariffs or fees on imported goods from Germany and other European countries. In response, Germany and other European countries have increased tariffs on American goods.” Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2018. Q8. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 13-26, 2018.

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showing that only 25% of Americans believe imposing tariffs on Europe will help the U.S. economy or protect American jobs.²⁹² The article goes on to say that 63% of Americans believe it is more important to maintain strong relations with U.S. allies across the Atlantic than to impose tariffs, and hold the belief that the EU trades fairly and cooperatively with the U.S..²⁹³ From this data it is evident that the policies being put into place do not reflect the views of citizens as expressed through surveys.

Vulnerabilities of the EU include how to address challenges with China, as discussed in Chapter Three. As a global median, 70% of people polled by PEW believe that China plays a bigger role in the world than it did ten years ago.²⁹⁴ Many Americans are concerned about the economic

²⁹⁰ Castillo, Alexandra, Poushter, Jacob. *Americans and Germans are Worlds Apart in Views of Their Countries' Relationship*.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Stokes, Bruce. *What do Americans Really Think About U.S.-EU Trade Tiff?* The Washington Post. July 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/30/what-do-americans-really-think-about-the-u-s-e-u-trade-tiff/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-trade-tiff%3Ahomepage%2Ft&utm_term=.11b8cf48d5a8&wpisrc=nl_cage&wpmm=1

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Devlin, Kat. *Five Charts on Global Views of China*. The Pew Research Center. October 2018. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views-of-china/>

strength of China, with China's military power as the second largest concern.²⁹⁵ Following the recommendation in Chapter Three, the EU should monitor and clarify relations with China, which could help bring a more accurate image of the real threats China poses to the U.S. and the EU. This can reinforce a common transatlantic perception of China, which would assist in the pursuit of joint policy initiatives.

4.2.4 | Case Study: European Security Advancements

Security policy, a core element of the transatlantic alliance, is an area where the employment of various media platforms can assist in strengthening the transatlantic partnership.

Unfortunately, security has become a point of contention between the United States and Europe.

The United States has allocated 3.3% of its GDP for defense in 2018, which is the largest dollar amount of any nation on Earth.²⁹⁶ By comparison, about 1.34% of the GDP of European states was allocated for defense in 2018, but this has continued to grow.²⁹⁷ This difference has become a cause of criticism by leaders who increasingly resent Europe's perceived inability or refusal to equitably share defense burdens. President Donald Trump famously said, "Words are easy, but actions are what matters. And for its own protection, Europe—and you know this, everybody knows this, everybody has to know this—Europe must do more."²⁹⁸

Security is a major concern of the citizens of the European Union. The European Commission conducted a survey in 2017 to assess Europeans' feelings on security. Interviewing about 28,093 people in 28-member states, it was found that 68% of respondents felt that the European Union was a safe place to live, which is about a 12% decrease from previous

²⁹⁵Devlin, Kat, Wike, Richard. *As Trade Tensions Rise, Fewer Americans See China Favorably*. Pew Research Center. August 2018. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/08/28/as-trade-tensions-rise-fewer-americans-see-china-favorably/>

²⁹⁶European Commission. *EU Budget for the Future*, 2018.

²⁹⁷European Commission. *EU Budget for the Future*.

²⁹⁸Schoen, John W.. "Are NATO allies really getting a 'free ride'? Here's what the numbers say." CNBC. CNBC, 06 July 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/06/nato-allies-military-spending-trump.html>.

surveys.²⁹⁹ In this same group, 90% of respondents felt that their city, town, or village was safe, a figure that has remained constant from previous surveys. The survey does not specify the reasons citizens felt unsafe, but it shows that European citizens may be unaware of the development of European security measures, a shortcoming that should be addressed.

The European Union has been developing an array of security systems in order to close the gap with the United States. The EU's development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation arrangement (PESCO) and the creation of a European Security Strategy are among the most significant advancements of European security. It is crucial that the European Union publicizes its actions so that its citizens are aware of defense developments. Without ample communication with citizens about ongoing security developments, their concerns will not change. Greater publicity will also familiarize the United States with PESCO and other security measures, allowing the nation to understand and encourage its growth, rather than simply criticizing European "free riders."

4.2.5 | Holes in Polling Data

In conducting research for this report, it was discovered that polls directly identified the concerns and inclinations of Europeans and Americans, yet there were many important topics that were absent from surveys. PEW and Eurobarometer are the polling sources that conducted comprehensive surveys throughout the EU and U.S. PEW is a private organization that is funded by individuals, while Eurobarometer is funded through the European Commission, a government organization. PEW conducts a large volume of surveys across various topics, but for EU based polls, the organization only polls select European nations, thus the result does not reflect the opinions of the EU as a whole. Eurobarometer, however, has the ability to fill in these crucial gaps. Eurobarometer polls citizens in all 28 EU member states and can give a more in-depth account of what is occurring at the local levels of the entire EU.

²⁹⁹ European Commission. *Europeans' Attitudes Towards Security*, 2017.

The overarching issues seen in polling data by Eurobarometer is the lack of EU polling of U.S. citizens and EU surveys on U.S. related topics. Because of this, the European Commission does not gain accurate knowledge of public attitudes regarding American interests. The EU also does not poll Europeans on their views towards America. This is important as it is necessary to understand how citizens react towards Europe's strongest ally in order to comprehend the extent to which the alliance should be deepened or what areas need more attention. By expanding the reach of Eurobarometer polling, specific U.S. interests could be uncovered. In order to gain a complete depiction of the areas of possible strain in the transatlantic alliance, the European Commission should consider expanding polling. The results could have the potential to uncover miscommunications that can be solved by publicizing the realities and proactively combating issues before they evolve. In broadening polling, the EU can cultivate approaches to issues in the transatlantic alliance that suit all levels of the EU.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION RELATED TO:

- ***Utilizing public affairs and media to promote transatlantic cultural interests and understanding***
 - *Ensure mutual understanding between the U.S. and EU by fostering dialogue through social media so that international cooperation is made easier.*
- ***Monitoring and updating official media systems to ensure free and fair flow of information***
 - *Encourage restructuring and modernizing the FCC.*
 - *Expand the East Strategic Communication Task Force.*
- ***Funding and analyzing more accurate and regular polling in both the United States and the European Union***
 - *Publicize specific polling statistics.*
 - *Expand Eurobarometer to include data on U.S. related topics*

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