Medieval Political Competition and the Attack on Ethnoreligious Diversity

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Abstract

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Sociology

This dissertation examines urban expulsions of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire 1000-1520 CE. I argue that expulsions were policy changes undertaken within a political economy that placed increasing value on religiously-based concepts of political responsibility and Christian community reform. This project is designed as three papers combining quantitative and historical methods. To complete this work, I translated and digitized a German-language compendium of maps and city histories, building a new spatial database presenting the most up-to-date history of Jewish life in medieval German lands. In the first chapter, I use this database to investigate how local urban politics made Jews vulnerable to political violence. The patchwork landscape of overlapping jurisdictions created conditions of competition over legitimacy, supremacy, and rights to resources, and Jews were symbolic and material prizes in these conflicts. The second chapter asks what social processes guide the spread of persecution. Did an expulsion by one ruler
affect another ruler’s choices about expulsion? Using event-history analysis methods, I document how religious change and spatially-structured economic and political incentives unraveled the norm against expelling Jews. The third chapter is focused on how different incentives, institutions, and actors link together in the process of expulsion. Using the first two papers’ quantitative analyses as a starting point, I work through narratives of non-expulsion and failed expulsion in the city of Constance, developing a generalizable theory of how expulsions of Jews fit into ongoing local and imperial political conflicts among Christians.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice*, Italian Jewish father Shylock speaks the classic line, “If you prick us, do we not bleed?” Through him, Shakespeare questions the extent of the early modern European boundary between Jews and Christians. The same insistence on humanity is present in the slogan of African-American sanitation workers in their 1968 strike in Memphis: “I am a man!” At the writing of this chapter, African-Americans and allies are again in the streets of US cities demanding that their equal humanity be recognized, using phrases like “I can’t breathe” that invoke Black men who pleaded for their lives in the hands of the state.

Studying positive social change of increasing inclusion is deeply attractive to social scientists. For one thing, many social scientists, myself included, are interested in how to increase inclusion and diminish inequality. Increasing inclusion has been the process of the past half-century, too, and so studying it has some immediacy and clear value for making sense of the world we live in today. But social change not a one-way street.

Particularly in the past decade or so, the norm of social integration has been unraveling in the so-called developed world. Politicians today in Europe and the US promise expulsion of ethnoracial and religious minority groups, if they come to power. Headlines prompt comparisons to xenophobic periods in the earlier twentieth century. Politicians’ calls for expulsions are not without historical precedent. Like first, second, and third generation immigrants today, medieval European Jewish communities expanded, bought houses, established synagogues, and became part of the civic fabric—and then began facing expulsions. Why? Importantly, can medieval experiences teach us something about contemporary exclusion?

Early sociologists actually wrote quite a lot about European Jews (Goldberg 2017). Their writings have enshrined misconceptions and stereotypes in classical sociological theory.
Contrary to what we learn from the “greats” of sociology, pre-twentieth century European Jews were not strangers (Simmel 1971), not predominantly moneylenders or capitalists (Sombart 1913) powerfully networked to move goods and money across long distances, and not the most important of state and court financiers (Coser 1974). European Jews are historically an occupationally diverse population, as likely to be farmers as anything else, living in rural villages as much as in cities, and co-residents for decades and centuries with Christian neighbors (Kießling 1997; Toch 1995; 2003b; 2004). When we begin to pull out the antisemitic stereotypes from the sociological canon, we realize that we actually have very little sociological knowledge about the lives and conditions of historical European Jews. We suddenly have a whole set of unanswered questions about when, why, and how Jews were excluded from Christian-rulled European societies. If we cannot rely on explanations about strangeness, or about the economic threat of a cabal of rich and powerful Jews, or about Jews as eunuchs, because they simply do not fit the facts, then we need new explanations about ethnoreligious boundaries, about political institutions and law-making, and about cultural change. Fortunately, sociology is rich in these sorts of explanations. Abandoning old theories will actually bring the past into closer dialogue with the present and help us recognize what present-day knowledge about ethnoracial hierarchies can contribute to our understanding of historical oppression, and vice versa.

This dissertation asks one overarching research question: What processes and institutional and cultural contexts led to medieval urban expulsions of Jews? I take medieval western German lands, 1000-1520CE, as the project’s temporal and geographic scope. During

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this time period, the region that today covers the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, western Germany, Switzerland, eastern France, and western alpine Italy (plus a sliver of Austria) was roughly in the realm of the Holy Roman Emperor, an oligarchically elected king of Germany and other lands. This realm was comprised of several dozen polities whose rulers formally owed their authority to grants of privileges by the Emperor, whether they be princes, bishops, lesser nobles, or self-governing cities. I analyze urban expulsions in this region.

Jews were a distinct social group. Jewish ethnoreligious identity was durable, despite their often-indistinguishable public appearance and habits (Elukin 2007; Lipton 2014; Oelsner 1962). Laws limiting Jewish-Christian interaction appeared repeatedly across the centuries, suggesting that Jews and Christians were not living in separation and distinctiveness (Malkiel 2003) as they were supposed to. Like any group, there were more well off and less well off Jews. Occupations varied. In some places, and more frequently with time, Jewish occupations might be restricted, but most occupations were restricted for Christians, too, through guild regulations (Friedrichs 1995). Poorer Jews did not participate in credit and monetary transactions (Toch 2013, 97–98), but richer Jews were involved in finance and city administration. The increasing political fragmentation of the Carolingian empire pushed sovereignty and administration to the local level, creating opportunities for Jews to be involved in administrations (Toch 2013, 99). Notably, “Jews could… become burghers or citizens of some of the towns” (Elukin 2007, 129), though not public officials (C. Cluse 2009). German Ashkenazi Jews led normal German lives (Toch 2013).

Many explanations of medieval expulsions effectively blame Jews for their own expulsions by focusing on the behavior of Jews. In particular, recent scholarship in economic history takes accusations of Jewish usury at face value, as well as the supposed prohibition on
Christians profiting from moneylending (S. O. Becker and Pascali 2019; Johnson and Koyama
2019; Rubin 2011). This scholarship is uncritical of the sources that make these claims as well as
uncritical of how racism shaped the exercise of political and economic power. German
historians, particularly those connected to the Arye Maimon Institute at Trier University, have
had a much different take, which shows up in how they describe the medieval context. For
instance, Scholl writes that cities used capital “looted” or “stolen” (geraubten) from Jews (2015,
177). As social scientists, we misidentify causes and processes of exclusion when we look for
something about Jews, rather than something about Christians, to explain expulsions.

This project brings perspectives on political competition, political culture, and minority-
majority relations to bear on medieval German expulsions of Jews. I set out to understand the
systemic and institutional sources of power, the evolution of religious ideologies (especially
concerning political power and religious difference), and how rulers and their rivals acted to
meet their goals within these contexts. I focus on Christian political relationships and institutions
– authority, rights, offices – because expulsions were political acts, no matter the processes that
led to them. Expulsions were official decisions to use political dominion to enact political
institutional exclusion. However, their political character has been understudied.

In three empirical studies, I examine the politics of Jewish expulsions from three different
vantage points. The first is a somewhat exploratory look at various political institutions and
arrangements compared with economic contexts. Medieval European city governments were
complex, yet few studies look at what variation was meaningful, let alone what that variation
meant for the governance of difference. The second takes up the question of social adoption; that
is, I study how social ties to other cities contributed to an uptick in expulsions in the fifteenth
century. In these two quantitative studies, I highlight the scientific gains for using more precise
political development measures that capture greater internal variation as well as the influence of other cities’ decisions on a city’s choice about how to treat Jews. While the quantitative analyses can summarize large numbers of cases and indicate general trends at specific points in time, they cannot elucidate the process of expulsion or explain the relationships between different factors. The third study is a case study of the German city of Constance from 1375 to 1448 tracing how the inclusion of Jews in the city was connected to political conflicts among Christian factions and the power dynamics between the city and the emperor.

In Chapter 2, I argue that policies excluding ethnoracial and religious minorities reinforce the power of political elites, and medieval expulsions were no exception. Changing religious and political culture, in the form of new value on community righteousness and the beginning of territorialization, provided incentives for polities to expel their Jewish residents. Using a new database of Jewish settlement and city development in the Western Holy Roman Empire 1000-1520 CE, I analyze the relationship between expulsion and different local distributions of political and economic power. Previous quantitative studies of German cities have elided the complication of medieval authority, partly through using samples only of the larger cities of the time. Jews lived in all kinds of towns, though, and an accurate picture of their experiences requires more detail and better representation of the varied governments they were subject to.

In Chapter 3, I ask what social processes guide the spread of ethnic or racial exclusion. I investigate the diffusion of expulsions of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire. For medieval rulers, religious and material concerns were strong rationales against expulsion. Yet expulsions increase markedly in the fifteenth century. I examine whether expulsions spread between cities and how they might have done so. Using my new database, I consider the role of universal mechanisms like observing early adopters and responding to religious change. I also consider whether
political and economic relationships segmented incentives to expel or not. It is relatively common sense among sociologists and political scientists to study the contemporary adoption of exclusion as socially influenced, and yet studies applying this approach to premodern political change are relatively limited. In particular, theories of expulsion and antisemitic violence have been atomistic rather than incorporating inter-polity social dependence.

In Chapter 4, I take up where the quantitative analyses leave off by taking the process of expulsion as the focus of study. The quantitative analyses assess where and under what conditions expulsions happened; Chapter 4’s comparative-historical analyses are the fodder for theory-building about how expulsions happened. I recount the history of the city of Constance, in southern Germany. Through this method, I can investigate in more detail how political competition, government finances, and religious change were connected to expulsions. Importantly, I can truly analyze expulsion as a case of boundary shift. Expulsion is a political outcome, but it is foremost a change in an ethnic boundary. I evaluate what kinds of theories of ethnic boundary change best fit medieval expulsions and Constance in particular.

A sociology dissertation on pre-modern history is unusual, though not unprecedented. Throughout the development and completion of this project I have drawn heavily from political science and economics, fields that have given more attention to pre-modern European political and economic development, at least in the past few decades. I think of this project as a sociological style of political economy. I hope that the studies in this project help the interdisciplinary field of political economy to think more sociologically about European history, about the political value of ethnoreligious exclusion, and about antisemitism. For sociologists, I hope that this project is a compelling argument that the past has bearing on the questions and phenomena that most captivate our field.
2. CONTEXTS OF STATE VIOLENCE: JEWISH EXPULSIONS IN THE HOLY
   ROMAN EMPIRE

2.1. INTRODUCTION

At its most fundamental, a society’s political conflicts concern who has what rights to
live and work within it. In many cases, ethnoracial and religious distinctions are the basis for
limited rights or exclusion. Even though these social boundary conflicts seem perennial, the
persecution of minorities is not inevitable (Moore 2007). Ethnoreligious boundaries are an
opportunity for persecution, not a prescription. In fact, the roots of a persecution may have little
direct relationship to a majority-minority divide. As Nirenberg (1996, 11) argued, “violence
against minorities is not only about minorities” (italics original); violence and exclusion are also
about majorities. The engines of persecution are often social and political processes occurring
within majority groups.

However, the conflict theory approach to studying ethnic violence brings an almost
unitary focus on the ethnic divide. Perhaps because of the nearness and moral offense of
nineteenth and twentieth century ethnic violence, the large literature on ethnic conflict has spent
decades honing theories of what conditions and processes lead to violence and war (Brubaker
and Laitin 1998; Gurr 1993). The main strands of research concern the social psychology of
ethnic groups and symbolic boundaries (Rydgren 2007; Hale 2008), the distribution of power
and resources (Hechter 2013; Wimmer 2013), and the role of movements and opportunities
(Olzak 1989; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) Across these foci, scholars compare groups and

1 This chapter has been accepted for publication in Social Science History. A preprint is available
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the power relationships between them (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; D. Siroky and Hechter 2016; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018). Focusing on interethnic relations is most useful for studying micro-level processes, like prejudice and discrimination (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016; Hjerm, Eger, and Danell 2018; Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008). When it comes to studying the actions of the state and political elites, the ethnic divide is not necessarily the most central conflict (Bush 2003). As connected to the state, the exploitation of social boundaries serves the purposes of reinforcing power. Whose power, then, is reinforced by persecuting a minority group? And who is that power fortified against?

In this article, I examine expulsions of Jews in the medieval western Holy Roman Empire. In related research, Johnson and Koyama and coauthors (Finley and Koyama 2018; Johnson and Koyama 2019; Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017) have investigated antisemitic violence in medieval Europe. They do not differentiate between expulsion and mob violence, as they are interested in all types of religious persecution. I exclusively study expulsions. As official proclamations by local governments mandating that a category of people leave their homes and livelihoods, these expulsions were cases of state violence against Jews. Expulsion edicts were obviously directed at Jews, but Jews were relatively powerless. Christians controlled all parts of governance. Jews and Christians were not arguing over which of them belonged in their society; Christians were in conflict with other Christians about social and political boundaries. Understanding the expulsions requires an investigation of their political context to identify what conflict between Christians the expulsions were part of.

Using a new dataset, I analyze expulsions in cities in the Western Holy Roman Empire that had Jewish residents 1000-1520 CE. To explain why expulsions occurred, I ask what it was about the majority – about Christians – that could have led to state violence against Jews.
Because expulsions were policy outcomes, I look to medieval political organization and political economy for answers. Johnson and Koyama (2019) argue that change in the need for religious legitimacy promoted an increase in antisemitic persecution. I argue that the nature of religious legitimacy changed. Christian authorities felt increasingly responsible for the righteousness and purity of their domains. Coupled with the revenue-hungry pressures of medieval political economy, political elites jostled to assert and maintain autonomy and authority in delimited, territorializing polities – city-states, principalities, and episcopates. Johnson and Koyama theorize that medieval political fragmentation made weak states that used identity rules to calibrate their administrative and fiscal capacity with their administrative and fiscal needs. I counter that it was not government strength or weakness but political competition that drove expulsions. I weigh specific factors of competition, including whether authority was fragmented, that are not strictly indicators of government capacity.

Expulsions were rare, though their incidence climbed considerably from the fifteenth century. The results of my analyses show that Jews were expelled where power and resources were contested among political elites in the upheaval of transition to new ideals of governance. City rulers faced ambiguous hierarchies of power and conflicting rights, challenges for sovereignty that they attempted to solve through their policies towards Jews. This study reinforces the interpretations of case studies of expulsions in England (Stacey 1997; Katzenelson 2005) and France (Barkey and Katzenelson 2011; Jordan 1989) that point to political competition and negotiation among Christian elites. I expand on the work of Wenninger (1981) and Johnson and Koyama (2019) by drawing attention to the role of local political institutions and relationships amidst sovereign fiscal insecurity.
Many of our ideas for defining states and government come from studying European territorialization through the medieval and early modern centuries. Returning to this era with a new eye for how “the have-nots lose in disorganized politics” (Key 1950, 307) is another view into the importance of political structures for understanding state power. In contexts of intra-ethnic conflict over political control, minority groups can be treated like pawns. Ethnic exclusion and violence are intra-group weapons for the consolidation of power.

2.2. MEDIEVAL POLITICS

Jewish-Christian relations changed because Christian ideas and institutions changed. The most influential changes were (1) territorialization of political dominions and (2) new and more prescriptive theocratic understandings of Christian piety. The former provoked conflict between rulers over resources and authority. The latter revolutionized the relationship between rulers and their subjects by placing responsibility for community righteousness in the hands of rulers. Together, they intensified political competition for legitimacy and control. Rights to govern and control Jewish residency and activities were subject to the same conflicts as other rights over privileges and authority. As individual Jews or families contracted with various towns or elites, they “increasingly found themselves in the crossfire between competing rulers” (Haverkamp 1995, 28).

2.2.1. Territorialization

The main struggle for medieval polities was governance capacity. Governance capacity primarily meant fiscal capacity, extracting enough income to maintain domains (Johnson and Koyama 2017a; Mann 1986; Olson 1993; Tilly 1990). Income paid for household expenditures, from food to clothing to travel, as well as staffing and contracting with other notables for security services at home and at war and construction and upkeep on family homes and
strongholds necessary for rule. In the High Middle Ages (1000-1250 CE), over 90% of Germanic people were legally unfree serfs, servants, and ministerials (Haverkamp 1988), whose status implied financial burden on their overlords. Feudal lords were responsible for providing implements, harvest-time labor, cattle, and seeds (Toch 2003b). Fragmented rights (Volckart 2002) and varying resources created complicated competition over how to obtain income.

Given difficulties of extracting land-based taxes, revenues from towns were attractive to rulers. Urban revenues were collected by impositions of fees, excise taxes, tolls, confiscation, and new tools like annuities (Isenmann 2012; Stasavage 2011). In many urban centers, the sources of revenue did not automatically and without question belong to one local ruler. Each revenue stream developed from customary law and specific grants of rights. The titular city ruler was often in competition with clerical authorities, the emperor, prominent guildsmen, and other local elites, who may have purchased individual customs and taxation rights or been granted them by the emperor. Further, cities were often run by agents, mortgage-holders, and/or city councils. Local officials performed various combinations of legal, fiscal, and administrative functions, depending on what self-governance rights were bought or bestowed on a city and local institutional cultures (Isenmann 2012, 236). Castellans and senior administrators (Amtmänner) were identifiable agents of an overlord. Civic juries (Schöffen), city chairmen (Bürgermeister), and city councils (Räte) represented a peer group of local elites in legal and/or administrative decision-making. Bailiffs (Schultheißen) enforced legal and fiscal agreements, particularly concerning the emperor’s coffers. All of these titular and office-holding political elites were city rulers. Urban centers had political competition built into their local governance; any mix of these rulers might be vying for fiscal superiority or monopoly on their own behalf or as agents of a principal.
Commercialization of sovereignty, especially through office-granting, was the foundation of territorialization (Reichert 1996, 278). Territorialization was the erection of delimited administration (Giddens 1987) where rulers could demand and expect compliance with taxation and regulation (Volckart 2000) because they had pushed out or overcome their competitors. As physical, economic, and legal borders (Boes 2007), city walls were bounds for new conflicts over sole sovereignty over all city occupants and activities, including over Jews. In Cologne in 1424, the agreement to expel Jews was the cornerstone of the settlement of a nearly ten-year conflict between the city and the archbishop over who held supreme sovereignty in the city (M. Wenninger 1981). Archbishop Dietrich, elected to his post in 1414, disregarded the status quo, established by his predecessors, that rights over Jewish residency were jointly held with the city’s secular government. He had inherited the desire to reestablish sole sovereignty over the whole city from the previous archbishop, his uncle Friedrich III; Archbishop Dietrich saw disputing shared jurisdiction over Jews as an opportunity to accomplish this (M. Wenninger 1981, 79). His campaign for sovereignty soon also included legal challenges to the city’s attempts to raise taxes, which he saw as disturbing his rights over through-trade along the Rhine River, on which the city was located. With the 1424 expulsion agreement, the relationship became friendly. The Archbishop gave up aspirations for supremacy within the city, but he gained sole possession of rights over the expelled Jews, whom he settled within his jurisdiction in Deutz, Bonn, and elsewhere. From these Jews the city government had collected 18,800 Marks in taxes, not to mention thousands of Marks via coerced direct loans, in the last 10 years alone. Archbishop Dietrich became renowned for having “the most and richest Jews” in Germany (M. Wenninger 1981, 93).

2.2.2. New theocratic understandings of Christian piety
Christian understandings of the historical and symbolic role of Jews preserved and enforced the social boundary between medieval Christians and Jews. Christians, living under the new covenant with God through the death of Jesus, were accountable to canon law. Canon law did not apply to Jews, who lived under the old covenant and Mosaic law (Dorin 2015, 119). Christian piety relied on this contrast, both linking and distinguishing Christians from their supposed predecessors. Sara Lipton (2014) argues that overreliance on this contrast to teach Christian spiritual lessons was at least partially responsible for increasing European antisemitism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Christian relationships to Jews began to change, even with the German bishops that had been Jews’ earliest medieval protectors. Developments in canon law, politics, and individual rulers’ personal opinions and relationships with other political leaders (C. Cluse 2013b) added pressure to reorder the relationship between Christians and Jews across continental Europe.

New developments in political philosophy pushed elites to recognize some Christian commonality and undertake moral responsibility for those they exercised power over (C. Cluse 1999; Isenmann 2012, 523). By the thirteenth century, Christian holiness had become a main concern for kings. Theological discussions in Paris, long a center of theological and legal training, posed and probed questions of ethics of Christian rule. Graduates of the university dispersed across Europe, taking these debates with them (C. Cluse 1999). King Louis IX proclaimed himself “Rex Christianismus” (Most Christian King) and became Saint Louis for his reformatory efforts to build a just and holy France (Jordan 1989). Pressure for holiness came from below, too. Stow (1992a, 285) argues that medieval rulers began to recognize that absolutism could not be maintained without a show of commitment to theocratic principles of Christian rule. Nirenberg (1996) details how rural agitators victimized Jews and lepers in a 1320
crusade and 1321 revolt that pressured French king Philip V to prioritize the moral health of his domains, especially to reconsider fiscal policies that exacerbated poverty.

Christians began to demand more from each other (Hechter 1987), to expect a different standard of behavior and public comportment. Appeals for Catholic unity and reform and renewal of crusading provided support for public accountability for Christian behavior. The fourteenth century was a century of increasing Christian disarray: abuses of power and position within the Church, louder and louder criticism of the Church, war among secular and episcopal powers, and schism in 1378 between allegiance to a pope in Avignon versus a pope in Rome (Housley 2017). Church fathers saw reconciliation and Christian unity as the path to reform, and in 1417 at the Council of Constance, they resolved to remain gathered until schism was ended and reform instituted (Housley 2017, 48). This gathering ultimately failed to accomplish these goals and dissolved in 1418, but it established the obligation for religious and secular leaders to pursue reform and orthodoxy. Rulers were entreated by two papal bulls in 1420 to participate in crusading against the Hussite sect in Bohemia and against Turks in the eastern Mediterranean, and this quickly turned to questioning rulers over why they would leave to fight when they could attack heretics in their own jurisdictions (Rubin 1999). These new Christian ethics of lordship amounted to compliance demands for a ruler to govern other Christians as a Christian, to shepherd their subjects by legislating against unchristian behavior, which would threaten Christian community holiness and health.

As best as we can tell, the 1424 expulsion in Cologne was not specifically attributable to these new Christian political ethics. However, city councilors from the Rat attempted to use its logic in a post-hoc justification written to King Sigismund of Germany, as yet uncrowned emperor, seven years later in 1431 (M. Wenninger 1981). King Sigismund had written to the city
for an account of why the Jews were expelled and insisted that the Jews be readmitted. The Rat members played on Cologne’s image as protector of the Christian faith (Rothkrug 1980) in order to evade blame for their actions. After making excuses for why they had not replied earlier, the letter authors offered that the Jews were expelled for causing religious unrest in the city: converting ignorant Christians to Judaism, being a liability for the city to protect from bloodthirsty anti-Hussite crusaders, lending money at interest despite a prohibition, degrading the city’s reputation as one of the holiest places in Christendom and defiling it with their unchristian feet, being rumored to be plotting to poison city wells, and more (M. Wenninger 1981, 94–96). The letter writers reminded King Sigismund that they had been granted privileges from popes, emperors, and kings to do what they thought best for the city, in this case being the eviction of the “unbelieving” Jews. The city leaders argued on the grounds of their Christian religious responsibilities coupled with their governing responsibilities. They were justified because they had acted to protect the moral and political order of Cologne’s Christian community.

2.3. CONSEQUENCES FOR JEWS

The co-evolution of territorial control and political theology fed conflict over political authority. Demands that a ruler change policies and institutions to be more Christian would not

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2 While canon law forbade lending money at excessive interest (usury) by foreigners, a widespread prohibition on lending money at some interest did not exist. Christian financiers, including the Church, regularly offered loans for a price. A tidy volume on political finance in the Holy Roman Empire covers many examples (Burgard et al. 1996), indicating the banality of Christian participation in financial markets. The interpretation of canon law regarding what counted as usury, and whose lending would be ignored or vilified, evolved throughout the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries and varied across polities. For a thorough study, see Dorin (2015). The challenge for modern scholars is a classic one: do we take complaints about usury at face value? Or do we read into them and interpret what is unsaid? Here, the past is incommensurable. What we do know is that Christians in finance who were not doing anything different than Jews were not always sanctioned in the ways Jews were.
have made sense without territorialization. Territorialization spurred rulers and subjects to focus on the boundaries of their Christian community as the borders of authority. Rulers’ obligations were to the Christian subjects in their jurisdiction, and not to Christians outside their jurisdiction. As rulers’ governance came under inspection, medieval Christians reconsidered whether a holy Christian community could include Jewish residents. Jews represented God’s history of commitment to the pious faithful, but they were also representatives of unbelief and unchristian living (Stacey 1992). Furthermore, agitators pointed out that Jews facilitated rulers’ unchristian financial practices (Hsia 1995). Whether their antisemitism was genuine or just a convenience, counterelites could use this ambiguity to their advantage (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012) by pressing rulers to expel Jews in order to live up to their Christian responsibility. Jewish residence became relevant to intra-Christian political competition.

Urban Jewish communities were vulnerable to expulsion because of their legal position. Like most people in medieval Europe, Jews did not have legal rights to freedom of movement and settlement. The emperor formally held all rights to “protect” Jews (Judenregal), including designating which towns could accept Jews as residents and issuing communal and individual letters assuring safe passage. These rights were farmed out, mortgaged, and granted to territorial princes, cities, and bishoprics (J. F. Battenberg 1995; Ries 1995, 215). Authorities could choose which Jewish individuals or families to admit and to whom to grant residency permits (Toch 2003b), based on such characteristics as their wealth or trade connections, to facilitate economic exchange locally and abroad that could be taxed to fund the local ruler. In the high medieval period, authorities and Jews made contracts concerning residency, protection, Jewish community contributions to town defense, and acceptance as burghers (C. Cluse 2009; Isenmann 2012, 140).
This classed Jews with other Päktburger, city residents under contracts, including merchants and gentry from other cities. City authorities could revoke residency contracts as it suited them.

Given the shifting religious and political economic pressures, we would expect that rulers everywhere in Ashkenaz began revoking residency privileges and expelling Jews. They did not. Despite the trends in Christian morality and territorialization, most rulers maintained Jewish co-residence. Broadly, rulers’ incentives were to maintain Jewish communities because they were easy targets for predatory fiscal policies. This function only increased in value as territorialization stepped up competition and warfare. As Johnson and Koyama (2019) outline, religiously-justified differential treatment of Jews was a shortcut for rulers looking to shore up or expand their governments’ capacity.

Jewish communities were instrumentally valuable to rulers (Dorin 2015). In a sense, there was a market for Jewish presence in a city or territory, although Jews did not have much bargaining power over the conditions of their location. This market for Jews paralleled the market for merchants, whom urban elites tempted to relocate by tax breaks and rights to hereditary land ownership (Haverkamp 1988, 177–78). Jews had higher literacy and education rates that better prepared them for financial professions, precipitating occupational shifts that were followed with legal restrictions limiting Jews’ involvement in non-financial occupations (Botticini and Eckstein 2005; 2012). Jews’ commercial activities provided money to a local economy, making transactions easier to accomplish, which in turn encouraged economic activity and more opportunities for a ruler to make, or take, money. Jewish merchant bankers also improved import and export flows, as their connections to other Jews in cities abroad diminished the costs and uncertainty in doing business in foreign locales. As Avner Greif (Greif 1989; 1993; 1994; 2008) has shown extensively, medieval Jewish trading networks were a reliable way to
move money and goods (though his research concerned circum-Mediterranean trade rather than continental). Jews contributed to the commercialization of a city (Botticini 2000; Botticini and Eckstein 2012; Johnson and Koyama 2017b), and commercialization meant more routine and liquid income collection for rulers. Within this fiscal landscape, Jews were vulnerable to rent-seeking governors (Finley and Koyama 2018; Koyama 2010). Their legal position, as essentially possessed by whomever held Judenregal, enabled rulers to practice confiscation and predation through taxation and forced loans. The immense financial value that rulers saw in Jews made expulsion a rare occurrence.

Competition over authority fueled both maintaining and expelling Jews. Fights over jurisdiction and supremacy could be funded in part by abusing Jewish communities, and these fights were also over control of Jewish communities. A third motivation was taking over local market power held by Jews, including the opportunity to lend to the government and profit from the interest and the political power that flows from other political elites being beholden to you (Ziwes 1996). Johnson and Koyama (2019) give extensive attention to the role of anti-Jewish policies as a strategy for claiming legitimate authority. I look more deeply at the specific local power relations that precipitated expulsions. Emperors, landgraves, bishops, guilds, and town councils wrestled over determining the relevant authority in a patchwork landscape of overlapping jurisdictions (K. R. Stow 1992a). Expulsion was a tool to undercut rivals or assert one’s authority (Kedar 1996), if rivals stood between the ruler and a monopoly on authority. Finley and Koyama (2018) produced an excellent study of how the macro-level political competition in the Holy Roman Empire affected the persecution of Jews. But there was significant variation in local political and economic structures. The focus of this study is the association between expulsions and the potential for local authority contests. In short, I argue
that Jewish communities were more likely to be expelled where authority was contested, and
different local structures yielded more or less insecurity for Jewish communities.

One layer of competition occurred among political elites within a polity (see table 2.1).
Characteristics of each title, office, or the constellation of claimants to authority could tip the
balance of competition in favor of one body or another. In free and imperial cities and episcopal
cities, where the bishop was installed by a cathedral chapter, the choice of governing officials
might be subject to political maneuvering among elites with voting rights; a new official might
be beholden to campaign promises or vulnerable to attacks by a faction within the city elite.
Civic moral reforms and Jewish expulsions could be legitimizing and defensive. In cities ruled
by religious authorities, these rulers might feel even stronger pressure to demonstrate their
Christian ethics of lordship, lest they be criticized by a reforming civil servant with mutinous
aspirations. Thus, despite strong instrumental incentives to maintain a local Jewish community,
local political contestation may have incentivized expulsion.

Table 2.1 Relational Structure of Political Competition and Potential Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures in inter-city politics</th>
<th>Holy Roman Emperor Kings (Bohemia, France)</th>
<th>Gentry Self-governing cities Archbishops/Bishops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Princes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lords</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures in intra-city politics</th>
<th>Holy Roman Emperor Local archbishop/bishop Titular prince/lord/gentry Possessor(s) of governance rights or offices City fiefholder(s) City mortgageholder(s)</th>
<th>Castellan Amtmann Schöffen Schultheiß Bürgermeister Rat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19
If this were the case, then I expect a higher incidence of expulsion in cities where multiple authorities claim rights of rule. In some places, this might have manifested as multiple lords sharing dominion, directly by fragmented rights or fiefs or indirectly through mortgages of rights. In others, conflicting claims to rule might be between local political administrations, like a Rat or Schöffen, and the agents of another, like the Schultheißen, castellans, and Amtmänner that were agents of the overlord (Isenmann 2012, 216). Relatedly, the conflict might have been between a city with local administrators and a resident overlord who might try to exert more absolutist, direct rule (Hechter 2013). Local contestation may have been higher where more revenue was at stake (Bueno de Mesquita and Bueno de Mesquita 2018), and there was a greater prize to be won by pushing out rivals.

Another layer of competition was between the local government and external rivals, including neighboring cities or lords, peers, or even the Holy Roman Emperor. Jews were under the jurisdiction of the Roman crown, no matter what city or village they lived in; expulsions of Jews asserted a polity’s territorial independence, against the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor (K. R. Stow 1992a). Imperial cities, which were granted self-governance by the emperor, or imperial immediacy, had on-going conflict with the emperor and his agents about how much independence they really had. Expulsion would be especially likely in these cities, which had more opportunities for intra-city strife on top of their struggles with the emperor. City rulers might expel Jews to spite any number of rivals, from the pope and the imperial regime (Haverkamp 1999) to local overlords to other cities.³

³ In 1515, Andernach expelled a Jewish family right after the Archbishop of Cologne had settled them there, disputing the right of the Archbishop to do so (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). Conversely, in 1495 Jews were arrested in Münster bei Bingen as part of a dispute between the Pfalzgraf (overlord in Münster bei Bingen) and the city of Bingen (home of several of the arrested Jews) (Mentgen 2016).
In other circumstances, inter-ruler warfare and politicking might stretch a ruler’s fiscal capacity to the point that expulsion and confiscation of Jewish assets outweighed any incentives to preserve Jews as insurance against future financial needs (Jordan 1998; generally, see Levi 1983, 1988; Olson 1993). Seizing the property of Jews was rewarding enough for France’s Philip II (Barkey and Katznelson 2011) that he did it twice. The Trier cathedral chapter estimated that expulsion there in 1418 generated 60,000 florins (and they wondered where their cut of the profits were) (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). Conflict might decrease the ruler’s discount rate on the value of Jewish residents, and the more desperate they were, the less it would matter how much the confiscation netted, as long as it was something. Since before the beginning of the millennium, German princes and families had been squabbling and warring over territory and succession (Haverkamp 1988). Alliances swapped with marriages, unexpected desertion, and negotiations over the office of emperor and inheritances. Cities and territorial rulers formed *Bunde*, alliances based on time-delimited pledges or treaties, to become blocs that enforced military peace, promoted trade, or bargained collectively with the emperor about non-interference - including with tax collection (Distler 2006; Isenmann 2012). A *Bund* marked a détente with other members. If the alliance brought stability and peace to a city, the government’s discount rate on the instrumental value of its Jewish community might rise again, preserving the community’s residence in the city.

With all these dynamics in mind, let’s return to the case of Cologne. In the early fifteenth century, the Cologne Jewish community had high instrumental value to both the city and the Archbishop. Coerced loans to city coffers helped the city spread the costs of regional warfare into peacetime (Mann 1986, 430) and stabilize city finances in the middle of a war-related economic downturn (M. Wenninger 1981, 83–86). City rulers raised import and export taxes,
depressing economic production of food staples for local consumption and revenues on shipping. The city extracted 22.3% of its direct loans 1414-1424 from the Jewish community (M. Wenninger 1981, 92), a sizeable financial tool the city council would not have easily parted with. At the same time, Archbishop Dietrich himself had attempted to fine both the Jews and the city to pay for his own war costs, but the Jews took him to court three times to contest his jurisdiction to do so. Under mediation by Duke Adolf of Jülich-Berg to end the ten-year feud between the city and the new archbishop Dietrich, the parties reconsidered whether Jews’ rights of residence should be extended. The Archbishop offered to remunerate the city for in return for expulsion. The agreement to expel the Jews resolved taxation and reparation disputes between city and the Archbishop, helped each to meet their financial goals, allowed the city to avoid continued jurisdictional conflict with the Archbishop over the Jews, and gave the impression that the Archbishop was expressing his rights over the Jews by forcing them to be relocated from the city and into his other territories. The expulsion further allowed Archbishop Dietrich to save face after being called out by name in 1422 by Pope Martin V for fighting other Germans instead of participating in crusading against unbelievers (Housley 2017, 59). Expulsion served the fiscal and political aims of the city of Cologne and the Archbishopric of Cologne.

2.4.DATA AND METHOD

Case studies can highlight the specific institutional contexts and political contests in individual cities and their connections to policies for Jewish residence. However, Jews lived in hundreds of German cities, and were expelled from over 100, making overall comparison based on historical narrative alone cognitively difficult. Further, we have limited information for many German cities about Jewish communities or any contention about their residence. I use a quantitative approach in order to explore which structural conditions for political competition
were more likely to produce expulsions, based on sparse information about each city rather than detailed histories.

For city-level data on politics, economics, and Jewish communities, I translated and digitized *Geschichte der Juden im Mittelalter von der Nordsee bis zu den Südalpen* (Haverkamp 2002), a compendium covering cities with Jewish settlement roughly from the Meuse River in the west to the easternmost tributaries of the Rhine River and from the North Sea to the Southern Alps. This region was the heart of historic Ashkenaz, which stretched across parts of the modern countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy. See Figure 1 for a map. The dataset is structured in the same manner as *Geschichte der Juden*, which is in century and half-century increments: 1000-1100, 1101-1200, 1201-1250, 1251-1300, 1301-1350, 1351-1400, 1401-1450, 1451-1500, 1501-1520. Organizing by city and by period is advantageous because many pieces of information about medieval cities are traceable to a period but fuzzy on the specific year.

Besides recording the locations of Jewish settlement and expulsions, *Geschichte der Juden* encodes: (1) the sovereign(s) and polity authority type (ecclesiastical, free or imperial, territorial lord or prince, or non-urban); (2) indicators of the development of Jewish community and ritual infrastructure (organized community, community leaders, official seal, cemetery, synagogue, mikveh, community center, hospital, Jewish quarter); (3) occurrence of persecutions, both period-specific (e.g., Plague persecutions) and perennial (e.g., ritual murder accusations);

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4 Jewish settlement was not random, since Jews needed permission to live in a city. Since this study is restricted to cities where Jews lived, I assume that factors for Jewish migration to a town are relatively consistent and do not affect one town more than another. The spatial pattern follows the overall distribution of towns, with generally greater density of settlement in southeastern German lands and along the Rhine.
(4) urban defensive, economic, and political development; and (5) lordly privileges over Jewish subjects.

_Geschichte der Juden_ distinguishes between certain and uncertain Jewish presence in a city, based on the types of sources and corroboration between multiple sources. Additionally, the collection notes whether settlements were “non-urban,” meaning they did not develop into cities of much substance during the time period. The database excludes cities with uncertain Jewish settlement as well as non-urban settlements. Most non-urban settlements have little additional information recorded besides Jewish presence; their small size likely means that there were few contemporary records about them and even fewer records that survived to the present. Non-urban locales were too small to have the institutional, economic, and political development under study here. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel that includes only as many cities in a period as had Jewish residents. Table 2.2 enumerates the temporal distribution of observations of the 811 cities in this study.5 Descriptive statistics are presented in table 2.3.

**Table 2.2 Jewish Residential Migration in German Lands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1000-1100</th>
<th>1101-1200</th>
<th>1201-1250</th>
<th>1251-1300</th>
<th>1301-1350</th>
<th>1351-1400</th>
<th>1401-1450</th>
<th>1451-1500</th>
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<td>Cities</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.1. **Dependent Variable: Expulsion**

5 _Geschichte der Juden_ is based on the third volume of _Germania Judaica_ (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987) plus extensive re-examination of previous volumes and additional sources produced since the first two volumes were completed. _Germania Judaica_ is the source for recent studies of medieval antisemitic persecution. This study is more geographically and temporally inclusive than those of Voigtländer and Voth, who limited themselves to the 1938 borders of Germany and matches to other data (325 cities), and Finley and Koyama, who restrict their sample to cities whose entries in Volume II of _Germania Judaica_ mention the Black Death Plague in the years 1340-1350 (340 cities).
For this study, the dependent variable is whether or not a local expulsion occurred. *Geschichte der Juden* catalogues years of confirmed, attempted, and uncertain expulsions on the local and territorial scale. I excluded attempted and uncertain expulsions, territorial expulsions, and expulsions with unknown dates.

**Figure 2.1** Jewish Settlement and Expulsions in German Lands, 1000-1520 CE
2.4.2. Political Contestation

The argument in this study leaves open which specific institutions or authority competitions would be most dangerous for Jewish communities. We have limited theory and empirics in this regard. Recent work is most likely to investigate the development of representative institutions and to ask whether representation was advantageous to a polity’s economy (Stasavage 2016; 2007; Wahl 2019). Participatory institutions were but one facet of medieval urban political systems, just as in today’s cities and states. Therefore, this study includes both theoretically-motivated measures and exploratory measures of political economies.

Sovereignty. To measure contestation over sovereignty within a city, I coded types of rulers, whether rule was shared, and whether rulership changed. From the timeline of sovereignty, I tallied and categorized rulers over a city within each period using binary, non-exclusive coding, since multiple individuals or bodies might have claims over a city during a period, either at the same time or through a transfer of sovereignty. This method differs from the typical measurement (Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Finley and Koyama 2018; Kim and Pfaff 2012; Pfaff 2013; Voigtländer and Voth 2012) that does not allow for overlapping categorizations, even though shared authority was not an anomaly. The possible ruler types were numerous: archbishop, bishop, religious house, religious foundation, imperial, free, king, prince, lord, minor nobility, city, and others (usually individual financiers who held mortgages over the city). Examining frequencies of cities and expulsion by ruler type helped to narrow the list of which ruler types to include, and I settled on including free, imperial, prince, bishop, and archbishop as dichotomous measures of who ever held sovereignty rights within the period. These cover the majority of observations and expulsions and represent a range of ranks.
among the nobility and clergy. Because these are binary, they indicate different types of
authority and contrast different packages of incentives.

To distinguish between shared or sole sovereignty and capture any effects of direct
competition over sovereignty, I use the mean count of sovereignty claimants per year in a period.
Values near or equal to one indicate that sovereignty was rarely shared, or not at all during the
period. High values (approximately 5 or 6) represent very fractured sovereignty rights. Moderate
values (approximately 2 or 3) might represent frequent power-sharing or a mix of years of sole
sovereignty with years of highly fragmented sovereignty. Additionally, I noted whether the city
was the residence of (one of) its sovereign(s) (1) or not (0).

Sovereignty transitions were an opportunity for political conflict. I coded types of
transitions between sovereigns within a period. These transitions occurred through mortgages,
sales, changes in feudal rights, treaties, conquests, deaths, marriages, and more. Since I am
interested in political contestation, I include a count of political transitions, that is, those due to
treaties or conquests. Additionally, I count the number of sovereignty transitions that occurred
through mortgages of sovereignty rights. This is another method for understanding a ruler’s
fiscal needs.

Political Institutions. To understand the potential role of individual political offices, I recorded
the presence (1) or absence (0) of the following local political offices: castellan, civic jury
(Schöffen), bailiff (Schultheiß), city chairman (Bürgermeister), and city council (Rat). Likewise,
I recorded the presence (1) or absence (0) of two types of local administration rights: self-
jurisdiction (Stadtrecht) and high jurisdiction, which was the right to try serious crimes and
utilize the death penalty. These offices indicate the level of local involvement in political
decision-making. None is a direct substitute for the others.
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan seat</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish community infrastructure</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persecutions</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous expulsions</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial development</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign moneylenders</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersecting transit routes</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alliances. Regional political cooperation in Bünde created blocs of mutual aid. Assurances that a ruler could rely on troops furnished by others may have diminished the importance of Jews as a tax source. Membership in any alliances, such as the Swabian League, the Decapolis (Alsace), or
the Rhenish League, was recorded by year from the detailed work of Distler (2006). I summed the count of regional alliance agreements for each city across all prior periods. The Hanseatic League, a trade-based alliance, is not considered in this measure.

2.4.3. Instrumental Value of Jewish Communities

Underlying my argument about political dynamics are the importance of commercial economic development and the potential for revenue collection in a city. I include measures of each of these, in line with previous economic arguments about the purely economic reasons for expulsion (Barzel 1992) or persecution (S. O. Becker and Pascali 2019).

Commercial Development. Maintaining a Jewish community for their instrumental value would be less important if a city had lively commercial activity outside of what was facilitated by Jewish merchants. Geschichte der Juden includes whether a city was known to have a market or market rights. I recoded the number and type of markets into an ordinal measure of market development: no markets (0), one market or a generic record of market rights (1), multiple markets (2), any number of fairs (3). The benefit of keeping the scale truncated in this manner, as compared to a count of markets or fairs, is that having outliers on number of markets or fairs is not actually helpful for the analysis, and often the reference is to plural markets rather than a specific number. As an indicator of commercial potential, I include a count of how many approximated medieval trade and pilgrimage routes (Bossak and Welford 2015) pass within 5 kilometers of each city; this is constant across periods.

Substitutes for Expropriating from Jews. As I laid out, a significant deterrent to expelling Jews was the perception of how valuable it might be to maintain their presence for on-going financial exploitation, or to confiscate everything from them at a future time of greater fiscal need. If a ruler had other options for confiscating from cultural others or formalized mechanisms for
regular income, Jews would have less instrumental value. The *Geschichte der Juden* catalogue mentions when foreign merchant-bankers (Lombards or Cahorsins) were active in a city. I code this as presence (1) or absence (0) for foreign financiers. I used keywords to code the presence (1) or absence (0) of toll and tariff collection and minting. Keyword coding was validated manually and corrected as necessary.

### 2.4.4. Other Independent Variables

**Christian Religious Institutionalization.** Historical religiosity is difficult to operationalize. One tactic is to code for whether religion-based authority was institutionalized into city governance. While others have differentiated between cities hosting bishoprics versus not, it is more accurate to consider whether *any* rights to sovereignty in a city were held by a religious authority. I captured this through the sovereignty coding for bishop and archbishop mentioned above.

Additionally, I coded whether a city was the seat of a diocese (1) or not (0). Bishops and archbishops did not always possess sovereignty over the seats of their dioceses, and the previous measure would miss these cities with intense presence of clergy, religious orders, pilgrims, relics, and religious symbolism. This metric may be the closest to capturing public religious vitality with the information contained in *Geschichte der Juden*.

**Jewish Community Infrastructure.** Finley and Koyama (2018) used the binary existences of synagogues, cemeteries, mikvehs, and Jewish quarters to represent community wealth. I created a cumulative measure of community infrastructure by summing the presence of synagogues,

---

6 Similar to Kim and Pfaff (2012), I first calculated the number of religious communities recorded in a city as a representation of the potential visibility and importance of religious ideology in civic life. Unfortunately, this information was absent or else impenetrably recorded as “various” for some of the most notable cities.

7 I am hesitant to assert that these artifacts of community development represent *wealth*. Certainly some Jewish communities did invest wealth in their ritual infrastructure, but the underlying historical data does distinguish between a grandiose synagogue and a plain one.
cemeteries, mikvehs, and Jewish quarters, resulting in a range from 0 to 4. This index of community infrastructure reduces otherwise dichotomous variation into one dimension that separates cities with less-developed Jewish communities, which were likely smaller, from more developed communities, which were likely larger.

Other Persecutions and Pogroms. Jews in the Middle Ages faced a variety of persecutions, including Crusades massacres, ritual murder accusations, host desecration accusations, and extortion. To account for the effect of local histories of persecution, I record the total persecutions of any kind in the previous period and the total expulsions or attempted expulsions in the previous period.

Time. Time period is recorded categorically in dummy variables, with the first period (1000-1100) as the referent category in order to draw contrasts between the earliest time period and which later periods might have a higher risk of expulsion, as some experts give reason to expect (Müller 2002).

2.4.5. Analytical Approach

Since expulsions occurred in 5.6% of the sample (116 observations), and furthermore because so many of the independent variables are non-normally distributed and/or dichotomous, the usual logistic regression approaches produce unreliable estimates for the relationships between expulsion and the independent variables. The computational problem for frequentist logistic regression is that sparseness - not all possible combinations are represented in the data, and many occur very few times - results in separation on the dependent variable. That is, there were no expulsions under some condition sets, and some condition sets are always associated with expulsions. Frequentist logistic regression calculations either overfit the model or, in my case, do not converge.
Instead, I implement Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian logistic regression. Bayesian logistic regression solves the problem by considering that the sample data are drawn from distributions of the covariates; supplying these prior distributions supplements the sample data to give limited information about potential condition sets that are not represented in the sample. The results are posterior distributions of all observed variables, dependent and independent, conditional on the prior distributions and the observed distributions. The posterior distributions tell us how realistic our expectations are, given our observations.

I use weakly informative priors and scale all non-dichotomous variables to be centered at 0 with a standard deviation of 0.5. To address the non-independent nature of observations in this panel data, I use a hierarchical specification with observations pooled by city. The modeling procedure involves 5 independent chains of 5,000 iterations, including 2,500 warm-up iterations per chain. All chains converged and mixed well, and the potential scale reduction factor for each variable in the model is less than 1.01. Further information on model details, convergence, and posterior checks, including robustness to removing outliers, are included in appendix A.3.

2.5. RESULTS

Expulsion was a relatively rare event, though not rare enough in terms of its human consequences. Expulsions were very uncommon before the fourteenth century; Geschichte der Juden noted only 4 urban expulsions prior to 1301 (Mainz 1012, Bingen 1198/1199, Lyon 1250, and Bern 1294). Excepting Plague-related expulsions 1348-1350, 16 expulsions were ordered before the fifteenth century. After this point, the frequency of expulsions increased dramatically, with the height of expulsions in the period 1451-1500, during which 46 cities conducted 47 expulsions (see table 2.4).
Table 2.4 Jewish Urban Settlement and Expulsions through Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1000-1100</th>
<th>1101-1200</th>
<th>1201-1250</th>
<th>1251-1300</th>
<th>1301-1350</th>
<th>1351-1400</th>
<th>1401-1450</th>
<th>1451-1500</th>
<th>1501-1520</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local expulsions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities where expulsions occurred</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For an initial look at political competition, we can check the probabilities of expulsion for different authority and institution conditions. Figure 2.2 compares rates of expulsions for those that had and did not have different types of authority structures or institutions. Without conditioning on any other variables, there is a high level of variation in whether the political structures correspond to differences in expulsion rates. Consistent with previous studies and with my arguments, the rate of expulsion was higher in free cities and imperial cities. Expulsions also happened more often in cities where rulers resided. For the different offices and local institutions, some had positive associations with expulsion, while others had negative associations. These comparisons do not attend to the panel structure of the data or the covariation of city conditions. Bayesian regression provides a more careful analysis.
Since the results of logistic regressions are conditional on which variables are included, and the magnitudes of the effects are not comparable between different specifications (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018), in Table 5 I present the results of a single model that includes all the theorized and exploratory variables. Results from Bayesian regression analyses are slightly different from frequentist regression. The results describe the posterior distributions, which are the distributions of coefficients describing the relationships between independent variables and the dependent variable. Posterior medians are the median estimated coefficients of change in the log-odds of expulsion. Credibility intervals capture a specified proportion of the density of the posteriors, centered around the medians. Since the model was estimated using partially scaled data, as described above, the posterior medians indicate the change in log-odds for the presence (=1) of each binary variable and for the mean plus two standard errors for each continuous variable. Full results are in Table A1.1. For comparison, Table A1.1 also includes results from two nested models: one with only control variables and a second with controls plus dominion.
categories and economic attributes. To aid interpretation, figure 2.3 visualizes a selection of effects translated into changes in probability of expulsion.

2.5.1. Formal Sovereignty

A few conditions set up a balance of power that was more likely to victimize Jewish communities. Most other studies have used categorization of authority type as an indicator of political contestation. However, as I have established, authority was split much of the time, with cities having as many as six different rulers in a given year. To address this, I examined the mean count of sovereignty claimants per year in a period. I observe the opposite pattern of what I expected. More rulers competing for control was better for Jewish communities. A higher mean count of rulers per year was associated with a lower incidence of expulsion; the odds of expulsion decrease 52% (decrease of 0.74 in log-odds) for a shift in the mean count of rulers from 1.27 (mean) to 2.31 (two standard errors above the mean). Sixteen of 116 expulsions occurred when sovereignty was shared. Further, Jews were less safe in cities where rulers were in residence. This appears to indicate that more direct, less contested sovereignty increased the precarity of Jewish communities. The odds of expulsion in a city when the ruler lived there were 274% higher (log-odds increased by 1.32) than cities where the ruler(s) lived elsewhere.

The types of rulers mostly did not matter, but the relationship between a city’s rulers and other external powers did matter. Imperial cities were nearly 30% more likely to expel Jews (180% increase in odds, 28 of 116 expulsions). These were cities where the Holy Roman Emperor had some direct authority, setting the city up for conflict between local elites and the distant emperor. Likewise, geopolitics imperiled Jews. Cities where a transition of sovereignty happened politically, via treaty or conquest, were more likely to expel. One political sovereignty transition (about four standard errors above the mean of approximately 0) increases the log-odds
by about 1.24, an increase of 246% in the odds of expulsion. The measurement strategies of this study are validated: more detailed measurement reveals that rulers’ holds on sovereignty mattered for the survival of Jewish communities.

Table 2.5 Main Results from Bayesian Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Posterior median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archbishop</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Count of Rulers *</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Transitions of Rule *</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage Transitions *</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruler’s Residence</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castellan</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schultheiss</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadtrechte</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rat</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bürgermeister</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schöffen</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market Development *</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Moneylenders</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Tolls</td>
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<td>Count of Travel Routes *</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan Seat</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Jewish Leaders</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish community development *</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Continuous variables (indicated by *) were scaled prior to estimation to the distribution mean = 0, sd = 2.5.

2.5.2. Local Political Institutions
Beyond formal rights of sovereignty, what happened on the ground, in terms of the actual institutional maintenance of political and territorial control, led to differential outcomes for Jewish communities. Looking at local offices and self-administration, the odds of expulsion with Schöffen are 88% less than without; the odds with a castellan are 82% less than without. These two offices had the largest association, negative or positive, with whether a city expelled its Jews. Other local institutions (Schultheiß, Rat, Burgermeister) were not related to the expulsions. More detailed historical investigation is needed to understand the importance and non-importance of each of these offices. Possession of Stadtrechte or high justice privileges also did not impact whether or not a Jewish community was expelled. Neither was a history of participation in regional alliances connected to expulsion, though I had reasoned that Bunde, by promoting geopolitical and economic security, would diminish the temptation to expel in order to confiscate. The posterior distributions for these no-relationship variables are consistent with zero effect.

2.5.3. Fiscal Opportunities

Turning to the financial side of sovereignty pressures, expulsion was more likely in cities where local rulers could manipulate their revenues using tools of absolutism. Rulers who had minting rights could simply coin more money, if they needed cash. For cities that had mints, the odds of expulsion are 136% higher. Similarly to the fiscal position of Jews, city governors could up the tax rates on foreign moneylenders’ activities or extort them for the privilege to continue business without much interference, since the foreigners did not have political power. For cities that had granted residency to foreign moneylenders, the odds are 270% higher. The presence of either could substitute for financial extraction from Jews and diminish the opportunity costs for expulsion. However, greater market development and trade-favorable location on roads had no
relationship with expulsions, either to promote or suppress them. Commercial activity and access did not increase or decrease the instrumental value of Jewish communities. It was the structure of political control over fiscal resources that mattered for policy regarding Jews, not simply the fiscal potential of a city.

2.5.4. The Role of Christian Values

The exercise of Christian piety as reforming and purifying lordship expanded theocracy beyond bishops and archbishops to any ruler who embraced it. Purification expressed as persecution and exclusion of Jews granted Christian moral authority to any ruler. Indeed, rule by a bishop or archbishop had no relationship with expulsion; the special moral authority of belonging to the Church hierarchy did not provide special motivation to expel Jews. The seat of a diocese was also not more likely to expel Jews, even though the concentration of clergy and monastic life, pilgrims, and religious history could have made community purification more urgent and successful. It is striking that secular and clerical rulers were equally unlikely to expel Jews. Rather, expulsions became more common across all cities from the fifteenth century on, as the pressures for territorialization grew.

The link between Jewish community development and expulsion provides further support for my argument. City rulers were more likely to expel Jewish communities that built more community and ritual infrastructure. Visible non-Christian otherness may have been counter to moral authority in a Christian city, or it may have highlighted the opposing power of the emperor within a city’s own walls, or perhaps the rulers simply needed an influx of revenues from confiscation. Each of these mechanisms is consistent with the overall story that polity leaders were acting to consolidate territorial rule.
Note. The marginal effects are relative to the baseline $p = 0.06$. The posterior distributions are displayed with their medians surrounded by 50% and 90% credibility intervals. All continuous variables are scaled to (mean=0, SD=0.5).

2.6. DISCUSSION

The constellation of sovereignty was a factor in historical European antisemitic persecutions (Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017; Barkey and Katzenelson 2011; Finley and Koyama 2018; Jordan 1989; 1998; Katzenelson 2005; Stacey 1988; 1997) and religious change (Pfaff and Corcoran 2012). This study replicates some of these findings. Further, it aims to capture the complexities and coexisting rights in urban spaces by including a wider range of political offices and institutions. The structure of political power clearly impacted the survival of Jewish communities. There is no straightforward story about which configurations of power
were most damaging to Jews because roles and rights were so inconsistent. It was exactly this absence of formulas that made Jews vulnerable.

Dominion and sovereignty were not straightforward in medieval Europe, including in German lands. Sovereignty did not follow the hierarchical structure of many of today’s states; relationships between towns, princes, and the Holy Roman Emperor were case-specific. The contrast between imperial cities and free cities highlights how the lack of a norm for city-emperor relationships harmed Jewish communities. These two types of cities had two different relationships to the emperor and territorial control. The absent emperor could, at any time, assert direct rule (Hechter 2013) over an imperial city and interfere with local goings-on, but free cities were relatively autonomous. The difference between these two approximates the difference between *de jure* and *de facto* autonomy. Jewish residency was less stable in imperial cities, where city autonomy was not formalized, where the city governors and the emperor had on-going clashes over who was ultimately in charge.

Conflicting rights were a key source of medieval contention. The general argument of this paper has been that political competition among Christians produced negative outcomes for Jews. However, instead of local political fragmentation leading to persecution, as Johnson and Koyama (2019) contend, Jews fared better where there were many rights-claimants.8 Co-rulership might be due to complicated inheritance, mortgaging and pledging (short-term and long-term), treaties, or any combination of these, making it tough to characterize what sorts of cities were more likely to have shared rule. With more parties, the financial rewards to rule are

8 Jewish communities in cities with a greater number of rulers were not more likely to experience a pogrom *instead of* expulsion. Among cities with a greater than average (1.27) mean count of rulers, the proportion of cities where Jews were victims of pogroms but not expulsions (39.7%) is no different from the proportion of cities that had expulsions and pogroms (43.8%).
divided ever smaller, and coordination on any policy is increasingly difficult, leaving little political incentive to expel. Further, more parties means it is less clear which Christians would benefit and which would lose. Here, the unsystematic nature of medieval German politics worked to preserve Jewish communities.

Power relationships vis-à-vis local institutions were similarly irregular. Jewish communities were more likely to be preserved where a castellan or college of Schöffen guarded civic peace. A castellan indicates an absentee sovereign who left an empowered agent to act in her or his name to govern castle affairs. This may have been a situation of stronger centralized control or lesser economic importance, both of which would be contexts of fewer rivals to political and economic power. Schöffen supplied a city government with legal capacity. Greater importance of law could be a conservative force for interreligious toleration because customary law was an alternative to religion-based rule (Johnson and Koyama 2013; 2019); new religious claims about purifying a city of unchristian behavior, and the claims on political legitimacy made therewith, would be less likely to stick.

Territorialization, and dominion more broadly, required as regular and certain access to cash as a governor could manage. This study supports previous research indicating that rulers and cities had financial motivations for maintaining or expelling Jews (Barzel 1992; Katznelson 2005; Miethke 2011; Veitch 1986). Commercialization provided financial opportunities, but only if the necessary bureaucracy and enforcement was in place. I did not find that general commercial development (Rubin 2014; Wahl 2016a) was related to policies of Jewish exclusion. Jews were expelled from cities where rulers could avoid bargaining with counterelites about new revenues and rates, where rulers had foreign moneylenders and minting as ready alternatives to
exploiting Jews. Captive resources, like Jews, or foreigners who needed permission for residency and business activity, or mints, would have been more reliably manipulated. Economic complementarity is a documented inhibitor of popular ethnic violence (Jha 2013; 2014; Landa 2016), but here the violence was undertaken by the government. Rather than complementarity between Christians and Jews (S. O. Becker and Pascali 2019), the dynamics are of substitutability for exploitation towards the purposes of rulers.

In the midst of these political struggles, the new Christian theocratic responsibility for moral guardianship did amount to a new attempt at a formula for sovereignty. Religion-based claims can be powerful legitimation for rule (Rubin 2017; Johnson and Koyama 2019). The motivating logic of purifying and protecting a city’s Christian community, whether convenient or truly felt, was equally available to Christian and lay rulers, an effect of the democratization of European Christianity (FitzGerald 2017). Laypeople were invigorating Christianity, joining monastic organizations as unvowed laborers, forming their own urban charitable communities, developing new saint cults (Pfaff 2013; Rothkrug 1980), and building new parish churches from local donations and labor (Creasman 2002; Minty 1996). These energies continued to the point of schism and prolonged warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Scribner 1991). In spite of new religious political ethics, though, preservation of Jewish communities was the default for Christian and secular rulers. Whatever religious motivations there were for expulsions, these motivations were never held so strongly that Jews were expelled everywhere.

Among cities with Jewish residents, the proportion of cities where foreign moneylenders were recorded did not increase over time but decreased from the fifteenth century. The proportion of cities with mints was essentially constantly about 20%. Any substitution that occurred was not a broader temporal trend.
2.7. CONCLUSION

This study is one more examination of European state-making in a rich social science tradition on the subject. Here, my focus is how managing social difference fit into medieval political development. I outlined how two long-run processes – territorialization and changes in political theology – created insecurity for Jewish communities. The argument and empirical focus of this paper is that these long-run processes did not have consistent effects on the position of Jewish communities but were contingent on local political economies. Johnson and Koyama (2019) describe how the changing value placed on religious legitimacy promoted antisemitic violence. With rather large city-by-city variation in sovereignty rights and political organization, though, we should be more attentive to what it was about different local governments that brought the need for religious legitimacy or capacity-building to the fore. That is what this study offers: exploration of how specific local structures mattered for the security of Jewish communities.

Each local institution and privilege does not align with a particular political regime or position within German lands; each of them provides independent information about the political and economic incentives and opportunities for rulers. Disaggregating city political and economic institutions (Wahl 2016b; 2019) reveals relationships to Jewish community survival that would be obscured by focusing on autonomy (Stasavage 2014) or regime structures (Blank, Dincecco, and Zhukov 2017) alone. Essentially, though, explanations relying on sovereignty types and autonomy describe political competition as endogenous to political institutions. By investigating which specific structures mattered in this case, I provide impetus for reexamination of other phenomena tied to pre-modern European political competition. As Liddy (2017) recently detailed about fifteenth-century England, even seemingly autocratic systems can have intense political
conflict within and between layers of government, down to individual cities. Contestation happens at lower levels of political systems, too, not just at the highest levels.

When looking at expulsions from cities, or any other case of state violence against minority groups, we need to keep in mind the whole spectrum of the political order. Competition over power and resources between factions of any type (Clark 1998; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999; Lachmann 1989) can affect the content and salience of an ethnic boundary (Hechter 1987; Stewart 2018; Wimmer 2013). In the case of the medieval Holy Roman Empire, the political system bred uncertainty about governance rights, which in turn fed struggles among Christian elites. Some of these resorted to persecuting Jewish communities by expelling Jews from their cities to bolster claims to sovereignty and mitigate financial problems. They used ethnic cleansing of Jews support their positions and possessions.
3. THE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDIEVAL EXPULSIONS OF JEWS

Governments are racialized organizations (Ray 2019). Ethnoracial exclusion and violence are tools of governance (Bracey 2015) that performatively demonstrate legitimacy and pragmatically protect privilege and inequality. At first brush, policies of exclusion would seem to be purely domestic affairs, built on cultural legacies of difference. Yet contemporary history illustrates that exclusion is not contained by borders. The past decade or so has seen a wave of racially exclusive populism in Europe and the US. Beyond domestic contexts, relationships between governments shape the consideration and then adoption of similar legislation (Glick and Friedland 2014; Meyer et al. 1997), including policies of ethnoracial exclusion. Social diffusion processes have eased the spread of racial extremist political parties (Rydgren 2005), fascism (Weyland 2010), and techniques for repression (Olar 2019).

Whether oppressive and exclusionary behavior is internally driven or externally induced has been a persistent theme in social science. We continue to have a pressing need to understand drift to extreme behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether patterns of social influence can help explain the incidence of medieval urban expulsions of Jews in German lands. Expulsions served financial ends, performed Christian duty, and solved political problems (Dorin 2016; Doten-Snitker forthcoming; Johnson and Koyama 2019; Müller 2002). Despite strong antisemitism, expulsion was unattractive, but expulsion does appear to spread in the fifteenth century. Inter-polity relationships might have provided the social inducement to overcome the disincentives to expulsion. Oftentimes, policy diffusion is treated as a modern phenomenon, but there is nothing inherently modern about political innovation and adoption or, for that matter, racial extremism.
Medieval German lands were dense with urban governments linked within a political culture that drew governments together in associations rather than absolutist hierarchies (Hardy 2018). The volume of urban governments creates an opportunity to study a racially extreme policy’s diffusion in a much larger group than would be possible for most modern policies. Using discrete-time event history analysis methods, I examine potential social processes for the transmission of expulsion policies between cities in western German lands in the late medieval era. I consider the role of universal mechanisms like observation of early adopters and responding to religious change as well as how political and economic relationships segmented incentives to expel or not. The foremost conclusion of this study is that policy change to enact total exclusion is unlikely, even in the face of changing attitudes and cultural repertoires (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014; Swidler 1986), when social network incentives are against it. When governments are politically and economically interdependent, their policies of ethnic and racial inclusion or exclusion are linked as well.

3.1. BACKGROUND

Expulsions of Jews in Western Europe were sporadic before the thirteenth century. Whereas France expelled all Jews off and on (1182, 1253, 1306, 1322, 1394, 1501) and England expelled Jews in 1290,¹ Kaiser Friedrich I (Barbarossa) confirmed his Christian responsibility to

¹ Philip II of France expelled Jews from his personally-held territories in 1182 (Jordan 1989, 1998), with the next major expulsion in 1253 by Louis IX (Saint Louis), who expelled Jews from French crown lands as part of his Crusade mission to protect Christian society (Stacey 1988). Edward I of England expelled Jews from his French territory of Gascony in 1289 and then England in 1290, ostensibly for religious reasons (Elukin 2007; Mundill 1998; K. Stow 2007) and likely for institutional control (Barkey and Katznelson 2011; Katznelson 2005; Koyama 2010). Philip IV expelled the Knights Templar from French crown lands in 1305 and Jews in 1306, both to stabilize royal finances after mismanagement and to assert the crown’s right to control populations in baronial lands (Jordan 1998). Jews were invited back to France, then expelled again in 1322 (Jordan 1989; K. R. Stow 1992b) and 1394 (Nirenberg 1996) and 1501
protect those who were faithful to the traditions of their fathers in *Iudaeis nostris Ratisponensibus* after the 1182 French expulsion. Generations of German kings followed suit, affirming Jewish rights as part of the spectacle of coronation. In German cities and principalities, Jews made contracts for their protection and gained citizenship rights (Haverkamp 1999). Yet the number of German expulsions climbed considerably in the fifteenth century (Haverkamp 2002). Although the general norm in medieval Germany was non-expulsion, city rulers did have reasons to ignore it, based on what meaning they put on having Jewish residents. One view of Jews was that they were a financial asset to be exploited and manipulated to maximize rulers’ incomes (Levi 1981; Olson 1993), including via contributing to the commercial and fiscal health of polities (Finley and Koyama 2018; Ries 1995; Scholl 2015). Understanding Jews as a financial resource is the dominant explanation in economic history for expulsions (Barzel 1992; Koyama 2010; Stacey 1997; M. Wenninger 1981). There were long-term benefits to maintaining a Jewish community because city rulers could gain permission from the German emperor to levy special taxes on Jews. Religious difference enabled rulers to develop financially exploitative policies (Johnson and Koyama 2019) that larger and more powerful Christian populations could effectively rebel against, but Jewish communities were smaller, with limited legal recourse. However, if rulers’ primary orientation was towards short-term financial gain from Jews, then

(K. R. Stow 1992b), with limited resettlement each time. Jews were kept out of England until the 17th century.

2 Ancestry has long been connected to understandings of peoplehood in Europe. In medieval Europe, Jewish blood made someone Jewish (Nirenberg 2009), though stereotypical (Weeda 2014) cultural and linguistic behaviors were the evidence of innate Jewishness (Bartlett 2001; K. Stow 2001). For a masterful study of racialization in medieval Europe, consult Heng (2018).

3 Like most privileges, permission to tax Jewish residents would be granted for a specific period of time, such as five or ten years. For example, in 1413 Constance was leased the right to collect and pocket half an imperial tax on the city’s Jews for 12 years (Hagen 2018).

4 On revolts, see Isenmann (1980), Kiser and Linton (2002), and Møller (2018).
expulsion could be anytime, as it would be an opportunity to confiscate Jews’ properties and other assets. If anything, there was demand for Jewish residents, and competition over who held the rights over their residency and taxes. Generally, expulsions for economic predation should be isolated transgressions of the non-expulsion norm.

A second way Christian rulers interpreted the presence of Jews in their cities is that Jews were an asset for Christian social order. Christianity-influenced beliefs declared that a good community included Jews because a) God had made a covenant with them, and thus they were the forebearers and partial inheritors of the promised apocalyptic Kingdom of God and b) they were an example and contrast for Christians, who should behave more righteously than Jews (J. F. Battenberg 1987; Laux 2010; Stacey 1992; K. R. Stow 1992a; K. Stow 2007). In theological constancy with Christian forefathers Paul and Augustine by viewing Jews as witnesses representing a pre-Christ relationship to God, popes proclaimed that the Church protected Jewish practice by Jews (K. Stow 2007). These rulers should be sensitive to changes in the perception that Jews are part of properly ordered Christian communities, ending Jewish residency in their cities when these beliefs change. In fact, such a change did occur in religious meaning. While the Church held its position, some theological innovators began to conceive of the relationship with Jews as a moral threat for Christians (Luzzati 1999). From the fifteenth century the canonical ban on usury was applied also to Jews (Dorin 2015; 2016), and church reform in the fifteenth

Demanding interest from the poor is forbidden in the Pentateuch (Exodus 22:25-27, Leviticus 25:35-38, Deuteronomy 23:19, 20, 24:6) and in the writings of the prophets. It is not expressly discussed in the New Testament by Jesus or the first apostles. Ambrose of Milan (339-97 CE) and his protégé Augustine (354-430 CE) both condemned lending at any interest. Contained in the laws of the Second Council of Lyon (1274) was Usurarum voraginem, an outline of the consequences for princes’ toleration of usury, profit by excessive interest on loans. There was no specific threshold past which interest became excessive. The judgement of whether an amount of interest was usurious was subjective. On medieval Jewish thinking about lending at interest, see Joseph Shatzmiller (1989), Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society.
century made Jewish financial activities a frequent reason for expulsion (C. Cluse 1999). This suggests that explanations and analyses should attend to whether expulsions follow a pattern of social influence spreading concerns about public morality.

A third meaning for Christian rulers is that resident Jews were a political asset. For one thing, Jews were convenient scapegoats. They were blamed for disturbances or social problems, from pandemics to economic crises (Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017; C. Cluse and Müller 2009; Haverkamp 2004; Jedwab, Johnson, and Koyama 2019). Mistreatment by the government, including imprisonment and execution, could mollify an agitated Christian population by demonstrating that rulers were taking action to address popular concerns. Performative antisemitism during Christian holy times (Nirenberg 1996) demonstrated city leaders’ Christian bona fides and deservingness as rulers. Rulers distanced themselves from the burdens of their government via policies that raised taxes on Jews, who then had to pass along increased costs of business to their mostly middle- and lower-class customers (Gilomen 2009). Because Jews became intermediaries, and because rights to “protect” (and therefore tax) them was farmed out, there is a nesting doll-quality for maintaining or expelling a Jewish community. If someone else had claim over the local Jews, the Jews became a liability and a siphon for someone else’s fiscal capacity. City rulers who lacked legal and economic control over the local Jews might expel the Jews to dodge indirect taxation and intervention in their affairs by another political elite. The

6 Imprisonments and executions during the Black Death plague of 1348-1351 were the most numerous, but they were by no means the only episodes of violent scapegoating. For narrative details of several examples, consult Germania Judaica (e.g., Würzburg in 1400, Constance in 1443).

7 “Protecting” Jews meant little more than exercising mastership over them. As a legal concept, it included responsibilities, but more importantly it included rights. As a corollary, in the modern world we still debate how much a government can extract from or monitor its citizens and how much it is responsible to provide them.
question here is whether some broader political concerns linked cities in such a way that expulsion could spread between them.

3.2. THEORY

Prior studies of medieval European expulsions have investigated expulsion as a domestic process, but of course policy decisions are a product of both domestic and external factors (D. J. Myers 2000; Shipan and Volden 2008). By external factors, I mean the social structures and relationships that influence rulers’ choices (Burt 1987; Hedstrom, Sandell, and Stern 2000; Strang 1991; Wurpts, Corcoran, and Pfaff 2018). There are two ways to think about social influence. The first, *what successfully propagates new behavior?*, is the most common within the significant literature on policy diffusion (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019). Framing the question in this way is especially useful for thinking about pro-social policies that one wants to spread. The second, *what constrains and prevents new behavior?* (Clemens and Cook 1999; Darwich 2017), is a useful reframing, especially with a corollary *what constraints fail when a new behavior is propagated?* Truly, there are two phenomena at issue: the predominance of the status quo plus a fraction that diverges to expel.

From this vantage, we see that to understand the uptick in expulsions, we must think about social influence as factors about the anti-expulsion norm and sanctions for violating it as well as relational factors that can moderate the norm or sanction or else magnify the domestic incentives to transgress. In medieval German lands, non-expulsion was socially reinforced via economic and political sanctions. Expulsion might attract punishment via fines or siege by the Holy Roman Emperor, to whom Jews ultimately legally belonged. Regional political alliances

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8 Cities like Cologne were called on by the emperor to account for their expulsions or failures to intervene against violence (Rubin 1995). Several cities were fined for pogroms at the time of the Black Death.
(Bünde) included directives about protecting Jews (Scholl 2012), and they, too, assessed fines as well as suspended members for violence against Jews (Hagen 2018). Punishments were in service of the peace of the land because expulsion was disruptive to the broader political and economic community. Politically, because Jews were understood to be caught within the intricate web of dominion rights, expulsion was an aggression against often-fragile relationships between political elites; there was particular fear that an uprising within a city, which might expel or murder Jews, would spread to other cities (Scholl 2012). Economically, expelling Jews interrupted local commerce, both because a portion of the local economy disappeared and because Jewish moneylenders closing shop meant that necessary access to credit was restricted, predominantly for middle- and lower-class Christians (Botticini 2000; Gilomen 2009). Local commercial interruptions could easily balloon into regional hiccups. Further, if a polity expelled its Jewish residents, a nearby authority might offer Jews residency to bolster their own finances. The Bishop of Metz did exactly this after the Archbishop of Trier expelled Jews from his territories in 1418 (Haverkamp 1999). The fifteenth-century expulsions in the Holy Roman Empire represent the failure of sanctioning threats, the failure of expulsion to be seen as toxic to peace in the land, and overall the failure of the norm against the removal of Jews.

What corroded these checks on expulsion? One view is to focus on the usefulness of expulsion as a technology of governance. If expulsion is technologically effective, it should grow in popularity as cities are exposed to the idea or observe its usefulness in other cities (Gilardi and Radaelli 2012; Shipan and Volden 2008; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008). Especially when a political behavior is relatively untested or materially risky (Olar 2019), political actors might value reassurance from observing others (M. H. Becker 1970) they perceive to face similar institutional realities (Greve, Kim, and Teh 2016; M. C. Horowitz 2010; Linebarger 2016). It
should not spread if it is not useful. Gilardi, Shipan, and Wueest (forthcoming) find that interpreting a new policy as technologically efficacious prompts the diffusion of the policy. However, in this case, expulsion was not a new technology; expulsions had been occurring in Europe in previous centuries, including a few within the Holy Roman Empire. The technological meaning of Jews, that they were a tool for government finance, was settled. If cities expelled Jews in a wave based on the confiscatory benefits, then the underlying issue would be some temporally-specific financial shock, and we might expect it to be relatively widespread.

Another possibility is that expulsion spread because it was imbued with new social meaning (Bail, Brown, and Wimmer 2019; Koenig and Dierkes 2011; Sikkink 2014). Who else does it first tells city rulers something about why they should expel, beyond the material meaning. When we consider doing something new that we know has significant drawbacks, we sometimes look to our closest friends and neighbors (Hadden and Jasny 2019; McAdam 1986) or to thought leaders (DeMora, Collingwood, and Ninci 2019; Watts and Dodds 2007), whose adoption of a new behavior gives social desirability or credibility to it (Abrutyn, Mueller, and Osborne 2019; Brown 2019). Expulsion might become a process of isomorphism (Clemens and Cook 1999; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), with rulers imitating a political feature without respect to material incentives. For example, a shift in the Christian religious meaning of Jews that rejected their co-residence in European Christendom could prompt a sea-change. The Council of Constance, which met 1414-1418 in Constance in modern southern Germany, debated the Christian understanding of Jews as part of its overall mission to unify Christendom against heterodoxy (Grayzel 1967, 302–4; Housley 2017). The annunciation of a new crusade against

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9 For the previous several decades, Latin Christendom had two rival popes, and recently a third rival was elected. The disarray was religious and geopolitical, as each pope had different royal
the Hussite sect and heretics in Europe and simultaneous call for all Christian rulers to exercise Christian dominion through orthodox purity in belief and behavior (Blickle 1992; Housley 2017; Rubin 1999) gave expulsion not only new religious meaning but new political meaning. This change both incentivized expulsion and diminished the threat of sanctions for it. Thus, we might expect that expulsions increased particularly after 1418, and perhaps also most of all nearer to Constance, as news spread and Council attendees returned to their cities. Other fifteenth- and sixteenth-century social changes likewise appear to have radiated from their epicenters (Cantoni 2012; Dittmar 2011; Rubin 2014). It also seems plausible that religious cities like the seats of bishops and archbishops would be early adopters after the Council of Constance.

Social structure itself might also be important for the spread or containment of expulsion (Bail, Brown, and Wimmer 2019; Centola 2015; Reagans and McEvily 2003; Watts and Strogatz 1998). Social structure segments economic and political concerns, so we should expect that social structure segments the interpretation and adoption of expulsion. I already noted that politically prominent cities were in regular communication to coordinate their affairs, which they formalized in Bund treaties. Bünde could try to prevent expulsions, but they might also reinforce defection from the anti-expulsion norm. These cities shared the political goal of preserving their governments from interference, whether by the emperor, princes, or popular uprisings. With the new political meaning originating in early fifteenth-century discussions about whether a good Christian government tolerated non-Christian belief and behavior, expulsion became politically attractive among these cities. Expulsion sent a challenge to the imperial political system (Evers 2017) that privileged the major noble families. Relationships among autonomy-seeking cities, supporters, and the continent had pressing geopolitical squabbles that required a Christian authority to resolve them.
united in their political structural equivalence (Centola 2015), might propagate this new political meaning as well as confer reassurance and a sense of belonging or identity (Acharya 2011; Meyer et al. 1997) about transgressing. Pragmatically, the potential costs of rebellion were diminished (Dixon and Roscigno 2003) as powerful peers expelled first, and they might even provide martial support against military intervention by the emperor.

Political prominence in medieval Germany was difficult to disentangle from economic prominence, just like in the contemporary world. The regional political economy functioned as a network of urban hubs plus their hinterlands (Eiden and Irsigler 2000; Sassen 2006; 2014; Snyder and Kick 1979), providing spatial structure to economic and social relations. Thus the economic and political incentives to expel, as well as tolerance to the disincentives, were spatially distributed. More economically stable autonomous cities (Chilosi and Volckart 2011) were nearby to smaller, less developed cities, who had greater economic interest in preserving Jewish communities and political aversion (as well as reduced agency) to commit a political transgression. Expulsion might actually relocate Jews to smaller places where they were under more direct control of territorial lords who held rights over them, as happened in Cologne in 1424 when the city expelled its Jews, who were technically under the dominion of the Archbishop of Cologne (M. Wenninger 1981). The interaction of the political meaning of expulsion with economic incentives could produce a bull’s-eye pattern of expulsions in prominent cities surrounded by cities that do not expel.

Alternatively, spatial patterns to expulsion might be the product of information networks. Information networks carry details about why new behaviors and ideas are attractive or unattractive. Until the advent of modern video and internet-based media, information networks were highly correlated with transit routes. Transit connections have been a determinant in the
spread of political movements, from 19th century riots in England (Aidt, Leon, and Satchell 2018) to political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in 20th century Egypt (Brooke and Ketchley 2018). In the medieval world, information traveled via letters and travelers. Transit networks that carried letters, people, and regular commercial exchange are a hybrid of geographic and social structure. Information about expulsion surely moved unevenly in German lands, and so perhaps expulsion was adopted unevenly based on incorporation into transit networks.

Social adoption of expulsion appears to be a likely channel for why the frequency of expulsion increased in the fifteenth century. Medieval cities were relatively interdependent. They could not enforce Christian financial piety unless their neighbors also did. Most of them were not prepared to raise serious challenges to their position in the political system unless others did. And expulsions were specifically a policy that moved taxable workers into another’s domain; cities would not want to adopt a materially damaging behavior without social reinforcement (Iannaccone 1992; 1994). Which, if any, of the social processes discussed above pushed expulsion from a sporadic to a consistent threat for Jewish communities?

3.3. MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY

Measuring this phenomenon requires data on Jewish settlement and expulsions for a large proportion of the political units in medieval Europe where Jews lived. Geschichte der Juden im Mittelalter von der Nordsee bis zu den Südalpen (Haverkamp 2002) covers the Rhineland and environs, instead of the whole continent, for the period 1000-1520 CE. However, unlike Encyclopedia Judaica, the other historical catalog of Jewish communities, it does cover all cities, from the smallest to the biggest, within its geographical scope. After translating and digitizing the gazetteer, I recoded and reorganized the data from half-century period-based observations into annual observations of each city. Cities are included only for years of certain Jewish
presence. I elect to limit the temporal scope of these analyses to 1385-1520 CE for historical and methodological reasons. Expulsions were extremely limited before the fifteenth century; the first notable expulsion was in 1390 from the Prince-Electorate of Pfalz. The institution of the first Judenschuldentilgung, an empire-wide transfer of debts to Jews to cities and King Wenceslaus, in 1385 would be a potential hinge in the political and economic interpretation of Jewish residents (Hagen 2018, 229). Methodologically, choosing 1385 as a starting year includes ample time and observations to detect temporal dependencies.

Expulsion orders could cover territories or individual cities. Here, I measure the occurrence of an expulsion at the city level and refer to these expulsions as local expulsions. I code each city as having no expulsion (0) or a local expulsion (1) in a year. I localize territorial expulsions by coding their occurrence in the city that is the territorial prince’s residence.10 All told, the sample includes 36,182 city-year observations. Figure 3.1 maps the spatial distribution of cities where Jews lived and cities that expelled Jews. Within this region, Jews lived in 578 cities, and they were victims of 105 local expulsions.

10 One territorial expulsion (Bayern-Landshut, 1450) is omitted from analysis because the territorial seat (Landshut) did not have any Jewish residents and is therefore not in Geschichte der Juden.
In order to account for processes of observation or learning, sociologists often expand the window of how long we expect it to take for some behavior to be adopted. Hedström (1994), Andrews and Biggs (2006), and Braun (2011) use the count of events $N$ in the polities $j$ (which is the sample excluding city $i$) in the previous time period as a general contagion measure. I have

**Figure 3.1** Jewish Settlement and Expulsions in the Western Holy Roman Empire, 1385-1520 CE, with Pilgrimage Routes

3.3.1. **Diffusion**

In order to account for processes of observation or learning, sociologists often expand the window of how long we expect it to take for some behavior to be adopted. Hedström (1994), Andrews and Biggs (2006), and Braun (2011) use the count of events $N$ in the polities $j$ (which is the sample excluding city $i$) in the previous time period as a general contagion measure. I have
calculated this for my dataset for a range of period lengths. The main results use a 10-year lag (see table 3.1 for descriptive statistics), while analyses in the appendices add two other prior period lengths.

\[ Dif_{1i} = \sum_{t=10}^{t-1} N_j \]

Historical research suggests that the Council of Constance shifted religious and political perceptions of Jewish subjects. We can contrast observations before and after 1418 through binary categorization as well as observe the proportion of expulsion that occurred in the years immediately following the Council. To measure the spatial relationship to Constance, I calculated least-cost paths along trade and transit routes, specifically the late medieval pilgrimage road network compiled by Bossak and Welford (2015) and the network of European rivers in Natural Earth II (version 4.1.0). After some preprocessing in QGIS (see appendix A.2), the network distances to Constance in kilometers were obtained through the riverdist R package (Tyers 2017).

The city catalog of *Geschichte der Juden* lists a wide range of information about city political and economic histories. Relevant for this study’s main purposes, I coded city dominion – who held rights of rule in the city. Using this data, I can explore whether expulsions spread after the Council of Constance within cities under religious rulers (under the dominion of an archbishop or bishop, or whether a city was the seat of an archbishopric or bishopric). A competing explanation is that expulsion spread among autonomy-seeking cities, who shared a political structural position, so I record which cities were free cities that formally held rights of self-governments as well as which cities were imperial cities that were under the direct authority of the Holy Roman Emperor.
Note. The sudden drop in circa 1350 is due to an epidemic of the Bubonic plague. Besides dying from this pestilence, Jewish communities were also targets of pogroms where rumors blamed the plague on Jews.

To directly assess whether expulsions compounded among these groups, I modify the diffusion metric to create $Dif_2$: the count of events $N$ within group $G$ across a sample in the previous time period, where $g$ is the same for the city $i$ and its alter cities $j$. For groups, I match a city to those that shared its dominion type in the previous period (here, 10 years). If the ruler of city $i$ was a bishop, then $Dif_2$ is calculated as the count of expulsions $N$ in other cities $j$ that were also ruled by a bishop.

$$Dif_2 = \sum_{j \in G} N_j$$
Above I argued that the incentives to expel were not evenly spatially distributed, and I offered a few reasons why expulsions might be spatially isolated. I calculated least-cost paths along transit routes between all cities. Following Braun (2011) and Hedström (1994), for each year I summed the distances to expulsions $D_{ij}$, then took the square root. I inverted this and multiplied by the number of expulsions, after which I summed in ten-year moving windows. This is a spatiotemporal lag (N. Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006) by definition. The count of expulsions $N$ can again be restricted to those in a group $G$, as with $Dif2$, and I calculate three versions of $Dif3$: among episcopal cities (ruled by a bishop or archbishop), among free or imperial cities, and generically among all cities. Values increase with closer expulsions or with a greater number of expulsions in the previous years at a consistent distance.

$$Dif3_i = \sum_{j \in G}^{t-10} \frac{N_j}{\sqrt{D_{ij}}}$$

Political associations might have dampened the spread of expulsions by sanctioning cities that shirked their responsibilities for public peace. For each city, I calculate the cumulative count of $Bunde$ agreements a city had concluded in prior years, based on Distler’s (2006) list of $Bünde$ and their city signatories.

My naïve alternative is whether expulsion was simply a function of integration into the region. To measure access to networks that might spread information about expulsion, I include the count of roads and rivers passing through a city. Counts of routes were calculated using the R package raster (Hijmans 2019) and a 5 km threshold to the pilgrimage road network and Natural Earth II rivers. Using the count of routes captures variation in incorporation into the

11 The exception here is that recent expulsions in the same city $i$ are dropped because their distance is 0 km. The importance of prior expulsions in city $i$ is measured directly, as explained later.
information network. Most cities were on at least one travel route; some were on as many as 13 routes.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics: Diffusion measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Expulsion</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>1444.29</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>35.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Council of Constance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_1$: Any expulsions</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_2$: Only in episcopal cities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_2$: Only in free or imperial cities</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_3$: Only in episcopal cities</td>
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<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_3$: Only in free or imperial cities</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Dif_3$: Any expulsions</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
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<td>Prior alliance treaties</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.2. City-level variables

The city-level political economic incentives for and against expulsion are not the main focus of this paper. Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama (2017), Finley and Koyama (2018), and Doten-Snitker (forthcoming) have investigated domestic incentives for adopting the policy of expulsion. Here, I include city-level factors from these prior studies, again coded from the city catalog in Geschichte der Juden. These include political institutions, economic development and institutions, and Christian and Jewish religious development. Descriptive statistics are in table 3.2. Additionally, time is included as a categorical effect through 15-year dummies, which splits the period into nine equal categories that do not overlap with any of the temporal variables.

I operationalize political authority in several ways. Besides the binary categorizations for religious rule and autonomy, I also code whether dominion rights were held by a prince. A city might be under the dominion of several types of rulers; I measure the potential for political
competition and volatility as the count of authorities over a city. Additionally, I include the presence (1) or absence (0) of Schöffen as a governing body in the city. A college of Schöffen was a quasi-legal body (Isenmann 2012) charged with maintaining public order (Börner 2010).

Domestic economic incentives for and against expulsion center on a city’s economic opportunities and how city authorities could collect funds. A general metric for economic development was commercial development, and I construct an ordinal measure of market activity (no markets (0), one market or a generic record of market rights (1), multiple markets (2), any number of fairs (3)). To capture the impact of alternative financial resources to confiscation from or exploitation of Jewish communities, I include the presence (1) or absence (0) of foreign merchants and rights to mint coins.

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics: City characteristics

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.29</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Market development</td>
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<td>Total previous expulsions</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, I measure aspects of communal religious life. I construct a cumulative index of Jewish community infrastructure, counting how many types of infrastructure a Jewish
community had (synagogue, cemetery, mikveh, Jewish quarter) on a scale from 0 to 4. To approximate the local inter-religious history, I measure the incidence of both prior expulsions and prior persecutions in a city.

3.3.3. Statistical method

Event history analysis is a common method for explaining trends in political action, among other phenomena. Its applications range from racial riots (Braun 2011; D. Myers 2010) to the founding of ethnic newspapers (Olzak and West 1991) and labor organizations (Hedstrom, Sandell, and Stern 2000) to the adoption of laws internationally (Berliner 2014; Dawson and Swiss forthcoming) and in the United States (Bricker and LaCombe 2020). Based on hazard models, it captures the temporal span until an event happens—how long something survives or how long it takes for something to happen after a catalytic event. The dependent variable is the hazard, or rate, of something happening after a length of time. When events are observed in longer, discrete periods, such as in years instead of days or months, discrete-time methods are appropriate. Discrete-time event history analysis amounts to using odds ratios instead of hazard rates; this is the same as performing logistic regression. Functionally, the model includes both (a) individual unit-level factors and (b) a diffusion hazard, which can be spatially and temporally adjusted (Strang and Tuma 1993).

Modeling a binary outcome can be difficult in social scientific studies, since we often have many independent or control variables. A complicated right side of a logistic regression model is likely to produce separation in the binary outcome. The co-occurrence of a few conditions will be associated only with 1’s, while the co-occurrence of others will be associated only with 0’s, and the predicted probabilities under standard logistic regression models will be 1 and 0, respectively, resulting in overestimation of coefficients for logistic regressions of rare
events or failure to converge. Because the dependent variable of expulsion is a rare event (105 of 36,182 observations) and compounded by the fact that many of the independent variables are binary as well as sparsely distributed, I use a Bayesian logistic regression, as proposed by Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, and Su (2008).

A Bayesian model requires the specification of a prior probability distribution, meaning an assumption or guess about what the distribution of the outcome data is, and updates this prior distribution through checking the sample data. The updated information about variable distributions, or the posterior distribution, is then used in the regression. Instead of treating the patterns observed in the sample as “truth,” a Bayesian regression introduces uncertainty around the sample distributions, with the results that separation is less likely and model convergence more likely.

In the case of a rare event, Gelman et al. (2008) and others (Betancourt 2017; Stan Development Team 2018a) argue for standardizing non-binary variables around 0 and rescaling to a standard deviation of 0.5 before using the weakly informative (Lemoine 2019; McElreath 2016) Student’s t distribution (df=7, scale=2.5) for prior probability distributions. With the rstanarm package 2.18.2 (Stan Development Team 2018b) for R, I estimate Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian hierarchical logistic regressions, with random effects for periodized settlement observations (since several covariates are period-based) nested within settlements. I use random effects because I am not interested in explaining effects of particular settlements, only in minimizing the influence of correlated errors within settlements. I use the Student’s half-t distribution (df=4, scale=1) for weakly informative prior probability distributions for the intercepts (Gelman 2006).
To obtain posterior probability distributions, for each model specification I iterated through 5 independent chains 5,000 times each, starting with 2,500 warm-up iterations per chain. Full model details and diagnostic checks are described in appendix A.3. Diagnostics did not detect any problematic behavior.

3.4. RESULTS

Table 3 displays the main event history analysis results using the rescaled sample data under six model specifications. Results are robust to varying the temporal window from 10 years to 5 years and to 20 years; a description of these additional analyses are in appendix A.3. Bayesian regression analyses produce posterior distributions for each component of a model that represent the joint distribution of the independent and dependent variables based on the observed data and the prior distributions provided by the analyst. Posterior medians and standard errors are analogous to regular logistic regression coefficients and their standard errors. Here, because of how the sample data were rescaled, for continuous variables the posterior median represents the effect of a 2-standard-error increase in the variable value instead of a one-unit increase. Since logistic regressions produce values showing change in log-odds, which can be difficult to interpret, Figure 5 translate these values visually into changes in probabilities and credibility intervals for the main diffusion-related variables for each model. Credibility intervals capture a set percent of the density of a posterior distribution. They function similarly to confidence intervals. Following McElreath (2016), I illustrate 89% credibility intervals, as well as 50% intervals. The coefficients from logistic regressions are conditional on which other variables are included, so it is unwise to compare magnitudes across models (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018).
Model 1 focuses on the potential impact of observing other cities expel or not expel. The results indicate that observing recent expulsions (\(Dif1\)) did play a determining role in the spread of expulsions, once other factors are accounted for – in this specification, expulsions were less likely when other cities had recently expelled Jews. The odds of expulsion were 49% lower when the count of expulsions in the previous 10 years was two standard deviations below (0 expulsions\(^{12}\)) the mean (6.97 expulsions). The pattern is the opposite of the expected temporal spike in expulsions, if cities were observing and learning about the technical utility of expulsion. Further, the results here do not provide evidence that participating in regional alliances provided social reinforcement for expelling or for non-expulsion. This model hints at why expulsions never occurred at a high rate or spread widely, and the rest of the model specifications help us pull apart what was happening in more detail.

In model 2, I added one temporal and one spatial measure of the importance of Christian religious changes inaugurated by the Council of Constance. Coarsely, I divided observations to those after the Council versus not. Most expulsions occurred afterwards, and the event history analysis results confirm a strong relationship. At the same time, the \(Dif1\) temporal relationship disappears. Additionally, the negative relationship between expulsions and distance from Constance appears to substantiate the hypothesis that expulsion spread outwards from Constance. However, there is no evidence that episcopal rulers were the more likely adopters of this new behavior. Indeed, none of the models presented here validate that idea. Model 3 demonstrates this most clearly. I disaggregated the temporal lag into two versions of \(Dif2\), one tracing the number of prior expulsions among cities ruled by bishops or archbishops and one tracing the

\(^{12}\) Technically, two standard deviations below the mean of \(Dif1\) is less than 0, but that is impossible, and I substitute 0 here.
number of prior expulsions among free or imperial cities. The model 3 results do not provide evidence that expulsion spread among either of these groups of cities or that expulsions among either of these groups catalyzed wider adoption of expulsion among other cities.

The results for model 4 demonstrate that multiple mechanisms jointly produce the spread of expulsion among some cities and the suppression of expulsion among others. In model 4, I included the same $Dif_2$ measures as in model 3, but this time I also included the spatial adjustments of $Dif_3$. That is, I modeled the probability of expulsion in relationship to other cities’ behavior and their proximity. The results show three important features. First, expulsion was more likely when free or imperial cities had done so recently. For observations two standard deviations above the mean (3.72), the odds of expulsion were 136% greater than observations at the mean (0.52). Second, expulsions were less likely in cities nearby to the expelling free or imperial cities. $Dif_3$ increases with more expulsions and with greater proximity to expulsions. For a city whose $Dif_3$ value in a year is two standard deviations above (0.56) the mean (0.6), the odds of expulsion are 56% lower. Third, distance to Constance remains important even after including these other layers of temporal and spatial measures; cities nearer to Constance were more likely to expel their Jewish residents. Additionally, I included interactions between each $Dif_2$ temporal measure and dummy variables for whether a city was of that same type, which detects whether episcopal cities, or free or imperial cities, responded differently to expulsions in
cities of their same type than did other cities. I find no evidence for a difference in temporal effects.

Note. Continuous variables scaled to (0, 2.5). Center lines are posterior medians. Shaded intervals are 50% credibility intervals; distribution outlines are 89% credibility intervals.

Models 5 and 6 explore the limits of these results. Model 5 omits distance to Constance and swaps a universal $Dif_3$, distance-adjusted prior expulsions, for the group-specific $Dif_3$ measures in model 4. The negative relationship with this universal $Dif_3$, now the only spatial independent variable, plus the non-importance of $Dif_2$ for free or imperial cities, the one

Figure 3.3 Posterior Distributions for Diffusion-related Effects, Transformed to Probabilities

temporal measure, underscores the role of space in German expulsions of Jews. Model 6 reverts to the universal $Dif_1$ and assesses whether spatial patterns were the effect of information
networks and transit access. The effect of lagged, distance-scaled expulsions persists, and there is no evidence that incorporation in the region via transit routes or treaties had anything to do with expulsions.

Regarding the local incentives for expulsion, this study mostly agrees with others that stress domestic political economy. Across the model specifications, Jews were more vulnerable to expulsion in cities where there were foreign moneylenders and where there was a local mint, both sources of city funding. Expulsions happened less often in cities run by boards of jurists (Schöffen). Each city had its own arrangements of political power and economic development. Expulsions were undertaken in the midst of struggles over authority and legitimacy (Doten-Snitker forthcoming; Finley and Koyama 2018; Johnson and Koyama 2019) that were more endogenous to some institutional arrangements than others. Once these institutional contexts and the social factors between cities are accounted for, the types of parties to dominion over a city did not matter. Expulsion was not more common among imperial cities, as observed in Doten-Snitker (forthcoming), Finley and Koyama (2018), and Voigtländer and Voth (2012), or among bishoprics and archbishoprics. Trends support the conclusion that local conditions for adoption of expulsion were the prevailing concern for cities, rather than social transmission.

The results also point to patterns in local interreligious cultures. Cities with more prior persecutions were more likely to expel their Jewish residents, as were cities with more Jewish community infrastructure. I cannot tell from these data and methods whether the relationship between Jewish community development and expulsions is one of community size and therefore

Nor was the comparative rarity of expulsion an effect of a lack of awareness about the policy idea. Roads and rivers crisscrossed the western Holy Roman Empire. The median distance for a sample city to a road was 3.6 kilometers, less than an hour’s walk; the median distance to a river or road is even closer, at 2.3 kilometers. Couriers were known to travel up to 65 kilometers in a day (Kreutz 2005).
visibility as religious others or valuable confiscable assets. The relationship between Jewish community features and their treatment by their neighbors is a good avenue for future research, as more contemporary investigations about minority groups provide several hypotheses about whether contact, visibility, or economics drive exclusion and targeted political violence.

3.5. DISCUSSION

In medieval German cities there was a norm against expelling Jewish communities. This study presents evidence that religious change and spatially-structured economic and political incentives unraveled this norm. Whereas the scholarly literature on medieval expulsions of Jews offers rich detail about individual cases and broader historical developments in antisemitism, this article branches out to consider whether urban expulsions were interdependent. I reveal the relational influences that facilitated the increase in expulsions in the fifteenth century.

I find that observing other cities’ expulsions did not universally accelerate the spread of expulsions in the fifteenth century, when the policy was most frequent. For medieval German cities as a whole, expulsion was of limited value. We see this in the infrequency of expulsion, in the segmenting of expulsion among cities with particular political economies, and in the spatial structure of expulsions. By comparison, Cantoni (2012) concluded that the Protestant Reformation spread in the sixteenth century via proximity to Wittenberg, the residence of Martin Luther. Likewise, Dittmar (2011) and Rubin (2014) argue that printing with a press and associated societal changes spread outward from Mainz, where the printing press was invented circa 1440. Expulsions of Jews did not begin with some small group of adopting cities and ripple out across the realm. The disadvantages of expulsion suppressed any potential norm cascade (Macy et al. 2019; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Watts 2002) effects.
Religious change gave new social meaning to expulsion beyond its use as a fiscal tool.

With theological developments at the Council of Constance, the Christian religious understanding of Jews evolved to see Jews as a moral threat, moderating one constraint on cities’ exclusionary antisemitism. Expulsions were more common closer to Constance and only became a relatively regular occurrence from the 1420s, as the crusade against the Hussites was established and the theocratic ideas debated at the Council were promulgated. Church leaders did not drive this trend, though. I find no evidence that bishops and archbishops expelled Jews from their cities first, nor that episcopal rulers were especially likely to expel Jews at all. These results reinforce the argument that the new emphasis on theocracy in the fifteenth century undermined the Latin Church’s monopoly on religious authority (Blickle 1992; Doten-Snitker forthcoming), laying the groundwork for the sixteenth century’s religious warfare.

If religious change created an opportunity to defect from the norm of non-expulsion, structural inequalities within the political and economic system shaped which city governments opted for expulsion. I find that expulsions by autonomy-hungry free and imperial cities precipitated growth in the number of expulsions, demonstrating that the social meaning of expulsion gained a new political dimension. These cities were politically well-integrated and relatively powerful. Expulsion asserted their autonomy from the German emperor or other political elites who may have held rights over the Jews in their midst. Like the ambitious governments in the US South that intervened in mob violence (E. M. Beck, Tolnay, and Bailey 2016), for these city governments expulsion fit with their political self-image and their relative power. Cities politically dependent on a prince or territorial lord may not have felt like they could risk what could be perceived of as interference in the rights and economic interests of their overlords.
Of course, expulsion was also differentially risky economically, which the bull’s-eye spatial pattern picks up. I find that expulsion in free or imperial cities suppressed expulsion in nearby cities. Political independence and economic independence were intertwined, particularly in the early fifteenth century (Chilosi and Volckart 2011) as expulsion increased. Politically independent cities were also more economically independent cities at the center of more agrarian, more volatile hinterlands. They could weather the budgetary losses that resulted from removing a portion of their population, whose existence and economic activity they taxed. In fact, the negative spatial pattern in this study is consistent with the interpretation that expulsion displaced Jews into cities that benefited from and valued their new residents economically. Unfortunately, we only have some records of the localities in which displaced Jews resettled, but at least some did move only a short distance. The social and internal constraints on expulsion persisted among smaller dependencies, but were loosened for cities with greater political and economic privileges.

In an attempt to rule out more simple alternatives, I also examined whether more generic exposure-based effects explain the limited spread of expulsions. I find evidence that an expulsion anywhere suppressed expulsion nearby, rather than transmitting expulsion. This reinforces my interpretation that economically central cities faced different risks and incentives than peripheral cities (Sassen 2014); this effect appears not to be confined only to free and imperial cities. In contrast, I find no evidence that greater incorporation into travel networks spread expulsions. In theory, cities at the nexus of more routes would be exposed to expulsions through more network

14 Historians at the Arye Maimon Institute for Jewish History at Trier University have been working on a project to improve our understanding of medieval Jewish migration.
connections that linked to more distant expulsions. Instead, as I have argued, the uptick in expulsions in the fifteenth century was not a function of exposure.

Tracing inter-governmental networks for diffusion is difficult in the past as well as in the modern world. Instead of relying only on proximity alone to represent inter-city social structure, I adapted a measure common in the sociology of diffusion (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Braun 2011; Hedström 1994) to account for categorical differences in power and status. By combining classification with distance, I can distinguish the importance of a particular group of cities for how others behaved. Historical knowledge about the case provides arguments for interpreting the categorical and spatial patterns. We do not have direct evidence about the reasons behind expulsion or non-expulsion for most cities. Historical studies might validate my conclusions and provide insight on what cues city leaders took from other cities.

3.6.CONCLUSION

Medieval Europe was not a hospitable place for Jews. Antisemitic rumors and stereotypes abounded, and Christian governments exploited and abused the ethnoreligious divide. Expulsions in German lands were clearly another expression of Christian victimization of Jews. Almost half of the years in the fifteenth century saw at least one expulsion. Yet there was no real momentum towards expulsion among German city governments. Expulsions were a persistent but still unusual occurrence. This article asks whether relational factors between cities explain why expulsions increased but did not spread widely.

Using a dataset I built based on a German synthesis of city histories, I weighed internal and network factors through discrete-time event history analysis, incorporating temporal and spatial elements. The domestic incentives to exploit ethnoracial difference for the benefit of city governments and rulers tethered most cities to the status quo of tolerating Jewish communities.
However, change in the Christian valuation of their Jewish neighbors and inter-city political and economic relationships did facilitate the limited adoption of expulsion. Precisely because Christian German city governments were racialized organizations instrumented for political and economic advantage (Bracey 2015), expulsion spread among some cities, but not others. This study affirms the value of the growing research body examining how space and ethnic or racial extremism are related (Hoerner, Jaax, and Rodon 2019; Homola, Pereira, and Tavits forthcoming; Pepinsky, Goodman, and Ziller 2020). Diffusion research often looks to proximity as a facilitator, which may be appropriate for some types of extremism (Andrews and Seguin 2015). However, in contrast to conventional understanding, this study demonstrates that proximity can hamper diffusion, too. I show that social structure quarantined diffusion within economic micro-regions. Instead of searching only for what ties assist the spread of exclusion or violence, studies should look for what kinds of proximity arrest it. Future research should test the category-based diffusion measures used here, which provide one option for disaggregating proximity.

The overall conclusion of this study is that inter-government relationships affect the adoption of exclusionary policies. However, shared racialization by itself was not sufficient for the transmission of expulsions. While new religious values and bigotry were necessary for expulsions to begin, these interacted with the existing power structure such that the leaders of expulsion come from an unexpected corner – secular city governments. This suggests that we should pay as much attention to distributions of political and economic power as we do to presumed ideological alignment in government-led exclusion and violence against minority groups.
4. HOW TOLERATION ENDED: THE POLITICAL PROCESSES OF EXPULSION IN LATE MEDIEVAL GERMAN JEWISH COMMUNITIES

It is rarely a surprise when new government policies radically change how excluded a minority group is within a society. Though policy details themselves are not always predictable, the intentions and effects can feel obvious to contemporary observers as well as to people who look back at the past to trace what happened. Every new policy will have a backstory – or, likely, more than one. This is the difficulty. We usually have much too many ideas about why exclusion happened. Reconstructing which particular factors led to a discriminating policy can be a small industry.

This paper is focused on the political process of medieval expulsions of Jews. In the latter half of the twentieth century, historical research disrupted the antisemitic argument that medieval Jewish communities’ financial activities brought on their expulsions. Subsequent case-based research into the causes of expulsions often concludes that these were strategic decisions made in political contexts rather than expressive actions driven by moral or religious commitments. At the same time, social scientific research on ethnic boundaries and inter-group conflict has produced a host of theories about why expulsion might have occurred.

I work through narratives of opportunities for expulsion in Constance, documenting how the treatment of Jews fit into ongoing political conflicts among Christians. In Constance, class conflict between the gentry, high-status guilds, and low-status guilds remade the city’s governing structures. Intra-Christian civic conflict was grounds for reconsidering the inclusion of Jews. Intervention by the German emperor hastened the othering of the city’s resident Jews. Eventually, the city leaders chose ethnoreligious exclusion as an affirmation of civic solidarity and a rejection of civic instability that the Jews came to represent.
Research on political contexts of medieval exclusion is a fruitful avenue for discerning what they teach us about present-day political exclusion. This case demonstrates that inter-ethnic antagonism is not necessarily a proximate cause of exclusion. Institutionalized social closure can occur without narratives of economic threat or cultural threat. Further, malice or individual selfishness are not the ultimate root of exclusion. Society-level intolerance can originate from pro-social communal concern.

4.1. THEORY

Symbolic boundaries divide people into groups (Brubaker 2004; Edgell et al. 2020; Lamont and Molnár 2002) through identifying categorical differences, such as in personal appearance, speech, cultural heritage, and more. Ethnicity and gender are two examples. Governments institutionalize symbolic boundaries (Charles Hirschman 1986), reserving different exercise of authority over different categorical groups (Lake 2009). When institutionalized, symbolic boundaries are also social boundaries, segmenting the material lives and opportunities of populations. By classification, governments create social structure (Bourdieu 1994); changes to institutionalized boundaries create material and symbolic changes in a society (Bailey, Fiahlo, and Loveman 2018). Different theories attribute changes in symbolic boundaries to different causes operating at different levels in a society, from micro to macro and from psychological to material. This paper is interested in why the institutionalization of a symbolic boundary – particularly, the political institutionalization – changes. Any useful theory must involve both boundary processes and political processes.

Groups are the basis of the social world. Perhaps the most quintessential understanding of groups is that they help individuals accomplish or obtain what they cannot do on their own (Buchanan 1965; Hechter 1987; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). When thinking about ethnic
boundaries and ethnic groups, it is easy to ascribe ethnic divisions to different individual preferences. The idea is that groups represent some set of individual preferences, and pursuit of these preferences creates patterns of segregation and separation at the aggregate (Schelling 1978). This perspective, most associated with public choice economics (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; M. Friedman 1962), is deeply dissatisfying as an explanation for why institutions become more exclusionary. All paths lead back to change in individual preferences and opportunities to pursue them, rather than particular political mechanisms or boundary-making processes. In fact, attending to the interaction of politics and boundaries shows us that members of a group use institutional weight (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2009) to hoard opportunities (Tilly 1998; 2003). We do not have strong reasons to assume that institutions accurately represent individual preferences anyway, especially in less democratic contexts.

Further, ethnic groups are often not especially cohesive (Brubaker 2002; 2004; Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982). Cultural heritage certainly can be the basis of perceived similarity, but individual preferences are shaped by a range of other factors like education, occupation, family structure, gender, personal histories, and more. These other factors can be cross-cutting across ethnic groups in a society (D. Siroky and Hechter 2016), and they produce as much or more differentiation within a society (Wimmer 2013).

Instead of individual preferences, the crux of the matter is the collective effort and how it is managed. Ethnic boundaries are institutionalized to help majority group members regulate effort towards and access to collective goods (Hechter 1987) with the backing of state enforcement. Majority group members perceive members of a minority group to be difficult to coerce with sanctions, or difficult to monitor, and therefore unreliable (Habyarimana et al. 2007;
Stephan et al. 1998) in endeavors that require collaboration and cooperation (Enos and Gidron 2018). This chapter argues that members of a majority adopt more exclusionary political institutions, to increase monitoring and sanctioning of minority group members, when they perceive a minority group to be increasingly unreliable. From the perspective of majority group members, this communal problem is governmental and needs governmental solutions, not interpersonal ones. Majority group individuals can only do so much surveilling and meting out of punishments; government enforcement is more effective. For example, the neighborhoods where minority group members can live might be restricted and patrolled so that the government can keep a closer eye on group members and curtail unwanted behavior.

This leads to two general propositions. First, exclusion will increase when sanctions become more difficult to use to affect the behavior of minority group members. Coercing a minority group might become more difficult if the minority group begins to seek outside aid to offset sanctioning costs, like co-ethnics or otherwise invested elites in a neighboring government (D. S. Siroky and Hale 2017). Or members of the majority group might think existing sanctions have lost their deterrent effect, such as if a group becomes too impoverished to pay fines for transgression. Second, exclusion will increase when the costs of monitoring the minority increase. Monitoring might become more costly if a minority group increases in relative size, if opportunity costs increase because a government becomes involved in resource-intensive activities like war, or if a minority group becomes less administratively legible. What these two processes look like contextually might vary considerably. I examine their plausibility within the case of urban medieval expulsions of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire.

4.1.1. Medieval expulsions of Jews
Symbolic boundaries can be about many things. There is considerable debate about how interchangeable different symbolic boundaries are, particularly whether ethnicity, race, and religion are meaningfully different (Brubaker 2009; 2014; Brubaker and Fernández 2019; Gorski 2019) for theorizing about boundary processes. In a way, this study sidesteps that debate by examining a boundary that has elements of all of these. Judaism is a religion. Its adherents follow particular social customs (informed by regional cultures) that they transmit to their descendants. Phenotypic stereotypes, endogamy, and cultural inheritance feed the perception of a singular Jewish race. The boundary around Jews is at once religious, ethnic, and racial in ways that cannot be pulled apart (Gonzalez-Lesser 2020).

This has been true in European cultures for centuries. In medieval Europe, concepts of symbolic groups included biological heritage and religious heritage (Nirenberg 2009). Use of *gens* and *natio* to describe peoples leaned on biological descent (Bartlett 2001), which was then thought to be expressed in distinctive behaviors (Weeda 2014) like language (Bartlett 2001). The medieval theory of group differences created problems of social legibility. Caricatures (Jordan 1987; 1990; Lipton 2014) did not reflect any real, identifiable physical characteristics of Jews. Jews were identifiable so much as they publicly followed distinctive Jewish customs in language, dress, or religion. The non-identifiability of Jews was actually a point of consternation at times (Gilomen 2009; Malkiel 2003). Jews supposedly had different blood and therefore different behavior from Christians, including inheritance of vices (Weeda 2014), but Christians had a hard time reconciling theory and reality (Lipton 2014). Historians still study whether

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1. Even now, medieval Jews are identifiable in historical records by distinctive names rather than categorically different activities or descriptions.
2. Christians themselves made Jewish difference illegible by participating in Jewish festivals and activities (M. J. Wenninger 2016). Not only were Jews hard to distinguish from Christians; Christians could be hard to distinguish from Jews.
Christian baptism could make someone no longer Jewish (Jordan 2001) by marking the end of Jewish cultural performance, though biological ties could not be cut (Heng 2018, 75–81). As Heng (2018) summarized, in medieval Europe differences were “electively essentialized...in order to distribute positions and powers differentially” (2018, 27).

Medieval European Jews were victim to episodes of mob violence (Abulafia 1999; Castritius and Battenberg 2008; Jankrift 2008; Toch 2003a) as well as institutional discrimination (Scholl 2015). Institutionalized exclusion was starkest in the fifteenth century, when governments in German (Müller 2002), Italian (Luzzati 1999), French (Jordan 1989), and Spanish (J. Friedman 1987) polities expelled Jews in complete social closure.

The recent book by Johnson and Koyama (2019) argues that European governments institutionalized difference between Christians and Jews to shore up legitimacy and elicit tax compliance by Christians. Their theory is that weak medieval European governments developed identity rules, or persecuting treatment of symbolically distinct groups like Jews, to match Christian religious ideas that designated Jews as morally suspect and untrustworthy. Governments abandoned these identity rules, they say, when governments gained enough capacity to make Christians comply without the help of religion. The reverse of their model is that toleration of Jews would decline, and institutionalized persecution increase, when governments face declining control capacity (Hechter 1987) over Christians. In other words, when governments lose capacity to regulate Christians’ taxation they regulate Jews more. While useful for describing the long-run transition from persecution to toleration in Europe, the theory has a few shortcomings for explaining expulsions, and for explaining increasing institutional...
exclusion more generally. First, their account naturalizes a boundary between Christians and Jews, assuming that religious difference creates stable social distance and Christian approbation of Jews. It does not explain why the boundary might vary or change; instead, change occurs in government interests in exploiting the boundary. Second, their account is politically undertheorized. They characterize political change as elites seeking an equilibrium with maximum revenue extraction. The theory thus describes politics also as an equilibrium at a set of identity rules, without guidance on why and how Jews would be treated more or less strictly.

My argument improves on theirs by giving more attention to boundary-making and its connection to political institutions. If I am right, then the precipitating process of an expulsion should be one that sows doubt among Christians that Jews are reliable members of the civic community. Expulsion should be the outgrowth of broader social processes that demonstrate either (a) increasing difficulty with sanctioning and controlling Jewish co-residents or (b) increasing difficulty with monitoring whether Jewish co-residents are properly contributing to the civic community. In medieval Germany, cities might have challenges in sanctioning Jews if Jews could escape sanction by outside intervention, or the Holy Roman Emperor divested a city of the right to directly govern resident Jews. Other possibilities are that it became common belief that Jews were too strongly committed to anti-Christian, anti-social behavior to be swayed by sanctions, or that Jews were impoverished to the point that financial punishments were moot. Monitoring might become more challenging or costly as a Jewish community grew, if a city became embroiled in external conflicts that limited what resources it devoted to monitoring, or if intervention by the emperor ended administrative surveillance of Jews. Importantly, the problems are institutional ones of governability, which is why government action is the corresponding response.
Other explanations for expulsions abound, falling mainly in three camps. One scholarly tradition focuses on the financial utility of Jewish subjects. That Jews were financially exploited is well-documented (Darman 2009; Gilomen 2000; Stacey 1987). Functionalist theories attribute expulsion to governments either satisfying pressing financial needs (Levi 1981; Olson 1993; 2000) by dispossessing Jews, forcing short sales or simply confiscating their assets, or else exploiting Jews to the point that governments could no longer extract anything further, making Jews a disposable, spent resource (Barzel 1992; Koyama 2010). This offers no insights as to why Jews would be othered and exploited in the first place, and it’s not especially processual. Simply put, the hypothesis here is that cities expelled Jewish communities when they needed cash, or when Jews could no longer be extorted for their “protection.” This theory would be supported by evidence that a city had financial needs that outstripped their regular budgets, or that needed to be satisfied on a shorter time scale than normal, and that the amounts confiscated from expelled Jews were used to make a significant payment towards these financial needs. Another possible trajectory would be that a city regularly extorted from Jews to meet financial needs, and Jews became impoverished and could no longer provide any useful amounts.

Another explanation comes from conflict theory, the scholarly tradition that focuses on conflict between unequal groups as a major force in motivating and guiding exclusion and violence. Conflict theories direct scholars to focus on material and symbolic disparities between groups (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Hechter 1978; D. Siroky and Hechter 2016; Smångs 2016), sometimes taking the social boundaries for granted (D. L. Horowitz 1985; Salzmann 2010; Varshney 2002). Structuralist theories are the most plausible version. First, one idea is that Jews were expelled because they were an economic threat (Böhm, Rusch, and Gürerk 2016; Kurer 2020) to Christians. This idea is a popular explanation for contemporary exclusion
in the US and Europe (McLaren 2003; Ziller and Heizmann 2020). Versions of this argue that economic complementarities protect a minority from targeted violence and exclusion (Jedwab, Johnson, and Koyama 2019; Jha 2013; 2014), but economic gains or losing a market monopoly triggers boundary policing (Landa 2016; Olzak 1989). Largely, theories in this camp look to popular pressure and mobilization (Huscroft 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 1997; 2003) when material interests change (Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017; Mitra and Ray 2013) to explain increasing exclusion. On the other side of things, political elites might initiate exclusion to reinforce their position and existing social structure among Christians (Gill and Keshavarzian 1999; Rubin 2017). This family of theories predicts that cities expelled Jews when economic structural changes stirred up economic grievances among classes of Christians, who then blamed Jews. As a process, this might look like changes in occupational structures, recession, or changes in the returns of different professions, followed by agitation among the classes displaced or losing income that specifically targets Jews.

Third, constructivist theories stress new ideas and revised meanings (Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed 2015; C Hirschman, Alba, and Farley 2000). One of the long-standing explanations for increasing exclusion of Jews is increasing antisemitism (K. Stow 2007). By itself, this argument is unsatisfactory because it provides no account of why institutional exclusion would happen rather than interpersonal violence. More sophisticated constructivist explanations point to the role of particular ideas about minority groups (Flores and Schachter 2018). Broadly, minority groups may become seen as threatening the culture of the majority group (Andrews and Seguin 2015; Hervik 2019; Paxton and Mughan 2006). Elsewhere, I have argued that new religious ideas created an opportunity (Cramsey and Wittenberg 2016) for expulsions by recategorizing Jews as threatening Christian community health and righteousness (Doten-Snitker forthcoming;
Mundill (1998) claims a similar cause for the 1290 expulsion from England. Here, the hypothesis is that a city expels Jews when popular perception of Jews, or at least the perception of city elites, shifts from understanding Jews as non-threatening to believing Jews are intolerably dangerous to Christian belief and social health. Evidence for this hypothesis must include popular or elite deployment of rhetoric that Jews were a threat, connected to political action to remove Jews from the local community.

Each of these perspectives locates causation in different processes. I consider their merits through analyzing the history of the city of Constance, Germany in the late fourteenth century to the mid-fifteenth century. Constance was a well-established city involved in long-distance trade to Italy, the Champagne fairs, and Spain as well as to the African and eastern Mediterranean coasts. Buying and selling for this business required money exchangers and moneylending, and Jews were brought in for this reason in 1242 (Joos 1968, 38) to supplement Christian financiers. After a Black Death pogrom in 1349 in which several hundred Jews were killed, Jews returned and resettled in Constance around 1375 (Overdick 1965; Darman 2009). Jews then lived in Constance until 1448, when the remainder of the community moved to Austrian cities. In the intervening decades, Constance experienced class conflict, financial downturns, and a major Church conference that sparked a crusade within Europe. The city government issued orders for Jews to leave the city four times but never followed through on enforcing expulsion. Tracing the histories of these episodes provides insight on what processes lead – or do not lead – to expulsion.

4.2. METHODS

This study uses comparative historical analysis. Comparative historical methods are particularly useful for studying processes through time when context is deeply important.
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2002). I focus on one city, one overall case, but examine several historical episodes to exploit within-case variability (Gerring 2007). Comparing processes among these episodes helps to eliminate rival theories (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004). Because these episodes occur in the same city, not only can I derive of sense of what is important at one time, but I can pull out contingency overall within the city (Sewell 2005).

Constance is an informative case. Most expulsions were carried out in cities like Constance that were relatively independent politically and economically (Doten-Snitker forthcoming). However, Constance is a negative case (Emigh 1997) in several senses. First, the city did not ever completely expel Jews. Though the city government resolved to expel Jews at two points, in the first instance they kept pushing back the date by which Jews were supposed to leave and then gave up the cause, and in the second instance it appears the order was quickly abandoned. We can observe the city up to the point of expulsion and the city to abandoning expulsion. Second, when Jews did emigrate, it was not because of an expulsion. This gives insight as to what other factors were at play in Jewish residency. Third, there were several occasions in which expulsion was probable, given existing theories about expulsions, but did not happen.

Constance was a mid-sized city, with population estimates around 4,000 (Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre 1988) to 6,000 (Darman 2009, 150) in the early fifteenth century. Most cities where Jews lived were small cities and not major centers (Doten-Snitker forthcoming); Constance is representative of middling and smaller cities more than the biggest cities (Overdick 1965, 34). Before the Black Death plague pogroms in the mid-fourteenth century, the Jewish community in Constance was one of the largest in Germany (M. Wenninger 1981, 102). With permission from the Holy Roman Emperor (Overdick 1965:29) King Wenceslaus, Constance admitted the first
members of a new Jewish community in 1375. Admission records name individuals, who represented households of unknown size. Not all new Jewish households show up in admissions records, though (Darman 2009). Records of the Jewish community’s size come mostly from preserved tax registers, which are limited before the 1420s. Historians estimate that 12-16 Jewish households lived in Constance at the beginning of the fifteenth century (Hagen 2018). In 1418, there were 20 Jewish households (Wenninger 1981:104); tax records in 1425 evidence 11 households (Darman 2009, 200). Jews were allowed to own houses anywhere in the city (Darman 2009, 191), but Jews congregated in two Jewish quarters: one centrally located and one not (Wenninger 1981:102). They had a synagogue and cemetery (Hagen 2018; Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987) and, given the community size, likely other individuals who performed community functions, like a butcher.

Cities like Constance admitted Jews to increase consumer credit options and facilitate mercantile and industrial activity (Overdick 1965:28). From the city magistrate’s records, it is evident that the business contacts of Jews in Constance stretched far beyond the city’s territory to Ulm, Augsburg, and into Switzerland, though the scope of business for Christian merchant bankers was “considerably larger” (Overdick 1965:35). Competition with Christian merchants, not a prohibition, limited Jewish trade in goods (Overdick 1965:61). There is evidence of Constance Jews dealing in wax, fine cloth, pepper, iron, ginger, and cotton (Overdick 1965:61). Jews involved in banking and lending generally had middle-class customers (Overdick 1965:36). In nearby Zürich, most loans (by volume and sum) were extended by non-Italian Christians (Gilomen 2009:219); the same would have been true for Constance.

4 Households might include extended family and servants or other household workers.
As informants about the happenings in Constance, I rely on Overdick (1965), Joos (1968), Wenninger (1981), Darman (2009), Gilomen (2009), and Hagen (2018). Mentgen (2006) provides a thorough historiography on expulsions in the medieval Holy Roman Empire, and studies by Müller (2002) and in an edited volume on this subject (Burgard, Haverkamp, and Mentgen 1999) are further guides. While I am limited to secondary sources, these sources overlap considerably in their reports; several use the same primary sources. However, the secondary sources come to differing conclusions about Constance’s social history. This is an opportunity for synthesis and comparison that can yield new insights. My data collection and analysis process is an additional guard against confirmation bias (Møller and Skaaning 2018).

This project has been pursued in iterative moves between historical reading, reading theory, and quantitative analysis of related historical data on expulsions. My abductive approach (Tavory and Timmermans 2014) has helped me learn where to focus my attention on what this particular case can teach us about Constance in particular, about historical expulsions of Jews in German lands, and more generally about institutional exclusion.

This chapter proceeds by examining six different episodes within the late medieval history of Constance, each of different temporal lengths. As Gerring (2007, 54) noted, disproving a theory requires only one case, while proving a theory takes many. I describe the events and processes of each episode paired with arguments about their significance and the longer-term trends within Constance.

4.3. MEDIEVAL CONSTANCE AND ITS JEWISH RESIDENTS

4.3.1. The 1380s

Since the 1360s to 1370s, the city’s economy had shifted from focus on long-distance trade and raw materials towards finished goods and retail trade (Joos 1968, 38). The long-
distance cloth trade made early Constance merchants wealthy, and they had become the local gentry (Joos 1968). Most of the authority struggle with the Bishop of Constance had finally been settled in the city government’s favor (Darman 2009, 151; Joos 1968, 44), but another political conflict was already taking center stage. Changing economic structures brought new economic power to new groups and sparked political tussles over political representation between the guilds and the gentry of merchant elites (Darman 2009, 151–52).

In 1383, some of the lower guilds led a revolt against the *Rat*, the representative council that controlled city governance. The *Wuchergesetz* (revolt against usurers) targeted high-interest loans by Christians. The Rat had tried to raise funds from the poor by approving high-interest consumer loans (Hagen 2018); the government would tax interest-based profits on these loans, which might accumulate quickly with borrowers’ limited repayment capacities. Conceivably, the high-interest loans also lined the pockets of the wealthier merchant-bankers in the city, who would have been well-represented in the *Rat*. New city regulations after the fact appear to target Christians whose financial practices were anti-social – lending in other cities and lending to Jews (Hagen 2018, 234), instead of offering credit to fellow citizens. On the other hand, the regulation of Jews’ activities, one of nine sections (Darman 2009, 193; Hagen 2018, 234), declares that Jews perform a social obligations in offering credit (M. Wenninger 1981, 104–5) and are permitted a higher interest rate. Jews shouldered higher risk in lending to the poor and to non-citizens inside and outside the city, and higher allowed interest reflected this risk (Overdick 1965, 40–42).

5 City governments expected that Jews would lend money in their cities. In Esslingen, Jews could not refuse a loan to a resident (Hagen 2018, 234–35); it was a civic obligation.
This very well could have been a time for expelling Jews. They had not been there long, and clearly there was already some interest in their financial practices. But instead the city negotiated tax-farming with King Wenceslaus in 1385, securing continued permission to have Jewish residents and to share tax revenues with the king (Darman 2009; Overdick 1965). That same year, Wenceslaus connived with the Swabian League cities (Constance included) to enact a massive debt transfer from Jews to the cities and the king (the first Judenschuldentilgung) (M. Wenninger 1981). The city government perhaps saw some value in using Jews as a cash cow, or had some dissatisfaction with how indebted some citizens were to Jews, or had a sense that at least some Jewish lending could be manipulated for territorial expansion (see Scholl 2015).

Conflict over representation boiled over again in 1389 because some guilds had outsize political and economic influence. The lesser guilds demanded a greater proportion of seats in the Rat (Joos 1968, 38), and to guard against accumulation of power, the Bürgermeister (mayor) and guild representatives in the Rat were to change annually (Joos 1968, 45). Then, when Wenceslaus issued an imperial tax on Jews in 1390, the city refused to participate; they had just helped the emperor alleviate his debts in the 1385 Judenschuldentilgung. Wenceslaus put Constance under imperial ban, designating it outside of imperial protection, and ultimately Constance promised only half the assessed amount (M. Wenninger 1981, 103). In 1393, the city again contracted to be the protectors and tax collectors of the Jews in Constance (Darman 2009, 152; Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987).

6 Imperial privileges, particularly for Jewish residency, were often time-delimited and would be renewed, either as a formality or with renegotiation, at regular intervals (F. Battenberg 1979; Haverkamp 2015; Ziweg 1995). The privilege to readmit Jews in 1375 likely was renewed in 1385 with this agreement, with the added provision that the city would retain a portion of the imperial taxes collected from Jews.
In this decade, the city community witnessed three forces that could have precipitated the expulsion of the Jews. The class structure among Christians was undergoing reorganization. Revolts demonstrate that civic community in Constance recognized greedy financial practices as cause for concern and political action. The Jews were almost completely dispossessed by the 1385 and 1390 debt erasures and transfers (Gilomen 2009, 215; Scholl 2015), so the city leaders also had limited reason to believe it could extort or confiscate from Jews anytime soon. And they didn’t try anything drastic. Instead, Jews continued to have a more banal economic function: providing needed credit to augment the lending done by Christians.

4.3.2. 1400-1413

The population of Constance quadrupled in the early fifteenth, meaning there were many immigrants looking for credit and cash to set up shop in the city’s growing trade economy (Overdick 1965, 51–52). As Overdick points out, though, Christian merchants were not going to lend to potential competitors. The city needed Jews to provide credit, as insider-outsiders who could not manipulate patronage into economic or political power. Post-Plague resettlement sources regularly give moneylending regulations with resettlement, indicating that moneylending was the reason for admission (Gilomen 2009, 195). In this same period and just to the west, Jews were readmitted to Bern in 1408 after an expulsion in 1404/05 because there had been a fire in 1405, and citizens needed credit to rebuild (Gilomen 2009, 195). Lausanne admitted Jews for the first time in 1408 and 1409 because preaching against Christian usury led to the prohibition of the Christian fraternities that provided credit in the city (Gilomen 2009, 196). The complementary economic position of Jews was strengthened.

At the same time, the civic community faced a new challenge in maintaining its social-economic groups and the balance of power between them. City citizenship was inherited,
purchased, or through guild membership, which was also hereditary (Joos 1968, 43). New immigrants needed to purchase city annuities and pay fees to join guilds, to gain rights and political voice. In the midst of social upheaval, and perhaps related to the population influx, the commercial nobility tried to join the guilds, but the Rat forbade it (Joos 1968, 39). If the nobility could join guilds, they could retake more control of the Rat, because of course guilds would elect noblemen to the Rat, to make political use of their connections and prestige. Conversely, a 1410/12 uprising led to a law that guildmembers could not become representatives of the gentry (Joos 1968, 47). Some of the guildsmen were upwardly mobile and becoming de facto members of the gentry, as merchant elites had done in the centuries before. If guildsmen represented the gentry in the Rat, then it might appear that the guilds had more than their share of control. And in both cases, it would be impossible to tell if they were truly representing the constituency they were supposed to, or if they would protect the interests of their true social standing.

Like in the period before, the city experienced political strife due to changing material interests. However, the concerns of the civic community were directed towards the upper classes. The position of the Jews still did not come under scrutiny. The sources say very little about Jews in Constance at this time. Perhaps this is because many of the city records from this period were lost (Darman 2009). But it appears that there was nothing of note: no pogroms, no major emigrations or immigrations, just business as usual. There was a single law that did codify some restrictions on Jews (Darman 2009), but it appears not to have been enforced. A volume of canon law was produced circa 1398-1406 that echoed the Lateran IV regulations about Christians and

7 The Fourth Lateran Council was one of the irregularly held ecumenical councils of the Roman Catholic Church, convened to debate doctrine and dogma and produce canon law that would guide jurists in matters of advising and adjudication. Lateran IV was held in 1215 in the Lateran Palace in Rome and was one of the last to include the Eastern Orthodox Church.
For a third time, in 1413 the German king, now Sigismund of Luxembourg, leased the imperial tax on Jews, the golden *Opferpfennig*, to the city, this time for 12 years. The previous arrangement had lapsed more than a decade prior, and Jews had been under the protection of the imperial agent of Swabia (Hagen 2018, 236). The new deal was Sigismund’s way of rewarding the city for loyalty and for damages suffered during the *Appenzellerkriege* (Hagen 2018, 232–33), a small uprising that became a regional war. Here we have some indication that the city was experiencing some war-related financial needs (Johnson and Koyama 2019; Tilly 1990), though absent the city registers of the time we cannot verify if this was the case. Battenberg (1987, 569) describes this sort of move as the commercialization of dominion. It was not new in Europe to reward friends or to create tax-farming positions. What is notable is specifically that Sigismund was using Jews in this manner in Constance. The city again had reason for a long-term relationship with the Jews.

**4.3.3. 1414-1418**

The year 1414 initiated an unusual time in the city. Roman Catholic clergy and their representatives from all across Europe gathered in Constance for a new ecumenical council called to mediate among factions and establish Church unity. Constance was the seat of the Bishop of Constance, under the Archbishop of Mainz, and the city was accustomed to having a large clerical presence. In fact, the great number of resident religious under the authority of the Bishop and not the city had caused authority conflicts in the fourteenth century until matters were settled in the 1370s and 1380s (Joos 1968). But this was a new level of Christian religious presence.
Convening the Council of Constance was a major success of the new German king Sigismund, who was trying to persuade the three popes of the time to relinquish their claims and elect a new unity pope (Housley 2017). He set up court in Constance to mediate between the factions and monitor the proceedings. The Council did ultimately resolve the papacy succession claims, but the more impactful activities of the Council were related to reforming Christendom.

A primary concern at the Council was how to create greater righteousness in Europe as a whole and in each community. The Council summoned Czech reformer Jan Hus, promising to hear him out, but upon his arrival Hus was tried for heresy and executed. Council attendees focused their efforts on how to suppress heresy and what to about un-Christian behavior (Housley 2017). Relatedly, Council attendees debated whether rulers could tolerate Jewish residents and simultaneously be responsible Christian rulers that protected the spiritual health of their domains (Grayzel 1967). Some popular preachers and Christian scholars at the time began arguing that Jews should convert to Christianity or else be forced out (C. Cluse 2013a; C. M. Cluse 2014; but see Mikosch 2010).

In a city full of reforming and purifying debates for four years, the Constance citizenry cannot have been ignorant of ideas being spread about Jews. Surely Sigismund would have been privy to some of the discussions about how a good ruler handles heretics, Jews, and unchristian behavior. The new Archbishop of Trier, who attended the Council as the late archbishop’s representative, did expel the Jews in his lands in 1418 (Haverkamp 1996; Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). New ideology made no mark as of yet in Constance, though. The city

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8 The position of pope was dangerous and risked assassination. European powers wanted to control the pope and his election because popes had veto and decision-making power over things like marriages among the nobility and mediation among kings. In 1378 the cardinals split, one group backed by France and Spain and another by Germany, in a dispute about who would become the next pope. Another dispute culminated in the election of a third pope in 1409.
government and Sigismund renegotiated their contract over the Jews (Darman 2009). Despite the visitation of strongly antisemitic clergy and their perception that Jews were a threat to Christian communities, Constance took no action to curtail Jewish lives.

4.3.4. 1420-1430

After the Council of Constance, conflict in the city picked up again. It’s clear that there were reform movements in the city, but the goal was not religious reform. Instead, different parties were still trying to work out how to maintain a balance of power and to have the power structure correspond to who was in the city.

The main issue was that some financially mobile guildsmen had intermarried with the gentry (Joos 1968, 46). The guilds were afraid of the economic and political consequences of losing their most prominent members to the new business of trading corporations and to a different social group (Joos 1968, 47). The city government was structured to balance the interests and representation of the guilds and the nobility; what did it mean if there was a new class of people who overlapped in some ways with the guilds and in others with the gentry? Particularly, it was a problem that the private interests of some guildsmen were now aligned with the nobility via marriage and business connections, even though they publicly represented the guilds. At the beginning of July 1420, a faction pressured the Rat to forbid corporations between gentry and guildsmen and to expel members of the patriciate from the Rat chamber (Joos 1968, 46). In the next year, about 35 nobles and guildsmen relinquished their citizenship and emigrated to other cities; they sought resolution to the conflict through their hosts. In December 1421 the cities of Schaffhausen, Überlingen, Ravensburg, Radolfzell, Wangen, Diessenhofen, Buchhorn (Friedrichshafen), and Lindau arbited between the city and emigres, and in January 1422 a portion of them returned to Constance (Joos 1968, 46). But arbitration by the cities made things
worse. The resolution allowed companies and intermarriage among the nobility and rich merchant guildsmen (Joos 1968, 47; M. Wenninger 1981, 106), reintroducing the problem of conflicting public and private issues. The Rat and civic community did not like that trading companies could mix social classes.

After the Council of Constance, the city seems to have regulated Jewish financial activities more closely by assessing a tax on those who participated in it (Darman 2009, 199). Of course, not all members of the community were participants (Darman 2009, 373; see Toch 2013). Wenninger reports that new restrictions on non-resident Jews were the first signs of the closing or narrowing of Jewish business (M. Wenninger 1981, 105). But these fit with overall changes in the city in the 1420s to regulate financial practices and do not necessarily signify that the city government was now singling out Jews. Yet again, the city negotiated with Sigismund to retain and profit from the right to protect Jews in the city in 1425, instead of negotiating for Jews’ removal.

The city was trying to figure out how to police wealth accumulation that created social instability. In 1425, companies that were founded in or after 1389 were dissolved (Joos 1968, 47) in another attempt to separate the nobility and the rich merchants. Some of these emigrated to nearby cities in early 1427, with others soon following (M. Wenninger 1981, 106). A sizeable faction moved to Ravensburg to start companies there (Joos 1968, 39; M. Wenninger 1981, 106). The Rat hoped that the nearby cities would also ban mixed companies, but they did not. Alone in this class struggle, and with several leading families having left, the Rat caved and rescinded its ban in 1429. City leaders tried a new social tactic to limit cross-class social mixing, instead of their ineffective economic interventions: the Rat banned dances (M. Wenninger 1981, 107). Additionally, some of the rich guildsmen were expelled from the city, the majority of whom
joined the esteemed *Große Ravensburger Handelsgesellschaft* to continue their entrepreneurial ventures (Joos 1968, 48). Joos (1968) observed that the *Rat* might have been increasing social control and been more authoritarian. Banning social functions and expelling prominent citizens certainly speaks to some desperation about how to handle the situation.

At this point, the social conflict had been going on for 20 years, and the city government was running out of strategies. The year 1429 brought a cocktail of factors to unrest in the city. Most of the nobility tried to relinquish their citizenship in September in an assembly before the *Rat*, and the guilds responded by locking the city gates, assembling their militias, and threatening that city residents would loot their possessions within the city. Ultimately, all but 8 of the gentry moved to Schaffhausen and were granted citizenship there (Joos 1968, 50). At the same time, the city confronted a small recession. Then, in December, a rumor started in nearby Ravensburg that Jews ritually murdered a city youth. Latent, ongoing antisemitism was sharpened by the possibility that Jews committed such an offensive act. The Jews were imprisoned a little less than a month later (Joos 1968, 51), in January 1430.

For Sigismund, Jews’ imprisonment was an excuse to intervene and an opportunity for financial gain, to fine the city and resolve his debts there (Hagen 2018, 236; M. Wenninger 1981, 107). Sigismund tried to reassert control over the Jews and void the 1425 agreement with the city (M. Wenninger 1981, 107–8). In July the *Rat* agreed to pay 7,000 Gulden, and Sigismund promised further intervention later in the year when he planned to visit Überlingen (M.

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9 Ritual murder accusations appear to originate in England in the twelfth century. The myths of ritual murders start with a missing boy or young man or the discovery of one’s body, leaping from there to the accusation that local Jews committed murder in ritual reenactment of the crucifixion of Jesus. See E.M. Rose (2015).

10 In total, 83 Jews were imprisoned (Darman 2009, 153). It is not possible to know for certain whether this number represents the entire Jewish population in the city at the time. City tax records enumerated households, not individuals.
Wenninger 1981, 109), less than 10 kilometers across the Bodensee from Constance. A fine would help cover his outstanding debts from his stay during the Council (Joos 1968, 51), which amounted to at least 25,000 Gulden (Fouquet 2014; Hagen 2018, 233; Joos 1968, 51). The Jews were released.

The imprisonment of the Jews was not the main storyline. While the Jews were captive, the conflict between the gentry, elite guildmembers, and the lower guilds continued. The Jews were imprisoned again at the end of July by the lower guilds in a putsch that also ejected many of the guild representatives from the Rat (Joos 1968, 50). The lower guilds were mad about how the upper guilds handled the negotiations over the Constance Jews; it was rumored that some Rat members received bribes from the Jews (Joos 1968, 50; M. Wenninger 1981, 108). This echoes the ongoing concerns that city leaders would line their own pockets instead of protecting public interest. Perhaps the lower guilds were worried about Sigismund’s debts and the recession; they seemed to reach out to stabilize the city economically (Joos 1968, 50; M. Wenninger 1981, 108). Sigismund decided he himself would mediate between the parties in the city, and he initially assessed a 160,000 Gulden fine (Joos 1968, 50) for the disturbance and for mistreatment of “his” Jews.

The city government balked at this high sum and negotiated down. Ultimately, Sigismund got 28,000 Gulden from the city and 10,000 Gulden from the Jews, and the city got 10,000 Gulden from the Jews. Given the way debt was manipulated and passed around, it is plausible that some of the money supposed to go to Sigismund was actually routed to different city citizens to pay Sigismund’s Council-era debts; at least, the money extorted from the Jews helped to settle Sigismund’s accounts (Joos 1968, 52).
Most of Sigismund’s mediation concerned the broader political conflict in the city, though. He decreed the disestablishment of the two lower guilds that had started the July uprising, as well as consolidated the remaining 18 into 10 guilds so that guild divisions did not correspond with sociopolitical divisions (Joos 1968, 37). Further, he reorganized and shrank the Rat from 140 to 20 representatives, declared that guildsmen who had switched loyalties to side with the merchant gentry had to pick a side, and reinstated dances and festivities among the gentry so long as only their kin participated (Joos 1968, 52; M. Wenninger 1981, 109). The guildsmen of questionable loyalty mostly joined the gentry (Joos 1968, 52; M. Wenninger 1981, 110). These decrees seem to have neutralized conflict; they were enforced for over 100 years (M. Wenninger 1981, 110).
Civic reform in Constance throughout the early fifteenth century targeted the richest guildsmen and the gentry, trying to limit whether guildsmen could join the gentry by virtue of wealth and whether the gentry could encroach on the guilds’ business by forming companies, like Italians had. In fact, the conflict here in Constance sees a counterfactual in the intra-city strife in Florence (Lansing 1991). Constance was a well-known producer of canvas; Florence gained economic might and fame through its wool trade. Florence had a city government, but it was effectively an oligarchy controlled by a series of families who gained prominence via commercial power and networks with the nobility. Perhaps Constance was aware of how things had turned out in Florence. Or perhaps they heard of German cities where the economic elites became the political elites, like in Nuremberg or Cologne. At any rate, stopping a mercantile oligarchy was of utmost importance to a majority of the citizenry.

Regarding the Jews, Constance strikes an unusual contrast to its neighbors by imprisoning Jews after the Ravensburg accusation. Most nearby cities committed genocide (Hagen 2018; Joos 1968; Overdick 1965; M. Wenninger 1981). Maybe the city was following a different script of how to interact with Jews and with the emperor. Scholl (2015) describes a comparable situation in Zürich. In 1401 the Zürich magistrate secured a “gift” from its Jews of more than 1500 Gulden. The “gift” was extorted following the Diessenhofen ritual murder accusation, which included a confession under torture that implicated a broader Jewish conspiracy, when the Rat imprisoned the Jews “aus Gründen der Sicherheit” (for the sake of security, in primary source) and then made them pay to be released (Scholl 2015, 165). In 1402, the city then bought dominion over the Greifensee for 6,000 Gulden from Graf Friedrich VII von Toggenburg (Scholl 2015, 164). In the case of Constance in 1430, the city seems to have fared poorly in this strategy. They had to pay a large fine that was only offset by one-third by what
they gained from Jews. Plus, the total 20,000 Gulden extorted from the Constance Jewish community thoroughly wrecked the ability of the Jews to play the banking role the city government had wanted them to play. The local Jews had to call on their familial networks to put together the funds; their ransom was financed partly through family connections to prominent Jewish bankers in nearby cities like Zürich (Darman 2009, 204). Unfortunately, Sigismund’s resolution disrupted the mostly peaceable relationship between the Christian community and the Jews in Constance (Darman 2009, 200).

4.3.5. 1431-1434

King Sigismund’s mediation in the city had long-lasting impact. His mandated guild reorganization relocated socioeconomic cleavages (Joos 1968, 37) to be internal to guilds. Besides organizational restructuring that touched economics, status groups, and political power, the city was economically transformed by the events of 1430. It lost commercial companies to Schaffhausen. It lost possession of the Thurgau region, its hinterland, which cut ties between raw material producers and urban entrepreneurs (Joos 1968, 39). Though Joos (1968) says losing Thurgau destroyed the city's economic importance, the tax registers do not show notable material differences. The city’s economy continued to grow up to the 1450s and 1460s (Darman 2009; Joos 1968; M. Wenninger 1981).

Regrouping after 1430, the city began to curtail Jewish inclusion. As part of Sigismund’s decrees, the city was to simplify its citizenship categories11 by eliminating one for residents that

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11 Medieval citizenship, particularly within the Holy Roman Empire, was tiered, with different rights and responsibilities. Full citizens held the most rights, with the possibility that they might hold a city office. A second category was often essentially identical but was for lower classes who might not have inherited citizenship or perhaps worked for citizens. Pfahlbürger were individuals who paid for partial rights (like tax burdens reduced from the level of foreigners) because business or personal choice brought them into long-term connection to a city, though their official residence or citizenship was elsewhere. Jewish citizens had rights and
retained citizenship rights elsewhere (usually gentry or elite merchants), and maybe this directed their attention to the category of Jewish citizens, too. First, Jews were forbidden in 1431 from holding property mortgages, which caused them much financial damage (Overdick 1965, 57) as they had to unload these mortgages in short sales. In September 1431, Constance resolved to admit no new Jews (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). These appear to be initial steps to reposition Jews and their position as partial citizens.

In 1429 the city used expulsion to solve problems of uncertainty about loyalty and commitment among the gentry and rich guildsmen. On October 29, 1432 Jews were told by the Rat to leave by November 11 (M. Wenninger 1981, 112). In November this was extended to March 1, 1433 at the request of Jews to have more time to wrap up their business (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987; M. Wenninger 1981, 112). The city government realized that Jews would not be able to leave unless they had no more business relationships, and they forbid business contacts for Bürger (Overdick 1965, 58). Closing business lasted so long that a repeated expulsion order in 1433 gave May 11 as the new date of departure (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987; Overdick 1965, 57), but the Rat extended this deadline to July 25 (M. Wenninger 1981, 112). The city hoped to provoke Jews to leave by making it unattractive to stay. But the city was unable to get all Jews to leave and reversed course (Overdick 1965, 58), with no more restrictions until the 1440 expulsion, which was also not enforced (Overdick 1965, 59).

Remember that Jews were now repossessed by the emperor, after a long history of dominion under the city. Generally, cities wanted control over taxation (Darman 2009, 378).

Responsibilities similar to full citizens, but like Pfahlbürger were usually charged higher taxes and just outside full jurisdiction of the city. See Darman (2009) for a thorough summary of citizenship in Constance. In comparison, see Liddy (2017) on citizenship in English towns.
Darman argues that cities at the time were trying not to destroy the financial power of their Jewish communities, though the Reich was doing so with abandon. Not only had the emperor reclaimed the Jews, drawing them outside the purview of the city government, but in doing so he also decimated their economic capacity. To pay the emperor’s high fine, the equivalent of 5 years of taxes (Darman 2009), the Jews must have called in loans, increased prices, and used whatever means possible to collect the funds. Sigismund’s extraordinary assessment on the Constance Jews plus the economic fallout as Jews cobbled together the money would have emphasized two things: Jews were not categorically part of the Constance civic community, and Jews could not be economically loyal to the civic community. Very clearly, Jews’ economic behaviors would have been at odds with the city economy and sowed doubt about their governability, just like the merchant elite who caused so much trouble in the preceding decades. Their continued presence was a threat to city stability.

What the city does after their expulsion attempts is instructive about their thinking. From 1434 records of Jewish taxes were moved to be with non-residents, a category shift in the position of Jews within the city (Darman 2009, 201). As a process, the city used administrative means to alienate their Jewish community. Jews advocated for themselves to avoid being uprooted, and their efforts were at least partly successful. While surviving records demonstrate economic arguments for why they could not leave, we should imagine that, like any people facing the prospect of displacement, the Constance Jews also felt attachment to their family homes, their neighbors, their ways of life, and the stability they had built in over 50 years of living in the city. But for the city leaders, Jewish otherness had never been felt so strongly.

4.3.6. 1435-1448
The rest of the 1430s passed without incident. The number of Jewish households declined, as did the absolute amount that the city collected in taxes (Darman 2009, 201), but incomes from Jews also never made up that much of the city budgets (Darman 2009; Gilomen 2009). Regionally, it appears that maybe the Jewish community was preparing to relocate its center to Schaffhausen; Gilomen (2009, 204) suggests that Jews were preparing to leave Zürich as well. A May 29, 1435 citizenship charter for a Jew named Lew includes twice annually to hold gatherings, appearing to be a yeshiva or Torah intensive and a synod, and to house the guests, for the payment of two glass windows for the Rathaus annually. According to *Germania Judaica*, Lew had been living in Constance and represented the Jews to the city government there, but also owned a house in Schaffhausen (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987, 1310). We know the Constance Jews had some prior connection to Jews in Schaffhausen because they drew financial support from them to pay their ransom in 1430 (Darman 2009). Perhaps some Constance Jews had already relocated there to regroup and avoid problems in Constance and other cities.

The next hiccup occurred in 1440. The city decreed an expulsion again, but it was not enforced (Hagen 2018; Overdick 1965, 59; M. Wenninger 1981, 112) or even extended, like in 1431-33.

In 1443, another ritual murder accusation again prompted the imprisonment of Jews in Constance (Overdick 1965, 59; M. Wenninger 1981, 112). This one was in Meersburg, less than 2 km directly across the Bodensee, and directly involved a Constance Jew. Some Jews tried to flee, knowing that imprisonment in the region historically led to exorbitant ransoms or to

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12 In the present day, Meersburg is where a ferry from Constance goes to connect the city, on an what is effectively a peninsula between two parts of the glacial lake Bodensee, with German lands to the north.
execution, but they were pursued by Constance citizens and forcibly brought back (Darman 2009, 153). In fact, all the Jews in the Bodensee region were imprisoned. Again, Constance dragged its feet on expelling the Jews, and the city refrained from genocidal violence.

The Meersburg ritual murder accusation seems to be the excuse the city needed to finally confront the empire. From the late 1430s, the empire pursued a more aggressive policy of extracting from cities via Jews, trapping Jews in the Christian perception that Jews were the king's “Handlungsträger” (operatives) (Jörg 2013, 9). The city wrote to the emperor Friedrich III, who had just been elected and crowned that same year, about what to do and how to resolve the issue (M. Wenninger 1981, 113). Negotiations went on for five years, with the Jews imprisoned the whole time. At the four-year mark, Duke Albrecht VI of Austria, brother to Friedrich, took over in the negotiations because Friedrich transferred dominion over the Constance Jews to him (Darman 2009, 153; Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). Albrecht generally was the Habsburg family representative, and Friedrich’s, in settling and intervening in claims in the Alps and environs while Friedrich was occupied with other concerns as a new emperor in the 1440s. The Duke of Austria repeated his right to protect the Jews, as agent of the Reich (Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). Was he threatening the city with violence? If so, it would have been believable. Albrecht was ruler of neighboring Inner Austria (Vorderösterreich) and had recently been battling with Zürich against the rest of the Swiss Confederacy, until peace was concluded in Constance in June 1446.

Albrecht’s negotiations or threats were effective, and the imprisoned Jews were released in 1448. This time, the city does not appear to have paid a fine or received any payment from the

13 Kaiser Maximillian I, Friedrich’s son and successor, would later formalize this relationship between cities and the empire by allowing governments to pay for the privilege of not having Jews in their domains (Mentgen 2006, 381).
Jews, and neither did King Friedrich extort anything from the Jews. However, the price of Jews’ release was that they sell their assets and property (Overdick 1965, 59). Forcing the Jews to liquidate their possessions would have compelled Jews to accept low prices and put Christian buyers at an advantage, so Christian residents certainly still benefitted personally from this racket. The city did not officially expel Jews, but the negotiated outcome was that Jews moved to Albrecht’s lands (Overdick 1965, 59; M. Wenninger 1981, 113) because he now “protected” them.

The crux of the situation was the city’s relationship with the empire, and through the empire the city’s relationship to the resident Jews. Surely the city should have recognized in 1390 that Jews were a financial asset for the emperor to manipulate, both to rid himself of some debts and to extract taxes to repay others (Hagen 2018, 229). The events of 1430 brought the communal risk of Jewish residents more into focus. For uncertain reasons, the city put half-hearted effort toward expulsion after 1430, and Jews began to emigrate. The city tightened Jews’ rights, even as Jews contributed less and less to commercial activity and city taxes. Although the city government removed Jews from the civic community via imprisonment in 1443, the city still did not formally expel Jews. Instead, civic leaders bargained with the emperor, because his authority and intervention was what was truly at stake. It was the empire’s move to withdraw Jews from Constance, since the city has lost confidence that they would or could contribute to the communal good.

4.4. IMPLICATIONS

In this paper I have traced medieval political and economic developments in the independent city of Constance and how these shaped the city’s relationship with Jews. The social history of Constance from the fourteenth into the fifteenth centuries was a history of struggle for
cooperation and social solidarity as material and social contexts changed in the city. Despite having material and ideological conditions that might have triggered the exclusion of Jews, the city government never actually expelled Jews. The city did take action to exclude the Jews as some of these factors waned but questions over the governance of Jews emerged.

To paraphrase Tolstoy, every ethnic boundary is fractious in its own way. The relationship between Jews and Christians in Constance was lacking notable dynamics that frequently occur in other ethnic boundaries, but their absence here is illuminating about the process of exclusion. In Constance, there never was an economic threat or a worry among Christians about Jews gaining too much social esteem. The city sought Jewish residents as a commercial supplement, and Jews remained ancillary. Though particular classes directed political activity at restricting Jews, they did so as part of broader struggles among Christians about governance and the right allocation of rights and responsibilities. Economic and political grievances were blamed on segments of the Christian population, not on Jews. The structuralist explanation of exclusion does not fit with this case.

Likewise, Constance Christians did not decry Jews as a cultural threat that undermine faith and Christian community in the city, even though the most important Christian thinkers of the time gathered in the city to debate exactly that. Antisemitic restrictions were not triggered by antisemitic preaching, which does not appear in any of the sources consulted. Among the general population, guilds organized religious life (Joos 1968; Ogilvie 2019; Richardson 2005), but we have no impressions that some guilds were especially antisemitic, even though the second 1430 imprisonment was led by two lesser guilds. There do not appear to be upswells of popular piety
that agitated against Jewish neighbors, and, unlike in other towns, there is no evidence that Christians converted the left-behind synagogue or other properties into Christian religious spaces (Creasman 2002; Minty 1996). Recorded antisemitic violence surfaces only after nearby ritual murder accusations. While Jews were understood to be different, they weren’t different in ways that really mattered until the late 1420s and especially after the 1430 arbitration changed the relationship between Jews and the city, as well as between the city and the emperor. The evidence does not support the constructivist theory for how exclusion would increase, at least not in its typical form.

The civic community was in the midst of a group-making process (Brubaker 2002; 2004), but it was secondarily related to excluding Jews and primarily related to the city commune. Within the city, different groups had different obligations in order to access rights and joint goods like security. The rich guildsmen and gentry earned distrust, and the city denied them rights and security in 1429, even expelling some of them. This was an important precedent for the city government’s 1431 decree expelling Jews. Christians became uncertain about whether the city government could appropriately regulate Jews and whether Jews would continue to perform their civic obligations (Hechter 1987) – because they were uncertain about what the emperor would do to or via Jews. In this way, the case of the Constance Jews underscores Wimmer’s admonishment that we “disentangl[e]…ethnic and nonethnic processes” (2013, 6) in changing ethnic boundaries. In Constance, an ethnic process that resulted in the institutional exclusion of Jews was embedded in a broader nonethnic process.

Voigtländer and Voth (2012) do not record a Judensau image in Constance. Rothkrug (1980) records one local saint shrine, established prior to 1000, and one Marian shrine erected in 1350-1530. Notably, the Council of Constance was held in the Constanceer Münster, the city cathedral whose full name is the Cathedral of Our Lady of Constance; the Virgin Mary is the patron saint of the church.
I expect that similar dynamics played out across European cities. In Erfurt in 1453, the city government denied Jews civic rights to protection and legal standing (Endermann 2010; Lämmerhirt 2010; Maimon, Breuer, and Guggenheim 1987). Jews petitioned the imperial court for a restoration of their rights, but ultimately the city Rat negotiated with their overlord the Archbishop of Mainz for expulsion into nearby villages in 1458. Antisemitic preaching by papal legate Nicholas of Cusa in 1451-1452 no doubt played a role in shifting opinion that Jews were untrustworthy citizens, but it is important to note that the city’s remedy was political exclusion. Jews in Erfurt were treated in the same way that Constance treated Christian elites, with the denial of rights and political dissociation. Both Constance and Erfurt were well-established cities of some independence, and this independence was somewhat of a requisite for expulsion. Small dependencies simply did not have the political standing to enact and enforce restrictions on Jews. Certainly many cities in Italy, Spain, and German lands did have the political capability, though, and did pursue local restrictions.

Similarly, questioning whether minority group members can be effectively monitored and sanctioned leads majority group members in contemporary societies on a path to institutional exclusion. One somewhat obvious case comes to mind for the United States: voting identity laws (DeMora, Collingwood, and Ninci 2019; Hicks et al. 2015). While racism is the guiding ethic of such restrictions, its codification is the result of distrust related to publicized claims that minority group members are distorting elections and therefore distorting governance. The election of Barack Obama and the perception that minority voters benefitted unduly convinced some White voters and officials that voting restrictions like required identification were a solution to preserve collective goods like military defense and legitimate use of the social safety net. The new laws discriminate in ways meant to resolve perceived failures of surveillance of minority groups.
Many stories are told about why governments exclude minority groups. This study demonstrates that functionalist theories stressing exploitation are insufficient. Social structural change had more direct connection to the institutionalization of exclusion by creating a nonethnic process that drew attention to the ethnic boundary, but it did not itself prompt expulsion. Antisemitic events created opportunities for change, but again were not sufficient and not directly implicated in the actual process that removed Jews in 1448. Ultimately, Jews were removed from Constance because the civic regime could not effectively govern them.
5. CONCLUSION

The ethnic conflict literature suffers from a common assumption: that ethnoracial exclusion and violence is the result of conflict between different ethnoracial groups. While some conflicts are between a majority and a minority group, in many other cases the minority group is too powerless to actually participate in conflict. In these settings, it is irresponsible to paint a picture of the minority group as having any reasonable options for counter-mobilization or oppositional threat. These groups cannot realistically initiate, sustain, or resolve violence. Instead, action and agency are monopolized by the majority group. To understand violence and exclusion in these cases, we have to look at what is happening within the majority group to change the importance or content of the social boundary.

The root of the problem is the difference between conceptualizing of conflict as something that occurs between parties versus something that occurs about parties. When political contests are between parties, the sociological focus might be on political opportunities, an imbalance of resources, proportional representation, and more. This conception draws us to questions, cases, and explanations that presuppose and reinforce a majority-minority dichotomy. We end up writing about different sides to a conflict as an exercise in describing a social boundary and why it exists.

If instead we conceive of conflict as about parties, we uncouple the conflict from the boundary and can look at each separately in order to better understand their union. Then we are not bound to think of whatever ethnoracial boundary regulates the most dramatic exclusion as the most important cleavage in society, and indeed we do not need to define the conflict as having any ethnic division at its heart. We become free to examine how a conflict becomes about a minority group even when that minority group is not party to the conflict.
Decoupling the conflict from the social boundary opens new angles to understand the relationship between the conflict and the minority group. If the minority group is not an active participant in the conflict, then who is? We can apply theories of competition, opposition, and mobilization to the ethnoracial majority group, looking at the fault lines and factions within the majority group. We already have theories about elite conflict, about interest groups, about resource mobilization, and political opportunity. These theories help us understand how different groups within the ethnoracial majority jockey for position, power, and control. In this dissertation, I introduce exclusion and violence into this realm. Who benefits from manipulating the social boundary, and how? What social processes provide an opportunity for manipulating the social boundary?

5.1. SUMMARY

This dissertation is composed of three interrelated studies whose analyses provide multiple, reinforcing views. I designed the project not to add another historical account of the ethnoreligious boundary between Christians and Jews but to demonstrate how the exclusion of Jews was part of phenomena bigger than ethnic competition or antagonism. Chapter 2 looks at the structures that endogenize inter-group conflict. Chapter 3 considers meso-level relational factors outside a local social ecosystem. Chapter 4 contextualizes institutional antisemitism in one city’s political and economic development.

For the case of Jews in medieval German cities, expulsions became more common in the fifteenth century as part of parallel processes of territorialization and religious reform. In Chapter 2 explores local political economy, in terms of specific political and economic institutions. What was governance like, and what was at stake, in medieval German cities? How was that related to expulsions? I show that the relational structure of political power between Christian elites could
insulate or expose Jewish communities to political contests of the time. Jews were derided, lesser members of Christian society, but in spite of increasing focus on Christian piety and legislating community purity, most cities did not expel their Jewish residents. City rulers that did expel were attempting to solve challenges for dominion and authority through their policies towards Jews.

Just as in today’s world, what happened in a city was not independent of what was going on around it. Cities’ political conflicts might be linked because cities faced similar political and economic issues, because they were peers in the status hierarchies of the Holy Roman Empire, or more simply because they were neighbors whose decisions affected each other. The idea of expulsion could spread along any of these links. In Chapter 3, I find that, factually, expulsion did not spread, or at least not very widely. Temporal and spatial trends indicate that expulsions in politically and economically powerful cities spurred expulsions generally but suppressed them nearby. This reinforces the idea from Chapter 2 that expulsions became more common because of new political conflicts over urban authority. The adoption of expulsion followed political and economic incentives that were embedded in inter-city relationships, particularly after theological changes gave expulsion fresh political value. Social interdependence can spur as well as squelch racial extremism.

Expulsion was not inevitable, as the history of Constance illustrates in Chapter 4. Jews ultimately left the city at the intervention of the emperor and his brother. The city had persistently included Jews despite religious ideas to the contrary and a long history of popular uprisings. Public agitation eventually directed some effort at antisemitism, but not independently of other conflicts among Christians. This closer look at a single city shows some of the same dynamics uncovered in the quantitative chapters. First, Constance exhibits conflict among Christian factions over rights and governance. The failed expulsion of 1431 was inextricably
linked to factional conflict. Second, the city government’s quest for autonomy, particularly from
the emperor, guided the actions leaders took to exclude Jews. Imperial meddling and overreach
turned the government against their Jewish neighbors. Exclusion in Constance was part of other
political process and not an end in itself.

5.2. IMPLICATIONS

Medieval Jews were mostly powerless to stop expulsions that displaced thousands of
them from dozens of German cities, just as they were powerless to contribute to political
conflicts that caused the expulsions. These conflicts were about bigger issues in Christian
society. Jews were caught up in struggles about power and prosperity.

It is not difficult to see parallels in the contemporary world. In Europe, social science
researchers have been studying similarities between far-right parties in the past decade, trying to
understand what is driving the increase in these groups. As I found with looking at whether the
Council of Constance created new social meaning about Jews, events like terrorist violence, the
2008 financial crash, or the migrant crisis can create political opportunities for ethnoracial
exclusion because they initiate new social meanings about minority groups and their place in
society.

Beyond ideology and opportunity, governments face incentives and disincentives for
exclusion that are shaped by the distribution of political and economic power. In medieval
Germany, expulsion spread among autonomy-hungry cities. Likewise, some European political
parties are combining anti-EU arguments about autonomy with Islamophobia and anti-migrant
political stances. In the US South during and after the Reconstruction era, anti-Black violence
and exclusion was not only a matter of local racism but also against the intervention of the
federal government, and the forms of exclusion were influenced by political and economic
interests. In the US today, I think of “sanctuary city” policies and non-cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Bigger cities that are more politically and economically autonomous are the ones defying the federal government.

5.3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The research in this dissertation should inspire further tests of the connections between political power, economic power, and ethnoreligious difference in the midst of struggles over the proper moral social order. At the very least, now that I have built this dataset on medieval antisemitism, I or others can explore other more questions about the medieval treatment of Jews, including how persecution was related to short-term, medium-term, and long-term social and economic outcomes. My conclusions about medieval antisemitic exclusion direct attention to two specific areas. First, future research should develop a better understanding of the connection between urban uprisings and expulsion, restriction, or pogroms. My study of Constance is a first step in this direction. Sociological theories of social closure, ethnic antagonism, and class-based political mobilization can be the intellectual guide. Public agitation is often directed at minority groups. Minority groups serve as scapegoats for both common folk and elites, and their persecution diverts pressure from elites. How did urban unrest affect religious symbolic boundaries? Did cities with growing—often class-based—unrest expel or otherwise persecute Jews? If so, there are three trajectories that allude to different interactions between political capacity and protester demands. First, if contention continued after expulsion, this is evidence that the complaints were about the social order generally and not Jews in particular. Second, if unrest calmed after expulsion without significant other social change, we can understand that the unrest truly was about difference and anti-Semitism. Third, pressure for ethnic cleansing may have dissipated if agitators’ demands for political change and economic change were met.
Another research effort should concern stratification, migration, and the economic integration of Jews in Christian Europe. The treatment of minority groups is often caught up in broader political and economic dynamics. There is an endogenous reason for this: communities that draw in migration from minority groups can be economically different from other communities. Were medieval Jews residents of more economically unequal cities, where stratified markets created demand for Jews to provide commercial services and goods to the lower end of the market? Did Jewish migration affect receiving cities' economic inequality? If Jews were massacred or expelled, how did inequality change in their absence? Research on these and similar questions will bring overdue attention to evaluating economic historians’ assumptions about the economic role and position of medieval Jews.
A. APPENDICES

A.1. CHAPTER 2: DETAILS OF BAYESIAN LOGISTIC REGRESSION

In this study, Bayesian generalized linear mixed models provide advantages over frequentist linear models. Bayesian models are joint probability models for all variables. Incorporating prior distributions into the estimation builds in some variability that may not be represented in the specific observations in a sample. Ultimately, this produces results based on more information than traditional regression. In this case, the results are more precise and reliable. To specify and estimate the hierarchical Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian logistic regression model, I use the rstanarm package 2.13.1 (Stan Development Team 2018b) in R. Following the advice of the Stan Development Team (2018a), Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, and Su (2008), and Betancourt (2017), I use weakly informative priors, the Student’s t distribution (df=7, scale=2.5). All five chains converged and mixed well. For converged models, the potential scale reduction factor \( \hat{R} \) for each variable in the model should be is less than 1.05, and the values for this model are all less than 1.01. Full results for posterior distributions are in table A.1, with model details and convergence information in tables A.2 and A.3. Pareto-smoothed importance sampling leave-one-out cross-validation (PSIS-LOO) and period-stratified exact K-fold validation, implemented through the loo package for R (Vehtari et al. 2018; Vehtari, Gelman, and Gabry 2017), confirms that the posterior distributions are stable to iterative omissions of observations and reestimation (all Pareto \( k < 0.7 \)).
Table A.1 Results from Bayesian Logistic Regression

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Note. Continuous variables were scaled prior to estimation to the distribution mean = 0, sd = 2.5.

### Table A.2 Model Statistics: Step Size and Divergence

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### Table A.3 Model Statistics: Effective Sample Sizes

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A.2.  CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION

This study relies mostly on data contained in *Geschichte der Juden im Mittelalter von der Nordsee bis zu den Südalpen* (Haverkamp 2002). This three-volume work was produced by a team of historians, led by Alfred Haverkamp, under a grant from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) to complete a historiographical summary and update on the history of Jews in the region of the Meuse and Rhine Rivers, 1000-1520 CE. The project revisited the first efforts to do so, begun a century previously and published in three volumes as *Germania Judaica*.

### A.2.1. Jewish settlement and persecutions

The second volume of *Geschichte der Juden* is a city catalog that systematically describes Jewish settlement, persecutions, city dominion, and city infrastructure in numbered lists, annotated with sources. City dominion and infrastructure data came from the *Deutsches Städtebuch* (Keyser and Stooob 1939-1974), another multivolume work of historical detail on regional development. I digitized the city catalog through data entry. As written, the catalog assigns dates in periods, since it can be difficult to date medieval histories to specific years. To convert these periods to annual observations, I follow a few procedures. When settlement dates are known, I include all years between a first known year and a last known year, excepting any

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known disruptions due to persecutions or expulsions. Where arrival is uncertain, if Jewish settlement in a town is only apparent because of a pogrom or expulsion, I add the three prior years. If arrival date is uncertain but settlement is evidenced within a period, such as through the undated erection of a synagogue, I use the first year of the period. For expulsions, I discard possible expulsions with “uncertain” evidence and expulsions without any dating to a year or range of years. Ranges occur when dating can be made relative to other dated events or when it is unclear what system a primary source uses to number months. In medieval Europe, some counted the new year and first month from December 25, and others counted from March 25. For expulsions dated to a range of years, I code the expulsion to the first year given. I follow the same procedures to record pogroms and therefore create sums of prior persecutions and expulsions.

A.2.2. Domestic conditions

To assign city dominion, I recorded a dataset of dominion as spells for each city, with start and end years and dominion parties. From the dominion parties, I coded whether dominion was held (or shared) by the emperor, princes, bishops, archbishops, and more, or whether the city held rights of self-government and was therefore a free city. I transformed this spell-based data into an annual table of the specific parties and party types for each year for each city. From this I can construct the counts of expulsions under different types of rulers.

To measure city economic and political institutions, I assign their presence for all years in a period in which they are evidenced, or from the year of their first evidence, and all successive years, unless it is recorded that they were changed, removed, or otherwise no longer existent. For Jewish community development, I similarly assign the presence of a cemetery, mikveh, or Jewish quarter for all years in a period in which they are evidenced, or from the year of their first
evidence, and all successive years, unless it is recorded that they were destroyed or otherwise no longer existent. I include Jewish quarters in this list because they were originally a requested feature of Jewish urban life, to facilitate keeping the Sabbath and to make space more defensible (Haverkamp 1995).

For membership in regional alliances, I recreated Distler’s (2006) table of regional alliances. I reorganized it from treaty-based observations with a list of parties to treaty-party observations that list a single party, a single year, and a single treaty. From here I could code whether each city participated in an alliance treaty in a year (and how many) and calculate how many prior alliances the city had participated in.

A.2.3. Spatial relationships

The first volume of Geschichte der Juden, and one of its improvements over Germania Judaica, contains maps produced in the early cartographic software Freehand. The digital files and their metadata are not available, nearly 20 years after their production. I digitized and georeferenced the maps in QGIS to gather city locations; duplicate names and otherwise-lost locations of historical cities make these maps vital for any spatial analyses. The maps appear to be created using the German Gauss-Krüger projection. For this study, the data were reprojected to the Lambert azimuthal equal area projection for Europe based on the European Terrestrial System 1989 (ETRS89), code EPSG:3035 (unit: meters). A Lambert azimuthal equal area projection preserves both distance and direction better than other map projections. The continent-scale projection is necessary because the study area is geographically large. Because distance accuracy and intelligibility are vital for this analysis, EPSG:3035 is the best map projection choice. All spatial calculations are performed using this projection and transformed into kilometers.
I obtain distances between cities along river and road travel routes. Bossak and Welford (2015) shared the data they collected of pilgrimage routes. I transformed these routes, composed of geolocated city sequences, into segmented lines. For water-based travel routes, I downloaded the Natural Earth rivers and lake centerlines (10 meter resolution) with scale ranks. Prior to spatial calculations, I preprocessed the pilgrimate routes and river courses in QGIS. I completed a spatial dissolve, added vertices at intersections, and snapped the city locations onto the network at the nearest route. Then I used the riverdist R package (Tyers 2017) and its riverdistancemat function to calculate distances between each city and all other cities along the network. For accuracy, since not all cities were located close to a transit route, I augmented the inter-city distances by adding in the distances between actual city locations and their network-snapped locations.

Hypotheses indicated that expelling cities should be closer to each other than what random spatial distribution of expulsions would predict. Investigating spatial autocorrelation of expulsions is also a pre-regression best practice (Kelly 2019). The unit of analysis here is cities, which are located at spatial points. If the units of analysis were spatial regions, I might use Moran’s $i$ to measure spatial autocorrelation (Tiefelsdorf 2000). Instead, I performed a Monte Carlo test of average nearest neighbors. I simulated 1000 random assignments of whether a city ever expelled, maintaining the overall number of expelling cities within each simulation. Figure A.1 shows the outcomes of the simulations compared to the observed average distance to a city’s nearest neighbor. The observed average nearest expelling neighbor is 28.99 kilometers away. The observed distance is below 86.7% of the simulated neighbor distances. This does not provide evidence that the distribution of expulsions is non-random. Among non-expelling cities, the observed average nearest neighbor is 13.56 kilometers away. In these simulations, the observed
distance is below 67.9% of the simulated neighbor distances. We cannot conclude that the distribution of non-expulsions is non-random.

![Figure A.1 Comparing the Observed and Simulated Distributions of First Nearest Neighbors](image)

Note. Dotted lines are the observed mean distance to the nearest same-outcome neighbor.

A.3. CHAPTER 3: BAYESIAN EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSES: ROBUSTNESS

To test my trust in the main results, I completed series of additional analyses as robustness checks. First, I examined whether economic shocks, as a result of climate variation and the resulting fluctuation in agricultural production, contributed to patterns in expulsions. Second, I revisited the main results and adjusted the time lag from 10 years to 5 years and to 20 years.

Other research has concluded that poor harvests (Behringer 1995; 1999; Oster 2004) led to violent scapegoating of Jewish communities (Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama 2017) in medieval and early modern Europe. Such a pattern might hide within the temporal and
spatiotemporal measures I have used, as it would have both temporal and geographic dimensions. To rule out this alternative, I imitate how Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama (2017) investigate poor harvests, using annual growing season (March-September) temperatures. I rely on the Community Climate Systems Model 4.0 (CCSM4.0) monthly climate retrodictions (Landrum et al. 2012) produced by the U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research for 800-1800CE. Unlike the Guiot, Corona, and ESCARSEL Members (Guiot, Corona, and Members 2010) retrodictions some use, the CCSM4.0 retrodictions cover the entire European continent, including the Alps. I extract the mean monthly temperatures (Celsius) for each city for March through September for each year and average them, then lag the temperature measures one year (min=6.95, max=18.88, mean=13.99, median=14.11, sd=1.26). As with other continuous variables, I rescale the temperature lags to a distribution centered on 0 with a standard deviation of 0.5 prior to including this variable in the model. Reanalysis with growing season temperature variation (table A.4) does not change the main results, and there is no relationship between temperature and expulsion.

As a last step, I returned to the original model specifications. In the main analyses, diffusion measures were calculated by using counts of expulsions in the prior 10 years. I recalculated the diffusion measures for two alternative spans: 5 years and 20 years. Table A.5 displays descriptive statistics for these variables. I reestimated model 4 using each of these variations (see table A.6). Using a 5-year span, the temporal and spatial diffusion effects disappear, except distance from Constance. Instead, the 15-year time period dummies soak up the temporal variation in expulsions. One change using the 20-year span is that in model B3, the spatial suppression effect seen originally only among free and imperial cities is evident for episcopal cities as well. Ten years appears to be a sensitive enough temporal lag.
Table A.4 Results of Reanalysis for Climactic Impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(B1)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing Season Temperature</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (10-yr, episcopal)</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (10-yr, free/imperial)</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij3}$ (10-yr, episcopal)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij3}$ (10-yr, free/imperial)</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (episc.) * episc.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (free/imp.) * free/imp.</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Km to Constance</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free or imperial</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of dominion parties</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schöffen</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market development</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign moneylenders</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish community development</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total previous persecutions</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total previous expulsions</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Intercept</td>
<td>-10.17</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Random Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-posterior</td>
<td>-2979.05</td>
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*Note.* Continuous variables were scaled prior to estimation to the distribution mean = 0, sd = 2.5.
Table A.5 Descriptive Statistics: Diffusion Measures for Alternate Time Lags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 Years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_2$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_2$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_3$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_3$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20 years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_2$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_2$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_3$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_i f_3$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.6 Results of Reanalysis with a Five-year Lag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(B2)</th>
<th></th>
<th>(B3)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij3}$ (episcopal)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij3}$ (free/imperial)</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (episc.) * episc.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ij2}$ (free/imp.) * free/imp.</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Km to Constance</td>
<td>-1.08</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free or imperial</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of dominion parties</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schöffen</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market development</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign moneylenders</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish community development</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total previous persecutions</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total previous expulsions</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Intercept</td>
<td>-9.88</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>-10.4</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Random Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-posterior</td>
<td>-2985.23</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2980.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Continuous variables were scaled prior to estimation to the distribution mean = 0, sd = 2.5.
REFERENCES


