Somaliland and Taiwan,
Unrecognized Sovereignty and Patron-Client State Relations

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Beyond the seemingly singular category of sovereign states lies a number of what might be called unrecognized states, semi-states, quasi-states, para-states, and on. No matter the verbiage, all point to the same issue: a territory claiming statehood and exercising de facto power, but lacking international recognition of sovereignty. A well-known example of such a state would be Taiwan, another would be Somaliland. This paper has two aims. The first is an exploration of Somaliland’s sovereignty, and the idea of state sovereignty itself. The second inquiry asks how unrecognized states can strive for acknowledgement and presence on the world stage, if sidelined from formal diplomatic state-to-state relations. Specifically, the paper explores if Somaliland can follow the same path that Taiwan took in achieving an elevated level of international interaction, despite lacking international legal sovereignty. American influence and contribution to Taiwan, what this paper calls patron-client state relations, was and is instrumental to Taiwan’s position. Ultimately, this paper suggests that under current conditions, a patron state will not emerge for Somaliland and that Taiwan’s successful maneuvering of its patron-client state relationship is bound to the specificities of its context and time period.
Introduction

If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it’s probably a duck. Easy, straight forward, commonsensical, most would agree this familiar saying’s lesson to be uncontroversial. If a territory looks like a state, governs like a state, and acts like a state, is it a sovereign state? This is harder to say. Beyond the seemingly singular category of sovereign states lies a number of what might be called unrecognized states, semi-states, quasi-states, para-states, and on. No matter the verbiage, all point to the same issue: a territory claiming statehood and exercising de facto power, but lacking international recognition of sovereignty. A well-known example of such a state would be Taiwan. Seas away and less famous, Somaliland, the northernmost region of internationally recognized Somalia, grapples with the same conundrum of nonrecognition. On July 1st, 2020, Somaliland and Taiwan announced bilateral relations. The Taiwan Representative Office was opened in Somaliland’s capital city Hargeisa on August 17th, and the Somaliland Representative Office opened in Taipei on September 9th. While the dedication of new office space is not your typical piece of juicy international news, this development might make one ask, what are these two supposed non-sovereign states doing, acting very much as sovereign states?

This paper has two aims. The first is an exploration of Somaliland’s sovereignty, and the idea of state sovereignty itself. Shackled to the infamous failed state of Somalia, what is going on with the success story that is Somaliland? How can one be demonstrably sovereign, while unrecognized as such? The second inquiry asks how unrecognized states can strive for acknowledgement and presence on the world stage, if sidelined from formal diplomatic state-to-
state relations. As a prosperous and well known unrecognized state, can Taiwan be used as case study to suggest a course of action for Somaliland’s own progress?

The composition of this paper is as follows: First, an outline of Somaliland’s history, to provide relevant context on present-day Somaliland. Following, I provide key theoretical concepts on sovereignty and statehood, so that we may understand Somaliland and Taiwan’s position when using the primary measurements of statehood. I then question the true need for international legal sovereignty for Somaliland, why or why not? From here I turn to the paper’s second inquiry, outlining how Taiwan has gotten to where it is, a contested state in official international law, but with widespread unspoken understanding of its legitimate statehood as only being limited by political demands. And lastly, with Taiwan’s path laid out, could Somaliland copy the Taiwan method, why or why not?

Two points of this project should be addressed. First, Somaliland and Taiwan’s shared status as an unrecognized state is likely their largest commonality. The two are different – in history, geography, economy, culture, religion, regional geopolitics, struggle against their “parent state,” and more. But, a comparative project is not unworthy simply due to difference. To be sure, attempts to map out strategies of one further-along country and superimpose it onto another are commonplace. It is my hope that despite their variance, looking at the two in association may assist my understanding of state formation, unrecognized state status, alternative forms of development outside sovereign state diplomacy, and indeed, to push against the primacy of sovereign states as the only habitable political categorization.
The second point needing qualification is my expectation that neither Somaliland nor Taiwan will achieve independent statehood anytime in the near future. The reason for Taiwan’s stalemate is obvious, as Chinese leadership has repeatedly made it emphatically clear that it will not allow for Taiwan independence. For Somaliland, I make the assumption for a few reasons. Evidence from the 20th century, when the number of states quadrupled with the addition of 150 new countries, suggests that new state birth tends to happen in waves. During the 20th century, there were four waves of new state formation. The first two coincided with the end of the two World Wars, the third happened during the era of decolonialization from the 50s through the 70s, and the breakup of Yugoslavia and the USSR during the early 1990s made the fourth wave. Currently, there is no major conflict suggesting the creation of a new cohort of states of which Somaliland would be part of. Additionally, it’s possible that Somaliland might have had more steam in securing independence during the early 2000s. I will expand on this thought in the following section.

This paper concludes that while a patron-client state relationship between the US and Taiwan greatly assisted Taiwan in the face of its unrecognized sovereignty, a similar relationship for Somaliland is unlikely to occur. While I find that the UAE is the most likely potential patron state for Somaliland, ultimately, the relationship will not attain greater heights. The reason for this is that there are no oppositional alternatives to UAE power in Somaliland, which demotivates the UAE to act in any large and committed fashion. Despite this, Somaliland, and Taiwan, will continue to be sovereign in all but legal designation.

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Somaliland

Somaliland, an unrecognized state despite its three decades of demonstrated good governance and political stability, is located in the very northwestern portion of Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory. Somaliland shares a southern border with Ethiopia, a western border with Djibouti, and to the east is Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia with sticky territory disputes with Somaliland. Somaliland has a population of about three and a half million, and covers about 137,600 square kilometers. This makes Somaliland larger than its two close neighbors, Djibouti and Eritrea, in both geographic size and population. Hargeisa is the capital city and hub of Somaliland, and the port of Berbera is of primary importance in Somaliland’s economy. Somaliland has its own passports, currency, military, flag, national anthem, governance structure, and all the markings of a functioning state. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, following the collapse of the state, and has since “established a functioning central government, a bi-cameral parliament, an independent judiciary, a national army, a working tax system, and – most importantly – has organized several democratic, multi-party elections.”

Somaliland is also relatively peaceful. Since 1996, when Somaliland’s internal conflict concerning post-independence leadership ended, it has experienced around 1 percent of fatalities from conflict of those that were suffered in the rest of Somalia. For all intents and purposes, Somaliland is a sovereign state responsible toward its citizenry, and wishes to be recognized as such. However, Somalia is unwilling to grant independence to the region and Somaliland remains internationally unrecognized to this day.

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3 Jakša, 176.
To understand the present day sovereignty dispute between Somaliland and Somalia, it’s necessary to cover their separate colonial histories, combined post-independence experience, and diverged realities since the deposition of the Barre regime. Somaliland was a former British Protectorate, with the rest of Somalia formerly an Italian Trust Territory. British Somaliland gained independence on June 26th, 1960, and Italian Somaliland followed suite 5 days later on July 1st, 1960. These 5 days of independent statehood, when 34 member states of the UN and the UN Security Council recognized Somaliland sovereignty, would later come to form a pillar in Somaliland’s independence discourse. Buoyed by the prospect of self-determination and the idea of a pan-Somali “Greater Somalia” state, the two then entered into union to form present day Somalia. The legal processes during unification were not well attended to. The two pivotal bilateral agreements, the Act of Union of Somalia, and the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law, were not signed as postulated. No single Act of Union was signed between the two parties, instead, two separate acts of union were approved by the Northern and Southern assemblies, neither being ratified by the other. Less than a year later, “a referendum was held to approve the provisional constitution under which the two ex-colonial territories had united at independence. Of the mere 100,000 in the north who voted on this issue half rejected the constitution, whereas in the south it was strongly supported.”

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mismanagement, are indicative of the political dynamic to come. With the central government installed in Mogadishu, Somalia’s north was largely marginalized in political practice.9 10

If the north was initially sidelined, the union took a turn for the worse when General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power via a coup in 1969, kickstarting years of repressive authoritarian rule. Barre’s incitement of the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977 became a major factor in the collapse of the Somali state and Somaliland’s move to disentangle itself.11 Home to ethnic Somalis, acquiring the Ogaden region of east Ethiopia would have been a step in realizing “Greater Somalia.” Somalia’s defeat signaled the end of this dream, as Ogaden was not the only region of ethnic Somalis needing recovery, with areas of northern Kenya and eastern Djibouti being of issue as well. Occurring in lockstep, Djibouti had rejected unification with Somalia by referendum that same year.12 Not only was the pan-Somali ideological justification for Somaliland and Somalia’s union lost, but the army and economy were both left in shreds. Exacerbating the tense situation further, the war resulted in a refugee crisis, and around four thousand refugee resettled into the Somaliland region. This caused great discomfort to many Somalilanders, as the newcomers were closely aligned with the Barre regime and received an imbalanced number of civil service positions and aid deliveries.13 Opposition to the Barre regime began to mobilize as these factors accumulated in force.

9 Bryden, 343.
11 Jakša, 173.
12 Poore, 127.
13 Poore, 127.
Among the opposition groups was the Somali National Movement (SNM), born from support of the Isaaq clan which calls Somaliland home. During the decade of the 1980s, in the attempt to squash assembling resistance, the Barre regime began to systemically persecute the Isaaq clan. This persecution of the northern Isaaq clan was ruthless enough to be considered genocidal, and eventually provoked the SNM to launch an unsuccessful offensive against Barre’s forces based in the Northwest in 1988. Barre’s counter was brutal, descending on Hargeisa “with a ground and aerial assault that killed up to 50,000 civilians and destroyed most of the physical infrastructure in the cities of Hargeysa and Burco.” In 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC), a different opposition group, gained control over Mogadishu and ousted Barre, who fled to take refuge in Nigeria. The resulting power vacuum led to intense conflict between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and the self-appointed President, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, and resulted in a full-blown civil war over Mogadishu. It was at this time that the SNM and elders of the northern clans unilaterally declared independence for the Republic of Somaliland in 1991. In 2001, a referendum was held in Somaliland where 97.1% of the voters supported independence.

The factors outlined above - Somaliland’s separate colonial history, five days of independence, voluntary union, bungled unification procedures and legalities, insignificant political representation in Somalia’s politics, Barre’s tyranny of the Isaaq clan, and nonexistent governance capability of Somalia post-Barre - are all central tenets deployed in argument for Somaliland’s independence. Many authors and scholars are sympathetic to Somaliland’s claim of independence, seeing as Somaliland meets most of the common criteria defining state sovereignty.

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14 Poore, 128-129.
15 Philips, 5.
16 Ahere, 30.
The turn of the century was arguably the most opportune time in Somaliland’s reach for independent sovereignty. After a decade of governance, the presidential election of 2003 was a pivotal proving point on the maturity of Somaliland politics. After an extremely narrow victory of less than 100 votes, presidential power switched not only to the opposition party, but to a non-Isaaq minority ethnic group. Following constitutional law, contestation of the close run election was settled via the Supreme Court and election results upheld without an outbreak of violence. Just two years later and famous to all who have explored the issue of Somaliland independence, the AU Fact Finding Mission to Somaliland in spring of 2005 added further momentum. The conclusion was a positive one, suggesting special consideration for the case of Somaliland independence and judgement to be made “from an objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-vis the aspirations of the people”. Following this development, then President Dahir Rayale Kahin formally presented the case for Somaliland’s independence to the AU in December 2005. There has been little activity directly concerning Somaliland’s independence since then, with the most recent gain being the establishment of bilateral relations with Taiwan.

**Theory on Statehood and Sovereignty**

Somaliland and Taiwan are both unrecognized states, but, what is a state? Common international law agrees that the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States presents the most recurrent definition of what a state is, declaring that a state is defined by possessing (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, (4) the capacity

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19 Phillips, 64.
to enter into relations with other states. No matter the criticism concerning the Montevideo Convention’s deficits, being overly inclusive, overly exclusive, outdated, it continues to stand as highly important and foundational towards any discussion on the definition of a state. It’s a satisfyingly straightforward and rational conception of statehood, formulaically suggesting that A + B + C + D = Statehood. And if the Montevideo definition is followed, both Somaliland and Taiwan meet said requirements to qualify as states. However, reality is hardly so simple.

The two dominant theories on statehood in international law are the declaratory theory and the constitutive theory. Declaratory theory focuses on internal legitimacy, suggesting that a state is a such when meeting the 4 criteria listed above. Upon demonstrating the requisite factors, one’s state status can then be declared. The Montevideo definition of state is the most famous example of the declaratory theory of statehood. In contrast, the constitutive theory focuses on external recognition. This model suggests that a state cannot be such until other states recognizes it, and therefore admits it into statehood. Statehood is constituted by its members. The declaratory theory works as an objective grant of recognition, whereas the constitutive theory is a political grant of recognition.

It is not difficult to understand that neither theories of statehood are sufficient on their own to accurately represent legitimate statehood, as it must be the combination of both internal

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23 Lalos, 799.
legitimacy and external recognition for the practical realization of a state. Without external recognition, a so-called state could illegitimately come to be, without buy-in or consent from its counterparts in the international circuit. Indeed, this is the view of some parent states rejecting the efforts of their rebellious “secessionist” regions. But without internal legitimacy, a so-called state can be propped up by international peers even if governance at home is a total farce. Somalia could said to be once such case. Another example took place in 2011, when “the British government considered recognizing the rebel forces fighting the Gaddafi regime in Libya in order to provide them access to Libyan state assets in British banks. This situation was farcical as the rebels held none of the regularly accepted criteria for statehood.”

While the declaratory model could be said to be more just in its empirical standard, the constitutive model is more reflective of our political reality, which is rarely impartial and neutral. Our international system is a social relationship. An apt metaphor to describe our state system could be that of a sorority or fraternity. A student may wear clothing with Greek letters on it, participate in common Greek life practices, live on Greek row, attend all events hosted by Greek life, be the child of parents with Greek membership, but until they are initiated as a pledge, they are not a house member and cannot access insider Greek life perks exclusive to members. And just as in any social relationship, there are codes of conduct to gain friends and prevent ostracization. The Westphalian state system presents the “rules” of our state system. The edict is simple: a state shall have exclusive sovereignty over their land. The two parts of this decree are exclusive

sovereignty, meaning nonintervention from other states, and territorial control, delineating the exact bounds of the a state’s right to exclusive sovereignty.

A political science perspective on the issue of sovereignty is more realist, sideling the binary of declaratory and constitutive theories. The title of Stephen Krasner’s work, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, names the issue directly. Krasner asserts that “the international system is an environment in which the logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness.”27 As can be inferred, the logics of appropriateness understands political action as being sourced from rules, known roles, and the generally agreed upon conduct. The logics of consequence views political action as the product of rational calculation completed to maximize a desirous preference. Violations of legally defined sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, forced or voluntary, are a frequent occurrence, as the outcome is often too appealing and too beneficial to be ignored for the sake of appropriateness. As the result of conventions, contracts, coercion, and imposition,28 violations of sovereignty are commonplace, often mutually agreed upon, and exists to disprove the idea of an all-sovereign, all-independent state.

While this section aimed to clarify the concept of statehood, the reality is that there are no straightforward answers on when and how statehood is determined. Common perception views sovereign states as an infallible fact, born from a source of lawful authority, or something that just *is*. Instead, rites of passage and rules of play are steeped in social (political) dynamic and personal (national) interest. For unrecognized states such as Somaliland and Taiwan, it’s important to acknowledge that their lack of sovereignty is not necessarily the natural result of their unsuitability.

Rather, it is more so the desired designation decided by the current powers that be. Or, at best, irresponsiveness of the international community to their new peer.

Written specifically on the issue of new state birth, Bridget Coggins’ *Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century* discusses the social-political motivation between existent state interests and new state admittance. Supportive of a constitutive theory of statehood, Coggins argues that new states achieve statehood via the allowance of existent state members, and admittance is most reliant on the position of the Great Powers. The international community of states is a social dynamic, they are mutually reliant on one another for the recognition of their sovereign authority. To have “my” state, there must be “your” state, otherwise there is no separation in power and control. Within this social dynamic, the admittance of a new state requires agreement. Seeing as we are past the time of *terra nullius*, new states can no longer be formed out of “unoccupied” land. Instead, they are part of, or at least tied to, another state. Although violations of sovereignty in reality are endless, the legal norms of the Westphalian state system dictates that one state shall not intervene in the sovereign territorial control of another. And so, recognition of a new state is inherently destabilizing to the international system. States have an incentive to move together in decision making, dispersing the blame of violating a norm and also rallying together in the case of potential retaliation from the parent state. New state birth operates on a threshold model. Although unanimous recognition is not necessary, a critical mass is. In this, “Great Power recognition serves as a focal point for others to follow, initiating a cascade of system-wide legitimacy.”29 Great powers consider three factors when supporting or disapproving of new state birth: international security concerns, domestic politics and security, and system stability. Unless

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29 Coggins, *Power Politics*, 9
the benefits are high enough to inspire the Great Powers to patron new state birth, stalemate and inaction favoring the status quo is largely the result.30 Acknowledging that statehood itself is not an unbiased belonging but a social construction produced by self-interested existent states jockeying for position, may we ask if international legal sovereignty is even necessary for Somaliland? While it would be beneficial, is it integral? These are the questions I turn to in the following section.

How Necessary is International Legal Sovereignty?

One primary argument on the need for recognition of Somaliland’s independence is concerned with exclusion from the principle international organizations exclusive to sovereign states. The big names pop out here, Somaliland is not eligible for participation in the functions of the UN, IMF, World Bank, WHO, or IGAD. Not only is Somaliland barred from representing itself in these international organizations, but Somaliland also suffers by being formally categorized as part of Somalia. A particularly famous incident, Somaliland’s government revenues collapsed in 1998 and dropped from $45 to $27 million USD. This was the result of Saudi Arabia banning Somaliland’s livestock because government-issued health certificates became no longer internationally recognized.31 Or, when the IMF declared Somalia ineligible for further loans in 1988, Somaliland was included in this as well; both were ineligible for loans from international financial institutions for three decades.32 33

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30 Coggins, Power Politics, 38.
31 Coggins, Power Politics, 33.
32 Philips, 50.
If one of the primary arguments for Somaliland’s sovereignty is that non-recognition withholds Somaliland from the gamut of external financial relations, and is therefore harmful to Somaliland’s progress, there are arguments to the contrary. Many scholars find that Somaliland’s isolation from the international circuit enabled locally-responsive leadership that built up Somaliland’s good governance. During Somaliland’s formative years, non-recognition resulted in negligible access to external capital, whether developmental assistance, foreign investment or loans, or rent from strategic or natural resources. This forced Somaliland to become self-reliant and internally accountable to their constituent businesses, financiers, community leaders, and people. Especially in comparison to Somalia, we can see that international aid and funding has not resulted in good governance, peaceful population, a stimulated economy, or any of the desired benefits. Excluding tiny states like the Gambia and Djibouti, Somalia was the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa when the government collapsed in 1991.\textsuperscript{34} There have been over eighteen internationally sponsored peace talks for national reconciliation in Somalia, most costing many millions of dollars, which have not brought lasting peace.\textsuperscript{35} There is no straight forward relationship between the availability of external financial aid and positive domestic development.

Dambisa Moyo, one of the more well-known anti-aid economists to the general public, argues the same, that aid does not work to Africa’s benefit. Whether this be aid projects for the general public or state-to-state aid agreements, the result is detrimental. Foreign aid projects targeting the common person are typically band-aid solutions which ignore the causative system, and can also directly generate the need for \textit{more} aid. If a charitable organization puts a girl through school for her to face the lack of career prospects a decade later, how much good does this do? If

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{34} Philips, 49.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{35} Philips, 51.}
a NGO aid project distributes mosquito nets in attempt to squash malaria, this large influx of free mosquito nets can put the local mosquito net manufacturing group out of business. Then, a few years later, there is no local ability to respond to the need of these same mosquito nets needing maintenance or replacement, therefore causing this aid project to continue. Another example, at a larger scale, is the import of cheap, subsidized food aid putting local farmers out of business. On a state-to-state level, massive amounts of corruption and embezzlement means that aid often enters into the pockets of heads of states and top officials, and continues no further. Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire’s president from 1965 to 1997, is thought to have stolen at least $5 billion from the country, Malawi’s former president Bakili Muluzi was charged with embezzling $12 million of aid money, and Zambia’s former president Frederick Chiluba was also charged with theft of public funds.\(^\text{36}\) Bad enough in itself, this type of political set-up fuels political instability and motivates attempted or successful coups, as whoever is in power stands to gain much financially.

And if international funding, supposedly secured via gaining sovereignty, can act as a miracle balm catapulting Somaliland a few steps ahead on the international totem pole, then it’s important to note that Somaliland has received international aid. By 2004, Somaliland received 37% of aid entering Somalia.\(^\text{37}\) Well over 100 domestic and international NGOs now operate in Somaliland, administering over $100 million in funding.\(^\text{38}\) According to Somalia’s 2019 report on aid flows, Somaliland received the second highest amount of aid in the country, second to only the Federal Government of Somalia itself. Somaliland received an average of $194 million of aid per year during 2017 and 2018, surpassing Banaadir, Galmudug, Hiirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, Moyo, Dambisa. “Why Foreign Aid is Hurting Africa.” The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 2009. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123758895999200083 Accessed May 12, 2021.
Phillips, 70.
Somaliland’s lack of international aid assistance during its formative decade of the 1990s is no longer the case, and its lack of recognized sovereignty appears to present no hindrance in receiving aid.

While Somaliland and all unrecognized states cannot access the perks of official state-to-state diplomatic transactions, they are, of course, forging ahead in their political and economic ties. Bodies such as the UN, EU, AU, and IGAD all work with Somaliland’s administration. Somaliland has a dozen missions abroad in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, South Africa, UAE, Taiwan, China, USA, UK, Belgium, Sweden, Germany. Other countries such as Yemen, Egypt, Italy, and France have also welcomed official delegations from the Somaliland government as responsible authorities. There are direct flights between Hargeisa and other major cities in the region and Somaliland passports are accepted by a number of countries including South Africa, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, UK, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the USA. Economically, Somaliland’s port of Berbera is of primary importance and rivals the neighboring port of Djibouti. Landlocked Ethiopia relies on friendly relations with Somaliland for access to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and has signed a long-term use agreement regarding the port. The Arabian Peninsula holds Somaliland’s other crucial trading partners, with export of livestock and animal products to Saudi Arabia and Yemen a key income source for the state.

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40 Bradbury, Choosing Politics over Violence, 548.


42 Maqgote, 219.


44 Beyene, 208.

true that Somaliland is withheld from a number of advantages only available to sovereign states, it is certainly not surrounded by walls of isolation.

Somaliland’s reach for sovereignty assumes state sovereignty to be a positive thing, a stamp of approval on Somaliland’s capability and authority. Official statehood acts as an ultimate benchmark of validity, the natural destination of any well-run and worthy state. However, contrary to popular understanding, statehood is not necessarily a factual measure of legitimacy. Particularly in an African context, we can see that formal, judicial sovereignty does not equate with factual governing integrity. I will highlight works by two Africanists, Jeffrey Herbst’s *States and Power in Africa*, and Robert Jackson’s *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. The two offer the same conundrum, that many African states suffer a contradiction between full claims to sovereignty, while possessing incomplete control over their territory. The result is often statehood without full governance.

Herbst stresses the importance of land, and specifically land’s accompanying power dynamics. He argues that the European model of statehood was never replicable onto the African continent. European state formation was initially motivated by dense populations on finite land, resulting in the necessity to claim and defend territory. Any invasion of territorial conquest would begin through ill-controlled and porous hinterlands, necessitating firm boundary demarcation managed through the bureaucratic spread of a centralized administration. To fight wars of conquest, leadership needed to raise money, recruit bodies, and influence opinion. This gave rise to a taxation system, population registry, and nationalism, in that order, and came to form much of the basis of the “state,” as known in Europe.
While no one factor can be the overwhelming cause of a certain political system, African geography was not as naturally conducive to equally distributed power across a large region. Considering just this specific element of geography, leaders faced three challenges when building states, “the cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure; the nature of national boundaries; and the design of state systems.”\(^{46}\) Vast, spacious land increases the cost of power infrastructure expansion, and reduces the necessity in establishing firm national boundaries. The resulting power system was one of concentric rings of power emanating from the metropole, rather than blanket authority across the entirety of a territory.

Further exacerbating this difficulty is the legacy of colonial occupation. Most African colonies were extraction sites, building administrative and physical infrastructure around the colonial node of power, and ignoring the outer reaches of land. The Berlin Conference of 1884 then took this habit and codified it. Eager to prevent other European powers from gaining an upper hand via new African colonies, but uneager themselves to administer their occupations, the European powers gathered to delineate their spheres of power on the African continent. Allowing for the most minimalist of obligations over their claimed territories, the conference maintained that if cities were held, the far vaster swathes of non-city land were safely guaranteed as well. Nearly a decade later, this was upheld once again with the OAU’s 1964 resolution “to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.”\(^{47}\) The culmination of this history is what we have today, with a number of African states holding statehood over their national territory, but often with only control over the capital city.

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The territorialization of Africa was not restricted to national borders. After colonial possessions were appropriately demarcated from one another, land was also divided internally and used to serve political and economic purposes. The roll out of institutionalized racial segregation in settler colonies such as South African, Kenya, or Zimbabwe is infamous. Territories of unequal status were established and access to land, resources, and rights were determined via one’s race or ethnicity. Beyond shaping the social fabric of lives, this also greatly shaped the actual geographic landscape of both urban and rural areas, creating neighboring pockets of markedly different reality within one country. In this we may ask, if statehood can be defined as governance of a people within a territory (and the capacity to enter into relations with other states), but the majority of the encompassed population are without rights, what state do they belong to? Does not the absence of an explicit responsibility to a territory’s people suggest a flawed concept of statehood?

Moving beyond land’s role in influencing statehood and governance, Jackson stresses international contribution and buy-in to the “negative sovereignty” of decolonized countries. Starting in the 1950s and largely complete by the mid-1960s, international norms of sovereignty took a massive turn, championing anti-colonialism, ex-colonial self-determination, and racial sovereignty, all underwritten by egalitarian and democratic values of the west. Decolonization swept through the world. However, this tide of change was so urgent and absolute, “that every colony could be granted independence at more or less the same time regardless of domestic conditions.” It became impossible to insist that some countries ought to receive more political tutelage prior to independence. States became legitimate in form, but not in substance, and it

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50 Jackson, 14.
became “possible to possess juridical statehood while as yet disclosing little evidence of empirical statehood.” When statehood was conferred without meeting effective governing capability, the result was non-competitive international norms. Domestic disorganization and illegitimacy did not impinge on states’ unqualified right to exist and likelihood for survival. To overthrow or occupy weak states was no longer internationally accepted; instead, weak states remained equal, legal peers, despite any degree of ramshackle reality. Jackson terms this relationship “negative sovereignty.”

The above scholarship shows that statehood, and perhaps particularly African statehood under the global (Western) definition, does not truthfully denote a met standard of achievement or authoritative control. Instead, states can be wildly illegitimate in their factual capacity of governance, while retaining the full juridical title of statehood. Non-competitive international norms and the freezing of the political map, delivered along with the end of colonialism during the 1960s, contributed to judicial sovereignty without empirical sovereignty. If sovereign statehood is supposedly desirable as the pinnacle of political achievement, but actually does not always possess as much factual legitimacy as the title suggests, does Somaliland actually need to buy into the necessity of statehood? Indeed, Taiwan is case in point that recognized sovereignty is not necessarily all important to the ability to act and be known on the world stage. If we put the goal of internationally recognized legal sovereignty on the back burner, and instead look toward how to advance relations with other states, what can Taiwan’s example show Somaliland?

51 Jackson, 25.
Taiwan’s Successful Unrecognition

Despite its small size and marginalized political position, Taiwan has performed quite well in achieving economic prowess, military security, and most importantly, positive, existent relations with most countries. Although Somaliland and Taiwan are both unrecognized under international law, there are different levels of non-recognition, creative solutions to sidestep the issue, and a large gray zone to explore and utilize. One way to think about Taiwan’s success despite unrecognition - whether or not compared to Somaliland - is to think about the typical measures of a state’s development. These include measures on economic health, environmental conservation, educational attainment, public health, gender equality, human rights, and so on. However, finding datasets which held information for both Somaliland and Taiwan proved difficult! Neither are members of the UN, meaning that they are excluded from the numerous databanks that the UN and its myriad organizations compile. Taiwan is often included in other datasets tracking various topics related to a country’s well-being, while Somaliland is not. A few examples include Freedom House, Europa World Plus, Reporters without Borders, Yale’s Environmental Performance Index, Transparency International, or the Wittgenstein Centre’s Human Capital Data Explorer. Taiwan also manages to slip its presence into certain prominent international organizations, holding membership with the World Trade Organization as “Chinese Taipei,” and included in the World Bank’s most recent release of Country Classification by Income Group. Somaliland is included in neither.

Another way to understand Taiwan’s success is to look at its ties with a large portion of the world’s countries, where there stands an unspoken understanding of Taiwan’s legitimate statehood as only being limited by political demands. This is a tricky thing to prove; how might I
suggest that countries do recognize Taiwan’s legitimacy when governments directly proclaim to not support Taiwanese sovereignty? One way is through relations, and understanding that administrative statements and actions can and often do differ. Government proclamations may say one thing, while actions assert a different approach. I looked at the governmental body responsible for foreign relations for the top fifteen largest economies, and looked to see if Somaliland and Taiwan would be represented. On nearly every homepage is a tab showing foreign countries that the country has relations with, most are broadly and vaguely defined (E.G. Countries and Regions), and some are specifically defined (E.G. Missions Abroad). No matter the difference here, the point is that these countries have relations with Taiwan, and it listed under the government department responsible for foreign affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ministry and Page</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
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<td>Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Country Files”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


As can be seen, most of the countries show relations with Taiwan. There are ways that these nations make clear that Taiwan is not officially recognized as a country: Japan lists Taiwan under “Other Area,” rather than being listed alphabetically with all other countries, South Korea left the flag for Taiwan as a blank, white rectangle, and Germany lists Taiwan as “Taiwan*,” following up that this is not commentary on Taiwan’s statehood. Nevertheless, overall, Taiwan is represented. In truth, “the consequences for Taiwan of losing its international legal sovereignty in the 1970s have been mitigated by the fact that some countries, notably the United States, have invented alternative arrangements that provide the functional equivalent of recognition.” 68 Taiwan’s belonging to the international stage is undeniable enough to appear time and time again, despite formal non-recognition. The same cannot be said for Somaliland.

68 Krasner, 36.
Important to Taiwan’s current achievement of international goodwill and positive relations, along with its healthy economy and military capability, is American influence and contribution. The US government’s patronage of early Taiwan is greatly important to Taiwan’s current standing despite unrecognition. Generous injections of military aid allowed for regime consolidation during Taiwan’s earliest years, and later injections of financial aid assisted Taiwan’s successful industrialization toward standing on its own two feet. Today, Taiwan’s military security remains beholden to American patronage. With Taiwan’s population of nearly 24 million and a geographical size slightly larger than the state of Maryland, there is no way for Taiwan’s military force and security strategy to be purely homegrown. Having American “backing” is the most compelling deterrent to a hypothetical hostile takeover from China. With decades of military and economic intertwinement, Taiwan’s efforts in soft power take place to continue stoking an already lit fire between itself and the US. A strategic game of attraction, soft power is a dance that requires partners, and in Taiwan’s case, the US is the partner to keep. Below I will cover the US-Taiwan patron-client state relationship, from American assistance via aid to Taiwanese soft power response.

**US Aid: militarization first, economy second, a hand in both**

War plays a crucial role in both the formation and viable continuation of modern day Taiwan. Upon the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT had no choice but to flee to Taiwan in hopes of regrouping to counterstrike and retake the mainland. The KMT’s retreat to Taiwan in December of 1949 disappointed American goals for the region and US-Taiwan relations began to flag. Continued financial support from the US was questioned as a waste of money and the Truman administration announced in 1950 that the US would not continue to provide military
aid or advice to Taiwan. In a grim turn of events, the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 came to Taiwan’s rescue.

Faced with an active effort by the Soviet Union and China to spread Communism into the Korean Peninsula, the US decided to secure Taiwan for democracy and to supposedly prevent a communist revolution throughout Asia. The US seventh fleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait, Congress approved the Mutual Security Act to authorize aid to nations friendly to the US, and Taiwan became a critically vital defense state nearly overnight. Following the dispatch of American troops into the region, the US injected generous aid into Taiwan with the aim of fortifying Taiwan’s military capability against a Chinese invasion. Total military assistance from the US to Taiwan between 1951 and 1965 was approximately $2.5 billion, an average of $167 million a year.

As the Korean War ended in armistice and Communist threat declined after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, the US needed to extricate itself from continued financial contribution and military support of Taiwan. The US had given economic aid deliveries that averaged nearly $600 million per year from 1951 to 1965, making it the largest per capita aid program in the world during that period. On a per capita basis, American aid to Taiwan was twice that of American aid to South Korea and ten times that of Japan. The need for Taiwan to fund its own military capacity to secure state stability and deter an offensive from China led to the next

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phase of American patronage in Taiwan’s development – rapid industrialization and economic growth.

The prior buildup of Taiwan’s armed forces and infrastructure became a supremely beneficial underpinning for Taiwan’s economic growth to come. American aid money that had been invested into telecommunications, the medical system, roads, expressways, harbors, airfields, water systems, the electric supply, bureaucratic administrative ability, all formed a healthy foundation for Taiwan’s industrialization. For locals, military construction and expansion had created employment for many, while technology transfer and training built up a population of skilled Taiwanese technocrats. During the ROC’s first decade in governance, US aid largely funded the rehabilitation and expansion of public utilities such as electricity, transportation, or mining. The production of fertilizer and sugar in specific was heavily supported, along with the production of cement, glass, and textiles.\(^\text{74}\)

Land reform was the first step taken before launching into industrial development. Learning from their past mistakes, the KMT saw successful land reform as necessary in preempting peasant unrest and mobilization. Land reform also kept the landlords in sight. Weakening landed elites prevented the budding state from being captured by business interests, and also contributed to later capitalist industrialization via compensating landlords with shares in state-owned enterprises that were later privatized.\(^\text{75}\) Taiwan’s land reform resulted in the partition of farmland previously held by landlords into smaller farmland sold to tenet farmers. Land reform logic assumed that farmers cultivating their own land would produce larger, more efficient yields, seeing as profits would return to themselves. Although land reform motivation and execution did not

\(^{74}\) Lee and Chang, 55.

\(^{75}\) Lee, 751.
exclusively come from the US, the US did contribute via irrigation projects, development of farmers’ organizations, seed improvement, and technical guidance.\textsuperscript{76}

Taiwan’s land reform and expansion in agricultural production was hugely successful. In 1952, 92% of Taiwan’s exports were processed and unprocessed agricultural products, with only 8% of exports being industrial goods.\textsuperscript{77} As active land reform efforts wrapped up around 1953, industrialization took priority. An import substitution policy saw that Taiwan primarily imported raw materials and manufacturing machinery, and used domestic labor capacity to produce light industry consumer products sold to the domestic market. As the domestic market became more and more saturated, Taiwan then turned to an export expansion strategy during the 1960s. The US was a key trading partner during industrialization, first largely exporting industrial raw materials and equipment to Taiwan, then serving as a market for Taiwanese exports. The US also contributed financial aid to establishing new enterprises via projects such as the Small Industry Loan Fund or the Model Factory Program.\textsuperscript{78} The establishment of export-processing zones event began as a US Proposal, and American advisors were directly engaged in recruiting private investors.\textsuperscript{79} Taiwan’s transition from agriculture to industry was very successful. By 1965, agricultural goods had fallen to being 54% of Taiwan’s exports, and industrial goods had risen to 46%.\textsuperscript{80}

Just as US military patronage of Taiwan was highly motivated by American goals to thwart Communism, rather than solely Taiwanese goals of state consolidation, US patronage of Taiwan’s industrial development was highly motivated by American self-interest. American patronage of

\textsuperscript{76} Chiang, 113.
\textsuperscript{77} Chiang, 116.
\textsuperscript{78} Lee, 751.
\textsuperscript{79} Lee, 751.
\textsuperscript{80} Chiang, 116.
Taiwanese industrialization was not merely an attempt at benevolent stewardship while the US gradually unshouldered the financial burden of ensuring stability in Taiwan and countering China. But the US also needed new markets to penetrate. Following WWII, the imbalance of American wealth in comparison to the rest of the world was too high, and the lack of currency to purchase American products threatened sustained US prosperity. Financing other countries’ imports of American goods via aid was an option for the short term, but the creation of viable markets for American products was needed in the long term.\textsuperscript{81} The US guided Taiwan towards market capitalism via their ability to shape Taiwan’s economic priorities. If financial contribution would have already bought the US sway in the KMT’s decision making, the fact that financial aid was annually ratified made it so that the uncertainly of upcoming aid raised the hold that the US had over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{82} Compounded over many years, the US had ample opportunity to groom Taiwan to join the global capitalist order.

Waning Cold War geopolitics, diverted attention to the Vietnam war, and the continued rise of China caused American commitment to Taiwan to recede. But, luckily, Taiwan was already on its way to prosperity by then. In 1971, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized China as the legitimate representative to the UN, and ceased recognition of the ROC government on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{83} But despite being on the outs in formal diplomatic recognition, the US still maintained demonstrated commitment to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 outlined American intentions for continued relations with Taiwan, emphasizing that peace in the region is of international concern and for the issue of Taiwan to be settled by peaceful means, and also

\textsuperscript{81} Gray, 583.
\textsuperscript{82} Chiang, 105.
noting sustained arms sales to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{84} The sale of 150 F-16 fighter aircrafts in 1992 was a first in US-Taiwan arms exchange, with multi-billion dollar weapons package delivered to Taiwan regularly since then.\textsuperscript{85}

In recent times, while Taiwan’s economy has independently continued its successful growth, Taiwan’s military strength remains highly tied to US patronage. The largest counter against a hypothetical Chinese offensive for the absorption of Taiwan is the possibility of American military intervention. In this, the US has maintained strategic ambiguity, which has generated its own line of scholarship.\textsuperscript{86} The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-1996 was a major test of American commitment to Taiwan. Sensitive to Taiwan’s first presidential election set for the following year, with Lee Teng-hui appearing to move away from the One-China policy, President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to speak at Cornell University pushed a tense relationship over the edge. China announced testing of its missile program, firing missiles less than 100 miles off Taiwan’s coast, while also amassing troops in Fujian province directly across the Taiwan strait. The Clinton administration sent naval forces and two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, threatened economic sanctions against China, and asked both sides to cool off. But, the number of US troops in the region was not increased.\textsuperscript{87} Maintenance of the status quo and calculated ambiguity in American response to China on behalf of Taiwan has been the name of the game for decades now.

Unchanged from the 1950s, Taiwan’s military security against China remains dominantly backed by the possibility of American deliverance.

**Taiwan’s Soft Power Maintenance of American Patronage**

American patronage of Taiwan has outlasted it’s originating motivation, growing US relations with China, the comings-and-goings of presidential administrations, and even changes in regime type in Taiwan’s case. But so long as Taiwan remains an unrecognized state vulnerable to China’s hypothetical absorption, Taiwan needs to continue tending to the maintenance of American patronage. Which, it partially does via soft power. Soft power is a political theory and practice introduced by the seminal work of Joseph Nye. In simple words, hard power is defined by coercion and payment (or military and money), whereas soft power rests on persuasion and attraction.\(^{88}\) Soft power persuasion rests on three primary resources: Culture, political values, and foreign policies.\(^{89}\) Is the state’s national culture attractive to the target audience? Does the state live up to its stated political values at home and abroad? Are the state’s foreign policies seen as legitimate and having moral authority? These resources are advertised and disseminated through a range of vehicles, such as through information agencies, public diplomacy, exchange programs, assistance programs, training programs, mass media, lobbying efforts, and so on.\(^{90}\) Integral to the working of soft power is the role of the audience. Who is the desired audience? Who is being attracted, persuaded, or courted? In projecting an image, an audience is needed: “The production of soft power by attraction depends upon both the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target.”\(^{91}\) Taiwan aims to attract all manners of international support, but the US, with deep

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89 Nye, 84.
90 Nye, 99.
91 Nye, 92.
pockets and VIP seats, remains a top priority. In encouraging continued US patronage, Taiwan’s soft power focuses on the value of Taiwan’s democracy.

Agreed on by both Taiwanese and American academics and politicians, democracy is viewed as the most valuable soft power asset that Taiwan holds internationally. This was particularly emphasized during the Chen administration of the early 2000s, which made the projection of Taiwan’s democracy the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Demonstrating a value-driven approach, a number of similar terms cropped up during this time, such as “democracy-based diplomacy,” “human rights-based diplomacy,” “civilian-based diplomacy,” or “public opinion-based democracy.”

Taiwan also invests government funding to further this identity. Meant to bridge aspiring and mature democracies, The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD) was established in 2003. The TFD publishes the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* and also found the World Forum for Democratization in Asia, which made its debut in Taiwan and has since been held in the Philippines and South Korea. Also established in 2003, the Democratic Pacific Union contains over two dozen participating countries, is chaired by Taiwan’s former vice president Lu Hsiu-lien, and has an ultimate goal of a future intergovernmental Union of Pacific Democracies.

Although several societal issues do exist, including neoliberal capitalist exploitation and xenophobia, Taiwan champions many of the values of liberal western democracies. Taiwan has a vibrant civil society with high levels of political engagement. Taiwanese multiculturalism has become a rallying cry marking Taiwan’s distinction from China, and the government has tried

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94 Wang and Lu, 443.
pulling itself closer to identifying as a pacific island state via its diplomatic ventures with small pacific island countries. Judicially demonstrating its proximity to western liberal values, Taiwan legalized same-sex marriage in 2019 and became the first country in Asia to do so. Taiwan has also demonstrated itself to be eco-conscious and prioritizing of greening efforts. Taiwan’s provision of public transportation and socialized healthcare are many years ahead of what is only a far-away dream for the United States.

Taiwan’s soft power sell of democracy is further elevated when in relation to China. Until international acceptance of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty completely severed from China is had, Taiwan’s political strategy will continue to prioritize its survival as a state separate from China. Taiwanese soft power is not simply about what the US and the world understands of Taiwan, but also what the world understands of Taiwan in comparison to China. As Nye writes, “Not only do actors try to influence each other directly and indirectly through soft power; they also compete to deprive each other of attractiveness and legitimacy, thus creating a disabling environment either in public opinion in the other country and/or in the eyes of relevant third parties.”95 Taiwan’s viability as a shining example of Asian democracy relies on its juxtaposition to China’s communist system anathema to Western and American audiences.

Fortunate for Taiwan, according to Nye, the efficacy of soft power rests on the credibility of the state. Attempts at soft power from states without credibility are easily seen as manipulative or propagandic.96 China, specifically from an American view, which is the view that matters as Taiwan’s patron, is seen as an admirable foe. One that is legitimate in its capability but uncredible in integrity. Attention to Chinese soft power, from the CCP itself and from outside observers,

95 Nye, 99.
96 Nye, 83.
began a quick rise shortly after the turn of the century.Operating from within China’s shadow and as its juxtaposition, Taiwanese actions are easily seen in a rose colored light. Indeed, Chinese and Taiwanese efforts at soft power have much overlap. China’s establishment of their Confucius Institutes around the world is watched with a skeptical eye, while Taiwan simultaneously presses forwarded with their language exchange programs and institutions without criticism.

Taiwan’s soft power, in cultivating continued favor from the US to secure itself against China, is seemingly successful. Shelley Rigger, an authoritative voice on Taiwan, states that among the many reasons for the United States’ support of Taiwan’s existence, one is an emotional bond. Rigger’s inclusion of a quote from Admiral Eric McVadon is illustrative: “Taiwan is like a blood brother; it need not do any more to warrant loyalty. The PRC is, in contrast, a stranger. Its qualities run hot and cold. Its origin and upbringing create uncertainties; trust has to be developed. And these feelings, in both cases, are reciprocal.” American patronage of Taiwan, beginning from pragmatic geopolitical concerns, has developed into emotional investment over the decades.

The US-Taiwan patron-client state relationship has been a great help to Taiwan’s standing as an unrecognized state, first through massive financial injections during Taiwan’s state consolidation, then in continued backing as Taiwan has risen on its own. Using this example, could Somaliland secure a patron for itself? Prior to exploring patron possibilities, I will briefly cover theory on patron-client state relationships.

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97 Wang and Lu, 426.
Theory on Patron-Client State Relationships

Understood in a more anthropological or sociological sense, a patron-client relationship sees patron delivery of material goods for client return of loyalty to the patron, which could be called on in times of need to assist the patron in their goals. This pattern of relationship can be magnified to the international level, where a patron-client state relationship is one that is asymmetrical, mutually beneficial, exchanges different resources, fluid, and affectively influenced. In specific, the relationship increases the security of the client and the power of the patron, which has already surpassed its own necessary threshold of security.

Shoemaker and Spanier’s *Patron-client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age* is a foundational work in the field. In their conception, the patron state typically delivers military security in exchange for some type of compliance from the client state which would expand the patron’s abilities. The relationship is highly asymmetrical in capability, but helps each part meet their specific goals. Patron states are said to have three goals ordered in increasing importance: Ideological, International Solidarity, and Strategic Advancement. Ideological goals hope to remake the client in the patron’s own image to display its system as superior to competing powers. International solidarity goals hope to hold the client as a member of the patron’s bloc in the global political landscape. Here we can think of general cooperation between heads of state, or the signing, voting, or pronunciation of support in international agreements. Lastly, and of the most value, strategic advancement goals hope to secure a client’s valuable terrain or resource to gain some type of military advantage over the patron’s opponents. This goal might see the denial of the client to the patron’s opponent as more valuable than the possession of the client itself, or

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the client is used as a conflict surrogate. Patron goals differ from client goals in that patrons are exploring low-risk ways to fortify its existent power while clients aim to decrease its vulnerable position in hostile security environments.” Clients have one goal: increased security. But, they also have a variety of regional contexts, state weaknesses, and impinging threats. The more immediate and damaging the threat, the more the client is willing to concede to its patron, which would be viewed as a savior.

Another scholar uses slightly more coequal framing to describe the patron-client state relationship, naming it to be an “asymmetric alliance” and using terms like partners or allies. Morrow sees the relationship as a tradeoff between security and autonomy. With security defined as the “ability to maintain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve” and autonomy as the “degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo.” In layman’s terms, security can be understood as military might and autonomy can be understood as the ability for external self-assertion.

The last included definition of the patron-client state relationship is in line with the above: “patron-client can be characterized as being voluntarily entered, asymmetrical dyads which are marked by a strong element of affectivity. Through the most important aspect of this type of relationship is the level of client compliance with patron policies, the dyads are usually mutually beneficial due to their inherent reciprocal nature.” Carney offers an additional dimension in emphasizing that affectivity plays a large part in this relationship; rather than simply an

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instrumental relationship, there is a bond of affinity or loyalty to the relationship. Carney uses the term “compliance” to describe the exchange taking place between the two states. Rather than progress towards goals, or a tradeoff between two resources, the relationship described here is client compliance to known or stated patrons expectations.

It is clear that this framework applies to the US-Taiwan relationship. At the time of relationship initiation, Taiwan, or more accurately the regime which was occupying Taiwan, was very much insecure and in a hostile environment. As the losing party of a civil war which had literally fled upon defeat, they were in the loser’s corner and uncertain of what punishment laid in the future. The US acted as savior during times of high precarity. And as for the US, Taiwan fit a number of patron goals. Ideologically, Taiwan, eventually, bat for the team of market capitalism and democracy. Strategically, denial of Taiwan to China was beneficial, as was forming it into a prized defensive base in American military calculations.

There are examples of patron-client state relations within an African context as well. With decolonization and Cold War politics unfolding during overlapping times, many African countries found themselves being courted by either the US or the Soviet Union during their debut as sovereign states. This sometimes worked to the advantage of African states, as the Cold War gave the African continent a significance to the international community which it might have otherwise lacked. Often, state leaders astutely used their Cold War alignment, or non-alignment, to their

102 Carney, 44.
country’s benefit. Non-alignment could be an advantageous standpoint, opening the possibility for relations, and assistance, from both sides.\textsuperscript{103}

As just one example of many, Kenya held an official stance of non-alignment despite a sure tilt towards Britain and the West. Britain and Kenya established a close military relationship in 1964, which worked well enough for Kenya for the next couple of years, until the Soviet Union offered a “gift” of four helicopters in 1967. While discussing this development with the British, Kenyan Defense Minister Njoroge Mungai expressed that “sometimes when Kenya’s old friends had been unable to help, other countries had offered help. Dr. Mungai said he felt like accepting these offers sometimes, but had not yet been obliged to do so. Because of Kenya’s defense relations with the UK, she naturally turned to Britain for help.”\textsuperscript{104} Ultimately, Britain didn’t up its commitment and support to Kenya, and the Soviet offer was declined as well. However, this dynamic of providing allegiance in exchange for financial and material aid lived on and the Kenyan administration did obtain a number of benefits from Britain, including jets just two years later.\textsuperscript{105}

Checkbook diplomacy, or dollar diplomacy, between Taiwan and China in the African continent is another, more recent, version of playing patrons off one another in negotiation for benefit. In exchange for recognition of either only Taipei or only Beijing, African countries stand to receive a generous aid package in return. For example, the Gambia received $35 million from Taiwan when it recognized Taiwan in 1994.\textsuperscript{106} Many African nations have switched back and forth

\textsuperscript{104} Cullen, 47.
\textsuperscript{105} Cullen, 48.
between the two states multiple times, and therefore receiving a financial package each time. Senegal, the Central African Republic, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, and Niger have all switched recognition two or more times, and some up to five times. São Tomé and Taiwan established bilateral relations in 1997, with Taiwan’s delivery of $30 million over the course of three years. These relations were cut off in 2016 for the explicit reason of São Tomé asking for a prohibitive amount of financial aid, and relations with Beijing were forged instead. Now, let us explore who, if any, may act as a patron to Somaliland, as the US did for Taiwan.

A Patron for Somaliland?

Before I start to explore potential patrons for Somaliland, the number of potential patron states must be delimited, as assessing all countries in the world is far beyond the scope of this paper. The genesis of a patron-client state relationship requires an insecure client which can deliver some type of advantage for the patron, a client’s location needs to intersect with patron geopolitical needs. American patronage of Taiwan was born out of Cold War geopolitics and the acute threat of Communism spreading throughout Asia. What geopolitics are at work in Somaliland’s neighborhood that could make Somaliland desirable to a patron? Located just before the Gulf of Aden flows into the Red Sea, Somaliland is positioned on one of the world’s most important shipping routes. And while Somaliland belongs to the Horn of Africa, the Gulf states of the Arabian peninsula are extremely nearby, with Yemen and its overwhelming crisis just across the waterway. With natural proximity further heightened by the importance of the Red Sea, the geopolitics of the

Horn and the Gulf have generous overlap. Particularly for Hargeisa in comparison to Mogadishu, Somaliland’s location easily brings it into the fold of Gulf considerations.

While indeed a simplification, acknowledgment that Saudi Arabia and Iran have long been at odds is helpful to a big-picture understanding of the geopolitics of the Middle East. Poor relations can be said to have originated with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the rise of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini led by intertwining Muslim thought with the state, and demanded greater regional regard through the merit of Iran’s religious leadership. The Persian monarchy overthrown and the Western-aligned Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi deposed, it was a new day in the most oil rich region of the world. Iraq was the first country to feel the effects. Threatened by the export of Iran’s brand of revolution, and enticed by the opportunity to gain power via annexing oil-rich regions of the still consolidating new state, Iraq invaded Iran. The Iran-Iraq war gave Saudi Arabia the opportunity to secure itself. Saudi Arabia fought the Islamic revolution in Iran through financial support to Iraq, drew itself closer to the US as ally, and set about promoting its image as the one true custodian of Islam through merit of containing both Mecca and Medina and practicing orthodox Wahhabism. It was also then that Saudi Arabia founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of all Gulf states except Iraq, and effectively forming an Arab alliance against Iran.\textsuperscript{109}

In this bitter conflict for political, economic, cultural, and religious primacy, Saudi Arabia has a strong alliance with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while Iran recently picked up the closest thing it has to a regional ally, Qatar. When the GCC came to a stalemate in disagreement,

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain severed diplomacy with Qatar in 2017 and instituted what came to be a near region wide blockade against Qatar. In turn, Qatar increased its ties with Iran and Turkey. The Gulf region is marked by several active wars, a relatively high threat of instability caused by Islamic terrorism, and unfriendliness between the two major regional powers. At the same time, the region is globally important for its oil production, its proximity to the Red Sea shipping route, and its frontline containment of Islamic terrorism. Together, this has led to heavy militarization of the waters and coastlines. Given that these geopolitical concerns are largely geographically bound, rather than something like the spread of communist ideology, my research scope follows this. My search for a potential patron state for Somaliland includes the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula, encompassing countries extending as north as Turkey, as east as Iran, as south as Kenya, and as west as Sudan and South Sudan. Syria and Yemen are both excluded, considering their active wars, and Somalia is excluded as well, considering that it will not be patron to Somaliland.

A potential patron state needs to be wealthy, powerful, and interested in Somaliland. With security being the client’s primary goal, a patron would need to be able to offer this benefit through military and/or financial support. Having money and military might both secures a state against outside forces, and makes less-resourced outside forces more susceptible to their wishes. In addition to being wealthy and powerful, a potential patron state for Somaliland obviously needs to be interested in Somaliland. To measure wealth and power, I use data readily compiled and available from international organizations. To measure interest, or existent relations with Somaliland, I analyze patterns of state-to-state interactions composed from a Somaliland news
source. Through these three criteria, it’s suggested the UAE stands as the most likely patron to Somaliland.

_Patron Wealth_

I used GDP to gain an idea of a country’s wealth. I am less interested in granular measures such as the livelihood/lifestyle of a civilian population or the expected/demonstrated growth of an economy. Instead, I used GDP as the most appropriate signal for a big picture understanding of which countries have the most money in the region. The chart below shows World Bank numbers of 2019 GDP.\(^{110}\)

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<th>Country</th>
<th>2019 GDP (in millions) (in constant 2010 US$)</th>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>65,060.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>64,784.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>39,710.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>34,321.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>33,596.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan (2015)</td>
<td>7,832.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea (2011)</td>
<td>1,727.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti (2010)</td>
<td>1,128.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Patron Power

I first used the 2019 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers database, compiled and released by the Bureau of Arms Control of the US Department of State, to assess military capability.\(^\text{111}\) Arms exports were viewed to assess which countries have the capacity to directly produce arms, for self-supply and sale to other countries. Arms imports were viewed to assess which countries could hypothetically have a reserve of arms, or a demonstrated ability to procure arms, even if they don’t independently have production power. Whether a top exporter or importer, countries that rank high have military power and can be considered relatively well-armed. Saudi Arabia can be used as example, while it might not be in the business of producing arms, it is a major arms importer and belongs to the ranks of the militarily powerful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms Export Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ranking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>67</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values above are 11 year mean values, covering 2007 – 2017, and given in constant 2017 dollars rounded to the nearest $100 million.

Israel and Turkey’s position as the top two arms exporters of the region is possible through its arms manufacturing companies. Of the top 100 largest arms producing and military services companies in the world, Israel’s Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael are respectively ranked #29, #40, #47. Turkey’s ASELSAN and Turkish Aerospace Industries follow as #62 and #71.\(^\text{112}\) While the UAE is the third arms exporter of the region, it is not at the same production caliber as Israel and Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are high in both rankings, and can be understood as also having higher military force respective to the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$7.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$5.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>$4.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>$4.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$3.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$2.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$1.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$1.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>$1.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$600 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>$200 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$200 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$200 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>$100 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After assessing countries’ big picture military might through the production or holding of arms, I also attempted to find information on specific state-to-state transfers, with the hopes of seeing which countries, if any, had a history of arms transfers to Somaliland. This information
proved difficult to find. The one source I found that does track arms transfers between countries, did not include Somaliland as a country option. Somalia was included, and while my paper views Somaliland and Somalia as separate, I was curious as to what might emerge. A search was run for arms transfers to Somalia, between 2000 and 2020, from Bahrain, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, and the UAE. There were only three transactions: the UAE delivered 15 armored personnel carriers (APC) in 2015, Qatar delivered 68 APC in 2019, and Turkey delivered 12 APC in 2020.\(^{113}\) This does not suggest anything noteworthy on arms transfers to Somaliland.

Another search was ran, ranging from 2010 to 2020, for the same list of outbound countries, and recipients as all countries included in the database. Here, we see the same pattern of military capability as outlined above, with Israel, Turkey, and the UAE leading in military power. The search shows Israel as having 318 arms transfers with 69 recipient countries, Turkey having 94 arms transfers with 34 recipient countries, and the UAE as having 58 arms transfers with 25 recipient countries.\(^{114}\) All other outbound countries had a dozen or fewer transactions during this same time span, if any at all.

**Patron Relations**

While datasets exist to measure a country’s wealth or military expenditure and transactions, no dataset exists to demonstrate which countries have a relationship with Somaliland. Here, I did my own research. News, as announcements of a country’s developments, setbacks, concerns, and


current issues, can be used to understand the happenings within a country, and across countries. I attempted to establish a pattern of interaction between Somaliland and outside states via analyzing news articles.

I used one news source, the Somaliland Sun, for this project. Since the goal of this analysis is to establish a relationship between Somaliland and other countries, it’s important that the news source be Somaliland-centric as well. News sources that group Somalia and Somaliland together, whether as one country, of one region, or in a diasporic fashion, do not serve the goal. Examples of these unfitting news sources include the Horn Observer or Somali Affairs. After being unable to find any guidance on the legitimacy of Somaliland news sources, such as through circulation numbers, I looked at social media in hopes of at least some measurement of potential readership. Though the number of social media subscribers do not denote factual accuracy of published news, it does at least show the news sources’ footprint size. While choosing a source, I looked at the Horn Tribune, the Somaliland Standard, and the Somaliland Sun. The Horn Tribune shows little social media presence, with only a Facebook page of 139 followers. The Somaliland Standard has a Twitter page established in 2018, with 893 followers. It also has a Facebook page, but it is set up as a personal account, rather than an organizational account, and has less than 200 friends. Lastly, the Somaliland Sun has a Twitter page established in 2011, with over 20,000 followers, and also has an organizational Facebook page with close to 4,000 followers. Given this, I decided to use the Somaliland Sun as my news source.

I combed through all news under the “Somaliland” tab of news and compiled a spreadsheets of all articles whose headlines involved other countries, spanning five years from
May 1, 2016 to May 1, 2021. There are a few exceptions to my article gathering. First, I did not include any articles with a global or diasporic scope, examples include “Ethnically Somali but Distinctively Kenyan, Somalilander, Djiboutian, Somali or Ethiopian”\textsuperscript{115} and “Somaliland at the Crossfire of a New East vs. West Global Cold War.”\textsuperscript{116} These articles are not relevant to my aim, I am looking for state-to-state interactions suggestive of close ties which could develop into a possible patron-client state relationship. These articles mention Somaliland in relation to the globe at large, which cannot act as a patron state. Second, I did not include articles on Somalia-Somaliland relations. Again, the hope of this news article spreadsheet is to suggest a budding patron-client state relationship in the making. Somalia will not patron and support Somaliland’s progress toward independent sovereignty. Examples of such excluded articles include “In Comparison to ‘can do’ Somaliland, Somalia is a Scam”\textsuperscript{117} and “We Have Nothing to do with Relations between Kenya and Somalia – President Bihi.”\textsuperscript{118} Third, international organizations such as the UN, EU, AU, or IGAD, are not included. While these organizations do have a role to play in the difficulty or ease of Somaliland’s reach for recognized sovereignty, they cannot patron Somaliland on a state-to-state basis and are not relevant to the scope of this analysis. Examples of these articles include “President Muse Bihi Receives EU Delegation”\textsuperscript{119} and “UN Negotiating New Terms that will Allow its agencies to Deal with Country Separately from Somalia”\textsuperscript{120} And lastly, I


With articles appropriately excluded through the criteria explained above, the spreadsheet contains a total of 168 articles. Given that not all articles, taken to represent state-to-state interactions, are of equal importance, I had to devise a system to appropriately rank the events’ significance. According to both title and content, I sorted the articles into three types: Diplomacy, Interaction, and Remark articles. Diplomacy articles include those describing bilateral relations, visits between government officials, and developments only producible via state relations – such as acceptance of official government documents or military activity. Interaction articles include those describing transnational developments which are not necessarily large-scale or high-level in status. These articles describe positive happenings for the average population, which could have been facilitated without government intervention. Remark articles include those that comment on general happenings, past, present, or future. These articles are statements or observations of low importance. These articles do not suggest a robust or dynamic development between Somaliland and another, but they do suggest that Somaliland, at very minimum, is in contact with these foreign countries. Below are examples of headlines sorted into their categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Diplomatic</strong> (3 points)</th>
<th><strong>Interaction</strong> (2 points)</th>
<th><strong>Remark</strong> (1 point)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“President Welcomes Uganda Members of Parliament at the Palace”¹²³</td>
<td>“UK Impacts Airlines’ Staff with Organized Illegal Migration Spotting Skills”¹²⁴</td>
<td>“Government Confirm the Livestock Export Ban to Saudi Arabia has been lifted”¹²⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Somaliland Pursues Maritime and Coastal Guarding Cooperation with Taiwan”¹²⁶</td>
<td>“Somaliland Beats Kenyan Team in an International Football Friendly in Hargeisa”¹²⁷</td>
<td>“Government of Norway says Death Penalty in Somaliland is Unacceptable”¹²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Somaliland Passport Recognized as a Valid Travel Document by the UAE Government”¹²⁹</td>
<td>“Turkish Airlines to start flights to Hargeisa’s Egal Intl Airport”¹³⁰</td>
<td>“Security Personnel Capture Fleeing Ethiopia’s Zone Five Ministers”¹³¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each category of articles holds a numerical value. Diplomacy articles are worth 3 points, Interaction articles 2 points, and Remark articles 1 point. This was decided by their relative importance to the goal of establishing a pattern of a could-be patron-client state relationship. Support of Somaliland’s independent sovereignty is most facilitated via diplomatic development, compared to lower level cooperation in society or general commentary. Three obstacles occurred in devising this numerical system. First, how to categorize articles that fall between two categories and therefore two point values? Second, how to assigned points to articles that address multiple

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foreign countries simultaneously? And third, how to understand and value situations where a singular incident generated multiple news articles in a row?

For the first obstacle, I decided to be rigid in sorting articles into only one category, chosen by which category was ultimately more defining to the news at hand. An example of this is “Ministry of Education Calls for Applications for 370 Ethiopian Bachelor Degree Study Scholarships.” This was split between Interaction and Diplomacy, as the event targeted the average population and did not necessarily need government facilitation, however, the governmental ministry of education was the actual organizing body. I labeled this an Interaction article, as the actual effect of this development would be primarily felt by the average population. Another example is “Veteran Taiwanese Technician Embracing Challenges of Somaliland.” This was split between Diplomacy and Remark. The article’s subject is working in Somaliland for the purpose of a diplomatic bilateral project, but the article provides general commentary on his experience. I sorted this as a Remark article, as the essence of the article is minimally important to state-to-state relations, and is a small statement piece far removed from the bilateral agreement.

For the second obstacle, I allotted points to all countries at hand. For example, in “Somalia is Enemy #1 of Somaliland, UAE and Saudi Friends #1,” both the UAE and Saudi Arabia receive +1 points (since this is a Remark article).

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I took a flexible approach to the third obstacle. In the spreadsheet of 168 articles, there were six instances where multiple articles were published in succession, but concerning the same event. Some as few as two articles published back to back: “Zambian Delegation led by Justice Gavin Lubinda in Hargeisa”\textsuperscript{135} and “Acceleration of Bilateral Relations with Zambia Imperative, Presidents Bihi and Edgar Lungu Concur.”\textsuperscript{136} Others held as many as 6, 7, or 10 articles published on the same topic within a few day span. In these cases, I decided to give the original category value to one article, with all following articles receiving only one additional point. The chart below is one case of the six that my spreadsheet contained. As the chart demonstrates, this altered point system makes a large difference in the end value allotted to the event. Through this method, I can retain the importance of the event, evidenced by how much media attention is given to announcing and circulating the happening, while also minimizing the inflation that would have occurred if simply left unaltered.


In whole, the 168 articles mentioned 27 countries and were split between 74 Remark articles, 72 Diplomacy articles, and 22 Interaction articles. Ranked in order of total point value, the countries are: The UAE (69), Taiwan (46), Ethiopia (29), UK (27), Kenya (20), Saudi Arabia (19), the US (16), Djibouti (15), Turkey (13), South Africa (10), Czech Republic (9), Uganda (6), Malawi (6), Finland (6), Sweden (6), Zambia (4), Israel (4), China (4), Kuwait (3), Egypt (3), Guinea (3), Germany (3), Denmark (2), France (2), Norway (2), Morocco (2), Qatar (1). This suggests that over the past five years, Somaliland has seen robust relations with the UAE and Taiwan as front runners, decently involved relations with a handful of other countries, and minimal relations with half of the countries reported on.

In addition to using the aggregate point values to determine the level of involvement with other countries, looking at the articles’ categorization can give us an idea of the type of relationship
these countries have with Somaliland. Comparing the article breakdown between Ethiopia and the UK, which respectively held 29 and 27 points, suggests a different type of relationship to Somaliland, even though the cumulative point value is similar. Of the 17 articles concerning Ethiopia, 9 were Remark articles, 4 Interaction articles, and 4 Diplomacy articles; 53% of articles were Remark articles. Of the 12 articles concerning the UK, 4 were Remark articles, 1 Interaction article, and 7 Diplomacy articles; 58% of articles were Diplomacy articles. So here we see that Somaliland is keeping close tabs on Ethiopia, understanding the general happenings in the country and how it might or might not relate to Somaliland. Compare this to the UK, where the relationship is much more concerned with Diplomacy, and shows less attention to lower level exchange. Kenya and Saudi Arabia, respectively holding 20 and 19 points, have similar types of relations to Somaliland, with article types evenly spread out between Remark, Interaction, and Diplomacy.

Looking at the front runners of the UAE and Taiwan is helpful as well. First, Taiwan’s articles are almost evenly split between Diplomacy and Remark articles – 13 of 24 being Remark and the other 11 being Diplomacy. These two are related, as Remark articles tend to follow published Diplomatic articles, resulting in a similar number of articles between the two categories. Second, although the spreadsheet goes back to May of 2016, articles concerning Taiwan only go as far back as April of 2020. This makes sense, as bilateral relations between the two were announced in early 2020. This also means that Taiwan’s second place position is misleading. If the spreadsheet contained data for the past ten years rather than five, Taiwan would likely not be in second place. Or if the data were reassessed in another five years, the breaking news of bilateral relations with Taiwan would no longer be fresh and exciting, lowering the number of articles on the subject and, therefore, Taiwan’s ranking. So, while Taiwan presently ranks as second in close
relations to Somaliland, this is likely a distortion given the point in time that I am gathering data. In contrast, articles concerning the UAE span the entire five year period and include Remark, Interaction, and Diplomacy articles more equally. From this spreadsheet, the UAE stands out as the country with the most involved and continuous relationship with Somaliland.

**Discussion**

It can be seen from the above three sections that the UAE has the money, the military, and the interest to be able to act as a potential patron state for Somaliland. Indeed, the UAE holds a strong presence in the region at large and in Somaliland itself. The UAE has been very proactive in its military advancement, holding a military facility in Assab, Eritrea; Berbera, Somaliland; Boosaaso, Puntland (Somalia); and Socotra Island, Yemen. In 2016, the UAE obtained a 25-year lease from Somaliland to construct a $90 million combined military air and naval base comprising an integrated 42 km$^2$ facility with two parallel runways and a deepwater naval base. In the same year, UAE’s DP World acquired a 30-year concession to manage and develop the Berbera commercial port, requiring $442 million in investment. DP World holds 51% stake in the port, Somaliland 30%, and Ethiopia the remaining 19%.

While countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel also have the money and military power, there is much less demonstrated interest towards Somaliland when compared to the UAE. Taking Turkey as example, it’s true that Turkey has been paying attention to the Horn and to

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137 Melvin, 2.
138 Melvin, 17.
139 Melvin, 17.
Somalia. In 2005, the AU accorded Turkey observer status.\textsuperscript{140} In 2011, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first Turkish leader to visit Somalia since its collapse in 1991.\textsuperscript{141} It was from about then on that increased humanitarian, political, and aid investments began to flow from Turkey to Somalia.\textsuperscript{142} In 2012, Turkish Airlines began a twice-weekly connection to Mogadishu, and starting in 2013, Turkish venture Favori LLC began operating the Mogadishu Aden Abdulle International Airport itself.\textsuperscript{143} In 2017, Turkey opened a military training facility in Mogadishu to train Somali military recruits. With construction costs of $50 million and a lease of 20 years, this one and a half square miles facility is the largest of such overseas investment for Turkey.\textsuperscript{144} At the start of 2020, Turkish oil drilling off Somalia’s coast became yet another planned development between Ankara and Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{145} However, what is clear is that Turkey is interested in Somalia and Mogadishu, not Somaliland and Hargeisa. Turkey has acknowledged Mogadishu to be the seat of government for all of Somalia and is not sympathetic to the question of Somaliland’s sovereignty.

And, while countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have frequent interactions with Somaliland, they do not possess the financial or military clout to patron Somaliland. Additionally, being neighbors, deliberations concerning Somalia have a more direct impact on how they are able to act towards Somaliland. For example, Ethiopia and Somalia have a history of conflict and competition. Important examples include land disputes, such as the Haud or Ogaden, with the latter resulting in

\textsuperscript{144} Bishku, 8.
\textsuperscript{143} Vertin, 10.
\textsuperscript{144} Vertin, Red Sea Rivalries, 10.
\textsuperscript{145} "Erdogan says Somalia has invited Turkey to explore for oil in its seas: NTV” Reuters, 01/20/2020. Accessed 04/16/2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-somalia-oil-idUSKBN1ZJ1DZ
war between the two countries. Ethiopia (and Eritrea) also mobilized Somali proxies during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, contributing to derailing the then unfolding Somali peace process. And when the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia was recognized by IGAD in 2000, Ethiopia supported an opposing faction and made brokering peace more difficult.\textsuperscript{146} But, the two countries are overcoming political challenges in hopes of better relations. A recent example from 2020 is the surprising proposition of a regional bloc between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia – the Horn of Africa Cooperation.\textsuperscript{147} The issue of Somaliland could dampen warming Ethiopia-Somalia relations. Instead, Ethiopia is better served by maintenance of the status quo: excellent relations with Somaliland, without outright support of its sovereignty, and friendly relations with Somalia as well. In sum, through the UAE’s financial wealth, military capability, and demonstrated interest in Somaliland, it is the most likely state to act as patron to Somaliland.

**Conclusion**

Despite Taiwan’s beneficial usage of patron-client state relations with the US, and the UAE’s front runner position in being a potential patron state for Somaliland, I ultimately find it unlikely that Somaliland will be able to maneuver itself into securing a patron. First and foremost, there is a lack of urgency on the issue of Somaliland’s sovereignty, or even on Somaliland itself, sovereign or not. Somalia is in no position to make demands on Somaliland nor to offensively force its return. Somaliland is not embroiled in any type of violent conflict which might capture international attention or provoke a leap in action by states tracking the Somaliland situation. No

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acute threat exists to cause leadership within Somaliland to place sovereignty as tip top priority, instead, the goal of sovereignty will be advanced alongside other goals.

Secondly, and this is directly tied to the lack of urgency in Somaliland, there are no oppositional powers interested in Somaliland. American patronage of Taiwan was born from the bipolar division of power during the Cold War. The US needed to retain Taiwan for itself against a united China and Soviet Union. The fact that the US had an opponent, that there was an alternative option to American power and patronage, forced the US to act. It’s the same dynamic for Africa and Cold War non-alignment, or for checkbook diplomacy between Taiwan and China: there needs to be an oppositional alternative for there to be an impetus for states to act as patron.

Thirdly, the advantage that Somaliland offers as a client state, its geographic location on a strategic coast, is unrelated to the issue of sovereignty. Whether or not Somaliland is a recognized, independent, sovereign state hardly impacts its ability to provide a coastline and its accompanying benefits. In contrast, the advantage that Taiwan offered was its denial to China and the communist system. Taiwan needed to be fortified, built up, and secured to be able to stand on its own and not fall to Communism, Taiwan’s state formation and consolidation was a goal in and of itself for the patron. Somaliland’s benefits are more related to transportation, market access, port usage, and military positioning. These goals can be reached whether Somaliland is sovereign or not. Additionally, neighboring Eritrea and Djibouti could offer much of the same benefit without outside governments needing to deal with the issue of sovereignty.
Fourthly, there has been very heavy investment into the rehabilitation of Somalia and the establishment of effective governance. From 2001 to 2019, the US government alone obligated a total of around $5.5 billion in aid towards Somalia. Somalia received over $2 billion of official development assistance annually in 2017 and 2018, with the US, UK, EU, and Germany leading in aid contribution in both humanitarian and development aid. These contemporary figures don’t even include past numbers, with UNOSOM I and II costing hundreds of millions of dollars. With this level of investment, in the amount of time and effort spent and in financial contribution as well, it is difficult to see how leading powers would willingly back Somaliland’s reach for independence and destabilize Somalia’s political footing.

So, while the UAE meets the criteria for acting as a patron state, the stage is simply not set. The UAE could patron Somaliland, and perhaps it is doing so on a smaller, more subtle scale. But, what would motivate the UAE to act in a more committed manner as Somaliland’s patron state? At present moment, little comes to mind. The UAE’s power would have to be threatened from a particular angle where Somaliland would be of service. Perhaps if Iran, as an adversarial regional power, started to court relations with Somaliland. Or, perhaps if the war in Yemen jumped across the Gulf of Aden and spread into Somaliland, becoming another battleground in proxy conflict with Iran, causing the need to “win” Somaliland as the UAE and Saudi Arabia have not yet been able to do in Yemen. These are speculative examples, but until the UAE comes up against an

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oppositional alternative, and until sovereignty itself becomes a significant benefit, Somaliland is likely to remain in the status quo.

Taiwan’s case, and others, show a pattern – secessionist or independence movements must possess buy-in from leading world powers. Kosovo is another example of an unrecognized state, and if judged by the amount of recognition held, is even more successful than Taiwan. While there surely is contestation on the issue of Kosovo’s sovereignty, it is recognized by approximately half of UN members and half of the UNSC as well. The literature concerning Kosovo’s path is clear; it was able to reach this level of recognition and de facto sovereignty via the support of leading Western powers and its close allies.\textsuperscript{150} 151 As Riegls and Doboš effectively summarizes Somaliland’s situation, “The irrelevance of the case for the international community and a lack of (super)power backing for any side led to the de facto resolution based on effectiveness and military superiority while the invisibility of the case led to the importance of the normative criteria for international recognition to be overlooked, as no strong state promoter with global reach appeared on the scene.”\textsuperscript{152}

While it appears unfortunate that no leading power has emerged to champion Somaliland’s case for independence, this might not be the full picture. First, the lack of urgency and international regard for Somaliland’s situation is related to the lack of violence involved in the issue. The issue of Serbian perpetrated ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars was directly and repeatedly used as


\textsuperscript{152} Reigls & Doboš, 453.
rational for the West’s support of Kosovo independence. And, we see the intertwinment between violence and new state birth elsewhere as well, whether East Timor, Eritrea, or South Sudan. Of course, violence does not always contribute positively to secessionism, with the Biafran war and the unrealized Republic of Biafra coming easily to mind. Holistically viewed, Somaliland’s peace and stability is surely more valuable than a label of judicial sovereignty. Second, if it is indeed the case that patronage or dominant power buy-in is necessary for recognized sovereignty, there is the question of at what cost? If compliance to patron wishes is the price for sovereignty, is this not an alternate version of lacking sovereignty? As Hehir puts it, “The dependence on Western powers has obvious implications for the sovereignty of Kosovo but also has troubling implications for similar situations around the world; the lesson of Kosovo would appear to be that people desirous of independence must orchestrate their own oppression and concomitantly cultivate obsequious relations with powerful Western states.”

During the early existence of the independent Republic of Kosovo, then prime minister Hashim Thaci even said that “Kosovo will do nothing without Washington and Brussels. No unilateral actions.” The dynamic of gaining recognized sovereignty via cooperation with great powers brings forth questions on the relationship between statehood and independence. A gain in recognized statehood status does not necessarily mean a gain in independence/an independent government, if compliance with bloc priorities becomes a weighty expectation.

154 Hehir, 89.
In sum, Somaliland will not be able to follow in Taiwan’s steps of utilizing a patron-client state relationship, as that type of relationship requires an oppositional alternative to exist. As of present day, none exist to challenge the UAE, which I suggest as the closest thing Somaliland has to a patron state. However, for Somaliland and Taiwan and other unrecognized states, the issue of unrecognized sovereignty might not be so much of an issue after all. Recognition can be both explicit and implicit, with announced bilateral relations and dedicated embassies as the height of explicit recognition. However, a whole range actions can speak to implicit recognition. These include meetings between senior government officials, while avoiding titles and locations indicative of statehood, or establishing liaison or representation offices rather than embassies and consulates.156 There is a spectrum of interaction that allows for the maintenance of gray zoned ambiguity, while state-to-state interactions continue to take place to great effect. It can seem a bit silly as times, seeing that “Indeed, as long as it does not establish full diplomatic relations, which would necessarily constitute recognition, evidence suggests that, as long as it keeps insisting that it has not in fact recognized it, a state can even go so far as to interact with a contested state as though it were recognized in all but name.”157

Somaliland and Taiwan will continue to operate and develop as they have over the past many decades, and the focus should move on from this false binary of state and non-state, sovereign and non-sovereign. There are other questions needing to be addressed, such as how unrecognized states can better gain a seat at the table in multilateral relations, which are more restrictive on the issue of sovereignty. Or, how unrecognized states can contribute and makes ties

157 Ker-Lindsay, 285.
with one another – as Taiwan and Somaliland have just done. Perhaps, we can ask how the focus on unrecognition actually inversely perpetuates the issue itself. How might scholarly contribution on the issue of unrecognized state sovereignty intersect with issues regarding autonomous regions and unincorporated territories, or native nations? The issue of unrecognized state sovereignty is not limited to what some might see as numerically few and geographically small territories. Rather, it is one lens of many which can and should be used to challenge the very expansive idea of sovereignty.
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