

Queer Alliances: Paradoxes and Power in the Formation of Rights-Based Movement Coalitions

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Abstract

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Since the early 2000s, inter- and intra-movement coalitions composed of organizations within the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movements have formed at the local level in Washington State and Arizona. However, coalition unity that culminated in wins like marriage equality came at a cost in both states. While the movements expanded and unified, they often simultaneously ossified around goals that matter to the most advantaged segments of their respective communities in each state context. The result is a paradox: coalitions do sometimes form within and across movements, promote enduring unity across seemingly divergent movements, and facilitate rights campaign wins. Yet, these coalitions can simultaneously

reinforce hierarchical exclusions through the continued marginalization of issues that uproot conventional power dynamics, like police violence and economic inequality. This project seeks to examine and explain this paradox. How do we explain coalitions that are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive? I argue that the construction of a common political movement narratives and a shared core of opponents can help to explain this paradox. The development of shared political movement narratives and common opponents can expand movements in some contexts. However, the episodic nature of rights-based campaigns can simultaneously contain and undermine movement expansion, reinforcing movement divisions based on race, gender, and class. In order to demonstrate how this paradox occurs, I employed a multi-method study that encompasses semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in Washington State and Arizona and archival research. Interviews were conducted with a broad sample of coalition players in each state, including: organization leaders, advocates, community workers, and politicians involved in LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant coalition formation. Unlike previous studies, which study national organizations or single movements, this study focuses on grassroots, coalition-based mobilization across and within two movements. In doing so, this project examines the extent to which inter- and intra-movement coalitions formed to win rights or thwart rights losses represent and serve intersectional and more marginalized communities – groups in political movements that are often absent within contemporary law and social change, legal mobilization, and political movements scholarship.

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CHAPTER 1

Queer Alliances

In April of 2010, when Arizona’s Governor Jan Brewer signed Senate Bill (SB) 1070. SB 1070 was an omnibus anti-immigration bill that enabled local law enforcement officers to stop and question people that they have reason to believe are undocumented about their immigration status. When signing the new legislation, Governor Brewer proudly claimed that the legislation ensured that the “constitutional rights of all in Arizona remain[ed] solid, stable, and steadfast” (Brewer 2010). In many ways, SB 1070 has had a profound impact on politics in Arizona and has ignited struggles to protect against threats to constitutional rights. But probably not quite in the manner imagined by Governor Brewer and other conservative politicians and activists, who passed SB 1070 with the goal of curtailing the efforts of the immigrant rights movement in the state. The signing of SB 1070 awakened the re-formation of political movement building in Arizona, initiated a fervor of coalition advocacy that spanned the immigrant, labor, and Latinx communities, and fueled a growing grassroots queer migrant justice movement. This newly re-formed movement has, by some accounts, been wildly successful. Six years after SB 1070 was signed into the law, much of the law has been dismantled through lawsuits and the State Senator who authored it has been forced out of office through an embarrassing recall election. Furthermore, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who infamously and aggressively enforced SB 1070 and federal immigration law in Maricopa County, has lost a series of humiliating civil rights lawsuits. In 2016, due in large part to the political movement organizing that grew in response to SB 1070, Arpaio lost his re-election campaign to a Democrat after serving 24-years as the Maricopa County Sheriff. A now institutionalized grassroots advocacy coalition is expanding in Arizona – most recently through a successful ballot initiative campaign in 2016 that increased the minimum

wage across the state and required employers to provide paid sick leave (Pitzi 2016).

The new formation of political movement alliances around a law that threatened the rights of multiple minority communities in Arizona is remarkable, given how intermittently many movement organizations worked together in the state little more than a decade ago. In the decade before SB 1070 passed, cross-community coalitions at the state level were rare, particularly when it came to immigration and LGBTQ issues. When I asked advocates and organization leaders about cross-community support at that time, they had difficulty recalling any. Some openly admitted that alliances between cross-community organizations were virtually non-existent then. Immigrants, migrants, and people who cared for their rights and safety worked to combat the growing anti-immigration movement in the state legislature and at the ballot box without the support of many labor unions, LGBTQ organizations, or member-driven community of color organizations. When LGBTQ rights organizations fought an attempted proposition that would have banned the legal recognition of all same-sex partnerships in 2006 and failed to thwart a statewide constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in 2008, the statewide coalitions they formed lacked the support of many Latinx and immigrant rights organizations (*Arizona Together* 2008; *Vote No on Prop 102* 2008).

While statewide cross-community rights campaign coalitions largely did not form during this time, there were some important alliances at the city level and around individual protest actions that began to emerge in the mid-2000s, planting the possibility for statewide alliances in the future. In 2004, following a nationwide surge in anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiatives and renewed anti-immigration advocacy in Arizona, a local LGBTQ organization and a grassroots migrant organization in Tucson announced an alliance in response to what they saw as dual attacks from the same opponents (Chávez 2013). In 2006, the rising anti-immigration wave in

Arizona combined with a national movement for immigration reform, spurred mass immigrant rights protests both in Arizona and across the country that encompassed Latinx and undocumented people and an array of other progressive movement advocates (Archibold 2006). During the 2000s, these alliances would continue to grow and fracture as individual opponent campaigns gained steam and lost momentum. Then in 2010, a massive threat to the rights of the Latinx, migrant, and immigrant communities in Arizona hit the ground with the signing of SB 1070, igniting a new furor of advocacy that led to the formation of a Latinx, labor, and immigration justice coalition and ultimately facilitated the growth of the queer migrant movement in the state.

Juan, a community organizer with the queer migrant movement in Arizona who I interviewed for this study, was one of the individuals who became more involved in movement-building as a result of SB 1070. Juan and his peers first created a queer migrant organization in the state to call attention to the experiences of those who identified as members of the LGBTQ and migrant communities. According to Juan, the queer and trans migrant organizing born out SB 1070 ultimately “rippled” into an array of organizing spaces in the state. The queer migrant community conducted several political actions and educational forums in the 2010s. During the afternoon I spent with him, Juan recalled in awestruck terms how he and other queer migrant activists have pushed for new imaginings of movement, community, and being in the wake of a devastating anti-immigration law. In one action orchestrated by queer migrant activists, the pop star Lady Gaga publicly condemned SB 1070 when her 2010 Monster Ball Tour came to Phoenix. In another, activists forced space for a queer and trans migrant contingent in the Phoenix Pride parade, capturing the attention of local media and the crowd in what they felt had become a mainstream LGBTQ movement space, dominated by large corporate funders and

mostly white gay men and lesbians. For Juan and many other queer migrant community workers I met during my fieldwork, the 2010s were powerful moment for re-imagining and challenging the limits of political movement organizing that they argued centered heteronormative experiences and discrete rights-based goals that rarely served the interests of those who are part of both the LGBTQ and migrant communities.

As political movements re-formed through new alliances in Arizona, movement organizations in Washington State were working together in new coalitions as well. The narrative of movement formation in Washington state is, in many ways, similar to Arizona's. However, in Washington State, movement formation was facilitated by a series of rights "wins" rather than rights "losses," culminating in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in 2012. As in Arizona, in the early 2000s, immigrant, labor, and LGBTQ organizations struggled to advance their movement agendas and worked together sporadically. This was particularly true of the mainstream LGBTQ rights movement, which had suffered a set of debilitating losses in the late 1990s. Following the loss of a 1997 ballot initiative campaign that sought to add sexual orientation to the state's anti-discrimination law, the state's LGBTQ advocacy organization largely disbanded. The following year a bipartisan coalition of state legislators passed a state version of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), clarifying that state law restricted marriage to two-person, heterosexual couples alone. But, in the mid-2000s, as in Arizona, grassroots alliances began to emerge. In 2006, a collection of civil rights organizations and businesses successfully lobbied for the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity and expression in Washington's anti-discrimination law through the Anderson Murray Anti-Discrimination Act. At about the same time, one immigrant rights organization and several labor unions filed *amici curiae* briefs in support of same-sex couples in a LGBTQ movement-led

lawsuit that sought to overturn the state's DOMA. Although, notably, the briefs failed to include most member-driven community of color and immigration justice organizations in the state.

Partnerships between community of color and immigrant rights organizations, labor unions, and the mainstream LGBTQ rights movement in Washington continued to grow throughout the 2000s, peaking in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in 2012, in a campaign coalition that included over 500 movement, business, and religious organizations throughout the state. The marriage equality campaign was perceived as a huge political win for movement advocates in the state.

On the surface, the expansion of cross-community movement coalitions around episodic rights campaigns in Washington State and Arizona appears to be mostly a successful illustration of how divergent minority communities came together and advanced human rights. But, in each case, discrete rights advances and movement expansion came at a cost. This is especially apparent in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. Emilio is an advocate with the LGBTQ, Latinx, and undocumented immigrant communities in Washington State. Emilio, like many other organizers and advocates affiliated with these communities in Washington felt even further marginalized and exploited by the marriage equality campaign. During our conversation, Emilio directly criticized mainstream LGBTQ movement advocates for claiming that marriage equality was an important issue for the queer migrant and undocumented immigrant movements that grew in Washington State, Arizona, and nationally throughout the late 2000s and 2010s:

Emilio: For a long time, many LGBTQ folks who are white or many gay folks who were fighting for marriage equality, saw equality just in that, just in marriage, which is sort of a very singular issue to think about equality and equity. And I think that's different for undocumented folks because why does it matter if we are married if we are both undocumented?

For many people like Emilio, marriage equality served as an issue that centered the experiences

of white gay men and lesbians who had citizenship status and who saw equality “just in marriage,” and, thus, no longer felt a need to continue mobilizing for LGBTQ justice once same-sex marriage was legalized nationwide. As a result, a lot of funding for LGBTQ rights movement issues evaporated after marriage, leaving organizations that purported to serve all LGBTQ people, including queer migrants and undocumented immigrants, trans people, and LGBTQ people of color, in a severely under-resourced position in the immediate aftermath of the win. According to Emilio, in statement echoed by other advocates, the de-mobilization that occurred in the aftermath of marriage exemplified “white LGBTQ folks not really understanding the whole idea of white privilege.”


Movement expansion around the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality in Washington and, to a lesser degree, against SB 1070 in Arizona involved the contraction of agendas in ways that benefited the most mainstream members of minority communities, those who are perceived as the most politically acceptable, “deserving” minorities at the expense of people like Juan and Emilio. Hierarchical power dynamics responsible for the centering of wealth, whiteness, and masculinity in the United States are not confined to political institutions; they pollute political movement organizing as well. Both cases demonstrate how episodic rights campaigns can paradoxically expand and contract political movements. In the following pages, I argue that alliances that form across divergent movements often unite and fracture in frenzied bursts around rights struggles rather than along a linear trajectory forward towards progress and even the most egalitarian aims often coincide with the retrenchment of hierarchical power. I examine the complexities of rights-based movement formation by focusing on a series of questions designed to uncover the myriad ways in which hierarchical power shapes cross-community coalition building in progressive political movements. What factors contribute to

movement formation and what factors limit movement expansion? How do we account for the formation of movements that paradoxically expand into new communities through the exclusion of others? How do intense rights advocacy moments impact movement formation?

Inter and Intra-Movement Coalitions

In answering these questions, I focus on two levels of coalition formation in the LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor communities in Washington State and Arizona: (1) across or inter-movement coalitions and, (2) within or intra-movement coalitions. These coalitions form both within and across mainstream and marginalized movements organizations as delineated in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Mainstream and Marginalized Movement Organization Alignment



The organizations that compose political movement coalitions often encompass both political (i.e., policy and/or litigation focused) organizations and health and human service organizations that represent the different minority communities depicted in Figure 1.1. This study enhances past scholarship on political movements by problematizing what counts as a movement. Rather than understanding movements as relatively homogenous entities composed of either policy-focused organizations *or* organizations that focus on litigation, the movements in this study are composed of coalitions of policy, litigation, protest, and health and human services organizations that represent minority communities.

In theory, coalition-building may seem like an obvious way for movements to achieve rights wins and thwart losses. However, coalition-building across and within movements is a difficult and delicate process in practice, especially in contexts where the multiplicity of organizations that represent minority communities are sometimes rivals with one another when it comes to fundraising and grant applications. This has a great deal to do with how power dynamics influence the way that movement organizations align. For example, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 above, the separate organizations that exist within the LGBTQ and immigrant movements coalesce around four divisions driven by differences based on policy and subject position. Along the *marginalized* end of the movement advocacy spectrum, queer and trans organizations unite around what mainstream groups perceived as more “radical” issues during the course of this study, like prison abolition and trans-inclusive healthcare. Marginalized groups that represent undocumented people and undocumented workers united behind issues like forming a union to help fight exploitative labor practices, de-militarizing the border, and ending immigration detention. Along the *mainstream* end of the movement advocacy spectrum depicted in Figure 1.1, LGBTQ rights organizations united behind rights-based issues like marriage

equality and adding sexual orientation and gender identity and expression to anti-discrimination policy while immigrant rights organizations united behind comprehensive immigration reform.

The policy positions and subject positions represented within these organizations are frequently constrained by intersecting structural hierarchies. Laws, policies, and political opportunities can limit how funding and public services are distributed to one subject position, but not others and, thus, constrain the set of opportunities available for all movement actors. For example, immigration advocacy is often limited by funding policies (in both public and private agencies) that encourage organizations to serve some immigrant populations over others. In immigration advocacy, there many organizations that represent immigrant survivors of domestic violence. However, because many US laws explicitly prohibit organizations from serving undocumented immigrants, the organizational capacity of the undocumented immigrant population is relatively smaller given the community's need. In addition, *political opportunity structures* can determine how funding is distributed from foundations in ways that benefit certain communities over others. For instance, before marriage equality was legal nationwide, a political shift in a state legislature that placed supporters of marriage equality in control would have suddenly created the possibility for the legalization of same-sex marriage in the state. This political opportunity might then encourage funders to donate money to movement organizations to conduct public education campaigns about same-sex marriage, which, in turn, would sideline other LGBTQ issues, like trans inclusive health care, that are not directly related to marriage equality. When a political opportunity structure, like a political opening for marriage equality, happens at the same time that organizations are restricted from serving undocumented immigrants, this creates an intersecting structural hierarchy that reinforces the movement organizations to ignore or sideline the interests of people who are trans and undocumented.

These laws and political opportunities structures place constraints on movement organizations that, in addition to policy preference and subject position, can stand in the way of the formation of inter- and intra-movement alliances by encouraging the representation of some communities and issues over others.

Despite these intersecting structural limits, the divergent movement communities depicted in Figure 1.1 have sometimes found ways to unite through the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions in some circumstances. Inter-movement coalitions are those that form across two or more movement communities. For example, the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality was composed of a coalition that included movement organizations affiliated with the LGBTQ community, immigrant rights organizations, undocumented worker organizations, and organizations that represent the trans and queer community. Intra-movement coalitions, on the other hand, involve collaborations within a specific movement community. For instance, both the struggle against SB 1070 and the campaign for marriage equality involved conversations and partnerships within mainstream organizations in each movement community between more advantaged members (i.e., those who were most concerned with mainstream wins like marriage equality and comprehensive immigration reform) and disadvantaged members (i.e., those who identified as both LGBTQ and members of the immigrant or migrant community). Inter- and Intra-movement coalitions frequently occur in the same rights campaign or simultaneously in the same organizing spaces.

Disadvantaged members can be part of *intersectionally marginalized* subgroups within movement communities (Strolovitch 2007). Intersectionally marginalized subgroups are composed of people whose *subject positions* encompass multiple marginalized sociopolitical groups. Many contemporary sociological and anthropological scholars in law and society argue

that legal and political discourses or discursive practices shape how individuals understand their relationships with the world through the formation of collective subjectivities or subject positions (see e.g., Cramer 2015, Chua 2014, Nielson 2004, Merry 2003). For example, a person's enacted and intersubjective understanding of their gender is informed by discourses or discursive practices performed through social, legal, and political systems (Merry 2003, Butler 1990). People can adopt multiple subject positions in addition to gender. In her article on how domestic violence survivors in Hilo, Hawai'i can experience empowerment through the law, Merry (2003) argues that people can adopt an autonomous rights-bearing subjectivity or subject position when they have positive experiences with the law (e.g., when they went to court and a judge decides a case in their favor). According to Merry (2003), domestic violence survivors have more difficulty adopting this subjectivity when they have negative experiences with the legal system as, for instance, when a police officer responding to a domestic violence dispute refuses to treat the dispute as a serious criminal offense. A negative response like this de-emphasizes a survivor's autonomous-rights bearing subjectivity thereby minimizing the survivor's ability to develop a rights consciousness through the law. In my project, some interviewees adopt *intersectionally marginalized* subject positions. Someone has an intersectionally marginalized subject position if their understanding of self constitutes an LGBTQ *and* an immigrant or migrant subject position or another combination of subject positions associated with minority groups.

Recognizing the existence of complex inter- and intra-movement coalitions composed of organizations of people who hold different subject positions destabilizes tendency in social movement and sociolegal scholarship to understand political movements as unitary and static entities. The tendency in movement scholarship towards a homogenous understanding of

movements is reinforced by the fact that only a few movement organizations have good organizational archives. However, movements are composed of an array of organizations that often do not have the capacity to keep good records or sustain organizational websites. The boundaries of political movements are often somewhat arbitrary, always contestable, and openly contested. I focus on inter- and intra-movement coalitions in this project and argue that political movements are best understood as a dynamic series of shifting coalitions rather than as monolithic bodies that have clear, singular goals or directions. Political movements are dynamic and volatile entities that are never formed, but always forming. Further, the groups that compose the shifting coalitions that constitute movements are unequally situated. Hierarchical power dynamics determine to a large extent which interests are centered within coalitions, or are considered the agenda of the “mainstream movement,” and which interests are considered marginal. As a result, the interests of groups that represent the most privileged members of minority communities are frequently constructed as a movement’s core while comparatively less privileged, intersectionally marginalized groups (e.g., LGBTQ people of color, trans and queer people, and undocumented immigrants), and the interests that matter to them, are placed at the margins. In other words, movements are coalitions that are constantly changing, and every movement that comes together will tend to reinforce fractures based on differential power.

Political Movements as Shifting Coalitions of Formal and Informal Organizations

In this project, I draw from political movement and law and society scholarship in constructing a theoretical model that explains the dynamics of grassroots inter- and intra-movement coalition building in two state settings. I define *movements* as *political* phenomena represented by “continuous process[es] from generation to decline” in line with scholars who

adopt a political process model of movements and, thus, study movement formation through how movement actors take advantage of political opportunity structures and respond to structural constraints (see e.g., McAdam 1999: 36). I complicate and enhance this understanding of movements by further envisioning political movements as entities composed of a series of shifting inter- and intra-movement coalitions. Recently, sociological scholars have called attention to the failure of most empirical studies of political movements to recognize that movements themselves are composed of formal and informal coalitional networks of organizations (see e.g., Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Most political movement scholarship assumes a structural homogeneity to movements and, for this reason, many political movement studies focus on one or a small core of organizations that claim to represent a given minority movement. This is especially true of scholarship on what Eskridge (2001) calls contemporary “identity-based movements”: the collection of movements that arose out of the mass protests of the 1950s and 1960s, including the civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement, the gay rights movement, and the disability rights movement. Scholarship on identity-based political movements often tends to focus on one or a few legal or political organizations because of the limits of available organizational data (see e.g., Keck 2009; Andersen 2006, Epp 1998, Tushnet 2005). The focus on a small set of national organizations reinforces constructions of political movements in the classroom and in popular media that center the narratives of a small core of the most well-resourced leaders. This inevitably results in the marginalization of the role that grassroots advocacy networks play in movements for social change.

For example, today, there are a large array of historical accounts of the role that national political and legal organizations like Human Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal, and Freedom to Marry played in advancing same-sex marriage across the United States (Cathcart and Gabel-

Brett 2016, Becker 2015, Kaplan and Dickey 2015, Solomon 2014). However, there are very few accounts that focus on the complex roles that local actors played in the struggle for marriage equality or the ways in which local LGBTQ rights campaigns contributed to movement building, with a few notable exceptions (see e.g., Chávez 2013, Stone 2012, Levitsky 2007). The dearth of empirical studies on local advocacy networks is understandable. Grassroots networks are not easily mapped or identified because they are composed of collectives of constantly shifting formal and informal organizations and alliances. At the local level, it is common for organizations to emerge for several years and then disappear, only to be replaced by new formations that may or may not include some of the same movement actors. Furthermore, the various struggles that local actors are involved in are not always archived or well-documented. Statewide ballot measure campaign coalitions that collect enough signatures to appear on the ballot in a general election may generate a lot of paperwork and media coverage, but campaigns that fail to make it onto the ballot, legislative campaigns that are centered in state capitols, and local court case campaigns that do not make it to an appellate court often do not. This is especially true in the 2000s, when mass layoffs at local news media outlets resulted in severe under-reporting on local politics and campaign websites and organizations were likely to appear for a few months during intense advocacy moments and dissolve once a campaign ended.

This project seeks to fill in the research gap through an in-depth examination of grassroots coalition building within the LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor movement communities in Washington State and Arizona. By analyzing the formation of political movement alliances, this study destabilizes contemporary understandings of “identity-based movements” that assume movement formation can primarily be found within a small collective of national organizations or movement organizations that represent one subject position. Instead, this study advances a

conceptual, methodological shift by studying political movements through alliances across a multiplicity of organizations and groups that hold an array of intersecting subject positions across intersecting structural hierarchies. When defining the LGBTQ rights movement or immigrant rights movement, it does not make sense to confine our understandings of these movements to specific minority populations alone. After all, movements are often most powerful and their ability to advance social change holds the greatest potential when they move across and through subject position boundaries, drawing in an amalgamation of diverse groups that span race, gender, and class into struggles against political and legal oppression.

Consequently, in this study, I understand political movements as a dynamic series of shifting inter- and intra-movement coalitions. Constructing movements as expansionist entities that defy specific organizational ties and transcend individual subject position boundaries is consistent with the critiques of scholars who decry monolithic understandings of activism and political movements studies that center organizational formation (Cohen 1999, Piven and Cloward 1979). Thus, in the same vein as Majic (2014), who argues that activists often simultaneously work in non-profit organizations and conduct non-organizational movement activism through her study of sex worker rights advocacy in California, this study recognizes that advocacy networks are both within and outside of formal organizations. The coalitions in this study encompass formal non-profit organizations and advocacy organizations, and informal organizations that are composed of volunteers who unite under a common name and mission, but have not applied for formal non-profit status with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). I argue that movement actors are not confined to the limits of formal organizations in their advocacy. Further, I contend that scholars should not only evaluate movements based on outcomes. Scholars should also study political movements through the expansion and contraction of inter-

and intra-movement coalitions. In other words, movements should not only be measured by their ability to attain discrete, rights-based goals, but also by their potential to expand into new struggles against power-laden legal and political hierarchies.

Legal Rights and Political Movement Formation

This is not to say that legal rights do not matter in political movement formation. Rights matter tremendously, but more for the extent to which they facilitate the expansion of inter- and intra-movement coalitions than as discrete policy ends or goals (McCann 1994). This study draws from law and society scholarship on *legal mobilization* in adopting an instrumentalist understanding of the role that rights play in movements for social change (see e.g., Zemans 1983). Legal mobilization scholars adopt a holistic understanding of rights by analyzing how advocates mobilize legal rights at the grassroots in struggles for social change. Instead of confining rights to litigation, legal mobilization scholars argue that rights are constituted through norms, symbols, and discourses in social and political life. Rights not only encompass court cases and judicial decisions, they also encompass grassroots aspirations – or how activists adopt new formations of what rights should be from the bottom-up. Thus, legal mobilization researchers have studied how the right to same-sex marriage moved from the aspirations of activists to an institutionalized legal reality (NeJaime 2014), why civil rights movement activists chose to pursue school desegregation before economic justice (Goluboff 2005), and how women and minorities have mobilized the law in the movement against discrimination in the workplace (Burstein 1991).

This study draws from and enhances legal mobilization scholarship by examining the paradoxical effects of rights struggles on movements for social change. Legal mobilization

scholars have long argued that rights struggles should be studied based on their expansionist and containing effects on movement mobilization (see e.g., McCann 1994). However, few studies fully examine these paradoxical effects because they tend to focus on homogenous political movements (see e.g., Keck 2009, Andersen 2006, Goldberg-Hiller 2004). Although many legal mobilization studies brilliantly uncover the promise and limits of the law within homogenous political movement settings, they largely do not engage with how movement struggles expand and contract across a multiplicity of organizations involved in grassroots settings. This study fills in this research gap by constructing movements as a set of shifting coalitions and examining the coalitional dynamics of the LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor rights movements in two different state contexts.

In arguing that that legal rights should be understood more as means than ends, this study challenges also law and social change scholarship that studies movement mobilization based on the success of rights wins in political or legal venues (see e.g., Klarman 2014, Rosenberg 2008, Klarman 2004, Kluger 2004). Many law and social movement scholars argue that legal rights cannot be advanced through court wins and, thus, legal advocacy tactics are a “hollow hope” for movements for social change (Rosenberg 2008). This scholarship involves two problematic underlying assumptions: (1) that movements are best evaluated for their ability to achieve court rulings that succeed in concretely securing legal entitlements, and (2) that academics can determine how oppressed communities should make long-term strategic choices about which political tactics to pursue without incorporating the standpoint of activists in their studies.

The first assumption, that movements are best evaluated on outcomes, is problematic because it constructs political movements that do not achieve wins as failed movements. As this project will show, some of the most powerful movements, that have the greatest potential to

expand into new struggles, form through failure, loss, and trauma. This is certainly what happened with the immigrant and labor justice movement in Arizona, where SB 1070, a law that had a devastating impact on minority communities in the state, galvanized and activated an entire generation of advocates, facilitating the formation of a cross-movement coalition that ultimately achieved a number of successes in the state. In line with legal mobilization scholars, I argue that, instead of evaluating movements based on their outcomes, we should evaluate their expansionist potential (McCann 1994, Goldberg-Hiller 2004, Scheingold 1974). Thus, for movement mobilization, the extent to which rights struggles enable the construction of movement coalitions that can more easily move onto new struggles for justice after an advance, is a better metric for mobilization than the success of discrete rights-based outcomes.

The second assumption, that it is sensible for academics to theorize which political tactics activists should pursue in struggles for social change, is problematic because oppressed communities operate within constantly changing political environments where choices are heavily constrained and often delimited by outside actors and opponents. For marginalized communities, movement building is frequently a struggle for survival against institutionalized oppression and continually changing circumstances. In this environment, it does not make sense to decide between pursuing court cases *or* legislation *or* ballot initiatives in struggles for social change, because institutional access is severely limited and changing political dynamics, public opinion, and other events can suddenly alter the political context within which movements operate, disrupting plans at a moment's notice. For instance, in the aftermath of the marriage equality win in Washington State, many LGBTQ groups began to hold community forums and to initiate advocacy discussions to strategize about mobilizing behind policies that most impacted LGBTQ people of color and trans people. This planning, however, was largely derailed when

LGBTQ rights opponents started threatening the state's LGBTQ inclusive anti-discrimination law at the state legislature and through ballot initiative campaigns that targeted the state's trans community by attempting to remove legal protections for trans and gender non-conforming people that were adopted in the state long ago. When communities face institutionalized oppression, political openings for advances, when they exist, are very slim, and unplanned attacks from dominant social groups are common. Within this context, assuming barriers to movement formation without considering the standpoint of activists, who live in contexts where political opportunities are constantly changing in unexpected ways, is unrealistic and patronizing

In this study, I challenge each assumption in law and social change scholarship by constructing a new theoretical framework for explaining how rights operate in movements for social change that centers the standpoint of activists through an analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with grassroots activists engaged in political movement coalition building. In doing so, I examine how rights work based on the extent to which they expand movements within heavily constrained political contexts as well as limit the opportunities for movement building available for oppressed communities. I argue that in examining the mobilizing potential within rights-based struggles, we should understand rights struggles as *episodes*: by which I connote intense advocacy moments created when external events alter a local political network, creating the possibility for a major rights-based advance or rights-based loss for the first time. I contend that intense offensive and defensive rights-based advocacy moments, or *rights episodes*, can result in the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions, and, thus, expand political movement mobilization. At the same time, these moments also often involve the further marginalization of intersectionally disadvantaged organizations and people within movements, particularly those who are a part of the marginalized organizations discussed above in Figure 1.1.

In offensive rights episodes, this marginalization is driven by mainstream organizations and, to some extent, opponents, who reinforce the centering of mainstream movement narratives that render invisible the experiences and issues most important to intersectionally disadvantaged groups. In defensive rights episodes, marginalization is driven mostly by opponent groups that campaign around policies that target and attack minority communities that, in turn, funnel movement responses through mainstream narratives that downplay or ignore difference. With both offensive and defensive rights episodes, intersectionally marginalized groups are often left worse off, as the resources devoted to the advocacy vortex that forms in order to achieve a rights win or thwart a loss dissipate and as public education campaigns reinforce a mainstream vision of minority communities that contributes to the further “othering” of more disadvantaged minority groups who are constructed as socially “undesirable.” In analyzing the phenomena of episodic rights campaigns, I focus on two major rights episodes: the *offensive* Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality and the *defensive* campaign against the virulently anti-immigrant SB 1070. Given that offensive and defensive rights episodes simultaneously expand movements by facilitating the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions and contain movements by reinforcing the further marginalization of disadvantaged groups, I argue that we should understand rights in paradoxical rather than either/or terms that obscure the complexities of rights-based advocacy in movements for social change.

Case Selection

I examine the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movement formation through case studies of two states: Washington and Arizona. My goal is to illustrate the complexity of political movement formation, to demonstrate the need for more attention to coalitions in studies of

rights-based movements, and to explain the ways in which political movement advocacy is often connected to hierarchical power dynamics. I have identified Washington and Arizona as my core cases for several reasons discussed below. Washington and Arizona provide a good pairing because some similarities make it possible to study movement formation in each state while other sharp differences between the two states mean that they can together reveal considerable complexity in movement mobilization at the local level and the various roles that grassroots advocacy networks play in coalition formation. The two state variables described here are chosen not because they are perfectly independent, and, thus, suitable for a linear causal analysis. This study is not an analysis of what causes rights wins or rights losses. Instead, my project is designed to reveal *how* political movement coalitions unite and fracture and *why* hierarchical power dynamics often persist in political movement formation.

As a threshold matter, inter-and intra-movement coalitions that span the LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor communities have formed in each state at the grassroots level. These coalitions formed around the same time that all three communities experienced political setbacks. In Washington, there are few signs of effective cross-community coalition work in the early 2000s. In 2005, only one immigrant rights organization (*Hate Fee Zone*, now *OneAmerica*) signed onto an *amicus* brief filed by civic and community leaders in support of gay and lesbian couples fighting for marriage equality in the case *Anderson v. King County*. By contrast, during the 2012 Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality, a wide array of organizations that represent immigrant communities endorsed the referendum. Similarly, in Arizona, when the state passed a same-sex marriage ban in 2008, the statewide campaign to thwart the initiative included no visible partnerships with immigrant rights organizations or organizations representing communities of color. Since then, coalitions between LGBTQ,

immigrant, and labor movement organizations have formed at the local level in Arizona (see e.g., Chávez 2013).

While the timing of coalition formation is similar across the two cases, there is important variation in Washington and Arizona on other dimensions. This includes variation across the two states (1) in the sequence of political and legal activism that occurred before and during efforts at coalition building, and (2) in the overall political culture, with Arizona much more conservative than Washington on LGBTQ and immigration issues. The Washington and Arizona cases show that rights losses and wins can provide an impetus for coalition building regardless of whether such losses and wins come in the courts or through political processes. In Washington state, movement advances usually occur through political processes like ballot initiative and legislative campaigns. In Arizona, on the other hand, these political processes are almost entirely closed off for movements since the state legislative and executive branches are controlled by many Republicans committed to anti-immigration, religious freedom, and right to work policies. Consequently, when movement wins do occur in Arizona, they often materialize in court campaigns that challenge the limits of state laws that movement actors argue violate the constitutional rights of minorities.

In addition to the different venues through which movement wins manifest in the two states, the sequence of advances also varies across Washington and Arizona, particularly for the LGBTQ and immigrant rights movements. Throughout the mid-2000s and 2010s, following significant policy losses in the 1990s, the LGBTQ, labor, immigrant rights movements advanced a series of discrete rights wins in Washington, a state that leans heavily Democratic. During this time, Washington experienced the institutionalization of in-state tuition for undocumented college students, the passage of an LGBTQ inclusive non-discrimination act in, the legalization

of marriage equality, and the passage of a law providing state financial for undocumented students. By contrast, throughout the same period of time in Arizona, a hostile state government that leans heavily Republican instituted a series of debilitating rights losses for LGBTQ, Latinx, and immigrant rights organizations. Between 2000 and 2010 alone Arizona enacted a stringent voter ID law that also limited access to state public benefits for undocumented persons, banned in-state tuition for undocumented students, passed a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, and passed the virulently anti-immigrant SB 1070, which allows local police to stop suspected undocumented immigrants and question them about their immigration status on the basis of race. Yet, despite contradictory trajectories of rights wins and losses, inter and intra-movement coalitions have emerged within the LGBTQ and immigrant communities in each state. By looking at both Arizona and Washington, contrasting cases of coalition development, this project provides a broader account of inter- and intra-movement coalition formation than studies that look only at national organizations alone, examine states with similar demographics and similar political contexts, or focus on a small subset of legal or political organizations rather than the various coalitions of organizations that compose movements.

Terminology: Describing Multiple Subject Positions in Contested a Terrain

Subject positions in political movements are in a constant state of flux. This is especially true of the LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Queer) movement, which challenges mainstream conceptualizations of sexuality and gender. The political labels that movement actors use in advocacy have altered dramatically over the past 60 years. For example, the term “homosexual,” which was often used in describing the LGBTQ movement in the 1960s and 1970s, is considered over-medicalized and a relic of mid-20th Century stigma. Similarly, the

term “queer,” which was once an epithet for people perceived as LGBTQ, has been reclaimed by members of the LGBTQ community and is now used by mainstream and marginalized organizations alike. Many of the LGBTQ organizations discussed in this project do not use the same acronym or terminology to when engaging in advocacy around sexual orientation and gender identity. This is a reflection of broad debate and community tensions over language and terminology. In order to best achieve clarity and inclusiveness, and because this project concerns inter- and intra- movement coalitions, I use the term “LGBTQ” to broadly refer to the organizing of mainstream groups that focus on issues like expanding anti-discrimination laws and workplace protections as well as marginalized queer and trans groups that focus on issues like trans inclusive healthcare. I use this term because it was the term most often employed by members of both communities during my fieldwork. Stated differently, I use “LGBTQ” when discussing the political movement as a whole. I use the terms “lesbian and gay” and “mainstream LGBTQ” to refer to mainstream organizations that have primarily focused on achieving discrete rights-based goals and formal legal equality. I use the terms “queer,” “transgender,” “trans,” and “gender non-conforming” to refer to marginalized organizations that are committed to economic, racial, and gender justice issues that are broadly aimed at contesting systemic oppression.

The subject positions adopted by members of the immigrant rights movement have, similarly, shifted over the past few years. Recognizing this, I use “immigrant” to describe those who engage in advocacy around comprehensive immigration reform and those who advocate for more community-based alternatives that reject what they see as harmful compromises when it comes to the militarization of the border and immigration detention. I use “migrant” to describe those organizations that advocate on behalf of seasonal migrant workers in the United States. Finally, the label “Latinx” started to surge among student, activist, and community building

groups in 2015, including groups that advocate for migrant justice and are a part of this study. Advocates started adopting this term as a gender inclusive term to describe the range of gender identities present in Latino/a, Latin@ community organizing spaces (Logue 2015). The term “Latinx” is still deeply contested within movement spaces as of this writing; however, I use it in this project because it was used by an array of study participants in describing their advocacy.

Studying Inter- and Intra-Movement Coalitions

I rely primarily on the sociolegal and historical context framework used by political movement and law and society scholars to identify the context within which groups form inter- and intra-movement coalitions and the impact that the politics of rights has on movement formation (Chua 2014, Gleeson 2012, Ernst, 2010, Lovell 2012, Levitsky 2007, Strolovitch 2007, Merry 2000, McCann 1994, Engel 1984). The analysis presented in this project details how rights-based political movement coalitions expand and contract movement mobilization at the local level, the role that intersectionally marginalized people play in movement expansion and contraction, and the relationship between episodic rights campaigns and social change as illuminated through 51 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant community leaders and advocates and over 30 participant observations. I conducted interviews and participant observations between December of 2014 and July of 2015 in Washington State and August of 2015 and October of 2015 in Arizona. I conducted 25 interviews in Washington and 26 in Arizona. The use of in-depth interviews is particularly well suited for investigations of identity politics, legal mobilization, and intersectional alliances as it “is useful for uncovering aspects of a phenomenon that may remain hidden, [and] because...the...trust that can be established between the researcher and subject in an in-person interview is invaluable when

encouraging subjects to define issues for themselves” (Simpson 1998:163). The goal of this study is to develop a bottom-up, grassroots lens to delineate how inter- and intra-movement coalition formation contributes to mobilization.

I interviewed organization leaders, advocates, community workers, and politicians who were active in and supportive of the campaigns associated with cross-community coalitions in Washington and Arizona and those who, though involved in interest group advocacy, chose not to engage in key campaigns. I also interviewed individuals who later came to regret or doubt their involvement in some campaigns, or questioned the utility of coalitions in movement mobilization. Many of the individuals interviewed who chose not to engage in some campaigns, expressed regret over their participation, or viewed alignments with mainstream organizations with speculation, either hold intersecting identities (e.g., identify as immigrants, persons of color, and/or LGBTQ) or hold more marginalized identities within these communities (e.g., are trans, gender non-conforming, or undocumented people).

Interviewees were given one of two interview protocols, one for organization leaders and one for advocates, community workers, and politicians. These protocols were designed as a loose guide for the interviews in order to allow interviewees the freedom to construct their own personal advocacy stories. I have included both interview protocols in Appendix I. I anticipated that organizational leaders might have a difficult time talking about alliances within their movements, so I began by asking more general questions about alliance building. I then asked about alliances across and within movements more specifically, including questions about coalition work in statewide rights campaigns. At the end of each interview, interviewees completed a post-interview demographic survey.

In conducting these interviews, I first identified potential interviewees through local

newspaper articles and organization archives naming key advocates and leaders. After reaching out to all identified potential interviewees with whose contact information was readily available, I used a snowball sampling technique to identify additional potential interviewees who are active in intersectional advocacy in both states. Before each interview, participants were presented with an informed consent form. Each interview was recorded and lasted anywhere between about 30 minutes and 2 hours depending upon interviewee availability. The interview analysis presented in this project is compiled from discourse patterns and common experiences recognized through the interview process and by using NVivo's qualitative research software to code patterns in transcribed interviews.¹

In addition to the in-depth interviews, I also engaged in participant observations whenever possible in order to more fully flesh out an understanding of the coalition's legal rights advocacy, to connect with potential interviewees, and to give back to the organizations and individuals who agreed to participate in this study. As a researcher and graduate student from a major university, I occupy a space of privilege that many of my interviewees do not. I am a white, cisgender woman, identify as queer, and come from a middle-class background. I had experience attending LGBTQ organization events and labor movement events through my graduate student union before beginning my fieldwork. I also interned for the civil rights law firm Columbia Legal Services while in law school in 2012, where I had the opportunity to meet local leaders involved in the immigrant rights movement in Washington State. During this internship, I assisted the law firm in litigating cases on behalf of organizations with large

¹ Interviews are lightly edited to eliminate excessive words (i.e., yeah, like, um, and that) and to explain acronyms and references to legislation used by interviewees in order to facilitate reading. Interviewees and other private individuals they referred to have been given pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.

undocumented immigrant memberships and observed the multiracial task force on police accountability – a coalition of community of color organizations that formed to combat police violence in Seattle. The main immigrant rights case I worked on concerned the increased border patrol presence along the Washington State border, which local immigration advocacy organizations argued created a climate of fear in Washington’s immigrant communities (Jayapal and Godoy 2012). Through these prior experiences, I developed contacts with local organizations in Washington State that I was able to go to when initially reaching out to interviewees. These experiences also taught me that many marginalized communities experience researcher intervention as exploitation and that white social justice advocates have a history of ignoring and marginalizing issues that matter to communities of color, undocumented people, and trans and queer people in Washington State. In recognizing this, I developed a methodological model designed to prevent my researcher interventions from tending towards minority community exploitation. Specifically, I developed a volunteer-intensive participant observation component to my study that involved volunteering at and participating in events designed to organize and provide services to the communities at the center of this study. In this way, I actively accounted for researcher positionality and subjectivity as a mechanism of transparency while conducting my research in line with contemporary critiques from qualitative and multi-method scholars in political science (Büthe and Jacobs 2015, Showden and Majic 2014).

Through the participant observation component, I was able to both connect with interviewees and give back through volunteer work to participant organizations. Because coalitions are the subject of the project, I was unable to volunteer with every organization. However, I did substantial volunteer work at coalition-based events. Most of the volunteer work

I engaged in was through Trans Pride Seattle in 2015 and 2016, where I served as a volunteer lead and spent about two months each year working with the organizing committee to help plan the event, which draws between 3,000 and 5,000 participants and many local organizations each June. While I volunteered, event organizers were aware that I was both a researcher and a volunteer committed to trans, immigration, labor, and racial justice. In addition to volunteering, I identified potential moments for participant observation by following group announcements, press releases, and action alerts. I also observed select public organization events such as protests, educational panels and forums, volunteer opportunities, and public membership meetings throughout the duration of my research. Through these participant observations, I was able to identify the extent to which differing groups work together both during and after heated advocacy moments and identify new interviewees.

The purpose of my chosen methodology is to explore how advocacy in different institutional and non-institutional forums contributed to and limited the formation of inter and intra-movement coalitions. The results presented are meant to convey the experiences expressed during the course of my research in a manner that considers and reflects upon my own positionality as a researcher and subject. The chapters that follow focus on those individuals who have been involved in large statewide campaigns and more localized, municipal efforts that focus on issues important to LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant communities. Unlike previous studies, which have focused on social justice movement organizations by studying national groups, this study focuses on state-level organizations, and, in doing so, explores the extent to which coalitions represent and serve intersectional and more marginalized communities – core groups in social justice movements that are largely ignored in contemporary scholarship. With this said, it is also important to recognize the limits of this research. This research does not provide a

causal analysis or a comprehensive analysis of every legal and political campaign (or attempted campaign) that interviewees have been involved with in the past. Rather, it is designed to identify those moments interviewees recollect as most important with the understanding that memories of these moments and their believed importance may shift over time, but, are crucial for learning about how communities form a collective identity and the limits of that identity. The life experiences recounted by interviewees are personal advocacy stories, which, in many cases, played out against a background of racism, classism, homophobia, transphobia, and sexism. The following chapters include excerpts from some, though not all, of these advocacy stories that delineate some of the factors that drive coalition unity and movement expansion as well as those that fracture and divide rights-based movement coalitions.

Outline of the Project

I argue that coalition formation often occurs in paradoxical ways, simultaneously expanding and constraining the political movements at the center of this study. The coalitions that formed around statewide campaigns in this study tended to expand movements by mobilizing and activating new groups, creating a sense of inter- and intra-movement unity, and bringing more community awareness to smaller organizations that represent intersectional and more marginalized movement constituencies. However, as the coalitions I analyze in this project expanded movements they also often constrained them, limiting the issues and opportunities available for marginalized group members, driving resources toward larger organizations that serve comparatively more privileged members of minority communities, and reinforcing historic power inequities within political movements. I present this argument across four chapters.

Chapters 2 and 3 begin my analysis of how coalition building tended to expand and

constrain the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant movements in Washington State and Arizona through an examination of how rights advocacy impacts political movement mobilization. These chapters argue that, rather than only asking which political tactics are best for achieving social change, when evaluating political movements, law and politics scholars should also examine the expansionist and containing impacts of rights events or *rights episodes*. When many scholars study law and social change they sometimes assume that movement actors can choose between the court cases and other political tactics, like legislation and ballot initiatives, when engaging in struggles for social change (see e.g., Klarman 2014, Rosenberg 2008). Through these chapters, I expose problems associated with studying law and social change in this manner. Political movements are rarely pre-constituted and movement actors are not usually in a position to chart strategy at the beginning of political campaigns. Rather, movements are unstable, hydra-like creatures that coalesce and divide as they attempt to respond to myriad short-term external threats that constrain venue choice. I argue that a more nuanced and contingent understanding of rights is necessary in order to capture how rights struggles impact political movement formation. Thinking of rights struggles as episodes better encompasses how rights can be strategically employed as movement resources, often in simultaneously expansionist and containing ways. Rights episodes tend to be at once activating and mobilizing moments that can achieve some successes and uncontrollable experiences that can force groups to devote significant resources to the most mainstream movement constituencies, containing movement mobilization. Chapters 2 and 3 delineate why studying rights struggles as episodes is useful for understanding the relationship between law and social change through an analysis of two cases of intense rights-based advocacy, or two rights episodes: (1) the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality in Washington State, and (2) the omnibus anti-immigration Senate Bill 1070 in Arizona.

I contextualize each rights episode through a sociolegal history of inter- and intra-movement coalition formation in Washington and Arizona. Modeled on legal mobilization scholarship (see e.g., Chua 2014, Gleeson 2012, Keck 2009, McCann 1994), these histories are constructed from interviews with coalition members, participant observations, organizational archives, news media, and a synthesis of secondary research materials. These chapters illustrate how inter- and intra-movement coalitions that formed through the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant movements in Washington and Arizona both mobilized and fractured around rights-based struggles. Chapters 2 and 3 include a discussion of key moments and tactics that helped activate these political movements and encouraged the formation of coalitions as well those that contained movement mobilization by limiting the capacity to move onto new movement struggles.

Chapter 4 addresses how the inter- and intra- movement coalitions described in the preceding chapters formed and why these coalitions were often unable to successfully pursue issues designed to uproot power. In this chapter, I delineate which factors contributed to the simultaneous expansion and contraction of inter- and intra-movement coalitions in Washington and Arizona based on an analysis of patterns across in-depth interviews with organization leaders, advocates, and community workers. This chapter further develops how coalitions unite and fracture through the construction of a shared past narrative and a common core of opponents (Adam 2017). I argue that the creation of a common political movement past narrative based on shared opponents facilitated the formation of coalitions in both states and, in doing so, expanded movement mobilization. Movement constituents formed inter- and intra-movement coalitions in Washington and Arizona by constructing narratives and building relationships around the idea that individuals and groups involved in these coalitions were part of one community that shared a

common political movement, or “civil rights,” past and the same opponents. This enabled the new relationships built between and across seemingly disparate movements to last beyond episodic rights campaigns, in some circumstances contributing to movement expansion and mobilization over time. However, the formation of this collective past simultaneously constrained political movements by reinforcing historic exclusions based on power. Chapter 4 ends with a discussion of how the formation of inter- and intra-movement alliances within both states tended to fracture and contain movements. Movement division occurred because most funding was consolidated in mainstream movement organizations that claimed responsibility for discrete rights wins at the expense of marginalized groups, because coalitions that formed around rights-based campaigns often involved the tokenization of intersectionally marginalized people within movements, and because movement organizations often had different policy and issue preferences that fractured alliances.

Chapter 5 examines how intersectionally marginalized subgroups within movements have strategically pushed back against movement the contraction discussed in the previous chapters (and analyzed in-depth in Chapter 4) in some contexts. These subgroups helped both mainstream and marginalized organizations thwart the constraining effects of movement formation in some circumstances. Using Merry’s (2006) notion of lawyer’s as translators, I argue that these *intersectional translators* are tactically important because (1) they combat the constraints of a discrete rights focus by demonstrating how this is strategically short-sighted and how adopting an expansionist view of the movement is in the interests of coalition partners, and (2) they call attention to the fact that inadequate commitment to the most marginal is a failure to advance justice. Using original data constructed from in-depth interviews and participant observations conducted with movement actors in Washington State and Arizona, Chapter 5 demonstrates how

intersectional translators create opportunities for expansionist movements through participating in and intentionally utilizing rights campaigns as resources for more expansionist ends; through the construction of new groups and subgroups; and through educational outreach and in-depth conversations across and within mainstream and marginalized movement organizations.

Most research on political advocacy within interest groups focuses on a single or a few political tactics and one community of interest group or movement organizations. Furthermore, most studies of activism around rights struggles within interest groups focus on national organizational litigation strategies or on a single, local organization. For this reason, our understanding of how local political movements impact social change through legal rights advocacy is under-theorized. This is especially true of research on LGBTQ organizations, which almost exclusively looks into the strategies and discourses adopted by top-down, national organizations. While national organizations clearly had an important role in political alliance building strategies, the divergent state case studies presented in this project allow me to uncover the importance of local organizations that adapt national imperatives to local conditions. Through this study, I illuminate how rights-based movement advocates and community workers might more effectively ally around crosscutting interests. Hence, my conclusion summarizes the core arguments made in each chapter and briefly analyzes how the coalitions described in the previous chapters evolved and have somewhat successfully thwarted the containing tendencies in past coalition formation. The model coalitions described in the conclusion include the One Phoenix ID coalition and the Washington SAFE Alliance. The One Phoenix ID coalition formed to achieve a municipal identification card for the City of Phoenix while the Washington SAFE Alliance formed to combat legislation and ballot initiative campaigns designed to limit the inclusion of transgender people in state anti-discrimination law. Each coalition has, in varying

ways, been effective at pushing back against the hierarchical power divisions that are often characteristic of coalition alignment. This study, thus, ends with a series of suggestions for creating more transformative political movements through coalition formation.

CHAPTER 2

Washington's Referendum 74 Campaign for Marriage Equality and the Paradoxical Implications of Created Rights Episodes

Bianca: I was dismayed, but not actually surprised to notice that [mainstream LGBTQ organization] had effectively collapsed *and the analogy was the neutron star*. That you had this hot bright, burning ball of energy that was providing life and so much movement and progression that had collapsed to almost nothing and it was still hot, but it was super dense, and it had almost a gravitational pull of its own. It wasn't quite a black hole, but it wasn't providing the impetus anymore. It wasn't a viable source of light and energy anymore. [Emphasis Added]

Introduction

In this chapter, I begin my analysis of political movement expansion and contraction by examining the relationship between episodic rights campaigns and movement mobilization in Washington State. In order to convey how episodic rights campaigns contribute to movement mobilization in a language that reflects the experiences of movement actors, I develop the concept *rights episodes*. While interviewing organization leaders and advocates, conducting participant observations, and analyzing archives and news media for this project, people who were involved in constructing inter- and intra-movement coalitions used similar terminology to describe intense rights-based advocacy moments. They would call these moments “fires,” “explosions,” “machines,” “hurricanes,” “vortexes,” and, my favorite analogy, “neutron stars.” Each analogy captures how heated rights struggles can sometimes manifest into mobilizing moments, or “episodes,” that activate new organizations and facilitate partnerships at the same time that they contain movement mobilization by focusing advocacy around discrete issues that usually do not serve the interests of marginalized people. How do struggles to obtain rights wins and thwart rights losses impact movement mobilization? How do they contribute to and/or inhibit the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions?

In answering these questions, I engage with scholarship on political movements, law and social change, and legal mobilization by illuminating how inter- and intra-movement coalitions can form through rights struggles within constrained political environments. The research findings presented here enhance this scholarship by demonstrating why scholars should also examine rights as means rather than only as ends when studying movement mobilization. As described briefly in Chapter 1, it is unrealistic for scholars to assume that it is always beneficial for movement actors to focus on whether to pursue change in courts *or* other political venues. Movement actors are rarely wedded to one venue or another, because opportunities for change can open at a moment's notice or close swiftly in the face of new opponent threats, disrupting and realigning movement agendas and priorities. This infamously occurred, for example, in the LGBTQ rights movement in the 1980s, when the AIDS epidemic combined with the ascent of politicians who aligned with LGBTQ movement opponents forced movement actors to mobilize behind HIV/AIDS, derailing organization agendas practically overnight. Because the conditions in which political movement organizations operate are constantly changing, efforts at centering one type of forum or tactic in the pursuit of social change are not likely to pay off. Instead, the strategy for grassroots movement actors is often in being prepared in the long-term for when the next intense advocacy event will activate and mobilize a mass movement. For this reason, in studying political movement formation, law and politics scholars should also examine movement mobilization based on the rippling expansionist and containing effects of rights events or rights episodes that emerge within political networks in different environments and contexts. These rippling effects can complicate future political movement struggles, making it easier or more difficult to organize around new issues depending on how much the rights episode contributes to the unification and division of movement alliances.

Many law and politics scholars study law and social change by examining the extent to which institutions are appropriate strategic choices for movement actors involved in struggles to obtain rights wins (see e.g., Klarman 2014, Rosenberg 2008, Klarman 2004, Kluger 2004). They often make these arguments through studies that focus on judicial decisions made at the Supreme Court and on conversations with legal elites without engaging with the experiences of grassroots movement actors. I enhance and complicate this scholarship through an examination of in-depth interviews conducted with local movement actors who understand rights mostly as means rather than ends. During my fieldwork, many interviewees were frequently puzzled when I asked them what role they thought the law played in movements for social change. What did I mean by the law? Was I asking about a court case or legislation? Was I asking about legislation designed to benefit political movements like the DREAM Act or harmful laws that increased criminalization? For movement actors, the law can exist in every movement-based action.

This chapter and the next expose problems associated with studying law and social change only in this manner. Rights movements are rarely pre-constituted and, thus, advocates are not often in a position to chart an isolated political strategy. Rather, successful movements often strategize with an eye towards long-term goals by considering how different political venues are networked and by preparing for possible new political actions that can shift political networks by spurring the formation of a sudden movement advocacy moment, or rights episode. Rights-based movement struggles are often unstable hydra-like creatures that coalesce and divide as they attempt to be responsive to myriad short-term threats that constrain choices, delimit opportunities, and complicate long-term goals. Building on the work of legal mobilization scholars, I argue that a more nuanced, contingent understanding of how rights work as tools can capture how the law impacts political movements in struggles for against systemic oppression

(see e.g., McCann 1994, Goldberg-Hiller 2004, Zemans 1983). Thinking of rights advocacy struggles through episodes often better encompasses how rights are employed as resources in simultaneously expansionist and containing ways across a variety political forums depending on context. Rights episodes can be at once activating and mobilizing moments that can achieve some movement advances and uncontrollable moments that can force groups to devote resources to the most mainstream movement constituencies, constraining mobilization and, thus, the likelihood of movement formation continuing beyond a campaign. I delineate why studying rights episodes can be useful for understanding the relationship between law and social change and utilize the interviews conducted for this study to describe the often paradoxical effects of episodic rights campaigns.

In this chapter and the next, I describe how rights episodes can impact political movement mobilization by analyzing two case studies: Washington's Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality (Chapter 2), and Arizona's SB 1070 (Chapter 3), a state law that enables local law enforcement officers to stop and question suspected undocumented immigrants. This chapter analyzes inter- and intra-movement mobilization that peaked in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality, a rights episode, in four parts. Part I draws from law and politics scholarship on political movements in order to theoretically develop the concept rights episodes. Part II briefly describes the political culture of Washington State in order to provide context for understanding the alliances that came together around marriage equality during the 2000s. Part III examines the series of expanding litigation, legislation, and ballot initiative campaigns that culminated in a rights episode around the legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington State. Part IV ends with an analysis of how the movement mobilization that expanded into a marriage equality campaign also constrained possibilities for inter- and intra-

movement alliances after marriage.

I argue that the rights episodes in this study worked through networked political venues to aid in the achievement of expansionist outcomes because they facilitated partnerships across political movement organizations that, in limited circumstances, continued after the episodes in this study dissipated. I contend that these rights episodes often expanded movement mobilization because they reinforced the factors associated with coalition unity by (1) emphasizing a common political movement past and, (2) highlighting a common core of opponents across seemingly divergent minority communities. At the same time, the Washington and Arizona rights episodes also contained political movement mobilization because they focused organizations and advocates on discrete rights-based issues, because they forced organizations into campaign cycles where groups are largely responsive to opponents and limited in their capacities to strategically determine resolutions, and because they often exacerbated the historic race, gender, and class inequities that privilege those issues that are least likely to uproot systemic oppression. I introduce the factors that many interviewees identified as important to coalition unity and the factors they argued contracted movement coalitions in this chapter and the next while examining each state's political movement narrative. After examining Washington and Arizona's political movement histories in Chapters 2 and 3, I engage with and analyze each of these factors, and the in-depth interviews, in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5. Since rights struggles in American politics are often funneled through episodic campaigns that can simultaneously expand and contract movement mobilization, scholars also consider how rights operate as strategic resources based on their paradoxical implications rather than only as ends in themselves when examining political movement formation.

I. Understanding Movement Mobilization through Rights Episodes

In developing the concept “rights episodes,” I draw from political science scholarship on political movements and political opportunity structures and law and social change scholarship that seeks to uncover the complex ways in which law complicates political movement formation. I define *rights episodes* as intense advocacy moments, or “vortexes” and “fires” that paradoxically both expand and contract political movements. Terms like “vortex” and “fire” underscore how movement actors often see rights episodes as agenda-setting and priority shifting moments that are in some ways beyond their control. Rights episodes can expand political movement mobilization by contributing to the formation of coalitions within and across both mainstream and marginalized movement organizations. These moments often contribute to inter- and intra-movement coalition formation because they can underscore the factors that influence coalition formation: they emphasize how mainstream and marginalized organizations have similar political movement or civil rights pasts and they highlight a common core of opponents. At the same time, rights episodes can have paradoxical implications on movements because they tend to exacerbate the factors that contribute to movement contraction: rights episodes focus movement mobilization around discrete campaigns and reinforce historic inequities within and across movements. Chapters 2 and 3 introduce how the coalitions at the center of this study expanded and contracted movement mobilization through these factors, which are analyzed in greater depth in Chapter 4.

Rights episodes can be *offensive* and *defensive*. *Offensive* rights episodes are initially constructed by movement actors in order to secure a rights win, such as marriage equality or legal representation for undocumented people in immigration proceedings. By contrast, *defensive* rights episodes are initially created by movement opponents to take away minority rights through

passing laws like SB 1070, which grants law enforcement officers greater authority to question undocumented people and, in the process, limits privacy rights and infringes on the right to equal legal protection. When a defensive rights episode emerges, movement actors can be forced to quickly respond and mobilize to prevent rights losses. Table 2.1 summarizes the similarities and differences between offensive and defensive rights episodes. There are two ways that offensive and defensive rights episodes can be different: (1) marginalization is primarily driven by different actors in each episode, and (2) defensive rights episodes have a greater capacity to unify inter- and intra-movement coalitions beyond a single campaign cycle. In offensive rights episodes, marginalization can be mostly driven by the mainstream organizations that orchestrate the episode while in defensive rights episodes marginalization tends to be mostly driven by opponents who are responsible for the creation of a rights threat. Opponents can still contribute to marginalization in offensive rights episodes and mainstream organizations can still be connected to marginalization in defensive episodes; however, whether they are the primary forces driving exclusion often depends upon the type of rights episode. Finally, defensive episodes can have a greater capacity to unify inter- and intra-movement coalitions beyond a single campaign cycle. Offensive rights episodes are often less expansionist because they can highlight friction across mainstream and marginalized organizations, especially when funding is funneled into the small collection of mainstream organizations at the center of the campaign coalition. This can exacerbate in-fighting between different factions in the immediate aftermath of the episode and heighten coalition fragmentation. By contrast, in defensive rights episodes, blame is often placed on the opponents who are the impetus behind the rights threat, which can minimize in-fighting and limit fragmentation after the rights episode dissipates.

Table 2.1 <u>Similarities and Differences Between Offensive and Defensive Rights Episodes</u>	
Similarities	Differences
Expand through emphasizing common political movement/civil rights past and shared opponents	Marginalization in <i>offensive</i> episodes is usually driven by mainstream organizations who determine the agenda or priority for a rights win
Contain movements around discrete campaigns	Marginalization in <i>defensive</i> episodes is largely driven by opponents who create the rights threat
Both types of episodes shift movement priorities, which manifests in a feeling of losing control of the agenda	<i>Defensive</i> episodes have greater capacity to expand inter- and intra-movement coalitions beyond a campaign cycle
Reinforce the marginalization and tokenization based on race, class, and gender hierarchies	<i>Offensive</i> episodes also unify inter- and intra-movement coalitions, but have less expansionist potential


Rights Episodes and Political Opportunity Structures

Episodic rights campaigns create shifts in political environments that provide ***political opportunity structures*** for success or failure that offer incentives that encourage people to engage in contentious politics and collective action (Tarrow 2011: 32-33, Meyer and Minkoff 2004, McAdam 1999). Political process or political opportunity modeling has long been used to describe why movements sometimes emerge and to explain the conditions in which movements are or are not successful (see e.g., McAdam 1999, McAdam et al. 1996, Gamson and Meyer 1996). According to scholars of political movements, political opportunity structures are concepts used to capture “the importance of the broader political system in structuring opportunities” that can expand collective action and political constraints that can limit collective action (McAdam et al. 1992: 2, see also Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1983). These scholars utilize political opportunity structures to explain how political movements generate or form and are also constrained through changes in networked political structures of informal and

formal power relations within a given political system or context. Building off this scholarship, I construct rights episodes as a type of or subset of political opportunity structure. When local political networks shift due to external actions, they can open a political opportunity through the formation of an intense rights-based advocacy moment or rights episode, and this episode, in turn, can place constraints on movement formation within a given political context.

Rights episodes often occur when a networked political advocacy environment suddenly opens a new opportunity for the impetus of an intense advocacy moment as described in Figure 2.1. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, a political network can shift or create a new political opportunity when a new political action, such as a shift in public support or a shift in political control, suddenly creates the possibility for a movement or counter-movement to achieve a long-standing rights win in a new political forum. This, in turn, creates an episodic vortex around achieving a rights win that can spur the formation and expansion of movement coalitions. I argue that, although the newly formed rights episode can sometimes contribute to movement mobilization and expansion, the episodic struggle can also simultaneously contain movement formation around a discrete rights-based advocacy moment, or rights episode, because these moments tend to complicate future political movement advocacy after the episode dissipates. Given their concurrent ability to mobilize and de-mobilize, rights episodes are complex political phenomena. A rights episode can be offensive – created by mainstream organizations in an attempt to secure a legal rights win – but a rights episode can also be a defensive response to counter-movement advocacy conducted by opponent groups as described above.

Figure 2.1 Rights Episode Formation



Legal Mobilization and How Rights Episodes Impact Political Movement Formation

In addition to enhancing scholarship on political movements and political opportunity structures, understanding movement mobilization through rights episodes is an intervention in law and social movement scholarship. Scholars are increasingly sophisticated about how they study the implications of rights struggles and litigation on political movements. Many law and society scholars examine the role that law plays in movements for social change by focusing on litigation alone, arguing that litigation largely contains political movements, provoking electoral and policy setbacks that usually thwart any achieved in court (Klarman 2014; Rosenberg 2008; Klarman 2004; Rimmerman 2002). For this reason, these scholars often imply that the law, understood as litigation, is usually not an appropriate strategic choice for movement actors in struggles for change. Other legal scholars who focus on litigation highlight the expansionist potential within legal rights wins, arguing that rights can serve as a useful strategic choice for political movements (Cummings & NeJaime 2010; Keck 2009; Pinello 2006; Eskridge 2002).

Although law and social change studies that focus on litigation are groundbreaking in their analysis of the various constraints and opportunities found in using litigation strategies to advance social change, these studies can assume that movement actors are usually in a position to select one type of political tactic or forum (e.g., either legislation or litigation) in social change struggles. One manifestation of this assumption are studies that set-up dichotomies between different political venues without considering how access to these forums often differs depending on context. These studies can construct litigation and other political tactics like legislation and ballot initiative campaigns within separate spheres rather than as networked political strategies that influence one another and can have different impacts on movements in different contexts.

For these scholars, the courts are a “hollow hope” for advancing social change and, thus, their findings suggest that some political venues such as legislatures and executive agencies, are better suited for the advancement of political movement goals and are not interconnected with other political forums (i.e., courts) (Rosenberg 2008).

Studies that construct social change models based on assumptions that different political strategies are the same in each context, present several problems for movement advocates. First, the opportunities available for movement actors are deeply constrained, depending on the political environment. For example, progressive advocates in states with Republican legislatures with political ideologies that differ from their own have very little opportunity to advance what is perceived as partisan legislation that serves progressive ends alone. Indeed, most of the legislative struggles progressive advocates organize in these state contexts focus on stopping legislation that harms the communities they serve. In this context, courts sometimes do protect minority communities whose rights are threatened by toxic legislation that infringes upon their constitutional rights. Court wins that prevent the advancement of harmful legislation, like legislation that takes away anti-discrimination protections for LGBTQ people or creates new criminal penalties for migrants, can become vehicles for empowering minority communities to mobilize in hostile environments (McCann 1994, Chua 2014). Although, importantly, litigation strategies can also backfire and constrain the ability to advance movement goals through court venues in political contexts where courts are controlled by conservative judges who are unwilling to allow courts to be used as vehicles for advancing minority movement causes. As I will argue below, this is what happened with LGBTQ movement advocacy in Washington State. In Washington, a court case loss constrained movement actors’ ability to strategically utilize state courts as political venues for achieving marriage equality, but also enabled the formation of

a new political opportunity structure in the state's legislature.

Second, political movement advocates' ability to make strategic choices between political venues is often tempered by the actions of opponent groups. Political movements do not exist in vacuums; they often develop in concert with opponents and counter-movements that frequently dictate what choices are available for progressive advocates as opponent groups attempt to maintain the status quo. During my fieldwork, I witnessed movement organizations scrap entire agendas when opponent organizations and legislators introduced legislation or filed a lawsuit that required immediate action. Movement actors, particularly those who are concerned with rights-based ideological struggles that do not often offer material outcomes for most members of a minority community, are largely dependent on opponent advocacy, which frequently dictates how rights battles are waged (see e.g., Dorf and Tarrow 2014, Fetner 2008, Mansbridge 1986). Furthermore, even when movement actors pursue an offensive strategy, they often do not have complete control over how this strategy will manifest in the real world where opponent groups can mobilize tactics to thwart an outcome and even the best planned messaging and organizing strategies can fail to persuade the public. In this context, strategic choices between political venues are often intensely constrained.

Finally, scholarship that constructs political venues within separate spaces does not often delve into the various ways in which different political venues are deeply networked. Court decisions can constrain or expand the extent to which legislatures can be strategically used as venues for change, while new legislation can constrain or expand political opportunities that enable the possibility for change through litigation. In rights-based movement struggles, different political forums are so intertwined that it is often difficult to distill them into separate variables. Struggles over rights can involve intense fights between movement organizations and

opponent groups that can play out a variety of different types of political institutions. These struggles can encourage groups to use all strategies and tactics they have in their arsenals, including using court decisions during legislative hearings to argue why a piece of legislation should or should not get enacted and using legislation during court hearings to persuade the judiciary. The courts constrain the types of laws that legislatures can enact and the type of language that appears in ballot initiatives. Contemporary Supreme Court precedent that is used to determine the contours of fundamental rights requires courts to consider legislative intent and political histories, including the laws state legislatures have and have not passed, when deciding cases. For these reasons, constructing the different political strategies as distinct rather than overlapping and intertwined makes is often not useful for movement advocates whose experience with movement advocacy emphasizes the myriad ways in which political venues are interconnected and whose strategy is often more concerned with being prepared for new opportunities and constraints when they arise rather than focusing on different types of political venues. This is not to say that scholars who focus argue that litigation can have negative effects on movements are incorrect. Certainly, litigation is often a harmful strategy for political movements that can constrain opportunities for change. However, scholarship that focuses only on litigation without also considering the ways in which litigation is networked with other political forums can sometimes over-determine the extent to which litigation is constraining.

In constructing rights episodes, I build upon the studies conducted by many *legal mobilization* scholars that adopt a broader conceptualization of what the law is in ways that reflect the lived experiences of movement actors. A conceptual shift in legal mobilization scholarship has pointed out that the “law” encompasses institutionalized legal strategies, legal norms and symbols, and legal rights discourse (McCann 1994, Lovell 2012, Bernstein et al.

2009; Andersen 2005, Goldberg-Hiller 2004, Marshall & Barclay 2003, Zemans 1983, Scheingold 1974). Leading legal mobilization scholars argue that one appropriate way to measure legal reform efforts is not only by “initial goals, local scale conflict or immediate outcomes,” but also by “lasting impacts on subsequent struggles—i.e., whether they are successfully contained or potentially expansionist in nature” (McCann 1994:307-308). However, there are not many studies that examine the containing and potentially expansionist nature of legal rights reforms by focusing on inter-and intra-movement dynamics in local contexts.

Although legal mobilization research strives to create a dynamic, multidimensional account of political movement formation, some legal mobilization scholarship, like some political movement scholarship, assumes a unidimensional, national, and single-axis political movement focus, especially scholarship on LGBTQ movement formation. These studies tend to examine political movements by focusing on just a few leading organizations that have seemingly clear goals and trajectories. As a result, these studies can miss the full complexity of rights-based movements, which often develop out of inter- and intra-movement coalitions or a larger number of organizations of varying size, sophistication, and visibility. For example, legal mobilization research that studies the LGBTQ movement formation tends to look to national litigation organizations or focuses on the extent to which a limited number of movement organizations advance issues that predominately concern white gay men and lesbians through either legislation or litigation, like marriage equality and incorporating sexual orientation and gender identity and expression into anti-discrimination laws (see e.g., Duam 2009, Keck 2009, Andersen 2005, Goldberg-Hiller 2004; but for Mello 2016, Hull 2004, Fisher 2009, which examine same-sex marriage, but in local rather than national contexts). These studies, while pioneering in their contributions to research on the potential and limits of the law, do not engage

with how intense rights advocacy moments mobilize through inter- and intra-movement coalition dynamics across the multiplicity of identities that make-up the LGBTQ movement. This study enhances contemporary legal mobilization scholarship, particularly scholarship that has focused on LGBTQ movement formation, by focusing on local organizations and grassroots inter- and intra-movement alliances rather than national litigation or policy focused organizations. National organizations can tell us much about national political strategy and the strategies of national organization leaders. However, national organizations often are not closely tied to the local communities that engage in everyday community organizing work. Local movement organizations are frequently faced with on-the-ground threats that they must quickly respond to without the immediate assistance of national organizations. This can contribute to the construction of different movement narratives at the local level and different experiences of movement formation than those relayed by national leaders. By focusing on local movement organizations and grassroots advocacy networks, this study aims to illuminate how inter- and intra-movement coalition formation is impacted by rights struggles in two state contexts.

This chapter and the next enhance legal mobilization and law and social change scholarship by examining the extent to which rights episodes mobilize inter- and intra-movement coalitions beyond discrete rights-based advocacy moments, that is, the extent to which rights episodes expand and contract movement mobilization. These chapters will also demonstrate the limits of scholarship that theorizes courts and other political venues as separated, insular spaces by examining the series of networked political movement-based advocacy that culminated in an offensive rights episode in Washington State, the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality, and a defensive rights episode in Arizona, SB 1070. As the following chapter will show, SB 1070 was one of the most politically charged anti-immigrant laws in contemporary

American politics, which increased racial profiling in Arizona and continues to influence both state and national immigration politics today.

II. Washington's Political Ethos: Liberalism in a Politically Divided State

In understanding how divergent organizations unified and mobilized during the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality and why this unity was fragile, it helps to reflect on Washington State's political dynamics. Washington is a politically divided state. Western Washington, which consists of a progressive urban stronghold in Seattle and the greater Puget Sound region, has long housed Democratic and pro-labor voters alongside a few Republican-leaning billionaires. Eastern Washington, by contrast, houses the state's rural agricultural region and consists of voters who align with the political ideologies of conservative and religious right politicians (Webley 2013). Despite the political division in the State between the eastern and western regions, Washington is often characterized as a liberal or "blue" state because the Democratic-leaning Western Washington is also the most populous area of the state and nearly always carries the state to the left in national elections. Since most people in Washington live in Seattle and the Puget Sound region, the politics of Seattle permeate throughout the state, much to the consternation and resentment of many Eastern Washingtonians. Although Washington's state capitol is in Olympia, most of the statewide movement organizations and labor unions are in Seattle. For this reason, it is common for advocates to live in Seattle and base much of their organizing in the city, but travel to Olympia each January for the start of the legislative session in a "Seattle to Olympia public policy pipeline." Because of the large influence that Seattle, the state's progressive center, has on Washington politics, and because most statewide movement organizations are based in the city, Seattle provides a window into the dynamics that shape

liberalism in Washington State.

A Radical Past in a City with a “Dual Personality”

According to Washington State historian James Gregory (2015), Seattle is a city with a “dual personality” and “strong echoes of a radical past” (Gregory 2015). The city’s dual personality comes from the presence of both progressive labor activists and business billionaires within city limits. Today, Seattle and the greater Puget Sound region are home to some of the wealthiest men in the nation, including Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and Microsoft’s Paul Allen and Bill Gates. These billionaires own and influence large swaths of the city, which is currently undergoing a tech boom driven by companies like Amazon, Microsoft, and Alaska Airlines whose headquarters are in the Puget Sound area. Although the tech boom is recent, the Puget Sound region has long encompassed wealthy international corporations, from the companies that profited off the Puget Sound area’s major seaport in the 1800s through the Boeing aerospace company, which was founded in the area in the early 1900s and is one of the state’s largest employers today. These corporations have tense and complicated relationships with progressive advocates in Western Washington. Although Western Washington’s corporations often support political movement campaigns, like the campaign to include LGBTQ status within the state’s anti-discrimination laws in 2006 and the marriage equality campaign in 2012, they also support fiscally conservative policies aimed at weakening the labor movement in Washington. Furthermore, they have also donated to anti-union Democratic and Republican legislators in the past (Confessore 2016). In 2012, for example, executives at Microsoft funding helped Republicans capture the Washington State Senate with the assistance of a few fiscally conservative Democrats who decided to work with Republican State Senators in a Majority

Coalition Caucus.

The liberal conservatism of large businesses and their CEO's in the Puget Sound region has contributed to the fracturing of progressive movement organizations in the State. Many mainstream movement organizations apply for and accept funding from these companies when engaging in political campaigns while others, especially marginalized organizations and those on the receiving end of anti-union efforts, are critical of the role that these businesses play in local movement politics. This is just one facet of the long history of in-fighting in progressive circles in Washington, which prevented many organizations from forming sustained campaign alliances in the past. As the below pages argue, movement organizations have overcome some of these divisions through the formation of expansive cross-community coalitions. However, although today's inter- and intra-movement coalitions often appear intersectional (because they include organizations from an array of different communities), they have difficulty maintaining unity and mobilization in the long-term as campaign dynamics inevitably bring out historic divisions.

Divergent Subject Positions Across Movement Communities in Seattle

In addition to historic divisions over the role that large businesses should play in political movement campaigns, movement organizations also have a long history of political division because they represent communities that hold different subject positions within Washington's radical past. One subject position lies within Washington's labor activism history. The state's labor movement past goes back to the late 1800s when the Puget Sound region experienced an economic boom in industrial sectors that attracted members of Eugene Debs's Social Democracy of America, an influx that ultimately spurred the creation of one of the largest branches of the Socialist Party in the nation in Washington State (Gregory 2015). By 1936, the large impact that

the Communist Party had in the state led then-Postmaster General James Farley to jokingly refer to the state as “the Soviet of Washington” (Gregory 2009). As late as 1964, about 45% people in Washington held union memberships (Bui 2015). Although Washington’s union membership has declined dramatically since 1964 along with the rest of the nation, Washington still has one of the largest union memberships in the nation and is the 5th most unionized state in the US (Johnson 2017).

A second subject position is based in Seattle’s racial and ethnic minority and immigrant communities. These communities’ activist past formed through grassroots organizing both for economic justice and against segregation, discrimination, and racial violence in Washington. Seattle has a long history of racial segregation, from housing to access to restaurants, hotels, hospitals, and employment (*Seattle Civil Rights and Labor History Project* 2017). Although visible segregation in Seattle has diminished over time and Seattle’s suburbs are some of the most diverse in the country, Seattle is still, in many ways, a de facto segregated city. This has a lot to do with how initial housing patterns were created through racially restrictive housing covenants that prevented homeowners in certain areas of the city from selling to minorities (Silva 2017). Furthermore, many unions in the state initially blocked racial minorities from union membership, spurring campaigns to end discriminatory hiring practices, such as the desegregation campaign at Boeing in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which sought to end the company’s failure to hire Black workers (Davenport 2017). In addition, during World War II, Washington State’s large Japanese and Japanese-American population was forced into internment camps. When they returned to their homes after the war, many were unable to re-gain access to their homes and businesses (Speidel 2017). Steven, one of the interviewees who participated in this study, recalled the destructive impact that internment had on his family

during his interview. Steven's grandparents lost their family farm after they were removed to an internment camp and his grandfather, who "couldn't take the thought of starting over again," died a few weeks before the war ended.

Currently, Seattle is considered one of the whitest cities in the United States with a white population of 67% according to demographic information from the last US Census; however, whiteness varies by neighborhood with the most diversity in a few city neighborhoods and just outside of the city's limits – an illustration of how Seattle's segregated continues to shape the present (Balk 2014, Stuteville 2014, Hobbs and Stoops 2002). Seattle's segregated past explains how organizations that represent immigrant communities and communities of color formed apart from movement organizations in the area that serve the state's white liberal-leaning population. When movement organizations formed to address long-standing segregation, discrimination, and racial violence, they operated in tension with white progressive movement spaces. Yet, despite the history of racial discrimination and violence, there are some ways in which Washington has historically been more egalitarian than other states when it comes to race. For example, Washington was one of the only states that did not pass racial anti-miscegenation laws in the 19th and 20th Century. Over time and through grassroots campaigns, racial tensions across movement organizations have somewhat diminished; however, these divisions still permeate local political movement campaigns, presenting significant barriers to the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions.

A third and final subject position is based in Seattle's LGBTQ community, which has moved from a position of invisibility and exile to a highly visible component of the state's political fabric through grassroots activism. According to historians McKenna (2017) and Atkins (2003), non-heterosexuality has existed in Seattle since at least the late 1800s, when low wage

workers who engaged in same-sex sexual conduct were convicted under the State's anti-sodomy law. Although organizations and bars serving gay men and lesbians existed in Washington before the late 1960s, Seattle gay activists became more visible in local progressive circles when they joined the gay liberation movement, forming a new generation of advocacy organizations, after the 1969 New York City Stonewall protests (McKenna 2017). Through the grassroots advocacy of gay liberationists in Seattle, the city passed an employment anti-discrimination ordinance that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in 1973, and a housing anti-discrimination ordinance that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing in 1975 (McKenna 2017, Gregory 2015). As the gay liberation movement grew into the LGBTQ movement of today, divisions arose in the movement over tactics and the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities and labor activists. With historic divisions across the various political movement communities that compose Washington's progressive center, political movement coalitions, when they formed, were often weak. Many early coalitions quickly fragmented after individual campaigns due to political in-fighting. As the below sections argue, this began to change in the 2000s, in the various rights campaigns leading up to the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality, which marked a historic alignment across the politically divided communities that make up progressive politics in Washington. How did new coalitions across and within these political movement communities form? Were they able to expand into new political movement struggles or did they reinforce historic inequities, fragmenting movements in the immediate aftermath of a rights win? The following section addresses these questions through an in-depth examination of the marriage equality rights episode in Washington State.

III. An Offensive Rights Episode: The Formation of the Washington State Referendum 74 Campaign for Marriage Equality

Political campaigns and court cases that advance human rights rarely occur in isolation. Rather, they are often part of an intertwined sequence of intense advocacy moments, or smaller campaigns, that can build over time or seem to ignite overnight. This is certainly true of the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. The Referendum 74 Campaign was built on four decades of smaller advocacy moments. Each moment built off the last, expanding the array of opportunities available for advocates and, eventually, expanding the array of communities and organizations that worked together in coalition to advance same-sex marriage. When lesbian and gay activists first began to fight for marriage equality in Washington State, they did so largely alone, without the support of political officials or other progressive political movements. Through a series of prior, networked political campaigns, movement actors constructed cross-community coalitions over time.

Advocacy around statewide campaigns has appeared intersectional in Washington State for several decades. Today, Washington political campaigns are led by a multiplicity of organizations that represent an array of minority communities and special interests. In order to have any statewide mobilization capacity, these groups have to operate in a somewhat intersectional manner, building alliances and coalitions wherever needed in order to obtain statewide rights wins. However, the alliances of the past were much more limited than they are today. The inter- and intra- movement coalitions that exist in Washington state solidified from the early 1990s through the mid 2000s as movement-based advocacy in the state was funneled through periodic initiative, legislative, and litigation campaigns. These prior statewide political campaigns created the network of opportunities available for movement actors in Washington

State. In the 2010s, this network began to shift for LGBTQ movement advocates who wanted to win same-sex marriage for Washington as the public became more supportive of same-sex marriage and major political officials, most notably President Barack Obama, endorsed marriage equality for the first time. This created a shift in the political network in Washington State that facilitated the development a massive rights episode when the legislative and ballot initiative process suddenly presented a viable opportunity for winning marriage. The marriage equality rights episode in Washington ultimately expanded movement mobilization through cross-community coalition formation at the same time that it severely constrained cross-movement partnerships in the aftermath of the win. Figure 2.2 depicts the formation of the Referendum 74 rights episode in Washington State.

Figure 2.2 Formation of the Referendum 74 Offensive Rights Episode



This section focuses on LGBTQ rights struggles in Washington State and analyzes the extent to which these struggles expanded into immigrant and labor movement struggles. The next chapter focuses on immigrant and migrant political movement formation in Arizona. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the Referendum 74 rights episode emerged out of networked political arenas with

prior events overlapping with and influencing the formation of new struggles. Immediately prior to the marriage equality rights episode, the political network that characterized rights-based advocacy in Washington State shifted when public support for marriage equality increased and the Democratic Party and President Barack Obama expressed support for legalizing same-sex marriage. This opened a space for the Washington State legislature to pass a law legalizing same-sex marriage for the first time, and, thus, enabled the formation of rights episode around marriage equality, culminating in the Referendum 74 Campaign. The analysis relayed in this section delineates how a same-sex marriage rights episode formed in Washington State and the extent to which this episode expanded movement mobilization through the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions.

“Laughed Out of Court:” Political Failure in the Early Stages of the Contemporary LGBTQ Rights Movement

It is possible to trace the origins of the struggle for marriage equality in Washington State back to September 20, 1971, when Paul Barwick and Faygele Ben Miriam (then named John Singer) went to the King County auditor’s office to request a marriage license (Sanders 2012, Sanders 2006). Barwick and Ben Miriam were part of the Seattle chapter of the Gay Liberation Front and considered themselves radical activists in the “business of gay liberation” (Sanders 2012). Lloyd Hara, then King County auditor, swiftly rejected their application for a marriage license and the couple sued, testing the boundaries of Washington State’s newly adopted Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which used gender-neutral language, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “sex” (Boucai 2015). The Equal Rights Amendment, which altered the Washington State Constitution, stated that “equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be

denied or abridged on account of sex” (*Singer v. Hara* 522 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Wash. 1974)).

At the time, Barwick and Ben Miriam believed that the state ERA could provide a new opportunity for the recognition of same-sex marriage through a court case. In the appellate court case *Singer v. Hara*, Barwick and Ben Miriam argued, based on the text of the new ERA, that it was unconstitutional for Washington State to deny same-sex couples the right to marry because of their sex. The appellate court roundly rejected Barwick and Ben Miriam’s argument, holding that the couple was not denied a marriage license because of their sex, or “status as males,” but, rather, because the state recognizes “that our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children” (*Singer v. Hara* 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. 1974)). Barwick and Ben Miriam still had an equal right to marry, but they could only do so for procreative purposes with a person of the opposite sex according to the court.

When referencing *Singer v. Hara* years later, lesbian and gay community advocates would say that Barwick and Ben Miriam were “laughed out of court,” that their case was treated as a ridiculous legal exercise with no real possibility of success (Sanders 2012). However, the events that preceded the case are representative of how the fight for marriage equality would progress in Washington over several decades: as an intertwined political struggle that encompassed multiple forums and tactics. In *Singer*, activists decided to sue because they felt that a constitutional amendment (the ERA) recently passed through in one political forum provided a new opportunity for change in another political forum – the courts. Much of the court decision was dedicated to interpreting whether the amendment intended to create a new right to same-sex marriage. That is, the constitutional amendment dictated the terms through which the court considered the legality of same-sex marriage in the state’s first same-sex marriage case.

A State Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)

This is also true of the struggles over same-sex marriage that occurred in other political venues, where court cases were frequently referenced during legislative debates. Twenty-four years after *Singer v. Hara*, prior court cases were discussed as the Washington State legislature debated and ultimately passed a state Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which further clarified that the state limited marriage to two-person heterosexual couples and would not recognize same-sex marriages conducted legally in other states. The Washington State DOMA passed in 1998 after nearly a decade of statewide advocacy that centered on pro and anti-LGBTQ ballot initiative campaigns fostered the beginning of inter- and intra-movement coalition building in the LGBTQ, labor and immigrant movements in Washington.

During the 1990s, a number of ballot measures helped form a backbone of common experiences of discrimination and a common core of opponents across the LGBTQ and racial justice movements in Washington that aided in the formation of movement coalitions, two factors associated with coalition development identified by interviewees in this study and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4. These coalitions began to form in the early 1990s through various initiative campaigns, and, then, grew through the 2000s, reaching their largest capacity in 2012 during the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. During the Referendum 74 Campaign over 500 LGBTQ, labor, community of color, and business organizations worked in coalition to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington. The ballot initiatives that contributed to the formation of inter- and intra- movement coalitions in Washington by emphasizing common opponents included a set of failed anti-LGBTQ initiatives in 1994 (Initiative 608 and Initiative 610), a failed pro-LGBTQ movement initiative in 1997 that

sought to pass anti-discrimination protections for lesbian and gay people (Initiative 677), and a successful anti-affirmative action initiative in 1998 (Initiative 200). The dual anti-LGBTQ initiatives in 1994 sought to ban all localities from passing civil rights laws that protected LGBTQ people from discrimination, prohibit schools from teaching non-heterosexuality as an appropriate lifestyle, and bar lesbians and gay men from being adoptive or foster parents (“We’re Here to Stay” 1998). The 1994 initiatives were fueled by an uptick counter-movement advocacy in Washington State and Oregon that likely occurred as a result of the 1993 lawsuit in Hawaii, *Baehr v. Lewin*, which provided a legal rationale for recognizing same-sex marriage as a constitutional right (*Baehr v. Lewin* 852 P.2d 44 (Hawaii 1993)). When LGBTQ movement opponents initiated both ballot campaigns, LGBTQ rights advocates formed the statewide advocacy organization Hands Off Washington for the purpose of fighting the initiatives and building partnerships with other minority community organizations, labor unions, and political organizations in Washington.

In interviews about the formation of Hands Off Washington in the documentary “We’re Here to Stay,” LGBTQ advocates argued that tensions ran high around issues of representation and identity during this time. Advocates struggled to form lasting and genuine partnerships with other organizations and individuals. Indeed, the first Executive Director of Hands Off Washington, Karen Cooper, illuminated how, despite building what was then one of the most racially, economically, and politically diverse coalitions in support of LGBTQ rights in the state’s history, the partnerships that formed and were intensely volatile and unstable:

Karen Cooper: We had many, many people working for a common goal that had never worked together before, didn’t know each other, sometimes knew each other and didn’t like each other. [We] came from all kinds of different backgrounds, classes, political experience, lack of political experiences, Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, liberals. And these folks were all struggling to work together on a common goal on an issue that was so intensely

personal. An example I've always used about why the campaign was difficult was that, let's say we're ordering some tablets and whether we're going to get yellow tablets or white tablets and nobody cares. However, at Hands Off Washington that could become a huge issue. The minorest of decisions, the smallest of decisions could become major battlegrounds because people's lives were being threatened, people's lives were at stake, so everything became highly charged with emotion. ("We're Here to Stay" 1998)

Despite the fragile nature of the coalitions that formed in the early 1990s, LGBTQ movement advocates were able to gain the support of some organizations that represented communities of color in the state by emphasizing common opponents. Specifically, LGBTQ activists discovered during opposition research that the Citizen's Alliance, one of the LGBTQ opponent coalitions at the time, had ties to the white supremacist populist party and the Klu Klux Klan. LGBTQ activists argued that they were able to use this information to convince some community of color organizations to join LGBTQ community-led coalitions in the 1990s ("We're Here to Stay" 1998).

Other individuals associated with LGBTQ rights movement coalition-building at that time also emphasized tensions around coalition formation. For example, Patrick Hogan, was an advocate with Bigot Busters, a Seattle-based grassroots group that formed in response to the anti-LGBTQ initiatives of the early 1990s. Bigot Busters engaged in what many other LGBTQ advocacy thought of as more radical tactics, like following opponents at shopping malls as opponents attempted to gather signatures to place the anti-LGBTQ initiatives on the ballot and intervening to explain why shoppers should refuse to sign (Atkins 2003). Below, Patrick Hogan argues that, in addition to friction around representation and identity, movement actors divided over these tactical approaches:

Patrick Hogan: There was an element of the community that always felt that the street activists, the radicals if you will, or you know the Queer Nation/ACT UP types were just giving everyone a bad name. And I think a lot of the friction came from that as well. You know that this wasn't something that was acceptable

somehow. (“We’re Here to Stay” 1998)

From friction over political and racial identity to the types of tactics the political movement should pursue, the campaign to stop the anti-LGBTQ initiatives in the early 1990s was characterized by divisions. These fissures along with the failed pro-LGBTQ movement ballot initiative campaign in 1997 eventually contributed to the dissolution of Hands Off Washington in the early 2000s.

Washington passed its state Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) after the LGBTQ movement was hobbled by the failure of Initiative 677, the 1997 ballot initiative that proposed expanding Washington State anti-discrimination law to cover sexual orientation (De Leon 1997, Murakami 1997). The initiative failed by nearly 20 percentage points despite support from then-Governor Gary Locke, possibly because the initiative appeared on the ballot along with a pro-gun measure supported by the National Rifle Association (NRA), driving up conservative voter turnout (Locke 1997, Murakami 1997, “Washington Initiative Shot Down” 1997). Washington State has a history of opponent groups, led by conservative activist Tim Eyman, placing counter-movement issues on the ballot in order to drive up conservative voter turnout during general elections. This tactic was famously used across the nation in 2004 when conservative activists placed constitutional amendments limiting marriage to two-person heterosexual couples on 11 state ballots in order to increase conservative voter turnout for then-President George W. Bush and in state electoral races (Dao 2004). Although, the success of opponent messaging (which was based in a moral panic about homosexuality harming children) during the 1997 ballot initiative campaign indicates that LGBTQ counter-movement advocacy played a role in the initiative’s defeat as well (“State of Washington Voters Pamphlet” 1997, “Gay Rights Bill Would Protect Gays’ Jobs” 1997). The loss of Initiative 677 in 1997 helped further the deterioration of the

state's then leading LGBTQ advocacy organization Hands Off Washington, which had formed earlier in the 1990s to fend off the anti-gay and lesbian ballot measures described above (Washington Office of the Secretary of State 1997).

Activated by Initiative 677, opponents swiftly worked to pass a statewide DOMA in the 1998 legislative session, with bipartisan, veto-proof support for a bill. During one floor debate of the proposed DOMA, legislators argued that the DOMA was necessary to clarify that *Singer v. Hara's* prohibition on same-sex marriage applied throughout Washington State and not in the appellate court district in which it was decided alone (see e.g., Thompson 1998). In arguing for the DOMA, State Representative Larry Sheahan contended that legislative action was necessary “to guide the courts,” which have said that, “if an issue is brought before the legislature, even if it fails...that can be brought into play when [looking] into legislative intent” (Sheahan 1998). In arguing against the state DOMA, then-State Representatives Dow Constantine and Ed Murray maintained that legislative action was unnecessary because *Singer v. Hara* prohibited same-sex couples from marrying already and the US Congress had already enacted a federal Defense of Marriage Act which granted states the ability to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states (Constantine 1998, Murray 1998). During the floor debate on Washington's DOMA, discussions of what *Singer v. Hara* did and did not do were pervasive and used by legislators to persuade their colleagues. Ultimately, both Republicans and Democrats in the Washington State legislature passed DOMA, overriding a veto from then-Governor Gary Locke (Mapes 1998).

Due to the networked way that the struggle over same-sex marriage developed in Washington State, Melo (2014) argues that the various battles over marriage equality in Washington, which culminated in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in 2012,

illustrate that political campaigns can build off one another over time, creating new political opportunities for change. Although it is certainly true that the sequence of political campaigns built off one another in Washington State, this construction does not happen along a linear trajectory from legislation to court case or vice versa. Instead, as political tactics, legislation and litigation are at once interwoven with one another. The continual use of references to different tactics in varying political forums demonstrates that each forum does not exist in a separate sphere but, rather, these venues intimately interconnected with one another – and not necessarily on a forward path that leads to progress.

No Longer A Laughing Matter: Possibilities in A Tough Courtroom Battle

Each new formation of the struggle for same-sex marriage in Washington State also indicates that mobilization around the right to marry grew over time in a series of intense advocacy moments. Following the enactment of a state DOMA in 1998, the next advocacy episode around same-sex marriage emerged in through the court cases *Andersen v. King County* and *Castle v. State*, two lower court cases that were ultimately consolidated under the name *Andersen v. King County* and heard before the Washington State Supreme Court in 2006. Advocates with Washington State's lesbian and gay community believed that a political opportunity for change was opening nationwide after the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in the 2003 through *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health* and as public support for marriage equality grew. These advocates felt that *Goodridge* provided a legal framework for arguing for the right to marry in the Washington State courts. Furthermore, much had changed in Washington since *Singer v. Hara*. The state's LGBTQ community had fought for and against numerous local ordinances, state bills, and ballot initiatives by the early 2000s. This,

along with the increased political representation of LGBTQ people in the state and shifts in national politics around the LGBTQ rights movement, created a climate in Washington that lesbian and gay advocates believed would enable the state's Supreme Court to legalize same-sex marriage in *Andersen v. King County*.

However, despite changes in the national and local political network, LGBTQ advocates were wary of initiating a court case in Washington State. Washington Supreme Court justices are elected, unlike in other states, like Massachusetts, which legalized same-sex marriage in *Goodridge v. Department of Health* in 2003 (*Goodridge v. Department of Health* 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass 2003)). Hence, LGBTQ advocates rightly feared that the fact that marriage equality was still unpopular nationwide in the early 2000s would influence how the Washington justices, who faced the prospect of losing their jobs in electoral backlash prompted by a pro-same-sex marriage court decision, would decide *Andersen v. King County*. Many LGBTQ advocates wondered if it was better to wait a few years to pursue a lawsuit once public opinion shifted even more and after more states legalized same-sex marriage. Ultimately, advocates believed that they were forced to risk a case when, in 2004, Dan Savage, the openly gay editor of the alt-weekly newspaper *The Stranger* in Seattle applied for a marriage license with a lesbian friend in an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of a state DOMA that forced gay men to marry women if they wanted access to marriage (Savage 2004, Young 2004). Local LGBTQ advocates decided to file same-sex marriage lawsuits with couples who they believed better represented normative marriage ideals in order to prevent Dan Savage from initiating a lawsuit as a less than ideal plaintiff without the backing of the LGBTQ legal advocacy network. In other words, the dynamics underlying the decision to pursue a marriage equality lawsuit in Washington are an example of how an unplanned new political action can derail movement strategy, forcing

advocates to respond to the new threat at a moment's notice (Dorf and Tarrow 2014, NeJaime 2014).

Although, the lesbian and gay community mobilized through a series of advocacy moments in the decades leading up to *Andersen v. King County*, mobilization was still constrained. In an *amicus curiae* brief filed by leaders of communities of color in support of the lesbian and gay plaintiffs in *Andersen v. King County*, interested amici included the state's Asian American bar associations, the state's Latinx Bar Association, and the state's African American Bar Association rather than through membership-driven movement advocacy organizations. The only membership-driven political movement organization that signed the brief was Hate Free Zone of Washington (now OneAmerica) along with a list of leaders of organizations representing communities of color *without their organizational affiliations* (Amicus Curiae Brief of the Loren Miller Barr Association et al. 2005). Hate Free Zone's decision to intervene was not made lightly or without opposition. Years later, when reflecting on the organization's decision to support same-sex couples in *Andersen*, Pramila Jayapal (the founder of Hate Free Zone who later became a congressional representative) recalled a heated debate amongst the organization's membership that centered on issues of faith that fostered deep conversations between the organization's members (O'Hagan 2013). The lack of inter- and intra-movement coalition around same-sex marriage would change dramatically by 2009, when cross-community grassroots mobilization through the Referendum 71 Campaign to expand domestic partnerships, increased organizational support in labor unions, immigrant rights organizations, and organizations that represent communities of color.

Ultimately, *Andersen v. King County* failed to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington State despite the expectations of LGBTQ rights advocates who believed that they would win

marriage at the State Supreme Court. Once again, the court referenced state legislation in reaching this decision. For example, when considering whether lesbian and gay people are a suspect class, the court discussed the 2006 Anderson-Murray Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression in public accommodations. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs and lesbian and gay community advocates, the court referenced this legislation to support the argument that lesbian and gay people are politically powerful, since they were able to use the legislative process to pass LGBTQ-friendly legislation. This argument supported the court's conclusion that lesbian and gay people are not a suspect class, so a law that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, here the state DOMA, was not subject to a heightened scrutiny constitutional test (*Andersen v. King County* 138 P.3d 963, 973 (Wash. 2006), Melo 2014: 17).

Lesbian and gay advocates also credited the 2004 election for the court loss. As stated above, in Washington State, Supreme Court justices were elected into office. During the 2004 election, an election characterized by increased conservative voter turnout due in part to anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiative campaigns in states across the US, the liberal and pro-marriage equality Supreme Court candidate, Faith Ireland, lost the election to the more conservative Jim Johnson. This shifted the balance on the state Supreme Court against same-sex marriage (Sanders 2006 citing then Lambda Legal attorney, then-State Representative Jamie Pedersen who argued that, "looking back...we really lost this in the 2004 elections"). Even though the lesbian and gay community lost the *Andersen v. King County* case, language in the court's opinion that criticized the legislature for passing the DOMA and clearly articulated that it was possible to legalize same-sex marriage through political channels, created a new political opening for a rights campaign at the state legislature (Melo 2014). At the end of the *Andersen*

case, recognizing the harms caused by the failure to extend marriage to same-sex couples, the Court admonished the legislature and asserting that, “given the clear hardship faced by same-sex couples evidenced in this lawsuit, the legislature may want to reexamine the impact of marriage laws on all citizens of this state.” The court’s explicit language calling on the legislature to pass protective legislation for same-sex couples contributed to the formation a new political opportunity to advance marriage benefits for same-sex couples in the legislature (*Andersen v. King County* 138 P.3d. 963, 990 (Wash. 2006)).

“Everything but Marriage”: The Referendum 71 Campaign

Andersen v. King County altered the political context in Washington and created the possibility for advocates to advance a law that expanded domestic partnerships in Washington State to encompass all the rights and benefits of marriage for the first time. In 2009, the emerging LGBTQ rights movement in Washington mobilized behind a campaign for domestic partnerships, newly bolstered by a court opinion that explicitly stated that there was no reason why “the legislature or the people acting through initiative process would be foreclosed from extending the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples in Washington” (*Andersen v. King County* 138 P.3d. 963, 963 (Wash. 2006)). After the *Andersen* case, legislators moved to expand domestic partner benefits in Washington State. This effort peaked with the passage of SB 5688 in 2009, the so-called “everything but marriage” law, which expanded previous domestic partnership laws in the state by adding domestic partnerships to all remaining areas of state law that addressed married couples (Turnbull 2009a).

Once again, floor debates in the legislature addressed case law. Legislators on both sides of the aisle discussed legal precedent to persuade their colleagues. State Senator Val Stevens

discussed both *Singer v. Hara* and *Andersen v. King County* to support the argument that courts in the state have historically opposed same-sex marriage. As a result, State Senator Stevens argued that legislators should vote against SB 5688 because “domestic partnership equals marriage,” contravening legal precedent (Stevens 2009). By contrast, State Senator Ed Murray argued that, although Senator Stevens was “correct when she described the process that the courts went through when they ruled DOMA constitutional, the courts also said the legislature offered gay and lesbian citizens of this state a remedy and that’s what we’re doing with this bill” – a clear reference to language the court used *Andersen* asserting that the legislature had the authority to determine how the state would recognize same-sex relationships (Murray 2009, Melo 2014). SB 5688 ultimately passed and was signed into law by then-Governor Christine Gregoire (Roesler 2009). However, Washington State has a referendum process, that allows citizens to refer acts of the legislature to the people through a petition process (Wyman 2013). Opponent groups, led by Larry Stickney, the president of the Washington Values Alliance, filed Referendum 71 and collected enough signatures to place the referendum on the November 2009 general election ballot, giving the Washington State electorate the ability to determine whether the state should expand domestic partnerships by adopting the “everything but marriage” law (La Corte 2009, Turnbull 2009b).

Through each political moment leading up to Referendum 71, support for the LGBTQ rights movement grew as lesbian and gay leaders, who wanted to incrementally work towards marriage equality, gained the support they needed to eventually pass SB 5688, the “everything but marriage” law, at the legislature. However, electoral and legislative campaigns provide a somewhat unique opportunity for movement expansion. For member-driven organizations, joining an *amicus curiae* brief in support of same-sex marriage can be controversial for many

members. Yet, endorsing and devoting resources to an initiative campaign is even more controversial and requires even more member outreach due to the higher degree of membership involvement in get out the vote efforts versus in an organization's decision to file an *amicus curiae* brief. According to Rachel, an advocate who worked with an organization that builds cross-community buildings through campaigns in Washington, episodic rights campaigns are important political opportunities for this reason since they enable deep conversations across and within minority communities:

Rachel: The opportunity with a campaign of course is that, as you're door knocking, as you're canvassing, as you're doing training with people, as you're developing commercials and radio sound bites, you are having as well a cultural conversation. That is again revealing people's kind of unspoken homophobia and transphobia, and then you help them shift.

Campaigns allow an opportunity for a "cultural conversation," where organizations and individuals communicate with one another and share story. This is true of episodic campaigns that emerge around court cases and legislation as well, as the previous sections show, though to a lesser degree. Recall that Representative Pramila Jayapal and other Hate Free Zone (now One America) leaders also had deep conversations with their organization's members when the group decided to support same-sex couples in *Andersen v. King County*. However, ballot initiatives require even more focused conversations between members of disparate communities and a larger degree of statewide mobilization to get out the vote necessary to secure a win.

Lesbian and gay community advocates achieved this through Referendum 71 by expanding the coalition of organizations that supported the rights of same-sex couples. This included a collective of organizations that represent immigrants and communities of color, a clear expansion from *Andersen v. King County*, when only Hate Free Zone and minority bar associations intervened to support same-sex couples. 31 organizations that represent immigrants

and communities of color ultimately endorsed Referendum 71 (American Civil Liberties Union 2009). Some of these organizations likely would have supported same-sex couples in *Andersen* as well. For example, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) did not intervene in *Andersen* in 2004, but has supported same-sex marriage since 1994 (Japanese American Citizens League 2007). However, cross-community coalition building in Washington State, especially with LGBTQ rights organizations that have historically been dominated by white lesbian and gay leaders, was relatively fragile in the early 2000s. Hence, lesbian and gay leaders may not have reached out extensively to or had not yet had deep, cross-community conversations with the array of organizations that endorsed Referendum 71, when *Andersen* was filed in 2004.

A “Neutron Star:” Marriage Equality and the Referendum 74 Rights Episode

Voters approved Referendum 71, ending the smaller advocacy moment that emerged around legislation that expanded domestic partnerships in 2009 (Tu 2009). Each of the smaller rights moments described thus far speaks to an expanding LGBTQ movement in Washington State, that mobilized over time by aligning with other movement-based organizations affiliated with the labor, immigrant, and racial justice movements in the state. This was especially true of the labor movement. A large number of labor organizations filed an *amicus* brief in support of same-sex couples in *Andersen v. King County* and the labor movement both endorsed and provided significant resources to help pass Referendum 71 (Amicus Curiae Brief of Labor Organizations 2005, Andrew 2009). The Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality, which emerged in 2012, would expand the movement even further, pulling virtually every progressive organization in the state into a vortex around the right to marry. The Referendum 74 Campaign accomplished this by expanding through factors associated with coalition development

introduced here and analyzed in greater depth in Chapter 4. That is, the marriage equality rights episode (1) provided an opportunity for organizations associated with the campaign to construct a common past through sharing story and (2) to clarify a common core of opponents.

In November of 2011, a coalition of labor, civil liberties, immigrant, community of color, and religious organizations, calling themselves Washington United for Marriage announced their intention to launch a campaign to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington State in 2012 (Brunner 2011). This coalition started to act in Washington State in response to the shifting political network, prompted by an increase of public and political support for same-sex marriage. The state's political network shifted further when President Barack Obama publicly endorsed same-sex marriage in 2012 (Calmes and Baker 2012). As with Referendum 71, advocates began the marriage equality rights episode at the legislature with the understanding that a referendum was certain. Movement leaders who decided to introduce marriage equality legislation likely selected 2012 because it was a presidential election year, which would increase Democratic turnout in Washington State, and because new polling data suggested that public opinion in Washington was shifting in support of same-sex marriage (O'Donnell 2011, Pew Research Center 2016). In early 2012, Democrats with the support of some Republicans introduced SB 6239 in the Washington State legislature to legalize same-sex marriage.

Once again, legislators referred to case law during floor debate as they attempted to persuade their colleagues to support or oppose SB 6239. For instance, State Senator Dan Swecker argued that doctors and "ordinary workers" who oppose same-sex marriage, "would be subject to discrimination lawsuits if they chose not to offer their services due to their religious or moral beliefs" while State Senator Debbie Regala drew an analogy between the legalization of same-sex marriage and *Loving v. Virginia*, the 1967 court case that declared state bans on

interracial marriage unconstitutional, a court case that legitimated her own interracial marriage nationwide (Swecker 2012, Regala 2012). In the Washington House of Representatives, State Representative Jamie Pedersen opened floor debate by reading from the 9th circuit court opinion in *Perry v. Hollingsworth* to demonstrate why marriage matters for same-sex couples while Representative Jay Rodne read from *Andersen v. King County* to illustrate that marriage should be limited to heterosexual marriages for procreative purposes (Pedersen 2012, Rodne 2012). The Washington State legislature ultimately passed SB 6239, legalizing same-sex marriage in Washington State, and the bill was signed into law by then-Governor Christine Gregoire (Turnbull 2012). Opponents quickly mobilized, forming their own coalition (Preserve Marriage Washington) and filed Referendum 74 (Associated Press 2012). After a Thurston County court removed biased language from the referendum at the urging of marriage equality advocates, Preserve Marriage Washington collected enough signatures to place Referendum 74 on the November 2012 general election ballot (Seattle Times Staff 2012, Baker 2012).

LGBTQ, labor, immigrant, and community of color advocates felt much better positioned during Referendum 74 than during Referendum 71. According to Emma, an advocate who helped construct the coalition of community of color and immigrant organizations that endorsed Referendum 74, the advocates, community workers, and organizers behind the campaign had professionalized and become more sophisticated through the prior, smaller rights advocacy moments:

Emma: I think by the time – so R-71 was 2009, and then R-74 was 2012 – I mean just in those 3 years it seems like the various POC [people of color] organizations that were involved in advocacy became a lot more sophisticated. So overall everyone – maybe because I personally had grown a lot professionally as well – so it just kind of seems like we all grew up together.

For Emma, organizers “grew up together” through multiple rights campaigns, expanding the

capacity of the multiple movements involved in coalition building over time. During interviews, organization leaders and advocates described how the similar messagings opponents used and “attacks” opponents waged during the Referendum 74 campaign *and* previous episodic rights campaigns emphasized how labor, immigrant, community of color, and LGBTQ organizations were aligned in the same struggle, strengthening coalitional unity in support of marriage equality.

Advocates further described how they used experiences of discrimination across minority communities to expand the coalition, emphasizing both that the LGBTQ community shared a common past with other minority communities and similar opponents. Below, Richard, an immigrant organization leader describes why emphasizing shared experiences of discrimination and traditional understandings of family helped expand cross-movement mobilization during the rights episode:

Richard: Our focus was family, number one family, so I think if you look at especially the radio ads that we would do, that we did, they were a father who was talking about his son who had come out to him and how he had banished him from the family essentially and how he had passed away while he had been kept away from the family and how much guilt and how much regret he had about that decision.... So it was kind of a dialogue with him sharing his regret about that. So there was a focus on family.

I think another thing we focused on was just overall discrimination I mean as an organization our tagline is “Justice for All” and so when we talk about justice for all we talk about justice for everyone and that includes the LGBT community. And so we really talked about it in terms of discrimination and people being treated differently because that’s something our members are acutely aware of is the fact that they are discriminated against in a lot of ways. They are sensitive to people being treated differently because of factors that are beyond their control or because of who they are and how they identify. So those were the messages that we led with.

Richard explains that ad campaigns that targeted the communities his organization served focused on family experiences, emphasizing how LGBTQ people are part of communities of

color and how rejection can tear families apart, and on shared experiences of discrimination. Members of Richard’s organization are frequently discriminated against because of their immigration status or because they belong to communities of color in a society that does not treat them as equals. Thus, they are “acutely aware” of discrimination and “sensitive to people being treated differently because of factors beyond their control.” By emphasizing shared past experiences of discrimination, which necessarily invoke similar opponents, Richard’s organization helped to expand the coalition, drawing in members of immigrant communities and communities of color as well as more organizations that represented these communities.

The emphasis on family is also clearly depicted through the campaign ads produced for communities of color and immigrant communities. In the below excerpt from a campaign ad directed at the Latinx community, the language of the ad focuses on how lesbian and gay people are part of one family and one community with Latinx people:

Famila Es Familia: Many Latinos know someone who is gay or lesbian. They are family members, neighbors, people we work with, and members of our church. **In the Latino community, we don’t turn our backs on family.** No member of anyone’s family—gay or straight—should have to face discrimination where they love, at their jobs, or when they hope to marry the person they love. **Latino families are stronger when they are together.** By supporting marriage for committed gay and lesbian couples, we strengthen *all* families in our community (“Latinos for the Freedom to Marry” 2012, emphasis as it appears in the advertisement. Advertisement included below).

This advertisement, produced by organizations that represent communities of color, strives to increase support for marriage equality by underscoring how lesbian and gay people are part of Latinx families and by comparing job discrimination to the exclusion of same-sex couples from state marriage and family law. The advertisement includes a photo of a lesbian couple that has been in a committed relationship for 22 years. The next page of the advertisement has a quote from Latinx community leader State Representative Luis Moscoso alongside his photo, a list of

Latinx community leaders, and a selection of local mainstream and marginalized Latinx and immigrant rights organizations in Seattle that endorse marriage equality.

Love. Commitment. Family.
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS


LATINOS FOR THE FREEDOM TO MARRY

FAMILIA ES FAMILIA

Many Latinos know someone who is gay or lesbian. They are our family members, neighbors, people we work with, and members of our church.

In the Latino community, we don't turn our backs on family. No member of anyone's family—gay or straight—should have to face discrimination where they live, at their jobs, or when they hope to marry the person they love.

Latino families are stronger when they are together. By supporting marriage for committed gay and lesbian couples, we strengthen *all* families in our community.



MARRIAGE PROTECTS FAMILIES

Marriage gives couples the tools and the security to build a life together and to protect their families. Couples get married because they want to be there for each other in sickness and in health, when times are good and when things get tough.

State and federal marriage laws provide a **safety net of legal and economic protections for married couples and their children**—including the ability to visit your spouse in the hospital and to transfer property, which can mean being able to remain in the family home when your spouse has passed away.

Nearly 42% of Latina lesbian couples, and nearly one in four Latino gay male couples are raising children. **Marriage helps Latino same-sex parents protect their families.**

MARRIAGE SAYS "WE ARE FAMILY"

Marriage says "We are a family" in a way that no other word does. Gay and lesbian couples may seem different from straight couples, but share similar values—like the importance of family and helping out our neighbors; worries—like making ends meet or the possibility of losing a job; and hopes and dreams—like finding that special someone to grow old with, and standing in front of friends and family to make a lifetime commitment.

Most people don't understand what a domestic partnership is, but marriage is understood. Marriage says that these two people belong to one another, that they have chosen each other above all others, that they take responsibility for each other, and that in times of crisis, they will be there for each other. **Marriage matters, and no one should be denied something so important.**

-Martha and Laura,
Federal Way

WhyMarriageMattersWashington.org

WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS TO WASHINGTON LATINOS

REFLECTING OUR COMMUNITY VALUES

Latinos are supporting marriage for same-sex couples because it reflects our community values. We believe in loving our neighbor and treating others the way we would want to be treated.

Once we learn more about it, we realize that marriage matters to gay people in similar ways that it matters to everyone. Gay and lesbian couples want to get married to make a lifetime commitment to the person they love and to protect their families.



"As a state legislator, I voted to extend marriage to same-sex couples. As the father of a gay son, I want him to be able to marry the person he loves. I want him to have the chance to stand in front of our friends and family and make a commitment to cherish, honor, and love his partner. That's what marriage is."

-WA State Rep. Luis Moscoso (D-1)

CIVIL MARRIAGE WILL NOT AFFECT YOUR CHURCH

Civil marriage for gay couples does not affect religious marriages, religious institutions, or clergy in any way. No religion would be forced to marry same-sex couples, or recognize same-sex marriages within the context of their religious beliefs.

LATINO LEADERS AND GROUPS SUPPORTING MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES

(*organizations listed for information purposes)

Washington Latino Organizations and Leaders

- Consejo
- Catholics for Marriage Equality
- Casa Latina (Seattle)
- Community to Community (Bellingham)
- Entre Hermanos (Seattle)
- El Centro de la Raza (Seattle)
- Latino Community Fund of Washington
- Northwest Immigrant Rights Project
- Seamar Community Health Centers
- Rep. Luis Moscoso (D-1)
- Jorge Quiroga, Catholics for Equality
- Jorge Barón, Executive Director, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project
- Ricardo García, founder, Radio KDNA* (Yakima)
- María Cuevas, Chicanos Studies, Yakima Valley Community College*

- Jean Hernandez, President, Edmonds Comm. College*
- Nina Martinez (Everett)
- Rogelio Riojas, CEO, Seamar Community Health Centers
- Noel Solano, MEChA GSE, Yakima Valley Community College*

National Latino Organizations

- National Council of La Raza
- League of United Latino American Citizens
- Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
- An more than 20 other respected national Latino groups

Why Marriage Matters Washington is a project of [Pride Foundation](#), [Western States Center](#) and [Freedom to Marry](#).

WhyMarriageMattersWashington.org

The emphasis on family as a cornerstone of the community and shared experiences of discrimination appeared in a variety of advertisements directed at communities of color with large immigrant constituencies in the Pacific Northwest. For instance, the below ad targeting the Asian/Pacific Islander (API) community describes similarities between LGBTQ and API

families, same-sex marriage, and past discriminatory laws prohibiting interracial marriage:

Reflecting Our Community Values and History: API communities support marriage for same-sex couples because it reflects our community values. We believe in loving our neighbor and treating others the way we would want to be treated. Marriage is about loyalty, stability, and security. Once we learn more about it, we realize that marriage matters to gay people in similar ways that it matters to everyone. Gay and lesbian couples want to get married to make a lifetime commitment to the person they love and to protect their families.

Asian/Pacific Islanders understand what it's like to face marriage discrimination. As recently as the mid-1900s, anti-miscegenation laws prohibited interracial marriages. The Washington Filipino, Japanese, and Chinese communities joined with other communities of color in the 1930s to defeat state anti-miscegenation laws. **Marriage says “we are family” in a way no other word does.** Gay and lesbian couples may seem different from straight couples, but share similar values—like the importance of family and helping out our neighbors; worries—like making ends meet or the possibility of losing a job; and hopes and dreams—like finding that special someone to grow old with, and standing in front of friends and family to make a lifetime commitment. (“Asian/Pacific Islanders for the Freedom to Marry” 2012, emphasis as it appears in the advertisement. First page of advertisement included below).

As with the advertisement above directed at the Latinx community, this ad highlights how same-sex marriage matches API community understandings of traditional, nuclear families.

Furthermore, the advertisement, by emphasizing the civil rights struggles of the API community over the legalization of interracial marriage, highlights a common civil rights past shared by LGBTQ and API people. In other words, the advertisement is an example of how civil rights narratives unify coalitions partners. In drawing attention to the similarities between denying same-sex couples and interracial couples the right to marry, the advertisement also calls attention to a common core of opponents. Both struggles were driven by religious and conservative opponents who used similar messagings and tactics based in moral fears that “undesirables” (here same-sex couples and interracial couples) should not be allowed to stain state-sanctioned civil marriages.

Love. Commitment. Family.

WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS

ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDERS FOR THE FREEDOM TO MARRY

SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE PART OF OUR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES

Many Asian/Pacific Islanders (API) know someone who is gay: neighbors, friends, and even our own family members. Within Asian/Pacific Islander families, unity is important. The lack of acceptance and recognition of gay and lesbian people breaks families apart. **By accepting our gay and lesbian family members, we strengthen all families in our community.**

Nearly 25% of same-sex couples where at least one person is Asian are raising children; more than 33% of same-sex couples where at least one person is Pacific Islander or Hawaiian are raising kids. Marriage helps API same-sex parents protect their families.

REFLECTING OUR COMMUNITY VALUES AND HISTORY

API communities support marriage for same-sex couples because it reflects our community values. We believe in loving our neighbor and treating others the way we would want to be treated. Marriage is about loyalty, stability, and security. Once we learn more about it, we realize that marriage matters to gay people in similar ways that it matters to everyone. Gay and lesbian couples want to get married to make a lifetime commitment to the person they love and to protect their families.

Asian/Pacific Islanders understand what it's like to face marriage discrimination. As recently as the mid-1900s, anti-miscegenation laws prohibited interracial marriages. The Washington Filipino, Japanese, and Chinese communities joined with other communities of color in the 1930s to defeat state anti-miscegenation laws.

MARRIAGE SAYS "WE ARE FAMILY"

Marriage says, "We are a family" in a way that no other word does. Gay and lesbian couples may seem different from straight couples, but share similar values—like the importance of family and helping out our neighbors; worries—like making ends meet or the possibility of losing a job; and hopes and dreams—like finding that special someone to grow old with, and standing in front of friends and family to make a lifetime commitment.



"There are so many Asian/Pacific Islanders who are also lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender. I don't see these communities as separate; we're all part of the larger community. Because API's have a history of being discriminated against, we have the moral authority and responsibility to advocate for fairness for all."

— Kip Tokuda,
former state legislator,
children's advocate, and
Japanese-American

WhyMarriageMattersWashington.org

By emphasizing how multiple movements share a common movement past and similar opponents, the series of smaller rights episodes that culminated in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality rights episode expanded inter- and intra-movement mobilization, building new coalitions and increasing cross-community partnerships, in some circumstances and contexts. This occurred through networked political processes that manifested through rights

struggles. Eventually, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided *Obergefell v. Hodges* in 2015, the case that legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, the Court directly referred to the many “referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns,” like those that occurred in Washington State, when making the argument that there has been sufficient deliberation about marriage equality to justify judicial intervention (*Obergefell v. Hodges* 576 U.S. 1, 23 (2015)).

IV. The Limits of the Right to Marry

Organizing through deep conversations within immigrant communities and communities of color expands inter- and intra-movement coalitions by emphasizing how disparate subject positions (e.g., LGBTQ people and Latinxs) are part of one community, share historic struggles against discrimination and oppression, and have a common core of opponents. However, there are also important ways that this messaging and other mechanisms that expanded the array of groups that support the LGBTQ rights movement through marriage equality campaigns are constraining and exclusive. The emphasis on “one community” and on traditional two-person families as a core social value as depicted in the advertisements above relies upon an understanding of family and community that centers lesbian and gay couples that most mirror mainstream heterosexual families. This is certainly an expansion of who and what constitutes a legitimate family in the mainstream. Yet, it is also a limited expansion that does not engage with a discussion of queer kinship networks that exist outside of nuclear families. Rights episodes like Referendum 74 hyper-focus on discrete, rights-based issues that allow little space for conversations about minority identities that exist outside of the mainstream. As a result, there is little space for movement expansion beyond a rights episode once the episode ends.

Voters ultimately approved Referendum 74, legalizing same-sex marriage throughout

Washington State, but this win came at a cost. After the marriage equality rights episode ended, my interviews show that movement mobilization dissipated because: (1) movement expansion centered on winning discrete rights rather than long-term cross-community mobilization; (2) the cyclical nature of the rights episode drained the movement organizations involved in the campaigns of resources; and (3) the rights episode privileged the experiences of the most mainstream constituencies within their respective movements rather than those who held identities or were part of queer relationships that are perceived as less socially desirable. Interviewees frequently emphasized the constraining impacts of the marriage equality rights episode, with some recounting experiences of tokenization and marginalization during the campaign. For example, Valeria is a community organizer who works with grassroots organizations that represent queer, trans, and undocumented people. In her interview, Valeria described marriage equality as a constraining rights episode that limited the imaginations of politicians and movement advocates:

Valeria: I think a lot of the groups I work with, like marriage equality just isn't their issue. Period. And I think some people are happy that it passed, some people actively feel that it's taken away from the attention that should be paid to the actual issues facing queer people. And that the funding, in the same ways as the comprehensive immigration reform funding has limited both a radical imagination and the strategies. You know the incredible focus on marriage equality has taken the focus away from the murders of trans women or policing or lack of access to healthcare that doesn't rely on you getting married and having somebody who already has a job who has access to healthcare. So those demands, you know the marriage equality demand or the CIR demand, are again demands that are very palatable despite the opposition. Ultimately, the Republicans could imagine a world in which you have marriage equality, the Republicans probably imagine a world in which you have CIR even though they're still well-based opposition. They can't imagine a world and probably Democrats can't either where there's no, where policing is omitted in ways LGBT women, or trans women are no longer at risk in the ways that they are.

For Valeria, “the incredible focus on marriage equality has taken the focus away from the murders of trans women or policing or lack of healthcare access that doesn't rely on you getting

married.” By hyper-focusing on a discrete rights-based issue that is “palatable despite the opposition,” the marriage equality rights episode sidelined deeper conversations about violence across LGBTQ and immigrant communities, communities of color, and low wage workers. In this way marriage equality limited “imagination” and constrained the multiple movements that worked together to get it passed. Although the marriage equality rights episode tended to expand political movement formation in some contexts, for example by expanding the array of subject positions represented within movement spaces, it did not meaningfully incorporate political issues that matter to many marginalized people and organizations and limited each movements’ ability to “imagine” beyond discrete rights outcomes.

After marriage, much of the mobilization that had expanded over decades through multiple episodic rights campaigns, dissolved. This is clearly apparent in the rapid decline of mainstream LGBTQ organizations once the campaign ended, both in Washington State and in other state contexts that expanded movement mobilization through marriage equality rights episodes. Below, Stephanie, the former leader of an organization that constructs inter- and intra-movement coalitions around ballot initiatives in Washington, describes how one mainstream LGBTQ organization lost momentum after Referendum 74:

Stephanie: I think specific to [mainstream LGBTQ rights organization], the other thing that we see is, we work with some of the largest labor unions and people who have dozens if not hundreds of employees. right? And we work with organizations like [a community of color organization] or others like [a marginalized LGBTQ organization] where there's only maybe one full-time staff person or maybe it's an all-volunteer run organization. And *it's very hard for organizations like that to really get out of a cycle of diminished capacity* because it's so hard when you're, one person trying to run an organization to both kind of raise your salary and then raise the amount of money that's needed to actually grow staff capacity, program capacity, and then bring in more funding so it's a very difficult thing to do. [The mainstream LGBTQ organization] was already relatively small organization to begin with....

Really kind of the drumbeat for 17 years while we were working to...get

domestic partnership laws and then working to expand domestic partnership and that build up to marriage equality took nearly 20 years. And even longer if you go back to Cal Anderson [an LGBTQ legislator in Washington State in the late 1980s and early 1990s]. *So, everybody knew that this is the sort of the holy grail. This is what we're working toward.* And so while [the mainstream LGBTQ organization] championed many, many other issues in the legislature, the focus particularly around fundraising for a long time was always around this will get us closer to marriage or then when Referendum 74 came around, this is about marriage. *And, so then when that happened, people just don't feel as compelled to give, to continue, to sustain.*

And I think that's, so partly the question in my mind is what could the community have done? What could [the mainstream LGBTQ organization] have done to really start the dialogue with their donors much, much earlier about, "Look, this is gonna pass and then we still have a lot to do?" Or to get multi-year commitments from donors or foundations, to say look we've seen it happen Massachusetts where marriage equality passes, the funding dries up, and then our ability to advocate is in jeopardy. What are we gonna do to really address this? And to do that really before marriage equality passed or the pieces were in place.... And, having said all of that, with an organization that's already strapped for capacity the ability to actually work that in is difficult, so these are the realities of really doing advocacy work is like a lot of times you're, you know, hindsight is 20/20, right? But when you're faced with the sort of a fight of your life and you're struck for capacity to begin with, it's all you can do to do what's in front of you.
[Emphasis Added]

In Washington State, as with many other states, mainstream LGBTQ organizations focused intensely around winning marriage in the 2000s. This was driven at first by opponent groups who worked to expand state level DOMAs, forcing local organizations that may not have focused on marriage equality in the past, to respond (Dorf and Tarrow 2014). Eventually, it became the primary focus of many state-based LGBTQ organizations. They still "championed many, many other issues at the legislature," demonstrating their commitment to other minority movements and expanding inter- and intra-movement coalitions in the process. However, marriage was "the holy grail." For mainstream LGBTQ organizations, the movement was more about winning a discrete right than mobilizing in the long-term. During the interviews, many advocates with immigrant and community of color organizations who worked on the Referendum 74 Campaign

were disenchanted with LGBTQ organizations for this reason – they felt that these organizations predominately cared about marriage and all other issues, including those that matter to the marginalized communities the LGBTQ organizations claimed to serve, were secondary.

For some interviewees, the concern that marriage alone was the center of mainstream LGBTQ organizing was validated after Referendum 74 as mainstream organizations were crippled by funding losses. All of the mainstream organization leaders and advocates I interviewed for this study clearly wanted to continue advocating after marriage and believed that an array of LGBTQ people for whom marriage equality was not a concern, were left behind by the win. But the crippling capacity of a rights episode is not only felt at the margins, mainstream organizations feel it as well. During the interviews, organization leaders and advocates described how mainstream LGBTQ organizing in Washington State was dealt a significant blow by the marriage equality rights episode. Organizations lost much of their funding after the Washington State marriage equality win, like many other local lesbian and gay organizations in other states because, as Stephanie explained above, they did not simultaneously plan for another rights episode or otherwise reserve funding collected during the Referendum 74 Campaign to ensure institutional longevity once money devoted to marriage equality disappeared. This, in turn, solidified the perception amongst many marginalized organizations that mainstream organizations are not concerned with issues that matter to more disadvantaged communities. According to many interviewees, some marginalized organizations then placed the blame on mainstream organizations for centering the right to marry at the expense of marginalized people, further fragmenting movements.

The mainstream LGBTQ movement's ability to continue to press for LGBTQ issues in Washington was minimal in the immediate aftermath of marriage because of limited institutional

capacity and because of the various constraints that fighting such an intense rights episode placed on the community. As a result, even though some LGBTQ movement organizations continued to endorse statewide rights campaigns, like the state effort to support comprehensive immigration reform, the Washington State DREAM Act (aka the Real Hope Act), and the Washington State Voting Rights Act, the organizational capacity to support these issues beyond endorsements was small. This limited capacity, in turn, supported the perception held by many individuals within other minority movements that relationships made between mainstream lesbian and gay organizations and organizations representing communities of color during the campaign were superficial and fragile. As the discussion in Chapter 4 will further show, many mainstream and marginalized organizations continue to view one another with “suspicion” because of fragile unions formed around discrete rights “wins.”

The constraints on movement mobilization after marriage also left many mainstream and marginalized organizations without the capacities they once had, which likely made them more vulnerable to future losses. In 2015, the YMCAs in Pierce and Kitsap county in Washington State adopted a new locker room policy allowing transgender people to use facilities that conform with their gender identity. The policy set off a storm of opposition in Washington State, as conservative activists quickly organized to overturn the policy. Eventually, their mobilization caught the attention of the Family Policy Institute of Washington (FPIW), one of the primary opponents of the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in 2012. After attempts to overturn the YMCA policy failed, FPIW and newly activated LGBTQ movement opponents decided to introduce a series of bills in the Washington State legislature to roll back the anti-discrimination protections for trans people that the LGBTQ community previously won with the passage of the Anderson-Murray Anti-Discrimination Act in 2006 (Sailor 2015a, Sailor 2015b,

Shapiro 2016). By the beginning of 2016, conservative news outlets buzzed about the situation in Washington, relaying moral fears about transgender people and a policy they argued would enable the sexual assault of women and children, sparking a moral panic that echoed and conflated old fears about homosexuality harming children and families. A new rights episode was emerging in Washington State, this time centering on the state's trans community – a community that has historically been marginalized in rights episodes around marriage. The struggle for marriage equality in Washington involved considerable public education about who lesbian and gay people are, but no public education about trans people who, at the time, were believed to hold the less socially “desirable” LGBTQ identity in society.

FPIW and conservative legislators introduced over 6 ant-trans bills at the Washington State legislature in 2016 (Holden 2016). They failed to pass, but since then, opponents have mobilized behind two initiative campaigns in an attempt to curtail protections for trans people under the state's anti-discrimination laws (Brownstone 2017, O'Sullivan 2017). With diminished capacity following the marriage equality win, mainstream LGBTQ mobilization to stop the anti-trans efforts was initially hampered. Coalitions that largely disbanded after marriage had to be re-built again from the ground-up. Yet, despite the institutional set-backs that the LGBTQ movement faced in fighting the emerging anti-trans effort, organizations were able to re-form inter- and intra-movement coalitions that came together around the marriage equality rights episode under new names: the Washington Safety and Access for Everyone (SAFE) Alliance and Washington Won't Discriminate. These new coalitions included labor organizations, immigrant rights organizations, and organizations that represent communities of color. However, notably, these coalitions were somewhat smaller than those formed during the marriage equality rights episode and lacked many of the immigrant and community of color organizations that had joined

the Referendum 74 coalitions. Advocates relied in part on the campaign coalition model they had developed over the decades through rights episodes like the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. For this reason, the political advocacy coalition adopted the name Washington Won't Discriminate – the same coalition name that LGBTQ advocates used while fighting for the Anderson-Murray Anti-Discrimination Act in 2006 (McCoy 2006). This time the defensive response to was led by trans leaders in the state who quickly organized mass protests, prepared trans community members to lobby at the legislature, and orchestrated a public education campaign, preparing community members to write op-eds for newspapers and to speak to their own organizations and communities about supporting Washington's trans community. After marriage, institutional and organizational capacity was crippled in Washington, contracting movement mobilization. Yet, the possibility of another rights episode emerging, and breathing life into the diminished political movement coalitions often remains because movement struggles do not always move forward in a linear manner towards progress. They are often part of interlocked movements and counter-movements that can continually form and re-form over time.

Conclusion

Washington's marriage equality rights episode took decades to develop, expanding into new partnerships and increasing mobilization around a discrete, mainstream LGBTQ issue in the process. This mobilization was often constrained because it was limited to winning rights rather than constructing a long-term sustainable movement, it centered the interests of the most privileged constituencies within the LGBTQ community, and it drained community organizations of funding and resources. The analysis presented here demonstrates that rights-based political movement formation does not always occur along a linear trajectory forward

towards progress. The development of the marriage equality rights episode often did not move seamlessly from a forward from one political venue to another. Instead, the political spaces through which the episode developed were often overlapped and networked with one another, together delimiting the institutional constraints placed on each phase of the episode's development. This suggests that, when analyzing the relationship between law and social change, we should not focus only political venues in isolation but, instead, scholars also should look to the intensely interwoven nature of the different political venues, which can vary depending on context, because struggles for rights can move in paradoxical ways through political spaces. The next chapter will further advance my analysis of how movement formation by examining the political development of inter- and intra- movement coalitions around a defensive rights episode: SB 1070 and the renewed threat that it presented for the migrant community in Arizona.

CHAPTER 3

Arizona's SB 1070 and the Paradoxical Implications of Defensive Rights Episodes

Diana: I first got involved in 2010, and it was after SB 1070 and the realization that our community, especially my family and myself were being attacked and the fear once it was passed. I was going to...university, and my mom, I didn't drive, I was too scared, so my mom dropped me off for my night class and that night all I could think about was, what if my mom doesn't come back. And that fear, the next day I was like, I need to do something, I need to get active. And prior to that, life was about keeping your head down, don't talk too much, don't ask too many questions so people don't ask you many questions, like keep hidden. So that fear drove me to say, ok they're attacking us anyway and we've been with our head down, you know. What happens when we raise ourselves and we're together? And so I got involved with electoral work, with different organizations.

Jorge Martinez: I drive about 100 to 120 miles a day, and I see a lot of people get detained. Everyone says SB 1070 is in court. It's not in court. We're living it. ["The State of Arizona" 2014]

Introduction

Jorge Martinez works as an ice cream truck driver in Arizona. He is also a member of Puente Movement, a migrant advocacy organization based in Phoenix. In the documentary, *The State of Arizona*, Martinez talks about how he became politically active when people in his community started getting deported in greater numbers in the late 2000s, particularly in the aftermath of the Support of Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, also known as Senate Bill (SB) 1070. SB 1070 is entrenched in a history of anti-immigrant law and policy that has had a profound impact on Martinez's community in Arizona. In the documentary, people sometimes described the rise in immigration enforcement and deportations in the state through the word "disappeared," a term that both captures the transnational experiences of Arizona's migrant workers who personally suffered the effects of government enforced disappearances in many Latin American countries and the anguish undocumented and mixed immigration status

families go through when a family member is banished from their home through US government deportation proceedings. Although SB 1070 is most known for its “show me your papers” provision, which allows law enforcement officers to question and detain those who they reasonably suspect are undocumented immigrants, SB 1070 is really an omnibus bill that aims to make “attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona” (SB 1070 2010). The goal of SB 1070 is to dramatically decrease the undocumented population in the State of Arizona. Immediately after the bill passed in 2010, the federal government filed a lawsuit challenging much of the law’s constitutionality. Yet Martinez, and many of the participants in this study, who felt the impacts of SB 1070 in their daily lives, from increased anti-immigrant rhetoric through the deportation of friends and family members, contend that SB 1070 is “not in court,” they are “living it.”

This chapter continues to examine how rights episodes impact movement mobilization by analyzing the formation of SB 1070 – a defensive rights episode that revitalized the immigrant rights movement in Arizona. As with the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in Washington State, SB 1070 tended to both expand and contract movement mobilization. However, rights episodes can also operate in different ways because how they form is often dictated by constrained and unique political environments. That is, rights episodes can have different effects depending on context. Like Referendum 74, SB 1070 activated and grew coalition partnerships that expanded into new rights events at the same time that it contained movement mobilization, in some circumstances. Yet, unlike Referendum 74, local coalition partnerships that formed through SB 1070 were in some ways able to expand into more sustained inter- and intra-movement alliances after the defensive rights episode had largely dissipated. In other words, SB 1070 seems to have had more expansionist potential than the Referendum 74

marriage equality rights episode. SB 1070 likely had greater expansionist potential because it was a defensive episode and, thus, there was an increased desperation in the rights advocacy moment that encouraged the formation of lasting alliances that center marginalized people and organizations. Furthermore, because SB 1070 was an omnibus bill with multiple components, it has not contracted as much as the single-issue focused, Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. SB 1070 also made it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented person while committing a criminal offense and has an anti-sanctuary cities clause that allows individuals to sue if cities or state government agencies refuse to enforce immigration law. The anti-sanctuary cities component has fostered more immigrant movement mobilization recently in the state due to increased federal immigration enforcement under President Trump's administration.

In the following pages, I delve into the complexities of the SB 1070 defensive rights episode, explaining how it impacted inter- and intra-movement coalition expansion while also containing movement mobilization, often mirroring the effects of the marriage equality rights episode in Washington State. Yet, my interviews also indicate that SB 1070 had important differences, (1) because its defensive nature helped shift most of the blame for marginalization onto movement opponents rather than mainstream organizations, and (2) because it had a greater potential to expand coalitions formed during the heated advocacy moment beyond a single campaign cycle. Through analyzing interviews with mainstream and marginalized movement advocates, this chapter will highlight these similarities and differences between defensive and offensive rights episodes.

In examining the SB 1070 defensive rights episode, I will delineate how the state environment from which SB 1070 emerged was shaped by anti-immigration mobilization, the unique political opportunities and constraints that exist in Arizona, and new political events

immediately preceding SB 1070 that created a fertile climate for a massive defensive rights episode. Furthermore, I will show how this defensive rights episode assisted in the institutionalization of a grassroots advocacy network that centered marginalized organizations and explain how this network became central to the electoral campaigning of mainstream political movement advocates. Through SB 1070, marginalized immigrant, labor, and LGBTQ movement organizations in Arizona constructed a civic engagement coalition that conducted voter registration drives and get out the vote efforts to increase their political capacity in the state. This civic engagement coalition strategically increased the importance of marginalized organizations in Arizona in movement building. Through this expansive coalition, marginalized organizations largely built the political power necessary to engage in future movement struggles. Marginalized organizations accomplished this increasing by working in coalition with mainstream organizations to get the votes needed to elect progressive candidates, and, then, by holding these candidates accountable for passing community-led public policies after electoral campaigns.

I present the expansionist and containing impacts of Arizona's defensive rights episode in three sections. The first section examines the political and social roots of SB 1070, which are based in a state ethos that supports racialized, gendered, and class-based hierarchies. This section will also delineate some of the key opponent figures interviewees identified as "enemies" and explain how the political philosophies that undergird opposition strategies are based in the state's past. The next section examines the various ways that movements expanded and mobilized through networked political campaigns surrounding SB 1070 and through the formation of an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network. In this section, I focus on the smaller rights moments (i.e., propositions, bills, and court cases) that immediately preceded SB 1070 and

formed in the aftermath of SB 1070 in addition to the intense SB 1070 advocacy moment. My analysis of movement expansion here focuses on those political campaigns identified by interviewees as important moments that shaped the environment out of which the defensive rights episode arose, creating an episodic rights vortex that sucked LGBTQ and labor activists into the struggle for immigrant rights. The final section relays how SB 1070 also had some containing effects on movement mobilization by funneling movement advocacy into cyclical campaigns and centering the experiences of the most privileged constituencies within minority populations. Through an analysis of Arizona's SB 1070, a defensive rights episode that activated an entire generation, this chapter further develops my understanding of how rights struggles can operate as episodes that often have paradoxical effects that at once expand and ossify political movements.

II. Understanding the Roots of SB 1070

In order to accurately describe how the SB 1070 rights episode emerged in Arizona, one must go back to the state's founding. During my fieldwork, it was common for Arizonans to describe the state's anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and anti-worker politics by turning to the state's history. One interviewee, an attorney who has worked on immigrant and migrant rights cases, described the flood of anti-immigrant bills and ballot initiatives that materialized in the early 2000s and made SB 1070 possible by referencing the "historical discrimination, historical white privilege, historical dominance by the Anglo community." When I asked another interviewee to describe the greatest problems facing the Latinx and immigrant communities in Arizona, she responded by explaining what she called the "cult of racism" that has developed in the state, especially in recent years. For Arizonans involved in the political movement struggles,

SB 1070 was a new manifestation of an entrenched state ethos that involves in the disenfranchisement and exclusion of minority communities. This section briefly examines Arizona's social and political culture to contextualize the climate surrounding the rise of SB 1070.

Southern Traditionalism, Frontier Values, and Law and Order

In describing the state ethos from which SB 1070 arose, it is perhaps best to start with the state's border because, in many ways, the politics of Arizona is a politics of borders. Arizona's US-Mexico border emerged out of the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase in 1853. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo encompassed a massive land grab by the US at a time when Mexico, as a still newly independent country, was unable to fend off US encroachment. The treaty officially ended the two-year Mexican-American War. The Gadsden Purchase was precipitated by the US government's desire to construct a Southern transcontinental railroad and resolve some of the conflicts that lingered after the Mexican-American War (González de Bustamante 2012, *US Department of State* 2017). As a new international border emerged, the terrain that would one day become Arizona was still deeply contested. The creation of the international boundary marked the onset of a struggle across multiple communities, from the members of Tohono O'odham Nation, whose tribal lands were divided by the border, to the Anglo community that would ultimately decry the federal government's "failure to seal the border," to the Mexican and migrant community disrupted by the new border's appearance (González de Bustamante 2012: 22).

The establishment of new US territory soon gave way to what Lynch (2010) calls Arizona's "long and bitter battle to shed its territorial status" – a battle that would last nearly 50

years (Lynch 2010: 23). This battle over Arizona's statehood brought out the "discriminatory attitudes" of Anglo Arizonans and American politicians (González de Bustamante 2012: 26). When members of Congress proposed a joint Arizona-New Mexico statehood, Arizona demurred out of a concern that New Mexico had a Mexican population that was too large (González de Bustamante 2012). At the federal level, the resistance to annexing Arizona stemmed from a majority view in Congress that Arizona's political leaders were "radicals" who distrusted the federal government (Lynch 2010: 23). Influenced heavily by the influx of settlers from Southern American states, Arizona's political culture was characterized by both the traditionalist values of Southern Democrats of the late 1800s and the frontier values of American settler communities of the time who migrated to the region through the westward expansion justified by Manifest Destiny ideology. Composed of a distrust of federal and state government and a pioneer culture that valued self-reliance and individualism, the political ethos that developed out of Arizona's founding continues to characterize the political climate in the state today (Lynch 2010).

After the annexation of Arizona in 1912, a series of "hot moments" jarred the inhabitants of the Arizona region (González de Bustamante 2012). Each of these events centered on a period of economic expansion followed by economic recession or depression that directly impacted the state's Latinx migrant worker population. While a racialized hierarchy dominated Arizona's politics in the early 1900s, the state's economy relied heavily on cheap laborers who worked in harsh conditions. At the time, Anglo farmers in the West feared the influx of Chinese and Japanese laborers. This resulted in the implementation of a series of exclusionary immigration laws at the federal level that dramatically slowed immigration from these countries. Exclusionary laws of the time that targeted Chinese and Japanese workers included the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which placed a moratorium on immigration from China; the Immigration Act of

1907, which closed a loophole immigrants from these countries used to enter the United States by forbidding the entry of immigrants who obtained visas issued by a foreign government; and the Asian Exclusion and National Origins Act of 1924, which placed quotas on those allowed to enter the United States and expanded the Chinese Exclusion Act (Águila 2013, González de Bustamante 2012). During a time period characterized by the racialized pseudo-science of eugenics and Social Darwinism, Mexican migrants were socially constructed by Anglo elites as the more desirable source of cheap labor because of their purported “domesticated” and “passive nature” (Águila 2013: 134-135).

Throughout the 1900s, Arizona relied on and spurned migrant labor depending on the whims of a boom and bust economic cycle that played upon the vulnerabilities of a state with a historically unstable economy. Following the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal government initiated a forced “repatriation” program that resulted in the deportation of nearly one million Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including US citizens (González de Bustamante 2012: 28). When the country needed laborers during WWII, the government instituted the temporary guest worker *Bracero* program to provide migrant workers predominately from Mexico with a pathway into Arizona as well as other states. Following a recession in 1953, the U.S. Border Patrol conducted a deportation program whose title encompassed a racial slur, indicative of the entrenched racial hierarchy that dominated US politics in the 1950s. The Border Patrol’s “Operation Wetback” forced the mass deportation of workers who came into the United States (González de Bustamante 2012). Although the Border Patrol was supposed to target undocumented workers and not those who came into the United States through the *Bracero* program, Border Patrol officers were indiscriminate as they conducted immigration sweeps. Each of these “hot moments” further embedded a racialized nativism in Arizona’s

political ethos that would resurge with force from time to time as Arizona's economy and immigrant population shifted and grew in future decades.

In addition to the federal programs described here, the state government has historically enacted hostile measures designed to marginalize its Latinx population. For example, until 1975, Arizona refused to provide election materials in Spanish or any language other than English. For this reason, when the United States adopted the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965, Arizona was the only entire state in the Southwest, other than Texas, that had to have proposed changes to its election laws pre-cleared by the federal government under Section 5 of the VRA. Furthermore, Arizona has always been a segregated state, first through official state, local, and federal laws and then through de facto segregation in the aftermath of civil rights laws that largely eliminated de jure segregation (Sinema 2012: 73). Arizona's historic segregation and inclusion in Section 5 are examples of policies created out of the Southern traditionalist and segregationist values brought into the state by Anglo settlers (Epps 2011, *US Department of Justice* 2015).

In addition to a political ethos based in the traditionalist values of Southern Democrats and pioneer individualism, Arizona developed a uniquely American frontier-style culture of harsh punishment and law and order politics (Lynch 2010; see also, Gottschalk 2008, Pestritto 2000, Sarat 1999, Christianson 1998, Dumm 1987 on the development of American law and order politics). The Arizonan blend of frontier individualism and law and order politics embedded demands for "cheap" and "harsh" punishment in the mythos that defined the state's Anglo community. This would prove a useful tool for Anglos in Arizona to politically implement a penitentiary and criminal justice system to socially control and solidify the underclass status of the state's Latinx, indigenous, black, and other minority communities that also violated constitutional and international human rights under the guise of remaining "cost effective"

(Lynch 2010). The myth that politicians and law enforcement officials must go “above the law” to protect the state against foreigners and other “invaders,” depicted universally as people of color in popular media, continues to haunt the political culture of the state generations after its inception.

Against this background, it becomes clearer why, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Arizona resisted adopting Martin Luther King, Jr. Day (MLK Day) as a holiday and passed a controversial constitutional amendment that made English the official language of the state. The constitutional amendment declaring English the official language of the state was eventually declared unconstitutional by the Arizona State Supreme Court in 1998 in *Ruiz v. Hull* (Terry 1998). The US Supreme Court then declined to hear a challenge to *Ruiz v. Hull*'s overturning of the English language amendment in *Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, leaving the Arizona high court's invalidation of the amendment intact. The invalidation of Arizona's attempt to make English the state's official language is one of many examples of the networked political context that exists in Arizona, a state where legislation and ballot initiatives are sometimes passed in violation of the federal and/or state constitution. For this reason, the courts often serve as important political venues that check invasive anti-immigrant and racist state laws and mobilization sources for movement organizations.

As with the struggle to invalidate the amendment mandating English as the official language of the state, interviewees invoked the MLK Day holiday struggle as one of a series of what González de Bustamante (2012) calls “hot moments” in explaining the culture through which SB 1070 emerged in Arizona. When former President Ronald Reagan pushed for the national adoption of a holiday to honor civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., Arizona's then-governor initially supported the move; although, Arizona's Representative John McCain

(now Senator McCain) voted against the proposed holiday in Congress (Amira 2013). Then, when Governor Evan Mecham assumed office in 1987, Mecham pushed for a ballot initiative asking Arizonans to vote on whether the state should adopt the holiday. Two initiatives appeared on the ballot in 1990, each would have created the state holiday, but both failed in the face of opposition campaigns that emphasized the economic cost of an additional paid holiday and aligned MLK with “radicalism” and “communism” – messaging that played upon the state’s southern traditionalist and frontier ethos (Cart 1990). When Arizonans failed to implement the holiday, the National Football League withdrew the planned 1993 Super Bowl from the state. This, along with millions of dollars in lost revenue from cancelled conferences, produced widespread outcry amongst Arizona’s business and tourism industry (the second largest industry in the state), which prompted another ballot initiative campaign, that ultimately passed, and, thus, finally enacted the holiday (Ye Hee Lee 2012).

While the law and order ethos that is embedded in Arizona’s political and social culture is largely centered on the oppression of working class racial minorities, scholars have also connected harsh on crime ideology to the criminalization and regulation of homosexuality, historically considered a social perversion and disorder in the United States (Engel 2016, Canaday 2011). This is evident in Arizona through the enactment of anti-LGBTQ laws like Senate Bill 1396, passed by Arizona legislators in 1991, which banned public school teachers from teaching anything that may promote “a homosexual lifestyle” in the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Beard Rau 2017, Huerta 1996). The 1991 ban remains in effect as of this writing despite recent efforts by legislators and activists affiliated with the LGBTQ, immigrant, worker alliance that emerged in the aftermath of SB 1070 to overturn the law (Wasser 2016). One of nine state “no promo homo” laws in the United States, Arizona’s law requires state public school

curricula to adopt heterosexuality as the norm of sexual orientation and exclude all other non-heterosexual forms of relationships from public education (Cooley 2015: 1009, Eskridge 2000). Critics align Arizona's "no promo homo" law with the "anti-gay propaganda law" passed in Russia in 2013, which criminalized the promotion of non-heterosexuality among minors and led to international calls for a boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia (Harmon Cooley 2015, Chokshi 2014, Hendley 2014).

Arizona's unique Southern traditionalist, frontier individualism, law and order political ethos, exemplified by laws like those described in this section, perhaps explains why political movement opponent groups and politicians are so politically powerful in the state. Arizona is home to the national conservative legal advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) and a state-based conservative advocacy group, the Center for Arizona Policy, led by Cathi Herrod. Often the leading force behind national anti-LGBTQ lawsuits, ADF was co-founded by James Dobson, the founder of the national anti-LGBTQ Evangelical Christian group Focus on the Family. Arizona is also a testing ground for national anti-immigrant legislation promoted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Kris Kobach affiliated group Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR). FAIR was founded in 1979 by Jon Tanton and others whose activism originated in the reproductive rights movement and the environmentalist population control movement. Tanton's FAIR grew out of movements that were affiliated with leftwing politics in the United States (HoSang 2010). The national organization seeks to end all undocumented immigration and eventually "permit no more than 300,000 immigrants and refugees" to gain entry in to the United States each year (Sinema 2012: 65). The 1988 effort to amend the state's constitution to make English the official language of Arizona was sponsored and funded by FAIR's Jon Tanton (Sinema 2012: 66). ALEC and FAIR

worked with local politicians in Arizona to pass the mass of anti-immigration bills and ballot initiatives in the 2000s discussed in the following section and have diligently labored to thwart legal challenges to these efforts initiated by immigrant rights movement advocates.

In addition to the slew of conservative groups and activists that have found their home in Arizona, state politicians frequently appeal to rights movement opponents as they work to pass and implement laws that hinder the communities that rights movements are supposed to serve. Arizona houses several “larger than life” politicians who have backed laws that target minority communities by appealing to stereotypes based in the state’s political ethos. Interviewees discussed several during this course of this study, most notably former State Senator Russell Pearce, former Governor Jan Brewer, and former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Pearce and Arpaio both won over public support in Arizona and became leading figures with far-right components of national politics by fashioning themselves as modern day John Wayne frontiersmen, protecting Anglo society from perceived undesirable minority elements who “invaded” Arizona through the Southern border. Both were at the peak of their political power during the 2000s, when anti-immigrant fervor gripped the state anew. Russell Pearce, a former Chief Deputy under Sheriff Arpaio, served in the state legislature from 2001 to 2011 and Joe Arpaio served as the Maricopa County Sheriff over six terms from 1993 through 2016 (Chin et al. 2012). Both were defeated at the ballot box and unseated by more moderate opponents through the inter- and intra-movement coalition mobilization that developed following the series of anti-immigrant, anti-worker, and anti-LGBTQ laws that emerged in the state throughout the 2000s and 2010s (Kiefer 2015, Lacey and Seelye 2011).



Former Senator Russell Pearce poses in front of a photo of John Wayne (Photo Credit A.T. Willet, *National Public Radio* 2008)



Former Sheriff Joe Arpaio poses in front of the phrase “I do it my way,” a reference to his favorite Frank Sinatra song, “My Way,” which exemplifies the Anglo Arizonan ethos that supports going “above the law” to harshly punish perceived wrongdoers. Incidentally, this was the song played during President Donald Trump’s first inaugural dance (Photo Credit Ross D. Franklin, *Associated Press* 2008).

II. A Defensive Rights Episode: Anti-Immigrant Fervor and the Formation of SB 1070 in Arizona


The 1990s were a relatively calm period for Arizona, likely due to the economic promises of the decade, which drove up the demand for labor nationwide. In response to this demand for labor, the migrant community in the United States rapidly increased in the mid to late 1990s (Singer 2012, Passel and Suro 2000). This increase was particularly stark in Arizona as a result of the federal programs enacted by President Bill Clinton, Operation Hold the Line (1993) and Operation Gatekeeper (1994), which increased border patrol agents in other major border states, like California and Texas, effectively funneling most migration from Mexico in the region through Arizona's Southern border, which was less heavily monitored (Sinema 2012: 73, Magaña 2013: 153). At the time, the federal government, controlled by politicians in both political parties who wanted to minimize immigration into the United States, believed this would slow migrant traffic from Mexico into the United States since crossing into the United States through Arizona's desert was more treacherous than in other states.

However, the effort to stem immigration ultimately backfired as those fleeing the economic violence and turmoil in Latin America, bolstered by Clinton era globalization policies, continued to migrate to the United States despite more dangerous and deadly border crossings. During the 1990s, the Latinx population in Arizona increased by about 215,000, 89 percent higher than the previous decade, while net migration soared 193 percent to about 392,000 people (Rex 2011). This spurred concern amongst many of Arizona's Anglo population and politicians, especially as researchers reported that Arizona would soon become a majority-minority state (Cárdenas et al. 2012). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, Anglo

politicians in Arizona heightened comparisons between the state’s migrant population and “foreign terrorists.” Within the state, growing concerns about rapidly changing demographics spilled over into debates about national security. These shifting external political events marked the onset of what would become a wave of anti-immigrant advocacy in Arizona that would surpass and galvanize other counter-rights movement goals, such as anti-LGBTQ and anti-worker policies, that were affiliated with the state’s southern traditionalist, frontier ethos. In the 2016 Presidential election, the national government experienced an upsurge of anti-establishment, populist sentiment, also in response to demographic changes and fears about rapid social change, that would bring President Donald Trump and other authoritarian figures into elected office. But in Arizona, this upsurge began over 15 years prior to the 2016 election. During the 2000s, Arizona became the testing ground for anti-immigrant advocacy that would soon overtake the United States at the national level.

This section analyzes the sea of anti-immigrant laws that catapulted into the state of Arizona beginning in the early 2000s and culminated with the passing of SB 1070 in 2010. Figure 3.1 depicts how the SB 1070 rights episode emerged from networked political actions (i.e., litigation, legislation, ballot initiatives, and executive actions). These actions bolstered anti-immigrant rights movement mobilization in Arizona through a political network of opportunities and constraints. This political network was disrupted in 2010 through new political actions such as the economic recession and the departure of Governor Janet Napolitano to the Department of Homeland Security. These new political actions shifted the political climate in the state, creating an environment ripe for a massive defensive rights episode in SB 1070.

Figure 3.1 Formation of the SB 1070 Rights Episode



During the 2000s, well over 100 anti-immigrant bills and ballot initiatives were filed in Arizona along with numerous court cases challenging the anti-immigrant actions of local officials and laws when they passed. Executive agencies at the federal level also implemented programs both nationwide and specific to Arizona that shaped political movement mobilization around immigrant and migrant community issues at the local level throughout this time. This onslaught of opponent advocacy makes it difficult to analyze how SB 1070 developed in the state by focusing in on only a few rights advocacy moments. In Washington State, it is possible to analyze how the Referendum 74 Campaign emerged out of a few prior episodic rights campaigns while, in Arizona, the sheer number of campaigns complicates matters. In order to accurately delineate the climate through which SB 1070 emerged, I am focusing in on those rights campaigns preceding SB 1070 that were of the greatest importance to the advocates, activists, community workers, and politicians who participated in this study. This section (1) analyzes the most important networked political moments that interviewees identified as precursors to SB 1070; (2) describes how new political actions in 2009 (i.e., the departure of Governor Janet Napolitano and the economic recession) shifted the political climate in the state even further toward extremist anti-immigrant rights proponents, setting the stage for a massive immigrant rights threat; and (3) examines the extent to which the SB 1070 defensive rights episode expanded and contracted inter- and intra-movement coalition formation in the state's immigrant, labor, and LGBTQ communities.

A Growing Storm: Rights Episodes in Arizona Before SB 1070

Although the anti-immigrant momentum in Arizona caught national attention in 2010 with the passage of SB 1070, anti-immigrant organizations started increasing their advocacy

work in the state with the help of local politicians and activists in the early 2000s following the major demographic shifts of the 1990s and after the 9/11 attacks activated national security concerns nationwide. Arguably the first anti-immigrant initiative of the decade was Proposition 203, which passed in 2000 by 63 percent (*Arizona Secretary of State* 2000). Proposition 203, modeled after California's Proposition 227, eliminated bilingual education programs in Arizona. During the campaign, proponents used messaging that played upon social fears about immigrants and Spanish language speakers in Arizona that were embedded in the racialized nativism that had developed in the state (Johnson 2005). The proposition appeared on the ballot following a lawsuit over the initiative's language, which opponents contended misstated bilingual education law and exaggerated the availability of alternative educational programs (*Sotomayor v. Burns* 13 P.3d 1198 (Ariz. 2000)). The same year that Proposition 203 appeared on the ballot, Russell Pearce was elected in the House of Representatives (Sinema 2012). Pearce's election began an era of anti-immigrant legislation in the state that reached a crescendo with SB 1070, which Pearce introduced and helped author with the assistance of FAIR and Kris Kobach, who would later become the Kansas Secretary of State and an affiliate of President Trump's administration (Beard Rau 2017).

At first, bills introduced in Arizona's legislature that targeted the state's immigrant and Latinx population were considered radical and extreme by Arizona's standard. According to State Senator Gallardo, when anti-immigrant groups and legislators started pursuing legislation in the early 2000s, most legislators "would sit around and...laugh" at the bills they introduced. In fact, in 2003, none of the anti-immigrant bills introduced by then Representative Pearce even made it to a floor vote (Sinema 2012). With not yet enough support at the legislature, anti-immigrant groups, decided to pursue their goals at the ballot box. Together with Russell Pearce,

they created Proposition 200, the Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, also known as the Protect Arizona Now initiative (Villagra 2006). Proponents modeled Proposition 200 off California's Proposition 187, which passed by 60 percent in California in 1994 (McDonnell 1999). Proposition 187 denied state services, like education, healthcare, and social services, to undocumented immigrants and made it a felony to create, sell, or use false identity documents (Calavita 1996, Nesbet and Sellgren 1995). Anti-immigrant groups were heavily limited by court precedents when crafting Proposition 200. In California, Proposition 187 faced a legal quagmire as at least eight lawsuits were filed by immigrant rights advocates preventing its implementation (Suro 1994). Most of Proposition 187 was ultimately voided, having run afoul of longstanding Supreme Court precedents like *Plyer v. Doe*, which acknowledged a basic right to education for undocumented immigrant children in 1982 (*Plyer v. Doe* 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). A federal district court also found that most of the proposition's provisions were preempted by the federal 1996 Priority Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which created a comprehensive scheme for determining undocumented immigrants' eligibility for public benefits (*League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson* 997 F.Supp. 1244 (C.D. California), McDonnell 1999).

Proposition 200 and The First Major Immigrant Rights Threats

Anti-immigrant rights proponents of Proposition 200 in Arizona attempted to skirt the court cases that negated most of Proposition 187 by constructing a limited version of Proposition 187 that (1) denied state social services to undocumented immigrants, but not educational services, (2) required proof of citizenship to register to vote, and (3) required photo identification in order to vote (*Arizona Secretary of State* 2004a). Proposition 200 passed by about 56 percent

in Arizona in 2004 (*Arizona Secretary of State* 2004b). As with Proposition 187 in California, immigrant rights movement actors swiftly challenged Proposition 200 in court and were largely successful at dismantling the new law (*Friendly House v. Napolitano* 419 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2005), *Gonzalez v. Arizona* (9th Cir 2007), Campbell 2011). In cases immediately filed after Proposition 200, the 9th Circuit did determine that Proposition 200 was constitutional on its face. However, this is largely attributable to then Democratic Attorney General Thomas Goddard, who determined that the welfare provisions of Proposition 200 only applied to a small number of state programs, like utility assistance and state programs providing cash assistance for disabled people, and not to broader public housing, food assistance, and employment programs that would have thrown the Proposition's constitutionality into question (Díaz and Sherwood 2005). The US Supreme Court in *Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona* also found that the part of the proposition that required proof of citizenship in order to register to vote violated federal law. In *Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona*, the Court held that Arizona cannot require prospective voters to submit information, here proof of citizenship, beyond what is required by the uniform federal form according to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) (*Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona* 133 S.Ct. 2447 (2013), Sanders 2013).

The manner in which Proposition 200 played out would ultimately hold for true for all rights movement and counter-rights movement proposals enacted into law. In the Proposition 200 campaign, political movement advocates were largely forced to focus on a ballot initiative campaign because this with was the political tactic that presented the possibility for an opponent advance within Arizona's political advocacy network. However, the success of Proposition 200, and this opponent political opportunity, was delimited by another political tactic, litigation, within the overarching political network of opportunities and constraints in Arizona. With little

political power in Arizona, few allies, and minimal statewide coalitions, rights movement organizations and activists frequently filed lawsuits to curb harmful laws passed by opponents in the state's legislature and by Arizona's voters at the ballot box. Immigrant rights advocates resorted largely to court cases to stem the tide of anti-immigrant laws not because of a grand strategy that determined that the courts were better vehicles for social change, but because they were entirely shut out of other political institutions. Hence, fighting for immigrant rights in the courts was largely a defensive move dictated by political constraints. Meanwhile, Proposition 200 galvanized immigrant rights opponents in Arizona, who were activated by the win, which highlighted the political left's inability to effectively mobilize in the state at the time. With anti-immigrant sentiment increasing in the aftermath of 9/11, there were few inter- and intra-movement partnerships capable of mobilizing to stop anti-immigrant measures in Arizona during the early 2000s.

Even Democrats were largely absent from progressive state level movement advocacy at the time. Democrats, rather than launching statewide campaigns in the early 2000s to thwart anti-immigrant momentum, responded by criticizing state-based approaches and focusing their efforts on federal level calls for comprehensive immigration reform (Sinema 2012). Furthermore, at the local level in Arizona, Democrats were not universally supportive of immigrant rights. Indeed, many of the bills Russell Pearce introduced after Proposition 200 were supported and signed into law by then Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano. For instance, Governor Napolitano signed House Bill (HB) 2779 (the Legal Arizona Workers Act) into law in 2007. HB 2779 prohibited employers from hiring undocumented immigrants and made it a felony for people to work with fake identity documents. This law was forcefully implemented by Sheriff Joe Arpaio in the late 2000s as he conducted raids of local businesses in search of undocumented immigrants after the

Maricopa County Sheriff's department was delegated the authority to enforce federal immigration law under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In one of these raids, Guadalupe García de Rayos was arrested and convicted of working with false identification under the 2007 law. As a convicted felon, García de Rayos was ultimately deported in 2017, one of the first high profile deportations of the Trump administration (Schmidt and Larimer 2017).

After Proposition 200, anti-immigrant organizations began to pass numerous propositions and bills in Arizona. Most of the propositions initiated as legislative proposals that were passed by the Arizona State Senate and House of Representatives and vetoed by then Governor Janet Napolitano. Often, when a proposed bill was vetoed by Governor Napolitano it would reappear as a House Concurrent Resolution or a Senate Concurrent Resolution and get placed by the legislature on the ballot, where Arizona voters were likely to approve the legislature's proposal, thereby skirting the Governor's veto. This happened with Proposition 300, which eliminated in-state tuition for undocumented students and passed by 71 percent of the vote in 2006 (*Arizona Secretary of State 2006a*). The Arizona legislature sent Proposition 300 to the ballot by passing Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 1031 in 2006 after Governor Napolitano vetoed a version of the proposal in 2005.

At the legislature, advocates and legislators for and against the slate of anti-immigrant proposals introduced often referred to court cases and federal law – a clear example of the networked nature of political institutions in the state. For instance, when arguing for SCR 1031, which became Proposition 300 and eventually eliminated in-state tuition for undocumented students in Arizona, State Senator Dean Martin, the prime sponsor of the proposal, argued that the proposal should pass because it was limited. While the it would eliminate in-state tuition for

undocumented students, State Senator Martin argued that undocumented students would still have access to education because, for example, “the state is under a federal court order to provide English education to students regardless of the student’s status” (Committee on K-12 Education 2006). When SCR 1031 appeared on the ballot as Proposition 300 in 2006, immigrant rights advocates urged voters to vote no, arguing that the “US Supreme Court has held that these children shall not be denied a public education,” a reference to the 1982 court case *Plyer v. Doe*, which held that undocumented children have a basic right to K-12 education (Legislative Latino Caucus 2006).

Furthermore, since many of the bills proposed in the legislature dealt directly with state authority to enforce federal immigration law, legislators and advocates debated the legal scope of Arizona’s ability to enact immigration related laws while considering state legislation. For this reason, during a hearing in the House Government Committee on HB 2779, which made it a state violation for employers to hire undocumented immigrants and made identity theft a felony in Arizona, Senator Russell Pearce argued that the bill was necessary to support the “rule of law.” He further contended that he consulted with immigration law experts who supported the legislation, specifically naming Kris Kobach, who argued that the partnership between the federal government and the state that the bill facilitates enables the state to carry out the terms of federal immigration law without violating the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution (Committee on Government 2007). By contrast, a Jessica Pacheco, representative from the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry argued that the US Constitution gives the federal government “sole and exclusive authority in enforcing federal immigration law,” suggesting that the state did not have the constitutional authority to carry out the legislation (Committee on Government 2007). After HB 2779 passed, this debate continued through a federal court case

challenging the legislation that eventually went all the way up to the Supreme Court in *Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting* in 2011. In *Whiting*, the Court upheld HB 2779 (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting* 563 US 582 (2011)). Clearly, networked court cases, legislation, ballot initiatives, and other political tactics shaped much of the debate that surrounded counter-immigrant rights movement proposals in Arizona at this time.

Inter- and Intra-Movement Coalition-Building in the 2000s

During the 2000s, an inter- and intra-rights movement coalition effort to stem the tide of counter-movement advocacy like the anti-immigrant rights proposals described above was minimal. Indeed, when the Arizona legislature considered SCR 1031, the proposal to eliminate in-state tuition for undocumented students, only a handful of faith groups and educational institutions opposed the measure at the legislature (see e.g., Committee on Appropriations 2006, Committee on K-12 Education 2006). LGBTQ organizations did not come to the legislature to express support for immigrant rights advocates during key hearings. The only union that came to the legislature to oppose the legislation was the Arizona Federation of Teachers Union (AFT-AZ). Local affiliates of United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades (IUPAT), unions that would eventually become major players in inter- and intra-rights movement coalition building in Arizona, were not present at hearings to express opposition to the proposal to eliminate in-state tuition.

The lack of inter- and intra-movement coalitions is also apparent in LGBTQ rights movement efforts to prevent anti-LGBTQ proposals from passing. In 2006, an alliance of conservative legislators and religious organizations, led by Center for Arizona Policy's Cathi

Herrod, successfully got a measure on the ballot to prohibit the legal recognition of all same-sex relationships, including civil unions and domestic partnerships. The 2006 attempt, Proposition 107, also known as the Protect Marriage Arizona initiative, ultimately failed by about 52 percent (*Arizona Secretary of State* 2006b). The failure of Proposition 107 marked one of the first same-sex marriage successes at the ballot box. However, the success was short lived when, in 2008, the same counter-movement coalition got a limited version of Proposition 107 on the ballot. The new initiative, Proposition 102, only prohibited same-sex marriage, but left open the possibility for the state to eventually recognize same-sex civil unions. Proposition 102 passed by 56 percent of the vote (*Arizona Secretary of State* 2008a). The coalition of inter- and intra-movement rights organizations that opposed both propositions included a range of LGBTQ groups, politicians, businesses, some faith groups, and unions. However, Latinx organizations, immigrant rights organizations, and other organizations that represent communities of color were notably absent from endorsement lists on LGBTQ advocacy campaign websites (*Arizona Together* 2006, *Arizona Together* 2008, *Arizona Secretary of State* 2006c, *Arizona Secretary of State* 2008b).

Although inter- and intra-movement coalition work at this time in Arizona was minimal in statewide rights campaigns, it was not entirely absent at the city level. Some cross-community coalitions formed during this time, but they usually only encompassed a handful of organizations. For instance, in *Queer Migration Politics*, scholar Karma Chávez (2013) documents the longstanding alliance between two organizations: the Tucson-based LGBTQ organization Wingspan and the grassroots migrant rights and justice organization Coalición de Derechos Humanos. Following the 2004 election, after Arizona passed the anti-migrant Proposition 200 and when it became apparent that an anti-same-sex marriage initiative was certain, the two organizations issued a joint statement that appeared in the *Tucson Weekly*,

arguing that both initiatives were part of the same opponent strategy – an illustration of partnerships forming by emphasizing common opponents, one of the factors associated with coalition unification first introduced in Chapter 2 (Chávez 2013: 113). Such an alliance is a clear indication of grassroots inter- and intra-movement coalition work despite a lack of unified cross-community support in many statewide coalition campaigns to stop harmful ballot initiatives and legislation.

Furthermore, many of the smaller defensive rights episodes that emerged in the 2000s were important activating moments for organizers, activists, and community workers who later became involved with inter- and intra-movement coalition building. In early 2006, as anti-immigrant bills and propositions began to pass with increasing frequency, Somos America was founded – a statewide coalition of immigrant justice organizations (Campbell 2011). During this time, many queer migrant youth who later became movement leaders and cross-community organizers were also activated. For example, Manuel, the leader of a queer migrant organization involved in coalition building, first started organizing in Arizona in response to Proposition 300:

Manuel: I had been organizing since 2006 with, actually my first thoughts of organizing were in 2004 with the Wilson 4 and the Wilson 4 were, Wilson 4 or 5 I'm not sure now, but they were these students that went on a trip to Michigan and they saw Niagara falls and so what they did is that they told them that, the Canadian side had a better view so they crossed over to Canada and then on their way back immigration stopped them and asked them for their papers. And so it was this local massive case, one of the first times that we see DREAMers in the news. And I remember going to the meetings about the Wilson 4 and really talking about them.

But then, in 2006 we start organizing because I graduated from high school...and I had a full ride scholarship to college and a presidential scholarship. *And then in 2006 we get hit with Proposition 300 that takes away any financial aid for undocumented students and then puts to us at out of state tuition. So what that did is I started organizing with some local people.* And before we were like undocumented and unafraid we were undocumented, very afraid, and I wasn't queer and unashamed, I was just in the closet. So, we started organizing in 2006. So then, what I noticed and throughout my organizing for those, 2006, 7, 8, 9, 10,

for those 5 years, I realized that these spaces were mainly dominated by religion and by the old guard leaders, right. Whose views were very, I'm going to say limited, at that time. [Emphasis Added]

In this interview excerpt, Manuel describes how undocumented youth were personally impacted by Proposition 300, as many lost access to in-state tuition once the initiative passed. This served as an important awakening moment for Manuel and others who experienced the negative fallout of the new law. Manuel also describes how limited coalition work was at the time as organizing “spaces were mainly dominated by religion” and “old guard leader” whose “views” were very “limited” – an indication that people who held LGBTQ identities were largely excluded from working within immigrant community organizing as openly LGBTQ people in the mid-2000s.

Like Manuel, Nicolas, another individual who later became active in coalition work was activated by Proposition 300:

Nicolas: In 2006, Arizona voters passed Proposition 300, which is our immigration tuition law here in Arizona. And essentially Proposition 300, what it said is that if you're undocumented and you're a student you will have to pay out-of-state tuition, you don't qualify for public aid, scholarships, things like that. So then, after, during this time, really since 2003-2004, I'd been involved with community-based issues and very involved with school organizations like [Latinx college organization] and so after high school I continued to be involved at [my college] in various issues from immigration. But it wasn't really until Proposition 300 passed that we had more involvement by immigrant youth, more consistently. And so, it was after that that I started to see more of my peers here really continue to want to be involved and be involved and kind of join the movement around issues of immigration.

According to Nicolas, a youth “movement around issues of immigration” began to emerge in Arizona during the 2000s. This was confirmed another interviewee who argued that most Latinx and immigrant community work in Arizona focused on health and human services rather than immigrant justice movement-based advocacy following the dissipation of civil rights movement activism in the aftermath of the 1960s and 1970s. However, this began to shift around 2004 as the flurry of anti-immigrant legislation picked up. This movement-building increased in the latter

half of the 2000s as progressively more destructive anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ laws passed in the state. Ultimately, this momentum would converge with an explosive force in 2010 when the Arizona legislature passed SB 1070.

A Storm Hits Arizona: SB 1070 and Movement Re-Formation

During the 2000s, although some of State Senator Russell Pearce's anti-immigrant proposals were signed into law or approved by a majority of the state's electorate at the ballot box, many others were vetoed by Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano. This changed in 2008, when Governor Napolitano was nominated by President Barack Obama to serve as the Secretary of Homeland Security. Governor Napolitano was succeeded by Arizona's Republican Secretary of State, Jan Brewer, who was much more supportive of legislation backed by Pearce, FAIR, and other Republican leaders in the state who were once considered the fringe of Arizona politics (Chin et al. 2012). When Jan Brewer became governor in 2009, proposed legislation that was vetoed by Janet Napolitano, suddenly had a realistic opportunity to pass in the legislature. Furthermore, during this time, far right movement mobilization against the newly elected President Obama increased at the local level with the rise of the Tea Party, particularly in States like Arizona, which had a history of racialized nativism. Anti-immigrant sentiment was further bolstered by the onset of the economic crisis of 2007-2008, which hit Arizona particularly hard as home sales plummeted and the state's tourism industry experienced major losses. In a state with a history of anti-immigrant fervor erupting in a new "hot moment" around a major economic decline, Arizona was ripe for the emergence of a massive defensive rights moment. As a result of the shift in Arizona's political network and the national economy, State Senator Russell Pearce introduced SB 1070 in 2010, an omnibus bill composed of a variety of prior legislative proposals that had failed to pass under Janet Napolitano's governorship.

Because SB 1070 is an omnibus bill, when it was passed it enacted an array of anti-immigrant proposals into law. This makes the net of issues covered by the bill much wider than those covered by single-issue bills, like the marriage equality legislation in Washington State that was ultimately approved by voters through Referendum 74 in 2012. Furthermore, SB 1070 provoked a defensive response from both the Latinx and migrant communities, the primary targets of the bill, placing blame for how movement advocacy emerged mostly on opponents rather than movement advocates as was the case with Referendum 74. The wide net of issues covered by SB 1070 and the fact the bill placed rights movement advocates in a defensive position, increased SB 1070's potential to expand rights movement mobilization to a larger degree than Referendum 74 in Washington State. Defensive actions tend to unify and expand movement coalitions because they more forcefully highlight common opponents and emphasize shared experiences of oppression, the factors associated with coalition unity introduced in Chapter 2. Offensive actions can do this as well if they provoke enough concerted opponent response and similarly encompass a wide range of issues. But rights movement actors, who are locked in a perpetual struggle against power, rarely have the political opening necessary to accomplish expansive political movement mobilization through a created rights campaign. The most controversial components of SB 1070 (1) create new state crimes related to immigration, (2) open cities and other localities to lawsuits if they enact "sanctuary" laws designed to limit cooperation between federal and local law enforcement on immigration law, and (3) enact new local police powers to enforce federal immigration law.

SB 1070 first created a variety of new crimes targeting undocumented immigrants in Arizona. For example, Section 3 of makes "willful failure to complete or carry" documentation of one's immigration status, in violation of federal law, a state misdemeanor. Section 5 further

makes it a state misdemeanor (1) for a driver to stop and “attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work” if doing so blocks traffic; (2) for a person to enter a stopped vehicle “in order to be hired by an occupant of the motor vehicle” if the vehicle blocks traffic; (3) for an undocumented immigrant to “knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor;” and (4) for a person who is “in violation of a criminal offense” to transport, conceal, harbor, or shield an undocumented immigrant or “encourage” an undocumented immigrant to come into the state. Section 10 of SB 1070 also allows police to impound a vehicle driven by someone who is “transporting, harboring, concealing, or shielding” an undocumented immigrant in the state.

The portions of Sections 5 and 10 that criminalize and create penalties for the harboring of undocumented immigrants were condemned by immigrant rights advocates who expressed concern that they criminalized mixed status families. The crimes laid out in Section 5 also excluded most businesses in the state and, instead, specifically targeted undocumented immigrants, their families and friends, and individuals who hire them for work from the roadside. Because the new crimes created in SB 1070 did not target businesses and because provisions of SB 1070 also created an affirmative defense for entrapped employers, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry remained neutral on the bill as it worked its way through the legislature. This made it more difficult for immigrant rights advocates to effectively argue that the bill would harm businesses in the state at the legislature (SB 1070 2010).

In addition to the new crimes enacted by SB 1070, Section 2 of the bill includes an anti-sanctuary cities provision and requires local law enforcement officers to inquire about immigration status – the controversial “show me your papers” provision. Under the anti-sanctuary cities clause of Section 2, *any* legal resident of Arizona can sue *any* official, state

agency, or state county, city, town, or political subdivision that implements “a policy or practice that restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws.” This section effectively makes it impossible for cities or localities to pass ordinances that prohibit local law enforcement officers from working with federal immigration officials, one of the key goals of immigrant rights advocates’ sanctuary cities movement, without risking citizen lawsuits. The “show me your papers” segment of Section 2 requires local law enforcement officers to make a “reasonable attempt...to determine the immigration status” of someone they stop, detain, or arrest if officers have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person is undocumented. This was the most controversial section of the law and the section that most galvanized rights movement advocates after SB 1070 passed. Immigrant rights advocates argued that it would encourage law enforcement officers to racially profile all Latinx people in Arizona, regardless of immigration status, in the process of locating undocumented immigrants (SB 1070 2010, Seldon et al. 2011).

At the legislature, proponents and opponents of the legislation, once again, referenced legal arguments and court cases in arguing for and against the law during legislative hearings on SB 1070. State Senator Russell Pearce, the bill’s prime sponsor, insisted that the bill respects the “constitutional right” of citizens to expect the enforcement of immigration laws and facilitates the partnership between the federal government and the states, who have an “inherent authority” to enforce immigration law (Committee on Military Affairs and Public Safety 2010). State Senator Pearce’s arguments here foreshadowed what would become a major court case that centered on state authority to enforce federal law under the federalism doctrine. Opponents, of the bill, like Jessica Allen, the Executive Director of the Border Action Network, argued that SB 1070 “would open up state of Arizona to tremendous lawsuits” like lawsuits elsewhere that have required cities and states to pay millions of dollars in plaintiff fees for passing laws similar to SB

1070 (Committee on Public Safety and Human Services 2010). John Thomas, a representative from the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police contended that the law would be particularly harmful in rural communities that “are going to have to pay outside counsel to come and defend them” in court as a result of the bill (Committee on Public Safety and Human Services 2010). Despite the outcry against the bill at the legislature, the firm support for the bill amongst anti-immigration advocates and legislators pushed SB 1070 swiftly through the legislature. In April of 2010, Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law – setting off a firestorm of political movement mobilization.

When SB 1070 passed, the bill had an immediate impact on everyday Latinx and low-income migrant workers, who suddenly faced the prospect of becoming the targets of law enforcement to a greater degree than in the past. This shocked and offended many members of minority communities in the state and, thus, ignited immigrant, Latinx, and labor rights movement mobilization throughout Arizona much more than any of the legislation, ballot initiatives, court cases, or executive actions of the 2000s. Although SB 1070 was supported by the public (Pew 2010), thousands of people were mobilized by the law and poured into Phoenix to protest and be a part of the newly re-forming immigrant rights movement (Riccardi 2010). A coalition of worker, migrant, and Latinx rights organizations and individuals affiliated with the queer and trans migrant movement launched ¡Alto Arizona!, explicitly drawing parallels between Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott of the Civil Rights Movement and the wave of anti-immigrant laws in Arizona (¡Alto Arizona! 2010). The campaign called for a boycott of Arizona and for President Barack Obama to intervene in the state to end both SB 1070 and the federal immigration programs his administration was conducting in the state, like the 287(g)

program (¡Alto Arizona! 2017).²

Inter- and Intra-Movement Coalition Expansion in the Aftermath of SB 1070

Defensive rights episodes, like SB 1070, can have the greatest mobilizing and activating potential because they often occur as a result of opponent mobilization and, thus, reinforce a shared political movement past, shared experiences of oppression, and a common core of opponents across multiple minority communities to a larger degree than offensive rights episodes – the factors associated with coalition unification introduced in Chapter 2 and described in greater depth in Chapter 4. Many interviewees discussed how mobilizing and activating the explosive SB 1070 defensive rights campaign was within migrant, immigrant, and Latinx communities. Diana, an organization leader with a marginalized group that primarily serves immigrants and communities of color but also partners with and supports local queer organizations, directly and eloquently emphasized this during her interview. In the following excerpt, Diana explained why SB 1070 was an activating moment:

Diana: Yeah I mean a lot of it is I think it was fear and the anger...the fear that you were going to be separated from your family and the anger that someone had control over that. And all of that, right? And then because...that was one of the first blatant things that happened, but they had been doing it right? Like they did the English-only law, Prop. 200, they did Prop. 300, they had been doing different laws that had affected our community, 287g, Secure Communities, and it had

² A reference to Section 287(g) of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act, 287(g) programs create partnerships with local and federal law enforcement, allowing local departments to carry out federal immigration laws. Sheriff Joe Arpaio's Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) operated a 287(g) program with the federal government between 2007 and 2011. In 2011, the US Department of Homeland Security, under the leadership of former Arizona Governor Janet Brewer revoked the MCSO's 287(g) authority (Stern 2011, Rivas 2011). This followed a US Department of Justice investigation determined that the MCSO was engaging in discriminatory practices in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act under Sheriff Joe Arpaio's leadership and the initiation of an ongoing civil rights lawsuit, *Melendres v. Arpaio*, which eventually found that the MCSO engaged in racial profiling and unlawful traffic stops of Latinxs (*Melendres v. Arpaio* 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), *United States Department of Justice* 2010).

been happening but none of us had really noticed or really activated to it.

But SB 1070 was so blatant, racist, that it shocked us. And it awoke us. I don't know, some people weren't shocked because they had seen it coming, but for a lot of us that were not involved, that were younger, [we] had no idea....

So it had been happening, right, and attrition through enforcement, making our life so miserable that we would self-deport. And they would talk about it, blatantly and loudly and say this is what we want – we want you to self-deport, we want you to leave, right? Russell Pearce, Joe Arpaio, talking about Tent City and that's like his concentration camp and...2010 was a very loud year of them speaking. And I think for us it was a decision point of are you going to fight, or are you going to leave?

And a lot of our families wanted to leave, a lot of our families did leave, and for some of us, we couldn't even afford to leave. So you just had to make a decision and I think, for me, it was, someone questioned me and said are you going to fight? And, I said yes, right, but then other, and so that's how we, that's how it happened. You have to ask people, you have to, in the conversations, it doesn't just happen I feel like. So when it happened to me I was asked by someone.

When I went to Jorge it was the same question. Are you going to fight? I went to Maria, to Pamela, to Fernando, to Diego, to Clara, to everyone, they all had to make the choice if they were going to fight or not. And 2010 provided that opportunity for us to make that choice and we chose to fight. And here we are continuing that.

According to Diana, SB 1070 was the “loudest” and most “blatantly racist” of a history of anti-immigrant and anti-Latinx laws in Arizona. In her interview, she discussed over a decade of exclusionary laws passed in the state, including Proposition 200 and Proposition 300, which are described in greater detail in the previous sections. Diana also discussed federal anti-immigrant laws like 287(g) and Secure Communities,³ federal programs that enable local law enforcement

³ Secure Communities was another federal program that linked local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities. It allowed local law enforcement to share digital fingerprints from everyone booked into local jails with federal immigration authorities. Federal immigration officials could then review the shared digital fingerprint data to identify and deport undocumented immigrants. Secure Communities was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2015 (*United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement* 2016; Associated Press 2014).

to essentially become federal immigration enforcement agents in Arizona. This intense anti-immigrant history culminated in the passage of SB 1070, which, Diana argues “shocked” a new generation of advocates into action, forcing them to confront threats posed to their community by Arizona’s anti-immigrant rights movement. Diana’s discussion of history as well as the fear and anger spurred by opponent activists like Russell Pearce and the infamously anti-immigrant Sheriff Joe Arpaio reinforces a shared political movement past narrative that, in the aftermath of SB 1070, would enable many immigrant rights advocates in Arizona to recognize an affinity with LGBTQ people over time, contributing to the formation of inter-movement partnerships when LGBTQ people faced similar counter-movement attacks later in the 2010s.

In July of 2010, shortly after SB 1070 passed, the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against SB 1070 that would eventually reach the US Supreme Court in *Arizona v. United States* (Hensley et al. 2010, *The Arizona Republic* 2012). The federal government’s lawsuit was one of several filed in the aftermath of SB 1070. The lawsuit challenged four provisions of the bill: (1) the part of Section 3 that made failure to comply with federal immigration requirements a state misdemeanor, (2) part of Section 5 that made it a state misdemeanor for undocumented immigrants to work, (3) a portion of Section 6 that allowed state law enforcement to arrest people who they have probable cause to believe are removable from the United States, and (4) Section 2(B), the infamous “show me your papers” provision (*Arizona v. United States* 567 US 387 (2012)). In 2012, the Supreme Court held that federal law preempted all of the sections of SB 1070 challenged by the federal government except Section 2(B). Although the federal lawsuit would gut much of SB 1070 in 2010, as soon as the lawsuit was filed, it effectively raised the profile of SB 1070, both in the State of Arizona and nationally, increasing media attention on the law and further mobilizing rights movement advocates.

Once SB 1070 passed and activated members of minority communities, advocates in Arizona looked for ways to build political power within marginalized and mainstream movement organizations against the anti-rights movement forces responsible for the law. Organizers in the area realized that immigrant rights movement advocates needed to focus on civic engagement and create a broad inter- and intra- movement coalition to unite and coordinate the newly mobilized constituencies in the state. In the below interview excerpt, Louis describes how one of the largest and most sustained coalitions was created and why immigrant rights activists decided to devote significant resources to civic engagement:

Louis: We had done two movement building trainings with youth, and one in Florida and one in Colorado and then they did it in Arizona. That was December 2009. And so, we were going to do something around immigrant rights and immigration reform out of that movement building training. And then April, the next April, you know four months later, 1070 hit the ground.

And so, seven of us went to the flag pole at the capital and did a press conference and kind of a vigil, kind of a prayer vigil, and asking the Governor to veto 1070. That prayer vigil, we just had decided to stay the night. And then we never left for like 103 more days.

And that grew to, we were over 40,000 [people] at one point. We had giant student walk outs. So this large, direct action, you know, non-violent direct action campaign on the literal grass of the state capital, is really what launched [our civic engagement coalition] because inside of the vigil we were certainly having a lot of conversations... and many of us realized we needed to move into a civic engagement phase because that would be the real way to defeat and move beyond the attacks and the defensive posture.

And so, we started to civic engagement work really for the first time most of us in the wake of 1070. And as everybody started doing it...we realized, yeah know, civic engagement work in particular needs to be coordinated. You don't want to all be knocking the same doors and the same neighborhoods. You want to share turf, you want to share best practices, you want to share data, and then be able to communicate your collective impact because nobody can cover an entire geography. Especially in a big city like Phoenix. So that's how [we] started to really form a civic engagements coalition in the wake of 1070.

Here, Louis, one of the leaders of a civic engagement coalition that formed in the wake of SB

1070 describes how a mass direct action evolved into a coalition that would coordinate labor unions and Latinx, immigrant, migrant, queer, and trans community organizations in Arizona around voter registration drives and get out the vote efforts. This inter-movement coalition was largely formed in order to build Latinx voting power in the state so that Latinx and immigrant rights advocates could “move beyond the attacks and the defensive posture” they had been forced to adopt due to the political power that anti-immigrant rights movement held in Arizona.

This coalition would eventually work with both mainstream and marginalized organizations as a collective of minority political movements continued to expand and mobilize through the fallout of SB 1070. James, a union organizer in Arizona, explains below why some unions started to work with immigrant and Latinx rights organizations following 1070:

James: I thought maybe we're getting somewhere with this worker rights thing, we're set, but then, SB 1070 came down and drown out everything. It was a very challenging situation for us. Because...in our industries, the places we actually organized had very few undocumented workers.... So it's very difficult for us that – you know – the immigration movement was not necessarily where we did the most of our work. It was exclusively really labor and social justice and economic justice. We really did not have a place in immigrants rights movement.

Erin: So, was there any shift that happened with that as a result of SB 1070?

James: Well, what happened at that point is that, my efforts to raise money and build interest in economic justice at that point fell on deaf ears because all any funders or anybody wanted to talk about was immigrants rights in Arizona and the fight against SB 1070. And so it was very difficult because we really didn't have that much to offer because we weren't a direct action organization. We weren't going to go out and do Know Your Rights trainings in the immigrant community. We didn't have a constituency that was ready to do direct action. And even more than that, we have a constituency many of whom are anti-immigrant, [a specific local union] did anyway.

What happened is that, the first stage was direct to action, lobbying, and Know Your Rights training. That's like when the groups, when, the sort of ad hoc coalition came together around SB 1070. And then they did a boycott of Arizona, which was also controversial for us because that basically hurts our workers and people. [One union] is like the hospitality industry and Phoenix has greatly, greatly suffered because of that. [That union] probably would have, were it not for

the Arizona boycott, [that union] would probably have 20 percent to 30 percent more members than they do right now. Because, you know, basically there's just not enough work [with all the cancelled conferences due to the boycott].

So it was a conflicted place, but our strategy for change here did have an element of politics, which is Latino voting based on [another union's] experience Los Angeles, where, after Proposition 187, in Los Angeles...they basically built power, labor power and worker power and immigrant power in LA by harnessing the power of Latino voting in a very targeted fashion with the union.

That was our model all along, but we, we didn't really have a clear plan to do that.... So when [the civic engagement coalition] was formed, it was largely formed for the interest of building Latino voting power, using SB 1070 as a spur for building or, you know, to drive Latino voting.

And one of the critical elements at the table coming together was...the fact that to participate in the table, everybody had to do the exact same program [according to the funders]. And there was an extraordinary level of accountability. And the other thing that was good about the [funding source] was that everybody [that worked with Latinos, immigrants, and local workers in the area] had to be invited to participate.

In this excerpt, James describes how unions he worked with became involved in inter- and intra-movement coalitions once SB 1070 passed. James says that once SB 1070 “came down and drowned out everything” funders no longer wanted to support worker’s rights and economic justice issues that the communities James organized cared about the most. Instead, all “anybody wanted to talk about was immigrant rights in Arizona and the fight against SB 1070.” As a result, in order to stay alive in the expanding political movement in Arizona, James’s labor organizers had to shift their priorities and more forcefully focus on the intersection between the immigrant rights and labor movement. They did this by joining the civic engagement coalition and participating in the struggle to build Latinx voting power in Arizona for long-term political movement ends like the economic justice goals James’s and Arizona worker’s rights activists desired. Over time, this civic engagement coalition became a powerful grassroots advocacy network that mainstream organizations turned to in order to help elect supportive politicians.

This, in turn, gave the marginalized organizations that composed the civic engagement coalition important leverage over mainstream organizations as the newly activated political movement began to pursue policy solutions later in the 2000s.

In addition to the civic engagement coalition created out of SB 1070, the defensive rights episode also activated many Latinx and undocumented youth in the state. Organizations that formed out of this movement would eventually join and expand the civic engagement coalition. The Latinx and undocumented youth movement in Arizona became particularly important in local electoral races in Phoenix and in creating local inter- and intra- movement coalitions around political movement-led policy proposals in the 2010s. For example, a group of Latinx youth activated by SB 1070 formed “Team Awesome,” a name created according to one interviewee:

because parents kept asking students, where are you going, who are you going with, and it’s like, “oh with a group of kids, a group of students.” And then eventually I was like, just tell them it’s “Team Awesome,” and it worked out, it was a mistake, but it did.

The group ultimately ran grassroots campaigns around “dozens of elections” in Arizona, centered in the greater Phoenix area. In 2011, they knocked on 72,000 doors in one district, increased Latinx voter turnout by 480 percent in the district, and helped elect Daniel Valenzuela to the Phoenix City Council in a seat never held by a Latinx person (Scherer 2012, Weigel 2012).

Eventually, Latinx youth affiliated with Team Awesome would join other organizations and help build other inter- and intra-movement partnerships in the emerging grassroots advocacy network. For instance, some of the leaders of Team Awesome along with the civic engagement coalition formed after SB 1070 developed another inter- and intra-movement coalition that included labor unions, immigrant rights organizations, queer migrant organizations, and a mainstream LGBTQ organization in 2016. This alliance, the One PHX ID Coalition, formed in

order to support a municipal ID card that members argued would aid undocumented, disabled, trans, and homeless people in Phoenix (*OnePHX* 2017). The emergence of local inter- and intra-movement coalitions like the One PHX ID Coalition and the civic engagement coalition is indicative of political movement expansion and the formation of an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network capable of mobilizing people from the ballot box through public policy campaigns in the aftermath of SB 1070. The Latinx and undocumented youth activated by SB1070 are also important for understanding the coalitional dynamics that arose in Arizona after 2010 because many leaders of the new undocumented youth movement identified as LGBTQ. After 2010, queer migrant organizers and community workers in Arizona started double-coming out forums (discussed in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5) and built new alliances between undocumented and LGBTQ movement organizations in the state.

Possibly one of the greatest electoral victories for movement actors in the immediate aftermath of SB 1070 was the defeat of State Senator Russell Pearce. After passing SB 1070, State Senator Russell Pearce introduced several anti-immigrant bills, including SB 1038, which sought to deny citizenship to children born to non-citizen parents in violation of the 14th Amendment. Although many of these bills ultimately failed, they underscored the extremism of anti-immigrant rights movement advocates like Pearce in Arizona. During this time, the Arizona economy suffered as the state lost millions of dollars due to conference cancellations spurred by the Arizona Boycott campaign that formed in response to SB 1070 (Fitz and Kelley 2010). This shifted the political climate against State Senator Russell Pearce. According to Victor, one of the individuals who helped launch the effort to remove Pearce from office, after Russell Pearce was appointed as the president of the State Senate in 2010 and after the wave of anti-immigrant extremism, “people were like, this is too much.” More specifically, many Republicans grew tired

of the policies Pearce pushed at the state legislature. In 2011, a group of political movement activists formed Citizens for a Better Arizona and collected enough signatures to trigger a recall election. The movement activists were not aided by the Democratic Party, but by the Mormon Republicans who dominated Pearce's district. The Mormon Church, which was trying to reach out to Latinx voters at the time, opposed SB 1070. Due to the Republican split in Pearce's district and an ethics scandal,⁴ the legislator once considered the most powerful and invincible politician in Arizona was ultimately unseated by a moderate Republican (Lacey and Seelye 2011, Thomason et al. 2011, Weiner 2011).

Following SB 1070, most organizations and individuals involved in coalitional advocacy were from the labor, Latinx, immigrant rights, and queer migrant communities in Arizona. Some interviewees indicated that broad support from mainstream LGBTQ organizations was lacking although progressive LGBTQ people affiliated with these organizations often participated in protests and anti-SB 1070 related actions. This started to shift in 2014 when conservative Christian activist Cathi Herrod, the President of the Center for Arizona Policy, worked with Republican legislators to craft Senate Bill 1062 (Beard Rau 2014). SB 1062 was a proposed expansion of the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) that, if passed, would have allowed state businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people. The bill passed in both the State House of Representatives and the Senate, but was ultimately vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer. Statewide and national outcry and pressure from businesses that faced possible economic losses due to a new boycott Arizona campaign and the National Football League's threat to remove the 2015 Super Bowl from Arizona if the law passed, ultimately convinced Brewer to veto SB 1062.

⁴ State Senator Pearce did not report receiving \$40,000 in gifts from Fiesta Bowl officials while he helped direct state entities toward the football game (Lacey and Seelye 2011, Robers 2011).

Many interviewees compared SB 1062 and SB 1070 and explained that what cross-community coalition did emerge in 2010s between the movement organizations activated by SB 1070 and mainstream LGBTQ organizations occurred due to similarities between the dual defensive rights episodes. According to Clara, one of the Latinx youth activated in the wake of SB 1070, the anti-LGBTQ SB 1062 initiated a similarly vortex-like response in Arizona:

Clara: That was an unexpected bill. I didn't think that something like that would happen in our legislature, but then again I forget that I live in Arizona sometimes. And that was crazy. It really was. It was the community that helped stop that. It truly was the community. Because for the first time you saw business leaders openly criticizing this. You saw people on both sides of the aisle criticizing this bill. And it's something that, *it was like wildfire man, I mean it spread so fast and it spread throughout the whole state.* You started seeing "We are Open for Business for Everyone" signs everywhere. [Emphasis Added]

The "wildfire" sparked by SB 1062 activated a variety of rights movement organizations, including those that represented the Latinx, labor, and mainstream LGBTQ community.

In the below exchange, State Senator Steve Gallardo discusses both how SB 1070 helped to create inter-movement coalitions and how the dual anti-immigrant SB 1070 and anti-LGBTQ SB 1062, which appeared in 2010 and 2014 respectively, mobilized inter-movement partnerships by emphasizing a shared movement past and common opponents:

State Senator Gallardo: I think 1070 really woke up people and you started to see the faith community step up, you started to see the African American community step up, but that was, that was the time that was the time that we, that you started to see more coalesce of a coalition.

But even with 1062, I went to the, I had to go to the immigrant community, some of our immigrant community and say, hey, you know, hate is hate. Let it be an attack on immigrants or an attack on the LGBT community, hate is hate and we need to stand with the LGBT community.

We had a press conference with those that you would normally see at those immigrant rights rallies that were standing in opposition to 1062. And it was a good message to send.

Interviewer: So do you think it wasn't just that you had these bills but also that it

was the same group of extremists that were pushing them that really brought people together?

State Senator Gallardo: Um-hmm. I think that started to resonate that we need to be working together. It was the same group. The same group of legislators that were pushing all of the anti-immigration stuff that would push the attacks on women's reproductive choices or push the attack on LGBT community, whatever. It was the same group of folks, same handful of legislators.

In his interview, State Senator Gallardo first explains that SB 1070 was an important mobilizing moment that helped activate, or “wake up,” cross-community support for immigrant rights issues from groups that previously had not participated in attempts to thwart anti-immigrant laws. State Senator Gallardo then describes how SB 1062, the next major defensive rights campaign after SB 1070, further helped to create alliances between mainstream LGBTQ and immigrant rights groups by emphasizing how members of both communities shared the same opponents. The “same group of legislators,” the same opponents or “enemies,” who pushed anti-immigrant laws likewise targeted LGBTQ people when they tried to pass SB 1062 in 2014. The dual defensive rights campaigns contributed to the formation of inter-movement coalitions by reinforcing that both communities are subjected to the same “hate,” the same “attacks.”

LGBTQ community advocates also described how these dual defensive rights campaigns assisted in the creation of inter-movement coalitions by emphasizing a shared political movement past that extended well beyond each rights campaign. For instance, Roger, an LGBTQ community advocate who works with mainstream LGBTQ organizations and marginalized organizations, described his support of efforts to stop SB 1070 and SB 1062 as follows:

Roger: I was there as an individual, I didn't want to miss it because it was the closest thing I'd ever seen in this state to the equivalent of our March on Washington that the gay community's done a couple times....

[F]rom an immigration standpoint, in the same way we saw Senate Bill 1070, we

then saw 1062. And so, in both cases, I mean with 1070 there most definitely was a gay community presence and a response, both through [mainstream LGBT organization name redacted] and then individuals. And we were very, very pleased and grateful, then when 1062 rolled around that there was indeed, I think people remembered that we were there for them and we were there for each other and so naturally that really helped. Like the MLK holiday, that issue rose many, many years ago, ultimately what drove the decision [Governor Jan Brewer's decision to veto SB 1062] was economics and it was chambers of commerce and people saying, you know, we've got nearly a million of square feet of a convention center and we've got a lot of companies that don't want to move their businesses here even though we've most of the year have a great climate.

And we also have conventions that won't come here because of our anti-immigration, the perception that most of Arizona [is anti-immigrant], because of Sheriff Joe and all the things that make it into the international news, that for the grand majority of us, it's really an ongoing embarrassment.

According to Roger, the common opponents that activate political movement organizations by passing or attempting to pass laws that target the communities they serve are deeply rooted in an inter-movement past. SB 1070 was not an isolated attack on a single community. Instead, Roger describes how activism around SB 1070, spurred by a common core of opponents, was reminiscent of the LGBTQ community's Marches on Washington, massive political rallies in Washington, D.C. conducted in the 1970s through the early 1990s in order to draw national attention to various forms of state violence directed at the LGBTQ community. At the state level, Roger argues that both SB 1070 and SB 1062 were "like the MLK Holiday" – the political moment in the late 1980s and early 1990s when opponent groups in Arizona moved to prevent the state from adopting Martin Luther King, Jr. Day as a state holiday. For Roger, these intense defensive moments are important mechanisms of both inter-movement and intra-movement mobilization. Thus, later in his interview Roger argued that "1062 was one of the best things that happened to us [to the LGBTQ community] because it's that slap in the face, a slap in the face that any community needs to wake up the sleeping giant that is an otherwise unengaged electorate" [Emphasis Added].

The Limits of Mobilizing through a Defensive Rights Episode

The defensive rights episode that emerged in Arizona in 2010 did aid in the expansion of movement mobilization. Activists, community workers, organizers, and politicians interviewed for this study argued that SB 1070, in conjunction with future defensive moments like the anti-LGBTQ SB 1062, activated new organizations and people and contributed to the construction of inter- and intra-movement coalitions over time. Interviewees demonstrated how these moments emphasized a shared political movement past and a common core of opponents who use the same messaging and tactics when advocating for laws that harm minority communities in the state. Yet, despite the mobilizing, expansionist capacity that exists within defensive rights moments like SB 1070, these moments also simultaneously constrain movement mobilization. Thus, when rights are funneled into mass defensive episodes, they operate in a similarly paradoxical fashion as offensive episodes like the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in Washington State. According to interviewees, defensive rights episodes constrain movement mobilization (1) because they center thwarting a rights loss, (2) because of their cyclical nature, and (3) because they reinforce hierarchical exclusions across movements by centering the experiences of those movement constituents deemed most “acceptable” by mainstream society. The below sections briefly introduce these factors associated with coalition fragmentation, which are discussed in greater depth in the following chapter.

Importantly, SB 1070 does appear to have expanded movement mobilization more than the offensive Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality. SB 1070 was likely more expansive because of its defensive nature, which sustained the movement actors longer than an electoral campaign or legislative session cycle and minimized coalition fragmentation as the

blame for the necessity of movement-based advocacy, and the trauma that this entails, was placed on opponents. However, the defensive rights moment still centered pushing back against a rights loss that many advocates felt solely impacted the migrant and Latinx communities, often at the expense of other communities. James, a union organizer, made this point in his interview excerpt discussed in the previous section:

James: I thought maybe we're getting somewhere with this worker rights thing, we're set, but then, SB 1070 came down and drowned out everything. It was a very challenging situation for us... my efforts to raise money and build interest in economic justice at that point fell on deaf ears because all any funders or anybody wanted to talk about was immigrants' rights in Arizona the fight against SB 1070. Because...in our industries, the places we actually organized had very few undocumented workers.... So it's very difficult for us that – you know – the immigration movement was not necessarily where we did the most of our work. It was exclusively really labor and social justice and economic justice.

According to James, once SB 1070 exploded in Arizona, labor movement advocates lost much of their funding. James's "efforts to raise money and build interest in economic justice...fell on deaf ears because all any funders or anybody wanted to talk about was immigrants' rights in Arizona" in the aftermath of SB 1070. As a result, James had to shift his focus from worker's rights to immigrant rights in order to maintain a place in the burgeoning immigrant rights-centered political movement in Arizona. In his interview, James also explained that the Boycott Arizona campaign, once of the cross-community actions that emerged out of SB 1070, harmed union membership since it drove business out of the state. He estimated that one union "would probably have 20 percent to 30 percent more members" had it not been for the Boycott Arizona campaign. This is an indication that SB 1070 narrowed the focus of movement mobilization onto a single community and rights issues that mattered to that community while placing issues important to other coalitional constituencies at the margins – at least during the highest point in the defensive rights struggle.

Furthermore, Victor, one of the progressive activists that worked to get Russel Pearce removed from office questioned the utility of the broad-based inter-and intra-movement partnerships that formed after SB 1070 because they often did not include Republicans. According to Victor, “if you really want to help immigrants [in Arizona], especially on a policy you have to have Republicans.” This is certainly true in a state political climate dominated by the Republican party. Without Republican support, political movement coalitions that formed in the aftermath of SB 1070 have still largely been unable to pass legislation in the Republican-controlled legislature. However, the coalitions have continued to expand in Arizona even though the momentum behind SB 1070 has largely disbanded and they have successfully moved some Republican voters in local and Statewide campaigns. Coalition partners have been able to successfully thwart some anti-immigrant legislation at the state legislature and recently achieved important movement advances through the passage of Proposition 206, which increased the minimum wage in the state and through the electoral defeat of Joe Arpaio in 2016.

The messaging and narrative behind the struggle to thwart SB 1070 has also revealed how rights episodes can privilege mainstream constituencies within movements. For this reason, many members of the queer migrant community ultimately rejected much of the mainstream immigrant rights narrative that was frequently centered in movement responses to anti-rights laws like SB 1070 according to interviewees. For example, Samuel, a community worker with the queer and trans migrant justice movement, fervently argued against the heteronormative family centered narrative that appears within most mainstream immigrant rights movement advocacy:

Samuel: We recognize that a lot of the story telling we've done as an immigrant rights movement, has been around families and the value of people for being good citizens and community members.

Which always leads to the question, well, what about people who are bad people and bad citizens and bad community members? Do they deserve human rights? And who is good and who is bad? A lot of times it's queer and trans people. We are default bad. We're stigmatized. We don't have wholesome church relationships or ten children to stand for our, you know, the breadth of our heart.

We're just people who are here, working and being part of community and city and the world. So we set out to find our people and also to tell the story about why our community has value. Beyond family, beyond church, beyond wholesomeness and goodness, why we have value as human beings and why we don't just deserve, but we own human rights.

In this excerpt, Samuel contends that the mainstream immigrant rights movement adopted a heteronormative nuclear family narrative in combatting anti-immigrant laws like SB 1070. Under this narrative, queer and trans people who do not have families or have been rejected by their families are constructed as “bad” or “undeserving” immigrants, excluded from the legal rights struggles that are at the center of mainstream organizing. Thus, mobilization around rights episodes that center mainstream experiences tends to contract mobilization as well by limiting the experiences represented in the heat of the moment and creating narratives that imply that those who do not fit “good” or “deserving” constructions of identity that are accepted in the mainstream are “default bad.”

Despite the movement expansion through SB 1070, this defensive campaign also marginalized some movement constituents and, in doing so, limited mobilization in some circumstances. Defensive rights campaigns can be traumatic moments that most negatively impact individuals who exist at the margins. Nicolas, a former organization leader who has worked with mainstream immigrant rights organizations and marginalized migrant LGBTQ organizations in inter- and intra-movement coalitions articulated how the trauma inflicted by laws like SB 1070 and the failure of the federal DREAM Act in 2010 disproportionately impacted those who are intersectionally marginalized (i.e., those who hold dual subject positions,

like people who are both undocumented and LGBTQ) during his interview.

Nicolas: Yeah, well in 2010 the DREAM Act failed in the Senate and during that time or a little bit after there was just kind of like a calm of well what's next because nationally it was a big movement and then also here locally with the passage of SB 1070 in April 2010, it was a huge loss – the passage of SB 1070 in Arizona and then a bigger loss with the failure to pass the DREAM Act.

And so after that there was a calm about what was going to happen next and what we could do. And I remember late 2010 just taking time to reflect and also to talk to a lot of my peers about where we were within the coalition and the work that we did and just immigration and all that. And I started to hear stories about friends that are gay and talking about their experiences during SB 1070 for example. One of the, the stories that impacted me the most is a story about a friend of mine after SB 1070 passed....

So then after SB 1070 passed one of my friends said that right before it passed his parents found out that he was gay. And so when SB 1070 passed we had this mayhem here in Arizona where people were just leaving and his parents and his family were one of those families that packed up and moved to Texas. And my friend said that when SB 1070 passed and they were getting ready to leave essentially his parents told him that if he wanted to go with them that he couldn't be gay anymore. And for him, I mean just, it was big because not only is he dealing with being undocumented in his family, but now on top of that he's being kind of alienated by his family because of his sexual orientation...

And so, when he said that, I started to talk to other friends about how they, how they also experienced being LGBT and in this movement.... That's when, yeah and so that was late 2010, early 2011, and during that time, I started, because I am gay myself, it's just not something that I put out as part of my immigrant story so to speak. It was never something that we emphasized.

So then, when I started sharing my story I started thinking about how do I highlight this aspect of my story and how do I draw like these similarities between what's going on with immigration now and being gay and discrimination and things like that. So then I started talking to my friends about their interests and just expanding their stories and then eventually we, we decided to form [LGBTQ migrant group name redacted] and this was kind of in tandem with what my peers across the country were doing in bringing out this issue of LGBT immigrants more.

Nicolas relates how Latinx and queer youth in Arizona both initiated inter- and intra-movement mobilization in the aftermath of the 2010 defensive rights campaigns and were disproportionately harmed by these campaigns. Nicolas's friend experienced dual ostracism as

his family was forced to flee Arizona in the wake of SB 1070 and his family refused to take him with them unless he renounced his sexual orientation. Yet, within this moment of social and familial trauma Nicolas and other advocates also created an opportunity for inter- and intra-movement mobilization and organizing, creating new organizations in order to ensure that their interests were represented in mainstream LGBTQ and immigrant movements organizations that had previously failed to recognize those who are intersectionally marginalized. This simultaneous experience of trauma and opportunity illuminates the often paradoxical implications of rights episodes.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined both how SB 1070 emerged in Arizona and how this defensive rights episode impacted movement mobilization. I argue that SB 1070 arose out of a state ethos based in Southern traditionalist, frontier, law and order values that enabled the development of a racialized nativism within Arizona's Anglo community. Thus, as the state experienced the boom and bust cycles of a capitalist economy, immigrants, migrants, and Latinx, and other people of color served as both a cheap source of labor during times of economic prosperity and scapegoats during hard economic times. Throughout the 2000s, in response to shifting demographics and the 9/11 national security crisis, Arizona's Anglo population responded by backing far-right anti-immigrant legislators and their legal proposals in the state legislature and at the ballot box. Immigrant rights advocates tried to stem the tide of anti-immigrant political advocacy through the courts, and, in some instances, were successful at doing so. However, when Arizona's political environment shifted in 2009 as Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano was selected by the Obama administration to lead the Department of

Homeland security, the Tea Party rose in response to the election of President Obama, and a major economic crisis fueled calls for harsh anti-immigrant laws, the state became fertile ground for the formation of a defensive immigrant rights episode that manifested in SB 1070.

I also illuminate some of the key differences between defensive and offensive rights episodes. In each type of rights episode, the blame for marginalization can fall on different parties. In offensive rights episodes, mainstream movement organizations often responsible for the formation of the episode can be criticized by movement actors for the marginalization and exclusion of certain people and organizations. This criticism can be exacerbated in rights campaigns composed mostly of organizations that tend not strategically think about movements beyond rights-based campaign cycles, as in the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. In defensive rights episodes, mainstream movement actors can still face some of the blame for marginalizing certain movement constituents; however, most of the blame is often placed on the opponents responsible for the formation of the episodic rights campaign. This can minimize coalition fragmentation in the aftermath of the rights episode, and, thus, can give defensive rights episodes greater expansionist potential than offensive rights episodes.

Finally, I argue, through an analysis of archival data and in-depth interviews with advocates, organizers, community workers, and politicians, that the SB 1070 defensive rights episode in some ways both expanded and constrained movement mobilization. SB 1070 often activated new organizations and individuals. The defensive rights episode tended to expand movement mobilization by emphasizing some factors associated with of inter- and intra-movement coalition unification: a common core of cross-community opponents, a shared political movement past, and shared experiences of oppression. At the same time, SB 1070 also paradoxically tended to contain movement mobilization because it often also emphasized some

factors associated with coalition division: the rights episode sometimes centered issues that most impact the state's immigrant communities while marginalizing those that mattered to other minority communities, funneled advocacy into cyclical campaigns, and reinforced hierarchical exclusions across movements based on race, gender, and class. The following chapter will further delve into these factors often associated with coalition expansion and contraction in greater detail by further analyzing my in-depth interviews with organization leaders and advocates.

CHAPTER 4

Unity and Division: Paradoxes in Political Movement Coalition Formation

Interviewer: When these bills started to emerge [and] when propositions started to emerge, particularly anti-immigrant ones, would you see any support for stopping them from LGBT community organizations...

State Senator Gallardo (AZ): No [interrupting]

Interviewer: or individuals?

State Senator Gallardo: No. And not to single out the LGBT community, I mean, keep in mind that in that early 2000s, I mean we didn't have support from the labor community. Organized labor was not very supportive, was not opposed to these bills. I mean, keep in mind, we didn't even have the Democratic Party.

The people were a little hesitant to go down that road. It was all new. Now we would have the support of organized labor like the AFL-CIO. We would have the support of the Democratic Party who would come out publicly and opposed to some of these bills, but back then they didn't. They didn't. It was primarily the Latinx community.

I think it took a while for us to realize that we couldn't fight these battles alone, that we needed at least as Latinx we needed to build relationships. Let it be with, with American Indians, let it be with the African American community or the LGBT community or even the [chamber of commerce or faith communities]. I mean, you now see a coalition of folks in support of Comprehensive Immigration Reform at the federal level, you didn't have that back then.

Introduction

As described in Chapters 2 and 3, political movement coalitions often do not occur naturally or easily. They must be constructed through sharing story, through the creation of narratives and of collective identities, that highlight similarity and difference. This chapter continues my analysis of political movement formation through an in-depth examination of the factors that interviewees argued tended to expand and constrain inter- and intra-movement coalition formation within and across LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant organizations in Washington State and Arizona in the 2000s and 2010s. Through an analysis of interviews that I

conducted with a wide array of movement actors in each state, I argue that the construction of a common civil rights past narrative and shared opponents tended to facilitate the construction of coalitions in both states and, in doing so, expanded political movement mobilization in some circumstances. However, the formation of this collective narrative often simultaneously constrained political movement expansion by reinforcing historic exclusions based on power. In other words, a paradox tended to exist at the center of a series of fragile unions that formed in Washington and Arizona within and across movement organizations: the formation of political movement coalitions often simultaneously involved expansion and contraction.

In making this argument, I enhance previous scholarship on rights-based political movement formation, particularly scholarship that focuses on shared ideology, political threats, and on culturally resonant framing strategies (Dorf and Tarrow 2014; Cornfield and McCammon 2010; Benford and Snow 2000; Benford 1997; McCarthy, McAdam, and Zald 1996; Zald 1996). There are very few systematic, empirical studies that examine movement dynamics across cases, movements, and time (Benford 1997: 411-412). For this reason, scholarship that examines how political movements form often obscures how power relations shape movements (Feree 2003; Steinberg 1999; Ellingson 1995). As a result, the important roles that marginalized constituencies within political movements play in movement formation and expansion are frequently overlooked. This chapter seeks to close the research gap by examining political movement coalition building across and within disparate political movements (the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movements) in two state contexts (Washington State and Arizona).

The following sections use excerpts from 51 in-depth interviews with organization leaders, advocates, community workers, and politicians in Washington State and Arizona to delineate how rights-based movement coalitions can sometimes simultaneously expand and

contract. I delineate some of the mechanics of movement coalition expansion and contraction in Washington State and Arizona in two sections. The first section examines how LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movement actors in both states constructed collective narratives, or a shared ideology, that formed the backbone of rights-based movement coalitions in both states. I argue that movement constituents formed inter- and intra-movement coalitions in each state by constructing narratives and building relationships around the idea that individuals and groups involved in these coalitions were part of one community that shared a common political movement, or “civil rights,” past and the same opponents or “enemies.” This enabled the new relationships built between and across disparate political movements to sometimes last beyond episodic rights campaign by contributing to movement expansion and mobilization over time.

The second section delineates how the construction of these new inter- and intra-movement alliances, or fragile unions, can come at a cost. Political movement formation and expansion in both state contexts also tended to simultaneously fracture and divide movement constituents based on power. According to interviewees, coalitions that formed were often fragile, superficial, and quickly fractured. Interviewees argued, first, that division often occurred because a disproportionately large amount of funding went to mainstream organizations that claimed responsibility for successes at the expense of marginalized groups. Second, interviewees argued that coalitions were frequently fragile because rights-based campaigns often involved the tokenization of marginalized constituencies within movements. Finally, interviewees contended that coalitions were sometimes superficial because the groups that composed them had different policy and issue preferences, with mainstream organizations primarily concerned with the achievement of rights wins and marginalized groups concerned with uprooting institutionalized power in the long-term or in ways that mainstream groups sometimes felt were at odds with their

interests.

I. One Community: Factors that Contribute to Coalition Unity

In Washington and Arizona, the emergence of inter- and intra-movement coalitions tended to correspond with the extent to which organization leaders, advocates, and community workers within marginalized and mainstream organizations developed a collective political movement narratives. In both states, movement actors formed a collective understanding of their connection to a shared past and a core of common opponents or “enemies.” This collective understanding involved relationship-building between and across movements that emphasized how movements composed of seemingly disparate subject positions were part of one community through the construction and highlighting of civil rights movement, other political movement narratives, and shared opponents. Opponents often manifested in specific individuals, including politicians, leaders of interest groups, and law enforcement officials who target minority populations over prolonged periods of time. However, opponents might also refer to a more generalizable fear of community ostracism as a result of one’s subject position, for example, as an LGBTQ-identified person or undocumented individual. Seemingly divergent organizations form a collective civil rights past narrative when they recognize that the same messagings, attacks, and fears experienced as a result of their own members’ subject positions also apply to other minority subject positions. For instance, the experience of “coming out” as LGBTQ is a collective understanding of past that applies to LGBTQ people alone and involves considerable fear of community ostracism or “othering” by those who do not hold this subject position.

According to my interviews with organization members, organizations that represent undocumented LGBTQ people were able to initiate the formation of common civil rights past

narratives between queer migrant and lesbian and gay organizations within the LGBTQ rights movement. They did this in limited circumstances by holding events like Double Coming Out forums and through direct conversations with other minority community organizations and individuals. During these events and through these conversations, interviewees emphasized the similarity between “coming out” as LGBTQ and “coming out of the shadows” as undocumented – a similar collective past experience that involves fear of community isolation for both. In recognizing the similarities between experiences of “coming out,” members from divergent groups were able to form a collective understanding of past, based on generalizable opponents, that aided in the formation of intra-movement coalitions between queer migrant organizations and LGBTQ organizations had that historically de-emphasized or ignored queer migrant constituents in Washington State and Arizona.

Multiple interviewees talked about or implied that creating an understanding of shared past and common opponents between movement organizations and amongst members of organizations was crucial to the formation of LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant inter- and intra-movement coalitions in both Washington State and Arizona. Interviewees’ discussions of the importance of opponents in the formation of collective narratives are aligned with LGBTQ studies and political movement scholars who argue that opponents play a prominent role in movement activism and that shared ideology and political threats are factors that contribute to coalition formation (Dorf and Tarrow 2014; Cornfield and McCammon 2010; Isaac 2010; McCammon and Van Dyke 2010; Fetner 2008). Sociologists who study coalitions have long recognized that shared goals and ideology contribute to coalition formation. Constructing a common past and shared opponents plays a prominent role in coalition unity because it helps solidify the contention that groups devoted to movement struggles are all part of the same

community and have overlapping goals. The interviews discussed in this section demonstrate how the construction of common opponents and of a shared past to contributes to the formation of inter- and intra- movement coalitions.

Sharing Story and Constructing a Common Past

In both state contexts, interviewees identified the importance of relationship-building in the creation of expansive political movement coalitions. This relationship-building, which involved movement actors telling their stories to illustrate how they were part of one common community, often involved considerable risk. This is apparent in the below interview excerpt, in which a transgender activist in Washington State describes the necessity of existing by “stealth” in the early years of trans community activism:

Interviewer: You also mentioned this idea of existing by stealth. Can you describe a little bit more what you mean by that?

Nicole: Again, I would link it to the same experiences that almost any emerging group, you can think of any, even labor, women’s movement, all those, there is a time when a few people just begin to do something, to speak out.

There’s usually a lot of difficulty in doing that. Well, I know this is true. And then anyone coming at that time, stealth just means, you know, doing it secretly. That was a matter of survival for many people in, in the gender nonconforming and trans world years ago because to be identified meant absolutely no job, probably no continuing in school if you were there, family kicking you out. I mean, you can look to the lesbian, gay and bi movement, for a similar pattern. So there were concrete real-world dangers piled upon dangers just to be known as a trans person or a gender nonconforming person.

So, there developed something of a, I mean it certainly wasn’t accepted by all, but there was something of a pattern in those early years of getting through whatever transition it was and then simply blending, disappearing, going stealth, being just a person in culture. Unknown. So, *that wasn’t very good for community-building*, but it, it allowed people to get on with their lives.

So, there we have it. Now it is no – it’s certainly more possible thanks to the unending work of so many people and so many movements – for many of us in

our various communities, to be public, to be open, to just be who we are, more often than, than ever before, and that means we also have the choice to be part of community and to be connected in ways that, that those couple generations ago could barely envision. [Emphasis Added]

In this interview excerpt, Nicole describes the great risk associated with coming out as a trans person in the early years of the LGBTQ movement. She connects this experience with the experiences of emerging groups in other political movements: the labor movement, the women's movement, and the lesbian, gay, and bisexual movement. That experience of coming out, of owning a stigmatized subject position as part of your personal narrative and arguing that you belong in the broader community, involves considerable risk – possibly the loss of employment, of an education, and of one's own family. In Washington State and Arizona, interviewees sometimes created inter- and intra-movement coalitions by actively engaging in this form of risk. They built relationships between and across communities that they had previously existed in by “stealth” by coming out as LGBTQ in labor movement spaces and immigrant spaces, by coming out as undocumented or as an immigrant in LGBTQ and labor movement spaces, and by supporting worker issues in LGBTQ and immigrant movement spaces. In doing so, they often expanded the array of identities represented within the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant movements in each state.

This was particularly apparent amongst LGBTQ undocumented youth in Washington and Arizona, who integrated into their respective communities by emphasizing similarities between the narrative of “coming out” as LGBTQ and the narrative of “coming out of the shadows” as undocumented. Interviewees described how they would highlight these similarities when talking with the broader community and with LGBTQ and immigrant rights organizations in order to expand the political movements that these groups belonged to. In the below excerpt, Emilio, an organization advocate who works with a group that represents LGBTQ and undocumented

people in Washington State, describes these coming out similarities and how they bridge multiple movements:

Emilio: As we think about the LGBTQ movement and the undocumented immigrant movement there's many parallels to them. For example, "coming out." LGBTQ folks come out to their families, come out to people who they know, come out every day, in every space, for any given reason. And that's really a similar scenario undocumented students face because undocumented students or undocumented people have to come out one way or another probably at least once a day to somebody about something.

So that coming out experience is very much the same, and I think it's very much one that, and I haven't seen a study on this and I wish that somebody would be maybe doing an actual more in-depth study about the mental state and the mental health of that coming out process and what it looks like for undocumented people and what it looks like for LGBTQ folks because I think they would find many, many, many similarities in terms of that....

What's also important to know is that through much of the organizing that happened, I would say at the federal level in some ways, it just so happened that undocumented folks, who happened to be LGBTQ also were the ones who were really leading some of these efforts. So, therefore, I think some of them felt you know, we're sharing our story as undocumented, but we're not sharing our story as queer or as someone who is LGBTQ.

And so many folks felt that was very important in terms of changing the perception of our own community towards that population. Because I think many folks and sometimes many immigrants have misconceptions about who are LGBTQ people and not only who are they but what is their "lifestyle" as many people have talked about. Those same misconceptions and perceptions are the same ones undocumented people get when somebody who is documented thinks about this specific population. Like, "who are these people and what is their lifestyle? Because we know them to be law-breakers and people who are not good people."

Again, there is many similarities to both of those two communities, and even more so, I think there's many, many, more similarities, more in detail between the undocumented population, undocumented groups, with transgender folks – because not only do they come out but there is also this struggle to actually document their lives. They go through their lives and either have access to state IDs or not or anything else like that.

According to Emilio, the coming out narrative is one of the similarities that exists between the LGBTQ and immigrant rights movements. Emilio and other LGBTQ undocumented leaders

highlighted these similar stories in order to create community within and across these movements. These dual coming out narratives often enabled the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions because they allowed LGBTQ people to see how their community related to the undocumented immigrant community and vice versa. In this way, Emilio and other interviewees helped construct a narrative that illuminated how the LGBTQ and undocumented immigrant communities were actually one, common political movement rather than distinct communities with different political movement trajectories.

Interviewees argued that forms of relationship building like dual coming out narratives were crucial for expanding movement mobilization for this reason. Indeed, the importance of sharing story was a prominent factor interviewees identified in creating change and expanding beyond single-subject position constructions within individual movement organizations, across political movements, and in the broader community. For example, Sarah, the leader of a small LGBTQ organization in Arizona described “sharing story” as one of the principle tactics used by activists who participated in the Equality Walk. The Equality Walk was a campaign led by Sarah’s organization in which members walked 660 miles across the State of Arizona and visited 114 cities in order to share their stories with rural Arizona residents. In the below excerpt, Sarah describes the sharing story tactic as it was used during the Equality Walk:

Sarah: [The Equality Walk] was where individuals walked the number of miles where Arizona had been a state without full marriage equality. And so, over the years, there were 660 miles walked total by 60 different people and 114 different cities were visited in Arizona and trainings were offered. And this was also done in July and August, so it was very hot and the point was to be dramatic and to have that conversation and there was a lot of change that we saw throughout that.

When we started doing it, it was definitely, “I’ve never met a gay person,” and by the end it was a very different dynamic and people wanted the trainings. And so being able to provide that for so long and then to see marriage equality happen in Arizona, but not just, you know, the law change, but also the mindset change. *And it was really about story-telling and about, you know, once you hear someone’s*

story you can never un-hear it. Their viewpoint might not change that day, but you've definitely planted that seed....

We set meetings for people along the way, whether they were government officials or everyday people or schoolteachers or whoever they were, we tried to set meetings in each town. But then we also just talked to people on the street, and we had some really difficult conversations, but *they always seemed to go pretty well because it was just a human dialogue* and we had a very diverse group of walkers and we had people that were very Christian or came from different backgrounds and were able to relate to different people differently.

And so, they kind of realized, a gay person isn't what I think it is necessarily, it's not somebody in chaps. It was a very good experience I think for them but then also for us, because we had some pre-conceived stereotypes of small towns that were also the guy with the gun rack and the big truck and you know he was the nicest guy and totally supportive, so you just never know. [Emphasis Added]

For Sarah and the Equality Walkers, sharing story enabled relationships to grow between rural residents and LGBTQ people. This, in turn, de-stigmatized LGBTQ status amongst some rural residents (and rural identity amongst LGBTQ marchers). It also allowed walk participants and residents they encountered to see how they were all part of one community. For the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movements, sharing story served the same function in the creation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions. The more groups and individuals saw themselves as part of the same community, the more sustainable these coalitions were in the long term.

Manuel, a queer migrant organization leader in Arizona, even more concretely related how sharing story was an important component of enabling coalitions to form between immigrant, labor, and LGBTQ communities. In the below excerpt, Manuel describes his dual coming out stories and why he believes telling them became an important way for groups to empathize with one another and work together in coalition:

Manuel: I think for me, what made me come out and like the feelings, were Prop 300, I was dedicated to school and I understood that that was what I wanted to do. But then I also understood that I needed to share my story and I had this like, I remember the first time I spoke on stage and talked about my story and coming out, I had like these butterflies in my stomach, right, just nervous feeling and like

this sense of like, that everybody was going to know my status and the police were going to come to my house and deport all of us and I felt like maybe I was going to walk down the street and people were going to throw things at me or maybe I was going to be called illegal. And that didn't feel good.

And that was the March in 2008 I believe, 2006 something like that. And then I come out in 2009, I came out in 2009. And I had the same feeling of like losing friends, but this time it was like the feeling of losing my family, right? Coming out and like really, really, like feeling alone and like I wasn't going to have any support system was scary. Also feeling like I was going to get gay-bashed or something like that. It's the same feelings that I was going to get things thrown at me while I was walking down the street.

They were very similar. And I think this is why the LGBT community was able to connect and we were able to bring membership in when [our local queer migrant organization] started because we were able to connect the same feelings and the feelings were very in line.

Manuel discusses two coming out narratives here. First, he talks about the how he felt when he came out as undocumented in the aftermath of Proposition 300. Proposition 300 was a referendum that passed by popular vote in Arizona in 2006 that prohibited college students who are unable to prove that they are documented residents from receiving state financial aid for college (McKinley 2008). Manuel then describes how similar this sharing story experience was to coming out as an LGBTQ person, how in both moments Manuel felt “that I was going to get things thrown at me while I was walking down the street.” In recalling his coming out stories, Manuel also relates an experience of significant risk that mirrors the one Nicole described in the beginning of this section when describing what it means to come out and identify as part of an “emerging group.” Because Manuel's dual coming out stories related to the stories of risk associated with owning a stigmatized status for other groups, people who heard his stories more easily understood how their own past struggles overlapped. Manuel argues that this ultimately helped LGBTQ and immigrant groups relate to one another and, in limited circumstances,

work together in inter- and intra-movement coalitions.

Sharing story is not a new tactic or something that is specific to solidifying alliances alone. Labor movement organizers have long used their own personal narratives as a means of organizing new members and building power. Indeed, many union organizing materials stress the importance of personal, one-on-one conversations for recruiting new union members and building political capacity.⁵ It is interesting that interviewees from across the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant movements identified what is essentially a union organizing tactic as one of the most effective means of creating coalitions and mobilizing movements. Interviewees who were involved in the labor movement often used the union organizing, “one-on-one” language to describe what other interviewees identified as “sharing story,” “story-telling,” or “relationship building.” In the below excerpt, Louis, who works with an immigrant worker advocacy group and local unions that have been involved in the creation of inter-movement coalitions between LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant communities, describes how “one-on-one,” grassroots conversations are used to build political capacity for cross-community issues:

Louis: We believe that the best way to move a voter is through a conversation, *one-on-one conversation*. And *inside of that conversation, to tell your story and to connect in a personal way*. And inside of that story connect with the shared values and shared experiences between the, the canvasser and the voter.

For example...[during the Proposition 104 Campaign] students were trained and the canvassers were trained to go out and talk about what it’s like to ride on the bus for, you know, an hour and a half, two hours everyday. And what increased bus routes and expansion of the light rail would do for their commute to school, for example. *And so it becomes not about politics, not about, you know, this party or that party, but about, you know, my life and the challenges that I face and why*

⁵ One-to-one conversations are considered an essential element in union organizing. This is quickly apparent in the online organizing materials of three prominent unions: The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) (*SEIU*, “The Complete Stewards Manual;” *AFT*, “Why One-to-One Communication is Essential to Effective Organizing;” AFL-CIO, “Facts about the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute”).

I'm out here talking to you. And people really connect to that and that sticks. And that, we know, is what moves people from a place of inertia to a place of engagement. And so that's how we do all of our civic engagement – all of our civic engagement work is built around our stories. And DREAMer narratives in particular have been a big part of a lot of those stories.

Interviewer: The DREAMers?

Louis: Yes. So a lot of our original narratives were around, I am a DREAMer or I am undocumented and I can't vote. But you can vote and so I need you to. I need you to vote for me. I need you to be a voice that speaks for me because I'm not able to vote in this election. And those were some of the original kinds of narratives that we were training people to use at the doors. [Emphasis Added].

In this excerpt, Louis delineates how immigrant and worker organizers use one-on-one conversations to increase voter turnout at the grassroots in Arizona. He references personal narratives about Proposition 104 and the DREAMers. Proposition 104 was a Phoenix ballot initiative that passed in 2015. The Proposition increased the city's sales tax to fund a light rail expansion. It was supported by a bipartisan coalition that included LGBTQ and labor movement organizations (Goth 2015; *MovePHX*, "List of Supporters"). The DREAM Act (the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act) was a federal bill that would have created a pathway to citizenship for some undocumented people who arrived in the United States as children. It failed to pass in 2010 largely due to opposition from Republicans in Congress and, most notably Senator John McCain of Arizona who had supported similar legislation in the 2000s (Ye Hee Lee 2016, Hing 2010). Undocumented people who would have qualified for this act adopted the name DREAMers during advocacy efforts in 2010. Louis argues that "one-on-one" conversations with people, or sharing personal stories, about how policies impact individual lives are one of the best ways to build political power for oppressed minority groups like low-income workers and undocumented people.

In inter- and intra- movement coalition formation, sharing story also involved the

construction of common movement and civil rights past narratives. Movement narratives were often used to illustrate how the missions of LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant organizations were connected to one another. Sage, an advocate in Washington State who conducted outreach with organizations to build coalitions around LGBTQ movement issues, discusses the utility of political movement narratives for inter-movement coalitions in the below exchange. Here, Sage describes the tactics she would use to get organizations that represent immigrants and communities of color to join Washington's Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality in 2012:

Interviewer: When you first went to some of these organizations, would you get any pushback from within these organizations and if so what types of things would you experience? And you can talk really generally, you don't have to mention specific groups.

Sage: I didn't personally get any nos from any organizations. I'm sure there were other people who did, I can't think of any organizations specifically actually, but some of the arguments were, this isn't our issue, this isn't our issue area, we're spread thin, we need to focus, you know, they would use as kinds of excuses. It was never anything blatant. It was more like, why should we? How does this pertain to us? This is outside of our mission.

Interviewer: What kind of things would you do to combat that particular question when it came up?

Sage: You know we, our messaging was, *we talked about the long history in Seattle of our long civil rights history. And we are lucky here that we have that. And it's not necessarily communities of color worked with LGBT communities, it was also we have this long history of different racial groups and ethnic groups working together, so building on that foundation is huge.*

We also have, we have leaders that are, that were very much on board with supporting this campaign and who were very vocal. So our tactic was not just going to organizations, it was also getting very highly visible people to support the campaign. *And they were just so integral to delivering the message of like, this is a civil rights issue.* And for communities of color it's a little bit different of a message I think than with maybe some other communities because we have experienced racism, we have experienced treating us differently because of the way we look or because of our beliefs. So I think that that tie in is what we depended on to get people to support the campaign.

Interviewer: So you would say, like drawing parallels between a common civil rights history?

Sage: It's, you know, that, but also, these are members of our community, we're not separate. We're, there are LGBT members of communities of color and we need to support them.

In this exchange, Sage does mention sharing story as a useful tactic for creating inter-movement coalitions. When she describes how minority leaders would highlight that “there are LGBT members of communities of color” she is referencing one-one-one conversations minority leaders had with their communities in order to drive up support for marriage equality during the rights episode. However, Sage also argues that calling attention to “our long civil rights history” was a crucial mechanism of getting ambivalent organizations that represent immigrants and communities of color to join a coalition that they at first felt only impacted the LGBTQ movement.

The construction of shared political movement narratives helped interviewees like Sage convey to different political movement groups that minority communities are connected, creating the possibility for long-term coalition relationships. Rachael, who worked for a marginalized organization, also clearly articulated the importance of creating a common political movement past for coalition unity. Rachel conducted workshops with mainstream organizations to encourage the formation of inter-movement coalitions. During her interview, Rachel described how the recognition of a common civil rights past unites organizations in this manner:

Rachel: We generally start off [our workshops], so an organization like [mainstream progressive women's rights group] or unions that are predominately white that have done strategic partnerships with us, they bring together their staff, their board, and their core leaders, and we need to build collectively a shared understanding of our history that weaves all of our movements together, so the civil rights, the immigrant rights, the LGBTQ justice, the labor unions. You need to be able to see the timeline of where our work has both been intersected and also been siloed. And then I think just walking through that timeline, people kind of

see we are facing the same opposition, we are facing the same kinds of attacks, the messaging that they use against our communities are fairly consistent across different communities, whether it's because you're abnormal, or immoral, or criminal, or you know a threat to the American way of life, right? So those kinds of messagings are fairly consistent across our marginalized communities.

According to Rachel, the development of a common civil rights past narrative can be the basis for a long-term inter-movement alliance. It builds strength between groups by calling out common opponents in movement struggles and illuminating how these opponents strive to divide marginalized communities rather than unite them. Furthermore, Rachel describes how inter-movement coalitions can form through building a “shared understanding of our history that weaves all our movements together.” Thus, it is not only the recognition of common opponents, but, also, the creation of a common political movement narrative that incorporates the LGBTQ movement with the immigrant rights movement, labor movement, and civil rights movement that contributes to intra- and inter-movement coalition formation.

Unlike Sage, Rachel's organization encountered groups that were opposed to marriage equality and initially hesitated to join the Referendum 74 marriage equality coalition. After Rachel's group worked with some of these organizations, through what Rachel called in her interview a process of “deep story-telling” and “a lot of one-on-ones with folks who were very religious and opposed to this,” several of these hostile organizations ultimately ended up endorsing and joining the Washington State inter- and intra-movement coalition that formed around the marriage equality rights episode. For Rachel and other interviewees involved in the construction of inter- and intra-movement coalitions like the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality, sharing story and the construction of a common political movement or civil rights past were crucial movement unifying tactics. Through sharing story, movement actors emphasized similar experiences across the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant communities in

Washington State and, thus, illustrated how struggles that impacted one minority community were intertwined with the struggles of others. This de-othered individual experiences and created a collective understanding that unified advocates.

Unity in Opponents and Political Threats

Not all interviewees used civil rights narratives when describing how inter- and intra-movement coalition alignment occurred in both state contexts. Indeed, many marginalized groups reject civil rights narratives that they argue do not uproot institutional oppression, but, rather, enable people to resign themselves to state supported “equality” that they believe does nothing to combat state power structures premised upon police violence, racism, and economic hardship. For these individuals, formal legal change, like expanding anti-discrimination laws to encompass more minority communities, falls short because it fails to combat systemic power-laden race, gender, and class hierarchies. Some activists, particularly those from marginalized organizations, contend that formal legal solutions like anti-discrimination laws uphold and maintain problematic institutionalized hierarchies. As a result, many interviewees constructed political movement past narratives in describing their coalition work that drew on common opponents rather than civil rights narratives. These interviewees referenced shared struggles or attacks when describing how their own communities related to others and, thus, why it is important to work together in coalition. In Arizona, it was particularly common for interviewees to discuss SB 1070 and SB 1062 as cross-community attacks that demonstrated how seemingly divergent minority communities share common movement histories. Recall from Chapter 3, SB 1070 (the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act) was the virulently anti-immigrant law, passed by the Arizona legislature in 2010, that enables local law enforcement

officers to check immigration documents when they have a reasonable suspicion that a person is undocumented (Thornburgh 2010). SB 1062, also described in detail in Chapter 3, was a proposed state religious freedom bill in 2014 that would have allowed businesses to discriminate on the basis of LGBTQ status had it passed (Alonzo 2014). In the below interview excerpt, Valeria, an advocate who works on immigration and LGBTQ movement issues, describes how SB 1070 helped her to understand how divergent minority communities are connected:

Valeria: I guess I feel that [SB 1070 has] made me more understanding and sensitive of everybody's issues and how they are all related. I feel like I'm just more aware and conscious of, how it always comes down to, how a lot of these issues always come down to poverty, to limited access, to different things and how law is really, just because something is the law doesn't mean that it's right and doesn't mean that it's good.

That's what I always say from 1070, I realized like, this is a really horrible law and just because somebody made it, it doesn't make it OK and it doesn't mean that it's right – and we have to fight against these types of laws because of the same thing with you know discrimination and racism and back in the 60s you know it was ok for people to be discriminated, it was ok for people to be separated, and it was the law. And just because it made the law, doesn't mean that it was ok. And now, years later with 1070, I see the same thing happening, but now I see it happening to LGBT folks, I see it happening to women's reproductive rights and politicians trying to dictate what women can and cannot do with their bodies. And that's none of their business. So I see it in multiple fronts now that I am able to do this work on a larger scale.

I used to do just immigrant rights work, now I do more, broader issues. I do multiple issues. Advocacy around a lot of different things, which include LGBT rights, police accountability, immigration, also women's reproductive rights.

For Valeria, SB 1070 represents an attack on one community that is connected to similar legal attacks on the LGBTQ community, people of color, and women that collectively create a common political movement past. The extremism that characterized SB 1070 made her realize that the attacks on each of these communities do not occur in isolation, they are indicative of communities that are engaged in the same political movement struggle.

When SB 1062 emerged in 2014, interviewees argue that alliances that were barely

beginning between LGBTQ, labor, immigrant movement groups in the aftermath of SB 1070 grew stronger. Below, Arizona State Senator Martín Quezada describes how SB 1062 strengthened cross-movement coalitions because it emphasized how these two communities shared the same opponents:

Interviewer: Since then [since 2010 and the ensuing electoral and legislative campaigns], have you, seen some of these alliances emerge around other legislation?

Senator Quezada⁶: I think so. I think those alliances have gotten stronger since then. And a lot of that happened when...Senate Bill 1062 was here. So we started to see the same thing that happened to us as immigrants, as an immigrant community back in Senate Bill 1070 was happening to the LGBT community this year in Senate Bill 1062.

And so, you know, as Latino and immigrant, immigrant rights of kind of activists, we rose to the occasion fought that just as hard. And, and we, came to the aid, I think of the LGBT community. And it became a bigger issue. It started to become a bigger issue I think because of those alliances and because people started to see the impact it had on our economy and the, the threat to the Super Bowl and so what made those alliances even easier. Because you got the Chambers of Commerce that were getting involved and these are groups that normally weren't, weren't historically all that concerned about LGBT rights.

Here, State Senator Quezada describes how Latinx and immigrant community activists recognized SB 1062 as an attack on the LGBTQ community that was identical to SB 1070. Because these dual attacks emphasized similarities between current and past attacks that each of these communities share, Latinx and immigrant rights activists “rose to the occasion and fought [SB 1062] just as hard.” Other interviewees corroborated the strengthening of inter-movement coalitions around SB 1062 as well, as Latinx, labor, and immigrant community leaders and organizations held press conferences in support of the LGBTQ community and appeared at rallies and protests opposing the proposed legislation.

⁶ Because State Senator Quezada is a public official who gave a non-anonymous interview, his real name is used.

In addition to shared legislative attacks, interviewees identified other forms of opposition that strengthened inter- and intra-movement coalition alignment. In the following exchange, Harry, the former leader of a mainstream LGBTQ organization in Washington who identifies as white and gay, discusses how shared opponents eventually helped in the formation of an inter-movement coalition by shifting labor organizations in Washington towards greater acceptance of lesbian and gay rights:

Harry: That was a big shift also from 2004. In 2004, I was working on a campaign for [a Democratic party candidate] and the labor groups were not on board on what they call the 3Gs: Guns, God, and Gays.... The first thing they said is we like you [candidate's name] ...but you're not good on this. Our members care about Guns, God, and Gays.... But that was showing that the conversation was not there yet within the labor organizations and that shifted a lot over the last 10 years from 2004 to 2012.

Interviewer: What do you think shifted it?

Harry: I think it was things like Ref 71 [the passage of the "everything but marriage," domestic partnership law]. You know, *they saw the right people turn out, to support it*. I also think that [my organization] had been part of the social justice conversation because of our alliance with [another progressive organization], and that the candidates that we were supporting were the candidates they were supporting. *We have the same opponents. You know, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.* [Emphasis Added]

Harry argues that lesbian and gay organizations' support of the same candidates and opposition to the same candidates as labor organizations ultimately helped shift labor organizations' position on lesbian and gay rights issues. This enabled labor and mainstream LGBTQ organizations to rely upon one another in various electoral contests and legislative battles on political movement issues other than those that were considered specific to their own groups. Harry explains that this inter-movement labor and mainstream LGBTQ alignment grew over time as his organization visibly demonstrated its support of issues that mattered to coalition partners by both endorsing their campaigns and devoting whatever resources his organization

could. By supporting cross-cutting issues like those central to the labor movement, his organization became a part of the long-term “social justice conversation.” This commitment to other groups’ causes and goals, combined with the presence of the same core opponents, helped to solidify the understanding that organizations serving divergent communities were on the same team over time.

Interviewees also described how opponents helped drive some of the most memorable direct actions they had been involved in and helped unify queer and immigrant rights activists. Here, Lisa, an advocate with a local marginalized organization in Washington that has strong feminist, LGBTQ liberation, racial justice, and economic justice values describes how an anti-immigrant rights march in Seattle in 2006 during the Seattle Pride Parade created an intersectional contingent in the Pride Parade that year:

Lisa: Well that was in 2006. I mean immigration was like the big issue right, and there was a lot of queer immigrants.... We worked with [groups that represent LGBTQ people of color] and, well, they were sort of loose groups and it overlapped with some of the immigrant rights groups....

And then the following year it was still the big issue and *also the right wing had started to organize more*. So then when we found out that the right wing was planning a anti-immigrant march downtown on the same day as Pride, what we did is, we did a contingent, we called that it The Love Knows No Borders contingent.... We got a bunch of flags from different countries and we had a big contingent in the parade and then we told people ahead of time [what] we were going to do....

So then at, we went down to the end of Broadway and then we turned down and marched downtown to meet the right wing parade, and counter protest against it. *And we had a few people who were already down there but most of us went from the Pride Parade and went down there and we had a lot of people*, I, oh God can't remember anymore how many, I don't know, a couple hundred people. *And then it grew bigger downtown because some people met us there*. Anyway, that was very effective, and it was the only counter protest to the right wing anti-immigrant group that was marching downtown so it was really important. [Emphasis Added]

According to Lisa, the presence of an anti-immigrant march in Seattle helped queer activists

organize an intersectional contingent in the Pride Parade, that later formed a counter-protest of an anti-immigrant rights protest. Furthermore, the size of the contingent “grew bigger downtown” as advocates left the Pride Parade route and joined the counter-protest of anti-immigrant rights march. That is, Lisa argues that the size and scale of the protest increased as “people went from the Pride Parade and went down” to the opponent anti-immigrant march, indicating that the presence of the opponents themselves served as an important mobilizing tactic for the intersectional LGBTQ/immigrant rights march.

Sometimes interviewees described how specific opponents or “enemies” aided the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions. For example, Tom, an LGBTQ person of color and the former leader of both a large progressive organization of Washington and a mainstream LGBTQ organization, discussed how a common core of opponents helped unify LGBTQ and immigrant rights organizations in an inter-movement coalition in 2009, during the “everything but marriage” campaign, which legalized domestic partnerships for same-sex couples in the state:

Tom: If you care about more revenue for programs that serve low-income communities, the people that are trying to oppose this are some of the same people that are trying to oppose marriage equality and a lot of all the other socio-economic issues that we care about. So we were able to kind of quietly make the argument to [groups that advocated for socioeconomic issues and communities of color] that our opposition is trying to divide us and that we need to stick together because that is the only chance that we have to win.

Interviewer: So identifying common opponents was a big component in terms of getting people to agree?

Tom: Yes and obviously the big boogeyman that we could point to was Tim Eyman who was behind a ton of it. You know he was obviously the first one to move on I-200 [the statewide affirmative action ban], he was the genesis behind it and played a significant role in a number of the anti-LGBT measures as well. So it wasn't like we were making stuff up. It was like this is clearly, if you are paying any attention at all, you know that this is part of some plan by our opposition to divide us. So I think that we were able to make that argument quietly to our

various coalition partners to get on board and do what they could to support these issues.

Tom describes in this exchange how the presence of a common group of opponents, helped unite coalition partners that cared about socioeconomic issues, including immigrant rights organizations, in Washington State. Notably, Tom points to Tim Eyman as a key unifying resource for intersectional coalition alignments. Tim Eyman is a conservative political activist in Washington State who frequently pushes statewide ballot measures designed to limit the rights of racial and LGBTQ minorities and to reinforce “small government” by making it more difficult for the state legislature to raise taxes.

Interviewees involved in coalition building in Arizona similarly described how specific opponents would contribute to the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions. Nicolas, one of the founders of an undocumented immigrant advocacy coalition in Arizona, explained how partnerships emerged between his group and a local LGBTQ group when the two realized that they were simultaneously protesting Arizona Senator John McCain’s office:

Nicolas: Going back to 2010, one of the big actions that we had here in Phoenix was called DREAM Army, where we spent weeks outside of Senator McCain’s office to try to get him to support the DREAM Act and focusing in on the stories of DREAMers that wanted to go to the army. And, of course, think of the Senator as a veteran we hoped that he would listen to those stories.

But I remember that one time we were out there protesting Senator McCain on the DREAM Act before the vote and the other side of the street in the other corner on 16th street here in Phoenix, there was a group of LGBT folks, I think it was [local LGBTQ organization name redacted] if I remember correctly, here locally there’s an LGBT organization called [local LGBTQ organization name redacted], that was protesting outside because of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.

And so, I remember that day like, me and even a couple of my friends were like going back and forth because you know we cared about both issues and I remember I knew some people in the other side of the street, but I didn’t pay attention to it then. I think that it wasn’t until after the failure of the DREAM Act where I really had time to just reflect and think because you know all that year, 2010, I mean nobody that was involved this issue had time to breath. Before SB

1070, after SB 1070, and then the DREAM Act, and it was just after the DREAM Act that everybody had time to just calm down, think, and then reflect on everything that was going on. So I think that is was both the strategy to have it gain more like support, but also the similar experiences that people like me had during that time that we didn't really get to discuss until after the fact....

But also in the political and policy way, and I think something that kind of worked against us but also for us eventually was the political alignment, again, just the fact that we had similar targets. Like Senator John McCain for example with the LGBT community, it was, it was just a given. After that we were more intentional in reaching out to LGBT groups to see how we could support each other's actions or strategies and how to expand our stories.

After 2010, Nicolas ultimately worked with the local LGBTQ organization discussed in the above interview excerpt in grassroots advocacy efforts. Nicolas contends that the fact that the local LGBTQ organization and undocumented immigrants had “similar targets” or the same opponents – here Senator John McCain – enabled the two groups to more easily see how their politics and policies aligned. This, in turn, helped develop a longer term inter-movement partnership between Nicolas's group and the LGBTQ organization he met while organizing actions at Senator McCain's office. Interviewees in Arizona likewise argued that former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, former Governor Jan Brewer, and former State Senator Russell Pearce⁷ were opposition leaders who served as shared opponents. These individuals and others supported actions and legislation that LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant organizations viewed

⁷ Sheriff Joe Arpaio was the Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona during this study. He is world renowned as America's “toughest sheriff” and instituted a wide range of anti-immigrant policies within the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department, including raids of local businesses in order to locate undocumented immigrants (*The Arizona Republic* 2015). In one incident in 2008 a “swarm of 230 law officers” descended upon the streets of Mesa, Arizona in order to round up undocumented people (Scarborough et al. 2008). *Melendres v. Arpaio*, a federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Latinx and immigrant community members in Arizona with the help of the ACLU, recently found that Sheriff Arpaio has engaged in racial profiling and unlawful traffic stops of Latinxs. Former State Senator Russell Pearce orchestrated SB 1070 in 2010, which was signed by then Governor Jan Brewer.

as forms of hate legislation, like SB 1070 and SB 1062, that ostracized and targeted immigrants, workers, and LGBTQ people. Many interviewees argued, like Nicolas, that having these people as cross-community opponents, enabled LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor groups that were the subjects of opponent attacks to relate to one another as oppressed communities with shared political movement struggles.

II. Fragile Unions: Factors that Contribute to Coalition Fracture

The above section describes some of the factors interviewees argued were crucial to the formation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions amongst LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant communities in Washington State and Arizona. These factors include sharing stories that emphasized how movement constituents were all part of one community, the construction of political movement and civil rights past narratives, and the recognition that communities shared common opponents. Partnerships did begin to emerge in Washington State and Arizona according to interviewees. However, interviewees were also quick to argue that coalitions, when they did form, were often superficial, easily divided, and fragile. Interviewees contended that these newly formed unions were fragile because a disproportionate amount of funding went to larger, mainstream groups; because coalitions often involved the tokenization of marginalized people, especially those who were intersectionally marginalized; and because mainstream and marginalized groups within these coalitions often disagreed with one another on which policies to pursue (rights-based issues versus structural change) and which political tactics were most effective. This section draws from the experiences related by interviewees to describe some of the ways that inter- and intra- movement coalitions can divide at the same time that they tend to expand movement mobilization.

“Money and Power”

David is the former leader of a group that represents LGBTQ people of color in Washington State. He has long been a member of the collective of political movement organizations that started forming larger and more politically powerful coalitions in the 2010s. In 2012, when mainstream LGBTQ groups and other groups that are part of Washington State’s political movement community formed the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality, David’s group was quick to join:

David: At that time we were interested in building our capacity for community mobilizing and engagement so we already had the interests. And then it was in all the papers [laughs]. I mean everyone was just jumping on that bandwagon. And we were asked to participate by some of the organizations that were – at that time we were developing a relationship with [mainstream LGBTQ organization name redacted] – and you know so they were talking to us about [the Referendum 74 campaign], and in fact we ended up going in together on a grant and we got some funding for our organizations to do this work.

When I asked David to describe his experiences with the Referendum 74 campaign and whether he saw the marriage equality rights episode as something that would specifically help the community his organization served, he was quick to point out that it would not. Although, David did point out some important benefits he felt that his organization acquired from participating in the coalition:

Interviewer: So when you decided to join onto the R-74 bandwagon did you see that as an issue that specifically impacted [LGBTQ people of color]?

David: Not as much. But we thought it would still be a good experience to participate. When I just asked around, you know people in the office, people in the community it seemed like getting married is not the top of people’s priority list. Because like I said people are worried about having a job, making money, paying the rent et cetera, not getting deported, and marriage is not necessarily at the top of their list. So we understood that, but we thought it would be interesting and important in some ways to participate anyway.

Interviewer: What were some of the benefits you got from participating and also the things that you didn't think were necessarily beneficial from participating?

David: Yeah so it did help us to build capacity. We had some of our folks get media training. A couple of our staff were actually featured in the marketing pieces. We went around and gave presentations, it helped us to deepen our relationships with some of the... organizations in the community like [names of organizations that represent immigrants and communities of color redacted], those folks. It gave us a way to cement those relationships more. It actually raised our profile within the community.

A lot more people, so a lot of people heard of us who hadn't heard about us before during the campaign, and so, you know and that had a lasting effect. After the campaign people still remembered who we are. And that was a result I think of our participation in the campaign.

In this exchange, David discusses both why his organization decided to join the campaign and some of the ways his organization benefited from participation. According to David, participation helped his group "build capacity." Members of his group received media training and participation in the coalition helped raise his group's profile within the community. However, David was also argued that the coalition was fragile and limiting and that his group was never fully included:

David: What was not so great about it is that it was kind of, the people who were sitting around the big table – so there was a big table and there was a little table. And we were not at the big table. The big table was all a pay as you play or whatever they call it pay-to-play type of deal. There was a small number of organizations that each brought a large sum of money to the table and they sort of were able to pay to be the big decision-makers...

We were at the lower tier, so basically the people that sat around that table who I think were all white people decided that they could win this campaign without having to invest in communities of color. They made a choice and a decision that they were not going to invest their efforts in communities of color. So at one point, so that was happening.

And then at one point, somebody sat up, there was a couple of funders that sat up and said, "hey wait a minute that's not cool." So what they did at that point was they brought in [intersectional advocacy group name redacted]... [The intersectional advocacy group] was invited to come in and handle that piece, So they did the best that they could. They did not do a great job in the African

American community because they are not from here they don't know anyone here, so they came in and they had the wrong person or people to work in the African American community. And it was not a good outcome.

In the Latino community they hired Camila and that was better because Camila is actually well-known in the community, she's an effective organizer. She already had a relationship with [that community] and so that was better.

But you know overall I had a bad, that was not a good experience, I mean it was good in the sense that I described earlier in terms of capacity building for us. What I thought was this, that the marriage equality campaign was an opportunity for movement-building... It was an opportunity for movement-building and that opportunity was not taken. I don't think they were interested in that. And actually you know [a local mainstream LGBTQ group leader] kind of warned me, well it wasn't a warning, he just told me at the very, very beginning before any of the work started, very, very early in the whole process he says, "look this is going to be a campaign and in campaigns the only thing anybody cares about is winning and everything else is not important."

And that's how it played out. You know they calculated what's it going to take to win and that came I think at the expense I think of communities like ours and organizations like ours, and that was very unfortunate. But it was also a valuable learning for me because I guess that's kind of how liberals behave in a situation like this. [Emphasis Added]

David argues that his organization's experience in the Referendum 74 campaign coalition was a bad one overall. His group was asked to participate, but they were treated as an add on group that was not essential to the coalition. Furthermore, they were relegated to the smaller, "lower tier" table. The community of color and immigrant groups that were part of the smaller table were also given much less money than the larger mainstream advocacy groups and wealthy funders who ran the "big table." This solidified the perception that the campaign coalition was not devoted to or concerned with maintaining ties with marginalized groups once the campaign ended. Consequently, David argues that the coalition was "an opportunity for movement-building that was not taken."

This wealth and power separation between mainstream and marginalized groups was discussed by multiple interviewees when referencing the Referendum 74 campaign. Emma, an

advocate with a mainstream organization in Washington corroborated David's argument that community of color outreach was an afterthought in the Referendum 74 campaign during her interview. Below, Emma delineates in more detail how the marginalization of communities of color in the marriage equality coalition was one example of the historic exclusion of people of color in progressive organizing in Washington:

Emma: While most of us that worked on the POC [people of color coalition] found our work to be important, I don't think that, as a whole the campaign leadership viewed it as important. I felt like some of the campaign leadership was quote on quote "allowing us" to do the work. You know versus, proactively saying, "Ok we really need to get this work done in communities of color. How can you help us make that happen?"...

You know, I would say, in general, in Washington, unless it's an immigrant rights issue POC work is always an add on....

Interviewer: Would you say that's a true incorporation or a problem that you see?

Emma: No, that's a problem, that's a problem. No matter, you know no, yeah, that's a problem I've seen that with every campaign that I've ever worked on. Legislative, ballot measure. Unless it's an immigrant rights campaign....

Interviewer: Why do you think that is?

Emma: I think Washingtonians, and this is just my own analysis. I think Washingtonians, particularly those in Western Washington, especially those in Seattle view themselves as, "well I'm liberal and progressive. Of, course I'm always thinking of communities of color." But really, when a campaign plan or a work plan is put forth, to me it's obvious that communities of color are not part of the foundation of whatever they're working on. It's always an add on.

Interviewer: Yeah. So it's like an afterthought, [an] add on.

Emma: It's an afterthought exactly. And it's left to the organizers of color to bring those issues to the front.

Interviewer: What do you think that does to relationship building between organizations?

Emma: I think it's hurtful. I mean, it doesn't necessarily prevent that relationship from happening, but I think that, you know, even here at [mainstream organization name redacted], I think there are some organizations that are very

suspicious of us and will still work with us, but it's kind of like they are resigned to knowing what we are.

Like David, Emma argues that community of color issues are considered an afterthought or “add on” in Washington State in all campaigns – both legislative and electoral. She also elaborates more on what treating communities of color as if they are a mere “add on” does for progressive organizing. According to Emma, this leaves all campaign coalitions between mainstream and marginalized groups fragile. Marginalized groups are hurt by this exclusive form of coalition building that leaves issues that matter to their communities forgotten. They are always “suspicious” of mainstream groups that receive most of the funding whenever these groups reach out and ask them to join their coalitions. Emma argues that the relationships between mainstream and marginalized groups still happen, but these relationships are fragile, with mainstream groups treating marginalized groups as if they are the “add on,” only necessary to show funders that they are incorporating communities of color, and communities of color perpetually viewing mainstream groups with suspicion as a result of “lower tier” treatment.

Some interviewees angrily argued that coalitions are superficial and exclusive because of the disproportionate funding that is funneled into mainstream groups during campaigns. Priya, for example, is an advocate who worked with both mainstream and marginalized groups during the Referendum 74 Campaign who ultimately left the advocacy arena in Washington as a result of her experience with coalition partners. During her interview, Priya argued that the historic division between mainstream and marginalized organizations, a division that prevents the creation of a long-term movement, is really about “money and power:”

Priya: The thing about Washington State, I think we won marriage not because we have a movement, like a real queer movement, it's because we have *money and power* and that will get you a victory as well.

For Priya, and other interviewees who work on coalition building in Washington State, inclusion

and exclusion in policymaking campaigns is dictated by large funders who capitalize on opportune moments in order to display their “progressivism” and attract business for their companies. This was particularly apparent during the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality, which brought in massive donations from wealthy donors like Jeff Bezos from Amazon and Bill Gates from Microsoft. Many argue that the inclusion of funding from these business is necessary to fund statewide advocacy campaigns and the massive coalition that emerged in support of the referendum. However, the inclusion of wealthy funders also likely contributed to the creation of a coalition that centered “money and power” and facilitated the further marginalization of immigrant and community of color groups that did not have the funding necessary to be included in the “big table.” Ultimately, the assistance of large funders whose money enabled the creation of inter- and intra-movement coalitions was very important and, thus, advocates likely would not have won marriage equality without it. Yet, the incorporation of large funders into the Referendum 74 campaign also came at a cost as many marginalized groups became suspicious of the motivations of movement actors in future coalition-based campaigns.

Tokenization

In Arizona, advocates and organization leaders also criticized inter- and intra- movement coalitions that disproportionately assist bigger, mainstream organizations that are better situated to capitalize on the tremendous amount of money that flows into immigrant and LGBTQ communities from national organizations and foundations that are interested in thwarting opponent advocacy. This disproportionate distribution tears away at the recognition of collective struggles. For example, Manuel, the leader of a queer migrant organization in Arizona, argued that in the aftermath of SB 1070, as queer migrants started sharing their stories and aiding the

formation of coalition, other organizations took advantage of the new popularity of queer migrant narratives:

Manuel: it started to become trendy to have UndocuQueers in your organization. We'd see a lot of our people like have an exodus I guess of our membership and then funnel into these organizations that at first weren't accepting but now because they need the funding and because it's sexy to do this kind of work, now have undocumented or UndocuQueer people in their organizations.

But again, and I think that the biggest problem we see locally is that a lot of the time, they failed to mention how these opportunities were created. So what we see is that, although we've been organizing for 4 years, because a lot of the curriculum we've done has been locally and we haven't got a lot of attention, a lot of the bigger organizations take advantage of the fact that nobody has heard and then they start getting the funding.

Manuel: So I think that that's a huge problem, and I think not just in Arizona, but I think nationally, right?

Interviewer: Yeah, it's like they get funding almost by exploiting—

Manuel: The non-profit industrial system.

For Manuel, the “biggest problem” within local movement building occurred as attention and funding shifted towards mainstream organizations that, he argued, “took advantage” of the sudden interest in his community’s subject positions, tokenizing queer migrant community members and swallowing all funding opportunities, or what Manuel calls the Non-Profit Industrial Complex. The Non-Profit Industrial Complex is a queer, trans, and critical race critique of non-profit funding of political movements that privilege social service and pro-state reform policies over policies proposed by marginalized community advocates like Manuel that focus on undoing state violence (e.g., combating police brutality and the carceral state) (Mananzala and Spade 2008). The next section describes how the divide between mainstream and marginalized communities epitomized by the Non-Profit Industrial Complex impacts coalition building in more detail. Tokenizing occurs when larger mainstream organizations invite

the participation of marginalized community members without placing them in leadership roles or broadly tackling issues that disproportionately impact these individuals, like immigration detention, economic security, and healthcare. Puar (2014) and others recognize tokenizing in this form as a “gestural intersectionality” where the mere presence of the intersectional subject is used by organizations to show “intersectionality” despite the fact that mainstream organization agendas remain unchanged (Puar 2014:78; see also Hancock 2016; Strolovitch 2007).

Other interviewees described how the tokenization of LGBTQ people of color is a form of racism within mainstream LGBTQ organizing that fragments partnerships between mainstream and marginalized people. In the below excerpt, Mateo describes why he stopped working with mainstream LGBTQ organizations in Arizona as a result of tokenization:

Mateo: Going back to when I was more involved with LGBT advocacy. One of the reasons I left the board of [a local mainstream LGBTQ organization] was it just felt like they didn't get it.... *So I was involved in several things and then just stopped because I was really frankly annoyed with leadership of the LGBT community. They just really seemed to be speaking to middle, upper class, and affluent white men.*

On the board of [a local mainstream LGBTQ organization], I complained about lack of representation. I was the only minority board member. It was a fairly big board, I think about 15 or 16 people. I was one of the only ones that wasn't rich and I was like, like the youngest board member as well, so there was a lot of issues.

But like everything you would see coming out, the *Echo* magazine used to have more of a role in terms of informing the gay community about issues and organizing people for events and causes, it still exists, but it's much more diminished with the rise of online stuff, people stop picking up magazines. So *Echo* magazine was one of the big, big, kind of distributors of information [for local mainstream LGBTQ organizations] that would have events and publicize things, and print things. Any images you saw are always beautiful, young, healthy, white men, mostly in skimpy attire. And some kind of cute lesbians, but nobody that would not be followed around in an Abercrombie and Fitch story nest, you know, are you in the right story (laughing)? So no disabled people, no old people, no, very few, very little minority representation. And people that were really gender, not the [searches for word]

Interviewer: Not gender [non]conforming I suppose.

Mateo: Yeah. So to the extent that the boys were pretty, they were boyishly pretty. Otherwise, they were hunkies, very ruggedly masculine looking men and all the advertisements and billboards and things. And the women were always very cute and small and white. *There rarely, there might be a black person. Very incidental, very token-ey. Um, but not meaningful representation of poor, LGBT people or minorities, disabled, elderly, any of those things.* And so this is just kind of my ongoing annoyance with these, the way these organizations did business. *They were telling the rest of the community that they weren't, I mean, by what they did, how they operated, how they spoke, what they put out there in the community. It made the rest of the community feel irrelevant.* And so, I just kind of got tired of waving that flag for a long time and just had to step back honestly to this day.

I, I only really stayed involved through our employee group because that was close to home, that was something I could do, but I haven't gone back to be more actively involved in any advocacy groups for LGBT community. Some of that is just because there's new leaders now, and I don't know a lot of them anymore, and so, I don't feel also like I need to. And there's, there's this great new leadership that's been emerging. It's younger, it's more diverse than it was when I was their age and they're getting things done. [Emphasis Added]

Here, Mateo describes the frustration he experienced as an LGBTQ person of color working with local mainstream organizations. Rather than fully including working people and people of color, Mateo argues that many of the organizations he was a part of only included people who did not fit a wealthy, white, slim, and abled ideal as “tokens.” There was no “meaningful representation of poor, LGBT people or minorities, disabled, elderly” people in the organizations that he used to be a part of. This left Mateo extremely aggravated with mainstream organizations because he felt that they were isolationist and exclusive. Mateo also says that there's a “great new leadership emerging” that is more diverse and more fully inclusive. This is a reference to the leaders in Arizona who have facilitated the new inter- and intra-movement coalitions in the state in recent years. However, Mateo also makes it clear that history of exclusion and the tokenization of LGBTQ people of color and low-income people is a continual barrier to inter- and intra-community relationship building.

In Washington State some of the activists interviewed, particularly those who hold marginalized identities, also talked about how the tokenization of their identities in coalitions encouraged them to leave the advocacy arena altogether and to regret their participation in episodic rights campaigns and in inter- and intra-movement coalitions. For instance, Priya is an LGBTQ person of color who worked with both mainstream lesbian and gay organizations and religious institutions during the campaign. She decided to leave mainstream advocacy as a result of the ostracization of the interests of communities of color that she witnessed after participating in the marriage equality coalition. Priya described her experience with mainstream coalition building in Washington in this way:

Priya: [The marriage equality campaign] was an experience, I came out of it being like I never want to do political organizing again. The kind of urgency and also just the nature of the campaign, the urgency behind everything is like, I need this today, I need a million dollars by the end of the week, I need a couple from Vancouver, Washington and then their picture by 3PM today and a quote, *and let's put this brown face in and that brown face in just so we have brown faces....*

And afterwards the relationships you are building in order to get support from communities of color to really stand up in front of their community and say I vote for this, I want this you know? And after the campaign what's the plan? Are you going to keep, are you going to continue this relationship? *No. You just want to be able to take a picture of this brown person speaking in front of a brown audience, voting for marriage equality.*

Afterwards you don't care about what's actually effecting this community and what they need and you're not going to stand up in front of your community and say, support the immigrant, you know the next immigrant rights issue. They're not doing it. But you want these folks to do it for you.... It was just like, I'm still bitter, I still have this kind of anger with me and it's just like knowing there's nothing genuine about it and feeling like I don't want to go, I don't want to actually do this. [Emphasis Added]

Priya vehemently argues that the mainstream marriage equality coalition in Washington failed to build lasting, genuine relationships between most organizations involved in advocacy. According to Priya, most of the relationships built were superficial and also harmful because they involved

the tokenization of communities of color. What Priya calls the “urgency” behind the rights episode made her feel exploited by, rather than genuinely supported by, the organizations involved in the campaign. This significantly harmed her relationship with the organizations. In this way, coalitions can function as a double-edged sword: both expanding movements and crippling their formation by simultaneously reinforcing similarity and difference.

Issue Fracture

In addition to coalition fissures due to funding discrepancies and tokenization, interviewees argued that genuine policy and political differences divided inter- and intra-movement coalitions as well. Because of these differences, coalitions sometimes will not emerge without a new political threat as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, which delve into how rights episodes can initiate coalition formation. Issue fracture occurs because mainstream and marginalized organizations are involved in different political projects that do not align unless they are forced to by the onset of an explosive rights advocacy moment – or a rights episode. Some mainstream groups are primarily concerned with obtaining rights associated with state recognition of minority subject positions such as marriage equality, a pathway to citizenship for some undocumented immigrants, and other discrete rights outcomes that are easily translatable to prospective funders. If these organizations do support policies designed to combat police brutality, economic inequality, or immigration detention, these are often framed as secondary concerns or they are discussed generally in ways that marginalized organizations often feel are not clearly connected to advocacy. Many marginalized organizations, on the other hand, are primarily focused on eradicating immigration detention, prison abolition, police brutality, and income inequality and can support political advocacy around these issues in ways that are

perceived as disruptive and, thus, make some mainstream organizations and those who fund mainstream advocacy efforts uncomfortable.

The political divisions between mainstream and marginalized groups can create tensions between organizations that are a part of inter- and intra-movement coalitions. For example, in both Washington and Arizona interviewees described coalition fissures around the Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill that was introduced in Congress in 2013, passed in the Senate, and failed to pass in the House of Representatives, as well as the executive actions President Obama issued in response to the bill's failure in the November of 2014 (Cházaro 2016; Parker 2014; Parker and Martin 2013; Johnson 2009). Mainstream and marginalized immigrant, labor, and LGBTQ organizations divided over these efforts at the national and local level. Mainstream organizations supported both the 2013 bill and President Obama's executive actions, arguing that they were good ways to begin reforming the immigration system in the United States. Marginalized organizations, on the other hand, argued that, although both efforts aided some immigrants, they also furthered the marginalization and criminalization of others. Advocates with marginalized groups argued that once immigration reform passed, the momentum behind the reform efforts would stall,⁸ limiting opportunities to aid immigrants left behind at the same time that state officials furthered their criminalization in carrying out the terms of the legislation and executive actions. For these reasons and others, many marginalized organizations opposed the immigration reform efforts in 2013 and 2014.

Amanda is a leader who works primarily with mainstream organizations in Arizona. In the below exchange she describes how tension emerged between mainstream and marginalized

⁸ Chapters 2 and 3 described how winning rights like Comprehensive Immigration Reform can stall other advocacy efforts and harm marginalized communities through the fallout associated with episodic rights campaigns.

groups as a result of this division over Comprehensive Immigration Reform and delayed executive action during the 2014 get out the vote effort:

Amanda: [A marginalized migrant community organization] ran a Boycott the Vote campaign last year and that caused a lot of angst. Yeah. I mean I can understand where they're coming from, but it definitely caused a little bit of a blowup.

Interviewer: Yeah. What was the Boycott the Vote campaign?

Amanda: Well, they just, you know, they were telling their members and sending out emails like "don't vote," you know, "show Democrats what," you know. Because Obama had promised executive action and didn't do executive action before the election I think in his attempt to sort of save the Senate which was misguided.

And there was this sort of national idea that Latinxs should not vote in 2014 so that Democrats would see that you have to, we're not just going to continue to vote for you when you do nothing for us because you say you're going to do something for us. You have to really take action, otherwise, we're not going to vote for you, and so they were telling people to stay home.

And we're like okay we can understand the argument; however, we've been working for decades to try to engage these people. We've been working our asses off and like this is about local and state level elections, it's not about Obama. You know, it's not even a presidential election year and you're telling people to stay home when we're busting our asses to get people to come out. And so, it was, there was the tension there.

Amanda expresses frustration over a local marginalized group's campaign to "Boycott the Vote" in 2014. Prior to 2014, Latinx, migrant, and labor community activists had worked for years to build a base of Latinx voters in Arizona. Many interviewees described Get Out the Vote efforts driven by young undocumented people as particularly powerful base-building moments. Many activists within the undocumented youth community in Arizona were activated through protests of SB 1070, the state's 2010 anti-immigrant law, which enables law enforcement officers to question individuals they suspect are undocumented about their immigration status. Critics of SB 1070 argue that the law has increased racial profiling in Arizona. By 2014, some marginalized

organizations that represented Arizona's immigrant and Latinx community were angered by the lack of movement at the federal level on immigration reform and the continued detention and deportation of undocumented people despite a flurry of pro-immigrant organizing at the local level in Arizona. They were also frustrated with local advocacy that focused on Get out the Vote efforts and did not connect the immigrant workers and LGBTQ immigrants behind these efforts to immigration reform policymakers.

As a result, one marginalized organization in Arizona, along with other grassroots organizations across the United States called for a Boycott of the Vote in 2014. Below is a statement from one of the leaders in Arizona who supported the boycott campaign that was included in a coalition press release:

Obama's latest political game demonstrates clearly that the Democratic Party is choosing to fight for another potentially fruitless term in office at the expense of our lives and families. In Arizona, we have learned that our community's bravery far surpasses that of any elected official. With the announcement of the President's cowardly delay on immigration relief, our support for the Democratic Party cannot be taken for granted. Without affirmative relief for our families, we are calling for a boycott of the vote. We cannot support a party that is destroying our families. (*National Day Laborer Organizing Network* 2014).

Amanda says that this campaign created a great deal of tension between mainstream and marginalized organizations involved in immigration and LGBTQ advocacy, fracturing coalition partnerships by calling attention to divisions based on political differences within organizing spaces at the local and national level. These divisions were especially pronounced in Arizona as some local advocates grew frustrated with Get Out the Vote efforts. Following the passage of SB 1070, local immigrant, migrant, and economic justice activists started organizing Get Out the Vote campaigns in order to elect officials who could reign in what many activists considered an extremist politics that had taken over Arizona. Yet, at the federal level, an effort to pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform stalled in 2013 as a fragile coalition of Democratic and

Republican legislators fractured around the legislation. This angered many local activists in Arizona who felt that their participation in Get Out the Vote efforts effectively translated into a bottom-up mandate, calling on federal politicians to reform the US immigration system. The Boycott the Vote campaign was the local arm of a national coalition effort to enforce this mandate, led by marginalized LGBTQ and migrant justice organizations. These advocates sought to force the Executive Branch of the United States to enact immigration relief without Congress after the failure and shortcomings of the 2013 Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill.

In late November of 2014, shortly after the 2014 election and marginalized organizations' coalition-based efforts to force executive action described in the above press release, the Obama administration issued executive orders that expanded the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) programs and the created the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.⁹ Once again, marginalized migrant and LGBTQ organizations quickly criticized both executive actions, which implemented some of the measures promised by the failed 2013 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill. Organizations that were part of the marginalized coalition argued that the executive actions failed to cover queer families, immigrants without children, and immigrants with criminal records – broadly interpreted to include those charged with misdemeanors based on the text of the DACA expansion and DAPA executive orders (Cházaro 2016; Bacon 2013, 2015; #NotIMore 2014). This is indicative of a continued divide between marginalized and mainstream groups over

⁹ Both the expanded DACA and DAPA programs were never fully implemented. Republican-led states challenged the programs' constitutionality in *Texas v. United States*, an appellate case that declared the immigration relief offered by the programs unconstitutional. Shortly before the 2016 election of Donald Trump, the US Supreme Court, left with an even number of justices after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, deadlocked over the case, preventing the Obama administration from implementing these programs before the end of his term (*Texas v. United States* 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); *American Immigration Council* 2016; Liptak and Shear 2016).

immigration policy and the political tactics necessary to accomplish movement goals.

In Washington State, interviewees described how partnerships between mainstream and marginalized organizations fractured over Comprehensive Immigration Reform as well. Below, Camila, an advocate with the coalition of marginalized organizations that opposed Comprehensive Immigration Reform describes this division. In explaining how mainstream and marginalized groups can divide, Camila references the Non-Profit Industrial Complex critique of mainstream organizations and Democratic Party backed coalitions that she believes exclude input from marginalized communities:

Camila: I learned because I worked with different community organizations, non-profits, and I learned how they are funded and I learned that the main foundations that actually had the money to pay for these were actually, working really closely with the Democratic Party, so that's why I understood that when a bill came down they had already been in agreement with the Democrats to do it the way Democrats wanted the bill, not the other way around – you know, having organizations have a say on exactly how the bill should be.

Democrats would bring a bill just saying, OK we have stakeholders here, they agree, let's go with the bill. And people, undocumented people were never considered to give any input. *We were told to be quite to hide, to never reveal our identities.* So we didn't for the longest time, we didn't. Until we saw more and more of these bills that never made it, but every time they were introduced again they were getting worse. *It was not about recognizing people's lives it was more about businesses.* So the more I read, the more bills came down, the more we realize well, you know the Democrats are really just, the people they are calling are business people they are not calling us.

So that's why, by 2010, I set up [local marginalized migrant organization] and I started helping with other communities and we built another campaign besides Comprehensive Immigration Reform, they call it CIR. [Emphasis Added]

In this interview excerpt, Camila criticizes the top-down way that mainstream organizations that form campaign coalitions in response to legislation issued by elites operate. According to Camila, these groups are not connected with marginalized communities. They do not form policies that are driven by the experiences of those who are most impacted by the outdated

immigration system that exists in the United States.

Camila and other interviewees argued that the decision to depart from mainstream organizations over Comprehensive Immigration Reform was driven by a desire to create bottom-up immigration reform in the United States, where undocumented immigrants and the organizations that represent them are included as the leaders of immigration policymaking rather than as token constituents used to support policies created by elites. For leaders and advocates that work with marginalized communities, the exclusion of the people most impacted by policy is part of the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, where wealthy funders take the lead and create policies that never challenge systemic inequities. Mainstream organizations that are part of the Non-Profit Industrial Complex receive funding from wealthy donors and push policy proposals that come from elites who hold political power while smaller, marginalized organizations that are excluded from this system and the policymaking decisions produced through it receive funding from community members and push policy proposals that come from engaged organization members. The division between marginalized and mainstream organizations over Comprehensive Immigration Reform is an indication that these organizations are often working in divergent political projects that tear away at coalition development or result in the creation of superficial coalitions between the mainstream and marginalized at opportune episodic rights moments.

In addition to divisions between mainstream and marginalized organizations over policies and political preferences like Comprehensive Immigration Reform, interviewees also discussed coalition fissures between LGBTQ, labor, immigrant organizations over group priorities. While there were some rights-based issues that resulted in large inter- and intra-community coalitions like marriage equality in Washington State and the successful campaign to

stop SB 1062 in Arizona, there are still issues that do not involve large cross-community coalitions because movement organizations do not see them as overlapping issues that are part of the same struggle. Interviewees in Arizona, for instance, argued that one of the issues LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant communities divided over was support for combating human rights abuses carried out by Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Interviewees said while some individuals within LGBTQ organizations supported efforts to thwart Sheriff Joe Arpaio, widespread support within by these organizations was lacking. In the below interview excerpt, Arizona State Senator Steve Gallardo describes the absence of LGBTQ organizations in immigrant community efforts to undermine Sheriff Joe Arpaio:

Interviewer: Have you seen any LGBT support, with that, with the various legal actions against him and protests?

Senator Gallardo: They're very silent [said quietly]...

Interviewer: Silent. Yeah?

Senator Gallardo: None... In terms of the LGBT community? Publicly no. I think if you, if you talk to many within the LGBT community, many of the more progressive side, I mean they, they would agree that, Sheriff Joe Arpaio has to go. Cause his time is done and it's time to change and they probably don't agree with his policies, but in the greater LGBT community, it's not being discussed.

Interviewer: Why don't you think that is? Do you think it's lack of outreach within the Arpaio camp or you think it's more of education needed within the LGBT community or is it combination of both possibly? Or something different?

Senator Gallardo: Both. Both. Both. I think more, I think probably more in the LGBT [community]. I think the focus, the focus in the LGBT community has been predominantly marriage. And it looks like that is, hopefully, a fight in the past and we can move onto other challenges, but that's been the focus of the LGBT community. It really has....

Let me put it this way, the LGBT community is going through the same growing pains as the Latinx community has gone through, in terms of understanding the importance of coalition building. It took a while before we said, "You know what, we can't fight these fights alone. We can't win these battles. We need, we need to bring other people under our umbrella and work with others to defeat...."

And I think the LGBT community is kind of going through the same growing pains [now], they can't, they can't fight alone. They can't or, it's difficult to win on the issue of equality without having other people with you and fighting for it.

State Senator Gallardo is in a unique position for understanding the complexities of inter- and intra-movement coalition building in Arizona. He has been a firm advocate for the Latinx, immigrant, and labor communities for over 15 years. In 2014, during the height of the campaign to stop SB 1062 (the state-based religious freedom bill that would have allowed businesses to refuse to serve LGBTQ people), State Senator Gallardo came out as gay. This placed him in direct conversation with LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant organizations involved in coalition building in Arizona. State Senator Gallardo argues that LGBTQ organizations have been largely absent in efforts to fight Joe Arpaio. Other interviews described this absence as the byproduct of the historic exclusion of LGBTQ people of color from organizational spaces that are controlled predominately by white cisgender gay men who have narrow political movement visions that do not encompass anti-racist organizing or issues. However, State Senator Gallardo also contends that this environment is shifting, in large part because of new political threats to the LGBTQ community in the aftermath of the legalization of marriage equality across the United States. State Senator Gallardo argues that LGBTQ organizations are now working more directly with immigrant and Latinx organizations because they are realizing that they will be unable to pass anti-discrimination legislation that is inclusive of LGBTQ people without other minority communities and the organizations that represent them. This is also indicative of a fragile coalition between these groups, where groups align for strategic political reasons rather than because they see other community issues as intertwined with their own.

The lack of a cross-community coalition around immigrant struggles to thwart Joe Arpaio is an example of the continued exclusion of LGBTQ people of color and immigrants within

LGBTQ organization spaces. Alejandro, an LGBTQ immigrant who is active in an organization that led the struggle against Arpaio corroborated this continued exclusion in his interview:

Interviewer: My next question is, what do you think are some of the biggest problems impacting the LGBTQ community in Arizona?

Alejandro: I think one of the biggest things is the lack of help from the bigger LGBTQ community. Especially like the white LGBT community. I don't know, I think there is like a disconnect between the brown GLBTQ and the white GLBTQ people around politics and around like human rights and all that so it makes it harder.

Interviewer: What do you think that disconnect is, like is it with respect to the issues that they focus on?

Alejandro: Yes, yes. Yeah that's one of the biggest things, but I think yeah that is not a, I hear it from some of my friends that are white they say, "well, that doesn't affect me because I am not undocumented" or it seems like more like an apathy.... It's some kind of like they don't care as long as they don't be personally effected by it.

Alejandro and other interviewees in both Washington State and Arizona described the continued division between LGBTQ organizations, which they argued were predominately concerned with white LGBTQ issues like marriage equality, and LGBTQ people of color and immigrants. For this reason, Alejandro contends that there is "apathy" towards issues that matter to people of color within many LGBTQ spaces. This is an indication of continued divisions between some LGBTQ and immigrant groups on core issues, even in the aftermath of coalitions created around marriage equality and expanding anti-discrimination laws to include sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. There continues to be tension when it comes mobilizing organizations in support of issues that impact those at the margins of their communities whose issues are often excluded in the service of narrow organizational visions that center on more advantaged community members.

Conclusion

This chapter describes how inter- and intra- movement coalitions tend to both expand and divide and, in doing so, can simultaneously build and fracture movement mobilization. In Washington State and Arizona, rights-based LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant movements often grew through the construction of a collective narratives. Advocates often accomplished this by sharing their personal stories through in-depth conversations with organizations and people who became coalition partners, by constructing a common cross-community political movement past, and by calling attention to common opponents and political threats. However, the coalitions that formed were also often fragile, superficial, and easily divided because the factors that contributed to their formation existed in the same space as factors that drove coalitions apart. At the same time that coalitions united, they often divided as funding disproportionately went to mainstream organizations, as marginalized organizations and their members were tokenized in the service of coalition goals, and as coalition partners disagreed over policy preferences that were indicative of communities engaged in divergent political projects.

Because coalitions can sometimes grow and fracture at the same time, people who have expansionist understandings of movement-building that move beyond narrow organizational missions that center on the most advantaged members of minority communities are important for political movement formation. These individuals are people like State Senator Steve Gallardo, who work within both mainstream and marginalized organization spaces. They can sometimes help cross-community groups see how they relate to other minority communities and communicate why it is strategically important for seemingly divergent communities to work together in inter- and intra- movement coalitions. In this way, people who communicate an expansionist view of political movements can operate as translators within and across disparate

communities, thwarting the containing effects of movement building. The next chapter describes the importance of these “intersectional translators” in coalition formation.

CHAPTER 5

Intersectional Translators: Thwarting the Paradoxical Effects of Movement Formation

Nicolas (AZ): Well, when [our queer migrant organization] started it wasn't like, "Oh here we are, we are immigrants and now we're like a thing." There needed to be a lot of building up of the narrative and, also, a lot of creating the space because the space wasn't there before for people to feel safe to come out... And so, during that time a lot of what I did was to be more intentional about putting my story out there and every time that I shared my story making sure I tell people that I was gay. And for some – I mean there were some people that knew – but now it was like I want to let everybody know and I really want to put it to the forefront to see what people's reactions are going to be and all of that stuff. Because I also knew people—I knew friends that didn't feel comfortable even within our own groups.

Tom (WA): I feel like there a certain number of people...who feel it all the way personally on a very pure social justice belief that they are all intertwined, but I would say that they are kind of the minority and that a lot of people who lead organizations aren't necessarily, don't share the same broad perspective of social justice, but know they want to win and in order to do so they have to build relationships with coalition partners and some of that requires going outside of their comfort zone to support issues that may not fit exactly, squarely within their world-view.

Introduction

Tom is the former leader of a mainstream LGBTQ organization in Washington State. During his interview, Tom mentioned several organization leaders in Washington, who straddled the line between mainstream and marginalized movement communities and played an important role in thwarting the paradoxical effects of political movement formation. Tom felt these people "saw the connections" between different political movements and helped form sustained coalitions by demonstrating why it was strategically important to form and maintain expansionist alliances across divergent minority communities. For Tom, these individuals were tactically important because they helped coalition partners understand why having a commitment to the movement was in their interests. What role do these people play in the formation of rights-based

movement coalitions?

In this chapter, I develop the concept *intersectional translators* to explain how certain leaders pushed back against the containing effects of political movement formation in some circumstances in Washington State and Arizona. Multiple interviewees described important leaders who contributed to expansionist movement formation, but did not have a name for them. Drawing from interviews with organization leaders and advocates in both states, I describe these leaders as intersectional translators who helped thwart the containing effects of movement formation in some contexts (1) by demonstrating for mainstream and marginalized coalition partners how adopting an expansionist view of movement was strategically in their interests, and (2) by calling attention to the fact that inadequate commitment to the most marginal is a failure to advance justice. The *expansionist view* that intersectional translators can communicate is a commitment to continual inter- and intra-movement coalition building that often grows out of rights episodes and other discrete political campaigns. Mainstream and marginalized organizations can adopt this expansionist view when they realize that it is strategically in their interest to do so (1) to be prepared for new, often unforeseen, short-term political threats and opportunities; (2) to build a pool of leaders over time; and (3) to sustain and strengthen coalitions that aid individual organizations and other coalition partners in achieving political movement advances that matter to the communities they serve and to funders. In this way, an expansionist view is not in tension with pragmatic decisions, but, rather, involves organizational preparation for new political threats. Intersectional translators can help organizations adopt an expansionist view by encouraging them to make short-term decisions with an eye towards movement expansion and by pointing out how some seemingly egalitarian short-term choices can be harmful for organizational and coalitional longevity.

My understanding of intersectional translators draws heavily from Sally Merry's (2006) use of translation in *Human Rights & Gender Violence*, which describes how human rights are adopted in local, grassroots contexts. Merry (2006) argues that certain people function as "translators" in rights advocacy. These people translate grievances into a rights language based on frameworks constructed by transnational elites (such as women's right to inherit), that translators then teach local actors to use when speaking with reporters and in advocating to end collective grievances. Like the translators in Merry's (2006) study, the intersectional translators I interviewed for this project would translate a boundary-pushing framework across the organizations and individuals involved in political movement coalition building. In doing so, intersectional translators sometimes helped thwart coalition fragmentation and movement contraction after discrete campaigns. Intersectional translators did this by explaining to both mainstream and marginalized coalition partners why adopting an expansionist view of political movement was strategically important. This expansionist re-imagining of movement can center long-term and broader political goals, like the abolition of immigration detention. Organizations that adopt an expansionist view often understand discrete rights wins as smaller, short-term advances that further the realization of broader social and political changes that disrupt systemic oppression.

Merry (2006) uses translation to describe how grievances are represented within movements composed of "a coalition of groups" with different social layers ranging from "poor to rich, lower class to social elite, rooted to transnationally mobile, minority to dominant group, and uneducated to educated" (Merry 2006: 192-194). Like Merry, (2006) this study is similarly concerned with layered coalitional dynamics (i.e., inter- and intra-movement coalitions) that are inclusive of broad spread of individuals: from mainstream to marginalized, wealthy to working

class, straight to LGBTQ, and citizen to undocumented. For Merry (2006), translators are people who help those who are part of one social layer frame their collective grievances in the language of others so that the multiple layers of groups that compose a movement can understand one another's perspectives (Merry 2006: 194). This concept is also similar to "norm brokerage," which is used by transnational movement scholars to describe how movement advocates mediate between international and domestic norms, as, for example, domestic LGBTQ groups do when working with international organizations and actors to advocate LGBTQ issues within hostile domestic environments (Ayoub 2016; Tarrow 2005).

In LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant coalition construction in Washington State, there were certain people who, like Merry's translators, went between mainstream and marginalized organizations, explaining why it was in the interest of each organization and the interest of the movements that they cared about to work together in coalitions and to adopt an expansionist of the movement while strategically engaging in short-term campaigns. In some cases, these people expanded the array of issues that movement organizations advocated on behalf of and expanded partnerships. I intervene in scholarship on rights-based movement coalitions by constructing these intersectional actors as translators that can assist in the formation of expansionist political movements. In doing so, translators create opportunities for individuals and groups to see how their own struggles against state violence and state power are intertwined.

This chapter will describe how intersectional translators can sometimes help thwart the paradoxical effects of movement formation in three parts. The first section describes how the concept "intersectional translators" enhances law and society scholarship on right-based movements by using intersectionality theory to understand the process of intersectional translation that occurs in coalition formation. The second section begins my analysis of select

interviews with intersectional translators in Washington State and Arizona by describing the various barriers within political movements that limit the formation of expansionist movements. The final section delineates how intersectional translators sometimes overcome the limits discussed in the second section by translating for mainstream and marginalized movement constituents why political movement expansion is in their interests. I argue that intersectional translators push back against movement contraction in some circumstances (1) through participating in and intentionally using mainstream rights campaigns as short-term advances that serve expansionist goals; (2) through the construction of new groups and subgroups that highlight the tactical importance of intersectionally marginalized people within existing movement communities; and (3) through educational outreach and in-depth conversations between translators and the various mainstream and marginalized organizations at the center of this study. The final section explains how, through each of these mechanisms, intersectional translators can sometimes thwart movement contraction by translating the strategic importance of committing to political movement expansion across all coalition partners.

I. Understanding Intersectional Translation Processes in Rights-Based Movements

In examining how intersectional translators can thwart the containing effects of movement formation, I draw from intersectionality theory. At its core, intersectionality theory exposes how “single axis thinking undermines legal thinking, disciplinary knowledge production, and struggles for social justice” (Cho et al. 2013:787). Intersectionality as a concept has multiple meanings. Many scholars have used it in order to make visible the struggles of those who are intersectionally marginalized and to reveal how grassroots organizations adopt strategies that transcend unidimensional struggles for change (Hancock 2016; Cho et al. 2013; Crenshaw

1991; Collins 1989; Crenshaw 1989). Intersectionality scholars also are often critical of institutional legal strategies for social change. These argue that legal rights struggles can force groups into individualistic identities that reify rather than challenge institutional inequalities and contribute to the systematic deployment of state violence against people who hold identities that are legally constructed as “undeserving” (Reddy 2011; Albiston 2009; Kandaswamy 2008; Bagenstos 2006; Brown 1995). Many contemporary critical race, queer studies, and feminist scholars who employ intersectionality argue that the pursuit of legal rights as isolated wins marginalizes the interests of bisexual identified individuals, people of color, and queer and trans people by limiting the imaginations of those who advocate for social change within these communities (Murib 2015, Chávez 2013; Stone 2012:chapter 6; Spade 2015; Puar 2011; Eng 2010; Puar 2007; Strolovitch 2007; Duggan 2003; Yoshino 2000; Harris 1993; Crenshaw 1991).

In addition to understanding intersectionality by examining how intersectionally marginalized people (e.g., people who hold queer and undocumented migrant subject positions) can be excluded through the decisions of movement advocates, intersectionality also describes how intersecting structural hierarchies constrain political movement formation. In the Washington State and Arizona political networks described in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, intersecting structural hierarchies often delimit the set of opportunities and constraints available for movement actors at any given time. For instance, in Arizona, political institutions are largely controlled by politicians who view undocumented people and queer and trans people as social “outsiders” who are part of the underclasses reinforced by the state’s southern traditionalist, law and order political ethos. Within this context, politicians passed laws designed to target these communities, like SB 1070, which increased the policing of undocumented immigrant communities in the state, and SB 1396, which prohibited public schools from teaching non-

heterosexuality in the classroom. In the Arizona political network, these laws created intersecting structural hierarchies that limited political opportunities for movement organizations by making it politically impractical to pursue broader policies designed to aid undocumented immigrant and trans and queer communities, like the elimination of immigration detention. For this reason, minority communities have formed a political movement in the state largely by focusing first on combatting harmful laws and pursuing smaller advances like passing a municipal ID for undocumented immigrants in Phoenix or a statewide ballot initiative that mandates paid sick leave. Movement advocates do not understand these short-term strategies as in tension with broader policy goals. Instead, they understand these short-term strategies as part of an iterated process of building an expansionist movement that may be able to achieve broader goals, like the elimination of immigration detention, in the future.

The understanding of *intersectionality* that I adopt in this chapter incorporates both the ways in which intersectionally marginalized subject positions can be excluded from political advocacy and the ways in which intersecting structural hierarchies delimit the boundaries of movement formation. Building off this understanding of intersectionality, I examine the experiences of certain movement actors who act as intersectional translators by communicating to mainstream and marginalized organizations how they can strategically and pragmatically build expansionist movements within the intersecting structural hierarchies that exist in a given state context. In other words, how translators communicate an expansionist view of movement within both organizational and structural constraints. In doing so, intersectional translators engage in an “intersectionality as practice” that can push back against the ossification and fragmentation that sometimes happens in the aftermath of rights episodes.

Studying intersectionality as practice in the manner described above is often difficult

because there continues to be a divide between academic and activist understandings of what intersectionality is and whether it can be effectively utilized by political movements. Because of the divide between intersectionality as an abstract ideal versus as part of the subject positions and structural constraints that characterize on-the-ground movement formation, some intersectionality theorists contend that intersectionality can never be fully employed in real world political movement settings. For these scholars, the concept is often diluted in meaning when utilized by some activists who understand intersectionality through representation alone rather than the practice of building movements. Due to this dilemma, some scholars argue that there is value in keeping intersectionality as an abstract ideal within the “politics of not yet” or the politics of “just out of reach” (Luft and Ward 2009: 33). Indeed, for many movement advocates, intersectionality has become a meaningless buzzword that is limited to calls for broader representation in marginalized organizations rather. Movement actors who use intersectionality in this way often use it as a replacement for “diversity” or “multiculturalism” and argue that intersectionality is achieved whenever people who have historically been intersectionally marginalized are represented on organization boards, in task forces, and in coalitions. This understanding diverges significantly from how many mainstream and marginalized movement actors interviewed for this study employed the idea of intersectionality as a practice while translating pragmatic strategies within intersecting structural hierarchies (Crenshaw 1989).

Despite the difficulties associated with using intersectionality to understand political movements, some of which are described above, some scholars are beginning to actively engage with real world applications of intersectionality (see e.g., Spade 2015; Tungohan 2015; Montoya 2013; Doetsch-Kidder 2012; Weldon 2011; Townsend-Bell 2011; Strolovitch 2007; Ernst 2007; Kurtz 2002; Cohen 1999). However, most of this scholarship still studies intersectionality at an

abstract level rather than through the lens of actual political movement actors who grapple with intersectionality as practice in their advocacy and political movement organizing. I situate the practice of intersectionality within the real experiences of people who enact the idea in political movement formation. In doing so, I move beyond the subject position critique focus of many intersectionality scholars. Instead, I examine the extent to which the organization leaders and advocates in this study employ *intersectional translation* within political movement coalitions to thwart movement fragmentation. Intersectional translation occurs when certain movement leaders translate the strategic importance of engaging in expansionist movement formation for both mainstream and marginalize organization leaders and advocates. Expansionist political movement formation, or an expansionist view of movement, is a commitment to continual inter- and intra-movement coalition building that often grows out of rights episodes and other short-term political campaigns. Intersectional translators communicate an expansionist view by explaining that adopting it often helps organizations prepare for political threats before they arise, grow a pool of movement leaders, and sustain coalitions that can aid in the achievement of both the short-term advances that funders and minority communities desire and broader movement goals.

This study builds upon the theoretical insights developed by intersectionality scholars who understand intersectionality as practice, applying these insights to an empirical study of coalition formation in real world political movement settings. I focus on how intersectional translators explain the strategic importance of adopting an expansionist view of the movement across the layers of organizations that compose political movement coalitions. Consequently, this study follows the path of intersectional interest group scholars like Strolovitch (2007) who examine the potential and limits of coalitional politics at the national level (Strolovitch 2007:

chapter 6). In order to accomplish this, I focus on the unique position of intersectional translators within marginalized and mainstream movement organizations in two state contexts (Washington State and Arizona) and develop a new theoretical concept born out of interviews with organization leaders and advocates. I argue that certain people engaged in inter and intra-movement coalition building function as intersectional translators: people who translate a view of expanding political movement for other movement actors.

II. Barriers that Inhibit the Adoption of Expansionist Movement Formation

Before explaining how intersectional translation is strategically important in political movement formation, it is helpful to understand some of the barriers that can the formation of expansionist political movements difficult. These barriers are interrelated and intertwined. This section will address two primary barriers that appeared over the course of my interviews and participant observations: (1) limitations derived from interpreting organizational missions in narrow ways, and (2) the historic exclusion of what Strolovitch (2007) calls “intersectionally disadvantaged subgroups” within movement organizations. Disadvantaged subgroups are composed of intersectionally marginalized people who hold intersectional subject positions within organizations. For example, people who engage in advocacy as LGBTQ, undocumented, and Latinx are members of a disadvantaged subgroup versus people who engage in advocacy as LGBTQ but not otherwise as members of another minority community. Understanding these barriers within and across mainstream and marginalized organizations serves as a window for understanding the limits of coalitional politics. According to previous studies on coalition politics, “when organizations work together on policy issues, many of the challenges and dynamics within individual organizations that engender low levels of activity on intersectionally

disadvantaged issues are replicated within the coalition” (Strolovitch 2007: 192; Levi and Murphy 2006). As a result, coalitions often divide and fracture due to the same barriers to intersectionality as practice that plague movement organizations.

How organizational structures and missions are interpreted can serve as a barrier for expansionist movement building. According to many interviewees, there are some types of organizations that can operate in a top-down manner where decisions about which issues to focus on are made by a small board of directors without input from membership (see also, Spade 2015, Arkles et al. 2010). These organizations may distribute surveys and ask members on email listservs to identify which issues matter the most to them, but there are rarely opportunities for members to help shape what appears on a survey or plans to fight for issues. As delineated in Chapter 4, some interviewees directly criticized top-down organizational structures and protested them by forming their own grassroots, community-driven groups and campaigns. Recall, this was the reason some interviewees decided to oppose Comprehensive Immigration Reform, and form a separate coalition of organizations to advocate for immigration reform. This top-down structure can exist within both mainstream and marginalized organizations. Movement contraction often occurs when an organization’s mission is interpreted in a way that allows the organization to refuse to engage in coalition formation with other minority communities. This happens, for example, when LGBTQ organizations advocate for marriage equality, expanding anti-discrimination protections, or trans-inclusive healthcare, but refuse to participate in immigration reform campaigns or when immigrant rights groups advocate for comprehensive immigration reform but refrain from participating in what they see as LGBTQ-community specific campaign coalitions. As the below sections will show, intersectional translators can combat movement contraction by explaining to an organization that does not see the utility of

working with other minority communities that doing so can help the organization achieve its own goals and better serve community members. When organizations contract movement formation by refusing to work with other minority communities, organization leadership and the issues organizations advocate on behalf of are often reflective of the most advantaged members (Strolovitch 2007, Cohen 1999). Intersectional translators interviewed for this study described this barrier by referencing the “limited” organizational leaders who would not join some rights campaign coalitions that centered what these leaders perceived as issues that mattered to other minority communities alone.

Some movement organizations that claim to represent an entire minority community have also faced critiques for failing to include intersectionally marginalized people in their campaigns. In recent years, some organizations have experienced these community-led critiques for their continued exclusion of intersectionally marginalized subgroups within political movement coalitions. Activists and academics have long criticized many national LGBTQ organizations for centering the interests of white cisgender gay men and ignoring those of LGBTQ women, people of color, and immigrants (see e.g., Arkles et al. 2010; Gan 2007; Vaid 1995). For instance, in 2015, the national LGBTQ organization, Human Rights Campaign, made news headlines when an internal report conducted by *The Pipeline Project* found that the group was a “judgmental,” “exclusionary,” “sexist,” and “homogenous” “white men’s club” (Geidner 2015). In the report, individuals interviewed argued that “people of color, transgender people, lower-socioeconomic people face institutionalized discrimination” within the Human Rights Campaign that results in the lower salaries and lack of promotion into leadership roles (Geidner 2015).

When a national LGBTQ organization like the Human Rights Campaign earns a reputation as an exclusive entity, this reputation shapes how community members perceive local

affiliate organizations. As a result, some interviewees who participated in this study used national examples to describe continued exclusion at the local level while other interviewees recalled direct experiences of discrimination within local groups that solidified the perception that such groups were most concerned with more advantaged community members. For example, in 2013, the national Human Rights Campaign, in coalition with national mainstream LGBTQ organizations and civil rights organizations, held a rally on the steps of the Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C. when the Court considered the first two marriage equality cases of the 2010s, *Hollingsworth v. Perry* and *United States v. Windsor*. A press release about the event focused on the representation of a diverse array of labor, civil rights, women's and immigrant community speakers in addition to LGBT community speakers at the rally. However, despite the diverse array of participants, undocumented speakers were told to edit their speeches to eliminate any reference to their documentation status or removed from the speaker roster and trans attendees were asked to lower the trans pride flag so that it was out of the view of television cameras. The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) ultimately issued an apology for editing the speeches and telling trans attendees to lower the trans pride flag (Brydum 2013). The event was supposed to be a moment when mainstream and marginalized LGBTQ groups worked in coalition to advance marriage equality. Instead, for some interviewees in this study it became another example of a history of exclusion of intersectionally marginalized subgroups within LGBTQ organization spaces.

Nicolas, an advocate in Arizona who works with the LGBTQ undocumented community remembered the incident years later and described how it harmed cross-community coalition building at the local level:

Interviewer: Did you see any support from any of the establishment LGBT groups or immigrant groups? The ones that have been around longer?

Nicolas: No, not any active support, not at that time yet, not around 2011/2010. I think that it wasn't until later that they were more vocal about this issue in certain areas, in certain ways. But at that time I think [local LGBTQ organization name redacted] was the only one that was reaching out.

Interviewer: When did you start to see more of the establishment support happen?

Nicolas: I can't say that I personally have. Just because I mean I know a lot of, here locally at least, I know a lot of the individuals that are part of the LGBT, what you would consider the LGBT groups...I think they were there. And I mean, just these other organizations, but I don't remember really when the establishment or even if the establishment LGBT groups really got fully behind some of the organizations that were working on immigration.

I think that generally there was like kind of talking points that people throw around about supporting each other and things like that, but there was few intentional meetings that I was a part of and maybe they happened without me, but I don't remember too much intentional partnerships...

I'm trying to remember what year it was, but there was a year when the national HRC held an event in DC and they did invite some members of the national Queer Undocumented Immigrant Project and I remember that one of our members, two of them that were scheduled to speak, they like cut them off, they told them that they were not going to be speaking anymore.

That was, I don't remember the details with that, but I think that was during a time when what we were doing around issue of immigration and the LGBT narrative I think it was something that was kind of bumping heads with whatever HRC had in mind nationally. *I think after that a lot of the local groups started to turn away from the establishment LGBT groups.* [Emphasis Added]

Nicolas's experience with the national HRC is an example of how the historic exclusion of intersectionally marginalized subgroups within movement organizations serves as a barrier to the realization of expansionist movement formation. HRC and mainstream LGBTQ groups had earned a reputation for centering the interests of white gay men by the time they held the marriage equality rally on the steps of the Supreme Court in 2013. Likely in response to criticisms that the organization was exclusive, HRC and other national LGBTQ groups invited other minority communities to participate in the marriage equality rally. However, the history of organizational

exclusion and marginalization plagued the event as HRC staff went around to the diverse array of groups represented and told them to eliminate speech and symbols that HRC staff felt deviated from the purpose of the event. This exclusion, in turn, had a rippling effect on local advocacy, solidifying the perception amongst LGBTQ migrant community organizations that they were not welcome in many LGBTQ movement campaigns and hindering future coalitions between LGBTQ groups and immigrant rights groups. As the next section will show, intersectional translators like Nicolas can help thwart the movement contraction described here by pointing out how it limits coalition formation and, thus, can prevent the formation of sustainable coalitions that can help achieve LGBTQ organization goals like marriage equality, or make it more difficult for coalitions to form around LGBTQ interests in the future, jeopardizing short-term advances. In this way, intersectional translators sometimes illuminate for organizations with a history of exclusion how adopting an expansionist view of movement building is strategically in their interests.

The exclusion of intersectionally marginalized subgroups within movement organizations is not limited to LGBTQ organizations. Interviewees in Arizona and Washington discussed similar experiences of organizational exclusion of LGBTQ people within immigrant organizations, labor unions, and other organizations that represent communities of color. These individuals related homophobic experiences they had in immigrant, labor, and community of color organizing spaces and described how these experiences were indicative of organizations that were not committed to forming expansionist political movements. Organizational exclusion is something that exists within all communities across mainstream and marginalized organizing spaces and continues to be a barrier that reinforces movement contraction. For example, in the below interview excerpt the leader of a mainstream LGBTQ organization in Washington State

describes how “siloed” conversations are on police brutality and hate crimes within organizations that represent communities of color and LGBTQ. In this excerpt, Olivia, the leader of a mainstream LGBTQ organization in Washington State discusses the limited interactions between the LGBTQ community and communities of color on policing issues overall and in a city task force created to address the rise in LGBTQ hate crimes at the local level:

Olivia: [T]here are some people of color on that, in that task force, but we’re not working on looking at hate crimes in general...and what’s happening with police. We’re certainly looking at police bias around LGBT [people] but not necessarily – I think the LGBT community could be way more vocal in terms of the Black Lives Matter movement.

Interviewer: So you don’t see that as something that’s within the conversation around what’s happening right now?

Olivia: I think they are very siloed conversations. Part of it is it’s hard to know from which community the lack of being able to work together is coming from. I think there’s still communities of color that are not as comfortable working with the LGBT community and there are still certainly barriers from within the LGBT community for understanding that racism is an important issue for us as well. You would think in a way that addressing hate crimes and bias within the police force could be bringing these different groups and constituencies together since we actually are part of each other’s community, but I haven’t seen that really yet become a more intentional movement.

Olivia is an intersectional translator who is the leader of a mainstream organization. She recognizes that LGBTQ people and communities of color “are part of each other’s community” and, during her interview, emphasized the importance of adopting an expansionist view of the movement. In this excerpt, Olivia says that LGBTQ communities and communities of color remain divided on policing issues in Washington State. There are some people of color in the LGBTQ hate crimes task force, but these individuals are primarily from LGBTQ organizations. Although, the fact that intersectionally marginalized people are included in an LGBTQ specific task force at all is a huge shift from the past. Yet, despite this change, on core policing issues, like those that the Black Lives Matter movement advocates on behalf of and other community of

color-led campaigns that address policing brutality, coalitions between groups are absent and conversations are “siloeed.” This coalition fragmentation harms movement building in both communities of color and LGBTQ communities because it hinders the realization of short-term goals, like creating solutions through a hate crimes task force that account for the intersectional array of experiences of violent hate crimes within the community.

III. The Strategic Importance of Intersectional Translation

Intersectional translation is strategically important in political movement formation because it can help thwart these barriers described above that exacerbate movement contraction. Intersectional translators create opportunities for intersectionality as practice by helping mainstream and marginalized coalition partners understand why it is strategically important to commit to expansionist political movement formation and pragmatically pursue discrete rights campaigns as short-term advances or means that service the realization of more broader, more systemic goals. Intersectional translators create the opportunity for intersectionality as practice by preventing political movements from ossifying around discrete issues. When translators intervene in mainstream and marginalized organization, they demonstrate to these organizations and individuals why it is strategically important to re-imagine wins as short-term advances. This, in turn, creates an opportunity for movement organizations and coalitions to form around new causes in the future and can help prevent coalition fragmentation.

This section examines how intersectional translators have pushed back against the paradoxical effects of political movement formation in limited circumstances in Washington State and Arizona. In the following pages, I focus on three mechanisms intersectional translators used in conveying the strategic importance of adopting an expansionist view of the movement

each state: (1) the tactical use of rights campaigns as resources or tools, (2) the creation of new groups and subgroups for intersectionally marginalized people, and (3) intersectional translator-led education campaigns such as “Double Coming Out” forums and other LGBTQ community of color events. According to my interviews, intersectional translators utilized each of these mechanisms to help mainstream and marginalized organization advocates see that committing to expansionist political movement formation was an important strategy that served their own interests.

Participation in Rights Campaigns

Strategically participating in short-term rights campaigns was, perhaps, one of the most controversial mechanisms intersectional translators used to communicate the tactical importance of adopting an expansionist view within the layers of LGBTQ, immigrant, and community of color organizations that often make up inter- and intra-movement coalitions. Interviewees were sometimes divided over the utility of working within rights campaigns. Some interviewees argued that rights campaigns did not assist in the formation expansionist movements since rights campaigns form around discrete advocacy moments that ossify around a win and then dissipate. However, interviewees who served as intersectional translators across mainstream and marginalized organizations saw rights campaigns as opportunities to help coalition partners understand these advocacy moments as possible short-term advances created through intersecting structural hierarchies that could be used to advance expansionist movement formation. Translators strategically participated in rights campaigns in order to build relationships with communities that would later partner with them on political projects and, in doing so, instilled an expansionist view within the various movement organizations that participated in rights

campaigns with them.

In my interviews with intersectional translators, some of the best examples of translators who intentionally participated in a mainstream rights campaign came from those who worked on the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality. Interestingly, some translators argued that they enabled the formation of cross-community partnerships by de-emphasizing civil rights narratives. Instead, translators sometimes used their personal stories to demonstrate how LGBTQ people were part of communities of color, and, as a result, helped de-stigmatize LGBTQ status, enabling communities of color and other coalition partners to see LGBTQ people as members of their own communities. In the below excerpt, Steven, an LGBTQ person of color who worked for the people of color coalition within the Referendum 74 Campaign for marriage equality explains how personal narratives contributed to the formation of cross-community partnerships:

Interviewer: What do you think were some of the most effective tactics at getting people to change their minds on it [marriage equality]?

Steven: *I think a lot of it was getting away from the civil rights issue and actually stressing the personal part of how it is, breaking it down to the least common denominator. If you have two people that love each other, and what's wrong with that? What threat does that pose? Particularly in my case because the partner I have now, we've been together ten years and we've raised his son....*

The thing is, I think that when people, when you talk to people about personal issues, personal feelings, a fact that everybody wants to go through life with someone, that resonates better than saying, "We need due process under law," and you know, demanding civil rights, which I believe in, but I think in terms of changing people's mindsets you have to deal with people rather than issues.

Steven describes how he de-emphasized rights during outreach with people and with organizations that represent communities of color. Instead, Steven highlighted his personal relationships. Steven argues that by "stressing the personal part" and talking about "personal feelings," supporting marriage equality became less about an issue and more about supporting another person who was part of your community and who shared the same past as you. In this

way, he helped the communities he worked with form partnerships through personal conversations during the campaign that could last beyond a discrete advocacy moment. Steven is one of the interviewees discussed in Chapter 4, who advanced a shared understanding of political movement past based on common community experiences and shared opponents rather than civil rights narratives. In doing so, Steven enabled the construction of inter- and intra-movement coalitions by helping form partnership that could last beyond the marriage equality rights episode.

For Steven, marriage equality was an issue that personally impacted his life. However, other intersectional translators argued that they participated in the marriage equality campaign even though they did not personally believe in marriage as an institution. For example, Rodrigo explains below that, although he is opposed to marriage and does not aspire to marry in his own life, he participated in the campaign to help create relationships with other organizations in Washington that could expand the political movement beyond the marriage equality campaign:

Rodrigo: I was part of the Referendum 74 Campaign, vote yes, and personally I don't believe in marriage. That's my personal point-of-view. But I went for it because I don't think that getting married should be an issue for anybody, right? If you are an adult and you are in love with another person, and these two people, only the two of them, decided to get together and get all the benefits protected by law and everything, why should I say no?

So then, when I got involved, I personally don't have a boyfriend, I don't believe in marriage as an institution. Hell yes, they have the right to, I mean we have the right, they meaning all of them, have the right. If they believe in marriage they should be able to get married...

Interviewer: What do you think, if any, were some of the benefits that came to you or [your organization] from that campaign?

Rodrigo: Well...we got more attention, we got really involved because we are different...we as a group we did a lot. So we got some place under the spotlight, to say something, yeah we got some sponsors. Few but we got some and also a better relationship or more relationships doing politics in Olympia.

According to Rodrigo, marriage equality was not an issue that impacted him. He did not believe in marriage and had no intention of getting married. However, participating in the campaign brought Rodrigo's organization partnerships with other groups that lasted beyond the marriage equality rights episode. After the campaign, Rodrigo's organization had new partnerships that they could all upon while "doing politics in Olympia." Olympia is the capitol of Washington State, so, in this exchange Rodrigo, is referencing how participation in a rights campaign built relationships across groups that worked with Rodrigo's organization on other issues, beyond the lifespan of a single campaign. For instance, Rodrigo explains later in the interview that his group worked with organizations that they solidified partnerships with through the marriage equality rights episode on an advocacy day in Olympia that called for legislation to assist in the eradication of HIV/AIDS, a disease that disproportionately impacts the LGBTQ communities of color Rodrigo works with.

In his interview, Rodrigo explains how his organization strategically used the marriage equality campaign as a resource for furthering expansionist movement formation. Camila also worked on the marriage equality campaign with the community of color coalition. Like, Rodrigo, Camila was skeptical of marriage equality, which her community saw as a very white LGBTQ issue. However, through the campaign, intersectional translators like Camila formed new relationships with other groups that represent communities of color as Camila explains below:

Camila: We did the marriage equality campaign and I really like the process that the [LGBTQ Latinx organization I worked with] did, because they were, they first surveyed the community. They asked the community, "What are your top priorities?" And immigration came as the top priority. And we had listed marriage equality and some of them said, well unless I can marry my partner and get papers [laughter] but otherwise I don't see how marriage equality is going to help me, right? So we identified marriage equality as really a very white LGBT issue. But then we figured, we had a conversation, where we figured, well we can push it, so it's a step towards on a federal level, immigration recognizes those marriages, and then people can be in the process of being a legal permanent

resident. *But also it builds our work without other LGBTQ groups, so we did it intentionally to join the marriage equality [campaign] because we wanted to connect with other people of color LGBTQ groups....*

Interviewer: But you were able to connect to these groups through the marriage equality campaign?

Camila: Yeah, Yeah so we, again we did it intentionally to build those [relationships] and the best thing is that, although that was the case and really nothing grew out of the marriage equality campaign, out of the detention campaign center campaign it has. Now we have, we did a People's Movement Assembly back in June and a whole group of LGBT people of color came together. Not only Latinxs but different ethnicities came together and said we really care about this issue and they have still till today helped us. [Emphasis Added]

Camila says that although “nothing really grew of the marriage equality campaign.” However, because her organization participated in the campaign very intentionally and used it as a means to build relationships with other organizations and to demonstrate the utility of engaging in expansionist movement formation, her organization was able to begin new partnerships with other groups. Camila's organization later used these partnerships as new political threats manifested in Washington. After the campaign, these partnerships continued and grew through other campaigns that focused on community-driven political projects. In her interview, Camila points to the People's Movement Assembly that a collective of local organizations in Washington created to challenge the legitimacy of immigration detention. The assembly took place at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington and is part of a broader movement against immigration detention that Camila's organization has helped build from the bottom-up in the Pacific Northwest. For Camila, the marriage equality campaign was problematic and exclusive, but she participated, nevertheless, and used it as a tactic for building a more expansive movement.

Other interviewees also described how they persuaded coalition partners who held

different subject positions than their own to join short-term campaigns in order to cultivate relationships they could later call upon as new political threats arose and as new political opportunities developed. For example, Tom is an LGBTQ person of color and was a leader of a mainstream LGBTQ organization in Washington State. During his interview, Tom explained how he worked as an intersectional translator within his organization by showing other leaders why it was strategically in their interests to participate in community of color-led campaigns:

Tom: I think that what was more challenging frankly was conversations on the board level because we had lots of discussions and I feel like our board was fairly divided and because I was serving as [leadership position redacted] it was kind of my responsibility to herd all the cats and get everyone on the same page. And so, one particular board member [name redacted] was very adamant that we were an explicitly anti-racist organization. And personally I very much in favor, but knowing that a majority white board who didn't necessarily see eye to eye on racial justice issues, I thought it was going to be very difficult. So there was a movement by I think [mainstream civil rights organization] and a few other organization – a few other people of color-led organizations who wanted to push a resolution or a bill frankly, to re-establish state-based affirmative action programs, which had been taken away by...[searches for name of initiative]

Interviewer: Initiative 200

Tom: Yes, exactly, and so we had a really divisive discussion about whether or not we should sign on as a supporter of affirmative action and (sighs in frustration) very disappointingly, one person who had been working in politics for quite some time said, "you know I worked as an organizer on that campaign and now I've come around to think that it's a matter of fairness so everyone should be treated equally." And I was like, crap. So she came out opposed to this resolution. And I was like this is just terrible. And so, we ended up at that point feeling gridlocked, so I made the pitch, "you may not agree personally with this, but we need coalition partners. So if you're willing to do just what you can to just say for the sake of getting our agenda passed sign onto this because otherwise we are going to lose support in communities of color." So that at least, that argument, and that relates to one of your questions here, *sometimes it's not based completely on the merits, but based on a political calculation to get people on board with something that they otherwise wouldn't necessarily support*. So that was definitely a learning moment where, so we don't all agree on this issue, but we agree on our goals and this is necessary to achieve our goals....

I feel like that there a certain number of people like the [name redacted] of the world who feel it all the way personally on a very pure social justice belief that

they are all intertwined, but I would say that they are kind of the minority and that a lot of people who lead organizations aren't necessarily, don't share the same broad perspective of social justice, *but know they want to win and in order to do so they have to build relationships with coalition partners and some of that requires going outside of their comfort zone to support issues that may not fit exactly, squarely within their world-view.* [Emphasis Added]

In this excerpt, Tom describes how he translated the strategic importance of joining a community of color-led coalition that formed to advance affirmative action policy to fellow leaders in a mainstream LGBTQ organization. Tom acted as an intersectional translator when one leader argued against the coalition. According to Tom, sometimes getting leaders to understand why they should join expansionist movement coalitions is “not based completely on the merits, but based on a political calculation to get people on board with something that they otherwise wouldn't necessarily support.” In persuading leaders, Tom played into their desire to win LGBTQ rights. He successfully argued that, in order to win, the organization needed to “build relationships with coalitions partners.” Failing to sign onto the community of color-led coalition would cause the organization to “lose support of communities of color” on issues that mattered to the LGBTQ organization and, in doing so harm the LGBTQ organization's ability to advance marriage equality. Thus, it was strategically important to join the coalition to build relationships that the LGBTQ organization could turn to in future campaigns regardless of what organization leaders thought about the “merits” of the issue the community of color led-coalition sought to advance. In other words, Tom acted as an intersectional translator by communicating to other organization leaders in a language they understand why it was tactically important to support issues that “may not fit exactly, squarely within their world view.” Tom persuaded other leaders that committing to expansionist movement formation was necessary to build relationships with other communities that could later be called upon to support the LGBTQ organization's interests.

Constructing New Groups and Subgroups

Throughout the interviews, intersectional translators described how experiences with homophobia or racism within movement organizations sometimes became awakening moments that “fueled” the creation of news spaces for intersectionally marginalized people. These spaces ultimately became important organizing venues where intersectional translators communicated why committing to expansionist political movement formation was strategically important for social movement actors across mainstream and marginalized organizations. Juan, in the below interview excerpt, describes how one of the first queer migrant organizations started in Phoenix, Arizona:

Juan: This was like early 2010, that’s when, you know I’ve never organized communities before, so this was a totally new experience.... *After some problematics within*, you know, me being a queer man inside [immigrant organization names redacted]. During the summer of human rights I was part of the freedom ride that started in San Antonio to the Detroit social forum and that was a whole life-changing experience. I went to the US social forum, learned a lot, a lot, a lot, and we stopped at Oklahoma. We did a tribal ceremony, sweat-lodge. And so the birth of [a grassroots queer migrant organization] happened...one of the first queer migrant organizations around SB 1070 and a lot of what was happening from detention centers, Joe Arpaio, you know just in all these different areas, being the queer voice in like this whole political arena.

And also creating intersectionalities between being queer and migrant, that’s where [our queer migrant organization] came from. You had these two things and we brought them together in a [new] space. Yeah so that’s what happened... *fast forward, you know, the idea of [our queer migrant] space sort of ripples into all of these other organizing spaces as well too*. That was the birth of queer migrant organizing here in Phoenix. In 2010.... It was huge...because before that there was nothing and that was the reason for me initiating [a queer organizing] space was because it wasn’t happening during the summer of human rights. We had a lot of queer people from out of the state coming into [local immigrant organizations] and *were I’m like, well, it’s sort of you know very heteronormative and you know where’s our voice?*

Interviewer: Did you go back and work with other organizations like [local immigrant organization name redacted]?

Juan: No, they were, *they had a lot of homophobic sort of like* [struggles to find

word]

Interviewer: leadership?

Juan: Yeah, leadership, *so I stepped out of that space and that's one of the things that offered fuel to the fire was like I had to step out of that space and create another space....* I sort of was like pushed out and so I created you know, *I'm not going to wait for a space long enough, might as well create it.* [Emphasis Added]

In this exchange, Juan describes how he, along with other LGBTQ migrant community members in Arizona, began organizing in new spaces in the early 2010s. 2010 was a pivotal year for political movement organizing in Arizona. It was the year that the Arizona legislature passed SB 1070, a law that increased racial profiling during police stops and, consequently, contributed to the formation of a defensive rights episode that targeted Arizona's Latinx, migrant, and queer and trans communities. SB 1070 was a moment that touched off a new era of intense immigrant movement organizing. Juan had previously been a part of immigrant organizations in Arizona, and, here, recalls how he experienced homophobia within exclusive immigrant community spaces. Eventually, Juan was "pushed out" of some immigrant organizations in Arizona. Juan explains that this "offered fuel to the fire," encouraging members of Arizona's queer migrant community to create new spaces for queer migrant organizing. In his interview, Juan later explains that the creation of queer migrant spaces "flourished" and, eventually "sort of ripple[d] into all of these other organizing spaces as well" in Arizona in the aftermath of SB 1070. This flourishing occurred as many people who were part of the LGBTQ migrant community in Arizona started interacting with mainstream and marginalized organizations and people and, through community outreach, communicated how committing to expansionist movement formation was strategically important.

Like Juan, Samuel is an intersectional translator who began a new queer migrant organization in Arizona in the 2010s. Both Juan and Samuel created space for queer migrant

“voices” and “stories” that they argued were excluded from immigrant narratives produced by some previous rights movement organizations and coalitions. Through these spaces, community organizers planned educational forums and events designed to persuade mainstream and marginalized organizations to adopt an expansionist view of the movement that incorporated intersectionally marginalized people and their stories. One the strategies adopted in these spaces was an educational model that members of the queer migrant movement used to demonstrate how emphasizing heteronormative family narratives harmed expansionist movement building. For this reason, critiques of who constituted a “good” or “deserving” immigrant were prominent components of interviews with intersectional translators in descriptions of how they conveyed the tactical importance of forming new coalition partnerships within and across mainstream and marginalized movement organizations. In the below excerpt which was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, Samuel describes how new queer migrant groups challenged the construction of who constitutes a “good” immigrant, and, in doing so, advanced an expansionist view of the movement:

Samuel: As queer and trans community, we often are estranged to our families, particularly the people in [immigration] detention...they don't have a single person in the country who knows where they are or in the world who actually knows that they're in that [immigration detention] center. People who have been here for ten years, twenty years, when they come out they may lose their home and they lose contact with their family and if something happens to them and they get entrapped in detention, no one knows that they're there. So we realized that step one was really making sure that we identified and found people in detention and then advocated for them based on their work as humans. We recognize that a lot of the story telling we've done as an immigrant rights movement, has been *around families and the value of people for being good citizens and community members.*

Which always leads to the question, well, what about people who are bad people and bad citizens and bad community members? Do they deserve human rights? *And who is good and who is bad? A lot of times it's queer and trans people. We are default bad. We're stigmatized.* We don't have wholesome church relationships or ten children to stand for our, you know, the breadth of our heart.

We're just people who are here, working and being part of community and city and the world. So we set out to find our people and also to tell the story about why our community has value. Beyond family, beyond church, beyond wholesomeness and goodness, why we have value as human beings and why we don't just deserve, but we own human rights. [Emphasis Added]

Here, Samuel describes how queer migrant organizations created space for new stories and narratives based in an expansionist view that were later communicated to other mainstream and marginalized movement organizations. According to Samuel, queer migrant community-building is committed to expansionist political movement formation because it disrupts the notion of who is considered “bad” in narratives adopted during rights campaign advocacy. Queer and trans people who do not have families are constructed as “bad” or “undeserving” immigrants, excluded from the rights-based policies that emerged out of some mainstream organizing. For example, in November of 2014, President Obama attempted to expand the existing DACA program and create a new DAPA program that would have granted relief from deportation and work authorization rights for some migrant parents.¹⁰ Many LGBTQ organizations criticized these executive actions, arguing that they were based largely around heteronormative families because they only covered a limited number of people who migrated to the United States without documentation as children and their parents. Many LGBTQ families were excluded from the executive actions because they either did not have legally recognized relationships with their children or were part of non-biological kinship networks that exist outside of state-recognized nuclear family structures (Rupert 2014). Some of the queer and trans people Samuel’s

¹⁰ The 2014 attempts to expand DACA and create a new DAPA program for the parents of those who qualified for DACA ultimately failed to get implemented before President Obama left office. These programs were attempts to expand the DACA program, created in 2012, which enabled certain people who arrived in the United States as children without documentation to qualify for deferred action from deportation proceedings for a period of two years and work authorization (*US Citizenship and Immigration Services* 2017).

organization served were amongst those excluded from the executive actions. By sharing stories that emphasized the “value” LGBTQ migrants have as “human beings,” Samuel’s organization directly challenged the utility of exclusionary, heteronormative-family based policies, urging immigrant organizations to adopt new understandings of who belongs. Queer migrant stories also demonstrate how movement building around heteronormative-family based policies without also considering the experiences of intersectionally marginalized people is tactically short-sighted because it limits the ability to form partnerships with LGBTQ organizations composed of people who are in non-heteronormative kinship networks. By emphasizing non-heteronormative stories, queer migrant organizing provides the opportunity for expansionist political movement capacities beyond dual, static categories like “good” versus “bad,” “deserving” versus “undeserving,” and “family” versus “single.” Samuel’s queer migrant organization challenged organizations to adopt intersectionality as practice by perpetually re-thinking and re-imagining how binary, static narratives constrain political movements by limiting partnerships with groups that can serve as important allies.

As in Arizona, intersectional translators in Washington State also created new groups and subgroups within movement organizations that became opportunities for advancing a commitment to expansionist movement formation. In Washington State, in the aftermath of the marriage equality campaign, a new trans-focused advocacy group emerged. The group ultimately became a strategically important component of political movement organizing in Washington because it created an organizing space for marginalized trans and gender non-conforming people who then partnered with mainstream and marginalized organizations in statewide campaigns. Below, Bianca, one of the leaders of this organization, describes how an experience of exclusion fueled her desire to form the trans-focused organizing space:

Bianca: What I noticed as an external observer of the marriage equality movement was that there was a lot of money and organizational effort, a coalition. Organizations said, “hey, we’re going to directly benefit from this work and so we’re going to put money in it. It’s an investment in our future and our community’s future and so we’re going to invest and we’re going to pump a lot of energy and life into this.” And because there was not a diversification of causes and issues that were being addressed, when marriage equality effectively passed, or was certainly slated to pass, I remember being in a space, pretty much on the eve of the election and asking someone involved with the campaign and saying, “So what’s next for some of these organizations that are super giant [that were behind the marriage equality campaign in Washington]?”

And it’s like, “Well, this person’s going off to do that, we’re effectively going to become smaller. We don’t have any other funding. We don’t even know officially what we are going to be doing.” And they said “maybe we’re going to be focusing on homeless issues or the elderly.”

And it was a singular moment for me. You know, sometimes you have those moments? And this was a moment where I felt like, here I am talking to not just a certain person, but to the marriage equality movement as a whole. And I had been told repeatedly in blog posts and from leaders and experts that, hey, *we’re dealing with marriage equality first and then we are going to move onto those trans issues because those are super important*. And here I was being told by somebody that was getting their paycheck from the marriage equality movement that, “Well, I don’t know what we’re going to deal with next.” [Emphasis Added]

Bianca relates an experience of frustration with the marriage equality movement and LGBTQ organizations in Washington State. Many members of Washington’s trans community decided to participate in the campaign for marriage equality because they were told that the LGBTQ movement would address trans issues after the campaign. However, after the campaign, much of the funding disappeared and LGBTQ leaders appeared unsure of which issues or communities they should start mobilizing around next. Problems were exacerbated further when movement opponents started to push anti-trans legislation and ballot initiatives in Washington State in 2016 that directly targeted trans people. Many trans community advocates like Bianca were disillusioned by mainstream LGBTQ advocacy in Washington, which supported and funded the marriage equality campaign but then dissipated at the moment when trans people across the state

faced escalating threats. Out of a deep frustration with the continued marginalization of the trans community, trans organizers and advocates in Washington created their own organization. Bianca's organization, like the queer migrant organizations in Arizona, activated and organized trans and gender non-conforming people, developing a new pool of community members and leaders who later partnered with mainstream and marginalized organizations in statewide coalitions where they seized upon new opportunities to convey why trans people were strategic allies in the movement. Through creating a new organization, the trans community became a key player within political movement building in Washington in the LGBTQ movement vacuum that emerged after the marriage equality campaign. As other LGBTQ organizations lost their funding and active members, the new trans community organization filled in the organizing gap and earned the support of more advantaged LGBTQ organizations by reminding them of promises they made to the trans community in past rights campaigns. The trans community's strategic importance the formation of an expansionist political movement in Washington accelerated as they partnered with other movement organizations in campaign coalitions.

In addition to the formation of the new organization in Washington State that bolstered the strategic importance of the state's trans community in coalition building, new subgroups sometimes emerged within longstanding organizations and expanded organizational commitments to marginalized communities. For instance, three interviewees described how an organizational space was re-imagined through the creation of a support group for trans people of color in one local organization in Washington. In the below excerpt, Jesse relates how he created a people of color (POC) subgroup within an organization that ultimately became a mechanism of expanding the organization's service mission:

Interviewer: What are some of the things that you've done within [a local trans organization] to address intersectional issues?

Jesse: Well I started their POC support group.

Interviewer: What's that?

Jesse: Every other week we break off and do a smaller and more intimate affinity based group.... I attended the groups when I was first coming out as trans to my family and first having that dialogue with myself....

But I also perceived a need for myself in terms of some of the issues that I had with being trans or identifying as trans were related more with dealing with my family culturally because my dad is Salvadorian and my mom is Puerto Rican. Being out to my friends and my job that was like a piece of cake. It was coming out to my family and figuring out a way to make them understand it and educate them, that was my biggest issue. But I felt like there wasn't really a place where I could do that or resources I could find to do that. So once I started getting more involved with [the local trans organization] and especially at the board level, I started pushing for this POC group.

Especially when we had a situation that happened where someone made some really nasty comments to another individual that were race-related and so that started a larger conversation within [the trans organization] about how do we start keeping these things from happening. This doesn't represent us, so what can we do to make that known? That's really what popped open these conversations and what allowed me to start do the work that I'm doing there....

[W]e also had some follow-up anti-racism workshops for our facilitators during the retreat. We're trying to set up more workshops in terms of sexual assault and anti-racism trainings at the board level and for our facilitators. They also sent me to a conference in Chicago a couple of weeks ago, [for the INCITE! Color of Violence conference]. I attended on behalf of [the trans organization] to make connections for [the organization] and also to educate myself better for [the trans organization].

One thing that I'm learning about myself is that I never really had the language to describe racism or explain it to other people. Much like you learn the language around gender and sexuality, you know jargon. So going to the conference really helped me to contextualize structural racism and state racism and how that relates to violence that different people feel.

In this exchange, Jesse describes how an experience with racism became a mechanism of re-thinking how the organization can better serve the needs of trans people of color. After "race-related" statements were made during a support group meeting, Jesse went to leaders of the

organization and convinced them to support a trans people of color subgroup and to conduct anti-racism education within the organization to better serve marginalized people who were already part of the organization. In order to facilitate this, the organization sent Jesse to a conference to learn “the language to describe racism” and “explain it to other people.” Jesse describes the process of becoming an intersectional translator. He explains how that he attended a national conference where he both learned how to “contextualize structural racism and state racism” and how to communicate this to both leaders and members of his organization.

Jesse, thus, became an intersectional translator within the organization, fostering new dialogue and new opportunities for expanding the array of perspectives within the organization. In this way, he also became part of a new pool of leaders committed to expansionist political movement formation. Jesse enabled the adoption of anti-racist community building strategies. As an intersectional translator, Jesse intervened not only to ensure the representation of trans people of color within the group, but to foster anti-racist organizational restructuring through new staff training and partnerships with other organizations that represent marginalized people across the country. Jesse helped instill an expansionist understanding of the community, one that incorporated intersectionally marginalized people, within the organization. Jesse translated for the group why it was strategically important to expand capacity and how this expansion served the organization’s existing service mission. In doing so, Jesse constructed an opportunity for expansionist community building and the incorporation of intersectionally marginalized people within his organization.

Organizing Through Education

In addition to creating new subgroups and organizations, intersectional translators led

educational forums within LGBTQ and immigrant community organizations. These forums provided an opportunity for communicating the strategic importance of committing to expansionist movement formation to both mainstream and marginalized coalition partners. The educational forums were spaces for recognizing both the similarities and differences between intersectionally marginalized people and the movement organizations that primarily centered one, more advantaged subject position (e.g., LGBTQ groups *or* immigrant community groups). By emphasizing similarity and difference in a way that advanced a commitment to movement that incorporates intersectionally marginalized people, intersectional translators used these educational forums to convey the tactical importance of committing to expansionist political movement formation.

Intersectional translators described an array of educational forums and educational activities that they conducted to translate how expansionist movement building that incorporated intersectionally marginalized people served the interests of all coalition partners. “Double Coming Out Forums” were perhaps one of the most powerful educational forums that translators discussed during interviews. In the 2010s, queer migrant organization leaders, advocates, and community workers conducted Double Coming Out forums in Arizona. In these forums, translators would share the similarities and differences between “coming out of the closet” as LGBTQ and “coming out of the shadows” as undocumented with mainstream LGBTQ groups and expand coalition partnerships in doing so. Below, Manuel, a member of the LGBTQ, Latinx, and migrant communities and who serves as a marginalized organization leader, delineates how these forums came about:

Manuel: So the way that we started bringing membership in right and like one of our first events was through Double Coming Out forums. Double Coming Out forums came about because we saw and we understood that the only way to build in essence our mission is to build bridges between the LGBT community and the

undocumented community so that we build a powerful movement where we're both like pushing each other, right? And like maybe catapulting off of one another so that we can, we can help each other forward.

But we started with the double coming out forums because we understood that the same fears that we felt when we were coming out of the shadows as undocumented were the same fears that we felt when we were coming out of the closet, right? So understanding this we were able then to go to LGBT organizations and talk about, first, we would touch upon coming out of the closet and then we would talk about coming out of the shadows, right? And then people could relate.

Manuel explains how the Double Coming Out forums emphasized that seemingly dissimilar identities have a shared past, emphasizing one of the factors associated with constructing expansionist coalitions discussed in Chapter 4. Within the LGBTQ community, “coming out of the closet” and the fear surrounding potential community ostracism as a result of articulating one’s identity is a unifying community narrative. Similarly, “coming out of the shadows” as undocumented involves a considerable fear of community ostracism that supports a collective community narrative. Manuel describes how his organization would highlight these shared experiences of fear around recognition to create a collective past or a narrative in terms through which “double coming out” forum attendees could relate, understand their shared experiences, and “build a powerful movement” composed of communities that also constantly “push each other.” The use of the phrase “push each other,” which highlights an emphasis on difference and a commitment movement expansion, is particularly telling. For Manuel, the Double Coming Out forums were an educational space used to convey how intersectionally marginalized people are part of existing political movements by emphasizing how the narratives of divergent minority communities (here LGBTQ people and immigrants) overlapped. At the same time, the forums conveyed difference, compelling movement organizations to evaluate campaign advances based on the extent to which they serve expansionist goals that incorporate marginalized communities.

The forums “pushed” attendees to imagine a community that formed the building blocks of a more expansive movement.

In his interview, Manuel also described how he served as an intersectional translator within migrant community spaces in addition to within mainstream LGBTQ spaces. Manuel intervened in migrant community spaces by using drag as a mechanism of educating the community about gender. In the below excerpt, Manuel explains how he broke down gender norms in the migrant community through drag:

Manuel: When we started doing the Double Coming Out forums, far more than that what really helped was the fact that I would go to different spaces in the migrant community and then perform as Alexandra and then I would start talking about LGBT issues. And I would get parents and people just come and talk to me and be like, so you are a woman? You want to be a woman? And I would tell them, what drag was, I would break it down for them right, gender, and they would be like that’s fascinating, I didn’t know. And we would invite them back to our meetings and we started building membership like that, through my drag.

Interviewer: So it was not only within the LGBT organizations, it was also within the migrant community through drag?

Manuel: Right, I did both. So that’s how I started like, I keep saying my LGBT advocacy, was successful because I was able to use drag as a vehicle, as a tool, to bring communities together.

According to Manuel, drag served as an additional vehicle for educating the migrant community about gender. Through drag, Manuel again pushed the boundaries of acceptability within a community space; here, the boundaries of gender norms within migrant community spaces. In doing so, Manuel communicated how LGBTQ people who have non-normative genders are part of migrant communities. Through drag and Double Coming Out forums, Manuel built membership and brought communities together than previously existed in separate spheres. He also pushed the boundaries of acceptability and called upon groups to confront the limits of subject positions that enable the construction of LGBTQ communities without migrants and

migrant communities without LGBTQ people. In other words, Manuel used the educational forums to highlight how LGBTQ migrants are part of minority communities and to convey the strategic importance of intersectionally marginalized people in connecting overlapping experiences and aiding coalition partnerships in struggles for social change.

For intersectional translators like Manuel, organizing movements through education served as one of the most important mechanisms of conveying the importance of queer migrant experiences to coalition partners. Juan is another intersectional translator who held queer history and educational workshops along with Manuel in Arizona. In the below excerpt, Juan describes why education is such an important mechanism for accomplishing social change:

Interviewer: What do you think are some of the best tactics for accomplishing social change?

Juan: Education and organizing that's always been my work [laughs]. Creating spaces. The past 5 years that's all I've been doing is creating spaces for folks to learn, to celebrate, even inviting allies, you know, straight people into these spaces to learn. And creating a base as well too because the more you teach the more that they're out there helping this idea grow, yeah. Community organizing, that's the heart of me. It's definitely the heart of me.

Here, Juan argues that education is an important tool for translating experiences across communities because it helps “create a base” for a movement with broad coalition partnerships and helps an “idea to grow” and take root. Juan uses the word “idea” here in order to call attention to the formation of movements that encompass intersectionally marginalized people in struggles against systemic oppression (i.e., ideas). Through educational forums and workshops, people like Juan translated for others how to form communities around ideas that could grow into expansive movements.

In addition to holding educational forums, intersectional translators would educate those involved in political movement struggles about how to strategically develop messaging that

incorporated other minority populations that they saw as potential coalition partners. For example, below, Diana, a translator who works with a marginalized organization that has formed LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant coalitions around local issues, discusses how she once pointed out flawed LGBTQ movement messaging and, in doing so, helped local LGBTQ movement organizations create new messaging that did not alienate coalition partners:

Diana: We were invited to that room where they were going to do a media training [on mainstream LGBTQ organization-led campaigns] especially for our Spanish-speaking communities. With like, again, the intersection of our communities. One of the talking points to like push back to people who were like, “no, you can’t get married or we don’t want to serve you, we don’t want to serve your business.” One of their talking points back to them was, “the law is the law.” Like, they just passed this, “we can now legally be married” like “the law is the law” and we get to be able to do this. Even if you’re not OK with this, this is the law. So that was very interesting, so they came up with that, *and for us like “the law is the law is the law” has been the way that they’ve like marginalized and oppressed us.*

And for them, “the law is the law” was a way that they were finally validated and like humanized. But the wording, seeing as a few of us that were immigrant and immigrant organizations raised our hands and were like, “we understand what that means, we understand why you’re saying that, but that doesn’t resonate good with us as a community. Like those words exactly have been used to continue to oppress us and marginalize us and dehumanize us. And so, can we find better wording for that?”

Here, Diana argues the messaging “the law is the law” did not resonate with immigrant communities who were marginalized and oppressed by opponent communities who used similar legality arguments to deny the humanity of undocumented people. LGBTQ organizations were using “the law is the law” in messaging designed to combat attacks from groups that were opposed to recently passed pro-LGBTQ movement laws like marriage equality and anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. However, this messaging threatened LGBTQ organizations’ ability to form partnerships with members of the immigrant community because this is the same language

that anti-immigrant groups use to dehumanize undocumented people when they argue that undocumented people should be deported because they have broken the law by migrating to the united states outside of official channels, and “the law is the law.” By educating LGBTQ organizations about the limits of their messaging tactics and they ways in which these tactics stigmatized immigrant communities, Diana helped the LGBTQ community form messaging strategies that were better suited for the development of partnerships that could aid in the advancement of collective LGBTQ and immigrant rights movement goals. This, in turn, underscored the importance committing to expansionist movement formation that incorporated people like Diana amongst local LGBTQ organizations in Arizona – people who could help LGBTQ movement organizations become better allies in the movement.

Intersectional translators in Washington State also held educational forums designed to initiate conversations between LGBTQ and other minority communities in the state. For instance, translators within Washington’s LGBTQ and Asian and Pacific Islander (API) communities held an educational event in 2015 that was designed to foster a space for people in the state who identified as members of the LGBTQ and API communities. Below, Rebecca describes how the event was created and its intended goals:

Rebecca: We received a grant from [a national API organization] to host this event because Seattle's always been really big in supporting LGBTQ issues in the community and we've noticed that at events like the Pride Parade or things where we'll go and advocate, there aren't a lot of Asian Pacific Islander LGBTQ people out representing themselves, and we thought, that's really odd because there's definitely a fairly large community within those two intersections. Why are people not out representing? And so that started the conversation of well, a lot of people don't, receive the support that they need growing up and a lot of Asian American families, they don't talk about issues like that a lot.

And so it kind of becomes this thing where you're just silent about it. That's where the premise of family came from. We want to make sure that people know that there's a place for them and that there are advocates and there are organizations that support them. And that's where we came up with the name

“Family” because a lot of people leave their families and need to find a family elsewhere and it’s their friends that are their families, and that’s how they get their support.

The Family event was an educational forum that centered on the experiences of LGBTQ and API people. The purpose of the event was to create a place for intersectionally marginalized people and to educate the broader API and LGBTQ communities about what it means to exist at the intersection of these populations. However, the event also nurtured the formation of a broad coalition of support organizations that came together to assist API and LGBTQ people through partnering with Rebecca’s organization to help create the educational forum. These support organizations included an array of both LGBTQ and API organizations in Washington State. The event thus aided in the construction of new partnerships across organizations. Like the Double Coming Out forums in Arizona, the Family event in Washington pushed the boundaries of accepted norms within divergent minority populations and contributed to the formation of an expansionist political movement between mainstream and marginalized organizations that incorporated intersectionally marginalized people served their own organizational missions.

Conclusion

Although Double Coming Out forums and other educational workshops created opportunities for expansionist movement, intersectional translators argued that they were also limited by the surface-level understanding of diversity that exists within many movement organization spaces. For this reason, educational events like the Double Coming Out forums did not always convince coalition partners of the strategic importance of seeing small rights campaign wins as advances or resources in the formation of an expansionist political movement. Problems persist for the realization of intersectionality as practice and expansive re-imaginings

of movement because navigating between different spaces of necessity involves continually hitting up against the constraints placed on movements by intersecting structural hierarchies. However, as this chapter argues, by intentionally using rights campaigns as resources, creating new organizations, and conducting educational forums, intersectional translators can demonstrate why it is strategically important for mainstream and marginalized organizations to commit to expansionist political movement formation. Through the mechanisms described here, intersectional translators aided in the creation of expansionist movement formation within and across mainstream and marginalized organizations in some circumstances. Translators accomplished this in some contexts by convincing organizations that expansionist movement building helps both mainstream and marginalized organizations.

Intersectional translators communicated how expansionist movement formation helps organizations prepare for future political threats and opportunities (like future attacks on immigrants and trans people). Translators like Jesse, who helped expand his organization's capacity to serve the community, illuminated how expansionist movements can cultivate a pool of leaders. In addition, some intersectional translators communicated how expansionist commitments can strengthen coalition partnerships. For instance, Tom connected emphasized the importance of movement expansion and helped form of an inter-movement alliance when he convinced his LGBTQ organization to commit to affirmative action policy in order to build a partnership could aid in the advancement of marriage equality in the future. By exposing limits and later forging new political projects within the intersecting structural hierarchies that characterize political networks, intersectional translators were sometimes able to create opportunities for the formation of expansionist movements in Washington State and Arizona.

CHAPTER 6

The Paradoxical Effects of Rights

Throughout this project, I have followed the experiences of organization leaders, advocates, and community workers involved in grassroots coalition building across the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movements in Washington State and Arizona. In doing so, I have shown how understanding political movements as a series of shifting coalitions can sometimes capture complexities that are often missed in contemporary studies that focus on only one or a few national organizations. When we see political movements as coalitions, we can uncover conflicts within and across movements that may be exacerbated and complicated by intense rights-based advocacy moments. In the preceding chapters, advocates described their own experiences of empowerment, activation, and mobilization that tended to contribute to the formation of political movement coalitions in a series of frenzied bursts around rights episodes. At the same time, these moments of mass movement often created a sense of heightened urgency that contributed to marginalization, tokenization, and, in some cases, exploitation in each state context. Thus, I argue that rights can function in paradoxical ways within movements in at least some contexts because they can facilitate both movement expansion and contraction in the same space. Furthermore, my analysis of interviews conducted with organizational leaders and advocates demonstrates that hierarchical power dynamics embedded in our society can be present in internal struggles within political movements, even when these movements form around the most egalitarian aims.

In this concluding chapter, I briefly summarize the results of my study of political movement formation in Washington State and Arizona. Following this summation, I provide some suggestions based on my analysis that movement organizations might adopt to avoid

marginalization and movement containment in some contexts. Finally, I end this chapter with an analysis of contemporary inter- and intra-movement coalitions that formed in Washington State and Arizona after I completed my fieldwork. In this analysis, I examine the extent to which these newer coalitions have further expanded prior alliances and the extent to which this political movement formation has ossified around episodic rights campaigns.

This study revealed some of the paradoxical components of movement building by examining the relationship between coalition formation and intense rights-based advocacy moments, or rights episodes in two state contexts. Chapter 3 analyzed movement formation in Arizona where, in the aftermath of the SB 1070 rights episode, thousands of people poured into the state to protest a wave of anti-immigrant advocacy. The experiences examined in this chapter described the response to SB 1070 as a moment of activation and mobilization by centering the advocacy stories of interviewees like Louis. Louis was one of the leaders of the civic engagement coalition that emerged in Arizona in response to the anti-immigrant law. He helped organize a “prayer vigil” with seven people at the state capitol that asked then-Governor Brewer to veto SB 1070, an inspired initiative that slowly grew into a large, non-violent direct action with “over 40,000 at one point.” Or consider Diana, who worked with organizations that represent immigrants and communities of color, and described SB 1070 as an “opportunity for us to make that choice and we chose to fight.” SB 1070 was a movement failure that was experienced as a loss and trauma by many of the people who were interviewed in this study as friends and family members suddenly became the targets of heightened law enforcement activity and racial profiling. Interviewees described SB 1070 as both a failure and an opportunity for movement building that fostered the creation of new coalitions and partnerships that ultimately helped to dismantle much of the law and remove some of the law’s most vociferous supporters

from public office. The rights episode often aided in movement building by underscoring the factors that contribute to inter- and intra-movement coalition formation examined in depth in Chapter 4: the episode often emphasized a shared movement past that unified seemingly disparate minority communities and underscored a common core of opponents.

Yet, the SB 1070 rights episode also reveals that as movements coalesce and mobilize, they can simultaneously fracture and marginalize in some circumstances. Interviewees like James described how marginalization sometimes happened through SB 1070 as the vortex surrounding the rights episode “drowned everything out,” including economic justice and worker’s rights campaigns. This marginalization was often felt most strongly by interviewees affiliated with the queer migrant, or UndocuQueer, movement as illustrated by Samuel, a leader in this movement who recounted the mainstreaming of heteronormative immigrant family narratives that excluded LGBTQ immigrants as “default bad” and “stigmatized.” Many movement advocates likely left the voices of LGBTQ immigrants out of movement narratives was necessary because they felt that they were forced to publicize immigrant narratives that least threatened and were most likely to persuade moderate and conservative opponents in the state. Interviewees argued that the mainstreaming of immigrant family narratives ultimately left many queer and trans immigrants worse off, or doubly marginalized, in the immediate aftermath of SB 1070, in at least some circumstances. Nicolas, another leader in the undocumented youth movement, described this process of double marginalization while recalling a conversation he had with a close friend whose immigrant parents told him that, if he wanted to flee the state with them in response to heightened policing, “he couldn’t be gay anymore.” The experiences recounted by interviewees in this study tend to complicate how we understand movement building. Political movement formation in both Arizona and Washington State involved some

advances as opportunities and new coalitions were created that had the potential to expand into new advocacy moments. However, political movement formation in both states also often involved suffering and loss as the process of identifying discrete policy outcomes and allies tended to also reinforce the exclusion of historically marginalized movement constituents.

This is, perhaps, even more apparent in the movement for marriage equality in Washington State. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality was in some ways a massive feat in movement expansion. Through the rights episode, new coalitions formed across both mainstream and marginalized organizations within the LGBTQ and immigrant justice movements in Washington State, again by emphasizing a common political movement or “civil rights” past and shared opponents. Campaign advertisements featured the stories of lesbian and gay men of color and were produced in multiple different languages. On election night, Seattle streets filled with people celebrating marriage equality. Yet, the coalition built to support marriage equality quickly fragmented after the win. Many interviewees who worked with LGBTQ, immigrant, and community of color organizations argued that they felt that most relationships built were superficial and would not last long after the campaign. Movement contraction was bolstered when, once the campaign ended, the bottom fell out of LGBTQ movement funding in the state, which, in turn, solidified the perception amongst some interviewees that the lesbians and gay men activated by the campaign saw “equality just in that, just in marriage.”

For this reason, many interviewees expressed anger and resentment when they described the Referendum 74 campaign for marriage equality. Some interviewees, like David, who worked with LGBTQ people of color during the campaign, argued that marriage equality was “an opportunity for movement-building and that opportunity was not taken.” Some questioned

whether the campaign was even a movement at all, or whether it was formed by people with “money and power” who only wanted to win marriage. Others spoke with awe and excitement about being part of a campaign that they felt was a political movement that would have concrete and positive impacts on society. These tensions over that constitutes a “movement” is particularly interesting. They reveal how struggles can manifest around what aims movements should pursue, who should be recognized as movement leaders (or whether movements should have leaders at all), and what issues movements should form around in some circumstances.

These tensions persisted throughout the rights-based campaigns in both states as certain understandings of movement surpassed others, sometimes creating coalition unity across a field of fragmentation. This fragmentation may have lasting impacts that can complicate future movement re-formations. This was especially apparent after marriage in Washington when opponents started to organize around eliminating trans rights. During the marriage equality campaign in Washington State, as in many other states, campaign materials understandably centered gay and lesbian couples who wanted to marry while queer and trans community members who were not married or coupled were largely not depicted in campaign materials. Although lesbians and gay men of color appeared on some campaign materials, interviewees in Washington State said that there was significantly less money devoted to community of color representations in the campaign. One interviewee argued that the community of color coalition was late to get onto the campaign website and felt that leaders with many LGBTQ organizations considered community of color outreach an “add on” rather than central to the campaign. Most advertisements featured white lesbian and gay couples, church leaders, and moderate and conservative community members who described their personal experiences with same-sex marriage. Advocates likely centered these experiences because the data and targeted messaging

driving the campaign contended that more mainstream experiences like these with same-sex marriage were less threatening for opponents and more likely to persuade swing voters.

As a result, most of the public education conducted through the marriage equality rights episode did not challenge gender norms. This meant that the marriage equality movement in Washington State involved almost no public education on gender identity and expression. When opponents later started to mobilize behind limiting access to public facilities for transgender people, these historically marginalized community members were suddenly at the center of renewed attacks. In other words, trans and gender non-conforming people found themselves doubly marginalized, both through exclusion from the LGBTQ movement's marriage equality campaigns and through opponent counter-mobilization in Washington State. Worse still, the funding behind marriage equality had evaporated, leaving LGBTQ organizations not as prepared to continue fighting for movement issues as many advocates who fought for marriage equality had hoped. With discrimination and suicide rates amongst the trans community, particularly trans people of color, much higher than the national average, the renewed counter-mobilization targeting this community presented an especially tragic threat. Thus, as with SB 1070, the marriage equality rights episode in Washington State encompassed both a movement advance and complicated the political environment in ways that exacerbated harms experienced by marginalized constituents within the movement.

But is movement contraction always a necessary component of political movement formation? Are there ways that progressive movement actors might limit or thwart tendencies towards exclusion and marginalization? In this chapter, I make some suggestions based on the interviews and participant observations for building movements that might minimize marginalization. The following sections (1) outline four suggestions for building expansionist

movements by drawing from the interview analyses in the prior chapters, and (2) analyze select contemporary inter- and intra-movement coalitions in Washington State and Arizona that have more successfully minimized exclusion and, thus, movement contraction, than past coalitions. Below, I convey how political movements might thwart the paradoxical effects of coalition formation in limited circumstances based on my analysis of inter- and intra-movement formation in Washington State and Arizona.

Building Expansionist Alliances

The previous chapters illuminated how rights-based coalition building can paradoxically expand and contract movement coalitions in some contexts. As summarized above, organizing around rights can sometimes fragment movements by harming intersectionally marginalized people who are part of what Strolovitch (2007) calls disadvantaged subgroups within minority communities. The fact that the paradoxical effects of rights are present in the different political contexts at the center of this study suggests that marginalization and exclusion cannot be fully avoided. This is especially true given that the process of organizing around policy campaigns in US politics often requires movement organizations to make decisions about which interests to advocate on behalf of in the short-term, which in turn inevitably results in the marginalization of other interests. Furthermore, openings for change can be narrower in political contexts with small minority populations or in communities with institutionalized opponent organizations devoted to thwarting movements for social change, and this might limit the types of campaigns and coalitions that movement actors can form. However, the analyses presented in this study suggest that it is possible to mitigate movement contraction in some circumstances. In this section, I draw from the analyses of the previous chapters in laying out four ways that political

movement actors can minimize coalition fragmentation: (1) by constructing a shared movement past and highlighting common opponents both during and after rights campaigns; (2) by devoting more resources to marginalized groups and individuals and providing opportunities for them to lead coalition organizing; (3) by adopting an expansionist commitment to movement formation through a politics of solidarity and strategically using rights campaigns to further this commitment; and (4) by forming non-partisan institutionalized grassroots advocacy networks that exist in separate spaces than Democratic or Republican party politics. These suggestions are difficult to attain in all settings and contexts. Nevertheless, they serve as important aspirational guidelines for pushing back against the hierarchical power dynamics that exist in our society and frequently manifest in political movement organizing.

A Shared Movement Past and Common Opponents

The interview analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated how some cross-community coalitions formed in Washington and Arizona through the construction of a shared movement past and a common core of opponents. Many interviewees emphasized how creating a shared “civil rights past” enabled different movement constituents to recognize how their movements overlapped. For example, some interviewees from Washington State who helped build coalitions between mainstream and marginalized organizations during the marriage equality campaign, argued that emphasizing “a long civil rights history” helped divergent organizations see how they communities they serve are intertwined. Other interviewees constructed a common movement past by sharing collective experiences of discrimination that spanned multiple minority populations. By constructing a common past, different political movement communities perceived their individual communities as part of a larger political movement, which often

enabled these communities to work together in coalitions.

Underscoring common opponents was also a crucial mechanism interviewees used to aid in the formation of cross-community coalitions in both states. Internalizing “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and emphasizing how divergent minority populations faced “the same kinds of attacks” helped mainstream and marginalized organization leaders and members understand how their struggles were intertwined with the struggles of other political movements in Arizona and Washington. Through recognizing shared opponents, different movement constituents often understood that it was strategically important to engage in the campaigns of others in order to weaken opponents. The analyses presented in this study suggest that constructing a common past and underscoring shared opponents can aid in the formation of expansionist movements by growing cross-community coalitions that, in some circumstances, involves long-term relationship building. As a result, political movements can sometimes benefit from utilizing these factors in building expansionist coalitions. However, because coalitions tend to contract at the same time they expand, political movements often must rely on more than emphasizing a shared past and a common core of opponents in order to minimize movement ossification around rights episodes. According to the interviews presented in Chapter 5, allowing intersectional translators from historically marginalized groups can further help political movements thwart the paradoxical effects of coalition building.

Enabling Historically Marginalized Groups to Lead

As described in Chapter 5, incorporating historically marginalized groups and leaders in political movements is often difficult. This has a lot to do with how funding is frequently funneled into mainstream organizations. Sage, one of the individuals who worked with mainstream

organizers and the people of color coalition in the Referendum 74 campaign, described why it is challenging to enable historically marginalized organizations and people to lead political movement formation in Washington State in her interview:

Sage: Often times with these campaigns, they [the funders] go to organizations that they know because those organizations have proven that they can deliver. But that's not casting a wide net maybe. You know with the R-74 campaign it was about casting a wide net and to really get into communities that we had not touched in the past. When you're resource limited you go to the people you know. And I think that, just going to certain organizations you know, you leave out certain communities. So the Latinx community is a good example that was, and the African American community, and actually well the Native American community too, there wasn't as many resources there. But I think we could have gone a lot deeper.

In this excerpt, Sage explains that the funding in statewide campaigns frequently goes to “those organizations [that] have proven they can deliver.” This means that organizations that rack up a series of small, short-term wins can be the most financially stable since they consistently attract funders each political cycle. The Referendum 74 campaign attempted to combat this tendency by “casting a wide net” and really reaching into communities that movement actors had not reached in the past on LGBTQ issues: communities of color and immigrant communities in Washington State. The campaign was somewhat successful at accomplishing this goal; however, resources were still limited, which prevented the coalition from going “deeper” by syphoning more funding into these communities and building more genuine, lasting relationships. As in other interviews conducted for this study, Sage expressed her frustration with a coalition that began to reach out to historically marginalized organizations and people, but did not do enough to construct long-term, lasting relationships. However, underneath Sage's frustration is an understanding that incorporating historically marginalized people in coalitions and allowing them to lead can be strategically important in movement building – for both mainstream and marginalized organizations.

Enabling historically marginalized people and groups to lead political movement coalitions is often tactically important because the issues that impact them the most, like ending immigration detention and police brutality, are often broader movement goals that can sustain movement organizations beyond discrete rights advances, or rights episodes. By placing historically marginalized people and their issues at the center of movements, mainstream rights campaigns can be converted from ends and wins to means and advances. Yet, it can be difficult for coalition partners to understand why it is in their interests to construct rights campaigns as means rather than ends. This is the reason why the intersectional translators, the leaders from historically marginalized groups discussed in Chapter 5, were often important in creating expansionist alliances. Intersectional translators helped thwart the paradoxes of power in movement building by showing mainstream and marginalized organizations in each state context why adopting an expansionist commitment to movement formation was in their interests. Educational events like Double Coming Out forums and the Family event that spanned Washington's API and LGBTQ communities expanded partnerships within coalitions beyond individual communities in some circumstances by emphasizing an expansionist view of the movement. Through these events, intersectional translators convinced coalition partners that solely committing to discrete rights campaigns is strategically short-sighted because these campaigns, when conducted in ways that do not consider movement expansion after the campaign ends, can drain resources and collapse organizations. Interviewees described these educational events as tools "to bring communities together" by "pushing each other" to think beyond short-term wins and individual subject positions when building movements. Intersectional translators, thus, assisted in the formation of expansionist movements by persuading both mainstream and marginalized organizations to center historically marginalized

groups in some circumstances. According to my analysis in the previous chapters, by enabling historically marginalized groups to lead coalitions and devoting more resources to the organizations that serve them, political movement organizations can sometimes enable more opportunities for intersectional translation.

Adopting an Expansionist Commitment to Political Movement Formation

Enabling historically marginalized groups to lead is strategically important because these groups assist in the adoption of an expansionist commitment to movement formation over cyclical campaign wins. Adopting an expansionist commitment is often difficult to realize because it requires political movement actors to always think beyond campaign cycles in contexts where opponents often set political movement agendas. For this reason, movement actors should not ignore cyclical campaigns, but, rather, they should think about them within organizational and coalitional models as tools that serve expansionist ends. As Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, cyclical rights campaigns can be powerful tools for activating and mobilizing cross-community coalitions building. However, according to my research, in some contexts the extent to which a cyclical campaign contributes to the construction of sustainable movements is often directly related to whether the coalitions and relationships developed during the campaign expand into new political movement struggles. When campaigns ossify around discrete cyclical wins, they tend to have less capacity to re-form around new struggles in the future.

Movement actors can sometimes move beyond a focus on cyclical campaign wins, and towards organizing around shared, expansionist ends by engaging in solidarity politics. As described in the previous chapters, adopting expansionist commitment to movement formation often serves the interests of mainstream and marginalized organizations alike because a

movement expansion can sustain and strengthen coalitions beyond individual campaigns, can encourage lasting partnerships that provide movement organizations with allies they can turn to in new campaign struggles, can enable organizations to always be prepared for unforeseeable political threats, and can commit movement constituents to a more holistic justice that incorporates historically marginalized people. Intersectionality and law and politics scholars have long argued for the adoption of an expansionist commitment to political movement formation by emphasizing the need for solidarity politics. Solidarity politics is a mechanism of engaging with the practice of intersectionality in the real world without being torn apart by difference, or the “Oppression Olympics” that often characterize progressive movement spaces (Hancock 2011; see also Sameh 2014, Yuval-Davis 2012, Collins 1990). According to Hancock (2011), the Oppression Olympics can occur within progressive organizing when discourse devolves into arguments about which gender, racial, sexual orientation, or class identity is the most oppressed and, thus, the most deserving (Hancock 2011: Chapter 1). In order to resist the divisive fallout of the Oppression Olympics, Hancock (2011) contends that we should engage in a “deep political solidarity” that goes beyond mere tolerance through a “cohesive ethic of equity, interdependence, and communal sharing” that is based in empathy, common values, and a shared sociopolitical past (Hancock 2011: 65).

Interviewees in this study often engaged in solidarity politics by committing to the campaign struggles of others in the service of expansionist movement formation. The factors that tended to contribute to coalition unity described in Chapter 4 included sharing story and constructing a common movement past in order to create empathy across a multiplicity of movement organizations and illustrate how one movement community’s interests are interconnected with others. Solidarity politics also often involves “partial situated knowledge” in

which each group within a coalition sees its' own political movement narrative as partial or "unfinished" and, thus, remains open to learning from and hearing other groups' experiences (Collins 1990: 236-237, Yuval-Davis 2012). Through solidarity politics, divergent movement communities can create a cohesive organizing ethic that values open dialogue with others by simultaneously recognizing similarity (i.e., shared values and a shared past) and difference (i.e., the ways in which one's own narrative and experiences are unfinished). Thinking about group formation as unfinished, yet also connected with others through common sociopolitical pasts pushes back against the idea that justice can be universally attained through discrete rights wins. In solidarity politics, wins are often advances in an incomplete journey towards the realization of a collection of shared interests. Engaging in a politics of solidarity around expansionist movement formation can contribute to the formation of lasting inter- and intra-movement coalitions that can be more readily called upon to support new policy solutions, combat new community threats, and respond to new rights episodes as they arise.

Create Institutionalized Grassroots Advocacy Networks

In Washington State and Arizona, the LGBTQ, labor, and immigrant rights movements achieved some wins in states with different political climates because cross-community political movement organizations began forming inter- and intra-movement coalitions, or institutionalized grassroots advocacy networks, in the late 2000s and 2010s. These networks were largely non-partisan. They occurred across non-profit and political organizations that were devoted to serving the needs of minority communities and workers rather than the needs of political parties; although, some of the political organizations did endorse, conduct get out the vote efforts, and engage in other activities designed to get political candidates who promised to represent these

communities elected. Because these advocacy networks were non-partisan they often both worked to get candidates elected that promised to serve minority communities and engaged in advocacy after an election to hold candidates accountable.

Non-partisan, institutionalized progressive grassroots advocacy networks are not present in every state. In fact, in rural areas with high Republican constituencies, institutionalized conservative advocacy networks composed of organizations like the National Rifle Association and those affiliated with the Christian Right are often more common (Skocpol 2016). Advocacy networks like these can be less common in political movements because minority populations lack the institutionalized power and resources that characterize opponent movements. However, in order to build a sustainable grassroots movement, political movement organizations can create similar institutionalized advocacy networks through the formation inter- and intra-movement coalitions like those described in this study. As the analysis of the divergent grassroots coalitions relayed in Chapters 2 and 3 shows, these alliances are often different depending on context. In some areas, this means that coalitions may encompass mainstream organizations considered more moderate or conservative. For example, the Arizona coalitions described in Chapter 3 were not always solely composed of progressive movement organizations. The coalition that defeated Sheriff Joe Arpaio won in Arizona both because of its powerful grassroots advocacy network and because it appealed to fiscal conservatives in the region who were angered over the mounting cost of Arpaio's various civil rights violations. Similarly, the coalition that defeated State Senator Russell Pearce in Arizona encompassed both progressive advocates and more religiously conservative Mormons who had grown uncomfortable with Pearce's tough stance on immigration, which they believed violated church teachings. The need for flexible coalitions that can include moderate and conservative interests is another reason why

focusing on discrete wins can be problematic. When movements become hyper-focused on winning they can contribute to the construction of “us” versus “them” narratives where there are clear winners and losers. This can be particularly harmful for minorities who live in conservative areas where they are reinforced as social “others” and “outsiders” on the “them” side of a culture war. Rather than thinking about organizing through wins, the politics of solidarity calls for an openness and commitment to expansionist movement formation that can both allow for the realization of difference and transcend the progressive/conservative binary that often characterizes representations of US politics.

Each of the suggestions for thwarting tendencies within movement formation towards containment described here are often difficult to attain. Hegemonic power dynamics can reinforce the centering of dominant narratives at the expense of marginalized ways of being in all aspects of our social and political lives. Uprooting systems of oppression will always be extremely difficult because these systems form the bedrocks of our own relationships with institutions, organizations, and individuals. For this reason, it may never be possible to form an expansionist political movement that eliminates marginalization and exclusion. However, there are contemporary inter- and intra-movement coalitions in Washington State and Arizona that embody some of the suggestions described here and, in doing so, might have greater expansionist potential than coalitions of the past in each state context. The next sections will further concretize each of these suggestions by examining some coalitions that seem to have incorporated some or all of them: the Washington State SAFE Alliance and Washington Won't Discriminate and the One Phoenix ID Coalition. These inter- and intra-movement coalitions are not perfect examples. The process of forming each coalition inevitably involved the marginalization of some issues and interests at the expense of others. Yet, they collectively can

illuminate a model for moving beyond the jarring vortexes that often form in harmful ways around rights episodes.

The SAFE Alliance and Washington Won't Discriminate: Fighting for Trans Justice in Washington State

After the marriage equality campaign in Washington State, the LGBTQ movement largely demobilized. In many ways, the community struggled to come to terms with how it should define itself once it achieved a large rights win that was unimaginable less than a decade in the past. This left many within the state's trans and queer communities dismayed. Throughout the marriage equality campaign, trans community members were told, "we're dealing with marriage equality first and then we are going to move onto those trans issues because those are super important," (interview with Bianca, Chapter 5). Yet, once the campaign ended, the movement seemed directionless and the coalition largely dissolved. Trans advocates in Washington responded by organizing the trans and queer communities and their allies in an attempt to build the political power necessary to persuade other political movement organizations in the state to incorporate trans justice in their coalitions. In doing so, trans advocates in Washington leveraged the promises made to their community during past LGBTQ rights campaign struggles. In order to organize the community and build the political power necessary to make the trans community a key player in both mainstream and marginalized organization coalition building, trans community members decided to form their own advocacy organization: Gender Justice League. Gender Justice League's (GJL) organizational model differed from that of other statewide LGBTQ organizations. The organization embedded issues that matter the most to historically marginalized minority communities within its mission statement, which centered

intersectionality and “racial justice, economic justice, first people’s justice, and ending oppression based on ability” (*Gender Justice League 2017a*). GJL also directly reached out to the local community and sought to develop and maintain active members, most notably through organizing the first Trans Pride Seattle in 2013. The event, which brought in nationally and internationally renowned queer and trans speakers each June, would draw between 3,000 and 5,000 people by 2016. The organization sought to maintain members by holding a series of regular membership meetings to keep community members engaged through the creation of member-driven educational and advocacy plans.

GJL’s model helped construct a non-partisan grassroots advocacy network that served the state’s trans community because it intentionally diverged from that of other LGBTQ organizations, which had largely relied on members for fundraising purposes and made decisions in a hierarchical, top-down fashion rather than from the bottom-up through member-driven meetings. The new group provided a non-hierarchical space for organizing the LGBTQ community from the grassroots. The organization largely owed its unique ability to quickly bring in and activate new community members to its Executive Director, Danni Askini, the former National Program Director for the GSA Network (the network of student-run LGBTQ high school and middle school clubs in the US) and the former Policy Director for Basic Rights Oregon (Oregon’s statewide LGBTQ movement organization) (*Gender Justice League 2017b*). Askini and other leaders in GJL acted as intersectional translators, brilliantly navigating the historic cleavages across Washington’s mainstream and marginalized organizations by convincing coalition partners of the strategic importance of including trans justice within political movement campaigns through educational outreach. In the 2010s, GJL helped form a new set of grassroots public policy and educational coalitions. One of the first coalitions that

Askini and GJL helped organize was the Coalition for Inclusive Healthcare: a network of LGBTQ, civil rights, and healthcare providers who sought to end discrimination based on gender identity and expression in public and private healthcare plans that operated in Washington State. The coalition achieved significant policy advances in 2014 and 2015 as trans activists with the coalition shared their personal experiences of discrimination with state agencies and emphasized through educational outreach how they were part of the broader political movement community in Washington. In 2014, the Washington State Insurance Commissioner formally announced that health insurance policies sold in Washington could not discriminate against transgender people (Hermans 2014, Askini 2014, *The Seattle Lesbian* 2014). In 2015, after GJL brought some of its newly activated members before the Washington State Health Care Authority to testify about the need for trans-inclusive healthcare, the Health Care Authority issued a set of new rules providing for inclusive coverage for transition-related care under the state's Medicaid program for the first time (*Legal Voice* 2015, Coalition for Inclusive Healthcare 2015).

As the Coalition for Inclusive Healthcare achieved important healthcare advances for trans Washingtonians, LGBTQ movement opponents were counter-organizing through the leadership of the national Family Research Council and the state-based Family Policy Institute of Washington. After experiencing marriage equality as an advocacy loss, religious right organizations like these began targeting the movement for trans justice. In a policy paper released by the Family Research Council in June of 2015, leaders argued against what they perceived as “the third wave assault on the sexes”: government recognition of trans and gender non-conforming people and the inclusion of gender identity and expression in non-discrimination laws, or what they termed “bathroom bills” (O’Leary and Sprigg 2015). LGBTQ rights opponents supported by these organizations began to mobilize in Washington State when the

state's Human Rights Commission passed a rule in 2015 clarifying that the 2006 Anderson-Murray Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, allowed transgender people to use bathrooms and public facilities consistent with their gender identity (Shapiro 2016, Yan 2016). After the Human Rights Commission's rule went into effect, local organizations affiliated with the religious right worked with conservative legislators to introduce 6 bills in the state legislature targeting the inclusion of gender identity and expression in state anti-discrimination law.

These newly activated opponents, the same group of "enemies" that has targeted the state's minority populations for decades, in some ways helped LGBTQ movement organizations like GJL, Equal Rights Washington and Pride Foundation, form a stronger, unified inter- and intra-movement coalition: the Washington Safety & Access for Everyone (SAFE) Alliance. The Washington SAFE Alliance was much larger than the Coalition for Inclusive Healthcare likely because the grave threat posed by legislation introduced through opponent mobilization helped GLJ and other LGBTQ organizations in the state underscore a common core opponents across multiple minority communities. The coalition encompassed over 160 LGBTQ, domestic violence, civil rights, immigrant justice, and labor unions devoted to educating the public about trans and gender non-conforming people. However, importantly, the coalition was still much smaller than the inter- and intra-movement coalition that formed during the marriage equality rights episode in 2012 (which had included over 500 organizations) and did not encompass as many immigrant or community of color organizations. It is unclear why the coalition was smaller, but it is possible that the smaller scope stemmed from the lack of educational outreach on gender identity and expression within immigrant communities and communities of color during and before the marriage equality rights episode. It is also possible that, as many

interviewees described in previous chapters, some immigrant and community of color organizations became wary of joining coalitions with LGBTQ movement organizations after feeling tokenized, marginalized and, in some cases, exploited during the marriage equality campaign. It is further possible that, due to funding decreases in the aftermath of the marriage equality campaign, the organizations at the center of the new trans coalitions just did not have the resources to conduct as much organizational outreach as they did during the Referendum 74 Campaign. Regardless of the reason, the smaller trans coalitions are indicative of movement contraction in the aftermath of the marriage equality rights episode.

When the anti-trans bills were introduced in early 2016, coalition partners worked to educate state legislators about trans and gender non-conforming people, with Danni Askini and GJL organizing LGBTQ community members and allies. GJL and coalition leaders helped prepare people to testify at the state capitol against the bills and meet with their legislators. In February of 2016, another grassroots organization, Organizing Trans Olympia formed, and further mobilized local trans and gender non-conforming people and their allies through a protest at the state capitol (Brownstone and Garland 2016). Organizations affiliated with the SAFE Alliance encouraged supporters to attend hearings related to the anti-trans bills. The SAFE Alliance also brought LGBTQ identified people and their allies to hearings on an opponent-led petition of the Human Rights Commission that asked the Commission to withdraw its newly enacted trans inclusive rule. At the hearings, advocates shared experiences of discrimination, drawing parallels between the multiple minority communities that composed the coalition.

The SAFE Alliance stopped the anti-trans momentum in dramatic fashion in the State Senate after persuading moderate Republican State Senators to oppose all 6 bills and educating Democratic legislators about trans justice (Herz 2016). During floor debate on one of the bills,

legislators' speeches underscored how effective the coalition's educational outreach and testimony was at constructing a common movement past around shared opponents and at leveraging the trans community as part of a broader political movement. For example, then-State Senator Pramila Jayapal spoke as a human rights activist, emphasizing how "the history of civil rights in this country is that it has always been based on fear, it has always been based on otherizing" (Senate Floor Debate 2016). Here, State Senator Jayapal spoke about a common civil rights history, connecting the trans community with other minority communities in Washington who have been collectively defined as "other" by socially dominant groups. The failure of the opponent driven legislation in 2016 was no small feat given the intense pressure legislators faced. In a trailer from a new documentary about organizing against transphobia in Washington, moderate Republican State Senator Joe Fain, one of the legislators who voted against the anti-trans bills, is shown at a local event where he discusses why it is important to stand up for the safety of transgender people. In the trailer, one of his constituents cuts him off, shouting angrily "you want to talk to talk about rights? It's my right to throw a punch into your nose" – a small window into the deeply divisive and violent politics that surrounded the anti-trans bills in Washington (*Marymoore Productions* 2017).



Washington SAFE Alliance Coalition members wait in a hallway outside of a Washington State Senate hearing where they will testify against one of the anti-trans bills. Danni Askini is in the center of the photo with Ryannah Quigley, an activist with GJL directly above them and Monisha Harrell, the Executive Director of Equal Rights Washington (ERW) below (Photo Credit Ted S. Warren, *The Associated Press* 2016).



“Trans Rights are Human Rights” banner, held by protestors from Organizing Trans Olympia during dueling protests between trans justice advocates and opponents on the steps of the Washington State Capitol in 2016 (Photo Credit Alex Garland, *The Stranger* 2016).

Despite thwarting the counter-mobilization and stopping the progress of the anti-trans bills in 2016, coalition leaders and members fully recognized the trauma created in the state's trans community when opponents spread falsehoods in campaigns that compared trans people to pedophiles and sexually abusive people who preyed upon women and children. High profile threats to legal protections for trans people, like those in Washington State, correlated with an increase in calls to national trans suicide hotlines (Ryan 2017). Furthermore, opponent organizations are largely composed of white, middle to upper middle class people who have the resources to continue organizing against the state's trans community beyond a single campaign cycle. This was particularly apparent in the immediate aftermath of failed anti-trans bills at the state capitol in 2016. After the bills were killed, opponents mobilized behind a ballot initiative campaign (Initiative 1515). I-1515 failed to make it on the general election ballot in 2016; however, opponents quickly mobilized again behind a second anti-trans ballot initiative campaign (Initiative 1552) in 2017. The continual attempts to bring anti-trans initiatives onto the general election ballot and pass anti-trans bills at the legislature suggest that opponents will continue to mobilize against the trans justice movement for the next several years. However, because common opponents can activate and mobilize coalitions (as shown in the previous chapters), the presence of activated cross-community opponents will likely sustain and help grow the new inter- and intra-movement coalitions building in Washington around trans justice as well.

The growth of inter- and intra movement coalition building is already happening in Washington alongside new opponent threats. Due to increasing state-based and national attacks on trans and gender non-conforming people, LGBTQ organizations, civil rights organizations, labor unions, and local businesses formed the Washington Won't Discriminate Campaign after

the anti-trans bills failed at the legislature in 2016. While organizations affiliated with the SAFE Alliance spearheaded public education efforts, those affiliated with Washington Won't Discriminate led efforts to thwart opponent-led political campaigns. Furthermore, shortly after Washington Won't Discriminate formed, trans leaders and state affiliates of the trans justice coalitions also launched the Transform Washington public education campaign, which featured a wide range of stories from trans Washingtonians. Members of the public education campaign's advisory committee included trans community leaders like Danni Askini and trans and queer people of color. Washington Won't Discriminate also hired local UndocuQueer activist Carlos Padilla to serve as the organizing director for the political campaign. The inclusion of historically marginalized groups as leaders within Washington Won't Discriminate is an indication that the campaign was designed in some ways that emphasized political movement expansion.

When the Washington SAFE Alliance and Washington Won't Discriminate originally formed, it appeared that organization leaders and advocates were attempting to revive the inter- and intra-movement coalitions of the past in response to new threats driven by the same core of opponents. The new coalitions paralleled past alliances that thwarted the effort to place the state's LGBTQ inclusive anti-discrimination law on the ballot in 2006 and passed marriage equality in 2012. Washington Won't Discriminate was even the same name that leaders used for the 2006 coalition. However, the new coalitions also appear to be more expansionist than past coalitions in some ways. First, both Washington Won't Discriminate and the Washington SAFE Alliance included leaders from historically marginalized populations and some organizations that represent these populations as described above. The new coalitions are likely more inclusive of these populations because of the demands of marginalized groups, which have exposed the hypocrisy of alienating the most marginal during past campaigns in Washington State. During

the interviews, some mainstream organization leaders and advocates talked about how their organizations were re-structuring to incorporate intersectionally marginalized people in response to internal criticisms from coalition partners who were marginalized in previous rights campaigns and who were promised resources and other actions to advance issues that matter to the communities they serve in the future. Furthermore, recently, historically marginalized groups in Washington have publicly exposed the hypocrisy of forming campaigns around only the most advantaged movement constituents through trans community events like Trans Pride Seattle, where speakers often call attention to the exclusion of trans people in local campaigns. #BlackLivesMatter activism has likely also fostered shifts in coalitional dynamics through local protests where activists question the legitimacy of political movement organizations that fail to incorporate issues that matter to intersectionally marginalized people. Second, due to the resurgence of opponent movements, the coalitions are not only devoted to a discrete rights win, but movement expansion around trans justice that can prepare trans advocates and their allies for opponent threats in the future. As a result, the coalitions formed the backbone of an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network that has outlasted a single political campaign cycle and appeared to grow and shift as opponent advocacy intensifies. For these reasons, the new inter- and intra-movement trans justice coalitions in Washington at least partially embodies the suggestions for expansionist movement formation: they emphasized a common movement past and shared opponents in their organizing, incorporated historically marginalized people as coalition leaders, and expanded local advocacy networks and coalitions beyond discrete campaigns in response to renewed opponent counter-mobilization.

Although the coalitions seem to embody the suggestions for building expansionist movements, they are still limited. Some of the organizations affiliated with the coalitions, like

GJL, have centered issues that matter to intersectionally marginalized people (the first suggestion described above). However, because the coalitions formed in response to opponent counter-mobilization they are primarily concerned with thwarting issues designed by opponents. This means that they have not yet moved to support other issues that center intersectionally marginalized people. Since the campaign issues that they are concerned with are led by opponents and intersecting structural hierarchies that contributed to the targeting of trans communities in Washington, the coalitions primarily engaged in a politics of inclusion aimed at mainstreaming subject positions through public education (Spade 2015). This is entirely understandable given the extreme strain that opponent counter-mobilization has placed on trans and gender non-conforming people in Washington. It is possible that, if the opponent threat subsides, the coalitions will re-form around more intersectionally inclusive issues, but, in a heightened moment of political threat, where opponents hold considerable power in the United States, the future is deeply uncertain.

ONE PHX ID: Coalition-Building Around a Municipal Identification Card in Arizona

Washington's trans justice coalitions may mark the beginning of an expansionist cross-community political movement in Washington State; however, the extent to which these coalitions will expand beyond campaigns driven by opponent threats is unclear. By contrast, the coalitions that formed in Arizona in the aftermath of SB 1070 have engaged in both offensive and defensive movement campaigns. As described in Chapter 3, SB 1070 mobilized and activated a new generation of community organizers in Arizona. Over time and through various campaigns in the early 2010s, these organizers formed an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network composed of immigrants, people of color, low wage workers, and members of the

LGBTQ migrant community. This grassroots advocacy network grew, according to some interviewees, when the devastating impact of SB 1070 persuaded local organizations that the only way to stop attacks from collective opponents, like State Senator Russell Pearce and Sheriff Joe Arpaio, within the intersecting structural hierarchies that characterize Arizona's political network was to build political power by expanding local alliances. One of the organizations that grew during this time was the Center for Neighborhood Leadership (CNL). CNL, like the Gender Justice League in Washington State, trained, mentored and activated community leaders at the grassroots, predominately through outreach to students enrolled in local schools. In doing so, the organization provided support for community-driven public policy solutions to social problems. The organization owed much of its ability to effectively activate and organize new community workers to its executive director, Viridiana Hernandez, one of the former members of Team Awesome. Team Awesome was the group of students, undocumented people, and community members discussed in Chapter 3 who led a series of Get Out the Vote efforts in Latinx neighborhoods after SB 1070 and helped elect some of the most active progressive politicians in Arizona (*Center for Neighborhood Leadership 2017*).

CNL is one of several organizations in Arizona that is committed to member-led grassroots change. Other organizations include Puente Arizona (a migrant advocacy organization), local labor unions, and Latinx community organizations. These organizations have spearheaded the formation of public policy and civic engagement alliances in the state in the aftermath of SB 1070. One of the new coalitions with the greatest expansive potential is One Arizona, the civic engagement coalition that they formed through advocacy against the defensive SB 1070 rights episode. The formation of One Arizona is another example of how institutionalized and politically powerful opponent advocacy can unite and expand inter- and

intra-movement coalitions. One Arizona intentionally centered historically marginalized people, with its mission statement emphasizing “immigrant rights, voting rights, education equity, racial, economic, and restorative justice and climate justice” in solidarity with “women, workers, immigrants, and the LGBTQ community” (*One Arizona* 2017). As described in Chapter 3, the more hostile conservative, intersecting structural hierarchies that limit political movement opportunities in Arizona contributed to the formation of broad inter- and intra-movement coalitions like One Arizona. These coalitions have incorporated intersectionally marginalized people in order to underscore their commitment to multiple communities as they attempt to grow alliances across minority populations that are attacked by common “enemies.” In Arizona, a state where the communities that compose political movements lack institutional power, minority groups must form alliances in order to mitigate constant opponent attacks.

The incorporation of historically marginalized people is even more apparent in the public policy campaigns that the One Arizona coalition has joined. These policy campaigns include the successful effort to pass Proposition 206 in 2016, which increased the minimum wage in Arizona to \$12/hour and required employers to provide paid sick leave, and the One PHX ID Coalition, an effort to create a municipal identification card in the City of Phoenix. Both public policy campaigns illustrate the growth of cross-community movement mobilization in Arizona in the face of strong opponents. The One PHX ID Coalition was especially intriguing because was somewhat successful at thwarting anti-immigrant activists who have tried to stop the municipal ID campaign by introducing bills aimed at limiting local control in a Republican controlled state legislature. The One PHX ID Coalition’s member organizations represented a broad spread of minority communities in Arizona, including the LGBTQ, immigrant, Latinx, and labor communities. Coalition member organizations included CNL, Equality Arizona, Arcoíris

Liberation Team, Living United for Change Arizona (LUCHA), Puente Movement, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades (IUPAT) (*One PHX* 2017). The coalition also included retired Phoenix Police Officer Paul Penzone, the public official who successfully unseated Sheriff Joe Arpaio in 2016.

In advocating for the municipal ID in Phoenix, coalition members frequently referred to the range of intersecting communities that the ID was designed to assist, from undocumented immigrants, to trans people, to people with disabilities, to people who are homeless. In doing so, the coalition internalized a shared movement past that spanned each of these communities. The One PHX ID Coalition organized a broad spread of individuals to testify in support of the municipal ID at the Phoenix City Council. The group of people who testified included Karina Jaramillo, a member of the Arcoíris Liberation Team and the Arizona Queer Undocumented Immigrant Project (AZ QUIP); and Gilbert Romero, a community organizer with Living United for Change Arizona (LUCHA), who testified as an LGBTQ person in an organization with a large number of undocumented members about how the ID would increase safety for undocumented people and allow LGBTQ people to choose how to identify themselves (the proposed ID would allow LGBTQ people to select their gender). Other coalition members who testified were part of the homeless and Latinx communities, such as Jennifer Gonzalez, who testified on behalf of organizations that serve homeless people; and Mari Cruz Ramirez, who spoke through a translator about how having a municipal ID would address the fear that members of the immigrant and Latinx communities face when reporting crimes to local law enforcement without an ID (Phoenix City Council Meeting 2015, Hogan 2015). Through the range of individuals represented in public testimony and interviewed by the local press, coalition

leaders advanced the municipal ID proposal by incorporating the narratives of intersectionally marginalized people. Individuals who spoke at the city council meeting also argued that they felt compelled to speak in support of the ID in order to hold city council members accountable after volunteering to turn out the vote to help elect council members who promised to represent their communities (Phoenix City Council Meeting 2015). The presence of individuals at the hearing who participated in both electoral efforts to vote supportive city council members into office and then hold them accountable through a community-led public policy proposal, signified the formation of an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network in Arizona that mobilized local advocates from the ballot box through the legislative process.

The Phoenix City Council formally approved a municipal ID proposal in a narrow 5 to 4 vote in August of 2016 (Gardiner 2016, City of Phoenix 2016). However, the road to a city municipal ID was marred by nearly two years of opponent attempts to derail the proposal. During this time State Senator John Kavanagh, one of the primary sponsors of SB 1070, and other anti-immigrant legislators in Arizona, attempted to pass legislation that would ban municipalities from adopting local ID cards (Beard Rau 2016). By orchestrating testimony against the legislative proposals and protests at the state capitol, leaders of the One PHX ID Coalition successfully fended off many opponent attempts to stop municipal IDs. A bipartisan alliance of Republicans and Democrats in the State Senate killed some opponent legislation designed to prevent local ID programs in 2016. In an interview with a local news outlet, Viridiana Hernandez, the executive director of CNL, speculated that the bipartisan alliance formed because One PHX coalition advocacy persuaded legislators “that this was an anti-immigrant bill” and, after the negative press and economic hardship SB 1070 brought to Arizona, “some legislators on both sides are just tired of that” (Gardiner 2017).

Throughout its short tenure, the organizations that composed the Phoenix One ID Coalition demonstrated a commitment to all four suggestions for building an expansionist movement. First, core partner organizations like CNL and the One Arizona coalition, built alliances by internalizing a common movement past and emphasizing shared opponents. The Arizona coalitions were committed to grassroots community-led policies that centered economic, race, gender, and immigration justice and they pushed policies that most benefited disadvantaged subgroups like a municipal ID program and a statewide ballot initiative that raised the minimum wage. This commitment was driven both by a construction of a common political movement past that spanned the communities that composed the coalitions, and by necessity because, in Arizona, organizations that represent minority communities do not have the power to thwart opponents unless they act in coalition due to how the state's intersecting structural hierarchies delimit movement formation. Second, the new Arizona coalitions incorporated leaders and organizations from historically marginalized communities. The core organizations represented undocumented immigrants, low wage workers, and members of Arizona's LGBTQ migrant community. These leaders were strategically chosen in order to underscore the coalitions' commitment to multiple communities and to increase political capital of minority communities in the state. Third, the Arizona coalitions formed an institutionalized grassroots advocacy network that is composed of member-led organizations that created policy solutions from the bottom-up. There are also indications that this network was sometimes able to mobilize people across multiple political venues, from the ballot box to the city council to the state legislature.

Finally, the Arizona coalitions described here incorporate an expansionist commitment to political movement formation through a politics of solidarity. The coalitions occasionally refused compromises that harmed disadvantaged subgroups when strategically possible. This was

apparent in the One Phoenix ID Coalition when leaders withdrew their support of the city's municipal ID program after the city council failed to adequately address concerns that the program would place undocumented immigrants at greater risk of deportation. The Coalition pulled its support of the municipal ID program that the city decided to implement at one point because it seemed that the city might share information about undocumented immigrants collected through the program with federal immigration officials (Gardiner 2017) Coalition leaders likely decided that it was strategically important to withdraw their support because the municipal ID program might harm undocumented coalition partners, who were coalition leaders and some of the most effective local organizers. For this reason, coalition leader may have decided that it was more tactically important to withdraw support for the city ID program to maintain relationships with politically effective coalition members than to harm relationships that could threaten future political movement advances. The coalitions have also demonstrated their commitment to an expansionist view of the movement because they have sustained and grown through multiple campaigns in different venues. This is likely easier to do in Arizona than in other contexts because large, debilitating wins that can be constructed as ends are less possible in the intersecting structural hierarchies that delimit Arizona's political network. In a political environment where movement advocates lose the vast majority of the time, it may be easier to persuade coalition partners who face the constant barrage of attacks that campaign wins, when they come, are small advances that are unlikely to de-mobilize opponents.

The formation of inter- and intra- movement coalitions in Arizona have helped historically marginalized communities “move beyond the attacks and the defensive posture” that they were been forced into in the past in some circumstances, especially in the decade or so leading up to SB 1070. Grassroots organizing in Arizona conducted by coalitions that were

activated by SB 1070 appeared to be quickly moving towards the formation of an expansionist movement for social change that would not ossify around discrete rights-based wins. In a hostile context with politically powerful opponents, each win or victory, when it occurs is likely more obviously a small advance in a long-term struggle against hegemonic power. Most recently, Puente Movement, CNL, and LUCHA, grassroots organizations in Arizona that are part of the One Arizona and One PHX ID coalitions, formed People United for Justice, a political organization devoted to bringing “together communities most impacted by racism and xenophobia to fight against criminalization and police violence” (*People United for Justice* 2017). In 2016, while the nation was captivated by one of the most heated and politically volatile presidential campaigns in modern history, People United for Justice formed the Bazta Arpaio campaign in Maricopa County, Arizona. A play on the Spanish word for enough (¡Basta!) and the initials for the state of Arizona (AZ), the Bazta Arpaio campaign sought to remove Sheriff Joe Arpaio from office and elect Democrat Paul Penzone as the new Sheriff of Maricopa County. The campaign coalition was catalyzed by decades of attacks against local immigrant communities, queer and trans people, and communities of color orchestrated by Sheriff Arpaio, an infamous common opponent.

While many of the individuals who participated in the campaign were part of organizations that formed in the aftermath of SB 1070 in 2010, others had organized against Sheriff Joe Arpaio well before 2010, working with attorneys to help collect the evidence to take Arpaio to court for violating the civil rights of Latinx and immigrant residents. Arpaio’s abusive practices had taken a severe toll on these communities through heightened policing. According to many interviewees, community members joined organizations like Puente Movement out of necessity in order to mobilize for their own survival. These organizations helped stop many anti-

immigrant laws at the state legislature, and gathered the evidence necessary to prove that Arpaio's sheriff department engaged in racial profiling and unlawful traffic stops. For example, Puente Movement documented dozens of the abuses members Latinx and migrant communities faced during Arpaio's tenure in an interactive website timeline. The timeline includes both stories of police abuse, like the time that Sheriff Arpaio forced Alma Chacon to give birth while shackled to her hospital bed, and stories of community empowerment, like the 100,000-person march against SB 1070 in the May of 2010 (*Puente Movement* 2017). After wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on civil rights lawsuits, local organizers were able to persuade some conservative and moderate voters that Arpaio was economically harming the state – cutting against the “cheap and harsh punishment” political ethos internalized in Arizona. It finally seemed possible for Sheriff Arpaio to lose an election, and the grassroots movement in Arizona, following years of smaller electoral and public policy advances, was ready to usher him out of office.

With an old school bus painted red and a large blow up figure of Sheriff Arpaio in handcuffs and a prison uniform, the Bazta Arpaio campaign tirelessly worked to Get out the Vote for the November 2016 general election (Ollstein). In one memorable campaign tactic, Jerssay Arredondo and members of the Bazta Arpaio campaign and the local queer migrant community produced a music video remake of Selena Quintanilla's “Baila Esta Cumbia” with Arredondo, who goes by the stage name FreeDa Put@, in Selena drag (Rivas 2016).



Campaign organizer Francisco Luna in red lipstick driving the red Bazta Arpaio Campaign school bus (Photo and Caption Information Credit Jorge Rivas, *Fusion* 2016)



Photo of FreeDa Put@ from the music video shoot of “Vota Con Esta Cumbia!” (Photo and Caption Information Credit Jorge Rivas, *Fusion* 2016). The music video replaces Selena’s “Baila Esta Cumbia” with lyrics urging the community to get out the vote: Siento algo que me mueve, un ritmo de mi comunidad. Tomen todos sus parejas, todos vamos a votar. Vota. Vota este Noviembre para, para sacar al Arpaio. Todos lo podemos lograr y va-vamos a ganar! [I feel something that moves me, a rhythm of my community. Take all your partners, together we are going to vote. Vote. Vote this November to remove Arpaio. We can do it together and we are going to win! Vote. Vote with this Cumbia. (FreeDa Put@ 2016, Translated by Author)]

The 2016 presidential election was a historic win for the Republican party, with presidential candidate Donald Trump winning large segments of the American electorate through a campaign that centered the same anti-immigrant rhetoric of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. But in Maricopa County, despite the nationwide surge in pro-Trump voters, Arpaio, a cross-community opponent who helped make inter-and intra-movement alliances possible in Arizona, lost his election. Sheriff Arpaio's loss, ushered in by inter- and intra-movement coalition formation in Arizona, is indicative of how political movement expansion is sometimes possible despite counter-movement organization imposed losses and intersecting structural hierarchies that delimit the opportunities available for movement advocates.

Conclusion

How rights often function in movements for social change is complex. Much of the scholarship on law and social change has tended toward either/or explanations of how rights impact movements. For most scholars, rights either fragment and individualize problems or they serve as important resources for resolving longstanding inequalities. My take-away from this study is that rights advocacy moments are often paradoxical in that they have both harmful and beneficial effects in political movements for social change. Scholars should also focus on the formation of coalitions within and across movements rather than only on a small set of organizations that claim to represent an entire movement in order to understand the multidimensional and paradoxical ways that rights operate within movements. Through examining coalition formation, I have focused on the role of rights advocacy in political movement formation in two state contexts. Yet, nothing in this study suggests that rights

advocacy is the only type of movement advocacy that works in paradoxical ways. Rather, this study suggests that the process of determining which issues to pursue and which narratives will serve as a movement's core can have paradoxical effects on the various communities that compose a movement, regardless of whether or not rights are involved.

We often think about movements as entities that represent the interests of one community or population; however, to form a powerful expansionist political movement, communities must often mobilize beyond individual subject positions, forming genuine alliances among groups that hold seemingly conflicting interests. This study has begun to illuminate how analyzing the formation of coalitions across and within organizations that represent the LGBTQ, immigrant, and labor communities can reveal the paradoxical components of rights-based movement advocacy. In doing so, I have shown that movements are not always best understood as unitary, homogenous entities that only represent one community, but rather can be seen as dynamic, multifaceted entities that form through tensions about what goals a movement should pursue, what values and stories should compose the narratives at a movement's core, and who a movement should represent.

In examining movement formation, I have strived to center the experiences of local organization leaders and community workers. This has allowed me to engage in an empirical study of the dynamics that shape grassroots inter- and intra-movement coalitions in two state settings with the combination of similarity and variance necessary to form a generalizable theory about the role of rights advocacy in grassroots political movements in some local settings in the United States. However, the process of engaging in a contextualized examination of grassroots movement building has also revealed that movements differ tremendously depending on the local political network. Thus, although I have highlighted some factors that contribute to movement

expansion and contraction, this is not meant to be a comprehensive study of grassroots movements in all settings. Instead, the goal of this study is to call attention to the need to study movements in local rather than national settings alone across intersectionally divergent communities and to reflect upon and elevate the voices of grassroots actors who are engaged in community building rather than organizational elites who are not embedded in the local communities that they claim to represent. Consequently, it is my hope that this study will encourage future scholars into grassroots movement building that is based in the experiences of intersectionally marginalized people. Future scholars can accomplish this through reflexive research that gives back to marginalized communities when they are the subject of study while centering their narratives in theorizing political movements for social change from the bottom-up.

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Appendix I

Interview Protocols

Appendix I includes the interview protocols that I used while conducting interviews in Washington State and Arizona from between December of 2014 and October of 2015. The protocols focused on LGBTQ, Latinx, and immigrant advocacy coalitions. In each state, I interviewed LGBTQ, Latinx, and immigrant movement advocates and labor movement advocates who participated in these advocacy coalitions. I interviewed labor movement advocates as well because my preliminary research identifies labor movement advocates and organizers as key coalition partners and because interviewees often suggested that I interview labor movement advocates when I asked them to suggest other study participants at the end of each interview.

I. Washington State

Interview Protocol I: Organization Leaders

Reference Number: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ to _____

Interviewee: _____

Job Title: _____

Organization: _____

Contact Information: _____

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I know that you're very busy and I am grateful for your time. The purpose of this interview is to get some additional information about your work with LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant rights advocacy. The interview will take about 45 minutes (or less upon request). I will start with a few general questions about your involvement with local organizations, followed by some questions about social and political activities you've participated in.

Before I begin, I want to make sure it's all right with you if I tape this interview. Anything you say will, of course, be kept completely anonymous if you would prefer. The information that I am collecting will be used only for my own research. Do you have any questions before I start?

General Organization Questions

I'd like to begin with just a few background questions about your involvement with [organization name].

- (1) How did you first get involved and active with [organization]?
- (2) How large is [organization]?
- (3) What do you think are the goals and aims of [organization] in your own words?
- (4) What is [organization's] general structure?
 - (a) Is it a 501(c)(3) organization, a 501(c)(4), or another type of organization?
 - (i) [Ask if the Organization Uses An Alternative Model] what is the philosophy behind this alternative organizational model?
 - (b) What are your organization's primary funding sources?
 - (c) If possible, can you tell me what [organization's] annual budget is?

General Social and Political Advocacy

Now I'd like to talk about your social and political advocacy.

- (5) What are the biggest problems facing the LGBTQ community in the state and nationwide? What about the Latino community? What about immigrant communities?
 - (a) What social and political advocacy has your organization done to address these problems?
 - (6) What are some of the biggest issues your organization has been involved with in the past?
 - (a) What advocacy has your organization done on behalf of these issues?

Coalition Work: LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant Alliances

Next, I would like to discuss how your organization has worked with other groups.

- (7) What organizations do you see as allies?
- (8) On what issues does [organization] work on with other local [Latino/Immigrant/LGBTQ] organizations?
 - (a) How much of [organization's] energy is devoted to these issues?
 - (b) How long has [organization] worked on these issues?
 - (C) Did you face any challenges, obstacles, or pushback from [organization] members and/or staff when you first began to work on these issues?

- (a) [If Answer Yes] how did you overcome these challenges?
- (b) [If Answer No] Why don't you think you faced any challenges with [organization] members when you first began to work on these issues?
- (d) What did you do in order to convince others to work with your organization on these cross-community issues?
- (9) After looking doing some background research on your organization, I've seen that you've worked with other LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant groups on the following events: [list several concrete events]. Did any of your members react negatively when you announced that you were working on these events or did they have difficulty seeing how these events aligned with your group's mission?
- (10) How have local cases like *Anderson v. King County* (the 2006 statewide same-sex marriage case) or legislation like the Washington DREAM Act (the 2014 legislative act expanding educational access to undocumented immigrant youth) impacted your activism? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this legislation?
- (a) What about Referendum 71 (the domestic partner/ "everything but marriage" law)? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this referendum?
- (b) What about Referendum 74 (the marriage equality law)? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this referendum?
- (c) What about the Washington Family Unity Act (HB 1716), a proposed Washington law that ensures that local law enforcement agencies are focused on their primary missions of serving and protecting the community, instead of immigration enforcement? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this legislation?
- (d) What about the legal actions surrounding the Tacoma's Northwest Detention Center Hunger Strike? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this event?
- (11) What do you think are the most effective tactics for accomplishing social change?
- (12) What role do you think the law plays in movements for social change?
- (13) Are there any [LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant] issues your organization has decided not to work on or devotes less time and energy on due to resource constraints?
- (14) What do you think are some of the benefits and constraints of coalition [or campaign] work you've been involved with in the past?

Interview Wrap-Up

- (15) Do you have any organization archives (like emails, press releases, pamphlets, flyers, or

organization publications) that I might look through for my research?

(16) Finally, can you suggest any other members of the community who might be interested in an interview?

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I really value having had the opportunity to hear your experiences and you have provided me with crucial information for my project.

Interview Protocol II: Protocol for Local Advocates

Reference Number: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ to _____

Interviewee: _____

Job Title: _____

Organization(s): _____

Contact Information: _____

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I know that you're very busy and I am grateful for your time. The purpose of this interview is to get some additional information about your work with LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant rights advocacy. The interview will take about 45 minutes (or less upon request). I will start with a few general questions about your involvement with local organizations, followed by some questions about social and political activities you've participated in.

Before I begin, I want to make sure it's all right with you if I tape this interview. Anything you say will, of course, be kept completely anonymous if you would prefer. The information that I am collecting will be used only for my own research. Do you have any questions before I start?

General Organization Questions

I'd like to begin with just a few background questions about your involvement with any local organizations.

- (1) Which local organizations have you worked with?
- (2) How long have you been active with these organizations?
- (3) How would you describe the goals and aims of these organizations in your own words? Which populations/communities do these organizations' serve?

General Social and Political Advocacy

Now I'd like to talk about your social and political advocacy.

(4) What are the biggest problems facing the LGBTQ community in the state and nationwide? What about the Latino community? What about immigrant communities?

(a) What social and political advocacy, if any, have you done on behalf of these problems?

(b) How do you think this advocacy has helped address these problems? Has any advocacy exacerbated these problems?

(5) What are some of the biggest issues (other than those already described) that you have been involved with in the past?

(a) What advocacy have you done on behalf of these issues if any?

(b) How do you think this advocacy contributed to social change?

Coalition Work: LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant Alliances

Next, I would like to discuss how your work with others on advocacy that impacts the LGBTQ, Latino, and immigrant rights communities.

(6) Just a moment ago, I asked you about your advocacy on LGBT, Latino, and immigrant rights issues separately. Are there any issues you've worked on that you believe impact these communities collectively?

(a) How long have you worked on these issues?

(c) Did you face any challenges or obstacles when you first began to work on these issues?

(a) [If Answer Yes] how did you overcome these challenges?

(b) [If Answer No] why don't you think you faced any challenges when you first began to work on these issues?

(7) Did any of the other organization members or people in your life react negatively when they found out that you were working on events that impact the LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant communities? Why or why not?

(8) Did anyone have difficulty seeing how the issues you've described aligned with their other advocacy (including their prior LGBTQ activism, Latino, or immigrant rights activism)? Why or Why not?

(9) How have local cases like *Anderson v. King County* (the 2006 statewide same-sex marriage case) or legislation like the Washington DREAM Act (the 2014 legislative act expanding educational access to undocumented immigrant youth) impacted your activism? Did you

participate in any advocacy around these cases or legislation?

(a) What about Referendum 71 (the domestic partner/ “everything but marriage” law)? Did you participate in any advocacy around this referendum?

(b) What about Referendum 74 (the marriage equality law)? Did you participate in any advocacy around this referendum?

(c) What about the Washington Family Unity Act (HB 1716), a proposed Washington law that ensures that local law enforcement agencies are focused on their primary missions of serving and protecting the community, instead of immigration enforcement? Did you participate in any advocacy around this legislation?

(d) What about the legal actions surrounding the Tacoma’s Northwest Detention Center Hunger Strike? Did you participate in any advocacy around this event?

(10) What do you think are the most effective tactics for accomplishing social change?

(11) What role do you think the law plays in movements for social change?

(12) Are there any [LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant] issues you have decided not to work on or devote less time and energy on due to resource constraints?

(13) What do you think are some of the benefits and constraints of coalition [or campaign] work you’ve been involved with in the past?

Interview Wrap-Up

(14) Do you have any organization archives (like emails, press releases, pamphlets, flyers, or organization publications) that I might look through for my research?

(15) Finally, can you suggest any other members of the community who might be interested in an interview?

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I really value having had the opportunity to hear your experiences and you have provided me with crucial information for my project.

II. Arizona

Interview Protocol I: Organization Leaders

Reference Number: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ to _____

Interviewee: _____

Job Title: _____

Organization: _____

Contact Information: _____

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I know that you're very busy and I am grateful for your time. The purpose of this interview is to get some additional information about your work with LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant rights advocacy. The interview will take about 45 minutes (or less upon request). I will start with a few general questions about your involvement with local organizations, followed by some questions about social and political activities you've participated in.

Before I begin, I want to make sure it's all right with you if I tape this interview. Anything you say will, of course, be kept completely anonymous if you would prefer. The information that I am collecting will be used only for my own research. Do you have any questions before I start?

General Organization Questions

I'd like to begin with just a few background questions about your involvement with [organization].

- (1) How did you first get involved and active with [organization]?
- (2) How large is [organization]?
- (3) What do you think are the goals and aims of [organization] in your own words?
- (4) What is [organization's] general structure?
 - (a) Is it a 501(c)(3) organization, a 501(c)(4), or another type of organization?
 - (i) [Ask if the Organization Uses An Alternative Model] what is the philosophy behind this alternative organizational model?
 - (b) What are your organization's primary funding sources?
 - (c) If possible, can you tell me what [organization's] annual budget is?

General Social and Political Advocacy

Now I'd like to talk about your social and political advocacy.

- (5) What are the biggest problems facing the LGBTQ community in the state and nationwide?

What about the Latino community? What about immigrant communities?

(a) What social and political advocacy has your organization done to address these problems?

(6) What are some of the biggest issues your organization has been involved with in the past?

(a) What advocacy has your organization done on behalf of these issues?

Coalition Work: LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant Alliances

Next, I would like to discuss how your organization has worked with other groups.

(7) What organizations do you see as allies?

(8) On what issues does [organization] work on with other local [Latino/Immigrant/LGBTQ] organizations?

(a) How much of [organization's] energy is devoted to these issues?

(b) How long has [organization] worked on these issues?

(c) Did you face any challenges, obstacles, or pushback from [organization] members and/or staff when you first began to work on these issues?

(a) [If Answer Yes] how did you overcome these challenges?

(b) [If Answer No] Why don't you think you faced any challenges with [organization] members when you first began to work on these issues?

(d) What did you do in order to convince others to work with your organization on these cross-community issues?

(9) After looking doing some background research on your organization, I've seen that you've worked with other LGBTQ/Latino/immigrant groups on the following events: [list several concrete events]. Did any of your members react negatively when you announced that you were working on these events or did they have difficulty seeing how these events aligned with your group's mission?

(10) How has legislation like SB 1070 (the 2010 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act) impacted your activism? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this legislation?

(a) What about the federal lawsuit (*Arizona v. United States*) challenging SB 1070? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this lawsuit?

(b) What about SB 1062 (the 2014 attempt to give individuals and businesses the ability to refuse

service based on religious beliefs)? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this legislation?

(c) What about Proposition 200, the Voter ID law passed in 2004? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this proposition?

(d) What about the legal actions charging the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department with racial profiling? Did you work with any other organizations on advocacy surrounding these legal actions?

(e) What about the Why Marriage Matters Arizona Campaign? Did your organization participate in any advocacy surrounding this campaign?

(11) What do you think are the most effective tactics for accomplishing social change?

(12) What role do you think the law plays in movements for social change?

(13) Are there any [LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant] issues your organization has decided not to work on or devotes less time and energy on due to resource constraints?

(14) What do you think are some of the benefits and constraints of coalition [or campaign] work you've been involved with in the past?

Interview Wrap-Up

(15) Do you have any organization archives (like emails, press releases, pamphlets, flyers, or organization publications) that I might look through for my research?

(16) Finally, can you suggest any other members of the community who might be interested in an interview?

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I really value having had the opportunity to hear your experiences and you have provided me with crucial information for my project.

Interview Protocol II: Protocol for Local Advocates

Reference Number: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ to _____

Interviewee: _____

Job Title: _____

Organization(s): _____

Contact Information: _____

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I know that you're very busy and I am grateful for your time. The purpose of this interview is to get some additional information about your work with LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant rights advocacy. The interview will take about 45 minutes (or less upon request). I will start with a few general questions about your involvement with local organizations, followed by some questions about social and political activities you've participated in.

Before I begin, I want to make sure it's all right with you if I tape this interview. Anything you say will, of course, be kept completely anonymous if you would prefer. The information that I am collecting will be used only for my own research. Do you have any questions before I start?

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- (3) How would you describe the goals and aims of these organizations in your own words? Which populations/communities do these organizations' serve?

General Social and Political Advocacy

Now I'd like to talk about your social and political advocacy.

- (4) What are the biggest problems facing the LGBTQ community in the state and nationwide? What about the Latino community? What about immigrant communities?
 - (a) What social and political advocacy, if any, have you done on behalf of these problems?
 - (b) How do you think this advocacy has helped address these problems? Has any advocacy exacerbated these problems?
- (5) What are some of the biggest issues (other than those already described) that you have been involved with in the past?
 - (a) What advocacy have you done on behalf of these issues if any?
 - (b) How do you think this advocacy contributed to social change?

Coalition Work: LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant Alliances

Next, I would like to discuss how your work with others on advocacy that impacts the LGBTQ,

Latino, and immigrant rights communities.

(6) Just a moment ago, I asked you about your advocacy on LGBT, Latino, and immigrant rights issues separately. Are there any issues you've worked on that you believe impact these communities collectively?

(a) How long have you worked on these issues?

(c) Did you face any challenges or obstacles when you first began to work on these issues?

(a) [If Answer Yes] how did you overcome these challenges?

(b) [If Answer No] why don't you think you faced any challenges when you first began to work on these issues?

(7) Did any of the other organization members or people in your life react negatively when they found out that you were working on events that impact the LGBTQ, Latino, and/or immigrant communities? Why or why not?

(8) Did anyone have difficulty seeing how the issues you've described aligned with their other advocacy (including their prior LGBTQ activism, Latino, or immigrant rights activism)? Why or Why not?

(9) How has legislation like SB 1070 (the 2010 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act) impacted your activism? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this legislation? Did you participate in any advocacy around this legislation?

(a) What about the federal lawsuit (*Arizona v. United States*) challenging SB 1070? Did you work with any other organizations on actions surrounding this lawsuit?

(b) What about SB 1062 (the 2014 attempt to give individuals and businesses the ability to refuse service based on religious beliefs)? Did you participate in any advocacy surrounding this legislation?

(c) What about Proposition 200, the Voter ID law passed in 2004? Did you participate in any advocacy surrounding this proposition?

(d) What about the legal actions charging the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department with racial profiling? Did you participate in any advocacy surrounding these legal actions?

(e) What about the Why Marriage Matters Arizona Campaign? Did you participate in any advocacy surrounding this campaign?

(10) What do you think are the most effective tactics for accomplishing social change?

(11) What role do you think the law plays in movements for social change?

(12) Are there any [LGBTQ/Latino/Immigrant] issues you have decided not to work on or devote less time and energy on due to resource constraints?

(13) What do you think are some of the benefits and constraints of coalition [or campaign] work you've been involved with in the past?

Interview Wrap-Up

(14) Do you have any organization archives (like emails, press releases, pamphlets, flyers, or organization publications) that I might look through for my research?

(15) Finally, can you suggest any other members of the community who might be interested in an interview?

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I really value having had the opportunity to hear your experiences and you have provided me with crucial information for my project.