Leading the March:
The Role of Latino Religion in the Immigrant Rights Movement

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ABSTRACT

As the Latino population living in the US continues to increase, these new residents are adjusting to life in a new host country in a way that merges their religious beliefs and social ties, which has the potential to result in engagement in unconventional political participation. Following the 2006 surge in immigrant rights marches, scholars of this movement continue to discover how this otherwise marginalized population was so effectively mobilized. While native-born Americans perceive a very distinct border between church and state, Latino immigrants and clergy effectively erased this boundary by using the social capital provided by membership in a congregation to engage Latinos, both citizens and undocumented, in the national discussion of immigrant rights by marching.

INTRO

Much like the influence of the Irish on American Catholicism in the 1800s, recent immigrants have been successful at "Latinoizing" Christianity, and Catholicism more specifically (Levitt 2006). In fact, without this wave of immigration, Catholic membership would be suffering; foreign-born Latinos make up 40% of America's Catholic population (Levitt 2006, Putnam and Campbell 2010). It is a long-held, sacred American notion that church and state are and should undoubtedly be separate; as Peggy Levitt points out, "…most Americans treat religion and culture as more distinct than they actually are. Many immigrants come from places where religion and culture go hand in hand" (2006). The understanding of the relationship that religion has to politics in the immigrants' home country does not disappear once the immigrants set foot in the new home country. Religion is often a vital tool utilized to build the foundation of what it is to be American for an immigrant (Levitt 2008, Hirschman 2004, Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000).

The Latino population in the United States has recently been of interest to various groups, and the attention paid to this particular group is likely to develop in the coming years. Growing at a rate that exceeds most other ethnic groups residing in the US, Latinos are poised to become a majority by 2050, according to Pew Research Center. Further, almost half (45%) of the nation's

Hispanic population claim residency in a handful of metropolitan areas, with the largest populations residing in Los Angeles, California and the New York-New Jersey metro[1]. In two areas of the country, the Latino population accounts for over 90% of the population: of those residing in Laredo, TX, 96% are Latino and 91% of the residents of the McAllen-Mission-Edinburg, TX metro area identify as Latino, largely of Mexican heritage[2].

Further, 2006 data indicates that Latinos residing in the US are young: the average age of this population is 27, while the average age of whites is 40, and the average age of native-born Hispanics is just 17[3]. As of 2006, 64% of Latinos residing the US are of Mexican heritage; the next largest sub-group includes those who claim Puerto Rican ancestry/nativity at just 9%[4]. Latinos living in the US are also religious: 68% identify as Catholic and 19% identify as Protestant, according to data compiled by Pew[5].

This group, largely comprised of young, fairly religious urban dwellers, is often reduced by campaign managers and politicians to "the Latino vote," and it seems were successfully courted by the Democratic Party in the most recent presidential election with the re-election of President Obama[6]. According to the Pew Research Hispanic Center, this growing ethnic bloc will "account for 40% of the growth in the eligible electorate in the U.S. between now and 2030, at which time 40 million Hispanics will be eligible to vote, up from 23.7 million now[7]." The power of this "minority" is becoming more evident as Latino issues, in particular the discussion

[1] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/09/19/characteristics-of-the-60-largest-metropolitan-areas-by-hispanic-population/
[2] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/09/19/characteristics-of-the-60-largest-metropolitan-areas-by-hispanic-population/
[3] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2008/01/23/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-2006/2006-statistical-portrait-08/
[4] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2008/01/23/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-2006/2006-statistical-portrait-05/
[5] Dataset, Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion, 2006
[6] http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/2013/1/8/latino_inaugural_2013_celebrates_obamas_reelection.htm
[7] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/14/an-awakened-giant-the-hispanic-electorate-is-likely-to-double-by-2030/

of immigrant rights, have been gaining exposure in the mainstream media. In 2006, the immigrant rights movement reached a peak, when demonstrations were held all over the country in defiance of pending legislation that would make being (or assisting) an unauthorized immigrant a felony. The re-invigoration of this movement was not coincidental; the numbers of undocumented immigrants living in the US reached a peak of 11.3 million in 2006[8].

The marches of early 2006, referred to as the "Primavera de los Inmigrantes" (the Spring of the Immigrants) by Flores-Gonzalez and Gutierrez (2010), were the culmination of an increasing immigrant presence in the US and reaction to stringent immigration legislation proposed in 2005. In January 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a guest worker program, which would offer undocumented immigrants working and living in the US a temporary 3-year visa, which, once expired, would require the holders to return to their home country[9]. Ideally meant to curtail the numbers of "undocumented" immigrants coming to the US, the program inadvertently led to a surge in illegal border crossings[10]: the undocumented population in the US increased by nearly 1 million between 2004 and 2005[11].

In December of 2005, the US House of Representatives passed HR 4437, or what was known more commonly as the Sensenbrenner Bill (sponsored by Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-WI and Rep. Peter King, R-NY) [12], which made being an undocumented immigrant a felony. The bill also required that anyone providing a service or assistance to immigrants demand proof of citizenship prior to administering the service[13]. 'Assistance' qualifying as a felony under the proposed law included everything from very literally helping immigrants to cross the border

[8] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/unauthorized-immigrants-11-1-million-in-2011/
[9] http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/07/bush.immigration/
[10] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/28/AR2005062801135.html
[11] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/unauthorized-immigrants-11-1-million-in-2011/
[12] http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/summary-of-the-sensenbrenner-immigration-bill.aspx
[13] http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/summary-of-the-sensenbrenner-immigration-bill.aspx

illegally to serving them a hot meal as a volunteer in a soup kitchen. This meant that everyone from well-meaning friends to priests and doctors could face arrest for a simple interaction. While the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (HR 4437) did not pass in the Senate, it did spark a response from the Latino community as well as from large numbers of their supporters, including Catholic leadership. Voss and Bloemraad (2011) assert that the 2006 marches "…arose [rapidly], in part, due to the loose network of local groups who received support from actors like the media or Catholic Church; organizations that could send widespread messages about the protests" (4).

Thanks in part to an operation put together by the US Council of Catholic Bishops in 2005 called the JFI (Justice for Immigrants) campaign, the Catholic Church's role in the 2006 marches was swift and well-organized (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). The JFI was "designed to unite and mobilize a growing network of Catholic institutions, individuals, and other persons of good faith is support of a broad legalization program and comprehensive immigration reform principles" (Voss and Bloemraad 2011, 105). Pointing to the effectiveness of dioceses as localized sources of power, Voss and Bloemraad (2011) identify a dual purpose served by the efforts of the JFI: first, the message provided legitimacy to the activist congregations already pursuing legislation reform and second, the message specified a tangible outlet for the congregations that were not as politically inclined to pursue "living their faith" (106).

The first march of 2006, held in Chicago, was organized by several associations, including a Chicago minuteman chapter, local Spanish-language DJs, labor unions, a collection of individual activists known as the March 10 coalition, and University of Illinois-Chicago faculty, as well as clergy, such as Father Marco Cardenas, pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Roman Catholic Church (Pallares 2010). Davis, Martinez, and Warner (Pallares and Flores-

Gonzalez 2010), in a qualitative analysis of the May 1, 2006 march held in Chicago, found that the Catholic Church promoted parishioner involvement in various ways and concluded that "the [church] is an important—perhaps the most important—institutional vehicle for the mass mobilization of Chicago's Mexican Americans" (93). Davis, et al, report that in the days leading up to march, various priests and clergy did utilize the pulpit to encourage church members to participate in the march (2010). The clergy also engaged tactics of "indirect encouragement", by "making known their opposition to anti-immigrant legislation and support for immigrant rights and urging employers to allow workers to take the afternoon off" (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010).

Cardinal Roger Mahony, former archbishop of Los Angeles, in his 2006 Ash Wednesday address, called on Catholics and clergy around the nation to defy HR 4437 should Congress successfully pass the bill into law. In an interview with the LA Times, Cardinal Mahoney said, "If you take this to its logical, ludicrous extreme, every single person who comes up to receive Holy Communion, you have to ask them to show papers. It becomes absurd and the church is not about to get into that. The church is here to serve people…we're not about to become immigration agents" (Los Angeles Times, "Immigrants Gain the Pulpit", March 1, 2006).

In the months following these calls to action, there was a boon of immigrant rights marches around the country. Referred to as "mega-marches", these gatherings were organized in cities throughout the US, with a message that was twofold: outright rejection of HR 4437 and a call for generalized immigration reform. An estimated 100,000 people attended the first mega-march, which occurred in Chicago on March 10, 2006 (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010). From March 24 through March 31, 2006, 6 more mega-marches took place in several cities

across the country: including Phoenix, Los Angeles, Nashville, Houston and Las Vegas[14]. The March 25 protest in Los Angeles is the largest on record, with over 500,000 people in attendance (New York Times, "Strategy Sessions Fueled Immigrant Marches", April 12, 2006) and was led by Cardinal Mahoney[15]. On April 10, 2006, 102 cities across the nation held marches, and on May 1, 2006 (also known as "A Day without an Immigrant" or "The Great American Boycott"), Latinos were encouraged to boycott schools and businesses in order to demonstrate the pivotal role immigrants play in local and state economies (New York Times, "Immigrants Take to US Streets in Show of Strength, May 2, 2006).

While the political efficacy for naturalized or native-born citizens lay in their power to cast votes, where did that leave those who would be more personally affected by such legislation? How would their voices be heard? And, who would guide them? Pallares and Flores-Gonzales, authors of Marcha: Latino Chicago and the Immigrant Rights Movement (2010), point to the concept of "substantive citizenship," which they define as "encouraging immigrants…to act as citizens by assuming new rights and responsibilities" (xxv). Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez (2010) also highlight the role the church leadership plays for those who are unable to take to the polls: "church activism cannot be taken for granted" (xxv).

In the most recent quest for liberty through civil rights, Latino immigrants to the United States have called upon a kind of faith-based morality in this pursuit, which appears to have been effectively cultivated and mobilized by organized religion; what Palacios (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2006) calls "faith-based community organizing." Immigrant religion has long been a tool for newcomers to assert access to rights, to mobilize, and to find their place as residents of a new country (Hirschman 2004, Hondagneu-Sotelo 2006, Hondagneu-Sotelo 2004, Leonard, et al

[14] http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/28/immigration/index.html
[15] http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/26/local/me-immig26

2005, Badillo 2006, Dolan 1975, Levitt 2008). Organized religion has also served marginalized and second-class citizens in similar ways; for example, the role the Black church played in the civil rights movement was pivotal to the success of that variety of social reform (Billingsley 1999, Harris 1991, Secret, et al 1990, Williams 2002). During the migration of the Irish to the US, the Catholic Church was both a familiar taste of home and a vehicle for adjustment to the new world (Dolan 1975). More recently, leaders of the Catholic Church have called upon their disenfranchised and undocumented Latino congregants to join the immigrant rights movement through the effective framing of the struggle for citizenship in a religious context (Voss and Bloemraad 2011).

For US citizens, these marches served as one choice from a buffet of democratic options to demonstrate to the federal government their desire for immigration reform. However, for those who were undocumented, these marches were likely the only way to make their demands known, despite the fact that marching is a risky endeavor. Various institutions, especially the Catholic Church, have encouraged these "pre-citizens" (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2006) to act in ways that demonstrate their desires, regardless of their citizenship status. While voting and other democratic processes are generally out of the question for non-citizens, participation in marches hypothetically is not; protest participation is a type of "substantive citizenship," as previously defined by Davis, Martinez and Warner (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010). When church leadership equates being a good citizen with being a good Christian, then citizenship pursuits align with religious and moral incentives.

This "lived religion" (Badillo 2006, Cadge & Ecklund 2007) approach described above is helpful towards understanding some part of the institutional mechanisms in place that influence the proliferation of these marches. However, the purpose of this paper is to move beyond an

aggregation of individuals with the right type of structural circumstances (Snow, et al. 1980, McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993) or collective identity (Poletta & Jasper 2001, Wimmer 2008, Cadge & Ecklund 2007). The goal of this project is to assess the relationship between religious *institutions* and the mobilization of certain populations. Generally, which factors correlate with the demonstration of substantive citizenship? Specifically, which aspects of an individual's institutional membership are most highly associated with participation in rights marches?

The data analyzed here demonstrate the relationship between the propensity to protest and organized religion is not simply about individual religious affiliation. Previous literature (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010, Badillo 2006, Voss and Bloemraad 2011, Cadge and Ecklund 2007, Hondagneu-Sotelo, et al 2004) demonstrates that Catholics are more likely to protest, but why? The research furthered here indicates that attitudes and religious values are inadequate to explain the behavior of interest. I propose that an individual's membership in a particular kind of religious organization is the most salient in predicting whether the individual pursues participation in this kind of collective action. Utilizing a dataset comprised of survey responses collected in the months following the mega-marches, the models presented here test the association between membership in an activated congregation and the outcome variable, participation in an IRM (immigrant rights march). The goal is to move beyond the simplified explanations that focus on attributes, such as ethnicity or citizenship status, which generally lack explanatory power, and further examine particular sociological variables that perhaps can say more about the processes at work in the community of interest. In sum, the model proposed here builds upon models of personal attributes to show how organizational ties and social capital

matter for mobilization. Particularly, I propose that congregational-level variables matter far more than denominational membership.

RELIGION AND CIVIC EMPOWERMENT IN THE US

The Catholic Church and Irish Immigrants

Hirschman (2004) describes the strengthening of the relationship between the Irish and the Catholic Church, a relationship that later had effects in the US. Hirschman attributes the Irish Famine as a primary catalyst in the conversion of many "nominal Irish Catholics" into devout practitioners. Not only did the famine wreak havoc on the poorest and least religious, altering the country's stratification, but altered the proportions of available clergy to congregants. Hirschman also cites improvement in the middle class welfare in the years following the Famine, leading to an uptick in tithing. The Devotional Revolution, "which began with the reform of the Church and led to the transformation of nominal Catholics into practicing Catholics within a generation" (Hirschman 2004), was the starting point for two reasons why the Irish Catholic Church was so robust in the States during the 19th century. First, the American Catholic Church became heavily Irish not due solely to its congregants' ethnicity, but because much of the members of the hierarchy were exported from Ireland. Second, Catholicism was the main cultural marker, which separated the Irish from the English; religious affiliation became the primary identity (Hirschman 2004).

Jay P. Dolan, author of *The Immigrant Church* (1975), also describes the pivotal relationship between 19th century Irish immigrants and the Catholic Church in the United States. Much like the German immigrants did, the Irish toted their religion, heroes and devotions to the States. Dolan links the strength of the immigrant church as stemming from the importance of

Catholicism in the homeland: “In Ireland, the priests were not only the spiritual functionaries, …[but also] trusted leaders of the people.” In New York, the Church’s hierarchy counted many Irish priests among its ranks. This power, Dolan argues, characterized the Irish-American Catholic Church as a “union of God and country”, which likely would not have been as strong without the persecution perpetuated by the many Protestants and their leadership. Dolan writes that the Irish-American press helped to cement awareness: “The Irish-American press reflected this sense of group-consciousness; by emphasizing the religious and ethnic distinctiveness of its readers it reinforced their self-identity at a time when they were under severe criticism in the United States” (1975).

Foner and Alba (2008) corroborate Dolan’s narrative; describing “deep-seated and virulent anti-Catholic nativism” in the New World, courtesy of “established” Protestants. Religions which did not qualify as strictly Protestant had two options: either exist separately from a dominant society deeply infused with Protestant ideals (e.g. the creation of Catholic schools) or go underground, restricted to private belief (e.g. American Judaism) (Foner and Alba 2008).

The Black Church and Civil Rights

The history between the black church and social reform tells of a long lineage of reverends, ministers and other church officials who guided their communities to improvements in their secular circumstances. Billingsley (1999) and Morris (1984) describe the role the black church played in the days and years following emancipation as catalytic towards improving the lot of an otherwise disenfranchised community. Morris (1984) writes: “churches provided them movement with an organized mass base; a leadership of clergymen largely economically

independent of the larger white society and…meeting places where the masses …collectively committed themselves to the struggle" (4).

Additionally, these ethnic religious enclaves provided a space for individuals to discover and cultivate various talents, from musical ability to leadership and public speaking skills. Billingsley reflects upon his days as a church-going youth in the late 1950s: "The St. James Baptist Church was a warm and caring place that nurtured emotional and spiritual growth as well as latent talent in its members. It gave me the opportunity to sing in the choir, to play my trombone, to teach Sunday school, and to stand before the congregation giving reports on current events" (1999, 3). The community provided by the church easily lent itself as fertile ground for the creation of the future leaders of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. This characterization of the church as inherently racial helps to explain its role in politics: "For Blacks, church is a part of their racial experience and therefore a politically important factor in fostering their worldview and thereby their political values" (Secret, et al. 1990, 6).

Billingsley's account of the post-emancipation church details a "resolute" movement into community action to provide various services for newly freed congregants. Primary areas of reform included "education, economic development, and politics" (1999, 35). The church in Savannah, Georgia, in particular, was an early reformer in the days following emancipation, and, Billingsley argues, "as agent of social reform reached its zenith during the civil rights era" (1999, 53). The most prominent and well-known activist, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., had his beginnings as a clergyman, as did Malcom X (a Muslim minister). The tradition continues with notable ministers Rev. Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson, both of whom are well-known faces of the present day movement. While the benefits of a safe community are vital, the sociological importance of leadership is not lost on Billingsley, who defines activist churches as those with

"strong and resourceful pastors [which] were more likely to respond to crisis in the community" (1999, 95). Morris (1984) agrees that the role of clergy was vital to the proliferation of the movement: "common church culture…could not provide the kind of social network that would be necessary to launch mass movements…that need was satisfied by interaction among the clergymen who headed the various churches" (11). In essence, the pulpit was, and perhaps still is, "a reliable channel for disseminating information [that] greatly enhance[d] the possibility for mass action…free from white economic pressures" (Morris 1984).

According to Cecil L. Murray, senior minister of the First A.M.E. church of Los Angeles, "The days of coming to church for personal salvation are over. Now we are looking not only for personal salvation but social salvation" (Billingsley 1999). Fredrick C. Harris (1991) defends Billingsley's account sociologically, utilizing his examination of 1987 GSS data to argue against the Marxist claim of religion as opiate, especially in the black community. Harris maintains: "religious beliefs and practices promote political mobilization rather than deter mobilization…[this challenges] the claim that religion in general is anti-political, anti-participatory, and an opiate of mass political consciousness" (65). Specifically, Harris' data indicate activism within the church is a strong predictor of voter participation, with the strongest relationship appearing in the black church-going community versus their white counterparts (1991). Williams (2002), author of *Politicized Religious Beliefs and the Civil Rights Movement*, agrees, contending that motivation to participate in political action is not simply driven by self-interest, and highlight the importance of religious culture and leadership. Williams (2002) finds: "churches with ministers and key congregants involved in activist networks were more likely to interpret church content in activist ways as opposed to those congregations that lacked individuals who participated in social activism" (219).

Latino Immigrants and the Catholic Church

The Irish have not been the only immigrant group to benefit from a familiar religious identity in a new country. Likewise, African-Americans have not been the only group experiencing second-class status to find power in the church. In both historical instances, the experience of church was framed ethnically and/or racially. "For many immigrant groups, starting with the Irish, identity as Catholics provided a sense of internal cohesion and status as they encountered prejudice and discrimination…in an odd way, generalized hostility…may have contributed to the American tradition of…[founding] ethnic churches" (Hirschman 2004). Throughout the influx of Irish and Italian immigrants to the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, local Catholic parishes remained an important source of information for new residents and assisted these immigrants by encouraging them to "…integrate into American society and to maintain ties to their ethnic cultures and homelands". Scholars of history argue that, not until after the policies enacted after Vatican II in 1966, did the church offer the same support to immigrants from Latin America. Following a period of "Americanization" policies in the 1960s, several organizations developed in order to better serve the Latino Catholic community in the United States. Additionally, while undocumented immigrants often live in fear of deportation, the Catholic Church makes its resources available regardless of the legal status of those who seek help. For many immigrants, their sole sanctuary from the hardships of being undocumented and, often, impoverished is within the confines of their church community. Odem (2004) maintains the church also serves other functions, besides its utility as "the central social welfare agency," it also provides a network for job opportunities and socializing. Churches often offer English classes and continue to celebrate culturally relevant feast days and patron saints, further encouraging integration (which differs from

assimilation) into American society. As Hirschman maintains: "the centrality of religion to immigrant communities can be summarized as the search for refuge, respectability and resources".

Religion, Adjustment, and Civic Engagement

Organized religion, although not expressly created to further political rights, has been a tool utilized by members and leadership alike to achieve collective political goals. For immigrants throughout American history, religious organizations have not only served as welfare agencies but also as agents of socialization and integration. Charles Hirschman (2004) posits "just as many immigrants come to learn that they are ethnics in the United States, a significant share of immigrants also 'become American' through participation in the religious and community activities of churches and temples". Hirschman is careful to articulate that, in many cases, religious affiliation is not utilized as a path to assimilation, but that does not take away from the vital role religion has played and continues to play for many immigrants, past and present. In recognition of the welfare services provided by the church, Hirschman writes "churches and other religious organizations also play an important role in the creation of community and as a major source of social and economic assistance for those in need", and argues that these efforts and provisions become that much more meaningful when packaged in a familiar religious context. This familiarity, when surrounded by things that are so starkly unfamiliar, is the key to why religion is so important to immigrants.

Generally, immigrant religion (with the exception of Islam) is viewed favorably in the US, further providing legitimacy for its members and leadership. Foner and Alba (2008) provide two reasons for this: first, as has been discussed, immigrant religion helps its members adjust to

the ways of a new country, and second (and perhaps equally as important), many citizens in the US are already quite religious and mostly Christian. In an impressively comprehensive review of sociological research, Wendy Cadge and Elaine Howard Ecklund (2007) synthesize several case studies concerning the role of religion in the lives of immigrants in the US and come to echo Hirschman's conclusions. Cadge and Ecklund observe, "many studies illustrate the range of formal and informal social services immigrants have access to through local religious organizations upon arriving in the United States." How does the centrality of religion in immigrants' lives translate outside of a religious context? The authors find that not enough research in pursuit of the answer to this question has been done, and they cite only one researcher who has pursued this line of questioning through examination of the post-1965 waves of immigrants to the US. Lien (1994), in a study of Asian American immigrants, finds that "Catholic immigrants have the highest rate of citizenship attainment."

However, in the years following Cadge and Ecklund's publication and following greater media attention to the immigrant influx, other scholars (Davis, Martinez and Warner (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010), Foley and Hoge 2007) describe the central role of the Catholic Church in mobilizing the Latino Catholic population to attend immigration marches. The work of Davis, et al. (Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010) focuses on the institutional effects: specifically, the priests' and church organizations' emphasis on the importance of the laity's participation in furthering the rights of immigrants. One of the primary messages for immigrants who are undocumented was one that emphasized participation in marches as a way to fulfill their civic responsibility, which was the way to "be a good Christian". Foley and Hoge (2007) assert that this kind of civic participation encouraged by clergy and situated in the American framework, regardless of the goal of the engagement, more deeply engages immigrants in

American culture: "religious leaders' appeals to ethnic identity to promote action on the behalf of the larger ethnic community – on behalf of homeland causes or in defense of immigrant rights in the US – 'paradoxically…integrate immigrants more deeply into American civic and political culture even as they preserve and reinforce their sense of difference'."

Foner and Alba, in summarizing the link between religion and immigrant civic engagement found in the literature, assertively maintain, "a bottom line conclusion for in the social science literature is that religion helps to turn immigrants into Americans and gives them and their children a sense of belonging or membership in the United States. Many scholars stress that…religious institutions are places where immigrants can formulate claims for inclusion in American society." In a recent analysis of survey data, Hartmann, Winchester, Edgell and Gerteis (2011) attempt to further understand the relationship between race and religion "because they tend to be understood in very different ways—race as a social problem, religion as an individual choice and collective good" (323). Hartmann, et al (2011) found that indicators of individual religious and racial salience do not vary as much across racial/ethnic groups as is implied by common discourse. Further, the data indicate that both whites and Latinos agree (35% of whites and 46% of Latinos) that being a member of a church is a "good way to become established in a local community" (333). Of greater importance to this paper, Hartmann, et al (2011) discover that, while the personal salience of race/ethnicity for Latinos is high (68%), the Latinos surveyed recognize that being a member of congregation (46%) is a better way to establish local roots than is being a member of a racial/ethnic organization (29%) (333). The goal of this particular project is to explore this claim and more explicitly measure the association between religion and civic adjustment that is arguably present in the Latino community.

THEORY

Socio-demographic Approach

Early sociological work on recruitment and collective action focused on the existence of structural factors that may discourage (or in the absence of such factors, encourage) participation in collective action, often referred to in the literature as "biographical availability" (Snow, et al. 1980, McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Biographical availability is defined by McAdam (1986) as "the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment" [or other responsibilities, such as marriage or children]. Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson (1980) ask: "what determines which potential participants are most likely to come into contact with and be recruited into one movement rather than another, if into any movement at all?" They argue that recruitment success is largely a function of availability. More specifically, the potential recruit must be someone who is "structurally most available for participation" (Snow, et al 1980). McAdam and Paulsen (1993) concur: There are four conditions under which participation in collective action would most likely occur: "(1) the occurrence of a specific recruiting attempt, (2) the successful linkage of movement and identity, (3) support for that linkage from persons who…sustain the identity…and (4) the absence of strong opposition". Individuals who engage in collective action are likely to be those who have the time to commit and are able to pursue interests without the constraints of other commitments such as family, work, or reputation. Those who participate are not necessarily outcasts or isolated, they simply have the ability to join and act without social or cultural cost.

The sociological value of this approach lies in situating the individual in a social context. However, this conclusion perhaps does not adequately consider institutional or organizational

context, which the model presented in this paper attempts to measure (the main difference being that residential information is added to this model in the analysis, which is why I call the parameters in model 1 "socio-demographics"). Individuals, especially on the aggregate, exist alongside and within institutions. Life in the United States in particular is rife with interactions between individuals and various organizations or associations. Alexis de Tocqueville (1839), champion of civil society, places democratic power squarely in the hands of civil associations and their members: "There is only one country on the face of the earth where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes. This same country is the only one where the continual exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life and where all the advantages of which civilization can confer are procured by means of it." Tocqueville argued that the decentralized nature of the US government essentially required that individuals move beyond simple self-interest and that they organize themselves so as to ensure that their democratic government provided the collective goods it had promised. Civic associations can take many forms and can assemble around almost any kind of interest: business associations, social clubs, leagues, immigrant rights, and even religious groups; the only prerequisite being that membership is voluntary.

Collective Identity

Another framework for explaining collective action is the notion of an individual's placement within a larger moral or cultural community. Often referred to as "collective identity" Polletta and Jasper (2001) define this concept as "an invididual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution…a perception of shared status or relation…distinct from personal identities" (285). Polletta and Jasper are careful to

explain that collective identity is more than just a simple aggregation of personal identities; rather, collective identity can be conceptualized as "fluid and relational" (298). That is, collective identity as a concept is highly reliant upon an individual's comparison to and relation with others. Additionally, this notion of collective identity, according to Polletta and Jasper, is fundamental to understanding movement recruitment and commitment. However, they do admit that the literature on collective identity does "leave fuzzy" the link between self-interest and identity. Perhaps, for some, the linkage between ideology, identity and self-interest is strong enough to result in mobilization.

Andreas Wimmer (2008) explores the notion of collective identity in an ethnic context and explains the mutability of ethnic boundaries dependent upon geographical location, group location within a particular nation-state (or movement between nation-states in the form of migration), sociological and historical contexts. While the majority of Latino immigrants to the US are of Mexican heritage, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Ecuadorians, and other groups of Latino origin also claim a stake in the outcome and attend protests. While in other contexts these sub-categories may be salient, in instances of this type of organized protest, individuals seems to embrace the expansionist categorization of "Latino".

As far as boundary constraints are concerned in the Latino immigrant context, networks are of utmost salience. Before individuals become "immigrants," they often live and exist in a network of like others who behave similarly and speak the same or a similar language. In a situation such as this, ethnic boundaries tend to be less important than they would be in a different host nation-state. For example, native Mexicans living in Mexico most likely identify as *Mexicano*, which is meant to differentiate from others who live in Central and Latin America. However, once this population immigrates to a new country, ethnic categorization could change.

Calling upon the "Latino" collective identity could, in theory, mobilize various segments of the population as parts of a larger whole.

Cadge and Ecklund (2007) further specify the identity-mobilization linkage in terms of religion: "some scholars have suggested that religious identities become more salient for immigrants in the United States than in their nations of origin because of the role religions have in preserving ethnic identities" (363). In their review of related literature, Cadge and Ecklund find that many scholars argue that there is an association between religious identity and civic involvement, but the mechanism propagating this linkage is as yet unclear.

Social Capital Model

While valuable, the biographical availability and collective identity models of explaining motivation and mobilization are lacking attention to the institutional context (and the social capital these institutions so often provide) of life in the United States. Granted, membership in organizations is not required of residents, but social capital is, at least theoretically, an inescapable and unavoidable facet of human existence. When the effort is made to build upon notions of socio-demographic characteristics and collective identity, the mechanisms at play between religiosity and movement participation may become clearer; that is, it becomes possible to examine the relationship between aspects of immigrant social capital in a religious context as a motivating factor for participation in immigrant rights marches. Levitt (2008) posits "religion socializes members into receiving-country politics…[and religion] facilitates the acquisition of an American cultural toolkit for immigrants and their children: a new language, a new political and civic culture, and new loyalties" (768). What remains to be seen is *how* religion facilitates

this transition, and Levitt argues that religious communities are often outfitted with "powerful resources and tools" that can result in particular types of activism.

Leonard (Leonard, et al 2005) posits "religious practices help maintain cultural…identities for immigrants and thus are a form of social capital that can strengthen immigrant self-confidence and possibly challenge adaptation to the US" (6). This claim is consistent with the findings of this paper, but I seek to specify that the types of "religious practices" are forms of external religiosity (pro-social behavior) motivated by outspoken clergy and membership in an activated congregation.

Djupe and Gilbert (2009) identify three trends present in the literature examining the political influence of churches. First, churches are often described as "training grounds for citizens…allowing church members to develop organizational skills applicable to political action." Second, some of the literature indicates that politically oriented church activities increase the levels of political efficacy of those who participate. Finally, the role of the clergy has been touted to have a positive effect on recruitment to political activities. Djupe and Gilbert, however, find evidence that none of these associations exist at the levels that have previously been described and that the effect of outspoken clergy is erratic, at best. However, the data examined in this paper point to exactly the opposite conclusion: outspoken clergy play a vital role in the mobilization of religious immigrant communities. One criticism of Djupe and Gilbert's work is that their dataset fails to cover the broad spectrum of Christian denominations in America, only consisting of information from the Lutheran and the Episcopal churches.

While Putnam and Campbell (2010) do concede the existence of a symbiotic relationship between ethnicity and religion (316), they come to conclusions similar to those of Djupe and Gilbert (2009) concerning the associations between congregations and political activity. Citing

Mark Chaves, Putnam and Campbell illustrate their viewpoint on the saliency (or lack thereof) of congregations on outcomes of political action: "Public attention notwithstanding, politics is not an arena in which most congregations actively participate. Politics remains, for most congregations, a peripheral activity" (Putnam and Campbell 2010). While this may be accurate for "most" congregations, is it accurate for ethnic, particularly Latino, congregations? The data examined in this paper point to a different assertion.

Historically, new immigrants tend to seek out religious enclaves that provide a familiar atmosphere; an atmosphere that reminds them of their old country parish and where, generally, most of the faces resemble their own (Dolan 1975, Leonard, Stepick, Vasquez, and Holdaway 2005). While important, I argue this homogeneous demographic composition is simply not enough to generate large-scale protest participation. Key to my argument is the difference between a simple immigrant/ethnic church and a congregation that is more politically inclined. Specifically, a congregation must possess two key characteristics. First, there must be acknowledgement or discussion of immigrant rights by the clergy, generally from the pulpit. Second, the parish must gather and encourage their members to participate in IRMs. This particular combination is what I will call an *activated congregation*. Membership in an activated congregation, I argue, increases the odds that any individual will participate in an IRM on his or her own.

In order to measure this association statistically utilizing the aforementioned dataset, the assertion can be stated as:

If the respondent is a member of an activated congregation, then the higher that respondent's odds of participating in a march herself.

The theoretical model can be visualized as:



METHODS: VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION

Sample

On the heels of several immigration rights marches in Chicago, in late 2006, the Pew Research Center surveyed over 4,000 Latinos (by telephone and in both English and Spanish) and discussed religion, politics, and lifestyle. These surveys resulted in the "Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion" dataset[16]. This sample is of particular relevance due to the fact that 73% of survey respondents were interviewed entirely in Spanish, indicating high levels of recent immigrants. According to a 2010 report issued by the Census Bureau, 63% of Latinos in the US identify as Mexican, roughly 9% identify as Puerto Rican, and 3.5% as Cuban, with the remaining Latino respondents identifying as "other Latin American" (2010). The sample of Latinos in this particular dataset boasts nearly identical proportions: 63% Mexican, 9% Puerto Rican, 4% Cuban.

According to the Association of Religious Data Archives, the survey was conducted by ICR (an independent research company), for the Pew Hispanic Center and the Pew Forum on

[16] Pew Hispanic Center and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2006). Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion. Association of Religious Data Archives [computer file]. http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/LATINO.asp

Religion & Public Life, and was administered via telephone in both English (1,036 respondents) and Spanish (2,949 respondents), with the remaining 31 interviews conducted partially in both languages. Computer software ensured the implementation of appropriate order and skip patterns. A "disproportionate stratified sample" was taken based on collecting telephone exchanges from areas with high concentrations of Latino households, and various strategies were utilized to prevent over-sampling of Latinos of Mexican heritage and Catholics. Once contacted, the respondent for each household was the individual over 18 who had had the most recent birthday (interviewers asked first to speak to the adult male with the most recent birthday, and if no male was available, then the adult female with most recent birthday was interviewed).

Analysis

I employ logistic regression as the method of statistical analysis due to the nature of the dependent variable, which is dichotomous. This particular type of regression analysis is used when Y is an indicator with a binary (0/1) outcome (Agresti and Finlay 2007), because utilizing linear regression when estimating a dichotomous dependent variable violates important assumptions about homoscedasticity and the distribution of the error term. In other words, "logit transformation…lineariz[es] the inherent nonlinear relationship between X and the probability of Y" (Pampel 2000, 14). Further, a single unit change in X can have varying impacts on Y based on where it falls on the curve (Pampel 2000), which differs from multiple linear regression where effects are interpreted as additive.

The event (Y) modeled here is participation in an immigrant rights march (IRM), and it is a dichotomous variable, where participation in the march is coded as y=1 and not participating in the march is coded as y=0. The probability of y (participating) is p and the odds of y

(participating) is expressed as probability, *p*, divided by 1-*p* (the probability of not participating). The natural log of the odds, *p*/(1-*p)*, is called *log odds* or *logit*. The model can be expressed as follows (Pampel 2000), for *k* explanatory variables and *i*=1…, and n cases:

$$\text{Log}[p_i/(1\text{-}p_i)] = b_0 + b_1X_{i1}+\ldots b_kX_{ik}$$

where p_i is the probability of y_i, and the left side of the equation is the logit or log odds. Here, the *x*'s can be either interval-level or dummy variables.

Table 1 reports exponentiated coefficients, or odds, which provide an easier way to discuss the output provided by logistic regression, "so that the independent variables affect the odds rather than the logged odds of the dependent variable" (Pampel 2000). Agresti and Finlay (2007) explain "exponentiating a beta parameter provides the multiplicative effect of that predictor on the odds, controlling for other variables" (488). Pampel's (2000) exponentiated equation is expressed as:

$$e^{\ln(p/(1\text{-}p)} = e^{b0 + b1Xi1+\ldots bkXik}$$

so that:

$$p/(1\text{-}p) = e^{b0} * e^{b1Xi1} * \ldots e^{bkXik}$$

Now, the left side of the equation equals the odds and the right side of the equation is multiplicative. For dichotomous variables, the exponentiated coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in odds between the independent variable in question and its referent category, in relation to the dependent variable. For example, the percentage change in odds of protesting between those who are employed compared those who are unemployed (in model 1) is ((1.285-1) x 100) = 28.5%; so that, those who are employed are 28.5 percent more likely to participate than those who are unemployed. For interval variables, the exponentiated coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in odds "when the associated x is increased by a single

unit" (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). For example, the variable measuring perceived level of discrimination against Latinos is a descending Lichert scale (5 = high perceived discrimination and 1=low perceived discrimination) and is an interval variable; as perceived discrimination decreases by a single unit (model 2), the percentage change in the odds of marching is ((.718-1) x 100) = -28.2% (a decrease of 28.2%).

Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the "model parameters that are most likely to give rise to the pattern of observations in the sample data" (Pampel 2000, 40). Pampel (2000) explains that the maximum likelihood function estimates a probability of observing the sample values for each case, and then multiplies the probabilities to find a summary "that a set of coefficients produces the actual values" (42). This results in a log likelihood value, which estimates the likelihood that the data would be observed with the specified parameter estimates (Pampel 2000). The larger (closer to zero) values indicate better fit. This particular goodness-of-fit test is used to compare two models: a simple model and a fuller model (Agresti and Finlay 2007). Simply put, the likelihood ratio test of independence holds that "the extra parameters in the full model equal zero…and gives the probability of the observed data as a function of the parameter values" (Agresti and Finlay 2007, 493). The log likelihood figures essentially help identify any insufficiencies between the proposed model's explanatory power and the data, but cannot necessarily be interpreted alone and without comparison to the LLH of another model.

While useful, one of the downsides of utilizing log likelihood ratios is that the ratio always decreases as variables increase, potentially resulting in overfitting. Also, log likelihood ratios simply "detect any discrepancies between model and reality" (Raftery 1995). Raftery (1995) argues, "we should be *comparing* the models, not just looking for possibly minor discrepancies between one of them and the data." Raftery utilizes a more useful figure for

comparing models and which actually penalizes the models for each variable: the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which is reported (in addition to the log likelihood ratio and degrees of freedom) in Table 1. As with the log likelihood ratio, the smallest BIC figure indicates the model with the best fit. Further, Pampel (2000) corroborates with Raftery (1995). Pampel citing Raftery on BIC differences indicating evidence for inclusion of variables: "a BIC difference of 0-2 as weak, 2-6 as positive, 6-10 as strong, and greater than 10 as very strong" (Pampel 2000, 31). The BIC figures of the models in Table 1 all show differences of greater than 10, indicating strong evidence for the inclusion of the additional variables. Pampel (2000) reiterates that "the BIC test of significance…provides more information than traditional significance tests…[and] proves especially helpful to logistic regression…" (31).

Dependent Variable

In this survey, respondents were asked specifically whether or not they participated in any IRMs in the 12 months prior, which provides the measurement of a very specific type of political protest. Respondents were given the options of yes, no, don't know, or refuse. Affirmative answers were coded as 1, and all other answers coded as 0. In order to maintain consistent N across all estimations, each model was limited to respondents who ever attend service (N=3,521), which dropped 495 respondents (those who "never" attend service) from the analysis. Since the purpose of this study is to uncover the potential power of congregations and clergy, it makes intuitive sense to remove those who do not attend services from this particular analysis.

Independent Variables

Upon identification of the variables of interest from the larger dataset, I grouped all variables into three theoretical and substantive categories for ease of interpretation[17]. The first grouping, which I refer to as the socio-demographic (and partially, biographical availability) model, is a collection of micro-level indicators and measures, which provide information about the respondent's biographical propensity (or, conversely, disinclination) to join social movements. This grouping includes employment status, metro status (presumably availability of marches is greater in urban areas), marital status, parental or guardianship status, and citizenship.

The second grouping, collective identity, provides slightly more information about the respondent's placement within the larger community. This grouping includes a variable that measures the priority ranking of various aspects of personal identity, an index measuring political ideology, as well as a variable that measures the respondent's perception of discrimination against Latinos by the society at large on a Lichert scale. Additionally, this grouping includes indicators of personal religiosity, including conversion history, religious affiliation, and rates of attendance at religious service. Also included are Lichert scale measurements of how important the respondent's religious beliefs are to both their political opinions and to life in general.

The final grouping, social capital, contains variables meant to model the experience of the respondents as members of organizations, in particular, members of congregations. Variables in this group include whether the respondent's congregation participated in any IRMs, if the clergy addresses immigration policy, the ethnic makeup of the respondent's congregation, and measurements of the respondent's volunteer commitments (church and elsewhere).

[17] All three estimations control for gender, age, citizenship status and language.

All indicators (with the exceptions: age, perceived discrimination against Latinos, rates of attendance at service, political/general importance of religious beliefs and congregation ethnicity) should be interpreted as binary, and some (as indicated in Table 1) should be interpreted in comparison to the referent category, as indicated.

RESULTS

The models put forward in the table below indicate that, while the differential recruitment and collective identity approaches are useful, the social capital model claims the variable with the most statistical influence over the outcome variable, protest participation. Additionally, model 3 boasts the lowest log likelihood ratio as well as the lowest BIC, both of which indicate best model fit.

Based on the assertions put forward by the scholars of biographical availability, the model here should indicate that factors such as having a job and/or children should discourage individuals from participating in IRMs. However, the coefficients indicate that, in comparison to unemployed individuals, employed respondents are more likely to participate. Having children is not significant, but being married does in fact decrease one's odds of participation (as is consistent with biographical availability literature).

The collective identity model was subdivided for ease of interpretation, and includes variables measuring identity priority, political ideology, and personal religiosity. The collective identity literature posits that one's ideological placement within a larger community, and in comparison and contrast to other members of the community, is enough to encourage civic participation at any level. In terms of identity prioritization, only two types of respondents are likely to participate in IRMs: those identifying primarily as Latino (compared to those who

identify primarily as American) and individuals who have higher levels of perceived discrimination against Latinos (the coefficient is negative because measurement of this particular indicator is a descending Lichert scale). Of further importance, both personal placement in a national political context and personal religious affiliation are *insignificant* towards determining the respondent's odds of participation in an immigrant rights march.

Political orientation on a conservative-liberal spectrum may help explain participation in other types of rallies or marches; for example, one can certainly imagine, if not observe, alliances between conservative ideology and Tea Party rallies or between liberal stances and civil rights movements. However, for the community of Latinos in this survey (both citizens and non-citizens), political ideology is statistically insignificant towards predicting participation in IRMs; rather, identity as Latinos takes precedence over politics.

Perhaps it makes sense to make substantive arguments about the kinds of people who do belong to religious institutions that focus on social justice issues, such as the Catholic Church. It is logical to assume that a Latino Catholic may be more inclined to march based on personal notions of religiosity and belief. Beyond the lack of sociological power that particular argument may have, the data examined here do not support that position either. The insignificance of individual religious affiliation in the model further affirms previous claims of the importance of understanding the effects of congregations and social capital on collective action.

Neither of the previous models provides much evidence in support of the assertions made by scholars of biographical availability or collective identity. However, the data does provide evidence for the vitality of the social capital literature, at least as it applies to Latinos in the US. Interestingly, volunteering at church does not increase the odds of having participated in a march, but volunteering outside of church does. The key variables of interest, previously

described as parts of an *activated congregation* (the presence of clergy who are outspoken concerning immigration and congregation-level participation in an IRM), are each significant and increase the odds of a positive outcome. In particular, outspoken clergy results in a percentage change in the odds by roughly 52% and congregation participation results in a percentage change in the odds of respondent participation by over 200%.

TABLE 1: Logistic Regression Estimates of Measurements of Socio-demographics (1), Collective Identity (2), and Social Capital (3) on the Likelihood of Protest in Immigrant Rights Marches (IRMs) of Latinos

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Socio-demographics			
Employed	1.285*	1.252*	1.196
(Unemployed[18])	(2.50)	(2.20)	(1.65)
Student	1.333	1.290	1.132
(Unemployed)	(1.10)	(0.96)	(0.44)
Northeast	1.280*	1.207	1.125
(South)	(2.25)	(1.69)	(1.01)
Midwest	2.237***	2.116***	1.793**
(South)	(4.09)	(3.75)	(2.74)
West	2.704***	2.639***	2.507***
(South)	(9.20)	(8.87)	(7.99)
Urban	1.150	1.175	1.213
(Rural)	(0.76)	(0.87)	(0.98)
Suburban	1.291	1.290	1.325
(Rural)	(1.25)	(1.24)	(1.29)
Parent/Guardian	1.099	1.083	1.000
(No children)	(1.00)	(0.83)	(0.00)
Married	0.793*	0.800*	0.841
(Not married)	(-2.56)	(-2.41)	(-1.77)

[18] Variable referent categories in parentheses.

Collective Identity		
Identity Priority:		
Country of Heritage	1.061	1.121
(Identify primarily as American)	(0.41)	(0.74)
Hispanic/Latino	1.363*	1.388*
(Identify primarily as American)	(2.01)	(2.01)
Religious Identity	0.942	0.982
(Identify primarily as American)	(-0.36)	(-0.10)
Identify equally all categories	1.068	1.078
(Identify primarily as American)	(0.30)	(0.33)
Political Ideology:		
Conservative	0.937	0.903
(Moderate)	(-0.59)	(-0.88)
Liberal	1.092	1.073
(Moderate)	(0.74)	(0.56)
No political opinion	0.819	0.946
(Moderate)	(-1.33)	(-0.35)
Perceived level of Latino discrimination	0.718***	0.767***
	(-5.13)	(-3.94)
Religiosity:		
Never converted	1.011	0.993
(Has converted)	(0.08)	(-0.05)
Not religious	1.091	1.117
(Catholic)	(0.41)	(0.50)
Protestant	0.812	0.940
(Catholic)	(-1.72)	(-0.48)
Other religion	0.673*	0.876
(Catholic)	(-1.96)	(-0.63)
Refused to answer	1.240	1.369
(Catholic)	(0.59)	(0.82)
Religious beliefs & Politics	0.915	0.981
	(-1.60)	(-0.33)
Religious beliefs & Life	0.855	0.919
	(-1.85)	(-0.96)
Freq. of service attendance	0.948	1.002
	(-1.43)	(0.04)

Social Capital	
Volunteer (other than church)	1.519***
	(6.36)
Volunteer at church	1.159
	(1.38)
Clergy speaks out about immigration	1.517***
	(4.21)
Congregation ethnicity	0.914
	(-1.20)
Church Protest Participation	3.123***
	(10.92)

N	3521	3521	3521
df	14	30	35
Log likelihood	-1736.83	-1704.00	-1568.32
Psuedo R^2	.08	.10	.17
BIC test	3596.16	3661.17	3430.626

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chi-squared tests of significance indicate that the difference between model 1 and model 2 is significant at the .01 level, and the difference between model 2 and model 3 is significant at the .001 level, indicating the parameters added at each level improve explanatory power.

CONCLUSION

This paper's fundamental assertion is that, while individual religious affiliation and beliefs are inconsequential for the particular outcome, congregation-level participation in IRMs as well as outspoken clergy are highly associated with individual participation in a given march. While some prior research does tout the important role religion plays in immigrant communities in terms of adjustment and resources, the findings described here further specify the political function of the relationship. Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) note the vigor of congregations as

catalysts of collective action: "because of the large number of people who gather in congregations every week, religious institutions constitute an important resource—perhaps an unparalleled one among US civic organizations—with the potential to supply the volunteer labor needed…[to] help keep communities intact and functioning effectively" (113). In essence, members of activated congregations, regardless of citizenship status, are more likely to interact with the government in meaningful ways by protesting. The models put forward in this paper more fully illustrate the social context in which individuals are situated; moving beyond discussions of availability and arguments based on ideology, beliefs and/or religious dogma.

However, these findings cannot be globally applied to US immigrant groups. Different groups entering the US at any given time arrive with various resources and to diverse reception by the current residents. However, the evidence furthered here stands in direct contrast to both Marxist and secularization theorists concerning the roles of church and state. Based on these findings, it could be argued a certain type of congregation and outspoken clergy serve as catalysts of political action for disenfranchised groups, not as an "opiate". Additionally, these data provide an inkling of evidence that religion, as an institution, is maintaining relevancy, at least for some.

The data utilized here also fail to address the notion of "sorting", described by Putnam and Campbell (2010) as the idea that "some [people] make choices about religion based on their politics. Thus we need not assume that people pick a church, and their friends at church, as political blank slates—that religion always drives people's politics" (434). However it may be true that some immigrants are more politically minded than others and may choose their congregations as such, it is also necessary to note that a collection of motivated individuals does not necessarily a protest make; herein lies the importance of active leadership and congregation

involvement. As asserted by Voss and Bloemraad (2011): "beyond means and motivation, political engagement also depends on whether you are asked" (21)

In terms of unpacking the relationship between religion and immigrant groups in a new home country, this study has only attempted to answer a fraction of questions posed by prior scholarship, and, admittedly, there is much left to discover. Further research in this field may attempt to more fully explain the relationship beyond simple association, and perhaps there are similar relationships to be explained for groups migrating between places outside of the US. Additionally, what role does religion play for immigrant groups who are not majority Christian? Do Muslim immigrants reap the same benefits as their Christian counterparts? Still, there is much to be gained by understanding how church and state interact for groups who are new to a country such as the US, which whole-heartedly (theoretically, if not practically) maintains those institutions' as quite separate entities. Ideally, this line of research will produce a more full-bodied understanding of immigrant politics in the US, and may uncover hidden mechanisms of power, racial dynamics and immigrant naturalization.

APPENDIX

Table A: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables in Model

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ProtestPar	3521	.2272082	.4190877	0	1
Socio-demographic Model:					
employed	3521	.6072139	.4884393	0	1
student	3521	.028117	.1653306	0	1
unemployed	3521	.3303039	.4703893	0	1
northeast	3521	.3257597	.4687246	0	1
northcentral	3521	.0451576	.2076792	0	1
west	3521	.2621414	.4398616	0	1
south	3521	.3669412	.4820387	0	1
urban	3521	.7685317	.4218309	0	1
suburban	3521	.1704061	.3760426	0	1
rural	3521	.0610622	.2394784	0	1
spanishdom	3521	.5819369	.4933107	0	1
bilingual	3521	.27691	.4475352	0	1
englishdom	3521	.1411531	.3482288	0	1
male	3521	.4387958	.4963104	0	1
age	3521	44.31014	18.60878	18	99
citizen	3521	.2550412	.4359463	0	1
noncitizen	3521	.4226072	.4940442	0	1
yeskids	3521	.4913377	.499996	0	1
nokids	3521	.5086623	.499996	0	1
married	3521	.5464357	.4979098	0	1
unmarried	3521	.4535643	.4979098	0	1

Collective Identity Model:					
country	3521	.3680773	.482351	0	1
hisp_lat	3521	.2050554	.4037994	0	1
religion	3521	.1780744	.3826297	0	1
amer	3521	.1488214	.3559628	0	1
all	3521	.0587901	.2352649	0	1
cons	3521	.360977	.4803521	0	1
lib	3521	.221528	.415334	0	1
mod	3521	.2732178	.4456751	0	1
none	3521	.1442772	.3514205	0	1
latinodisc~m	3521	1.541039	.758722	1	3
yesalways	3521	.7165578	.4507332	0	1
noconverted	3521	.1874467	.3903252	0	1
norelig	3521	.082079	.274524	0	1
protestant	3521	.3007668	.4586566	0	1
catholic	3521	.5313831	.499085	0	1
otherrelig	3521	.0718546	.2582837	0	1
refused	3521	.0139165	.1171611	0	1
relig_bel_~p	3521	1.867083	.8531018	1	3
rel_imp_life	3521	1.333144	.5983458	1	3
servattend	3521	2.680773	1.353362	1	5
Social capital Model:					
volun_others	3521	.5171826	.727154	0	2
volun_church	3521	.3510366	.4773622	0	1
clergyspea~g	3521	.4407839	.4965516	0	1
cong_eth	3521	1.369781	.7289751	1	4
churchProt~r	3521	.1979551	.3985147	0	1

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