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2. [REDACTED] EL SALVADOR: INTERNAL (b)(1)  
SITUATION. (b)(3) NatSecAct

WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE OVERALL ASSESSMENTS IN THE [REDACTED] AND CONCUR WITH THE FINDINGS IN PARA 10, OUTLOOK. (b)(1)  
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WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FDR AND THE FMLN, WE AGREE THAT AN IMMINENT SPLIT IS UNLIKELY. WE EXPECT THAT DIFFERENCES WILL CONTINUE TO SURFACE, BUT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE FDR--GIVEN THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY CLIMATE--HAS FEW REALISTIC OPTIONS OTHER THAN TO REMAIN WITHIN THE INSURGENT FOLD. A GRADUAL SPLINTERING OVER MANY MONTHS IS POSSIBLE, BUT EXILED POLITICIANS HAVE LITTLE NEAR TERM POLITICAL FUTURE IN EL SALVADOR. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR PEOPLE SUCH AS ZAMORA AND UNGO. DUARTE--GIVEN CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY--PROBABLY SEES LITTLE ADVANTAGE TO PROVIDING THE FDR WITH A POLITICAL OPENING. WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT FOR A QUICK RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE.

IN OUR JUDGMENT, DUARTE'S MOST SERIOUS NEAR TERM WORRY COMES FROM THE ECONOMY. WE ANTICIPATE THAT AUSTERITY WILL PRODUCE A NEW ROUND OF LABOR UNREST. DUARTE APPEARS TO BE GAMBLING THAT HIS EXTENSIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN TO DAMPEN OPPOSITION WILL ALLOW HIM TO RIDE OUT THE STRIKES AS HE DID LAST NOVEMBER. LEFTIST LABOR LEADERS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY BELIEVE DUARTE IS VULNERABLE TO LABOR AGITATION AND ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON POPULAR FRUSTRATION WITH ECONOMIC HARDTIMES.

WE BELIEVE THE INSURGENTS ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH SUCCESS IN CREATING A SINGLE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. REPORTING CONTINUES TO INDICATE THAT--PUBLIC PROCLAMATIONS NOTWITHSTANDING--THE MILITARY FACTIONS ARE DIVIDED BY TACTICAL, STRATEGIC, AND IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES AS WELL AS PERSONAL RIVALRIES.

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN DUARTE AND THE MILITARY ARE STRAINED. CONFUSION OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TOWARD THE HOLIDAY TRUCE HIGHLIGHTED AND MAGNIFIED THESE TENSIONS. ALTHOUGH COLONEL OCHOA REMAINS AN IMPORTANT FIGURE, WE WOULD CAUTION ON EXTRAPOLATING FROM HIS GRUMBLING. END-OF-YEAR REASSIGNMENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN DELAYED IN AN EFFORT TO CALM DISCONTENT.


REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAVE NOT YET MADE DEMANDS FOR THE RELEASE OF COLONEL AVALOS AND APPEAR IN NO HURRY TO NEGOTIATE HIS RELEASE. IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A PRESSING ISSUE IN THE MILITARY AT PRESENT.

WE NOTE THAT WHILE D'AUBUISSON HAS STEPPED DOWN AS ARENA PARTY HEAD, HE REMAINS A MAJOR BEHIND-THE-SCENES VOICE IN PARTY AFFAIRS.

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