© Copyright 2016
Shin Haeng Lee

Digitally Mediated Political Participation:
Understanding the Democratic Impact of Internet Diffusion in the Asian Media Systems

Shin Haeng Lee

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2016

Reading Committee:

Philip Edward Howard, Chair

Christopher A. Adolph

Matthew J. Powers

Randal A. Beam

Patricia Moy

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Department of Communication

University of Washington

Abstract

Digitally Mediated Political Participation:
Understanding the Democratic Impact of Internet Diffusion in the Asian Media Systems

Shin Haeng Lee

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Philip Edward Howard, Professor, Communication
Department of Communication

This dissertation is devoted to an examination of the democratic impact that internet diffusion has on political participation in East and Southeast Asia. To begin with, I conceptualize digitally mediated political participation in which internet use affords an unconventional pathway of individual citizens toward collective action. The mechanism of micro-mobilization lies in the technological capacity that enables structural ties to digitally networked activism. But unconventional mobilization involves contextual variation in opportunity structures across countries. Therefore, I compare eight Asian countries in relation to media systems as well as regime types: South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia, and Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Based on this comparative analysis, I study the mechanism of unconventional mobilization that is predicted by internet use at the individual

level. Data came from three cross-national surveys undertaken in the mid-2000s and early 2010s: Asian Barometer Survey, World Press Trends, and World Values Survey. The findings show that the "Asian internet" has distinctive mobilizing features: 1) that it provides communication and organizing capacities for the individual pathway to unconventional political participation; 2) that it exerts greater effects on participation in non-democracies or poor democracies than in wealthy democracies; and 3) that it is nevertheless constrained by national mass-media systems. In conclusion, digitally mediated political participation sheds light on a new individual pathway to citizen engagement in politics that is distinct from traditional communicative or organizational structures.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures v

List of Tables vi

Glossary viii

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

1.1 Internet Diffusion and its Political Implications 4

1.2 Why are East and Southeast Asia Important? 7

1.3 An Overview of the Dissertation 10

Chapter 2. Theories of Digitally Mediated Political Participation 15

2.1 Introduction 15

2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 16

2.2.1 Conceptualization of Political Participation 16

2.2.2 Theories of Political Participation 20

2.2.3 The Internet as a Mobilizing Structure 24

2.2.4 The Internet in the Context of Asian Politics 29

2.2.5 Criticisms from Institutionalism 32

2.2.6 Media Systems 34

2.3 Gaps in the Literature 39

Chapter 3. Political Opportunity Structures in East and Southeast Asia 42

3.1 Introduction 42

3.2 Early Forms of Digitally Mediated Political Participation in Asia 43

3.3 Regime Types in East and Southeast Asia 47
3.3.1 Wealthy Democracies 48
3.3.2 Poor Democracies 51
3.3.3 Authoritarian Regimes 54
3.3.4 Ambiguous Regimes 58
3.4 Media Systems in East and Southeast Asia 62
3.4.1 Pluralized Media Systems 63
3.4.2 Liberalized Media Systems 68
3.4.3 Restricted Media Systems 72
3.5 Conclusion 75
Chapter 4. The Internet's Impact on Political Participation 78
4.1 Introduction 78
4.2 Literature Review 81
4.2.1 The Internet in the Context of Political Participation 81
4.2.2 Structural, Communicative, and Attitudinal Factors 84
4.2.3 Contextualizing the Internet in East and Southeast Asia 88
4.3 Hypotheses....92
4.4 Method....93
4.4.1 Data 93
4.4.2 Outcome Variable 94
4.4.3 Explanatory Variables.... 99
4.4.4 Analyses.... 100
4.5 Results 103
4.6 Discussion....113
4.7 Conclusion 119

Chapter 5. The Impact of Digital Network Connectivity on Protest Participation 121
5.1 Introduction 121
5.2 Literature Review 124
5.2.1 Effects of Internet Diffusion on Political Participation 124
5.2.2 Ability, Motivation, and Mobilizing Structures.. 128
5.2.3 Reinforcement Thesis 131
5.3 Hypotheses...134
5.4 Method...136
5.4.1 Data 136
5.4.2 Outcome Variable 137
5.4.3 Explanatory Variables.. 138
5.4.4 Analyses 140
5.5 Results 141
5.6 Discussion..149
5.7 Conclusion 154
Chapter 6. The Impact of Media Systems on Digitally Mediated Political Participation........... 157
6.1 Introduction 157
6.2 Literature Review 160
6.2.1 Contextual Factors in Citizen Participation 160
6.2.2 Why Are Media Systems Important?.. 164
6.2.3 Why Are Newspaper Market Structures Important? 168
6.3 Hypotheses...173
6.4 Method...176
6.4.1 Data 176

6.4.2 Outcome Variable ... 179

6.4.3 Individual-level Explanatory Variables ... 179

6.4.4 Modeling ... 180

6.5 Results ... 183

6.6 Discussion ... 191

6.7 Conclusion ... 197

Chapter 7. Conclusion ... 200

Bibliography ... 221

Appendix 1.A. Internet Penetration Rates ... 255

Appendix 4.A. ABS Sample Sizes and Response Rates ... 256

Appendix 4.B. Fit Statistics of LCA Models ... 257

Appendix 5.A. WVS Sample Sizes and Response Rates ... 258

Appendix 5.B. An Index of Four Items on Protest Participation (0–3) ... 259

Appendix 5.C. WVS Explanatory Variables in the Mid-2000s ... 260

Appendix 5.D. WVS Explanatory Variables in the Early 2010s ... 261

Appendix 6.A. Data on Country-level Indicators of Media Systems ... 262

Appendix 6.B. Multilevel Models Using WVS Data ... 263

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 4.

Figure 4.1. Estimates of the Three Latent-Classes in the ABS Data, Wave 2 (2005–07) 95

Figure 4.2. Estimates of the Three Latent-Classes in the ABS Data, Wave 3 (2010–11) 96

Figure 4.3. Structural Relationships Among Endogenous Variables in the Mid-2000s 109

Figure 4.4. Structural Relationships Among Endogenous Variables in the Early 2010s 110

Chapter 5.

Figure 5.1. Effects of Digital Dependency on Protest Participation among Media Users.......... 148

Chapter 6.

Figure 6.1. Cross-level Interaction Model of Political Participation 176

Figure 6.2. Across-country Effects of Internet Use on Political Participation 186

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 1.

Table 1.1. Overview of the Hypotheses and their Results 14

Chapter 3.

Table 3.1. Regime Types and Media Systems in East and Southeast Asia 76

Chapter 4.

Table 4.1. Latent Classes of the Respondents Based on Predicted Class Memberships 97

Table 4.2. Descriptive Summaries of the Explanatory Variables 98

Table 4.3. Latent-Class Regression Model of Political Participation in the Mid-2000s 105

Table 4.4. Latent-Class Regression Model of Political Participation in the Early 2010s........... 106

Table 4.5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for O–S–O–R Models 107

Table 4.6. Mobilizing Effects of Internet Use with and without Organizational Membership .. 111

Chapter 5.

Table 5.1. Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation in Democracies....................... 142

Table 5.2. Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation in Non-Democracies 143

Table 5.3. Pooled Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation 145

Chapter 6.

Table 6.1. Loadings for Common Factors of Asian Media Systems 184

Table 6.2. Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Political Participation 187

Table 6.3. Mass-circulation Press Model Predicting Political Participation 188

Table 6.4. Market Competition Model Predicting Political Participation 190

Table 6.5. Categorization of Opportunity Structures in East and Southeast Asia 198

Chapter 7.

Table 7.1. Digitally Mediated Political Participation in East and Southeast Asia..................... 213

GLOSSARY

ABS: Asian Barometer Survey

BN: Barisan Nasional

CPC: Communist Party of China

DDI: Digital Dependency Index

DJP: Democratic Justice Party

GDP at PPP: Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity

GNP: Grand National Party

HDI: Human Development Index

ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies

IMF: International Monetary Fund

KMT: Kuomintang

LCA: Latent Class Analysis

MBC: Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation

NGOs: Non-Government Organizations

PAP: People's Action Party

SEM: Structural Equation Modeling

SMS: Short Message Service

TDI: Technology Distribution Index

VCP: Vietnamese Communist Party

WPT: World Press Trends

WVS: World Values Survey

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Through the six-year journey to complete my doctoral studies, many people have supported me and helped me finish this dissertation in numerous ways. But above all, my gratitude must go first and foremost to God. Without his help and grace I could not have overcome the challenges that I faced during my studies.

Next, I must convey my gratitude and sincere appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Phil Howard, for his support, patience, and encouragement. It was such a blessing that he was my advisor. From the first time I met with him until today, he has given me a vast amount of inspiration and intellectual help. He was the professor who introduced me to the field of comparative research. My thanks also must go to the members of my committee, Drs. Patricia Moy, Randal Beam, Matthew Powers, and Christopher Adolph, for reading drafts of this dissertation and providing many valuable comments that improved the content. Ms. Heather Werckle should be acknowledged as the kindest answerer to my endless questions about my graduate studies over the years.

My doctoral studies have benefited from my employment at the Center for Social Science Computation and Research. Especially, I am grateful to Dr. Darryl Holman, Mr. Fred Nick (R.I.P), Ms. Tina Tian, and Ms. Kathy Davis at the Center. I would also like to thank my former advisor—Dr. Amy Reynolds—and UW colleagues Will Mari, Luis Santana, Matt Bellinger, Stephanie Lee, Colin Beam, William Brown, and Jeff Rud.

I am truly indebted to my family—my mom, dad, and younger sister Bora (who already earned her doctoral degree in piano)—as well as my beloved friend Tae Yun Lim. This dissertation is dedicated to all of these people. Thank you so much.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Rev. Chae Chang Lee and Mrs. Soon Ae Lee.

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the government of South Korea, under a new president, agreed to relax beef imports from the U.S. Immediately, the decision ushered in a series of demonstrations against the trade policy and the government. The protesters framed the issue in a public-health discourse that appealed to mass interest. In the eyes of the government, in contrast, the motivation for the collective action was exaggerated anxiety about mad cow disease in imported meats. The gap in the framing of the risk was too wide to be bridged, and massive crowds protested for a prolonged period of time. As a result, the Korean government had to address growing public concern over U.S. beef imports by delaying importation of meat especially from cattle over 30 months of age.

Interestingly, the protest against U.S. beef was distinct from traditional protests that engaged civil-society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in mobilizing and coordinating large-scale collective action. Instead of such social-movement organizations working in perfect order, the protesters were fluid, open, and spontaneous, as people came from heterogeneous political backgrounds and multiple social bases. Indeed, the initiators of the mobilization were made up mainly of middle- and high-school students as well as young mothers with strollers who were not visible in previous protests. Although a huge crowd gathered in the streets and squares of Seoul, people participated in multiple methods of protest and expressed personal opinions in creative ways as long as their collectivity was identified with the candlelight vigil. This vigil therefore featured voluntary chants and free presentations among the protesters rather than a unified slogan and structured activity.

The Korean protest in 2008 was a manifestation of the rise of a networked public relying on new modes of participation in protest activism without grand orchestration (Kim, 2014).

There were inexperienced individual actors who were self-motivated in connecting disgruntled individuals, reinforcing concern about mad cow disease, and consolidating agitation against the president and his policies. At the same time, the mobilization of large-scale collective actions took place through personalized ways of public communication. Cyberspace was the venue for individual activists to instigate, coordinate, and expand the protest among people with different degrees of concern, knowledge, skill, and commitment to the public issue. Their online communities became the mobilizing agents for circulating contentious information, recruiting participants, forming collective identities, and organizing protest activities.

The 2008 candlelight vigil in South Korea demonstrates a mechanism of "digitally mediated political participation." This emerging form of political participation in the digital age is distinctive in its way of relating individuals to a collective identity, bridging social capital, and conducting political action in the absence of conventional social-movement organizations. Many cases of contemporary political activism are instead embedded in internet-enabled networks where people are given new structural capacities for mobilization (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2012). The capacities of internet diffusion mediate personalized paths to grassroots organizing without formal organizations, as well as agents and modes of mobilization that go beyond the traditional bounds of political participation.

Digitally mediated political participation is not unique to the Korean context of political action. Notwithstanding differences in the type, scale, and target of protest, the political landscape in Asia is becoming increasingly endowed with collective actions in which protesters are informed about, sensitized about, and mobilized into demonstrations through digitized personal media (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qui, & Sey, 2007). On March 18, 2014, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Taiwan held a record-breaking demonstration in front of the

Presidential Hall to protest the Ma Ying Jeou administration's pro-China stances and policies. The so-called Sunflower Movement was initiated by hundreds of students who took advantage of social media for mobilization of the public. Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution in 2014 was a peaceful Occupy kind of protest instigated and coordinated by youth groups dissatisfied with the Chinese government and its authoritarian practices. Malaysia's Bersih (Clean) in the early 2010s was a pro-democracy movement not affiliated with any political party but endorsed by many international NGOs and diaspora communities. Its advocacy of electoral reforms was broadened to street assemblies among the apolitical segments of online communities. Around the same time, The Philippines and Thailand witnessed mass mobilization of students and other young people who had not previously participated in activism now demanding responsive and accountable governance (Case, 2015; Ford, 2013).

The above cases illustrate the manifestations of digitally mediated political participation in diverse contexts of Asian politics. They entail young tech-savvy protesters who are incentivized by shared grievances and collective identities that form and crystallize through digital networks. That is to say, internet diffusion provides new capacities for mobilizing structures that organize aggrieved individuals and coordinate collective action. Indeed, internet-enabled mobilization is distinguished in its horizontal and decentralized networks of protesters from the hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations of traditional social movements (Bimber et al., 2012; Castells, 2012). Although this emerging form of political activism comes at the expense of coherence and effectiveness, digital networks suit a range of activists from individuals to flexible issue publics and transnational action networks (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). But how generalizable are the effects of internet diffusion beyond different socio-

economic structures and institutions in the Asian context of democracy? Alas, much of the research on this topic has been limited to a particular geographical area or time period.

For a generalizable explanation of contemporary political activism across countries, I examine whether, and if so how, internet use provides a mobilizing structure. At the same time, my analysis of internet capacities takes into account structural and institutional factors affecting the agency of political actors. Such contextual factors are important in that they provide not only incentives for but also constraints on the mechanism by which individuals participate in political action. Because the internet has increasingly evolved into a social space, furthermore, it becomes apparent that pre-existing power relations enter cyberspace to maintain the status quo (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012). Therefore, in this dissertation, I first argue that the internet provides systemic capacities of mobilization for individual citizens by which they are organized around a civic or political cause. Subsequently, I demonstrate that the mobilizing capacity of internet use is constrained by institutions within which people engage in politics.

1.1 INTERNET DIFFUSION AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Does internet use have political effects in Asia? And how, and in what rational contexts, does it have such effects? To address these questions, I investigate large-scale social change in structural circumstances that enable and constrain political agency in the new information environment. Doing so allows us not to claim technological determinism but to gain a better understanding of the ways in which internet use has consequences for political life.

What does existing research reveal about the political outcomes of internet diffusion? First, younger generations of citizens are increasingly adopting personalized paths to political action and becoming informal agents of political action. This theoretical framework relies on Bennett's (1998) idea of individuated engagement in lifestyle politics with regard to the

formation of flexible issue publics in the face of distrusted traditional institutions and declining ideological loyalties. Of course, Putnam (2000) cautions that, because of the popular use of the media in everyday norms and practices, individuals are growing detached from community-based involvement in public life. Nevertheless, in view of Bennett's personalization of politics, the trend to individualization brings about a new form of collective efforts to redress shared grievances as a trade-off. This alternative route to political mobilization gives primacy to individuals over organizations who are endowed with diversified personal interests and tangled power relations resulting from modernization and social differentiation (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Inglehart, 1997).

Second, globalization has brought about scale shifting in political activism. This change means "the seamless and simultaneous presence of local events and issues at a global scale (and the converse) without the necessary involvement of intermediate-scale structures, such as the nation-state" (Livingstone & Asmolov, 2010, p. 751). As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to define the agents, recruits, and targets of social movements within the boundaries of traditional institutions. Rather, recent political activism frequently goes beyond power relations that are institutionalized in conventional systems of communication processes and organizing structures (Faist, 2000). For instance, since the financial crisis of the late 1990s, local and state governments in East and Southeast Asia have frequently faced political activism in protest over the pressure imposed by international financial institutions. The mobilization has been facilitated by the expansion of transnational information systems, which are applied to the local political context. As people become equipped with more opportunities that redefine their social and political identities, their political activity can take place outside of country-specific mechanisms

through which citizenship is performed (Moy, Bimber, Rojecki, Xenos, & Iyengar, 2012; Tarrow & McAdam, 2005).

The rise of digitally mediated political participation would not be independent of changes in the macro-level set of mobilizing opportunities that shape individuals' incentives and costs of participation and the forms of actions they take. Rather, in the emerging context of personalized engagement in politics and transnational networks of collective action, digital networks are increasingly essential to mobilize large-scale activism. This view concurs with the perspective of Benkler (2006), who extends the logic of rational-choice theory to the growing popularity of user-generated content and individual contribution to information flows, which should not be subsumed under altruism. Castells (2009) also offers a relevant thesis in which a transnationally networked structure of personal technologies decentralizes pre-existing power to produce the meaning and values shared within a nation-state.

Moreover, the theoretical framework of technology mobilization posits a different mechanism through which people act on a social or political cause. In particular, online youth engagement in public life is encouraged by communication processes and organizing structures without traditional mediating institutions (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). This does not necessarily mean that open political contestation takes place more easily than ever before among the more diverse actors. In the emerging media environment, civil activists are still constrained and manipulated by the existing power holders when making their voices heard by the public (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2012; Morozov, 2011). Nevertheless, the diffusion of digital media provides unprecedented venues and logics for political activism, especially among those who are isolated from the institutional sphere of politics (Bennett & Segerbeg, 2013).

The structure of opportunities for contemporary political activism is inseparable from the personalization of politics and transnationalization of collective-action networks, which are observed mostly in post-industrial societies (Bennett, 1998; Dalton, 2002; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005). But the global diffusion of social media and mobile phones has facilitated new ways of mobilizing the masses in non-Western societies (Howard & Hussain, 2013). Indeed, Bennett (2005) posits the increasing role of social technologies in mobilizing protest, affording the formation of transnationally networked advocacy and its suitability for personalized engagement that goes beyond conventional structures of civil-society organizations. Internet diffusion is a key condition that provides such digital-network capacities for social movements. Two problems remain unresolved, however: 1) whether or not internet diffusion mediates such social change as an opportunity for transnational activism in which participatory behaviors are not subsumed under institutionalized forms of political action; and 2) how the mobilization is manifested in individual pathways to political participation that transcends pre-existing mobilizing structures.

1.2 Why are East and Southeast Asia Important?

As of 2015, Asia witnessed a 1,129.3% growth in its population that uses the internet compared with 15 years ago. Now that 45.6% of the world's population is connected to the World Wide Web, the continent is equipped with a developing infrastructure for digital networks to expand. Of course, this pattern of technology diffusion does not necessarily transcend social inequality but often mirrors socio-economic and institutional variation across countries. But when it comes to the regions of East and Southeast Asia, the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been a prevalent trend. For instance, even with its restrictive media system, Vietnam had mobile-phone penetration close to 150 percent in 2012, and more than half of its users had access to the internet (Freedom House, 2013a).

More importantly, Southeast Asia is a region where people take part far more in online social networking sites far more than the global average (Abbott, 2015). Facebook maintains its dominance in cyberspace across the countries; for example, more than 80 percent of internet users in Indonesia, Malaysia, and The Philippines have an active profile on Facebook (Nielsen, 2011). Twitter and YouTube are also included in the top five sites that internet users visit in most of the countries. It is clear that social media have become an increasingly important means for people with internet-accessible mobile devices to connect with political, cultural, and commercial artifacts (Lee, 2015). The popularity of these US-based social-networking platforms raises the question of whether Western phenomena of digital activism are exported to Southeast Asian contexts.

In particular, the adoption patterns of ICTs in East and Southeast Asia have important implications for the regional landscape of contemporary politics. The Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 stimulated much scholarly discussion about how social movements would be manifested in the non-Western context of restrictive media systems. Some scholars found that the cause of political unrest was the development of online civil-society groups who were benefiting from the diffusion of the internet and mobile phones (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & Zhu, 2012; Howard, 2010). In Muslim societies with unfavorable opportunities for social change over the years, digital networks mobilized a new venue for disgruntled members of the public to be sensitized to their liberty and develop grassroots organizing in opposition to long-lasting dictatorships (Howard & Hussain, 2013). Hence, what Egypt and Tunisia showed in 2011 was digitally mediated political participation that connected individual citizens at home and abroad, thus engaging them in personalized mechanisms for the participation. That is to say, internet

diffusion provides a new mobilizing structure within which personalization of politics and transnational activism facilitate individuals to act on shared problems.

In this dissertation, I compare eight Asian countries in relation to regime types and media systems. The countries under study include South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia, and Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Based on this comparative analysis, I study political participation that is predicted by internet use at the individual level. Data come from three cross-national surveys undertaken in the mid-2000s and early 2010s: Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), World Press Trends (WPT), and World Values Survey (WVS). By using such data, this study accounts for country-level factors, as well as individual-level characteristics.

The eight countries in East and Southeast Asia were carefully chosen not just because of the rapid adoption of ICTs and digital media but also because of the comparative structure of opportunities for political participation. Appendix 1.A presents internet penetration rates in the Asian countries at least a year before each data-collection period. Clearly, there is wide cross-national variation in internet penetration rates because of different economic conditions and regime types. The countries also witnessed a great deal of variation in the growth rates of internet penetration between the two survey periods, ranging from a 12.24% increase in South Korea to a nearly 250% increase in Vietnam. This context that the Asian countries offer is notable insofar as the development of digital networks has occurred on the basis of structural conditions that prioritize mediating institutions in the formation of public spheres. For instance, Lee and Santana (2015) found that, in Asian media systems, increased public access to information through digital media gives rise to the growth of citizens who act as forces of accountability rather than becoming cynical about conventional journalistic institutions. From

the comparative perspective, therefore, the Asian context is appropriate to examine empirically how internet diffusion operates as a generalized mechanism, along with institutional arrangements, for political participation.

1.3 An Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation is devoted to an examination of the democratic impact that internet diffusion has on political participation in East and Southeast Asia. To do so, Chapter 2 deals with conceptual and theoretical frameworks for elucidating digitally mediated political participation in which internet use affords an unconventional pathway of individuals to participation in politics. But it is both wrongheaded and naïve for the research on unconventional mobilization to ignore contextual differences in opportunity structures across countries. Although the internet acts as a new mobilizing structure of citizen communication and grassroots organizing, its capacity is embedded in social-structural, institutional, and cultural conditions that constrain individuals' political agency. In this respect, two questions emerge. First, has digital network connectivity facilitated alternative pathways to political participation that are marginalized by traditional institutions? How, then, has digitally mediated political participation been constrained by the enduring domination of national systems of political communication?

In Chapter 3, I contextualize opportunity structures for the mobilization of political participation in East and Southeast Asia. In particular, the Asian countries must be evaluated in two respects: regime types and media systems. Certainly, these two aspects are related in important ways. Yet the type of governance and the organization of media institutions in the Asian countries are quite diverse, so that one of these aspects alone does not capture the full range of features of each country's polity. First, the Asian countries under study are classified into four regime types: 1) wealthy democracies, 2) poor democracies, 3) authoritarian regimes,

and 4) ambiguous regimes. I separated wealthy and poor democracies in East and Southeast Asia because of the considerable disparity in technology access and government effectiveness between the two regions. Next, I categorize the Asian countries into three models: 1) pluralized, 2) liberalized, and 3) restricted media systems. This classification demonstrates comparable or different points of the media systems that highlight their role in the opportunity structure for the civil-society mobilization. Therefore, both regime types and media systems are addressed as they accounts for the contextual influence of power relations, institutionalized in society, on the mechanism by which individuals have different costs and incentives to conduct political activity.

Chapter 4 explores how the internet enables its users' pathways to political action by pooling individual-level data across the Asian countries in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s. This cross-national analysis employs the ABS data set, gathered in the two waves. The results show that internet use is positively associated with unconventional political participation, while it is not with institutionalized action. Also, the data reveal the mechanism by which the technology influences interpersonal discussion and self-efficacy, in turn leading to participation. Furthermore, internet use is found to provide mobilizing capacities for those who lack organizational membership as a traditional agent of political action. As a result, I find that the "Asian internet" has distinctive political features: 1) that is manifested outside the institutionalized field of politics; 2) that mobilizes new political communication systems that facilitate interpersonal discussion and self-efficacious feelings about politics; and 3) that bridges social networks and enables organizational structures for civil society.

Chapter 5 examines whether digital network connectivity has generalizable effects on protest participation across different opportunity structures in East and Southeast Asia. For this cross-country analysis with longitudinal comparisons, data came from the WVS data set for two

survey waves: 2005–07 (wave 5) and 2010–13 (wave 6). The results show that, when individual citizens are connected to digital networks through the internet, the technology provides a mobilizing structure for political action that cuts across national boundaries as well as survey waves. Notwithstanding the generalizable effects of internet use, its mobilizing capacities are not independent of political opportunity structures that vary according to regime types. Asian internet users perform protest activity to a greater extent in non-democracies than in democracies. And poor democracies provide more incentives for digital network connectivity to facilitate protest participation than wealthy democracies do. Furthermore, the new mobilizing structure is constrained by traditional national systems of mediated communication. Given pre-existing opportunities for media users to be involved in politics, that is, the mobilizing effects of technology take place differently across the Asian media systems.

In Chapter 6, I argue that Asian media systems provide an important source of cross-national variation in opportunity structures for protest participation among those who benefit from internet use. Multi-level modeling is used to test whether the mobilization at the individual level is contingent on the newspaper-market structures at the country level. Data came from the WPT data set for the media-system variables and the Asian Barometer Survey for the individual-level variables. I find that, when media systems have a larger circulation of national dailies, political participation is predicted by: (1) greater political interest; (2) lower news consumption; (3) less frequent political discussion; and (4) low internet use. The findings suggest that, insofar as media systems are more characterized by the strong development of a mass-circulation press, political participation is encouraged by personal motivation to a greater extent than an opportunity for citizen communication per se. In this context, the cost structures of political information are less favorable for internet diffusion to benefit the civil-society groups for

mobilization. The Asian media systems shape and influence the dynamics of political communication in the new information environment.

In the Conclusion, I demonstrate that the findings of the previous chapters shed light on the mechanism through which digital democracy manifests in East and Southeast Asia. In particular, I discuss a relationship between internet use and political participation given a potential reinforcement for the existing participation gap. Empirical evidence, however, supports the impact of internet use on political participation. For instance, internet use per se facilitates collective organizing for a civic or political cause among individual citizens without active membership in any formal organization. Moreover, internet use as a structural orientation to communication improves the overall fit of the structural model to the data in predicting political involvement. But at the same time, the mechanism of influence is constrained by media systems that reduce incentives for the mobilizing capacity of technology. The strong development of mass-media structures facilitates power-holders to intervene in social unrest and generates high costs for online civil society to reach out to engage ordinary citizens. That is, digital democracy is shaped and constrained by the traditional ways in which individuals relate to public life. To sum up, Table 1.1 presents the hypotheses that are tested in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, and the obtained results.

Table 1.1. Overview of the Hypotheses and their Results

Hypothesis	Result
H4.1: If people living in East and Southeast Asia use the internet more frequently, then they will be more likely to perform unconventional political actions, rather than institutionalized ones.	Supported
H4.2: If internet use is situated in the O–S–O–R model of political participation, then it will enhance the communication stimuli (S) and the psychological orientations (second O) that in turn encourage political action.	Supported
H4.3: If people living in East and Southeast Asia use the internet more frequently, then they will be more likely to perform political action regardless of organizational membership.	Supported
H5.1: If people living in East and Southeast Asian countries have more access to digital networks, then they will be more likely to participate in protest activity across the countries.	Supported
H5.2: If digital network connectivity enhances protest participation, then technology effects will be greater in non-democracies than in democracies. The effects will be also greater in poor democracies than in wealthy democracies.	Supported
H5.3: If digital network connectivity enhances protest participation, then technology effects across East and Southeast Asia will increase generally among people who are less dependent on mass media.	Partially Supported
H6.1–1: If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then internet use will be less likely to enhance political participation.	Supported
H6.1–2: If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then internet use will be less likely to enhance political participation.	Not Supported
H6.2–1: If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then political participation will be more likely to depend on political interest and/or self-efficacy.	Supported
H6.2–2: If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then political participation will be more likely to depend on political interest and/or self-efficacy.	Not Supported
H6.3–1: If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then political participation will be less effected by news consumption and/or political discussion.	Supported
H6.3–2: If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then political participation will be less effected by news consumption and/or political discussion.	Not Supported

Chapter 2. THEORIES OF DIGITALLY MEDIATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

How does internet diffusion provide new capacities for political participation in East and Southeast Asia? In this chapter, the question is first addressed by reviewing conceptual and theoretical frameworks for assessing the way in which the internet affords a mobilizing structure of political participation. Subsequently, the question is asked how the capacity of internet diffusion is constrained by opportunity structures specific to the regional context. Of course, the political impact of internet diffusion and the mechanism of mobilization have frequently been examined in previous studies about diverse contexts of political participation. But what remains to be explored are: 1) whether or not digital network connectivity facilitates alternative pathways to political participation that are marginalized by traditional institutions and 2) how digitally mediated political participation has been constrained by the enduring domination of national systems of political communication.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Digital technology provides people with a new means of practicing political action in a variety of contexts. In the 2011 Arab Spring, for example, the diffusion of social media and mobile phones allowed popular involvement in political communication and civic association, which in turn democratized the opportunity structure for protest mobilization (Howard & Hussain, 2013). This is the case inasmuch as a digitally enabled relationship between political actors and the mass public offers greatly increased opportunities for alternative voices to be heard in the formation of political identities and public discourse (Benkler, 2006; Lievrouw, 2011). The resulting expansion of public cyberspace helps mobilize popular demands for transparency and

accountability in governance, even in closed regimes, because of its capacity for monitoring human rights and civil liberties (Diamond, 2010). More importantly, digital media provide new structures in which individuals are connected, organized, and coordinated for a common cause (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Earl & Kimport, 2011). Internet connectivity has thereby become a crucial factor in the study of political mobilization.

Nevertheless, any theory of citizen mobilization cannot be independent of opportunity structures that shape and influence the mechanism by which people calculate the utility of their participation. In other words, the development of digital democracy is constrained by political opportunities that are structured or institutionalized in the context within which individuals have different costs and benefits of political action. For instance, in a strong state, online civil-society groups are given no institutional support to develop an anti-government voice into offline political protest. Where the political system is liberalized, even when the media outlets are dominated by the elite, internet diffusion provides an unprecedented channel for alternative voices to complement journalism. Even if media institutions were further afflicted with public distrust, digital media would prioritize citizen voices over an additional outlet (Lee & Luis, 2015; Welp & Wheatley, 2012). Likewise, the use of digital technology is embedded in pre-existing relations among the state, the media, and dissenting activists. How, then, does internet diffusion provide new capacities for political participation in East and Southeast Asia?

2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

2.2.1 *Conceptualization of Political Participation*

The concept of digitally mediated political participation is viewed in this dissertation as political participation that is mobilized by digital network connectivity through the internet and technologies to access it. Whereas the term "political participation" has been interpreted in

various ways, I rely specifically on the meaning of participation that is mobilized in a collective effort to bring about social change in support of democracy. What social change, then, has been discussed in relation to democracy?

Przeworski (1991) argues that among the signs that democracy is developing are the moment when it is recognized as "the only game in town" to determine who will exercise government power. From this perspective, democratic change occurs through the entrenchment of government that abides by the rule of law to protect the human rights of all citizens and pursue public goods, as well as being constituted and replaced by the people's consent under universal suffrage. But more particularly, the moment includes not only the installation of representative institutions based on free, fair, regular, and competitive elections but also the establishment of a democratic constitution that guarantees human rights, civil liberties, and political pluralism for the citizenry. This concept of democratization offers a framework for assessing political change according to ways of evaluating institutional arrangements (Diamond, Liz, & Lipset, 1990; Huntington, 1968; Powell, 1982).

Another school of theories about democracy emphasizes the necessity for the expansion of a general public that strongly embraces democracy (Dahl, 1997; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Shin, 2012). From this perspective, consolidation of democracy should come with growing mutual dependency between the institutional quality of democracy and the cultural orientation towards it. The foundation of representative institutions and democratic constitutions fosters citizens' endorsement of democratic norms and values; yet, without a strong attachment of the people to democracy and its way of governance, consolidation of a liberal democracy is hardly viable (Dalton, 2002; Diamond, 1999). Unless a democracy sustains a robust legitimacy based on citizens' deep and resilient commitment to democratic values and practices, it runs against

obstacles when it comes to social stability and government effectiveness. In view of this, public opinion has been frequently studied as a way of assessing the depth of democratic values (Chang, Chu, & Huang, 2006; Chang, Chu, & Welsh, 2013; Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Shin, 2012).

For democracy to function effectively, the governed need to possess the qualities of active citizenship (Dahlgren, 2000). These qualities include not only the ability to understand and internalize democratic norms and values but also the capacity to gain political knowledge and information, maintain political interest and involvement, and participate in civic and political affairs (Dalton, 2002). "Democratization," for Dalton, refers to the expansion of cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral involvement in politics that determine how people are governed and served in allocating resources and benefits. This is the case, given a normative theory of democracy, insofar as the government must be ruled by the people, for the people.

In this dissertation, I adopt Dahl's (1971) view that the development of democracy entails the formation and growth of active citizenship in which political participation of the populace manifests in contesting, formulating, and implementing policies. Brown (1998) also notes that what should characterize democratic systems is the citizenry's participation in the political process, as well as elected officials' accountability to the electorate and their transparent actions and procedures. That is to say, the development of democracy depends on the extent to which people are able to be involved not only in the output side of the political system but also in the input side. Without the participation of the mass citizenry in political decision-making processes, a regime lacks democratic representation to attain accountability and transparency of governance (Shin, 2012). Therefore, on top of the institutional establishment and cultural normalization of

democracy, democratization needs to be accompanied by the advancement of a popularly governed political process.

Since the 1980s, the so-called third wave of democratization has brought about a series of democratic transitions in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Asian Pacific region. In reality, such regime changes have come with different forms and degrees of democracy across countries. Although many countries in East and Southeast Asia have installed or at least claimed representative democracy as a principle for governing, democracy-in-practice has been manifested in varying ways. These countries indeed have mass endorsement of democracy as an ideologically preferred form of government. But it is not unusual that people living in these regions form political identities in isolation from the norms and values of liberal democracy such as civil liberties, separation of powers, checks and balances, civilian control of the military, the rule of law, and freedoms of the press and association (Chang et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2007; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Shin, 2012).

It is not surprising that such limited consolidations of democracy-in-practice in East and Southeast Asia have led to a lack of collective efforts to redress shared grievances and affect political decision-making processes. Social change in support of democracy occurs through the mobilization of bottom-up social movements that empower civil-society voices. And the development of democracy is attended by collective actions in which citizen participation is mobilized for a public good in a way of challenging institutionalized power relations in politics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Inglehart, 1977). This perspective provides a conceptual framework for understanding political participation that is supportive of democracy in the Asian context.

2.2.2 *Theories of Political Participation*

How, then, do we account for the mechanism by which political participation occurs? Traditional explanations of political participation have focused on different levels of analysis regarding which factors are involved in the process by which people engage in politics. At the individual level, political scientists have frequently drawn on rational-choice theory. From this perspective, political participation is the result of a cost-benefit calculation influenced by sociological and psychological resources (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). When disgruntled citizens are equipped more with cognitive and organizational skills on top of financial resources and time, they have reduced costs of learning about incentives and opportunities to participate in political activity to achieve their goals. This resource-oriented view suggests that patterns of political participation mirror social inequalities according to socio-economic status (Stockemer, 2014; Stolle & Hooghe, 2009). Moreover, when individuals have more psychological resources, they are better positioned to transform grievances into political behaviors and actualize their claims for a public good. The perceived incentives for such behavioral engagement include political interest, knowledge, and a sense of efficacy to affect the policy-making process, as well as dissatisfaction with the government (Bimber, 2003; Delli Carpini, 2004; Opp, 2013). This individual-level view of political action provides a relevant analytical framework for explaining how people decide to participate.

However, the above-mentioned rational-choice theory is not sufficient to account for the mechanisms by which individuals engage especially in political activities to challenge the status quo. We should, rather, consider Mancur Olson's problem of a free-rider dilemma: since such collective efforts are mobilized to deliver a public good that is not selective in its utilities, individuals decide not to bear the costs of participation "on their own" as the way of maximizing

the utility (Olson, 1965). Students of rational-choice theory have therefore paid attention to organizational agents of social movements that mobilize selective incentives, arrange cost-reducing resources, and form collective identities. From this perspective, the theory of collective action revolves around meso-level organizations or macro-level structures beyond individual actors. In particular, previous studies of social movements have been centered on three sets of underpinning forces: (1) the structure of political opportunity, (2) the formation of collective identities, and (3) cultural framings (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2009). Can these three factors be situated in a theory of contemporary political activism?

First, the political opportunity structure indicates an objective environment in which political actors and processes are rooted. This theory of collective action puts emphasis on an increase in political opportunities or constraints, resulting from social or institutional change, for social-movement organizations to mobilize resources (McAdam et al., 1996). In a similar vein, modernization theorists view mass participation in politics as a result of socio-economic development that is conducive to growing wealth, education and urbanization of citizens (Lipset, 1959; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969). Beyond its direct influence, the process of modernization also has a democratic impact through the emergence and growth of "a large, educated, articulate middle class of people" who prioritize post-material values such as individual autonomy and self-expression over material concerns based on physical and economic security (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). This perspective on modernization emphasizes the possibility of structural and cultural changes that not only shape but also mediate individual resources and motivations for political participation.

In addition, students of institutionalism argue that the structures of opportunities or constraints for mobilization are contingent on institutional arrangements. Thus, voting turnout is

found to vary across countries according to the electoral system, the number and ideological distribution of political parties, the levels of electoral competition, the adoption of compulsory voting, and so forth (Norris, 2002; see also Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1997). By the same token, media systems act as a major source of variation in political engagement. Indeed, a good deal of the literature has found that the mass-media structures affect the extent to which people are politically informed and engaged (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Baek, 2009; Groshek, 2011; Zaller, 1992). Also, previous studies have found that a public-service model of broadcasting promotes political knowledge in a superior way compared with a commercial system, because public-service broadcasting ensures the quality and diversity of programming and coverage that foster an informed citizenry (Curran, Iyengar, Lund, & Salovaara-Moring, 2009; Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001).

The idea about political opportunity structures explains the favorable circumstances in which collective action is more likely to occur. However, it does not account for an agency mobilizing resources for collective action. That is, in spite of unfavorable structures for activism, formal organizations can bring about social change. This theory highlights civil-society groups as the agent for inducing people to overcome the free-rider problem: rational people tend to avoid accepting the costs of participation in collective action when its desired utilities are not selective and are instead universal (Olson, 1965). The organizations work instead to increase the incentives for participation by aligning their members' grievances to frames of collective action, as well as to reduce the costs of resource mobilization. That is, such groups "provide the mechanisms through which political issues are articulated, participants are recruited, targets, locations, and timing of collective actions are determined, complex tasks and strategies are coordinated, and methods and tactics are selected" (Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009, p. 72–73).

Moreover, for individuals with organizational affiliations and identification, not acting for the cause of the organization is a cost, rather than a benefit, because of its sanctioning mechanism (Opp, 2009).

But formal organizations are not the only agent of mobilization. Social networks and ties provide another dimension for the mechanism through which individuals gain cost-reducing incentives for participation in collective action. Having large interpersonal networks, as well as becoming a member of voluntary organizations, facilitates peripheral groups of the citizenry to have access to out-of-bounds information about common grievances (Soon & Cho, 2014). This form of engagement reflects the power of weak ties in information flows and community organization (Granovetter, 1973). Putnam (1995; 2000) also argues that dense linkages of heterogeneous social networks bridge interpersonal trust in support of cooperative actions for matters of common concern. His theory of social capital relates cross-societal variation in political participation to aggregate levels of social trust and the density of associational membership, with both serving as a public good (see also Norris, 2002).

Finally, culture cannot be ignored, even in the context of rational-choice theory for political participation. Geertz (1973) defined culture as:

> A historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [i.e., people] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life. (p. 89)

From this perspective, culture is a particular mechanism by which people perceive, evaluate, and behave toward politics in accordance with shared meanings and values. It is particularly the case insofar as the mobilization of political action is influenced by how its utility is framed and

interpreted. In the same vein, Ross (2009) argues that since culture links individual and collective identities, it offers “a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others” so that social sanctions are placed upon political participants (p. 159). That is, culture creates a context-specific rationality of interest maximization when collective efforts are mobilized (Shi, 2015). Thus, this dissertation situates the explanation of political participation in Asian countries that are comparable in the shared meaning of elite-challenging action.

2.2.3 *The Internet as a Mobilizing Structure*

The internet is made up of digital technologies designed to connect and communicate between laterally networked nodes. In this dissertation, I argue that technology diffusion provides a new mechanism by which individuals are engaged and organized for a political cause. How, and why, is increasing internet use assumed to mobilize political participation? Basically, internet users are provided with new capacities for information seeking and interpersonal networking outside traditional structures and associations for social integration. According to Benkler (2006), such digitally enabled activities transcend conventional practices for and boundaries of political involvement, which used to be shaped mainly by legacy media and hierarchical organizations. In the view of Castells (2009), however, the development of such digitally enabled pathways to political life entails a challenge to the traditionally structured ones.

Indeed, the internet has the capacity to reduce transaction costs for individuals to be informed, recruited, and coordinated for collective action. Therefore, its growth in connectivity could theoretically give rise to new generations of citizens who would have not otherwise mobilized for a political cause (Howard, 2010). This impact of internet diffusion is especially manifested in its technological affordances for emerging trends of activism toward 1) personalization of politics (Bennett, 1998) and 2) transnational advocacy networks (Keck &

Sikkink, 1998). Of course, the internet is not a sufficient cause of such recent patterns of political participation. But the technology acts as a transporter of the post-industrial trends, allowing for a new mechanism by which collective efforts are mobilized for a political cause.

First, in post-industrial Western democracies, some scholars of political communication argue that the process by which individual citizens engage in politics has been scaled down to individuated levels from traditionally structured and mass-mediated ways (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The increasing phenomenon of personalized communication enhances political participation that takes place through individuated pathways to public spheres without elite mediation (Bennett, 1998; Castells, 2009). In this perspective, internet-mediated democracy brings about the emergence of new political actors who seek individuated ways of engagement in public discourse and policy-making processes (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011).

Since Habermas (1989), the public sphere has been conceptualized as an intermediary system of communication between elites and citizens that allows for free and equal deliberation over common concerns and, as a result, the formation of a "public" and its considered opinions. To attain such an ideal, the media "should" play an autonomous, inclusive role in shaping rational discourse, independent of political, economic, and social powers (Habermas, 2006). But, admittedly, it is a normative ideal insofar as mass-mediated communication has been subject to a few power-holders. Moreover, the media effects have been considered socially structured in that individual citizens rely on opinion leaders in their social networks. This "two-step flow of communication" model has emphasized a social-mediation process that aligns the public sphere formation with social structures (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).

However, the post-industrial trend toward personalization of politics fosters multiple, fragmented public spheres that undermine the role of the conventional social order in

information flows. This phenomenon has altered communication patterns between elites and citizens and moved them from a two-step process via broadcasting to a one-step model through "narrowcasting" (Bennett & Manheim, 2006). As a result, centralized control of mediated communication becomes no longer effective for delimiting the public sphere. In fact, the recent expansion of individuated media in the new information environment makes it difficult for political elites to mold minds uncontested through the mass media. Moreover, such social change to personalized politics is not restricted in the context of Western democracies. Along with the global diffusion of individuated means of communication, the governed constitute fragmented but recalcitrant publics whose perceptions, opinions, and attitudes interact more closely with the functioning of authoritarian rules with restrictive media systems (Shirky, 2011).

The internet has indeed weakened the conventional boundaries of journalism, established by traditional media systems, in content as well as in format. In particular, Williams and Delli Carpini (2011) argue that:

> Perhaps the greatest challenge to the existing media regime is the increasing ability of citizens to directly produce and access information about political, social, and economic like, bypassing both traditional and new media gatekeepers entirely.… Social networking (e.g., Facebook), user-generated sites (e.g., YouTube), and microblogging services (e.g., Twitter) regularly demonstrate both the political utility of new media and the futility of distinguishing the news from other categories or providers of information. (p. 89)

For this reason, interpersonal social networking on the internet becomes indistinguishable from mediated public discourse from the top down. Similarly, Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl (2005) highlight an emerging aspect of the new information environment in which personal relations and private spheres become clearly inseparable from the formation of public spheres. Indeed,

diverse online communities and even entertainment platforms enable their users to build a new kind of social guild and an accompanying association wherever an alternative voice on political and civic issues emerges and/or spreads out horizontally.

Assuredly, given their assumption about citizens' incompetence to promote for a collective civic good, Lippmann's (1965) students may be wary of the end of traditional gatekeepers in public communications. In light of this democratic theory, professional elites and their ideas of accountability are crucial in the functioning of democracy, and at odds with the notion of popular inclusion encouraged by technology distribution. Nevertheless, the trend toward personalization does not necessarily lead to civic withdrawal as a result of increasing detachment from traditional media systems (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Rather, the popular use of the internet offers distinctive capabilities for connecting interpersonal networks outside of a traditional social setting; thus, it helps match the utility of political participation at the individual level with its perceived benefits at the meso- or macro-level. Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that digital networks serve as the agent of aligning personalized politics based on demographic and lifestyle qualities with like-minded partners and activities through "loosely tied, opt-in/opt-out networks." In their view, the internet is a vehicle for a new mobilizing structure "through which people come together and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al., 2009).

In addition, the global diffusion of the internet enables people to connect with each other internationally, as well as interpersonally, in real-time and spontaneous ways that were simply not available before (Castells, 2009). We have seen how digital natives who have grown up with the new technology, as well as civil activists (and hackers), are often successful in bypassing state-managed communication and hierarchical organizations (Howard, 2010). They take skillful advantage of digital technology, as their government does, by (re)creating alternative means of

organizing, coordinating, and mobilizing political opposition or civic movement without traditional civil-society organizations. Moreover, the increasing commercialization of digital media frequently opens up inflows of Western (or developed countries') content and applications, regardless of their political intentions, into restrictive media systems.

More importantly, the international connectivity of internet use extends networked advocacy for political activism to local protesters who suffer the lack of civil society. Previously, the entrenchment of civil society has been indeed found important in political activism, because organizations are the agent of incentivizing individuals to overcome the free-rider dilemma through collective-identity mobilization, and resource coordination (Olson, 1965; Putnam, 1995). But the growing phenomenon of transnational activism sheds light on unprecedented pathways to grassroots organizing, which are less subject to country-specific constraints associated with resources and targets of activism (Bimber et al., 2009). Instead, collective action is increasingly organized beyond national structures and organizations insofar as the increasing power of supranational institutions is targeted by international alliances with local activists (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). As a result, people in diverse local contexts witness the expansion of a global civil society where they form political identities and coordinate collective activities without support from local social groups (Castells, 2008).

Transnationally networked activism is well suited to the expansion of personalized, flexible public-issue spheres that arise at the expense of the decline of the traditional social bases for the mobilization (della Porta & Tarrow, 2005). Alternatively, people witness emerging forms of political participation that occur through digital networks that go beyond national boundaries of traditional civil-society organizations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Internet diffusion is

central to the development of digitally networked activism that mobilizes individuals with shared grievances but without organizations.

2.2.4 *The Internet in the Context of Asian Politics*

Internet diffusion provides an important pathway to political participation through its capacities to transmit personalization of politics and transnationally networked advocacy. In particular, the increasing connectivity of the technology provides a mobilizing structure within which individuals access and generate social-capital resources in support of participation (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011). This impact of digital network connectivity is especially manifested by the mobilization of youth who detach themselves more and more from traditional social organizations and political institutions as the agent of social change (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Earl & Kimport, 2011). But this theory of digitally networked activism is mostly grounded in post-industrial Western democracies. It is still questionable how internet use is related to political participation in the Asian context, the countries in which share a particular civic culture.

The Asian countries provide valuable cases in the study of digitally mediated political participation. Many people living in the countries uphold normative orientations toward hierarchical institutions because of Confucian traditions and strong-state development experiences (Evans, 1995; Huntington, 1996). But the mobilizing impact of internet diffusion is manifested by the emergence of younger generations of citizens who are increasingly isolated from conventional forms of, and pathways to, political involvement (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). For online youth, digital networks instead provide a unique capacity to be connected and coordinated around a civic or political cause, to address their dissatisfaction even in the absence of grand orchestration by formal organizations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). East and Southeast Asia are nonetheless regions with deeply rooted confidence

in hierarchical structures of political institutions (Chang et al., 2013). At the same time, media systems are still elite-dominated and it has been hard for civil society to find room for entrenchment (McCargo, 2012; Romano & Bromley, 2005). Privacy is subordinated to public interest, and globalization is frequently framed as cultural imperialism (Zakaria, 1994).

How has internet diffusion influenced the mechanism by which political participation occurs among people living in the non-Western context of democracy? Even in Asian countries, certainly, digitally mediated realms of political communication have complicated the conventional scheme in which power-holders perpetuate their interests, target information sources, and shape how public discourse circulates (Abbott, 2012; George, 2003). In the restrictive media system, therefore, it is not surprising that digital youth embrace democratic identities and pursue civil liberties outside traditional norms (Howard, 2010). Similarly, a strong body of scholarship attests to the mobilizing impact of technology under authoritarian control in encouraging public demand for democracy (Nisbet, Stoycheff, & Pearce, 2012), nurturing autonomous civil society (Abbott, 2012), making government more accountable (Hussain & Howard, 2013), and helping to bring about political transitions if the state loses legitimacy (Howard, 2010). By the same token, increasing internet use can facilitate the development of new mechanisms through which individuals are mobilized to practice active citizenship. That is, these contemporary publics prioritize "the opportunity to participate in the decisions affecting their lives more than they value institutions and procedures that ensure stability and order at the possible cost of citizen input" (Dalton, 2002, p. 95).

Of course, such a change in individual pathways to political action is not independent of what social, psychological, and cultural resources individual citizens are equipped with and how they translate such resources into the participation (George, 2006). It is also certain that civil-

society groups—both online and offline—are struggling with elites' resistance to any change in social structures and mechanisms of political action (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012). In reality, their struggle is not only limited to consolidated- or semi-authoritarian states but also observable in democracies (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011). But at the same time, given the global triumph of market economics at this moment, few Asian regimes maintain a suffocating grip over the popular use of the media on the way to commercialization. In allowing the expansion of new media outlets such as cable and satellite television and the internet, as a result, many countries face the unpredictable situation that social connectedness and association go beyond authorized channels. The worldwide adoption of mobile network technologies also makes available an explosion of potentially liberating tools across different societal contexts, which destabilizes the elite-dominated power structures of a public sphere (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu, & Sey, 2007; Hussain & Howard, 2013).

In many East and Southeast Asian countries, it is no longer unusual for the voices of civil activists and even ordinary citizens to go viral online and be heard in the formation of public discourse. As a result, new communication networks through the internet facilitate people to learn about shared grievances, encounter dissident information, connect with civil-society groups, and receive the social rewards of being participatory (Howard, 2015). And the transnational connectivity of communication networks affords a new mechanism for grassroots organizing and collective action the resources and boundaries of which transcend personal networks and local communities within nation-states (Castells, 2009).

Different from traditional mobilizing organizations such as parties, unions, or mass media with hierarchical structures, digitally networked activism is characterized by fluid, decentralized, and transnational organizational structures (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber, Flanagin, &

Stohl, 2012). Accordingly, cross-national differences in civil-society organizations diminish in the recent trajectories of mass mobilization in which networked advocacy delivers selective incentives to protesters who lack local organizational forms (Bimber et al., 2009). Bennett and Segerberg (2013) shed light on a generalizable change in cost-benefit calculations of collective action for individuals who benefit from weak ties through digital networks. Their view suggests that digital network connectivity provides personalized structures for communication and organization that incentivize participation in an unprecedented way, even when contending with institutional politics.

In this dissertation, I agree with Bennett and Segerberg (2013), who argue that digital network connectivity affords mobilization and organization of political activism. In East and Southeast Asia, the internet acts as an unprecedented, alternative structure within which individual citizens are involved in collective efforts to voice and redress common grievances. Thus, internet use facilitates the emergence of personalized pathways to political participation for those who would otherwise not have been given access to channels of engagement in public life. And this unprecedented structure of citizen mobilization is not confined to a particular national context of political opportunities that are normally structured to maintain the status quo.

2.2.5 *Criticisms from Institutionalism*

Nevertheless, any mobilizing structures for activism are constrained by the entrenched power of institutions. Students of institutionalism challenge the role of the internet in providing new capacities for political action on the basis of assumptions about the normalization of political relations. First, Milner (2006) substantiates a significant cross-country variance in internet connectivity per se, attributable to the constraints of regime types on technology adoption. By extension, other scholars maintain that authoritarian governments have limited the political effect

of technology through the strong presence of state controls on digital networks (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2010; Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). Methods of repression include not only a physical hindrance to digital network access and its connection but also a regulatory restriction on citizens and their behavior, causing a chilling effect (Deibert et al., 2010; Howard & Hussain, 2013). Such digital inequalities manifest as not only technology-based differences in access, devices, and applications but also in user-based differences in activities and attainments (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2013; Zillien & Hargittai, 2009). Also, government elites are often tempted to use internet blocking and filtering strategies to disconnect internal dissenters from the international community and any advocacy networks for civil society.

In East and Southeast Asia, furthermore, political opportunities have been unfavorable to mass mobilization insofar as a government performs effectively and gains legitimacy from the majority of its citizens (Chang et al., 2013; Shi, 2015). Recent scholarship has also revealed how adroit governing institutions and policies in such strong states are at manipulating public opinion and agenda setting by utilizing digital networks (Deibert et al., 2012). In many regimes, in fact, experienced autocrats police communication systems, in coalition with private companies (Howard et al., 2011). That is to say, existing power-holders benefit from strategic co-optation of technology to maintain the status quo by exercising legal and/or illegal controls over the governed sector as well as civil society (Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). More sophisticated regimes have often taken preemptive action to exploit human or technological agents who discredit alternative voices and marginalize dissent (Howard, 2015). As a result, civil-society groups are put under surveillance to isolate ordinary citizens from protest activism.

From the perspective of institutionalism, accordingly, internet diffusion does not inevitably enhance a new pathway to political participation when technology use is at odds with

the interest of ruling elites who are influential in the formation of opportunity structures. Since political power-holders have increasingly expanded their interference in digital networks, rather, chilling effects may be just so likely to occur in diverse contexts of social interactions online. Meanwhile, government agencies routinely enter cyberspace to promote state agendas surreptitiously, together with propaganda spread by their allied media outlets (George, 2006). Digital technology has neither a built-in immunity from state control nor the inherent force to liberalize public spheres. Instead, traditional elites have an advantage over ordinary citizens in structural opportunities for political mobilization.

But are regime types sufficient to account for in the structuring process of political opportunities? In this dissertation, I demonstrate that the opportunity structure for political participation is not always subsumed under the black-and-white differences between democracy and dictatorship, especially in East and Southeast Asia. Apart from such regime types of the state, media systems are drawn upon to address how digitally mediated political participation is constrained by opportunity structures specific to the national context of institutions. From this perspective, the mobilizing capacity of internet use is not manifested independent of the media systems in which it takes place.

2.2.6 *Media Systems*

Why is internet diffusion assumed to bring about the development of new structural capacities for collective action within which individual citizens are mobilized to participate through personalized communication and transnational networks? Certainly, pre-existing power holders attempt to maintain their control over the new mechanism of mobilization through which the mass media influence “the process of formation of the public mind” (Castells, 2007, p. 258). The emerging form of political mobilization through the internet should be confronted with

traditional institutions within the nation-state as a source of domination. However, internet use has particular effects on citizen participation in a context where media institutions are organized to facilitate state-controlled or elite-centered politics.

Castells (2007) argues that power relations in society are structured and institutionalized by media systems. Accordingly, media systems provide structural constraints on political mobilization and they have particularly important implications in the Asian context of digital democracy. How, then, can media systems provide structural conditions that constrain mobilizing agency? In other words, how are such contextual factors involved in the mechanism by which individuals calculate the costs, risks, and incentives of political participation even as they want to maximize its utility? Given the political context of Western democracies, Cook (1998) argues that the media serve as political institutions that offer a central venue for communication between governing agencies and the governed. From this perspective of new institutionalism, news agencies have an independent impact on political processes as journalists often come into conflict with politicians and authorities by questioning them about public affairs issues and government accountability. In the same vein, media institutions have a capacity to delimit political discourses and shape public opinion, so they impact a shift in power relations between citizens' agency and elites' control (Habermas, 2006; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). It has been further argued that journalists work as an agent of stabilization or transformation according to their own practices at odds with the interests of political and economic power (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004).

Besides such journalistic practices, some scholars regard media structures as a contextual factor in political participation, despite their divergent views of influence. Putnam (2000) relates increasing the use of media, especially electronic media, with growing detachment of the mass

citizenry from public life. His argument sheds light on a media-driven individualized lifestyle that comes at the expense of social gathering and bonding strong ties. However, his view of social capital may not account for the emerging form of social integration in the digital age. Many communication scholars have found that the internet provides a new means of generating and accessing social capital insofar as the technology is used for informational and social-networking purposes (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). By conceptualizing its multi-dimensionality of usage patterns, the internet is thus related to civic engagement (Moy, Manosevitch, Stamm, & Dunsmore, 2005a).

In this dissertation, internet use is conceptualized as an opportunity to be involved in the emerging form of social integration. By "opportunity" I mean the distinctiveness of digital media in information flows and social relations. This opportunity is manifested differently in the context to which the mechanism of political involvement varies across societies, as well as among people. Previous studies suggest the political effects of internet use through certain types of activity. But its mobilizing capacity can also be examined by focusing on contextual differences within which people use the internet. Measuring the frequency of internet use, my conceptualization is therefore intended to study under what contextual conditions the technology has political implications.

Norris (2000) highlights media use as the agent of greater involvement in politics when it comes to the news media that inform disaggregated individuals about public issues. But beyond whether the media encourage individuals' engagement in or isolation from politics, previous literature emphasizes the increasing role of the media in the face of the declining power of traditional political institutions and civil-society structures. For example, Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) point out a trend toward the individualization of politics at the expense of declining

structured ideologies and institutional organizations. From their perspective, the personalization of politics accelerates in response to the growing political influence of the media, the content of which is imbued with entertainment and lifestyle issues.

My conceptualization of internet use as a new opportunity for social integration should address the assumption about its difference not only from preexisting pathways to public life but also from the use of communication channels among people who are already motivated to be informed. If the mobilizing capacity of technology were contingent on informational gratification that people are seeking from media use, for example, the new mechanism of political involvement could not be assumed. To examine the assumption about mobilizing effects of internet diffusion, therefore, its use needs to be situated within a broader context where people gain the same gratification from different sources. Insofar as internet use is viewed as the unprecedented mechanism of involvement in public life, its distinctiveness should be the case even when traditional media use leads to political participation.

Why are media systems an important part of the mechanism for political participation? From the perspective of rational-choice theory, the media exert an impact on the cost structures in which alternative voices and civil demands incentivize participation (McAdam et al., 1996). In particular, when people have such low-cost channels to develop civic skills, they have perceived benefits of acting on shared grievances to a greater extent. At the same time, the authorities have additional difficulty in discrediting dissident information flows and isolating activists from bystander publics when their media systems do not facilitate elite domination of public discourses. That is, media systems produce cross-national systematic differences in structural conditions by which mobilizing agency is constrained. In the same vein, Esser et al. (2012)

suggest that mass mobilization has different opportunity structures according to the ways in which the media are structured and institutionalized within the nation-state.

Certainly, the functioning of media systems is context-specific rather than generalizable (Hallin & Mancini, 2012). In East and Southeast Asia, for example, most of the countries are witnessing strong, enduring public confidence in traditional media institutions (Lee & Santana, 2015). Furthermore, it is not unusual that media outlets in the regions are in coalition with the state to restrict civil society and silence dissent (George, 2006; McCargo, 2012; Pan, 2005). This cultural context shows a dimension of media institutions as a systemic force that work to maintain existing power relations (Castells, 2007). In the restrictive media system, that is, the expansion of news markets is conducive not necessarily to the widening of public involvement but rather to the marginalizing of dissident voices in the public sphere (Tiffen & Kwak, 2005). For instance, under the presence of a strong state and its legitimacy, the growth of self-supporting news organizations in Southeast Asia has not fostered journalistic autonomy at odds with the government voice (McCargo, 2012). During the Arab Spring, the presence of authoritative journalists and their trusted organizations further weakened the mobilizing role of online civil society (Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides, & Freelon, 2012).

Nevertheless, media institutions in East and Southeast Asia are not always organized to restrict alternative public spheres at variance with the interests of power-holders. Rather, in some contexts, news outlets become the agent of social change from an internal dynamic within the media sector rather than from a strained relationship between media controllers and practitioners (Hong & Hsu, 1999). For example, the growth of broadcasting journalism in Japan undermined the information cartels of the elite press and authorities (McCargo, 2003). In South Korea, the market rivalry between mainstream newspapers and television broadcasters contributed to the

development of pluralism in the media: the former antagonized liberal presidents while the latter was in conflict with the opposition conservative party (Kwak, 2005). An empirical analysis is thus required to assess the role of such structural constraints in a political struggle between mobilization of disaffected citizens and institutional controls.

2.3 Gaps in the Literature

The political impact of internet diffusion and the mechanism of mobilization have been examined in many previous studies. But what remains to be explored are: 1) whether or not digital network connectivity facilitates alternative pathways to political participation that are marginalized by traditional institutions and 2) how digitally mediated political participation has been constrained by the enduring domination of national systems of political communication.

The increasing importance of digital networks in political activism is not because of their inherent mobilizing capacities. It is rather because large-scale social changes enable technology to serve as a new means of participating in public life. Globalization and post-modernization are the underlying causes of the emergence of individuated but transnationally networked publics who engage in collective gathering without grand orchestration (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Inglehart, 1997). In the meantime, the personalization of politics allows grassroots organizing of individuals who act on multiple political identifications and flexible identities at the expense of declining traditional organizing through formal organizations (Bennett, 1998). The internet and ICTs that help access to digital networks provide an important means for disgruntled citizens to be connected around a similar cause and coordinated for digitally networked activism (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).

But previous studies have been limited in explicating whether internet diffusion mediates digitally networked activism in the Asian context, the opportunity structures of which have

effectively marginalized the agents of popular mobilization. In particular, it is unclear whether the Asian internet provides new capacities for ordinary citizens to engage in collective action despite the constraints of political institutions and organizational structures. East and Southeast Asian countries yield a particular context within which strong states maintain strong legitimacy and good governance, so that many civil-society groups have not been given enough resources and opportunities to become entrenched in society. It is thus questionable whether digital network connectivity provides a new mobilizing structure that is situated in the regional context of constraints on individual incentives for political participation.

In assessing the mobilizing capacity of internet diffusion, moreover, its manifestation has rarely been compared across countries that share particular cultural norms at work in political participation, except for Howard (2010). The countries in East and Southeast Asia are indeed characterized by the endurance, at varying levels, of Confucian value systems, which frame civil liberties as subordinate to the national interest (Shi, 2015; Thompson, 2001; Zakaria, 1994). Any explanation of digitally mediated political participation can be therefore more convincing insofar as people respond to incentives and sanctions in a comparable manner.

To be sure, modernization theorists argue that socio-economic development gives rise to cultural change in a homogeneous manner across different societies: as people give primacy to post-materialist values over materialist ones, their political behavior becomes “unconventional” in its cause, mode, and target (Inglehart, 1997). As a result of globalization, furthermore, expansion of transnational media has led to the increasing accessibility of universalist cultural frames such as human rights and protection of the environment that contradict traditional norms (Boli & Thomas, 1999). Nevertheless, digital networks organize individuals according to their shared identities and values that mobilize personalized grievances and frame social rewards for,

or sanctions on, political action. It is important, therefore, to ground evidence of digitally mediated political participation in the Asian countries within comparable cultures.

Finally, the Asia-specific opportunities for digitally mediated political participation needs to be addressed in any consideration of media systems. The media agency intervenes in the structuring process of mechanisms by which individuals engage in political action and of boundaries in which mobilization is restricted to structural constraints. Indeed, media systems in East and Southeast Asia are diverse enough to transcend the classification of regime types. This institutional view, rather, suggests that, in the formation of transnational communication networks that lead individual citizens to act politically on their own terms, internet use is constrained by structured information flows in line with established power relations.

Yet there is little empirical evidence to elucidate media systems as contextual constraints on digitally mediated political participation. Indeed, the study of interactive patterns between traditional and emerging media is important because both intervene in the process by which people are provided with incentives and opportunities for political participation (Castells, 2007). And fierce competition occurs when contemporary political activism arises from a seemingly unceasing cycle of struggle between liberation and control, which are both facilitated by technology (Diamond, 2010). My analysis of Asian media systems will therefore contribute to an understanding of opportunity structures for internet diffusion to encourage citizen participation under existing social constraints on political action that challenges elites.

Chapter 3. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

This chapter is dedicated to an examination of how the Asian countries under study are endowed with opportunity structures for the mobilization of political participation. In particular, I argue that the East and Southeast Asian countries must be evaluated in two respects: regime types and media systems. Certainly, these two aspects are related in important ways. Yet the type of governance and the organization of media institutions in East and Southeast Asia are quite diverse, so that one of these aspects alone does not capture the full range of features of each country's polity. Therefore, both regime types and media systems are addressed as they accounts for the contextual influence of power relations, institutionalized in society, on the mechanism by which individuals have different costs and incentives to conduct political activity.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

To begin with, I describe some cases of large-scale protest activity in Pacific Asia during the first few years of the 21st century. In particular, the regional cases show the successful mobilization of digitally networked activism in the early adoption process of the internet. From them, moreover, we can gain relevant insights into how traditional institutions have evolved to provide constraints on the mechanism for political participation in an era of the rapidly growing internet connectivity. That is to say, normalization has expanded as traditional power-holders have entered cyberspace. As a result, online journalism and alternative information flows have often been subsumed under traditional media systems in which a few authoritative, mainstream media organizations dominate the news market. Government-led development has also impeded the reform of media systems: media cross-ownership, state-controlled licensing systems, and strict legal restrictions

on press freedom hinder civic experience. Using such means, some strong states in Southeast Asia have been successful at isolating their liberalization of the media from civil-society development (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012).

This chapter examines how the institutionalized context of political and media powers produces constraints on the mobilizing capacity of internet diffusion and maintains the status quo. I pay focused attention to the eight countries in East and Southeast Asia: South Korea and Taiwan in the former region, and Indonesia, The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam in the latter. These countries are diverse in the institutional arrangements and characteristics that provide distinct political opportunities for citizen participation. As discussed below, I classify them into four regime types with respect to the level of democracy institutionalized in their governing structures. Institutional heterogeneity among the Asian countries is further addressed by considering the different working patterns of their media systems. The countries are therefore categorized into the following three groups: pluralized, liberalized, and restricted media systems. This categorization creates an additional dimension to the structure in which digitally mediated political participation is constrained by contextual factors.

3.2 Early Forms of Digitally Mediated Political Participation in Asia

In the early 2000s, the development of online platforms and expansion of accessible technologies in East and Southeast Asia were believed to afford new structures of popular mobilization (Coronel, 2002; George, 2003; Lee, 2005). This idea was especially related to the growth of an online public sphere dominated by educated youth and civil activists rather than vested information-providers and traditional journalists. For such actors who were previously marginalized in political communication systems, cyberspace was indeed a source of hope and

opportunity that would empower their voice to influence public opinion and mobilize collective action. Accordingly, at the internet's initial stage of diffusion The Philippines and South Korea provided some examples of digitally mediated political participation across different geographical contexts.

In 2001, President Joseph Estrada of The Philippines resigned from office when the police and the military sided with hundreds of thousands of protesters in the streets who were outraged at his corruption and mismanagement. For the protesters, mobile phones were the most important means of sharing information and communication about presidential misconduct and of organizing through short message service (SMS) exchanges—so much so that their protest was labeled an "SMS revolution" (Santner, 2010). The internet was another channel for the displeased activists to connect with the mass public, publicize their opposition to Estrada, coordinate their voices about the impeachment trial, and organize protests (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qiu, & Sey, 2007). At that time of social unrest, Filipino cyberspace was filled with nearly 200 anti-Estrada websites and 100 e-mail discussion groups (Coronel, 2002). In contrast to the prominent role that such online communities played in the 2001 uprising, Filipino news organizations were passive in investigating presidential indiscretions. Their timidity was linked to the lack of journalistic autonomy from the government, as well as the market competition that stimulated commercialization of media content.

In 2002, South Korea witnessed a surprising political mobilization in which a Web-based voluntary association of Roh Moo-Hyun's supporters, Nosamo, played a key role in his election to the presidency (Shin, 2005). It was an unexpected victory because Roh was considered the most liberal and unconventional presidential candidate in South Korea's history of democracy. Also, he had an antagonistic relation with the press on top of his reputation as a maverick in

political circles. Three national newspapers (*Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo*, and *Dong-a Ilbo*) implicitly endorsed the frontrunner candidate of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), Lee Hoi-Chang, who had a distinguished career as a Supreme Court Justice. Their endorsement was weighty since the mainstream news media occupied above 70% of the market share at that time. Furthermore, GNP was representative of "the ideological legacy of the traditional ruling elite of Korean society," because the party corresponded firmly with the vested interests of the established order (Lee, 2009, p. 313). But widespread internet use in South Korea made it possible for Nosamo to organize and promote a large grassroots campaign force. Roh's emotional campaign was successful especially in engaging youth on the Web and mobilizing them as "a formidable voting bloc" (Shin, 2005). In contrast, Lee's GNP remained oriented towards traditional media and older voters. This difference helped Roh overcome his status as a minor politician.

Roh's successful political campaign was also facilitated by the growing popularity of Web-based news outlets among Korean citizens. To be sure, traditional print and broadcast media outlets dominated public communication during the election period. Yet digital media began to provide an important source of alternative public discourse in which citizen voices were heard. The leading example was *OhmyNews*. Founded in early 2000, this independent Web-based medium became the first viable model of citizen journalism for those who were distrustful of mainstream media but enthusiastic about political engagement (Joyce, 2007; Kim & Johnson, 2006). The emergence and development of alternative internet-based media were not restricted to South Korea. Around the same time, Malays also witnessed the growth of *Malaysiakini*, which attracted people who were dissatisfied with lacking credibility in traditional news outlets (Seneviratne, 2007).

The success of alternative media such as *OhmyNews* in South Korea and *Malaysiakini* in Malaysia should not be ignored in the growth of an online public sphere. In cyberspace, younger generations of citizens have become interested in political affairs, informed about shared grievances, involved in debate forums, and connected with like-minded groups. In the same vein, Shin (2005) argues that many Korean websites for citizen journalism "raised the political sensitivity of not only those who actually post their viewpoints, but also of the readers in general" and, eventually, had a significant impact on the outcome of the 2002 presidential election (p. 31). In particular, the transformation of the media landscape was marked by the first interview that president-elect Roh had with *OhmyNews*. This widely read interview helped successfully establish online journalism in the Korean news market.

Of course, in neither The Philippines nor South Korea was internet diffusion a sufficient cause of mass mobilization. Rather, both countries shed light on the importance of political opportunity structures that are unique to the nation state. Students of social movements argue that the objective structure for resource mobilization is regularized and institutionalized by conventional relations among government, elite actors, and clusters of disgruntled citizens and activists (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2009). For example, President Roh could not have had such strong support from youth and civil-society groups online without widespread anti-American and anti-regionalism sentiments at odds with his competitor, Lee (Joyce, 2007; Shin, 2005). Meanwhile, the development of alternative online journalism benefited greatly from the pre-existing media reform movement against the mainstream conservative newspapers. In addition, the Filipino countrywide revolt might have not been possible if the authorities had used the mass media to discredit civil voices, appease discontent, or hinder public awareness of protests (Santner, 2010).

To examine the mobilizing capacity of internet diffusion in East and Southeast Asia, it is therefore important to take into account political opportunity structures that vary across the countries according to regime types and media systems. The national context of such structures yields different constraints on the process by which internet use serves as the means of mass mobilization that affects political participation. The characteristics of regime authority should make differences in resources, risks, and incentives for civil-society organizations when making collective claims. But in the meantime, the organization of media institutions should not be ignored, because it generates cross-national differences in the cost structure for dissident information and alternative discourse to be silenced by traditional institutions.

3.3 Regime Types in East and Southeast Asia

There are diverse regimes across the East and Southeast Asian countries. And this diversity in regime types suggests a cross-national difference in political opportunities for mass mobilization, as manifested by the historical path toward democratization in the regions. Beginning from the overthrow of Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the third wave of democratization took place in South Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s. Meaningful elections to replace or threaten the incumbent leader also occurred in Indonesia and Thailand during the 1990s and in Malaysia in 2008. In contrast, Singapore and Vietnam have been persistently immune to regime transformation. Given the regional variation in democratization experience, therefore, the Asian countries are classified into four regime types: 1) wealthy democracies, 2) poor democracies, 3) authoritarian regimes, and 4) ambiguous regimes. In particular, I separated wealthy and poor democracies in East and Southeast Asia given considerable disparity in technology diffusion and economic development between the two regions. This comparative framework of Asian politics

suggests how regime authority characteristics provide contextual opportunities for political participation and also constraints on it.

3.3.1 *Wealthy Democracies*

South Korea and Taiwan are proud of their successful achievements of procedural democracy on top of rapid economic development. These Asian democracies are indeed distinguishable from their affluent regional neighbors, except for Japan, in which authoritarian regimes have endured. But before democratization in 1987, both East Asian countries also experienced authoritarian rule that had been in power under martial law established by the military in South Korea and by the single-party Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan. And, during the period of dictatorship, both countries achieved effective state-sponsored industrialization and poverty reduction under a centralized bureaucracy constituted of highly educated officials (Evans, 1995).

As modernization theorists argue, the development of socio-economic structures gave rise to the growth of a middle class who supported of civil liberties and political rights (Fukuyama, 1997; Lipset, 1959). The development of civil-society organizations was a social outcome of modernization, a high proportion of college-educated youth being opposed to the dictatorship (Diamond, 1994). Globalization is another cause of democratic transition in South Korea and Taiwan that strive to be equipped with a correspondence structure for the successful arrival of a free-market economy. In both countries, governing institutions have been under the eye of the international community, which opposes the restriction of civil liberties. Consequently, the rapidly developing economies in East Asia were able to join the third wave of democratization in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the mass citizenry of the two countries could strongly embrace civil liberalization, learning from the experience of a successful transition to democracy (Shin, 2012; Shin & Shyu, 1997).

Nevertheless, both East Asian countries are also characterized by their “bounded” way of democratization. And, as Slater (2012) pointed out, the presidential designates, Roh Tae Woo in South Korea and Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan, compromised public demands for liberalization by initiating and implementing the reform program with their own hands. For example, the former of the two decided to hold a direct election of the Korean president and the latter lifted Taiwanese martial law so that opposition parties were legally formed to contest the elections. Ironically, their response to the pressure of the dissident movement, backed by middle-class support for liberalization, kept the ruling parties, Democratic Justice Party (DJP) of Korea and KMT, as the mainstream in political circles. Roh became the first democratically elected president since the fall of authoritarianism in South Korea, and KMT won the initial democratic election in Taiwan.

Furthermore, the two countries have not fully developed into liberal democracies. Shin and Shyu (1997) pointed out three spoilers to democratic consolidation in South Korea and Taiwan. First, each has its own rival regime—North Korea and China—ruled by communist ideology, and the risk of armed conflict remains serious. This geopolitical situation hampers the expansion of civil liberties such as freedom of expression—so much so that legal and regulatory restrictions are frequently imposed on citizen activists and their groups in the name of state security. Second, both witnessed the economic legacy of a successful modernization model fulfilled by authoritarian rule with effective governance and political stability. For that reason, it makes sense that “the Taiwanese and Korean authoritarian regimes each had incubated a vibrant middle class with moderate and even conservative political leanings” (Slater, 2012, p. 26).

Slater’s argument is related to the final reason for limited democracy in South Korea and Taiwan: the majority of public opinion has firmly adhered to a “capitalistic pragmatism,” which

prioritizes government performance over democratic development in regime legitimacy (Chang, Chu, & Welsh, 2013; Shin & Shyu, 1997). It is thus understandable that South Korea's change to the opposition party took place on the heels of the country's financial crisis in 1997. Even after the peaceful turnover of the regime, the successor to DJP—the Grand National Party—and KMT took political power back from the opposition in the late 2000s. Their comeback is not irrelevant to the failures of achieving the expected performance and social stability of the opposition governments compared with their authoritarian predecessors (Slater, 2012, p. 26).

Given their political conditions, the two East Asian countries provide not only constraints on mobilization of large-scale political activism but also opportunities for it. In South Korea, the decision of the designated presidential successor, Roh, to accept demands for direct elections indeed mollified massive social and labor unrest. But the social movement empowered formidable and charismatic opposition leaders, Young-sam Kim and Dae-jung Kim, who were elected as President after one another following the end of Roh's government. Meanwhile, both pro-democracy figures were representative of the deep-rooted regionalism that determined citizens' standards of voting and incentives for being participatory. From this perspective, Kim (1998) argues that the political reality in South Korea has suffered from an enduring lack of ideological, religious, or class cleavages in party politics, replaced by regionalism, school relationships, and kinship. This political landscape has left room for mass mobilization in opposition to the elite-oriented politics that fails to reflect civil-society interests.

In comparison with the hasty transition into democracy in its East Asian counterpart, democratization in Taiwan was gradual and soft. It was the outcome, in part, of a diplomatic strategy in which KMT's Chiang made democratic reforms to cope with the emergence of China in international affairs. But since martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwanese democracy has been

grappling with ethnic tensions between earlier immigrants from China—mainly Minnan and Hakka, who experienced Japanese rule—and Chinese mainlanders who fled from the Communist Party of China (CPC). The tension was aggravated because the latter prevailed over the former by taking up key positions in the government, the ruling KMT, and the military. Also, given the historical difference in background of these two ethnic groups, their socio-political struggle has generated a national identity cleavage for relations with China that has played a prominent role in Taiwanese politics (Hsieh, 2005).

3.3.2 *Poor Democracies*

Comparably to South Korea and Taiwan, Indonesia and The Philippines in Southeast Asia share the experience of a democratic transition. In The Philippines, the demise of the Marcos regime in 1986 signaled the country's promising journey toward democracy. Since the overthrow of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, Indonesians have also seen persistent progress toward the development of democratic institutions. And, based on political learning from the experience, the majority of citizens have been able to embrace democracy as "the only game in town" (Shin, 2012). Differently from the East Asian countries, however, democratization in Southeast Asia took place in the absence of social-structural changes conducive to civil liberalization. Indeed, none of the emerging democracies in the region have witnessed a growth of the middle class at the same level that the Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—have attained. The lack of such a wide middle-class base has precluded the rise of a vigorous civil society, constituted mainly of diverse civic and social organizations, which precedes democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1994).

From the perspective of modernization theorists, the political problem in Indonesia and The Philippines is not a surprising consequence of their socio-economic underdevelopment

(Fukuyama & Marwah, 2000; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). Given Lipset's thesis, in particular, Przeworski and his colleagues (1996) argue that a democracy is impregnable only when its per-capita annual income exceeds $6,000 (in current US dollars), which has not been true in both countries so far. Although it is open to debate on causation, the lack of civil liberties in the region is therefore associated with its lower level of development compared with that of the East Asian countries. Indeed, democratization occurred in the Southeast Asian countries as a result of the failure of governance and the financial crisis of dictatorship. As a result, both countries are riddled with context-specific challenges to the stable consolidation of democracy.

In 1986, the People Power Revolution in The Philippines succeeded in converting the mass citizenry's developmental disappointment with the autocratic Marcos regime into a democratic transition (Pei, 1998). The country's democratization, early for Asia, promised a rosy future for the regional democracy. However, The Philippines has undergone so much socio-political instability that its quality of governance lags far behind the quality of an electoral democracy (O'Donnell, 1994). In fact, political institutions have been too weak to supply responsive and accountable governance beyond electoral legitimation. Money politics is a manifestation of the Filipino democratic landscape, taking the form of bribery, vote-buying, and fraud. And such a high level of corruption in high places has hindered the development of citizens' deep and resilient commitment to liberal values. As a result, Filipinos are lukewarm about seeking performative democracy, inasmuch as "elections are not decisions between policy alternatives, but popularity contests between charismatic leaders" (Emmerson, 2012, p. 68).

Its regional neighbor, Indonesia, also experienced a democratic transition when Suharto's dictatorship lost popular support because of the financial crisis in 1998 (Emmerson, 1999). That

is to say, the democratization took place as a way of redressing socio-economic backwardness (Thompson, 2001). Thereafter, Indonesia has been a consistent adherent of democracy based on the "freely contested multi-party election" (Aspinall, 2010, p. 20). And, as a big archipelago country with the largest Muslim population in the world, the Indonesian democracy is notable for the stable coexistence of a great deal of ethno-linguistic and religious diversity. As a result, the country has witnessed the expansion of civil liberties accompanied by the growth of a pluralistic media market, signifying political liberalization in the region.

However, like its neighboring democracy, Indonesia is often censured for a lack of established institutions and effective policies to support civil liberties, despite the existence of electoral democracy for more than a decade. The country is indeed subject to some illiberal, non-democratic reverse, typified by political corruption such as cronyism, vote-buying, and patronage as well as violent religious and ethnic conflict. In the view of skeptics, the Indonesian democratization entailed neither the substantive institutionalization of democracy in formulating and implementing government policies nor a normative commitment of the mass citizenry to liberal values (Emmerson, 2012).

Accordingly, Aspinall (2010) suggest three obstacles that signify a bumpy road to the consolidation of civil society in Indonesia and The Philippines. First, neither of the countries has institutions that are strong enough to have kept the military in check so that its interference in politics is deterred in any circumstance. For example, even though the Suharto dictatorship was displaced, its military legacies remained intact, so the military continued to play a central role in the political, governmental, and even business sectors (Liddle, 1998). Second, the vast diversity of ethno-regional cultures impedes the democratic regimes' attempts to exert centralized control over the violent local conflicts between rival religious or ethnic groups. Rather, local elites and

their allies have shunned the rule of law and remained involved in corruption. Such ineffectiveness of governance is linked with the decentralized political structure in the huge archipelagic state. But the state's governing network suffers also from local clans, who control their regions "like virtual private fiefdoms" (Aspinall, 2010, p. 27). Finally, despite the peaceful inclusion of Muslim power in political circles, Indonesians' religious diversity remains a pitfall for a functioning democracy insofar as militant Islamists have perpetrated violent acts against faith-based minorities.

Given such characteristics of weak states, both Indonesia and The Philippines have also been grappling with many social problems, such as corruption, poverty, crime, and long-running armed religious insurgency. And continuing social instability heralds growing dissatisfaction with the incumbent authorities and government policies. Unsatisfactory performance of the democratic regimes is further viewed as a source of potential authoritarian reverse, just as their preceding dictatorship came to an end because of its developmental failure (Emmerson, 2012). But more importantly, failing governance provides greater incentives for the mobilization of social movements to demand transparency, accountability, and responsiveness from state agencies. With regard to their limited governance capacities, the Southeast Asian democracies contrast strikingly with their authoritarian neighbors.

3.3.3 *Authoritarian Regimes*

In contrast to the occurrence of democratization in East and Southeast Asia, some countries are marked by strong states that manifest how well authoritarian regimes have endured and even prospered. Singapore and Vietnam are the exemplars of the Asian path-dependency that contradicts the modernization theory. Certainly, these Southeast Asian countries are different in socio-economic modernization. As a sovereign city-state, Singapore is one of the major

commercial hubs in the global economy. On top of material wealth, Singaporeans enjoy a highly favorable condition of human development (World Bank, 2012). Not only is acute poverty rare, education and healthcare services are also easily and widely accessible to the citizenry.

On the contrary, as one of the few remaining countries under a Communist government, Vietnam is a relative latecomer in modernization. Following the country's independence from the French, the Vietnam War was a major cause of impoverishing and politically isolating the country. But since 1986 the so-called *Doi Moi* policy has brought Vietnamese economic reforms in which their socialist-oriented market has begun the path towards integration into the world economy. The socialist country has also moved its industrial focus to high-tech fields on the basis of world-class levels of school enrollment and literacy rate (World Bank, 2012). Nevertheless, Vietnam still lags far behind the neighboring autocrat, Singapore, in its healthcare accessibility and life expectancy as well as income equality and wealth.

Despite their different status in modernization, the Asian regimes have in common top-down renovations that have operated effectively in liberalizing their economic market alongside the restriction of civil society. Their Chinese-like "dual-track" approach to liberalization isolates the ruling practice of Asian authoritarianism from that of closed regimes in other regions. And that point highlights how well the governing agencies have sustained a good deal of trust and popular support from the majority of the populace, despite the lack of civil liberties and political rights. In the same vein, students of comparative politics argue that the quality of governance prevails over the quality of democracy in the political context of Singapore and Vietnam (Brown, 1998; Slater, 2012). On the one hand, the strong states have gained in legitimacy and resiliency through effective policy action, accountable welfare provision, and elite commitment to moral uprightness. On the other hand, they exercise "their ability to keep up their remarkable records of

suppressing political contestation and cultivating nondemocratic convictions and values among their citizens" (Chang et al., 2013, p. 163). For this reason, the mass demand for democracy at the process level has not developed enough to advance political reforms.

Particularly in the non-democratic regimes, the ruling party has dominated executive, legislative, and even judicial institutions while maintaining robust legitimacy rooted in a government that performs well. They have co-opted market-oriented capitalism to achieve development and stability in a more effective way than their neighboring democracies. As a result, although there exist non-negligible differences in the two authoritarian systems and their extent of institutionalization, both exhibit a long-standing coexistence of political illiberalism and economic liberalism. As also manifested in the success of the Chinese economic reform, the non-democracies in Southeast Asia have proudly managed their constraints on political liberalism: their effective and accountable governance contrasts with neighboring elected governments that are "inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good" (Zakaria, 1997, p. 25).

The authoritarian regimes present their country-specific opportunities for, as well as challenges to, mass mobilization in support of democracy. As a parliamentary republic, Singapore inherits a democratic legacy of the Westminster system from its colonial history, under which it has held elections to represent constituencies. The government has also distanced the military and administrative bureaucrats from political competition. The elections have been at times meaningfully competitive, while the city-state has high levels of order, security, and effective criminal justice along with the absence of corruption and irregularities. Nevertheless, the control of the ruling power in Singapore has never changed. Diamond (2002) regards the political model as a hegemonic system insofar as the ruling party, the People's Action Party

(PAP), "monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power" (p. 25). Scholars and civic activists have further lamented the lack of civil liberties in Singapore, given legal restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly (Diamond, 1999; 2002). As the party's founder and the state's former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew is iconic for the successful endurance of a Singapore-style authoritarian regime: his advocacy of "Asian values" envisages the regime's incompatibility with Western-style democratization (Kausikan, 1998; Zakaria, 1994).

Since the Vietnam War, Vietnam remains one of the few communist one-party states in the world on the basis of popular attachment to the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Thought." This former colony of France has been preoccupied with nation-building in opposition to Western encroachment. Thus, it is not surprising that the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has held major positions in governing institutions to exert totalitarian control over society. But the enactment of the *Doi Moi* reforms in the mid-1980s caused a decrease in VCP's omnipresent power (Brown, 1998). And economic renovation forced the closed regime to open the door to regional neighbors, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, and even the US. This social change was further propelled by the collapse of the country's old ally, the Soviet Union, and the rise of Chinese "dual-track" reform.

To be sure, free-market principles diffuse along with the emergence of the middle classes in support of civil liberties. And, in Vietnam, the economic development brought about social cleavages between the urban rich and the rural poor that hinder state intervention in local affairs. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese political opportunity structure has still provided weighty constrains on the mobilization of civil society. Also, the authoritarian state was able to co-opt the

liberalization trend by adopting resilient adaptive rule with some liberal governing practices. Its tactics include “widening the number of ruling-party members who are allowed a role in choosing the top leaders, raising the number of directly elected local-government posts, and ensuring that the Communist Party listens more attentively to state officials, legislators, and citizens” (Gainsborough, 2012, p. 37). And, by doing so, the VCP’s cadres have been able to silence demands for greater political openness, cited as “extreme liberalism.”

3.3.4 *Ambiguous Regimes*

Unlike their authoritarian neighbors, Malaysia and Thailand have witnessed significant democratization. In particular, the Malaysian power structure has increasingly included the opposition, led by the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. For instance, in the general election of 2008, the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition failed to win a two-thirds majority for the first time in Malaysia’s history of parliamentary election. In the 2013 election, the Anwar-led opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition obtained more votes than the standing BN coalition government; but because of gerrymandering, a power turnover did not occur. Even so, it seems evident that the Malaysian political system is faced increasingly with a substantive challenge by the opposition to the long-established dominance of the BN coalition in politics.

Ruled by a constitutional monarchy, Thailand has also had the democratic experience. In the early 2000s, a series of electoral wins by a tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, had once been expected to engage the mass of citizens in representative politics and improve democratic quality. Indeed, deemed an economic reliever during the period of recession, Thaksin came to power through his appeal to and popularity with large rural constituencies who had been marginalized in politics. Yet, his lack of democratic commitment and abuses of power accompanied by irresponsible populism worsened the long-lasting problems in Thai politics, such as corruption

and deep cleavages, which led to a military coup in 2006, a judicial one in 2008, and another military coup in 2014.

The two Southeast Asian countries manifest how young democratic institutions have struggled with the legacy of authoritarianism. Consequently, their journey to democracy is rocky and indecisive, as exemplified by competitive elections held at the expense of the consolidation of democratic institutions. Diamond (2002) considers regimes of this kind "ambiguous" in that "they fall on the blurry boundary between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism, with independent observers disagreeing over how to classify them" (p. 26). Indeed, the two Asian regimes in 2013 were categorized as democracy by the Polity IV project, which examined democratic/autocratic qualities of governing institutions. Meanwhile, the Freedom House rated their condition of political rights and civil liberties as "Partly Free." In both regimes it remains to be determined how democratic institutions are entrenched in the structure of political opportunities for civil-society mobilization.

It is nevertheless important to note that both Asian countries have gained and maintained popular support for the illiberal institutions of government from their performance and integrity rather than their democratic legitimacy from political contestation (Chang et al., 2013). This pattern of regime support is similar to that of neighboring powers—China and Singapore—based on their successful development model without political liberalization. Compared with regional democracies, the development of these ambiguous regimes is remarkable given their income level several decades ago. Thus, scholars of comparative politics argue that the form of government in such countries lacks solid protection for civil liberties under the rule of law beyond the simple institutionalization of free, fair, and competitive elections (Diamond, 2002; O'Donnell, 1994).

Reilly (2013) views the regime character of Malaysia, with its state strength, as having arisen in the name of nation-building after independence from British colonial rule. The country has also maintained a lopsided political structure based on the Westminster parliamentary system. Based on the United Malays National Organization as the ruling party, the Alliance Party coalition and its successor, the BN coalition, have never allowed the opposition party to be a majority. Their long-established rule is a consequence of the state apparatus through which the federal government's hegemony applies to all political arenas that deliver social stability and economic welfare, in spite of regime-initiated processes of liberalization (Slater, 2012). Indeed, the strong states in Southeast Asia have kept a tight grip on regional autonomy, ethnic integration, press freedom, and political room for the opposition.

In fact, as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural federal state, Malaysia is analogous to Indonesia with regard to a political landscape that is centered mostly on ethno-regional and religious considerations and their cleavage. Also, both countries are similar in that their government legitimacy was questioned when economic policies failed. But these neighbors were different in the mechanism by which demands for liberalization reforms led to democratization. The Indonesian dictator Suharto failed to crush the pro-democracy movement subsequent to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was relatively better at mollifying the opposition movement, *reformasi* (reformation).

What caused such a difference in opportunity structures for democratic transition? First, the countries were different in "legitimation by performance" (Emmerson, 1999). Compared with Indonesia, Malaysia was far more successful in developing an industrial market economy based on its fine infrastructure. As a result, Malay citizens should have some disincentives to challenge the status quo because of their basic achievements in life expectancy and access to

knowledge as well as income level. Next, despite the economic crisis, Mahathir decided not to receive financial aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would have liberalized the market and even the political sector in an uncontrollable manner (Emmerson, 1999). Instead, the Malay leader wrote off the economic crisis as an imperialistic Western conspiracy, and in so doing was able to keep his coalition in power. In the Asian context, that is, the legitimation of regime power and its failure stem from government performance and charismatic leadership above and beyond procedural democracy that allows for citizens' participation (Chang et al., 2013). Malaysia's experience exemplifies how mobilization of civil society can be considerably constrained by effective autocrats, whom Indonesians did not have.

As another ambiguous regime in Southeast Asia, Thailand characterizes its own structure of political opportunities. For example, Thai politics has been full of deeply polarized struggles between two political parties. On the one side, the former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra's Pheu Thai Party was the successor to the dissolved Thaksin's proxy parties: the People's Power Party (the so-called "red shirts") and the Tahi Rak Thai Party. Owing to the support of the isolated rural mass of the electorate, this camp made a sweep of the general elections for the last decade while preparing to promote a populist agenda. On the other side are the People's Alliance for Democracy (the so-called "yellow shirts") and its patron, the Democrat Party. This group represents the traditional establishment of urban, educated elites in Bangkok who loathed Thaksin and promoted loyalism to the monarchy.

The Thai military is another political ally of the elites. And it acts as another source of a fractious, unstable political system since it remains untouched, so that constitutional, civilian, and democratic rule is far still from being consolidated in Thailand (Pongsudhirak, 2012). In 2014, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the armed forces overthrew Shinawatra's elected

government and its allied populist movement in the name of ending the political unrest. But the takeover terminated most of the constitution, banned political gatherings, and restricted information flows. In fact, the recurrence of coups d'état indicates a political roller coaster for the Thai democracy. This regime is proud of sustaining a constitutional monarchy since the 1932 Revolution. But for only a relatively short period of time could it have been considered a true democracy in which the mass public was fully involved in free, fair, and competitive elections. Instead, undemocratic transitions and practices of power have resulted in a volatile, polarized political system. And this situation is conducive not only to social unrest but also to private sentiments that discourage participation in mass mobilization.

3.4 Media Systems in East and Southeast Asia

As discussed above, given the structure of opportunities or challenges for citizen participation, nuances exist between and even within the East and Southeast Asian regime types. But the Asian countries are diverse enough to go beyond this level of democracy. I demonstrate, rather, how Asian media systems provide contextual constraints on the mobilization that are not subsumed under regime types. To do so, I categorize the Asian countries into three models: pluralized, liberalized, and restricted media systems. Then why is the consideration of media systems important in the mechanism by which individuals engage in political action?

A series of liberalization reforms in the 1990s allowed the mass media in the Asian countries to evolve. Commercialization and differentiation began to emerge to some extent in the Asian media systems with a lack of autonomy and professionalism. Also, the mass media have become a major source of political learning and public communication throughout the regions. But the path of media development was contingent on regional- or country-specific structural, cultural, and historical conditions, so its patterns have been indigenized within the Asian context

(Hallin & Mancini, 2012). Consequently, the Asian media systems have gone through very different development trajectories from those found in the West.

In East and Southeast Asia, most of the countries suffered a colonial history and post-colonial authoritarianism. Across the regions, it is therefore rife that political institutions and grassroots associations have been deprived of resources to be mobilized for the entrenchment of civil society. Rather, making the media instruments of the government has been prevalent. As a result, the Asian media systems suffer intense partisanship, statism, corporatism, and questionable ownership and profitability of media businesses, despite different levels of the continuation of low resources (McCargo, 2012). And in these contexts, journalism has lacked the political and institutional fundamentals of press freedom and professionalism, regardless of who is in power. Furthermore, the Asian countries are very different in spoken languages, so that a wider reach of transnational news networks and their content is hampered across media systems. This regional condition puts additional constraints on international pressure on the state and on the market to promote civil liberties. The following section describes comparable or different points of the media systems that highlight their role in the institutional context of opportunity structures for the civil-society mobilization.

3.4.1 *Pluralized Media Systems*

Until the late 1980s, most of the Asian countries possessed restricted, oligopolistic media systems with state-controlled broadcasters as well as pro-government newspapers. Indeed, the "development journalism" model swept throughout East Asia under rules and policies that were still authoritarian. With the presence of a strong state-market coalition, the underdevelopment of civil society also led to vulnerability of media actors to the intervention of power-holders. Following the countries' democratic transitions in 1987, however, media systems in South Korea

and Taiwan have gone through substantive development based on their advanced infrastructure, enabled by economic and political reforms. Indeed, their democratization was the inception of pluralism in the Asian media systems.

Accompanied by media deregulation, the Asian democracies underwent unprecedented competition among diversified news outlets that had discrete marketing strategies (Hong & Hsu, 1999). Consequently, pluralization began to form and crystallize in news-content and readership patterns based on media ownership. In South Korea, the number of daily newspapers skyrocketed from 60 in 1988 to 116 in 2002 (Quick, 2003). Over the same period, the Taiwanese media market added 278 newspapers in addition to more than 150 new radio stations (Woodier, 2008). Media reform was also implemented with the initiation of the broadcasting of television and radio programs by privately owned corporate media. South Korea launched two commercial broadcasting networks, the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), insulated at least in part from state intervention. Taiwan established cable-television services in the early 1990s and had achieved the highest penetration rate in Asia a decade later.

South Korea and Taiwan are also characterized by external pluralism enshrined in their media systems, which entail competing political ideologies, despite their having some difference in the political landscape. First, the top three national dailies—*Chosun*, *JoongAng*, and *Dong-a*—have dominated the Korean newspaper market based on their right-wing ideology, at odds with liberal presidents as well as pro-government broadcasters (Kwak, 2012). The influence of these newspapers endured in the media-rich market by serving a conservative middle-class readership, aligning their opposition views with the conservative party. Since the conservative Grand National Party regained power in 2008, in contrast, the pro-liberal newspapers, *Hankyoreh* and

Kyunghyang Shinmun, have sustained their readership based on opposition-party supporters. MBC was also accused of instigating an anti-government movement against a trade policy to lift a ban on beef imports from the US. With internet diffusion, anti-conservative media have been further able to gain a growing share of online news markets. The growth of online journalism is vindicated by the viable existence of alternative news outlets such as *OhmyNews* and *Pressian*. Insofar as news agencies are commonly recognized by their political partisanship, external pluralism is present in the Korean media system.

Considered the most free media system in Asia, Taiwan's diversity of news outlets has characterized a vigorous political pluralism among cable news channels (Hong, 1999; Tiffen & Kwak, 2005). These new media outlets were able to encroach on the KMT-dominated media landscape by offering "more news reports, more interviews, and more analyses of current affairs," with the aid of the Pan-Green Coalition's opposition to the pro-unification Pan-Blue Coalition (Lo, 2012, p. 105). In doing so, competing political parties and ideologies became so dynamic that the mass media served as an important channel for each coalition's publicity. The pro-independence *Liberty Times* has indeed risen to the top of the most-read newspapers, so external pluralism flourishes in company with the pro-unification *United Daily News* and *China Times*.

Furthermore, commercialization has fostered pluralism in the East Asian media systems. The widespread diffusion of cable, satellite, and internet networks accelerated fierce competition between media channels in a market where commercial logic was prioritized (Hong, 1999; Tiffen & Kwak, 2005). For instance, Taiwan's KMT-owned newspapers, the *Central Daily News* and the *China Daily News*, have been increasingly losing their market share. Their decline in influence as well as circulation began with the lifting of martial law that had imposed a ban on new newspaper launches. Currently, two commercially run newspapers, the *Liberty Times* and

the *Apple Daily,* have topped the market, which used to be dominated by the *China Times* and *United Daily News* as mouthpieces for the KMT. As for the Taiwanese media system, commercialization has become a non-reversible phenomenon in support of a Western free-market economy.

In addition, the pluralized media systems in East Asia have witnessed the creation of some journalistic professionalism. Before their democratic transition, the mass media in South Korea and Taiwan had a history of co-option, manipulation, censorship, and oppression by authoritarian regimes, which kept a tight grip on journalism as a public good. Tiffen and Kwak (2005) argue that both countries have "traditions first of journalism being subject to state control and then to varying degrees conforming to the editorial line of their organizations" (p. 146). But after the countries joined the third wave of democratization in the late 1980s, the media began to function as an important social institution, taking part in the dynamics of social change. A source of professional journalism was, ironically, the concentration of the mainstream media, which were filled with highly educated journalists. These agencies maintain a dominant position in the news market based on exclusive information-sharing with the elite. As a result, the media were able to reflect their polarized party systems, so they became an essential public sphere where not only politicians seek to reach the mass citizenry but also voters oversee their elected government and representatives.

Of course, pluralism in the Asian media systems has distinctive manifestations in comparison with those found in the West. And, as a result, technology diffusion has contextual constraints on, as well as opportunities for, the mobilization of political pluralism and civil society. Although the liberalization phase began in the region a couple of decades ago, the media sector in particular has not consolidated its institutionalized independence from government

influence. Because of their authoritarian legacy, media systems in the Asian democracies are still dominated by the state-controlled broadcasting companies, which are vulnerable to government policy and the political situation. In South Korea, external pluralism has been, rather, kept up by a persistent contradiction between privately owned newspapers and government-controlled broadcasters on the one hand, and alternative media and activists sympathetic to the opposition on the other hand. Meanwhile, Taiwan's media landscape has suffered from political polarization inasmuch as most media outlets are owned by or affiliated with either the KMT or the opposition Pan-Green Coalition. Their editorial stance is so evident that commercial-oriented internal pluralism is unviable in the market.

The predominance of conservative views in the East Asian media systems is another dimension of the context in which internet connectivity affects the opportunity structure for political participation. Although both South Korea and Taiwan offer constitutional protection to press freedom and its application is substantive, media activity, for example, is often subject to legal penalty in the name of libel and defamation. In the former country, the rule of conservative government has enforced censorship of and penalties for even digital content generated by, or otherwise sympathetic to, North Korea under the National Security Law (Deibert et al., 2012). Meanwhile, backed by the regime with de-regulation policies, Korean right-wing newspapers were allowed to launch their cable television networks as of December 2011 in an effort to overcome the crisis of the newspaper industry. Accordingly, the diminished pluralism of the mainstream news market has motivated the opposition and its allied groups to seek networked advocacy and communication using the internet. In the latter country, as its commercial relationship with Chinese corporations has deepened, media owners and practitioners have shown growing self-censorship on matters affecting China for the sake of protecting their

financial interests (Freedom House, 2013a). At the same time, Taiwanese face the Chinese government's increasing attempts to influence their media outlets via advertising, so civil activists instigate collective action amid anxiety about the erosion of press pluralism.

3.4.2 *Liberalized Media Systems*

Southeast Asian countries show how political mobilization is constrained by media institutions. Certainly, some media systems were liberalized from the political sector to some extent as a consequence of democratization. Nevertheless, the establishment of media autonomy in the context is still far from full-fledged (McCargo, 2012). Instead, a lack of professional journalism and media trust has encouraged the influence of alternative online sources of information in the periods of social unrest.

Since the collapse in 1998 of the autocratic former President Suharto, Indonesia has come gradually towards democracy in response to what is known as the *reformasi* era. In The Philippines, massive protests ousted the dictatorship of President Marcos, and an electoral democracy has existed since 1986. Thailand also experienced the end of military power in politics, caused by a political uprising of the middle class in 1992. In company with the democratization process, the media sector has also transitioned into an open market (Lai, 2011; McCargo, 2003; Sukma, 2010). In the wake of such democratic experiences, the press could be relatively free of severe government controls: the state is restricted in revoking publication licenses once they are issued. Also, privately owned media companies have expanded their market reach while providing diversity of content.

In such free-press circumstances, Indonesia, Thailand, and The Philippines have experienced a significant increase in newspaper circulation as well as in the number of media outlets during the past couple of decades. And the countries had a resulting rise of

commercialization in media systems. In Indonesia, the advertising revenues of daily newspapers went up about 10 times from 2000 to 2011, whereas the number of newspaper titles merely doubled. Over that period, advertising expenditure in the press increased more than twofold in the Philippines and about one third in Thailand. Also, Indonesians are equipped with dozens of private radio stations as well as 10 fast-growing national television networks that compete with the oldest, the sole state-run television station *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (Laksmi & Harayanto, 2007). Similarly, Filipinos witnessed the rapid growth of hundreds of commercial television and radio stations that operate nationally or regionally in intense competition with each other. Since Thailand enacted the 1997 Constitution, the county has also made significant advances in media reform, so much so that more than 20 privately owned dailies are in business just to serve the readership in Bangkok.

In the Southeast Asian countries, moreover, foreign newspapers and transnational television networks have significantly expanded their reach. And the growth of international media markets spawned a Western-style business model. Particularly, insofar as liberalization created a Southeast Asian context of democracy and democratization, media reforms occurred in the name of allowing journalism to pursue its values through commercialization and professionalization. In line with the homogenization thesis of global media systems, moreover, the norm of objectivity began to prevail over blatant political partisanship across the media systems (Romano & Bromley, 2005). Indeed, news organizations have increasingly aligned their apparent political stance with a balanced and detached one, insisting on their role as an authoritative agent in the formation of public spheres.

However, it is true that Western-based norms and values of journalistic professionalism are hardly assimilated into the Southeast Asian media systems: clientelism prevails over internal

pluralism and autonomy for news organizations (McCargo, 2003). Although the market has been liberalized, journalists and their practices are still vulnerable to the concentration of media power in self-interested private entities and unstable democratic institutions (McCargo, 2012). That is to say, socio-political instability and prevalent corruption have weakened structural conditions for liberalized media systems to institutionalize journalism as a social institution.

Instead, the Southeast Asian countries brought about regional-specific liberalized media systems. Although the notion of a free press is enshrined in their constitutions, democracy has never come with competitive pluralism. In particular, Hanitzsch and Hidayat (2012) argue that the media industry in Indonesia is grappling with the maintenance of diverse public voices because of concentrated ownership as well as the media moguls' resistance to the policy of diversification. Even after media liberalization, journalism practitioners have been criticized for unprofessional conduct resulting from incipient autonomy, weak monitoring mechanisms, a lack of journalistic ethics, and amateurish reporting skills (Hanitzsch, 2005; Hanitzsch & Hidayat, 2012).

The Philippines is a case of media-sector concentration of ownership in the hands of wealthy families and businesses. Meanwhile, the most popular media, television and radio, exert a limited influence in Filipinos' everyday public life, because television is entertainment-oriented and radio is localized (Pertierra, 2012). That is, media institutions were not consolidated as a result of giving primacy to commercialization over public service provision. In this Asian context of democracy, Santos (2003) highlights the corruption of the Filipino media: private business and government frequently bribe news reporters, who cause a deterioration in the quality of media content and a diminution of its corrective power in society. Given its notorious record in coping with crimes against journalists, furthermore, the country suffers from a threat to

press freedom because of the impunity that is frequently enjoyed by wrongdoers (Freedom House, 2013a).

Thailand's experience of media development reflects its uneasy reconciliation of democracy within a monarchy. In fact, the elected Thaksin administration's failure and the 2006 military coup were preludes to a crisis of democratic institutions. But more importantly, media autonomy has been restricted because of the governmental abuse of *lèse-majesté* laws that prohibit any criticism of the royal institution and the monarch (Deibert et al., 2012). In this context of faltering democracy, media liberalization has manifested differently in print and broadcast news agencies. For instance, the press is under the control of large conglomerates and prominent families, independent from the state's direct control. But the Thai government and its allies still own almost all national broadcast stations. Accordingly, liberalization has not been a sufficient source of the institutionalization of professional journalism to achieve a position of public trust (McCargo, 2012).

Given the quality of media institutions, liberalized media systems in Southeast Asia provide certain opportunities for technology diffusion to mobilize civil-society experiences. In the regional countries, digital media use is relatively independent of explicit government restrictions on the emergence of alternative discourse and citizen journalism (Lai, 2011). Also, as a result of the proliferation of cybercafés and mobile phones, these less "wired" countries—Indonesia, The Philippines, and Thailand—leapfrogged into a digitally networked society where social media and blogs now serve as a lifestyle staple for citizens (Freedom House, 2013b). In the same vein, Laksmi and Harayanto (2007) argue that cyberspace in Southeast Asian expanded people's access to alternative voices that would have not been heard via mainstream media outlets. Even with the liberalized but unprofessional media, civil associations benefit greatly

from digital network connectivity that is relatively less concentrated and less integrated into the interests of power-holders.

3.4.3 *Restricted Media Systems*

Although liberalization of the media has swept across Southeast Asia, some countries have persistently isolated their domestic political affairs from the transnational trend. This guarded enthusiasm for a liberalized market economy shapes the restricted context of media systems, which reflects governmental objectives for promoting central government hegemony (Romano & Bromley, 2005). That is to say, the strong states in Southeast Asia have never allowed the growth of journalism institutions to get out of their control. Vietnam is the exemplar of the Communist Party's omnipotent control over all print, broadcast, and electronic media. Meanwhile, this country co-opted China's mixed system of free-market economy and one-party politics for the media market. Such a restricted model of media systems reveals additional constraints on citizen participation situated in Southeast Asia.

Originally, the Vietnamese government perpetuated the Soviet Communist model in which the development of the mass media was intended for class struggle and propaganda. Even after Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization in 2007, its dictatorial rule by the Communist Party kept a tight grip on state-owned media outlets through restrictive licensing. In the restrictive media system, the functioning of news agencies is completely subordinated to that of governing agencies. Self-censorship is also pervasive among journalists, whose boundaries of criticism are established in advance. It is therefore not surprising that media systems are marshaled to support the government but marginalize civil society (Marr, 1998).

Vietnam's neighboring strong states, Malaysia and Singapore, have also restricted media systems. But these comparatively better-developed economies in Southeast Asia manipulate their

liberalized media markets under the strong influence of government in coalition with a few affiliated entrepreneurs. Indeed, market-oriented reforms in their media environment were aimed at assuring compliance with international market principles and maintaining competitiveness in the global economy (Guan & Nesadurai, 2009; Lai, 2011). Both Malaysia and Singapore further showed off their liberalization of media systems by instituting commercial media operations. The introduction of privatization policies established a privately owned television station for Malaysia as early as 1984 and for Singapore in 1994.

However, many Southeast Asian media systems remain under the control of the state, which employs savvy tactics to benefit from the workings of commercial media. In particular, the state concentrates news outlets to a few conglomerates in coalition with political power holders (Deibert et al., 2012; George, 2003). Journalists and their organizations are also subject to the government's infringement of press freedom (Guan & Nesadurai, 2009). Especially, censorship and state intervention restrict the media from reporting politically, ethnically, and religiously sensitive matters (McCargo, 2012). In the same vein, George (2010) argues that the ruling party in Singapore, PAP, has been effective in systematically suppressing civil society and silencing its demands for democracy by conducting "strategies of coercion, co-optation and corporatist reconfiguration of potentially contentious groups and institutions" (p. 129).

The Malaysian government applies similar strategies to control journalism practices, which include the reconfiguration of "ownership structure, security-related laws, and a nurtured fear of political instability" (Tamam, Raj, & Govindasamy, 2012, p. 81). In particular, Malaysia has a liberalized media market in which an ostensibly wide variety of media outlets are still concentrated on a coalition of stakeholders of government consisting of "party-affiliated investment companies or wealthy businessmen with close connections to the main governing

party, the United Malay National Organization or its Chinese coalition partner, Malaysian Chinese Association" (Senevirate, 2007, p. 87). In addition to the concentration issue, restricted media systems constrain the development of journalistic professionalism because of the strong legitimacy that citizens accord their governing institutions. By the same token, George (2010) argues that such a harmonious Asian-style social consensus has made possible authoritarian resistance to vibrant pluralism in public spheres.

Will the restricted media systems in Southeast Asia endure through the age of technology diffusion? Despite their restrictive standards imposed on media practitioners, the strong states—Malaysia and Vietnam—manifest signs of digitally mediated political participation. Despite the Vietnamese restrictive condition for political communication, for example, Deibert et al. (2012) conclude that its cyberspace is a contested venue in which diverse actors are increasingly involved. They note that, in particular, regulatory arrangements and cyber-attacks have not yet been successful in discouraging digital media users from making their criticisms of the state heard. Given the Malaysian blogosphere, the internet also offers a relatively more free environment within which dissidents exchange information and opinions compared with traditional media outlets. Lai (2011) found that such alternative sources for public communication are read by around 80% of internet users and written by 38% among them.

Of course, technology diffusion does not always encourage democracy in the restricted media systems. Rather, as seen in the Singaporean cyberspace, the regime is often successful in suppressing organized dissent among internet users (George, 2010). Although its blogosphere is as vibrant as in Malaysia, Singapore is distinguished by its effective control mechanisms on public involvement and civil-society development (Lai, 2011). In this country, online dissidents are discredited and marginalized by the mass media, so ordinary citizens are isolated from any

collective efforts to challenge the elite. The restriction of alternative voices has been possible because the mainstream media provide an authoritative, principal venue for public discourse. And the media are voluntarily subservient to the national interest while silencing civil society's demands for democracy (George, 2003; Romano & Bromley, 2005). This Singaporean model of media systems shows how new mobilizing structures are constrained by traditional top-down communication strategies. In Malaysia, however, the county's lack of media credibility cannot help hinder the growth of alternative online journalism in public spheres (Tamam et al., 2012).

3.5 Conclusion

The comparative analysis of media systems in Asia sheds light on cross-country variation in the structure of opportunities for and challenges to mobilization of political action that are not captured through the classification of regime types. For instance, as consolidated democracies, Indonesia and South Korea provide different constraints on such mobilization. The former country is characterized by a liberalized media system in which people lack trustworthy sources of public communication, so civil-society groups make their voices heard through digital networks. The latter country is, however, equipped with a pluralized media system that already reflects social and political cleavages; therefore, the internet is less able to provide distinct pathways to civil-society experiences. Table 3.1 presents my categorization of regime types and media systems in East and Southeast Asia.

Of course, some scholars would expect the institutionalization of democracy to be an underlying cause of different constraints on citizen participation. But the study of media systems suggests that traditional news outlets are instrumental in government efforts to marginalize dissidents to varying extents across the Asian countries. Through the influence of media

institutions in the context of public communication, therefore, political actors and civil activists are involved with different opportunity structures for mobilizing political activism.

Table 3.1. Regime Types and Media Systems in East and Southeast Asia

Media Systems \ Regime Types	Authoritarian Regimes	Ambiguous Regimes	Democracies
Pluralized Systems			South Korea Taiwan
Liberalized Systems		Thailand	Indonesia The Philippines
Restrictive Systems	Singapore Vietnam	Malaysia	

Source: Author's categorization based on analysis of regime types and media systems among East and Southeast Asian countries.

Notwithstanding such institutional environments, the rapid growth of the Asian internet promises increasing room for alternative media to inform and organize citizens, especially in the absence of a full-fledged civil society. The widespread connectivity of digital networks through mobile phones and social media, moreover, provides an unprecedented means for online civil activists and their organizations to mobilize political action among those who are dissatisfied with the institutional working of the mass media as well as governing agencies. Therefore, internet use mediates individual pathways to political participation. And the manifestation of digitally mediated political participation is not subsumed under traditional mechanisms by which collective action is mobilized for a civic or political cause. Despite its varying effects, internet

diffusion has therefore been accompanied by the advent of protesters who transcend established systems of political communication, especially outside the norms of institutional politics.

The following chapters are devoted to finding empirical evidence concerning the internet as a new source of individual pathways to political participation among East and Southeast Asian countries. This whole study examines how the impact of technology diffusion is observed in the pooled data across the Asian countries, which have different structures of opportunities for, or constraints on, the mobilization of political participation. By doing so, this dissertation seeks generalizable evidence to explicate the mechanism through which digitally mediated political participation takes place beyond traditional pathways to political participation. But at the same time, my comparative strategy adds to a contextual understanding of digital network connectivity as a new mobilizing structure that is nevertheless constrained by traditional media structures.

Chapter 4. INTERNET'S IMPACT ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

This chapter examines the effects of internet use on political participation in East and Southeast Asia. Data came from the Asian Barometer Survey, gathered in two waves: 2005–07 and 2010–11. The results show that internet use is positively associated with unconventional political participation, while it is not with institutionalized action. Also, the data reveal the mechanism by which the technology influences interpersonal discussion and self-efficacy, in turn leading to participation. Furthermore, internet use is found to provide mobilizing capacities for those who lack organizational membership as a traditional agent of political action. In this chapter, I find that the "Asian internet" has had a political impact: 1) that is manifested outside the institutional field of politics; 2) that facilitates interpersonal discussion and self-efficacious feelings about politics; and 3) that bridges social networks and enables organizational structures for civil society.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

People living in East and Southeast Asia are witnessing the fastest-growing market in the world for the internet and mobile phones. The rapid development of internet connectivity in the regions would, for the most part, be impossible without governmental policies with an interest in economic benefits. But the technology use is also shaped by its socio-economic, political, and cultural circumstances. As a result, the internet has become part of political culture in the region. For instance, the diffusion pattern of digital networks in non-Western contexts often goes beyond cross-country variation between democracy and dictatorship, as well as those between rich and poor countries (Lee, 2015).

Furthermore, Southeast Asia is a remarkable region where people take part far more in online social networking sites than the worldwide average penetration of the services (Abbott, 2015). Facebook maintains its dominance in cyberspace across the countries, insofar as more than 80 percent of internet users in Indonesia, Malaysia, and The Philippines have an active profile on Facebook (Nielsen, 2011). Twitter and YouTube are also included in the top five sites that internet users visit in most of the countries. That is to say, social media have become an increasingly important means for people to connect with political, cultural, and commercial artifacts.

The pattern of technology diffusion in Asia should draw academic attention to its impact on the democratic landscape. One reason is that digitally enabled networks can empower civil-society groups to make their voices heard, to raise public awareness, and to mobilize collective action (Howard, 2010). Indeed, analysts have noted that online communities and cell-phone expansion played a crucial role in mobilizing the 2001 SMS revolution in The Philippines (Coronel, 2002), the 2008 anti-beef import protest in South Korea (Yun & Chang, 2011), and the 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong (Lam, 2014). Therefore, some researchers argue that the internet and mobile phones facilitate collective actions among people living in Asian countries (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qui, & Sey, 2007).

However, the Asian region is exposed to the increasing pervasiveness of internet controls from economic and political power-holders who have evolved surreptitiously but effectively (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012). In emerging and even consolidated democracies, it is not surprising that digital networks are monitored by the governing elite to manipulate public opinion, dissuade civil activists, isolate such activists from the general public, and maintain the status quo (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011). Moreover, skeptics point to

continuing inequalities not only in access to the technology but also in usage patterns and the processing skills necessary to participate in politics (Kim, 2007; Norris, 2001). How has internet connectivity altered the dynamics of mobilization in East and Southeast Asia, with its distinctive political cultures and institutional settings? What implications has internet diffusion in Asia had on the generalizable dynamics within which individuals perform political action?

The debate on digital democracy has centered on post-industrial societies in the U.S. and Western Europe. Meanwhile, it is relatively unclear whether the technology has political impacts in East and Southeast Asia, which may differ from what has been generally agreed to be the case in Western democracies. In particular, previous research found that the effects of internet use in the regions distinguish between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation (Gainous, Wagner, & Abbott, 2015). Whereas the latter is encouraged by the reduced costs of being exposed to dissident voices through digital networks, the former is decreasing in the new information environment. This contextualization of the internet adds to a better understanding of its relationship with the political world.

Nevertheless, it remains to be explored how the internet complements or replaces traditional agents of political participation in mobilizing new pathways to action. This question is important for explicating the mechanism by which technology diffusion provides new capacities for individual citizens to engage in public life. Therefore, it is necessary to situate the technology within the Asian context of individual pathways to political participation. Since the "Asian internet" is the manifestation of socio-economic, political, and cultural influences in the region, that is to say, it should have particular implications for mobilization that is context-specific. The technology is distinctively instrumental in developing civil-society organizations that have been nonetheless deprived of favorable political opportunities in the Asian countries (Chang, Chu, &

Park, 2007; Diamond & Plattner, 1998). Accordingly, I argue that the expansion of digital connectivity has the capacity to provide mobilizing structures for collective action.

This chapter examines how internet use is related to political participation in East and Southeast Asia as the regions with rapid economic development and market liberalization. This question is first addressed by reviewing the effects that internet use has had on political action. In particular, unconventional political activities will be discussed with respect to why they matter in the Asian context. Then, I move to the mechanism through which political participation takes place in traditional settings through a communication-mediation process. Finally, I demonstrate that the Asian internet complements individual pathways to political participation and even mobilizes organizational structures for collective action.

4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

4.2.1 *The Internet in the Context of Political Participation*

Internet use has been found to enhance political participation in diverse contexts. The technology provides increasing capacities for civil-society actors and groups to mobilize political activism in democratizing contexts as well as in post-industrial societies (Anduiza, Cantijoch, & Gallergo, 2009; Boulianne, 2009). But empirical evidence is still insufficient and contradictory to understand the democratizing impact of new technology under illiberal political conditions (e.g., Howard, 2010; Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). A deterministic view of technology-driven mobilization is too naïve to be generalizable. How and under what conditions, then, is the diffusion of the internet thought to facilitate political participation in East and Southeast Asia?

According to Benkler (2006), using the internet, horizontally networked communication and organization become efficient over time, independent of hierarchically structured mobilization. Civil-society organizations benefit from the characteristics of digital technology

insofar as their organizational structure is more horizontally networked and decentralized than conventional political organizations are (Anduiza et al., 2009). Moreover, along with the trend toward post-industrial societies, the rise of lifestyle politics gives primacy to personalized forms of political communication and participation (Bennett, 1998). Individual citizens have therefore begun to detach themselves more and more from the influence of mass-mediated, hierarchical processes of political engagement (Bennett & Manheim, 2006). This personalization of politics conforms to the character of digitally enabled point-to-point communication, which is better suited to engage segmented, individuated audiences (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).

From their perspective, internet diffusion facilitates the emergence of new pathways to political participation. That is, as a vast array of information sources and network connectivity, the internet helps citizens form their own communities, if informal and fluid, and coordinate collective action for diverse purposes. This technological potential is apposite to the successful use of digital media among civil-society groups because of its decentralized nature of production as well as its circulation and use of political messages to mobilize and organize individual citizens (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Furthermore, the distinctive nature of digital democracy comes at the expense of the trend in which the youth become more and more detached from hierarchically structured and traditionally organized mass politics (Dalton, 2002). That is to say, the internet affords a structural opportunity for a new way of organizational work for individuals' political participation, different from the older, conventional logic of collective action based on hierarchical institutions and formal organizations (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005).

As a key element in a functioning democracy, political participation has different forms of actual behaviors that people perform to influence the political processes of decision-making and the exercise of power (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Given the role of communication

in political involvement, McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) distinguished “institutionalized” and “non-traditional” modes of participation, which are conceptually distinct in their forms of action. The literature has differentiated non-traditional forms of participation such as joining a public forum and engaging in deliberative conversation from institutionalized forms of action such as voting and campaign-related activities (McLeod et al., 1999; Moy & Gastil, 2006). Delli Carpini (2004) has distinguished direct forms of political action from its indirect forms in how people manifest expression of opinion. In particular, as the term “indirect” connotes, the indirect form of action conveys a lower amount of information compared with more direct forms of participation (Moy, Torres, Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005b; Verba et al., 1995). For example, even if a person attends a political event, such an action does not necessarily express his or her opinions about politics as much as signing a petition or attending a protest would.

It is therefore questionable whether the internet has effects that cut across different forms of political participation among people living in East and Southeast Asia. But Gainous et al. (2015) found that the Asian internet enhances unconventional forms of political action, despite its negative impact on conventional ones. The mechanism of influence is that the technology nurtures contentious publics in Asia who would have been marginalized by traditional systems of political communication. The internet and mobile phones are indeed instrumental in reducing the costs for dissident citizens to be informed and organized in ways that challenge the status quo. Meanwhile, the increasing use of the technology of social networking complements the way people maintain and even solidify interpersonal relationships that are supportive of civic engagement (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). For civil-society groups lacking communicative and organizational resources, digital media help make their voices heard, bridge their networks, and coordinate collective action.

Based on the narrowcasting model, recent social activism has shown how digital technology is well suited for producing and circulating customized messages among disaffected but segmented publics (Howard, 2010). Independent journalists are also enabled to distribute political information online that might not be heard otherwise (Garrett, 2006). Even with the restriction of civil liberties, internet use increases the benefits of collective organizing in relation to getting recognition and support from, as well as showing altruism for, like-minded communities, who are easily formed and bridged in the virtual sphere (Polat, 2005). Thus, it is no longer at issue that the success of political activism is more and more dependent on a digital-sensitive strategy, especially in state-managed media systems (Howard & Hussain, 2013). That is to say, the internet has become an essential factor in mobilization of elite-challenging politics.

4.2.2 *Structural, Communicative, and Attitudinal Factors*

To assess the impact of internet use, it is important to consider what factors are involved in the mechanism by which people perform political action. First of all, socio-economic status brings about variation among individuals in political participation because such status shapes cost-benefit structures for learning about and engaging in politics (Verba et al., 1995). That is, as people gain more knowledge and skills to understand public matters, they are more likely to perform political action to address shared concerns. Motivation is another factor to be considered because of its role in differential gains from communication, as well as its direct influence on political involvement (Delli Carpini, 2004; Xenos & Moy, 2007). This perspective emphasizes the importance of political interest as a mediator of actual participation (Bimber, 2003).

Previous studies emphasize the effects that individuals' embeddedness in social networks and organizations has on political participation. A larger interpersonal network facilitates cognitive and attitudinal orientations toward political matters (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Gil de

Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005). This theory concurs with the idea that having a wide range of conversation partners increases the likelihood of exposure to out-of-bounds knowledge and mobilizing information from the politically active (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley, 1990). Interpersonal trust is another dimension of social-capital resources that are conducive to mobilization of collective action because people perceive increased benefits from their cooperation with trusted others (Putnam, 1995). Moreover, citizens' membership in a formal social organization is a crucial source of greater political participation (Putnam, 2000). Such social-integration features provide mobilizing resources for individuals to match personal interests with shared problems, incentivize their cooperation, and coordinate collective activities (Olson, 1965).

Communication scholars argue that, in addition to such structural attributes, an increase in opportunities for political learning, expression, and discussion stimulates reflection, deliberation, and opinion-formation, which are consequential for political participation (McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). The acquisition of the necessary information for political expression reduces the cost of having political discussions, as well as of conducting participatory behaviors (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). For this reason, consumption of news about public affairs is believed to enable cognitive and attitudinal gains in favor of citizen participation (McLeod et al., 1996; Moy & Gastil, 2006). Also, political discussion is a crucial stage of communication mediation in which information-processing leads to cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral changes in political involvement (Kwak et al., 2005; Scheufele, 2002). Furthermore, frequent involvement in interpersonal conversations fosters an attentive use of information sources that is conducive to political engagement (Eveland, 2004; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).

Communication mediates not only participatory behaviors directly. It also brings about psychological gains that amplify its effects on political action indirectly. Self-efficacy is the attitudinal outcome of communication, an outcome that affects the mechanism of political participation. This concept refers to feelings of "one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics" (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991, p. 1407). The internal dimension of political efficacy is expected to increase as a result of the enhanced opportunity for information-acquisition (Delli Carpini, 2004; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). The lower costs of being informed about political matters enhance individuals' feeling of their capability to affect the political system (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Also, frequent exchanges of opinion among citizens facilitate learning about heterogeneous political viewpoints and deliberative evaluation on political matters, which in turn enhance self-efficacy and actual participation (Moy & Gastil, 2006; Scheufele et al., 2004). This theory of communication-driven internal efficacy is more generalizable across different political systems compared with external efficacy—another dimension of political efficacy that refers to beliefs and perceptions in the responsiveness of government authorities and institutions to citizen demands (Niemi et al., 1991, p. 1408).

Dissatisfaction with public affairs is another important predictor of political action because this psychological attribute affects the cost-benefit calculation within which people decide to not only perform political action but also choose its form (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). The psychological factor of mobilization also incentivizes attitudinal orientation to unconventional norms over traditional ones (Norris, 2002). Moreover, the literature supports that an increasing cross-border flow of information disaffects the public who are denied civil liberties (Gainous et al., 2015; Shirky, 2011). Therefore, in predicting individuals' political participation especially in unconventional acts, their level of dissatisfaction with politics should be taken into account not

only as a stimulant to protest activity but also as an outcome of citizen communication that mediates the action.

Given an integrative approach to the mechanism by which political participation takes place, McLeod and his colleagues have proposed the O–S–O–R model: individuals' social integration and interest in public affairs shape their different orientations (the first "O") to communication as stimuli ("S"); subsequently, personal orientations such as political knowledge and efficacy in the second "O" mediate a causal path from the communication stimuli to participatory behavior as a response ("R") (McLeod et al., 1999; 2002). This theory suggests indirect effects that internet use has on political involvement. That is to say, internet use enables opportunities for information and organization that in turn facilitate alternative pathways to political involvement. If this is the case, access to the internet can serve as a proxy for social integration.

The diffusion of the internet gives prominence to expansion of structural opportunities for political involvement, which is manifested by not only being informed and opinionated about politics (Xenos & Moy, 2007), but also engaging in socializing and communicative activities (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 2010; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). In doing so, internet use can foster attitudinal and behavioral engagement in political life. The increasing use of the technology for social networking has become a low-cost practice that entails interpersonal interactions as the agent of civic engagement (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011). The reduced cost of acquiring and processing information afforded by internet use enhances self-efficacy as an antecedent of actual participatory behavior (Delli Carpini, 2004; Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). Accordingly, the internet provides structural capacities for producing indirect pathways to political action through communicative and attitudinal gains.

4.2.3 *Contextualizing the Internet in East and Southeast Asia*

Of course, any given pattern of political participation should vary according to its underlying structures of costs and benefits within which individual citizens are mobilized for action. And cross-country heterogeneity is easily conceivable in opportunity structures for political participation. I therefore concede that internet use per se does not lead to political action beyond contextual differences in political opportunities, as well as technology diffusion. Indeed, the countries in East and Southeast Asia are diverse in structure, given their disparities in democratic institutionalization. Beginning from the overthrow of The Philippines' dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the third wave of democratization took place in South Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s. Also, meaningful elections to replace or threaten the incumbent leader occurred in Thailand and Indonesia during the 1990s and in Malaysia in 2008. But Singapore and Vietnam have been persistently immune to transformation of their regime.

The Asian countries are also marked by various social and political backgrounds, which are not subsumed under their regime types. South Korea and Taiwan are proud of their transition to democracy and its good functioning, which have brought about the emergence of post-industrial society. Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are strong states in Southeast Asia, which have achieved industrialization—to varying extents, nonetheless—under the restriction of civil society. By contrast, their regional neighbors—Indonesia, Thailand and The Philippines—suffer from democratic transition without a growth of the middle class at the same level that the Asian Tigers have attained. This comparative framework is important because the emergence of an educated middle class enables people to seek civil liberties as a critical condition for civil-society development (Fukuyama, 1997). Furthermore, people living in the Asian countries are equipped with widely varying accessibility to the internet: the International Telecommunication Union

published its penetration rates in 2014, ranging from 17% in Indonesia, 35% in Thailand, 40% in The Philippines, and 48% in Vietnam to 68% in Malaysia, 82% in Singapore, 84% in Taiwan, and 84% in South Korea. Such cross-national variation in structural conditions should provide different opportunities for individual citizens to benefit from the internet's mobilizing capacities.

Comparative researchers suggest that the Asian countries share a political culture, marked by Confucianism, statism, and developmentalism, that hinders the development of active citizenship (Huntington, 1991). For many political leaders in the regions, political participation in unconventional forms is often considered unnecessary or even harmful to the maintenance of effective and accountable governance (Zakaria, 1994). In such non-democracies, rather, institutionalized forms of political participation are often manipulated to give legitimacy to the state (Chang, Chu, & Welsh, 2013). This regional context sheds light on the possibility that internet diffusion mobilizes civil society.

Diamond (1994) defines civil society as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (p. 5). From this perspective, the entrenchment of civil-society organizations means that citizens have social structural resources to pursue their interests in line with the public good, independent of or even at odds with the state interests. For this reason, civil society provides venues for "the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests" that are likely to be marginalized by state-managed systems of communication and organization (Diamond, 1994, p. 8). Hence, large-scale public demonstrations, which introduced the democratic transition in East Asia during the late 1980s, could not have occurred without the mobilization of civil society (Diamond & Plattner, 1998). Civil-society organizations serve as the

agent of political activism that aims to challenge elite-driven politics rather than as the agent of conventional activities orchestrated by political power-holders.

Given that internet use allows new pathways to unconventional political action, it is thus questionable whether such use expands civil society. Some scholars of comparative politics argue that online civil activists and groups overcome traditional structures of communication and organization in mobilizing political activism (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011). Their ability to do so is related to the character of digital technology, which is distinctively suited and leveraged to provoke a networked action designed for individual citizens to fulfill their diverse civil identities. The proliferation of affordable mobile telephony narrows inequalities in access to information. The popularization of social media reduces costs for circulating user-generated content, bridging social networks, and connecting with international advocacy groups. Gainous et al. (2015), for example, found that internet use enhances collective action in the non-institutional field of politics that transcends different levels of democratization among the Asian countries.

Previous studies found that the communal or societal attributes of connectedness and integration affect the mechanism by which individuals actualize political effects from their acquisition of information (Kang & Kwak, 2003; Paek, Yoon, & Shah, 2005). The impact of internet use can be therefore contingent on social contexts within which individual citizens are given different mobilizing structures. According to the reinforcement thesis that has been proposed, furthermore, the technology reinforces, rather than bridges, the existing gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Celeste, & Shafer, 2004). Rather, the opportunity structure benefits disproportionately people who are in a favorable position to be informed and organized for collective action. That is to say, the participation gap may deepen in

cyberspace between those who already benefit from structural opportunities for mobilization and those who do not.

In the Asian context of citizen participation, the internet can nonetheless become a distinctive venue for maintaining and enriching interpersonal relations and associations through connective and socializing activities online. A recent across-the-board surge in social networking services such as Facebook and Twitter represents the changeover of internet use, transcending its role as a mediated source of gaining information by visiting websites or using e-mail. Especially, social media provide increasing capacities for individuals to go beyond their small, like-minded networks of close ties (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). The heterogeneity of personal networks is important, because frequent encounters with opposing points of view have an effect, albeit one that has been debated, on political participation. Some researchers have found beneficial effects for the exposure of non-like-minded ideas on cognition and deliberation (Kwak et al., 2005; Scheufele et al., 2004), whereas others note that supportive interpersonal interaction encourages people to be politically decisive and involved (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Mutz, 2002). Moreover, internet use complements the role of well-developed memberships in social networks and organizations that foster participatory behaviors across social strata (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005).

Therefore, internet diffusion suggests the increasing opportunity for individual citizens to be equipped with mobilizing resources in spite of their lack of social membership as the agent of collective action. It is the case insofar as the technology facilitates people to go beyond their close ties and encounter heterogeneous opinions from diverse sectors, including civil society. In doing so, internet users are mobilized for political participation without traditional organizational resources, especially when it takes place outside the institutional sphere of politics.

4.3 HYPOTHESES

The literature review in the above section leads to several hypotheses. First, in the Asian context where civil-society members and grassroots groups lack opportunities for communication and organization, the diffusion of internet use is likely to act as a new channel for unconventional forms of political participation. This relationship is possible because the internet is particularly well suited to political mobilization that occurs outside the institutional field of politics beyond traditional political relations. The first hypothesis is thus proposed:

> H4.1: *If people living in East and Southeast Asia use the internet more frequently, then they will be more likely to perform unconventional political actions, rather than institutionalized ones.*

If the internet has become an important and effective means of political mobilization, its frequent use will facilitate communication acts and attitudinal gains that in turn enhance political action. Given the mechanism by which individuals' orientations lead to their behavioral response, that is, the internet as a mobilizing structure has an impact on communication stimuli and attitudinal gains that mediate behavioral engagement in politics. This line of reasoning leads to the second hypothesis:

> H4.2: *If internet use is situated in the O–S–O–R model of political participation, then it will enhance the communication stimuli (S) and the psychological orientations (second O) that in turn encourage political action.*

Finally, the internet provides mobilizing capacities for people to be not only informed but also organized around a civic or political cause. More importantly, the increasing use of the technology for social networking equips individual citizens with low-cost opportunities for interpersonal interaction and collective coordination. The mobilizing capacity of internet use is

manifested by participation in protest activism without active membership in any traditional social organizations. The final hypothesis is posed:

> H4.3: *If people living in East and Southeast Asia use the internet more frequently, then they will be more likely to perform political action regardless of organizational membership.*

4.4 METHOD

4.4.1 *Data*

To test the above hypotheses, data were obtained from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). ABS provided reliable and comparable individual-level data on public opinion about political, social, and economic issues. The data set also offered information and background characteristics about the respondents and their households. The surveys were administered by a regional network of research teams who carried out face-to-face interviews with nationally representative samples of voting-age adults (17–19 years old and above). A standard sample size of the countries ranged from 1,000 to 1,598 respondents and the response rate varied from 24% to 90% (see Appendix 4.A).

The unit of analysis was an individual respondent living in East and Southeast Asia. The countries under analysis were: South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia and Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Given temporal as well as cross-national differences in internet adoption as well as the political situation, I used the survey data for the eight Asian countries that were gathered during the two biennia 2005–07 (wave 2) and 2010–11 (wave 3). Individual-level data were thus pooled across the eight countries of interest in each survey wave.

4.4.2 *Outcome Variable*

As an outcome variable, political participation was conceptualized as behavioral involvement in action that allowed a collective expression of intention to affect government action and policy-making. This concept was operationalized by differentiating not only between those who were politically active and inactive but also between conventional and unconventional forms of political action among the active. Out of a battery of questionnaire items pertaining to political action, the ABS data set provided five categorical items that were available in both waves. In particular, the respondents were asked to report whether and to what extent they had ever during the past three years: (1) attended a campaign meeting or rally in the national election (1 = No; 2 = Yes), (2) contacted elected officials or legislative representatives, (3) got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition, (4) attended a demonstration or protest march, and (5) used force or violence for a political cause (1 = Never done; 2 = Once; 3 = More than once).

Using latent class analysis (LCA), the observed responses to the items were employed to measure the underlying patterns of engagement in individual activities, manifested in different forms of political participation. The different forms of participation were identified by estimating "the probabilities of each response to each observed variable for each latent class" (Collins & Lanza, 2010, p. 12). In doing so, a combination of the item responses yielded several salient patterns that could be classified into distinct subgroups with regard to their underlying tendencies toward institutionalized or unconventional activities, as well as political participation per se.

Subsequently, a three-class model was found to be superior to a two-class model within each country, as well as across countries, in both survey waves. The LCA classification yielded a different distribution of the classes between waves. Also, in relation to BIC, the preferred model was the two-class one in most of the countries. Nevertheless, the Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood

ratio test suggested that three classes were preferable to two classes to fit each within-country data set, as well as the pooled cross-country data set in each wave. That is, just a distinction between the active and the inactive was not desirable to represent the data. Appendix 4.B shows the fit statistics of the three latent-classes models compared with those with two latent-classes.



Note: Along with the proportion of observations, each group of red bars represents the probabilities, conditional on each latent class, of observing each response (1 = Never done; 2 = Once; 3 = More than once) to each manifest variable of political action. Taller bars indicate higher conditional probabilities of observing the response. Class 1: Inactive; Class 2: Traditional; Class 3: Unconventional.
Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data in wave 2, using the *lavaan* package in R.

Figure 4.1. Estimates of the Three Latent-Classes in the ABS Data, Wave 2 (2005–07)



Note: Along with the proportion of observations, each group of red bars represents the probabilities, conditional on each latent class, of observing each response (1 = Never done; 2 = Once; 3 = More than once) to each manifest variable of political action. Taller bars indicate higher conditional probabilities of observing the response. Class 1: Inactive; Class 2: Traditional; Class 3: Unconventional.
Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data in wave 3, using the *lavaan* package in R.

Figure 4.2. Estimates of the Three Latent-Classes in the ABS Data, Wave 3 (2010–11)

The overall best-fit model arrived at the following three latent-classes to which the respondents belonged: 1) *The inactive*, serving as a baseline group, referring to those who absented themselves from any political activity; 2) *the traditional*, those who were selectively active in institutionalized forms of political action such as attending a campaign meeting and contacting elected officials; and 3) *the unconventional*, those who were active not only in

traditional activities but also in unconventional forms of activism such as signing a petition, attending a demonstration, and using force for a political cause. Although the population size is much smaller than for other groups, the unconventional group is far less susceptible to different cost structures of unconventional political activities than those in the institutionalized field of politics. The distinct response patterns of the latent classes were plotted to show the estimated class-conditional probabilities of observing responses to each manifest variable (labeled "Campaign" through "Violence") in the mid-2000s (Figure 4.1) and the early 2010s (Figure 4.2). Table 4.1 shows the descriptive summaries of the predicted class memberships in the pooled data, as well as in each country.

Table 4.1. Latent Classes of the Respondents Based on Predicted Class Memberships

Country	Mid-2000s			Early 2010s		
	Inactive	Traditional	Unconventional	Inactive	Traditional	Unconventional
Pooled	6,695 (63.3%)	3,661 (34.6%)	217 (2.1%)	8,278 (79.1%)	1,845 (17.6%)	343 (3.3%)
Singapore	785 (77.6%)	218 (21.5%)	9 (0.9%)	926 (92.6%)	61 (6.1%)	13 (1.3%)
Taiwan	1,193 (75.2%)	367 (23.1%)	27 (1.7%)	1,451 (91.1%)	109 (6.8%)	32 (2.0%)
South Korea	869 (71.7%)	324 (26.7%)	19 (1.6%)	1,045 (86.6%)	118 (9.8%)	44 (3.6%)
Indonesia	1,114 (69.7%)	437 (27.3%)	47 (2.9%)	1,365 (88.0%)	139 (9.0%)	46 (3.0%)
Philippines	832 (69.3%)	319 (26.6%)	49 (4.1%)	1,072 (89.3%)	72 (6.0%)	56 (4.7%)
Malaysia	680 (55.8%)	511 (42.0%)	27 (2.2%)	778 (64.1%)	370 (30.5%)	66 (5.4%)
Thailand	791 (51.2%)	721 (46.6%)	34 (2.2%)	1,122 (74.2%)	337 (22.3%)	53 (3.5%)
Vietnam	431 (35.9%)	764 (63.7%)	5 (0.4%)	519 (43.6%)	639 (53.6%)	33 (2.8%)

Note: Entries are class frequencies, with percentages in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations based on ABS cumulative data, waves 2 and 3.

Table 4.2. Descriptive Summaries of the Explanatory Variables

Variable	Definition	Mid-2000s		Early 2010s	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	Respondent's age	40.90	14.76	43.02	14.89
Education	1 = No formal education, 10 = Post-grad degree	5.33	2.39	5.33	2.44
Income	1 = Lowest level, 5 = Highest level	2.79	1.47	2.64	1.36
Internet Use	1 = Never, 6 = Almost daily	1.90	1.70	2.34	1.96
Network Size	1 = 0-4 people, 5 = 50 or more people	2.49	1.22	2.54	1.22
Political Interest	1 = Not at all interested, 4 = Very interested in politics	2.42	0.92	2.50	0.96
News Exposure	1 = Practically never, 5 = Every day	3.67	1.40	3.57	1.45
Political Discussion	1 = Never, 3 = Frequently	1.70	0.63	1.66	0.64
Internal Efficacy	1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree	2.31	0.84	2.38	0.87

Variable	Definition	Frequency (%)	Frequency (%)
Gender	1 = Male, 2 = Female	1 = 5,310 (50.21%) 2 = 5,266 (49.79%)	1 = 5,265 (50.30%) 2 = 5,202 (49.70%)
Urban Residence	Residence in urban areas	No = 5,426 (51.30%) Yes = 5,150 (48.70%)	No = 4,809 (45.94%) Yes = 5,659 (54.06%)
Organizational Membership	Membership in any social organization or group	No = 7,160 (67.70%) Yes = 3,416 (32.30%)	No = 3,758 (35.90%) Yes = 6,709 (64.10%)
Interpersonal Trust	Most people can be trusted	No = 8,056 (76.17%) Yes = 2,520 (23.83%)	No = 7,066 (67.51%) Yes = 3,401 (32.49%)
Dissatisfaction	Dissatisfied with the way democracy works	No = 6,974 (65.94%) Yes = 3,602 (34.06%)	No = 7,085 (67.69%) Yes = 3,382 (32.31%)

Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

4.4.3 *Explanatory Variables*

A key explanatory variable, internet use, was operationalized through a survey item to measure the frequency of using the internet. This ordinal variable was scored on a six-point scale, ranging from 0 (never) to 5 (almost daily). In addition, the size of personal networks was measured by using an item that asked respondents how many people they had contact with in a typical weekday to chat, talk, or discuss matters face to face, by telephone, by mail, or on the internet (5-point scale, *0-4 people* to *50 or more people*). As another factor of individuals' network structures, organizational membership was also measured by dichotomizing those who reported active membership in any voluntary organizations or formal groups and those who did not. The list of organizations included a variety of examples: political parties, residential and community associations, religious groups, sports and recreational clubs, culture organizations, charities, public-interest groups, labor unions, farmer unions or agricultural associations, professional organizations, business associations, parent–teacher associations, consumer cooperatives, alumni associations, and so forth. Finally, as a cultural dimension of social capital, interpersonal trust was tapped with an item asking whether the respondents would say 1) *most people can be trusted* or 2) *you must be very careful in dealing with people*.

The agents of political communication processes were also taken into account. The first agent was news consumption, which was operationalized by using an item that measured how often people followed news about politics and government (5-point scale, *practically never* to *every day*). The second agent was political discussion, which was measured by an item on how often people discussed political matters with family members or friends (3-point scale, *never* to *frequently*). In this study, political discussion was confined to activity that took place within a more intimate social setting and reduced exposure to conflicting social pressures.

A set of psychological variables was also controlled for. The variable of political interest came from an item asking respondents how interested they would say they were in politics (4-point scale, *not at all interested* to *very interested*). The internal dimension of political efficacy was measured by an item on the degree of agreement to the statement “I think I have the ability to participate in politics” (4-point scale, *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*). For the variable of dissatisfaction with politics, I used an item to measure how satisfied or dissatisfied respondents were with the way democracy worked in their respective country. A binary variable was then created to dichotomize the respondents who were dissatisfied and satisfied in general. Finally, socio-economic status was measured through the respondents’ demographics. These confounding factors came from a series of items on the respondents’ gender (*female* = 1, *male* = 0), age (*years*), and level of education (10-point scale, *no formal education* to *post-graduate degree*), self-evaluated household income (5-point scale, *lowest level* to *highest level*), and residence in urban areas (*urban residence* = 1, *rural residence* = 0). The descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are available in Table 4.2.

4.4.4 *Analyses*

Based on a total of 224 survey-based items (14 independent variables × 8 country units × 2 survey waves), a large percentage of these items (*N* = 193; 86.16%) retained less than 5% missing values. The top five items that retained the largest proportion of missing values were those on internal political efficacy in Vietnam in waves 2 (15.92%) and 3 (28.30%), self-evaluated levels of household income in Singapore (27.20%) and Vietnam (17.30%) in wave 3, and internet use in The Philippines (14.75%) in wave 2. To address potential biases caused by missing data, multiple imputation was implemented using the *mi* package in the R environment

(Su, Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2011). This procedure imputed each explanatory variable with missing data by drawing on the other variables within a country in each survey wave.

H4.1 was tested using an LCA regression model that simultaneously estimated its coefficients in predicting latent class membership (Linzer & Lewis, 2011). To examine H4.2, structural-equation modeling (SEM) was employed through the *lavaan* package in the R environment (Rosseel, 2012). This statistical technique allows a chain of multiple regression models to be estimated in determining structural relationships among endogenous variables (Kline, 2005). In line with the O–S–O–R model, a series of explanatory variables was treated as the endogenous variables: internet use, in addition to a network size, organizational membership, interpersonal trust, and political interest, as the first "O"; news consumption and political discussion as "S"; self-efficacy and dissatisfaction with politics as the second "O"; and being a member of an unconventional group as "R." The variables for socio-demographics were counted as exogenous variables to be controlled for in each structural equation. Finally, a logit model was used to test H4.3 by creating a binary variable to isolate the unconventional from other groups. This variable was regressed on the explanatory variables with the exception of organizational membership. The logit model was rather fitted to each wave data, differentiating between those who reported organizational membership and those who did not.

In estimating the structural relationships among the endogenous variables (H4.2), I first tested the assumption that internet use was treated as an antecedent of the communication stimuli in the O–S–O–R model. It is indeed possible that internet use is an outcome of, rather than an antecedent to, political involvement. Thus, the assumption was tested by assessing how well additional paths from internet use in the first "O" improve the overall fit of the model to the data. The SEM technique was used to specify the best-fitting structural paths among the endogenous

variables in the theoretically derived model by freeing or fixing them to be estimated (Kline, 2005). The theorized path model was embedded in the context of the known O–S–O–R model as a guidepost (McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele et al., 2004). To arrive at the best-fit model, any non-significant path among the endogenous variables was removed in line with the standard SEM modification method (Bollen, 1989). The quality of the structural model was evaluated on the basis of the fit indices. This modification process helped identify a baseline model that fit the data best in each wave while taking no account of internet use frequency (Model 1). Next, additional paths from the internet-use variable as a factor in the first set of orientations (first O) were freed or fixed on the basis of a likelihood ratio (LR) test. This alternative model (Model 2) was then compared with Model 1 in terms of fit indices: CFI, TLI, RMSEA, SRMR, and the ratio of chi-square to its degrees of freedom (χ^2/df). Regarding CFI and TLI, the better model fit has a value closer to 1, with the recommendation of 0.95 as an optimal cut-off value (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For RMSEA and SRMR, the cut-off point is 0.05 and lower values indicate better model-data fit (Kline, 2005). This two-step modeling was intended to examine whether the overall fit of the model to data would improve when additional paths for the technology use were set free to be estimated within the theoretically driven structural paths among the variables.

In fitting the above regression and structural equation models, country-fixed effects were taken into account because of the cross-national heterogeneity in political participation. Each model included country dummies, so that each country had its own intercept. Also, for a longitudinal comparison of this cross-national analysis, the models were fitted to the pooled data in each wave. Moreover, in estimating regression models, the linear explanatory variables were centered and scaled to have mean zero and variance one. The binary variables were dummy

coded. Through standardizing, the variables were put on a common scale within each country.[1] Lastly, all the estimated models counted survey weights to protect against bias in estimated coefficients, given the unequal probabilities of sampling not only within but also across countries. Survey weighting was important because response rates to politically relevant items would be subject to country-level factors such as institutions and culture.

4.5 RESULTS

The first hypothesis (H4.1) was that frequent internet use would be positively associated with the unconventional rather than the traditional. During the mid-2000s, both forms of political participation in East and Southeast Asia were a function of being male as well as having organizational membership, frequent political discussion, stronger political interest, and greater internal efficacy (see Table 4.3). Compared with the inactive, the traditional group was distinctively associated with being older, resident in rural areas, having a larger social network, following news more frequently, and lacking in interpersonal trust, as well as using the internet less frequently. The unconventional group was instead characterized by its members' younger age, higher level of education, more frequent involvement in political discussion, and dissatisfaction with the way democracy worked in their country, when compared not only with the inactive but also with the traditional. More importantly, the unconventional form of political participation was predicted by more frequent use of the internet than in other groups.

Similarly, the ABS data show the relationship between internet use and unconventional political participation in the early 2010s. As seen in Table 4.4, being the traditional or the

[1] Standardizing was performed to account for the cross-country gap in internet penetration rates. For instance, weekly internet users in a country where cybercafés are the main source of access can be comparable to daily users in another country with far lower access costs. However, the models using unstandardized predictors did not change the results in any significant way.

unconventional was commonly predicted by being male, living in rural areas, having organizational membership, having political discussion more frequently, and having greater interest in or self-efficacious feeling about politics. But the traditional form of political participation was a distinctive function of being older, more educated, or a frequent news consumer. In contrast, the unconventional were distinguished from other groups in regard to the participants' lower level of education, frequent discussing of political matters, and more frequent internet use. Even in comparison with the traditional group, the unconventional one was characterized by its frequent use of the internet, as well as being less educated, having a larger personal network, consuming news less frequently, and having political discussion more frequently. The ABS data consistently substantiate positive effects that internet use has on the unconventional form of political participation beyond its long-established predictors, while demonstrating insignificant or even negative effects of the internet on institutionalized political action. The findings support H4.1.

The second hypothesis (H4.2) was that, if internet use were situated in the O–S–O–R model as the mechanism of political participation, then it would influence political action indirectly through its effects on the communication stimuli (S) and the psychological orientations (second O). This hypothesis was tested using the SEM approach. First, the best-fitting baseline model to each wave data confirmed that the hypothesized paths among the endogenous variables without internet use were consistent with the theorized O–S–O–R model: traditional agents of social integration lead to political participation via communication and efficacy (McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007). That is, the theoretically driven relationship of the variables has the validity in the Asian context to account for the process by which individuals' social-structural conditions lead to their engagement in the non-institutionalized forms of political action.

Table 4.3. Latent-Class Regression Model of Political Participation in the Mid-2000s

	Traditional vs. Inactive	Unconventional vs. Inactive	Unconventional vs. Traditional
Demographics			
Gender (Female)	−0.38***	−0.53***	−0.15
Age	0.06*	−0.16*	−0.23**
Education	0.02	0.27**	0.25**
Income	0.01	0.07	0.07
Urban Residence	−0.21***	−0.13	0.08
Social Integration			
Internet Use	−0.07*	0.17**	0.23***
Network Size	0.09***	0.04	−0.05
Organizational Membership	0.48***	0.86***	0.38**
Interpersonal Trust	−0.22***	−0.01	0.21
Communication Process			
News Consumption	0.09***	0.01	−0.08
Political Discussion	0.23***	0.49***	0.26***
Motivation			
Political Interest	0.22***	0.17*	−0.05
Internal Efficacy	0.17***	0.35***	0.18**
Dissatisfaction	−0.06	0.36*	0.43**
Country Fixed Effects	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Intercept	−0.96***	−4.81***	−3.84***
N	3,661 vs. 6,695	217 vs. 6,695	217 vs. 3,661
McFadden's R^2 (%)		12.73	

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; Entries are standardized multinomial logit coefficients. For the sake of brevity, coefficient estimates of country fixed effects are not reported. Contact the author for more information.

Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data, wave 2.

Table 4.4. Latent-Class Regression Model of Political Participation in the Early 2010s

	Traditional vs. Inactive	Unconventional vs. Inactive	Unconventional vs. Traditional
Demographics			
Gender (Female)	−0.38***	−0.26*	0.11
Age	0.19***	0.07	−0.11
Education	0.12**	−0.17*	−0.29***
Income	0.05	−0.03	−0.09
Urban Residence	−0.36***	−0.34*	0.02
Social Integration			
Internet Use	−0.03	0.28***	0.31***
Network Size	−0.06	0.09	0.15*
Organizational Membership	0.85***	0.59***	−0.26
Interpersonal Trust	−0.06	−0.24	−0.18
Communication Process			
News Consumption	0.29***	0.08	−0.21**
Political Discussion	0.14***	0.39***	0.25***
Motivation			
Political Interest	0.23***	0.16*	−0.07
Internal Efficacy	0.19***	0.32***	0.12
Dissatisfaction	0.10	0.10	0.00
Country-Fixed Effects	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Intercept	−2.50***	−3.91***	−1.41
N	1,845 vs. 8,278	343 vs. 8,278	343 vs. 1,845
McFadden's R^2 (%)		20.89	

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; Entries are standardized multinomial logit coefficients. For the sake of brevity, coefficient estimates of country fixed effects are not reported. Contact the author for more information.
Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data, wave 3.

Table 4.5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for O–S–O–R Models

Structural Models in the Mid 2000s	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2/df
Model 1. O without Internet Use → S → O → R	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.002	0.97 (12.61/13)
Model 2. O with Internet Use → S → O → R	1.000	1.001	0.000	0.002	0.94 (14.98/16)
Structural Models in the Early 2010s	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2/df
Model 1. O without Internet Use → S → O → R	0.997	0.966	0.017	0.004	4.00 (44.00/11)
Model 2. O with Internet Use → S → O → R	0.998	0.973	0.016	0.004	3.71 (44.55/12)

Note: Structural paths in each model were freed or fixed, except for internet use, as appropriate to reach the best fit, controlling for socio-demographic factors. CFI & TLI: The better fit has a higher value, with the recommendation of 0.95 as an optimal cut-off value (Hu & Bentler, 1999); RMSEA & SRMR: Lower values indicate better model-data fit, with a cut-off point is 0.05 (Kline, 2005); χ^2/df ratio: values below 2 as indications of a desirable model fit; First O = A network size, organizational membership, interpersonal trust, and political interest; S = News consumption and political discussion; Second O = internal efficacy and dissatisfaction with politics; R = Unconventional political participation.

Source: Author's calculations based on the ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

When internet use was situated in the baseline O–S–O–R model, model comparisons supported its role as a factor in the first "O". As seen in Table 4.5, the SEM method produced Model 1 with the best fit to the data in each wave. To be sure, given the χ^2/df ratio, Model 1 in the early 2010s might not fit the data well insofar as Kline (2005) noted values below 2 as indications of a desirable model fit. Yet, according to Hu and Bentler's (1999) two-index presentation strategy, a good fit requires CFI and TLI of 0.96 or higher while the acceptable threshold level for RMSEA and SRMR is 0.05 or lower. Therefore, the structural paths in Model 1 for both survey waves provided support for the adequacy of the O–S–O–R model, especially when its relations were situated in the Asian context of unconventional political participation.

Subsequently, all structural paths from the internet-use variable were set free to be estimated in Model 2. By doing so, I found that this incorporation process for internet use improved—or at least maintained—the overall fit of Model 1 to each wave data. That is, when internet use frequency was situated in the theorized O–S–O–R model, the structural relationships among the endogenous variables identified the goodness of fit of the model to the ABS data in each wave. My two-step SEM analysis confirmed that internet use provided a dimension of antecedent orientations that constrain the communication situation and, in turn, participatory behaviors.

To enhance explanation of the structural relationships among the endogenous variables, the best-fitting models to each wave data are visualized in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. During the period of the mid-2000s, internet use frequency was positively associated with frequent political discussion, internal efficacy, and dissatisfaction with politics that were, in turn, positively related to unconventional political participation (Figure 4.3). On top of its direct relationship with the participation, that is, frequent internet use (first O) led to the communication stimuli (S) and the attitudinal orientations (second O) that mediated greater political action (R). But internet use was negatively associated with news consumption that led to political participation through the psychological mediator of dissatisfaction with politics. In the early 2010s, the ABS data yielded a similar structural relationship among the endogenous variables (Figure 4.4). Besides its direct relationship with unconventional political participation, internet use was positively associated with political discussion and internal efficacy that served as mediators of the participation. However, the technology use during this period was significantly related neither with news consumption nor dissatisfaction with politics. Taken together, the results support H4.2.



Note: Structural paths from the variables for the first set of orientations (network size, organizational membership, interpersonal trust, and political interest) are omitted for clarity. CFI: 1.000; TLI: 1.001; RMSEA: 0.000; SRMR: 0.002; χ^2/df: 14.98/16

. ⟶ Positive effects; ⋯⋯▸ Negative effects; ◂·–·▸ Covariance.

Source: Author's calculations and illustration based on ABS data, wave 2.

Figure 4.3. Structural Relationships Among Endogenous Variables in the Mid-2000s



Note: Structural paths from the variables for the first set of orientations (network size, organizational membership, interpersonal trust, and political interest) are omitted for clarity. CFI: 0.998; TLI: 0. 973; RMSEA: 0.016; SRMR: 0.004; χ^2/df: 44.55/12

. ——→ Positive effects; ·········→ Negative effects; ←·—·→ Covariance.

Source: Author's calculations and illustration based on ABS data, wave 3.

Figure 4.4. Structural Relationships Among Endogenous Variables in the Early 2010s

Table 4.6. Mobilizing Effects of Internet Use with and without Organizational Membership

	Unconventional Participation in the mid-2000s		Unconventional Participation in Early 2010s	
	Non-membership	Membership	Non-membership	Membership
Demographics				
Gender (Female)	−0.20	−0.65**	−0.14	−0.17
Age	−0.13	−0.28*	−0.07	0.10
Education	0.17	0.35**	−0.14	−0.25**
Income	−0.03	0.23*	−0.14	−0.01
Urban Residence	0.07	−0.12	−0.50	−0.18
Social Integration				
Internet Use	0.28***	0.10	0.29**	0.32***
Network Size	−0.03	0.04	−0.03	0.15*
Interpersonal Trust	0.32	−0.23	0.15	−0.38*
Communication Process				
News Consumption	0.06	−0.08	0.01	0.04
Political Discussion	0.19	0.62***	0.21	0.41***
Motivation				
Political Interest	0.17	−0.05	0.30*	0.04
Internal Efficacy	0.23*	0.35***	0.36***	0.25***
Dissatisfaction	0.29	0.50*	0.58**	−0.18
Country-Fixed Effects	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Intercept	−5.10***	−5.42	−3.85***	−4.34*
N	7,452	3,121	5,085	5,381
McFadden's R^2 (%)	9.21	21.93	9.09	6.02

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Entries are standardized logit coefficients. For the sake of brevity, coefficient estimates of country-fixed effects are not reported. Contact the author for more information.

Source: Author's calculations based on ABS data, waves 2 – 3.

The final hypothesis (H4.3) was that, if people living in East and Southeast Asia were using the internet more frequently, then they would be more likely to perform unconventional political action regardless of organizational membership. This hypothesis was tested by

differentiating the respondents between those who reported active membership in any voluntary organization and those who did not. The results in Table 4.6 show that significant predictors of political action were considerably different between the two groups. Among those with organizational membership, unconventional political participation in the mid-2000s was a function of socio-economic status (being male, younger, more educated, or richer), frequent political discussion, perceived self-efficacy, or dissatisfaction with politics. But for those who lacked membership, the participation was predicted by frequent internet use or self-efficacious feelings about politics.

In the early 2010s, unconventional political participation with organizational membership took place to a greater extent among those who reported a lower level of education, frequent internet use, a larger network size, frequent political discussion, stronger self-efficacy, or lack of interpersonal trust. On the other hand, participation without membership was related with internet use, as well as psychological orientations such as political interest, internal efficacy, and dissatisfaction with politics. The ABS data in both waves show that, for those who are isolated from formal voluntary organizations, the internet serves as the only structural resource for their participation in unconventional political action. H4.3 is therefore supported.

For the sake of robustness of the above hypotheses testing, a post-hoc analysis was performed to rule out the possibility that the above findings were attributable to one specific outlying country. Using a jack-knife test, the models were estimated eight times by excluding each country from the data in each wave. The results were similar in all cases, validating especially the patterns in which internet use impacts political action (H4.1 and H4.2). Another post-hoc analysis was also conducted to address a multicollinearity issue, given that internet use could have been correlated with organizational membership. However, the data yielded that such

membership was not associated with frequent internet use. The result confirmed the validity of my comparison between the respondents who lacked such a traditional resource and those who did not in assessing the effect of the internet on unconventional political participation (H4.3).

4.6 Discussion

When internet use began to become popular, analysts were concerned that time-displacement would cause declines in social trust and real-world ties, considered a leading culprit of civic withdrawal (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie, 2001). Given the role of the technology in political participation, therefore, a skeptical view notes the resulting increase in privatized time that displaces community-related activities as a channel of the participation (Putnam, 2000). Furthermore, as younger populations are increasingly detached from or marginalized by traditional structures in political involvement, their growing reliance on digital media may stimulate withdrawal from public discourse (Sunstein, 2007). From this perspective, the internet has become a sphere of isolation or dissuasion from citizen participation in public life.

However, the findings of the present study contradict the skeptical view of the internet for public involvement in political life. Among people living in East and Southeast Asia, the technology has provided mobilizing capacities for them to exercise active citizenship. Although it is limited to a small segment of the population, unconventional political participation is the manifestation of action that individual citizens are encouraged to perform through their internet use. In particular, technological affordances have given mobilizing structures for the politically active who are otherwise isolated from traditional channels of information processing and social networking. Through these capacities, Asian internet users are also provided with more opportunities to have a psychological resource—self-efficacious feelings—as a mediator of the participation. Furthermore, as expansion of digital networks offers organizing resources for

collective action, the internet helps mobilization of the withdrawal from traditional civil-society membership. Digital technology enables networked action without formal organizations inasmuch as it takes place outside the institutional field of politics. Robustness of the findings is achieved in that the effects of internet use are consistent in both the mid-2000s and early 2010s. Also, the effects transcend any peculiar country.

Nevertheless, we need to deal with some limitations of the data and the analytical method used in examining the hypotheses. First of all, in predicting political participation, each of the explanatory variables was measured by a single item because of the lack of pertinent items in the large-scale cross-national dataset. Also, some relevant items were not available in all countries of interest. Furthermore, interpretation of the results should be undertaken with caution because internet use has been found to have very different effects when its multidimensionality is considered. In other words, the political meaning of the internet differs according to the type of online activities in which people are involved (Moy, Manosevitch, Stamm, & Dunsmore, 2005a; Shah et al., 2005). Ideally, it would have been also desirable to take into account digital-network characteristics that facilitate communicative and associational activities as mobilizing resources of political action (Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011).

Conceptualized as a new pathway to social integration, internet use was treated as a structural orientation in the O–S–O–R model. But this conceptual work is based on an unproven assumption: internet use per se cannot be considered a proxy for social integration. In view of this assumption, internet use is considered the first O, whereas other studies involving the O–S–O–R model have treated internet use as the S (Cho et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2011; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). And it is possible that the technology serves as a communication channel for politics among those who socially integrated. Because the measure of internet use does not

differentiate various types of activities, even some of which are performed in isolation from social life, it is also unclear how the use of technology per se predicts communication. In that regard, when particularizing the usage patterns, the internet may manifest a different role in political involvement.

This limitation is related to the analysis of secondary data, whereby the operationalization of internet use was restricted to the available item that was repurposed for my conceptual work. Using different datasets that specify the usage patterns, therefore, the impact of internet use could have been observed in a more nuanced manner. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, internet use was conceptualized as a new opportunity for social integration that takes place differently from its preexisting patterns. Personalization of politics and transnationally networked advocacy are underlying agents of unconventional mobilization within which the internet play a distinctive role in enabling individual pathways to collective action. The technology facilitates exposure to or involvement in digitally networked activism that mobilizes individual participation. Given limited access to the internet in developing countries, furthermore, individuals' use of the technology can produce structural differences in opportunity for involvement in such a post-industrial trend. This contextual view of internet use for politics is notable where individual pathways to unconventional political participation are restricted otherwise.

Using the pooled data across multiple Asian countries necessitates such a contextual understanding because of their societal-level variation in democratic institutions, civil-society development, and political culture. Of course, the unconventional actions are emerging repertoires of citizen participation in many post-industrial societies (Inglehart, 1997). But at the same time, individuals' political behavior is not independent of such country-level factors that intervene in their cost-benefit calculation. Indeed, individual-level predictors of political action

may not account for why the odds of participating in the institutionalized field of politics are much higher in semi- or fully authoritarian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam than in Asian democracies or a regional neighbor, Singapore. In the same vein, unconventional political participation should not be irrelevant to such macro-level effects. Discerning the different patterns for political participation between the countries will thus offer important insights into a more contextualized impact of internet use on the Asian democratic landscape. This concern calls for a future study to take account of country-level factors in postulating political consequences of technology diffusion in Asia.

Despite its limitations, this chapter provides important explanations for the contours of political mobilization in the new information environment. In particular, the ABS data showed a meaningful distinction between traditional and unconventional forms of political participation in relation to the mobilizing capacities of the internet. Not surprisingly, because of their different costs of participation, the latter is much less likely to occur than the former. But frequent internet use is associated with greater participation only in the unconventional action while it is not with the institutionalized type. The results suggest the internet-enabled emergence of communication systems within which individual citizens are informed, sensitized, and organized around a social or political cause. This system is not subsumed under the traditional pattern of information flows or social associations. For example, when internet users perform protest activity, they do not rely on consumption of news about politics and government, and even detach themselves from it. They benefit instead from the technological capacities for social interactions that equip them for political involvement through interpersonal discussion. They also gain in psychological resources for participation such as self-efficacious feelings about politics (Kenski & Stroud, 2006), as well as disaffection with the status quo (Gainous et al., 2015). For this reason, the

internet serves as the alternative channel for civic associations that characterize decentralized, horizontal structures of information flows and political relations.

Social or civic organizations are an important agent of political mobilization in both traditional and unconventional manners. In Western democracies, individuals' social integration has been found to equip them with resources for political action (Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995). Similarly, within the Asian context, civil-society groups provide an essential resource for people to be mobilized for civic or political purposes. But the Asian internet provides a mobilizing resource for citizen participation among those who are socially withdrawn from traditional civil-society organizations. The findings indicate that the technology expands personal networks to be connected beyond an intimate, like-minded social setting. Since Granovetter (1973) pointed out the importance of "weak tie" networks in information flows, scholars have shed light on their mobilizing effects through which individual citizens benefit from such networks' large size and heterogeneous character (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Moreover, the significance of interpersonal relations is also supported insofar as it takes place in an intimate and probably supportive social setting, as a channel for gaining in self-efficacy and participatory citizenship (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004; Mutz, 2002). From the results, however, we cannot conclude how the internet influences the communication processes. In the virtual sphere, people are given opportunities to be exposed to and struggle with heterogeneity and extremism just as much as to form strong ties and bridge like-minded communities. Future studies will therefore benefit from nuanced distinctions between homogeneous and heterogeneous digital networks, as well as between online and offline interactions.

Finally, the divergent effects of the internet shed light on the Asian context within which its users' political activities are isolated from traditional media systems. Although the technology

acts as a crucial means of citizen participation in unconventional action, loyal news followers are directed only to institutionalized forms of political expression. Compared with this traditional group, unconventional political actors are instead disconnected from the legacy media source of civic learning and engagement. The Asian internet substitutes for the mediated pathway to mobilization, especially for those individual citizens who are deprived of structured resources for social connectedness that is manifested by a variety of voluntary organizations. This regional context contrasts decentralized, networked political relations in digital activism with hierarchical, institutionalized ones in traditional mass politics.

Regarding the global diffusion of digital technology, controversy has arisen over whether internet use has enabled a wider and deeper involvement of citizens in politics. Skeptics argue that technology reinforces the status quo insofar as social inequalities and participation gaps are enduring even in the new information environment. Also, dissident activists are often isolated from majoritarian publics under the tight grip, or at least vigilant eye, of the state. The stability of semi-authoritarianism in Singapore and Vietnam indicates that the mere diffusion of information technology per se has not necessarily facilitated citizen mobilization. Rather, a robust legitimacy has been rooted in a well-performing strongman who provides not only economic development but also accountable governance at a far higher level than that achieved in democratic neighbors such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Under the presence of networked authoritarianism, political culture is not likely to give a favorable opportunity structure for internet users to pursue civil liberties and political participation (Pearce & Kendzior, 2012).

Notwithstanding the skepticism, this chapter suggests that internet diffusion in East and Southeast Asia provides an unprecedented mobilizing structure for individual citizens to engage in political action. The causal story is neither singular nor deterministic. Rather, the internet acts

as a means of actualizing active citizenship among those who are marginalized in traditional, hierarchical structures of political opportunities but oriented to emerging repertoires of civic action. They are small in number but rigorous in political expression, even using unconventional forms of action. As seen in the recent Umbrella movement in Hong Kong, the governing elites in Asia will therefore be faced with demands of new activists for accountability and civil liberties, distinct from the pre-existing challenges of opposition parties and civil-society organizations. When governments fail in their responsiveness to disgruntled citizens, the internet becomes an alternative but effective means of organizing and coordinating collective activities.

4.7 Conclusion

East and Southeast Asia are regions with many countries that witness a world-class growth in the information-technology industry. People living in the countries have increasing access—despite enduring income inequality—to internet-enabled networks through mobile phones and social media (Lee, 2015). More importantly, because of the shared high level of literacy and educational attainment in the regions, internet use has become a low-cost activity more and more, going often beyond social structural constraints. Given this trend of technology diffusion in Asia, this chapter examined whether or not more frequent use of the internet would be related to greater involvement in political action. This relationship was assumed insofar as the technology provides mobilizing capacities for individuals to be connected to and embedded in a variety of networks and ties. In doing so, internet users are given opportunities of information and communication around shared concerns that mobilize them to be active civically or politically. I found that the mobilizing opportunity is not restricted to those who are socially integrated in traditional settings. It is rather manifested in the context of unconventional political participation among those who lack membership in civil-society organizations. Therefore, the theoretical

model developed here substantiates the idea that internet diffusion has a democratic impact especially in the non-institutionalized field of political participation.

Nevertheless, the democratic impact of technology in Asia requires a more nuanced understanding of cross-national differences in structural and institutional constraints on political participation. Many countries in the region are indeed characterized by political institutions and culture that are unfavorable to the entrenchment of civil-society organizations and independent media systems (George, 2006; McCargo, 2012). Thus, it remains to be seen whether the internet has a distinctive impact in the restrictive media system where people lack a free press in support of citizen voices. Furthermore, the results of this chapter are not sufficient to determine whether or not the internet as a new structure for political involvement manifests its impact that goes beyond traditional sources of information and discourse on public issues that mobilize individual citizens. In particular, different information sources play different roles in democratic engagement (Chaffee & Frank, 1996). The next chapter will therefore examine the effects of different communication sources, including the internet, on political participation to offer deeper insights into the democratic impact of technology diffusion in Asia.

Chapter 5. THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL NETWORK CONNECTIVITY ON PROTEST PARTICIPATION

This chapter examines how digital network connectivity has effects on protest participation across different opportunity structures in East and Southeast Asia. For this comparative analysis, data came from the World Values Survey for two survey waves: 2005–07 (wave 5) and 2010–13 (wave 6). The results show that, when individual citizens are connected to digital networks through the internet, the technology provides a mobilizing structure for political action that cuts across national boundaries as well as survey waves. Notwithstanding the generalizable effects of internet use, its mobilizing capacities are not independent of political opportunity structures that vary according to regime types. Asian internet users perform protest activity to a greater extent in non-democracies than in democracies. And poor democracies provide more incentives for digital network connectivity to facilitate protest participation than wealthy democracies do. Furthermore, the new mobilizing structure is constrained by traditional national systems of mediated communication. Given pre-existing opportunities for media users to be involved in politics, that is, the mobilizing effects of technology take place differently across the Asian media systems.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The diffusion of internet use has been linked with political participation in a variety of contexts. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that internet diffusion had a mobilizing impact on individual pathways to political participation in East and Southeast Asia. Also, the impact was found to take place outside the institutional field of political behaviors. I revealed that internet use had greater mobilizing effects on individuals who were marginalized in the traditional systems of social association and political communication. Furthermore, my structural equation modeling analysis

confirmed the mediating function that digital technology played in allowing frequent political discussion and producing greater self-efficacious feelings about politics, as well as enhancing protest behaviors. In doing so, the Asian internet provided unprecedented mobilizing structures for people to participate in politics, as long as it occurs in a non-institutionalized field.

However, testing the hypotheses in the previous chapter was not free from limitations. Because the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data set was gathered in 2010–11, rapid expansion of internet-accessible mobile phones (dubbed “smartphones”) in Asia over the past five years should have been taken into account. The diffusion of mobile phones has drawn academic attention to their capacities for enhancing digital network connectivity beyond computer accessibility (Lee, 2015). More importantly, the cellular means of personalized communication are related to civil-society development as well as political activism that transcend social structures and national borders (Howard & Hussain, 2013; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). Given the worldwide expansion of social media, furthermore, digital network connectivity overcomes a digital divide based on socio-economic inequality among publics in East and Southeast Asia. The region now has five out of the top 20 countries with the largest Facebook populations in the world, and they were the fastest-growing markets for the service between 2009 and 2011 (Abbott, 2012).

More importantly, the findings of the previous chapter call for a comparative analysis of the Asian countries that generate important macro-level variation in individual pathways to political participation. In particular, their socio-political conditions may be too different to be pooled with respect to the formation of public spheres within which citizens are informed about a collective cause. Furthermore, the countries offer widely varying structures and institutions of mediated communication that affect opportunities for social interactions and collective

organizing (Esser et al., 2012). For instance, media systems are able to produce inequalities in information opportunities not only among individuals but also among countries (Mughan & Gunther, 2000). In the same vein, the mobilizing effects of digital network connectivity can be constrained by traditional national systems in which political information flows and public discourse develops. The mass media should not be ignored in this context when investigating mobilizing structures for political participation in East and Southeast Asia.

This chapter examines the cross-country heterogeneity of opportunity structures for ordinary citizens. Drawing on McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009), I define the opportunity structure as the costs and incentives for participation in politics. And these windows of opportunity can vary in the size and number according to the extent to which people are able to access and generate social-capital resources (Putnam, 1993; 2000). That is to say, because Asian societies are equipped with different levels of civil-society development, social interaction, and interpersonal trust, digital network connectivity is formed differently and impacts political participation to varying extents across the countries.

Comparative studies demonstrate that societal-level systems of mediated communication also yield varying structures of constraints on individual pathways to political participation (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011; van Kempen, 2007). Moreover, in relation to the changing media environment, societies vary in the formation of opportunity structures for citizens to create and utilize social capital (Putnam, 2000). Such macro-level variation in the opportunity structure sheds light on the possibility that media systems intervene in the mechanism by which individuals participate in politics (Prior, 2007). Is the opportunity structure for mobilization contingent on the national context of mediated communication in East and Southeast Asia? How

are the effects of digital network connectivity on protest participation manifested in Asian countries with diverse media systems?

In this chapter, digital network connectivity is tested for generalizable effects on public involvement in protest activism across different opportunity structures in East and Southeast Asia. The effects are assumed to transcend national boundaries insofar as people benefit from the internet or mobile phones, especially when they are politically informed. But I also examine how the consolidation of democratic institutions influences digitally enabled pathways to protest participation. Furthermore, the effects are assessed in the context of mediated communication that provides different opportunity structures for political involvement not only between individuals but also among countries.

This chapter employs longitudinal, cross-national data from the World Values Surveys (WVS). Compared with the ABS data used in Chapter 2, the WVS data set provides more nuanced measures of mediated communication for political information. Moreover, the latest wave of the WVS covers several Asian countries where the survey was conducted in 2012–13. Using the data gathered during that period helps control for not only any upward trend in mobile-phone penetration rates, but also for any after-effects of the widespread adoption of technology in the Asian region. By doing so, this chapter examines the generalizable influence of digital network connectivity on political participation and the mechanism of mobilization.

5.2 Literature Review

5.2.1 *Effects of Internet Diffusion on Political Participation*

As a key element of a well-functioning democracy, political participation has intrigued scholars from a wide range of disciplines. And many have studied the concept by operationalizing the involvement of citizens in behaviors such as voting and attending protests. Such activities are

indeed meaningful to democracy because, through these actions, citizens are able to affect the political decision-making processes (Dalton, 2002). In this context, digital network connectivity has been frequently contemplated with regard to its capacity to mobilize political participation among the users of the internet or mobile phones, who communicate about collective issues.

Digital network connectivity serves as a mobilizing structure for individual citizens to be politically informed and connected. In particular, previous studies suggest that the mobilizing capacity of technology is manifested by the reduced cost of expressive activity and grassroots organizing (Garrett, 2006; Howard, 2010). From this perspective, the diffusion of digital technology means that ordinary citizens have a low-cost channel to influence decision-makers by expressing opinions through using a variety of Web-based tools such as email, bulletin boards, and e-petitions (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 2010). Also, purposeful and tech-savvy activists are given an increased capacity to engage ordinary citizens without commitment to traditional politics through social networks that facilitate them to target the disaffected and the like-minded (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011).

Of course, internet diffusion does not necessarily bring about such effects through any form of political action in different social contexts. Admittedly, political activities are manifold in their form of participation as well as in their patterns of institutionalization across countries (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). But, as shown in Chapter 2, the Asian internet is a means of engaging in political processes that occur outside the institutional field of politics. This "unconventional" form of political participation is manifested by protest activities such as signing a petition, attending a peaceful demonstration, or joining in boycotts (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). And through these unconventional activities, citizens express their opinions to influence the decision-making process directly, rather than being mediated by the

political elite indirectly, or otherwise orchestrated by them (Delli Carpini, 2004). Yet, in the Asian context, technology is irrelevant to traditional forms of participation in election-related activities, such as voting, attending a campaign event or rally, and contacting public officials.

Certainly, some may argue that the cause of protest politics is situational rather than systematic, insofar as its mobilizing opportunity is more contingent on "particular issues, specific events, and the role of leaders" (Norris, 2002, p. 194) than on structural conditions of political involvement. But recent studies demonstrate that protest participation involves different risks, costs, and purposes that intervene systematically in the mechanism by which individuals decide to participate and societies witness varying levels of popular mobilization (Opp, 2013; Stokeman, 2014). And digital network connectivity has an impact on political participation: individual citizens benefit from networked agencies in accessing and generating social-capital resources (Howard, 2010). The mechanism of influence is systematic in that the technology facilitates personalized engagement in lifestyle politics that mobilizes people by matching and organizing segmented concerns in unprecedentedly efficient ways (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).

Proposed by Putnam (1995), the concept of social capital has been theorized to shape and influence political participation. It matters in diverse contexts where individuals are mobilized for the participation through dense linkages of heterogeneous social interactions that bridge interpersonal trust in support of cooperative actions as regards common concern. Although Putnam (2000) blames electronic media, especially television, for the decline of traditional social associations, proponents of public media give nuances to the effects of media, as well as content, on social capital (Guo & Moy, 1998; Norris, 2000). In particular, communication scholars shed light on the different functions the internet provides for public involvement with regard to its distinctive capability for communication and association in the media landscape, as well as its

multidimensionality of use and content (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010; Moy, Manosevitch, Stamm, & Dunsmore, 2005a; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001).

This chapter concentrates on the distinctive capacity that digital network connectivity facilitates, and how it helps people become mobilized around a collective cause. For instance, the internet enables political communication and grassroots organizing to develop in a different way from those based on formal organizations or face-to-face social relations. Social-media services and customized technologies help the organizing of segmented but issue-based publics because of the increasing primacy given to personalization and consumerism over collectivism and ideological commitments in the field of politics (Bennett, 2005; Kim, 2009). Even in non-democratic societies, civil activists benefit from digital networks, becoming producers and disseminators of political information that would have been tempered by conventional news outlets during times of social upheaval such as the Arab Spring (Lotan et al., 2011).

To be sure, before the arrival of digital media, protest participation was no longer unconventional in Western post-industrial democracies. In these countries, the majority of the population has increasingly engaged in an emerging repertoire of low-cost, personalized forms of protest action at the expense of membership in traditional agencies of civic engagement and voting (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). In emerging democracies or illiberal societies, by contrast, the popular mobilization of protest activism has been easily silenced by the state in the absence of large-scale digital networks (Howard & Hussain, 2013). But their adoption of the internet or mobile phones propels the trend of personalization in political involvement: individual citizens form public spheres through "loosely tied, opt-in/opt-out networks" based on their fluid identities that give primacy to lifestyle qualities over traditional social cleavages (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Moreover, the transnational connectivity of digital networks helps disaffected but

traditionally marginalized civil actors and groups benefit from international advocacy associations in generating social-capital resources. In the new information environment, that is, people are equipped with unprecedented mobilizing structures for collective actions to address shared grievances, challenge elite-driven political relations and even overthrow dictators.

5.2.2 *Ability, Motivation, and Mobilizing Structures*

The global diffusion of digital technologies provides a mobilizing structure for the emerging repertoires of political participation that often cuts across national boundaries. Since citizens' participation in protest activities is triggered in reaction to the personalization of politics, its patterns may be relatively independent of traditional factors that structure the participation gap among people with different abilities, motivations, and mobilizing opportunities. Jennings and van Deth (1989) also note that socio-demographic or attitudinal characteristics of protesters are less specifiable than those of political participants in conventional acts such as voting and campaigns. Nevertheless, the patterns of protest participation should not be independent of the individual-level attributes of being or becoming engaged in politics.

The literature corroborates the importance of socio-economic status for involvement in public life (Verba & Nie, 1972). A better education and higher family-income levels enable people to have more time, money, and civic skills in support of nurturing participatory citizenship (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Verba et al., 1995). Research has also emphasized individuals' social structures as a source of variation in digital network connectivity as well as political involvement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; van Dijk, 2005). Gender-related and generational factors are relevant to the participation gap in the context (Hargittai & Hsieh, 2013). Especially, youth is found to be a determining factor for prioritizing alternative forms of

activism over conventional paths to a public life in either online or offline settings (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009; Xenos & Foot, 2007).

On top of such sociological variables, psychological factors should not be ruled out as mobilizing resources that motivate people to engage in protest activism. Because greater political interest reduces the costs of being informed but increases the perceived benefits of participation, the psychological concept has been considered a crucial antecedent to political behaviors (Delli Carpini, 2004; Verba et al., 1995). Additionally, the psychological approach sheds light on the effects of attitudinal factors such as discontent and self-efficacious beliefs about political systems on the mechanism by which people are incentivized to conduct elite-challenging activities (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). To predict protest participation in relation to technology use, the relevance of this psychological view as well as the sociological approach should be taken into account.

However, individual ability and motivation are not the whole story of why people perform political actions. Rather, protest participation is related to the extent to which people take social opportunities to be mobilized. The literature found the importance of mobilizing structures that provide incentives for individuals to be collectively organized for a social or political cause. In line with a neo-Tocquevillian view of civil society, Putnam (1993; 1995) emphasizes the dense social networks formed by a variety of formal civic organizations that enrich democratic citizenship. This social capital and frequent interaction within such organizations facilitates collective interests. But social capital is not just pertaining to such social-structural features. Putnam (1995) also highlights the interpersonal trust that enables people to perceive their cooperation as working for mutual benefit so that they do not freeride.

In the same vein, studies have shown how important membership in formal civic organizations is for individuals to overcome collective-action problems (Rogers, Bultena, & Barb, 1975). Unions, environmental associations, and consumer groups are influential in engaging their members frequently in petition drives, demonstrations, and boycotts (Stokemer, 2014). Group membership functions also as an indirect stimulant to participation, because interaction with other members broadens citizens' range of interests and experiences that make social, as well as political, problems more relevant (Olsen, 1972; Verba & Nie, 1972). Similarly, Pollock (1982) posited group activity as an agent of mobilization in which people were informed, oriented, and trained to participate in the political domain as a byproduct of their organizational involvement. In doing so, tighter social linkages provide more opportunities to not only be recruited and organized for political activity directly but also to be informed and deliberate about collective problems that elicit psychological orientations toward public life (Calhoun, 1988; Moy & Gastil, 2006; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).

But organizational membership and interpersonal trust are not the only social-capital resources that enlarge politically meaningful social networks (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). The effect of social interaction on political participation has been further found to be robust even in the context of non-political, informal relations (Kwak, Shah, & Holbert, 2004). Similarly, a rich body of research has put forth the view that interpersonal relations offer an important source of political engagement. This school of thought is in line with a "two-step flow of communication" model, with emphasis on a process of social mediation (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In this process, exchanges of information and opinions have effects on patterns of political cognition, attitudes, and behaviors. Adopting this view, some research has further shown that interpersonal communication mediates between media use and political participation (Hardy & Scheufele,

2005; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). The findings suggest that frequent political conversations motivate people and enhance attention to the media for information acquisition and processing (Scheufele, 2002). From this perspective, interpersonal conversation should be controlled for because of its effects not only on political participation but also on patterns of digital media use.

5.2.3 *Reinforcement Thesis*

The stunning growth of digital network connectivity in East and Southeast Asia should offer important insights about any mobilizing effects. I argue that the diffusion of technology provides a mobilizing structure for people to perform protest activities that are restricted in the regional context of elite-driven politics. The effects result from more frequent use of the internet or mobile phones after holding constant other determinants of political participation. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that reinforcement theories shed light on the possibility that information-empowerment occurs disproportionately among those who benefit from the opportunity for political involvement. More importantly, digital network connectivity as a mobilizing structure is constrained by the systemic, economic and institutional factors that generate societal-level differences in political opportunities for citizen activism.

In the view of reinforcement theorists, first, the existing disparity between the information rich and poor may endure despite expanded opportunities to be mobilized for political action (Norris, 2001). Since individual users are given greater control over what they do with the internet, for instance, their civic skills and motivation to take advantage of the opportunity for a political purpose should matter. Even if equal internet access occurs, a gap in political involvement is thus posited between the politically interested and the less interested (Bimber, 2003; Xenos & Moy, 2007), as well as between the socio-economically advantaged and their counterparts (Hargittai & Walejko, 2008). Meanwhile, considering the individualization of

politics, Norris (2000) notes that media use for participation is reinforced among those who are predisposed to do so. The reduced costs of information do not necessarily facilitate ordinary citizens to participate in political action.

Moreover, individual citizens are constrained by country-specific conditions of economic and political attributes that shape the costs of being digitally connected, as well as of engaging in elite-challenging politics. Previous studies relate declining participation in traditional forms of politics to phenomena in post-industrial societies such as personalization of civic life (Bennett, 1998), privatization of leisure time (Putnam, 2000), or media commercialization (Curran, Iyengar, Lund & Salovaara-Moring, 2009). Also, regarding the political consequences of economic development, modernization theorists predict the structural growth of an educated middle class seeking diverse interests and the cultural orientation to self-expression values. In view of Inglehart and his colleagues, such a post-modernization process encourages certain populations to practice their active citizenship through unconventional forms of political action (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). From their perspective, the effects of technology as a mobilizing structure may mirror cross-national variation in development.

The Asian countries have various regime types ranging from autocracy to full democracy along with diverse levels of economic development. Such country-level variation is powerful enough to shape and influence digital network connectivity per se and its mobilizing capacities for protest participation (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012; Norris 2002). For instance, the endurance of soft-authoritarian control of politics in Malaysia and Singapore entails an effective institutional arrangement that has discredited civil society's demands for citizen participation (George, 2003; 2006). But the importance of regime types stems not just from the capacity of governments to restrict elite-challenging action. The effective functioning of state

controls also yields restrictive circumstances in which digital network connectivity does not work for civil society development (Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012).

Any mobilizing structure is also contingent on a context within which individuals are given different opportunities for civic learning from the media. Within the national boundaries of opportunity structures, especially, the diffusion of the internet or mobile phones is confronted with the "openings, barriers and resources" of the information environment where ordinary citizens are able to get sense of their need for activism (Esser et al., 2012; Eisinger, 1973). That is to say, the mobilizing impact of technology is not just mediated by its capacities to access and generate social capital but also moderated by the context in which political information flows are structured and institutionalized.

The moderating role of the mass media in mobilization has been indeed substantiated by a strong body of scholarship that posits a communication mediation model. McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) argue that social relations take different paths to political participation according to patterns of mass and interpersonal communication for information acquisition and processing. The impact of the mass media on civic engagement has also been substantiated in the context of hard-news use that invalidates Putnam's time-displacement thesis (Moy, Scheufele, & Holbert, 1999; Shah et al., 2001). Furthermore, the mass media are found to interact with interpersonal conversations in encouraging political engagement because both communication factors are mutually reinforced so that differential gains occur in the information environment (Scheufele, 2002). From this perspective, although digital network connectivity reduces the costs of accessing social-capital resources and mobilizing structures, its manifestation may be subsumed under existing patterns of the communication-mediation process within traditional channels of information and mobilization.

5.3 HYPOTHESES

Drawing on the above theories, three hypotheses are proposed. First, I argue that frequent use of the internet or mobile phones enhances protest participation in East and Southeast Asia. This relationship is generalizable insofar as people within digital networks have more opportunities for their personalized interests to be connected and organized around shared concerns (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Thus, technology diffusion expands individual pathways to collective action in an unprecedented way of transcending individual-level inequalities in the ability, motivation, and social-capital resources among people living in the Asian countries. Furthermore, the mobilizing impact of technology is likely to increase as a wider population of Asian internet users benefit from digital network connectivity in response to the growing popularization of social media and mobile devices.

> H5.1: *If people living in East and Southeast Asian countries have more access to digital networks, then they will be more likely to participate in protest activity across the countries.*

Nevertheless, the effects of digital network connectivity on protest participation may not be constant across the Asian countries with different regimes. Rather, people living in the Asian countries are constrained by contextual attributes that mold opportunity structures. And the opportunity structure provides different costs and incentives for individuals to engage in protest activity. Reinforcement theorists may argue that a country's democratic and socio-economic development causes conventional forms of collective organizing to give way to alternative, self-expressive ones. Indeed, digitally networked activism benefits from structural and institutional changes in post-industrial democracies that enable personalization of politics and transnational activism (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Internet use for protest participation can therefore occur

to a greater extent in democracies than in non-democracies, as well as in developed societies than in developing ones.

In this chapter, however, I argue that digitally enabled mobilization manifests in the Asian countries. That is, technology serves as a mobilizing structure that facilitates protest participation in a context with insufficient resources for civil-society development. In a restrictive political system, for example, protesters have greater incentives to prioritize the internet over traditional pathways to grassroots organizing. When people lack opportunities to access and generate social capital, digital network connectivity provides an alternative pathway to collective action. Likewise, cross-national variation in institutional attributes shapes the opportunity structure for people to rely on digital network connectivity as a distinctive means of engaging in public life. In other words, technology provides greater affordances for mobilization in the environment where institutional barriers increase the costs of individual-level pathways to unconventional political action and restrict the opportunities of civil-society development.

> H5.2: *If digital network connectivity enhances protest participation, then technology effects will be greater in non-democracies than in democracies. The effects will be also greater in poor democracies than in wealthy democracies.*

The mobilizing capacity of digital network connectivity has been frequently examined in diverse contexts of inequalities in individuals' ability and motivation for political participation. But relatively few studies have investigated the political information environment within which people access and utilize social-capital resources. Given the Asian countries' disparities in economic and political attributes, their media systems provide different opportunity structures of citizen mobilization. Moreover, reinforcement theorists suggest that digital network connectivity disproportionately benefits those who already gain information from traditional systems of political communication.

In this chapter, I therefore situate the effects of digital network connectivity in the political information environment within which the participation gap is reinforced, rather than being bridged between people with different opportunities for civic learning and social involvement. That is, I examine whether the mobilizing capacities of the internet or mobile phones is constrained by mediated pathways to political involvement, which disproportionately benefit the information-rich in traditional media systems. This reasoning is generalizable across the Asian countries in that the technology suits the personalization of politics and affords social-capital resources that go beyond the conventional boundaries of a civil society to a greater extent than the mass media do in post-industrial democracies and developing non-democracies.

> H5.3: *If digital network connectivity enhances protest participation, then technology effects across East and Southeast Asia will increase generally among people who are less dependent on mass media.*

5.4 METHOD

5.4.1 *Data*

This chapter makes use of the WVS data set, which has published cross-national survey data on the public's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in seven Asian countries of interest. The countries include non-democracies such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as democracies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and The Philippines. Also, the former two are distinguished from the latter two because of different socio-economic status. This classification draws not only on that made by Freedom House annually, which measures the level of civil liberties and political rights in a given country, but also on the Polity IV dataset that provides annual, cross-national scores on qualities of democracy and autocracy institutionalized in governing institutions and procedures.

The WVS data set also provided two survey waves: 2005–07 (wave 5) and 2010–13 (wave 6). Using both waves, this chapter aims to control for any temporal effects of digital network connectivity. The Asian countries are rapidly changing in that they are leapfrogging fixed-line internet access to wireless one. Although the countries are at various stages of socio-economic development, their homogeneous enthusiasm for technology adoption may provide considerable between-wave variation in digital network connectivity. The countries covered in both survey waves are South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand. The data on Indonesia and Vietnam were available only in wave 5, and The Philippines only in wave 6. Unlike in the previous chapter, Singapore was excluded from this analysis because of missing data on items that measure protest activities.

The WVS data sets were gathered by a regional network of research teams, which carried out face-to-face interviews with nationally representative samples of voting-age adults (17–19 years old and above). The sample size for each country ranged from 1,200 to 2,015 respondents (stratified random sampling). Based on American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) standards, the calculated response rates ranged from 28.4% to 89.9% (AAPOR, 2006). Appendix 5.A reports more detailed information about the sample size and the response rates.

5.4.2 *Outcome Variable*

The outcome variable, protest participation, was operationalized using measures of respondents' past experiences of conducting any protest activity. The WVS data offered a set of items asking whether the respondents signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended peaceful demonstrations, joined strikes (wave 6 only), or performed any other act of protest in the last five years (wave 5) or in the last year (wave 6). These items were combined into a cumulative, ordinal scale (4 point) measuring the extent of participation in each wave. In every country except Vietnam, Cronbach's

α was above 0.5 as a minimal threshold level to accept internal consistency among the multiple-item measures employed as a single construct (Nunnally, 1967). Appendix 5.B presents descriptive summaries and α values of the outcome variable in each country.

5.4.3 *Explanatory Variables*

As a key explanatory variable, digital network connectivity was measured through the frequency of using the internet and mobile phones (wave 6 only) from which respondents learned what was going on in their country and the world. The variable for the internet from the WVS wave 5 data dichotomized respondents into those who used the technology last week to obtain information and those who did. The internet variable in both waves and the mobile-phone variable in wave 6 were scored on a five-point scale, from 0 (never) to 4 (daily).

A battery of WVS items was used to assess the respondents' social-capital resources. Interpersonal conversation was tapped with an item to measure the frequency of learning what was going on in their country and the world from talks with friends or colleagues. This variable from the wave 5 data dichotomized the respondents' answers into using it to obtain information last week versus not using it last week. The variable from wave 6 was ranked on a scale of 0 to 4. Regarding a structural dimension of social capital, I created a binary variable to distinguish the respondents who reported active membership in any formal organizations from those who did not. The organizations included: (a) church or religious organizations, (b) sports or recreational organizations, (c) art, music, or educational organizations, (d) labor unions, (e) political parties, (f) environmental organizations, (g) professional organizations, (h) humanitarian or charitable organizations, and (i) any others. Cronbach's α values were 0.69 and 0.74 for the items in the waves 5 and 6 data sets, respectively. Social capital was also tapped with an item on

interpersonal trust, asking the respondents whether they would say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people.

I tested the reinforcement thesis by constructing a Digital Dependency Index (DDI). Drawing on media dependency proposed by Becker and Whitney (1980), DDI weighted an individual's relative use of digital media against his or her total media use (eq5.1). This index derived from the ratio of each respondent's frequency of information seeking from the internet or mobile phone to the sum of the frequencies of using all major media sources including daily newspaper and television or radio news. The variables for such traditional media sources were scored on the same dichotomous (wave 5) or five-point (wave 6) scales as those used to measure the frequency of information seeking using the internet or mobile phones. DDI made it possible to assess the extent to which digital network connectivity mobilizes individual citizens given their structured relation to mediated communication. In other words, if DDI has a significant relationship with protest participation, the mobilization thesis is supported in that individuals' use of digital media has a distinctive impact on participation in the media context. If not, the reinforcement thesis is confirmed insofar as the effects of digital network connectivity are contingent on individuals' structured advantages in public involvement.

$$DDI = \frac{Usage\ Frequency\ of\ Internet\ or\ Mobile\ Phone}{Usage\ Frequencies\ of\ Internet\ or\ Mobile\ Phone + Newspaper + TV\ or\ Radio\ News} \quad (5.1)$$

Finally, demographic and motivational variables were included to control for sociological and psychological antecedents not only to communicative and associational activities but also to protest participation. Above all, socio-economic status was taken into account using items on gender, age, and level of education (9-point scale) as well as household-income levels (10-point scale). Political interest was also derived from a survey item asking the respondents how

interested they would say they were in politics, ranging from 'not at all interested' to 'very interested' (4-point scale). The variable, democraticness, came from an item, 'how democratically is this country being governed today?' Responses ranged from 1 = 'not at all democratic' to 10 = 'completely democratic'. The descriptive summaries of the explanatory variables within each country are shown in Appendices 5.C (wave 5) and 5.D (wave 6).

5.4.4 *Analyses*

A total of 143 survey-based items were used in the analysis (13 independent variables × 11 country units). A large percentage of these items (N = 138; 96.5%) retained less than 5% missing values. The top two items that retained the largest proportion of missing values were those on household-income levels (11.02%) and democraticness (8.98%) among Indonesian respondents in wave 5. With regard to the incomplete data on the explanatory variables, the *mi* package in the *R* environment was employed to impute missing values as outlined by Su, Gelman, Hill, and Yajima (2011). Each variable with missing values was thus imputed through iterative processes that predicted it from the other variables to draw on. This multiple imputation procedure was conducted within each country unit, not for the entire WVS data set.

A series of hierarchical ordinal logistic regression models was run on the imputed WVS data set for each of the seven Asian countries in the fifth and sixth waves. The same model was also fitted to each of the WVS data sets pooled across the Asian countries in each of waves 5 and 6. In doing so, country-level factors were included to examine the differential effects of digital network connectivity not only between democracies and non-democracies but also between wealthy democracies and poor democracies. In the regression models, a chain of demographic, motivational, and social-capital variables were entered in a structural equation model: socio-economic status, personal incentives, and mobilizing opportunities preceded digital network

accessibility, as well as political participation. Individuals' use of the internet and mobile phones was then included in interaction terms with country-level variables for democracies or wealthy democracies. The Asian democracies and non-democracies were listed according to the degree of freedom of the press rated and published by Freedom House. McFadden's pseudo R^2 was used as a measure of explained variance for each model: the proportion of the outcome variable that is explained by each block of explanatory variables in the regression. Meanwhile, within-country weights were included in the analysis. With regard to politically relevant items, especially, response rates were assumed to differ between social cleavages in a country. Survey weighting could not be ignored in the context.

5.5 RESULTS

Table 5.1 presents the results of the ordinal logistic regression models to predict the likelihood of protest participation in each of the Asian democracies—Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and The Philippines—where press freedom is at least in part institutionalized. The explained variance in the outcome variable varies widely from 4.65% (South Korea in 2005) to 13.61% (Taiwan in 2006). The results show that the participation is a function of the traditional predictors such as political interest, organizational membership, and the frequency of interpersonal conversation. These variables have significant effects on mobilization, which are evidenced consistently across the countries or between their survey periods. But there is also a significant influence that comes from digital network connectivity, irrespective of the societal level of technology diffusion (H5.1). The impact is manifested among those who frequently obtain information from the internet in Indonesia and Taiwan during the mid-2000s or in South Korea and Taiwan during the early 2010s. In The Philippines, additionally, mobile phones serve as a mediated communication channel on which protest participants drew frequently during the early 2010s.

Table 5.1. Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation in Democracies

Country	Taiwan		South Korea		Indonesia	Philippines
Year	2006	2012	2005	2010	2006	2012
Demographics						
Gender (Female)	0.50**	−0.08	−0.30*	−0.17	−0.55***	−0.49**
Age	0.38***	0.21	0.02	0.15	−0.26***	−0.03
Education	0.45***	0.30*	0.04	0.32***	0.28***	0.04
Income	−0.02	−0.05	−0.08	−0.09	−0.01	0.01
McFadden R^2 (%)	4.12	2.14	0.54	3.34	4.49	1.02
Motivation						
Political interest	0.78***	0.75***	0.44***	0.44***	0.40***	0.30**
Democraticness	0.01	−0.09	−0.03	−0.16*	−0.17**	0.12
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	6.97	6.63	2.62	2.76	2.48	1.31
Social capital						
Interpersonal trust	0.14	0.50*	−0.29*	−0.13	−0.03	0.84*
Membership	0.44*	0.50*	0.60***	0.21	0.47***	0.63**
Conversation	0.66***	0.23	0.45**	0.21*	0.02	0.19
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	1.65	2.21	1.49	0.55	0.61	1.98
Digital network						
Internet	0.68***	0.31*	−0.07	0.28**	0.44**	−0.05
Mobile Phones	N.A.	0.06	N.A.	−0.14	N.A.	0.25*
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	0.87	0.51	0.01	0.50	0.37	0.50
Final McFadden R^2 (%)	13.61	11.48	4.65	7.16	7.95	4.81
Cutpoint 1	3.05***	2.95***	0.71***	1.09***	1.51***	2.27***
Cutpoint 2	4.41***	4.81***	2.15***	2.67***	3.17***	3.78***
Cutpoint 3	6.96***	6.16***	3.22***	3.64***	5.05***	5.13***
N	1,227	1,238	1,200	1,200	2,015	1,200

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; Entries are final standardized logit regression coefficients. McFadden R^2 indicates the ratio of the likelihood, estimating the explained variability in the dependent variable by each model.

Source: WVS waves 5 and 6 (see data section)

Table 5.2. Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation in Non-Democracies

Country	Malaysia		Thailand		Vietnam
Year	2006	2012	2007	2013	2006
Demographics					
Gender (Female)	−0.14	−0.04	−0.38*	0.28	0.35
Age	0.13	0.17	−0.13	0.01	0.06
Education	0.07	0.20	0.05	0.30**	−0.01
Income	−0.02	0.01	−0.09	0.04	−0.16
McFadden R^2 (%)	0.89	1.52	1.77	4.41	1.51
Motivation					
Political interest	0.23*	0.44**	0.19*	0.35***	0.40**
Democraticness	−0.48***	−0.50***	0.16*	−0.19*	−0.28**
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	5.03	4.49	1.49	1.73	2.68
Social capital					
Interpersonal trust	0.84**	0.24	0.24	0.38*	0.34
Membership	1.62***	1.34***	1.31***	0.37*	1.17***
Conversation	0.24	0.01	−0.06	0.10	0.58*
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	8.36	4.54	5.40	1.16	4.76
Digital network					
Internet	0.20	0.49**	0.90***	0.45***	0.64*
Mobile phone	N.A.	−0.32*	N.A.	0.07	N.A.
Incr. McFadden R^2 (%)	0.23	1.98	1.23	1.50	0.50
Final McFadden R^2 (%)	14.50	12.53	9.89	8.80	9.45
Cutpoint 1	3.00***	3.99***	2.60***	2.12***	4.11***
Cutpoint 2	4.73***	5.17***	4.23***	2.72***	7.41***
Cutpoint 3	8.49***	6.40***	6.11***	3.45***	8.33***
N	1,201	1,300	1,534	1,200	1,495

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; Entries are final standardized logit regression coefficients. McFadden R^2 indicates the ratio of the likelihood, estimating the explained variability in the dependent variable by each model.

Source: WVS waves 5 and 6 (see data section)

Table 5.2 shows the results of the ordinal logistic models to predict the outcome variable from the explanatory variables in Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam as non-democracies in Asia. Similar to the results for the Asian democracies, protest participation is explained by traditional predictors such as political interest and civic membership. But individuals' perceived level of undemocraticness emerges distinctively as a psychological resource that motivates them to be active in the non-democratic environment. Meanwhile, except for Malaysians in 2006, frequent internet use as a political information source predicts a greater likelihood of participation in protest activity among those who are surveyed in Thailand and Vietnam during the mid-2000s or in Malaysia and Thailand during the early 2010s. The WVS data substantiate that digital network connectivity in Asia provides generalizable mobilizing capacities for individual citizens to participate in protest beyond their different opportunity structures. The findings support H5.1.

H5.2 tested whether mobilizing capacities of digital network connectivity were facilitated by non-democracies or poor democracies. As shown in Tables 5.3, democracies and wealthy democracies report a greater likelihood of being participatory than non-democracies and poor democracies, respectively. But the results of cross-level interaction terms show that internet use is less related to protest participation among democracies than non-democracies. That is, digital network connectivity functions as a mobilizing structure of collective action to a greater extent under more restrictive state controls. This interaction effect is significant in the early 2010s.

Also, compared with wealthy democracies, internet use in a poor democracy enhances protest activity to a greater extent in the mid-2000s. In the early 2010s, mobile-phone use has such a mobilizing effect among people living a poor democracy. At the same time, internet use predicts the participation only in wealthy democracies. The findings corroborate the mobilizing capacities of digital network connectivity, manifested in developing or non-democratic countries.

Table 5.3. Pooled Effects of Digital Networks on Protest Participation

Regime Type	Democracies vs. Non-Democracies		Wealthy Democracies vs. Poor Democracies	
Year	Mid-2000s	Early 2010s	Mid-2000s	Early 2010s
Demographics				
Gender (Female)	−0.28***	−0.13*	−0.37***	−0.35***
Age	−0.09**	−0.03	−0.13***	0.01
Education	0.06	0.16***	0.13**	0.09
Income	−0.07*	−0.01	−0.04	−0.03
Motivation				
Political interest	0.41***	0.38***	0.44***	0.42***
Democraticness	−0.12***	−0.13***	−0.14***	−0.05
Social capital				
Interpersonal trust	−0.07	0.49***	−0.08	0.09
Membership	0.59***	0.38***	0.54***	0.34***
Conversation	0.16*	0.16***	0.34***	0.18***
Digital network				
Internet	0.83***	0.55***	0.58***	−0.03
Mobile phone	N.A.	0.06	N.A.	0.25
Regime-type effects				
(Wealthy) Democracy	0.96***	0.19**	0.89***	0.61***
(Wealthy) Democracy × Internet	−0.13	−0.47***	−0.47**	0.32***
(Wealthy) Democracy × Mobile phone	N.A.	−0.04	N.A.	−0.37***
McFadden R^2 (%)	8.59	5.88	6.94	5.63
Cutpoint 1	2.62***	2.18***	1.88***	2.10***
Cutpoint 2	4.21***	3.28***	3.43***	3.64***
Cutpoint 3	5.76***	4.13***	4.95***	4.76***
N	8,672	6,138	4,442	3,638

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; Entries are final standardized logit regression coefficients. Estimated coefficients of country fixed effects are not reported for brevity.

Source: WVS waves 5 and 6 (see data section)

The results of this comparative analysis contradict reinforcement theorists who may predict continuing inequalities in digital democracy. Of course, the internet in the early 2010s has a positive impact on protest participation only in South Korea and Taiwan as wealthy democracies, not in The Philippines as a poor democracy. Nevertheless, the mobilization of collective action in the poor democracy benefits from mobile-phone diffusion that makes possible low-cost access to social-capital resources. The findings demonstrate that, in neither non-democracies nor poor democracies, digital network connectivity is confronted with more constraints to be politically useful. Rather, technology diffusion incentivizes civil-society groups to cope with their lack of resources and opportunities for collective action. H5.2 is supported.

H5.3 was that, if digital network connectivity mobilized protest participation, its effects would increase among individual citizens who were less dependent on the mass media. This relationship was assumed to differ in the mechanism of influence between democracies and non-democracies. In the former political environment, digitally mediated public spheres better suit the personalization of politics and the rise of alternative activism than mass-mediated ones. In the latter environment, technology equips people with a transnationally networked advocacy that incentivizes protest participation. This individual pathway to participation was hypothesized to contrast with traditional media systems in the institutional context.

To test H5.3, DDIs for the internet and mobile phones (wave 6 only) were instead entered in the regression models using the data on the respondents who reported using any type of media among daily newspapers, TV or radio news, and the internet or mobile phones at least once a week. By doing so, the effects of digital network connectivity were examined for its mobilizing capacity in the media system where individuals are provided with different opportunities to be informed about and involved in a public life.

As shown in Figure 5.1, DDI is positively related to protest participation only among Indonesian internet users in democratic media systems. But digital dependency does not have any mobilizing effect in media systems of other Asian democracies. Rather, in South Korea, some reinforcement effect is found among mobile phone users insofar as their participation increases as they rely more on the mass media. On the contrary, non-democracies in Southeast Asia present significant effects of DDI on protest participation as far as internet use is concerned in their restrictive media system. The mobilizing capacity of digital network connectivity became more robust among Malays, Thais and Vietnamese during the early 2010s, when their increasing internet use is weighted against the frequency of mass-media use. Meanwhile, the negative effect of mobile phone use on the participation in Malaysia is canceled out when taking into account individual citizens' usage pattern of the mass media.

The differential effects of DDI are corroborated by the pooled data. In each survey wave, more reliance on the internet in media context is associated with protest participation in non-democracies to a greater extent than in democracies. In the early 2010s, the difference is statistically significant. That is, digital network connectivity has greater mobilization effects as civil organizations have more constraints on their ability to reach out to the general public and to use mass-media resources for coordinating large-scale collective activities. The findings suggest that, when situating internet use in media systems, important societal-level variation emerges in the opportunity structure for citizen participation. In a restrictive media system, digital network connectivity provides unprecedented mobilizing capacities for the mass citizenry to be engaged. But in democratic systems, the mobilizing capacity is subject to the participation gap between the media rich and poor. And, in doing so, technology is subsumed under existing inequalities in political behaviors. The WVS data only partially supports H5.3.



Note: Ordinal logit regression coefficient estimates of the Digital Dependency Indexes for the internet and mobile phones with 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Author's calculations and illustration based on WVS data, waves 5–6.

Figure 5.1. Effects of Digital Dependency on Protest Participation among Media Users

5.6 Discussion

Before discussing the results, one important limitation to be addressed is the use of secondary data analysis in communication research. In particular, the WVS data do not provide nuanced measures of digital media use for social interaction and the resulting network characteristics such as network size and tie strength. These measures are nonetheless important to understand how digital network connectivity mobilizes citizen participation through its capacities for accessing and generating social-capital resources (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). This is the case, particularly given the decline of formal civic organizations and traditional media systems (Bennett, 1998; Putnam, 2000). Bakker and de Vreese (2011) also found that, above and beyond informational-media use, the socializing activities of youth online were related to their unconventional forms of political participation. In the same vein, along with their rapid adoption of social media, younger people may have a narrowing gap in their social-capital resources to be mobilized for activism. Future studies should address the increasing role of social-media use in information-flows and political involvement in Asia.

Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter was to test how effects of digital network connectivity on protest participation could be seen in Asian countries with different opportunity structures. Using the WVS data, therefore, this chapter contributes by broadening our understanding of the mechanism through which the mobilizing capacities of technology are facilitated or constrained by opportunity structures that provide national-specific incentives for individual citizens to perform protest activities. Previous studies on political participation have mainly focused on individual-level factors arguing that digital media exert greater effects on those who already benefit from personal resources and motivation such as education and political interest. At the societal level, meanwhile, the participation gap has been viewed as an outcome of

unequal opportunity structures between countries. But the global diffusion of mobile phones and social media transcends cross-national variation in social structures and institutions and, in doing so, individual citizens are given transnational opportunities to access and generate social-capital resources (Lee, 2015). How has digital network connectivity manifested its mobilizing capacities in East and Southeast Asia with widely varying constraints on protest participation?

The results show that, when individual citizens are connected to digital networks through the internet, these technologies provide a mobilizing structure for political action that is effective across national boundaries as well as survey waves. In particular, despite its wider penetration and easier accessibility, the internet in the early 2010s is not necessarily more predictive of protest behavior than the technology in the mid-2000s. The mobilization is especially unique in context of individual pathways to social interactions. For instance, a between-wave comparison shows that internet use has emerged as a significant predictor of participation in South Korea and Malaysia at the expense of the effects of traditional agents of social-capital formation. The findings suggest that, digital network connectivity offers increasing capacities for mobilizing structures and develops unprecedented pathways to civic involvement and collective organizing.

Notwithstanding the generalizable effects of internet use, its mobilizing capacities are not independent of political opportunity structures that vary according to regime types in Asia. For instance, Asian internet users perform protest activity to a greater extent in non-democracies than in democracies. Digital network connectivity in the Asian countries with illiberal political regimes has become a more important source of mobilizing structures for protest participation than in the countries where individual citizens have pre-existing low-cost channels for social and civic associations. Indeed, among people living in such non-democracies, social-capital resources account for participation to a greater extent than personal motivations do. Because the

political environment is equipped with increased barriers to civil-society organizations, especially, group membership means strong commitment to collective concerns and predominates in individual pathways to activism.

In the Asian countries with democratic regimes, to be sure, technology effects are not constant. Digital network connectivity has greater effects on protest participation among people living in Indonesia and The Philippines than in South Korea and Taiwan. This regional disparity reflects the gap in economic development based on the effective functioning of government. In wealthy democracies, personal interest in politics outweighs social interactions in predicting participation. For individuals who benefit from governing institutions that provide low-cost opportunities for political behavior, their motivation matters. Indeed, personal psychology has carried considerable weight with the effects of internet use in the Western post-industrial context of political involvement (Bimber, 2003; Xenos & Moy, 2007).

On the other hand, the traditional agents of social-capital formation are lagging behind in poor democracies. Certainly, across the Asian countries, organizational membership is a consistent, robust predictor of protest activity. But interpersonal conversation as a channel of political information enhances participation only in wealthy democracies. The findings indicate that the weakness of democratic institutions incentivizes digital network connectivity to serve as a mobilizing structure of social-capital resources. As a new source of collective organizing, the internet and mobile phones provide greater capacities for mobilization of people who suffer from poor democracy. Future studies should examine the mechanism through which the mobilization is contingent on democratization as well as industrialization.

The results suggest that regime types are not enough to account for cross-national variation in the mobilizing effects of digital network connectivity. The internet across the Asian

countries and mobile phones in The Philippines offer important structures for the mass citizenry to engage in political activism, which cut across their national boundaries of opportunity structures. The generalizability of the new mobilizing structure is nevertheless constrained by traditional national systems of mediated communication. That is, as far as the capacity of technology is embedded in mediated structures for individuals to be involved in politics, substantial cross-national variation emerges in the mobilization.

In particular, as for people using the mass media as their information source in Taiwan, South Korea, and The Philippines, the mobilizing effects of digital network connectivity turn insignificant. In these countries, individuals are equipped with relatively low-cost media sources to learn civic skills and create social capital. Therefore, political action becomes a matter of personal incentives to participate above and beyond structural opportunities to be mobilized. Indeed, among Taiwanese and Koreans, political interest and perceived undemocraticness explains protest participation to a greater extent than social-capital resources and digital network connectivity do together. Such post-industrial democracies in Asia furnish people with a media system in which the distinctive capacity of mobilization for internet users is less relevant.

On the contrary, other Asian countries witness the enduring capacity of technology as a mobilizing structure that goes beyond personal resources and motivation as the key to mediated involvement in politics. Especially in Asian non-democracies, protest participation is more a matter of social-capital resources than of personal psychology. And in this context, the worldwide expansion of non-governmental organizations and international associations for human rights and environmental issues has provided a structural opportunity for mobilization of civil-society groups (Castells, 2008; Diamond, 1994). The increasing capacity of digital network connectivity for social interactions and collective organizing should therefore provide mobilizing

structures to a greater extent in the restrictive media system. In doing so, digital networks overrides traditional media in mobilizing individual pathways to political involvement.

The mobilizing capacity of digital network connectivity is constrained by opportunity structures that vary between countries, as well as between social classes or strata within a country. And the results of this chapter suggest that the opportunity structure is shaped not only by political institutions but also by media systems. Admittedly, being informed is a necessary precondition for people to perform political action. It is facilitated by the opportunity structure, which reduces the costs of understanding and judging shared problems as well as of learning civic skills and accessing social-capital resources in an effective way (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Studies strongly support the idea that the opportunity structure for communication and association is shaped by the ways in which the mass media are structured and institutionalized to involve the mass citizenry in public life (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Esser et al., 2012). This chapter shows that the political effects of digital media are also contingent on macro-level media system attributes.

In many Asian countries, political communication systems are subject to the dominant influence of governments who seek to control dissident voices and civil-society groups. The hierarchical structure of mainstream media is the key to the control of the state over the production and distribution of politically challenging content. Therefore, it should not be surprising that traditional channels of mediated communication are isolated from the opportunity structure for protest activism. Nevertheless, individuals' embeddedness in their media context is important to understand the mechanism by which they decide to participate in politics, and the media produce macro-level differences in the opportunity structure for the mobilization of the mass citizenry. The opportunity structure helps people perceive more benefits of addressing

collective interests (as compared to the potential cost of participation for action) and, sometimes, of challenging the status quo to redress shared grievances. Also, the opportunity structure allows lower costs for civil-society groups to make their voices heard and organize activism more generally. The effects of digital network connectivity depend on the opportunity structure.

Today, when citizens have the ability and motivation but lack information opportunities, the increasing expansion of digital media facilitates grassroots organizing and civic activism. In a restrictive media system, the decentralized structure of online information flows can increase exposure to a plurality of citizen voices that would otherwise be tamed or manipulated by the political elite. Such an alternative pathway to public communication provides more capacities for people to be informed and engaged. This mobilizing impact of technology diffusion is facilitated by the widespread expansion of cheap mobile devices and digital social networks. Civil activists benefit from the structural opportunity so much so that they are now keen to reach and organize their like-minded supports, and are adept at it (Howard & Hussain, 2013). The development of online civil society groups has become a crucial factor in predicting large-scale collective action more and more in diverse contexts.

5.7 Conclusion

Mobilization and reinforcement are not necessarily mutually exclusive phenomena, but rather both are important to understand political participation in the new information environment. Reinforcement theories elucidate certain inequalities in digital media use for political involvement. Personal resources and motivation are important for technology to be useful for public communication and social association. But mobilization theories are not wrong. Rather, their perspective explains why technology diffusion is manifested differently in the field of unconventional politics among the Asian countries. In particular, the increasing use of the

internet and mobile phones provides a mobilizing structure for protest participation to a greater extent among people are deprived of low-cost, alternative pathways to political participation in their media systems. With the expansion of digital network connectivity in these contexts, civil-society members are now afforded "networks of recruitment" in support of social mobilization (Verba et al., 1995).

As the technology-diffusion trend cuts across socio-structural divides within and between Asian societies, furthermore, its mobilizing capacity for activism has begun to transcend pre-existing disparities in mobilizing resources (Lee, 2015). In doing so, social media tools are found to be effective in infusing individuals with a sense of community (Garrett, 2006), as well as in affording the organized relationships that are necessary for collective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Indeed, when large-scale protest activism occurs in the Asian context, it becomes more and more apparent that participants are neither committed to traditional civil-society organizations nor politically partisan. They are, rather, rooted in online communities, relying on individual bloggers and other online writers, and coordinated by social-networking tools (Howard, 2010). Such loosely-organized but network-based protests are exemplified by recent cases such as the 2008 anti-beef import demonstrations in South Korea, the 2014 Sunflower movement in Taiwan, and the 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong.

What matters is to reveal under what conditions digital network connectivity mobilizes political participation. Given the mechanism through which technology impacts protest activity, the results of this chapter suggest that media systems yield important cross-national variation in the opportunity structure for popular mobilization beyond regime types and social development. But is it the case that the political effects of digital network connectivity vary systematically according to the ways in which the media are structured or institutionalized in a country? If so,

what characteristics of media systems exert such moderating impacts on individuals' civic or political action? These are relevant questions to the context of East and Southeast Asia, given the heterogeneity of media systems that are neither subsumed under political nor economic conditions. In the next chapter, I will examine how the relationship between individuals' internet use and protest action is contingent on their respective media system's characteristics. This macro-level perspective will offer deeper insights into the democratic implications of technology diffusion in Asia.

Chapter 6. THE IMPACT OF MEDIA SYSTEMS ON DIGITALLY MEDIATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In this chapter, I argue that Asian media systems provide an important source of cross-national variation in opportunity structures for protest participation among those who benefit from digital network connectivity. Multi-level modeling is used to test whether the mobilizing capacities of internet use at the individual level are contingent on the newspaper-market structures at the country level. Data came from the World Press Trends for the media-system variables and the Asian Barometer Survey for the individual-level variables. I found that, when media systems have a larger circulation of national newspapers, political participation is predicted by: (1) greater political interest; (2) lower news consumption; (3) less frequent political discussion; and (4) low internet use. The findings suggest that, insofar as media systems are more characterized by the strong development of a mass-circulation press, political participation is encouraged by personal motivation to a greater extent than an opportunity for citizen communication per se. In this context, the cost structures of political information are less favorable for internet diffusion to benefit the civil-society groups for mobilization. The Asian media systems shape and influence the dynamics of political communication in the new information environment.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, I established that internet use in East and Southeast Asia is positively related to participation in unconventional forms of political action. Through digital network connectivity, protesters are equipped with an unprecedented means of connecting and coordinating with the mass public in diverse contexts. That is, technology diffusion provides

mobilizing structures for civil-society groups to be organized around a social or civic cause in the Asian countries.

Individuals' political participation does not, however, take place in isolation from their surroundings, especially the media systems in which they are embedded. Even though civil-society groups are afforded unprecedented structures to connect and coordinate, the technology does not constantly cause grassroots mobilization across social contexts (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). In particular, the growth and entrenchment of online civil society in East and Southeast Asia corresponds neither to the prevalence of internet use nor to the presence of democratic institutions for citizen participation (Abbott, 2012; George, 2006). My consideration of such contextual factors raises a question about the generalizability of the mobilizing impact of technology diffusion in the Asian countries: Under what social conditions does internet use enhance or hinder citizen participation?

In this chapter, I take the next step, testing for how digitally mediated political participation is constrained by opportunity structures that vary widely across the countries in East and Southeast Asia. In particular, I focus on media systems in which mass-media structures influence civil-society mobilization. Previous studies have revealed that media systems are related to civic and political culture (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b; Norris, 2000). In the same vein, some research has found that people have different patterns of civic learning and political involvement given the way in which media systems shape the cost structures of information acquisition (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; van Kempen, 2007). This view echoes the rational-choice theory in which people respond rationally to a cost-benefit calculation for political participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). But the literature has devoted less attention to comparative analysis of media systems that impact opportunity structures of political mobilization (Mughan

& Gunther, 2000). The countries in East and Southeast Asia are indeed varied with regard to the structure of the mass media that facilitate or hinder the mechanism by which people are informed about, and organized around, a social or political cause. The analysis of media systems fills the gap and adds to a better understanding of citizen mobilization in the digital media environment.

In this dissertation, I view media systems as a structural condition that incentivizes or constrains political mobilization. My argument draws on the view of Habermas (1989; 2006), who distinguishes *media power* from both *political* and *economic power*. According to his argument, media organizations are agents of change in political culture insofar as they play a crucial role in producing and circulating information conducive to the formation of influential interests and public opinion (see also Cook, 1998). In democracies, furthermore, traditional news agencies determine the value of political information and intervene in its distribution process (Gans, 2004). Even under a dictator's control over political communications, the mass media act as an effective lever in creating propaganda, manipulating the populace, and dissuading civically or politically disaffected citizens (Neuman, 1991). Therefore, media systems reduce or increase the cost for the mass citizenry to be informed and mobilized for a political cause (Esser et al., 2012; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011).

I argue that media systems are important to be considered for the elucidation of which opportunity structures facilitate or hinder the mobilizing capacity of internet use. My argument draws on Esser et al. (2012) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009), whose view was that citizen involvement in public life is incentivized or constrained by the opportunity structure in the political information environment. For example, media systems act as institutions that disincentivize the mechanism by which individuals' ability and motivation matter in their learning about, evaluation of, and engagement in civic or political matters (Aalberg & Curran,

2012; Curran, Iyengar, Lund, & Salovaaara-Moring, 2009). Although internet use provides mobilizing capacity, its manifestation in political communication systems will thus be contingent on the contextual factor in the cost structures of information and participation.

In the following section, I discuss why a cross-national variation in media systems is important for understanding digitally mediated political participation in East and Southeast Asia. To this end, political action is first addressed in relation to its societal circumstances. Subsequently, I focus on mass-media structures to investigate cross-national differences in the opportunity structure. To be specific, the structure of national newspaper markets is addressed by analyzing its moderating impact at the societal level on the mobilization at the individual level. Multi-level modeling is used to test this cross-level interaction effect. Doing so clarifies how online civil society is constrained by political communication systems beyond different levels of democracy and technology diffusion.

6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

6.2.1 *Contextual Factors in Citizen Participation*

Since the classic studies of Verba and his colleagues, political participation has been understood to be manifested in various forms and means and to different extents (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). In addition to its multidimensionality, the political participation of individuals varies across their surroundings, as well as personal characteristics, insofar as the decision to participate takes place through a cost-benefit calculation: where the benefits of being engaged are expected to exceed costs, people participate in activism (Downs, 1957). It is therefore natural for political scientists to be attentive to cross-country variation in political institutions that affect individuals' ability and motivation to participate (Lijphart, 1997; Verba et

al., 1978). For instance, the nature of authoritarian rule builds and maintains institutions and policies that obstruct mass mobilization in opposition to the status quo.

The dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian regimes provides the most powerful framework for explaining cross-country variation in political opportunity structures (Neuman, 1991). In particular, liberal institutions facilitate the flow of information in support of individuals' cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral engagement in public life (Norris, 2000). In Southeast Asia, restrictive governments are, however, eager to keep the opportunity structures of political mobilization adverse to dissidents and civil-society groups challenging the authorities (George, 2006). Authoritarian rules are indeed effective at citizen manipulation, "characterized by strict censorship, repression of journalistic liberty, and heavy-handed efforts to structure highly selective flows of information to the general public" (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 4). This view subordinates the mobilizing structures of large-scale collective action to the regime that shapes the conventions and objectives of public communication.

Modernization theorists offer another important factor to consider in relation to the ability and motivation of individuals to engage in politics. In their view, socio-economic development expands a restive, educated middle class seeking diverse individualistic interests (Fukuyama, 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). Inglehart and Welzel (2009) have traced courses of social development in which economic growth gives rise to "a large, educated, articulate middle class of people" who uphold post-material values, such as individual autonomy and self-expression, and working as pro-democracy forces. Also, in South Korea and Taiwan, economic growth and market liberalization have spilled over into liberalization of civil-society spaces where people are connected, coordinated, and mobilized for their own civic and political purposes to be met (Diamond, 1994). This modernization process has led to the entrenchment of

civil-society organizations. In this sense, socio-economic modernization is a contextual factor that affects people's ability and incentives to be interested in, aware of, and participatory in politics.

Furthermore, political culture is an important aspect of macro-level conditions for civil-society groups to emerge and flourish. Political action is incentivized by a greater disposition of citizens toward civil liberalization; by contrast, it is constrained by favorable opinions toward the governance of the state (Shi, 2015). In East Asian and some Southeast Asian countries, especially, the cultural legacy of Confucianism has given primacy to familism over individualism, harmony over contestation, authority over liberty, and paternalism over libertarianism, so public opinion is not favorable to civil-society development (Huntington, 1991). Such regional cultural circumstances create more difficulties for activists to reach the mass citizenry and connect them with civil-society groups in the mobilization of elite-challenging collective actions.

The development of civil-society organizations is also related to an aggregate level of social capital, which varies across countries because of their different cultural heritages. In essence, social capital is defined as the propensity of people to trust and interact with each other in establishing and maintaining pro-social norms of behavior based on a sense of community (Putnam, 1995). This concept explains why people create or bridge communities beyond their personal boundaries of relationships. For example, as an element of social capital, trust functions as a resource that enables people to work together for civic and political purposes beyond individual interests (Yamagishi, 1986). Also, rich social networks and ties facilitate people to engage in communities where they exchange information, encounter heterogeneous opinions,

and develop political identities (Putnam, 1993). Putnam (2000) further argues that community-level networks and social associations are vital to the functioning of democracy.

Digital network connectivity opens up the space for a civil society where people care more about freedom, pluralism, and even democracy in diverse social contexts. The capacity of technology diffusion requires neither the existence of a strong middle-class nor the entrenchment of democratic institutions to be manifested; rather, it benefits disaffected citizens who lack traditional resources for bridging social networks and coordinating collective action (Howard, 2010). It is indeed a transnational trend that, with the proliferation of affordable mobile access to digital networks, internet artifacts mold the cultural and political identity of youth beyond the nation-state. Howard (2015) further argues that digital network connectivity is a primary means of overcoming the cost–benefit calculation problem in citizen mobilization. In particular, as internet users have reduced cost for learning about contentious issues and being involved in various modes of activism, they can grasp how their participation satisfies individual goals in an easier way (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). In that regard, internet diffusion enables new political communication systems in which civil-society organizations develop beyond traditional constraints. Even though internet use per se may not cause democratization, its strategic use is more and more crucial for the mass mobilization of political activism (Howard & Hussian, 2013).

East and Southeast Asian countries are varied with regard to the above-mentioned contextual conditions for the mobilization of large-scale collective actions. For instance, the development of online civil society is constrained by existing socio-economic inequalities that generate a societal gap in internet access and use (Norris, 2001; van Dijk, 2005). The "digital divide" is further deepening between and within countries because of different government controls over the Web (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008). The controls are applied

not just to access but also to the flow of information and its content (Deibert et al., 2012; Morozov, 2011). State censorship gains legitimacy through its ostensible opposition to cultural imperialism. The classification of the Asian countries according to their regime types and technology diffusion is thus important for understanding cross-national variation in the development of online civil society as a mobilizing structure of political activism.

Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 5, the consideration of such country-level factors is in itself insufficient to explain why Southeast Asian countries witness different manifestations of internet use as a mobilizing structure beyond their levels of democracy and technology diffusion. Simply put, not every civil society benefits from internet diffusion. In this chapter, I focus on Asian media systems that serve as a structural factor of the mobilization. To be sure, media systems are not independent of existing socio-political conditions. Rather, media development interacts with democratic development and civil liberalization (Mughan & Gunther, 2000). Yet media systems have an impact on the dynamics of political communication systems from which civil-society groups need to benefit in reaching the public and mobilizing activism. This is the case insofar as a strong body of scholarship has substantiated that the lower the information costs for civic-minded citizens, the greater the incentives for them to engage in political action (Bimber, 2003; Prior, 2007). The following section addresses why media systems matter to our understanding of the mechanism by which digitally mediated political participation takes place in East and Southeast Asia.

6.2.2 *Why Are Media Systems Important?*

Why are media systems in East and Southeast Asia important for understanding the mechanism of citizen participation in politics? Along with globalization and free-market reforms in East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, a deregulation trend forced local economies to

move toward liberalization or privatization (or both) of their media sector (Hong & Hsu, 1999; Kwak, 2012). Across Southeast Asian countries, moreover, news-media markets have expanded rapidly to create a big and fast-growing business that benefits from relatively high levels of literary and educational attainment (Abbott, 2004). And this rapid media development has gone beyond regime types. In the liberalized and/or privatized markets, mass-media organizations began to include the mass citizenry as a consumer of news products. This structural change, driven by media deregulation, was accompanied by a growing role for news agencies to enhance citizen participation in social movements (Mughan & Gunther, 2000; Norris, 2000).

Of course, the countries in East and Southeast Asia are not homogeneous with respect to their paths toward media development. In Malaysia, civil actors have opportunities, albeit limited, for political communication systems that make dissident voices heard under authoritarian rule (George, 2006). By contrast, in Singapore, media owners and practitioners have been effectively under the control of the state for many years despite the country's highest level of socio-economic development in Asia. Because of this, civil society is marginalized by institutions. In South Korea, as a result of the growing adoption of liberal market logic, the media organizations have increasing competition for audience ratings and commercial pressures. In contrast, the legacy of party-owned news outlets in Taiwan has hindered the path toward the development of mass-media structures that cut across social divisions and cleavages, despite the country's political liberalization (Tiffen & Kwak, 2005).

Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the media systems, the liberalization trend has enabled the expansion of the news market across the national borders in the regions (Romano & Bromley, 2005). Globalization, differentiation, and education improvements also increased the importance of information exchange among various stakeholders within and between countries,

giving prominence to the media in political communication systems (Habermas, 2006; Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). This trend of the media development has political implications in that the media can act as the agents of citizen mobilization (Norris, 2000). This view resonates with the media as an instrument for conveying the information necessary for making sense of complex and detailed public issues, as well as stimulating general awareness as well as discussion of, and the fostering of self-efficacy about, civic and political matters (Delli Carpini, 2004). Moreover, structural change in the media environments can bring opportunities for, or constraints on, civil-society actors who seek a means of reaching and mobilizing a politically minded public, as well as news consumers who form and develop a sense of community and citizenship (Prior, 2007).

Such effects of the media are relevant to a contrast between newspaper readership and television viewership with respect to their different influence on individuals' involvement in community-level social relationships (Moy, Scheufele, & Holbert, 1999; Putnam, 1995). But more importantly, because the media sector is differentiated from the political system, the dynamics of political participation can vary across social contexts in relation to how the news media and their audiences constitute a system of political communication (Habermas, 2006; Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). In the same vein, a corpus of research has revealed how media systems generate cross-country variation in political participation (Aalberg, van Aelst, & Curran, 2010; Curran et al., 2009). For instance, focusing on European media systems, van Kempen (2007) argues that cross-national variation in electoral participation is associated with the degree of parallelism between partisanship and media consumption. A strong aggregate-level alignment of newspapers with party preferences among their readership enables the media to mobilize segmented audiences who share a homogeneous political identity.

Certainly, media systems in the Asian countries under study should be constrained by their regimes and different from those in more fully democratized Western countries. It is also notable that media liberalization of political control is not necessarily conducive to the development of civil society; rather, with the increasing influence of commercial pressures, the media sector has become subservient to market power and media concentration (Benson, 2006; Habermas, 1989). As seen in the case of Singapore, furthermore, the growth of the media markets can be exploited to manipulate public opinion and isolate citizen voices from the public sphere. This is the case because the news media in East and Southeast Asia have long been considered as employing a "development-journalism" model in cooperation with government rules and policies (Romano & Bromley, 2005).

Nevertheless, media systems shape the opportunity structure for mass mobilization of political activism in East and Southeast Asia. In South Korea, for instance, the legacy of a bureaucratic–authoritarian regime led people to trust in the news media, as well as in civil-society organizations, far more than to trust in political institutions (Shin & Park, 2008). In Malaysia and Taiwan, along with the countries' trend towards liberalization, the news media began to reflect external pluralism to some extent and serve as social institutions to which fragmented elites and publics attend (Hughes, 2005). In the Asian countries, the significance of media systems increases because civic engagement is influenced more by such social institutions with which people have a relationship than by their social trust in general (Igarashi et al., 2008). This context suggests that the mass media are influential in the formation of public discourses and opinions that facilitate or discourage political action.

At the societal level, political participation is contingent on the opportunity structures of citizen communication. The reduced costs of political information lessen the gap in public

involvement, going beyond unequal abilities and motivations to be informed about and involved in public life. Certainly, political participation mirrors such individual-level inequalities resulting from different resources and motivation such as education and political interest (Bimber, 2003; Delli Carpini, 2004). But the mechanism of political participation is also conditional on societal systems of political communication, which shape and influence the structure of costs and opportunities to which individual actors respond (Prior, 2007). Media systems are indeed important in the structure of information flows, which affects the process by which people are civically or politically minded so that political participation is incentivized (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). Media systems do have such effects in East and Southeast Asia, insofar as news agencies serve as social institutions that facilitate the formation of social norms, relationships, and trust. Therefore, given internet use as a new mobilizing structure of political involvement, we should take into account the power of media systems.

6.2.3 *Why Are Newspaper Market Structures Important?*

When it comes to various manifestations of media systems across countries, comparative research emphasizes the significance of newspaper-market structures (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a; Norris, 2009). Regarding the influence of media systems, this chapter focuses on the development of newspaper markets conceptualized as the extent to which the media seek and achieve a wider readership in the news market. This view draws particularly on the theoretical framework of Hallin and Mancini (2004b), who argue that the formation and functioning of the media differ from one country to another in relation to the *structure of newspaper markets*. This concept is an essential dimension of media systems for understanding how the news media work in public communications and what effects they bring about in a political culture. I further argue

that newspaper-market structures are involved in shaping the relationship between internet use and political participation in East and Southeast Asia.

In the Western democratic context, newspapers have been theorized as a mobilizing force in the flow of information, not only between governors and governed but also among citizens (Gans, 2004; Norris, 2000). This theory has revealed some contextual influences of newspaper-market structures on civic and political engagement. For example, the primacy of commercial news outlets over public ones in the market has been found to reduce the supply of public-affairs information (Aalberg et al., 2010; Hallin & Mancini, 2004a), which in turn hinders not only political conversation (Shah et al., 2007) but also political self-efficacy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). From this perspective, it is not surprising that comparative research has found differences in public knowledge and qualities of citizenship between the American liberal-market model and the European public-service model (Curran et al., 2009). The gap between countries echoes a variation in newspaper-market structures because, when the news market is better structured to convey public-affairs information to the readership, people have a reduced cost of acquiring political knowledge and involvement (Aalberg & Curran, 2012).

Newspaper-market structures have a contextual impact on political participation, not just because the audience acquires political knowledge but also because the media are institutions that shape patterns of information-seeking and information-processing in a social context. According to the mass-media structure, for example, cross-national variation emerges in profiles of users of hard news media (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011). The differences are related to a newspaper-centric structure of media markets with lower information costs than those of a television-centric media culture (Norris, 2000). In the former environment, a civic-minded public relies less on their ability and motivation to use the media for political learning than the public

do in the latter. In the latter environment, although mass-mediated communication involves the general public to a greater extent, it comes with higher costs of the information-acquisition and information-processing necessary to have opinions and participate in politics. In this context, the mobilizing capacity of media use diminishes because news products are designed for a wider circulation, so that political information cuts across social divisions and cleavages. Thus, individuals' ability and motivation become more important for their information-seeking to bring about political participation.

Of course, compared with television, newspapers act as the agent of political involvement to a greater extent because the medium is better suited to the users' "explicit information intent" (Chaffee & Frank, 1996). When newspapers reach a wide public, therefore, the cost of public affairs information can lower. And a strong body of evidence suggests that newspapers have cognitive effects on political knowledge and elaboration because the medium has more favorable features for conveying detailed information about complex political issues than broadcast media have (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005; Guo & Moy, 1998; Holbert, 2005). The medium-specific functions of newspapers have been further corroborated at the aggregate level because the structural primacy given to a large newspaper market (over the reach of television) provides advantageous circumstances for the media to serve as the agent of political communication (Norris, 2000; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011).

It is ironic, however, that the political agency of the media does not necessarily increase by reaching a mass public: the readership includes those who are neither educated nor interested enough to participate in public life (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). The development of a mass-circulation press is particularly connected with the dynamics in which people have different cost structures for learning about and engaging in public life. For example, in the media market that

consolidates the mass-circulation press, the news market is more subservient to a trend toward commercialization than is the market dominated by partisan newspapers with financial patronage (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). In the former media systems, people have too high costs of political information to be incentivized for political participation when compared with those in the latter systems. That is, as the news media seek a mass public, they cut across the gap in individuals' ability and motivation to be mobilized, so that media use lessens its impact on the participation.

Of course, the structure of newspaper markets is multidimensional. The number of newspaper titles is indicative of the degree of competition among the media organizations. This dimension of media systems is also related to commercialization. Hallin and Mancini (2004a) argue that commercialization becomes the most prevailing trend across media systems as newspaper markets develop across their national borders. As a result, the news media promote "catch-all-ism," in which their products seek majoritarianism rather than clientelism, either openly or purposively. Commercialization of newspaper markets is therefore accompanied by an organizational effort to downplay open partisanship and damp down information on public affairs, an action that tends to attract a broader audience (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Gunther & Muchan, 2000). The more media systems are commercialized and market-oriented, therefore, the less likely the media act as an agent of political communication.

The development of the mass-circulation press and its competition means the increasing influence of commercialization in the media market. Growing market pressures force media organizations to comply with a generic approach to news coverage and commentary and to therefore attempt to cut across social cleavages by emphasizing nonpartisan entertainment (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). At the same time, civic knowledge and mobilizing information are more likely to be ignored by the commercial logic that prevails in the media market. Of course,

the internet provides people with a new channel for civil-society development, whereas pre-existing political communication systems may not. Nevertheless, previous studies have shown how successful traditional news outlets in the U.S. are in maintaining their roles and practices as a professional gatekeeper when serving the users of online information sources such as blogs and Twitter (Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012; Singer, 2005). The structure of newspaper markets is thus involved in shaping the cost structure of information even in cyberspace.

Newspaper-market structures have specific implications for understanding media systems in East and Southeast Asia, where the press has been liberalized for the most part compared with the electronic media. The Asian countries certainly show a path-dependency in which the legacy of successful state-driven development keeps a grip on the media, especially on television, in the name of keeping the airwaves for public use. Different from their interventionist attitude toward broadcasters under the strict control of the state, many of the Asian countries had a de-regulation policy for their print-media sector (Romano & Bromley, 2005). In such a context, the press has developed into a social institution regardless of civil liberalization.

For example, whereas the Thai government and its allies own and control almost all broadcast stations in the country, the newspaper market is dominated by large conglomerates and prominent families who are largely free from government controls (McCargo, 2012). They can be so in that the government is restricted in revoking publication licenses once they are issued. Thais are thus supplied with the freest and most outspoken press in Southeast Asia, despite lacking consolidation in democratic institutions (McCargo, 2003). In South Korea, the top three privately owned national dailies—*Chosun*, *JoongAng*, and *Dong-a*—have dominated the news market, where their right-wing ideology suits a conservative middle-class readership. These news organizations were at odds with the former liberal presidents, as well as with government-

controlled broadcasters (Kwak, 2012). Despite different levels of democracy institutionalized in the two Asian countries, the press has exerted some influence over the pattern of information-acquisition, public-opinion formation, and political participation in both societies. Therefore, newspaper-market structures indicate an important aspect of political communication systems in relation to how people relate to their civic and political world.

6.3 Hypotheses

In this chapter, I have discussed so far how media systems affect the structural conditions in which internet use benefits civil-society organizations to inform and engage the general public. When the technology serves as the mobilizing structure for individual citizens to participate in large-scale collective actions, therefore, mass-media structures incentivize or constrain the mobilization of political communication systems in the digital environment. How, then, is the impact of media systems manifested in the mechanism by which internet use enhances political participation?

The impact of mass-media structures can be viewed from two divergent perspectives. At one end of the spectrum is reinforcement theory, in which "the informationally rich get richer" (Price & Zaller, 1993, p. 138; see also Norris, 2000). This view suggests that internet use enhances political participation, inasmuch as media systems are structured to facilitate political involvement. If media institutions were organized to lower information costs, new technology would amplify its role as a new structure of political communication. In contrast, internet use is less likely to be influential in political participation insofar as the predominance of commercial interests in a news market comes at the expense of information-oriented structure. This perspective echoes that the internet complements rather than replaces traditional communication systems (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001).

At the other end of the spectrum is mobilization theory, which emphasizes the distinctive function of the internet in the media system. The "information-poor," who have been isolated from traditional communication systems, are mobilized. This perspective is reflective of a functionalist theory that puts emphasis on the societal need for a new technology to have a greater impact on citizens who are otherwise deprived of information sources (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Rubin & Windahl, 1986). In the same vein, internet use manifests its mobilizing capacity to a greater extent because media systems are structured to increase information costs at odds with the inclusion of citizen voices. From this perspective, the internet functions as the agent of narrowing the gap in public involvement within and between media systems.

The following hypotheses are proposed to examine whether digitally mediated political participation is constrained by mass-media structures that increase information costs. This media system is characterized by the strong development of the mass-circulation press and the existence of fierce competition among the news outlets. As a result, media systems provide less favorable opportunity structures for individual citizens to engage in public life through media use. In view of the reinforcement theory, internet users are also deprived of media resources for the mobilization of political participation.

H6.1–1: *If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then internet use will be less likely to enhance political participation.*

H6.1–2: *If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then internet use will be less likely to enhance political participation.*

The impact of newspaper-market structures should be also related to personal agents of political participation in order to corroborate the validity of the findings. In particular, when media systems increase barriers of political information, mobilization will be contingent more on

one's political interest and the self-efficacy necessary to scrutinize, understand, and evaluate civically or politically relevant matters from media sources. That is, with higher information costs, political communication systems are more bound up with one's ability or motivation to be politically involved.

H6.2–1: *If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then political participation will be more likely to depend on political interest and/or self-efficacy.*

H6.2–2: *If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then political participation will be more likely to depend on political interest and/or self-efficacy.*

When media systems are structured by the strong development of the mass-circulation press and fierce competition among the news outlets, political information sources seek a wider audience by damping down partisan cues. In this media system, civil-society organizations have fewer incentives (and higher costs) to use media resources for mass mobilization. As a result, communication agents of political participation may not be as influential as political interest or self-efficacy in political participation.

H6.3–1: *If newspapers have a larger circulation in the media system, then political participation will be less effected by news consumption and/or political discussion.*

H6.3–2: *If newspapers have more market competition in the media system, then political participation will be less effected by news consumption and/or political discussion.*

To sum up, following Paek, Yoon, and Shah (2005) and Shehata and Strömbäck (2011), Figure 6.1 illustrates the hypothesized cross-level interaction effects that are to be examined.



Source: Author's elaboration based on Paek et al. (2005), and Shehata and Strömbäck (2011).

Figure 6.1. Cross-level Interaction Model of Political Participation

6.4 METHOD

6.4.1 *Data*

To test the hypotheses, the research reported in this chapter used both individual-level and country-level data on the countries under analysis: two countries in East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) and six countries in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). Using the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data sets in wave 2 (2005–2007) and wave 3 (2010–2011), individual-level variables were pooled across the eight Asian

countries in each wave. Country-level variables came from several data sources to tap into Asian media systems in the same years that the ABS produced the individual-level data on each country.

The data included aggregate-level indicators of newspaper-market structures such as the total average circulation of daily newspapers, the number of newspaper titles per million habitants, the newspapers' share of advertising expenditures in the media market, and the C4 index as the circulation share of the top four newspapers in each country. I obtained these variables from the World Press Trends (WPT) data set, published annually by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers. As a result, newspapers were operationalized as national dailies because they were considered more relevant to the informational capacity of the media than were local or regional newspapers with a keen interest in maximizing readership (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). Of course, previous studies found the degree of newspaper-centrism to be an important dimension of newspaper-market structures that was operationalized as the ratio of national-newspaper circulation per 1,000 inhabitants to the average daily minutes of total television watching (Norris, 2000; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011). Unfortunately, this measure was not included because of a lack of reliable data on television-viewing for some Asian countries. Instead, I compared newspapers with television in relation to their advertising expenditures. This measure is relevant to estimates of not only their market share (Picard, 2008) but also their media-use patterns (Elvestad & Blekesaune, 2008).

In addition, the country-level data took into account socio-economic, democratic, and infrastructural factors that affect the new media environment. The variables included the Human Development Index (HDI), the Polity score, the Freedom of the Press index, and the diffusion rates of internet use and mobile cellular subscriptions. First, HDI, created by the United Nations

Development Programme, offered cross-country estimates of socio-economic development based on a combination of annual data about life expectancy, average years of schooling, and gross national income per capita. In 2013, for instance, HDI ranged from 0.944 for Norway (the highest level of human development) to 0.337 for Niger (the lowest level).

The Polity score, published by the Polity IV project, provided time-series, cross-national data on comparable qualities of democracy relative to autocracy in governing institutions (Marshall & Gurr, 2014). This score ranked each Asian regime annually between −10 (complete autocracy) and 10 (complete democracy). The Freedom of the Press index, from the Freedom House, measured the level of legal, political, and economic restrictions placed upon the media in each country annually. The index ranged from 0 (least free) to 100 (most free).

As reported by the International Telecommunications Union, the national counts of internet users and the numbers of cellular mobile telephone subscribers were measured. In doing so, I took advantage of the Technology Distribution Index (TDI): the technological variables were constructed to reflect each country's share of technology adoption in the Asian region weighted against its GDP at PPP relative to the total regional output (Howard, Anderson, Busch, & Nafus, 2009). This index allowed for capturing the impact of political culture on technology diffusion beyond the impact of economic wealth (Howard et al., 2009). Also, given the impact of economic wealth on the penetration of newspapers, the circulation of national dailies was derived in line with the TDI by weighting each country's relative share of the total circulation in the Asian region against its relative share of the total regional GDP at PPP. The country-level data are summarized in Appendix 6.A.

6.4.2 *Outcome Variable*

This chapter follows my conceptualization of political participation in the previous chapters. In particular, I operationalized the outcome variable by measuring individuals' participation in protest activities, which have been marginalized by traditional systems of communication and organization. The variable was derived from respondent reports of political acts in the past three years, available from both Waves 2 and 3 of the ABS data set, such as: 1) getting together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition, 2) attending a demonstration or protest march, and 3) using force or violence for a political cause. Using the items, the outcome variable dichotomized the respondents into those who had performed any of the acts (10.67% in Wave 2; 16.51% in Wave 3) and those who had not performed any.

6.4.3 *Individual-level Explanatory Variables*

As a key explanatory variable of interest, internet use was taken into account by distinguishing people who reported using the technology frequently from those who did not. Thus, asking respondents to indicate their frequency of internet use, a survey item was employed to generate a dummy binary variable coded "1" for those who used the technology at least once a week and "0" for those who did so less frequently or never (M = 0.31, SD = 0.46).

Explanatory variables also included political interest, self-efficacy, news consumption, and political discussion. First, political interest was measured by using an item asking how respondents would assess their interest in politics (0 = not at all interested, 3 = very interested). Responses for this item were used to generate a 4-point variable (M = 1.44, SD = 0.93). Next, internal political efficacy was gauged by using an item that asked respondents to evaluate the following statement: "I think I have the ability to participate in politics" (0 = strongly disagree, 3 = strongly agree). This item yielded a 4-point measure (M = 1.26, SD = 0.79). Third, hard-news

use drew on an item that asked respondents how often they followed news about politics and government (0 = practically never, 4 = every day). Using this item, a 5-point measure was produced (*M* = 2.71, *SD* = 1.37). Finally, political discussion was tapped via an item that measured the frequency with which individuals discussed political matters in a more intimate social setting, such as when they got together with their family members or friends, a method which is found to be effective in mobilization (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Mutz, 2002). Responses for this item, ranging from "never" (scored 0) to "frequently" (scored 2), were then recoded to a 3-point scale (*M* = 0.73, *SD* = 0.62).

In predicting the outcome variable, I controlled for individuals' difference in social relationships because of its impact on civic engagement and even political participation (Putnam, 1993; 2000). The size of individuals' network was tapped with an item to measure the number of people that respondents had contact with in a typical week to chat, talk, or discuss matters face-to-face with, on the telephone, via mail, or through the internet. This item was scored on a 5-point scale, ranging from "0–4 people" to "50 or more people" (*M* = 1.60, *SD* = 1.23). Organizational membership was tapped with items that indicated whether respondents belonged to any social or civic organization (*M* = 0.40, *SD* = 0.49). The list of organizations was described in Chapter 2. Lastly, respondents' demographic and socio-economic characteristics were controlled for at the individual level. The variables included sex (50% female), age (*M* = 42.99 years, *SD* = 15.16 years), education (10-point scale, median category: incomplete secondary/high school), and household income (5-point scale, median category: low level).

6.4.4 *Modeling*

To reveal the impact of media systems, a factor analysis was run to derive latent but meaningful dimensions of the newspaper-market structure from the country-level data set. This method was

intended particularly to isolate particular newspaper-market structures, which were hypothesized as country-level factors in digitally mediated political participation. The extracted factor-scores were used as media-system variables in turn to test their moderating effects on the relationship between the individual-level variables. The purpose of this analysis was not only to identify the characteristics of the Asian media systems but also to create the country-level variables that overcame the issue of multicollinearity, as some original indicators were highly correlated with one another. The Bartlett method was therefore used to produce unbiased scores for each media system that were correlated only with their underlying factor. The Bartlett scores were then treated as media-system variables characterizing the newspaper-market structures in Asia.

Multilevel modeling was used to test the cross-level interaction between newspaper-market structures and internet use in predicting political participation. Using the *lme4* package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in the R environment, a generalized linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data. In estimating the regression models, standardization was also conducted on each variable by centering it on the country-specific mean and dividing it by its standard deviation to ensure comparability across countries. The variables were thus placed on a common scale within each country.[2] The multilevel modeling technique permitted disentangling the variance among the eight countries with two survey years from the within-country variance among individuals (Hox, 2010). Doing so enabled explanation of variation between the two survey years and across eight countries (nested within a survey wave), as well as across individuals (nested within a country in a survey wave). The estimated equation is:

$$Y_{i,j,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i,j.k} + \beta_2 w_{j,k} + \beta_3 x_{i,j,k} w_{j,k} + u_{0,j,k} + \epsilon_{i,j,k} \qquad (6.1)$$

[2] Similar to the analysis in Chapter 4, the regression models were run with unstandardized explanatory variables at the individual level. This post-hoc analysis corroborates that standardizing did not affect the results of the present chapter in any significant way.

where

$Y_{i,j,k}$: *Individual-level outcome variables of individual i* in country *j* in survey year *k*

$x_{i,j,k}$: *Individual-level explanatory variables of individual i* in country *j* in survey year *k*

$w_{j,k}$: *Country-level explanatory variables of* country *j* in survey year *k*

β_0: *Fixed intercept*

β_1: *Fixed-effects parameters of the slopes for the individual-level explanatory variables*

β_2: *Fixed-effects parameters of the slopes for the country-level explanatory variables*

β_3: *Fixed-effects parameters of the slopes for the cross-level interaction terms*

$u_{0,j,k}$: *Random-effects parameters of the intercept for country j* in survey year *k*

$\epsilon_{i,j,k}$: *Residual errors at the individual level*

As seen in eq6.1, an interaction term $x_{i,j,k}w_{j,k}$ was included to estimate β_3 *based on the assumption that* the relationship between individual-level predictors was dependent on a function of country-level predictors. The random effects, varying across macro-level units, were given by the random intercept $u_{0,j,k}$. However, the random effects of the slopes for the predictors were not included in the model, because they are not of concern in this chapter.

It should be noted that this multilevel modeling has the small sample size at the country level. The number of the macro-level unit in analysis was 16 (eight countries with two survey years). This issue might lead to biased estimates for the standard errors of the fixed and random parameters at the macro-level with small sample sizes. However, a previous study found that the problem of small macro-level sample sizes was relevant only for inaccurate estimates of the macro-level standard errors (Maas & Hox, 2005). Meanwhile, the study corroborates unbiased parameter estimates and their standard errors for not only the micro-level effects but also the interaction with macro-level effects. Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, and Chen (2012) have also argued that, in testing cross-level interactions, statistical power is garnered more by the average sample size of the micro-level units than by the macro-level sample size. Accordingly, given the

purposes of this chapter, multilevel modeling was appropriate for estimating not only the main effects of individual-level explanatory variables but also cross-level interaction effects between individual-level and country-level variables.

6.5 RESULTS

Using the Varimax rotation method, the factor analysis of the country-level variables yielded four factors that accounted for 86% of the total variance in the data. Table 6.1 summarizes the results of the four-factor solution. Given the relatively small sample size with 16 observations, I applied a stringent criterion with a cut-off at |0.50|. This means that, in extracting factors from the data, country-level items were retained only if an absolute value of a factor loading was 0.50 or greater. This procedure made interpretation of the factor loadings easier and more meaningful.

As seen in Table 6.1, the first factor explains concentration of newspapers most, along with an increase in HDI and a decrease in TDI for mobile-phone subscriptions. This factor, termed “market concentration,” reflects the degree of concentration in the newspaper-market structure. The second factor affects the TDI for total average circulation of national paid-for dailies on top of an increase in the TDIs for internet users. This factor defines “development of a mass-circulation press,” a key variable of interest. The third factor, labeled “democratic institutions,” is in relation to the Polity score and the Freedom of the Press index, reflecting the extent to which the media are free from restrictive regulations and government controls. The final factor has a strong effect on the number of national newspaper titles per million inhabitants, but a weak effect on the newspaper share of advertising expenditures. Thus, this factor, dubbed “market competition,” is considered indicative of the degree to which free-market competition is created in the newspaper industry. Taken together, the Asian media systems involve cross-country variation in the development of a mass-circulation press and a degree of competition in

the newspaper market, which can be subsumed under neither socio-economic nor political frameworks. The media-system variables were used to fit the multilevel model.

Table 6.1. Loadings for Common Factors of Asian Media Systems

Manifest Indicators	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
	Market Concentration	Mass-circulation Press	Democratic Institution	Market Competition
HDI	**0.79**	−0.22	0.33	0.39
Mobile Phone Distribution	**−0.76**	0.45	−0.11	−0.40
C4 Index of Newspaper Market	**0.95**	−0.22	−0.17	
Internet Use Distribution	−0.16	**0.67**	−0.16	
Newspaper Circulation Index	−0.25	**0.96**		
Polity Score	−0.12	−0.25	**0.88**	0.12
Press Freedom Index	0.15		**0.97**	0.10
Newspaper Titles per Million	0.24	0.13	0.24	**0.93**
Advertising Expenditure	0.34	−0.45		**0.50**
Eigen Value	2.41	1.96	1.95	1.45
Explained Variance	0.27	0.22	0.22	0.16
Cumulative Explained Variance	0.27	0.49	0.70	0.86

Note: Varimax Rotation; loadings in bold are values above |.50|.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, ICT Indicators of International Telecommunication Union, The Polity IV Project's Polity Score, Freedom House's Freedom of the Press Index, and World Association of Newspapers' World Press Trends.

Before fitting the multilevel model, an "intercept-only" model was estimated to calculate an intra-class correlation (ICC) beforehand. This procedure estimates "the correlation between values of two randomly drawn micro-units in the same, randomly drawn, macro-unit" (Hoff, p.

18). That is to say, ICC assesses the proportion of variance in the outcome variable attributable to cross-country and between-year differences. The ICC coefficient ρ is thus defined as:

$$\rho = \tau^2/(\tau^2 + \sigma^2) \tag{6.2}$$

where

τ^2: Variance between macro-level units

σ^2: Estimated residual variance within the macro-level unit

The computation of ICC yielded that approximately 8% of the total variation in political participation was attributable to differences across countries or between survey years. Indeed, when the country-specific coefficients of internet use are plotted in Figure 6.2, there is substantial variation in its relationship with the participation that stem from cross-national and between-year differences.

Subsequently, three multilevel models were fitted to the hierarchical data set, in which the individual-level variables were nested within the media-system variables. The first cross-level interaction model tested the first pair of hypotheses: if national dailies have a larger circulation (H6.1–1) or more competition (H6.1–2) in the media system, then individuals' internet use will be *less* likely associated with political participation. The second model assessed the second pair of hypotheses: if national dailies have a larger circulation (H6.2–1) or more competition (H6.2–2) in the media system, then individuals' political interest and self-efficacy will be *more* likely associated with political participation. The final model examined the third pair of hypotheses: if national dailies have a larger circulation (H6.3–1) or more competition (H6.3–2) in the media system, then individuals' news consumption and political discussion will be *less* likely associated with political participation.



Note: Each country has its own regression coefficients and standard errors in individual models, varying across countries as well as between survey years within the country. The first line in each country comes from the wave-2 model and the second line from the wave-3 model.
Source: Author's calculations based on the ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

Figure 6.2. Across-country Effects of Internet Use on Political Participation

The results of the first interaction model are presented in Table 6.2. Maximum likelihood estimates show that individuals' political participation is related to their socio-demographics such as gender, age, and education. Membership in any social or civic group is also associated strongly with the participation. If people belong to such an organization, they are 59% more likely to participate than those who are not involved in any association. But individuals' network size does not have a significant influence at the 95% confidence level. In addition, the multilevel model corroborates that political participation is significantly predicted by political interest, self-efficacy, hard-news consumption, and political discussion: each one-unit increment in these variables increases the odds of participation by 6%, 18%, 20%, and 33%, respectively. As the final individual-level variable of interest, internet use has a significant relationship with political participation. Its coefficient is the largest of all the determinants. Being a frequent internet user means an 81% increase in the odds of participation ($p < 0.001$).

Table 6.2. Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Political Participation

Variable	Beta		Odds Ratio
Individual-level Fixed Effects			
Gender (Female)	−0.39***	(0.05)	0.09
Age	−0.09***	(0.03)	0.68
Education	0.11***	(0.03)	0.91
Income	0.02	(0.03)	1.12
Urban Residence	0.02	(0.05)	1.02
Network Size	0.04	(0.02)	1.04
Organizational Membership	0.46***	(0.05)	1.59
Political Interest	0.06*	(0.03)	1.06
Internal Efficacy	0.16***	(0.02)	1.18
News Consumption	0.18***	(0.03)	1.20
Political Discussion	0.28***	(0.03)	1.33
Internet Use	0.59***	(0.14)	1.81
Media-system Fixed Effects			
Market Concentration	−0.45*	(0.19)	0.64
Mass-circulation Press	0.01	(0.16)	1.01
Democratic Institution	0.26	(0.16)	1.29
Market competition	0.10	(0.14)	1.11
AIC of Baseline Model	12,678.64		
Cross-level Interaction Fixed Effects			
Internet Use × Market Concentration	0.21	(0.14)	1.23
Internet Use × Mass-circulation Press	−0.25*	(0.11)	0.78
Internet Use × Democratic Institution	0.07	(0.10)	1.07
Internet Use × Market Competition	−0.09	(0.07)	0.92
AIC of Interaction Model	12,678.61		
Random Effects			
Country×Wave-level σ^2	0.24		
N	18,230		

Note: Weighted maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Source: Author's calculations based on the ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

Given the media-system variables, "market concentration" predicts only individuals' participation in political activism directly. If the media systems in East and Southeast have more concentrated market structures, then individuals' likelihood of being participatory decreases by 36% ($p < 0.05$). Yet, as expected, a small sample size of macro-level units hinders gain in precision but yields a relatively large variance of the estimates. When it comes to the interaction estimates, the standard errors nonetheless diminish to some extent. Especially, the multilevel model substantiates that the relationship between internet use and political participation is contingent on development of a mass-circulation press. When media systems are characterized by larger circulation of national dailies, the impact of internet use on political participation becomes weaker by 22% ($p < 0.05$). But there is no significant effect of market competition in the newspaper industry. Accordingly, the findings corroborate H6.1–1 but not H6.1–2.

Table 6.3. Mass-circulation Press Model Predicting Political Participation

Variable	Beta		Odds Ratio
AIC of Baseline Model	12,678.64		
Cross-level interaction fixed effects			
Political Interest × Mass-circulation Press	0.09***	(0.02)	1.10
Internal Efficacy × Mass-circulation Press	0.02	(0.02)	1.02
News Consumption × Mass-circulation Press	−0.08***	(0.02)	0.92
Political Discussion × Mass-circulation Press	−0.05*	(0.02)	0.95
Internet Use × Mass-circulation Press	−0.11*	(0.05)	0.89
AIC of Mass-circulation Press Model	12,657.70		
Random Effects			
Country × Wave-level σ^2	0.22		
N	18,230		

Note: Weighted maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Source: Author's calculations based on the ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

The effects of media systems are further examined in the second and third interaction models. First, Table 6.3 presents the results of the multilevel model to examine how political participation is differently associated with individuals' political interest, self-efficacy, news consumption, political discussion, and internet use according to the development of a mass-circulation press. Above all, internet use retains its decreasing relationship with the participation in a media system that has a large circulation of national dailies.

Meanwhile, political interest has a greater mobilizing influence in media systems characterized by the development of a mass-circulation press. A one-unit increment in the development of a mass-circulation press leads to a 10% increase in the positive relationship between political interest and participation in political activism ($p < 0.001$). However, self-efficacy does not significantly interact with the structure of newspaper markets, although its coefficient is positive. The data lend partial support to H6.2–1. Also, the interaction model in Table 6.3 substantiates that news consumption and political discussion become less determinant for the participation. A one-unit increment in the development of a mass-circulation press is related with a decrease in the political effects of news consumption and political discussion of 8% ($p < 0.001$) and of 5% ($p < 0.05$), respectively. The findings support H6.3–1.

The third multilevel model was estimated to test the cross-level interaction effects of market competition in the newspaper industry on the relationship between the individual-level variables. As presented in Table 6.4, the model does not yield any significant role for newspaper-market competition in moderating the effects of political interest, self-efficacy, news consumption, political discussion, as well as internet use on participation in civic and political activism. The data support neither H6.2–2 nor H6.3–2.

Table 6.4. Market Competition Model Predicting Political Participation

Variable	Beta		Odds Ratio
AIC of Baseline Model	12,678.64		
Cross-level interaction fixed effects			
Political Interest × Market Competition	−0.05	(0.03)	.95
Internal Efficacy × Market Competition	−0.00	(0.03)	1.00
News Consumption × Market Competition	−0.05	(0.03)	.96
Political Discussion × Market Competition	0.00	(0.03)	1.00
Internet Use × Market Competition	−0.03	(0.07)	.97
AIC of Market Competition	12,681.26		
Random Effects			
Country × Wave-level σ^2	0.22		
N	18,230		

Note: Weighted maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Source: Author's calculations based on the ABS data, waves 2 and 3.

Lastly, for the sake of the robustness of the cross-level interaction effect between internet use and mass-circulation press, I performed a post-hoc analysis of the multilevel model using the World Values Survey (WVS) data set. All the variables were the same as those in the models predicting protest participation in Chapter 4, except for a country-level variable of the average frequency of newspaper use. This variable was created to measure the percentage of people who used daily newspaper for information acquisition at least once a week in each country unit. This hierarchical data set included the individual-level variables that were nested within the national average variable of newspaper use in two waves: mid-2000s and early 2010s. A multilevel model was fitted to the hierarchical data set, testing a cross-level interaction term between individuals' internet use and countries' newspaper use. As presented in Appendix 6.B, the results lend additional support to H6.1–1: When media systems are characterized by a greater use of national

dailies, the impact of internet use on political participation becomes weaker by 77% ($p < 0.001$). The following section discusses the implications of these results.

6.6 DISCUSSION

In East and Southeast Asia, internet use provides a mobilizing capacity for disaffected citizens to be organized around a civic or political cause. Given the regional contexts of political action, getting together to raise a public issue, signing a petition, and attending a demonstration have previously been considered unconventional and nonconformist, insofar as they are restricted to small civil-society groups and college-student associations (Castells, 2008). The diffusion of internet use, however, has changed the dynamics of political communication systems (Howard, 2010). As discussed in the previous chapters, digital network connectivity has increasingly emerged as an important pathway to participation in elite-challenging politics among those who are marginalized by institutions.

Nevertheless, the mobilizing capacity of internet use is not independent of, but rather constrained by, national opportunity structures for mass mobilization of political activism. In this chapter, I have examined the idea that media systems in the Asian countries that incentivize or disincentivize the mechanism by which internet diffusion mobilize a new system of political communication. The structure of newspaper markets is a dimension of the Asian media systems that is examined regarding its moderating impact on the relationship between internet use and political participation. The comparative structures of national newspaper markets are manifested by the development of a mass-circulation press and competition in the newspaper industry, which vary across the Asian countries. These indicators are not simply subsumed under media development, concentration, or democratization.

The findings substantiate the hypothesis that the relationship between internet use and political participation is uneven across the Asian media systems, which have different levels of development of a mass-circulation press. This characteristic of media systems generates between-country variation in political communication systems within which individuals are mobilized for collective action. In particular, the mobilizing capacity of internet use is attenuated by newspaper-market structures in which national dailies have larger circulation in regard to economic wealth. Instead, individuals' ability and motivation wield a greater influence on political involvement. Although internet use reduces the transaction costs of information processing to mobilize and coordinate collective action, the technological impact is therefore contingent on the users' personal interest in civic or political matters. The results suggest that mass-media sturctures provide certain constraints on digitally mediated political participation.

Traditional media-market structures influence the information barriers (Esser et al., 2012; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011). In particular, the strong development of the mass-circulation press in the media system produces high information costs, insofar as political communication pursues a majoritarian perspective and marginalizes dissident voices. In this context, media outlets seek wider audiences. The media dampen political and partisan cues, so that mediated public spheres per se become trivialized in mass mobilization. That is, this opportunity structure subordinates opinionated, mobilizing content to depoliticized, catch-all content. Therefore, civil-society groups have more constraints, resulting from high information costs, to make their voices heard in the political communication systems. Although media use and information processing cut across different social structures, such communication acts are less connected to mobilization. Rather, personal resources and motivation are so important for involvement in public life that the participation gap is reinforced along lines of existing social inequalities. The results of this

chapter suggest that this opportunity structure constrains internet diffusion from benefiting alternative agents of mobilization in opposition to the status quo.

By contrast, the underdevelopment of a mass-circulation press generates an opportunity for the mobilization of large-scale collective action through internet use. When the circulation of national dailies is relatively limited, the barrier of political information through communication is low. Because the mass media reach the general public to a limited extent, mediated public discourses reflect social or political cleavages to a greater extent. Political communication systems are therefore more inclusive of pluralistic voices, so that civil-society groups are given more venues to inform and organize ordinary citizens. Mobilizing information is thus easier to be communicated through the media and amplified through interpersonal discussion. That is to say, mediated communication promotes activity to gain the skills, experiences, and incentives necessary for participation in civic and political matters. In this media system, the internet provides more capacities for mobilizing a new system of political communication that benefits civil-society groups in making their voices heard and mobilizing large-scale collective action.

The findings in this chapter echo the argument that the process and patterns of political communication, even in the digital age, are influenced by the way in which the mass media are structured to affect information costs (Gunther & Mughan, 2000; Hallin & Mancini, 2004b; Norris, 2009). That is to say, media systems shape opportunity structures for civic learning and political participation (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; van Kempen, 2007). As an alternative channel for communication and organization, internet use is therefore constrained by the opportunity structure of traditional media systems that incentivize or obstruct its capacity. But it is notable that not all media system characteristics have such contextual effects on digitally mediated political participation. For instance, the mobilizing capacity of internet use is manifested across

the Asian countries regardless of their degree of market concentration in the newspaper industry, which is also reflective of the socio-economic development at the country level.

Interestingly, the impact of internet use is unrelated to the level of democratic institutions in media systems, in which political communication is intuitively expected to provide different constraints on mass mobilization. Instead, there is a trade-off between the state and civil society in the formation of opportunity structures for the mobilization. On the one hand, citizen participation in unconventional political actions is disincentivized by authoritarian rules that increase penalties for challenging the status quo. When internet users receive such legal or other direct sanctions, their incentives for being participatory succumb to Olson's (1965) dilemma of collective action (Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). On the other hand, digitally networked activism enables grassroots organizing for a civic or political cause among individuals who seek personal interests in an unprecedented manner (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). In this emerging form of political participation, traditional social structures and governing agencies are not necessarily influential on the opportunity structure. Rather, civil-society groups often make the case that they benefit from the strategic use of technology for maintaining communities, as well as bridging new ties and coordinating collective action (Howard, 2015).

It is further noteworthy that another indicator of mass-media structures—market competition in the newspaper industry—does not have any moderating effect on digitally mediated political participation. This characteristic of media systems is also independent of the traditional mechanism of political participation, enhanced by motivations and communication acts. Previous literature argues that increasing competition in the media market yields unfavorable opportunity structures for the expansion of civil society (Gunther & Mughan, 2000;

Patterson, 1993). However, the findings of this chapter suggest that this is not the case, given the media systems in East and Southeast Asia at least.

Why is media competition irrelevant to citizen mobilization? An explanation is the dual consequences of media liberalization, as a trade-off between commercialization and mobilization. First, the trend has led to the demise of media-politics parallelism, which debilitated the media agent of mobilizing political action. But at the same time, the liberalization has opened up an opportunity for civil-society voices because of technology diffusion, as manifested by the development of alternative online journalism via *Malaysiakini* in Malaysia and *OhmyNews* in South Korea.

Of course, Asian media systems do not assimilate to a Western-based liberal model for journalism institutions. For example, given the media context of Southeast Asia, clientelism prevails over internal pluralism and autonomy for news organizations, which are then exploited in political struggles among government factions (McCargo, 2012). In the regional democracies, furthermore, socio-political instability and prevalent corruption have undermined media trust. Because many Asian countries share a colonial history and post-colonial authoritarianism, media liberalization has been indeed isolated from the entrenchment of civil-society organizations and mass political parties by state intervention and proactive subsidies. According to Huntington's (1996) indigenization thesis, in addition, East Asia is a region with an enduring power for the sorts of traditional values that keep media liberalization away from civic culture. Given such a path-dependent nature of media development in the Asian countries, therefore, some may argue that their media systems are irrelevant to the structure of political opportunities for mobilization.

Accordingly, interpretation of the results should be undertaken with caution, because newspaper-market structures provide only a partial picture of Asian media systems. The relative

underdevelopment of professional journalism, as well as the persistent state intervention in media operations, shed light on meaningful dimensions for a better appraisal of opportunity structures for mobilization of political communication systems in the digital age. For instance, even though strong media-party parallelism characterizes the European Polarized Pluralist Model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b; van Kempen, 2007), media partisanship is observed in many Asian countries. In the same vein, McCargo (2012) argue that the Southeast Asian media systems offer the dimension of parallelism to consider whether "journalists are often engaged in relatively mechanical news-gathering activities that serve the interests of the adjacent power holder" (p. 216).

Last but not least, the validity of operationalization of newspaper-centrism could be undermined insofar as average television viewing was not included in this analysis because of a lack of reliable data. Advertising expenditures in the media market, as well as newspaper circulation, do not tell the whole story about a newspaper-reading culture, which should be situated within historical and cultural contexts. These limitations should be taken into careful consideration in further research on the existing media circumstances in Asia and their effects on a change in democratic culture.

Notwithstanding the skepticism about Asian media power, this chapter demonstrates that mass-media structures, particularly national newspaper-circulation numbers, provide constraints on the mechanism of mobilization of political participation in the new information environment. The traditional media system is involved in the formation of opportunity structures for internet diffusion to reduce the transaction costs of communication and coordination among people who are organized around common interests. In this sense, media systems are political institutions by which mobilization of large-scale collective action is incentivized or constrained. The contextual

understanding of mass-media structures is therefore essential to analyze the opportunity structure for digitally mediated political participation.

6.7 Conclusion

In many Southeast Asian countries, the news organizations have long been criticized for creating and maintaining a strong collusion between media owners (as well as journalists) and political authorities. For instance, because of the media moguls' resistance to diversification policies, given the concentrated ownership, Indonesia is still struggling "with the maintenance of a diversity of public voices" (Hanitzsch & Hidayat, 2012, p. 37). Among Filipinos, the popularity of commercial entertainment on television has hampered the development of newspapers as a credible source of citizen involvement in public life (Pertierra, 2012). Despite the liberalized media market to some extent, the Malaysian media system has been accompanied by strict restrictions on the press as well as a highly concentrated ownership structure in collusion with the state (Seneviratne, 2007).

In this dissertation, I argue that the internet serves as a mobilizing structure for individual citizens to participate in political activism that is unconventional and aims at challenging the status quo. This alternative pathway to political participation may transcend traditional structures within which disaffected individuals are connected and organized around shared concerns. Such an influence of internet use is manifested by the mobilization of political communication systems that facilitate participatory behaviors across East and Southeast Asian countries. In this sense, digitally mediated political participation has a particular democratic impact in the Asian context, which has a deficiency in the entrenchment of civil-society organizations and journalism institutions that facilitate people to overcome Olson's dilemma of collective action.

Nevertheless, the Asian media systems are not extraneous to the opportunity structure for digitally mediated political participation, nor are they subsumed under regime types. Rather, mass-media structures have significant effects on incentives and constraints at work in the mechanism through which internet use manifests its mobilizing capacity. Accordingly, the Asian countries under study are classified by high and low development of the mass-circulation press in each of regime types: authoritarian regimes, ambiguous regimes, poor democracies, and wealthy democracies. This simple categorization appears in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5. Categorization of Opportunity Structures in East and Southeast Asia

		Regime Types			
		Authoritarian Regimes	Ambiguous Regimes	Poor Democracies	Wealthy Democracies
Development of mass-circulation press	High	Vietnam	Thailand	The Philippines	South Korea
	Low	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia	Taiwan

Source: Author's categorization based on analysis of regime types and media systems in East and Southeast Asia during the periods: mid-2000s and early 2010s.

To be sure, the table oversimplifies the opportunity structure in many ways, insofar as between-country variation exists in political constraints within the same regime type. Nevertheless, the categorization is useful for understanding why the mobilizing capacity of digital network connectivity is manifested differently in Asian countries with a comparable degree to which democratic institutions are consolidated and functioning. Simply put, people have different opportunities for digitally mediated political participation in relation to their mass-media structures. When the media system lowers costs of political information, technology diffusion facilitates opportunities for this new media channel where people scrutinize, evaluate,

and take action on civic and political cues. When the media system increases information costs, by contrast, individuals' ability and motivation become influential in processing media use into political learning, deliberation, and participation. In this context, although online civil society motivates and mobilizes disaffected segments of society, digitally mediated political participation is constrained by traditional structures of public communication.

Chapter 7. CONCLUSION

This dissertation makes two notable contributions to our understanding of media and democracy. First, my analysis of large-scale survey data in eight East and Southeast Asian countries reveals that their media systems matter for contemporary political participation. Previously, the attention of media systems scholars was mostly concentrated on Western societies, with regard to how their information environments shape the way people are informed about and involved in public life. Asian countries, however, have been relatively ignored by the media studies literature, which has seemingly presumed the dominance of state control in society. Only a few recent studies have begun to take into consideration the importance of media environments in the context of Asian politics (Kwak, 2012; McCargo, 2012). Nevertheless, this line of research has been limited in explicating how Asian media systems affect the mechanism of political participation in the digital age. My study of the eight Asian countries sheds light on the impact of media systems on the cost structure of internet users' involvement in unconventional political acts.

Another contribution of this work is adding to the development literature by identifying the democratic impact of internet diffusion. I argue that the technology acts as a mobilizing structure for people to engage in the emerging form of political participation among developing countries in Southeast Asia. Particularly, my analysis of large-scale survey data shows that internet users participate in protests even when they lack formal organizational membership. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that internet diffusion causes greater political participation. The diffusion of internet use, instead, facilitates post-industrial trends in political participation, so that contemporary activism mobilizes individual participation in a way that might not be possible otherwise. Personalization of politics and transnationally networked advocacy are the

manifestations of underlying social change observed in Western post-industrial democracies, which provide isolated individuals with an unconventional pathway to public life. Internet diffusion mediates such new mechanisms of micro-mobilization in Asian developing countries.

In the introduction of this dissertation, I raised the questions of whether, and if so how, internet use could provide a mobilizing structure for political participation among people living in East and Southeast Asia. I believe I have shown that it has. Indeed, through internet diffusion individuated publics have new pathways to mobilization of collective action for a social or political cause. In Chapter 2, digitally mediated political participation is conceptualized with as regard to the Asian local contexts in which internet use mediates the personalization of politics and transnational activism. Such mobilizing capacities of the technology are further theorized to cut across different conditions of institutional constraints on the agents of collective organizing in the regions. From this perspective, this dissertation demonstrates that the “Asian internet” serves as a mobilizing structure for citizen participation that is generalizable beyond a regional or national setting of institutions and traditions.

In Chapter 3, I investigated the regime types and media systems of the eight Asian countries that provide political opportunities for, as well as institutional constraints on, the mobilization. Such structural conditions are indeed influential on the mechanism by which individuals calculate the costs and benefits of participating in collective action. In particular, the comparative study found that civil-society development in East and Southeast Asia has struggled with challenges of path-dependent resistance to change not only in authoritarian regimes but also in democracies. Effective governance and deep legitimacy have enabled strong states in the Asian countries to restrict civil associations from the mass mobilization of demands for democracy. Democratization in Southeast Asia did not lead to the institutionalization of citizen

voice in governance, because corruption and social instability limit structural opportunities for political participation in such weak states.

But more importantly, the media systems, not simply regime types, are more important to understanding contemporary political participation. Especially, the mass-mediated structure of public communication matters beyond regime type in that the opposition and civil society have different costs of overcoming traditional media by using the internet. In democracies, digitally networked activism becomes less distinguishable by the wide reach of the mass media that reflect political cleavages. In authoritarian regimes, the development of mass communication enables state intervention to occur in all aspects of social associations and marginalize dissidents. By doing so, media systems affect the level of incentives and costs for alternative pathways to political participation among people living in a country. Therefore, the capacity of the internet as a mobilizing structure is manifested to varying extents by individuals within media systems and by the systems themselves.

Of course, the results of my analysis still have to be corroborated, because the data impose some limitations on the formation of concepts and their operationalization. Here, I want to reiterate that the findings are based on my secondary data analysis in which the variables of the model rely on survey items designed with different purposes from my conceptual framework. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, the variable of internet use was repurposed to conceptualize digitally mediated opportunities for social integration. Yet the item measuring the frequency of internet use involves various meanings beyond my assumption about the technology. And my assumption about internet use was not able to be tested using the data. Therefore, caution is required with interpretation because, without employing more carefully designed items to measure different types of activities, the variable of internet use may lack face validity.

Second, the variable of internal political efficacy came from a single item on the degree of agreement to the statement "I think I have the ability to participate in politics." However, this operationalization of self-efficacy was insufficient to measure its concept as "beliefs about one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively, in politics" (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991, p. 1407). To operationalize internal political efficacy, therefore, previous studies included multiple items to measure one's subjective judgment of understanding, confidence, and self-qualification that enable people's beliefs about political effectiveness (Lee, 2006; Morrell, 2003; Moy & Gastil, 2006; Scheufele, 2002). The reason behind this limitation is also related to my analysis of secondary data that provided the single item tapping internal political efficacy in all the countries under study. Therefore, a careful interpretation of efficacious feelings about politics among Asian internet users is needed in future studies.

Third, in studying Asian media systems, I conceptualized the market development of mass-circulation press as a proxy for a political information environment within which costs and opportunities are shaped to hinder the role of internet use in mobilizing individual participation. And the concept of newspaper market structures was measured by circulation rates of national dailies in a given country. But the assumption about mass-market newspapers is not based on rigorous evidence, and its measure may not address my concept of media systems. Indeed, the underdevelopment of mass-market newspapers could indicate the predominance of high-quality journalism serving a small number of informed citizens over tabloid journalism that seeks a wider readership. By contrast, it is also possible that a narrow newspaper market represents strict state control over media-market development. Although both cases witness low penetration rates of newspapers, the opportunity structure for mobilization may differ among countries with widely different media systems.

Bearing the above-mentioned limitations in mind, the results can shed some light on this question: Is my view of digitally mediated political participation in East and Southeast Asia supported by empirical evidence? In this dissertation, the generalizable impact of internet use is examined by pooling individual-level data across eight countries in the regions, gathered in two waves: the mid-2000s and the early 2010s. Using the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data, Chapter 4 shows that frequent internet use is related to greater participation in political action that takes unconventional forms, and the relationship has been consistent in both survey waves. Furthermore, the World Values Survey (WVS) data in Chapter 5 corroborate the generalizable impact of internet use across the Asian countries, despite their different structures of political opportunities. The mobilizing capacities of internet use are manifested by its distinctive role in structures of social integration that enable individual pathways to political participation, especially outside of institutions.

However, the generalizability of the internet's impact on political participation can be questioned insofar as both the ABS and WVS data sets came from countries that are widely different in the mechanism of unconventional political participation. Democratic countries should have much larger windows of opportunity for participation during election periods. If the data were gathered during that time, the political impact of internet use would be contingent on election-period effects. Fortunately, in the Asian democracies under study, the survey data were not gathered within six months before and after their presidential or legislative elections. The only exception was The Philippines, where the ABS data were collected in March 2010. In this poor democracy in Southeast Asia, the general election for the president was held in May of that year with the fast-growing market of online news and social-media campaigns. *Boto Mo Ipatrol Mo* (Patrol your vote) is an example of how digital activism expanded rapidly in the 2010

election period. ABS-CBN, a Filipino television network, drove the campaign to engage people in a Web-based system for observations, resulting in 125,487 fans on Facebook and 23,111 supporters on Twitter during its peak (Tapnio & Rood, 2011).

In non-democratic or ambiguous regimes, the openings of opportunity windows for mobilization are less likely to depend on election-period effects in which elections and institutions are structured to legitimate government authority. But their opportunity structure is still subject to social movements and civic activism that are mobilized to demand government action. For example, Malaysia, categorized as an ambiguous regime in this dissertation, witnessed a large-scale public demonstration in July 2011. *Bersih* (Clean) was a social movement in which nongovernmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks mobilized a mass rally of more than 20,000 protesters demanding electoral reforms. Three months later, the ABS data were gathered in the country. This data-collection period, therefore, could be problematic for the generalizability of the results, so much so that the political crisis may have led to a peculiar picture of technology in the context of citizen mobilization. Future studies should examine whether internet use for politics is contingent on, or goes beyond, such political events or crises.

Will further expansion of digital network connectivity predict greater political participation and, ultimately, democracy in East and Southeast Asia? This relationship would be crucial to the conclusion of my dissertation. Although both ABS and WVS data sets support a positive association between internet use and political action, their nature of a two-wave, cross-sectional survey is not sufficient to test for causality between the variables. Rather, there is a possibility of reverse causality in which the internet manifests its mobilizing capacity only among those who would have performed political action in any case. From this perspective,

internet use mirrors or even reinforces the existing participation gap rather than expands new pathways to public life. Furthermore, technology diffusion is often viewed as increasing state intervention in civil society since the instrument of communication facilitates the interests of the status quo to a much greater extent than those of the marginalized.

But the findings in this dissertation suggest that such a reinforcement thesis is not the case in the Asian context of elite-challenging politics. First, the ABS data support that internet use is not associated with institutionalized forms of political participation that occurs through campaign-related activities or contacting the authorities. Such conventional activities are, instead, a function of structured pathways through social institutions and organizations that echo the existing participation gap. Meanwhile, the technology serves as a mobilizing structure for collective action by those who are isolated from traditional structures. That is to say, internet use enables individuals to perform protest activity without active membership in any formal organization. To be sure, in the context of East and Southeast Asia, unconventional forms of political action are limited to a small segment of the population in the regions. Nevertheless, internet use and the resulting digital network connectivity has been central to the mobilization of protesters, especially for those who are marginalized in structural opportunities for participation.

As discussed, one limitation of this study is the lack of more nuanced measures of online practices with different platforms that involve a variety of gratifications, such as socialization, information seeking, entertainment, life improvement, civic obligation, and political expression. This limitation precludes the analysis of the multidimensionality of internet use to enable various pathways to political participation. Nevertheless, using a generic-use indicator, my findings of the relationship support the hypothesis that technology diffusion per se has become a structural opportunity for civil-society groups to be mobilized in an unprecedented way. To be specific,

more nuanced indicators of internet use should reflect existing gaps in political involvement on the basis of personal resources or motivation for civic or social gratifications (Campbell & Kwak, 2010; Chung & Yoo, 2008; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001). However, as an overarching activity that encompasses such different gratifications, the general indicator estimates the extent to which technology is intrinsically related to structural changes in the mobilization of political participation that especially occurs through elite-challenging activities. Beyond the traditional agents of social integration, frequent internet use provides individuals with distinctive capacities for political participation.

Evidence of mobilization comes further from a comparison between the unconventional and the traditional, differentiated by their pattern of political action using the ABS data. In the mid-2000s with relatively limited internet access, the former group was characterized by having more favorable structural resources and personal motivation for protest participation than the latter group: younger age, higher level of education, organizational membership, frequent political discussion, stronger self-efficacious feeling, and greater dissatisfaction with current political affairs, as well as frequent internet use. But in the early 2010s, when there was a wider diffusion of the internet, the unconventional outperformed the traditional only with regard to political discussion and personal-network size, besides the frequency of internet use. Rather, the former group was less educated and had lower reliance on news institutions than the latter. How could such a gap in protester characteristics happen? What enabled the dissatisfied mobilized for collective action? Although this dissertation does not aim at determining whether internet use is a sufficient cause of the mobilization, it is well demonstrated that internet use is crucial for such individual, unprecedented pathways to grassroots organizing in East and Southeast Asia.

Last, but not least, internet use as a predictor of political participation is supported by the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. Of course, this method is not designed to test any causality between variables from cross-sectional data. It is nonetheless useful in confirming the goodness-of-fit of a theorized model to data, from which structural relationships are estimated. In Chapter 4, internet use as a structural orientation (the first "O") to communication is found to improve the overall fit of the O(orientation)–S(stimulus)–O(orientation)–R(response) model to the data, gathered in the mid-2000s and in the early 2010s. The results also support my postulated indirect pathway to political participation in which the technology enhances the mediating effects of interpersonal discussion and self-efficacious feeling about politics. Accordingly, my dissertation corroborates the role of the internet as a new mobilizing structure in line with empirical work supporting the structure–communication–orientation–involvement sequence (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned evidence of digitally mediated political participation, the capacity of internet use is surrounded by contextual constraints on citizen activism. For instance, the level of democracy influences the structure of political opportunities for the mobilization. As seen in Chapter 5, indeed, authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia provide greater incentives for the disaffected to take advantage of digital network connectivity as an unprecedented structure for external outreach and collective action than for people who live in democracies. This finding lends support to the mobilization of democracy insofar as social media expand distinctive capacities for citizen communication and civic association (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011). But in the meantime, the WVS data shed light on a reinforcement effect of media institutions on digitally networked activism. The Asian countries have widely varying structures of mass communication that affect the costs of dissident information and opportunities for civil

society. When the structural capacity of technology is situated in individuals' use of the mass media, therefore, considerable cross-national variation emerges in its effects on the mobilization.

Indeed, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 should cause some skepticism about digital democracy in the context of East and Southeast Asia. Although technology diffusion enables new mobilizing structures for political participation, its effects are isolated from, or even marginalized by, institutions. That is, internet use does not yield any generalizable structure of access to the conventional field of politics. In the meantime, as a relatively pervasive technology for access, mobile phone use has not brought about any mobilizing effects except for Filipinos. Such a gap in device use supports the digital divide thesis that technology diffusion mirrors existing social inequalities and its benefits work to reinforce the status quo (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Celeste, & Shafer, 2004; van Dijk, 2005). If this were the case, then internet use for politics would have been isolated from the mobilization of ordinary citizens who are disaffected but deprived of access to digital networks.

Furthermore, news institutions yield some controls of mass mobilization. Because of this, digitally networked dissidents are effectively mollified, silenced, or discredited by the influence of mass-mediated communication in the elite-led formation of political discourse and public opinion. As a matter of fact, every state has its own motive for managing collective efforts to challenge the status quo, so that state intervention in digital network connectivity cuts across the level of democracy (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011). The digital divide thesis also suggests that existing power-holders may avoid digitally networked activism because of limited direct access to the internet. Not all determined autocrats are successful in controlling digital networks, though. Lee (2015) found that, when regimes fail to maintain socio-political stability, the diffusion of social media transcends institutional constraints as well as socio-economic

development, and the phenomenon is especially facilitated by digital network connectivity through not only mobile phones but also wireless/shared access in urban areas.

What matters in digitally mediated political participation is thus opportunity structure that incentivizes internet use for the mobilization. This view of opportunity structures draws on Esser at al. (2012) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) inasmuch as media systems provide different incentives and constraints that affect the mechanism through which internet users are mobilized for political action. Indeed, East and Southeast Asia are regions with diverse mass-media structures that are not necessarily subsumed under regime types. In this context, the Asian countries provide digitally connected and politically disaffected citizens with widely varying structures of opportunities to access mobilizing resources between societies. By comparing the countries' mass-media structures given their regime types, therefore, this dissertation corroborates the idea that the internet acts as a mobilizing structure that goes beyond an event-specific means of grassroots organizing and that, simultaneously, is constrained by institutions.

Certainly, as social media emerge and expand into diverse social settings, the "leading" role that media institutions play in political communication has increasingly given way to a "linking" function for personal networks (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Bennett & Manheim, 2006; Castells, 2009). In light of this change, it is not surprising that digitally mediated mobilization is not necessarily dependent on social structures and political institutions that give rise to strong development of civil society. But the Asian context of technology diffusion involves political cultures that somewhat ironically reinforce deep-rooted confidence in media institutions (Lee & Santana, 2015). Therefore, the manifestation of digitally mediated political participation is confronted with the enduring influence of institutions in the formation of public discourse and the mobilization of disaffected citizens.

The mechanism for mobilization of individual citizens through internet use may therefore involve cultural resistance to social change. Many rational-choice theorists focus on the costs and incentives of political action in diverse contexts. But they have been relatively uninterested in cultural factors. In the view of culturalist theorists, nevertheless, mobilization of collective action is subject to the influence of traditional norms in social interactions; as a result, path-dependency emerges in the process by which political participation is incentivized. In particular, deep-rooted normative orientations intervene in the mechanism through which people's cognition, attitude and evaluation brings about different patterns of political participation and its accompanying methods (Eckstein, 1988; McLeod, Sotirovic, & Holbert, 1998; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Even if the internet provided organizing structures that were central to resource mobilization for collective action, individual pathways to the participation for challenging traditional institutions would be therefore constrained by the culture in which people are embedded.

Indeed, people living in the Asian countries are embedded in a context of political cultures that prioritize societal harmony over individual interests and that take a hierarchical relationship with authority for granted (Huntington, 1991; Shi, 2015; Shin, 2012). In this cultural context, the mobilization of networked individuals over hierarchical organizations would also be confronted with traditional value systems acting as social sanctions to the participation. In the same vein, some modernization theorists have paid attention to stagnating citizen participation in protest activities in the regions that controverts a view of development-driven social change in support of personal expression and consumerism, labeled as post-materialism (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). The modernization process may make an exception of the Asian countries in the mechanism by which individual actors transcend the traditional systems of political communication. By the same token, this thesis of digitally mediated political participation

suggests a question: how is the internet as a mobilizing structure constrained by the organization of media institutions in East and Southeast Asia?

In Chapter 6, four discrete factors are derived from a variety of country-level indicators to assess the media systems. I found that strong development of a mass-circulation press moderates the relationship between internet use and political participation. Within such media systems, the opportunity structure provides fewer incentives for, or more constraints on, the mobilizing capacity of internet use. That is, the establishment of mass-media structures facilitates power-holders to intervene in social unrest and generates high costs for civil society to reach out to inform and organize ordinary citizens.

Of course, the mechanism of mass-mediated politics and controls should vary across the regime types that shape and influence media institutions. For example, both Singapore and Taiwan are equipped with opportunity structures that hinder the development of a mass-circulation press. In such a media system, the government has greater costs to isolate digitally networked dissents from the mass citizenry. However, in the former country, media systems act as institutionalized sanctions aimed at facilitating state intervention. In contrast, in the latter country, civil society is not restricted from mediated resources for the mobilization. In this democratic context, rather, existing media pluralism disincentivizes the distinctive capacity of internet diffusion to provide mobilizing structures. Accordingly, the opportunity structure for digitally mediated political participation should be assessed in a comparative view of regime types in which media systems are embedded.

Table 7.1 identifies the important features that explain digitally mediated political participation across eight countries over the whole region. Based on the categorization of regime

types and media systems, I summarize the country-specific opportunity structure for the internet to encourage unconventional political participation.

Table 7.1. Digitally Mediated Political Participation in East and Southeast Asia

	Pluralized Media Systems	
Wealthy Democracies	***South Korea*** Internet use for politics is suppressed by an individual's frequent use of the mass media and the country's high circulation of newspaper.	***Taiwan*** Internet use for politics is suppressed by an individual's frequent use of the mass media but encouraged by the country's low circulation of newspapers.
	Liberalized Media Systems	
Poor Democracies	***The Philippines*** Mobile-phone use for politics is suppressed by an individual's frequent use of the mass media and the country's high circulation of newspapers, but encouraged by the poor economy.	***Indonesia*** Internet use for politics is encouraged by the country's low circulation of newspapers and the poor economy.
	Liberalized Media Systems	**Restrictive Media Systems**
Ambiguous Regimes	***Thailand*** Internet use of politics is suppressed by the country's high circulation of newspapers but encouraged by the ambiguous regime.	***Malaysia*** Internet use of politics is encouraged by the country's low circulation of newspapers and the ambiguous regime.
	Restrictive Media Systems	
Authoritarian Regimes	***Vietnam*** Internet use for politics is suppressed by the country's high circulation of newspapers, but encouraged by the authoritarian regime.	***Singapore*** Internet use of politics is encouraged by the country's low circulation of newspapers and the authoritarian regime.

Source: Author's descriptions based on the findings of the previous chapters.

First, South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia are wealthy democracies with institutional and procedural structures to protect civil liberties and political rights from executive restrictions. Both countries are also comparable in their favorable opportunities for citizen mobilization based on the collective experience of successful democratic transitions and the entrenchment of civil society online and offline. And the political effect of digital media mirrors that of traditional media rather than mobilizing a new venue for public communication. Accordingly, individuals' frequent use of the mass media normalizes the mobilizing capacity of technology.

But the Asian wealthy democracies have different structures of media systems in which mass communication mediates political participation. In particular, Taiwan is characterized by political pluralism in media institutions that lower costs for large-scale collective actions to be mobilized through mediated communication more than in South Korea. Accordingly, the capacity of internet use is facilitated by the polarized media system, which incentivizes mediated access to mobilizing resources. The Korean media system is, however, oriented to a "catch-all-ism" that seeks to cut across socio-political cleavages, so that mediated communication constrains dissent. As news organizations compete for audiences with diverse interests, therefore, media systems dampen partisan politics and mobilization. In the opportunity structure, media use per se is less likely to foster political participation. Rather, the internet capacity depends more on the users' predispositions that mirror existing inequality in the participation among individuals.

Second, poor democracies in Southeast Asia—Indonesia and The Philippines—offer favorable opportunity structures for digitally mediated political participation in the region. In such weak states, especially, the diffusion of affordable technology enables an effective organizing structure for disaffected citizens to demand collectively some accountable functions of governance without strong state intervention. For example, The Philippines is the only country

where mobile-phone use predicts protest participation. With a liberalized political environment, civil-society organizations are also confronted with relatively fewer constraints on grassroots organizing than their regional neighbors are.

However, Indonesia and The Philippines are different in the media systems that influence digitally mediated political participation. In particular, compared with the media outlets in the former country, those in the latter one are large-scale organizations that feature wider circulation of newspapers. This news market prioritizes nonpartisan entertainment more than civic knowledge and political information that hinder their commercially oriented business strategies. This opportunity structure puts more constraints on, rather than incentives for, the mechanism by which Filipino citizens are politically engaged through their media use. By contrast, Indonesian civil society is provided with more incentives to benefit from the internet as an alternative means of reaching out to the mass citizenry because of limited access to traditional media.

Third, as ambiguous regimes in Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Thailand experienced recent political upheavals. And digital network connectivity acted as a mobilizing structure for the opposition and disgruntled citizens to be organized around a shared concern. But at the same time, authoritarian resistance and the underdevelopment of democratic institutions yielded some constraints on the mobilization and, as a result, citizen voices succumbed to the coalition of a few power-holders. Therefore, digitally mediated political participation comes into existence with double-edged effects of the development of the mass-circulation press.

In Thailand, the liberalized media system led to the expansion of newspaper circulation. This growth of mass-media structures equips the power-holders for state controls over political unrest. Indeed, the limited autonomy of journalism keeps news institutions apart from citizen activism. So online dissidents suffer more constraints, as they witness a wider reach of traditional

media to manipulate or marginalize civil-society organizations. On the other hand, the Malay newspaper market is relatively lagging behind. In this context, the distinctive capacity of internet use is manifested in political communication systems to a greater extent when the traditional media system is challenged by a significant democratizing force. That is, in opposition to elite-oriented media, elite-challenging politics takes place more frequently through the new means of citizen communication and grassroots organizing in the age of democratization.

Lastly, Singapore and Vietnam are authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia that arrange their media systems in favor of their ruling party. Also, the governments organized social and political institutions to their own advantage. Given such hegemonic control of the media, dissident groups and civil-society organizations have been restricted from access to mobilizing resources for collective action. This regime condition incentivizes protesters to take advantage of digital network connectivity as a new structure to access and generate social-capital resources. As a result, internet diffusion poses a serious challenge to the authoritarian regimes that intervene in all facets of political life through severe restrictions on freedom of information flows and political association.

But the media systems in the authoritarian regimes require different costs to discourage internet users from acting on elite-challenging politics. When the state lacks in mass-media structures that cut across social divisions, it costs more to dissuade and silence dissent. Singapore is the case that digitally mediated political participation is encouraged by the country's low circulation of national newspapers. By contrast, the development of the mass-circulation press in Vietnam adds to structural constraints on online civil society because autocrats benefit from institutionalized news outlets that serve diverse audiences in mollifying social unrest. Hence,

compared with Singapore, Vietnam provides less favorable opportunities for the internet to provide new pathways to political participation for a collective cause.

In East and Southeast Asia, internet diffusion might have an impact on transaction costs for individual citizens to be organized around a civic or political cause. The technology has been important especially in unconventional political participation among those who are isolated from traditional structures of mobilization. To be sure, pre-existing opportunity structures matter to the mechanism through which internet use enhances the participation. At the individual level, personal resources and motivation encourage internet use for politics. At the country level, the consolidation of democracy and its effective functioning disincentivize the mobilizing capacity of technology. But these factors do not tell the whole story about the opportunity structure. A comparison of media systems adds to a better understanding of how digital democracy is shaped and constrained by the traditional ways in which individuals relate to public life. Mass-media structures are therefore the institutions that moderate the democratic impact of internet diffusion.

This dissertation adds to the understanding of unconventional mobilization in which isolated individuals, especially youth, engage in direct elite-challenging politics rather than relying on institutions and political elites. This post-industrial phenomenon has led scholars to reconceptualize contemporary political participation that goes beyond traditional forms and agents of mobilization (Bennett, 1998; Dalton, 2002). In the eight East and Southeast Asian countries under study, I found that internet use plays a significant role in the mechanism of unconventional mobilization across the regions. That is to say, the internet affects individual participation in protest activity beyond preexisting agents of collective organizing. This finding lends support to the theory of connective action by Bennett and Segerberg (2013) in that the internet connectivity enables development of communication infrastructures as a substitute for

organizational infrastructures within which people are recruited, incentivized, and coordinated for large-scale protests.

Of course, my analysis of large-scale survey data restricts confirmation of the mechanism for unconventional mobilization in support of democracy. The dataset under study neither reveals the context in which political action takes place nor rules out the possibility that the mobilization is actually driven, licensed, organized, or structured by the state, not by civil society or disaffected citizens. Given the self-reported nature of the survey items on protest activities, these items also may not reveal the actual meaning of such behaviors among the respondents. Thus, given unconventional mobilization in the Asian countries, the findings about the relationship between internet use and political participation should be interpreted carefully.

What implications, then, do the caveats suggest for understanding unconventional mobilization in East and Southeast Asia? Internet diffusion may increase the likelihood of mobilization, but its democratic impact on unconventional political participation manifests only under particular conditions. This is the case given the nature of mobilization in media systems that are structured to marginalize citizen voices but maintain state control. Indeed, the Asian regions require a contextual understanding of unconventional mobilization. For example, Inglehart's (1997) theory of modernization and post-materialism is limited in explaining why participating in protest activity has stagnated across the Asian countries that have rapid development and high penetration rates of the mass media. Instead, Weberians may argue that the power of the state is influential in opportunity structures for unconventional mobilization, which hinder individual participation in the context of Asian politics where authoritarian regimes maintain legitimacy.

Rational-choice theories of political participation offer another view of the mechanism for mobilization at the micro level, given the structural variation in personal resources that incentivize the decision to be unconventionally active (Norris, 2002; Opp, 2013; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Higher education might help people perceive more benefits of the action while having greater self-efficacy and knowledge to reduce the costs of individual participation. Socio-economic inequalities can also generate individuals' differences in having incentives to challenge the status quo. Nevertheless, neither the ABS nor the WVS data suggest that socio-economic status predicts individual participation consistently. When institutional infrastructures such as the mass-media system are organized to increase costs of elite-challenging politics, individual-level variation in personal resources for the participation diminishes.

Social-movement theory may help fill the gap in such macro-level or micro-level explanations of unconventional mobilization. From a meso-level perspective, the agency of mobilization belongs to social-movement organizations rather than isolated individuals who calculate the costs and benefits of their action (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2012; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2009). In the same vein, both ABS and WVS data show that membership in formal voluntary organizations increases participation in unconventional political acts. This finding suggests that people with organizational ties to activism have more opportunities to be recruited and incentivized for protest activities. Such organizations are a key source of reducing the costs and increasing the perceived benefits of political participation. The mechanism of unconventional mobilization can be thus understood in this context within which people have organizational infrastructures to form collective identities, identify shared concerns, apply action frames, and enable coalition brokerage (Bimber et al., 2012; McAdam et al., 2009).

But participation in the digital age does not always require such traditional meso-level models of political activism. Rather, the underlying dynamics of unconventional mobilization are not subsumed under social-movement theory that explains traditional organization-driven protest mobilization. Alternatively, the data suggest micro-mobilization of individual participation in the action without formal organizational membership. In this process, the technology affords an organizational infrastructure for individuals to have structural ties to activism that incentivizes their participation. For the mechanism of unconventional mobilization to take place, therefore, internet use should afford involvement in organizing without formal organizations.

Social media do provide such organizing capacities for individual internet users to mobilize around shared concerns and identities in restrictive political systems (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011). Under such conditions of structural ties to digitally networked activism, the internet affects individual participation. But in media systems where institutions dominate communication processes, individual citizens have more constraints on unconventional mobilization. Formal organizations, including those at odds with the interests of civil society, are instead incentivized to co-opt digitally networked activism that manipulates disaffected but isolated individuals. This phenomenon may be the case insofar as many Asian countries suffer a lack of institutional infrastructures for civil-society entrenchment. Although internet diffusion reduces organizing costs to an unprecedented extent, it is thus not necessarily supportive of individual participation in elite-challenging politics. Rather, it can be used to reinforce formal organizational structures in the restrictive political environment. It is still unsettled whether internet use for politics facilitates individual participation in truly “unconventional” mobilization.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aalberg, T., & Curran, J. (2012). *How media inform democracy: A comparative approach*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Aalberg, T., van Aelst, P., & Curran, J. (2010). Media systems and the political information environment: A cross-national comparison. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *15*(3), 255–271. http://doi.org/10.1177/1940161210367422

Abbott, J. (Ed.). (2004). *The political economy of the internet in Asia and the Pacific: Digital divides, economic competitiveness, and security challenges*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Abbott, J. (2012). Democracy@internet.org revisited: Analysing the socio-political impact of the internet and new social media in East Asia. *Third World Quarterly*, *33*(2), 333–357. http://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.666015

Abbott, J. (2015). Hype or hubris? The political impact of the internet and social networking in Southeast Asia. In W. Case (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of Southeast Asian democratization* (pp. 201–222). New York, NY: Routledge.

Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J., & Freelon, D. (2012). Blogs and bullets II: New media and conflict after the Arab Spring. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW80.pdf

American Association for Public Opinion Research. (2006). *Standard definitions: Final dispositions of case codes and outcome rates for surveys* (4th ed.). Lenexa, KS: Author.

Anduiza, E., Cantijoch, M., & Gallego, A. (2009). Political participation and the internet: A field essay. *Information, Communication & Society*, *12*(6), 860–878. http://doi.org/10.1080/13691180802282720

Aspinall, E. (2010). The irony of success. *Journal of Democracy*, *21*(2), 20–34. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0157

Baek, M. (2009). A comparative analysis of political communication systems and voter turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, *53*(2), 376–393. http://doi.org/10.2307/25548124

Bakker, T. P., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). Good news for the future? Young people, internet use, and political participation. *Communication Research*, *38*(4), 451–470. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650210381738

Ball-Rokeach, S. J., & DeFleur, M. L. (1976). A dependency model of mass-media effects. *Communication Research*, *3*(1), 3–21. http://doi.org/10.1177/009365027600300101

Barnes, S. H., & Kaase, M. (1979). *Political action: Mass participation in five Western democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2014). Fitting linear mixed-effects models using lme4. *arXiv Preprint arXiv:1406.5823*.

Becker, L. B., & Whitney, D. C. (1980). Effects of media dependencies: Audience assessment of government. *Communication Research*, *7*(1), 95–120. http://doi.org/10.1177/009365028000700105

Benkler, Y. (2006). *The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bennett, W. L. (1998). The uncivic culture: Communication, identity, and the rise of lifestyle politics. *P.S.: Political Science and Politics*, *31*(4), 740–761. http://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096500053270

Bennett, W. L. (2005). Social movements beyond borders: Organizations, communication, and political capacity in two eras of transnational activism. In D. della Porta & S. G. Tarrow

(Eds.), *Transnational protest and global activism* (pp. 203–226). New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bennett, W. L., & Iyengar, S. (2008). A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations of political communication. *Journal of Communication*, *58*(4), 707–731. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00410.x

Bennett, W. L., & Manheim, J. B. (2006). The one-step flow of communication. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *608*(1), 213–232. http://doi.org/10.1177/0002716206292266

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2013). *The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Freelon, D. (2011). Communicating civic engagement: Contrasting models of citizenship in the youth web sphere. *Journal of Communication*, *61*(5), 835–856. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01588.x

Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Rank, A. (2009). Young citizens and civic learning: Two paradigms of citizenship in the digital age. *Citizenship Studies*, *13*(2), 105–120. http://doi.org/10.1080/13621020902731116

Benson, R. (2006). News media as a "journalistic field": What Bourdieu adds to new institutionalism, and vice versa. *Political Communication*, *23*(2), 187–202. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600600629802

Bimber, B. A. (2003). *Information and American democracy: Technology in the evolution of political power*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bimber, B. A., Flanagin, A. J., & Stohl, C. (2005). Reconceptualizing collective action in the contemporary media environment. *Communication Theory*, *15*(4), 365–388. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2005.tb00340.x

Bimber, B. A., Flanagin, A. J., & Stohl, C. (2012). *Collective action in organizations: Interaction and engagement in an era of technological change*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bimber, B., Stohl, C., & Flanagin, A. J. (2009). Technological change and the shifting nature of political organization. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of internet politics* (pp. 72–85). New York, NY: Routledge.

Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (Eds.). (1999). *Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bollen, K. A. (1989). *Structural equation models with latent variables*. New York, NY: Wiley.

Boulianne, S. (2009). Does internet use affect engagement? A meta-analysis of research. *Political Communication*, *26*(2), 193–211. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600902854363

Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review*, *89*(2), 271–294. http://doi.org/10.2307/2082425

Brown, F. Z. (1998). Vietnam's tentative transformation. In L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (pp. 184–198). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Calhoun, C. (1988). Populist politics, communications media and large scale societal integration. *Sociological Theory*, *6*(2), 219–241. http://doi.org/10.2307/202117

Campbell, S. W., & Kwak, N. (2010). Mobile communication and civic life: Linking patterns of use to civic and political engagement. *Journal of Communication*, *60*(3), 536–555. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01496.x

Case, W. (2015). *Routledge handbook of Southeast Asian democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. *International Journal of Communication*, *1*, 238–266.

Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *616*(1), 78–93. http://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311877

Castells, M. (2009). *Communication power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Castells, M. (2012). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age*. Malden, MA: Polity.

Castells, M., Fernández-Ardèvol, M., Qiu, J. L., & Sey, A. (2007). *Mobile communication and society: A global perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/id/10173576

Chaffee, S., & Frank, S. (1996). How Americans get political Information: Print versus broadcast news. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *546*, 48–58. http://doi.org/10.2307/1048169

Chang, A., Chu, Y., & Welsh, B. (2013). Southeast Asia: Sources of regime support. *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(2), 150–164. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0025

Chang, Y., Chu, Y., & Huang, M. (2006). The uneven growth of democratic legitimacy in East Asia. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *18*(2), 246–255.

Chang, Y., Zhu, Y., & Park, C. (2007). Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. *Journal of Democracy*, *18*(3), 66–80. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2007.0043

Cho, J., Shah, D. V., McLeod, J. M., McLeod, D. M., Scholl, R. M., & Gotlieb, M. R. (2009). Campaigns, reflection, and deliberation: Advancing an O-S-R-O-R model of communication effects. *Communication Theory*, *19*(1), 66–88. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.01333.x

Chung, D. S., & Yoo, C. Y. (2008). Audience motivations for using interactive features: Distinguishing use of different types of interactivity on an online newspaper. *Mass Communication and Society*, *11*(4), 375–397. http://doi.org/10.1080/15205430701791048

Cohen, A., Vigoda, E., & Samorly, A. (2001). Analysis of the mediating effect of personal-psychological variables on the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation: A structural equations framework. *Political Psychology*, *22*(4), 727–757. http://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00260

Collins, L. M., & Lanza, S. T. (2010). *Latent class and latent transition analysis: With applications in the social behavioral, and health sciences*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Cook, T. E. (1998). *Governing with the news: The news media as a political institution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Coronel, S. S. (2002, June 15). New media played a role in the people's uprising. Retrieved November 3, 2013, from http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101372/New-Media-Played-a-Role-in-the-Peoples-Uprising.aspx

Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Lund, A. B., & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media system, public knowledge and democracy: A comparative study. *European Journal of Communication*, *24*(1), 5–26. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323108098943

Dahlgren, P. (2000). The internet and the democratization of civic culture. *Political Communication*, *17*(4), 335–340. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600050178933

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1997). Development and democratic culture. In L. J. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu, & H. Tien (Eds.), *Consolidating the third wave democracies: Regional challenges* (pp. 34–39). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2002). *Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies*. Congressional Quarterly Press.

Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (2000). *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Deibert, R., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (Eds.). (2008). *Access denied: The practice and policy of global internet filtering*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved from http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid=26545

Deibert, R., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (Eds.). (2010). *Access controlled: The shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Deibert, R., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (Eds.). (2012). *Access contested: Security, identity, and resistance in Asian cyberspace information revolution and global politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Deibert, R., & Rohozinski, R. (2012). Contesting cyberspace and the coming crisis of authority. In R. Deibert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski, & J. Zittrain (Eds.), *Access contested: Security, identity, and resistance in Asian cyberspace information revolution and global politics* (pp. 21–42). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

della Porta, D., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.). (2005). *Transnational protest and global activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Delli Carpini, M. X. (2004). Mediating democratic engagement: The impact of communications on citizens' involvement in political and civic life. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *Handbook of political communication research* (pp. 357–394). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dewey, T., Kaden, J., Marks, M., Matsushima, S., & Zhu, B. (2012). *The impact of social media on social unrest in the Arab Spring*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Retrieved from https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf

Diamond, L. (1994). Rethinking civil society: Toward democratic consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, *5*(3), 4–17. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0041

Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, *13*(2), 21–35. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025

Diamond, L. (2010). Liberation technology. *Journal of Democracy*, *21*(3), 69–83. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0190

Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., & Lipset, S. M. (Eds.). (1990). *Politics in developing countries: Comparing experiences with democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. F. (Eds.). (1998). *Democracy in East Asia*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

DiMaggio, P., Hargittai, E., Celeste, C., & Shafer, S. (2004). Digital inequality: From unequal access to differentiated use. In K. M. Neckerman (Ed.), *Social inequality* (pp. 355–400). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

DiMaggio, P., Hargittai, E., Neuman, W. R., & Robinson, J. P. (2001). Social implications of the internet. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *27*, 307–336. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.307

Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York, NY: Harper.

Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). *Digitally enabled social change: Activism in the internet age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Eckstein, H. (1988). A culturalist theory of political change. *The American Political Science Review*, *82*(3), 789–804. http://doi.org/10.2307/1962491

Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook "friends:" Social capital and college students' use of online social network sites. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *12*(4), 1143–1168. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00367.x

Elvestad, E., & Blekesaune, A. (2008). Newspaper readers in Europe: A multilevel study of individual and national differences. *European Journal of Communication*, *23*(4), 425–447. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323108096993

Emmerson, D. K. (1999). A tale of three countries. *Journal of Democracy*, *10*(4), 35–53.

Emmerson, D. K. (2012). Minding the gap between democracy and governance. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(2), 62–73. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0030

Esser, F., de Vreese, C. H., Strömbäck, J., van Aelst, P., Aalberg, T., Stanyer, J., … Papathanassopoulos, S. (2012). Political information opportunities in Europe: A

longitudinal and comparative study of thirteen television systems. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *17*(3), 247–274. http://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212442956

Evans, P. B. (1995). *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Eveland, W. P., & Hively, M. H. (2009). Political discussion frequency, network size, and "heterogeneity" of discussion as predictors of political knowledge and participation. *Journal of Communication*, *59*(2), 205–224. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01412.x

Eveland, W. P. J. (2004). The effect of political discussion in producing informed citizens: The roles of information, motivation, and elaboration. *Political Communication*, *21*(2), 177–193. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600490443877

Eveland, W. P. J., Hayes, A. F., Shah, D. V., & Kwak, N. (2005). Understanding the relationship between communication and political knowledge: A model comparison approach using panel data. *Political Communication*, *22*(4), 423–446. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600500311345

Eveland, W. P. J., & Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Connecting news media use with gaps in knowledge and participation. *Political Communication*, *17*(3), 215–237. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846000414250

Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: Implications for the study of citizenship and culture. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *23*(2), 189–222. http://doi.org/10.1080/014198700329024

Ford, M. (2013). *Social activism in Southeast Asia*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Freedom House. (2013a). Freedom of the press. Retrieved November 22, 2013, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press

Freedom House. (2013b). Freedom on the Net. Retrieved November 22, 2013, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-net

Fukuyama, F. (1997). The illusion of exceptionalism. *Journal of Democracy*, *8*(3), 146–149.

Fukuyama, F., & Marwah, S. (2000). Dimensions of development. *Journal of Democracy*, *11*(4), 80–94. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0076

Gainous, J., Wagner, K., & Abbott, J. (2015). Civic disobedience: Does internet use stimulate political unrest in East Asia? *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *12*(2), 219–236. http://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2015.1034909

Gainsborough, M. (2012). Elites vs. reform in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(2), 34–46. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0024

Gans, H. J. (2004). *Democracy and the news*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Garrett, R. K. (2006). Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs. *Information, Communication & Society*, *9*(2), 202–224. http://doi.org/10.1080/13691180600630773

Garrett, R. K., Bimber, B., Gil de Zúñiga, H., Heinderyckx, F., Kelly, J., & Smith, M. (2012). New ICTs and the study of political communication. *International Journal of Communication*, *6*, 214–231.

Geertz, C. (1973). *Religion as a cultural system: The interpretation of culture*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

George, C. (2003). The internet and the narrow tailoring dilemma for “Asian” democracies. *The Communication Review*, *6*(3), 247–268. http://doi.org/10.1080/10714420390226270

George, C. (2006). *Contentious journalism and the internet: Toward democratic discourse in Malaysia and Singapore*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

George, C. (2010). Networked autocracy: Consolidating Singapore's political system. In M. C. Anthony (Ed.), *Political change, democratic transitions and security in Southeast Asia* (pp. 124–137). New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=465446

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *17*(3), 319–336. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x

Gil de Zúñiga, H., & Valenzuela, S. (2011). The mediating path to a stronger citizenship: Online and offline networks, weak ties, and civic engagement. *Communication Research*, *38*(3), 397–421. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650210384984

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Veenstra, A., Vraga, E., & Shah, D. (2010). Digital democracy: Reimagining pathways to political participation. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *7*(1), 36–51. http://doi.org/10.1080/19331680903316742

Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1360–1380.

Groshek, J. (2011). Media, instability, and democracy: Examining the granger-causal relationships of 122 countries from 1946 to 2003. *Journal of Communication*, *61*(6), 1161–1182. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01594.x

Guan, L. H., & Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2009). Political transition in Malaysia: The future of Malaysia's hybrid political regime. In M. C. Anthony (Ed.), *Political change, democratic*

transitions and security in Southeast Asia (pp. 97–123). New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=465446

Gunther, R., & Mughan, A. (2000). *Democracy and the media: A comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Guo, Z., & Moy, P. (1998). Medium or message? Predicting dimensions of political sophistication. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *10*(1), 25–50. http://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/10.1.25

Gurevitch, M., & Blumler, J. G. (2004). State of the art of comparative political communication research: Poised for maturity? In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), *Comparing political communication: Theories, cases, and challenges* (pp. 325–343). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Habermas, J. (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.

Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. *Communication Theory*, *16*(4), 411–426. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00280.x

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004a). Americanization, globalization, and secularization: Understanding the convergence of media systems and political communication. In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), *Comparing political communication: Theories, cases, and challenges* (pp. 25–44). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004b). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2012). *Comparing media systems beyond the Western world*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hanitzsch, T. (2005). Journalists in Indonesia: Educated but timid watchdogs. *Journalism Studies*, *6*(4), 493–508. http://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500250396

Hanitzsch, T., & Hidayat, D. N. (2012). Journalists in Indonesia. In D. H. Weaver & L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist in the 21st century* (pp. 36–51). New York, NY: Routledge.

Hardy, B. W., & Scheufele, D. A. (2005). Examining differential gains from internet use: Comparing the moderating role of talk and online interactions. *Journal of Communication*, *55*(1), 71–84. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2005.tb02659.x

Hargittai, E., & Hsieh, Y. P. (2013). Digital inequality. In W. H. Dutton (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of internet studies* (pp. 129–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hargittai, E., & Walejko, G. (2008). The participation divide: Content creation and sharing in the digital age. *Information, Communication & Society*, *11*(2), 239–256. http://doi.org/10.1080/13691180801946150

Holbert, R. L. (2005). Intramedia mediation: The cumulative and complementary effects of news media use. *Political Communication*, *22*(4), 447–461. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600500311378

Holtz-Bacha, C., & Norris, P. (2001). "To entertain, inform, and educate": Still the role of public television. *Political Communication*, *18*(2), 123–140. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846001750322943

Hong, J. (1999). Globalization and change in Taiwan's media: The interplay of political and economic forces. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *9*(2), 39–59. http://doi.org/10.1080/01292989909359624

Hong, J., & Hsu, Y.-C. (1999). Asian NICs' broadcast media in the era of globalization: The trend of commercialization and its impact, implications and limits. *International Communication Gazette*, *61*(3 & 4), 225–242. http://doi.org/10.1177/0016549299061003003

Howard, P. N. (2005). Deep democracy, thin citizenship: The impact of digital media in political campaign strategy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *597*(1), 153–170. http://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204270139

Howard, P. N. (2010). *The digital origins of dictatorship and democracy: Information technology and political Islam*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Howard, P. N. (2015). *Pax technica: How the internet of things may set us free or lock us up*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Howard, P. N., Anderson, K., Busch, L., & Nafus, D. (2009). Sizing up information societies: Toward a better metric for the cultures of ICT adoption. *The Information Society*, *25*(3), 208–219. http://doi.org/10.1080/01972240902848948

Howard, P. N., Agarwal, S. D., & Hussain, M. M. (2011). When do states disconnect their digital networks? Regime responses to the political uses of social media. *The Communication Review*, *14*(3), 216–232. http://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2011.597254

Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2013). *Democracy's fourth wave? Digital media and the Arab Spring*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hox, J. J. (2010). *Multilevel analysis techniques and applications*. New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=574571

Hsieh, J. F. (2005). Ethnicity, national identity, and domestic politics in Taiwan. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *40*(1-2), 13–28. http://doi.org/10.1177/0021909605052936

Hughes, C. (2005). Introduction: Democratization and communication in the Asia-Pacific region. *Pacific Affairs*, *78*(1), 9–22. http://doi.org/10.2307/40023438

Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, *6*(1), 1–55. http://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, *2*(2), 12–34.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Hussain, M. M., & Howard, P. N. (2013). What best explains successful protest cascades? ICTs and the fuzzy causes of the Arab Spring. *International Studies Review*, *15*(1), 48–66. http://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12020

Igarashi, T., Kashima, Y., Kashima, E. S., Farsides, T., Kim, U., Strack, F., … Yuki, M. (2008). Culture, trust, and social networks. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *11*(1), 88–101. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2007.00246.x

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Catterberg, G. (2002). Trends in political action: The developmental trend and the post-honeymoon decline. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *43*(3-5), 300–316. http://doi.org/10.1177/002071520204300305

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2009). How development leads to democracy: What we know about modernization. *Foreign Affairs*, *88*(2), 33–48.

Jackman, R. W. (1987). Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial democracies. *American Political Science Review*, *81*(2), 405–423. http://doi.org/10.2307/1961959

Jennings, M. K., & van Deth, J. W. (1989). *Continuities in political action: A longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies*. New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter.

Joyce, M. (2007). *The citizen journalism web site "Ohmynews" and the 2002 South Korean presidential election*. Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007-15. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1077920 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1077920

Jung, N., Kim, Y., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2011). The mediating role of knowledge and efficacy in the effects of communication on political participation. *Mass Communication and Society*, *14*(4), 407–430. http://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2010.496135

Kang, N., & Kwak, N. (2003). A multilevel approach to civic participation: Individual length of residence, neighborhood residential stability, and their interactive effects with media use. *Communication Research*, *30*(1), 80–106. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650202239028

Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). *Personal influence: The part played by people in the flow of mass communications*. New York: Free Press.

Kausikan, B. (1998). The "Asian values" debate: A view from Singapore. In L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (pp. 17–27). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kenski, K., & Stroud, N. J. (2006). Connections between internet use and political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *50*(2), 173–192. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_1

Kim, B.-K. (1998). Korea's crisis of success. In L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (pp. 113–132). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kim, D., & Johnson, T. J. (2006). A victory of the internet over mass media? Examining the effects of online media on political attitudes in South Korea. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *16*(1), 1–18. http://doi.org/10.1080/01292980500467251

Kim, J. (2014). The networked public, multitentacled participation, and collaborative expertise: US beef and the Korean candlelight protest. *East Asian Science, Technology and Society*, *8*(2), 229–252. http://doi.org/10.1215/18752160-2650927

Kim, J., Wyatt, R. O., & Katz, E. (1999). News, talk, opinion, participation: The part played by conversation in deliberative democracy. *Political Communication*, *16*(4), 361–385. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198541

Kim, S.-H. (2007). Media use, social capital, and civic participation in South Korea. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *84*(3), 477–494. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769900708400305

Kim, Y. M. (2009). Issue publics in the new information environment. *Communication Research*, *36*(2), 254–284. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650208330253

Kline, R. B. (2005). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Kraut R., Patterson M., Lundmark V., Kiesler S., Mukopadhyay T., & Scherlis W. (1998). Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social involvement and psychological well-being? *The American Psychologist*, *53*(9), 1017–31. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.53.9.1017

Kwak, K.-S. (2005). Democratization and changing state-media relations in South Korea. In A. R. Romano & M. Bromley (Eds.), *Journalism and Democracy in Asia* (pp. 123–134). New York, NY: Routledge.

Kwak, K.-S. (2012). *Media and democratic transition in South Korea*. New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://www.myilibrary.com?id=383387

Kwak, N., Shah, D. V., & Holbert, R. L. (2004). Connecting, trusting, and participating: The direct and interactive effects of social associations. *Political Research Quarterly*, *57*(4), 643–652. http://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700412

Kwak, N., Williams, A. E., Wang, X., & Lee, H. (2005). Talking politics and engaging politics: An examination of the interactive relationships between structural features of political talk and discussion engagement. *Communication Research*, *32*(1), 87–111. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650204271400

Lai, C.-H. (2011). A multifaceted perspective on blogs and society. *Journal of International Communication*, *17*(1), 51–72. http://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2011.559156

Lake, R. L. D., & Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Social capital, social networks, and political participation. *Political Psychology*, *19*(3), 567–584. http://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00118

Laksmi, S., & Haryanto, I. (2007). Indonesia: Alternative media enjoying a fresh breeze. In K. Seneviratne (Ed.), *Media pluralism in Asia: The role & impact of alternative media* (pp. 53–85). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University.

Lam, O. (2014, October 6). The invisible violence of cyber war in Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution. Retrieved from http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/10/06/the-invisible-violence-of-cyber-war-in-hong-kongs-umbrella-revolution/

Lasorsa, D. L., Lewis, S. C., & Holton, A. E. (2012). Normalizing Twitter: Journalism practice in an emerging communication space. *Journalism Studies*, *13*(1), 19–36. http://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2011.571825

Lee, S. H. (2015). Can regimes really discourage social networking? Urbanization, mobile phone use, and the dictator's plight. *First Monday*, *20*(5). http://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i5.5420

Lee, S. H., & Santana, L. (2015). *Does digital media impact public trust in Asian and South American journalism?* (Tow Center for Digital Journalism No. A Tow/Knight Report 030520151). New York, NY: Columbia University. Retrieved from http://towcenter.org/research/did-digital-media-impact-public-trust-in-asian-south-american-journalism/

Lee, T. (2005). Going online: Journalism and civil society in Singapore. In A. R. Romano & M. Bromley (Eds.), *Journalism and democracy in Asia* (pp. 15–27). New York, NY: Routledge.

Lee, Y.-O. (2009). Internet election 2.0? Culture, institutions, and technology in the Korean Presidential elections of 2002 and 2007. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *6*(3/4), 312–325. http://doi.org/10.1080/19331680903050085

Leighley, J. E. (1990). Social interaction and contextual influences on political participation. *American Politics Research*, *18*(4), 459–475. http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9001800404

Liddle, R. W. (1998). Indonesia: Suharto's tightening grip. In L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (pp. 199–214). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lievrouw, L. A. (2011). *Alternative and activist new media*. Malden, MA: Polity.

Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma. *American Political Science Review*, *91*(1), 1–14. http://doi.org/10.2307/2952255

Linzer, D. A., & Lewis, J. B. (2011). poLCA: An R package for polytomous variable latent class analysis. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *42*(10), 1–29.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lippmann, W. (1965). *Public opinion*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, *53*(1), 69–105. http://doi.org/10.2307/1951731

Livingstone, S., & Asmolov, G. (2010). Networks and the future of foreign affairs reporting. *Journalism Studies*, *11*(5), 745–460. http://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2010.503024

Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D., Pearce, I., & Boyd, D. (2011). The Revolutions were tweeted: Information flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. *International Journal of Communication*, *5*, 1375–1405.

Lo, V.-H. (2012). Journalists in Taiwan. In D. H. Weaver & L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist in the 21st century* (pp. 104–112). New York, NY: Routledge.

Maas, C. J. M., & Hox, J. J. (2005). Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. *Methodology*, *1*(3), 85–91. http://doi.org/10.1027/1614-2241.1.3.85

Marr, D. G. (1998). *Mass media in Vietnam*. Canberra: Australian National University.

Marshall, M. G., & Gurr, T. R. (2014). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2013. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Mathieu, J. E., Aguinis, H., Culpepper, S. A., & Chen, G. (2012). Understanding and estimating the power to detect cross-level interaction effects in multilevel modeling. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *97*(5), 951–966. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0028380

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1996). *Comparative perspectives on social movements*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2009). Comparative perspectives on contentious politics. In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. Zuckerman (Eds.), *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure* (pp. 260–290). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

McCargo, D. (2003). *Media and politics in Pacific Asia*. New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon.

McCargo, D. (2012). Partisan polyvalence: Characterizing the political role of Asian media. In D. C. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Comparing media systems beyond the Western world* (pp. 201–223). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

McLeod, D. M., Kosicki, G. M., & McLeod, J. M. (2002). Resurveying the boundaries of political communication effects. In J. Bryant & D. Zillman (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 238–239). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

McLeod, J. M., Daily, K., Guo, Z., Eveland, W. P., Bayer, J., Yang, S., & Wang, H. (1996). Community integration, local media use, and democratic processes. *Communication Research*, *23*(2), 179–209. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198659

McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., & Moy, P. (1999). Community, communication, and participation: The role of mass media and interpersonal discussion in local political participation. *Political Communication*, *16*(3), 315–336. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198659

McLeod, J. M., Sotirovic, M., & Holbert, R. L. (1998). Values as sociotropic judgments influencing communication patterns. *Communication Research*, *25*(5), 453–485. http://doi.org/10.1177/009365098025005001

Milner, H. V. (2006). The digital divide: The role of political institutions in technology diffusion. *Comparative Political Studies*, *39*(2), 176–199. http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005282983

Morozov, E. (2011). *The net delusion: The dark side of internet freedom*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Morrell, M. E. (2003). Survey and experimental evidence for a reliable and valid measure of internal political efficacy. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *67*(4), 589–602. http://doi.org/10.1086/378965

Moy, P., Bimber, B., Rojecki, A., Xenos, M., & Iyengar, S. (2012). Shifting contours in political communication research. *International Journal of Communication*, *6*, 247–254.

Moy, P., & Gastil, J. (2006). Predicting deliberative conversation: The impact of discussion networks, media use, and political cognitions. *Political Communication*, *23*(4), 443–460. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600600977003

Moy, P., Manosevitch, E., Stamm, K., & Dunsmore, K. (2005a). Linking dimensions of internet use and civic engagement. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *82*(3), 571–586. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769900508200306

Moy, P., Scheufele, D. A., & Holbert, R. L. (1999). Television use and social capital: Testing Putnam's time displacement hypothesis. *Mass Communication and Society*, *2*(1-2), 27–45. http://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.1999.9677860

Moy, P., Torres, M., Tanaka, K., & McCluskey, M. R. (2005b). Knowledge or trust? Investigating linkages between media reliance and participation. *Communication Research*, *32*(1), 59–86. http://doi.org/0.1177/0093650204271399

Mughan, A., & Gunther, R. (2000). The media in democratic and nondemocratic regimes: A multilevel perspective. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and the media: A comparative perspective* (pp. 1–27). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mutz, D. C. (2002). The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, *46*(4), 838–855. http://doi.org/10.2307/3088437

Neuman, W. R. (1991). *The future of the mass audience*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Nielsen. (2011). *Southeast Asian digital consumer habits*. Retrieved from http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2011/south-east-asian-digital-consumer-habits.html

Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. *American Political Science Review*, *85*(04), 1407–1413. http://doi.org/10.2307/1963953

Nie, N. H. (2001). Sociability, interpersonal relations, and the internet: Reconciling conflicting findings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *45*(3), 420–435. http://doi.org/10.1177/00027640121957277

Nie, N. H., Powell, G. B., & Prewitt, K. (1969). Social structure and political participation: Developmental relationships, Part I. *American Political Science Review*, *63*(02), 361–378. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400262278

Nisbet, E. C., Stoycheff, E., & Pearce, K. E. (2012). Internet use and democratic demands: A multinational, multilevel model of internet use and citizen attitudes about democracy. *Journal of Communication*, *62*(2), 249–265. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01627.x

Nisbet, M. C., & Scheufele, D. A. (2004). Political talk as a catalyst for online citizenship. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *81*(4), 877–896. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769900408100410

Norris, P. (2000). *A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (2001). *Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet worldwide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (2009). Comparative political communications: Common frameworks or Babelian confusion? *Government & Opposition*, *44*(3), 321–340. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01290.x

Nunnally, J. C. (1967). *Psychometric theory* (1st ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

O'Donnell, G. A. (1994). Delegative democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, *5*(1), 55–69.

Olsen, M. E. (1972). Social participation and voting turnout: A multivariate analysis. *American Sociological Review*, *37*(3), 317–333.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Opp, K.-D. (2009). *Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique and synthesis*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Opp, K.-D. (2013). Rational choice theory and social movements. In D. A. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements* (Vol. 3). London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Paek, H.-J., Yoon, S.-H., & Shah, D. V. (2005). Local news, social integration, and community participation: Hierarchical linear modeling of contextual and cross-level effects. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *82*(3), 587–606. http://doi.org/10.1177/107769900508200307

Pan, Z. (2005). Media change through bounded innovations: Journalism in China's media reforms. In A. R. Romano & M. Bromley (Eds.), *Journalism and democracy in Asia* (pp. 96–107). New York, NY: Routledge.

Patterson, T. (1993). *Out of order: How the decline of political parties and the growing power of the news media undermine the American way of electing presidents.* New York, NY: Knopf.

Pearce, K. E., & Kendzior, S. (2012). Networked authoritarianism and social media in Azerbaijan. *Journal of Communication*, *62*(2), 283–298. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01633.x

Pei, M. (1998). The fall and rise of democracy in East Asia. In L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (pp. 57–78). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pertierra, R. (2012). *The new media, society & politics in the Philippines* (fesmedia Asia series). Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.fesmedia-asia.org/uploads/media/PHILIPPINES_2012.pdf

Picard, R. G. (2008). Shifts in newspaper advertising expenditures and their implications for the future of newspapers. *Journalism Studies*, *9*(5), 704–716. http://doi.org/10.1080/14616700802207649

Polat, R. K. (2005). The internet and political participation: Exploring the explanatory links. *European Journal of Communication*, *20*(4), 435–459. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323105058251

Pollock, P. H. (1982). Organizations as agents of mobilization: How does group activity affect political participation? *American Journal of Political Science*, *26*(3), 485–503. http://doi.org/10.2307/2110939

Pongsudhirak, T. (2012). Thailand's uneasy passage. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(2), 47–61. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0027

Powell, G. B. (1982). *Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability and violence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Price, V., & Zaller, J. (1993). Who gets the news? Alternative measures of news reception and their implications for research. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *57*(2), 133–164. http://doi.org/10.1086/269363

Prior, M. (2007). *Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (1996). What makes democracies endure? *Journal of Democracy*, *7*(1), 39–55.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). *Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990* (1st ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, *28*(04), 664–683. http://doi.org/10.2307/420517

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Quick, A. C. (2003). *World press encyclopedia: A survey of press systems worldwide*. Detroit: Gale.

Reilly, B. (2013). Southeast Asia: In the shadow of China. *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(1), 156–164. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0013

Rogers, D. L., Bultena, G. L., & Barb, K. H. (1975). Voluntary association membership and political participation: An exploration of the mobilization hypothesis. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *16*(3), 305–318. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1975.tb00950.x

Romano, A. R., & Bromley, M. (Eds.). (2005). *Journalism and democracy in Asia*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *48*(2), 1–36.

Ross, M. H. (2009). Culture in comparative political analysis. In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. Zuckerman (Eds.), *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure* (pp. 134–161). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Rubin, A. M., & Windahl, S. (1986). The uses and dependency model of mass communication. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *3*, 184–199. http://doi.org/10.1080/15295039609366643

Santner, V. (2010). *The SMS-revolution: The impact of mobile phones on political protest using the example of the EDSA II movement in the Philippines in 2001*. University of Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from http://othes.univie.ac.at/9059/1/2010-03-28_0304108.pdf

Santos, J. M. C. (2003). Out of reach: Television, the public sphere and civil society in the Philippines. In P. Kitley (Ed.), *Television, regulation, and civil society in Asia* (pp. 131–147). New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon.

Scheufele, D. A. (2002). Examining differential gains from mass media and their implications for participatory behavior. *Communication Research*, *29*(1), 46. http://doi.org/10.1177/009365020202900103

Scheufele, D. A., Nisbet, M. C., Brossard, D., & Nisbet, E. C. (2004). Social structure and citizenship: Examining the impacts of social setting, network heterogeneity, and informational variables on political participation. *Political Communication*, *21*(3), 315–338. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600490481389

Seneviratne, K. (2007). Malaysia: Alternative media only on the internet. In K. Seneviratne (Ed.), *Media pluralism in Asia: The role & impact of alternative media* (pp. 86–131). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University.

Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Eveland, W., & Kwak, N. (2005). Information and expression in a digital age: Modeling internet effects on civic participation. *Communication Research*, *32*(5), 531–565. http://doi.org/10.1177/0093650205279209

Shah, D. V., Kwak, N., & Holbert, R. L. (2001). “Connecting” and “disconnecting” with civic life: Patterns of internet use and the production of social capital. *Political Communication*, *18*(2), 141–162. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846001750322952

Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Nah, S., Gotlieb, M. R., Hwang, H., Lee, N., … McLeod, D. M. (2007). Campaign ads, online messaging, and participation: Extending the communication mediation model. *Journal of Communication*, *57*(4), 676–703. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00363.x

Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2011). A matter of context: A comparative study of media environments and news consumption gaps in Europe. *Political Communication*, *28*(1), 110–134. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2010.543006

Shin, D. C. (2012). *Confucianism and democratization in East Asia*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Shin, D. C., & Park, C. M. (2008). The mass public and democratic politics in South Korea: Exploring the subjective world of democratization in flux. In Y. Zhu (Ed.), *How East Asians view democracy* (pp. 39–60). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Shin, D. C., & Shyu, H. (1997). Political ambivalence in South Korea and Taiwan. *Journal of Democracy*, *8*(3), 109–124.

Shin, E. H. (2005). Presidential elections, internet politics, and citizens' organizations in South Korea. *Development and Society*, *34*(1), 25–47.

Shirky, C. (2011). Political power of social media. *Foreign Affairs*, *90*(1), 28–41.

Shi, T. (2015). *The cultural logic of politics in mainland China and Taiwan*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, J. (2005). The political j-blogger: "Normalizing" a new media form to fit old norms and practices. *Journalism*, *6*(2), 173–198. http://doi.org/10.1177/1464884905051009

Slater, D. (2012). Strong-state democratization in Malaysia and Singapore. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(2), 19–33. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0021

Soon, C., & Cho, H. (2014). OMGs! Offline-based movement organizations, online-based movement organizations and network mobilization: A case study of political bloggers in Singapore. *Information, Communication & Society*, *17*(5), 537–559. http://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.808256

Sotirovic, M., & McLeod, J. M. (2001). Values, communication behavior, and political participation. *Political Communication*, *18*(3), 273–300. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600152400347

Stockemer, D. (2014). What drives unconventional political participation? A two level study. *The Social Science Journal*, *51*(2), 201–211. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2013.10.012

Stolle, D., & Hooghe, M. (2009). *Shifting inequalities? Patterns of exclusion and inclusion in emerging forms of political participation* (WZB Discussion Paper No. No. SP | 2009-204). WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44136

Sukma, R. (2010). Political transition and democratic resilience in Indonesia. In M. C. Anthony (Ed.), *Political change, democratic transitions and security in Southeast Asia* (pp. 16–33). New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=465446

Sunstein, C. R. (2007). *Republic.com 2.0*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Su, Y.-S., Gelman, A. E., Hill, J., & Yajima, M. (2011). Multiple imputation with diagnostics (mi) in R: Opening windows into the black box. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *45*(2), 1–31.

Tamam, E., Raj, S. J., & Govindasamy, M. (2012). Malaysian journalists. In D. H. Weaver & L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist in the 21st century* (pp. 78–90). New York, NY: Routledge.

Tapnio, E., & Rood, S. (2011, October 12). Social media in The Philippines is widespread, but what is its impact? Retrieved from http://asiafoundation.org/2011/10/12/social-media-in-the-philippines-is-widespread-but-what-is-its-impact/

Tarrow, S., & McAdam, D. (2004). Scale shift in transnational contention. In D. della Porta & S. G. Tarrow (Eds.), *Transnational protest and global activism* (pp. 121–147). New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield.

Thompson, M. R. (2001). Whatever happened to “Asian values”? *Journal of Democracy*, *12*(4), 154–165. http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2001.0083

Tiffen, R., & Kwak, K.-S. (2005). Cable television and democratization in Taiwan and South Korea. In A. R. Romano & M. Bromley (Eds.), *Journalism and democracy in Asia* (pp. 135–147). New York, NY: Routledge.

van Deursen, A. J. A. M., & van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2013). The digital divide shifts to differences in usage. *New Media & Society*. http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813487959

van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2005). *The deepening divide: Inequality in the information society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

van Kempen, H. (2007). Media-party parallelism and its effects: A cross-national comparative study. *Political Communication*, *24*(3), 303–320. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600701471674

Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics* (Vol. 4). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Welp, Y., & Wheatley, J. (2012). The uses of digital media for contentious politics in Latin America. In E. Anduiza, M. J. Jensen, & L. Jorba (Eds.), *Digital media and political engagement worldwide: A comparative study* (pp. 177–199). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, B. A., & Delli Carpini, M. X. (2011). *After broadcast news: Media regimes, democracy, and the new information environment*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Wojcieszak, M. E., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Online groups and political discourse: Do online discussion spaces facilitate exposure to political disagreement? *Journal of Communication*, *59*(1), 40–56. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01403.x

Xenos, M., & Foot, K. A. (2007). Not your father's Internet: The generation gap in online politics. In W. L. Bennett (Ed.), *Digital media and youth civic engagement* (pp. 59–65). Washington, DC: MacArthur Foundation.

Xenos, M., & Moy, P. (2007). Direct and differential effects of the internet on political and civic engagement. *Journal of Communication*, *57*(4), 704–718. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00364.x

Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*(1), 110. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110

Yun, S., & Chang, W. Y. (2011). New media and political socialization of teenagers: The case of the 2008 candlelight protests in Korea. *Asian Perspective*, *35*(1), 135–162. http://doi.org/10.5555/0258-9184-35.1.135

Zakaria, F. (1994). Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. *Foreign Affairs*, *73*(2), 109–126.

Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, *76*(6), 22–43.

Zaller, J. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zillien, N., & Hargittai, E. (2009). Digital distinction: Status-specific types of internet usage. *Social Science Quarterly*, *90*(2), 274–291. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2009.00617.x

APPENDIX 1.A. Internet Penetration Rates

Regime Type	Country	Year	ABS	WVS	Internet Penetration
Rich Democracies	South Korea	2004	2006	2005	72.70%
		2009	2011	2010	81.60%
	Taiwan	2005	2006	2006	58.01%
		2009	2010	2012	69.90%
Poor Democracies	Indonesia	2005	2006	2006	3.60%
		2010	2011	N.A.	10.92%
	Philippines	2004	2005	N.A.	5.24%
		2009	2010	2012	9.00%
Authoritarian Regimes	Singapore	2005	2006	N.A.	61.00%
		2009	2010	N.A.	69.00%
	Vietnam	2004	2005	2006	7.64%
		2009	2010	N.A.	26.55%
Ambiguous Regimes	Malaysia	2005	2007	2006	48.63%
		2010	2011	2012	56.30%
	Thailand	2005	2006	2007	15.03%
		2009	2010	2013	20.10%

Note: ABS and WVS refer to their data-collection periods.

Source: Percentage of Individuals using the Internet from International Telecommunications Union.

APPENDIX 4.A. ABS Sample Sizes and Response Rates

Country	ABS Wave	Survey Year	Sample Size	Response Rate
Singapore	2	2006	1,012	70%
	3	2010	1,000	41%
Indonesia	2	2006	1,598	90%
	3	2011	1,550	79%
Malaysia	2	2007	1,218	60%
	3	2011	1,214	Unknown
Philippines	2	2005	1,200	Unknown
	3	2010	1,200	Unknown
South Korea	2	2006	1,212	45%
	3	2011	1,207	24%
Taiwan	2	2006	1,587	35%
	3	2010	1,592	Unknown
Thailand	2	2006	1,546	Unknown
	3	2010	1,512	52%
Vietnam	2	2005	1,200	Unknown
	3	2010	1,191	Unknown

Source: Asian Barometer Survey cumulative data, waves 2 and 3.

APPENDIX 4.B. Fit Statistics of LCA Models

Model	2005–07 (ABS wave 2)			2010–11 (ABS wave 3)		
	AIC diff.	BIC diff.	LMR LRT	AIC diff.	BIC diff.	LMR LRT
Pooled	−563.28	−490.62	0.000	−663.46	−590.90	0.000
Singapore	−6.85	37.43	0.004	−13.12	35.95	0.003
Taiwan	−10.84	37.48	0.000	−7.24	46.49	0.002
South Korea	−12.98	38.11	0.000	−26.25	24.71	0.000
Indonesia	−23.51	30.26	0.000	−15.91	37.55	0.000
Philippines	−25.57	25.33	0.000	−12.79	38.11	0.000
Malaysia	−99.23	−48.18	0.000	−79.06	−28.04	0.000
Thailand	−17.72	35.72	0.000	−59.71	−6.50	0.000
Vietnam	−5.10	45.80	0.000	−221.53	−170.70	0.000

Note: The first and second columns in each wave present the differences in AIC and BIC values, respectively, between the three-class model and the two-class model. The negative values mean that the three-class model has a lower AIC or BIC than the two-class model does, indicating its better fit to the observed data. The last column in each wave shows the Lo–Mendell–Rubin Likelihood Ratio Test (LMR LRT) for three classes (H_1) versus two classes (H_0). The test supports a significant improvement in fit of the three-class model over the two-class model.

Source: Author's calculations based on the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data, waves 2 and 3.

APPENDIX 5.A. WVS Sample Sizes and Response Rates

Country	WVS Wave	Survey Year	Sample Size	Response Rate
Indonesia	5	2006	2,015	Unknown
The Philippines	6	2012	1,200	Unknown
South Korea	5	2005	1,200	Unknown
	6	2010	1,200	55.4%
Taiwan	5	2006	1,227	44.0%
	6	2012	1,238	28.4%
Thailand	5	2007	1,534	Unknown
	6	2013	1,200	Unknown
Malaysia	5	2006	1,201	Unknown
	6	2012	1,300	Unknown
Vietnam	5	2006	1,495	89.9%

Source: World Values Surveys, waves 5 and 6.

APPENDIX 5.B. An Index of Four Items on Protest Participation (0–3)

Country	2005-2007		2010-2013	
	Mean (s.d.)	Cronbach's α	Mean (s.d.)	Cronbach's α
Indonesia	0.30 (0.61)	0.53	N.A.	N.A.
Philippines	N.A.	N.A.	0.16 (0.47)	0.60
South Korea	0.60 (0.82)	0.63	0.37 (0.72)	0.66
Taiwan	0.22 (0.56)	0.70	0.13 (0.41)	0.51
Thailand	0.17 (0.47)	0.52	0.37 (0.85)	0.80
Malaysia	0.17 (0.46)	0.62	0.06 (0.33)	0.62
Vietnam	0.08 (0.30)	0.41	N.A.	N.A.

Note: Have done signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, or any other act of protest in the last five years (Wave 5) or in the last year (Wave 6). Cronbach's α = standardized α

APPENDIX 5.C. WVS Explanatory Variables in the Mid-2000s

Country	Indonesia	Malaysia	South Korea	Taiwan	Thailand	Vietnam
Gender (Female, %)	47.74	50.12	50.58	49.65	50.98	48.70
Age	36.11 (0.31)	31.86 (0.34)	42.20 (0.52)	42.38 (0.51)	45.42 (0.40)	40.75 (0.41)
Education (0—8)	5.49 (0.05)	4.69 (0.06)	5.46 (0.98)	5.07 (0.07)	3.32 (0.06)	3.36 (0.04)
Income (0—9)	4.21 (0.05)	4.88 (0.05)	3.61 (0.08)	3.42 (0.06)	4.58 (0.05)	4.45 (0.04)
Political interest (0—3)	1.24 (0.02)	1.20 (0.02)	1.30 (0.03)	0.94 (0.03)	2.00 (0.02)	2.05 (0.02)
Democraticness (0—9)	5.54 (0.05)	5.99 (0.05)	5.38 (0.07)	5.90 (0.07)	6.04 (0.04)	6.93 (0.05)
Interpersonal trust (Yes, %)	42.48	8.83	28.05	24.29	41.59	52.37
Membership (Yes, %)	59.31	29.14	34.01	22.68	32.33	39.80
Conversation (Yes, %)	85.47	80.43	71.78	50.24	71.97	73.24
Internet (Yes, %)	19.75	36.72	59.23	31.73	14.34	9.83
Newspaper (Yes, %)	52.46	86.68	67.69	54.11	50.13	39.06
Radio or TV news (Yes, %)	90.82	91.76	93.64	89.25	90.55	95.32
DDI for Internet (0—1)	0.08 (0.00)	0.14 (0.01)	0.23 (0.01)	0.13 (0.01)	0.06 (0.00)	0.04 (0.00)

Note: Entries are the weighted mean values with standard errors in parentheses or the weighted percentages.

Source: WVS wave 5 (see data section)

APPENDIX 5.D. WVS Explanatory Variables in the Early 2010s

Country	Malaysia	South Korea	Taiwan	Thailand	The Philippines
Gender (Female, %)	48.62	50.58	50.31	47.50	50.00
Age	40.01 (0.39)	43.79 (0.59)	44.60 (0.48)	45.12 (0.35)	43.06 (0.48)
Education (0—8)	4.05 (0.05)	5.61 (0.10)	5.81 (0.07)	3.78 (0.07)	4.46 (0.08)
Income (0—9)	5.00 (0.05)	3.68 (0.07)	3.71 (0.05)	3.65 (0.07)	3.18 (0.08)
Political interest (0—3)	1.40 (0.02)	1.23 (0.03)	1.01 (0.03)	1.93 (0.02)	1.65 (0.03)
Democraticness (0—9)	6.17 (0.05)	4.87 (0.07)	5.88 (0.07)	5.79 (0.07)	6.35 (0.08)
Interpersonal trust (Yes, %)	8.54	26.55	30.61	32.84	3.15
Membership (Yes, %)	25.00	41.38	51.70	48.63	55.88
Conversation (0—4)	3.21 (0.04)	3.09 (0.05)	2.33 (0.04)	2.70 (0.05)	3.27 (0.04)
Internet (0—4)	1.80 (0.05)	2.58 (0.07)	2.32 (0.06)	1.11 (0.05)	0.95 (0.04)
Mobile phone (0—4)	2.68 (0.05)	2.50 (0.07)	2.01 (0.06)	1.85 (0.05)	2.35 (0.05)
Newspaper (0—4)	3.43 (0.03)	2.28 (0.06)	2.69 (0.04)	2.07 (0.05)	1.88 (0.04)
Radio or TV news (0—4)	3.79 (0.02)	3.72 (0.03)	3.83 (0.02)	3.85 (0.02)	3.84 (0.02)
DDI for Internet (0—1)	0.17 (0.00)	0.27 (0.01)	0.23 (0.01)	0.11 (0.00)	0.11 (0.00)
DDI For Mobile phone (0—1)	0.25 (0.00)	0.27 (0.01)	0.20 (0.01)	0.20 (0.01)	0.26 (0.01)

Note: Entries are the weighted mean values with standard errors in parentheses or the weighted percentages.

Source: WVS wave 6 (see data section)

APPENDIX 6.A. Data on Country-level Indicators of Media Systems

Country	Year	HDI	Polity	Press	Internet	Mobile	Circulation	Ad	Title	C4
Indonesia	2006	0.640	8	46	10,850	63,803	4900	0.50	1.46	26.28
	2011	0.678	8	51	29,939	249,806	9255	0.69	2.46	21.41
The Philippines	2005	0.638	8	60	4,632	34,779	3780	0.25	0.31	19.34
	2010	0.651	8	54	23,361	83,150	3800	0.20	0.29	33.71
South Korea	2006	0.856	8	70	37,779	40,197	13274	1.23	3.80	55.31
	2011	0.886	8	68	41,715	52,507	12505	0.82	7.07	41.98
Taiwan	2006	0.854	10	80	14,670	23,249	4200	0.75	1.09	57.10
	2010	0.879	10	75	16,426	27,840	3350	0.49	0.91	58.06
Thailand	2006	0.685	−5	41	11,306	40,125	7300	0.36	0.68	48.63
	2010	0.715	4	38	14,874	71,726	7525	0.33	0.68	47.18
Malaysia	2007	0.747	3	35	14,935	23,347	2750	1.73	1.04	40.33
	2011	0.768	6	37	17,543	36,661	2596	1.42	1.08	51.63
Singapore	2006	0.840	−2	31	2,597	4,789	1009	0.99	2.04	79.68
	2010	0.894	−2	32	3,604	7,385	964	1.23	1.58	79.13
Vietnam	2005	0.598	−7	23	14,375	18,892	3700	0.23	0.66	33.24
	2010	0.629	−7	17	26,644	111,570	4000	0.14	0.63	35.75

Note: HDI = Human Development Index; Polity = Polity score; Press = Press Freedom Index; Internet = Number of Internet users ('000); Mobile = Number of Mobile Cellular Subscriptions ('000); Circulation = National Paid-for Dailies' Total Average Circulation; Ad = Advertising Expenditures on Newspapers in proportion to Television; Title = Number of National Paid-for Dailies' Titles per Million Inhabitants; C4 = C4 Index of Newspaper Market in Circulation.

Source: The Polity IV Project, The Freedom House, The Polity IV Project, United Nations Development Programme, and author's calculations of newspaper market indicators based on data from World Association of Newspapers' World Press Trends.

APPENDIX 6.B. Multilevel Models Using WVS Data

Variable	Beta		Odds Ratio
Intercept	−2.36*	(0.96)	0.09
Individual-level fixed effects			
Gender (female)	−0.19***	(0.05)	0.83
Age	−0.09**	(0.03)	0.91
Education	0.16***	(0.03)	1.18
Income	−0.07*	(0.03)	0.93
Political interest	0.38***	(0.03)	1.47
Organizational membership	0.44***	(0.05)	1.56
Interpersonal conversation	0.23***	(0.07)	1.26
News broadcasts use	−0.24*	(0.11)	0.79
Daily newspaper use	0.15**	(0.06)	1.16
Internet use	1.18***	(0.24)	3.27
Country-level fixed effects			
National average of daily newspaper use	0.37	(1.59)	1.45
Cross-level interaction fixed effects			
Internet use × National average of daily newspaper use	−1.46***	(0.43)	0.23
Random effects			
Country × wave-level σ^2	0.20		
Country	0.36		
AIC	10,208.7		
BIC	10,319.1		
N	11,581		

Note: Weighted maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the WVS data, waves 5 and 6.

VITA

Shin Haeng Lee was born and raised in Incheon, a large port city in South Korea, as the son of Rev. Chae Change Lee and Mrs. Soon Ae Lee. Upon completion of his high school studies at Ansan Dongsan Christian High School, he entered Korea University in Seoul, Korea and received the degree of Bachelor of Sociology in 2008. In August 2008, he went to the School of Journalism at Indiana University at Bloomington and earned the degree of Master of Arts in Journalism in 2010. In September of 2010, he began his doctoral studies in Communication at the University of Washington at Seattle. Since September of 2012, he has worked as a consultant at the Center for Social Science Computation and Research at the same institution.