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Planning in postmodern era: navigating normativity and political implications of
'planning for/in uncertainty'

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Abstract

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This dissertation primarily aims to address the question of what should be 'the role of planning' in today's era of uncertainty, compounded by climate change and natural hazards events in addition to ever-diverging socio-economic inequalities. In the first chapter, I proposed a set of 'anti-essentialist norms' in planning, based on which planning practitioners can gauge whose voices and interests should be prioritized in the midst of the conflicts amongst different social groups and movements. To do so, I drew theoretical insights from third-wave feminist social theorists who have explored for a long time where to find a source of political solidarity that goes beyond the fixed categorization of gender. The second chapter, on the other hand, aimed to develop and promote more progressive use of the 'resilience' concept in disaster planning, by a thorough examination on the history and use of the concept across different disciplines. I have proposed that more emphasis on co-constitutive human-nature relationship as well as focusing on the collective aspects of resilience building can move us forward towards the progressive articulation of resilience theory, going beyond the pessimistic critique on resilience as 'offloading of responsibilities'. Finally, the third chapter subsequently argued for the

progressive potentials of resilience in disaster planning in practice — comparing the cases of Seattle and Paris. Based on eleven in-depth key informant interviews with practitioners in the field, I have demonstrated how resilience can become a source of empowerment and innovation for local governments to effectuate a more inclusive, participatory risk governance model. In the end, my dissertation was an effort to converge ‘social problems’ and ‘ecological problems’ in public policy — by outlining planners’ role in addressing social inequality on the one hand (Chapter 1), and yet at the same time proposing the possibilities of ‘resilience’ or ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ where our changing relationship with nature calls for the rise of solidarity and collective actions — represented as increasing local initiatives and more inclusive knowledge practices (Chapter 3).

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DEDICATION

To my mom, Cho, Jung Soon,

and my dad, Kwon Jon.

Chapter 0 : INTRODUCTION: CHALLENGES OF PLANNING IN/FOR UNCERTAINTY

The proposed three papers (Chapter 1, 2, 3) argue *for* finding normativity of planning in postmodern era, where ‘uncertainty’ and ‘flexibility’ have become major themes. Planning theorists argue that the high contingency and uncertainty of today’s world call for a new approach to planning, a kind of approach that underlines flexibility and open-endedness. In the realm of planning practice, on the other hand, city governments find themselves to be in the situation of planning in uncertainty, where the contingency of disaster events reveal the limits of their knowledge and control. In the midst of these dynamics, I am concerned that such extensive focus on ‘flexibility’ and ‘high contingency’ often leads planning to be considered as a “value-free” activity in which planners are not held accountable for the ethical consequences of planning outcomes. To address this issue, the three papers focus on how to think more substantially on normativity and political implications of planning. The first paper (Chapter 1) aims to propose a theoretical basis for ‘anti-essentialist norm’ in planning, based on which planning practitioners can anchor their ethical considerations of planning outcomes. The second and third papers (Chapter 2 and 3) concern the political implications of ‘resilience’ in planning. In response to recent debates on whether resilience is a progressive or neoliberal concept, the second paper (Chapter 2) provides a literature review on how different disciplines use resilience in what specific contexts, and how political implications of the concept change depending on their contextual utilization. The third paper (Chapter 3), building up on that, discusses the contextual factors that influence the political

progressiveness of ‘resilience’, based on a comparative case study of disaster planning in practice (Seattle and Paris).

Accordingly, it can be said that the main motivation behind my dissertation research comes from the fact that the practice of planning is often considered as neutral or depoliticized, where intentions for “good governance” is taken for granted, techniques for “good governance” are value-free, and, accordingly, well-intended planning initiatives would automatically get translated into the results that are “good” also. For instance, on the side of planning theory, “multi-planar” or “fluid” planning’s emphasis on flexibility assumes that certain techniques of inclusive planning processes are, first of all, a part of unquestionable “good governance” scheme, and second of all, they are bound to bring about “good” outcomes without any value-loaded discussions on ‘what planning should do’. On the side of planning practice — of which I focus on the context of disaster planning — the *change* in the legitimation logic of planning, with the rise of the ‘resilience’ concept, goes often unnoticed, or granted as a natural evolution of planning in the face of new challenges; there has been a lack of consideration on what kind of social or political implications that the ‘planning based on resilience’ would entail. In other words, overall — both in planning theory and practice — we have been avoiding the questions on normativity or political implications of planning for/in uncertainty, as if the contingency or uncertainty of future itself exempts us from thinking of any ethical concerns of planning outcomes.

In that context I have designed the three papers that navigate these issues both theoretically and empirically. The first paper (Chapter 1) focuses on the current developments of

planning theory, where more and more emphasis is placed on flexibility and open-ended aspects of postmodern planning approach — while letting go of the question of normativity or related accounts of social justice. This is in part because of postmodernism and its ardent defense of “open-endedness” is often considered as contradictory to any prescriptive nuances. Can postmodern concepts and theoretical standpoint propose a basis for normativity? Eventually, I was concerned with political implications of the planning outcomes, because they can never be neutral — despite our good intentions, or the inclusive procedures that are assumed to result in “good” outcomes. Winners and losers will be there as a result of planning decisions; the flexibility and open-endedness cannot justify the political outcomes that are disadvantageous to certain segments of population. How can planning be responsible to the “unintended” planning outcomes? Based on what criteria planning/planners should be held accountable? Chapter 1 aims to address this issue at a theoretical level, by providing a perspective that postmodern concepts do and can be the basis of political solidarity and subsequently, a normative direction of planning agenda as a public policy — or, the role of planner in navigating these questions of normativity and ethics. As an outcome of this theoretical exploration, I propose what could be considered as ‘anti-essentialist norms’, based on which a planner can make judgments concerning who and whose interest — which social groups or collectives — should be prioritized and heard first as compared to the others, in order to promote more inclusive and just urban space.

In continuing my concern on political implication of planning, I have become interested in the increasing use of resilience that has been attractive both to academia and practitioners. Chapter 2 and 3 aim to address this issue in different ways. Chapter 2 is a critical literature

review that aims to respond better to the current debates on political implications of resilience. In the disciplines of planning and disaster management — resilience is rather considered as a positive and normatively “good” concept that we should all pursue. On the other hand, the disciplines of geography and international development consider resilience as having negative implications, arguing that it is just another word for justifying fiscal decentralization or neoliberal account of self-sufficiency. The debates on whether resilience is a ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ concept has *not* been constructive since each side cherry-picked different notions of resilience without taking account of contextual specificities where ‘resilience’ was used. In this context, I thought that it was necessary to map out the concept according to different disciplinary interests, which eventually framed divergent contextual elements that can either be politically positive (e.g. liberal/progressive) or negative (e.g. neoliberal). The purpose of doing such exercise was to facilitate more constructive debate on resilience, by clarifying in what specific context and conditions it can bring out ‘positive’ political implications, or ‘negative’ political implications. Finally, in the end of this chapter, I provide the criteria with which one can gauge the political normativity of resilience: 1) human relationship with nature and the use of local knowledge; 2) applicability of “holistic approach”; 3) acknowledgment of human collectivity in identifying operationalisers of resilience; 4) adequate governmental support and connection with population in the pursuit of “resilience” agenda.

Chapter 3 is the continuation of understanding political implication of “resilience” in planning, but more based on empirical examples of planning practices. I demonstrate in this chapter how the logic of legitimation (e.g. rationale behind planning strategies/initiatives) has been changing with the rise of “resilience”, and questions whether such change signals a

transition from late-modernity understanding of governance (where everything was considered as government's maneuvering and manipulation of total control) to post-modern understanding of governance (where other non-conventional powers have an opportunity to influence). To do so, I characterize what I refer as "post-modern theorization of resilience", which focuses on the role of knowledge practices and political narratives in legitimizing the mode of governance. Rather than outrightly rejecting resilience as a cover up for neoliberalism, post-modern framing of resilience notes 1) how the concept can initiate the shift in planners' view and practice on knowledges (going beyond "expert knowledge") 2) how the flexibility of the concept can be used for developing political narratives that are progressive 3) how the concept can open up potential new venues for non-conventional powers to intervene into policy making/ decision making processes, inviting new actors (i.e. non-planners, non-experts) to the planning dialogue. Using these three characteristics of "post-modern framing of resilience", I discuss two cross-national cases — Seattle and Paris — where the concept of 'resilience' is opening up opportunities for non-planners and non-conventional actors/agencies to intervene into territorial governance. Chapter 3 connects with the Chapter 2's literature review in that it proposes, in actual disaster planning in practice, the progressive potentials of the resilience concept — contributing to the discussion of how and in what context resilience can become a part of more progressive political agenda rather than remaining as a passive tool for neoliberal governance.

On the other hand, the common theme of the first and third chapter may be the prescriptive aspects of planning (e.g. 'what planning should be') in the context of increasing uncertainty and contingency, represented more specifically in the third paper as environmental hazards, or the risk of facing different disaster events. If the first paper laid out a theoretical

ground for why postmodern planning is, in its theoretical essence, connected to the agenda of social justice and inclusive governance, the third paper focuses on how the use of resilience in disaster planning can go in that direction, by demonstrating in what context it can possess progressive political potentials. The normativity in the third paper is more subtle, but it is there; while the claimed purpose of the third paper is to show in what contexts resilience *can* have ‘positive’ political implications, its underlying suggestion would be we *should* go in that direction if we can.

In summary, my intended contribution to academia with these three papers would be the following. Above all, I would like to argue that the current emphasis on flexibility and open-endedness in planning should not avoid the ethical questions of actual planning *outcomes*. Uncertainty and contingency of future is not a new concept, and it does not (and should not) exempt us from ethical concerns on planning outcomes — e.g. concerns on how to avoid the kinds of planning outcomes that are disadvantageous to certain populations in an unjust way. I think that planning theorists should more actively engage in the question of normativity, within the postmodernist paradigm that acknowledges the impossibility of full representation of the reality — whether that being the limits of fixed legal categorization of different social groups or what we believe as “expert knowledge” in planning. I wanted to point out that finding normativity in postmodern planning is the predicament that planning theorists face today, and we should actively and more courageously take on that challenge. Secondly, by investigating different political implications of a planning concept — “resilience”, I wanted to demonstrate, eventually, how the flexibility of a planning concept can be used differently depending on the interests of the users — either users being academics or practitioners. Resilience was a perfect

example to showcase this because it is such a contested concept that is being used cross-disciplinarily (in academic context) and internationally (in planning practice context). With a hermeneutic approach to understanding ‘resilience’, what I aim to contribute to the literature is the idea that an application of a planning concept is never neutral, and that we need to be aware of its political and social implications as well as the contextual factors which influence those implications. The two objectives laid out here — 1) finding normativity in postmodern planning 2) demonstrating political implications of a planning concept — are concerned with my proposition that planning in postmodern era should not forego the questions of normativity or its implications on political/social order.

Chapter 1 : RE-FRAMING POSTMODERN PLANNING WITH FEMINIST SOCIAL THEORY — TOWARDS ‘ANTI-ESSENTIALIST NORMS’

I believe that the task facing all theorists committed to social change is that of working to construct some theoretical bases for political solidarity.

Nancy Hartsock, *The Feminist Standpoint Revisited* (1998)

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the current developments in planning theory literature, with regard to its extensive focus on flexibility and process. While emphasizing the open-endedness and procedural validity of planning, planning theorists seem to have forgotten ethical considerations on the results of planning outcomes. This is understandable given that postmodernism and its ardent defense of ‘open-endedness’ is often considered as contradictory to any prescriptive nuances. However, I argue that normativity of planning is possible within the postmodern paradigm, and that postmodern concepts and theoretical standpoint can propose a basis for normativity. To demonstrate this, I adopt the works of political theorists who have been working on normativity and political solidarity within the postmodern paradigm (anti-essentialist, anti-Cartesian) — most of whom are inspired by the future paths of feminism. To be clear, what I refer as ‘feminism’ is not just about defending the status of women as a legal category, but also about how to construct political solidarity against inequalities — *without* essentialist categorizations or *a priori* conceptualizations. Using the ideas of Young (second/third wave feminism), Laclau and Mouffe (post-Marxism), Mouffe (post-Marxism/ third wave feminism),

and Butler (third wave feminism/ body politics), I sketch in this paper what could be considered as ‘anti-essentialist norms’, based on which a planner can make judgments concerning who and whose voices — which social groups or ‘serial collectives’ — should be prioritized and heard first as compared to the others, in order to promote more inclusive and just urban space. The three anti-essentialist norms that I propose in this paper are: 1) taking account of historicity of social relations, 2) having a modest attitude towards what we claim as the representation of ‘the public’, and finally, 3) recognizing human interdependency that leads to pursuing ‘future-orientedness’ in a political project.

1. INTRODUCTION

The two keywords in recent development of planning theory are: ‘flexibility’ and ‘process’. Planning theory writers argue that, upon acknowledging the limitation of positivist planning, planning should focus more on its open-endedness (i.e. flexibility) and procedural validity, in order to be able to weather through highly contingent future that we face today (Hillier, 2008, 2011; Balducci et al., 2011; Nyseth, 2012). This trend is perhaps not new: the communicative turn in planning theory (Healey, 2003[1996]; Forester, 1999, 2006; Innes and Booher, 1999), and especially ‘consensus planning’ – a modified version of Habermasian-inspired planning theory (Innes, 2004) – was born by embracing the ideas of pragmatism, which actively rejected modernist, essentialist ideas of truth. As pragmatist philosophy marks the beginning of postmodernism, one can argue that such tradition of planning was ultimately based upon postmodern ways of thinking (anti-Cartesian). On the other hand, the theories of planning in the recent decade (2000s) derive their philosophical ground from continental postmodern philosophy

(or anti-modern; e.g. actor-network theory), all the more emphasizing the impossibility of rationalist control and what it means to ‘plan’ in times of uncertainty and contingency.

One of the major characteristics of postmodern planning is the assertion that planning should be an ‘open-ended’ activity, where the role of planner is limited to mediating among different conflicting interests. And such attitude, I argue here, is problematic since it fails to address ethical considerations on the actual planning outcomes. This critique is essentially linked to the center of this project: how to address normativity in planning? Can postmodern concepts and theoretical standpoint propose a basis for normativity? Eventually, I was concerned with political implications of the planning outcomes, because they can never be neutral — despite good intentions, or the inclusive procedures that are assumed to result in ‘good’ outcomes. Winners and losers will be resulted from planning decisions; flexibility and open-endedness cannot justify the political outcomes that are disadvantageous to certain segments of population. How can planning be responsible to the ‘unintended’ planning outcomes? Based on what criteria planning should be held accountable?

The main objective of this paper is therefore to sketch some of the ideas on “how to re-frame postmodern planning theory”, eventually to suggest a version of ‘anti-essentialist norm’ in planning. In doing so, I argue that feminist social theory offers very important insights on how to establish the direction of ‘where we want to go’ (i.e. some kind of normative framework) without relying on transcendental or essentialist values or concepts. Feminist social theory has evolved over the last four decades, and its development was centered around the idea of where to find political solidarity without *a priori* concepts, groups, or categorizations. While the ideas of

second wave feminism in the 1960s have been effective in providing a moral ground for defending equal rights for minority groups, they have also been heavily criticized for being quasi-fundamentalists. Due to their emphasis on achieving social justice and fighting against inequality unjustly placed on different groups, their political standpoint had to maintain the essentialist idea of ‘fundamental/inherent differences’ among the legal categories such as gender or race. In other words, they were unable to let go of the essentialist categorization between ‘men’ and ‘women’, or ‘black’ and ‘white’, for they firmly believe that acknowledging the existence of these categories (and thus recognizing inequalities across such categories) is a major source of political solidarity — without which a normative political standpoint (e.g. ‘what should be done’) cannot be established. But, do we need groups and categorizations – or emphasizing ‘fundamental differences’ – for a political action against social injustice? Is sticking to the strict notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘grouping’ according to our ‘inherent characteristics’, a condition for any political solidarity? Isn’t it ironic, that the eventual political aim of feminist social theory was to remove the barriers that creates inequalities in our society, yet it attempts to do so by putting up strict boundaries in-between the different groups? In addition, the emphasis on ‘fundamental’ or ‘inherent’ differences are at odds with postmodernism that rejected the very notion of timelessness or context-independence of *a priori*, from which feminism was able to initiate its anti-Cartesian philosophy.

This debate on political solidarity, or the question of *where* should we find the basis of our political solidarity – *if* we were to move beyond a priori concepts/groups/categories – remains at the heart of contemporary feminist social theory. And I consider this debate to be useful and inspirational for reframing postmodern planning theory in a way that provides some

normative pointers for planning practices, without being fixated to modernist, ‘context-free’ norms or ethics. I draw the main ideas from third wave feminist theorists such as Mouffe and Butler, who draw their theoretical groundings from post-Marxist radical democracy, psychoanalysis, and body politics. I examine their ideas focusing on their efforts to find ‘postmodern’ theoretical ground for political solidarity. After summarizing and pointing out their major theoretical insights, I sketch in this paper what could be considered as ‘anti-essentialist norms’, based on which a planner can make judgments concerning who and whose interest — which social groups or collectives — should be prioritized and heard first as compared to the others, in order to promote more inclusive and just urban space. The three anti-essentialist norms that I propose in this paper are: 1) taking account of historicity of social relations, 2) having a modest attitude towards what we claim as the representation of ‘the public’, and finally, 3) recognizing human interdependency that leads to pursuing ‘future-orientedness’ in a political project.

2. THE ERA OF UNCERTAINTY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF POSTMODERN PLANNING IDEAS

While communicative planning or consensus approach to planning has reached its momentum to be a mainstream, several scholars in the planning discipline started suggesting new ideas that go beyond the current planning practices. These scholars argue that the increasing ‘uncertainty’ of today’s era calls for a new approach to spatial planning, sketching out how those ‘new approaches’ would look in practice or how planners can start shifting their attitudes and practices in response to such new types of planning. It can be said that, this trend of ‘planning for

uncertainty' has been initiated by Hillier's multi-planar planning (2008; 2011). She argued that "spatial planning requires both redefinition and a new theoretical foundation in order to be relevant to the dynamic complexities and contingencies of today's world" (2008: 25).

Accordingly, she suggested that "we need to re-invent planning as a strategic future-oriented activity, taking into account the unknown, open up for new possibilities, towards a planning as becoming instead of planning as fixing" (2007: 17). Balducci et al. (2011) and Nyseth (2012) followed the similar track, calling for a new shape of planning that is not fixed, more flexible, and demonstrated some of the examples of what that would look like in practice. They focus on the ideas of fluidity and flexibility, drawing theoretical concepts mainly from Deleuze and Guattari ('lines of flight' or fluidity) as well as Latour ('actant-network theory').

The problematic aspect of this emphasis on fluidity and flexibility becomes clearer in Boelens' (2010; 2011) "actor-relational approach" (ARA). ARA underlines the importance of acknowledging the planning initiatives led by other actors that exist beyond traditional governmental structures — which could be summarized as, "associative democracy" (Webb, 2011). The most problematic aspect of this approach concerns the fact that it is essentially unclear which kind of "citizen initiatives" should be prioritized and why. As Latour says "follow the actors" (2005), Boelens says "follow the networks" (2010) if we were to deliver actor-relational results. According to these ideas, planners should be open-minded enough to take in the goals and visions set up by external actors (networks, associations, organizations, groups that exist in civil society), instead of imposing those of their own. From this perspective, a planner is a quiet observer, neutral, cool-minded assistant who "explores" what kind of networks exist, what kind of activities/project that these networks aspire to achieve, and then provide the

conditions in which they can prosper on their own. Boonstra and Boelens (2011) noted that, their “outside-in” approach — unlike conventional “inside-out” approach — implies that “planners adopt an open, unbiased and un(pre)structured view to deal with upcoming socio-spatial initiatives ‘on the outside’” (p. 117); “planners should consistently trace and follow those initiatives with an open and unbiased mind, trying to become a respected member of those heterogeneous associations” (p. 118).

However, should all the activities of these (citizen-initiated) networks be respected as they are? In other words, are all bottom-up initiatives “good”? The main example that Boonstra and Boelens (2011) discusses — as a demonstration of actor-relational approach to planning — is the Business Improvement Districts (BID), self-organized by business owners in the neighborhood. But say, for instance, the initiatives of a BID network of actors mobilize themselves to evict homeless population from their district for the purpose of “business improvement” – or to attract only “the right kind of people” (who have purchasing power) to their district (e.g. for the case of San Francisco, see Selbin et al., 2016). Is that kind of project also one of the things that planners should sign up for when supporting these “citizen-driven” networks or initiatives? And what if there’s an advocate group (for the homeless) that attempt to fight such initiatives on the grounds of the citizen rights in public space? (e.g. the Western Regional Advocacy Project has recently organized a march to the Union Square BID in San Francisco to protest the way businesses use city police to banish homeless people). With what standards should planners 1) ask themselves whether certain “bottom-up” initiatives are aligned with “public values” or elements of social justice 2) take sides with a certain network or an

initiative of a network when there are conflicting interests or values? In other words, what kind of normative perspective a planner is supposed to be equipped with?

While actor-network theory can be empowering in the sense that it attempts to acknowledge and respect the existing citizen networks and initiatives, it should be also noted that, without a clear identification of normative angle that planners should adhere to, it is subject to the same criticism for rendering planners be neutral or “in the middle” as in communicative/consensus planning. And due to the absence of discussion on valorization of particular planning ideas or directions, the question remains on the accountability of planning outcomes. Leaving everything — including the consequences of what certain decision would bring to the rest of population — up to the hands of “the networks” can be detrimental to those who do not possess power or resources to defend their rights and interests, let alone forming a network that is legible to government agencies. Similar critique can be applied across recent planning theory ideas’ focus on “process” and “becoming” (Hillier, 2011; Balducci et al. 2011; Nyseth, 2012). While these ideas, framed as “fluid planning”, attempt to open up potentialities for ideas and initiatives that come from divergent actors, its “openness” can become in turn the source of its lack of potency to *ensure* the outcomes to have elements of social justice and change.

3. WHY FEMINIST SOCIAL THEORY CAN BE INSPIRING FOR PROVIDING NORMS THAT TOUCHES ON ETHICS WITHOUT BEING FIXATED TO ESSENTIALIST IDEAS

Feminist theory, in its foundation, was already benefiting greatly from postmodernism and pragmatism that rejected ‘objective’, ‘transcendental’, ‘the right’ knowledge — the implication

of which provided feminist theorists a theoretical ground to argue against the imposition of ‘masculine’ ways of knowing. The validity of localized and situated knowledges based on shared experiences, wisdom, and other ways of knowing — which have been advocated by postmodernism and pragmatism — became the basis of feminist theory and activism. Feminist pragmatist Kruks (2001) argued that effective feminist politics requires “hold[ing] onto the concepts of experience and must attend to the ways in which experience can exceed discursivity” (p. 133). She presented domestic violence as an example that is “not only discursively constituted by also lived ‘from the inside out’” (p. 138).

But at times their political agenda ‘to emancipate women’, in the face of reality, was often predicated on the idea of predetermined categorization of gender, which sometimes imposed the idea of ‘femininity’ in attempts to consolidate their political position ‘against masculinity’. Accordingly, in their advocacy of ‘politics of difference’, feminists have claimed for justifying ‘special treatments’ for oppressed and underrepresented groups (Young, 1990), based on egalitarian values that sees ‘equality’ as the participation and inclusion of all groups (and therefore sometimes requiring different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups). This ‘politics of difference’, however, relied its theoretical basis on predetermined, *a priori* categories that advocated the existence of “inherent differences”, which has become politically problematic mainly for two reasons:

- 1) Categories are bound to leave out (or exclude) people in the margin (cf. Lesbians? Black-asians?); it’s never possible to capture the perfect representation of particularities. i.e. ‘Exclusionary effects of the category from within feminist discourse’ (Butler, 1990a)
- 2) Political solidarity based on fixed categorizations does not have future in articulating different social movements (i.e. coalition politics) — which is needed to fight against a

particular issue that concerns *all* categories; What about the issues that we have to fight together, regardless of what categories we're supposed to belong to (e.g. freedom of speech)? (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1995)

Above all, as categories being categories — as a representative label based on *commonalities* — it is impossible to include every single particularity that differentiates one from another *within* 'the group'. As Butler put, "the category reflects the restricted location of its theoreticians and, hence, fails to recognize the intersection of gender with race, class, ethnicity, age, sexuality and other currents which contribute to the formation of cultural (non)identity" (Butler, 1990a: 325). For example, the challenges that homosexual women face must be different from those faced by straight women, so is what black women face from what Asian women face. And since different challenges lead to different political agendas that each particularity needs, the imposition of categories — in attempts to protect the identity of 'women' — can be totalizing, undemocratic, and un-postmodern as it results in exclusion and subsequent political closure.

On the other hand, the second problem with category-based politics comes from reflecting on what happens in the future, or in anticipation of political agendas to come. Mouffe (1995) has argued that feminist politics should not be understood as a form of politics design to pursue the interests of women as 'women', since it will only lead to foreclosing political process of articulation — i.e. the linkage (or articulation) of the social movements (or fighting for common political agendas) *across* different pre-determined groups or categories. According to Mouffe, the pursuit of feminist goals and aims should be within the context of *wider* articulation of other societal demands (that come from different types of subordination, which concern race

or sexuality) (Mouffe, 1995: 329). It is in the similar line of concern when Wendy Brown posed the danger of identity politics, and that there is no future for feminism that insists on ‘femininity’, as it will only lead to resentment-laden exclusion rather than forward-looking solidarity (Heyes, 2016): “Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future — for itself and others — that triumphs over this pain” (Brown, 1995: 74, as cited in Heyes, 2016).

In the end, what feminist theorists realize is that the categories themselves are the legacy of modernist framing and dichotomization — and the task in front of them is to find a theoretical basis for political solidarity that goes beyond that. Butler (1990a) notes how going beyond binary dichotomy of gender in feminist politics can acknowledge and empower our agency, implying the possibilities towards coalition politics: “The loss of that reification of gender relations ought not to be lamented as the failure of a feminist political theory but rather, affirmed as the promise of the possibility of complex and generative subject positions as well as coalition strategies that neither presuppose nor fix their constitutive subjects in their place” (p. 339). Accordingly, moving on from political solidarity based on essentialist categorization, third wave feminists seek their normative ground by even-more-fully embracing of postmodernism — focusing on translating how the openness, flexibility, and post-reasonness can lead to emancipatory agendas not only for women but also for other minority groups. Drawing from psychoanalysis, post-Marxism, and body politics, feminist social theorists expands their theoretical ground towards ‘social postmodernism’ that attempts to show how postmodern openness and post-reasonness *guides* their project of democracy and egalitarian imagery.

These theoretical insights that feminist social postmodernism had — moving *from* category-based, second wave feminism (whose solidarity was still based on essentialist categorization of gender) *to* more future-oriented, third wave feminism (whose solidarity attempts to go beyond gender categories) — help us realize why essentialist norms are eventually limited, and how one could pursue more future-oriented politics that goes beyond solidarity based on enclosed social identity. Above all, essentialist norms are limited because, no categorization is complete or fully comprehensive and thus political solidarity based on essentialist categorization will always subject to misrepresent or underrepresent certain minority groups. The problem with the second wave feminist agenda was that their essentialist categorization of “women” failed to represent the interests or needs of all different kinds of groups of women, such as the challenges that homosexual women or other ethnic minorities woman have faced. In fact, what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) pointed out as the fundamental flaw of political solidarity based on Marxist “class” was also similar: a fixed notion of “working class” does not represent the fact that there are different kinds of working class, as well as different needs and challenges that these different groups (e.g. across different generations, races, or gender) can face. Therefore, essentialist approach to norms are limited in that they can fail to recognize the needs and interests of groups, especially minorities that are underrepresented. Therefore, I argue throughout this paper how we can learn from a tradition of scholarship — i.e. feminist social theory or feminist social postmodernism — in order to sketch a landscape on how to judge/evaluate which social collective is normatively ‘better’ than the others.

4. FEMINIST SOCIAL THEORY: HOW POSTMODERN CONCEPTS LEAD US TO A MORE LIBERAL AGENDA

In attempts to find a theoretical ground for normativity in post-modern planning, my interest here lies in how feminist political theorists find a way to go beyond identity politics *while* being still firmly rooted in their initial political motivation for addressing social inequalities. In this section, I aim to show how the current developments of feminist social theory uses postmodern concepts for more normative and progressive agenda. More specifically, the starting point of third wave feminism begins from the acceptance of ‘radically unfixed social identity’, which aims to find a new theoretical ground for political solidarity other than ‘inherent’ or ‘fundamental’ femininity. This argument is pioneered by Butler (1990a; 1990b; 1993), who projected a future of feminism that no longer relies on its modernist obsession with the biological categorization of sex. Her well-known argument on ‘gender as performativity’ through the example of drag — was largely accepted and popularized as empowerment of independent self-agency. On the surface, this ‘performativity’ argument seems almost as a detachment from politicization of gender because of its innovation (as a political theory of the 90’s) in introducing post-structural possibilities and radical acknowledgement of human agency that frees itself from the weight of structures. But, what often gets overlooked in in her work is how her theorization is in fact a carefully layered political argument towards progressive re-articulation of gender and sexuality¹. Butler (1993; 1999) has repeatedly shown her concerns on how ‘gender performativity’ can wrongly get confused with naive *presentist voluntarism* (1993: 228; 1999: xxvi) that underestimates the historicity of discourse and power. And this differentiation between performativity and

¹ Whether post-structuralism is politically detached or engaged is a discussion that should be addressed in another paper; but in case of Butler, her work is built around the political engagement of post-structuralism.

voluntarism is very important because here she emphasizes how her work is not merely about acknowledgement of human agency, but it eventually aims to address its political motivation towards progressive re-articulation of power. In order to draw more political implication from her work, one should focus on two key axes of her work: 1) how *not* to underestimate the historicity of discourse and power, but then 2) how can we *go beyond* enclave politics loaded with historicity — and to do so where should we find the ‘right’ or ‘good’ direction of human agency and political articulation. These two issues are not merely ‘feminist’ but essentially a part of the common quest for any political theorist who attend to social inequality and justice. And therefore, discussing them in depth would eventually lead us to understand how postmodern political theorists are finding their theoretical ground for political solidarity that no longer relies on modernist categorizations or grouping of social collectives (e.g. gender, race, class). While I used Butler’s work to identify these main themes, I also build my argument by drawing ideas from other political theorists who have been working around similar topics.

4.1. Acknowledging historicity of discourse and power

Butler’s *Gender Trouble* (1990b) not only celebrated the potentialities of agency via deconstructing ‘the given’ gender, but also argued for a political project that does not underestimate the historicity of existing discourse and power. More specifically, the book also noted the necessity of acknowledging the historic conditions (and the existing collective, repetitive actions) that define and limit what’s considered to be ‘normal’ or ‘a style of being’, ‘a stylistics of existence’, or ‘styles of flesh’ — which cannot suddenly be reshaped by a single

individual action (p. 189-191): “[t]hese styles are never fully self-styled, for styles have a history, and those histories condition and limit the possibilities” (p. 190). In that sense, ‘gender as performativity’ is not merely an individual initiative to dress or act like the other, but a ‘sustained and repeated’ political project that can become effective *only when* (a) it considers the accumulative character (i.e. historicity) of gender norms that have been produced/re-produced over time (b) it possesses the elements of collectivity and repetition that renders it to become a social, collective strategy. In Butler’s words, “[t]here are temporal and collective dimensions to these actions, and their public character is not inconsequential . . . Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; *rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts*” (p. 191, emphasis added). In other words, it’s not that you (as an individual) wake up one day and perform cross-dressing that it alone revolutionizes the social perception of gender; it’s not only a matter of individual initiative and agency that this ‘performativity’ emphasizes — it is equally concerned with the possibility of collective politics that we can *together* enact upon, because the real change on addressing injustices/inequalities — against any social category such as female gender — can only come from collective and repeated performances that effectively challenge the established social notions of that category:

“The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; *“Agency”, then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition*” (p. 198, emphasis added).

Butler connected this idea — of how agency should be located in temporal and collective milieu of a political project — with psycho-analytic approach to gender (more detailed in 1990b), with which she demonstrated how our individual, conscious ‘will’ or ‘freedom’ for change cannot control our very own subconscious-self’s identification of gender (i.e. ‘interior fixity’) which is unavoidably influenced by the historicity of already-established gender norms and social perceptions (p. 136-137). The only way to break out of this domination of subconscious is through translating this radical individual will into a collective political project that can effectuate a real change at a societal level. Butler’s later work — *Bodies That Matter* (1993) — implies a few options for engaging with such political project and strategy. One of them, in relation to acknowledging the historicity of discourse and power, is the genealogical approach to what’s currently considered to be the ‘given’ social categories or the concepts, in order to critique and uncover the historical interests and power relations behind these categories. The genealogical critique of the subject “is the interrogation of those constitutive and exclusionary relations of power through which contemporary discourse resources are formed”, such as, by questioning, “who is represented by which use of the term, and who is excluded”? (p. 229).

Butler’s argument here remains largely at the theoretical level that insists on how post-modern political activism, in order to avoid the naïveté of presentist voluntarism, needs to acknowledge the historical, accumulative aspects of power relations and social identities that cannot be suddenly uprooted. The task at hand here is therefore to analyze, document, and better understand the historical process in which particular power relations have produced and maintained the current ‘norms’ of social identities and relations. This argument, in practice, may only get translated into just enhancing ‘better understanding’ of the state of things — thus not

necessarily a collective, political project. After all, Butler is not really answering our key question of, ‘where to find political solidarity that is not based on fixed categories’? However, her work can also be linked with the works of other feminist social theorists who have been working on how to reinvigorate feminist political activism that are postmodern (i.e. anti-essentialist) and yet also fully acknowledging the role of collective, historical, shared experiences that become the basis for political solidarity.

For instance, Young’s later work (1995) used Sartre’s ‘seriality’ approach in attempts to demonstrate how to imagine feminist politics that go beyond modernist identity politics that are based on fixed categorization of gender. Young attempted to provide a postmodern theoretical ground for political solidarity that is not based on particular foundational characteristics (e.g. ‘women’) but more based on the historical experiences of people who went through a certain form of subordination (regarding them a certain ‘series’ of persons). In essence, her work here was a theoretical effort to acknowledge the historicity behind the formation of current identity politics, while at the same time expanding the inclusivity of ‘the groups’. To do so, these ‘groups’ would need to accept the flexible and fluid notion of labeling that are based on shared, collective experiences *rather than* strict categorization based on foundational characteristics — for instance, ‘inherent femininity’. However, although we can no longer rely on essentialist labeling of ‘women’, it is still necessary, from a pragmatic point of view, to recognize women as a social collective in order for us to recognize the structural conditions of oppression whose solutions are beyond individuals.

“One reason to conceptualize women as a collective, I think, is to maintain a point of view outside of liberal individualism... *Without conceptualizing women as a*

group in some sense, it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process. If we obey the injunction to think of people only as individuals, then the disadvantages and exclusions we call oppressions reduce to individuals in one of two ways. Either we blame the victims and say that the disadvantaged person's choices and capacities render them less competitive, or we attribute their advantage to the attitudes of other individuals, who for whatever reason don't "like" the disadvantaged ones. *In either case structural and political ways to address and rectify the disadvantage are written out of the discourse, leaving individuals wrestle with their bootstraps.* The importance of being able to talk about disadvantage and oppression in terms of groups exist just as much for those oppressed through race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, and the like as through gender" (p. 192-193, emphasis added).

But to consider women as a collective, it is important that we don't fall back to the modernist essentialist paradigm — of women as 'women', a group that is based on the *a priori* biological sex. So here Young asks, on the formation of political solidarity, "on the basis of what do they come together? What are the social conditions that have motivated the politics?" (p. 197) The key conceptual work here is to differentiate '(voluntary) groups' and what Sartre called as 'series'; "Unlike a group, which forms around actively shared objectives, a series is a social collective whose members are unified *passively* by the objects around which their actions are oriented or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the others" (p. 199, emphasis added). One needs to take notice of the seriality's emphasis on '*passivity*'; the political solidarity of 'series' comes not from a voluntary will but more from the external situation one finds oneself to be in — because of the already-established social relations that have been existing long before s/he was born. S/he is not responsible for this particular social milieu where s/he finds herself to be in, but s/he has no choice but to be engaged with a political project that enhances the status quo of the 'series' of people (which includes oneself) who are also sharing

that particular condition of suffering (e.g. social inequality, injustices, forms of subordination). In that sense, Sartre's seriality is useful for re-thinking the basis of political solidarity of social categories (race, class, gender, and other collective structures) — which we often think of as constituted by their foundational characteristics, such as their skin color, biological sex, or immobile social status determined by the existing economic structure. The point of such re-thinking is ignited by the *radical acceptance of unfixed social identity*, and therefore the fact that these categories (race, class, gender) are just different forms of seriality that are flexible and mobile, which neither necessarily define the identity of individuals nor name attributes they share with others; “[t]hey are material structures arising from people’s historically congealed institutional actions and expectations that position and limit individuals in determinate ways that they must deal with” (p. 207). In this way, ‘women’ as a ‘series’ resolves the dilemma that developed in feminist theory: here, ‘women’ can claim themselves as a social collective, yet without falling into a false essentialism. That is because they find the collective solidarity of their political project *not* from internal attributes of ‘femininity’, *but* from external institutional circumstances in which they find themselves to be in: “[t]here is a unity to the series of women, but it is a *passive* unity, one that does not arise from the individuals called women *but rather positions them through the material organization of social relations as enabled and constrained by the structural relations* of enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of labor” (p. 208, emphasis added).

As a political project, serial collectives — that are dedicated to a political project of changing the status quo — would question a set of structural constraints and relations that condition the *collective* experiences of individuals with the world they’re situated in. To do so,

valuing of historical, collective, shared experiences is necessary, since the unity of the ‘series’ derives from the shared experiences (of subordination) that have been conditioned by historical social structures that materialize certain oppressive environments and backgrounds against particular ‘series’ of people. Linking this back to Butler’s emphasis on how not to underestimate historicity of discourse and power, Young’s conceptual reframing of women as a ‘series’ — with its valorization of collective experiences caused by historical social structures — also underlines the limits of presentist voluntarism. We cannot suddenly ignore the muddy situation that we’re in just because we one day decide to do so. As Butler states, “Performativity describes ... turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not a ‘pure’ opposition, a ‘transcendence’ of contemporary relations of power, but *a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure*” (1993: 141, emphasis added). What this all means for a ‘post-modern’ political project — is that a) we need to consider how our ‘will’ and ‘freedom’ is inevitably conditioned by the historicity of social structures — which necessitates a collective political action rather than liberal individualism b) although, the basis of such political solidarity should not come from already-established *a priori* categorization but rather from shared experiences — which, in turn, allows our political project to be wider and ever-expanding.

4.2. Going beyond melancholia: where to find the ‘good’ or ‘right’ direction of human agency and political articulation — towards more inclusive, positive, future-oriented articulation of the social

One of the problems with this ‘historicity’ approach is that because we try not to forget the experiences of oppression and suffering, we might be at the risk of slipping back into collective melancholia or enclave politics (such as that of identity politics) which causes self-absorption and pessimistic outlook on politics. Butler (1990a; 1990b; 1993)’s significant contribution here has been the fact that she projected a future of feminist politics that goes beyond such melancholia, by proposing possibilities of human agency in forming a collective political articulation that effectively counters the domination of existing power. Her concept of ‘performativity’ precisely advocates for such possibility of political re-articulation or ‘affirmative resignification’ (1993: 240), which emphasize the fact that while individual submission to the historic forces causes melancholia that leads to paralysis and self-destruction, collective and institutional actions taken on that shared memory can trigger a political action (p. 236).

So let us say that agency is granted, there definitely is a possibility of change with which we can break free from historical and structural forces — when we act collectively. But when we consider ourselves finally free from these structures — who decides where we go? Who decides what’s a meaningful, legitimate, affirmative political articulation and movement? Who decides the ‘right’ kind of collective political action or motivation behind it? As Butler asks, “How will we know the difference between the power we promote and the power we oppose?” (p. 241) Butler’s early works do not provide a clear answer to these questions. Her later work, *Precarious Life* (2004), provides some sketches of how such questions of ethics can be addressed in formation of political solidarity. The point of her entry, as the title of the book suggests, is to recognize the vulnerabilities that we all share as selves, communities, cities, countries, or as humans entirely; this leads us to think about our interdependency and mutual responsibilities on/

with one another — my action, my possession, and my privilege can have consequences to you, and yours to me. There is an emphasis on interdependency which gives legitimacy and just reason behind why each of us needs to care about the differences, the undervalued, or the deficiency of the other: we should care about these differences because they are caused by the very action of valuing ours (over the others’) and maintaining the sufficiency on our side. In that sense, *Precarious Life* also brings attention to the value of emotional qualities and abilities with which we can empathize with the others, which are often considered as feminine, irrational, and illogical; although itself being not enough, the ability to understand and sympathize with the positions and situations of the Other is a starting point of political movements, since one can take those emotions, such as grief, as a source of power to imagine a future that could address the cause of these emotions, rather than disregarding them as a sign of weakness or inaction. As Butler (2004) notes, grief may be understood as “a point of departure for a new understanding consideration of the others”, which leads to critically evaluating and opposing the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others. At the same time, however, it should not be just remaining at the level of invoking melancholia; as Butler points out, the real political movement and action driven by grief can be possible only when “the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia can be moved into a consideration of the vulnerability of others. . . . then we critically evaluate and oppose the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others, thus certain human lives are more grievable than others” (p. 30).

Recognizing the interdependency of human lives using the emotional qualities to sympathize with the situations of the Other — renews a ‘humanist’ perspective that basically attempts to assert how all lives matter and how each of our lives are dependent on another. What

would be the implication of such perspective to political movements, or more specifically, what does it say about finding the ethically ‘correct’ and ‘good’ direction of political articulation? Let me be more specific with where I’m going with this. The recent U.S. 2016 presidential election brought our attention to how difficult it is to address the question of ‘who decides’ or ‘on the basis of which we decide’ what are the ‘good’ direction of political solidarity. White, blue-color led “political movements” in rural parts of America voiced themselves to be the ‘minority’ and ‘victims’ of the current knowledge-based economic structure, which did not allow them enough time or resources to make a timely industry transition. To what extent this is true — is a topic for another day; what I mean to point out here that ‘political solidarity’ is not inherently ethical or good, and if we can agree on the fact that such movements are ‘not good’ for our society as a whole — on the basis of which we can claim such ethical judgment, is a difficult question. Butler (2004)’s answer to this question is somewhat vague. She does hint a normative perspective in that we need to re-value the lives that have *not* been previously recognized, represented, or mattered, which goes back to the issue of acknowledging the historicity of current struggles (p. 43). But the implication of this is rather too weak to apply to establishing an ethical ground for judging whether a certain political solidarity, movement, or articulation is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’.

This problem is certainly not a new one, and I would like to draw insights from Laclau and Mouffe’s *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (2001[1985]) which specifically addressed this question. Although this may not necessarily be categorized as ‘feminist social theory’, they used the examples of feminism to clarify their point on the normativity of political solidarity, which later influenced Mouffe (1995)’s work on third wave feminism. While Mouffe’s (1995) was precise with regard to how the future feminism’s political solidarity should not come from

physical attributes of biological sex, Laclau and Mouffe's concern focused on how the future socialists' political solidarity can go beyond the Marxist categorization of 'fundamental' classes. In doing so, they discussed the rise of the 'New Right' and their successful political articulation (pp. 169-175) as well as the future strategies of *how* the Left's political solidarity can differentiate itself from that of right-wing populism (pp. 176, 182-189). Political solidarity and articulation is available for all 'series' of people²; the novelty of the 'new right', according to Laclau and Mouffe, lies in its successful articulation of neoliberal discourse as a series of 'democratic' resistances against the welfare state. Their emphasis on individual liberty and freedom articulates a kind of political solidarity amongst 'the people' who defend traditional values and freedom of enterprise, contesting against the welfare state and all the 'subversives' (feminists, blacks, young people). So, say that the new right has achieved a successful political articulation. How can progressives differentiate their political articulation from that of neo-conservatives? The strategy that Laclau and Mouffe suggest, is to embrace the radicalism of unfixed social identities; to accept that all of these articulations are mere signifiers, and that there is no real 'enemy' or adversaries based on fundamentally fixed identities. Our 'edge', so to speak, is the fact that we don't have definite frontiers that divide 'us' and 'them', which then allows us to expand our movement and integrate all different 'series' of people into our side of the game: "the alternative of the left should consist of locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chains of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression. The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-

² From here on I will be using 'series' whenever I want to emphasize the external conditions that form political solidarity of 'groups', inspired by the Young (1992)'s work on Sartre's seriality that I noted earlier.

democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy” (p. 176).

Their argument says a lot about where to find an ethical compass in the postmodern era. It implies that the logic of equivalence (that of Left’s) should no longer be based upon the fundamental characteristics of subordinated groups (e.g. attributes of gender, class, race), and that it can only be augmented by embracing the unfixity and openness (which are the characteristics of postmodernism) that relies on relative aspects of social identity. Based on this, our social movement and political project can become more inclusive by reaching out to wider audience and expanding to represent more diverse needs and interests of different groups. In this regard, what makes “the progressives” ethically correct — as opposed to the neo-conservatives — comes from the fact that we pursue, unlike them, more inclusive, more future-oriented political project that aims to link up with different social movements for fighting against all different kinds of subordination. The ultimate goal is to link all these different forms of struggles one by one, although this process should not be forced (as in Habermasian ‘all as one group’ consensus approach) — precisely because each of their own historicity and particularities of shared experiences and discourses that have to be respected along the way.

This idea of achieving more inclusive and future oriented, positive articulation of the social — is definitely in line with the implications of Young’s use of Sartre’s seriality. The implication of Sartre’s ‘seriality’ is in fact more than acknowledging historicity of external conditions that formulates ‘a group’. The conceptual switch of the source of group solidarity from ‘a common set of attributes’ to ‘collectively shared experiences conditioned by historical

and social structures' — changes the direction of feminist politics in practice. The direction of their project is *no longer* about advocating only the rights of a certain group ('women') through finding foundational commonalities within 'women' alone and thus drawing boundaries between 'us' and 'them' — *but* it is to be more about expanding their boundary of 'series' via attending to similar collective experiences of oppression and subordination. This transforms feminist politics from a narrow, exclusive agenda to coalition politics that is concerned with all different forms of subordination (not only just that of 'women').

Laclau and Mouffe's stepping away from the Gramscian socialist agenda (p. 137) is also due to the fact that they acknowledge 'class' as a temporary social category, as opposed to 'fundamental class' that determines a group's identity for good. For instance, 'working class' is composed of workers of older generation and younger generation, and the antagonism as well as the political agenda of each group can become diverged — e.g. the political agenda of the young now blame the older working class for their unemployment and job insecurity. Same thing applies to feminism; the political agenda of 'women' can never achieve the totality of all women's agendas, as they differ across generations, races, and classes. Thus, all social identities are floating and never fundamental, always temporary and partial — since historic moments in time would at any moment change our identity, the social collective we belong to, and the agenda we fight for. Simply put, in any historical moment to come, the 'series' that I temporarily belong to — might end up in a situation of subordination that nobody was able to foresee, and consequently, I would end up forming a new 'series' with others that I previously differentiated myself from. In a certain sense, if Laclau and Mouffe proposed something 'essentialistic', it would be this somewhat cautious vision on future (or the condition of 'uncertainty') that we will

eventually in need of each other, and that the shared human interdependency will never be able to forsaken *due to* this very anticipation of “a future historic moment” that nobody can predict or prepare for. And that is precisely the reason why we should always consider how the pursuit of rights of my group is situated within/ in association with the matrices of the other groups’ pursuit of rights and their own interests, which then leads us to pursue “relative autonomy” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]: viii).

If we accept this underlying assumption that comes from a cautious take on uncertainty — which leads to the recognition that I might be in need of you, and you might be in need of me — the utility of ‘seriality’ becomes clearer. Only upon the acceptance of the temporary character of any political solidarity/identity, we can imagine a wider (and more inclusive) political articulation that is able to link up the different kinds of social movements, which would connect us to a larger social agenda and transformative project for a larger audience — for a “positive reconstruction of a new social order” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]: 189) that can address *future challenges to come*. Mouffe’s (1995) projection of the future of feminism is precisely to surpass feminism as enclave politics; she rejected the feminism based on *a priori*, foundational categorization of women because such project is not inclusive or future-forwarding enough to attend to the concerns of other social groups. In other words, if the feminism flourishes at the expense of impeding the rights of working class, it is detrimental to the ultimate goal of achieving a wider democratic equivalence — which will be needed to address all forms of inequality and subordination.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST SOCIAL THEORY IN DEVELOPING ‘ANTI-ESSENTIALIST NORMS’ FOR PLANNING IN PRACTICE

In this section, I discuss how these ideas can inspire anti-essentialist norms for planners. I draw three major themes that we could learn from the evolution of feminist social theory, and translate them into a suite of norms that can help planners to judge ‘whose side’ they should be on — which social groups, networks, or ‘serial collectives’ should be prioritized or taken into account first, especially when planners find themselves in the midst of conflicts of needs or interests among different groups.

5.1. Valuing the historicity of collective experiences: Can these groups’ solidarity be justified by historical experiences and relationships that are currently resulting in negative material consequences on their present socio/economic condition?

What we can learn from Young (1992)’s use of Sartre’s seriality, is the fact that we need to valorize the historical background behind formation of a particular ‘series’ of people. This idea of acknowledging the historicity of shared experiences and social structures (that have caused those experiences of oppression) — is also consistent with Butler’s careful argument for ‘performativity’, which she differentiated from ‘presentist voluntarism’. Butler’s assertion that performativity and human agency should be located within the ‘impurity’ of on-going historic and social structures — implies that we cannot just ignore the current political struggles, and more importantly, the fact that how those struggles are caused by historical social structures that have unjustly prioritized the rights and interests of certain groups over the others. Hence, our work as planners remains on addressing the historicity of on-going social, economic, political

movements and struggles that are present in our cities. To be invested in such historicity means that planning agenda shall be dedicated to addressing structural and more fundamental causes behind the current social problems of inequality and everyday social justice issues. What we have to remind ourselves is the fact that the present relations amongst different social groups (e.g. unequal distribution of resources; unjust relations of subordination) are a product of historical events and experiences; in this context, “doing justice” to the historicity of collective experiences means that we should take them into account when addressing the current conflictual relationship amongst different social groups. Accordingly, when confronted with a situation of ‘whose political project should be prioritized over the others’, planners can ask whether the involved group’s solidarity can be justified by their historical, collective experiences that are currently resulting in negative material consequences on their present socio-economic condition. For instance, the slogan of “Black Lives Matter” is justified in the sense that their collective, historical experiences of subordination — highlighted by continuous unjust treatments during U.S. law enforcement processes; despite of it being temporarily exclusive to African Americans, their voice and their pursuit of a political project should be respected and prioritized given that their present experience of injustice is caused by historical relationships and experiences. As Butler argued for the legitimacy of Black Lives Matter:

“When we are talking about racism, and anti-black racism in the United States, we have to remember that under slavery black lives were considered only a fraction of a human life... One reason we chant “Black Lives Matter” is so important is that it states the obvious but the obvious has not yet been historically realized. So it is a statement of outrage and a demand of equality, for the right to live free of constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt peonage, segregation, and a prison system geared toward the containment, neutralization and degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more and more easily and often can take away a black life in a flash all

because some officer perceives a threat.” (Butler, January 2015, in an interview with *New York Times*)

5.2. Looking for the under-representedness of the social: Have these groups’ rights or interests been under-represented in the current definition of ‘the public’?

However, on the other hand, we should also be cautious of category-based social movements or political projects driven by fixed social categories or social identity. The second wave feminism’s fundamental flaw came from the fact that its essentialist conceptualization of ‘women’ prevented them from recognizing the fact that there are different groups of women (within the ‘women’ category), different challenges and struggles that cannot be represented as just one, unitary agenda. The reason why we find the legitimacy of “Black Lives Matter” *not* in the category of race itself *but* in the historicity of their collective experiences — is to highlight the fact that their political solidarity is formulated by a temporary external condition, rather than an essentialist, fixed concept that is too sure of its comprehensiveness. This differentiation is important because it underlines the temporality of any political solidarity, the fact that it is always partial — and therefore subject to be challenged by those who have been underrepresented in the current labeling and categorization of ‘a group’ (e.g. gender, race, or any other legal categorization). Third wave feminism precisely has begun by the moment where feminists have realized that their previous political agenda — based on the fixed categorization of ‘women’ — is far away from grasping/representing all the different challenges and issues that different groups (under such label of ‘women’) might face. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism begins from the recognition that the fundamental ‘class’ does not exist, and that the ‘labor class’ is in fact

composed of many different types of workers' groups that have different challenges (and therefore different political agendas).

Let us place this theoretical insight in the context of planning in practice. Any policy decision or action that a planning department embarks upon is based on an effort to represent and pursue the interests and rights of 'the public'. In a way, it is also an attempt to form a political solidarity, as planners try to define whose interests and rights they aim to represent and protect, and claim that we all have to come together to pursue certain policy agendas that are based on those definitions and understandings. If we can agree on the fact that making planning decisions — which can either come out of planners' expertise based on their experiences or citizen engagement efforts (i.e. public roundtables/meetings) — is also a kind of forging political solidarity, we should also recognize the fact that these decisions can only partially and temporarily represent the rights and interests of 'the public'. Planners should acknowledge the fact that any planning process driven by the government will have limitations in its perspective.

No matter how much effort we put in to be inclusive and all-embracing, it is not realistically possible to represent the totality of the identities as well as the pursuit of rights/interests of all plural groups, because they all rely on their own collective experiences that is sometimes 'known' or 'felt' only within that group — thus temporarily 'unknown' to planners. For instance, it has been suggested that 'emergent groups' after disaster events are often results of social and political inequality, which led to underrepresented-ness of certain groups' rights and interests (Lindell and Perry, 1992). Dominant groups that produce plans based on their own cultural norms, values, and expectations — may fail to address the needs of minority groups

within the community (Neal and Phillips, 1995). This can lead to neglected groups organizing themselves (i.e. ‘emergent groups’), in order to provide their own assistance to group members or to advocate for their rights (Jon and Purcell, 2018). Such incidents remind planners to be always in a seeking mode for the underrepresented-ness of the social, or who’s being underrepresented, whose lives/interests have been neglected in their current frame of ‘the public’. Accordingly, when faced with a conundrum of “whose side” they should be on, planners should be able to ask this question of whether the emergence of a group’s political project is caused by their under-representedness in the current frame of “the public”. If there could arise an understanding that a certain social group (or a ‘network’)’s collective movement is driven by the lack of recognition or acknowledgement from planners/public sector, planners should be ready to learn from their stories and prioritize their needs over those of the groups who have been conventionally well-represented.

5.3. Evaluating future-orientedness of a political project: Can these groups’ political agenda attempt to create a new positive direction — positive articulation of the social? Do these groups, eventually, attempt to reach out to other groups and create coalition with those who share the similar experiences and stories of underrepresentation and subordination?

Another important lesson that we can draw from the evolution of feminist social theory — from essentialist category-based, second wave feminism to more future-oriented, third wave feminism that aims to expand the beneficiaries of their political project — is the limitations of identity politics. For instance, “Black Lives Matter” is a powerful political project that attempts to bring

about material changes to the everyday lives of African Americans, and one can say that its strength (as a political project) comes from the specific collective experiences that African Americans can identify with or personally relate to. However, one should also recognize the limitation of such approach; as we learned from the third wave feminists, a group's attachment to particular identification can easily lean towards "enclave politics" or "collective melancholia" that closes off its future as a political project by being exclusive to only a certain group of people. In other words, if a political movement driven by a certain group (or 'series') starts to discount the rights/needs of other groups in the name of advocating only for their own rights/needs, how would they be able to differentiate the righteousness of their normativity *from* that of movements based on possessive individualism (e.g. "right wing" populism)? The question here, then, is about how to project what should be the future orientation of a political project, going beyond enclaved politics which may be useful for a short term but can also create exclusivity against other groups in the long term.

Accordingly, in order to go beyond enclaved politics, we would need to acknowledge the proposition of "radically unfixed social identity" — and how that can contribute to the further-expansion of a progressive agenda. By blurring the frontiers that divide 'us' and 'them', we will be able to achieve a wider social movement that reaches a larger audience as well as more beneficiaries (from the movement). The way Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985]) differentiated the Left's social movement from that of neo-conservatism was to emphasize the fact that how the Left's project avoids exclusive prioritization of 'our rights' over 'their rights'. Populist articulations based on possessive individual liberalism cannot survive the logical conclusion of radical unfixity; its essentialist principle of 'pursuit of individual liberty trumps all other

principles' would always require them to form adversaries and enemies with *fixed* social position, because their projects are continuously in need of proving how their rights, interests and pursuit of liberty should be prioritized by all means — regardless of how that would negatively affect other groups' pursuit of the same. In the end, such approach fails to address the future-orientedness of a political project, because the creation of exclusive groups hinders our ability to weather through the uncertainty of future challenges that may necessitate solidarity across all 'series'. In other words, in any future historic moment to come, we might end up in a condition that would require us to form alliances/solidarity with 'the others' that we previously differentiated ourselves from. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) took an example of the condition of an oppressive regime (or "monopolization of economic power"), against which all different 'series' will form solidarity with one another *for a greater goal* (p. 132). In the end, the 'uncertainty' of future — which prevents us from fully knowing or planning for what will happen — becomes an occasion where we start recognizing our interdependency on one another, or the fact that we would eventually be in need of each other despite the current historic condition (of inequality) that may *temporarily* create barriers between us.

Therefore, in order to maintain this future-forwarding perspective — while staying "political" — we should be able to foresee how we would achieve a wider articulation of different political projects and solidarities for a "positive organization of the social" or "positive reconstruction of the social fabric" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]: 189) — that can be as inclusive as possible. As Laclau and Mouffe noted:

"... no hegemonic project can be based exclusively on a democratic logic, but must also consist of a set of proposals for the positive organization of the social. If the demands of a

subordinated group are presented purely as negative demands subversive of a certain order, without being linked to any viable project for the reconstruction of specific areas of society, their capacity to act hegemonically will be excluded from the outset. This is the difference between what might be called a ‘strategy of opposition’ and a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’. In the case of the first, the element of negation of a certain social or political order predominates, but this element of negativity is not accompanied by any real attempt to establish different nodal points from which a process of different and positive reconstruction of the social fabric could be instituted — and as a result the strategy is condemned to marginality. This is the case with the different versions of ‘enclave politics’, whether ideological or corporative. In the case of the strategy of construction of a new order, in contrast, the element of social positivity predominates, but this very fact creates an unstable balance and a constant tension with the subversive logic of democracy.” (p. 189)

Subsequently, they argue how the normative orientation of progressive politics should not be just based on “a set of anti-system demands” — rather, it should be based on their capacity for proposing a wider, systematic, “hegemonic direction” and “positive reconstruction” that could address and respond to all different forms of subordinations or the issues that different subordinated groups go through.

If we could situate this insight into ‘how to prioritize one group over the other’, planners can look into such future-orientedness of a political project that different groups propose. Accordingly, the criteria for evaluating groups can be based on these questions: Can these groups’ political agenda attempt to create a new positive direction — a future-oriented, socially progressive vision that is broad enough to address different experiences of subordination? In other words, Do these groups, eventually, attempt to reach out to other groups and create coalition with those who share the similar experiences and stories of underrepresentation and subordination? These questions can provide a normative perspective through which planners can gauge the legitimacy and ethical appropriateness of a political project, eventually differentiating

progressive social movements from collective lobbying based on possessive liberal individualism (e.g. NIMBY-ism or “right wing” populism). Accordingly, when planners encounter the kinds of political projects or “movements” that proliferate the exclusivity against other groups — rather than proposing an inclusive, future-oriented vision that could achieve a wider articulation of the social, they should be more cautious of how such movements may negatively affect the rights of other groups, and eventually, play a role of patrolling them.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has taken on an ambitious project of sketching a normative perspective for planning — yet a norm that is ‘anti-essentialist’ in the sense that it is not based on fundamental or *a priori* concepts. The necessity of embarking on such an initiative was predicated on the idea that current developments of planning theory, by placing more and more emphasis on flexibility and open-ended aspects of postmodern planning approach, are letting go of the question of normativity or related accounts of social justice. Can postmodern concepts and theoretical standpoint propose a basis for normativity? Previous efforts on normative approach to planning in postmodern era — such as those of Soja (1997) and Sandercock (1998), have been criticized for “using” postmodern concepts for “forcing” a politically progressive agenda, taking such progressive direction itself as an *a priori* position (see Allmendinger, 2011 for more detailed criticism). In response to such critique, what I attempted to do here is to suggest that postmodern concepts *themselves* support or even direct us towards striving for democratic/egalitarian values. In that way, pursuing democratic/egalitarian values are not just a baseline that we begin from

(basically, *a priori*), but a kind of ‘a priori’ that can be deduced and theoretically/logically driven by the adoption of postmodern concepts.

Accordingly, the main work of this paper was to demonstrate how postmodern concepts can be the basis of political solidarity and subsequently, a normative direction of planning agenda. In doing so, I studied the works of political theorists who have been working on normativity and political solidarity within the postmodern paradigm (anti-essentialist, anti-Cartesian) — most of whom are inspired by envisioning the future paths of feminism. I investigated how feminist political theorists, by using postmodern radical acceptance of ‘unfixed social identity’, find a way to go beyond identity politics while still being firmly rooted in their initial political motivation for addressing social inequalities. Two major themes were identified from this investigation. The first theme is to recognize the historicity of the shared experiences of subordination caused by the current on-going limitations of social structures, which then leads us to acknowledge the necessity of social collectives for political movements and actions asking for a concrete, material social change. However, in order to find the source of solidarity not from essentialist categories or conceptualization but from temporary, external, historic condition, I adopted Young’s use of ‘seriality’ in legitimizing political solidarity for feminism. The second theme is with regard to achieving more inclusive and positive articulation of the social, which attempts to link up different social movements by proposing a future-oriented vision. This perspective concerns the efforts to go beyond the risk of identity politics falling into collective melancholia or enclave politics that proliferate the idea of exclusivity, or the division between “us” and “them”. In fact, this second theme is closely tied with the first theme’s use of ‘seriality’ in that such inclusive, positive linkage across different political projects can be possible upon

acknowledging the temporary character of any political solidarity. In other words, if we can agree on the fact that political solidarity does not come from fundamental or internally fixed attributes (e.g. “inherent” femininity, skin color, or ‘fundamental’ classes) but from an external condition that necessitates a formation of collective movement — articulating or linking up different political projects through pursuing a more inclusive social vision becomes a true possibility.

Drawing from these theoretical lessons, I have provided three ‘criteria’ for planners to judge which networks, groups, or ‘series’ should be prioritized over the others. The first criterion is whether these groups’ solidarity and political agenda could be justified by historical experiences and relationships — which are currently resulting in negative material consequences on their present socio/economic condition; the ‘historicity’ approach reminds us of how the present relations amongst different social groups are a product of historical events and experiences, and that we should take them into account when prioritizing certain groups’ needs more than the others. The second criterion is whether an emergence of a group’s political project (i.e. collective action or movement) is caused by their under-representedness in the current frame of ‘the public’; acknowledging the partiality of any political solidarity — the fact that it is not realistically possible for a political solidarity to be all-embracing and completely comprehensive — would help planners to realize how there could be under-represented needs, interests, or rights of certain groups that are neglected in the current definition or framework of ‘the public’. Upon such realization, planners would need to pay more attention to listening to the groups whose needs and rights have been underrepresented. Finally, the third criterion concerns whether these groups’ political agenda has a broader, inclusive vision that proposes a possibility of linking up

with other political projects or collective initiatives. According to this criterion, if a group's political project only promotes exclusivity (of defending their own needs/interests) — rather than being a part of a wider social movement that could bring about changes to all different forms of subordination — it is possible that such movement should be controlled or limited by planners.

The openness and unfixity that postmodernity defends, in my opinion, does not call for a relativistic position in planning. Postmodernism has been an inspiration for third wave feminist politics and their social movements, for its defense of openness and unfixity (of social identities) opened up an another terrain for feminists to explore where to find political solidarity without the modernist categorization of gender. But more importantly, the openness of postmodernity also provided an opportunity for feminist theorists to widen their basis of solidarity — by reaching out to other marginalized 'series' who share the similar historical experiences of subordination. It is my suggestion that planning, as a form of political action that calls for political solidarity within 'the public' it aims to represent, can draw insights from these ideas in order to find some normative directions towards a more inclusive and just city. In that regard, postmodern planning theorists should not only be concerned with the openness and flexibility of planning process, but also should actively create the linkage of how anti-essentialist ideas can inspire the kinds of planning practices that do not step away from the issues of social justice — which is closely tied to achieving planning's purpose of serving a wider public.

Chapter 2 : LOCATING POLITICAL NORMATIVITY OF RESILIENCE: A CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH TO THEORIZING “PROGRESSIVE RESILIENCE”

ABSTRACT

This literature review aims to respond better to the current debates on political implications of resilience. In the disciplines of planning and disaster management, resilience is considered as a positive and normatively ‘good’ concept that we should all pursue. On the other hand, the disciplines of geography and international development consider resilience as having negative political implications, arguing that it is just another word for justifying fiscal decentralization or neoliberal account of self-sufficiency. The debates on whether resilience is a ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ concept has *not* been constructive since each side cherry-picked different notions of resilience without taking account of contextual specificities where resilience was used. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a set of criteria through which one can gauge the political normativity of applying the concept of ‘resilience’. And yet in order to draw such criteria, a thorough classification across geographic and political spectra of applying resilience — accompanied by a close reading of contextual elements in different sets of literature — was necessary. Based on the results of such exercise, the paper discusses a potential set of criteria that could determine such political normativity of the resilience concept: 1) human relationship with nature and the use of local knowledge; 2) applicability of “holistic approach”; 3) acknowledgment of human collectivity in identifying operationalisers of resilience; 4) adequate governmental support and connection with population in the pursuit of “resilience” agenda.

1. INTRODUCTION

The critical problem with the current writings on resilience is the fact that the researchers just *cherry-pick* some notions of resilience *out of the contexts* in which they were used, and then apply them into their own field of research without considering the differences between the contexts. For instance, the academic articles on resilience (such as Klein et al. 2003) often place Carpenter et al. (2001) (whose approach is equivalent to that of Folke et al. 2002) and Handmer and Dovers (1996) on the same shelf by lumping them together into Holling-nian ecological resilience. However, when one takes a closer look, it can be observed that there are significant differences across the contexts of examples (or stories, case studies, evidences) that researchers/writers use to demonstrate their own notion of ‘resilience’. More specifically, Carpenter et al. (2001) and Folke et al. (2002) introduced ‘resilience’ in the context of natural resource management — which typically unfolds in rural areas where the livelihood of the communities are closely connected to the nature (fishing, agriculture, etc). On the other hand, Handmer and Dovers (1996) discussed ‘resilience’ in the context of the international community’s dilemma in pursuing a general urban sustainability agenda (with the arrival of climate change), pointing out that some approaches of ‘resilience’ often get translated into justifying gradual changes that only benefits (and does not interfere with) the elites and the powerful. Although the concept itself can be recognized as trans-disciplinary, homogenizing the notions (or interpretations) of resilience used by different writers — without carefully considering the different contexts where the concept is applied to — easily attracts the kinds of criticisms that overgeneralize what ‘resilience approach’ implies.

The very motivation of this paper begins from how to respond to/ engage in a discussion with a typical critique on resilience, which asks whether ‘resilience’ is just another sheer pro-environment political discourse that rationalizes neoliberal governance. Scholars, mainly from the geography literature, have pointed out that resilience discourse — which emphasizes local community’s capacity to “self-organize” — can easily become a technique of governance to off-load responsibilities to individuals, institutions, and economies, rendering them accountable for their own adaptation and survival (Welsh, 2014). For these scholars, resilience is a conservative term when applied to social sphere, since it “close[s] off wider questions of progressive social change” (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012: 254). Joseph (2013) discussed resilience as “embedded neoliberalism” — a form of governmentality that emphasizes individual responsibility: resilience theory underlines the need for adaptability at the unit level, and such idea of self-reliance and human adaptability can easily be taken up by neoliberal discourse and practices where citizens are ‘free’ to take responsibility for their own life choices. Most recently, Romain Felli (2014) noted international organizations’ neoliberal use of resilience as maintaining the status quo without structural changes that can genuinely address environmental issues.

Such cautionary remarks on resilience cannot be easily shrugged off. Even the proponents of resilience — such as McEntire (2002; 2005) and Reghezza-Zitt et al. (2012) — hinted whether the current direction towards resilience is in fact worse off than the previously-dominant ‘vulnerability approach’ that used to address the structural issues of poverty and inequality. As McEntire noted, the social vulnerability school (O’Keefe et al., 1976; Hewitt, 1983; Britton, 1986; Peacock et al., 1997; Wisner et al., 2004) was highly critical of the global capitalist economic system, and suggested the need to alter power structures and change political/

economic ideologies if disasters are to be reduced (Wisner et al., 2004). Resilience approach, however, takes up a different approach in that its emphasis on “empowerment”, “self-sufficiency”, “adaptive capacity” often overshadow the structural or root causes that created the vulnerability of certain groups in the first place. Therefore, Reghezza-Zitt and colleagues (2012) ask whether the resilience approach brings back the moral interpretation of disasters, which “stigmatizes those who do not participate in resilience’s process, without any attempt to understand the *causes* for their ‘passivity’” (line 51).

But what do we exactly mean by “resilience approach”, though? As the notions of resilience adopted by scholars, planners, and policy makers are difficult to generalize, the approaches inspired by the resilience concept can significantly vary across the contexts where the resilience concept is applied. In other words, the way in which ‘resilience’ is operationalized into a practice of urban planning or disaster management really depends on the geographic and political spectra that each unique context has. For instance, as we will discuss further, while resilience approach in the urban planning field only pertains to the areas and actors within the jurisdictional boundaries, resilience approach in disaster management often deals with inter-jurisdictional areas as well as applying a broader spectra of political actors involved in practicing resilience. In the context of international development, from which the critics of resilience mainly draw their examples, the political spectra is even larger as it is based on the actions of international development organizations (typically large INGOs such as UN or Oxfam) who are involved with projects in developing countries (i.e. aid-receiving countries). In order to constructively engage ourselves in a debate on what kinds of resilience approach we should be wary of — in that it may end up as a cover up of offloading responsibilities to individuals —

there is an urgent need to map out different notions of resilience, especially with regard to recognizing the differences in geographic and political spectra that each academic field is immersed with when practicing or operationalizing resilience.

Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to provide a set of criteria through which one can gauge the political normativity of applying the concept of ‘resilience’. And yet in order to draw such criteria, a thorough classification across geographic and political spectra of applying resilience — accompanied by a close reading of contextual elements in different sets of literature — was necessary. Based on the results of such exercise, the paper discusses a potential set of criteria that could determine such political normativity of the resilience concept: 1) human relationship with nature and the use of local knowledge; 2) applicability of “holistic approach”; 3) acknowledgment of human collectivity in identifying operationalisers of resilience; 4) adequate governmental support and connection with population in the pursuit of “resilience” agenda.

2. THE NEED FOR CONTEXT-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF RESILIENCE

The existing literature reviews on resilience have been successful in documenting and summarizing the definitions of resilience being used by different authors, yet not necessarily looking into the specific contexts where those definitions were used. While Manyena (2006)’s review examined some of the contexts and examples used by different authors, it was only to underline various conceptual components of resilience (e.g. whether resilience is understood as a outcome, process, or quality of a community). Furthermore, the major part of Manyena’s review was dedicated to differentiating the concept of resilience from that of vulnerability, framing

‘resilience’ only within disasters context. On the other hand, Norris et al. (2007)’s review was more comprehensive in that they drew literature from more diverse disciplines, but they also focused on analyzing definitions — rather than considering particularities of the contexts where resilience was used. The reason why there is lack of consideration on the contextual particularities — comes from the fact that the ultimate purpose of their articles was to propose ‘resilience’ as a normatively ‘good’ agenda for building community capacity (especially in response to disasters). In sum, Manyena (2006) and Norris et al. (2007)’s reviews were limited for three reasons: 1) they only focused on analyzing resilience based on a range of different definitions, not specific contexts where it was used; 2) their concern on how to operationalize the concept only remained in disasters context — therefore unable to provide insights on how the implications of *their* resilience (in disasters context) may be different from the implications of resilience in other disciplines (environmental sciences, land use planning, international development, etc); 3) they consider resilience as a normatively ‘good’ agenda to follow, in the sense that there is no consideration on how the concept may be ‘abused’ in the face of political realities.

Other more recent literature reviews on resilience (Bahadur et al., 2013; Meerow et al., 2015) also aimed to unify the definition of resilience itself, without deeply reflecting upon the specific contextual differences of where the concept is applied. For instance, Meerow et al. (2015) provided a very extensive review on resilience from multiple disciplines, however their criteria were based only on the stated definitions and co-citation analysis (using mutual citation counts as a way to identify ‘clusters’ of writers using resilience), underlining which definition has been the most influential of all. Their article provided an analysis on conceptual tensions

among the different uses of resilience, but this was done without noting the contextual differences or disciplinary interests. Such efforts to understand resilience as ‘one unified concept’ can be useful in capturing the current academic account of resilience. However, they can also easily lead to over-generalization, which then attracts criticisms that outrightly reject resilience without considering how the concept can be manifested differently depending on contextual specificities. Going further, the articles that they analyzed all considered resilience as a positive concept (p. 43) — which is far away from a comprehensive account of resilience, since there are other closely related disciplines that discussed resilience as having negative political/social implications. In which specific context can resilience, as a flexible concept, have positive or negative implications?

Accordingly, one of the main limitations of “definition-based” literature reviews comes from the fact that the flexibility of the resilience concept makes its meaning/implication entirely dependent on the *context* in which it was used. The basic definition of ‘resilience’ remains more or less universal; it is generally understood as the capacity to “bounce back” to the normal functioning after a shock, although there has been debates on how “the normal” should be defined. The popularity of resilience began from the adoption of Holling (1973)’s ecological resilience into the contexts of social systems; Holling’s ecological resilience argued for the kinds of ‘resilient quality’ that not only withstand external shocks but also recognize the opportunities that a disturbance opens up in terms of renewal of the system or emergence of new trajectories (Folke, 2006). Here, resilience becomes the capacity to ‘bounce forward for the better’, with a somewhat darwinistic attitude which could be summarized as ‘sacrifice can be made for the survival of the better-fitted ones’. And this is where the controversy on resilience begins: who

decides what's "better", or the direction of "forward"? If a physical shock — earthquake, flood, or any kind of unexpected natural hazards events — can be considered as a "good thing" that promotes us to be "better", does it mean that the people who were impacted by these events — mostly due to their lack of economic/political resources — somehow 'deserved' such outcomes for the 'betterment' of a society as a whole? In such normative discussions, literature reviews on the definition itself fall short, for political implications or normativity of the concept cannot be revealed on the basis of 'how authors define it'. What matters more here is how they applied and used the concept in which specific contexts and examples, and more specifically, from where their motivation to adopt this concept has begun and why — most of which are dependent on each of their own disciplinary interests.

Therefore, in order to create a set of criteria for judging the political normativity of 'resilience' concept — which is the purpose of this article — more context-based understanding of how the concept is being used across different disciplines becomes necessary. For instance, Reghezza-Zitt et al. (2012)'s literature review discussed how to determine positive or negative implications of resilience, noting that there should be more systematic distinction with regard to different temporal and spatial scales (e.g. city scale? regional scale? national scale?) in understanding the use of 'resilience' — in order to avoid empty debates on who's right or wrong about the normativity of the concept. Their literature review underlined the importance of contextual understanding of resilience, if we were to critique and discuss the concept in a more constructive way.

Building upon such effort, this paper aims to map out the contextual differences across academic disciplines, using the variables that could provide more clarification on the political implications in their application of ‘resilience’. In order to do so, I focused on analyzing the examples or stories that authors used to demonstrate their notions of resilience — rather than definitions that they claim to use. This is precisely because, the purpose of doing this context-based literature review is not to unify the divergent definitions or understandings, but to clarify the political implication of resilience by mapping out the clusters of contexts where resilience concept was used. Based on this context-based understanding of resilience — which helps determining in what specific context resilience has positive or negative political implications — I will propose in the discussion section a set of criteria for judging the political normativity of applying resilience.

3. CATEGORIZING THE USE OF RESILIENCE ACROSS DIFFERENT DISCIPLINARY CONTEXTS

There are three “camps” (or clusters) that could be identified as sharing similar disciplinary contexts: “Ecology Camp”, “Public Policy Camp”, and “Geography Camp”. The “Ecology Camp” is composed of the disciplinary contexts such as natural resource management or environmental sciences, which are primarily concerned with how ‘resilience’ reminds us of the relationship between human and nature. Their disciplinary interests are sustainable, symbiotic human-nature relationship and maintaining high level of bio-diversity, potentially invoking the idea of environmental protectionism — asking human behaviors and decisions to be responsible for their consequences on nature. Accordingly, in their application of resilience, the recognition

of relationship between human-nature relationship is strong, which is an important characteristic that sets them apart from the application of resilience by other academic disciplines. As a result, their perception of temporal spectrum of resilience is very long, as they are concerned with how ecosystem functions respond to human collective actions and institutional decisions (e.g. the effects of pollution on agriculture productivity or bio-diversity in the long term). The political normativity of ‘resilience’ is positive in this camp; for them, the concept of resilience is an opportunity to promote the co-constitutive, symbiotic relationship between ecosystems and human social systems — which can be translated into our collective will to be more conscious about the impacts of human actions on nature.

<i>Contexts</i>	<i>Ecology Camp</i>		<i>Public Policy Camp</i>			<i>Critical Geography Camp</i>	
	<i>Natural Resource Management</i>	<i>Environmental Sciences</i>	<i>Urban Planning</i>	<i>Hazards Studies</i>	<i>Public Administration</i>	<i>Security Studies</i>	<i>International Development</i>
<i>Human-nature relationship</i>	Strong; symbiotic relationship between human and nature		Medium; negative impacts of natural events on urban form	Medium; negative impacts of natural events on human life	Low; challenges of unpredictable hazards on institutional organizations	N/A	
<i>Temporal spectrum</i>	Long; feedback loop based on ecological system		Medium; based on urban functioning	Medium; based on human collective capacity	Short; based on immediate organizational response	Short; individual response to disasters using one's own resources	
<i>Political normativity of resilience</i>	Positive; resilience reminds us the relationship between ecosystems and social systems		Positive; resilience is a collective human and institutional capacity for cities and communities to develop, which helps us initiate new policy approaches under unpredictable circumstances			Negative; resilience is only an excuse to offload government responsibilities onto individuals	

Table 2-1. A brief summary of how ‘resilience’ is interpreted/used in different contexts, across academic disciplines (and “camps”).

On the other hand, the “Public Policy Camp” perceives nature and natural events as adversaries that humans have to guard against, for which “planning” or “public policy”

initiatives are executed in order to protect citizens from the unpredictability of natural hazards events. Accordingly, the temporal spectrum of resilience is much shorter, as it concerns only the rapid functioning of human-driven systems (urban forms, neighborhood collectives, institutional organizations) to respond and adapt to natural hazards risks or impacts — their disciplinary interests do not cover ecosystem functions or the relationship between human and nature. In their positivist-driven attitude of making difference via policy initiatives, their notion of political normativity of ‘resilience’ is positive; it is a positive term that signifies our collective capacity to overcome (or “bounce back”) from adversities that natural hazards present, which can inspire us to initiate new policy approaches in the face of unpredictable circumstances.

The “Critical Geography Camp” is the cluster that is most critical of the concept of ‘resilience’, often referring it as a cover-up for neoliberalism — its emphasis on “self-sufficiency” or “capacity building” is merely a mask that disguises “offloading of responsibilities onto individuals”, with which the government withdraws its responsibilities on social needs. This is primarily because their disciplinary interests are concerned with criticizing or critically evaluating national level policies (e.g. security studies) or the practices of international non-profit organizations (e.g. international relations/ development). In their references of resilience, there is no notion of human-nature relationship, as their focus remains only on criticizing market-driven institutional decisions or other governmental decisions to cut down public expenses — which are legitimized by their campaigns to encourage individuals and local communities to be self-sufficient and therefore “resilient” on their own. Accordingly, the temporal spectrum of their version of resilience is short, as it mainly concerns the capacity of individuals and households to respond to external shocks caused by hazards events.

By grouping different disciplines according to their similarities in contextual elements — into three major camps — it can be noticed how the normative perspective of each camp essentially differs from one another, mainly due to each of their own distinctive disciplinary interests. For instance, “Ecology Camp” fails to recognize the normativity of resilience on social problems (inequality, poverty, unequal distribution of resources), since their primary focus is placed on maintaining the symbiotic relationship between humans and nature — its normative assertion would only concern human actions on nature and environment. As for “Public Policy Camp”, mainly due to their positivistic outlook and framing of the world (“problem-solving” approach via policies as “fixing tools”), they often fail to acknowledge some unintended consequences or manipulation of the concept by the existing power relations — such as “offloading of responsibilities” or “societalization/individualization of risk” (noted by “Critical Geography Camp”). On the other hand, due to their critical perspective on government actions in general, researchers in “Critical Geography Camp” often fail to recognize the practical or useful sides of resilience in terms of disaster policy or planning initiatives (e.g. going beyond protection/prevention approach), and the fact that resilience can also be translated into opportunities for other non-governmental actors to intervene into governance and planning (e.g. widening knowledge-base through more inclusive/participatory approach to governance, or appreciation of local and vernacular knowledges). In addition, they also fail to see how the concept of resilience invokes the idea of human-nature relationship, or the consideration on the impacts of human actions on ecosystem functions.

In the following sub-sections, I will explore more in detail how the concept of resilience has been introduced and used across the different academic disciplines, focusing on the aspects

that could help clarify the political implications of resilience. By examining the context of *examples* and stories that were used by the researchers in their writing, I will parse out the uses and notions of resilience especially on the following aspects: 1) how the concept was introduced to each discipline (history and motivation behind it); 2) the specific examples where the resilience concept of applied; 3) the authors' attempts to measure the quality of resilience; 4) recognized resource dependency (of human/institutional systems) on natural resources; 5) the spectrum of actors who practice resilience in their examples. Comparing the history and motivation behind different authors' adoption of resilience to their discipline — as well as their efforts to materialize the concept through proposing measurements — reveals in more detail the specific use of the concept across disciplines/contexts, which then helps the formulation of criteria on gauging the political normativity of the concept. In this paper, the 'positive' political normativity implies the promotion of policy agendas that concern rethinking our relationship with nature as well as building our collective will to weather through uncertainty. On the other hand, the 'negative' political normativity corresponds to the scenarios that critical geographers envisioned — i.e. resilience becoming an excuse to offload responsibilities onto individuals, while the government withdraws its support on social needs (see Table 1).

3.1. Ecology Camp: Rural Sociology and Environmental Sciences

In discussing the use of resilience theory in ecology, there could be two subfields that can be divided depending on the contexts of the examples used by the authors: rural sociology (overlapping with agricultural economics) and environmental sciences. One of the most

fundamental aspects when discussing resilience within the context of ecology is how humanity is a part of the whole eco-system and we should accustom our behaviors so as to make the system sustainable both for nature and for us humans. The idea of symbiotic, sustainable *co-existence* of human society and nature is the key in understanding resilience in the field of ecology.

In the case of rural sociology and agricultural economics, the examples of resilience are often demonstrated in the context of natural resource management or coastal rural communities in the face of climate change. For instance, Adger (2000) discussed ‘resilience’ by taking an example of North Vietnam coastal communities’ aquaculture and agricultural conversion of mangroves. In this example, the natural ecosystem (mainly mangrove resources) is closely related to the livelihood system of coastal (human) communities. Accordingly, resilience of these communities are measured by the ability of the community to maintain sustainable common property management of the remaining mangrove and fishing areas. Resilient common property management, according to Adger (2000), “is enhanced through the users co-operating on the basis of relatively equitable share of the benefits of use and the critical role of the resource in their livelihood stability” (p. 359). This article shows how social and ecological resilience are connected, especially in the context of natural resource management where the livelihoods of communities are dependent on the bearings of natural resources. Thus sustainable resource management is beneficial for the nature and in human communities in the long term, which is the goal of practicing resilience. Another article that uses similar notion of resilience is that of Tompkins and Adger (2004), who discussed resilience in the context of sustainable resource management — in the case of preserving coral reefs. In this work, Tompkins and Adger (2004) consider resilience as a synonym of “adaptive capacity”, arguing that “Adaptive capacity, which

is often used to refer to the set of preconditions that enables individuals or groups to respond to climate change (Olsson and Folke 2001, Brooks 2003, Berkhout et al. 2004), is a synonym for many characteristics of resilience”. Accordingly, they discuss resilience as practices related to some form of the “customary management” in natural resource management, which means, how the indigenous communities have successfully weathered through the threats to their livelihoods caused by climate change. In their main example, “How co-management promotes resilience for climate change adaptation in Trinidad and Tobago”, the authors discuss the importance of protecting coral reefs and other marine ecosystem mainly because they are closely related to the livelihoods of the community — which is based on tourism industry. Maintaining healthy marine ecosystem for these island countries is extremely crucial because they have a huge stake in influencing social and economic life of the community. And coral reefs and mangroves are important because they protect island from storm and wave damage.

Folke et al. (2010) also adopts a similar notion of resilience, as they discussed resilience as something that comes out of human action in relation to natural resources. Their article focuses on the negative impacts of human action on natural resources, such as over-exploitation. In this context, the resilience can be observed by looking at how agricultural communities overcome land productivity crisis and subsequent social crisis of deteriorated livelihoods. The measures to enhance the ability to deal with this better (i.e. resilience) are the ability to apply more sustainable agricultural practices, such as weed management or green manuring techniques, or no-till systems. Another example used is Australia’s Great Barrier Reef management, the strategies to enhance resilience under the conditions of overharvesting and global warming were:

organizational learning (internal re-organization and management innovation), increasing public awareness of environmental issues, involving a broader set of stakeholders, among others.

Subsequently, one can observe that, in these contexts of ‘resilience’ — in the field of rural sociology, agricultural economics, and therefore natural resource management — the functioning of human social system and natural ecosystem are closely connected. In this context, practicing resilience means that the government organizations perform more inclusive approach to decision making processes. For them, social and ecological resilience could be enhanced by engaging key stakeholders in a process of information dissemination and dialog to explore their preferences for managing the area. They argue that “inclusionary and integrated learning-based coastal management” contributes in resilience because, 1) expanded networks of engagement act is a resource in coping with weather extremes, and, 2) learning in groups can more effectively incorporated into management processes in informal institutions. Obviously, these are small rural countries where deliberate democracy can be achieved through direct dialogues.

In the case of environmental sciences, on the other hand, resilience is perceived more as a quality of natural ecosystem (environment), not so much as a quality of human/social systems. The scholars involved in such research is interested in the relationship between humans and ecological processes mutually influencing each other, and intend to measure resilience by *how well the nature responds* to the consequences of decisions made by human organizations or social systems. Notable example of such approach is Alberti et al. (2003)’s work, who suggested “resilience” to be measured as species-diversity in a populated urban areas. The focus of “resilience” here in large part is consisted of their ecological interests in how nature responds to

the consequences of urbanization and agglomeration, which is resulted from the institutional decisions made by humans. Accordingly, they consider resilience as biological diversity (e.g. species diversity), “because species perform diverse ecological functions and ecologists have proposed that an increase in species richness also increases functional diversity (Tilman et al., 1996) and resilience (Peterson et al., 1998)”. What seems to be missing in their application of ecological understanding to urban systems, however, is the fact that while biodiversity can be an indicator of resilience for natural ecosystems — one should also consider more deeply on whether that could really be an indicator of resilience that represents the sustainability of *social* systems (e.g. human institutional ability to weather through environmental changes). Consequently, ‘resilience’ used in environmental sciences often overlook the human aspects of resilience; “adaptive capacity” here means the capacity of natural systems to bounce back from the environmental harms done by the humans, which is very different from urban planning or hazards planning’s understanding of ‘resilience’ which mainly use the concept to represent the capacity of human communities or institutions for weathering through the environmental hazards (earthquakes, flooding, etc.).

This leads to a conclusion that the resilience discussed in environmental sciences may not have practical relevance for urban planning/disaster management in that 1) its resilience does not address the capacity of ‘human’ systems, and therefore 2) it lacks the consideration on what the promotion of ‘resilience’ implies in planning and policy; if all they argue for is the protection of environment — represented by biodiversity — how is it different from promoting sustainability? Do we really need to use ‘resilience’ here? Yet, on a more positive note, once can also draw some broad “lesson” of their version of resilience to urban planning. For instance, their proposal of

cities as “complex systems” calls for a holistic approach to understanding the the ways things work in urban setting, which is crowded with multiple stakeholders, institutions, physical infrastructures, in addition to the ecosystem functions that cause hazards events (e.g. fire, flooding, etc).

Let us summarize, to clearly note the political implications of ‘resilience’ applied in ecology discipline (rural sociology and environmental sciences). As for rural sociology and agricultural economics (represented by Adger, 2000, Folke et a, 2010), their resilience call for more inclusive approach to natural resource management, such as customary management that prioritizes contextually competent knowledges that are earned from the inhabitants’ collective experiences. This can lead to the kinds of knowledge practices that are more inclusive, participatory, and polyvocal, taking account of plural perspectives and wisdom accumulated through experiences and personal histories — rather than merely prioritizing ‘expert’ knowledges made from the bird’s eye view (Jon, 2018). As for environmental sciences, their resilience has completely different meaning in that it is measured by bio-diversity rather than capacity of human community/institutions. Focusing on human activity being integrated into a part of entire ecosystem, it proposes more ‘systemic’ or holistic approaches to disaster management that considers the interactions between human decisions and ecosystem functions, *going beyond* instant symptom-fixing approaches with temporary, short-term outcomes (e.g. preventing flooding by building dams or barriers that blocks the river flow, ignoring the questions of biodiversity in the habitat). The political implications of such research can be understood as, 1) on the one hand, a critique on engineering resilience (e.g. instant and short-sighted problem fixing approach), and, 2) on the other hand, promoting environmental protectionism, which

prioritizes preserving natural ecosystem and its functioning as the main goal for achieving the kind of “resilience” that allows the peaceful co-existence of human and non-human beings.

3.2. Public Policy Camp: Urban Planning, Hazards Studies, and Public Administration

The use of resilience theory has become very popular in the field of urban planning, as well as in public administration literature that specifically concerns crisis/emergency management. The important commonalities between them is the fact that they are more and more concerned with the catastrophic impacts of natural hazards on human communities, and therefore these literature start regarding “nature” as something we need to protect ourselves from. Another important point that should be noted is the fact that, unlike the context of rural sociology where resilience theory was used, the ecological functions are not directly related to the livelihoods (or economy) of the urban communities. Indeed, the threat from natural hazards would have impacts on the urban form or the way we build (and therefore lives of the citizens) however the linkage is much weaker than the contexts where the communities are dependent on nature-based industries such as agriculture, aquaculture, or nature-tourism.

But there is a critical difference between the influence of resilience theory on urban planning and on emergency management. In the context of urban planning, it is often closely associated with “sustainable development” in that the environmental threats that they recognize mainly concern climate-change-driven events such as flooding or other events caused by weather extremes. At the same time, its “strategies” of enhancing resilience often entail prevention or mitigation approach, as primary concern for planning is protecting physical structures (e.g.

buildings) or maintaining the functioning of utilities infrastructures (e.g. electricity, transportation). Consequently, as I discuss further below, the objective of practicing resilience here is to avoid or minimize the potential physical impacts of a disaster by land use regulations (e.g. restricting development in hazard areas) or maintaining protective features of natural environment (e.g. wetlands or sand dunes).

On the other hand, resilience theory in public administration focuses more on the post-priori context of disasters. Highly contingent catastrophes, such as earthquake or volcano eruptions, are not necessarily consequences of human actions, and therefore the symbiotic, co-existential relationship between human and nature (i.e. if we behave well, nature will treat us well) doesn't get firmly established here. Rather, nature would create some adversity for us, and it's our job to come up with ways to deal with them in a more efficient or more creative manner. When pushed to its limits, the *cause* of a crisis or disastrous situation does not matter to this school of literature; they consider terrorist acts or other crisis situations as equivalent to post-natural-disaster contexts since they all call for the similar kinds of emergency management strategies. In this context, the quality of resilience lies less on the strength of physical structures, but more on the human organizational capacities to respond/recover from disruption, and learn from the past experiences moving forward.

! Implication of resilience theory in urban planning

Since urban planning primarily concerns actual physical structures, more attention is given on how urban form changes and adjusts itself due to climate change related hazards. It is

hard to lobby for a complete-reinvention of the areas before an actual disastrous event occurs, considering present costs (of demolishing, rebuilding) as well as lack of certainty with regard to the actual probability or the location of a future hazard event. Therefore, their strategies of “resilience” remains in large part reactive, often staying at the level of “Type 2” resilience introduced by Handmer and Dovers (1996). Handmer and Dovers presented three types of resilience approaches: 1) Type 1 as ignorance, resistance to change 2) Type 2 as “change at the margins” 3) Type 3 as openness and flexibility. According to them, “Type 2” resilience is essentially what is often observed in the “sustainability” dialogue in politics. It advocates for a gradual change, only when that benefits (and does not interfere with) the interests of the elites and the powerful. Most of the time Type 2 approach pursues a non-disruptive change, a politically and economically palatable option that places a greater value on the near term costs.

This “Type 2” resilience approach, often considered as realistic or pragmatic, can be seen in a variety of “resilience” dialogue in urban planning literature. For instance, “enhancing resilience by land use practices” (Burby et al., 2000) is a good example of such approach. It looks at the hazards and vulnerability on the surface level, and believes that resilience of a community can be improved by rearranging the physical elements of urban form. To be “adaptive” here is to “readjust” the existing urban form – i.e. “change at the margins” – in a way that prevents destruction or loss of the existing infrastructure. This is understandable given that the current buildings and infrastructures are assets of a city – planners inevitably needs to be on the conservative or protective side when it comes to “re-organizing” these spatial structures unless there was an impactful disruption that frees them from protecting them. In a nutshell, resilience approach in the field of urban planning often has to remain on the conservative side

because of its concern on protecting existing physical structures/infrastructures that allows the city's continuous functioning.

Accordingly, the researchers in this field primarily focus on the mitigation strategies that aim to avoid or lessen the physical impacts of a disaster. According to Godschalk (1999), the resilience approach, unlike the resistance approach, uses *non-structural mitigation measures* to reduce or eliminate the risk to human life and property from natural hazards (p. 77). Therefore, strategies for enhancing the resiliency of a city includes the following: 1) avoiding hazard areas by directing new development away from known hazard locations through land use plans and regulations; or; 2) maintaining protective features of natural environment by protecting sand dunes, wetlands, forests and vegetated areas, and other ecological elements that absorb and reduce hazard impacts. Burby et al. (2000), as briefly mentioned above, presented “managing development [via land use planning]” as one of the most efficient ways for “building resilience” (p. 103) or “creating hazard resilient cities”, quoting Mileti (1999): “No single approach to bringing sustainable hazard mitigation into existence shows more promise at this time than increased use of sound and equitable land-use management”. According to them, land use planning is “the means for gathering and analyzing information about the suitability for development of land exposed to natural hazards, so that the limitations of hazard-prone areas are understood by citizens, potential investors, and government officials”. Accordingly, specific examples of building resilience includes: setting up building standards (e.g. flood-proofing requirements, seismic design standards, and retrofit requirements for existing buildings), enforcing development regulations (e.g. flood zone regulations; setbacks from faults, steep slopes, and coastal erosion areas; and zoning overlay zones for sensitive lands, such as wetlands,

dunes, and hillsides); avoiding placing public facilities in hazardous locations; using land and property acquisition to purchase hazardous properties with public funds and convert them to less hazardous uses. Such land use policies and regulations are considered to be a stepping stone for reducing negative impacts of disaster events by directing growth away from susceptible areas. At the same time, some of the hazard-mitigation land use practices are considered to be “proactive” when they not only steer development away from vulnerable areas but also protect critical natural habitats or water quality (Brody et al., 2010).

However, despite their distancing themselves from “structural approaches” (based on engineering practices that “hardens” the infrastructure), these aforementioned approaches in fact are not too different from Geis (2000) who preferred the term “disaster-resistant” over “disaster-resilient” in advocating for similar type of planning initiatives. Geis (2000) introduced “Disaster Resistant Communities” (DRC) as a new paradigm for creating safer cities that are resistant to natural disasters, and suggested very similar strategies as with the other sustainability-resilience-planning scholars noted above. One difference may be that Geis stressed the importance of designing/building homes and infrastructures that are structurally sound; sustainability-resilience-planning literature on the other hand emphasized more on land use regulations or other what they call “non-structural” measures to mitigate risks. But other than that, the approach of Geis and sustainability-resilience-development scholars can be considered to be almost identical. Geis, in addition to prioritizing structural measures, also specifically notes location considerations through general land-use plans as one of the core elements of the DRC approach. DRC approach promotes mitigation-based agenda, which he calls “disaster resistant design” that considers development patterns, configuration of public infrastructure, or location and service

capacity of community facilities. Despite its approach being more or less similar to sustainability-resilience-development scholars (who used the term “resilience”), Geis specifically notes why he prefers the term “disaster-resistant” over “disaster-resilient” for the strategies that he proposes.

It is often asked why the term “disaster resistant community” was chosen as opposed to “disaster resilient community”? There is a very specific reason. Webster defines resilience as the “ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change.” The synonym that is used is elastic. On the other hand, “resistant” is defined as “the ability to resist.” Do we want our communities to “recover from or adjust easily” to a disaster, which insinuates that one has occurred, or do we want them to “resist the disaster” i.e., not to allow the inevitable damage from an extreme natural event to reach “disastrous” proportions. In this context, and in the view of this writer, resistant has the most fitting connotation. We want to keep natural hazards from becoming “natural disasters,” therefore, resisting a disaster. We want our communities to be hazard resilient and disaster resistant. Along with that consideration, and in our time-byte society, the disaster resistant term has more of an impact (attracts more attention), and is, therefore, more marketable. Marketable in the sense that most people probably prefer to feel resistant to disasters, not just resilient to them. (p. 152)

Conceptually speaking, Geis’ clarification perhaps explains better of the approaches to mitigate hazards via land use planning. In other words, land use planning or similar policy-level regulations, despite its being “non-structural” measures, can be summarized better as plans to be “resistant against” rather than “resilient in the face of” natural hazards, since they intend to prevent or minimize the physical impacts based on a priori or presumptive knowledge. Tierney (2014) commented that it is “something of a mystery” how the dialogue suddenly switched from the concept of resistance to that of resilience. She assumed that, as noted above, it is because of the policy initiatives to link sustainability agenda with hazard management agenda that is initially suggested by Mileti (1999). But it is hard to know whether the actual approach itself has

become different along with the discourse change to “resilience” instead of “resistance”. Is “resilient-communities” in urban planning just another new name for already-existed “resistant-communities”? In other words, if the “sustainable-resilience-planning” approach is not too different from – or even better described by – “resistant communities” approach (by Geis), what are we really gaining from adopting the concept of resilience in the field of urban planning?

With regard to that matter, two points can be observed. The “resilient communities” dialogue in urban planning, which claims for “managing land use to build resilience” (Olshansky and Kartez, 1998), focus on what governments or public institutions can do about the uncertainties inherent in natural hazards. It often calls regulatory tools (e.g. zoning) as “capabilities” or “capacities” of a community, automatically assuming that the capability of a community (i.e. city, in most of such discourses) equals to the capability of the city government. For instance, Brody (2003; 2009; 2010) and Berke et al., (2012) stressed organizational capacity of policy learning, mainly evaluating how governing bodies of public sector handles the risk of natural hazards via planning and policy. The “plan quality studies” in relation with natural hazards basically attempts to quantify and measure “community resilience” by scoring how well government policies are formed, using criteria such as: the use of land use policies based on risk analysis (or “fact base” planning, as they termed), public education, technical assistance, taxation and fiscal policies, flood warning and forecasting.

But what could distinguish resilience-planning dialogue from resistance-planning dialogue may be their emphasis on citizen engagement and stakeholder participation in planning process. They argue that better decisions (better in terms of what works for the community of

concern) can be made by more inclusive process (i.e. wider stakeholder engagement) of making mitigation/land use plans (Brody et al. 2003; Godschalk et al. 2003). Here, land use and zoning is not entirely dependent on risk analysis on scientific data, but also can be shaped by on community values/ visions and what stakeholders really want for their own community. Berke and Smith (2009), while actively adopting Mileti (1999)'s linkage of sustainable development and resilience, argue that hazard mitigation approach (non-structural approaches) such as land use planning is *closer* to the concept of resilience (as compared to structural approaches), because, this approach embraces the idea of policy dialogue and public participation through community engagement, dispute resolution and negotiation. They presented hazard mitigation planning as a learning process, and argued that such process can enhance "community resilience" since "communities engaged in the development of a hazard mitigation plan benefit from the involvement of individuals trained in the art of public participation and dispute resolution". Given that such process is designed to involve some collective learning (e.g. learning from each other's interest and positions, learning from past experiences by groups discussions and actions), this aspect of hazard mitigation to some extent resonates with the theory of resilience that encourages interaction among different components as well as adaptive learning *evolving* from the past. Their approach is largely based on consensus planning theory (these writers often quote Innes and Booher, 1999; 2003) where planners serve as a mediator, facilitator, and consensus builder, but at the same time they also merge it with advocative planning for pursuing certain principles.

! Implication of resilience theory in hazard studies

Tierney (2014) summarized the introduction of the concept of resilience in hazard studies and how the scholars attempt to measure “inherent resilience”. Inherent resilience is a pre-existing socio-economic condition, the quality of which can be understood as a community’s ability to respond and recover from disasters in a timely manner. A comprehensive measurement of resilience can be interpreted as a general assessment of a community, such as: infrastructural robustness (as discussed above as “structural resilience”), institutional capacity (government regulatory tools such as zoning; or government investment in public health or police), economic soundness (businesses and job opportunities), and “social resilience” (which I will discuss further in the following paragraph). While other aspects are pretty much straight forward when it comes to measurement as they can be fairly well represented by quantitative information (number of aging buildings, the amount of fund invested, business volumes and number of jobs, etc) – “social resilience” is rather tricky characteristic to measure solely through quantified data.

Measuring “social resilience” can be understood as having two different aspects. The first aspect is perceiving resilience as a flipside of vulnerability. According to this idea, we can measure resilience by looking at the variables that indicate social vulnerability. Susan Cutter, who initially worked on creating vulnerability indicators (Cutter et al. 2003) using variables such as household income or education level or race (as non-white), has moved on to work on creating resilience indicators with more or less the same variables but in the opposite sense (Cutter et al., 2010). For instance, low education level can mean that the community members may have less economic opportunities and higher vulnerability – therefore “community resilience” is evaluated

as high if population educational levels are high. Similar logic applies to the variables such as the percentage of population that is non-elderly and non-disabled as indicators of resilience, since the elderly and disabled are likely to be the most vulnerable in case of emergency. Income level, English language competency or access to a vehicle are also used as indicators of resilience based on such logic, assuming that the population with low income, less English speaking, or less access to vehicles would be more vulnerable to external disturbances. Using these socio-economic characteristics of communities as the indicators of community resilience is fundamentally rooted on the perception of resilience as opposite of vulnerability.

On the other hand, another aspect with regard to measuring resilience attempts to explain that in many cases resilience itself is not merely an antonym of vulnerability. Low economic opportunity or income level, or social status (e.g. political power; prestige), do not necessarily explain the social capital aspect of community resilience. Less materially-fortunate communities or non-English speaking immigrant communities have repetitively shown their own forms of resilience that are equally persistent and valuable in times of disasters. The most notable example would be the case of Vietnamese neighborhood of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, which demonstrated effective response and recovery capitalizing on the strong network and social capital surrounding its community church and related organizations. Similar cases exist everywhere in the world (see Vale et al., 2014, for the case of Banda Aceh housing rebuilding process), and these stories show that those who are labeled as socially and economically vulnerable may also have something else that explains their own forms of resilience. Reghezza-Zitt and colleagues (2012) questioned whether resilience is just an antonym of vulnerability:

The matter is that one can be vulnerable to an impact while being perfectly resilient. It is not possible to systematically oppose vulnerability and resilience. This is especially obvious with cities where, however is defined vulnerability (as a damage potential, a degree of exposition, an incapacity to face an impact) we see a multiplicity of examples of cities exposed to hazards, hit by disasters, hence vulnerable, that yet manage to rebound, recoup and reconstruct, to come back to an equilibrium, to normality, etc. Vale and Campanella even wonder over the remarkable resilience of cities, since history only relates the definitive disappearance of a few cities while urban disasters are innumerable (Vale, Campanella, 2005). In a certain way, it could be said that it is because one is vulnerable that one can be resilient: in the strictest meaning, there can only be resilience if there is an impact and a disruption, which, analytically, implies vulnerability. But in a larger sense, it is because a society or a territory is vulnerable that it will suffer crises and that it will have to face up, to adapt and to learn from the disaster. The more crises a system suffers, the better it can show resilience capacity (property), learn from the disaster and become resilient in fact (state) (paragraph 33).

If a community can be resilient while being physically (structurally) vulnerable — above all in a material sense — then it all comes down to human factor: is there something else other than material resources that allows, when everything falls apart, people to recollect and stand up again? When such psychological perception of resilience is translated into the field of sociology or urban studies, the question becomes whether or not a community has collective resilience, or collective social capacity of people based on their human networks and relationship with the place. The idea of networks becomes important, because that's what gives value to the collectivity as more than a sheer sum of individuals. Tierney (2014) noted a set of examples where resilience means more than being physically strong or having material resources, precisely due to the existence of social capital. For instance, Klinenberg (2002)'s research on the impacts of 1995 Chicago heatwave underlined the importance of social capital and support networks. He compared two neighborhoods that were socio-economically similar (minority population), and

yet they were substantially different when it comes to the existence of social infrastructure that could serve as a safety net both during normal times and during times of crisis. The immigrant neighborhood with rich social capital and deep connection with nearby churches had much less death incidents than the other neighborhood that were lack of kinship and other support networks. New Orleans's Grand Bayou is also another example Tierney noted, addressing specifically how a physically and economically vulnerable community like Grand Bayou can at the same time illustrate its own form of community resilience via different forms of social capital and community-based knowledge. Mainly composed of Native American population, the community has always been rich in kinship and social ties, which became the source of resilience in weathering through their physical vulnerability caused by numerous external factors, such as multiple hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, Isaac), encroachment by the oil and gas industry, or sea level rise that resulted in coastal erosion and wetland loss.

As such examples show how social capital is “lynchpin” of disaster resilience (Tierney, 2014: 185), researchers often attempt to capture this idea of social capital, social bonding, or place attachment as indicators of resilience. Norris et al. (2008), for instance, placed more emphasis on social capital and informal networks in creating indicators of community resilience, including factors that consist of various kinds of networked resources. In addition to household income and socio-economic status, Norris and her colleagues added other sides of resilience such as: “community competence”, the capacity for collective decision making and ability to engage in collective action; “social capital” as the amount of social support members of a community expect and receive; “social embeddedness” that is fostered by informal relationships among community members, cooperative and collaborative ties among organizations, and resident

participation in community activities and their sense of attachment. Pelling (2003), earlier in the literature, also noted such social capital and collective capacity as a form of resilience, calling it as “local adaptive potential”. The variables that he used to measure such potential included: the degree of informal social support (communal activities), involvement in church activities or community groups, participation in elections, or awareness of local development organization, among others.

These efforts to measure resilience become important for planning and policy perspective that attempts to enhance the kinds of qualities that are considered positive, competent, and resourceful in the face of disasters. In other words, once we accept resilience as a positive quality of a community that we should identify, develop, or enhance, then the measurement issue becomes critical. If we consider resilience as a flipside of vulnerability, we focus on the issues that are physically and materialistically vulnerable and think of how to make these less vulnerable. What the concept of resilience brings to the table, when perceived as more than the flipside of vulnerability, is the degree of collective capacity or social capital achieved through human networks at a local, neighborhood, or “subsystem” scale. And with this understanding, there seems to be a tension between “global” and “local” when we attempt to operationalize the concept of resilience. For instance, while the concept of resilience embraces the idea of holistic approach that takes account of “global” picture in the long term (e.g. city as a complex system where the interplay of different components affect the future of each component), resilience as social capital can be better measured or understood at the level of subsystem or narrower spatial scale (e.g. at the neighborhood level as opposed to city/metropolitan level). For instance, the variables such as informal networks and people’s involvement with community-based

organizations would have to be appraised neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis. The Community Assessment of Resilience Tool (CART), introduced by Pfefferbaum and colleagues (2013), is a neighborhood-scale based exercise that attempt to provide resilience related to decision support for the concerning community leaders and groups (and not to make any cross-community comparisons) – which evaluates resilience only at the subsystem level, as a part of measuring their self-sufficiency (e.g. capacity to recover without external help).

! Implication of resilience in emergency management / public administration

In the field of public administration and emergency management, however, the resilience concept can be manifested in a more radical way, given that they are not really concerned with sustainability of physical structures. Their major concern is on human organizations which are considered to be flexible and easily be subject to change. If the most influential theoretical figures (when it comes to “resilience”) in the field of urban planning were Adger and Resilience Alliance scholars, the figures in the field of emergency management are Wildavsky (1985, 1988) and Kreps (1991, 1992). Wildavsky (1988) distinguished two ways of coping with uncertainty, “anticipation” and “resilience”. According to Wildavsky (1988), anticipation is a mode of control, and the efforts are “made to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage is done”. On the other hand, resilience is “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back” (p. 77). In characterizing the two strategies, Wildavsky (1988: 224) considered resilience as developed by trial and error, general capacities, and decentralization. Anticipation, on the other hand, placed emphasis on predicting hazards, specialized protections, and centralization. While anticipation approach relies on

detecting problems and avoiding them, which is fundamentally risk averse and frightened of change, resilience approach concerns the capacity of institutions to *learn* how to cope with the unknown, which places more emphasis on innovation and flexibility.

Comfort (1994) took up Wildavsky's notion of resilience and studied the fluency of information flow as an indicator of institutional resilience. As a case study, she studied the inter-organizational disaster response system that evolved following the Northridge California earthquake of January 1994, and assessed the extent to which Wildavsky's interpretation of resilience can help explain the dynamics of disaster response system. She noted several characteristics of a system that renders it to be resilient: 1) a capacity for creative innovation 2) flexibility in relationships between the part and the whole 3) the readiness to change and adapt 4) knowledge sharing and dissemination throughout the wider society, and 5) timely information flow. When it comes to *human institutions*, a flexible organization structure that allows adaptation (i.e. response to changes) – both at the system level and at the sub-system level – would be the key in *enhancing information* flow which then leads to the resiliency of the system. Accordingly, Comfort conducted her research based on the idea that the degree of “information flow” (or information sharing, communication/interaction among different organizations) would be able to represent such qualities of resilience: “information and its means of collection, integration, and dissemination become a constant factor in either transforming patterns of organizational behavior to reduce risk of future threat or in increasing the danger of catastrophe in environments of recurring societal risk” (p. 160).

The resilient institutional system, according to her, can perform effective, coordinated actions among a set of interdependent organizations seeking to achieve a common goal (e.g. protecting life and property in recurring danger). Hence, her use of the concept “complex adaptive systems” were used in the context of institutional behavior, which is not limited one jurisdiction or one level of government (e.g. within the city boundary, or city-level government – which was the focus on sustainability-resilience-planning approach). Instead, such “system” comprises all the concerned jurisdictions and different levels of government. Large scale natural events such as fire or earthquake doesn't occur strictly within a city/county's jurisdictional boundary; “[a] disaster, by definition, means that local jurisdictions have exceeded their resources in terms of meeting the needs of their populations created by a damaging event. This condition requires public agencies to mobilize resources across organizational and jurisdictional levels to engage response operations in the very specific context of disaster affected community (p. 166)”. The measure of resilience, in this case, depends on *how well coordinated the actions are* among different institutions, along with fluency of information flow and interaction of individual components that leads to institutional learning and evolution (or transformation that allows a better response in future events). Therefore, her examples of resilient disaster response systems are the following: previous investment in professional training, equipment, experience of emergency response personnel at both city and county level – which led to the activation of the LA County Urban Search and Rescue team that illustrated a new capacity previously not available in California (compared to 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake); mutual aid/ coordination across different communities – emergency managers and mutual aid program that allowed sister communities to lend their managers to the afflicted community at no cost. As a result of the

study, she defined resilience as “a capacity for learning from one set of conditions/actions and incorporating that new knowledge into the decision process for the next stage of action” (p.168).

In her later work *Shared Risk: Complex Systems in Seismic Response* (Comfort, 1999), she studied emergent systems that demonstrate creative response to dynamic disaster environments that is not limited to government agencies in public sector. In this study, she included more diverse actors in public, private, and nonprofit sectors, and focused more specifically on *fluent information flow* as an indicator of resilient systems. Her dynamic model of disaster management, adaptive performance is enhanced by influent information exchange, effective intra- and inter-organizational learning, and frequent collective action (p. 35-36). The research was guided by the following questions: 1) How do the content and exchange of information affect the decision-making capacity of public/private/nonprofit managers engaged in disaster operations? 2) What kinds of information are required by public/private/nonprofit managers to coordinate actions of their respective organizations appropriately in a disaster environment? 3) In what ways can information content and exchange be structured to maximize adaptive performance within and between organizations in a disaster environment? (p. 44). Accordingly, she examined the following aspects across the multiple international earthquake disaster cases³: information exchange, organizational learning, adaptive behavior and self-organization. For instance, the study counted the number of interactions among the institution, and ran regression analyses to see what kind of organization (public local/ public national, non-profit local/ non-profit national, private local/ private national) contributed the most to adaptive

³ San Salvador, 1986; Ecuador, 1987; Armenia, 1988; Mexico City, 1985, Erzincan Turkey, 1992; Marathwada, India 1993; Northridge, 1994; Hanshin, Japan 1995

responses such as emergency response, damage assessment, communication/ coordination, disaster relief, or recovery/ reconstruction.

On the other hand, for some scholars in emergency management, “creative innovation” or “improvisation” right after a disruptive event seems to be one of the key concepts in practicing resilience. They therefore direct their interests on what makes such instant creative decisions possible, and how we can make that happen as much as possible. Kreps (1991) underlined how improvised behavior is a necessary complement to disaster planning, and argued that preparation and improvisation go hand in hand (p. 33) – noting that preparation is a prerequisite for creative innovation. Weick (1993) discussed how improvised behavior can occur and what we can do to enhance our capacity to improvise in times of crisis. By studying the case of the Mann Gulch disaster (forest fire), Weick laid out the potential conditions that render creative improvisation to thrive: 1) previous experience and knowledge – you can be creative only when you have relevant base knowledge; 2) flexibility of organization structure – rigid rules are deterrent to improvised order; 3) fluency and frequency of communication – the lack of communication heightens the group's vulnerability to disruption. Linking the aspects of improvisation (creativity and flexibility) and planning in disaster management, McEntire (2012) suggested “spontaneous planning” as a “visible and empirical phenomenon which may have profound impact on disaster resilience” (p. 472). Following the works of Wachtendorf (2004) and Kendra and Wachtendorf (2005), McEntire analyzed the factors and conditions of successful improvisation, for the purpose of developing the ways in which we can achieve or arrive at such condition via preparation and planning ahead (McEntire, 2012, 2014). Accordingly, the lessons of resilience concept that comprehensive emergency management draws from are: 1) flexible organizational

structure with sub-systems, which enables better information flow and responsiveness to disaster events 2) the institutional capacity to learn from the past, 3) innovation, new ideas to improvise.

In short, in the fields of emergency management and public administration, the organizational capacity and institutional networks are the major themes of resilience, which then becomes the basis of measuring resilience. Resilience here is not so much about individual households' financial means to respond better to the external shocks. While they do discuss individual capacity in terms of their awareness of and preparedness for potential risk events, these are appreciated for the purpose of serving more effective communication and collaboration across different institutional actions or the fluency of emergency activities. This organizational approach to resilience is often politically neutral as it only promotes the idea of more effective collaboration and communication among the different organizations and actors; it is basically about enhancing the technical flow of administration in emergency communication and actions. However, the writers such as Murphy et al. (2007), Smith (2012), and McEntire (2012) attempt to acknowledge the active agency of affected populations, suggesting the important role that informal, citizen-driven community organizations can contribute to more effective emergency management. In that regard, it does possess some nuance of more democratized governance scheme, which challenges the expert-driven model of spatial governance.

3.3. Critical Geography Camp: Geography, Security Studies, and International Development

Most of criticisms made on resilience come from the disciplines of geography and international development, which focuses on how the resilience concept is being manipulated by 1) state-

driven agenda that tries to legitimize offloading of state responsibilities onto individuals and communities 2) international agenda that promotes the idea of individual self-sufficiency as conformed to global capitalist economy. Their criticism is often targeted at national level or supra-national level governance actors which attempt to make use of the flexibility of the resilience concept in order to better serve global capitalism. Accordingly, Walker and Cooper (2011) argued how resilience is “a pervasive idiom of global governance”, being “abstract and malleable enough to encompass the worlds of high finance, defense and urban infrastructure” (p. 144).

In the geography discipline, MacKinnon and Derickson (2012)’s critique on resilience was discussed in the context of UK’s new approach to its national security agenda, which highlights individual responsibilities to “be prepared” — ignoring the structural and systematic inequalities that do not allow equal amount of agency across different segments of population. Such prescription of “correct behavior” does not challenge the existing capitalist system and its social order, and accordingly, “the resilience of capitalism is achieved at the expense of certain social groups and regions that bear the costs of periodic waves of adaptation and restructuring” (p. 254). Their examples of how ‘resilience’ is being manipulated include ‘UK Strategy of Resilience’, which projects measures and structures to enable organizations and communities to better anticipate and tolerate disruption and turbulence (Anderson, 2010). UK’s government agencies started to underline the need for communities to become more resilient and self-reliant (UK Cabinet Office, 2011a, 2011b). The criticism on such new approach arises from the fact that such policies are merely a legitimization of the governments’ letting go of their own responsibilities, leaving up to the individual capacities to weather through adversities *without*

proper governmental supports that can counter the present structural and systematic inequalities. More specifically, ‘community empowerment’ initiative is viewed as one of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda, which promotes community self-reliance and empowerment by reducing the powers of the state (HM Government, 2010). In other words, raising public awareness and encouraging ‘responsibilization’ is considered as sheer offloading of responsibilities onto individuals, as they promote the ideas of middle-class voluntarism and social responsibility while maintaining existing forms of social hierarchy and control (Joseph, 2002).

What’s worse, according to them, is how such new security strategies — which emphasizes self-sufficiency, local innovation and learning — are being linked with the regional economic competitiveness, eventually serving the success of global markets led by policy makers and business leaders. In this sense, ‘resilience’ is being considered as a “muted successor” (p. 260) of ‘creative cities’ agenda which has been a city-marketing strategy to attract more businesses and the ‘right’ kinds of privileged populations. In relation to that, another point of criticism on resilience is placed in the context of decreasing public expenditure, and how resilience is being served as legitimizing the state’s neoliberal policy agenda. This is related to the theories of neoliberal public governance which prioritizes market rationalities over social needs (Derrida, 1976; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). Within such theoretical framework, an argument arises concerning the linkage between “reduction of public expenditure” and “promotion of self-sufficiency”. The argument is composed of the hypothesis that those two public policy initiatives are essentially intertwined, in that the political narratives for “self-sufficiency of local communities” are formulated in order to naturalize (and justify) the

inevitable, uneven material consequences that neoliberal governance results in. And eventually, such discourses on “you have to be self-sufficient — and therefore resilient” would effectively help the state withdraw its responsibility and accountability of remediating the impacts of their practices and policies. As MacKinnon and Derickson (2012) write: “Implicit, then, in resilience discourse is the notion that urban and regional policy should enable communities to constantly remake themselves in a manner that suits the fickle whims of capital with limited support from the state. Not only does this approach hold little promise of fostering greater social justice, it also elevates the operation of the market over the well-being of the communities that are meant to be resilient” (p. 263).

David Chandler (2013) is another scholar who provided a trenchant critique on resilience as a political discourse, which legitimizes the transition *from* security being the state’s interest and responsibilities *to* security being reduced to the accountability of individual human behaviors. His work interpreted ‘resilience’ as a ‘societalization’ of security agenda, which was once fundamentally a national (State’s) domain. In lieu of a kinds of national security discourses that focuses on military equipment, technology, or welfare provisions, resilience discourse praises certain attributes of population, certain qualities and capacities that individuals and communities must possess in the era of uncertainty. And accordingly, the deliberation of security agenda to the citizens and society occurs: “This shift from a focus on the activity and provision of government to the capacity of citizens to effectively respond and adapt to crises and problems — and increasingly to take responsibility for “self-government” — is of vital importance to our understanding of resilience as a set of discursive practices of governing through societal security” (p. 212). The examples (or ‘proofs’) of such unfolding of resilience mainly focuses on

the UK's recent national policy discourses on "how to empower citizens to be more capable of governing themselves through making better life choices in the fact of risk and complexity" (p. 212). The UK's policy initiatives on "nudging" individual behavior and attention to improving individual choice making (led by UK Cabinet Office and policy groups such as Royal Society for the Arts' Social Brain project) are based on the assumption that citizens are expected to proactive in taking responsibility for their own security and those around them (Dean, 2011). Resilience, within this understanding, is a perfect example of late-modernity governance, which subtly creates an societal "milieu" where individuals become self-reflective of their own behaviors and capacities, instead of interventionist, explicit top-down orders of the state — i.e. "perhaps the opposite of a 'Big Brother State'" (Lentzos and Rose, 2009: 243). Developing the desirable qualities to be 'resilient' — to adapt, survive, and bounce back — is left as the task of individuals and communities, while the state discreetly formulates the kinds of social conditions in which such understanding (i.e. "security as individual responsibility") becomes widespread and naturalized.

Such social-darwinism aspects of resilience — where individual households and communities themselves are responsible for their own survival and adaptation without proper governmental support — has also been noted by the discipline of international relations and development. While geography and security studies discipline focused on the state (national government)'s manipulation of resilience for the purpose of withdrawing their own responsibilities of protecting citizens, the writers of international relations discipline focused on criticizing the development practices of international organizations in aid-dependent countries. Notably, Grove (2013; 2014) studied the case of Jamaican small villages where internationally-

funded practices on building “resilience” of villagers can be interpreted as enforcing artificial and depoliticized forms of adaptive capacity that does not threaten neoliberal order. Several international aids have financed the disaster planning of Jamaica, such as UK’s Department for International Development, Red Cross, Canadian Development Agency. And the supported programs by these international aids — e.g. hazards education, participatory focus groups, and transect walks — fundamentally aimed to enhance the awareness of “objective” version of risk and vulnerabilities, as well as to promote the importance of response-ability and self-sufficiency by awakening the inhabitants’ fear. In the end, the villagers’ motivation to activate their preparedness and therefore to become “active agents of their own survival” (Grove, 2013: 10) is a product of these “resilience-building programs” that attempt to moralize individual behavior (see also Reghezza-Zitt et al., 2012). And perhaps the most problematic aspect of this approach comes from the fact that these programs 1) justify the limits of external support — they push the villagers to be self-reliant without external help, thus diminishing the role of government 2) do not challenge structural inequalities, considering populations to have equal amount of capacity and agency while ignoring the historical and structural elements (of society) that systematically prevent them from having equal will and capacity to be “self-sufficient”.

Furthermore, Felli (2013) and Felli & Castree (2012) analyzed the ‘resilience’ discourse of INGOs (such as United Nations) which enforces the moralization of individual behavior, which eventually ignores *the actual cause* of environmental degradation and catastrophes resulted from it — i.e. capitalist exploitation of nature. By praising “proactive” and “entrepreneurial” behaviors of the victims as “being resilient”, what the resilience discourse effectively hides is why and how we ended up with these disasters at the first place, preserving

and thus passively advocating the existing forms of socio-economic system and relations. As Felli (2014) puts: “therefore, this strategy of adaption not only makes it possible to respond to the consequences of the environmental degradation (without contesting this degradation itself nor its causes), but also it comes to be beneficial for global political economy, allowing the perpetuation or even the increased accumulation of capital” (p. 114, translated by the author). In these discourses (produced by INGOs) are likely to cause material consequences as actual policies in place, since they now play an increasingly important role in national and local disaster planning — by producing/advocating certain types of norms and ways of thinking (Revet, 2009; 2011).

Overall, it can be observed that the critiques made on resilience — often in the disciplines of geography, security studies, and international relations/development — studied the situations/ contexts in which ‘resilience’ discourse is being manipulated by the State or supra-national agencies to justify their “ulterior motives”. In case of ‘the State’, it tends to use resilience as a justification for the State’s withdrawing of its responsibilities from security functions and serving of social needs; in case of international institutions, they tend to produce certain policy discourses that do not interfere with the existing global political economic system, in which ‘resilience’ serves as a concept that naturalizes and consolidates either structural inequalities or environmental degradation that the system itself induces. In the end, the problematic aspects of operationalizing ‘resilience’ occur when 1) it is associated with decrease in public expenditure or government’s disengagement with social needs 2) there is a significant distance or gap between the initiation of ‘resilience’ agenda (e.g. supra-national agencies’ policy recommendations) and

its actual relevancy/appropriateness to local social and political contexts. These two points will be discussed further in the following section.

4. DISCUSSION: DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS/APPLICATION OF RESILIENCE CONCEPT AND THEIR RESULTING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

In this section, I will discuss four points that demonstrate more clearly the different interpretations and application of resilience concept. These discussion themes are oriented towards their political implications, or positive or negative connotations of resilience in terms of its impacts on pursuit of progressive values such as social inequality and democratic governance. Here I propose four axes that are important for determining social and political implication of “resilience” concept: 1) human relationship with nature and the use of local knowledge; 2) applicability of “holistic approach”; 3) acknowledgment of human collectivity in identifying operationalisers of resilience; 4) adequate governmental support and connection with population in the pursuit of “resilience” agenda.

4.1. Human relationship with nature & the use of local knowledge

The discussion on this first theme will be based on the comparison between rural sociology/agricultural economics discipline (“proponents” of resilience) and geography/international development discipline (“critics” of resilience). The critique on resilience — made by the disciplines of geography, security studies, and International development — is often framed with late-modernity theorization of governance, largely influenced by Foucault’s governmentality,

Beck's Risk Society, and Giddens's societalization of risk. These theoretical frameworks basically argue how the state has changed its governance approach *from* "interventionist, 'Big Brother' type of top-down" schemes *to* "subtly nudging, quietly-manipulative" schemes. Resilience, within this understanding, is a perfect example of late-modernity governance, which subtly creates an societal "milieu" where individuals become self-reflective of their own behaviors and capacities, instead of interventionist, explicit top-down orders of the state. But in the end, despite these different methods/schemes, the state's manipulation remains the same: it still preserves and executes its "ulterior motives", either those being achieving technocratic governance or naturalizing neoliberal governance that favors the existing economic system and power hierarchy. Developing the desirable qualities to be 'resilient' — to adapt, survive, and bounce back — is left as the task of individuals and communities, while the state discreetly formulates the kinds of social conditions in which such understanding (i.e. "security as individual responsibility") becomes widespread and naturalized. Here, the emphasis on "local knowledge" is an empty discourse to offload responsibilities to individuals and communities, which doesn't really have any substantial implications on the extent of manipulation that the state manages to achieve.

These interpretations are in fact pretty far away from the application of resilience in rural sociology or environmental sciences, where the scholars/writers perceive 'resilience' as a concept that symbolizes the symbiotic relationship between human and nature. In the context of natural resource management where human economic activities (i.e. agriculture or aquaculture) are closely related to the natural systems, the human systems are inevitably obliged to respect ecosystem functions with minimal intervention — which in turn would be compensated by

earnings of their harvest or the productivity of land. To do so, the use of local knowledge — accumulated through inhabitants’ experience and wisdom — is noted as important, which was how their proposal of “engaging local inhabitants” into planning and governance came about (Adger, 2000). Could this — emphasis on local knowledge — possibly be relevant to “urban” disaster management context where the connection between human system and ecosystem functions are largely limited? In another paper (Jon, 2018), I have discussed the implications of resilience concept in more progressive knowledge practices in disaster planning. Drawing insights from the interdisciplinary critical studies of science and technology literature, I demonstrated how ‘resilience’ does not have to be *only* referred to as a ‘capability’ or ‘characteristic’ of individuals and communities, but can also be usefully engaged with as a particular kind of knowledge practice that can be integrated into disaster planning in ways that are beneficial.

Unlike a ‘prevention’ or ‘mitigation’ approach that prioritizes scientific or expert knowledge that can prevent or minimize potential impacts from a hazard event, these initiatives acknowledge or even embrace the uncertainty and unpredictability of environmental hazards and try to improve the ways in which we respond or recover following a disaster — through addressing communities’ adaptive capacity (Chandler & Coaffee, 2016; Tierney, 2014). Drawing on ecosystem management literature, planning practices based on ecological resilience consider natural disasters as ‘changing agents’ that could bring about changes to the entire system; not as necessarily a ‘disturbance’ or ‘disruption’ to the status quo, that we have to protect and preserve. Since the new, ‘disrupted’ state following a disaster is perceived as a neutral condition that comes not only with challenges but also with opportunities, the purpose of planning here is not to

‘bounce back’ to the status quo ante but to build the community’s capacity to adapt and unfold futures that had been unthinkable prior to the disaster. Accordingly, because planning here does not focus extensively on ‘preventing’ things from happening — and embraces the contingency and uncertainty of natural hazards, given that there is no one ‘normal’ to go back to — what really matters in these practices is not necessarily how accurate the risk estimates or damage assessments are, but the strengths of social networks, local knowledges and connections, which become the major source of the community’s adaptive capacity in the aftermath of a disaster.

In current disaster planning frameworks which often prioritize scientific knowledge as the major source for decision-making, understanding resilience as a transformative agenda rather than as the maintenance of the status quo invites new alternatives for practicing and applying knowledges that are reflexive, flexible, polyvocal and inclusive. Furthermore, with its emphasis on decentralized forms of adaptive capacity, ecological resilience could provide support for knowledge practices that are local and ‘situated’ in the sense that this knowledge is more contextually competent for the human and cultural agencies already in place. Such an understanding can also be associated with the works of other writers (Jasanoff, 2003; Reghezza-Zitt, 2015; Wynne, 1996) who have not only problematized the unquestioned public trust in scientific knowledge but have also called for more democratized knowledge production processes such as public participation and the adoption of plural perspectives, especially in the decision domains constrained by data-driven assessments.

4.2. Urban vs. Rural: the applicability of “holistic approach”

Resilience in Social Sciences discipline, as noted above, is originated from the context of natural resource management where the human system and nature system are closely interconnected. Here, human economic activities are essentially dependent on the proper functioning of ecosystem, and the feedback from nature is evident in the sense that it directly affects human activities in the forms of land productivity or the quality of annual harvest. This emphasis on building a long-term (i.e. sustainable), symbiotic relationship with human activities and nature — was how the “holistic approach” came about within the concept of resilience, which fundamentally aims to respect the functioning of nature that uses certain disturbances as a useful tool for the long-term betterment of the system (e.g. forests’ use of fire in a way to give breaths to hidden organisms living underneath the surface). On the other hand, going one step further from these contexts of respecting ecosystem functions, Alberti et al. (2003) suggested the implications of resilience approach in urban systems, calling for more holistic and integrative view that takes account of different constituents of the system. This meant that we should consider how different components of city functions interact with one another and also with ecosystem functions.

More specifically, Alberti et al. (2003)’s approach proposed the ways to understand cities as a complex system, emphasizing that the interactions between humans and ecological processes in urban regions cannot be explained simply by studying the properties of their individual parts (therefore, “holistic approach”). The authors argue that cities are “complex and ecological entities” that have their way of evolving itself by the interactions among different

constituents in the system: “cities evolve as the outcome of myriad interactions between the individual choices and actions of many human agents (e.g., households, businesses, developers, and governments) and biophysical agents such as local geomorphology, climate, and natural disturbance regimes” (p. 1170). This argument can be a basis of critique on “instant” problem solving methods that is often predominant in engineering-resilience approach. For instance, what Katrina has taught us — especially to urban planning and disaster management — was how insufficient it is to respond to environmental hazards with temporary engineering approach (such as building seawalls or storm-surge barriers). It is a well-developed argument that how disasters are not necessarily “natural” disasters, as different elements of a city and their interactions among them leads to domino-effects of negative consequences on populations (e.g. interactions between ecosystem functions and for-profit/development-oriented institutional decisions — often cause situations that are disastrous to inhabitants). In this sense, understanding cities as “complex system” — as environmental science discipline argues for in their application of resilience — can have some implications on disaster planning/management in practice, by underlining how environmental hazards should be addressed in a holistic manner, taking account of how different actors, elements, functions of the city interact with one another.

Thus, there are two themes that resilience concepts can invoke, which are:

- 1) co-constitutive relationship between human social systems and ecosystem functions;
- 2) integrative, wide-picture approach that takes account of different constituents within the urban system

However, it can be noted that ‘systematic, holistic view of environment’ that resilience reminds us of — seeing a phenomenon or an actant within a wider time and geographical scale — do not really appear in the discussion within literature of geography/international development disciplines, which criticized resilience mainly based on its emphasis of ‘self-sufficiency’ or ‘self-reliance’ of individuals or households. Thus, the advocacy on the ‘usefulness’ of resilience concept — and going further, potentially politically progressive implications of resilience — can be centered around this aspect, with regard to how it reminds us of 1) the relationship between human social system and ecosystem functions, how to build more long-term, sustainable, symbiotic relationship between them (similar to “environmental sustainability”); 2) holistic approach that takes account of different elements, actors, constituents of a urban network or a system, or institutional collaboration — this is more so in the case of large-scale metropolitan areas (Reghezza-Zitt, 2015).

	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>
<i>Human-Nature relationship</i>	Limited (in the long term it is essentially connected, but it's less visible); here, the priority is placed more on protecting people and property against natural hazards, which are not necessarily induced by human actions (earthquakes, volcano activities, etc)!	Closely connected (more visible connection, human economic activities are dependent on proper functioning of natural systems — feedback from the nature is more evident as it directly affects human activities in the form of land productivity or the quality of annual harvest)
<i>Implication of using 'local knowledges'</i>	Participatory GIS, different ways of representing/communicating disasters, vulnerability, and community resilience — in a way that reflects the reality of local inhabitants — other than “objective” forms of representation; taking account of personal histories and accumulated lived experiences (Jon, 2018).!	Natural resource management, inhabitants knowledge (or tribal knowledge) accumulated through experiences and wisdom!
<i>Holistic Approach</i>	“Holistic” or “Systematic” approach is applied in the sense of taking account of different elements, actors, constituents of a urban network or a system, or institutional collaboration; this is more so in the case of large-scale metropolitan areas!	“Holistic” in the sense that it considers the effects of human actions on nature, as human actions themselves are affected by nature in the form of natural resources (e.g. agri/aquaculture economy is dependent on productivity of the land/water)

Table 2-2. How to theorize progressive resilience — in urban vs. rural contexts.

4.3. Acknowledgment of human collectivity in identifying operationalisers of resilience

Another important point of discussion is who are identified as actual “operationalizers” of resilience, or the main actors who put in place the communities/cities to be ‘resilient’. It can be observed that there is a wide spectrum of actors that lead, activate, or operationalize the concept of resilient, which vary across different academic disciplines depending on what kind of “stories”, case studies, that they use for demonstrating their own version of resilience. The identification of actors depend on the disciplinary emphasis with which the writers applied the

concept of resilience. For instance, in the context of natural resource management, due to its emphasis made on symbiotic, sustainable human-nature relationship, the major actors are villagers who are dependent on agriculture economy — it is up to them to cultivate ‘resilience’ that considers interactions between functions of ecosystems and human social systems. Similar notions of ‘locally-driven’ resilience can be found in Hazards Studies, which places emphasis on social capital and the extent of social cohesion in local communities at the neighborhood-scale. Since the Hurricane Katrina in 2007, scholars in this field pay attention to ‘non-structural’ aspects of resilience, noting the important roles of community-based organizations and neighborhood group leaders who effectively filled the gap between the urgent emergency needs (of population) and the lack of government capacity to address them all.

On the other hand, in the disciplines that concern public policy making — urban planning and public administrations — the main leading actors of ‘resilience’ are essentially city governments and other government institutions, as the writers in these fields discuss what should be the ‘role’ of planners, emergency managers, or government officials. As for urban planning discipline, because of its disciplinary interests in zoning, mitigation and regulation (e.g. where to build or not to build, depending on the predicted risk), the main leading actors are essentially composed of planners in city (local) governments who attempt to “prevent” impacts or reduce the vulnerability as much as they can. For them, “resilience” is measured by the city government’s capacity to minimize the potential impacts of disasters, so that the city can go back to its own functioning as soon as possible. In the context of public administration, their version of resilience pays more attention to “how to respond” instead of “how to minimize”. Their assumption is already placed on the fact that “what will happen will happen” — letting go of the

control or prediction of the potential impacts. What they focus on instead is how fast and efficiently we can respond to those impacts, which then becomes translated into the efforts that enhance institutional coordination and building stronger networks across those different stakeholders (local, regional, federal (national)). For them, ‘resilience’ is a connectivity or network efficiency across different government institutions, which contributes to more rapid and effective response to extreme events — wherever it would be (urban or rural), whatever the cause is (natural or industrial disasters).

It can be observed that, within the critical perspective on resilience — mostly coming from security studies and international development — the main driving actors of ‘resilience’ are in much wider political/geographic spectrum (than the rest of other disciplines covered here), as they mainly concern national policy initiative or INGO’s creation of policy discourses (as compared to city-government actions or neighborhood-scale social capital). In these cases where the measurement scale of resilience is rather unclear, ‘resilience’ is often understood as individual capacity to weather through difficulties in life, essentially losing the *collective aspects* of ‘building resilience’ at a certain level of groups of people (e.g. neighborhood, city, region, etc). This observation brings our attention to how important it is to clarify ‘in what specific geographical spectrum’ we intend to talk about when we talk about resilience. Without specifying “*in what scale of human collectivity*” we attempt to envision and build resilience *together*, the resilience discourse is inevitably subject to criticism of “offloading of responsibilities onto individuals”.

Contexts	Ecology Camp		Public Policy Camp			Critical Geography Camp	
	Natural Resource Management	Environmental Sciences	Urban Planning	Hazards Studies	Public Administration	Security Studies	International Development
<i>Disciplinary interests</i>	Sustainable human-nature relationship	Bio-diversity	Zoning, mitigation, regulation/design	Social cohesion, social capital	Institutional coordination	Societalization of risk (government withdrawal of social needs)	Critical studies/evaluation of the activities of INGOs
<i>Measurement emphasis</i>	Village's ability to sustain their agri/aqua culture in the long term	Species diversity	City government's capacity to formulate a coherent plan (zoning/regulations)	Educational level, income level, English competency in the neighborhood! Community's collective capacity for decision making & action	Flexible organizational structure with sub-systems, information flow and responsiveness to events! Institutional capacity to learn from the past!	Individual capacity and financial/political resources at the household level	
<i>Geographical spectrum</i>	Rural village-level	City-level	City-level	Neighborhood level	Regional level governments (not limited to city boundaries)	Vague; but mostly about national policies/initiatives	Vague; but mostly about practices of INGO in local areas of developing countries
<i>Main driving actors of 'resilience'</i>	Villagers,! Farmers (agri/aqua culture)! 'Locals'!	"policy makers" (but not evident in which field/dpt.)	Urban planners (city government, planning dpt.)	Community members, community-based organizations! 'Locals'!	A wide range of public institutions – local gov, regional gov, emergency managers!	'the State'	INGOs, foreign development aids

Table 2-3. Different emphases and driving actors of resilience across the disciplinary contexts.

4.4. Adequate governmental support & connection with population

Another important point of discussion that divides the proponents and critics (of resilience) is the existence of adequate government support. The critics of resilience are often concerned with the fact that the discourse of resilience is in fact being 'abused' by the government who eventually

intends to withdraw its responsibilities on social needs and inequalities. However, this contention is hard to be received by the disciplines of urban planning and public administration disciplines, whose disciplinary interests fundamentally focuses on ‘the role’ of government — what planners and public policies should do in order to render the city and region to be more resilient. In their concrete examples of building social cohesion or enhancing institutional connectivity — the discussion on withdrawal of government responsibilities is not necessarily relevant.

It can be observed that the major controversy surrounding the political implication of resilience concept depends on the interpretation of non-material resilience: how do we define non-material resilience, and what do we mean by it? Are we talking about ‘resilience’ as an inherent capacity of individual self-help behavior which is left “up to” individuals’ own financial/political/social resources, or is ‘resilience’ a collective capability that we build together through adequate governmental support and consistent communication with the population? This is perhaps the key question that should be asked when we talk about resilience in the context of public intervention — or how to “intervene better” — via planning and public policy. In this perspective, the interpretations of non-material resilience — as I summarize here, 1) social capital 2) institutional connectivity 3) self-help individual behavior — can have different political and social implications depending on the position of government intervention. In fact, even the “self-help individual behavior” — which is the main point of criticism made by security studies and international development — is not inherently “bad” in the sense that it can be practically effective for population to be better-prepared and perhaps have more autonomy in the face of unexpected hazards events. The problem, which the critics imagine as the worst cast scenario, arises when such discourse of emphasizing non-material resilience combines with the

government's ulterior motive of either 1) withdrawing their support on social needs that have to be addressed in a structural/systematic level (e.g. public budget cuts) 2) pursuing technocratic, depoliticized mode of governance that loses connection with the reality of population/inhabitants (their lives, opinions, etc).

For instance, the emphasis on building social capital or social cohesion at the neighborhood level can imply more democratic form of governance that encourages inhabitants to develop their own information-sharing networks and a sense of community/togetherness that can be helpful in times of disasters. In the case of Seattle, the city government financially sponsors 'community emergency hubs' initiated/maintained by community members, which can become the place of building networks and sharing knowledge/experiences. In addition to that, the hubs can also establish more effective communication channel between 'the needs' of inhabitants and the intention of government intervention, which helps public policy decision to represent better of the needs of population. However, if the discourse of building social capital is essentially 'used' by the government intervention of withdrawing from the social needs, this would mean that 'possessing social capital' is an inherent property of a neighborhood that is left to the community members to develop on their own. This would mean that the government would not consider the unequal political/social/financial resources placed differently across different communities, not acknowledging/addressing the different level of needs between more well-off communities and other more disfranchised communities. In this case, the criticism on resilience can be accurate: when considered as an inherent property rather than an on-going, collective objective that gets built up by inhabitants, resilience can be an excuse to offload

government responsibilities onto individuals and neighborhoods that are, in most of the cases, do not possess the same level of resources, capacity, or will to be self-reliant or ‘resilient’.

A similar idea can be applied to an interpretation of non-material resilience as ‘institutional connectivity’, which is often the case in the contexts of public administration and emergency management. Focusing on institutional connectivity is a pragmatic understanding of resilience, but at the same time it could be translated to ‘depoliticized’ or ‘technocratic’ governance that does not consider or represent the needs of communities or population. Several writers (Metzger et al., 2015; Legacy, 2016) have criticized the recent re-rise of technocratic governance where the practices of ‘good governance’ is taken for granted — considering ‘the continuation of status quo’ as the norm, thus denying any necessity of social transformation or change. These writers have been primarily concerned with how current ‘stream-lined’ institutional arrangements that do not challenge ‘pro-growth political pressures’ are leading urban planning and policy, which is problematic as it fails to incorporate the perspectives and interests of plural, heterogenous publics that are not necessarily aligned with such ‘pro-growth’ agenda. In this context, procedural ‘citizen participation’ are “merely used as pre-emptive technique for foreclosing the political by replacing the, in professional planning circles, well-known procedural acronym DAD (Decide, Announce, Defend) with the related and even more disturbing UNCLE (Unlimited Never-ending Consultation Leading to Exhaustion)” (Metzger et al., 2015: 21). This particular criticism on how current planning emphasis on “institutional coordination” or “proceduralism” can often overlook the necessity of more meaningful public involvement, which can genuinely bring about close connection between the needs of population/inhabitants and the policies and planning practices that are being put in place. In the

case of disaster planning, resilience's theme of creating more effective institutional networks and connectivity would have to pursue 'vertical integration' (of different types and levels of organizations — across public agencies as well as community-based organizations and social collectives), which goes beyond the level of coordination only amongst governmental institutions or agencies (Smith, 2012).

A more serious engagement of criticism on resilience allows us to have an important and necessary discussions on 1) how regarding the current status quo as a norm to 'return back to' can actually neglect the necessary changes in existing social/economic system and social relations that perpetuate certain forms on inequality 2) how pursuing of certain planning/public policy agenda should be relevant to (and in consultation with) local social/political contexts and needs/realities of population already in place. Therefore, for 'non-material resilience' to be a politically progressive, socially transformative agenda in planning and public policy dialogues — instead of being outrightly rejected as a cover-up for neoliberal territorial governance — it should actively reflect further on 1) whether we can actually go further from "returning back to the status quo", considering opportunities for pushing more socially transformative/progressive agenda in the process of post-event recuperation and recovery 2) whether there can be more effective and synergetic conversation between technical aspects of risk governance and local knowledges driven by inhabitant experiences.

	<i>Social capital</i>	<i>Institutional Connectivity</i>	<i>Self-help individual behavior</i>
<i>Adequate governmental support & connection with population</i>	Governmental organizations can encourage small-scale community “hubs” or invest in (financially support) long-term oriented neighborhood-based communication channels!	More efforts and resources placed on coordination of different institutions and network of actors, including collaboration with civic organizations and community-based organizations — “vertical and horizontal integration” (Smith, 2012)!	Building of capabilities, equipped with emergency information and communications, <i>customized</i> to the community needs and the relevancy to the lives of inhabitants
<i>Withdrawal of government responsibilities on social needs & disconnection with population</i>	Lack of consideration on structural inequalities — how some communities have more financial/ political resources than other disfranchised communities	Technocratic governance approach where only the administrative government organizations (or operators of infrastructure networks) are taken into account for “building resilience”	Individuals are left to survive and adapt to extreme events with their own proper financial resources! Survival kits and emergency information given from “the top”

Table 2-4. Interpretations of non-material resilience and their political implications depending on the position of government intervention.

5. CONCLUSION

This extensive literature review on resilience is inspired by current debates on resilience, especially with regard to writers’ hurried conclusion on resilience as either ‘empowerment of local agencies’ or ‘cover-up for neoliberal territorial governance’. Focusing on the aspect of ‘celebrating decentralized forms of governance’, proponents of resilience have argued that the concept can actually encourage more bottom-up approach to risk/territorial governance, which is based on local experiences and knowledges that are more relevant to the contexts of local agencies already in place. On the other hand, critics have pointed out that, when associated with decrease in public expenditure or support on social needs, resilience concept can actually be used

as an excuse of legitimizing a kind of governance that tries to offload government responsibilities onto individuals and communities. These debates have not been most effective in the sense that they did not consider the specific contexts of how and why resilience may have positive or negative political implications in terms of social change or more democratic governance. For instance, the potential positive aspects of ‘decentralized forms of governance’ are initially drawn from the examples of natural resource management, where rural communities — whose economic systems are closely connected to ecosystem functions (e.g. agriculture) — find their own way of balancing resource exploitation and environmental protection in a more sustainable way, based on their own empirical experiences and knowledges coming from them. On the other hand, resilience as “offloading of government responsibilities” is coming from specific political contexts where either resilience is used as an excuse to justify public spending cuts, or, resilience concept is being pushed by third parties (such as international organizations) — creating a disconnect between governance initiatives and the needs of local population/inhabitants. Not considering these contexts of the examples used by authors (from different disciplines) has led to the current close-ended debates on resilience, where resilience is judged by a simplistic question of “either good or bad” — when the actual reality of operationalizing the concept poses much more complex possibilities.

Recognizing a need for a kind of literature review that takes account of these contextual differences and interpretations, what I attempted to demonstrate here is how this “either good or bad” opinions on resilience is nurtured by overgeneralization of certain aspects of the concept, which have been cherry-picked by different disciplines and then applied to their own cases/stories that are specific to their disciplinary interests. In this process of overgeneralization and

cherry-picking certain aspects, a variety of factors that can direct different social/political implications of the resilience concept — such as measurement unit of resilience, political actors/operationalizers of resilience, geographical spectrum of resilience — are often overlooked or ignored, leading to misunderstandings and confusion of why (and in what specific occasions) ‘resilience’ can possess positive or negative connotations and implications. In order to give more clarity to this muddy mixture of different understandings and interpretations, I focused on contextual interpretations of resilience across different academic disciplines, by having a more close look at the specific examples and stories that authors use for demonstrating their own version and interpretation of ‘resilience’. In doing so, I used a set of variables that can deconstruct better of these interpretations — including measurements of resilience, a spectrum of engaged political actors, resource dependency on nature, and acknowledged materiality of disturbance — showing how specific disciplinary interests can actually shape certain interpretations and resulting political implications.

In addition to clarifying different understandings and interpretations that are purposefully shaped by each discipline, I also tried to elaborate further on how to theorize what conditions/factors can actually evoke positive or negative political implications of resilience. I suggested that, above all, the resilience concept can have positive political implications when considered as a knowledge practice that takes more serious account of local experiences and knowledges — which is inspired by the context of natural resource management where the symbiotic relationship between ecological and human systems is critical. Secondly, I have summarized how a ‘holistic approach’ — that the resilience concept draws us to — can be a relevant idea in urban contexts, although such approach was originated from rural community contexts where there is a

close connection between human economic system and ecosystem functions. A 'holistic approach' to urban planning and risk governance might imply more inclusive and integrative approach that takes account of different constituents within the urban system, bringing more divergent actors into the table of planning and public policy. Third, I have argued that, in order for resilience to retain positive connotations, it would have to be regarded as something that is an on-going, *collective* project that has specific geographical boundaries, not as an inherent quality possessed by individuals equipped with their own political/financial/social resources. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when associated with decrease of public expenditure and support on social needs, or technocratic governance schemes that lose connection with the actual needs of population, the implications of non-material resilience — either as social capital/cohesion, institutional connectivity, or self-help behavior — can be negative. But, this also suggests that on the other side of the story — with serious political and financial engagement of local governments to support social needs, as well as their efforts to close the gap between what they can do and what population needs — resilience does have potential to be developed into more politically progressive agenda.

Resilience is indeed a buzzword in different academic disciplines and different sectors of public policy agendas. As a concept, it elicit certain perspectives and approaches to territorial governance, especially on the questions of sustainable development, environment protection, decentralization and localization of governance, as well as the role of government in the face of events that are beyond prediction and control. In this context, interdisciplinary collaboration and studies are highly encouraged; however, cherrypicking certain notions without any reflection on contextual factors (of examples and stories) can only give rise to overgeneralization of the

concept — which then deters synergetic or productive conversation that can genuinely forge mutual learning and collaboration. More serious engagement with the concept would involve more patient efforts to understand each other’s disciplinary interests and contexts, going beyond simplistic conclusion or judgment on what the concept “is”. As demonstrated throughout this paper, resilience, due to its flexibility and polysemic character (i.e. having multiple meanings), can be anything and everything depending on the intention of users, as well as their success in linguistic articulation and contextual application. In other words, it is now up to academia, writers, planners, and policy makers who can shape and direct the concept one way or the other, possibly into more progressive governance practices that can assist and foster social change.

Chapter 3 : LATE MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY? THE REISE OF GLOBAL RESILIENCE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON LOCAL DISASTER PLANNING (SEATTLE AND PARIS)

It is through language that the horizon of our present is constituted; it is the life of the past in the present and thus constitutes the movement of tradition. The error of the Enlightenment, according to Gadamer, was to discredit ‘prejudices’ and to propose an ideal of understanding which requires that one transcend one’s present and free oneself from one’s insertion into history. But it is precisely these prejudices that define our hermeneutical situation and constitute our condition of understanding and openness to the world.

Chantal Mouffe, ‘Radical Democracy’ (1993)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies how the approaches to disaster planning have been changing with the rise of ‘resilience’, a concept that has been widely recommended by various international institutions. It primarily concerns how such shift occurs in planning discourses, as well as how globalization of a policy concept unfolds differently in different planning contexts. To do so, I discuss how ‘resilience’ influences local policy agendas, comparing disaster planning discourses of Seattle and Paris. Comparing different manifestations of a global concept not only underlines the naiveté of pursuing resilience as a unilateral, self-explanatory agenda, but also a lack of thorough research in the current literature where writers often hurriedly conclude resilience as a sheer cover-up for neoliberalism. In response to critical studies on resilience which predominantly argue that ‘resilience’ is just another excuse to legitimize withdrawal of government assistance on social needs, I argue how the application of ‘postmodern’ lens to resilience can also help us recognize progressive political potentials of resilience — which have been hard to be seen under the ‘late-modernity’ framing of resilience.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, ‘resilience’ has become one of the most popular concepts in planning, where the idea of uncertainty and uncontrollability of the future — with increased awareness on preparing for unexpected natural hazards events — haunts planners ever more. In this context, this paper aims to examine and reflect on the current trend in disaster planning, where resilience is used most frequently as a positive concept that highlights human resiliency and innovative capacity to overcome difficulties. Institutional push for this concept is evident, mostly driven by international organizations such as United Nations (UN), World Bank, or OECD (Revet, 2009; Felli, 2014). They often influence local policy agendas with various ‘policy recommendations’, and it can be well observed that ‘resilience’ has become a favorite term. UN’s Hyogo Framework for Action was titled as ‘Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’, World Bank has its own program of ‘City Resilience Program’, and, OECD provide policy recommendation reports for its ‘Resilient Cities’ program. Most recently, Rockefeller foundation launched a global policy initiative called ‘100 Resilient Cities’, with which city governments receive a certain amount of funding from the foundation to appoint a ‘Resilience Officer’ and produce a policy initiative document on ‘Resilience Strategies’.

What can be observed in this international buzz on resilience is how logic of planning and governance is being shifted. While previous disaster management framework placed more emphasis on prevention and risk reduction — which relied on ‘control’ of disasters using scientific and technical *a priori* knowledge — it can be observed that recent developments in disaster planning place more emphasis on building capacities that can be utilized in post-disaster context, with the increasing use of the concept of ‘resilience’. Tierney (2014)’s book *The Social*

Roots of Risk demonstrated how the concept of resilience introduced a new perspective in hazards studies/disaster planning; the adoption of ‘resilience’ concept in disaster planning marks the graduation from pre-resilience perspectives of prevention, as it enables a fundamental critique of modernist forms of knowing and narrow ‘problem solving’ approaches (Chandler and Coeffee, 2017). Welsh (2014: 16) also noted how “resilience discourses mark a break with the modernism of the ‘risk society’ by introducing novelty, adaptation, unpredictability, transformation, vulnerability and systems into a governmental discourse that now makes the governance of uncertainty and unpredictability a hallmark of rule” (see also Dillon and Reid, 2009; Dalby, 2013).

In this context, the paper aims to demonstrate how the logic of policy legitimation is changing internationally, focusing on the field of disaster planning and management where the use of resilience concept has become increasingly ‘in fashion’. The existing critical studies on resilience see this as problematic: they argue that resilience only serves as legitimizing neoliberal policy agenda that is compatible with global economic system of capitalism (Joseph, 2013; Grove, 2013, 2014; Mavelli, 2017). More specifically, internationalization of policy concepts can be worrying since they may only serve as naturalizing global diffusion of the policies that do not intervene with the existing (international) neoliberal social order. However, while these existing debates on resilience only focused on the unilateral, therefore ‘global’ notion of “resilience as neoliberal governance agenda”, this paper asks whether the rise of resilience concept can imply a shift in the mode of governance that is specific to each of different political contexts. This perspective is inspired by theoretical inquiries on the relationship between knowledge and legitimation of public policy (Eliasson, 2000; Corburn, 2003; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Kütting

& Lipschutz, 2012). What kind of knowledge, or whose knowledge, matters in contemporary disaster planning? Does the rise of resilience signal a change in legitimation logic of planning, as it shifts the focus of disaster planning *from* controlling pre-event factors *to* management of post-event contexts? What does that imply in local governance — especially with regard to the question of *where* planning should find its source of legitimacy? And what are the political and social implications of such changes in the legitimation logic of planning?

These questions, in fact, can be better framed by what I refer as “post-modern theorization of resilience”, which focuses on the role of knowledge practices and political narratives in legitimizing the mode of governance. Rather than outrightly rejecting resilience as a cover up for neoliberalism, post-modern framing of resilience notes 1) how the concept can initiate the shift in planners’ view and practice on knowledges (going beyond “expert knowledge”) 2) how the flexibility of the concept can be used for developing political narratives that are progressive 3) how the concept can open up potential new venues for non-conventional powers to intervene into policy making/ decision making processes, inviting new actors (i.e. non-planners, non-experts) to the planning dialogue. Accordingly, the main objective of this paper is to suggest a new proposition on resilience; in response to critical studies on resilience which predominantly argue that ‘resilience’ is just another excuse to legitimize withdrawal of government assistance on social needs, I argue how the “postmodern” view on resilience can help us recognize progressive political potential of resilience — which have been hard to be seen under the “late-modernity” framing of resilience.

To make this argument, I compare two cross-national cases — Seattle and Paris — both of which are members of Rockefeller foundation’s ‘100 Resilient Cities’. By comparing two

international cases, I am able to demonstrate what the current international buzz on resilience actually means to local disaster planning in practice, or more specifically, how the concept is being translated into policy initiatives or a shift in local governments' approach to disaster management. Comparing different manifestations of a global concept not only underlines the naiveté of considering resilience as a unilateral, self-explanatory agenda, but also the need for more in-depth research on the specificities of how the concept is used — which are, as this paper shows, not necessarily subject to becoming a passive tool for neoliberal governance.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: CONTROVERSY AROUND THE USE OF RESILIENCE IN DISASTER PLANNING

2.1. Late-modernity vs. Post-modernity view on “resilience”

The current scholars working on critical resilience (Coeffee et al., 2008; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012; Chandler, 2013; Joseph, 2013; Grove, 2013; Davoudi, 2014) draw their critical angle from the theories of late-modernity (Beck, 1992, 1995, 1999; Giddens, 1990, 1991) and the concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991, 2008). They combine Beck's Risk Society — the fact that now we live in a society where the risk is incalculable — with Foucault's governmentality (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). The resulting paradigm claims that the heightened uncertainty and ungraspable risk (e.g. terrorism, disasters, catastrophes) render an opportunity for the State to organize the society in a way that it increases its social control or maintains the existing social order. However, *in contrast to* Beck's assumption (1992, 1999) that the risk society would start to acknowledge the limits of scientific/technical control of the

society, the current critical resilience writers place more emphasis on the State's maneuvering of the uncertainty, either via 'precautionary principle' or 'maintaining neoliberal social order'.

For instance, several writers have used Foucault's governmentality to demonstrate how resilience is a form of governmentality that aims to maintain the existing neoliberal social order. The concept of governmentality is used here to emphasize how the act of governing or governance has *no longer* much to do with top-down regulation or law enforcements, but more to do with "conditioning" of the society so that it accommodates and "naturally" embraces a certain social order — with the creation of everyday social milieu that normalize individual practices that are conformed to that order. In other words, "governance operates indirectly through the work on informal level of societal life" (Chandler, 2013: 211). One of the key elements of Beck's theory that these writers draw upon is "individualization" of risk: with the argument of uncertainty — i.e. "we, the government, can't control everything in this era of uncertainty" — the burden of risk management migrates *from* the jurisdictions of institutions *to* the individualized sphere of personal decision making (Mythen, 2005). From such perspective, Chandler (2013) interpreted resilience discourse as the shift from a state-based to a "societalization" of security practices; recent 'resilience' policies and practices shift the focus of security from state interests and capacities to the citizenry's capacity of making rational behavioral choices.

More specifically, the discourse of resilience, which underlines "self-sufficiency", internal "coping capacity", and "adaptability", is creating a kind of societal condition that naturalizes the existing neoliberal social order that places the onus on individuals and their

agency — without deeply attending to the fact that people do not all have the same agency when they are unequally positioned in structural processes. Joseph (2013) discussed resilience as “embedded neoliberalism”, a form of governmentality that emphasizes individual responsibility: resilience theory underlines the need for adaptability at the unit level, and such idea of self-reliance and human adaptability can easily be taken up by neoliberal discourse and practices where citizens are ‘free’ to take responsibility for their own life choices. Grove (2014) noted how “empowerment” strategies (e.g. participatory techniques such as focus groups or education programs) only naturalize the existing socio-economic inequalities by constructing “an artificial and depoliticized form of adaptive capacity that does not threaten neoliberal order” (Grove, 2014: 240).

On the other hand, increasing efforts have been made to interpret the use of resilience in more socially progressive ways. In summary, they focus on three positive aspects what resilience concept has brought to the table: 1) its promise of social transformation – not “bouncing back”, but “bouncing forward”; 2) its emphasis on social capital and local knowledge; 3) its acknowledgement of human agency. Tierney (2014) demonstrated how the concept of resilience introduced a new perspective in hazards studies/disaster planning; resilience begins with the assumption that problems cannot be prevented, solved or cured in traditional ways (e.g. reductionist or linear), implying more radical calls for rethinking social/political organizations and their adaptive learning towards transformation and progress. Furthermore, her book focused on interpreting “social resilience” mainly as a local community’s social capital and the status of “being networked”, or whether or not a community has collective social capacity of people based on their human networks and knowledge sharing. Tierney (2014) noted a set of examples where

resilience means more than being physically strong or having material resources, precisely due to the existence of social capital that allows the sharing of local knowledge – arguing how social capital is “lynchpin” of disaster resilience (Tierney, 2014: 185).

In addition, the acknowledgement of human agency in resilience discourse is noted more clearly by Schmidt (2014). Schmidt (2014) used Dewey’s pragmatism to understand resilience in potentially a more positive way, underlining human agency or the belief that internal human agency can have effect on the external, given condition. She argued that Deweyan understanding of resilience can translate the neoliberal impasse (“never getting it right”) into proactive human will/agency (“always having to adapt”) – i.e. adversity can only makes us stronger. In other words, “pragmatic” understanding of resilience doesn’t just succumb to the neoliberal social order; its emphasis on human agency, and the belief that we still possess the power to influence the external world, will only grow in the face of impossibility and unattainability – which becomes the source of empowerment and possibility of political actions. Similarly, DeVerteuil and Golubchikov (2016)’s article on ‘Can Resilience be Redeemed?’ argued that the resilience discourse may be able to save itself when focusing on the ‘persistent resilience’ of ‘survivor’ communities. Especially from the perspective of grass-root organizations and alternative powers, resilience can be considered as an proactive response and movement against the existing social order, or the preordained trajectory. In other words, with resilience’s emphasis on “bouncing forward”, we can direct our attention to social/political progress. Thus, their argument is based on three theses: i) resilience can sustain alternative and previous practices that contradict neoliberalism; (ii) resilience is more active and dynamic than passive; and (iii) resilience can

sustain survival, thus acting as a precursor to more obviously transformative action such as resistance.

The gist of ‘late-modernist’ theorization of resilience underlines how our society is now already structured in a way that maintains neoliberal social order, and how the “resilience” discourse is just another example of governmentality orchestrated by the currently dominant power. In this framework, resilience is a perfect example of how bureaucracies use the left’s vocabularies (e.g. empowerment, decentralization, localization) to preserve the current social order and power structures. Resilience, within this understanding, is a perfect example of late-modernity governance, which subtly creates an societal “milieu” where individuals become self-reflective of their own behaviors and capacities, instead of interventionist, explicit top-down orders of the state — i.e. the opposite of a ‘Big Brother State’. Developing the desirable qualities to be ‘resilient’ — to adapt, survive, and bounce back — is left as the task of individuals and communities, while the state discreetly formulates the kinds of social conditions in which such understanding (i.e. “security as individual responsibility”) becomes widespread and naturalized.

On the other hand, ‘post-modernist’ theorization of resilience, which questions metanarratives and introduces the potentialities of human agency, can offer interpretations that are more open-ended — implying a wider range of political actions from divergent actors. In this framework, the rise of resilience can go either way: the flexibility of its interpretation definitely remains vulnerable to the manipulation of the dominant power that uses the concept in a way that serves their interests, however such flexibility can also offer a real opportunity to introduce the kind of governance inspired by more contextually competent knowledge and acknowledgement

of human agency. In the following section, I will demonstrate what I consider to be the main difference between ‘late-modernity theorization of resilience’ and ‘post-modern theorization of resilience’, then propose three characteristics of using resilience in a way that has politically progressive potentials — which, as a result, could be better framed with postmodern understanding of governance.

2.2. Theoretical lens for postmodern understanding ‘resilience’: Different kinds of knowledges, the role of political narratives, and the rise of “other” powers

In ‘late-modernist’ understanding of ‘resilience’, the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ is an opportunity for government to regain social control and affirm their legitimacy in governance, focusing on how science and technologies are (ab)used in naturalizing the existing social order. The modernist hierarchy of knowledge remains intact *to a certain extent* — to the extent of which the government is able to maintain the power and authority that comes from the use of ‘expert knowledge’ and ‘scientific facts’. For instance, disaster planning can still prioritize scientific facts and predictions (drawing from scientific/ technical expertise), however *not only* just in the modernist sense of trying to ‘control’ the disaster, *but also* in the sense that it intends to ‘nudge’ the individual households to react in a certain way that is the most rational and economical.

On the other hand, the post-modernist paradigm is based on a working hypothesis that such conventional hierarchy of knowledge is now challenged and that the increasing importance is now placed upon the development of prescriptive narratives. Lyotard (1979) claimed that how ‘expertness’ of scientific knowledge has lost its aura (i.e. their automatic authority and power

that comes from just being ‘scientific’). In such condition, the government encounters a “legitimation crisis” in that it can no longer rely on “expertise” or “scientific knowledge” for claiming the credibility and authority of its decisions. It has to do more. What they need more of, in the era where the scientific knowledge is now equalled with other different types of knowledges, is a successful development of narratives and normative argumentations that legitimize how their particular way of using certain techniques (over different ways, over different techniques) is ‘good’ for the society. In other words, the authority of the government has to come from a fragile basis of certain normative claims that can be overturned and challenged. While it is a crisis for the current social order, it also hints at an opportunity for different political directions that can capitalize on such crisis.

Here, I draw on three aspects that could help theorizing a ‘postmodern’ lens of understanding resilience. The first element is ‘acknowledgement of different kinds of knowledges’. In the context of environmental planning and policy, several scholars have noted the relationship between ‘the rise of different kinds of knowledges’ and the authority of public policy (or “power”). Jasanoff and Martello (2004)’s edited book, *Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance*, highlighted the democratization of “knowledge” used in local governance, acknowledging the rise of more “down-to-earth” (therefore “earthly”), contextually competent local knowledges based on the realities of lived experience — as opposed to remote, “faceless” global knowledge based on climate prediction and modeling. Accordingly, their book effectively questioned who decides and how we decide the “knowledge” that is deemed to be legitimate enough to formulate public policies, as well as what that means to developing politics and governance that is not only environment-friendly but also socially

inclusive. More recently, Kütting and Lipschutz (2012)'s edited book *Environmental Governance: Power and Knowledge in Local-Global World*, also addressed this conundrum of the relationship between knowledge and power in local governance, asking whether abstract, “spaced-based” forms of knowledge (e.g. scientific modeling, predictions) “must necessarily trump” local “placed-based” forms (e.g. local knowledges, vernacular technics, civic sciences), and eventually advocating for the kinds of knowledge practices that fosters more effective forms of *social* power. These inquiries suggest how the increasing notion of “Anthropocene” and “uncertainty” — public awareness on climate change and environmental degradation triggered by natural hazards and disasters — induces new dynamics to knowledge and power in local governance, especially with regard to how to legitimize local planning decisions and agendas. Accordingly, it can be observed how acknowledging the rise of ‘different kinds of knowledges’, as well as their implication on governance and power, is an on-going discussion and debate in the context of environmental planning and policy.

The second element is the role of political narratives/discourses, or the role of ‘linguistic articulation’ in legitimizing the rationale of public policy. As mentioned above, one of the governance challenges in ‘postmodern era’ is caused by the diminishment of the “scientific aura” or “expert knowledges”, which makes it difficult for the government to rationalize certain policy decisions — as they cannot say, without a doubt, that “they know better”. Accordingly, in an era where science and technology have become a part of the mundanity — rather than authoritative, untouchable norms — linguistic articulation and use of narratives/discourses play equally an important role in legitimizing public policy. For instance, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has produced numerous important works on neoliberalism, in which he stressed the significance of

neoliberal *discourse* in the political project of neoliberalism. Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) characterized certain vocabularies (e.g. globalization, flexibility, employability) as possessing the “performative power” to bring into the very realities they claim to describe. In other words, a political project can be, to a substantial degree, initiated, led, or driven by discourse (Fairclough, 2003: 204). The “performativity” of political narratives, discourses, or the use of certain policy concepts — emphasizes the unfixity, openness, and possibility of being used for progressive politics. The political potentials of unfixed, flexible concepts in political discourses have been well noted by Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985])’s proposed paradigm for the tasks of the Left; they have argued that, while the unfixity of a concept in political discourse allows its articulation with elements of conservative discourse, it *also* allows different forms of articulation and redefinition which accentuate the democratic moment (p. 176). Similarly, Foucault (1980) also characterized ‘progressive politics’ as the one that seeks to transform the ways in which certain discourses are conventionally formulated. For instance, one can question the reasons why certain concepts (such as ‘organism’, ‘function’, or ‘evolution’) are used in a particular way in political discourses, for the purpose of challenging such conventional ways of using them. Accordingly, I propose in this paper that such linguistic articulation is becoming increasingly important in legitimizing public policy agendas, which is why 1) there is a need for more careful investigation on how the ‘resilience’ concept is used and integrated into policy discourses, and, 2) there is a political potential for using the concept of resilience, which could be achieved by developing and maintaining the “progressive ways” of articulating and using the concept in policy discourses.

Finally, the third element is with regard to the opening up of new venues for unconventional actors to intervene into territorial governance and planning, what I would refer as

‘the rise of the ‘other’ powers’. Indeed, it is difficult to deny the neoliberal unfolding of how ‘resilience’ is adopted in a way that only favors the current power relations or abused by the government’s intention to withdraw social needs. The examples of such unfolding are often framed with the assumption that how the currently dominant power would always prevail, and therefore how ‘resilience’ is bound to serve the maintenance (and naturalization) of existing social relations and inequalities. But these arguments are missing the other side of the story. In the original theories of Foucault’s governmentality or Beck’s risk society, the main story line is indeed the State’s offloading of responsibilities onto individuals, but the spread of responsibilities also implied something else — the diffusion of “power” in the sense of individual/collective *capabilities to act*, or “the productive aspect of power” (Foucault, 1980: 119). This new framing of “power” attempts to go beyond the notion of State’s power to control/manipulate:

“In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one identifies power with a law which says no, power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition. Now I believe that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, one which has been curiously widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.” (Foucault, 1980: 119)

“I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily *extend beyond* the limits of State... first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, *is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations*, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.” (Foucault, 1980: 122, emphasis added)

In the end, the dispersal of responsibilities — or the “effect” of such dispersal — is not necessarily bound to serve the dominant power *or* only be directed in the ways in which the dominant power aims to control/design: it can also unravel in the fashion that no single agent has control of. For instance, the State’s campaign on sexual education was intended to hammer into parents head their own parental educational responsibilities, or into children’s heads their relationship with their own body. However, the final “effect” or consequences of such campaign do not always turn out to be what the State apparatus envisions to be, *because* there are other kinds of positive powers and potentialities that arise thanks to such education or “sexualization” of infantile body — and these new power relations or “possible subversive recodifications of power relations” (Foucault, 1980: 123) are not necessarily subject to the State’s control. In fact, Beck’s (1992, 1999) theory of Risk Society also hinted the similar notion of the opportunities and potentialities for new power relations to emerge (precisely under such “risk society” condition), as he points out the limitations of technical/scientific knowledge-base (as well as never-conquerable uncertainties) — which calls for more inclusive knowledge and decision making processes by embracing the wisdoms/opinions of those who have traditionally be excluded (see also his later work on “emancipatory catastrophism” (2015)).

Here, one could consider Rorty (1984)’s attitude of doing theory on postmodernity; one could use Foucault’s approach to reveal and “explain who is currently getting and using power for what purposes”, but then, also, “suggest how some other people might get it and use it for other purposes” (p. 42). This implies that, despite the grim account of how resilience is being used to legitimize the State’s withdrawal of responsibilities on social needs — the uncertainty of hazards risk and the increasing public awareness on such risk *can open up* new venues for non-

conventional powers to intervene into planning, policy making, or other governance decision making processes. In other words, the diffusion of risk culture, risk education, or the kinds of campaigns on the strategies to “be resilient” — are not necessarily a passive tool for neoliberal governance, but also can become an open-ended occasion in which new agencies and power relations emerge.

In sum, the post-modern theorization of resilience notes: 1) how the concept can initiate the shift in planners’ view and practice on knowledges (going beyond “expert knowledge”) 2) how the flexibility of the concept can be used for developing political narratives that are progressive 3) how the concept can open up potential new venues for non-conventional powers to intervene into policy making/ decision making processes, inviting new actors (i.e. non-planners, non-experts) to the planning dialogue. Using such theorization as a window through which examples, stories, or cases are studied — as this paper does with the cases of Seattle and Paris — can allow us to see the political potentials of resilience, or the aspects that are often overlooked in late-modernist framing of resilience.

3. METHODS

The purpose of this project, ultimately, is to *generate a new theory* on how ‘resilience’ could be framed with a postmodern understanding of governance. Qualitative case studies are effective in generating new theories by heuristically identifying new variables and hypotheses, especially focusing on the “deviant” cases “whose outcomes are not predicted or explained well by existing theories, can be particularly useful in identifying new or left-out variables”. Such approach is driven by archival work or interviews which can reveal new variables that cannot be subsumed

under pre-existing codes or datasets (Bennett, 2004: 24, 35). Accordingly, this project is based on two qualitative case studies on local disaster planning, as represented or discussed in planning documents and interviews.

As for the main source of data, the project focused on analyzing 1) disaster planning documents and policy discourses 2) interview scripts with emergency managers/planners working in the related field (who participate in producing disaster planning documents). The official planning and policy documents consulted for this project are listed in the Table 1. As for interviews, in total, eleven in-depth key informant interviews were conducted, which became the basis of interview transcripts used for text analyses. In Seattle, six interviews were conducted (three emergency managers in the Seattle Office of Emergency Management, in addition to three people working in the field of emergency management). In Paris, five interviews were conducted (two officers working in State-led agencies working in flood risk management, two officers working in local agencies in planning/flood risk management, and one architect involved in flood area planning). The collected data was analyzed with the assistance of text analysis software (*Atlas.TI*), which helped systemizing the application of consistent codes (throughout different texts), and consequently, revealed some major patterns within the data.

The project mainly aimed to address two research questions, and two methodological approaches have been adopted respectively. Above all, I was interested in how the global institutional push on a policy concept (i.e. “resilience”) influences the disaster planning discourses — internationally. In order to attend to this research interest, I compared two cross-national case studies, the case of Seattle and Paris. Such cross-national comparative approach to

policy analysis has been demonstrated well in Barlett and Vayrus (2017) and Carney (2009). Carney (2009), who compared educational policies of three countries (Denmark, Nepal, and China), coined the term educational ‘policyscape’, which refers to capturing “some essential elements of globalization as a phenomenon (object and process) and provide a tool with which to explore the spread of policy ideas and pedagogical practice across different national schools systems” (p. 68). The notion of ‘policyscapes’, as Barlett and Virus (2017) points out, allows researchers to maintain a certain degree of attention on the state without making it the sole or primary focus of analysis, thus allowing the relevance of cross-country comparison that looks more to the roles of actors and their initiatives, possibly influenced and inspired by *something larger than* ‘national’ culture. And since I primarily wanted to understand *in depth* what the international buzz of ‘resilience’ actually means to local disaster planning, Barlett and Virus (2017)’s approach to cross-national case comparison was the most appropriate method in that it 1) acknowledges the global spread of policy ideas without being too fixated to national characteristics 2) therefore allows a comparison of the role of actors and policy initiatives across countries — despite the given different ‘cultural⁴’ contexts.

Secondly, I was equally interested in how “resilience” is currently being used in policy discourses, or how the concept is “linguistically articulated” in which specific discourse contexts — in attempts to reveal *whether* they were used in a pejorative sense of “citizens *have to* be self-sufficient on their own” (i.e. weight on individual resilience), or, a real pragmatic sense of “we can’t always predict what’s going to happen, so let’s think about *what we will do* given that it’s

⁴ In Barlett and Vayrus (2017)’s approach to cross-national case comparison method, the definition of ‘culture’ is also renewed, as it not only just signifies the culture that is ‘given’, but also the kinds of culture that is ‘in the making’ — precisely because they consider ‘the role of actors’ as more important than the background where the actors may initially belong to (i.e. human agency over the given environment).

going to happen” (i.e. weight on more collective aspects of resilience). In order to explore how the concept of “resilience” is applied in local disaster policy discourses, I needed to use ‘interpretive policy analysis’ (IPA) which is really good at analyzing the use of narratives and linguistic articulation in legitimizing and diffusing public policies. Yanow (2000) differentiated IPA from other approaches to policy analysis: while traditional approaches to policy analysis assume that policy words can and should have unambiguous, or neutral meanings that can and should be communicated in a univocal manner — IPA assumes that, in contrast, it is impossible to study a policy language without taking account of imbedded values and identities. Policy documents, legislation, and implementation strategies are understood here not only instrumentally rational but also expressive — of meanings, including individual and collective identity. From such interpretative approach to policy analysis, this project mainly intended to interpret specific applications of “resilience” in disaster planning discourses, with theoretical frameworks (e.g. “late-modernity” and/or “post-modern” theorization of resilience) as a window through which such analysis takes place.

4. POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RISK GOVERNANCE IN SEATTLE AND PARIS DISASTER PLANNING

4.1 Seattle: Decentralized, process-oriented planning

There are two characteristics that are distinctive in the case of Seattle, as compared to the case of Paris. First of all, the political structure of risk governance in the U.S. is decentralized, in that localities develop and implement their own disaster planning under the guidance of Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Under the federal law “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act” (1988), as amended by the “Disaster Mitigation Act” (2000), local governments in the U.S. are required to develop a hazard mitigation plan that identifies the jurisdiction’s natural hazards and mitigation strategies. Local hazard mitigation planning documents are required to follow the guidelines of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who verifies and approves the plans.

However, it should be noted that the major part of these mandated guidelines concern only the ‘process’ of planning, such as stakeholders engagement, public participation, and regular updates. The details of actual regulations and their implementation are subject to each jurisdiction’s laws and local contexts — which means, City of Seattle, as a local government, possesses political capacity to initiate and implement their own policies and regulations as they see fit. Indeed, Seattle’s disaster planning and risk management is in conversation with other regional disaster plans, such as those of King County and Washington State, which are larger jurisdictions to which Seattle belongs. For instance, the most important State influence on local disaster planning is “Critical Areas Ordinances”, based on which the local governments need to develop policies and regulations in “critical areas” defined as frequently flooded areas (including areas prone to tsunamis), geologically hazardous areas (including areas prone to erosion, landslide, seismic activity, volcanic activity, etc.) (Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2013: Element C/p. 26). However, the city itself is very much of a primary actor of disaster planning. Although it is required by the Washington State to establish regulations, the specificities of them are vague — it is up to the local governments what kind of regulations they would implement in their own jurisdictions. Accordingly, the City of Seattle (more specifically,

the Office of Emergency Management) is the main actor that manages production of disaster plan documents and coordination with different parties involved. Seattle’s “2015-2021 All Hazards Mitigation Plan” lists all the functions and legal roles that the city executes (framed as “capabilities”), which includes regulatory zoning, risk assessment, financial support, and public outreach (p. 5.1-5.28).

Second, disaster planning in Seattle has clear distinctions in their actions across different disaster phases — mitigation, response and recovery. Each disaster phase has its own specific plan (“2015-2021 All Hazards Mitigation Plan”, “Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”, and “Disaster Recovery Framework”). Different actors (e.g. Seattle City Light, Police, Public Utilities, Transportation, etc) are organized *around these plans*, which are led and produced by the City of Seattle. This effectively limits the number of plans that concerns disaster planning and risk management, as the city is in charge of orchestrating different actors and their responsibilities. Such organization of risk governance is not necessarily evident across different local contexts, as we will see below, which could be noted when placed in comparison with the case of Paris where different actors possess and lead their own risk management plans according to their priorities and responsibilities.

The City of Seattle has recently joined the “Resilience Cities Network” (RCN) financed by the Rockefeller foundation in 2017. The members of RCN, in exchange for the financial support (which allows them to hire a Resilience Officer in the city government), are required to produce a ‘Resilience Strategy’. Accordingly, Seattle recently has set up a website ‘Resilient Seattle’ (<https://www.seattle.gov/resilience>), which communicates the process of developing their

resilience strategy document (expected in mid 2018), as well as conducts online citizen surveys. Their most recent publication, ‘Seattle Resilience Workshop Report’ (October 2017, prepared by a consulting firm “AECOM”), summarizes the results of their public outreach and engagement, such as ‘Resilience Narratives for the City’ and ‘Priority Stakeholder Recommendations and Engagement’.

Site	Political Scale	Actor	Risk Management			Recovery Framework
			Risk communication	Mitigation & Exposure reduction (pre-event)	Disaster Response (post-event)	
Seattle	State-level	Washington State		2013 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan		
	Regional	King County		King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan	King County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)	“The Resilient King County Initiative” (Recovery Plan)
	Local	City of Seattle (Office of Emergency Management)	SHIVA (Seattle Hazards Identification and Vulnerability Analysis)!	City of Seattle 2015 – 2021 All-Hazards Mitigation Plan	Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (Base Plan)!	City of Seattle Disaster Recovery Framework
		City of Seattle (Office of Sustainability & Environment)	“Seattle Resilience Workshop Report”, published with the financial support of Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Network			

Table 3-1. Disaster planning/ risk governance structure in the case of Seattle.

4.2. Paris: Centralized, responsibility-based planning

In the context of Paris, on the other hand, the State (as *l'État*) intervention is much more present and concentrated, given that the city contains the most of the country's vested interests as the capital. Above all, different state-led agencies (e.g. *Prefecture de Police de Paris (PP)*, *Prefecture de la Region Ile-de-France*⁵ (*PRIF*) — all part of *l'État*, 'the State') are dedicated to planning risk/disaster management in the Parisian region. As compared to disaster management of the U.S. where the national disaster agency (FEMA) leaves the details of disaster planning to the localities, in France, the state-led agencies often try to lead the disaster planning, and localities are required to follow the rules and instructions set by them. Accordingly, the required responsibility of city government (*Mairie de Paris*) is rather limited as the city only involves with 1) the formation of "*Plan Communal de Sauvegarde*" (PCS; Emergency evacuation/ first response plan for saving lives) 2) informing population of the potential risk elements and developing "culture of risk"⁶. The City of Paris does have capacities in urban planning, but they are substantially constrained by regulations mandated by state-led agencies. For instance, they can initiate urban planning projects such as "*Quartiers Resilients*" (Resilient Neighborhoods), which aims to integrate more flood-conscious architecture and urban design into planning. This is not a legal responsibility or obligation assigned to the city; it is rather a positive engagement and initiative that the city chooses to participate. In terms of the decisions made on regulatory

⁵ Ile-de-France is the region that Paris belongs to (as in Seattle belonging to King County region).

⁶ Translated as "how to get used to living with risk"; disaster planning documents state that public education, information availability, and emergency exercises can enhance the citizen's awareness of natural hazards risks/ potential impacts, and therefore developing the "culture of risk".

measures (e.g. zoning on where to build or not to build) are driven by the state-led regional agency, *Prefecture de la Region Ile-de-France* (PRIF).

Furthermore, unlike Seattle's case where the city is in charge of assuring the continuity of public utility services (e.g. electricity, water, transportation), in the case of Paris, it is the local state-led agency (*Prefecture de Police de Paris*; PP) who controls and makes sure that the utility service operators (public and private; e.g. operators of electricity, water, transportation, gas, sanitation, heating) have the functional Continuity of Activity Plans (*Le Plan de Continuité d'Activité*; PCA). These utility service operators are often referred as “critical network operators (*Opérateurs de réseaux critiques*)” or “Vitaly Important Organizations (*Opérateurs d'Importance Vitale*)”. Critical network operators are engaged as important stakeholders for local flood risk management plan (SLGRI — *Stratégie locale de gestion des risques d'inondation*; to be detailed below), considered as more important than the role of *Mairie de Paris* (the city government).

Another important characteristic of the Paris case comes from the fact that disaster plans are written separately by different actors according to their responsibilities — depending on the disaster phase that each of them is in charge of. As for hazard mitigation and zoning regulations, the state-led agency *Prefecture de la region Ile-de-France* (PRIF) — more specifically, by DRIEE, an authority within PRIF — organizes the flood prevention zoning plan referred as “PPRi (Plan de prévention des risques d'inondation de Paris)”. PPRi is essentially a collection of different area maps that summarize which areas are legally allowed to build/develop, or not allowed to develop due to potential high risk of flooding. The objective of PPRi is to constrain

urban planning according to the risk level; as a result, the planning capacity of *Mairie de Paris* (the city government) can be strongly limited by PPRi.

On the other hand, as for disaster response, it is *Prefecture de Police de Paris* (PP) — more specifically, *Zone de Defense*, authority within PP — that concerns the crisis management and response for all different types of unexpected events including terrorism, flooding, and other climate irregularity events. There is a national emergency response plan referred as “ORSEC Plan” (*Dispositif ORSEC — Organisation de la Réponse de Security Civile*). ORSEC Plan mobilizes various emergency responders such as fire department, ambulance, hospitals, police, and civil security organizations (e.g. Red Cross). ORSEC Plans are written by state-led regional/local agencies, and in case of Paris, it is *Le Préfet de Police de Paris* (the head of the *Prefecture de Police de Paris*) that is the responsible leader of the emergency response plan in Paris. *Le Préfet de Police de Paris* also leads EU-financed initiative “EU SEQUANA”, which is a series of emergency exercises with different risk scenarios in attempts to bring together different actors in actual practice as well as to increase the attention of the public on flooding. *Plan Communal de Sauvegarde* (PCS) is another plan that concerns disaster response in Paris, led by *Mairie de Paris*. PCS is a locally organized safety and security plan in the face of extreme events, and it is a national legal obligation for all city governments to formulate a PCS.

Concerning the post-crisis phase of flood management (e.g. early recovery and rebuilding), state-led agencies recently introduced new planning frameworks that take account of post-crisis conditions and what they plan to do. At the river basin level, the state-led regional agency PRIF (*Prefecture de la region Ile-de-France*) recently produced a flood management plan

PGRI (*Le plan de gestion des risques d'inondation*; Plan of Flood Risk Management), which concerns management of flood risk in the Seine-Normandie river basin area (*bassin Seine-Normandie*). At the local level, SLGRI (*La stratégie locale de gestion des risques d'inondation*; Local Strategy of Flood Risk Management) has been introduced by state-led regional agency PRIF (*Prefecture de la region Ile-de-France*) and state-led local agency PP (*Prefecture de Police de Paris*). SLGRI is the finest (i.e. the lowest scale) component of the flood risk management policy, which constitutes as a part of PGRI. In other words, PGRI is an “umbrella document” that overviews the general intention of different localities at the river basin level, and SLGRI is flood management strategies elaborated at the local level (e.g. “territories that are subject to high risk of inundation” (TRI)). SLGRI is a planning document setting out broad guidelines and broad objectives on all the components of flood risk management (prevention, awareness, knowledge, crisis management, vulnerability, risk integration in urban planning, etc.). It is elaborated in consultation with all the actors of the territories having a role in flood risk management (State, communities, economic actors, etc.). However, unlike PPRI, it has no regulatory or prescriptive value.

Paris is also a member of Resilient Cities Network (RCN) financed by the Rockefeller foundation, and has recently produced a document “Strategy of Resilience”. While the actual disaster planning itself is led by state-led agencies (i.e. *Prefecture de la region Ile-de-France*, *Prefecture de Police de Paris*), it is the Parisian local (city) government (*Mairie de Paris*) that leads the “Resilience Cities” program in Paris. The “Resilience Officer” has been appointed by the Mayor of Paris, and the “Strategy of Resilience” has been written by the Mayor’s office. This strategy associates the concept of resilience with the questions of solidarity and inequality, in

addition to proposing a collaborative governance model that mobilizes actors and organizations beyond the government sphere.

Site	Political Scale	Actor	Risk Management			Recovery Framework
			Risk communication/ information for the public	Mitigation & Exposure reduction (pre-event)	Crisis management / Response (post-event)	
Paris	National (l'Etat)	Prefecture de police de Paris (Zone de Defense)			Dispositif ORSEC! l'exercice EU Sequana 2016	
		Prefecture de la Region Ile-de-France (PRIF), ! DRIEE (authority within the PRIF) !	Information Acquéreurs / Locataires	Plan de prévention des risques d'inondation (PPRI) de Paris		
				<p>Le plan de gestion des risques d'inondation (PGRI) — by DRIEE (flood risk management at the river basin level)</p> <p>Stratégie locale de gestion des risques d'inondation (SLGRI) — for Metropole Francilienne (Paris) — by DRIEE with Prefecture de Police (flood risk management at the local level; Paris metropolitan area)</p> <p>Charte d'engagement pour "concevoir des quartiers résilients" face au risque d'inondation — Engagement for building resilient neighborhoods in the face of flood risk!</p> <p>Assuring Le Plan de Continuité d'Activité (PCA) of utility service operators</p>		
		Seine Grand Lac (River Basin)		Programme d'actions de prévention des inondations (PAPI)		

Local	Mairie de Paris	DICRIM (Les Risques Majeurs à Paris)		Plan Communal de Sauvegarde de Paris (PCS) Heatwaves Plan (Plan Canicule) !	
	"Stratégie de Résilience de Paris", published with the financial support of Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities Network				
	Opérateurs de réseaux critiques (Critical network operators)		Plan de prévention: internal document which describe all the prevention and protection measures	Le Plan de Continuité d'Activité (PCA), Continuity of Activity Plan (internal document)	

Table 3-2. Disaster planning/ risk governance structure in the case of Paris

5. FUSING RESILIENCE INTO PUBLIC POLICY — INFLUENCE OF ‘RESILIENCE’ ON DISASTER PLANNING

The main common idea that justifies the rise of the resilience concept is based on the notion that planners can't control or prevent a disaster to certain extent. This acknowledgment of “incapacity to control”, in this context, can be understood as a pragmatic approach, which shifts the direction of planning from “fighting against the nature” to “working and living with the risk that we have a limited control of”. Planning documents and interviews with planners in Seattle and Paris have constantly stressed how they aim to go beyond the prevention and protection approach, which is

the main reason why their adoption of ‘resilience’ concept becomes relevant. For instance, the rationale of Seattle’s Disaster Recovery Framework begins with:

“We as the community of Seattle will at some point in the future have to recover from a major disaster. We don’t know when it will happen, or which of the many identified threats will be the cause of it, or if it will be brought about by an unforeseen threat. We don’t know how it will impact our community ... We can’t predict with precision our particular needs or the specifics of the countless choices we’ll need to make, as individuals, as public sector entities, as private and not-for-profit organizations, and as a community. Knowing what we know and acknowledging what we don’t, we still can anticipate the types of devastation that will occur, the magnitude of destruction, and the type of structures and processes we’ll need in place to make well-informed, participatory decisions about how to rebuild and support the recovery of our community.” (Seattle Disaster Recovery Framework, 2015: 1)

Similarly, Paris’ recent documents on flood management also underline the uncontrollability of disasters, calling for a new approach to “living with the risk” instead of “fighting against the floods”. Flood Risk Management Plan, referred as PGRI (2015), claims how “zero risk doesn’t exist”, and that “beyond the risk management and the reparations, the time has come to consider the flood risk in a more holistic way in order to better anticipate [flood events] and organize” (p. 2). PGRI notes the limits of prevention approach, and argues for more integrated approach to flood risk management:

“Flood management is gradually exiting from a one-dimensional logic limited to an approach in terms of protection. The stated goal is no longer to fight against the floods but how to better live with. A consensus has been reached around the impossibility of achieving a “zero risk” of flooding. The construction of protective structures thus appears to be a partial response to the risks, dealing only with the hazard without necessary reflection on the exposure of what’s at stake and a potential risk of rupture which always exists, especially if the flood occurs higher than what had been built. The notions of reducing vulnerability and improving the resilience of territories make their way into the discourse of intention but still have little concrete operational implications. Innovation in this area remains is left to be encouraged.” (PGRI, 2015: 20)

In PGRI, “integrated flood risk management” not only concerns protection and prevention of urban structures *but also* preservation of water, biodiversity, urban planning, and architecture. If the concept of resilience remind planners of how “fighting against” should no longer the goal of disaster planning, what should then become the focus of planning? In the end, this question is closely tied to the ways in which cities themselves operationalize the concept of resilience, which is essentially an open-ended concept. With my theoretical argument on how the rise of resilience symbolizes a shift towards postmodern governance, the discussion will specifically focus on the aspects of disaster planning that demonstrate a new governance phenomenon that goes beyond a previous model of risk governance.

5.1. Seattle: Citizen engagement, local knowledge, and decentralized forms of planning

As for the case of Seattle, the influence of “resilience” has become more apparent with the formation of “Disaster Recovery Framework” (City’s own initiative). Interviews with Seattle Office of Emergency Management (Seattle OEM) have made clarifications in the difference between “Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP)” and “Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF)”. Above all, as for mitigation plans, the motivation/drive is external, since FEMA requires HMP for federal grant funding. As for recovery plans, there is no requirement at the state level, yet it was more voluntary initiative at the city level. After the international earthquake incidents in 2011-2013, Seattle City Council started discussing what the city could do more than hazard mitigation and emergency management. Especially the Seattle’s similarities with Christchurch in terms of geographic hazards characteristics (e.g. earthquake risk), the city’s risk planning was influenced by those incidents. Consequently, the director of OEM took a lead on building

recovery framework — and the funding came from Seattle City Council (OEM officer 1, Interview with author, January 2018).

Another key difference between the HMP and DRF is that the DRF aims to work with local communities (different neighborhoods — framed by the city as “urban villages”) which are heavily involved. For the building recovery framework, Seattle OEM has worked with various community based organizations as their partners, as well as private sector and non-profit organizations. In doing so, it can be observed how the knowledge base — which is a source of legitimizing government plans — is shifting from technical knowledge to more contextually competent knowledges.

“The key difference between hazard mitigation plans and recovery framework is that, in Recovery Framework, the local communities (urban villages, etc) are heavily involved. We have Community Based Organizations as our partners, as well as private sector, non-profits, etc. Here we need the information and resources outside the city and our office, outside the government. This is different from the case of mitigation plan which was based on the city governments’ own asset and knowledge, for example, risk analysis and expert information” (OEM officer 1, Interview with author, January 2018).

“I think we initially valued government knowledge, and now we’re trying to look at knowledge from different communities. It’s a gradual shift. Especially for public risk education and outreach, it is important to send a message of “what you need to do” to be prepared, but it’s hard to know what kind of information is really relevant to different groups of people. Is what I think important for you to know – is that really what you need to know in *your* situation? Does what I’m presenting — really makes sense to your situation? What we think as important may not be what they think as important or relevant to their context, especially across cultural contexts” (OEM officer 2, Interview with author, February 2018).

Accordingly, there are two interesting factors about Seattle’s approach to risk governance and disaster planning, with its integration of the concept of ‘resilience’. First of all, the city pays a lot of attention to public engagement and citizen participation, with its assertion that the city’s

planning initiatives will be based on the results from public discussions. And as a result of these citizen engagement efforts, more and more emphasis is being placed on the themes of housing affordability, racial equity, and social disparities, which were identified by citizens (Seattle Resilience Workshop Report, 2017). The Seattle Resilience Workshop brought about 100 participants (from public sector, private sector, and citizens), with whom the city led discussions on the topics of 1) “What does resilience mean for you” 2) “Identify and assess shocks and stresses” 3) “Assessing Seattle’s strengths and weaknesses” and finally, 4) “Identifying Resilience Building actions”. The most discussed topic in terms of shocks and stresses was affordable housing and problems of homelessness, as well as education equality and racial/social justice. Accordingly, the action ideas for ‘Resilient Seattle’ included ‘bilingual community-based action plans’, ‘different communication systems to reach everyone (taking account of language barriers)’, ‘Maintain [neighborhood] vibrancy’ via investments in cultural and economic diversity, and more attention to small and emerging businesses preparing for earthquakes. In summary, a lot of emphasis has been made on the themes of social justice and equity issues, which holds the city government accountable for addressing and ensuring the social equity for all (Workshop participant, Interview with author, November 2017).

In the end, the ‘strategies/actions to be resilient’ are not entirely dependent on ‘expert-driven’ risk assessment or hazards probability modeling — rather, they find their source of legitimation in the fact that their actions are primarily based on citizens’ opinions and reported needs. As OEM officers noted:

“Mitigation is more about what you can do given the state of the physical infrastructure, where are the most vulnerable areas, bridges, calculating the risk and number of

population that may be affected, etc. A recovery framework is about after the disaster how we would start rebuilding, so it's more about common value, what we really pursue as a value and a vision." (OEM officer 2, Interview with author, February 2018).

"I think a recovery framework gives a starting point for creative solutions that can come up by networking and building connections across different stakeholders and organizations. Building up on the values, rather than the immediate tactical response strategies. Anticipate what's going to happen and giving an actual thought of what we would do. We learned a lot from the case of Christchurch; they realized that earthquake actually gave them an opportunity to think of what really matters to them, what is really valuable to them. For them it was football stadium, and other facilities that the communities really wanted to rebuild, so they can re-focus on their community values that can be vetted in each neighborhood." (OEM officer 3, Interview with author, February 2018).

Discovering a common value and vision — is a collective, on-going project, instead of an expert-driven risk analyses and prescriptions. Especially in DRF, this emphasis on citizen engagement and participatory planning is evident: "It is a City core belief that everyone can have their say in how the City makes decisions through an inclusive, transparent process of governance during disaster recovery. This is an essential part of the whole community approach" (p. 9); "Successful long-term disaster recovery in any community will be contingent on frequent and thoughtful community engagement, shared information about the status of recovery and available resources, and garnering input from community members about the direction and priority to be placed on recovery activities" (p. 29); "A well-planned and participatory recovery and reconstruction process helps the city reactivate itself, restore and rebuild its damaged infrastructure, and recover its economy, empowering citizens to rebuild their lives, housing and livelihoods" (p. 18).

The second interesting aspect of Seattle's approach to disaster planning is the promotion of decentralized forms of governance — with its proposition of 'neighborhood-based' disaster management. This constitutes a part of the 'Urban Village' strategy which was initiated by the

city's comprehensive plan (Seattle OEM, 2015: 10, 48, 145, 154). The 'Urban Village' approach to planning divides the city into several neighborhoods/units (p. 155), which possess their own health centers, grocery stores, and collection of businesses in each neighborhood. DRF emphasizes how this neighborhood-based approach to disaster management can be more effective in terms of delivering the local needs, as well as encouraging more active engagement of citizens. Specific strategies to do so include: "identifying leaders and mentors within the community/neighborhood who can help validate the disaster information"; "defining and prioritizing the set of current and long-term recovery issues relevant to the specific neighborhood to be engaged"; "cultivating community organizations and businesses that will commit to participating in pre-disaster recovery planning and taking an active role in post-disaster recovery" (p. 50). This emphasis on localism and establishment of sub-systems within the city remains consistent in rebuilding strategies: "create and preserve unique neighborhoods with local services and commercial offerings"; "promote the establishment of health centers, grocery stores, and businesses in each neighborhood"; "establish resiliency at a neighborhood level by promoting district systems (water, stormwater, and energy), local services, and hazard-aware long-term planning" (p. 145).

Another concrete example of such "decentralized governance initiatives" is the establishment of neighborhood-based groups such as 'Community Emergency Hubs', based on which community members can build social cohesion and regular communication channels with other nearby inhabitants and existing community organizations:

"Community Emergency Hubs are places where people gather after a disaster to help each other. These Hubs are established by community members and encompass

geographic areas larger than just an immediate block or building. Hubs serve as a central gathering place among neighbors in multiple homes, apartments and condominiums ... While the office of Emergency Management supports Community Emergency Hubs, the mission of the Hub is accomplished solely through neighbors and community members” (City of Seattle, 2016).

Currently there are 135 hubs organized throughout the city, and the Office of Emergency Management provided \$1,500 starting fund for a community initiative to organize a new Hub. Such specific decentralized governance initiatives can be understood with the concept of resilience, which promotes the idea of subsystems and enhanced communications within the constituents (Aschan-Legonie, 2000). In importing of ecological resilience into urban geography, Aschan-Leygonie noted the competence of sub-systems — or what she calls “nucleus” or “hubs” within a system — as one of the factors that shows a urban system’s resilience. The sub-systems can facilitate the integration of different components in the operations of the system and thus rendering their functioning more coherent and resilient. These organized subsets often function as spatial systems of lower organizational level, and they contribute the system’s resilience through the ease of dissemination of information and innovations, which can enable the actors of the system to face a disturbance better. Effectively, Seattle’s active initiative to engage with more smaller-scale, neighborhood-based territorial governance — e.g. neighborhood-based planing and community hubs — can be understood within this context of creating subsystems that contribute to the system’s (in this case City’s) resilience.

Indeed, such promotion of decentralized mode of governance — or the emphasis on “self-sufficiency of subsystems” — can be precisely what late-modernist theorists have been wary of: this is the moment where the government “offloads responsibilities onto individuals”, or

achieves the “societalization of risk”, by pushing neighborhoods and individuals to be resilient on their own. However, at the same time, applying the post-modern lens of theorizing resilience can also allow us to see something else: the creation of such subsystems is, essentially, an attempt to engage non-planners and non-experts to planning process in a more concrete and palpable manner, which opens up new opportunities for non-conventional agencies to intervene into territorial governance. As discussed in section 2.2., “the dispersal of responsibilities” does not necessarily end up as a passive tool for the State apparatus’ scenario of control, because, the “effect” of such dispersal can also unfold in a manner that favors the rise of “other powers” — by providing opportunities for non-conventional actors to involve in the decision making processes which they previously had no access to. Within such theoretical angle, creating “Urban Villages” or “Community Emergency Hubs” — is not necessarily a part of the city’s supposedly grand scheme to “offload its responsibilities”, but can be considered as its pragmatic attempt to reach out to as many different actors as possible.

Accordingly, studying the case of Seattle — with post-modern theorization of resilience — can reveal how the concept can be translated into the kinds of policy initiatives that have progressive political potentials. For instance, creating a more inclusive knowledge base — which is not only limited to scientific information but also expands to local knowledge, experiences and discussions — symbolizes a new governance initiative that goes beyond conventional approach of “in-framing” and “controlling” natural hazards. In fact, the argument *for* citizen engagement and the importance of inhabitant-driven information is strengthened by the unpredictable and uncertain nature of hazards events; because the Hazards Mitigation Plan — based on the best technical knowledge possible on natural hazards — is limited in the sense that it cannot perfectly

predict or prevent these events from happening (or how they would impact citizens' lives), the initiation of the Recovery Framework — which opens up potential roles of communities and citizens — became inevitable and necessary. It is difficult to understand such shift in governance only with the late-modernity theorization of resilience — i.e. the State's offloading of responsibilities onto individuals; the acknowledgement of government's incapability "to do all" is not just an excuse to draw back their role on social needs, but can also be considered as a reality that gives a legitimate reason to activate more participatory, citizen-driven governance — which can be more 'efficient' and 'logical' in the contexts where conventional governance may fail. This is precisely what post-modern theorization of resilience implied: creating a more inclusive knowledge base, use of 'resilience' in a more politically progressive discourse context, and opening up of new venues for 'other powers' to intervene more systematically into planning processes — are the aspects that can only be viewed through the postmodern theoretical lens, which fits well into the case of Seattle and their use of 'resilience' in disaster planning.

5.2. Paris: Culture of risk, architectural innovation, and the rise of local initiatives

In the case of Paris, while "planning for recovery" is not yet of a systematized idea, the introduction of PGRI (*Le plan de gestion des risques d'inondation*; Flood Risk Management Plan, at the river basin level) and SLGRI (*La stratégie locale de gestion des risques d'inondation*; Local Strategy of Flood Risk Management, at the local level) could be regarded as the examples of how 'resilience' concept can inspire new approaches to disaster management and planning. These two documents demonstrate a new focus of flood risk management that goes

beyond prevention approach, and the changing focus of disaster planning — from state-driven model of prevention approach to local-driven model of adaptation approach.

Above all, creating a “culture of risk” — through which citizens as well as relevant stakeholders can start being aware of potential risks of flooding — is considered as one of the main tool to “building resilience”⁷. Essentially, a culture of risk primarily concerns being aware of the potential risks as well as the challenges to launch on adaptive behavior in case of an emergency; yet going further, it can also imply encouraging more collaborative approach across public services, government agencies, and other stakeholders. Accordingly, there are three aspects to consider in application of a culture of risk: 1) Information diffusion to the public; 2) Collaborative approach to risk management; instigating “transversal” collaboration, encouraging dialogue across different government departments, local governments, and technicians; 3) “Return of the experience”: keep historical memories and learn from past experiences for better adaptation to risk in the future.

This “public education on risk” or “collaborative approach to risk management” may seem mundane to the case of Seattle where there has been a long history of public outreach and decentralized model of governance, it does symbolize a change in the context of Paris where the State has been primarily in charge of “taking care of” citizens — which meant that a lot of decisions and prescriptions were given from the State to localities. But this authority and legitimation is now challenged by the unpredictability and uncontrollability of natural hazards events that call for a new rationale and approach to governance. Once we acknowledge that there

⁷ Given that Parisian region hasn’t had a major flooding event during the past 60 years, the awareness of risk and reflection on what to do in case of flooding events has been largely limited. (SLGRI, 2016: 31)

is going to be a change — although we don't know what it would be exactly, or the magnitude of it — it becomes *necessary* to engage different stakeholders and actors who maintain the everyday functioning of the city. In this context, 'resilience' approach — which is novel in the sense that it gives reflection to what we should do *given that* a catastrophic event will eventually occur — is being translated into engaging different local actors concerned. As compared to previous French risk governance model where state-driven prescriptions dominated (e.g. with PPRi — state regulations deciding the which areas are allowed to be developed or not), this can be considered as a shift in the governance model especially with regard to initiating a dialogue between state-led agencies and local territorial actors (e.g. the city government, department [county-level area] councils, and other actors associated with urban planning). SLGRI (2016) is one of the first attempts to strike such conversations and encourage collaborations across different levels of government and other local actors; as SLGRI notes: "Flood risk management is at the interface of several public policies, where the coherence and articulation are essential to the implementation of the strategy: indeed, risk management requires coordination between public policies in the field of water, land development planning and crisis management. Due to different trends of decentralization, it requires a good articulation between the communities and the services of the State, and a strong commitment of all the actors concerned" (SLGRI, 2016: 8). Since the SLGRI, there have been a number of stakeholder meetings organized by the City, state-led agencies, and research institutions; in these meetings, a wide ranger of actors were brought into roundtables and positioned to inform one another on their knowledge and opinions (Interview with an officer at *Prefecture de la Region Ile-de-France*, May 2018; the author has also physically attended two of these meetings.)

Furthermore, increasing interest in “innovative design and architecture” in flood zones is noticeable in the case of Paris. The case of Paris effectively showcases the paradox of building a sustainable city — in the era of natural disasters. There is a need for continuing to build around the city that has already been developed (for the purpose of becoming more “compact” city), although the remaining areas — the areas that haven’t been developed yet — are supposedly subject to the risk of flooding. This paradox puts the city in a situation where “resilience” becomes a new imperative to use new innovative architecture and design for urban development in flood zones. Accordingly, SLGRI notes that the how “Grand Paris” project — creating a more connected Paris Metropolitan area with more concentrated development and new networks of transportation — will invite new residential developments (70,000 units per year), some of which are located in flood zones (p. 37). In attempts to create a more dense, and yet more “resilient” metropolis, the fact that these areas are “at risk” becomes a “unique occasion” for urban renewal projects with the conception of “resilient urban planning”. As SLGRI writes: “at present, PPRis are not sufficient to impose on developers [to use] resilient construction methods. It is therefore necessary to support the application of this tool by providing specific support to public or private owners for major urban renewal operations, which represents a real opportunity. The project approaches are thus an *opportunity* to stimulate new reflections resulting in the proposal of innovative technical and functional solutions, both from the owners of the works and the designers”. An officer at Institute of Urban Planning (*Institut d’aménagement et d’urbanisme d’Île-de-France*, IAU), a public urban planning research center within Ile-de-France region) also noted:

“Risk is an opportunity for innovative thinking, because it’s about how to think about ‘coping with the risk’. Here, we not only think about the constraints of flooding, but also how we can deal with the risk. Two different approaches are possible. First, we can prohibit construction in flood zones. In some areas that are at high risk, yes, we do have to prohibit construction. But, we are in an agglomerated region, a metropolis, and we have to keep building. For that, we need another approach — which is, to “cope with” (“*composer avec*”). It’s about how to construct differently (“*construire différemment*”). And in this second perspective we can start thinking about innovation, urban renewal, and competence. For instance, in Paris’ Batignolles area — there have been 55 million units of new housing built in 15 years and, there are all constructed in flood zones. This mean that we still build, we can still build, in the areas subject to flood risk. Then the question is how to build differently, with technical innovation, but also with organization of space, or the ways of thinking about how to organize space.” (Officer 1 at IAU, Interview with author, April 2018)

What kind of architectural innovation and design — incorporates the concept of resilience? Do the “innovations” here — only refer to new functional designs and construction techniques that are resistant to water and flooding? How does the concept of ‘resilience’ influence the way we organize and conceptualize space? Especially given Paris’ vested interest in developing “Resilient Neighborhoods⁸” (which mainly refers to using new architectural designs to be resilient in the face of flooding), these questions could not be overlooked in studying how resilience concept is changing risk governance of Paris. According to the author’s interview with an architect who has been primarily working on the development of flood-resilient neighborhoods, resilient design is essentially making the reality of our surrounding environment *visible* to us, so that we can build and organize space in conversation with, in cohabitation with the change of seasons and environment. As he put it:

“Resilience is not a technical attitude, but a cultural attitude... If we live in a completely closed bubble, protected by dams and seawalls, we are no longer conscious of the

⁸ “Quartier Resilients” (i.e. Resilient Neighborhoods) is a new policy initiative (2018) by the state-led regional agency, Prefecture de la Region Ile-de-France (“*Charte d’engagement pour ‘concevoir des quartiers résilients ‘face au risque d’inondation*”). It primarily concerns how to build or organize space differently, using innovative architecture and design.

surrounding environment, or what surrounds us; with resilience approach, we can start think of nature and environment in our organization of space, and this way we can visually observe how the water is rising. We have to see things before it becomes a disaster, and then start paying attention to what will happen next. That's "*sensibilisation*" of risk [risk awareness]. To do so, we need to live more in correspondence with nature, noticing the fluctuation of seasons" (Architect 1, Interview with author, May 2018).

Furthermore, according to the architect, the concept of 'resilience' has effectively given an occasion to talk about our organization of space with a variety of local actors involved — police, the city government, research centers, and other local stakeholders involved in urban planning. Flood risk gave them an occasion to reflect not only on potential flood risk, but also urban planning issues in general:

"What I saw as a change is the mode of dialogue surrounding the subject. There is a real debate about architecture. Before, in Paris, in the last 30 years, architecture was all about public competitions ("concours") and aesthetic judgments that nobody really knew how to justify. But with resilience, we have an occasion to talk about architecture with other local actors, because when we talk about flood risk, we also get to talk about other things: different designs, forms, techniques, as well as where we will locate housing, who are the vulnerable people, what to do with old factories. The ability to talk about these things — is a real progress". (Architect 1, Interview with author, May 2018)

In the end, the emphasis on architectural designs and innovation in translating resilience into public policy — is not necessarily another technocratic approach where "experts know better"; what we can observe here is how 'resilience' creates an opportunity to exchange and share different knowledges ("*savoir-faire*"), perspectives, and opinions.

While 'citizen engagement' remains at an elementary level — especially in comparison with the case of Seattle — the rise of resilience is also opening up opportunities for local initiatives to exert and regain their capacity of governance, thanks to the linguistic flexibility and positive connotation of the word 'resilience'. For instance, Paris' Strategy of Resilience actively capitalizes on the flexibility of 'resilience', effectively framing in a way that corresponds with their political intentions and agendas. It

can be observed that, in the document, a lot of emphasis is made on how to address social/economic inequalities (e.g. prioritizing the needs of more vulnerable population) and to build “solidarity” or “social cohesion”. The city government’s use of “resilience” is legitimized by the political narratives and normative statements, which underlines values of social justice and citizen engagement/participation. This has to be understood within the context of Paris where the political power of the city government is highly limited; especially zoning regulations, decided by the state-led agencies, is one of the biggest constraints which give the city government a little room to lead urban planning projects or carry their own policy directives. In such context, the city government’s active participation in “resilient cities network” program and its own production of “resilient strategies” — are in fact giving them a new pathway to intervene into urban planning and territorial governance.

“[State] is adding constraints, that are sometimes the reverse of solutions. That’s the way France has been thinking. If there’s an issue, let’s make a law. Let’s make a rule. It will never be like resilience thinkers do, like, ‘who are the stakeholders? How can we convince all the concerns of stakeholders to be onboard together for improvement process?’. No. It will be more like, ‘We are the State. We’re going to prescribe a law. And you’ll have to respect it. And that’s it!’ That’s the way the governance is operated at the national level. And it’s not working anymore nowadays. At all. It’s totally inefficient ... Especially with uncertainty and the arrival of Anthropocene.” (Paris Resilience Officer, Interview with author, May 2018).

Accordingly, it can be noted how “resilience” can become a useful tool for the local (city) government to develop its own capability to project their political agenda into disaster planning or new governance initiatives in relation to disaster management, which has been previously dominated/controlled by the state-led agencies (as *l’État*). But perhaps it is not that resilience concept itself is creating certain kind of new policies, but rather the flexibility of the concept is allowing already-existing policy agendas to get actualized further, or get pushed through more effectively. Given that, in Paris, there are 27 deputy mayors (elected officials) from different political parties, there have been different projects that have been separately proposed without

proper integration with one another (or in some cases in competition with one another) — e.g. “Smart City”, “Sustainable City”, “Inclusive City”, etc. But by using ‘resilience’, as a global, almost all-embracing concept that could get an agreement from anyone — it became more feasible to integrate existing initiatives and push them through for their actualization. One of the officials working at the Prefecture of Police of Paris has also mentioned how the positive connotation of the resilience gives more opportunity to talk about flood risk and mobilize adaptive actions:

“Resilience doesn’t create fear. When we talk about risk management, it means that we’re vulnerable, and people don’t want to hear that. But when we say “resilience”, it’s more friendly (“*amicale*”) and nice (“*sympa*”), and this can imply new opportunities for communicating risk with different actors, populations as well as politicians and elected officials. So it’s true that resilience gives an opportunity for us to do things that we couldn’t do before, because of its positive connotations and communicability”. (Officer 1 at Prefecture of Police of Paris, Interview with author, April 2018).

“If, at the local level, they decide to integrate resilience, or do something with the concept, they can have a change of condition. If resilience gives more power, it’s thanks to resilience, thanks to this concept that they can take of conscious of risks, and do much more actions. So in the end, it’s up to them to decide, if they want to do something about it, they can bring about a change” (Officer 1 at Prefecture of Police of Paris, Interview with author, April 2018).

In Paris, resilience gives rise to 1) more conversation and interaction between state agencies and territorial actors 2) sharing of different knowledges, perspectives and opinions, even in the conventionally closed “expert” fields 3) more local initiatives, which are made available by capitalizing on the openness and performativity of the concept. This change in the mode of governance can be better understood with postmodern framework of resilience; above all, the necessity and inevitability of launching more collaborative, pluricentric mode of risk governance — under the acknowledgement that the State alone cannot control or take care of

what will happen — is a real shift that opens up more opportunities for the new actors to engage in risk management and urban planning, which is hard to be explained only with late-modernity understanding of resilience. Secondly, the more effective communication of “expert-knowledges” to non-experts and sharing of different “savoir-faires”, is essentially an effort to narrow the gap between the realm of “experts” and “non-experts”, which cannot be framed within late-modernity theorization where technocratic maneuvering often triumphs. Finally, the ways in which local governments can capitalize on the flexibility of resilience concept — with their political will, agenda, and articulation — is a good example of postmodern governance, where political narratives and linguistic articulation become the new rationale for legitimizing public policy, which previously was legitimized on the basis of scientific, technocratic prediction and modeling. And in this new paradigm, the experts, non-experts, planners, non-planners, are located at the same level as “stakeholders”:

“Role of the State, the role of city, or the role of public sector is definitely changing with the concept of resilience... Traditionally, the public sector in France, has been considering their main duty as prescribing rules, and making sure that they are applied. Controlling, and condemning if they’re not applied. Rules, prescribing, controlling. And we have to shift from this way of thinking in the public sector.. so, let say, ‘regulating’ way of thinking to more ‘authorizing’ way of thinking. We can’t do everything as a city... ‘People are stupid, so the public sector has to prescribe the rules to protect them’ — this way of thinking has to shift. And resilience is definitely not working using the classical, administrative way of thinking in France. Because resilience is based on stakeholder involvement. Stakeholders, whoever they are, citizens, private sector, researchers... So it means that before, it was the public sector who was managing everything and convening stakeholders for their opinion, and now, it’s the public sector that is at the same level as the other stakeholders.” (Paris Resilience Officer, Interview with author, May 2018).

6. CONCLUSION

Bourg and Whiteside (2010), in their book *Toward A Ecological Democracy (Vers une démocratie écologique)*, invoke the idea that the current representative democracy system fails to address ecological problems that are often trans-national and trans-generational, calling for a new institutional system of governance. One of the characteristics of environmental/ecological challenges — which reveal limitations of a conventional territorial governance system — is their unpredictability; it is impossible to predict in advance what will be the long term environmental consequences of our short-term, reactionary decisions, often driven by our extension of the freedom of the present, such as economic productivity and efficiency. The situation of unpredictability contradicts with the classic maxim of governance: “to govern, is to foresee” (p. 14). In order to address this challenge of governance in the era of uncertainty, they discuss the possibility of multiplying citizen discussion forums, whose objective is to establish in the society a circuit of communication and reflection, creating discussions that are more participatory and reflexive. These can include public consultations before planning/development projects as well as institutional exchange of knowledges and perspectives (p. 59-60).

Such governance challenges in general also make us reflect on the future of local spatial planning and governance, which are often faced with environmental hazards whose causes are out of their capacity to understand, control, and plan for. How should we plan for what’s to come, when we don’t have the means to know what’s to come? The fundamental contradiction of “planning for uncertainty” effectively questions the conventional mode of governance, the ways we use to legitimate public policy, and eventually, the role of government itself. In attempts to tap into this ambitious question, this project studied how the introduction of ‘resilience’ — which

pushes us to reflect on what we can *do* in post-event, instead of controlling what would happen — influences and changes the previous model of governance, asking whether such transition can be considered as one of the examples of “postmodern condition” that Lyotard (1979) proposed almost four decades ago. A dominant literature of critical studies on resilience, often adopting late-modernity understanding of resilience, has argued that ‘resilience’ is just another excuse to legitimize withdrawal of government assistance on social needs, resulting in consolidation of the existing social and economic relations. However, by demonstrating some of the “outlier” aspects (e.g. opening up of knowledge base, development of subsystems, citizen engagement, public debates, and the rise of local initiatives) that are hard to be explained by such late-modernity theorization of resilience — I wanted to question whether we can start imagining the future of resilience concept in a more positive, progressive way.

Comparing the cases of Seattle and Paris allowed us to consider contextual specificities that render different manifestations of a policy concept that has been pushed by various international institutions and initiatives. In the context of Seattle, given its history of commitment to citizen engagement and participatory planning, ‘resilience’ is giving an another occasion to realize more public debates on core values and visions shared by the citizens, in addition to encouraging neighborhood-driven subsystems that can enhance social cohesion and information sharing. Given that the city government is mostly in charge of all planning and regulatory activities across different disaster phases, the consistency of disaster planning is maintained — which is one of the reasons why the efforts to close the gap between government capabilities and citizen needs are much clearer. On the other hand, the case of Paris demonstrates a governance model heavily influenced by state-driven decisions and regulations, which

effectively limits what the city government can do in the anticipation of extreme hazard events. But precisely in this context, the utilization of the ‘resilience’ concept offers an opportunity and occasion for the city government to more rigorously consider their role and capabilities in risk management, as well as to propose more locally-driven initiatives that reflect better of their own vision and agenda. In this sense, resilience is becoming a medium, or a language that fosters dialogues across different institutions, notably between state-led agencies and local governments. Such more collaborative model of governance is definitely something new for the context of Paris, which is triggered by acknowledging the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the challenges that environmental hazards imply.

The current global phenomena of fusing resilience into public policies, notably in disaster planning and risk management, help us understand more concretely what is or should be a basis of planning, or a source of legitimizing policy decisions — which is increasingly becoming an important question on territorial governance that is now challenged by the uncertainty of environmental hazards and other related ecological considerations. More thorough case studies and researches could uncover how these phenomena occur as well as what would be their social and political implications. Indeed, in doing so, researchers should be cautious of the negative implications of ‘resilience’, noted well by scholars using late-modernity theories. However, we should also not overlook the other side of the story, which could be better framed with postmodern understanding of how linguistic articulation and the rise of narratives become the new source of legitimizing public policies. While the flexibility and vagueness of the concept is subject to abuses, it is precisely thanks to that character that resilience can become a source of openings for new agencies, new knowledge practices, and new local initiatives.

Chapter 4 : CONCLUSION: NAVIGATING NORMATIVITY IN THE CURRENTS OF “UNCERTAINTY” — UNDER ITS DANGERS, AS WELL AS WITH ITS POSSIBILITIES

This dissertation aimed to address the question of finding political normativity of planning as a public policy, especially under the acknowledgement of uncertainty and uncontrollability that places us out of the modernist way of “expert-driven” planning where planners were expected to “know better”. This condition can be divided into two. First of all, what I explored in Chapter 1 is the condition in which planners are becoming mere “mediators” of different interests; as they scrape off of their “expert status” in planning practices, it seems as if their responsibility and accountability as public servants are also coming off simultaneously without careful reflection. As I demonstrated in the chapter, the political and social implications of “network-driven” planning — in which planners are following *wherever* the “networks” (i.e. a group of like-minded citizens who collectively pursue the advocacy of their interests and needs) lead the way — can be grim. If planners merely “follow the actors” without a set of normative attitude, the outcome of such planning could be shaped by those who have the power and resources to project their own interests and needs — which, consequently, can result in the oppression of the rights and needs of those who do not possess the equal amount of influence that allows them to advocate for themselves. Concerned with such potential outcomes, I proposed in Chapter 1 what should be the basis of normative or ethical grounds based on which planners can be more conscious of where their well-intended respect of “actors” or “networks” — or certain “bottom-up” initiatives — may lead to. Uncertainty, and the resulting “flexible approach to planning”, is

more of a concern here, since it can allow planners to casually drop their responsibility and accountability on planning outcomes.

On the other hand, the second condition that I explore in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 has more to do with how such uncertainty and uncontrollability — represented by natural hazards and risks — can be an opportunity for non-conventional actors and agencies to intervene into governance and planning, focusing on the progressive potentials of a planning concept (“resilience”). This argument, in its conception, is a response to the criticisms made on resilience, which claimed that such uncertainty and uncontrollability is bound to be manipulated by the existing social relations and power, or the government’s “letting-go” of its responsibilities on social needs. It is indeed a legitimate concern, which is partially related to my argument in Chapter 1 where I asserted that we do need some sort of “norms” precisely because of the danger and negative outcomes that “uncertainty” and “flexibility” might entail. However, as opposed to Chapter 1 which was primarily occupied with “what to do” in the worst case scenarios where uncertainty and flexibility is abused by the already powerful and privileged (e.g. the cases where so called “bottom-up” initiatives turn out to be “social movements” led by white supremacists or NIMBY-an actions) — Chapter 3 focused on how to harness the conditions of uncertainty, which can open up new venues for progressive politics to push through their initiatives and agenda. Here, uncertainty proposes possibilities and opportunities, perhaps more than the “danger” noted earlier in the Chapter 1. However, such potentials are not self-acting norms, or “destined to be good” conditions, as much as they are not necessarily “destined to be bad” or “destined to serve neoliberal governance”. As noted in Chapter 2, resilience itself is a concept that can symbolize social capital, institutional connectivity, or self-help behavior; the normativity or social

implications of these meanings are not self-explanatory — rather, they are entirely dependent on contextual factors such as the existence of adequate government support and its connection with local population, or the availability of community-based organizations/ other local leaderships. In other words, in order for these progressive potentials of resilience to get activated, it takes our political will and collective intention that can direct the currents in a way we consider to be normatively “good” or politically “progressive”.

In retrospect, my efforts to deal with these two conditions — prescribing some sort of norms in response to the dangers of uncertainty (Chapter 1) and yet, at the same time, projecting progressive potentials of resilience that harness the opportunities of uncertainty (Chapter 3) — seem contradictory to one another. However, one should also note that my approach to “prescribing norms” — was, at its heart, fundamentally *anti-essentialist* in the sense that they are particularly against the modernist conviction of “all-knowing” knowledge, or its notion of the reality as “all-graspable” or “all-representable”. When the source of our political solidarity — which is the basis of proposing social norms (or “what we *should* do”) — cannot depend on the fixed labeling or categorization of “who we are” as one group, how can we imagine “doing something together”, or pursuing a collective political project together? The main question of the first project (Chapter 1) was, therefore, about how to forge political solidarity amongst “the public” for which planners aim to serve, when it is practically impossible to represent or even grasp the limitless array of social groups that fight for their rights, needs, and divergent interests. Accordingly, I drew insights from feminist social theorists who have had previous experiences in attempting to solve a similar kind of enigma: how to continue their political project of “feminism”, while fully recognizing the impossibility of representing all women’s identities and

needs into the one label of “women”? Two main lessons were noted from such feminist theorists’ early efforts: 1) taking account of the “historicity” (e.g. historical events, occurrences, collective experiences) that structures the social and power relations that we have today 2) at the same time, always being conscious of the future-orientedness of a political project, which would allow alliances across different social groups, designated legal categories, or auto-designated identities — in the anticipation of a “future historic moment” that reminds us of the common human vulnerability that everyone shares. Arriving at these lessons — and producing a set of criteria for planners to judge which social groups must have more legitimate claims than others — was a long journey that recognizes how immensely difficult and painstaking it is to devise “norms” in postmodern era, where we start losing the conviction on our capacity to know-it-all, do-it-all, or control-it-all. In the end, Chapter 1 was not only just about warning the danger of uncertainty and throwing off a bunch of rules to follow, but also (or more so) about the on-going challenges of defining “the role of planner” in postmodern condition, where “doing the right thing” is never definite or unequivocal.

In that sense, the possibilities or progressive potentials of uncertainty that Chapter 3 proposes — and partially what Chapter 2 implies also — are connected to Chapter 1 in the sense that both of them are concerned with the challenges of planning in postmodern era, especially with regard to difficulties of navigating normativity in the currents of uncertainty. As noted above, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, *despite* their positive notes on how resilience — which acknowledges uncertainty and uncontrollability of natural hazard events — can become a source of empowerment for local initiatives, they are in fact never *sure* of how resilience agenda would unfold in terms of its social/political implications. In fact, the reason why I was motivated to

show “progressive potentials of resilience” — was to *question* the conviction that critical scholars on resilience seemed to have; a dominant literature on resilience, a case after a case, attempted to project how bad this concept is in itself, only focusing on the occasions where it only serves as a mask for naturalizing neoliberal governance. With such conviction, we’ve failed to hear and recognize the other side of the story — or the fact that, 1) the concept itself is not internally negative, but it’s the specific contexts (where it is used) that determine the normativity of the concept 2) and accordingly, there can be progressive potentials of resilience, which are to be activated by local political/collective will — if they can successfully capitalize on the opportunities and new venues of intervention given by the condition of uncertainty and unpredictability (as in Beck’s later proposal of “emancipatory catastrophism”). This acknowledgement of “the other side of the story” can only be possible within a postmodern framing of governance, which does not predetermine the future course of power relations one way or the other — and thus leaving the room for different endings and possibilities to arise, either positive or negative. And precisely in this open-ended aspect of postmodern condition — which makes it incredibly difficult for planners to say, with 100% conviction, where we’re heading *to*, or what we’re planning *for* — is where Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 meet, as both of them deal with how to navigate political normativity of planning in the currents of uncertainty — under its dangers, as well as with its possibilities.

In his recent book, *Where to land: how to navigate in politics (Où atterrir: comment s’orienter en politique)*, Latour (2017) discusses how the future orientation of politics is no longer divided between “the left” and “the right”, but has more to do with how we navigate between “ecological problems” and “social problems” (p. 75-77). With uncertainties of future,

compounded by climate change and subsequent natural hazards events, the normative direction of public policy now depends on our capacity to find new ways of converging these two issues that are often found in competition. This dissertation would like to be considered as a part of such debates, as it is concerned with addressing social inequality on the one hand (Chapter 1), and yet at the same time proposes the possibilities of “resilience” or “emancipatory catastrophism” where our changing relationship with nature calls for the rise of solidarity and collective actions — represented as increasing local initiatives and more inclusive knowledge practices (Chapter 3). In that sense, I do believe in the political potentials of ‘resilience’, which ultimately becomes a progressive agenda in its association with nature, ecosystems, and ecology (Chapter 2) — since it reminds us of the fact that we are nature ourselves, and that the agenda of “progressives” can be enriched further within such notion of human-nature co-inhabitation (which goes beyond a mere environment-protectionism). More research and theoretical development should be made more extensively on this subject, especially with regard to how “resilience” would be able to provide some practical bridges between ecological concerns and social concerns. With its divergent, interdisciplinary significations including bottom-up initiatives, social capital, as well as our inseparable connection with nature — the potentials of resilience in devising a normative direction of future politics can be limitless. Navigating political normativity of planning in the era of uncertainty is a difficult task ahead of us, and yet more humble and conscious attitude towards the truth and knowledge — i.e. our sincere engagement with acknowledging the limits of our capacity to know/control — would certainly be a good starting point, and “resilience”, with its emphasis on unpredictability and uncontrollability of nature, does seem to find an effective way of triggering that.

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VITA

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