

Middle East Militaries: *In* and *Out* of Politics and Economies due to External Threat Perceptions
A Dynamic Regional Order Approach to Civil–military Relations:
Comparative Cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel

Marwa Maziad

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Reading Committee:

Joel Migdal, Co-chair

Reşat Kasaba, Co-chair

Dan Chirot

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Marwa Maziad

University of Washington

Abstract

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Marwa Maziad

Co-Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor Joel Migdal
Jackson School of International Studies

Co-Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor Reşat Kasaba
Jackson School of International Studies

There are many ways for the military to intervene in politics, whether through a direct governing role or monopolizing the national security apparatus. Another much-debated means for military intervention in politics is to play a role in a country's economy. Turkey, Egypt, and Israel are three Middle East cases whose militaries have exhibited various economic roles since the 1950s. Subsequent oscillations between economic civilianization and remilitarization have followed. The three cases, however, have shared comparative inception stories of military economic roles, albeit with contrasting configurations of how these military economic activities manifested over time. The militaries' involvement in the economic realm includes (a) high military budget relative to the civilian state budget and the country's GDP (Israel); (b) military-run defense industries or the militarization of various economic sectors, such as high-tech, through an advanced military-industrial-complex (Israel and Turkey); and (c) income-generating military-

owned enterprises for the purpose of military self-sufficiency. These military-run companies make up for relatively smaller official defense budgets (Egypt). The military-owned holdings can serve as officer pension funds that invest in the civilian economy to directly redistribute the wealth to the retired soldiers (Turkey). Or they include swathes of land controlled by the armed forces that are later sold for income-generation after being vacated (Israel and Egypt). Why did these three seemingly different cases, in terms of their histories, political structures, and societies, converge—one way or another—on a similarly high military involvement in the economic realm of their respective countries? I argue that these military economic roles are co-constituted from within a high threat perception dynamic regional order. In other words, the three militaries play an economic role to maintain themselves as the three strongest militaries in the Middle East. The dynamic regional order approach to understanding economic civil–military relations in the Middle East allows two key observations. First, the countries actually influenced each other’s economic civil–military relations trajectories by virtue of being rival adjacent neighbors, in a high-threat perception environment. This circumstance of regional rivalry and competitive national projects pushed for an arms race in their early years of state formation, which in turn militarized their respective economies over the decades. Second, the countries have consequently been emulating one another from a pool of “best practices,” or at least normalized global civil–military relations practices of military economic roles. I argue that none of these countries’ military economic roles can be understood as an isolated case. The economic role of the military is, thus, a product of the needs of the three countries alike to allocate enough economic resources for their respective militaries in order to enforce sufficient deterrence in a high threat perceptions regional order.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Militaries in Economies.....	7
1.2 Research Question	9
1.3 Argument	11
1.4 Background to the Research Problem	13
1.5 Scope of the Study	31
1.6 Significance of the Study	36
1.7 Methods and Data Collection.....	45
1.8 The Dissertation Chapters	51
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework	53
2.1 Conditions Under Which Militaries Intervene in Politics.....	54
General Civil–Military Relations Theories	54
Clausewitz: War is politics by other means and civilian control over the military is a necessity.....	54
Laswell’s Garrison State: When Technically-Advanced Officers Govern and Rule	55
The 1950s and 1960s: Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer—Militaries as Modernization Agents.....	55
Not All Kinds of “Civilian Control” Were Created Equal: Subjective and Objective Civilian Control	59
What is Military Corporateness?	60
1970s: Comparative Approaches to Civil–Military Relations	69
The 1990s and 2000s: Desch, Schiff, Kamrava, Croissant and Kuehn, Sarigil.....	75
Combining Views	83
Theories on Civil Military Relations in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.....	85

Civil–Military Relations in Turkey	86
Civil–Military Relations in Egypt	95
Civil–Military Relations in Israel.....	105
2.2 Defense Economics	109
Economic Sketch of Turkey	111
Economic Sketch of Egypt	120
Economic Sketch of Israel.....	124
2.3 A Theoretical Framework Comparing and Contrasting Turkey, Egypt, and Israel from within a Middle East Dynamic Regional Order	126
Military in State and in Society.....	126
Militaries in a Dynamic Regional Order	127
2.4 Applying the Dynamic Regional Order Approach	128
2.5 Conclusion	129
Chapter 3 The Turkish Armed Forces: An Economic Power in the Political Sphere	131
3.1 Introduction.....	131
3.2 Background: The Turkish Military and Party Politics.....	138
The Civilian Government’s role in “Segmentalizing” the Officer Corps along economic lines in the 1950s:.....	139
3.3 The Regional Context.....	142
Animosity and Rivalry in the Regional Order (1952–1960)	150
Mimesis (1960–1979).....	159
Praetorianism and Privatization (1980–1990).....	160
Regional Convergence on Neoliberalism (1990–2010)	161
Current Regional Divergences (2011–Present).....	163
3.4 The Turkish Military Budget: 1950 to the Present.....	165

The Battle for Budgetary Control: No Concordance.....	184
3.5 Origins of the Defense Industry	188
3.6 Military-Controlled Civilian-Products Enterprise: The OYAK Story.....	194
Characterizing OYAK: military or civilian organization?.....	201
OYAK’s Function and Administration: Social Welfare and Social Service for Armed Forces	
Officers.....	205
OYAK: The Military Holding Company.....	207
OYAK’s Evolution and Growth.....	209
3.7 Conclusion	219
 Chapter 4 The Egyptian Armed Forces: An Economic Power in the Political Sphere	
.....	222
4.1 Introduction.....	222
4.2 Egypt in the Region: Militarized Economy?.....	224
4.3 Periodization	245
Regional Antagonism and Rivalry: (1952–1979).....	246
Mimesis (1980–1995).....	248
Convergence (1996–2010)	250
Current Divergence (2011—Present).....	250
4.4 Chronological Historical Phases of the EAF in Egypt’s Political Economy	251
Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement of 1952.....	252
Defense Budget in the Early Years of the Republic (1952–1979).....	256
Defense Industries in the Early Years of the Republic (1952–1979)	259
The Egyptian Armed Forces’ Civilian Economic Roles in the Early Years (1952–1979)	261
Sadat and Economic Infitah (1970–1981)	261

Defense Budget in The Middle Years (1980–1995)	269
Defense Industries in the Middle Years (1980–1995)	273
The Egyptian Armed Forces' Civilian Economic Activities in the Middle Years (1980–1995).....	281
4.5 Egypt's Military Economic Enterprise Since January 25, 2011.....	290
4.6 Conclusion	294
Chapter 5 The Israel Defense Forces: An Economic Power in the Political Sphere. 297	
5.1 Introduction.....	297
5.2 Israel in the Region: State Militarization and Societal Militarism.....	298
5.3 Periodization	305
5.4 Chronological Historical Phases in the Middle East	307
Regional Antagonism and Rivalry (1948–1979).....	307
Defense budget in the early years.....	307
Who decides on the defense budget?.....	310
1967 War	317
1973 War	318
Defense Industries in the Early Years.....	320
Settlements as Defense: IDF's Civilian Economic Roles in the Early Years.....	329
Mimesis (1980–1995).....	338
Defense budget in the middle years	338
Defense Industries in the Middle Years	340
IDF's Civilian Economic Activities in the Middle Years.....	344
Convergence on Neo-Liberal Policies and Globalization (1996–2010).....	346
Defense Budget in Globalized Times.....	347
Defense Industries in Globalized Times	349
Current Divergences (2011—Present).....	352

Military Income-Generating Civilian-Products in Current Times: Hi-Tech Security Networks and Land Sales	356
5.5 Conclusion	361
Chapter 6 Conclusion.....	364
Bibliography	374

LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure 1 Variations and equivalence in penetrative economic roles of the military in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.</i>	28
<i>Figure 2 Middle East military expenditure by country as percentage of GDP</i>	28
<i>Figure 3 Middle East military expenditure in dollar amount.</i>	29
<i>Figure 4 Egyptians’ “Great deal of trust” and “Quite a lot of trust” in the armed forces over 85%.</i>	64
<i>Figure 5 The IDF is the most trusted institution in Israel.</i>	65
<i>Figure 6 Sarigil’s Fourfold Military Typology.</i>	81
<i>Figure 7 Trust in the Egyptian Military compared to other institutions 2011.</i>	102
<i>Figure 8 Trust in the Egyptian Military compared to other institutions 2016.</i>	103
<i>Figure 9 Comparison of military expenditure figures in Turkey 1953-1959.</i>	167
<i>Figure 10 Inflationary trends during the Menderes Regime.</i>	168
<i>Figure 11 Military expenditure figures in Turkey 1960—1979</i>	170
<i>Figure 12 Turkey’s military expenditure in \$US dollar amounts is on the high since 1960.</i>	172
<i>Figure 13 Actual dollar amount of military spending in Turkey 2009–2018.</i>	175
<i>Figure 14 Decreasing Turkish military expenditures as percentage of GDP (1960–2016)</i>	176
<i>Figure 15 Military expenditure as percentage of GDP. Israel, Egypt, Turkey</i>	177
<i>Figure 16 World Bank data on Turkey’s GDP</i>	178
<i>Figure 17 World Bank data on Turkey’s GDP in comparison to regional powers</i>	178
<i>Figure 18 Turkey’s Defense Budget as Percentage of GDP.</i>	179
<i>Figure 19 Military Expenditure by country in US\$ billions 2018.</i>	180
<i>Figure 20 Comparing Egypt to Turkey’s Military Expenditure. Turkey is \$19 billion. Egypt is only \$4 billion..</i>	183
<i>Figure 21 Turkey’s GDP Compared to Italy and other Middle East Countries.</i>	192
<i>Figure 22 Turkey’s GDP Compared to European Countries and other Middle East Countries</i>	193
<i>Figure 23 OYAK as a Holding Company—Assets, Revenue, and Exports.</i>	211
<i>Figure 24 The new 2019 OYAK website emphasizes the paid taxes.</i>	211
<i>Figure 25 OYAK total taxes paid in 2016, 2017 and 218.</i>	214

<i>Figure 26 OYAK revenue has slightly declined in 2018 from 2017</i>	215
<i>Figure 27 OYAK companies include cologne and tomato paste. NSPO include similar food products.</i>	223
<i>Figure 28 Middle East 10 Strongest Military Forces, 2018.</i>	225
<i>Figure 29 Middle East military expenditure by country.</i>	225
<i>Figure 30 Egypt's Defense Budget as Percentage of GDP in 2016. Egypt spent a mere 1.6%. Israel spent a whopping 5.6% of GDP</i>	228
<i>Figure 31 Military expenditure by country, 1962–1979 © SIPRI 2019</i>	257
<i>Figure 32 Graph comparing Egypt military expenditure to Israel military expenditure 1962–2015.</i>	257
<i>Figure 33 Graph comparing Egypt military expenditure to Turkey military expenditure 1962–2015.</i>	258
<i>Figure 34 Egypt and Israel share a parallel trajectory of military expenditure as percentage of GDP. This reflects their mutual threat perceptions in the 1960s. Nonetheless, Israel's actual military expenditure share as percentage of GDP (ranging 30%-3.7%) whereas Egypt (ranging 17%-1.3%).</i>	258
<i>Figure 35 Egypt's arms imports 1960-2017</i>	260
<i>Figure 36 Number of Egyptian military officers serving on the Cabinet, 1951–1981.</i>	268
<i>Figure 37 Egypt's military expenditure 1969–2015.</i>	270
<i>Figure 38 Egypt's Military Expenditure 1980-1995 in 2017 constant USD billion</i>	273
<i>Figure 39 Egypt's arms exports. Highest point is in 1982, during the Iraq-Iran war reaching \$1 billion</i>	275
<i>Figure 40 Diversification of sources of Egyptian arms, 1981-1985.</i>	276
<i>Figure 41 Frenzy graph reflecting arms imports of the three countries and their constant fluctuations..</i>	279
<i>Figure 42 Egypt's military revamped NSPO website in English showcasing agricultural and industrial projects and announcing civilian job applications</i>	290
<i>Figure 43 Egypt's GDP in 2017 \$235.4 billion. Egypt's current GDP/PPP however is \$1.2 trillion.</i>	291
<i>Figure 44 Egypt's military expenditure 2010-2018.</i>	291
<i>Figure 45 High Percentage of Israeli Defense Budget as Percentage of State Expenditure (1960–2019).</i>	309
<i>Figure 46 In dollar amounts, the Israeli Government's defense consumption expenditure perpetually increased since 1960.</i>	309
<i>Figure 47 Fluctuation in the defense budget as a percentage of the GDP (1950–2013).</i>	311
<i>Figure 48 Arms Exports in the three cases of Turkey, Egypt, Israel 1961-2017. Israel has the highest volume..</i>	319

<i>Figure 49 Tank at “Ammunition Hill” dating back to the 1967 war, Jerusalem.</i>	330
<i>Figure 50 The World’s arms imports. The peak year was 1981 at \$41.7 billion. The slope seems to be getting higher again since 2001.</i>	343
<i>Figure 51 Israel Military Expenditure 1962—2018.</i>	347
<i>Figure 52 Israel military expenditure 2008—2018</i>	349
<i>Figure 53 Biggest Military Budgets as Percentage of GDP in 2014 and 2018. The same countries are the highest spenders. Turkey increased its spending. Israel remains the second highest spender after Saudi Arabia.</i>	353
<i>Figure 54 Defense expenditure as percentage of government expenditure and GDP in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.</i>	354
<i>Figure 55 Vacated military posts made way for business development. Sarona Open Shopping Mall, at the center of Tel Aviv, stands on land previously belonging to the IDF HaKirya base.</i>	358

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DEDICATION

To my father, Dr. Mohamed Maziad, and my mother, Dr. Sawsan El Ghazali

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In a 2004 talk, then-Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Technological and Logistics Director General Udi Adam said:

Twenty years ago, the IDF ground coffee. That is, anyone driving in Sarafend base would be intoxicated with the aroma. . . . Now such things don't exist. . . . We purchase 130,000 pairs of military shoes a year, but we don't produce any. . . . We have about 1.5 million doctor-patient meetings, most of them within army units . . . but we don't have military hospitals. . . . We swallow 400 million capsules of paracetamol per year, these we buy in pharmacies and do not produce. We eat close to 150,000 lunch meals. . . . My intention is to outsource this entire field. . . . What I wish to [do] is to outsource anything that is not [within] our core business— such as tank transporters, which the private sector finds non-economic. . . . We have defined our core business and we redefine it annually, as things change. One example is the transporting business on which we spend about 1.2 billion shekels [approximately. US\$334 million], of which 250 million shekels [about US\$70 million] is military and the rest is civilian. . . . The factors we take into account in outsourcing are whether we have the capacity to function in emergency conditions— that there is no damage to operational capacity . . . and of course long term economic feasibility (Seidman, 2010, p. 731).

Based on the quote above, it is clear that 20 years earlier, in 1984, the Israeli army had performed these tasks of feeding, clothing, and healing its soldiers. The same was true in Turkey and Egypt. By 2004, however, “such things” did not exist in Israel. “Such things” also partially subsided in Turkey around 2004 when the military was relegated, both politically and

economically, under the ultimate political monopoly of Prime Minister-turned-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been in office for 16 years and counting. But “such things” remain integral to Egypt’s doctrine of military logistics self-sufficiency. The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) maintain that military economic activities are necessary to safeguard the military’s capacity to operate in emergency situations, which IDF Official Adam evoked above, especially in light of renewed regional threat perceptions. Why the current divergence among the three cases, despite earlier decades of similarities in the military’s economic share and economic role? In this dissertation I will trace the similarities and current differences in the military economic roles in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel while emphasizing that despite the varied configurations in their economic roles, the militaries find equivalent ways to stay the three strongest armies in the Middle East and among the top twenty strongest armies worldwide.

It is also noteworthy that only two years after the aforementioned statement, IDF Technological and Logistics Director General Adam was one of the first Israeli military officers to resign over Israel’s logistics failures during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 (Greenberg, 2006, para. 4). As a committee was formed to assess the failures of the war, David Brodet was assigned to investigate and the Brodet Report was issued (Shiffer, 2010, p 232). The Brodet Report found that Israeli soldiers were cut off from food and water because of outsourced services to the private sector (Brodet Report, 2006 pp. 100-102 cited in Seidman, 2010, p. 731; Seidman, 2016, p. 82-83). According to an Israeli military scholar that I interviewed, “The fear that private contractors would fail to deliver to the conflict zone during emergency situations materialized indeed by 2006” (personal communication, 2015). Consequently, the privatization schemes, which started in the early 2000s in Israel to outsource military logistics to civilian contractors, have since been revised in Israel in light of these failures on the battlefield

(Seidman, 2016, p. 82).

By contrast, the EAF has uniformly been cognizant of the importance of maintaining military logistics in military hands. Producing bread and pasta to feed the soldiers, setting bottled water factories for them to drink, building military pharmaceutical companies for soldiers' war injuries and traumas, and owning military cement plants for building war bunkers have continued to be strategic products for the EAF, produced by the EAF. Any surplus is sold on the civilian market at lower prices to combat potential monopolies by civilian businesses over these strategic goods, especially cement and steel. The purpose of this arrangement is to secure the military's self-sufficiency in strategic materials, to contribute to market competition by controlling potential market monopolies, and to satisfy the lower-income strata by providing cheaper products. Finally, "The generated income is re-invested in the military factories or used to procure arms" (personal communication with the EAF Spokesperson, 2013).

This viewpoint regarding the necessity for military self-sufficiency was reflected in a TV interview with four-star Air Force Marshal Ahmed Shafik, who was a presidential candidate in the 2012 elections after the January 25, 2011 uprising against the thirty-year tenure of former president Hosni Mubarak. Shafik lost by a small margin to Islamist Muslim Brotherhood Candidate Mohamed Morsi. According to the official results, Morsi won by 51.73% against Shafik, who received 48.27% of the vote (Official website of election results, 2012).

During his campaign, Shafik answered anchor Lamiss El Hadidy's direct and accusative-in-tone questions. Shafik emphasized the difference between a "military regime and a president of a military background." He added, "Eisenhower in the United States, Charles de Gaulle in France, and Churchill in the United Kingdom were all military men who became political leaders of military background. They did not establish military rule in their countries!" Interjected by the

anchor “But here in Egypt we are now very sensitive to leaders of military background! Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak!” He interjected back, objecting, “And Hosni Mubarak did not instill military rule, despite being of military background!”

The anchor came back at Shafik “Would you agree to the continuation of the economic activities of the military institution?” He responded, by saying:

Shafik: “Ah . . . The economic activities . . . Can I talk on behalf of the military institution and say something?”

The anchor [impatiently and confrontationally]: “No I am asking you if you were to be president, would you accept the continuation of the economic activities of the military?”

Shafik: “Ok. Ok. I’ll tell you. I’ll explain it to you. Cement as a material, just as example, has to be available for the Armed Forces 24/7 and 365 days a year. Not moist. It has to be ready and available for use in war action. Okay? The armed forces cannot wait for a factory!”

The anchor: “Especially a private factory.”

Shafik: “Either way, a private or public!”

The anchor: “Well, they are all private now!”

Shafik: “Well, exactly then, especially that they are private factories. So the EAF goes ahead and starts a cement factory for its needs! It does that so that it keeps its necessary reserve of cement. After 6 months, that amount will just be about to get moisture. It’s about to become waste! So the EAF sells it [on the market, on time, before expiration] so that it’s not wasted. What’s wrong with that? Now you should actually ask me about paying taxes. And now I would say yes! I am 100% with paying taxes. The military-owned companies should pay taxes to the state (*CBC-Egypt*, 2012, my translation from Arabic).

Judging by Israeli Logistics Director-General Adam's own eventual ordeal in 2006 and despite the validity of a rational position in favor of the military's self-sufficiency rationale in strategic products for combat readiness in cases of emergency, the EAF has nonetheless been bashed since 2011 for that very emphasis on military self-sufficiency in producing strategic civilian products and controlling essential military logistics matters. The EAF's self-sufficiency attitude has been deemed either backwards and antiquated in its economic Statism or opportunistic and privileged in its market inclinations— due to profits made on surpluses of products sold on the civilian market (Abul-Magd, 2011 para. 7, 10, 11, 13, 2012; Ashour, 2015, pp. 16-18; Azzam, 2012, p. 6 footnote 23; Springborg, 2011, 2017).

While I consider and weigh this academic critique of self-sufficiency— now prominent in the literature on the political economy of militaries— I argue against this framing in the recent literature because I see that scholars (Ashour, 2015; Marshall, 2013, 2015; Springborg, 2011, 2017) approached this question of Egypt's military economic role without a sufficiently comparative lens to other cases and how militaries behave economically beyond Egypt. By contrast, as I employed a comparative lens to other adjacent regional cases, I discovered similar military economic practices to those of Egypt, in both Turkey and Israel. More important, this comparative lens can help us understand potential pitfalls or outright failures of rushing toward privatization practices, especially in the realm of military logistics, as the aforementioned case of Israel illustrates. Egyptian military officers are aware of this comparative lens. In the same TV interview with Air Force Marshal Shafik as presidential candidate in 2012, he explicitly referred to the regional and international “best practices” comparisons of which the EAF is aware, and with which it tries to aligns itself:

El Hadidy [sarcastically and confrontationally]: “Would you accept a ‘special status’ for the

army? A special [constitutional] ‘spot’ for the armed forces?”

Shafik [impatiently]: “There is no ‘special status.’ Let’s not philosophize! There is ‘how things are done all over the world!’ I have to take the experiences/experiments of others and apply them like they do.

El Hadidy [scornfully and still confrontationally]: “Which experiments/cases would you like to apply then?”

Shafik [visibly trying to be calm]: “All experiments/cases can benefit us.”

El Hadidy [confrontationally]: “No, the Turkish civil-military case is different from the American case, unlike the French case! Which one, then?!”

Shafik replied, “This can benefit us. And that can benefit us. And that third one can also benefit us.” More impatiently, however, he added, “Listen to me! What are you even talking to me about? You are asking me about what is ‘water’ to me!” Shafik meant to say: you are asking me about ABC’s in my field, namely economic civil-military relations. He meant that this is the easiest topic for him to discuss, given his professional expertise on the topic as a military man. Agitated, he continued, “All comparisons can benefit us. All of them, however, put the armed forces on the side.” He meant that all cases had their armed forces withdraw from politics, but that this has to be done without hurting the armed forces’ combat readiness and by securing their funding resources. In other words, Egypt is not inventing the wheel, when it comes to principles of military economic security. The armed forces should not have a “special status” in the economy. But, certainly, their economic resources have to also be secured, as any other regional or international case of economic civil-military relations.

This dissertation responds to the media discourse and scholastic debate on the economic role and/or share of the military in the political science literature and it sheds light on complex

economic civil–military practices, as a research problem in the Middle East as a regional order. The argument contrasts current theories in the political economy literature, which are mostly critical of the military economic role/share, by providing a regional approach to this question of economic roles of the Middle East militaries. My research highlights regional similarities in addressing the dilemma of balancing the military economic role; all while maintaining deterrent military power in the three cases under study.

1.1 MILITARIES IN ECONOMIES

There are many ways for a military to intervene in politics, including through out-right coups for assuming power and executive governing roles. Militaries can also intervene in politics through a monopoly over national security policy setting. A much-debated manifestation of intervention in politics, however, is for the military to play a role in a country's economy. In the Middle East, the three countries of this study seem to have a quasi-symbiotic civil–military relationship when it comes to their economic involvements. Turkey, Israel, and Egypt have all exhibited degrees of economic militarization, followed by civilianization (i.e., allowing civilians to rise in a market economy and to even provide the military with its needed civilian products) followed by (re)militarization (in which the military has (re)assumed a much larger role in the civilian economy). The alternating economic civil–military relationships in these three countries become apparent when their militaries' various economic roles are examined over time. Throughout the decades since Turkey's, Israel's, and Egypt's establishment as modern independent states in 1923, 1948, and 1952, respectively, their armies had formative roles in the new states and their economies. Subsequent fluctuations in the military economic role occurred as each of the three cases oscillated, or alternated between convictions about the strong role of the state in the

economy and attempts to open the domestic market to free enterprise or toward global integration in the world economy.

The oscillation between militaries playing economic roles and civilians proliferating in a market economy took place in all three cases. The different degrees of trust in the soundness of economic policies that propagate opening the market to private civilian enterprises differently affected the role of the military in the economy in each case. The higher the overall governmental and societal trust in the capitalist market economy is, the more likely the military was to figure out a way to survive in that capitalist economy by first making room for other civilian business actors and then carving out a space for military enterprises within that civilian market (Turkey since 1960; Egypt 1979–2011; Israel since the mid-1990s). The lower the trust in the civilian capitalists at home and their global partners, the more likely will be the return to state-led economic nationalism. That is when the military plays a role in infrastructure, mining, and certain civilian products of strategic importance (Egypt 1952–1979 and again since 2008 and more so since 2013 to the present).

The current comeback of economic nationalism, however, is far from being an Egyptian anomaly, as the literature since 2011 has erroneously claimed (Abul-Magd, 2011; Ashour, 2015; Marshall, 2013, 2015; Springborg, 2011). For example, economic nationalism (McCarthy, 2018, para. 1) is resurging worldwide, including in the United States, whether under socialist ideas by presidential candidate Bernie Sanders or opposing ideas from Steve Bannon, the populist former advisor to President Donald Trump. Some actually state, “The more important question is whether economic nationalism is any good for the country.” They assert, “In principle, it is” (McCarthy, 2018, para. 4). Furthermore, President Trump declared a national emergency on February 15, 2019 to assign the role of building a border security wall to the military. President

Trump did that away from Congress allocations, through executive order. He managed to tap into the military budget, allocating \$8 billion to the task of border wall building. Assigning the military to such infrastructure tasks was routine in Egypt and Israel from the 1950s until the mid-1980s, with some declines and comebacks to this day. Such a military role has continued in Egypt more so than in Israel and Turkey. And while the military's economic role subsided during the 1990s and 2000s and made room for more civilian economic forces in all the three cases, by 2013 the EAF came back front and center in governing, in national security policy setting, and in assuming an economic role on behalf of the state.

In this respect, the EAF's role in building infrastructure is part and parcel of anti-globalism free-trade trends that emerged as a reaction to particularly apparent global neoliberal failures of the 1990s and 2000s, which had once relegated and sidelined the state. The state is coming back, and the military factors heavily into that economic nationalist comeback as an oscillation away from decades of globalized civilian market economy, which have created societally recognized grievances. Under these circumstances of troubled times in the default, normalized, neoliberal civilian economic realm, the military starts, anew, to play greater economic roles on behalf of the state.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

If Turkey, Egypt, and Israel seem different today in the economic dimension of their civil-military relations, what explains that difference despite being among the top strongest militaries in the Middle East and the world? Why the current divergence among the three cases all while the Global Fire Power (GFP) for 2019 rates Turkey as 9th, Egypt 12th, and Israel 17th among the most powerful militaries worldwide? Also in what ways have these three prominent Middle

Eastern militaries been behaving similarly? What is the story arc regarding the contrast between military economic self-sufficiency versus dependencies on the civilian sector in the three countries? Why has the economic dimension of civil–military relations been alternating between civilianization, in which the military assumes a relatively smaller economic role, allowing civilian actors to rise in a civilian market economy, and (re)militarization, in which the military reassumes an increased economic role as a market player among many civilian others or through a statist discourse of behaving on behalf of the state under legalized national emergency laws and codes? This dissertation addresses aspects of economic civil–military relations and investigates questions revolving around the how and why militaries play economic roles in the three Middle Eastern powers of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.

The three cases demonstrate comparative inception stories of military economic roles and sometimes contrasting configurations of how these military economic activities manifested over time. The bottom line, however, is that all three militaries have a large economic share in their respective countries. Three aspects of their militaries’ involvement in the economic realm illustrate this:

1. A high defense budget and high military expenditure relative to the civilian state budget and as a percentage of the country’s GDP (Israel and Turkey; but not Egypt);
2. Military-run defense industries or the militarization of various sectors, such as the defense sector-dependent civilian hi-tech startup businesses, through state special funds an advanced military-industrial-complex, (Israel, Turkey, and to a lesser degree Egypt); and
3. Income-generating civilian-products enterprises; holdings as pension funds for officers; or swathes of land controlled and sold by the armed forces, (Egypt, Turkey, and to a

lesser but increasing degree Israel).

Why did these three seemingly different cases, in terms of their histories, political structures, and societies, converge on a strong economic role for their militaries? And why have all three militaries taken a share of the economic pie, one way or another, irrespective of the particular variations of the economic role that these three militaries assumed over time?

1.3 ARGUMENT

To begin, in this dissertation I argue that the economic role of the military is a phenomenon that manifested in all three cases under study despite their differences in approaching the specifics of the military's economic role. I argue this occurred because of the high threat perceptions and incessant rivalry in the Middle East as a region. The dynamic changes in the Middle East as a regional order of continuous rivalries and competition (independent variable) cause a strong economic role by the militaries (dependent variable) to manifest in the three cases alike. Ultimately, the military economic share expands to amass necessary resources for the purpose of enabling the three militaries to maintain parity. While details about the military economic role might vary in the particular shape that economic role takes from case to case, the various forms serve as equivalent paths toward military strength in the regional order. In the end, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel are the three strongest regional militaries in a Middle East of perpetually resurfacing high threat perceptions. Hence, my analysis takes a regional approach to understanding domestic economic civil–military relations in the cases. I conclude by illustrating that each case manifested similar/equivalent attributes in their militaries' economic roles, shares, and activities, due to regional circumstances.

Simply put: if we ask why the Egyptian military plays a role in the civilian economy, the

answer is that Egypt is married to its regional circumstance. And as long as its regional rivals, Turkey and Israel, have an equally designated economic share for their respective militaries whether through a high defense budget or through a sophisticated military-industrial-complex and are rated the other two strongest regional militaries, then Egypt must keep on par by allocating additional economic resources, absent an adequate formal official defense budget.

Similarly, we have the Israeli Defense Forces carving out a military-industrial complex over the past decades because its rivals of Egypt and Turkey (as well as Iran, by now Israel's main regional rival) have done so in a high-threat perception region.

Finally, the Turkish Armed Forces have a pension fund that operates as a privately owned holding group with currently US\$15 billion yearly revenue that goes directly to the retired officers as a complementary pension. The birth of this pension fund in 1961, however, goes back to a Cold War moment when the region was negotiating transformations from a state-led economy to a market economy. In the 1950s, the Turkish soldiers were economically left behind as a social class of state bureaucrats, while market economy policies were introduced. In light of resulting inflation, the formal defense budget, which covered personnel salaries and weapon modernization programs, could not match the officer corps' needs. Turkey went through these stages of state-led economy and market economy, all while keeping the Turkish military strong in a high-threat perception region.

Thus, I argue that the military economic share in the three cases ebbs and flows to keep the military equipped and combat ready and the officers as a social class appeased enough not to revolt against drastic measures by civilian governments. However, the basic necessity for a strong military capacity in the first place is due to the degree of perceived threats within the Middle East as a regional order. My argument primarily differs from others in the literature in its

emphasis on the regional order and the similar military economic practices among these strong Middle Eastern players. Other works in the literature either focus narrowly on domestic affairs in each case separately or on the global powers in relation to each case, again, separately. I take issue with how previous works separated these three important Middle East regional cases from one another as if they were substantively different cases (Kamrava, 2000; Springborg, 2011). The problem with these case-specific analyses be it on Turkey (Akça, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011, 2014, 2016) on Egypt (Abul-Magd, 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017; Ashour, 2015; Marshall, 2013, 2015; Springborg, 2011, 2017) or on Israel (Barak & Sheffer, 2007; Sheffer & Barak, 2013) that divorce the reasons behind the similarities in military economic role/share from within their regional order is that they ignore how the presence of these cases in one regional order has made them emulate or demarcate themselves from one another, albeit always in relation to one another as regional, equally strong, and rival military powers.

1.4 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Research on the armed forces' role in the economy goes back to the mid-1950s. Modernization theory literature has depicted this military economic role as primarily positive because the militaries were seen as nation-building agents. Armies were to play an instrumental role in modernizing the state and the economy of developing nations (Finer, 1962, 1982; Huntington, 1957, 1982; Janowitz, 1960, 1964, 1967; Pye, 1962). In fact, the Turkish military intervention of 1960 became a classic case of what civilians like Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes ought not to do, as he slashed several military economic resources while opening economic opportunities for the Turkish rural bourgeoisie.

Simultaneously, Menderes toyed with promoting Islamic rhetoric over the secularist

foundations of the Turkish Republic, which made most scholars consider ideological factors to have played an equally important role in the military intervention. For example, “Among the chief accusations raised against Menderes was that he had exploited religion for political purposes and infringed upon the constitution” (Pelt, 2008, p. 92). Not to undermine the importance of these ideological factors, I only shed additional light on the economic element behind the 1960 military intervention in Turkey as an equally important factor considered in the literature. In agreement with some scholars (Huntington, 1957; Stepan, 1988; Linz & Stepan, 1996), I re-emphasize that slashed economic resources for the military can tip the civil–military equilibrium and invite mutiny or an outright coup. Therefore, the economic strength of Middle Eastern militaries has to be weighed into any programs of civil–military relations reform.

The literature’s interest in militaries’ economic roles waned during the mid–1970s because earlier works had set certain prescriptions and ultimately recommended the armies’ developmental role during peacetime as well as mobilizing and organizing societies during war time. Interest picked up again during the mid–1980s and 1990s with studies on Latin America, such as with Stepan (1988) and the *Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Huntington, 1991). The same prescription was renewed in the literature during the 1990s, regarding the necessity of coup-proofing by securing the military economically as a positive path toward military professionalization and for the purpose of its withdrawal from direct political intervention to take up governing roles. In other words, the literature recommendation was to secure the armed forces economically to have them withdraw from direct interventions in politics.

By the late 1990s to the mid–2000s, few studies addressed the topic of civil–military relations, at all. Brooks (1998, 2008) and Droz-Vincent (2008) wrote on Arab armies; Schiff

(1992, 1995) theorized about the concordance among the Israeli military, political echelon, and society; Parla (1998) and Akça (2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2014, 2016) tackled the Turkish military's economic role anew and challenged that role as opposed to the recommended economic role for the military in peacetime. The scarcity of works on civil—military relations had to do with already settled earlier recommendations for a military's economic role into legalized formats: Turkey's Armed Forces Pension Fund *Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* (OYAK), set by 1961; Egypt's National Service Projects Organization (NSPO) set by 1979; and the IDF's more expansive military-industrial-complex of the defense industries of the 1980s as the Israel case illustrates.

By 2011, however, interest in the militaries was renewed again following the Arab uprisings. Differences in the response of the militaries in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen were examined in relation to professionalism and military esprit de corps, corporate interests, armed forces cohesion, and military doctrine (Albrecht, 2014, 2015; Lutterbeck, 2011, 2013). At this juncture, economic interests were evoked as an important dimension of civil-military relations to re-investigate (Abul-Magd, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2016, 2017; Ashour, 2015; Marshall, 2013, 2015, 2017; Springborg, 2011). "It's a business conglomerate, like General Electric," said Robert Springborg, professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, referring to the Egyptian military (Ross, 2011, para. 3). Concerning Egypt most specifically, a particularly flawed and "shapeless statistic" as criticized by Egyptian Political Economist Dr. Ahmed Sayed Elnaggar (2012) started to circulate in the international media regarding the scope of the Egyptian military in the economy. In the wide range "of 5–60% of the economy," that "shapeless statistic" was endlessly cited and/or attributed to Springborg in various media and scholarly publications (El-Rifae, 2014, para. 13; Hamama, 2016, para. 1; Momani, 2018, p. 9;

Ross, 2011, para. 12; Springborg, 2013). Even though in some instances Springborg was quoted actually to acknowledge that the very, “estimates of [the military’s] share of the Egyptian economy—ranging from 5 to 40 percent—are ‘absolute guesswork,’” (Ross, 2011, para. 12), the un-scrutinized statistic kept making the rounds.

Countering the statistic, Elnaggar (2012) wrote in an Al Ahram newspaper article titled “*The economy of the army between exaggerations and the logic of dismantling the state*” that the wide range of this speculative statistic should have gotten any serious researcher to wonder: Is the military economic role in Egypt as small as 5% or as big as 40%? And what does the *share of the economy* mean anyway? Do those citing the statistic mean a percentage of Egypt’s GDP? Or are they calculating military-owned assets as part of the economy? Elnaggar articulated:

In the West, information prevails that the army’s economy accounts for 40% of the Egyptian economy, which is completely false. The source of the error is that it calculates the assets owned by the army as a percentage of GDP, while the most accurate approach would be the calculation of these assets as a percentage of total productive assets in the Egyptian economy. Or better yet the calculation should be about the annual *output* of the military economic activities as a proportion of GDP. According to this latter method, the share of the military’s income-generating activities and their output will probably be less than 5% of the Egyptian economy and its output (Elnaggar, 2012, my translation from Arabic).

Instead of the more proper aforementioned suggested ways for calculation the Egyptian military’s contribution to the economy, the meaningless range was cited and recited internationally, both journalistically and academically. For example, Raphaeli (2013) asserted “estimates of the size the Egyptian economy controlled by the army range from 5 percent to 40 percent. . . . Most analysts estimate that control between 25–40 percent” (para. 12). The two

citations given in Raphaeli's article go back to Abul-Magd (2011, para. 2) who did not cite any specific authors in her article of that year, and simply said "experts assess the army's economic share to be 25 to 40%" without any attribution to sources. But that particular range, now even increased to 5–60% in another *Guardian* article written a year later by a *Washington Post* staff: "Economic experts estimate the military's holdings at anywhere between 5% and 60% of the economy" (Hauslohner, 2014, para. 9). Luckily, however, the journalist offered a counter argument when she acknowledged that a "high-ranking military officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said revenue from military industries totaled less than 1% of GDP last year" (Hauslohner, 2014, para. 10).

It was not until recently that a *Reuters* (2018) news report acknowledged that while estimates varied on the scale of the military's role in the economy, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi had already said in an earlier report from December 2016 that "the military accounts for up to two percent of output" (*Reuters*, 2018). Sisi said at the opening of a military factory, "It has been said that the military's economy is worth 20 or even 50 percent of the economy. I wish!" (*Reuters*, 2016, para. 5). Indeed, per *Reuters* (2016, para. 2.) and Hamama (2016), 1.5-2 percent of Egypt's total economic output—an output, which Sisi said was 3-4 trillion Egyptian pounds (\$160 billion-\$213 billion)— would put the military's share of economic activity at a range between \$2.39 billion and \$4.26 billion only.

According to the *Reuters* report (2018, para. 15), a "leading political scientist. . . . put the figure at about three percent of GDP." At the time the World Bank estimated Egypt's GDP at US\$332.9 billion in 2016 (World Bank Egypt Data, 2019). Thus, according to these reports, the profit of the economic activities of the Egyptian military is indeed somewhere from 1–3% of the GDP. That is a total of US\$3.329–\$9.98 billion in revenue and still lower than or equal to the

US\$9.8 billion annual revenue of Turkey's OYAK, for example—an amount directly distributed to the soldiers as a complementary source of long-term loans and post-retirement pension (OYAK Website, 2019). The point to make here is that Egypt is far from being an anomaly in its military's economic activities, if compared to Turkey, or Israel. Moreover, the share of this military economic activity as an output of GDP is less than or comparable to its regional counterparts. Finally, the profits of the activities are not directly distributed on the officers, as in a pension fund but are rather re-invested in the projects or used to buy arms, beyond the confines of the US military aid, since diversification of sources of procurement is a military strategic necessity for Egypt.

The media and academic literature's inability to accurately assess the statistic regarding the military's economic share in the Egyptian case was a primary motivation to investigate this question of the military's economic role and to situate it within its size relative to other regional cases. Hence, from the available data upon which other scholars have inferred their own conclusions, I discovered that a more accurate statistic of the annual revenue and/or net profits of the Egyptian military's civilian-products enterprises is actually somewhere between 0.5%–1.5% of the GDP. For example, Brooks (1998) and Harb (2003, p. 285) had once cited the CIA report (1985, p. 3) about the earnings of the economic activities of the Ministry of Defense industries to be roughly US\$500 million for that year. If the GDP of 1998 was US\$84 billion, then that US\$500 million earnings constitute 0.59% of the GDP. But apparently both Brooks (1998) and Harb (2003) when they refer to a 1985 CIA figure that was reflecting the peak arms exports to Iraq at the time, they do not really update their figures. That US\$ 500 million of military industries earnings as a percentage of Egypt's GDP of US\$ 34 billion for 1985 (World Bank Egypt Data, 2019) still constituted a mere 1.47% of GDP. That percentage of military industries

or military civilian enterprises earnings relative to the GDP did not change that much since 1985, as the chapter on Egypt will show. This percentage of profits in military's economic activities relative to GDP is also comparable to the revenue of OYAK (\$9.8 billion), which also constitutes about 1% of Turkey's annual GDP (\$851 billion), as the chapter on Turkey will discuss (World Bank Turkey Data, 2019). Thus, the annual profits of both Turkey's and Egypt's militaries' civilian products economic activities constitute a fraction of their GDP as opposed to how the infamous statistic about Egypt's military economic share has presented the military economic reality, especially regarding Egypt.

Thus, as the militaries' economic roles in the Middle East have re-attracted much attention since the 2011 Arab uprisings, I began to see Turkey, Egypt and Israel together as a few lasting Middle East states in a sea of failed ones. Their rising regional influence also began to show. Existing typologies, however, set these three countries apart as different cases (Kamrava, 2000; Springborg, 2011). No study has placed the three countries' trajectories together in one typology to systematically show similarities (and some individual distinctions) and argue that the relationship among them is there. As these three prominent players keep on par with one another and among the top 17 militaries worldwide, I examine how their militaries' economic roles have been constituted by the high threat perception in their regional order.

By closely examining the parallel military economic histories of these three countries, I reveal similarities regarding the genesis of their respective military-related economic penetrations. Moreover, the so-called "military economic empires" (Harding, 2016, para. 3; Tadros, 2012, para. 15) in each case have been changed and adapted in parallel over time from economic nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, to social welfare nation-building developmental tasks in the 1970s and 1980s (Altnay, 2004) to the military as a capitalist market player and

local partner of global multinationals by the 1990s and 2000s, to a return to economic nationalism in the Egyptian case since 2013—in parallel to global trends in the same direction even within the United States under an economic nationalism discourse by the Trump administration and a socialist discourse of a Bernie Sanders candidacy.

Economic nationalism has its reasons. The case of how easily paracetamol and military drugs more generally should have been outsourced to civilian producers in Israel, for example, has to be contrasted to Egypt's "trauma" from the Soviets who were not reliable allies in providing weapons, let alone other ammunition or war necessities, in preparation for the 1973 War (Sadat, 1978, p. 128). A circumstance pushed the Egyptian military to decide to be as self-sufficient as possible and not depend on international allies or on domestic civilian producers when it comes to military core needs. Al-Qot (1980) stated:

1967 was the ordeal and the defeat. 1973 was the victory that dazzled the world: Friends and foes alike. And between the two wars, stood the Egyptian mind and the Egyptian will to seek salvation. President Sadat's decision to diversify sources of access to weapons was one of the most important decisions that commanders and officers of the branches of the armed forces made use of in all areas. In the field of military pharmacy and medical service, in particular ... the decision was not to import any kind of combat drugs, and only to manufacture them locally, efficiently, and in good quality, especially after the Soviet Union refused to export them to us (my translation from Arabic).

The decision by the Egyptian political leadership under Sadat for the EAF to depend neither on civilian locals nor on international markets was a formative experience and the product of geopolitical circumstances. Besides the ammunitions and heavy weaponry, as much as can be domestically manufactured should be domestically manufactured because, "no one will come to

our rescue” as the head of Nasser Higher Military Academy, told me in a 2015 interview (personal communication, March 2015). “This is why we have Safi bottled water factory, or have bread bakeries, or have cement plants,” he added. “This is the product of Egypt’s experience from 1967 to the 1973 War: be self-sufficient and always self-sufficient” (personal communication, March 2015).

By contrast, an Israeli civil–military relations academic expert told me that the IDF could domestically outsource water delivery to its units because it does not have to worry about self-sufficiency anymore. “And what if the local civilian manufacturers cannot reach the units in times of emergency?” I asked. The answer of this Israeli military scholar was somewhat frustrated, “Look, if we are in dire time of war, many will come to our rescue. Germany will airlift water to us, Ok?! Water and such civilian products are not a concern for the IDF to set its factories to produce them!” Thus, we can see the contrast between Egypt and Israel when it comes to military self-reliance. Israel can outsource to international allies or domestic civilian producers. Egypt cannot rely on that.

Perhaps military self-sufficiency in production of key strategic civilian products is not a concern for the IDF anymore. But it is a legitimate concern for Egypt. Based on both countries’ respective accurate calculations, the armed forces in the two cases reach equivalence in handling their military necessities, in their own way. The equivalence of Egypt’s and Israel’s military economic paths means that the two regional players follow equivalent, though not identical, paths to build their military combat readiness, especially when it comes to matters of military logistics. That said however, it seems that Israel itself has to be careful with the outsourcing and privatization assumption. For instance Seidman (2010) concluded:

Finally, there is always the nagging question of the success of privatization when tested

under the sort of emergency situations for which the military is maintained. A cautionary tale comes from the Lebanon War [2006]. It suggests that sometimes, military food was better than no food: Some reports claimed that during the Second Lebanese War soldiers went hungry, and rumors had it that private contractors had refused to deliver under fire. These allegations were probably wrong, but they accentuated the calls for more public oversight of the extent of privatization in the military. Moreover, what the investigation committee set up after the war clearly found out was that the military authorities have opted for too few reserves of various supplies, having concluded that war was not imminent. They were wrong, and the result was acute shortages when wartime finally came. Military discretion proved wrong. Civilian oversight proved too late (p. 735).

Indeed, it is a universally applicable cautionary tale that has continued in Egypt since 1967 to the present, and it explains the EAF's legitimate insistence on self-reliance and self-sufficiency in strategic civilian products to remain combat ready. My main point, however, is that the military economic roles of these three cases are co-constituted from within a regional circumstances of wars that taught the different countries parallel lessons about how to handle their militaries' economic resources. A regional approach to understanding the question of an economic military role allows two key observations: (a) the countries actually influenced each other's economic civil-military relations trajectories by virtue of being rival adjacent neighbors in a high-threat perception environment that pushed for an arms race between the 1950s and 1980; and (b) their militaries have consequently been emulating one another from a pool of "best practices" in the economic realm to maintain their equivalent military strength as regional equals from the 1980s onwards. The chapter-by-chapter evidence for each case will show causal chains and delineate mechanisms of regional mutual influence. It will become clear that the militaries in

these countries played economic roles to maintain military strength in a high-threat neighborhood. Thus the economic role played by the militaries of these three countries is explained not as a product of an exclusively domestic power dynamic between the military and civilians of each country, but rather as a regional phenomenon based on national security threat perceptions and international relations.

The military's role in the economy in all three cases grew as its direct role in politics diminished. At some point, governments of these three countries were either primarily composed of a hierarchical military organization (Turkey in 1960 and 1980 and Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and his fellow colonels as a ruling class from 1952–1967) or were civilian governments permeated by retired military figures (Israel since 1948 and Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak from 1971–2011). Extrapolating from the general literature on civil-military relations in its political economy dimension (Beeson, 2008; Huntington, 1957 p. 15; Linz & Stepan, 1996) we can see that in the three countries, their active duty members of the armed forces have been willing to extricate themselves from direct ruling power, peacefully (i.e., not perform coups) if:

- The military institution's primary defense role were respected and the civilian government reached a concordance with the military regarding national security
- Sufficient resources for officers' professional development, modernization of weaponry, and other defense necessities were provided
- Officers' material corporate interests, as a professional class among many, were secured

In fact, Huntington (1957) wrote explicitly about the necessary relationship between officers' professional motivation and sufficient economic compensation:

Does the officer have a professional motivation? Clearly he does not act primarily from economic incentives. In Western society the vocation of Officership is not well rewarded

monetarily. Nor is his behavior within his profession governed by economic rewards and punishments. The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steady and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society. The combination of these drives constitutes professional motivation. *Society, on the other hand, can only assure this motivation if it offers its officers continuing and sufficient pay both while on active duty and when retire* (p. 15, emphasis added)

Later, Huntington (1991) argued that the bargaining that takes place during democratic transitions creates winners and losers. He cautioned that it is crucial for new democratic governments that the military do not see itself as a loser in this democratization process. If that becomes the perception, then the military may frame democracy negatively and develop incentives to seek options, such as a coup, resulting in other forms of government, away from civilian/democratic ones. Accordingly, the burden is often on rising civilian politicians to manage civil–military relations in a way that does not create the conditions for military interventions. This way militaries do not perceive themselves as losers through the civilianization and/or democratization process of politics and can willingly withdraw from competition over direct ruling or governing roles (Huntington, 1991).

In this view, a sense of economic security is a prerequisite for decreased chances of coups and for more balanced civil–military relations. That said, however, a given military’s economic well-being is a necessary but insufficient condition to prevent direct coups or indirect interventions. Military interventions may occur for different reasons, paramount among which

are: (a) ideological reasons, such as guardianship of the national character of the state, as reflected in the protection of secularism and strong statist tendencies in Turkey with the interval interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007; and (b) external national security threats, such as Egypt in 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood regime, which was perceived by the Egyptian military, after 1 year in power, as a transnational force more connected to Turkey's Erdoğan's regime and his Qatari ally in the Gulf, especially vis-à-vis their foreign policies supporting mercenary Islamist fighters in Syria (Saleh & Perry, 2013, para. 10), than a sheer domestic political player (Maziad, 2019, p. 115). Although Israel has never had a direct military intervention in the form of a coup, the 1967 War was almost dictated by the IDF (Peri, 1983a). The military stopped short of threatening a direct coup, as it succeeded in pressuring the civilian government to accept the IDF's vision for a pre-emptive war against Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser (Gluska, 2007; Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013; Peri, 1983a).

Having acknowledged that direct and indirect military interventions did indeed occur in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel based on ideological and national security threat perceptions, this dissertation focuses on the economic realm of military roles and penetrations in the civilian economy whether through a huge defense budget allocation, expansion of defense industry under the military's umbrella, or nation-building missions that create civilian economic activities for the armed forces. The economic realm has been a domain of negotiating economic ideologies as well as questions of building military capacity to confront external threats. The economy is an in-between dimension of civil-military relations. By that I mean a dimension of civil-military relations that lies between military intervention in actual governing as a ruling class and military dominance over national security policy. The economy is a middle space where the military intervenes, as in the three cases.

In the three cases at hand, military penetration in the economic realm manifests in three different ways: (a) a massive defense budget (e.g., Israel, Turkey); (b) establishing strong defense industries whereby the technological research and development overflows onto the larger civilian economy, thereby creating complex civilian-military-industrial relations through “security networks” (Sheffer & Barak, 2013) in all three cases to a greater or lesser extent; and (c) running income-generating civilian-products commercial enterprises or controlling expansive lands (e.g., Turkey and Egypt; Egypt and Israel).

	Turkey	Egypt	Israel
Military Budget (SIPRI, 2019)	High	Low	Very High
	\$18.96 Billion in 2018	\$3.11 Billion in 2018	\$15.94 Billion for 2018
State Budget (CIA Fact Book, 2019)	Revenues: \$172.8 billion	Revenues: \$42.32 billion	Revenues: \$93.11 billion
	Expenditures: \$185.8 billion	Expenditures: \$62.61 billion	Expenditure \$100.2 billion
	Military Budget= 10% of state public expenditure	Military Budget = 4.9% of state public expenditure	Military Budget = 15.9% of state public expenditure
	Range from 1.9% to 2.88% of GDP between 2014 and 2018	Range from 1.6% to 1.2% of GDP between 2014-2018	Range from 5.62 to 4.5% of GDP between 2014-2018
	\$851.5 Billion	\$236.5 Billion	\$317 Billion
	\$2.186 Trillion	\$1.2 Trillion	\$350.7 Billion
GDP/Nominal GDP/ PPP CIA Factbook 2019 (latest)		The discrepancy between GDP Nominal and PPP is highest in Egypt	Israel’s GDP/PPP is much lower than that of Egypt or Turkey’s

available figures based on 2017 information)			
Ranking among World Military Spenders as percentage of GDP (CIA Fact book, 2019)	61 st	63 rd	7 th
Ranking among highest world spenders in actual dollars (SIPRI, 2019)	17 th	Not among the top 20 spenders	15 th
Defense Industries/ Advanced Military-Industrial-Complex	High	Low/Medium	High
Civilian products Enterprises/ Land Ownership	High—OYAK Low	High—NSPO High—EAF-owned Land Law	Low High—IDF-owned Land Law
Ranking of Military Strength Worldwide (Business Insider, 2018; Global Fire Power Index 2019)	9 th	12 th	17 th

Ranking of Military Strength Regionally (International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS; Forbes 2018)	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
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Figure 1 Variations and equivalence in penetrative economic roles of the military in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. Sources: Compiled data from SIPRI (2019); Forbes (2018); CIA World Fact Book (2019); World Bank Egypt (2019); World Bank Israel (2019); World Bank Turkey (2019) and various newspaper articles quoting officials regarding state budgets of each country: (MoF Egypt, 2018). Israel reflects the latest available information regarding 2018–2019 state budget (JPost, 2018).

Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2018 © SIPRI 2019																	
Country	Notes	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Middle East																	
Bahrain	94	4.7%	4.0%	3.2%	3.1%	3.0%	2.8%	3.6%	3.3%	3.6%	3.8%	4.1%	4.4%	4.6%	4.7%	4.4%	3.6%
Egypt	¶	3.2%	2.9%	2.7%	2.6%	2.4%	2.2%	2.0%	2.0%	1.8%	1.6%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%	1.4%	1.2%
Iran	95	2.4%	2.8%	3.0%	3.3%	2.7%	2.8%	3.2%	2.9%	2.4%	2.8%	2.2%	2.3%	2.8%	3.0%	3.1%	2.7%
Iraq	¶ 96	..	1.7%	2.2%	1.9%	2.2%	2.4%	2.9%	2.7%	2.3%	1.9%	3.3%	3.0%	5.3%	3.5%	3.8%	2.7%
Israel	97	8.5%	8.2%	7.7%	7.5%	6.8%	6.6%	6.8%	6.2%	6.2%	6.0%	5.9%	6.0%	5.6%	4.6%	4.4%	4.3%
Jordan		6.0%	5.1%	4.8%	4.7%	6.0%	6.2%	6.6%	5.9%	5.5%	4.8%	4.3%	4.3%	4.3%	4.6%	4.8%	4.7%
Kuwait	98	6.5%	5.8%	4.3%	3.5%	3.6%	3.0%	4.0%	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%	3.3%	3.6%	5.0%	5.8%	5.6%	5.1%
Lebanon		4.7%	4.5%	4.5%	4.6%	4.6%	4.0%	4.0%	4.1%	4.1%	4.0%	4.2%	4.7%	4.5%	5.2%	4.6%	5.0%
Oman	† 99	9.1%	9.0%	8.8%	8.1%	7.7%	5.7%	7.0%	6.3%	7.4%	12.1%	11.1%	10.1%	10.8%	12%	9.6%	8.2%
Qatar		3.3%	2.4%	2.0%	1.8%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	1.5%
Saudi Arabia	§ 100	8.7%	8.1%	7.7%	7.8%	8.5%	7.4%	9.6%	8.6%	7.2%	7.7%	9.0%	10.7%	13.3%	9.9%	10.3%	8.8%
Syria		6.2%	5.5%	5.0%	4.4%	4.1%	3.6%	4.0%	4.1%
Turkey		3.3%	2.7%	2.4%	2.4%	2.3%	2.2%	2.5%	2.3%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	1.9%	1.8%	2.1%	2.1%	2.5%
UAE	101	4.7%	4.6%	3.7%	3.2%	3.3%	3.7%	5.5%	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	6.0%	5.6%
Yemen	102	6.9%	5.3%	4.9%	4.3%	4.9%	4.4%	5.7%	4.7%	4.9%	4.6%	4.1%	4.0%
Yemen, North	103	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

Numbered footnotes can be found on the Footnotes worksheet.
† Figures for these countries do not include military pensions
‡ Figures for these countries are for current spending only (i.e. exclude capital spending)
§ Figures for these countries are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure
¶ Figures for these countries do not include spending on paramilitary forces
The symbols || and || between two parts of a series for a country indicate a series break, where data before the red lines may not be consistent with data after.

Figure 2 Middle East military expenditure by country as percentage of GDP. Rankings are based on 2018 data. Egypt's military expenditure is the lowest (Source: SIPRI, 2019)

Military expenditure by country, in constant (2017) US\$ m., 1988-2018 SIPRI 2019													
Country	Notes	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2018 Current
Middle East													
Bahrain	94	869	973	971	1195	1331	1468	1566	1503	1526	1533	1357	1397
Egypt	5	3307	3210	3209	3117	3033	3008	3281	3479	3277	2766	2564	3110
Iran	95	13341	13959	14204	12809	13497	10661	10574	11123	12604	13931	12612	13194
Iraq	96	4122	3929	4427	4771	4338	7999	6963	9536	5971	7416	6200	6318
Israel	97	15892	16665	16062	16625	16778	17213	18119	18174	15740	15582	15690	15947
Jordan		1686	1962	1859	1827	1614	1511	1574	1656	1827	1940	1874	1958
Kuwait	98	5344	5195	5100	5827	6306	5966	5955	5998	6559	6765	7211	7296
Lebanon		1446	1743	1863	1821	1846	1940	2234	2289	2686	2441	2606	2776
Oman	99	4157	3908	4126	5402	9706	9103	8443	7739	8063	6803	6611	6710
Qatar		2492	2203	2174
Saudi Arabia	100	49921	51303	53396	54122	61251	70194	82732	88233	63141	70400	65843	67555
Syria	
Turkey		12482	13357	13087	13214	13504	13838	13917	14355	16630	17824	22088	18967
UAE	101	13467	15856	19885	21600	21282	26070	24601
Yemen	102	2507	2868	2847	2581	2365	2176	2093
Yemen, North	103	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

Numbered footnotes can be found on the Footnotes worksheet.
† Figures for these countries do not include military pensions
‡ Figures for these countries are for current spending only (i.e. exclude capital spending)
§ Figures for these countries are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure
¶ Figures for these countries do not include spending on paramilitary forces
The symbols ¶ and ¶ between two parts of a series for a country indicate a series break, where data before the red lines may not be consistent with data after.

Figure 3 Middle East military expenditure in dollar amount. Rankings are based on 2018 data. Egypt's military expenditure is the lowest (Source: SIPRI, 2019)

Economic security becomes necessary in exchange for withdrawal from a direct heavy role in governing (Huntington, 1991). In other words, the mechanism of granting the military one of the three manifestations of economic roles has been a means by which civilians in those three countries grant themselves the possibility to rise to political power and exercise balanced enough objective civilian control that secures the military in terms of resource allocations, all while not inviting a coup threat.¹ This mechanism of civil–military relations, however, does not always stay in balance. Varying degrees of oscillations between economic pathologies and adjusted

¹ Huntington (1957) clearly emphasizes the importance of equilibrium in civil–military relations through objective civilian control, for the purpose of a given society's security against foreign military threats (military security). Hence, no recommendations regarding balanced civil–military relations should be considered valid if they push military officers to the financial edge, especially regarding their material equipment necessities, and economic well-being as a class of professionals, among many others. Huntington (p. viii), explicitly states:

Any system of civil–military relations thus involves a complex equilibrium between the authority, influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence, and ideology of nonmilitary groups on the other. Equilibrium may be achieved in an infinite variety of ways. One particular type of equilibria – “objective civilian control” – maximizes military security. Utilizing this standard, it is possible to analyze the extent to which the system of civil–military relations in any society tends to enhance or detract from the military security of that society.

recoveries have manifested in the three cases. Civil–military relations are always in flux as the dynamic interactions between civilian politicians and military actors continue.

The second argument is that the three regional countries underwent similar trajectories of securing material resources for their respective militaries. These three countries—all with different economic histories, political cultures, and legal frameworks—converged on strong economic roles for their militaries because the economic role was a way for civilianizing the governing dimension of politics in each case, and each country’s sense of regional threat perception mattered. Each case converged on a strong economic role for their military to continue to maintain themselves as regional military powers. As noted, they are among the strongest 17 armies in the world despite the variations in the individual military economic path each case has followed.

Accordingly, the three countries’ changing perceptions of a regional arms race pushed their militaries to constantly allocate resources to retain their army strength and stay on a par with the other regional powers.² They did that for deterrence in a high-threat perception region. As they strengthened their military power in particular cases, they threatened one another at various junctures. Egypt and Israel were mutually threatening from 1948–1979. Turkey’s Menderes was threatening to Nasser, and eventually Nasser became threatening to Menderes from 1954–1960 (Pelt, 2104). The three countries converged on regional peace among themselves from 1980–

² Certainly an additional important regional case is Iran. It is a source of threat perception to Israel since the mid–2000s. First, Iran financed proxy non-state militants such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and currently it is a potential nuclear threat. One of the limitations of this study is not going in depth about Iran. But Iran certainly factors within the theoretical framework of a Dynamic Regional Order Approach to understanding oscillating degrees of civilianization and (re) militarization of the economies of the other regional cases. For, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its expansionist militant and militarized ideology, Iran counts as a regional threat to several states, namely Israel and the Arab States of the Gulf. Future research can go deeper into the Iranian case and how it, too, co-constituted not only the current changes taking place in the Israeli military, but also the nascent national armies and defense industries in of the Arab Gulf States.

2005, albeit with new threat perceptions, such as Iran becoming a threat for Israel. Other (internal/transnational) non-state actors, such as the Palestinian Intifada, followed by Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in South Lebanon became new threats for Israel. The Kurdish PKK represented an internal threat perception for Turkey, which was opposed by the armed forces. The internal threats for Egypt were Islamic Jihad and fundamentalism in Egypt; the latter case, however, was not combated by the armed forces, but rather with police forces. By 2010, the Mavi Marmara incident, in which IDF soldiers killed Turkish activists in their attempt to break the siege of Gaza, marked Turkish–Israeli animosity under Erdoğan’s government, as his pan-Islamist regional politics were starting to expand into Gaza. By 2012, Erdoğan’s pact with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood meant Turkey became a newly perceived threat to Egypt. The argument here is that the oscillating regional circumstances from high threat perceptions (1948–1979), on the one hand, to mimesis and convergence on peace economic practices (1980–2010), on the other hand, influenced domestic civil–military relations along the economic dimension. Once threat perceptions are regionally heightened, again since 2011, this circumstance influences the economic configurations of the military’s share in the state budget, in arms manufacturing, and in the production of certain civilian goods for military self-sufficiency, and as income-generating resources, in light of reduced defense budgets.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

After examining each case separately, I appreciated how much these three cases have been contemporaneous, living in the same time period, and co-spatial, living in the same geographical geopolitical space. This very condition of existing in the newly formed Middle East as a regional order and co-experiencing watershed historical events such as the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire and its caliphate by 1923/1924; the post-colonial independence movements in 1948 and onwards; the post-Cold War regional and international convergences on neoliberal economics by the 1989–1991 juncture; and the post-globalized consumerism and fragmented identities by 2000 has been impactful. All these chronological conditions affected the three countries in similar ways. Frictions among them all, out of a sense of rivalry, demarcations, competition, and also sometimes eventual regional cooperation, developed over the decades. These frictions played out in their threat perceptions, which directly affected their domestic civil–military relations and the military doctrines of their respective armed forces. This situation influenced, in turn, their respective militaries’ assumed economic roles, be it in carving out a hefty defense budget, establishing a defense industry, or assuming civilian nation-building roles as well as ensuring self-sufficiency in military needs for strategic civilian goods as illustrated above regarding Egypt in particular.

With these four parallel phases in each of the three countries, I look at the three cases vis-à-vis one another within a Middle East shaped by these main players since the end of WWII. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the regional caliphate and the establishment of a secular Turkish Republic by 1923/1924 greatly contributed to a series of reactions across the three cases. What followed in Egypt by 1928 was the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) only 4 years after the caliphate collapsed in Turkey (Al Jazeera Arabic Website Hassan Al Banna Report, 2018). The MB explicitly wished it could recreate the caliphate regionally, but from within Egypt as a new base (Al-Banna, 1999, p. 103 cited in Muclaire, 2016; Al Jazeera Arabic Website, n. d). The subsequent establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 was *a* reason for the mobilization of the Free Officers movement within the Egyptian army, following Egypt’s army defeat in the 1948 war, but was not the only reason, as Gamal Abdel Nasser (1953) emphasized

in his book *Philosophy of the Revolution* (p. 15-19). The monarchy was to be blamed for the defeat, in terms of not adequately equipping and training the Egyptian army, all while sending it in harms way (Abdel Nasser, 1953, p. 15-19). But the main issue was political liberation of Egyptians from the British occupation. In fact, Nasser explicitly states that he learnt from the “Israelis” in their own struggle against the British. Nasser wrote about his experience under siege in Fallujah during the 1948 War.

The Fallujah was besieged, and the enemy’s concentration was hitting by cannon and air. I often said to myself: ‘here we are in these burrows, trapped. We have been tricked into a battle we have not been preparing for. Our destinies have been played with, by greed, conspiracies, and lusts. Here I was under fire without arms.’

And when I got to this point of thinking, I found my thoughts suddenly jumping across the battlefield, across the border, into Egypt, and I said to myself: This is our homeland over there. It is another Fallujah, at a larger scale. What happens to us here is a miniature picture of what happens there? Our homeland is besieged by problems and hostility, and it was tricked and pushed into a battle that it was not prepared for. Its fate was played with by greed, conspiracies, and desires. It was left under fire without weapons!

Moreover, it was not only the friends in Palestine, who inspired me into thinking about the future of our homeland. And it was not the experiences that drowned our ideas with vows and hopes for the fate of our homeland, *but the enemies also played their role in reminding us of the homeland and its problems.* A few months ago I read articles written about me by an Israeli officer, named Y. Cohen, and published by the *Jewish Observer newspaper*. In these articles, it was narrated how the Jewish officer met with me during the truce talks and said:

‘The subject which Gamal Abdel Nasser always raised with me *was Israel’s struggle against the British*; how we organized our secret resistance movement against them in Palestine and how we were able to garner public opinion in the world behind us in our struggle against them’ (Nasser, 1953, p. 18-19, my translation from Arabic).

That Fallujah experience made its mark on Nasser and led to the eventual establishment of the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1952. The Free Officers were emulating the Jewish organizing against the British occupation. They were also emulating Turkey’s Ataturk of 1923, at a time when Turkey’s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was undoing key attributes of Ataturk’s republic, primarily its secular foundation as well as its non-expansionist trends into the Middle East, but rather veering toward Europe. By mid-1950s, Nasser of Egypt stood as a direct opposition to Menderes’s regionally penetrative foreign policies, on behalf of the West (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019; Sadat, 1978, p. 135). In fact, Egypt and Turkey were on collision course vis-à-vis Syria by 1955 and Turkey’s establishment of the Baghdad Pact along with Iraq, Pakistan, and the old imperial power of Britain. By 1958 there was a direct standoff between Menderes’s revival of Ottoman legacies into the Middle East and Nasser’s successful pan-Arab nationalism as a response to Menderes’ regional policies. In 1960, young Turkish colonels in the contemporaneous image of the mobilized Free Officers of Egypt of 1952 renewed Atatürkist ideals and ousted Menderes, who was hanged by 1961. “Among the chief accusations raised against Menderes was that he had infringed on Turkey’s constitution by undermining the principles of the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, and had exploited religion for political purposes” (Pelt, 2014, p. 2).

The subsequent turn toward militarization of state and society that dominated the 1950s and 1960s in the three countries and the subsequent oscillation toward civilianization that took place

in later decades (Brown, 1988) manifested in the changing economic role for the militaries of the three regional players. I argue that none of these countries' military economic role can be understood in a vacuum; as the literature has thus far mostly perceived them to be (Abul-Magd, 2017; Akça, 2010b, 2016; Springborg, 2017). Not only are they similar cases, but they also constitute each other's very military economic path, as regional rivals who emulate one another. Through a detailed comparison, and building upon previous research in the literature (Civcik, 2015),³ it is concluded that beyond the often-cited historical, cultural, and societal legacies; constitutional-legal foundations; and the strength and ideology of particular political leaders who determine the type and level of military interventions within each case individually, there seems to be a thread that brings Turkey, Egypt, and Israel together in a regional orbit of oscillating comparisons and contrasts.

I argue that a dynamic regional order accounts for the oscillations in the three cases. My level of analysis stands between local idiosyncratic cases and global supranational trends such as the cold war and post-cold war alliances. Thus, the element of threat perception is not treated in this dissertation as an isolated domestic issue for civilians and the military to grapple with locally, but is further explicated at the regional level of the entire Middle East as a *neighborhood*.

³ In my dissertation, I directly build on this in-depth study with a remarkable research design that compares Israel's and Turkey's civil-military relations for the first time, in a long time since an article by Mehran Kamrava on the general topology of Middle East militaries. Civcik concluded that the four independent variables influencing civil-military in each case, separately, are: Historical, cultural, and social legacies; constitutional-legal foundations; threat perceptions; and the strength and ideologies of political actors. Those factors are core to both cases of Turkey and Israel and they vary in the ways they play out differently in each case. I agree with this characterization and I do include these factors in my explanatory framework. I go one level further in my research design by comparing Egypt to both countries, as the three share similarities and exhibit differences. By conducting a parallel systematic comparison to Civcik's identified factors, I discovered that beyond those important four factors, that reflect domestic military-in-state-and-society relations, there is actually a dynamic regional order that influence the three cases simultaneously, yet with oscillations of the outcome of civil-military relations within each case and across the cases. Moreover, the perpetual oscillations back and forth from militarism to civilianization, I argue, occur in each case; in response to changes occurring in another.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Subordination of the military to civilian authorities is a prerequisite in democratic systems, yet oscillations in civil–military relations happen within a given country due to historical, cultural, and social attributes; constitutional-legal foundations; threat perceptions; political leadership; and the regional order in which a given country is geo-spatially and geo-politically located. All these factors make for civil–military shifts over time. These elements may result in military interventions of different degrees at different times. Therefore, a comparative research design of a number of countries helps us appreciate how the typology of civil–military relations changes even in democratic countries, given the variation of these factors, let alone in democratizing countries like the cases in this study that all fall within a regional order that has been constantly in flux. While there have been early seminal works on the military in Middle East politics (Be’Eri, 1970; Kamrava, 2000; Perlmutter, 1974, 1982, 1985) the subject has barely been researched in the past decade, only to resurface with the Arab uprisings of 2011 (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2017; Kandil, 2016; Lutterbeck, 2011; Springborg, 2011, 2016, 2017).

Before that 2011 juncture in the literature, most civil–military research was confined to single-country cases, such as studies on Turkey (Aydınlı, 2009, 2011; Aydınlı, Özcan & Akyaz, 2006; Cizre, 2003, 2004, 2008a; Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006; Evin, 1988, 1991; Güney & Karatekelioglu, 2005; Gürsoy, 2011; Heper, 2005, 2011; Heper & Güney, 2000; Jenkins, 2001, 2007; Michaud-Emin, 2007; Sarigil, 2011; Satana, 2008, 2011; Tachau, & Heper, 1983) or ones on Israel (Ben-Ari, 2001; Ben-Eliezer, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003; 2004; Ben-Meir, 1995; Etzioni-Halevy, 1996; Cohen, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008; Cohen-Almagor, 1995; Inbar, 1990; Levy, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013; Lissak, 2001; Shani & Kuchik, 2007;

Vigoda Gadot & Mizrahi, 2010) or (Abdallah, 1987, 1988, 1990a, 199b; Satloff, 1988, Springborg, 1987, 1988, 1989) on Egypt.

There has been little systematic, in-depth research on the relationships of politics and the military in multiple cases, such as Sayigh (1992) who looked at the Arab arms industry, Cook (2007), who compared Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria, Campbell (2009), who looked at the militaries of Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan cases as Muslim countries, and Civcik (2015), who combined Turkey and Israel. No study has addressed Turkey, Egypt, and Israel together as three comparable regional Middle Eastern powers.

For a research design on comparative politics, the cases should have major similarities and distinct differences to explain why the militaries intervene in politics and the economy differently and to different degrees. Turkey, Egypt, and Israel have major similarities in their nationalist histories and levels of success in modern state-building endeavors. They share characteristics of oscillating along a pendulum of democratization and autocratic single party rule trends that affect their political cultures. They also have similarities in their military–society relations, where military conscription socializes their male citizens into one shared experience of mandatory military service. The three countries share similar constitutional and legal foundations of their militaries’ roles and functions. Finally, heightened degrees of threat perceptions manifest in the three cases and impactful political leaders and military commanders have altered the course of their civil–military relations domestically and—which is the argument in this dissertation—created stimuli to which other countries responded from within a dynamic regional order that perpetuated fluctuations in the degree of balance of their civil–military relations. These similarities in the cases and differences in the outcomes at times, their convergence on the same outcomes at others, and even total exchange of positions among themselves over time can be

detected as back-and-forth oscillations in military interventions in politics in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.

By *oscillations* between military penetrations and withdrawals, I mean fluctuations in military political and economic roles within each case, over time, which manifested in:

- Military penetration into state and society, accompanied by societal reverence, and appreciation for the military's nation-building roles that are beyond the military security core missions. Various Middle Eastern militaries have assumed these nation-building, noncore missions in infrastructure, education, and training as the regional countries struggled to economically keep on par with one another as competitive players. This kind of military penetration has been uniformly characteristic in the three cases' early years of statehood.
- Military withdrawals from political and economic realms, accompanied by an increased focus on core defense missions and armed forces professionalization. This occurred following societal scrutiny and criticism of the military leadership and their role expansion attempts beyond military security. Military withdrawals from noncore missions usually occur after military defeats (Abdallah, 1997). For example, societal backlash against both the Egyptian and Israeli political and military leaderships alike occurred after their respective military setbacks and major blunders. The societal pressure to focus exclusively on military affairs occurred in both countries around the 1967 and 1973 wars, as the first represented a military defeat for Egypt, while the latter represented a subsequently equivalent shocking battle failure for Israel.

These very oscillations in civil–military relations over decades have represented a back-and-forth between military penetrations into and withdrawals from political and economic roles. I argue they are greatly influenced by the dynamism of the regional order of the Middle East, itself

as a complex system. This happens because the circumstances of external threat perception become woven into a domestic security discourse. This very security discourse ushers in counterarguments, led by civil-society and the media, against the increased securitization of the state and society. Such security arguments and counterarguments regarding the military expenditure and economic role of the armed forces have taken place in Turkey, Egypt and Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and onward.

For example, the debate on defense spending and the then-burgeoning economic role of the Egyptian military was alive and well throughout the 1980s. Satloff (1988) wrote, “At the same time as the military grows in popular stature and in political power, it is beginning to face new and potentially constricting checks on its ability to exercise that authority (p. 17). He added, “The military is now being challenged by a democratizing society” (p. 17). Citing how Mubarak has “doggedly promoted the growth of democratic institutions, most notably an independent opposition press,” at the time of writing in the late 1980s, Satloff, attests that “the opposition has taken up the charge and has started to comment with ferocity” on issues “deemed out-of-bounds,” prior (p. 17). Unlike earlier decades, key issues of “national security and military policy” were subjected to “open debate, Satloff concluded (p. 17).

Over 50 original op-ed pieces from 1984–1987 were compiled and re-published in an academic book on Egyptian civil–military relations, by scholar Ahmad Abdallah (1990a) entitled *The Army and Democracy in Egypt*. The edited volume included four academic studies and chapters by Egyptian scholars including, an Arabic translation of Egypt military scholar Robert Springborg, whose more recent assessment of the military economic share I refuted above. The original newspaper articles compiled in Abdallah (1990a) reflected the debates in the state-owned newspapers as well as those of the political opposition newspapers, where civilian

intellectuals and retired military officers thoroughly analyzed the pro-and-con positions regarding the need for reduced military expenditure following the Peace Treaty with Israel. Writers also publicly showed signs of caution regarding the rising economic roles of the military at that time (Abdallah, 1990a). Some columnists heavily criticized the military's burgeoning economic activities and called for transparency and budget oversight by the *Al-Riqaba Al-Idareyya*, the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) in liaison with *Al-Gehaz Al-Markazi lel-Muhasabat* Central Auditing Authority (CAA) (Murad, 1986 republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 169—170). More columnists described the increased investments in the defense industry to have “shackled Egypt with debt” that has indeed reached \$4.5 billion that year and sarcastically narrated the Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abel Halim Abu Ghazala trip to “the new Masters in Washington” in order to negotiate better armament deals (Ali, 1986, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 178). Using the term of British J. M. Barrie, the columnist of leftist oppositional *Tagamou Party* newspaper *Al Ahali* caustically described Abu Ghazala as “The Admirable Crichton” who came back to Egypt “like the top of his class he is, bringing us all sorts of discounts that would supposedly ease the burdens of our debts!” He cynically continued that this “success” should keep the Field Marshal afloat and even on the “rise” as he “presides over the military institution, which has had the upper hand in ruling over Egypt for thirty four years and now is invading the Egyptian social life” the columnist continued, “through its roads, and bridges, and telephones, and schools, and bread, and meat, and beans, and lentils, and onions” (Ali, 1986, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990, p. 178).

Against this sharp and biting criticism, other Egyptian writers provided counter arguments, considering the need to maintain military expenditure and to increase the civilian nation-building roles of the military during the 1980s. These cited Israel, Turkey, Iran, and other regional players

as military spenders with whom Egypt had to keep up (Nafie, 1987, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990, p. 193). For example, citing the already reduced military spending, Nafie (1987) writes in his Al Ahram newspaper column, “Egypt’s military spending has been reduced to the international standard of 8-9% of GDP [at the time], in a region, whose countries’ military spending fluctuates between 16 and 30%” (republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990, p. 192). That is evidence of how the regional parity was a motivating factor in the internal lively debates on the army’s economic role in Egypt. “After all, it was the 1979 peace treaty with Israel that spurred Egypt’s military-business complex to diversify into more consumer-oriented fields, in part to employ soldiers no longer at war” (Ross, 2011). That was the moment of the inception of the civilian products military’s National Service Products Organization (NSPO). Another retired military officer, who also holds a PhD wrote, “The armed forces of any country all over the world are an integral part of the fabric of the infrastructure of the society emanating from it. One of the most critically important lessons learned from the defeat of the 1967 and October 1973 victory is that through management, a given country can rebuild a developed and advanced army; based on its social, economic and educational base.” He continues:

The idea of granting the members of the military organization their needs is absolutely in all the armies of the world, regardless of the nature of their political systems. These set of basic and mandatory services and facilities, are described by some in Egypt as privileges and described by others as exceptions, although it is scientifically proven that the services—and not privileges—granted to the military sector in Egypt are significantly lower than in the armies of many other countries other than Egypt. I recall regarding this question that I asked a Soviet adviser in 1970 about whether the Soviet army had special advantages/privileges. His answer was in the affirmative, all while being surprised from the core of the question to

begin with. He then went ahead and enumerated in detail, various aspects of such advantages (Shakeeb, 1984, republished in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 155—156).

The aforementioned debate between civilians and military started and lasted throughout the 1980s. Moreover, another 4000 words report was published in 1999 in Al Ahram Newspaper, detailing all economic activities and sharing numbers of profits publicly, as Mubarak was opening an exhibition entitled “The Armed Forces and Development” (Abdel Aziz & El-Kholi, 1999). The same debates on defense spending and/or the economic share of the military ensued in Israel and Turkey. I bring in themes and elements from the discourse initiated by these journalists, analysts, and retired military officers in the various chapters and I cite their debates.

Economic discussions around the military resurfaced in subsequent critical junctures in the 1990s and mid-2000s as the three countries engaged with privatization schemes of their respective public sector. Finally, the economic and social justice grievances further burst into the Egyptian uprising of January 2011, the Tel Aviv demonstrations in September of the same year, and the Istanbul Taksim Square protests of 2013 (Maziad, et. al, 2017).

The militaries’ political and economic roles factored into the recent mass mobilizations, in all three countries. In Turkey’s Gezi Park protests of 2013, the military was perceived by some in favorable contrast to the corruption of the civilian government and the forecasted long-term authoritarianism of Erdoğan (Maziad, 2013). By 2016, however, the failed coup reflected that the Turkish people were weary of their country’s history of frequent military interventions (Maziad, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). In Israel, the military maintained its perpetual image as the most trusted institution and the legitimate basis of the political elite. In Egypt, the military was further scrutinized from 2011–2013 (Abul-Magd, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2016, 2017) due to its carved-out economic role since the early 1980s. By the critical juncture of the June 30 2013,

however, and the subsequent mass protests following the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood's 1-year regime, the EAF was largely perceived as the nation's savior.

What evidence for that perception? The evidence comes from the media reports at the time (Al-Sharif & Saleh, 2013; Saleh & Fayed, 2013). To illustrate, the Guardian reported, "Millions of demonstrators line streets to demand president's removal on first anniversary of his inauguration" (Kingsley, 2013). Another Reuters report on June 30 showed that while a senior MB politician Essam El-Erian "denounced the protests as a 'coup attempt,'" the journalists conveyed that "the Tahrir crowd roared approval when an army helicopter hovering overhead dropped Egyptian flags on the protesters" (Saleh & Fayed, 2013). A military source told Reuters "the move was intended to encourage patriotism and was not a gesture of political support" (Saleh & Fayed, 2013). The Reuters reporters showed that protesters "bellowed their anger at the Brotherhood, which they accuse of hijacking Egypt's revolution and using electoral victories to monopolize power and impose Islamic law" (Saleh & Fayed, 2013). Moreover, Egypt's secular, liberal, and left wing opposition, including former chief of the UN Atomic Energy Commission Mohamed El Baradei and leftist 2012 presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, participated in the June 30 marches in Cairo. Hundreds of thousands of additional protesters marched to the Mediterranean port of Alexandria, Egypt's second-largest city. Large demonstrations were reported in at least 20 towns around the country. In Cairo, "marchers stopped to shake hands and take pictures with soldiers guarding key buildings" (Saleh & Fayed, 2013). Finally, high-ranking police officers, at least six of them, spoke at the Tahrir Square podium in support of the protesters, as a Reuters witness confirmed (Saleh & Fayed, 2013).

The MB misinterpreted the signals coming from the Egyptian public during the preceding 6 months. For example, a BBC (2013) profile on *Tamarod*— a group whose name means Revolt in

Arabic—stated that Tamarod is “a new grassroots protest movement” that was behind the “nationwide protests against President Mohammed Morsi, a year after he took office.” Millions of Egyptians were filling in Tamarod petitions. The group claimed, “it has collected more than 22 million signatures for a petition demanding Mr. Morsi step down and allow fresh presidential elections to be held” (BBC, 2013). The public explicitly shared their plans to march against Morsi’s presidency, precisely the way they did against Mubarak. They expected Morsi also to relinquish power. There was buyer’s remorse among Egyptians following Morsi’s election, especially among Morsi voters who were not ideologically Muslim Brotherhood members. Those non-ideological voters were the necessary numbers to guarantee Morsi his slim 2012 electoral victory of 51.73%—“not a mandate by any stretch of imagination” (Maziad, 2013). In fact, the *Guardian* reported, “many in Tahrir Square emphasized their religiosity, while rejecting what they perceived as the Brotherhood's attempts to run the Egyptian state along religious lines and to arbitrate on the correct interpretation of Islam” (Kingsley, 2013). “Haga Zeinab, a niqab-wearing protester in Tahrir” whom the *Guardian* journalist interviewed, said explicitly, “I voted for him. But it turns out he only thinks his own people can be Muslims” (Kingsley, 2013). Without those non-Brotherhood Morsi voters, the numbers of ideologically Pro-MB Islamists would not have been sufficient. Within the self-granted justification of “revolutionary circumstance,” the Egyptians, many of who had voted for Morsi, as my own fieldwork interviews confirmed the *Guardian*’s account, decided to use protests to oust Morsi. Elsewhere, I wrote:

On June 30, millions of Egyptians marched, petitioning a “democratic demand” to the then “democratically-elected President Morsi”—namely a call for early elections. Based on Tamarod’s millions of signed forms of “withdrawal of confidence,” Egyptians argued they

have created what they called “an impeachment process with a revolutionary license,” given that the parliament was dissolved due to the unconstitutionality of the law that had created it. Morsi ignored the seriousness of these protests (Maziad, 2013).

The MB had assumed that they won over the military, given the ongoing public critique to which the armed forces had been incessantly subjected the preceding year. But that was not an accurate assessment of civil–military relations in Egypt and is part of what I mean by oscillations in civil–military relations in the three cases. Pro and counter discourses at the levels of the state, the military, and society change over time, given the changing regional circumstances and the perceived threats that emerge.

1.7 METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

The analysis for this dissertation primarily relied on in-depth historical process tracing (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2015; George & Bennett, 2005) between 1950–2016 in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. This included reviewing secondary academic sources written on the subject of civil-military relations and conducting qualitative content analysis of media reports on portrayals of the militaries in the three countries. As I compared Turkey, Egypt, and Israel along the dimension of military economic intervention, I took on a theoretical approach as to understand the relationship between the three countries. I paid attention to formative events in each country, but my focus was on the shared patterns and developments of their militaries’ economic role. To theorize about their similarities (Goldstone, 2003), I examined instances of convergences where their militaries’ economic practices were more or less equivalent.

I am fluent in Arabic, Turkish, and Hebrew, which facilitated my research. I relied on primary sources, such as speeches by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the autobiography of Anwar Sadat,

and the memoirs of Salah Nasr, the head of the Egyptian Intelligence Agency from 1957–1967. Primary sources from Egypt also include op-ed analytical pieces on the topic of civil–military relations, especially the economic dimension, by retired military officers, academic political scientists, and policy advisors. These primary source articles were published from 1984–1987 and compiled in Ahmed Abdallah’s (1990a) book mentioned above. I also looked at speeches by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

My research included anthropological fieldwork participant observations in the three countries. I conducted interviews with politicians and both retired and active duty military officers. In Egypt, I formally interviewed, or personally communicated for research purposes, with a total of 26 individuals. In Turkey, I formally interviewed, or personally communicated for research purposes, with a total of 20 individuals. In Israel, I formally interviewed, or personally communicated for research purposes, with a total of 15 individuals. Those individuals covered the profile of active duty and retired officers, journalists, academic experts, and civilian politicians. My conversations addressed various aspects of civil–military relations, with questions on military governing roles, military impact on national security policy, and the military’s role and share in the economy. In each dissertation chapter, I highlight the interviews of four to five interviewees, whose insights spoke directly to the economic question of civil–military relations.

In addition to fieldwork interviews, I consulted memoirs, read newspapers, and checked official websites of military and political institutions. Moreover, I relied on seminal secondary sources such as the books and articles of researchers, scholars, and journalists.

TABLE 1. DATA COLLECTION AND FIELDWORK DETAILS

	Egypt	Turkey	Israel
Number of formal interviews and/or personal communication	26	20	15
Other field notes generated during interactions at these events:	<p>Participant-observer at a National Security Course:</p> <p>15 Lectures given by active duty or retired military officers at the Nasser Higher Military Academy</p> <p>Watching TV Talk Shows pertaining to the military</p> <p>Watching TV interviews with active duty and retired military officers</p> <p>July 26 2013 Armed Forces call for a public mandate to fight terrorism and the second wave of supporting protests that ensued following the June 30 anti-MB protests.</p>	<p>Interviewing at Think Tanks:</p> <p>TESEV</p> <p>EDAM</p> <p>Gezi Park mass protests in May-June 2013</p>	<p>Taking notes at a number of lectures given by IDF officers at the:</p> <p>Association for Israel Studies (AIS) Conference 2016 in Israel</p> <p>Israel Institute Annual Conference 2016 in Israel; among the speakers were former Israeli and American politicians such as Tsipi Livni, and Dennis Ross</p> <p>Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUSAFS) Conferences 2015 and 2017 in the US; and</p> <p>European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) in Israel 2015 and Greece 2017</p>

In Turkey, I was a visiting researcher at Şehir University from May to July 2013 and worked with Professor Ümit Cizre, an expert on civil–military relations in Turkey. She introduced me to other key researchers on civil–military relations, whom I interviewed. I have also interviewed

retired generals at a number of think tanks. I was affiliated with and conducted interviews with senior analysts at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies Ekonomi ve Dış politika Araştırma Merkezi (EDAM).

During my time in Turkey, I witnessed the Taksim Gezi Park protests and reported on them in a number of published analytical pieces for *Aljazeera English* and *Almasry Alyoum*, Egypt's independent daily newspaper. I also got to interview some activists and young Atatürk supporters about what the military represented to them and how they perceived the future of civil-military relations in Turkey. I later returned for more anthropological fieldwork from November 2014 till mid-March 2015 and for subsequent short visits in 2016 just 1 week before the failed coup of 2016. During that time I consulted some Turkish newspapers with different political strands from 1980–2016. This included orienting myself with the discourse in the mainstream newspapers such as *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet*, the liberal *Radikal* and *Taraf*, the secularist *Cumhuriyet*, and Islamist-Gülenist *Zaman* and pro-Erdoğan *Sabah*. I used official websites of the Turkish Armed Forces, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish National Security Council, and Turkish Pension Fund OYAK. I contacted OYAK for interviews but the organization formally declined my request.

In Egypt, I conducted fieldwork from July 2013–November 2013, during which time I witnessed the military intervention after June 30 mass protests, which resulted in a people's call for early elections and eventually ousted the 1-year MB regime. I interviewed and debated with a number of scholars such as Khaled Fahmy, Ahmed Abd Rabou, Tewfik Aclimandos, Ashraf El Sherif, and Zeinab Abul-Magd. These are key researchers who have conducted substantial work on the Egyptian military. I also met a key bureaucrat at the Central Auditing Organization

(CAO)⁴ in Cairo, who supervises military business activities and conducted interviews with civilian contractors who work under the EAF's infrastructure projects such as the New Suez Canal expansion project that was completed in one year, by July 2015. I also formally interviewed the military spokesperson in 2013. Moreover, I experienced, firsthand, the military curfew of summer 2013, with its security measures and checkpoints, immediately after some Islamist elements decided to resist the June 30 mass protests and resort to violence. I also witnessed intermittent terrorist attacks in Cairo and followed the local and international media coverage of the accelerating low-intensity warfare of transnational terrorism emanating from Gaza onto Sinai. The infiltrators from Gaza are the more extreme and uncontrollable elements of Hamas. These elements morphed into Ansar Bait El Maqdes (Supporters of Jerusalem) and latched onto Sinai. A series of U.S. Department of the Treasury (2008, 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2016) and U.S. Department of State reports (2015a, 2015b) on the origins of terrorism financing networks in the Qatar as well as Bait Al Maqdes in particular, state that there are clear "indications that the it may receive funding from external actors." The foreign terrorist group Ansar Bait El Maqedes, eventually paid allegiance to the transnational Islamic State and became Wilayet Sinai (Provence of Sinai). The transnationally financed terrorism group, Wilayet Sinai, targeted both the Egyptian army and Israel. Financing dwindled since the US administration forced Qatar in 2017 to monitor terrorism financing networks thriving in that country. Terrorist attacks in Northern Sinai decreased following that 2017 juncture (Maziad, 2019, p. 110).

From several months of research, I could compare this time of heightened security

⁴ The CAO is an independent auditing institution established in Egypt in 1942 as an instrument of public finance control. The CAO supervises the management of public-sector companies and government departments, including about 130 central government departments and administrative units, 120 service agencies, 29 governorates, 50 economic authorities and more than 160 state-owned enterprises, political parties, trade unions, national and party news media, and all units subsidized by the State. The CAO may also audit and examine the work and accounts of any other entity, as assigned by the President, the Prime Minister or the People's Assembly of Egypt. It is independent of the cabinet, and reports directly to the President of Egypt, to whom it is subordinated.

discourse—in response to the overall insecurity—to subsequent times of political stabilization following the election of President Abdel Fattah El Sisi in 2014 and the eventual end of competitive politics altogether by his re-election for a second term in 2018—when no viable political alternatives seemed to rise or be allowed to rise to the surface. I returned to the field from September to November 2014; March 2015–July 2015 and later during a period of dissertation writing, while a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Political Science at the American University in Cairo from September 2015–May 2016. During fieldwork, I conducted archival research at *Al Ahram Newspaper* archives. I followed their file stacks that categorized news on the Egyptian Armed Forces. I focused on the years 1977–1987 to see the emerging story of the economic and developmental role of the military during the beginning of peace economy and the transition following the Peace Treaty with Israel. The narrative that emerged showed that the establishment of NSPO was for the purpose of contributing to the country’s general economic development after years of war, as well as for the maintenance of the military’s preparedness during peacetime. NSPO was an income-generation mechanism to continue the EAF’s military preparedness through self-sufficiency. That was especially highlighted in the newspaper articles as a lesson learned by the EAF, as the military’s reliance on Soviet allies during in the interim period between the 1967 War and 1973 War was tested and failed that test. The Soviets were not responsive to Egypt’s needs for immediate re-armament following the 1967 defeat. Since this time, diversifying the sources of armament procurement became an important goal for President Anwar’s Sadat and President Hosni Mubarak after him. The military had to find self-financing mechanisms for various sources of weapon acquisition. NSPO’s profits were to be geared toward such acquisition, in light of reduced post-War defense budget. That was the narrative around NSPO that emerged from Al-Ahram archive.

I also conducted a participant-observation at the Nasser Higher Military Academy for three weeks in April 2015. This was the duration of a civil–military relations course at the Military Academy where I interviewed the military leadership of the institution and also had access to retired officers for further interviews.

For my research on the Israeli case, I received a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowship to study advanced Hebrew at Tel Aviv University and conduct ethnographic fieldwork interviews. Additionally, I was in Israel on several pilot fieldwork research, and conference trips. This included 2 weeks in December 2014, a summer June–October 2015, a 2-week conferences trip as a presenter at the Association for Israel Studies (AIS), and as an invited participant-observer at the Israel Institute Annual Conference in June 2016. During these research trips, I had the chance to conduct interviews with a number of key military/political leaders as well as civil–military relations experts at the Institute of National Security Studies. I also followed the civil–military relations and security discourse on the Jerusalem Post and the English edition of *Haaretz* for the Israeli case. I consulted the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IDF official website, and the Israeli National Security Council. I also consulted some IDF publications such as the 2015 IDF Strategy Document, *Israel Defense* periodical and website and received some translated articles of *Maarachot* and *Bein Haktavim*. I conducted semi-structured interviews with former IDF senior officers and Israeli experts in the field of military strategy and doctrine. I also conducted participant-observations on ethnographic fieldwork visits to Hebron and the Golan.

1.8 THE DISSERTATION CHAPTERS

This dissertation is composed of six chapters. Following this introduction, my second chapter

discusses the strength and weaknesses of the theories of civil–military relations in general, and for Turkey, Egypt, and Israel as separate cases. The chapter suggests my conceptual framework emphasizing a regional approach to understanding Middle East militaries. The following three chapters of the dissertation focus on the economic dimension of military roles in each case. In each case chapter, I compare the armed forces’ share in defense budgets; dominance in defense industries; and assuming civilian nation-building roles, which morphed over the decades, into income-generating enterprises. Each chapter is dedicated to a country case, followed by a conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Provided in this chapter is a review of the major scholarly literature that informs my dissertation research as well as the conceptual framework that combines them into a study. In the first section below is a chronological presentation of literature on civil–military relations. The general literature addresses the question of why some militaries⁵ intervene in politics. I conceptualize politics to be measured along three dimensions: actual governing, playing a penetrative role in the economy, and dominance over national security policy setting. In this dissertation, I focus on the middle dimension of military intervention in the economy in the cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel without being oblivious to the two other dimensions of military intervention in politics. Hence, in this chapter, I look at the broader questions in the literature on civil–military relations that address the other two important dimensions of intervention in politics, governing and

⁵ Definition of Military (Military, n.d.)

A military is an armed force typically officially authorized and maintained by a sovereign state, intended for warfare and other functions and tasks according to state interests and policies. The main functions of the militaries maintained by sovereign states are usually defined as defense of the state, its territory and population, deterrence, participation in different types of peacekeeping/multinational operations, and in some cases support to civilian institutions. Beyond that, the militaries can be employed in various sanctioned and not sanctioned activities within the state as: population control, the promotion of a political agenda, emergency services and reconstruction, protecting corporate economic interests, social ceremonies and national honor guards, intelligence activities, law enforcement missions and guarding important areas and persons. It may consist of one or more military branches such as an Army, Navy, Air Force and in certain countries, Marines and Coast Guard, with its members identifiable by their distinct military uniform. For a nation's military may function as a discrete subculture within a larger civil society, through the development of separate infrastructures, which may include housing, schools, utilities, logistics, health and medical, law, food production, finance and banking.

In broad usage, the terms “armed forces” and “military” are often treated as synonymous, although in technical usage a distinction is sometimes made in which a country's armed forces may include both its military and other paramilitary forces. There are various forms of irregular military forces, not belonging to a recognized state; though they share many attributes with regular military forces, they are less often referred as simply “military.”

The profession of soldiering as part of a military is older than recorded history itself. Some of the most enduring images of classical antiquity portray the power and feats of its military leaders.

national security policy setting.

I delineate the difference between subjective and objective civilian control of the military, as well as provide analysis of the concept of military corporateness, which refers to the shared professional ties related to the nature of work performed in a given profession and the acquired sense of group belonging. The following section draws in scholarly analysis of civil–military relations of the three regional powers that are the subject of this study. The third section offers a definition of defense economics and an economic sketch of the different phases into which the country cases morphed. The fourth and final section posits my own idea of a changing dynamic regional order that combines the scholarly literature into a new conceptual framework to provide a new view on civil–military relations in the Middle East.

2.1 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MILITARIES INTERVENE IN POLITICS

General Civil–Military Relations Theories

Clausewitz: War is politics by other means and civilian control over the military is a necessity.

Among the first theorizations of civil–military relations is Carl von Clausewitz’s book *Vom Kriege On War*, published in 1832. The principle of civilian control over the military was established in his famous quotation: “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 87). Clausewitz concluded that war ought to be subject to policy. Otherwise it becomes “something pointless and devoid of sense” (p. 605). But who sets policies? The answer became that legitimate political authorities do, and from here stemmed the principle of civilian control over the military.

Laswell's Garrison State: When Technically-Advanced Officers Govern and Rule

In more modern times, Lasswell's (1941) article "The Garrison State" is also a formative writing on civil–military relations. Lasswell argued that technology would play a role in military–political relations. Without advanced technology, military-ruled states would continue to exist. As technology advances, however, garrison states (where military abilities and technology fuse) would take over traditional military states. In Lasswell's analysis, military effectiveness necessitates "knowledge of the technical and psychological characteristics of modern production processes" (p. 458). As the military officers become well versed in both technical and psychological domains, they rise to power in a garrison state.

Accordingly, Lasswell (1941, 1962) used the term *garrison state* to describe states whose political elite is composed of technologically advanced military officers. He wrote, "A world of garrison states is a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society" (Lasswell, 1962, p. 455). Lasswell argued that the likelihood of garrison states to emerge increases exponentially if the regional environment is characterized by high external threats. Citizens of garrison states experience a "startle pattern" (p. 460) due to the external threats circumstances. Their rulers employ public fear and anxiety to harness support for militarized politics. Consequently, under these conditions, in which garrison states exist, liberal democratic culture would disintegrate, and the militaristic leaders would authoritatively dictate state decisions (p. 461-462).

The 1950s and 1960s: Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer—Militaries as Modernization Agents

The number of theories on civil–military relations subsided after Lasswell's pre-WWII conceptualizations only to re-emerge in the 1950s with Samuel Huntington's book, *The Soldier*

and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–military Relations (1957). This was followed in the 1960s by a sociological approach to analyzing the military profession and its officer corps through the work of Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960) and *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (1964). Another important contribution came when Samuel Finer published *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (1962). These books asked similar questions: How much separation should be sought between the civilian political authority and its army? Should the military be completely subordinate to the government? Or should the armed forces be permitted enough autonomy in order to fulfill their role in securing the nation? Huntington argued for total separation, professionalization, and autonomy. Finer, by contrast, argued for integration, stating that a civilian government can be efficient enough as to keep the civil–military relationship in check, by decreasing or eliminating the conditions for the possibility of an actual need for military interventions. Recognizing the potential “need” for an interventionist military, however, Janowitz pointed out that in some countries, especially the post-colonial newly independent African and Asian states, governments could lack state capacity to function in a politically orderly, and economically viable manner. Under these conditions, military officers assume a role in both politics and the economy in order to fulfill nation-building roles in light of a gap in the state’s capacity. The next section will engage more with the three aforementioned theorists.

Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) was written in the context of the Cold War and stated “civil–military relations are one aspect of national security policy” (p. 1). According to Huntington, national security policy manifests in three forms: military security policy, internal security policy, and situational security policy. The purpose of the armed forces

is to provide military security. This military security has to be exclusively against external threats.

Consequently, militaries should not be concerned with internal security policy, which has to do with internally subversive threats. This is the job of the civilian police force and internal security courts. Neither should the military be concerned with long-term situational security that has to do with change in the economy, education, demographics and other social issues that need to be solved through governmental policies of a civilian, elected, political leadership and not a military leadership.

Huntington (1957) also saw two imperatives influencing the character of military institutions: a “functional imperative” mandated by providing military security for society and a “societal imperative” that deals with societal values, ideological trends, social forces, and the various political and legal institutions of a given society (p. 2). Huntington emphasized that the mechanism by which military security is provided cannot be isolated from societal imperatives. While he advocated for military autonomy, Huntington still located the military-in-state and in-society, as he asserted that militaries should provide security with the maximum consideration for societal imperatives. But what happens when the need for military security against external threats clashes with liberal societal ideals? In Huntington’s view, the act of striking a balance between security provision and societal considerations depends on the level of professionalization of the military.

As Huntington (1957) delineated the functional and societal imperatives, he argued that military institutions that only attend to [liberal] social values might be impaired when it comes to fulfilling their military security function. Yet he noted it is difficult to keep military institutions purely governed by functional military security imperatives. That difficulty translates into the

conclusion that the “interaction of these two forces [functional and societal imperatives] is the nub of the problem of civil–military relations” (p. 2).

Huntington (1957) compared how security used to be perceived as a given, “an inheritance rather than a creation” (p. 3). He contrasted this to his own time of change in technology and international relations in the Cold War context. That made “security the final goal of policy rather than its starting assumption” (p. 3). That acute condition of both technology advancement and perilous international relations has only been further exacerbated since Huntington’s writing, albeit after some decades of international cooperation and overall optimism by the end of the Cold War. That is what makes his theory resonate anew today, especially in the context of the Middle East with heightened threat perceptions, anew. With this acute condition, the impulse of many states to re-emphasize the functional imperative of military security provision could not be relegated or sidelined. This shift of priorities, according to Huntington, became capsulated in the following dilemma:

Previously the primary question was: What pattern of civil–military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplanted by the more important question: What pattern of civil–military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation? (p. 3)

The balancing of power and attitude between civilian and military groups is key to healthy civil–military relations. Thus, in response to this civil–military balancing of power dilemma, Huntington (1957) asserted, “Nations, which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil–military relations, squander their resources and run uncalculated risks” (p. 2). In the historical context of the Cold War, I argue that this kind of militarism and military security discourse has influenced many other countries beyond the United States (Vagts, 1959). This applies to the three countries

in the present study, from within their dynamic regional order, vis-à-vis one another. As the United States had once set an example that advocated favoring the functional imperative of military security over liberal democratic values, so did many other countries.

Per Huntington's (1957) theory, professionalism is conceptually tied to civilian control over the military. Indeed, Huntington's main research problem was how to ensure civilian control over the military, all while keeping a strong military. His answer to that question of ensuring civilian control was ensuring a perpetually modernized professional army constituted of "managers of violence" (p. 11) who direct their arms outwards in defense of the state and society against external threats. The professional army is not assigned the role of the defense of a particular government or regime.

Not All Kinds of "Civilian Control" Were Created Equal: Subjective and Objective Civilian Control

In delineating the definition of civilian control over the military, Huntington (1957) profoundly distinguished between two types: subjective and objective civilian control. For him, objective civilian control was "the minimization of military power through the maximization of the civilian power" (p. 80). In democracies, Huntington argued, this translates into carving out a sphere of military autonomy while maintaining the supremacy of civilian political authority, whereas subjective civilian control ushers in a skewed type of civilian control over the military. This can end up politicizing what should be an independent institution and creating a loyalist military, one that protects the regime at the expense of state and society. Because subjective civilian control is "identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups" (Huntington, 1957, p. 84), it makes the military, rather than an arm of the state, an arm of the civilian ruling regime, executing their political, economic, or national security directives without

sufficient regard for the state and society. Huntington drew attention to the subjective mechanisms of control as taking place in “undemocratic circumstances [to] maximize civilian power by politicizing the military and binding them and their interests to those of the civilian regime” (Cottey et. al, 2002 p. 33).

Objective civilian control, by contrast, requires a clear separation of responsibilities between civil and military sectors, according to Huntington (1957), with the military having an autonomous and professional area of responsibility. This way, the military’s political neutrality becomes institutionalized and internalized as part of its professional code. In this respect, objective civilian control can be attained by “militarizing the military and making it the tool of the state” (p. 83) and rendering the armed forces “politically sterile and neutral” (p. 84). Objective civilian control accordingly is the opposite of subjective civilian control, where in the latter, the army becomes the tool of transient civilian governments or a long-lasting civilian authoritarian regime, as in currently the case of the Turkish Armed Forces under Erdoğan, for example (Maziad, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Özkan, 2018).

What is Military Corporateness?

Key attributes of any given profession are its expert knowledge, duties, and corporate ethos, defined above as the needs of a given professional group to perform their job. These needs emphasize their sense of belonging to that profession (Huntington, 1957, p. 8). Huntington’s use of military corporateness refers to the shared professional ties among soldiers related to the nature of their performed job and their acquired sense of group belonging (p. 8-10). In Huntington’s delineation of the military profession, military officers have three aspects to their job responsibility: to serve as representatives of their professional interests, to advise on military affairs, and to execute military strategy. In this respect, their role is to present the political

authority with professionally needed parameters for military security, to counsel on national security affairs, and apply the decision made by the political leadership, even at times of disagreement with those decisions (Huntington, 1957, p. 72).

Huntington's (1957) theoretical framework is crucial to understanding civil–military relations. Yet he seems to ignore the situation when the military's very professionalism and corporate sense of mission could push the officers to intervene in politics. In response, Civcik (2015) wrote speaking of the Turkish context, “As a more professional army becomes the major expert on security issues and as security-related issues also have political aspects, [the military] could play a certain role in such political decisions” (p. 20). In other words, a military monopoly over expert knowledge of security issues can engender military disdain for civilian political strategic advisors, whom the military leadership deems too radically different in their understanding of national policy. This situation can create disequilibrium in civil–military relations and can even usher the military into politics, directly or indirectly, as in the case of Turkey between 1960 and 2007.

Janowitz (1960), like Huntington, perceived the civilian and military worlds as different from one another. While Huntington theorized about ways to control the difference, Janowitz advanced a theory that diminishes the difference. Janowitz took the viewpoint that a separation between the military and civilian authorities should be avoided. By contrast to what Huntington proposed, Janowitz's view was that the military should be much more integrated in society. Janowitz saw the role of the professional soldier as becoming “inevitably more political” in the modern world (Cottey et. al, 2002, p. 33). Accordingly, the civic participation of both soldiers and civilians alongside one another, not their separation, can achieve civilian control.

Within the Cold War circumstance Janowitz (1960) predicted the transformation of the

military into a “constabulary force” (p. 418), which would engage in limited global wars. The military establishment develops into “a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418). This constabulary circumstance renders the armed forces on constant call, and, therefore, the borders between war and peace erode. Under these circumstances, “the military derives its inspiring power more from the idea of the police officer rather than the warrior” (Feaver, 1996, p. 164). Janowitz emphasized, however, that the realm of the military must remain external threats not domestic affairs.

According to Janowitz, the military and the civilian political authorities share overlapping functions and expertise with one another (Owens, 2011, p. 25). That makes the officer corps become conscious of as well as educated about political affairs. Yet Janowitz (1960) qualified this awareness by recommending that military leaders be “above politics” (p. 233), referring to officers being unpoliticized and uninvolved in petty political competition with civilian factions. In this respect the merger of the military’s professional ethos and the democratic political culture could be achieved. That merger could institute for civilian control through laws and regulations, without compromising liberalism (Janowitz, 1960, p. 3). This is a major contrast to Huntington, who warned that societal liberal democratic values could potentially impair military security. In the 1950s and 1960s Turkey, Egypt, and Israel would prove classic cases of Janowitz’s model of military-in-society integration. In fact, he named them as illustrative cases in his book *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (1964).

First, their respective militaries played a foundational role in building state capacity and shaping the future of their nations. Second and more specifically, Janowitz’s model could readily be applied to the Turkish, Egyptian, and Israeli contexts because of their army conscription.

There is hardly any separation of the military from society in the three cases, as their respective youths spend between 1–3 years as conscripted soldiers. This is why the three societies have maintained an overall deeply rooted respect for their armed forces. Over the decades, polls in Turkey (Jenkins, 2001, 2007; Michaud-Emin, 2007, pp. 33-34; Rheault, 2007; Sarigil, 2011, p. 274), in Egypt (Lotito, 2018) and in Israel (Hermann et al., 2011, 2012, 2018; Mizrahi, Vigoda-Gadot, & Cohen, 2009; Tiargan-Orr & Eran-Jona, 2015, 2016; Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi, 2010) have consistently shown the military to be the most trusted institution of state and societal institutions. Some scholars argue that high levels of societal trust in the military legitimize military interventions in political crises or in dominating national security policy setting (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006, p. 411). For example, a 2007 Gallup poll in Turkey showed the Turkish military to be the most trusted institution by 81% of the respondents, while the national government scored 56% and the honesty of the elections received 43% of confidence (Rheault, 2007). Trust in the Turkish military deteriorated after the failed coup of 2016. Interestingly, however, there are signs of renewed trust in the military over the current Erdoğan government. For example, a recent Turkish research firm, Kuantum Araştırma, conducted a survey, interviewing more than 1,500 people in 26 of Turkey’s provinces. The results showed that “the most trusted Turkish institution continues to be the military, with almost 70% of respondents expressing confidence in the institution” (Ahval, 2018). The survey findings also show “that while around 50% of Turks trust Erdoğan, nearly 30% of Turks do not trust him at all” (Ahval, 2018).

As for Egypt, even during the 2011 upheaval, polls right after the January 25th uprising showed that 82% of Egyptians trusted the army as institution and 69% expressed their trust in the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) itself (Arab Barometer, 2011). National

Public Radio (NPR) reported at the time that “despite a lower public profile in the past two decades, the Egyptian military is still seen as the most respected, trusted and efficient institution in the country” (Westervelt, 2011). The reason given was “conscription.” Because, of that, the military “is also seen as representative of the nation” (Westerwelt, 2011). These high trust in the Egyptian military continued despite major shortcomings during what became known as the transitional period— prior to the 2012 elections. Yet, critical reporting of the performance of SCAF, both in the Egyptian media and internationally; studies produced by think tanks like Chatham House (Azzam, 2018, p. 2); or NGOs like Human Rights Watch could not discredit “the high levels of public trust and approval [the military] continues to enjoy” as cited in a Carnegie report (Sayigh, 2012, p. 25). Most recent available polls from 2016 show the Egyptians’ trust in the military to be a “great deal” and “quite a lot” more than 85% (Lotito, 2018; Arab Barometer, 2011, 2013, 2016).




Figure 4 Egyptians’ “Great deal of trust” and “Quite a lot of trust” in the armed forces over 85%. Source: <http://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-analysis-tool/>

Equally in Israel, a recent 2018 poll by the Israel Democracy Institute showed that only 34% of the Jewish Israeli public trusts the government; only 30% trusts the legislature; and only 16%

of Jewish Israelis trust the political parties. The army however, continued to be the institution “to garner nearly universal approval” (Sokol, 2018). Almost 90% of Israeli Jews trust the IDF (Hermann et. al, 2018). Some consider it “an approval rating reflecting the centrality of military service in the country” (Sokol, 2018).




Figure 5 The Israeli Democracy Index. The IDF is the most trusted institution in Israel. Source: <https://en.idi.org.il/media/12170/the-israeli-democracy-index-2018.pdf>

The public’s trust in the Turkish, Egyptian, and Israeli militaries is congruent with recent results in Western Europe. There, “trust in the military exceeds trust in other institutions”

according to a 2018 Pew research (Johnson, 2018). Vast majorities in eight Western European countries surveyed by Pew Research Center said they trust the military, ranging from 84% in France to 66% in Spain. A similar survey question asked in the United States showed that 80% of Americans “said they have confidence that the military will act in the best interests of the public” (Johnson, 2018).

While having strong professional armies, the three militaries remained integrated in their respective societies through conscription, which is in line with Janowitz’s model. For example, Michaud-Emin (2007) wrote about Turkey and Israel:

The Turkish military is a very important socializing mechanism, as it is in Israel, and the rite of passage into manhood for both Turkish and Israelis is the mandatory military service... Much of this cultural brainwashing and these socializing mechanisms might explain why Turkish society tenaciously grasps the view that the Turkish military is its most trusted and popular institution (pp. 33-34).

Similarly, in Egypt conscription plays a socially integrative role. Gotowicki (1997) described the Egyptian military service “as an important socialization agent in Egyptian society” (p. 3). He added:

In the military, a new recruit with a traditional background is placed in an egalitarian environment that provides the soldier with the prospect of social mobility through a system of promotion based on merit rather than class/kinship factors.... From a political perspective, he learns of a world beyond his rural agrarian origins and of a larger political self in a national community. This tends to be a politicizing experience providing the soldier with a sense of “civic” identity and loyalty to the state—[beyond] family, village and religion.... Military service provides a soldier with a sense of citizenship,

responsibility, and nationalism -- all especially important in the Middle East where the credibility and legitimacy of a central government usually diminishes rapidly as distance increases from its capital (p. 3).

While public trust in the armed forces in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel has been considerably high over the decades, as the aforementioned polls show, a shift in global socioeconomic trends since the late 1980s resulted in a gradual increase in public and media criticism (Ben-Ari, Rosenhek, & Maman, 2001; Ben-Eliezer, 2003; Ben-Meir, 1995; Cohen, 2001, 2006, 2008; Inbar, 1990; Levy, 2003; Peri, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b Satloff, 1988). But despite often heard claims that the status of the military is dwindling, a comparison of the public's trust in the military and other state institutions shows that the latter's status remains generally high and stable, and outbids any other major institution in the three countries, alike (Ahval, 2018; Doron & Lebel 2003, 2004; Hermann, et al. 2011, 2012, 2018; Lotito, 2018; Shani & Kuchik 2007; Sokol, 2018; Tiargan-Orr & Eran-Jona, 2015; Vigoda Gadot & Mizrahi 2010).

Contrasting Huntington (1957), Finer (1962) said professionalism could have a double-edged impact on military interventions. In one iteration, professionalism can indeed limit military interventions by circumscribing the military officers to their expert roles as professional soldiers. In another iteration, however, professionalism itself could lead to military intervention by heightening the officers' need to dominate foreign policy setting or even internal politics.

Professionalism can engender military intervention, Finer (1962) argued, due to three motives. First, a professional military's loyalty is to the state not to a government or a regime (p. 25). This translates into the military's setting of national interests as its *raison d'être*, which could clash with a given government's articulation of national interest. To the military,

guardianship means that the state's sovereignty and independence rely on them as defenders of borders, and therefore defenders of the physical container called the territorial state, which secures the nation and its citizens (Finer, 1962, p. 22). A second motivation to intervene, according to Finer, is the penchant to safeguard the autonomous foundations of the military, which Finer labeled "military syndicalism" (Finer, 1962, p. 26). This is a similar concept to Huntington's military corporateness. In this respect, the military demands of the civilian politicians the military's self-regulation of managing its professional affairs. If civilians do not understand this need, the military could intervene on behalf of protecting the military profession itself from what it perceives as incompetent and meddling civilians. Finer's third and final observation regarding the way professionalism might heighten the chances of military intervention was that a professional army would not want to be used as a tool to choose one political rival over the other (p. 27). If a given civilian government or regime attempts to politicize the army as its own tool, a professional military could revolt against this imposition by shortsighted civilians. That could cause an actual attempted military intervention in politics or a threat to do so, directly or indirectly.

Finer (1962, p. 28) drew an opposite conclusion from Huntington's (1957) by arguing that professionalism is not what stands in the way of a military's decision to intervene. Rather, he showed that what prevents a military from intervening is whether the military's doctrine includes a belief in civilian supremacy over it, which only happens when the military trusts the competence of civilians. If this trust in competence is ever shaken, the military could very well intervene from the rationale of the guardian of state and society. And in that case professionalism does not prevent intervention, but rather military confidence in its very professionalism, compared to all other intuitions, would usher it right into politics (Finer, 1962, p. 28). This latter

point has to do with societal values and society's reception of the guardian role of the military. For example, Finer explained, "Where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak. Where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope—both in manner and in substance" (p. 21). The history of Turkey is replete with such military interventions against civilian governments that were deemed incompetent and that failed to balance the civil–military relation in that country.

Egypt's military intervention of 2013 against the MB government after only 1 year in power is another case of what Finer described here regarding civilians' incompetence, and attempted politicization of the professional army to become an arm of a given civilian regime, instead of the depoliticized armed forces of the state and society. Israel's army continuing to be perceived as the most trusted institution, especially compared to party politics and the long-term tenure of right wing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is a sign of the indirect power the military holds over Israeli polarized politics.

1970s: Comparative Approaches to Civil–Military Relations

By the 1970s a new comparative direction emerged in the political science literature through the works of A. R. Luckham in his article "A Comparative Typology of Civil–Military Relations" (1971), Bengt Abrahamsson's book *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (1972), Claude Welch and Arthur Smith's *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil–military Relations* (1974) and *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (1976), and Amos Perlmutter's, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (1977). These theories were a continuation of Cold War dynamics written in the West to explain variations between the First, Second, and Third Worlds.

Luckham (1971) explicated the relations between the civilian and military realms by conceptualizing the nature of the boundaries that separate them. In his typology, Luckham delineated three kinds of boundaries between civilian and military spheres (p. 17–18):

- 1) Integral boundaries: These civil–military boundaries are separate and impermeable. They maintain the autonomy of both sides of the civil–military equation.
- 2) Permeated boundaries: These refer to complete merging of roles and responsibilities in integrated organizational structures.
- 3) Fragmented boundaries: These reflect the way a military has separate roles, responsibilities, and goals. However some aspects of these boundaries tend to be integral (i.e., impermeable), whereas others can be more permeated (i.e., permeable).

According to Luckham, what determines the type of boundaries between civilians and the military are the degree of structural demarcation within the military institution, its function, and the intensity of military officers’ cohesion (p. 18). Civil—military relations are changing relations. They can shift from one characterization to another, depending on interactions between the military and civilians, domestically, as well as standardization of professional practices, regionally, and internationally.

Abrahamsson (1972, p. 17), in line with Finer (1962), reasoned that military professionalism produces security experts, who through their autonomy are also likely to view themselves as better managers of a multifaceted social institution. These managerial skills give the officers the confidence that not only are they security specialists but also that their professionalism gives them an edge over other civilian institutions. Abrahamsson’s (1972, p. 13) observations regarding the soldiers’ training, which combines military strategy with political affairs, make him conclude that actual professionalism combined with autonomy creates “a fusion of military

and political roles” rather than separating the military from political arenas. In the case of a coup d’état, it is more difficult for the civilian leadership to stand up to resistance “from a high-professionalized army than a low-professionalized army” because professionalization creates a “politically powerful and highly independent social structure” (Civcik, 2015, p. 26).

Welch and Smith (1974) similarly illustrated that “the most important variables that affect civil–military relations are political participation, civil institutions, military strength, and the institutional boundaries between the armed forces and other groups” (p. 3). Welch and Smith affirmed that when civilian institutions perform badly, the likelihood of a military’s intervention in politics rises. That explained how the democratic, regular, and uninterrupted political participation of a given society cements the legitimacy of the political institutions in their governing role and fortifies the political system as a whole. This in turn and in real practice reduces any chances of military coups. In Welch and Smith’s view, besides the strength of the political institutions there is emphasis on the military’s strength in terms of unity, cohesion, and professionalism. The authors argued that technological advancement, acquisition of equipment, and a sense of corporateness might bolster the military’s mandate to intervene. In this respect, they agreed with Finer (1962) and contrasted to Huntington’s (1957) view that the greater the professionalism and autonomy the more the civilian control (Welch & Smith, 1974, p. 18). Thus, for Welch and Smith, the “voluntary acceptance of the civilian supremacy” is crucial (Civcik, 2015, p. 25).

The military interventions in Turkey between 1960 and 2007 are illustrative of Finer’s (1962), Abrahamsson’s (1972), and Welch and Smith’s (1974, 1976) conceptualizations. Every decade, the Turkish military stepped in or threatened to step in and out of direct and indirect governing roles in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007. From a professional, autonomous, and

security expert position, the Turkish military succeeded in repeated interventions. By contrast, the Egyptian military had been depoliticized and noninterventionist since its 1967 defeat (Abdallah, 1997; Be'eri, 1982, p. 77) and up until 2011 and 2013. For example, various scholars such as Satloff (1988) wrote about "Sadat and the army: subordination" (p. 3). Sadat's policy was one of "relative demilitarization" as it aimed to "politically constrain the armed forces" (p. 3). Having decided, after the 1967 War, that a military battle against Israel was an existential necessity, Sadat "understood the need to foster the professionalization of the Egyptian army" and prepare it for war (Satloff, 1988, p. 6). There are reasons why Sadat emphasized his civilian supremacy over the armed forces from his position of president. These include Sadat's having eye witnessed the struggles of the 1960s, "when the armed forces were too interested in domestic Egyptian politics" (Satloff, 1988, p. 4). For example, the armed forces had pushed for a decision in the Yemen War and that left the forces inadequately prepared "for the contest against Israel" (Satloff, 1988, p. 4).

By the 1973 war, and "through victory, the *raison d'etre* of the armed forces" as ruling elite "lost urgency" (Satloff, 1988, p. 6). Sadat was therefore able to push for his vision of "peace and prosperity" and "to relegate the military to the sidelines of Egyptian politics" (Satloff, 1988, p. 6). For example, whereas former army officers filled many civilian ministries throughout the Nasser years, Sadat replaced them with competent civilian politicians. Roughly 20% of Nasser's ministers were army officers; Sadat cut that percentage to fewer than 5% (Cooper, 1982, p. 208). Mubarak maintained the same trend of relegating the military to the sidelines, all while providing for their professional military capacity-building needs.

By 2013, however, the EAF behaved for the first time similarly to Turkey's history of military interventions. Out of their professional, autonomous, and security expert position as the

most trusted institution and custodian of national security issues, the EAF sided with mass protests against Islamist civilians, who rose to power after the Egyptian uprising of 2011. The military framed the mass protesters' call for early elections against the Islamist regime as a mandate to step in. After giving an ultimatum to all parties to solve the political impasse, the military managed to step in and remove Mohamed Morsi from the presidency. This was the first time the Egyptian military intervened in a very similar fashion to Turkey's history of military interventions, especially in 1960 against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and 1980 against the political violence between the right wing and left wing politicians at the time. Turkey and Egypt in those particular cases were illustrative of the aforementioned authors' models (Finer 1962; Abrahamsson, 1972; Welch & Smith; 1974, 1976), where the militaries received societal support for their interventions because of the military professionalism and competence vis-à-vis civilians' incompetence.

If Huntington's theory rests on the idea that military professionalism precludes military interventions and institutes civilian control, Perlmutter (1977) argued against this interpretation, and was more in line with Finer (1962), Abrahamsson (1972), and Welch and Smith (1974, 1976). Perlmutter emphasized the bureaucratic nature of the soldier's job. As a bureaucrat, the military man becomes a skilled manager (of violence) and a strategist. These added skills, Perlmutter (1977) argued, could possibly open venues for military politicization (p. 2). As the military professionalizes and bureaucratizes, like any other modern state institution, it acquires more managerial abilities. It could also desire further autonomy and more self-regulation of its affairs. Perlmutter (1977, p. 3) argued that increased autonomy actually elicits an interventionist attitude in politics and in policy setting.

Perlmutter (1977) suggested that setting policies and their executions are interrelated realms of politics and military security, and therefore are not separate ones as Huntington said they were. The result is that the connection between the bureaucratic military and the executive branch of government attracts the military toward weighing in on political issues. The bureaucratic structure may even thrust the military overtly into politics through government takeovers in what Perlmutter called “praetorian countries” (Perlmutter, 1977, p. 2), referring to a particular unit in Imperial Rome, but in modern times, a praetorian military dominantly intervenes in the political system and can execute a coup d’état. By contrast, militaries that do not intervene for actual rule are non-praetorian militaries. Finer (1962), however, defined military intervention to include direct rule as well as influence, pressure, removal of a civilian government in order to replace it by another civilian one, or ousting a government to instate military rule. Perlmutter noted that in these praetorian regimes, the military develops as a ruling class. The political leadership primarily emerges from within the military as opposed to coming from other civilian sectors.

Turkey after 1923, Israel after 1948, and Egypt after 1952 all experienced varying degrees of this phenomenon of military praetorianism. Military officers who played a formative role in the foundation of the state continued to play direct or indirect roles in governing, administering, and setting policy directions for their new emerging states. As the theorists above proposed, the officers’ perceptions of their supposedly superior technical and managerial skills propelled them toward political leadership positions. Israel has experienced the political phenomenon of “parachuting officers” where upper echelon military leaders, especially former Chiefs of Staff run for office and win elections. They win due to societal trust in the military above any other state institutions.

From the aforementioned studies, it seems that scholars had thus focused on endogenous domestic factors that affect civil–military relations: primarily political institutions, political culture, and political structures as well as the competence of the civilian political authorities and professionalism and autonomy of the military institutions. In that respect, the external threat perceptions in so far as they influence domestic civil–military relations were not explicated. By contrast, Desch (1999) examined structural elements of external and internal threats to be the independent variables explaining variations in civilian control as an outcome. Desch argued that external threats unify the state and society against external enemies, real or perceived, and as such, they bond the military and the civilians together and thereby boost civilian supremacy. The case of Egypt under Sadat, in preparation for the 1973 War is illustrative of this situation of civilian supremacy in light of external threats and war preparation. Internal threats, however, can result in different outcomes depending on who threatens which target (Desch, 1999, p. 12-13).

Desch broke down the variations among internal threats this way:

1. A societal threat targeting the military and the civilian political establishment could engender a civilian dictatorship supported by a regime-backing loyalist military.
2. A government-generated threat toward the military and society could create conditions to induce a military coup that overthrows one government and replace it with another civilian government.
3. Finally, a government-generated threat toward the military alone, not implicating society per se, is likely to result in an agitated, mobilized, and intervening military that instills military rule if it succeeds in its attempted intervention.

From the typology, Desch (1999) concluded that cases in which the state confronts high-level

external threats and low-level internal threats, its civil–military relations would stabilize toward a civilian supremacy because military security needs to be fulfilled by the military, which will be so focused on this task (its *raison d’être*) as to not engage itself with governing political issues. The second situation Desch designated occurs when a state faces low-level external and high-level internal threats, which could result in military takeovers (Desch, 1999, p. 13-14). Israel is a case of framing matters along high external threats, which maintained formal civilian supremacy (despite the military’s pervasive indirect penetrative role). Turkey, by contrast is a case of various manifestations of all that Desch described in terms of internal threats. Since 1960, internal threats were framed by the Turkish military to have been generated from the various civilian governments.

Critical of Huntington’s (1957) theorization that separates the military from the civilian realm, Schiff (1992, 1995, 2009) devised the concept of *concordance theory* to examine civil–military relations and compared civil–military relations to the post-revolutionary United States, India, Pakistan, Argentina, and Israel. Schiff posited that the United States is distinct in the way its historical, cultural, and societal dynamics instituted a separation between the political and military realm. Accordingly, Schiff (1992) argued that it makes little sense to apply the US model to other countries with different historical, cultural, and social dynamics (p. 8). Actually, she argued that Huntington’s separation theory “does not even apply to the United States in all historical periods” (Owens, 2011, p. 33).

Schiff (1992; 1995) pointed to the necessity of concordance between three partners: military, civilians, and society in order to lessen the likelihood of military intervention in domestic politics. Concordance is achieved through the deliberations and discussions over military affairs that allow military professionals to fully express their viewpoints and for civilians to listen to

military expertise, and to honestly communicate to society real threats without exaggerations, but without ignoring real threats for ideological dispositions, either. Concordance theory showed that a concordant relationship between the three sides “might involve separations but does not require it” (Schiff, 1992, p. 32).

Kamrava (2000) examined how Middle East political leaders have instilled military professionalization while guarding the existing political system against military coups. This concept is known as *coup-proofing*. Kamrava characterized the dilemma of civilian leaders regarding military professionalization. As the political leadership seeks to modernize and upgrade the military’s weaponry, it risks giving the military too much power. As civilian authorities advance the military’s professional training, and increase their technology, the military officers might start feeling superior to other civilians. And while the political leadership safeguards meritocracy and formalizes recruitment, promotions, and demotions to ensure military combat-readiness and effectiveness, all of this military professional development could also boost the military’s corporateness (Huntington, 1957) and syndicalism (Finer, 1962). Military corporateness, in turn, could lead military officers to organize for greater political roles and economic shares. Along with that, appear Finer’s, Abrahamsson’s and Perlmutter’s caveats regarding the military’s political aspirations, based on the officers’ technical advancement and autonomy.

Presenting a civil-military relations model on the Middle East Kamrava (2000) analyzed four types of Middle East political systems that differently addressed the dilemma of keeping strong militaries while maintaining civilian supremacy. His model included:

- 1) Military democracies (pp. 70-75);
- 2) Autocratic officer-politicians (pp. 76-79);

- 3) Oil monarchies of the Gulf, whose small military forces are partly manned by commissioned foreign officers (pp. 80-84); and
- 4) The “civic myth monarchies” of Jordan and Morocco, where large, conscription- based armies enjoy a certain level of corporate autonomy, and higher officers enjoy moderate privileges in exchange for their loyalty to the civilian monarchical regime (pp. 90-91).

Kamrava (2000) labeled Israel and Turkey under the first type: military democracies (p. 70-75). This type of political system has democratic institutions, yet the military has great privileges; maintains autonomy from formal political civilian control; and exercises major political influence along with high public support. The second type of “autocratic officer-politicians” occurs when the civilianized political leadership has a military background (pp. 76-79). According to Kamrava’s (2000) analysis, this group included Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, and other Republics in the Arab Middle East. Among these countries, however, are those that established military forces based on regime-oriented ideology (Kamrava, 2000, pp. 82-85). The last two types concern regional monarchies, be it oil rich or not.

But the typology has completely transformed since 2000. For this reason, I argue that Egypt stands out among these Arab cases as a different category. Also, what escaped Kamrava’s categorization even back in 2000 is that the Egyptian military, as opposed to all the other Arab cases listed above, did not become a regime-loyalist military. Since the 1967 defeat, the EAF was no longer the ruling class. At the latter years of Nasser’s rule and especially with subsequent presidents Sadat and Mubarak, the politicization of the armed forces was overcome (Satloff, 1988). Sadat and Mubarak skillfully balanced the sensitive equation of professionalizing and modernizing the Egyptian military while depoliticizing it; all while satisfying its basic professional corporate needs well enough. This was achieved without rendering it a regimist

military. In retrospect, this is actual objective civilian control, the kind that militarizes the military without rendering it a regimist military.

The test came in 2011, during the Arab uprisings. States like Egypt, where the military was professional and not an arm of a regime, did not fire at the protesters (Lutterbeck, 2011). Countries where the militaries were not professionalized, but were rather ethnocized into factionalist cliques loyal to the regime, as the case of Syria (McLauchlin, 2010), sided with the regime against the internationally-funded armed rebels (Albrecht, 2015, p. 39).

Alarming, the Turkish Armed Forces under Erdoğan are incrementally changing into regimist-loyalist forces. For example, in a 2015 fieldwork interview with Former Chief of Staff Iker Başbuğ, he stated to me that promotions and demotions depend on the level of loyalty to Erdoğan's regime (Maziad, 2016b). Başbuğ had been arrested in 2012, tried in civilian trials of military personnel, and was sentenced in August 2013 to life imprisonment on charges of planning a military coup in 2008 in what was known as the Ergenekon case. He was later released along with a group of army commanders in March 2014, on the basis of "fabricated evidence" (Toksabay, 2014, para. 7).

In our conversation, Başbuğ told me that he "worried about the disintegration of the Turkish army and its slipping into non-professionalism, as promotions are made to loyalists of the regime." He added, "all competent leaders were overthrown already" (Maziad, 2016b). When I probed him about who rose upwards in the military, at the time, he told me that the whole process was some kind of politicization of army loyalists to be advanced to commanding positions. And that the army no longer includes militarily qualified leaders (as in professionally and technically). This situation incrementally erodes the Turkish military's professionalism. He feared that the "Turkish military is no longer as combat-ready, as coherent, or as capable of

fighting [as it historically used to be].” And he emphasized to me that “the anger in the middle and lower military ranks was worsening.” This was the signal for me to analyze that mutiny within the army was possible, or rather expected to happen. I read the 2016 failed attempted coup in light of this politicization of the TAF into loyalists and non-loyalists (Maziad, 2016b).

Equally alarming, Israel is also witnessing a theocratization turn in its military (Levy, 2011; Peri, 2006b). This also affects the military professionalism and potential civilian control if Israeli governments were to ever change from right wing to left wing or centrist. At this point an increasingly theocratized army might not obey the commands of a new civilian (liberal) government. In short, the three cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel have changed drastically since Kamrava’s typology in the year 2000. New realities regarding new regional threat perceptions for each case change their civil–military relations. For that reason, Turkey and Israel are no longer “military democracies,” and Egypt has not uniformly been locked in a simplistic “autocratic officer-politician” category. Israel and Turkey are exhibiting signs of long-term civilian theocratic authoritarianism under Netanyahu and Erdoğan, while Egypt under Abdel Fatah el-Sisi is exhibiting concerns about external threat perceptions, emanating from an ideologically pan-Islamist regionally expansionist Turkey. In response to that external threat perception, the Egyptian case is showing signs of statist militarization and societal militarism. Accordingly, the three cases are currently shifting and morphing from one of Kamrava’s (2000) categories to the other.

As for the degrees of separation or integration among the military, the civilian politicians, and society, in Sarigil’s (2011) typology of militaries, there are four categories that vary with high and low societal integration and how such integration corresponds to variation along a high or low political role for the military.

1. Low societal integration and low political role = a professional army.
2. High societal integration and low political role = a nation's army.
3. Low societal integration and high political role = a predatory praetorian army.
4. High societal integration and high political role = a popular praetorian army.

Table 1 A Fourfold Military Typology (Sarigil, 2011)

		Societal Integration	
		Low	High
Political Role	Low	Q1 Professional	Q2 Nation's Army
	High	Q3 Predatory Praetorian	Q4 Popular Praetorian

Figure 6 Sarigil's Fourfold Military Typology. Source (Sarigil, 2011)

The United States is a case of a professional army. *Predatory praetorian* applies to the military regimes of 1970s Latin America. In contrast, *popular praetorian* militaries periodically interject into civilian politics, depending on the assessment of military security emergencies. According to Abd Rabou (2016), the Turkish and Egyptian militaries can be categorized as popular praetorian because of the kind of direct intervention or indirect political influence that they have demonstrated. Israel's military may be categorized somewhere between a nation's army with high societal integration and low political role and also a popular praetorian army, just like Egypt and Turkey, with high societal integration and a high political role (Peri, 1983a, 1983b).

Popular praetorian militaries see themselves as “guardians of the survival and stability of the

political regime” (Sarigil, 2011, p. 269). Solving political impasses or settling disputes rather than installing military rule motivate military interventions in these cases. Accordingly, a popular praetorian or guardian military has less political penetration, social control, or repression than a predatory praetorian or ruler military. In the guardian popular praetorian type, the military occupies a behind-the-scenes role instead of exercising direct political power. A popular praetorian military also receives high societal trust and is backed by large segments of society, who might even invite a military intervention into politics to play a rescuer role for the state in cases of political crises.

According to Perlmutter (1969, 1978), Israel is a non-praetorian state, and with Sarigil’s quadrants, it could be a nation’s army and not a popular praetorian state. Peri (1983a) disagreed, and Bein (1986, p. 132) wrote that Perlmutter addressed the military’s role in Israeli society without accurately characterizing its praetorian nature. In his critique, Bein asserted that Israel’s scholars, speaking to western audiences, have generally shown “Israel as a miraculous exception to the pattern of high involvement of the military in politics in newly established states.” In such authors’ views (Perlmutter, 1969, 1978, 1985; Safran, 1963, 1969, 1981), despite the perpetual state of war since Israel’s establishment in 1948, “the IDF has been a professional, apolitical army, completely under the control of civilian political authorities” (Bein, 1986, p. 132). Bein, however, emphasized that such a characterization belies common sense and that a great deal of evidence is now readily available of contrary depictions of the Israeli army as being more political than previously assumed. Peri (1983) offered this kind of updated reading of the Israeli military’s political role. His analysis of several instances of Israeli civil–military relations all led him to conclude that there has been a trend of constantly increasing involvement of the military in politics since 1948. Peri pointed to two factors that have problematized Israeli civil–

military relations: (a) the role of the IDF as an occupation force since 1967, and (b) the expansive entrance of “parachuting” former senior military officers onto civilian political positions starting with the mid–1960s.

While Egypt and Turkey have been routinely called out as “Popular Pretorian” militaries (Kamrava, 2008; Sarigil, 2009, 2011; Abd Rabou 2016), Israel has not classically been categorized, as such, in the works of Perlmutter (1968, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1985) and other earlier authors. With the work of Peri analyzing the Israeli case, it seems that Israel indeed has much more in common with the other two Middle Eastern cases in this study than the existing typologies in the literature have had us believe. In this dissertation, I build on Peri’s analysis and bring the Israeli case closer to the other two cases. I delineate how the Middle East as a dynamic regional order, and the perpetually morphing threat perceptions within that regional order as a whole, influence civil–military relations across the cases, often times in a series of convergences followed by divergences, but all in interaction with one another and not in isolation as “miraculously” different or distinct cases.

Combining Views

Among all aforementioned theories, two strands appear to be salient: theories that emphasize separation between the military sphere and the civilian sphere and those that emphasize the need for concordance between the military, the civilian authorities, and citizens (Abd Rabou, 2016, p. 11). Combining both outlooks, Croissant and Kuehn (2010) offered a theoretical framework to analyze civil–military relations in democratizing countries. They examined morphing civil–military relations from a separation standpoint without ignoring myriad structural elements and situational circumstances that necessitate integration and concordance between the military and civilians. These elements and circumstances also include the impact of external actors in the

international arena. The authors regarded society as a structural factor influencing civil–military relations. Moreover, they argued that different aspects of civilian control could be exercised through five decision-making areas of civil–military relations. The question becomes who, civilians or the military establishment, decide on:

- 1) Elite recruitment;
- 2) Public policy setting;
- 3) Internal security;
- 4) National defense; and
- 5) Military organization.

Croissant and Kuehn’s approach illustrated that the standing of civilian authorities standing on the continuum of political power distribution between civilians and the military depends on the outcome of both groups’ competition over who will dominate those aforementioned areas of decision-making (Abd Rabou, 2016, p. 11). Thus, the level of civilian control in democratizing countries depends on the civilian authorities’ willingness and capacity to devise strategies that put in place trusted institutions that can limit the need for military intervention. Croissant and Kuehn’s (2010) recommended strategies for civilian control. These included:

- 1) Appeasement,
- 2) Monitoring,
- 3) Ascriptive selection of armed forces personnel,
- 4) Political socialization of the military to accept civilian control,
- 5) Rewarding compliance and
- 6) Punishing non-compliance.

The first strategy refers to appeasing the military through satisfying their professional needs

for modernization programs of weapons, technology, facilities, increased salaries, and so on. The second strategy concerns civilians' monitoring of any subversive activities within the armed forces and combating them. The third strategy addresses promotions and demotions of the armed forces personnel, including shuffling people in posts and avoiding the creation of power centers. This, however, could quickly turn into bad advice if the armed forces promotions started to depend on regime loyalty tests. The fourth strategy relates to political socialization of the military into belief in the long-term viability of civilian control, for the de-politicization and integrity of the armed forces themselves. The fifth strategy highlights rewards to those who internalize the importance and the practical functionality of civilian control and the sixth strategy emphasizes punishment of those who act against these values.

The primary merit of this approach of evaluating the level of military interventionism in politics is that it does not undermine the citizenry or the society at large. Rather, it views them as among the structural factors that influence civil—military relations. Nor does it ignore exogenous factors, including threat perceptions. Given that the three cases under study have less separation and more integration of their armed forces in the state and in society, this approach is a useful lens through which to see Turkey, Egypt, and Israel and their strategies of striking a balance in their civil—military relations.

Theories on Civil Military Relations in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel

The aforementioned theories and typologies reflect civil—military relations in general terms. The following sections will address the literature on military interventions in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. For example, touching on Egypt and Turkey together, along with Algeria, Cook (2007) described these countries as military-dominated political systems, exhibiting indirect military

rule, and a strong military influence on political affairs. While acknowledging differences, Cook detected striking similarities in the military officers' role in modern state building and in instituting military political dominance in his three case studies. Gradually, militaries were able to withdraw from politics, recede into their barracks, exclusively focus on military matters, and “conceal their powers behind a facade of pseudo-democratic institutions” (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014, p. 7). The following section looks at civil–military relations literature in each of my three cases, as I highlight their historical similarities, and some of their current divergences.

Civil–Military Relations in Turkey

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) intervened in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, and most recently a failed attempted coup took place in summer 2016. This is a high frequency of interventions. Almost every 10 years the military steps into politics directly or indirectly. Why is that the case? There are few conceptual frameworks to organize our understanding of the Turkish case over time.

Going back to historical roots, Nilüfer Narlı (2000) had drawn attention to Ottoman state–military relations. Narlı explained that Ottoman legacy granted, “the armed forces a preeminent role in society” as well as in the civilian political realm (p. 108). To this point of continuity between the Turkish military's Ottoman historical legacies and the republican era, Kasaba (2008) wrote about the inception of the Turkish Republic in intersection with the Ottoman Empire and not in isolation from it. For example, the 1908 Young Turk Revolution of the Ottoman Empire era occurred when the Young Turks movement restored the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and ushered in multi-party politics under the Ottoman parliament (Zürcher, 2010). Demographically, the Young Turks movement consisted of Ottoman exiles, students, civil servants, and army officers. Kasaba (2008) showed that “the post–1908 period was also marked by the rise of the

military in Ottoman politics, which along with the strong state, would become a key feature of modern Turkey” (p. 4). Kasaba added that despite all wishful thinking for a “clean break” (p. 3) between Ottoman legacies and the republican future, one cannot ignore the fact that the republican leaders were the “products of the Ottoman context; their thoughts, plans and ideology were shaped by it.”

More scholars, such as Hale (1988, 1992, 1994), Harris (1965, 1988), Kasaba (1994) and Güney (2002), equally emphasized this continuity between Ottoman historical legacy and the new Turkish Republic of 1923, including the role of the military in both eras.⁶

Several scholars confirm that the Turkish military has strongly identified with the nation (Birand, 1991; Aydınli, 2009, p. 593; Sarigil, 2012, p. 4). For example, Ret. Gen. Aytac Yalman, commander of the land forces (2002-2004), once said, “The Turkish nation is a military-nation...[the army] is its soul.” In his inaugural ceremony as Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ stated, “The fundamental source of power for a military is the gun. For the Turkish military, however, it is nation’s trust and love for the military” (quoted in Sarigil, 2011, p. 274). The historical popularity of the military among Turkish citizens often led to military interventionism at times of political crises (Jenkins, 2007).

Cizre (1997, 2003, 2004, 2008) addressed the concept of Turkish military *autonomy* up until 2002 and the rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). Contrary to Huntington’s (1957) theorization on the importance of military professionalism in preventing military interventions in politics, Cizre demonstrated, in line with Finer (1962), that in the Turkish case, professionalism

⁶ For a more nuanced analysis of continuities between Ottoman Empire and modern turkey, and how no study on Turkey’s modern history can be isolated from addressing the Ottoman Empire, see Reşat Kasaba “A time and a place for the non-state: social change in the Ottoman Empire during the ‘Long Nineteenth Century,’” in J. Migdal et al., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 207–90.

and its related institutional autonomy have continuously ushered the military into politics.

In her theorizations, Cizre (1993, 1997, 2002, 2003) exposed the areas in which the Turkish Armed Forces practiced their autonomy to include: (a) appointments, promotions, and demotions of senior and junior officers; (b) supervising the writing of military curriculum, military doctrine, and military strategy; (c) controlling military reforms, upgrading, and equipment modernization; and (d) maintaining political independence. Military autonomy eventually resulted in variations of direct and indirect intervention in politics. Cizre (1997, p. 153, 2003, 2004, 2008a, 2008b) attributed this interventionism in Turkey to:

- 1) Historical, cultural, societal dynamics;
- 2) Constitutional-legal prerogatives; and
- 3) Political structural instruments.

In Cizre's analysis (1997, p. 153), however, the Turkish military should not be portrayed as praetorian—to use Perlmutter's (1974, 1978) term—even with the history of repeated military interventions. Rather, Cizre (2004, 2008a, 2008b) argued that the surgical interventions can be viewed as corrective measures to reinstitute a form of democracy, after instances of political violence, especially in the years 1960, 1971 and 1980, and/or re-instill secularism if deemed threatened by political Islamism as in the years 1997 and 2007.

Another author who connects the Turkish military's self-image as guardians of the state to their distrust in the competency of the civilians is Tanel Demirel (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). Demirel (2004a) argued that the level of military distrust in civilians influences their degree of acceptance or rejection of civilian supremacy in matters of governing and national security policy (p. 127). Demirel pointed out that the Turkish military's general attitude regarding civilian supremacy is not one of a straightforward acceptance as would be found in

Western democracies. This view is in agreement with Finer's (1962) points on the question of distrust in civilian political institutions. When civilian political actors lack competence, this correlates with military interventionism in domestic politics. Demirel (2004a), using Huntington's (1957) definition, showed that the nature of civil–military relations is the product of equilibrium of power between the civilian and military sides. In Demirel's assessment, the historical imbalance in Turkish civil–military relations in favor of the military had stemmed from civilians being scared of the military's response to their suggested policies or from civilians' contentment with the military's political role and their acceptance of a status quo of a military-dominated political culture (p. 134).

Civcik (2015) thoroughly compared both Turkey and Israel with four independent variables: historical, cultural, and societal legacies; threat perceptions; legal-constitutional structures; and the strength and ideologies of the political and military leaders in both countries. Before Civcik's dissertation, Turkey and Israel have been paired up in only two short articles. First, as stated above, Kamrava's typology (2000) paired Turkey and Israel in one group of “ostensibly democratic states, in which the state predominates but allows the military to play an important role in domestic politics,” and he called them “military democracies” (p. 70-75). While acknowledging differences from within these two “military democracies” in comparison to other Middle Eastern states' civil–military relations, Kamrava highlighted the similarities between Israel and Turkey. The similarities include a popular support for the army's political influence and the professionalization of the members of these armies, especially when it comes to their relations to other western democracies. Both countries held alliances with the West. Turkey is a member of NATO. Israel has intimate military-to-military relations with the United States.

Second, in a basic comparison of the two countries, Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson (2005) discussed role definitions and role expansion of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces. The authors showed how these processes affected politics in each country. The comparison addressed civil–military relations in Turkey until 1999 and in Israel until 2000. This leaves out significant developments in civil–military relations in both countries to date. For example, Turkey’s previous situation of accepted military political influence has dramatically shifted with the rise of the AKP single-party rule since 2002, and Erdoğan’s monopoly of Turkish politics since 2003. At first, the ruling party legislated a total of nine harmonization laws from 2002 to 2004 to satisfy the European laws and regulations that constitute the European Union *acquis* of the Copenhagen criteria. These reforms of the post-Helsinki era were prematurely celebrated in the civil-military relations literature (Aydınlı, 2009; Aydınlı, Özcan & Akyaz, 2006; Cizre, 2004; Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006; Güney & Karatekelioglu, 2005; Gürsoy, 2011; Heper, 2003, 2005a, 2005b 2011; Heper & Güney, 2000, 2004; Heper & Toktaş, 2003; Jenkins, 2007; Michaud-Emin, 2007; Narlı, 2003; Oguzlu, 2003; Pion-Berlin, 2011; Sarigil, 2011; Satana, 2011).

Moreover, subsequent legislations on civil-military relations passed in a 2010 referendum. Civilianization was perceived as a path toward democratization in Turkey, and toward more congruence and harmony with European countries. However, equating subjective civilian control over the Turkish military with civilianization and jumping to the conclusion that this is democratization proved to be a fallacy in the Turkish case. “The AKP government, having begun the process, did not go further to establish a democratic form of state, but instead manufactured a civilian authoritarian state” (Akça, 2016, p. 89). Even worse, incrementally, “Erdoğan changed the Turkish military from a powerful guardian of the state and society to a loyalist army to his

own regime” (Maziad, 2016a) that has become a regional threat to his Middle East neighbors. Thus, scholars eventually came to the conclusion that Erdoğan’s “so-called democratization project is rather a project of replacing military tutelage with a neoliberal authoritarian regime” (Akça et. al, 2014, p. 3; Akça, 2010a, 2014).

Elsewhere, I argued that a political turn of attempting to create “a regimist army” has already begun since 2013 (Maziad, 2016b). This later intensified with the purges following the failed attempted coup of 2016. In a series of columns for Egyptian independent newspaper *Almasry Alyoum* (Maziad, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c), I argued that the attempted coup itself was expected as “an ‘agitation’ within the army in the form of an internal ‘revolt’” (Maziad, 2016b). I explained that the mutiny from within came as a reaction to a newly created ideological army, intended to serve “as a loyalist arm to Erdoğan’s regime” (Maziad, 2016c). The Turkish army ideologically changed from a republican Kemalist guardian of the secular state to one where followers of the Islamist Clerk Fethullah Gülen movement (Aras & Caha, 2003) and the pro-Erdoğan factions competed (Ünay & Dilek, 2016, p. 207). Eventually, Erdoğan broke his ties with his former ally Gülen, and aimed to promote his own loyalists in the Turkish army (Maziad, 2016a). The Turkish army stands since 2016 as a politicized arm of Erdoğan’s regime (Maziad, 2016c).

An explicit call under the title “Don’t Turn The Turkish Army Into A Political Tool” came two years after my earlier published remarks in *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper, to echo the same concerns. In the title of a Foreign Affairs article, Özgür Özkan (2018) wrote about Erdoğan’s proposed “reforms” of military affairs:

Critics are concerned that these reforms only politicize the military and seek to transform it into a partisan force loyal to the president. Over the past two years, there have been numerous allegations that political affiliation, ideology, and personal ties matter more than

merit — especially in recruitment practices, officer promotions and assignments, and in awarding defense contracts.

Indeed, I was among those early critics. My argument, two years prior (Maziad, 2016a) was that a “mobilization within the army” could take the form of “army mutiny or rebellion, as a reaction to Erdoğan’s very authoritarianism and preferential treatment in promotions within the military he wants to control” (Maziad, 2016b). So, in terms of forecasting potential agitations or mutiny within the Turkish army, at all, we find that Huntington’s (1957) distinctions between objective and subjective civilian control have proven helpful. The benefits of the former and the adverse repercussions of the latter are distinct. They are not one and the same. And thus, my argument was that Erdoğan’s subjective civilian control over the Turkish military meant that “democracy is far from consolidation in Erdoğan’s emerging regime, which is now taking shape and actually calcifying” thereby transforming “Turkey from a *state* to a *regime*” (Maziad, 2016c).

Echoing similar ideas, Özkan (2018) later emphasized, “Many are concerned that Erdoğan may use this opportunity to transform the military into a guardian force for his one-man regime.” He continued, “Erdoğan’s patronage over the high command, his ties with the defense industry, and his unusual militarist attitude since 2015, which has included appearances in camouflage drill uniforms and frequent visits to military bases, have only intensified these concerns” (Özkan, 2018). Indeed, since 2016 these concerns have been intensifying among the majority of Turkey observers.

My own explanation, however, is that the current set of problematic civil-military relations in Turkey are not exclusively domestic affairs. By contrast, I argue that Turkey’s troubled civil-military relations are at least partly caused, by the regional circumstance; namely the current

animosity between Turkey and Egypt (Maziad, 2019, pp. 114-116). The animosity stems from Erdoğan's and his former Minister of Foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision for the region. Since 2005, they have enacted a regionally hegemonic pan-Islamist foreign policy (Özkan, 2014). Ultimately, however, Turkey's regionally expansionist foreign policies failed. Erdoğan's exaggerated support for the Muslim Brotherhood collapsed in Egypt by 2013. That is when "the Muslim Brotherhood's internationalism backfired domestically" (Maziad, 2013, para. 16).

More specifically, Erdoğan's military adventurism into Syria clashed with the Egyptian military's core conceptions of Egyptian national security interests. I mean by Erdoğan's military adventurism, both his logistical support for armed Islamist militant groups and his later decision to involve Turkey's own troops in Syria. Erdoğan's Syria policies between 2011 and 2013, in accordance with the Gulf state of Qatar and with the Muslim Brotherhood 1-year ruling faction in Egypt alarmed the Egyptian armed forces against the Muslim Brotherhood's internationalism (Maziad, 2013, para. 16; Maziad, 2018b, p. 11) at the expense of Egypt's national security (Lesch, 2014, p. 4). To illustrate, on June 15, 2013, still president at the time, Morsi attended a rally "packed with hardline fellow Islamists calling for holy war in Syria" (Saleh & Perry, 2013, para. 1). A Reuters report stated in its headline that "Morsi role at Syria rally seen as tipping point for Egypt army" (Saleh & Perry, 2013). This rally was the ultimate pre-cursor to the mass protests of June 30 and the military intervention on July 3 (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 1; Lesch 2014, p. 4). Morsi sat while Islamists rallied for "Opening the door for Jihad in Syria" uttering this jihad word verbatim. Morsi vowed to "commit the Egyptian youth, the Egyptian people and the Egyptian army" to the cause (Hassaan, 2013). "Sending civilians to Syria to train in carrying arms and the art of war, thereafter returning to Egypt" (El-Hodeiby, 2013, para. 24) alarmed many Egyptian journalists and public intellectuals, who took to twitter or commented to

international media. Some of them warned: “It is clear that Morsi aims to appease the jihadists in Egypt, hoping they would support him against the expected mass protests called for by the opposition on June 30 at the anniversary of his election” (Sky News Arabia, 2013). This policy direction toward Syria was in line with Erdoğan’s pan-Islamist vision (Özkan, 2014).

For the Egyptian army, however, Egyptian and International analysts interpreted the Syria rally to have crossed “a national security red line” (Saleh & Perry, 2013, para. 10). The army was on high alert when Morsi encouraged “Egyptians to fight abroad, risking creating a new generation of jihadists” Reuters report stated (Saleh & Perry, 2013, para. 10). At the core of the military’s concerns was militant Islam. A military source told Reuters that the army “condemned recent remarks made by ‘retired terrorists’ allied to Morsi, who has deepened his ties with the once-armed group al-Gamaa al-Islamiya” (Saleh & Perry, 2013, para. 11).

In Turkey, observers stated that after the 2016 failed attempted coup, “civil-military relations reached a new level as the officer corps deposited most power into the hands of the government, such as the case of Syria, where the government has a great deal of influence” (El-Amraoui & Edroos, 2018). This is significant; Erdoğan started calling all the shots regarding the Syria military adventurism, absent any objections from within the Turkish military leadership. Turkey policy in Syria directly clashed with Egypt’s national security interests and was eventually resisted and foiled by Egypt’s military. That is how Turkey became perceived as the primary threat to Egypt. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt started to only be seen as local agents to regional projects. Moreover, the Morsi regime had been striking deals with Turkey and Qatar regarding the development the Suez Canal region, in an exclusive manner of Egyptian military (Hauslohner, 2014).

The Suez Canal is one of the militaries most prized land holdings. The Egyptian military

responded to the Muslim Brotherhood's internationalist alliances with Qatar and Turkey by fostering its proximity to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The regional resistance eventually kept at bay the Turkey-Qatar alliance vis-à-vis Syria. For example, Turkey and Qatar's financial and logistical support of armed militant Islamists in Syria recruited youth from Tunisia, instead of Egypt (Weinberg, 2014a, 2014b). Eventually all this kind of support for transnationally funded mercenary jihadists in Syria that started, in 2012, by Qatar's "call to arm the rebels" under to Obama administration (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2012), and continued as Qatar avowed it "will help Syrian rebels even if Trump ends U.S. role" (Maclean & Finn, 2016) came to a halt by 2018, following the formal Arab Quartet Boycott of Qatar in 2017 and the Trump administration's pressures on Qatar's terrorism financing networks (Maziad, 2019, pp. 120-122).

In short, Erdoğan's civilian expansionist pan-Islamism is the reversed mirror image of Sisi's militarized defensive statism. Turkey and Egypt are key regional players who split the Arab Gulf States and Israel between their respective regional foreign policies. Egypt gained the support of UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel while Turkey maintained a hold over Qatar's pro-Islamism foreign policy. Turkey and Egypt's respective civil-military relations are not exclusively domestic affairs because they currently perceive one another as major regional threats. And that in turn affect their international ties with Europe and the US.

Civil-Military Relations in Egypt

Amid seminal books on Egypt, a primary work is Anouar Abdel-Malek's (1968) *Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*. Abdel-Malek (1968, 1974a, 1974b) showed how in 1952 the military started to play a role in Egyptian political and economic life, as an institution and a new community of elites. Socially, absent a clearly unified and dominant middle class ideology, the military revolutionaries were able to replace a formerly

agrarian aristocracy. Politically, an increasingly illegitimate monarchy, weak political parties, and an independence struggle against British occupation gave the military revolutionary leaders a national mandate. “Both socially and politically, the new leaders saw themselves, and were seen, as the only cohesive group capable of setting Egypt on the right course” (Harb, 2003 p. 276).

The Egyptian military revolution in 1952 also had far-reaching regional repercussions touching the entire Middle East. Known as the “colonels coup,” Nasser and the Free Officers became typical examples of subsequent young officers’ military interventions (McDermott, 1988, p. 1). Military interventions took place in Iraq (1958, 1963, 1968), Syria (1963, 1970), Yemen (1962), Turkey (1960) and Libya (1969) (Cleveland, 2004, pp. 295-307, 314-317, 333-335). Moreover, a form of military dominance over national security policy took place in Israel, during the military decision to go to pre-emptive war, threatening a military coup unless the political leadership approves the war plans in 1967 (Peri, 2006a; Bowen, 2017). In Israel, “the generals were furious when the cabinet agreed on 28 May to wait two weeks.” They rejected the postponement. For the Israeli military leaders, the 1967 war “was about much more than the Straits of Tiran,” which had been closed to Israeli navigation. “What mattered was the big picture. Nasser was uniting the entire Arab world against them” (Bowen, 2017). Unsurprisingly, former Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, around the same age and of the same generation as Nasser and Sadat, was a reason that inspired and mobilized the younger ranks in the Israeli army officers, as they demanded his promotion to Minister of Defense on the eve of the war. Against US warnings, Israel fired the first shot on Egypt the next day on June 5. These series of direct and indirect political interventions throughout the 1950s and 1960s illustrated the prominence of Middle Eastern militaries and initiated intense debates among political scientists and Middle Eastern scholars.

Two interrelated debates ensued: (a) what conditions elicited such intervention and (b) whether interventions could stand for positive change (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014). During the 1950s and 1960s, several influential scholars considered the military to be a positive force for change and modernization in Middle Eastern politics (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014). Halpern (1963) argued that military professionals would stand as modernization agents of the newly liberated Middle East countries. He made the case that in Egypt, the officer corps represented key elements of the “New Middle Class,” which could stand for progressive social, economic, and political advancement (Halpern, 1963, p. 52).

Other scholars such as Vatikiotis (1961, 1968) and Shils (1962) offered related assertions, both advocating the military’s capacity as a vanguard of progress. This mirrored the authors’ acceptance of modernization theory, which prevailed in academic debates from the 1950s well into the 1970s. All these scholars perceived the armed forces to be best positioned to spearhead essential industrialization thanks “to their organizational capacity and national commitment ascribed to their higher officers (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014, pp. 4-5).”

Later Eric Nordlinger (1977, pp. 22-27) provided a typology of three types of military regimes: the “ruler,” “moderator,” and “guardian” regimes. These correspond to Amos Perlmutter’s (1977) two categories: ruler and arbitrator. Egypt between 1952 and 1967 could be considered a military ruler regime, but not since 1967. Nordlinger posited that the military’s political interventionist actions are often primarily motivated by their own corporate interests, rather than by a more generalized sense of national security threats. The case of the 1960 coup in Turkey can fall under this category of corporate interests. However, as mentioned above, military corporateness per Huntington’s (1957) term, or military syndicalism per Finer’s (1962) do not necessarily have negative connotations. They are basic requirements of a given profession

to maintain its professional needs.

In Egypt, Satloff (1988), Abdallah (1988, 1990 pp. 12-13) Harb (2003, pp. 269-270), and Kandil (2016) illustrated how following the military defeat of 1967 by Israel, first Nasser and, more important, Sadat exercised civilian control strategies, The military was sidelined in preparation for the 1973 War to return Israel-occupied Sinai (Satloff, 1988, p. 6; Harb, 2003, pp. 269-270). After 1973 War, the relationship of the armed forces to the political leadership turned into “an actual subordination of the armed forces to the civilianized leadership in the office of the Egyptian presidency and the person of the president” (Harb, 2003, p. 287). As Brooks (1998, p. 24) reports, citing her communication with a US Military analyst, the Egyptian military is on board accepting a political subordination and actually remaining out of politics, as long as its professional needs are met through its own economic autonomy and that its 100% self-sufficiency is achieved. This military economic self-sufficiency allowed for military withdrawal from politics from the 1970s–2013.

It can be concluded that by the late 1980s, the topic of the role of the military in Egypt was dropped from scholarly debates because it was becoming a non-topic following civilianization under Sadat (Barak & David, 2010, pp. 806-807). Since the late 1990s, however, scholars have attempted to address the lack of democratization and the prevalence of authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East. Bellin (2004) illustrated how this phenomenon has been tackled in earlier scholarship, as she sought alternative explanations for this trend. Scholarship on Egyptian civil–military relations lagged far behind the times. Authoritarianism, Egypt’s autocratic rule, and military-civil relations would only be examined after Mubarak had stayed in power for three decades. Now, however, the word *authoritarianism* is not reserved only for the Arab countries of the Middle East. Two characters, Erdoğan of Turkey and Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, have

been increasingly described as authoritarians, despite their reliance on procedural democratic processes. Using Mubarak-like extensions of their rule, one term a time, the Turkish and Israeli leaders, however, have pitched themselves as the single viable alternatives.

In the coming chapters, I will demonstrate that the political science literature has separated Egypt from the Middle East as whole. Grouping Egypt exclusively with Arab and Muslim countries creates a false disconnection from other non-Arab regional rivals such as Turkey and Israel. These two countries have actually changed in their civil–military relations to the extent that they are currently converging with Egypt in ways not reflected in the literature thus far. As both Israel and Turkey converge, however, on an authoritarian or ideologically religious turn (Peri, 2006b), Egypt itself is heading toward a secularist-nationalist-militarism akin to the initial spot where Turkey and Israel had once been, in the 1970s, 1980s, and up till the early 2000s.

Referencing Lutterbeck (2015, p. 11–12), Arafat (2017) wrote “There are currently no Middle Eastern countries qualifying as military ruler regimes, where the military directly and openly controls political decision-making” (p. 38). Instead, policymaking in most Middle East countries “is left to governments, which are nowadays largely civilianized arbitrator regimes” (p. 38). However, the “armed forces remain key actors in overseeing the political process from behind the scenes” (p. 38). At times of state existential threats, however, or when incompetent civilians assault core corporate interests of the military institution, “the military is likely to seize direct control of the political decision making” (Arafat, 2017, p. 38).

To qualify Arafat’s analysis above, however, it should be noted that in 2011 and 2013, when the Egyptian state faced a potential existential threat, the Egyptian Armed Forces sided with the popular mass protests. In 2011, a non-regimist professional military sided with the people, who ousted 30-year authoritarian president Mubarak. In 2013, the armed forces equally sided with the

mass protesters, who ousted the 1-year Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. On both occasions, the armed forces held a calculative wait-and-see attitude and allowed a political process to take place among the political rivals. When street protesters reached a critical mass on both counts, the armed forces sided with the Egyptian people. The military assumed a transitional role on both occasions, derived from the people's resistance to both the Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood regimes. Hence, instead of "seizing direct control of the political decision-making," the EAF played an arbitrator role over the political parties in 2011, and morphed into the guardian role by 2013. For example, "the notion held by both the military and Egyptian society regarding the military's 'guardian role' is not insignificant in this context" (Arafat, 2017, p. 38). The military sees itself and is perceived by most Egyptians as the protector of the nation. "The idea that Egypt as a state is in danger looms large in the discourse of the military" (Azzam, 2012, p. 2). The military's guardian role has provided the military unmistakable popularity. For example, in the days prior to Mubarak's stepping down, the military received wide, popular support, while the public rejected other elements of the regime (Brashear et al., 2012, pp. 21–25). After June 30th 2013, the Egyptian state emphasized that it "faces a war led by extremist forces" (Al Jazeera English, 2013). "Many Egyptians seem to concur, considering that for the first time since January 25, they've actually committed to the curfew for their own safety" (Maziad, 2013).

The Egyptian military did not play a role in politics until 2011. By then, it entered politics in a moderator capacity, following the January 25 uprising against Mubarak's long tenure of thirty years. At this juncture, the military served as arbitrator between various political groups eager to politically participate, until the election of Mohamed Morsi on June 30th June 2012.

By June 30th 2013, exactly one year later, the Egyptian Armed Forces re-intervened, by then, in a guardian capacity. The military did that in support of another popular uprising against the

Muslim Brotherhood regime. The military was constitutionally assuming this guardian role for the first time. The military's "Guardian Role" was written in the 2012 constitution for the first time. Ironically, this was approved by a Muslim Brotherhood dominated parliament. By then the Egyptian military was emulating some of Turkish military's history and legacies, but in customized ways. A number of Egyptian scholars, journalists, and political analysts engaged in their writings with the comparison between Turkey's 1960 and 1980 interventions and Egypt's contemporary moment (El-Shobaky 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; El-Komy, 2011; Maziad 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). In fact a seminar was organized, in 2012, by the National Center for Translation to discuss the Turkish constitution, which was recently translated by the Center. The invited guests included First Woman Constitutional Judge Tahani Al-Gibali, Turkey Scholar and Almasry Alyoum Columnist Amr Al-Shobaky, the Turkish Ambassador in Egypt, and other Egyptian ambassadors and public intellectuals. El-Gibaly rejected the notion of imposing the experience of any country during the writing of the constitution saying, "There is a grave danger in imitating the constitution of any country. As we build our constitutional legitimacy, Egypt is capable of read the experiences of others and adopting its own vision." She further emphasized, "If Egypt is not the guarantor of building its own constitutional legitimacy, I think that this would be a defect that may call for protests by the Egyptian people, once again, to express their indignation" (El-Komy, 2012).

Civilian intellectuals in that seminar agreed that the Turkish experience could serve as a reference of civil-military relations, as well as the development of political Islam but that it could never be copied. That said, however, indeed the "guardian role" of the armed forces that had existed in the Turkish constitution since 1961 and 1980 amendments, was copied for the first time in Egypt, in the 2012 constitution. Based on that very constitutional license, approved by

the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament in 2012, and adopted by popular referendum, the military could constitutionally intervene on July 3, 2013 after an impasse was reached between the Islamist regime of Mohamed Morsi and the protesters on June 30. As theorists had linked public trust and the degree of support for a professional army's intervention at times of political crises, Egypt proved to be another example that lends support to earlier theorizations about Turkey and other cases (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006, p. 411). Figures below are on public trust in the military institution in 2011 and 2016.




Figure 7 Trust in the Egyptian Military compared to other institutions 2011.
 Source: Carnegie <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77610>




Figure 8 Trust in the Egyptian Military compared to other institutions 2016.
 Source: Carnegie <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77610>

Finally, regarding military penetration into the Egyptian economy, besides military-owned companies that are formally part of the National Service Products Organization (NSPO), a number of retired generals run state-owned companies from within the Egyptian public sector. Critics see that as a form of “militarization” of the Egyptian state and the economy (Abul-Magd, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2017). According to Springborg (1989, 2017) and Abul-Magd (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2017), military economic interests have negatively affected the Egyptian market

economy. These authors also argued that military's protection of its economic share also delayed the military's response to deliberations on economic reforms. I argue against these views, as clearly Egypt's civilian private sector, not the military-run companies or the state-owned public sector, were dominant in the last 20 years before the 2011 protests against Mubarak than these authors accounted for. In fact, the monopolistic practices of particular civilian crony capitalists like steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz were the illustrative examples of most of the economic grievances of the 2011 protests. The Egyptians were against Mubarak's civilian son Gamal Mubarak and his clique of civilian businessmen, who dominated the ruling National Democratic Party as a civilian new guard.

If anything, the military economic share was a balancing act to those monopolistic practices of a few monopolistic civilian crony capitalists. Moreover, authors like Springborg (2011, 2017) and Abul-Magd (2017) have exaggerated the military's economic share, without sufficient contextualization within the regional comparative cases of Turkey and Israel. Finally, Springborg and Abul-Magd seem to have contradicted themselves repeatedly when they first argued that the military assumes an overwhelming share of the economy, but then emphasized that civilian private businessmen have benefited greatly from close cooperation with the army, as private entrepreneurs have been awarded lucrative contracts with the army and benefited strongly from technology sharing. So does this mean the military assumed a huge share in the economy or actually cooperated with civilian business actors, and the latter thrived in a market economy? The latter is indeed what actually took place between the mid-1990s and 2011.

It is only by that juncture of 2011 and more so by 2013, and not before, that the military started to re-assert itself as an economic player. This re-assertion itself has to be understood from within an internationally replicated trend of economic nationalism, and not an exclusively

Egyptian civil-military relations phenomenon.

Finally, emphasizing the Middle East region at large, I build on Civcik's (2015) comparative theoretical framework of Israel and Turkey, and add Egypt. This is the first study of a systematic comparison of these three key players within the Middle East as a dynamic regional order. Like Turkey and Israel, Egypt's military shares the same popular support. Members of its armed forces have been depoliticized and professionalized since 1967, yet the military has played an economic role and remained an important factor in regional and international politics. Egypt equally established relations with the West. For example, along with Israel, they are the highest recipients of US military aid. Striking new weapon procurement deals with European countries, particularly France and Germany, Egypt has also carefully crafted new relations with Russia, since 2015 as it acquired new Russian military equipment. Egypt has recently created new political- economic realities in the Middle East, to which both Turkey and Israel have been responding. With special attention to threat perception, I show the fluctuating and incomplete processes of civilianization-to-militarization trends within the three cases, and the Middle East as a whole. In doing so, I focus on the economic dimension of civil-military relations, as it relates to defense economics in a high-threat perception region. In the next section, I look at the economic map of each case.

Civil-Military Relations in Israel

The literature on civil-military relations offers different explanations regarding the relationship between the Israeli military and the state and society. There are three streams within the literature: the traditionalist approach, the critical approach, and the new critical approach. Traditionalist thinkers like Horowitz (1977, 1982), Eisenstadt (1967), and Perlmutter (1968, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1985) believed civilian control has been decidedly embedded

since the inception of the Israeli state in 1948. Therefore, outright military coups have never threatened Israel's political system, those authors argued. For example, Israel's pre-state political parties' militias were all put under the new state's control. While no one official can do that, David Ben-Gurion, from his civilian position as first prime minister, exercised what Max Weber would define as a state monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. In doing so, Ben-Gurion insisted that pre-state communal defense forces, the Haganah, Palmach, and Irgun, be absorbed into the IDF. More dramatically, in June 1948, Ben-Gurion ordered the Palmach forces to sink a ship called *Altalena*. The ship had brought arms from Europe to be delivered to the Irgun. The Altalena Affair ended in the dissolution of the Irgun. Eventually, Ben-Gurion also dissolved the Palmach force from within the IDF. Ben-Gurion feared the Palmach was becoming too politicized as an arm of one of the competing political parties (Mapam versus Mapai).

Scholars often cite the aforementioned incidents as evidence for the political leadership's civilian control over the military, since the establishment of the Israeli state (Maman & Lissak, 1996). This traditionalist approach categorizes civil–military relations in Israel as primarily balanced, and quite different from other regional and post-WWII newly independent post-colonial countries of the south. Israel is perceived as rather a successful anomaly in its alleged civil–military relations equilibrium (Perlmutter, 1968, 1969, 1974, 1978).

Other scholars, however, belonging to the critical approach of analyzing Israeli civil–military relations, looked beyond those historical events, and interpreted them as sheer pretenses of civilian control over the military. The realities of civil–military relations in Israel are more complex, they argued. Writing against the grain, Peri (1983) explicitly denied that Israel has ever had balanced civil–military relations. Until Peri's writing, the literature had more or less refrained from portraying Israel as either a garrison state, where technically-advanced military

officers dominate politics thanks to their self-ascribed expertise in management (Laswell, 1941), or a praetorian one where military officers outright rule because they can (Perlmutter, 1968, 1977, 1978). Peri, by contrast, considered Israel's civil–military relations to be far from settled, unlike those in supposed democratic or developed countries. More recent work, also belonging to the critical approach, such as Schiff's (1992, 1995, 2009) concordance theory, underscores the way the Israeli state and society exhibit obvious “uncivil” and rather militaristic characteristics. According to Schiff, civil–military relations in Israel defy any classically assumed “separation” (Huntington, 1957) between the civilian and military realms in Western democracies. Her theory states that, concordance, as in agreement, between the political elite, the military, and society on “the role and function of the military” is fostered “without reliance on civilian institutional control” (Schiff, 2009, p. 111). Thus, instead of institutional civilian control, concordance is the mechanism by which the military has actually permeated the state and society in Israel. Such convergence among the three elements of state, military, and society, however, perpetuates state militarization and societal militarism.

But what do militarization and militarism mean? And what forms do they take?

Militarization does not simply refer to a country's military power or fighting capacity. Rather, it refers to the extent to which military affairs dominate state expenditures and its percentage of GDP compared to civilian affairs, such as, for example, the number of physicians per capita. As for the definition of *militarism*, it includes the predominance, at the societal level, of the military class or its ideals, the exaltation of military virtues and morals, and the policy of aggressive military preparedness (Militarism, n.d.).

While I agree with the characterization of Israel as a militarized state and a militaristic society, the shortcoming of this lens, however, is that it looks at domestic state-military-society

relations within Israel alone, without sufficient consideration of regional similarities of other players, particularly Egypt, who represented the main rival to Israel for at least the first 30 years of Israel's inception as a state. That is to say, both Israel and Egypt and not only Israel, have exhibited what Schiff (1995, 2009) seemed to state as a matter-of-fact concordance between the military, political elite, and society. I add that Egypt equally engaged in the self-same militaristic and militarized practices as Israel yet has often been singled out as if Egyptians were under military rule, thereby ignoring Egypt's own concordance among its political leadership, the military, and society, for the purpose of military security against external threats.

By comparing the two cases, along with Turkey, Israel is revealed as yet another regional case of problematic civil–military relations, not, an isolated case or some sort of special and exclusively justified anomaly in its own militarization and militarism. The concordance theory, therefore, while applicable to Israel, should have been expanded to Israel's neighboring countries that have been operating from within one regional order of mutual rivalry and threat perceptions for long decades before converging on shared practices following subsequent phases of peace. As it stood at first, Schiff's application of concordance theory in Israel, as it binds the political elite, society, and the military into agreed-upon ways to behave and function, did not take into consideration the largely similar, comparative context in which the Israeli military operates and performs its primary function of national defense. Israel operates within the regional order of the Middle East, indeed, and therefore influences it and is influenced by it. Hence, I argue that what happens in Israel, in terms of threat perceptions, degrees of militarism and militarization, and the way all of these factors economically manifest in variations of military budget and defense expenditure, defense industries, and a civilian-product military economic role is a regional supra-condition that has been applied in Israel, Egypt and Turkey, as much as elsewhere in the region.

This critique brings us to what the literature also produced as a new critical approach, illustrated by the work of contributors in Sheffer and Barak's (2010) *Militarism and Israeli Society*. The various authors of the edited volume argued that classic civil–military relations theories are insufficient when it comes to understanding the Israeli case because classic civil–military relations theories do not grasp the realities of smaller democratic or democratizing countries that deal (or have dealt) with real or imagined “continuous existential threats” (p. 3). In such cases, state militarization and societal militarism become products of constant anxiety about the very existence of the state as a political construct. This anxiety, manufactured or real, has affected, in turn, the domestic configuration of state-military-society relations in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East. However, state militarization and societal militarism have not been uniform over the past near century since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of independent states, starting with the Turkish Republic in 1923. Moreover, since the 2011 regional uprisings, including socio-economic protests in Israel, criticism currently voiced within Israel regarding “exaggerated threat perceptions, completely far-fetched military budgets,” and the military's economic behavior, “like a sacred tycoon institution that cannot be touched,” are signs of burgeoning societal resistance to Israeli militarism, in light of economic inequalities within Israel and the Middle East region at large (Interview with Israeli Journalist, 2015).

2.2 DEFENSE ECONOMICS

For Perlmutter (1977), the highly professionalized military of a praetorian regime may function as a ruling class and behave as a political elite. In that respect, a praetorian military could become oppressive (Abd-Rabou, 2016). According to Perlmutter, the military's motivation under these circumstances is usually its own corporate interests, meaning institutional needs for the

military profession, which sometimes negatively connotes the institution's corporate self-interests and survival at the expense of other sectors of the state and society. For Huntington (1957), and Finer (1962), however, military corporateness and military syndicalism can be seen as positive attributes of professionalism and dedication to the core task of military security. Therefore, the term "corporate interests" should not be uniformly read negatively, as if to mean exclusively focusing on the political or financial interests of the military officers, without regards for national military security. But what about the military's financial interests indeed? Defense economics is a field of study that looks at the economic aspects of defense policies. It examines the military's economic share and economic role. McGuire (1995) defined defense economics as follows:

Defense economics derives from and is embedded in the multi-dimensional array of issues each country must address when providing for its national security. Applying economic concepts and methods, it attempts to evaluate this great diversity of security related questions, and to understand how each country's security interacts and fits in with the security of all nations in the international system. Included in Defense Economics are such overarching questions as: definition of what security actually is; how resource scarcity, distribution, and stage of economic development influences the security obtainable by each nation in the international system; relationships between defense sectors and national economies within and across countries; efficiency in provision of security; incentive structures which promote or resolve conflict; institutional arrangements which promote or retard peace, stability, and equity. (p. 1)

The three cases under study engaged with defense economics in order to provide for their defense needs. This took place within a larger (civilian) economic circumstance for each country

and its economic strength or weakness. However, the three countries and the Middle East region as a whole went through phases that were globally experienced. All these domestic, regional, and global economic circumstances affected their defense economics and the way each country provided for their defense needs over time in a high-threat perception region. Below is a sketch of the economic phases of each country in the present study and the way the military economic share or economic activities fit in some of these phases.

Economic Sketch of Turkey

Scholars on Turkish history, military, and political economy (Esmer, 1999; Karpas, 1959, 1975, 1988; Karaman & Pamuk 2013; Pamuk, 1981, 2012; Kasaba, 1993, 2008; Keyder, 1987, 2004; Heper, 1988, 1991, 1996; Zürcher, 1997; Hale, 1992, 1993, 2000; Önis, 1997, 2007, 2011; Tuğal, 2002, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2013, 2014, 2016; Jenkins, 2006; Ahmad, 1988, 1993; Quatert, 1979) divided Turkey's economic history into the following phases:

1. **1923–1929:** The Turkish economy was open to the rest of the world. Economic policies emphasized private accumulation of capital.
2. **1930–1945:** Statist economic policies emphasized state capital accumulation in a period of global crises. This is known as statism or etatism. This is not the same as import substitution industrialization (ISI), which ranged from the late 1940s–1970s. In fact, from the 1930s onwards, Turkey's general economic history is narrated in terms of an “export-oriented bourgeoisie” as a key actor in the power bloc of the time, “albeit a subordinated actor until the 1980s” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 36).
3. **1950–1960:** Multi-party competitive elections brought into power the Democrat Party (DP) and its leader Adnan Menderes as prime minister after decades of single-party rule under the Republican Party. The decade-long DP government experienced three types of

failures or misfortunes: economic failure due to inflation and a foreign exchange crisis, domestic political clashes as Menderes's encouragement of a religious conservative ideological direction was resisted by the old secular Turkish republican elite, and regional Middle East foreign policy debacles regarding regional security pacts that were resisted primarily by Egypt. The combination of these challenges and crises culminated in a military intervention by the young colonels of the Turkish Armed Forces. This started out in the vein of the Egyptian Free Officers' own military intervention. As this was coined at the time as a typical "Colonel Coup" (McDermott, 1988, p. 1). Soon after however, the military generals purged the radicals and re-aligned the armed forces into market economy through the creation of the OYAK, as an armed forces pension fund, whose companies invest in the market economy, along with other private capitalists.

Economically, the pre-coup DP government experimented with supporting rural agricultural development at the expense of urban industrialization. There was an economic rivalry between the urban Istanbul industrialist elites and the rural Anatolian agricultural rising middle class (Pamuk, 1981). The DP government opened the economy to a new rising rural middle class from the Anatolia region, whose economic activities relied on agricultural exports. The DP economic policies geared toward cultivating new lands, thanks to favorable weather conditions and the increased demand for primary products during the Korean War, which maintained large volumes of Turkish wheat exports. This kept the support for Democrat Party policies for three to four years (Pamuk, 1981, p. 21). But by the mid-1950s, the decline in world market demand for raw materials and the decline in agricultural production in Turkey, due to harsh weather conditions, caused an unfortunate massive crop failure in 1954. This produced a foreign

exchange crisis, which necessitated a stabilization program and de facto currency devaluation. The Turkish economy took a hit given this crop failure crisis. Krueger (1974) wrote:

There can be little doubt that the government's cereals policy was responsible for much of the initial inflationary pressure experiences within the Turkish economy. The large import surplus in the years 1951 to 1953 and the rapid increases in agricultural output offset much of the inflationary pressure and there were relatively small rates of price increases. With the first crop failure in 1954, however, the effects of [Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (TMO)—Soil Products Office] and their financing were immediately felt (p. 44).

TMO had been organized as a state enterprise in 1938 and responsible for price intervention in wheat and other cereals, and the sole importer and exporter of cereals for Turkey. At this particular juncture of crop failure in 1954, it became clear that a mode of capital accumulation, strongly emphasizing agricultural output could not be relied upon in Turkey. Under these circumstances, import substitution industrialization led by the bourgeoisie represented the only means of resuming the capital accumulation process and expanding the Turkish economy (Pamuk, 1981, p. 21).

Ideologically, Menderes's veering away from Ataturk's foundations of statist secularism toward more religious conservative sensibilities created tension with the old republican elite. Eventually, large landowners and big traders were first to invest their capital to industry and take advantage of the opportunities offered by import substitution policies. Pamuk concludes that import substitution industrialization, now led by private capital, did not emerge as the result of a shift of power between different fractions of

capital and redefined priorities by the Democrat Party administration. Rather it was an ad-hoc response to the constraints and pressures imposed by the foreign exchange crisis of the mid-1950s, which the DP administration policies caused in the first place.

Finally, in terms of regional foreign policy, Menderes clashed with Nasser in Egypt over the former's regionally hyperactive foreign policy into the Middle East on behalf of his Western allies (Abou-el-Fadl, 2019, p. 3). "When Democrat party came to power in 1950 they re-embarked Turkey's engagement in the Middle Eastern politics. Their idea was to set up a kind of Arab-NATO under Turkey's leadership" (Bilgin, 2017, p. 245). Adnan Menderes took it upon himself to advocate for the Baghdad Pact that was to unite the countries of the Middle East against communism. While the Baghdad Pact was not a result of a DP initiative to conquer the Arab World, Menderes assumed the role of a regional broker for the Baghdad Pact in 1955 on behalf of the West. The pact was a part of new US foreign policy design where regional organizations such as BP (later Central Treaty Organization CENTO) were supposed to provide security and help contain the USSR. The established scholarship and broad consensus about Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War emphasize that (Hale, 2000; Harris, 1975). However, at the regional level itself, the clash between Nasser's visions and Menderes' actions played out in ways that foiled the Baghdad Pact and similar such pacts altogether.

Turkey's threat perceptions under Menderes were aligned with Western anti-communist fears of the time. For instance, The Baghdad Pact was to include Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and the rest of the Arab countries as a military defense pact against any Soviet Union communist expansionism into the Middle East region. While not a communist himself, Egypt's Nasser stood diametrically opposed to any such military alliances with

the West, given the circumstance of recent independence from the British (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, pp. 3-4; Sadat, 1978, pp. 126-129; 136-139). Nasser's refusal to join the pact, framed him as a potential communist threat in the eyes of Menderes and Britain. Eventually, the Baghdad Pact failed to recruit the support of sufficient Arab countries. In response, a year later in 1956, Menderes supported the tripartite aggression of Britain, France, and Israel over Egypt's Suez Canal. That position during the Suez Crisis sealed the enmity between Nasser and Menderes. The 1950s, accordingly, were a time of antagonistic rivalry between Nasser of Egypt and Menderes of Turkey and their regional foreign policy toward the rest of the Middle East countries. For example, Meral (2014, para. 3, 4) wrote about the history of Turkish-Egyptian relations. He reflects on this episode of the 1950s as follows:

Turkish foreign policy, particularly its engagement with Iraq and its Western orientation, regularly brought both countries into collision as Nasser pursued his ambitious regional projects: Turkey's support for the British in the Suez Crisis attracted Nasser's anger, for example, while Nasser's stances on Cyprus and Syria caused serious concern in Ankara. Interestingly, it was the Democratic Party government of Adnan Menderes—a religious-conservative Prime Minister who was hanged following a military coup and who serves as a frequent reference point for Erdoğan—that pushed for more Turkish engagement with the countries of the Middle East following decades of Turkish disengagement. Turkey's feeble attempts to unite and lead the Middle East clashed with the foreign policy efforts of Nasser's Egypt, and it was only after the 1960 military coup that ousted the Menderes government that Egypt and Turkey began a normalization process.

In the end, the economic, ideological, and regional foreign policy crises of the DP government triggered the military intervention against structural and unexpected failures in Menderes' policy directions.

4. **1960–1971:** A period of state-led industrialization based on import substituting protectionism. As the colonels intervened and ousted the DP government, a significant economic outcome of this military intervention was the creation of the OYAK pension fund in 1961. The fund had an ambiguous combination of public and private designations. Companies owned by the armed forces would be market players. The companies' profits would directly be distributed to the military officers in the form of retirement supplements and/or loans during the years of active duty. With OYAK, the Turkish military became an influential economic player.
5. **1971–1980:** This decade started with a military intervention in 1971 that changed the civilian government. Tuğal (2016) conceptualized the 1970s as a period of transition to neoliberalism in the context of an Islamic economically liberalized Middle East (p. 243). Regarding Turkey, Tuğal argued that a “passive revolution” began in the 1980s in reaction to the post–1968 leftist movements, the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution and, later, the Kurdish insurgency (p. 25). In this respect, Turkey's “passive revolution” sought to bypass the secular corporatist regime of both the big private industrialist businesses, such as that of Koç, Sabancı, and other big conglomerates, as well as that of the military's OYAK, via a “passive mobilization of potentially subversive groups through political society” (p. 26).

This decade also ended with another military intervention and actual military rule for three years before elections resumed. The 1980 coup ushered in a period of economic

liberalization and export-oriented industrialization. Also, these are years of high inflation. The subsequent economic outcome was an opening of the Turkish economy to liberal trade in goods, services, and financial market transactions.

6. **1981–2001**, Since the 1980s, neoliberal economic policies have led the state to channel most of its resources to the repayment of the national debt and interest on loans. Remaining public resources were not spent on new investments or social welfare but were poured into military and domestic security spending. The military, as opposed to the civilian police, played a role in domestic security of the restive Kurdish region and the armed militias that formed there. The Kurdish insurgency became a significant feature of Turkey's defense economics in the 1980s. Export-oriented capitalists became important partners in the ruling class.

Why did a capitalist class become a dominant actor in Turkey's power bloc since the 1930s to begin with; how did their relative power transform over time, and how did state-business relations shift in the 1980s, the 1990s and, more significantly, after Turkey's 2001 economic crisis? Özden et al. (2018) argue that we cannot understand Turkey's economy without understanding the two capitalist factions: the secular big business urbanite industrialists and the pious small and medium size Anatolian capitalists. The concept of big business being organized under the Western-oriented, secularist Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSAİD) cannot be completely separated from "the medium-scale pious bourgeoisie who played a crucial role in the constitution of the AKP" and its rise to power by 2002. The fact is since the 1930s onwards, there have been "export-oriented groups on either side." The main conflict among Turkey's various capitalists, however, has been between each side's export-oriented groups: "the medium-

scale, export-oriented groups, which have been financially dependent on outward-oriented big capital and who have continuously complained about the monopoly power of TÜSİAD groups over finance” (Özden et al., 2018, p. 241). These issues of big business versus small businesses and the question of finance influenced the conflicts between Turkey’s capitalist factions since the 1990s, which directly or indirectly influenced and, from time to time, determined internal relations within Turkey’s power bloc.

Following the financial liberalization decision of 1989, the turn to a financial accumulation model generated successive and deepening economic crises. Manufacturing investment gradually decreased, inflation hit record highs, and the economy suffered from large foreign trade and budget deficits. At the same time, brief periods of economic growth between crises depended chiefly on domestic consumption, not on exports, as predicted by market reformers. In-deed, the economy followed the direction of foreign financial capital flows, which stimulated a vicious cycle of capital inflows and financial excess that ended with successive deep-seated crises, among which the February 2001 financial crash was the most devastating (Aybar & Lapavistas, 2001). In response to the unsustainability of this capital accumulation regime, flagship companies of Turkish industry gradually became critical of the inadequacies of successive weak coalition governments in implementing a second wave of neoliberal reforms. However, the governing parties’ reluctance to introduce reforms actually reflected deeper cracks within the power bloc before the 2001 crisis.

Social, political, and economic transformation after 1980 and the organic crisis of the 1990s are the period that is believed to have led to the political rise of the AKP. Neoliberal restructuring triggered the dynamics of the crisis in diverse areas, which

culminated in an organic crisis during the 1990s. The 1990s was much more than “a mismanagement that ultimately led to the financial meltdown of 2001” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 53). Instead the 1990s need to be analyzed in detail in order to correctly locate the AKP’s role within the passive revolution (Özden et. al, 2018, p. 243–244). The crisis of accumulation and heightened conflict within the power bloc together with an inability to produce broad-based popular consent were the sources of the protracted hegemonic crisis of the 1990s (Aybar & Lapavistas, 2001). The most important conflict among the capital fractions in terms of its role in the rise of the AKP and the success of the passive revolution was the one between medium-scale, Islamic-conservative, Anatolian capital and Istanbul-based, Western-oriented, secularist, big capital. The export-oriented industrialization of the post–1980 period, based on reducing labor costs and engaging in global production chains, accelerated the capital accumulation of the former fraction of the capitalist class. Yet, monopolization of access to financial resources by Turkey’s big capital groups had long been the main hindrance for this fraction since the 1960s. “The financialization of the Turkish economy” (Özden et. al, 2018, p. 244) further burdened the financial resources needed by the small and medium-scale manufacturing bourgeoisie, of which the pious capitalists were part. Industrialization based on flexible labor relations and decreasing wages could not compensate as successive economic crises led to the devastating collapse of the Turkish economy in 2001 (Doğan & Durak, 2014).

7. **2002–Present:** According to Tuğal (2016, pp. 88–90, 92–93) Turkey’s “power bloc” under the AKP combines the “export-oriented businessmen, religious intellectuals, and the state elite . . . politicians from the now failed center-right parties, the liberal (less rigidly secularist, more pro-American and less authoritarian) wing of the military, as well

as center-rightists in the secular media” (p. 88). The power bloc also included some leftists, liberals, and the Gülen community, (p. 88, 93), up until the Gezi Park protests of 2013 and the attempted military coup of 2016, respectively. That is “how the AKP has managed to build a hegemonic strategy”(Özden et al., 2018, p. 242). In Özden et al.’s analysis, Turkey’s big bourgeoisie and its global partners were, indeed, integral to the institutionalization of capitalist accumulation strategies post the 2001 financial crisis. The big bourgeoisie were not absent, but rather “profoundly active in the redesign of the politico-administrative structure of the state and political society” (p. 242). The pious bourgeoisie whose capital accumulation needs could not be achieved within the parameters of the pre-cursor to the AKP namely the Islamist Welfare Party’s Just Economic Order and its “moral capitalism idealism” was a fundamental actor in the emergence of the AKP (p. 242). Gradually, the pious bourgeoisie became ideologically and politically powerful within the power bloc—a powerful position they enjoy to date. But one that could be challenged in the near future, given the economic decline Turkey is experiencing, due to regional distrust in its hegemonic and expansionist pan-Islamist foreign policy (Özkan, 2014).

Economic Sketch of Egypt

Authors on Egyptian history, military, and political economy, Vatikiotis (1961, 1968, 1978), Anwar Abdel Malek (1968, 1974a, 1974b), Waterbury (1983), Abul-Magd (2016; 2017), Abd Rabou (2016), and Kandil (2016) showed that Egypt has a rather stable mixed economy (public and private) of average growth between 3–5% over the past quarter-century. The economy witnessed different phases of development during which the public and private sectors alternated in their economic impact as follows:

1. **1923–1952:** This phase witnessed the growth of national industries and private capital. Egyptian national entrepreneur Talaat Harb was a symbol as a national tycoon in banking, insurance, and industry. The political system was a constitutional monarchy with party-politics and a democratically elected parliament. Culturally, anti-British occupation nationalist liberalization political movements and a liberalized economic culture characterized this phase.
2. **1952–1966 Import substitution and nationalization:** Following the Free Officers' mobilization and seizure of power, ending the monarchy and declaring the republic, the first phase of public sector industrialization was established in 1957 under President Gama Abdel Nasser. Focus was on heavy industries such as iron and steel, chemical industries, and heavy machinery. Nationalization of banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies amassed private capital into the public sector. Foreign direct investment was almost banned.
3. **1967–1973: Inter-War period:** This period negatively impacted the economic performance, as military spending had risen up to 34% of GDP in preparation for the 1973 war efforts. Public sector roles in import substitution dwindled as the focus was on war preparation.
4. **1974–1985: *Infitah* (Opening):** Following the 1973 War, Sadat was adamant about peace as a path to economic development. Signing the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979, Sadat's subsequent economic policies encouraged Arab and foreign investment through liberalizing trade and payment incentives. Tourism and textile industries were emphasized as drivers of growth. The economy expanded, but this proved insufficient and growth consequently scaled back. The International Monetary Fund recommended

austerity measures and economic structural adjustments. And by 1977 Sadat's government withheld subsidies on basic goods such as bread and gas. Riots broke out in Cairo. Sadat revoked his measures and returned the government subsidies. These subsidies remained a sensitive issue since. No government could touch subsidy alleviation until the Sisi government in 2016. In light of a slashed budget, following the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the political leadership decided on the policy of self-sufficiency for Egyptian Armed Forces. Not only that, but the political authority under Sadat's presidency assigned the armed forces a developmental role. That was designated as a way of paying back to society after years of defense spending (Nafie, 1987 republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 193; Ahram, 1980; Mitwally, 1987, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 196). The National Service Projects Organization (NSPO) was conceived as a special fund (Sanduq Khass-- sometimes translated as private fund) within the Ministry of Defense. The idea was to have the army play a developmental nation-building role, given that the state-led economic role, previously through the public sector, was already being relegated, thereby opening the way to private capital and a market economy. NSPO was conceived as a recommended income generating, self-sufficiency mechanism in light of reduced military spending after the Peace Treaty with Israel. Similarly, Egypt's NSPO shared some of OYAK's ambiguities, regarding private and public legal designations. However, in contrast to Turkey's OYAK, Egypt's NSPO was not set as a private fund for the retired officers. Instead, NSPO's profits are directly re-invested in the companies that constitute the organization and are used for supplementary weapon procurement.

5. **1985–1990: External Debt Crisis:** The external debt crisis and Paris Club rescheduling and debt reduction occurred.
6. **1991–2007: Economic Reform:** Reform policies were introduced to meet the terms of international institutions, lenders, and donors, including wider incentives for the role of the private sector in all economic activities. That is when the military economic activities further adapted into playing a balancing, anchoring act, between national Egyptian capital and the global capital of multinationals, whose profits never stay in the indigenous economy.
7. **2008–2011: The Post Global Financial Crisis:** Egypt's annual growth rates benefited the rich and failed to trickle down and reduce poverty, which increased to about 50%. Soaring food prices, especially for grains, led to calls for the government to provide more immediate assistance to the population of more than 40% in the "poverty tunnel" and to strike a "new deal" on agriculture policy and reform. Again, the military's self-sufficiency policy of producing its own essentials, especially bread, proved most reliable during the food shortage crisis of 2008. The April 6th Youth Movement was born on that date in 2008 as young grassroots organizers joined forces with worker's strike against the privatization of Al Mahalla textile public sector company, and against the imbalance between income and increase prices. Bread was made available by the army to mitigate the effect of the economic crisis. Egypt faced some adverse repercussions of the global financial crisis on the national economy, yet not too shattering effects, thanks to less, not more, integration in the global economy than had been planned for. By 2011, however, the political and socioeconomic conditions led to the popular uprising on 25 January 2011.

8. **2012–Present: Post-Revolution:** The Egyptian economy is still recovering from the aftermath of the 2011 revolution and the 2013 collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood regime. The Sisi government confronts multiple challenges to restore growth and international investor confidence when the entire region is facing existential threats to state survival itself— as in the case of Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In an increasingly militarized, high-threat perception region, military spending had to proportionately rise as well. Weapon modernization programs and acquisition of new military equipment were made from the military generated income, absent increased allocations to formal military budget, which is kept at \$4.2 billion compared to regional spenders, who reach more than \$15 billion each (World Bank Data, 2019). Egypt survived the regional instability, and ironically, its statist self-sufficiency turn from 2013 to 2019 has paid off given the dire regional circumstances.

Economic Sketch of Israel

Scholarship on Israel's economic history has made it clear that the state played a crucial role in the country's political economy up until the 1973 war. The enormity of needs and the socialist philosophy of the main political party in the founding government coalitions led to extreme government intervention in the economy. Governmental budgets and strong protectionist measures to foster import-substitution industrialization enabled the development of new industries, chief among them textiles. State subsidies were given to help the development of exports in addition to traditional exports of citrus products and cut diamonds. From 1950 until 1965, Israel achieved a high rate of growth: real gross national product grew by an average annual rate of over 11%, and per capita GNP by greater than 6%. Defense spending however

increased to high proportions. The total defense burden (including expenses not in the budget) reached its maximum relative size during and after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, close to 30% of GNP in 1974–1978. In the 2000–2004 period, the defense budget alone reached about 22–25% of the GDP.

Regarding Israel's political economy, seminal publications include Aharoni (1991) *The Israeli Economy: Dreams and Realities*, Ben-Porath (1993) *The State and Capitalism in Israel*, Plessner (1994) *The Political Economy of Israel: from Ideology to Stagnation*; and Shalev (1992), *Labour and Political Economy in Israel*. This is a shared trajectory with both Turkey and Egypt up until the same juncture of the mid-1970s. By 1980, the three countries had converged on more liberalized economics, as the Reagan–Thatcher era was starting to dominate worldwide, dismantling government bureaucracies and deregulating key industries.

More specifically, Shalev (1992) wrote that after 1973, the state lacked the capacity to stop serious economic decline, let alone to increase per capita economic growth. The Israeli state failed to mitigate demands by the middle class, organized labor, and the poor on the one hand and to decrease public sector spending on the other (pp. 261–63). While the pre-1974 state was extremely autonomous, that autonomy was remarkably limited after this date. That is when Israel transformed— like Egypt and Turkey— from a welfare state to a more pro-business government (p. 307). The military, as a state institution, had to adjust, in each of the three cases, to this new economic reality and found ways to survive these radical economic changes through one or more of the three economic resources they could amass (high military budget; prominent defense industries; income-generating civilian enterprises) all while keeping on par with one another in terms of military strength and combat readiness, given the regional circumstance of high threat perception.

The phases show development from state-led to market-led economic cultures in the three cases alike. The current divergence among them is that Egypt is going back to more statist economic nationalism, whereas Turkey is still within a more globally integrated market economy. Turkey is officially in a recession as of 2019, due to what is now called “slobalization,” defined as slow economic growth due to reaching a saturation point of globalization. Israel has maintained a strong security state. But Israel is also experiencing cases of business corruption at the highest level of government, including the indictment case of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The subsequent dissertation chapters will look at how defense economics played out in each case, and more importantly vis-à-vis one another, as the three militaries maintained their status at top strength, regionally, and internationally.

2.3 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK COMPARING AND CONTRASTING TURKEY, EGYPT, AND ISRAEL FROM WITHIN A MIDDLE EAST DYNAMIC REGIONAL ORDER

Military in State and in Society

As an overall framework for this project, I adopt Migdal’s (2001) state-in-society approach, which views society as a “mélange” of social organizations. Through Migdal’s prism, societies are perpetually morphing as a result of incessant struggles over social control. The state is formed by different interests that “[push], [pull], blurring of boundaries and domination by others . . . [in] numerous junctures between . . . [the] state’s diffuse parts and other social organizations” (Migdal et al., 1994, p. 3). Each interaction can build more power for the components implicated; they may cause both to subside in power; or some state actors may join select social groups against other groups. The outcome may be “dispersed or integrated domination” (Migdal et al., 1994, p. 3), contingent on how coherent and territorially dominant

any given major social force is, whether it is the state or other dominant social group. Applying this notion to the military, considered as a state component with rather independent political and economic elements within it, who act as a collective at times or as factions and units at other times would be novel. This would be useful in analyzing how the armed forces ally with other social groups to form coalitions in times of transitions. Such coalitions may also include groups beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, for example, other governments of state allies, or the militaries of other state allies, international businesses, or neighboring regional states.

This means that while the military uses its political and economic influence to affect the state and society, I argue that other components of the state and society equally affect the military institution in unpredictable and unintentional ways. The military does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, there are numerous partners and antagonists, coalitions and resisters, in other state organs and within society who interact with the military (Migdal, 1988). Not a monolith in its own right either, (Provizer, 1978, p. 298), the military is rather composed of hierarchies, tiers, and actors with their own internal logic, calculus of struggles, and share of frustrations that enable or impede them from acting in certain ways in line with or out of line with their institutional interests.

Militaries in a Dynamic Regional Order

After locating the three cases of the Turkish, Egyptian, and Israeli militaries-in-state-and-in-society to analyze the endogenous reasons why they have intervened or withdrawn from politics, I will combine the three cases within the framework of a regional order of Middle East civil-military relations. This is a novel approach and not without difficulties. Traditionally, Turkey and Israel have been paired with Europe and the West. This repairs a disconnection that I find in the literature, which does not consider the Middle East as a whole.

2.4 APPLYING THE DYNAMIC REGIONAL ORDER APPROACH

Based on all these readings of civil–military relations and the three cases of my research design in particular, I focus on why these militaries intervene in politics along the economic dimension as a product of external threat perceptions within the Middle East region. By comparing these three cases as militaries in state and society who experience varying threat perceptions from within a dynamic (as in changing) regional order, I argue, that the regional order affects domestic economic civil–military relations. I conceptualize military intervention in politics to be measured along three dimensions: (a) actual governing as a ruling class, (b) involvement in economic activities and/or receiving a disproportionately big defense budget, and (c) dominance in national security setting. For this dissertation, I focus on the economic dimension and look at how (a) the military budget factors into the state budget, (b) how strong the defense industries are and whether they are dominated by the armed forces or private companies, and (c) to what extent the militaries in these three countries have established civilian-product economic enterprises.

I locate my work within the new critical approach by emphasizing how the Israeli case fits within a contextualized history of broader regional civil–military relations; relations that exhibit shared similarities, for the region as a whole. Mutually perceived threats emerged and continued, then subsided and resurfaced over the past century, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, followed by the State of Israel in 1948 and the newly Independent Egypt of 1952. These critical junctures in the history of these important regional players in turn triggered decades of actions, reactions, and interactions among these three newly independent states, as well as other regional cases in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including the Arab States of the Gulf, and Iran. After years of antagonism and rivalry, however, the primary

cases of this study, namely Turkey, Egypt, and Israel started to resemble each other in their oscillations between two alternatives: civilian long-time ruling authoritarians and/or a return to statist militarization and societal militarism.

The political cultures of the three cases of this study have individually oscillated along a continuum of secularist-nationalist-militarization, on the one hand, and religious-transnational-militancy, on the other hand. In summary, the three militaries all shifted within their own domestic circumstance over the decades since their emergence as independent states. In each case, attributes of the domestic economy varied and changed over decades of regional interactions. Despite the oscillation from state-led economic policies to market economy, back to some societal calls for the return to further welfare state practices, the economic share/role of the military remained integral to the three cases alike. That happened in order for the three countries to keep on par with each other as the strongest regional militaries, where Turkey is rated 1, Egypt 2, and Israel 3 as the strongest militaries in the region. They are also rated 9, 12, and 17 as the strongest armies worldwide, respectively.

2.5 CONCLUSION

By combining these countries in a comparative design, we discover something about regional circumstances. Thus, my theorization is a mid-level analysis of the dynamic regional order of the Middle East as a neighborhood. This conceptualization stands mid-way between single-case studies and the international supra-circumstance surveys.

In the following chapters I will delineate the extent to which economic civil–military relations have been influenced by the three countries’ existence in the same orbit of heightened threat perceptions. Through the examination of primary documents, the consultation of further

secondary literature and drawing upon fieldwork research interviews conducted in the three countries, I will attempt to highlight similarities and illustrate that the three cases of military economic roles have replicated aspects of one another over a period of time.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES: AN ECONOMIC POWER IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the 1950s, frustration within the lower ranks of Turkey's military reached a tipping point. Turkey scholar Feroz Ahmad quotes 1960 coup leader Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, describing the "humiliation" some officers experienced in the run-up to 1960, as being referred to as "lemonaders" who couldn't afford an expensive drink, or shoddy basement living spaces referred to as "staff officer flats" (Ahmad, 1977, p. 288). Civilian Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi) ("DP") had, according to the colonels who ousted him, "drifted from society's values and disparaged the armed forces in the process" (Cook, 2016). Substantial changes to the Turkish socio-economic structure and "the declining position of the officer corps as a social class" caused the agitation and subsequent mobilization of various segments of the military against the Menderes government of the 1950s (Fidel, 1970, p. 19).

After nearly 40 years since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the country experienced its first military coup, which removed the civilian regime and replaced it by a governing military junta, the National Unity Committee (NUC). "It was a coalition of motley factions in the armed forces, all hungry for power" (Ahmad, 1993, p. 126). While military men had founded the Turkish Republic and the armed forces continuously participated both in conceptualizing and executing public policy ever since, the republic had never faced an overt armed forces mutiny, until 1960. Turkey would experience subsequent military interventions, ultimatums, and attempted coups in 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007, and 2016. Why did Turkey experience its first military coup at that 1960 juncture, most specifically? I argue that the adverse

economic conditions of the officer corps at the time, paired up with the regional and international circumstance of what became known as a typical “colonels’ coup” in developing countries (McDermott, 1988, p. 1) set Turkey on the path for that initial military intervention of 1960. Moreover, the legal residues and legacies of that first coup institutionalized for a path toward subsequent ones, in the name of guarding the state and society against the failed policies of civilian governments. In this chapter, I will locate the inception story of the economic share and role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) within this time period of the 1950s. I will then address the current changes taking place in this military economic share and role under the Erdoğan government.

The 1950s were a decade characterized by both out-of-balance domestic civil-military relations under the civilian Menderes government, and problematic, penetrative, and ultimately regionally resisted Turkish foreign policies into the Middle East, conducted on behalf of Turkey’s Western allies. The Turkish civilian government failed both domestically as well as in terms of foreign policy. These two sources of problems, the domestic and the regional failures, led to agitations within the army and its mobilization against the civilian government. Menderes was ousted by the revolting lower ranks of the TAF, in a manner similar to Egypt’s own 1952 Free Officers Movement, across the Mediterranean. Both interventions were called revolutions. Colonels and lower ranks led both. And on the last minute, activist officers sought an army general to be a figurehead leader. General Mohamed Naguib in Egypt and General Cemal Gürsel in Turkey served as the “swing man” (Needler, 1971, p. 101). Ultimately however, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser sidelined General Naguib, and became elected President of Egypt in June 1956, while General Gürsel “proving more astute than Egypt’s General Naguib” prevailed over the Turkish radical young officers (Khanna, 1961, p. 8). Despite this particular detail of

divergence, regarding which faction of the military institution prevailed in each case, the initial similarities, and even the different outcomes in Turkey and Egypt, would continue to date because these outcomes are the products of interactive histories of parallel civil-military relations in the two countries and the Middle East region as a whole. The Turkish 1960 coup was described in the contemporaneous media with vocabulary similar to that of Egypt's 1952 military mobilization: "swift, clean, and bloodless" (Khanna, 1961, p. 8).

In Turkey, regardless of the infighting between the revolutionary and more conservative elements in the TAF, Turkey's "Guardian Role" of the military was carved in the constitution of 1961, and through the National Security Council (NSC) of 1963. The military's Guardian Role remained intact until the 2010 constitutional amendments. Initially sought out as a way of Turkey's harmonization with the European Union, these civil-military relations amendments proved to be little more than an overreach from autocratic Prime Minister-turned-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan onto the military domain, as to weaken the military's grip on state politics and strengthen his own regime. The military's Guardian Role, however, was not only ideologically political, but also economic. Through the establishment of the Armed Forces Pension Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu*) OYAK in 1961, the Turkish military has instated itself as an economic player. OYAK fund would create companies and invest in the civilian economy ever since.

Economically, OYAK was established for two main reasons: First, as a pension fund, OYAK's purpose was to satisfy the lagging behind corporate interests of the officer corps, as a social class that had been economically ignored and relegated under Menderes's government of the 1950s. OYAK was formed to forestall future officer uprising by guaranteeing a secure retirement. In this respect, OYAK was a coup-proofing mechanism that emerged from the 1960

coup itself. Coup proofing is defined “as the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup” (Quinlivan, 1999, 133). These actions include among other tools, financing and appeasing the military monetarily, through weapon modernization programs, as well as improving military personnel’s standard of living. At a very basic level, OYAK’s establishment in 1961 acted as a necessary future coup-proofing mechanism.

Second, as a national capital investor, OYAK was to become and remain an integral part of Turkey’s mixed economy: an economy that fluctuated between state-led capitalism, and market-driven private profits. Accordingly, the second function of OYAK was to integrate the military—as a state institution—and its officer corps, as state employees, into the very market economy that seemed to have put them at a disadvantage during the 1950s. This OYAK model will be a classic case of military economic activities in several other developing countries straddling between various economic models that aim to reconcile state-led development and free market economy (Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003). Egypt, for example, would only follow suit and its military would set its income-generating establishment by 1979 as Egypt, too, changes from state-led economic development to market economy, by the mid-1970s (Shakeeb, 1984 republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, pp. 96-99).

All in all, in terms of the Turkish military’s economic share, since that critical juncture of 1960, the TAF has enjoyed a substantial formal military budget for weapon modernization programs; has established a considerable defense industry that rendered Turkey’s military a considerable player in the country’s economy; and has expanded OYAK from a mere pension fund to a Group that eventually became one of the top three conglomerates in Turkey (Demir, 2010, p. 163). In other words, the military was financially secured as to not cause another 1960-type mutiny. True, subsequent coups and threats of coups did take place in 1971, 1980, 1997 and

2007 but these were for more for ideological and national security reasons, and less so for military economic grievances as the case of 1960. One key reason for coups—economic grievances of military personnel—was eliminated by the establishment of OYAK, the sufficient allocation of military budgets, and the establishment of defense industry dominated by the military officers.

Most recently, however, under pretenses of civilian control, the already existing economic role of the Turkish military is currently being channeled to the advantage of President Erdoğan's own immediate family and their surrounding clique in his nascent regime (Ant, 2018). By that I mean that in the name of "civilian control," Erdoğan has used his power as President to start interfering in the legal structure of OYAK. TAF's economic activities, and military-owned assets are being gradually directed to the benefit of the civilian loyalists of Erdoğan's regime. To use Samuel Huntington (1957) terms, this would be considered the faulty type of subjective civilian control that builds regime-loyalist armies and not the type of objective civilian control that depoliticizes armies enough as to guaranteed their non-intervention, all while maintaining concordance (Schiff, 1995; 2009) among the political echelon, the military, and society. For example, a slow process is taking place where the already carved out defense industry that dates back to the 1960 juncture is being appropriated to the advantage of President Erdoğan's close affiliates (Ahval, 2014). This is done through the sale of public military factories or facilitating their acquisitions under pretenses of "only transferring production rights" and not their full "privatization," according to the Turkish defense minister (Bekdil, 2019). These defense industry assets, however, are transferred into the private hands of close members in the president's ruling party. Something quite similar to Menderes's practices of factionalism, favoritism, and segementalization within the army is being replicated in contemporary Turkey.

Consequently, just as a number of politicized and disenfranchised colonels and lower ranks in their early forties led the 1960 coup against Menderes (Zürcher, 2003, pp. 253-254), likewise, a group of politicized, agitated, and mobilized middle and lower-rank officers performed the 2016 failed attempted coup against Erdoğan's person (Jacoby, 2016, p. 134). The 2016 mutiny was caused by agitations within the armed forces, where anti-Erdoğan officers in favor of his ally-turned-foe Fetuhullah Gülen revolted from within the regime against the Erdoğan factions (Ünay, & Dilek, 2016, p. 205). The fact that a coup was attempted in 2016 to begin with is evidence to ruptures in Turkey's civilian control. More specifically, however, the coup's failure and the ensuing purges within the armed forces are even clearer evidence to Erdoğan's current *subjective* civilian control, which simply creates favoritism and regime loyalists within the armed forces (Maziad, 2016a, 2016b, 2016; Özkan, 2018). For example, at total of 1,684 members of the TAF were suspended and 96 were arrested across the branches (Star, 2016). Hundreds of thousand other bureaucrats were purged from the state apparatus as a whole, in the judiciary, schools, universities, the media, and other state organs. Moreover, private business assets were seized and frozen from suspected Gülen members.

Accordingly, while civilian oversight over the Turkish military's economic role and share has been the recommendation of scholars and activists alike since the mid-2000s (Akça, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2016; Cizre, 2008; Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1997, 2002; Saribrahimoglu, 2007, 2009), the ways in which these recommendations have played out, in practice, have been more than flawed. Hence, Turkey's economic civil-military relations are far from being ideal, at this point, let alone offering a successful model for others to emulate—particularly Egypt whose military economic activities have equally been under attack since the 2011 uprising (Springborg, 2017; Abul-Magd, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016).

The chapter's sections will start by a regional periodization to reflect on some Turkish-Egyptian and Turkish-Israeli interactions that represented changing phases in mutual threat perceptions, since the 1950s. Then, the chapter will map changes in the TAF's economic share since the 1950s in terms of military budget, defense industry, and the military-owned civilian enterprises under OYAK. The sections are intended a) to illustrate how the Turkish military has maintained an economic share, one way or another, since the 1960 coup, thereby propelling regional players, particularly Egypt, to remain just as militarily vigilant, to keep on par with an important regional power like Turkey and b) to show how the recent call for "civilianization" of OYAK's military economic enterprises, in particular, i.e. the call for the breakdown of this military economic edifice, did not lead to "democratization." Rather, Turkey's current economic civil-military relations are far from balanced or settled under the current civilian regime of president Erdoğan, who is increasingly becoming domestically authoritarian and more importantly militarily adventurist at the Middle East regional level. His expansionist version of regionally pan-Islamist politics is perceived as the primary threat for Egypt. This threat perception, in turn, militarizes Egyptian politics even further, in defense from an external national security menace. As for Israeli-Turkish relations, they too have dwindled since 2005, due again to Erdoğan's pan-Islamist support of Hamas in Gaza.

That is why it is important to analyze the case of Turkey, especially in the creation of the military-managed holding, OYAK, which not only interfaces with the government, but also forms a major economic player in the Turkish economy. Once this analysis is laid out in this chapter, I will turn to the relevant case of military-owned companies and their market penetration in Egypt in Chapter 4. I contrast in Chapter 5, *both* Turkey's and Egypt's military need for extra-budgetary income-generating military-owned enterprises, on the one hand, to Israel's already

secured high military budget, on the other hand. In the end, my central argument in this dissertation is that these three cases are all similarly keeping on par with one another as the three strongest militaries in a high threat perception Middle East region.

3.2 BACKGROUND: THE TURKISH MILITARY AND PARTY POLITICS

Between 1923 and 1950, Turkey, while not under military rule, was under a single-party system, dominated by the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) ("CHP") (Belge, 2006, p. 653). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established CHP and the rest of the nation's founding elite, including Atatürk's fellow retired army officers, joined that party (Belge, 2006, p. 659). Throughout the twenty-seven years of single-party rule, the state and the party became synonymous. Similarly, the state's ideology was the party's ideology, which was based on "Kemalism." The Kemalist ideology reflected Kemal Atatürk's beliefs in modernization, national unity, and, above all, secularism (Varol, 2012, p. 323). Kemalism's Six Arrows represented secularism, republicanism, nationalism, étatism, reformism, and populism (Atatürk, 2005).

When Turkey moved from single-party rule to a multi-party system between 1946 and 1950, the Democrat Party emerged as the alternative. CHP and DP (and the latter's subsequent party iterations) diverged in their cultural, political, and economic directions, ever since. CHP continued to reflect the country's older, republican, urban elite, while DP became a populist, anti-bureaucracy party, reflecting the social values and the economic interests of a largely rural constituency (Fidel, 1970, p. 22). In 1950, the DP achieved a landslide victory in Parliament and replaced CHP in the government seat. For the first time since the establishment of the republic, the founding members of the secular elite were no longer the nation's rulers.

Both the military and the civil bureaucracy, however, stayed resolutely loyal to CHP and its Kemalist ideology, despite the fact that the party was out of power through democratic elections (Varol, 2012, p. 323). The reason behind the alliance between the military, the civil state bureaucracy, and the CHP is that in contrast to the DP, whose constituents were new social groups emerging from the grassroots at the societal level, CHP's claim "as Atatürk's party conjured up memories of the comfortable link between the army and government" and that is why the CHP continued to be the military's preferred civilian political party after the military intervention in 1960 (Ahmad, 1993, p. 11). In other words, CHP stood for the secular *republic*—i.e. the *state*—while DP resonated with formerly economically sidelined, more socially conservative, and religious elements of the *populace*—i.e. *society*. Following the 1960 coup and the ensuing constitution of 1961, however, the Turkish military carved out, anew, its role as the guardian of the secular state and its ideological makeup—namely Kemalism. The political clash between the military and civilian parties that mobilize new societal constituents continued to resurface throughout Turkey's history in several subsequent military interventions.

The Civilian Government's role in "Segmentalizing" the Officer Corps along economic lines in the 1950s:

The military intervention of 1960, in of itself, was not necessarily foreseeable. For, as late as 1955, Turkish civil-military relations seemed to have been stable, with the principle of civilian control over the military securely set. During the subsequent five years of the Menderes government, however, established civil-military relations patterns declined, and by 1960 "the principle of civilian domination of politics was destroyed" (Fidel, 1970, p. 19).

In retrospect, Menderes policies and practices of dividing up the armed forces, into those close to his regime and those who are not, almost invited such coup. For, "individual military

organizations are not monoliths” (Provizer, 1978, p. 298). The officer corps is rather a “segmentalized group” in which various clusters have different interests, political visions, and prospects for upward social mobility (Fidel, 1970, p. 19). Accordingly, the impact of Menderes’s policies on the overall social structure of Turkey—which primarily favored the rural small business middle class over urban big business industrialists and state employees—also affected the different segments of officer corps differently. Furthermore, his government’s handling of the professional needs and aspirations of various segments of the officer corps, more specifically, produced the interventionist outcome. To illustrate, Menderes wooed the top brass, instead of alienating them. He was very successful in winning over the pashas (military generals) and felt quite secure with some prominent generals on his side. But that was not the case regarding the younger officers. Even more ironically, Menderes’s support for Turkey’s joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 further deepened the fissures between the junior and senior officers.

Within NATO, the demographic attributes of Turkey’s officer corps started to matter. Junior Turkish officers in NATO were more driven, more technologically savvy, and more curious about modern warfare strategy than their senior counterparts. The younger officers started to feel self-important and self-confident. Relative to their own senior military leadership, and certainly relative to the DP civilian government, the young officers started feeling more professionally advanced, organized, and skilled in management than both the older military leadership and the civilian political leadership (Ahmad, 1993, p. 120). This situation reflects Samuel Finer’s (1962) ideas about military professionalism as a path to military interventionism. The junior Turkish officers’ exposure to other military professionals from Europe, and their discussions of world affairs expanded their horizons. “Their own world [in Turkey] began to seem small and

provincial and the urge to reform and change grew stronger” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). They became “contemptuous” of Turkish politicians who were constantly bickering with each other while the country’s socio-economic problems remained unsolved. Some “embarrassment” even emerged when foreign officers of NATO inquired about Turkey’s political and economic situations (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). Due to these shortcomings in Menderes’ policies toward the military (Fidel, 1970), the making of a typical “colonels’ coup” was underway (Dickinson, 2010).

In terms of “segmentalization”, Menderes’s co-opting of pashas divided the officer corps along lines of rank and socio-economic status (Fidel, 1970, p. 25). Menderes proved so effective in appeasing his High Command that the junior officer conspirators of 1960 had difficulty finding a full general to act as head of their movement. The colonels, however, eventually found General Gürsel. The importance of seeking a senior officer to lead the intervention illustrates military hierarchy. Rumors has it that four-star general Ragıp Gümüşpala, the Commander of the Third Army stationed in Eastern Anatolia, threatened the young rebelling officers that if they did not appoint a general as their leader, he himself would lead the Third Army and would seize power over the capital and government, thereby pushing the rebellious colonels to find a senior officer over them (Yürekli, 2012). Ironically, after the colonels’ coup succeeded, General Gümüşpala eventually led the oppositional right-wing party, which was established under the name of Justice Party, as a continuation of Menderes’s banned DP.

It is important to note that military coherence and non-factionalism is paramount even at times of military intervention. In fact, it is quite crucial to maintain military coherence, at the time of such interventions. If the military command disintegrates during such phases of politicization, the military as institution risks disintegrating altogether into infighting,

factionalism, and regional warlords. None of that should ever be risked during a decision to intervene in domestic politics. Turkey's 1960 coup and the subsequent coup attempts in 1962 and 1963 remained lessons learned, for all militaries, against the risks of endless spirals of plotting and counter-plotting, once a given army is politicized enough to intervene in domestic politics. Syria, Iraq, Sudan and myriad other cases of coups and other army factions' counter-coups proved as alarming cases within the literature (Be'Eri, 1982, p. 75).

3.3 THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

Some scholars have cited Egypt's Colonel Nasser as the contemporaneous "archetype" of what became known as a typical "colonel's coup" defined as "the replacement by force of an established system of rule by a regime under direct military control, but having as its aim the provision of a preferable form of independent, just, and popular government" (McDermott, 1988, p. 1). For example, the literature cites Ethiopia's 1960 military officers as "more than half-expected to emulate the Egyptian colonel, who staged a coup in 1952 that overthrew the dynasty, a century and a half old, of Mohammed Ali" (Bahru, 2001, p. 207). Greece also had its own colonels' coup by 1967 (Keeley, 2011). The reason why Egypt's colonels' coup became a model to emulate for other officers worldwide is that all of them grappled with contemporaneous national liberation and post-independence socio-economic pressures (Finer, 1962). Once politicized and interventionist, however, an army is likely to continue their infighting.

To illustrate, following the 1960 Turkish coup, a power struggle emerged between two groups within the Turkish ruling junta. The junior Turkish colonels wanted their 1960 junta to "retain power sine die", writes Ahmad (1993, p. 128). "They even talked of creating a 'new culture' and a populist political system, without parties, on the model of Nasser's Egypt" (p.

128). “These junior and middle-rung officers frankly had no faith in liberal democracy” writes one contemporaneous international columnist from *The Times of India*. “Claiming to be neo-Kemalist, they sought a prolonged ‘holiday’ from the ‘corrupt’ politicians, re-imposition of the army’s authoritarian rule, and a massive thrust towards Kemal Ataturk’s ideal: State capitalism, westernization, and social reform” (Khanna, 1961).

By contrast to Egypt, where the colonels prevailed, however, Turkey’s group of “radical” officers were eventually snuffed out. General Gürsel said in his radio address on the evening of 27 May 1960, “I took over the administration of the state to stop the tragic course of events” (Gürsel, 1960b). In a later interview for *Cumhuriyet* (1960), he further elaborated, “The network was ready. I personally did not want the army to intervene and had been stopping the attempts (of takeover) of my younger friends. Things reached to such a state that despite my belief that the army should not interfere I let them free in their duties.” He added, “Now my only goal is to reinstate an administration built on the principles of justice and ethics” (Gürsel, 1960a).

The motivations of the “radical” Turkish junior officers to politically intervene; oust Turkey’s civilian government; and actually form a ruling junta, should be read as common contemporaneous manifestations of the post-WWII “recurrent phenomenon” of “military seizure of political power” in the developing world (Fidel, 1970, p. 19). Both single case studies and cross-case comparisons registered the importance of “the military in the development process” and noted “the correlation between nation building and military politics” (Fidel, 1970, p. 19). Post-WWII, the economic developmental role of the state, and more specifically that of the military officers as civil servants, who act on behalf of the state, was being negotiated everywhere in the newly independent countries (Finer, 1962; Janowitz, 1964; Abdel Malek, 1968, Needler, 1971; Welch, 1971; Bienen, 1971; Be’eri, 1982, p. 74). Moreover, the worldwide

debate on the economic role of the state was not limited to the Middle East. Various nations experienced the ideological struggle between state-led economic governance on the one hand, and market-based economic governance on the other (Fidel, 1970, p. 19). The role of the military in economic development, in particular, was equally debated and negotiated. Most of the literature of the 1960s and the 1970s concluded that military governments could spearhead modernization and contribute to economic development in the third world and developing countries (Vatikiotis, 1961; Abdel-Malek, 1962; Finer, 1962; Johnson, 1962; Daalder, 1962; Fisher, 1963; Halpern, 1963; Torrey, 1964; Haddad, 1965; Seale, 1965; Hamon, 1966; Vernier, 1966).

For example, a 1976 cross-national aggregate study on the economic performance of military regimes included 44 countries, among them Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Spain, Brazil South Korea and Argentina. The study concluded that:

Military regimes are not associated with countries that have either lower economic development or lower economic performance rates. Further, military regimes are more likely to be associated with an improvement rather than deterioration in economic performance, though this association is not sufficiently strong to support the image of the military as a major force for economic development. While it is clear from the incidence of uprisings and further coups that military regimes are not uniformly successful in all areas of policy performance, it is equally clear that the simple equation of the military regime with an obstacle to development is quite erroneous (McKinlay & Cohan, 1976, p. 309-310).

It was only by the late 1970s, that the favorable view of the military as a contributor to progress and economic development was somewhat being questioned in the literature (Be'eri,

1982; Bienin, 1971; Dekmejian, 1971, 1982; Hurewitz, 1979; Perlmutter, 1974). “The coups becoming less frequent and less spectacular and the performance of the ruling officers less brilliant, books about them became more sparse and theorizing about them more modest” (Be’eri, 1982, p. 74).

Before this moment of revisionism of the economic role of the welfare state in the 1970s, parts of Europe itself developed their own post-WWII socialist democratic synthesis, which emanated from Scandinavian countries like Norway. Norway’s socialist democratic synthesis, for example, was a product of weighing the policies of an economically liberal democratic capitalistic West and an economically communist Soviet Union, with Norway’s own communist political party roots (Lowe, 2017, p. 140-143).

Similarly, Middle East countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Israel also experienced this post WWII dilemma of weighing the virtues of state-led capitalism along with societal democratic socialism on the one hand, versus more extreme versions of Western economic capitalism on the other hand. Turkey, along, with the other cases reached their own synthesis. But the fact remains that all these countries grappled with degrees of state capitalism and socialism on the one hand versus extreme laissez-faire market economy on the other. Indeed, the move of young Turkish officers to fuse state-led economic governance with their own privately-held military-owned business enterprises, later pushed against by neoliberal politics of the 1990s, represents a common oscillation back and forth from the dominant role of the state and the military in the economy to a partial share of private capital in market economy. The Turkish case proves that the military plays a role on both accounts, be it state-led public sector Etatism up until the 1950s or carving out a space in private capitalist market economics following the 1960 coup (Akça, 2016, p. 73).

Moreover, this oscillation, or at least the grappling with the merits of alternating between a state role in the economy to a free market economy, and the role of the military economic activities in this economic landscape, manifested among the three countries discussed in this dissertation. Turkey is an important case to illustrate this political economy phenomenon. While a pro-Western ally, under the civilian Menderes government, the Turkish military equally reflected on the role of the state and the military in economic development, as each country settled somewhere along the continuum of state economies to free-market ones. The reaction of the officer “lemonaders” in Turkey was therefore not only a piece with global politics, but also mimetic of Egypt’s Nasser of the 1950s and 1960s. Nasser’s Statism, however, was in of itself mimetic of what was held as an earlier and already established Ataturk statist model at the time. “The success of Kemal Ataturk frequently is cited as evidence that military rule can bring transformations civilian regimes were unable to bring about. “Be like Ataturk,” the adage seems to run, “and our country will prosper” (Welch, 1971, p. 219). Even, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had equally cited Ataturk as an exemplary statesman. Ben-Gurion said:

As a student in Turkey I was familiar with the wretched Turkish regime.... I believed it to be decayed and hopeless... when suddenly... a man appeared whose name was unknown.... [He] breathed new life into the Turkish people... [He led them] to revolt against enslavement... The Turks, who had been crushed by oppression, [now] gathered courage and became an independent nation, proud and respected (Mitchell, 2013).

It is significant, however, that after Ataturk had set an example for Egypt and Israel to emulate, the young Turkish military officers of the mid-1950s compared notes across the Middle East regional neighborhood, as they all charted the economic paths of their post-WWII independent nation-states. For example, in Egypt, the young Nasser and his senior military

officer Mohamed Naguib debated how long the officers should remain in power before they return governance to elected civilians. Naguib preferred a return to democratically elected civilian government. The Muslim Brotherhood supported Naguib and tried to drive a wedge among the officers. Nasser and his young colleagues won over Naguib. Following a 1954 attempt on his life by a Muslim Brotherhood member, Nasser cracked down on the organization (Nasr, 1999a, p. 329—332), put President Naguib under house arrest and assumed executive office. He was formally elected president in June 1956 (Nasr, 1999a, p. 285)

By contrast, on November 13, 1960 in Turkey, the “moderate generals” won over the “radical colonels” and ousted fourteen members from the ruling junta. “The Fourteen,” as they became known, were arrested and sent out as attachés in Turkish embassies overseas (Ahmad, 1993, p. 128). Purging The Fourteen was well received by society members of the bourgeoisie, who were alarmed by the Nasser-like “collectivist radicalism” of the radical officers (Ahmad, 1993, p. 128). This act of purging collectivist voices, however, further frustrated those living in “staff officer flats.” This military group interpreted the purge as the end of prospects for real social change.

This explains how losing the representatives of their revolutionary viewpoints on the ruling National Unity Committee pushed yet another group of young sidelined officers to plot other coups. Their conspiracies, however, were discovered and halted. Yet the discovery did not prevent two more young officers’ attempts to overthrow the government. The first was on February 22, 1962 and the second on May 21, 1963. Both attempts also failed.

This experience of agitated young officers who looked at regional and international, socialist, collectivistic mass politics and saw the military as a conduit for achieving political goals made its mark on the TAF, by making the leadership aware of the danger of politicization (Fidel, 1970,

p. 19) Senior active-duty officers, since then, became vigilant about the potential threat of coups from below. They made sure they “contained” any contrarian voices, through appeasement and/or coercion, in order to guard the military institution as a whole. For example, the senior leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces had already formed the Armed Forces Union (AFU) in 1961. The purpose of the AFU was to satisfy the military needs: its “syndicalism” to use Samuel Finer’s (1962) term. The goal of AFU was to make room for voices from all ranks to be heard, all while keep any potential military intervention decisions exclusive to the higher command of the military leadership. This measure was designed to bar the army’s politicization and to prevent the spiral into endless coups and counter-coups. This mechanism worked. For example, subsequent ultimatums and actual military interventions in 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007 were always coming from the military leadership, not from disgruntled, agitated, elements at the lower levels in the hierarchy.

It was not until July 2016 that the young disgruntled middle-rank and junior-level officers mobilized again. This time against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a reaction to his division of the armed forces into two groups: his regime loyalists and those loyal to the Fethullah Gülen movement. The latter feared for their own future career in the military. As a preemptive measure to their expected laying off by Erdoğan and his loyalists, that group of young officers enacted an ill-planned and botched coup. That was a measure of last resort to guard their future against an ideological oscillation that would, in their minds, impoverish them as military officers, counted by the Erdoğan regime as Gülenist enemies. Their attempt failed, however, and Erdoğan’s loyalists in the Turkish Armed Forces jailed those very Gülenist officers (Jacoby, 2016, p. 134).

Looking to Egypt, the military’s share of the economy has been criticized in the literature as if they were anomalous cases of economic militarization of a backward third world country

(Springborg, 2011, 2017; Abul-Magd, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2017; Marshall, 2013, 2015; Azzam, 2012; Sayigh, 2012). What the history of OYAK here shows, however, is that Egypt is not anomalous in the Middle East, especially when compared to Turkey. In fact, founded in 1961, OYAK has carved out its space in Turkey's economy as the 3rd largest conglomerate in the market (Demir, 2010). We therefore need to look at the phenomenon of state-led and market-based governance across the dynamic regional order to fully appreciate Turkey and Egypt's militaries as economic players. The implications of this at the regional level are found in what model of governance and level of market integration Turkey, Egypt, and Israel would choose, over subsequent decades. Should they converge on similar policies that might create possibilities for mutual ideological understanding and cooperation? Should they diverge in their choices, however, that could create increased regional animosity and rivalry.

The broader debate about the political economy in the Middle East, however, also touches on a recent question in the scholarly literature on Turkey. There, political scientist Ismet Akça (2004, 2006, 2009, 2010b, 2016) disagreed with some of my scholar interviewees about civil-military developments under Erdoğan and the vulnerability of OYAK. A political scientist I interviewed at EDAM political and economic think tank, for example, believed that OYAK is constitutionally unassailable by private interests or civilian regimist meddling. Akça, however, had argued that the civilianization of a military-dominated economy would spell democratization for Turkey. My own position vis-a-vis these two scholars is that Erdoğan has already shown that OYAK is *not* constitutionally unassailable and that, under this regime, civilianization spells corruption.

What the history of OYAK shows us is a mixed political solution to the problem of poverty among state employees and bureaucrats. The agitations of the “lemonaders” resulted in the

creation of a holding company that invests and manages billions of dollars of government employee pensions. Yet, the more recent regimist and neoliberal turn under Erdoğan's rule is likewise emblematic of a gutting of state and military economic activities for the purpose of creating a clique of crony capitalists. All this will be explained in greater detail below by first demonstrating the role of the dynamic regional order in inspiring mimesis among groups of military officer corps in their antagonism to particular regime-building practices, performed by civilian governments.

Animosity and Rivalry in the Regional Order (1952–1960)

The Middle East as a regional order had co-constituting effects on the three countries of this study and their respective economic civil-military relations. We start with Turkey's 1923 establishment of the Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leadership. The success of Atatürk in ending the Sultanate and Caliphate in Turkey inspired and eventually created, through mimesis, the leaders of the Egyptian Free Officers Movement, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat. The political mobilization within the Egyptian army started after 1938 (Perlmutter, 1974; Sadat, 1978). Memoirs of the Free Officers verify this mimesis by explicitly pointing to Turkey and Atatürk as a model. "Be like Atatürk" applied in the Egyptian context and the Israeli one.

For example, Atatürk explicitly influenced Anwar Sadat, a Free Officers member. Sadat mentions Atatürk as his "ideal" in his autobiography, *In Search of Identity* (1978, p. 16). "I admired his military uniform" Sadat writes, (p. 12). "[And I] realized that he could not have mounted his revolution, or done anything, in fact, without the armed forces," Sadat added (p. 12). Sadat also saw Atatürk as a hero "who liberated his country" from a corrupt leadership and "rebuilt it" after a risk of occupation by foreign powers (1978, p. 25). When held in prison during

WWII, under British accusations of spying, Sadat read H. C. Armstrong's biography of Ataturk, *Gray Wolf* (1932). Among Egyptian national heroes like Mustafa Kamel and international leaders like Ghandi, Sadat confirms, "my love for Ataturk stands out," (Sadat, 1978, p. 25).

Despite this early emulation of Ataturk in the regional order, be it by the Egyptians or the Israelis, as cited above in the words of Ben-Gurion, in later years, throughout the 1950s, Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes and Egypt's President Nasser set their countries on a collision course, regarding what became known as the Baghdad Pact. Pelt (2014) describes the context in which the two national leaders acted:

The Turkish prime minister saw [a leading role for Turkey] as a logical consequence of his activist foreign policy; what surprised Menderes however was that Egypt's new leader Gamal Abdel Nasser harbored similar ambitions. In this way the potential appeal to the Arab countries of the Turco-Pakistani Pact set Turkey and Egypt on a course of confrontation (p. 116)

Conflict was inevitable, and the Turkish ambassador was ousted from Egypt at the time (*The Cairns Post*, 1954). Nasser in Egypt vehemently opposed Menderes's regionally activist foreign policy through the 1955 military alliance of the Baghdad Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain, with the encouragement of the United States (Sadat, 1978, pp. 126-129; Abou-El-Fadl, 2019 p. 3-4; Pelt, 2014, p. 250).

As opposed to Sadat's and his own praise of Ataturk, Nasser looked at Menderes's schemes into the Arab world with suspicion, as documented in former Egyptian Director of Intelligence Salah Nasr's memoirs (Nasr, 1999b, pp. 58-60). Nasser despised Menderes's attempt to act like the "gendarme of the West in the Middle East," (Bağcı, 1990) as a token of building alliances with Britain. Nasser, for instance, drew a distinction between Britain and the United States, with

whom the Free Officers had consulted at the time of their mobilization in 1952. Sadat, (1978, p. 108) writes about this distinction:

Before I announced that the revolution had taken place, we considered getting in touch with the Americans (even at dawn on July 23) to give them an idea of the objectives and nature of our revolution. The image of the United States was closely associated in our minds with championing the cause of freedom and supporting liberation movements. Besides, by establishing such a link we sought to neutralize the British. But how could we do so when we knew nobody at the U.S. Embassy? We eventually found an officer in charge of Air Force Intelligence called Ali Sabri who was friendly at the time with the U.S. military attaché. We summoned him and gave him a message to convey, through his friend, to the U.S. ambassador, Mr. Caffery. It was actually delivered early in the morning, on July 23. The U.S. ambassador thought it was a nice gesture, particularly as he was one of King Farouk's personal friends (at least, that was what the king thought). Indeed, our contact with him marked the start of a good relationship, so much so that while the British were trying hard to identify the members of the Constituent Council, the U.S. ambassador invited us to have dinner with him at his place and we all accepted (p. 108).

By contrast to this initial relation to the United States, Britain remained Egypt's primary Western concern. Thus, when Menderes was seen as coordinating the Baghdad Pact with the old imperial powers, Egypt was not going to allow this to happen. "Indeed, it had been the Turkish diplomats who first pursued Western bloc, rather than the reverse" (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 4). Pelt (2014) describes the tension between Egypt's Nasser and Turkey's Menderes over this very Turkish pro-western policy orientation:

[Menderes's] ambitions to upgrade Turkey's role in the Middle East, and his clear endeavors

to promote the interests of the Western bloc in that area, unleashed a series of *new regional dynamics*. Initially, his ambitions clashed with those of Nasser, who, *in turn*, strived to secure Egypt a leading role in the Middle East as a promoter of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism. Ankara and Cairo collided because of the Baghdad Pact, and Syria was the battleground (p. 250, emphasis mine).

Indeed, Syria was “the arena for Turkey’s and Egypt’s regional activism, this time in a confrontation” (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 3). Menderes was suspicious of Egypt’s Free Officers, fearing they, as well as their Syrian counterpart, would turn to Soviet allies. “When Turkey mobilized troops to the Syrian border, Egypt sent troops to the port of Latakia, *in response*” (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 3, emphasis added). This became known as the Syria Crisis of 1957. The superpowers were almost dragged to the verge of confrontation in an explosive situation (Nasr, 1999b, p. 59).

But why was Egypt adamantly opposed to pacts? The origin and rationale for refusal of military pacts and military bases is described in Sadat’s autobiography (1978, p. 126-127). Sadat says that the year 1953 was “an eventful one.” One event that he recalled clearly was Egypt’s request for weapons from the United States. The U.S. ambassador, Jeffery Caffery, “being our friend,” was open to Egypt’s request and contacted his government at once. The answer Egypt received was “that the United States would be willing to hold a Mutual Security Pact with us.” Sadat continues, “[This was] a formula devised by the Americans after World War II” to allow them to “fill the so-called vacuum by replacing Britain and France in those countries where they used to have an ‘influence’” (p. 126).

Sadat further articulates how this did not suit Egypt’s policy direction. “The version of that formula delivered to us stated that the United States was prepared to provide us with weapons,

free of charge, on one condition: a number of American experts would have to come in with the weapons, and the weapons must never be used against a U.S. ally.” Sadat asserts, “We gave the paper back to the U.S. ambassador and said, ‘Thank you, we wanted to buy weapons with our own money; we don’t want them free of charge. We also reject the Mutual Security Pact because it affects our independence, which we value as highly as life itself.’”

Sadat then narrates that the Egyptians maintained their weapons negotiations with the United States, “though unenthusiastically.” And while the Americans agreed to have an Egyptian military mission in Washington to discuss an arms deal, “when [the mission] arrived in Washington, the Americans ignored [it] completely, which hurt us a great deal and left us in no doubt whatsoever that they didn’t want to sell us any weapons, and that the whole exercise was namely a tactical maneuver” (p. 127).

Sadat then chronicles how “the Americans tried afterwards to persuade us to join one pact after another.” He refers to pacts spearheaded by John Foster Dulles “within the framework of his “containment” policy, intended to contain the Soviet Union by surrounding it “with a belt of bases and pacts.” The pacts started with NATO and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and ended with the Baghdad Pact, which should have tied the two together. “We gave them a clear and categorical answer,” Sadat emphasized in his autobiography. “Our will had been completely ‘liberated’ the minute the revolution was carried out; pacts and maritime bases were out of the question” (Sadat, 1978, p. 127).

By 1955–1956, it was clear that any further attempt to lure other Arab states into the Baghdad Pact would be futile: Nasser’s strong appeal to the Arab masses proved a tremendous barrier (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, pp. 3-5). As an example of this animosity, Nasser told Britain to leave not only the Suez Canal but also Cyprus, a demand that in May 1956 made Turkish

Foreign Minister Fuat Koprülü identify Nasser “as an enemy of Turkey” (Baci, 1990 cited in Pelt, p. 129).

After diplomatic confrontations with Menderes, Nasser succeeded in convincing most Arab countries to abandon the Baghdad Pact and came out triumphant when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. In the meantime, Turkey’s Menderes expressed his belief that Britain’s military presence near the Suez Canal was not motivated by self-interest, but was merely the “guarding of an outpost of one of the key positions of the free world” (Pelt, p. 115). The resulting Suez Crisis, in October and November of 1956, and the eventual political victory of Nasser after the withdrawal of the attacking countries, Britain, France, and Israel, “not only sealed the enmity between Turkey and Egypt, it also made the Middle East a Cold War hotspot and Nasser a symbol of successful Arab resistance to colonialist designs on the region” (Pelt, pp. 128–129).

Evidence of a dynamic regional order can be located in the push and pull of foreign policies between Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. The making of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism in the region was not only the result of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948 as customarily deduced, but also a product of “a religious conservative” Menderes with pan-Turkish expansionist and Islamized rhetoric into the Middle East through a Baghdad Pact that combined Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran along with old and new guard Western imperialists like Britain and the US (Meral, 2014). Sadat gives a detailed account of the Baghdad Pact in his autobiography. He states, “In December 1953 I had established a new newspaper—*al-Gumhuriyah* (The Republic)—and assumed the post of editor-in-chief. It was to prove the organ of the revolution and play a significant role in thwarting the Baghdad Pact (Sadat, 1978, p. 136). He adds,

Although uninterested in power for so long, I had accepted the post of Minister of State in the government formed by Nasser to help him expedite certain projects. In January 1955 the Islamic Congress was established, with me as secretary-general. This post necessitated many visits to the various countries of our region, as I had to work for closer links between Arab and Muslim countries as well as for certain political objectives in the interest of our national cause. It is no exaggeration to say that I played an important part in the frustration of the Baghdad Pact.

Sadat, goes on to delineate how exactly Egypt's outreach into the Arab world was a product of the perceived threat of the Baghdad Pact. He narrates:

In Jordan, for instance, although the king belonged to the same ruling family that ruled in Iraq, I was able to persuade him not to join the pact. One important consequence of this was the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, the British commander-in-chief of the Jordanian Army. It was the decision of King Hussein. In Lebanon I met President Camille Chamoun and succeeded in keeping Lebanon out of the pact, utilizing the old irresolvable hostility between Chamoun and his family on the one hand and the Turks on the other. In Baghdad I met Nuri al-Said to try to persuade him not to join. Our meeting lasted perhaps too long, for the sly politician told journalists that Anwar el-Sadat was negotiating with him about Egypt's accession. When the meeting ended I was surprised to hear this from the journalists. Of course I denied that anything of the sort had happened and explained that it was just one of Nuri al-Said's well-known tricks (Sadat, 1978, pp. 136- 137).

Thus, in terms of regional dynamics between Egypt and Turkey at the time, it is reasonable to conclude that during Menderes's premiership, "Turkey's feeble attempts to unite and lead the Middle East clashed with the foreign policy efforts of Nasser's Egypt, and it was only after the

1960 military coup that ousted the Menderes government that Egypt and Turkey began a normalization process” (Meral, 2014, para. 3). Adnan Menderes was hanged following the 1960 military intervention. Diplomatic relations with Egypt were restored under Cemal Gürsel, in 1965.

If that is how Nasser viewed Menderes’s regional encroachments, mimesis followed from within Turkey’s military, in emulation of Egypt’s statist economic policies of the late-1950s. Leaders during Turkey’s May 27, 1960 military intervention often cited Nasser’s own “revolution” and the nationalist-secularist-socialist turn as inspiration. Egypt’s Nasser (and more so Sadat) therefore emulated Ataturk’s conceptualization of the armed forces as the vanguard of society in the 1950s. Meanwhile, Ataturk’s descendants, the young Turkish colonels, rallied to Nasser’s policies of statism, such as state-welfare, state capitalism, and state-led development of the late 1950s and 1960s, as their own country veered away from Ataturk’s statist legacies.

Ulus (2011, p. 3) shows that the re-invention of Kemalism elsewhere in the region—such as the Ba’ath and Nasser regimes in the neighboring Middle East countries in the 1950s— influenced the agitated young officers behind the military intervention of 1960 in Turkey. In fact, the word “revolutionary” was used in Nasser’s speeches and was often used in the Turkish literature to describe the 1960 military intervention, avoiding the term “coup” (Heper & Evin, 1988). Meanwhile, the words *raj’iyya* and *irtica*— both mean backwardness in Turkish and Arabic respectively—were equally used throughout the 1960s in both countries to describe feudalist conservative societal currents.

Thus, in addition to the history of leftist movements within Turkey, it is especially important to understand “[regional] structural and historical factors in the affirmation of military interventions” (Ulus, 2011, p. 3). For “the intermingling of international developments such as

the Castro regime in Cuba, the Nasser regime in Egypt, and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria, with internal developments—the 27 May coup and the liberal constitution that followed—all contributed to the ideology of the leftists” (p. 3). Nevertheless, Ulus emphasizes that the “internalization of the Kemalist ideology as a nation-state building ideology” is behind the Turkish military intervention.

Finally, the 1960 military coup in Turkey had a distinct economic outcome. It resulted in the establishment of the Armed Forces Pension Fund, OYAK, as an income-generating company whose profits are distributed to officers’ pensions. This OYAK setup was a corrective measure to the Menderes’s civilian economic policies that ignored army modernization programs and, most importantly, the military officers’ economic wellbeing. Huntington’s assertion of the necessity for civil-military *equilibrium* was violated under the Menderes government, because economic gains were largely isolated to private industries.

Here we see that the development of OYAK comes as a reaction to economic policies that failed to sufficiently benefit Turkish military officers. The military officers’ 1960 coup in Turkey sought to correct what they saw as disparities in economic growth first through emulation of Nasser’s more openly statist, public sector policies, but then morphing the OYAK model into a market player, in congruence with the Kemalist urban big business industrialists (Fidel, 1970). OYAK started out as a special, and quite ambiguous blend of statist and market economics (Parla, 1998). This has changed more recently with a “civilianization” turn under Erdoğan, who is targeting OYAK and replacing its economic strength by privileging its competition among the Anatolian small and medium size businesses, which I’ll touch on below.

Mimesis (1960–1979)

After nearly a decade of animosity in which Egypt's Nasser emulated Turkey's Ataturk, while Turkey's own Menderes veered away from Ataturk and antagonized Nasser, Turkey's young officers eventually conducted their own colonels' coup, reviving Kemalism in Turkey, albeit with more inclination to contemporary trends. The result was the growth of two modern militaries within the regional order.

Following the 1960 coup, the Turkish officer corps established the precedent that the army was to become the guardian of Kemalism. The Turkish military carved out “the right and duty to intervene” when it deemed the “values of Ataturk and the spirit of his reforms to be in danger” (Pelt, p. 3). This brand of Kemalism had earlier influenced Egypt when it mobilized the Egyptian officers to intervene against King Farouk in 1952 (Sadat, 1978, p. 25). Kemalism would again influence Turkey's army after a decade of Menderes in power. For example, relations between the two countries improved after the secularist military coup ousted Menderes in Turkey. Evidence for this is the return of a new Turkish ambassador to Egypt by 1965, after the previous one was considered *persona non-grata* due to his anti-Nasser comments in 1954, during the Menderes government (Cairns, 1954; Meral, 2014, para. 17).

The hanging of Menderes must be understood as the culmination of an active process of framing him as a threat to Kemalism. Secularism and reformism quickly became sticking points for the Menderes regime. By linking Menderes to an Islamized project within Turkey, and outside Turkey through the Baghdad Pact—which was to include Islamic Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—I argue that not only was Menderes perceived as a threat to Kemalist values domestically in Turkey, but Menderes was also regionally perceived as a threat, especially against Nasser's own application of a renewed version of the Kemalist Six Arrows:

republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and *revolutionary* reformism. Accordingly, the mimesis I refer to is the way the colonels of Turkey emulated aspects of Nasser's renewed Statism, all while Sadat by 1979, eventually created the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO) in line with Turkey's own formula of military role in economic development and as a market player among other thriving private capitalists (Shakeeb, 1984, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, pp. 96-99).

Praetorianism and Privatization (1980–1990)

Turkey has been described historically as displaying “praetorian militarism” (Perlmutter, 1974). The term refers to a type of “capitalist militarist structure where the military is an economic actor in all fields of the economy (production, trade, finance)” (Akça, 2010b; Ben-Eliezer, 1997). As war preparations and war waging have always been connected to modes of production, the relationship between *capitalism* and *war* has created “new, specific, and intricate forms” of militarism. In most developed countries, this manifests in a structure termed the “military-industrial complex” (Serfati, 2001; Custers, 2008; Nitzan and Bichler, 1996). The “complex” is made up of a) companies operating in the war industry, which benefit from high military spending, and b) the military and/or civilian political authorities, which make military procurement decisions.

The Turkish military had dominated the defense industrial complex and was criticized for that (Akça, 2010b), up until that critical juncture of 2012, when civilian President Erdoğan—being at the top of the current Turkish regime—began dictating military fiscal decisions. Although we'll go further into Erdoğan's policies toward the military later, it should be noted here that OYAK sits rather uncomfortably with both aspects of the military-industrial complex—the civilian and the military aspects.

By the 1980s, the varying degrees of successes and failures of state-led Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) (Turkey 1940–1950 and later 1960–1980; Egypt 1952–1973; and Israel 1948–1973) steered the three countries of the dynamic regional order towards experimentations with neoliberal fiscal policies and the erosion of the public sector, all while liberalizing the economy for free market forces and private enterprise. This push toward privatization represented a potential direct threat to the military business activities by making the military itself susceptible to private business, and not the other way around. The push toward privatization however, also created opportunities for military business further thriving, in Turkey and elsewhere, as the that pushed the militaries to form partnerships with private sector and international multinationals (Parla, 1998; Springborg, 1988) in order to survive in a new economic landscape. The military-industrial complex in the dynamic regional order, therefore, saw critical changes under neoliberal policies, especially in the subsequent decade. In Turkey, for example, OYAK rose to economic prominence between the 1980s and 1990s, becoming Turkey's 3rd strongest business Group (Akça, 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Demir, 2010).

Regional Convergence on Neoliberalism (1990–2010)

By the mid-1990s, the three militaries evolved by becoming national income-generating *capitalistic* players. This resulted as a function of the dynamic convergence of civilian governments' economic liberalization policies post-1980 in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel alike. This convergence among the three cases continued with further parallel iterations in the form of public-sector privatization in the 1990s and globalization in the 2000s, yet with characteristics that were unique to the region.

Since the mid-1990s, across the regional order, various countries shifted away from a welfare state structure by privatizing most government services. That left the military, as a public institution, at a crossroad of re-inventing its economic role in light of potentially slashed budgets. Moreover, by the mid-2000s, another regional model arose from the Arab Gulf States: the state acts like a *holding company* as it manages state wealth funds (Amico, 2015), or alternatively a *khaliji kafeel* (Gulf state sponsor) that acts as domestic partner to international businesses. These regional models, derived from Arab Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, offered frameworks for the militaries to mimetically reproduce, as supra-state national economic entities. Be it in Turkey of the 2000s, when in 2007 OYAK acquired the 1965 public steel factory *Erdemir*, during the privatization process in a public auction or in Egypt as the *Alexandria Tersana* is one of the companies affiliated to the Armed Forces' Maritime Industries and Services Organization. Alexandria Tersana is one of the largest in heavy industries and the leader of the shipbuilding and repair industry in Egypt and the Middle East. It was established in 1960 within the free zone of Western Alexandria port. Slashed for privatization, the Egyptian Armed Forces purchased the Tersana in a public auction, just like the OYAK. It acquired and maintained this formidable shipping industrial complex in national hands as it lies in the heart of shipping lines from the Far East to southern Mediterranean in Alexandria. Thus, the Egyptian military enterprises pursued a similar process as that of Turkey's OYAK. The armed forces are currently the driver of infrastructure and economic development, in Egypt. Earlier in Turkey, OYAK was acting in lieu of previous state-owned enterprises that were slashed for privatization. In both cases of Turkey and Egypt, the military stepped in and purchased those very former state-owned enterprises.

Militaries then became partners of international businesses, similar to and in competition with other national private conglomerates. The public has often trusted the militaries more than private national capital companies, as the latter were often deemed *too internationalist, too globalized*—ready to liquidate and leave at any moment. The nature of militaries as *patriotic here-to-stay* state institutions, even when they engage in globalized international business, offered an attribute that made it more trusted by the public. This national economic attribute of public support for the military should not be glossed over in international media or scholarship analyzing the economic roles of Middle East militaries. For example, Afaf Al Sayyid-Marsot (1990, p. 292) notes that Egyptians do not begrudge army benefits because every family has, one way or another at one time or another someone in it.

Current Regional Divergences (2011–Present)

A recent study by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) of 34 governments revealed that they hold a total of 2,111 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), reaching \$2 trillion in value and employing about 6 million people. Half of the 10 largest globally listed companies show a state as a main shareholder (Amico, 2015). “The state as a ‘capitalist’ in its own right plays a significant role in emerging economies such as China, India and Russia, but also across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” (Amico, 2015).

By contrast to Erdoğan’s Turkey that promoted the rise of small business enterprises of his mostly Muslim pious Anatolian constituency, “high level of state ownership is characteristic” of the majority of Arab states, oil-exporting and importing, in economies as varied as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. That is where there is a current divergence between Turkey’s economic model and that of Egypt.

“A close look at the role and impact of state ownership in the region,” however, “reveals that the state is not always – as is commonly assumed – an inefficient owner” (Amico, 2015). New voices in political economy research, with whom I agree, show that “the popular perception of the state as an ‘inept capitalist’ collides with reality in some countries and sectors.” Indeed, some regional governments have directed SOEs for infrastructure projects, public services provision, and even research and development. For example, Saudi SOEs such as Ma’aden and SABIC have become big successful multinational enterprises, “while undertaking social mandates on behalf of the state” (Amico, 2015). These successes are significant since they highlight “the ability of state capitalism to succeed in some contexts and fail in others.” This is a trend that merits attention because the social contract in the region has been re-written post 2011 and again post 2013, with the militarized, nationalist, statist comeback in Egypt, in direct opposition to Turkey’s model (Maziad, 2019).

The Gulf-States model has been in higher synergy with Egypt’s military post-2011 uprising as the Egyptian military has developed a strong statist comeback. The analysis of OYAK will lead us to startling and heterodox understandings of the Egyptian military’s share of the economy, which has been criticized in the literature as among the worst and anomalous cases of economic militarization (Springborg, 2017; Abul-Magd, 2016; Marshall, 2015, 2017). What Turkey’s OYAK details will show is that Egypt is not anomalous in the Middle East but is instead mimetic of that original OYAK setup since 1961. When compared to Egypt’s military, OYAK (a holding company) has carved out its space in Turkey’s economy as the third largest conglomerate. What is more, OYAK did initially function as an important supplementary source of income for the armed forces personnel, who as government employees were disadvantaged in light of economic transformations in Turkey and the world biased towards private sector businessmen. The

supposed call for civilianization or even the breaking down of this semi-public semi-private holding company (Akça et. al, 2014), however, does not hold the democratizing promise that many expect from neoliberal policies. While privatization across the MENA region “has actually ground to a halt” (Amico, 2015) due to “allegations of crony capitalism” especially in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, in contrast to this trend in MENA, Erdoğan is continuing to build a Gamal Mubarak-like clique of crony capitalists. The civilian Erdoğan regime, whose clique wants to dominate military affairs in a false pretense of civilianization, is currently targeting OYAK. The truth of the civilian invasion of the military pension fund OYAK is that the Erdoğan regime is instead creating a clique of crony capitalists. It is for this reason that a deep dive into the legal and operational standing of OYAK is necessary, both as a rebuttal to claims that Egypt’s military is an outsized economic player, and as a more cynical view of the neoliberal civilianization of military-run income-generating activities.

3.4 THE TURKISH MILITARY BUDGET: 1950 TO THE PRESENT

Turkey’s military is one of the largest in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. It is currently rated the 9th strongest army in the world (Credit, Suisse, 2019; GFP, 2019). Military power is often associated with military expenditure. Per NATO statistics, defense expenditure does not include pensions. That is why OYAK as a pension fund is treated separately below. Turkey, today, is considered one of the top 20 military spenders. Insufficient military spending during the 1950s, however, was one factor leading to the 1960 coup, and the very establishment of OYAK as a pension fund to make up for personnel grievances. For example, although Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the membership that was supposed to enhance financial resources for the

armed forces hardly did, as NATO did not contribute additional resources towards the defense budget (Ahmad, 1993, p. 124).

To illustrate, relative to its national income, as percentage of its GDP, Turkey was already overspending on its military compared to other NATO members. And while Turkish military expenditures increased after joining NATO, paradoxically, NATO and US aid did *not* shoulder that cost burden. Throughout the 1950s Menderes erroneously calculated that spending would decrease after Turkey joined the north Atlantic alliance. He thought “rather naively, that the alliance would provide huge subsidies” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 124). In a classic, guns or butter dilemma, the Menderes government specifically resisted further spending on armed forces personnel. Moreover, in light of soaring inflation, Menderes “did not intend to spend even more money on reforms or on adjusting officers’ salaries to ever rising inflation” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125).

According to Ahmad’s (1993) calculations, the increase in military expenditure went from \$248 million in 1950 to \$273 in 1951 to \$307 in 1952 and to \$381 in 1953 (Ahmad, 1993, p. 124). Ahmad (1993) argues that despite this perpetual increase throughout the next generation, “the military’s appetite seemed impossible to satisfy” (p. 125). I counter argue against this notion of “impossible to satisfy” appetite. First, despite the *net* increase in expenditure, per Ahmad himself, resources were not allocated to the military *personnel’s* needs in terms of matching inflation. Hence, the birth of a mutual assistance fund like OYAK, albeit imperfect and possibly deformed at the time of its creation as it capitalized on benefits provided in both public and private laws. The officers’ grievances were an expected outcome to failing civilian economic policies toward military personnel. Second, SIPRI data shows slightly different figures from those of Ahmad’s. What is significant about the SIPRI figures is that in the seven years between

1953–1959, the actual rounded figures for military expenditure were: \$294, \$332, \$383, \$412, \$450, \$523, and \$766 million respectively. Despite this sustainable increase in military expenditure, this data is nevertheless lower than Ahmad’s measure for the year 1953 by almost \$90 million. His figure for 1953 is \$381, while SIPRI’s is only \$294. This cast some shadow on his figures. Third, and most importantly the seeming steady increase Ahmad (1993) describes had to be qualified given the level of inflation. For example, we can note SIPRI’s figures and how they reflect a seeming drastic surge from \$523 to \$766 in 1959, on the eve of the coup. These figures seem to be in line with Ahmad’s argument regarding sustained increase in the 1950s. However, if we look at SIPRI’s 2017 constant dollar figures for the same duration, what is revealed is that the purchase power *dwindled* in the years 1956, 1957, and 1958, only to finally pick up again in 1959 (but only to the 1955 level). Thus, instead of a steady increase, *there was actually a drop*. This is a sign of the ailing economy at the time.

	Year									
	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Feroz Ahmad (1993) Figures	\$248	\$273	\$307	\$381						
SIPRI Current \$US	\$213	\$239	\$258	\$294	\$332	\$383	\$412	\$450	\$523	\$766
SIPRI 2017 Constant in billion \$US				\$1.376	\$1.391	\$1.407	\$1.303	\$1.210	\$1.176	\$1.399

Source: Feroz Ahmad (1993); SIPRI Turkey Expenditure (2019)

Figure 9 Comparison of military expenditure figures in Turkey 1953-1959. Figures increase in actual amount but decrease or stagnate relative to inflation.

Per SIPRI, the equivalent amounts in 2017 (constant) US dollars 1953–1955 are: \$1.376 billion, \$1.391, and \$1.407 respectively. A drop followed this last figure of 1955 to \$1.303

billion in 1956. A second drop followed to \$1.210, in 1957. And yet another *drop* in military expenditure to \$1.176 followed in 1958. By 1959 a surge back to \$1.399 took place, but only close to the level of 1955. Accordingly, contrary to what Ahmad described regarding the officers' insatiable "appetite" for budget increases, in practice, relative to adjustment to inflation, the budget was not perpetually increasing, but was rather decreasing in value, under Menderes.

TABLE 1
INFLATIONARY TRENDS DURING THE MENDERES REGIME:
TURKISH PRICE INDICES 1950-59
(1948=100)

	<i>Wholesale Prices*</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>	<i>Retail Prices in Istanbul*</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>	<i>Retail Prices in Ankara+</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>
1950	96		105		103	
1951	109	+13.5	104	- 1.0	102	- 1.0
1952	107	- 1.8	111	+ 6.7	107	+ 4.9
1953	109	+ 1.9	118	+ 6.3	112	+ 4.7
1954	119	+ 9.2	135	+14.4	122	+ 8.9
1955	134	+12.7	147	+ 8.9	138	+13.1
1956	157	+17.2	169	+14.9	153	+10.9
1957	183	+16.6	181	+ 7.0	172	+12.4
1958	223	+21.9	215	+18.8	198	+15.1
1959	268	+20.2	255	+18.6	243	+22.7

*SOURCE: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
+SOURCE: Conjuncture Section, Ministry of Commerce

Figure 10 Inflationary trends during the Menderes Regime.

In Menderes's view, military reform would have had to *follow* economic growth, and so military officers' wages suffered enormously under a struggling economy and inflation. Since the economy stagnated, given the crop failure of 1954 (Krueger, 1974, p. 8), the military weapon modernization programs could not be improved. Menderes announced as much to the Grand National Assembly on May 24, 1954:

We shall continue our efforts to bring our heroic army to a position consonant with the needs of today ... This will be accomplished by using all material and moral resources *in proportion to the strength of our economic and financial potential* [Applause] As has

been our practice so far, *military appropriations will increase in proportion to the growth in our national income* (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125, emphasis mine).

Because the overall economic situation in Turkey was deteriorating under the Menderes government, military reform and weapon modernization stagnated. The economic decline was due to a capital accumulation crisis and competition over agricultural-versus-industrial development policies, ultimately resulting in currency devaluation by 1959 (Krueger, 1974, p. 7—9). This lack of military modernization programs is one of the primary declared reasons behind the 1960 military intervention. To illustrate, the army started to become “restless in the mid-1950s,” years characterized by heightened inflation, political turmoil, and a general sense of malaise in urban districts (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). The soldiers experienced similar grievances to those of “the general public, especially the lower middle class whose position was being rapidly eroded” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). Moreover, the officers “deplored the erosion of moral values.” In the eyes of the soldiers, the Democrats were replacing authentic Turkish values with materialist ones, “which glorified the cash nexus” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). Orhan Erkanli, one of the eventually sidelined “radical” Fourteen clearly voiced these concerns in an interview published seven weeks after the coup, in Istanbul’s daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* on 20 July 1960:

The clique in power after 1954 trampled on all the rights of the people. They deceived the nation and dragged the country into economic and social ruin. Moral values were forgotten and people were made oblivious of them. The institution of the state was transformed into an appendage of the party organization. The pride of the Turkish Armed Forces, which are the only organized force in the country, was hurt on every occasion;

the uniform, which is the real legacy of our history brought shame to those who wore it (Erkanli, 1960; Ahmad, 1993, p. 125).

The coup established military budgetary effects. It might seem puzzling that even though the military stepped out of power by 1963, the military grew even as the military lost power. However, here is what I mean to show: Following a military intervention, the defense budget has to remain adequate as a minimum pre-requisite for a military not to re-intervene. That does not negate that a military can intervene for other ideological and national security reasons. But at a minimum the economic factor has to be accounted for by covering the armed forces needs for resources and materiel. Given that the 1960 military intervention in Turkey had an important economic grievances dimension to it due to Menderes’s failure to adequately balance economic civil-military relations, the share of Turkey’s defense budget in the overall government budget has been institutionalized to remain medium to high, ever since. For example, as reflected in Table below, the military budget increased from 2017 (constant) USD \$1.543 in 1960 to \$2.496 in 1969.

	Year									
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
SIPRI \$US 2017 constant in billion	\$1.543	\$1.734	\$1.85	\$1.898	\$2.036	\$2.13	\$2.14	\$2.303	\$2.574	\$2.496
	Year									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
SIPRI \$US 2017 constant in billion	\$2.768	\$3.172	\$3.33	\$3.535	\$3.964	\$6.931	\$7.3	\$7.012	\$6.421	\$5.697

Source: SIPRI (2019) Turkey Expenditure 1960-1979. \$US 2017 (constant) in billion

Figure 11 Military expenditure figures in Turkey 1960–1979

Post-military coup, during the 1960s and 1970s, military spending continued to rise, as Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. For example, expenditure jumped from current USD \$1.137 billion to \$2.285 billion from 1974 to 1975 alone (equivalent to a jump from \$3.964 to \$6.931 in 2017 constant USD as reflected in Table above). During the 1980s, military spending spiked once more when the Turkish Armed Forces—as opposed to domestic police—took charge of fighting the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast, following the 1980 coup. This trend of increased military spending was remarkably heightened between 1989 and 1993, when expenditure jumped again from current USD \$3.374 to \$7.075 billion (equivalent to a jump from \$7.772 to \$11.227 in 2017 constant USD). Perhaps some calculated appeasement to the military class in times of transition was factored into budgetary decisions. This translated into increased spending as opposed to an expected drop in military expenditure post-Cold War. In sum, after the 1960 onwards, the amount of the defense budget, weapons modernization programs, and other professional needs have been consistently met. This is considered a learnt lesson of never going below a certain level of officer corps' professional satisfaction. That is one legacy of the 1960 coup that is generalizable in the literature. The reason why this Turkey's 1960 coup is significant in the literature on civil-military relations is that it shows how military interventions institutionalize for certain practices that affect subsequent developments in political, economic, or national security policies.




Figure 12 Turkey's military expenditure in \$US dollar amounts is on the high since 1960, with a drop at the 2002-2003 juncture, followed by another dramatic increase after 2015.
Source: Public data on Google: Tradingeconomics.com based on SIPRI data.

Steadily thereafter net military spending continued to rise throughout the 1990s and 2000s. For example, between 1993 and 2003, spending rose by \$3 billion from current US \$7.075 to \$10.278 (SIPRI, 2019). Around 2003 in particular, which marks the US invasion of Iraq, Turkish military spending reached as high as 3.3% of the Turkish GDP (SIPRI, 2019). Thus far, the Turkish military itself dictated this increased spending between 1960 and 2003, prior to the rise of the AK Party government in 2002 (Kemal, 2013). And while net military spending dropped immediately following that 2003 mark, it was maintained at an average of 2.2% of GDP throughout the rest of the 2000s (SIPRI, 2019).

Some estimates of Turkey's military spending between 2008 and 2014 claim that expenditure flattened at around \$10 billion a year, or about 1.16% of GDP, under the AKP government (Bekdil, 2014). More current data, however, shows that Turkey's military expenditure has been higher than those claims. According to SIPRI, the 2009-2014 figure of military spending was up to \$14 billion. By 2019, this figure is \$19 billion (SIPRI, 2019). More important, however, the

interpretation of this continuous surge is what matters. As opposed to a supposedly positive signs of civilianization of government spending allocations, which would have had to be associated with a decreased military budget under President Erdoğan, his military adventurism into Syria, however, meant he sustained increased military spending, to finance his regionally threatening foreign policy. Significantly, prior to the 2016 attempted coup, there were disagreements among his military leadership regarding his hawkish and military interventionist Syria policy. For example, by the critical juncture of 2012, marking Erdoğan's support for a regional pan-Islamist project (Özkan, 2014), the Turkish President's interventionist foreign policy translated into a civilians-initiated militarized fiscal policy. That is to say the civilian Erdoğan became more militarily adventurist in his decisions regarding Syria. Hence, the civilians pursued a militarized budget. That said, however, while actual spending in dollars increased, military spending as a percentage of GDP initially dropped over the years of the AKP government. The drop of Turkey's military expenditure as percentage of GDP, during the early years of the AKP government, occurred primarily because the Turkish economy performed well and expanded between 2002 and 2014. The Turkish economy started to shift towards decline, however, around that very critical juncture of 2012–2014, when Turkey's foreign policies collided with regional resistance against Erdoğan's pan-Islamist expansionism and his alliance with the Internationalist Muslim Brotherhood group.

The regional impact had its mark as the year 2014 alone registered a 9.4% increase, over that of 2013, in Turkey's combined security, defense, and intelligence budgets (Kemal, 2013). This happened "amid criticism from opposition deputies" of the CHP, who called the increase in security allocations, "excessive" (Kemal, 2013). Far from remaining at \$10 billion a year, between 2008 and 2016, as some pro-government estimates have contended (Bekdil, 2014),

Turkish military expenditures actually ranged between \$13.8 billion and almost \$16 billion during this period. Moreover, budgets for internal security and intelligence were boosted due to the regime's fears of domestic opposition forces, following the Gezi Park anti-government protests in summer 2013.

Responding to regional dynamics, in 2014 a top security assistant to then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Turkey's defense spending was lower than the NATO requirements, and much less than the security needs of a country like Turkey. "Turkey faces multiple conventional and asymmetrical threats and it would be more convenient if it spent 2 to 2.5 percent on defense," he declared (Bekdil, 2014). Accordingly, experts expected defense spending to double by 2018, reaching as high as \$23 billion in proportion to an expected growth in GDP. While by 2019 Turkey's military expenditure does stand at 2.5% of GDP at \$19 billion, it never reached the expected surge of \$23 billion, because the GDP itself took a hit. This hit occurred between 2014 and 2016 due to the failure of the so-called Turkish "Democratically-Islamist Model" in maintaining regionally hegemonic politics (Maziad, 2019, p. 114-115). Due to perilous regional foreign policies, hot cash investments from Arab Gulf States such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia fled the country. Qatar, Turkey's only regional Gulf ally was forced to make up for the Emirati and Saudi exit from Turkish markets. Accordingly, economic dividends stopped flowing from within the region, all while raising suspicions about Turkey, among its European economic partners.




Figure 13 Actual dollar amount of military spending in Turkey 2009–2018. A dramatic surge in spending takes place around 2014–2015 due to Erdoğan’s regional military adventurism. Source: tradingeconomics.com; SIPRI




Figure 14 Decreasing Turkish military expenditures as percentage of GDP (1960–2016), with one spike in 1975. Source of graph: World Bank

According SIPRI (2019) data, we can note a peak in Turkey’s military expenditure as percentage of GDP to be 5.1% from 1974–1975 during the Cyprus invasion. The percentage drops from 3.7% to 1.7% of GDP between 2002 and 2016, under the AKP government. More recent SIPRI (2019) data, however, shows that 2016 military expenditure as percentage of GDP was 2.1% and that of 2019 is 2.5% of GDP. Resurgence in spending was expected between 2018 and 2023, if the President Erdoğan’s regional military adventurism continues. Indeed, Turkey’s 2019 military expenditure has reached \$19 billion, according to SIPRI (2019).




Figure 15 Military expenditure as percentage of GDP. Israel is in blue with a high 30.5% of GDP immediately after Egypt's 1973 War. Egypt is in green with a high 17.2% of GDP right after Israel's 1967 War and in preparation for the 1973 war. Turkey in red, consistently less than 5% of GDP. That peak of 5% was in 1975, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

Source: (World Bank, 2019)




Figure 16 World Bank data on Turkey's GDP




Figure 17 World Bank data on Turkey's GDP in comparison to regional powers

Estimates show that the 2018 figures constitute a “40% rise in spending on the military and paramilitary gendarmerie,” compared to the previous year of 2017 (Köker, 2017). However, the

latest SIPRI data available for 2019 leaves Turkey's military spending at 2.5% of GDP. This is still more than the average of NATO military spending of 1.2%.

Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2018 © SIPRI 2019																	
Country	Notes	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Middle East																	
Bahrain	94	4.7%	4.0%	3.2%	3.1%	3.0%	2.8%	3.6%	3.3%	3.6%	3.8%	4.1%	4.4%	4.6%	4.7%	4.4%	3.6%
Egypt	¶	3.2%	2.9%	2.7%	2.6%	2.4%	2.2%	2.0%	2.0%	1.8%	1.6%	1.6%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%	1.4%	1.2%
Iran	95	2.4%	2.8%	3.0%	3.3%	2.7%	2.8%	3.2%	2.9%	2.4%	2.8%	2.2%	2.3%	2.8%	3.0%	3.1%	2.7%
Iraq	¶ 96	..	1.7%	2.2%	1.9%	2.2%	2.4%	2.9%	2.7%	2.3%	1.9%	3.3%	3.0%	5.3%	3.5%	3.8%	2.7%
Israel	97	8.5%	8.2%	7.7%	7.5%	6.8%	6.6%	6.8%	6.2%	6.2%	6.0%	5.9%	6.0%	5.6%	4.6%	4.4%	4.3%
Jordan		6.0%	5.1%	4.8%	4.7%	6.0%	6.2%	6.6%	5.9%	5.5%	4.8%	4.3%	4.3%	4.3%	4.6%	4.8%	4.7%
Kuwait	98	6.5%	5.8%	4.3%	3.5%	3.6%	3.0%	4.0%	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%	3.3%	3.6%	5.0%	5.8%	5.6%	5.1%
Lebanon		4.7%	4.5%	4.5%	4.6%	4.6%	4.0%	4.0%	4.1%	4.1%	4.0%	4.2%	4.7%	4.5%	5.2%	4.6%	5.0%
Oman	† 99	9.1%	9.0%	8.8%	8.1%	7.7%	5.7%	7.0%	6.3%	7.4%	12.1%	11.1%	10.1%	10.8%	12%	9.6%	8.2%
Qatar		3.3%	2.4%	2.0%	1.8%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	1.5%
Saudi Arabia	§ 100	8.7%	8.1%	7.7%	7.8%	8.5%	7.4%	9.6%	8.6%	7.2%	7.7%	9.0%	10.7%	13.3%	9.9%	10.3%	8.8%
Syria		6.2%	5.5%	5.0%	4.4%	4.1%	3.6%	4.0%	4.1%
Turkey		3.3%	2.7%	2.4%	2.4%	2.3%	2.2%	2.5%	2.3%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	1.9%	1.8%	2.1%	2.1%	2.5%
UAE	101	4.7%	4.6%	3.7%	3.2%	3.3%	3.7%	5.5%	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	6.0%	5.6%
Yemen	102	6.9%	5.3%	4.9%	4.3%	4.9%	4.4%	5.7%	4.7%	4.9%	4.6%	4.1%	4.0%
Yemen, North	103	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

Numbered footnotes can be found on the Footnotes worksheet.
† Figures for these countries do not include military pensions
‡ Figures for these countries are for current spending only (i.e. exclude capital spending)
§ Figures for these countries are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure
¶ Figures for these countries do not include spending on paramilitary forces
The symbols || and || between two parts of a series for a country indicate a series break, where data before the red lines may not be consistent with data after.

Figure 18 Turkey's Defense Budget as Percentage of GDP Note that Turkey spends 2.5% of GDP on defense, while Egypt spends a mere 1.2%. Israel spent a whopping 5.6% of GDP on defense in 2015 and is now down to the still high percentage of 4.3% of GDP

Turkey increased its military spending by 9.7% between 2007 and 2016 (SIPRI, 2016). Standing at a \$19 billion military budget in 2018, Turkey is the 15th largest military spender globally (SIPRI, 2019). Since the attempted military coup in July 2016, however, detailed data on Turkish military expenditure has become harder to obtain. Turkey’s latest state budget for 2018 reached \$198.8 billion (Reuters, 2017; CIA, 2017), military spending reached 19 billion.




Figure 19 Military Expenditure by country in US\$ billions 2018. Source: SIPRI (2019)

But what does this mean for the regional order? Let’s compare Turkey, Israel, and Egypt. Overall, the military expenditure of Turkey could be considered medium-level at 2% of GDP, per NATO recommendation. This level of military spending stands at around 7.5–8% of Turkey’s state budget (assuming figures close to the 2016 military budget of \$14.9 billion and

the 2018 state budget of \$198.8). This is proportionately nearly a third of Israel's budget of 5.8% of GDP and 18% of state budget. And yet it is not as low as Egypt's military budget of 1.6% of GDP and 4% of state budget. Accordingly, Turkey is a prominent military spender regionally and internationally. This entire narrative of how defense spending was not slashed is also a critique of the assumed "civilianization" turn under "civilian" President Erdoğan. Civilianization refers to reducing defense spending, and allocating resources to civilian issues like housing, or healthcare, or education. Activists would have wanted Erdoğan to slash the defense budget. But the numbers show that Erdoğan did not "civilianize" the governmental budget via significant cuts in defense spending. The dollar amount of the defense budget decreased in 2003 but increased again, right after and has been increasing since 2008. Between 2009 and 2018, the budget increased from \$14.3 billion to \$19.57 billion (SIPRI, 2018).

In my analysis, based on these facts, this means, first of all that Erdoğan indeed did not, could not have (and should not have) decreased the defense budget between 2008 and 2011—contrary to the scholars/activists calling for slashed military budgets. If a civilian government encroaches too much on military affairs, including advocating for what would be deemed insufficient defense budgets by the officer corps, that civilian government would be asking for agitation and almost inviting a coup. Thus, civilian control is not just an uncalculated bravado act by civilians over military spending. It requires concordance and agreement between the military, the political leadership, and society (Schiff, 1992). Second, when Erdoğan tried to sufficiently "civilianize" the governmental budget, by maintaining defense spending at the medium level of 2% of GDP and not higher (as in the case of Israel, for example), he only ended up politicizing the armed forces by promoting his own loyalists as beneficiaries versus purging his enemies within the armed forces. Thus, for a while, between 2003 and 2010, Erdoğan continued to

contain and appease the officer corps financially as he could not really cut resources significantly without expecting the risk of mutiny. By 2010, however, he was able to start ridding the army of the Kemalist elements, through his alliance with the Gülenists in the judiciary and the police and through the constitutional amendments that allowed for the trial of military officers in civilian courts (Akyol, 2015, Alpay, 2012). A mutiny did eventually occur, however, in 2016 due to politicization of the Turkish armed forces. The lower rank Gülenist elements had concerns about their upward promotions. They worried about their military career. The 2016 attempted coup was a measure of last resort, as the Gülenist elements knew that Erdoğan's allies, within the armed forces, would eventually sack the Gülenists. Those very Gülenist elements in the armed forces were once Erdoğan's allies in his fight against the Kemalists. The Gülenist eventually became Erdoğan's enemies (Butler, 2016). They performed an ill-planned coup attempt. And sure enough it was foiled and they were imprisoned.

The final point regarding defense spending is that it actually started to get higher by 2015. I argued and illustrated that this was due to Erdoğan's military adventurism into Syria and due to the private business cliques composed of civilian loyalists to his regime. Those civilians ventured into defense industries that were dominated prior by former retired officers (as usually the case worldwide, be it in Egypt, Israel or the United States). Obviously, weapon procurement is paid for by allocated defense budgets. This explains why the defense budget did not significantly decrease in dollar amount over time, since 1960, even under Erdoğan's "civilian" political leadership—That is because his own regime supporters benefit from the defense industries now.

This characterization of the Turkish military budget as not being low, in absolute terms, is meant to show how constant the military economic share in Turkey has remained since 1960 couple, regardless of subsequent military withdrawals, and return of power to civilians. Besides

describing the Turkish case as a separate example, this characterization is also significant as to emphasize that the economic wellbeing of the officers is a necessary condition for non-intervention in politics. It might not be a sufficient condition, since militaries can intervene for ideological, and national security reasons, as in the case of Turkey of 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007. But the literature shows, and I agree, that the economic well being of the officer corps, through adequate economic resources, is a minimum necessary prerequisite for non-intervention.




Figure 20 Comparing Egypt to Turkey’s Military Expenditure. Turkey is over \$19 billion. Egypt is only \$4 billion. Source: Tradingeconomics.com based on SIPRI data.

All of this is also related to my overall argument regarding the regional order because it is important to explain how Egypt’s military economic activities have to be read in light of these regional practices of maintained military economic share: Be it through a formal defense budget that remains high (Israel) or relatively high (Turkey) or through economic activities as a direct perk/bonus/supplement to the military as a social class of state employees, as in the cases of Turkey’s OYAK and Egypt’s NSPO. Egypt is neither an anomaly among the regional practices

of economic civil-military relations. Nor should it be reducing its military economic resources, given the renewed threat Erdoğan's regionally expansionist pan-Islamist regime represents to both Egypt, and to some extent to Israel as well.

The Battle for Budgetary Control: No Concordance

With military expenditure comes military procurement, and the Turkish military arsenal is full. Only five countries on Credit Suisse's list have more submarines than Turkey. It has large fleets of tank, fighter jets, and helicopters. Turkey has also been a committed member to the F-35 program, albeit is not suspended due the clash of the Trump administration with Erdoğan. But who decides on procurements? Is it civilians or the military itself?

Researchers have long criticized Turkey for its military-controlled defense budgets (Akça, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Akça et al., 2014). "In fact, in Turkey discussing military spending was a taboo issue for years. Even discussing it had the effect of frightening people," CHP deputy Vahap Sezer said, referring to the military pressures on those who discussed defense budgets or criticized general military policies (Kemal, 2013, para. 4). "Still, however, despite a new Court of Accounts Law, it is understood that necessary steps have not been taken to allow us to deliberate the defense budget in a transparent fashion," the CHP deputy added, stressing that Turkey has made some development in defense-related issues (Kemal, 2013, para. 5).

The process by which President Erdoğan has exercised control over military spending, however, has passed through a number of phases and is far from linear or uniform. A December 2014 interview I conducted with a Retired Admiral revealed some details regarding the complexity of the question of civilian control over Turkey's military budget. The Admiral explained:

If you are going to be superior to your military forces [as in to exercise civilian control] ... you have to know some budget issues regarding the military. And for years and years, the civilian governments have been asking the military: “How much do you want from me?” If we say 10, they give us 10. If we say 12, they give us 12 (Personal communication, December 2014).

Scholars have increasingly indicated the importance of civilians educating themselves on defense budgeting matters (Cizre, 2010; Cancian, 2015) to change this dynamic. It is important to note, however, that the hoped-for balance in civil-military relations—based on civilian knowledge of military budgetary complexities—is *not* what happened in the Turkish case under the AK Party government of President Erdoğan.

The civilianization of the military budgeting process did not result in less spending or less corruption. Instead of civilian approving military spending plans, produced through civil-military *deliberations* regarding national security threats and foreign policies directions, what happened in the Turkish case was something entirely different. The Retired Admiral explains:

After Erdoğan took power, this situation [of the military controlling defense spending rather than civilians] did not change between 2002 and 2007. Yet, they [in government] were watching the military people. I came two or three times together with Mr. Erdoğan. I was a retired Admiral. He was thinking I must have some connections within the Army, Navy, TGS [Turkish General Staff]— I was not! But he wanted to send some messages— “I am not Erbakan. I have changed.” It was something like that. And at that time, I told him: To be superior to the Turkish Armed Forces— as government [meaning civilian control]—you have to have enough knowledge as to control the budget of the military forces. If you don’t have that, forget about it! Why? Because, as *governor*, you have to

give no more than 2-page directives to the military forces. Very simple. Saying that we will be friends with Greece. We will solve the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey. We will continue to be in the crisis in Syria and Iraq and if the time comes we will solve it using you—the military. And there will be no problem with Russia and our interests with America will continue. Something like that. And at that time if I, the military, come with a budget to you and ask you for Aircraft carriers and some hundred F-18s or something like that, at that time you would say: Hey, didn't you read my instructions?! [As in, there would be no need to that amount of weapon procurement] ... If they don't do this, they will never be superior to the military forces (Personal communication, December 2014).

This quotation emphasizes the importance of *concordance* between the political echelon, the military, and society, regarding foreign policy, military directives, and the required taxes to finance that agreed-upon policy direction (Schiff, 1995). For in the words of Admiral William Owens, formerly of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[T]he budget is the strategy. The budget is the policy. All of the Washington statements that are made on policy and strategy come down to the budget” (Cancian, 2015).

But that is not what happened with Erdoğan's defective type of civilian control over military budget, and military affairs more generally. The Retired Admiral insightfully continued in our interview, a year and half before the attempted coup of July 2016:

Unfortunately, even after I said these things ... Unfortunately, instead of being those kind of politicians, they preferred to—sorry I would use this word—to *destroy* the military forces, using the courts ... Yes, and supported by whom? Fethullah Gülen. They are enemies now [2014]. [sarcastically laughs] But they preferred it that way! Yes. Sadly ...

because as they said, we have to have power over the military forces, I showed them *the way*. They preferred *not* to choose that way. And they said ok. We will use the courts and the lawyers and whatever and we will put in prison [distressed]— *the most brilliant generals and admirals* and then while doing that we will create our *own* forces ... (Personal Communication, December 2014).

It is precisely this kind of “destructive” model of civilian control that the literature on balanced civil-military relations warns us. Civilian authoritarian regime-building strategies, utilizing the military as an arm of their nascent regimes—these should never be the sought-after outcomes from controlling professional militaries. Regrettably, that is what the Turkish model of civil-military relations currently stands for. The politicization that touched the Turkish Armed Forces and split it between Gülenists and Erdoğanians, after both collaborated to rid the military of the secularist statist Kemalists, is the kind of “regimism” that marks the currently flawed Turkish model of civil-military relations (Maziad, 2016b). This generalized distortion in civil-military relations equally impacted the *economic dimension* of civil-military relations. For as the economy suffered from political tensions and risky foreign policies, so did military budgeting and expenditure issues.

With what appears to be a lack of concordance between the military and the government in Turkey in recent years, we might be concerned that an economic downturn could result in another military coup to reaffirm military pensions. Although Erdoğan’s “civilianization” efforts are ostensibly to curtail the political dominance of military officers through controlling purse, the result of a sudden and unexpected economic downturn could spark a military intervention directed against the regime. What explains the Erdoğan regime’s antagonism of military management appears to lie in the praetorian origins of the Turkish defense industry—an industry

that is becoming increasingly dominated by civilians, close to Erdoğan's regime, who are replacing the officers who used to sit on boards of public and private defense companies.

3.5 ORIGINS OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Turkey's defense industry was initiated during the first years of the Republic, but state resources were not sufficient to give the industry the necessary push. By 1952, the nascent national defense industry came to a halt due to the foreign military aid from the United States and arms trading from the US under Turkey's membership in NATO. But as mentioned above, the promises of arms procurement under Menderes's government were not fulfilled, which frustrated the officers, who saw their defense budgets reduced relative to inflation, their promised weapon modernization plans unfulfilled, and their defense industry halted.

Later however, this halt was reversed due to regional circumstances facing Turkey during the 1960s. This include Turkey's eventual invasion of Cyprus in 1974, when an arms embargo was placed on Turkey. At this point, "the primary reason for setting up a defense industry in Turkey was to lower the degree of dependence on allies for arms and technology" (Cizre Sakkalioğlu, 1997, p. 160). As often the case, the embargo pushed Turkey toward the development of an indigenous defense industry dependent on national resources. After 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation was established, albeit with limited resources. In the 1980s, the state initiated the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and the establishment of a national defense industry based on contemporary technology. The Under Secretariat for Defense Industries was established in 1985 under Law No. 3238. Today, companies in the Turkish defense industry operate in air platforms, producing licensed and main products such as the licensed F-16 Fighting Falcon and the now-halted Joint Production of F-35 Lightning II. The Turkish defense

industries also operate in battery and power systems, electronics and software, information technology, land platforms, naval platforms, and rocket-missile ammunition (Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı Turkish Defense Industries Website, 2019).

But who currently dominates Turkey's defense industries? Up until 2012, critics argued that military spending has reached "extremely high levels" and that it is "under the almost absolute control of the military" (Akça, 2010b, p. 5–7). Currently, however, President Erdoğan directly advocates for increased military spending. This happens for two reasons. First is Erdoğan's engagement in military adventurism and regionally aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. To illustrate, Erdoğan's involvement in Syria and his renewed clashes with the Kurdish separatist organization, (known in Turkish as the PKK), are listed in international military reports as reasons behind the surge in military spending (Credit Suisse, 2018).

Second, and important for the question of corruption, Erdoğan's own family members control shares in defense companies that profit from increased procurement allocations (Madra, 2018). Erdoğan's son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, is the minister of energy and natural resources (AFP, 2015). He was later named the Economy Chief as the cabinet's treasury and finance minister (*Malay Mail*, 2018). Another son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar, is the director of a drone company whose main customer is the Turkish Armed Forces (*Hürriyet*, 2016). Another businessman, Ethem Sancak, known for his declared love of Erdoğan, manufactures armored personnel carriers. Headlines such as "Underlying nepotism? Military tank factory becomes part of Turkish-Qatari venture" started to appear in trade magazines such *Defense News* (Bekdil, 2019). Turkey's top tank factory was built in 1975. By presidential decree, it was transferred to BMC, the joint Turkish-Qatari armored vehicles venture. Sancak is the Turkish partner. Known as one of Erdogan's "closest confidants," Sancak is a senior member of Erdoğan's ruling party, and also

serves on the president's executive board. This seemingly reverses the order of influence in praetorian militarism. In the name of civilian control over the military budget, President Erdoğan is personally invested in increasing military spending and not decreasing it as civil-military relations scholar and activists had long hoped (Akça, 2010b). Instead, Erdoğan increased the military budget a) to advance more militarized foreign policies and b) to increase defense industry business for his immediate "civilian" beneficiary clique.

Scholars are unsure how much further military expenditure, and its dependent the defense industry, will expand or contract. As noted before, military expenditure also depends on the strength of the Turkish economy as a whole. Yet the Turkish economy is showing signs of drawbacks. For example, in the same interview, the Retired Admiral described the perils of Turkey's economy back in 2014:

Maybe when you see from the outside, you say, "Oh! The Turkish economy is good and every year it goes up 4%. They are not affected very much by the economic crisis in Turkey." But there is only one reason for that. It is hot money! ... I know what we are producing. What we are selling. What we are buying. And if there is no hot money it takes only 3 or 4 days to collapse.

What this "hot money" signifies is that Turkey's economy is unstable and is dependent on investors' trust in the stability of the political and economy system. If investors trust Turkey's economy they would bring their money. But hot cash means, money that does not stay for long in the economy. Moreover, it is often attributed with money laundry of unproductive trade activities instead of deeply rooted investments in a given country. Due to Turkey's conflict with Egypt and its Gulf allies over political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood for example, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia withdrew their investments from Turkey, leaving only

Qatar to shoulder the burden of investing in the Turkish economy, with more than \$20 billion (Maziad, 2019, p. 119) This withdrawal by Saudi Arabia and Emirates is a withdrawal of hot cash. For example, Abu Dhabi National Energy Co (Taqa) pulled out its \$12b investment from Turkey power projects (Al Makahle, 2013; Oxford Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, 2015; Maziad, 2019, p. 119). We see how the Turkish lira has floundered since 2015. Qatar was pressured to bail the Turkish Lira out by pumping in \$15 billion (the Economist, 2018; Maziad, 2019, p. 119). By April 2019, Turkey has officially entered recession (Devranoğlu, 2019), precisely because of the interruptions in flow of this kind of hot cash. In short, the regional dynamics and more specifically the Turkey-Egypt antagonism over political Islam matter. They have indeed adversely impacted the Turkish economy (Akkoç, 2015).

In the same vein, another Turkish Retired Colonel Professor, with a PhD, at Turkish Think Tank, further elaborated on the economy-military capacity nexus, and what he called *vehm etmek* or conveying mirage and delusions about Turkey's regional economic and military capacities. He told me in a July 2013 interview:

What is the current GDP of Turkey [2013]? 752 Billion Dollars. That is approximately 1/5th of Italy's ... So when you compare yourself with a country that is a middle economic power, and you're only one fifth of it, then how powerful are you, really? ... *A strong army cannot live without a strong economy.* If you have a strong economy, then you have a strong army. Because the takeoff of one F-16 jet, just the takeoff, starts with \$500,000 and if you are not capable of continuing this situation for a longer time, then you don't have a strong army either. *If you don't have the capability of keeping your army active, then you don't have military power.*

This quote from 2013, is almost foretelling of the perilous situation in which the Turkish army finds itself today, as the civilian leadership has pushed the armed forces into military operations. Besides problematic structural issues regarding military cohesion and fighting capacity, following the thousands of purges of the top-trained military officers (Star, 2016), the retired colonel makes clear that the Turkish economy itself could be negatively impacted by President's Erdoğan's newfound militarism. An incrementally weaker civilian economy could fail to support a sustained military effort. And military losses could further impact the civilian economy. Nonetheless, civilian war profiteers, close the political leadership, could very well continue to reap some benefits from their defense industry sales, in the meantime (Hürriyet, 2016; Bekdil, 2019). This condition, in of itself, might recreate further agitations within the army.




Figure 21 Turkey's GDP Compared to Italy and other Middle East Countries.




Figure 22 Turkey's GDP Compared to European Countries and other Middle East Countries

In conclusion, earlier I addressed oscillations between civilianization and militarization within the military budgets and defense industries. Ironically, since 2012, civilians controlling military spending did *not* reduce military budgets, or “civilianize” foreign policy in the Turkish case. On the contrary, an intricate civilian-dominated military-industrial complex ensued as a new war profiteering apparatus burgeoned (Bekdil, 2019). Furthermore, evidence shows that, as the current civilian government increased its grip on military expenditure, it further expanded spending towards a more militarized foreign policy—a pitfall into which militarily adventurist civilians sometimes become entrapped. One such prominent example is militarily adventurist “civilian” Saddam Hussein in his decision to go to war and invade Kuwait. In doing so, he undermined regional resistance and international convergence in support of this resistance.

Now that we understand some of the dynamic behind Turkey's military budget and military-industrial complex (the conflict between a Kemalist, secularized military and an Islamist regime), we can turn to a discussion of OYAK, another battleground for civilian or military control. The next section analyzes the inception story of the third dimension of the Turkish military's economic involvement, namely the civilian-products enterprises, managed by the OYAK Pension Fund.

3.6 MILITARY-CONTROLLED CIVILIAN-PRODUCTS ENTERPRISE: THE OYAK STORY

The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund, OYAK, is one of Turkey's biggest conglomerates with approximately 90 subsidiaries in Turkey and abroad, operating in industry, finance, and services (Parla, 1974, 1998). The Group's local subsidiaries cover various sectors, including mine metallurgy, concrete, energy, chemicals, cyber-security services, building and construction works, medical technologies, veterinary products, foodstuff, tourism, financial services, automotive and logistics. Meanwhile, OYAK also operates in 19 countries, while contributing to the Turkish economy by creating over 30,000 jobs (OYAK website). Current business partners include Renault, Axa, Goodyear and Elf, and Turkish conglomerates such as Sabancı, Koç, and Yaşar Holdings (Kuru, 2012). OYAK profits are *never* used for military spending or for investment projects in the defense sector (Butler, 2012). Its economic investments are exclusively run for the post-retirement benefits of Turkish military personnel.

Scholars have argued that one aspect of Turkey's economic militarization is the fact that its armed forces act as a "collective capitalist organization through OYAK" (Akça, 2010, p. 8). But OYAK is far from the only example of militarily controlled enterprises. The literature on civil-military relations in Latin America and Asia does look at military economic interests in the

private sector. From this scholarship the term *milbus* developed to describe groups like OYAK. The term was coined and later re-conceptualized by Ayesha Siddiqa in her book *Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (2007). Siddiqa defines *milbus* as: “[M]ilitary capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, but is neither recorded nor part of the defense budget (p. 1). Accordingly, “it is a completely independent genre of capital.” *Milbus* main characteristic attribute is entrepreneurial activities that do not follow “the normal accountability procedures of the state” (p. 1). Militaries in countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, and a number of Latin American countries, have engaged in economic activities to supplement their lower military budgets, forming and expanding *milbus*-like organizations (Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003). In contrast to this notion, I argue that the very birth of such a collective organization can be explained as a product of civilians’ failure to manage the civilianization process of the Turkish economy in the early 1950s.

In this section, links are made to the way OYAK’s inception story is mimetic to (and eventually diverge from) Nasser’s contemporaneous regional model of nationalization of private assets into a huge public sector in 1961, and how ultimately, OYAK’s public/private characteristics link to the blueprint for Egypt’s own National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) (discussed in the following chapter) whose 1979 law shares significant similarities with that of OYAK.

OYAK was a direct product of Turkey’s first military intervention on May 27, 1960. Law No. 205, ratified on January 3, 1961 by the ruling junta of the National Unity Committee (NUC), created an Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund to advocate for the post-retirement interests of the army officers. Thus, some scholars describe OYAK as a “product of a legislative exercise from an extraordinary period” (Akça, 2010b, p. 8). Moreover, Turkey experts point to the fact

that the process that established OYAK led to a law that remained one of the longest-standing Turkish laws, all while normalizing OYAK's very presence as a market player (Akça, 2004, pp. 230-234, 2006, pp. 333-338; Parla, 1998 p. 29).

As civilian state bureaucrats, liberal intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie supported the military intervention of 1960 itself, OYAK's birth was welcomed by segments of society for various political and economic reasons. In fact, civilians served on the Fund's administration in the early years of its establishment. The main economic justification for an entity like OYAK rested on the idea that retired military officers are "only provided a modest living" and are "unable to retain lifestyles that correspond to their social status" (Akça, 2010, p. 9). Accordingly, OYAK emerged so that retired officers "would no longer be worried about their future and could enjoy financial and spiritual peace" (p. 9).

The exact wording in the reports leading up to the establishment of OYAK gave the following rationale:

After the long years of active duty, the retirement benefits and salaries make possible only a modest mode of life, even not enough to buy a small apartment... Under the current regulations, the military officers once retired are not able to live a life appropriate to their social status... This proposition of law has been prepared in order to make possible for the members of the military to attain material and spiritual ease through their mutual assistance and their own financial sources...

Quoted as such in the reports of the proposal of the Law no. 205 and of the Commission of Security and Economy, references to the reports are made in Akça (2006, p. 334) citing law Professor Ejder Yılmaz (1989, pp. 67-68), who also offered legal consultancy to OYAK. The evidence from the Committee of National Unity's General Assembly records underlines the

socio-economic dissatisfaction of the military members as one of the most important reasons behind the establishment of OYAK (Parla, 1998, pp. 37-38). The report's emphasis on the officers' allocation of "their mutual assistance and their own financial resources," introduces the concept of military self-sufficiency to the Turkish case. Self-sufficiency is more acutely prominent in Egypt and Israel. It seems, however, that the concept is integral to the regional order, given each country's careful trepidations between reliance on international allies, on the one hand, or civilian domestic economic partners, on the other hand.

For those partners could very well be oblivious to military needs. Moreover, this tendency toward self-sufficiency can be explained as a product of the general circumstance of being under a financially tight, increasingly civilianized political and economic culture. Under those circumstances, militaries would find themselves pushed to assume a role of resourceful self-reliance, as if to fend for themselves, as they continue to perform their basic defense function.

While some scholars, like Ismet Akça (2010b), argue that military officers in Turkey saw themselves as a "privileged community" (p. 9), it is clear that under the Democrat Party (DP) government of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, officers were deemed a *lower status*, and were only attempting to match themselves *up* to other counterparts in the rising civilian communities of technocrats and businessmen. The officers were "worried about their future" as stated in the report leading the Law of OYAK (Yılmaz, 1989, pp. 67-68). Civil-military relations literature classically informs us, however, that "worried" armed forces can turn into an agitated and mobilized force to the extent of intervening in an outright coup (Huntington, 1957). Hence, the lesson learned is that balanced civil-military relations should never make the armed forces *that* worried.

Accordingly, the emphasis on social status, at the time, can be interpreted as a reaction to civilian dynamics. Soldiers tried to keep up with a newly emerging civilian business class. In other words, as Turkey rapidly changed from an earlier era of *state capitalism* (1923–1950) into a *capitalistic society* (1950–1960), the young officers became acutely aware of their disadvantage as state employees. This societal economic transformation under Menderes happened at a critical juncture of a decreased state role in the economy. Nonetheless, the situation reflects a failure on the part of the civilian government as to not anticipate an expected coup that primarily rested on economic hardships.

Turkey scholar Feroz Ahmad explains the development of the military into an “unprivileged” class when he describes how after Ataturk’s death in 1938, “there was a sense of anti-climax when ordinary and lesser men took over the reins of power” (1993, p. 122). This is an economic-grievances explanation for the agitated officers. The young officers started to detest the rising class of civilian officials and businessmen who were establishing a new political and economic culture. Ahmad continues, “This class lived well while people who had to live on a fixed salary had difficulty simply keeping afloat because of the high rate of inflation” (p. 122).

The contrast between civilians and the military, as two social classes, became more apparent during World War II and until the late-1950s, as corruption prevailed, and the black-market helped make fortunes. Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, one of 1960 coup leaders, was a young officer during the World War II. Recalling the humiliation, he wrote:

During this period, the administration, with the Milli Şef [National Chief, the self-chosen title by İsmet İnönü in 1938] and his accomplices in the lead adopted a patronizing and belittling attitude towards the army and the officers and the generals who led it. The cost of living and the struggle to survive was humiliating and suffocating to the officers.

Everywhere they were treated like second-class human beings. In Ankara, people had labeled basement flats “Staff-Officer flats.” In places of entertainment officers were nicknamed “lemonaders” because they could not afford to order expensive drinks and compete with the black-marketeers and profiteers; the sons of this sacrificing nation were described by such names! (Ahmad, 1993, p. 123).

If that was the sentiment of Colonel Türkeş in the mid-1940s, when he was in his late twenties, things did not progress by the time for multi-party politics and the Democrat Party victory in 1950. Despite the Colonel’s hope that things would evolve for the country and the army, they hardly did. The armed forces reform was long awaited and was supposed to be part of the DP’s program. Yet that reform did not take place under the civilian Menderes government. Another way of dissecting the 1960 military coup is looking at it as a product of a power struggle between two social forces operating under different economically hegemonic projects (Akça, 2006, p. 334). By the mid-1950s, Turkey witnessed a capital accumulation crisis (Pamuk, 1981, p. 21). As the Democrat Party insisted on its *rural-centered* accumulation and development plans, which perpetuated high inflation and budgetary deficit, a counter-force formed in response to Menderes’s project, with another hegemonic alternative. This counter-force was a coalition of *urban-based* social groups.

It did not help that Menderes relied on an increasingly Islamized version of authoritarianism. This complex circumstance of economic and cultural dimensions caused a counter-reaction within society after Menderes took power. In the end, the 1960 military intervention was backed by “an urban-based coalition dissatisfied with the DP policies” (Akça, 2006, p. 334). They included the military and civil servants, industrial bourgeoisie, and developmentalist intellectuals, who joined forces against the Menderes government. This mix of civilian and

military actors is what made the 1960 intervention possible. Significantly, this very coalition was eventually reflected in the management structure of OYAK (Akça, 2006 p. 334). As Turkish Scholar Taha Parla (1998) states:

OYAK became a legal institutional and decision-making structure that brings into an organic whole 1) the armed forces, 2) the upper civilian bureaucracy, 3) the peak organizations of big business, commanding/commanded by, we may add, a collective capital consisting of *army* capital, *state* capital, and *private* capital—both national and transnational (Parla, 1998, p. 37, emphasis added).

This designation of both public and private attributes characterized OYAK since its inception. Moreover, the merger of *army, state, and private capital* became a basis on which OYAK progressed into one of the main capitalist, profit-seeking, conglomerates in Turkey. Interestingly, OYAK's private capital model and legal setup was to be emulated by Egypt, two decades later, when Sadat and later Mubarak veered away from statist policies to engage with free market economics (Mitchell, 1991, 1999, 2002) and both designated a partnership role for the military in economic development (Satloff, 1988, p. 10-11).

Political Economist Sinan Ülgen of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) emphasized to me, in a 2013 interview, that despite the initial ambiguity of the OYAK setup, decades later OYAK has no “privilege” or special status in an already established free market Turkish economy:

In Turkey, as it is rightly observed, the military has an economic arm. But that military involvement in the economy is just like that of any other market player. There are no special privileges given to the military that has to undermine other market players ... That doesn't mean that the military is *NOT* a market player; *they are* ... There are no

special rules and regulations that give advantages for the military in terms of competition in the market. That is what I mean by “no privilege.” And that is why there had been no attack on the military’s economic operations because that would be unconstitutional (Personal communication, June 2013).

When I asked Ülgen why it would be “unconstitutional” to assault the Turkish military economic activities, he unequivocally replied, “Because you cannot discriminate against a market player, just because the funding comes from the military officers. That would be unconstitutional. It would be against the constitutional right of free enterprise.”

As we have seen in this section, socio-economic factors led to the development of the holding company OYAK, a *milbus*-like organization that has since founding grown to become a major player in the Turkish economy. This group is composed primarily of military officer staff and military officer funds, but also represents a public-private blend of interests. Under the current neoliberal and Islamist Erdoğan regime, a process of civilianization is underway that threatens a constitutional crisis for OYAK. So, what is the legal and constitutional standing of OYAK *within* Turkey’s free enterprise economy? And what is the current status and future of the OYAK group, which is targeted for civilianization by the AKP government? After all, in May 2016, the management of the OYAK group was changed in what was described as a “civilian coup” (Gurcan, 2016). The government forced this “civilian coup” onto OYAK, only two months before the attempted military coup of July 15, 2016.

Characterizing OYAK: military or civilian organization?

OYAK’s legal status has been somewhat perplexing. It operates as both a private and public entity, per the very law that created it. Article I of Law No. 205 states that “OYAK is an institution related to the Ministry of National Defense.” Yet, it also characterizes it is an

administratively and financially independent legal entity: “The Fund shall be subject to the provisions of this Law and *private law* and shall be a corporate body with *financial and administrative autonomy*” (Law of OYAK, 1961).”

If Article I stated the “private” nature of the Fund, Article 37 emphasized its “public” attributes: “All of the property of the Fund as well as all of the revenues and debts due to the Fund shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as State property. Offences against such property shall be subject to the same legal remedies as offences against State property” (Law of OYAK, 1961). The OYAK Law regulates OYAK’s dealings with third parties, which legally allows OYAK to pursue private income-generating activities.

Thus, OYAK Law renders it a public legal entity because it provides it with public rights and privileges, all while maintaining its private designation in terms of financial gains. The result is that OYAK has a uniquely tailored legal status that permits it to reap the benefits of both private and public law. For example, the Supreme Military Administrative Court (SMAC) had been the legal arbitrator of OYAK and its beneficiaries. Accordingly, in cases brought against OYAK, the criticism has been that SMAC’s verdicts routinely sided with the Fund against the civilian complainants. Cases against OYAK include claims regarding the benefit distribution to former beneficiaries and the constitutionality of compulsory membership to OYAK (Akça, 2006, pp. 315–16, 2010b, p. 9). This situation has recently changed under Erdoğan. In 2018, the currently amended constitution abolished the SMAC, and Supreme Military Court of Appeals altogether (Gurses, 2016; Gagaptay, 2018), not only stripping OYAK of military judiciary privileges, but also denying the actual Armed Forces their military courts.

In annual reports, OYAK managers have emphasized the civilianization developments taking place in OYAK over the years, as they tend to *dissociate* the Fund from the military (OYAK

Annual Activity Report, 2017, p. 3). For example, in OYAK's Activity Reports, the following is stated under the subtitle: "What OYAK Is Not?"

- It is *not* a part of the government's social security system.
- It is *not* a part of the Turkish Armed Forces.
- It is *not* an institution that receives aid or subsidies from the government and/or any agency.
- It is *not* a commercial institution that participates in defense industry activities.
- It is *not* an institution that does *not* pay taxes.
- It is *not* a corporation or limited company. It does not have capital and issued shares.

Hence, neither the government nor personal investors have had OYAK shares. (Activity Report, 2011, p. 2)

Contrary to OYAK's self-depiction as a separate entity from the Turkish Armed Forces, however, critics have highlighted that the Fund's administrative structure shows that "the military is clearly in control" (Akça, 2010b, p. 9). For example, critics cite that the permanent membership of the Fund is made of active officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civilians holding administrative posts within the Turkish Armed Forces (Law of OYAK Article 17, "Members of the Fund", 1961). All those members pay mandatory salary contributions to OYAK. These mandatory salary contributions, critics argue, could count as a disguised way of receiving "aid or subsidy from the government" that the OYAK website denies. Moreover, OYAK's detractors add, "this constant supply of cash becomes OYAK's greatest strength during times of financial crisis" (Akça, 2010b, p. 11).

A counter-argument, however, should be that, because this share is to be invested for post-retirement compensations *of* military personnel, it serves the function of normal supplementary

retirement pensions *for* military personnel. Hence, this is the normal logical *raison d'être* of the Fund and the officers' membership payments constituting it.

Moreover, since most members of the Armed Forces retire at the colonel level, in their mid-forties, those retired officers would require a second career and/or enough retirement bonuses to keep them on par with other social classes. In this respect, OYAK functions as offering necessary services to keep those armed forces personnel un-agitated at the collective and individual level post-military service. For example, although junior officers often complain about the compulsory deduction from their monthly incomes, they “realize how beneficial it can be as their retirement age approaches” (Gurcan, 2016). Retired non-commissioned officers, who pay obligatory fees to OYAK, have also criticized the fund's reflection of high-ranking officers' special interests (İnsel and Bayramoğlu, 2004; Kuru, 2012, p. 40). Both the officers and NCOs, however, receive “a substantial retirement bonus from OYAK” besides their state retirement benefits. For example, “A four-star general with 40 years of service gets about \$250,000 retirement bonus from OYAK, while a colonel with 30 years gets \$110,000 and an NCO about \$90,000” (Gurcan, 2016).

This is a significant amount that matches up the officers and NCOs, alike, to other civilian professionals engaged in free enterprise, especially as civilians, on average, retire at an older age than officers, and are also free to have a private practice of their professions. A surgeon, an engineer, a journalist, or a lawyer can continue to practice the same profession, in public institutions and or/privately, much longer than retired officers who are made to leave the military at an earlier age to avoid a top-heavy staff of generals. That is because the military is intrinsically a hierarchical institution that, by design, must retain a pyramid-like shape in its leadership.

OYAK's Function and Administration: Social Welfare and Social Service for Armed Forces Officers

There are two kinds of services that OYAK provides for its members: social welfare and social services. *Social welfare* concerns the pension, death, and disability benefits in exchange for years of contributions. OYAK members of at least 10 years receive them post-retirement (Akça, 2004, pp. 235–237; OYAK Annual Report, 2009, p. 18). As for OYAK's provision of *social services*, this takes the form of *credits and loans* provided to OYAK members for long-term investments. Since the 1960s, OYAK also established “Army Bazaars,” which, like the British NAAFI⁷ and the American PX⁸, offer discounted goods to the armed forces. “This proved a great hedge against inflation because everything from food to refrigerators was sold at prices substantially lower than those, which the average citizen was forced to pay” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 131).

A criticism often fielded against OYAK is that what distinguishes it from other social security institutions is that OYAK has no restrictions on redirecting its savings funds into income-generating projects. However, OYAK highlights its unusual success as the only functional example of “complementary occupational pension funds in Turkey,” known as “second pillar” pension systems, because they provide secondary funds to basic pensions (OYAK Annual Report, 2011, p. 1). The rationale remains, as Huntington (1957, p. 15) argues, that those “professional managers of violence” have to attain and maintain financial security

⁷ The Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) is a company, which the British government established in 1920 to manage British Armed Forces needed recreational activities, and to sell merchandize to officers and their families. NAAFI runs clubs, bars, shops, supermarkets, launderettes, restaurants, cafés and other facilities on most British military bases and also canteens on board Royal Navy ships. It operates in military bases in Britain and overseas (NAAFI website, n.d).

⁸ PX stands for Post Exchange and was chosen to differentiate it from BX (Base Exchange) used on Air force bases. “In the US Armed Forces, BX is a common name for a type of retail store operating on United States military installations worldwide. Originally akin to trading posts, they now resemble department stores or strip malls. <https://www.shopmyexchange.com>

while in active-duty and post-retirement. OYAK has been a means to that end.

OYAK's administration has a board made up of 50 to 100 member representatives. The Board has routinely consisted of a mix of retired and active-duty military members. The seven-member board of directors, despite the law stating that a maximum of three members out of the seven-member board of directors may be military personnel, since 1976 the military has controlled four seats in addition to the presidency of the board (Akça, 2010b, p. 9). The "civilian takeover" of May 2016 was meant to upset this setup and change OYAK's leadership with AKP-vetted managers. Civilian professionals, on the other hand, administer OYAK subsidiary companies. Retired military officers serve on the boards of these companies. But data is lacking in terms of their numbers (Akça, 2010b, p. 9).

As critics have looked negatively at the officer-dominated OYAK Board as a feature of economic militarization, in contrast, an EDAM Think Tank scholar emphasized the normalcy of the military Board members:

They can be on the board to represent the interests of their pension, but they are not on the executive/managerial level of the subsidiaries. They are on the board level. That's understandable. If they own 60% of a given company, then they should get their representation at the board level (personal communication, June 2013).

In line with this scholar's analysis, other experts have pointed out that "the true shareholders of OYAK, are the officers and NCOs. This *naturally* makes the military high command influential in shaping OYAK's management" (Gurcan, 2016). Perhaps, the full avowal of profit-seeking activities of OYAK is what has placed it at a different position from other countries' military-run businesses. Egypt's military, for example, has not clearly declared their revenues and boasted their returns on investments. Moreover, OYAK's hiring private auditing firms and

publicly releasing annual returns, while divorcing the group from the Public Oversight Delegation, was designed to relieve OYAK from political attacks regarding “public oversight” or “parliamentary oversight” or “civilian governmental oversight.”

OYAK: The Military Holding Company

OYAK was established as a profit-seeking financial institution that acts like a holding company. It operates in all economic sectors of industry, services, trade, and finance. Taha Parla (1998) asserts it is “difficult to speak of OYAK’s economic activities as having an orientation toward national military self-sufficiency—let alone national economic development They are rather profit oriented in the strict sense of the term” (p. 31). But has OYAK benefited the market in terms of competition or has it monopolized the market?

Critics highlight that the 1960 to 1980 period is when the net value of OYAK steeply rose. OYAK is accused of benefiting from the protectionist policies of Turkey’s import substitution industrialization era. For example, as OYAK ventured into the automotive and steel industries, it was shielded “by bloated customs duties, bans on imports, tax freedoms, and state subsidies” (Akça, 2010b, p. 12).

Post-1980, OYAK continued to thrive when Turkey shifted to liberal economic policies. Akça points out, “Thanks to the oligopolistic nature of the industrial production sector in the post-1980 period, OYAK and other large corporations maintained high profit margins, with power concentrated in the automotive, cement, iron-steel, and agricultural chemicals sectors” (Akça, 2010b, p. 12). My interviewee from EDAM think thank, however, refutes this:

Yes, OYAK is a market player. But one player among many! I mean there is no market sector where OYAK is the only operator. They are partners with Renault. But there are other car manufacturers. They have a cement plant. But there are other cement factories.

They have an insurance business but there are other insurance companies. They used to have an OYAK Bank but they don't have a bank anymore. In 2007, OYAK sold its bank to ING for \$2.7 billion (Personal communication, June 2013).

One can conclude that through OYAK, the military officers are market players but far from monopolize the market. Moreover, while Akça (2010b) has criticized OYAK for continuously maximizing profits through “neoliberal accumulation strategies,” all while using rhetoric of “national security and the national interest” (p. 12), regarding the unique setup of combining private/public designations, EDAM scholar somewhat agrees with Akça's (2010) characterizations but then later qualifies the notion of “advantage” in important ways:

But of course, initially, they were able to bring in some big foreign names as their partners. Renault, AXA. Foreign names came to partner with them. And from the Renault perspective, they decided to partner with OYAK essentially because they believe this alliance would give them an *advantage* to overcome some of the bureaucratic barriers. That is the logic (Personal communication, June 2013).

Indeed, this kind of “advantage” is at the core of some of the criticism fielded at OYAK as a privileged domestic Turkish partner to international business. While my scholar interviewee at EDAM recognizes the problematic advantage OYAK held as a Turkish local partner with global investors, he counter argues, however, that this situation was more prominent in the past than it is today:

So, the reason that the military was able to get Renault as a partner is perhaps a question that you should ask in terms of the military's economic role. One reason in the past, much less so today, was that having the military as a partner in Turkey would help the foreign investor overcome some of the red-tape, the bureaucracy associated with investing in

Turkey and becoming operational in Turkey ... There is a soft advantage, you know, of having the Pension Fund as your partner. That is the main advantage.

What this indicates for OYAK and the broader region is that the public/private nature of the holding company made OYAK a conduit for foreign businesses to enter into the Turkish economy. By reducing red tape for non-Turkish companies, OYAK functioned, curiously, as a neoliberal element of the Turkish economy, reducing the bureaucratic drag on economic activity and state control over foreign investments.

OYAK's Evolution and Growth

If OYAK functioned as a preferred domestic partner for international business in earlier decades, by the 1990s this advantage seems to have been less pronounced, as big Turkish conglomerates like Sabancı or Koç engaged in international partnerships. Moreover, while neoliberal privatization and financial investment strategies helped OYAK make huge gains through acquisition of public sector companies, OYAK has in fact partnered with other local market players such as Sabancı's subsidiary OYSA to buy two cement factories that were privatized in 1992. It joined GAMA holding company to acquire another cement factory in 1996. For example, OYAK had had a relative advantage following the 2001-banking crisis, where it obtained Sümerbank (Akça, 2010b p. 12). And by 2005, OYAK purchased one of Turkey's biggest and most lucrative public sector iron-steel firms, Erdemir. While Turkey witnessed a number of financial crises since 1989, which worsened in 1994, 1999, 2001, and 2008 as the Turkish economy experienced problematic financial capital accumulation, OYAK pursued financial gains by lending to the over-indebted state at high interest rates.

Throughout the 2000s, OYAK continued to boast its income-generating, profit-maximizing endeavors as a sign of successful investments with optimum returns for its constituents. The

fund's 2009 Annual Report opening statement explicitly declares that it operates as a holding company for high returns:

... OYAK is a mutual assistance organization and a pension fund committed to achieving the highest financial returns for its members. It also functions as a holding company that manages a variety of portfolio and equity investments distinguished by their social and environmental value, in order to earn maximum returns for members while maintaining a sound actuarial balance (OYAK Annual Report, 2009, p. 1)

In the most recent Annual Report of 2016, OYAK further emphasized that its primary purpose is “to establish a secure future for its nearly 306 thousand members” by providing “the highest possible level of return” and delivering “high value-added services through its unique service model.” Most recently however, in May 2016 there has been a civilian takeover of the top management of OYAK. It has been interpreted as a civilian encroachment on the necessary financial well-being of the military officers, in an already free market economy, where AKP affiliates are the rising business class, who seem to be the ones receiving the current preferential treatment. President Erdoğan travels with an entourage of more than 200 businessmen to broker deals during country visits. I personally witnessed such meetings in Cairo in November 2012. If the civilian takeover of OYAK described earlier continues, however, the financial security of the Turkish military officers might be jeopardized.

Another question regards OYAK's relationship to those other market players, such as Sabancı and Koç. How do they find OYAK's presence as a conglomerate? Are there conflicts? My interviewee at EDAM think tank asserts, “They are competing. They have to compete. But there is no bad blood between them. Because OYAK is competing for the same purpose as the others do.”




Figure 23 OYAK as a Holding Company—Assets, Revenue, and Exports 2018.




Figure 24 The new 2019 OYAK website emphasizes the paid taxes.

Finally, with all the academic criticism of OYAK as a dominant player in the Turkish economy, the data presents a somewhat different reality. Consider the following:

1. OYAK's Total Assets of \$18.3 billion represent only 2% of Turkey's 2016 GDP
2. OYAK's Total Revenue of \$8.5 billion represents barely 0.99% of Turkey's 2016 GDP
3. OYAK's Total Exports of \$3.5 billion represents a mere 0.4% of Turkey's 2016 GDP

Now compare this to another big civilian family conglomerate, such as that of Koç's 2016 revenues of 70.9 billion lira, equivalent to \$19.34 billion for 2017 exchange (Cezer, 2017) and we find that Koç represents 2.25% of Turkey's 2016 GDP of \$863.7 for that year (World Bank Turkey). Thus the comparison between OYAK's revenue to that of Koç's is 0.99% of GDP to 2.25% of GDP. Both represent a fraction of the Turkish GDP of \$863.7 billion. Definitely OYAK is no sole dominant player as critics make it seem.

This alternative comparison of Koç and OYAK demonstrates the latter's lack of a monopoly in Turkey. That is to say, according to 2016 exchange rate (0.2734 USD = 1 TRY), the revenues of Koç would be \$19.3 billion while OYAK's revenue was \$18.3 billion. These are quite close. OYAK is therefore far from being a market monopolist. Similar data in the following chapter will reveal that Egypt's own NSPO is merely one market player among many, but indeed with a real "orientation toward national military self-sufficiency and a national economic development" mandate, to use Parla's (1998, p. 31) terms, which he argues does not apply to OYAK in its strict sense of profit making as a pension fund for the military officers.

Taxes are another subject that OYAK has been criticized for as a given economic advantage. While OYAK subsidiaries *do pay taxes*, OYAK itself is exempted from a number of taxes (income, inheritance, estate transfer taxes, and revenue stamp duties). OYAK is also accused of reaping benefits from this particular business, when it passes on bankrupt companies to publicly owned firms, when it partners with public enterprises, and when it secures public procurement contracts or use public resources (Akça, 2010b, p. 11). EDAM think tank analyst confirms one tax advantage:

There is only one tax benefit, which I think OYAK has—an income tax exemption. For example, when OYAK invests in a business, the business operates as a normal company.

It pays taxes. There is no privilege there. At the year-end, after an OYAK subsidiary receives the profit, it pays a corporate tax on that profit. There is no problem there either. Then the business, after having paid the corporate tax, it distributes money to its owners—That’s why the owners invested in the business to begin with. When the after-taxed money is distributed to the owners, per Turkish tax law, you are supposed to pay an income tax. And to the best of my knowledge, OYAK *does not pay an income tax*.

Accordingly, not paying income tax is the only advantage that OYAK seems to have over other market players. “But the competition rules and everything else apply to them,” the EDAM scholar affirmed. When I asked him directly: Do you expect the military officers to continue to have their setup of an economically active business group forever? His answer again was unequivocal: “Yes, because this is a pension fund!” When I specified: So there is no interest in seeing them privatized? He was almost alarmed by the question itself, stating, “It *can’t* be done. It’s *unconstitutional*. Because they operate the way any other pension fund does. Take the California Pension Fund that invests in Turkey, for example. It operates the same way!”




Figure 25 OYAK total taxes paid in 2016, 2017 and 2018. Source: OYAK Website

In contrast to the EDAM analyst’s understanding of OYAK and its constitutional standing in the Turkish economy there are contrary viewpoints from critics, spearheaded by Akça’s academic work, whose analysis aims for the “military-economic deconstruction as a necessary step for the civilianization of spaces, which currently perpetuate militarism” (Akça, 2010b, p. 5). For example, Akça concluded his seminal report recommendation from 2010 addressing the three pillars of Turkey’s military economic structure (military spending, defense industries, and OYAK) and offered proposals for short- and long-term solutions. These proposals had two basic propositions:

- 1) Eliminate the almost absolute control of the military over all three pillars, opening them to democratic oversight by the parliament and civilian organizations;
- 2) Deconstruct the existing military-economic structure so that Turkey’s economic resources can be used to meet democratic social needs, rather than those needs

determined by a military rationale. (Akça, 2010b, p. 5)

Regrettably, however, it is these kinds of recommendations that allowed the AKP government and President Erdoğan to take over the military spending decision-making process in order to further advance his militarized foreign policies. This is not the civilianization our scholar-activists had hoped for. Against Akça’s vision, the Erdoğan regime has penetrated into the defense industries family members and a civilian clique instead of divesting from the war industry into civilian economic sectors. In addition, while according to the EDAM think tank analyst, a slow civilian takeover of OYAK itself for the purpose of weakening and eliminating it is unconstitutional, that very civilian takeover is what occurred in 2016.




Figure 26 OYAK revenue has slightly declined in 2018 from 2017

To illustrate, under President Erdoğan, the OYAK law has been attacked since 2012. Parliamentarian AK Party Bursa deputy Ismail Aydin said in a Reuters' interview, “It is very dated and does not satisfy today’s conditions. It is a law prepared in anti-democratic conditions” (Butler, 2012). Aydin was the chairman of a parliamentary subcommittee investigating

complaints from OYAK NCO members (Butler, 2012). He continued, “The OYAK law was prepared in 1961 and emerged right after the coup; it was prepared by the military themselves. The law must be revised and adapted to today’s circumstances” (Butler, 2012). Ultimately, by May 2016, the management of OYAK was changed by government intervention. OYAK CEO Coskun Ulusoy unexpectedly quit in May of 2016 after 16 years of successfully managing the group. Under his leadership OYAK had become a dominant economic player and international business actor to reckon with. Its total economic worth grew to \$20 billion in assets and revenue combined and its annual exports reaching \$3.3 billion (Munir, 2016). All this data shows how OYAK transcended being a pension fund and became a “rich, big, powerful, and fertile economic conglomerate for the Turkish Armed Forces personnel” (Gurcan, 2016).

But in May 2016, just two months before the attempted military coup, the assault on OYAK’s management was described by journalist Metin Munir (2016) of the news website T24, as a “civilian coup.” The first surprise regarding the “extraordinary civilian takeover” was the resignations of retired Lt. Gen. Necati Ozbahadir and his team on the executive board. Then came the resignation of the once much-celebrated CEO Ulusoy.

A new Retired Major General became chairman of the board and Süleyman Savaş Erdem, who was the deputy head of the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, was appointed as CEO of the group. The change in management was almost completely ignored in the Turkish media (Gurcan, 2016). In fact, the OYAK management was instructed not give any interviews or any information besides the name of the new CEO being Erdem. Erdem is known to be close to President Erdoğan (Gurcan, 2016; Jacoby, 2016, p. 134). These moves raised questions. People wondered if it was yet another purge, which became customary in the year prior to the attempted military coup of July 2016. As Munir (2016) explicitly said that with this “civilian coup” he emphasized

that “Turkish Armed Forces’ rule of OYAK has ended and the AKP era has started.” It was then predicted that all higher managers appointed to work under Ulusoy by the military high command would be removed and “new managers *loyal to the AKP* will replace them over time” (Munir, 2016). That is what happened.

More alarmingly, critics thought that with this shakeup, it seems that AKP has no intention of expanding OYAK. Rather, the party is suspected “to first shrink it through privatization and eventually eliminate it” (Gurcan, 2016). Others concluded, it would be no surprise if economic fears not dissimilar to those ushering in previous interventions (Günlük-Şenesen & Kırık, 2015) contributed to the 2016 coup attempt (Jacoby, 2016, p. 134)

These were precisely the questions I raised in my interviews during fieldwork in 2013. Five years later, despite being told that it would be unconstitutional, this is precisely what seems to be happening to OYAK under pretenses of civilian control. For example, Erdem is suspected to have been appointed CEO in order to execute a secret agenda to first downsize OYAK, then privatize and eradicate it (Jacoby, 2016, p. 134).

Erdem, like former OYAK CEO Ulusoy, is a civilian business administration expert. As CEOs of OYAK group, running the business side of the fund, they are not military officers. The questions about Erdem are not related to his technocratic abilities but are rather related to his loyalist proximity to the Erdoğan regime. He began his government career in 1997 as assistant inspector at the Prime Ministry Inspection Board and rose to the post of chief inspector in 2007, under Erdoğan’s government. He took various training courses in the United States and has harnessed managerial experience in the private sector. His credentials, however, do not seem to sufficiently silence suspicions about his ability to handle an enormous holding such as OYAK, with more than 30,000 employees, 90 subsidiary companies, and assets and revenues worth \$20

billion combined (Gurcan, 2016). He is thought of as a close figure to Erdoğan's regime, and that he is put there to help break OYAK down, not help it grow (Marek, 2016). If this took place, the process would be somewhat similar to privatization schemes of public companies in the 1990s. This would add yet another dimension of ambiguity to OYAK's legal status that combines public and private attributes.

One officer interviewed with Al Monitor coverage of the OYAK "civilian takeover" story said, "Now the savings of 300,000 officers and NCOs are entrusted to Erdem. Keep in mind, the money of us military people is a bit valuable" (Gurcan, 2016). The author of the analysis piece, himself a former officer concurred with the interviewee, saying, "As a former soldier who bought a house with his OYAK savings, the money of Turkish soldiers is truly valuable. This is why 300,000 soldiers will always be closely watching Erdem" (Gurcan, 2016).

Finally, this could be interpreted as civilian encroachment on the Turkish Armed Forces' economic domain. By civilian encroachment I mean Erdoğan's interventionism in changing the OYAK leadership from Ulusoy to his loyalist Erdem. The civilian encroachment on the economic domain of OYAK is equally related to other civil-military relations in Turkey, namely governing and national security policy setting. The political arrangements have shifted drastically in the Turkish case. For example, while it used to be a parliamentary system with a prime minister and government being the main civilian counterparts to the army, this is no longer the case. "Military-government relations have now turned into relations between the military and the presidential palace, making Erdoğan the sole civilian counterpart of the military" (Gurcan, 2016). While such steps were once celebrated as they were supposed to be geared towards civilian control, the Turkish case shows that "not all civilian takeovers automatically mean democratization" (Gurcan, 2016).

3.7 CONCLUSION

In contrast to recommendations in the political science literature on Turkey (Akça, 2010b; Cizre, 2008b; Gürsoy, 2011; Heper & Güney, 2000, 2004; Heper 2011) I do not see the takeover of the economic structures of the military as a way towards civilianization and therefore, as if a logical conclusion, democratization in Turkey. I argue that there is a rhetorical conflation of civilianization and democratization. In fact, there have been non-democratic outcomes for the civilianization process in Turkey. The result of the civilian insurgency in OYAK, and elsewhere, is the crony capitalism, corruption, and authoritarianism of President Erdoğan and his entourage of 200 businessmen, who secure most of the international business deals, all while creating regimist loyalism.

Thus, I argue that the sheer “civilianization” of the economic dimension of the Turkish civil-military relations has neither resulted in fair market practices nor liberal democratization. On the contrary, the very Turkish case under President Erdoğan shows that civilianization of the economy can feed private interests as a special business class profits from the privatization of state and partial-state organizations. Civilianization can result in new monopolies and crony capitalism.

In conclusion, as of 2015, the Turkish case has shown an astonishing progression of civilian takeovers of institutions that was the traditional economic turf of the Turkish Armed Forces. This series of events manifested in three ways: First, in the heightened dominance of the civilian bureaucracy over military budget and expenditure decision-making for weapons procurement. Ironically, this did not lead towards decreased military spending but rather towards increased military expenditure and militarily adventurist foreign policy. Civilianization of the war

decision-making process, in this sense, has led to foreign adventurist wars.

Second, developments in economic civil-military relations moved to undo the monopoly of the retired generals on defense companies, by paving the way for civilian penetration into this domain. The retired generals, however, were replaced by intricate networks of closer “civilian” affiliates of the Erdoğan regime, all while keeping defense industries as a major player in the Turkish economy. Instead of a demilitarization of the economy at large through decreasing investments in the defense sector then, there is rather a consolidation of power toward certain private ends, and specific beneficiaries i.e. corruption.

Third, as a conglomerate, OYAK is under threat of total disintegration, if teams of lawyers target the *public* aspects of its legal status and deem it as unconstitutional. Indeed, continuing to closely watch OYAK and its new CEO’s performance will inform us about the nature of future civilian dominance over economic civil-military relations in Turkey. Should OYAK be declared unconstitutional, and a relic of its origins in the 1960s military coup, then a major social safety net for military officers in Turkey might be eliminated. Given the history of coups in Turkey, and the hidden roots of Kemalism, this could likely result in a potential future revival of Kemalism. An eventual military intervention against Erdoğan’s regime is not farfetched.

Finally, allowing the military to match up to other social classes in an increasingly globalized and neoliberal economy was a way of pacifying the armed forces and accounting for equilibrium in civil-military relations. OYAK developed to contain the young cadres against outright rebellion due to socio-economic grievances. The *young* Turkish *colonels* reacted in 1960, emulating Nasser in Egypt (McDermott, 1988, p. 1). By 1979, post-Peace Treaty, however, Egypt itself caught up with the OYAK model as Sadat avoided potential reactions of his own young members of the armed forces, in light of his planned budget cuts of formal defense

expenditure. Instead of waiting for a potential coup, Sadat peacefully and procedurally established a similar economic arrangement for the Egyptian Armed Forces, through NSPO. Unlike Menderes, Sadat safeguarded the needs of the armed forces by legally setting up NSPO in a similar format to Turkey's OYAK. For this organization, however, Sadat's government kept the *public* aspect of the NSPO law more salient than the *private* dimension (contrary to OYAK). For example, NSPO as an entire structure is under government oversight, as the Central Auditing Authority is the auditor in charge, not a private auditing firm (again, contrary to OYAK).

In the next two chapters I explore the tensions between state and private business, as well as democratization and civilianization in Egypt and Israel along the same three dimensions of military economic involvement: military budget; defense industries; and military-owned civilian-products enterprises. There I will also touch on the significant land ownership of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces respectively.

CHAPTER 4

THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES: AN ECONOMIC POWER IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

“Why does the Egyptian army still press olive oil and manufacture refrigerators?” a retired US Army officer and current professor at the US National Defense University (NDU) in Washington asked me.⁹ This chapter investigates this puzzling question regarding the Egyptian Armed Forces’ (EAF) involvement in the civilian national economy.

Scholars have been perplexed and quite critical of such economic involvement, deeming it detrimental to a healthy economy and even to military cohesion and combat readiness (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2016; Marshall, 2015; Springborg, 2017). In fact, not only does the Egyptian military have the seemingly laughable olive oil pressing plants and refrigerator factories, the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), established in 1979 in accordance with Executive Order No. 32 under Sadat, has factories, plants, and companies operating in five main economic sectors: agriculture and food industry, industrial manufacturing, engineering, services, and mining. NSPO’s civilian production incorporates clothes, pharmaceuticals, appliances, and scientific equipment such as microscopes. “The military economic capacity is set to 100% self-sufficiency in agriculture, for food security and to prevent any logistical problems in food production or distribution (Ahram newspaper, 1982, April 13). The EAF also owns companies that bid for construction of public works projects such as bridges, roads, and schools.

⁹ This was during a talk I gave on the Egyptian defense economics and defense industries in April 2018.

While the EAF has been “more or less low-key about these economic activities,” in the early to mid–1980s (Montasser, 1982), after too much recent exposure, sarcasm, and outright attacks in the international media and academic scholarship alike (Abul-Magd 2017; Elbaradei, 2012; Springborg, 2013), about being “the pasta army,” “cleaning services military,” and “armed forces of frying pans,” the EAF is currently proudly showing off their civilian-products companies and their profits with a brand new Arabic–English website that lists their activities (NSPO, 2018). This is a new development. Perhaps they learned a thing or two about Turkey’s Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK). As a private conglomerate, the OYAK armed forces pension fund has been unabashedly advertising itself as one of Turkey’s five biggest conglomerates, whose investments span diverse economic sectors, including civilian products such as the supposedly laughable Tukaş Company that produces tomato sauce. Acquired by OYAK in 1967, Tukaş is now considered one of the leading companies in the agro-food business. But no one calls the Turkish Armed Forces the “armed forces of tomato sauce.” Why not? Because neither OYAK nor NSPO should be the measure for combat readiness of these two top world militaries. If anything, they are contributing factors to their military strength. Rather, their inception stories have particular circumstances. OYAK’s story was explained in the previous chapter and NSPO’s will be delineated here. Their similarities as well as their differences will be highlighted.



Figure 27 OYAK companies include cologne and tomato paste. NSPO companies include similar food products. That does not say anything intrinsically negative about military combat readiness of either army, as some scholars have erroneously deduced.

Sources: (OYAK Annual Report, 2011)

Contrary to the viewpoint that reduces the Egyptian military’s intervention in the economy to be an anomalous case of a corrupt, backwards, and inefficient military on all accounts whether economically (Abul-Magd, 2017) or in terms of questioning their actual competence in the military primary function of defense (Marshall, 2015) by contrast, I argue for an opposite reading of this political economy phenomenon. Egypt’s military economic activities are to be understood as a product of Egypt’s regional order and in congruence with specific practices in Turkey and Israel along their respective historical legacies of military economic activities.

4.2 EGYPT IN THE REGION: MILITARIZED ECONOMY?

Egypt is not an anomaly in its regional order. In fact, Egypt has been similar to cases such as Turkey and Israel where the militaries have historically played economic roles under various guises from the 1950s to the present. Indeed, income-generating economic activities fill a tremendous gap (Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003) between the comparatively low defense budget of Egypt—relative to that of Turkey and Israel—and Egypt’s defense needs. For example, according to Forbes (2018), Egypt’s defense budget is a mere \$2.7 billion, whereas Turkey’s military expenditure is \$18.2 billion (SIPRI, 2018), and Israel’s is \$17 billion (SIPRI, 2018).

	Ranking in of Military Power in the Middle East	Active Personnel	2017 Budget (Forbes, 2018)
Turkey	1 st	355,800	\$18bn
Egypt	2nd	438,500	\$2.7bn lowest
Israel	3 rd	176,500	\$18.5bn
Iran	4 th	523,000	\$16bn
Saudi Arabia	5 th	227,000	\$76.7bn highest
Algeria	6 th	130,000	\$10bn

Syria	7 th	142,500	Unknown
Morocco	8 th	195,000	\$3.5bn
Iraq	9 th	64,000	\$19.3bn
United Arab Emirates	10 th	63,000	Unknown

Figure 28 Middle East 10 Strongest Military Forces, 2018. Rankings are based on 2017 data. Egypt was the lowest funded yet the second strongest regional military, after Turkey, and before Israel. (Sources: Forbes, 2018; SIPRI, 2018).

Military expenditure by country, in constant (2016) US\$ m., 2009-2017 © SIPRI 2018											
Country	Notes	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2017 Current
Middle East											
Bahrain	94	960	958	1179	1312	1448	1544	1482	1506	1384	1397
Egypt	¶	4421	4419	4292	4176	4142	4518	4790	4513	4004	2774
Iran	95	13728	13962	12616	13125	10367	10281	10814	12264	14086	14548
Iraq	¶ 96	3925	4423	4766	4334	7991	6956	9527	5970	7284	7416
Israel	97	15606	15044	15582	15728	16146	17009	17064	14783	15501	16489
Jordan		1902	1799	1768	1562	1462	1523	1602	1770	1877	1940
Kuwait	98	5108	5014	5726	6200	5865	5853	5895	6447	6693	6831
Lebanon		1691	1808	1767	1791	1882	2167	2221	2606	2368	2441
Oman	↑ 99	5135	5424	7099	12762	11945	11079	10155	10581	8417	8687
Qatar		2199	2171
Saudi Arabia	§ 100	53209	55379	56132	63514	72791	85435	90258	63673	69521	69413
Syria	
Turkey		14340	14050	14187	14498	14857	14942	15412	17854	19580	18190
UAE	101	15726	19722	21424	21108	25857	24400
Yemen	102	3439	3414	3095	2836	2609	2510
Yemen, North	103	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

Figure 29 Middle East military expenditure by country. Rankings are based on 2017 data. Egypt's military expenditure is the lowest, after Bahrain. (Sources: SIPRI, 2018.)

In the Egyptian case, the economic income-generating activities of the Ministry of Defense have core military functions beyond “serving the primary goal of military self-sufficiency in food security and basic strategic goods such as: water for soldiers to drink, bread/pasta for them to eat, and cement to build bunkers” (CBC-Egypt, 2012). In fact “The profits also contribute to actual arms procurement, in terms of diversifying the sources of military equipment as well as financing weapons modernization programs” (Personal interview with Colonel Ahmed Ali, former Spokesperson of the EAF, 2013).

Diversifying the sources of armament has been a state policy direction, under President Anwar Sadat since the 1970s’ pre-1973 war and onward (Abdallah, 1990b; CIA, 1985, p. 3). Ironically, the term following the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel was code for acquiring US

weapons after prior reliance on Soviet arms. But in the current contemporary context, the same term “diversifying the sources of armament,” is meant to enable the EAF to find sources of military imports beyond US military aid. US military aid dictates purchasing US military equipment and has been recently politicized under President Barack Obama’s administration to pressure the Egyptian military on core national security issues, especially regarding Syria. For example, the EAF was against any support for regionally amassed mercenary Islamist fighters in Syria and clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood’s 1-year rule of Mohamed Mursi and his backers in Turkey and Qatar over this particular national security question (Maziad, 2019; Saleh, 2013). In fact, “Mursi role at Syria rally [was] seen as tipping point for Egypt army,” as a headline from Reuters read (Saleh, 2013). Then-President Mursi sat and listened as Islamist speakers openly called for jihad in Syria (Saleh, 2013) and for “committing the Egyptian army, the Egyptian people, and the Egyptian youth to Jihad in Syria” (Hassaan, 2013).

That celebrated \$1.3 billion granted annually by Washington “had depreciated by at least 50 percent since 1979” (Kandil, 2016, p. 184). By now, US military aid has created its own political economy between the US government and American private arms manufacturers. To illustrate, the arms aid between Egypt and the US practically operates as a US governmental subsidy to American companies, and that is why the defense lobbyists call for continued US aid to Egypt (Marshall, 2012). That is because the aid is given to Egypt but must be used for US-made weaponry and equipment and for American training. In short, Egypt is not that dependent on the US military aid to begin with and cannot solely rely on it. Self-sufficiency and diversification of sources of armament were two ingrained lessons after the Soviet arms were never delivered prior to the 1973 War, and Egypt managed its October 6 battle with its existing resources (Sadat, 1978, pp. 220-221).

An example of diversifying the sources of armament is Egypt's \$1 billion deal for two French Mistral helicopter carriers. France initially built the two ships for Russia, but that deal was voided after Russia's annexation of Crimea (Reuters, 2016). Such purchases and others "would at least be partly made from the Ministry of Defense's private funds," a spokesperson to the EAF told me in 2013. "Therefore, the civilian-products profits do go toward additional arms procurement. Also, sometimes procurement deals have to remain secret for national security purposes before finalized acquisition," the EAF spokesperson emphasized. Indeed, Egypt's acquisition of a number of navy units from Russia, Germany, and France (Mouchantaf, 2018) and the deployment of the France-made Mistral-class helicopter carrier, named Gamal Abdel Nasser, to the Bab El Mandeb region since the beginning of the Yemen War in 2015 was a significant move. The carrier was deployed to guard the straits leading up to the Suez Canal without directly participating in the Saudi-led Yemen War. This move has been characterized by an Israeli specialized publication, *Israel Defense*, as a "reflection of the strategic importance of this area for Egypt" and its successful "counter-balance" against the military build-up by other players in the area (Shay, 2017).

In other words, in the Egyptian case, the income-generating economic activities in contrast to the OYAK, as explained in the previous chapter, are indeed used for weapons acquisition. That is not the case for Turkey, whose defense budget is already substantial. Neither is it the case in Israel, as the next chapter illustrates, where already sufficiently high direct state-budget allocations are in place for all military procurements as well as investments in the domestic Israeli defense industry. In short, the EAF finds somewhat dissimilar yet equivalent ways to match up to other regional players, as they all grapple with the question of military budgetary

constraints in a high threat perception region, and their ranking in the top tier regional and world militaries.

Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 2003-2016 © SIPRI 2017															
Country	Notes	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Middle East															
Bahrain	94	4.7%	4.0%	3.2%	3.1%	3.0%	2.8%	3.6%	3.3%	3.6%	3.9%	4.1%	4.4%	4.7%	4.8%
Egypt	†	3.3%	3.0%	2.9%	2.7%	2.5%	2.3%	2.1%	2.1%	1.9%	1.8%	1.6%	1.7%	1.7%	1.6%
Iran	95	2.7%	3.1%	3.3%	3.6%	3.0%	3.1%	3.5%	3.2%	2.4%	2.6%	2.3%	2.3%	2.6%	3.0%
Iraq	†96	..	1.7%	2.2%	1.9%	2.2%	2.4%	2.9%	2.8%	2.4%	2.2%	3.9%	3.6%	6.5%	4.8%
Israel	97	8.5%	8.1%	7.6%	7.4%	6.7%	6.5%	6.7%	6.2%	5.9%	5.7%	5.8%	5.9%	5.6%	5.8%
Jordan		6.0%	5.1%	4.8%	4.7%	6.0%	6.2%	6.6%	5.7%	5.5%	4.8%	4.3%	4.3%	4.3%	4.5%
Kuwait	98	6.5%	5.8%	4.3%	3.5%	3.6%	3.0%	4.0%	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%	3.3%	3.6%	4.8%	6.5%
Lebanon		4.6%	4.5%	4.5%	4.6%	4.6%	4.0%	4.0%	4.1%	4.1%	4.0%	4.1%	4.6%	4.4%	..
Oman	±99	12.2%	12.1%	11.8%	10.8%	10.3%	7.6%	9.3%	8.3%	9.8%	16.2%	15.0%	13.4%	16.3%	16.7%
Qatar		3.3%	2.4%	2.0%	1.8%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	1.5%
Saudi Arabia	§100	8.7%	8.1%	7.7%	7.8%	8.5%	7.4%	9.6%	8.6%	7.2%	7.7%	9.0%	10.7%	13.5%	10.4%
Syria		6.2%	5.5%	5.0%	4.4%	4.1%	3.6%	4.0%	4.1%
Turkey		3.4%	2.8%	2.5%	2.5%	2.4%	2.3%	2.7%	2.5%	2.2%	2.3%	2.3%	2.2%	2.2%	2.0%
UAE	101	4.7%	4.6%	3.7%	3.2%	3.3%	3.7%	5.5%	6.1%	5.5%	5.1%	6.1%	5.7%
Yemen	102	6.0%	4.7%	4.3%	3.6%	4.1%	3.9%	5.0%	4.7%	5.2%	5.0%	4.7%	4.6%
Yemen, North	103	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

Numbered footnotes can be found on the Footnotes worksheet.
† Figures for these countries do not include military pensions
‡ Figures for these countries are for current spending only (i.e. exclude capital spending)
§ Figures for these countries are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure
¶ Figures for these countries do not include spending on paramilitary forces
The symbols † and ‡ between two parts of a series for a country indicate a series break, where data before the red lines may not be consistent with data after.

Figure 30 Egypt's Defense Budget as Percentage of GDP in 2016. Egypt spent a mere 1.6%. Israel spent a whopping 5.6% of GDP and is down to a still high 4.3% of GDP in 2019

Source: (SIPRI, 2019)

Another myth has been circulating that the income-generating civilian products activities go completely unaccounted for without any civilian state or parliamentary oversight (Abul-Magd 2016, 2017; Springborg, 2017). The reality is that this question of state oversight was raised in the 1980s and dealt with then and there (Abdallah, 1990a). The legal confusion, for some, regarded the executive order that created the NSPO in 1979, which specifies its nature as a private fund within the Ministry of Defense. This situation, however, was amended back in the 1980s. That is when the Central Auditing Authority (CAA)¹⁰ started supervising all military-

¹⁰ The Central Auditing Authority (CAA) or Central Auditing Organization (CAO) is an independent auditing institution established in Egypt in 1942 as an instrument of public finance control. The CAO supervises the management of public-sector companies and government departments, including about 130 central government departments and administrative units, 120 service agencies, 29 governorates, 50 economic authorities and more than 160 state-owned enterprises, political parties, trade unions, national and party news media, and all units subsidized by the State. The CAO may also audit and examine the work and accounts of any other entity, as assigned by the President, the Prime Minister or the People's Assembly of Egypt. It is independent of the cabinet, and reports directly to the President of Egypt, to whom it is subordinated. The military-owned and run companies are supervised by the CAO. (CAO, n.d.). In 2009 there were 638 Private Funds in state agencies and ministries. They all constitute

owned and -run companies as state companies, albeit specially designated to the Ministry of Defense (Elsaab, 2013).

In fact, this was a demand in the public discourse in newspapers that discussed military expenditure and income generating-activities back in the 1980s when “The appropriateness of reinventing the military as an economic player provoked public debate” (Kandil, 2016, p. 307). Discussing these economic civil–military relations was nothing new as some scholars (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b, 2016, 2017; Springborg 2011, 2017) made it seem in their writings following the 2011 uprising. Back in the 1980s, retired army analysts wrote articles in response to the civilians’ queries by first emphasizing that this was a purely *political* decision with directives from the political leadership (Shakeeb, 1984, p. 97). The retired military officers delineated back then how the government demanded the armed forces become self-sufficient and to assist in economic development by providing their surplus products as affordable goods and services (Fakhr, 1985; Farahat, 1984). A 2008 report by the CAA affirmed “that the military’s economic activities covered its bare necessities without generating much surplus” let alone monopolistically competed with civilian producers (Farouk 2008, p. 288, cited in Kandil, 2016, p. 307). Moreover, in March 2012, General Mahmoud Nasr, the assistant defense minister for financial affairs said that the net worth of the military’s economic activities in 2011 was about \$1 billion, and that over the span of Mubarak’s 30 years presidency, the accumulated profits did not exceed \$1.2 billion (Gamal, 2012; Kandil, 2016, p. 307). “All these profits get re-invested or used towards additional weapons procurement” (Personal communication with EAF

2.44% of the GDP of that year, according to the available data. In August 2018, the Parliament demanded and compiled a list of all Private Funds in the state apparatus (Youm7, 2018).

spokesperson, August 2013). To set the academic record straight, the debate as well as the actual governmental oversight through the CAA started in the 1980s and continues to date, unlike much of the scholarship that has been produced post-January 2011 (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b; Springborg, 2011). That is not to mention that “private funds” and “special accounts” Al-Sanadeeq Al-Khasa (*khas*) means both private and special as in designated/specified the opposite of public/general) exists in a myriad other ministries to begin with. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own “special accounts funds” that distributes additional pensions to retired diplomats based on the fund’s investment (personal communication with a former diplomat, 2015).

The idea of special accounts or private funds goes back to the aftermath of the 1967 defeat. They were devised as a solution in order to reduce the burden on the state budget and its inability to meet certain needs. The first precedent was the promulgation of Law No. 38 of 1967, which approved the establishment of a local municipal cleaning fund that generated income through the collection of local cleaning fees. The formal official legalization of the “special accounts” or “private funds” goes back to the era of former President Anwar Sadat through Law No. 53 of 1973 regarding the state budget. This law allowed the establishment of “special funds” and “units of a special nature” through Article (20), which stipulates that a decision by the President of the Republic may establish funds for which specific resources are allocated for specific uses. The Fund shall prepare a special budget outside the general state budget and the administrative bodies, such as the administrative apparatus, the local administration, public service and economic bodies, and other public legal persons. In Mubarak’s time, these funds have branched out and spread in all ministries, governorates, and holding companies. At this stage, a series of

laws have been issued giving the right to many entities to establish special funds, such as the Education Law No. 139 of 1981 and the Universities Law No. 49 of 1992.

The main income-generation resources for the special funds within the various public institutions are fines, road tolls, gate-crossings, utility bills such as garbage and electricity in local municipalities accounts, as well as various other state institutions. The issue is that incomes generated and deposited into these “special funds” are not collected by the Ministry of Finance to be included in the state budget. In fact more than 61,000 governmental bank accounts have been operating outside of the Central Bank accounts. Per their legal designation, they rather go to their own special accounts. Various state agencies differed in their estimates of the total balance on these accounts. They are estimated to be 33 billion pounds (approximately \$2 billion), according to data from the Ministry of Finance and 63 billion pounds (approximately \$3.8 billion), according to the Central Auditing Authority (Abdel-Ghani, 2018).

Speaking of all these kinds of public agencies’ “special accounts,” not only those of the Ministry of Defense, Dr. Medhat Al-Sherif, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives’ Economic Affairs Committee of, said in a *Youm7* newspaper interview that the cooperation between the legislative and executive authorities regarding funds and special accounts resulted in the establishment of a complete database. “After 40 years of their establishment, we have a complete database of ‘private’ funds and special accounts, After all previous governments lost their data” (Sobh, 2018). Deputy Chairman Al-Sherif pointed out that there are a number of demands by the Committee of Economic Affairs, including estimating the volume of cash flows in those funds and accounts because the existing numbers reflect surpluses, but there are flows throughout the year. In addition, the parliamentary deliberations reflected the need to adopt Ministry of Finance regulations governing these funds and consult with the Ministry of Finance

about the annexation of some funds to the state budget, explaining a sub-committee of the Economic Affairs Committee was to follow up on the subject of “private/special accounts” in all state agencies.

From his part, in a parliamentary session discussing the proposed law to regulate the special funds, The Minister of Finance commented, “There have been governmental controls and oversight on the funds of these special accounts. Before disbursement of any funds to those ‘special accounts’, the representatives of the Ministry of Finance exercise oversight. After disbursement, the Central Auditing Authority performs its oversight.” He added, “All funds and special accounts are digitized now through a modern system, which detect day-by-day expenditure, which helps us exercise oversight” (Gawish, 2018).

Given the public and academic debates on their para-legal status, “black box” designations, and out right accusations of corruptions, these 61,000 bank accounts have been most recently appropriated into a unified treasury account per Law No. 170 of 2018, “in order to exercise oversight over public money, with the aim of reducing the financial crisis facing the country” (Abdel-Ghani, 2018). Per the law, the government started to collect 5% to 15% from the annual profits of all these “special accounts” excluding the following: Research projects funded by grants, international agreements or donations; university hospital accounts, research and scientific centers, health departments and hospitals, health service improvement funds, health and social welfare funds for workers and private insurance funds; social housing projects; and the Ministry of Defense special accounts funds.

According to the Ministry of Finance, the General Petroleum Corporation Fund is the largest private fund in terms of value, reaching 2.3 billion pounds (approximately \$135 million), followed by the account of the Library of Alexandria, which has 1.04 billion pounds

(approximately \$88 million), and the Interior Ministry funds at 436.8 million pounds (approximately \$28 million). Other city councils' special funds include those on which certain hires are made, for higher paying individuals than regular government employees' Human Resources schedules. These funds have been set in place, largely to attract calibers from the private business sector to government positions.

The point to be made here, however, is that the phenomenon of a "special account" is far from exclusive to the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and the Egyptian armed forces. Ministry of Education, the Petroleum Fund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all local municipalities and other state agencies have their "special funds." It was a pervasive political economy phenomenon in Egypt when various public agencies were pushed to create self-sustaining income-generating funds. Moreover, it is not a phenomenon unique to Egypt of 1967, but is rather akin to public universities in the United States, for example, pushed to find funding resources, through for-profit activities in order to maintain academic programs. If anything, the establishment of "private funds/special accounts" within public agencies was a symptom and reflection of an ongoing trend of state withdrawal from public services provision. This trend of state withdrawal started in the 1980s and 1990s and continued till the mid 2000s, and is being critiqued in capitalist western democracies as much as in Egypt today. However, the media and scholar activists' idea of "annexation" of funds that had been legally established within various state agencies and units into a big state budget, after they have already created self-sustaining mechanism is not a magic bullet solution to end corruption in of itself, either.

It is perhaps reasonable for the government to collect a 5 to 15% of the annual revenue of these funds, as the legislation has passed. But this very action might still be critiqued and needs further evaluation, as to how the collected funds are spent by the government. Hence, it is

important, if anything, to clarify that there is already a vivid discourse around the value or burden of these private funds special accounts funds; be it that of the Armed Forces or any other state institutions or agencies. Generalized activist criticism against these funds in all state agencies has been mostly blind to the historical context and cross-case examples of these special accounts, beyond the Egyptian military, and beyond the Egyptian case altogether; be it in its military or civilian dimensions.

To this point of oversight, in my fieldwork interview with the general heading the Nasser Higher Academy for Military Science, he emphasized:

All projects that take place are under the control of all regulatory accounting and tax procedures applicable in the state. I want to say a strange thing no one accounts for laughing]. Did you see the cafeteria upstairs? That very basic, simple cafeteria [laughs]. Do you know that that cafeteria has to be visited by someone from the Central Auditing Authority to oversee it? Can you imagine? That cafeteria [laughs].

The joke is that from the biggest NSPO projects to the smallest cafeteria in the Nasser Academy, these facilities are legally under the Ministry of Defense and operated as a “private or special fund” to the Ministry of Defense with their own bank account numbers, yet they are still generating state money, not officers’ private distributable profits. In contrast to this setup, the profits from OYAK-owned companies explicitly state that their profits do not contribute to Turkish military expenditure, as gains are legitimately used per their legal setup as supplementary pensions to the retired officers (OYAK website). This is not the situation in Egypt. Thus, this discrepancy between the level of formal military spending among the three regional cases explains and justifies the EAF’s income-generating activities in light of a low military budget, while belonging to the Middle East, where renewed threat perceptions ebb and

flow within the regional order. Moreover, by contrast to Europe as a regional order, Egypt's neighboring countries are among the highest spenders. Accordingly, the EAF uses extra-budgetary resources to keep on par with peer regional states.

More specifically, I argue that the EAF has indeed been quite successfully adjusting, given Egypt's and the overall regional circumstance of uncertain economic transformations. This took shape through a total metamorphosis from a public sector, welfare state and socialist economics under Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s. Then this shifted to the *infitah* open-door policies Sadat by the mid-1970s. Followed were the neo-conservative state austerity measures and economic liberalization of the 1980s. Afterwards, privatization schemes and complete globalization dominated the economy in the 1990s and 2000s under Mubarak. The Egyptian Armed Forces have astutely observed these economic metamorphoses as looming long-term "situational security" threats (Huntington, 1957, p. 1) and have been assigned a developmental role by the political leadership throughout the phases. Within classic modernization theory of the time, these were measures recommended by the literature on civil-military relations (Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960, 1964, 1967), not criticized measures as has been the case lately (Abul-Magd, 2017; Springborg, 2017).

Hence, the EAF's economic developmental role was far from being an anomaly since the 1950s to date. Performing these assigned developmental tasks does not mean the EAF has been the ruling class uniformly since the Free Officers seized power in 1952, as the reductive cliché "60 years of military rule" circulating in the literature on Egypt since the 2011 uprising connoted (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e; Springborg, 2017). In contrast to those scholars, and in agreement with Kandil (2016), Harb (2003), and Abdallah (1990), I too emphasize that "while [the military] was the preeminent institution in the political process during

the 1950s and 1960s, it has since the 1970s accepted a subordinate role in a presidential system that both safeguards its interests but limits its direct influence in politics” (Harb, 2003, p. 269). In fact, Egypt is a much closer case to Israel than meets the eye in terms of Israel’s “parachuting former military officers” (Peri, 1983a), assuming political office and the public trust in the military institution, all while civilian control has been exercised since the 1967 defeat of Egypt, and the subsequent sidelining of the military from politics. No coups were attempted in either case since the rise of the Free Officers in 1952 in Egypt. As for the 2013 military intervention following a popular uprising against the Muslim Brotherhood regime, indeed that is a case that proves the point that the military as a ruling elite had not been in power since 1967, until it stepped in anew, given the military’s newly perceived regional threats, particularly emanating from an expansionist pan-Islamist Turkey too supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood’s internationalism in Qatar, Tunisia, Gaza and the failed attempts in Syria (Başkan, 2019; Maziad, 2019; Trager, 2017).

The remainder of this chapter shows how the different Middle Eastern phases reflect on the economic role of the EAF in terms of change in defense budgets and military expenditure, fluctuations in establishing and developing the defense industries, and the development of successful income-generating military-run civilian-products enterprises, especially in the aftermath of the rise of a new civilian class of businessmen in the 1970s, shady public sector privatization schemes in the 1990s, and flocking of multinational organizations in the 2000s. Privatization across the MENA region “has actually ground to a halt,” as it largely “fell a victim to allegations of crony capitalism” especially in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia”— the top recipients of privatization revenues in the region (Amico, 2015). All these economic policies were devised, executed, and dominated by civilian actors. In short, far from engulfing politics

and the economy, the Egyptian military barely maintained its space within an already civilianized economy after the 1973 war. It is only since 2013 that a statist, militarized, national security and external threats-oriented comeback in Egypt replaced the failed public assets' privatization schemes, in emulation of a successful Gulf States model of State Owned Enterprises.

I argue that it is rather quite astonishing that the EAF succeeded to remain the second strongest regional army in the Middle East, after Turkey and before Israel in 3rd place, and the 12th worldwide after Turkey in 10th place, and Israel in 17th (Global Fire Power, 2018), despite all these economic upheavals and change of domestic and international economic policies and realities, and given its lowered defense budget since 1979. It is quite puzzling and rather impressive, in fact, that the income-generating activities in Egypt helped finance the armed forces after decades of slashed defense budgets when other cases might not prove as successful (Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003), especially in the currently perilous times of heightened regional threat perceptions and utter state collapse of neighboring countries. If anything, as a now declassified CIA report from 1985 explicitly stated:

The military production sector provides several important benefits to Egypt's economy:

1. Much-needed employment opportunities for Egyptian scientists and engineers, as well as for larger numbers of semiskilled and unskilled workers;
2. The production of civil and military goods and services that Egypt otherwise would be forced to procure from outside sources at higher cost; and
3. Foreign exchange earned through arms exports (CIA p. iv).

Even while critical in its tone of Egypt's attempt at creating "a self-sustaining defense, industry," the CIA (1985) clearly stated, "although the lack of data prevents confirmations, we

suspect that the net impact of the public-sector military enterprises on Egypt's operating budget and the economy is only moderately negative" (p. 3). "Only moderately negative" was the CIA assessment in 1985, as it continued to deconstruct that argument itself by saying, "Substantial financial allocations for these industries are balanced by the goods and services they provide the Egyptian military, which otherwise would be forced to procure everything from bullets to batteries from foreign suppliers" (p. 3). The authors admitted, "These enterprises also produce some civilian products that from personal observation appear to be of higher quality than those produced in non-military Egyptian factories" (p. 3). Many Egyptian consumers back in the 1980s and today concur with this observation. In fact, the military enterprises' civilian products became affordable options for the middle class, who cannot afford the imported brand-name refrigerator or the Kalamata olive oil, about which the U.S. retired officer inquired. Domestically manufactured products are cheaper and can indeed be better quality. As for olive oil, more specifically and even pickles, which scholars have routinely scorned (Abul-Magd, 2012a, 2012b; Springborg, 2017), an active duty general laid out the EAF's rationale:

This is a crucial element regarding the social aspect, the *socio-economic* role of these economic projects. Let's talk about olive cultivation. For starters, let's just say first and foremost that the Egyptian olive is better than that of Greek Kalamata [smiles]. Just so that we get that straight! [Jokingly laughs]. But again, I am serious. We have two types of olives in Egypt: One in Siwa [Western Desert] and one in Rafah [North Sinai]. The olives in Rafah are of less quality than the olive in Siwa. Why? Because there is more rain there, in Rafah, and the water is more abundant. And the drier it is, as in Siwa, the better olives are. Either way; this olive or that olive. Both are good. One day the businessman who IMPORTS olives from Kalamata, Greece started to fight the growers in their price, by presenting himself as an

olive plant manufacturer. He'd say, "I would only buy your olives with that given price!" A very low price, that is. So the grower cannot sell it for that price. "I would lose," the grower would say. So what would happen? The armed forces would go in and start a factory right in the area. [smiles]. The armed forces buy the olives from the grower at a moderate price. And we squeeze and sell olive oil and yes we do pickles!! [sarcastically laughs] As they make fun of us! Yes we make pickles. Why though? [on a serious note] Because if this grower abandoned the cultivation of olives, he will grow Bango [cheap weed]. I want to keep him as an olive farmer. I want his olives to remain profitable. If I, as the armed forces, had given up on this role, you know very well how the other powerful people are ready to engage in price speculations. And why would those businessmen even engage in price speculation? Because at the very end, you might discover that that guy, who wants to buy the olive for the lowest price, is himself the importer of Kalamata olive. And he wants to get rid of olive growers and kill the local industry, for his imports to take over. Why? Because he knows that what we have in Egypt is better than what he wants to import. And this is logical. We have better olives. Why? Because as long as it rains, the drier areas have better olives. So that is the story of how an olive factory owned and run by the armed forces comes to being! [sarcastically]. And as a side product, yes we pickle! In another area we grow dates. And we are not ashamed of that (translation from interview in Arabic by author).

Settlements as Defense

The notion of agriculture and defense, which the general interviewed above articulated was adopted by Egypt in slogans like "Conquering the desert—Ghazw Al SaHara'a," which were introduced in the 1950s but much more clearly articulated by the 1980s "When Egyptians got to learn more about Israelis and how they think and behave" (Montasser, 1982). In Israel, Nahal:

from *Noar Halutzi Lohem* is an acronym for “fighting pioneer youth.” While it may sound like a youth militia, it is a different entity. In 1948, a *gar’in* (core group) of Jewish pioneers asked Ben-Gurion that members be permitted to do their military service as a collective rather than being randomly divided into different units. In response, Ben-Gurion established the Nahal program, which combined military service and farming, often in peripheral areas (Wikipedia Nahal, 2018). Nahal was the outcome of what happens when kibbutz culture directly interacts with the army. It became a merger of settlement ideology and notions of security. As a paramilitary program within the IDF, Nahal set up outposts in rough terrains so as to conquer the desert. Nahal also collaborated with the IDF to enlist commanders, agricultural coaches, and social community leaders. Nahal became settlements established by soldiers in Israel and Israeli-occupied territories. The goal for every Nahal settlement was to become a civilian settlement and serve as a first line of defense against potential future Arab invasions. This method of encouraging settlement was particularly effective in in the Negev, the Galilee, the Arabah, and after 1967 in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula). That phenomenon is parallel to what the Egyptian general said about olive pressing plants and Egyptians doing their military service as part of NSPO.

The idea in Israel was that the “IDF alone had the ability to place young people in areas unprepared for civilian settlement” (Seidman, 2010, p. 728). Through Nahal, the army established several military settlements that combined farming with regional defense in outlying and state-border areas. The rationale was based on the fact that “civilians need gainful employment, family housing, and all accompanying social services; soldiers do not” (Seidman, 2010, p. 729). Nahal, accordingly was a military-established civilian settlement meant to serve as a first line of defense against potential future Arab invasions in border areas. I discovered that

this notion of “settlements as defense” and the role of the armed forces in creating civilian settled communities was already shared by one of my active duty Egyptian generals’ interviewees:

OK. I’ll tell you a something else. There is an area in Egypt called Uwaitat: A series of oases in the Western Desert: Siwa, Farafra, Kharga and Dakhla. It’s called the New Valley. This East of Uwaitat is a promising area, where the amount of groundwater is estimated to be enormous. But the infrastructure in terms of construction would cost enormously too. No investor would want to invest there. So we go invest there because nobody goes. At the same time, there is another dimension to this kind of investment that we do in Uwaitat, despite the fact that the whole project is putting financial pressure on us, in many other things, that could have been more lucrative, financially—if we were simply after money and investments, which we are not. So why did the armed forces start a farm there? Because as soon as we did five or six farmers set up their own farms. So what model are we actually following in starting this farm? The Armed Forces is working with the model that one-day it knows it would sell its initial spot and leave. Why? Because I want to create a community. I do not want to keep it for the armed forces. In other words, if you go now you will find a very strange thing: The armed forces from the start divided the whole area into villages. Even those who work there—and they are all civilians—they are self-referring to themselves as what village are you from? “qarriet kaza or kaza” Village so and so. Why? Because one day I would leave this entire area after it has become settled. And I would go do the work elsewhere, when no one would go to these remote areas and start.

The Egyptian army’s emphasis on agricultural production and self-sufficiency is consistent with the Nahal trend in Israel. In an interview with an Egyptian Professor of Plant Pathology, he confirmed to me that the Egyptian civilian professors of agriculture as well as the military

officers were aware of Nahal and used it as a model. Suffice to say that the first land in Rafah, north Sinai, which the general referred to as being military-owned for the agricultural purpose of olive production, was constructed on the remainder of the Jewish *Yamit* settlement in 1967-occupied Sinai that was returned to Egypt in 1982 (Abdel Aziz & El-Kholi, 1999). The Yamit settlement in Sinai, which was Nahal settlement, was quite troubling for Sadat during the negotiations for the peace treaty. He explicitly insisted that the Israelis vacate it and leave no civilian or military settler behind by April 25, 1982. But Begin was trying hard not to vacate this settlement. Egyptian General Mohsen Hamdy, who was in charge of the handover of Sinai from the Israelis, narrates his experience negotiating with them:

These were difficult negotiations. Israel always tried to evade the treaty's stipulations and began to create several pretexts, including that it had two very large air bases inside Area C, Hovda and Eitan. It was among their provocative demands that they wanted to keep the two bases even after the withdrawal! Then, Begin told President Sadat that there are three Israeli settlements in the Sinai inhabited by about 40 Israeli families; the Yamit settlement at Rafah; a farm in Arish; and a fishing settlement at the Gulf of Aqaba. Begin asked Sadat if they can remain and that he did not mind raising the Egyptian flag on them. And as Begin was explaining, we were shocked to see four small boats at the sea, on which a group of citizens chanted. Begin said, "See? These are the inhabitants of the settlements, they are simple people." Meanwhile, Sadat lit his pipe and looked at the roof and said, "Listen, Menahem, next April 25th: No military or civilian will be stationed in Sinai. The meeting is over" (Ayoub, 2009).

After Sadat's assassination in October 1981, Mubarak saw that the Israelis vacate all settlements. April 25 is Sinai Liberation Day, a national holiday in Egypt. Yamit's history as an

agricultural military settlement, designed to become an eventual civilian one, goes back to Israeli occupation of Sinai between 1967 and 1979. During that time, the Egyptian Bedouins were evacuated by Israeli Generals Ariel Sharon and Moshe Dayan, who planned to build Yamit as a settlement civilian community (Yamit, n.d.). After the end of the Israeli occupation and the return of the land to the Egyptian army, Yamit was then returned to the Bedouins, who cultivated it, and their olive oil produce was purchased and distributed by the Egyptian military, consistent with what the general narrated in the interview. In the inauguration of the military-owned Sinai Co. for National Food Security Production in 1999, the commander emphasized how it was once a Jewish army colony (Abdel Aziz & El-Kholi, 1999) The address of the military-owned company Sinai Co. still reads “Former Yamit Colony.”

Soon after the 1973 war, and the subsequent 1979 peace treaty, the EAF emulated that practice of agricultural expansion for military self-sufficiency in food production as well as appropriated the desert settlement mentality, especially in the liberated Sinai as well as the Western Desert on the border with Libya. For example, the Egyptian Executive Order No. 531 for 1981 regarding Armed Forces Land allowed the military to occupy vast lands, unless otherwise already designated for state agencies; this law was passed to conquer the desert and build new communities, calling them exactly that: settlements. Most famous among them today is the upscale urban development called the Fifth Settlement. This entire 1980s trajectory of the Egyptian Armed Forces’ controlling vast swathes of lands, as well as establishing farms, and owning livestock, and so on was a formula already existing in Israel through the marriage between the socialist communal kibbutz movement and the IDF.

4.3 CATERING TO THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS: *DOUR*—MILITARY CLUBS AS WEDDING HALLS

Some of the projects that were established by the armed forces stem from the fact that we are not an economically developed country and stable in its development. I can't even enumerate. So many things. So I cannot look at those economically developed countries and then be judged: why aren't you doing like them? For example, Military *Dour*, the Military Clubs, or Hotels that we are criticized for running as wedding halls [laughs]. "The military runs wedding halls!" Big headlines! Big Deal! [laughs]. Yes, we do, and we are actually proud of it because these *Dour* met a very important social need. They were indeed a substitute for weddings that used to be on rooftops [laughs]. Remember those? [serious tone]. All the movies in the 1980s were about the lower middle classes having their weddings on humble rooftops. Those spots you now see where the current *Dour* Military Clubs and Hotels are were former military bases that were going to be vacated, as various city centers encroached on former military camps and training sites. So, yes, now functioning military training terrains had to move out in the desert. Good. But what do we do with the vacated bases? We kept them and turned them into income-generating facilities, which substitutes our already low defense budget, on the one hand, and as service for the middle class, who can afford having a wedding party in one of our *Dour* but not at the Sheraton or Hilton. And those who can afford the big expensive hotels, good for them! But we have those *Dour* as a cheaper alternative for the middle classes, and we are very proud of it.

The *Dour* were legally started in 1981 through the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency, which is an organ of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. Established in accordance with Executive Order No. 531 of 1981 to establish housing, shops, administrative units, and parking spaces on

land owned by the armed forces in order to serve the civil sector. It is important to note that the lands “owned” by the Egyptian armed forces were initially all vacated lands after the British Occupation. This includes the Suez Canal region and other terrains that used to be occupied by the British forces as bases, camps, or for training purposes. Therefor their transfer to the Egyptian military is a logical development. The criticism comes from what happens after these barracks are vacated and are to move away from the city. Israel equally vacates city-center barracks and gains that income into IDF special funds to finance the new barracks in the Negev region for example (Ahronheim, 2017; Elis, 2015; Seidman, 2010).

4.3 PERIODIZATION

Egypt experienced stages of the military economy, in parallel with its two neighboring countries, Turkey and Israel. I will cover Egypt’s military economic history in relation to the regional order along the following chronological phases and their characterizations as they influenced the Egyptian military’s military budget, defense industries, and income-generating economic activities, and land ownership. This will cover:

1. Reaction to regional threats and experiences in regional wars (1952–1979);
2. Mimesis (imitating one another) regarding military economic practices (1980–1995);
3. The parallel impact of international forces pushing toward neoliberalism (1996–2010); and
4. Global Multinationals vs. The Statist Holding (The Arab Gulf States Model) (2011–2018).

In the following section I will briefly introduce and summarize the highlighted characteristics of the economic phases. In the subsequent sections I will offer details on the development of Egypt’s military budget over time, its defense industry through the phases, and its income generation economic activities from 1979 to date.

Regional Antagonism and Rivalry: (1952–1979)

As stated in the previous chapter, Egypt and Turkey were on a collision course as Menderes and Nasser perceived each other as nemeses (Pelt, 2014, p. 116). Menderes's expansionist plans into the Middle East region on behalf of the old imperial powers such as Britain clashed with Nasser's resistance to these encroachments through his own propagation of secular pan-Arab nationalism. Iraq and Syria were the diplomatic battlegrounds. Nasser foiled the Baghdad Pact of 1955 and sent 1,600 Egyptian troops to Syria as he declared two bilateral military agreements, one between Egypt and Syria and the other between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and declared the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria in 1958. This spreading of secular Arab nationalism, under Nasser, was the response to Menderes's vision for a more anti-communist Middle East, under his leadership in Turkey, and that was to include Muslim-majority countries like Iran and Pakistan. While some scholars may argue that it is more likely that Nasser's policies were in response to the atavistic monarchical regimes in the region, which he constantly railed against, and Israel, which had leveled the humiliating defeat on Egypt and had prompted the 1952 coup (Migdal, 2014), it is equally established in the literature that "it was not until 1955 that Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as a pan-Arab hero, as Egypt gained sympathy for her efforts to throw off British domination" (Kerr, 1971, p. 3). That is to say Nasser's pan-Arabism was not a given since 1952. Egypt's statist republicanism was, but not an expansionist pan-Arab ideology. Nor did the "pan-Arab hero" wait until 1956, the year in which Nasser emerged triumphant following the Tripartite Aggression of Britain, France, and Israel. But it is rather 1955 that marks his pan-Arabism. That is the year Nasser rallied against Turkey's promotion of the Baghdad Pact on behalf of Britain and the West. 1955 is more significant in Nasser's

emphasis on articulating a pan-Arab, and not necessarily or exclusively a pan-Islamic world, as propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which he banned a year earlier in 1954.

Between 1955 and 1958, the Soviet Union was also in the Middle East. It helped Nasser in Egypt, as well as the Syrian government and the Iraqi military coup, “as a counter to the support given to other regimes by Britain and America” (Kerr, 1971, p. 2). Nasser, however, was never a communist. Turkey’s Menderes’s however was concerned Nasser might be or become so. Turkey’s major threat perceptions were anti-communism (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 3). In order to receive the US aid and support that stemmed from the Truman Doctrine to contain communism, Menderes was compelled to play the role of the “Gendarme of the Middle East” on behalf of the West (Bağcı, 1990, p. 80).

Certainly, that is not to deny that Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism, as a response to Turkey’s leading role in executing the West-proposed Baghdad Pact of 1955, did not go unnoticed by Israel, who worried about Egypt’s rising regional dominance. The 1956 campaign and the 1967 war were two Israeli offensives against Egypt to deter Nasser. Egypt’s own equivalent response came as a successful offensive strike on Israel on 6th of October 1973, which shook the Israelis, as much as 1967 shocked the Egyptians. Ultimately Egypt and Israel as two regional powers made their points militarily, through back-to-back wars, and could eventually move to peace. They could move to peace because they have tested each other in war and understood that both states are here to stay and survive. This phase, in short, was full of regional rivalry and antagonism among the three countries. Given the regional high threat perceptions, defense spending skyrocketed, as will be addressed below. Egypt was engaged in an actual war economy from 1948 all the way to 1956: the Yemen war (1962–1970), post–1967 war, during the War of Attrition, and leading up to the 1973 war. The Egyptian military budget was high, the foundation

for a national defense industry was laid, and the army played a state-building modernization role from the 1950s–1979, per the international literature recommendation at the time for post-colonial independent developing countries (Huntington, 1957; Finer, 1962; Janowitz, 1960). This phase ended with the peace treaty with Israel and peacetime economics started the following phase.

Mimesis (1980–1995)

In light of Cold War dynamics, Egypt joined the Western camp and “landed with the Americans” after its peace treaty with Israel to paraphrase Egyptian Journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (Satloff, 1988, p. 5). That is to say Sadat moved Egypt from the Soviet orbit to the friendship with United States, albeit without formal alliances, as he was adamant about Egypt’s independence away from formal pacts or allowing the United States to have military bases on Egyptian territory (Sadat, 1978, pp. 126—127). Moreover, adjusting to international recommendations for neoconservative austerity measures, free enterprise, and peace economics, Egypt’s economic policies dictated reduced military budgets during peacetime. To illustrate, Satloff (1988, p. 4) writes, “The successful crossing of the Suez” in the 1973 War set the tone for civil-military relations in Egypt. “Through victory, the *raison d’etre* of the armed forces lost urgency.” That allowed Sadat to “proceed with undermining the institutional power of the armed forces.” Sadat was therefore able to pursue “his grand strategy of ‘peace and prosperity’ to relegate the military to the sidelines of Egyptian politics and to redirect government investment from the military establishment to civilian development” (Satloff, 1988, p. 5). For example, in early 1977, Sadat articulated in an interview to the Iranian newspaper *Rastakhiz*,

If we were able to achieve peace this year ... military expenses would definitely drop ... I

truly need all the funds I can get to rebuild my country. Until this moment, our average military expenditure is very high and we cannot afford to weaken our armed forces as long as we are confronting Israel (*Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 1981, p. 317).

The political leadership under Sadat and Mubarak demanded self-sufficiency of the military and pushed the armed forces to legally engage in extra-state-budget income-generating economic activities in order to keep on par with potentially emerging national security threats, if deemed necessary. NSPO was established in 1979 based on Executive Order No. 32 under President Anwar Sadat, which stated:

The National Service Projects Organization of the Armed Forces is an organ within the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. It was established in accordance with Executive Order No. 32 of 1979 under President Anwar Sadat. The goal of this Organ is achieving relative self-sufficiency of the main needs of the armed forces in order to ease the burdens of state. In addition to marketing the surplus in the domestic market and assisting in the state's economic development projects through an advanced industrial production base.

In addition to the US military aid in the form of loans first and then grants, parallel to US-Israeli grants, the Egyptian defense industry flourished and attained self-sufficiency in ammunition production as well as some areas of spare parts (*Meet the Press* Interview with Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, 1982). More importantly, it became exports-directed. Its main client was Iraq in the 1980s (CIA Report, 1985, p. 3). By the Gulf War in 1991, the United States forgave many of Egypt's accumulated military debts, after Abu Ghazala's loan forgiveness negotiations that had started in the late 1980s and were debated in the press. The press discourse provided heated pro-and-cons positions in relation to defense spending, which had increased to the debt to \$4.5 billion (Springborg, 1990, p. 87) versus expansion of an industrial foundation for defense

industries, which required increased spending (Abdallah, 1990a, p. 19; Abdel-Razek, 1986, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, pp. 123—124; Howeidy, 1986, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990a, pp. 145—146).

Convergence (1996–2010)

Dealing with neoliberal economic policies, privatization of national state assets, globalization, and its trans-borders cash flows, the Egyptian military consolidated their military-owned companies into an entity that started to behave more like a conglomerate among many other emerging private conglomerates from 1991–2010. The Egyptian military-owned civilian products income-generating edifice, NSPO, gradually started to look more like Turkey's conglomerate OYAK. A main difference is that all profits from OYAK legally and clearly go to the officers as a legitimate pension fund. In the Egyptian case, NSPO as a private/special fund within the Ministry of Defense remains state money, not a private pension fund distributed to the officers post-retirement as a supplementary pension. NSPO will start behaving in the next phase as a Gulf-like State Holding.

Current Divergence (2011—Present)

By the 2011 uprising and more specifically by the June 30, 2013 mass protests and the subsequent military intervention that ousted the MB regime, the Egyptian military assumed a new role of national economics where the military acted on behalf of the state in promoting national industries as a direct reaction to the preceding 2 decades of globalization since the early 1990s. By 2019 these economic nationalism ideas simmering since 2011 are no longer exclusive to Egypt. They are contemporaneous trends.

There are similarities in the United States, where, ironically, Bannon-like nationalist economics and Bernie Sanders-like socialism, are products of globalization. On the two extreme ends of right-wing and left-wing US politics, we find the question of a more national and statist role in the economy revisited. Egypt is at the heart of this debate and in the heart of its practice under the current presidency of Abdel Fattah El Sisi. In this respect Egypt's current economic model emulates aspects of the statist holding model of the Arab Gulf States, such as Qatar and UAE, where state sovereign funds play roles in the national economy. Thus, Egypt's case of the military institution currently being a strong economic player can be analyzed, not as an out of this world return to Nasser's era, as if Egypt were out of the contemporary historical moment, but rather as a contemporaneous combination of the Gulf model, Russian regional and international influence, and socialist and nationalist economics trends taking place in the capitalistic United States itself.

4.4 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORICAL PHASES OF THE EAF IN EGYPT'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

In this section, I'll shed some light on the economic historical context in which civil–military relations in Egypt shaped and military-owned companies grew. Egypt transformed from a state-planned economy from 1952–1970 under Nasser to an open market economy from 1976–1990 under Sadat and Mubarak. Then the economy expanded to accommodate neoliberal globalism. After the January 25, 2011 uprising to date under Sisi, a new formulation of nationalist economics in the image of contemporaneous discussions in Europe and the United States is taking place.

Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement of 1952

A monarchy that was gradually perceived as illegitimate, prevalent feebleness in the political party system, and a nationalist struggle against British colonialism bestowed upon the Revolutionary Leaders of 1952 the image of saviors of the nation (Be'Eri, 1970; Hamrroush, 1974, 1980, 1986, 1987; Issawi, 1990; Vatikiotis, 1961, 1967, 1968). Among the officers, Nasser featured prominently. In emulation of the liberation role of the founding officers of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Free Officers movement followed suit (Abdel Nasser, 1953; Sadat, 1978). The circumstances of the Free Officers' takeover made it possible for the new leaders to direct Egyptian affairs into uncharted territories.

Socially and politically, military officers considered themselves and were considered by many members of society as the single coherent group qualified to set Egypt on the correct path politically, economically, socially, and culturally. This favorable societal perception included the Muslim Brotherhood's of the Egyptian army officers. The MB first supported the officers and liaised with them (Nasr, 1999a, p. 325). Soon after, however, the MB leadership showed their intentions of playing a "tutelage" role over the officers by asking Nasser to always consult with them about his policy directions, which Nasser vehemently rejected (Nasr, 1999a, p. 329).

The officers started with banning political parties and establishing the Liberation Rally instead. The purpose was to fill the political void and to mobilize people to support the emerging political regime against existing competition—namely the nationalist liberal Wafd Party and the religious organization of the MB (Hammad, 1986, 1990; Vatikiotis, 1961). The revolutionary officers were worried about the Wafd Party, established in the 1920s as a coherent nationalist, secular group. They were also concerned about the MB's self-entitlement as a guiding tutelage. The Revolutionary Council decided to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood "after it became clear

that brotherhood is veering toward resorting to violence” (Nasr, 1999a, p. 230). The first incident started with some Muslim Brotherhood youth members, who harassed the youth members of the first political organization, which the revolution established on university campuses—The Liberation Organization. The two sides confronted each other in a bloody clash (Nasr, 1999a, p. 230). Ultimately, the Muslim Brotherhood was eventually banned in 1954, after members of its militant units set to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria during one of his speeches (Sadat, 1978, p. 124).

Politically, the National Union substituted for the Liberation Rally in 1957, only to be succeeded by the Arab Socialist Union in 1962. The latter was to offer the ideological foundation of Egyptian socialism and Arab nationalism (Dissouki, 1997, p. 164). Numerous political committees and intelligence services complemented these mass organizations. The security apparatus in its military and civilian dimensions infiltrated all aspects of life and practically stopped any autonomous political activity let alone activism (Kandil, 2016). Economically, the new leadership applied strategies that had extensive and long-lasting effects. It sequestered land from large landowners, limiting ownership to 200 acres per person (reduced to 100 in 1961 and 50 in 1969), and redistributed parts to landless peasants (Abdel-Malek, 1968; Issawi, 1990; Vatikiotis, 1978). The government also started the Aswan High Dam on the Nile to raise irrigation capacity and to produce electricity (Fahim, 1981). Arguably the most controversial economic policies that Nasser established were the sequestering of local and foreign companies beginning with the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal and progressing to seizing all insurance companies, commercial banks, and foreign trade businesses by the mid-1960s (Abdel Malek, 1968; Vatikiotis, 1978).

Nationalization policies, subsequent land ownership, and production laws were enacted to provide the state with the necessary capital to launch an industrialization drive. The purpose of this statist turn was to grant Egypt its economic independence. Richards and Waterbury (1996) rightfully argued that Egypt's drive was a typical statist attitude in favor of import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) policies. Egypt emulated this attitude from many developing countries, such as Turkey's statist policies under Ataturk and Inonu (1923–1950) followed by ISI in the late 1940s and 1950s, to substitute domestic production for imports. This was also in parallel with Israel's statist socialist policies under Ben-Gurion and the subsequent single-party rule of consecutive Labor Party governments (1948–1977). In this respect, Egypt followed a similar path. But while for the first 5-year plan (1960–1964), the statist ISI drive had some positive outcomes in Egypt, by 1964 statist planning was clogged due to inefficiency and shortage of capital in the late 1960s (Richards & Waterbury, 1996 pp. 183–184).

The most prominent feature of Nasser's economic policies was establishing a pervasive public sector, but this was not the current active duty military-run business, which scholars critique today regarding NSPO. NSPO was a completely new entity not formed until 1979. Civilianized officers who left the army to preside over agencies, ministries, and companies manned the newly established public sector. This was the mark of the time. Officers were the ruling class between 1952 and 1967. This situation happened as the new revolutionaries became suspicious of the remnants (*feloul*) of the ancient régime.

Interestingly, this phenomenon of officers administering the state in Egypt was equally and similarly one of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) main characteristics of Israel in the early years, and it affected the IDF's pattern of occupying administrative positions in the newly established state. The IDF penetrated the state and society in the transition period immediately following the

1948 war. For example, the number of Jews in the British Mandatory government in Palestine was already limited because the Jewish population was a minority (32.6%) to the Arabs. By the end of the British Mandate in 1948, most government posts became vacant; senior civil servants went back to Britain, and Arabs who fled the war left their positions empty. According to Burn (2002), “Of the 29,000 permanent employees and 9,500 temporary ones, about 85 percent had left” (p. 45–46 cited in Seidman, 2010, p. 720). Only 5,200 Jewish employees—4,500 civil servants and 700 policemen—remained to fill that gap. Clearly, the new government needed thousands more in the workforce. While experienced civilian Jewish employees of the mandatory government could have helped run the newly formed Israeli government, not many of them were retained in their positions.

The reason for this is that the new Israeli leadership often perceived those mandatory government employees as collaborators with the British ancient régime and subsequently treated them with suspicion (Seidman, 2010). Accordingly, a large number of pre-state Jewish bureaucrats were scrutinized and laid off. New employees replaced them, mainly from pre-state Zionist organizations whose members started to lead the various government agencies. The number of civilians, however, was still low. That is how the army was called upon to fill in to do civilian governing tasks. That is why, “in the formative years of the nation, the IDF was involved in all national tasks, physically as well as ideologically” (Seidman, 2010, p. 720). More specifically, “the army was said to contribute to absorption of immigrants, educate for good citizenship and patriotism, and foster culture.” Moreover, “the IDF engineering units were used to construct and maintain many of the camps, which housed a large number of new immigrants who arrived in the early 1950s” (Epstein & Uritsky, 2004, p. 169). That is the mechanism by which the IDF became part and parcel of the new state administrative/governing apparatus. That

very mechanism of the army's nation-building civilian administrative role was replicated in parallel in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.

As retired fellow officers occupied civilian positions, the active duty armed forces also had to be appeased and secured in their place. Military expenditure increased during that time, as will be delineated in the next section. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Nasser's friend and chief of staff of the Armed Forces up until the 1967 defeat, challenged civil–military relations as a power center under his army command started to form. Amer's challenge to Nasser's *civilian* political leadership from the latter's position of presidency is what led to the creation of a complex and problematic *civilian* state security apparatus that received orders from the president and behaved more like the FBI during the McCarthyism era, in reaction to the army's own military intelligence under Amer. A power triangle of the presidency, the security apparatus of a civilian police state, and the military was created at this moment and continued until Mubarak's last days in power (Kandil, 2016).

Defense Budget in the Early Years of the Republic (1952–1979)

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has data on Egypt that go back to 1962, but not earlier. It is clear that military spending was increasing incrementally in the 1960s until it spiked immediately following the 1967 war, when it jumped from \$1.841 billion (in constant 2017 US\$) in 1967 to \$3.751 billion during the war of attrition from 1967–1970. Israel's spending in 1970 was at \$8.411 billion, while Turkey a decade after the end of the Menderes regime was no longer a regional threat to Egypt, within the Middle East. Turkey's budget by the end of 1970 was lower than that of the other two regional powers at \$2.768 billion. By 1979, Egypt's budget dropped to a mere \$3.143 billion, following the Peace Treaty, while Israel's stayed as high as \$11.786 billion, albeit at a drop from \$15.443 billion in 1974, right after the 1973 War.

Turkey incrementally increased till \$5.697 billion. The tables below show military expenditure for the three countries in constant (2017) US\$ for the years 1962–1979.

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Egypt	\$1.108	\$1.590	\$2.049	\$2.049	\$1.758	\$1.841	\$2.390	\$3.167	\$3.751
Israel	\$1.720	\$2.055	\$2.100	\$2.196	\$2.434	\$3.967	\$5.027	\$6.200	\$8.441
Turkey	\$1.847	\$1.898	\$2.036	\$2.133	\$2.137	\$2.303	\$2.574	\$2.496	\$2.768

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Egypt	\$4.215	\$3.476	\$3.531	\$4.701	\$4.458	\$4.617	\$5.118	\$4.162	\$3.143
Israel	\$9.125	\$9.252	\$13.63	\$13.98	\$15.44	\$14.28	\$12.19	\$13.246	\$11.786
Turkey	\$3.172	\$3.334	\$3.535	\$3.964	\$6.931	\$7.282	\$7.012	\$6.421	\$5.697

Figure 31 Military expenditure by country, 1962–1979 © SIPRI 2019

Figures are in US\$ billion, at constant 2017 prices and exchange rates. Figures in red show some significant increases at specific junctures




Figure 32 Graph comparing Egypt military expenditure to Israel military expenditure 1962–2015. Both countries were similar in their pattern of spending between 1965 and 1979, albeit the actual dollar value is much lower for Egypt. Egypt's spending peaked again in 1986 then dropped. (Source: Tradingeconomics.com)




Figure 33 Graph comparing Egypt military expenditure to Turkey military expenditure 1962–2015. (Source: Tradingeconomics.com)




Figure 34 Egypt and Israel share a parallel trajectory of military expenditure as percentage of GDP. This reflects their mutual threat perceptions in the 1960s. It also shows their similar responses to regional and international threats. Nonetheless, Israel's actual military expenditure share as percentage of GDP (ranging 30%-3.7%) is much higher than that of Egypt (ranging 17%-1.3%).

Defense Industries in the Early Years of the Republic (1952–1979)

Egypt has been the “most important manufacturer of weapons and military components” among the Arab countries (Global Security, 1990). The Minister of Defense is usually the Minister of Military Production as well. Presided over by a major general and a part of the Ministry of Military Production, the Armament Authority has been the main producer of defense systems in Egypt from the 1950s to the present. The Armament Authority has been in charge of deciding which military systems to produce or procure. All military branches are represented in the Armament Authority as it negotiates and signs contracts with foreign arms suppliers.

As early as 1949, Egypt had plans to manufacture its own fighter jets at an industrial base developed during World War II when the United States and the United Kingdom signed contracts with Egypt to supply their forces with certain military equipment. By the time the Free Officers rose to power and the Republic was declared in 1952, a successful project was the Gumbhureyya (Republic) basic flight trainer, a class of aircraft designed specifically to facilitate flight training of pilots and aircrews, of which almost 200 were eventually made. Moreover, Egypt partnered in joint-venture projects to manufacture European-designed military aircrafts, and in 1962 Egypt started an ambitious program, assisted by West German engineers, to design and build a supersonic jet fighter.

Soon after, however, the government ended the project because of financial constraints that started to accumulate prior to the June 1967 war. In another program also with the help of West German scientists and technicians, the Egyptian air force built models of three surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). These designs, however, were never operationalized either. The dilemma was the same one that faced Israel at the time: whether to use investments to develop a domestic

industry or capitalize on opportunities for arms purchase, in light of international embargos on arms for both countries. Nasser purchased large numbers of Soviet arms “to quickly match Israeli capability rather than await the uncertain results of Egypt’s costly arms development efforts” (CIA, 1985, p. 3). This policy direction “virtually shut down the arms industry and led to the cancellation of the most promising aeronautical research and development programs” (CIA, 1985, p. 3). Israel, by contrast, pursued a dual-strategy of arms imports when available and investing in the domestic defense industry when possible, as will be delineated in the next chapter. Both countries, however, had to grapple with the question of self-sufficiency in arms production and match one another’s capacities, as they mutually perceived each other as primary threats during the 1960s and 1970s.




Figure 35 Egypt’s arms imports 1960-2017

The Egyptian Armed Forces' Civilian Economic Roles in the Early Years (1952–1979)

In terms of assigning military men civilian economic roles since 1959, Nasser pursued two policies. He expanded the public sector firms, which were manned by his peers of retiring off-duty army officers, put in these places by their benefactor, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer (Kandil, 2016). And he charged the military factories with the task of producing military equipment and military and civilian products simultaneously. In 1959, Nasser (1959) said in a public speech, “Not only will our new military factories be producing armed vehicles and tanks but also sewing machines for civilians’ needs.” Nasser added, “And yes if there is imminent need to reverse the military factories’ production back to defense weapon systems, they can go back to that.” Nasser continued that part of building “our Socialist Democratic Cooperative Society in industry is to have the government be a shareholder in industrialization. And the army will play a role in this industrialization, in peacetime.”

In fact the slogan “We will manufacture all: From the needle to the rocket” was the working theorem of the time. Eventually this pervasive role of army men both in the administration of the state and its economy became heavily critiqued in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat. New understanding of the strategic needs for military self-sufficiency in certain sectors would be debated in the mid–1980s, as introduced above. How the new direction of civilian products evolved after the 1973 war will be analyzed in the chronological phases below.

Sadat and Economic Infitah (1970–1981)

Beginning with the post–1967 defeat reality and without a Nasser-type charisma he did not initially have the gifts to fill, Sadat capitalized on the October 6 “Nasr” or “victory” of the 1973 war against Israel to instill a number of domestic and international economic and political initiatives, all while exerting the executive power of the president on the military, hence keeping

it both loyal and professional.¹¹ In 1974, Sadat ushered in the beginning of the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP), known as *infitah*, that began replacing the socialist policies of the 1952 Revolution, and the military did not object. Infitah's purpose was to offer sufficient inducements to attract massive amounts of western and Arab capital into Egypt to help stimulate the country's economy. In effect it was saying to the rest of the world, come here and make money out of Egypt, in the hope that Egypt will make money out of the rest of the world (Thames TV, 1977). In 1974 and 1975, after intensive diplomacy by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, negotiations between Egyptian and Israeli officials resulted in two disengagement agreements between respective forces on the Suez Canal, and the canal was opened for navigation. Sadat's most daring foreign policy initiative, however, was his visit to Israel in the fall of 1977, which ultimately led to the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The outcome of this agreement, by which the army abided, translated into removing Egypt from the military domain of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The military acted as a state institution obliged by its duty and obedience to the civilian political leadership represented in the president. Neither did the military shirk when Sadat decided to begin multi-party politics in 1976. By then, the state had been acting under his command; the 1971 Corrective Revolution had purged his Nasserist adversaries; the 1973 victory against Israel had given him an earned legitimacy; and the *infitah* had put Egypt's economy on a new path,

¹¹ A crucial war decision as well as foreign policy directive that Sadat undertook from his position as President with the legitimate political authority, before 1973, and without the military shirking or rebelling against his civilian control, was expelling about 15,000 Soviet personnel from Egypt, who were stationed after the 1967 war, despite Sadat's signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet Union. The literature highlights how pro-Soviet Egyptian army officers could have at least attempted to stage some resistance or mutiny if not an outright coup, if they were too politicized or too entangled in pro-soviet favoritism cliques. None of that occurred. The professional Egyptian military obeyed the legitimate political leadership of President Sadat in war decision and subsequently during political diplomatic negotiations.

allowing for the emergence of a new economic bourgeoisie, independent and entrepreneurial, yet under Sadat's wing of protection (Harb, 2003). In a *Thames TV* (1977) interview, Sadat said:

I don't think any president who came in Egypt here or in any other country in the Third World has faced what I am facing. The experience of socialism that we had here, it has been proved wrong and it has made our country reach a very miserable state. I am trying my best. But how can I build the country with such high military expenditure? For that, I am really asking for peace. And I am working for peace.

So, when Sadat saw that a new era of multi-party politics could start, there was no organized military elite to oppose his policies of liberalization or enact a coup against him. In line with Abdallah (1990), Harb (2003), and Kandil (2016), my argument is that the military had formally politically withdrawn by the 1967 defeat in Egypt. Yet in exchange for this withdrawal from governing roles, their economic institutional interests had to be kept intact. This withdrawal from politics occurred in light of military professionalization and pressures for democratization processes. Egypt under Sadat was experiencing Turkey's own opening of a multi-party system under Ismet Inonu in 1946, which led to the election of Adnan Menderes. Sadat had spoken in various interviews about correcting the path of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 as Turkey did (Ahram, 1980). For example, in a long speech on June 6, 1980, addressing the EAF, Sadat talked about the democratic path on which he chose to put Egypt. He refers to the major purge of "political power centers" on May 15, 1971 as the second revolution (Sadat, 1978, p. 204). The purge included the remnants from Nasser's regime, which included a number of retired military officers who manned the Egyptian government at the time. Sadat said,

We corrected the history of one hundred years, since the Orabi revolution to the struggles of Mustafa Kamel and Mohamed Farid, to the 1919 revolution, to the revolution of July 23. We

have corrected all that history, and all what stained the acts of the rulers of this country and all what jeopardized our future. We corrected all of this with one stroke; of what you achieved on October 6, 1973. Today the construction is being completed, with a well-anchored state established on constitutional state institutions, not on the rule of the individual. That is when constitutional legitimacy replaces revolutionary legitimacy. The constitutional legitimacy stems from the two revolutions: July 23, 1952 and that of May 15 (Ahram, 1980, my translation).

Sadat continued to articulate the new constitutional legitimacy by saying:

It was your revolution on 23 July that eliminated foreign occupation, the corrupt rule of the corrupt monarchy, party-rule that collaborated with the King and the colonizers to corrupt political life in Egypt. *The May 15 revolution came to correct the course of the July 23 revolution.* This way you, [the armed forces] know the will of the people and the people forever realize safety, security, and democracy. Now that the construction has been completed, we must begin the process of rebuilding the country as best as any country in the world can be: A country that is living in prosperity, democracy, and with human dignity (Ahram, 1980, my translation, emphasis added).

Sadat, however, in contrast to Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was cognizant of the importance of fulfilling the military's needs, all while reducing the military budget. Self-sufficiency became a policy directive from Sadat to the military. And the military obeyed and figured out ways to adjust to the new civilianized economy of peacetime, by producing its own strategic needs.

The military's obedience and professionalism had been institutionalized well enough by January 1977 when they were openly tested. Based on the International Monetary Fund's

recommendation to reduce spending, the Egyptian government revealed that it would slash subsidies on essential commodities. As soon as this announcement was made, demonstrations and riots broke out in Cairo and other cities in what became known as the Bread Riots of 1977, while Sadat personally called it “intifadat al-Harameyya: the riot of the thieves and riffraff” in a TV interview (Thames TV, 1977). Police capacity was exhausted, and Sadat had to ask the armed forces to quell the riots and reinstate order. This was the first deployment of troops in the Cairo in the republic’s history. They did; and a few days later, the army went back to the barracks (Abdallah, 1990b; Harb, 2003; Satloff, 1988).

The 1977 Bread Riots illustrate that Sadat, and after him Mubarak in his own test of the Central Security Forces agitations in 1986, have both managed to create new references for legitimacy that bypass the military background they had. The point is that they used their legitimate authority from position of President to call on the military to restore order, without the military jumping on power. Sadat’s decision to deploy the army in 1977 “was made out of reluctance, not out of an eagerness to employ the forces of state control against the rioters” (Satloff, 1988, p.6). The official account of the Egyptians “gives barely a hint of the military’s pivotal role in safeguarding domestic security” (Satloff, 1988, p.6). To illustrate, in a parliamentary speech several days after order was restored, Prime Minister Mamduh Salim shared the measures the government took to quell the protests. “He gave top billing to the role of the police force and referred to the role of the armed forces only as an afterthought” (Satloff, 1988, p. 6) Salim said,

It is also clear that the attempt was contained and the scheme foiled, not because of a retreat by the [elements] that had prepared themselves to cause these disturbances, but because the police forces confronted the waves of sabotage and demonstrations on January 18 and 19, in addition to the assistance provided by the armed forces on the evening of January 18 (Satloff,

1988 p. 7, citing Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 31, 1977, citing Cairo Domestic Service (radio), January 29, 1977).

In his own public narrative of the riots, Sadat “virtually never referred to the role played by the armed forces” in restoring security (Satloff, 1988, p. 8). Furthermore, observers citing the US ambassador at the time noted that Minister of War General Muhammad Abdul Ghani al-Gamasy was “extremely reluctant” to deploy his troops against Egyptian civilians (Indyk, 1984, p. 54). Civil-military relations scholars have established since this incidence that not only did Sadat not want the army involved, but Egypt’s professionalized army shared his sentiment as well (Harb, 2003; Kandil, 2016; Satloff, 1988; Yossef, 2014). This was a strong evidence of the aspired for concordance (Schiff, 1995) in Egyptian civil-military relations.

It was the obedience with which the army went back to the barracks that needs to be stressed as an illustration of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s civilian control over a depoliticized armed forces. To undermine any possibility for subsequent coups, Sadat and then Mubarak were very careful to exhibit and exercise their civilian control as presidents over the military institution as an arm of the state. In return, however, starting in 1975, the Arab Organization for Industrialization was established for military production with funds from the Arab Gulf States, and by 1979 the military civilian economic activities of NSPO were started and allowed to grow in both Sadat’s and Mubarak’s eras.

In Egypt, despite the legacy of the 1952 Free Officers Movement that ended the monarchy and brought the soldiers to rule, the 1967 military defeat pushed Nasser himself and certainly Sadat afterward to purge the military ruling class and to professionalize the institution to make it focus strictly on war and defense affairs. From that time onward, the military has not been the exclusive “ruling class” as some scholars might have argued (Abul-Magd; 2016; Cook, 2007;

Springborg, 2011; 2017). I posit that military defeat alters civil–military relations and Egypt is such case after 1967. By 1973 War success, Sadat as the political war strategist and peace architect was acknowledged as such by the professional armed forces. For example, Minister of War Gamasy said to President Sadat on his way to Jerusalem in November 1977, while bidding him farewell at the tarmac of Cairo Airport

The armed forces are aware of the dimensions and responsibilities of the present situation and are closely watching your courageous step toward a just peace. So march ahead, Mr. President, with the blessings of God, and you have, from all members of the armed forces, greetings, esteem and prayers for success (cited in Baker, 1978, p. 160).

Actually, the graph below shows the difference in number of officers during the 1950s and 1960s versus the 1970s under Sadat. For instance, under Sadat, only five out of a total of 26 governorates had former officers appointed to their helm (Cooper, 1982, p. 205). This trend of demilitarization of public office continued under Mubarak during the 80s and 90s only to change again slightly, starting in the mid–2000s, as a way of bringing the military officers on board regarding Mubarak’s big project: the Dynastic Republic and his son Gamal’s potential rise to power. Ultimately, as a non-regimist, professional army the Egyptian military would not side with Mubarak or his son in the face of the January 25 uprising against the perpetual rule of the Mubaraks.




Figure 36 Number of Egyptian military officers serving on the Cabinet, 1951–1981. (Source: Mark N. Cooper. (1982).

In his last days, Sadat’s liberalization policies, both economic and political, became overwhelming, and his measured opening of political participation resulted in an increased political sense of entitlement that he was unable or unwilling to tackle (Waterbury, 1983, chapter 15). On October 6, 1981, an Islamist group headed by Abbud El-Zumor, a lieutenant colonel in military intelligence at the time, conspired from amid the ranks and assassinated Sadat during an army parade commemorating the eighth anniversary of the 1973 war. As militant members of what became known as Egypt Islamic Jihad, those few young officers infiltrated into the primarily secular nationalist military and murdered Sadat in objection to his peace treaty with Israel.

According to interviews and information obtained by journalist Lawrence Wright, the group was recruiting military officers and accumulating weapons, waiting for the right moment to launch “a complete overthrow of the existing order” in Egypt. In fact:

[Al-Zumar's] plan was to kill the main leaders of the country, capture the headquarters of the army and State Security, the telephone exchange building, and of course the radio and television building where news of the Islamic revolution would then be broadcast, unleashing—he expected—a popular uprising against secular authority all over the country. (Wright, 2006 p. 59)

Islamist politics had already mobilized enough people at the societal level and capitalized on portraying military defeats in the case of 1967, as God's fury with the Egyptians, who forgot their religion and became too secular and socialist under Nasser. This socio-cultural transformation in Egypt engendered societal change and chipped away at some of the military's political grip. At first, Sadat maneuvered this condition of and Islamizing polity to his advantage as he released political Islamists from prison in 1971, all while playing on the "Pious President" trope, thereby instituting his own and Mubarak's subsequent authoritarian presidencies as moderate Muslim leaders, tolerant of societal religious currents, but not politically Islamist. The Egyptian military was never politicized into Islamism. That explains why as the non-regimist professional army they have been since 1973, the Egyptian Armed Forces would neither side with Mubarak in the face of the 2011 nor with Mohamed Morsi in the face of the 2013 popular uprising against the Muslim Brotherhood regime, whose internationalism and pan-Islamist ties to a pro-Islamist Turkey and its financial backer Qatar were perceived as *external* national security threats, more than simply a domestic political party that rose to power through legitimate elections.

Defense Budget in The Middle Years (1980–1995)

Complaining about military expenditure in earlier times, Sadat was keen on reaping the benefits of peace from lowered military spending. Starting in 1980, Egypt became the lowest spender

among the three countries during this entire phase, going down from the highest point of spending of \$4.916 billion¹² in 1985 to lowest point of \$2.269 billion in 1993.




Figure 37 Egypt's military expenditure 1969—2015. Source: Tradingeconomics.com based on (SIPRI, 2019)

Nonetheless, analysts observed at the time that, “the Mubarak era has so far been marked as a time of rejuvenation of the armed forces as a modern fighting force (symbolized by the movement toward mechanization and the acquisition of American F-16 and French Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft)” (Satloff, 1988 p. 9). However, intense domestic criticism of defense spending within the oppositional parties newspapers like leftist *Al Ahali* and Leftist-turned-Islamist *Al Shaab*, alike was ignited and intensified between 1984 and 1987. Critics thought Egypt is overspending and is getting embroiled in debt, under the pretext of Sadat’s “diversification of sources of armament” which according to critics was code for switching from the Soviet camp to the United States and accordingly be dependent on Washington, instead of achieving the independence in political and national security decisions. Thus, the oppositional press saw that Egypt’s armament from the United States was uneconomic military spending (Abdel-Razek, 1986, republished in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 124). The year 1985 was the highest in spending of this

¹² All figures in this section are for the constant 2017 US\$.

phase. In response to the vivid debate in the Egyptian newspapers for and against defense expenditure, Mubarak made these statements in an interview:

Our military spending is weak, and I say that it is not enough. Half goes to salaries, the rest for subsistence and other needs. If it were not for aid, we would have a difficult situation, while those around us have countless equipment. The fact is that I suffer a lot, as I said, from hearing such talk on this subject. And those who repeat it do not understand its truth, but it is only a bidding process for them; and I tell them “haram ‘alaikum” shame on you, this is your country. If there were cases of extravagance in military spending, I would have dismissed whomever responsible for that. There is not. We are under spending. (P. 123) In fact, if that [cutting military spending] is in the interest of Israel, I do not think it is in the interests of Egypt” (Abdel-Razek, 1986, column republished in full in Abdallah, 1990a, p. 123-124)

But the critics did not take it lying down. Confirming what Satloff (1988) observed regarding the opposition’s taking charge and commenting “with ferocity” on issues “deemed out-of-bounds,” prior (p. 17), the columnist response to Mubarak in *Al Ahali* was bold:

We say to the president that it is “haram ‘alah” shame on him and grossly unjust of him to respond to the thoughtful deliberations of former military officials, like General Ameen Howeidy in his take on current military spending, with the accusation of misunderstanding, playing a bidding game, and serving the interests of the Israeli “enemy” when we call for ‘rationalization of military spending’ in order to reach operating efficiency. For although our population, as in human capital is 12 times larger than Israel, our armed forces are only slightly larger than that of Israel. But the most important and most dangerous thing is that Israel has full superiority in the striking force (armor and air force) and this requires ‘rationalization of expenditure’, i.e., the review of the volume of expenditure and its return

on investment, because the point is not in size or quantity of spending any more, but in the quality of the return on this spending: Making sure that the return on each pound or dollar spent will achieve the greatest amount of defense and defense efficiency (Abdel-Razek, 1986, article fully republished in Abdallah, 1990, p. 123)

The intensity of this criticism was in 1986, on the year when Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala negotiated loan forgiveness (Abdallah, 1990, p. 19; Abdel-Razek, 1986, pp. 123—124; Howaidy, 1986, pp. 145—146) and transformed U.S. military aid from long-term loans to unpaid grants. Overall, Israel was the highest spender during this phase of 1980-1995, fluctuating between the lowest point of \$11.582 billion in 1986 and the highest spending of \$18.267 billion in 1991 around the time of the Gulf War. Turkey was somewhere in the middle as a military spender, steadily and incrementally increasing from \$5.905 billion in 1980 to \$11.276 billion in 1995. The discrepancy between Egypt's military spending and the other two regional powers was already clear by 1995. Egypt's military expenditure was a mere \$2.342 billion, whereas Israel's was \$13.377 billion, and Turkey's was \$11.276 billion. Around the 1995 juncture, Egypt's extremely low military budget relative to its competitive regional powers was precisely when the next phase of increased income-generating activities started picking up again under new Minister of Defense Field Marshal Hassan Tantawi. Abu Ghazala had lost his job in 1991 when the pentagon revealed he was smuggling "American missile technology and deal[ing] with North Korea," in Abu Ghazala's attempts to make the Egyptian army better than what "Washington would allow for" (Kandil, 2016, p. 309).

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Egypt	\$3.072	\$3.717	\$4.110	\$4.610	\$4.906	\$4.916 Highest	\$4.463	\$3.791
Israel	\$12.492	\$14.659	\$13.577	\$12.086	\$13.146	\$12.413	\$11.582	\$14.158
Turkey	\$5.905	\$6.662	\$7.283	\$6.891	\$6.699	\$7.107	\$7.985	\$7.626

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Egypt	\$2.986	\$2.407	\$2.370	\$2.386	\$2.338	\$2.269 Lowest	\$2.380	\$2.342
Israel	\$15.675	\$12.732	\$13.446	\$18.267	\$13.789	\$15.164	\$14.397	\$13.377
Turkey	\$6.717	\$7.772	\$9.391	\$9.654	\$10.154	\$11.227	\$10.976	\$11.276

Source: SIPRI 2019

Figure 38 Egypt's Military Expenditure 1980-1995 in 2017 constant USD billion

Defense Industries in the Middle Years (1980–1995)

Egypt's domestic defense industry "has been and remains completely controlled by the military through the Ministry of Military Production, and the prospects of private and foreign companies are perceived as a threat to the country's national security interests" (*Businesswire*, 2018).

Initially, the defense industry was stalled in the aftermath of the peace treaty with Israel. Just as Arab-funded development was beginning to flow to the Arab Organization for Industrialization to support pan-Arab arms production programs, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel led Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE at the time to withdraw their financing from Egypt's newly established organization and to shut their markets to Egyptian arms exports. The effect did not last for long, however, as the defense industry developed exponentially during the early years of this phase, starting in 1981. Production was geared toward domestic needs in terms of self-sufficiency in ammunitions and spare parts (*Meet the Press* Interview with Field Marshal

Abu Ghazala, 1982), as well as geared toward exports to bring in foreign currency. The following are the military factories that were consolidated under the Ministry of Military Production between 1980 and 1995:

- Abu Zaabal Tank Repair Factory
- Arab British Dynamics Company —Product Focus and Helwan Factory for Developed Industries—Services
- Arab Organization for Industrialization—Aircraft Factory
- Arab Organization for Industrialization—Electronics Factory
- Arab Organization for Industrialization—Engine Factory
- Arab Organization for Industrialization—Kader Factory
- Arab Organization for Industrialization—Sakr Factory

The 1985 CIA report stated that Egypt’s military production sector provided several important benefits to Egypt’s economy. The report enumerated them as the provision of civil and military goods and services; naming the military production sector as “significant earners” of hard currency through arms exports, and employing scientists and technicians (CIA, 1982, p. 3). In fact, more than 100,000 Egyptian civilians worked in the defense industry during this phase. The report clearly stated that the state-owned Egyptian military production sector was EAF-run. The sum of the arms sales component, excluding the civilian products of NSPO, was estimated to have exported the total amount of “\$500 million in 1984 and may have reached \$1 billion in 1982 when Egypt provided a large quantity of arms and ammunition to Iraq” (CIA, 1985, p. 3). These exports included resale of Soviet weaponry from Egyptian stockpiles. The writers pointed out, “We suspect that the military has used a large share of these earnings for purchases of *non-*

US weapons, turning funds over the Central Bank only when foreign exchange is insufficient to cover other important defense-related obligations” (p. 3).



Figure 39 Egypt’s arms exports. Highest point is in 1982, during the Iraq-Iran war. Egypt was exporting weapons to Iraq that reached around \$80 million, and in other sources in the literature \$1 billion is cited (McDermott, 1988).

Diversification of sources of armament had been a lesson learned from the 1967 and 1973 episodes. Egypt did not find the soviet ally reliable. By mid–1985 as Egypt was becoming a US ally, it still kept its military doctrine of self-sufficiency of what the military can produce, including civilian strategic products. Self-sufficiency also meant diversifying the sources of armament for all arms that has to be purchased. Mubarak clearly made a decision “to divert a greater percentage of economic resources to the purchase of military goods and to the expansion of the military” (Satloff, 1988, p. 10). In doing so, however, “three-fifths of the more than \$7 billion in arms that Egypt has imported between 1981-1985 came from non-U.S. sources

“(Satloff, 1988, p. 10). Away from total dependence on the Soviet Union or the United States, the main sources of weapon technologies on which Egypt started to rely in the early to mid—1980s were France, the United Kingdom, as well as Brazil, China and North Korea (CIA, 1982, p. 4).

Table 1: Sources of Egyptian Arms Imports, 1981-1985
(Hundreds of Millions of Constant 1983 \$US)

Country	Amount	percentage of total
United States	2,900	40.7
France	1,200	16.8
China	525	7.4
United Kingdom	460	6.4
Italy	350	4.9
Soviet Union	40	0.6
<i>Others</i>	1,640	23.0
Total	7,120	

Source: ACDA, 1986

Figure 40 Diversification of sources of Egyptian arms, 1981-1985. Source: Satloff, 1988 p. 11 based on data from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)'s publication: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers.

The reason why Egypt did not rely exclusively on the US military aid has to do with its experience with the unreliability of the Soviet ally as well as the actual frustration with Washington itself regarding what it was willing to allow Egypt to procure. For example, Abu Ghazala reflected his officers' frustration of having to depend on a country determined to keep Israel's military power ahead of all Arab countries combined behind (*Meet the Press*, 1982; Al-Baz, 2007, pp. 206-208).

In fact, the aforementioned 1985 CIA report explicitly stated, “Foreign governments and firms, however, are unlikely to provide the kinds of technology or key manufacturing processes that will permit Egypt to independently produce its own weapons” (p. 6) The report stated that “West European firms will be interested in maintaining Egypt's dependence primarily to retain

their market shares and to forestall Egyptian competition with their exports (p 6). The report added that it was expected that Egypt “would consider substantial Soviet or Warsaw pact defense production assistance only if Western nations deny Egypt—perhaps as a result of another conflict with Israel—continued access to the kinds of production technology and weapons it now receives (p. 6)

Indeed the CIA report recorded Egypt’s collaboration with North Korea in reverse-engineering weapons such as 130- and 122-mm guns, the 122-mm multiple rocket launcher and the anti-aircraft gun. The report showed the CIA’s belief that Egypt increasingly relied on the China and North Korea “more because of foreign policy considerations and a desire to maintain arms technology diversity than to obtain specific technical capabilities (p. 5). In other arms diversification of sources of arm procurement was a strategic decision for Egypt who cannot rely on a single ally. This strategy has helped Egypt maintain some degrees of independence, which helps with its deterrence strategy, and keeping its war decision in its own hands. The October 1973 is the reason behind this strategy. When the Soviet Union refused to supply Egypt with sufficient weapons, Sadat had to rely on what he already had and still go to war on the 6th of October in order to change “the no peace, no war status quo” and actually reach strategic peace with Israel.

Sadat (1978 pp. 220-221) recounts in his autobiography negotiating at the Kremlin in March 1971. He established two main points: “The first point was that we didn’t want Soviet soldiers to fight our battle for us; the second was that we never sought to initiate a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States” (p. 21). Sadat then discusses a deal of receiving thirty MIG-25 aircrafts and the most needed deterrent weapon of SAM batteries, as Israel had been bombing Egypt in the depth of Cairo and other cities. The condition the Soviets first stipulated

was that the aircrafts “be used only when prior Soviet permission had been granted” (p. 220). Sadat was “livid with rage” and stated “Nobody, is allowed to take a decision on Egyptian affairs except the people of Egypt itself—represented by me, the President of Egypt! I don’t want to craft.” Breshnev then took Sadat to the side and tried to tell him that he would send him thirty MIG-25s of which Egypt already had four. Sadat calmed down and said “I take back what I said about our differences, provided of course that the pilots received their orders from me.” The soviets never sent Egypt the promised aircraft (p. 221). Sadat ordered the four-Soviet manned aircraft be grounded and he told the Soviets to choose between taking them back and selling them to Egypt. Sadat had kept those aircrafts to do reconnaissance missions for the Egyptian armed forces. What Sadat realized was that he four aircrafts were there to do reconnaissance for the Soviet Fifth Fleet against the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The aircrafts left the Soviet Union as they refused to sell them to Egypt Sadat was utterly frustrated with the situation. He narrates:

The Soviet Union sent me the SAM batteries in April 1971. Part of the ammunition promised was also sent, but the rest was not received until the [American] airlift [to Israel] of the October 1973 War. As for the aircraft and the deterrents [Soviet political leader] Brezhnev had promised me, they proved to be part of the lip service I was paid. This was how the Soviet Union always dealt with me. It liked to see our hands tied, so that we were unable to take a decision (p. 221).

That is precisely why the Soviet Union could not believe Sadat decided to go to war when he didn’t have all the weapons he needed. But it was a matter of Egypt’s survival to go to war in 1973 in order to change the status quo enough as to get to negotiations and liberate the occupied Sinai. And that is the story of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Egypt’s political leadership to rely

on multiple sources of armament and to rely on themselves in ammunition manufacturing and civilian strategic products as much as they can. “No one will come to help us” is the operation theorem as one Egyptian military officer told me.




Figure 41 Frenzy graph reflecting arms imports of the three countries and their constant fluctuations. Egypt in red is the highest importer of arms (from the Soviet Union) before the 1973 war and the highest importer today.

The United States’ commitment to Israel’s quantitative qualitative advantage in weapon procurement over that of Egypt was revealed in multiple incidents. For example, Israel’s F-16 fighter jets were two-thirds more than Egypt’s. When Egypt requested the Advanced Medium-

Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), the pentagon refused, referring to Israeli concerns. And while the United States subsidized 70% of Israel's costs in developing Arrow missiles, it rejected Egypt's requests to develop a similarly advanced missile program. So even though the two countries possess similar weapons in their arsenals, the quality and quantity of Israel's weapons are made on purpose to remain superior, as part of Israel's security doctrine (*Meet the Press*, 1982; Frisch 2001, pp. 3-5; Frisch, 2013).

Finally, investments in the Egypt's defense industry during this phase 1980-1995 were aborted by 1988, however, due to US intervention to hinder accelerated progress in the domain of the arms industry, in both Egypt and Israel, as it accused both countries of stealing some of the US technology to reverse engineer them and create domestically manufactured weapons for exports on the global market. The defense industry slowed down more in Egypt than it did in Israel, as the latter again picked up its investments in R&D and manufacturing by the mid-1990s because of its own perpetual threats. What happened in the Egyptian case is that Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abu Ghazala was exposed to Washington as smuggling missile technology of about "430 pounds of carbon phenolic cloth, a material to help elude radar that is used in missile nose cones and stealth aircraft" (*New York Times*, 1989). In fact, it was the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Ahranot* that reported that the minister of defense did that "behind Washington's back" (Kandil, 2016, p. 305).

Even more, the newspaper revealed Abu Ghazala's talks with North Korea on missile technology and his preliminary ideas of developing chemical weapons. It is clear that the US knew about these collaborations with North Korea since the 1985 CIA report. So it might hardly be a revelation by the Israeli newspaper. However, at this juncture, Mubarak dismissed "his friend-turned-rival" who by now got him in trouble with Washington (Al-Baz, 2007, pp. 78—

81). The Egyptian defense industry lagged behind Israel since. But Egypt still received its imported arms both from the United States and other sources and continued to manage to make do with restrictions imposed on it, all while remaining among the top militaries in the world.

The Egyptian Armed Forces' Civilian Economic Activities in the Middle Years (1980–1995)

Sadat, occupying the civilian position as president, needed to create the necessary equilibrium in civil–military relations in order to avoid any agitation within the armed forces that would invite a coup. Accordingly, as he was pursuing his *infitah*—Open Door Policy, where a civilian bourgeoisie was to start rising through international trade and entrepreneurial import/export businesses, the Armed Forces were assigned a developmental role, per the literature recommendations for developing modernizing countries (Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Perlmutter, 1974) to come on board regarding the anticipated tectonic socio-economic changes.¹³ Sadat's political maneuvering was an exercise in orderly civilian control from his civilian position as president. Sadat was a president who happened to be from a military background. But he was not the representative of the military in office. For example (Be'eri, 1982) notes that while in the mid-1950s “Naguib and Nasser and their comrades were officers who had only just left active service in the army, Sadat at the end of the seventies had not actively participated in army service for more than twenty years and he was not seen as a representative of the officer-corps in particular”(p.77).

Sadat's reference to Ataturk and how he depoliticized the Turkish Armed Forces have been

¹³ Al Ahram newspaper covered news on civil–military relations seminars conducted at Cairo University between civilian economists and military officers. It covered extensive interviews with Chief of Staff Ahmed Kamal Hassan in 1979 and with the subsequent Chief of Staff Abu Ghazala in 1981. Sadat was also interviewed talking about the rationale for the developmental role of the armed forces and their task in post-war nation-building. International trends and the literature on civil–military relations were cited throughout those interviews and media coverage. The emphasis was that Egypt was in line with the established civil–military relations practices at the time.

frequently stated in his autobiography (Sadat, 1978). Accordingly, Egypt's NSPO was born out of Egypt's plans for a civilianized free market economy after almost 2 decades of statist economic policies followed by a war economy.

Moreover, the difficulties Egypt faced in regional wars pushed it toward economic self-sufficiency. Roots for the Egyptian military's strategic role in development came out as a response to the regional circumstance of the 1967 military defeat, the 1973 victory, and the subsequent peace treaty with Israel. For example, Egypt's military concept of self-sufficiency of three civilian strategic products—water for soldiers to drink, bread for them to eat, and cement as a basic bunker building material—was born in response to Israel's successful reliance on the United States in preparation for the 1967 war, and its total dependence on the United States during the Yom Kippur 1973 war (CBC-Egypt, 2012). Egypt's adoption of self-sufficiency stemmed from the untrustworthiness of its own so-called ally at the time, the Soviet Union.¹⁴ For example, after waiting for Soviet medicine, let alone weapons, that never came in preparation for the 1973 war with Israel, Egypt learned a harsh lesson that resulted in the strategic decision to make the Armed Forces build a pharmaceuticals factory rather than rely on outside assistance (Al Qot, 1980). Thus, the notion of military self-sufficiency regarding certain civilian strategic goods was a direct product of experiences in regional inter-state wars.

¹⁴ In his autobiography *In Search for Identity*, Sadat (1978) wrote extensively about the notion of false reliance on the Soviets, who dragged on their promised deliveries of much-needed weapon and equipment shipments. That was the reason why Sadat dispelled the Soviet military experts in 1972 and decided to exclusively rely on existing weapons, and military materiel. Self-sufficiency was born out of necessity and the realization that Egypt's Soviet ally is not as dependable as Israel's American ally. Self-sufficiency as a concept however has its roots in Machiavelli's advice in his seminal book on war, *The Prince*. Machiavelli (2004, p. 54) argued that alliances are perilous, "useless, and dangerous" since they are often in the interests of those with whom a nation allies—and whose interest are rarely ever the same as one nation's own national interests. Sadat narrates in detail his struggle with the Soviets between 1967 and 1973, over his decision to go to war in order to change the status quo of the then Israeli occupied Sinai. The Soviets had their own calculations vis-à-vis the US détente and Egypt was left to fend for itself. Accordingly, self-sufficiency is a deeply ingrained military doctrine in the Egyptian armed forces due to both theoretically supported reasons as well as historically rooted empirical evidence.

Israel itself was impacted by the shock of its unpreparedness in the 1973 war. Israel faced the reality of its helpless dependence on the United States. The frantic “Save Israel” call during the 1973 war was not something for Israel to feel secure about (Boyne, 1998, p. 54; Maoz, 2009; Sadat, 1978, p. 257). In turn, Israel also learned aspects of self-sufficiency. Thus, after the Yom Kippur War, there was “a considerable increase in the economic role of the defense establishment with the growth of Israel’s military-industrial complex, which includes the IDF, government defense industries and public as well as private firms that produce defense-related equipment” (Kaplan, 2015). Egypt and Israel adopted aspects of self-sufficiency at the same historical moment for just one example of many showing what these countries share with one another in terms of military’s economic doctrines born out of regional circumstances and interactions. Actually, one school of thought (Abul-Magd, 2016) has dismissively suggested that military self-sufficiency is an obsolete Egyptian concept. Critics of this income-generating military self-sufficiency thinking (Springborg, 2017) argued that the notion should be discounted as empty and sometimes rather false nationalistic rhetoric. Yet, in fact self-sufficiency is not exclusively Egyptian rhetoric. While Egypt’s military self-sufficiency doctrine validly goes back to learned lessons from the 1967 and 1973 episodes (Sadat, 1978), it happens to equally be a contemporary concern for Israel. For example, to date, *both* Egypt and Israel maintain self-sufficiency as a strategic disposition. In a recent strategic assessment report regarding Israel’s gas imports from Egypt (Starfor, 2018), for example, the analysis showed an emphasis on civilian strategic goods in addition to energy and weaponry:

Before the discovery of Tamar and Leviathan, Israel had been dependent on natural gas from neighboring Egypt. This reliance, however, presented major problems for Israel. Because the country has long strived to cultivate self-sufficiency in a number of areas—water, food,

energy or military procurement—any dependency on foreign natural gas represented a strategic liability. Perhaps even worse for Netanyahu’s government, the situation provided a regional power with an opportunity to exert considerable leverage over Israel (Starfor, 2018).

The domains in which NSPO are involved are as follows. The revamped website seems to promote these activities and showcase them more than the earlier low-key presence it used to be.

Agriculture & Food Industry Field	Mining Field	Engineering Field	Industrial Field	Services Field
Food Security Sector	Mining sector	National Co. for General Construction & supplies	El-Nasr Company for Intermediate Chemicals	El-Nasr company for services & maintenance (Queen service)
Egg Production Complex	Egyptian Black Sand Company	The National Company for roads building and development	Arab International Optronics (AIO)	The National Company for petroleum
National Co. for Natural Water in Siwa (SAFI)			Plastic Rolls factory	
National Co. for Food Industry			El-Areesh company for cement	
Upper Egypt Company for agricultural industry & land Reclamation			National Company for Batteries	
National Company for Land Reclamation & Agriculture Queen Company for Macaroni Pasta				

Wadi El-Sheih Farm				
National Company for Fishery and Aquaculture				
National Company for Refrigerating & Transportation				

A rare interview in the first episode of *Meet the Press* (1982) is a telling document of civil–military relations openly debated in Egypt in the early 1980s. Egyptian Journalist Salah Montasser (1982) had the following exchange with then-Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abu Ghazala.

Montasser: “The armed forces have demonstrated some remarkable success in the civil enterprises; like the phones lines we all have now and the bridges we all use... it is a success you are trying to hide even. No advertising or promotion for this kind of civilian projects.”

Quite telling of his perspective on economic civil–military relations and strategic military link to the specific civilian projects the armed forces undertakes, Abu Ghazala answered:

“Yes. True. [smiles]. It’s because we don’t want to cause any kind of sensitivity as not to be perceived as competitors. We are not competitors. If we enter any civilian-type project, we are entering it, yes out of service to the national economy, and developmental role and such, but it is always in something that has strong relationship with our core military strategy. Let me illustrate, to you sir. Why did the armed forces work in transportation and telephones? It is for our core military strategic needs to move from the burden of a standing army to a reserves army.”

Having acknowledged earlier in the show that a standing army is expensive to maintain,

where salaries and operation costs are high, Abu Ghazala continued:

So the reserve army is more economically efficient and less of a burden on a given state. But to have a reserve military system, you need the ability to call on them and have them in place; mobilized efficiently. So you need communication infrastructure and transportation infrastructure. First, communication to contact them to begin with and second, transportation to mobilize them and move them to camps. Hence, the Signal Command of the armed forces connected telephones, and the Engineering Corps of the armed forces built roads and bridges. So we do the things that might serve the greater national economy, but our *motivation* is always coming from professional military needs. We are building things for ourselves in the military to be self-sufficient.”

Abu Ghazala’s clear explanation elucidates the rationale of how these civilian-type projects came about. They are never non-core military needs. But with the political mandate for them to fend for themselves, in light of a slashed budget since 1979, they were obliged to maintain their self-help practices.

Journalist [laughs]: “But a better life for all could also be your duty!”

Abu Ghazala [soberly with a smile]: “Yes, sure.. But that is the duty of all Egyptians, not just the armed forces. That is why it is crucial that it is clear to you that we are only doing things related to our military profession, as such, even if they have a civilian nature. When we engage in a seemingly civilian project, it is always integral to the military strategy *itself*, not just out of competition with civilians.”

Another journalist: “But as a note, and I have to be completely frank with you, sir. Since 1967, we have been analyzing the reasons for the Naksa [setback], and we concluded that the immersion of the Egyptian armed forces in fields outside the battlefield [in governing and

administrative roles] was a main reason. Can you at least assure us, sir, that these activities have nothing to do with combat formations?”

Abu Ghazala: “The National Service Projects Organization is totally separated from the combat formations units. I mean we don’t have an Armored Division working on telephones! Our Armored Divisions are doing their training. Those doing their compulsory military service, who are over and above the annual needs, can be stationed on a NSPO project to do their military service all while acquiring a skill.

Indeed, in the 1980s the EAF oversaw the administration of a literacy program, where more than “one third a million young men” were taught how to read and write (Nafie, 1987, republished as a full article in Abdallah, 1990, p. 193). Moreover skilled Egyptian workers who traveled in the 1980s to work in the Gulf countries attribute their skills to training they received during military service (Nafie, 1987, p. 193). I personally met a number of older taxi drivers, who told me they had learned to drive in the army and were hired later as private chauffeurs to dignitaries to whom they established their own ties. The French ‘service nationale’ in lieu of a military service, has been an option for French citizens to go overseas and teach French as their ‘military service,’ at the French Cultural Centers all over the world, including in Egypt where I met some. This civilian-type service is similar to Israel’s early state formation programs, where immigrants were integrated, non-speakers of Hebrew were taught, and newcomers to the 1948 established state were taught about agriculture and industry in camps and Kibbutzim. A more contemporary iteration is the high-tech arrangement the IDF has with its conscripts, who are not placed in combat units. Some are placed for their technical abilities as the MAMRAM computing unit in the IDF since the 1960s to date, or the Nahal agricultural “settlement as defense” units in the 1950s and 1960s. Abu Ghazala continued to explain in his interview:

Let's say those who reach the age annually and are eligible for military service enlistment are 267,000. But the armed forces do not need all of them. We might need 100,000 in combat units. Out of the remaining eligible 167,000 who are not necessarily combat-eligible, we might take 20,000 and have them do their military service, learn some job skills in NSPO projects, with their civilian characteristics. That way those recruits acquire some useful vocational skills and perform their national service in a setting that is more civilians in nature. However the civil project itself in which they are serving is in of itself closely tied with a military strategy in which certain military needs have to be met.

In another exchange in a 1986 Cairo radio interview, note the following exchange, regarding "economic security" which evokes Huntington's (1957, p. 1) definition of national security as having three aspects of security: military security (against external threats), internal security (the responsibility of civilian police forces) and situational security (that have to do with long-term governmental policies vis-à-vis the economy, demographics, healthcare, etc.).

Journalist: In a speech last month, Your Excellency said that defense is a national strategy, and that it requires material aid from the ministry of defense, which is in charge of planning, and other ministries, which are in charge of implementation. How is this coordinated?

Abu Ghazala: ... National security depends on many things, including military security. Military security is inseparable from other factors, such as economic security. That is why we say that the whole subject is indivisible. Hence, there must be an integrated plan to ensure Egyptian national security through coordination. A comprehensive plan should be drawn up, involving the various ministries and other parties concerned (Cairo Domestic Service, April 24, 1986; cited in FBIS, April 30, 1986, cited in Satloff, 1988, p. 13).

In summary, since the peace treaty of 1979 and throughout the 1980s, “the armed forces have been ready to step in to fill vacuums when other actors have proved incapable” (Satloff, 1988, p. 13). Certain shortcomings within the civilian ministries that already have been demilitarized from retired officers and led by professional technocrats, have opened avenues of opportunity for a military establishment keen on the public’s trust, and pushed toward self-sufficiency, absent an adequate defense budget compared to its regional counterparts. As the Egyptian bureaucracy became “increasingly incapable of delivering basic social services (e.g., food and healthcare), “the military has begun to fill the void” (Satloff, 1988, p. 13). The rationale behind this military role expansion, accordingly, points to the army’s impact on domestic economic development. In this view, the military is considered the most reliable engine of economic growth. “We compete with international commercial companies and we have beaten all of them,” the Defense Minister once said (*Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 1981, p.12). Moreover, the only competitors at the time were the Islamist social service provision by the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, implicit in the military as economic powerhouse argument is “the contention that if the armed forces were not to pick up the slack, private Islamic charitable institutions would take control of what was once solely a government domain” (Satloff, 1988, p. 14).

Hence, the official rationale for the expansion of the military prerogatives rested on the argument that regional peace and Egypt’s security in the region can only be maintained through strength and the creation of an Egyptian deterrent force “whose existence” according to Abu Ghazala “would convince potential adversaries of the futility of war with Egypt.” Such adversaries would “reckon that a war against Egypt, if they were to make a precise calculation would be a huge loss in their casualties that they would refrain from taking the risk of war” (Meet the Press, 1982). Given the deteriorated state of the military budget of 1980, only a

massive infusion of financial capital through the NSPO’s self-sufficiency projects could indeed restore Egypt’s fighting capability and have it today as military force to reckon with.




Figure 42 Egypt’s military revamped NSPO website in English showcasing agricultural and industrial projects and announcing civilian job applications

4.5 EGYPT’S MILITARY ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE SINCE JANUARY 25, 2011

Under Mubarak military spending fell from 19.5% of the GDP in 1980 to 2.2% of the GDP in 2010, the lowest level in the country’s history. In terms of dollar amount, defense expenditures alternated from \$2.4–4.2 billion under Mubarak, irrespective of inflation levels or the tenfold increase in Egypt’s GDP from \$17.8–188 billion (Kandil, 2016, p. 307). Rather than flourishing under these economic circumstances, the military lived threatened the government would “slash military salaries severely” (Frisch, 2001 p. 2). Inflation had ravaged military salaries in the

1980s. So much so that an international newspaper in 1982 reported that “a good secretary in a foreign oil company can now earn more than a full colonel” (Richards, 1982 cited in Springborg, 1987, p. 6 and Springborg, 1990, p. 67).




Figure 43 Egypt’s GDP in 2017 \$235.4 billion. Egypt’s current GDP/PPP however is \$1.2 trillion.




Figure 44 Egypt’s military expenditure 2010-2018. Source: Tradingeconomics/SIPRI.

On March 28, 2012 in post-Mubarak Egypt, the then-ruling Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) warned against any meddling with the military's economic activities, amid an escalating power struggle with the then dominant Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). At that time, Major General Mahmud Nasr, a member of the Supreme Council and assistant defense minister for financial affairs, defended the military business against circulating media criticism saying, "This is not state money! This is the product of the sweat and hard work of the Ministry of Defense's projects" (Gamal, 2012).

Major General Nasr warned that the military would "not allow any interference from anyone in the armed forces' economic projects" (Gamal, 2012). In an atypically detailed justification of the military's economic ventures, Major General Nasr said in front of a number of economists and journalists that the businesses in various sectors, have grown, "thanks to our good management of these assets," from LE 11 million in 1979 to LE 644 million in 1990 to LE 6.3 billion in 2011, which is \$1 billion annual revenue of that year, 2011, and that profits accumulated between 1990 and 2011 were \$1.2 billion, relatively modest figures (Gamal, 2012).¹⁵ Moreover, he argued that the military's economic independence through venturing into businesses is a necessity, given the trivial 4.2% of the state budget, allocated to the military, when that military budget rather "deserves" at least 15% of the state budget, in par with other countries. Just a comparison to regional rivals, indeed Turkey spends 9% of state budget and Israel 15% as the previous chapter showed in this dissertation. Nasr bluntly defended the independent economic activity of the army, saying it had one of two choices "either to place the

¹⁵ According to the 2012 exchange rate, at the time of Major General Nasr's press conference, 6.3 billion Egyptian pounds was \$1 billion. In 2018 exchange rate, after the devaluation, that would only be \$356 million. However, the value should be assessed at the time. Egypt's GDP was \$279.4 in 2012. Therefore, \$1 billion annual profit for 2011 constitutes 0.35% of GDP. Not 5% not 40% of the economy, whatever that vagueness of the word "of the economy" means, as it has been erroneously circulating in the literature, citing Robert Springborg (Marshall & Stacher, 2012).

burden of defense funding on the already burdensome state budget” or to control spending while “generating resources from an economic sector in order to achieve self-sufficiency and a create returns that would be used to finance some of the demands of the armed forces, in addition to the implementation of projects for the benefit of the civilian sector as a commitment of responsibility.” Nasr continued, “The second option was adopted due to exhausted state of financial affairs in which the government found itself. He considered that these military economic activates are what “protect the country now,” meaning that at the time of such political turmoil, the army’s self-sufficiency kept it standing strong for national security defense, as well as overall economic hardships back in 2012. Coverage of this news caused a stir in the Egyptian media concerning the future of military-state-society political and economic relations.

But Major General Nasr has a point. For example, public school teachers in Egypt started giving evening private lessons. Government employees started getting tips to aid salaries not in par with the inflation. They added evening jobs as taxi drivers, cashiers in supermarkets, and government women employees cooking and selling their homemade food as side entrepreneurial projects. Doctors opened their private clinics and formed private hospitals. That idea of “shoghl ‘Hor” or entrepreneurial free market work became pervasive in all professions. What would an active duty military officer do to maintain status in a neoliberalizing economy and shifting society when the law orders them not to do private work? As a way of matching their fixed governmental salaries to inflation, they should get an increase in their income reflected in matching a surge in the military budget (i.e., tax money to the Ministry of Defense). That actually did not happen, in Egypt, post-peace treaty. Rather, the budget was slashed down to constitute a meager 4% of state budget. The alternative was for the government to emphasize the necessity of self-sufficiency or rather fending for themselves in a slashed state budget when it

comes to defense. The product was the Law of NSPO that allowed the armed forces to establish an income-generating extra-budgetary source.

4.6 CONCLUSION

Egypt's NSPO has been the target of great criticism and sarcasm, both academic and journalistic (Abul-Magd 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017; Marshall, 2013, 2017; Springborg, 2017, 2018). The EAF's economic activities are perplexing to many, including experts in political economy. The military's civilian enterprises make the public and specialized scholars alike wonder if these military businesses influence military fighting capability, combat readiness, and even cohesion as a unified armed force that should be out of business activities for fear of infighting (Marshall, 2015; Springborg, 2017). While these viewpoints might have their merits in terms of legitimate concerns regarding how these military assets are or should be run, the overall assessment of the Egyptian case seem to blindly single it out as an anomaly, ignoring similarities between Egypt and other countries within the Middle East as a regional order, which includes Turkey and Israel.

The three militaries of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel rank in the top 16 strongest militaries worldwide and the three strongest militaries in a high-threat perception region. How did Egypt's military match up to the other two militaries in terms of economic power and actual fighting capacity and military strength if scholars like Springborg (2011; 2017), Abul-Magd (2016; 2017), and Marshall (2015; 2017) were correct that the Egyptian case was fundamentally different from others in the region? It seems clear, instead, that Egypt is similar to Turkey and Israel in many ways that shaped a similar role for its military.

Moreover, if the recent literature of the aforementioned scholars were correct in its assessment of the Egyptian case, then predictions since 2013 of eventual infighting and

disintegration of the Egyptian armed forces (Marshall, 2015; Springborg 2017) should have come to pass. This has not occurred. The military in Egypt is cohesive, and its strength has actually jumped from Global Fire Power's ranking of 16th in 2012 to 12th in 2018 and 2019. Its fighting capability has only increased. Perhaps, instead, the scholarly assessments about the inception story of the EAF's economic activities and trajectories to date have suffered from a few blind spots. This chapter aimed to engage with some of the issues raised in the literature about the EAF's economic activities. It also locates Egypt within its region, in a comparison, not contrast, to Turkey's and Israel's own histories of military economic penetrations that take one or more of the following forms:

- Large military budgets as a percentage of the state budget and/or GDP;
- Dominance over an expansive defense industry for domestic needs or exports; and
- Income-generating civilian-products business enterprises for military self-sufficiency purposes and to contribute to the civilian market to curb monopolies in strategic goods.

Economists have criticized the kind of civilian economic activities in which the EAF have engaged. Critics have said that military business is damaging the Egyptian economy because it weakens private initiative by low-cost subsidized labor and release from payment of taxes and fees for licenses. However, if the entire so-called "military business empire's" annual revenue constitutes 0.5–1.5% of the GDP, as a high-ranking military officer said in 2014 (*The Guardian*, 2014), and as actual triangulated evidence show (Hamama, 2016), then that is a minuscule percentage (Kandil, 2016) comparable to OYAK's annual revenue, for example. This is far from the flawed statistics that have been quoted to say the Egyptian military controls 5–40% of the Egyptian economy. Nonetheless, that minuscule figure went a long way, as Egypt's military is still one of the few lasting ones to have protected the state, after massive regional upheavals.

Moreover, given the limited percentage, it is fair to say that military economic activities have rather served a crucial military self-sufficiency doctrine, especially in light of a military budget that remained at 4% of the state budget (at 1.6% of the GDP) from 1979–2018. These numbers are incomparable to the high spending in a currently antagonistic Turkey, under pan-Islamist Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and to a neighboring Israel that is rated first on the Global Militarization Index worldwide (GMI, 2018).

Moreover, given a global shift to “economic nationalism,” (McCarthy, 2018) as a reaction to particular failing aspects of globalization, Egypt is only adjusting to global trends and following the wave. For instance, when the Trump administration raises tariffs on foreign goods or implicates the US military as a partner and basis for a hoped-for bi-partisan approval on an infrastructure bill or calls for the rise of national industries as opposed to imports, this must be understood as a contemporaneous world circumstance with which the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi is opting to align. Arguably, the real influence behind this current international trend of “national economics” is Russia and its President Vladimir Putin, whose reach into the Middle East since 2013 has been highly influential. But this also means that Egypt is adjusting to regional and global trends as well. El Sisi’s call on the armed forces is to build roads, update the infrastructure, construct a new capital in the desert, produce strategic products such as cement, and cultivate wheat fields in the remote southwest region of Uwainat on the Libyan and Sudanese borders. In these ways Egypt and its current political leadership are only adjusting to very statist and economically nationalist trends, circulating worldwide— including within the United States of America, the bastion of capitalism, private ownership, and pro-globalization policies.

CHAPTER 5

THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES: AN ECONOMIC POWER IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

There is no denying that Israel, despite being one of the few democracies in the Middle East, is a highly militaristic state. But does this militarism stem from the military itself, or from within the civilian government and society, or as a response to regional geopolitical threat perceptions? I argue that the latter is a substantial factor in determining domestic civil–military relations in Israel, especially when it comes to the economic role that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has assumed, since the establishment of the state in 1948 to the present. Regional threat perceptions were the perpetual excuse for the IDF to carve out an increasing share of the civilian economic pie over the years. This was done through a high defense budget, dominance over the defense industries, through civilian income-generating activities in the sale of military land holdings, and in the high-tech industry. In doing so, the other regional players, mainly Egypt, and Turkey, continued to allow their militaries to play an economic role to follow similar practices and keep on par with one another.

The chapter will address the IDF's historical legacies in administrative government roles and in dominance over national security policy setting while focusing on the decades-long economic metamorphosis in Israel. Israel's economy has transformed from (a) a welfare state with socialist policies, etatism, and state-led development in the 1950s and 1960s to (b) a transitional war economy in the 1970s, which caused an economic depression following Egypt's 1973 War with Israel, and then to (c) an open market economy and pro-business environment from the 1980s onwards. During the 1990s, public assets privatization laws were passed. By the

2000s, Israel was more integrated in the global economy with multinationals flocking to Israel's market and governmental encouragement of foreign direct investments (FDI). These economic sequential phases are almost identical to those of Turkey and Egypt, as illustrated in the previous chapters. This is more a function of global trends than exclusively regional dynamics. My point, however, is that as the regional players all grappled with adjusting to these worldwide economic turns, they affected one another at the regional level, as their militaries had to carve out an economic share, in order to remain strong in a high threat perception region, all while the economy is changing from statist capitalism to open market and private enterprise. Hence, the IDF carved out an economic role, space, and influence, as a product of regional geopolitical dynamics. Likewise, as the IDF became situated within these economic transformations, it exhibited attributes that are both similar to and sometimes distinct from those manifested in its neighboring countries.

5.2 ISRAEL IN THE REGION: STATE MILITARIZATION AND SOCIETAL MILITARISM

Israel has been a typifying case for heightened state militarization and societal militarism. In a conference presentation, to the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), on June 15, 2017, Professor Yagil Levy (2017) described the Israeli situation as a case of “civilian control over the military but not civilian control over militarization.” This means that while the military as an institution does not directly intervene politically and economically, the civilian political echelons and civil society alike cannot control the indirectly perpetuated militarization of the state. In fact, Israel's militarization has been consistently ranked as the world's highest on the Bonn International Center for Conversion's Global Militarization Index (BICC's GMI). The GMI depicts worldwide militarization as it compares such things as a

country's military spending to its GDP and its health expenditure. The index also contrasts the total number of military and paramilitary service members with the country's number of doctors. Finally, the Index counts the number of heavy weapons in a country's armed forces. These and other metrics are used to rank a country, which in turn allows for assessing the level of a country's militarization relative to other countries. By these standards, for example, the United States, the most powerful military in the world in terms of firepower as well as being the most highly funded is ranked 31, not 1st, on the militarization index, whereas Israel is ranked number one, as in the highest in the world. That is to mean that the United States despite its high military spending is not consumed entirely by this militarization. There is room for civilian needs. Turkey and Egypt rank 25 and 28 respectively (i.e., quite comparable to the United States, in contrast to Israel's highest level of militarization).¹⁶ The fact that Turkey, Egypt and Israel are in the top 30, however, is still considered high militarization for the MENA region as a whole, relative to other regions (Grawert & Abul-Magd 2016). More specific to Israel, an Israeli journalist whom I interviewed during fieldwork critically and sarcastically described his country's militarization:

In Israel, 'threat' becomes our thing and everything becomes security, security, security... existence . . . security, security . . . existence. So, when we as Israeli citizens ask our government why don't you give us more money and spend on solving social and economic inequality? The answer is: because I cannot cut money from the army!" (Personal communication with Israeli journalist, September 2015).

¹⁶ Israel's ranking at 1st place on militarization has been consistent since 1990, except for a few years when it went to 2nd place after Eritrea (2004–2006). Turkey and Egypt occupied anywhere between the mid-20th place to mid-30th since 1990. For the latest rankings of 2016, Turkey is at 25th place and Egypt at 28th, whereas Russia is at 4th place and the US is at 31st place (GMI, 2017).

But is this level of state militarization, or societal resistance to such militarization, an exclusively domestic Israeli state-society affair? I argue that Israel's state militarization is not an isolated case of domestic issues divorced from regional phenomena. Rather, I emphasize that the state of affairs in domestic civil–military relations is the product of the geopolitical circumstance of the Middle East. Israel does not exhibit contemporary Western European or American attributes of expected equilibrium in civil–military relations (Huntington, 1957) because it does not operate from within Europe or North America as a regional order (Katzenstein, 2005) where the immediate threat of war among European states has all but dissipated post-WWII.¹⁷ By contrast, the Middle East has been a region manifesting intra-state high-threat perceptions since WWII.

Accordingly, the fluctuations in the region's threat levels—albeit with a generally heightened threat perception—has influenced domestic civil–military relations in each of the regional cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel in the present study. More specifically, I argue that the dynamism of this regional order has equally influenced the various manifestations of the armed forces' role in the economy, as the focus of this chapter will show. In short, the Israeli military's role in politics and in the economy has demonstrably shared similarities with its regional rivals Egypt and Turkey in terms of governing, managerial, and administrative roles; in terms of nation-building

¹⁷ It is true that the Cold War followed on the heels of WWII, and the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat. But that was considered an *external* threat to Western Europe. In other words, there were no longer internally warring countries *within* Europe, and consequently no internal European arms race, as had been the case between Britain, Germany, and France prior to WWII. NATO was a formula to combine defense *within* the European regional order against a shared external threat. A stark difference is the Middle East, where the US-devised, Britain/Turkey-imposed Baghdad Pact failed in the 1950s, for example. The rivalry between Adnan Menderes of Turkey and Nasser of Egypt were accentuated. Menderes's encroachments on the Middle East region, on behalf of the West, clashed with Nasser's ideas and ideals, which translated in the latter's defense of the Arab region of the Middle East in the form of secular, statist, republican, populist, and revolutionary/reformist Arab nationalism. Borrowing Atatürk's own six arrows of Kemalism, Nasser tried to apply this in the Arab region of the Middle East. This created a clash with Turkey's self-perceived role under Menderes, as well as Israel's interpretation of Nasserism and Arab nationalism as an expansionist policy that aims to eradicate Israel itself. Hence, Nasser's Arab nationalism is the product of Egypt's self-positioning vis-a-vis both Turkey and Israel, and not only the latter.

tasks and economic activities; and in terms of national security policy setting. That is to say, Israel is no different from the other regional players.

Just as with Turkey and Egypt, Israel certainly had no easy path in its own complex civil–military relations. One of my Israeli interviewees self-critically diagnosed the problematic Israeli need to be “tough” in the neighborhood. He analyzed the rise of Netanyahu, now pushing to reschedule another election in order to secure his fifth term as Prime Minister. The emphasis was on Netanyahu’s militaristic background despite being an elected civilian:

Netanyahu is now a civilian but he was in the military’s most elite unit: *Sayeret Matkal*. His brother Yoni was the head of *Sayeret Matkal*. Two other brothers of Netanyahu had been there. So, he holds the ‘proof’ that ‘I’m a tough man, and I can lead.’ Amir Peretz, a leftist, for example was not. He’s not considered to be a tough man. And Israelis want a tough man!!! [sarcastically laughs]. And that is also why leftist Isaac “Bougie” Herzog didn’t stand a chance! [laughs]. He’s too soft. You need to be a macho Mediterranean, you know, in order to be here! [laughs]. *You have to look like neighboring countries* [laughs]. You have to be tough and you have to show you will be able to protect. And say things like ‘everybody is against us . . . and wants to kill us’ . . . and all that stuff [sarcastically laughs] (Personal communication, September, 2015).

Thus, the emphasis of fitting in the neighborhood and the Israeli societal need to be seen as tough seeped into societal reception or rejection of the politically elected leadership. In other words, once the security discourse is activated in one country, it in turn affects adjacent countries, often in similar ways. Security discourse increases state militarization and societal militarism within regional cases. Security discourse also triggers, however, a distinctly domestic resistance by some activist groups, who object to increased securitization of life in their countries

and the Middle East as a whole. The case of the Israeli journalist cited above is an example of such Israeli activists, vocal against increased militarization and securitization. Following, our interview, he asked the waiter, in Hebrew, about his expectations for Netanyahu's political future. Back in 2015, the waiter said, "Netanyahu is King and his son will be Prince. They are not going anywhere." The two laughed at the idea. But the quote reminded me of the early 2000s in Egypt. Egyptians talked about Hosni Mubarak and his son Gamal and sarcastically lamented the prospect for a dynastic republic. Such societal resistance equally manifests in parallel across the regional borders.

As to further illuminate the intersection between state militarization and societal militarism, I quote an Israeli-American professor of civil-military relations. He led a tour to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, for a number of senior and junior civil-military relations scholars, who participated in a conference and a workshop on Special Operations Forces. I was on of the participants. The professor explained how a memorial on the way to the top of the Golan could help us understand Israeli Jewish culture in general and the security culture in particular. He said:

Memorials are part of people's lives—the people who are still alive. When I try to explain to people from outside of Israel, very often people would say, 'Israel is the strongest military in the Middle East. And you are a regional super power. And according to Time Magazine you have nuclear weapons.' And so on. These kinds of things. But I think the most important thing to understand is that most Israelis, Israeli Jews specially, feel threatened. They feel an existential threat. Okay? So from the outside or objectively speaking, we look very strong. But this is a subjective feeling. Now this kind of culture of memorials they serve, if you like, to remind people; to constantly reinforce this kind of mindset. People would gather here and this is beautiful. They 're-member.' You become

a member again of that period, if you like. The national calendar is full of these kinds of anniversaries. It is not only the national Memorial Day. But there are anniversaries for wars. And if you look at it, this is part of Israeli militarism. But it is important to understand what kind of mindset people are brought into; what kind of things they experience. Even just driving along the Golan Heights, on a vacation, with your friends, you are reminded of war.

Having theoretically located Israel as similar to the militarized politics and economics of its Middle East neighbors, in the next section I focus on the Israeli case and show evidence of how the IDF penetrated the state apparatus as well as the economic realm. How has the IDF played such a role in the state and society? How has its political and economic role morphed over time due to regional threat perceptions? And in what ways have various IDF practices impacted other regional militaries' economic behaviors in Turkey and especially in Egypt?

In addressing these questions, I consider the military budget and expenditures, the defense industry, the IDF-backed civilian products (particularly innovations in the high-tech industry), and IDF-controlled lands, which have generated lucrative sales after the IDF vacated former military bases in the heart of Tel Aviv and relocated to peripheral areas. Surprisingly, these items of state aid to defense industries, including high-tech civilian products, and state-commissioned civil projects, military-built infrastructure, and land sales were not included in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics' Report on Defense Consumption (Publication No. 1651, 2016). Neither were they counted in defense costs and earnings, despite their income-generating impact for the IDF and Israel's overall civilian macroeconomics. Oddly, the reasons given for this elision in (Publication No. 1651, 2016) were that these are "expenditures in which the defense component cannot be separated without special investigation," or that these are "expenditures that were not

estimated due to lack of relevant data.” The document further delineates:

Expenditures in which the defense component cannot be separated without special investigation:

1. Aid to defense enterprises (Israel Military Industries, Israel Aircraft Industries, and Rafael). Aid to these enterprises, which manufacture mainly for export, is multi-purposed, including financing for the development of competitive ability, development of new products for civilian use, and financing of pensions and severance pay for discharged employees.
2. Transfers to the civil administration in the Judea and Samaria areas. The civil administration performs a variety of civil tasks, including education, health, and welfare activities for local residents.
3. Building of bypass roads for residents of Israeli localities in the Judea and Samaria areas. These roads are also used by the non-Israeli population.

Expenditures that were not estimated due to lack of relevant data:

1. Alternative expenditure for use of lands occupied by the defense establishment (i.e., the added cost stemming from allocation of land for the defense establishment without payment or at reduced cost).

That explanation is quite vague. One might wonder why then there are no “special investigations” into those items, which are indeed part of the off-budget income-generating economic activities of the IDF; or why “relevant data” are lacking. Again, contrary to scholars who have singled out Egypt as having an armed force entrenched in off-budgetary resources; I place Israel in similar circumstances with Egypt. This evidence from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics’ Report on Defense Consumption showed that the IDF handles similar items to those managed by the Egyptian Armed Forces, especially land sales and infrastructure projects, such as

“transfers to the Civil Administration in the Judea and Samaria area” and “building of bypass roads for residents of Israeli localities in the Judea and Samaria area” cited above. In fact, while similar items of civilian infrastructure missions by the EAF are often highlighted by critics of Egypt’s defense expenditures “as a black box,” “unaccounted for,” reflecting a sign of “militarization of the Egyptian economy” (Abul-Magd, 2017; Springborg 2017), in reality these off-budgetary allocations, as economic activities and infrastructure building missions, are indeed accounted for as income-generating activities. As such, works are commissioned by the Army’s Engineering Corps for various ministries and state agencies. Such contracts are, indeed, audited by Egypt’s Administrative Control Authority (ACA) in liaison with Central Auditing Authority (CAA) (Hassan, 2017).

It is thus peculiar that Israel’s own official defense expenditure reports exclude such items without convincing explanations as to why that is the case, beyond “lack of relevant data” that seems to have not been sought out, or a need for “special investigation” that apparently has not been conducted. Thus, I posit here that based on these details alone, the current, most updated research-based conclusion is that the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces are closer in their handling of their civilian-type infrastructure missions than has been previously stated in the literature (Kamrava, 2000; Springborg, 2016).

5.3 PERIODIZATION

Since the establishment of the state of Israel 70 years ago, the economic role of the IDF transformed in response to the dynamic regional order in the following four phases. These phases are not equal in length. Rather, they are marked by critical junctures that affected the military economic share and role and its oscillation between penetrations and withdrawals.

1. Antagonism and Rivalry in War Time (1948–1979). The first phase of approximately 30 years starts with the war establishing Israel as a state and ends with the peace treaty with Egypt. Military plays an economically penetrative role in Israel.
2. Mimesis in Peace Time (1980–1995). The second phase of 15 years spans the post-peace treaty to the Oslo Accords I and II with the Palestinians. The military is economically penetrative in Israel as well as Egypt and Turkey as the primary partner in state defense industries working in exports.
3. Convergence on Neo-Liberal Economic Policies and Globalization (1996–2011). The third phase of the following 15 years starts after the assassination of Leftist Labor Party Retired General and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the hands of a Jewish extremist, which marks the collapse of the Oslo Accords and signals the second rise of right-wing politics in Israel following what started with Menachem Begin's election in 1977. Economically, during this phase, privatization of public assets pushed the IDF to reconsider its economic role and to outsource any non-core tasks of defense. The IDF subcontracted to civilians most of non-core functions while establishing a more sophisticated military-industrial complex in partnership with private businesses and global capital. A convergence on similar public sector privatization practices manifested in Turkey and Egypt. The militaries in the three countries configured similar, albeit customized, responses to this generalized regional circumstance of neoliberal economic policies. The military is seemingly withdrawing from a directly penetrative economic role. The military adapted to an indirectly networked and influential mechanism.
4. Current Divergences (2011–Present). This currently ongoing phase detects in what ways Israel's military economic activities diverge from Egypt's while converging with it on a

statist, securitized discourse. The military is economically withdrawn in Israel, sidelined in Turkey, and renewed in Egypt after decades of relegation.

Each section below will look at how a given regional circumstance and chronological phase (independent variable), with its main critical junctures, reflected a change in the IDF's economic role (dependent variable) through defense budgets, defense industries, and/or civilian-products military economic activities. The latter dimension of the IDF's civilian economic roles will be address more specifically the IDF-controlled lands that get released for resale to civilians, while the IDF retains the money. It also traces the IDF's role in the early history of computerization in Israel upon which the currently vibrant civilian hi-tech industry is founded and how the IDF is the entity to which the industry owes its development and boom.

5.4 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORICAL PHASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The following sections delineate the chronological historical phases and their impact on the IDF's economic share in terms of Defense Budget and Military Expenditure, in the Defense Industries, and in the civilian income-generating economic activities of the military.

Regional Antagonism and Rivalry (1948–1979)

Defense budget in the early years

This phase was a time of competition between Israel and its similarly statist socialist and militarized neighbors, particularly Egypt. The phase was characterized by high defense budget and military expenditure, in Israel.¹⁸ To back an IDF-initiated change in military strategy from

¹⁸ According to Publication No. 1651 of the Central Bureau of Statistics, entitled “Defence Expenditure in Israel 1950–2014,” August, 2016 Defense Expenditure follows two definitions:

1. The narrow definition, or **General Government Defense Consumption Expenditure**, is accepted in the calculation of GDP in the National Accounts and is a part of general government consumption expenditure.

defense to offense (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013), Israel expanded its military finances by 1953. This increase followed the rise to power of the Free Officers in Egypt, who explicitly stated that Egypt's military defeat in the 1948 war against Israel was one reason, albeit not the only one, for their revolt against the monarchy's political and military failures in the hope of instituting a post-colonial, socialist, democratic republic in Egypt in the very image of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkey (Sadat, 1978). This was a phase of regional antagonism, rivalry, and mutual comparisons of best governing and economic practices. It was also an episode of configuring civil–military relations, including the role of the military in the new emerging regional countries.

Perceiving the new emerging republic of Egypt under Nasser and his fellow colonels as a primary threat, Israel launched an aggressive military campaign in 1956, a pre-emptive offensive war in 1967, and a response to Egypt's own offense-defense attack in the 1973 war. As Seidman (2010) said, "Wars and military occupation have a price, peace has its premium" (p. 725). The regional antagonism, rivalry, and wars of the early years had a price indeed. For example, Israel's defense expenditures' share was a 20.8% of the total public expenditure in 1960. This percentage rose to 42.6% in 1970, before dropping to 29.4% in 1980 after the peace treaty with

This item is composed of direct defense expenditure, i.e., actual payments by the defense establishment for wages, for purchase of goods and services, for depreciation, and for taxes on production.

2. The broad definition, or **Total Defense Cost**, includes, in addition to direct defense expenditure, charges of the value of work performed by soldiers in compulsory service, additional payments by employers to supplement wages of employees doing reserve service, expenditure for the storage of emergency stocks, investment in construction of shelters, etc.

The narrow definition is consistent with the international definitions of Core Accounts in the New International Guide for National Accounts.

The broad definition corresponds to the [1968 System of National Accounts] SNA's recommendation of presenting issues of special interest in Satellite Accounts. Accounts of this kind were set up in Israel for education, health, culture, research and development, and environmental protection. These accounts focus on specific subjects that are included in several items in the National Accounts, and present a detailed classification that sometimes differs from what is accepted in the Core Accounts. The definition of defense cost was discussed and finalized by a special committee that included representatives of the Bank of Israel, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS.Gov.IL, 2016).

Egypt (Lifshitz & Yiśra’el, 2003). In terms of percentage of GDP, between 1956 and 1966, defense expenditures amounted to about 9% of the GDP. While the 1956 campaign did not lead to a steep increase in expenditure in the years that immediately followed. However, both the 1967 and 1973 wars brought on significant increases in Israeli defense expenditure, which reached 19.7% of the GDP in the period 1967–1972 and 28.7% of the GDP in 1973–1975. This was an all-time high.

	Phase One First Thirty Years 1948–1979	Phase Two Subsequent Fifteen Years 1980–1995	Phase Three Subsequent Fifteen Years 1996–2011	Phase Four Current Ten Years 2011–2019
Percentage of Israeli defense expenditure as a percentage of state expenditure	1960: 20.8% 1970: 42.6%	1980: 29.4% 1991: 22.1%	2001: 15.8%	2014: 14.8% Pre-approved for 2019: 15.2%

Figure 45 High Percentage of Israeli Defense Budget as Percentage of State Expenditure (1960–2019). Overall, however, there is a reduction in percentage of defense expenditure as a percentage of public expenditure between 1948 and 2018/2019.




Figure 46 In terms of dollar amounts, the Israeli Government’s defense consumption expenditure perpetually increased since 1960. It is clear, however, that the peak in defense expenditure was between 1973 and 1979, following the Israeli military setback in the 1973 War against Egypt and prior to the eventual Peace Treaty with Egypt.

The figures in the table above, however, remain disproportionately high compared to Egypt's defense expenditure, 4% of state public expenditure since the 1980s. It reached 8% in the most recent years of increased regional threats, following the regional uprisings of 2011. As a percentage of the GDP, Egypt's defense expenditure has been a minuscule 1.2% of the GDP, a percentage comparable to that of European countries. This is an indication of reduced threat perceptions in Egypt between 1980 and 2013, which had increased at that critical juncture.

Who decides on the defense budget?

In Israel, as in Turkey and Egypt, the size of the defense budget is determined within the military, while civilian ministries have little input (Civcik, 2015, p. 120). That might seem surprising, given the fact that first the Finance Minister and then the Cabinet decides the overall allocation. Arguably, the military proposes but does not determine. However, despite these procedural steps, the army is still considered the dominant partner in the equation due to its perpetual monopoly over notions of national security expertise (Shiffer, 2007, p. 202). The mechanism that generates the defense budget in Israel is as follows: the military's Chief of General Staff (CGS) consults his Financial Advisor, who also presides over the Budget Division at the (civilian) Ministry of Defense. The advice pertains to guidelines for proposing the defense budget. After deliberations within the military's general staff, a final decision is reached by the military's CGS and passed on to the minister of defense for administrative implementation. While the Defense Minister must get the money from the treasury, that is, the Finance Minister, who proposes the overall allocation to the Cabinet, and while the Finance Minister often trims the military's proposals and then forwards the overall state budget to the cabinet and Knesset for approval, the military does quite well in the overall allocation process to the various ministries.

The record shows that the IDF gets its way, in the end, especially when the Prime Minister intervenes and reconciles the budget in favor of the military, as well be shown later in this section. But the story of the budget starts, indeed, within the IDF and also ends with the IDF's pressure on the Prime Minister.




Figure 47 Fluctuation in the defense budget as a percentage of the GDP (1950–2013). The peak of the defense budget as a percentage of the GDP remains in the 1965–1979 phase of heightened regional antagonism and rivalry with Egypt, during which time the 1967 and 1973 wars took place.

To illustrate, the fact that the Financial Advisor to the IDF is the same person as the Head of the Budget Division in the Ministry of Defense means that initiating the budget starts within the army first and that the civilian Ministry of Defense practically rubberstamps that budget (Civcik, 2015, p. 120). While the Ministry of Defense can examine whether the IDF's financial demands are acceptable, it cannot thoroughly evaluate the IDF's claimed need for a given arms purchase or whether a certain piece of equipment can be fulfilled by other means (Peri, 1983a, p. 219).

To prove this point, only on a few occasions did the defense minister cut a defense budget. One such case is when Ben-Gurion, as both prime minister and minister of defense, slashed the military budget in 1951 due to the dire economic situation in the early years of the state. But that

incident was before the rise of the military as a ruling class in neighboring Egypt. Hence, the threat perception was not as paramount. In most other subsequent cases, the Ministry of Defense has accepted whatever budget the general staff demanded. The minister of defense has even tried to advocate for more on behalf of the IDF. A cited case is that of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol, who served in both positions after Ben-Gurion from 1963–1967.

Throughout his tenure as Minister of Defense, Eshkol was known to have asked military officers, “Have you got enough equipment, devices, spare parts, and ammunition? Is it enough, or do you need more? Tell me, tell me, children, and we’ll rack our brains so as to get it for you!” (Peri, 1983a, p. 219, cited in Civcik, 2015 p. 120).

After the Ministry of Defense prepares the defense budget, it goes for the approval of the Ministry of Finance, which is tasked with oversight (Tov, 2005, p. 23). In the first years of the state, the Minister of Finance, just like the Defense Minister, did not object to military needs and approved the requested budget (Peri, 1983a, p. 220). By the end of the 1960s, however, following the 1967 war, the Ministry of Finance began to resist increased defense budgets, as pushed by the Ministry of Defense. That is because the defense budget increased significantly. For this reason, Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir (1963-1968 and 1969-1974) decided in 1972, to set a special unit within the ministry of finance to deliberate on the defense budget. That was a measure taken to intervene with the monopoly of the Budget Division within the Defense, which employed only one staff member on part time basis to oversee the IDF’s demands for the defense budget (Peri, 1983a, p. 221). Despite these efforts of oversight, however, the military command manages to always get their increased allocations, when they need. The 1973 War with Egypt and the shock and trauma it caused Israel is a factor in this insistence on combat readiness.

Israelis share the burden of the IDF with tax payments and years of compulsory, essentially unpaid military service. There are public pressures to curb the costs of national defense. In 2005 Israeli defense consumption reached about 8% of the GDP, or about 23% of total government expenditures. This was several times higher than the GDP expenditures of most Western nations, and was also higher than the expenditure of the Middle East countries Egypt, Iran, and Turkey (Aharoni, 1991; Shiffer, 2007 p. 195; Seidman, 2010, p. 725). For example, from 1999–2005, under Sharon’s premiership, the actual defense budget exceeded the officially approved government allocation for defense by 10–15%. Neither the government nor the Knesset nor the Israeli public learned about this excess (Sheffer & Barak, 2013, p. 87). In 2008, the same thing happened. The actual defense budget exceeded the originally approved budget by 9.6%, without much public debate (Even, 2009, 2010, p. 41, cited in Civcik, 2015, p. 120, 2014). How did that happen? It was through direct intervention by the Prime Minister.

But increasingly since the mid–2000s, there have been civilian budgetary needs (e.g., education, health, welfare) and there are strong-minded officials in the Israeli Ministry of Finance who try and sometimes manage to curb the Ministry of Defense’s perpetual attempts to increase the IDF’s budget (Seidman, 2010).

With time, the debate over the defense budget came to forefront, but not as significantly as some scholars not familiar with the Israeli case might assume (Abul-Magd, 2017; Springborg, 2016) about Israel, as a democratic country with transparent political procedures. It is true that with time, the Ministry of Finance became the main challenge to the military, not because the civilian finance administrators are experts on the subject of military, but because they control the funds (Shiffer, 2007, 197–202). As retired Major General Giora Eiland put it, the debate became a “clash of giants,” namely the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance (Eiland, 2007).

In the end however, the defense establishment always gets what it wants (Eiland, 2007). When there are discrepancies between the Defense and Finance Ministry, the prime minister first encourages a compromise. But then the prime minister finds a way to financially appease the military. As was the case in 2003, bargaining took place when the Defense Ministry suggested one figure and the Finance Ministry suggested another. The prime minister encouraged that this figure be NIS 2 billion more than what the minister of finance advised and approximately NIS 6 billion less than the minister of defense requested. Following a number of meetings between the prime minister and the top IDF officers, however, the prime minister asked his government to allocate an extra NIS 4 billion to the defense budget. Clearly, the IDF not only prepared the budget, the officers also made sure the government approved their version of the budget (Civcik, 2015, p. 122).

After the ministers of defense and finance deliberate, the cabinet is next in terms of defense budget approval. As cabinet members tend to lack in-depth understanding of the budget, they do not examine it or critique it (Shiffer, 2007 p. 97). Cabinet ministers barely inquire for clarification, but they often perceive themselves as having no capacity or expert knowledge to revamp budget proposals (Peri, 1983a, 223). To compensate for this shortcoming in civil–military relations, the government established a National Security Council (NSC) in 1999 to enhance civilian input in security matters, including the defense budget. But the NSC has proven not to be an influential government body (Civcik, 2015, p. 122).

The last stamp of approval on the defense budget comes from the Knesset. Not all Knesset members discuss the defense budget in an open debate. Rather, two limited subcommittees examine the budget proposal: the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FADC) and the Defense Budget Committee. As in the United States, a disproportionate number of the chairs and

members of these committees are often from a military background and are not typical civilian lawmakers. This is also the case in Turkey and Egypt.

The Knesset subcommittees may direct queries to the minister of defense, the chief of general staff, and the economic adviser to the ministry or head of the Budget Division. It is also in their jurisdiction to modify the defense budget, as Knesset ratification is a necessity. That said, however, “Knesset’s supervision on the defense budget and the defense expenditure is not efficient at all like in Turkey” (Civcik, 2015, p. 123) because members of the subcommittees often complain about the lack of provided information (Shiffer, 2007, p. 197) Additionally, many of the Knesset members themselves lack specialized knowledge on economics or defense issues, so, “Therefore they prefer to leave it to the military” (Civcik, 2015, p. 123). This is especially the case when it comes to arms procurement. Labor Party Knesset Member Israel Kargman stated:

We have, of course, to rely on the General Staff when it tells us, for example, of the need for more missiles rather than planes. Even if someone in the Committee thinks otherwise, who are we to decide such matters? We know nothing about it and must rely on the soldiers. (Peri 1983, p. 226)

Add to this complex civil–military relation the assumptions senior military officers often hold of civilians, as they regard them to comprehend nothing of defense and national security (Cizre, 2008; Peri, 1983a, 1983b, 2006a, 2006b). Kargman’s justifications for military leadership on defense matters are identical to explanations in Turkey (Cizre, 2008; personal communication with Cizre summer 2013) and Egypt (CBC-Egypt, 2012), that civilians lack the military expertise, so they cannot possibly understand military needs and hence cannot supervise or question the defense budget and expenditures. Solutions to that in the three countries alike have

to start with educating civilians on defense and security matters, as well as procurement protocols. Training in these matters can be given to civilians.¹⁹

Most recently, in December 2018, IDF Ombudsman Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brik had raised “a public storm about the army’s preparedness” in a number of reports released over several months (Harel, 2018). After hesitance and long debates, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot assigned two committees with the task of examining Brik’s allegations. One, presided by IDF Comptroller Brig. Gen. (res.) Ilan Harari, investigated the combat readiness of different divisions. The other, led by retired majors general Avi Mizrahi and Doron Almog, reported on the state of the ground forces. The reports focused on shortcomings in the army’s combat readiness (which Brik had contemptuously criticized), lapses in the army’s personnel policy and issues concerning the IDF’s organizational culture (Harel, 2018). “Mizrahi reacted with an emotional outburst, as if to confirm the claim made in the question. “There is a chasm between what Brik says and what I’m saying,” he emphasized. Then he added in direct reference, again, to the 1973 War and the assumed lesson learned about combat readiness:

¹⁹ One of the fellowships I personally received from Columbia University in 2015 was the Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). During this workshop, among several other topics, we discussed arms procurement and how civilians can and should be able to examine the affordability of a given piece of military equipment. It is a technical question. But in the end, the retired military officer, who led that particular workshop, emphasized that any civilian (politician, journalist, member of the general public) can be and should be educated enough to make these kinds of assessments. He made the analogy to buying a refrigerator, a computer, or a camera. One does not need to be an engineer. One needs to be able to assess their needs for this piece of equipment and to determine the parameters of what they can afford to buy. They can get advice from the technically savvy and professionals but they should weigh this advice and in the end personally decide on what they can and should buy. Similarly, tax paying and politically representative civilians should also be the ones to make these budgetary decisions about defense matters. However this entire civil-military relationship of civilian oversight should not be an antagonistic one against members of the military, to begin with. It should be a balanced and mutually respectful relationship, for the purpose of national defense and security. This latter pre-requisite is often missing when civil-military relations are discussed in the context of the Middle East, where the confrontations and political fights between civilians and the military reach a boiling point. A recommendation is to foster ongoing debates, rather than a culmination of a point of agitation and explosion regarding the right of civilians to discuss defense matters. Hence, educating civilians on defense budgetary matters and promoting open communication between officers and civilians can alleviate frustrations regarding an assumed lack of civilians’ knowledge, by the military members of society.

There are a lot of problems in Israeli society. There were always gaps in the army. I'm also a general and I'm sorry if I was born too late to serve in 1973. But Brik is mistaken, even if he has a medal of honor from that war. That's my truth and I believe it. I wouldn't lie to myself. Brik isn't the Dutch boy standing with his finger in the dike. Our chief of staff doesn't deserve this. I'm speaking from the depths of my heart (Harel, 2018).

What both Mizrahi and Harari concluded, however, was money would solve issues. The recommended that, "the ground forces need budgetary stability for the coming decade." They even suggested "an unusual idea," according to Haaretz reporting (Harel, 2018). That was "setting an external budget (referred to as a "box"), from which 10 billion shekels (\$2.65 billion)" would be channeled to modernize the ground forces over the upcoming five years. "How might this be achieved given the deterioration in the country's health services, educational gaps and the sense that a global financial crisis is looming?" The Haaretz journalist wondered. "The army isn't explaining for now," he answered in his news article (Harel, 2018).

1967 War

At the time of the war decision in 1967, Eshkol was pressured out of his position as Minister of Defense due to agitations from within the army that called on former Chief of Staff Major-General Moshe Dayan to step in as minister of defense on June 5 (Gluska, 2007). This is one of the main cases of political mobilization within the IDF, as the officers imposed their will on the civilian government. In the end, the war decision of 1967 was made primarily from within the IDF and dictated upon the hesitant civilian political leadership. Prime Minister Eshkol simply rubberstamped the IDF's vision for a pre-emptive war (Gluska, 2007; Peri, 1983a, 2006a). As for the defense budgetary questions more specifically, Moshe Dayan, when he assumed the civilian position of defense minister due to IDF pressures, did away with preliminary proposals on arms

procurements altogether to eliminate budgetary constraints on defense (Peri, 1983a, p. 224).

Throughout the early years of the state, all the way to the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the minister of finance, just like his defense counterpart, approved the IDF-requested budget almost without discussion (Peri, 1983a, p. 220). By the end of the 1960s and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, however, the Ministry of Finance started to take some issue with the budgets suggested by the Ministry of Defense under Moshe Dayan's leadership when it doubled. It went from 20.8% of public expenditure in 1960 to 42.6% in 1970. This was primarily due to the war of attrition that Egypt sustained from 1967 until the 1973 war.

When Pinhas Sapir served as minister of finance from 1969–1974, he had concerns about the Budget Division within the Ministry of Defense. In 1972, Sapir formed a special unit within his Ministry of Finance to evaluate the defense budget (Peri, 1983a, p. 221), but that did not have a strong impact. The army continued to dictate the budget, and the Ministry of Finance continued to fulfill the military's needs. The IDF relationship to state and society changed, however, after the 1973 debacle.

1973 War

If Dayan had spiked the military budget and expenditure by 1970, even more defense spending was allocated after the Israeli army's blunder in 1973 war. For example, according to a declassified CIA report (1973), Israeli officials estimated the 1973 war loss to be \$2 billion in the first week alone (p. 3). The Israelis put a price tag of between \$2.5–3 billion for additional armament to be purchased from the United States over the following years to replace the loss and maintain "military parity with the Arabs" (CIA, 1973, p. 4). Moreover, Shalev (1992) wrote that after 1973, the state lacked the capacity to stop serious economic decline, let alone to increase per capita economic growth. The Israeli state failed to mitigate demands by the middle class,

organized labor, and the poor on the one hand and to decrease public sector spending on the other (pp. 261-63). The point here is that the 1973 War was the critical juncture after which the state role in the economy was to start shifting.

By 1974, Israel transformed from a welfare state to a more pro-business government (Shalev, 1992, p. 307), just like neighboring Egypt under Sadat's *Infitah* Open Door Economic Policy and Turkey. The military as a state institution had to adjust in each of the three cases to a new economic reality and find ways to survive radical economic changes. For example, as the defense budget was decreased in Israel by the 1979 Peace Treaty juncture, the defense industries flourished and attracted more state fund, as a macroeconomic policy toward exports.




Figure 48 Arms Exports in the three cases of Turkey, Egypt, Israel 1961-2017. Israel has the highest volume. Source: SIPRI.

A more elaborate military-industrial complex started to form by critical juncture post-1973 War, where the aid to defense enterprises (Israel Military Industries, Israel Aircraft Industries, and Rafael) was not even counted from within straightforward military expenditure (Publication, No. 1651). This situation of a reduced defense budget and increased state subsidized spending in defense industries lasted throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s. By the 2000s, both defense budget, and the defense industries increased. Israeli arms exports skyrocketed by 2014, reaching almost a \$1.4 billion.

Defense Industries in the Early Years

In the formative years of the state, Israel established a defense industry, in order to address its urgent security needs. “The Israeli government sought to achieve self-sufficiency and reduced reliance on defense imports” (Lifshitz, 2012). In the early 1950s, which marked ceasefire agreements without comprehensive peace in the Middle East, there were international embargos on arms exports to the region. Despite the embargos, Israel sought arms and military equipment, primarily from France. Its urge for arms purchasing, however, was met with international resistance. These international embargos were imposed on arms sales to both Egypt and Israel and eventually on Turkey in the 1970s after the invasion of Cyprus. The purpose of the embargos was to avoid a regional arms race. Despite these embargos in the 1950s, Israel was able to import arms from France, and Egypt was able to secure an arms deal from Czechoslovakia in 1955.

Ironically the embargos eventually triggered indigenous arms manufacturing policies in the three countries. Egypt and Israel in particular, as two primary rivals throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, established national arms factories, aiming to meet their domestic military needs and achieve self-sufficiency. For decades, this situation pushed the Israeli government to implement a “dual-strategy defense policy” (Lifshitz, 2012). The dual-strategy defense policy was

comprised of taking advantage of any opportunity for imported weaponry while pouring state funds into the establishment of a domestic defense industry. Thus, the domestic defense industry was thought of as freeing Israel from complete reliance on foreign purchases. “Israel’s dual strategy created an inverse relation between import opportunities and efforts to achieve self-sufficiency” (Lifshitz, 2012). That is to say as more import opportunities decreased, there was more investment in the domestic arms industry and vice versa.

Between mid-1950 and the 1967 war, France was a willing arms deals partner to Israel, providing it with advanced weapons, as long as they were for defense purposes and not an offense war. For the duration of this arms supply from France, the domestic defense industry remained limited. In 1967, however, France discontinued its arms sales to Israel and enacted an embargo on arms exports to Israel after the offensive attack of the 1967 war (Oren, Barak & Shapira, 2013). The international arms embargo, thus, translated into Israel’s expansion of its own arms manufacturing. Israel relied on its indigenous arms industry to liberate itself from complete dependence on foreign arms providers, including major weapons systems in a “yes, we can” ethos (Seidman, 2014, p. 723). Lifshitz (2012) wrote, “The self-sufficiency doctrine thus established dominated defense industry policy for the following 15 to 20 years.”

To understand this phenomenon of self-sufficiency in both Egypt and Israel, at the theoretical level, during the 1950s and 1960s, neorealist theory of balancing power (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979) can be helpful. The theory states that “peer competitors constantly arm against each other” (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 70). The evidence illustrates that effective balances predominate among peer competitors (Elman, 1999) and that “successful military practices diffuse rapidly” (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 70). These mutual emulations take place “because

states worry about their security, monitor one another's military capabilities, and repair any erosion of their relative position" (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 70).

Within the European regional order of the 1940s, for example France, Germany, and Russia armed and imitated successful practices to counter increases in their competitors' capabilities. Eventually, the Soviet Union also imitated Germany's blitzkrieg style. The timing of actions by these states and the reasons behind them gave support "to neorealist arguments that great powers arm and imitate in response to adverse shifts in the distribution of military capabilities (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 79). Egypt and Israel were two such competitors who emulated one another as regional powers. The evidence is demonstrated through their parallel acquisition of arms, despite the embargos on both of them. Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia, concluded in September 1955 came after the February 28 Israeli attack on Egyptian military posts in then Egypt-administered Gaza, which pushed Egypt to arm. Sadat writes, "That date—the last day of February 1955—was of historic significance. It marked, in effect, a turning point, in the history of Egypt, the revolution, the Middle East and third World countries inasmuch as it made us realize how urgently we needed weapons" (Sadat, 1978, p. 135).

The Czech arm deal ended the monopoly of the West as suppliers of weapons. The deal effectively raised the spirits of the Third World countries, "whose members began to feel that there was somebody they could resort to in their effort to liberate their national will from the colonial hegemony under which they had lived for centuries—even if this took the form of a straightforward business transaction" (Sadat, 1978, p. 135). Sadat articulates in his autobiography how Egypt's need for weapons given the regional threat perceptions made it request US support first. But when the Americans denied Egypt its requests, imposing an

embargo on both Egypt and Israel, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union, just as much as Israel turned to France. He wrote:

The country's budget at the time was £200 million but our economic situation wasn't bad. When the Americans turned down our request for weapons we contacted the Russians early in 1953, while Stalin was on the deathbed, but they in turn refused; Stalin's principles prevented him from supplying weapons to non-Communist states. However, following a meeting during the Bandung Non-Alignment Conference in the spring of 1955 between Nasser and Chou En-lai, a mediation effort was made and the Soviet Union, on Chou's recommendation, accepted it. In September 1955 the first-ever arms deal was concluded between us on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on the other (p. 128).

This particular arms deal, in of itself, was also a turning point for Israel, in terms of its decision to participate in the tripartite aggression of 1956, along with Britain and France. Evidence from my research comes from the statements of Israeli leader Ben-Gurion. His extensive statements in his address to the Knesset on November 7, 1956, two days after the ceasefire in Sinai reflects how much he actually grasped the importance of keeping on par in armament, based on his mutual antagonism with Egypt's Nasser. Ben-Gurion said:

The glorious military operation, which lasted a week and conquered the entire Sinai Peninsula of 60,000 square kilometers is an unprecedented feat in Jewish history and is rare in the world's history. This heroic advance is a focal point not only for the consolidation of the State's security and internal tranquility but also for our external relations on the world scene. Our forces did not attack Egypt proper and I hope the Egyptian dictator will not compel Israelis to violate the biblical injunction never to return to that country (Ben-Gurion, 1956).

Focusing on how much the Czech arms deal was a deal breaker for Israel's level of anxiety regarding Egypt's military readiness, Ben-Gurion stated:

Three weeks ago, I told the Knesset of the increased gravity of the Czech arms deal which had supplied Egypt with a tremendous flow of heavy armaments it is only a week ago that our forces discovered the astonishing quantity and first-rate quality of this copious supply of Soviet arms, only part of which had been dispatched to the Sinai peninsula.

Neither the Egyptian dictator nor his peace-loving friends in Czechoslovakia had the least doubt about the purpose of these enormous quantities of heavy arms. Certainly neither the supplier nor the recipient meant them to fall into Israeli hands. On the contrary, they meant them to bring about the downfall of Israel.

While at the time Nasser was concerned with Menderes's expansionist efforts to sway Iraq and Syria his way, on behalf of the West, Israel felt most concerned about Nasser's expansionist efforts. Eventually after 1956, however, Israel would become even more of the expansionist player in the region by 1967. Eventually, a resistance to such expansionist projects, be it militarily or ideologically, become a feature of the Middle East as a regional order. Any one country's attempts at hegemonic expansionism eventually become routinely resisted in the region, by other alliances, formed among the rest of the players. To the fear of expansionism, Ben-Gurion said:

At the beginning of our mobilization, I received two messages from the President of the United States expressing concern over the mobilization of reserves. In my reply of 29 October to the President, I reminded him of his constant efforts for peace in the region for the past year, which I supported wholeheartedly, as well as the fact that it was the Egyptian dictator who sabotaged these efforts. I also informed the President of the increasing gravity

of the situation arising from the dictator's expansionist aims, the extent of his rearmament and attempts to undermine the independence of the Arab countries, and above all his overt intention to destroy Israel, his establishing a military alliance with Jordan and Syria under Egyptian command, and the renewal of fidayun activities.

Repeating how much Israel was overwhelmed by the extent of military equipment Egypt has possessed from the Czech deal, Ben-Gurion wrote.

My Government appealed to the people of Israel to combine alertness with calm, and I feel confident that with your vast military experience you appreciate to the full the crucial danger in which we find ourselves. As I said previously, our forces were given strict orders not to cross the Suez Canal or to attack Egyptian territory proper, and remain entirely within the limits of the Sinai Peninsula. I am confident military histories will make a thorough study of this remarkable operation carried out by the Israeli Army in a few days in a vast desert area against an enemy armed and equipped down to the smallest detail with the finest, most modern weapons of the Soviet Bloc and elsewhere.

It is only now, after the occupation of the Gaza Strip, Abu Ageila, El-Arish, Nekhal, Mitla, and the Filat Gulf, that we have fully realized how great in quantity, how modern and excellent in quality were the Egyptian arms and equipment. They had heavy weapons, tanks, guns, first-class communications equipment, motor transport, armoured cars, and clothing supplies immeasurably superior to anything our forces possess.

In spite of all our previous information about the flow of heavy arms of all types, which the Egyptian dictator received during the year, we had no real notion of the enormous quantities and superior quality of the arms and equipment he had received. The vast booty, which fell into our hands, proves that beyond all doubt Egypt's dictator squeezed Egypt's hungry masses

to provide his army with everything they had, but all this was of no avail because there was no spirit in them.

The two rivals continued to arm from outside suppliers, as well as invest in their local industries, in order to rely on themselves vis-à-vis one another, regardless of their formal or informal alliances, with the United States in the case of Israel or the Soviet Union, in the case of Egypt. By 1967, Egypt and Israel were both armed. Israel's surprise attack on Egypt, which wiped the entire air force, on the ground, without an actual military fight, set Egypt's air force back to zero point. It had to re-arm and re-absorb the new technology. President Sadat chronicles his agony over acquiring new Soviet arms in the preparation for the 1973 war (Sadat, 1978 p. 220-222). Israel's own failures in the "historic traumas" of the 1973 War pushed for continuous armament to date (Harel, 2018).

In fact the October 1973 war between Egypt, Syria, and Israel "was the most complicated short war in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict" (Bar-Joseph & Yossef, 2014, p. 584). Unlike the wars of 1956 and 1967, in which Israel had "initiated the hostilities and dictated the course of the war until its end," in 1973 all the parties involved "initiated major battles and all had their share of battlefield successes and failures." This was particularly the case regarding the Egyptian front, where the war had "five main stages: 6–7 October – Egyptian initiative and Egyptian success; 8 October – Israeli initiative and Israeli failure; 9–13 October – mutual standstill; 14 October – Egyptian initiative and Egyptian failure; and 15–23 October – Israeli initiative and Israeli success" (Bar-Joseph & Yossef, 2014, p. 584).

Based on the mix of failure and successes, the Israeli defense industries had to re-strategize until they further dominated the Israeli economy following Israeli failings in the 1973 war against Egypt's surprise attack. This war showed Israel its dependency on the United States.

Israel realized its over-reliance on the United States, especially regarding the resupply of much needed ammunitions. While grateful to the United States, its dependency did not make Israel feel safe, and “Israelis, for their part, do not wish to be this dependent on a foreign power” (Ferilich, 2017). Even with one ally as “friendly and well meaning towards Israel as the US,” Israelis perceive the need for their country’s ongoing “freedom of decision and maneuver as vital to its national security” (Ferilich, 2017).

Moreover, Israel’s own experience of dependency during the war confirmed a valuable lesson for Egypt where military self-reliance was a strategy, as in the case of preparation for the 1973 war. Egypt had already realized that neither the Soviet Union (its supposed ally) nor the United States would ever come to Egypt’s rescue in the way the United States did for Israel (Sadat, 1978). Accordingly, the highest degree of self-sufficiency in manufacturing the quickly depleted ammunitions, at the very least, became a strategic military goal for the EAF to exercise as much control and maneuverability in national security questions as possible, given the well-known circumstance of the global powers’ dominance (*Meet the Press* Interview with Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, 1982). This goal of self-sufficiency in ammunition manufacturing was achieved in Egypt by the early 1980s, as balanced deterrence mechanism against Israel, at times of peace (Abdallah, 1990a; Nafie, 1987).

In terms of application of neorealist balance of power theory (Avant, 2000; Elman, 1999, 2003, pp. 8–9; Goldman & Andres, 1999; Herrera & Mahnken, 2003 pp. 217–225; Horowitz, 2010; Parent & Rosato, 2015), accordingly, these two cases of Israel and Egypt relied on “self-help” in aspects of their defense industries. The lesson was not lost on Sadat during the 1973 war or on Israel’s military leadership. As Parent and Rosato (2015) elaborated, “States know that even when the world is calm, it is not safe, and absent a higher authority they must protect

themselves” (p. 85). The authors continued to say that in contrast to the shortcomings of exclusively relying on external alliances, “great powers place their trust in *internal balancing* to deal with adverse shifts in the balance of military capabilities.” Varying degrees of “power” and the dictates of “geography” translate into differences in state exertion of levels of effort as they “*imitate* different innovations,” but overall keep their internal balancing “relentless.” Keeping self-reliant internal balancing is key since “the same is not true of external balancing.” As the writers maintained, “Allies can issue assurances that they will contribute capabilities to combat threats, but states cannot be sure that their partners will honor their commitments” (Parent & Rosato 2015, p. 85). Consequently, “not only do great powers rarely balance externally, but they also doubt the firmness of their own and their rivals’ alliances,” Egypt and Israel fully grasped these lessons during the early phase of their mutual antagonism and rivalry and acted accordingly in terms of internal balancing through their indigenous defense industries throughout the 1950s–1970s, and in terms of combat readiness to date. For example, reports on the IDF’s need for constant combat readiness are traced to traumatic failures that stem “from the 1973 Yom Kippur War” (Harel, 2018).

Relevant to the discussion of defense industries is the origins of computing in Israel. In fact, the history of computing in Israel is intertwined with the IDF. While computing started in 1947 at the Weizmann Institute of Science before the creation of the state of Israel, Breznitz (2002, 2005) argued that the 1948 war and continued threat perceptions “quickly propelled the development of computing in Israel onto a different track” (Breznitz, 2002, p. 14) from the military. While academia, primarily the Weizmann Institute, advanced three generations of computers called the *Golems* “the defense apparatus and the state bureaucracy quickly became the torchbearers of software development in Israel” (Breznitz, 2002, p. 14). Arguably, the first

use of computers in IDF units was RAFAEL (Armament Development Authority), so “RAFAEL, the first, and for many years almost the only body in Israel to conduct high-tech R&D, had already started to use computers in the 1950s” (Breznitz, 2002, p. 14). In 1956, still a subunit within the IDF, RAFAEL developed one of the first analog computers in Israel. By 1960 MAMRAM (Center for Computers and Mechanized Records) was established. At the time the IDF bought a Philco computer from the United States. Breznitz (2002) noted, “Due to the non-existence of software programmers in Israel, graduates from the MAMRAM’s core programming course later became the leaders of the Israeli software industry” (p. 15). I will show how the MAMRAM IDF unit was the impetus and continues to be the power behind the currently burgeoning high-tech industry with both military and civilian applications.

Finally, following the peace treaty of 1979, as the United States provided military aid to both Egypt and Israel, mutual antagonism subsided. The two countries, however, maintained military parity for the purpose of mutual deterrence, thereby guarding the peace. Both countries started to acquire heavy weaponry from the United States. By the 1980s, they also shifted their arms industry toward exportation as an income-generating macroeconomic activity, as will be delineated, later below, in the next chronological phase of mimesis of peace economics between 1980 and 1995.

Settlements as Defense: IDF’s Civilian Economic Roles in the Early Years

In the inception story of the IDF’s civilian economic roles, the civilian role of the Israeli army has expanded in two ways. First, the IDF assumed civilian nation-building missions within the early years of the newly established state of 1948 to fill in gaps in the state apparatus and its agencies. This was also applied to the military administration in Arab areas in Israel until 1966. Second, the IDF dominated much more pervasively as the post-1967 military government in the

occupied territories. The military government lasted until 1981 when the Civil Administration was established in the territories, albeit under the management of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and in direct coordination with the IDF as the sovereign entity, per international law, in the occupied territories.

Regarding the first way of IDF civilian role expansion during the early years of the Israeli state, the following can be summarized. The socialist ideology and kibbutzim mentality of pairing settlement with security plus agricultural activities with community defense meant that IDF-controlled lands went through a two-tiered process of being first occupied by the IDF as outposts, through what was called Nahal, a civilian agricultural community managed as an IDF unit, and then being left for civilians as a settled community. For example, many of the current civilian kibbutzim were originally Nahal military outposts (Nahal, n.d.). Kibbutzim had their heyday in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s before their eventual decline and privatization in the 1990s. This situation gave the IDF a civilian nation-building mission, which enabled the IDF to possess vast amounts of state lands. For example, currently, 53% of all Israeli state land belongs to the IDF and up to 83% when the occupied West Bank is counted (Oren, 2007).



Figure 49 Tank at “Ammunition Hill” dating back to the 1967 war, Jerusalem. Photo by author.

These civilian nation-building characteristics of the army in the Israeli case had macroeconomic dimensions and consequences (Segev, 2007; Seidman, 2010). In the occupied territories more specifically, the military ruled, governed, set economic policies, administered those policies, policed the Palestinian population, controlled building permits, and granted or confiscated lands. In other words, the IDF both conducted and supervised civilian and defense activity in the occupied territories between 1967 and 1981 (Segev, 2007).

The implication for the Palestinians who stayed in the occupied territories of 1967 is that not only did the IDF handle the security dimension, but it also directly ruled, governed, and administered the territories as well as controlled its inhabitants' economic lifeline. Segev (2007) wrote:

The military and civilian presence in the territories rapidly mutated into an endless labyrinth of headquarters, commands, branches, departments, units, wings, bureaus, authorities, administrations, and outposts—a giant warren of countless officers, soldiers, and civil servants. Their work consisted almost entirely of inventing more and more reasons to interfere in the residents' daily lives, which they accomplished by means of laws and regulations and ordinance and injunctions that, like some of the bureaucratic whimsies that ruled Israeli citizens, reflected no clear policy of a calculated strategy but rather, above all, arbitrariness. (p. 464)

Segev (2007) argued that this militarized governance in the occupied territories was influenced by four factors: the British occupation in pre-state Palestine, the military rule over Arab citizens of Israel between 1948 and 1966, the short episode of governing Gaza around the 1956 military campaign, and the contemporaneous Vietnam War experience of the United States.

Early military guidebooks explained, “carrying arms is one proof of an Arab man’s masculinity and a means of elevating his status” (Segev, 2007, p. 460). Based on this analysis the IDF advised that shortly after occupying a town “a demonstration of armor, artillery, and aircraft” should be conducted. Accordingly, these Israeli occupation forces made a point of patrolling the center of towns periodically, “making loud noise as they poured on the center,” from all directions, and “such a display of power should have a significant effect on the inhabitants” (Segev, 2007, p. 460). Patrols, searches, and blockades followed and were conducted with purpose. Military handbooks minutely detailed how to perform these acts while monitoring the reactions of the colonized people (Segev, 2007, p. 460).

Hence, the Israeli military government’s administration of civilian people’s lives was the operating theorem in the occupied territories. This is the applied manifestation of the abstract definition of military rule. “A consequence of the occupation of these territories Israel was responsible for the economic as well as the political life in the areas taken over” (Halevi, 2008). The military government became involved in all quintessentially civilian activities such as: conducting population census, examining school textbooks, and planning the economy. They also set health policies and directly supervised their execution, including polio vaccines, setting proper sanitation, and preventing outbreaks of epidemics. The military government was in charge of religious affairs for both Muslim sites as well as Jewish holy sites. The military governor handled postal and communication services while “implementing meticulous censorship” (Segev, 2007 p. 460).

The military ruler also played the role of ambassador and the face of Israeli foreign policy. He had to project a positive image to international organizations and with delegates from foreign countries such as journalists and relief workers. In the economy in particular, the military

governor oversaw the economy as a whole and continued to collect taxes and to enact other fiscal and monetary policies. He planned the transformation of the agricultural economy to new market demands. He supervised industrial operations and guaranteed the uninterrupted flow of consumer goods at reasonable prices. The military governor also set public works projects and involved the population to combat unemployment. This approach of putting the people to work instead of providing state welfare was meant as an “important tool in calming tempers and reducing incitement” (Segev, 2007, pp. 460–461). As a product of this colossal military occupation enterprise:

The mountains of paperwork this system produced document innumerable duplications, conflicts of interest, and confrontations between egos, both personal and institutional, not only between the security system and the government officers, but also among various military sectors, between the military and other security arms, such as the Shabak and the police, within those sectors themselves, and among government ministries. The separate military government systems of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights created even further duplication. (Segev, 2007, p. 464)

By July 1967, the organizational chart of the military government staff at the central command headquarters multiplied to include six groups of job holders and a total of 61 government positions, including a staff officer of tourism, staff officer of archeology, and staff officer of insurance. All these civilian domains were governed, administered, and practically ruled by military officers, liaising with the civilian government employees who saw employment in the occupied territories as an opportunity and who were “eager to grab a piece of the massive bounty that had fallen into Israel’s hands” (Segev, 2007, p. 465).

As for the civilian ministries of the state of Israel, their goal became to attempt to expand their relevance to administering the occupied territories. That is why they inflated their own portions of the state budget. Segev (2007) noted “Clerks brought to the territories a burst of energy and a visionary sense of adventure—the Zionist enterprise lived again, and safe from the watchful eyes of the state comptroller” (p. 465). For example, the state comptroller’s report for the first year of Israeli occupation was apparently “so devastating” that the IDF managed to block its publication (Segev, 2007, p. 465). The report remained classified ever since. Besides detailing violations of the rights of Palestinian detainees, the report presumably also contained a small tale of corruption: the chief military rabbinate placed charity collection boxes in holy sites like Rachel’s Tomb, but soldiers opened the boxes, took the money, and no proper accounts were kept (Segev, 2007, p. 465).

Military governors like Shlomo Gazit complained that good people were hard to find and bring the occupied territories. They would not want to leave their main government positions in Israel and come to the territories as military officers under military command. Those who did go were not “among the most competent, and they had to be lured with power, salaries, and titles that they would probably not have attained on the civilian track” (Segev, 2007, p. 466). More important, once they were in the territories, it became difficult to get rid of those civilian-turned-officers government employees because they refused to yield what they saw as a forward career path. Others wanted to fill positions in the territories because they perceived it as an opportunity to take advantage of their fluency in Arabic to get ahead (Segev, 2007).

The involvement of the military in people’s daily lives became even more entrenched. Military chiefs needed to be deployed, “so that factories producing soap, cigarettes, and arak can get back to work,” wrote Major Moshe Goldenberg, the administration officer of the military

government staff at central command headquarters. For without their military orders and command those civilian factories would not operate (cited in Segev, 2007, p. 466). Such was the penetration of the IDF that one military order on tobacco—of all things—formally states:

Israel Defense Forces/IDF Forces Command in the West Bank Region/

Tobacco Law NO. 32 for 1952/ Order No. 31 (10).

By the powers vested in me by the ordinance concerning appointment as per the Laws of Customs and Excise (west Bank Region (no. 31) 5727–1967, and Article 40 of the Tobacco Law No. 32 for 1952 (herein below) I hereby order...

What followed were 22 clauses and sub clauses regulating the price of cigarettes and tobacco (Segev, 2007, p. 467).

Finally, beyond the military rule over the Arab Palestinian population within the occupied territories of the West Bank in 1967, “the allocation of resources to Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has been a political and economic issue ever since (Halevi, 2008).

It is of note that the phenomenon of the Israeli military assuming a civilian economic role manifested equally across the border in Egypt. This occurred largely under Nasser and the rise of the military officers into the state apparatus, during the 1950s, up until the treaty in 1979, when the state was demilitarized from the pervasive military officers. That said, however, IDF set a particular example for Egypt regarding the use of state land and phasing them into civilian communities, such as the case of the kibbutzim. For example, by 1981, Egypt set its own Law of the Armed Forces Lands, which stated that all state lands, all over the country, unless otherwise already designated for civilian ministries and state agencies, belong to the armed forces under the nationalist pretext that the armed forces are the ones who physically liberated that very Egyptian

land from Israeli occupation.²⁰ Also, the EAF's emphasis on agricultural development and settling outposts in the desert are a parallel development to patterns already initiated and practiced by the Israeli Defense Forces throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This situation of pervasive land control by the Egyptian military starting in the 1980s has been a point of avid criticism of the EAF (Abul-Magd, 2017; Springborg, 2017). Clearly, however, that very situation of army-controlled lands is similar to Israel and not exclusive to Egypt. The very template of how the EAF settled outposts, formed kibbutz-like communities, and called them settlements is derived from this episode of the early years in Israel's own history and practice of civilian nation-building missions within Israel and onto the occupied territories. When Sinai was returned, the EAF carved that role for themselves, in emulation of some of the IDF's own practices of recognizing settlements as defense (Interview, with Egyptian military officer).

In fact, Egypt's Law of Land for the Armed Forces was the product of the encounter with Israeli practices following the end of the total occupation of Sinai in 1982. Sadat said, "the Armed Forces liberated all of Egypt's lands, and they are their protectors." The released lands became the possession of the EAF in mimesis of Israel's own IDF-controlled state land. Most certainly, and most obviously, however, when the EAF perform civilian nation-building missions in Egypt, they are not doing that as a foreign occupying force, the way the IDF did in the occupied territories. The EAF practices are rather reserved to aspects of within borders nation-building convictions, shared by several armies, worldwide (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002). That said, therefore, the Israel case of army-controlled lands is very problematic, given the actual military occupation of the Arab non-Israeli Palestinian population on the West Bank.

²⁰ The Armed Forces Land Projects Agency is an organ of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. Established in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 531 of 1981. The agency handles the establishment of investment projects in housing, commercial shops, administrative units, parking spaces, etc. on land owned by the armed forces, in order to serve the civil sector (NSPO, n.d.).

Hence, intentionally or not, the new emerging states of Israel in 1948 and Egypt in 1952 were militarized and militaristic during that first phase of antagonism and rivalry. As two rising regional players, who mutually perceived each other as external threats, the two countries were constantly comparing notes to keep on par with one another, congruent with military practices diffusion theory (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 70). The Egyptian state became less militarized and Egyptian society less militaristic in the subsequent phases, as its primary threat perception of Israel subsided, whereas Israel's state militarization and militarism continued as it continued to perceive threats in other regional players, as well as what can be considered somewhat technically domestic Palestinian resistance, given the Israeli military occupation.

As for Turkey, after the military revolt and intervention of the young colonels in 1960, the Turkish constitution also carved out an economic role for the military and explicitly defined economic policies as part and parcel of strategic national defense, as explained in Chapter 3. Like Israel and Egypt at that time, the Turkish Armed Forces also saw themselves as nationalist economists through newly launched companies, in concert with Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) trends in both Egypt and Turkey during the 1950s and 1960. The law of OYAK ensued and permitted the armed forces to engage in civilian products income-generating activities. The reason was to match the Turkish Armed Forces' meager state salaries in comparison to fellow civilians in the private business sphere, as the latter were to rise in an emerging market economy. This very Turkish OYAK model of matching officers to rising civilians in an open market economy would be emulated by Egypt, later throughout the 1980s (Abdallah, 1990a; Fakhr, 1985; Farahat, 1984; Nafie, 1987), in the subsequent two chronological phases of mimesis and convergence on neoliberal economic policies.

The reason why I bring the aforementioned evidence is to show that the first phase of antagonism and rivalry among the new states in the region similarly influenced their armed forces' economic roles. This manifested in the share of defense budget, in the establishment of arms industries, and in the armed forces' civilian nation-building missions that morphed into income-generating activities for their respective armed forces in later decades. This episode of intense regional rivalry among Turkey, Egypt, and Israel beginning in the 1950s ended with the treaty of 1979 and the rise of a new rival to Israel, Turkey, and Egypt: the Revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran. Ironically, in response to that very new threat from an Islamic Iran, the three countries ideologically shifted from their previous socialist, progressive, leftist politics of the 1950s and 1960s to a right-wing religious-conservative synthesis by 1980. Mimesis would become the feature of the following decade.

Mimesis (1980–1995)

Defense budget in the middle years

Following the 1979 treaty, this phase witnessed mimesis in the region through the proliferation of socially conservative values and neoliberal economics. The twin of religious conservatism paired with economic liberalization visited Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, who struggled to keep their militaries on par with one another while civilianizing their economies and looking toward post-war development. The social and economic directions the three countries took reflected their alliance with the Western camp within the international circumstance of the Cold War. Reagan and Thatcher's policies in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, influenced this phase of mimesis. As noted above, military expenditure in Israel compared to public spending was 29.4% in 1980, a drop from the 1970s when military expenditure was an all-time high of 42.6% of public spending. In terms of percentage of the

GDP, between 1976 and 1985, defense expenditure decreased to 20.8% of the GDP after it was 28.7% of the GDP in 1973–1975. That 20.8% of the GDP is still significantly high compared to Egypt at the time when its defense spending dropped to only 9% of the GDP. In fact this major discrepancy between Israel's military spending and that of Egypt is what ushered in the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), a civilian-products income-generating enterprises of the EAF, as a way of supplementing the slashed military budget (Nafie, 1987).

From 1986–1990 there was a further significant decrease in Israeli defense consumption to 14.1% of the GDP, following the implementation of the government's Economic Stabilization Program. Under the new neoliberal climate, politicians imposed constraints on government spending by privatizing state services. Ben-Eliezer (2004) described the transformation taking place in the Israeli economy as follows:

Although some may disagree about the causes, few will dispute that the Israeli society has been undergoing a process of change since the second half of the 1980s. Above all, this has been an economic change. . . . A neoliberal culture of popularity ratings began to develop, marked by personal choice, marketing commercialization, and competition. The emphasis on private consumption intersected with post-materialist values that revolved around the needs, liberties, desires, and body of the individual (pp. 52–53).

Within these shifting circumstances of civilian consumerism and commercialization, the defense budget's share dropped, and its percentage relative to the GDP has constantly declined. The budget continued to be at a lower percentage of public spending and the GDP throughout the 1980s until the mid 1990s.

The explanation for this relative drop in Israel's military spending is that the 1979 treaty ushered in some regional stability; threat perceptions became more domestic than regional.

Israel's threat came from the Palestinian resistance within the occupied territories, as well as from the Palestinian resistance residing in neighboring nation-states, but not from the armies of those states whether from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, or Egypt. Even Hezbollah, is considered a non-state actor, supported by Iran in Lebanon, but not a formal Lebanese or Iranian army. Despite the fact that Israel was fighting the Palestinian resistance (a lightly armed militia, not a full-fledged Arab state army), Israel still struggled in its military campaigns in Lebanon both the Litani Operation in 1978 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This elicited societal resistance within Israel against these wars; which ultimately influenced the discussions on defense budget allocations.

Defense Industries in the Middle Years

In the late 1980s, thanks to guaranteed military aid from the United States, fears regarding arms import dissipated, and therefore the emphasis on a domestic defense industry initially was thought to have declined. "Opportunities for arms procurement abroad were perhaps the most important factor, though not the only one, in determining the role of Israel's domestic defense industry" (Lifshitz, 2012). Ironically however, this episode of peacetime economics and US arms supply marked a heightened attempt at expanding the arms industry, not necessarily to only meet Israel's own deterrence security needs but to rather morph the industry toward income-generating exports. This was a macroeconomic strategy where the IDF played a major economic role. This was also the time when the IDF and the Turkish military closely cooperated and shared training exercises. The two countries brokered deals where Israel helped with Turkey's military modernization program that started in the late 1990s and continued over the next 20–25 years.

As indicated above, the Israeli arms industry accelerated after the 1973 military failure, as IDF's security doctrine of invincibility was shattered on October 6 of that year (Lebel, Lewin, &

Bligh, 2015). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the rapidly growing domestic defense production bolstered economic activity in a time of economic depression. During 1980s, more specifically, the defense industry “became a highly significant sector of the Israeli economy,” influencing “macroeconomic and structural developments of the country,” and led the IDF to become an economic powerhouse (Lifshitz, 2012). The technology-focused defense industry, “changed the course of industrial growth as a whole,” by amassing investments “in electronics, aerospace, optical instruments, and more (Lifshitz, 2012). The EAF under the leadership of Chief of Staff Abu Ghazala followed a parallel path to Israel. Abu Ghazala explicitly stated Israel’s technological investments as a motivation to open military owned companies in electronics and optical instruments, emphasizing not only their military use but also civilian applications in marketed products. In Israel, this created job opportunities for scientists, engineers, and skilled workers, whose technical career path started during military service in the MAMRAM IDF units, as stated above (Lifshitz, 2012).

Because of battlefield technological advancement and the global arms market, a new military technologies conviction developed that “original solutions were imperative.” The new global conditions, particularly during and after the-Cold War era, “reinforced the idea that only indigenous, unique developments that were unobtainable in the international market and concealed until used in battle, could give Israel qualitative advantages and the ability to surprise its enemies” (Lifshitz, 2012). This belief hastened the defense industries during that time period, despite the reliance on important US weaponry. “Contributing to the growth and productivity of the entire economy, the defense industry was thus an important agent of modernization” (Lifshitz, 2012). The outcome of defense industries growth was an advanced mechanization level across all economic domains. Factories ushered in higher levels of quality control. These

technological developments spread into other sectors beyond the defense industry and its sub-contractors.

In the end this growth in the defense industry drove Israeli exports and “became a major contributor to Israel’s balance of payments (BOP)” (Lifshitz, 2012). Analysts attribute to the defense exports not only direct favorable effects on the BOP through their international sales volumes, but also indirectly, “by paving the way for civilian goods to enter overseas markets previously unfamiliar with Israeli products (Lifshitz, 2012).

Nonetheless, this growth of the defense industry encountered problems. For example, competition toward high performance among countries already manufacturing weapons raised the costs for developing cutting-edge weapons “to the point where it was doubtful whether a small economy could afford a self-sufficiency-oriented policy” (Lifshitz, 2012). That is when economic constraints became relevant. This was also when some development programs, such as the Lavie fighter aircraft, were discontinued in 1987 due to the lack of feasibility of the economic returns given the United States’ prominence in the arms market. “Self-sufficiency was relegated to second place, and a new perception gradually emerged that the industry had to supply the IDF with unique technological solutions for force multiplication” (Lifshitz, 2012).

A similar freeze on some weapons development projects took place in Egypt around the same time for similar economic viability reasons. Both countries were also accused of stealing US technology and reverse engineering weapons in their respective countries. The defense industry picked up again in Israel in the 1990s, especially in terms of technologically innovative military weapons such as drones and air defense systems.

By the late 1980s and throughout most of the 1990s, declining demand for arms both domestically and internationally “brought more than two decades of continuous growth to a halt, leading to the downsizing of most of the defense companies,” in Israel (Lifshitz, 2012).




Figure 50 The World’s arms imports. The peak year was 1981 at \$41.7 billion. The slope seems to be getting higher again since 2001. The high demand and decreased demand of the world market for arms affect exporters, like Israel. For example, Egypt decreased its exports of arms after 1986, given the decline in the world demand for arms.

In the meantime, civilian economic domains surged, and the defense industry’s share of the economic pie significantly declined. This seemingly unfavorable circumstance would be the basis for a new relationship, however, between the IDF and the high-tech sector. This relationship will combine both defense and civilian products that will deepen in the subsequent

phase of more globalized economies, where the IDF makes Israel the start-up nation, it is often described to be (Rosenberg, 2018).

IDF's Civilian Economic Activities in the Middle Years

As for the IDF-assumed civilian economic activities during this time period, these civilian activities have initially declined, given the overall transformation of the country from socialism to capitalism, and because the state and IDF nation-building missions, of immigrants absorption, or education, or agricultural kibbutzim seemed somewhat of the past. Moreover, in the occupied territories, the Military Governorate of the IDF transformed by 1981 into the Civil Administration to liaise with the Israeli government as it governed the West Bank. The direct governing involvement of the IDF into the occupied territories subsided between 1980 and 1993, even prior to the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 and 1995, when military day-to-day administration declined. Civil-military scholar Yagil Levy told me, that the move was an attempt to re-militarize the IDF back into military affairs and away from previously held civilian administrative tasks (personal communication, 2017). Levy explained, “because the West Bank is an occupied territory and Israel has refrained from applying the Israeli law on it (apart from the annexed East Jerusalem) it faced a dilemma: On the one hand, the Israeli Military (IDF) is the sovereign because of the requirements of the international law. On the other hand, controlling a disputed area, in which complicated relations between settlers and Palestinians develop and the Palestinians resist politically, not only militarily, the Israeli rule, has embroiled the IDF into politics” (email communication, 2017). Thus, for the purpose of understanding the Occupation Regime in relation to civil-military relations in Israel, the issue is what happened in 1981 and why in 1981. Levy articulates, “1981 was important because Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai and simultaneously expanded the settlement project in the West Bank so

it needed new mechanisms to pacify the West Bank. “ Accordingly, “the transformation from the Israeli Military Governorate into the Israeli Civil Administration was an attempt to ‘militarize’ the military back, as in professionalize it again into pure military affairs and distancing it from actual governing and administration. Thus the Israeli Civil Administration was established for this purpose

Sadly, this quickly reversed and the military presence resurfaced with the eventual collapse of the peace process with the Palestinians by 1996 and the rise to power of right-wing Netanyahu of the Likud Party. That Civil Administration bureaucracy remained under the IDF jurisdiction and administratively under the Ministry of Defense. Lands, settlements, permits for building, or any other civilian economic activities within the territories, for Jews or Arabs, continued to be legally and practically controlled by the military, since the IDF is the sovereign over the occupied territories and therefore the single institution in charge of administering the military occupation. This gave the IDF new governing authority and economic power over lands in the West Bank that were being settled as part of IDF-conceived defense strategy.

To conclude, as civilian private business rose in a liberalizing market economy, the military in Israel, like those in Egypt and Turkey, devised ways to sustain their financial resources. For example, while the Israeli defense budget remained high, in comparison to that of Egypt, whose military expenditure was substantially lowered immediately after the 1973 war, Israel’s defense budget was eventually reduced since 1980. Due to societal demands to lower Israel’s military budget, especially following the controversies of the 1982 war in Lebanon, the IDF had to continue to find financial resources. That manifested in the defense industry as an IDF income generator, and macroeconomic powerhouse. In sum, by that 1980 juncture Egypt, Turkey, and

Israel mimicked similar economic liberalization policies that affected their three respective militaries in parallel ways.

Convergence on Neo-Liberal Policies and Globalization (1996–2010)

The neoliberal shift that started with public sector privatization in the earlier phase continued following the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. By the 1995 assassination of Rabin, the peace process era was about to dramatically shift. While the peace process formally continued in the Wye Agreement and then Camp David and ended in 2000, the 1995 critical juncture was the beginning of the dominance of right-wing politics in Israel. This episode marked renewed resurgence in increased defense budget allocations. The reason was the rise of right-wing Jewish militancy, which culminated in the election of Benjamin Netanyahu for his first term in 1996–1999. Only to be followed by more right-wing Likud dominance under retired General Ariel Sharon (2000-2005). Netanyahu was to rise to power again for three more terms from 2009 to the present for a total of 13 years since his first three-years term in 1996 and counting. This episode remilitarized Israeli foreign policies and was economically reflected, anew, in heightened defense budget allocations. Interestingly, the matching, and even exceeding military spenders today, are not Egypt and Turkey, but are rather the Arab Gulf States, primarily Oman, and Saudi Arabia, with their shared threat perception of Iran. Today, the Arab Gulf States are heavy spenders on defense; just as much as or even exceed Israel's defense budget. For example, Saudi Arabia spends 10% of its GDP on defense. Oman is also the highest spender on defense in the Middle East, with 13.73% of its GDP put towards defense. That is because the Gulf States and Israel identify Iran to be their shared primary threat.

This phase marked the Israeli military's response to the regionally shared circumstance of public state assets privatization. Shifting from an earlier era of socialist policies, Turkey, Egypt,

and Israel all converged on globalized neo-liberal economic policies. This new economic phase marked the IDF's rescinding of non-core missions and its own self-imposed privatization of non-combat activities. Food, logistics, transportation, and uniform supplies are but a few civilian products required for meeting the needs of the military as an institution. These items have all been outsourced to private companies and are no longer produced by the Israeli armed forces by themselves for themselves (Seidman, 2010).




Figure 51 Israel Military Expenditure 1962—2018. Source: *Tradingeconomics.com/SIPRI*

Defense Budget in Globalized Times

Despite its increase in dollar amount, the percentage of military spending relative to other public expenditures dropped to 22.1% of the state budget in 1990 from 29.4% in 1980, and to a mere 15.8% in 2001, an indication of reduced Israeli external threat perceptions. In fact, from 1991–1995, defense expenditure continued to decrease and averaged 10.2% of the GDP. Still, this is substantially higher than for neighboring Egypt, where defense expenditure is only 1.3 to 1.7% of GDP, and Turkey, where the defense expenditure is 2 to 2.5% of GDP. Thus, though Israeli military spending has been reduced, it is still higher than its historical rivals. Moreover,

according to (Lifshitz, 2003), at the turn of the 21st century, Israel's defense expenditures were about twenty times as high—in real terms—as they had been in the early 1950s. Most recently, the Israeli cabinet approved the 2019 state budget, which totals \$116 billion in expenditures. Funding for the Defense Ministry amounts to \$17.6 billion, or 15.2% of the state budget (JPost, 2018).

The question is how much of a burden these expenditures were on the national treasury. Defense expenditure is always relatively high in Israel, compared to its neighbors within the regional order of the Middle East. That is because Israel constantly designates external threats: If it were not Egypt after the peace treaty in 1979, it became Iraq until the first Gulf War of 1991 and the second Gulf war of 2003. If it were not only the Palestinian Intifada and HAMAS in Gaza in 2000, then it has been HAMAS and Iran since 2009.

Fluctuations in defense spending could be detected when measured against the Israeli GDP. The years 1996–2001 were characterized for the most part by rapid economic growth. This made it possible to increase defense expenditure in quantitative terms after years of decline, and at the same time reduce the percentage of the GDP allocated to defense expenditure. The relative proportion depended on Israel's general economic situation, its international relations with world powers (i.e., their willingness to offer financial support and military aid), and with its regional neighbors (wars and military occupation are expensive, whereas peace enhances economic development). Since 2001, there has been a trend of gradual decline in the share of resources allocated to defense, from 8.5% of GDP in 2002 to 5.6% of the GDP in 2014. Moreover, this phase marked a spike in the development of hi-tech industries and an intricate military-industrial-complex in the software business, thereby increasing the IDF influence over both the arms industry and the civilian-products technology market.




Figure 52 Israel military expenditure 2008–2018

Defense Industries in Globalized Times

Renewed military operations during the Second Intifada of 2000; the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005; the Second War on Lebanon in 2006; and the Gaza Wars: Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009; Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012; and Operation Protective Edge in 2014 all pushed toward an expansion of the arms industry after the decline in the late 1990s. The new weapons included field trial of technological military innovations such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones, such as the Heron deployed in Operation Cast Lead on Gaza and the Iron Dome that became operational and was deployed in 2011.

Despite the new expansions, the defense industry’s contribution to the economy, when calculated as “output, employment and exports, is estimated at less than half of what it was in the 1970s and 1980s” (Lifshitz, 2012). As it is not that significant a macroeconomic player, anymore, Military Analyst Lifshitz (2012) argued the “any future defense industry policy should place possible macroeconomic benefits *secondary* to strategic implications.” Lifshitz was concerned that that three main threats he identifies for Israel were not attended to through the kind of projects in which the defense industry is invested. He warned that the defense industry in

Israel was still oriented toward exports and international demands than to meeting domestic security needs. The threats Lifshitz names are:

1. Long-distance existential threats from an enemy without a common border that might involve the use of weapons of mass destruction;
2. Threats of full-scale conventional armed conflict with neighboring enemies; and
3. Threats of terrorism against targets inside Israel or targets identified with Israel abroad.

In responding to these threats, Lifshitz argued that the defense industry must fulfill three main roles:

1. Assuring the IDF's technological superiority through original and concealed developments specifically designed to meet its operational doctrines and relevant theater conditions;
2. Providing independent and continuous supplies of armaments and enhancing the freedom of action to use them; and
3. Strengthening Israel's overall deterrence capacity by revealing cutting-edge technological and industrial capabilities.

Analyzing the aforementioned factors, Lifshitz argued that attending to Israel's long-distance existential threats should be a priority. He complained, however, "This seemingly indisputable conclusion raises serious questions regarding the current defense industry set up and its compatibility with such a mission." Lifshitz also lamented that the Israel's defense companies that remain dependent on exports' income may not be as focused as they should be on R&D and weapon programs, "of domestic priority." "Inevitably, export orders compete with domestic orders," Lifshitz asserted, "over scarce resources—high-quality human capital, R&D capabilities, production infrastructure, financial means, and management attention."

Also, aiming to augment their orders, defense companies could obtain “export permits for weapons systems even though the sale of these systems abroad involves the revelation of secret technologies.” And, because foreign buyers prefer technology transfer arrangements, “securing export orders often involves the transferring of development and production capacities abroad, sometimes without preserving such capacities for domestic use.” Hence, Lifshitz critiqued the current export-oriented defense industry in Israel as being focused on external profits over and above, the “effective fulfillment of their strategic role.” He concluded that it is “necessary then to create a new balance between the various activities of the Israeli defense industry that grants explicit and uncompromised priority to local demands.” While such restructuring of the defense industry, “will certainly have economic and budgetary implications,” Lifshitz reasons, “that this would be no different than other justified costs of national security.”


In terms of Israel’s relations with Turkey, the Israeli air force continued to train in Turkey for its long-range missions and to participate in annual exercises with the Turkish Air Force. Relations between Israel and Turkey took a downturn, however, after Erdoğan consolidated his power in Turkey since 2002, being in office for 16 years now. Though Erdoğan had officially visited Israel in 2005 as prime minister and initially maintained business-as-usual relations, his eventual anti-Israeli rhetoric and efforts to lead a dominant role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have symbolized an intentional Turkish realignment from secular Israeli-oriented to a pan-Islamist regionally hegemonic stance. Most notably, relations exploded after the 2008–09 Gaza War and the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid. Around the 2008 juncture, Erdoğan’s regime became increasingly perceived as an external threat to both Egypt and Israel. This perception will only deepen in the next phase.

Current Divergences (2011—Present)

This phase showed specificities about the scope of the economic role of the IDF in comparison to neighboring countries. It also marks societal resistance to the security discourse from some liberal segments of society and critiques of the high defense spending and militarization of the economy through defense industry. At the same time the religious right made inroads into the IDF and slogans about “settlements as security” morphed from a leftist kibbutzim legacy of the 1950s and 1960s to a theological belief in the Holiness of the Land and the need to defend it (Peri, 2006b). The budget, however, did not go down, all while the IDF created new income-generating activities, especially through vacating and trading in high-value lands to finance other military-designated needs. Despite the IDF’s fears, the budget did not go down. A seeming case of double dipping in both high budget and income-generation economic activities currently manifests itself in Israel under the Benjamin Netanyahu government.

The Biggest Military Budgets As A Percent Of GDP

Military expenditure as a % of GDP in selected countries in 2018




* Estimations
@StatistaCharts Source: SIPRI

Forbes statista

The Biggest Military Budgets As A Percentage Of GDP

Estimated military expenditure as a % of GDP in selected countries in 2014



Source: SIPRI

Forbes statista

Figure 53 Biggest Military Budgets as Percentage of GDP in 2014 and 2018. The same countries are the highest spenders. Turkey increased its spending. Israel remains the second highest spender after Saudi Arabia.
Source: Forbes 2015, 2019; SIPRI

An international comparison of expenditure on defense showed that general government expenditure on defense in Israel, as a percentage of GDP, is higher than in other developed

countries (1–2% of GDP in European countries compared to 4.3—5.2% of GDP in Israel). A comparison with developing countries also showed that Israel’s expenditure on defense is one of the highest. Egypt’s expenditure is also higher than that of other Middle East neighbors.

	Defence expenditure, as a percentage of:						
	כלל הוצאות ההמגור הממשלתי ⁽²⁾			התוצר המקומי הגולמי			
	Total general government expenditure ⁽²⁾			Gross domestic product			
	2014	2013	2012	2014	2013	2012	
Advanced Economies							מדינות מפותחות
Austria	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	אוסטריה
Germany	2.3	2.4	2.5	1.0	1.1	1.1	גרמניה
Italy	2.3	2.3	2.6	1.2	1.2	1.3	איטליה
Spain	2.0	2.2	2.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	ספרד
Israel	14.8	14.4	14.8	6.0	5.9	6.0	ישראל
Singapore	21.8	23.0	24.9	3.3	3.2	3.3	סינגפור
Sweden	2.5	2.8	2.7	1.3	1.5	1.4	שוודיה
United States	9.3	9.8	10.6	3.5	3.8	4.2	ארצות הברית
United Kingdom	4.9	5.0	5.1	2.2	2.2	2.4	הממלכה המאוחדת
Russian Federation	4.1	5.9	7.3	2.7	2.5	3.1	רוסיה
Ireland	...	1.0	0.9	...	0.4	0.4	אירלנד
Turkey	4.3	4.1	4.2	1.6	1.5	1.6	טורקיה
Emerging and Developing Economies							מדינות מתפתחות
Albania	2.8	3.3	3.3	0.8	0.9	0.9	אלבניה
Ukraine	3.9	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.0	1.0	אוקראינה
Georgia	7.4	8.2	9.3	2.2	2.4	2.7	גאורגיה
Kazakhstan	5.5	5.8	5.4	1.1	1.1	1.1	קזחסטן
Egypt	4.5	4.5	5.1	2.0	1.7	1.6	מצרים
Jordan	...	9.7	10.4	3.5	3.6	4.0	ירדן
United Arab Emirates	3.0	2.5	3.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	ברית האמירויות הערביות
South Africa	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	דרום אפריקה

Figure 54 Defense expenditure as percentage of government expenditure and GDP in Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (Publication. No. 1651, 2016; CBS.II.Gov, 2016).

The IDF operates particularly in two domains. The first is applied innovation research for civilian products with hi-tech startups. The second is the sale of military-controlled lands for cash post-vacating. The first domain flourished due to the US military aid that resulted from the peace treaty with Egypt. A consequence of this is the militarization of the civilian economy of technology and the creation of security networks within the larger non-defense related industrial base. The latter domain inserts the IDF as a real estate economic player, as it vacates prime-time locations in the city center for farther outposts and receives monetary compensation.

Most recently, IDF-controlled lands constitute 53% of the state land, a figure that jumps to 83% if we count the occupied territories. And indeed, these should be counted, given that they fall squarely under military jurisdiction. Currently, due to societal pressures regarding defense budget cuts, any military-vacated lands within Israel proper are sold for the civilian purposes of housing and development. The IDF is therefore directly compensated for land it arguably never owned but has practically held (Seidman, 2010). This serves as an additional income-generating source in light of any foreseeable reduction in military spending. In short, the Israeli armed forces have a large share of the economic pie in Israel, be it through a high defense budget, an established arms industry that they dominate, an intricate civilian-military security network, partnerships with high-tech startups, and land sales in exchange for new settlements and outposts for military bases in the Negev area.

Moreover, the tension between the settlements' self-defense and a military doctrine of offense that goes back to the 1954 moment of clash between the left-wing kibbutzniks and the IDF remains active today, especially when it comes to analysis of concepts such as "settlements as defense." It is ironic that under the Netanyahu leadership, religious-right settlers have appropriated the very historically left-wing kibbutzniks policy of "settlement as defense" by actively settling in the West Bank area (Peri, 2006b). These citizens insist on referring to the area by its holy names of Judea and Samaria. This in of itself showed continuity of "practices" from the early years of the state to today's religious takes on settlement politics. This is also mimetic of regional religious trends of the sacredness of the land to Muslim jihadists. Thus, both the leftist secular trends and the fundamentalist religious turn in Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, including Jewish and Muslim extremism, are mirror images of one another.

Military Income-Generating Civilian-Products in Current Times:

Hi-Tech Security Networks and Land Sales

The IDF is currently exhibiting more signs of entrenched economic undertakings, in light of societal pressures to cut their already high military budget—a budget that constitutes a disproportionately high 15.2% of state budget or up to 5.2% of GDP in 2017 (Business Insider, 2017), and slightly down to 4.3% in 2018 (SIPRI, 2019). While Israel is not a NATO member, it is significant to compare its very high percentage on military spending to the lower spending of other NATO member nations, countries the Trump administration is pushing to shoulder more of the financial burden. Currently, on average, NATO democracies spend as low as 1.2% or less of GDP (NATO Press Release, 2017).

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Israel has needed to raise money from land bids in part because its military budget leaves little room for civilian spending” (Harris, 2016).

The money gained from vacating of prime real estate locations in the heart of Tel Aviv—like the Sarona Mall, for example—is retained by the military, albeit operated by a separate budget, to be redirected toward new outposts in the Negev, or to other purposes deemed necessary by the military (Ahronheim, 2017; Elis, 2015; Seidman, 2010). It is thus telling that *land* in particular is an important *military asset* in Israel. Absent a huge military budget, the Israeli military might very well regularly use land assets as an income generator.

According to Oren (2007), Israel’s security sector “controls and influences” more than 53% of state-owned land, not even counting the military-occupied West Bank. Oren emphasizes the significance and broader implications of the security sector’s penetration into the territorial realm, such as Israeli laws granting the security sector a distinct status beyond the civilian realm

and allowing it a broad spectrum for control. In the territorial domain in particular, Oren also describes the security sector functioning as if it were a “separate framework” altogether, operating autonomously from the civilian spheres.

Scholars agree that the government, media, and civil society in Israel hardly pay attention to land use for security reasons. This question of its military land ownership has received insufficient attention, as reflected in the comparatively low number of issues raised by academics, journalists and the general public in Israel.

For example, Shmuel Even, an expert in Israel’s defense at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, said in a *Business Insider* interview that the country’s defense budget of \$15 billion in 2012 (increased to \$17.54 billion for the 2019 budget) was to be constituted of “70 percent contributed by Israeli taxpayers, 21 percent coming from U.S. aid and 9 percent coming from Defense Ministry income” (Kelley, 2012). An important question should be: What is that “defense Ministry income” and how exactly is it monitored? As shown above, land sales and the cash acquired for vacating posts is one of the prime income generators for the IDF (Seidman, 2010).



Figure 55 Vacated military posts made way for business development. Sarona Open Shopping Mall, at the center of Tel Aviv, stands on land previously belonging to the IDF HaKirya base. The General Staff Matcal Tower with its helipad is seen within the government, military, and businesses mixed-use complex. Photo credit by author.

While so far direct military involvement in the economic realm might seem like a marginal activity for the IDF (9% of military budget), the military nonetheless has influenced the broader concept of business and economic networks. Besides an actually established military-industrial complex of weapon manufacturing, there are even more subtle forms of militarism in the civilian market.

Kachtan and Binks (2016) demonstrated that links formed during military service among the advanced military echelon continue post-military service and affect one's chances in the private business realm, and consequently one's economic standing in society. A case in point is the story of Israeli startup WeWork, valued at \$20 billion (Orpaz, 2017). Company founder and CEO Adam Neumann said, "[My] kibbutz childhood and Israeli army service molded WeWork, nicknamed 'Kibbutz 2.0'" (Orpaz, 2017). Neumann attributed to the military service getting "to know a lot of my best friends" (Orpaz, 2017). One of them, Ariel Tiger, is currently the CFO of

WeWork, and one of the company's top managers. Thus, the way the Israeli military service correlates to opportunities in civilian life, including business opportunities, is significant.

People meet in the military and then go onto civilian life. The military service years become a vehicle for their networks in civilian business life. For example, some aspects of this military-to-civilian life transition are reflected in my interview with a young Israeli Mizrahi Jew, whose family is originally from Iraq. He was studying computer science at Tel Aviv University. He worked at a pizza place in the graduate students dorm. When I asked him about his time at the military, he was very sophisticated in his language and word choice in English. He said,

This is a very militaristic society. You cannot go far if you don't do well in the army. Even in a job interview the first question is: 'What did you do in the army? What was your rank?' They'd ask, 'Why did you just have an officer job?'

"As opposed to what?" I asked.

"As opposed to some combat-level position," he replied. He continued. "I said to one job interviewer, 'I was in that battalion. I was a commander blah blah.' The job interviewer continued to grill me. She asked, 'Why didn't you stay longer and advance?' I said, 'Because I didn't like it!' She came back at me 'Why don't you like it? You don't like organization? What?!' I started thinking. 'I don't like it because...' She pressed and pressed. She was interrogating; pressing me about it. Even though it's a high-tech job! I wasn't prepared for this! I was prepared to answer questions about my education. What I studied here at the university. This.. that... But then I knew how to put a stop.

"How?!" I asked him. "I told her I lost a friend in an operation," he said. "And that's how she stopped!" he added.

“She didn’t ask you further? Why not?” I asked. He answered, “Because that’s the end! What is she going to ask now? How did you lose him?! That would be too much! So she stopped.”

“You are smart,” I said to him. He smiled and said, “Well. It was not totally true but half true.” “How so,” I asked. He said, “Well I didn’t lose a close friend. But there was someone in my company. But it’s not like I knew him well or anything.” He finished by telling me, “I’ll tell you a joke we have about the three years of Israeli military service:

One life;

Two (Too) short;

Three years!! For what?

Sheffer and Barak (2013) showed that a highly organic yet influential security network has influenced Israel's domestic sphere, particularly after the Israeli-Arab War of 1967 and the subsequent Israeli military occupation. Composed of active duty and former security personnel and their partners in the state’s various civilian spheres, this security network has influenced Israeli culture, politics, society, economy, public discourse, and foreign relations.

Michael (2007a, 2007b) showed how contemporary “low-intensity conflict” ties to military knowledge, thereby affecting civilian control—which is formally retained, as an ideal—at the institutional level, but in practice becomes weakened. Michael dissects Israel’s “epistemic authority” to reveal how the military elite dominates over Palestinian affairs. The military is perceived as more trusted in these matters, both by the general public as well as by the civilian political elite. In turn, this situation impacts the way civilian control is practiced. Michael highlights the spectrum of political-military interaction and how it “reinforces the weakness of civilian control over the military,” in Israel.

5.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I illustrated how the shared socialist ideas of the time affected the economic role of the military in terms of budget, defense industry, and civilian enterprises at the inception of the state of Israel. As laid out above, my argument is that change in the aforementioned four historically chronological phases of the geopolitical regional order, due the regional dynamics (security threats) and emulation of the other powers in each of the four periods (the independent variable) caused change and variation in aspects of the IDF's economic role (dependent variable) in terms of the defense budget, defense industries, and civilian-military income-generating activities.

Due to its core defense missions, its nation-building civilian tasks, as well as policing operations in civilian parts of the West Bank (Peri, 1983a), the IDF assumed a large share of Israel's economic pie. First, the IDF carved out a huge defense budget relative to other items on the state budget, such as education and health care. Second, the Ministry of Defense established an arms industry. This was due to international embargos on arms during the 1950s and 1960s, as the international community aimed to reduce the regional arms race, especially between Egypt and Israel. The IDF had been the major partner in the defense industries, as opposed to private arms companies. Only recently was the IMI privatized and sold to a private company. Third, the IDF set up and dominated particular economic sectors in the civilian economy, most important among them Israel's science, technology, engineering, and mathematics research and development (STEM R&D) programs. Per the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as much as 4.9% of Israel's GDP is spent on research (MFA, 2018). Since the inception of the state, the IDF

has been a dominant economic actor, and more currently an integral partner in the output of civilian software products by the mid-2000s.

In Israel, allocations for the defense budget were high relative to state expenditure and GDP and compared to other countries (CBS.Gov.IL, 2016). Military budgets as percentage of public spending, however, showed some variation from very high during phase one of rivalry antagonisms with neighbors (1948–1979), particularly around 1973–1975, “when defense consumption reached its peak” (CBS.Gov.IL, 2016 p. 10). This was followed by some reductions in phase two during a peacetime economy and regional stability (1980–1995), only to drop further and then rise again in phase three (1996–2011) during confrontations with the non-state actors of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). The defense budget increased again in 2011 as a newly emerging Jewish militant religion-nationalistic ideological turn increased visible signs in response to Iran (currently perceived to be Israel’s major regional threat). However, all these recent increases in budgetary allocation as a percentage of public expenditure and GDP are not as high as the 1973 War moment, when Egypt was perceived by Israel as an existential threat. Over time and across the three cases of this study alike, the ideas of the time changed from statist socialism in phase one, to domestic economic liberalization in phase two, to neoliberal trends and globalization in phase three, to the current phase of divisions between secular-religious; militarized-militant; economic nationalism versus global trade.

Israel is decidedly militarized in all three dimensions of politics: governing, economic activities, and national security policies. It is clear that the militarization of the Israeli state and society is having an effect domestically, and this militarization of politics affects the Middle East as whole. In a region currently threatened by the potential for total state collapse at the hands of

proliferating militant non-state actors or revived versions of old expansionist civilizational ideological turns, such as that of Turkey's pan-Islamist "pax-Ottomana" (Pope, 2010) and Iran's Persian Revolutionary Islamism, we find that Egypt's own militaristic turn since 2013, for example, has been the product of regional tectonic changes in which Egypt converged on Israel's decades-long militarism, employing a similar rubric of a state fighting an "existential war" against regional foreign-funded terrorism (El Sisi, 2014). In the end, being located in a high threat perceptions region is a circumstance that directly impacts domestic civil–military relations and impedes orderly and balanced objective civilian control of the military in all of the regional cases. What the long-term ramifications will be regionally will only be known in the years to come (Maziad, 2018a).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Pressed olive oil and pickles; refrigerators and sewing machines; wedding halls and bowling alleys; software development and dominance in the tech industry: these are just a few of the civilian-product economic activities in which militaries around the world have been engaged for decades. Be it in China, Russia, Honduras; Argentina, Thailand, Pakistan; Vietnam, Indonesia, Congo (Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003) or Turkey, Egypt, and Israel, the economic roles of the armed forces, of countries spanning four continents (Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America) have taken various forms and iterations in times of peace and war.

Two observations can be made about armed forces' global economic roles. First, they all have particular inception stories (i.e., reasons and circumstances for how military economic activities and commercial business enterprises came about). Those stories are shared worldwide. The specialized literature in civil–military relations clearly explains this phenomenon through a series of basic givens and rational factors delineated in the chapters above. These factors usually have to do with:

1. A history of a political military role in state formation and wars of independence, increasing defense budgets. This is followed by an economic/developmental role of the armed forces in state modernization and nation-building once the military withdraws from a direct governing rule (Janowitz, 1960; Finer, 1962; Cook, 2007).
2. International embargos on arms imports to reduce regional rivalries and antagonisms, ironically, can spur domestic defense industries.

3. An eventual transition to reduced defense budgets in times of relative regional peace with neighbors can create the conditions of possibility for income-generating civilian-products commercial enterprises. This becomes tied to military doctrines of self-sufficiency, in fluctuating regional and international circumstances of threat perception.

Defense budgets, defense industries, and civilian-product income-generating commercial enterprises are the three elements constituting the economic role of the militaries, as were delineated in this dissertation. They are complementary and equivalent routes for financing the armed forces of three important regional players in the Middle East: Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. These three countries perceived each other as a source of threat at different points in their histories. That very threat perception influenced the economic role of the military in their respective cases as a way of keeping on par with one another as the three strongest regional armies and among the top 17 militaries of the world (Business Insider, 2018; Global Military Power, 2018).

The second observation is that the armed forces' economic activities have developed, morphed, and adapted to domestic, regional, and international economic trends over time. The various armed forces' economic manifestations include one or more of the following: a disproportionate defense budget relative to the civilian state budget, a military-industrial-complex of arms exportation, or military land occupation/administration that allows for leasing/selling as well as ownership and management of commercial entities. All these economic portfolios have not been monolithic and have not characterized one case, in isolation from other regional Middle East cases, or even far away from other contemporaneous cases in other regional orders.

The similarities of the cycles through which international cases have been going regarding manifested economic roles of the armed forces are so clear that no single case should be treated as an anomaly, as the literature has sometimes treated them. Rather, most cases of military economic activities can be rooted in quite similar historical inception stories of why and how they emerged and developed over time within their regional orbits.

Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the economic role of the armed forces goes through ebbs and flows, depending on threat perceptions, which influence the economic role of the militaries in three ways: allocated defense budgets, established arms industries, and income-generating activities based on military doctrines regarding the role of the armed forces in times of war and in times of peace, during which the armed forces must still maintain the requisite economic resources for combat readiness.

The crux of this dissertation is to relate this explanation of the reasons behind military intervention in the economic sphere to the Middle East cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel when no study has paired them together prior. As the aim of this research was to examine the military economic behavior of these three dominant players in the Middle East, evidence showed how through a series of regional dynamics their respective militaries' economic power was conceived, grew, waned at points, reconsolidated, and re-expanded, only to be followed by some dwindling and withdrawal, in a back and forth, oscillatory fashion. The argument here is that these oscillations from high to low economic penetrations depend on shifting regional threat perceptions. The shifts in threat perception affect militaries' budget allocated by the political leadership. Changes in allocated funds push the militaries toward weapon industries and civilian-products income-generating enterprises.

These characteristics are indicative of the adaptive attributes of the armed forces to regional and international circumstances. It is ironic that despite their assumed rigidity based on the hierarchal organizational structure, successful armed forces are quite adaptive and flexible in response to changing political, economic, and security circumstances. The three cases at hand have exhibited such adaptability over time to survive in their neighborhood. To illustrate, when defense budgets are huge, the military is already having a substantial portion of state spending, as in the case of Israel. When that defense budget and formal military expenditure are slashed by the civilian political leadership, the military forms income-generating activities, either as pure pension funds for the military class, as with Turkey in 1960, or as civilian-products commercial operations managed by the Ministry of Defense to complement the lowered defense budgets, as with Egypt post-peace treaty with Israel in 1979. In the end, however, the three cases maintain equivalent parity through budgetary or off-budgetary funding resources, so that Turkey, Egypt, and Israel maintain their current status as three strongest armies in the Middle East in a highly volatile regional order.

My dissertation's main research question was: why did these seemingly different country cases all have militaries with a large economic role? My argument was that all three cases relate to one another while maintaining their regional military strength as top world militaries, due to perpetual regional threat perceptions. The Global Fire Power (GFP, 2018) rates Turkey as 9th, Egypt 12th, and Israel 17th among most powerful militaries worldwide.

In what ways, then, have the three cases of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel responded to one another in terms of their respective militaries' economic role? The argument in the dissertation addressed four chronological phases that manifested in each country case:

1. Animosity and rivalry and how that condition caused changes in the military economy due to reaction to regional threats and experiences in regional wars (1948–1979);
2. Mimesis and how the neo-conservative wave of state withdrawal and economic liberalization affected military economic practices in the three countries alike (1980–1995);
3. Convergence on neoliberal economic policies—in parallel across the three cases—as the result of the impact of international forces pushing toward privatization of public assets (1996–2011); and
4. Divergences among the cases in response to global trend of multinationals versus a come back of economic nationalism and the Statist Holding (The Arab Gulf States Model influencing Egypt and to lesser extent Turkey and Israel; 2011–present).

These four phases constituted the components of my independent variable—the dynamism of the Middle East as a regional order and how it caused the economic response of the three militaries as the Dependent Variable. The regional circumstance of threat perception caused the militaries stay combat ready by carving out an economic share. When threat perceptions were lowered as in the case of Egypt after 1979, the political leadership lowered the military budget. However, the military had to maintain self-sufficiency, and legally through civilian sanctions, seek income-generating source to stay on par with potential regional rivals. These economic civil-military relations have been configured and reconfigured along the dimensions of military budget, defense industries, and income-generating civilian-products economic activities. The subsets of my independent variable (the chronological phases, which the region experienced) structured the manifestations of the dependent variable for Turkey, Egypt, and Israel.

6.1 ANTAGONISMS AND RIVALRIES (1950–1979)

The three countries developed mutual threat perceptions during this period. They all saw each other as expansionist, hegemonic rising powers. Turkey under Menderes (r. 1950–1960) and Egypt under Nasser (r. 1954–1970) perceived each other as regional threats. Nasser was “suspicious” of Menderes’ outreach into the Middle East through the formation of “western-sponsored” alliances with Iraq and Syria (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 4). By adding Islamist Pakistan and allying with an old imperial power like Britain, the Democrats of Turkey played “an uncharacteristically activist role in promoting the ill-fated Baghdad Pact of 1955” (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 4). Menderes antagonized Nasser during the 1950s. Nasser’s response was to regionally promote pan-Arab nationalism. The union with Syria in 1958 was the direct translation of Egypt’s threat perception of Turkey’s outreach into the Middle East, on behalf of Western powers (Abou-El-Fadl, 2019, p. 4). Egypt and Israel equally accused one another’s regional expansionism, throughout this time period, with back-to-back wars in 1956, 1967 and 1973, until the peace treaty in 1979.

6.2 MIMESIS (1980–1995)

During this phase, the three countries matched each other’s economic policies. They mimicked each other’s military economic practices during this time period of regional and international neo-conservative austerity measures and state withdrawal toward market economic liberalization. As the international debates revolved around the role of the state in economy, regulators or welfare providers, the state started to economically withdraw, allowing private business to gradually emerge. In the process, the militaries in the three countries alike, especially Egypt and Israel, retained some remainder of socialist welfare nation-building missions. The army, both in Egypt and Israel, had already been performing these nation-building missions during the 1950s

in terms of infrastructure, telecommunications, and food security projects. Some aspects of these projects continued to be provided by the armies during the 1980s, in light of the overall transformation of the economy toward private capital and open markets. That mimesis took place at a time of relative regional peace and stability. External regional threats subsided but internal threats within each country flared up. Yet keeping on par with one another in a regional military balance drove the defense industries in the three countries alike during the 1980s.

6.3 CONVERGENCE (1996–2010)

During the 1990s, the three cases converged on worldwide trends of neoliberal policies. This was a period of public assets' privatization schemes. Militaries in the three country cases adjusted to this new era as they became market players and income-generating institutions through civilian products conglomerates (Turkey and Egypt) or intricate government-military-business security networks in the hi-tech industry (Israel), as the latter privatized and civilianized many non-core missions of the IDF. The three militaries carved out a new economic role in a changing world economy. Land sales and cash flows in exchange of vacating military bases marked some of both Israel's and Egypt's economic behavior during that time.

6.4 CURRENT DIVERGENCE (2011–PRESENT)

Threat perceptions resurfaced between Turkey and Egypt and between Turkey and Israel by the 2013 juncture. That year brought back a secularist-statist-militaristic turn in Egypt in direct opposition to Turkey's current pan-Islamist transnational and militancy-backing regime of Erdoğan. The antagonism between Turkey and Egypt brought Egypt closer to Israel and drew the latter further apart from Turkey, after decades of proximity. Moreover, the statist-militaristic turn in Egypt economically manifested in the shape of Arab Gulf States-like Sovereign Funds, where

the military-run companies act on behalf of the state in global business partnerships.

The findings of this dissertation showed that the cases are much comparatively closer than Springborg's typology (2011b) suggested when he set Turkey, Egypt, and Israel apart, all while the international media and academic reports have framed Egypt as an extreme anomaly in its military economic activities without a comparative framework that includes the other two regionally influential cases of Turkey and Israel. In reality, as my dissertation showed, these three country cases have been more interactive with one another than the literature has stated.

Thus, I assert that each of these countries' military economic institutions has not been a monolithic edifice. Neither have they been that different from one another. Accordingly, while the three countries might have slightly deviated at some points in their respective military economic histories, they have also shown signs of convergence on similar practices at subsequent critical junctures; and overall the three went through the same motions along the chronological phases between their inceptions as states to date.

Accordingly, my analysis is a reading against the grain that pairs the three countries as similar within the typology of intervention in the economic realm. This conceptualization is a counter argument to Springborg's typology (2011b), with which he groups Egypt in with Syria, Iran, Pakistan as Military Inc., separates Turkey's military as a different tier of noninterventionist armed forces in the economy and excludes Israel under the rubric of an advanced US-like military-industrial complex without looking closer at the shared inception story of that very "military-industrial-complex" and its macroeconomic impact in Israel. Instead, I aimed to deconstruct Springborg's typology and looked at the three cases through a regional lens. I argued that a regional circumstance of an oscillating sense of emulation/competition and arms race/threat perceptions arose among the three regional powers and carved out a place for the

armed forces in the economy in the three cases alike. Military penetration in the economy manifests through high military budgets or other income-generating activities. Thus, this dissertation updates some of Springborg's dated categories. The flaw stems from the arbitrary separation made among these three particularly significant regional cases of importance in the Middle East, as the strongest three armies in the Middle East and among the strongest 17 armies worldwide (Forbes, 2017; GFP 2018).

Finally, the dynamic regional order approach may have further generalizability to other regions as contained orders with their own regional dynamics. The military economic behavior of a given state can be examined together with other regional players from within their regional order to discover new ways by which militaries respond to one another within a regional geopolitical neighborhood. For example, instead of comparing Pakistan to Egypt as Muslim countries and contrasting India to Pakistan and Egypt to Israel, comparing India to Pakistan, and comparing Egypt to Israel reveals new patterns. Subsequently, comparing the dynamics within entire regional orders to one another would also be interesting. For example, comparing the European regional order pre-WWII of heightened threat perception and the Middle East as a regional order during high threat perceptions could reveal shared patterns under high threat perceptions circumstance.

In the chapters above, I narrowed in on each case and showed how the military intervention in the economy oscillated in varied albeit equivalent ways. I illustrated that the three militaries played varied but equivalent economic roles in order to secure both primary roles of national security and regional deterrence, as well as secondary roles of modernization, nation-building, and development according to the shifting best practices understood from one decade to another since modern state formation of Turkey in 1923, Israel in 1948, and Egypt in 1952. Most

important, these three militaries assumed various yet equivalent economic roles to keep on par with one another as the three strongest armies in the Middle East and among the top 17 armies worldwide in a high-threat region and increasingly remilitarized world.

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