

Refracted Images: India's Self-Image and
the Influence of China on Indian foreign policy (1950-1975)

Deep Pal

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2019

Reading Committee:

Sunila S. Kale, Chair

David Bachman

Srinath Raghavan

Anand A. Yang

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

© Copyright 2019

Deep Pal

University of Washington

Abstract

Refracted Images: India's Self-Image and
the Influence of China on foreign policy (1950-1975)

Deep Pal

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

Sunila S. Kale

The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

While visiting India from Lhasa in 1956—57, the Dalai Lama indicated that he would consider not returning to China-occupied Tibet should India offer him political asylum. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was not enthusiastic and suggested that the best way forward for the Tibetan people was for the Dalai Lama to stay in Lhasa. Less than two years later, in March 1959, India reversed this policy, deciding to grant political asylum to the Dalai Lama even before he requested it. What explains such inconsistencies or abrupt policy reversals? To answer this question, I analyze the role that cognitive predispositions play in determining policy. I use a modified framework of refracted images to investigate how three crucial aspects of India's self-

image – civilizational conviction, territorial anxiety, and development – impact Indian foreign policy. I hypothesize that the apparent abrupt reversals or sudden discrepancies in Indian policy become intelligible when examined through aspects of India's self-image vis-à-vis China as refracted through India's interactions with other actors in the region. Using primary source documents from three major archives and detailed interviews with 52 foreign policy decision-makers, I conduct an intertemporal analysis of India's policy towards Tibet in 1950—1959, and a paired comparison of India's policies towards Bhutan and Sikkim in 1968—1975. I conclude that the relationship between Asia's two comparably sized powers—China and India—can be understood with reference to other smaller actors in the region. In this case, India's foreign policy choices are shaped by its self-image and the desire that others respect this image, as evidenced in its relations with its Himalayan neighbors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures	viii
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	1
1.1 Puzzle and Research Question	1
1.2 Existing Frameworks	3
1.2.1 Within the Traditional Approach	4
1.2.2 The postcolonial States and Foreign Policy Analysis	8
1.2.3 Recent Indian Approaches	14
1.3 Argument: Refracted Images	16
1.3.1 The Logic of Images	17
1.3.2 Modified Framework – Refracted Images:	18
1.4 Research Design.....	21
1.4.1 Aspects of Images	22
1.4.2 Case Study	28
1.4.3 Research Design and Methods.....	32
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation	37
Chapter 2. TIBET 1950—1959.....	39
2.1 Introduction.....	39
2.2 Prologue – autonomy and suzerainty	42
2.3 India’s cautious approach to Tibet: 1950-’51	48

2.3.1	Civilizational conviction.....	53
2.3.2	Territorial Anxiety	57
2.3.3	Development as foreign policy	60
2.3.4	Planning the Dalai Lama’s escape	62
2.4	Prioritizing the Dalai Lama: 1959.....	68
2.4.1	The Dalai Lama’s Escape	68
2.4.2	The Turn in the Sino-Indian Relationship	74
2.4.3	Territorial anxiety	79
2.4.4	Civilizational conviction.....	82
2.4.5	Development as foreign policy	88
2.5	Conclusion	90
Chapter 3. BHUTAN 1969—1975		94
3.1	Introduction.....	94
3.2	The Need for Special Relationships.....	101
3.3	In Tandem With Bhutan: Two Can Play This Game	108
3.3.1	Civilizational conviction.....	108
3.3.2	Territorial anxiety	118
3.3.3	Development as foreign policy	126
3.4	Conclusion	134
Chapter 4. SIKKIM 1968—1975.....		137
4.1	Introduction.....	137
4.2	Managing Sikkim With One eye on Tibet	140

4.3	Sikkim – From “Association” to Assimilation	143
4.3.1	Civilizational conviction.....	143
4.3.2	Territorial anxiety	162
4.3.3	Development as foreign policy	174
4.4	Conclusion	178
Chapter 5. CONCLUSION		183
5.1	Summary of Findings.....	185
5.2	The Saliency of Images.....	190
5.3	Further Research.....	195
Bibliography		198
Appendix A: Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Government of India and the Government Of Nepal.....		217
Appendix B: Treaty of Friendship between India and Bhutan		221
Appendix C: Treaty of Friendship between India and Bhutan, 2007		225
Appendix D: India-Sikkim Treaty		229
Appendix E: Letters Exchanged Between the Political Officer and the Maharaja of Sikkim Pursuant To India-Sikkim Treaty.....		235
Appendix F: Tripartite Agreement between Sikkim, India, and the political parties in Sikkim		243
Appendix G: The Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Bill, 1974		249
Appendix H: The Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975		250

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Framework of Refracted Images.	17
Figure. 2.1: Contested territories in the Sino-Indian border.	74

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation represents a labor of love and an intellectual journey that I had the fortitude to complete in large measure because of the trust, encouragement and contribution of many people.

I am endlessly grateful to my advisor and mentor Sunila Kale, who believed in my capabilities perhaps more than I did. She was always there to encourage me, give advice, and most importantly, taught me to think critically and constantly. My committee members, David Bachman, Anand Yang, and Srinath Raghavan offered significant guidance throughout the research process and during the writing of this dissertation. David Bachman worked with me from my first quarter in the Jackson School, guiding and helping shape my understanding of International Relations while directing my ideas towards a viable research project. Anand Yang, who also worked with me from my first year in program, offered inspiration and intellectual support, encouraging me to make the most of the resources that the University of Washington had to offer. With his immense and perhaps unparalleled understanding of early postcolonial India, Srinath Raghavan provided valuable insight about reading historical events, and reminded me never to lose sight of the big picture.

The community in Jackson School were always there to support, whether to brainstorm to get past a barrier, to commiserate with me after setbacks, to encourage me during bouts of self-doubt, or to offer an avenue to vent. Nathalie Williams and Christian Novetzke were generous with their time, patience, and advice beyond what mere academic responsibilities mandated. I can only hope to

pay forward what their support has meant to me. Monique Thormann, offered opportunities for professional development not only during the school year, but over summer, helping fund my fieldwork. And finally, the South Asia Center has my gratitude, not only for their generous financial support, but equally importantly, for providing an enriching intellectual home.

Writing a dissertation may be a lonely process, something that only the presence of friends can remedy. I have been fortunate to be surrounded by a number of friends across all time zones. In JSIS, I would like to mention Berkay Gulen, Oded Oron, Megan Ward, and Emily Willard in particular, for being there for endless discussions on the project, for their support, encouragement, and most of all, for their enduring friendship. Michelle Tigchelaar, with the benefit of having been through the doctoral process a few years earlier, provided much appreciated dinner, drinks, and the assurance that everything will eventually get better.

Information can be empowering; it can also be intimidating, especially when one has to mine them from the Indian archives. I owe a debt of gratitude to Narayani Basu, Amit Julka, and Shilpa Sharma not only for making the archives easier to navigate, but also for their company, support and friendship. Jyoti Luthra, who almost single-handedly ensured that the manuscript division of Teen Murti Bhavan functioned smoothly, and files were accessible to researchers, deserves a special mention.

Rudra Chaudhuri, Bonnie Glaser, Amit Das Gupta, Avinash Paliwal, Raji Rajagopalan, Jeff Smith, and Constantino Xavier are the rare breed of mentors, colleagues, and friends that inspire and

intimidate at the same time with their brilliance. My project and my understanding of the subject has been enriched by their wisdom and encouragement.

Last but by no means the least, my family – my Baba, Maa, my sisters Pallabi, Sujata and their families, who did not need to know why I decided to quit a promising career as a journalist to embark on this journey; that I needed to do it, was enough for them. I thank them for their unwavering faith in me. My partner Tanvi, shared this journey with me from half a world away, fighting my anxiety, imposter syndrome, and fear with me. With immense patience she picked up the slack when I faltered in my responsibilities beyond the dissertation; she also gently reminded me that my project was only a part of my life, and not my entire existence.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the weather in Seattle where I did most of my writing. By being its best self, it graciously discouraged me from going out and enjoying myself which ensured that I completed the dissertation.

DEDICATION

To Maa and Baba.

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

“Dignitary with immediate entourage of 8 crossed Chutangmu border into our territory evening 31st March. Our APO [Assistant Political Officer] on spot apprehends possibility of agents following to do him harm in our territory. We have therefore ordered local sealing of border after his arrival except to individuals of his party voiced for by him.”

Advisor to Assam Governor to
Foreign Secretary, 1 April 1959.¹

The understated text of the communiqué above does not entirely explain the magnitude of the event it confirms – the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India exactly sixty years ago this year. India’s decision to grant him asylum has cast a long shadow on the Sino-Indian relationship for the six decades since then. The message also does not reveal the weight of the years-long deliberation carried out by India’s decision-makers that led them to concede that the best way forward for the Dalai Lama and all that he stood for would involve him leaving Tibet for India. Merely two years earlier, His Holiness the Dalai Lama (HHDL) had hinted to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that he was considering seeking political asylum in India. Nehru, in a response characterized by almost complete lack of enthusiasm, had suggested that he go back to Tibet and try to sort out issues with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).² Such a response

¹ Telegram from Advisor to Governor of Assam to Foreign Secretary, 1 April 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru post-1947 Papers (hereafter JNSG), Vol- 679-II, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter NMML).

² A complete and more nuanced account of the developments including events preceding and succeeding the meeting are presented in the following chapter on Tibet.

seemed consistent with his stand on the Tibet issue since 1950 when Chinese forces launched their campaign for “peaceful liberation” of Tibet. Nehru and his aides had, so far, aimed at balancing India’s relationship with both sides, taking care not to appear as favoring one over the other. However, this seemed to change in March 1959, as India seemed to disregard the displeasure of the PRC and reversed its longstanding policy. This, however, is not the only instance of a turnaround of Indian policies in incidents involving China. As I explore these occurrences, I ask, what has prompted India to either reverse its foreign policy stance over time or adopt seemingly inconsistent policies? Using the specificity of this question, I aim to examine the overall motivations in foreign policy decision-making in states and ask, how and why do countries make foreign policy decisions?

I also aim to identify the role that cognitive preferences play in informing the interests of states. I achieve this by understanding how a state determines its priorities, conveys them in the form of aspects of its self-image in its interaction with other states, and interprets the responses to these priorities. In a two-step framework, I identify both text and behavior that carry the self-image by states as well as interpret responses to them. In the first stage, I analyze primary source material such as published documents such as records of deliberations, speeches, and letters to identify motivating principles of self-image. In the second stage, I use detailed interviews, primary source material from members of the foreign policy bureaucracy, and archival government and personal documents to examine how, if at all, these ideas about self-image endure and are reflected in subsequent foreign policy priorities. In an approach different from the established frameworks of realism or liberalism, I investigate the role that the cognitive predispositions of a state’s decision-makers play in their relationship with other states, and by extension in determining policy. I test

these motivating principles of foreign policy in intertemporal as well as interspatial analyses across various instances of abrupt reversals or seeming inconsistencies in foreign policy in order to capture variation in foreign policy behavior.

After laying out the theoretical and empirical puzzle that guides this research, I establish the state of the field and the existing body of literature, and elaborate on my intervention to these frameworks with the modified framework of refracted images. Thereafter, I present the broad outlines of my argument and explain how it leads to my analysis of the role of cognitive preferences in foreign policy decisions. After that, I introduce my cases and explain the logic behind case selection, follow this with an account of the research design and methods, and end with a description of how subsequent chapters of this dissertation are organized.

1.2 EXISTING FRAMEWORKS

In their attempt to categorize international interactions, mainstay theories in International Relations (IR) scholarship have looked at the processes of decision-making and state behavior as separate and distinct from the motivations of individual human agents. For instance, Kenneth Waltz, who first proposed neorealism, one of the most well-known and widely used representations of realist thought, argued that in an international system defined by anarchy, state behavior is guided by a need to survive.³ However, Waltz admits that facilitating better analysis of foreign policy falls beyond the remit of structural realism.⁴ Most other forms of realism, while

³ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley PubCo, 1979) p 93-94.

⁴ Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (September 1, 1996): 7–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429297>.

differing on the motivating factors for state action, continue to leave out human agents, choosing either the international system or states as the level of analysis. Liberalism, the other popular approach in IR, which sees interstate relationships from the standpoint of political economy, depends on institutions and repeated interactions between states to balance their varying interests and situations of potential conflict. However, in the absence of a way to explain or understand internal mechanisms that influence decisions, the state effectively remains a black box. It raises questions like, how do domestic publics, or various constituencies influence decision-making? The absence of human agents indicates a gap at the level of analysis that can explain state behavior.

1.2.1 *Within the Traditional Approach*

There have, however, been other frameworks primarily following either the realist or liberalist tradition that have tried to bypass the problem with levels of analysis. Neoclassical Realism, as offered by Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, for instance, approaches the issue of foreign policy analysis with both systemic considerations as well as domestic level variables as influencing decisions.⁵ According to this framework, foreign policy behavior may be satisfactorily explained through the interaction of the “Foreign Policy Executive” and interest groups within a state. By taking into account factors such as the “Foreign Policy Executive” as well as societal groups, this framework includes both national interests as well as narrower, group-based interests based on preferences in the analytical framework. Similarly, working within the liberalist tradition, Moravcsik offers an approach to Liberal theory that allows for both individual and private groups

⁵ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

of individuals within a state to appear as fundamental actors in decision-making.⁶ He classifies his formulation into ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism, depending on whether state policy influenced impact on collective social values, economic gains and losses, and forms of representation, respectively. By considering both state-society relations, as well as the transnational context that states are embedded in, this approach too, allows interests as well as ideas along with institutions to be considered in the decision-making matrix.

While these approaches expand the scope of the research agenda under the realist or liberalist umbrella, they have also been criticized for stepping out of disciplinary boundaries. Moravcsik, for example, has been accused of undermining the essence of liberalism, as well as for his overdependence on the explanatory power of interaction between states.⁷ However, my reasons for looking beyond Neoclassical Realism or Moravcsik's Liberal Theory in this dissertation have little to do with considerations of theoretical boundedness, and more with analytical power.

While these frameworks look beyond other versions of realist or liberalist theory in involving individuals, domestic factors, or even preferences, they still leave out certain aspects. In his critique of Neoclassical Realism, Berkin points out that a framework dedicated to understanding the role of preference of domestic actors must consider more microeconomic factors, and include contextual and sociological aspects.⁸ In investigating the influence of self-image on preferences

⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 (1997): 513–553.

⁷ Reus-Smit, C., 2001, *The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands*. In Kegley, C. W. Jr. (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 107-149

⁸ Samuel Barkin, review of *Review of Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (2010): 714–15.

for foreign policy, I find that these approaches leave out the role of cognitive predispositions, such as biases, stereotypes, and heuristics from the analytical frame.

An endeavor to understand political decision-making becomes inherently fruitful once the universe of possible decisions is opened up to options that are not guided only by rational choice. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's work has been instrumental in indicating how rationality limits the number of choices under consideration, whereas an analysis taking into account varying situations and the personality of the individual is better able to grasp decision-making.⁹ Similarly, Rosenau exhibits how the influence of variables such as public opinion or interest groups varies depending on the situation and the players. Graham Allison's study on the Cuban Missile Crisis contributes to the bureaucratic interest model, illustrating how when the state is no longer considered a unitary actor, the understanding of how it perceives information changes, bringing into play sub-units that are guided by their position within the system.¹⁰

Accepting the salience of ideas in state behavior as an analytical necessity raises questions about the extent to which structure and agency affect change. Do ideas and behavior by individuals principally drive state behavior? Alternatively, do structural aspects of international politics overwhelm individual action and act as critical deciding factors? Part of the literature, for instance, argues that neither ideas nor interest have primacy over the other. Goldstein and Keohane believe that both have causal relevance, with ideas providing causal road maps,

⁹ Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

¹⁰ Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (1969): 689–718, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1954423>.

influencing strategies, and developing institutions.¹¹ Fearon and Wendt, similarly, advise looking at both ideas and material interests, and by extension, rationalism and constructivism, as analytical tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions.¹² Ted Hopf suggests that actors and structures mutually constitute each such, as seen in the case of US behavior in Vietnam. For Hopf, this is a case in point where the United States' action of intervention in Vietnam allowed it to reproduce its own identity of great power, as well as the structure that gave meaning to its action.¹³

The analytical focus of traditional frameworks is another problematic aspect. Almost all cases used to validate the competency of these frameworks relate to Western states. While the homogeneity in case selection has aided the cause of parsimony, they have left the frameworks inadequately prepared to explain a world navigated by a multitude of young postcolonial states. For instance, these theories have few explanations for the propagation of nonalignment as state policy or the popularity of the Non-Aligned Movement among postcolonial states in the 1960s and 1970s, which emerged as a way to avoid being drawn into the Cold War.

¹¹ Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹² James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in *Handbook of International Relations* (1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002), 52–72, http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/hdbk_intlrelations/n3.xml.

¹³ Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>.

1.2.2 *The postcolonial States and Foreign Policy Analysis*

Since the mid-20th century, from the time the postcolonial states started to emerge, mainstream academic theories of international relations and foreign policy have stayed limited to the Western experience. In part, this may be explained by the dominance of American and European institutions within the global academy. This manifested in the lack of facilities dedicated to the research of the postcolonial experience, and early researchers being trained in the Western tradition, with examples drawn exclusively from Western experiences. The question, then, is what explains the fact that Western scholarship has maintained its Eurocentric bias in subsequent decades?¹⁴ In analyzing the persistence of this phenomenon, Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya offer several explanations. These include the possibility of the West maintaining its hegemonic status even when it came to the enterprise of IR theory building; or the possibility that non-Western theories are only now catching up with the West; or that the existence of non-Western theories has been inaccessible to the West due to language or other barriers. However, they also point out that non-Western contributions are often looked at as not meeting “the criteria for hard theory. Instead, they are more likely to fit within softer conceptions, focusing on the ideas and beliefs from classical and contemporary periods.”¹⁵

¹⁴ Hopf, for example, in the chapter mentioned above, used U.S. behavior as an example; the case studies in Goldstein and Keohane’s edited volume include the European Union, the United States, Western Europe, Germany, Japan and Early Stuart England; Graham Allison’s study on conceptual models of decision-making makes use of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case; to understand the political approach to policy as opposed to an optimizing strategy, Barbara Farnham examined Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy in “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making;”

¹⁵ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010) p 10-21.

Analysis of Indian foreign policy is an ideal case in point. In deciphering the development of Indian political behavior in the shadow of overwhelming historical events such as Partition, early rivalry with Pakistan, and an emerging China, how does one account for continuity in decision-making? Does this suggest that elites in charge of making decisions were immutably connected by a socially constructed reality that influenced the understanding of their position in the world? What does a reality that aids the persistence of ideas about relations with other states and reflects in decision-making look like? How does a state convey its understanding of such a reality in its foreign policy approach? The challenge lies in expanding the conceptual boundaries of extant theory so that an explanation of non-Western accounts based in IR theory becomes possible.

Using an interdisciplinary, agent-oriented approach such as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) helps address many issues mentioned above. Decision-making in FPA analysis is treated as a multicausal and multilevel process like any other real-world activity. Since it is interdisciplinary, FPA includes elements from psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, anthropology, and economics. According to FPA's agent-oriented approach, human decision-makers are the point of integration between material and ideational motivations that determine state behavior. Such a formulation allows space in FPA to accommodate issues of accountability and imperfect decision-making, allowing for variables such as cognitive preferences or cultural inclinations, or small group dynamics. It further acknowledges that decisions may not always result from purely rational considerations, that there may be conflict over crucial decisions, and that satisfactory options may be selected over optimum ones.¹⁶ FPA's broad base of multiple disciplines

¹⁶ Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Second edition. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014); Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 1 (1989): 15–44, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00042.x>.

buttresses its capacity to accommodate various kinds of determining principles. For instance, key variables from unitary states to institutions to individual leaders can be considered, thereby involving human agents in the process. It also employs a range of methodologies to analyze the decision-making process, and scholarly questions can be linked to practical policy concerns.

With this in the background, looking at the kind of gaps in existing scholarship focusing solely on Western traditions of social theory and practice illuminate the ways in which FPA can be useful. In India. While IR scholarship has been abundant since the early years after independence, it has often been an uncomfortable fit in the purely positivist approach to Western IR. Domestically developed IR literature on India has usually been exceptionalist or subsystemic. Postcolonial Asia and Africa used concepts such as nonalignment to advocate for regionalism as opposed to taking sides based on the classic Cold War balance of power model. They justified this approach by citing “enlightened national interest.”¹⁷ Among South Asian states, the deeply painful memories of colonialism and Partition have been key influencing factors, because of which, the discussion in the domestic literature has revolved around maintaining territorial integrity, creating a robust anti-imperialist alliance among postcolonial states, as well as maintaining freedom in policy formation and internal development.¹⁸ Another often explored strain examines India’s options and approaches to regionalism in South Asia as well as India’s place in the international order.¹⁹

¹⁷ K. Subrahmanyam, “Subcontinental Security,” *Strategic Analysis* 5, no. 5–6 (1981): 243–261, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168109427557>.

¹⁸ Angadipuram Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-1972* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981).

¹⁹ Sisir Gupta, *India and the International System* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981); S. D. Muni, *India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension : With Special Reference to Neighbours* (Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009); Kanti P.

Traditional IR scholarship has developed around critical ideas such as sovereignty, security as a means for survival, nationalism, and balance of power. An attempt to expand the conceptual boundaries of the discipline beyond the European experience will require examining what these ideas mean for a state that has only recently been decolonized. India's position in South Asia is a suitable example. Sudipta Kaviraj traces the development of the ideas of nationalism and the establishment of institutions in India to the modernity introduced by the empire.²⁰ Considering that the genesis of these concepts is fundamentally different in a postcolonial setting from that in the West, it is essential to examine their role in the postcolonial setting. For example, the norm of non-intervention, connected to Westphalian sovereignty, demonstrates a significant difference in approach. India has had close civilizational and economic ties with most of its immediate neighbors, and territories belonging to at least three were administered as part of colonial India. While committing to nonintervention in word, India's actions have demonstrated a more nuanced approach. It is possible to argue that Indian understanding of sovereignty had emerged from multiple genealogies that include the Mughal empire, rule by the East India Company, and the British Crown, to name a few.

On the one hand, a prominent feature in Indian policy in the region has involved granting developmental aid to smaller neighbors in exchange for influence.²¹ On the other, with few

Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture," in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).

²⁰ Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

²¹ Jayanth Jacob, "Nepal Top Recipient of India Aid with Rs 253 Crore," *Hindustan Times*, April 6, 2018, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nepal-top-recipient-of-india-aid-with-rs-253-crore/story-0HFcfbgSj9zaGVbuE4gASM.html>.

exceptions, India has refrained from intervening even when values espoused by it are threatened, most recently evident in India's reluctance at visibly involving itself during a coup in the Maldives.²² Many of the frameworks discussed so far aim to accommodate the diverse stakeholders and ideas to explain the process of decision-making better. While they are likely to help illuminate the causal process guiding behavior mentioned above, few studies so far have aspired to engage with cases beyond the western experience.

Within the overall FPA umbrella, IR scholars have been looking for alternative approaches to the study of state behavior that do not depend solely on material interest as an explanatory variable. In the post-Cold War era of theorizing, approaches that involve identity and culture, and argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are not only material but also cultural and institutional, have gained ground.²³ Others have followed, claiming that cultural approaches to security may be organizational, political, strategic, or global.²⁴ However, the cultural variable has drawn criticism about its seemingly all-encompassing nature. Scholars describe it as a nebulous concept, which weakens its explanatory power.²⁵

²² This refers to a 2018 political crisis in the Maldives resulting from conflict between President Abdulla Yameen and the country's Supreme Court after the former decided to disobey a ruling on reinstatement of parliament members, deciding instead to have supreme court justices arrested. Members of opposition parties, including former democratically elected president Mohammed Nasheed asked for Indian intervention, ostensibly to protect democratic values. However, despite allegations of undue influence in the police, justice system, and the election commission by President Yameen, and multiple calls for India to intervene with its military till the Maldivian Presidential election later in the year, India decided to let the democratic process play out by itself. More here: Shubhajit Roy, "India's Tightrope Walk on Maldives," *The Indian Express*, August 29, 2018, <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indias-tightrope-walk-on-maldives-5329849/>.

²³ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

²⁴ Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda," in *Culture and Foreign Policy*, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: LRIenner Publishers, 1997).

²⁵ Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash - Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 141-170.

Within the FPA umbrella, the cognitive approach builds on social psychology, asking, what role does the way that decision-makers perceive the world play in decision-making? Among the different ways of answering this question, one relates to examining images that states use to signal their priorities. Using the explanatory power of images also addresses the theoretical problem of overgeneralization. A framework that uses images as a vehicle for states to convey priorities also helps examine and explain behavior by postcolonial states that do not conform solely to motivations of security. It makes space for subjective human inclinations, such as perceptions, behavioral preferences, and judgments about the relative stature of other states. In postcolonial societies, where some institutions did not evolve indigenously from society, accommodating such influences becomes more critical. The images framework, using the human agent or society as a whole as the level of analysis, allows for subjectivity, including unintentional errors such as misunderstood messages, and intentional distractions such as deception. The images approach that I find relevant to my research, albeit with significant modifications, relates to a framework of perception and images proposed by Robert Jervis. Perception, according to the framework, involves actors in a state making inferences based on their understandings (which involves beliefs) about other actors (through images) and what other actors will do in given situations (intentions).²⁶ A state conveys these aspects of images through behavior in the form of signals and indices.²⁷ I examine the framework in greater detail in section

²⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²⁷ Jervis makes a distinction between signals and indices as interpreted by interacting governments. A signal is a statement or action the meaning of which is established by tacit or explicit understanding among the actors. Indices, on the other hand, are more persuasive. They carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct.

1.3 in relation to my intervention of refracted images.

1.2.3 *Recent Indian Approaches*

Academic assessments of Indian foreign policy have often focused on nonalignment as the dominant strain, often conflating it with a purely idealistic approach. According to these accounts, Indian foreign policy exhibits no clear strategic vision, and India's foreign policymakers prefer idealism at the cost of consistency and foresight.²⁸ As a result, as these accounts note, India's foreign policy has been defined by its dependence on personalities and guided by ad-hocism. Early policy on China, Goa, and Kashmir are offered as examples of Nehru starting as an idealist but eventually resorting to a policy of pragmatic convenience, thereby turning away from establishing an institutional approach to decision-making.²⁹ Some accounts lean toward the other extreme, claiming that realist considerations have been the most critical influence on Indian foreign policy, and will continue to be so.³⁰ Beyond the argument of apparent ad-hocism dictating policy, scholars identify two clear outlooks – an idealist one, attributed to Ashoka or Gandhi, and a pragmatist or realist one, usually called a Kautilyan or Machiavellian approach, that have influenced foreign policy behavior.³¹

²⁸ Tanham, George K. *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

²⁹ Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities*, Rev. ed. (New Delhi: Allied, 1980); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Cape, 1970); Shashi Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India*, 1st ed. (New York: Arcade Pub, 2003).

³⁰ Garver, John W. *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.

³¹ Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," *India Review* 8, no. 3 (2009): 209–233, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903116750>; Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

It is only recently that non-binary, nuanced interpretations of Indian diplomatic history have started appearing. In this body of literature, Nehru is no longer portrayed as someone moved solely by idealism and given to ad-hoc policymaking. According to Raghavan, he is best described as a “liberal idealist,” one who abhorred wars but also recognized the necessity of force in statecraft.³² The nuance offered by these accounts goes beyond Nehru and includes India’s motivations, which are analyzed not as either interest or idea-driven, but as evolving from both.³³ Chatterjee Miller, for instance, posits that a sense of victimization and collective trauma guided postcolonial India’s nation-building and decision-making exercise.³⁴ According to Shankar, an investment in India’s international reputation as a tool to demonstrate resolve and strength drives its foreign policy.³⁵ Chacko highlights the complicated relationship of India’s postcolonial experience with modernity, which, on the one hand, was desirable as a cure for backwardness in a society emerging from colonialism; at the same time, it was despised for engendering the exploitative relationship that formed the basis of British dominance in India.³⁶ Scholars also argue that Indian leaders looked at the past, to a history of glory which rightfully belonged to India. Bajpai, for instance, uses modified structuralism as an approach, as it allows considerations beyond pure security. He argues that bringing back India’s past glory and greatness has been one of the core values that dictated Indian thinking on security since

³² Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010).

³³ Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947* (India: HarperCollins Publishers, 2014).

³⁴ Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

³⁵ Mahesh Shankar, *The Reputational Imperative: Nehru’s India in Territorial Conflict*, 1 edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018).

³⁶ Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004* (Taylor and Francis, 2013).

independence.³⁷ Others, such as Datta-Ray, refer to texts like the Mahabharata or Kautilya's Arthashastra as the values espoused in them are useful in explaining and incorporating the uniquely postcolonial approach to decision-making, over oft-used Western notions of an anarchic binary world.³⁸

1.3 ARGUMENT: REFRACTED IMAGES

Robert Jervis' images approach offers an appropriate starting point for my research. According to this framework, a state aims to influence beliefs about it in other states through the use of images. To this end, decision-makers project images and monitor how these images are interpreted by others. Jervis defines a decision-maker's image of another actor as "those of his beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances."³⁹ Jervis further suggests that understanding the framework of images is incomplete unless it is considered with the study of perceptions. Jervis argues that "just as actors need to predict what others will do, so they also want others to make desired predictions about their own behavior; actors not only perceive others, they signal in order to project images that may be either true or false. (Indeed, when they interpret others' behavior, they realize that the others are also trying to project desired images.)"⁴⁰ Essentially, he proposes that images and

³⁷ Kanti P. Bajpai, "India: Modified Structuralism," in *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 162–63.

³⁸ Deep Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy: A Critique of Eurocentrism* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

³⁹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (1970; repr., New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1989) 2-5.

⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," in *Political Psychology*, ed. K.R. Monroe (Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002), 295-296.

perceptions have to be studied together as the process in which images are projected and perceived is continuous, and both sides have to be analyzed for best methodological outcomes.

1.3.1 *The Logic of Images*

A state's interpretation of images projected by others allows it to determine threats and opportunities, thereby constructing a reality, that in turn guides the images that the state wants to project. The images framework allows actors in different states to be considered as operating within their own socially constructed reality different from that of other states. Since the realities considered are specific to environments of the actors, their understanding of risk, reward and opportunity are specific to these realities as well. These are influenced by their understanding of other states, and guided by cognitive predispositions such as biases, stereotypes, and heuristics. In this reality, states project images of how they want to be seen, and also interpret how these images are received by other states.

While many other variables determine what influences decision-makers, in the context of the images approach, actors update their realities in distinctly different ways depending on how they interpret behavior by other states. Further, Jervis proposes the concept of "aspects of images" to explain why states may act in a certain way to give a particular impression. These aspects of images are expressions of goals that these states may pursue in their foreign policy. As examples Jervis suggests goodwill, prestige, or saving face, which are not foreign policy goals, but help in the pursuit of goals and to guide behavior.⁴¹ For my research, I modify this framework of images and perception developed by Robert Jervis.

⁴¹ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, 7-8.

1.3.2 *Modified Framework – Refracted Images:*




Fig. 1.1: Framework of Refracted Images

The model above explains the fundamental characteristics of my modifications to the framework offered by Robert Jervis. I posit that the relationship of images is not always a direct relationship between two states based on how the decision-makers in the two states interpret aspects of self-images expressed by the other state. Instead, the active mediation of third parties in the form of other states often allows analytical advantages. As Figure. 1.1 shows, I suggest that a state may derive its impressions about what is essential to another state through the second state's behavior and projection of self-image towards other states. In effect, decision-makers in state A are still motivated by their perceptions about state B, and may still deploy aspects of their self-image in response. However, in this case, they draw their interpretations not only from images that are deployed by state B in response to state A, but also from images that are refracted through other

actors – in this case, states C, D, and E. This approach has a number of methodological and analytical advantages, while making the best use of the fundamental characteristics of Jervis' images framework.

Interactions between states in the real world seldom take place in an entirely bilateral basis. In most occasions, there are other actors involved, whether or not they are explicitly recognized. The Cold war, by its very definition, played out through other actors such as Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba, so that the two primary actors, the United States, and the Soviet Union did not have to engage in direct confrontation. In the images approach, making space for actors beyond the primary two offers a methodological advantage. Jervis' formulation would be constrained by the necessity to choose evidence that is explicitly bilateral. However allowing other players in the framework of refracted images allows evidence that may not have been exclusively a part of the interaction between state A and state B to be considered. Such evidence is fit to be included as long as long as they are relevant to the analysis of the relationship between state A and state B. This potentially opens up additional material for consideration in a study, while also offering an added layer of complexity and nuance in the way actors in states interact with each other.

Jervis's framework is based on the assumption that the projection of images in a state is guided by the motivation to influence beliefs about them in other states while drawing inferences from their behavior. Quite naturally, this allows for deliberate deception as a possible motive in the deployment of images. For instance, in the image above, state B is aware that state A is interpreting its signals and indices and forming an impression about state B on the basis of the self-image it has projected. Naturally, this leads to the possibility of state B being deliberately

deceptive and modifying its behavior to circulate false perceptions about its priorities. However, when the relationship is conceptualized through a system of refracted images, additional disincentives to deceive may present themselves. Since state B's primary priority is dealing with state C, D or E, even while aware that state A is watching them, it is conceivable that their necessity to deal with state C, D or E may interfere with their objective of being deceptive, at least part of the time. Of course, this changes if state B's primary objective of interacting with state C, D, or E is to deceive state A.

In this dissertation, I analyze the role of images in the Sino-Indian relationship, specifically, aspects of India's self-image and how they are influenced by China. However, I examine the relationship with the help of the modified framework of refracted images. I posit that India's refracted image of itself vis-à-vis China is mediated through other actors in the region, usually smaller states. I explore aspects of images that have come to be crucial to India and are a result of postcolonial India's unique historical experiences, collective memory, and institutional cultures. The historical moments that I analyze include the role of Tibet from 1950—'51 and in 1959, the role of Sikkim from 1968—1975, and the role of Bhutan from 1968—1975 in refracting India's self-image vis-à-vis China. My analysis suggests that understanding how two relatively comparably sized powers interact with one another requires an understanding of how third smaller parties become involved. In the Indian context, this involvement reveals two essential points. First, that India's foreign policy choices are powerfully shaped by its self-image as well as a desire that other actors respect this self-image. Secondly, within India's immediate neighborhood, it is perceptions of China that fundamentally structure how India relates to smaller regional actors. A detailed account of these instances in Indian foreign policy decision-making,

and how refracted images fit in the analysis, follows later in the chapter in Section 1.4.2.

It is pertinent to note one last important point about the images approach. Jervis is modest in claiming the role of images in explaining state behavior, cautioning against considering this approach as the sole or the best way to approach the question of decision-making.⁴² Images, he cautions, constitute only one of the many influences on how states interpret the behavior of other states and make predictions about them. At times, images may be ignored, or a state may be able to do little to modify its image. In the same vein, I suggest that this study is aimed only at understanding how cognitive biases play a role in the policymakers making up their minds. There are, of course, many other variables that are at play at all times.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

In this section I address the issue of India's aspects of images, starting with listing and explaining the aspects of images that I address in my research, along with how I inductively derive them from books, articles, and letters in the pre-1947 period, and with the help of official documents in the MEA, and in letters and notes in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), as well as interviews conducted for this dissertation, for the post-1947 period. In the following part of the section, I explain the logic of case selection for this study and expand on the instances under investigation. In the last part of this section, I explain my research design and research methods.

⁴² Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, 11-17.

1.4.1 *Aspects of Images*

In expounding upon the role of aspects of images, Robert Jervis says that, “if state A can convince B of its good will, that is, of its friendly intentions towards B, B may be more willing to cooperate since it will not fear that A is trying to draw it into a trap.”⁴³ For India, while other dynamic and vibrant aspects of images influencing Indian self-image exist, I find the set of aspects below to have strongly made their appearance and to be the most relevant. I find them in my examination of elite discourse during the last two decades of the 19th century and the first four decades of the 20th century. These aspects of images reside in speeches, writings, and letters of influential personalities, as well as in actions taken by them. They are often connected with complex ideas comprising Indian nationalism, and appear in discussions and conversations involving over a dozen personalities including Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Govind Ballabh Pant. While Tagore or Gandhi have had a relatively minor imprint on postcolonial Indian politics, their perspectives on how India should approach its role in the world after freedom in 1947, or elements of Indian identity that should prominently reflect after independence, propagated through the discourse in various ways. Tagore, for instance, considered the question of India’s civilizational connections in Asia during a visit to China in 1924, extolling his hosts to “preach a message of love and, therewith overcoming all differences bridge the chasm of passions which has been widening for ages. Age after age, in Asia great dreamers have made the world sweet with showers of their love, Asia is again waiting for such dreamers to come and carry on the work, not of fighting, not of profit-making, but of establishing bonds of spiritual relationship.”⁴⁴ Similarly, in the preface to *The Discovery of*

⁴³ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, 7-8.

⁴⁴ Rabindranath Tagore, *Talks in China: Lectures Delivered in April and May, 1924* (Visva-Bharati, 1925), 60.

India, which engages with many of these questions, Nehru thanks his companions in prison, singling out Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Pant, Narendra Deva and M. Asaf Ali for their contribution to these considerations.⁴⁵ However, unlike Nehru, not all of them had to tackle these questions while in the spotlight of public political life. Nehru was involved in everyday politics and administration, which he used as vehicles to carry forward his philosophical beliefs. Kaviraj suggests that as the various ideas in Indian nationalism began to vie for dominance, Nehru started bringing them into the governing machinery by creating a base, “an alternative apparatus,” using the bureaucracy.⁴⁶ Once developed in the early years around independence, the aspects of self-image relevant to foreign policy continued to influence behavior in later years. As Shyam Saran, Indian Foreign Secretary in 2004—2006 argues, “the driving forces are the same. They have not changed. There is an instinctive understanding that you must manage your periphery. Without doing this, and aiming for a settled region, you will not be able to play a role, regionally.”⁴⁷

Civilizational conviction as an aspect of self-image: Arising out of the imagination of India as a more important actor in the world stage than what it came to be at independence, this aspect of self-image referred to an understanding of pre-colonial India when it was powerful, independent and influential. As Nehru wrote in 1946, “one has not only to go back in time but to travel, in mind if not in body, to various countries of Asia, where India spread out in many ways, leaving immortal testimony of her spirit, her power, and her love of beauty. How few of us know of

⁴⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (1946; repr., Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 9.

⁴⁶ Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India*, 25.

⁴⁷ Personal interview with Shyam Saran, Delhi, India, 26 July 2016.

these great achievements of our past, how few realize that if India was great in thought and philosophy, she was equally great in action.”⁴⁸ This manifested in two ways – first, in believing in and acting with the understanding that India has its own sphere of influence. This sphere is both geographical and cultural, and reached back to India’s relationships with actors in the region and around the world for hundreds of years. In 1927, for instance, as a co-organizer of the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels, Nehru helped draft a joint declaration that championed the millennia-old connections between India and China. “We must now resume the ancient personal, cultural and political relations between the two peoples,” it advocated.⁴⁹ The conviction also manifested itself in the understanding that India was not only an influential but also a powerful actor in the region. This was based on the belief that India had been a regional actor with a past of glory and power, which it will regain once again, because it deserves to. By extension, this image as projected imagined India to be civilizationally influential in its neighborhood and beyond. Reclaiming this position by indicating the existence of civilizational ties with other actors in the region has been a primary objective of Indian foreign policy. As one of Nehru’s top diplomats, G.S. Bajpai, explained, India “will do her utmost to maintain and strengthen her friendship with the countries of the Commonwealth, the United States of America, and other nations of Europe, Eastern as well as Western, or, as in Latin America, of European origin. But, with goodwill towards all and malice towards none, solicitude for Asia and friendship for her immediate neighbours must remain the keystone of her policy.”⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 200.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 1 (1889-1947) (Harvard University Press, 1976), 100-102.

⁵⁰ Girija Shankar Bajpai, “India and the Balance of Power,” *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* 1 (1952).

Territorial anxiety as an aspect of self-image: The most immediate, and perhaps the most potent motivation that has guided territorial anxiety as an aspect of self-image in India was its experience with Partition, the most traumatic event for independent India. This loss of territory resulted in the articulation of territorial anxiety as a refusal to recognize further contesting claims on India's territory, with the implicit articulation that all the territory that India laid claim to, rightfully belonged to it. In some ways, this idea of territoriality was also dictated by the experiences during British India. Several members of the civil service in British India joined independent India's government. They included independent India's first Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) G.S. Bajpai, and its first Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon. All of them had worked with, and were influenced by Olaf Caroe, the foreign secretary to the Government of India during the Second World War. In examining Caroe's legacy, Peter Brobst refers to his recognition of the Indian "subcontinent's geospatial centrality."⁵¹ Caroe was also cognizant of a resurgent China expanding in its surrounding areas. Further, he suggested that keeping Indian territory safe would involve building enduring relationships with states to India's north and north-east and maintaining the dominant influence on them.⁵² While Caroe's formulation of buffer states was rejected for its colonial and imperialist flavor, his ideas about the need to safeguard Indian territory left a lasting imprint on these officials, as reflected in their articulations of Indian self-image. According to Steven Hoffman, a scholar of Sino-Indian relations, there were additional facades to India's expression of territoriality. According to him,

⁵¹ Peter John Brobst, *The Future of The Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India's Independence, and the Defense of Asia* (Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 2005), xx.

⁵² *Ibid*, 66-69.

Indian ideas about territoriality connected with an Indian idea of nationalism, which believed that India's territory and boundaries were handed down to India with time, and were, therefore, unassailable.⁵³ A similar formulation was offered by K.M. Panikkar who believed that the Himalayas as the boundary of Indian territory was extremely significant to the evolution of Indian history, as "it has cut India off from its continental affiliations. To the Hindus the World ended with the Himalayas. What lay beyond was the region of unexplored mystery. The great Empire of China was cut off from her for all practical purposes. The repercussions of events on the other side of Tibet did not penetrate into India."⁵⁴ This, once again, led to the articulation that India's borders were non-negotiable in India's projection of self-image.

Prioritizing development as an aspect of self-image: As an aspect of self-image, the focus on development as a component of foreign policy inherited elements from the British, which melded with India's own aspirations as potential power. The internal role of development for India was aspirational and necessary, guided by the understanding India was yet to develop in many social, political, and economic aspects. As a result, it was presented as a significant theme by all leaders, such as in Nehru famously describing India's dams as "temples of modern India," or Indira Gandhi coining "Garibi Hatao" (eradicate poverty) as the major platform of her election campaign in 1971. Before independence, in 1946, this motivated Nehru to send his envoy V.K. Krishna Menon to the Soviet Union to seek development assistance as well as help with procuring food grains. The counterpart of this domestic necessity to develop was the quest for

⁵³ Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*, International Crisis Behavior Series ; v. 6 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 25.

⁵⁴ K. M. Panikkar, "The Himalayas and Indian Defence," *India Quarterly* III, no. 3 (September 1947): 233–8.

helping development in other states, both in the form of trade as well as aid. This was guided by the understanding that India's own development could only take place in a neighborhood that was developed and peaceful. The Asian Relations Conference in March April 1947 that Nehru spearheaded, kept out contentious issues such as defense and security to maximize participation of world leaders from different camps. Instead, common challenges of economic development that the new postcolonial states faced emerged as a primary focal point of the conference. The Asian Relations Organization that emerged from the conference did not develop as an effective association for various reasons. However, it is possible to trace the influence of the initiative in the eventual Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. Not only was it India's responsibility as the bigger actor in the region with more resources to help others develop, India was also eager to export its own experiences and expertise with developmental activities in the form of direct assistance, technical know-how, grants and loans, or, even trade, which required and enabled a peaceful neighborhood. Soon after independence, for example, the Indian Mission in Lhasa advocated that India consider providing technical know-how to Tibet to increase land under cultivation, arguing that such a move would lead to social improvement and the stability of the Tibetan Government.⁵⁵ This aspect of India's self-image also connected to its expectations that India's attention to the development of and skill building in smaller states, would assure these states of India's intentions and have them lean towards India. In his visit to Bhutan in 1958, Nehru offered assistance in developing education and health facilities as well as infrastructure. In his note to the MEA, Nehru suggested that "it is of the highest importance from the political and economic points of view for us to link up India with Bhutan by a proper road or roads. This will

⁵⁵ Report from H.E. Richardson, Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer, Sikkim, 30 March 1950, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II.

be a more effective link between Bhutan and India than all the treaties and settlements that we might make.”⁵⁶ The strong influence of this aspect of self-image reached beyond the immediate region, discernible in the importance that India attached and the role it played in multilateral initiatives from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to the United Nations (U.N.).

1.4.2 *Case Study*

There are several instances that showcase India’s foreign policy decision-making process in action. However, there are fewer situations that exhibit an abrupt reversal or apparent deviation from the established policy as pursued for many years. A closer look at these instances brings out one common element – the presence of what is often colloquially referred to as “the China factor.” This is also where my puzzle is situated. These moments that reflect puzzling instances of foreign policy, characterized by what may well be considered inconsistencies, are situated at various points in time in independent India’s history, and involve different actors in the region. However, as the accounts below show, China features prominently in all of them.

The long shadow of Partition and the outsized role that Pakistan has played in the Indian psyche, both administrative and popular, has guided the majority of the studies investigating foreign policy processes in India. The ease of availability of primary and secondary source material on Pakistan has evoked many appealing research questions. However, this attention on Pakistan has often come at the cost of adequate focus on India’s other neighbors, both smaller South Asian states such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal as well as bigger neighbors such as China. While

⁵⁶ Note to Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt, 26 September 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* (hereafter SWJN), ed. Madhavan K. Palat, Series II, Vol. 44, p 311-322.

only recently have some studies started examining the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship, there is still a dearth of scholarship on the influence of India and China in South Asia, something that I hope to address in my study. The episodes below not only engage with the Sino-Indian relationship, but also interrogate how it has influenced Indian policy towards others in the region.

India's Tibet policy 1949—1959: The first instance is an intertemporal comparison focused on Tibet. In this chapter, I ask why India did not act during the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, but ignored Chinese concerns in allowing political asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959. In a diachronic analysis, I examine India's Tibet policy, starting with the country's initial restrained response to the annexation of Tibet in 1950—'51 and culminating in the decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959. This case is significant as it demonstrates a critical change in India's approach to Tibet in the decade after independence. From taking a muted stand in 1949—'50 as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) took control of Tibet, India offered political asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959, a decision that continues to cast its shadow on the Sino-Indian relationship. In my study, I highlight the change in India's ideas about China's regard for its self-image between 1950 and 1959. While other important issues, such as the issue of PRC's membership in the U.N., and the Korean War crowded India's list of foreign policy engagements, I find that the decision on Tibet is determined relatively independently of these developments. I base my argument on India's self-image vis-à-vis China, which plays a vital role through the entirety of the period in consideration. I hypothesize that Indian decision-makers interpreted a change in Chinese motivations regarding Tibet and the Dalai Lama between 1950 and 1959. These changed priorities clashed with the images that India projected as important, leading to a decision to separate India's Tibet policy from its policy towards the Dalai Lama. By 1959, while aspects of

India's self-image remained the same, its interpretation of China's approach as refracted through Tibet had changed, which manifested in the decision in 1959. The analysis of this case draws from primary as well as secondary declassified archival material, personal accounts of foreign policy practitioners, and secondary analysis.

Indian policy towards Bhutan 1968—1975: The second instance from the case is the first part of a synchronic study involving Bhutan and Sikkim. Here, I ask, why did India encourage Bhutan's aspirations for greater autonomy, eventually supporting an application for membership of the U.N. in 1971, but refused to allow similar autonomy to Sikkim, eventually merging it in 1975. I use a comparative research design to analyze India's diverging policies towards Sikkim and Bhutan in the 1960s and 1970s. Independent India inherited the special status in the relations of the two mountain kingdoms through treaties, in 1949 for Bhutan and 1950 for Sikkim. After 1950, the two kingdoms assumed significance due to their geographic position between India and the PRC. Despite a similar starting point, Indian policy towards these two small states sharply diverged, especially concerning India's attitude towards the ambitions for autonomy by the two. By sponsoring Bhutan's membership of the U.N. in 1971, India effectively assisted Bhutan's efforts to establish itself as a member of the international community. I argue that India's Bhutan policies were a result of their acknowledgment of civilizational connections and recognizing India's territorial anxiety, while welcoming Indian development activities. I establish the role of Bhutan's efforts to recognize Indian concerns, by exploring the difference in India's stand between the two states by examining official archival documents, parliamentary deliberations, private papers, and interviews with key players in administrations at the time.

Indian policy towards Sikkim 1968—1975: In the following part of the paired comparison, I examine India's relationship with Sikkim during the same period. While both Sikkim and Bhutan were cognizant of India's self-image, unlike Bhutan, Sikkim deflected India's efforts to this effect. Sikkim's response prompted India to suspect the influence of external powers such as China, raising territorial questions. Sikkim's eagerness to indicate civilizational ties with China, as well as a denial of India's role in its development, added to India's apprehensions. I hypothesize that the dissonance in Indian policy is attributable to the difference in response to Indian priorities. The Indian government in both instances was formed by the same political party, with the same prime minister in charge, with a minimal overall change in stated foreign policy. The diverging policies connect to the variance in their behavior, and to the fact that India was focused on its own image, vis-à-vis China in its approach to these actors. The similarity of the two instances makes this case ideal for a paired comparison. I explore the difference in India's stand between the two states through an examination of official archival documents, parliamentary deliberations, private papers, and interviews with key players in administrations at the time.

It is important to address the reason for not involving Nepal as part of this study. Geographically, Nepal forms part of the contiguous landmass bordering India in the north. As in the case of Sikkim and Bhutan, India's relationship with Nepal was also inherited from and reflected ties with the British and was guided by a treaty signed after India's independence. However, this is where the similarities end. Nepal's political heft came from its larger geography, greater population, and bigger economy, which allowed it to shape a less dependent relationship with the British. Subsequently, the contours of this relationship transferred to India, where issues such as sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity were emphasized. This was a marked

difference from Bhutan, who agreed to be “guided” in their external relations by India and from Sikkim, which, as a “protectorate” was treaty-bound to leave defense, communications and external relations to India.⁵⁷

1.4.3 *Research Design and Methods*

The challenge of determining the intent of decision-makers as well as establishing a connection between stated objectives and future behavior is inherent in the study of foreign policy. The black box of decision-making becomes more opaque when declassification policies are arbitrary, as in India. However, in the course of my search for relevant material, I discovered that while disorganized, sufficient archival material exists to build a narrative that is accessible, both for the pre-independence as well as post-independence periods. The national project of building awareness about the independence movement has resulted in the declassification and publication of a sufficient number of primary and secondary source documents from the pre-1947 years. Accessing documents from the post-1947 period is relatively complicated due to poor organization and lack of digitization and requires a significant investment of time and other resources.

I source my data through archival research and detailed personal interviews, and use thematic analysis and process-tracing to identify priorities and aspects of projected self-image that have guided foreign policy decision-making. Accessed documents include declassified memos and letters exchanged within the PMO and the MEA, white papers, and parliament records.

Communication between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan, as well as the

⁵⁷ Complete text of 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship in Appendix A.

erstwhile Government of Sikkim, offer invaluable contextual insights. In instances where archival material is incomplete or hard to come by, detailed interviews with key personnel help in triangulation. Interviews with diplomats, present or former members of the executive and legislature, and politicians allow me to trace the process by which events unfold and to establish a causal chain.

I conducted my research over 15 months in various parts of India and Bhutan. The National Archives of India (NAI) and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), both in Delhi are the primary archives for my study. The former is a storehouse of policy documents, including reports, policy suggestions, and memos that trace the progress of thinking in the government about critical events. I discovered regular reports pertaining to India's policy towards China and Tibet in 1950s, Sikkim and Bhutan policy in 1960s and 1970s, as well as minutes of meetings about India's foreign policy within the government and with foreign officials. Many of these have only been declassified recently, and as such, have not featured even in more recent studies.

NMML contains the most extensive collection of private papers in India from public intellectuals, senior bureaucrats, and elected officials that help in following the discourse as it developed at the highest levels of decision-making elites. These include unpublished memoirs, speeches, letters and diaries and demo-official files from personalities including M.O. Mathai, personal secretary to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, foreign secretaries during the period such as K.P.S. Menon, Subimal Dutt, and T.N. Kaul, and diplomats in charge of India's relations with Sikkim before its inclusion in India, such as Apa Pant, and Nari Rustamji, among others. The other collection that has substantially contributed to my study comprises files from

the PMO during Nehru's tenure, and were opened to researchers for the first time in 2017. Unlike the multi-volume Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru which offer only Nehru's perspective on issues, these provide documents written by others, chronologically arranged, as they arrived on Nehru's desk, along with his response. This provides a far more nuanced and complete interpretation of developments during the crucial years of the making of post-independence India. Additional digitized documents from the British National Archives have helped in triangulation to corroborate accounts as recorded by the Indian government.

For my interviews, I started by contacting former bureaucrats who were in decision-making positions during the periods spanning the period under research. Examining India's policies towards Sikkim and Bhutan as well as Tibet benefited from conversations with those who were involved in these episodes. The "snowball" method of identifying interviewees was crucial in this process as there exist few first-person accounts by those who have spent long years in the Indian government, and the tight-knit foreign policy community is selective about with whom they share information. Interviews with those playing key roles during these periods such as Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's brother, and key interlocutor for him in the 1950s; former Foreign Secretary and Political Officer in Sikkim K.S. Bajpai; and India's first Ambassador to Bhutan, and Chief Executive in Sikkim Brajbir Saran Das, provided me with rich details of critical events and insight into essential considerations during decision-making. Contrasting perspectives from interviews of former Bhutanese officials provided interesting perspectives about Indian priorities and how others perceived them.

For my analysis, I have found event process tracing and thematic coding to be particularly valuable in determining causal pathways. Process-tracing operates by building the causal process to connect independent and dependent variables by fragments of multiple types of evidence. It establishes the sequence in which they appear and the role assigned to them based on their position in the causal chain. For my research, evidentiary data in the form of developments as events unfold, also called causal process observations, aid in establishing the chronological and causal process.⁵⁸ With an order of events and causality established, simultaneous analysis of the data help draw out the relation between aspects of self-image and their influence on policy. Investigating speeches, policy documents, legislative records, and interviews aid in understanding the relative importance accorded by decision-making agents to various ideas and inputs prior to a resolution amounting to policy.

The analysis of India's contrasting approaches towards Sikkim and Bhutan offered an opportunity for a paired comparison as part of a most-similar case research design. Along with being geographically proximate, they fulfilled other requirements for such a comparison, such as a common historical and cultural background, similarities in administrative systems including special relationships with British, and later, independent India. In my paired comparison to understand why Indian policies towards Sikkim and Bhutan differed, the design, which Tarrow claimed can help in directing attention to how the two occurrences differ, seemed ideal.⁵⁹ While such a design may not help completely identify all confounding variables, it allowed dual-

⁵⁸ Henry E. Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

⁵⁹ Sidney Tarrow, "The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 2 (February 1, 2010): 234.

process tracing, which, significantly increased the inferential power of the design over the single-case study.⁶⁰

While process tracing can be useful for both theory testing and theory building, an inductive approach, as Beach and Pederson have pointed out, is particularly useful when using the method for theory building.⁶¹ Considering that in this project I start by saying that postcolonial societies need to be studied with the understanding that the state and the certain institutions evolved differently in than in the case of the West, an inductive approach was appropriate. It allowed the exploration of new outlooks about what might have guided a state to behave in a particular way. This also corresponded to the enterprise of postcolonial international relations, especially in building explanatory power by looking beyond a purely positivist approach to IR. Blagden has argued for the use of inductive and deductive methods in tandem, and pointed out that IR scholarship has often pushed for the deductive approach at the cost of inductive research even when there is a case to be made for the latter.⁶² In this instance as well, while a deductive approach could help identify the pattern to predict policy reversals, it is equally important to investigate these instances to understand what guides such behavior. As Bennett and Elman have indicated, understanding the actual mechanisms of how these actors operated need to traced by historical, inductive analysis.⁶³

⁶⁰ Tarrow, "The Strategy of Paired Comparison," 245.

⁶¹ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, "What Is Process-Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process Tracing Methods and Their Uses and Limitations," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2011), 16-17, <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1902082>.

⁶² David Blagden, "Induction and Deduction in International Relations: Squaring the Circle Between Theory and Evidence," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 200, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw004>.

⁶³ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (February 1, 2007): 185–86, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006296346>.

I have analyzed 3000 pages of documents and conducted around 50 interviews, which disclosed a common perspective shared by the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy. This reality was informed by a deep awareness of the context within which these personalities operated, irrespective of chief executives, and periods of governance. This shared understanding of the direction that policy should take did not seem guided merely by strategic exigencies, which often varied. It, in fact, hinted at the existence of a more immutable socially constructed reality that informed decision-makers about India's position in the international order. As I have examined this shared ideational core behind recurring interests in a state in this study, I have also aimed to bring theoretical grounding to the study of images and foreign policy within the larger universe of postcolonial states.

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

I organize the dissertation in the following way. In the next three chapters I detail the historical events analyzed in this. In chapter 2, I detail India's approach to Tibet during the Chinese invasion in 1950. I establish how the decision to not act followed a consideration that Indian priorities were not under threat. I compare this with the turn in Indian policy from 1957 to March 1959, when the Dalai Lama arrives in India from Lhasa.

In chapter 3, I explore India's relationships with Bhutan as the first part of a paired comparison. I focus on how the same priorities conveyed through images by India evoked different responses in the two kingdoms, and how that influenced subsequent Indian policies. I establish how Bhutan

and Sikkim's reactions to Indian priorities consistently diverged from the mid-1960s. I continue the comparison in chapter 4, to trace the path to Sikkim's absorption in 1975, and highlight India's contrasting approaches towards Bhutan and Sikkim.

In the concluding chapter, I summarize the findings, examine the modified framework of refracted images, and examine the implications and the avenues that it opens for further research. By extension, I look at what the framework means for theorizing foreign policy, not just in India, but also to aid building a theory of images and foreign policy in postcolonial states.

Chapter 2. TIBET 1950—1959

2.1 INTRODUCTION

“We cannot save Tibet, as we would have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.”

Jawaharlal Nehru – “Policy regarding China and Tibet”

18 November 1950.⁶⁴

“Prime Minister is quite clear in his mind that if the DALAI LAMA seeks protection in Indian territory we should give him asylum. You should not, repeat not, however, reveal this to anybody at this stage.”

Cable from Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt to

Political Office Sikkim and Lhasa Mission, 15 March 1959.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Policy regarding China and Tibet, 18 November 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru, *SWJN*, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal, Series II, Vol. 15-II, p 346.

⁶⁵ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi, to Political Sikkim, repeated to Cogendia, Lhasa, 15 March 1959, *JNSG*, Vol-677-I, NMML.

In this chapter, I assess the change in India's approach to Tibet between 1950 and 1959, arguably, the two most significant dates in the history of modern Tibet. In October 1950, the PLA began its campaign for "peaceful liberation" of Tibet from Chamdo in East Tibet. The development was widely discussed in India, not just in the foreign policy bureaucracy, but even in parliament. While Nehru and his aides, the top foreign policy decision-makers in the country were concerned about the developments in Tibet, they determined that it would be counterproductive for India to involve itself directly. Therefore, Indian action was limited to questioning and protesting Chinese action, without any direct intervention.

Developments took a different turn in 1959. Anti-Chinese protests led to widespread unrest in the Tibetan capital, and in March, the Dalai Lama was invited to the local military headquarters, ostensibly for a cultural event. Days before he was scheduled to appear there, he left Lhasa with a small entourage, traveling east, towards India. As his aides informed the local Indian mission that he had left the capital, they also sounded out the possibility of him being allowed into India. In response, the MEA repeated a decision that had already been conveyed earlier – if the Dalai Lama chose to come to India, he would be received with the appropriate courtesy. India lived up to its word two weeks later, when the Dalai Lama along with eight other people arrived in India at Chuthangmu, in present-day Arunachal Pradesh, and was received by Indian officials.

This incident marked a distinct shift in Indian policy over earlier years. Even as late as 1957, during his meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in India, the Dalai Lama had requested that he be allowed to stay on in India. While Nehru was not blind to the situation in Tibet under Communist rule, he believed that the best way forward required the Dalai Lama stay on in Lhasa. What

transpired in a matter of merely two years that convinced Indian decision-makers to reverse their stand on Tibet held over the years? In this chapter, I approach the question from the perspective of the refracted images framework. I argue that it is necessary to address the issue from the perspective of India's self-image vis-à-vis China as refracted through Tibet. Following the framework proposed in chapter 1, I aim to connect India's foreign policy decision-making to responses to its self-image. In this case, India's foreign policy behavior is guided by how the PRC reacts to aspects of self-image projected by India to convey what it considers important in its relationship with Tibet. The aspects important to India, in this case, involve India's civilizational conviction regarding its relationship with Tibet, the question of threat to territoriality that changed between 1950 and 1959, and the aspect of development as a vital component of foreign policy. Using a diachronic approach, I analyze primary and secondary source material pertaining to Tibet from two periods – the first from 1950—'51, and the second from 1957—'59. I use thematic coding and process tracing to analyze interviews and archival documents to chart the direction taken by policy, and investigate the role of self-image behind foreign policy determinations and subsequently, behavior.

I argue that in the period under consideration, India's decision-makers considered Tibet policy to be distinct from their policy towards the Dalai Lama. Till 1957, Tibet policy was accorded the position of primacy among the two. As part of this, despite the Chinese invasion of Tibet and its subsequent impact on Tibetan autonomy and identity, Nehru and other Indian decision-makers found that a status quo policy of no direct involvement was optimal. Under changed circumstances after 1957 leading up to the Dalai Lama's escape from Lhasa in March 1959, the policy towards him became significantly more urgent than Tibet policy. Seen through the lens of

policy towards the Dalai Lama, India believed that aspects of its self-image vis-à-vis China was under sufficient threat to require action.

This chapter is structured in the following way. In the next section, I explore the status of the India-Tibet relationship in the early years after Indian independence. Subsequently, I analyze the developments of 1950—'51, and how these affected India's self-image. I begin at the run-up to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, consider the Seventeen Point Agreement signed between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the government of China, and end this section with an account of plans for the Dalai Lama's escape, and how India involved itself in the process. The following section starts with the circumstances of the Dalai Lama's departure for India in 1959. To understand the Indian approach to the events of this period, I thereafter focus on events of previous years starting from 1954, and examine how they influenced India's self-image and helped prioritize the policy towards the Dalai Lama over the Tibet policy. In the concluding section, I briefly revisit the developments and what they indicate about India's self-image as refracted through Tibet in this inter-temporal analysis.

2.2 PROLOGUE – AUTONOMY AND SUZERAINTY

The 1940s were significant in the changes they brought, both for Western states as well as postcolonial states across the world. In South Asia, this manifested primarily in Indian independence and the establishment of the dominions of India and Pakistan. Alongside significant domestic policies, major foreign policy questions occupied the leaders of the newly established Indian state. As Nehru's biographer Sarvepalli Gopal writes, the challenge for India was that "with much economic and diplomatic potential but little actual power it was difficult to

make any impact without at the same time arousing resentment in a world already riven by the cold war.”⁶⁶ Navigating issues such as that of establishing relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, and the nature of the continuing association with Britain, therefore, took precedence as India prepared to engage with the rest of the world as an independent state.

In these circumstances, it was a while before India’s relations in the neighborhood came into focus. For example, it was less than a month before independence that Tibet was informed that the government of independent India would succeed the British government in relations with Tibet, including all treaty provisions. In a note, the outgoing government informed the Tibetan government that “after August 15th the close and cordial relations which have existed for so many years with themselves and the Government of India will continue with the successor Indian Government upon whom alone the rights and obligations arising from the existing treaty provisions will thereafter devolve.”⁶⁷ For India, this meant accepting Tibet as an autonomous region that operated under Chinese suzerainty. In the absence of an adequate number of qualified officials to take over, British representatives such as Arthur Hopkinson and Hugh Richardson were asked to continue as Political Officer for Sikkim and as in-charge of the Lhasa Mission for a few months, till the Indian government could make alternative arrangements.

Designating the incoming government of India as the sole successor served the purposes of continuing trade relations between Tibet and British India. Keeping the arrangement allowed

⁶⁶ Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 2 (1947-1956) (Harvard University Press, 1980) p 43.

⁶⁷ Letter from EA. & C.R. Department, New Delhi to Political Officer, Sikkim, 23 July 1947, NAI File no. 12(4)NEF/47 (Secret).

independent India to establish itself as a legitimate political entity, as well as ensure that trading posts in Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung on the Tibetan side, and the British (now Indian) Mission in Lhasa continued to stand as symbols of exceptional relations between India and Tibet. This move was significant from the perspective of Tibetan autonomy as well, as it would de facto endorse Tibet's right to maintain independent relations with sovereign entities. A note from the outgoing government to Nehru, at the time in charge of External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations in India's interim cabinet, advised that "the transition from a British to an Indian Mission is intended to take place unobtrusively and without publicity in order to avoid the risk of any constitutional issue being raised by China."⁶⁸

That was, however, not to be. While British India and then, independent India saw no contradiction in accepting Tibet's status as an autonomous region, this arrangement was not acceptable to either the nationalists or the communists. In October 1947, Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government in China reached out to the Indian ambassador, and one of its most experienced diplomats K.P.S. Menon, suggesting that with the departure of the British, terms drafted by them to guide Indo-Tibet trade also be retired. While admitting that India considered Tibet an autonomous territory under Chinese rule, Menon refused to rewrite terms that had been in place for years. In an implicit reference to India's civilizational connections with Tibet, Menon clarified that it was unlikely that India would agree to talk to China on the status of Tibet without representatives of Tibet in the room. "To do so," said the then Indian ambassador, "would be to repudiate the autonomy of Tibet which the government of India had recognized for

⁶⁸ Letter from Secretary of State for India, London to Governor General (External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department), New Delhi, 24 June 1947, NAI, File no. 12(4)NEF/47 (Secret).

the last 33 years.” At the same time, he promised that “the government of India would not in any way obstruct or hamper...any arrangements which China and Tibet might wish to come to directly.”⁶⁹ Menon reiterated his point more forcefully in a letter to Delhi a month later, explaining that “any mention of Tibet in a Sino-Indian Commercial Treaty is apt to be regarded by China and resented by Tibet, as an indication that we are resiling [sic] from our policy of recognising, and supporting, the autonomy of Tibet which she has, in fact, enjoyed for nearly forty years.”⁷⁰

India was still making up its mind about policy towards Tibet vis-à-vis policy towards China, and where the Dalai Lama would feature. There was little to indicate in 1947 the various choices that India would have to make in the coming years. However, the importance of Tibet to India did not escape Indian strategists. Historian and diplomat K.M. Panikkar who succeeded Menon in China, wrote in 1947 about Tibet’s crucial role in safeguarding Indian territory in the north, as the Himalaya’s merely provided a barrier; Tibet provided depth to this frontier, thereby making Indian territory inaccessible.⁷¹ Further, in a note that he sent from his vantage point in Nanjing in June 1948, Panikkar opined that India needed to focus on the McMahon Line, as it was likely that if China hardened its control over Tibet, a rejection of the McMahon Line and renewal of claims on the territory of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim were sure to follow.⁷² From the perspective

⁶⁹ Letter from Embassy of India, to The Hon’ble member for the External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Nanking, 21 October 1947, NAI, File no. 12(4)NEF/47 (Secret).

⁷⁰ Letter from Embassy of India in China, to The Hon’ble member for the External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Nanking, 6 December 1947, NAI, File no. 12(4)NEF/47 (Secret).

⁷¹ K. M. Panikkar, “The Himalayas and Indian Defence,” *India Quarterly* III, no. 3 (September 1947): 233–8002E

⁷² Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010) 230-233.

of territoriality, as well as India's sphere of influence, this was an unacceptable possibility. As the Chinese nationalist government repeated the requests it made to Menon regarding Indo-Tibet trade, Panikkar told Delhi of the attempts to widen the scope of the conversation by including the issue of delineation of the border. He saw in this "an attempt to bring to a head the entire question of India's relations with Tibet and pose as a champion of Tibet's claims and thus perhaps get her sovereignty accepted by the Tibetans."⁷³

As early as November 1948 Panikkar was confident that the communists would come to power in China. In a note titled "When China goes Communist," he suggested that India start considering "how the interests of India will be affected and to examine whether any reorientation of our policy will be necessary to meet the changed situation."⁷⁴ Soon after, his view gathered momentum, as Nehru and others in charge of decision-making began discussing the probable course of action. By June-July 1949, Nehru was convinced that for Chiang Kai-shek "there is not a ghost of a chance of succeeding now."⁷⁵ He instructed Menon, who was now foreign secretary, to keep a close eye on China's approach to Tibet, as India would need to modify its policies and act in case anything happened.

Even in an environment of changing geopolitical realities, India's objective of maintaining its relationship with Tibet as well as its presence in Tibetan territory rose out of a sense of civilizational connections, territorial considerations, as well as the policy of continuing

⁷³ Letter from Embassy of India in China to K.P.S. Menon, 20 October 1948, NAI, File no. 7/2/NEF/48 (Secret).

⁷⁴ Claude Arpi, *Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation: India Tibet Relations (1947-1962): Part 1* (Vij Books India, 2017) 43-44.

⁷⁵ Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaylakshmi Pandit, 1 July 1949, SWJN, Series II, Vol. 12, 408.

assistance to Tibet through trade and other means. As Foreign Secretary Menon explained in a note, India's right to trade with Tibet and station trade agents in Gartok, Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet rose out of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1893, which far superseded any treaty that either the nationalist or communist governments of China objected to.⁷⁶ In his compendium of MEA documents concerning India and China, former diplomat A.S. Bhasin lists discussions about Tibet policy within the foreign policy bureaucracy at the time. India's Lhasa representative Richardson, and foreign secretary Menon wanted to ensure that the Indian Mission in Lhasa was not disrupted while finding ways to "give our moral support to Tibet."⁷⁷ While they also advocated the need for strengthening India's northern frontiers, Nehru believed there was no immediate territorial threat and that there was "practically no chance of any military danger to India arising from any possible change in Tibet. Geographically, this is very difficult and practically it would be a foolish adventure."⁷⁸

As the next few years would establish, while India's Tibet policy would not jeopardize India's territorial integrity, the decision to distinguish between the policy towards Tibet from the policy towards the Dalai Lama would in time be a leading cause of the breakdown of Sino-Indian relations. Nehru perhaps had an inkling, though not a concrete idea of what was to come. Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Weeks before, in a letter to his Finance Minister John Matthai, Nehru admitted that "recent developments in China and Tibet indicate that Chinese Communists are likely to invade Tibet

⁷⁶ Note on Relations with Tibet by K.P.S. Menon, 22 August 1950, JNSG, Vol- 62-I, NMML.

⁷⁷ Avtar Singh Bhasin, *India-China Relations, 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, vol. 1 (Geetika Publishers, 2018) 114.

⁷⁸ Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to G.S. Bajpai, 9 July 1949, SWJN, Series II, vol. 12, 410-411.

sometime or other. This will not come very soon. However, it may well take place within a year...The result of all this is that we may have the Chinese or Tibetan Communists right up on our Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim border.”⁷⁹

The comment is interesting as it divulges an understanding of the neighborhood both as India’s sphere of influence as well as the key to its territorial security. Notwithstanding his premonitions, Nehru would welcome the new regime in Beijing in December 1949 and express his desire to establish diplomatic relations. India’s tightrope walk in the following months would involve reconciling with the strategy of acknowledging Chinese suzerainty over Tibet while also operating with the assumption of Tibetan autonomy. In a November 1949 note, Panikkar touched on the question at the core of this challenging policy – “the Chinese position which successive Government [sic] have consistently maintained is that Tibet enjoys autonomy as an internal relationship with China. If China decides to make her suzerainty effective, do we have any right or claim to intervene, so long as our treaty interests are safeguarded?”⁸⁰

2.3 INDIA’S CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO TIBET: 1950-’51

The Battle of Chamdo in October 1950 marked the beginning of the last assault on Tibet. It led eventually to the Seventeen Point Agreement signed between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Central People’s Government of the PRC in May 1951, thereby cementing Chinese control over Tibet. A cable sent by the MEA to the Indian Mission in Lhasa weeks after the battle began, indicated how India policies towards Tibet and the Dalai Lama were already

⁷⁹ Bhasin, *India-China Relations, 1947-2000*, 144.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 165.

separate. On the one hand, it explained that “owing to (India’s) recognition of China’s suzerainty over Tibet, it would be inadvisable for us to sponsor Tibet’s appeal to the U.N. We see no objection, however, to appeal being addressed direct by Tibetan Government by Secretary General, U.N. for presentation to Security Council.” The cable also in clear, unequivocal terms, instructed the Indian Mission to inform the Tibetan government that “should the Dalai Lama decide to come to India, he and any officials that may be accompanying him, will, of course, be allowed to stay in India and receive such protection and assistance as the Government of India can provide.”⁸¹

No one in the Indian establishment missed the significance of deciding to allow the Dalai Lama asylum even while not intervening in China’s campaign to “peacefully liberate” Tibet. As I establish in this section, as the inevitability of a Chinese assault on Tibet became clear, Indian decision-makers who were so far conflicted between their civilizational connections to both China and Tibet, decide on an approach that they believe was the only available course of action. They decided to desist from any interference with the Chinese campaign in Tibet. At the same time, they chose to honor the indisputable role of the Dalai Lama in India’s civilizational connection to Tibet. Their decision was aided by the accurate assumption that Indian territory is not under threat during China’s push into Tibet in 1950—’51. Concerns about continuing trade and development relations with Tibet did come up in discussions about the issue at this time. However Indian officials such as Ambassador K.M. Panikkar and MEA Secretary General G.S. Bajpai interpreted assurances of preserving Tibetan identity during their conversations with

⁸¹ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi, to Indian Mission, Lhasa, 29 October 1950, JNSG, Vol- 61-II, NMML.

Chinese officials as confirmation that the relationship will not undergo any severe change – an assumption that is proved erroneous in later years.

Much like India, Tibet had also been closely following the developments in the battle between the communists and the nationalists from the early 1940s. Once they understood that Chiang Kai-shek's army would be unable to hold on to power, Tibet immediately sent back Chinese nationals in Lhasa, including those in the Chinese mission. Indian representatives in Tibet believed that this was guided by the belief that the Chinese representatives could transfer their allegiance to the new regime; more importantly, the Tibetan government saw this as an opportunity of “openly asserting its independent status, before a new Chinese regime got a chance of claiming sovereignty over Tibet after the disappearance of the KMT Government.”⁸²

There was also a change in the Tibetan government's approach to the newly independent Indian government from 1947-'48 to 1949. In response to messages asking that the trade regulations in place between British India and Tibet be continued, Tibetan officials indicated that their priority was “return of indisputable Tibetan territory which are on the frontier between Tibet and India and which were gradually included into India in the past...if Tibetan territories are returned to Tibetan Government it will be of great help in restoring confidence of Tibetan people.”⁸³ This suddenly changed when Mao Zedong established his control over China. In November 1949 the Political Office in Sikkim reported that Tibetan priorities had changed, and they were now

⁸² Annual and bi-annual reports from Tibet for 1949, 2 February 1950, NAI, File no. 3/17/R&I/50.

⁸³ Letter from Lhasa Mission to Political Sikkim and Foreign New Delhi, 24 March 1948, NAI, File no. 7/2/NEF/48 (Secret).

“anxious to negotiate a new treaty with India. They seemed to have NO (repeat NO) clear idea as to respects in which existing treaty required amendment but suggested conclusion of new treaty would disprove Communist allegations that India was trying to establish control over Tibet.”⁸⁴

A new treaty was not the only expectation. Suddenly waking up to the likely changes that a communist regime in China could mean for them, the Tibetan government bundled their request for a treaty with demands for “supply of arms and ammunition as well as for Indian instructors for military advice and training of Tibetan soldiers in the use of new weapons, like mortars. They also asked whether India would be prepared to sign a new Treaty with Tibet in which India would recognize the independence, instead of mere autonomy of Tibet.”⁸⁵ The issue of providing arms and ammunition was a complicated one. The Indian government had been providing Tibet with a limited quantity of arms and ammunition since the Simla Convention in 1914. In 1949, for instance, this included ammunition for “rifles, bren gun and sten guns.”⁸⁶ Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother who had left Tibet some years ago, and spent time in India and Taiwan, had, by now, emerged as an important interlocutor for his Holiness. He claims that when he met Nehru in 1949, the prime minister promised all help to Tibet, including arms and ammunition.⁸⁷ However, from the Indian perspective, the offer held as long a Chinese attack remained only a possibility. In case of a real assault, India could not be seen providing military

⁸⁴ Letter from Political Sikkim to Foreign, New Delhi, 4 November, 1949, NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II Secret.

⁸⁵ Annual and bi-annual reports from Tibet for 1949, 2 February 1950, NAI, File no. 3/17/R&I/50.

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Personal interview with Gyalo Thondup, Kalimpong, India, 12 Sep 2016.

support to Tibet against China. This was not only a question of security but of being seen as taking sides in a clash between two parties to both of which India claimed closeness.

In January 1950, the Dalai Lama and members of his government wrote to Nehru asking for additional help with arms and ammunition. They also requested that India train them to prepare in the event of a Chinese attack. The letter asked for “latest types of military weapons and also those types which were used during the Second World War such as cannons, machine-guns, trench mortars etc.” It requested “ammunition manufacturing machines to be installed here in Tibet with necessary chemicals for gunpowder, technical engineers for the above machines and temporary loan of instructors for the new weapons which do not so far exist in Tibet.” The letter ended with the request to help take the Tibetan cause to the United Nations.⁸⁸ However, by the time the message made it to India, the prime minister, K.M. Panikkar, Foreign Secretary Menon, and Sikkim Political Officer Harishwar Dayal had already discussed the question. While there was no objection to providing more ammunition, Nehru insisted that the move must in no way indicate to China that this was an Indian attempt to arm Tibetans to fight them.⁸⁹ To the Dalai Lama’s request then, India declined to provide modern weaponry and means and technical know-how of producing ammunition. India agreed to give some military training, far less than what the Tibetan government had asked.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Letter from the Dalai Lama to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 January 1950, NAI, File no. 10(47)-NEF/50.

⁸⁹ Note on meeting held by Prime Minister with Foreign Secretary (K.P.S. Menon), K.M. Panikkar and Political Office (H. Dayal), 30 December 1949, NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II.

⁹⁰ Telegram from Foreign, New Delhi to Indian Mission, Lhasa, 9 January 1950, NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II.

2.3.1 *Civilizational conviction*

As the discussion above illustrates, by December 1949, Nehru and others in the MEA had decided that the optimal policy in dealing with China and Tibet would be one that balanced between Tibetan expectations and the reality of a new Chinese government. Was this policy guided by a perception of threat to Indian territory from China, which could intensify in case of explicit support to the Tibetan cause? Alternatively, was this a result of the civilizational connection that India felt towards China? An examination of the available evidence points away from the former, and towards the latter. Additionally, Indian decision-makers were uncertain that the Tibetan claim to autonomy and its right to conduct its foreign relations would hold up to international legal scrutiny. As Nehru told the press at a conference in January 1950, “The old policy of India under British rule was recognition of the autonomy of Tibet and, vaguely, recognising the suzerainty of China over Tibet, subject to that autonomy. It is all rather vague in the sense that is not precisely put down... how far Tibet can have relations with other countries, I do not know.”⁹¹

The affinity that India felt with the emerging new China complicated the decision. As Nehru described in a note to Bajpai right after the Tibetan campaign began, “in the long-term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole.”⁹² In his conversation with other leaders in the region, such as Indonesia’s Sukarno, he had already recommended that “we should

⁹¹ Press conference by Jawaharlal Nehru, 6 January 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 14-I, 27.

⁹² Policy on China and Tibet, 16 November 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 15-II, 345.

offer our restrained friendship to the new China, We must keep our dignity and we must not submit to any affront. But generally speaking, we should be friendly and cooperative unless we differ on a particular issue.”⁹³ To Burma’s Thakin Nu he advised that “a hostile approach to the new Government in China would be exceedingly bad policy. The injury to the Government will be relatively little. But the injury to the neighbouring countries and world peace would be considerable.⁹⁴ In this hope for a new Asia led by India and China, Tibet had a minor role to play. As K.P.S. Menon explained later, “we did not want anything, even Tibet to come in the way of friendly relations between India and China...we thought we could forget that past when both India and China suffered from imperialism, in the broad sense, and start all afresh.”⁹⁵

Around the time Mao’s men were taking over from the nationalist government, Nehru believed that a policy of friendship on equal terms was the best approach to the new emerging China. As the invasion of Tibet started, Nehru admitted that “China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign Power can prevent it. We cannot do so.”⁹⁶ On the other hand, Ambassador Panikkar, in his messages from Beijing, strained to convince Delhi that India’s security was in no way under threat from China. While presenting his credentials in May 1950, Panikkar reported Mao Zedong talking about the necessity for India and China to tackle the important problems facing them, and that they could not afford to waste time in wars.⁹⁷ In a

⁹³ Letter to A. Soekarno, 22 December 1949, SWJN, Series II, Vol 14-I, 548.

⁹⁴ Letter to Thakin Nu, 7 January 1950, SWJN, Series II, Vol 14-I, 504.

⁹⁵ K.P.S. Menon oral history interview by B.R. Nanda, 1981, NMML.

⁹⁶ Policy on China and Tibet, 16 November 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 15-II, 343.

⁹⁷ Telegram from Indian Embassy Peking to Foreign, New Delhi, 20 May 1950, JNSG, Vol- 44-II, NMML.

note to his sister and the ambassador to the United States, Vijaylakshmi Pandit, Nehru agreed that “there can be little doubt that the Chinese Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present day conflicts and in the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be friendly.”⁹⁸ In another note around the same time, Panikkar further confirmed that “new China realises that India has always been and will continue to be an area, where China’s influence will never penetrate. She realises further that the Indian and Chinese worlds will continue to co-exist as independent areas in any set of circumstances which could be visualized.” Friendship or not, Panikkar however, was gravely mistaken on one count, when he believed that “From what the Ambassador said, I felt that the Government would be inclined to listen to friendly advice from our Government both on Formosa and Tibet.”⁹⁹

Nehru was, however, against an armed campaign against Tibet, a point that he labored to get across to Beijing in his multiple messages through Panikkar. On receiving the news of the Tibet campaign, he attempted to use the potential United Nations membership of the PRC as leverage to steer them towards restraint. He asked Panikkar to caution the Chinese leadership that “any invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops will have serious consequences in regard to their position in the United Nations. It will strengthen the hands of the enemies of China and weaken those who are supporting China’s cause there.”¹⁰⁰ The question of whether the new Chinese government

⁹⁸ Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaylakshmi Pandit, copy to B.N. Rau, 30 August 1950, JNSG, Vol- 53-II.

⁹⁹ A preliminary analysis of the problems of New China by Sardar KM Panikkar Indian Ambassador in China, 1 July 1950, NAI, File no. 771/CJK/50.

¹⁰⁰ Telegram from Jawaharlal Nehru to K.M. Panikkar, 19 October 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 15-I, 436.

should occupy the position meant for China in the Security Council was running parallel to the Tibetan plan to bring the China-Tibet issue to the U.N. for discussion. As early as December 1949, India had signaled to the United States that it did not think the time was right to bring up the Tibet issue in the United Nations.¹⁰¹ The reasons for this was two-fold – the Indian foreign policy establishment believed that once the Tibet issue came up in the U.N., it would vitiate the atmosphere, and harm Tibet’s aim of a negotiated settlement; at the same time, India did not want the issue to affect the Sino-Indian relation. This view gained ground after an Indian resolution for PRC’s admission to the U.N. failed in the General Assembly. As PRC Premier, and Mao’s second-in-command Zhou Enlai expressed his disappointment at the outcome, Delhi agreed, saying “we are no less disappointed than Chou En Lai over the vote on our resolution for PEKING’s admission to the U.N.”¹⁰² Therefore, weeks later, when El Salvador decided to bring up the Tibet question, BN. Rau, the Indian representative to the U.N., was instructed to support the motion, but not make any legal arguments that could affect India’s relations with China.¹⁰³ In end-November, the U.N. decided to postpone action on the Tibetan question indefinitely after India asserted that a peaceful solution was still possible.¹⁰⁴ In the meantime, Tibetan representatives had arrived in Delhi to negotiate with Chinese representatives in Delhi. They would eventually proceed to Beijing after initial trouble in getting transit visas through Hong

¹⁰¹ Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 274, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d274>.

¹⁰² Telegram from Foreign, New Delhi to Indembassy, Peking, 23 September 1950, JNSG, Vol.-56-I, NMML.

¹⁰³ Telegram from G.S. Bajpai to K.M. Panikkar, 20 November, 1950, JNSG, Vol.-64-II, NMML.

¹⁰⁴ According to Melvyn Goldstein, the Tibetan appeal was apparently drafted by S. Sinha, India’s man in Lhasa. The absence of reference in any official communication whether from Lhasa or Delhi, and the secrecy surrounding it during Goldstein’s research suggest that Sinha was perhaps operating in his personal capacity, keeping even Delhi out of the loop. For more see Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet: 1913-1951 The Demise of the Lamaist State*, vol. 1 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 708-709.

Kong. For the government of India, as discussions in early December attest, the Korean issue needed to take priority in the United Nations.¹⁰⁵

2.3.2 *Territorial Anxiety*

Even as he acknowledged that sooner or later, China was going to attack Tibet, Nehru did not believe this posed a territorial threat to India. In the north, he said, “the best guarantee of India's safety from that frontier is the inhospitable terrain and climate of Tibet as well as the mountains that separate Tibet from India.” He, however, did admit that the developments in China and Tibet made it necessary for India to be more aware of possible repercussions in border areas, including in Bhutan and Sikkim.¹⁰⁶ He repeated his belief that “the Government of China will not evoke a conflict with India or anyone else” in a meeting at the MEA in December 1949. However, he also believed that international acceptance of the new Chinese government was necessary as, if it stayed remained unrecognized and unstable, “it is possible that guerilla bands, irregulars or Fifth columnists will start working,” which would, in turn, affect the stability of India’s borders. The recognition from India came in late December 1949, and the United Kingdom followed soon after. The dissonance among Nehru’s advisors about the stand towards China started growing loud only after the assault on Tibet in October 1950. The strongest note of dissent came from Nehru’s peer in the independence movement and his deputy in the Prime Minister’s Office, Vallabhbhai Patel. In a long letter in November, he questioned the wisdom of trusting Chinese assurances on Tibet, cautioned about campaigns in the border, and in one prescient comment,

¹⁰⁵ Note on Tibet by G.S. Bajpai, 5 December 1950, JNSG Vol. 66-II, NMML.

¹⁰⁶ Letter to Chief Ministers, 1 December 1949, SWJN, Series II, Vol 14-I, 367.

warned that “the undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves.”¹⁰⁷ This did not seem to change Nehru’s mind, who, the very next day claimed that it would take a world war for China and India to stand on opposing sides.¹⁰⁸

The Calcutta Statesman first reported that the PLA was advancing through Tibet on 11 October 1950. This information contradicted what India’s foreign policy decision-makers had anticipated, and what Chinese leaders had assured. It evoked disbelief in Delhi, where the MEA announced that they had no information to confirm the report. The Political Office in Sikkim initially claimed the news report was likely misinformation as “Kalimpong is always full of rumours, some of which are based on delayed information which is not accurate, regarding events that have occurred some time previously.”¹⁰⁹ Even after the newspaper report was corroborated, Nehru claimed that “there is no foreseeable possibility of any real military threat to our frontier via Tibet.”¹¹⁰ This frustrated his other advisors as well. India’s man in Lhasa, Sumul Sinha, complained in his annual report that “India pursued rather uncertainly a policy of benevolent neutrality in regard to the Sino-Tibetan conflict. While she expected China to show forbearance and generosity in her treatment of Tibet, she advised Tibet early in 1950 to refrain from bellicose action and language.”¹¹¹ Back in Delhi, G.S. Bajpai told Foreign Secretary Menon that he felt

¹⁰⁷ Letter on Tibet from Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 November, 1950, JNSG Vol. - 62-II, NMML.

¹⁰⁸ Note from Jawaharlal Nehru, 8 November, 1950, JNSG Vol. - 62-II, NMML.

¹⁰⁹ SIKKIM - Monthly report from Political Officer in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, 20 October 1950, NAI, File No.- 8(13)-NEF/50

¹¹⁰ Letter to Chief Ministers, 3 December, 1950, JNSG Vol Vol. - 66-I, NMML.

¹¹¹ Annual report from Tibet (Lhasa) for 1950, 15 January 1951, NAI, File No. 3(18)-R&I/513(18)-R&I/51.

that the prime minister did not sufficiently appreciate the dangers from China, wondering if he should make way for those that could get Nehru to listen to their advice.¹¹² As news of the battle in Chamdo came in, Bajpai had written to the prime minister questioning the wisdom of seeking an alliance with China, suggesting that if “China’s response to our endeavour for friendship is to be unilateral action against our neighbours, then I submit, China’s friendship can be of little value to us.” Both he and the foreign secretary pointed their fingers at the Ambassador Panikkar for misrepresenting, or at the very least, misunderstanding China’s stand on Tibet. Foreign Secretary Menon felt that he had been “rather half hearted in making representations to the Chinese government regarding the incursions of their forces into Tibet,” while according to Secretary General Bajpai, “for some inexplicable reason, he seems to persist in his erroneous conceptacle of Chinese claims and Chinese maps.”¹¹³ Panikkar defended his stand, claiming that while he knew that China had intervened in Tibet, no one in Beijing was ready to admit it, or talk to him about it – making it difficult for him to get his point across.¹¹⁴

Nehru had come to accept the political occupation of Tibet by China as *fait accompli*. However, he still believed that they would let Tibet have religious freedom and regional autonomy. “This autonomy,” he said, “can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet enjoyed during the last forty years or so. But it is reasonable to assume from the very nature of Tibetan geography, terrain and climate, that a large measure of autonomy is almost inevitable.”¹¹⁵ Nehru believed that unlike British India, independent India

¹¹² Note from K.P.S. Menon to M.O. Mathai, 25 November 1950, JNSG, Vol. – 65-I, NMML.

¹¹³ Bhasin, *India-China Relations, 1947-2000*, 385-387.

¹¹⁴ K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat*. (London: G Allen & Unwin, 1955), 111-112.

¹¹⁵ Policy on China and Tibet, 16 November 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 15-II, 343-344.

had little leverage that it could use to convince China. The only avenue available was the regular representations that Panikkar made to the Chinese government asking for a peaceful resolution to the issue. There was a gap in how the two sides interpreted the issue – as Nehru admitted in parliament that while the Chinese claimed they were prepared for a peaceful solution, they did not agree to abandon their plan of Tibet’s “peaceful liberation.”¹¹⁶

2.3.3 *Development as foreign policy*

The issue of autonomy tied to India’s relations with Tibet in multiple ways. As K.P.S Menon pointed out in a note written in August 1950, almost all the aspects of self-image are involved in this question. For one, it is to India’s interest to have to deal “not with a strong Communist China but with a mild religious Tibet.” Further, handling this issue now would assure relationships with other boundary states in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Finally, a Tibet not free to make its own decisions would deeply impact India’s cultural and trade relations with Tibet.¹¹⁷ It is not just Menon who seemed to believe that the trade and development dynamic in India’s relation with Tibet were connected. As early as July 1949, as Mao was coming to power in China, Bajpai insisted that the communists be explained how India’s aid to Tibet was not a provocation to fight them, but help for “social and economic reform in Tibet.”¹¹⁸ In a report in March 1950, Richardson from the Lhasa Mission connected social improvement and the stability of the Tibetan Government to bringing more land in Tibet under cultivation. Since the Tibetan

¹¹⁶ Prime Minister’s foreign policy speech in Parliament, 6 December, 1950, JNSG, Vol. 66-II.

¹¹⁷ Note on Relations with Tibet by K.P.S. Menon, 22 August 1950, JNSG Vol. – 52-II, NMML.

¹¹⁸ Avtar Singh Bhasin, *India-China Relations, 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, vol. 1 (Geetika Publishers, 2018) 114.

Government lacked adequate resources, Richardson recommended that the Government of India should immediately consider a request for economic assistance.¹¹⁹ Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim, concurred, “if the Tibetan Government were to ask for a loan for this purpose, I would recommend that their request be given the most sympathetic consideration.”¹²⁰ With increasing Chinese control over Tibet in the following months, it is unlikely that the Indian plan went ahead. As the Dalai Lama’s representatives negotiated the terms of the agreement with China in Beijing in early 1951, Nehru made a public statement about the nature of the Indo-Tibet relationship. While speaking to journalists, he expressed hope that as soon as things returned to normal in Tibet, trade and other economic and social relationships with India would resume as before.¹²¹ The sentiment was echoed by the Tibetan delegation that met the prime minister on their way to Beijing later the same month.¹²² Point 14 in the Seventeen Point Agreement signed in May between Tibet and China would even promise the “establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations” between Tibet and neighboring countries.¹²³ After the agreement, in a conversation with Panikkar, Zhou recognized the legitimacy of India’s cultural and trade interests in Tibet. However, in exchange, India was required to limit its Mission in Lhasa to a consulate general.¹²⁴ Soon after, India’s trade with Tibet would get increasingly difficult and eventually lead to the closure of the Lhasa mission and the trading posts.

¹¹⁹ Report from H.E. Richardson, Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa to Political Officer, Sikkim, 30 March 1950, NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II

¹²⁰ Telegram from Political Officer, Sikkim, to Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 18 April 1950, NAI, File no. 7/13/NEF/49-Pt-II

¹²¹ Press Conference by Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 March 1951, JNSG Vol. – 76-II, NMML.

¹²² Telegram from Foreign, New Delhi to Indembassy, Peking, copy to Political Sikkim and Mission, Lhasa, 31 March 1951, JNSG Vol.-78-I, NMML.

¹²³ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi to Political, Sikkim, 29 May 1951, JNSG Vol.-87-I, NMML.

¹²⁴ Panikkar, *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat*, 175.

2.3.4 *Planning the Dalai Lama's escape*

Though the Dalai Lama finally arrived in India in 1959, it was not the first time that he had left Lhasa. The developments of 1959 are better known, but the plan for the Dalai Lama's departure in 1950-'51 is no less critical, especially because it points at the deliberate nature of Indian decision-making, and self-image. Discussion on the plan mostly took place in October-December 1950, before the Dalai Lama had left Lhasa. This was the same time as when China's Tibet campaign had begun, and India realized that the PRC did not intend to honor its promises of a peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue. As Indian decision-makers decided against directly confronting China on the subject, they also resolved to continue support to Tibet in some ways – in this case, by agreeing to house the Dalai Lama in India if he sought exile.

The question of accommodating the Dalai Lama in India came up for the first time in late October as members of the Tibetan Government approached the Indian Mission in Lhasa. In a series of two cables on 27 and 28 October, Sumul Sinha explained that the "Tibetan Government are preparing to send the Dalai Lama down to India for asylum. They hope Government of India would look after him during his exile and exercise influence on the Chinese for amicable settlement which would pave the way for his return." The decision to seek asylum, Sinha explained, was guided by the belief that "nothing will now stop the daily advance of Chinese troops into Tibet and it may NOT be long before Lhasa itself is threatened. In that event it is natural that the life of His HOLINESS will be in danger." In India, the cable went on to say, the Dalai Lama intended to "present case of Tibet personally to Prime Minister and seek his advice

whether any further approach to President MAO through Govt. of India would be of any avail.”¹²⁵ In a quick and unambiguous response sent the next day, the MEA said that “should the Dalai Lama decide to come to India, he and any officials that may be accompanying him, will, of course, be allowed to stay in India and receive such protection and assistance as the Government of India can provide.”¹²⁶ At the same time, preparations ensued in India to house the Dalai Lama and his entourage. However, Delhi also emphasized that the Lhasa Mission should ensure that the final decision for the Dalai Lama to leave had to be a Tibetan one; in no way should it seem that India was leading a movement against China.

In the following weeks, the Lhasa Mission, in a surprise proposal, suggested that air evacuation be considered as a viable option for the Dalai Lama to reach India. Though Lhasa did not have air connectivity, a telegram informed Delhi that the Tibetan Government were open to building a runway in Lhasa. The proposal seemed to have followed a surprise offer from Robert Trumbull, the New York Times reporter in India. Sinha told Delhi that Trumbull had sent a cable “to the Tibetan Government offering to send a plane with experienced pilots to evacuate his HOLINESS and party.”¹²⁷ Trumbull had been stationed in India for a long time, and had been sending out regular dispatches on China and the Tibet issue. At the time he sent his offer to the Tibetan government, he also wrote an article about how the assault on Chamdo had changed Nehru’s view of China, claiming that, “(Nehru) believes that every avenue towards a peaceful solution should be followed to its end before armies march, no matter how risky or how remote the

¹²⁵ Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 27 October 1950, JNSG Vol. 61-II, NMML and Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 28 October 1950, JNSG Vol. 61-II, NMML.

¹²⁶ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi, to Indian Mission, Lhasa, 29 October 1950, JNSG, Vol- 61-II, NMML.

¹²⁷ Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 8 November 1950, JNSG Vol. 62-II, NMML.

possibility of success.”¹²⁸ The move from a reporter of events to an active participant was unanticipated. More so, because there was no way to find out if Trumbull’s proposal was guided merely by the prospect of a good news story, or if he was acting for someone in the United States, whether government or private. Sinha seemed to favor keeping the option open as a last resort in case the PLA surrounded Lhasa and made the Dalai Lama’s escape by land impossible.¹²⁹

Building a runway was not the only preparation that occupied the government in Tibet. In anticipation of leaving, the Dalai Lama was formally invested with complete state powers that established him as the temporal and spiritual leader of Tibet. The Tibetan government seemed to have second thoughts about Trumbull’s generous offer. Depending on the promises of a private citizen with unknown backing suddenly seemed risky, and they informed the Lhasa mission that they would rather have the Indian government send a plane in case of an emergency.¹³⁰ Delhi too was beginning to wake up to this new player who had inserted himself into the complicated situation. The Indian mission to the U.N. flagged an article by Trumbull that claimed that the Soviets were planning to move into India through Tibet, asking questions about his antecedents and access.¹³¹ Following a note from Nehru questioning the wisdom of taking the initiative of sending an aircraft to Tibet, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the cabinet decided to discuss the

¹²⁸ By Robert Trumbull Special to The New York Times. “Nehru Now Sees China in a Different Light: Peiping's Sharp Replies to Protests On Tibet Shock Indian Premier U.S.-Indian Differences Position on Tibet Adherence to Line New Tone in Relations Anxiety Over Nepal.” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Nov 05, 1950. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/111660575?accountid=14784>.

¹²⁹ Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 10 November 1950, JNSG Vol. 63-I, NMML.

¹³⁰ Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 19 November 1950, JNSG Vol. 64-II, NMML.

¹³¹ Telegram from Indiadel, New York to Foreign, New Delhi, 22 November 1950, JNSG Vol. 65-I, NMML.

matter.¹³² The report that followed recommended that Trumbull's efforts carried an intrinsic political threat, as "if he splashes the news to the world that he was the rescuer it would give the Chinese the much needed evidence in support of their allegation of Anglo-American influences being at work in Tibet."¹³³ An Indian pilot, the report said, in an Indian plane, was a better idea, provided that His Holiness asked for one.

In early December the MEA told the Lhasa Mission that Delhi was okay with having the Dalai Lama arrive on a plane. However, political expediency dictated that instead of India offering one, the Tibetan government themselves should charter an Indian plane.¹³⁴ The West Bengal government had already been asked and had suggested possible accommodations for His Holiness and his people.¹³⁵ However, when the Dalai Lama finally left Lhasa on December 19, he chose the land route to Chumbi valley, near the Indian border. He would end up staying there till the Seventeen Point Agreement was signed, never crossing into India, and returning to Lhasa soon after. Multiple reasons may have contributed to his decision not to leave Tibet. Even while he was in Lhasa, opposing views were beginning to emerge among his men about his departure. PLA troops had stopped their march towards Lhasa by mid-November. Some in Tibet believed that the Dalai Lama should continue to stay on in Lhasa to provide guidance and leadership. India's suggestion that "evacuation of Lhasa will NOT only be an invitation to the Chinese but

¹³² Note from the Prime Minister to the Secretary General of the MEA and the Foreign Secretary, 23 November 1950, JNSG Vol. 65-I, NMML.

¹³³ Note for the Foreign Affairs Committee on Flight of an Aircraft to Lhasa to Evacuate the Dalai Lama, by S.N. Haskar, Joint Secretary, MEA, 30 November 1950, JNSG vol. 65-II, NMML.

¹³⁴ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi, to Indian Mission, Lhasa, 2 December 1950, JNSG, Vol- 66-I, NMML.

¹³⁵ Cable from West Bengal, Calcutta to Foreign, New Delhi, 9 December 1950, JNSG, Vol. 67-II, NMML.

will lead to internal turmoil unnecessarily. The PSYCHOLOGICAL moment had NOT arrived when people of Tibet would gladly see DALAI take refuge in Yatung; the flight now would appear as flight of the people, and breach of faith to the Chinese,” may not have changed the decision to leave Lhasa, but might have influenced subsequent decisions.¹³⁶ According to the Lhasa Mission, as late as March 1951, the Dalai Lama received letters from Lhasa, which pleaded for him to not proceed to India, and return to the Tibetan capital.¹³⁷

India’s concerns about impingements on its sphere of influence or ties with Tibet were not directed only towards the PRC. There were others who inexplicably involved themselves from time to time, often with no intimation through India’s official channels. In one such surprise move in March 1951, the United States suddenly decided to be interested in Tibet. The country had so far refrained from commenting, except noting in January 1951 that the State Department was “interested in the continuance of Tibetan autonomy and views sympathetically the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations.”¹³⁸ However, this did not lead to an official, public stand on the legal status of Tibet. Now suddenly, the U.S. Ambassador in India, Loy Henderson wrote to the Dalai Lama, asking him not to go back to Lhasa and instead seek help outside, suggesting Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) as a possible asylum destination. If that were difficult, he even suggested that the Dalai Lama “could be certain of finding a place of refuge in one of the friendly countries, including the United States, in the Western Hemisphere.” The only problem, as he wrote to Washington, D.C., was that he was acting without information or authorization of

¹³⁶ Telegram from Indian Mission Lhasa to Foreign, New Delhi, 18 December 1950, JNSG Vol. 68-I, NMML.

¹³⁷ Annual report for 1951 from the Indian Mission, Lhasa, 19 February 1952, NAI, File no.- 3(19) - R&I-52.

¹³⁸ Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951*, 753.

his government, admitting that his letter to the Dalai Lama “does not mean that I have any intention of following the practice in the future of going ahead in matters of this kind without proper authority.”¹³⁹ Henderson’s letter did not make it to the representatives of the Dalai Lama till May 1951, by which point, the Chinese government, and HHDL’s representatives were already in conversation. In the meantime, in an unrelated development in Beijing, Zhou Enlai spoke to Ambassador Panikkar at around the same time that Henderson wrote the letter. Talking about the negotiations that were about to begin, Zhou hinted that the talks had the best chance of succeeding if the Dalai Lama did not leave Tibet. Panikkar refused to commit, saying that Indian policy was to allow political asylum to those who asked for it, and if the Dalai Lama wanted to come to India, there were no grounds for India to decline.¹⁴⁰

After weeks of negotiation, the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Central Government signed the Seventeen Point Agreement on 23 May 1951. The text had not been circulated beforehand, and it is unlikely that the Dalai Lama had an opportunity to vet the contents. A month later, Tsepon Shakabpa, one of HHDL’s close associates, told a member of the U.S. mission in India that the Dalai Lama did not recognize the terms of the agreement.¹⁴¹ An MEA note detailing this meeting has a postscript from a secretary at the department speculating that “obviously, as a next step the Dalai Lama will seek sanctuary in India.”¹⁴² However, this did

¹³⁹ The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), 29 March, 1951, FRUS, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2, New Delhi Post Files: Lot 58 F 95.

¹⁴⁰ Telegram from Indembassy, Peking to Foreign, New Delhi, 22 March 1951, JNSG Vol. 78-I, NMML.

¹⁴¹ The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 11 June 1951, FRUS, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2, Document 793B.00/6–1151.

¹⁴² Note by Subimal Dutt, Additional Secretary, MEA on his meeting with the American Chargé d'affaires, 27 June 1951, JNSG Vol. 90-I, NMML.

not happen; instead, the Dalai Lama decided to return to Lhasa in July. Though the Dalai Lama did not leave Lhasa on this occasion, the conversation about asylum in India laid the bedrock for the consideration of separating Tibet policy from policy towards the Dalai Lama. As the following section establishes, India was far more proactive about accommodating the Dalai Lama in 1959. To a great extent, this was guided by the understanding among Indian decision-makers that China's responses to India's self-image about the Tibet relationship would not conform to Indian expectations.

2.4 PRIORITIZING THE DALAI LAMA: 1959

2.4.1 *The Dalai Lama's Escape*

Despite his initial reservations against the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Dalai Lama was persuaded by point 4 that promised to “not alter the existing political system in Tibet, as well as the “the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.”¹⁴³ It seemed that the PRC did not intend to alter the established administration and internal autonomy of Tibet. However, changes began to manifest themselves soon. For instance, in early 1952, representatives of the Chinese government proposed opening a school that would teach Chinese to the Tibetan children. The same year, a messenger informed HHDL that Mao Zedong had ordered that the two Tibetan prime ministers be dismissed.¹⁴⁴ In the following years, keeping a balance became increasingly tricky, balancing Chinese inroads with growing Tibetan resentment, while protests against Chinese control and authority continued to spread from Kham in east Tibet. His long visit

¹⁴³ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi to Political, Sikkim, 29 May 1951, JNSG Vol.-87-I, NMML.

¹⁴⁴ Note on Lhasa weekly report – April 1952 (Miscellaneous reports on Tibet from P.O. in Sikkim), 27 April 1952, NAI File no.- N/52/1392/1201(Secret)

to China in 1954—'55 to improve China-Tibet relations too, did not help. In March 1959, as news spread that the Dalai Lama had been invited to a cultural program in the military command in Lhasa, people began to gather outside HHDL's palace. The PLA had asked the Dalai Lama to visit without the guards that usually accompanied him, and locals interpreted this as a sign that they planned to abduct him. They believed that the Chinese wanted the Dalai Lama to attend the National People's Congress in April. Thousands of people gathered in front of Norbulingka, the Dalai Lama's residence, to prevent him from leaving, and protesting Chinese presence. As the PLA tried to suppress the dissent and disperse the people, the rebellion spread across Lhasa.

Delhi was watching intently as the situation in Lhasa deteriorated. Bajpai and Menon had moved out of the MEA, but the new Foreign Secretary, Subimal Dutt, kept a close eye on Tibet as well as China. There had been no change in the Indian stand on not appearing to take sides. As riots intensified, the Lhasa Mission was instructed to refrain from seeking security from either the Tibetans or the Chinese. However, once it was clear that the Dalai Lama may once again consider leaving Lhasa, India did not wait for the Tibetans to raise the question of asylum. On 15 March the MEA informed Lhasa and Sikkim Political Office that the "Prime Minister is quite clear in his mind that if the DALAI LAMA seeks protection in Indian territory we should give him asylum. You should not, repeat not, however, reveal this to anybody at this stage."¹⁴⁵ The same day, the foreign secretary wrote to the Advisor to the Assam Government that the Dalai Lama's mother and sister were about to leave Lhasa, asking him to ensure they were allowed to enter India and inform Delhi of their arrival immediately.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Telegram from Foreign New Delhi, to Political Sikkim, repeated to Cogendia, Lhasa, 15 March 1959, JNSG Vol 677-I, NMML.

¹⁴⁶ Cable from Foreign Secretary to Adga Shillong, 15 March 1959, JNSG Vol 677-I, NMML.

The Dalai Lama left Lhasa by road two days after this, on the night of 17 March. His aides came to inform the Indian representative of the news the next morning, requesting that the “Government of India may be informed about it with requests to grant him asylum.”¹⁴⁷ In its response, the MEA repeated the offer for asylum and asked the Lhasa Mission to try to ensure that the message reached the Dalai Lama.¹⁴⁸ The fact that the Dalai Lama had already left, and was going to be incommunicado for much of his travel, added to the urgency. There was little way to know how far he had reached, or when and where he planned to cross into India. Nonetheless, discussions in the Indian government had now turned towards the logistics and preparations for his arrival, including the prospect of deputing officers who were familiar with his habits.¹⁴⁹ Since security was a major concern, Delhi suggested that “it may be advisable to split up the party and move DALAI LAMA, his relations and his immediate entourage with minimum of delay as far from the border as possible.”¹⁵⁰ In Lhasa, the local government was dissolved, and protests quelled, as Chinese forces took control of the city. The Indian Mission, now facing restrictions of movement from Chinese guards, wryly observed that “the future of Tibet is dark, and only a miracle can save Tibet from the clutches of the Chinese Communist Colonialists.”¹⁵¹ These developments were widely followed in India. Under immense pressure

¹⁴⁷ Cable from Cogendia, Lhasa to Political Sikkim, Gangtok. and Foreign, New Delhi, 18 March 1959, JNSG Vol 677-I, NMML.

¹⁴⁸ Cable from Foreign, New Delhi to Cogendia Lhasa, repeated to Political Sikkim, Gangtok, 19 March 1959, JNSG Vol 677-I, NMML.

¹⁴⁹ Cable from Political Sikkim, Gangtok. To Foreign, New Delhi, 27 March 1959, JNSG Vol 678-II, NMML.

¹⁵⁰ Cable from Foreign, New Delhi, to Adga Shillong, 27 March 1959, JNSG Vol 678-II, NMML.

¹⁵¹ Reports for the months of March, April and May, 1959 (Reports (other than annual) from Lhasa), 1 June 1959, NAI File No.- 6(35)-R&I/59.

from the general public as well as the political opposition, Nehru responded to questions in the parliament twice in ten days. He had to walk a tight rope, making sure not to give out details about the Dalai Lama's plans. On being asked where the Dalai Lama was, he truthfully replied that he did not know.¹⁵²

Just as the Indian government was unaware of the Dalai Lama's exact whereabouts, he was also oblivious of the Indian government's offer. On 26 March, the Dalai Lama wrote a letter for the Indian Prime Minister, explaining the circumstances of his departure, and claiming that since his life was in danger, escaping to India was the only option open to him.¹⁵³ Two messengers carrying the letter reached India at Chuthangmu on 29 March, where an English translation was transmitted to Delhi. The messengers then continued with their mission of delivering the original message by hand.¹⁵⁴ In the meantime, another messenger from the Dalai Lama arrived with a question for Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's brother. His Holiness wanted to know about the status of the asylum request.¹⁵⁵ This led to renewed attempts by the MEA and the Political Officer in Sikkim to reach HHDL and inform him of the Indian government's decision. The prime minister also met Thondup and expressed his explicit offer of asylum.¹⁵⁶ However, as a discussion between the Sikkim Political Officer Apa Pant and Foreign Secretary Dutt revealed, it

¹⁵² In the Lok Sabha: The Situation in Tibet, 23 march 1950, SWJN, Series II, vol. 47, 458.

¹⁵³ Translation of letter from the Dalai Lama to Jawaharlal Nehru, 26 March 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 6, NMML.

¹⁵⁴ Report on the entry of His Holiness the Dalai Lama into India, 5 April 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 6, NMML.

¹⁵⁵ Cable from Foreign, New Delhi to Political Sikkim, Gangtok, 27 March 1959, JNSG Vol 678-II, NMML.

¹⁵⁶ Personal interview with Gyalo Thondup, Kalimpong, India, 12 Sep 2016.

was impossible to find out the exact location of the Dalai Lama. There was no certainty that the messenger who had arrived recently would manage to meet him on his journey back, as “the possibility of his being intercepted in the territory through which he has to travel, is great.”¹⁵⁷

On 29 March, an advance party comprising a junior member of the Dalai Lama’s government reached Chuthangmu and informed Indian officers that His Holiness and others were going to arrive in the same location on 31 March.¹⁵⁸ T.S. Murty, Assistant Political Officer of Tawang along with other officials, arrived to receive the Dalai Lama and his companions. Everything went according to plan, as a cable from K.L. Mehta, Advisor to the Assam Government informed the foreign secretary – the “dignitary with immediate entourage of 8 crossed Chutangmu border into our territory evening 31st March.”¹⁵⁹ Foreign Secretary Dutt responded with a “greatly relieved.” The relief was both at the fact that the Dalai Lama’s long and treacherous journey had ended, and that Delhi no longer needed to hold its breath about the secret of his escape. However, it would still need to balance between his expectations and China's ire at the assumption that India had sided with Tibet. As a first step, Dutt passed on two specific instructions – “unless health considerations make rest at Tawang imperative, party should not halt there but move as further down as possible without delay”¹⁶⁰ Over the next few weeks, the Dalai Lama, traveled through present-day Arunachal Pradesh, discussing logistical issues and

¹⁵⁷ Cable from Political Sikkim, Gangtok to Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, New Delhi, 28 March 1959, JNSG Vol 678-II, NMML.

¹⁵⁸ Report on the entry of His Holiness the Dalai Lama into India, 5 April 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 6, NMML.

¹⁵⁹ Cable from Adga Shillong to Foreign Secretary, 1 April 1959, JNSG Vol 679-II, NMML.

¹⁶⁰ Cable from Foreign Secretary to Adga Shillong, 1 April 1959, JNSG Vol 679-II, NMML.

possible places to settle down in India with a number of Indian officers, including Har Mander Singh, Political Officer in Kameng Frontier Division, and the prime minister's envoy P.N. Menon. On 6 April, while at the historically and geopolitically significant Tawang, Singh read out the prime minister's response to the Dalai Lama's letter which welcomed him to India.

India's response to the developments in Tibet and the Dalai Lama in 1959 was somewhat distinct from the cautious response nine years ago. In 1950, the emphasis was on procedure – in ensuring that asylum was sought, and not offered. This time, the Indian government seemed more intent on informing the Dalai Lama that he was welcome in India. This did not mean that the attempt to appear neutral between China and Tibet was absent. In a speech to the parliament days before the Dalai Lama's arrival, Nehru stated that “the position of all previous Governments in India and elsewhere has been the recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy...The measure of the autonomy has varied, because the strength of China, the weakness of China, the strength of Tibet, the weakness of Tibet has varied in the course of the last hundreds of years. But, that is the position.”¹⁶¹ On both occasions, he emphasized the civilizational connection between India and Tibet, which formed the distinction between India's response to China's approach to Tibet, and India's policy on the Dalai Lama. The latter, he explained, was based on the “long tradition of cultural and religious ties between India and the Tibet region of China. In this region like many places of pilgrimage which are considered holy by both Hindus and Buddhists and large numbers of our people visit them every

¹⁶¹ Jawaharlal Nehru In the Lok Sabha: Tibet, 30 March 1959, SWJN, Series II, vol. 47, 473.

year. The Dalai Lama, whom we had the honour and pleasure of receiving in our country in 1956-57, is held in high veneration by our people.”¹⁶²

2.4.2 *The Turn in the Sino-Indian Relationship*

India’s wish to be seen as not taking sides was influenced by the continuing importance of China in India’s foreign relations. It helped that India believed in a shared, common set of values and experiences that connected it to China. The Indian understanding was that this not only influenced their histories but also directed them towards a common path for the future. However, soon after, recent experiences seemed to trump civilizational ties in dictating how the two countries approached the world. While independent India was the product of a peaceful and non-violent struggle, the PRC’s path to the new regime was quite the opposite. As a result, while Nehru believed that power consisted of being a moral force in the comity of nations, the Chinese approach favored an active role of force. For India, this reflected in the increasing number of claims on territory that it considered its own. Apart from a forceful rejection of the McMahon Line, Chinese claims eventually extended to the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh, where India discovered a Chinese highway being constructed. As far as a relationship of development was concerned, China started discouraging traditional Indo-Tibet trade soon after 1951. In an environment where the Chinese government often accused the Indian government of undermining its authority on various issues, keeping cultural ties with Tibet alive were difficult enough; providing development assistance was out of the question.

¹⁶² Jawaharlal Nehru In the Lok Sabha: The Situation in Tibet, 23 March 1959, SWJN, Series II, vol. 47, 458.

Innumerable studies have researched the turn in the relationship. While some of these have tried to make sense of the developments by situating them in the historical context, others have apportioned blame on one actor or the other.¹⁶³ Though an exact recreation of events of the time is challenging, new archival material has helped add more nuance and understanding about both Indian and Chinese motivations. For instance, it is clear that Zhou Enlai's 1954 characterization of the relationship as "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" was not shared by many in the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy. Bilateral issues were piling up faster than they could be resolved, or even discussed. When conversations did happen, many in the Indian establishment believed that there was a fundamental distinction in the way India and China approached each other. N Raghavan, the Ambassador in Beijing who was part of the Indian team negotiating an agreement with China on trade with Tibet in 1954, believed that India was emotional in its approach to China, while they seemed to harbor no such feelings. In a note on the Chinese government's attitude towards India, he suggested that China's aim was to "make use of India and her independent role in international affairs but to see as far as possible that by doing so, India did not increase its stature in international fields so that China's ultimate role as the leading Asian power was in no manner

¹⁶³ Barring few exceptions, the most detailed Indian accounts of the early years of India-China relations come from practitioners, many who had experienced China from close quarters. These include, Girija Shankar Bajpai, *China's Shadow over Sikkim: The Politics of Intimidation* (New Delhi : Hartford, Wi.: Lancer Publishers ; Spantech & Lancer, 1999); Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977); Lakhan Lal Mehrotra, *India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options* (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997); K. P. S. Menon, *Many Worlds: An Autobiography* (Oxford U.P., 1966); B.N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1971); K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat*. (London: G Allen & Unwin, 1955); C. V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead after "Mao's India War,"* Timely Books (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000); Similar accounts in English using Chinese archives, and by Chinese bureaucrats are sparse; however, the limited available material has been used by Western scholars, first, and most significantly in Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*, Michigan Studies on China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975). This has been followed in a number of other accounts including John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*, International Crisis Behavior Series ; v. 6 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Cape, 1970).

effected or threatened.”¹⁶⁴ R.K. Nehru, who succeeded Raghavan in Beijing, believed that this behavior was not necessarily a sign of deceit, but often, out of a lack of information and clarity, as reflected in their approach to the boundary question.¹⁶⁵

The issue of Tibet and how it featured in relations to the PRC always stayed relevant to the Sino-Indian relationship. China began extending its influence on various aspects of life in Tibet soon after the 1951 agreement. Despite the apparent dissonance reflecting in these developments, the Indian leadership was not ready to give up on the Sino-Indian relationship. To settle the Tibet issue, India negotiated an agreement on trade with Tibet in 1954. According to this, India would withdraw its military escorts from trading posts in Tibet, and hand over its postal and other infrastructure to China. More importantly, by declaring mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as non-interference in each other's internal affairs in the preamble of the agreement, India had legitimized Chinese presence in Tibet.¹⁶⁶ However, the relationship stayed active in other initiatives. There were regular bilateral visits – Zhou visited India multiple times, at times within months, like in 1956—’57, while Nehru met Mao in China in late 1954. Cultural and people to people relations thrived, with the establishment of the India China Friendship Association, and through exchanges, including a delegation led by Vijaylakshmi Pandit in 1957. Both states had advocated for the need to establish alternatives to Cold War rival blocs and played essential roles in publicizing Panchsheel or Five Principles of

¹⁶⁴ Letter from Ambassador N. Raghavan to Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 March 1954, JNSG Vol. 241-I, NMML.

¹⁶⁵ Our China Policy: A Personal Assessment, 30 July 1968, R.K. Nehru Papers, Subject File 5, NMML.

¹⁶⁶ “Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India,” April 29, 1954, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7807>.

Peaceful Coexistence as guidelines for relations between states. These are the same principles that were articulated in the preamble to the agreement on trade with Tibet. India and Burma also insisted on including the PRC in the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung where 29 decolonized states came together to chart a path for the future.

These aspects of bonhomie notwithstanding, the frontier question emerged as the most critical unresolved issue at the bilateral level. The Indian establishment was aware that parts of the Sino-Indian border remained unmapped, which hindered clarity on jurisdiction. At the same time, Chinese maps often included areas that India believed to be theirs. When India and China met to discuss the trade agreement in 1954, some officials wanted to bring up the border issue as well. “As the question of territorial integrity had been raised, it was essential that the border should be clearly defined and should be specifically accepted by both sides. There should be some quid pro quo, in any case, for our recognition of Tibet as a “region of China.””¹⁶⁷ Nehru has often been seen as having made up his mind about not raising the boundary question with the Chinese. However, available evidence seems to indicate that the strategy was to wait for the Chinese to raise the question, to indicate that India had no confusions on the question of territoriality. An MEA note advising the Indian negotiators on strategy for the meetings stated that “we have declared several times that we adhere strictly to the McMahon Line, so far as our Northern border is concerned it is well defined by usage, custom and tradition.” If the issue came up, they were directed to say that “happily there are no territorial disputes between India and China” –

¹⁶⁷ Our China Policy: A Personal Assessment, 30 July 1968, R.K. Nehru Papers, Subject File 5, NMML.

avoiding the issue altogether was preferable. Nehru concurred with this view, and provided support to the approach at the highest level.¹⁶⁸

Nehru himself resorted to the same strategy in October, when he met Zhou in Beijing, bringing up the border only to point out errors in Chinese maps that depicted “portions of Burma and even of India as if they were Chinese territories.” When Zhou admitted that the new regime did not have its maps yet, Nehru used to opportunity to get the Indian point across, that “so far as India was concerned...there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them.”¹⁶⁹ Like the Indians, the Chinese avoided raising the boundary issue and worked to keep their options open. During the negotiation on the trade agreement, leader of the Chinese delegation, Chang Han-Fu insisted that the principles that would eventually form the Panchsheel be employed to “all pending questions that are ripe for settlement.”¹⁷⁰ After negotiations, the Indian delegation announced that all outstanding questions were settled. However, “the Chinese reply was that only such questions had been settled as were ripe for settlement.”¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Note Prepared by MEA on Strategy for Discussion with China on Tibet, 3 December, 1953, JNSG Vol.-218, NMML.

¹⁶⁹ Note by Jawaharlal Nehru on Implications of China Visit, 14 November 1954, SWJN, Series II, Vol 27, 81-82.

¹⁷⁰ Telegram from Indembassy, Peking to Foreign, New Delhi, 8 January, 1954, JNSG Vol. 227-II, NMML

¹⁷¹ Our China Policy: A Personal Assessment, 30 July 1968, R.K. Nehru Papers, Subject File 5, NMML.

2.4.3 Territorial anxiety




Fig. 2.1: Contested territories in the Sino-Indian border

The issue of the unsettled frontier between India and China would expand beyond the McMahon Line into Aksai Chin, as well as what was then the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the eastern sector. In a note titled “Chinese designs on the North East of India,” Sumul Sinha had cautioned Delhi about the possibility of China supporting traditional Tibetan claims to areas in Sikkim, Bhutan, and parts of Indian territory. Responding to the note in October 1953, Ambassador Panikkar disagreed. He had seen no evidence of this, and such a development seemed extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, he suggested, India needed to strengthen its

relationships with states in the border, “through a policy of wise statesmanship pursued over a period of years, a policy of firm friendship of the people of the area.” By making the fruits of development available to these regions, India could reduce the possibility of Chinese influence.¹⁷² Sinha’s concerns proved accurate in some years when China raised claims on the territory of Bhutan and NEFA, and asserted cultural and civilizational affinity towards Sikkim.

Starting in 1954, there were almost yearly transgressions in Bara Hoti, located in India’s Garhwal district, (in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border). These illustrated the kind of problems that emerged from leaving the border issue unsettled. Bara Hoti had traditionally been the site of a post that Tibetan traders set up every summer. However, once the Chinese were in charge, they began to claim the area as part of Tibet. In July 1954, they referred to the Panchsheel principles and contended that the presence of Indian soldiers there was “not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India, and the spirit of the Joint Communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India.”¹⁷³ Despite a flurry of notes, the issue was not resolved. It flared up again in 1956, and this time, India had to tackle transgressions further north, in Ladakh as well. The concern over troops in contested areas reflected in the language of communication. In an aide mémoire in September 1956 about PLA movement in Shipki La in Ladakh, the MEA warned the Chinese representative that India would “consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist,” and that “there might be an unfortunate clash on our border

¹⁷² Response by K.M. Panikkar on Note by Sinha “Chinese Designs on the North-East Frontier of India,” 10 October 1953, , JNSG Vol. 209-I, NMML.

¹⁷³ “Note given by the counsellor of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, 17 July 1954,” in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 1, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1954).

which will have undesirable results.”¹⁷⁴ By 1958, a sense of lack of trust seemed to pervade, as a note from Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt, suggests. Writing to the prime minister as well as other senior colleagues, he cautioned that while negotiating Bara Hoti with the Chinese, India “should not bring in other disputes. It is important for us to know the working of the Chinese mind in regard to the border question generally.”¹⁷⁵

One way of addressing the issue of contested territories open to India was through the publication of new maps. With the disagreement on the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, Nehru had already asked for old maps to be replaced in 1954. Most importantly, he said, new maps “should be printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any “line”. These new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory.”¹⁷⁶

While focusing its attention on the eastern sector, it was Chinese action on the western sector that caught India by surprise. In 1957, India came to know about a road that China had built through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet.¹⁷⁷ The next year China published a set of new maps that showed areas that India considered its own as Chinese territory, both in the

¹⁷⁴ “Aide mémoire given to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India, 24 September 1956,” in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 1, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1954).

¹⁷⁵ Note on Barahoti Dispute from Foreign Secretary, 14 April 1958, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 32, NMML.

¹⁷⁶ Trade and Frontier with China: Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, 1 July 1954, SWJN, Series II, vol. 26, 482.

¹⁷⁷ While Delhi was taken by surprise, it seems that China’s road-building exercise was not entirely unknown. The chief of India’s Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik claimed later that his surveys in Ladakh had detected the activity and accordingly, he had informed the government. For more see B.N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1971.). Even the CIA reported the construction of at least three roads, as early as 1952. While Mullik would later work closely with the CIA on Tibet, there is no evidence that these findings of the CIA were ever passed on to India. For more see Central Intelligence Agency, “1. CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS, WEST TIBET 2. ROAD CONSTRUCTION, SINKIANG TO TIBET AND LADAKH,” CREST, General CIA Records, July 15, 1953, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A001700750005-6.pdf>.

eastern and the western sector. Dutt pointed at the fact that the Chinese were aware that these areas appeared in Indian maps, insisting that “if after having included this area in our map we just kept quiet, our attitude of indifference might serve as an encouragement to the Chinese authorities to take unilateral action in other contested areas also.”¹⁷⁸ When Nehru pointed out the issues in a letter to Zhou, his response was not different from what he had said earlier – that the communist government would alter boundaries as necessary when it had carried out its own surveys.¹⁷⁹ From India’s perspective, it seemed that China was unapologetic in claiming more of Indian territory without discussion or explanation.

2.4.4 *Civilizational conviction*

For a while after independence, India was convinced that working with China was the only way to strengthen the voice of post-colonial states. Indian foreign policy involved bringing together newly emerged, post-colonial states that had little clout individually but could emerge as a strong voice if they agreed to work together. As a leading power in Asia, China was crucial to this plan. For instance, in their discussion in June 1954, Nehru and Zhou most readily agreed on the effects that colonial rule had had across in Asia and that rebuilding would have to take that into account.¹⁸⁰ For India, this would mean a clean break from past legacies in a show of good faith to China. During the 1954 trade agreement on Tibet, therefore, Nehru insisted on getting rid of

¹⁷⁸ Note from Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister, 8 October 1958, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 33, NMML.

¹⁷⁹ “Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 14 December 1958” and “Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 23 January 1959,” in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 1, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1954).

¹⁸⁰ See conversation with Chou En-Lai, I, II, III, and IV, 25-26 June, 1954, SWJN, Series II, vol. 26, 366-396.

colonial trappings, because “our so-called interests in Tibet derive largely from our inheriting certain British interests to which they succeeded in establishing in the days of British expansionism. We became the inheritors of British imperialism to a slight extent.”¹⁸¹ Nehru understood the role of Chinese expansionism in the Asia. This, however, did not contradict the belief that India and China were meant to be civilizational comrades-in-arms – at least as long as the Chinese also seemed to reciprocate the belief. As he commented on Panikkar’s response to the note by Sinha about Chinese designs in India’s North East, “it is important today and even more so in the long future that India and China should have friendly relations and not have a dangerous frontier. The best way to ensure this on our side is to develop the border regions on this side not only in the sense of roads etc. but in the sense of winning people there to the conception of India.”¹⁸²

The feeling of bonhomie continued beyond Zhou’s June 1954 visit, to Nehru’s visit to China later in the year, and even into the Bandung Conference the next year. Eventually, several developments raised questions on the notion of Sino-Indian brotherhood. The territorial transgressions in Bara Hoti and elsewhere that had started earlier began to trickle into Delhi with disturbing regularity. There were also reports about China strong-arming its way into Tibetan life. A speech made its way to Nehru’s office in August 1955, where the Dalai Lama seemed to have dropped his usual restraint to express strong disappointment over means adopted by Chinese representatives. In the speech, HHDL claimed that some Chinese officials “might have

¹⁸¹ Note from Prime Minister to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary: Policy Towards China and Tibet, 18 June 1954, JNSG Vol. 262-I, NMML.

¹⁸² Prime Minister’s comment on Panikkar’s response to Note by S. Sinha “titled “Chinese designs on the North East of India,” 10 October 1953, JNSG Vol. 209-I, NMML.

such a useless determination right from the beginning which would never bring any good to Tibet. Such officers can be sent back forthwith.”¹⁸³ The comment gave rise to concerns over China’s role, as well as Tibet’s ability to stay autonomous in its culture and identity. As late as 1954, Nehru had believed that Tibet being “most inhospitable to others, it cannot maintain large numbers of foreigners and the like. If the Tibetans are stout enough to keep up a spirit of freedom, they will maintain a large measure of autonomy and the Chinese will not interfere.”¹⁸⁴

It seemed that Nehru’s hopes about the role that Tibet’s inhospitable terrain would play were misplaced. Indian officials working in Tibet were now urging Delhi to work to maintain its cultural connections with Tibet actively. The trade agent in Yatung wrote to Political Officer in Sikkim, Apa Pant, suggesting that “Tibetans still have respect and friendly thoughts for India as they feel that their religion and script came from India. If possible we should send some religious men from India to give and take religious knowledge in Tibet, and thus strengthen our ties of friendship with the religious people of Tibet who have and will continue to have, a great deal of influence on the minds of the people of Tibet.”¹⁸⁵ In a separate note, the consulate general in Lhasa echoed these views, suggesting specific steps that included “a half hour or so broadcast daily by the All India Radio in Tibetan of news music and topical things. Our films are also most popular and we should make every effort to send out the best ones in 16 m.m. copies and if necessary subsidize such exchange. The award of scholarships is not quite easy what with the

¹⁸³ Speech of the Dalai Lama translated from news summary, 2 August 1955, JNSG Vol. 392-II, NMML.

¹⁸⁴ Note from Prime Minister to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary: Policy Towards China and Tibet, 18 June 1954, JNSG Vol. 262-I, NMML.

¹⁸⁵ Note from Indian Trade Agent at Yatung, S.L. Chibber to Political officer in Sikkim Apa Pant, undated, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 3, NMML.

low level of education and Chinese obstruction. But candidates from students already at school in India and even drawn from Ladakhis and Nepalese settled in Tibet should be tapped.”¹⁸⁶

An excellent opportunity to showcase this cultural closeness presented itself in end-1956. On the occasion of the Buddha’s 2,500th birth anniversary, the Mahabodhi Society planned celebrations for November-December 1956, for which they invited the Dalai Lama. Beijing however, was not sure if it was wise to let him travel to India. Till early October, Nehru himself felt that given the conditions in Tibet, it was “almost impossible” for the Dalai Lama to visit.¹⁸⁷ Eventually, Beijing did approve the visit; at the same time, it persuaded the pro-PRC Panchen Lama to accompany him. Additionally, Zhou Enlai himself would also visit India at the same time.

Arriving in India in November 1956, the Dalai Lama, used the opportunity to apprise the Indian prime minister of the oppressive situation in Tibet. When he met Nehru, His Holiness even indicated that he was considering not going back to Tibet. Nehru however, was of the opinion that the situation in Tibet could still be resolved. He brought up the Tibet issue in his conversation with Zhou a few weeks later. Zhou claimed that the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951 guided Chinese policy towards Tibet, which, he claimed, had been “to give them an autonomous government under the Central Government, enjoying a large measure of autonomous rights. The Central Government consults it on all related matters and local matters are handled by themselves.”¹⁸⁸ This seemed to convince Nehru. In his next meeting with the Dalai Lama, Nehru

¹⁸⁶ Note from Consulate General at Lhasa, P.N. Menon to Political officer in Sikkim Apa Pant, 3 February 1956, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 3, NMML.

¹⁸⁷ Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to K.G. Saiyidain, 5 October 1956, SWJN, Series II, vol. 35, 517.

¹⁸⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru’s talks with Chou En-lai – I, 31 December 1956, SWJN, Series II, vol. 36, 595.

categorically suggested that not returning to Tibet “would be the height of folly and it would harm him as well as Tibet. This was not the way to serve the cause of Tibet. He must be in his own country and give a lead to his people.”¹⁸⁹ The Dalai Lama stayed on in for a few more weeks in Kalimpong and Sikkim and eventually left for Lhasa via Nathu La in early March 1957.

Nehru’s confidence that Zhou would live up to his words seemed misplaced, not only in Tibet but also in bilateral issues between India and China. India had just found out about the road in Aksai Chin in 1957. That Zhou Enlai had not brought up the Aksai Chin topic in all his conversations with the prime minister when he was in India a few months before, now seemed deliberate and deceitful. R.K. Nehru believed that China’s silence in bringing up the road-building could have to do with the fact that India had never brought up Aksai Chin with China because even “in 1958, when we lodged our protest and subsequently when the aggression was denounced in Parliament, we were still not sure about our rights in Aksai Chin.”¹⁹⁰ However, not many of his colleagues subscribed to this point of view. To most in the foreign policy bureaucracy, the issue was not just about Aksai Chin; there was a breakdown of overall trust with China. While the Aksai Chin issue blew up in importance in 1958, talks on some of the contested territories, such as Bara Hoti began, but soon lost their way due to the immense gap in perception between the two sides. India believed there was a perceptible shift in China’s approach. “It seems to me that whatever the internal reasons might be in China, the attitude of

¹⁸⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru’s talks with Chou En-lai – IV, 1 January 1957, SWJN, Series II, vol. 36, 618-619.

¹⁹⁰ Our China Policy: A Personal Assessment, 30 July 1968, R.K. Nehru Papers, Subject File 5, NMML.

the Chinese Government has stiffened somewhat even in regard to India,” is how Nehru described the development.¹⁹¹

The stiffening of attitude was also visible in the Chinese government’s approach to Tibet. In early 1958, the Dalai Lama had informed Beijing that he wanted Prime Minister Nehru to visit Tibet. Zhou himself informed the Indian ambassador of the development, adding that he planned to accompany Nehru in this visit. Delhi welcomed the invitation, enquiring if late summer or early autumn would be convenient.¹⁹² In the meantime, Delhi began to draw up a tentative schedule of places Nehru would like to visit. While Chinese officials continued the conversation about tentative dates, things did not seem to move forward. Till June, Beijing had not confirmed dates; as Pant in Sikkim came to know, the Dalai Lama had also been kept in the dark about the prime minister’s visit.¹⁹³ By July, Nehru too was convinced that the Chinese government did not want him in Tibet, as he confessed to Apa Pant. To him, this seemed guided by Beijing’s belief that India was supporting anti-China activities in Kalimpong.¹⁹⁴ Days later, the Chinese embassy informed the MEA that they were concerned that some elements in Tibet were planning to “cause bodily harm” to the Indian prime minister, suggesting that the trip be postponed.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Note from the Prime Minister to the Foreign Secretary, 15 June 1958, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 32, NMML.

¹⁹² Letter No. FS/115 from Foreign Secretary to Apa B. Pant, Political Officer, Sikkim, 29 January 1958, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 53, NMML.

¹⁹³ Telegram from Political, Gangtok to Foreign New Delhi, 10 June 1958, JNSG, Vol- 624-II, NMML.

¹⁹⁴ Letter from the Prime Minister to Political Officer, Sikkim, 11 July 1958, JNSG, Vol- 632-I, NMML.

¹⁹⁵ Bhasin, *India-China Relations, 1947-2000*, 1903.

2.4.5 *Development as foreign policy*

China's policy of bringing Tibet under its complete control, understandably comprised an element of increasing development in the region as well as building infrastructure that would allow Tibet to increase trade with the mainland. This came at the cost of India's traditional relationship with the region that involved both trade and assistance for development. China believed that this was necessary to wean Tibet away from India and its influence. Additionally, by being in charge of Tibetan development, China could be in control of the process of assimilating Tibetans into the Chinese mainstream. During his stint as the consulate general at Lhasa, P.N. Menon found that "the phase that started with 17 point agreement is definitely over. The Chinese State Council will now decide the direction that Tibet takes, as they are moving things in Tibet including the setting up of the preparatory committee for Tibet Autonomous Region."¹⁹⁶ He deduced that security and infrastructure development were the two priorities of the Chinese government, going by the fact that at least one PLA division (around 12,000 soldiers) was stationed to keep peace in the Tibetan capital. Additional troops were deployed for road building and to carry out other infrastructure work.

However, Menon found that despite these efforts, trade with India still flourished, mainly because other parts of China were so far away from Tibet. He reported that China was trying to discourage trade with India, for instance, by restricting the use of Indian rupee by Tibetan traders. Menon concluded that "if this trend is continued, the pattern of trade between India and Tibet may undergo a change for the worse and the benefits of economic exchange with us reduce

¹⁹⁶ Note from Consulate General at Lhasa, P.N. Menon to Political officer in Sikkim Apa Pant, 3 February 1956, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 3, NMML.

to an extent which will facilitate the early economic and political integration of Tibet with China.”¹⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the spy agency of the United States, had confirmed his findings in 1953, reporting that “the Chinese were in complete control of trade and business.” However, trade with India still thriving, with Tibetan traders sending tea, incense, and veils to Ladakh, and bringing back dried fruit, soap, cigarettes, and sugar.¹⁹⁸ This did not mean Delhi was blind to the possibility that this was temporary, and Chinese restrictions could come in any day. In 1954 Nehru urged that India intensify its trade with Tibet despite it being a small market. He argued that trade with Tibet was modest enough not to threaten China. However, “from the economic and psychological points of view, it will be advantageous to us.” He urged that India “should allow as much trade as possible. If transport difficulties come in the way, they will limit the trade. It is not for us to plead transport difficulties and refuse permission for trade. Therefore, we should agree to free and unrestricted transit of goods to Tibet through India subject only to our own demand and supply position.”¹⁹⁹ Since India was no longer able to extend development aid to Tibet, trade was the only way that some aspects of the traditional relationships could continue.

It was also apparent that by this time India was no longer in a position to offer loans to Tibet as suggested by Hugh Richardson and Harishwar Dayal a few years ago. The CIA reported having found Bank of China representatives not just in Lhasa, but in other trading towns such as

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, “1. TRADE BETWEEN LADAKH, SINKIANG AND TIBET 2. CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN TIBET” CREST, General CIA Records, July 24, 1953, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A001900120001-7.pdf>.

¹⁹⁹ Trade and Frontier with China: Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, 1 July 1954, SWJN, Series II, vol. 26, 483.

Gyantse as well, where they were “urging Tibetans to accept loans.” Simultaneously, the Chinese were opening schools all across eastern Tibet that would follow the Chinese method of education.²⁰⁰ S.L. Chibber, the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung stated that Chinese development activities included “setting up of new form of government in Lhasa, strengthening of defences to guard ancestral boundaries, improvement of agriculture, education, improvement of communication and among many other things training of the youth of Tibet in communist methods so as to make them think from their point of view and bring them closer to China.”²⁰¹ In this environment, it is unlikely that India could have offered development assistance for Tibet through Beijing. Ambassador Raghavan’s assessment of the Chinese attitude towards India was that domestically, China was keen on projecting India “as a capitalist country suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism and as such still not free but awaiting ultimate liberation.”²⁰² With this view, the Chinese government could not be seen accepting Indian help on Tibet. The development aspect of the relationships withered soon after 1951; Indo-Tibet trade too, would eventually almost cease by 1958.

2.5 CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out the difference in India’s approach to the Tibet question between 1950 and 1959, and asked – what explains the fact that India decided not to act

²⁰⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “1. CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, EASTERN TIBET 2. ATTITUDE OF INDIAN OFFICIALS, TIBET,” CREST, General CIA Records, December 24, 1953, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A003200150001-9.pdf>.

²⁰¹ Note from Indian Trade Agent at Yatung, S.L. Chibber to Political officer in Sikkim Apa Pant, undated, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 3, NMML.

²⁰² Letter from Ambassador N. Raghavan to Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 March 1954, JNSG Vol. 241-I, NMML.

in 1950 when China attacked Tibet, but decisively moved to provide asylum to the Dalai Lama nine years later? If an aversion to antagonizing China guided the behavior in the earlier instance, what explains the reversal of Indian behavior later? By using an images framework based on the work of Robert Jervis, I argue that India's decisions become understandable when aspects of India's self- image vis-à-vis China are viewed as refracted through Tibet. In an intertemporal analysis, I investigate three aspects of the Indian self-image – civilizational conviction, territorial anxiety, and the preference for using development as foreign policy. Using thematic coding of primary source documents and process tracing, I use archival a material and interviews to draw out the differences in the Indian approach in these there aspects between 1950—'51 and 1959.

India's civilizational conviction involved a belief that India deserved a position of power different from where it found itself at independence, as well as the view that India had its own sphere of influence. These persuaded India to consider China a peer and a fellow traveler in the path to a post-colonial, anti-imperial future. At the time of the PRC's campaign for "peaceful liberation" of Tibet, members of the Indian establishment believed that China would not destroy Tibet's autonomous nature and distinct identity, which, in turn, guided them not to act. Indian leaders had not accounted for the different paths that India and China had followed to their current iterations in 1947 and 1949 respectively, and how that influenced their approach to the world. On the other hand, in 1959, by the time the Dalai Lama considered leaving the Tibetan capital, Indian leaders had reconciled to the fact there was a stark difference in the way that China and India approached the civilizational aspect of the relationship. While the cultural connections that the Dalai Lama represented were considered invaluable by India, China did not feel the same way. The Indian leadership had often indicated that they believed the Dalai Lama

crucial to the Indo-Tibet relationship, even in 1950—'51. Therefore, once Nehru and others felt that the Dalai Lama's position was becoming untenable in Tibet, they did not hesitate to offer him asylum.

India's territorial anxiety too underwent a considerable change between 1950 and 1959. As Nehru mentioned in public and private statements at the time of the Chinese campaign on Tibet, he did not consider the presence of the PLA close to India's borders a threat to territory.

However, the Indian foreign policy establishment believed that the PRC underwent a change in their approach on territorial issues in the mid-1950s. They claimed that after the agreement on trade with Tibet was signed in 1954, there was a distinct change in the way Chinese leaders talked about the issue of contested territories and how they wanted to address and resolve them.

This perception was augmented by incidents such as the repeated inclusion of territories that India considered its own in Chinese maps, presence of PLA patrols in disputed areas, and most importantly, in the discovery of a road built by the Chinese through Aksai Chin, which India claimed. These developments added to the difficulty that India found in coordinating its vision of the region with that of China.

Finally, the aspect of development and trade that had traditionally been a part of the Indo-Tibetan relationship began to wither away soon after 1950. Independent India also inherited the responsibilities that had so long been fulfilled by the British Empire. This included help with economic development as well as providing support in Tibetan trade. In the years soon after 1947, India considered loans to the Tibet government for carrying out projects. However, in the post-1950 period, trade was made increasingly difficult by Chinese authorities, who wanted to

integrate Tibet with PRC. Additionally, China was uncomfortable with the region's dependence on Indian goods. Naturally, in this environment, development assistance was impossible. By 1959, India's changing relationship with Tibet and the role China played in shaping it further guided Indian policymakers to change their approach. It had also become increasingly difficult to follow a Tibet policy independent of Chinese involvement. As a result, by 1959, India felt that offering asylum to the Dalai Lama was necessary as a means of preserving the last vestiges of the traditional Indo-Tibet relationship.

Chapter 3. BHUTAN 1969—1975

3.1 INTRODUCTION

“I think it will be a good thing if we treat this State as closely allied to us as possible rather than consider it alien. Of course, Bhutanese subjects need not be considered to be Indian nationals. But when this Parliament finally controls major policies about that State, when the Government of India gives them annual subsidies and aids, it is far from an alien State.”

Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 August 1951²⁰³

“[The Bhutanese King] said, “you have always been comparing Bhutan to Sikkim, but Bhutan and Sikkim have two different statuses. So I am very disturbed that when you are talking about sponsoring Bhutan to the U.N., you are not making a difference between Sikkim and Bhutan and Bhutan is nowhere near Sikkim!” He shared all this with the President of India.”

B.S. Das, 5 August 2016.²⁰⁴

In this chapter and the next, I assess India’s relationships with Sikkim and Bhutan in the first three decades after independence, focusing primarily on how they responded to evolving Indian strategic considerations. In this chapter, in particular, I focus on the relationship with Bhutan,

²⁰³ Jawaharlal Nehru during debate in parliament on rectification of the Assam-Bhutan Boundary Policy, 7 August 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru, *SWJN*, Series II, Vol. 16-II, 509-510.

²⁰⁴ Personal interview with B.S. Das, Delhi, India, 5 Aug 2016.

one, which went from strength to strength even during moments of substantial crisis in independent India's history. The relationship took off on a firm footing during Indian independence and eventually led to India responding to Bhutanese calls for greater autonomy by actively working towards Bhutan becoming a member of the United Nations. What explains this response from India? Especially, when, in neighboring Sikkim (a similarly small Buddhist kingdom with civilizational connections to India and Tibet, and borders with both) India's response to the question of autonomy was far less accommodating? I argue that Bhutanese considerations and acknowledgment of aspects of Indian self-image vis-à-vis China, including civilizational conviction, territorial anxiety, and development as foreign policy, induced an accommodative policy from India, in comparison to the one towards Sikkim.

I begin by explaining the unique historical and geopolitical factors that guided India in developing its relationships with these states. Thereafter I examine the early years after independence, during which India started its relationships with Bhutan and Sikkim on an even keel. In the subsequent section, I deal with the period from 1968, when India's separate approaches towards the two states had become visible. In this section, I analyze the Bhutan-India relationship from the perspective of three aspects of self-image that I have been using in this dissertation – civilizational conviction, territorial anxiety, and development as a component of foreign policy.

At the outset, it is vital to situate Bhutan and Sikkim in Indian strategic thought vis-à-vis China. The broad contours of India's association with the two kingdoms, guided by individual bilateral treaties signed with independent India, were derived from relationships developed by the British

in the 19th and early 20th centuries.²⁰⁵ The irreversible arrangement of geography played a significant role in determining Indian strategic considerations. Sikkim and Bhutan and their many passes were all that separated India from Tibet and the fallout from a possible Chinese misadventure. As early as 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru highlighted his concerns about this geopolitical reality, emphasizing that he foresaw a “great deal of trouble with China,” and cautioned that one thing that India could not allow to happen was “any foreign intrusion in Bhutan or defense or foreign affairs not being completely under us.”²⁰⁶ He advised of the need to prepare for an eventuality of “Chinese or Tibetan Communists right up on our Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim border.”²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ There exists a rich literature on Sikkim from mid-20th century. However, since they were little known in the outside world, most of these are religious or anthropological texts offering a novel eye on the two remote mountain kingdoms and their customs and traditions. Few studies focused on their relationship with the outside world till the 1970s, when political developments brought focus on the subject. It is important to note that most of these are personal accounts, and therefore often slant either towards the Chogyal or towards India. Significant among these include Nari Rustomji, *Enchanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan, and India's Northeastern Borderlands*. (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nari Rustomji, *Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy* (Ahmedabad: Allied Publishers, 1987); Hope Cooke, *Time Change: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); Brajbir Saran Das, *The Sikkim Saga* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983); Brajbir Saran Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat* (Tata McGraw-Hill Education Pvt. Ltd., 2010); Girija Shankar Bajpai, *China's Shadow over Sikkim: The Politics of Intimidation* (New Delhi : Hartford, Wi.: Lancer Publishers ; Spantech & Lancer, 1999); Triloki Nath Kaul, *Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979); Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984); Andrew Duff, *Sikkim: Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd, 2017); Satyendra R. Shukla, *Sikkim : The Story of Integration* (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1976). Bhutan, on the other hand has found focus in fewer full-length academic volumes. Significant ones, both full-length volumes and papers include Nari Rustomji, *Enchanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan, and India's Northeastern Borderlands*. (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1971); Brajbir Saran Das, *Mission to Bhutan: A Nation in Transition* (New Delhi: Vikas PubHouse, 1995); Rajesh S. Kharat, *Foreign Policy of Bhutan* (Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005); Medha Bisht, “Bhutan’s Foreign Policy Determinants: An Assessment,” *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 1 (2012); Manorama Kohli, *From Dependency to Interdependence: A Study of Indo-Bhutan Relations* (New Delhi: Vikas PubHouse, 1993); S. D. Muni, “Bhutan’s Deferential Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 158–163; Syed Aziz-Al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, “Bhutan’s Foreign Policy: Cautious Self-Assertion?,” *Asian Survey* 33, no. 11 (1993): 1043.

²⁰⁶ Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Akbar Hydari, 9 August 1948, JNSG, Vol- 12-I, NMML.

²⁰⁷ Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to John Matthai, 10 September 1949, SWJN, Series II, vol. 13, 260.

Though the treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim clearly defined relations with India differently, the Indian establishment, manned by members of the erstwhile British civil service for years after independence, often slipped into the colonial practice of bracketing them together. For a newly independent India asserting its civilizational connections in the region, the two kingdoms represented common cultural connections. Additionally, their geographical contiguities, the fact that both had special treaty relationships with India, and their similar strategic roles, made similar strategic responses a viable approach in the eyes of Indian decision-makers. Pre-colonial commercial and social networks were still operational, allowing India to pursue its policy of development both to build relationships with these states, as well to expand its trading role. Most importantly, relations with Sikkim, Bhutan, as well as Tibet were conducted through the Political Office in Sikkim which was responsible for keeping Delhi updated.²⁰⁸

The analysis in this chapter and the next looks beyond the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 and the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 to understand the divergence in the relationship of the states. I aim to explain this through my framework of refracted images which investigates the role Sikkim and Bhutan play in refracting aspects of India's self-image in relation to China. In these chapters, I evaluate how, in an environment of rapidly changing strategic considerations, India interpreted Sikkimese and Bhutanese behavior in response to the three aspects of self-image that India projected. I argue that India's projection of its self-image comes with an inherent expectation of other players in the region acknowledging and responding to it. While the relationships with

²⁰⁸ This obviously made neither Sikkim nor Bhutan happy. Bhutanese policy consistently attempted to separate themselves from Sikkim, objecting even to visits to Sikkim and Bhutan together by Indian leaders, as reflected in the quote in the beginning of this chapter. On the other hand, the Sikkimese king never missed an opportunity to publicly emphasize the salience of a separate Sikkimese identity.

Sikkim and Bhutan started off from a largely similar footing, I attribute the eventual variation in policy to the difference in their responses, how Indian decision-makers perceived them, and drew inferences from them.

Empirically, archival material and interviews provide indications of statements as well as action by Sikkim and Bhutan, how they reflected on Indian self-image, the messages inferred, and how India, thereafter responded with its messages motivated by the three preferences. The two chapters encompass a two-part argument. First, from the 1960s, Chinese activity in the region amplified India's territorial anxiety, perceived threats to its preference for development, and India's priority in keeping its civilizational ties with actors in the region, which reflected in aspects of self-image that India projected. Faced with this uncertainty, India attributed greater importance to behavior from Sikkim and Bhutan that signaled clear acknowledgment of these concerns. Second, I argue that whereas India perceived images projected by Bhutan as sufficient recognition of India's status as the preeminent regional power, those from Palden Thondup Namgyal, Sikkim's last king (also called the Chogyal), were interpreted as disregarding Indian concerns. This perceived difference was reflected in the diverging Indian policies towards the two kingdoms.

Bhutan's response to these aspects of self-image gave India little reason to complain. Despite emphasizing that Bhutan could choose whether or not to act according to Indian advice, the royals in the kingdom made it a point to acknowledge and engage with Indian security concerns. For instance, despite intermittent domestic opposition to the stationing of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in the country, the Bhutanese royals seldom brought it up with India.

Though at times, the MEA would consider cultivating multiple power centers in the country to stay relevant, the royal family made sure to recognize its appreciation of the policy of engaging with Bhutan through the monarchy, assuaging Indian concerns. Finally, India's suggested focus on development was gratefully acknowledged by the Bhutanese elites who refused aid from anyone but India and looked at Indian funding for Bhutan's five-year development plans.

Methodologically, this chapter, along with the next, comprise a paired comparison of Sikkim and Bhutan, as part of a most-similar case research design. While the two instances in this comparison fulfill the condition of geographical proximity, which in this case also results in similar strategic threats and requirements, there is more that binds the two kingdoms together. These include a common historical and cultural background which extends into administrative systems as well as social hierarchies. Politically, both were committed in pre-colonial special relationships with British India, and later with independent India. According to Tarrow, though a most-similar systems design such as this can make singling out of the experimental variables difficult, the method is useful in directing attention to how the two differ.²⁰⁹ For Sikkim and Bhutan, this reflected in the images that the two project in response to geopolitical changes, with knowledge about Indian security concerns. At the same time, the analysis is cognizant of the question of external validity raised by that Slater and Ziblatt.²¹⁰ Indeed, I do not claim to provide an overriding explanation for the difference in India's association with Sikkim and Bhutan, which can be applied to explain the variation in the association of small states with their large

²⁰⁹ Sidney Tarrow, "The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 2 (February 1, 2010): 234.

²¹⁰ Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison," *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 10 (October 1, 2013): 1306.

neighbors for all other cases. However, the available evidence here allows substantial theoretical contribution, which Slater and Ziblatt confirm as one of the conditions that are important while choosing paired comparisons.²¹¹ Adequate archival and interview data available for these cases offer opportunities to understand how images are decided, projected, and perceived, and the role that policy decisions and behavior play, which aids further theory-building. Finally, as Tarrow indicates, while such design may not entirely ensure identification of all confounding variables, the opportunity of dual-process tracing in paired comparisons significantly increases the inferential power of the design over the single-case study.²¹²

In explaining the Indo-Bhutan relationship vis-à-vis the Indo-Sikkim relationship, rival accounts have argued that Bhutan was allowed more leeway under the terms of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949. While I delve into the terms of the Indo-Sikkim treaty of 1950 in more details in the following chapter, I argue that this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The comparatively less-intrusive language in the Bhutan treaty read “the Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”²¹³ However, this did not stop the MEA from interpreting the clause to India’s advantage. In an early reading, the MEA claimed that since “the present Government of India is a successor to the British Government and the text of Article 2 is identical with the amendment of 1910, even without a similar explanation we have the right to assume that the interpretation

²¹¹ Ibid, p 1313.

²¹² Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison,” 245.

²¹³ India and Bhutan Instrument of Ratification, 15 September 1949, Nari Rustomji Subject File 14, NMML.

holds good and only the Government of India is responsible for Bhutan's external relations."²¹⁴

Throughout the 1960s, India represented Bhutan's concerns on the boundary with China with the consent of the king and Bhutan's national assembly, the Tshogdu.²¹⁵ Unlike what an explanation based on terms of the treaty would expect, India's approach to Bhutan did not substantially change even after the kingdom decided to take over the responsibility of directly discussing boundary issues with China.

3.2 THE NEED FOR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The government of independent India found it necessary to sign treaties with Sikkim as well as Bhutan to maintain the unique relationships they had had with British India. During discussions for a treaty with Bhutan, Nehru proposed an extension of the relationship "the principles of which would be that Defence and External Affairs will be entrusted to the Indian Union. We shall treat Bhutan as a special case, and not as an Indian State. In effect it will be in subsidiary alliance with India, as it has been more or less in the past."²¹⁶ Nehru himself raised the subject

²¹⁴ Note "India's responsibility for the External Relations of Bhutan and Sikkim and China's Hesitation in Accepting the Position" in file India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan boundaries, undated, NAI, File no. HI/107(1)/72.

²¹⁵ In a visit to India in 1960, the King of Bhutan said "I have requested the Prime Minister of India, on behalf of my Government that the Government of India initiate or take up any question with China regarding our northern border." (NMML Nari Rustomji Subject file 14); After Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai claimed in 1959 that neither the Tibet-Sikkim border nor the Tibet-Bhutan border fell within the scope of China's conversation with India, Nehru pointed out that Chinese maps showed sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet, and that "under treaty relationships with Bhutan the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government." (Letter from Zhou to Nehru, 8 Sept 1959, MEA Nehru White Paper 2, pp 44; Letter from Nehru to Zhou, 26 Sept 1959, MEA Nehru White Paper 2, pp 60;); Only in 1974, after Bhutan had become a member of the United Nations, Inder Pal Khosla, the Indian Ambassador in 1974 was told that the Bhutanese did not want India to speak for them to the Chinese. According to Bhutanese Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering, while Bhutan was ready to consult India, it was free to decide whether to follow the advice. (Personal interview with Inder Pal Khosla, Delhi, India, 14 Nov 2017).

²¹⁶ Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Akbar Hydari, 9 August 1948, JNSG, Vol- 12-I, NMML.

with Bhutan in April 1949 with little success “as the Bhutanese appeared to be frightened by this suggestion, the Prime Minister said that there would be no attempt to impose any settlement on them.”²¹⁷

Despite attempts to formalize and perhaps extend Bhutan’s association with India, available evidence does not suggest that this was an attempt to integrate Bhutan into the newly formed Union of India along with princely states. Bhutan had already dropped out of the conversation with the Chamber of Princes, to distinguish between them and the princely states.²¹⁸ A resolution moved by Nehru in January 1947 and adopted by the Constituent Assembly allowed additional powers to the committee negotiating with the princely states for “examining the special problem of Bhutan and Sikkim and to report to the Assembly the result of such examination.” The committee, Nehru explained, would have the additional task of negotiating with “territories which are not Indian states, specially Bhutan and Sikkim.”²¹⁹

India’s strategic calculations regarding the region reflected an evolving concern of China’s motivations and geographical proximity to India. The PLA’s success in taking over control of

²¹⁷ Note “Article II of the Treaty of 1949 and the status of Bhutan” in file Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Sikkim, relation legal and other matters, 9 April 1969, NAI, File no. - PP(JS) 3(1)/69. Bhutanese records, however, recount the incident differently. According to accounts published recently - “The Bhutan delegation stood firm in safeguarding Bhutan’s security and protecting its sovereignty,” writes the Queen Mother in the book. In fact, the discussions were far more tense than anyone had anticipated. “We maintained that unless we received some sort of written favourable assurance on our [territorial] claims, we were not authorised to discuss future relations between India and Bhutan,” Ashi Tashi’s minutes record says, and the Bhutanese delegation nearly left without an agreement. Eventually the word “communications” was left out, a concession from Nehru who had argued that Bhutan would not be able to build its communications infrastructure on its own. (Tashi, Tshering. “Befriending the Neighbour.” *The Hindu*, July 24, 2018. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/befriending-the-neighbour/article24497565.ece>.)

²¹⁸ Personal interview with Sunanda Datta-Ray, Kolkata, India, 9 Dec 2017.

²¹⁹ Quoted in Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984) p 48.

Tibet in 1950—'51 irrevocably changed the balance of power. Chinese soldiers now patrolled the streets of Lhasa. India's mission and trade agencies in Tibet were finding it increasingly difficult to operate. Though by the late 1950s he would come to accept otherwise, Nehru was initially confident that India had little to be concerned about despite PLA presence in Tibet.²²⁰ As the years progressed, Chinese influence started to be omnipresent. In October 1958, Nehru, along with daughter Indira Gandhi embarked on a visit to Bhutan following the traditional trade routes, arriving in Tibet through Sikkim. As they stopped to spend a night in Yatung, a town with an Indian trading post, Nehru noticed that the "main market road was full of Indian shops."²²¹ In a fitting sign of the changing times, representatives of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas who arrived to welcome the Indian Prime Minister were escorted by the PLA general in charge of Lhasa.

These remnants of the old order, which characterized an old relationship were under pressure and began to disappear soon. Within six months of the Dalai Lama leaving for India in March 1959, Nehru was protesting Chinese cartographical claims on Bhutanese territory to the Chinese Premier, while the Indian Trade Agent wrote of Chinese officers in Tibet claiming that they would soon "'liberate' Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and other parts of India."²²² India's relationships with Sikkim and Bhutan were on an even keel at this time, and it was necessary to project an image of established exceptional relations with the two kingdoms. The deliberation over how to depict Sikkim and Bhutan in relation to India in official maps reflect this. In September 1954, in

²²⁰ See chapter on Tibet for more on this.

²²¹ Jawaharlal Nehru: Letter to Chief Ministers, 15 October 1958, SWJN Series 2 vol 44, 19-27.

²²² "Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China," 26 September 1959, in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 2, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1954).

a meeting in the prime minister's room, it was decided that "Sikkim and Bhutan should be shown inside the international boundary of India and should be demarcated from the rest of India by State Boundary symbols. They should be shaded differently from the rest of India and differently from each other and shown in the reference as "states attached to India by special treaties."²²³ Nehru believed that India "should not object to Bhutan being shown outside the international boundary. If this question is raised, we can explain to the Bhutan government that we are prepared to mark the boundary differently. Again, we should not take the initiative in this matter."²²⁴

The decision followed the concern that acknowledging Bhutan as a separate state at par with others could encourage China to believe that India had no particular interest in its neighbor. The safest route, therefore, was to indicate Bhutan's existence within India's sphere of influence. Eventually, following objections, Bhutan's boundaries began to be depicted with symbols different from India's interstate and international boundaries. In 1969, Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul admitted that "the King of Bhutan, His Ministers and the Royal Advisory Council have represented the matter to us several times. This is a major irritant. Constitutionally also, Bhutan does not lie within the "territories of the Union". I have no doubt that the time has come to make this change regarding Bhutan." Sikkim, however, he believed, must be considered separately.²²⁵

²²³ MEA note "Enclosure 1: The Depiction of the India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan Boundaries," in file Depiction of Indo-Bhutan boundary, 12 September 1969, NAI, file No. PP(JS) 3(2)/69

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Comment by Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul to MEA note "Enclosure 1: The Depiction of the India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan Boundaries," in file Depiction of Indo-Bhutan boundary, 16 September 1969, NAI, file No. PP(JS) 3(2)/69

This comment was not an indication that the approach to the region was about to change; the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak wars in 1962 and 1965 had already done that.

While it is unlikely that Delhi believed that Bhutan or Sikkim was in any immediate danger of being taken over, the MEA had been drawing attention to “virulent, provocative and abusive” messages broadcast through loudspeakers in the border. These urged the Indian Army to “oppose the Government of India” and to “support the revolution and establish a true People's Republic.”²²⁶ Beijing's denial of a role in this was not convincing, as staid official statements were followed by harsh demi-official responses. A Xinhua release in October 1966 accused India of continuing British expansionist policy because “it treats Sikkim as its “protectorate,” encroaching upon Sikkim's independence and sovereignty. It tries hard to tighten its control over Bhutan and makes every effort to prevent the latter from attaining its due international status and even intends to send troops directly into Bhutanese territory and station them there.”²²⁷

The sparring through diplomatic channels eventually peaked in a series of confrontations on the Sikkim border around the end of 1967. The action started in Nathu La, a traditionally active pass connecting to Chumbi Valley that had been closed since 1962. In the preceding months, India and China had blamed each other's diplomats of espionage, eventually expelling them. A report from Sikkim on the incident starts innocuously, mentioning only a “serious incident” in Nathu

²²⁶ “Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India,” 28 July, 1966, and “Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India,” 25 November, 1966 in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 13, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1967).

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7, 85, 99.

La on September 11.²²⁸ On the ground, things were hardly as prosaic. Rising tension between Indian and Chinese soldiers over few weeks boiled over as Indians laid barb-wire fences. India claimed that the PLA attacked without provocation, first with small-arms, and then, with mortars and artillery, forcing them to retaliate. While the exact number varies in Chinese and Indian accounts, combined casualties reached hundreds in the next three days. Once the guns fell silent, an Indian report from Sikkim wondered if this behavior was reflective of new “political adventurism” in Red Guards, advising caution in other border areas.²²⁹ In less than a month, similar skirmishes broke out in Cho La, a pass north-west of Nathu La. However, this time, hostilities ceased faster.

China claimed that the “planned, prepared and long pre-meditated,” clashes were instances of Indian adventurism supported by Soviet revisionism and American imperialism.²³⁰ India alleged that “by launching another attack shortly after a similar one which was unleashed by Chinese troops at Nathu La on the 11th of September, the Chinese Government is seeking to build up tension at a border which has never been in dispute. The Government of India are resolved to repel any aggression against the frontiers.”²³¹ India emphasized that these frontiers referred to not only India’s own, but also those of Sikkim and Bhutan.

²²⁸ “Monthly report for September 1967 from the Office of the Political Officer, Sikkim,” in Monthly political reports (other than annual) from Gangtok, 6 October 1967, NAI, File no. HI/1012(33)/67

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ Indian-Chinese Border Incidents: Chinese reports, 13 September 1967, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), File No. FCO 37/68.

²³¹ “Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India,” 3 October, 1967, 1966 in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper.*, vol. 14, White Paper (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1968).

The precariousness of the Himalayan borders was suddenly bared. The view that China was actively working to bring India's neighbors into its sphere of influence was gaining ground beyond India. The British Commonwealth Office believed that "the Chinese intend to subvert the Himalayan states from the inside, which would at least seem to establish their interest...Chinese have been saying in Lhasa that Sikkim and Bhutan were once part of Tibet and that the Chinese Government are now trying to incorporate them again with Tibet."²³² Irrespective of whether China intended to incorporate these kingdoms or merely influence them, it was clear that the hardening of the policy was underway. Chinese ideological and material support were finding their way to Naga dissidents in India's Northeast, and Naxalite rebels in West Bengal.²³³

During this time, there was a leadership change in India, which coincided with an overall evolution in international and domestic considerations. The new Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, responded to these changes by approaching the neighborhood from a perspective more entrenched on security considerations than her father's. Indian policies now expected a near constant acknowledgment from Sikkim and Bhutan of India's security concerns. Kaul's comments on maps merely reflected an element of the different routes that India's Sikkim and Bhutan policies had started to take. In word and deed, the government was conveying anxiety over its territorial security and Indian influence among the Himalayan neighbors. It also posed a threat to the policy of development that kept the smaller states beholden to India. In the

²³² Letter from British Commonwealth Office to the British High Commissions in Delhi, 3 October 1967, TNA, File No. FCO 37/68.

²³³ In April 1969, the MEA sent a note to the Embassy of China in Delhi with information gathered over the previous few years on specific instances when Naga dissidents had been given military training, financial and ideological support, and met CCP leaders. Note available in TNA FCO 37/373.

following section, I address the various ways in which these differences manifested in the case of Bhutan when investigated from the perspective of the three aspects of India's self-image.

3.3 IN TANDEM WITH BHUTAN: TWO CAN PLAY THIS GAME

3.3.1 *Civilizational conviction*

To a great extent, the attentiveness that India had come to expect of Bhutan in understanding India's concerns can be attributed to the third king of the Wangchuck dynasty who ascended to the throne in 1952. Jigme Dorji Wangchuck and Nehru struck up a friendly and respectful relationship early on, which extended beyond personal equations, and into how they approached the two states. As early as 1954, Nehru had suggested developing Indo-Bhutanese relations independent of Sikkim through a separate agent in Bhutan.²³⁴ Bhutan hesitated till 1968, torn between the desire to be treated separately from Sikkim, and the concerns of excessive Indian meddling.²³⁵ An Indian agent exclusively for Bhutan was eventually necessary to end the practice of communicating with Delhi through Sikkim as part of the separations of Sikkim and Bhutan policies.

Brajbir Saran Das, a career Indian Police Service officer, was sounded out in late 1967 to take over as Special Officer of the Indian Government in Bhutan, "to have someone who will be useful to the King and his Government, so that there is a direct channel of communication between us and the King."²³⁶ Das was also mandated by Delhi to convince dissatisfied sections

²³⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru's Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Joint Secretary: Coordination between India and Bhutan, 30 January 1954, SWJN, Series II, Vol. 24, 593-4.

²³⁵ Brajbir Saran Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat* (Tata McGraw-Hill Education Pvt. Ltd., 2010) p 59-60.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, 54.

of the younger Bhutanese elite that India had Bhutan's best interests in mind. Kaul, he says, sent him to "create an element of confidence in the minds of the younger lot of Bhutan. Let them not feel that we are cheating them or bypassing them."²³⁷ As Jigme Dorji Wangchuck sought more time before approving the Indian request, Kaul and Das traveled to Bhutan's capital Thimphu to seek the King's assent. While the King agreed, the Speaker of the Tshogdu wrote to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, cautioning that her representative would be sent back if found acting against Bhutanese interest. Though the King expressed his surprise at the letter, Das believed this was another instance where the King had gotten his point across subtly, without burning bridges with Delhi.²³⁸

Even as a new chapter of the India-Bhutan relationship started, King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck's ill-health continued to be a concern. The King aimed to maintain the Wangchuck dynasty by keeping the throne safe for his minor son, Jigme Singye Wangchuck. The most enduring way to maintain independence, he realized, was as a member of the United Nations, which was impossible without Indian sponsorship. This had been a long-standing desire, brought up by Bhutan with Nehru as early as 1959.²³⁹ They had even convinced Sikkim Political Officer Apa Pant that sponsoring Bhutan's membership would be useful as a strategy to safeguard against Chinese intervention.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ Personal interview with B.S. Das, Delhi, India, 5 Aug 2016.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Note from Foreign Secretary to Law Ministry, 28 September, 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 37, NMML.

²⁴⁰ Letter from Apa Pant to Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai, 24 November 1962, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 9, NMML.

While India was deliberating on the U.N. question, the Bhutanese King started another process that was close to India's heart. He initiated political reforms aimed at bringing in some form of democracy in the kingdom and turning it into a democratic monarchy. He presided over Bhutan's first cabinet in 1968, as both Head of Government and Head of State, designed to move sovereignty from the King to the national assembly eventually. Against all advice, he proposed that the Tshogdu have the power to ask a monarch to abdicate if two-thirds of the members disapproved of him.²⁴¹ In a nation that had known only an absolute monarchy, the Tshogdu approved it in 1969 more out of loyalty to the king than the will to democratize.²⁴² In an apparent coincidence, the next year, the Tshogdu decided to debate rules of succession in instances when the heir is a minor. As the King sat silently in approval, the assembly decided that a four-member Regency Council would take over the King's functions as long as the crown prince was a minor. For accountability, the council would have one member each from the royal family, the monks, the officials, and the people's representatives. Additionally, the council would function at the pleasure of the assembly which could dismiss or reorganize it if it so wished.²⁴³ The King had introduced democracy in his kingdom while legitimizing his lineage and eliminating alternate power centers.

²⁴¹ "Monthly Political Report for November 1968 from the Office of the Political Officer, Sikkim," 5 December 1968, NAI, File No. HI/1012/23/68.

²⁴² This was borne out by the fact that after the fourth king Jigme Singye Wangchuck ascended the throne in 1972, the provision was scrapped.

²⁴³ "Monthly Political Report for May 1970 from the Office of the Special Officer of India in Bhutan," 1 June 1970, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/70

However, the issue of U.N. membership was still unresolved. Younger Bhutanese elites led by the King's step-brother Namgyal Wangchuck who held the title of Tengye Lyonpo were getting impatient. The King had prevailed upon them to not raise the issue during Indira Gandhi's visit in 1968. When she visited two years later, however, the Tshogdu had several questions; why was Indian sponsorship to Bhutan's application taking so long? Also, nine years after they started training Bhutanese officers, why was the Indian Army still in Bhutan? A sudden Chinese incursion in May 1970 in Ha sector of western Bhutan put things in perspective. Das recalls the agitated King asking that the "Indian Army and Air Force to prepare to move into Bhutan to protect it. My troops will resist the Chinese if they move further."²⁴⁴ Though the PLA troops disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared, the King took the opportunity to emphasize the importance of Indian support and the necessity of having the military training team around.

During a visit by the Indian President V.V. Giri, Bhutan's King announced that the country would seek U.N. membership with Indian sponsorship. To ensure that India did not feel left behind as Bhutan joined the international community, the King reiterated that while Bhutan would open its missions in Delhi and New York, the country "was not yet ready to have Embassies in other countries just as she was not yet prepared to receive Embassies from other countries in Bhutan. Bhutan's representative in Delhi would, if necessary, build contacts with other countries."²⁴⁵ While the assurance was particularly relieving for India, building consensus on Bhutan's sponsorship was complicated. Sections of India's foreign policy bureaucracy

²⁴⁴Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat*, 85-86.

²⁴⁵ "Political report for May 1970 from the Office of the Special Officer of India in Bhutan" in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok and Thimphu, 1 June 1970, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/70.

preferred a status quo policy above all else. Supporting Bhutan would encourage them to be more independent and require India to invest effort in adjusting to a new reality. British diplomats reported India's hesitation on the issue of support over the years and expressed surprise at the announcement. Americans speculated that India's agreement must have been preceded by an undertaking from Bhutan that they would not allow representation from the Chinese in their country.²⁴⁶

India's concerns centered around the fate of Article 2 of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty once Bhutan was an independent, sovereign member of the international community. Bhutan could decide to disregard the provision that had so far sanctioned Indian influence over the country's foreign policy. By extension, this could allow Bhutan to engage with China in ways it had not done so far, potentially jeopardizing India's interests and security. There were confusing signals from China as well that India was trying to interpret. With no prior notice, Mao Zedong had reached out to Brajesh Mishra, the Indian Chargé d'affaires in Beijing during May Day celebrations, saying, "we cannot keep on quarrelling like this. We should try and be friends again. India is a great country. Indian people are good people. We will be friends again some day."²⁴⁷ While Indian policymakers were sure that the overture was significant, they could not immediately tell how it would reflect on the relationship, or, the region.

²⁴⁶ Letter from United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations to Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 14 August 1970, TNA, File No. FCO 37/531.

²⁴⁷ Telegram from Indembassy Peking, to Foreign, New Delhi, 6 May 1970, P.N. Haksar Papers Installment I & II, Subject File 29, NMML.

India's concern related to the bigger question of what Bhutan could do once it moved beyond the Indian sphere of influence. As United Nations member, Bhutan would have rights and privileges that would allow it to join and vote in favor of either bloc in a world divided by the Cold War. Representatives of big powers were already making a beeline for Bhutan. Kenneth Keating, the American ambassador, came bearing offers of economic assistance, but as George Griffin, the Political Officer in the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta remembers, the real objective was to get Bhutan to vote favorably in the U.N.²⁴⁸ Emissaries from Nepal, New Zealand, followed them. The Japanese envoy came last, and in a conversation with Das, blamed India for Bhutan's refusal to engage with the world.²⁴⁹ Much to India's relief, Jigme Dorji politely thanked and declined all offers that came his way. He lost no opportunity to reassure India and emphasize common civilizational bonds and security concerns between Bhutan and India. In a major policy speech to the assembly in 1970, he reminded his citizens that Bhutan's "northern neighbour is not only very large but also become dangerous. They believe that Bhutan is one of the five fingers of their hand and have claimed most of our territory as their own". He also referred to the happenings in Tibet which had compelled Bhutan to forge close relations with India."²⁵⁰ The King did want to engage with other states, but on his own terms. Article 2 allowed him that space while holding India responsible for Bhutan's reticence. As he pointed out in the speech, depending on India was, in fact, in Bhutan's interest.

²⁴⁸ "Oral History Project Country Reader: India." Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d. <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/India.pdf>, 816.

²⁴⁹ Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat*, 94.

²⁵⁰ Annual Political Report from B.S. Das, Special Officer of India in Bhutan, for the year 1970, 6 March 1971, NAI, File No. HI/1011/93/71.

In the United Nations, in the meantime, a peculiar debate threatened to upend the central objective of the organization. Influential members belonging to different sides of Cold War blocs were concerned about the uncertainty that multiple voting mini-states would bring. They questioned whether smaller states should have the same rights as other members. The United States proposed grouping smaller states into a category with limited ability to influence proceedings. As “associate members,” they would have no right to vote or seek office, and no obligation to contribute to the U.N. budget.²⁵¹ When the proposal failed, other barriers were introduced. Dago Tsering, member of Bhutan’s first permanent mission, and later Permanent Representative, remembers the Security Council claiming that “we do not take countries whose populations are less than one million, and they cited Kuwait, Mongolia – all sorts of political examples. And we felt if tiny countries in the Pacific could become members, why couldn’t we? Bhutan, according to our census reports, had over 1.3 million people. Where is the snag here?”²⁵²

The Bhutanese delegation was now canvassing for support. The Tengye Lyonpo and Sangay Penjore, who would later take over as Bhutan’s first Permanent Representative to the United Nations, spent a month in New York in 1970 meeting members of over 70 delegations. They also met the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and the U.S. Under Secretary of State. The effort was beginning to pay-off, barring the attention that Article 2 of the Indo-Bhutan treaty was expectedly receiving. Eventually, an explanation that representatives of other countries could reach Bhutan in its missions in New York and Delhi helped iron out creases. It also helped that

²⁵¹ “Note from C.R. Gharekhan, Deputy Secretary U.N.-II to all heads of Indian missions abroad on question of mini-states in the U.N.,” in file Political notes prepared by Ministry of External Affairs,” 7 Dec 1970, NAI, File No. HI/121/2/70-II.

²⁵² Personal interview with Dago Tsering, Thimphu, Bhutan, 2 Sep 2016.

India was not the only member that had “special relationships” with others. As the British Foreign Office put it, “we do not wish to quarrel particularly with the Indians; we do not wish to probe too closely into the relationships between Bhutan and India since we may have similar problems when some of the Gulf states apply for membership of the U.N.”²⁵³ Once Britain came on board, France followed. The Soviet Union agreed, though they did not want the agreement recorded on paper. The United States, the final stumbling block had reservations about Bhutan’s sovereignty. Eventually, in December the State Department informed the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. that their “legal advisers had, however, concluded that although the relationships could be argued to “derogate somewhat” from Bhutanese sovereignty, nevertheless Bhutan was correctly described as a “sovereign, independent, state, in a special treaty relationship with India”.”²⁵⁴ Bhutan’s submitted its formal letter of application to the United Nations on 21 December 1970.

Bhutan’s application was taken up for consideration by the Security Council for discussion on 9 and 10 February 1971. This was to be followed by a General Assembly vote. In a final push, the Indian Permanent Representative reiterated the “Government of India’s unqualified confidence in Bhutan’s ability to fulfill the obligations of the Charter as a Member of the United Nations”²⁵⁵ Japan, France, Argentina, Italy, and others also welcomed Bhutan’s inclusion. As the PRC was still not a member of the U.N., it fell on Pakistan’s representative to bring up Chinese concerns.

²⁵³ Internal communication, South Asia Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 8 January 1971, TNA, File No. FCO 37/751.

²⁵⁴ Cable from UK Embassy Washington, to Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 31 December 1970, TNA, File No. FCO 37/531.

²⁵⁵ "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fifteen Hundred and Sixty-sixth Meeting," copy of United Nations Security Council meeting, 10 February 1971, TNA File No. FCO 37/751.

In a dig to the Indo-Bhutan relationship, Pakistan expressed hope that “animated by its sturdy sentiments of independence, Bhutan will maintain the most harmonious relations with both its great neighbours to the north and to the south in the interests of peace and stability in the continent of Asia.”²⁵⁶ As the world welcomed Bhutan to the table, India was aware that the new arrangement would require reorienting Indian policies. Das wrote from Thimphu, “it has become all the more necessary for us to examine all aspects of our relationship very closely and prepare ourselves to face the new factors which must arise within a course of three to four years. As I have said several times, we have all the advantages now which we can consolidate. It will be too late after a year or two.”²⁵⁷

In the run-up to the next U.N. General Assembly in September 1971, Bhutan set up its mission in Delhi in May. Representative Pema Wangchuck presented his credentials to President Giri, while B.S. Das was elevated from Special Officer to Representative. Accounts of the event validated Bhutan’s sovereign identity, reporting that this was the first time that the country had received an envoy from a foreign country.²⁵⁸ The Bhutanese Permanent Mission in New York was set to open in July 1971. At the King’s request, Amar Nath Ram, India’s First Secretary in Bhutan, was appointed the Deputy Prominent Representative to the U.N. Bhutanese mission to help the new member navigate the intricate networks of international diplomacy. Ram would stay on the job till 1973, representing Bhutan in meetings with UNCTAD, UNDP, and UNECAFE. After PRC’s

²⁵⁶ “Report from C.V. Ranganathan, First Secretary at the U.N. Mission to J.N. Dixit, Deputy Secretary, (U.N.), MEA on U.N.SC discussion on Bhutan’s entry,” in file Admission of Bhutan into the United Nations, 12 February 1971, NAI, File No. HI/121(9)/71.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ “Monthly report for July” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), 1 August 1971, NA, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/71.

admission to the U.N., he received Huang Hua, the first Permanent Representative to the U.N., who discussed the history of Bhutan-China relations, and prospects for the future development of relations.²⁵⁹ He won appreciation for dressing like the rest of the Bhutanese mission and guiding them “with tact and discretion.”²⁶⁰

On 21 September, Bhutan was voted as the 128th member of the United Nations by the General Assembly with no opposition. To foil accusations that it had a colonial relationship with Bhutan, India got a large number of Afro-Asian countries to co-sponsor the application. The news of admission sparked celebrations across Bhutan. Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, who had personally invested a great deal in getting Bhutan to a position of independent, international standing recognized by other states, had finally succeeded in his 19th year as King. Congratulatory messages came in from the Indian prime minister and president, the Chogyal in Sikkim, and the British prime minister, while the Australian and Japanese representatives in India came visiting. The King, once again made sure to address India’s concerns emphasizing “privately as well as publicly that Bhutan’s membership should, in fact, see a closer relationship with India and foreign influence should be prevented as much as possible.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Telephone interview with A.N. Ram, Hyderabad, India, 9 Nov 2017.

²⁶⁰ Note from United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 October 1971, TNA File No. FCO 37/751.

²⁶¹ “Monthly report for September from the Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), 1 October 1971, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/71.

3.3.2 *Territorial anxiety*

India had started enhancing its defense preparedness in the border regions after its defeat in 1962. This involved planning for new mountain divisions to deny Chinese troops access to the plains, as well as the construction of new border roads to improve troop mobility.²⁶² However, greater security of the border could not be achieved without securing states like Bhutan and Sikkim. While India's treaty arrangement with Bhutan did not allow troops deployments, the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) was set up and deployed in 1961. While their role was strictly in a non-combat capacity, Bhutan's readiness to have them, which reflected a positive understanding of India's anxieties, was relieving to Delhi. While Bhutan stayed uneventful, a few years later during the skirmishes at Nathu La, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took this as a sign that the region needed to be a priority. Multiple high-level visits, as well as changes in policy and personnel, indicated the heightened importance of the Himalayan borderlands. At the same time, the Cultural Revolution was unfolding across the border, in China. The Bhutanese elite saw this as a threat to Bhutanese sovereignty and identity, "given the Chinese threats and its announced views of the Himalayan kingdoms, the absorption of Bhutan into Tibet, and therefore China, loomed as a fearful possibility. The Cultural Revolution of Chairman Mao Zedong would have destroyed all of Bhutan's traditions and the young monarchy. Bhutan would have no longer existed as a distinct cultural and political entity."²⁶³ This aligned Bhutanese interest with India's territorial anxiety, which would continue well into the 1970s, While Bhutan gained a security

²⁶² Despatch from the British High Commission in Delhi: The Indian Army, 29 April 1965, TNA File No. FO 371/180972.

²⁶³ Om Pradhan. *Bhutan: The Roar of the Thunder Dragon*. Thimphu: KMedia, 2012. p 64

guarantee from the arrangement, India gained the assurance of not having to worry about a fickle neighbor.

Before the Cultural Revolution was over, other significant developments engulfed South Asia. Indira Gandhi had called for national elections a year early and had won handsomely. She met the Bhutanese King and the Crown Prince during their visit to Delhi in April 1971. Around the time, political unrest was boiling over in Pakistan. In general elections of December 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's party had won a majority in the national assembly, backed by almost all seats in East Pakistan. However, military leader Yahya Khan and leader of the second largest party Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, both based in West Pakistan, conspired to keep him out of power. To quell the massive civil unrest that followed, Yahya Khan arrested Rahman in March. A brutal army crackdown started in East Pakistan, leading to refugees pouring in over the border, into India. By the end of the year, about 3 million people were killed, and 10 million had taken refuge in India, which came with its own economic and political cost. However, the rest of the world seemed ambivalent about the crisis. In a visit to India in July, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was explicit that the United States would not back India in case of war.

Unknown to India, later on in the same trip to Asia, Kissinger traveled to China to initiate a historic rapprochement. Kissinger would continue to meet Chinese representatives for the rest of the year, often in New York. On multiple occasions during these meetings, he tried to persuade Chinese Permanent Representative Huang Hua to participate in the United States' attempts to protect Pakistan. In one instance, he mentioned that the U.S. was sending a flotilla to the Indian

Ocean, suggesting that China approach the region from the north to help pressure India.²⁶⁴ The U.S. Seventh Fleet's Task Force 74, with the country's largest aircraft carrier Enterprise, did pull into the Bay of Bengal in the last days of the war. China stepped up its delivery of arms to Pakistan and condemned India's role, but for various reasons, refused to involve itself directly. Had it not been so, the nightmare scenario that Indian strategic planners had prophesied and been anxious about, would have come true.

Notwithstanding these developments, which India only found out about later, Pakistan's closeness to China was worrying. Coupled with the U.S.-Pakistan camaraderie, this swayed India in pursuing a "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" with the Soviet Union. The treaty was signed in Delhi in August 1971. After Prime Minister Gandhi's final attempt to rally world leaders into taking a stand failed, the war in East Pakistani started on 3 December. It was to last merely two weeks, ending with the surrender of Pakistan's forces in Dhaka, and the creation of independent Bangladesh. In the entire episode, Indira Gandhi's government was most troubled by the refusal of world powers to take a stand to pressure Pakistan towards a political settlement. Most countries acknowledged Pakistan's role in fomenting the crisis. However, in the lack of a coordinated stand, Yahya Khan had no reason to give in.

While others vacillated, Bhutan repeatedly signaled a preference for not only India's position but also values espoused by India. Starting a collection drive for the refugees with a personal contribution of five hundred thousand rupees, Jigme Dorji appealed to his citizens that "the

²⁶⁴ FRUS 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 274, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d274>.

refugee population in India has reached 50 lakhs, five times the population of Bhutan...India is doing what she can, but even then, thousands of refugees are dying every day of hunger, disease and wounds sustained in East Pakistan. In view of all this, we in Bhutan have also to extend our help.”²⁶⁵ Das reported that “the Bangla Desh issue for him (the King) became emotional and a matter of belief in certain principles which had to uphold. It was this firm belief that led him in the past to spurn the olive branch dangled so many times before him by the Chinese and the Pakistanis.”²⁶⁶ The King even denied an audience to U.S. Senator Charles Percy, apparently to demonstrate his displeasure at U.S. decision to supply weapons to Pakistan.

In October, right after Bhutan was admitted to the U.N., the King visited a refugee camp in Calcutta. The Indian Representative’s office pointed out that, with a vote in the U.N. now, Bhutan could choose to appear neutral like Nepal and work towards developing its rapport with countries like China and the United States. Instead, during the war, Bhutan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry expressed their explicit support for India and expressed hopes of establishing relations with an independent Bangladesh soon.²⁶⁷ True to its word, Bhutan was the second country to recognize Bangladesh, within 24 hours of India. In the Indo-Bhutan equation, this was a win-win. India was grateful for the camaraderie, made even more special by Bhutan pulling far beyond its weight as an example for others. This earned Bhutan India’s confidence; it also built

²⁶⁵ “Monthly report for June 1971 to the Ministry of External Affairs from the Office of the Special Officer of India in Bhutan” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), July 1971, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/71.

²⁶⁶ “Note from B.S. Das, Representative of India in Bhutan to Director (N), MEA, titled “Significance of Bhutan’s Recognition of Bangla Desh” in file India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan boundaries, 7 February 1972, NAI, File No. HI/107(1)/72.

²⁶⁷ Ibid

credibility as an international actor with an independent mind soon after joining the U.N. India was so preoccupied in the aftermath of the war that no one noticed that Bhutan did not need to wait for India's advice before deciding to recognize Bangladesh.

The Wangchucks were attentive to the images projected by India and responded with signals and indices of their own that in turn allayed Indian concerns. They had found that Indian support for their aspirations was more forthcoming if they appeared to be equally aware of Indian apprehensions. Once in the United Nations, Bhutan was inundated with requests from envoys based in India asking for the establishment of relations, and for permission to visit. When British High Commissioner Garvey reached out to the Bhutanese representative in Delhi with a proposal to establish diplomatic relations, Pema Wangchuck politely declined, citing limited resources.²⁶⁸ Almost every country approaching Bhutan would face this response over the next few years. Bhutan's relationship with Bangladesh was another matter. Bhutan was second to recognize their emergence as a free people and now wanted to follow up by developing its first independent relationship with a state other than India. In April 1972 Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering visited Bangladesh to discuss prospects for trade and elevating the existing relationship to the ambassadorial level. Proposals for trilateral cooperation in energy and other projects made sure that India did not feel left out.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ Note from U.K. High Commissioner Terence Garvey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1972, TNA File No. FCO 37/981.

²⁶⁹ "Monthly report to the Ministry of External Affairs from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan for April 1972" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), May 1972, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/72.

Before the dust had settled in the Bangladesh affair, King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck passed on in July 1972. He had been king for most of independent India's history; more importantly, he was the lynchpin of Bhutan's relationship with India. The responsibility now fell on his 17-year old son and heir, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, whose coronation, however, would have to wait till 1974, when the stars were aligned favorably. A change of ruler meant a possible need to update policies, especially since there were some concerns about his purported inclinations towards China, while he was the crown prince.²⁷⁰ However, as King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck exhibited no inclination to expand contacts with the Chinese beyond what existed at the U.N. where "cards and greetings were exchanged on appropriate occasions and China had sent a message of condolences on the death of the late King."²⁷¹ In late 1972, Bhutan would agree to send a team as observers to the Asian-African-Latin American Table Tennis Tournament to China, clarifying that "the decision to accept the invitation was taken in order to avoid any possibility of unnecessarily irritating Bhutan's powerful neighbour in the north."²⁷²

Indian anxiety about Chinese inroads in the region was now real, albeit in an innocuous manner that India had little way of obstructing. It could only hope that Bhutan continued to heed its signals. As Jigme Singye Wangchuck prepared for his first state visit to India, voices of impatience with India's role in Bhutan had grown louder. In a meeting in the U.S. Embassy in

²⁷⁰ Personal interview with B.S. Das, Delhi, India, 5 Aug 2016.

²⁷¹ "Monthly report to the Ministry of External Affairs from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan for August 1972" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), 7 September 1972, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/72.

²⁷² "Monthly report to the Ministry of External Affairs from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan for December 1972" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), 5 January 1973, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/72.

Delhi, a Bhutanese diplomat admitted that they were working to replace Indian advisors in Bhutan. The plan was to rely on Bhutanese advisors and take help from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).²⁷³ Some in the MEA believed that this was an appropriate opportunity to alert him to India's concerns, by making it clear that "we would view with concern Bhutanese responding to loaded overtures of the Chinese as we are convinced that this would be contrary to Bhutan's long-term interests as well as our own." Some suggested that appealing to the mutual security concerns would help as "China may appear to be friendly, but the lessons of Tibet and the lessons we also learnt in placing our trust in her friendship in the fifties does caution us. Her national interests and her ideological objectives do not seem to point in the direction of the respect for Bhutan's personality, even if in the short run she may pay homage to Bhutan's independence and her development."²⁷⁴ Irrespective of what was discussed behind closed doors, the press statement "reiterated their readiness to maintain "close coordination" in their foreign policies in the spirit of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949."²⁷⁵

Despite the regime change in Bhutan, China had not made direct overtures yet. There were, however, a series of border intrusions by herdsmen from Tibet into northern Bhutan. An Indian report on the incidents wondered that "it is probable that the Chinese were also aiming at beginning a direct dialogue with Bhutan on the settlement of the boundary dispute between Tibet

²⁷³ FRUS 1969–1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 255, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d255>.

²⁷⁴ "Draft talking points between PM and the King of Bhutan" in file Bhutan – Miscellaneous, December 1974, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

²⁷⁵ "Political reports for December 1974 from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Bhutan, 16 January 1975, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/74 - II.

and Bhutan.”²⁷⁶ American analysts believed that China aimed to offer “land-locked states of Nepal and Bhutan alternate links with the world via China, while realistically indicating that China cannot replace these countries’ economic reliance on India... Thus the PRC proposed construction of a series of feeder roads from Nepal and Bhutan to China – if they can be maintained – would be useful primarily for their strategic and psychological value.”²⁷⁷

Others were more direct in their attempt to woo Bhutan. When Bhutan’s Permanent Representative Sangay Penjore visited the State Department, he was thanked for their role in the U.N. and encouraged “to discuss matters of common interest with Bhutan and noted LoS (Law of the Seas) as an issue where our interests were likely to be compatible with theirs.”²⁷⁸ The United States would continue to try to find issues of common interest with Bhutan. Later in the year, their embassy in Cambodia would mention being asked by Khmer Republic officials about finding a way to approach Bhutan for support in the U.N. The U.S. embassy had replied that “Bhutan’s foreign policy and foreign relations are controlled or at least heavily influenced by India, so it would be unlikely there could be any change in Bhutan’s position at U.N. in absence of a change of policy by India.”²⁷⁹ While it might have been correct in 1974, when it came choosing

²⁷⁶ “Monthly report to the Ministry of External Affairs from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan” in file Political reports (other than annual) from Bhutan, 14 September 1973, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/73-II.

²⁷⁷ Consulate Hong Kong, “China and South Asia,” Wikileaks Cable: 1974HONGK11725_b, dated October 26, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974HONGK11725_b.html.

²⁷⁸ Department of State, “Bhutan’s permrep visits Washington,” Wikileaks Cable: 1974STATE042349_b, dated March 2, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974STATE042349_b.html.

²⁷⁹ Embassy Phnom Penh, “Bhutan Foreign Policy and Relations,” Wikileaks Cable: 1974PHNOM10575_b, dated August 9, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974PHNOM10575_b.html.

between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnam-backed regime in 1979, Bhutan voted differently from India, siding with China and the United States.

Indian concerns also stemmed from the restive political climate in neighboring Sikkim where majority Nepalis were leading a protest against the Chogyal. While this was an opportunity for Bhutan to establish how they were different from Sikkim, there were apprehensions that the minority Nepali population in southern Bhutan could be influenced by their brethren across the border. Jigme Singye Wangchuck had sent emissaries to Sikkim in 1973 to convey his sympathies to the Chogyal; their other motive was to find how things had come to such a pass, and if there was ever a possibility of India reacting the same way in Bhutan.²⁸⁰ As the situation evolved in 1975 leading eventually to Sikkim's incorporation in India and the removal of the Chogyal, Bhutan's King emphasized that the Chogyal had misread the people's will and was responsible for his downfall. He said that given the Chogyal's missteps, India's response was entirely understandable.²⁸¹ While the elite in Thimphu was curious about Sikkim, they were careful to assure India at this particularly delicate time, making sure never to never the line that could make Gandhi question Bhutanese motives.

3.3.3 *Development as foreign policy*

Right from the beginning of independent India's relations with Bhutan, a major pillar of the partnership was Bhutan's acceptance of India's policy of assisting with economic development.

²⁸⁰ "Monthly report to the Ministry of External Affairs from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan" in file Political reports (other than annual) from Bhutan, 9 June 1973, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/73-II.

²⁸¹ "Political report for March and April 1975 from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Bhutan, 13 May 1975, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/75.

The kingdom suffered from chronic underdevelopment, and the policy helped them tackle the problem. Support to development extended on all fronts, including Bhutan's first few 5-year plans which aided the construction of Bhutan's first motorable roads in 1961. After Nehru's death in 1964, the Bhutanese king continued to nurture this relationship, elevating it beyond mere personal rapport. The arrival of the first Indian agent for Bhutan in 1968, was marked by a visit by Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai, who soon after granted a request for Rs 100 million in aid to Bhutan. The Indian agent often accompanied Bhutanese representatives in their visit to Delhi to talk about development aid.

India's development plans were also subject to the vagaries of Bhutan's internal politicking. As Jigme Dorji Wangchuck initiated political reforms in 1969, the King's step-brother Namgyal Wangchuck targeted the kingdom's policies towards India to vent his displeasure and claim that the King had been too fast with the reforms.²⁸² With support from some young Bhutanese elites, he suggested that Bhutan's rate of development be sped up, and if India was not up to the task, Bhutan should seek help from others. The dissatisfaction was palpable, not just to Indians, but even to the few visitors that made it to Bhutan. U.S. Political Officer in the Delhi William Brown, who traveled to Bhutan with Ambassador Kenneth Keating in May 1970 remembers that they "got an earful, from the Bhutanese, about Indian imperialism, colonialism, and domination. The Bhutanese were the recipients of Indian money, defense assistance, and so on, but the Indians kept them under very tight control."²⁸³ As India watched anxiously, the King removed

²⁸² "Political report for June 1969 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan" in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok, 7 July 1969, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/69.

²⁸³ "Oral History Project Country Reader: India." Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d. <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/India.pdf>, 791.

the Tengye Lyonpo from Thimphu, nominating him to lead a delegation of Bhutanese representatives to work with Indian officers in New York.

After its membership of the United Nations, Bhutan was beginning to get noticed. In a discussion about ministates as members of the U.N., the U.S. mission lauded Bhutan's backing to a resolution on contributions to the World Health Organization (WHO). In a note on the 27th U.N. General Assembly, the mission singled out the country, appreciating "Bhutan's vote (in contrast to that of India) in our favor on 25 percent issue."²⁸⁴ The Cold War blocs were discovering that Bhutan could have its voice separate from India's. A team from the British Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) soon arrived in Bhutan to explore possibilities of administering further aid to Bhutan. They met officials right up to the Foreign minister and reported back that the Bhutanese were keen on help in medical, educational, agricultural, and workforce training.²⁸⁵ However, as Jigme Singye Wangchuck took over as king soon after, he stuck to the policies established by his father. On the question of aid, he signaled a preference for the established system of accepting aid under the Colombo Plan, and not bilaterally from other states. Both would eventually change, but for the time being, India was relieved that their policy could continue even with the new king.

As Bhutan opened up to the world, various states sent their representatives to find out more. A British team claimed in its report that "the Bhutanese are at times resentful of the massive Indian

²⁸⁴ United States Mission in United Nations, New York, "Ministates," Wikileaks Cable: 1973USUNN02382_b, dated June 26, 1973, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973USUNN02382_b.html.

²⁸⁵ "Shangri La Revisited," report on Official Development Assistance team visit to Bhutan in November 1973, undated, TNA File No. FCO 37/1531.

involvement in their country. We found that a common expression of this resentment was to decry the quality of Indian goods, services, and personnel in Bhutan. The Foreign Minister merely hinted at this, others were more explicit.”²⁸⁶ However, the foreign minister was explicit about seeking help in delineating Bhutan’s border with China.²⁸⁷ India was aware that the wheels were turning slowly.

The Americans corroborated that the MEA had told them that they believed that “both Nepal and Bhutan had recently shown signs of reluctance to cooperate on defense matters with India fully. Nepal’s position, in particular, had irked Mrs. Gandhi, who sent a direct message to King Birendra. T.N. Kaul was tasked with carrying a message of caution and Indian irritation to the young Bhutanese King.”²⁸⁸ India was coming to terms with Bhutan’s new international stature, even wondering if it had carried the policy of development too far. An MEA report called India an “overzealous suitor,” suggesting that “we have literally smothered Bhutan with financial assistance. Whenever any foreign country, international agency or a national of a foreign country has offered aid or made probings, we have, on hearing about it, endeavoured to replace the same, and advised Bhutan to keep foreigners out. With the result that a feeling is beginning to develop among the Bhutanese that we are trying to hem them in...It is in the younger generation of the ruling elite that the resentment is strongest.” It went on to speculate a scenario where “Bhutan cannot for ever ignore its big neighbor. China could attempt to normalise its relation with Bhutan

²⁸⁶ Ibid

²⁸⁷ Ibid

²⁸⁸ Embassy New Delhi, “Sikkim: One journalist's view,” Wikileaks Cable: 1973NEWDE04833_b, dated April 25, 1973, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973NEWDE04833_b.html.

by settling its boundary problem. It could also offer to provide aid to Bhutan. The question is how much.”²⁸⁹

A different set of concerns emerged as the date for Jigme Singye Wangchuck’s coronation on 2 June 1974 closed in. Apart from neighbors, the King wanted to invite representatives from states like Japan and Australia, as well from U.N. Security Council members. The list was to include China, making it the first visit of an official Chinese representation to Bhutan. Publicly, the MEA claimed it was Bhutan’s prerogative; in private, they hinted that they saw no particular reason to invite the Chinese.²⁹⁰ As Bhutan reached out to the charge d'affaires of the PRC embassy in New Delhi, Beijing enthusiastically made an offer that had alarm bells ringing in Delhi. China suggested that they send Dong Biwu, a higher-ranking representative, and the acting president of the PRC.²⁹¹ The development was against everything that India had indicated as acceptable through the years. Delhi and Thimphu conferred on India’s concerns until a solution presented itself. The King would not cancel his invitation, but he would insist on having the representative in India visit. Despite India’s efforts, Bhutan had now opened a channel with China, though it would stay dormant for many more years.

The coronation was by far the grandest international event Bhutan had ever organized, with 300 guests from the world over. It was closely watched in India, not just by the MEA, but even by

²⁸⁹ “An Approach to Economic Aid to Bhutan: A Politico-Economic Approach” in file Bhutan - Miscellaneous, 28 November 1973, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

²⁹⁰ Embassy New Delhi, "Attendance at Bhutan coronation ceremonies," Wikileaks Cable: 1974NEWDE05089_b, dated April 17, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NEWDE05089_b.html.

²⁹¹ Personal interview with Inder Pal Khosla, Delhi, India, 14 Nov 2017; John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) p 180-181.

Prime Minister Gandhi. Apart from the regular report sent by the Indian representative, President Giri, who represented India, wrote a separate letter to the prime minister on his impressions. To India's relief, the Chinese representative got no special treatment. The PRC embassy charge d'affaires Ma Muming met the King along with other foreign ambassadors and was not granted a one-on-one meeting. He, however, did meet Foreign Minister Tsering. The report mentions that Ma offered Chinese help for the economic development of Bhutan in both meetings, which was politely refused.²⁹² President Giri's letter corroborates this, also pointing out that India would have to try harder:

“my clear impression during this heart-to-heart talk was that the King was determined to follow his esteemed father's footsteps in the matter of improving Indo-Bhutanese relations... Many nations are competing to get a foothold in Bhutan, and it may be difficult to withstand these pressures. Since there has been some disappointment over the delay in implementation of the Chukha project, we must implement it as expeditiously as possible. Another matter to which we should give serious attention is to see that we depute some of our best officers with a sense of dedication so that the people of Bhutan can see tangible results.”²⁹³

It was clear to Delhi that Bhutan had moved on from knowing the outside world only through Indian lenses, and wanted to expand the space to carry out its affairs with the rest of the world. In Thimphu, Foreign Minister Tsering often had conversations with the Indian ambassador Khosla

²⁹² “Political report for the month of June 1974 from the Indian Representative to Bhutan to MEA” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Bhutan, 3 July 1974, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/74 - II.

²⁹³ “Letter from V.V. Giri, President of India to Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister” in file Bhutan - Miscellaneous, June 1974, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

about Article 2 in the Indo-Bhutan Treaty and how it seemed to suggest that Bhutan was not entirely sovereign.²⁹⁴ Bhutan was now managing its aid program, and the space for the article had effectively shrunk only to issues directly affecting India, in this case, concerning China, and perhaps Pakistan. Tourism in Bhutan had picked up, and new hotels had come up in Thimphu, Paro, and Phuntsholing. Experts from the WHO and the Food and Agriculture Organization reduced the need for Indian experts. The Bhutanese, according to a British observer in 1975, “are now lapping up aid. This is mainly multilateral, but there are also Swiss, Australian and I believe Canadian contributions, as well as our own.”²⁹⁵

Indian policymakers were aware that there was no way to turn the tide and bring Bhutan back entirely in India’s orbit. The only way forward, they decided, was to hold on to the influence that India continued to have. Keeping the status quo too would now require work. An MEA report recommended that India nurture various power groups to expand its favorable image. These included the “(a) Wangchucks (Tengye Lyonpo); (b) Dorjis; (c) Royal Grandmothers and late King’s sisters; (d) Army and Royal Bodyguard; (e) Traditionalists (Lamas, Tsongdu, etc.); (f) Young elite”²⁹⁶ There was also the issue of deputing an Indian officer to Bhutan’s U.N. mission. Bhutan was now asking to end the arrangement and turn over the position to one of their own. In an internal note, the foreign secretary suggested that further attempts be made to persuade the Bhutanese. Foreign policy coordination, he argued, could work only with an Indian member in

²⁹⁴ Personal interview with Inder Pal Khosla, Delhi, India, 14 Nov 2017.

²⁹⁵ Note on visit to Bhutan in May 1975 from Richard Thomas, U.K. High Commission New Delhi, to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 May 1975, TNA File No. FCO 37/1675.

²⁹⁶ “Note - Recommendations for Policy Reappraisal with Bhutan from Policy Planning Division to Additional Secretary (AD&PP), MEA” in file Bhutan - Miscellaneous, December 1974, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

the team, offering even to reciprocate with a Bhutanese officer in the Indian mission. In his final recommendation though, he agreed to give in as long as India had Bhutan's "unequivocal endorsement on major questions (e.g. attitude to China, defence arrangements, opening of diplomatic mission in Bhutan or by Bhutan abroad, restricting U.N.DP activities, etc.)"²⁹⁷

IMTRAT's presence was tied to some of these core concerns, primarily defense and China. The Tshogdu again questioned their presence in 1975, and the new King promised to raise it with India during his next visit to Delhi.²⁹⁸ However, the Government of India was extremely sensitive on this one issue. It refused to entertain the suggestion, leading the Bhutanese to claim that Indians had "misunderstood" the proposal, and decided to postpone the issue for later.²⁹⁹ On the issue of delimitation of the Bhutan-Tibet boundary, Thimphu decided that it should talk to Beijing directly, believing that the problem was more likely to be resolved if the two came to the table without a third party. Bhutan and China eventually started border talks in 1983. Till 2018, 25 rounds of talks have been held, with no resolution so far. As of now, Bhutan remains the largest recipient of Indian technical and development support, while China's role is negligible.³⁰⁰ However, Bhutan works with several multilateral and bilateral partners for capacity building.

²⁹⁷ "Note from Foreign Secretary to External Affairs Minister" in file Bhutan - Miscellaneous, 11 June 1975, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

²⁹⁸ "Political report for May 1975 from Office of the Representative of India in Bhutan" in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Bhutan, 14 June 1975, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/75.

²⁹⁹ "Visit to India of King of Bhutan," note from U.K. High Commission New Delhi, to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 24 September 1975, TNA File No. FCO 37/1675.

³⁰⁰ "Annual Report 2017-2018" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 6, 2018), http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/29788_MEA-AR-2017-18-03-02-2018.pdf.

3.4 CONCLUSION

At the outset of this chapter, I presented the question motivating this analysis – what conditions guided India to accept and encourage a more independent Bhutan, but not Sikkim? I contested that rival explanations that put the onus on the difference in India’s treaties with Sikkim and Bhutan fail to explain the dichotomous approach satisfactorily. I used a modified form of the framework of images proposed by Robert Jervis, to examine India’s aspects of self-image vis-à-vis China and how they refract through actors such as Sikkim and Bhutan. I also introduced three aspects of self-image relevant to India, that include civilizational conviction, a priority for development, and the preference for a low-risk, low-return, middle-path in decision-making.

In this chapter, the first of two that deal with the region, I examined how these aspects apply to Bhutan. I analyzed available evidence to argue that in the period following the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pak war, India’s territorial anxiety was heightened by Chinese presence across its northern borders. The altered geopolitical realities of the time also compelled it to tend to its civilizational ties in the region, as well as relook its approach of conducting foreign policy through development. As the acknowledgment of these priorities became increasingly important, India actively conveyed these priorities to Bhutan. In return, the state signaled an understanding and appreciation of Indian priorities in both their words and actions. In subsequent years, this led to a policy where India encouraged and supported Bhutan’s ambitions of greater autonomy.

For instance, despite the country’s advance towards an independent international entity, the Bhutanese King never wavered from acknowledging India’s territorial anxiety, which could be triggered from a threat to the territory to perceived erosion of its civilizational ties. He aligned

with Indian security concerns early on, and in 1970 when Chinese soldiers were found to have transgressed in the Ha sector in Bhutan, King Jigme Dorji lost no time in asking for Indian help. The instance that unequivocally assured India of Bhutanese motives was behavior during the 1971 war. From the aid collection drive and refugee colony visit to the King's snub to U.S. Senator Charles Percy in protest of the American policy in the region, and finally, prompt recognition of independent Bangladesh exhibited a willingness to stand with India even when the rest of the world was not.

I argue that various factors, most prominently, their U.N. membership could have led Bhutan to defy the way they responded to the Indian narrative of long-held civilizational ties. Both B.S. Das and Indian President V.V. Giri drew attention to the issue of changes in their notes before and after the successful U.N. application. However, explicit mentions of Indian help and Indo-Bhutan relations by Bhutanese kings continued to assure India that even when Bhutan spread its wings and became a member of the international community, it would not be at the cost of Indian priorities.

Finally, Bhutan also aligned itself with India's preference of using aid and development activities as a significant component of foreign policy, accepting and making grateful mentions of Indian largesse, including in the setting up of the five-year plans for the kingdom. As the King was fond of saying, it was in Bhutan's interest to depend on India for assistance. Later, his son Jigme Singye, like the previous king, made sure to decline offers of aid from various parties, ensuring that the news always reached Indian ears to assure them. By 1974, when Bhutan had started accepting aid from international agencies and other countries, MEA had realized that there was

no way India could compete with what was on offer, leading to an opinion that Bhutan be not “smothered with financial assistance” anymore.³⁰¹ While Bhutan’s international role eventually modified its engagement with the world, India’s policies recognized that the Wangchucks did not reject their relationship with India.

³⁰¹ “An Approach to Economic Aid to Bhutan: A Politico-Economic Approach” in file Bhutan - Miscellaneous, 28 November 1973, NAI, File No. PP/JS/3/1/73.

Chapter 4. SIKKIM 1968—1975

4.1 INTRODUCTION

“China has, from time to time, laid claims to overlordship in Sikkim, Bhutan and even Nepal (I myself saw, on the walls of the military academy in Chengtu, a map of China as it was and, in Chinese eyes, should be, embracing Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and large slices of Kashmir). Any faltering on our part will encourage these irredentist tendencies on China’s part.”

K.P.S. Menon to Jawaharlal Nehru

22 August 1950.³⁰²

“In Sikkim a lot of developments has taken place as the Government of India is pumping in 22 crores per annum now as compared to 3 ½ that we got when I was in Government. Departments have mushroomed and all sorts of organisations formed but I feel that compared to our past the country and people are getting very little return for the amount of money.”

Palden Thondup Namgyal to Apa B. Pant, 26 Dec 1977³⁰³

³⁰² Note on Relations with Tibet from Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 22 August 1950, JNSG, Vol- 52-II, NMML.

³⁰³ Letter from Palden Thondup Namgyal to Apa Pant, 26 December 1977, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Correspondence with Palden Thondup Namgyal, NMML.

The quotes above may span a quarter century, but they highlight the some of the major underlying issues that explain the trajectory of the India-Sikkim relationship between Indian independence and 1975. This chapter, read with the previous one that traces India's relationship with Bhutan in the first three decades after independence, continues to contrast how actors in the neighborhood responded to evolving Indian strategic considerations. In turn, this chapter engages with the question – in comparison with Bhutan, why did India take a different approach to the relationship with Sikkim, and discourage ambitions for greater autonomy, eventually merging it with itself in 1975? I aim to establish that the difference in Sikkim's response to the three aspects of India's self-image explains this difference in India's approach. The Sikkim royal family's disregard of a civilizational relationship with India, refusal to acknowledge India's territorial anxiety, and an apparent lack of appreciation for India's help in Sikkim's development contributed to this perception.

In the post-1962 Sino-Indian war and 1965 Indo-Pak war environment, Delhi took the Sikkimese ruler's disregard of Indian security concerns as a threat that potentially benefited China, increasing India's territorial anxiety. Similarly, India interpreted the Chogyal's insistence on asserting an independent identity for his kingdom as an erosion of India's civilizational connect with the region. With time, the Chogyal also questioned India's signals on development hinting at possible alternatives that were interpreted as an ambition to open up to China. Continued disregard of these aspects of images conveyed by India led to a policy that divested the Chogyal of executive powers in 1973, and eventually to a merger of Sikkim with India in 1975.

Methodologically, this chapter offers the second part of the paired comparison between Sikkim and Bhutan started in the previous chapter. I use the same framework of refracted images used in

the Bhutan chapter, examining how aspects of Indian self-image vis-à-vis China refract through Sikkim. This chapter is based on analyzing how Sikkim's responses to India's civilizational conviction, territorial anxiety, and approach of development as foreign policy differed from Bhutan's leading to a divergence of policy between Sikkim and Bhutan in terms of their ambitions for autonomy.

Rival explanations of India's relations with Sikkim claim that these interactions were guided by history and statute. These accounts suggest that Sikkim's position was made untenable by the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, which articulated its relationship with India as that of a protectorate. Whereas, in the Indo-Bhutan Treaty, Bhutan only agreed to be guided by India's advice when it came to conducting its external affairs.³⁰⁴ As this chapter establishes, however, available evidence does not support such a deterministic approach. There is little evidence to suggest that India all along had planned an eventual takeover. On the contrary, accounts from the time and an analysis of developments indicate that India's response to Sikkim was influenced by perceived signaling, initiating a policy that led to the eventual merger.

³⁰⁴ The 1950 Indo-Sikkim Treaty describes Sikkim as a protectorate of India. It said that Sikkim would have internal autonomy, while the Government of India will be responsible for defense and territorial integrity of Sikkim with the right to station any number of troops as it thought necessary for the purpose. India would also be responsible for Sikkim's communications, and Sikkim would go through India in reaching out to any country. The treaty also has provision for an Indian representative in Sikkim to ensure stability in Sikkim necessary for India's security, which eventually took the form of Dewan, Political Officer and Chine Executive. While the treaty goes into considerable length about the India-Sikkim relationships, it did not unambiguously address the issue of Sikkim's international status. In comparison, the 1949 Indo-Bhutan Treaty promised Bhutan internal autonomy, while the Government of Bhutan "agrees to be guided by" the advice of the Government of India in managing its foreign affairs. Over the years, the two countries discussed the purview of this "advice," at times arguing that while Bhutan was bound to seek advice, it did not mean they were bound to act only in accordance to the advice. The provision was eventually dropped from a reworked version of the treaty in 2007.

4.2 MANAGING SIKKIM WITH ONE EYE ON TIBET

India's 1950 treaty with Sikkim drew considerably from the 1890 agreement between the kingdom and the British Government in India, making India responsible for Sikkim's external affairs, territorial integrity and defense, and communication.³⁰⁵ While the terms suggest an attempt to continue the close relationship inherited from British rule, it is unlikely that this was India's way of integrating Sikkim in the same way that princely states were integrated. The special resolution in the Constituent Assembly in January 1947 that allowed the additional authority to the committee negotiating with the princely states, for "examining the special problem of Bhutan and Sikkim" explains this.³⁰⁶ While Sikkim was a part of the Chamber of Princes, their presence was considered an exception. In fact, while meeting Sikkim's Maharajkumar (crown prince) and future Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal in July 1947, Secretary of States V.P. Menon acknowledged that Sikkim's position was different, and entering the union of India was unnecessary.³⁰⁷ However, to assertions of parity with Bhutan, Menon was non-committal.³⁰⁸ When a group of aggrieved Sikkimese politicians met Nehru in December 1948 and suggested that India take over Sikkim, Nehru declined, and instead offered to help them democratize gradually.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁵ Note "Sikkim-India Relations" in file India-Sikkim relations (old papers received from Dr. Khilani, Dy. Dir (H.D.), 5 October 1970, NAI, File no. HI/102/33/80

³⁰⁶ See chapter on Bhutan for more on this.

³⁰⁷ Note "Sikkim's Relations with India" in file India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan boundaries, undated, NAI File no. HI/107(1)/72

³⁰⁸ Singh, Amar Kaur Jasbir. *Himalayan Triangle: Historical Survey of British India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, 1765-1950*. London: The British Library Publishing Division, 1988. pp 260-261

³⁰⁹ Sharma, Sudheer. "25 Years after SIKKIM." *Nepali Times*, March 2001. <http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=9621#.W2iJndIzY54>.

During much the 1950s and 1960s, India's relationships with Sikkim and Bhutan ran on parallel tracks, guided by a perception that India needed to indicate to the world that both were firmly in India's sphere of influence. In one of his letters to chief ministers soon after China's Tibet campaign, Nehru indicated that if it ever came to securing its borders, it would be India's responsibility to secure Sikkim and Bhutan as well.³¹⁰ As the previous chapter establishes, while the relationship with Bhutan offered little resistance, India had to try a lot harder with Sikkim. For one, India had to assure Sikkim often that they had no intention of taking over, or use its right to employ officials in the Sikkim government to wrest control of the administration.³¹¹ When the Sikkimese government liked some of these officials and asked to extend their services, India often obliged.³¹²

The benefits, however, did not dissuade Sikkim from airing their disagreements with India, which often had to do with India's position on Tibet and China. Indian officials made sure to periodically update them on the Indian position, explaining why certain decisions were necessary.³¹³ Delhi seemed to be okay with them having their own opinion, as long as that did not jeopardize Indian security. In internal discussions in 1959, Indian officials expressed reservations in helping set up a radio station in Sikkim as it could lead to dissemination of their

³¹⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru Letter to Chief Ministers, 18 December 1950, JNSG Vol. 68-I, NMML.

³¹¹ Subimal Dutt File 29 (MSWord) August 2, 1957 - P 399 - On Sikkim stand - India not keen to take over Sikkim; Subimal Dutt File 57 (PDF) - March 1959 - 102-103 - Letter to Maharaja of Sikkim on 1951 on employing Dewan – assuring India won't meddle.

³¹² Subimal Dutt File 53 (MSWord) 28 Jan 1958 – p 277 - Letter to Tashi agreeing to keep Rustomji in Sikkim.

³¹³ JNSG 679-I – April 8, 1959 - 308 - Sikkim letter (JLN to Tashi Namgyal on DI being in India); Subimal Dutt File 36 (PDF) – April 1959 (exact date not there) – draft of letter to telling Tashi Namgyal about Tibet policy.

views, which the Chinese could consider being instigated by India.³¹⁴ The Maharajkumar often led the charge in these disagreements, a trait that would define his relationship with India for many years.³¹⁵ India tried various ways to reach him, sometimes informing him that the Bhutanese king followed Indian advice on Tibet, hinting that he should do the same.³¹⁶ When subtlety did not do the trick, Delhi asked the Sikkim Political Officer to convey India's stand, pointing out that "we cannot let the Maharajkumar dictate our policy."³¹⁷

When the time came, India hoped that Sikkim would bolster their borders adequately to ensure that Tibetan refugees did not flow into India. Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt urged Apa Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim to caution the Maharajkumar that closeness to China could come with a price, with which India would not be able to help.³¹⁸ At some point, commenting on a note by the political office, Foreign Secretary Dutt wondered, "the Political Office speaks of a new constitution for Sikkim to be evolved by the Dewan in consultation with political parties in Sikkim. Would it ever be permissible for the Political Officer or the Government of India to impose such a constitution on Sikkim?"³¹⁹ The comment was prophetic, as, India would

³¹⁴ Subimal Dutt File 31 (MSWord) - 6 Jan 1958 - Risk in getting Sikkimese have their own radio station and giving them full control.

³¹⁵ Subimal Dutt File 40 (PDF) - 19 Feb 1959 - Should refuse to be blackmailed by PT that he will get close to China.

³¹⁶ JNSG 677-I – March 15, 1959 - 27-PO Sikkim to MEA (let Sikkim know that Bhutan follows our advice on Tibet).

³¹⁷ Note from Foreign Secretary, 5 August 1957, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 29, NMML.

³¹⁸ Note from Foreign Secretary to Joint Secretary (East), 19 February 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 40, NMML.

³¹⁹ Note from Note from Foreign Secretary on options in Sikkim, 13 October 1959, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 38, NMML.

eventually impose a constitution on Sikkim, as well as pass an amendment to the Indian constitution to allow Sikkim representation in the Indian parliament. The seeds for the process that would finally begin in 1973 had already germinated a decade and a half ago.

The Sino-Indian War in 1962, and soon after, the Indo-Pak War in 1965, brought into prominence the northern borderlands and a necessity to increase security in these areas. However, these wars were not what led India to separate its policies towards Sikkim and Bhutan. A divergence in policies was already underway, led by a set of factors arising from India's interactions with these two kingdoms. The following section addresses these developments in the India-Sikkim relationship from the perspective of the three aspects of Indian self-image introduced in earlier chapters.

4.3 SIKKIM – FROM “ASSOCIATION” TO ASSIMILATION

4.3.1 *Civilizational conviction*

A Buddhist kingdom, Sikkim traced its heritage to Tibet, most often through familial and cultural ties. Thondup's family was part Tibetan, while his sister, Coocoola was married to Tibetan nobility. Beyond the ties of recent history, India hoped that its status as the home of Buddhism would help it connect with Sikkim at a civilizational level. However, these expectations were belied soon after India's independence. Even before he had taken over as King of Sikkim, Palden had made a habit of responding to Indian signals about civilizational ties by asserting a separate Sikkimese identity, and suggesting that the treaty with India be revised. This issue raised its head at the most inconvenient times. For instance, right after the India-Pakistan war of 1965, the Chogyal, as the Maharaja of Sikkim came to be known after his coronation, and Coocoola

responded to a Chinese statement about the Sikkim-Tibet border by highlighting Sikkim's separate identity. Coming at a most inopportune moment, this only reinforced his unreliability to Delhi. The MEA felt that the "Maharajkumar suffers from a complex. He would like Sikkim to be in the same position as Bhutan, but at the same time he realises he had treaty obligations and Sikkim could not in any case stand on its own."³²⁰

Palden Thondup's wife, an American citizen whom he married in 1963, compounded the problem. A student traveling through India, Hope Cooke decided to give up her American passport and immerse herself in Sikkimese life and politics after meeting the Maharajkumar. Some accounts claimed she was an American agent, sent by the CIA in an attempt to gain a foothold in the region. While there was no evidence to support this, Cooke, or Gyalmo, as she became to be known after marriage, led from the front in asserting Sikkimese identity. She encouraged the creation of the Youth Study Forum in 1965 with junior Sikkim Government officers close to the palace. Set up to facilitate political discussion and instill awareness, Indian officials in Sikkim often claimed that the forum lobbied with international visitors to build awareness about Sikkimese demands for self-determination.

Another issue that troubled India was the Chogyal's prioritization of revising the treaty with India.³²¹ Leading a group of young, educated Sikkimese, the Chogyal had spearheaded the notion of a "Tibeto-Burman" identity that included all tribes of Sikkim – Bhutia, Lepcha, and Nepali,

³²⁰ Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai to T.N. Kaul sent to Apa Pant, 10 July 1962, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 9, NMML.

³²¹ "Report for June 1967 from the Office of the Political Office in Sikkim and Bhutan" in file Monthly political reports (other than annual) from Gangtok, 1 July 1967, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/67.

and emphasized being “not Indian.”³²² The Chogyal had already unsuccessfully sought a meeting on the issue with the British Paymaster-General in 1966, meeting the British High Commissioner in Delhi instead. According to High Commissioner Paul Gore-Booth, the Chogyal was impatient with the Indian position of wanting to wait for a couple of years before committing to any revision. Even the British representative found his China-leaning views alarming, reporting that “he tends to argue that in the border skirmishes the Indians are nearly as bad as the Chinese, so that one had to remind him that if he were left to the mercies of the Chinese he would not be left where he is for very long”.³²³

After Indira Gandhi came back as prime minister in 1967, the Indo-Sikkim relationship seemed to be coming back on track. India had come out of two wars with the understanding that its security environment had changed, and needed attention. Part of this would have to involve additional attention on the borders. Showcasing the relationship through state visits to Sikkim and Bhutan, especially after recent incidents in Nathu La, seemed like an appropriate strategy. The Chogyal and the Gyälmo had just visited India and were accorded the highest honors. Prime Minister Gandhi received them at the airport, and Indian President Zakir Hussain hosted them at a formal lunch. The presidential aircraft was made available for the royal family to travel within India. The show of camaraderie continued when Gandhi arrived in Gangtok with her daughter-in-law, Sonia Gandhi, Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, and Home Secretary L.P. Singh in May 1968. For a brief moment, it seemed as the preferences in foreign policy that India wanted

³²² Jackie Hiltz, “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s,” *Bulletin of Tibetology*, 2003, 67–83, <http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/243140>.

³²³ “The Chogyal of Sikkim,” note from P.H. Gore-Booth, U.K. High Commission New Delhi, 20 January 1966, TNA File No. FO 371/186947

Sikkim to know about had been received, and Sikkim was responding entirely in agreement. A report on the visit claimed that it had “provided an opportunity for further close contacts between the Prime Minister and the Chogyal and greatly helped in removing minor misunderstandings.” When the MEA claimed that this was the high point in Indo-Sikkimese relationship, the assertion even seemed believable.³²⁴ Unfortunately, as was clear soon, if this was indeed the peak for the relationship, it could only go downhill from here.

Months after Gandhi’s visit, as the Political Office prepared celebrations for Indian Independence Day, public demonstrations organized by a pro-palace journalist broke out. The demonstration started by seeking more independence for Sikkim, but soon transformed into an anti-India demonstration. Slogans such as “we want no interference in our affairs by the Indians,” “don’t hoodwink us all the time, we are a buffer but not duffers” particularly rankled Indian officers present in Sikkim. One slogan in particular “we shall move North if Treaty is not revised” spoke right to the core of Indian insecurities.³²⁵ Despite a delegation from the Chogyal to meet the prime minister for damage control, Delhi again started questioning the Chogyal’s motives. Only after pressure from Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, the Chogyal agreed to condemn the incident late in the year. To remove all ambiguity, Delhi decided to be direct in advising the Chogyal of India’s priorities, a strategy India would fall back on as communication between Sikkim and Delhi worsened. This time, it fell on Kaul to ask him to forget about treaty revision

³²⁴ Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984). p 139.

³²⁵ “Monthly Political Report for August 1968 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan” in file Monthly reports (other than annual reports) from Sikkim (Gangtok), 5 September 1968, NAI, File No. HI/1012/23/68.

as long “as the Chinese threat prevailed and there was a likelihood of military danger to Sikkim.”³²⁶

India’s stand only seemed to push the Chogyal to display his disapproval of the treaty. While Sikkim was required to route its communications with other states through Delhi, the Chogyal bypassed India in sending a congratulatory message to President Nixon for a successful moon landing. This followed earlier attempts to build relationships with governments in Iran, Pakistan, and China.³²⁷ In December 1968, Thondup established his External Affairs Advisory Committee with his top aides to explore ways for Sikkim to join international organizations. On their own, these were minor, innocuous steps that the Indian state could live with; together, they made the Chogyal look like an unreliable entity – an erratic player who could only get more unpredictable.

The Chogyal was not without his supporters in Delhi. Foremost among them was Triloki Nath “Tikki” Kaul, Foreign Secretary between 1968 and 1972. They met in the 1950s when Kaul was posted in London, and Palden Thondup was a student in Cambridge. While his remit as Foreign Secretary included far more than just the two kingdoms standing at India’s border with Tibet, he had an abiding interest in Sikkim and Bhutan. As Sikkim’s ruler and Delhi increasingly found themselves on the opposing sides of a vision for Sikkim’s future, Kaul provided a personal touch. He believed that there was maneuvering space between Delhi’s view of absolute control of Sikkim’s future and the Chogyal’s dream of independent Sikkim. His approach included a

³²⁶ “Monthly Political Report for September 1968 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan” in file Monthly reports (other than annual reports) from Sikkim (Gangtok), 5 October 1968, NAI, File No. HI/1012/23/68.

³²⁷ “Political report for July 1969 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan” in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok, 10 August 1969, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/69.

vision for Sikkim to attain the status enjoyed by Bhutan which included minimal control from India, and independent international standing, at least in multinational organizations. Katyayani Shankar Bajpai, an officer he handpicked as Political Officer of Sikkim, says he was told to “prepare to give Sikkim, a Bhutan status ... we will have to go the Bhutan way with Sikkim.”³²⁸

Kaul admitted that the approach was guided in large part to scrub away the archaic term that defined India’s relations with Sikkim and sat uncomfortably with India’s status as a staunch opposer of imperialism. He says that as foreign secretary, one of his goals “was to have a democratic autonomous Sikkim as long as defence, communications and security remained with us, and remove the incongruous and ugly appellation of 'protectorate' from the treaty.”³²⁹ By 1969, the MEA also felt that it was important to heed changing world opinion, and “try to reformulate these relations in a form more acceptable to the international community while at the same time preserving the substance of the present arrangement. A confederal pattern appears to be one such reformulation. A confederal relationship is not open to the criticism which may be directed against a protectorate or other dependent relationship.”³³⁰

A new chapter in Sikkim’s relation with India started around the time K.S. Bajpai was handpicked by Kaul to take over as Political Officer in 1970. In his four years on the job, Bajpai would end up being a significant player. By this time, Kaul had convinced the prime minister of the need to reexamine the treaty with Sikkim. Secretary to the Prime Minister and one of

³²⁸ Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017.

³²⁹ Triloki Nath Kaul, *Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979). p 89

³³⁰ “Article II of the Treaty of 1949 and the status of Bhutan” in file Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Sikkim, relation legal and other matters, 9 April 1969, NAI, File no. PP(JS) 3(1)/69.

Gandhi's confidantes Parmeshwar Narayan Haksar agreed that "we have been playing with this country in a petty sort of way...I have never dealt with the intricacies of Indo-Sikkimese relations; but there does appear to be something wrong when we reiterate our faith in a Treaty to which the other party is seriously objecting."³³¹ Bajpai, however, was not convinced that the situation was unmanageable.³³² He suspected that the Chogyal's claim of treaty-revision as popular demand was not completely true. He also believed that the Chogyal's control over the format of the election was a more significant hindrance to good governance. For instance, he believed that the complicated seat arrangement for the Sikkim State Council was a ploy by the Chogyal to keep "the system wide open for manipulation and contrivance. The vital powers...continue to be vested in the Chogyal and what is sought to be achieved in revising the treaty does not therefore amount to any further democratisation of the administration."³³³

The division of seats for the state council was indeed peculiar. Its complexity theoretically put Sikkim ahead of Bhutan on a democratization curve. However, the majority, the Sikkimese of Nepalese origin, believed that the system was rigged against them. The Nepalese formed 70 percent of the population, while the Bhutia-Lepchas formed 25 percent. In the name of parity, the council equated the two, allotting each a third of the council seats. The Chogyal, belonging to the Bhutia-Lepcha community, also nominated a third of the members of the council. This ensured that no matter who won, the reigns were firmly in the hands of the ruler. Whether it was a

³³¹ Note from Secretary, Prime Minister's Secretariat, P.N. Haksar to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 26 February 1969, P.N. Haksar Papers Installment I & II, Subject File 44, NMML.

³³² Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017.

³³³ Note on Sikkim originally from the New Zealand High Commission to Wellington shared with U.K. High Commission New Delhi, 1 November 1970, TNA File No. FCO 37/532.

deliberate attempt or not, dividing seats along communal lines encouraged parties to merge and split regularly, thereby keeping the electorate divided and helping the Chogyal.

In this situation, India was now mulling the possibility of cultivating alternate power centers in Sikkim. Security concerns were still paramount, as the political officer told visiting American Ambassador Keating's party, "a half hour's flight away, as the crow flies, are 50,000, heavily armed, Chinese troops. This is strategic territory for us, and that's why we are here. We suffered what we did in 1962, and we're not about to let that happen again."³³⁴ The Director of the MEA's Northern Division hinted at an alternative India had started considering. In a meeting with Bhutanese minister Dago Tsering, he admitted that India was "toying with the idea of Kazi Lhendup Dorji as the Chogyal no longer enjoys our confidence."³³⁵ The leader of the pro-democracy Sikkim National Congress (SNC) had been in politics from the 1950s, but India had just discovered that he could be their way to tap into popular sentiment.³³⁶

The theme underlining Kazi Lhendup Dorji Khagsarpa's political career in Sikkim since the 1950s was a desire to introduce democracy – a motivation that India understood and could appreciate. Kazi, however, believed that this was unlikely to happen as long as the Chogyal was in charge; and that the way to greater democratization lay through Sikkim's incorporation into India. He dismissed the idea of Sikkimese independence in 1970, championing closer relations

³³⁴ "Oral History Project Country Reader: India." Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d. <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/India.pdf>, 791.

³³⁵ Personal interview with Dago Tsering, Thimphu, Bhutan, 2 Sep 2016.

³³⁶ A former R&AW operative, R.K. Yadav, claims that Kazi was convinced and aided to build opinion against the Chogyal, in his book "*Mission R&AW*, 2014 edition (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014).

with India instead. He argued that Sikkim had progressed solely due to Indian aid, which fit the narrative dear to India.³³⁷ He followed this up with a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, requesting that India merge Sikkim with itself.³³⁸

The Kazi, as well as other political leaders, were coming together to form a viable political opposition to the Chogyal. The Sikkimese king believed much of this was fomented by India, and in a bid to consolidate control, he did away with the post of Sidlon or prime minister, traditionally an Indian nominee. However, such a step hardly made things easier for him. British High Commissioner Terence Garvey wrote after a visit in 1972, “the requirements of defence must, in the absence of a fundamental change in Sino-Indian relations, oblige India to ensure that Sikkim’s territory is at India’s disposal. It would be much tidier if Sikkim became part of India, adding one more to the growing number of tribal Himalayan states, but it would probably not be easy at this late stage, in the absence of some external or internal convulsion, to bring this about.”³³⁹

Evidence, however, does not suggest an attempt by India to merge Sikkim. Instead, it tried to offer several alternate arrangements that would formalize the Sikkim-India relationship. Once Thondup rejected all of them, India resorted to another document that had been in existence. These were confidential letters exchanged between then Political Officer Harishwar Dayal, and

³³⁷ “Monthly political report for the month of March 1970 sent by the Office of the Political Officer for Sikkim and Bhutan” in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok and Thimphu, 9 April 1970, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/70.

³³⁸ Personal interview with L.L. Mehrotra, Delhi, India, 15 Dec 2017.

³³⁹ Note on Sikkim from U.K. High Commissioner Terence Garvey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 November 1972, TNA File No. FCO 37/982.

Tashi Namgyal, Maharaj of Sikkim in February 1951, which clarified and expanded on the treaty. While the treaty promised internal autonomy to Sikkim, the letters allowed India a loophole to intervene. According to the letters, “should a situation arise in which law and order are seriously threatened within the State, or there is gross internal maladministration, the Maharaja will have the right to ask for the assistance of the Government of India who will render such assistance as they may consider reasonable and necessary.”³⁴⁰ The document made it sound like it was the Chogyal’s prerogative to decide whether help was warranted, and India would be treaty-bound to help. To Indian policymakers, this was an opportunity to get their foot in the door. They did not have to wait long, as a curious sequence of events starting with the Sikkim Council election in early 1973 made Indian intervention necessary.

In council elections held in February 1973, the pro-palace Sikkim National Party (SNP) emerged as the largest party with 9 out of 18 seats. Along with the Chogyal’s nomination, this meant a comfortable majority for pro-monarchy forces. This, in turn, would mean no movement on demands such as the institution of a written constitution, the abolition of unfair parity system, and greater democratization. Other major parties, including the SNC and the newly formed Sikkim Janata Congress (SJC), accused the palace of rigging the election and launched a political agitation across Sikkim under the aegis of the newly formed Joint Action Committee (JAC). As agitations intensified, Political Officer Bajpai and senior MEA official Avtar Singh moderated negotiations between agitators and the Chogyal.

³⁴⁰ Complete text of letters exchanged between the Maharaja of Sikkim and the Political Officer in Appendix E.

There are multiple contrasting accounts of what transpired over the following weeks. According to Thondup and his sympathizers, India aided agitators to the point of a complete breakdown of law and order. This was aimed at legitimizing eventual Indian intervention, to get the Chogyal to eventually ask India to take over law and order, which he did on April 8.³⁴¹ Indian accounts, both academic and administrative, claim that the mayhem had reached alarming proportions and that the Chogyal invited India to restore law and order.³⁴² Bajpai's account comes the closest to admitting that India had its agenda, if not to help agitators, then to stand back as "Delhi hoped that the shock would work as we had always protected him against the populace. After the 1973 elections, we saw a chance to show him that he needed us more than we needed him, so we let the populace shock him."³⁴³ The agreement between India and Sikkim that was signed on 8 April, effectively turned the Chogyal into a constitutional head, relieving him of administrative duties, which were to be taken up by an administrator assigned by Delhi.

The person Delhi sent was B.S. Das, who came back to the region one year after his tenure in Bhutan had ended. As Chief Executive, he would take over executive functions of the Chogyal. Thondup was unmistakably bitter when he met Das, exclaiming, "please note that Sikkim is not Goa, which you have come to take over as Administrator."³⁴⁴ As the ensuing months would show, Goa was not the appropriate analogy for Sikkim. If anything, India's strategy turned out to

³⁴¹ Most comprehensive account in Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, chapters 10 and 11

³⁴² Satyendra R. Shukla, *Sikkim : The Story of Integration* (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1976); Pran Nath Chopra, *Sikkim* (New Delhi: SChand, 1979).; Brajbir Saran Das, *The Sikkim Saga* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983).

³⁴³ Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017.

³⁴⁴ Brajbir Saran Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat* (Tata McGraw-Hill Education Pvt. Ltd., 2010). p 112

be more like the one in Kashmir in 1947, in which the Chogyal was to be left eventually with no option but to agree to India's plans for his kingdom.³⁴⁵

The agreement reflecting this arrangement was arrived at and signed on May 8. The Chogyal, Kewal Singh, India's new Foreign Secretary, and leaders of Sikkim's political parties signed a tripartite agreement which promised a democratic government, the rule of law and independent judiciary, fundamental rights, a written constitution, greater power to representatives of the people as well as elections on one-man-one-vote principle.³⁴⁶ The list of promises overlapped the democratization measures that the Chogyal had managed to avoid so far, promises, that, if accomplished, would no doubt leave less space for the monarchy. The agreement had already shifted power to the Chief Executive, with a requirement merely to keep the Chogyal informed. Disagreements, said the agreement, "shall be referred to the Political Officer in Sikkim, who shall obtain the advice of the Government of India, which shall be binding."³⁴⁷ Sikkim had begun to be subsumed under the Indian democratic umbrella.

One of the Indian officials present for the signing remembers an upset Chogyal yelling out after signing the agreement, "you have robbed me of everything, I trusted you."³⁴⁸ Das reports that the

³⁴⁵ In contrast to the popularly held notion that Kashmir's Maharaj Hari Singh willingly and unequivocally chose India, some newer works have analyzed historical documents to posit that circumstances that left him no option but to agree to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, were deliberately created. Primary among the scholars suggesting this include Victoria Schofield (*Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*), and Alistair Lamb (*Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990*).

³⁴⁶ Complete text of Tripartite Agreement in Appendix F.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, Paragraph 8

³⁴⁸ "A" senior Indian government official interview 2017 (details withheld on interviewee's request)

foreign secretary assured him, “you shall remain the Chogyal and your son will be the heir. Your dynasty will be protected, and your interests will not be harmed.”³⁴⁹ An alternate version claims that Singh’s words were mere platitudes, and India was engaged in willful deceit. Datta-Ray reports that the Chogyal showed him another document, a bipartite one signed on April 23. It assured that the Chogyal will continue to perform his functions and that the country's future constitution would guarantee “the constitutional position of the Chogyal of Sikkim.” The Chogyal believed that this superseded the tripartite agreement signed a fortnight later.³⁵⁰ Das admits that the bipartite agreement assured continuity of the Namgyal dynasty, but contends that it provided for the Chogyal to exercise his residuary powers only through the Chief Executive.³⁵¹

A comparison of the developments in Sikkim and Bhutan in this period establish how far apart the policies towards the two states had grown. While Sikkim was attempting to get India to agree to a treaty revision that would allow them greater autonomy, Bhutan had already managed an Indian sponsorship for their membership to the United Nations, a move that would undoubtedly allow them greater autonomy as a member of the international community. As expected India’s involvement in Bhutan’s application raised the inevitable comparison with Sikkim. It was evident that the Chogyal was watching the developments closely, and attempting to build a case for a similar future for Sikkim. While Thondup was visiting Delhi in November 1970, his close aide, and intelligence chief Karma Topden was asked by a British High Commission official if their ultimate objective was independence from India. In candor that surprised the official,

³⁴⁹ Personal interview with B.S. Das, Delhi, India, 5 Aug 2016.

³⁵⁰ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 203-204.

³⁵¹ Das, *The Sikkim Saga*, 24-25.

Topden responded, “that is what we are fighting for.”³⁵² The MEA, in the meantime, prepared to answer questions that could potentially be raised by the international community – why did India choose to sponsor Bhutan, but not Sikkim? Given its dependence on India for external relations, could Bhutan be considered sovereign? Was sponsoring Sikkim for the U.N. a future possibility?

The MEA instructed its diplomats to maintain that Sikkim and Bhutan were different in this matter. They were asked to emphasize that “the provisions of Article 2 of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty by which the Government of Bhutan has agreed to be guided by the Government of India in the conduct of its external relations have not, in any way, resulted in the Government of India hindering Bhutan’s emergence as an independent country. It should be pointed out that India supported Bhutan’s candidature for membership of the Colombo Plan and the Universal Postal Union, which confirms that Article 2 of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty was not interpreted in a manner which would hinder Bhutan’s emergence as a member of the multilateral organisations.”³⁵³ External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh defended the decision in the floor of the parliament, claiming that Bhutan’s special relationship did not impinge on its sovereignty. On Sikkim, the directive contended that “there is a clear difference between the pattern of relations we have with Bhutan and the pattern of relations that we have with Sikkim. The Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1949 clearly entrusts the responsibility of conducting Sikkim’s external relations with the Government of India. There is no point in speculating on this problem in

³⁵² Note on Chogyal's India visit from U.K. High Commission New Delhi to Foreign and COMmonwealth Office, 14 December 1970, TNA File No. FCO 37/532.

³⁵³ “Letter from MEA to all Heads of Missions abroad and heads of all divisions in the ministry” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual) from Thimphu (Bhutan), 2 January 1971, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33-II)/71.

advance.”³⁵⁴ It was crucial to avoid any reference that might raise the “protectorate” issue as that would inevitably lead to a Sikkim-Bhutan comparison.

Back in Gangtok, as the Chief Executive took over his responsibilities, India was accused of intentionally deceiving the Chogyal. It is essential to examine this allegation as it connects to the contention that the decision to annex Sikkim was already in motion. Das claims that his only brief was to support “the aspirations of the people of Sikkim, and should not allow the Chogyal to exploit them.”³⁵⁵ However, how far was Das expected to go to show his support? Was this a suggestion to create conditions that could justify a merger? Das and Bajpai, the two senior Indian officers in Sikkim and effectively in charge of all law and order issues, deny this. Their claims notwithstanding, it seems unlikely that a decision had been made to depose the Chogyal and incorporate Sikkim. Had a feasible plan been in place, it is unlikely that it would have been kept in abeyance for two long years, until April 1975, especially when security concerns were severe. The MEA recommended that “while curtailing the substantial powers of the Chogyal he may be retained constitutional head with ceremonial pomp and pageantry which are popular with the masses in all the three Himalayan kingdoms.”³⁵⁶

It was, however, clear that something had changed in how India viewed Sikkim. P.N. Dhar, who replaced Haksar as Gandhi’s secretary reports that by the time he met her along with Kewal Singh just before the Chogyal had agreed to enlist Indian help, “[Indira Gandhi] had already

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ Brajbir Saran Das, *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat* (Tata McGraw-Hill Education Pvt. Ltd., 2010). pp 114.

³⁵⁶ NAI file “Emerging options for India and Sikkim,” 5 May 1973, NAI, File No. HI/102(40)/73

made up her mind.”³⁵⁷ Because of events over the next few months, this seems to refer to a decision on taking control of Sikkim’s administration and reducing space for Thondup. With the successful 1971 election and the Bangladesh campaign behind her, Gandhi’s mettle as a popular leader as well as administrator was unchallenged. She was now busy battling the emergence of new political opponents, and allegations of corruption. Kaul, a family friend, had retired, and Gandhi had fallen out with Haksar, who departed in early 1973. Her new advisors had no personal connections with Sikkim and looked at it like any other issue. According to a serving officer, “Kewal Singh was more hardheaded and focused. He had a different perspective from Kaul, who had the same ideas about Sikkim as Nehru did. However, Kewal Singh saw our security concerns in a clearer perspective.”³⁵⁸ Gandhi seemed short on both patience and time and preferred a direct approach over a nuanced one. Bajpai, who had a direct line with Delhi, felt that unlike others, she was comfortable with wielding power, and it reflected in the way she made decisions.³⁵⁹ Instead of tempering her approach, her new advisors saw it fit to go along with her new assertive persona.

Gandhi decided that it was time to bring a new player in the mix in the form of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the new external intelligence agency. Rameshwar Nath Kao, the head of the agency which directly reported to the PMO, was now briefing the prime minister with ground reports from Sikkim. As with intelligence agencies elsewhere, details of RAW’s activities are

³⁵⁷ Prithvi Nath Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy* (New Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 278.

³⁵⁸ “A” senior Indian government official interview 2017 (details withheld on interviewee’s request)

³⁵⁹ Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017.

sparse.³⁶⁰ However, most indicators point at their presence in Sikkim by 1973. One view suggests that the agency began to keep an eye on Sikkim once Hope Cooke entered the scene.³⁶¹ Dhar claims that the PMO was tired of meandering and fruitless discussions between the MEA and the Chogyal, and they preferred assessments by RAW “to the confusing and often conflicting reports that came to us from the MEA and its diplomatic sources.”³⁶² Once on the ground, it is unlikely that RAW’s actions were limited only to sending reports. Thondup accused the RAW of bankrolling JAC agitations, housing protesters, feeding and paying them to continue for days. Bajpai says that he has “no doubt that our intelligence agency was then told to guide this movement. I have no doubt that they did that. I have no reason to deny that. I have no reason to condemn it either.”³⁶³ Indian policy in Sikkim had now moved from mere diplomacy to subterfuge and spycraft.

In the meantime, democratic institutions were taking root in Sikkim. In elections in 1974, Kazi’s party won 30 out of 32 seats in the council, establishing him up as the undisputed political leader in Sikkim. Dhar acknowledges the RAW’s hand in the election in a peculiar non-denial denial saying that “there was no interference whatsoever from outside unless the efforts of the RAW to boost the morale of the Congress leaders is considered interference.”³⁶⁴ Kazi immediately asked

³⁶⁰ Accounts by former RAW employees, (such as R. K. Yadav, *Mission R&AW*, 2014 edition (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014) and Asoka Raina, *Inside RAW.: Story of India’s Secret Service* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1982)) abound, but they are usually written by those with no direct role in the operation; only a recent publication, G. B. S. Sidhu, *Sikkim - Dawn of Democracy: The Truth Behind The Merger With India* (Penguin Viking, 2018) admits to a detailed RAW role with evidence and substantiations, and is written by someone who was closely and verifiably associated with the developments in Sikkim.

³⁶¹ Personal interview with Ranjit Gupta, Delhi, India, 21 Dec 2017.

³⁶² Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy*, 275-276.

³⁶³ Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017.

³⁶⁴ Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy*, 280-281.

for an Indian constitutional adviser for Sikkim and Sikkim's participation in Indian political and economic institutions.³⁶⁵ The options discussed by Foreign Secretary Dutt and Political Officer Apa Pant in 1959 were being brought to life.³⁶⁶ The popularly elected leaders authorized a more significant role for India in Sikkim. Datta-Ray believed that Indian officers working for the Chief Executive prompted Kazi. He singles out K.M. Lal, calling him “Kazi's alter ego, apparently suggesting what steps the Sikkim Congress leader should take, drafting his letters and statements, and egging him on to confront the durbar.”³⁶⁷ Lal denies it, describing his role solely as that of a conduit between Kazi and the Chief Executive.³⁶⁸

Thondup sought to use his access to Delhi to protest against Kazi's proposals. However, his visit coincided with India's first nuclear tests in May, which drowned out every other issue. In June 1974, barely a month after he had been appointed Sikkim's constitutional advisor, G.R. Rajagopaul presented his recommendations for a new constitution. The Chogyal was concerned with a clause retained from the tripartite agreement that allowed Delhi to have the last word in case of disagreements. The draft also called the chief of assembly “chief minister,” like in an Indian state, and not a “prime minister.” India had firmly entrenched itself in Sikkim's body politic and had no plans of leaving anytime soon. It was now Das' turn to do some plain-speaking to the Chogyal. In a note to the Chogyal Das laid down India's lines in the sand – “(a) Sikkim could never hope to have an independent status; (b) Delhi was committed to support a

³⁶⁵ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 212-213.

³⁶⁶ See beginning of section 4.2: Managing Sikkim with One Eye on Tibet for more on this.

³⁶⁷ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 206.

³⁶⁸ Personal interview with K.M. Lal, Delhi, India, 14 Dec 2017.

democratic government in Sikkim; (c) the Chogyal will have to accept the position of a constitutional head; and (d) Sikkim's identity was maintainable within these parameters."³⁶⁹

Despite the Chogyal's refusal to assent, the assembly endorsed the draft in a rushed late-night session on June 20-21. Reporting on the episode, UPI journalist Sylvana Foa wondered how much of the proceedings the legislators could comprehend, considering only 3 of them were fluent in English.³⁷⁰ Nonetheless, India seemed well in control of its strategy of a more significant role in Sikkim, pushing the Chogyal out. As Thondup rushed to meet Gandhi, it seemed that even Delhi had given up on the civilizational connections that he had ignored all these years. In the meeting, as Thondup "wanted the discussion to continue, but Mrs Gandhi fell silent and looked aloof. She had perfected the use of silence as a negative response. After an oppressive moment in which nothing was said, the Chogyal stood up to leave. Mrs Gandhi bade him farewell with folded hands and an enigmatic smile, still without saying anything."³⁷¹ The Sikkim Assembly passed the Government of Sikkim Bill, as the constitution bill had come to be called, in early July 1974. Thondup was told, "it has now become necessary for you to give your assent," and reluctantly complied.³⁷² Sikkim was all but a state in the Union of India; in less than a year, the Chogyal would be ousted.

³⁶⁹ Das, *The Sikkim Saga*, 84.

³⁷⁰ Note on Sikkim originally from the Australian High Commission to Canberra shared with U.K. High Commission New Delhi, 10 September 1974, TNA File No. FCO 37/1534.

³⁷¹ Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the "Emergency", and Indian Democracy*, 291-292.

³⁷² Embassy New Delhi, "Sikkim," Wikileaks Cable: 1974NEWDE08716_b, dated July 1, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NEWDE08716_b.html.

4.3.2 *Territorial anxiety*

Thondup seemed to revel in equivocating between India and China even before he had taken over the mantle of the ruler of Sikkim. In 1960, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had to instruct Sikkim Political Officer, Apa Pant that “we should deal with the Maharajkumar in such a manner that in his frustration he does not throw himself in the arms of the Chinese...A serious situation may arise if he denounces the Indo-Sikkim Treaty or appeals to the Chinese for assistance.”³⁷³ In response, Pant cautioned “from every quarter I hear that the Maharajkumar is still toying seriously with the idea of the “Himalayan Federation” – Sikkim-Bhutan-Nepal to be guaranteed by China, India, Russia and others. He often speaks about changing the treaty with India...He also speaks of “not upsetting the Chinese” by “foolish actions of Indians.” All these things we have to bear in mind when we are dealing with him.”³⁷⁴

By this time, Thondup’s wife, the Gyalmo, had moved beyond mere covert support to Sikkim’s quest for independent identity, and into questions of territoriality. Writing for the *Bulletin of Tibetology* in 1966, she questioned the British takeover of Darjeeling from Sikkim in 1835, claiming that the transfer was void as the British reneged on their promise to transfer land in exchange.³⁷⁵ The Chogyal’s claim that the article was merely an academic exercise, and not to question India’s current claim on Darjeeling, did not assuage Indian anxiety. These years were particularly fraught for Indian policymakers. The country had just experienced wars with China

³⁷³ Sikkim Political Officer Apa Pant to Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt, 19 December 1960, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Subject File 6, NMML.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁵ Namgyal, Hope. “The Sikkimese Theory of Land-Holding and the Darjeeling Grant.” *Bulletin of Tibetology* III, no. 2 (July 1966): 46–58.

and Pakistan, and East Pakistan was entering a phase of political turmoil that would eventually boil over in 1971. Delhi's decision to secure the northern borders came in the form of plans for new mountain divisions in armed forces that could deter Chinese troops reach India's plains; at the same time, border infrastructure was to be improved to help troop mobility.³⁷⁶ The 1950 treaty with Sikkim allowed stationing of Indian troops in Sikkim. However, India's attempts to increase troop numbers were met with resistance from the Chogyal who lost no opportunity to remind of his displeasure with the presence of Indian soldiers.

As 1971 and the crisis in East Pakistan dawned, the Chogyal's response further convinced India that the ruler of Sikkim was unconcerned about India's troubles. While Bhutan lost no chance in assuring India of its support, Thondup's actions looked lukewarm and forced. As the situation worsened in East Pakistan, Thondup released a statement in April 1971 condemning the bloodshed. However, his decision to play it safe, choosing not to name countries left everyone guessing about where his allegiances were. While South Asia moved towards war, the Chogyal and Gyalmo were busy in the United States, trying to garner international support for a U.N. seat and equal status with Bhutan. In 1971, they spent months abroad, explaining their claim to anyone who would listen. To familiarize the West with Sikkim, they organized fashion shows in New York, displaying Sikkimese apparel on windows of high-end stores on Fifth Avenue. On the opening night of the events, Sikkimese flags on either side of the New York streets welcomed the guests.³⁷⁷ Back home, the Youth Study Forum questioned India's claims of fighting colonialism, claiming that its approach to Sikkim was no different.

³⁷⁶ "A Valedictory Report on the Indian Army by Brigadier I.M. Christie, Military Adviser to the British High Commissioner in India, 12 March 1965, TNA File No. FO 371/180972.

³⁷⁷ Hope Cooke, *Time Change: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980) pp 200-201.

As the war began in December 1971, the Political Office found that “in conversation with Sikkimese officials one could discern an avoidance of the subject of the Indo-Pak war. This was part of the deliberate effort by the Darbar to make us feel that the Sikkimese do not feel involved in India’s conflicts because of alienation through India’s ‘unsympathetic’ attitude towards Sikkimese ‘aspirations’.”³⁷⁸ While the Sikkimese ruler was prompt in congratulating the Indian Prime Minister at the end of the war, his behavior could not have been further from his neighbor’s.

Throughout this period, India attempted to signal its insecurities to Sikkim king in the way it did with Bhutan monarch. In 1968, sometime after Kaul’s conversation with the Chogyal asking him to forget about the treaty revision any time soon, communication between India and Sikkim began to break down. Neither seemed to heed the messages projected by the other, choosing instead to respond with projections that highlighted their priorities. The Chogyal, for instance, doubled down in his efforts to create an image of a sovereign monarch. Visitors were asked to address the Chogyal and the Gyälmo as “King” and “Queen.” When he was refused honors accorded to a Head of State, and offered only that due to Head of Government, he canceled a planned visit to Nepal in February 1970. To pacify him, Delhi decided that worked out another proposal, offering Sikkim a “special relationship” similar to the one between France and Monaco. Thondup, however, wanted more. Instead of Monaco, which only enjoyed observer status in the U.N., he wanted to have a status similar to Luxembourg’s, which was a founding

³⁷⁸ “Monthly Political Report for December 1971 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Gangtok (Sikkim), 8 February 1972, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/71.

member of the United Nations. This was beyond what India was willing to offer, and negotiations fell through.³⁷⁹

In many respects, India still found it comforting to deal with the Chogyal, perhaps for reasons of familiarity. The nature of the issue that concerned India by 1972 was one that could only be understood by the Chogyal. The Naxal movement had spread along West Bengal, just south of the border from Sikkim. It was guided by a violent Maoist interpretation that envisaged overthrowing the state and had found ideological and material support from China. It appealed to some in the Nepali population in Bengal, and Delhi was concerned that soon, Sikkim's Nepali groups opposing the Chogyal would turn to it as well, and attempt to overthrow the monarchy. The prospect of the resultant mayhem was alarming; it could also be the kind of opportunity that would appeal to China. In March 1972, therefore, Kaul arrived in Gangtok with a fresh proposal, an offer of Sikkim's "permanent association" with India.³⁸⁰

Kaul believed that this latest proposal would take care of the pesky "protectorate" tag stuck to Sikkim. It involved rephrasing the Indo-Sikkim Treaty to read "Sikkim shall be in permanent association with India and, subject to the provisions of this treaty, shall continue to enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs."³⁸¹ While this was, in effect, a revision of the treaty, Chogyal's lawyers advised him that swapping "protectorate" for "permanent association," would put him in uncharted waters. According to Datta-Ray,

³⁷⁹ Duff, *Sikkim*, 151-152.

³⁸⁰ "Monthly Political Report for February and March 1972 from Office of the Political Officer in Sikkim" in file Political reports etc. (Other than Annual Reports) from Gangtok, 7 April 1972, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/72.

³⁸¹ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 149.

“the system of protectorate – no matter how many of your powers are exercised by the Government of India, they are exercised in your name. You have delegated that to the Government of India and you can withdraw them. You retain your intrinsic and inherent identity as a sovereign entity, whereas associated state, Sir Humphrey Baldock said, is not an art form. It is part of the union of India. Once you accept that, you are in no way different from another state of India. You may be a hereditary monarch instead of a nominated Governor, but you are part of the Indian Union.”³⁸²

With no legal protection under this new arrangement, the Chogyal was advised, once they were in, Sikkim would have no way of backing out ever. Thondup proposed a new draft that suggested that “there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the government of India and the government of Sikkim and between the people of India and Sikkim. Sikkim in full sovereign rights enters into a permanent association with the government of India and entrusts to them the rights and responsibilities stipulated in this treaty hereunder.”³⁸³ The term “sovereign rights,” was a deal breaker, as accepting it would mean allowing the Chogyal to proceed to form relationships with other states as he saw fit. Kaul was alone in his optimism that the Chogyal would come around. In a note, Haksar wrote that “the Foreign Secretary says that he found the Chogyal “ready and willing” and that he found him “in a chastened mood”. With great respect, this makes no sense to me... We must not delude ourselves. The Chogyal wants independence, a membership of the United Nations and he is gradually eroding our will.” He advocated a hard break from Thondup, choosing instead to “establish contact with the people of Sikkim, develop a

³⁸² Personal interview with Sunanda Datta-Ray, Kolkata, India, 9 Dec 2017.

³⁸³ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 151.

relationship and earn their goodwill and use that as a real lever against the vagaries of the Chogyal. If we decide on such a policy, I have no doubt that in two years we shall get Chogyal running to us for protection against his own people.”³⁸⁴

By now, the India view was that the way to reduce insecurities in Sikkim lay in reducing maneuvering space for the Chogyal. Das and Bajpai were nearing the end of their terms, and it was essential to secure India’s new arrangement with Sikkim soon. Every few months, Chinese media reports decried the suppression of the people’s voice in Sikkim by India. What Delhi needed was an arrangement that could be interpreted as the voice of the Sikkimese people. Kazi was still in control of the state council, and he now worked in tandem with Delhi. Kazi asked for Sikkimese participation and representation in Indian institutions, claiming that this is what the people wanted. In response, Indira Gandhi introduced a bill to amend the Indian constitution and incorporate Sikkim as an “associate state” of India.³⁸⁵ The prime minister met opposition party members to garner support, arguing that India was only responding to the will of Sikkim’s electorate. The bill was pushed through both houses of parliament with minimal debate in early September, formalizing Sikkim’s representation in the Indian parliament.

The development elicited severe reactions from China, with state-owned publications accusing India of imperialist tendencies, describing its action “as an excuse to seek annexation.”³⁸⁶ An official condemnation from the Foreign Ministry claimed that “the Chinese Government

³⁸⁴ Note from Principal Secretary P.N. Haksar to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 14 March 1972, P.N. Haksar Papers Installment III, Subject File 179, NMML.

³⁸⁵ Complete text of Sikkim Bill 1974 in Appendix G.

³⁸⁶ “Monthly Political Report for July 1974 from Embassy of India in Peking” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Peking, 4 August 1974, NAI, File No. HI/1012(14)/74.

absolutely does not recognise the illegal annexation of Sikkim.”³⁸⁷ The PRC would keep up the pressure on the issue for months, bringing up the issue in the United Nations General Assembly later in the year, calling India’s action “another naked act of expansionism perpetrated by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan by armed force.”³⁸⁸

Sikkim’s closest neighbors, who were most concerned, were also most judicious with their responses, ensuring that even in their concern, they did not appear to be ignoring Indian claims of security concerns. Bhutan’s royals did not officially comment, their silence only broken when they enquired about the progress of the “action in Sikkim.” The queen mother also let some junior Indian officers know that “what India was doing to the Chogyal was not right.”³⁸⁹ Nepal’s ambassador to India told the U.S. Counselor in the Delhi that “Nepal and Bhutan realized the need to be very careful in their dealings with India under such circumstances.”³⁹⁰ The noise surrounding Sikkim was now too loud for the world to ignore, especially now that even China had involved itself. The British Foreign Office began speculating on the nature of Chinese interest in Sikkim, and how far China’s incursions in the region could go.³⁹¹ Americans too began following Chinese commentary and questioned “why the Indians decided to expose

³⁸⁷ “Monthly Political Report for September 1974 from Embassy of India in Peking” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Peking, 4 October 1974, NAI, File No. HI/1012(14)/74.

³⁸⁸ United States Mission in United Nations, New York, “USUN Unclassified summary No. 32,” Wikileaks Cable: 1974USUNN03660_b, dated October 3, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974USUNN03660_b.html.

³⁸⁹ Personal interview with Inder Pal Khosla, Delhi, India, 14 Nov 2017.

³⁹⁰ Embassy New Delhi, “Sikkim,” Wikileaks Cable: 1974NEWDE11926_b, dated September 9, 1974, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NEWDE11926_b.html.

³⁹¹ Internal communication on Sikkim, South Asia Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 8 August 1974, TNA, File No. FCO 37/1533.

themselves to certain international criticism when it already had effective control over Sikkim.” They wondered if “India's confrontation with the Chogyal last year and his continued effort to assert his independent authority prompted India to undertake a “permanent” solution at this time.”³⁹²

Despite international speculation, things began to settle down on the ground. Except for sporadic protests, both pro-monarchy and pro-democracy, the rest of 1974 saw a lull in the action. Sikkim had a new Chief Executive in B.B. Lal, who had been Thondup's batchmate during the Indian Civil Service training. Bajpai too was replaced, with Gurbachan Singh taking over as the last Political Officer. Even as Delhi was recalibrating to a new status quo with involvement in Sikkim's political affairs, there was little certainty on the Chogyal's next move. Speaking to Das, Kewal Singh, who had taken over as foreign secretary from Kaul, was skeptical that the Chogyal had reconciled to the new arrangement. He believed that since the Chogyal had not relented in all this time, there was no reason to believe that he would suddenly give up.³⁹³ As 1975 dawned, two incidents drove home the need to decide on the Chogyal's status once and for all.

Though divested of his executive role, the Chogyal remained the constitutional head of Sikkim. While everyone hoped he would eventually grow in the role, events in early 1975 called the wisdom of this assumption into question. In January 1975, Nepal's King Birendra was reaching out to states in the neighborhood for his coronation. As the invitation for the Chogyal arrived

³⁹² FRUS 1969–1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 253, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d253>.

³⁹³ Das, *The Sikkim Saga*, 59.

through India, the MEA reached out to Nepal, informing them that “under no circumstances should sovereign courtesies be extended to the Chogyal.”³⁹⁴ On reaching Kathmandu, Thondup set out to meet as many foreign representatives as he could, including Chinese Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien, Lord Mountbatten, and U.S. Senator Charles Percy, apprising them of his version of developments. Responding to a question on whether he planned to take the issue to the United Nations in a press conference, he promised “not to leave any stone unturned...to secure a separate identity for Sikkim.”³⁹⁵

The meeting that India found most alarming was the one that the Chogyal had with the Chinese Vice-premier, who reportedly was “very sympathetic” to Sikkim’s cause.³⁹⁶ Associated developments seemed to suggest the germination of a China-supported movement to isolate India in the region and question its territoriality as a whole. This included supporting claims of India having “dismembered” Pakistan, encouraging Nepal’s proposal to declare the region a nuclear-free “Zone of Peace,” backing the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir, and raising the purported struggle of Sikkimese people against “naked annexation by Indian expansionism.”³⁹⁷

³⁹⁴ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 269.

³⁹⁵ “Monthly Political Report for March 1975 from Embassy of India in Kathmandu” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Kathmandu, 8 April 1975, NAI, File No. HI/1012(27)/75.

³⁹⁶ Note on Sikkim from the U.K. High Commission New Delhi to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 April 1975, TNA File No. FCO 37/1672.

³⁹⁷ “Monthly Political Report for April 1975 from Embassy of India in Peking” in file Political reports etc. (other than annual reports) from Peking, 8 May 1975, NAI, File No. HI/1012(14)/75.

India was particularly troubled by what it considered unwarranted Chinese meddling in its backyard. When asked about the development in an interview, the prime minister questioned China's record in Tibet, criticizing that "they have just two different standards."³⁹⁸ Thondup's behavior, that too in foreign soil, had crossed a line. In a conversation with the U.S. mission in India, MEA officials confessed having cautioned him while in Kathmandu. Even Lord Mountbatten, rebuked him at the request of an Indian minister who was present.³⁹⁹ Back home, things seemed to have suddenly sped up. Foreign Secretary Singh turned up in Gangtok in an unscheduled visit for two days, perhaps making arrangements for what was to come. Members of Sikkim Congress in the meantime launched a fresh agitation against the Chogyal for claiming that Sikkim had no responsible democratic government.

The other worrying development involved the Chogyal's eldest son, the crown prince. Kazi's wife – Kazini Elisa-Maria Dorji, a Belgian woman who had always taken great interest in her husband's career brokered meetings between the crown prince and the chief minister in March. It seemed that both sides were attempting a thaw, and eventually a deal between the palace and the assembly. The only problem with any such arrangement was that it could immediately lead to an eruption of Nepalese public sentiment. Ranjit Gupta, First Secretary in the Political Office, claims that "the anger, the resentment of the Nepalese community was palpable. They were intensely anti-Chogyal. This was not something that was or could have been manufactured by India because it was so widespread."⁴⁰⁰ Significantly, it also suggested that the stability of

³⁹⁸ Embassy New Delhi, "Prime Minister's interview with UPI March 11," Wikileaks Cable: 1975NEWDE03523_b, dated March 13, 1975, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NEWDE03523_b.html.

³⁹⁹ Embassy New Delhi, "Developments in Sikkim," Wikileaks Cable: 1975NEWDE03170_b, dated March 6, 1975, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NEWDE03170_b.html.

⁴⁰⁰ Personal interview with Ranjit Gupta, Delhi, India, 22 July 2016.

Sikkim, and by extension India's interests, could be endangered not just by the Chogyal, but even by democratically elected leaders.

Much has been written about the next phase in Sikkim's history.⁴⁰¹ Over April 9 and 10, the Indian government moved decisively to take care of its Chogyal problem. On the first day, the Indian Army surrounded the palace to disarm the Sikkim Guards who were in charge of Thondup's security. Chogyal's supporters later claimed that 40,000 soldiers were sent for the job.⁴⁰² While that is likely an exaggeration, Datta-Ray reports that "bowling down the road from India House was a steady stream of one-ton military trucks and jeeps with lowered hoods. Soldiers in battle fatigues crammed the vehicles. The convoy stopped at the pavilion where men poured out to begin the advance."⁴⁰³ In this show of strength for the Indian state, one palace guard was killed, and a few injured. Bajpai believes that the messy operation exhibited India's discomfort in wielding power, whereas Gupta describes it as a "long, meandering, bumbling process, executed very shabbily."⁴⁰⁴ At the end of an operation that took less than an hour, communication lines in the palace were disconnected, and Thondup and his family were confined to the palace.

⁴⁰¹ See Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, chapters 1, 16-17; Duff, *Sikkim*, chapters 9-10.

⁴⁰² "Report from the Intelligence Bureau - May 1975" in file Sikkim – Anti-India propaganda and activities by the supporters of the Chogyal, 8 May 1975, NAI, File No. 13013/1/75-SKM.

⁴⁰³ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 9.

⁴⁰⁴ Personal interview with K.S. Bajpai, Delhi, India, 16 Nov 2017; Personal interview with Ranjit Gupta, Delhi, India, 22 July 2016.

The next day, the assembly passed a resolution asking that the institution of Chogyal be abolished, and Sikkim is merged with India. Delhi and Gangtok's actions were now wholly synchronized. Foreign Minister Yashwantrao Chavan told the Indian parliament that the guards were paid for by India, and "there could be no justification for a private army of about 400 people retained by the Chogyal on the palace premises, but paid for by the public exchequer."⁴⁰⁵ In a letter to the Chogyal, Chavan held him responsible for the turn of events, saying that "we have all along been hopeful that you would show understanding and keep pace with the march towards democratisation. These hopes have been belied."⁴⁰⁶

India was in near-complete control of Sikkim, except for a democratic stamp of approval. With efficiency uncharacteristic of either the Indian or the Sikkim governments, a referendum was organized for April 15 for all of Sikkim to vote on the proposal to merge. MEA's Joint Secretary North, N.B. Menon uncomfortably defended the competence, saying that "the machinery was there because of the last election and the referendum could easily be organised."⁴⁰⁷ Datta-Ray claims that India stage-managed the outcome, and "the chief executive took pains to ensure that the outcome did not disappoint him."⁴⁰⁸ R.K. Yadav, a former R&AW operative, claims that the agency had anticipated the move and already made arrangements.⁴⁰⁹ Interestingly, G.B.S. Sidhu,

⁴⁰⁵ Copy of Statement by Indian Minister of External Affairs in Lok Sabha on 11 April 1975, on the situation in Sikkim, TNA File No. FCO 37/1672.

⁴⁰⁶ Embassy New Delhi, "Sikkim," Wikileaks Cable: 1975NEWDE04921_b, dated April 11, 1975, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NEWDE04921_b.html.

⁴⁰⁷ Note on conversation with N.B. Menon, Joint Secretary, MEA with Oliver Forster. U.K. High Commission New Delhi, 16 April 1975, TNA File No. FCO 37/1672.

⁴⁰⁸ Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab*, 308.

⁴⁰⁹ Yadav, *Mission R&AW*, 319-320.

who demonstrates exemplary candor in the rest of his account is aberrantly silent about RAW's role in this development.⁴¹⁰ The result overwhelmingly supported a merger, and Kazi and his ministers were in Delhi the next morning to talk about the modalities. The 36th Amendment to the Indian Constitution was passed by parliament on 5 May. Sikkim joined the Indian Union as the 22nd state on 16 May with the President signing the constitution amendment act.

Thondup would continue to protest India's actions, futilely attempting to get the United States and Britain to intervene. China was still sympathetic to his cause, accusing India of imperialist tendencies towards its neighbors. In a statement in end-April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry asked, "Sikkim today, whose turn tomorrow?"⁴¹¹ However, with the incorporation of Sikkim complete, and the border with Tibet secure, Indira Gandhi and her government paid little attention. Their focus had shifted again, to much more critical issues. The Emergency was to be declared in less than a month. The Chogyal now existed only in the past.

4.3.3 *Development as foreign policy*

A couple of years after he had been deposed, Thondup pointed out in a personal letter to Apa Pant that "a lot of developments have taken place in Sikkim." He complained that "Government of India are pumping in 22 crores per annum now as compared to 3½ that we got when I was in Government."⁴¹² The former Chogyal was right – since the merger, India had used development

⁴¹⁰ Sidhu, *Sikkim - Dawn of Democracy*.

⁴¹¹ "Chinese Government Statement on Sikkim," copy of release from People's Republic of China, 29 April 1975, TNA File No. FCO 37/1673.

⁴¹² Palden Thondup Namgyal to Apa Pant, 26 December 1977, Apa Pant Papers, Instalment 1, Correspondence with Palden Thondup Namgyal, NMML.

as an essential strategy to cement its hold over the new state and convince the Sikkimese people that they had taken the right decision. Land reforms had been initiated, along with employment generating projects including an animal husbandry program, a watch factory, a paper mill, and a policy to approve easy loans for buying poultry and cattle.⁴¹³ This was part of a 20-point economic program for the state with a particular focus on “emotional integration.” Ahead of the prime minister’s visit in 1976, the Indian Home Ministry published a booklet on the successes of the program, claiming that it “enthused the people of Sikkim as nothing else has enthused them in their life before and one can hear about the 20 point programme and its implementation in all nooks and corners of the state.”⁴¹⁴

While the extra focus on development may have been a part of the strategy to win over the Sikkimese after 1975, the importance of development in the relationship with Sikkim was never lost on India. The Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950, which made India responsible for Sikkim’s external relations specified that this included “political, economic and financial” aspects of foreign policy. This meant that not just development, but even Sikkim’s trade, along with the prospect of earning of foreign exchange depended on India. An MEA note on the treaty pointed out that China had never been conformable with of India’s role, and may, at some time, try to lure Sikkim away by promising to take care of development – suggesting that India be alert to this possibility.⁴¹⁵ India’s development aid to Sikkim, therefore, was not just in the form of direct

⁴¹³“Note on developments in Sikkim after its integration with India” in file Developments in Sikkim after its integration with India, 1976, NAI, File No. 18030/4/76-SKM.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ “India’s responsibility for the External Relations of Bhutan and Sikkim and China’s Hesitation in Accepting the Position” in file India-Sikkim and India-Bhutan boundaries, undated, NAI File No. HI/107(1)/72.

development assistance, but also technical know-how, knowledge sharing, deputing of experts, as well as trade. The elements of security were also not absent. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) set up by Nehru in 1960 prioritized road building in Sikkim and Bhutan to as part of focus on infrastructure development in the border areas.

As mentioned earlier, at a personal level, this involved ensuring that the royal family, including the Chogyal, could have access to foreign exchange as they needed, even if it did not meet Indian policy at all times. The arrival of Nari Rustomji, who had had long connections with the region, as the Dewan in Sikkim in 1954 started off the first Seven Year Plan for Sikkim funded entirely by India, with planned infrastructure, education, and health projects. Sikkim was almost always kept under consideration while planning projects in the region. In 1959, for instance, while proposing hydroelectricity projects in Bhutan and Bengal, the MEA discussed ways in which such a project would help Sikkim.⁴¹⁶ When Indira Gandhi began to take an active interest in the region after 1967, during her visit to Sikkim, she appeared for a public meeting with the Chogyal in a stadium built with Indian assistance. In a public acknowledgment that would become rare in the following years, Thondup thanked India for “the generous assistance and sympathy received from India.” Gandhi, in turn, said that India sought to “fashion our relations on the basis of understanding, cooperation and mutual benefit.”⁴¹⁷ The only other time, he would thank India for help with improving the lives of the Sikkimese would be in 1972, at the inauguration of Sikkim 72 – an exhibition of Sikkim’s development. In his speech, the Chogyal profusely thanked India

⁴¹⁶ Subimal Dutt File 57 (PDF) - March 1959 – 104-106 - Letter from MEA (FS?) to PM of Bhutan on electricity project to help both W Bengal and Sikkim.

⁴¹⁷ “Monthly Political Report for May 1968 from the Office of the Political Officer, Sikkim,” 4 June 1968, NAI, File No. HI/1012/23/68.

for its help, financial and otherwise, singling out Indian experts, and those on deputation in Sikkim⁴¹⁸

As the discussion above establishes, the issue of development and aid was intensely political, and often used by either side to make a point. In 1968, for example, as India pressured the Chogyal to act against those who had carried out protests against India during independence day celebrations, Thondup struck back by deciding to limit the role the State Bank of India. In the absence of a robust banking system in Sikkim, a large share of financial transactions was conducted through the State Bank. However, they were now asked to limit their dealings to the Government of India's accounts in Sikkim. Reporting that the bank had suddenly been asked to vacate the building that they operated out of, the political office wondered if there was more to the sudden decision than met the eye.⁴¹⁹ Soon after, to take control of the system of getting foreign experts to Sikkim, and to circumvent the practice of inviting them through Indian channels, the Chogyal devised a system of inviting experts as personal guests to the Palace. These would often be experts working in Bhutan under the Colombo Plan arrangements.⁴²⁰

In 1970, as the Chogyal expressed his inability to get anti-India protests under control, Foreign Secretary Kaul arrived on a two day trip to Gangtok, but not to talk about the protests. He was scheduled to inspect the progress of development projects, and discuss major India-financed

⁴¹⁸ Monthly report for November 1972 from Sikkim Political Office, in file Political reports etc. (Other than Annual Reports) from Gangtok, 5 December 1972, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/72.

⁴¹⁹ Monthly report for September 1968 from Sikkim Political Office, in file Monthly reports (other than annual reports) from Sikkim (Gangtok), 5 October 1968, NAI, File No. HI/1012/23/68.

⁴²⁰ Monthly report for November 1969 from Sikkim Political Office, in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok, 10 December 1969, NAI, File No. HI/1012(33)/69.

schemes with the Palace. While not directly connecting the two, the report from Sikkim does point out that the protests seemed to lose steam soon after the foreign secretary's conversations on development issues.⁴²¹ Around the same time, Kazi started to signal his inclinations and get Delhi's attention by talking about the role that Indian aid had played in developing Sikkim. It seemed that he was on the right track – the political office reported back noted that this was “the first occasion that a political leader has come out in open support of the assistance that India has been giving without being critical of it.”⁴²²

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter, read with the previous one on the Indo-Bhutan relationship is aimed at a paired comparison of India's relationship with the Bhutan and Sikkim to understand how and why India decided to accept and encourage a more independent Bhutan, but not Sikkim. For the analysis, I use a framework of refracted images in which aspects of India's self-image vis-à-vis China refract through Sikkim and Bhutan, with different results. I examine the relationships through the three aspects of images used in this dissertation – civilizational conviction, development as a component of foreign policy, and territorial anxiety, to argue that these aspects of self-images account for the difference in India's response to Sikkim and Bhutan.

I analyze available evidence to argue that in the period following the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pak war, India's territorial anxiety was heightened by Chinese presence across its northern borders. The altered geopolitical realities of the time also compelled it to relook its

⁴²¹ Monthly report for July 1970 from Sikkim Political Office, in file Political reports (other than annual reports) from Gangtok and Thimphu, 4 August 1970, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/70.

⁴²² “Monthly Political Report for March 1970 from the Office of the Political Officer, Sikkim and Bhutan,” 9 April 1970, NAI, File No. HI/1012/33/70.

approach of conducting foreign policy through aid and development. As the acknowledgment of these priorities became increasingly important, India actively conveyed these priorities to Sikkim and Bhutan. I argue that Sikkim and Bhutan vastly differed in their responses, paving the way for contrasting policies. As Bhutan signaled an understanding and appreciation of Indian priorities in both their words and actions, Sikkim did not. In subsequent years, this led to a policy where India encouraged and supported Bhutan's ambitions of greater autonomy, while it brought Sikkim under Indian control.

For instance, despite the country's advance towards an independent international status, the Bhutanese King never wavered from easing India's territorial anxiety. He aligned with Indian security concerns early on, unequivocally assuring India during the 1971 war. From the aid collection drive and refugee colony visit to the King's snub to U.S. Senator Charles Percy in protest of the American policy in the region, and finally, prompt recognition of independent Bangladesh exhibited a willingness to stand with India even when the rest of the world was not. Sikkimese behavior, on the other hand, seemed to convey a lack of interest in Indian concerns. Worse, it suggested that when pushed, the Chogyal would act to pacify India only as long as the pressure was on, changing tack the moment he was no longer under scrutiny. Thondup's refusal to act against anti-India protesters in 1968, raising the Sikkimese identity issue when India at the most inopportune moments, such as in the aftermath of the 1965 war with Pakistan, and his ambivalence, claiming that India and China were almost equally to blame for boundary skirmishes, only amplified Indian concerns.⁴²³ The blunt messages such as the one from T.N.

⁴²³ "The Chogyal of Sikkim," note from P.H. Gore-Booth, U.K. High Commission New Delhi, 20 January 1966, TNA File No. FO 371/186947

Kaul in 1968, and from B.S. Das in 1973 resulted from India's incredulity at his refusal to recognize India's apprehensions. Unpredictability such as this eventually forced India to move to oust him as Chogyal after his outburst in Kathmandu in March 1975.

Bhutan's assurances went a long way in assuaging Indian civilizational conviction, even as the country was moving towards a greater autonomy through membership of the United Nations. The membership would inevitably entail a modification in the way India conducted business with the country. Both B.S. Das and Indian President V.V. Giri drew attention to the issue in their notes before and after the U.N. application. However, explicit mentions of Indian help and Indo-Bhutan relations by Bhutanese kings continued to assure India that even when Bhutan spread its wings and became a member of the international community, it would not be at the cost of Indian priorities. On the other hand, the story of Sikkim's relationship with India is replete with attempts of redrawing the relationship, moving from known to unknown territory, with offers from "associate state" to "permanent association." Despite his intransigence, it was the Chogyal that India chose to work with at the height of the Naxal movement, helping to ensure that the problem did not spread to Sikkim. However, India believed that the Chogyal aimed to scuttle every attempt from India to reconcile, refusing to acknowledge civilizational ties, until he was ultimately removed.

Finally, Bhutan also aligned itself with India's preference of using aid and development activities as a mainstay of foreign policy, accepting and making grateful mentions of Indian largesse, including in the setting up of the five-year plans for the kingdom. As the King was fond of

saying, it was in Bhutan's interest to depend on India for assistance. Later, his son Jigme Singye, like the previous king, made sure to decline offers of aid from various parties, ensuring that the news always reached Indian ears to assure them. In contrast, the Chogyal seldom publicly acknowledged India's role in Sikkim's development. In contrast, Kazi's argument that Sikkim needed to stay close to India for the role that its aid played in developing Sikkim was perhaps one of the reasons that India decided to work with him. In the following years, India spent most of its energy managing the Chogyal, with little opportunity to discuss development. It was only after 1975 that the focus was back on development.

Since the 1960s, as India got increasingly restless about China across the border, the first line of defense in addressing the perceived threats were the royal families in both kingdoms.

Relationships with Sikkim and Bhutan diverged starkly here. The treaties formed only the framework of what was possible; a sense of goodwill and perceptions drove the relationships.

While the behavior of Bhutanese monarchs reassured India that their concerns were important, the Chogyal gave the impression that he was temperamental, and could tilt towards China at the most inopportune moment. In describing the crux of the Sikkim-Bhutan dichotomy in 1970,

Haksar pithily commented that "while Bhutan, whatever the future may hold, has been most cooperative. We feel we have exercised a benevolent presence in Sikkim, but have not always felt we were appreciated."⁴²⁴ This illuminates the underlying preferences that guided Indian

policymakers – principles that the Chogyal was blind to, while the Wangchucks were not.

Together with geopolitics, this is what eventually guided India's relationship with Sikkim inevitably down a path that ended with incorporation in India.

⁴²⁴ Jairam Ramesh, *Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi* (Simon & Schuster India, 2018). pp 354-355

Chapter 5. CONCLUSION

“We could not come here this year and said, “We have had a bit of trouble on our Frontier, so the whole basis of our approach to the United Nations on particular question has changed.” If this is the attitude Governments must take in the Assembly, then that Assembly cannot hope to make progress. Therefore, I think, if anything we deserve a degree of appreciation from a large number of people, that even when we are ourselves have been hurt, we were willing to bring up this question of principles in interests of United Nations and in the interests of world peace and cooperation. That, Mr. President, is our position.”

V.K. Krishna Menon – “Statement on the question of Tibet.”

22 October 1959.⁴²⁵

A major motivation for this research has been to find an answer to the question – how do countries decide on their foreign policy? More specifically, how do cognitive preferences of decision-makers influence foreign policy behavior? In finding answers to these questions, I have hoped to gain insights on the decision-making processes in postcolonial states. Major IR theories have disregarded the research agenda of analyzing foreign policy behavior or the influences behind it. This has often been a level of analysis issue – with IR concerning itself with system level or state level analyses, while the in foreign policy, considering an individual level is crucial. The FPA tradition has allowed various approaches to understanding this question, from

⁴²⁵ Statements made by V.K. Krishna Menon, Chairman of the Indian delegation to the United Nations on “The Question of Tibet,” 22 October 1959, file No. 928, V.K. Krishna Menon papers, Instalment 2, NMML.

using cultural variables to the role of domestic politics. I have used FPA to examine the question from the perspective of images, and how the self-image of a state has guided its relationship with other states. Diplomacy, usually considered the domain of power interests and security concerns may seem distant from the consideration of images, and an association of the two tenuous. By using newly available archival material along with interviews, and secondary source material, I have challenged this assumption to establish the presence of certain aspects of images in the decision-making process in India.

I have examined various historical moments between 1950 and 1975, in which Indian foreign policy decisions have exhibited sudden inconsistencies or unexpected reversals. I have found that India's decision-makers were guided by certain aspects of images which stayed constant through a sustained period. These aspects were present pre as well as post-independence and were expressed through public as well as private conversations, letters, articles, and official documents. They were considerations that foreign policy makers such as bureaucrats and political leaders discussed and considered in the process of determining priorities in foreign policy and deciding appropriate behavior. Further, these aspects of images did not necessarily work bilaterally between the two states under consideration. I have found that India's aspects of self-image with respect to China, refracted through other third parties in the region, such as Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet. For instance, I found that a major reason for India to proactively offer asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 was related to India's interpretation of Chinese actions. Indian decision-makers believed that there was a perceived change in China's approach to Tibet between 1950 and 1959, which reflected in China's approach to Indian's self-image and India's priorities. Further, I have found that understanding how two bigger neighbors like India and

China interacted with each other required understanding the role of smaller actors in the region.

In this concluding chapter, I summarize these findings and look at the wider implications of the use of a framework of images to analyze Indian foreign policy. Specifically, I examine the question about the salience of a framework of images. Finally, I discuss a future research agenda in India, and beyond, that can benefit from a framework of images.

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I began this study by introducing the major motivating question for this study. I argued that mainstream theoretical frameworks leave much to be desired in the study of preferences as a motivating factor. While certain formulations, such as Moravcsik's Liberal Theory or Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro's Neoclassical Realism have acknowledged the role of preferences, cognitive aspects have remained out of the scope of analysis. I have accommodated these characteristics by using a framework proposed by Robert Jervis as a starting point. Images for a state, in this definition, were defined as "those of its beliefs about the other that affect its predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances."⁴²⁶ I have also used the concept of aspects of images referring to beliefs that a state has about itself, ones that help it convey its priorities. With these, I have determined the aspects of images that have consistently guided Indian foreign policy priorities and examined multiple historical moments in Indian foreign policy decision-making that seemed to exhibit traits of a sudden discrepancy or abrupt reversal in the established policy.

⁴²⁶ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, 5.

In examining these cases, I have modified the images framework offered by Jervis to make space for the role of other actors in the relationship between two states. I have posited that the relationship between two states is not necessarily bilateral, and that such a relationship may be better understood by accommodating other states in the region in a framework of refracted images. In this instance, I have argued that a layered understanding of the Sino-Indian relationship from an images perspective is best done with the involvement of other smaller actors in the region, such as Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet. India's aspects of self-image vis-à-vis China are mediated through these actors. I have also argued that in India's case, it is China, which has most fundamentally influenced India's relationship with its smaller neighbors. I have examined the role of Tibet in 1950—'51 and in 1959, the role of Sikkim in 1968—1975, and the role of Bhutan in 1968—1975 in refracting India's self-image vis-à-vis China. Further, I have discussed how each of these cases have exhibited developments that, at first glance, seemed like deviations, or even reversals of policy that had been in place for some years.

Following an inductive process, I have determined the aspects of self-image that have been important to India from the pre-independence period. Since a major motivation of my project was to explore new approaches to understanding what might have guided a state to behave in a particular way, I have found inductive research to be particularly appropriate and useful. By examining articles, speeches, letters, and policy documents, I have arrived at civilization conviction, territorial anxiety and development as a part of foreign policy as three major aspects of self-image that have been important to India in conducting foreign policy. In three chapters, through intertemporal as well as interspatial analyses of the instances mentioned above, I have

investigated how Indian interpretations of responses to its self-image have guided foreign policy. The instance of Tibet has offered an opportunity of diachronic analysis, where I have investigated the reasons for two different approaches in Indian policy in 1950 and 1959. The other two instances, in Sikkim and Bhutan, have offered an opportunity for synchronic research where I have investigated the variation in Indian policy towards Bhutan and Sikkim during the same period, 1968—1975. To understand the policies and the role of self-image, I have used archival material in the form of official documents and private papers, and interviews with key players in administrations at the time.

I have defined civilizational conviction, the first aspect of India's self-image, as the belief that India has been and will be again an influential player in its neighborhood. Additionally, as a major power in the region, India would also have its own sphere of influence. In the case of Tibet, I have found that India believed it has civilizational ties with both Tibet and China in 1950, leading it to attempt to maintain these ties with both. I have also found that India was guided by the assumption that even in the case of a Chinese campaign against Tibet, the latter would continue to have its separate identity, thereby keeping its civilizational connection with India intact. Further, India believed that China felt similarly about the larger role of India and China in Asia, which it did not want to jeopardize. I have further argued that by 1959, India's assumptions about China's civilizational priorities have changed, allowing for the consideration that Tibet might lose its individual identity. While this did not lead India to intervene in Chinese actions in Tibet, it did prompt India to offer asylum to the Dalai Lama as a way of preserving Tibet's civilizational identity. I have found similar developments in the analyses involving Bhutan and Sikkim. Though the policy towards the two was comparable in the early years after

independence, Bhutan's acknowledgment of its ties with India led to a policy of cooperation and greater autonomy. Sikkim, on the other hand, endorsed a policy of resistance, holding both India and China responsible for troubles in the border and hinting that it saw itself closer to China in seeking a common history than India. Over the years, this led to a divergence in Indian policy towards Bhutan and Sikkim, and with diminishing confidence in the Sikkimese elite, a consensus on merging the state with India emerged among Indian policymakers.

Territorial anxiety, the other aspect of self-image that I have found to influence Indian policy owed its origin most significantly to the partition. This experience resulted in anxiety over claims made by others on territory that India considered to be its own. In Tibet, I have found that the change in India's understanding of China and policy coincided with increasing insecurity about China's motives with regard to territory claimed by India. In 1950, even as PLA troops advanced through Tibet, Indian decision-makers believe that this did not portend a threat on Indian territory. This changed by 1959, due to reports of Chinese road construction through Aksai Chin and PRC's obfuscation in responding to Indian claims on the boundary in multiple sectors. Similarly, in the case of Sikkim, I have found that a major sticking point in the Indo-Sikkim relationship continued to be Sikkim's reluctance in allowing India more control over the security of the Sikkim-Tibet border. While India considered this a right per the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, Sikkim cited concerns about the effect of the presence of Indian troops on the domestic audience. On the other hand, while Indian troops were present in Bhutan only on a training capacity, the state lost no opportunity to express its unanimity with India on territorial issues. The most important example of this presented itself during the Bangladesh war in 1971, when the Bhutanese king offered unequivocal support to India at the time when no other states did.

Finally, the policy of using development as a component of foreign policy as an aspect owed its origin to both India's emergence as the inheritor of the British in South Asia, as well as on its understanding of its role in the region. India's decision-makers operated with the conviction that a developed region is key to its own development, and as the biggest actor in the region, it had a role to play in helping others in this respect. Conversely, it interpreted a refusal to be helped as a signal of shifting allegiances, as it did in the case of Sikkim. While the Sikkimese king tried his best to prevent increasing Indian influence in the form of development assistance, the Bhutanese royals welcomed the benefits that such aid bought. Later, after Bhutan's membership of the United Nations made it possible for others states to offer it aid, Bhutan continued to assure India and prioritize Indian aid to convey that it did not intend to challenge the status quo. I also found that aid, as well as trade, was a key component of India's relationship with Tibet from pre-independence years, something that India was keen to continue after 1947. Finding out that China was actively blocking Indian attempts at maintaining this aspect of the Indo-Tibet relationship seriously transformed India's considerations about the motivations and role of China. In Tibet, and the other instances under consideration, India initially believed this to be a result of unclear signaling through self-image. As a result, there were initial attempts by India to modify its behavior to signal how it perceived its role. However, eventually, Indian decision-makers concluded that their understanding of India's role in the region as represented through self-image was not adequately mirrored in the way that other states in the region, most importantly China, perceived it or responded.

The quote at the beginning of this chapter was part of an address delivered by V.K. Krishna

Menon, leader of the Indian delegation in late 1959. Delivered while the U.N. was discussing the issue of the PRC's membership in late 1959, Menon emphasized that India's policies were driven by its ideals, and were not merely transactional necessities. He also expected to be lauded for this stand. Minutes later, as part of the same speech he commented that, "if we thought that we should not bring this up here this year, it could only be there was a change in our foreign policy, in its fundamental or because we think principles are so elastic that they can be forgotten when one's own interests are concerned! That is not the position as far as I am concerned."⁴²⁷

This speech was delivered months after India had accommodated the Dalai Lama and his followers in India at the cost of affecting its relationship with China. However, in this comment, Menon, known for his persistence in advocating a larger role for India in the global stage, attempted to convey the aspects of self-image important to India. The comment reflected an attempt to project India as a civilizational actor who should be appreciated for taking the long view that was guided not merely by selfish priorities, but considerations of what was important for other states and stability in the international order. In turn, such a stand also sought to assert that Indian decisions were important enough to influence outcomes impacting other major states. This is consistent with what I have found in my analysis; that self-image was an important vehicle to convey how India desired to be perceived by other states; and that they persisted for a considerable period of time.

5.2 THE SALIENCE OF IMAGES

At this juncture, it is important to address a more fundamental question – why use a framework

⁴²⁷ Statements made by V.K. Krishna Menon, Chairman of the Indian delegation to the United Nations on "The Question of Tibet," 22 October 1959, file No. 928, V.K. Krishna Menon papers, Instalment 2, NMML.

of refracted images? What analytical benefits does an analysis based on this framework offer? Considering this question requires stepping back and considering the role that human agents play in decision-making. It follows that the cognitive process, or the way in which these decision-makers understand the world around them cannot be left out. Valerie Hudson, a scholar of IR and foreign policy, who has worked extensively in studying non-realist explanations for foreign policy behavior, has used literature from psychology to direct towards factors beyond rationality that continue to be important:

“human capacity to be rational is bounded. Herbert Simon, the Nobel laureate, notes that our bounded rationality stems from our inability to know everything, think everything, and understand everything (including ourselves). We construct a simplified mental model of reality and behave fairly rationally within its confines, but those confines may be quite severe. Mental models are inescapable, but they do have their downsides. They are hard to change, and they are based only upon what we know.”⁴²⁸

In order to efficiently store as well as recall these sensory inputs, the mind uses “shortcuts” to determine what data it might call upon later for more detailed processing. Often, the process of filing away this information for recalling it later is accomplished with the help of what must be considered stereotypes, biases, and heuristics. Hudson further argues that it is not only cognition that finds a role in decision-making, but also emotion, which is often ignored by IR theorists focused on rational choice.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁸ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 43.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

In this backdrop, images serve an important role in explaining decisions that, seen only through the prism of rational choice, may seem unintelligible. For instance, Jervis discusses how states seem to take decisions that reflect generosity or gratitude; they also seem to operate on trust, or act to appear trustworthy. According to him, these represent legitimate aspects of beliefs in states and are connected to goals.⁴³⁰ He describes beliefs such as goodwill, prestige or the need to save face, as connected to goals in the form of “aspects of a state’s image that greatly contribute to its pursuit of other goals.”⁴³¹ Examined in this way, claims of a historical sphere of influence from modern nation-states such as India and China, or conceptualizations of a “century of national humiliation” from China become understandable.⁴³²

While Jervis has extensively examined the role of perceptions in Western decision-making processes, in his work, the presence of postcolonial states has been limited to instances analyzing how powers such as the United States or Britain have perceived their behavior.⁴³³ In using a modified version of the framework offered by Jervis, I have expanded the explanatory horizon of self-image as an analytical tool. While the original framework of images has operated with the assumption of a single policymaker at the apex, I have argued that in the Indian case, there have

⁴³⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 43-44.

⁴³¹ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, 7-8.

⁴³² John Garver, “The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation,” *China Report* 47, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 99–113, <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700204>.

⁴³³ India, for instance, makes a handful of appearances in Robert Jervis’ *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976) in pp 51, 101, 123, 135, and 346, but always to explain U.S. or British interpretations of Indian behavior. Only on p 301, the perception of Indian elites on the relation with China comes up, where Jervis cites G. Eric Hansen’s 1968 paper for *Orbis*, “Indian Perceptions of the Chinese Communist Regime and Revolution.”

been a constellation of elite foreign policy shapers both as political leaders and bureaucrats that constituted the base. These elite decision-makers have developed and shared images, and it is in communication with each other that they built perceptions and made interpretations. In case of Tibet, for example, I have found that Nehru was inarguably the first among equals. However, interpreting responses to India's self-image, and deciding on response took place through his interactions with personalities such as MEA General Secretary G.S. Bajpai, foreign secretaries K.P.S. Menon and Subimal Dutt, ambassadors to China K.M. Panikkar, and R.K. Nehru, and leader of the delegation to the U.N., V.K. Krishna Menon, among others. Similarly, for Sikkim and Bhutan, I have found that while Indira Gandhi took over Nehru's role, she was aided by Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, her personal secretaries P.N. Haksar and P.N. Dhar, head of RAW R.N. Kao, Sikkim Political Officer K.S. Bajpai, and others. This would suggest that while the responsibility of taking the final decision would have fallen to Jawaharlal Nehru or Indira Gandhi as head of the council of ministers, an analysis of the decision-making process would be incomplete without examining the role of others.

The most important contribution of the modified framework of refracted images was the opportunity to expand the dimensions of the relationships between two states to involve other actors in the region. As I have established here, issues and events that, at first glance, would seem only to reflect the dynamics between two countries may have deliberately or accidentally involved other states. Keeping this in perspective, while looking at the evidence potentially allowed for a more textured analysis of the relationship between two states. That this framework aided an understanding of political decision-making in India would suggest that it could find applications in other post-colonial countries where governing structures were similarly imposed,

and did not develop organically. As Kaviraj notes, the size of the population and diversity of India with varied cultural and administrative contexts could offer a checkered story that would apply to the experience of various postcolonial societies. The interactions between the empire and the cultural and political resources of the colonized society could also bring out similarities between India and other postcolonial states, thereby offering interesting avenues for research. Additionally, since the timeline of colonization of Indian is spread out over decades, the empire could have undertaken similar projects in different colonies at the same time. Given the similarity in the way that postcolonial societies were introduced to ideas such as democracy and modern sovereignty, it is also possible to argue that as more and more postcolonial states democratize, the path they follow would likely be closer to India's than Europe's.⁴³⁴ Finally, the objective of not overstating evidence has required researchers to consider confounding variables at all times. A confounding variable is one that influences both the dependent and the independent variable. Being able to isolate a single relevant independent variable, free of the influence of other variables in determining the outcome in the dependent variable has been considered the prerequisite of good research. Under such an approach, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet would likely be considered confounding variables, coming in the way of understanding the dynamics of the India-China relationship. However, the framework of refracted images would allow making use of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet by asking if they did, in fact, influence how India and China interacted with another, and if so, how?

⁴³⁴ Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India*, 216-217.

5.3 FURTHER RESEARCH

With this study, I hope to contribute to the emerging literature that aims to take a nuanced approach to Indian foreign policy and make it intelligible without employing either realism or nonalignment. I believe that my doctoral project will have policy-relevant applications as well. Asia is on the cusp of the rise of new powers, reorientation of existing players, and reorganization of alliances. My dissertation argues that within India's immediate neighborhood, it is perceptions of China that fundamentally structure how India relates to its smaller regional actors. As I establish in this dissertation, this has been the case for India's neighbors to the East and Northeast. Over the last decade or so, China's objective of emerging as a leading actor in the region, and subsequent projects such as the Belt-Road Initiative, have led to an expansion of China's sphere of influence in India's entire neighborhood. In many of these countries, such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, China has either replaced, or appeared as the primary contender to deliver infrastructure projects such as roads, ports and airports. This offers an important starting point to analyses that consider what drives the aspirations of regional players beyond security needs. My research is ideally placed to offer such insights.

An important way to take this project forward would be to ask how far the images framework can be extended. It is conceivable that the consideration of self-image will always be present to influence decision-making, as it forms the world that human agents inhabit. This is how India sees itself and perceives its role in the world. It follows, that the framework will be relevant not only at the level of states, but even multilateral platforms, such as in the NAM, or the New International Economic Order (NIEO) that were put forward during the 1970s through the United Nations, or even in India's overall approach to the United Nations. Krishna Menon's speech

quoted earlier also demonstrates how India's role at the U.N. also influences its relationships with China. Moving closer to the present, is it possible that this consideration still exists in India's attempts to engage internationally? India's approach to the process of becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers group would indicate it does. For instance, India responded to a special waiver extended by the organization in 2008 with nonchalance, indicating that such an arrangement only reflected an affirmation of India's stature, and that civil nuclear cooperation with India was not only in India's interests, but it is also "good for the world."⁴³⁵

Another avenue in testing the efficacy of refracted images will involve exploring how the modified framework reconciles with motivations already present in India. Kautilya's Arthashastra, for example, is often declared as a major inspiration for a unique brand of strategic thought exclusive to India. While that claim may be debatable, there are aspects that seem to work well with the concept of refracted images. The mandala theory, for example, which proposes theoretical categorizations that a state can use to develop relationships with other actors in the state-system offers labels such as "enemy's enemy," categorizing such a state as a natural ally.⁴³⁶ It is possible to argue that such a grouping follows a logic similar to that of refracting one's self-image through various third parties, and deserves further attention.

Finally, as indicated earlier, the framework of refracted images merits being tested in other cases

⁴³⁵ "Statement by the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on the Final Outcome of the Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group" (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, September 6, 2008), <https://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18804/statement+by+the+prime+minister+dr+manmohan+singh+on+the+final+outcome+of+the+meeting+of+the+nuclear+suppliers+group>.

⁴³⁶ Patrick Olivelle, *King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya's Arthaśāstra : A New Annotated Translation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 46-51.

where the modern nation-state emerged as a result of colonization. The development of the state and institutions in most postcolonial societies followed a different trajectory than colonial states. Kaviraj, for example, has argued that European powers can trace the genesis of the state to the discourse of the Enlightenment. The existence of a strong civil society helped in the emergence of institutions, and in making the state responsible. However, India and other postcolonial societies did not have similar a similar civil society to engender the advent of institutions and balance the role of the state. In fact, indigenous society in these cases did not naturally evolve into the colonial state with its institutions. The colonial state was imposed for purposes of governance, which, in turn, advanced institutions.⁴³⁷ With this in the background, it is worth examining if this process common across a vast number of postcolonial states has systematized comparable approaches to decision-making.

This dissertation is just the cautious first step in what I hope, will be a long-term research agenda involving the framework of refracted images to understand how states make decisions based on what they believe is their image. Research approaches mentioned in this section can assist in attuning the framework both theoretically and methodologically. In this dissertation I hope to have offered a feasible method of discerning the relationship between multiple states in close proximity using an often-ignored variable.

⁴³⁷ Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ARCHIVAL RESOURCES

Personal papers

- Apa B. Pant. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- K.M. Panikkar. Personal papers. National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.
- K.P.S. Menon. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- Nari Rustomji. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- P.N. Haksar. Personal papers, Instalment I, II and III. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- R.K. Nehru. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- Subimal Dutt. Personal papers, Instalment I. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- T.N. Kaul. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- Vijaylakshmi Pandit. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.
- V.K. Krishna Menon. Personal papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.

Collections

- CableGate. Wikileaks.
- Central Intelligence Agency. CREST. The National Archives at College Park, Maryland, United States of America.
- FCO 37: South Asia Department. The National Archives, London, United Kingdom.
- FO 371: Records of the Foreign Office. The National Archives, London, United Kingdom.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976 and Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971). Office of the Historian, Department of State, Washington D.C., United States of America.
- Jawaharlal Nehru. Post-independence papers. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India.

Index to the Proceedings of the MEA (1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952). National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

Ministry of Home Affairs (No. 144, 202, and 205). Volume I, II and III. National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

Ministry of External Affairs (No. 17, 18, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, and 245). Vol. 1 and 2. National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

Prime Minister's Office (No. 193). National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

The List of Nepal and Sikkim (No. 149). National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

2. BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Abi-Habib, Maria, and Austin Ramzy. "Indian Jets Strike in Pakistan in Revenge for Kashmir Attack." *The New York Times*, February 26, 2019.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-jets.html>.

Abraham, Itty. *How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics*. 1 edition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Acharya, Alka. *China & India: Politics of Incremental Engagement*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2008.

Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan, eds. *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010.

———. "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction." In *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010.

Adler, Emanuel. "Constructivism and International Relations." In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 95–118. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002. http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/hdbk_intlrelations/n5.xml.

Ahmed, Ali. "Strategic Culture and Indian Self-Assurance." *Journal of Peace Studies* 17, no. 2&3 (September 2010). <http://www.icpsnet.org/adm/pdf/1291710631.pdf>.

Ahsan, Syed Aziz-Al, and Bhumitra Chakma. "Bhutan's Foreign Policy: Cautious Self-Assertion?" *Asian Survey* 33, no. 11 (1993): 1043.

Alex Mintz. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- Allen S. Whiting. *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*. Michigan Studies on China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975.
- Allison, Graham T. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (1969): 689–718. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1954423>.
- "Annual Report 2017-2018." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 6, 2018. http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/29788_MEA-AR-2017-18-03-02-2018.pdf.
- Appadorai, Angadipuram. *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1972*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Arpi, Claude. *Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation: India Tibet Relations (1947-1962) : Part 1*. Vij Books India, 2017.
- . *Will Tibet Ever Find Her Soul Again?: India Tibet Relations (1947-1962) : Part 2*. Rohan Vij, 2019.
- Bajpai, Girija Shankar. *China's Shadow over Sikkim: The Politics of Intimidation*. New Delhi : Hartford, Wi.: Lancer Publishers ; Spantech & Lancer, 1999.
- . "India and the Balance of Power." *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* 1 (1952).
- Bajpai, Kanti P. "India: Modified Structuralism." In *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 157–97. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . "Indian Strategic Culture." In *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, edited by Michael R. Chambers. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
- Bajpai, Kanti P., and Siddharth Mallavarapu. *International Relations in India: Bringing Theory Back Home*. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005.
- . *International Relations in India: Theorising the Region and the Nation*. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005.
- Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja. *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities*. Rev. ed. New Delhi: Allied, 1980.
- Basnet, Lal Bahadur. *Sikkim: A Short Political History*. New Delhi: S. Chand, 1974.
- Basrur, Rajesh M. "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 2 (2001): 181–198.

- Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. "What Is Process-Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process Tracing Methods and Their Uses and Limitations." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2011.
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1902082>.
- Behuria, Ashok K., Smruti S. Pattanaik, and Arvind Gupta. "Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?" *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 2 (2012): 229–246.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.646440>.
- Bhasin, Avtar Singh. *India-China Relations, 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*. V vols. Geetika Publishers, 2018.
- . *Nepal's Relations with India and China: Documents 1947-1992*. Delhi: Siba Exim, 1994.
- Bhattacharjea, Mira Sinha. *China, the World, and India*. Samskriti, 2001.
- Bisht, Medha. "Bhutan's Foreign Policy Determinants: An Assessment." *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 1 (2012): 57–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.628481>.
- Blagden, David. "Induction and Deduction in International Relations: Squaring the Circle Between Theory and Evidence." *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 195–213.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw004>.
- Brecher, Michael. *India and World Politics; Krishna Menon's View of the World*. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- . "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior A Preliminary Report." *International Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (March 1, 1977): 39–74. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600147>.
- Brecher, Michael, and Benjamin Geist. *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Breuning, Marijke. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007.
- Brobst, Peter John. *The Future of The Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India's Independence, and the Defense of Asia*. Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 2005.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd ed., with A new introduction by the author. ECPR Press Classics. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2007.
- Carlsnaes, Walter, and Stefano Guzzini, eds. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. 1 edition. 5 vols. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011.

- Chacko, Priya. *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*. Taylor and Francis, 2013.
- Chaudhuri, Rudra. *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947*. India: HarperCollins Publishers, 2014.
- . “Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 6 (2009): 841–869. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189618>.
- Coelho, V. H. *Sikkim and Bhutan*. Reprint edition. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971.
- Cohen, Stephen P. *India: Emerging Power*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
- Cooke, Hope. *Time Change: An Autobiography*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.
- Cottam, Martha L. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition*. Westview Press, 1986.
- Dalai Lama. *Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of The Dalai Lama*. Reissue edition. HarperOne, 2008.
- Dalvi, J. P. *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*. UK ed. edition. Natraj Publishers, 2010.
- Das, Brajbir Saran. “Bhutan.” In *India and Its Neighbourhood*, edited by U.S. Bajpai. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986.
- . *Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat*. Tata McGraw-Hill Education Pvt. Ltd., 2010.
- . *Mission to Bhutan: A Nation in Transition*. New Delhi: Vikas PubHouse, 1995.
- . *The Sikkim Saga*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1983.
- Das Gupta, Amit. *Serving India: A Political Biography of Subimal Dutt (1903-1992), India's Longest Foreign Secretary*. New Delhi: Manohar, 2017.
- Datta-Ray, Deep. *The Making of Indian Diplomacy: A Critique of Eurocentrism*. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1984.
- Dayal, Harishwar. “The Genesis and Organization of the Indian Foreign Service.” *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* 1 (1952).
- Desch, Michael C. “Culture Clash - Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies.” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 141–170.

- Dhar, Prithvi Nath. *Indira Gandhi, the "Emergency", and Indian Democracy*. New Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Dixit, Jyotindra Nath. *India's Foreign Policy and Its Neighbours*. New Delhi: Gyan PubHouse, 2001.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn. "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 297–320.
- Dower, John W. *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq*. 1st ed. New York: WWNorton : New Press, 2010.
- Duff, Andrew. *Sikkim: Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom*. Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd, 2017.
- Elman, Colin. "Horses for Courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (September 1, 1996): 7–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429297>.
- Engelmeier, Tobias F. *Nation-Building and Foreign Policy in India: An Identity-Strategy Conflict*. New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009.
- Farnham, Barbara. "Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making." *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004): 441–463. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00379.x>.
- Farnham, Barbara Reardon. *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*. Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." In *Handbook of International Relations*, 52–72. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002. http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/hdbk_intlrelations/n3.xml.
- Finlay, David J., Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen. *Enemies in Politics*. Rand McNally, 1967.
- Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding, eds. *The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know*. New York : Washington: Columbia University Press ; Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004.
- G. V. C. Naidu, Mumin Chen, and Ruiwei Na, eds. *India and China in the Emerging Dynamics of East Asia*. New Delhi: Springer, 2015.
- Gandhi, Indira. *Aspects of Our Foreign Policy: From Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi*. New Delhi]: VNMalhotra for and on behalf of All India Congress Committee, 1973.
- . *Indira Gandhi, Speeches and Writings*. 1st U.S. ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

- . *The Years of Endeavour: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969-August 1972*. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govtof India, 1975.
- Garrison, Jean A., Juliet Kaarbo, Douglas Foyle, Mark Schafer, and Eric K. Stern. “Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium.” *International Studies Review* 5, no. 2 (2003): 155–202.
- Garver, John. “The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation.” *China Report* 47, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 99–113. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700204>.
- Garver, John W. *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
- Gilboy, George J., and Eric Heginbotham. *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Gokhale, Ashok B. *Inside Three Monarchies and Six Republics: Memoirs of an Indian Diplomat*. Ashok B. Gokhale, 2007.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. *A History of Modern Tibet: 1913-1951 The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Vol. 1. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991.
- . *A History of Modern Tibet: 1951-1955 The Calm before the Storm*. First edition. Vol. 2. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2009.
- . *A History of Modern Tibet: 1955-1957 The Storm Clouds Descend*. Vol. 3. Dev Publishers & Distributors, 2014.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli. *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*. 3 vols. Harvard University Press.
- Govind Ballabh Pant. *Selected Works of Govind Ballabh Pant*. 17 vols. Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Gundevia, Y. D. *Outside the Archives*. Hyderabad India: Sangam Books Ltd, 1984.
- Gupta, Sisir. *India and the International System*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1981.
- Guyot-Réchar, Bérénice. *Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Haas, Mark L. *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989*. Ithaca, N.Y.; Bristol: Cornell University Press, 2007.

- Hermann, Margaret G., and Joe Hagan, eds. *Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking*. Malden, Mass.: Published by Blackwell Publishers for the International Studies Association, 2001.
- Herrmann, Richard K. *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy*. 1 edition. Pittsburgh; Chicago: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985.
- . “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Herrmann, Richard K., Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti. “Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace.” *Political Psychology* 30, no. 5 (2009): 721–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00723.x>.
- Hiltz, Jackie. “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s.” *Bulletin of Tibetology*, 2003, 67–83. <http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/243140>.
- Hoffmann, Steven A. *India and the China Crisis*. International Crisis Behavior Series ; v. 6. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Holsti, Kal J. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 233–309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>.
- Holsti, Ole R. “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.” *Journal of International Affairs* 21, no. 1 (1967): 16–39.
- . “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy.” *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 1 (1989): 15–44. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00042.x>.
- . “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6, no. 3 (1962): 244–52.
- Hopf, Ted. *Social Construction of Foreign Policy: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. 1 edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- . “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>.
- Hudson, Valerie M., ed. *Culture & Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: LRIenner Publishers, 1997.
- . “Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda.” In *Culture and Foreign Policy*, edited by Valerie M. Hudson. Boulder, CO: LRIenner Publishers, 1997.

- . *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014.
- Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. “Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes.” *The Journal of Politics* 52, no. 1 (February 1, 1990): 3–28.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2131417>.
- Jervis, Robert. *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*. Princeton University Press, 2017.
- . *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. 1976. Reprint, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- . *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. 1970. Reprint, New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- . “Understanding Beliefs.” *Political Psychology* 27, no. 5 (2006): 641–63.
- . *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- . “Thinking about Strategic Culture.” *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119>.
- Jones, Rodney W. “India’s Strategic Culture.” Washington, D.C.: SAIC, 2006.
<https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/india.pdf>.
- K. Natwar Singh. *My China Diary, 1956-88*. New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2009.
- Kaarbo, Juliet. *Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Choices*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.
<http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3415052>.
- Kalha, Ranjit Singh. *India-China Boundary Issues: Quest for Settlement*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014.
- Kapur, Devesh. “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy.” *India Review* 8, no. 3 (2009): 286–305.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903116818>.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New Directions in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

- Kaul, Brij Mohan. *The Untold Story*. Allied Publishers Pvt Limited, 1967.
- Kaul, Triloki Nath. *Ambassadors Need Not Lie*. 1st ed. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1988.
- Kavic, Lorne J. *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965*. University of California Press, 1967.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. *The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- . *The Trajectories of the Indian State: Politics and Ideas*. Place of publication not identified: Orient Blackswan, 2012.
- Kennedy, Andrew Bingham. *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Keshav Mishra. *Rapprochement across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations Post Cold War Period (1947-2003)*. Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2004.
- Khan, Sulmaan Wasif. *Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands*. The New Cold War History. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
- Kharat, Rajesh S. *Foreign Policy of Bhutan*. Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005.
- Khilnani, Sunil. *The Idea of India*. 1st Ppbk Ed, 1999 edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.
- Khilnani, Sunil, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, and Siddharth Varadarajan. *Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign & Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century*. New Delhi: Penguin : Viking, 2013.
- Khosla, I. P. *Underdogs End Empires: A Memoir*. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2010.
- Kier, Elizabeth. "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars." *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93.
- Kieschnick, John, and Meir Shahar, eds. *India in the Chinese Imagination: Myth, Religion, and Thought*. Encounters with Asia. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
- Knaus, John Kenneth. *Orphans Of The Cold War: America And The Tibetan Struggle For Survival*. New York; Plymouth: PublicAffairs, 2000.
- Kohli, Manorama. *From Dependency to Interdependence: A Study of Indo-Bhutan Relations*. New Delhi: Vikas PubHouse, 1993.

- Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 185–205. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018920>.
- Krishna V. Rajan, ed. *The Ambassadors' Club: The Indian Diplomat at Large*. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, a joint venture with the India Today Group, 2012.
- Kuldip Nayar. *Beyond the Lines: An Autobiography*. New Delhi: Lotus Collection, 2012.
- Lamb, Alastair. "War in the Himalayas." Edited by Neville Maxwell. *Modern Asian Studies* 5, no. 4 (1971): 389–97.
- Laura Neack. *The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era*. 2nd ed. New Millennium Books in International Studies. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step." *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (1996): 118–137. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2082802>.
- . "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "failure" of Internationalism." *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997): 31–.
- Leites, Nathan Constantin. *The Operational Code of the Politburo*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB104-1.html.
- Leo E. Rose. *The Politics of Bhutan*. South Asian Political Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Li, Jianglin. *Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959*. Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Ling, L. H. M., Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Payal Banerjee, Nimmi Kurian, Mahendra P. Lama, and Li Bo. *India China: Rethinking Borders and Security*. Configurations: Critical Studies of World Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016.
- Lintner, Bertil. *China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Lock, Edward. "Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation." *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2010): 685–708. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000276>.
- Malik, Mohan. *China and India: Great Power Rivals*. Boulder, Colo.: FirstForumPress, 2011.

- Mallavarapu, Siddharth. "Development of International Relations Theory in India." *International Studies* 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 165–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600211>.
- Manjari Chatterjee Miller. "Re-Collecting Empire: 'Victimhood' and the 1962 Sino-Indian War." In *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader*, edited by Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant. Critical Issues in Indian Politics. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Mattoo, Amitabh, and Happymon Jacob. *Shaping India's Foreign Policy: People, Politics, and Places*. Foreign Policy, Peace, and Security Series. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2010.
- Maxwell, Neville. *India's China War*. London: Cape, 1970.
- Mehrotra, Lakhan Lal. *India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options*. New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997.
- Mehta, Jagat S. *Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems through Diplomacy: Seven Case Studies, 1958-1978*. New Delhi: Manohar : Distributed in South Asia by Foundation Books, 2006.
- . *The Tryst Betrayed: Reflections on Diplomacy and Development*. Penguin UK, 2015.
- Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India." *India Review* 8, no. 3 (2009): 209–233. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903116750>.
- Menon, K. P. S. *Many Worlds: An Autobiography*. Oxford U.P., 1966.
- Menon, Shivshankar. *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*. Geopolitics in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Penguin Allen Lane, 2016.
- Miller, Manjari Chatterjee. "The Role of Beliefs in Identifying Rising Powers." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (2016): 211–238. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow006>.
- . *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*. Studies in Asian Security. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Mintz, A. *Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Polyheuristic Theory of Decision*. 2002. Reprint, Springer, 2016.
- Mohan, C. Raja. *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New Delhi ; New York: Viking, 2003.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51 (1997): 513–553.
- Mullik, B.N. *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal*. Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1971.
- Muni, S. D. "Bhutan's Deferential Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 158–163.

- . “Problem Areas in India’s Neighbourhood Policy.” *South Asian Survey* 10, no. 2 (2003): 185–196.
- Namgyal, Hope. “The Sikkimese Theory of Land-Holding and the Darjeeling Grant.” *Bulletin of Tibetology* III, no. 2 (July 1966): 46–58.
- Narang, Vipin, and Paul Staniland. “Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy.” *India Review* 11, no. 2 (2012): 76–94. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2012.674818>.
- Nari Rustomji. *Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy*. Ahmedabad: Allied Publishers, 1987.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. *India’s Foreign Policy; Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*. Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govtof India, 1961.
- . *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches*. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958.
- . *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*. 48 vols. II. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- . *The Discovery of India*. 1946. Reprint, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China: White Paper*. Vol. 1. 14 vols. White Paper. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1959.
- Olivelle, Patrick. *King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra : A New Annotated Translation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Om Pradhan. *Bhutan: The Roar of the Thunder Dragon*. Thimphu: KMedia, 2012.
- P. Raghunadha Rao. *Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India*. New Delhi: Cosmo, 1978.
- Panikkar, K. M. *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat*. London: G Allen & Unwin, 1955.
- . “The Himalayas and Indian Defence.” *India Quarterly* III, no. 3 (September 1947): 233–8.
- Pardesi, Manjeet S. “Image Theory and the Initiation of Strategic Rivalries.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, March 29, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.318>.
- . “The Initiation of the Sino-Indian Rivalry.” *Asian Security* 0, no. 0 (May 15, 2018): 1–32. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1471060>.
- Patel, Vallabhbhai. *The Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel*. Vol. 15. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1990.

- Patel, Vallabhbhai, Durga Das, and Shankar Prasada. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence: 1945-50*. Vol. VIII. Navajivan Publishing House, 1973.
- Paul, T. V., ed. *South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*. 1 edition. University Press: Stanford Security Studies, 2010.
- Pran Nath Chopra. *Sikkim*. New Delhi: SChand, 1979.
- “Proceedings to the Constituent Assmebly of India.” Constituent Assmebly of India. Accessed May 18, 2019. <https://cadindia.clpr.org.in/>.
- Purnendu Kumar Banerjee. *My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India*. 1st ed. New Delhi: Clarion Books, 1990.
- Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697>.
- Raghavan, Srinath. *War and Peace in Modern India*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010.
- Raina, Asoka. *Inside RAW.: Story of India's Secret Service*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1982.
- Rajendra Kumar Jain. *China South Asian Relations, 1947-1980*. New Delhi: Radiant, 1981.
- Ramesh, Jairam. *Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi*. Simon & Schuster India, 2018.
- Rana, A. P. *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period*. Delhi: Macmillan Coof India, 1976.
- Rana, Kishan S. “Inside the Indian Foreign Service.” *Foreign Service Journal of the American Foreign Service Association* 79, no. 10 (October 2002): 35–41.
- Ranganathan, C. V., and Vinod C. Khanna. *India and China: The Way Ahead after “Mao's India War.”* Timely Books. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000.
- Rasgotra, Maharajkrishna. *A Life in Diplomacy*. Penguin UK, 2016.
- Robert Barry Farrell, editor. *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*. Evanston [Ill.]: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Rustomji, Nari. *Bhutan: The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis*. Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

- . *Enchanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan, and India's Northeastern Borderlands*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- S. Nihal Singh. *Ink in My Veins: A Life in Journalism*. New Delhi: Hay House Publishers India PvtLtd, 2011.
- Shalini Saksena. *India, China, and the Revolution*. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1992.
- Shankar, Mahesh. *The Reputational Imperative: Nehru's India in Territorial Conflict*. 1 edition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018.
- Sharma, Sudheer. "25 Years after SIKKIM." *Nepali Times*, March 2001.
<http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=9621#.W2iJndIzY54>.
- Shukla, Satyendra R. *Sikkim : The Story of Integration*. New Delhi: S. Chand, 1976.
- Sidhu, G. B. S. *Sikkim - Dawn of Democracy: The Truth Behind The Merger With India*. Penguin Viking, 2018.
- Singh, Amar Kaur Jasbir. *Himalayan Triangle: Historical Survey of British India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, 1765-1950*. London: The British Library Publishing Division, 1988.
- Singh, Kewal. *Partition and Aftermath: Memoirs of an Ambassador*. New Delhi: Vikas PubHouse, 1991.
- Singh, Sinderpal. *India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP*. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics ; 108. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New Nork, NY: Routledge, 2013.
- Sinha, Atish, and Madhup Mohta. *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007.
- Slater, Dan, and Daniel Ziblatt. "The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison." *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 10 (October 1, 2013): 1301–27.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012472469>.
- Snyder, Jack L. "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War." *International Organization* 56, no. 1 (2002): 7–45.
- Snyder, Richard C., Henry W. Bruck, Burton M. Sapin, and Valerie M. Hudson. *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*. 1962. Reprint, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Sorabjee, Soli J. *The Governor: Sage or Saboteur*. Roli Books International, 1985.
- Subimal Dutt. *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*. Calcutta: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977.

- Subrahmanyam, K., and Arthur Monteiro. *Shedding Shibboleths: India's Evolving Strategic Outlook*. Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005.
- Sullivan, Kate. "Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership Aspirations." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 37, no. 4 (2014): 640–55.
- Surjit Mansingh, and Harsh V. Pant. "Rising China and Emergent India in the Twenty-First Century: Friends or Rivals." In *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader*, edited by Kanti P. Bajpai. Critical Issues in Indian Politics. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- T. P. Sreenivasan. *Words, Words, Words: Adventures in Diplomacy*. Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2008.
- Tagore, Rabindranath. *Talks in China: Lectures Delivered in April and May, 1924*. Visva-Bharati, 1925.
- Tanham, George K. *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207/>.
- Tarrow, Sidney. "The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice." *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 2 (February 1, 2010): 230–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009350044>.
- Tashi, Tshering. "Befriending the Neighbour." *The Hindu*, July 24, 2018, sec. Comment. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/befriending-the-neighbour/article24497565.ece>.
- Tellis, Ashley J. "Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific." In *Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills. The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016.
- Triloki Nath Kaul. *A Diplomat's Diary, 1947-99: China, India, and USA, the Tantalising Triangle*. 1st ed. Delhi: Macmillan India, 2000.
- . *Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1979.
- . *India, China and Indochina: (Reflections of a Liberated Diplomat)*. New Delhi: Allied, 1980.
- . *Reminiscences, Discreet and Indiscreet*. 1st ed. New Delhi, India: Lancers Publishers, 1982.
- . *The Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations*. New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1980.
- Tsering Shakya. *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947*. London: Pimlico, 1999.

Twomey, Christopher. "Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm by George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham. New York,," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 759–60. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12135>.

Tyabji, Badr-ud-Din. *Indian Policies and Practice*. Oriental Publishers, 1972.

Upadhyay, Archana. *India's Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India*. Library of International Relations (Series) ; 39. London ; New York: IBTauris, 2009.

Upreti, Bhuwan Chandra. *Bhutan, Dilemma of Change in a Himalayan Kingdom*. Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2004.

Verghese, B. G. *First Draft: Witness to the Making of Modern India*. Chennai: Tranquebar Press, 2010.

Vertzberger, Yaacov. *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Revised Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.

———. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 67. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183>.

Williams, Michael C. "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 58, no. 4 (2004): 633–65.

Xuecheng Liu. *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.

Yadav, R. K. *Mission R&AW*. 2014 edition. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014.

3. INTERVIEWS AND ORAL HISTORIES

Bajpai, Katyani Shankar. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 16 November 2017 and 6 December 2017.

Dalai Lama. Interview by B.R. Nanda. Interview for Oral History Project. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 13 March 1978.

Das, Brajbir Saran. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Noida, India, 5 August 2016.

Datta-Ray, Sunanda. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Kolkata, India, 9 December 2017.

Devare, Sudhir. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 23 November 2017.

Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. Country Reader: India. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA. <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/India.pdf>.

Gonsalves, Eric. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Bengaluru, India, 28 July 2016.

Gupta, Ranjit. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 22 July 2016 and 21 December 2017.

Kalha, Ranjit Singh. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 2 August 2016.

Khanna, Vinod. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Noida, India, 6 August 2016.

Khosla, Inder Pal. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 14 November 2017.

Lal, K.M. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Gurugram, India, 14 December 2017.

Mehrotra, Lakhan Lal. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Gurugram, India, 15 July 2016 and 15 December 2017.

Menon, K.P.S. Interview by B.R. Nanda. Oral History. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 8 November 1976.

Menon, Shiv Shankar. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 16 August 2016.

Nambiar, Vijay. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Noida, India, 8 November 2017.

Nehru, R.K. Interview by B.R. Nanda. Oral History. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 8 April 1972.

Pant, Apa B. Interview by B.R. Nanda. Oral History. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 13 October 1971.

Pradhan, Om. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Semtokha, Bhutan, 2 September 2016.

Ram, Amar Nath. Interview by Deep Pal. Telephonic interview. 9 November 2017.

Rana, Kishan S. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 9 August 2016.

Ranganathan, C.V. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Bengaluru, India, 27 July 2016.

Rao, Nirupama. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Bengaluru, India, 28 July 2016.

Saran, Shyam. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 26 July 2016.

Sen, Ronen. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Noida, India, 20 August 2016.

Singh, Natwar. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Delhi, India, 1 December 2017.

Thondup, Gyalo. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Kalimpong, India, 12 September 2016.

Tshering, Dago. Interview by Deep Pal. Personal interview. Thimphu, India, 2 September 2016.

**APPENDIX A: TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL.**

Kathmandu, Nepal, 31 July 1950.

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal, recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries; Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries; Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely,

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

His EXCELLENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH,
Ambassador of India in Nepal.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL

MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA,
Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal,

who having examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:—

Article 1

There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

Article 2

The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

Article 3

In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article 1 the two Governments agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions. The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on a reciprocal basis: Provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with either Government.

Article 4

The two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as may be agreed to. Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authorization of their appointment. Such exequatur or authorization is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible. The persons mentioned

above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State.

Article 5

The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

Article 6

Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

Article 7

The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.

Article 8

So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous Treaties, agreements, and engagements entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

Article 9

This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

Article 10

This Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

DONE in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July 1950.

(Signed)

CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH

For the Government of India.

(Signed)

MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RAN,

For the Government of Nepal.

APPENDIX B: TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND BHUTAN

Darjeeling, India, 8 August 1949.

THE Government of India on the one part and His Highness the Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the stage of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India. and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their peoples. have resolved to conclude the following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their representatives.

[Here follow the names]

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.

ARTICLE 2

The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.

ARTICLE 3

In place of the compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the treaty of Sinochula and enhanced by the Treaty of the 8th day of January 1910 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual

payment of Rupees five lakhs to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that the said annual payment shall be made on the day of January every year, the first payment being made on the 10th day of January, 1950. This payment shall continue to long as this treaty remains in force and its terms arc duly observed.

ARTICLE 4

Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall. within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, return to the Government of Bhutan about 32 square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.

ARTICLE 5

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and of the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for the carriage, by land and water, of its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.

ARTICLE 6

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there Is no danger to India from such importations. The Government Of Bhutan. On the

other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private Individuals.

ARTICLE 7

The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal Justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.

ARTICLE 8

(1)The Government of Indian shall. on demand being duly made in writing by tile Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition Act. 19031 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said Act who may take refuge in Indian territory.

(2)The Government of Bhutan shall. on requisition being duly made by the Government of India. or by any officer authorised by file Government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects. or subjects of a foreign power. whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by the Government of India with the said power, accused of any of the crimes, specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903. who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan. and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory shall flee into Bhutan. on such evidence of their guilt being produced an shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

ARTICLE 9

Arty differences and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this treaty shall in the first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three months of the start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner:-

(1) One Person nominated by the Government of India

(2) One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan;

(3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be chairman.

The judgment of this tribunal shall be final and executed without delay by either party.

ARTICLE 10

This treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.

Done in Duplicate at Darjeeling this 8th day of August, 1949, corresponding with the Bhutanese date the 15th day of the 6th month of the Earth-Bull year.

For the Government of India:

HARISHWAR DAYAL, Political Officer in Sikkim.

For the Government of H. H. the Maharaja of Bhutan:

DEB ZIMPON SONAM TOBGVE DORJI YANG-LOP SONAM CHHO-ZIM THONDUP RIN-
ZIM TANDIN HA DRUNG JIGMIE PALDEN DORJI

APPENDIX C: TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND BHUTAN, 2007⁴³⁸

Thimphu, Bhutan, 8 February 2007.

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan:
Reaffirming their respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
Recalling the historical relations that have existed between our two countries;
Recognizing with deep satisfaction the manner in which these relations have evolved and
matured over the years into a model of good neighbourly relations;
Being fully committed to further strengthening this enduring and mutually beneficial relationship
based on genuine goodwill and friendship, shared interests, and close understanding and
cooperation;
Desiring to clearly reflect this exemplary relationship as it stands today; And having decided,
through mutual consent, to update the 1949 Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering the
relations of friendship and neighbourliness between India and Bhutan;
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan.

Article 2

⁴³⁸ This treaty, signed in 2007, replaced the treaty signed in 1949 (Appendix B). The text of Article 2 reflects the major difference between the two agreements, a result of Bhutan growing into its role as an independent, sovereign state, and by extension, asserting its desire to engage with Indian equal terms. In its new iteration, the aspect about the Government of Bhutan being guided by the Government of India on external relations is dropped.

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.

Article 3

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of Bhutan and the Government of India. Both the Governments shall provide full cooperation and assistance to each other in the matter of trade and commerce.

Article 4

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition and materials outside Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals.

Article 5

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.

Article 6

The extradition of persons wanted by either state for crimes and for unlawful activities affecting their security shall be in keeping with the extradition agreements between the two countries.

Article 7

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to promote cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two countries. These shall be extended to such areas as education, health, sports, science and technology.

Article 8

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to continue to consolidate and expand their economic cooperation for mutual and longterm benefit.

Article 9

Any differences and disputes arising in the interpretation and application of this Treaty shall be settled bilaterally by negotiations in a spirit of trust and understanding in consonance with the historically close ties of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation that form the bedrock of Bhutan-India relations.

Article 10

This Treaty shall come into force upon the exchange of Instruments of Ratification by the two Governments which shall take place in Thimphu within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

The Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.

In witness whereof, the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty.

Done at New Delhi on the Eighth Day of February Two Thousand and Seven, in two originals each in Hindi, Dzongkha and English languages, each text being equally authentic. However, in case of difference, the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of The Republic of India

Sd/-

(Pranab Mukherjee)

Minister of External Affairs

For the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan

Sd/-

(H.R.H.Trongsa Penlop Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck)

The Crown Prince of Bhutan

APPENDIX D: INDIA-SIKKIM TREATY

Gangtok, Sikkim, 5 December 1950.

The President of India and His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim being desirous of further strengthening the good relations already existing between India and Sikkim have resolved to enter into a new Treaty with each other and the President of India has for the purpose appointed as his Plenipotentiary SHRI HARISWAR DAYAL, Political Officer in Sikkim and HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA having examined Shri Hariswar Dayal's credentials and found them good and in due form the two have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE I

All previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim which are at present in force as between India and Sikkim are hereby formally cancelled.

ARTICLE II

Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.

ARTICLE III

- (1) The Government of India will be responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.

(2) The measures referred to in para (1) will as far as possible be taken by the Government of India in consultation with the Government of Sikkim.

(3) The Government of Sikkim shall not import any arms ammunitions, military stores or other warlike materials of any description for any purpose whatsoever without the previous consent of the Government of India.

ARTICLE IV

(1) The external relations of Sikkim whether political, economic and financial shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim shall have to dealings with any foreign power.

(2) Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign countries shall be treated as Indian protected persons for the purpose of passports, and shall receive from Indian representatives abroad the same protection and facilities as Indian nationals.

ARTICLE V

The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy and import duty, transport duty or other imports on the goods brought into or in transit through Sikkim and the Government of India agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.

ARTICLE VI

(1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air-navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India even assistance in their construction, maintenance and protection.

- (2) The Government of Sikkim may, however, construct, maintain and regulate the use of railways and aerodromes and landing grounds and air-navigation facilities to such extent as may be agreed to by the Government of India.
- (3) The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain in Sikkim, roads for strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving communications with India and other adjoining countries; and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in the construction, maintenance and protection of such roads.

ARTICLE VII

- (1) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the right of entry into, and free movement within India and Indian nationals and have the right to entry into, free movement within Sikkim.
- (2) Subject to such regulations as the Government of Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government of India, Indian nationals shall have :
- (a) the right to carry on trade and commerce in Sikkim; and
 - (b) when established in any trade in Sikkim, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of any property, movable or immovable, for the purposes of their trade or residence in Sikkim.
- (3) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same rights;
- (a) to carry on trade and commerce in India, and to employment therein, and
 - (b) of acquiring, holding and disposing of property movable and immovable, as Indian nationals.

ARTICLE VIII

- (1) Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject to the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within India shall be subject to the laws of India.

(2) Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated in Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner, the Government of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative of the Government of India in Sikkim (hereinafter referred to as the India Representative) with particulars of the charge against such persons.

If in the case of any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner if is so demanded by the Indian Representative, such person shall be handed over to him trial before such court as may be established for the purpose of the Government of India either in Sikkim or outside.

ARTICLE IX

(1) The Government of Sikkim agrees to seize and deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim who has taken refuge therein on demand being made by the Indian Representative. Should any delay occur in complying with such demand, the Indian police may follow the person whose surrender has been demanded into any part of Sikkim, and shall, on showing a warrant signed by the Indian Representative, receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution of their object from the Sikkim officers.

(2) The Government of India similarly agrees, on demand being made by the Government of Sikkim, to take extradition proceedings against, and surrender, any fugitive offender from Sikkim who has taken refuge in the territory of India.

(3) In this article, “fugitive offender” means a person who is accused of having committed an extradition offence as defined in the First Schedule of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903

any other offence which may hereafter be agreed upon between the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim as being an extradition offence.

ARTICLE X

The Government of India, having in mind the friendly relations already existing between India and Sikkim and now further strengthened by this treaty and being desirous of assisting in the development and good administration of Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government of Sikkim a sum of rupees three lakhs every year so long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim.

The first payment under this Article will be made before the end of the year 1950, and subsequent payments will be made in the month of August every year.

ARTICLE XI

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their residential and office accommodation and generally in regard to carrying out their duties in Sikkim.

ARTICLE XII

If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred to the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.

ARTICLE XIII

This Treaty shall come into force without ratification from the date of signature by both the parties.

Done in duplicate at Gangtok on this 5th day of December, 1950.

Sd/- HARISWAR DAYAL,

Political Officer in Sikkim

Sd/- TASHI NAMGYAL

His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim

**APPENDIX E: LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE
POLITICAL OFFICER AND THE MAHARAJA OF SIKKIM
PURSUANT TO INDIA-SIKKIM TREATY**

Gangtok, Sikkim, 24 February 1951.

From:

Shri H. Dayal, ICS,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

To

His Highness Maharaja Sir Tashi Namgyal
K.C.S.I., K.C.E.E.
Maharaja of Sikkim,
The Palace,
Gangtok.

No. I-LE

Dated, Gangtok, the 25th February, 1951

My Friend,

During the discussions held in Delhi in March 1950 between the representatives of the Governments of India and Sikkim the future relations of Sikkim with India were discussed in all their aspects, Agreement was reached on the terms of a treaty between the Government

India and the Maharaja of Sikkim which has been recently signed. In addition, agreement was reached on future administrative arrangements within Sikkim and on certain other matters. The understandings reached between the representatives of the two Governments are accordingly incorporated in the following paragraphs and I now have pleasure in communicating the Government of India's agreement thereto.

1. In order to ensure the maintenance of good Government and efficient administration in Sikkim, the Government of India may require the Maharaja of Sikkim to appoint as Dewan an officer nominated by the Government of India for such periods as may, after consultation with the Maharaja, be considered necessary. The Dewan shall be principal adviser and executive officer of the Maharaja. If there is a difference of opinion between the Maharaja and the Dewan on any important matter, it will be referred to the Government of India and decided in accordance with their advice.

2. With a view to developing self-governing institutions, village panchayats shall be formed in the State of Sikkim on an elective basis. There shall be a council for the state which will be elected by the elected panchayats, provided that an alternative method of election of the Council may be prescribed by agreement between the Governments of India and Sikkim. This council will, to begin with, have advisory functions. Its functions and extent of responsibility will be progressively enlarged. Until such a council is formed in the manner indicated above, there shall be an advisory Council associated with the Dewan, the members of which shall be appointed by the Maharaja of Sikkim on the advice of the Dewan to represent the principal interests in the State.

3. Should a situation arise in which law and order are seriously threatened within the State, or there is gross internal maladministration, the Maharaja will have the right to ask for the

assistance of the Government of India who will render such assistance as they may consider reasonable and necessary. Independently of such a request the Government of India will be entitled in such a situation to give such advice as they may consider necessary and appropriate dealing with the situation and the Maharaja shall be bound to act in accordance with such advice.

4. The Government of India will, as far as practicable, assist the government of Sikkim in the development of the natural resources of Sikkim and the improvement of the standards of its people and will consider sympathetically any application for assistance by way of a loan, technical assistance or supply of machinery.

5. The Government of Sikkim will not in future employ person other than a subject of Sikkim without the consent of the Government of India, but may obtain professional advice from Indian nationals without such consent.

6. Article IV of the treaty shall not affect any arrangements between the Government of Sikkim and the Governments of Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal which were in force on the date of the treaty.

7. The right of the movement of Indian nationals in Sikkim shall not extend to any areas in Sikkim which, on religious or other grounds, are not open to the public, The right of the subjects of Sikkim to free movement within India shall not extend to such areas as may be prohibited to the public by order of the Central Government, a State Government or a local authority.

8. The Government of India will extend to the subjects of Sikkim the same facilities in the matter of education, including technical and vocational education, and technical and other scholarships as are available to Indian nationals.

9. (1) The expression 'person in the service of the Government of India' in Article VIII of the treaty shall be deemed to include officers lent by the Government of India to the Government of Sikkim.

(2) No demand by the Indian representative will be made in pursuance of paragraph 2 of clause (2) of Article VII of the treaty -

(a) In the case of a person in the service of the Government of India as explained in the preceding subparagraph, if the offence is punishable with fine only and was not committed in the discharge of his official duties;

(b) in the case of subject of Sikkim who is an employee of the Government of India, if the accused is not charged with having committed an offence in the discharge of his official duties;

(c) in the case of a national of Bhutan, Nepal or Tibet, if the accused is not an employee of the Government of India and is not charged with having committed an offence in the discharge of his official duties; and

(d) in the case of a foreigner, other than a national of Bhutan, Nepal or Tibet, if the offence is punishable with fine only.

10. The Government of India and the Government of Sikkim will, as far as practicable, assist each other in realising payment from revenue defaulters against either Government residing in the territory of the other.

11. All disputes in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of this letter dealing with matters relating to or connected with the treaty concluded between India and Sikkim, shall be covered by Article XII of the treaty.

I remain,

Your Highness' sincere friend,

Sd/ - Harishwar Dayal

POLITICAL OFFICER IN SIKKIM.

No. L CA/24

THE PALACE
GANGTOK, SIKKIM.
The 24th February, 1951.

To

The Political officer in Sikkim,
The Residency, Gangtok

My Friend,

During the discussions held in Delhi in March 1950 between the representatives of the Government of India and my Government the future relations of Sikkim with India were discussed in all their aspects. Agreement was reached on the terms of a treaty between the Government of India and the Maharaja of Sikkim which has been recently signed. In addition, agreement was reached on future administrative arrangements within Sikkim and on certain other matters. The understanding reached between my representatives and those of the Government of India are accordingly incorporated in the following paragraphs and I now have pleasure in communicating my agreement thereto.

1. In order to ensure the maintenance of good Government and efficient administration in Sikkim, the Government of Indian may require the Maharaja of Sikkim to appoint as Dewan an officer nominated by the Government of India for such periods as may, after consultation with the Maharaja, be considered necessary. The Dewan shall be the principal adviser and executive officer of the Maharaja. If there is a difference of opinion between the Maharaja and the Dewan

on any important matter, it will be referred to the Government of India and decided in accordance with their advice.

2. With a view to developing self-governing institutions, village panchayats shall be formed in the State of Sikkim on an elective basis. There shall be a council for the state which will be elected by the elected panchayats, provided that an alternative method of election of the Council may be prescribed by agreement between the Governments of India and Sikkim. This council will, to begin with, have advisory functions. Its functions and extent of responsibility will be progressively enlarged. Until such a council is formed in the manner indicated above, there shall be an advisory Council associated with the Dewan, the members of which shall be appointed by the Maharaja of Sikkim on the advice of the Dewan to represent the principal interests in the State.

3. Should a situation arise in which law and order are seriously threatened within the State, or there is gross internal maladministration, the Maharaja will have the right to ask for the assistance of the Government of India who will render such assistance as they may consider reasonable and necessary. Independently of such a request the Government of India will be entitled in such a situation to give such advice as they may consider necessary and appropriate dealing with the situation and the Maharaja shall be bound to act in accordance with such advice.

4. The Government of India will, as far as practicable, assist the government of Sikkim in the development of the natural resources of Sikkim and the improvement of the standards of its people and will consider sympathetically any application for assistance by way of a loan, technical assistance or supply of machinery.

5. The Government of Sikkim will not in future employ person other than a subject of Sikkim without the consent of the Government of India, but may obtain professional advice from Indian nationals without such consent.

6. Article IV of the treaty shall not affect any arrangements between the Government of Sikkim and the Governments of Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal which were in force on the date of the treaty.

7. The right of the movement of Indian nationals in Sikkim shall not extend to any areas in Sikkim which, on religious or other grounds, are not open to the public, The right of the subjects of Sikkim to free movement within India shall not extend to such areas as may be prohibited to the public by order of the Central Government, a State Government or a local authority.

8. The Government of India will extend to the subjects of Sikkim the same facilities in the matter of education, including technical and vocational education, and technical and other scholarships as are available to Indian nationals.

9. (1) The expression 'person in the service of the Government of India' in Article VIII of the treaty shall be deemed to include officers lent by the Government of India to the Government of Sikkim.

(2) No demand by the Indian representative will be made in pursuance of paragraph 2 of clause (2) of Article VII of the treaty -

(a) In the case of a person in the service of the Government of India as explained in the preceding subparagraph, if the offence is punishable with fine only and was not committed in the discharge of his official duties;

(b) in the case of subject of Sikkim who is an employee of the Government of India, if the accused is not charged with having committed an offence in the discharge of his official duties;

(c) in the case of a national of Bhutan, Nepal or Tibet, if the accused is not an employee of the Government of India and is not charged with having committed an offence in the discharge of his official duties; and

(d) in the case of a foreigner, other than a national of Bhutan, Nepal or Tibet, if the offence is punishable with fine only.

10. The Government of India and the Government of Sikkim will, as far as practicable, assist each other in realising payment from revenue defaulters against either Government residing in the territory of the other.

11. All disputes in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of this letter dealing with matters relating to or connected with the treaty concluded between India and Sikkim, shall be covered by Article XII of the treaty.

I remain,

Yours sincere friend

sd/- Tashi Nangyal

Maharaja of Sikkim.

APPENDIX F: TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SIKKIM, INDIA, AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN SIKKIM

Gangtok, Sikkim, 8 May 1973.

WHEREAS the Chogyal and the people Sikkim are convinced that their interest and the long-term interest of Sikkim as a whole call for :

- (i) the establishment of a fully responsible Government in Sikkim with a more democratic Constitution, the guarantee of fundamental rights, the rule of law, an independent judiciary and greater legislative and executive powers for the elected representatives of the people;
- (ii) a system of elections based on adult suffrage which will give equitable representation to all sections of the people on the basis of the principle of one man one vote;
- (iii) the strengthening of Indo-Sikkim cooperation and inter-relationship; and

WHEREAS the Chogyal as well as the representatives of the people had requested the Government of India.

- (i) To take responsibility for the establishment of law and order and good administration in Sikkim following the breakdown of all three.
- (ii) To ensure the further development of Constitutional Government communal harmony, good administration and rapid economic and social development in Sikkim.
- (iii) i'o provide the Head of Administration (Chief Executive) in Sikkim's help achieve and to safeguard all the above needs and objectives;

AND WHEREAS the Government of India have agreed to discharge the responsibilities hereby renewed to them;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of India, the Chogyal of Sikkim and the Leaders of the Political Parties of Sikkim, have agreed as follows :

1. The three parties hereby recognise and undertake to ensure the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Sikkim. The people of Sikkim will enjoy the right of election on the basis of adult suffrage to give effect to the principle of one man one vote.
2. There shall be an Assembly in Sikkim. The Assembly shall be elected every four years. Elections shall be fair and free, and shall be conducted under the supervision of a representative of the Election Commission of India, who shall be appointed for the purpose by the Government of Sikkim.
3. (1) In accordance with this agreement, the Assembly shall have power to propose laws and adopt resolutions for the welfare of the people of Sikkim on any of the matters enumerated herein below, namely :
 - i) Education
 - ii) Public Health
 - iii) Excise
 - iv) Press and publicity
 - v) Transport
 - vi) Bazars
 - vii) Forests
 - viii) Public Works
 - ix) Agriculture
 - x) Food suppliesand
 - xi) Economic and social planning, including state enterprises
 - xii) Home and Establishment
 - xiii) Finance
 - ivx) Land Revenue.

- (2) The Assembly shall not discuss or ask questions on the following :
- (a) The Chogyal and the Members of the Ruling Family;
 - (b) Any matter pending before the Court of Law;
 - (c) The appointment of the Chief Executive and members of the Judiciary; and
- (1) Any matter which concerns the responsibilities of the Government of India under this Agreement, or under any other Agreement between India and Sikkim.
4. There shall be an Executive Council consisting of elected members of the Assembly who shall be appointed to the Executive Council by the Chogyal on the advice of the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive will preside over the meetings of the Executive Council.
5. The system of elections shall be so organised as to make the Assembly adequately representative of the various sections of the population. The size and composition of the Assembly and of the Executive Council shall be such as may be prescribed from time to time, care being taken to ensure that no single section of the population acquires a dominating position due mainly to its ethnic origin, and that the rights and interests of the Sikkimese of Bhutia, Lepcha origin and of the Sikkimese of Nepali, which includes Tsong and Scheduled Caste, origin are fully protected.
6. The Chogyal shall perform the functions of his high office in accordance with the Constitution of Sikkim as set out in the Agreement.
7. To head and Administration in Sikkim there shall be a Chief Executive, who shall be appointed by the Chogyal on the nomination of the Government of India.
8. The Executive shall have all the powers necessary for the discharge of his functions and responsibilities; and shall exercise his powers as the following manner :

- (i) With respect to matters, allocated to a Member of the Executive Council, he shall act in consultation with the Member to whom administrative functions in this regard have been allocated.
- (ii) He shall submit all important matters to the Chogyal for his information and for his approval of the action proposed to be taken except where immediate action is required. In the latter case, he shall obtain the Chogyal/s approval as soon after the action has been taken as possible.
- (iii) He shall have a special responsibility to ensure the proper implementation of the Constitutional and administrative changes in Sikkim, the smooth and efficient running of its administration, the continued enjoyment of basic rights and fundamental freedom by all sections of the population of Sikkim and the optimum utilization for the benefit of the people of Sikkim of the funds allocated for the economic and social development of Sikkim.
- (iv) In cases involving amity between the various sections of the population of Sikkim, or the development of Democratic Government and efficient administration in Sikkim, any difference of opinion between him and the Chogyal shall be referred to the Political Officer in Sikkim, who shall obtain the advice of the Government of India, which shall be binding.

9. There shall be equality before the law in Sikkim. The Judiciary shall remain independent.

10. The palace establishment and the Sikkim Guards shall remain directly under the Chogyal.

11. The Government of India, who are solely responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim, and who are solely responsible for the conduct and regulation of the external relations of Sikkim, whether political, economic or financial, reaffirm their determination to

discharge these and their other responsibilities for the benefit of the people of Sikkim, for their communal harmony, good administration and economic and social development. It is hereby reaffirmed that they shall have the necessary powers for carrying out these responsibilities.

Done in triplicate at Gangtok on this Eighth day of May of the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Three, A.D.

Sd/- Kewal Singh
Foreign Secretary
Government of India

Sd/- Palden Thondup Namgyal
The Chogyal of Sikkim

Leaders of the Political Parties representing the people of Sikkim :

For Sikkim Janata Congress

Sd/- K. C. Pradhan

Sd/- B.B. Gurung

Sd/- S.K. Rai

Sd/- B.P. Dahal

Sd/- B. Kharel

For Sikkim National Congress

Sd/- K. Lhendup Dorji

Sd/- C.S. Rai

Sd/- C.B. Chettri

Sd/- N.K. Subedi

Sd/- D.N. Tiwari

For Sikkim National Party

Sd/- Netuk Tsering

Sd/-Man Bahadur Basnet

Sd/- Tasa Thungay

Sd/- Padam Kharel

Sd/- K. Wangdi

APPENDIX G: THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) BILL, 1974

Bill

further to amend the Constitution of India to give effect to the wishes of the people of Sikkim for strengthening Indo-Sikkim co-operation and inter-relationship.

Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-fifth Year of the Republic of India as follows:

1. (1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1974.
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the central Government may, by notification in the Official *gazette*, appoint
2. After article 2 of the Constitution, the following article shall be inserted, namely –
“2A Sikkim, which comprises the territories specified in the Tenth Schedule, shall be associated with the Union on the terms and conditions set out in that Schedule.”
3. In article 80 of the Constitution, in clause (1), for the words “The Council of States”, the words and figure “Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of the tenth Schedule, the Council of States” shall be substituted.
4. In article 81 of the Constitution, in clause (1), for the words and figures 'Subject to the provisions of article 331,' the words and figures “Subject to the provisions of article 331 and paragraph of 4 of the Tenth Schedule’ shall be substituted.
5. After the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, the following Schedule shall be added, namely –

APPENDIX H: THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975

Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975 which was enacted as the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

1. The Sikkim Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the 10th April, 1975 which, inter alia, noted the persistent harmful activities of the Chogyal which were aimed at undermining the responsible democratic Government set up under the provisions of the May 8 Agreement of 1973 and the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. The Resolution declared that the Assembly had satisfied itself that these activities of the Chogyal not only violated the objectives of the Agreement of May 8, 1973, but also ran counter to the wishes of the people of Sikkim and impeded their democratic development and participation in the political and economic life of India. Accordingly the Assembly solemnly declared and resolved that “The institution of the Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent unit of India, enjoying a democratic and fully responsible Government”.

2. The Assembly also resolved that this Resolution be submitted to the people of Sikkim forthwith for their approval. A special opinion poll conducted by the Government of Sikkim on the 14th April, 1975 resulted in a total of 59,637 votes in favour and 1,496 votes against the Resolution out of a total electorate of approximately 97,000.

3. The result of this poll was communicated to the Government of India by the Chief Minister of Sikkim on the 15th April, 1975. The Chief Minister on behalf of the Council of Ministers strongly requested the Government of India to make an immediate response and accept the above decision, taking, as has been requested in the Assembly Resolution of the 10th April, 1975, such measures as may be necessary and appropriate to implement the decision as early as possible.

4. The Chief Minister and other Ministers of Sikkim also visited New Delhi on the 16th-17th April, 1975 and urged the Government of India to take immediate action in this behalf.

5. Accordingly, it is proposed to include Sikkim as a full-fledged State in the First Schedule to the Constitution and to allot to Sikkim one seat in the Council of States and one seat in the House of the People. It is also proposed to insert a new article containing the provisions considered necessary to meet the special circumstances and needs of Sikkim.

6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.

NEW DELHI; Y. B. CHAVAN.

The 19th April, 1975.

THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975

[16th May, 1975.]

An Act further to amend the Constitution of India.

BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-

1. Short title and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975.

(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the date_668 on which the Bill for this Act [introduced in the House of the People as the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975], as passed by the House of the People, is passed by the Council of States.

2. Amendment of First Schedule.- In the First Schedule to the Constitution, under the heading "I. THE STATES", after entry 21, the following entry shall be inserted namely:-

“22. Sikkim The territories which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, were comprised in Sikkim.”.

3. Insertion of new article 371F.- After article 371E of the Constitution, the following article shall be inserted, namely:- “371F. Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim.-

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-

(a) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall consist of not less than thirty members;

(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-

(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;

(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to be the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and

(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;

(c) in the case of the Assembly deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim under clause (b), the references to the period of five years in clause (1) of article 172 shall be construed as references to a period of four years and the said period of four years shall be deemed to commence from the appointed day;

(d) until other provisions are made by Parliament by law, there shall be allotted to the State of Sikkim one seat in the House of the People and the State of Sikkim shall form one parliamentary constituency to be called the parliamentary constituency for Sikkim;

(e) the representative of the State of Sikkim in the House of the People in existence on the appointed day shall be elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;

(f) Parliament may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim make provision for the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim which may be filled by candidates belonging to such sections

and for the delimitation of the assembly constituencies from which candidates belonging to such sections alone may stand for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;

(g) the Governor of Sikkim shall have special responsibility for peace and for an equitable arrangement for ensuring the social and economic advancement of different sections of the population of Sikkim and in the discharge of his special responsibility under this clause, the Governor of Sikkim shall, subject to such directions as the President may, from time to time, deem fit to issue, act in his discretion;

(h) all property and assets (whether within or outside the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim) which immediately before the appointed day were vested in the Government of Sikkim or in any other authority or in any person for the purposes of the Government of Sikkim shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the Government of the State of Sikkim;

(i) the High Court functioning as such immediately before the appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be the High Court for the State of Sikkim;

(j) all courts of civil, criminal and revenue jurisdiction, all authorities and all officers, judicial, executive and ministerial, throughout the territory of the State of Sikkim shall continue on and from the appointed day to exercise their respective functions subject to the provisions of this Constitution;

(k) all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority;

(l) for the purpose of facilitating the application of any such law as is referred to in clause (k) in relation to the administration of the State of Sikkim and for the purpose of bringing the

provisions of any such law into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may, within two years from the appointed day, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon, every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law;

(m) neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute or other matter arising out of any treaty, agreement, engagement or other similar instrument relating to Sikkim which was entered into or executed before the appointed day and to which the Government of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party, but nothing in this clause shall be construed to derogate from the provisions of article 143;

(n) the President may, by public notification, extend with such restrictions or modifications as he thinks fit to the State of Sikkim any enactment which is in force in a State in India at the date of the notification;

(o) if any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by order, do anything (including any adaptation or modification of any other article) which appears to him to be necessary for the purpose of removing that difficulty: Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of two years from the appointed day;

(p) all things done and all actions taken in or in relation to the State of Sikkim or the territories comprised therein during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending immediately before the date on which the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, receives the assent of the President shall, in so far as they are in conformity with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, be

deemed for all purposes to have been validly done or taken under this Constitution as so amended.”.

4. Amendment of Fourth Schedule.-In the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, in the Table,-

(a) after entry 21, the following entry shall be inserted, namely:---

“22. Sikkim 1”;

(b) existing entries 22 to 25 shall be renumbered as entries 23 to 26 respectively;

(c) for the figures "231", the figures "232" shall be substituted.

5. Consequential amendments.-The following consequential amendments shall be made in the Constitution, namely:-

(a) article 2A shall be omitted;

(b) in article 80, in clause (1), the words and figure "Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule," shall be omitted;

(c) in article 81, in clause (1), the words and figure "and paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule" shall be omitted;

(d) the Tenth Schedule shall be omitted.

VITA

Deep Pal is a doctoral candidate in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). His research interests include International Relations, foreign policy, and regional security of South Asia. His doctoral dissertation examines the Sino-Indian relationship since the middle of the 20th century and the role of self-image in foreign policy. Prior to this, he worked for NBR, and at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has about a decade's experience as a journalist in India. He has a master's degree in International Affairs from The George Washington University. He can be reached on deep.pal@gmail.com.